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Res. 09928-2010 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 09/06/2010
OutcomeResultado
The Chamber held unconstitutional Article 3(a) of the CPCA and the case law of the First Chamber that referred all public-employment disputes to the labor courts, but dismissed the challenge to the repealed law's Article 4(a) as capable of constitutionally conforming interpretation.La Sala declaró inconstitucional el artículo 3, inciso a), del CPCA y la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera que remitía a la vía laboral cualquier controversia de empleo público, pero desestimó la impugnación del artículo 4, inciso a), de la ley derogada por considerarlo susceptible de interpretación conforme con la Constitución.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber consolidated two actions of unconstitutionality against Article 3(a) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code and the case law of the First Chamber that, under the old law, systematically referred to labor courts actions seeking annulment of administrative acts arising from public employment relationships. The Court held that Article 49 of the Constitution exclusively reserves to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction the review of the legality of all administrative activity, including conduct occurring within a statutory relationship. The radical exclusion in the Code emptied this institutional guarantee of its content, and was therefore declared unconstitutional. It also struck down the case law that labeled any public-employment dispute as “purely labor.” It clarified that jurisdiction is determined by the substantive content of the claim and the applicable legal regime: challenges to the substantial conformity of administrative conduct with the legal framework belong to the contentious-administrative venue; typically labor claims (bonuses, vacation, severance pay) remain with the labor courts. The old Regulatory Law itself was not annulled, as it allowed for a constitutionally conforming interpretation. The ruling has retroactive effect to the effective date of the annulled provision and case law, without prejudice to good-faith vested rights and settled legal situations.La Sala Constitucional acumuló dos acciones de inconstitucionalidad contra el artículo 3, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo y contra la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera que, basada en la antigua ley, remitía sistemáticamente a la jurisdicción laboral las pretensiones de nulidad de actos administrativos surgidos en relaciones de empleo público. El Tribunal determinó que el artículo 49 constitucional reserva exclusivamente a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa la fiscalización de la legalidad de la función administrativa, incluidas las conductas que se produzcan en el marco de una relación estatutaria. Estimó que la exclusión radical del CPCA vacía de contenido esa garantía institucional, por lo que lo declaró inconstitucional. También declaró inconstitucional la jurisprudencia que calificaba cualquier controversia derivada del empleo público como “netamente laboral”. Precisó que la competencia se define según el contenido material de la pretensión y el régimen jurídico aplicable: si se cuestiona la conformidad sustancial de la conducta administrativa con el bloque de legalidad, corresponde a la jurisdicción contenciosa; si la pretensión es típicamente laboral (aguinaldo, vacaciones, cesantía), corresponde a la jurisdicción de trabajo. La antigua Ley Reguladora no fue anulada en sí misma, pues admitía una interpretación conforme con la Constitución. La sentencia tiene efectos retroactivos a la vigencia de la norma y jurisprudencia anuladas, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas.
Key excerptExtracto clave
The challenged provision radically and absolutely —without exception— excludes from the jurisdiction and decision of the contentious-administrative courts any claim related to administrative conduct within a statutory relationship, thereby flagrantly violating the Law of the Constitution and, in particular, Article 49, which exclusively reserves to that jurisdictional venue, as its material competence, the duty to “guarantee the legality of the administrative function.” The challenged statutory text, by its closed literal wording, does not permit an interpretation consistent with the Law of the Constitution and the necessary distinction between claims that, by their material content and applicable legal regime, must be heard and decided by either the contentious-administrative or the labor jurisdiction. (…) Indeed, as noted, there are claims that, by their substantive character and applicable legal regime, even if brought within the context of a public-employment relationship, must be heard and decided, by constitutional imperative (Article 49 of the Constitution), by the contentious-administrative courts — that is, all those in which a public official challenges the substantial conformity or validity of any specific manifestation of the administrative function or administrative conduct with the administrative legal system.El precepto impugnado excluye de manera radical y absoluta –sin excepción- del conocimiento y resolución de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, toda pretensión relacionada con la conducta administrativa en el marco de una relación estatutaria, con lo cual transgrede, palmariamente, el Derecho de la Constitución y, particularmente, el artículo 49 constitucional que le reservó exclusivamente, como competencia material, a ese orden jurisdiccional “garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa”. El texto legislativo impugnado no admite, por su tenor literal cerrado, una interpretación conforme con el Derecho de la Constitución y la necesaria distinción entre pretensiones que, por su contenido material y el régimen jurídico aplicable, deben ser de conocimiento y resolución, sea de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa o de la laboral. (…) En efecto, tal y como se señaló, habrá pretensiones que, por su carácter material o sustancial y el régimen jurídico aplicable, aunque deducidas en el contexto de una relación de empleo público, deben ser conocidas y resueltas, por imperativo constitucional (artículo 49 de la Constitución), por la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, esto es, todas aquellas en las que un funcionario o servidor público cuestione la conformidad sustancial o validez de cualquier manifestación específica de la función administrativa o conducta administrativa con el ordenamiento jurídico-administrativo.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El constituyente derivado o poder reformador estableció una reserva constitucional de la competencia material de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa al estatuir que su objeto es “garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa”, razón por la cual el legislador ordinario, en el ejercicio de su libertad de conformación o configuración, no puede atribuirle esa competencia a otro orden jurisdiccional que no sea el contencioso-administrativo, puesto que, de ser así, estaría vaciando de contenido la garantía institucional y el derecho fundamental que consagra el artículo 49 de la Constitución."
"The derived constituent power established a constitutional reservation of the material competence of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction by providing that its purpose is to “guarantee the legality of the administrative function,” whereby the ordinary legislator, in the exercise of its freedom to shape or configure the law, may not assign that competence to any jurisdictional order other than the contentious-administrative one, since doing so would empty of content the institutional guarantee and fundamental right enshrined in Article 49 of the Constitution."
Considerando IV
"El constituyente derivado o poder reformador estableció una reserva constitucional de la competencia material de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa al estatuir que su objeto es “garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa”, razón por la cual el legislador ordinario, en el ejercicio de su libertad de conformación o configuración, no puede atribuirle esa competencia a otro orden jurisdiccional que no sea el contencioso-administrativo, puesto que, de ser así, estaría vaciando de contenido la garantía institucional y el derecho fundamental que consagra el artículo 49 de la Constitución."
Considerando IV
"Este Tribunal Constitucional, estima que los criterios determinantes para deslindar el ámbito competencial de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa de otros ordenes jurisdiccionales especializados serán, entonces, los siguientes: 1°) El contenido material o sustancial de la pretensión y 2°) el régimen jurídico aplicable; de modo que si se discute la conformidad o disconformidad sustancial de una manifestación específica de la función administrativa con el bloque de legalidad, el conflicto de interés, será, necesariamente, de conocimiento de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa."
"This Constitutional Court considers that the determining criteria for delimiting the jurisdictional scope of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction from other specialized jurisdictional orders will henceforth be the following: (1) the material or substantive content of the claim, and (2) the applicable legal regime; so that if the substantial conformity or non-conformity of a specific manifestation of the administrative function with the rule-of-law block is at issue, the dispute must necessarily be heard by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction."
Considerando IV
"Este Tribunal Constitucional, estima que los criterios determinantes para deslindar el ámbito competencial de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa de otros ordenes jurisdiccionales especializados serán, entonces, los siguientes: 1°) El contenido material o sustancial de la pretensión y 2°) el régimen jurídico aplicable; de modo que si se discute la conformidad o disconformidad sustancial de una manifestación específica de la función administrativa con el bloque de legalidad, el conflicto de interés, será, necesariamente, de conocimiento de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa."
Considerando IV
"La jurisdicción laboral deberá conocer y resolver –aunque el tema se encuentre relacionado con la conducta o función administrativa ejercida por un ente público- extremos típica o materialmente laborales, tales como la procedencia o no y el cálculo para el pago del aguinaldo, vacaciones, preaviso y auxilio de cesantía, lo concerniente al reconocimiento de una jubilación o pensión o los riesgos profesionales, las controversias que se susciten en el ámbito del Derecho laboral individual y colectivo."
"The labor jurisdiction shall hear and decide —even if the matter is related to the administrative conduct or function exercised by a public entity— typically or materially labor matters, such as the propriety or not and the calculation for payment of the Christmas bonus, vacation, notice and severance aid, matters concerning the recognition of a pension or retirement, occupational hazards, and disputes arising in the field of individual and collective labor law."
Considerando VI
"La jurisdicción laboral deberá conocer y resolver –aunque el tema se encuentre relacionado con la conducta o función administrativa ejercida por un ente público- extremos típica o materialmente laborales, tales como la procedencia o no y el cálculo para el pago del aguinaldo, vacaciones, preaviso y auxilio de cesantía, lo concerniente al reconocimiento de una jubilación o pensión o los riesgos profesionales, las controversias que se susciten en el ámbito del Derecho laboral individual y colectivo."
Considerando VI
Full documentDocumento completo
CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours on June ninth, two thousand ten.
Consolidated actions of unconstitutionality, the first (No. 08-012174-0007-CO), filed by CÉSAR HINES CÉSPEDES, identity card No. 7-061-989, ENRIQUE ROJAS FRANCO, identity card No. 1-390-1250, and DIEGO MOYA MEZA, identity card No. 1-1065-0968, against the case law of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that remits, based on subject matter, to the labor jurisdiction, proceedings whose object is the nullity of administrative acts connected to a public employment relationship issued based on Article 4, subsection a), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, which provision is also challenged, and, by connection, against Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 25, 2006, insofar as it excludes public employment matters from the cognizance of said jurisdiction; the second action (No. 09-008798-0007-CO), filed by MANRIQUE JIMÉNEZ MEZA, identity card No. 1-487-250, against subsection a) of Article 3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 25, 2006, and, subsidiarily, against the interpretation that the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has given in favor of remitting public employment matters to the labor jurisdiction. Also participating in the action are the PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA and the INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE VIVIENDA Y URBANISMO.
WHEREAS:
Judge Jinesta Lobo is the Rapporteur; and,
CONSIDERING:
Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes as one of the requirements for filing an action of unconstitutionality, in the case of concrete review, the existence of a matter pending resolution before the courts, including habeas corpus or amparo, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, as a reasonable means to protect the substantial legal situation that is deemed harmed. In this regard, this Constitutional Tribunal, in judgment No. 4190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, indicated the following:
«(…) In the first place, it is a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution —whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route— is required to access the constitutional forum, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the principal matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Tribunal has a positive or negative impact on said pending proceeding, since it rules on the constitutionality of the provisions that must be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this forum —requirements of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (…)».
In the action of unconstitutionality No. 08-012174-0007-CO, the claimants originally claimed standing to file this action, citing, as base matters where they had invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions, the proceedings conducted before the administrative jurisdiction, in judicial files No. 05-000677-163-CA and No. 000337-163-CA. However, subsequently, in response to the warning from the Presidency of this Chamber to demonstrate, by means of certified copies, said standing, they omitted to provide the documents referring to the first of said proceedings and, instead, indicated No. 08-000644-1027-CA, filed by Francisco José Hernández Solano against the State. Thus, by resolution of 11:30 a.m. on December 18, 2009 (see folio 111), leave was granted for this action, based on proceedings No. 00-000337-0163-CA and No. 08-00644-1027-CA, both filed before the administrative jurisdiction and in which the competence, based on subject matter, of said jurisdiction is discussed, and in which, in effect, the unconstitutionality of the provisions challenged here was alleged (copies at folios 59-65 and 67-83).
Both proceedings being pending resolution, this Tribunal considers that the claimants do have standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality. On the other hand, Manrique Jiménez Meza filed action of unconstitutionality No. 09-008798-0007-CO, consolidated with the present one, in which he claimed standing by virtue of having invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions in the proceeding being conducted under file No. 08-000766-1027-CA, which he effectively demonstrated (copies at folios 292-293). In another vein, since the challenged provisions are general provisions, it is possible, in accordance with Article 73 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, to challenge them through this forum.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of this same law, “(…) those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to assist in the arguments that may justify its admissibility or inadmissibility or to expand, as applicable, the grounds of unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them.” In this case, the following three active joint appearances were filed within the legal period and, therefore, are admissible: Fernando Pérez Morais (folios 167-172), Jorge Fisher Aragón, representing Maykel Segura López (folios 173-175), and Eduardo López Arroyo, representing Hugo Salas Brenes (folios 179-1783). Also filed, in an untimely manner, and, therefore, not admitted, are the active joint appearance filed by [Name 001] (folio 241) and the passive joint appearance raised by Alvin Villavicencio Coronado (folio 242).
Both actions of unconstitutionality coincide in challenging Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006, insofar as it provides that claims related to administrative conduct in matters of public employment relations shall fall under the cognizance of the labor jurisdiction. Additionally, in the first action filed, No. 08-012174-0007-CO, the case law rendered by the First Chamber of Cassation is attacked, in light of Article 4, subsection a), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa No.
3667 of March 12, 1966, insofar as it refers any controversy arising within a public or statutory employment relationship to the knowledge and resolution of the labor jurisdiction, which is why the cited provision of the repealed Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction is also challenged.
The original constituent and the reform power addressed defining the material competence and, consequently, the extension and scope of two jurisdictions essential to the Social and Democratic Rule of Law. Indeed, provisions 10 and 48 establish the material competence of the constitutional jurisdiction and, in provision 49, that of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. This makes manifest, in the will of the original constituent and the reform power, the transcendence of both the control of constitutionality and of legality of the public powers in order to guarantee the effective enjoyment and exercise of the fundamental and human rights enshrined, respectively, in the constitutional text and the instruments of Public International Law. Without any doubt, such constitutional precepts embody what doctrine has called the sovereign clause of the Constitutional Rule of Law. With regard, particularly, to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, Article 49 of the Constitution, after the partial reform by virtue of Law No. 3124 of June 25, 1963, provides as follows:
“The contentious-administrative jurisdiction is established as an attribution of the Judicial Power, with the object of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and any other public law entity.
Deviation of power shall be grounds for challenging administrative acts.
The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the governed parties.” From the literal transcription of the constitutional precept, the following can be highlighted:
1°) The derived constituent or reform power opted for a “judicialist” model of administrative justice, that is, entrusting a specialized jurisdictional order of the Judicial Power with the competence and attribution to exercise oversight of the legality of the administrative function, that is, its substantial conformity or adaptation to the block of legality. This system offers considerable guarantees and comparative advantages for the individual seeking justice, such as specialization, which, accompanied by the judicial career established infra-constitutionally, represents a true guarantee of correctness and of compliance with the constitutional imperative contained in provision 41 of the Constitution of "full justice." 2°) The reform power defined, with clear clarity, the material competence of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, indicating that its object is "to guarantee the legality of the administrative function." It should be noted that the constitutional norm does not distinguish, so that this specialized jurisdictional order is responsible for the oversight of any specific manifestation of the administrative function, without exceptions.
The derived constituent thus enshrined a plenary and universal administrative justice, preventing any redoubts or areas of the administrative function from being exempt from the control or oversight of legality. The "administrative function" is an indeterminate legal concept, used by the reform power since 1963, which comprises or encompasses any specific or concrete manifestation thereof, that is, any administrative conduct - by action or omission - (e.g., formal activity, material actions, and formal and material omissions), as well as the complementary, more dynamic and flexible figure of the administrative-legal relationship.
3°) The derived constituent or reform power established a constitutional reservation of the material competence of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction by decreeing that its object is "to guarantee the legality of the administrative function," which is why the ordinary legislator, in the exercise of its freedom of conformation or configuration, cannot attribute that competence to another jurisdictional order that is not the contentious-administrative one, since, if it did so, it would be emptying the institutional guarantee and the fundamental right enshrined in Article 49 of the Constitution of its content. On this particular point and, upon better consideration, this Constitutional Court varies or reverses the thesis set forth in Votes Nos. 3095-94 of 15:57 hrs. of August 3, 1994, 7540-94 of 17:42 hrs. of December 21, both of 1994, 5686-95 of 15:39 hrs. of October 18, 1995, and 14999-2007 of 15:06 hrs. of October 17, 2007.
The foregoing means that when a claimant pursues a claim to question the invalidity or substantial non-conformity with the administrative-legal order of an administrative conduct or any singular manifestation of the administrative function (formal or material omission, formal activity or material action, or administrative-legal relationship), the contentious-administrative jurisdiction must necessarily hear and resolve it. Obviously, if the claim, by its material content, even if related to some administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function – insofar as a public entity or organ is involved – is governed by the labor, family, or agrarian legal regime, it must be heard and resolved by those jurisdictional organs, because it does not, properly speaking, question the substantial conformity or non-conformity of the administrative function or conduct with the administrative-legal order, which is what Article 49 of the Constitution reserves for the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.
This Constitutional Court considers that the determining criteria for delimiting the competential scope of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction from other specialized jurisdictional orders – which, henceforth, must be taken into consideration by the ordinary jurisdiction – will be, then, the following: 1°) The material or substantial content of the claim and 2°) the applicable legal regime; so that if the substantial conformity or non-conformity of a specific manifestation of the administrative function with the block of legality is discussed, the conflict of interest will, necessarily, be heard by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.
4°) The control of legality enshrined in provision 49 of the Constitution is projected, as indicated, to the entire administrative function carried out by any public entity or organ, that is, to all public administrations, without exception. For this reason, the first paragraph of the constitutional precept under examination concludes with a residual or general formula, indicating that it comprises the function carried out both by the central administration – State – and by "any other public law entity." 5°) The derived constituent opted for a mixed administrative justice, because the first paragraph, by defining the object of the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order - "to guarantee the legality of the administrative function" -, must be complemented, ineluctably, with the final paragraph, when it prescribes that the law shall provide protection, at a minimum, to subjective rights and legitimate interests – without distinguishing, regarding the latter, so that the protection of both personal and collective interests, whether corporate or diffuse, is admissible.
Consequently, the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, according to the Law of the Constitution, was instituted both to ensure the legality of the administrative function and for the effective protection of the substantial legal situations of the governed parties against the public powers. Thus, constitutionally, an objective and subjective role of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction is combined.
V.CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCTS RELATED TO A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AS A SPECIFIC MANIFESTATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION. Article 49 of the Constitution establishes a plenary and universal contentious-administrative jurisdiction that allows the claimant to impugn or attack any conduct or manifestation of the administrative function before that jurisdictional order. Among the possible specific manifestations of the administrative function, constitutionally challengeable before the contentious-administrative venue, are, obviously, those conducts of the public administrations within the framework or context of a public or statutory employment relationship, unquestionably governed by Administrative Law or of an administrative-legal nature, as can be deduced from provisions 191, 192 of the Constitution, 111 and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, and the constitutional case law that informs them (Votes of this Constitutional Court Nos. 1696-92, 4453-2000, 244-2001, and 14416-2006).
Consequently, the ordinary legislator cannot radically exclude - totally and absolutely - from the knowledge and resolution of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction all administrative conduct in the matter of public employment relationships, since, on such a point, it has no freedom of disposition, because it is bound by the material competence defined and reserved in Article 49 of the Constitution. From the foregoing, one cannot conclude either that all administrative conduct, in public employment matters, must be heard and resolved before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, because there will be claims and points that, due to their material content and the applicable legal regime, must, inevitably, be ventilated before the labor jurisdiction, by reason of its specific material competence.
Provision 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006), provides as follows:
“The Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction shall not hear the following claims:
As noted supra, when the claimant seeks to discuss the substantial non-conformity or invalidity of an administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function with the administrative-legal order, the matter must be ventilated, owing to the reservation and constitutional imperative of Article 49, before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In essence, the claimant has the constitutional guarantee to challenge any conduct that is a manifestation of the administrative function before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, it being the case that there are conducts that occur within a public employment relationship that are a specific expression of the general concept of the "administrative function." On the other hand, there will be claims that, due to their substantial content and the applicable legal regime, must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, given its competential specialty and the need to apply, to the specific case, the dogmatic categories, institutions, institutes, principles, and particular hermeneutic tools of that legal discipline.
Thus, by way of example and without claiming exhaustiveness, the labor jurisdiction must hear and resolve – even if the issue is related to the administrative conduct or function exercised by a public entity – matters that are typically or materially labor-related, such as the appropriateness or not and the calculation for the payment of the Christmas bonus, vacations, notice, and severance pay, matters concerning the recognition of retirement or a pension or occupational hazards, controversies that arise in the field of individual and collective Labor Law (e.g., socio-economic conflicts), everything related to the exercise of the right to strike or work stoppage, etc. In the same vein, it must be recognized that in the case of employees tasked with activities subject to the ordinary law of public enterprises or of economic services carried out by a public administration, or simple laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the respective public entity, that is, those doctrine calls "workers of the public administration," the controversies arising must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, since it does not involve, in the strict sense, a public official, servant, or employee (Articles 111, paragraph 2, and 112, paragraph 2, of the General Law of Public Administration), given that any conduct emanating from the public entity, in such a context, will not be subject to the administrative legal regime, nor can it be materially deemed an administrative-legal relationship.
It is necessary to emphasize that the constituent opted for jurisdictional orders specialized by subject matter – at least up to a certain instance – as a guarantee of correctness and a means for achieving the constitutional imperative of prompt and full justice. While Article 41 of the Constitution enshrines the general right of access to the jurisdiction, later provisions 10, 48, 49, 70, and 153 of the fundamental norm clearly opt for the establishment of specialized jurisdictions. So that the claimant has the right to choose before which jurisdictional order it brings action, as long as the material nature of the claim and the applicable legal regime are congruent with the specialty – constitutional or legal – of the respective jurisdiction. This Constitutional Court does not overlook that in judicial practice, due to inadequate or defective representation or legal advice, claimants may make mistakes when bringing a claim or when combining them before a determined jurisdictional order; however, in such cases, the jurisdictional organ must proceed, with due promptness and procedural economy, to disaggregate the claims that, due to their substantial content and the applicable legal regime, should not be ventilated in that venue, as well as to give swift course to the admissible ones, if no other cause prevents it.
In the same sense, upon the emergence of any conflict of competence, the jurisdictional organs involved and the First Chamber of Cassation, insofar as it serves as the Court of Conflicts between the contentious-administrative and labor jurisdictions, must be particularly diligent in processing and settling it to avoid any undue delay or unjustified postponement that significantly affects the fundamental right to prompt justice (Article 41 of the Constitution) or the human right contained in the American Convention to a process within a reasonable time (Article 8.1).
VII.UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE FIRST CHAMBER OF CASSATION IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A), OF THE LAW REGULATING THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION WHEN RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF COMPETENCE BETWEEN THE LABOR AND CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTIONS. The claimants also challenge as unconstitutional the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation, when acting as the Court of Conflicts of competence between the labor and contentious-administrative jurisdictions, and, particularly, when applying provision 4, subsection a), of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. The Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006 – entered into force on January 1, 2008, according to the vacatio legis provided in Article 222 of that normative body – repealed the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction No. 3667 of March 12, 1966 (Article 198 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code), however, within the interim law provisions of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, Transitory Provisions III and IV prescribed the following:
“TRANSITORY III.- The regime for challenging acts that have become final in the administrative channel before the entry into force of this Code shall be governed by the legislation in force at that time.
TRANSITORY IV.- Contentious-administrative proceedings and ordinary civil lawsuits attributed to the civil treasury jurisdiction, filed prior to the entry into force of this Code, whatever their procedural status, shall continue to be processed, in all their procedures and appeals, according to the norms that governed at the date of filing. For this purpose, the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court shall continue with the processing of said matters until their conclusion, and the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal shall maintain the sections that are convenient to hear the impugnment lawsuits provided for in Articles 82 to 90 of the Law regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, and on appeal against the resolutions issued by the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court.” Independently of the interpretation that the ordinary jurisdiction may have given to these transitory norms, the truth of the matter is that they make manifest the ultra-activity of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction and of those judicial interpretations, in matters of competence conflicts, that were produced at the appropriate procedural moment and that could even be verified in the future regarding proceedings still pending under the repealed procedural legislation.
Consequently, what is challenged is a case law pattern that continues to produce effects, without discarding the possibility that it may do so in the future for matters initiated under the formally repealed legislation not yet definitively concluded. Since the early Votes Nos. 185-95 of 16:35 hrs. of January 10, 1995, and 4587-97 of 15:45 hrs. of August 5, 1997, this Constitutional Court admitted, by way of normative integration, the unconstitutionality action against repeated criteria by jurisdictional organs that have created a case law pattern, given that Article 3 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes that the Constitution shall be considered infringed when this results from the interpretation made by public authorities of legal norms and the legal effects they produce, all in accordance with the supreme object of the constitutional jurisdiction to guarantee the supremacy of the Law of the Constitution (Articles 10 of the Constitution and 1 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction).
In the present case, the case law line established by the First Chamber of Cassation is challenged, starting from Resolution No. 607-C-01 of 10:09 hrs. of August 10, 2001, when resolving conflicts of competence between the labor and contentious-administrative jurisdictions and referring the matter to the former, even when it involves claims materially governed by Administrative Law (e.g., nullity of a dismissal act, reinstatement, and payment of damages), considering, broadly, that any controversy generated in public employment relationships is "of a purely labor nature." For this purpose, a copy of the following resolutions from that judicial instance is provided: 770-C-2001 of 9:51 hrs. of October 3, 2001, 478-C-2005 of 9:40 hrs. of July 7, 2005, 742-C-2006 of 10:05 hrs. of October 5, 2006, and 769-C-2007 of 15:20 hrs. of October 31, 2007, whereby the requirement to accredit the case law pattern is deemed fulfilled.
In light of the considerations expressed in the preceding whereas clauses, it is evident that the case law line of the First Chamber of Cassation that ordered, before the entry into force of the new Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code and in application of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, to refer to the labor channel any proceeding in which a claim is brought within the framework of a statutory relationship, considering it a controversy of a "purely labor nature," is, by all lights, unconstitutional for violating Article 49 of the Constitution. Indeed, as indicated, there will be claims that, due to their material or substantial nature and the applicable legal regime, although brought in the context of a public employment relationship, must be heard and resolved, by constitutional imperative (Article 49 of the Constitution), by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, that is, all those in which a public official or servant questions the substantial conformity or validity of any specific manifestation of the administrative function or administrative conduct with the administrative-legal order.
VIII.ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A), OF THE LAW REGULATING THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION. Article 4, subsection a), of the repealed Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), which still continues to produce legal effects in proceedings initiated before the entry into force of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, provided as follows:
“The following shall not pertain to the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction:
Consequently, Article 4, subsection a), of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction had a more elastic content or a more open texture – in contrast to the rigidity and radicalness of Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code – that allowed interpretations in conformity with the Law of the Constitution and, in particular, with what is provided in Article 49 of the Constitution. In sum, from the challenged legislative text, it is possible to distinguish, with clear clarity, two types of claims – according to their material or substantial content and the applicable legal regime –, that is, those aimed at questioning the validity or substantial conformity of an administrative conduct with the administrative legal order and those that, although related to the formal conduct of public administrations – given the eminently reviewing or objective nature of the administrative justice model established in the 1966 Law –, which, by their materiality and the applicable legal regime, must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction as they are governed by Labor Law – individual or collective.
Due to the binding nature that even the whereas part of constitutional judgments has, the First Chamber of Cassation must, henceforth, if it has to apply Article 4, subsection a), of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, take note of the reasons stated in this judgment to reverse the case law or interpretive line now declared unconstitutional, admitting the interpretation in conformity with Article 49 of the Constitution of the challenged legal provision. For these reasons, this Chamber considers that the challenged norm is not, in itself, unconstitutional, so that this point must be dismissed. What is unconstitutional, as noted in the preceding whereas clause, is the interpretation of the norm made by the First Chamber of Cassation since the year 2001.
By virtue of the reasons stated, it is necessary to declare the accumulated unconstitutionality actions partially granted, as indicated in the operative part.
THEREFORE:
The accumulated actions are partially granted. Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Law No. 8508 of April 28, 2006) is declared unconstitutional, as is the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation of the Supreme Court of Justice which, in application of Article 4, subsection a), of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, referred any controversy related to a public employment relationship to the labor jurisdiction considering it "purely labor," even if the claimant materially sought to challenge the substantial non-conformity or invalidity of an administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function with the administrative legal order, arising in a statutory relationship. As for the challenge of Article 4, subsection a), of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the accumulated actions are dismissed.
This declaration of unconstitutionality has declaratory and retroactive effects to the date the challenged norm and jurisprudence came into force, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, or legal relationships and situations consolidated by statute of limitations (prescripción), expiration (caducidad), or a judgment having the authority of material res judicata (sentencia pasada en autoridad de cosa juzgada material). Publish it in its entirety in the Boletín Judicial and summarize it in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Notify the Procuraduría General de la República, the plaintiffs, the coadjuvants, and the judicial authorities hearing the underlying matter. Communicate to the presidency of the Asamblea Legislativa and of the Sala Primera de Casación of the Corte Suprema de Justicia.
Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
801/199/ibj.- He added, finally, that to start dogmatically from the premise that any and all administrative conduct or legal-administrative relationship related to public employment is, imperatively, the exclusive purview of labor jurisdictional competence, also contradicts the principle of swift and complete justice and the rights of those seeking justice who may pursue, in one jurisdiction or the other, labor matters or perhaps administrative dispute matters. For this reason, he principally requests the unconstitutionality of Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. In the alternative, he alleged the unconstitutionality of the interpretation that the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia has given in favor of referring public employment matters to the labor jurisdiction, for which purpose he cited rulings 742-C-2006 of 10:05 a.m. on October 5, 2006, 607-C-01 of 10:09 a.m. on August 10, 2001, and 769-C-2007 of 3:20 p.m. on October 31, 2007.
Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,
CONSIDERING:
Section 75, paragraph 1, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes, as one of the prerequisites for filing an action of unconstitutionality, in the case of concrete review, the existence of a matter pending resolution before the courts, including habeas corpus or amparo, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue, as a reasonable means to protect the substantial legal situation deemed injured. In this regard, this Constitutional Court, in ruling No. 4190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, stated the following:
"(...) Firstly, it is a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution - whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue - is required to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on that pending proceeding, since it pronounces on the constitutionality of the rules that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does legislation allow direct access to this avenue - prerequisites of paragraphs two and three of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (...)".
In the action of unconstitutionality No. 08-012174-0007-CO, the claimants originally claimed to have standing to file this action, indicating, as base cases where they had invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged rules, the proceedings conducted before the administrative dispute jurisdiction, in court files No. 05-000677-163-CA and No. 000337-163-CA. However, subsequently, in response to the warning from the Presidency of this Chamber to demonstrate such standing through certified copies, they failed to provide the documents referring to the first of those proceedings and, instead, indicated No. 08-000644-1027-CA, filed by Francisco José Hernández Solano against the State. Therefore, by resolution of 11:30 a.m. on December 18, 2009 (see folio 111), this action was admitted, based on proceedings No. 00-000337-0163-CA and No. 08-00644-1027-CA, both filed before the administrative dispute jurisdiction and in which the subject-matter competence of said jurisdiction is discussed, and in which, in effect, the unconstitutionality of the rules challenged here was alleged (copies at folios 59-65 and 67-83).
As both proceedings are pending resolution, this Court considers that the claimants do have standing to initiate this action of unconstitutionality. On the other hand, Manrique Jiménez Meza filed the action of unconstitutionality No. 09-008798-0007-CO, joined to the present one, in which he asserted standing by virtue of having invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged rules in the proceeding processed under file No. 08-000766-1027-CA, which he duly demonstrated (copies at folios 292-293). In another vein, since the challenged rules are general provisions, they are indeed subject to challenge in this avenue, in accordance with Article 73 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, within the fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of this same law, "(...) those with a legitimate interest may appear within it, in order to coadyuvate in the arguments that could justify its admissibility or inadmissibility or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds for unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that interests them." In this case, the following three active coadjuvancies were filed within the legal deadline and are, therefore, admissible: Fernando Pérez Morais (folios 167-172), Jorge Fisher Aragón, on behalf of Maykel Segura López (folios 173-175), and Eduardo López Arroyo, on behalf of Hugo Salas Brenes (folios 179-1783). Furthermore, filed extemporaneously and, therefore, not admitted, are the active coadjuvancy filed by [Name 001] (folio 241) and the passive coadjuvancy brought by Alvin Villavicencio Coronado (folio 242).
Both actions of unconstitutionality coincide in challenging Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006, inasmuch as it provides that claims related to administrative conduct in the area of public employment relations shall be heard by the labor jurisdiction. Additionally, in the first action filed, No. 08-012174-0007-CO, the jurisprudence handed down by the Sala Primera de Casación is challenged, in light of Article 4, subsection a), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa No. 3667 of March 12, 1966, inasmuch as it refers any dispute arising within a public or statutory employment relationship to the knowledge and resolution of the labor jurisdiction; therefore, the cited section of the repealed Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa is also challenged.
The original framer of the Constitution and the amending power undertook to define the subject-matter competence and, consequently, the extension and scope of two jurisdictions essential to the Social and Democratic Rule of Law. Indeed, in sections 10 and 48, the subject-matter competence of the constitutional jurisdiction is established, and in section 49, that of the administrative dispute jurisdiction. The foregoing makes evident, in the will of the original framer and of the amending power, the transcendence of both the control of constitutionality and of the legality of public powers for the sake of guaranteeing the effective enjoyment and exercise of the fundamental and human rights enshrined, respectively, in the constitutional text and in the instruments of Public International Law. Without a doubt, such constitutional precepts embody what legal doctrine has called the regal clause of the Constitutional Rule of Law. With regard, particularly, to the administrative dispute jurisdiction, Article 49 of the Constitution, after the partial reform by virtue of Law No. 3124 of June 25, 1963, provides the following:
"The administrative dispute jurisdiction is established as an attribution of the Judicial Branch, with the purpose of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and every other public law entity.
Deviation of power shall be a ground for challenging administrative acts.
The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of the administered." From the literal transcription of the constitutional precept, the following should be highlighted:
1°) The derived framer or amending power opted for a "judicialist" model of administrative justice, that is, entrusting to a specialized jurisdictional order of the Judicial Branch the competence and attribution to exercise oversight of the legality of the administrative function, that is, its substantial conformity or compatibility with the body of legality. This system offers considerable guarantees and comparative advantages for those seeking justice, such as specialization, which, accompanied by the judicial career established at an infra-constitutional level, represents a true guarantee of correctness and compliance with the constitutional imperative contained in section 41 of the Constitution for "complete justice." 2°) The amending power defined, with meridian clarity, the subject-matter competence of the administrative dispute jurisdiction, by indicating that its purpose is "to guarantee the legality of the administrative function." It should be noted that the constitutional rule does not distinguish, so that this specialized jurisdictional order is responsible for the oversight of any specific manifestation of the administrative function, without exceptions.
The derived framer thus enshrined a plenary and universal administrative justice, preventing there from being any redoubts or areas of the administrative function exempt from control or oversight of legality. The "administrative function" is an indeterminate legal concept, used by the amending power since 1963, which includes or encompasses any specific or concrete manifestation thereof, that is, all administrative conduct - by action or omission - (e.g., formal activity, material actions, and formal and material omissions), as well as the complementary, more dynamic and flexible figure of the legal-administrative relationship.
3°) The derived framer or amending power established a constitutional reservation of the subject-matter competence of the administrative dispute jurisdiction by stipulating that its purpose is "to guarantee the legality of the administrative function," a reason for which the ordinary legislator, in the exercise of its freedom of configuration or structuring, cannot attribute that competence to any other jurisdictional order that is not the administrative dispute one, since, if it did so, it would be emptying the institutional guarantee and the fundamental right enshrined in Article 49 of the Constitution of its content. On this particular point, and upon better consideration, this Constitutional Court varies or reverses the thesis set forth in Votos Nos. 3095-94 of 3:57 p.m. on August 3, 1994, 7540-94 of 5:42 p.m. on December 21, 1994, 5686-95 of 3:39 p.m. on October 18, 1995, and 14999-2007 of 3:06 p.m. on October 17, 2007.
The foregoing means that when a person seeking justice brings a claim to challenge the invalidity or substantial non-conformity with the administrative legal order of an administrative conduct or any singular manifestation of the administrative function (formal or material omission, formal activity or material action, or legal-administrative relationship), the administrative dispute jurisdiction must inevitably hear and resolve it. Obviously, if the claim, due to its material content, even if related to some administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function – insofar as a public entity or body intervenes – is governed by the labor, family, or agrarian legal regime, it must be heard and resolved by those jurisdictional bodies, since what is properly questioned is not the substantial conformity or non-conformity of the administrative function or conduct with the administrative legal order, which is what Article 49 of the Constitution reserves to the administrative dispute jurisdiction.
This Constitutional Court considers that the determining criteria to delineate the scope of competence of the administrative dispute jurisdiction from other specialized jurisdictional orders – which, henceforth, must be taken into consideration by the ordinary jurisdiction – will be, therefore, the following: 1°) The material or substantial content of the claim and 2°) the applicable legal regime; so that if the substantial conformity or non-conformity of a specific manifestation of the administrative function with the body of legality is disputed, the conflict of interest shall necessarily be heard by the administrative dispute jurisdiction.
4°) The control of legality enshrined in section 49 of the Constitution extends, as indicated, to the entire administrative function carried out by any public entity or body, that is, to all public administrations, without exception. For this reason, the first paragraph of the constitutional precept under examination concludes with a residual or general formula, by indicating that the function carried out by both the central administration – State – and "every other public law entity" is included.
5°) The derived framer opted for a mixed administrative justice, since the first paragraph, by defining the purpose of the administrative dispute jurisdictional order -"to guarantee the legality of the administrative function"-, must be complemented, ineluctably, with the in fine paragraph, by prescribing that the law shall provide protection, at least, to subjective rights and legitimate interests – without distinguishing, regarding the latter, so that the protection of both personal and collective ones, be they corporate or diffuse, is admissible. Consequently, the administrative dispute jurisdiction, according to the Law of the Constitution, was instituted both to ensure the legality of the administrative function and to effectively protect the substantial legal situations of the administered vis-à-vis the public powers.
Thus, constitutionally, an objective and subjective role of the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) is combined.
V.CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCTS RELATED TO A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AS A SPECIFIC MANIFESTATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION. Article 49 of the Constitution establishes a plenary and universal administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) that allows the claimant to challenge or attack any conduct or manifestation of the administrative function before that jurisdictional body. Among the possible specific manifestations of the administrative function, constitutionally challengeable before the administrative litigation venue (sede contencioso-administrativa), are, obviously, those conducts of public administrations within the framework or context of a public or statutory employment relationship, unquestionably governed by Administrative Law or of an administrative-legal nature, as derived from articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution, 111 and 112 of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and the constitutional case law that informs them (Votes of this Constitutional Court Nos. 1696-92, 4453-2000, 244-2001, and 14416-2006).
Consequently, the ordinary legislator cannot radically—totally and absolutely—exclude from the cognizance and resolution of the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) all administrative conduct in matters of public employment relationships, since it has no freedom of disposition over this extreme, because it is bound by the material competence defined and reserved in Article 49 of the Constitution. From the above, it cannot be concluded either that all administrative conduct in matters of public employment must be heard and resolved before the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa), since there will be claims (pretensiones) and extremes that, due to their material content and the applicable legal regime, must inevitably be litigated before the labor jurisdiction, by reason of its specific material competence.
VI.UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 3, SUBSECTION a), OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL CODE (CÓDIGO PROCESAL CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVO). Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo) (Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006), provides the following:
*"The Contencioso-Administrativa and Civil de Hacienda Jurisdiction shall not hear the following claims:* *a) Those related to the conduct of the Public Administration in matters of public employment relationships, which shall be of the cognizance of the labor jurisdiction (…)"* The challenged precept radically and absolutely—without exception—excludes from the cognizance and resolution of the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) any claim (pretensión) related to administrative conduct within the framework of a statutory relationship, thereby flagrantly transgressing the Law of the Constitution and, particularly, Article 49 of the Constitution, which reserved exclusively, as material competence, to that jurisdictional body *"guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function"*. The challenged legislative text does not admit, by its closed literal tenor, an interpretation conforming to the Law of the Constitution and the necessary distinction between claims (pretensiones) that, due to their material content and the applicable legal regime, must be of the cognizance and resolution, either of the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) or the labor jurisdiction.
As noted supra, when the claimant seeks to discuss the substantial non-conformity or invalidity of an administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function with the administrative-legal system, the matter must be litigated, by the reservation and constitutional imperative of Article 49, before the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa). In essence, the claimant has the constitutional guarantee to challenge any conduct that is a manifestation of the administrative function before the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa), it being that there are conducts that occur within a public employment relationship that are a specific expression of the general concept of the *"administrative function"*. On the other hand, there will be claims (pretensiones) that, due to their substantial content and the applicable legal regime, must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, given its competence specialty and the need to apply, to the specific case, the dogmatic categories, institutions, institutes, principles, and particular hermeneutic tools of that legal discipline.
Thus, by way of example and without claim of exhaustiveness, the labor jurisdiction must hear and resolve—even if the issue is related to the administrative conduct or function exercised by a public entity—typically or materially labor extremes, such as the appropriateness or not and the calculation for the payment of the year-end bonus (aguinaldo), vacation days, prior notice, and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), matters concerning the recognition of a retirement or pension or professional risks, controversies that arise in the field of individual and collective Labor Law (e.g., conflicts of an economic-social nature), everything related to the exercise of the right to strike or work stoppage, etc. In the same vein, it is necessary to recognize that in the case of employees in charge of activities subject to the common law of public enterprises or economic services developed by a public administration or of simple laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the respective public entity, that is, those whom doctrine calls "workers of the public administration," the controversies that arise must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, as it is not, in the strict sense, a public official, servant, or employee (Articles 111, paragraph 2, and 112, paragraph 2, of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), given that any conduct emanating from the public entity, in such context, will not be subject to the administrative legal regime, nor can it be considered, materially, as an administrative-legal relationship.
It is necessary to highlight that the constitutional assembly decided on specialized jurisdictional bodies based on the subject matter—at least up to a certain instance—as a guarantee of correctness and a means to achieve the constitutional imperative of prompt and due justice. Although Article 41 of the Constitution enshrines the general right of access to the jurisdiction, then Articles 10, 48, 49, 70, and 153 of the fundamental norm clearly opt for the establishment of specialized jurisdictions. Thus, the claimant has the right to choose before which jurisdictional body they bring action, as long as the material nature of the claim (pretensión) and the applicable legal regime are congruent with the specialty—constitutional or legal—of the respective jurisdiction. This Constitutional Court does not overlook that in judicial practice, due to inadequate or defective legal representation or advice, claimants may make mistakes when filing a claim (pretensión) or when combining them before a specific jurisdictional body; however, in such cases, the jurisdictional body must proceed, with due speed and procedural economy, to separate the claims (pretensiones) that, due to their substantial content and the applicable legal regime, should not be litigated in that venue, as well as to give agile course to those that are appropriate, if no other cause prevents it.
In the same sense, upon the emergence of any conflict of competence, the jurisdictional bodies involved and the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), insofar as it acts as the Court of Conflicts between the administrative litigation (contencioso-administrativa) and labor jurisdictions, must be particularly diligent in processing and resolving it to avoid any undue dilation or unjustified delay that significantly affects the fundamental right to prompt justice (Article 41 of the Constitution) or the human right contained in the American Convention to a process within a reasonable time (Article 8.1).
VII.UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE FIRST CHAMBER OF CASSATION (SALA PRIMERA DE CASACIÓN) IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION a), OF THE REGULATORY LAW OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION (LEY REGULADORA DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVA) WHEN RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF COMPETENCE BETWEEN THE LABOR AND CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTIONS. The petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), when acting as the Court of Conflicts of competence between the labor and administrative litigation (contencioso-administrativa) jurisdictions, and, particularly, when applying Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa). The Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006—which entered into force on January 1, 2008, according to the *vacatio legis* established in Article 222 of that regulatory body—repealed the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) No. 3667 of March 12, 1966 (Article 198 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo)), however, within the interim law provisions of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), Transitory Provisions III and IV stipulated the following:
*"TRANSITORIO III.- The regime for challenging acts that have become final in the administrative stage before the effective date of this Code shall be governed by the legislation in force at that time.* *TRANSITORIO IV.- The contentious-administrative proceedings and ordinary trials attributed to the civil de Hacienda avenue, filed prior to the entry into force of this Code, whatever their procedural stage, shall continue to be substantiated, in all their procedures and remedies, by the rules that governed at the date of initiation. For this purpose, the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda shall continue processing said matters until their conclusion, and the Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo shall maintain the sections that are convenient to hear the challenge claims provided for in Articles 82 to 90 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), and on appeal from the resolutions issued by the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda."* Regardless of the interpretation that the ordinary jurisdiction may have given to these transitory norms, the truth of the matter is that they make clear the ultra-activity of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) and of those judicial interpretations, in matters of conflicts of competence, that were produced at the appropriate procedural moment and that could even occur in the future with respect to proceedings still pending under the repealed adjective legislation.
Consequently, what is challenged is a jurisprudential guideline that continues to produce effects, without ruling out the possibility that it may do so in the future for matters initiated based on the formally repealed legislation that are not yet definitively concluded. Since the early Votes Nos. 185-95 of 4:35 p.m. on January 10, 1995, and 4587-97 of 3:45 p.m. on August 5, 1997, this Constitutional Court admitted, via normative integration, the action of unconstitutionality against the reiterated criteria of jurisdictional bodies that have created a jurisprudential pattern, since Article 3 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes that the Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the interpretation that public authorities make of legal norms and the legal effects it produces, all in accordance with the supreme object of constitutional jurisdiction to guarantee the supremacy of the Law of the Constitution (Articles 10 of the Constitution and 1 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)).
In this specific case, what is challenged is the jurisprudential line established by the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), starting from resolution No. 607-C-01 of 10:09 a.m. on August 10, 2001, when resolving conflicts of competence between the labor and administrative litigation (contencioso-administrativa) jurisdictions and referring the matter to the first, even when dealing with claims (pretensiones) materially governed by Administrative Law (e.g., nullity of a dismissal act, reinstatement, and payment of damages and losses), by considering, *grosso modo*, that any controversy generated in public employment relationships is "of a purely labor nature." For this purpose, copies of the following resolutions of that judicial instance are provided: 770-C-2001 of 9:51 a.m. on October 3, 2001, 478-C-2005 of 9:40 a.m. on July 7, 2005, 742-C-2006 of 10:05 a.m. on October 5, 2006, and 769-C-2007 of 3:20 p.m. on October 31, 2007, whereby the requirement to prove the jurisprudential guideline is considered fulfilled.
In light of the considerations made in the preceding recitals, it is evident that the jurisprudential line of the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación) that ordered, before the entry into force of the new Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), and in application of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), to refer to the labor avenue any process in which a claim (pretensión) is filed within the framework of a statutory relationship, considering it a controversy "of a purely labor nature," is, most clearly, unconstitutional as it breaches Article 49 of the Constitution. Indeed, as noted, there will be claims (pretensiones) that, due to their material or substantial nature and the applicable legal regime, even if filed in the context of a public employment relationship, must be heard and resolved, by constitutional imperative (Article 49 of the Constitution), by the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa), that is, all those in which a public official or servant questions the substantial conformity or validity of any specific manifestation of the administrative function or administrative conduct with the administrative-legal system.
VIII.ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION a), OF THE REGULATORY LAW OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION (LEY REGULADORA DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVA). Article 4, subsection a), of the repealed Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), which still continues to produce legal effects in proceedings commenced before the entry into force of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), provided the following:
*"The following shall not correspond to the Contencioso-Administrativa Jurisdiction:* *a) Criminal matters and those others that, although related to acts of the Public Administration, correspond to the labor jurisdiction (…)"* This Constitutional Court considers that this precept of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) is not, *per se*, unconstitutional, since, in a manner consistent with the constitutionally established and reserved competence for that jurisdictional body *("guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function")* in Article 49 of the Constitution, it admits the possibility that this specialized jurisdiction may hear and resolve certain controversies even in the context of a statutory or public employment relationship; so much so, that the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), before adopting the latest jurisprudential line that is now being challenged, maintained, to resolve conflicts of competence between the labor and administrative litigation (contencioso-administrativa) venues, that the administrative litigation judge (juez contencioso-administrativo) could hear and resolve claims (pretensiones) in which the validity of an administrative procedure or a formal administrative act was challenged and the substantial restitution of the legal situation was sought (*in natura* through reinstatement or by equivalent means through the payment of damages and losses or lost wages).
Consequently, Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) had a more elastic content or a more open texture—in contrast to the rigidity and radicality of Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo)—that allowed interpretations conforming to the Law of the Constitution and, in particular, to the provisions of Article 49 of the Constitution. In sum, from the challenged legislative text it is possible to distinguish, with clear clarity, two types of claims (pretensiones)—according to their material or substantial content and the applicable legal regime—, that is, those aimed at questioning the validity or substantial conformity of an administrative conduct with the administrative-legal system, and those that, although related to the formal conduct of public administrations—given the eminently reviewing or objective nature of the administrative justice model established in the 1966 Law—, which, due to their materiality and the applicable legal regime, must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, being governed by Labor Law—individual or collective.
Given the binding nature of even the recital part of constitutional judgments, the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación) must, henceforth, if it has to apply Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), take note of the reasons set forth in this judgment to reverse the jurisprudential or interpretative line that is now declared unconstitutional, admitting the interpretation conforming to Article 49 of the Constitution of the challenged legal article. For these reasons, this Chamber considers that the challenged norm is not, in itself, unconstitutional, and therefore, this extreme must be dismissed. What is unconstitutional, as noted in the preceding recital, is the interpretation that the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación) has made of the norm since the year 2001.
By virtue of the reasons set forth, it is necessary to declare partially with merit the accumulated actions of unconstitutionality, as indicated in the operative part.
THEREFORE:
The accumulated actions are declared partially with merit. Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo) (Law No. 8508 of April 28, 2006) is declared unconstitutional, as is the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación) of the Supreme Court of Justice that, in application of Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa), referred any controversy related to a public employment relationship to the labor jurisdiction by considering it "purely labor," even though the claimant materially sought to challenge the substantial non-conformity or invalidity of an administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function with the administrative-legal system, arising in a statutory relationship.
As for the challenge to Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), the accumulated actions are dismissed. This declaration of unconstitutionality has declaratory and retroactive effects to the date of effectiveness of the challenged norm and case law, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, and legal relationships and situations consolidated by prescription, expiration, or judgment that carries the authority of material res judicata. Publish fully in the Boletín Judicial and summarize in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Notify the Procuraduría General de la República, the petitioners, the coadjuvants, and the judicial authorities hearing the prior matter.
Communicate to the presidency of the Legislative Assembly and to the First Chamber of Cassation of the Supreme Court of Justice.
Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
801/199/ibj.- Added by judgment 011034-10. Jurisprudence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that refers, by reason of subject matter, to the labor jurisdiction, proceedings that seek the nullity of administrative acts linked to a public employment relationship ", "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [] } ], "contenidosInteresOrden": "4", "despacho": "Sala Constitucional", "despachoOrden": "8", "enteSistematizador": "SALA CONSTITUCIONAL", "esCambioCriterio": "0", "esCriterioUnificador": "0", "esNotaSeparada": "0", "esProtegida": "1", "esResolucionClave": "1", "esResolucionEstructural": "0", "esResolucionOral": "0", "esResolucionRelevante": "1", "esVotoSalvado": "0", "expediente": "080121740007CO", "fecha": "2010-06-09", "formatoDocumento": "ESCRITO", "hora": "15:00", "id": "sen-1-0007-473953", "numeroDocumento": "09928", "redactor": "Ernesto Jinesta Lobo", "sentenciasRelacionadas": [...], "sourceName": "Documentos", "subNumeroDocumento": "1", "tipoDocumento": "SNT", "tipoInformacion": "Resolución Judicial", "tipoResolucion": "De Fondo", "resultado": "Con lugar parcialmente", "controlCons": "Sentencia estimatoria", "tipoTexto": "1", "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [], "html": " SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fifteen hours on June ninth, two thousand ten.
Accumulated actions of unconstitutionality, the first (No. 08-012174-0007-CO), filed by CÉSAR HINES CÉSPEDES, ID No. 7-061-989, ENRIQUE ROJAS FRANCO, ID No. 1-390-1250 and DIEGO MOYA MEZA, ID No. 1-1065-0968, against the jurisprudence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that refers, by reason of subject matter, to the labor jurisdiction, proceedings that seek the nullity of administrative acts linked to a public employment relationship issued based on Article 4, subsection a), of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, a provision which is also challenged, and, by connection, against Article 3, subsection a), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 25, 2006, insofar as it excludes matters of public employment from the cognizance of said jurisdiction; the second action (No. 09-008798-0007-CO), filed by MANRIQUE JIMÉNEZ MEZA, ID No. 1-487-250, against subsection a) of Article 3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Law No. 8508 of April 25, 2006, and, subsidiarily, against the interpretation that the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has given in favor of referring public employment matters to the labor jurisdiction. Also intervening in the action is the PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA and the INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE VIVIENDA Y URBANISMO.
RESULTANDO:
of October 22, 2008 (folio 51), the plaintiffs were warned to submit a document accrediting the representation under which they were appearing; a certified copy of the brief where they invoked the unconstitutionality they request, within a matter pending resolution, and sufficient references to the case law they challenge.
Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta Lobo; and,
WHEREAS:
Article 75, 1st paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes as one of the prerequisites for filing the acción de inconstitucionalidad, in the case of concrete review, the existence of a matter pending resolution before the courts, including hábeas corpus or amparo, or in the procedure for exhausting the administrative channel, as a reasonable means to protect the substantial legal situation deemed injured. In this regard, this Tribunal Constitucional, in sentencia No. 4190-95 at 11:33 a.m.
of July 28, 1995, stated the following:
"(...) In the first place, it is a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action (acción popular), which means that the existence of a pending matter—whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure for exhausting administrative remedies (agotar la vía administrativa)—is required to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that the decision of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) has a positive or negative impact on that pending proceeding, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this route—presuppositions of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) (...)".
In the unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad) No. 08-012174-0007-CO, the petitioners originally claimed standing (legitimados) to file this action, pointing to the proceedings before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa), in judicial case files No. 05-000677-163-CA and No. 000337-163-CA, as the base matters where they had invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms. However, subsequently, in response to the warning (prevención) from the Presidency of this Chamber (Sala) to prove such standing through certified copies, they omitted to provide the documents related to the first of those proceedings and, instead, indicated No. 08-000644-1027-CA, filed by Francisco José Hernández Solano against the State. Therefore, by resolution of 11:30 a.m. on December 18, 2009 (see folio 111), this action was admitted, based on proceedings No. 00-000337-0163-CA and No. 08-00644-1027-CA, both filed before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, in which the jurisdiction—by reason of subject matter—of said jurisdiction is discussed, and in which, indeed, the unconstitutionality of the norms challenged here was alleged (copies at folios 59-65 and 67-83).
Both proceedings being pending resolution, this Court (Tribunal) considers that the plaintiffs are indeed standing (legitimados) to bring this unconstitutionality action. Furthermore, Manrique Jiménez Meza filed unconstitutionality action No. 09-008798-0007-CO, consolidated (acumulada) with the present one, in which he asserted standing by virtue of having invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms in the proceeding processed under case file No. 08-000766-1027-CA, which he effectively demonstrated (copies at folios 292-293). In another vein, since the challenged norms are provisions of a general nature, it is admissible, in accordance with Article 73 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, to question them through this route.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, within fifteen days following the first publication of the notice referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of this same law, *"(...) those with a legitimate interest (interés legítimo) may appear in this [proceeding] to assist (coadyuvar) in the arguments that may justify its admissibility or inadmissibility, or to expand, as the case may be, the grounds for unconstitutionality in relation to the matter that concerns them."* In this case, the following three active joinders (coadyuvancias activas) were filed within the legal deadline and are, therefore, admissible: Fernando Pérez Morais (folios 167-172), Jorge Fisher Aragón, representing Maykel Segura López (folios 173-175), and Eduardo López Arroyo, representing Hugo Salas Brenes (folios 179-1783). Also filed, but untimely and therefore not admitted, are the active joinder filed by [Name 001] (folio 241) and the passive joinder (coadyuvancia pasiva) filed by Alvin Villavicencio Coronado (folio 242).
Both unconstitutionality actions coincide in challenging section 3°, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006, insofar as it provides that claims (pretensiones) related to administrative conduct in public employment relations matters will be heard by the labor jurisdiction (jurisdicción laboral). Additionally, the first action filed, No. 08-012174-0007-CO, attacks the jurisprudence handed down by the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), in light of Article 4°, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) No. 3667 of March 12, 1966, insofar as it refers any controversy arising within a public or statutory employment relationship to the knowledge and resolution of the labor jurisdiction; therefore, the cited provision of the repealed Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction is also challenged.
IV.CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTRIBUTION OF A COMPETENCE (COMPETENCIA). The original constituent power (constituyente originario) and the amending power (poder reformador) undertook to define the subject-matter jurisdiction (competencia material) and, consequently, the extension and scope of two jurisdictions essential to the Social and Democratic State of Law (Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho). Indeed, sections 10 and 48 establish the subject-matter jurisdiction of the constitutional jurisdiction (jurisdicción constitucional) and, in section 49, that of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. The foregoing makes evident, in the will of the original constituent power and the amending power, the transcendence of both the constitutionality control and the legality control of public powers in order to guarantee the effective enjoyment and exercise of the fundamental rights and human rights enshrined, respectively, in the constitutional text and the instruments of Public International Law.
Undoubtedly, such constitutional precepts embody what doctrine has termed the regal clause of the Constitutional State of Law (Estado Constitucional de Derecho). Regarding, particularly, the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, Article 49 of the Constitution, after the partial amendment by virtue of Law No. 3124 of June 25, 1963, provides the following:
*"The contentious-administrative jurisdiction is established as an attribution of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial), with the object of guaranteeing the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and every other entity of public law.* *Deviation of power (desviación de poder) shall be a ground for challenging administrative acts.* *The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights (derechos subjetivos) and legitimate interests (intereses legítimos) of the administered parties (administrados)."* Based on the literal transcription of the constitutional precept, the following is worth highlighting:
1°) The derived constituent power or amending power opted for a "judicialist" model of administrative justice; that is, entrusting a specialized jurisdictional order of the Judicial Branch with the competence and attribution to exercise oversight of the legality of the administrative function, meaning its substantial conformity or adjustment to the legality framework (bloque de legalidad). This system offers considerable guarantees and comparative advantages for the justiciable party (justiciable), such as specialization, which, accompanied by the judicial career (carrera judicial) established at the infra-constitutional level, represents a true guarantee of correctness and compliance with the constitutional imperative contained in section 41 of the Constitution of "full justice." 2°) The amending power defined, with clear clarity, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, indicating that its object is *"to guarantee the legality of the administrative function."* It is worth noting that the constitutional norm does not distinguish, so that this specialized jurisdictional order is responsible for the oversight of any specific manifestation of the administrative function, without exceptions.
The derived constituent power thus enshrined a plenary and universal administrative justice, avoiding any enclaves or areas of the administrative function exempt from legality control or oversight. The *"administrative function"* is an indeterminate legal concept, employed by the amending power from 1963 onwards, which encompasses or includes any specific or concrete manifestation thereof; that is, all administrative conduct—by action or omission (omisión)—(e.g., formal activity, material actions (actuaciones materiales), and formal and material omissions), as well as the complementary, more dynamic and flexible figure of the administrative legal relationship (relación jurídica-administrativa).
3°) The derived constituent power or amending power established a constitutional reservation (reserva constitucional) of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction by stipulating that its object is *"to guarantee the legality of the administrative function,"* for which reason the ordinary legislator, in the exercise of its freedom of configuration, cannot attribute that competence to another jurisdictional order that is not the contentious-administrative one, since, were it to do so, it would be emptying of content the institutional guarantee and the fundamental right enshrined in Article 49 of the Constitution. On this particular point, and after better consideration, this Constitutional Court varies or reverses the thesis set forth in Opinions (Votos) Nos. 3095-94 of 3:57 p.m. on August 3, 1994, 7540-94 of 5:42 p.m. on December 21, 1994, 5686-95 of 3:39 p.m. on October 18, 1995, and 14999-2007 of 3:06 p.m. on October 17, 2007.
The foregoing means that when a justiciable party brings a claim (pretensión) to question the invalidity or substantial non-conformity with the administrative legal system of an administrative conduct or any singular manifestation of the administrative function (formal or material omission, formal activity, material action, or administrative legal relationship), the contentious-administrative jurisdiction must necessarily hear and resolve it. Obviously, if the claim, due to its material content, even if related to some administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function—insofar as a public entity or body intervenes—is governed by the labor, family, or agrarian legal regime, it must be heard and resolved by those jurisdictional bodies, since what is being questioned is not, properly, the substantial conformity or non-conformity of the administrative function or conduct with the administrative legal system, which is what Article 49 of the Constitution reserves to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.
This Constitutional Court considers that the determining criteria for delimiting the scope of competence of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction from other specialized jurisdictional orders—which, henceforth, must be considered by the ordinary jurisdiction (jurisdicción ordinaria)—will therefore be the following: 1°) The material or substantial content of the claim and 2°) the applicable legal regime; so that if the substantial conformity or non-conformity of a specific manifestation of the administrative function with the legality framework is being discussed, the conflict of interest will necessarily be heard by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.
4°) The legality control enshrined in section 49 of the Constitution is projected, as indicated, to all the administrative function carried out by any public entity or body; that is, to all public administrations, without exception. For this reason, the first paragraph of the constitutional precept under examination concludes with a residual or general formula, indicating that it encompasses the function carried out both by the central administration—the State—and by *"every other entity of public law."* 5°) The derived constituent power opted for a mixed administrative justice, since the first paragraph, when defining the object of the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order—*"to guarantee the legality of the administrative function"*—must be complemented, inevitably, with the final paragraph *in fine*, by prescribing that the law shall provide protection, at a minimum, to subjective rights and legitimate interests—without distinguishing regarding the latter, making admissible the protection of both personal and collective interests, whether corporate or diffuse.
Consequently, the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, according to the Law of the Constitution, was instituted both to ensure the legality of the administrative function and for the effective protection of the substantial legal positions (situaciones jurídicas sustanciales) of the administered parties against public powers. Thus, an objective and subjective role of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction is constitutionally combined.
V.CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCTS RELATED TO A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AS A SPECIFIC MANIFESTATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION. Article 49 of the Constitution establishes a plenary and universal contentious-administrative jurisdiction that allows the justiciable party to challenge or attack any conduct or manifestation of the administrative function before that jurisdictional order. Among the possible specific manifestations of the administrative function constitutionally challengeable before the contentious-administrative forum are, obviously, those conducts of public administrations within the framework or context of a public or statutory employment relationship, unquestionably governed by Administrative Law or of an administrative-legal nature, as emerges from sections 191 and 192 of the Constitution, 111 and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and from the constitutional jurisprudence that informs them (Opinions of this Constitutional Court Nos. 1696-92, 4453-2000, 244-2001, and 14416-2006).
Consequently, the ordinary legislator cannot radically exclude—totally and absolutely—from the knowledge and resolution of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction all administrative conduct in public employment relations matters, since it has no freedom of disposition over this aspect, as it is bound by the subject-matter jurisdiction defined and reserved in Article 49 of the Constitution. From the foregoing, it also cannot be concluded that every administrative conduct in public employment matters must be heard and resolved before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, because there will be claims and issues that, due to their material content and the applicable legal regime, must inevitably be brought before the labor jurisdiction, by reason of its specific subject-matter jurisdiction.
Section 3°, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006), provides the following:
*"The Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda) shall not hear the following claims:* *a) Those related to the conduct of the Public Administration in public employment relations matters, which shall be heard by the labor jurisdiction (...)"* The challenged provision radically and absolutely—without exception—excludes from the knowledge and resolution of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction all claims related to administrative conduct within the framework of a statutory relationship, thereby clearly violating the Law of the Constitution and, particularly, Article 49 of the Constitution, which exclusively reserved to that jurisdictional order, as its subject-matter jurisdiction, *"to guarantee the legality of the administrative function."* The challenged legislative text does not allow, due to its closed literal tenor, an interpretation consistent with the Law of the Constitution and the necessary distinction between claims that, due to their material content and the applicable legal regime, must be heard and resolved either by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction or by the labor jurisdiction.
As noted supra, when the justiciable party seeks to discuss the substantial non-conformity or invalidity of an administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function with the administrative legal system, the matter must be brought, due to the reservation and constitutional imperative of Article 49, before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In essence, the justiciable party has the constitutional guarantee of challenging any conduct that is a manifestation of the administrative function before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, given that there are conducts produced within a public employment relationship that are specific expressions of the general concept of the *"administrative function."* On the other hand, there will be claims that, due to their substantial content and the applicable legal regime, must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, considering its special competence and the need to apply, to the specific case, the particular dogmatic categories, institutions, institutes, principles, and hermeneutical tools of that legal discipline.
Thus, by way of example and without claiming to be exhaustive, the labor jurisdiction must hear and resolve—even if the matter is related to the administrative conduct or function exercised by a public entity—issues that are typical or materially labor-related, such as the propriety or not of and the calculation for the payment of the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, prior notice (preaviso), and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), matters concerning the recognition of a retirement or pension or professional risks, controversies arising in the field of individual and collective Labor Law (e.g., economic-social conflicts), everything related to the exercise of the right to strike or work stoppage (paro), etc. In the same vein, it is necessary to recognize that in the case of employees responsible for tasks subject to common law of public enterprises or economic services developed by a public administration, or of mere laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the respective public entity; that is, those doctrine calls "workers of the public administration," the controversies that arise must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction, as they are not, in the strict sense, a public official, servant, or employee (Articles 111, paragraph 2°, and 112, paragraph 2°, of the General Law of Public Administration), given that any conduct emanating from the public entity, in such context, will not be subject to the administrative legal regime and cannot be considered, materially, as an administrative legal relationship.
It is necessary to highlight that the constituent power opted for jurisdictional orders specialized by reason of subject matter—at least up to a certain instance—as a guarantee of correctness and a means for achieving the constitutional imperative of prompt and full justice. Although Article 41 of the Constitution enshrines the general right of access to jurisdiction, sections 10, 48, 49, 70, and 153 of the fundamental norm clearly opt for the establishment of specialized jurisdictions.
Thus, the party seeking justice has the right to choose before which jurisdictional order to bring an action, provided that the material nature of the claim and the applicable legal regime is congruent with the specialty—constitutional or legal—of the respective jurisdiction. This Constitutional Court does not overlook that in judicial practice, due to inadequate or defective legal representation or advice, parties may make mistakes when bringing a claim or combining them before a specific jurisdictional order; however, in such cases, the jurisdictional body must proceed, with due celerity and procedural economy, to sever the claims that, by their substantial content and the applicable legal regime, should not be heard in that venue, and to give swift course to those that are appropriate, unless another cause prevents it. In the same vein, when any conflict of competence arises, the jurisdictional bodies involved and the First Chamber of Cassation (Sala Primera de Casación), insofar as it acts as the Court of Conflicts between the contentious-administrative and labor jurisdictions, must be particularly diligent in processing and resolving it to avoid any undue delay or unjustified postponement that significantly affects the fundamental right to a swift justice (Article 41 of the Constitution) or the human right contained in the American Convention to a process within a reasonable time (Article 8.1).
VII.UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE FIRST CHAMBER OF CASSATION IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A), OF THE REGULATORY LAW OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION WHEN RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF COMPETENCE BETWEEN THE LABOR AND CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTIONS. The plaintiffs also challenge as unconstitutional the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation, when acting as the Court of Conflicts of competence between the labor and contentious-administrative jurisdiction, and, particularly, when applying Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa). The Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), Law No. 8508 of April 24, 2006—which entered into force on January 1, 2008, according to the *vacatio legis* established in Article 222 of that normative body—repealed the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction No. 3667 of March 12, 1966 (Article 198 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code); however, within the interim law provisions of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, Transitional Provisions III and IV stipulated the following:
"TRANSITORIO III.- The regime for challenging acts that became final in the administrative venue before this Code's entry into force shall be governed by the legislation in force at that time.
TRANSITORIO IV.- Contentious-administrative proceedings and ordinary lawsuits attributed to the civil Treasury venue, filed prior to this Code's entry into force, regardless of their procedural stage, shall continue to be processed, in all their procedures and recourses, by the norms that governed on the date of filing. For this purpose, the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) shall continue processing such matters until their conclusion, and the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo) shall maintain the sections deemed convenient to hear the challenge lawsuits provided for in Articles 82 to 90 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, and, on appeal, the resolutions issued by the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court." Regardless of the interpretation that the ordinary jurisdiction may have given to these transitional norms, what is certain is that they clearly demonstrate the continued applicability (ultra-actividad) of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction and of those judicial interpretations in matters of competence conflicts that occurred at the proper procedural moment and that could even arise in the future regarding proceedings still pending under the repealed procedural legislation.
Consequently, the challenged item is a jurisprudential guideline that continues to produce effects, without dismissing the possibility that it may do so in the future for matters initiated under the formally repealed legislation that have not yet definitively concluded. Since the early rulings Voto No. 185-95 of 4:35 p.m. on January 10, 1995, and Voto No. 4587-97 of 3:45 p.m. on August 5, 1997, this Constitutional Court has admitted, through normative integration, the action of unconstitutionality against reiterated criteria by jurisdictional bodies that have created a jurisprudential guideline, given that Article 3 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes that the Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the interpretation made by public authorities of legal norms and the legal effects they produce, all in accordance with the supreme purpose of the constitutional jurisdiction to guarantee the supremacy of Constitutional Law (Article 10 of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law).
In this case, what is challenged is the jurisprudential line established by the First Chamber of Cassation, commencing with Resolution No. 607-C-01 of 10:09 a.m. on August 10, 2001, when resolving conflicts of competence between the labor and contentious-administrative jurisdictions and remitting the matter to the former, even when the claims are materially governed by Administrative Law (e.g., nullity of a dismissal act, reinstatement, and payment of damages), by considering, roughly speaking (grosso modo), that any controversy arising in public employment relations is "of a purely labor nature." For this purpose, copies of the following resolutions from that judicial instance are provided: 770-C-2001 of 9:51 a.m. on October 3, 2001, 478-C-2005 of 9:40 a.m. on July 7, 2005, 742-C-2006 of 10:05 a.m. on October 5, 2006, and 769-C-2007 of 3:20 p.m. on October 31, 2007, by which the requirement to demonstrate the jurisprudential guideline is considered fulfilled.
In light of the considerations set forth in the preceding recitals, it is evident that the jurisprudential line of the First Chamber of Cassation, which ordered, before the entry into force of the new Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code and in application of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the remittance to the labor venue of any proceeding in which a claim is brought within the framework of a statutory relationship, considering it a controversy "of a purely labor nature," is, by all lights, unconstitutional as it violates Article 49 of the Constitution. Indeed, as was noted, there are claims that, by their material or substantial character and the applicable legal regime, although brought in the context of a public employment relationship, must be heard and resolved, by constitutional mandate (Article 49 of the Constitution), by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction; that is, all those in which a public official or employee questions the substantial conformity or validity of any specific manifestation of the administrative function or administrative conduct with the administrative legal order.
VIII.ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A), OF THE REGULATORY LAW OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION. Article 4, subsection a), of the repealed Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), which continues to produce legal effects in proceedings filed before the entry into force of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, provided as follows:
<i>"The following shall not correspond to the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction:
Consequently, Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction had a more elastic content or a more open texture—in contrast with the rigidity and radical nature of Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code—that allowed interpretations consistent with Constitutional Law and, in particular, with the provisions of Article 49 of the Constitution. In summary, from the challenged legislative text, it is possible to distinguish, with crystal clarity, two types of claims—according to their material or substantial content and the applicable legal regime—, that is, those aimed at questioning the validity or substantial conformity of an administrative conduct with the administrative legal order, and those that, although related to the formal conduct of public administrations—given the eminently reviewing or objective character of the administrative justice model established in the 1966 Law—, by their materiality and the applicable legal regime, must be heard and resolved by the labor jurisdiction as they are governed by Labor Law—individual or collective.
Given the binding nature of even the recital portion of constitutional judgments, the First Chamber of Cassation must, henceforth, if it must apply Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, take note of the reasons set forth in this judgment to reverse the jurisprudential or interpretive line now declared unconstitutional, admitting the interpretation consistent with Article 49 of the Constitution of the challenged legal provision. For these reasons, this Chamber considers that the challenged norm is not, in itself, unconstitutional, so this aspect must be dismissed. What is unconstitutional, as noted in the preceding recital, is the interpretation that the First Chamber of Cassation has made of the norm since 2001.
By virtue of the reasons set forth, the accumulated actions of unconstitutionality must be partially granted, as indicated in the operative part.
POR TANTO:
The accumulated actions are partially granted. Article 3, subsection a), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Law No. 8508 of April 28, 2006) and the case law of the First Chamber of Cassation of the Supreme Court of Justice that, in application of Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, remitted to the labor jurisdiction any controversy related to a public employment relationship, considering it "purely labor," even when the party materially sought to challenge the substantial nonconformity with, or invalidity of, an administrative conduct or specific manifestation of the administrative function against the administrative legal order, arising in a statutory relationship, are declared unconstitutional. Regarding the challenge of Article 4, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, the accumulated actions are dismissed.
This declaration of unconstitutionality has declaratory and retroactive effects to the date on which the challenged norm and case law came into force, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, or legal relationships and situations consolidated by prescription, expiration, or judgment having the authority of material res judicata. Publish in full in the Boletín Judicial and summarize in the official gazette La Gaceta. Notify the Procuraduría General de la República, the plaintiffs, the coadjuvants, and the judicial authorities hearing the prior matter. Communicate to the presidency of the Asamblea Legislativa and of the First Chamber of Cassation of the Corte Suprema de Justicia.
Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
801/199/ibj.-
SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas de nueve de junio de dos mil diez.
Acciones de inconstitucionalidad acumuladas, la primera (No. 08-012174-0007-CO), interpuesta por CÉSAR HINES CÉSPEDES, cédula No. 7-061-989, ENRIQUE ROJAS FRANCO, cédula No. 1-390-1250 y DIEGO MOYA MEZA, cédula No. 1-1065-0968, contra la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que remite, en razón de la materia, a la jurisdicción laboral, los procesos que tienen como objeto la nulidad de actos administrativos vinculados a una relación de empleo público emitida con fundamento en el artículo 4°, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, ordinal que, también, impugna y, por conexidad, contra el artículo 3°, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 de 25 de abril del 2006, en cuanto excluye del conocimiento de dicha jurisdicción la materia del empleo público, la segunda acción (No. 09-008798-0007-CO), interpuesta por MANRIQUE JIMÉNEZ MEZA, cédula No. 1-487-250, contra el inciso a) del artículo 3° del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 de 25 de abril del 2006, y, subsidiariamente, contra la interpretación que la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha dado a favor de la remisión de los asuntos de empleo público a la jurisdicción laboral. Interviene también en la acción la PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA y el INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE VIVIENDA Y URBANISMO.
RESULTANDO:
Redacta el Magistrado Jinesta Lobo; y,
CONSIDERANDO:
El numeral 75, párrafo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece como uno de los presupuestos para interponer la acción de inconstitucionalidad, en el caso del control concreto, la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver ante los tribunales, inclusive de hábeas corpus o de amparo, o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, como un medio razonable para tutelar la situación jurídica sustancial que se estima lesionada. Al respecto, este Tribunal Constitucional, en la sentencia No. 4190-95 de las 11:33 hrs. del 28 de julio de 1995, indicó lo siguiente:
«(…) En primer término, se trata de un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (…)».
En la acción de inconstitucionalidad No. 08-012174-0007-CO, los gestionantes, originalmente, alegaron estar legitimados para interponer esta acción, señalando, como asuntos base, donde habían invocado la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas, los procesos sustanciados ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, en los expedientes judiciales No. 05-000677-163-CA y No. 000337-163-CA. Sin embargo, posteriormente, atendiendo a la prevención de la Presidencia de esta Sala para que demostraran, mediante copias certificadas, dicha legitimación, omitieron aportar los documentos referidos al primero de dichos procesos y, en su lugar, indicaron el No. 08-000644-1027-CA, interpuesto por Francisco José Hernández Solano contra el Estado. De manera que, mediante resolución de las 11:30 hrs. del 18 de diciembre del 2009 (ver folio 111) se le dio curso a esta acción, con base en los procesos No. 00-000337-0163-CA y No. 08-00644-1027-CA, ambos presentados ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa y en los que se discute sobre la competencia, en razón de la materia, de dicha jurisdicción y en los que, en efecto, se alegó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas aquí impugnadas (copias a folios 59-65 y 67-83).
Estando ambos procesos pendientes de resolución, este Tribunal considera que los accionantes sí están legitimados para incoar esta acción de inconstitucionalidad. De otra parte, Manrique Jiménez Meza interpuso la acción de inconstitucionalidad No. 09-008798-0007-CO, acumulada a la presente, en la que aseguró estar legitimado en virtud de haber invocado la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas en el proceso que se tramita bajo el expediente No. 08-000766-1027-CA, lo que, efectivamente demostró (copias a folios 292-293). En otro orden de ideas, ya que, las normas impugnadas son disposiciones de carácter general sí cabe, de conformidad con el artículo 73 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional cuestionarlas en esta vía.
De conformidad con el artículo 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en los quince días posteriores a la primera publicación del aviso a que alude el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de esta misma ley, “(…) aquellos con interés legítimo, podrán apersonarse dentro de ésta, a fin de coadyuvar en las alegaciones que pudieren justificar su procedencia o improcedencia o para ampliar, en su caso, los motivos de inconstitucionalidad en relación con el asunto que les interesa”. En este caso, se presentaron dentro del plazo de ley y, por ende, son admisibles las siguientes tres coadyuvancias activas: Fernando Pérez Morais (folios 167-172), Jorge Fisher Aragón, en representación de Maykel Segura López (folios 173-175), y Eduardo López Arroyo, en representación de Hugo Salas Brenes (folios 179-1783). Se presentaron, además, de manera extemporánea y, por ende, no se admiten, la coadyuvancia activa interpuesta por [Nombre 001] (folio 241) y la coadyuvancia pasiva planteada por Alvin Villavicencio Coronado (folio 242).
Sendas acciones de inconstitucionalidad coinciden en impugnar en ordinal 3°, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 de 24 de abril de 2006, en cuanto dispone que las pretensiones relacionadas con la conducta administrativa en materia de relaciones de empelo publico, serán de conocimiento de la jurisdicción laboral. Adicionalmente, en la primera acción interpuesta, No. 08-012174-0007-CO, se ataca la jurisprudencia vertida por la Sala Primera de Casación, a la luz del artículo 4°, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa No. 3667 de 12 de marzo de 1966, en cuanto remite a conocimiento y resolución de la jurisdicción laboral cualquier controversia surgida en el seno de una relación de empleo público o estatutaria, por lo que, también, se acciona contra el numeral citado de la derogada Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa.
El constituyente originario y el poder reformador se ocuparon de definir la competencia material y, por consiguiente, la extensión y alcances de dos jurisdicciones esenciales para el Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho. En efecto, en los ordinales 10 y 48 se establece la competencia material de la jurisdicción constitucional y, en el numeral 49, la de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. Lo anterior deja patente, en la voluntad del constituyente originario y del poder reformador, la trascendencia tanto del control de constitucionalidad como de legalidad de los poderes públicos en aras de garantizar el goce y ejercicio efectivos de los derechos fundamentales y humanos consagrados, respectivamente, en el texto constitucional y los instrumentos del Derecho Internacional Público. Sin duda alguna, tales preceptos constitucionales encarnan lo que la doctrina ha denominado la cláusula regia del Estado Constitucional de Derecho. En lo que se refiere, particularmente, a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, el artículo 49 constitucional, después de la reforma parcial por virtud de la Ley No. 3124 de 25 de junio de 1963, dispone lo siguiente:
“Establécese la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa como atribución del Poder Judicial, con el objeto de garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado, de sus instituciones y de toda otra entidad de derecho público.
La desviación de poder será motivo de impugnación de los actos administrativos.
La ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados”.
A partir de la transcripción literal del precepto constitucional, cabe resaltar lo siguiente:
1°) El constituyente derivado o poder reformador optó por un modelo de justicia administrativa “judicialista”, esto es, encomendándole a un orden jurisdiccional especializado del Poder Judicial la competencia y atribución de ejercer la fiscalización de la legalidad de la función administrativa, esto es, su conformidad sustancial o adecuación con el bloque de legalidad. Este sistema ofrece garantías y ventajas comparativas considerables para el justiciable, tales como la especialización, lo que acompañado de la carrera judicial dispuesta de manera infra-constitucional, representa una verdadera garantía de acierto y de cumplimiento del imperativo constitucional contenido en el ordinal 41 de la Constitución de una “justicia cumplida”.
2°) El poder reformador definió, con meridiana claridad, la competencia material de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, al indicar que su objeto es “garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa” . Cabe acotar que la norma constitucional no distingue, de modo que a ese orden jurisdiccional especializado le compete la fiscalización de cualquier manifestación específica de la función administrativa, sin excepciones. El constituyente derivado consagró, así, una justicia administrativa plenaria y universal, evitando que haya reductos o ámbitos de la función administrativa exentos del control o fiscalización de legalidad. La “función administrativa” es un concepto jurídico indeterminado, empleado por el poder reformador a partir de 1963, que comprende o engloba cualquier manifestación específica o concreta de ésta, esto es, toda conducta administrativa -por acción u omisión- (v. gr. la actividad formal, las actuaciones materiales y las omisiones formales y materiales), así como la figura complementaria, más dinámica y flexible, de la relación jurídica-administrativa.
3°) El constituyente derivado o poder reformador estableció una reserva constitucional de la competencia material de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa al estatuir que su objeto es “garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa”, razón por la cual el legislador ordinario, en el ejercicio de su libertad de conformación o configuración, no puede atribuirle esa competencia a otro orden jurisdiccional que no sea el contencioso-administrativo, puesto que, de ser así, estaría vaciando de contenido la garantía institucional y el derecho fundamental que consagra el artículo 49 de la Constitución. Sobre este punto en particular y, bajo una mejor ponderación, este Tribunal Constitucional varía o revierte la tesis 1994, 7540-94 de las 17:42 hrs. de 21 de diciembre ambos de 1994, 5686-95 de las 15:39 hrs. de 18 de octubre de 1995 y 14999-2007 de las 15:06 hrs. de 17 de octubre de 2007.
Lo anterior significa que cuando un justiciable deduce una pretensión para cuestionar la invalidez o disconformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico-administrativo de una conducta administrativa o cualquier manifestación singular de la función administrativa (omisión formal o material, actividad formal o actuación material o relación jurídico-administrativa), debe conocerla y resolverla, indefectiblemente, la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. Obviamente, si la pretensión, por su contenido material, aunque esté relacionada con alguna conducta administrativa o manifestación específica de la función administrativa –en la medida en que interviene un ente u órgano público-, se encuentra regida por el régimen jurídico laboral, de familia o agrario, debe ser conocida y resuelta por esos órganos jurisdiccionales, por cuanto, no se cuestiona, propiamente, conformidad o disconformidad sustancial de la función o conducta administrativa con el ordenamiento jurídico-administrativo que es lo que el artículo 49 constitucional le reserva a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa.
Este Tribunal Constitucional, estima que los criterios determinantes para deslindar el ámbito competencial de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa de otros ordenes jurisdiccionales especializados –que, en adelante, deben tenerse en consideración por la jurisdicción ordinaria- serán, entonces, los siguientes: 1°) El contenido material o sustancial de la pretensión y 2°) el régimen jurídico aplicable; de modo que si se discute la conformidad o disconformidad sustancial de una manifestación específica de la función administrativa con el bloque de legalidad, el conflicto de interés, será, necesariamente, de conocimiento de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa.
4°) El control de legalidad consagrado en el numeral 49 de la Constitución se proyecta, como se indicó, a toda la función administrativa desplegada por cualquier ente u órgano público, esto es, a todas las administraciones públicas, sin excepción. Por tal razón, el párrafo primero del precepto constitucional objeto de examen concluye con una fórmula residual o general, al indicar que comprende la función desplegada tanto por la administración central –Estado- como por “toda otra entidad de derecho público”.
5°) El constituyente derivado optó por una justicia administrativa mixta, por cuanto, el párrafo primero, al definir el objeto del orden jurisdiccional contencioso-administrativo -“garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa”-, debe complementarse, ineluctablemente, con el párrafo in fine, al preceptuar que ley brindará protección, como mínimo, a los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos –sin distinguir, en cuanto a estos últimos, por lo que resulta admisible la tutela tanto de los personales como de los colectivos, sea corporativos o difusos-. Consecuentemente, la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, según el Derecho de la Constitución, fue instituida tanto para velar por la legalidad de la función administrativa como para la tutela efectiva de las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de los administrados frente a los poderes públicos. Se conjuga, así, constitucionalmente, un rol objetivo y subjetivo de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa.
V.ALGUNAS CONDUCTAS ADMINISTRATIVAS RELACIONADAS CON UNA RELACIÓN DE EMPLEO PÚBLICO COMO MANIFESTACIÓN ESPECÍFICA DE LA FUNCIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA. El artículo 49 constitucional establece una jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa plenaria y universal que le permite al justiciable impugnar o atacar cualquier conducta o manifestación de la función administrativa ante ese orden jurisdiccional. Dentro de las posibles manifestaciones específicas de la función administrativa, constitucionalmente impugnables ante la sede contencioso-administrativa, se encuentran, obviamente, aquellas conductas de las administraciones públicas en el marco o contexto de una relación de empleo público o estatutaria, incuestionablemente, regida por el Derecho Administrativo o de naturaleza jurídico-administrativa, según se desprende de los ordinales 191, 192 de la Constitución, 111 y 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y de la jurisprudencia constitucional que los informa (Votos de este Tribunal Constitucional Nos. 1696-92, 4453-2000, 244-2001 y 14416-2006).
Por consiguiente, el legislador ordinario no puede excluir de manera radical -total y absoluta- del conocimiento y resolución de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa toda conducta administrativa en materia de relaciones de empleo público, puesto que, sobre tal extremo no tiene libertad de disposición, por cuanto, lo vincula la competencia material definida y reservada en el artículo 49 constitucional. De lo dicho, tampoco cabe concluir que toda conducta administrativa, en materia de empleo público, debe ser conocida y resuelta ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, por cuanto, habrá pretensiones y extremos que, por su contenido material y el régimen jurídico aplicable, deben ser, inevitablemente, ventilados ante la jurisdicción laboral, por razón de su competencia material específica.
El numeral 3°, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo (Ley No. 8508 de 24 de abril de 2006), dispone lo siguiente:
“La jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa y Civil de Hacienda no conocerá de las pretensiones siguientes:
Como se apuntó supra, cuando el justiciable pretende discutir la disconformidad sustancial o invalidez de una conducta administrativa o manifestación específica de la función administrativa con el ordenamiento jurídico-administrativo, el asunto debe ser ventilado, por la reserva y el imperativo constitucional del artículo 49, ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. En esencia, el justiciable tiene la garantía constitucional de impugnar cualquier conducta que sea manifestación de la función administrativa ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, siendo que existen conductas que se producen dentro de una relación de empleo público que son expresión específica del concepto general de la “función administrativa”. De otra parte, habrá pretensiones que, por su contenido sustancial y el régimen jurídico aplicable, deben ser conocidas y resueltas por la jurisdicción laboral, habida cuenta de su especialidad competencial y de la necesidad de aplicar, al caso concreto, las categorías dogmáticas, instituciones, institutos, principios y herramientas hermenéuticas particulares de esa disciplina jurídica.
Así, a modo de ejemplo y sin pretensión de exhaustividad, la jurisdicción laboral deberá conocer y resolver –aunque el tema se encuentre relacionado con la conducta o función administrativa ejercida por un ente público- extremos típica o materialmente laborales, tales como la procedencia o no y el cálculo para el pago del aguinaldo, vacaciones, preaviso y auxilio de cesantía, lo concerniente al reconocimiento de una jubilación o pensión o los riesgos profesionales, las controversias que se susciten en el ámbito del Derecho laboral individual y colectivo (v. gr. conflictos de carácter económico-social), de todo lo relativo al ejercicio del derecho a la huelga o el paro, etc. En igual sentido, se impone reconocer que tratándose de empleados encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común de empresas públicas o de servicios económicos desarrollados por una administración pública o de simples obreros, trabajadores o empleados que no participan de la gestión pública del respectivo ente público, esto es, de los que la doctrina denomina “trabajadores de la administración pública”, las controversias surgidas deben ser conocidas y resueltas por la jurisdicción laboral, al no tratarse, en sentido estricto, de un funcionario, servidor o empleado público (artículos 111, párrafo 2°, y 112, párrafo 2°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), dado que, cualquier conducta emanada del ente público, en tal contexto, no estará sometida al régimen jurídico administrativo y tampoco podrá ser reputada, materialmente, como una relación jurídico-administrativa.
Es preciso resaltar que el constituyente optó por órdenes jurisdiccionales especializados por razón de la materia –por lo menos hasta cierta instancia-, como una garantía de acierto y un medio para el logro del imperativo constitucional de una justicia pronta y cumplida. Si bien, el artículo 41 constitucional consagra el derecho general de acceso a la jurisdicción, luego los numerales 10, 48, 49, 70 y 153 de la norma fundamental optan, claramente, por el establecimiento de jurisdicciones especializadas. De manera que el justiciable tiene el derecho de elegir ante cuál orden jurisdiccional acciona, en el tanto la naturaleza material de la pretensión y el régimen jurídico aplicable sea congruente con la especialidad –constitucional o legal- de la respectiva jurisdicción. Este Tribunal Constitucional no obvia que en la práctica judicial, por una inadecuada o defectuosa representación o asesoría jurídica, los justiciables pueden incurrir en equívocos al deducir una pretensión o al combinarlas ante un orden jurisdiccional determinado, sin embargo, en tales casos, debe procederse, por el órgano jurisdiccional, con la celeridad y economía procesal debidas, a desacumular las pretensiones que, por su contenido sustancial y el régimen jurídico aplicable, no deben ventilarse en esa sede, así como dar curso ágil a las procedentes, si otra causa no lo impide.
En igual sentido, ante el surgimiento de cualquier conflicto de competencia, los órganos jurisdiccionales involucrados y la Sala Primera de Casación, en cuanto funge como Tribunal de Conflictos entre las jurisdicciones contencioso-administrativa y laboral, deben ser particularmente diligentes al tramitarlo y dirimirlo para evitar cualquier dilación indebida o retardo injustificado que afecte sensiblemente el derecho fundamental a una justicia pronta (artículo 41 constitucional) o el derecho humano contenido en la Convención Americana a un proceso en un plazo razonable (artículo 8.1).
VII.INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA SALA PRIMERA DE CASACIÓN EN LA INTERPRETACIÓN Y APLICACIÓN DEL ARTÍCULO 4°, INCISO A), DE LA LEY REGULADORA DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVA AL RESOLVER LOS CONFLICTOS DE COMPETENCIA ENTRE LAS JURISDICCIÓN LABORAL Y CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVA. Los accionantes impugnan, también, por inconstitucional la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de Casación, al fungir como Tribunal de Conflictos de competencia entre la jurisdicción laboral y contencioso-administrativa, y, particularmente, al aplicar el numeral 4, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa. El Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 de 24 de abril de 2006 –entrado en vigencia el 1° de enero de 2008, según la vacatio legis dispuesta en el artículo 222 de ese cuerpo normativo- derogó la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa No. 3667 de 12 de marzo de 1966 (artículo 198 del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), empero, dentro de las disposiciones de Derecho interino del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, los Transitorios III y IV preceptuaron lo siguiente:
“TRANSITORIO III.- El régimen de impugnación de los actos que hayan quedado firmes en la vía administrativa antes de la vigencia del presente Código, se regirá por la legislación vigente en ese momento.
TRANSITORIO IV.- Los procesos contencioso-administrativos y los juicios ordinarios atribuidos a la vía civil de Hacienda, interpuestos con anterioridad a la entrada en vigencia de este Código, cualquiera que sea su estado procesal, continuarán sustanciándose, en todos sus trámites y recursos, por las normas que regían a la fecha de inicio. Para tal efecto, el Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda continuará con el trámite de dichos asuntos hasta su finalización, y el Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo mantendrá las secciones que sean convenientes para conocer de las demandas de impugnación previstas en los artículos 82 a 90 de la Ley reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, y en grado de las resoluciones que dicte el Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda”.
Independientemente, de la interpretación que le haya brindado la jurisdicción ordinaria a estas normas transitorias, lo cierto del caso es que dejan patente la ultra-actividad de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa y de aquellas interpretaciones judiciales, en materia de conflictos de competencia, que se produjeron en el momento procesal oportuno y que, incluso, podrían verificarse en un futuro respecto de los procesos aún en trámite bajo la derogada legislación adjetiva. Por consiguiente, la impugnada es una pauta jurisprudencial que sigue produciendo efectos, sin descartarse la posibilidad que lo haga en un futuro para asuntos iniciados con fundamento en la legislación formal derogada todavía sin fenecer definitivamente. Desde los tempranos Votos Nos. 185-95 de las 16:35 hrs. de 10 de enero de 1995 y 4587-97 de las 15:45 hrs. de 5 de agosto de 1997, este Tribunal Constitucional admitió, por vía de integración normativa, la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los criterios reiterados por los órganos jurisdiccionales que ha creado una pauta jurisprudencial, puesto que, el artículo 3° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece que se tendrá por infringida la Constitución cuando esto resulte de la interpretación que hagan las autoridades públicas de las normas jurídicas y de los efectos jurídicos que ésta produzca, todo en concordancia con el objeto supremo de la jurisdicción constitucional de garantizar la supremacía del Derecho de la Constitución (artículos 10 de la Constitución y 1° de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).
En la especie, se impugna la línea jurisprudencial sentada por la Sala Primera de Casación, que arranca a partir de la resolución No. 607-C-01 de las 10:09 hrs. de 10 de agosto de 2001, al resolver conflictos de competencia entre la jurisdicción laboral y contencioso-administrativa y remitir el asunto a la primera, aún cuando se trata de pretensiones materialmente regidas por el Derecho Administrativo (v. gr. nulidad de un acto de despido, reinstalación y pago de daños y perjuicios), al estimar, grosso modo, que cualquier controversia que se genere en las relaciones de empleo público es “de índole netamente laboral”. Para tal efecto, se aporta copia de las siguientes resoluciones de esa instancia judicial: 770-C-2001 de las 9:51 hrs. de 3 de octubre de 2001, 478-C-2005 de las 9:40 hrs. de 7 de julio de 2005, 742-C-2006 de las 10:05 hrs. de 5 de octubre de 2006 y 769-C-2007 de las 15:20 hrs. de 31 de octubre de 2007, con lo cual se tiene por cumplido el requisito de acreditar la pauta jurisprudencial.
A tenor de las consideraciones vertidas en los considerandos precedentes, es evidente que la línea jurisprudencial de la Sala Primera de Casación que dispuso, antes de la entrada en vigencia del nuevo Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, y en aplicación de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, remitir a la vía laboral cualquier proceso en el que se deduzca una pretensión dentro del marco de una relación estatutaria, por considerarla una controversia de “índole netamente laboral”, resulta, a toda luces, inconstitucional al quebrantar el artículo 49 de la Constitución. En efecto, tal y como se señaló, habrá pretensiones que, por su carácter material o sustancial y el régimen jurídico aplicable, aunque deducidas en el contexto de una relación de empleo público, deben ser conocidas y resueltas, por imperativo constitucional (artículo 49 de la Constitución), por la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, esto es, todas aquellas en las que un funcionario o servidor público cuestione la conformidad sustancial o validez de cualquier manifestación específica de la función administrativa o conducta administrativa con el ordenamiento jurídico-administrativo.
VIII.INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD ADUCIDA DEL ARTÍCULO 4°, INCISO A), DE LA LEY REGULADORA DE LA JURISDICCIÓN CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVA. El artículo 4°, inciso a), de la derogada Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (No. 3667 de 12 de marzo de 1966) que todavía sigue produciendo efectos jurídicos en los procesos incoados antes de la entrada en vigor del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, disponía lo siguiente:
“No corresponderán a la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa:
Consecuentemente, el artículo 4°, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa tenía un contenido más elástico o una textura más abierta –en contraste con la rigidez y radicalidad del artículo 3°, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo- que permitía interpretaciones conformes con el Derecho de la Constitución y, en particular, con lo dispuesto en el artículo 49 constitucional. En suma, a partir del texto legislativo impugnado es posible distinguir, con meridiana claridad, dos tipos de pretensiones –según su contenido material o sustancial y el régimen jurídico aplicable-, esto es, las dirigidas a cuestionar la validez o conformidad sustancial de una conducta administrativa con el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo y aquellas que, aunque relacionadas con la conducta formal de las administraciones públicas –dado el carácter eminentemente revisor u objetivo del modelo de justicia administrativa establecido en la Ley de 1966-, que por su materialidad y el régimen jurídico aplicable, deben ser conocidas y resueltas por la jurisdicción laboral al encontrarse regidas por el Derecho del Trabajo –individual o colectivo-.
Por el carácter vinculante que tiene, incluso, la parte considerativa de las sentencias constitucionales, debe, en adelante, la Sala Primera de Casación, si tuviere que aplicar el artículo 4°, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, tomar nota de las razones vertidas en esta sentencia para revertir la línea jurisprudencial o interpretativa que ahora se declara inconstitucional, admitiendo la interpretación conforme con el artículo 49 constitucional del numeral de ley impugnado. Por estas razones, estima esta Sala que la norma impugnada no resulta, por sí misma, inconstitucional, por lo que tal extremo debe ser desestimado. Lo que sí resulta inconstitucional, como se apuntó, en el considerando precedente, es la interpretación que ha efectuado de la norma la Sala Primera de Casación desde el año 2001.
En mérito de las razones expuestas se impone declarar parcialmente con lugar las acciones de inconstitucionalidad acumuladas, según se indica en la parte dispositiva.
POR TANTO:
Se declaran parcialmente con lugar las acciones acumuladas. Se declara inconstitucional el artículo 3°, inciso a), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo (Ley No. 8508 de 28 de abril de 2006) y la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de Casación de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que, en aplicación del artículo 4°, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, remitía a la jurisdicción laboral cualquier controversia relacionada con una relación de empleo público al considerarla “netamente laboral”, aunque el justiciable pretendiera, materialmente, impugnar la disconformidad sustancial o invalidez de una conducta administrativa o manifestación específica de la función administrativa con el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo, surgida en una relación estatutaria. En cuanto a la impugnación del artículo 4°, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa se desestiman las acciones acumuladas.
Esta declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de la norma y la jurisprudencia impugnadas, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe, las relaciones y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas por prescripción, caducidad o sentencia pasada en autoridad de cosa juzgada material. Publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial y reséñese en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta. Notifíquese a la Procuraduría General de la República, los accionantes, los coadyuvantes y las autoridades judiciales que conocen del asunto previo. Comuníquese a la presidencia de la Asamblea Legislativa y de la Sala Primera de Casación de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.
Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
801/199/ibj.-
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