Legality of Binding CGR Provisions on Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge Management PlanLegalidad de las disposiciones vinculantes de la CGR sobre el Plan de Manejo del Refugio Gandoca-Manzanillo

VI.- The first objection raised by the plaintiffs translates into a questioning of the powers of the CGR to issue reports containing binding provisions on environmental matters. For this Court, the relationship between the principle of protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment imposed by Article 50 of the Constitution in turn establishes the duty of the State, in a broad sense, to undertake the necessary actions to ensure the effectiveness of that constitutional maxim. In this case, the CGR alleges that its actions are aimed at protecting that environmental right, to the extent that the wildlife refuges form part of the Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado). In that regard, it should be noted that national legislation is extensive in provisions that have a protective purpose for the environment. Among these, Article 1 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, No. 7554 of November 13, 1995) establishes the State's duty to defend and preserve the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, in pursuit of the greatest well-being for the inhabitants of the Nation. Along the same lines, the first article of the current Forestry Law (Ley Forestal, No. 7575 of April 16, 1996) stipulates: "This law establishes, as an essential and priority function of the State, to ensure the conservation, protection, and administration of natural forests and the production, use, industrialization, and promotion of the country's forest resources destined for that purpose, in accordance with the principle of adequate and sustainable use of renewable natural resources. (...)". Because it is of special relevance in this proceeding, given the debate on various aspects of a wildlife refuge (RNVS-GM), it is crucial to refer to the regulation of the concept of protected wilderness areas (áreas silvestres protegidas), a category of which an RVS is a part. Along these lines, Article 32 of the Organic Environmental Law (No. 7554) states: "Article 32. Classification of protected wilderness areas. The Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, may establish protected wilderness areas, in any of the management categories that are established and in those indicated below: a) Forest reserves. b) Protective zones. c) National parks. d) Biological reserves. e) National wildlife refuges. f) Wetlands. g) Natural monuments. These management categories and those created in the future shall be administered by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, except for those established in Article 33 of this law. Municipalities must collaborate in the preservation of these areas." To the extent that the RVS-GM possesses or includes areas that are natural heritage of the State (patrimonio natural del Estado), a special duty of protection is imposed, as a derivation of the objectives set forth in Article 35 of that same law, within which are listed: "a) Conserve representative natural environments of the different biogeographical regions and the most fragile ecosystems, to ensure the balance and continuity of evolutionary and ecological processes. b) Safeguard the genetic diversity of wild species upon which evolutionary continuity depends, particularly endemic, threatened, or endangered species. c) Ensure the sustainable use of ecosystems and their elements, fostering the active participation of neighboring communities. d) Promote scientific research, the study of ecosystems and their balance, as well as knowledge and technologies that allow the sustainable use and conservation of the country's natural resources. e) Protect and improve aquifer zones and hydrographic basins, to reduce and avoid the negative impact that their poor management can cause. f) Protect the natural and scenic surroundings of historical and architectural sites and centers, national monuments, archaeological sites, and places of historical and artistic interest, of importance for culture and national identity." From that standpoint, the Constitutional Chamber itself has highlighted the duty to protect the PNE, as was indicated, among others, in ruling No. 21258-2010 of 2:00 p.m. on December 22, 2010. That duty of protection requires that, in cases such as this one, where the zone that has been constituted as an RNVS is of mixed nature, the areas that are public domain and fit within the category of Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) be delimited with due precision, distinguishing them from those that are private domain. In line with the foregoing, as indicated above, in report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, the CGR warned that in the Zoning Regulation (Reglamento de Zonificación) of the RNVS-GM, the areas corresponding to public and private domain were not clearly delimited, while the applicable limitations due to the presence of forested ecosystems or wetlands on properties titled in favor of private parties, located in zone 1 Llanura Costera Cocles Manzanillo, were not considered.

In light of these regulations, this Court does not observe any infraction of the competence regime that prohibits the CGR from conducting investigations and rendering reports containing provisions on environmental matters. It is in each case that it must be weighed whether the participation of that oversight body constitutes a substitution of the powers of the bodies that make up the Environmental Administration, but in general terms, the existence of specialized units in that matter does not restrict the control that the oversight body could carry out over that subject.

VII.- Regarding the regulations of the lands that make up the Protected Wilderness Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas), the Regulation to the Biodiversity Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Biodiversidad) denominates them as follows in Article 3, subsection a): "Defined geographical space, officially declared and designated with a management category by virtue of its natural, cultural, and/or socioeconomic importance, to fulfill certain conservation and management objectives." It has already been established that pursuant to Article 32 of the LOA, in relation to the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad), No. 7788, and its regulation, Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 34433, this latter norm in its Article 70 establishes that the protected wilderness areas (áreas silvestres protegidas) are: a) Forest reserves. b) Protective zones. c) National parks. d) Biological reserves. e) National wildlife refuges. f) Wetlands. g) Natural monuments, h) Marine Reserves, and i) Marine Management Areas. Along those same lines, it establishes the types of RVS in the following sense:

"Article 70.-ASP management categories. For purposes of classifying the different management categories of protected wilderness areas (áreas silvestres protegidas), the following technical criteria are established for each one of them: a) ... e) National Wildlife Refuges: Geographical areas that possess terrestrial, marine, marine-coastal, freshwater ecosystems, or a combination of these. Their main purposes shall be the conservation, research, increase, and management of wild flora and fauna, especially those that are on the path to extinction. For classification purposes, there are three classes of national wildlife refuges: e.1) State-owned refuges. Those in which the areas declared as such belong entirely to the State and are public domain. Their administration shall correspond exclusively to the SINAC. Their main objectives are: conservation, research, and management of wild flora and fauna, especially those species that are officially declared by the country as endangered or with reduced populations, as well as migratory species and endemic species. Because they are the natural heritage of the State (patrimonio natural del Estado), only research, training, and ecotourism activities may be carried out. e.2) Privately-owned refuges. Those in which the areas declared as such belong entirely to private parties. Their administration shall correspond to the property owners and shall be supervised by the SINAC. Their main objectives are: conservation, research, and management of wild flora and fauna, especially those species that are officially declared by the country as endangered or with reduced populations, as well as migratory species and endemic species. On the lands of privately-owned refuges, only productive activities may be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law (Reglamento de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre), Executive Decree No. 32633-MINAE, of March 10, 2005, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005. e.3) Mixed-ownership refuges. Those in which the areas declared as such belong partly to the State and partly to private parties. Their main objectives are: conservation, research, and management of wild flora and fauna, especially those species that are officially declared by the country as endangered or with reduced populations, as well as migratory species and endemic species. Their administration shall be shared between the private owners and the SINAC, such that on lands that are State property, only the activities previously indicated for state-owned refuges, indicated in subsection i), may be carried out, while on privately-owned lands, the activities indicated for privately-owned refuges indicated in subsection ii) may be carried out, respecting the respective criteria and requirements." As it pertains to this case, as has been indicated, the RVS-GM was created by Decree No. 16614, in effect since October 29, 1985, ratified by Executive Decree No. 34043 of November 11, 2007. Articles 4 and 7 of Decree 16614 require the issuance of a management plan (plan de manejo) in the following sense: "Article 4.—To carry out a forest use plan, a reforestation project, or to intend a land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo) within the Refuge, a management plan must be prepared, which must have the approval of the General Forestry Directorate." In the same sense, Article 7 of the same decree stated: "Article 7.—The General Forestry Directorate through the Department of Wildlife and the General Directorate of Fishery and Aquaculture Resources must prepare a management plan (plan de manejo) for the use of marine resources, their products, and byproducts. Both agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock shall coordinate with the community development associations of the surrounding localities the activities related to the resources mentioned in this article." As can be deduced from the recitals of that decree, the cause for creation lies in the existence in the Talamanca zone of resources such as mangroves, swamps, forests, and reefs of unique value, as well as the existence of the country's only association of yolillo and orey palms, and the presence of endangered species such as the manatee, crocodile, caiman, tapir, and various species of monkeys and felines. Likewise, that decree refers to the existence in the coastal strip of the only natural bank of mangrove oyster, one of the few breeding grounds for tarpon, and resident and unique populations of lobster. But equally, recital 5 of that decree recognizes that the zone possesses beaches of great tourist potential under regulated management.

As a derivation of what is set forth in Articles 4 and 7 just mentioned, Executive Decree No. 34946-MINAET issued the Zoning Regulation of the RNVS-GM. Precisely, from the review of the content of that Regulation, the CGR derived a series of observations, under the consideration that said planning did not consider the delimitation and applicable regulations for the lands that form part of the PNE, given the presence of forested ecosystems or wetlands on properties titled in the name of private parties, in the Llanura Costera Cocles Manzanillo zone. In that sense, the CGR relates that through official communication DFOE-AE-0452 of September 3, 2013, the Environmental and Energy Services Audit Area (Área de Fiscalización de Servicios Ambientales y de Energía), regarding the environmental variable (variable ambiental) in that zoning, pointed out that it was necessary for the SINAC to process again before SETENA the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) of that regulation, prior to considering the compliance with provision b) of report note No. DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011 as accredited.

VIII.- Regarding the need for that zoning regulation to satisfy the environmental variable (variable ambiental) under the terms established by the CGR, it should be noted, as was indicated, through official communication No. DFOE-AE-0087 (2713) of February 18, 2015, the CGR made modifications to the provisions of report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, in response to the fact that through official communication DM-578-2014 of November 11, 2014, the head of MINAE stated that the competence for issuing management plans (planes de manejo) corresponded to the National Council of Conservation Areas (Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, CONAC), and therefore it was not a power of the Director of SINAC. Similarly, through official communication SG-143-2014-SETENA of July 2, 2014, the Plenary Commission agreement corresponding to ordinary session No. 73-2014-SETENA of July 1, 2014, Article 27, was submitted, in which it is sustained that environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) corresponds to be granted to the Management Plan (Plan de Manejo) and not to the Zoning Regulation (Reglamento de Zonificación).

Given this background, the CGR modified part of the originally issued provisions in the sense of requiring the Minister of Environment and Energy to "Review and issue the Management Plan of the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, submitted by the National Council of Conservation Areas, according to provision b) of this communication. Communicate to the Comptroller General's Office the number of the Executive Decree and La Gaceta in which said Plan is published, within the two calendar months following receipt of the Plan submitted by the National Council of Conservation Areas." -condition a-. For its part, in condition b), it ordered the CONAC to "Adjust and approve the Management Plan of the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, so that the zoning that is determined conforms to technical standards and legality, technical field studies, and in observance of the provisions of Articles 18 and 19 of Law No. 7575, as well as compliance with the purposes of the Refuge's creation. Submit the Management Plan to the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaria Técnica Nacional Ambiental) for processing of environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental); this no later than December 18, 2015. Once the environmental viability is obtained, submit the Management Plan to the Minister of Environment and Energy for the issuance process, no later than April 15, 2016. Submit to the Comptroller General's Office a copy of the communication by which it sends the Management Plan to the Minister of Environment and Energy, no later than April 22, 2016." Likewise, it issued two new provisions to the Plenary Commission of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaria Técnica Nacional Ambiental), to establish the parameters to allow the environmental assessment of the management plans (planes de manejo) of Protected Wilderness Areas (Areas Silvestres Protegidas), classified in the category to which the Management Plan of the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge belongs; in addition to resolving on the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) of the Management Plan of the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, submitted by the National Council of Conservation Areas.

It is on this constitution of the provisions that we proceed to the examination proposed by the parties. In that sense, in accordance with Article 17 of the LOA, in relation to Article 1 of Executive Decree No. 32967-MINAE, it is necessary that said planning have an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) for undertaking projects or activities that, by their nature and content, imply the risk of altering or contaminating the environment, as well as the mandatory nature of the cited variable in all land-use planning. Article 1 of Executive Decree No. 32967 establishes in its initial paragraph: "Article 1.—Introduction of the environmental variable (variable ambiental) in Regulatory Plans or other Land-Use Planning. In all land-use planning developed in the country, including cantonal or local regulatory plans, public or private, in which the development of activities, works, or projects that could generate effects on the environment is planned, the environmental variable must be integrated in accordance with the Procedure for the Introduction of the environmental variable in Regulatory Plans or other Land-Use Planning established in Annex 1 (Anexo 1) of this decree. Which is also made available to the public at the headquarters of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat – SETENA and on the website of the Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Commerce and the Federated College of Engineers and Architects. (...)".

Unlike what the plaintiffs claim, this Court considers that the literal wording of that rule does not allow sustaining that this environmental variable (variable ambiental) only merits evaluation within the regulatory plans (planes reguladores), whether cantonal or local, public or private, excluding instruments such as Management Plans (Planes de Manejo) for Protected Wilderness Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas). On closer examination, the grammatical reference to that type of regulatory plans is merely by way of inclusion within the factual assumption that the rule previously defines, consisting of all land-use planning. That is to say, it is not limited solely to regulatory plans, but to any programmatic instrument of land use that could impact the environment. In that sense, this Chamber shares the State's impressions in stating that the Management Plans (Planes de Manejo) of Protected Wilderness Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas) are planning instruments that seek to guide land-use management toward the fulfillment of the creation objectives, and therefore seek to guide decisions in the management of not only state lands but also private ones.

From that perspective of analysis, they are strategic mechanisms for conservation and management of those zones, and therefore there is no normative reason to deny the requirement of the environmental diagnosis in that type of planning. As the State indicates, the fact that public and private areas converge in a zoning —the latter, through agreements with private parties on the conservation of their properties— does not lead to denying the need to comply with environmental regulations and the actions inherent to the due protection of the environment, which includes, as in these cases, satisfying the conservation objectives that have served as the basis for the creation of the ASP, as well as the zoning strategies that include mixed-ownership properties. Hence, given the content of Decree 34946-MINAET (Zoning Regulation of the RNVS-GM), and the use regime that defines zones of a residential, recreational residential, tourist hotel, special hotel, protection areas, camping, sports, parking, urban commercial, commercial, institutional, quarries (tajos), and cultural heritage type (see Article 1), as well as the indication of recommended uses, recommended uses with conditions, non-permitted uses, property dimensions, densities, and setbacks, it becomes necessary to define the harmony and balance of that land-use management planning with the ecosystems sought to be protected in that zone, given the need to collate the specific use with the general or cumulative impact on the refuge, resulting from the presence of a coastal ecosystem that, due to its fragility, has been sought to be protected.

On this subject, regarding the need for environmental impact evaluations (evaluaciones de incidencias ambientales) in the development of human activities, including zoning and land-use projects in environmentally relevant areas, in ruling 1220-2002 of February 6, 2002, in which it analyzed an unconstitutionality action filed against the SETENA Procedures Regulation, Decree 26228-MINAE, and other norms, the Constitutional Chamber fundamentally stated:

"...It has already been stated that the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) establishes in Article 17, as a development of what Article 50 of the Constitution provides, the obligation to have an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) to carry out activities or projects that by their nature could alter or contaminate the environment. As the Attorney General's Office correctly points out in its report, the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) is conceived by the legislator as a technical procedure that allows controlling a possible environmental alteration with the consequent affectation of ecosystems. Without a doubt, it is a technical matter whose detailed regulation escapes the logic of the legislative procedure and can, as a matter of principle and within the existing legal framework, be regulated by the Executive Branch. The Organic Environmental Law clearly states that '...Human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate residues, toxic or hazardous materials, shall require an environmental impact assessment created in this law...', which allows affirming, upon correct reading, that no human activity that could alter or contaminate the environment can dispense with the referred environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental). The formula that the Executive Branch has devised to allow establishing, 'prima facie', whether the human activity being undertaken could alter or destroy the environment, has been the presentation of the form called 'Preliminary Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar)'. It is not then, as the Administrative Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo) maintains in its report, that the Executive Branch has absolute discretion to indicate the projects that must carry out the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental), since by provision of the Political Constitution itself (Art. 50) and the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), as a general principle, every human activity that modifies the environment 'shall require' the referred study. It is therefore the condition of the project or work that will determine, in each case, whether or not the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) is required, and not the establishment of arbitrary conditions through the regulatory route. The regulation must only establish the manner in which the project's conditions will be known, and that is what will determine the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental). This means that the defense and preservation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, conceptualized in Article 50 of the Constitution, is the fundamental right of every person and functions as an inescapable general principle, such that in this matter it is not possible to make generic exceptions (in urban matters and other topics dealt with in articles 19 and 20) to exempt compliance with environmental obligations, since by doing so one runs the risk of deconstitutionalizing the guarantee of State response in defense of the environment. Thus, the mechanism used by the Executive Decree determining 'a priori' activities or works that are exempt from the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental), considering the size of the work, the existence of regulatory plans (planes reguladores), the number of people in the operation or activity, the number of rooms, the project qualification (social interest), or land use, evidences an excess in the exercise of regulatory power that exceeds the remission to Article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law and that empties the content of the inhabitants' right for the Public Powers to exercise direct environmental control —not by delegation to environmental regents (regencias)— in the application of protective legislation. This is not to say that the Executive Branch cannot, via regulation, determine, based on precise technical studies, that a specific activity or project does not require environmental impact assessments (estudios de impacto ambiental); but this implies that such a definition must be duly motivated and justified. Recall that in the case of exempting a higher-ranking control (constitutional), the reasonableness and proportionality of the exceptional circumstance shall be reviewable by the judge, whether through ordinary legal channels or constitutional control. But to the general regime conceived by the derived Constituent, a generalized exception that has no other motivation or basis than the very existence of the rule that so declares it is inadmissible. (...)".

From that perspective, this Court shares the CGR's considerations regarding the necessary consideration of the environmental variable (variable ambiental) within the Zoning Regulations of areas that, as in this case, because it is an RNVS of a mixed nature, where properties of public domain and private nature converge, impact the environment, a diagnosis that in itself must be carried out in any development that presents a risk of environmental impact. On closer inspection, the mention in Articles 17 of the LOA and 1 of Decree 32967 does not constitute an exhaustive list of planning instruments that must necessarily have an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental). As the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) has indicated in the recently cited ruling, the EIA is a technical procedure that allows controlling a possible environmental alteration with the consequent affectation of ecosystems, so understanding its utility and purpose would not allow sustaining an exhaustiveness or closed list of the references that those norms stipulate. On the contrary, from the analysis of the regulatory assumptions of Decree No. 32967-MINAE, it emerges that all land-use planning must have that environmental measurement, regardless of the type of property in question, which allows sustaining that the territorial planning to be implemented in a protected wilderness area (área silvestre protegida) requires the consideration of this variable. This is irrespective of whether a Zoning Plan (Plan de Zonificación) for an RNVS or a protected wilderness area (área silvestre protegida) is not, initially, part of a regulatory plan (plan regulador).

At this point, it is worth highlighting what was indicated by the Environmental Services Audit Area (Área de Fiscalización de Servicios Ambientales) of the CGR in communication DFOE-AE-0452, in stating that the mere circumstance that the Guide for the Formulation of Management Plans (Planes de Manejo) for Protected Wilderness Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas) and the Procedures Manual for the Publication of Management Plans (Planes de Manejo) of the Protected Wilderness Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas) of SINAC do not set the procedure or the requirement for environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) does not negate the obligation to carry it out, given the prevalence of higher-ranking norms such as Article 50 of the Constitution, Article 17 of the LOA, and Article 1 of Executive Decree No. 32967-MINAE. Similarly, the need for this environmental diagnosis not only in the Zoning Regulation (Reglamento de Zonificación) of the RNVS-GM but also in the management plan (plan de manejo) in that sector, was noted by SETENA. Indeed, in the course of the compliance follow-up actions regarding the provisions issued by the CGR, in communication SG-DEAE-267-2013 of June 7, 2013, from SETENA, addressed to the Executive Directorate of SINAC, it is stated, in relevant part: "...By virtue of your communication SINAC-DE-912, where you very specifically request us to submit the study 'Zoning Regulation of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge' for assessment, so that this Secretariat grants environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) to it, I must indicate the following: The minimum contents established in said decree include the environmental diagnosis studies that are called Indices of Environmental Fragility (índices de fragibilidad ambiental, IFAs), which are not provided within the documentation supplied by you; likewise, the Environmental Scope Analysis study (análisis de alcance ambiental, AAA) where the proposed zoning is assessed is also not included within the documentation provided. Finally, the so-called sustainable development regulation (reglamento de desarrollo sostenible, RDS) has not been included within the documentation submitted for assessment. What you have provided, as you rightly indicate in your communication, is the Zoning Regulation of the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, which is not subject to evaluation by this Secretariat under the terms dictated by the aforementioned decree, that is, the evaluation of IFAs, AAA, and RDS. Thus, the document provided does not comply with what is established in decree No. 32964-MINAE, therefore the granting of an environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) is not appropriate, and as such it could not respond positively to the explicit request to make an exception to grant environmental viability to the regulation in question, precisely because what was provided does not conform to what is established in decree No. 32967-MINAE." (Image 146 folder 1 CD evidence) This was later reiterated in official communication DEAE-247-2014 of June 30, 2014, in which SETENA indicates to the Plenary Commission that, in response to official communication DFOE-SD-1285 from the CGR (previous point), by official communication SG-DEAE-267-2013, it was communicated to SINAC that the environmental diagnosis included the IFAs, AAA, and RDS, which had not been submitted. This position was endorsed by the Plenary Commission through agreement ACP-08-14 of July 1, 2014. (Images 191-193 folder 1 CD evidence) From that perspective of understanding, the requirement expressed in point b) of official communication DFOE-AE-0087 of February 18, 2015 (2713) from the CGR, which required the National Council of Conservation Areas (Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, CONAC): "b) To the National Council of Conservation Areas: Adjust and approve the Management Plan for the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, so that the zoning determined is in accordance with technical and legal standards, field technical studies, and in observance of the provisions of articles 18 and 19 of Law No. 7575, as well as compliance with the purposes for the Refuge's creation. Remit the Management Plan to the National Environmental Technical Secretariat for processing of environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental); this by no later than December 18, 2015. Once environmental feasibility is obtained, remit the Management Plan to the Minister of Environment and Energy for the issuance process, no later than April 15, 2016. Remit to the Comptroller General a copy of the official communication by which the Management Plan is sent to the Minister of Environment and Energy, no later than April 22, 2016.", does not show the inaccuracies alleged by the plaintiffs, insofar as the issuance of the cited Zoning Regulation does not require the fulfillment of the measurement of the environmental variable. For this Court, in the case of Protected Wild Areas, including those composed of public and private property (mixed), it is necessary to satisfy those environmental diagnoses, to the extent that the land-use regime for privately owned properties must be consistent with the purposes of creation and protection of the area and a use consistent with sustainable development, that is, in harmony with the environment. Such aspects require, consequently, that the proposed land-use regime within the respective management plan for the zone be weighed. As stated in the case file, the Plenary Commission of SETENA, in the agreement adopted in article 10 of ordinary session No. 070-2015-SETENA of May 26, 2015, agreement number ACP-55-15, taking into account the modifications made to official communication DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, modified by official communication DFOE-AE-0087 of February 18, 2015 (2713) from the CGR, ordered that the measurement of environmental feasibility was not necessary for the management plans of Protected Wild Areas, as the analysis of Decree No. 32967 does not expressly contemplate such an assumption. (Images 223-228 of folder 1 CD evidence) However, later, in the agreement adopted in article 2 of ordinary session No. 0127-2015-SETENA of September 10, 2015, agreement number ACP-119-15, and under the indication that it maintained the position expressed in agreement number ACP-55-15 mentioned ut supra, in compliance with the provisions of the CGR, they issued that decision solely for the RNVS-GM case. In that sense, it agreed to approve the proposed terms of reference for the incorporation of the environmental variable into the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, mixed category, proposed in official communication DEAE-288-2015 by geographer Nuria Chavarría, as a result of which it ordered to indicate to SINAC that it should proceed to request the opening of the respective administrative file (expediente administrativo) at SETENA, for the purpose of processing the Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental) of the cited Management Plan. (Images 232-234 folder 1 CD Evidence) From the foregoing, it is clear that the review and adjustment of the RNVS-GM Management Plan has the endorsement of SETENA to grant environmental feasibility. However, it is necessary to reiterate that this Chamber agrees with what was indicated by the CGR in the questioned conducts, in that the relationship of the norms cited above allows and requires that this type of planning instrument must also include the analysis of environmental feasibility, given that these are instruments which, by providing permissibility or potential enablement of activities that will impact the environment that the creation of a Protected Wild Area seeks to safeguard, in this mixed-type case, must have that diagnosis to weigh its harmony and consistency with the environment and with the purpose pursued when creating the ASP. On this particular point, it is worth noting that through a writing dated October 9, 2018, the State informs the Court that through the agreement of the Plenary Commission of Setena No. CCP-185-2017 adopted in article 09 of ordinary session 121-2017 of September 27, 2017, it is indicated regarding subsection e) of Report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, which requires it to resolve on the environmental feasibility of the RNVS-GM Management Plan, that said analysis has not concluded as it is still in process, in addition to the fact that given the unconstitutionality action pending against Law No. 9223 which establishes the new boundaries and areas of the RNVS-GM (expediente 14-019174-0007-CO), it is not possible to issue a final decision until that action is resolved. This circumstance will be the object of consideration infra.

IX.- On the object of study of report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011. The plaintiffs challenge the content of the report in question, considering it biased and limited, insofar as it only considered one zone of the refuge, considering it illegitimate to apply the results of that analysis to their properties, as they limit the exercise of the right of ownership (derecho de dominio). From the analysis of that official communication, it is clear that the study on which it was based was carried out for the period from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2009, through the review of the documentation of the administrative files of the RNVS-GM Management Plan and its zoning, as well as related documentation, in accordance with the Manual of General Audit Standards for the Public Sector, No. M-2-2006-CO-DFOE. That report indicates that the review of that documentation determined that the Zoning Regulation issued through Executive Decree No. 34946-MINAET dated December 6, 2008, did not consider the delimitation, nor applicable regulations for lands of the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado, PNE), nor the limitations in the presence of forest ecosystems (ecosistemas boscosos) or wetlands (humedales) on real estate titled in the name of private individuals, located in the zone called "Cocles-Manzanillo Coastal Plain." It also refers that in ACLAC-073-2011 from the La Amistad Caribe Conservation Area, it was indicated that the zoning maps did not record the specific delimitation of the PNE, despite having taken steps for the cadastral survey of the Refuge. It criticized that: "...the land uses permitted by that Regulation in the Cocles Manzanillo Coastal Plain apply equally to all lands without distinguishing whether it is PNE or whether they are properties with land-use limitations currently in the name of private individuals, or if they have another condition. In this way, the referred Coastal Plain with an extension of 933.78 has, is subdivided into fifteen zones such as the agricultural zone of 104.73 has; the residential zone of 56.06 has; the recreational residential zone of 78.52 has; the tourist hotel zone of 204.15 has; and other categories that record recommended uses and recommended uses with conditions that do not fall within what is permitted on PNE lands, or that do not detail restrictions associated with the presence of ecosystems of environmental fragility currently in the name of private individuals." As a complement to that analysis of files within that time range, the cited report specifies: "In order to complement the analysis, this Comptroller General requested the collaboration of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal ... and the National Institute of Agricultural Technology Transfer ... for the development of a field sampling on some lands located in the residential and tourist hotel zone of the cited Cocles Manzanillo Coastal Plain, in order to ascertain the respective biological, forest, and soil science (edafológicas) conditions, that would allow accounting for the state in which those lands are found." After referring to the findings of the reports rendered by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal and the INTA, it considered that the described cases revealed the presence of lands included in the Cocles Manzanillo Coastal Plain that had high conditions of environmental fragility, despite which, they were not being adequately protected, since in some cases, despite the existence of forest or wetland zones, the lands had been intervened to the point of their affectation, contrary to the purposes of the refuge's creation. From that perspective, the reference made to zone 1 of the RNVS-GM, in the analyses carried out by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal and the INTA, are a complement to the documentary examination previously carried out by the CGR and which in no way implied only that zone. On the contrary, from the content of that report it is clear that despite prior knowledge of the existence of zones that form part of the PNE, these geographic zones were not duly identified nor delimited in the cited Regulation, according to the reference made in official communication ACLAC-073-2011. Likewise, it highlights that the use permitted by the Regulation does not discriminate whether the land corresponds to PNE or to lands of another nature with limitations. Both issues are decisive for the due protection of the Protected Wild Area, to the extent that the land-use regime allows discriminating the possible activities in order to safeguard the PNE or the type of administrative limitation applicable to a specific geographic zone. The questioned act highlights the relevance of that definition when stating: "Regarding the cited Cocles-Manzanillo coastal plain, it is characterized as a narrow plain less than one kilometer wide from Puerto Viejo to Punta Manzanillo...This zone is important as a buffer area (área de amortiguamiento), since it controls sedimentation and contamination on the coral reefs located a few meters from the beach and which could (sic) be affected by the erosion of the slopes to the south of the sector; furthermore, hydrological studies locate here the most important aquifer in the zone...". Moreover, based on the reports of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal and the INTA, it is clear that the lands in the sample zone present conditions of high environmental fragility and do not have due protection; despite the presence of forest or wetland, they have been intervened to the point of affectation, which, it is reiterated, is contrary to the protection purpose that supported the creation of the refuge in question. Precisely, based on those considerations, it was that in the reference report (DFOE-03-2011), in the provisions section, subsection c) established: "c) To the Plenary Commission of SETENA: Refrain from granting environmental feasibilities (viabilidades ambientales) in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, until the Zoning Regulation is formalized in accordance with the review and adjustments previously indicated. Remit to this Comptroller General, a copy of the Plenary Commission agreement where the pertinent instructions are given, no later than July 30, 2011." It is clear that the absence of an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) in the Management Plan issued for the RNVS-GM entails, as a direct consequence, the impossibility of granting environmental feasibilities for specific lands or sectors located within that Protected Wild Area, given that in this scope, it must be considered as a unit of environmental protection due to the unitary purpose of safeguarding conferred upon it with its creation. The analysis of those specific environmental feasibilities, therefore, is subject to the Management Plan and the Zoning Regulation. On this particular, as mentioned by the representation of the CGR, this Court had already ruled within expediente No. 11-4480-1027-CA, which was an ordinary proceeding by the company named Palma Verde Socratea S.A. against the State, a case in which it petitioned for a declaration of nullity of resolution DEA-1984-2011, which ordered the suspension of the process of granting environmental feasibility for the development of works within a property owned by it located within the RNVS-GM, considering that the suspension of the environmental assessment process was contrary to law and that the Comptroller's report on which SETENA based the suspension (a report which is precisely the one analyzed in this proceeding), was issued almost three years ago (at that instant), after which several environmental licenses had been issued. In judgment No. 248-2012-VI of 4:00 p.m. on November 2, 2012, this Administrative Litigation Court, Section VI, ordered as relevant: "... By reason of the foregoing, it is considered that the reason alleged by the defendant party, in the challenged act, is indeed real and existent, that there is no misapplication of the law, since within the legal framework accused as violated, the regulation is subordinate to the law, according to the invoked article 129 of the Political Constitution, as the Comptroller's report that orders the suspension and is the reason alleged in the challenged act, does contain juridically and technically exposed reasons why it is considered that the regulation fails to comply with article 17 of the Organic Law of the Environment, that the forest zones, wetland zones are not sufficiently protected, nor the State Natural Heritage delimited, whereby, by reason of articles 7 and 50 of the Political Constitution, we would have that effectively, the State, by accepting the suspension order issued by the Comptroller, complies with both constitutional obligations and those derived from the laws and International Treaties on environmental protection, that is, a protective action would be being carried out to protect the environment, keep it healthy and ecologically balanced, applying the precautionary principle (principio precautorio), which, like all variables of environmental law, turns out to be a transversal axis to all public function activity, which must respond both legally and technically to safeguard the environment, and always be present in the factual and legal considerations that inform its actions.(...)". Although that judgment did not analyze the validity of the CGR report, its reference is necessary as it highlights that that act reflects the technical reasons that led to concluding the disregard of article 17 of the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), due to the insufficiency of protection of forest zones, wetlands, and the lack of delimitation of the PNE, justifying reasons for the suspension of the proceeding ordered in that file. Again, if it was determined that the environmental diagnosis was necessary for the Management Plan, so that lacking that requirement, the Zoning Regulation showed that irregularity, it is clear that the authorizations for types of use or granting of building permit titles (licencias constructivas), being dependent on that planning, must be suspended until what was indicated regarding the environmental variable is normalized. Attending to that logical linkage, it was ordered to direct SETENA to refrain from granting environmental feasibilities, and to the Municipality of Talamanca, an equal deprivation regarding the granting of construction permits, until the Management Plan is adjusted regarding the already noted issue.

X.- On construction permits, through official communication DFOE-AE-0159 (4811) of June 24, 2011, the Area of Environmental Services and Energy of the Division of Operative and Evaluative Auditing of the CGR, communicates to the Municipality of Talamanca "Note report No. DFOE-AE-IF-05-2011 with the results of the study on some use permits granted by the Municipality of Talamanca on lands of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge." In that act, it is expressed, as relevant, regarding the result of the study of some cases for which the Municipality of Talamanca granted precarious land-use permits and construction permits to carry out buildings on lands included within the boundaries of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, in a period between January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2009. On the results, it reported: "1- It was determined that the Municipal Council of Talamanca granted precarious land-use permits on three lands of the State Natural Heritage (PNE) located within the Maritime Terrestrial Zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre, ZMT) of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge, which are lacking in legality, as all were carried out under the protection of Law No. 6043, Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone, which does not apply in that Refuge in accordance with article 73 of that same regulatory body. Furthermore, that Municipality granted said permits without having the legitimacy to do so, since the administrator of said Refuge is the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (MINAET) through the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC). ...". It considered that the Local Council lacked competence to grant the land-use permits granted in ordinary session No. 27 of November 8, 2006, in relation to the land described in cadastral map L-658883-2000, permit granted in ordinary session No. 41 of February 21, 2007, cadastral map L-1155267-2007, use permit in extraordinary session No. 76 of July 17, 2008, land in map L-660211-2000. It indicated that those cases are located within the zone of the RNVS-GM, which overlaps with the boundaries originally occupied by the Bribri de Kekoldi Indigenous Territory, created through Executive Decree No. 7267 of August 9, 1977, and whose boundaries were ratified in the Indigenous Law No. 6172 of November 29, 1977. In said report, it issued the following provisions to the Council and the Municipal Mayor of Talamanca: "a) To the Municipal Council of Talamanca i- Review the legality of the precarious land-use permits granted on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, in order to take the legally appropriate actions, especially in accordance with articles 73 of the Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone No. 6043 and article 32 of the Organic Law of the Environment No. 7554. Inform this controlling body about the actions taken, through an official communication to be remitted no later than May 30, 2012. ii- Refrain henceforth from granting precarious use permits on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge. Remit to this Comptroller General, no later than July 30, 2011, a copy of the Municipal Council agreement where this measure is adopted. b) To the Municipal Mayor of Talamanca i- Review the legality of the construction permits granted on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge to assess the existence of possible nullities and adopt the corresponding actions according to law, respecting due process, in observance of technical and legal aspects, and especially in accordance with article 32 of the Organic Law of the Environment No. 7554 and article 58 of the Biodiversity Law No. 7788. Inform this controlling body by official communication about the actions taken, no later than August 31, 2012. ii- Refrain henceforth from granting construction permits on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, until the Zoning Regulation adjusted by SINAC and MINAET is formalized, in accordance with what was requested by this controlling body through report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011 of May 31, 2011. Remit to this Comptroller General, no later than July 30, 2011, a copy of the administrative resolution through which the pertinent instructions are given.(...)". (Images 183-192 of the main file) Given that the invalidity of point b) ii) of that official communication is questioned, regarding the abstention from granting construction permits, it must be specified that, certainly, as it concerns a Wildlife Refuge of mixed category, which therefore involves private and public properties, it is evident that the protection of the private property right, enshrined in article 45 of the Magna Carta, stipulates that the administrative limitations imposed on the substantial content of the right of ownership be legitimate and rational. Along these lines, the analysis of the environmental variable allows generating inputs and technical criteria that enable objectively justifying the limitations necessary for a specific geographic space or activity, while also constituting a tool that would lead to the suppression of excessive limitations, not supported by technical references and considerations. In that sense, administrative limitations find common limits, among which the following can be indicated: - They must be proportional to the administrative need that must be satisfied thereby; - It must have some type of plausible justification, it must truly respond to an administrative need; - It is required that the property not be altered, disintegrated, or dismembered; - That it be valid in its form, competence, object, and will. The above presupposes the legal duty to tolerate administrative limitations for reasons of public necessity and social interest. However, it is clear that by virtue of a limitation of this nature, one cannot lead to the material effect of rendering the property dysfunctional, that is, denying the proper exercise of the right of ownership regarding its essential attributes, since in such case, one would be facing a de facto expropriation, with the juridical consequences that this entails, which is, the duty to indemnify the titleholder who has been dispossessed of that right. In this case, by virtue of the principle of the environmental function of property, whose foundation rests on the relationship between articles 45 and 50 of the Political Constitution, the Organic Law of the Environment, and the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), even private properties included within protected wild areas must satisfy the use regime in accordance with the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, in order to the postulate of sustainable development and prior environmental assessment. In that order, for example, within the limits derived from the aforementioned environmental function, the exercise of any human activity that may potentially generate an alteration in the environment requires a prior environmental assessment before the development of activities (art. 17 Organic Law of the Environment); furthermore, the land-use regime must be consistent with the ordering or management plans applicable to the geographic zone in order to safeguard the object of creation of the Protected Wild Area (in this type of matter). Even in that use regime, it is necessary to limit activities that have the potential effect of interrupting the natural cycles of ecosystems, such as intrusion into the natural cycles of forest regeneration or wetlands. From that perspective, the conditioning of the granting of construction permits or continuation in the processing of environmental impact study procedures, does not constitute an unreasonable imposition in this specific case, given that there must be harmony in the individual analysis of those procedures, with respect to the general framework represented by the Management Plan. It is a derivation pertaining to the case of the preventive, precautionary (precautorio), and in dubio pro natura principles that operate in this matter, and of a clear protection and conservation of the protected zones in question, in order to the provisions of canons 22 of the Biodiversity Law No. 7788 and 42 of the Organic Law of the Environment. It is clear that environmental matters impose legitimate limitations on the exercise of the right to build, a component of the right of ownership (art. 264 Civil Code), which requires that building activities, and with greater reason, in this type of protected area, harmonize with the principle of sustainable development and the environmental function of property that sustains those limitations. Hence, in view of analyzing the appropriateness or not of construction permits, it is necessary to have a Management Plan that adjusts to the ecological harmony conditions already commented upon. However, this Court observes that to date, the CGR's provision regarding the adjustment of the Management Plan to the instruments for weighing the environmental variable has not been effectively realized. Even, as has been stated, through a writing dated October 9, 2018, the State informs the Court that through the agreement of the Plenary Commission of Setena No. CCP-185-2017 adopted in article 09 of ordinary session 121-2017 of September 27, 2017, it is indicated regarding subsection e) of Report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, which requires it to resolve on the environmental feasibility of the RNVS-GM Management Plan, that said analysis has not concluded as it is still in process, in addition to the fact that given the unconstitutionality action pending against Law No. 9223 which establishes the new boundaries and areas of the RNVS-GM (expediente 14-019174-0007-CO), it is not possible to issue a final decision until that action is resolved. (Images 729 of the main file) That is to say, from the issuance of the questioned CGR report to date, the processing and resolution of the environmental feasibility procedures for the Plan has not been able to be concluded, which directly impedes the resolution and granting of construction permits or environmental impact studies for project applications by owners of private estates located in the RNVS-GM. This circumstance could well end up affecting the availability of the owners of privately owned properties, an aspect that, for reasons of order, will be analyzed infra. However, this does not lead to establishing the invalidity of the provisions issued by the CGR, which, in the order set forth, are considered reasonable, congruent, and necessary with the results of the investigation that produced report No. DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, because the requirement to include the environmental diagnosis within the REGAMA Management Plan would lead nowhere if the granting of construction permits and environmental feasibility studies for private properties located within the refuge area is not limited. Note that the cited official communication not only makes references to the possible illegality of construction permits granted in zones whose competence corresponded to the administrator of the Refuge, that is, MINAE, but also to the impossibility of continuing to grant construction permits, until the matter relating to the adjustment of the Zoning Regulation is clarified.

XI.- On the claims related to the voluntariness of the forestry regime (régimen forestal). In their subsidiary claim, the following is formulated: "1- That the present lawsuit be upheld and that it be declared that the undersigned, in our capacity as private owners, are entitled to the right to voluntarily withdraw from the forestry regime at the time we request it, as it concerns a voluntary submission regime and not a perpetual easement (servidumbre perpetua)." Now, it has been established in this process, an uncontroverted aspect, that the plaintiff entities possess properties located within the area of the RNVS-GM, whose reference can be observed in proven fact number 2) of this ruling. It has already been established that by virtue of the environmental and social function of private property, article 45 of the Magna Carta itself, in its third paragraph, establishes the possibility of imposing limitations on the right of ownership for reasons of public interest, a derivation of which, it is clear that it concerns a right that is not absolute, to the extent that the legal duty to accept such restrictions is imposed. In that order, it is insisted, in the ecological sphere, the Organic Law of the Environment itself imposes the obligation on the State (and other public entities) to promote sustainable development, which implies the exercise of private property in congruence and harmony with the environment, so that human activities are carried out in a manner coordinated with the regeneration of the environment. This implies that economic and environmental development must be promoted in a sustainable manner. The foregoing justifies the imposition of limits on the exercise of those economic, productive, or private human activities, so that the environment is impacted to the least extent possible, or else, its maintenance or regeneration is permitted. In cases such as the present one, such ideological vision, with formal normative expression, entails that in cases where private properties are located within environmentally sensitive areas that have a special protection regime, the activities to be carried out must be framed within the planned use, oriented towards the protection of those ecosystems.

Thus, in the case of Protected Wilderness Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas), land use (uso del suelo) must be subject to prior assessments of the potential impact on the natural resources present in the protected area, such as wetlands, marine resources, and soil capacity, in accordance with the use regime that, as a matter of principle, based on technical reasonableness, must have weighed the synergy between productive activities and ecological considerations. In this regard, section 34 of the Environmental Organic Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, No. 7554), by way of reference, imposes the duty to adopt preventive measures in Protected Wilderness Areas (ASP) to prevent or eliminate the exploitation or occupation of any area belonging to the State, and to enforce the ecological, geomorphological, and aesthetic characteristics that determined their establishment. This same purpose is developed in numeral 35 *ejusdem*, as it sets the objectives for the creation, conservation, administration, development, and monitoring of protected areas, among which can be mentioned, solely by way of reference: "a) Conserve representative natural environments of the different biogeographical regions and the most fragile ecosystems, to ensure the balance and continuity of evolutionary and ecological processes; b) Safeguard the genetic diversity of wild species on which evolutionary continuity depends, particularly those that are endemic, threatened, or in danger of extinction; c) Ensure the sustainable use of ecosystems and their elements, encouraging the active participation of neighboring communities; d) Promote scientific research, the study of ecosystems and their balance, as well as the knowledge and technologies that allow for the sustainable use and conservation of the country's natural resources; e) Protect and improve aquifer zones and hydrographic basins, to reduce and avoid the negative impact that their poor management can cause; f) Protect the natural and scenic environments of historical and architectural sites and centers, national monuments, archaeological sites, and places of historical and artistic interest, important for the culture and national identity." For the purposes of this matter, and given the claims of the plaintiff entities, the provisions of canon 37 of that Law No. 7554 are relevant, as it regulates the treatment of the inclusion of private properties in the creation of state Protected Wilderness Areas (ASP):

"Article 37.- Powers of the Executive Branch. When establishing protected wilderness areas, regardless of their management category, the Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE), is empowered to include, within their limits, the private properties or parts of private properties necessary to fulfill the objectives indicated in this law and to implement them in accordance with the respective management plan or to create legal easements (servidumbres legales) for ecological protection and compliance with this law. In the case of national parks, biological reserves, or state national wildlife refuges, the lands shall be acquired by purchase, expropriation, or both procedures, with prior compensation. In the cases of forest reserves, protective zones, mixed wildlife refuges, and wetlands, the properties or parts thereof may also be purchased or expropriated, unless, at the owner's request, they are voluntarily subjected to the forest regime. This subjection shall be registered in the Public Property Registry as an encumbrance (afectación) on the property, which will be maintained for the time established in the management plan. Private properties affected according to the provisions of this article, for being located in national parks, biological reserves, wildlife refuges, forest reserves, and protective zones, shall be encompassed within the state protected areas only from the moment they have been paid for or legally expropriated, except when they voluntarily submit to the Forest Regime (Régimen Forestal). In the case of forest reserves, protective zones, and wildlife refuges, and should payment or expropriation not have been made, and while it is being carried out, the areas shall be subject to an environmental management plan (plan de ordenamiento ambiental) that includes an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) and subsequently, to the management, recovery, and restoration plan for the resources. (Thus amended the previous paragraph by Article 72, subsection c) of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, which in turn was amended by 114 of the Biodiversity Law, No. 7788 of April 30, 1998) The Executive Branch is empowered to, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE), carry out the expropriations contemplated in this article, in accordance with the provisions of the Expropriations Law No. 7495, of May 3, 1995." As can be observed, this precept establishes the possibility of including privately owned lands within mixed-status Wildlife Refuges (RVS), for which purpose the State may opt for their purchase or expropriation, or the owners of those properties may voluntarily submit to the forest regime, in which case the corresponding registry annotation will be made, the validity of which will last for the time established in the management plan. In that sense, once the owner of the dominion right has voluntarily joined the forest regime, the validity of that encumbrance regime is maintained for the period established in the management plan. According to this precept, once those private properties have been acquired by purchase or expropriation, or when the owner has voluntarily submitted to the forest regime, they are incorporated into the state protected wilderness areas. However, the same norm specifies that while said acquisition is being carried out, those properties are subject to the Management Plan or Environmental Management Plan. From this perspective of examination, contrary to what the plaintiffs state, once private property is included within the design of a National Wildlife Refuge (RNVS), even if its inclusion was voluntary, it cannot likewise be withdrawn, insofar as that portion of land has been considered part of a single functional environmental and ecological unit, therefore, an essential component of an ecosystem that seeks to be protected and conserved as the very *ratio* of the constitution of the Protected Wilderness Area (Área Silvestre Protegida), in that category. Otherwise, there would be an undeniable impact on the integrity of said ecosystem, if it were permitted that, based on the delinking from the forest regime, the owner could give a different use than that established in the respective Management Plan for that area. In any case, as section 37 of the Environmental Organic Law (LOA) rightly points out, even in cases where the acquisition process by the State is pending, those properties would be subject to the use limitations derived from the respective Management Plan and Zoning Regulations, regulatory instruments that, by special competence, constitute the reference for the destination of land use (uso del suelo) in those zones. Indeed, the environmental protection emanating from the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) itself (No. 7575), which imposes the principle of sustainable development, obliges that the use regime for those spaces be consistent and consequent with the resource protection policies defined by the environmental management instrument, which is also linked to the environmental protection purposes set forth in section 14 of the Biodiversity Law. This purpose is observed in what has already been stated, in the sense that construction permits for those private properties could not be granted contrary to these environmental ordinances (Management Plan and Zoning Regulations of the National Wildlife Refuge (RNVS)), regardless of whether the private owners are or are not inserted within the forest regime, since ultimately, the purpose of protection of the State Natural Heritage (PNE) prevails in these matters. At this point, it is worth highlighting what was indicated by the State and the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR), a topic not rebutted by the plaintiffs, regarding that the territorial space over which this process is presented is a mixed-category National Wildlife Refuge (RNVS), which by design includes public and private property, in a case where the procedure for the constitution of the REGAMA through Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG was agreed upon with the community, without there appearing in the case file any element that would allow holding a different view, such that regardless of what has been indicated, the private properties that form part of the refuge area are subject to the limitations inherent to that regime. Of course, if that regime were to materially lead to a substantial emptying of the dominion right, that is, a dysfunctionality of that right, the duty of the State to expropriate those private lands would arise. However, as has been pointed out, the measures that are the object of challenge in this case impose rational provisions regarding the assessment of the environmental variable and the suspension of construction permit procedures, given the situations detected with respect to the implications and content of the Zoning Regulations issued through Executive Decree No. 34946-MINAET of December 6, 2008. Such provisions of the CGR do not prevent the exercise of the essential attributes of the dominion right of private owners, even though they condition the processing and granting of construction permits on the inclusion of the environmental assessment in the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, but this does not imply or entail a substantial suppression of the property right. Note that the parties fail to prove that they have undertaken any procedure in this regard. However, as was warned above, through a filing on October 9, 2018, the State notified the Court that through agreement of the SETENA Plenary Commission No. CCP-185-2017 adopted in article 09 of ordinary session 121-2017 of September 27, 2017, it is indicated regarding subsection e) of Report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, which imposes on it the duty to resolve on the environmental viability of the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, that such analysis has not been completed because it is still in process, and moreover, due to the unconstitutionality action pending over Law No. 9223 that establishes the new limits and areas of the RNVS-GM (file 14-019174-0007-CO), it is not possible to issue a final decision until that action is resolved. (Images 729 of the main file) This highlights a worrying delay in the completion of the compliance adjustment of the measures ordered by the CGR, which implies an impact on the rights of the owners to dispose of their properties, insofar as there is still no definition regarding the possible use regime for those properties. This circumstance prevents the resolution and granting of construction permits or environmental impact assessments (estudios de impacto ambiental) for project requests by owners of private lands located in the RNVS-GM, which, without a doubt, truncates that availability of the owners of privately owned properties. From this standpoint, it is necessary to urge the competent administrative units so that, within the strictest legal possibilities, the necessary measures are adopted and finalized in the shortest possible time to satisfy the inclusion of the environmental diagnosis in the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, so that the procedures for construction permit requests regarding private lands located within the area of that refuge can be reactivated, when possible. However, this condition does not allow the claim formulated to be admitted, seeking to lift those measures ordered by the CGR regarding that type of request, given the prevalence of environmental protection as a derivation of the precautionary principle that prevails in this field. The foregoing is because it was formulated in the principal claim 3 and in subsidiary claim 1, which respectively state: "3.- That the provisions that have paralyzed the plaintiffs' properties be rendered without effect." and "1- That this lawsuit be granted and that it be declared that we, the undersigned, in our capacity as private owners, are entitled to voluntarily withdraw from the forest regime at any time we so request, as it is a voluntary submission regime and not a perpetual easement (servidumbre)." XII.- Regarding the indemnification claims. Related to this point, in the subsidiary claims, the following indemnification claim is formulated: "3- That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay for Material Damages and consequential damages caused to each of the plaintiffs. Material damage as a consequence of the freezing their lands have suffered, given the impossibility of carrying out any type of construction for 70 months, totally restricting their use and disposition in an area of high attractiveness and with strong real estate dynamics, for which I prudentially estimate said damage at the sum of one million colones for each of the plaintiffs. Consequential damages for the depreciation suffered in the land values in the zone, a product of the mentioned paralysis and its effects on the real estate market and especially for contributing to creating a climate of high legal uncertainty in the zone where the plaintiffs' properties in this process are located, and, in general, all private property within the REGAMA, the mixed property that concerns us, for which I provisionally estimate said consequential damages at the sum of one million colones for each of the plaintiffs. Both sums are provisional and shall be determined in the sentence execution phase. (Images 58-105, 546, 549-552 of the main file)." What is requested demands making some (brief) references to the civil liability regime of the Public Administration. Under numeral 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the Administration is responsible for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning. It is worth noting that the legislator's reference is not simply to acts, but transcends the entire administrative functioning (article 49 of the Political Constitution), a concept that reflects any form of manifestation of administrative will, whether formal or material, and that also encompasses dysfunction, i.e., administrative omissions. Said responsibility is framed, therefore, within a preeminently objective regime, which encompasses in its foundation the theory of damage and risk, as well as the equilibrium in the patrimonial equation. This fundamentally seeks the compensatory reparation to someone who has experienced a lesion attributable to the public organization as a center of authority that proves to be unlawful at its base. This finalist criterion produces, in turn, a full transformation in the central axis of the responsibility itself, because it abandons the analytical observation of the subject producing the damage and the qualification of their conduct, to place itself in the position of the victim, who, diminished in their legal situation, is exempted from proving any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except as regards their personal responsibility). This causes, without a doubt, a shift in the very focus of its foundation, since there will be liability of the Administration whenever its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning causes damage that the victim has no duty to bear, whether patrimonial or extra-patrimonial, regardless of their subjective legal situation and the ownership or condition of power they hold, complying, of course, with the essential prerequisite of the causal nexus. On this topic, see the extensive development made in ruling no. 584 of 10 hours 40 minutes of August 11, 2005, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. From this standpoint, legislation imposes as criteria for imputation illicit or licit conduct, as well as normal or abnormal functioning. In the case of licit conduct and normal functioning, the Legal System establishes prerequisites and requirements that determine its origin; among them, the damage must be special or abnormal, which implies that it must fall upon a small proportion of affected persons, or in the second case, it must have an exceptional intensity. In these hypotheses, liability only covers the damage, not the loss of profit (lucro cesante) (articles 194 and 195 of the General Law of Public Administration). For its part, in illicit conduct and abnormal functioning, the liability is plenary. Nevertheless, given these criteria of imputability, it must be proven that the lesion is a consequence of these actions or omissions, in order to establish the causal nexus that allows the attribution of liability to the center of public authority. In addition to this, in cases of abnormality and illicitness, the judge must undertake an examination of the public functioning, in order to establish whether a proceeding that departs from legality or contradicts the concepts of administrative efficiency has indeed occurred. In such cases, it is decisive to clearly infer the existence of these criteria, because otherwise, the treatment and analysis of each case must be different, attending to the type of functioning to which the detriment is attributed. Exempting causes from such liability include the fault of the victim, the act of a third party, and force majeure. However, in each debate, the judge must examine whether the liberating effect of such circumstances is total or only partial, a case in which it can only produce a reducing effect on the liability of the administrative unit. Again, the concurrence of these aspects concerns the Administration. This compensatory duty subsists even in the face of damages caused as a result of faults committed by its officials or servants, during the performance of their duties or on the occasion of the position they hold. Indeed, canon 191, in relation to 199, both of the General Law of Public Administration, refer to the State objective responsibility for the actions or omissions of its officials, when they have used the position or the means it provides them to cause a harmful effect in the legal sphere of a third party, which there is no duty to bear. In that respect, those means or instruments are avenues of causal occasion that give rise to liability, due to the modal, instrumental, or indirect link with the service. It should be noted that this indemnity duty is based, in addition, on the concept of fundamental unlawfulness (antijuridicidad de base), translatable as the non-existence of the duty to bear the lesion. More simply, whenever a lesion has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, be it active or omissive, which the victim has no obligation to bear, the indemnity duty arises as a derivation of the maxim of integral reparation of damage that follows from numeral 41 of the Political Constitution. Hence, within the spectrum of coverage of this liability system, damages that may be caused by normal functioning or licit conduct are included, because in such cases, although in principle the public proceeding conforms to legality or the efficiency rules that guide it, if a harmful effect that the person has no duty to bear is produced, it must be compensated. Of course, in these hypotheses the damage must be special (infringed upon a small proportion of affected persons) or abnormal (i.e., of an exceptionally intense scope, above normal margins of tolerance), giving rise to the reparability of the damage, but not the loss of profit (lucro cesante), according to the rules provided by articles 194 and 195 of the General Law of Public Administration. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that not all damage is compensable, but only that which the Legal System considers fundamentally unlawful. Indeed, only the lesion that, when confronted with the entirety of the Legal System, can be deemed as fundamentally unlawful is compensable; the contrary would lead, according to the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, to affirming compensation for a harmful action in the face of a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified, which would lead to the imminent bankruptcy of the State, which in the national context, is linked directly or indirectly to a great number of action areas. Put in simpler terms, fundamental unlawfulness exists whenever a legal mandate establishes the obligation to repair a lesion contrary to law that the victim must not bear, aside from the imputation parameter. Still, as indicated, it is worth noting that not all damage is compensable, but only that which is effective, assessable, and individualizable. The breadth of the protective framework of the Administration's objective liability system is no obstacle to the duty to prove that the damage is a consequence of a public proceeding. In turn, the factual framework from which the lesion to extra-patrimonial assets can be inferred must be demonstrated. It is not enough to allege the existence of suffering or lesions; at least the facts that, in theory, have originated such detriment must be demonstrated. This comes as a derivation of the principle of the burden of proof, which follows from numeral 58 subsection e) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA) in relation to numeral 196 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), and norm 41.1. of the Civil Procedure Code, No. 9342, by establishing the need for the one who claims to have a right to prove the facts constitutive of that right. This is not a reversal of the burden of proof in a matter based on the integral reparation of damage and having as pillars the damage and the risk created, but rather the minimum verification of the imputation criteria and facts that give origin to the damage, as elementary prerequisites for the attribution of liability and thus the emergence of the reparatory obligation. Ordinal 82 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code establishes as one of the purposes of the process to determine the real truth of the facts, by any means of proof. However, this does not relieve the party claiming to have a right opposable to a third party, as is the case of the right to reparation of damage, from proving the factual foundations that support that right, as well as the very existence of the lesion. This is without prejudice to those cases where the suffering arises as a logical consequence of an administrative proceeding. The foregoing also derives from the provisions of canon 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, in that it states: “In any case, the alleged damage must be effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group.” The effectiveness of the damage in a specific case depends directly on the demonstration of the nexus of causality, which allows linking the harmful result with an action or omission of a Public Administration. This is also established in numeral 58 of the previously cited Code, in that it imposes on the plaintiff the duty to indicate the causes of the claimed lesion, what it consists of, and its prudential estimate. While such a requirement is provided for in the indicated norm when the reparation request is accessory, it must be satisfied with much greater reason when the core framework of the claim is an indemnification, because in those cases, the establishment of these prerequisites is the minimum basis for acceding to what is requested. In this dynamic, it is not enough to argue about the probable existence of damages; their effectiveness must be proven. Likewise, within this general scheme, it should be noted that the indemnification action sought to be imposed on the Public Administration is subject to a statute of limitations of four years, according to ordinal 198 of the General Law of Public Administration.

XIII.- In the specific case, the first point to set forth is the existence or not of damage that can be considered a valid basis for indemnification. Under the protection of precept 196 of the LGAP, the compensable damage must be effective, assessable, and individualizable (aspects already addressed), but also fundamentally unlawful (antijurídico en su base), i.e., that there is no legal duty to bear it. Furthermore, it is necessary for the person claiming its reparation to prove its existence, as well as the reference and existence of the causes to which it is imputed, so that the judge can verify the existence of a causal relationship between the antecedent fact to which it is attributed and the lesion as a consequence of that cause, while also having to consider whether it is referable or imputable to the subject blamed. As was anticipated above, the delay evidenced in this process regarding the due compliance with the provisions issued by the CGR concerning the environmental assessment (evaluación ambiental) of the Management Plan in the RNVS-GM, as well as the suspension of the processing of environmental impact studies and construction permits until the Management Plan (and the zoning regulations issued by Decree 34946-MINAET) is regularized, may well constitute a cause of disturbance of the exercise of the dominion right of private owners. However, that sole circumstance does not automatically lead one to assume the concurrence of real, effective, and individualizable damage that justifies the estimation of the indemnification claim formulated. Within the framework of the plaintiff's allegations, the requests for damages and consequential damages they make are based on conjectures that find no support in the merit of the case file. Note that regarding material damages, they associate them with the impossibility of using and disposing of their properties for the period the "freezing" has lasted, as well as with the restriction on the use of properties they consider to belong to an area of high attractiveness and with strong real estate dynamics. In the same way, they base the consequential damages on the supposed depreciation suffered in the land values in the zone, a product of the paralysis and its effects on the real estate market, and especially for contributing to creating a climate of high legal uncertainty in the zone where the plaintiffs' properties are located in this process, and in general, all private property within the RNVS-GM. Having considered the complaint, this Court does not find that the plaintiffs have duly proven the effective occurrence of the lesions whose reparation they seek. If one looks closely, their requests are based on subjective appreciations, which, regardless of their origin or not, require, to be a fertile basis for indemnification, the contribution of evidence that allows holding those harmful consequences to their respective legal spheres as proven. There is not a single piece of evidence in the case file from which the existence of these damages and consequential damages can be inferred or deduced, at least remotely, and in those terms, the claim under examination could not be subject to estimation. Such alleged detriments cannot be taken for granted by this Court, since they cannot even be considered the logical and necessary consequence of the delays that are pointed out. They are therefore mere conjectures of the plaintiffs, not supported by tangible and objective elements of proof, which leads, without further ado, to their rejection. For the foregoing, it is not an obstacle that the plaintiffs have indicated that such estimates are prudential and that they would be set in the sentence execution phase. In that order, in accordance with ordinal 122 subsection m) of the CPCA, the judgment rendered in this type of contentious-administrative process can order the award of damages and consequential damages, in the following terms: "i) Ruling on their existence and amount, provided they are proven in the case file when the judgment is rendered. ii) Ruling in abstract, when their existence is proven, but not their amount. iii) Ruling in abstract, when their existence and amount are not proven, provided they are a consequence of the administrative conduct or administrative-legal relationship objected to in the complaint." Under the protection of that mandate, in relation to precept 58 subsection e) of the CPCA and 196 of the LGAP, deferring the quantification of damages to the sentence execution phase requires that the occurrence of damages, at least in the abstract, has been previously proven, the quantification (liquidation) of which was not possible to determine in the ordinary or constitutive phase of the process, so that the details of the concrete magnitude of the lesions must be relegated to that procedural phase. Nevertheless, we insist, it is primary and cannot be postponed that the existence of the damage has been proven, which in this case has not occurred. On the other hand, not even through numeral iii) of subsection m) of the previously cited article 122 would it be possible to accede to the requests under study, given that it has been established that those conducts do not present the causes of invalidity that the claimants complain of. Consequently, this extreme of the complaint must be so ordered.

XIV.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses opposed. Once the legal transfer was granted, the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) opposed the defenses of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of right. For its part, the State opposed the defense of lack of right. The SINAC raised the defense of lack of right.

Regarding the CGR, with respect to the request concerning the voluntary withdrawal from the forest regime (régimen forestal), the defense of lack of passive legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) must be accepted, since, as that party effectively asserts, such a request does not involve in any way conduct or powers that are specific to that specialized body. Whether or not a property belongs to a forest regime, as well as the possibility of voluntary inclusion in or withdrawal of private owners from the forest regime, is a matter outside the decision-making authority of that oversight body. Consequently, under the terms of Article 12.1 in relation to 12.5 of the CPCA, the relationship of opposability of the effects of the claim with respect to that party is not observed, which leads to the acceptance of said defense. With respect to the rest, the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) is accepted. That same defense is accepted with regard to the State and SINAC, both in the main claims and in the subsidiary ones. Consequently, the dismissal of the lawsuit must be ordered in its entirety.

VI.- The first criticism formulated by the plaintiffs translates into a questioning of the CGR's powers to issue reports containing binding provisions on environmental matters. For this Tribunal, the relationship of the principle of protection of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment imposed by Article 50 of the Magna Carta, establishes in turn the duty of the State, in a broad sense, to undertake the appropriate actions to ensure the effectiveness of that constitutional maxim. In this case, the CGR alleges that its actions are aimed at protecting that environmental right, to the extent that the wildlife refuges (refugios de vida silvestre) are part of the Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado). In that sense, it should be noted that national regulations are prolific in provisions that have a tutelary purpose of the environment. Among these, Article 1 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, No. 7554 of November 13, 1995) establishes the State's duty to defend and preserve the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, in pursuit of the greatest well-being for the inhabitants of the Nation. Along the same lines, the first provision of the current Forest Law (Ley Forestal, No. 7575 of April 16, 1996) stipulates: "This law establishes, as an essential and priority function of the State, to ensure the conservation, protection, and administration of natural forests and the production, utilization, industrialization, and promotion of the country's forest resources destined for that purpose, in accordance with the principle of adequate and sustainable use of renewable natural resources. (...)". Because of its special relevance in this process, given the debate on various aspects of a wildlife refuge (RNVS-GM), it is crucial to refer to the regulation of the concept of protected wilderness areas (áreas silvestres protegidas), a category of which a wildlife refuge (RVS) forms a part. In this line, Article 32 of the Organic Environmental Law (No. 7554) states: "Article 32. Classification of protected wilderness areas. The Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, may establish protected wilderness areas, in any of the management categories that are established and indicated below: a) Forest reserves. b) Protective zones. c) National parks. d) Biological reserves. e) National wildlife refuges. f) Wetlands. g) Natural monuments. These management categories and those created in the future will be administered by the Ministry of Environment and Energy, except those established in Article 33 of this law. Municipalities must collaborate in the preservation of these areas." To the extent that the RVS-GM possesses or includes areas that are natural heritage of the State, a special duty of protection is imposed, as a derivation of the objectives set forth in Article 35 of that same law, which lists: "a) Conserve the representative natural environments of the different biogeographic regions and the most fragile ecosystems, to ensure the balance and continuity of evolutionary and ecological processes. b) Safeguard the genetic diversity of wild species on which evolutionary continuity depends, particularly those that are endemic, threatened, or in danger of extinction. c) Ensure the sustainable use of ecosystems and their elements, encouraging the active participation of neighboring communities. d) Promote scientific research, the study of ecosystems and their balance, as well as the knowledge and technologies that allow the sustainable use of the country's natural resources and their conservation. e) Protect and improve aquifer zones and hydrographic basins, to reduce and avoid the negative impact that their poor management can cause. f) Protect the natural and landscape environments of historical and architectural sites and centers, national monuments, archaeological sites, and places of historical and artistic interest, of importance for the culture and national identity." From that perspective, the Constitutional Chamber itself has highlighted the duty to protect the PNE, as indicated, among others, in ruling No. 21258-2010 at 2:00 p.m. on December 22, 2010. This duty of protection requires that, in cases like the present one, where the area that has been constituted as an RNVS is of a mixed nature, the areas that are public domain and fit within the category of Natural Heritage of the State must be delimited with due precision from those that are private domain. Consistent with the foregoing, as indicated above, in report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, the CGR warns that in the Zoning Regulations for the RNVS-GM, the areas corresponding to public and private domain (demanio público y privado) were not clearly delimited, while the limitations applicable due to the presence of forest ecosystems or wetlands on properties titled in favor of private parties, located in zone 1 Llanura Costera Cocles Manzanillo, were not considered. In light of these regulations, this Tribunal does not observe any infringement of the regime of powers that prohibits the CGR from conducting investigations and issuing reports containing provisions on environmental matters. It is in each case that it must be weighed whether the participation of that comptroller body implies a substitution of powers of the bodies that make up the Environmental Administration, but in general terms, the existence of specialized units in this matter does not restrict the control that the comptroller body could exercise over that matter. VII.- Regarding the regulations of the lands that make up the Protected Wilderness Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas), the Regulation to the Biodiversity Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Biodiversidad) designates them as follows in Article 3, subsection a): "A defined geographic space, officially declared and designated with a management category by virtue of its natural, cultural, and/or socioeconomic importance, to fulfill certain conservation and management objectives." It has already been established that according to Article 32 of the LOA, in relation to the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad), No. 7788, and its regulation, Executive Decree No. 34433, this latter norm in its Article 70, establishes that the protected wilderness areas are: a) Forest reserves. b) Protective zones. c) National parks. d) Biological reserves. e) National wildlife refuges. f) Wetlands. g) Natural monuments, h) Marine Reserves, and i) Marine Management Areas. In the same line, it sets out the types of RVS in the following sense: "Article 70.-Management categories of ASP. For the purposes of classifying the different management categories of protected wilderness areas, the following technical criteria are established for each one of them: a) ... e) National Wildlife Refuges: Geographic areas that possess terrestrial, marine, marine-coastal, freshwater ecosystems, or a combination thereof. Their main purposes will be the conservation, research, increase, and management of wild flora and fauna, especially those that are on the verge of extinction. For classification purposes, there are three classes of national wildlife refuges: e.1) State-owned refuges (Refugios de propiedad estatal). Those in which the areas declared as such belong entirely to the State and are public domain. Their administration shall correspond exclusively to SINAC. Their main objectives are: conservation, research, and management of wild flora and fauna, especially those species officially declared by the country as in danger of extinction or with reduced populations, as well as migratory species and endemic species. Because they are the natural heritage of the State, only research, training, and ecotourism activities may be carried out. e.2) Private refuges (Refugios de propiedad privada). Those in which the areas declared as such belong entirely to private parties. Their administration shall correspond to the property owners and be supervised by SINAC. Their main objectives are: conservation, research, and management of wild flora and fauna, especially those species officially declared by the country as in danger of extinction or with reduced populations, as well as migratory species and endemic species. On the lands of private refuges, only productive activities may be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation to the Wildlife Conservation Law (Reglamento de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre), Executive Decree No. 32633-MINAE, of March 10, 2005, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of September 20, 2005. e.3) Mixed-ownership refuges (Refugios de propiedad mixta). Those in which the areas declared as such belong partly to the State and partly to private parties. Their main objectives are: conservation, research, and management of wild flora and fauna, especially those species officially declared by the country as in danger of extinction or with reduced populations, as well as migratory species and endemic species. Their administration shall be shared between the private owners and SINAC, so that on State-owned lands, only the activities previously indicated for state-owned refuges, indicated in subsection i), may be carried out, while on privately owned lands, the activities indicated for private refuges, indicated in subsection ii), may be carried out, respecting the respective criteria and requirements." Regarding the present case, as has been indicated, the RVS-GM was created by Decree No. 16614, in effect since October 29, 1985, ratified by Executive Decree No. 34043 of November 11, 2007. Sections 4 and 7 of Decree 16614 require the issuance of a management plan (plan de manejo) as follows: "Article 4.—To carry out a forest management plan, a reforestation project within the Refuge, or to intend a land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo), a management plan must be prepared and must be approved by the General Forestry Directorate (Dirección General Forestal)." In the same vein, mandate 7 of the same stated: "Article 7.—The General Forestry Directorate through the Wildlife Department and the General Directorate of Fisheries and Aquaculture Resources must prepare a management plan for the utilization of marine resources, their products, and by-products. Both dependencies of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock shall coordinate with the community development associations of the surrounding localities the activities related to the resources mentioned in this article." As can be deduced from the recital part of that decree, the reason for creation lies in the existence in the Talamanca area of resources such as mangroves, swamps, forests, and reefs of unique value, as well as the existence of the country's only association of yolillo and orey, and the presence of endangered species such as the manatee, crocodile, caiman, tapir, and various species of monkeys and felines. Similarly, that decree refers to the existence in the coastal strip of the only natural mangrove oyster bed, one of the few breeding grounds for tarpon, and unique resident populations of lobster. But equally, recital 5 of that decree recognizes that the area possesses beaches of great tourist potential under regulated management. As a derivation of what is postulated in the recently referenced Sections 4 and 7, through Executive Decree No. 34946-MINAET, the Zoning Regulations for the RNVS-GM are issued. Precisely, from the review of the content of that Regulation, the CGR derived a series of observations, under the consideration that this planning did not consider the delimitation and applicable regulations for the lands that form part of the PNE, given the presence of forest ecosystems or wetlands on properties titled in the name of private parties, in the Llanura Costera Cocles Manzanillo zone. In that sense, the CGR relates that through official letter DFOE-AE-0452 of September 3, 2013, the Environmental and Energy Services Oversight Area (Área de Fiscalización de Servicios Ambientales y de Energía), regarding the environmental variable in that zoning, indicated that it was necessary for SINAC to manage again before SETENA the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) of that regulation, prior to considering compliance with provision b) of report note No. DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011 as accredited. VIII.- Regarding the need for that zoning regulation to satisfy the environmental variable in the terms established by the CGR, it should be noted, as was indicated, that through official letter No. DFOE-AE-0087 (2713) of February 18, 2015, the CGR made modifications to the provisions of report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, in response to the fact that through official letter DM-578-2014 of November 11, 2014, the head of MINAE stated that the competence for issuing management plans corresponded to the National Council of Conservation Areas (Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, CONAC), and therefore it was not the authority of the SINAC Director. Similarly, through official letter SG-143-2014-SETENA of July 2, 2014, the agreement of the Plenary Commission corresponding to ordinary session No. 73-2014-SETENA of July 1, 2014, Article 27, is forwarded, in which it is maintained that the environmental viability must be granted to the Management Plan and not to the Zoning Regulations. Given this background, the CGR modified part of the provisions originally issued to require the Minister of Environment and Energy to "Acknowledge and issue the Management Plan for the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo), sent to you by the National Council of Conservation Areas, according to provision b) of this official letter. Communicate to the Comptroller General the Executive Decree number and La Gaceta number in which said Plan is published, within the two calendar months following receipt of the Plan sent to you by the National Council of Conservation Areas." -condition a-. For its part, in condition b) it ordered CONAC to "Adjust and approve the Management Plan for the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, so that the zoning determined is in accordance with technical standards and legality, field technical studies, and in observance of the provisions of Articles 18 and 19 of Law No. 7575, as well as compliance with the purposes for creating the Refuge. Send the Management Plan to the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaria Técnica Nacional Ambiental) for processing of the environmental viability; this by no later than December 18, 2015. Once the environmental viability is obtained, send the Management Plan to the Minister of Environment and Energy for the issuance process, by no later than April 15, 2016. Send a copy of the official letter via which you send the Management Plan to the Minister of Environment and Energy to the Comptroller General, by no later than April 22, 2016." Likewise, it issued two new provisions, to the Plenary Commission of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, to establish the parameters to allow the environmental assessment of the management plans for Protected Wilderness Areas, classified in the category to which the Management Plan for the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge belongs; in addition to resolving on the environmental viability of the Management Plan for the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, sent to you by the National Council of Conservation Areas. It is concerning the constitution of these provisions that the examination proposed by the parties is entered into. In that sense, in accordance with Article 17 of the LOA, in relation to provision 1 of Executive Decree No. 32967-MINAE, it is necessary that this planning include an environmental impact study for the execution of projects or activities, which by their nature and content, involve the risk of altering or polluting the environment, as well as the mandatory nature of the cited variable in all land-use planning. Provision 1 of Executive Decree No. 32967 establishes in its initial paragraph: "Article 1.—Introduction of the environmental variable in Regulatory Plans (Planes Reguladores) or other Land-use Planning. In all land-use planning developed in the country, including cantonal or local regulatory plans, public or private, in which the development of activities, works, or projects that could generate effects on the environment is planned, the environmental variable must be integrated in accordance with the Procedure for the Introduction of the environmental variable in Regulatory Plans or other Land-use Planning established in Annex 1 of this decree. Which is also made available to the public at the headquarters of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat – SETENA and on the website of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce and the Federated College of Engineers and Architects. (...)". Unlike what the plaintiffs state, this Tribunal considers that the literal wording of this norm does not allow maintaining that this environmental variable only merits evaluation within regulatory plans, whether cantonal or local, public or private, excluding instruments such as Management Plans for Protected Wilderness Areas. If looked at closely, the grammatical reference to that type of regulatory plans is only as a reference for inclusion within the factual assumption previously defined by the norm, consisting of all land-use planning. That is, it is not limited only to regulatory plans, but to any programmatic instrument for land use that may impact the environment. In that sense, this Chamber shares the impressions of the State in pointing out that the Management Plans for Protected Wilderness Areas are planning instruments that seek to guide the management of land use toward the fulfillment of the creation objectives, and therefore seek to guide decisions in the management of not only state but also private lands. From this examination point of view, they are strategic mechanisms for the conservation and management of these zones, so there is no normative reason to deny the requirement for environmental diagnosis in this type of programming. As the State indicates, the fact that public and private areas converge in a zoning, the latter through agreements with private parties on the conservation of their properties, does not lead to denying the need to comply with environmental regulations and the actions inherent to the due protection of the environment, which includes, as in these cases, the satisfaction of the conservation objectives that have given basis to the creation of ASP, as well as the zoning strategies that include mixed-ownership properties. Hence, given the content of Decree 34946-MINAET (Zoning Regulations for the RNVS-GM), and the use regime that defines zones of residential, recreational residential, tourist hotel, special hotel, protection areas, camping, sports, parking, urban commercial, commercial, institutional, quarries, and cultural heritage types (see Article 1), as well as the indication of recommended uses, conditionally recommended uses, unpermitted uses, property dimensions, densities, and setbacks, it becomes necessary to define the harmony and balance of this land-use management programming with the ecosystems sought to be protected in that area, given the need to compare the specific use with the general or cumulative impact for the refuge, resulting from the presence of a coastal ecosystem that, due to its fragility, has been sought to be protected. On this topic, regarding the need for environmental impact assessments in the development of human activities, including zoning and land-use projects for environmentally relevant areas, in ruling 1220-2002 of February 6, 2002, in which it analyzed an unconstitutionality action filed against the SETENA Procedures Regulation, Decree 26228-MINAE and other norms, the Constitutional Chamber fundamentally stated: "...It was already anticipated that the Organic Environmental Law establishes in Article 17, as a development of what is provided in Article 50 of the Constitution, the obligation to have an environmental impact study to carry out activities or projects that by their nature may alter or pollute the environment. As the Attorney General's Office rightly points out in its report, the environmental impact study is conceived by the legislator as a technical procedure that allows controlling a possible environmental alteration with the consequent affectation of ecosystems. Without a doubt, it is a technical matter whose detailed regulation escapes the logic of the legislative procedure and can, as a thesis of principle and within the existing legal framework, be regulated by the Executive Branch. The Organic Environmental Law clearly states that '...Human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate waste, toxic or hazardous materials, will require an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) created in this law...', which allows affirming, in a correct reading, that no human activity that can alter or pollute the environment can dispense with the referred environmental impact study. The formula that the Executive Branch has devised so that it can be established, 'prima facie', whether the human activity undertaken can alter or destroy the environment, has been the presentation of the form called 'Preliminary Environmental Assessment'. It is not then, as the Administrative Environmental Tribunal maintains in its report, that the Executive Branch has absolute discretion to point out the projects that must carry out the environmental impact study, since by provision of the Political Constitution itself (Art. 50) and the Organic Environmental Law, as a general principle, all human activity modifying the environment 'will require' the referred study. It is then the condition of the project or work that will determine, in each case, whether or not the environmental impact study is required, and not the establishment of arbitrary conditions by regulatory means. The regulation should only establish the way in which the conditions of the project will be known, and that is what will determine the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the environmental impact study. This means that the defense and preservation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, conceptualized in Article 50 of the Constitution, is the fundamental right of every person and functions as an unavoidable general principle, so that in this matter it is not possible to make generic exceptions (in urban planning matters and other topics covered by Articles 19 and 20) to exempt compliance with environmental obligations, since doing so risks deconstitutionalizing the guarantee of state response in defense of the environment. Such being the case, the mechanism used by the Executive Decree determining 'a priori' activities or works that are exempt from the environmental impact study, in attention to the size of the work, the existence of regulatory plans, the number of people in the operation or activity, the number of rooms, the project's classification (social interest) or land use, evidences an excess in the exercise of regulatory power that surpasses the referral to Article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law and that empties the content of the inhabitants' right for the Public Powers to exercise direct environmental control –not by delegation to regencies– in the application of protective legislation. It is not meant by this that the Executive Branch cannot, via regulation, determine, based on precise technical studies that a certain activity or project does not require environmental impact studies; but this supposes that such a definition is duly motivated and justified. Remember that in the case of exempting a higher-level control (constitutional), the reasonableness and proportionality of the exceptional circumstance will be reviewable by the judge, either in the ordinary legal path or through constitutionality control. But to the general regime conceived by the derived Constituent, a generalized exception is inadmissible that has no other motivation or foundation than the very existence of the norm that so declares it.(...)". From this perspective, this Tribunal shares the CGR's considerations regarding the necessary weighting of the environmental variable within the Zoning Regulations of areas that, as in this case, because it is an RNVS of a mixed nature, where properties of both public domain (demanial) and private nature converge, impact the environment, a diagnosis that in itself, must be carried out in any development that presents a risk of environmental impact. If looked at closely, the indication of mandates 17 of the LOA and 1 of Decree 32967, do not constitute an exhaustive list of planning instruments that must necessarily have the environmental impact assessment. As the Constitutional Court has indicated in the recently cited ruling, the EIA is a technical procedure that allows controlling a possible environmental alteration with the consequent affectation of ecosystems, so the understanding of its utility and purpose would not allow sustaining an exhaustiveness or completeness of the references that those norms stipulate. On the contrary, from the analysis of the regulatory assumptions of Decree No. 32967-MINAE, it is clear that all land-use planning must include this environmental measurement, regardless of the type of property involved, which allows sustaining that the territorial planning to be implemented in a protected wilderness area requires the weighting of this variable. The foregoing regardless of whether a Zoning Plan for an RNVS or a protected wilderness area does not, initially, form part of a regulatory plan. At this point, it is worth highlighting what was indicated by the Environmental Services Oversight Area of the CGR in official letter DFOE-AE-0452, in which it pointed out that the mere circumstance that the Guide for the formulation of Management Plans for Protected Wilderness Areas and the Procedures Manual for the publication of Management Plans for Protected Wilderness Areas of SINAC does not set the procedure or the requirement of environmental viability does not eliminate the obligation to carry it out, given the prevalence of higher norms such as Article 50 of the Magna Carta, 17 of the LOA, and Article 1 of Executive Decree No. 32967-MINAE. Likewise, the need to have this environmental diagnosis not only in the Zoning Regulations for the RNVS-GM, but in the management plan (plan de manejo) for that sector, was noted by SETENA. Indeed, in the course of the follow-up actions for compliance with the provisions issued by the CGR, in official letter SG-DEAE-267-2013 of June 7, 2013, from SETENA, addressed to the Executive Directorate of SINAC, it is indicated in relevant part: "...By virtue of your official letter SINAC-DE-912, where you very specifically request us to submit the study 'Zoning Regulations for the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge' for assessment, in order for this Secretariat to grant environmental viability to the same, I must indicate the following: The minimum contents established in said decree include the environmental diagnosis studies which are the so-called environmental fragility indexes (IFAs), which are not provided within the documentation supplied by you; likewise, the environmental scoping analysis study (AAA) where the proposed zoning is evaluated is also not included within the documentation provided. Finally, the so-called sustainable development regulation (RDS) has not been included within the documentation submitted for assessment. What you have provided, as you well indicate in your official letter, is the Zoning Regulations for the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, which is not subject to evaluation by this Secretariat under the terms dictated by the aforementioned decree, that is, the evaluation of IFAs, AAA, and RDS. Such being the case, the provided document does not comply with what is established in Decree No.

32964-MINAE, therefore the granting of an environmental viability is not appropriate, and as such, a positive response could not be given to the explicit request to make an exception to grant environmental viability to the regulation in question, precisely because what was provided does not conform to the provisions of decree No. 3296-7MINAE". (Image 146 folder 1 CD evidence) This was later reiterated in official letter DEAE-247-2014 of June 30, 2014, in which SETENA indicates to the Plenary Commission that, in response to official letter DFOE-SD-1285 from the CGR (previous point), via official letter SG-DEAE-267-2013, SINAC was informed that the environmental assessment (diagnóstico ambiental) included the IFAs, AAA, and RDS, which had not been submitted. This position was endorsed by the Plenary Commission through agreement ACP-08-14 of July 1, 2014. (Images 191-193 folder 1 CD evidence) From this understanding, the requirement expressed in point b) of official letter DFOE-AE-0087 of February 18, 2015 (2713) from the CGR, which required the National Council of Conservation Areas (Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, CONAC) to: "b) To the National Council of Conservation Areas: Adjust and approve the Management Plan for the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, so that the zoning determined is in accordance with technical and legal standards, field technical studies, and in observance of the provisions of articles 18 and 19 of Law No. 7575, as well as compliance with the purposes for the Refuge's creation. Submit the Management Plan to the National Environmental Technical Secretariat for processing of environmental viability; this by no later than December 18, 2015. Once environmental viability is obtained, submit the Management Plan to the Minister of Environment and Energy for the issuance process, by no later than April 15, 2016. Send the Comptroller General a copy of the official letter sending the Management Plan to the Minister of Environment and Energy, by no later than April 22, 2016.", does not show the inaccuracies alleged by the plaintiffs, regarding the fact that the issuance of the aforementioned Zoning Regulation does not require compliance with the measurement of the environmental variable. For this Court, in the case of Protected Wild Areas, including those composed of public and private property (mixed), it is necessary to satisfy those environmental assessments (diagnósticos ambientales) to the extent that the land-use regime for privately owned properties must be consistent with the purposes of creation and protection of the area and with a use consistent with sustainable development, that is, in harmony with the environment. Such aspects consequently require that the proposed land-use regime within the respective area's management plan be carefully weighed. As evidenced in the case file, the Plenary Commission of SETENA, in the agreement adopted in article 10 of ordinary session No. 070-2015-SETENA of May 26, 2015, agreement number ACP-55-15, in response to the modifications made to official letter DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, modified by official letter DFOE-AE-0087 of February 18, 2015 (2713) from the CGR, ruled that the measurement of environmental viability was not necessary for the management plans of Protected Wild Areas, given that an analysis of Decree No. 32967 does not expressly contemplate such a scenario. (Images 223-228 of folder 1 CD evidence) However, later, in the agreement adopted in article 2 of ordinary session No. 0127-2015-SETENA of September 10, 2015, agreement number ACP-119-15, and under the indication that it maintained the position expressed in the aforementioned agreement number ACP-55-15, in compliance with the provisions of the CGR, it issued that decision solely for the case of RNVS-GM. In that sense, it agreed to approve the proposed terms of reference for incorporating the environmental variable into the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, a mixed category, proposed in official letter DEAE-288-2015 by geographer Nuria Chavarría, as a result of which it ordered SINAC to be instructed that it must proceed to request the opening of the respective administrative case file in SETENA for the purpose of processing the Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental) of the aforementioned Management Plan. (Images 232-234 folder 1 CD Evidence) From the above, it follows that the review and adjustment of the RNVS-GM Management Plan has SETENA's endorsement to grant environmental viability. Nonetheless, it is necessary to reiterate that this Chamber agrees with what was indicated by the CGR regarding the questioned conduct, in that the relationship of the above-cited norms allows and requires that the analysis of environmental feasibility must also be included in this type of planning instrument, given that these are instruments which, by providing permissibility or potential authorization for activities that will impact the environment intended to be protected by the creation of a Protected Wild Area (Área Silvestre Protegida, ASP)—in this case, of a mixed nature—must have that assessment to weigh its harmony and consistency with the environment and with the purpose pursued in creating the ASP. On this particular matter, it should be noted that through a submission dated October 9, 2018, the State informed the Court that through agreement of the Plenary Commission of Setena No. CCP-185-2017, adopted in article 09 of ordinary session 121-2017 of September 27, 2017, it is indicated regarding subsection e) of Report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, which requires it to resolve on the environmental viability of the RNVS-GM Management Plan, that this analysis has not been completed because it is in process, and furthermore, given the unconstitutionality action pending against Law No. 9223, which establishes the new boundaries and areas of the RNVS-GM (case file 14-019174-0007-CO), it is not possible to issue a final decision until that action is resolved. This circumstance will be considered below.

IX.- On the object of study of report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011. The plaintiffs reproach the content of the report in question for considering it biased and limited, to the extent that it only considered one area of the refuge, considering it illegitimate that the results of that analysis be applied to their properties, as they limit the exercise of their property rights. From the analysis of that official letter, it is clear that the study on which it was based was conducted for the period from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2009, through the review of documentation from the administrative files of the RNVS-GM Management Plan and its zoning, as well as related documentation, in accordance with the Manual of General Audit Standards for the Public Sector, No. M-2-2006-CO-DFOE. That report states that the review of that documentation determined that the Zoning Regulation issued via Executive Decree No. 34946-MINAET dated December 6, 2008, did not consider the delimitation or applicable regulations for the State's Natural Heritage lands, nor the limitations due to the presence of forest or wetland ecosystems on real estate titled in the name of private individuals, located in the area called "Cocles-Manzanillo Coastal Plain." It also notes that in ACLAC-073-2011 from the La Amistad Caribe Conservation Area, it was indicated that the zoning maps did not record the precise delimitation of the PNE, despite efforts having been made for the cadastral survey of the Refuge. It criticized that: "...the land uses permitted by that Regulation in the Cocles Manzanillo Coastal Plain apply equally to all lands without distinguishing whether they are PNE or if they are properties with land-use limitations currently held by private individuals, or if they have another condition. In this way, the referred Coastal Plain, with an area of 933.78 ha3, is subdivided into fifteen zones such as the agricultural zone of 104.73 ha; the residential zone of 56.06 ha; the recreational residential zone of 78.52 ha; the tourist hotel zone of 204.15 ha; and other categories that set out recommended uses and recommended uses with conditions that do not fit within what is permitted on PNE lands, or that do not detail restrictions associated with the presence of ecosystems of environmental fragility currently held by private individuals." As a complement to that analysis of files in that time range, the cited report specifies: "For purposes of complementing the analysis, this Comptroller General requested the collaboration of the Administrative Environmental Tribunal ... and the National Institute for Transfer in Agricultural Technology ... for the development of a field sampling on some lands located in the residential and tourist hotel zone of the aforementioned Cocles Manzanillo Coastal Plain, in order to ascertain the respective biological, forestry, and pedological conditions that would allow accounting for the state of those lands." After referring to the findings of the reports rendered by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal and INTA, it considered that the cases described revealed the presence of lands within the Cocles Manzanillo Coastal Plain that met high conditions of environmental fragility, despite which, they were not being adequately protected, since in some cases, despite the existence of forest or wetland areas, the lands had been intervened to the point of their degradation, contrary to the purposes of the refuge's creation. From that standpoint, the reference made to zone 1 of the RNVS-GM in the analyses carried out by the Administrative Environmental Tribunal and INTA complements the documentary examination previously carried out by the CGR and in no way implied only that zone. On the contrary, from the content of that report it is clear that despite prior knowledge of the existence of zones that form part of the PNE, these geographical zones were not duly identified or delimited in the cited Regulation, according to the reference made in official letter ACLAC-073-2011. Likewise, it highlights that the use permitted by the Regulation does not discriminate whether the land corresponds to PNE or to lands of another nature with limitations. Both issues are decisive for the due protection of the Protected Wild Area, to the extent that the land-use regime allows discriminating possible activities in order to safeguard the PNE, or the type of administrative limitation applicable to a specific geographical area. The questioned act reveals the relevance of that definition by indicating: "Regarding the aforementioned Cocles-Manzanillo coastal plain, it is characterized as a narrow plain less than a kilometer wide from Puerto Viejo to Punta Manzanillo... This area is important as a buffer zone, as it controls sedimentation and contamination on the coral reefs located a few meters from the beach and which could be affected by the erosion of the slopes to the south of the sector; furthermore, hydrological studies locate the most important aquifer in the area here...". Moreover, based on the reports from the Administrative Environmental Tribunal and INTA, it is evident that the lands in the sample zone present conditions of high environmental fragility, do not have the proper protection, and that despite the presence of forest or wetland, they have been intervened to the point of their degradation, which, it is reiterated, is contrary to the protection purpose that supported the creation of the refuge in question. Precisely on the basis of these considerations, the reference report (DFOE-03-2011), in the provisions section under subsection c), established: "c) To the Plenary Commission of SETENA: Refrain from granting environmental viabilities in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, until the Zoning Regulation is made official in accordance with the review and adjustments indicated above. Send this Comptroller General a copy of the Plenary Commission agreement where the pertinent instructions are given, by no later than July 30, 2011." It is clear that the absence of an environmental impact assessment in the Management Plan issued for the RNVS-GM entails, as a direct consequence, the impossibility of granting environmental viabilities for specific lands or sectors located within that Protected Wild Area, given that in this scope it must be considered as a unit of environmental protection due to the unitary safeguarding purpose conferred upon it by its creation. The analysis of those specific environmental viabilities, therefore, is subject to the Management Plan and the Zoning Regulations. On this particular matter, as mentioned by the CGR's representation, this Court had already ruled within case file No. 11-4480-1027-CA, which was an ordinary proceeding by the company Palma Verde Socratea S.A. against the State, a case in which it petitioned for a declaration of nullity of resolution DEA-1984-2011, which ordered the suspension of the process for granting environmental viability for the development of works on a property owned by it located within the RNVS-GM, considering that the suspension of the environmental assessment procedure was contrary to law and that the Comptroller's report on which SETENA based the suspension (a report which is precisely the one analyzed in this proceeding) was issued almost three years prior (at that moment), after which several environmental licenses had been issued. In judgment No. 248-2012-VI from 4:00 p.m. on November 2, 2012, this Contentious-Administrative Court, Section VI, ruled in relevant part: "... By reason of the foregoing, it is deemed that the reason alleged by the defendant party in the challenged act is real and existing, that there is no misapplication of the law, because within the legal framework accused of being violated, the regulation is subject to the law, according to the invoked article 129 of the Political Constitution, given that the Comptroller's report ordering the suspension, which is the reason alleged in the challenged act, does contain legally and technically stated reasons why the regulation is considered to fail to comply with article 17 of the Environmental Organic Law, that the forest zones, wetland zones are not sufficiently protected, nor is the State's Natural Heritage delimited, whereby, by reason of articles 7 and 50 of the Political Constitution, we would have that effectively the State, in accepting the suspension order issued by the Comptroller's Office, complies both with constitutional obligations and with those derived from laws and International Treaties regarding environmental protection, that is, a protective action would be being carried out to protect the environment, keep it healthy and ecologically balanced, applying the precautionary principle, which, like all variables of environmental law, proves to be a transversal axis to all public function activity, which must respond both legally and technically to protect the environment, and always be present in the factual and legal considerations that inform its actions. (...)". Although that judgment did not analyze the validity of the CGR's report, its reference is necessary as it highlights that this act reflects the technical reasons that led to the conclusion regarding the neglect of article 17 of the LOA, due to the insufficient protection of forest zones, wetlands, and lack of delimitation of the PNE, justifying reasons for the suspension of the proceeding ordered in that file. Again, if it was determined that the environmental assessment (diagnóstico ambiental) was necessary for the Management Plan, such that lacking that requirement, the Zoning Regulation showed that irregularity, it is clear that the authorizations for types of use or the granting of building permits (construction licenses), being dependent on that planning, must be suspended until what was indicated regarding the environmental variable is normalized. Attending to that logical link, it was ordered to direct SETENA to refrain from granting environmental viabilities, and to the Municipality of Talamanca, the same prohibition regarding the granting of construction permits, until the Management Plan was adjusted regarding the aforementioned issue.

X.- On construction permits, via official letter DFOE-AE-0159 (4811) of June 24, 2011, the Environmental Services and Energy Area of the Operational and Evaluative Oversight Division of the CGR communicated to the Municipality of Talamanca "Note report No. DFOE-AE-IF-05-2011 with the results of the study on some use permits granted by the Municipality of Talamanca on lands of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge." That act states, in relevant part, the result of the study of some cases for which the Municipality of Talamanca granted precarious land-use permits and construction permits to build structures on lands within the boundaries of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, in a period from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2009. Regarding the results, it reported: "1- It was determined that the Municipal Council of Talamanca granted precarious land-use permits on three State Natural Heritage (PNE) lands located within the Maritime Terrestrial Zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre, ZMT) of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge, which lack legality, as they were all granted under Law No. 6043, Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone, which does not apply in that Refuge in accordance with article 73 of that same regulatory body. Furthermore, that Municipality granted said permits without having the legitimacy to do so, because the holder of the administration of said Refuge is the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (MINAET) through the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC). ...". It deemed that the Local Council lacked the competence to grant land-use permits granted in ordinary session No. 27 of November 8, 2006, in relation to the land described in cadastral plan L-658883-2000; a permit granted in ordinary session No. 41 of February 21, 2007, cadastral plan L-1155267-2007; a use permit in extraordinary session No. 76 of July 17, 2008, land in plan L-660211-2000. It pointed out that those cases are located within the RNVS-GM zone, which overlaps with the limits originally occupied by the Bribri de Kekoldi Indigenous Territory, created by Executive Decree No. 7267 of August 9, 1977, and whose boundaries were ratified in Indigenous Law No. 6172 of November 29, 1977. In said report, it issued the following provisions to the Council and the Municipal Mayor of Talamanca: "a) To the Municipal Council of Talamanca i- Review the legality of the precarious land-use permits granted on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, in order to take the actions legally appropriate, especially in accordance with articles 73 of the Law on the Maritime Terrestrial Zone No. 6043 and article 32 of the Environmental Organic Law No. 7554. Inform this oversight body of actions taken, via an official letter to be sent by no later than May 30, 2012. ii- Refrain henceforth from granting precarious use permits on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge. Send this Comptroller General, by no later than July 30, 2011, a copy of the Municipal Council agreement adopting this measure. b) To the Municipal Mayor of Talamanca i- Review the legality of the construction permits granted on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge to assess the existence of possible nullities and adopt the corresponding actions in accordance with the law, respecting due process, in observance of technical and legal aspects, and especially in accordance with article 32 of the Environmental Organic Law No. 7554 and article 58 of the Biodiversity Law No. 7788. Inform this oversight body via official letter of actions taken, by no later than August 31, 2012. ii- Refrain henceforth from granting construction permits on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, until the Zoning Regulation, adjusted by SINAC and MINAET, is made official in accordance with what was requested by this oversight body through report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011 of May 31, 2011. Send this Comptroller General, by no later than July 30, 2011, a copy of the administrative resolution issuing the pertinent instructions. (...)". (Images 183-192 of the principal file) Given that the invalidity of point b) ii) of that official letter is being challenged, regarding the abstention from granting construction permits, it must be specified that, certainly, in the case of a mixed-category Wildlife Refuge, which therefore involves private and public properties, it is evident that the protection of the right to private property, enshrined in article 45 of the Magna Carta, stipulates that the administrative limitations imposed on the substantial content of the right of ownership must be legitimate and rational. In this line, the analysis of the environmental variable allows for the generation of inputs and technical criteria that permit objective justification of the limitations necessary for a specific geographical space or activity, while also constituting a tool that would lead to the removal of excessive limitations, unsupported by technical references and considerations. In that sense, administrative limitations have common limits, among which the following can be indicated: - They must be proportional to the administrative need they must satisfy; - They must have some type of plausible justification, they must truly respond to an administrative need; - It is required that the property not be altered, disintegrated, or dismembered; - They must be valid in their form, competence, object, and intent. The above implies the legal duty to tolerate administrative limitations for reasons of public necessity and social interest. However, it is clear that by virtue of a limitation of this nature, the material effect of rendering the property dysfunctional cannot be brought about, that is, denying the proper exercise of the right of ownership regarding its essential attributes, because in such a case, one would be facing a de facto expropriation, with the legal consequences that entails, namely, the duty to compensate the owner who has been deprived of that right. In this case, by virtue of the principle of the environmental function of property, whose support rests on the relationship between articles 45 and 50 of the Political Constitution, the Environmental Organic Law, and the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), even private properties included within protected wild areas must satisfy the land-use regime in accordance with the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, in order to the postulate of sustainable development and prior environmental assessment. In that order, for example, within the limits derived from the aforementioned environmental function, the exercise of any human activity that could potentially generate an alteration to the environment requires a prior environmental assessment before the development of activities (art. 17 LOA); moreover, the land-use regime must be consistent with the zoning or management plans applicable to the geographical area in order to protect the purpose for creating the Protected Wild Area (in this type of matter). Even within that land-use regime, it is necessary to limit activities whose potential effect is the interruption of the natural cycles of ecosystems, such as intrusion into the natural cycles of forest regeneration or wetlands. From this perspective, the conditioning of granting construction permits or continuing the processing of environmental impact study procedures does not constitute an unreasonable imposition in this specific case, given that there must be harmony in the individual analysis of these procedures with respect to the general framework represented by the Management Plan (Plan de Manejo). It is a derivation pertinent to the case from the principles of prevention, precaution, and in dubio pro natura, which operate in this matter, and from a clear protection and conservation of the protected areas in question, in accordance with the provisions of canons 22 of the Biodiversity Law No. 7788 and 42 of the LOA. It is clear that environmental matters impose legitimate limitations on the exercise of the right to build, a component of the right of ownership (art. 264 Civil Code), which requires that building activities, and with greater reason in this type of protected area, harmonize with the principle of sustainable development and the environmental function of property that supports those limitations. Hence, when analyzing the appropriateness or not of construction permits, it is necessary to have a Management Plan that conforms to the conditions of ecological harmony already discussed. Nonetheless, this Court observes that to date, the CGR's provision regarding the adjustment of the Management Plan to the instruments for weighing the environmental variable has not been effectively materialized. In fact, as has been stated, via a submission dated October 9, 2018, the State informed the Court that through the agreement of the Plenary Commission of Setena No. CCP-185-2017, adopted in article 09 of ordinary session 121-2017 of September 27, 2017, it is indicated regarding subsection e) of Report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, which requires it to resolve on the environmental viability of the RNVS-GM Management Plan, that this analysis has not been completed because it is in process, and furthermore, given the unconstitutionality action pending against Law No. 9223, which establishes the new boundaries and areas of the RNVS-GM (case file 14-019174-0007-CO), it is not possible to issue a final decision until that action is resolved. (Images 729 of the principal file) That is, from the issuance of the questioned CGR report to date, the attention and resolution of the environmental viability procedures for the Plan have not been able to be completed, which directly prevents the resolution and granting of construction permits or environmental impact studies for project requests by owners of private properties located in the RNVS-GM. This circumstance could well end up affecting the availability of the private domain property owners, an aspect that, for reasons of order, will be analyzed below. However, this does not lead to establishing the invalidity of the provisions issued by the CGR, which, in order of what has been stated, are considered reasonable, consistent, and necessary with the results of the investigation that produced report No. DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, because requiring the inclusion of the environmental assessment (diagnóstico ambiental) within the REGAMA Management Plan would be futile if the granting of construction permits and environmental feasibility studies for private properties located within the refuge area is not limited. Note that the cited official letter not only refers to the possible illegality of construction permits granted in areas where competence corresponded to the administrator of the Refuge, i.e., MINAE, but also to the impossibility of continuing to grant construction permits until the matter relating to the adjustment of the Zoning Regulation is clarified.

XI.- On the claims related to the voluntary nature of the forest regime. In their subsidiary claim, the following is formulated: "1- This lawsuit is granted, and it is declared that the undersigned, in our capacity as private owners, have the right to voluntarily withdraw from the forest regime at the moment we request it, as it is a voluntary submission regime and not a perpetual easement (servidumbre)." Now, it has been established in this process, a non-controversial aspect, that the plaintiff entities own properties located within the area of the RNVS-GM, the reference of which can be observed in proven fact number 2) of this ruling. It has already been established that by virtue of the environmental and social function of private property, article 45 of the Magna Carta itself, in its third paragraph, establishes the possibility of imposing limitations for reasons of public interest on the right of ownership, a derivation of which is that it is clearly a right that is not absolute, to the extent that the legal duty to accept such restrictions is imposed. In that order, it is insisted, in the ecological realm, the Environmental Organic Law itself imposes the obligation on the State (and other public entities) to promote sustainable development, which entails the exercise of private property in congruence and harmony with the environment, so that human activities are carried out in coordination with the regeneration of the environment. This implies that economic and environmental development must be promoted in a sustainable manner. The foregoing justifies the imposition of limits on the exercise of those human economic, productive, or private activities, so that the environment is impacted to the least degree possible, or its maintenance or regeneration is permitted.

In cases such as the present one, this ideological vision, with formal normative expression, entails that in cases where private properties are located within environmentally sensitive areas that have a special protection regime, the activities to be carried out must be framed within the planned use, oriented toward the protection of those ecosystems. Thus, in the case of Protected Wild Areas, it is necessary for land use to be subject to prior assessments of potential impact on the natural resources present in the protected area, such as wetlands, marine resources, and soil capacity, in accordance with the use regime that, in principle, based on technical reasonableness, must have weighed the synergy between productive activities and ecological considerations. In this regard, Article 34 of the Organic Environmental Law (No. 7554), by way of reference, imposes the duty to adopt preventive measures in Protected Wild Areas to prevent or eliminate exploitation or occupation throughout the state-owned area, and to enforce respect for the ecological, geomorphological, and aesthetic characteristics that determined its establishment. This same purpose is developed in Article 35 of the same law, insofar as it sets the objectives for the creation, conservation, administration, development, and monitoring of protected areas, among which may be mentioned, solely by way of reference: "a) Conserve representative natural environments of the different biogeographical regions and the most fragile ecosystems, to ensure the balance and continuity of evolutionary and ecological processes; b) Safeguard the genetic diversity of wild species on which evolutionary continuity depends, particularly endemic, threatened, or endangered species; c) Ensure the sustainable use of ecosystems and their elements, encouraging the active participation of neighboring communities; d) Promote scientific research, the study of ecosystems and their balance, as well as the knowledge and technologies that allow for the sustainable use of the country's natural resources and their conservation; e) Protect and improve aquifer zones and hydrographic basins, to reduce and avoid the negative impact that poor management may cause; f) Protect the natural and scenic environments of historical and architectural sites and centers, national monuments, archaeological sites, and places of historical and artistic interest, important for culture and national identity." For purposes of the present matter, and given the claims of the plaintiff entities, the provisions of Article 37 of that Law No. 7554 are relevant, as it regulates the treatment of including private properties in the creation of state Protected Wild Areas:

"Article 37.- Powers of the Executive Branch. When establishing protected wild areas, whatever their management category, the Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía), is empowered to include, within their boundaries, the private properties or parts of private properties necessary to fulfill the objectives set forth in this law and to implement them in accordance with the respective management plan, or to create legal easements (servidumbres) for ecological protection and compliance with this law.

When dealing with national parks, biological reserves, or state national wildlife refuges, the lands shall be acquired by purchase, expropriation, or both procedures, with prior compensation. In the case of forest reserves, protective zones, mixed wildlife refuges, and wetlands, the properties or parts thereof may also be purchased or expropriated, unless, at the owner's request, they voluntarily submit to the forest regime. This submission shall be registered in the Public Property Registry as an encumbrance (afectación) on the property, which shall be maintained for the time established in the management plan.

Private properties affected according to the provisions of this article, by being located in national parks, biological reserves, wildlife refuges, forest reserves, and protective zones, shall be comprised within the state protected areas only from the moment payment has been made or they have been legally expropriated, except when they voluntarily submit to the Forest Regime. In the case of forest reserves, protective zones, and wildlife refuges, and if payment or expropriation has not been carried out and while it is being carried out, the areas shall be subject to an environmental management plan that includes the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) and subsequently, to the plan for management, recovery, and restoration of the resources. (The preceding paragraph as amended by Article 72, subsection c) of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, which in turn was amended by Article 114 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad), No. 7788 of April 30, 1998) The Executive Branch is empowered, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, to carry out the expropriations contemplated in this article, in accordance with the provisions of the Expropriations Law No. 7495, of May 3, 1995." As observed, that precept establishes the possibility of including privately owned lands within mixed-category Wildlife Refuges, for which purpose the State may either opt for their purchase or expropriation, or the owners of those properties may voluntarily submit to the forest regime, in which case the due registry annotation shall be made, whose validity shall be for the time established in the management plan. In this sense, once the owner of the property right has voluntarily entered the forest regime, the validity of that encumbrance regime is maintained for the period established in the management plan. According to that precept, once those private properties have been acquired by purchase or expropriation, or when the owner has voluntarily submitted to the forest regime, they become incorporated into the state protected wild areas. However, the same norm specifies that while that acquisition is being carried out, those properties are subject to the Management Plan or Environmental Management Plan. From this perspective of analysis, contrary to what the plaintiffs state, once a private property is included within the design of a National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre, RNVS), even though its inclusion has been voluntary, it cannot likewise be withdrawn, insofar as that portion of land has been considered part of a single functional environmental and ecological unit, and therefore, an essential component of an ecosystem that seeks to be protected and conserved as the very rationale for the constitution of the Protected Wild Area, in that category. Otherwise, an undeniable impact on the integrity of said ecosystem would occur if it were permitted that, upon dissociation from the forest regime, the owner could put the land to a use different from that established in the respective Management Plan for that area. In any case, as Article 37 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, LOA) rightly indicates, even in cases where the acquisition procedure by the State is pending, those properties would be subject to the use limitations derived from the respective Management Plan and Zoning Regulation, regulatory instruments that, by special competence, constitute the reference for the land-use destination in those zones. Indeed, the environmental protection emanating from the Forest Law itself (No. 7575), which imposes the principle of sustainable development, obliges that the use regime of those spaces be consistent and consequent with the protection policies for those resources defined by the environmental management instrument, which likewise links to the environmental protective purposes set forth in Article 14 of the Biodiversity Law. This purpose is observed in what has been presented, in the sense that construction permits for those private properties could not be granted contrary to those environmental ordinances (Management Plan and Zoning Regulation of the RNVS), regardless of whether the private owners are included or not within the forest regime, since ultimately, the purpose of protecting the Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado, PNE) prevails in these disputes. At this point, it is worth highlighting what was indicated by the State and the CGR (Contraloría General de la República), a matter not rebutted by the plaintiffs, regarding that the territorial space over which this proceeding is brought is a mixed-category RNVS, which by design includes public and private property, in a case where the constitution process of REGAMA through Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG was agreed upon with the community, without any element in the case file that would allow holding a different criterion, such that apart from what has been stated, the private properties that form part of the refuge area are subject to the limitations inherent in that regime. Of course, if that regime were to materially lead to a substantial hollowing out of the property right, that is, to a dysfunctionality of that right, the duty of the State to expropriate those private lands would arise. However, as has been noted, the measures that are the object of challenge in this case impose rational provisions regarding assessment of the environmental variable and suspension of construction permit procedures, given the situations detected concerning the implications and content of the Zoning Regulation issued through Executive Decree No. 34946-MINAET of December 6, 2008. Such provisions of the CGR do not prevent the exercise of the essential attributes of the property right of private owners, even though they condition the processing and granting of construction permits on the inclusion of the environmental assessment in the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, but this does not entail or imply a substantial suppression of the property right. Note that the parties fail to prove that they had processed any procedure in that sense. However, as was warned above, by brief dated October 9, 2018, the State informs the Court that through the agreement of the SETENA (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) Plenary Commission No. CCP-185-2017 adopted in Article 09 of the ordinary session 121-2017 of September 27, 2017, it is stated regarding subsection e) of Report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, which requires resolving on the environmental viability of the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, that said analysis has not concluded because it is in process, and furthermore, given the unconstitutionality action pending over Law No. 9223 which establishes the new boundaries and areas of the RNVS-GM (file 14-019174-0007-CO), it is not possible to issue a final decision until that action is resolved. (Images 729 of the main file). This reveals a concerning delay in the completion of the conformity adjustment of the measures ordered by the CGR, which implies an impact on the rights of the owners to dispose of their properties, insofar as there is still no definition regarding the possible use regime on those lands. This circumstance prevents the resolution and granting of construction permits or environmental impact studies for project requests by owners of private lands located in the RNVS-GM, which undoubtedly truncates that availability for the owners of privately-owned properties. From this standpoint, it is necessary to urge the competent administrative units so that, within the strict legal possibilities, the necessary measures be adopted and implemented in the shortest possible time to satisfy the inclusion of the environmental diagnosis in the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, such that the procedures for construction permit applications regarding private lands situated within the area of that refuge can be reactivated, when possible. However, that condition does not permit admitting the claim formulated to lift those measures ordered by the CGR regarding that type of application, given the prevalence of environmental protection as a derivation of the precautionary principle that prevails in this field. The foregoing, because it was formulated in principal claim 3 and in subsidiary claim 1, which state respectively: "3.- That the provisions that have paralyzed the plaintiffs' properties be rendered ineffective." and "1- That this lawsuit be granted and that it be declared that the undersigned, in our capacity as private owners, have the right to voluntarily withdraw from the forest regime at the moment we request it, as it is a voluntary submission regime and not a perpetual easement (servidumbre)." XII.- Regarding the claims for compensation. Related to this point, in the subsidiary claims, the following claim for compensation is formulated: "3- That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay for Material Damages and losses caused to each of the plaintiffs. Material damage as a consequence of the freezing their lands have suffered due to the impossibility of carrying out any type of construction for 70 months, totally restricting their use and disposition in an area of high attractiveness and strong real estate dynamics, for which I prudentially estimate said damage in the sum of one million colones for each of the plaintiffs. Losses for the depreciation suffered in land values in the area, as a product of the aforementioned paralysis and its effects on the real estate market and especially for contributing to creating a climate of high legal uncertainty in the area where the plaintiffs' properties are located in this proceeding and, in general, all private property within REGAMA, the mixed property that concerns us, for which I provisionally estimate said losses in the sum of one million colones for each of the plaintiffs. Both sums are provisional and shall be determined in the sentence execution phase. (Images 58-105, 546, 549-552 of the main file)." What is petitioned requires making some (brief) references to the civil liability regime of the Public Administration. Under Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), the Administration is liable for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning. It is worth highlighting that the legislature's reference is not simply to acts, but transcends the entire administrative functioning (Article 49 of the Political Constitution), a concept that reflects any form of manifestation of administrative will, whether formal or material, and that also encompasses dysfunction, that is, administrative omissions. Said liability is framed, therefore, within a preeminently objective regime, which encompasses in its foundation both the theory of damage and risk, as well as the equilibrium in the patrimonial equation. This fundamentally seeks compensatory reparation for anyone who has experienced a harm attributable to the public organization as a center of authority that turns out to be unlawful in its basis. This finalist criterion produces, in turn, a complete transformation in the central axis of liability itself, as it abandons the analytical observation of the subject producing the damage and the qualification of their conduct, to place itself in the position of the victim, who, diminished in their legal situation, is exempted from proving any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except regarding their personal liability). This undoubtedly causes a shift in the very focus of its foundation, since there will be liability of the Administration whenever its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate functioning causes a damage that the victim has no duty to bear, whether patrimonial or non-patrimonial, regardless of their subjective legal situation and the ownership or condition of power they hold, complying of course with the indispensable prerequisite of the causal nexus. On the subject, see the extensive analysis carried out in resolution No. 584 of 10 hours 40 minutes of August 11, 2005, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. From this standpoint, legislation imposes unlawful or lawful conduct, as well as normal or abnormal functioning, as criteria for imputation. In the case of lawful conduct and normal functioning, the Legal System establishes prerequisites and requirements that determine its applicability, among them, the damage must be special or abnormal, which means it must fall on a small proportion of affected persons, or, in the second case, it must have exceptional intensity. In these hypotheses, liability only covers the damage, not lost profits (lucro cesante) (Articles 194 and 195 of the General Law of Public Administration). Meanwhile, in unlawful conduct and abnormal functioning, liability is plenary. Nevertheless, given those criteria of imputability, it must be proven that the harm is a consequence of those actions or omissions, in order to establish the causal nexus that allows attributing liability to the center of public authority. In addition to this, in cases of abnormality and unlawfulness, the judge must approach an examination of public functioning, in order to establish whether there has effectively been a proceeding that departs from legality or contradicts the concepts of administrative efficiency. In such cases, clearly inferring the existence of these criteria is decisive, because otherwise, the treatment and analysis of each case must be different, depending on the type of functioning to which the detriment is attributed. Causes for exempting such liability include the fault of the victim, the act of a third party, and force majeure. However, in each debate, the judge must examine whether the liberating effect of such circumstances is total or only partial, in which case it may only produce a reducing effect on the liability of the administrative unit. Again, the concurrence of those aspects is the responsibility of the Administration. This compensatory duty subsists even against damages caused as a result of faults committed by its officials or servants, during the performance of their duties or on occasion of the position they hold. Indeed, Article 191, in relation to Article 199, both of the General Law of Public Administration, refer to the State's objective liability for the actions or omissions of its officials, when they have used the position or the means it provides them to cause a harmful effect on the legal sphere of a third party, which there is no duty to bear. In that regard, those means or instruments are channels of causal occasionality that give way to liability, through modal, instrumental, or indirect linkage with the service. It should be noted that this compensatory duty is also based on the concept of basic unlawfulness, translatable into the nonexistence of the duty to bear the harm. More simply, whenever a harm has been suffered as a consequence of public conduct, whether active or omissive, that the victim has no obligation to bear, the compensatory duty arises as a derivation of the maxim of integral reparation of damage that follows from Article 41 of the Political Constitution. Hence, within the coverage spectrum of this liability system, damages that may be caused by normal functioning or lawful conduct are included, since in such cases, even though in principle the public proceeding conforms to legality or the efficiency rules that guide it, if a harmful effect is produced that the person has no duty to bear, it must be compensated. Of course, in those hypotheses the damage must be special (inflicted on a small proportion of affected persons) or abnormal (that is, of exceptionally intense scope, above the normal margins of tolerance), giving rise to the reparability of the damage, but not lost profits, according to the rules provided by Articles 194 and 195 of the General Law of Public Administration. Nevertheless, it should be noted that not all damage is compensable, but only that which the Legal System considers unlawful in its basis. Indeed, only the harm that, confronted with the whole of the Legal System, can be deemed unlawful in its basis is compensable; the contrary would lead, according to the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, to affirming compensation for harmful action against a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and accepts as normal and justified, which would lead to an imminent bankruptcy of the State, which in the national context is linked directly or indirectly to a great number of areas of action. Stated in simpler terms, basic unlawfulness exists whenever a legal mandate establishes the obligation to repair a harm contrary to law that the victim should not bear, regardless of the imputation parameter. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be pointed out that not all damage is compensable, but only that which is effective, evaluable, and individualizable. The breadth of the protective framework of the Administration's objective liability system is not an obstacle to the duty to prove that the damage is a consequence of a public proceeding. In turn, the factual framework from which it is viable to deduce harm to non-patrimonial assets must be demonstrated. It is not enough to allege the existence of suffering or injuries; at least the facts that, in theory, have originated such detriment must be demonstrated. This comes as a derivation of the principle of the burden of proof, which arises from Article 58 subsection e) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA) in relation to Article 196 of the LGAP, and rule 41.1. of the Civil Procedure Code, No. 9342, by establishing the need for whoever claims to have a right to prove the facts constituting it. It is not a matter of reversing the burden of proof in a matter that is based on the integral reparation of damage and has damage and created risk as its pillars, but of the minimum verification of the imputation criteria and facts that give rise to the damage, as elementary prerequisites for attributing liability and, with it, the emergence of the duty to compensate. Article 82 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code establishes as one of the purposes of the process to determine the real truth of the facts, through any means of proof. However, that does not relieve the party claiming to have a right opposable to a third party, as is the case with the right to reparation of a damage, from proving the factual foundations that support that right, as well as the very existence of the harm. The foregoing is without prejudice to those cases in which the suffering arises as a logical consequence of an administrative proceeding. The foregoing also derives from the provisions of Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, insofar as it states: “In any case the alleged damage must be effective, evaluable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group.” The effectiveness of the damage in a specific case depends, directly, on demonstrating the causal nexus, which allows linking the harmful result with an action or omission of a Public Administration. This is also established in Article 58 of the previously cited Code, insofar as it imposes the duty on the plaintiff to indicate the causes of the claimed harm, what it consists of, and its prudential estimation. While such a requirement is provided for in the indicated norm when the claim for compensation is accessory, it must be satisfied with much greater reason when the core framework of the claim is compensation, since in those cases, the establishment of those prerequisites is the minimum basis for granting what is petitioned. In this dynamic, it is not enough to argue about the probable existence of damages; their effectiveness must be proven. Likewise, within this general scheme, it must be noted that the compensatory action sought to be charged to the Public Administration is subject to a statute of limitations of four years, according to Article 198 of the General Law of Public Administration.

XIII.- In the case at hand, the first point to consider is the existence or not of damage that can be considered a valid basis for compensation. In light of precept 196 of the LGAP, compensable damage must be effective, evaluable, and individualizable (aspects already addressed), but also, unlawful in its basis, that is, there must be no legal duty to bear it. Moreover, it is necessary for the person claiming its reparation to prove its existence, as well as the reference to and existence of the causes to which it is attributed, so that the judge can verify the existence of a causal relationship between the antecedent fact attributed as cause and the harm as a consequence of that cause, while also having to weigh whether it is referable or attributtable to the subject to whom it is charged. As was anticipated above, the delay evidenced in this proceeding regarding the due compliance with the provisions issued by the CGR concerning the environmental assessment of the Management Plan in the RNVS-GM, as well as the suspension of processing of environmental impact studies and construction permits until the Management Plan is regularized (and the zoning regulation issued by Decree 34946-MINAET), may well constitute a cause of disturbance to the exercise of the property right of private owners. However, that single circumstance does not automatically lead to the presumption of the concurrence of real, effective, and individualizable damage that justifies the estimation of the compensatory claim being formulated. Within the framework of the plaintiffs' allegations, their claims for damages are based on conjectures that find no support in the merits of the case file. Note that regarding material damages, they associate them with the impossibility of using and disposing of their assets for the period during which the "freezing" has been maintained, as well as with the restriction on using assets that, they believe, belong to an area of high attractiveness and strong real estate dynamics. Likewise, they base the claim for losses on the supposed depreciation suffered in land values in the area, as a product of the paralysis and its effects on the real estate market and especially for contributing to creating a climate of high legal uncertainty in the area where the plaintiffs' properties are located in this proceeding and, in general, all private property within the RNVS-GM. Having weighed the complaint, this Court does not find that the plaintiffs have duly proven the effective occurrence of the injuries whose reparation they seek. Upon close inspection, their requests are based on subjective appreciations, which, regardless of their pertinence or not, require, to be a fertile basis for compensation, the contribution of elements of conviction that allow those harmful consequences to their respective legal spheres to be taken as proven. There is not a single piece of evidence in the case file from which the existence of those damages and losses can be inferred or deduced, at least remotely, and in those terms, the claim under examination could not be subject to estimation. Such alleged detriments cannot be taken for granted by this Court, since they cannot even be considered a logical and necessary consequence of the delays being asserted. They are, therefore, mere conjectures by the plaintiffs, not supported by tangible and objective elements of proof, which leads, without more, to their rejection. For the above, it is no obstacle that the plaintiffs have indicated that such estimations are prudential and would be set in the sentence execution phase. In that vein, in accordance with Article 122 subsection m) of the CPCA, the judgment issued in this type of contentious administrative proceeding can order the award of damages and losses, in the following terms: "i) Pronouncement on their existence and amount, provided they are proven in the case file at the time judgment is rendered. ii) Pronouncement in the abstract, when their existence is proven, but not their amount. iii) Pronouncement in the abstract, when their existence and amount are not proven, provided they are a consequence of the administrative conduct or legal-administrative relationship that is the object of the lawsuit." Under that mandate, in relation to precept 58 subsection e) of the CPCA and 196 of the LGAP, the deferral of the quantification of damages to the sentence execution phase requires that, beforehand, the occurrence of damages whose quantification (liquidation) was not possible to determine in the ordinary or constitutive phase of the proceeding has been proven, at least in the abstract, such that the details of the concrete magnitude of the injuries must be relegated to that phase of the process. However, it is insisted, it is primary and imperative that the existence of the damage has been proven, which has not occurred in this case. On the other hand, it would not even be possible to grant the requests under study by way of subsection iii) of subsection m) of Article 122 previously cited, since it has been established that those conducts do not present the grounds for invalidity that the claimants challenge. Thus, this part of the complaint must be disposed of.

XIV.- Corollary. Analysis of defenses raised. Upon granting the legally mandated transfer, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) raised the defenses of lack of passive legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of right.

For its part, the State raised the defense of lack of right. SINAC raised the defense of lack of right. Regarding the CGR, with respect to the request related to the voluntary withdrawal from the forest regime, the defense of lack of passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva) must be accepted, since, as that party effectively asserts, such a petition in no way involves conduct or competencies that are proper to that specialized body. Whether or not one belongs to a forest regime, as well as the possibility of inclusion or voluntary withdrawal of private owners from the forest regime, is a matter beyond the decision-making availability of that oversight body. As a consequence, under the terms of Article 12.1 in relation to 12.5 of the CPCA, the necessary relationship of opposability of the claim’s effects with respect to that party is not observed, which leads to the acceptance of the cited defense. As for the rest, the defense of lack of right is accepted. That same defense is accepted regarding the State and SINAC, both in the main claims and in the subsidiary ones. Consequently, the dismissal of the lawsuit in its entirety must be ordered.

For its part, in condition b) it ordered CONAC to "Adjust and approve the Management Plan (Plan de Manejo) of the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge (Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo), so that the zoning (zonificación) that is determined conforms to technical and legal standards, field technical studies, and in observance of the provisions of Articles 18 and 19 of Law No. 7575, as well as compliance with the purposes for which the Refuge was created. Submit the Management Plan to the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental) for processing of the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental); this no later than December 18, 2015. Once the environmental viability is obtained, submit the Management Plan to the Minister of Environment and Energy for the issuance process, no later than April 15, 2016. Submit a copy of the official communication by which the Management Plan is sent to the Minister of Environment and Energy to the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General), no later than April 22, 2016." Likewise, it issued two new dispositions to the Plenary Commission (Comisión Plenaria) of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, so that it would establish the parameters to allow the environmental assessment (valoración ambiental) of the management plans for Protected Wild Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas), classified in the category to which the Management Plan of the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge belongs; in addition to resolving the environmental viability of the Management Plan of the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, submitted to it by the National Council of Conservation Areas (Consejo Nacional de Areas de Conservación). It is regarding the constitutionality of these dispositions that the examination proposed by the parties is entered into. In that sense, in accordance with numeral 17 of the LOA, in relation to canon 1 of Executive Decree No. 32967-MINAE, it is necessary for said planning to include an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) for the execution of projects or activities that, by their nature and content, imply the risk of altering or contaminating the environment, as well as the mandatory nature of the cited variable in all land-use planning (planificación de uso del suelo). Canon 1 of Executive Decree No. 32967 establishes in its initial paragraph: "Article 1—Introduction of the environmental variable into Regulatory Plans (Planes Reguladores) or other Land-Use Planning. In all land-use planning developed in the country, including cantonal or local regulatory plans, public or private, which plan the development of activities, works, or projects that could generate effects on the environment, the environmental variable must be integrated in accordance with the Procedure for the Introduction of the environmental variable into Regulatory Plans or other Land-Use Planning established in Annex 1 of this decree. Which is also made available to the public at the headquarters of the National Environmental Technical Secretariat – SETENA and on the website of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Commerce and the Federated College of Engineers and Architects. (...)". Contrary to what the plaintiffs assert, this Tribunal considers that the literal wording of that rule does not support the claim that this environmental variable only merits evaluation within regulatory plans, whether cantonal or local, public or private, excluding instruments such as Management Plans for Protected Wild Areas. Upon close examination, the grammatical reference to that type of regulatory plans is merely as a reference for inclusion within the factual assumption that the rule previously defines, consisting of all land-use planning. That is, it is not limited solely to regulatory plans, but rather to any programmatic land-use instrument that may impact the environment. In this sense, this Chamber shares the State's impressions when it indicates that the Management Plans of Protected Wild Areas are planning instruments that seek to guide land-use management toward the fulfillment of the creation objectives, and as such seek to guide decisions in the management of not only state-owned but also private lands. From this perspective of examination, they are strategic mechanisms for the conservation and management of these zones, and therefore there is no normative reason to deny the requirement for environmental diagnosis (diagnóstico ambiental) in this type of programming. As the State indicates, the fact that public and private areas converge in a zoning map (zonificación), the latter through agreements with private parties regarding the conservation of their properties, does not lead to denying the need to comply with environmental regulations and the actions inherent to the proper protection of the environment, which includes, as in these cases, the satisfaction of the conservation objectives that have provided the basis for the creation of the Protected Wild Area (ASP), as well as the zoning strategies that include properties of a mixed nature (orden mixto). Hence, given the content of Decree 34946-MINAET (Zoning Regulations for the RNVS-GM), and the land-use regime that defines residential, recreational residential, tourist hotel, special hotel, protection areas, camping, sports, parking, urban commercial, commercial, institutional, quarries (tajos), and cultural heritage zones (see Article 1), as well as the indication of recommended uses, recommended uses with conditions, unpermitted uses, property dimensions, densities, and setbacks, it is necessary to define the harmony and balance of that land-use management programming with the ecosystems sought to be protected in that zone, given the need to compare the specific use with the general or cumulative impact on the refuge, as a result of the presence of a coastal ecosystem which, due to its fragility, has been sought to be protected. On this topic, regarding the necessity of environmental impact assessments in the development of human activities, including zoning and land-use projects in environmentally relevant areas, in ruling 1220-2002 of February 6, 2002, in which it analyzed an action of unconstitutionality brought against the SETENA Procedures Regulations, Decree 26228-MINAE, and other rules, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) stated in its essential parts: "...It has already been noted that the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) establishes in Article 17, as a development of what is provided in Article 50 of the Constitution, the obligation to have an environmental impact assessment to carry out activities or projects that, by their nature, may alter or contaminate the environment. As the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) correctly points out in its report, the environmental impact assessment (EIA) is conceived by the legislator as a technical procedure that allows for control of a possible environmental alteration with the consequent affectation of ecosystems. Without any doubt, this is a technical matter whose detailed regulation escapes the logic of the legislative procedure and can, as a thesis of principle and within the existing legal framework, be regulated by the Executive Branch. The Organic Environmental Law clearly states that '...Human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate waste, toxic or hazardous materials, will require an environmental impact assessment created in this law...', which allows one to affirm, in a correct reading, that no human activity that can alter or contaminate the environment can dispense with the referenced environmental impact assessment. The formula that the Executive Branch has devised so that it can be established, 'prima facie', whether the human activity undertaken can alter or destroy the environment, has been the presentation of the form called 'Preliminary Environmental Assessment' (Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar). It is not then, as the Environmental Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo) holds in its report, that the Executive Branch has absolute discretion to designate the projects that must conduct the environmental impact assessment, since by provision of the Political Constitution itself (Art. 50) and the Organic Environmental Law, as a general principle, all human activity that modifies the environment 'will require' the referenced study. It is, therefore, the condition of the project or work that will determine, in each case, whether or not the environmental impact assessment is required, and not the establishment of arbitrary conditions through regulatory means. The regulation must only establish the manner in which the conditions of the project will be known, and that is what will determine the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the environmental impact assessment. This means that the defense and preservation of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, set forth in Constitutional Article 50, is the fundamental right of every person and functions as an unavoidable general principle, so that in this matter it is not possible to make generic exceptions (in urban planning matters and other topics covered by Articles 19 and 20) to exonerate compliance with environmental obligations, as this runs the risk of deconstitutionalizing the guarantee of a state response in defense of the environment. Thus, the mechanism used by the Executive Decree determining 'a priori' activities or works that are exempt from the environmental impact assessment, considering the size of the work, the existence of regulatory plans, the number of people in the operation or activity, the number of rooms, the classification of the project (social interest), or land use, demonstrates an excess in the exercise of regulatory power that exceeds the referral to Article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law and empties the content of the inhabitants' right for the Public Authorities to exercise direct environmental control – not by delegation to regencies (regencias) – in the application of protective legislation. This is not to say that the Executive Branch cannot, via regulations, determine, based on precise technical studies, that a specific activity or project does not require environmental impact assessments; but this implies that such a definition be duly motivated and justified. It must be remembered that in the case of excepting a higher-ranking control (constitutional), the reasonableness and proportionality of the exceptional circumstance will be reviewable by the judge, whether through ordinary legal channels or constitutional control. But to the general regime conceived by the derived Constituent Authority, a generalized exception that has no other motivation or grounding than the very existence of the rule that so declares it is inadmissible (...)." From that perspective, this Tribunal shares the considerations of the CGR regarding the necessary weighing of the environmental variable within the Zoning Regulations (Reglamentos de Zonificación) for areas that, as in this case, because it involves a Mixed National Wildlife Refuge (RNVS de naturaleza mixta), in which state-owned (demanial) and private properties converge, impact the environment, a diagnosis that in itself must be carried out in any development that presents a risk of environmental impact. Upon close examination, the mention of mandates 17 of the LOA and 1 of Decree 32967 does not constitute an exhaustive list of planning instruments that must necessarily have an environmental impact assessment. As the Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitucional) has indicated in the ruling just cited, the EIA is a technical procedure that allows control of a possible environmental alteration with the consequent affectation of ecosystems, so the understanding of its utility and purpose would not permit maintaining the exhaustiveness of the references that those rules stipulate. On the contrary, from the analysis of the regulatory assumptions of Decree No. 32967-MINAE, it follows that all land-use planning must include that environmental measurement, regardless of the type of property involved, which allows one to maintain that the territorial planning to be implemented in a protected wild area requires the weighing of this variable. The foregoing regardless of whether a Zoning Plan for an RNVS or a protected wild area is not, initially, part of a regulatory plan. At this point, it is worth highlighting what was indicated by the Environmental Services Audit Area (Área de Fiscalización de Servicios Ambientales) of the CGR in official communication DFOE-AE-0452, insofar as it pointed out that the mere circumstance that the Guide for the formulation of Management Plans for Protected Wild Areas and the Procedures Manual for the publication of Management Plans for Protected Wild Areas of SINAC does not establish the procedure or the requirement for environmental viability, does not negate the obligation to carry it out, given the prevalence of higher rules such as Article 50 of the Magna Carta, 17 of the LOA, and numeral 1 of Executive Decree No. 32967-MINAE. Similarly, the need to have this environmental diagnosis not only in the Zoning Regulations of the RNVS-GM but also in the management plan for that sector was noted by SETENA. Indeed, in the course of follow-up actions regarding compliance with the dispositions issued by the CGR, in official communication SG-DEAE-267-2013 of June 7, 2013, from SETENA, addressed to the Executive Directorate of SINAC, the relevant portion states: "... By virtue of your official communication SINAC-DE-912, where you very specifically request submitting for assessment the study 'Zoning Regulations of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge', so that this Secretariat may grant the environmental viability thereof, I must indicate the following: The minimum contents established in said decree include the environmental diagnosis studies, which are called environmental fragility indices (índices de fragibilidad ambiental, IFAs), which are not provided within the documentation supplied by you; likewise, the environmental scope analysis study (análisis de alcance ambiental, AAA), where the proposed zoning is assessed, is also not included within the provided documentation. Finally, the so-called sustainable development regulation (reglamento de desarrollo sostenible, RDS) has not been included within the documentation submitted for assessment. What has been provided by you, as you correctly indicate in your official communication, is the Zoning Regulations of the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, which is not subject to evaluation by this Secretariat under the terms dictated by the aforementioned decree, that is, the evaluation of the IFAs, AAA, and RDS. Thus, the provided document does not comply with the provisions of Decree No. 32964-MINAE, and therefore the granting of environmental viability is not appropriate, and as such, it is not possible to respond positively to the explicit request to make an exception to grant environmental viability to the regulation in question, precisely because what was provided does not conform to the provisions of Decree No. 32967-MINAE." (Image 146 folder 1 CD evidence) This was later reiterated in official communication DEAE-247-2014 of June 30, 2014, in which SETENA indicates to the Plenary Commission that, in response to official communication DFOE-SD-1285 of the CGR (previous point), through official communication SG-DEAE-267-2013, it communicated to SINAC that the environmental diagnosis included the IFAs, AAA, and RDS, which had not been submitted. This position was endorsed by the Plenary Commission through agreement ACP-08-14 of July 1, 2014. (Images 191-193 folder 1 CD evidence) From this perspective of understanding, the requirement expressed in point b) of official communication DFOE-AE-0087 of February 18, 2015 (2713) from the CGR, which required the National Council of Conservation Areas (Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, CONAC): "b) To the National Council of Conservation Areas Adjust and approve the Management Plan of the Gandoca Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, so that the zoning that is determined conforms to technical and legal standards, field technical studies, and in observance of the provisions of Articles 18 and 19 of Law No. 7575, as well as compliance with the purposes for which the Refuge was created. Submit the Management Plan to the National Environmental Technical Secretariat for processing of the environmental viability; this no later than December 18, 2015. Once the environmental viability is obtained, submit the Management Plan to the Minister of Environment and Energy for the issuance process, no later than April 15, 2016. Submit a copy of the official communication by which the Management Plan is sent to the Minister of Environment and Energy to the Office of the Comptroller General, no later than April 22, 2016.", does not exhibit the inaccuracies that the plaintiffs object to, regarding whether the issuance of the cited Zoning Regulations requires compliance with the measurement of the environmental variable. For this Tribunal, in the case of Protected Wild Areas, and among these, those that are composed of public and private property (mixed), it is necessary to satisfy these environmental diagnoses, to the extent that the land-use regime for privately owned properties must be consistent with the purposes of the area's creation and protection and a use consistent with sustainable development, that is, in harmony with the environment. Such aspects consequently require that the proposed land-use regime be weighed within the respective management plan for the area. As recorded in the case file, the Plenary Commission of SETENA, in the agreement adopted in Article 10 of the ordinary session No. 070-2015-SETENA of May 26, 2015, agreement number ACP-55-15, responding to the modifications made to official communication DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, modified by official communication DFOE-AE-0087 of February 18, 2015 (2713) from the CGR, resolved that the measurement of environmental viability was not necessary for the management plans of Protected Wild Areas, given that the analysis of Decree No. 32967 does not expressly contemplate such a scenario. (Images 223-228 of folder 1 CD evidence) However, later, in the agreement adopted in Article 2 of ordinary session No. 0127-2015-SETENA of September 10, 2015, agreement number ACP-119-15, and under the statement that it maintained the position expressed in the aforementioned agreement number ACP-55-15, in compliance with the CGR's dispositions, it issued that decision solely for the RNVS-GM case. In that sense, it agreed to approve the proposed terms of reference for the incorporation of the environmental variable in the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, mixed category, proposed in official communication DEAE-288-2015 by geographer Nuria Chavarría, as a result of which it ordered SINAC to be instructed that it must proceed to request the opening of the respective administrative file (expediente administrativo) with SETENA, for the purpose of processing the Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental) of the cited Management Plan. (Images 232-234 folder 1 CD Evidence) From the foregoing, it follows that the revision and adjustment of the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM has SETENA's endorsement to grant environmental viability. Nevertheless, it is necessary to reiterate that this Chamber shares what was indicated by the CGR in the questioned conducts regarding the fact that the relationship of the rules cited above allows and requires that in this type of planning instruments, the analysis of environmental feasibility (factibilidad ambiental) must also be included, given that these are instruments that, by providing permissibility or potential authorization for activities that will impact the environment that the creation of a Protected Wild Area seeks to protect, in this case, of a mixed nature (orden mixto), must have that diagnosis to weigh its harmony and congruence with the environment and with the pursued goal when creating the ASP. In this regard, it should be noted that through a brief dated October 9, 2018, the State informs the Tribunal that through agreement ACP-185-2017 of the Plenary Commission of SETENA, adopted in Article 09 of ordinary session 121-2017 of September 27, 2017, it is indicated regarding subparagraph e) of Report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, which imposes resolving the environmental viability of the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, that said analysis has not been completed as it is still being processed, and furthermore, given the action of unconstitutionality pending against Law No. 9223, which establishes the new boundaries and areas of the RNVS-GM (case file 14-019174-0007-CO), it is not possible to issue a final decision until that action is resolved. This circumstance will be considered below.

IX.- On the object of study of report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011. The plaintiffs object to the content of the report in question, considering it biased and limited, to the extent that it only considered one zone of the refuge, considering it illegitimate that the results of that analysis be applied to their properties, because they limit the exercise of property rights (derecho de dominio). From the analysis of that official communication, it follows that the study on which it was based was conducted for the period from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2009, through the review of the documentation of the administrative files of the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM and its zoning, as well as related documentation, in accordance with the Manual of General Audit Standards for the Public Sector, No. M-2-2006-CO-DFOE. That report indicates that from the review of that documentation, it was determined that the Zoning Regulations issued through Executive Decree No. 34946-MINAET dated December 6, 2008, did not consider the delimitation, nor applicable regulations for the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) lands, nor the limitations given the presence of forest or wetland ecosystems on real estate properties titled in the name of private parties, located in the area called "Cocles-Manzanillo Coastal Plain" (Llanura costera Cocles-Manzanillo). It also refers that in ACLAC-073-2011 from the La Amistad Caribe Conservation Area (Área de Conservación La Amistad Caribe), it was indicated that the zoning maps did not record the specific delimitation of the PNE, despite having conducted efforts for the cadastral survey (levantamiento catastral) of the Refuge. It criticized that: "...the land uses permitted by those Regulations in the Cocles Manzanillo Coastal Plain apply equally to all lands, without distinguishing whether it is PNE or real estate with land-use limitations which are currently in the name of private parties, or if they have another condition. In this way, the referenced Coastal Plain with an area of 933.78 hectares3, is subdivided into fifteen zones such as agricultural of 104.73 hectares; residential of 56.06 hectares; recreational residential of 78.52 hectares; tourist hotel of 204.15 hectares; and other categories that record recommended uses and recommended uses with conditions that do not fall within what is permitted on PNE lands, or that do not detail restrictions associated with the presence of ecosystems with environmental fragility (fragibilidad ambiental) currently in the name of private parties." As a complement to that analysis of files within that time range, the cited report specifies: "For the purpose of complementing the analysis, this Office of the Comptroller General requested the collaboration of the Environmental Administrative Tribunal ... and the National Institute for Transfer in Agricultural Technology (Instituto Nacional de Transferencia en Tecnología Agropecuaria) ... for the development of field sampling in some lands located in the residential and tourist hotel zone of the cited Cocles Manzanillo Coastal Plain, in order to ascertain the respective biological, forest, and edaphological (edafológicas) conditions, which would allow giving an account of the state in which those lands are found." After referring to the findings of the reports issued by the Environmental Administrative Tribunal and INTA, it considered that the described cases revealed the presence of lands included in the Cocles Manzanillo Coastal Plain that possessed high environmental fragility conditions, despite which, they were not being adequately protected, since in some cases, despite the existence of forest or wetland areas, the lands had been intervened to the point of their affectation, contrary to the purposes for which the refuge was created. From this standpoint, the reference made to zone 1 of the RNVS-GM in the analyses conducted by the Environmental Administrative Tribunal and INTA are a complement to the documentary examination previously conducted by the CGR and which in no way implied only that zone. On the contrary, from the content of that report, it follows that despite prior knowledge of the existence of zones that form part of the PNE, these geographical zones were not duly identified or delimited in the cited Regulations, according to the reference made in official communication ACLAC-073-2011. Similarly, it highlights that the use permitted by the Regulations does not discriminate whether the land corresponds to PNE or rather to lands of another nature with limitations. Both issues are determinant for the due protection of the Protected Wild Area, to the extent that the land-use regime allows discriminating the possible activities in order to safeguard the PNE or the type of administrative limitation (limitación administrativa) that is applicable to a determined geographical zone. The challenged act demonstrates the relevance of that definition by stating: "With respect to the cited Cocles-Manzanillo coastal plain, it is characterized as a narrow plain less than a kilometer wide from Puerto Viejo to Punta Manzanillo...This zone is important as a buffer zone (área de amortiguamiento), as it controls sedimentation and contamination on the coral reefs located a few meters from the beach and which could be affected by the erosion of the hillsides south of the sector; furthermore, hydrological studies locate the most important aquifer (acuífero) in the zone here...". Moreover, based on the reports from the Environmental Administrative Tribunal and INTA, it follows that the lands in the sample zone present conditions of high environmental fragility, do not have due protection, and despite the presence of forest or wetland, have been intervened to the point of their affectation, which, it is reiterated, is contrary to the protection goal that supported the creation of the refuge in question. Precisely, based on those considerations, it was that in the referenced report (DFOE-03-2011), in the dispositions section in subparagraph c), it was established: "c) To the Plenary Commission of SETENA: Refrain from granting environmental viabilities (viabilidades ambientales) in the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, until the Zoning Regulations (Reglamento de Zonificación) are made official in accordance with the revision and adjustments previously indicated. Submit to this Office of the Comptroller General a copy of the agreement of the Plenary Commission where the pertinent instructions are issued, no later than July 30, 2011." It is clear that the absence of an environmental impact assessment in the Management Plan issued for the RNVS-GM implies, by direct consequence, the impossibility of granting environmental viabilities regarding specific lands or sectors located within that Protected Wild Area, given that in this scope it must be considered as a unit of environmental protection (tutela ambiental) due to the unitary goal of safeguarding conferred upon it with its creation. The analysis of those specific environmental viabilities is, therefore, subject to the Management Plan and the Zoning Regulations. In this regard, as the representative of the CGR mentions, this Tribunal had already ruled within case file No. 11-4480-1027-CA, which was an ordinary proceeding by the company named Palma Verde Socratea S.A. against the State, a case in which it petitioned for a declaration of nullity of resolution DEA-1984-2011, which ordered the suspension of the process for granting environmental viability for the development of works within a property owned by it located within the RNVS-GM, considering that the suspension of the environmental assessment process was contrary to law and that the Office of the Comptroller General's report on which SETENA based the suspension (a report which is precisely the one analyzed in this proceeding) had been issued nearly three years prior (at that moment), after which several environmental licenses had been granted. In judgment No. 248-2012-VI at 16:00 hours of November 2, 2012, this Administrative Litigation Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), Section VI, resolved in the relevant part: "... By reason of the foregoing, it is considered that the reason alleged by the defendant party in the challenged act is real and existent, that there is no disapplication of the law, since within the legal framework accused of being violated, the regulation is subject to the law, according to the invoked Article 129 of the Political Constitution, given that the report from the Office of the Comptroller General ordering the suspension, which is the reason alleged in the challenged act, does contain juridically and technically argued the reasons why it is considered that the regulation fails to comply with Article 17 of the Organic Environmental Law, that the forest zones, wetland zones are not sufficiently protected, nor is the State Natural Heritage delimited, with which, by reason of Articles 7 and 50 of the Political Constitution, we would have that effectively the State, by accepting the suspension order issued by the Office of the Comptroller General, complies both with constitutional obligations, as well as with those derived from laws and International Treaties regarding environmental protection, that is, a protective action (acción de tutela) would be being carried out to protect the environment, to keep it healthy and ecologically balanced, applying the precautionary principle (principio precautorio), which, like all variables of environmental law, acts as a transversal axis to all public function activity, which must respond both juridically and technically to protect the environment, and be always present in the considerations of fact and law that inform its actions. (...)".

Although that judgment did not analyze the validity of the CGR report, its reference is necessary insofar as it highlights that this act reflects the technical reasons that led to the conclusion regarding the disregard of Article 17 of the LOA, due to the insufficient protection of forest areas, wetlands, and the lack of delimitation of the PNE, justifying grounds for the suspension of the procedure ordered in that file. Again, if it was determined that the environmental assessment was necessary for the Management Plan, such that in the absence of that requirement, the Zoning Regulation showed that irregularity, it is clear that the enablement of types of use or the granting of building permit titles (constructive licenses), as they are dependent on that planning, must be suspended until what has been noted regarding the environmental variable is normalized. In response to that logical connection, the order was issued to SETENA to refrain from granting environmental approvals, and to the Municipality of Talamanca, an equal prohibition regarding the granting of construction permits, until the Management Plan was adjusted regarding the aforementioned issue.

X.- Regarding construction permits, through official letter DFOE-AE-0159 (4811) of June 24, 2011, the Area of Environmental and Energy Services of the Division of Operative and Evaluative Oversight of the CGR, communicated to the Municipality of Talamanca "Report note No. DFOE-AE-IF-05-2011 with the results of the study on some use permits granted by the Municipality of Talamanca on lands of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge." That act states, in relevant part, the results of the study of some cases for which the Municipality of Talamanca granted precarious land-use permits (permisos de uso de suelo en forma precaria) and construction permits to erect buildings on lands located within the boundaries of the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, in a period between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2009. Regarding the results, it reported: "1- It was determined that the Municipal Council of Talamanca granted precarious land-use permits over three lands of the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado, PNE) located within the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone (Zona Marítimo Terrestre, ZMT) of the Gandoca-Manzanillo Refuge, which lack legality, since all were issued under the protection of Law No. 6043, Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone, which does not apply in that Refuge in accordance with Article 73 of that same regulatory body. Furthermore, that Municipality granted said permits without having the legitimacy to do so, as the administrator of said Refuge is the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (MINAET) through the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC). ...". It held that the Local Council lacked jurisdiction to grant land-use permits granted in ordinary session No. 27 of November 8, 2006, in relation to the land described in cadastral plan L-658883-2000, a permit granted in ordinary session No. 41 of February 21, 2007, cadastral plan L-1155267-2007, a use permit in extraordinary session No. 76 of July 17, 2008, land in plan L-660211-2000. It pointed out that those cases are located within the area of the RNVS-GM, which overlaps with the boundaries originally occupied by the Indigenous Bribri Territory of Kekoldi, created by Executive Decree No. 7267 of August 9, 1977, and whose boundaries were ratified in Indigenous Law No. 6172 of November 29, 1977. In said report, it issued the following orders to the Council and the Municipal Mayor of Talamanca: "a) To the Municipal Council of Talamanca i- Review the legality of the precarious land-use permits granted on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, in order to take the actions that legally correspond, especially in accordance with Article 73 of the Law on the Maritime-Terrestrial Zone No. 6043 and Article 32 of the Organic Environmental Law No. 7554. Report to this oversight body on the actions taken, by means of an official letter to be sent no later than May 30, 2012. ii- Refrain henceforth from granting precarious use permits on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge. Submit to this Comptroller General, no later than July 30, 2011, a copy of the agreement of the Municipal Council adopting this measure. b) To the Municipal Mayor of Talamanca i- Review the legality of the construction permits granted on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge to assess the existence of possible nullities and adopt the corresponding actions according to law, respecting due process, in observance of technical and legal aspects, and especially in accordance with Article 32 of the Organic Environmental Law No. 7554 and Article 58 of the Biodiversity Law No. 7788. Report to this oversight body by official letter on the actions taken, no later than August 31, 2012. ii- Refrain henceforth from granting construction permits on lands within the Gandoca-Manzanillo National Wildlife Refuge, until the Zoning Regulation adjusted by SINAC and MINAET is officialized, in accordance with what was requested by this oversight body through report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011 of May 31, 2011. Submit to this Comptroller General, no later than July 30, 2011, a copy of the administrative resolution through which the pertinent instructions are issued. (...)". (Images 183-192 of the main file) Given that the invalidity of point b) ii) of that official letter is questioned, regarding the abstention from granting construction permits, it must be specified that, certainly, as this is a Wildlife Refuge of mixed category, which as such involves private and public properties, it is evident that the protection of the right to private property, enshrined in Article 45 of the Magna Carta, mandates that the administrative limitations imposed on the substantial content of the right of ownership be legitimate and rational. In that line, the analysis of the environmental variable allows for the generation of inputs and technical criteria that enable the objective justification of the limitations necessary for a specific geographic space or activity, while also constituting a tool that would lead to the suppression of excessive limitations not supported by technical references and considerations. In that sense, administrative limitations find common limits, among which the following can be indicated: - They must be proportional to the administrative need they must satisfy; - They must have some type of plausible justification, they must truly respond to an administrative need; - It is required that property not be altered, disintegrated, or dismembered; - That it be valid in its form, jurisdiction, object, and will. The foregoing implies the legal duty to tolerate administrative limitations for reasons of public necessity and social interest. However, it is clear that by virtue of a limitation of this nature, the material effect of rendering the property dysfunctional cannot be achieved, that is, denying the proper exercise of the right of ownership regarding its essential attributes, for in such a case, one would be facing a de facto expropriation, with the legal consequences that this entails, namely, the duty to compensate the titleholder who has been dispossessed of that right. In this case, by virtue of the principle of the environmental function of property, whose support rests on the relationship of Articles 45 and 50 of the Political Constitution, the Organic Environmental Law, and the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), even private properties included within protected wild areas must satisfy the use regime in accordance with the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, in order of the postulate of sustainable development and prior environmental assessment. In that order, for example, within the limits derived from the aforementioned environmental function, the exercise of any human activity that may potentially generate an alteration in the environment requires an environmental assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) prior to the development of activities (Art. 17 LOA); furthermore, the land-use regime must be congruent with the management or planning plans applicable to the geographic area in order to protect the purpose for which the Protected Wild Area was created (in this type of matter). Even within that use regime, it is necessary to limit activities that have the potential effect of interrupting the natural cycles of ecosystems, such as intrusion into the natural cycles of forest regeneration or wetlands. From that perspective, the conditioning of the granting of construction permits or the continuation of the processing of environmental impact study proceedings does not constitute an unreasonable imposition in the specific case, given that there must be harmony in the individual analysis of those proceedings, with respect to the general framework represented by the Management Plan. This is a derivation pertinent to the case of the preventive, precautionary, and *in dubio pro natura* principles, which operate in this matter, and a clear protection and conservation of the protected areas in question, in accordance with the provisions of precepts 22 of the Biodiversity Law No. 7788 and 42 of the LOA. It is clear that environmental matters impose legitimate limitations on the exercise of the right to build, a component of the right of ownership (Art. 264 Civil Code), which requires that building activities, and with greater reason, in this type of protected areas, harmonize with the principle of sustainable development and the environmental function of property that supports those limitations. Hence, in order to analyze the appropriateness or not of construction permits, it is necessary to have a Management Plan that conforms to the conditions of ecological harmony already discussed. However, this Court observes that to date, the CGR's order regarding the adjustment of the Management Plan to the instruments for weighing the environmental variable has not been effectively concretized. Even, as has been stated, by means of a writing dated October 9, 2018, the State notifies the Court that through the agreement of the Plenary Commission of SETENA No. CCP-185-2017 adopted in Article 09 of ordinary session 121-2017 of September 27, 2017, it is indicated regarding subsection e) of Report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, which requires it to resolve on the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) of the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, that said analysis has not concluded as it is in progress, and furthermore, given the unconstitutionality action pending against Law No. 9223 establishing the new boundaries and areas of the RNVS-GM (file 14-019174-0007-CO), it is not possible to issue a final decision until that action is resolved. (Images 729 of the main file) That is, from the issuance of the questioned CGR report to date, the attention and resolution of the environmental feasibility proceedings for the Plan has not been completed, which directly prevents the resolution and granting of construction permits or environmental impact studies in project applications by owners of private estates located in the RNVS-GM. This circumstance could well eventually affect the availability of the owners of privately-owned real estate, an aspect that, for organizational reasons, will be analyzed below. However, this does not lead to establishing the invalidity of the provisions issued by the CGR, which, in light of the foregoing, are considered reasonable, congruent, and necessary with the results of the investigation that produced report No. DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, since requiring the inclusion of the environmental assessment within the REGAMA Management Plan would be meaningless if the granting of construction permits and environmental feasibility studies for private properties located within the refuge area is not limited. Note that the cited official letter not only refers to the possible illegality of construction permits granted in areas where jurisdiction corresponded to the administrator of the Refuge, i.e., MINAE, but also to the impossibility of continuing to grant construction permits until the issue regarding the adjustment of the Zoning Regulation is clarified.

XI.- Regarding the claims related to the voluntary nature of the forestry regime (régimen forestal). In its subsidiary claim, the following is formulated: "1- That this lawsuit be granted and that it be declared that we, the undersigned, in our capacity as private owners, have the right to voluntarily withdraw from the forestry regime at the moment we request it, as it is a voluntary regime of submission and not a perpetual easement (servidumbre perpetua)." Now, it has been established in this proceeding, an uncontroverted aspect, that the plaintiff entities own properties located within the area of the RNVS-GM, a reference to which can be seen in proven fact number 2) of this ruling. It has already been established that by virtue of the environmental and social function of private property, Article 45 of the Magna Carta itself, in its third paragraph, establishes the possibility of imposing limitations for reasons of public interest on the right of ownership, a derivation of which makes it clear that it is a right that is not absolute, to the extent that the legal duty to accept such restrictions is imposed. In that order, it is reiterated, in the ecological sphere, the Organic Environmental Law itself imposes the obligation on the State (and other public entities) to promote sustainable development, which entails the exercise of private property in congruence and harmony with the environment, such that human activities are carried out in coordination with the regeneration of the environment. This implies that economic and environmental development must be promoted sustainably. The foregoing justifies the imposition of limits on the exercise of those human economic, productive, or private activities, in order to impact the environment to the least degree, or to allow its maintenance or regeneration. In cases such as the present one, such an ideological vision, with formal normative expression, entails that in cases where private properties are located within environmentally sensitive areas that have a special protection regime, the activities to be carried out must be framed within the planned use, oriented towards the protection of those ecosystems. Thus, in the cases of Protected Wild Areas, it is necessary for land use to be subject to prior evaluations of the potential impact on the natural resources present in the protected area, such as wetlands, marine resources, soil capacity, in accordance with the use regime that, in principle, by technical reasonableness, must have weighed the synergy between productive activities and ecological considerations. In this sense, Article 34 of the Organic Environmental Law (No. 7554), as a reference, imposes the duty to adopt preventive measures in the ASPs, to prevent or eliminate the exploitation, occupation in all State-owned areas, and to enforce respect for the ecological, geomorphological, and aesthetic characteristics that determined their establishment. That same purpose is developed in numeral 35 ejusdem, as it sets the objectives for the creation, conservation, administration, development, and surveillance of protected areas, among which can be mentioned, only as a reference: "a) Conserve the representative natural environments of the different biogeographic regions and the most fragile ecosystems, to ensure the balance and continuity of evolutionary and ecological processes; b) Safeguard the genetic diversity of wild species on which evolutionary continuity depends, particularly those that are endemic, threatened, or in danger of extinction; c) Ensure the sustainable use of ecosystems and their elements, fostering the active participation of neighboring communities; d) Promote scientific research, the study of ecosystems and their balance, as well as the knowledge and technologies that allow the sustainable use of the country's natural resources and their conservation; e) Protect and improve aquifer zones and hydrographic basins, to reduce and avoid the negative impact that their poor management can cause; f) Protect the natural and landscape environments of historical and architectural sites and centers, national monuments, archaeological sites, and places of historical and artistic interest, of importance for culture and national identity." For purposes of the present matter, and given the claims of the plaintiff entities, what is prescribed by precept 37 of that Law No. 7554 is relevant, as it regulates the treatment of the inclusion of private properties in the creation of state ASPs:

"Article 37.- Powers of the Executive Branch. When establishing protected wild areas, whatever their management category, the Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, is empowered to include, within its boundaries, the private properties or parts of private properties necessary to fulfill the objectives set forth in this law and to implement them in accordance with the respective management plan or to create the legal easements for ecological protection and compliance with this law. When it concerns national parks, biological reserves, or state national wildlife refuges, the lands shall be acquired by purchase, expropriation, or both procedures, upon prior compensation. In the cases of forest reserves, protective zones, mixed wildlife refuges, and wetlands, the properties or parts thereof may also be purchased or expropriated, unless, at the request of the owner, they voluntarily submit to the forestry regime. That subjection shall be registered in the Public Property Registry, as an encumbrance (afectación) on the property, which shall remain for the time established in the management plan. Private properties affected as provided in this article, for being located in national parks, biological reserves, wildlife refuges, forest reserves, and protective zones, shall be included within the state protected areas only from the moment they have been paid for or legally expropriated, except when they voluntarily submit to the Forestry Regime. In the case of forest reserves, protective zones, and wildlife refuges, and in the event that payment or expropriation has not been carried out and while it is being carried out, the areas shall be subject to an environmental planning plan that includes the environmental impact assessment and subsequently, to the management, recovery, and restoration of resources plan. (Thus reformed the previous paragraph by Article 72, subsection c) of the Forestry Law, No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, which in turn was reformed by Article 114 of the Biodiversity Law, No. 7788 of April 30, 1998) The Executive Branch is empowered, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, to carry out the expropriations contemplated in this article, in accordance with the provisions of the Expropriations Law No. 7495, of May 3, 1995." As observed, that precept establishes the possibility of including privately owned lands within RVSs of a mixed nature, for which purpose the State may opt for their purchase or expropriation, or the owners of those properties may voluntarily submit to the forestry regime, in which case the due registration annotation will be made, the validity of which shall be for the time established in the management plan. In that sense, once the owner of the right of ownership has voluntarily joined the forestry regime, the validity of that encumbrance regime is maintained for the period established in the management plan. According to that precept, once those private properties have been acquired by purchase or expropriation, or when the owner has voluntarily submitted to the forestry regime, they become incorporated into the state protected wild areas. However, the same rule specifies that while that acquisition is being carried out, those properties are subject to the Management Plan or Environmental Planning Plan. From that examination perspective, contrary to what the plaintiffs express, once a private property is included within the design of an RNVS, even though its inclusion was voluntary, it cannot likewise be withdrawn, to the extent that that portion of land has been considered part of a single environmental and ecological functional unit, therefore, an essential component of an ecosystem sought to be protected and conserved as the very ratio for the constitution of the Protected Wild Area, in that category. Otherwise, an undeniable impact on the integrality of said ecosystem would occur if, upon disengagement from the forestry regime, the owner were allowed to give a use different from that established in the respective Management Plan for that area. In any case, as Article 37 of the LOA correctly points out, even in cases where the acquisition process by the State is pending, those properties would be subject to the use limitations derived from the respective Management Plan and Zoning Regulation, regulatory instruments that, by special jurisdiction, constitute the reference for land use designation in those areas. Indeed, the environmental protection emanating from the Forestry Law itself (No. 7575), which imposes the principle of sustainable development, obliges that the use regime for those spaces be consistent and congruent with the protection policies for those resources defined by the environmental management instrument, which also links with the protective goals for the environment set forth in Article 14 of the Biodiversity Law. This purpose is observed in what has already been stated, in the sense that construction permits for those private properties could not be granted contrary to those environmental ordinances (Management Plan and Zoning Regulation of the RNVS), regardless of whether the private owners are or are not included within the forestry regime, for ultimately, the protection purpose of the PNE imposes itself in these disputes. On this point, it is worth highlighting what was indicated by the State and the CGR, a point not rebutted by the plaintiffs, in that the territorial space over which this proceeding is brought is an RNVS of mixed category, which by design, includes public and private property, in a case in which the constitution process for the REGAMA through Executive Decree No. 16614-MAG was agreed upon with the community, without any element appearing in the case file that would allow a different criterion, such that apart from what has been indicated, the private properties that are part of the refuge area are subject to the limitations inherent in that regime. Of course, if that regime were to materially lead to a substantial emptying of the right of ownership, that is, to a dysfunctionality of that right, the duty of the State to expropriate those private lands would arise. However, as has been indicated, the measures that are the object of challenge in this case impose rational provisions regarding the evaluation of the environmental variable and the suspension of construction permit proceedings, given the situations detected regarding the implications and content of the Zoning Regulation issued through Executive Decree No. 34946-MINAET of December 6, 2008. Such CGR provisions do not prevent the exercise of the essential attributes of the right of ownership of private owners, even though they condition the processing and granting of construction permits on the inclusion of the environmental assessment in the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, but that does not entail or imply a substantial suppression of the property right. Note that the parties do not manage to prove that they had processed any proceeding in that regard. However, as was warned above, through a writing dated October 9, 2018, the State notifies the Court that through the agreement of the Plenary Commission of SETENA No. CCP-185-2017 adopted in Article 09 of ordinary session 121-2017 of September 27, 2017, it is indicated regarding subsection e) of Report DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, which requires it to resolve on the environmental feasibility of the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, that said analysis has not concluded as it is in progress, and furthermore, given the unconstitutionality action pending against Law No. 9223 establishing the new boundaries and areas of the RNVS-GM (file 14-019174-0007-CO), it is not possible to issue a final decision until that action is resolved. (Images 729 of the main file) This reveals a concerning delay in the completion of the conformity adjustment of the measures ordered by the CGR, which implies an impact on the rights of owners to dispose of their properties, to the extent that there is still no definition regarding the possible use regime on those properties. That circumstance prevents the resolution and granting of construction permits or environmental impact studies in project applications by owners of private estates located in the RNVS-GM, which, undoubtedly, truncates that availability of the owners of privately-owned real estate. From that standpoint, it is necessary to urge the competent administrative units so that, within the strict legal possibilities, the necessary measures are adopted and concretized in the shortest possible time to satisfy the inclusion of the environmental assessment in the Management Plan of the RNVS-GM, such that the proceedings for applications for construction permits regarding private lands located within the area of that refuge can be reactivated, when possible. However, that condition does not permit admitting the claim made for those measures ordered by the CGR regarding that type of applications to be lifted, given the prevalence of environmental protection as a derivation of the precautionary principle that imposes itself in this field. The foregoing because it was formulated in main claim 3 and in subsidiary claim 1 which respectively state: "3.- That the provisions that have paralyzed the plaintiffs' properties be rendered null and void." and "1- That this lawsuit be granted and that it be declared that we, the undersigned, in our capacity as private owners, have the right to voluntarily withdraw from the forestry regime at the moment we request it, as it is a voluntary regime of submission and not a perpetual easement." XII.- Regarding the indemnity claims. Related to this point, in the subsidiary claims, the following indemnity claim is formulated: "3- That the defendants be jointly and severally condemned to pay for Material Damage and damages (perjuicios) caused to each of the plaintiffs. Material damage as a consequence of the freezing that their lands have suffered due to the impossibility of undertaking any type of construction for 70 months, totally restricting their use and disposition in an area of high attractiveness and with strong real estate dynamics, for which I prudentially estimate said damage in the sum of one million colones for each of the plaintiffs. Damages for the depreciation suffered in land values in the area, as a result of the aforementioned paralysis and its effects on the real estate market and especially for contributing to creating a climate of high legal insecurity in the area where the properties of the claimants in this proceeding are located and, in general, of all private property within the REGAMA, a mixed property that concerns us, for which I provisionally estimate said damages in the sum of one million colones for each of the plaintiffs. Both sums are provisional and shall be determined in the judgment execution phase. (Images 58-105, 546, 549-552 of the main file)." What is requested necessitates making some (brief) references to the civil liability regime of the Public Administration. Under the protection of numeral 190 of the General Law of Public Administration, the Administration is responsible for its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal, functioning. It is worth noting that the reference made by the legislator is not simply to acts, but transcends all administrative functioning (Article 49 of the Political Constitution), a concept that reflects any form of manifestation of administrative will, whether formal or material, and which also encompasses dysfunction, that is, administrative omissions. Said responsibility is framed, therefore, within a preeminently objective regime, which encompasses in its basis both the theory of damage and risk, as well as the balance in the patrimonial equation. This seeks, fundamentally, the compensatory reparation to one who has experienced an injury attributable to the public organization as a center of authority that proves to be unlawful in its basis.

This finalist criterion in turn produces a complete transformation in the central axis of responsibility itself, for it abandons the analytical observation of the subject who produced the harm and the characterization of their conduct, to place itself in the position of the victim, who, diminished in their legal situation, is exempted from the proof of any subjective parameter of the acting public agent (except as regards their personal liability). This undoubtedly causes a shift in the very focus of its basis, since the Administration will be liable whenever its normal or abnormal, legitimate or illegitimate, functioning causes a harm that the victim has no duty to bear, whether economic or non-economic, regardless of their subjective legal situation and the ownership or condition of power they hold, provided, of course, that the indispensable prerequisite of the causal link is met. On this subject, see the extensive analysis carried out in resolution no. 584 of 10 hours 40 minutes of August 11, 2005, of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. From this perspective, legislation imposes as criteria for attribution of liability unlawful or lawful conduct, as well as normal or abnormal functioning. In the case of lawful conduct and normal functioning, the Legal System establishes requirements and conditions that determine its applicability, among which the harm must be special or abnormal, which means that it must fall upon a small proportion of affected persons or, in the second case, must have an exceptional intensity. In these scenarios, liability covers only the harm, not lost profits (lucro cesante) (Articles 194 and 195 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). On the other hand, in the case of unlawful conduct and abnormal functioning, liability is plenary. Nevertheless, under these criteria of attributability, it must be proven that the injury is a consequence of those actions or omissions, in order to establish the causal link that allows the attribution of liability to the public authority body. Added to this, in cases of abnormality and unlawfulness, the court must undertake an examination of the public functioning, in order to establish whether conduct that departs from legality or, indeed, contradicts the concepts of administrative efficiency has truly occurred. In such cases, it is decisive to clearly infer the existence of these criteria, for otherwise, the treatment and analysis of each case must be different, depending on the type of functioning to which the detriment is attributed. Exempting causes from such liability are the fault of the victim, the act of a third party, and force majeure (fuerza mayor). However, in each debate, the court must examine whether the exonerating effect of such circumstances is total or only partial, in which case it can only produce a mitigating effect on the liability of the administrative body. Again, the occurrence of these aspects falls upon the Administration. This compensatory duty subsists even for harm caused as a result of faults committed by its officials or servants during the performance of their duties or on the occasion of the office they hold. Indeed, canon 191, in relation to 199, both of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, attribute objective liability to the State for the actions or omissions of its officials, when they have used the office or the means it provides them to cause a harmful effect on the legal sphere of a third party, which there is no duty to bear. To that extent, these means or instruments are channels of causal occasion giving rise to liability, due to the modal, instrumental, or indirect connection with the service. It should be noted that this duty to compensate is based, furthermore, on the concept of fundamental unlawfulness (antijuridicidad de base), translatable as the non-existence of the duty to bear the injury. More simply, whenever an injury has been suffered as a consequence of a public conduct, whether active or omissive, which the victim has no obligation to bear, the duty to compensate arises as a derivation of the principle of full reparation of harm that stems from numeral 41 of the Political Constitution. Hence, within the spectrum of coverage of this system of liability, the harm that may be caused by normal functioning or by lawful conduct is included, since in such cases, despite the fact that in principle the public conduct conforms to legality or to the rules of efficiency that guide it, if a harmful effect is produced that the person has no duty to bear, it must be compensated. Naturally, in these scenarios, the harm must be special (inflicted upon a small proportion of affected persons) or abnormal (that is, of an exceptionally intense scope, above normal margins of tolerance), giving rise to the reparability of the harm, but not of lost profits, according to the rules set forth by Articles 194 and 195 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Nevertheless, it should be noted that not all harm is compensable, but only that which the Legal System considers fundamentally unlawful. Indeed, only the injury that, confronted with the entire Legal System, can be deemed fundamentally unlawful is compensable; the opposite would lead, as stated by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, to affirming compensation for a harmful action in the face of a detriment that the Legal System does not reproach and that, on the contrary, tolerates and consents to as normal and justified, which would lead to the imminent bankruptcy of the State, which in the national context, is directly or indirectly linked to a large number of areas of action. Put more simply, fundamental unlawfulness exists whenever a legal mandate establishes the obligation to repair an injury contrary to law that the victim should not bear, regardless of the parameter of attribution. Despite the foregoing, it should be highlighted that not all harm is compensable, but only that which is effective, assessable, and individualizable. The breadth of the protective framework of the Administration's system of objective liability is no obstacle to the duty to prove that the harm is a consequence of a public conduct. In turn, the factual framework from which the injury to non-economic interests can be inferred must be demonstrated. It is not enough to allege the existence of suffering or injuries; it must be demonstrated, at least, the facts that, in theory, have given rise to such detriment. This comes as a derivation of the principle of burden of proof, which arises from ordinal 58 subsection e) of the CPCA in relation to numeral 196 of the LGAP and rule 41.1. of the Código Procesal Civil, No. 9342, by establishing the necessity for whoever claims to have a right, to prove the constitutive facts thereof. It is not a matter of a reversal of the burden of proof in a subject matter based on the full reparation of harm and having harm and created risk as its pillars, but rather of the minimal proof of the criteria of attribution and the facts giving rise to the harm, as elementary prerequisites for the attribution of liability and, with it, the emergence of the obligation to repair. Ordinal 82 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establishes as one of the purposes of the process, to determine the real truth of the facts, through any means of proof. However, this does not relieve the party who asserts having a right enforceable against a third party, as is the case of the right to reparation of harm, from proving the factual grounds that support that right, as well as the very existence of the injury. The foregoing is without prejudice to those cases in which the suffering arises as a logical consequence of an administrative act. The foregoing derives, moreover, from what is prescribed by canon 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, insofar as it states: “In any case, the alleged harm must be effective, assessable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group.” The effectiveness of the harm in a specific case depends directly on the demonstration of the causal link, which allows the harmful result to be linked to an action or omission of a Public Administration. This is also established in ordinal 58 of the Code previously cited, insofar as it imposes the duty of the claimant to indicate the causes of the claimed injury, what it consists of, and its prudential estimate. While such a requirement is provided for in the indicated rule when the claim for reparation is accessory, it must be satisfied with much greater reason when the core framework of the claim is a compensation, since in those cases, the establishment of those prerequisites is the minimum basis for granting what is requested. In this dynamic, it is not enough to argue about the probable existence of damages; their effectiveness must be proven. Likewise, within this general scheme, it should be noted that the action for compensation sought to be imposed on the Public Administration is subject to a statute of limitations of four years, by virtue of ordinal 198 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.

XIII.- In the species, the first point to be raised is the existence or not of a harm that can be considered a valid basis for compensation. In the light of precept 196 of the LGAP, the compensable harm must be effective, assessable, and individualizable (aspects already addressed), but also, fundamentally unlawful, that is, one that there is no legal duty to bear. Furthermore, it is necessary that whoever claims its reparation prove its existence, as well as the reference and existence of the causes to which it is attributed, so that the court can verify the existence of a causal relationship between the antecedent fact to which it is attributed and the injury as a consequence of that cause, while also weighing whether it is referable or attributable to the subject to whom it is charged. As was anticipated above, the delay evident in this process regarding the due compliance with the provisions issued by the CGR concerning the environmental impact assessment of the Management Plan in the RNVS-GM, as well as the suspension of the processing of environmental impact studies and construction permits until the Management Plan is regularized (and the zoning regulations issued by Decreto 34946-MINAET), may well constitute a cause of disturbance of the exercise of the right of ownership of private landowners. However, that sole circumstance does not automatically lead to the presumption of the concurrence of a real, effective, and individualizable harm that justifies the acceptance of the compensation claim being formulated. Within the framework of the plaintiffs' allegations, the claims for damages (daños y perjuicios) they make are based on conjectures that find no support in the merits of the case file. Note that with regard to material damages (daños materiales), they associate them with the impossibility of using and disposing of their properties for the period during which the "freeze" has been maintained, as well as with the restriction on the use of properties they consider belong to an area of high attractiveness and with high real estate dynamics. Similarly, the losses (perjuicios) are based on the alleged depreciation suffered in land values in the area, product of the paralysis and its effects on the real estate market, and especially for contributing to creating a climate of high legal uncertainty in the zone where the complainants' properties are located in this process and, in general, of all private property within the RNVS-GM. Having weighed the lawsuit, this Tribunal does not consider that the plaintiffs have duly proven the effective occurrence of the injuries whose reparation they seek. Closely examined, their requests are based on subjective assessments, which, regardless of their appropriateness or not, require, to be a fertile basis for compensation, the contribution of elements of conviction that allow those harmful consequences to their respective legal spheres to be taken as proven. There is not a single piece of evidence in the case file from which the existence of those damages and losses can be inferred or deduced, at least remotely, and in those terms, the claim under examination could not be subject to acceptance. Such alleged detriments cannot be taken for granted by this Tribunal, given that they cannot even be considered the logical and necessary consequence of the delays being alleged. They are, therefore, mere conjectures of the plaintiffs, not supported by tangible and objective elements of proof, which leads, without further ado, to their rejection. The foregoing is not hindered by the fact that the plaintiffs have indicated that such estimates are prudential and would be set in the sentence execution phase. In this vein, in line with ordinal 122 subsection m) of the CPCA, the judgment rendered in this type of contentious-administrative process may order the condemnation of damages and losses, in the following terms: "i) Pronouncement on their existence and amount, provided they are proven in the case file upon issuing the judgment. ii) Pronouncement in the abstract, when their existence, but not their amount, is established. iii) Pronouncement in the abstract, when neither their existence nor their amount is established, provided they are a consequence of the administrative conduct or administrative-legal relationship that is the object of the lawsuit." In the light of that mandate, in relation to precept 58 subsection e) of the CPCA and 196 of the LGAP, referring the quantification of damages to the sentence execution phase requires that, beforehand, the occurrence of damages whose quantification (liquidation) could not be determined in the ordinary or constitutive phase of the process has been proven, at least in the abstract, such that the details of the concrete magnitude of the injuries must be relegated to that phase of the process. Nevertheless, it is insisted, it is primary and cannot be deferred that the existence of the harm has been proven, which has not occurred in this case. On the other hand, not even under numeral iii) of subsection m) of article 122 previously cited would it be possible to grant the requests under study, given that it has been established that these conducts do not present the grounds of invalidity that the claimants reproach. Thus, this point of the lawsuit must be decided.

XIV.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses asserted. Once the legal transfer was granted, the Contraloría General de la República asserted the defenses of lack of standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of right. For its part, the State asserted that of lack of right. SINAC raised the defense of lack of right. With regard to the CGR, regarding the request related to the voluntariness of withdrawal from the forest regime (régimen forestal), the defense of lack of standing to be sued must be upheld, since, as that party effectively asserts, such a request does not in any way involve conducts or competencies that are proper to that specialized body. Belonging or not to a forest regime, as well as the possibility of voluntary inclusion or withdrawal of private landowners from the forest regime, is a matter beyond the decision-making availability of that oversight body, as a consequence of which, under the terms of article 12.1 in relation to 12.5 of the CPCA, the relationship of enforceability of effects of the claim with respect to that party is not observed, which leads to upholding the cited defense. As for the rest, the defense of lack of right is upheld. That same defense is upheld with respect to the State and SINAC, both in the main claims and in the subsidiary claims. Consequently, the rejection of the lawsuit in all its points must be ordered.”

"VI.- El primer reproche que formulan las accionantes, se traduce en un cuestionamiento de las competencias de la CGR para la emisión de informes que contienen disposiciones vinculantes en materia ambiental. Para este Tribunal, la relación del principio de tutela del derecho al ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado que impone el numeral 50 de la Carta Magna, establece a su vez el deber del Estado, en sentido amplio, de emprender las acciones debidas que permitan la efectividad de esa máxima constitucional. En la especie, la CGR alega que sus acciones van direccionadas a la tutela de ese derecho ambiental, en la medida en que los refugios de vida silvestre forman parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado. En ese sentido, cabe señalar que la normativa patria es prolija en disposiciones que ostentan un fin tutelar del medio ambiente. Dentro de estas, el numeral 1 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (No. 7554 del 13 de noviembre de 1995) establece el deber del Estado de defender y preservar el derecho al ambiente sano y equilibrado ecológicamente, en búsqueda del mayor bienestar para los habitantes de la Nación. En esa misma orientación, el canon primero de la Ley Forestal vigente (No. 7575 del 16 de abril de 1996) estipula: "La presente ley establece, como función esencial y prioritaria del Estado, velar por la conservación, protección y administración de los bosques naturales y por la producción, el aprovechamiento, la industrialización y el fomento de los recursos forestales del país destinados a ese fin, de acuerdo con el principio de uso adecuado y sostenible de los recursos naturales renovables. (...)". Por ser de especial relevancia en este proceso, dado el debate sobre aspectos varios de un refugio de vida silvestre (RNVS-GM), es determinante remitir a la regulación del concepto de áreas silvestres protegidas, categoría de la cual forma parte un RVS. En esa línea, el canon 32 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (No. 7554) señala: "Artículo 32. Clasificación de las áreas silvestres protegidas. El Poder Ejecutivo, por medio del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, podrá establecer áreas silvestres protegidas, en cualquiera de las categorías de manejo que se establezcan y en las que se señalan a continuación: a) Reservas forestales. b) Zonas protectoras. c) Parques nacionales. d) Reservas biológicas. e) Refugios nacionales de vida silvestre. f) Humedales. g) Monumentos naturales. Esas categorías de manejo y las que se creen en el futuro, serán administradas por el Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, salvo las establecidas en el artículo 33 de esta ley. Las municipalidades deben colaborar en la preservación de estas áreas." En la medida en que el RVS-GM posee o incluye áreas que son patrimonio natural del Estado, se impone un deber especial de protección, como derivación de los objetivos que fija el numeral 35 de esa misma ley, dentro de los que se enlista: "a) Conservar los ambientes naturales representativos de las diferentes regiones biogeográficas y de los ecosistemas más frágiles, para asegurar el equilibrio y la continuidad de los procesos evolutivos y ecológicos. b) Salvaguardar la diversidad genética de las especies silvestres de las que depende la continuidad evolutiva, particularmente las endémicas, amenazadas o en peligro de extinción. c) Asegurar el uso sostenible de los ecosistemas y sus elementos, fomentando la activa participación de las comunidades vecinas. d) Promover la investigación científica, el estudio de los ecosistemas y su equilibrio, así como el conocimiento y las tecnologías que permitan el uso sostenible de los recursos naturales del país y su conservación. e) Proteger y mejorar las zonas acuíferas y las cuencas hidrográficas, para reducir y evitar el impacto negativo que puede ocasionar su mal manejo. f) Proteger los entornos naturales y paisajísticos de los sitios y centros históricos y arquitectónicos, de los monumentos nacionales, de los sitios arqueológicos y de los lugares de interés histórico y artístico, de importancia para la cultura y la identidad nacional." Desde ese plano, la misma Sala Constitucional ha puesto de manifiesto el deber de protección del PNE, como fuese indicado, entre otros, en el voto No. 21258-2010 de las 14 horas del 22 de diciembre del 2010. Ese deber de protección obliga a que, en casos como el presente, en el que la zona que se ha constituido como un RNVS, es de naturaleza mixta, se delimite con la precisión debida, las áreas que son de dominio público y encajan dentro de la categoría de Patrimonio Natural del Estado, de aquellas que son de dominio privado. A tono con lo expuesto, como se ha indicado arriba, en el informe DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, la CGR advierte que en el Reglamento de Zonificación del RNVS-GM no estaba claramente delimitadas las áreas correspondientes a demanio público y privado, a la vez que no se consideraban las limitaciones aplicables por la presencia de ecosistemas boscosos o de humedales en bienes titulados a favor de particulares, que se localizan en la zona 1 Llanura Costera Cocles Manzanillo. A la luz de esas regulaciones, no observa este Tribunal infracción alguna al régimen de competencias que prohíba a la CGR realizar investigaciones y rendir informes que contengan disposiciones en menesteres ambientales. Es en cada caso que habrá de ponderarse si la participación de esa instancia contralora supone una sustitución de competencias de los órganos que integran la Administración Ambiental, pero en términos generales, la existencia de unidades especializadas en esa materia, no restringe el control que sobre esa materia podría realizar la instancia contralora. VII.- Sobre las regulaciones de los terrenos que componen las Áreas Silvestres Protegidas, el Reglamento a la Ley de Biodiversidad, las denomina de la siguiente manera en el artículo 3 inciso a): "Espacio geográfico definido, declarado oficialmente y designado con una categoría de manejo en virtud de su importancia natural, cultural y/o socioeconómica, para cumplir con determinados objetivos de conservación y de gestión." Ya se ha establecido que al tenor del artículo 32 de la LOA, en relación con la Ley de Biodiversidad, No. 7788 y su reglamento, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34433, esta última norma en su numeral 70, establecen que las áreas silvestres proptegidas son: a) Reservas forestales. b) Zonas protectoras. c) Parques nacionales. d) Reservas biológicas. e) Refugios nacionales de vida silvestre. f) Humedales. g) Monumentos naturales, h) Reservas Marinas, e i) Áreas Marinas de Manejo. En esa misma línea, establece los tipos de RVS en el siguiente sentido: "Artículo 70.-Categorías de manejo de ASP. Para efectos de la clasificación de las distintas categorías de manejo de áreas silvestres protegidas se establecen los siguientes criterios técnicos para cada una de ellas: a) ... e) Refugios Nacionales de Vida Silvestre: Áreas geográficas que poseen ecosistemas terrestres, marinos, marino-costeros, de agua dulce o una combinación de estos. Sus fines principales serán la conservación, la investigación, el incremento y el manejo de la flora y la fauna silvestres, en especial de las que se encuentren en vías de extinción. Para efectos de clasificarlos, existen tres clases de refugios nacionales de vida silvestre: e.1) Refugios de propiedad estatal. Son aquellos en los que las áreas declaradas como tales pertenecen en su totalidad al Estado y son de dominio público. Su administración corresponderá en forma exclusiva al SINAC. Sus principales objetivos son: la conservación, la investigación y el manejo de la flora y la fauna silvestres, en especial de aquellas especies que se encuentren declaradas oficialmente por el país como en peligro de extinción o con poblaciones reducidas, así como las especies migratorias y las especies endémicas. Por tratarse del patrimonio natural del Estado, únicamente podrán desarrollarse labores de investigación, capacitación y ecoturismo. e.2) Refugios de propiedad privada. Son aquellos en los cuales las áreas declaradas como tales pertenecen en su totalidad a particulares. Su administración corresponderá a los propietarios de los inmuebles y será supervisada por el SINAC. Sus principales objetivos son: la conservación, la investigación y el manejo de la flora y la fauna silvestres, en especial de aquellas especies que se encuentran declaradas oficialmente por el país como en peligro de extinción o con poblaciones reducidas, así como las especies migratorias y las especies endémicas. En los terrenos de los refugios de propiedad privada, sólo podrán desarrollarse actividades productivas de conformidad con lo que estipula el Reglamento de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 32633-MINAE, del 10 de marzo del 2005, publicado en La Gaceta Nº 180 del 20 de setiembre del 2005. e.3) Refugios de propiedad mixta. Son aquellos en los cuales las áreas declaradas como tales pertenecen en parte al Estado y en parte a particulares. Sus principales objetivos son: la conservación, la investigación y el manejo de la flora y la fauna silvestres, en especial de aquellas especies que se encuentran declaradas oficialmente por el país como en peligro de extinción o con poblaciones reducidas, así como las especies migratorias y las especies endémicas. Su administración será compartida entre los propietarios particulares y el SINAC, de manera que en los terrenos que sean propiedad del Estado sólo podrán desarrollarse las actividades indicadas previamente para los refugios de propiedad estatal, indicadas en el inciso i) mientras que en los terrenos de propiedad privada podrán desarrollarse las actividades señaladas para los refugios de propiedad privada indicadas en el inciso ii), respetando los criterios y requisitos respectivos." En lo que atañe al presente caso, como se ha indicado, el RVS-GM, fue creado mediante el Decreto No.l 16614 vigente desde el 29 de octubre de 1985, ratificado por el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34043 del 11 de noviembre de 2007. Los ordinales 4 y 7 del Decreto 16614 imponen la emisión de un plan de manejo en el siguiente sentido: "Artículo 4°—Para realizar dentro del Refugio un plan de aprovechamiento forestal, un proyecto de reforestación o se pretenda dar un cambio de uso al suelo, se deberá elaborar un plan de manejo que deberá contar con la aprobación de la Dirección General Forestal.". En igual sentido, el mandato 7 ejusdem expuso: "Artículo 7°—La Dirección General Forestal a través del Departamento de Vida Silvestre y la Dirección General de Recursos Pesqueros y Acuacultura deberán elaborar un plan de manejo para la utilización de los recursos marinos, sus productos y subproductos. Ambas dependencias del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería coordinarán con las asociaciones de desarrollo comunal de las localidades aledañas las actividades que tengan relación con los recursos mencionados en este artículo." Según se desprende de la parte considerativa de ese decreto, la causa de creación estriba en la existencia en la zona de Talamanca de recursos tales como manglares, pantanos, bosques y arrecifes de valor único, a la vez de la existencia de la única asociación de yolillo y orey del país, y la presencia de especies en vías de extinción como el manatí, cocodrilo, caimán, danta y diversas especies de monos y felinos. De igual manera refiere ese decreto a la existencia en la franja litoral del único banco natural de ostión de magle, uno de los pocos criaderos de sábalo y poblaciones residentes y únicas de langosta. Pero igualmente el considerando 5 de ese decreto reconoce que la zona posee playas de gran potencial turístico bajo un manejo regulado. Como derivación de lo postulado en los numerales 4 y 7 recién referidos, mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34946-MINAET, se emite el Reglamento de Zonificación del RNVS-GM. Precisamente, de la revisión del contenido de ese Reglamento, es que la CGR desprendió una serie de observaciones, bajo la consideración de que esa planificación no consideraba la delimitación y regulaciones aplicables a los terrenos que forman parte del PNE, dada la presencia de ecosistemas boscosos o de humedales en inmuebles titulados a nombre de particulares, en la zona Llanura Costera Cocles Manzanillo. En ese sentido, la CGR relata que mediante el oficio DFOE-AE-0452 del 03 de septiembre del 2013, el Área de Fiscalización de Servicios Ambientales y de Energía, a propósito de la variable ambiental en esa zonificación, señaló que era necesario que el SINAC gestionara nuevamente ante la SETENA, la viabilidad ambiental de ese reglamento, de previo a dar por acreditado el cumplimiento de la disposición b) de la nota informe No. DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011. VIII.- Sobre la necesidad de que ese reglamento de zonificación satisfaga la variable ambiental en los términos establecidos por la CGR, cabe señalar, tal y como fuese indicado, mediante el oficio No. DFOE-AE-0087 (2713) del 18 de febrero del 2015, la CGR realizó modificaciones a las disposiciones del informe DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, atendiendo a que mediante el oficio DM-578-2014 del 11 de noviembre del 2014, el titular del MINAE expuso que la competencia para la emisión de planes de manejo correspondía al Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (CONAC), por lo que no era facultad del Director del SINAC. De igual modo, por oficio SG-143-2014-SETENA del 02 de julio del 2014, se remite acuerdo de Comisión Plenaria correspondiente a la sesión ordinaria No. 73-2014-SETENA del 01 de julio del 2014, artículo 27, en el que se sostiene que la viabilidad ambiental corresponde ser otorgada al Plan de Manejo y no al Reglamento de Zonificación. Dado esos antecedentes, la CGR modificó parte de las disposiciones originalmente emitidas en el sentido de requerir al Ministro de Ambiente y Energía "Conocer y emitir el Plan de Manejo del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo, que le remita el Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, según la disposición b) de este oficio. Comunicar a la Contraloría General el número de Decreto Ejecutivo y de La Gaceta en que dicho Plan se publique, en el trascurso de los dos meses calendario posteriores al recibo del Plan que le remita el Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación." -condición a-. Por su parte, en la condición b) dispuso al CONAC "Ajustar y aprobar el Plan de Manejo del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo, de manera que la zonificación que se determine sea conforme a la técnica y la legalidad, estudios técnicos de campo y en observancia de lo estipulado en los artículos 18 y 19 de la Ley Nro. 7575, así como, del cumplimiento de los fines de creación del Refugio. Remitir el Plan de Manejo y a la Secretaria Técnica Nacional Ambiental para trámite de la viabilidad ambiental; ello a mas tardar el 18 de diciembre de 2015. Una vez obtenida la viabilidad ambiental remitir el Plan de Manejo al Ministro de Ambiente y Energía para el tramite de emisión, a mas tardar el 15 de abril de 2016. Remitir a la Contraloría General copia del oficio mediante el cual envía el Plan de Manejo al Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, a mas tardar el 22 de abril de 2016.". Igualmente, emitió dos nuevas disposiciones, a la Comisión Plenaria de la Secretaria Técnica Nacional Ambiental, para que estableciera los parámetros para permitir la valoración ambiental de los planes de manejo de las Areas Silvestres Protegidas, clasificadas en la categoría a la cual pertenece el Plan de Manejo del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo; además de resolver acerca de la viabilidad ambiental del Plan de Manejo del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo, que le remita el Consejo Nacional de Areas de Conservación. Es sobre esa constitución de las disposiciones, que se ingresa al examen propuesta por las partes. En ese sentido, de conformidad con el numeral 17 de la LOA, en relación con el canon 1 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 32967-MINAE, es menester que esa planificación cuente con un estudio de impacto ambiental para la realización de proyectos o actividades, que por su naturaleza y contenido, impliquen el riesgo de alterar o contaminar el medio ambiente, así como la preceptividad de la citada variable en toda planificación de uso del suelo. El canon 1 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 32967 establece en su párrafo inicial: "Artículo 1º—Introducción de la variable ambiental en los Planes Reguladores u otra Planificación de uso del suelo. En toda planificación de uso de suelo que se desarrolle en el país, incluyendo los planes reguladores cantonales o locales, públicos o privados, en los que se planifique el desarrollo de actividades, obras o proyectos que pudiesen generar efectos en el ambiente, deberá integrarse la variable ambiental de acuerdo con el Procedimiento para la Introducción de la variable ambiental en los Planes Reguladores u otra Planificación de uso del suelo que se establece en el Anexo 1 del presente decreto. El cuál también se pone a disposición del público en la sede de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental – SETENA y en el sitio web del Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio y del Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos. (...)". A diferencia de lo que exponen las accionantes, este Tribunal estima que la literalidad de esa norma no permite sostener que esta variable ambiental solamente merezca evaluación dentro de los planes reguladores, sean cantonales o locales, públicos o privados, excluyendo instrumentos como Planes de Manejo de Áreas Silvestres Protegidas. Si bien se mira, la referencia gramatical a ese tipo de planes reguladores, es solamente a modo de referencia de inclusión dentro del supuesto de hecho que previamente define la norma, consistente en toda planificación de uso de suelo. Es decir, no se limita solamente a los planes reguladores, sino a cualquier instrumento programático de uso de suelo que pueda impactar al medio ambiente. En ese sentido, comparte esta Cámara las impresiones del Estado en cuanto señala que los Planes de Manejo de las Áreas Silvestres Protegidas son instrumentos de planificación que buscan orientar la gestión del uso del suelo hacia el cumplimiento de los objetivos de creación, por lo que buscan orientar las decisiones en gestión de terrenos no solamente estatales sino privados. Desde esa arista de examen, son mecanismos estratégicos de conservación y gestión de esas zonas, por lo que no existe razón normativa para negar la exigencia del diagnóstico ambiental en ese tipo de programaciones. Tal y como indica el Estado, el que en una zonificación converjan áreas públicas y privadas, estas últimas, mediante acuerdos con particulares sobre la conservación de sus bienes, no lleva a negar la necesidad de cumplir con las normas ambientales y las acciones propias de la debida tutela del medio ambiente, lo que incluye, como en estos casos, la satisfacción de los objetivos de conservación que han dado base a la creación de ASP, así como las estrategias de zonificación que incluyan propiedades de orden mixto. De ahí que ante el contenido del Decreto 34946-MINAET (Reglamento de Zonificación del RNVS-GM), y el régimen de uso que define zonas de tipo residencial, residencial recreativa, hotelera turística, hotelera especial, áreas de protección, acampar, deportiva, estacionamientos, comercial urbana, comercial, institucional, tajos y patrimonial cultural (ver artículo 1), así como la indicación de usos recomendados, usos recomendados con condición, usos no permitidos, dimensiones de inmuebles, densidades y retiros, es que se hace necesario definir la armonía y equilibrio de esa programación de gestión de uso de suelo con los ecosistemas que se busca tutelar en esa zona, dada la necesidad de cotejar el uso específico con el impacto general o acumulativo para el refugio, producto de la presencia de un ecosistema costero que por su fragilidad, se ha buscado proteger. Sobre este tema, a propósito de la necesidad de las evaluaciones de incidencias ambientales en el desarrollo de las actividades humanas, dentro de ellas los proyectos de zonificación y uso del suelo de zonas ambientalmente relevantes, en el voto 1220-2002 del 06 de febrero del 2002, en la que analizaba acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada contra el Reglamento de Procedimientos de SETENA, Decreto 26228-MINAE y otras normas, la Sala Constitucional señaló en lo fundamental: "...Ya se adelantó que la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente establece en el artículo 17, como desarrollo de lo que dispone el artículo 50 constitucional, la obligación de contar con un estudio de impacto ambiental para realizar actividades o proyectos que por su naturaleza puedan alterar o contaminar el medio ambiente. Como con acierto lo señala la Procuraduría en su informe, el estudio de impacto ambiental se concibe, por el legislador, como un procedimiento técnico que permite controlar una posible alteración ambiental con la consecuente afectación de los ecosistemas. Sin duda alguna, se trata de materia técnica cuya regulación en detalle escapa la lógica del procedimiento legislativo y puede, como tesis de principio y dentro del marco legal existente, ser reglamentada por el Poder Ejecutivo. La Ley Orgánica del Ambiente señala con claridad que “...Las actividades humanas que alteren o destruyan elementos del ambiente o generen residuos, materiales tóxicos o peligrosos, requerirán de una evaluación de impacto ambiental creada en esta ley...”, lo que permite afirmar, en correcta lectura, que ninguna actividad humana que pueda alterar o contaminar el ambiente puede prescindir del referido estudio de impacto ambiental. La fórmula que el Poder Ejecutivo ha ideado para que pueda establecerse, “prima facie”, si la actividad humana que se emprende puede alterar o destruir el ambiente, ha sido la presentación del formulario llamado "de Evaluación Ambiental Preliminar". No es entonces, como lo sostiene el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo en su informe, que el Poder Ejecutivo tenga discrecionalidad absoluta para señalar los proyectos que deben realizar el estudio de impacto ambiental, en tanto por disposición de la propia Constitución Política (art. 50) y la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, como principio general, toda actividad humana de modificación del entorno “requerirá” el referido estudio. Es entonces la condición del proyecto o la obra la que determinará, en cada caso, si se requiere o no del estudio de impacto ambiental y no el establecimiento de condiciones arbitrarias por la vía reglamentaria. El reglamento solo debe establecer la forma en que se conocerán las condiciones del proyecto, y ello es lo que determinará la procedencia o improcedencia del estudio de impacto ambiental. Esto significa que la defensa y la preservación del derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, conceptuado en el artículo 50 constitucional, es el derecho fundamental de toda persona y funciona como un principio general ineludible, de manera que en esta materia no es posible hacer excepciones genéricas (en materia urbanística y otros tópicos de lo que se ocupan los artículos 19 y 20) para exonerar el cumplimiento de obligaciones ambientales, pues con ello se corre el riesgo de desconstitucionalizar la garantía de respuesta estatal en defensa del ambiente. Así las cosas, el mecanismo usado por el Decreto Ejecutivo determinando "a priori" actividades u obras que están exentas del estudio de impacto ambiental, en atención al tamaño de la obra, a la existencia de planes reguladores, al número de personas en la operación o actividad, a la cantidad de habitaciones, la calificación del proyecto(interés social) o el uso del suelo, evidencia un exceso en el ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria que supera la remisión al artículo 17 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y que vacía de contenido el derecho de los habitantes a que los Poderes Públicos ejerzan control ambiental directo –no por delegación en regencias- en la aplicación de la legislación tutelar. No se quiere decir con ello, que no pueda el Poder Ejecutivo, vía reglamentaria, determinar, con fundamento en estudios técnicos precisos que una determinada actividad o proyecto no requiera los estudios de impacto ambiental; pero ello supone que tal definición esté debidamente motivada y justificada. Recuérdese que en el caso de exceptuar un control de rango superior (constitucional), la razonabilidad y la proporcionalidad de la circunstancia excepcional, serán revisable por el juez, sea en la vía legal ordinaria o del control de constitucionalidad. Pero al régimen general concebido por el Constituyente derivado, es inadmisible una excepción generalizada que no tiene otra motivación o fundamentación, que la existencia misma de la norma que así lo declara.(...)". Desde esa óptica, comparte este Tribunal las consideraciones de la CGR en cuanto a la necesaria ponderación de la variable ambiental dentro de los Reglamentos de Zonificación de áreas que, como en este caso, por tratarse de un RNVS de naturaleza mixta, en la que convergen propiedades de naturaleza demanial y privada, impactan en el medio ambiente, diagnóstico que de por sí, ha de realizarse en todo desarrollo que presente riesgo de impacto ambiental. Si bien se mira, la indicación de los mandatos 17 de la LOA y 1 del Decreto 32967, no constituyen una lista taxativa de instrumentos de planificación que deban contar, necesariamente, con la evaluación de impacto ambiental. Tal y como lo ha indicado el Tribunal Constitucional en el voto recién citado, el EIA es un procedimiento técnico que permite controlar una posible alteración ambiental con la consecuente afectación de los ecosistemas, por lo que la comprensión de su utilidad y finalidad, no permitiría sostener una taxatividad o exhaustividad de las referencias que esas normas estipulan. Por el contrario, del análisis de los supuestos regulatorios del Decreto No. 32967-MINAE se desprende que toda planificación de uso del suelo, ha de contar con esa medición ambiental, al margen del tipo de propiedad de que se trate, lo que permite sostener que la planificación territorial a implementar en un área silvestre protegida, exige de la ponderación de esta variable. Lo anterior al margen de que un Plan de Zonificación de un RNVS o de un área silvestre protegida, no forme parte, en inicio, de un plan regulador. En este punto, cabe resaltar lo indicado por el Área de Fiscalización de Servicios Ambientales de la CGR en el oficio DFOE-AE-0452, en cuanto señaló que la sola circunstancia de que la Guía para la formulación de Planes de Manejo de Áreas Silvestres Protegidas y el Manual de Procedimientos para la publicación de los Planes de Manejo de las Áreas Silvestres Protegidas del SINAC no fije el procedimiento ni el requisito de la viabilidad ambiental, no enerva la obligación de llevarla a cabo, dada la prevalencia de normas superiores como el artículo 50 de la Carta Magna, 17 de la LOA y el numeral 1 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 32967-MINAE. De igual manera, la necesidad de contar con ese diagnóstico ambiental no solamente en el Reglamento de Zonificación del RNVS-GM, sino del plan de manejo en ese sector, fue advertido por la SETENA. En efecto, en el curso de las acciones de seguimiento del cumplimiento de las disposiciones emitidas por la CGR, en el oficio SG-DEAE-267-2013 del 07 de junio del 2013 de la SETENA, dirigido a la Dirección Ejecutiva del SINAC, se indica en lo relevante: "...En virtud de su oficio SINAC-DE-912, donde nos solicita muy concretamente, someter a valoración el estudio "Reglamento de Zonificación del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo", en aras de que esta Secretaría otorgue la viabilidad ambiental al mismo, he de indicarle lo siguiente: Los contenidos mínimos establecidos en dicho decreto, incluyen los estudios de diagnóstico ambiental que son los denominados índices de fragibilidad ambiental (IFAs), mismos que no son aportados dentro de la documentación por ustedes suministrada; así mismo el estudio de análisis de alcance ambiental (AAA) donde se valora la zonificación propuesta tampoco se incluye dentro de la documentación aportada. Por último, el denominado reglamento de desarrollo sostenible (RDS) no se ha incluido dentro de la documentación sometida a valoración. Lo aportado por ustedes, como bien lo indican en su oficio, el Reglamento de Zonificación del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo que no es sujeto de evaluación por parte de esta Secretaría en los términos que dicta el decreto antes mencionado, es decir la evaluación de IFAs, AAA y RDS. Así las cosas, el documento aportado no cumple con lo establecido en el decreto No. 32964-MINAE, por lo que no corresponde el otorgamiento de una viabilidad ambiental, siendo así que no podría responderse de manera positiva a la solicitud explícita de hacer una excepción para otorgar viabilidad ambiental al reglamento en cuestión, precisamente porque lo aportado no se ajusta a lo establecido en el decreto No. 3296-7MINAE". (Imagen 146 carpeta 1 CD prueba) Esto fue luego reiterado en el oficio DEAE-247-2014 del 30 de junio del 2014, en el cual, la SETENA indica a la Comisión Plenaria, que en atención al oficio DFOE-SD-1285 de la CGR (punto anterior), por oficio SG-DEAE-267-2013, se comunicó al SINAC, que el diagnóstico ambiental incluía los IFAs, AAA y RDS, los que no habían sido presentados. Esta postura fue avalada por la Comisión Plenaria mediante acuerdo ACP-08-14 del 01 de julio del 2014. (Imágenes 191-193 carpeta 1 CD prueba) Desde esa arista de comprensión, el requerimiento expresado en el punto b) del oficio DFOE-AE-0087 del 18 de febrero del 2015 (2713) de la CGR que requería al Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (CONAC): "b) Al Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación Ajustar y aprobar el Plan de Manejo del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca Manzanillo, de manera que la zonificación que se determine sea conforme a la técnica y la legalidad, estudios técnicos de campo y en observancia de lo estipulado en los artículos 18 y 19 de la Ley Nro. 7575, así como, del cumplimiento de los fines de creación del Refugio. Remitir el Plan de Manejo y a la Secretaria Técnica Nacional Ambiental para trámite de la viabilidad ambiental; ello a mas tardar el 18 de diciembre de 2015. Una vez obtenida la viabilidad ambiental remitir el Plan de Manejo al Ministro de Ambiente y Energía para el tramite de emisión, a mas tardar el 15 de abril de 2016. Remitir a la Contraloría General copia del oficio mediante el cual envía el Plan de Manejo al Ministro de Ambiente y Energía, a mas tardar el 22 de abril de 2016.", no muestra las incorrecciones que reprochan las accionantes, en cuanto a que la emisión del citado Reglamento de Zonificación no requiera del cumplimiento de la medición de la variable ambiental. Para este Tribunal, tratándose de Áreas Silvestres Protegidas, dentro de estas, las que se encuentren integradas por propiedad pública y privada (mixtas), es necesario satisfacer esos diagnósticos ambientales, en la medida en que el régimen de uso de los bienes de titularidad privada deben ser congruentes con los fines de creación y de protección del área y un uso congruente con el desarrollo sostenible, sea, en armonía con el medio ambiente. Tales aspectos exigen, en consecuencia, que se pondere el régimen propuesto de uso de suelo dentro del respectivo plan de manejo de la zona. Según consta en autos, la Comisión Plenaria de la SETENA, en el acuerdo adoptado en el artículo 10 de la sesión ordinaria No. 070-2015-SETENA del 26 de mayo del 2015, número de acuerdo ACP-55-15, atendiendo a las modificaciones realizadas al oficio DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, modificado por el oficio DFOE-AE-0087 del 18 de febrero del 2015 (2713) de la CGR, dispuso que no era necesaria la medición de la viabilidad ambiental para los planes de manejo de las Áreas Silvestres Protegidas, siendo que del análisis del Decreto No. 32967 no se contempla tal supuesto de manera expresa. (Imágenes 223-228 de la carpeta 1 CD prueba) Sin embargo, luego, en el acuerdo adoptado en el artículo 2 de la sesión ordinaria No. 0127-2015-SETENA del 10 de septiembre del 2015, acuerdo número ACP-119-15 y bajo el señalamiento que mantenía la postura expresada en el acuerdo número ACP-55-15 mencionado ut supra, en acatamiento de las disposiciones de la CGR, emitían esa decisión únicamente para el caso RNVS-GM. En ese sentido acordó aprobar la propuesta de términos de referencia para la incorporación de la variable ambiental en el Plan de Manejo del RNVS-GM, categoría mixta, propuesta en el oficio DEAE-288-2015 de la geógrafa Nuria Chavarría, producto de lo cual dispuso indicar al SINAC que debía proceder a solicitar la apertura del respectivo expediente administrativo en SETENA, a efectos de tramitar la Evaluación Ambiental del citado Plan de Manejo. (Imágenes 232-234 carpeta 1 CD Prueba) A partir de lo anterior se desprende que la revisión y ajuste del Plan de Manejo del RNVS-GM, cuenta con el aval de SETENA para otorgar la viabilidad ambiental. Con todo, es menester reiterar que comparte esta Cámara lo indicado por la CGR en las conductas cuestionadas en cuanto a que la relación de las normas arriba citadas, permiten y exigen que en este tipo de instrumentos de planificación, deba incluirse igualmente el análisis de la factibilidad ambiental, dado que se trata de instrumentos que al disponer permisibilidad o habilitación potencial de actividades que impactarán en el ambiente que pretende tutelar la creación de un Área Silvestre Protegida, en este caso, de orden mixto, deben contar con ese diagnóstico para ponderar su armonía y congruencia con el medio y con el fin perseguido al crear el ASP. Sobre este particular cabe indicar que mediante escrito del 09 de octubre del 2018, el Estado pone en conocimiento del Tribunal que mediante el acuerdo de la Comisión Plenaria de Setena No. CCP-185-2017 adoptado en el artículo 09 de la sesión ordinaria 121-2017 del 27 de septiembre del 2017, se indica en cuanto al inciso e) del Informe DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, que le impone resolver acerca de la viabilidad ambiental del Plan de Manejo del RNVS-GM, que dicho análisis no ha culminado por encontrarse en trámite, además de que dada la acción de inconstitucionalidad que pesa sobre la Ley No.- 9223 que establece los nuevos límites y áreas del RNVS-GM (expediente 14-019174-0007-CO), no es posible emitir decisión final, hasta tanto se resuelva esa acción. Esta circunstancia será objeto de consideración infra. IX.- Sobre el objeto de estudio del informe DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011. Las accionantes reprochan el contenido del informe en cuestión por considerarlo parcial y limitado, en la medida en que solamente consideró una zona del refugio, considerando ilegítimo que les apliquen los resultados de ese análisis a sus propiedades, por cuanto limitan el ejercicio del derecho de dominio. Del análisis de ese oficio se desprende que el estudio que le dio base fue realizado para el período comprendido del 01 de enero del 2005 al 31 de diciembre del 2009, mediante la revisión de la documentación de los expedientes administrativos del Plan de Manejo del RNVS-GM y su zonificación, así como de documentación conexa, conforme al Manual de Normas Generales de Auditoría para el Sector Público, No. M-2-2006-CO-DFOE. Ese informe señala que de la revisión de esa documentación se determinó que el Reglamento de Zonificación emitido mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34946-MINAET de fecha 06 de diciembre del 2008, no consideraba la delimitación, ni regulaciones aplicables a los terrenos de Patrimonio Natural del Estado, ni las limitaciones ante la presencia de ecosistemas boscosos o de humedal en bienes inmuebles titulados a nombre de particulares, ubicados en la zona denominada "Llanura costera Cocles-Manzanillo. Refiere además que en el ACLAC-073-2011 del Área de Conservación La Amistad Caribe, se indicó que los mapas de zonificación no consignaban la delimitación puntual del PNE, pese haber realizado gestiones para el levantamiento catastral del Refugio. Criticó que: "...los usos de suelo permitidos por ese Reglamento en la Llanura Costera Cocles Manzanillo aplican por igual a todos los terrenos sin distinguir si es PNE o si son inmuebles con limitaciones de uso de suelo que en la actualidad están a nombre de particulares, o si tienen otra condición. De esta forma la referida Llanura Costera con una extensión de 933,78 has3, se subdivide en quince zonas como son la agrícola de 104.73 has; la residencial de 56.06 has; la residencial recreativa de 78.52 has; la hotelera turística de 204.15 has; y otras categorías que consignan usos recomendados y usos recomendados con condición que no se enmarcan dentro de lo permitido en terrenos del PNE, o que no detallan restricciones asociadas a la presencia de ecosistemas de fragibilidad ambiental actualmente a nombre de particulares." Como complemento de ese análisis de expedientes en ese rango temporal, el citado informe precisa: "Para efectos de complementar el análisis, esta Contraloría General solicitó la colaboración del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo ... y del Instituto Nacional de Transferencia en Tecnología Agropecuaria ... para el desarrollo de un muestreo de campo en algunos terrenos ubicados en la zona residencial y hotelera turística de la citada Llanura Costera Cocles Manzanillo, a fin de conocer las condiciones biológicas, forestales y edafológicas respectivas, que permitieran dar cuenta del estado en que se encuentran esos terrenos." Luego de referir a los hallazgos de los informes rendidos por el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo y el INTA, consideró que los casos descritos revelaban la presencia de terrenos comprendidos en la Llanura Costera Cocles Manzanillo que reunían altas condiciones de fragibilidad ambiental, pese a lo cual, no se estaban protegiendo de manera adecuada, ya que en algunos casos, pese a la existencia de zonas de bosque o humedal, los terrenos habían sido intervenidos al punto de su afectación, contrario a los fines de creación del refugio. Desde ese plano, la referencia que se hace a la zona 1 del RNVS-GM, en los análisis realizados por el Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo y el INTA, son complemento del examen documental previamente realizado por la CGR y que en modo alguno, implicaba solamente esa zona. Por el contrario, del contenido de ese informe se desprende que pese al conocimiento previo de existencia de zonas que forman parte del PNE, estas zonas geográficas no estaban debidamente identificadas ni delimitadas en el citado Reglamento, según la referencia realizada en el oficio ACLAC-073-2011. De igual manera, pone en evidencia que el uso permitido por el Reglamento, no discrimina si el terreno corresponde a PNE o bien a terrenos de otra naturaleza con limitaciones. Ambas cuestiones son determinantes para la tutela debida del Área Silvestre Protegida, en la medida en que el régimen de uso del suelo permite discriminar las actividades posibles en orden al resguardo del PNE o bien, el tipo de limitación administrativa que resulta aplicable a determinada zona geográfica. El acto cuestionado pone de manifiesto la relevancia de esa definición al indicar: "Con respecto a la citada Llanura costera Cocles-Manzanillo, ésta se caracteriza como una llanura angosta de menos de un kilómetro de ancho desde Puerto Viejo hasta Punta Manzanillo...Esta zona es importante como área de amortiguamiento, pues controla la sedimentación y contaminación sobre los arrecifes de coral ubicados a pocos metros de la playa y que podría (sic) verse afectados por la erosión de las laderas al sur del sector; además, estudios hidrológicos ubican aquí el acuífero más importante de la zona...". Por demás, con sustento en los informes del Tribunal Ambiental Administrativo y el INTA, se desprende que los terrenos de la zona de muestra, presentan condiciones de alta fragilidad ambiental, no cuentan con la protección debida, siendo que pese a la presencia de bosque o humedal, han sido intervenidos al punto de su afectación, lo que, se reitera, es contrario al fin de protección que amparó la creación del refugio de marras. Precisamente, sobre la base de esas consideraciones, fue que en el informe de referencia (DFOE-03-2011), en el aparte de disposiciones en el inciso c) se estableció: "c) A la Comisión Plenaria de la SETENA: Abstenerse de otorgar viabilidades ambientales en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, hasta tanto no esté oficializado el Reglamento de Zonificación de acuerdo con la revisión y los ajustes antes indicados. Remitir a esta Contraloría General, copia del acuerdo de la Comisión Plenaria en donde se giren las instrucciones pertinentes, a más tardar el 30 de julio de 2011." Resulta claro que la ausencia de valoración de impacto ambiental en el Plan de Manejo emitido para el RNVS-GM, supone, por consecuencia directa, la imposibilidad de otorgar viabilidades ambientales respecto de terrenos o sectores específicos ubicados dentro de esa Área Silvestre Protegida, dado que en este ámbito ha de ser considerado como una unidad de tutela ambiental por el fin unitario de resguardo que le ha sido conferido con su creación. El análisis de esas viabilidades ambientales concretas, por ende, se encuentra sujeto a que el Plan de Manejo y la Reglamentación de zonificación. Sobre este particular, tal y como menciona la representación de la CGR, ya este Tribunal se había pronunciado dentro del expediente No. 11-4480-1027-CA, que era proceso ordinario de la empresa denominada Palma Verde Socratea S.A. contra el Estado, causa en la que peticionaba la declaratoria de nulidad de la resolución DEA-1984-2011, que dispuso la suspensión del trámite de otorgamiento de viabilidad ambiental para el desarrollo de obras dentro de un inmueble de su propiedad ubicado dentro del RNVS-GM, por estimar que la suspensión del trámite de evaluación ambiental era contraria a derecho y que el informe de la Contraloría sobre el cual SETENA sustentaba la suspensión (informe que es justo el que se analiza en este proceso), fue emitido hace casi tres años (en ese instante), después de lo cual se habían emitido varias licencias ambientales. En la sentencia No. 248-2012-VI de las 16 horas del 02 de noviembre del 2012, este Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI dispuso en lo relevante: "... En razón de lo anterior se estima que el motivo alegado por la parte demandada, en el acto impugnado, sí es real y existente, que no hay una desaplicación de la ley, pues dentro del ordenamiento que se acusa como violentado, el reglamento esta supeditado a la ley, según el invocado artículo 129 de la Constitución Política, siendo que el informe de la Contraloría que ordena la suspensión y que es el motivo alegado en el acto impugnado, sí contiene expuestas jurídica y técnicamente, las razones por las cuales se estima el reglamento incumple con el artículo 17 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, que no están suficientemente protegidas las zonas de bosque, las zonas de humedales ni delimitado el Patrimonio Natural del Estado, con lo cual en razón de los artículos 7 y 50 de la Constitución Política, tendríamos que efectivamente El Estado al acoger la orden de suspensión girada por la Contraloría, cumple tanto con las obligaciones constitucionales, como también con las derivadas de las leyes y los Tratados Internacionales en materia de protección del ambiente, es decir se estaría realizando una acción de tutela para proteger el ambiente, mantenerlo sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, haciendo una aplicación del principio precautorio, el cual al igual que toda las variables del derecho ambiental resulta ser un eje transversal a toda la actividad de la función pública, la cual deberá responder tanto jurídica como técnicamente para tutelar el ambiente, y estar presente siempre en las consideraciones de hecho y derecho que informan su accionar.(...)". Si bien en esa sentencia no se ingresó a analizar la validez del informe de la CGR, su referencia es necesaria en cuanto pone en evidencia que ese acto refleja las razones técnicas que llevaron a concluir sobre la desatención del artículo 17 de la LOA, por la insuficiencia de protección de las zonas de bosque, humedales, y falta de delimitación del PNE, motivos justificantes para la suspensión del trámite dispuesto en aquella carpeta. De nuevo, si se determinó que el diagnóstico ambiental era necesario para el Plan de Manejo, de suerte que en tanto carente de esa exigencia, el Reglamento de Zonificación, mostraba esa irregularidad, es claro que las habilitaciones de tipos de uso u otorgamiento de títulos de habilitación edilicia (licencias constructivas), en tanto dependientes de aquella planificación, deben suspenderse hasta que se normalice lo señalado en cuanto a la variable ambiental. Atendiendo a ese ligamen lógico, fue que se dispuso ordenar a la SETENA la abstención de otorgar viabilidades ambientales, y a la Municipalidad de Talamanca, igual privación respecto del otorgamiento de permisos de construcción, hasta tanto se ajustara el Plan de Manejo en cuanto al tema ya señalado. X.- Sobre los permisos de construcción, mediante el oficio DFOE-AE-0159 (4811) del 24 de junio del 2011, el Área de Servicios Ambientales y de Energía de la División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativa de la CGR, se comunica a la Municipalidad de Talamanca "Nota informe Nro. DFOE-AE-IF-05-2011 con los resultados del estudio sobre algunos permisos de uso otorgados por la Municipalidad de Talamanca en terrenos del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo." En ese acto se expresa, en lo relevante, sobre el resultado del estudio de algunos casos para los cuales la Municipalidad de Talamanca otorgó permisos de uso de suelo en forma precaria y permisos de construcción para realizar edificaciones en terrenos comprendidos dentro de los límites del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, en un período comprendido entre el 1 de enero de 2005 al 31 de diciembre de 2009. Sobre los resultados informó: "1- Se determinó que el Concejo Municipal de Talamanca otorgó permisos de uso de suelo en forma precaria sobre tres terrenos del Patrimonio Natural del Estado (PNE) ubicados dentro de la Zona Marítimo Terrestre (ZMT) del Refugio Gandoca-Manzanillo, los cuales son carentes de legalidad, pues todos se realizaron al amparo de la Ley Nro. 6043, Ley sobre Zona Marítimo Terrestre, la cual no aplica en ese Refugio de conformidad con el artículo 73 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo. Además, esa Municipalidad otorgó dichos permisos sin tener legitimación para ello, pues el titular de la administración de dicho Refugio es el Ministerio del Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones (MINAET) mediante el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC). ...". Estimó que el Concejo Local carecía de competencia para otorgar permisos de uso de suelo concedidos en sesión ordinaria No. 27 del 08 de noviembre del 2006, en relación con el terreno descrito en el plano catastrado L-658883-2000, permiso otorgado en sesión ordinaria No. 41 del 21 de febrero del 2007, plano catastrado L-1155267-2007, permiso de uso en sesión extraordinaria No. 76 del 17 de julio de 2008, terreno en plano L-660211-2000. Señaló que esos casos se encuentran ubicados dentro de la zona del RNVS-GM, que se traslapa con los límites originalmente ocupados por el territorio Indígena Bribri de Kekoldi, creado mediante Decreto Ejecutivo No. 7267 del 9 de agosto de 1977, y cuyos límites fueron ratificados en la Ley Indígena No. 6172 del 29 de noviembre de 1977. En dicho informe emitió las siguientes disposiciones al Concejo y al Alcalde Municipal de Talamanca: "a) Al Concejo Municipal de Talamanca i- Revisar la legalidad de los permisos de uso de suelo otorgados en forma precaria en terrenos dentro del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, a efectos de que se tomen las acciones que en derecho correspondan, especialmente conforme a los artículos 73 de la Ley sobre Zona Marítimo Terrestre Nro. 6043 y al artículo 32 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente Nro. 7554. Informar a este órgano contralor acerca de lo actuado, mediante un oficio que sea remitido a más tardar el 30 de mayo de 2012. ii- Abstenerse en lo sucesivo de otorgar permisos de uso en forma precaria en terrenos dentro del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo. Remitir a esta Contraloría General, a más tardar el 30 de julio de 2011, copia del acuerdo del Concejo Municipal donde se adopte esta medida. b) Al Alcalde Municipal de Talamanca i- Revisar la legalidad de los permisos de construcción otorgados en terrenos dentro del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo para valorar la existencia de posibles nulidades y adoptar las acciones correspondientes conforme a derecho, respetando el debido proceso, en observancia de aspectos técnicos y legales, y especialmente conforme al artículo 32 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente Nro. 7554 y el artículo 58 de la Ley de Biodiversidad Nro. 7788. Informar a este órgano contralor mediante oficio acerca de lo actuado, a más tardar el 31 de agosto de 2012. ii- Abstenerse en lo sucesivo de otorgar permisos de construcción en terrenos dentro del Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre Gandoca-Manzanillo, hasta tanto no esté oficializado el Reglamento de Zonificación ajustado por el SINAC y el MINAET, de acuerdo con lo solicitado por este órgano contralor mediante informe DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011 del 31 de mayo de 2011. Remitir a esta Contraloría General, a más tardar el 30 de julio de 2011, copia de la resolución administrativa mediante la cual se giren las instrucciones pertinentes.(...)". (Imágenes 183-192 del principal) Siendo que se cuestiona la invalidez del punto b) ii) de ese oficio, en cuanto a la abstención de otorgar permisos de construcción, hay que precisar que, ciertamente, al tratarse de un Refugio de Vida Silvestre de categoría mixta, que por tal involucra propiedades privadas y públicas, es evidente que la tutela del derecho de propiedad privada, que consagra el ordinal 45 de la Carta Magna, estatuye que las limitaciones administrativas que se imponen al contenido sustancial del derecho de dominio, sean legítimas y racionales. En esa línea, el análisis de la variable ambiental permite generar insumos y criterios técnicos que permite justificar objetivamente las limitaciones que resulten necesarias para determinado espacio geográfico o actividad, a la vez que se constituye en una herramienta que llevaría a la supresión de limitaciones excesivas, no amparadas en referencias y ponderaciones de orden técnico. En ese sentido, las limitaciones administrativas, encuentran límites comunes dentro de los cuales se pueden indicar los siguientes: - Deben ser proporcionales a la necesidad administrativa que con ella se debe satisfacer; - Debe tener algún tipo de justificación plausible, debe responder realmente a una necesidad administrativa; - Se exige que no se altere, desintegre o desmembre la propiedad; - Que sea válida en su forma, competencia, objeto y voluntad. Lo anterior supone el deber jurídico de tolerar las limitaciones administrativas por causas de necesidad pública e interés social. No obstante, es claro que en virtud de una limitación de esta índole, no se puede llevar al efecto material de disfuncionalizar la propiedad, sea, negar el ejercicio propio del derecho de dominio en cuanto a sus tributos esenciales, pues en tal caso, se estaría frente a una expropiación de hecho, con las consecuencias jurídicas que ello supone, cual es, el deber de indemnizar al titular que ha sido despojado de ese derecho. En este caso, por virtud del principio de función ambiental de la propiedad, cuyo sustento descansa en la relación de los ordinales 45 y 50 de la Constitución Política, Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y Ley Forestal, incluso las propiedades privadas incluidas dentro de las áreas silvestres protegidas, deben satisfacer el régimen de uso conforme al derecho al ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, en orden al postulado de desarrollo sostenible y la evaluación ambiental previa. En ese orden, verbigracia, dentro de los límites derivados de la función ambiental aludida, el ejercicio de toda actividad humana que pueda, potencialmente, generar una alteración en el ambiente, requiere de la evaluación ambiental precedente al desarrollo de actividades (art. 17 LOA); además, el régimen de uso del suelo ha de ser congruente con los planes de ordenamiento o de manejo aplicable la zona geográfica a fin de tutelar el objeto de creación del Área Silvestre Protegida (en este tipo de asuntos). Incluso, en ese régimen de uso, es menester limitar las actividades que tengan como efecto potencial la interrupción de los ciclos naturales de los ecosistemas, tales como intrusión en los ciclos naturales de regeneración de bosque o humedales. Desde esa óptica, el condicionamiento de otorgamiento de permisos de construcción o continuación en la tramitación de gestiones de estudios de impacto ambiental, no se constituye en una imposición irrazonable en el caso concreto, dado que debe existir armonía en el análisis individual de esas gestiones, respecto del marco general que representa el Plan de Manejo. Se trata de una derivación atinente al caso de los principios preventivo, precautorio e in dubio pro natura, que operan en esta materia, y de una clara protección y conservación de las zonas protegidas de marras, en orden a lo dispuesto por los cánones 22 de la Ley de Biodiversidad No. 7788 y 42 de la LOA. Es claro que la materia ambiental impone limitaciones legítimas al ejercicio del derecho de edificación, componente del derecho de dominio (art. 264 Código Civil), lo que impone que las actividades edilicias, y con mayor razón, en este tipo de áreas protegidas, armonice con el principio de desarrollo sostenible y la función ambiental de la propiedad que da sustento a esas limitaciones. De ahí que de cara a analizar la procedencia o no de permisos de construcción, sea necesario contar un Plan de Manejo que se ajuste a las condiciones de armonía ecológica ya comentadas. Con todo, observa este Tribunal que a la fecha, no se ha concretado efectivamente la disposición de la CGR en cuanto al ajuste del Plan de Manejo a los instrumentos de ponderación de la variable ambiental. Incluso, como se ha expuesto, mediante escrito del 09 de octubre del 2018, el Estado pone en conocimiento del Tribunal que mediante el acuerdo de la Comisión Plenaria de Setena No. CCP-185-2017 adoptado en el artículo 09 de la sesión ordinaria 121-2017 del 27 de septiembre del 2017, se indica en cuanto al inciso e) del Informe DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, que le impone resolver acerca de la viabilidad ambiental del Plan de Manejo del RNVS-GM, que dicho análisis no ha culminado por encontrarse en trámite, además de que dada la acción de inconstitucionalidad que pesa sobre la Ley No.- 9223 que establece los nuevos límites y áreas del RNVS-GM (expediente 14-019174-0007-CO), no es posible emitir decisión final, hasta tanto se resuelva esa acción. (Imágenes 729 del principal) Es decir, desde la emisión del informe de la CGR cuestionado y hasta la fecha, la atención y resolución de los trámites de viabilidad ambiental del Plan no se ha logrado culminar, lo que directamente impide la resolución y otorgamiento de los permisos de construcción o estudios de impacto ambiental en peticiones de proyectos por parte de propietarios de fundos privados situados en el RNVS-GM. Esta circunstancia bien podría llegar a afectar la disponibilidad de los propietarios de los inmuebles de dominio privado, aspecto que por cuestiones de orden, será analizado infra. Sin embargo, esto no lleva a establecer la invalidez de las disposiciones emitidas por la CGR, las cuales, en orden a lo expuesto, se consideran razonables, congruentes y necesarias con los resultados de la investigación que dio como producto el informe No. DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, pues a nada llevaría la exigencia de incluir el diagnóstico ambiental dentro del Plan de Manejo del REGAMA, si no se limita el otorgamiento de permisos de construcción y estudios de factibilidad ambiental para inmuebles particulares ubicados dentro del área del refugio. Nótese que el citado oficio no solamente se hacen referencias a la eventual ilegalidad de permisos de construcción otorgados en zonas cuya competencia correspondía al administrador del Refugio, sea, el MINAE, sino además a la imposibilidad de seguir otorgando permisos de construcción, hasta tanto se esclareciera lo relativo al ajuste del Reglamento de Zonificación. XI.- Sobre las pretensiones relacionadas con la voluntariedad del régimen forestal. En su pretensión subsidiaria, se formula lo siguiente: "1- Con lugar la presente demanda y que se declare que los suscritos en nuestra condición de propietarios privados, nos asiste el derecho de retirarnos voluntariamente del régimen forestal en el momento que lo solicitemos, por tratarse de un régimen voluntario de sometimiento y no una servidumbre perpetua." Ahora bien, se ha establecido en este proceso, aspecto no controvertido, que las entidades accionantes cuentan con heredades que se ubican dentro del área del RNVS-GM, cuya referencia puede observarse en el hecho probado número 2) de este fallo. Ya se ha establecido que en virtud de la función ambiental y social de la propiedad privada, el mismo ordinal 45 de la Carta Magna, en su párrafo tercero, establece la posibilidad de imponer limitaciones por causas de interés público al derecho de dominio, derivación de lo cual, es claro que se trata de un derecho que no es absoluto, en la medida en que se impone el deber jurídico de aceptar tales restricciones. En ese orden, se insiste, en el ámbito ecológico, la misma Ley Orgánica del Ambiente impone la obligación del Estado (y demás entes públicos) de potenciar el desarrollo sostenible que supone, el ejercicio de la propiedad privada en congruencia y armonía con el medio ambiente, de suerte que las actividades humanas se realicen de manera coordinada con la regeneración del ambiente. Esto implica que debe potenciarse el desarrollo económico y ambiental de manera sostenible. Lo anterior justifica la imposición de límites en el ejercicio de esas actividades humanas económicas, productivas o privadas, a fin de que se impacte en la menor medida el ambiente, o bien, se permita su mantenimiento o regeneración. En casos como el presente, tal visión ideológica, con expresión formal normativa, conlleva a que en los casos en que las propiedades privadas se encuentren dentro de áreas ambientalmente sensibles que cuentan con un régimen especial de protección, las actividades a realizar deban enmarcarse dentro del uso planificado, orientado a la protección de esos ecosistemas. Así, en los casos de Áreas Silvestres Protegidas, es necesario que el uso del suelo se supedite a las evaluaciones previas de potencial impacto a los recursos naturales presentes en el área protegida, como es el caso de humedales, recursos marinos, capacidad de suelos, en orden al régimen de uso que, en tesis de principio, por razonabilidad técnica, ha de haber ponderado la sinergía entre las actividades productivas y las consideraciones de orden ecológico. En este sentido, el ordinal 34 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente (No. 7554), a modo de referencia, impone el deber de adoptar las medidas preventivas en las ASP, para prevenir o eliminar el aprovechamiento, ocupación en toda el área propiedad del Estado, y hacer respetar las características ecológicas, geomorfológicas y estéticas que han determinado su establecimiento. Esa misma finalidad se desarrolla en el numeral 35 ejusdem, en cuanto fija los objetivos de la creación, conservación, administración, desarrollo y vigilancia de las áreas protegidas, dentro de los cuales se pueden mencionar, solamente a modo de referencia: "a) Conservar los ambientes naturales representativos de las diferentes regiones biogeográficas y de los ecosistemas más frágiles, para asegurar el equilibrio y la continuidad de los procesos evolutivos y ecológicos; b) Salvaguardar la diversidad genética de las especies silvestres de las que depende la continuidad evolutiva, particularmente las endémicas, amenazadas o en peligro de extinción; c) Asegurar el uso sostenible de los ecosistemas y sus elementos, fomentando la activa participación de las comunidades vecinas; d) Promover la investigación científica, el estudio de los ecosistemas y su equilibrio, así como el conocimiento y las tecnologías que permitan el uso sostenible de los recursos naturales del país y su conservación; e) Proteger y mejorar las zonas acuíferas y las cuencas hidrográficas, para reducir y evitar el impacto negativo que puede ocasionar su mal manejo; f) Proteger los entornos naturales y paisajísticos de los sitios y centros históricos y arquitectónicos, de los monumentos nacionales, de los sitios arqueológicos y de los lugares de interés histórico y artístico, de importancia para la cultura y la identidad nacional." Para efectos del presente asunto, y dadas las pretensiones de las entidades accionantes, resulta relevante lo preceptuado por el canon 37 de esa Ley No. 7554, en cuanto regula el tratamiento de inclusión de fincas particulares en la creación de ASP estatales: "Artículo 37.- Facultades del Poder Ejecutivo. Al establecer áreas silvestres protegidas, cualquiera sea su categoría de manejo, el Poder Ejecutivo, por medio del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, queda facultado para incluir, dentro de sus límites, las fincas o partes de fincas particulares necesarias para cumplir con los objetivos señalados en esta ley y para instrumentarlos de acuerdo con el respectivo plan de manejo o crear las servidumbres legales para la protección ecológica y el cumplimiento de la presente ley. Cuando se trate de parques nacionales, reservas biológicas o refugios nacionales de vida silvestre estatales, los terrenos serán adquiridos por compra, expropiación o ambos procedimientos, previa indemnización. En los casos de reservas forestales, zonas protectoras, refugios de vida silvestre mixtos y humedales, los predios o sus partes también podrán comprarse o expropiarse, salvo que, por requerimiento del propietario, se sometan voluntariamente al régimen forestal. Esa sujeción será inscrita en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, como una afectación al inmueble, que se mantendrá durante el tiempo establecido en el plan de manejo. Las fincas particulares afectadas según lo dispuesto por este artículo, por encontrarse en parques nacionales, reservas biológicas, refugios de vida silvestre, reservas forestales y zonas protectoras, quedarán comprendidas dentro de las áreas protegidas estatales solo a partir del momento en que se hayan pagado o expropiado legalmente, salvo cuando en forma voluntaria se sometan al Régimen Forestal. Tratándose de reservas forestales, zonas protectoras y refugios de vida silvestre y en caso de que el pago o la expropiación no se haya efectuado y mientras se efectúa, las áreas quedarán sometidas a un plan de ordenamiento ambiental que incluye la evaluación de impacto ambiental y posteriormente, al plan de manejo, recuperación y reposición de los recursos. (Así reformado el párrafo anterior por el artículo 72, inciso c) de la Ley Forestal, N° 7575 del 13 de febrero de 1996, que a su vez fue reformado por el 114 de la Ley de Biodiversidad, N° 7788 de 30 de abril de 1998) Se faculta al Poder Ejecutivo para que, por medio del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, realice las expropiaciones, contempladas en este artículo, de conformidad con lo establecido en la Ley de expropiaciones No. 7495, del 3 de mayo de 1995." Como se observa, ese precepto establece la posibilidad de incluir dentro de los RVS de naturaleza mixta, terrenos de propiedad privada, a efectos de lo cual, bien puede optar el Estado por su compra o expropiación, o bien, que los titulares de esos predios se sometan voluntariamente al régimen forestal, caso en el cual, se realizará la anotación registral debida cuya vigencia será durante el tiempo establecido en el plan de manejo. En ese sentido, una vez que el titular del derecho de dominio se ha incorporado voluntariamente al régimen forestal, la vigencia de ese régimen de afectación se mantiene por el lapso establecido en el plan de manejo. Conforme a ese precepto, una vez que esas fincas particulares hayan sido adquiridas por compra o expropiación, o bien, cuando el propietario se haya sometido voluntariamente al régimen forestal, quedan incorporadas a las áreas silvestres protegidas estatales. Empero, la misma norma precisa que en tanto se realiza esa adquisición, esas heredades quedan sometidas al Plan de Manejo o Plan de Ordenamiento Ambiental. Desde esa arista de examen, a diferencia de lo que expresan las accionantes, una vez incluida una propiedad privada dentro del diseño de un RNVS, pese a que su inclusión ha sido voluntaria, no puede igualmente retirarse, en la medida en que esa porción de tierra se ha considerado parte de una sola unidad funcional ambiental y ecológica, por tanto, componente esencial de un ecosistema que busca ser protegido y conservado como ratio misma de la constitución del Área Silvestre Protegida, en esa categoría. De otro modo, se produciría una afectación indudable en la integralidad de dicho ecosistema, si se permitiera que a partir de la desvinculación con el régimen forestal, el propietario pudiera dar un uso diverso al que se ha establecido en el respectivo Plan de Manejo de esa área. En todo caso, como bien señala el numeral 37 de la LOA, aún en casos de estar pendiente el trámite de adquisición de parte del Estado, esos inmuebles quedarían sujetos a las limitaciones de uso que derivan del respectivo Plan de Manejo y Reglamento de Zonificación, instrumentos regulatorios que por competencia especial, constituyen el referente de destino de uso del suelo en esas zonas. En efecto, la protección ambiental que dimana de la misma Ley Forestal (No. 7575), que impone el principio de desarrollo sostenible, obliga a que el régimen de uso de esos espacios, sea congruente y consecuente con las políticas de protección de esos recursos que define el instrumento de gestión ambiental, lo que igualmente engarza con los fines tutelares del ambiente que plasma el ordinal 14 de la Ley de Biodiversidad. Esta finalidad se observa en lo ya expuesto, en el sentido de que los permisos de construcción de esos predios particulares no podrían otorgarse a contrapelo de esas ordenanzas ambientales (Plan de Manejo y Reglamento de Zonificación del RNVS), ello con independencia de si los propietarios privados se encuentran insertos o no dentro del régimen forestal, pues a fin de cuentas, la finalidad de protección del PNE se impone en estas lides. En este punto cabe destacar lo indicado por el Estado y la CGR, tema no rebatido por las demandantes, en cuanto a que el espacio territorial sobre el cual se presenta este proceso, es un RNVS de categoría mixta, que por diseño, incluye propiedad pública y privada, en un caso en el que en el trámite de constitución del REGAMA mediante Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 16614-MAG, fue concertado con la comunidad, sin que conste en autos elemento alguno que permita sostener criterio diverso, de suerte que al margen de lo señalado, las propiedades privadas que forman parte del área del refugio, se encuentran afectas a las limitaciones propias de ese régimen. Desde luego que si ese régimen llevara materialmente a un vaciamiento sustancial del derecho de dominio, sea, a una disfucionalidad de ese derecho, surgiría el deber del Estado de expropiar esas tierras particulares. Empero, como se ha señalado, las medidas que son objeto de impugnación en esta causa, imponen disposiciones racionales en materia de evaluación de la variable ambiental y suspensión de trámites de permisos de construcción, dadas las situaciones detectadas respecto de las implicaciones y contenido del Reglamento de Zonificación emitido mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 34946-MINAET del 06 de diciembre del 2008. Tales disposiciones de la CGR no impiden el ejercicio de los atributos esenciales del derecho de dominio de los propietarios particulares, aún y cuando condicionan la tramitación y otorgamiento de permisos de construcción a la inclusión de la evaluación ambiental en el Plan de Manejo del RNVS-GM, pero ello no supone ni implica una supresión sustancial del derecho de propiedad. Nótese que las partes no logran acreditar que hubiesen gestionado trámite alguno en ese sentido. Sin embargo, como fuese advertido arriba, mediante escrito del 09 de octubre del 2018, el Estado pone en conocimiento del Tribunal que mediante el acuerdo de la Comisión Plenaria de Setena No. CCP-185-2017 adoptado en el artículo 09 de la sesión ordinaria 121-2017 del 27 de septiembre del 2017, se indica en cuanto al inciso e) del Informe DFOE-AE-IF-03-2011, que le impone resolver acerca de la viabilidad ambiental del Plan de Manejo del RNVS-GM, que dicho análisis no ha culminado por encontrarse en trámite, además de que dada la acción de inconstitucionalidad que pesa sobre la Ley No.- 9223 que establece los nuevos límites y áreas del RNVS-GM (expediente 14-019174-0007-CO), no es posible emitir decisión final, hasta tanto se resuelva esa acción. (Imágenes 729 del principal) Esto pone en evidencia una dilación preocupante en la culminación del ajuste de conformidad de las medidas ordenadas por la CGR, que implica una afectación a los derechos de los propietarios de disponer de sus heredades, en la medida en que no existe definición aún en cuanto al régimen de uso posible en esos predios. Esa circunstancia impide la resolución y otorgamiento de los permisos de construcción o estudios de impacto ambiental en peticiones de proyectos por parte de propietarios de fundos privados situados en el RNVS-GM, lo que, a no dudarlo, trunca esa disponibilidad de los propietarios de los inmuebles de dominio privado. Desde ese plano, es necesario instar a las unidades administrativas competentes para que dentro de las posibilidades legales de rigor, se adopten y concreten en el menor plazo posible las medidas necesarias para satisfacer la inclusión del diagnóstico ambiental en el Plan de Manejo del RNVS-GM, de suerte que se puedan reactivar, cuando sea posible, los trámites de solicitudes de permisos de construcción respecto de los terrenos privados situados dentro del área de ese refugio. Empero, esa condición no permite admitir el reclamo formulado para que se levanten esas medidas dispuestas por la CGR en cuanto a ese tipo de solicitudes, dada la prevalencia de la tutela al ambiente como derivación del principio precautorio que se impone en este campo. Lo anterior por haber sido formulado en la pretensión principal 3 y en la subsidiaria 1 que señalan respectivamente: "3.- Que se dejen sin efecto las disposiciones que tienen paralizadas las propiedades de los actores." y "1- Con lugar la presente demanda y que se declare que los suscritos en nuestra condición de propietarios privados, nos asiste el derecho de retirarnos voluntariamente del régimen forestal en el momento que lo solicitemos, por tratarse de un régimen voluntario de sometimiento y no una servidumbre perpetua." XII.- Sobre los reclamos indemnizatorios. Relacionado con este punto, en las pretensiones subsidiarias, se formula el siguiente reclamo indemnizatorio: "3- Se condene a los demandados de forma solidaria al pago por Daño Material y perjuicios causado a cada uno de los actores. Daño material como consecuencias del congelamiento que han sufrido sus tierras ante la imposibilidad de realizar cualquier tipo de construcciones durante 70 meses restringiendo en su totalidad su uso y disposición en una zona de elevado atractivo y con fuerte dinámica inmobiliaria, por lo que estimo (sic) prudencialmente dicho daño en la suma de un millón de colones para cada uno de los actores. Perjuicios por la depreciación sufrida en los valores de la tierra en la zona, producto de la parálisis comentada y de sus efectos sobre el mercado inmueble y especialmente por contribuir a crear un clima de alta inseguridad jurídica en la zona donde están las propiedades de los demandantes en este proceso y, en general de toda la propiedad privada dentro del REGAMA, propiedad mixta que nos ocupa por lo que estimo (sic) provisionalmente dichos perjuicios en la suma de un millón de colones por cada uno de de los actores. Ambas sumas son provisionales y se determinarán en la fase de ejecución de sentencia. (Imágenes 58-105, 546, 549-552 del principal)". Lo peticionado exige realizar algunas referencias (breves) al régimen de responsabilidad civil de la Administración Pública. Al amparo del numeral 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, la Administración es responsable por su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal. Cabe destacar que la referencia que hace el legislador no es simplemente a los actos, sino que trasciende todo el funcionamiento administrativo (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política), concepto que refleja cualquier forma de manifestación de voluntad administrativa, sean formales o materiales, y que engloba además, a la disfunción, sea, las omisiones administrativas. La responsabilidad dicha, se enmarca, por ende, dentro de un régimen preeminentemente objetivo, que engloba en su fundamento tanto la teoría del daño y del riesgo, así como en el equilibrio en la ecuación patrimonial. Con ello se procura, en lo fundamental, la reparación indemnizatoria a quien ha experimentado una lesión atribuible a la organización pública como centro de autoridad que resulta ser antijurídica en su base. Este criterio finalista produce a su vez, una transformación plena en el eje central de la responsabilidad misma, pues abandona la observación analítica del sujeto productor del daño y la calificación de su conducta, para ubicarse en la posición de la víctima, que menguada en su situación jurídica, queda eximida en la comprobación de cualquier parámetro subjetivo del agente público actuante (salvo en lo que a su responsabilidad personal se refiere). Esto ocasiona, sin duda, un giro en el enfoque mismo de su fundamento, ya que habrá responsabilidad de la Administración siempre que su funcionamiento normal o anormal, legítimo o ilegítimo, cause un daño que la víctima no tenga el deber de soportar, ya sea patrimonial o extrapatrimonial, con independencia de su situación jurídica subjetiva y la titularidad o condición de poder que ostente, cumpliendo claro está, con el presupuesto imprescindible del nexo causal. Sobre el tema, véase el extenso desarrollo realizado en la resolución no. 584 de las 10 horas 40 minutos del 11 de agosto del 2005 de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Desde este plano, la legislación impone como criterios de imputación la conducta ilícita o lícita, así como el funcionamiento normal o anormal. En el caso de la conducta lícita y el funcionamiento normal, el Ordenamiento Jurídico establece presupuestos y exigencias que determinan su procedencia, entre ellos, el daño debe ser especial o anormal, lo que supone que debe recaer sobre una pequeña proporción de afectados o bien, en el segundo caso, debe tener una intensidad excepcional. En estas hipótesis la responsabilidad solo cubre el daño, no así el lucro cesante (artículos 194 y 195 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Por su parte, en la conducta ilícita y el funcionamiento anormal, la responsabilidad es plenaria. Con todo, ante esos criterios de imputabilidad, ha de acreditarse que la lesión es consecuencia de esas acciones u omisiones, a efectos de establecer el nexo causal que permita la atribución de responsabilidad al centro de autoridad pública. Aunado a ello, en los casos de anormalidad e ilicitud, el juzgador ha de abordar un examen del funcionamiento público, a fin de establecer si efectivamente, se ha presentado un proceder que se aleja de la legalidad o bien, se contrapone a los conceptos de eficiencia administrativa. En tales casos, resulta determinante inferir con claridad la existencia de esos criterios, pues de otro modo, el tratamiento y análisis de cada caso debe ser diferente, atendiendo al tipo de funcionamiento al que se atribuye el detrimento. Surgen como causas eximentes de tal responsabilidad la culpa de la víctima, el hecho de un tercero y la fuerza mayor. Empero, en cada debate, el juzgador ha de examinar si el efecto liberatorio de tales circunstancias es total o lo es solo parcial, caso este en que solo podrá llegar a producir un efecto reductor en la responsabilidad de la unidad administrativa. De nuevo, la concurrencia de esos aspectos incumbe a la Administración. Este deber compensatorio subsiste incluso ante los daños ocasionados a raíz de las faltas cometidas por sus funcionarios o servidores, durante el desempeño de sus deberes o en ocasión del cargo que ocupan. En efecto, el canon 191, en relación al 199, ambos de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, refieren al Estado la responsabilidad objetiva por las acciones u omisiones de sus funcionarios, cuando se hayan valido del cargo o de los medios que este les proporciona, para causar un efecto dañoso en la esfera jurídica de un tercero, que no se tiene el deber de soportar. En ese tanto, esos medios o instrumentos son vías de ocasionalidad causal que dan paso a la responsabilidad, por la vinculación modal, instrumental o indirecta con el servicio. Cabe destacar que este deber indemnizatorio se fundamenta, además, en el concepto de antijuridicidad de base, traducible en la inexistencia del deber de soportar la lesión. Más simple, siempre que se haya sufrido una lesión como consecuencia de una conducta pública, sea esta activa u omisiva, que la víctima no tiene la obligación de soportar, surge el deber indemnizatorio como derivación de máxima de reparación integral del daño que se desprende del numeral 41 de la Constitución Política. De ahí que dentro del espectro de cobertura de este sistema de responsabilidad, se encuentren comprendidos los daños que puedan ocasionarse de un funcionamiento normal o bien de una conducta lícita, pues en tales casos, pese a que en tesis de principio, el proceder público se ajusta a legalidad o bien a las reglas de eficiencia que lo orientan, si se produce un efecto lesivo que la persona no tiene el deber de soportar, ha de ser indemnizado. Desde luego que en esas hipótesis el daño ha de ser especial (infringido a una pequeña proporción de afectados) o anormal (sea, de un alcance excepcionalmente intenso, por encima de los márgenes normales de tolerancia), dando pie a la reparabilidad del daño, no así del lucro cesante, según las reglas dispuestas por los artículos 194 y 195 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Con todo, cabe indicar que no todo daño es indemnizable, sino solo aquel que el Ordenamiento Jurídico considere antijurídico en su base. En efecto, sólo es indemnizable la lesión que confrontada con la globalidad del Ordenamiento, pueda reputarse como antijurídica en su base; lo contrario llevaría, a decir de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, a afirmar la compensación por acción dañosa frente a un menoscabo que el Ordenamiento no reprocha y que, por el contrario, tolera y consciente como normal y justificado, lo que llevaría a una inminente quiebra del Estado, que en el contexto nacional, se encuentra vinculado directa o indirectamente con un gran número de áreas de acción. Dicho en términos más simples, existe antijuricidad de base siempre que un mandato legal establezca la obligación de reparar una lesión contraria a derecho que la víctima no deba soportar, al margen del parámetro de imputación. Aún lo indicado, cabe destacar que no todo daño es indemnizable, sino solo aquel que sea efectivo, evaluable e individualizable. La amplitud del marco de tutela del sistema de responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración no es óbice del deber de acreditar que el daño es consecuencia de un proceder público. A su vez, debe demostrarse el marco fáctico a partir del cual, es viable desprender la lesión a los bienes extrapatrimoniales. No basta alegar la existencia de padecimientos o lesiones, debe demostrarse al menos, los hechos que en teoría, han originado tal detrimento. Ello viene como derivación del principio de carga de la prueba, que dimana del ordinal 58 inciso e) del CPCA en relación al numeral 196 de la LGAP, y norma 41.1. del Código Procesal Civil, No. 9342, al establecer la necesidad de quien alega tener un derecho, de probar los hechos constitutivos de aquel. No se trata de una inversión de la carga probatoria en una materia que se sustenta en la reparación integral del daño y tiene como pilares el daño y el riesgo creado, sino de la comprobación mínima de los criterios de imputación y hechos que dan origen al daño, como presupuestos elementales de la atribución de responsabilidad y con ello del surgimiento de la obligación reparadora. El ordinal 82 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establece como una de las finalidades del proceso, determinar la verdad real de los hechos, mediante cualesquiera medios de prueba. Empero, ello no releva a la parte que aduce tener un derecho oponible a un tercero, como es el caso del derecho de reparación de un daño, de acreditar los fundamentos fácticos que sustentan ese derecho, así como de la existencia misma de la lesión. Lo anterior sin perjuicio de aquellos casos en que el padecimiento surge como consecuencia lógica de un proceder administrativo. Lo anterior deriva además de lo preceptuado por el canon 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en cuanto señala: “En todo caso el daño alegado habrá de ser efectivo, evaluable e individualizable en relación con una persona o grupo.” La efectividad del daño en un caso concreto pende, de manera directa, de la demostración del nexo de causalidad, que permita vincular el resultado lesivo con una acción u omisión de una Administración Pública. Así además se establece en el ordinal 58 del Código de previa cita, en cuanto impone el deber del accionante de señalar las causas de la lesión reclamada, en qué consiste, y su estimación prudencial. Si bien tal exigencia se encuentra prevista en la norma indicada cuando el pedimento reparador sea accesorio, con mucho mayor razón ha de satisfacerse cuando el marco medular de la pretensión sea una indemnización, pues en esos casos, el establecimiento de esos presupuestos, es la base mínima para acceder a lo peticionado. En esa dinámica, no basta argumentar sobre la existencia probable de daños, debe acreditarse su efectividad. De igual modo, dentro de este esquema general, cabe indicar que la acción indemnizatoria que se busca cargar a la Administración Pública se encuentra sujeta a un plazo de prescripción de cuatro años, al tenor del ordinal 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. XIII.- En la especie, el primer punto a esgrimir es la existencia o no de un daño que pueda considerarse base válida de indemnización. Al socaire del precepto 196 de la LGAP, el daño indemnizable ha de ser efectivo, evaluable e individualizable (aspectos ya abordados), pero además, antijurídico en su base, sea, que no se tenga el deber legal de soportar. Por demás, es necesario que quien reclama su reparación, acredite su existencia, así como la referencia y existencia de las causas a las que se le imputa, de suerte que el juzgador pueda cotejar la existencia de una relación de causalidad entre el hecho antecedente al que se atribuye y la lesión como consecuencia de aquella causa, a la vez que ha de ponderar si es referible o imputable al sujeto a quien se endilga. Tal y como fue anticipado arriba, la dilación que se evidencia en este proceso respecto del cumplimiento debido de las disposiciones emitidas por la CGR en torno a la evaluación ambiental del Plan de Manejo en el RNVS-GM, así como de la suspensión de trámite de estudios de impacto ambiental y permisos de construcción hasta tanto se regularice el Plan de Manejo (y reglamento de zonificación emitido por el Decreto 34946-MINAET), bien puede constituirse en causal de perturbación del ejercicio del derecho de dominio de los propietarios privados. Empero, esa sola circunstancia no hace suponer de manera automática la concurrencia de un daño real, efectivo e individualizable que justifique la estimación del reclamo indemnizatorio que se formula. En el marco de las alegaciones de las demandantes, los requerimientos de daños y perjuicios que realizan, se sustentan en conjeturas que no encuentran respaldo en el mérito de los autos. Nótese que en cuanto a los daños materiales, los asocian a la imposibilidad de uso y disposición de sus bienes por el plazo en que se ha mantenido el "congelamiento", así como por la restricción de uso de bienes que consideran, pertenecen a una zona de elevado atractivo y con alta dinámica inmobiliaria. De igual manera, los perjuicios los sustenta en la supuesta depreciación sufrida en los valores de la tierra en la zona, producto de la parálisis y de sus efectos sobre el mercado inmueble y especialmente por contribuir a crear un clima de alta inseguridad jurídica en la zona donde están las propiedades de los demandantes en este proceso y, en general de toda la propiedad privada dentro del RNVS-GM. Ponderada la demanda, no estima este Tribunal que las accionantes hayan acreditado de manera debida la efectiva ocurrencia de las lesiones cuya reparación pretenden. Si bien se mira, sus ruegos se sustentan en apreciaciones subjetivas, que al margen de su procedencia o no, requieren para ser base fértil de indemnización, del aporte de los elementos de convicción que permitan tener por acreditadas esas consecuencias nocivas a sus respectivas esferas jurídicas. No existe en autos una sola probanza a partir de la cual se pueda inferir o colegir, al menos de manera remota, la existencia de esos daños y perjuicios, y en esos términos, la pretensión bajo examen no podría ser objeto de estimación. Tales detrimentos alegatos no pueden ser dados por supuestos por este Tribunal, dado que ni siquiera pueden tenerse como consecuencia lógica y necesaria de las dilaciones que se acusan. Son por ende meras conjeturas de los actores, no amparadas en elementos tangibles y objetivos de acreditación, lo que lleva, sin más, a su rechazo. Para lo anterior no es óbice que los accionantes hayan señalado que tales estimaciones son prudenciales y que se fijarían en fase de ejecución de sentencia. En ese orden, a tono con el ordinal 122 inciso m) del CPCA, la sentencia dictada en este tipo de procesos contencioso administrativo, puede disponer la condena de los daños y perjuicios, en los siguientes términos: "i) Pronunciamiento sobre su existencia y cuantía, siempre que consten probados en autos al dictarse la sentencia. ii) Pronunciamiento en abstracto, cuando conste su existencia, pero no su cuantía. iii) Pronunciamiento en abstracto, cuando no conste su existencia y cuantía, siempre que sean consecuencia de la conducta administrativa o relación jurídico-administrativa objeto de la demanda." Al socaire de ese mandato, en relación con el precepto 58 inciso e) del CPCA y 196 de la LGAP, la remisión de la cuantificación de los daños para la fase de ejecución de sentencia exige que de antemano se haya acreditado, al menos de manera abstracta, la ocurrencia de daños cuya cuantificación (liquidación) no haya sido posible determinar en la fase ordinaria o constitutiva del proceso, de suerte que los detalle de la magnitud concreta de las lesiones, deba relegarse para esa fase del proceso. Con todo, se insiste, es primario e impostergable que se haya acreditado la existencia del daño, lo que en esta causa no ha ocurrido. Por otro lado, ni siquiera por el numeral iii) del inciso m) del artículo 122 previamente citado sería posible acceder a los ruegos bajo estudio, dado que se ha establecido que esas conductas no presentan las causales de invalidez que reprochan los reclamantes. Así las cosas, debe disponerse este extremo de la demanda. XIV.- Corolario. Análisis de defensas opuestas. Conferido el traslado de ley, la Contraloría General de la República opuso las defensas de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva y falta de derecho. Por su parte el Estado, la de falta de derecho. El SINAC, planteó la defensa de falta de derecho. En lo que se refiere a la CGR, respecto del ruego relacionado con la voluntariedad de retiro del régimen forestal, debe acogerse la defensa de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva, por cuanto, como efectivamente asevera esa parte, tal pedimento no involucra en modo alguno conductas o competencias que sean propias de ese órgano especializado. La pertenencia o no a un régimen forestal, así como la posibilidad de inclusión o retiro voluntario de propietarios privados, del régimen forestal, es un tema ajeno a la disponibilidad de decisión de esa instancia de fiscalización, consecuencia de lo cual, en los términos del artículo 12.1 en relación al 12.5 del CPCA, no se observa la relación de oponibilidad de efectos de la pretensión respecto de esa parte, lo lleva a acoger la citada defensa. En lo demás, se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho. Se acoge esa misma defensa en lo referente al Estado y al SINAC, tanto en las pretensiones principales como en las subsidiarias. En consecuencia, debe disponerse el rechazo de la demanda en todos sus extremos."