Art. 22 of the Urban Planning Law annulled for excluding compensationArt. 22 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana anulado por excluir indemnización

06706 Unconstitutionality Action No. 219-P-89 Nombre74798 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.- San José, at fifteen hours twenty-one minutes on the twenty-first of December, nineteen hundred and ninety-three.- Unconstitutionality action filed by Nombre74798, of legal age, married, businessman, resident of Ciudad Quesada, ID #CED55378, against Article XV, subsection 3 of the Zoning Regulation (Reglamento de Zonificación) of Ciudad Quesada; Articles 15, 19, 22, and 29 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) #4240 of November 15, 1968, and the agreement of the Council of the Central Canton of San Carlos, adopted in Article 7 of the Session of August 8, 1989.-

WHEREAS:

1.- The purpose of the action is to have the following declared unconstitutional:

• a)Articles 15 and 19 of the Urban Planning Law, deemed contrary to Articles 9, 45, and 46 of the Political Constitution.- The plaintiff alleges that these norms, by granting Municipalities broad powers to plan and control urban development within the limits of their territory, violate the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley), and consequently the separation of powers, because they authorize the imposition of limitations on private property via "delegated regulation (reglamento delegado)," the existence of which is not possible in our legal system; and furthermore, because this avenue also authorizes councils to cancel municipal licenses when activities are not compatible with the conforming uses established for each zone of the City, a situation contrary to business freedom; b) Articles 22 and 29 of the same Law; the former insofar as it establishes the State's non-liability regarding limitations on property, and the latter, insofar as it empowers municipalities to close commercial or industrial establishments that operate without the corresponding use certificate, for not protecting the acquired rights of non-conforming uses at the time of its entry into force, contrary to the provisions of Article 34 of the Constitution;- c) Article XV, subsection 3 of the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) of Ciudad Quesada, which authorizes that Municipality to cancel non-conforming uses it considers unacceptable within the timeframe it sets, which implies the establishment of limitations on private property and business.

That in any case it is a delegated regulation that intervenes in matters reserved to formal law, and that it also does not respect the acquired rights of existing companies at the time of its entry into force, that are engaged in non-conforming uses within a specific zone of the regulatory plan (plan regulador); and finally, ch) article 7 of the session of August 8, 1989, of the Municipal Council of San Carlos.- 2.- The unconstitutionality of these norms was alleged within the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the cited agreement of the Municipal Council of San Carlos, before the Superior Court for Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Matters of San José.- 3.- The action was granted leave to proceed by resolution at 4:00 p.m. on November 22, 1989, and the legal notices were published in Judicial Bulletins #237, #238, and #239 of December 15, 18, and 19 of that year.- 4.- Licenciado Adrián Vargas Benavides, Attorney General of the Republic, responded to the hearing granted and requested that the action be dismissed in all its aspects.- In summary, he stated: A) That the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) has as its main objective the regulation of urbanism as an integral phenomenon encompassing the public and local interests of each Canton, and that the "regulatory plan (plan regulador)" is issued by each municipality by authority of Article 15 of the Law, which is consistent with Articles 19, 22, and 29—challenged here—and which are based on Article 169 of the Political Constitution; therefore, it is indeed possible to impose, by regulatory means, through the enactment of these "plans," urban planning charges for the benefit of the local community, without this implying a delegation to the municipalities of powers that constitutionally belong to another Branch of the Republic—in this case, the legislative power—, considering that "...if certainly Delegation is prohibited in our legal system, it is also true that if the Regulation has been authorized by the constituent power and by the legislator, it has ceased to be delegated and nothing prevents its issuance." (folio 23).- B) Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of the regulatory plans (planes reguladores), he indicates that these are merely limited to developing the constitutional and legal precepts by which municipalities were granted powers to administer local interests and services within their territorial jurisdiction, and therefore they contain no constitutional conflict.- For this same reason, and regarding the alleged violation of Article 34 of the Constitution, he stated that because these are measures aimed at the beautification of the city, the existence of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations cannot be alleged in this matter, since otherwise we would not be in the presence of a properly constitutional matter, but rather before the application of individual acts, which are precisely those that can be remedied through ordinary channels. In his opinion, there are no acquired urban planning rights, unless the construction work had already begun when the Law was enacted.- Thus, if the administered party considers itself affected by the charge imposed on its property, which he considers an "impossible thing to happen," it may well claim the alleged damage caused by non-contractual liability. C) Finally, regarding Article XV of the Zoning Regulation of Ciudad Quesada, he considered that it is also not unconstitutional, since the power granted to that municipality to cancel non-conforming uses it deems unacceptable within the period it sets, does not entail the power to impose limitations on the right of property, nor on free enterprise; and furthermore, because the establishment of prohibitions by virtue of the application of the Zoning regulation in each city or of higher local interests, does not violate the attributes of ownership and other freedoms inherent to individuals.- 5.- The oral hearing provided for in Article 85 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) was held on April 26, 1990.- 6.- The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.- This judgment is issued within the authorization conferred by Transitory Article II of the Law of this Jurisdiction.- Drafted by Judge Sancho González; and, CONSIDERING (CONSIDERANDO):

• A)LOCAL URBAN PLANNING (PLANIFICACION URBANA LOCAL).- I).- For the plaintiff, Articles 15 and 19 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) are contrary to Articles 9, 105, and 121 subsection 1) of the Constitution, as they grant unlimited powers to municipalities to interfere in matters reserved to formal law, such as the imposition of regulations on property rights and free enterprise.- The Attorney General of the Republic, for his part, considered that Article 169 of the Political Constitution fully empowers municipalities to plan the urban development of their locality and that it is, in any case, an authorization derived directly from its text, as a way of ensuring "local interests and services."- For this reason, it is the Chamber's criterion that it is necessary to specify the concept of the term "local," at least to determine whether the power of urban planning granted to municipalities within their territorial limits falls within it, or if, on the contrary, it exceeds it, in contravention of the constitutional articles invoked by the plaintiff.- Certainly, Article 169 does not define, nor does it provide sufficient elements of judgment to definitively extract what should be understood by "local interests and services," just as neither the Urban Planning Law nor the Municipal Code does so; it is in reality an indeterminate legal concept, such as those of "public order" or "good customs" to cite only those established in the Constitution itself (Article 28 paragraph 2) or, additionally, those of "fidelity," "natural use of things," "urgency," "public utility," "harmful conduct," "tranquility," etc.- The common denominator of all these concepts turns out to be the fact that the law does not resolve their content with exactness for their application in specific cases; and to unravel their exact content in those cases, it is necessary to resort—as the most qualified doctrine affirms—to criteria of value and experience, by whoever is responsible for applying it and, in the last instance, by the judge (See as reference Chamber judgment #1684-91 at 4:00 p.m. on August 28, 1991).- II).- The Chamber considers that the power attributed to local governments to plan urban development within the limits of their territory does integrate the constitutional concept of "local interests and services" referred to in Article 169 of the Constitution, a competence that was recognized by the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) (#4240 of November 15, 1968, amended by Laws #6575 of April 27, 1981, and #6595 of August 6 of that same year), specifically in Articles 15 and 19 challenged here, which literally state:

Article 15.- In accordance with the precept of Article 169 of the Political Constitution, the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development within the limits of their jurisdictional territory is recognized. Consequently, each one of them shall provide what is appropriate to implement a regulatory plan (plan regulador), and the related urban development regulations, in the areas where it must govern, without prejudice to extending all or some of its effects to other sectors, where qualified reasons exist to establish a specific control regime."- Article 19.- Each Municipality shall issue and promulgate the procedural rules necessary for the due observance of the regulatory plan (plan regulador) and for the protection of the interests of health, safety, comfort, and well-being of the community." III).- Within what can be called the administrative organization of urbanism in our country, the Directorate of Urbanism—attached to the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, INVU)—and the Office of Planning (today the Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy) are the bodies responsible for preparing the National Urban Development Plan, through which the general policies on the growth and development of urban areas are set.- Said Plan—which is specifically prepared by the Directorate and proposed by the Institute's Board of Directors—must include technical studies on the population factor with growth projections at the national, regional, and urban levels, on land use with plans on the extent and forms of utilization of portions required for urban development, industrial development, housing and urban renewal, public services, and the general location of transportation projects, among others.- Furthermore, the Directorate of Urbanism functions as an advisory body to the municipalities for the purpose of preparing, applying, and modifying the municipal or local Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) and its Regulations before their final adoption.- However, the foregoing must be understood as the formal limit of the broad guidelines, technical standards, or general directives according to which local governments must prepare their respective regulatory plans (planes reguladores) and the corresponding urban development regulations, as it is not possible to claim that the National Urban Development Plan be prepared and fully implemented by the Central Government, without the direct intervention of the municipalities in this matter.- Such a situation violates not only the most elementary principles of logic and convenience, given that these are the particular interests of each canton of the Republic, but also the constitutional principles of the municipal regime, established by our Fundamental Charter in Articles 168 to 175.- Urban planning, that is, the preparation and implementation of regulatory plans (planes reguladores), is a function inherent to the municipalities to the exclusion of any other public entity, except as stated regarding the general policy-making powers attributed to the Ministry of Planning and the Directorate of Urbanism.- This issue was already developed by the Chamber in judgment #5305-93 at 10:06 a.m. on October twenty-second of last year, which, regarding the municipal power to plan local urban development and the imposition of limitations on property by virtue of the execution of a regulatory plan (plan regulador), indicated:

"... the limitation on property imposed by a regulatory plan (plan regulador) is constitutionally possible, because the right of property is not unlimited; rather, there is a general framework within which the owner can act and which must be compatible with the constitutional content of that right. For the reasons stated, in the opinion of this Court, the limitation imposed, as long as it is adjusted to a current regulatory plan (plan regulador), does not violate, as suggested in the appeal, Article 45 of the Political Constitution, as long as that regulatory plan (plan regulador) does not de-constitutionalize the private property that is affected by that instrument. Sensu contrario, if the limitations exceed the minimum parameters of reasonableness and proportionality, they would be contrary to the Political Constitution."- IV).- Articles 15 and 19 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) are therefore not unconstitutional, since they are merely limited to recognizing the competence of municipalities to plan urban development within the limits of their territory through the corresponding regulations, which does not violate the constitutional principles invoked by the plaintiff: that of legislative reserve (reserva de ley), because being—as stated—local urban planning is a function inherent to the municipalities by virtue of the express text of the Constitution, and the limits of the exercise of that power being set in the Urban Planning Law, the Regulations or Regulatory Plans (Planes Reguladores) are the development of those principles; and those of property and free enterprise, because they in no way impose restrictions on those rights, but rather simply grant the power to control the correct use of land and thus guarantee a rational and harmonious development of urban centers as well as commercial, industrial, sports centers, etc. (see also in the same sense, judgments #2153-93 at 9:21 a.m. on May 21 and #5305-93 at 10:06 a.m. on October 22, both of this year).- B) UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 22 OF LAW #4240 V).- Article 22 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) is also challenged, which literally provides:

Article 22.- None of the limitations on property that this law establishes, as charges or easements (servidumbres) of the urban regime that they are, require registration in the Public Registry, nor shall they give rise to any compensation, except in those cases where this law expressly so provides."- This norm is openly unconstitutional, as it is contrary to Articles 9, 45, and 46 of the Political Constitution.- The exemption from liability it establishes inverts the terms in which the right of property and its limitations are conceived.- The Chamber considers that the limitations established by the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) are indeed compensable, of course to the extent of the severity or the extent of the injury; and this both when dealing with "impossible limitations" which are always compensable because they amount to an expropriation, and when in the presence of limitations where this circumstance does not concur.- In other terms, those that are possible are compensable, to the extent that lawful acts or the normal functioning of the Administration are; that is, to the extent that those permitted acts cause—as stated—a special injury in the form defined by Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration, that is, by the small number of affected parties or by the exceptional intensity of the injury (thus the Chamber ruled in judgment #6419-93 at 10:21 a.m. on the 3rd of this month).- To maintain that the limitations on property permitted by Article 45 of the Constitution are not compensable is equivalent to totally inverting the constitutional concepts on the right of property: what the Constitution does is make them possible exceptionally, because the rule is that they are not possible by virtue of the inviolability of property; but to go from there to affirm that because they are possible none is compensable is equivalent to violating all the principles not only of the right of property, but of equity and justice, among them the principle of equality before public charges, by virtue of which what interests the community in general must be borne by the community, compensating all its members, through the taxes they pay, to whoever suffers a prejudice both because of what positively interests the entire community and because of misfortunes, which must be passively borne by all.- By virtue of this same principle—equality before public charges—collective advantages or misfortunes that harm everyone in general are not compensable, but not because they are not compensable but because individualizing them is practically equivalent to leaving things as they are (for example, the case of taxes), since in those cases it is a general damage, and what exists then is a true compensation of debits and credits.- It must be clear that, as has already been established on previous occasions, not all urban planning charges are compensable, but only those that empty the content of the fundamental right in question, whether in its entirety or in one or some of its essential attributes, according to its nature: emptying the content of the right is not a reasonable limitation, but an absolute deprivation of it (see in this sense judgment #5097-93 at 10:24 a.m. on October 15 last).- VI).- Regarding the constitutional violations pointed out to Article 29 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), it must be indicated that if, as has already been established, it is possible to limit private property for reasons of social interest through the implementation and launching of regulatory plans (planes reguladores), without violating the constitutional principles inherent to the right of property, free enterprise, or legislative reserve (reserva de ley), it is also not contrary to these to require the corresponding use certificate from interested parties, for the purpose of granting licenses for commercial or industrial establishments, nor is the power granted to the corresponding municipality to order, in case of contravention of that requirement, the closure of the premises, without prejudice to the criminal liability incurred.- Said authorization must be understood, however, in the sense that commercial or industrial establishments that are operating normally at the time the Plan enters into force cannot be required to obtain the use certificate, because they have an acquired right to continue operating as they were before; that is, provided they are doing so in accordance with the Law, and not outside of it.- C) THE ZONING REGULATION OF SAN CARLOS VII).- Regarding Article XV subsection 3 of the Zoning Regulation of San Carlos and the possibility granted to that municipality to cancel at any time the non-conforming uses it considers unacceptable within the period it indicates, the Chamber considers that the principles set forth in the preceding Considering (Considerando) are applicable, given that, being a legitimate use of the land, which becomes "non-conforming" upon the entry into force of the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador), its holder has an acquired right to continue operating, if it meets all the requirements demanded by law; the Chamber considers that the Municipality is empowered to freeze the growth of the business or activity within the zone where the use is incompatible, and even to order its cancellation and compensate the injury caused, and if the distortion caused by the regulatory plan (plan regulador) is of such magnitude that it justifies it, then proceed to initiate expropriation proceedings.- Subsection 3) of Article XV challenged is not unconstitutional, as long as it is interpreted and applied in the sense that the power granted therein to the Municipality of San Carlos must be accompanied by the corresponding compensation, according to the severity of the injury.- VIII).- Finally, the Chamber declares the action improperly admitted, regarding the agreement of the Council of the Central Canton of San Carlos, adopted in article 7 of the Session of August 8, 1989, as these are acts of individual application of the Zoning Regulation; its conformity with the Law must be resolved, by virtue of the improper hierarchical appeal of the agreement, before the Superior Court for Contentious-Administrative Matters.- The foregoing, taking into account the substantive grounds set forth in this judgment.- THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The action is partially granted; and, consequently:

• A)Article 22 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) #4240 of November 15, 1968, and its amendments, is annulled as unconstitutional.- This judgment is declaratory and its effects are retroactive to the date of enactment of that norm, except for rights acquired in good faith, which in accordance with the provisions of Article 91 of the Law of this Jurisdiction, are the limitations imposed based on the norm that is annulled, before the publication of the first legal notice of this action.- B) The action is rejected outright insofar as it challenges the Agreement of the Council of the Central Canton of San Carlos, adopted in article 7 of the Session of August 8, 1989.- C) Article XV subsection 3 of the Zoning Regulation of San Carlos, published in La Gaceta on Thursday, April 29, 1982, is not unconstitutional, provided it is interpreted in the sense that the power attributed to the municipality to eliminate non-conforming uses with the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) that it considers unacceptable in the terms expressed therein, must be accompanied by the corresponding compensation, according to the severity of the injury.- CH) In all other respects, the action is dismissed.- Luis Paulino Mora M.

President Jorge E. Castro B. Luis Fernando Solano C.

Eduardo Sancho G. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

José Luis Molina Q. Hernando Arias G.

Francisco Mendoza B.

Acting Clerk Fabrizio.9418 Action of Unconstitutionality No. 219-P-89 Nombre74798 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.- San José, at fifteen hours twenty-one minutes on the twenty-first of December, nineteen ninety-three.- Action of unconstitutionality filed by Nombre74798, of legal age, married, businessman, resident of Ciudad Quesada, identity card #CED55378, against Article XV, subsection 3 of the Zoning Regulations (Reglamento de Zonificación) of Ciudad Quesada; Articles 15, 19, 22, and 29 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) #4240 of November 15, 1968, and the agreement of the Municipal Council (Concejo) of the Central Canton of San Carlos, adopted in Article 7 of the Session held on August 8, 1989.- WHEREAS (RESULTANDO):

1.- The action seeks a declaration that the following are unconstitutional:

• a)Articles 15 and 19 of the Urban Planning Law, on the grounds that they are contrary to Articles 9, 45, and 46 of the Political Constitution.- The plaintiff alleges that these norms, by granting broad powers to the Municipalities to plan and control urban development within the limits of their territory, violate the principle of legal reservation (reserva de ley), and consequently the principle of separation of powers, because they authorize the imposition of limitations on private property via a "delegated regulation" (reglamento delegado), the existence of which is not possible in our legal system; and furthermore, because by this same means the councils are also authorized to cancel municipal licenses (patentes) when the activities are not compatible with the conforming uses (usos conformes) established for each zone of the City, a situation contrary to freedom of enterprise; b) Articles 22 and 29 of the same Law; the former insofar as it establishes the non-liability of the State in matters of property limitations, and the latter, insofar as it empowers the municipalities to close commercial or industrial establishments that operate without the corresponding use certificate (certificado de uso), because it does not safeguard the acquired rights (derechos adquiridos) of non-conforming uses (usos no conformes) existing at the time of its entry into force, contrary to the provisions of Article 34 of the Constitution;- c) Article XV, subsection 3 of the Master Plan (Plan Regulador) of Ciudad Quesada, which authorizes that Municipality to cancel non-conforming uses it considers unacceptable within the timeframe it establishes itself, which implies the establishment of limitations on private property and on the freedom of enterprise. That in any case it constitutes a delegated regulation that intervenes in matters reserved for formal law, and that also does not respect the acquired rights of existing companies at the time of its entry into force, which are engaged in non-conforming uses within a specific zone of the master plan; and finally, ch) Article 7 of the session of August 8, 1989, of the Municipal Council of San Carlos.- 2.- The unconstitutionality of these norms was alleged within the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the plaintiff against the cited agreement of the Municipal Council of San Carlos, before the Superior Court for Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Matters of San José.- 3.- The action was admitted for processing by resolution at 16:00 hours on November 22, 1989, and the legal notices (edictos de ley) were published in Judicial Bulletins #237, #238, and #239 of December 15, 18, and 19 of that year.- 4.- Licenciado Adrián Vargas Benavides, Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), responded to the hearing granted and requested the action be dismissed in its entirety.- In summary, he stated: A) That the main objective of the Urban Planning Law is to regulate urbanism as an integral phenomenon encompassing the public and local interests of each Canton, and that the "master plan" is issued by each municipality by attribution of Article 15 of the Law, which concurs with Articles 19, 22, and 29 -challenged herein- and which are based on Article 169 of the Political Constitution; therefore, it is indeed possible to impose, via regulatory means, through the promulgation of these "plans," urban planning charges (cargas urbanísticas) for the benefit of the local community, and without this implying the delegation to the municipalities of powers that constitutionally belong to another Branch of the Republic -in this case, the legislative power-, considering that "...if delegation is certainly prohibited in our legal system, it is also true that if the Regulation has been authorized by the constituent power and by the legislator, it has ceased to be delegated and nothing prevents its issuance." (folio 23).- B) Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of the master plans, he indicates that these are merely limited to developing the constitutional and legal precepts through which the municipalities were granted powers to administer local interests and services within their territorial jurisdiction, and therefore they do not contain any constitutional conflict.- For this same reason, and regarding the alleged violation of Article 34 of the Constitution, he stated that because these are measures aimed at city beautification, the existence of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations cannot be claimed in this matter, as otherwise we would not be in the presence of a matter properly constitutional, but rather facing the application of acts of an individual nature, which are precisely those that can be remedied through ordinary channels. In his opinion, there are no acquired urban planning rights, unless at the time the Law was enacted, the construction had already begun.- Thus, if the administered party considers itself affected by the charge imposed on its property, which he considers "an impossible thing to happen," it may well claim the alleged damage caused through non-contractual liability. C) Finally, regarding Article XV of the Zoning Regulations of Ciudad Quesada, he considered that it is also not unconstitutional, since the power granted to that municipality to cancel non-conforming uses it deems unacceptable within the timeframe it sets does not entail imposing limitations on the right to property, nor on private enterprise; and additionally, because the establishment of prohibitions by virtue of the application of the Zoning regulations in each city or superior local interests does not violate the attributes of ownership and other inherent freedoms of individuals.- 5.- The oral hearing provided for in Article 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction was held on April 26, 1990.- 6.- The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.- This judgment is rendered within the authorization conferred by Transitory Article II of the Law of this Jurisdiction.- Drafted by Magistrate Sancho González; and, WHEREAS (CONSIDERANDO):
• A)LOCAL URBAN PLANNING.- I).- For the plaintiff, Articles 15 and 19 of the Urban Planning Law are contrary to constitutional Articles 9, 105, and 121, subsection 1), because they grant unlimited powers to the municipalities to interfere in matters reserved for formal law (ley formal), such as the imposition of regulations on property rights and free enterprise.- The Attorney General of the Republic, for his part, considered that Article 169 of the Political Constitution fully empowers the municipalities to plan the urban development of their locality and that it is, in any case, an authorization derived directly from its text, as a means of ensuring "local interests and services" (intereses y servicios locales).- For this reason, it is the Chamber's criterion that it is necessary to define the concept of the term "local," at least to determine if the power of urban planning granted to the municipalities within their territorial limits fits within it, or if, on the contrary, it exceeds it, in contravention of the constitutional articles invoked by the actor.- Certainly, Article 169 does not define, nor does it provide greater elements of judgment to definitively extract what should be understood by "local interests and services," just as the Urban Planning Law or the Municipal Code does not do so either; it is in reality an indeterminate legal concept, like those of "public order" or "good customs" to cite only those established in the Constitution itself (Article 28, paragraph 2) or in addition, those of "fidelity," "natural use of things," "urgency," "public utility," "harmful conduct," "tranquility," etc.- The common denominator of all these concepts turns out to be the fact that the law does not precisely resolve their content for application in specific cases; and to unravel their exact content in those cases it is necessary to resort -as the most qualified doctrine affirms- to criteria of value and experience, on the part of whomever must apply it and ultimately the judge (See as reference judgment #1684-91 of this Chamber at 16:00 hours on August 28, 1991).- II).- The Chamber considers that the power attributed to local governments to plan urban development within the limits of their territory does indeed form part of the constitutional concept of "local interests and services" referred to in Article 169 of the Constitution, a competence that was recognized by the Urban Planning Law (#4240 of November 15, 1968, amended by Laws #6575 of April 27, 1981, and #6595 of August 6 of the same year), specifically in Articles 15 and 19 challenged herein, which literally establish:

Article 15.- Pursuant to the precept of Article 169 of the Political Constitution, the competence and authority of municipal governments to plan and control urban development, within the limits of their jurisdictional territory, is recognized. Consequently, each one of them shall provide whatever is appropriate to implement a master plan (plan regulador), and the related urban development regulations (reglamentos de desarrollo urbano), in the areas where it must govern, without prejudice to extending all or some of its effects to other sectors, where qualified reasons exist to establish a specific control regime.»- Article 19.- Each Municipality shall issue and promulgate the necessary procedural rules for the due observance of the master plan and for the protection of the interests of health, safety, comfort, and well-being of the community.» III).- Within what can be called the administrative organization of urbanism in our country, the Urbanism Directorate (Dirección de Urbanismo) -attached to the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo)- and the Planning Office (now the Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy) are the bodies responsible for preparing the National Urban Development Plan, through which the general policies on the growth and development of urban areas are established.- Said Plan -which is specifically prepared by the Directorate and proposed by the Institute's Board of Directors- must include technical studies on the population factor with growth projections at the national, regional, and urban levels, on land use with plans on the extension and forms of utilization of the portions required for urban development, industrial development, housing and urban renewal, public services, and the general location of transportation projects, among others.- Furthermore, the Urbanism Directorate functions as an advisory body to the municipalities for the purposes of preparing, applying, and modifying the municipal or local Master Plan and its Regulations before their final adoption.- However, the foregoing must be understood as the formal limit of the broad guidelines, technical standards, or general directives according to which local governments must prepare their respective master plans and the corresponding urban development regulations, since it is not possible to claim that the National Urban Development Plan be fully prepared and implemented by the Central Government, without the direct intervention of the municipalities in this matter.- Such a situation violates not only the most elementary principles of logic and convenience, given that it concerns the particular interests of each canton of the Republic, but also the constitutional principles of the municipal regime, established by our Fundamental Charter in Articles 168 to 175.- Urban planning, be it the preparation and implementation of master plans, is an inherent function of the municipalities to the exclusion of all other public entities, except as stated regarding the general directive powers attributed to the Ministry of Planning and the Urbanism Directorate.- This topic was already developed by the Chamber in judgment #5305-93 at 10:06 hours on October twenty-second of last year, which, regarding the municipal power to plan local urban development and the imposition of limitations on property by virtue of the execution of a master plan, stated:

"... the limitation on property imposed by a master plan is constitutionally possible, because the right to property is not unlimited; rather, there is a general framework within which the owner can act and which must be compatible with the constitutional content of that right. For the reasons stated, in the opinion of this Court, the imposed limitation, insofar as it conforms to a valid master plan, does not violate, as suggested in the appeal, Article 45 of the Political Constitution, as long as that master plan does not deconstitutionalize the private property affected by that instrument. A contrario sensu, if the limitations exceed the minimum parameters of reasonableness and proportionality, they would be contrary to the Political Constitution." .- IV).- Articles 15 and 19 of the Urban Planning Law are therefore not unconstitutional, since they are merely limited to recognizing the competence of the municipalities to plan urban development within the limits of their territory through the corresponding regulations, which does not violate the constitutional principles invoked by the plaintiff: the principle of legal reservation (reserva de ley), because local urban planning being -as stated- an inherent function of the municipalities by virtue of express text of the Constitution, and the limits of the exercise of that attribution being set in the Urban Planning Law, the Regulations or Master Plans are a development of those principles; and those of property and free enterprise, because they do not in any way impose restrictions on those rights, but rather simply grant the power to control the correct use of land and thus guarantee a rational and harmonious development of urban centers as well as commercial, industrial, sports centers, etc. (see also in the same sense, judgments #2153-93 at 9:21 hours on May 21 and #5305-93 at 10:06 hours on October 22, both of this year).- B) UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 22 OF LAW #4240 V).- Article 22 of the Urban Planning Law is also challenged, which literally provides:

Article 22.- None of the limitations on property that this law establishes, as charges or easements (servidumbres) of the urban regime that they are, require registration in the Public Registry, nor will they give rise to any compensation (indemnización), except in those cases where this law expressly provides for it.» .- This norm is openly unconstitutional, as it is contrary to Articles 9, 45, and 46 of the Political Constitution.- The exemption from liability it establishes inverts the terms in which the right to property and its limitations are conceived.- The Chamber considers that the limitations established by the Urban Planning Law are indeed compensable, dependent of course on the severity or extent of the injury; and this applies both when dealing with "impossible limitations," which always are so because they equate to an expropriation, and when in the presence of limitations where this circumstance does not occur.- In other terms, those that are possible are compensable, to the extent that lawful acts or the normal functioning of the Administration are compensable; that is, to the extent that these permitted acts cause -as stated- a special injury in the manner defined by Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), be it due to the small number of those affected or the exceptional intensity of the injury (thus ruled this Chamber in judgment #6419-93 at 10:21 hours on the 3rd of this month).- To maintain that the limitations on property permitted by Article 45 of the Constitution are not compensable is equivalent to totally inverting the constitutional concepts regarding the right to property: what the Constitution does is to make them possible exceptionally, because the rule is that they are not permissible by virtue of the inviolability of property; but from there to affirm that because they are possible, none is compensable, is equivalent to violating all the principles, not only of the right to property, but of equity and justice, among them the principle of equality before public burdens (igualdad ante las cargas públicas), by virtue of which what interests the community in general must be borne by the community, compensating all its members, through the taxes they pay, to whomever suffers an injury, both due to what positively interests the entire community as well as due to the misfortunes that must be passively borne by all.- By virtue of this same principle -equality before public burdens- collective advantages or misfortunes that harm everyone in general are not compensable, but not because they are not so, but because individualizing them is practically equivalent to leaving things as they are (for example, the case of taxes), since in those cases it involves a general damage, and what exists then is a true compensation of debits and credits.- It must be clear that, as has already been established on previous occasions, not all urban planning charges are compensable, but only those that empty the content of the fundamental right in question, either in its totality or in one or some of its essential attributes, according to its nature: emptying the content of the right is not a reasonable limitation, but an absolute deprivation thereof (see in this sense judgment #5097-93 at 10:24 hours on October 15 of last year).- VI).- Regarding the constitutional violations pointed out concerning Article 29 of the Urban Planning Law, it must be indicated that if, as already established, it is possible to limit private property for reasons of social interest through the implementation and startup of master plans, without violating the constitutional principles inherent to the right to property, free enterprise, or legal reservation, it is also not contrary to these to require the corresponding use certificate from the interested parties, for the purposes of granting licenses for commercial or industrial establishments, nor is the power granted to the corresponding municipality to order, in case of contravention of that requirement, the closure of the premises, without prejudice to any criminal liability incurred.- Said authorization must be understood, however, in the sense that commercial or industrial establishments operating normally at the time the Plan enters into force cannot be required to obtain the use certificate, because they have an acquired right to continue operating as they were before; that is, provided they were operating in accordance with the Law, and not outside it.- C) THE ZONING REGULATIONS OF SAN CARLOS VII).- Regarding Article XV, subsection 3 of the Zoning Regulations of San Carlos and the possibility granted to that municipality to cancel at any time the non-conforming uses it considers unacceptable within the timeframe it indicates, the Chamber considers that the principles set forth in the preceding Considering are applicable, since because it concerns a legitimate use of the land, which becomes "non-conforming" upon the entry into force of the Master Plan, its holder has an acquired right to continue operating, if it meets all the requirements demanded by law; the Chamber considers that the Municipality is indeed empowered to freeze the growth of the business or activity within the zone where the use is incompatible, and even to order its cancellation and compensate the injury caused, and if the distortion caused by the master plan is of such magnitude that it justifies it, then to proceed to initiate expropriation (expropiación) proceedings.- Subsection 3) of Article XV challenged is not unconstitutional, insofar as it is interpreted and applied in the sense that the power therein granted to the Municipality of San Carlos must be accompanied by the corresponding compensation (indemnización), according to the severity of the injury.- VIII).- Finally, the Chamber declares the action wrongly admitted, regarding the agreement of the Municipal Council of the Central Canton of San Carlos, adopted in Article 7 of the Session of August 8, 1989, because these are acts of individual application of the Zoning Regulations; its conformity with the Law must be resolved, by virtue of the improper hierarchical appeal (recurso jerárquico impropio) against the agreement, before the Superior Court for Contentious-Administrative Matters.- The foregoing, taking into account the substantive grounds set forth in this judgment.- THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The action is partially granted; and, consequently:

• A)Article 22 of the Urban Planning Law #4240 of November 15, 1968, and its amendments, is annulled as unconstitutional.- This judgment is declaratory and its effects are retroactive to the date of promulgation of that norm, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, which, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91 of the Law of this Jurisdiction, are the limitations imposed based on the annulled norm, before the publication of the first notice (edicto) of this action.- B) The action is rejected outright insofar as it challenges the Agreement of the Municipal Council of the Central Canton of San Carlos, adopted in Article 7 of the Session of August 8, 1989.- C) Article XV, subsection 3 of the Zoning Regulations of San Carlos, published in La Gaceta of Thursday, April 29, 1982, is not unconstitutional, provided it is interpreted in the sense that the power attributed to the municipality to eliminate non-conforming uses with the Master Plan that it considers unacceptable, in the terms expressed therein, must be accompanied by the corresponding compensation (indemnización), according to the severity of the injury.- CH) In all other respects, the action is denied.- Luis Paulino Mora M.

President Jorge E. Castro B. Luis Fernando Solano C.

Eduardo Sancho G. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

José Luis Molina Q. Hernando Arias G.

Francisco Mendoza B.

Acting Secretary (Secretario a.i.)

Fabrizio.9418

06706 Acción de Inconstitucionalidad N° 219-P-89 Nombre74798 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.- San José, a las quince horas veintiún minutos del veintiuno de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres.- Acción de inconstitucionalidad de Nombre74798 , mayor, casado, empresario, vecino de Ciudad Quesada, cédula #CED55378, contra el artículo XV inciso 3 del Reglamento de Zonificación de Ciudad Quesada; los artículos 15, 19, 22 y 29 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana #4240 del 15 de noviembre de 1968, y el acuerdo del Concejo del Cantón Central de San Carlos, tomado en el artículo 7 de la Sesión del 8 de agosto de 1989.-

RESULTANDO:

1.- La acción tiene por objeto que se declaren inconstitucionales:

• a)Los artículos 15 y 19 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, por estimarlos contrarios a los artículos 9, 45 y 46 de la Constitución Política.- Alega el accionante que dichas normas, al otorgar a las Municipalidades amplias facultades para planificar y controlar el desarrollo urbano dentro de los límites de su territorio, violan el principio de reserva de ley, y consecuentemente el de separación de poderes, pues autorizan la imposición de limitaciones a la propiedad privada vía "reglamento delegado", cuya existencia no es posible en nuestro ordenamiento; y además, porque también por esa vía se autoriza a los concejos a cancelar las patentes municipales cuando las actividades no sean compatibles con los usos conformes establecidos para cada zona de la Ciudad, situación contraria a la libertad empresarial; b) los artículos 22 y 29 de la misma Ley; el primero en cuanto establece la irresponsabilidad del Estado en materia de limitaciones a la propiedad, y el segundo, en cuanto faculta a las municipalidades a clausurar los establecimientos comerciales o industriales que funcionen sin el certificado de uso correspondiente, por no dejar a salvo los derechos adquiridos de los usos no conformes al momento de su entrada en vigencia, contra lo dispuesto en el artículo 34 de la Constitución;- c) el artículo XV inciso 3 del Plan Regulador de Ciudad Quesada que autoriza a esa Municipalidad para cancelar los usos no conformes que considere inaceptables en el plazo que ella misma fije, lo que implica el establecimiento de limitaciones a la propiedad privada y a la empresarial. Que se trata en todo caso de un reglamento delegado que interviene en materias reservadas a la ley formal, y que tampoco respeta los derechos adquiridos de las empresas existentes al momento de su entrada en vigencia, que se dediquen a usos no conformes dentro de una determinada zona del plan regulador; y finalmente, ch) el artículo 7 de la sesión del 8 de agosto de 1989 del Concejo Municipal de San Carlos.- 2.- La inconstitucionalidad de esas normas se alegó dentro del recurso de apelación planteado por el accionante contra el citado acuerdo del Concejo Municipal de San Carlos, ante el Tribunal Superior de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda de San José.- 3.- A la acción se le dió curso por resolución de las 16:00 horas del 22 de noviembre de 1989 y los edictos de ley se publicaron en los Boletines Judiciales #237, #238 y #239 de 15, 18 y 19 de diciembre de ese año.- 4.- El Licenciado Adrián Vargas Benavides, Procurador General de la República, evacuó la audiencia conferida y solicitó desestimar en todos sus extremos la acción.- En síntesis manifestó: A) Que la Ley de Planificación Urbana tiene como objetivo principal regular el urbanismo como fenómeno integral que abarque los intereses públicos y locales de cada Cantón y que el "plan regulador" lo emite cada municipalidad por atribución del artículo 15 de la Ley, que concuerda con los artículos 19, 22 y 29 -aquí impugnados- y que tienen como base el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política; por lo que sí resulta posible imponer vía reglamentaria, mediante la promulgación de esos "planes", cargas urbanísticas en beneficio de la colectividad local, y sin que ello implique delegar en las municipalidades potestades que corresponden constitucionalmente a otro Poder de la República -en el presente caso, la potestad legislativa-, al estimar que "...si ciertamente la Delegación está prohibida en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, también lo es que si el Reglamento ha sido autorizado por el constituyente y por el legislador, ya dejó de ser delegado y nada impide que se dicte." (folio 23).- B) En cuanto a la supuesta inconstitucionalidad de los planes reguladores, indica que éstos únicamente se limitan a desarrollar los preceptos constitucionales y legales por los que se otorgó a las municipalidades atribuciones para administrar los intereses y servicios locales dentro de su jurisdicción territorial, por lo que no contienen ningún roce constitucional.- Por esa misma razón, y en lo referente a la alegada violación del artículo 34 de la Constitución, manifestó que por tratarse de medidas tendientes al embellecimiento de la ciudad no puede alegarse en esta materia la existencia de derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, pues en caso contrario no estaríamos en presencia de materia propiamente constitucional, sino ante la aplicación de actos de carácter individual que precisamente son los que pueden ser reparados por la vía ordinaria. En su criterio, no hay derechos urbanísticos adquiridos, a menos de que cuando se dictó la Ley, ya la obra se hubiere iniciado.- De esta forma, si el administrado se considera afectado por la carga impuesta sobre su propiedad, lo que considera una "cosa imposible de suceder", bien puede éste reclamar el supuesto daño que por responsabilidad extracontractual se produjo. C) Finalmente, en lo referente al artículo XV del Reglamento de Zonificación de Ciudad Quesada, consideró que tampoco es inconstitucional, por cuanto la facultad otorgada a ese municipio para cancelar los usos no conformes que estime inaceptables en el plazo que fije, no acarrea la de imponer limitaciones al derecho de propiedad, ni a la libre empresa; y además, porque el establecimiento de prohibiciones en virtud de la aplicación del reglamento de Zonificación en cada ciudad o de intereses superiores locales, no atenta contra los atributos del dominio y demás libertades inherentes a los individuos.- 5.- La audiencia oral prevista en el artículo 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se celebró el 26 de abril de 1990.- 6.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de ley.- Esta sentencia se dicta dentro de la autorización conferida por el artículo Transitorio II de la Ley de esta Jurisdicción.- Redacta el Magistrado Sancho González; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

• A)LA PLANIFICACION URBANA LOCAL.- I).- Para el accionante los artículos 15 y 19 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana son contrarios a los artículos 9, 105 y 121 inciso 1) constitucionales, pues otorgan potestades ilimitadas a las municipalidades para interferir en materia reservada a la ley formal, como es la imposición de regulaciones a los derechos de propiedad y de libre empresa.- El Procurador General de la República, por su parte, estimó que el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política faculta plenamente a las municipalidades para planificar el desarrollo urbano de su localidad y que se trata en todo caso de una autorización derivada directamente de su texto, como una forma de velar por los "intereses y servicios locales".- Por esta razón es criterio de la Sala que resulta necesario concretar el concepto del término "local", al menos para determinar si la potestad de planificación urbana otorgada a los muncicipios dentro de sus límites territoriales, encuadra dentro de éste, o si por el contrario lo excede, en contravención de los artículos constitucionales invocados por el actor.- Ciertamente, el artículo 169 no define, ni da mayores elementos de juicio como para extraer en forma definitiva lo que debe entenderse por "intereses y servicios locales", como tampoco lo hace la Ley de Planificación Urbana o el Código Municipal; se trata en realidad de un concepto jurídico indeterminado, tal como los de "orden público" o "buenas costumbres" para citar sólo los establecidos en la propia Constitución (artículo 28 párrafo 2) o además, los de "fidelidad", "uso natural de las cosas", "urgencia", "utilidad pública", "conducta nociva", "tranquilidad", etc.- El común denominador de todos estos conceptos resulta ser el hecho de que la ley no resuelve con exactitud su contenido para su aplicación en casos concretos; y para desentrañar su contenido exacto en esos casos resulta necesario acudir -como lo afirma la más calificada doctrina- a criterios de valor y experiencia, por parte de quien corresponda aplicarlo y en última instancia del juez (Véase como referencia la sentencia de esta Sala #1684-91 de las 16:00 horas del 28 de agosto de 1991).- II).- La Sala estima que la potestad atribuida a los gobiernos locales para planificar el desarrollo urbano dentro de los límites de su territorio sí integra el concepto constitucional de "intereses y servicios locales" a que hace referencia el artículo 169 de la Constitución, competencia que fue reconocida por la Ley de Planificación Urbana (#4240 del 15 de noviembre de 1968, reformada por Leyes #6575 de 27 de abril de 1981 y #6595 de 6 de agosto de ese mismo año), específicamente en los artículos 15 y 19 aquí impugnados, que literalmente establecen:

Artículo 15.- Conforme al precepto del artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, reconócese la competencia y autoridad de los gobiernos municipales para planificar y controlar el desarrollo urbano, dentro de los límites de su territorio jurisdiccional. Consecuentemente, cada uno de ellos dispondrá lo que proceda para implantar un plan regulador, y los reglamentos de desarrollo urbano conexos, en las áreas donde deba regir, sin perjuicio de extender todos o algunos de sus efectos a otros sectores, en que priven razones calificadas para establecer un determinado régimen contralor.».- Artículo 19.- Cada Municipalidad emitirá y promulgará las reglas procesales necesarias para el debido acatamiento del plan regulador y para la protección de los intereses de la salud, seguridad, comodidad y bienestar de la comunidad.» III).- Dentro de lo que puede denominarse la organización administrativa del urbanismo en nuestro país, la Dirección de Urbanismo -adscrita al Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo-y la Oficina de Planificación (hoy día Ministerio de Planificación y Política Económica) son los órganos encargados de elaborar el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano, a través del cual, se fijan las políticas generales sobre el crecimiento y desarrollo de las áreas urbanas.- Dicho Plan -que concretamente es elaborado por la Dirección y propuesto por la Junta Directiva del Instituto- debe incluir estudios técnicos sobre el factor de población con proyecciones de crecimiento a nivel nacional, regional y urbano, sobre el uso de la tierra con planes sobre la extensión y formas de aprovechamiento de las porciones requeridas para desarrollo urbano, el desarrollo industrial, vivienda y renovación urbana, servicios públicos y ubicación en general de los proyectos sobre transportes, entre otros.- Además, la Dirección de Urbanismo funciona como órgano asesor de las municipalidades a los efectos de preparar, aplicar y modificar el Plan Regulador municipal o local y sus Reglamentos antes de su adopción definitiva.- Sin embargo, lo expuesto debe entenderse como el límite formal de los grandes lineamientos, normas técnicas o directrices generales conforme a las cuales deben los gobiernos locales elaborar sus respectivos planes reguladores y los reglamentos de desarrollo urbano correspondientes, pues no es posible pretender que el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano se elabore y ponga en práctica íntegramente por el Gobierno Central, sin la intervención directa de las municipalidades en esa materia.- Tal situación atenta no sólo contra los más elementales principios de la lógica y la conveniencia, habida cuenta de que se trata de los intereses particulares de cada cantón de la República, sino también contra los principios constitucionales del régimen municipal, establecido por nuestra Carta Fundamental en los artículos 168 a 175.- La planificación urbana, sea la elaboración y puesta en marcha de los planes reguladores, es una función inherente a las municipalidades con exlusión de todo otro ente público, salvo lo dicho en cuanto a las potestades de dirección general atribuidas al Ministerio de Planificación y a la Dirección de Urbanismo.- Este tema ya fue desarrollado por la Sala en la sentencia #5305-93 de las 10:06 horas del veintidós de octubre pasado, que en lo referente a la potestad municipal para planificar el desarrollo urbano local y la imposición de limitaciones a la propiedad en virtud de la ejecución de un plan regulador indicó:

"... la limitación a la propiedad impuesta por un plan regulador es constitucionalmente posible, debido a que el derecho de propiedad no es ilimitado, antes bien, existe un marco general dentro del que puede actuar el propietario y que debe ser compatible con el contenido constitucional de ese derecho. Por lo expresado, a juicio de este Tribunal, la limitación impuesta, en tanto ajustada a un plan regulador vigente, no violenta como se sugiere en el recurso el artículo 45 de la Constitución Política, en tanto ese plan regulador no desconstitucionalice la propiedad privada que se vea afectada por ese instrumento. A contrario sensu, si las limitaciones exceden los parámetros mínimos de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, resultarían contrarias a la Constitución Política.".- IV).- Los artículos 15 y 19 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana por tanto no son inconstitucionales, ya que únicamente se limitan a reconocer la competencia de las municipalidades para planificar el desarrollo urbano dentro de los límites de su territorio mediante los reglamentos correspondientes, lo que no violenta los principios constitucionales invocados por el accionante: el de reserva de ley, pues siendo -como se dijo- la planificación urbana local es una función inherente a las municipalidades en virtud de texto expreso de la Constitución, y estando fijados los límites del ejercicio de esa atribución en la Ley de Planificación Urbana, los Reglamentos o Planes Reguladores son desarrollo de esos principios; y los de propiedad y libre empresa, por cuanto no imponen en forma alguna restricciones a esos derechos, sino que simplemente otorgan la potestad de controlar la correcta utilización de los suelos y garantizar así un desarrollo racional y armónico tanto de los centros urbanos como de los comerciales, industriales, deportivos, etc. (ver además en el mismo sentido, las sentencias #2153-93 de las 9:21 horas del 21 de mayo y #5305-93 de las 10:06 horas del 22 de octubre, ambas de este año).- B) INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL ARTICULO 22 DE LA LEY #4240 V).- Se impugna también el artículo 22 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, que a la letra dispone:

Artículo 22.- Ninguna de las limitaciones a la propiedad que esta ley establece, como cargas o servidumbres del régimen urbano que son, precisan de inscripción en el Registro Público, ni darán lugar a indemnización alguna, excepto en aquellos casos en que expresamente lo disponga esta ley.».- Esta norma es abiertamente inconstitucional, por ser contrario a los artículos 9, 45 y 46 de la Constitución Política.- La eximente de responsabilidad que establece invierte los términos en que está concebido el derecho de propiedad y sus limitaciones.- La Sala estima que las limitaciones que establece la Ley de Planificación Urbana sí son indemnizables, claro está en la medida de la gravedad o la extensión de la lesión; y esto tanto cuando se trate de "limitaciones imposibles" que siempre lo son porque equivalen a una expropiación, como cuando se esté en presencia de limitaciones en que no concurre esta circunstancia.- En otros términos, las que son posibles son indemnizables, en la medida en que lo son los actos lícitos o el funcionamiento normal de la Administración; es decir, en la medida en que esos actos permitidos causen -como se dijo- una lesión especial en la forma en que los tiene definidos el artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, sea por el pequeño número de afectados o por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión (así se pronunció esta Sala en la sentencia #6419-93 de las 10:21 horas del 3 de este mes).- Sostener que las limitaciones a la propiedad permitidas por el artículo 45 de la Constitución no son indemnizables, equivale a invertir totalmente los conceptos constitucionales sobre el derecho de propiedad: lo que la Constitución hace es hacerlas posibles excepcionalmente, porque la regla es que no lo son en virtud de la inviolabilidad de la propiedad; pero de ahí a afirmar que por ser posibles ninguna es indemnizable equivale a violar todos los principios ya no sólo del derecho de propiedad, sino de la equidad y la justicia, entre ellos el principio de igualdad ante las cargas públicas, en virtud del cual lo que interesa a la comunidad en general es la comunidad quien debe soportarlo, indemnizando todos los miembros de ésta, a través de los impuestos que pagan, a quien sufra un perjuicio tanto por causa de lo que interesa a toda la comunidad positivamente como de los infortunios, que pasivamente deben ser soportados por todos.- En virtud de este mismo principio -igualdad ante las cargas públicas- las ventajas colectivas o los infortunios que perjudican a todos en general no son indemnizables, pero no porque no lo sean sino porque individualizarlas equivale prácticamente a dejar las cosas como están (verbigracia, el caso de los impuestos), ya que en esos casos se trata de un daño general, y lo que hay es entonces una verdadera compensación de débitos y créditos.- Debe quedar claro que, como ya se ha establecido en anteriores oportunidades, no todas las cargas urbanísticas son indemnizables, sino solamente aquellas que vacien el contenido del derecho fundamental de que se trate, sea en su totalidad o en alguno o algunos de sus atributos esenciales, de acuerdo a su naturaleza: vaciar el contenido del derecho no es una limitación razonable, sino una privación absoluta de éste (ver en este sentido la sentencia #5097-93 de las 10:24 horas del 15 de octubre pasado).- VI).- En cuanto a las violaciones constitucionales apuntadas al artículo 29 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, debe indicarse que si, como ya se estableció, es posible limitar la propiedad privada por motivos de interés social mediante la implantación y puesta en marcha de planes reguladores, sin violar los principios constitucionales inherentes al derecho de propiedad, libre empresa o al de reserva de ley, tampoco es contrario a éstos, exigir el certificado de uso correspondiente a los interesados, a los efectos de conceder patentes para establecimientos comerciales o industriales, como tampoco la potestad otorgada a la municipalidad correspondiente para ordenar, en caso de contravención de ese requisito, la clausura del local, sin perjuicio de la responsabilidad penal en que se incurra.- Dicha autorización debe entenderse sin embargo, en el sentido de que a los establecimientos comerciales o industriales que funcionen normalmente al momento de entrada en vigencia del Plan, no se les puede imponer el certificado de uso, porque tienen un derecho adquirido a seguir funcionando como lo estaban antes; eso sí, siempre y cuando lo estén de acuerdo a la Ley, y no al margen de ella.- C) EL REGLAMENTO DE ZONIFICACION DE SAN CARLOS VII).- En lo referente al artículo XV inciso 3 del Reglamento de Zonificación de San Carlos y la posibilidad otorgada a ese municipio para cancelar en cualquier momento los usos no conformes que considere inaceptables en el plazo que ella indique, la Sala estima que le son aplicables los principios expuestos en el Considerando anterior, dado que por tratarse de un uso legítimo de la tierra, que se torna "no conforme" al entrar en vigencia el Plan Regulador, su titular tiene un derecho adquirido a seguir funcionando, si cumple con todos los requisitos exigidos por ley; la Sala considera que la Municipalidad sí está facultada para congelar el crecimiento del negocio o la actividad dentro de la zona en que el uso resulta incompatible, e incluso para ordenar su cancelación e indemnizar la lesión causada, y si la distorsión que hace el plan regulador es de tal magnitud que lo justifica, proceder entonces a iniciar las diligencias de expropiación.- El inciso 3) del artículo XV impugnado no es inconstitucional, en tanto se interprete y aplique en el sentido de que la potestad allí otorgada a la Municipalidad de San Carlos, debe ir acompañada de la indemnización correspondiente, de acuerdo a la gravedad de la lesión.- VIII).- Finalmente, la Sala declara mal admitida la acción, en lo referente al acuerdo del Concejo del Cantón Central de San Carlos, tomado en el artículo 7 de la Sesión del 8 de agosto de 1989, por tratarse de los actos de aplicación individual del Reglamento de Zonificación; su conformidad con el Ordenamiento deberá resolverse, en virtud del recurso jerárquico impropio de apelación del acuerdo, ante el Tribunal Superior de lo Contencioso Administrativo.- Lo anterior, atendiendo los fundamentos de fondo expuestos en esta sentencia.-

POR TANTO:

Se declara parcialmente con lugar la acción; y, en consecuencia:

• A)Se anula por inconstitucional el artículo 22 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana #4240 de 15 de noviembre de 1968 y sus reformas.- Esta sentencia es declarativa y sus efectos retroactivos a la fecha de promulgación de esa norma, salvo los derechos adquiridos de buena fe, que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo en el artículo 91 de la Ley de esta Jurisdicción, son las limitaciones impuestas con fundamento en la norma que se anula, antes de la publicación del primer edicto de esta acción.- B) Se rechaza de plano la acción en cuanto impugna el Acuerdo del Concejo del Cantón Central de San Carlos, tomado en el artículo 7 de la Sesión del 8 de agosto de 1989.- C) No es inconstitucional el artículo XV inciso 3 del Reglamento de Zonificación de San Carlos, publicado en La Gaceta del jueves 29 de abril de 1982, siempre que se interprete en el sentido de que la potestad atribuida a la municipalidad para eliminar los usos no conformes con el Plan Regulador que ella considere inaceptables en los términos allí expresados, debe ir acompañada de la indemnización correspondiente, según la gravedad de la lesión.- CH) En lo demás, se declara sin lugar la acción.- Luis Paulino Mora M.

Jorge E. Castro B. Luis Fernando Solano C.

Eduardo Sancho G. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

José Luis Molina Q. Hernando Arias G.

Francisco Mendoza B.

Secretario a.i.

Fabrizio.9418