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Res. 09928-2010 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 09/06/2010
OutcomeResultado
The Chamber held unconstitutional Article 3(a) of the CPCA and the case law of the First Chamber that referred all public-employment disputes to the labor courts, but dismissed the challenge to the repealed law's Article 4(a) as capable of constitutionally conforming interpretation.La Sala declaró inconstitucional el artículo 3, inciso a), del CPCA y la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera que remitía a la vía laboral cualquier controversia de empleo público, pero desestimó la impugnación del artículo 4, inciso a), de la ley derogada por considerarlo susceptible de interpretación conforme con la Constitución.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber consolidated two actions of unconstitutionality against Article 3(a) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code and the case law of the First Chamber that, under the old law, systematically referred to labor courts actions seeking annulment of administrative acts arising from public employment relationships. The Court held that Article 49 of the Constitution exclusively reserves to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction the review of the legality of all administrative activity, including conduct occurring within a statutory relationship. The radical exclusion in the Code emptied this institutional guarantee of its content, and was therefore declared unconstitutional. It also struck down the case law that labeled any public-employment dispute as “purely labor.” It clarified that jurisdiction is determined by the substantive content of the claim and the applicable legal regime: challenges to the substantial conformity of administrative conduct with the legal framework belong to the contentious-administrative venue; typically labor claims (bonuses, vacation, severance pay) remain with the labor courts. The old Regulatory Law itself was not annulled, as it allowed for a constitutionally conforming interpretation. The ruling has retroactive effect to the effective date of the annulled provision and case law, without prejudice to good-faith vested rights and settled legal situations.La Sala Constitucional acumuló dos acciones de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 3, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo y contra la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera que, basada en la antigua ley, remitía sistemáticamente a la jurisdicción laboral las pretensiones de nulidad de actos administrativos surgidos en relaciones de empleo público. El Tribunal determinó que el artículo 49 constitucional reserva exclusivamente a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa la fiscalización de la legalidad de la función administrativa, incluidas las conductas que se produzcan en el marco de una relación estatutaria. Estimó que la exclusión radical del CPCA vacía de contenido esa garantía institucional, por lo que lo declaró inconstitucional. También declaró inconstitucional la jurisprudencia que calificaba cualquier controversia derivada del empleo público como “netamente laboral”. Precisó que la competencia se define según el contenido material de la pretensión y el régimen jurídico aplicable: si se cuestiona la conformidad sustancial de la conducta administrativa con el bloque de legalidad, corresponde a la jurisdicción contenciosa; si la pretensión es típicamente laboral (aguinaldo, vacaciones, cesantía), corresponde a la jurisdicción de trabajo. La antigua Ley Reguladora no fue anulada en sí misma, pues admitía una interpretación conforme con la Constitución. La sentencia tiene efectos retroactivos a la vigencia de la norma y jurisprudencia anuladas, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas.
Key excerptExtracto clave
The challenged provision radically and absolutely —without exception— excludes from the jurisdiction and decision of the contentious-administrative courts any claim related to administrative conduct within a statutory relationship, thereby flagrantly violating the Law of the Constitution and, in particular, Article 49, which exclusively reserves to that jurisdictional venue, as its material competence, the duty to “guarantee the legality of the administrative function.” The challenged statutory text, by its closed literal wording, does not permit an interpretation consistent with the Law of the Constitution and the necessary distinction between claims that, by their material content and applicable legal regime, must be heard and decided by either the contentious-administrative or the labor jurisdiction. (…) Indeed, as noted, there are claims that, by their substantive character and applicable legal regime, even if brought within the context of a public-employment relationship, must be heard and decided, by constitutional imperative (Article 49 of the Constitution), by the contentious-administrative courts — that is, all those in which a public official challenges the substantial conformity or validity of any specific manifestation of the administrative function or administrative conduct with the administrative legal system.El precepto impugnado excluye de manera radical y absoluta –sin excepción- del conocimiento y resolución de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, toda pretensión relacionada con la conducta administrativa en el marco de una relación estatutaria, con lo cual transgrede, palmariamente, el Derecho de la Constitución y, particularmente, el artículo 49 constitucional que le reservó exclusivamente, como competencia material, a ese orden jurisdiccional “garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa”. El texto legislativo impugnado no admite, por su tenor literal cerrado, una interpretación conforme con el Derecho de la Constitución y la necesaria distinción entre pretensiones que, por su contenido material y el régimen jurídico aplicable, deben ser de conocimiento y resolución, sea de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa o de la laboral. (…) En efecto, tal y como se señaló, habrá pretensiones que, por su carácter material o sustancial y el régimen jurídico aplicable, aunque deducidas en el contexto de una relación de empleo público, deben ser conocidas y resueltas, por imperativo constitucional (artículo 49 de la Constitución), por la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, esto es, todas aquellas en las que un funcionario o servidor público cuestione la conformidad sustancial o validez de cualquier manifestación específica de la función administrativa o conducta administrativa con el ordenamiento jurídico-administrativo.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El constituyente derivado o poder reformador estableció una reserva constitucional de la competencia material de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa al estatuir que su objeto es “garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa”, razón por la cual el legislador ordinario, en el ejercicio de su libertad de conformación o configuración, no puede atribuirle esa competencia a otro orden jurisdiccional que no sea el contencioso-administrativo, puesto que, de ser así, estaría vaciando de contenido la garantía institucional y el derecho fundamental que consagra el artículo 49 de la Constitución."
"The derived constituent power established a constitutional reservation of the material competence of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction by providing that its purpose is to “guarantee the legality of the administrative function,” whereby the ordinary legislator, in the exercise of its freedom to shape or configure the law, may not assign that competence to any jurisdictional order other than the contentious-administrative one, since doing so would empty of content the institutional guarantee and fundamental right enshrined in Article 49 of the Constitution."
Considerando IV
"El constituyente derivado o poder reformador estableció una reserva constitucional de la competencia material de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa al estatuir que su objeto es “garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa”, razón por la cual el legislador ordinario, en el ejercicio de su libertad de conformación o configuración, no puede atribuirle esa competencia a otro orden jurisdiccional que no sea el contencioso-administrativo, puesto que, de ser así, estaría vaciando de contenido la garantía institucional y el derecho fundamental que consagra el artículo 49 de la Constitución."
Considerando IV
"Este Tribunal Constitucional, estima que los criterios determinantes para deslindar el ámbito competencial de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa de otros ordenes jurisdiccionales especializados serán, entonces, los siguientes: 1°) El contenido material o sustancial de la pretensión y 2°) el régimen jurídico aplicable; de modo que si se discute la conformidad o disconformidad sustancial de una manifestación específica de la función administrativa con el bloque de legalidad, el conflicto de interés, será, necesariamente, de conocimiento de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa."
"This Constitutional Court considers that the determining criteria for delimiting the jurisdictional scope of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction from other specialized jurisdictional orders will henceforth be the following: (1) the material or substantive content of the claim, and (2) the applicable legal regime; so that if the substantial conformity or non-conformity of a specific manifestation of the administrative function with the rule-of-law block is at issue, the dispute must necessarily be heard by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction."
Considerando IV
"Este Tribunal Constitucional, estima que los criterios determinantes para deslindar el ámbito competencial de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa de otros ordenes jurisdiccionales especializados serán, entonces, los siguientes: 1°) El contenido material o sustancial de la pretensión y 2°) el régimen jurídico aplicable; de modo que si se discute la conformidad o disconformidad sustancial de una manifestación específica de la función administrativa con el bloque de legalidad, el conflicto de interés, será, necesariamente, de conocimiento de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa."
Considerando IV
"La jurisdicción laboral deberá conocer y resolver –aunque el tema se encuentre relacionado con la conducta o función administrativa ejercida por un ente público- extremos típica o materialmente laborales, tales como la procedencia o no y el cálculo para el pago del aguinaldo, vacaciones, preaviso y auxilio de cesantía, lo concerniente al reconocimiento de una jubilación o pensión o los riesgos profesionales, las controversias que se susciten en el ámbito del Derecho laboral individual y colectivo."
"The labor jurisdiction shall hear and decide —even if the matter is related to the administrative conduct or function exercised by a public entity— typically or materially labor matters, such as the propriety or not and the calculation for payment of the Christmas bonus, vacation, notice and severance aid, matters concerning the recognition of a pension or retirement, occupational hazards, and disputes arising in the field of individual and collective labor law."
Considerando VI
"La jurisdicción laboral deberá conocer y resolver –aunque el tema se encuentre relacionado con la conducta o función administrativa ejercida por un ente público- extremos típica o materialmente laborales, tales como la procedencia o no y el cálculo para el pago del aguinaldo, vacaciones, preaviso y auxilio de cesantía, lo concerniente al reconocimiento de una jubilación o pensión o los riesgos profesionales, las controversias que se susciten en el ámbito del Derecho laboral individual y colectivo."
Considerando VI
Full documentDocumento completo
Res. No. 2010009928 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours on June ninth, two thousand ten.
Consolidated actions of unconstitutionality, the first (No. 08-012174-0007-CO), filed by CÉSAR HINES CÉSPEDES, identity card No. 7-061-989, ENRIQUE ROJAS FRANCO, identity card No. 1-390-1250, and DIEGO MOYA MEZA, identity card No. 1-1065-0968, against the case law of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that remits, based on subject matter, to the labor jurisdiction, proceedings whose object is the nullity of administrative acts connected to a public employment relationship issued based on Article 4, subsection a), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, which provision is also challenged, and, by connection, against Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 25, 2006, insofar as it excludes public employment matters from the cognizance of said jurisdiction; the second action (No. 09-008798-0007-CO), filed by MANRIQUE JIMÉNEZ MEZA, identity card No. 1-487-250, against subsection a) of Article 3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 25, 2006, and, subsidiarily, against the interpretation that the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has given in favor of remitting public employment matters to the labor jurisdiction. Also participating in the action are the PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA and the INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE VIVIENDA Y URBANISMO.
WHEREAS:
1.- By brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at 7:51 a.m. on September 8, 2008 (folios 1-56), César Hines Céspedes, identity card No. 7-061-989, Enrique Rojas Franco, identity card No. 1-390-1250, and Diego Moya Meza, identity card No. 1-1065-968, the latter two stating they act as directing attorneys in the judicial proceedings of Mrs. Lilliana Alfaro Rojas, in judicial file No. 05-000677-163-CA, and of Lidia González Mora, in judicial proceeding No. 00-000337-163-CA, sought a declaration of unconstitutionality of the case law of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that remits, based on subject matter, to the labor jurisdiction, proceedings whose object is the nullity of administrative acts connected to a public employment relationship, and, by connection, of Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 25, 2006, insofar as it excludes public employment matters from the cognizance of said jurisdiction, and, for the same reason, of Article 4, subsection a), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, No. 3667 of March 12, 1966. The provisions are challenged because, in the claimants' view, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has maintained a jurisprudential position that has instituted differentiated treatment for public employment relationships derived from employment contracts existing between public officials and the Public Administration, causing a violation of the underlying legal relationship that gives rise to or is the reason for the existence of the principal relationship, which is of an administrative nature, thereby infringing the provisions of Article 49 of the Political Constitution. Article 3, subsection a), of the new Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo is also unconstitutional, since it establishes that the Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction shall not hear claims related to the conduct of the Public Administration in matters of public employment relations, which shall fall under the cognizance of the labor jurisdiction. In this case, just as was established by Article 4, subsection a), of the former Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa (also challenged), the Political Constitution is flagrantly violated, specifically the cited Article 49, which clearly delimits the scope and specific purpose of the administrative jurisdiction. The essence of the new Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, expressed in the legislator's intent embodied in Article 3, subsection a), of this normative body, is the same as was maintained in the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, exactly in Article 4, subsection a), of its articles, which is why both criteria represent the arbitrariness reflected in the disregard of what is established by Article 49 of the Constitution.
2.- By resolution of the Presidency of the Chamber at 10:15 a.m. on October 22, 2008 (folio 51), the claimants were warned to present a document proving the capacity in which they appeared; a certified copy of the pleading in which they invoked the unconstitutionality they request, within a pending matter; and sufficient references to the case law they challenge.
3.- By brief filed at 1:12 p.m. (folio 53), claimants Enrique Rojas Franco and Diego Moya Meza indicated they were filing the documents to comply with the warning.
4.- By resolution of the Presidency of the Chamber at 11:30 a.m. on December 18, 2008 (folio 111), leave was granted for this action of unconstitutionality.
5.- The legal notices were published in Judicial Bulletins numbers 15, 16, and 17 of January 22, 23, and 26, 2009 (folio 115).
6.- By brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:20 p.m. on January 28, 2009 (folios 116-151), Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, in her capacity as Procuradora General de la República, recommended granting the action and finding the challenged provisions unconstitutional. The Procuradora clarified, in the first place, that the content of this action of unconstitutionality fully coincides with the arguments set forth by claimant César Hines in action of unconstitutionality No. 06-013862-0007-CO, also filed by him; consequently, the current report is based on the one rendered in that file. She did not address standing. On the merits, she indicated that Article 49 of the Political Constitution exclusively attributes judicial review of the legality of the administrative function to the administrative jurisdiction. Public employment relations are legal-administrative relations. Consequently, the case law of the First Chamber that attributes cognizance of disputes over the public employment relationship to the labor jurisdiction, as well as the legal provisions on which it is based, are indeed unconstitutional. In effect, she adds, the administrative jurisdiction was created as a distinct jurisdiction within the Judicial Branch; the distinction does not originate from the nature of the persons, but from the object of protection. Its task is to guarantee the legality of the actions of public administrations vis-à-vis the administered party and to protect the rights of the latter. No other jurisdiction can exercise review in those same terms. On the other hand, the Procuraduría continues, the public employment relationship is administrative, as derived from Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, distinct from the ordinary labor relationship. This is also contemplated in Articles 111 and 112 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and has been reiterated by this Chamber in several judgments. Now, the challenged provisions have not distinguished in any way the nature of the relationship. They implicitly presume that every employment relationship in the public sector is of a labor nature, disregarding what was previously noted. Reasons of convenience have been alleged, says the Procuraduría, for the labor jurisdiction to hear and resolve administrative matters; however, these are not acceptable, since, in accordance with Article 49 of the Constitution, only within the administrative jurisdiction is it possible to create a tribunal specializing in public employment matters. Finally, the Procuraduría argues that only when the employment relationship, in the public sector, is governed by labor law, can the labor jurisdiction hear it. This situation arises, for example, in public enterprises governed by private law. In any case, even in this last situation, the managerial and oversight classes are excepted. In sum, the Procuraduría concludes, the challenged provisions are indeed unconstitutional and it requests that they be so declared, but that a period of 3 to 5 years be granted for the Legislative Assembly to enact a law establishing a section within the administrative jurisdiction responsible for resolving conflicts related to public employment.
7.- By brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:03 p.m. on February 4, 2009 (folios 152-163), María del Carmen Redondo Solís, General Manager of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, answered the hearing. She indicated that she finds no defects of unconstitutionality in the challenged provisions. The labor jurisdiction also protects principles contained in the Political Constitution. On the other hand, it does not conform to the principle of swift and complete justice for the employee to have to first seek the nullity of the act and then demand the labor extremes in the labor forum. In the specific case, the relationship with the dismissed employee was strictly labor in nature. It was originally filed before the administrative jurisdiction, which suspended the act, and the former employee was therefore reinstated. Subsequently, by decision of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, the matter was assigned to the labor jurisdiction. Regarding the particular case of Lidia González Mora, this Chamber has already even ruled on an amparo appeal. It also did so, generally, on the restructuring that the institute underwent. Legal relationships do not present themselves in a pure form, and it is clear that the State becomes involved in a series of activities, including private ones. There is no unconstitutionality whatsoever in the labor jurisdiction hearing disputes arising from an employment relationship that the State has established with a person.
8.- By brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:29 p.m. on February 10, 2009 (folios 167-171), Luis Fernando Pérez Morais filed an active joint appearance. He indicated that he filed an administrative action against the State, but the Administrative Court declared itself without jurisdiction, following the case law challenged in this action. He considers that there are issues, such as the demand for compensation, that are not included within the object of a labor proceeding. He considers, consequently, that the challenged provisions are contrary to Article 49 of the Political Constitution.
9.- By brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:17 p.m. on February 12, 2009 (folios 173-175), Jorge Fisher Aragón filed an active joint appearance. He indicated that Maykel Segura López filed a proceeding against the State before the Administrative Court, but it declared itself without jurisdiction by virtue of the challenged provisions, which he considers contrary to Article 49 of the Political Constitution.
10.- By brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:20 p.m. on February 12, 2009 (folios 179-183), Eduardo López Arroyo, special judicial attorney-in-fact of Víctor Hugo Salas Brenes, filed an active joint appearance. He indicated that the latter filed a request, before the Administrative Tribunal, for an atypical interim measure, in a proceeding against the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which is charging him employer contributions, with which he disagrees. However, the Tribunal indicated that it is possibly a case where a lack of jurisdiction based on subject matter arises. He considers that it concerns the nullity of an act that does not comply with legality, which is proper to the administrative jurisdiction.
11.- By resolution at 10:20 a.m. on February 18, 2009 (folio 217), the hearings granted to the Procuraduría General de la República and the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo were deemed answered. Likewise, the active joint appearances indicated above were deemed filed. Finally, this action of unconstitutionality was assigned.
12.- By brief filed at 8:32 a.m. on April 14, 2009 (folio 241), [Name 001] filed an active joint appearance, since he filed an identical action, but it was rejected for formal reasons.
13.- By brief filed with the Secretariat of the Chamber at 8:55 a.m. on February 16, 2009 (folio 242), Alvin Villavicencio Coronado, whose signature is not authenticated, complained about the filing of this action of unconstitutionality.
14.- By brief filed at 1:30 p.m. on May 18, 2009 (folio 248), Noemy Campos Solórzano stated that the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José stayed a proceeding in which she is a party, and whose resolution is urgent, as it concerns her pension. She requested that said case be excluded from the stay, so that the Court could render judgment.
15.- By brief filed at 11:50 a.m. on June 10, 2009 (folios 249-250), Cristino Herrera Trejos, whose signature does not appear authenticated, requested that this action be resolved, as he is a party to a proceeding pending in the labor forum, which was stayed due to this unconstitutionality proceeding.
16.- By brief filed at 8:45 a.m. on June 11, 2009 (folio 255), Alvin Villavicencio Coronado, whose signature is not authenticated, requested the prompt dispatch of this proceeding, as he is a party to a proceeding that is stayed by virtue of this action of unconstitutionality.
17.- By brief filed at 9:22 a.m. on June 15, 2009 (folio 256), Anabelle Cordero Montero, Judicial Assistant of the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, forwarded files No. 00-000337-0163-CA and No. 08-000644-1027-CA.
18.- By brief filed at 12:12 p.m. on September 25, 2009 (folio 257), Luis Antonio Quesada M., whose signature is not authenticated, requested the prompt dispatch of this proceeding, as he is a party to a proceeding that is stayed by virtue of this action of unconstitutionality.
19.- By brief filed at 3:54 p.m. on September 29, 2009 (folio 258), Ana María Madriz Gamboa requested the prompt dispatch of this proceeding, as she is a party to a proceeding that is stayed by virtue of this action of unconstitutionality.
20.- By brief filed at 11:08 a.m. on June 10, 2009 (folios 264-291), Manrique Jiménez Meza, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of José Manuel Ulate Avendaño, filed an action of unconstitutionality against subsection a) of Article 3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, challenged in this action, and, subsidiarily, against the case law of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in favor of remitting public employment matters to the labor jurisdiction (judgments No. 742-C-2006, No. 607-C-01, and No. 769-C-2007), to which file No. 09-008798-0007-CO was assigned. Regarding standing, he argued that his represented party, in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of Heredia, is the defendant in proceeding No. 08-000766-1027-CA filed by the Contraloría General de la República before the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, for the purpose of annulling administrative agreements for the payment of seniority bonuses to his represented party. He argued that, in said proceeding, his represented party alleged the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions as a means to defend his rights. On the merits, he argued that the provision attacked in the present proceeding, whether in its letter, content, or interpretation, violates the following articles of the Political Constitution: Article 11 (duty of subordination of public officials to the Law and the Constitution as primordial law); 39 and 41 (due process, insofar as the justiciable party is forced to resort to labor jurisdictional competence when their claims are proper to administrative law and administrative procedural law for the safeguard of their legitimate interests and subjective rights); 49 (principle of autonomy of the administrative jurisdiction); Articles 70 and 74 (insofar as the labor jurisdiction is created in relation to social rights of an inalienable rank, without this jurisdiction being able to resolve matters related to extremes proper to administrative law and the administrative jurisdiction, in which situations could arise where rights and interests are waivable); the principle of reasonableness, because, in his judgment, it is not reasonable for the rule of law to be violated by law or by its interpretation and for the fulfillment of the justiciable parties' claims to be prevented, whether in the strictly labor dynamic or in the properly administrative one, with the dogmatic exclusion of one for the exclusive benefit of the other. Proportionality, because leaving the administrative jurisdiction excluded when the claims have a strict link with this jurisdiction and not with the other, labor-type one, constitutes a denial of justice to the detriment of the justiciable parties and their freedom of choice, according to the claims in each proceeding. He added, finally, that dogmatically presuming that any and all administrative conduct or legal-administrative relationship related to public employment is, imperatively, the exclusive domain of labor jurisdictional competence, also contradicts the principle of swift and complete justice and the rights of justiciable parties who claim, in one or the other jurisdiction, labor or perhaps administrative extremes. Therefore, he principally requests the unconstitutionality of Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Subsidiarily, he alleged the unconstitutionality of the interpretation that the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has given in favor of remitting public employment matters to the labor jurisdiction, for which he cited judgments 742-C-2006 of 10:05 a.m. on October 5, 2006, 607-C-01 of 10:09 a.m. on August 10, 2001, and 769-C-2007 of 3:20 p.m. on October 31, 2007.
21.- By resolution No. 2009-010543 of 2:44 p.m. on July 1, 2009 (folios 297-300), the issuance of the final judgment in action No. 09-008798-0007-CO was reserved pending resolution of action No. 08-012174-0007-CO.
22.- By resolution No. 2009-015667 of 2:44 p.m. on October 7, 2009 (folio 302), resolution No. 2009-010543 was nullified and action No. 09-008798-0007-CO was ordered consolidated with the present one.
23.- By brief filed at 11:05 a.m. on November 17, 2009 (folios 305-306), Rolando Chacón Ramírez, who is a party in a labor proceeding stayed by this action, requested that it be clarified that matters already being processed in the labor forum may continue until their conclusion.
24.- By brief filed at 10:00 a.m. on February 1, 2010 (folios 309-310), Verny Cordero Fonseca, who says he is a party in a labor proceeding stayed by this action, requested that it be rejected and, in any case, that it be resolved promptly.
25.- By brief filed at 2:00 p.m. on February 12, 2010 (folios 313-314), Jesús Araya Zúñiga and Ruth Camacho Jiménez requested to be considered active coadjuvants, as they are parties in a proceeding where the challenged provision is applied.
26.- By brief filed at 10:30 a.m. on February 15, 2010 (folios 315-316), Verny Cordero Fonseca reiterated the brief he had already filed.
27.- By brief filed at 11:07 a.m. on March 4, 2010 (folios 318-319), Eduardo Contreras Ramírez requested the prompt resolution of this action, as he is a party in a proceeding that is stayed by virtue of it.
28.- By brief filed at 9:00 a.m. on April 13, 2010 (folio 320), Cristino Herrera Trejos, whose signature does not appear authenticated, reiterated his request for this action to be resolved.
29.- By brief filed at 1:04 p.m. on April 14, 2010 (folio 321), Edgar Cubero Castro, whose signature does not appear authenticated, requested the prompt resolution of this proceeding, as it prevents the final issuance of the resolution in a labor proceeding in which he is a party.
30.- By brief filed at 7:55 a.m. on April 21, 2010 (folios 325-329), Flor de María Flores Chavarría, whose signature does not appear authenticated, requested the prompt dispatch of this proceeding and that it be declared without merit, as it keeps labor proceedings paralyzed, in one of which she is a party.
31.- By brief filed at 10:53 a.m. on May 12, 2010 (folio 330), Ana María Madriz Gamboa reiterated the request for the prompt dispatch of this proceeding.
32.- In the processing of the proceeding, the prescriptions of law have been observed.
Judge Jinesta Lobo is the Rapporteur; and,
CONSIDERING:
I.- STANDING AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes as one of the requirements for filing an action of unconstitutionality, in the case of concrete review, the existence of a matter pending resolution before the courts, including habeas corpus or amparo, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, as a reasonable means to protect the substantial legal situation that is deemed harmed. In this regard, this Constitutional Tribunal, in judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, indicated the following:
«(…) In the first place, it is a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution —whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route— is required to access the constitutional forum, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the principal matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Tribunal has a positive or negative impact on said pending proceeding, since it rules on the constitutionality of the provisions that must be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this forum —requirements of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (…)».
In the action of unconstitutionality No. 08-012174-0007-CO, the claimants originally claimed standing to file this action, citing, as base matters where they had invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions, the proceedings conducted before the administrative jurisdiction, in judicial files No. 05-000677-163-CA and No. 000337-163-CA. However, subsequently, in response to the warning from the Presidency of this Chamber to demonstrate, by means of certified copies, said standing, they omitted to provide the documents referring to the first of said proceedings and, instead, indicated No. 08-000644-1027-CA, filed by Francisco José Hernández Solano against the State. Thus, by resolution of 11:30 a.m. on December 18, 2009 (see folio 111), leave was granted for this action, based on proceedings No. 00-000337-0163-CA and No. 08-00644-1027-CA, both filed before the administrative jurisdiction and in which the competence, based on subject matter, of said jurisdiction is discussed, and in which, in effect, the unconstitutionality of the provisions challenged here was alleged (copies at folios 59-65 and 67-83). Both proceedings being pending resolution, this Tribunal considers that the claimants do have standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality. On the other hand, Manrique Jiménez Meza filed action of unconstitutionality No. 09-008798-0007-CO, consolidated with the present one, in which he claimed standing by virtue of having invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions in the proceeding being conducted under file No. 08-000766-1027-CA, which he effectively demonstrated (copies at folios 292-293). In another vein, since the challenged provisions are general provisions, it is possible, in accordance with Article 73 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, to challenge them through this forum.
II.- JOINT APPEARANCES. In accordance with Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of this same law, “(…) those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to assist in the arguments that may justify its admissibility or inadmissibility or to expand, as applicable, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them.” In this case, the following three active joint appearances were filed within the legal period and, therefore, are admissible: Fernando Pérez Morais (folios 167-172), Jorge Fisher Aragón, representing Maykel Segura López (folios 173-175), and Eduardo López Arroyo, representing Hugo Salas Brenes (folios 179-1783). Also filed, in an untimely manner, and, therefore, not admitted, are the active joint appearance filed by [Name 001] (folio 241) and the passive joint appearance raised by Alvin Villavicencio Coronado (folio 242).
III.- OBJECT OF THE CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY. Both actions of unconstitutionality coincide in challenging Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006, insofar as it provides that claims related to administrative conduct in matters of public employment relations shall fall under the cognizance of the labor jurisdiction. Additionally, in the first action filed, No. 08-012174-0007-CO, the case law rendered by the First Chamber of Cassation is attacked, in light of Article 4, subsection a), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa No.
3667 of March 12, 1966, insofar as it refers any controversy arising within a public or statutory employment relationship to the knowledge and resolution of the labor jurisdiction, which is why the cited provision of the repealed Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction is also challenged.
IV.- CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTRIBUTION OF COMPETENCE. The original constituent and the reform power addressed defining the material competence and, consequently, the extension and scope of two jurisdictions essential to the Social and Democratic Rule of Law. Indeed, provisions 10 and 48 establish the material competence of the constitutional jurisdiction and, in provision 49, that of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. This makes manifest, in the will of the original constituent and the reform power, the transcendence of both the control of constitutionality and of legality of the public powers in order to guarantee the effective enjoyment and exercise of the fundamental and human rights enshrined, respectively, in the constitutional text and the instruments of Public International Law. Without any doubt, such constitutional precepts embody what doctrine has called the sovereign clause of the Constitutional Rule of Law. With regard, particularly, to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, Article 49 of the Constitution, after the partial reform by virtue of Law No. 3124 of June 25, 1963, provides as follows:
“The contentious-administrative jurisdiction is established as an attribution of the Judicial Power, with the object of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and any other public law entity.
Deviation of power shall be grounds for challenging administrative acts.
The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the governed parties.” From the literal transcription of the constitutional precept, the following can be highlighted:
1°) The derived constituent or reform power opted for a “judicialist” model of administrative justice, that is, entrusting a specialized jurisdictional order of the Judicial Power with the competence and attribution to exercise oversight of the legality of the administrative function, that is, its substantial conformity or adaptation to the block of legality. This system offers considerable guarantees and comparative advantages for the individual seeking justice, such as specialization, which, accompanied by the judicial career established infra-constitutionally, represents a true guarantee of correctness and of compliance with the constitutional imperative contained in provision 41 of the Constitution of "full justice." 2°) The reform power defined, with clear clarity, the material competence of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, indicating that its object is "to guarantee the legality of the administrative function." It should be noted that the constitutional norm does not distinguish, so that this specialized jurisdictional order is responsible for the oversight of any specific manifestation of the administrative function, without exceptions. The derived constituent thus enshrined a plenary and universal administrative justice, preventing any redoubts or areas of the administrative function from being exempt from the control or oversight of legality. The "administrative function" is an indeterminate legal concept, used by the reform power since 1963, which comprises or encompasses any specific or concrete manifestation thereof, that is, any administrative conduct - by action or omission - (e.g., formal activity, material actions, and formal and material omissions), as well as the complementary, more dynamic and flexible figure of the administrative-legal relationship.
3°) The derived constituent or reform power established a constitutional reservation of the material competence of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction by decreeing that its object is "to guarantee the legality of the administrative function," which is why the ordinary legislator, in the exercise of its freedom of conformation or configuration, cannot attribute that competence to another jurisdictional order that is not the contentious-administrative one, since, if it did so, it would be emptying the institutional guarantee and the fundamental right enshrined in Article 49 of the Constitution of its content. On this particular point and, upon better consideration, this Constitutional Court varies or reverses the thesis set forth in Votes Nos. 3095-94 of 15:57 hrs. of August 3, 1994, 7540-94 of 17:42 hrs. of December 21, both of 1994, 5686-95 of 15:39 hrs. of October 18, 1995, and 14999-2007 of 15:06 hrs. of October 17, 2007. The foregoing means that when a claimant pursues a claim to question the invalidity or substantial non-conformity with the administrative-legal order of an administrative conduct or any singular manifestation of the administrative function (formal or material omission, formal activity or material action, or administrative-legal relationship), the contentious-administrative jurisdiction must necessarily hear and resolve it. Obviously, if the claim, by its material content, even if related to some administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function – insofar as a public entity or organ is involved – is governed by the labor, family, or agrarian legal regime, it must be heard and resolved by those jurisdictional organs, because it does not, properly speaking, question the substantial conformity or non-conformity of the administrative function or conduct with the administrative-legal order, which is what Article 49 of the Constitution reserves for the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. This Constitutional Court considers that the determining criteria for delimiting the competential scope of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction from other specialized jurisdictional orders – which, henceforth, must be taken into consideration by the ordinary jurisdiction – will be, then, the following: 1°) The material or substantial content of the claim and 2°) the applicable legal regime; so that if the substantial conformity or non-conformity of a specific manifestation of the administrative function with the block of legality is discussed, the conflict of interest will, necessarily, be heard by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.
4°) The control of legality enshrined in provision 49 of the Constitution is projected, as indicated, to the entire administrative function carried out by any public entity or organ, that is, to all public administrations, without exception. For this reason, the first paragraph of the constitutional precept under examination concludes with a residual or general formula, indicating that it comprises the function carried out both by the central administration – State – and by "any other public law entity." 5°) The derived constituent opted for a mixed administrative justice, because the first paragraph, by defining the object of the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order - "to guarantee the legality of the administrative function" -, must be complemented, ineluctably, with the final paragraph, when it prescribes that the law shall provide protection, at a minimum, to subjective rights and legitimate interests – without distinguishing, regarding the latter, so that the protection of both personal and collective interests, whether corporate or diffuse, is admissible. Consequently, the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, according to the Law of the Constitution, was instituted both to ensure the legality of the administrative function and for the effective protection of the substantial legal situations of the governed parties against the public powers. Thus, constitutionally, an objective and subjective role of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction is combined.
V.- CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCTS RELATED TO A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AS A SPECIFIC MANIFESTATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION. Article 49 of the Constitution establishes a plenary and universal contentious-administrative jurisdiction that allows the claimant to impugn or attack any conduct or manifestation of the administrative function before that jurisdictional order. Among the possible specific manifestations of the administrative function, constitutionally challengeable before the contentious-administrative venue, are, obviously, those conducts of the public administrations within the framework or context of a public or statutory employment relationship, unquestionably governed by Administrative Law or of an administrative-legal nature, as can be deduced from provisions 191, 192 of the Constitution, 111 and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, and the constitutional case law that informs them (Votes of this Constitutional Court Nos. 1696-92, 4453-2000, 244-2001, and 14416-2006). Consequently, the ordinary legislator cannot radically exclude - totally and absolutely - from the knowledge and resolution of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction all administrative conduct in the matter of public employment relationships, since, on such a point, it has no freedom of disposition, because it is bound by the material competence defined and reserved in Article 49 of the Constitution. From the foregoing, one cannot conclude either that all administrative conduct, in public employment matters, must be heard and resolved before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, because there will be claims and points that, due to their material content and the applicable legal regime, must, inevitably, be ventilated before the labor jurisdiction, by reason of its specific material competence.
VI.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 3, SUBSECTION A), OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE CODE. Provision 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006), provides as follows:
“The Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction shall not hear the following claims:
VII.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE FIRST CHAMBER OF CASSATION IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A), OF THE LAW REGULATING THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION WHEN RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF COMPETENCE BETWEEN THE LABOR AND CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTIONS. The claimants also challenge as unconstitutional the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation, when acting as the Court of Conflicts of competence between the labor and contentious-administrative jurisdictions, and, particularly, when applying provision 4, subsection a), of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. The Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006 – entered into force on January 1, 2008, according to the vacatio legis provided in Article 222 of that normative body – repealed the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction No. 3667 of March 12, 1966 (Article 198 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code), however, within the interim law provisions of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, Transitory Provisions III and IV prescribed the following:
“TRANSITORY III.- The regime for challenging acts that have become final in the administrative channel before the entry into force of this Code shall be governed by the legislation in force at that time.
TRANSITORY IV.- Contentious-administrative proceedings and ordinary civil lawsuits attributed to the civil treasury jurisdiction, filed prior to the entry into force of this Code, whatever their procedural status, shall continue to be processed, in all their procedures and appeals, according to the norms that governed at the date of filing. For this purpose, the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court shall continue with the processing of said matters until their conclusion, and the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal shall maintain the sections that are convenient to hear the impugnment lawsuits provided for in Articles 82 to 90 of the Law regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, and on appeal against the resolutions issued by the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court.” Independently of the interpretation that the ordinary jurisdiction may have given to these transitory norms, the truth of the matter is that they make manifest the ultra-activity of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction and of those judicial interpretations, in matters of competence conflicts, that were produced at the appropriate procedural moment and that could even be verified in the future regarding proceedings still pending under the repealed procedural legislation. Consequently, what is challenged is a case law pattern that continues to produce effects, without discarding the possibility that it may do so in the future for matters initiated under the formally repealed legislation not yet definitively concluded. Since the early Votes Nos. 185-95 of 16:35 hrs. of January 10, 1995, and 4587-97 of 15:45 hrs. of August 5, 1997, this Constitutional Court admitted, by way of normative integration, the unconstitutionality action against repeated criteria by jurisdictional organs that have created a case law pattern, given that Article 3 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes that the Constitution shall be considered infringed when this results from the interpretation made by public authorities of legal norms and the legal effects they produce, all in accordance with the supreme object of the constitutional jurisdiction to guarantee the supremacy of the Law of the Constitution (Articles 10 of the Constitution and 1 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction). In the present case, the case law line established by the First Chamber of Cassation is challenged, starting from Resolution No. 607-C-01 of 10:09 hrs. of August 10, 2001, when resolving conflicts of competence between the labor and contentious-administrative jurisdictions and referring the matter to the former, even when it involves claims materially governed by Administrative Law (e.g., nullity of a dismissal act, reinstatement, and payment of damages), considering, broadly, that any controversy generated in public employment relationships is "of a purely labor nature." For this purpose, a copy of the following resolutions from that judicial instance is provided: 770-C-2001 of 9:51 hrs. of October 3, 2001, 478-C-2005 of 9:40 hrs. of July 7, 2005, 742-C-2006 of 10:05 hrs. of October 5, 2006, and 769-C-2007 of 15:20 hrs. of October 31, 2007, whereby the requirement to accredit the case law pattern is deemed fulfilled. In light of the considerations expressed in the preceding whereas clauses, it is evident that the case law line of the First Chamber of Cassation that ordered, before the entry into force of the new Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code and in application of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, to refer to the labor channel any proceeding in which a claim is brought within the framework of a statutory relationship, considering it a controversy of a "purely labor nature," is, by all lights, unconstitutional for violating Article 49 of the Constitution. Indeed, as indicated, there will be claims that, due to their material or substantial nature and the applicable legal regime, although brought in the context of a public employment relationship, must be heard and resolved, by constitutional imperative (Article 49 of the Constitution), by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, that is, all those in which a public official or servant questions the substantial conformity or validity of any specific manifestation of the administrative function or administrative conduct with the administrative-legal order.
VIII.- ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A), OF THE LAW REGULATING THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION. Article 4, subsection a), of the repealed Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), which still continues to produce legal effects in proceedings initiated before the entry into force of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, provided as follows:
“The following shall not pertain to the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction:
IX.- COROLLARY. By virtue of the reasons stated, it is necessary to declare the accumulated unconstitutionality actions partially granted, as indicated in the operative part.
THEREFORE:
The accumulated actions are partially granted. Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Law No. 8508 of April 28, 2006) is declared unconstitutional, as is the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation of the Supreme Court of Justice which, in application of Article 4, subsection a), of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, referred any controversy related to a public employment relationship to the labor jurisdiction considering it "purely labor," even if the claimant materially sought to challenge the substantial non-conformity or invalidity of an administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function with the administrative legal order, arising in a statutory relationship. As for the challenge of Article 4, subsection a), of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the accumulated actions are dismissed.
This declaration of unconstitutionality has declaratory and retroactive effects to the date the challenged norm and jurisprudence came into force, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, or legal relationships and situations consolidated by statute of limitations (prescripción), expiration (caducidad), or a judgment having the authority of material res judicata (sentencia pasada en autoridad de cosa juzgada material). Publish it in its entirety in the Boletín Judicial and summarize it in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Notify the Procuraduría General de la República, the plaintiffs, the coadjuvants, and the judicial authorities hearing the underlying matter. Communicate to the presidency of the Asamblea Legislativa and of the Sala Primera de Casación of the Corte Suprema de Justicia.
Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
801/199/ibj.- He added, finally, that to start dogmatically from the premise that any and all administrative conduct or legal-administrative relationship related to public employment is, imperatively, the exclusive purview of labor jurisdictional competence, also contradicts the principle of swift and complete justice and the rights of those seeking justice who may pursue, in one jurisdiction or the other, labor matters or perhaps administrative dispute matters. For this reason, he principally requests the unconstitutionality of Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. In the alternative, he alleged the unconstitutionality of the interpretation that the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has given in favor of referring public employment matters to the labor jurisdiction, for which purpose he cited rulings 742-C-2006 of 10:05 a.m. on October 5, 2006, 607-C-01 of 10:09 a.m. on August 10, 2001, and 769-C-2007 of 3:20 p.m. on October 31, 2007.
**21.-** By resolution No. 2009-010543 of 2:44 p.m. on July 1, 2009 (folios 297-300), the final judgment on the merits in Action No. 09-008798-0007-CO was reserved pending the resolution of Action No. 08-012174-0007-CO.
**22.-** By resolution No. 2009-015667 of 2:44 p.m. on October 7, 2009 (folio 302), resolution No. 2009-010543 was annulled, and the joinder of Action No. 09-008798-0007-CO to the present action was ordered.
**23.-** By brief filed at 11:05 a.m. on November 17, 2009 (folios 305-306), Rolando Chacón Ramírez, who is a party to a labor proceeding suspended due to this action, requested clarification that matters already being processed in the labor avenue may continue until their conclusion.
**24.-** By brief filed at 10:00 a.m. on February 1, 2010 (folios 309-310), Verny Cordero Fonseca, who claims to be a party to a labor proceeding suspended due to this action, requested that it be rejected and that, in any event, it be resolved promptly.
**25.-** By brief filed at 2:00 p.m. on February 12, 2010 (folios 313-314), Jesús Araya Zúñiga and Ruth Camacho Jiménez requested to be considered as active coadjuvants, being parties to a proceeding where the challenged rule is applied.
**26.-** By brief filed at 10:30 a.m. on February 15, 2010 (folios 315-316), Verny Cordero Fonseca reiterated the brief he had already filed.
**27.-** By brief filed at 11:07 a.m. on March 4, 2010 (folios 318-319), Eduardo Contreras Ramírez requested the prompt resolution of this action, as he is a party to a proceeding that is suspended by virtue of it.
**28.-** By brief filed at 9:00 a.m. on April 13, 2010 (folio 320), Cristino Herrera Trejos, whose signature is not authenticated, reiterated his request for this action to be resolved.
**29.-** By brief filed at 1:04 p.m. on April 14, 2010 (folio 321), Edgar Cubero Castro, whose signature is not authenticated, requested the prompt resolution of this proceeding, as it prevents the final issuance of the decision in a labor proceeding to which he is a party.
**30.-** By brief filed at 7:55 a.m. on April 21, 2010 (folios 325-329), Flor de María Flores Chavarría, whose signature is not authenticated, requested the prompt dispatch of this proceeding and that it be declared without merit, since it keeps labor proceedings paralyzed, in one of which she is a party.
**31.-** By brief filed at 10:53 a.m. on May 12, 2010 (folio 330), Ana María Madriz Gamboa reiterated the request for prompt dispatch of this proceeding.
**32.-** The legal requirements have been observed in the processing of the proceeding.
Drafted by Magistrate **Jinesta Lobo**; and, **CONSIDERING:** **I.- STANDING AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** Section 75, paragraph 1, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes, as one of the prerequisites for filing an action of unconstitutionality, in the case of concrete review, the existence of a matter pending resolution before the courts, including habeas corpus or amparo, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue, as a reasonable means to protect the substantial legal situation deemed injured. In this regard, this Constitutional Court, in ruling No. 4190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, stated the following:
"(...) Firstly, it is a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution - whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue - is required to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on that pending proceeding, since it pronounces on the constitutionality of the rules that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does legislation allow direct access to this avenue - prerequisites of paragraphs two and three of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (...)".
In the action of unconstitutionality No. 08-012174-0007-CO, the claimants originally claimed to have standing to file this action, indicating, as base cases where they had invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged rules, the proceedings conducted before the administrative dispute jurisdiction, in court files No. 05-000677-163-CA and No. 000337-163-CA. However, subsequently, in response to the warning from the Presidency of this Chamber to demonstrate such standing through certified copies, they failed to provide the documents referring to the first of those proceedings and, instead, indicated No. 08-000644-1027-CA, filed by Francisco José Hernández Solano against the State. Therefore, by resolution of 11:30 a.m. on December 18, 2009 (see folio 111), this action was admitted, based on proceedings No. 00-000337-0163-CA and No. 08-00644-1027-CA, both filed before the administrative dispute jurisdiction and in which the subject-matter competence of said jurisdiction is discussed, and in which, in effect, the unconstitutionality of the rules challenged here was alleged (copies at folios 59-65 and 67-83). As both proceedings are pending resolution, this Court considers that the claimants do have standing to initiate this action of unconstitutionality. On the other hand, Manrique Jiménez Meza filed the action of unconstitutionality No. 09-008798-0007-CO, joined to the present one, in which he asserted standing by virtue of having invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged rules in the proceeding processed under file No. 08-000766-1027-CA, which he duly demonstrated (copies at folios 292-293). In another vein, since the challenged rules are general provisions, they are indeed subject to challenge in this avenue, in accordance with Article 73 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.
**II.- COADJUVANCIES.** In accordance with Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, within the fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of this same law, "(...) those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadyuvate in the arguments that could justify its admissibility or inadmissibility or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds for unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." In this case, the following three active coadjuvancies were filed within the legal deadline and are, therefore, admissible: Fernando Pérez Morais (folios 167-172), Jorge Fisher Aragón, on behalf of Maykel Segura López (folios 173-175), and Eduardo López Arroyo, on behalf of Hugo Salas Brenes (folios 179-1783). Furthermore, filed extemporaneously and, therefore, not admitted, are the active coadjuvancy filed by [Name 001] (folio 241) and the passive coadjuvancy brought by Alvin Villavicencio Coronado (folio 242).
**III.- SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE JOINED ACTIONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.** Both actions of unconstitutionality coincide in challenging Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006, inasmuch as it provides that claims related to administrative conduct in the area of public employment relations shall be heard by the labor jurisdiction. Additionally, in the first action filed, No. 08-012174-0007-CO, the jurisprudence handed down by the Sala Primera de Casación is challenged, in light of Article 4, subsection a), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa No. 3667 of March 12, 1966, inasmuch as it refers any dispute arising within a public or statutory employment relationship to the knowledge and resolution of the labor jurisdiction; therefore, the cited section of the repealed Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa is also challenged.
**IV.- CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE JURISDICTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTRIBUTION OF JURISDICTION.** The original framer of the Constitution and the amending power undertook to define the subject-matter competence and, consequently, the extension and scope of two jurisdictions essential to the Social and Democratic Rule of Law. Indeed, in sections 10 and 48, the subject-matter competence of the constitutional jurisdiction is established, and in section 49, that of the administrative dispute jurisdiction. The foregoing makes evident, in the will of the original framer and of the amending power, the transcendence of both the control of constitutionality and of the legality of public powers for the sake of guaranteeing the effective enjoyment and exercise of the fundamental and human rights enshrined, respectively, in the constitutional text and in the instruments of Public International Law. Without a doubt, such constitutional precepts embody what legal doctrine has called the regal clause of the Constitutional Rule of Law. With regard, particularly, to the administrative dispute jurisdiction, Article 49 of the Constitution, after the partial reform by virtue of Law No. 3124 of June 25, 1963, provides the following:
"The administrative dispute jurisdiction is established as an attribution of the Judicial Branch, with the purpose of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and every other public law entity.
Deviation of power shall be a ground for challenging administrative acts.
The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of the administered." From the literal transcription of the constitutional precept, the following should be highlighted:
1°) The derived framer or amending power opted for a "judicialist" model of administrative justice, that is, entrusting to a specialized jurisdictional order of the Judicial Branch the competence and attribution to exercise oversight of the legality of the administrative function, that is, its substantial conformity or compatibility with the body of legality. This system offers considerable guarantees and comparative advantages for those seeking justice, such as specialization, which, accompanied by the judicial career established at an infra-constitutional level, represents a true guarantee of correctness and compliance with the constitutional imperative contained in section 41 of the Constitution for "complete justice." 2°) The amending power defined, with meridian clarity, the subject-matter competence of the administrative dispute jurisdiction, by indicating that its purpose is "to guarantee the legality of the administrative function." It should be noted that the constitutional rule does not distinguish, so that this specialized jurisdictional order is responsible for the oversight of any specific manifestation of the administrative function, without exceptions. The derived framer thus enshrined a plenary and universal administrative justice, preventing there from being any redoubts or areas of the administrative function exempt from control or oversight of legality. The "administrative function" is an indeterminate legal concept, used by the amending power since 1963, which includes or encompasses any specific or concrete manifestation thereof, that is, all administrative conduct - by action or omission - (e.g., formal activity, material actions, and formal and material omissions), as well as the complementary, more dynamic and flexible figure of the legal-administrative relationship.
3°) The derived framer or amending power established a constitutional reservation of the subject-matter competence of the administrative dispute jurisdiction by stipulating that its purpose is "to guarantee the legality of the administrative function," a reason for which the ordinary legislator, in the exercise of its freedom of configuration or structuring, cannot attribute that competence to any other jurisdictional order that is not the administrative dispute one, since, if it did so, it would be emptying the institutional guarantee and the fundamental right enshrined in Article 49 of the Constitution of its content. On this particular point, and upon better consideration, this Constitutional Court varies or reverses the thesis set forth in Votos Nos. 3095-94 of 3:57 p.m. on August 3, 1994, 7540-94 of 5:42 p.m. on December 21, 1994, 5686-95 of 3:39 p.m. on October 18, 1995, and 14999-2007 of 3:06 p.m. on October 17, 2007. The foregoing means that when a person seeking justice brings a claim to challenge the invalidity or substantial non-conformity with the administrative legal order of an administrative conduct or any singular manifestation of the administrative function (formal or material omission, formal activity or material action, or legal-administrative relationship), the administrative dispute jurisdiction must inevitably hear and resolve it. Obviously, if the claim, due to its material content, even if related to some administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function – insofar as a public entity or body intervenes – is governed by the labor, family, or agrarian legal regime, it must be heard and resolved by those jurisdictional bodies, since what is properly questioned is not the substantial conformity or non-conformity of the administrative function or conduct with the administrative legal order, which is what Article 49 of the Constitution reserves to the administrative dispute jurisdiction. This Constitutional Court considers that the determining criteria to delineate the scope of competence of the administrative dispute jurisdiction from other specialized jurisdictional orders – which, henceforth, must be taken into consideration by the ordinary jurisdiction – will be, therefore, the following: 1°) The material or substantial content of the claim and 2°) the applicable legal regime; so that if the substantial conformity or non-conformity of a specific manifestation of the administrative function with the body of legality is disputed, the conflict of interest shall necessarily be heard by the administrative dispute jurisdiction.
4°) The control of legality enshrined in section 49 of the Constitution extends, as indicated, to the entire administrative function carried out by any public entity or body, that is, to all public administrations, without exception. For this reason, the first paragraph of the constitutional precept under examination concludes with a residual or general formula, by indicating that the function carried out by both the central administration – State – and "every other public law entity" is included.
5°) The derived framer opted for a mixed administrative justice, since the first paragraph, by defining the purpose of the administrative dispute jurisdictional order -"to guarantee the legality of the administrative function"-, must be complemented, ineluctably, with the in fine paragraph, by prescribing that the law shall provide protection, at least, to subjective rights and legitimate interests – without distinguishing, regarding the latter, so that the protection of both personal and collective ones, be they corporate or diffuse, is admissible. Consequently, the administrative dispute jurisdiction, according to the Law of the Constitution, was instituted both to ensure the legality of the administrative function and to effectively protect the substantial legal situations of the administered vis-à-vis the public powers.
Thus, constitutionally, an objective and subjective role of the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) is combined.
**V.- CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCTS RELATED TO A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AS A SPECIFIC MANIFESTATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION.** Article 49 of the Constitution establishes a plenary and universal administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) that allows the claimant to challenge or attack any conduct or manifestation of the administrative function before that jurisdictional body. Among the possible specific manifestations of the administrative function, constitutionally challengeable before the administrative litigation venue (sede contencioso-administrativa), are, obviously, those conducts of public administrations within the framework or context of a public or statutory employment relationship, unquestionably governed by Administrative Law or of an administrative-legal nature, as derived from articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution, 111 and 112 of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and the constitutional case law that informs them (Votes of this Constitutional Court Nos. 1696-92, 4453-2000, 244-2001, and 14416-2006). Consequently, the ordinary legislator cannot radically—totally and absolutely—exclude from the cognizance and resolution of the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) all administrative conduct in matters of public employment relationships, since it has no freedom of disposition over this extreme, because it is bound by the material competence defined and reserved in Article 49 of the Constitution. From the above, it cannot be concluded either that all administrative conduct in matters of public employment must be heard and resolved before the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa), since there will be **claims (pretensiones) and extremes that, due to their material content and the applicable legal regime**, must inevitably be litigated before the labor jurisdiction, by reason of its specific material competence.
**VI.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 3, SUBSECTION a), OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL CODE (CÓDIGO PROCESAL CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVO).** Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo) (Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006), provides the following:
*"The Contencioso-Administrativa and Civil de Hacienda Jurisdiction shall not hear the following claims:* *a) Those related to the conduct of the Public Administration in matters of public employment relationships, which shall be of the cognizance of the labor jurisdiction (…)"* The challenged precept radically and absolutely—without exception—excludes from the cognizance and resolution of the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) any claim (pretensión) related to administrative conduct within the framework of a statutory relationship, thereby flagrantly transgressing the Law of the Constitution and, particularly, Article 49 of the Constitution, which reserved exclusively, as material competence, to that jurisdictional body *"guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function"*. The challenged legislative text does not admit, by its closed literal tenor, an interpretation conforming to the Law of the Constitution and the necessary distinction between **claims (pretensiones) that, due to their material content and the applicable legal regime**, must be of the cognizance and resolution, either of the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) or the labor jurisdiction. As noted supra, when the claimant seeks to discuss the substantial non-conformity or invalidity of an administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function with the administrative-legal system, the matter must be litigated, by the reservation and constitutional imperative of Article 49, before the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa). In essence, the claimant has the constitutional guarantee to challenge any conduct that is a manifestation of the administrative function before the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa), it being that there are conducts that occur within a public employment relationship that are a specific expression of the general concept of the *"administrative function"*. On the other hand, there will be **claims (pretensiones) that, due to their substantial content and the applicable legal regime**, must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, given its competence specialty and the need to apply, to the specific case, the dogmatic categories, institutions, institutes, principles, and particular hermeneutic tools of that legal discipline. Thus, by way of example and without claim of exhaustiveness, the labor jurisdiction must hear and resolve—even if the issue is related to the administrative conduct or function exercised by a public entity—typically or materially labor extremes, such as the appropriateness or not and the calculation for the payment of the year-end bonus (aguinaldo), vacation days, prior notice, and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), matters concerning the recognition of a retirement or pension or professional risks, controversies that arise in the field of individual and collective Labor Law (e.g., conflicts of an economic-social nature), everything related to the exercise of the right to strike or work stoppage, etc. In the same vein, it is necessary to recognize that in the case of employees in charge of activities subject to the common law of public enterprises or economic services developed by a public administration or of simple laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the respective public entity, that is, those whom doctrine calls "workers of the public administration," the controversies that arise must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, as it is not, in the strict sense, a public official, servant, or employee (Articles 111, paragraph 2, and 112, paragraph 2, of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), given that any conduct emanating from the public entity, in such context, will not be subject to the administrative legal regime, nor can it be considered, materially, as an administrative-legal relationship. It is necessary to highlight that the constitutional assembly decided on specialized jurisdictional bodies based on the subject matter—at least up to a certain instance—as a guarantee of correctness and a means to achieve the constitutional imperative of prompt and due justice. Although Article 41 of the Constitution enshrines the general right of access to the jurisdiction, then Articles 10, 48, 49, 70, and 153 of the fundamental norm clearly opt for the establishment of specialized jurisdictions. Thus, the claimant has the right to choose before which jurisdictional body they bring action, as long as the **material nature of the claim (pretensión) and the applicable legal regime** are congruent with the specialty—constitutional or legal—of the respective jurisdiction. This Constitutional Court does not overlook that in judicial practice, due to inadequate or defective legal representation or advice, claimants may make mistakes when filing a claim (pretensión) or when combining them before a specific jurisdictional body; however, in such cases, the jurisdictional body must proceed, with due speed and procedural economy, to separate the **claims (pretensiones) that, due to their substantial content and the applicable legal regime**, should not be litigated in that venue, as well as to give agile course to those that are appropriate, if no other cause prevents it. In the same sense, upon the emergence of any conflict of competence, the jurisdictional bodies involved and the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), insofar as it acts as the Court of Conflicts between the administrative litigation (contencioso-administrativa) and labor jurisdictions, must be particularly diligent in processing and resolving it to avoid any undue dilation or unjustified delay that significantly affects the fundamental right to prompt justice (Article 41 of the Constitution) or the human right contained in the American Convention to a process within a reasonable time (Article 8.1).
**VII.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE FIRST CHAMBER OF CASSATION (SALA PRIMERA DE CASACIÓN) IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION a), OF THE REGULATORY LAW OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION (LEY REGULADORA DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVA) WHEN RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF COMPETENCE BETWEEN THE LABOR AND CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTIONS.** The petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), when acting as the Court of Conflicts of competence between the labor and administrative litigation (contencioso-administrativa) jurisdictions, and, particularly, when applying Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa). The Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006—which entered into force on January 1, 2008, according to the *vacatio legis* established in Article 222 of that regulatory body—repealed the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) No. 3667 of March 12, 1966 (Article 198 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo)), however, within the interim law provisions of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), Transitory Provisions III and IV stipulated the following:
*"TRANSITORIO III.- The regime for challenging acts that have become final in the administrative stage before the effective date of this Code shall be governed by the legislation in force at that time.* *TRANSITORIO IV.- The contentious-administrative proceedings and ordinary trials attributed to the civil de Hacienda avenue, filed prior to the entry into force of this Code, whatever their procedural stage, shall continue to be substantiated, in all their procedures and remedies, by the rules that governed at the date of initiation. For this purpose, the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda shall continue processing said matters until their conclusion, and the Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo shall maintain the sections that are convenient to hear the challenge claims provided for in Articles 82 to 90 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), and on appeal from the resolutions issued by the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda."* Regardless of the interpretation that the ordinary jurisdiction may have given to these transitory norms, the truth of the matter is that they make clear the ultra-activity of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) and of those judicial interpretations, in matters of conflicts of competence, that were produced at the appropriate procedural moment and that could even occur in the future with respect to proceedings still pending under the repealed adjective legislation. Consequently, what is challenged is a jurisprudential guideline that continues to produce effects, without ruling out the possibility that it may do so in the future for matters initiated based on the formally repealed legislation that are not yet definitively concluded. Since the early Votes Nos. 185-95 of 4:35 p.m. on January 10, 1995, and 4587-97 of 3:45 p.m. on August 5, 1997, this Constitutional Court admitted, via normative integration, the action of unconstitutionality against the reiterated criteria of jurisdictional bodies that have created a jurisprudential pattern, since Article 3 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes that the Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the interpretation that public authorities make of legal norms and the legal effects it produces, all in accordance with the supreme object of constitutional jurisdiction to guarantee the supremacy of the Law of the Constitution (Articles 10 of the Constitution and 1 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)). In this specific case, what is challenged is the jurisprudential line established by the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), starting from resolution No. 607-C-01 of 10:09 a.m. on August 10, 2001, when resolving conflicts of competence between the labor and administrative litigation (contencioso-administrativa) jurisdictions and referring the matter to the first, even when dealing with claims (pretensiones) materially governed by Administrative Law (e.g., nullity of a dismissal act, reinstatement, and payment of damages and losses), by considering, *grosso modo*, that any controversy generated in public employment relationships is "of a purely labor nature." For this purpose, copies of the following resolutions of that judicial instance are provided: 770-C-2001 of 9:51 a.m. on October 3, 2001, 478-C-2005 of 9:40 a.m. on July 7, 2005, 742-C-2006 of 10:05 a.m. on October 5, 2006, and 769-C-2007 of 3:20 p.m. on October 31, 2007, whereby the requirement to prove the jurisprudential guideline is considered fulfilled. In light of the considerations made in the preceding recitals, it is evident that the jurisprudential line of the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación) that ordered, before the entry into force of the new Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), and in application of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), to refer to the labor avenue any process in which a claim (pretensión) is filed within the framework of a statutory relationship, considering it a controversy "of a purely labor nature," is, most clearly, unconstitutional as it breaches Article 49 of the Constitution. Indeed, as noted, there will be **claims (pretensiones) that, due to their material or substantial nature and the applicable legal regime**, even if filed in the context of a public employment relationship, must be heard and resolved, by constitutional imperative (Article 49 of the Constitution), by the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa), that is, all those in which a public official or servant questions the substantial conformity or validity of any specific manifestation of the administrative function or administrative conduct with the administrative-legal system.
**VIII.- ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION a), OF THE REGULATORY LAW OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION (LEY REGULADORA DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVA).** Article 4, subsection a), of the repealed Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), which still continues to produce legal effects in proceedings commenced before the entry into force of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), provided the following:
*"The following shall not correspond to the Contencioso-Administrativa Jurisdiction:* *a) Criminal matters and those others that, although related to acts of the Public Administration, correspond to the labor jurisdiction (…)"* This Constitutional Court considers that this precept of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) is not, *per se*, unconstitutional, since, in a manner consistent with the constitutionally established and reserved competence for that jurisdictional body *("guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function")* in Article 49 of the Constitution, it admits the possibility that this specialized jurisdiction may hear and resolve certain controversies even in the context of a statutory or public employment relationship; so much so, that the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), before adopting the latest jurisprudential line that is now being challenged, maintained, to resolve conflicts of competence between the labor and administrative litigation (contencioso-administrativa) venues, that the administrative litigation judge (juez contencioso-administrativo) could hear and resolve claims (pretensiones) in which the validity of an administrative procedure or a formal administrative act was challenged and the substantial restitution of the legal situation was sought (*in natura* through reinstatement or by equivalent means through the payment of damages and losses or lost wages). Consequently, Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) had a more elastic content or a more open texture—in contrast to the rigidity and radicality of Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo)—that allowed interpretations conforming to the Law of the Constitution and, in particular, to the provisions of Article 49 of the Constitution. In sum, from the challenged legislative text it is possible to distinguish, with clear clarity, two types of **claims (pretensiones)—according to their material or substantial content and the applicable legal regime—**, that is, those aimed at questioning the validity or substantial conformity of an administrative conduct with the administrative-legal system, and those that, although related to the formal conduct of public administrations—given the eminently reviewing or objective nature of the administrative justice model established in the 1966 Law—, which, due to their materiality and the applicable legal regime, must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, being governed by Labor Law—individual or collective. Given the binding nature of even the recital part of constitutional judgments, the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación) must, henceforth, if it has to apply Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), take note of the reasons set forth in this judgment to reverse the jurisprudential or interpretative line that is now declared unconstitutional, admitting the interpretation conforming to Article 49 of the Constitution of the challenged legal article. For these reasons, this Chamber considers that the challenged norm is not, in itself, unconstitutional, and therefore, this extreme must be dismissed. What is unconstitutional, as noted in the preceding recital, is the interpretation that the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación) has made of the norm since the year 2001.
**IX.- COROLLARY.** By virtue of the reasons set forth, it is necessary to declare partially with merit the accumulated actions of unconstitutionality, as indicated in the operative part.
**THEREFORE:** The accumulated actions are declared partially with merit. Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo) (Law No. 8508 of April 28, 2006) is declared unconstitutional, as is the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación) of the Supreme Court of Justice that, in application of Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), referred any controversy related to a public employment relationship to the labor jurisdiction by considering it "purely labor," even though the claimant materially sought to challenge the substantial non-conformity or invalidity of an administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function with the administrative-legal system, arising in a statutory relationship. As for the challenge to Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), the accumulated actions are dismissed. This declaration of unconstitutionality has declaratory and retroactive effects to the date of effectiveness of the challenged norm and case law, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, and legal relationships and situations consolidated by prescription, expiration, or judgment that carries the authority of material res judicata. Publish fully in the Boletín Judicial and summarize in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Notify the Procuraduría General de la República, the petitioners, the coadjuvants, and the judicial authorities hearing the prior matter.
Communicate to the presidency of the Legislative Assembly and to the First Chamber of Cassation of the Supreme Court of Justice.
Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
801/199/ibj.- Added by judgment 011034-10. 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No. 08-012174-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2010009928** **SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fifteen hours on June ninth, two thousand ten.** Accumulated actions of unconstitutionality, the first (No. 08-012174-0007-CO), filed by **CÉSAR HINES CÉSPEDES**, ID No. 7-061-989, **ENRIQUE ROJAS FRANCO**, ID No. 1-390-1250 and **DIEGO MOYA MEZA**, ID No. 1-1065-0968, against the jurisprudence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that refers, by reason of subject matter, to the labor jurisdiction, proceedings that seek the nullity of administrative acts linked to a public employment relationship issued based on Article 4, subsection a), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, a provision which is also challenged, and, by connection, against Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 25, 2006, insofar as it excludes matters of public employment from the cognizance of said jurisdiction; the second action (No. 09-008798-0007-CO), filed by **MANRIQUE JIMÉNEZ MEZA**, ID No. 1-487-250, against subsection a) of Article 3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 25, 2006, and, subsidiarily, against the interpretation that the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has given in favor of referring public employment matters to the labor jurisdiction. Also intervening in the action is the **PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA** and the **INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE VIVIENDA Y URBANISMO.** **RESULTANDO:** **1.-** By brief filed in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 7:51 a.m. on September 8, 2008 (folios 1-56), César Hines Céspedes, ID No. 7-061-989, Enrique Rojas Franco, ID No. 1-390-1250, and Diego Moya Meza, ID No. 1-1065-968, the latter two acting, they state, in their capacity as directing attorneys in the judicial proceedings of Mrs. Lilliana Alfaro Rojas, in judicial file No. 05-000677-163-CA, and of Lidia González Mora, in judicial proceeding No. 00-000337-163-CA, requested a declaration of unconstitutionality of the jurisprudence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that refers, by reason of the subject matter, to the labor jurisdiction, proceedings that seek the nullity of administrative acts linked to a public employment relationship and, by connection, of Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 25, 2006, in what excludes matters of public employment from the cognizance of said jurisdiction and, for the same reason, of Article 4, subsection a), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, No. 3667 of March 12, 1966. The provisions are challenged insofar as, in the opinion of the plaintiffs, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has been maintaining a jurisprudential position establishing a differential treatment of public employment relationships arising from employment contracts existing between public officials and the public Administration, causing a violation of the underlying legal relationship that gives rise to or reason for the existence of the principal relationship, which is of an administrative nature and thereby infringing the provisions of Article 49 of the Political Constitution. Provision 3, subsection a), of the new Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo is also unconstitutional, given that it establishes that the Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda Jurisdiction shall not hear claims related to the conduct of the Public Administration in matters of public employment relations, which shall be heard by the labor jurisdiction. In this case, just as established by provision 4, subsection a), of the former Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa (also questioned), the Political Constitution is flagrantly violated, specifically the cited provision 49 which clearly defines the scope and specific purpose of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. The essence of the new Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, expressed in the legislator's intention embodied in Article 3, subsection a), of the normative body, is the same as that maintained in the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, exactly in provision 4, subsection a), of its articles, for which reason both criteria entail an arbitrariness reflected in the non-observance of the provisions of Article 49 of the Constitution.
**2.-** By ruling of the Presidency of the Chamber at 10:15 a.m.
of October 22, 2008 (folio 51), the plaintiffs were warned to submit a document accrediting the representation under which they were appearing; a certified copy of the brief where they invoked the unconstitutionality they request, within a matter pending resolution, and sufficient references to the case law they challenge.
**3.-** By a brief filed at 1:12 p.m. (folio 53), the plaintiffs Enrique Rojas Franco and Diego Moya Meza indicated they were submitting the documents to comply with the warning.
**4.-** By a ruling of the Presidency of the Chamber at 11:30 a.m. on December 18, 2008 (folio 111), this acción de inconstitucionalidad was admitted for processing.
**5.-** The legal notices were published in the Judicial Bulletins numbers 15, 16, and 17 of January 22, 23, and 26, 2009 (folio 115).
**6.-** By a brief filed in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:20 p.m. on January 28, 2009 (folios 116-151), Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, in her capacity as Procuradora General de la República, recommended declaring the acción with merit and holding the challenged norms unconstitutional. The Procuradora first clarified that the content of this acción de inconstitucionalidad fully coincides with the arguments set forth by the plaintiff César Hines in acción de inconstitucionalidad No. 06-013862-0007-CO, also filed by him; consequently, the current report is based on the one rendered in that expediente. She did not address standing. On the merits, she indicated that Article 49 of the Constitución Política exclusively attributes judicial review of the legality of the administrative function to the contencioso-administrativa jurisdiction. Public employment relationships are legal-administrative relationships. Consequently, the case law of the Sala Primera that attributes jurisdiction over disputes regarding public employment relationships to the labor jurisdiction, as well as the legal provisions on which it is based, are indeed unconstitutional. In effect, she adds, the contencioso-administrativa jurisdiction was created as a distinct jurisdiction within the Poder Judicial; the distinction does not originate from the nature of the persons but from the object of protection. Its purpose is to guarantee the legality of the actions of public administrations vis-à-vis the administered party and to protect the rights of the latter. No other jurisdiction can exercise judicial review in those same terms. Further, the Procuraduría continues, the public employment relationship is administrative, as follows from Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitución Política, distinct from the common labor relationship. It is also so contemplated in Articles 111 and 112 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and this Chamber has reiterated it in various rulings. Now, the challenged norms have not in any way distinguished the nature of the relationship. They implicitly presume that every employment relationship in the public sector is of a labor nature, disregarding the foregoing. The Procuraduría states that reasons of convenience have been alleged for the labor jurisdiction to hear and resolve contencioso-administrativo matters; however, these are not admissible, since, in accordance with Article 49 of the Constitution, only within the contencioso-administrativa jurisdiction is it possible to create a court with specialization in public employment matters. Finally, the Procuraduría maintains that only when the employment relationship in the public sector is governed by labor law can the labor jurisdiction hear it. This scenario occurs, for example, in public companies governed by private law. In any case, the managerial and oversight classes are excepted in this latter scenario. In summary, the Procuraduría concludes that the challenged norms are indeed unconstitutional and requests that they be so declared, but that a period of 3 to 5 years be granted so that the Poder Legislativo may enact a law establishing a section within the contencioso-administrativa jurisdiction charged with resolving disputes related to public employment.
**7.-** By a brief filed in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:03 p.m. on February 4, 2009 (folios 152-163), María del Carmen Redondo Solís, Gerente General of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, responded to the hearing. She indicated that she finds no vices of unconstitutionality in the challenged norms. The labor jurisdiction also protects principles contained in the Constitución Política. Furthermore, it does not conform to the principle of swift and complete justice that the worker must first seek the annulment of the act and then, through the labor channel, demand the labor claims. In the specific case, the relationship with the dismissed official was strictly a labor one. It was originally filed before the contencioso-administrativa jurisdiction, which suspended the act, resulting in the former official being reinstated. Subsequently, by decision of the Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, the matter was assigned to the labor jurisdiction. Regarding the particular case of Lidia González Mora, this Chamber has even already ruled on it in a recurso de amparo. It has also ruled generally on the restructuring suffered by the institute. Relationships in Law do not present themselves in a pure form, and it is clear that the State becomes involved in a series of activities, even private ones. There is no unconstitutionality whatsoever in the labor jurisdiction hearing disputes arising from a labor relationship that the State has established with a person.
**8.-** By a brief filed in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:29 p.m. on February 10, 2009 (folios 167-171), Luis Fernando Pérez Morais filed an active joinder (coadyuvancia activa). He indicated that he had filed a contencioso-administrativa acción against the State, but the Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo declared itself incompetent, following the case law challenged in this acción. He considers that there are issues, such as the demand for indemnification, that are not included within the scope of a labor proceeding. He therefore considers that the challenged norms are contrary to Article 49 of the Constitución Política.
**9.-** By a brief filed in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:17 p.m. on February 12, 2009 (folios 173-175), Jorge Fisher Aragón filed an active joinder (coadyuvancia activa). He indicated that Maykel Segura López filed a proceeding against the State before the Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo, but it declared itself incompetent by virtue of the challenged norms, which he considers contrary to Article 49 of the Constitución Política.
**10.-** By a brief filed in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:20 p.m. on February 12, 2009 (folios 179-183), Eduardo López Arroyo, special judicial attorney-in-fact (apoderado especial judicial) of Víctor Hugo Salas Brenes, filed an active joinder (coadyuvancia activa). He indicated that the latter filed a request before the Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo for an atypical precautionary measure (medida cautelar atípica) in a proceeding against the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which is charging him employer contributions, with which he disagrees. However, the Tribunal indicated that it might be a case of lack of jurisdiction by reason of subject matter. He considers that it involves the annulment of an act that does not comply with legality, which is proper to the contencioso-administrativa jurisdiction.
**11.-** By a ruling at 10:20 a.m. on February 18, 2009 (folio 217), the hearings granted to the Procuraduría General de la República and the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo were considered answered. Likewise, the active joinders (coadyuvancias activas) indicated above were considered filed. Finally, this acción de inconstitucionalidad was assigned.
**12.-** By a brief filed at 8:32 a.m. on April 14, 2009 (folio 241), [Nombre 001] filed an active joinder (coadyuvancia activa), as he had filed an identical acción, but it was rejected on procedural grounds.
**13.-** By a brief in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 8:55 a.m. on February 16, 2009 (folio 242), Alvin Villavicencio Coronado, whose signature is not authenticated, complained about the filing of this acción de inconstitucionalidad.
**14.-** By a brief filed at 1:30 p.m. on May 18, 2009 (folio 248), Noemy Campos Solórzano stated that the Juzgado de Trabajo of the II Circuito Judicial de San José suspended a proceeding in which she is a party, and whose resolution is urgent, as it pertains to her pension. She requested that said case be excluded from the suspension so that the Juzgado could rule.
**15.-** By a brief filed at 11:50 a.m. on June 10, 2009 (folios 249-250), Cristino Herrera Trejos, whose signature does not appear authenticated, requested that this acción be resolved, as he is a party in a proceeding pending in the labor channel that was suspended due to this proceso de inconstitucionalidad.
**16.-** By a brief filed at 8:45 a.m. on June 11, 2009 (folio 255), Alvin Villavicencio Coronado, whose signature is not authenticated, requested the prompt dispatch of this proceso, as he is a party in a proceeding that is suspended by virtue of this acción de inconstitucionalidad.
**17.-** By a brief filed at 9:22 a.m. on June 15, 2009 (folio 256), Anabelle Cordero Montero, Judicial Assistant of the Juzgado de Trabajo of the II Circuito Judicial de San José, forwarded expedientes No. 00-000337-0163-CA and No. 08-000644-1027-CA.
**18.-** By a brief filed at 12:12 p.m. on September 25, 2009 (folio 257), Luis Antonio Quesada M., whose signature is not authenticated, requested the prompt dispatch of this proceso, as he is a party in a proceeding that is suspended by virtue of this acción de inconstitucionalidad.
**19.-** By a brief filed at 3:54 p.m. on September 29, 2009 (folio 258), Ana María Madriz Gamboa requested the prompt dispatch of this proceso, as she is a party in a proceeding that is suspended by virtue of this acción de inconstitucionalidad.
**20.-** By a brief filed at 11:08 a.m. on June 10, 2009 (folios 264-291), Manrique Jiménez Meza, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of José Manuel Ulate Avendaño, filed an acción de inconstitucionalidad against subparagraph a) of Article 3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, challenged in this acción, and, subsidiarily, against the case law of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia in favor of referring public employment matters to the labor jurisdiction (sentencias No. 742-C-2006, No. 607-C-01, and No. 769-C-2007), to which expediente No. 09-008798-0007-CO was assigned. Regarding standing, he argued that his represented party, in his capacity as Mayor of the Municipalidad de Heredia, is the defendant in proceeding No. 08-000766-1027-CA filed by the Contraloría General de la República before the Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, seeking to annul the administrative agreements for the payment of seniority bonuses (anualidades) to his represented party. He argued that, in said proceeding, his represented party raised the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms as a means to defend his rights. On the merits, he maintained that the norm challenged in the present proceso, whether in its letter, content, or interpretation, violates the following articles of the Constitución Política: Article 11 (duty of subordination of public officials to the Law of the Constitution as primordial law); 39 and 41 (due process, in that the litigant is forced to resort to labor jurisdictional competence when their claims are proper to administrative law and contencioso-administrativo procedural law for the safeguarding of their legitimate interests and subjective rights); 49 (principle of autonomy of the contencioso-administrativa jurisdiction); Articles 70 and 74 (insofar as the labor jurisdiction is created in relation to inalienable social rights, without this jurisdiction being able to resolve matters related to aspects proper to administrative law and the contencioso-administrativa jurisdiction, in which situations could arise where rights and interests are waivable); the principle of reasonableness, because, in his judgment, it is not reasonable for the rule of law to be violated by law or its interpretation and for the satisfaction of the litigants' claims to be prevented, whether in the strictly labor dynamic or in the properly contencioso-administrativa one, with the dogmatic exclusion of one to the exclusive benefit of the other. Proportionality, insofar as excluding the contencioso-administrativa jurisdiction when the claims have a strict connection with this jurisdiction and not with the other labor-type one constitutes a denial of justice to the detriment of litigants and their freedom of choice, according to the claims in each proceeding. He finally added that to dogmatically assume that each and every administrative action or legal-administrative relationship related to public employment is, imperatively, the exclusive domain of labor jurisdictional competence also contradicts the principle of swift and complete justice and the rights of litigants who seek, in one jurisdiction or the other, labor or perhaps contencioso-administrativo aspects. For this reason, he principally requests the unconstitutionality of Article 3, subparagraph a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. In a subsidiary manner, he alleged the unconstitutionality of the interpretation that the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has given in favor of referring public employment matters to the labor jurisdiction, for which he cited sentencias 742-C-2006 at 10:05 a.m. on October 5, 2006, 607-C-01 at 10:09 a.m. on August 10, 2001, and 769-C-2007 at 3:20 p.m. on October 31, 2007.
**21.-** By ruling No. 2009-010543 at 2:44 p.m. on July 1, 2009 (folios 297-300), the issuance of the final judgment on the merits in acción No. 09-008798-0007-CO was reserved pending resolution in acción No. 08-012174-0007-CO.
**22.-** By ruling No. 2009-015667 at 2:44 p.m. on October 7, 2009 (folio 302), ruling No. 2009-010543 was annulled and it was ordered to consolidate acción No. 09-008798-0007-CO with the present one.
**23.-** By a brief filed at 11:05 a.m. on November 17, 2009 (folios 305-306), Rolando Chacón Ramírez, who is a party in a labor proceeding suspended by this acción, requested that it be clarified that matters already being processed in the labor channel may continue until their conclusion.
**24.-** By a brief filed at 10:00 a.m. on February 1, 2010 (folios 309-310), Verny Cordero Fonseca, who claims to be a party in a labor proceeding suspended by this acción, requested that it be rejected and, in any case, resolved promptly.
**25.-** By a brief filed at 2:00 p.m. on February 12, 2010 (folios 313-314), Jesús Araya Zúñiga and Ruth Camacho Jiménez requested to be considered active coadjuvants (coadyuvantes activos), as they are a party in a proceeding where the challenged norm is applied.
**26.-** By a brief filed at 10:30 a.m. on February 15, 2010 (folios 315-316), Verny Cordero Fonseca reiterated the brief he had already submitted.
**27.-** By a brief filed at 11:07 a.m. on March 4, 2010 (folios 318-319), Eduardo Contreras Ramírez requested the prompt resolution of this acción, as he is a party in a proceeding that is suspended by virtue of it.
**28.-** By a brief filed at 9:00 a.m. on April 13, 2010 (folio 320), Cristino Herrera Trejos, whose signature does not appear authenticated, reiterated his request for this acción to be resolved.
**29.-** By a brief filed at 1:04 p.m. on April 14, 2010 (folio 321), Edgar Cubero Castro, whose signature does not appear authenticated, requested the prompt resolution of this proceso, as it prevents the final issuance of the ruling in a labor proceeding in which he is a party.
**30.-** By a brief filed at 7:55 a.m. on April 21, 2010 (folios 325-329), Flor de María Flores Chavarría, whose signature does not appear authenticated, requested the prompt dispatch of this proceso and that it be declared without merit, as it keeps labor proceedings paralyzed, in one of which she is a party.
**31.-** By a brief filed at 10:53 a.m. on May 12, 2010 (folio 330), Ana María Madriz Gamboa reiterated the request for the prompt dispatch of this proceso.
**32.-** In the processing of the proceeding, the prescriptions of law have been observed.
Drafted by Magistrate **Jinesta Lobo**; and, **WHEREAS:** **I.- STANDING AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD.** Article 75, 1st paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes as one of the prerequisites for filing the acción de inconstitucionalidad, in the case of concrete review, the existence of a matter pending resolution before the courts, including hábeas corpus or amparo, or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative channel, as a reasonable means to protect the substantial legal situation deemed injured. In this regard, this Tribunal Constitucional, in sentencia No. 4190-95 at 11:33 a.m.
of July 28, 1995, stated the following:
"(...) In the first place, it is a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action (acción popular), which means that the existence of a pending matter—whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure for exhausting administrative remedies (agotar la vía administrativa)—is required to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that the decision of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) has a positive or negative impact on that pending proceeding, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this route—presuppositions of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) (...)".
In the unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad) No. 08-012174-0007-CO, the petitioners originally claimed standing (legitimados) to file this action, pointing to the proceedings before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa), in judicial case files No. 05-000677-163-CA and No. 000337-163-CA, as the base matters where they had invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms. However, subsequently, in response to the warning (prevención) from the Presidency of this Chamber (Sala) to prove such standing through certified copies, they omitted to provide the documents related to the first of those proceedings and, instead, indicated No. 08-000644-1027-CA, filed by Francisco José Hernández Solano against the State. Therefore, by resolution of 11:30 a.m. on December 18, 2009 (see folio 111), this action was admitted, based on proceedings No. 00-000337-0163-CA and No. 08-00644-1027-CA, both filed before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, in which the jurisdiction—by reason of subject matter—of said jurisdiction is discussed, and in which, indeed, the unconstitutionality of the norms challenged here was alleged (copies at folios 59-65 and 67-83). Both proceedings being pending resolution, this Court (Tribunal) considers that the plaintiffs are indeed standing (legitimados) to bring this unconstitutionality action. Furthermore, Manrique Jiménez Meza filed unconstitutionality action No. 09-008798-0007-CO, consolidated (acumulada) with the present one, in which he asserted standing by virtue of having invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms in the proceeding processed under case file No. 08-000766-1027-CA, which he effectively demonstrated (copies at folios 292-293). In another vein, since the challenged norms are provisions of a general nature, it is admissible, in accordance with Article 73 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, to question them through this route.
**II.- JOINDERS (COADYUVANCIAS).** In accordance with Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of this same law, *"(...) those with a legitimate interest (interés legítimo) may appear in this [proceeding] to assist (coadyuvar) in the arguments that may justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds for unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that concerns them."* In this case, the following three active joinders (coadyuvancias activas) were filed within the legal deadline and are, therefore, admissible: Fernando Pérez Morais (folios 167-172), Jorge Fisher Aragón, representing Maykel Segura López (folios 173-175), and Eduardo López Arroyo, representing Hugo Salas Brenes (folios 179-1783). Also filed, but untimely and therefore not admitted, are the active joinder filed by [Name 001] (folio 241) and the passive joinder (coadyuvancia pasiva) filed by Alvin Villavicencio Coronado (folio 242).
**III.- SUBJECT MATTER (OBJETO) OF THE CONSOLIDATED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTIONS.** Both unconstitutionality actions coincide in challenging section 3°, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006, insofar as it provides that claims (pretensiones) related to administrative conduct in public employment relations matters will be heard by the labor jurisdiction (jurisdicción laboral). Additionally, the first action filed, No. 08-012174-0007-CO, attacks the jurisprudence handed down by the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), in light of Article 4°, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) No. 3667 of March 12, 1966, insofar as it refers any controversy arising within a public or statutory employment relationship to the knowledge and resolution of the labor jurisdiction; therefore, the cited provision of the repealed Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction is also challenged.
**IV.- CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTRIBUTION OF A COMPETENCE (COMPETENCIA).** The original constituent power (constituyente originario) and the amending power (poder reformador) undertook to define the subject-matter jurisdiction (competencia material) and, consequently, the extension and scope of two jurisdictions essential to the Social and Democratic State of Law (Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho). Indeed, sections 10 and 48 establish the subject-matter jurisdiction of the constitutional jurisdiction (jurisdicción constitucional) and, in section 49, that of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. The foregoing makes evident, in the will of the original constituent power and the amending power, the transcendence of both the constitutionality control and the legality control of public powers in order to guarantee the effective enjoyment and exercise of the fundamental rights and human rights enshrined, respectively, in the constitutional text and the instruments of Public International Law. Undoubtedly, such constitutional precepts embody what doctrine has termed the regal clause of the Constitutional State of Law (Estado Constitucional de Derecho). Regarding, particularly, the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, Article 49 of the Constitution, after the partial amendment by virtue of Law No. 3124 of June 25, 1963, provides the following:
*"The contentious-administrative jurisdiction is established as an attribution of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial), with the object of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and every other entity of public law.* *Deviation of power (desviación de poder) shall be a ground for challenging administrative acts.* *The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) and legitimate interests (intereses legítimos) of the administered parties (administrados)."* Based on the literal transcription of the constitutional precept, the following is worth highlighting:
1°) The derived constituent power or amending power opted for a "judicialist" model of administrative justice; that is, entrusting a specialized jurisdictional order of the Judicial Branch with the competence and attribution to exercise oversight of the legality of the administrative function, meaning its substantial conformity or adjustment to the legality framework (bloque de legalidad). This system offers considerable guarantees and comparative advantages for the justiciable party (justiciable), such as specialization, which, accompanied by the judicial career (carrera judicial) established at the infra-constitutional level, represents a true guarantee of correctness and compliance with the constitutional imperative contained in section 41 of the Constitution of "full justice." 2°) The amending power defined, with clear clarity, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, indicating that its object is *"to guarantee the legality of the administrative function."* It is worth noting that the constitutional norm does not distinguish, so that this specialized jurisdictional order is responsible for the oversight of any specific manifestation of the administrative function, without exceptions. The derived constituent power thus enshrined a plenary and universal administrative justice, avoiding any enclaves or areas of the administrative function exempt from legality control or oversight. The *"administrative function"* is an indeterminate legal concept, employed by the amending power from 1963 onwards, which encompasses or includes any specific or concrete manifestation thereof; that is, all administrative conduct—by action or omission (omisión)—(e.g., formal activity, material actions (actuaciones materiales), and formal and material omissions), as well as the complementary, more dynamic and flexible figure of the administrative legal relationship (relación jurídica-administrativa).
3°) The derived constituent power or amending power established a constitutional reservation (reserva constitucional) of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction by stipulating that its object is *"to guarantee the legality of the administrative function,"* for which reason the ordinary legislator, in the exercise of its freedom of configuration, cannot attribute that competence to another jurisdictional order that is not the contentious-administrative one, since, were it to do so, it would be emptying of content the institutional guarantee and the fundamental right enshrined in Article 49 of the Constitution. On this particular point, and after better consideration, this Constitutional Court varies or reverses the thesis set forth in Opinions (Votos) Nos. 3095-94 of 3:57 p.m. on August 3, 1994, 7540-94 of 5:42 p.m. on December 21, 1994, 5686-95 of 3:39 p.m. on October 18, 1995, and 14999-2007 of 3:06 p.m. on October 17, 2007. The foregoing means that when a justiciable party brings a claim (pretensión) to question the invalidity or substantial non-conformity with the administrative legal system of an administrative conduct or any singular manifestation of the administrative function (formal or material omission, formal activity, material action, or administrative legal relationship), the contentious-administrative jurisdiction must necessarily hear and resolve it. Obviously, if the claim, due to its material content, even if related to some administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function—insofar as a public entity or body intervenes—is governed by the labor, family, or agrarian legal regime, it must be heard and resolved by those jurisdictional bodies, since what is being questioned is not, properly, the substantial conformity or non-conformity of the administrative function or conduct with the administrative legal system, which is what Article 49 of the Constitution reserves to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. This Constitutional Court considers that the determining criteria for delimiting the scope of competence of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction from other specialized jurisdictional orders—which, henceforth, must be considered by the ordinary jurisdiction (jurisdicción ordinaria)—will therefore be the following: **1°)** The **material or substantial content of the claim** and **2°)** the **applicable legal regime**; so that if the substantial conformity or non-conformity of a specific manifestation of the administrative function with the legality framework is being discussed, the conflict of interest will necessarily be heard by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.
4°) The legality control enshrined in section 49 of the Constitution is projected, as indicated, to all the administrative function carried out by any public entity or body; that is, to all public administrations, without exception. For this reason, the first paragraph of the constitutional precept under examination concludes with a residual or general formula, indicating that it encompasses the function carried out both by the central administration—the State—and by *"every other entity of public law."* 5°) The derived constituent power opted for a mixed administrative justice, since the first paragraph, when defining the object of the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order—*"to guarantee the legality of the administrative function"*—must be complemented, inevitably, with the final paragraph *in fine*, by prescribing that the law shall provide protection, at a minimum, to subjective rights and legitimate interests—without distinguishing regarding the latter, making admissible the protection of both personal and collective interests, whether corporate or diffuse. Consequently, the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, according to the Law of the Constitution, was instituted both to ensure the legality of the administrative function and for the effective protection of the substantial legal positions (situaciones jurídicas sustanciales) of the administered parties against public powers. Thus, an objective and subjective role of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction is constitutionally combined.
**V.- CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCTS RELATED TO A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AS A SPECIFIC MANIFESTATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION.** Article 49 of the Constitution establishes a plenary and universal contentious-administrative jurisdiction that allows the justiciable party to challenge or attack any conduct or manifestation of the administrative function before that jurisdictional order. Among the possible specific manifestations of the administrative function constitutionally challengeable before the contentious-administrative forum are, obviously, those conducts of public administrations within the framework or context of a public or statutory employment relationship, unquestionably governed by Administrative Law or of an administrative-legal nature, as emerges from sections 191 and 192 of the Constitution, 111 and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and from the constitutional jurisprudence that informs them (Opinions of this Constitutional Court Nos. 1696-92, 4453-2000, 244-2001, and 14416-2006). Consequently, the ordinary legislator cannot radically exclude—totally and absolutely—from the knowledge and resolution of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction all administrative conduct in public employment relations matters, since it has no freedom of disposition over this aspect, as it is bound by the subject-matter jurisdiction defined and reserved in Article 49 of the Constitution. From the foregoing, it also cannot be concluded that every administrative conduct in public employment matters must be heard and resolved before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, because there will be **claims and issues that, due to their material content and the applicable legal regime**, must inevitably be brought before the labor jurisdiction, by reason of its specific subject-matter jurisdiction.
**VI.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 3°, SUBSECTION A), OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL CODE.** Section 3°, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006), provides the following:
*"The Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda) shall not hear the following claims:* *a) Those related to the conduct of the Public Administration in public employment relations matters, which shall be heard by the labor jurisdiction (...)"* The challenged provision radically and absolutely—without exception—excludes from the knowledge and resolution of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction all claims related to administrative conduct within the framework of a statutory relationship, thereby clearly violating the Law of the Constitution and, particularly, Article 49 of the Constitution, which exclusively reserved to that jurisdictional order, as its subject-matter jurisdiction, *"to guarantee the legality of the administrative function."* The challenged legislative text does not allow, due to its closed literal tenor, an interpretation consistent with the Law of the Constitution and the necessary distinction between **claims that, due to their material content and the applicable legal regime**, must be heard and resolved either by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction or by the labor jurisdiction. As noted supra, when the justiciable party seeks to discuss the substantial non-conformity or invalidity of an administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function with the administrative legal system, the matter must be brought, due to the reservation and constitutional imperative of Article 49, before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In essence, the justiciable party has the constitutional guarantee of challenging any conduct that is a manifestation of the administrative function before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, given that there are conducts produced within a public employment relationship that are specific expressions of the general concept of the *"administrative function."* On the other hand, there will be **claims that, due to their substantial content and the applicable legal regime**, must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, considering its special competence and the need to apply, to the specific case, the particular dogmatic categories, institutions, institutes, principles, and hermeneutical tools of that legal discipline. Thus, by way of example and without claiming to be exhaustive, the labor jurisdiction must hear and resolve—even if the matter is related to the administrative conduct or function exercised by a public entity—issues that are typical or materially labor-related, such as the propriety or not of and the calculation for the payment of the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, prior notice (preaviso), and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), matters concerning the recognition of a retirement or pension or professional risks, controversies arising in the field of individual and collective Labor Law (e.g., economic-social conflicts), everything related to the exercise of the right to strike or work stoppage (paro), etc. In the same vein, it is necessary to recognize that in the case of employees responsible for tasks subject to common law of public enterprises or economic services developed by a public administration, or of mere laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the respective public entity; that is, those doctrine calls "workers of the public administration," the controversies that arise must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, as they are not, in the strict sense, a public official, servant, or employee (Articles 111, paragraph 2°, and 112, paragraph 2°, of the General Law of Public Administration), given that any conduct emanating from the public entity, in such context, will not be subject to the administrative legal regime and cannot be considered, materially, as an administrative legal relationship. It is necessary to highlight that the constituent power opted for jurisdictional orders specialized by reason of subject matter—at least up to a certain instance—as a guarantee of correctness and a means for achieving the constitutional imperative of prompt and full justice. Although Article 41 of the Constitution enshrines the general right of access to jurisdiction, sections 10, 48, 49, 70, and 153 of the fundamental norm clearly opt for the establishment of specialized jurisdictions.
Thus, the party seeking justice has the right to choose before which jurisdictional order to bring an action, provided that the **material nature of the claim and the applicable legal regime** is congruent with the specialty—constitutional or legal—of the respective jurisdiction. This Constitutional Court does not overlook that in judicial practice, due to inadequate or defective legal representation or advice, parties may make mistakes when bringing a claim or combining them before a specific jurisdictional order; however, in such cases, the jurisdictional body must proceed, with due celerity and procedural economy, to sever the **claims that, by their substantial content and the applicable legal regime**, should not be heard in that venue, and to give swift course to those that are appropriate, unless another cause prevents it. In the same vein, when any conflict of competence arises, the jurisdictional bodies involved and the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), insofar as it acts as the Court of Conflicts between the contentious-administrative and labor jurisdictions, must be particularly diligent in processing and resolving it to avoid any undue delay or unjustified postponement that significantly affects the fundamental right to a swift justice (Article 41 of the Constitution) or the human right contained in the American Convention to a process within a reasonable time (Article 8.1).
**VII.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE FIRST CHAMBER OF CASSATION IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A), OF THE REGULATORY LAW OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION WHEN RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF COMPETENCE BETWEEN THE LABOR AND CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTIONS.** The plaintiffs also challenge as unconstitutional the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation, when acting as the Court of Conflicts of competence between the labor and contentious-administrative jurisdiction, and, particularly, when applying Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa). The Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006—which entered into force on January 1, 2008, according to the *vacatio legis* established in Article 222 of that normative body—repealed the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction No. 3667 of March 12, 1966 (Article 198 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code); however, within the interim law provisions of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, Transitional Provisions III and IV stipulated the following:
"TRANSITORIO III.- The regime for challenging acts that became final in the administrative venue before this Code's entry into force shall be governed by the legislation in force at that time.
TRANSITORIO IV.- Contentious-administrative proceedings and ordinary lawsuits attributed to the civil Treasury venue, filed prior to this Code's entry into force, regardless of their procedural stage, shall continue to be processed, in all their procedures and recourses, by the norms that governed on the date of filing. For this purpose, the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) shall continue processing such matters until their conclusion, and the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo) shall maintain the sections deemed convenient to hear the challenge lawsuits provided for in Articles 82 to 90 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, and, on appeal, the resolutions issued by the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court." Regardless of the interpretation that the ordinary jurisdiction may have given to these transitional norms, what is certain is that they clearly demonstrate the continued applicability (ultra-actividad) of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction and of those judicial interpretations in matters of competence conflicts that occurred at the proper procedural moment and that could even arise in the future regarding proceedings still pending under the repealed procedural legislation. Consequently, the challenged item is a jurisprudential guideline that continues to produce effects, without dismissing the possibility that it may do so in the future for matters initiated under the formally repealed legislation that have not yet definitively concluded. Since the early rulings Voto No. 185-95 of 4:35 p.m. on January 10, 1995, and Voto No. 4587-97 of 3:45 p.m. on August 5, 1997, this Constitutional Court has admitted, through normative integration, the action of unconstitutionality against reiterated criteria by jurisdictional bodies that have created a jurisprudential guideline, given that Article 3 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes that the Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the interpretation made by public authorities of legal norms and the legal effects they produce, all in accordance with the supreme purpose of the constitutional jurisdiction to guarantee the supremacy of Constitutional Law (Article 10 of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law). In this case, what is challenged is the jurisprudential line established by the First Chamber of Cassation, commencing with Resolution No. 607-C-01 of 10:09 a.m. on August 10, 2001, when resolving conflicts of competence between the labor and contentious-administrative jurisdictions and remitting the matter to the former, even when the claims are materially governed by Administrative Law (e.g., nullity of a dismissal act, reinstatement, and payment of damages), by considering, roughly speaking (grosso modo), that any controversy arising in public employment relations is "of a purely labor nature." For this purpose, copies of the following resolutions from that judicial instance are provided: 770-C-2001 of 9:51 a.m. on October 3, 2001, 478-C-2005 of 9:40 a.m. on July 7, 2005, 742-C-2006 of 10:05 a.m. on October 5, 2006, and 769-C-2007 of 3:20 p.m. on October 31, 2007, by which the requirement to demonstrate the jurisprudential guideline is considered fulfilled. In light of the considerations set forth in the preceding recitals, it is evident that the jurisprudential line of the First Chamber of Cassation, which ordered, before the entry into force of the new Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code and in application of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the remittance to the labor venue of any proceeding in which a claim is brought within the framework of a statutory relationship, considering it a controversy "of a purely labor nature," is, by all lights, unconstitutional as it violates Article 49 of the Constitution. Indeed, as was noted, there are **claims that, by their material or substantial character and the applicable legal regime**, although brought in the context of a public employment relationship, must be heard and resolved, by constitutional mandate (Article 49 of the Constitution), by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction; that is, all those in which a public official or employee questions the substantial conformity or validity of any specific manifestation of the administrative function or administrative conduct with the administrative legal order.
**VIII.- ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A), OF THE REGULATORY LAW OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION.** Article 4, subsection a), of the repealed Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), which continues to produce legal effects in proceedings filed before the entry into force of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, provided as follows:
<i>"The following shall not correspond to the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction:
**IX.- COROLLARY.** By virtue of the reasons set forth, the accumulated actions of unconstitutionality must be partially granted, as indicated in the operative part.
**POR TANTO:** The accumulated actions are partially granted. Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Law No. 8508 of April 28, 2006) and the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation of the Supreme Court of Justice that, in application of Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, remitted to the labor jurisdiction any controversy related to a public employment relationship, considering it "purely labor," even when the party materially sought to challenge the substantial nonconformity with, or invalidity of, an administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function against the administrative legal order, arising in a statutory relationship, are declared unconstitutional. Regarding the challenge of Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the accumulated actions are dismissed. This declaration of unconstitutionality has declaratory and retroactive effects to the date on which the challenged norm and case law came into force, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, or legal relationships and situations consolidated by prescription, expiration, or judgment having the authority of material res judicata. Publish in full in the Boletín Judicial and summarize in the official gazette La Gaceta. Notify the Procuraduría General de la República, the plaintiffs, the coadjuvants, and the judicial authorities hearing the prior matter. Communicate to the presidency of the Asamblea Legislativa and of the First Chamber of Cassation of the Corte Suprema de Justicia.
Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
801/199/ibj.-
Res. No. 2010009928 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas de nueve de junio de dos mil diez.
Acciones de inconstitucionalidad acumuladas, la primera (No. 08-012174-0007-CO), interpuesta por CÉSAR HINES CÉSPEDES, cédula No. 7-061-989, ENRIQUE ROJAS FRANCO, cédula No. 1-390-1250 y DIEGO MOYA MEZA, cédula No. 1-1065-0968, contra la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que remite, en razón de la materia, a la jurisdicción laboral, los procesos que tienen como objeto la nulidad de actos administrativos vinculados a una relación de empleo público emitida con fundamento en el artículo 4°, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, ordinal que, también, impugna y, por conexidad, contra el artículo 3°, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 de 25 de abril del 2006, en cuanto excluye del conocimiento de dicha jurisdicción la materia del empleo público, la segunda acción (No. 09-008798-0007-CO), interpuesta por MANRIQUE JIMÉNEZ MEZA, cédula No. 1-487-250, contra el inciso a) del artículo 3° del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 de 25 de abril del 2006, y, subsidiariamente, contra la interpretación que la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha dado a favor de la remisión de los asuntos de empleo público a la jurisdicción laboral. Interviene también en la acción la PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA y el INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE VIVIENDA Y URBANISMO.
RESULTANDO:
1.- Por memorial presentado en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 7:51 hrs. del 8 de setiembre del 2008 (folios 1-56), César Hines Céspedes, cédula No. 7-061-989, Enrique Rojas Franco, cédula No. 1-390-1250, y Diego Moya Meza, cédula No. 1-1065-968, los dos últimos quienes dicen actuar en condición de abogados directores de los procesos judiciales de la señora Lilliana Alfaro Rojas, en el expediente judicial No. 05-000677-163-CA y de Lidia González Mora, en el proceso judicial No. 00-000337-163-CA, solicitaron la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que remite, en razón de la materia, a la jurisdicción laboral, los procesos que tienen como objeto la nulidad de actos administrativos vinculados a una relación de empleo público y, por conexidad, del artículo 3°, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 de 25 de abril del 2006, en cuanto excluye del conocimiento de dicha jurisdicción la materia del empleo público y, por el mismo motivo, del artículo 4°, inciso a), de la Ley de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, No. 3667 de 12 de marzo de 1966. Las normas se impugnan en cuanto, en criterio de los accionantes, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha venido manteniendo una posición jurisprudencial en donde se ha instituido un trato diferenciado a las relaciones de empleo público derivadas de contratos de trabajo existentes entre funcionarios públicos y la Administración pública, provocando la violación de la relación jurídica subyacente que da pie o razón de existencia a la relación principal, que es de carácter administrativo e infringiendo así lo dispuesto en el artículo 49 de la Constitución Política. El numeral 3°, inciso a), del nuevo Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo resulta también inconstitucional, toda vez que establece que la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda no conocerá las pretensiones relacionadas con la conducta de la Administración Pública en materia de relaciones de empleo público, las cuales serán de conocimiento de la jurisdicción laboral. En este caso, al igual que lo establecía el numeral 4°, inciso a), de la antigua Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa (también cuestionado), se violenta flagrantemente la Constitución Política, específicamente el citado numeral 49 que delimita claramente el alcance y fin específico de la jurisdicción contenciosa. La esencia del nuevo Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, expresada en la intención del legislador encarnada en el artículo 3°, inciso a), del cuerpo normativo, es la misma que se venía manteniendo en la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, exactamente en el numeral 4°, inciso a), de su articulado, motivo por el cual ambos criterios suponen la arbitrariedad reflejada en la inobservancia de lo establecido por el artículo 49 constitucional.
2.- Por resolución de la Presidencia de la Sala de las 10:15 hrs. del 22 de octubre del 2008 (folio 51), se le previno a los actores que presentaran documento que acreditara la representación con la que comparecían; copia certificada del libelo donde invocaron la inconstitucionalidad que solicitan, dentro de un asunto pendiente de resolución y referencias suficiente de la jurisprudencia que impugnan.
3.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 13:12 hrs. (folio 53), los actores Enrique Rojas Franco y Diego Moya Meza indicaron que presentaban los documentos para cumplir con la prevención.
4.- Por resolución de la Presidencia de la Sala de las 11:30 hrs. del 18 de diciembre del 2008 (folio 111), se le dio curso a la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad.
5.- Los avisos de Ley fueron publicados en los Boletines Judiciales números 15, 16 y 17 de los días 22, 23 y 26 de enero del 2009 (folio 115).
6.- Mediante escrito presentado en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 15:20 hrs. del 28 de enero del 2009 (folios 116-151), Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, en su condición de Procuradora General de la República, recomendó declarar con lugar la acción y tener por inconstitucionales las normas impugnadas. La Procuradora aclaró, en primer término, que el contenido de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad coincide, plenamente, con los argumentos expuestos por el accionante César Hines en la acción de inconstitucionalidad No. 06-013862-0007-CO, también interpuesta por él; por consiguiente, el actual informe encuentra su base en el que se rindió en dicho expediente. No se refirió a la legitimación. En cuanto al fondo, indicó que el artículo 49 de la Constitución Política atribuye, en forma exclusiva, el control judicial de la legalidad de la función administrativa a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. Las relaciones de empleo público son relaciones jurídico-administrativas. En consecuencia, la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera que atribuye el conocimiento de las controversias sobre la relación de empleo público a la jurisdicción laboral, así como las disposiciones legales en que se sustenta, sí son inconstitucionales. En efecto, agrega, la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa fue creada como una jurisdicción distinta dentro del Poder Judicial; la distinción no se origina de la naturaleza de las personas, sino del objeto de protección. Su cometido es garantizar la legalidad de la actuación de las administraciones públicas frente al administrado y tutelar los derechos de éste último. Ninguna otra jurisdicción puede ejercer un control en esos mismos términos. De otra parte, continúa la Procuraduría, la relación de empleo público es administrativa, según se desprende de los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política, distinta de la relación laboral común. Así, también, está contemplado en los artículos 111 y 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y lo ha reiterado esta Sala en varias sentencias. Ahora bien, las normas impugnadas no han distinguido en forma alguna la naturaleza de la relación. Implícitamente, presume que toda relación de empleo en el sector público es de naturaleza laboral, desconociendo lo anteriormente apuntado. Se han alegado, dice la Procuraduría, razones de conveniencia para que la jurisdicción laboral conozca y resuelva asuntos contencioso-administrativos; sin embargo, estas no son atendibles, pues, de conformidad con el artículo 49 constitucional, solo dentro de la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa es posible crear un tribunal con especialidad en materia de empleo público. Finalmente, la Procuraduría sostiene que sólo cuando la relación de empleo, en el sector público, se rige por el derecho laboral, puede conocerlo la jurisdicción de trabajo. Se da este supuesto, por ejemplo, en las empresas públicas que se rigen por el derecho privado. En todo caso, se exceptúan, en este último supuesto, la clase gerencial y de fiscalización. En suma, concluye la Procuraduría, las normas impugnadas sí son inconstitucionales y así pide que se declaren, pero que se conceda un plazo de 3 a 5 años para que el Poder Legislativo dicte una ley que establezca una sección dentro de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa que se encargue de resolver los conflictos relacionados con el empleo público.
7.- Mediante escrito presentado en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 15:03 hrs. del 4 de febrero del 2009 (folios 152-163), María del Carmen Redondo Solís, Gerente General de Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo, contestó la audiencia. Indicó que no encuentra vicios de inconstitucionalidad en las normas impugnadas. La jurisdicción laboral, también, protege principios contenidos en la Constitución Política. De otra parte, no se ajusta al principio de justicia pronta y cumplida que el trabajador deba, primero, solicitar la nulidad del acto y luego exigir, en la vía de trabajo, los extremos laborales. En el caso concreto, la relación con la funcionaria despedida fue estrictamente laboral. Originalmente se presentó ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, que suspendió el acto, por lo que la ex funcionaria fue reinstalada. Posteriormente, por decisión de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el asunto fue radicado en la jurisdicción laboral. Sobre el caso particular de Lidia González Mora, ya esta Sala, incluso, se pronunció en un recurso de amparo. De manera general, también, lo hizo sobre la reestructuración que sufrió el instituto. Las relaciones en Derecho no se presentan de manera pura y es claro que el Estado se inmiscuye en una serie de actividades, incluso, privadas. No hay inconstitucionalidad alguna en que la jurisdicción laboral conozca los conflictos surgidos de una relación laboral que el Estado haya establecido con una persona.
8.- Mediante escrito presentado en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 15:29 hrs. del 10 de febrero del 2009 (folios 167-171), Luis Fernando Pérez Morais, presentó una coadyuvancia activa. Indicó que él presentó una acción contencioso-administrativa contra el Estado, pero el Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo se declaró incompetente, siguiendo la jurisprudencia que se impugna en esta acción. Considera que hay temas, como la exigencia de una indemnización, que no están comprendidos dentro del objeto de un proceso laboral. Considera, por consiguiente, que las normas impugnadas son contrarias al artículo 49 de la Constitución Política.
9.- Mediante escrito presentado en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 15:17 hrs. del 12 de febrero del 2009 (folios 173-175), Jorge Fisher Aragón, presentó una coadyuvancia activa. Indicó que Maykel Segura López interpuso un proceso contra el Estado ante el Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo, pero éste se declaró incompetente, en virtud de las normas impugnadas, lo que él considera contrario al artículo 49 de la Constitución Política.
10.- Mediante escrito presentado en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 15:20 hrs. del 12 de febrero del 2009 (folios 179-183), Eduardo López Arroyo, apoderado especial judicial de Víctor Hugo Salas Brenes, presentó una coadyuvancia activa. Indicó que éste último presentó una solicitud, ante el Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo, de medida cautelar atípica, en un proceso contra la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, que le cobra cuotas patronales, con lo que él no está de acuerdo. Sin embargo, el Tribunal señaló que, posiblemente, se trata de un caso donde se presenta una incompetencia en razón de la materia. Considera que se trata de la nulidad de un acto que no se ajusta a la legalidad, lo que es propio de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa.
11.- Por resolución de las 10:20 hrs. del 18 de febrero del 2009 (folio 217), se tuvieron por contestadas las audiencias concedidas a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo. Igualmente, se tuvieron por presentadas las coadyuvancias activas arriba indicadas. Finalmente, se turnó esta acción de inconstitucionalidad.
12.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 8:32 hrs. del 14 de abril del 2009 (folio 241), [Nombre 001], presentó coadyuvancia activa, ya que él presentó una acción idéntica, pero fue rechazada por la forma.
13.- Mediante escrito en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 8:55 hrs. del 16 de febrero del 2009 (folio 242), Alvin Villavicencio Coronado, cuya firma no está autenticada, se quejó por la presentación de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad.
14.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 13:30 hrs. de 18 de mayo de 2009 (folio 248), Noemy Campos Solórzano, manifestó que el Juzgado de Trabajo del II Circuito Judicial de San José suspendió un proceso en el que ella es parte, y cuya resolución es urgente, pues versa sobre su pensión. Solicitó que se excluyera dicho caso de la suspensión, para que el Juzgado pudiera fallar.
15.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 11:50 hrs. del 10 de junio de 2009 (folios 249-250), Cristino Herrera Trejos, cuya firma no aparece autenticada, solicitó que se resolviera esta acción, pues es parte en un proceso pendiente en la vía laboral, que se suspendió debido a este proceso de inconstitucionalidad.
16.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 8:45 hrs. del 11 de junio de 2009 (folio 255), Alvin Villavicencio Coronado, cuya firma no está autenticada, solicitó el pronto despacho de este proceso, pues es parte en un proceso que se encuentra suspendido en virtud de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad.
17.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 9:22 hrs. de 15 de junio de 2009 (folio 256), Anabelle Cordero Montero, Asistente Judicial del Juzgado de Trabajo del II Circuito Judicial de San José, remitió los expedientes No. 00-000337-0163-CA y No. 08-000644-1027-CA.
18.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 12:12 hrs. del 25 de setiembre de 2009 (folio 257), Luis Antonio Quesada M., cuya firma no está autenticada, solicitó el pronto despacho de este proceso, pues es parte en un proceso que se encuentra suspendido en virtud de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad.
19.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 15:54 hrs. de 29 de septiembre de 2009 (folio 258), Ana María Madriz Gamboa, solicitó el pronto despacho de este proceso, pues es parte en un proceso que se encuentra suspendido en virtud de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad.
20.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 11:08 hrs. de 10 de junio de 2009 (folios 264-291), Manrique Jiménez Meza, en calidad de apoderado de José Manuel Ulate Avendaño, interpuso acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el inciso a) del artículo 3 del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, impugnado en esta acción, y, subsidiariamente, contra la jurisprudencia de de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia a favor de la remisión de los asuntos de empleo público a la jurisdicción laboral (sentencias No. 742-C-2006, No. 607-C-01 y No. 769-C-2007), a la que se le asignó el su representado, en calidad de Alcalde de la Municipalidad de Heredia, es parte demandada en el proceso No. 08-000766-1027-CA interpuesto por la Contraloría General de la República ante el Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, con el fin de anular los acuerdos administrativos de pago de anualidades a su representado. Adujo que, en dicho proceso, su representado alegó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas, como medio para defender sus derechos. En cuanto al fondo, sostuvo que la norma atacada en el presente proceso, sea en su letra, contenido o interpretación, viola los siguientes numerales de la Constitución Política: artículo 11 (deber de subordinación de los funcionarios públicos al Derecho de la Constitución en calidad de derecho primigenio); 39 y 41 (debido proceso, por cuanto se obliga al justiciable a recurrir a la competencia jurisdiccional laboral, cuando sus pretensiones sean propias del derecho administrativo y del procesal contencioso administrativo para la salvaguarda de sus intereses legítimos y derechos subjetivos); 49 (principio de autonomía de la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa); artículos 70 y 74 (en cuanto se crea la jurisdicción de trabajo en relación con los derechos sociales de rango irrenunciable, sin que esta jurisdicción pueda resolver asuntos relacionados con extremos propios del derecho administrativo y de la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa, en la que podrían darse situaciones donde los derechos e intereses sean renunciables); el principio de razonabilidad, porque, a su juicio, no es razonable que el estado de derecho se violente por ley o por su interpretación y que se impida satisfacer las pretensiones de los justiciables, sea en la dinámica estrictamente laboral o en la propiamente contencioso-administrativa, con exclusión dogmática de una en beneficio exclusivo de la otra. La proporcionalidad, por cuanto dejar excluida la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa cuando las pretensiones tengan ligamen estricto con esta jurisdicción y no con la otra de tipo laboral, lo que constituye una negación de justicia en perjuicio de los justiciables y de su libertad de elección, conforme a las pretensiones en cada proceso. Agregó, finalmente, que, partir dogmáticamente de que toda y cualquier conducta administrativa o relación jurídico-administrativa relacionadas con empleo público sea, imperativamente, resorte exclusivo de la competencia jurisdiccional laboral, contradice también el principio de la justicia pronta y cumplida y los derechos de los justiciables que pretendan, en una u otra jurisdicción, extremos laborales o acaso contencioso administrativos. Por ello, solicita, de manera principal la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 3, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. De manera subsidiaria, alegó la inconstitucionalidad de la interpretación que la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha dado en favor de la remisión de los asuntos de empleo público a la jurisdicción laboral, para lo cual señaló las sentencias 742-C-2006 de las 10:05 horas del 5 de octubre de 2006, 607-C-01 de las 10:09 horas del 10 de agosto del 2001 y 769-C-2007 de las 15:20 horas del 31 de octubre del 2007.
21.- Por resolución No. 2009-010543 de las 14:44 hrs. de 1° de julio de 2009 (folios 297-300), se reservó el dictado de la sentencia de fondo en la acción No. 09-008798-0007-CO a la espera de que se resolviera en la acción No. 08-012174-0007-CO.
22.- Por resolución No. 2009-015667 de las 14:44 hrs. de 7 de octubre de 2009 (folio 302), se anuló la resolución No. 2009-010543 y se ordenó acumular la acción No. 09-008798-0007-CO a la presente.
23.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 11:05 hrs. de 17 de noviembre de 2009 (folios 305-306), Rolando Chacón Ramírez, quien es parte dentro de un proceso laboral suspendido por esta acción, solicitó que se aclarara que los asuntos que ya se tramitan en la vía laboral puedan continuar hasta su finalización.
24.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 10:00 hrs. de 1° de febrero de 2010 (folios 309-310), Verny Cordero Fonseca, quien dice ser parte en un proceso laboral suspendido por esta acción, solicitó que se rechazara y que, en todo caso, se resolviera pronto.
25.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 14:00 hrs. de 12 de febrero de 2010 (folios 313-314), Jesús Araya Zúñiga y Ruth Camacho Jiménez, solicitaron ser tenido como coadyuvantes activos, por ser parte en un proceso en donde se aplica la norma impugnada.
26.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 10:30 hrs. de 15 de febrero de 2010 (folios 315-316), Verny Cordero Fonseca reiteró el escrito que ya había presentado.
27.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 11:07 hrs. de 4 de marzo de 2010 (folios 318-319), Eduardo Contreras Ramírez, solicitó la pronta resolución de esta acción, pues es parte en un proceso que está suspendido en virtud de esta.
28.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 9:00 hrs. de 13 de abril de 2010 (folio 320), Cristino Herrera Trejos, cuya firma no aparece autenticada, reiteró su solicitud para que se resolviera esta acción.
29.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 13:04 hrs. de 14 de abril de 2010 (folio 321), Edgar Cubero Castro, cuya firma no aparece autenticada, solicitó la pronta resolución de este proceso, pues impide el dictado final de la resolución de un proceso laboral en que es parte.
30.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 7:55 hrs. de 21 de abril de 2010 (folios 325-329), Flor de María Flores Chavarría, cuya firma no aparece autenticada, solicitó el pronto despacho de este proceso y que se declarara sin lugar, pues mantiene paralizados los procesos laborales, en uno de los cuales ella es parte.
31.- Mediante escrito presentado a las 10:53 hrs. de 12 de mayo de 2010 (folio 330), Ana María Madriz Gamboa, reiteró la solicitud de pronto despacho de este proceso.
32.- En la substanciación del proceso se han observado las prescripciones de ley.
Redacta el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo; y,
CONSIDERANDO:
I.- LEGITIMACIÓN Y PROCEDENCIA DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. El numeral 75, párrafo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece como uno de los presupuestos para interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad, en el caso del control concreto, la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver ante los tribunales, inclusive de hábeas corpus o de amparo, o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, como un medio razonable para tutelar la situación jurídica sustancial que se estima lesionada. Al respecto, este Tribunal Constitucional, en la sentencia No. 4190-95 de las 11:33 hrs. del 28 de julio de 1995, indicó lo siguiente:
«(…) En primer término, se trata de un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (…)».
En la acción de inconstitucionalidad No. 08-012174-0007-CO, los gestionantes, originalmente, alegaron estar legitimados para interponer esta acción, señalando, como asuntos base, donde habían invocado la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas, los procesos sustanciados ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, en los expedientes judiciales No. 05-000677-163-CA y No. 000337-163-CA. Sin embargo, posteriormente, atendiendo a la prevención de la Presidencia de esta Sala para que demostraran, mediante copias certificadas, dicha legitimación, omitieron aportar los documentos referidos al primero de dichos procesos y, en su lugar, indicaron el No. 08-000644-1027-CA, interpuesto por Francisco José Hernández Solano contra el Estado. De manera que, mediante resolución de las 11:30 hrs. del 18 de diciembre del 2009 (ver folio 111) se le dio curso a esta acción, con base en los procesos No. 00-000337-0163-CA y No. 08-00644-1027-CA, ambos presentados ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa y en los que se discute sobre la competencia, en razón de la materia, de dicha jurisdicción y en los que, en efecto, se alegó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas aquí impugnadas (copias a folios 59-65 y 67-83). Estando ambos procesos pendientes de resolución, este Tribunal considera que los accionantes sí están legitimados para incoar esta acción de inconstitucionalidad. De otra parte, Manrique Jiménez Meza interpuso la acción de inconstitucionalidad No. 09-008798-0007-CO, acumulada a la presente, en la que aseguró estar legitimado en virtud de haber invocado la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas en el proceso que se tramita bajo el expediente No. 08-000766-1027-CA, lo que, efectivamente demostró (copias a folios 292-293). En otro orden de ideas, ya que, las normas impugnadas son disposiciones de carácter general sí cabe, de conformidad con el artículo 73 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional cuestionarlas en esta vía.
II.- COADYUVANCIAS. De conformidad con el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en los quince días posteriores a la primera publicación del aviso a que alude el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de esta misma ley, “(…) aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, a fin de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa”. En este caso, se presentaron dentro del plazo de ley y, por ende, son admisibles las siguientes tres coadyuvancias activas: Fernando Pérez Morais (folios 167-172), Jorge Fisher Aragón, en representación de Maykel Segura López (folios 173-175), y Eduardo López Arroyo, en representación de Hugo Salas Brenes (folios 179-1783). Se presentaron, además, de manera extemporánea y, por ende, no se admiten, la coadyuvancia activa interpuesta por [Nombre 001] (folio 241) y la coadyuvancia pasiva planteada por Alvin Villavicencio Coronado (folio 242).
III.- OBJETO DE LAS ACCIONES DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD ACUMULADAS. Sendas acciones de inconstitucionalidad coinciden en impugnar en ordinal 3°, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 de 24 de abril de 2006, en cuanto dispone que las pretensiones relacionadas con la conducta administrativa en materia de relaciones de empelo publico, serán de conocimiento de la jurisdicción laboral. Adicionalmente, en la primera acción interpuesta, No. 08-012174-0007-CO, se ataca la jurisprudencia vertida por la Sala Primera de Casación, a la luz del artículo 4°, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa No. 3667 de 12 de marzo de 1966, en cuanto remite a conocimiento y resolución de la jurisdicción laboral cualquier controversia surgida en el seno de una relación de empleo público o estatutaria, por lo que, también, se acciona contra el numeral citado de la derogada Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa.
IV.- REGULACIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVA Y LA ATRIBUCIÓN CONSTITUCIONAL DE UNA COMPETENCIA. El constituyente originario y el poder reformador se ocuparon de definir la competencia material y, por consiguiente, la extensión y alcances de dos jurisdicciones esenciales para el Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho. En efecto, en los ordinales 10 y 48 se establece la competencia material de la jurisdicción constitucional y, en el numeral 49, la de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. Lo anterior deja patente, en la voluntad del constituyente originario y del poder reformador, la trascendencia tanto del control de constitucionalidad como de legalidad de los poderes públicos en aras de garantizar el goce y ejercicio efectivos de los derechos fundamentales y humanos consagrados, respectivamente, en el texto constitucional y los instrumentos del Derecho Internacional Público. Sin duda alguna, tales preceptos constitucionales encarnan lo que la doctrina ha denominado la cláusula regia del Estado Constitucional de Derecho. En lo que se refiere, particularmente, a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, el artículo 49 constitucional, después de la reforma parcial por virtud de la Ley No. 3124 de 25 de junio de 1963, dispone lo siguiente:
“Establécese la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa como atribución del Poder Judicial, con el objeto de garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado, de sus instituciones y de toda otra entidad de derecho público.
La desviación de poder será motivo de impugnación de los actos administrativos.
La ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados”.
A partir de la transcripción literal del precepto constitucional, cabe resaltar lo siguiente:
1°) El constituyente derivado o poder reformador optó por un modelo de justicia administrativa “judicialista”, esto es, encomendándole a un orden jurisdiccional especializado del Poder Judicial la competencia y atribución de ejercer la fiscalización de la legalidad de la función administrativa, esto es, su conformidad sustancial o adecuación con el bloque de legalidad. Este sistema ofrece garantías y ventajas comparativas considerables para el justiciable, tales como la especialización, lo que acompañado de la carrera judicial dispuesta de manera infra-constitucional, representa una verdadera garantía de acierto y de cumplimiento del imperativo constitucional contenido en el ordinal 41 de la Constitución de una “justicia cumplida”.
2°) El poder reformador definió, con meridiana claridad, la competencia material de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, al indicar que su objeto es “garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa” . Cabe acotar que la norma constitucional no distingue, de modo que a ese orden jurisdiccional especializado le compete la fiscalización de cualquier manifestación específica de la función administrativa, sin excepciones. El constituyente derivado consagró, así, una justicia administrativa plenaria y universal, evitando que haya reductos o ámbitos de la función administrativa exentos del control o fiscalización de legalidad. La “función administrativa” es un concepto jurídico indeterminado, empleado por el poder reformador a partir de 1963, que comprende o engloba cualquier manifestación específica o concreta de ésta, esto es, toda conducta administrativa -por acción u omisión- (v. gr. la actividad formal, las actuaciones materiales y las omisiones formales y materiales), así como la figura complementaria, más dinámica y flexible, de la relación jurídica-administrativa.
3°) El constituyente derivado o poder reformador estableció una reserva constitucional de la competencia material de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa al estatuir que su objeto es “garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa”, razón por la cual el legislador ordinario, en el ejercicio de su libertad de conformación o configuración, no puede atribuirle esa competencia a otro orden jurisdiccional que no sea el contencioso-administrativo, puesto que, de ser así, estaría vaciando de contenido la garantía institucional y el derecho fundamental que consagra el artículo 49 de la Constitución. Sobre este punto en particular y, bajo una mejor ponderación, este Tribunal Constitucional varía o revierte la tesis 1994, 7540-94 de las 17:42 hrs. de 21 de diciembre ambos de 1994, 5686-95 de las 15:39 hrs. de 18 de octubre de 1995 y 14999-2007 de las 15:06 hrs. de 17 de octubre de 2007. Lo anterior significa que cuando un justiciable deduce una pretensión para cuestionar la invalidez o disconformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico-administrativo de una conducta administrativa o cualquier manifestación singular de la función administrativa (omisión formal o material, actividad formal o actuación material o relación jurídico-administrativa), debe conocerla y resolverla, indefectiblemente, la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. Obviamente, si la pretensión, por su contenido material, aunque esté relacionada con alguna conducta administrativa o manifestación específica de la función administrativa –en la medida en que interviene un ente u órgano público-, se encuentra regida por el régimen jurídico laboral, de familia o agrario, debe ser conocida y resuelta por esos órganos jurisdiccionales, por cuanto, no se cuestiona, propiamente, conformidad o disconformidad sustancial de la función o conducta administrativa con el ordenamiento jurídico-administrativo que es lo que el artículo 49 constitucional le reserva a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. Este Tribunal Constitucional, estima que los criterios determinantes para deslindar el ámbito competencial de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa de otros ordenes jurisdiccionales especializados –que, en adelante, deben tenerse en consideración por la jurisdicción ordinaria- serán, entonces, los siguientes: 1°) El contenido material o sustancial de la pretensión y 2°) el régimen jurídico aplicable; de modo que si se discute la conformidad o disconformidad sustancial de una manifestación específica de la función administrativa con el bloque de legalidad, el conflicto de interés, será, necesariamente, de conocimiento de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa.
4°) El control de legalidad consagrado en el numeral 49 de la Constitución se proyecta, como se indicó, a toda la función administrativa desplegada por cualquier ente u órgano público, esto es, a todas las administraciones públicas, sin excepción. Por tal razón, el párrafo primero del precepto constitucional objeto de examen concluye con una fórmula residual o general, al indicar que comprende la función desplegada tanto por la administración central –Estado- como por “toda otra entidad de derecho público”.
5°) El constituyente derivado optó por una justicia administrativa mixta, por cuanto, el párrafo primero, al definir el objeto del orden jurisdiccional contencioso-administrativo -“garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa”-, debe complementarse, ineluctablemente, con el párrafo in fine, al preceptuar que ley brindará protección, como mínimo, a los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos –sin distinguir, en cuanto a estos últimos, por lo que resulta admisible la tutela tanto de los personales como de los colectivos, sea corporativos o difusos-. Consecuentemente, la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, según el Derecho de la Constitución, fue instituida tanto para velar por la legalidad de la función administrativa como para la tutela efectiva de las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de los administrados frente a los poderes públicos. Se conjuga, así, constitucionalmente, un rol objetivo y subjetivo de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa.
V.- ALGUNAS CONDUCTAS ADMINISTRATIVAS RELACIONADAS CON UNA RELACIÓN DE EMPLEO PÚBLICO COMO MANIFESTACIÓN ESPECÍFICA DE LA FUNCIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. El artículo 49 constitucional establece una jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa plenaria y universal que le permite al justiciable impugnar o atacar cualquier conducta o manifestación de la función administrativa ante ese orden jurisdiccional. Dentro de las posibles manifestaciones específicas de la función administrativa, constitucionalmente impugnables ante la sede contencioso-administrativa, se encuentran, obviamente, aquellas conductas de las administraciones públicas en el marco o contexto de una relación de empleo público o estatutaria, incuestionablemente, regida por el Derecho Administrativo o de naturaleza jurídico-administrativa, según se desprende de los ordinales 191, 192 de la Constitución, 111 y 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y de la jurisprudencia constitucional que los informa (Votos de este Tribunal Constitucional Nos. 1696-92, 4453-2000, 244-2001 y 14416-2006). Por consiguiente, el legislador ordinario no puede excluir de manera radical -total y absoluta- del conocimiento y resolución de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa toda conducta administrativa en materia de relaciones de empleo público, puesto que, sobre tal extremo no tiene libertad de disposición, por cuanto, lo vincula la competencia material definida y reservada en el artículo 49 constitucional. De lo dicho, tampoco cabe concluir que toda conducta administrativa, en materia de empleo público, debe ser conocida y resuelta ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, por cuanto, habrá pretensiones y extremos que, por su contenido material y el régimen jurídico aplicable, deben ser, inevitablemente, ventilados ante la jurisdicción laboral, por razón de su competencia material específica.
VI.- INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL ARTÍCULO 3°, INCISO A), DEL CÓDIGO PROCESAL CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVO. El numeral 3°, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo (Ley No. 8508 de 24 de abril de 2006), dispone lo siguiente:
“La jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda no conocerá de las pretensiones siguientes:
VII.- INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA SALA PRIMERA DE CASACIÓN EN LA INTERPRETACIÓN Y APLICACIÓN DEL ARTÍCULO 4°, INCISO A), DE LA LEY REGULADORA DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVA AL RESOLVER LOS CONFLICTOS DE COMPETENCIA ENTRE LAS JURISDICCIÓN LABORAL Y CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVA. Los accionantes impugnan, también, por inconstitucional la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de Casación, al fungir como Tribunal de Conflictos de competencia entre la jurisdicción laboral y contencioso-administrativa, y, particularmente, al aplicar el numeral 4, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa. El Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 de 24 de abril de 2006 –entrado en vigencia el 1° de enero de 2008, según la vacatio legis dispuesta en el artículo 222 de ese cuerpo normativo- derogó la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa No. 3667 de 12 de marzo de 1966 (artículo 198 del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), empero, dentro de las disposiciones de Derecho interino del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, los Transitorios III y IV preceptuaron lo siguiente:
“TRANSITORIO III.- El régimen de impugnación de los actos que hayan quedado firmes en la vía administrativa antes de la vigencia del presente Código, se regirá por la legislación vigente en ese momento.
TRANSITORIO IV.- Los procesos contencioso-administrativos y los juicios ordinarios atribuidos a la vía civil de Hacienda, interpuestos con anterioridad a la entrada en vigencia de este Código, cualquiera que sea su estado procesal, continuarán sustanciándose, en todos sus trámites y recursos, por las normas que regían a la fecha de inicio. Para tal efecto, el Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda continuará con el trámite de dichos asuntos hasta su finalización, y el Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo mantendrá las secciones que sean convenientes para conocer de las demandas de impugnación previstas en los artículos 82 a 90 de la Ley reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, y en grado de las resoluciones que dicte el Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda”.
Independientemente, de la interpretación que le haya brindado la jurisdicción ordinaria a estas normas transitorias, lo cierto del caso es que dejan patente la ultra-actividad de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa y de aquellas interpretaciones judiciales, en materia de conflictos de competencia, que se produjeron en el momento procesal oportuno y que, incluso, podrían verificarse en un futuro respecto de los procesos aún en trámite bajo la derogada legislación adjetiva. Por consiguiente, la impugnada es una pauta jurisprudencial que sigue produciendo efectos, sin descartarse la posibilidad que lo haga en un futuro para asuntos iniciados con fundamento en la legislación formal derogada todavía sin fenecer definitivamente. Desde los tempranos Votos Nos. 185-95 de las 16:35 hrs. de 10 de enero de 1995 y 4587-97 de las 15:45 hrs. de 5 de agosto de 1997, este Tribunal Constitucional admitió, por vía de integración normativa, la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los criterios reiterados por los órganos jurisdiccionales que ha creado una pauta jurisprudencial, puesto que, el artículo 3° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que se tendrá por infringida la Constitución cuando esto resulte de la interpretación que hagan las autoridades públicas de las normas jurídicas y de los efectos jurídicos que ésta produzca, todo en concordancia con el objeto supremo de la jurisdicción constitucional de garantizar la supremacía del Derecho de la Constitución (artículos 10 de la Constitución y 1° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). En la especie, se impugna la línea jurisprudencial sentada por la Sala Primera de Casación, que arranca a partir de la resolución No. 607-C-01 de las 10:09 hrs. de 10 de agosto de 2001, al resolver conflictos de competencia entre la jurisdicción laboral y contencioso-administrativa y remitir el asunto a la primera, aún cuando se trata de pretensiones materialmente regidas por el Derecho Administrativo (v. gr. nulidad de un acto de despido, reinstalación y pago de daños y perjuicios), al estimar, grosso modo, que cualquier controversia que se genere en las relaciones de empleo público es “de índole netamente laboral”. Para tal efecto, se aporta copia de las siguientes resoluciones de esa instancia judicial: 770-C-2001 de las 9:51 hrs. de 3 de octubre de 2001, 478-C-2005 de las 9:40 hrs. de 7 de julio de 2005, 742-C-2006 de las 10:05 hrs. de 5 de octubre de 2006 y 769-C-2007 de las 15:20 hrs. de 31 de octubre de 2007, con lo cual se tiene por cumplido el requisito de acreditar la pauta jurisprudencial. A tenor de las consideraciones vertidas en los considerandos precedentes, es evidente que la línea jurisprudencial de la Sala Primera de Casación que dispuso, antes de la entrada en vigencia del nuevo Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, y en aplicación de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, remitir a la vía laboral cualquier proceso en el que se deduzca una pretensión dentro del marco de una relación estatutaria, por considerarla una controversia de “índole netamente laboral”, resulta, a toda luces, inconstitucional al quebrantar el artículo 49 de la Constitución. En efecto, tal y como se señaló, habrá pretensiones que, por su carácter material o sustancial y el régimen jurídico aplicable, aunque deducidas en el contexto de una relación de empleo público, deben ser conocidas y resueltas, por imperativo constitucional (artículo 49 de la Constitución), por la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, esto es, todas aquellas en las que un funcionario o servidor público cuestione la conformidad sustancial o validez de cualquier manifestación específica de la función administrativa o conducta administrativa con el ordenamiento jurídico-administrativo.
VIII.- INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD ADUCIDA DEL ARTÍCULO 4°, INCISO A), DE LA LEY REGULADORA DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVA. El artículo 4°, inciso a), de la derogada Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (No. 3667 de 12 de marzo de 1966) que todavía sigue produciendo efectos jurídicos en los procesos incoados antes de la entrada en vigor del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, disponía lo siguiente:
“No corresponderán a la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa:
IX.- COROLARIO. En mérito de las razones expuestas se impone declarar parcialmente con lugar las acciones de inconstitucionalidad acumuladas, según se indica en la parte dispositiva.
POR TANTO:
Se declaran parcialmente con lugar las acciones acumuladas. Se declara inconstitucional el artículo 3°, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo (Ley No. 8508 de 28 de abril de 2006) y la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de Casación de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que, en aplicación del artículo 4°, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, remitía a la jurisdicción laboral cualquier controversia relacionada con una relación de empleo público al considerarla “netamente laboral”, aunque el justiciable pretendiera, materialmente, impugnar la disconformidad sustancial o invalidez de una conducta administrativa o manifestación específica de la función administrativa con el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo, surgida en una relación estatutaria. En cuanto a la impugnación del artículo 4°, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa se desestiman las acciones acumuladas. Esta declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de la norma y la jurisprudencia impugnadas, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe, las relaciones y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas por prescripción, caducidad o sentencia pasada en autoridad de cosa juzgada material. Publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial y reséñese en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Notifíquese a la Procuraduría General de la República, los accionantes, los coadyuvantes y las autoridades judiciales que conocen del asunto previo. Comuníquese a la presidencia de la Asamblea Legislativa y de la Sala Primera de Casación de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.
Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
801/199/ibj.-
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