Constitutionality of curing failure to exhaust administrative remedies in municipal mattersConstitucionalidad del saneamiento de la falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa en materia municipal

CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours twenty-one minutes on the twelfth of December of two thousand twelve.

Discretionary judicial consultation filed by the CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY COURT, EIGHTH SECTION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSE, ANNEX, regarding whether articles 120 subsection 4) and 31 subsection 1) of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code are contrary to articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution.

Resultando

1-. By resolution of fourteen hours on the twenty-sixth of July of the current year, issued in case file [...], the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Eighth Section, requested that this Chamber rule on the constitutionality of articles 120 subsection 4) and 31 subsection 1) of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code. It states that this Chamber, in judgment 2005-06866, had defined that the improper two-headed hierarchy in municipal matters is of constitutional origin, which is why they believe it makes the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) mandatory in that matter, without any exception. They believe that the legislator, upon enacting law number 8508, in the articles under consultation, chose to establish an exception contra legem. They indicate that in the case serving as the basis for the consultation—a proceeding in municipal matters—the processing judge did not note sua sponte that administrative remedies had not been exhausted, nor is it evident that the defect was alleged by the defendant; therefore, the only judge who could have rectified the procedure did not do so, and they, the judges of the oral and public phase, have no option but to hold the debate, applying a rule they consider unconstitutional because it deems the lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies rectified by stating: "Article 120 subsection 4. If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that administrative remedies have not been exhausted, the defect shall be deemed rectified." This rule applied to municipal matters, in their view, strips articles 173 and 182 of their essential content, for which the framers did provide prior exhaustion as a requirement to access the judicial path. They believe the same defect is present in the case of article 31 subsection 1) of the same Code concerning administrative contracting matters.

2.- All parties having been summoned in the resolution of fourteen hours on the twenty-sixth of July of the current year, and duly notified, no filings of appearance or arguments appear in the case file.

3.- By resolution of eleven hours on the twenty-first of August of two thousand twelve, the Presidency of the Chamber accepted the consultation, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República). The Office of the Attorney General states in its response that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a procedural institute specific to the contentious administrative process whose foundation rests on the power of self-protection (auto tutela) inherent to the Public Administration. It adds that this institute basically consists of the obligation to exhaust the administrative remedies that the legal system establishes against administrative acts as a prerequisite for the admissibility of lawsuits against them in court. It establishes that the configuration of the procedural institute of exhaustion of administrative remedies falls within the scope of legislative discretion, and that, as this Constitutional Chamber has recognized in its case law, judgment number 3669-2006 of fifteen hours on the fifteenth of March of two thousand six, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory in matters governed by constitutional articles 173 and 184, that is, in municipal and administrative contracting matters, by express provision of the framers; therefore, it considers the rule under consultation to be unconstitutional.

4-. In the processing of the proceeding, the legal requirements have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate Mora Mora; and,

Considerando

I.- ADMISSIBILITY. Article 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) establishes the prerequisites for the admission of judicial consultations, a provision from which elements emerge that condition its origin: a) that it be filed by a judge; b) that there be "well-founded doubts" regarding the constitutionality of the rule, act, conduct, or omission to be applied or adjudicated in a case submitted to the cognizance of the judge or tribunal; and c) that in that prior matter, the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be adjudicated. These prerequisites were analyzed by this Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 1617-1997 of fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on the seventeenth of March of nineteen ninety-seven, at which time the following was stated:

"(...) A. That it be filed by a «judge», a generic term that—of course—applies both to single-member judges and to collegial tribunals, and concerning which it is unnecessary to specify further than: a) that it must involve authorities vested with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations filed by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is facing the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitral award, endowed with the authority of res judicata); and b) that the judge must be, at the time of filing the consultation, duly empowered to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure that, like this one, has a purely incidental character).

B. That there be «well-founded doubts» regarding the constitutionality of the rule, act, conduct, or omission to be applied or adjudicated. This means the questioning must be reasonable and considered. It also implies it cannot concern aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would mean disregarding the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under such circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it must be emphasized, due to its relevance to the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those rulings in which the Chamber has expressly validated the conformity of the rule, act, conduct, or omission to constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a rule has previously passed explicit constitutional scrutiny (by way of an action or consultation), a new challenge on the same point would not be viable, but it could be regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same rule, particularly because—in this case—there is always the possibility of a constitutional violation, no longer in the rule itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps through an amparo or habeas corpus proceeding) does not mean there cannot be doubts about the constitutionality of the rule itself upon which they are based. And, under this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.

C. That there be a case submitted to the cognizance of the judge or tribunal. As in the action of unconstitutionality, the judicial consultation never occurs in a vacuum or for mere academic interest; rather, it must be relevant to the decision or resolution of the so-called «prior» or «principal» matter. Finally, D. That, in that prior matter, the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be adjudicated, an aspect that—due to its relevance for the case—is appropriate to clarify. Indeed, the expression «the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be adjudicated» carries a very defined current meaning and is completely different from if the law spoke in terms of «the rule may be applied or the act, conduct, or omission may be adjudicated». The judicial consultation is not available upon the mere eventuality that those circumstances may occur, since—as explained above—this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinal exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the rule or the adjudication of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality (...)." (The emphasis is not part of the original).

In the case under review, the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Eighth Section, raises its doubts regarding the constitutionality of articles 120 subsection 4) and 31 subsection 1) of the Contentious Administrative Procedural Code in relation to articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution. However, in the case of article 31 subsection 1), the consultation must be rejected because the incidental requirement that the challenged rule be applicable to the case giving rise to the consultation is not met. As the Court correctly notes, the proceeding serving as the basis for the consultation concerns municipal matters, and the cited rule refers partially to administrative contracting matters, such that one of the admissibility requirements demanded by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction in its cited article 102 is not present. Consequently, the filed consultation is partially rejected regarding this rule and its relation to article 182 of the Political Constitution, and it is admitted, for meeting the formal requirements, as it relates to the cited article 120 subsection 4) and to article 31 subsection 1) only regarding its relation to municipal matters.

II.- RULES UNDER CONSULTATION. Article 120 subsection 4) of the current Contentious Administrative Procedural Code states:

"1) The judgment shall declare the inadmissibility, in whole or in part, of the claim in the following cases:

(...)

• 4)If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that administrative remedies have not been exhausted, the defect shall be deemed rectified." For its part, article 31 subsection 1) states:
• 1)"The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be optional, except as provided in articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution." III.- CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS. It is correct to affirm that the constitutionality of the exhaustion of administrative remedies was analyzed by this Chamber in judgments 3669-2006 and 9928-2010, in which it was determined that, except for the exceptions contained in articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution, referring respectively to municipal and administrative contracting matters, requiring the prior exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition for accessing the judicial path is contrary to the Political Constitution.

Regarding what is relevant, it was stated:

"IV.- PRECEPTIVE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS. In the classic conception of substantial and formal Administrative Law, public administrations, insofar as they seek and attend to public interests or the satisfaction of collective needs, must be vested with a series of extraordinary prerogatives. Thus, in the field of Administrative Procedural Law, traditionally, the preceptive exhaustion of administrative remedies or the prior gubernative path was admitted as a formal privilege, that is, that those administered who consider themselves injured or aggrieved by an administrative act must, prior to resorting to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, exhaust all ordinary administrative remedies available against it at the administrative venue. Consequently, the exhaustion of administrative remedies becomes a prerequisite for the admissibility of the contentious administrative process in its classic and traditional objective or reviewing version. At the basis of this institute lies the so-called prerogative of declarative and executive self-protection of public administrations, which in turn has found support in principles such as effectiveness, efficiency, and good administration.

Declarative self-protection means that public entities can, by and for themselves, without needing to resort to a judge, impose obligations on those administered or suppress or modify their substantial legal situations—whether called subjective rights or legitimate interests. The unavoidable legislative obligation of the administered party to file or raise all ordinary administrative remedies against an administrative act before resorting to the contentious-administrative judge constitutes a specific manifestation of the declarative self-protection of public administrations, since the legislator expects that the public administration itself may defend the challenged administrative act or annul or modify it, sparing it from having to appear before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In this way, in the administrative venue, the public administration becomes, at the same time, judge and party, since it must address the requests or petitions filed by those administered and resolve the ordinary administrative remedies that may be available against the final act it itself issues. As can be seen, self-protection is a concept diametrically opposed to that which prevails in the rest of the legal branches, where heterotutela (heteroprotection) operates, that is, protection exercised by a third party supra partes with the constitutional guarantees of impartiality, independence, and objectivity, such as a jurisdictional body. Thus, by way of example, in the field of Private Law, an individual can impose an obligation on or affect the substantial legal situations of another, solely and exclusively, if this arises consensually through the application of the principle of party autonomy (article 28 of the Political Constitution) or through the intervention of a judge (article 41 of the Political Constitution). However, the guiding principles of administrative organization and function, efficiency and effectiveness, embodied in the Political Constitution itself (articles 140, subsection 8°, and 191), must be understood, at all times and under any circumstance, as subordinated to fundamental rights and must yield before them, since they constitute the foundation and the basis of the entire legal system. In modern times, public administrations must be conceived and understood as another legal subject within the legal system, so that the asymmetry or chronic inequality that prevails in the field of contentious-administrative jurisdiction between the administered or citizen and the respective public entity is repugnant to Constitutional Law.

The legislative recognition and granting of a series of formal or adjective prerogatives to public entities in the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order has no objective and reasonable justification if their administrative function, in accordance with the constitutional parameter (articles 33 and 49 of the Political Constitution), must be subject to plenary and universal legality review, without fissures or exempt redoubts, and, above all, if they are created and set in motion to serve or meet the needs of citizens or those administered—service-oriented organizations (organizaciones serviciales)—.

V.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRECEPTIVE NATURE OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. Currently, especially in light of the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and the stronger binding force of fundamental rights, as well as their expansive and progressive effectiveness and more favorable interpretation, it is understood that the mandatory or preceptive nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies clashes with the fundamental right of those administered to obtain prompt and complete justice under articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution (effective judicial protection) and with the principle of equality, since only in the contentious-administrative process—and not in the other jurisdictions—is the person seeking justice obligated, before resorting to the judicial path, to exhaust all ordinary administrative remedies available. The infringement on the fundamental right to prompt and complete justice arises from the following aspects: a) Normally, when the administered party files ordinary remedies of revocation, appeal, or reconsideration—the latter understood as the horizontal remedy available against the acts of the supreme hierarchical head or superior—they do not succeed in having the body itself or its superior modify or annul it, such that exhausting administrative remedies is like drawing water from a dry well, obtaining nothing from filing the remedies, thus transforming it into a heavy burden or a kind of via crucis for the administered party; b) it is known that the administrative procedure and its recourse or review phase often extend beyond legal deadlines and what may be conceived as a reasonable period, thereby indefinitely prolonging, even for years, access to effective judicial protection, without the possibility of doing so immediately and when deemed appropriate; c) the sum of the time needed to exhaust administrative remedies together with that required by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction causes the administered parties to obtain tardy justice, which, eventually, may transform—depending on its prolongation and the particular circumstances of the administered parties seeking justice—into a denial of justice; the foregoing constitutes a clear and evident relative advantage for public entities from which they sometimes benefit, since the administered party or citizen passes—by their ordinary condition as an individual—and the public administration remains prolonged over time. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, it must be indicated that the preceptive exhaustion of administrative remedies, derived from the privilege of declarative self-protection, exposes the person seeking justice who litigates against a public administration to a discriminatory situation, since there is no objective and reasonable motive to subject them to that mandatory requirement, unlike the rest of the jurisdictional orders. It must be considered that even the freedom of legislative configuration or discretion when designing the various processes has the principle of equality as an insurmountable limit. The foregoing is reinforced if it is considered that public administrations are just another legal subject that should not enjoy such privileges or prerogatives and that the central axis in a service-providing administration or in a Social and Democratic Rule of Law State is the person, that is, the user or consumer of public goods and services. In essence, public interests and the satisfaction of collective needs cannot be taken as empowering clauses to undermine the fundamental rights of those administered or, simply, as an altar for them to be sacrificed.

VI.- ADAPTATION OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETER: OPTIONAL OR ELECTIVE NATURE FOR THE ADMINISTERED PARTY. The most favorable interpretation of the expansive and progressive effectiveness of the fundamental rights of those administered to prompt and complete justice and to equality requires a qualitative rethinking of the mandatory nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies imposed by the legislator. Indeed, it must be understood that the exhaustion of administrative remedies should be left to the free choice of the administered party, so that it is the latter who, after making a probability judgment about the eventual success of their action at the administrative venue, decides whether or not to file the available administrative remedies. It is to be expected that the possibilities of the administered party are reinforced when dealing with so-called "administrative tribunals" (e.g., Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental), Tax Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo), National Customs Tribunal (Tribunal Aduanero Nacional), Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal del Servicio Civil), Teaching Career Tribunal (Tribunal de Carrera Docente), Administrative Registry Tribunal (Tribunal Registral Administrativo), Transport Tribunal (Tribunal de Transportes), etc.), since, as these have been constituted, almost usually, as highly deconcentrated bodies, a greater guarantee of technical specialty, impartiality, and objectivity is obtained, as the hierarchical relationship fades and any political criterion dissolves. The idea of the optional nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not alien or foreign to the infra-constitutional legal system; the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction itself establishes four scenarios where it is optional. Thus, article 32 exempts the presumed act due to negative silence when it emanates from the hierarchical head, acts not manifested in writing—tacit—, and regulations from the remedy of reconsideration. Article 87, in the case of the special process for the removal of directors of decentralized entities, establishes that it is not necessary to file the prior remedy of reconsideration. For its part, article 357 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) stipulates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge de facto actions. Finally, the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction itself, in its article 31, indicates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to resort to an amparo proceeding. It is necessary to clarify and warn, although it is not the object of this judicial consultation, due to its transcendental importance, that the statute of limitations for the action—whatever it may be—when the administered party chooses not to exhaust administrative remedies, will begin to run from the notification of the unchallenged final act. In sum, the elective nature of the administrative path is absolutely consistent with the fundamental rights of those administered to access jurisdiction, to prompt and complete justice (article 41 of the Political Constitution), to equality (article 33 of the Political Constitution), and to review the legality of the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution). That said, it must be highlighted that it is equally constitutional for the administered party to choose to go directly to the judicial path, without exhausting administrative remedies, as when they choose to do so.

VII.- PRECEPTIVE EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT. The original framers established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is preceptive, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of correctness, speed, and economy for the administered party. In such circumstances are numerals 173, regarding municipal agreements, insofar as paragraph 2° of that numeral establishes that if the objected or challenged agreement is not revoked or reformed, the background documents will pass to a Court dependent on the Judicial Branch as indicated by law for it to resolve definitively, and 184, insofar as it reserves for the Comptroller General of the Republic the improper hierarchy of administrative acts issued in administrative contracting matters. In these two scenarios, since a constitutional rule provides coverage for the preceptive exhaustion of administrative remedies, that mandatory prerequisite for the admissibility of a contentious-administrative proceeding cannot be considered unconstitutional.

VIII.- TACITLY CONSENTED ACT: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS. Another of the formal privileges of public administrations in the contentious-administrative process is the dogmatic and legislative figure of the tacitly consented act, which has an irrefutable logic in relation to the preceptive exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies—sustained by the privilege of declarative self-protection—is a mandatory admissibility requirement, consequently, if the administered party does not timely and formally exercise the available administrative remedies, the legislator presumes, from the omitted conduct of the administered party, that they have tacitly consented to the administrative act by not challenging it within the deadlines and through the means provided by the legal system. This procedural institute is a direct violation of the fundamental right of those administered to access jurisdiction (article 41 of the Political Constitution), since it perpetually prevents them from discussing the matter before the jurisdiction provided by the framers to exercise legality review of the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution), simply because they did not exercise and file the available administrative remedies. Consequently, if the adaptation of the exhaustion of administrative remedies to the constitutional parameter compels considering it optional or elective for the administered party, the figure of the consented act must be deemed unconstitutional insofar as it implicitly assumes such a requirement must be mandatorily fulfilled.

IX.- RELATED RULES. Article 89 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction directs that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a rule or law shall also declare that of the other provisions thereof whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. That numeral, by virtue of article 108 ibidem, is applicable suppletorily to judicial consultations. For the foregoing reasons, this Constitutional Court considers that by connection with the rules under consultation, the following articles of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa) are also unconstitutional: a) The phrase of article 18, paragraph 1° of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction insofar as it establishes "(...) that are not susceptible to further remedy through administrative channels (...)"; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1° of article 41 of that normative body insofar as it provides "d) That administrative remedies have not been exhausted"; c) Paragraph 3° of article 33 of that law by providing "3. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies shall give rise to its assertion by way of preliminary defense, if the Court does not perceive the defect at the stage foreseen in article 41"; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4° of article 33 by stating "(...) for not having been challenged administratively in a timely and proper manner"; e) subsection c) of article 50 of the referenced law by indicating "c) The failure to exhaust administrative remedies".

However, although the cited judgment recognizes the existence of the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a requirement in municipal and administrative contracting matters, the Chamber considers the reasoning of the consulting Court to be erroneous in giving the cited constitutional rules and case law a scope they do not have. Certainly, the Constitution establishes the exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal and administrative contracting matters, but it does not regulate the manner in which that exhaustion must be credited within the judicial process.

The nature of this legal mechanism (instituto) by logic requires that the claim of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía) be raised and demanded by the administration at the very beginning of the process. Given that the process is a logical sequence of actions, the legislator may well order at which phase of the proceeding, according to the nature of the mechanism, a certain requirement must be enforced, especially taking into account that several equally relevant constitutional norms coexist within it, which must be harmonized to guarantee due process (debido proceso) and effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) for individuals. In this sense, the principles of prompt justice and effective judicial protection require that in this case, if the interested party had the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust administrative remedies at the start of the process and did not do so, that procedural stage has precluded (precluido) in favor of the administered party. If the aim is to safeguard the principle of administrative self-protection (autotutela) and the opportunity to correct a void act or one that may generate liability for the State, the administration can correct it at any time. In the specific case, the administration had the full opportunity to timely allege the defect and did not do so, and while it is true that it is the responsibility of the judge in the intermediate stage to purge the process, if neither did so, even though the party had the possibility of invoking the defect, it cannot be said that the administration was left defenseless, nor that the administered party must bear the omissions of both. If we take the right to appeal, for example—a right derived from due process—it could not be argued that this right assists the party openly at all stages of the same, but rather it is the legislator who, attending to its nature, determines the time, mode, and deadline for its exercise, a right which, if waived by the interested party, may cause the stage to be precluded, depending on the process in question. Ultimately, this is a matter of procedural ordering, which, as indicated, contains several constitutional rights to balance and harmonize. Determining that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies can be alleged openly at any phase of the process, even at the trial stage, is to place this legal mechanism above essential fundamental rights such as celerity and prompt and complete justice. As the jurisprudence (jurisprudencia) of this Chamber has indicated (8549-2002), it is a constitutional imperative that both administrative and judicial procedures be prompt, timely, and complete for the sake of transcendental constitutional values such as legal security (seguridad jurídica) and legal certainty (certeza jurídica), of which all administered parties are deserving recipients. As the cited judgment correctly indicates, for the foregoing reason, administrative procedures are informed by a series of principles of deep constitutional roots, such as those of promptness and timeliness (Article 41 of the Political Constitution), better known as celerity or speed (Articles 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law on Public Administration), effectiveness and efficiency (Articles 140, subsection 8, of the Political Constitution, 4, 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law on Public Administration), procedural simplicity and economy (Article 269, paragraph 1, ibidem), which impose on public entities the imperative obligation to conduct them within a reasonable timeframe and without undue delays, i.e., without serious and unjustified delays to avoid the frustration, eventual extinction, or serious injury of the substantial legal situations invoked by the administered parties due to the passage of excessive and unreasonable time. “The substantial and positional privilege of public administrations, called declaratory self-protection (autotutela declarativa) and which, ultimately, constitutes a heavy burden for the administered parties, should not be inverted and used by them to cause an unlawful injury to the administered party through the unnecessary prolongation of administrative procedures.” The same arguments are valid for judicial processes, such that it makes no sense that, when the administration had the possibility—with knowledge of the claimants' pretensions—of having, on one hand, alleged the defect of failure to exhaust administrative remedies at the beginning of the process, or, on the other hand, reversed the act if it so deemed, in exercise of the principle of self-protection, it did neither, and that, in the face of its inaction and that of the processing judge, the interest of the administration is placed before that of the administered party, when the process has already advanced to the start of the trial phase. The administered party has no reason to suffer the inaction of the administration, or of the administration of justice, to the detriment of their constitutional right to prompt and complete justice and their right to be effectively protected, especially considering that in this matter, the administration enjoys an advantage—by constitutional provision—over the administered party, which it did not know how to invoke or defend in a timely manner.

VI.- COROLLARY. In sum, this Chamber interprets that Articles 120, subsection 4) and 31, subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, the latter in its relation with Article 173 of the Political Constitution, are not contrary to the Political Constitution, in that what they do is regulate the form and procedural moment in which the exhaustion of remedies referred to in the constitutional norms can be enforced. Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, and Magistrate Rueda Leal issues a dissenting vote (salva el voto) and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code unconstitutional.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO) The consultation is summarily rejected (se rechaza de plano) regarding Article 31, subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code in relation to Article 182 of the Political Constitution. The consultation formulated is evacuated in the sense that Articles 120, subsection 4), and 31, subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, the latter in its relation with Article 173 of the Political Constitution, are not contrary to the Political Constitution. Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons. Magistrate Rueda Leal issues a dissenting vote and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code unconstitutional.

Gilbert Armijo S.

Acting President (Presidente a.i.)

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L. José Paulino Hernández G.

DIFFERENT REASONS OF MAGISTRATES JINESTA LOBO AND HERNANDEZ GUTIERREZ Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. Indeed, Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, Law No. 8508 of April 28, 2006, literally stated the following:

"If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that there is a failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), the defect shall be considered cured (subsanado)" By virtue of what was resolved by this Constitutional Chamber in Vote No. 3669-06 and subsection 31, paragraph 1, the constitutional rule or principle is that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is optional or voluntary, by virtue of the fundamental and human rights that assist the administered litigant who maintains a controversy with a public administration. Consequently, Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code has meaning, precisely, only for the exceptional cases in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory. This article has no meaning or application for the rest of the ordinary hypotheses where exhaustion is optional or voluntary. The purpose of introducing a precept of this nature into the procedural legislation is based on clear constitutional reasons, which are the following:

a. The exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a right of public administrations, but a privilege or prerogative that violates the principle and right to equality.

b. By application of the constitutional principles of legal security and legal certainty, public administrations may well—when the exhaustion of administrative remedies is exceptionally mandatory—put forward such a privilege as a preliminary defense. This is confirmed by Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, which enables the representatives of the sued public powers to allege as a preliminary defense the "Failure to exhaust administrative remedies, when applicable." Consequently, the sued public administration has a procedural opportunity to put forward such a defense, and if it does not take advantage of it, it must bear the consequences of its own negligence and that of its representative. Furthermore, the new model of administrative justice introduced the figure of the "Processing Judge" (Juez tramitador) responsible for purging (sanear) the process during the preliminary hearing (Article 90, paragraph 1, subsection a, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code), and during that stage, all defects of the process must be noticed, and the preliminary defense under Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code must even be resolved, so that the interested party can cure any defect on this particular point (Article 92 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code). In short, by application of the constitutional principles of legal security and legal certainty, there is a specific procedural moment to raise the failure to exhaust administrative remedies in cases where it is mandatory; otherwise, the figure of preclusion (preclusión) operates, which has full support in the constitutional principles already indicated.

c. The right to effective judicial protection or prompt and complete justice (Article 41 of the Constitution) and to control the legality of all forms of manifestation of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Constitution) assists the administered litigant, who, if the sued public administration omitted to raise the preliminary defense of mandatory exhaustion and if the processing judge did not notice such a defect, must not bear the consequences of the negligent conduct of both the sued public entity and the processing judge.

d. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies as an instrument to prevent knowledge of the case on its merits is an eminently formal figure that must yield to the demands of material justice that assist the litigant who seeks it before the courts of law, for the sake of knowing and resolving the merits and seeking a definitive solution to the controversy, that is, the constitutional rule of "in dubio pro accione," implicitly contained in Article 41 of the Constitution.

For the reasons stated, we consider that Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code is in accordance with the standard of constitutionality.

Ernesto Jinesta L. José Paulino Hernández G.

DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE RUEDA The undersigned Magistrate Rueda Leal partially separates myself from the majority decision because I consider that the consultation should be evacuated in the sense that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code is unconstitutional. I must clarify that I share the assessment made in the majority vote, in the sense of summarily rejecting the consultation regarding Article 31, subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code in relation to Article 182 of the Political Constitution, since indeed the requirement of incidentality, which requires that the challenged norm be applicable to the case giving rise to the consultation, is not met. As the consulting Court informs, the process that serves as the basis for the consultation is of municipal matter, and given that the cited Article 31, subsection 1) refers partially to matters of administrative contracting, one of the admissibility requirements demanded by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction to hear a case regarding the constitutionality of that norm would not be met. However, regarding the question of constitutionality raised by the consulting body related to Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, I do believe a ruling on the merits should be issued in the following sense:

First, I consider that the Constitutional Text clearly establishes in its section 173 that, in municipal matters, the exhaustion of administrative remedies must be completed before the "Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates to resolve definitively." That is, prior to filing any jurisdictional process or action, the challenged administrative act must pass through a final filter before the improper biphasic hierarchical body in municipal matters indicated by section 173 of the Constitution itself and, consequently, exhaust administrative remedies through that instance. Under this understanding, the consulting parties are correct in the sense that the exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters is of constitutional origin; for this reason, I consider that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code does directly violate the Constitution, since by virtue of this norm, the defect of not having previously exhausted administrative remedies in municipal matters is allowed to be considered cured, despite the express mandate established in the Constitution in the sense that this type of exhaustion is mandatory and imperative. As stated in judgment number [...] by this Chamber: "It must be noted that the only improper biphasic hierarchy that the original constituent power itself admitted, so much so that it took the trouble to regulate it expressly in the constitutional text itself—which confirms its highly exceptional character—, is that of Article 173, paragraph 2, of the Political Constitution, when indicating that the review and oversight of the agreements of the Municipal Councils shall be the responsibility of the '(…) Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates (…)' –the Contentious-Administrative Court-." Ergo, due to the special character that the Constitution itself provides regarding this type of exhaustion of remedies in municipal matters, I consider that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code is indeed unconstitutional. Second, the administrative body or instance that finally reviews the challenged act in municipal matters constitutes a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, economy, impartiality, independence, and objectivity for the administered party, because said task is entrusted to an improper hierarchical superior, different from the instance where the questioned administrative act was issued, hence the Original Constituent Power considered it appropriate to exhaust administrative remedies in municipal matters, thanks to the guarantees implied by resorting to an instance independent of the one that issued the act.

Third, this very Chamber, in judgment number 3669-2006 of 15:00 hours on March 15, 2006, established the following:

"VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT. The original constituent power established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, and economy for the administered party. In such circumstances, sections 173 regarding municipal agreements are found, insofar as paragraph 2 of that section establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or modified, the records shall be forwarded to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates to resolve definitively, and 184 insofar as it reserves for the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) the improper hierarchy over administrative acts issued in matters of administrative contracting. In these two cases, given the existence of a constitutional norm that provides coverage for mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be considered that this mandatory prerequisite for the admissibility of a contentious-administrative process is unconstitutional." Thus, disregarding such a clear pronouncement would result in a situation generating legal insecurity, by ignoring the mandatory nature that the precedents of this Court have already indicated on the topic of exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters.

Fourth, I do not share the thesis of the majority of the Chamber set forth in the sub lite, in the sense that the nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters, by logic, requires that its non-compliance be invoked at the beginning of the judicial process, and that therefore it is also logical that the legislator can order at which phase of the judicial process this failure of exhaustion must be invoked. This is because, since this exhaustion is mandatory in municipal matters (by direct provision of the Constitution), it can be invoked at any moment when one of the parties becomes aware of it. Nor is it true that if the interested party had the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust remedies (in municipal matters) at the beginning of the process and did not do so, it should be considered that that stage has been precluded, since as explained supra, the Constitutional Text establishes that this exhaustion is mandatory, and therefore it could not be precluded, even if the legislator so provides, under penalty of incurring a defect of unconstitutionality. Thus, I consider that—specifically—Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code does directly violate the Fundamental Charter, by considering a defect cured that the Constitution itself requires as mandatory, i.e., that must be complied with. Regarding the consulted Article 31, subsection 1), I find no conflict with the Constitution, because it precisely indicates that "The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be optional, except for what is provided in Articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution"; contrario sensu, the exhaustion of administrative remedies for the cases contemplated in Article 173 of the Constitution is mandatory, as has been maintained in this dissenting vote and as the Chamber has explained in its precedents.

Ergo, the problem of constitutionality arises from what is stipulated in Article 120, subsection 4) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, and, therefore, I consider that the consultation should have been evacuated in the sense that this norm is unconstitutional.

Paul Rueda Leal Magistrate He adds that said institute consists, basically, of the obligation to exhaust the administrative remedies (recursos administrativos) that the legal system establishes against administrative acts as a prerequisite for the admissibility of claims against them in judicial proceedings. He establishes that the configuration of the procedural institute of exhaustion of administrative remedies falls within the scope of legislative discretion, and that, as recognized by the Constitutional Chamber in its jurisprudence, judgment number 3669-2006 of fifteen hours on March fifteen, two thousand six, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory in matters regulated by constitutional articles 173 and 184, that is, in municipal and administrative contracting matters, by express provision of the constituent power, for which reason he considers the consulted norm to be unconstitutional.

**4-.** In the substantiation of the process, the legal prescriptions have been observed.

Drafted by **Magistrate Mora Mora**; **Considering** **I-. ADMISSIBILITY.** Article 102 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for the admission of judicial consultations (consultas judiciales), a provision from which elements that condition its origin can be deduced: a) that it is formulated by a judge; b) that "founded doubts" exist regarding the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged in a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court; and, c) that in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged. These prerequisites were analyzed by this Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 1617-1997 of fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on March seventeen, nineteen ninety-seven, an occasion on which the following was stated:

"(…) A. That it be formulated by a 'judge' (juez), a generic term that –of course– applies to both single-member judges and collegiate courts, and regarding which it is unnecessary to clarify more than: a) that it must be authorities vested with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative tribunals but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is before the processing of a proceeding leading to the rendering of a judgment or arbitral award, vested with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must, at the time of formulating the consultation, be duly authorized to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a ruling that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure that, like this one, possesses a purely incidental character).

B. That 'founded doubts' exist about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged. This means that the questioning must be reasonable and balanced. Furthermore, it implies that it cannot concern aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would mean disregarding the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it should be emphasized, due to its relevance for the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the adequacy of the norm, act, conduct, or omission to the constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a norm has previously passed the explicit examination of constitutionality (by way of an action or consultation), a new questioning on the same point would not be viable, but it could be so regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same norm, particularly because –in this case– the possibility of a constitutional breach always exists, no longer in the norm itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps by way of amparo or habeas corpus) does not mean that doubts cannot exist about the constitutionality of the norm itself on which they are based. And, in this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.

C. That a case exists submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court. Just as in an unconstitutionality action (acción de inconstitucionalidad), the judicial consultation never occurs in a vacuum or out of mere academic interest, but it must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the so-called 'prior' or 'principal' matter. Finally, D. That, in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that –due to its relevance for the case– is convenient to clarify. In effect, the expression 'the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be judged,' carries a very defined present meaning and is totally different from if the law spoke in terms of 'the norm might be applied or the act, conduct, or omission might be judged.' The judicial consultation does not proceed before the mere eventuality that those circumstances occur, since –as explained above– this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinal exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the norm or the judging of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality for him (…)." (The emphasis is not part of the original).

In the case under examination, the Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda Court, Eighth Section, raises its doubts regarding the constitutionality of articles 120, subsection 4), and 31, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo in relation to articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution. However, in the case of article 31, subsection 1), the consultation must be rejected because the assumption of incidentality that requires the questioned norm to be applicable to the case originating the consultation is not present. As the Court well points out, the process serving as the basis for the consultation concerns municipal matters, and the cited norm partially refers to matters of administrative contracting, such that one of the prerequisites for admissibility required by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction in its cited article 102 is not met. Consequently, the consultation formulated is partially rejected regarding this norm and its relation to article 182 of the Political Constitution, and it is admitted, for meeting the formal requirements, regarding the cited article 120, subsection 4) and article 31, subsection 1) only insofar as it relates to municipal matters.

**II.- CONSULTED NORMS.** Article 120, subsection 4) of the current Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo states:

"1) The judgment will declare the inadmissibility, total or partial, of the claim (pretensión) in the following cases:

(...)

• 4)If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that there is a failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa), the defect will be deemed to have been cured." For its part, article 31, subsection 1) states:
• 1)"The exhaustion of administrative remedies will be optional, except for what is provided in articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution." **III.- CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS.** It is correct to affirm that the constitutionality of the exhaustion of administrative remedies was analyzed by this Chamber in judgments 3669-2006 and 9928-2010, in which it was determined that, except for the exceptions contained in articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution, referring respectively to municipal and administrative contracting matters, requiring the prior exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition for accessing the judicial route is contrary to the Political Constitution.

In that which is relevant, it was indicated:

**"IV.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS.** In the classic conception of substantial and formal Administrative Law, public administrations, insofar as they procure and attend to public interests or the satisfaction of collective needs, must be provided with a series of extraordinary prerogatives. Thus, in the field of Administrative Procedural Law, the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the prior governmental route, was traditionally admitted as a formal privilege; that is, that individuals (administrados) who consider themselves injured or aggrieved by an administrative act must, prior to resorting to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, exhaust all ordinary administrative remedies (recursos administrativos) admissible against it in the administrative venue. Consequently, the exhaustion of administrative remedies becomes a prerequisite for the admissibility of the contentious-administrative process in its classic and traditional objective or reviewing version. At the base of this institute lies the so-called prerogative of declaratory and executive self-tutelage (auto tutela) of public administrations, which has found support, at the same time, in principles such as those of effectiveness, efficiency, and good administration.

The declaratory self-tutelage means that public entities can, by themselves and before themselves, without needing to resort to a judge, impose obligations on individuals or suppress or modify their substantial legal situations –be they subjective rights or legitimate interests–. The inescapable legislative obligation of the individual to exercise or raise all ordinary administrative remedies against an administrative act before resorting to the contentious-administrative judge constitutes a specific manifestation of the declaratory self-tutelage of public administrations, since the legislator expects that the public administration itself can defend the impugned administrative act or annul or modify it, avoiding having to appear before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In this way, in the administrative route, the public administration becomes, at the same time, judge and party, since it must attend to the requests or petitions formulated by the individuals and resolve the ordinary administrative remedies that proceed against the final act that it itself issues. As can be seen, self-tutelage is a concept diametrically opposed to that which prevails in the rest of the legal branches, in which heterotutelage operates, that is, that exercised by a third party supra partes with the constitutional guarantees of impartiality, independence, and objectivity, as is a jurisdictional body. Thus, by way of example, in the field of Private Law, a private individual can impose an obligation on or affect the substantial legal situations of another, solely and exclusively, if this arises consensually through the application of the principle of freedom of contract (article 28 of the Political Constitution) or from the intervention of a judge (article 41 of the Political Constitution). However, the guiding principles of administrative organization and function of efficiency and effectiveness, embodied in the Political Constitution itself (articles 140, subsection 8°, and 191), must be understood, at all times and under any circumstance, to be subordinated to fundamental rights and must yield before them, since they constitute the foundation and the basis of the entire legal system. In modern times, public administrations must be conceived and understood as one more subject of Law within the legal system, so that it is repugnant to Constitutional Law to have the asymmetry or chronic inequality that prevails in the field of contentious-administrative jurisdiction between the individual or citizen and the respective public entity.

The legislative recognition and granting of a series of formal or adjective prerogatives to public entities in the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order has no objective and reasonable justification if their administrative function, according to the constitutional parameter (articles 33 and 49 of the Political Constitution), must be subject to full and universal control of legality, without fissures or exempt redoubts, and, above all, if they are created and put into operation to serve or attend to the needs of citizens or individuals –service organizations–.

**V.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MANDATORY CHARACTER OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.** Currently, especially in light of the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and the stronger binding force of fundamental rights, as well as their expansive and progressive effectiveness and most favorable interpretation, it is understood that the mandatory or prescriptive character of the exhaustion of administrative remedies conflicts with the fundamental right of individuals to obtain prompt and complete justice ex articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution (effective judicial protection, tutela judicial efectiva) and with the principle of equality, since only in the contentious-administrative process –and not so in the rest of the jurisdictions– is the litigant obliged, before resorting to the judicial route, to exhaust all admissible ordinary administrative remedies. The infringement of the fundamental right to prompt and complete justice arises from the following aspects: a) Normally, when the individual files the ordinary remedies of reconsideration (revocatoria), appeal (apelación), or review (reposición) –the latter understood as the horizontal remedy admissible against acts of the highest authority or supreme hierarchical superior–, they do not achieve that the body itself or its superior modifies or annuls it, so that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is like drawing water from a dry well, achieving nothing from filing the remedies, thus transforming itself into a heavy burden or a kind of via crucis for the individual; b) it is known that the administrative procedure and its appellate or review stage usually extends beyond legal deadlines and what can be conceived as a reasonable timeframe, thereby indefinitely prolonging, even for years, access to effective judicial protection, without having the possibility of doing so immediately and when one deems it opportune; c) the sum of the period necessary to exhaust administrative remedies plus that required by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction causes individuals to obtain tardy justice, which, eventually, can transform –depending on its prolongation and the particular circumstances of the individual litigants– into a denial of justice; the foregoing constitutes a clear and evident relative advantage for public entities of which they, on occasions, take advantage, since the individual or citizen passes –due to their ordinary condition as a natural person– and the public administration remains for a prolonged time. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, it must be indicated that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, derived from the privilege of declaratory self-tutelage, exposes the litigant who sues a public administration to a discriminatory situation, since there is no objective and reasonable motive to subject them to that obligatory requirement, unlike the rest of the jurisdictional orders. It must be taken into consideration that even the freedom of configuration or legislative discretion when designing the various processes has the principle of equality as an insurmountable limit. The foregoing is reinforced if it is considered that public administrations are one more subject of Law that has no reason to enjoy such privileges or prerogatives, and that the central axis in a welfare administration or in a Social and Democratic State of Law is the person, that is, the user or consumer of public goods and services. In essence, public interests and the satisfaction of collective needs cannot be considered as empowerment clauses to undermine the fundamental rights of individuals or, simply, as the altar on which to sacrifice them.

**VI.- ADAPTATION OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETER: OPTIONAL OR ELECTIVE CHARACTER FOR THE INDIVIDUAL.** The most favorable interpretation to the expansive and progressive effectiveness of the fundamental rights of individuals to prompt and complete justice and to equality compels a qualitative rethinking of the obligatory character of the exhaustion of administrative remedies imposed by the legislator. In effect, it must be understood that the exhaustion of administrative remedies should be left to the free choice of the individual, so that it is the latter who, after making a probability judgment about the potential success of their action in the administrative venue, decides whether or not to file the available administrative remedies. It is to be expected that the individual's possibilities are reinforced when it concerns so-called "administrative tribunals" (e.g., Environmental Tribunal, Tax Administrative Tribunal, National Customs Tribunal, Civil Service Tribunal, Teaching Career Tribunal, Administrative Registry Tribunal, Transport Tribunal, etc.), since, as they have been constituted, almost usually, as highly decentralized (desconcentrados) bodies, a greater guarantee of technical specialty, impartiality, and objectivity is obtained, as the hierarchy relationship dissipates and any political criterion is diluted. The idea of the optional character of the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not alien or strange to the infra-constitutional legal system; the Regulatory Law of the Contencioso-Administrativa Jurisdiction itself establishes four cases in which it is optional. Thus, article 32 exempts from the review remedy (reposición) the implied act by negative silence when it emanates from the highest authority, acts not expressed in writing –implied–, and regulations. Article 87, in the case of the special process for the removal of directors of decentralized entities, establishes that it is not necessary to file the prior remedy of review. For its part, article 357 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge acts of trespass (vías de hecho). Finally, the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction itself, in its article 31, indicates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to resort to the amparo process. It is necessary to clarify and warn, although it is not the object of this judicial consultation, due to its transcendental importance, that the statute of limitations for the action (plazo de caducidad) –whatever that may be–, when the individual opts not to exhaust administrative remedies, will begin to run from the notification of the unchallenged final act. In sum, the elective character of the administrative route is absolutely congruent with the fundamental rights of individuals of access to jurisdiction, to prompt and complete justice (article 41 of the Political Constitution), to equality (article 33 of the Political Constitution), and to control the legality of the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution). However, it must be highlighted that it is just as constitutional for the individual to choose to go directly to the judicial route, without exhausting administrative remedies, as when they choose to do so.

**VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT.** The original constituent power established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of correctness, speed, and economy for the individual. In such circumstances, numerals 173 are found regarding municipal agreements, insofar as paragraph 2° of that numeral establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or reformed, the records will pass to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch indicated by law to resolve definitively; and 184 insofar as it reserves for the General Comptroller of the Republic the improper hierarchy over administrative acts issued in matters of administrative contracting. In these two cases, since a constitutional norm exists that provides coverage for the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be considered unconstitutional for this obligatory prerequisite for the admissibility of a contentious-administrative process.

**VIII.- IMPLIEDLY CONSENTED ACT (ACTO TÁCITAMENTE CONSENTIDO): UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS.** Another of the formal privileges of public administrations in the contentious-administrative process is the dogmatic and legislative figure of the impliedly consented act, which has an irrefutable logic in relation to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies –supported by the privilege of declaratory self-tutelage– is a mandatory prerequisite for admissibility, consequently, if the individual does not exercise the appropriate administrative remedies in time and form, the legislator presumes, from the individual's passive conduct, that they have impliedly consented to the administrative act by not appealing it within the deadlines and through the means provided by the legal system. That procedural institute frontally infringes upon the fundamental right of individuals to access the jurisdiction (article 41 of the Political Constitution), since it perpetually prevents them from discussing the matter before the jurisdiction established by the constituent power to exercise control of legality over the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution), simply for not having exercised and filed the appropriate administrative remedies. Consequently, if the adaptation of the exhaustion of administrative remedies to the constitutional parameter compels considering it optional or elective for the individual, the figure of the consented act must be deemed unconstitutional insofar as it implicitly supposes that such requirement must be compulsorily fulfilled.

**IX.- CONNECTED NORMS.** Article 89 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction prescribes that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a norm or law will also declare that of the other precepts thereof whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. That numeral, by what is provided in article 108 ibidem, is supplementarily applicable to judicial consultations.

For the reasons stated, this Constitutional Court finds that, by connection with the consulted norms, the following provisions of the Law Regulating the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction are also unconstitutional: a) The phrase of Article 18, paragraph 1 of the Law Regulating the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction insofar as it establishes “(…) that are not susceptible to a further appeal in the administrative process (…)”; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1 of Article 41 of that body of law insofar as it provides “d) That the administrative process has not been exhausted”; c) Paragraph 3 of Article 33 of that law when it prescribes “3. The failure to exhaust the administrative process will give rise to its allegation, by way of a preliminary defense, if the Court does not appreciate the defect at the opportunity provided in Article 41”; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4 of Article 33 when it indicates “(…) for not having been administratively appealed in a timely and proper manner”; e) subsection c) of Article 50 of the referred law when it indicates “c) The failure to exhaust the administrative process.” Notwithstanding that the cited judgment recognizes the existence of the exhaustion of the administrative process as a requirement in municipal and administrative contracting matters, the Chamber finds that the reasoning of the consulting Court is mistaken in giving the constitutional norms and cited jurisprudence a scope they do not possess. Certainly, the Constitution establishes the exhaustion of the administrative process in municipal and administrative contracting matters, but it does not regulate the manner in which that exhaustion must be proven within the judicial process. The nature of the legal institution logically demands that the exhaustion be alleged and required by the administration at the beginning of the process. Given that the process is a logical sequence of actions, the legislator can indeed order at what phase of the procedure, according to the nature of the institution, a specific requirement is enforced, especially considering that several equally relevant constitutional norms coexist within it, which must be harmonized to guarantee due process (debido proceso) and effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) for individuals. In this sense, the principle of prompt justice and effective judicial protection requires that in this case, if the interested party had the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust the administrative process at the beginning of the process and did not do so, that stage has closed (recluido) in favor of the individual. If it is a matter of safeguarding the principle of self-protection (autotutela) and the opportunity to correct a null act or one that could generate liability for the State, the administration can correct it at any time. In the specific case, the administration had the full opportunity to raise the procedural defect in a timely manner and did not do so, and while it is true that the judge in the intermediate stage is responsible for purging the process of defects, if the judge also did not do so, even though the party had the possibility of invoking the defect, it cannot be said that the administration was left defenseless, nor that the individual must bear the omissions of both. If we take the right to appeal, for example—a right derived from due process—it could not be alleged that this right assists the party openly in all stages thereof, but rather it is the legislator who, taking into account its nature, determines the time, mode, and term for exercising it, a right that, if declined by the interested party, can cause the stage to preclude, depending on the process in question. It is, ultimately, a matter of the ordering of the process, which, as indicated, contains several constitutional rights that must be balanced and harmonized. To determine that the exhaustion of the administrative process can be alleged openly at any phase of the process, even at the trial stage, is to place this institution above essential fundamental rights such as celerity and prompt and complete justice. As the jurisprudence of this Chamber has indicated (8549-2002), it is a constitutional imperative that both administrative and judicial procedures be prompt, timely, and complete in the interest of transcendent constitutional values such as legal security and certainty (seguridad y certeza jurídicas), to which all individuals are rightfully entitled. As the cited judgment rightly points out, for this reason, administrative procedures are informed by a series of principles of deep constitutional roots, such as those of promptness and opportunity (Article 41 of the Political Constitution), better known as celerity or speed (Articles 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law on Public Administration), efficacy and efficiency (Articles 140, subsection 8, of the Political Constitution, 4, 225, paragraph 1, and 269, paragraph 1, of the General Law on Public Administration), procedural simplicity and economy (Article 269, paragraph 1, ibidem), which impose on public entities the imperative obligation to substantiate them within a reasonable period and without undue delays, that is, without serious and unjustified delays to avoid the frustration, eventual extinction, or serious harm to the substantial legal situations invoked by individuals due to the passage of excessive and unreasonable time. “The substantial and positional privilege of public administrations, called declaratory self-protection (autotutela declarativa) and which, ultimately, constitutes a heavy burden for individuals, should not be inverted and exploited by them to cause an unlawful injury to the individual through the unnecessary prolongation of administrative procedures.” The same arguments are valid for judicial processes, such that it makes no sense that, with the administration having the possibility—knowing the claims of the plaintiffs—to, on one hand, have alleged the defect of failure to exhaust the administrative process at the beginning of the process, or, on the other hand, to reverse the act if it so deems, in exercise of the principle of self-protection, it does neither, and that, in the face of its inertia and that of the handling judge, the interest of the administration is placed before that of the individual when the process has already advanced to the start of the trial phase. The individual has no reason to suffer the inertia of the administration, or of the administration of justice, to the detriment of their constitutional right to prompt and complete justice and their right to be effectively protected, especially considering that in this matter, the administration enjoys an advantage—by constitutional provision—over the individual, which it did not know how to invoke or defend in a timely manner.

VI.- COROLLARY. In summary, this Chamber interprets that Articles 120, subsection 4) and 31, subsection 1) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, the latter in its relation to Article 173 of the Political Constitution, are not contrary to the Political Constitution, insofar as what they do is regulate the procedural form and moment in which the exhaustion referred to in the constitutional norms can be asserted. Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, and Magistrate Rueda Leal dissents and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code unconstitutional.

POR TANTO

The consultation is summarily rejected in relation to Article 31, subsection 1) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code concerning Article 182 of the Political Constitution. The consultation is resolved in the sense that Articles 120, subsection 4), and 31, subsection 1) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, the latter in its relation to Article 173 of the Political Constitution, are not contrary to the Political Constitution. Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons. Magistrate Rueda Leal dissents and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code unconstitutional.

Gilbert Armijo S. Acting President Luis Paulino Mora M. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L. José Paulino Hernández G.

DIFFERENT REASONS OF MAGISTRATES JINESTA LOBO AND HERNANDEZ GUTIERREZ Magistrates Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code. Certainly, Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, Law No. 8508 of April 28, 2006, literally provided the following:

“If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that there is a failure to exhaust the administrative process, the defect shall be deemed cured” By virtue of what was decided by this Constitutional Chamber in Voto No. 3669-06 and Article 31, paragraph 1, the constitutional rule or principle is that the exhaustion of the administrative process is optional or voluntary, by virtue of the fundamental and human rights that assist the individual litigant who has a dispute with a public administration. Consequently, Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code is, precisely, only meaningful for the exceptional cases where the exhaustion of the administrative process is mandatory. This numeral has no meaning or application for the rest of the ordinary hypotheses where exhaustion is optional or voluntary. The purpose of introducing such a precept into the procedural legislation is due to clear reasons of constitutionality, which are the following:

a. The exhaustion of the administrative process is not a right of public administrations, but rather a privilege or prerogative that violates the principle and right to equality.

b. By application of the constitutional principles of legal security and certainty, public administrations can indeed—when the exhaustion of the administrative process is exceptionally mandatory—raise this privilege as a preliminary defense. This is confirmed by Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, which enables the representatives of the sued public powers to allege as a preliminary defense the “Failure to exhaust the administrative process, when appropriate.” Consequently, the sued public administration has a procedural opportunity to raise such a defense, and if it does not take advantage of it, it must bear the consequences of its own negligence and that of its representative. Furthermore, the new model of administrative justice introduced the figure of the “Handling Judge” (Juez tramitador) responsible for purging the process during the preliminary hearing (Article 90, paragraph 1, subsection a, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code), and during this stage, all defects of the process must be noted, and the preliminary defense of Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code must even be resolved, so that the interested party can cure any defect in this regard (Article 92 of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code). Ultimately, by application of the constitutional principles of legal security and certainty, there is a specific procedural moment to raise the failure to exhaust the administrative process in cases where it is mandatory, otherwise the figure of preclusion (preclusión) applies, which has full support in the aforementioned constitutional principles.

c. The right to effective judicial protection or prompt and complete justice (Article 41 of the Constitution) and to control the legality of all forms of manifestation of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Constitution) belongs to the individual litigant, who, if the sued public administration omitted to raise the preliminary defense of mandatory exhaustion and if the handling judge did not note such defect, should not bear the consequences of the omission of both the sued public entity and the handling judge.

d. The failure to exhaust the administrative process as an instrument to prevent the case from being heard on its merits is an eminently formal figure that must yield to the demands of material justice that assist the litigant who seeks it before the courts, for the sake of knowing and resolving the merits and finding a definitive solution to the dispute, under the constitutional rule of "in dubio pro accione," implicitly contained in Article 41 of the Constitution.

For the reasons stated, we find that Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code is in conformity with the constitutional standard.

Ernesto Jinesta L. José Paulino Hernández G.

DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE RUEDA The undersigned Magistrate Rueda Leal partially separate from the majority decision because I find that the consultation should be resolved in the sense that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code is unconstitutional. I must clarify that I share the assessment made in the majority vote, in the sense of summarily rejecting the consultation regarding Article 31, subsection 1) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code in relation to Article 182 of the Political Constitution, since, indeed, the requirement of incidentality—which demands that the questioned norm be applicable to the case giving rise to the consultation—is not met. As the consulting Court reports, the process serving as the basis for the consultation is a municipal matter, and considering that the cited Article 31, subsection l) partially refers to administrative contracting matters, one of the admissibility requirements demanded by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction for hearing the constitutionality of that norm would not be present. However, regarding the doubt of constitutionality raised by the consulting body concerning Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code, I do believe a ruling on the merits should be issued in the following sense:

First, I consider that the Constitutional Text clearly establishes in its Article 173 that, in municipal matters, the administrative process must be exhausted before the “Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates to resolve definitively.” That is, prior to filing any process or jurisdictional action, the challenged administrative act must pass through a final filter before the two-phase improper hierarchical body (jerarca impropio bifásico) in municipal matters indicated by Article 173 of the Constitution itself and, consequently, exhaust the administrative process through that instance. Under this understanding, the consultants are correct that the exhaustion of the administrative process in municipal matters is of constitutional origin; therefore, I find that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code does directly violate the Constitution, since this norm allows the defect of not having previously exhausted the administrative process in municipal matters to be deemed cured, despite the express mandate provided in the Constitution that this type of exhaustion is obligatory and mandatory. As stated in judgment number […] issued by this Chamber: “It must be noted that the only two-phase improper hierarchy that the original constituent power itself admitted, to such an extent that it expressly regulated it in the constitutional text itself—which confirms its highly exceptional character—is that of Article 173, paragraph 2, of the Political Constitution, when indicating that the review and oversight of the agreements of the Municipal Councils shall be the responsibility of ‘(…) the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates (…)‘—the Administrative-Contentious Court—.“ Ergo, given the special character that the Constitution itself provides for this type of exhaustion of the administrative process in municipal matters, I find that Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code is indeed unconstitutional. Second, the administrative body or instance that finally reviews the challenged act in municipal matters constitutes a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, economy, impartiality, independence, and objectivity for the individual, because this task is entrusted to an improper hierarchical superior, different from the instance where the questioned administrative act was issued; hence, the Original Constituent Power deemed it appropriate to exhaust the administrative process in municipal matters, thanks to the guarantees implied by resorting to an instance independent of the one that issued the act.

Third, this Chamber itself, in judgment number 3669-2006 of 3:00 p.m. on March 15, 2006, established the following:

“VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT. The original constituent power established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of the administrative process is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, and economy for the individual. In such circumstances, Articles 173, regarding municipal agreements, insofar as paragraph 2 of that article establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or reformed, the case file shall be sent to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates to resolve definitively, and 184, insofar as it reserves for the Comptroller General of the Republic the improper hierarchy (jerarquía impropia) of administrative acts issued in matters of administrative contracting. In these two cases, since there is a constitutional norm that provides coverage for the mandatory exhaustion of the administrative process, it cannot be considered that this obligatory prerequisite for the admissibility of an administrative-contentious process is unconstitutional.” Thus, disregarding such a clear pronouncement would result in a situation that generates legal uncertainty (inseguridad jurídica), by ignoring the mandatory nature already indicated by this Court’s precedents on the subject of exhausting the administrative process in municipal matters.

Fourth, I do not share the thesis of the majority of the Chamber set forth in the sub lite matter, in the sense that the nature of the exhaustion of the administrative process, in municipal matters, logically demands that its lack of compliance be invoked at the beginning of the judicial process, and that therefore it is also logical that the legislator can order at what phase of the judicial process this lack of exhaustion must be invoked. This is because, since this exhaustion is mandatory in municipal matters (by direct provision of the Constitution), it can be invoked at any moment when one of the parties becomes aware of it. Nor is it true that if the interested party had the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust the administrative process (in municipal matters) at the beginning of the process and did not do so, that stage should be considered to have precluded (precluido), since, as explained above, the Constitutional Text provides that this exhaustion is mandatory, so it could not preclude, even if the legislator so orders, under penalty of incurring a defect of unconstitutionality. Thus, I consider that—specifically—Article 120, subsection 4) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code does directly violate the Fundamental Charter, by deeming cured a defect that the Constitution itself demands as mandatory, that is, which it is obligatory to comply with. Regarding the consulted Article 31, subsection 1), I do not find any clash of constitutionality, since it precisely indicates that “The exhaustion of the administrative process shall be optional, except for the provisions of Articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution”; conversely, the exhaustion of the administrative process for the cases contemplated in Article 173 of the Constitution is mandatory, as has been sustained in this dissenting vote and as the Chamber has explained in its precedents.

Ergo, the constitutionality issue arises from the stipulation in Article 120(4) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and, for that reason, I believe the consultation should have been resolved in the sense that this norm is unconstitutional.

Paul Rueda Leal Magistrate As the Court correctly notes, the proceeding giving rise to this consultation is of a municipal nature, and the cited provision refers partially to matters of government procurement (contratación administrativa); therefore, one of the admissibility requirements set forth in Article 102 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, cited above, is not met. Consequently, the consultation is partially rejected as it relates to this provision and its relation to Article 182 of the Constitución Política, and is admitted, for meeting the formal requirements, as it relates to Article 120, subsection 4) cited above and to Article 31, subsection 1) only as far as its relation to municipal matters.

II. PROVISIONS CONSULTED. Article 120, subsection 4) of the current Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo states

“1) The judgment shall declare the inadmissibility, in whole or in part, of the claim in the following cases:

(...)

• 4)If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that the administrative remedies (vía administrativa) have not been exhausted, the defect shall be deemed cured.” For its part, Article 31, subsection 1) states:
• 1)“The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be optional, except as provided in Articles 173 and 182 of the Constitución Política.”

III.CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS. It is correct to state that the constitutionality of the exhaustion of administrative remedies was analyzed by this Chamber in judgments 3669-2006 and 9928-2010, in which it was determined that, except for the exceptions contained in Articles 173 and 182 of the Constitución Política, referring respectively to municipal and government procurement matters, requiring the prior exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition for accessing the jurisdictional channel is contrary to the Constitución Política.

In what is relevant, it was stated:

"IV.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS. In the classical conception of substantive and formal Administrative Law, public administrations, insofar as they seek and attend to public interests or the satisfaction of collective needs, must be endowed with a series of extraordinary prerogatives. Thus, in the field of Administrative Procedural Law, the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies or the prior governmental channel was traditionally admitted as a formal privilege; that is, that persons under administration (administrados) who consider themselves injured or aggrieved by an administrative act must, before resorting to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, exhaust all ordinary administrative appeals available against said act within the administrative venue. Consequently, the exhaustion of administrative remedies becomes an admissibility requirement for the contentious-administrative proceeding in its classical and traditional objective or reviewing version. Underlying this institution is the so-called prerogative of declaratory and executive self-tutelage (auto tutela) of public administrations, which has found support, at the same time, in principles such as those of effectiveness, efficiency, and good administration.

Declaratory self-tutelage means that public entities can, by themselves and for themselves, without the need to resort to a judge, impose obligations on persons under administration or suppress or modify their substantial legal situations—be they subjective rights or legitimate interests. The inescapable legislative obligation of the person under administration to exercise or file all ordinary administrative appeals against an administrative act before resorting to the contentious-administrative judge constitutes a specific manifestation of the declaratory self-tutelage of public administrations, since the legislature expects the public administration itself to either defend the challenged administrative act or annul or modify it, thus avoiding the need to appear before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In this way, in the administrative channel, the public administration becomes, simultaneously, judge and party, since it must attend to the requests or petitions made by the persons under administration and resolve the ordinary administrative appeals that proceed against the final act it itself issues. As can be seen, self-tutelage is a concept diametrically opposed to the one prevailing in the rest of the legal branches, in which hetero-tutelage operates, that is, that exercised by a third party supra partes with the constitutional guarantees of impartiality, independence, and objectivity, such as a jurisdictional body. Thus, by way of example, in the field of Private Law, an individual can impose an obligation on or affect the substantial legal situations of another, solely and exclusively, if this arises consensually through the application of the principle of freedom of contract (autonomía de la voluntad) (Article 28 of the Constitución Política) or through the intervention of a judge (Article 41 of the Constitución Política). However, the guiding principles of administrative organization and function of efficiency and effectiveness, embodied in the Constitución Política itself (Articles 140, subsection 8°, and 191), must be understood, at all times and under any circumstance, as subordinate to fundamental rights and must yield to them, since these constitute the foundation and the basis of the entire legal system. In modern times, public administrations must be conceived and understood as one more subject of law within the legal system, such that the asymmetry or chronic inequality that prevails in the field of contentious-administrative jurisdiction between the person under administration or the citizen and the respective public entity is repugnant to the Law of the Constitution.

The legislative recognition and granting of a series of formal or adjective prerogatives to public entities in the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order has no objective and reasonable justification if their administrative function, according to the constitutional parameter (Articles 33 and 49 of the Constitución Política), must be subject to full and universal legality control, without fissures or exempt enclosures, and, above all, if they are created and put into operation to serve or attend to the needs of citizens or persons under administration—service organizations.

V.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MANDATORY NATURE OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. Currently, especially in light of the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and the strongest binding force of fundamental rights, as well as their expansive and progressive effectiveness and most favorable interpretation, it is understood that the obligatory or mandatory nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies conflicts with the fundamental right of persons under administration to obtain prompt and complete justice under Articles 41 and 49 of the Constitución Política (effective judicial protection) and with the principle of equality, since only in the contentious-administrative proceeding—and not in the rest of the jurisdictions—is the litigant obliged, before resorting to the jurisdictional channel, to exhaust all ordinary administrative appeals available. The infringement of the fundamental right to prompt and complete justice arises from the following aspects: a) Normally, when the person under administration files the ordinary appeals for revocation, appeal, or reconsideration—the latter understood as the horizontal appeal available against the acts of the highest authority or supreme hierarchical superior—they do not succeed in getting the body itself or its superior to modify or annul it, so that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is like drawing water from a dry well, achieving nothing from the filing of appeals, thus becoming a heavy burden or a kind of via crucis for the person under administration; b) it is known that the administrative procedure and its appeal or review stage usually extend beyond the legal deadlines and beyond what can be conceived as a reasonable time, thereby indefinitely prolonging, even for years, access to effective judicial protection, without the possibility of doing so immediately and when deemed appropriate; c) the sum of the time required to exhaust administrative remedies with the time required by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction causes persons under administration to obtain tardy justice, which can eventually transform—depending on its prolongation and the particular circumstances of the litigating persons under administration—into a denial of justice; the foregoing constitutes a clear and evident relative advantage for public entities which they sometimes exploit, since the person under administration or citizen passes—due to their ordinary condition as a natural person—and the public administration remains for a prolonged time. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, it must be noted that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, derived from the privilege of declaratory self-tutelage, exposes the litigant who sues a public administration to a discriminatory situation, since there is no objective and reasonable motive to subject them to this obligatory requirement, unlike the rest of the jurisdictional orders. It must be taken into consideration that even the legislature's freedom of configuration or discretion in designing the various processes has the principle of equality as an insurmountable limit. The foregoing is reinforced if one considers that public administrations are one more subject of law that should not enjoy such privileges or prerogatives and that the central axis in a service-providing administration or in a Social and Democratic State under the Rule of Law is the person, that is, the user or consumer of public goods and services. In essence, public interests and the satisfaction of collective needs cannot be seen as empowerment clauses to undermine the fundamental rights of persons under administration or, simply, as the altar upon which they are to be sacrificed.

VI.- ADAPTING THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETER: FACULTATIVE OR OPTIONAL NATURE FOR THE PERSON UNDER ADMINISTRATION. The most favorable interpretation of the expansive and progressive effectiveness of the fundamental rights of persons under administration to prompt and complete justice and to equality requires a qualitative rethinking of the obligatory nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies imposed by the legislature. Indeed, it must be understood that the exhaustion of administrative remedies should be left to the free choice of the person under administration, so that it is they who, after making a probability judgment about the eventual success of their action in the administrative venue, decide whether or not to file the available administrative appeals. It is to be expected that the person's possibilities are strengthened when dealing with so-called “administrative tribunals” (e.g., Tribunal Ambiental, Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, Tribunal Aduanero Nacional, Tribunal del Servicio Civil, Tribunal de Carrera Docente, Tribunal Registral Administrativo, Tribunal de Transportes, etc.), since, as these have been constituted, almost usually, as highly decentralized bodies, a greater guarantee of technical specialty, impartiality, and objectivity is obtained, as the hierarchical relationship is blurred and any political criterion is diluted. The idea of the facultative nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not alien or strange to the sub-constitutional legal system; the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa itself establishes four cases in which it is optional. Thus, Article 32 exempts from the appeal for reconsideration the act presumed due to negative silence when it emanates from the highest authority, acts not manifested in writing—tacit—and regulations. Article 87, in the case of the special proceeding for the removal of directors of decentralized entities, establishes that it is not necessary to file the prior appeal for reconsideration. For its part, Article 357 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública stipulates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge de facto actions. Finally, the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional itself, in its Article 31, indicates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to resort to the amparo proceeding. It is worth clarifying and warning, although it is not the object of this judicial consultation, due to its transcendental importance, that the statute of limitations for the action—whatever it may be—when the person under administration chooses not to exhaust administrative remedies, will begin to run from the notification of the final, unchallenged act. In summary, the elective nature of administrative remedies is absolutely consistent with the fundamental rights of persons under administration of access to the jurisdiction, to prompt and complete justice (Article 41 of the Constitución Política), to equality (Article 33 of the Constitución Política), and to control the legality of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Constitución Política). However, it must be highlighted that it is just as constitutional for the person under administration to choose to go directly to the jurisdictional channel, without exhausting administrative remedies, as when they choose to do so.

VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT. The original constituent established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of correctness, speed, and economy for the person under administration. In such circumstances are found numeral 173 regarding municipal agreements, in that paragraph 2° of that numeral establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or reformed, the background records shall pass to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates for it to resolve definitively, and 184 in that it reserves to the Contraloría General de la República the improper hierarchy over administrative acts issued in matters of government procurement (contratación administrativa). In these two cases, since a constitutional provision covers the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, this obligatory prerequisite for the admissibility of a contentious-administrative proceeding cannot be deemed unconstitutional.

VIII.- TACITLY CONSENTED ACT: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS. Another of the formal privileges of public administrations in the contentious-administrative proceeding is the dogmatic and legislative figure of the tacitly consented act, which has an irrefutable logic in relation to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies—sustained by the privilege of declaratory self-tutelage—is a mandatory admissibility requirement, consequently, if the person under administration does not exercise in a timely and proper manner the available administrative appeals, the legislator presumes, based on the omitted conduct of the person under administration, that they have tacitly consented to the administrative act by not appealing it within the time limits and through the means established by the legal system. This procedural institute frontally infringes upon the fundamental right of persons under administration to access the jurisdiction (Article 41 of the Constitución Política), since it perpetually prevents them from discussing the matter before the jurisdiction established by the constituent to exercise control over the legality of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Constitución Política), simply because they did not exercise and file the available administrative remedies. Consequently, if adapting the exhaustion of administrative remedies to the constitutional parameter requires considering it as facultative or optional for the person under administration, the figure of the consented act must be deemed unconstitutional insofar as it implicitly assumes that this requirement must be mandatorily fulfilled.

IX.- RELATED PROVISIONS. Article 89 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional provides that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a provision or law shall also declare that of the other precepts thereof whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. This numeral, by what is provided in Article 108 ibidem, is supplementarily applicable to judicial consultations. For the reasons stated, this Constitutional Court considers that, by connection with the provisions consulted, the following provisions of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa are also unconstitutional: a) The phrase of Article 18, paragraph 1° of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa insofar as it establishes “(…) that are not susceptible to a further appeal in the administrative channel (…)”; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1° of Article 41 of that regulatory body insofar as it provides “d) That the administrative remedies have not been exhausted”; c) Paragraph 3° of Article 33 of that law in providing “3. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies shall give rise to its allegation, by way of preliminary defense, if the Court does not note the defect at the opportunity provided in Article 41”; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4° of Article 33 in stating “(…) for not having been administratively appealed in a timely and proper manner”; e) subsection c) of Article 50 of the referenced law in indicating “c) The failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” Notwithstanding that the cited judgment recognizes the existence of the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a requirement in municipal and government procurement (contratación administrativa) matters, the Chamber considers that the reasoning of the consulting Court is mistaken in giving the cited constitutional provisions and case law a scope they do not have. Certainly, the Constitution establishes the exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal and government procurement matters, but it does not regulate the manner in which this exhaustion must be accredited within the judicial proceeding. The nature of the institution logically requires that the exhaustion be alleged and demanded by the administration at the beginning of the proceeding. Given that the proceeding is a logical sequence of actions, the legislator can indeed order at which phase of the procedure, according to the nature of the institution, a specific requirement is enforced, especially taking into account that several equally relevant constitutional provisions coexist within it, which must be harmonized to guarantee due process and effective judicial protection for individuals. In this sense, the principle of prompt justice and effective judicial protection requires that in this case, if the interested party had the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust administrative remedies at the beginning of the proceeding and did not do so, that stage has concluded in favor of the person under administration. If the purpose is to safeguard the principle of self-tutelage and the opportunity to correct a null act or one that could generate liability for the State, the administration can correct it at any time. In the specific case, the administration had the full opportunity to allege the defect in a timely manner and did not do so, and while it is true that it is the responsibility of the judge at the intermediate stage to cleanse the proceeding, if he also did not do so, and the party had the possibility of invoking the defect, it cannot be said that the administration was left defenseless, nor that the person under administration must bear the omissions of both. If we take the right to appeal, for example—a right derived from due process—it could not be alleged that this right assists the party openly at all stages of the proceeding, but rather it is the legislator who, attending to its nature, determines the time, manner, and deadline for its exercise, a right which, if waived by the interested party, can cause that stage to conclude, depending on the proceeding in question. It is, in short, a matter of the ordering of the proceeding, which, as indicated, contains several constitutional rights that must be balanced and harmonized. Determining that the exhaustion of administrative remedies can be alleged openly at any phase of the proceeding, even at the trial stage, is to place this institution above essential fundamental rights such as that of speed and prompt and complete justice. As the case law of this Chamber has indicated (8549-2002), it is a constitutional imperative that both administrative and judicial procedures be prompt, timely, and complete for the sake of transcendental constitutional values such as legal security and certainty, of which all persons under administration are worthy recipients. As the cited judgment correctly notes, therefore, administrative procedures are informed by a series of principles of deep constitutional roots, such as those of promptness and timeliness (Article 41 of the Constitución Política), better known as speed or rapidity (Articles 225, paragraph 1°, and 269, paragraph 1°, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), effectiveness and efficiency (Articles 140, subsection 8, of the Constitución Política, 4°, 225, paragraph 1°, and 269, paragraph 1°, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), procedural simplicity and economy (Article 269, paragraph 1°, ibidem), which impose on public entities the imperative obligation to process them within a reasonable time and without undue delays, that is, without serious and unjustified delays to avoid frustration, the eventual extinction, or the serious injury of the substantial legal situations invoked by the persons under administration due to the passage of excessive and unreasonable time. “The substantial and positional privilege of public administrations, called declaratory self-tutelage, which ultimately constitutes a heavy burden for persons under administration, must not be inverted and exploited by these to cause anti-juridical harm to the person under administration through the unnecessary prolongation of administrative procedures.” The same arguments are valid for judicial proceedings, such that it makes no sense that the administration, having the possibility—with knowledge of the claimants' claims—on the one hand to have alleged the defect of failure to exhaust administrative remedies at the beginning of the proceeding, or on the other hand, to reverse the act if it deems it so, in exercise of the principle of self-tutelage, did neither, and that, given its inertia and that of the processing judge, the interest of the administration should be placed above that of the person under administration, when the proceeding has already advanced to the start of the trial phase. The person under administration has no reason to suffer the inertia of the administration, or of the administration of justice, to the detriment of their constitutional right to prompt and complete justice and their right to be effectively protected, especially taking into account that in this matter, the administration enjoys an advantage—by constitutional provision—over the person under administration, which it did not know how to invoke or defend in a timely manner.

VI.- COROLLARY. In summary, this Chamber interprets that Articles 120, subsection 4) and 31, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the latter in its relation to Article 173 of the Constitución Política, are not contrary to the Constitución Política, insofar as what they do is regulate the form and procedural moment in which the exhaustion referred to in the constitutional provisions can be asserted. Justices Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4°, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, and Justice Rueda Leal dissents and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo unconstitutional.

POR TANTO

The consultation is summarily rejected with regard to Article 31, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo in relation to Article 182 of the Constitución Política. The consultation filed is answered in the sense that Articles 120, subsection 4), and 31, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the latter in its relation to Article 173 of the Constitución Política, are not contrary to the Constitución Política. Justices Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons. Justice Rueda Leal dissents and declares Article 120, subsection 4) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo unconstitutional.

</span></p> Gilbert Armijo S.

Presidente a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L. José Paulino Hernández G.

DISSENTING REASONS OF JUDGES JINESTA LOBO AND HERNANDEZ GUTIERREZ Judges Jinesta Lobo and Hernández Gutiérrez give different reasons regarding the constitutionality of Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo. Certainly, Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 of April 28, 2006, literally provided the following:

"If, in the oral and public phase, it is determined that there is a failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), the defect shall be deemed corrected" By virtue of what was resolved by this Constitutional Chamber in Voto No. 3669-06 and numeral 31, paragraph 1, the constitutional rule or principle is that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is facultative or optional, by virtue of the fundamental and human rights that assist the justiciable citizen who sustains a controversy with a public administration. Consequently, ordinal 120, paragraph 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo has, precisely, meaning, only for the exceptional cases in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory (preceptivo). That numeral has no meaning or application for the rest of the ordinary hypotheses in which exhaustion is facultative or optional. The purpose of introducing a precept of such nature in the adjective legislation is due to clear reasons of constitutionality, which are the following:

a. The exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a right of public administrations, but a privilege or prerogative that violates the principle and right to equality. b. By application of the constitutional principles of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and legal security (certeza jurídica), public administrations may well—when exhaustion of administrative remedies is exceptionally mandatory—allege such privilege as a preliminary defense. This is confirmed by Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, which enables the representatives of the sued public powers to allege as a preliminary defense the "Failure to exhaust administrative remedies, when applicable." Consequently, the sued public administration has a procedural opportunity to allege such defense, and if it does not take advantage of it, it must bear the consequences of its own neglect and that of its representative. Furthermore, the new model of administrative justice introduced the figure of the "Case Management Judge" (Juez tramitador) charged with purging the process during the preliminary hearing (Article 90, paragraph 1, subsection a, of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), and during that stage, all defects of the process must be noticed and, even, the preliminary defense of Article 66, paragraph 1, subsection c), of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo must be resolved, so that the interested party can correct any defect on the matter (Article 92 of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo). In short, by application of the constitutional principles of legal certainty and legal security, there is a specific procedural moment to allege the failure to exhaust administrative remedies in cases where it is mandatory; otherwise, the figure of preclusion operates, which has full support in the aforementioned constitutional principles. c. The right to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) or swift and complete justice (Article 41 of the Constitution) and to control the legality of all forms of manifestation of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Constitution) assists the justiciable citizen, who, if the sued public administration omitted to raise the preliminary defense of mandatory exhaustion and if the Case Management Judge did not notice such defect, must not bear the consequences of the omitted conduct of both the sued public entity and the Case Management Judge. d. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies as an instrument to prevent hearing the merits of the matter is an eminently formal figure that must yield to the demands of substantive justice (justicia material) that assist the justiciable who petitions for it before the judicial courts, for the sake of knowing and resolving the merits and seeking a definitive solution to the controversy, that is, the constitutional rule of "in dubio pro accione," implicitly contained in Article 41 of the Constitution.

For the reasons stated, we consider that Article 120, paragraph 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo is in accordance with the constitutionality parameter.

Ernesto Jinesta L. José Paulino Hernández G.

DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE RUEDA The undersigned Judge Rueda Leal partially separates from the majority decision because I consider that the consultation must be resolved in the sense that Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo is unconstitutional. I must clarify that I share the appreciation made in the majority vote, in the sense of flatly rejecting the consultation regarding Article 31, section 1, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo in relation to Article 182 of the Constitución Política, since the assumption of incidentality that requires the challenged norm to be applicable to the case giving rise to the consultation indeed does not occur. As reported by the consulting Court, the process that serves as the basis for the consultation is of municipal matter, and given that the cited ordinal 31, section l), partially refers to matters of administrative contracting, one of the admissibility requirements demanded by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional to hear about the constitutionality of that norm would not be met. However, regarding the doubt of constitutionality raised by the consulting body related to Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, I do consider that a substantive ruling must be issued in the following sense:

First, I consider that the constitutional text clearly establishes in its numeral 173 that, in municipal matters, administrative remedies must be exhausted before the "Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates to resolve definitively." That is, prior to filing any process or jurisdictional action, the challenged administrative act must pass a last filter before the improper two-phase hierarch body in municipal matters indicated by ordinal 173 of the Constitution itself and, consequently, exhaust administrative remedies through that instance. Under that understanding, the consultants are right in the sense that the exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters is of constitutional origin; therefore, I consider that Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo does directly attack the Constitution, since based on this norm, the defect of not having previously exhausted administrative remedies in municipal matters is allowed to be deemed corrected, despite the express mandate provided in the Constitution in the sense that this type of exhaustion is obligatory and mandatory. As was said in judgment number [...] by this Chamber: "It must be warned that the only improper two-phase hierarchy that the original constituent admitted, to the point of regulating it expressly in the constitutional text itself—which confirms its exceptionally exceptional character—is that of Article 173, paragraph 2, of the Constitución Política, when indicating that the review and oversight of the agreements of the Municipal Councils will be in charge of the '(…) Court dependent on the Judicial Branch that the law indicates (…)'—Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo—". Ergo, due to the special character that the Constitution itself provides regarding this type of exhaustion of remedies in municipal matters, I consider that Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo is indeed unconstitutional. Second, the body or administrative instance that finally reviews the challenged act in municipal matters constitutes a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, economy, impartiality, independence, and objectivity for the citizen, because said task is entrusted to an improper hierarch, different from the instance where the challenged administrative act was issued; hence, the original constituent deemed it appropriate to exhaust administrative remedies in municipal matters, thanks to the guarantees implied by resorting to an instance independent from the one that issued the act.

Third, this very Chamber, in judgment number 3669-2006 of 3:00 p.m. on March 15, 2006, established the following:

"VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT. The original constituent established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of accuracy, celerity, and economy for the citizen. In such circumstances, numerals 173 regarding municipal agreements are found, since paragraph 2 of that numeral establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or reformed, the background files will pass to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch indicated by law to resolve definitively, and 184 in that it reserves to the Contraloría General de la República the improper hierarchy of administrative acts issued in matters of administrative contracting. In these two cases, as there is a constitutional norm that provides coverage to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be considered that this obligatory requirement of admissibility for a contentious-administrative process is unconstitutional" Thus, to disregard a pronouncement as clear as that one would result in a situation generating legal uncertainty (inseguridad jurídica), by ignoring the mandatory character that the precedents of this Court have already indicated on the topic of exhaustion of administrative remedies in municipal matters.

Fourth, I do not share the thesis of the majority of the Chamber set forth in the sub lite, in the sense that the nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies, in municipal matters, logically demands that its lack of compliance be invoked at the beginning of the judicial process, and that therefore it is also logical that the legislator can order in which phase of the judicial process that lack of exhaustion must be invoked. This is because, as that exhaustion is mandatory in municipal matters (by direct provision of the Constitution), it can be invoked at any time that any of the parties becomes aware of it. Nor is it true that if the interested party, having the opportunity to allege the failure to exhaust remedies (in municipal matters) at the beginning of the process and did not do so, that stage should be considered precluded, since as explained supra, the constitutional text provides that this exhaustion is mandatory, so it could not preclude, even if the legislator provides for it, under penalty of incurring a defect of unconstitutionality. Such being the case, I consider that —specifically— Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo does directly attack the Carta Fundamental, by deeming corrected a defect that the Constitution itself demands as mandatory, that is, that it is obligatory to fulfill. Regarding the consulted Article 31, section 1, I find no clash of constitutionality, as it precisely indicates that "The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be facultative, except for the provisions of Articles 173 and 182 of the Constitución Política"; contrario sensu, the exhaustion of administrative remedies for the cases contemplated in Article 173 of the Constitution is mandatory, as has been maintained in this dissenting vote and as the Chamber has explained in its precedents.

Ergo, the problem of constitutionality arises from what is stipulated in Article 120, section 4, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and, for this reason, I consider that the consultation should have been resolved in the sense that this norm is unconstitutional.

Paul Rueda Leal Judge

Voto Nº 2012-17737 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciséis horas veintiún minutos del doce de diciembre de dos mil doce.

Consulta Judicial facultativa formulada por el TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA SECCIÓN OCTAVA DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO DE SAN JOSE, ANEXO, sobre si los artículos 120 inciso 4), y 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, son contrarios a los artículos 173 y 182 de la Constitución Política.

Resultando

1-. Por resolución de las catorce horas del veintiséis de Julio del año en curso, dictada en el expediente [...], el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Octava, solicitó a esta Sala que se pronuncie sobre la constitucionalidad de los artículos 120 inciso 4), y 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Señala que esta Sala en la sentencia 2005-06866 había definido que la jerarquía impropia bicéfala en material municipal, es de origen constitucional, razón por la cual ellos estiman hace obligatorio, sin excepción alguna, el agotamiento de la vía administrativa en la materia. Estiman que el legislador, al promulgar la ley número 8508, en los artículos consultados, optó por establecer una excepción contra legem. Señalan que en el caso que sirve de base a la consulta -proceso en material municipal-, el juez tramitador, no advirtió de oficio que no se había agotado la vía administrativa, ni consta que el vicio fuera alegado por la parte demandada, por lo que el único juez que podía sanear el procedimiento no lo hizo y ellos, los jueces de la etapa oral y pública no tienen otra opción mas que celebrar el debate, aplicando una norma, que estiman inconstitucional porque da por saneado la falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa al señalar: “Artículo 120 inciso 4. Si, en la fase oral y pública, se determina que existe una falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, se tendrá por subsanado el defecto”. Esta norma aplicada a materia municipal, a su criterio, viene a dejar sin contenido esencial los artículos 173 y 182, para los cuales el constituyente sí previó el agotamiento previo como requisito para acceder a la vía jurisdiccional. Estiman que el mismo vicio se presenta en el caso del artículo 31 inciso 1) del mismo Código en material de contratación administrativa.

2.- Emplazadas las partes en la resolución de las catorce horas del veintiséis de julio del año en curso, y debidamente notificadas, no constan en el expediente escritos de apersonamiento, ni argumentaciones.

3.- Por resolución de las once horas del veintiuno de agosto del dos mil doce, la Presidencia de la Sala dio curso a la consulta, confiriendo audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República. La Procuraduría en su respuesta señala que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa es un instituto procesal propio del proceso contencioso administrativo cuyo fundamento descansa en la potestad de auto tutela propia de la Administración Pública. Añade que dicho instituto consiste, básicamente, en la obligación de agotar los recursos administrativos que el ordenamiento establece contra los actos administrativos como requisito de admisibilidad de las demandas contra estos en sede judicial. Establece que la configuración del instituto procesal del agotamiento de la vía administrativa, cae en el ámbito de la discrecionalidad legislativa, y que tal y como lo ha reconocido la Sala Constitucional en su jurisprudencia, sentencia número 3669-2006 de las quince horas del quince de marzo del dos mil seis el agotamiento de la vía administrativa es obligatoria en la material regulada en los artículos constitucionales 173 y 184, es decir en materia municipal y de contratación administrativa, por disposición expresa del constituyente, por lo que estima que la norma consultada es inconstitucional.

4-. En la substanciación del proceso se ha observado las prescripciones legales.

Redacta el Magistrado Mora Mora; y,

Considerando

I-.ADMISIBILIDAD. El artículo 102 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece los presupuestos de admisión de las consultas judiciales, disposición de la que se desprenden elementos que condicionan su procedencia: a) que la misma sea formulada por un juez; b) que existan “dudas fundadas” sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión que se deba aplicar o juzgar en un caso sometido al conocimiento del juzgador o tribunal y, c) que en ese asunto previo, deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda de constitucionalidad. Estos presupuestos fueron analizados por este Tribunal Constitucional en la Sentencia No. 1617-1997 de las catorce horas cincuenta y cuatro minutos del diecisiete de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y siete, oportunidad en la que se expuso, lo siguiente:

“(…) A. Que la formule un «juez», término genérico que –desde luego– se aplica tanto a los juzgadores unipersonales como a los tribunales colegiados, y sobre lo cual es innecesario precisar más que: a) que debe tratarse de autoridades dotadas de poder jurisdiccional, lo cual excluye las consultas formuladas por tribunales administrativos, pero sí incluye las que hagan los árbitros en el marco de los asuntos sujetos a su decisión (nótese que lo relevante en todos los casos es que se esté ante el trámite de un proceso conducente al dictado de una sentencia o laudo arbitral, dotados de la autoridad de la cosa juzgada); y, b) que el juzgador debe estar, al momento de formular la consulta, debidamente habilitado para ejercer esa competencia (ya que mal podría pensarse que una resolución que sea inválida en el proceso en cuestión pueda surtir el efecto de dar inicio a un trámite que, como éste, posee un carácter puramente incidental).

B. Que existan «dudas fundadas» sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión que se deba aplicar o juzgar. Esto quiere decir que el cuestionamiento debe ser razonable y ponderado. Además implica que no puede versar sobre aspectos sobre cuya constitucionalidad la Sala ya se haya pronunciado. Ello es así no sólo porque aceptar lo contrario implicaría desconocer la eficacia erga omnes de las resoluciones de esta jurisdicción, sino también dado que una consulta bajo esas circunstancias evidentemente carecería de interés actual. Pero subráyese, por su relevancia para el sub examine, que la explicada circunstancia sólo deriva de aquellos pronunciamientos en que la Sala haya validado expresamente la adecuación de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión a los parámetros constitucionales. En consecuencia, si una norma ha superado anteriormente el examen un nuevo cuestionamiento sobre el mismo punto, pero sí podría serlo respecto de un acto, conducta u omisión basados en la misma norma, particularmente porque –en este caso– siempre existe la posibilidad de un quebranto constitucional, ya no en la norma en sí, sino en su interpretación o aplicación. A la inversa, el hecho de que un acto, conducta u omisión haya sido refrendado anteriormente (quizás en vía de amparo o hábeas corpus) no significa que no puedan existir dudas sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma misma en que aquellos se fundamenten. Y, en esta hipótesis, la consulta judicial es pertinente.

C. Que exista un caso sometido al conocimiento del juzgador o tribunal. Al igual que en la acción de inconstitucionalidad, la consulta judicial nunca se da en el vacío o por mero afán académico, sino que ella debe ser relevante para la decisión o resolución del llamado «asunto previo» o «principal». Finalmente, D. Que, en ese asunto previo, deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda de constitucionalidad, aspecto que –por su relevancia para el caso– resulta conveniente precisar. En efecto, la expresión «deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión», conlleva un sentido actual muy definido y totalmente distinto a que si la ley hablara en términos de que «pueda aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión». La consulta judicial no procede ante la mera eventualidad de que acaezcan esas circunstancias, ya que –como se explicó arriba– esta concepción equivaldría a que se inviertan los recursos de la jurisdicción constitucional en un simple ejercicio académico o doctrinario. Para que la consulta sea viable, el juzgador debe estar enfrentado, con certidumbre y en tiempo presente, a la aplicación de la norma o al juzgamiento del acto, conducta u omisión que le suscite una duda de constitucionalidad (…).” (El destacado no forma parte del original).

En el caso en examen, el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Octava, plantea sus dudas en relación con la constitucionalidad de los artículos 120 inciso 4), y 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo en relación con los artículos 173 y 182 de la Constitución Política. No obstante, en el caso del artículo 31 inciso 1), la consulta debe rechazarse porque no se da el supuesto de incidentalidad que exige que la norma cuestionada sea aplicable al caso que origina la consulta. Como bien señala el Tribunal, el proceso que sirve de base a la consulta es de material municipal, y la norma citada se refiere parcialmente a materia de contratación administrativa, de tal forma que no se da uno de los supuestos de admisibilidad que exige la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional en su artículo 102 citado. En consecuencia se rechaza parcialmente la consulta formulada en cuanto a esta norma y su relación con el artículo 182 de la Constitución Política y se admite por cumplir las exigencias formales, la que se refiere al artículo 120 inciso 4) citada y del 31 1) sólo en cuanto a su relación con la materia municipal.

II.-NORMAS CONSULTADAS. Señala el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo vigente:

“1) La sentencia declarará la inadmisibilidad, total o parcial, de la pretensión en los casos siguientes:

(...)

• 4)Si, en la fase oral y pública, se determina que existe una falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, se tendrá por subsanado el defecto”.

Por su parte, el artículo 31 inciso 1) señala:

• 1)“El agotamiento de la vía administrativa será facultativo, salvo para lo dispuesto en los artículos 173 y 182 de la Constitución Política.” III.-ANÁLISIS DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Es correcto afirmar que la constitucionalidad del agotamiento de la vía administrativa fue analizado por esta Sala en las sentencias 3669-2006 y 9928-2010, en las cuales se determinó que, salvo las excepciones contenidas en los artículos 173 y 182 de la Constitución Política, referidos por su orden a las materias municipal y de contratación administrativa, exigir el agotamiento previo de la vía administrativa como condición para acceder la vía jurisdiccional, resulta contrario a la Constitución Política.

En lo que interesa se indicó:

"IV.- AGOTAMIENTO PRECEPTIVO DE LA VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA: PRIVILEGIO INJUSTIFICADOFORMAL DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS. En la concepción clásica del Derecho Administrativo sustancial y formal, las administraciones públicas, en cuanto procuran y atienden los intereses públicos o la satisfacción de las necesidades colectivas, deben estar provistas de una serie de prerrogativas extraordinarias. Así, en el ámbito del Derecho Procesal Administrativo, tradicionalmente, se admitió como un privilegio de carácter formal el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa o la vía gubernativa previa, esto es, que los administrados que se estiman lesionados o agraviados por un acto administrativo deben, de previo a acudir a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, agotar todos los recursos administrativos ordinarios procedentes contra el mismo en sede administrativa. Consecuentemente, el agotamiento de la vía administrativa, se convierte en un requisito de admisibilidad del proceso contencioso administrativo en su versión objetiva o revisora clásica y tradicional. En la base de este instituto subyace la denominada prerrogativa del auto tutela declarativa y ejecutiva de las administraciones públicas, la cual ha encontrado sustento, al propio tiempo, en principios tales como los de eficacia, eficiencia y buena administración.

La auto tutela declarativa significa que los entes públicos pueden, por sí y ante sí, sin necesidad de acudir ante un juez, imponerle obligaciones a los administrados o bien suprimirles o modificarles sus situaciones jurídicas sustanciales –llámense derechos subjetivos o intereses legítimos-. La obligación legislativa ineludible del administrado de ejercer o plantear todos los recursos administrativos ordinarios contra un acto administrativo antes de acudir ante el juez contencioso-administrativo, constituye una manifestación específica de la auto tutela declarativa de las administraciones públicas, puesto que, el legislador espera que la propia administración pública pueda defender el acto administrativo impugnado o bien anularlo o modificarlo, evitándole tener que comparecer ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. De esta forma, en la vía administrativa la administración pública se convierte, al mismo tiempo, en juez y parte, puesto que, debe atender las solicitudes o pedimentos formulados por los administrados y resolver los recursos administrativos ordinarios que procedan contra el acto final que ella misma dicte. Como se ve, la autotutela es un concepto diametralmente opuesto al que impera en el resto de las ramas jurídicas, en las que opera la heterotutela, esto es, la ejercida por un tercero supra partes con las garantías constitucionales de imparcialidad, independencia y objetividad, como lo es un órgano jurisdiccional. Así, a modo de ejemplo, en el ámbito del Derecho Privado un particular puede imponerle una obligación o afectar las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de otro, única y exclusivamente, si ello surge de forma consensuada a través de la aplicación del principio de la autonomía de la voluntad (artículo 28 de la Constitución Política) o de la intervención de un juez (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política). No obstante, los principios rectores de la organización y función administrativa de la eficiencia y eficacia, plasmados en la propia Constitución Política (artículos 140, inciso 8°, y 191), deben entenderse, en todo momento y bajo cualquier circunstancia, subordinados a los derechos fundamentales y deben ceder ante éstos, puesto que, constituyen el fundamento y la base de entero ordenamiento jurídico. Modernamente las administraciones públicas deben ser concebidas y entendidas como un sujeto de Derecho más del ordenamiento jurídico, de modo que resulta repugnante para el Derecho de la Constitución la asimetría o desigualdad crónica que campea en el ámbito de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa entre el administrado o el ciudadano y el respectivo ente público.

El reconocimiento y otorgamiento legislativo de una serie de prerrogativas formales o adjetivas a los entes públicos en el orden jurisdiccional contencioso-administrativo no tiene justificación objetiva y razonable si su función administrativa, de acuerdo con el parámetro constitucional (artículos 33 y 49 de la Constitución Política) debe ser objeto de un control de legalidad plenario y universal, sin fisuras o reductos exentos y, sobre todo, si son creados y puestos en funcionamiento para servir o atender las necesidades de los ciudadanos o administrados – organizaciones serviciales-.

V.- INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL CARÁCTER PRECEPTIVO DEL AGOTAMIENTO DE LA VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA. Actualmente, sobre todo a la luz de los principios de la supremacía de la Constitución y de la vinculación más fuerte de los derechos fundamentales, así como de su eficacia expansiva y progresiva e interpretación más favorable, se entiende que el carácter obligatorio o preceptivo del agotamiento de la vía administrativa riñe con el derecho fundamental de los administrados a obtener una justicia pronta y cumplida ex artículos 41 y 49 de la Constitución Política (tutela judicial efectiva) y con el principio de igualdad, puesto que, sólo en el proceso contencioso-administrativo –y no así en el resto de las jurisdicciones- se le obliga al justiciable, antes de acudir a la vía jurisdiccional, agotar todos los recursos administrativos ordinarios procedentes. La infracción al derecho fundamental a una justicia pronta y cumplida deviene de los siguientes aspectos: a) Normalmente, cuando el administrado interpone los recursos ordinarios de revocatoria, apelación o de reposición –entendido este último como el recurso horizontal que cabe contra los actos del jerarca o superior jerárquico supremo-, no logra que el propio órgano o su superior lo modifique o anule, de modo que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa es como sacar agua de un pozo seco, al no lograrse obtener nada de la interposición de los recursos, transformándose así en una pesada carga o especie de vía crucis para el administrado; b) es sabido que el procedimiento administrativo y su etapa recursiva o de revisión, suele prolongarse más allá de los plazos legales y de lo que puede concebirse como un plazo razonable, con lo cual se prolonga indefinidamente, incluso por años, el acceso a la tutela judicial efectiva, sin tener posibilidad de hacerlo inmediatamente y cuando lo estime oportuno; c) la sumatoria del plazo necesario para agotar la vía administrativa con el requerido por la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, provoca que los administrados obtengan una justicia tardía, la cual, eventualmente, puede transformarse –según su prolongación y las circunstancias particulares de los administrados justiciables- en una denegación de justicia; lo anterior constituye una clara y evidente ventaja relativa para los entes públicos de la cual, en ocasiones, se prevalen, puesto que, el administrado o ciudadano pasa –por su condición ordinaria de persona física- y la administración pública permanece prolongadamente en el tiempo. En lo que atañe a la vulneración del principio de igualdad, debe indicarse que el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa, derivado del privilegio de la autotutela declarativa, expone al justiciable que litiga contra una administración pública a una situación discriminatoria, puesto que, no existe un motivo objetivo y razonable para someterlo a ese requisito obligatorio, a diferencia del resto de los ordenes jurisdiccionales. Debe tenerse en consideración que, incluso, la libertad de configuración o discrecionalidad legislativa al diseñar los diversos procesos, tiene como límite infranqueable el principio de igualdad. Lo anterior, queda reforzado si se considera que las administraciones públicas son un sujeto de Derecho más que no tienen por qué gozar de tales privilegios o prerrogativas y que el eje central en una administración prestacional o en un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho lo es la persona, esto es, el usuario o consumidor de los bienes y servicios públicos. En esencia, los intereses públicos y la satisfacción de las necesidades colectivas no pueden tenerse como cláusulas de apoderamiento para enervar los derechos fundamentales de los administrados o, sencillamente, como el altar para ser sacrificados.

VI.- ADECUACIÓN DEL AGOTAMIENTO DE LA VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA AL PARÁMETRO CONSTITUCIONAL: CARÁCTER FACULTATIVO U OPTATIVO PARA EL ADMINISTRADO. La interpretación más favorable a la eficacia expansiva y progresiva de los derechos fundamentales de los administrados a una justicia pronta y cumplida y a la igualdad, impone replantearse cualitativamente el carácter obligatorio del agotamiento de la vía administrativa impuesto por el legislador. En efecto, debe entenderse que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa debe quedar a la libérrima elección del administrado, de modo que sea éste quien, después de efectuar un juicio de probabilidad acerca del éxito eventual de su gestión en sede administrativa, decida si interpone o no los recursos administrativos procedentes. Es de esperar que las posibilidades del administrado se refuercen cuando se trata de los denominados “tribunales administrativos” (v. gr. Tribunal Ambiental, Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, Tribunal Aduanero Nacional, Tribunal del Servicio Civil, Tribunal de Carrera Docente, Tribunal Registral Administrativo, Tribunal de Transportes, etc.), puesto que, como los mismos han sido constituidos, casi de forma usual, como órganos desconcentrados en grado máximo, se obtiene una mayor garantía de especialidad técnica, imparcialidad y objetividad, al difuminarse la relación de jerarquía y diluirse cualquier criterio político. La idea del carácter facultativo del agotamiento de la vía administrativa, no es ajena o extraña al ordenamiento jurídico infraconstitucional, la propia Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa establece cuatro supuestos en que resulta optativa. Así, el artículo 32 exceptúa del recurso de reposición el acto presunto por silencio negativo cuando emana del jerarca, los actos no manifestados por escrito –tácitos- y los reglamentos. El artículo 87, en tratándose del proceso especial de separación de directores de las entidades descentralizadas, establece que no es necesario plantear el recurso previo de reposición. Por su parte el artículo 357 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública estatuye que no es necesario agotar la vía administrativa para impugnar las vías de hecho. Por último, la propia Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en su artículo 31 indica que no es necesario agotar la vía administrativa para acudir al proceso de amparo. Cabe aclarar y advertir, aunque no es objeto de la presente consulta judicial, por su trascendental importancia que el plazo de caducidad de la acción –cualquiera que este sea-, cuando el administrado opta por no agotar la vía administrativa, empezará a correr a partir de la notificación del acto final no impugnado. En suma, el carácter electivo de la vía administrativa, resulta absolutamente congruente con los derechos fundamentales de los administrados de acceso a la jurisdicción, a una justicia pronta y cumplida (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), a la igualdad (artículo 33 de la Constitución Política) y a controlar la legalidad de la función administrativa (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política). Ahora bien, debe resaltarse que tan constitucional es que el administrado opte por acudir directamente a la vía jurisdiccional, sin agotar la vía administrativa, como cuando elige hacerlo.

VII.- AGOTAMIENTO PRECEPTIVO IMPUESTO POR EL TEXTO CONSTITUCIONAL. El constituyente originario estableció varias hipótesis en que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa resulta preceptivo, al entender que el órgano o instancia que revisa o fiscaliza un acto administrativo determinado es una garantía de acierto, celeridad y economía para el administrado. En tales circunstancias, se encuentran los numerales 173 respecto de los acuerdos municipales, en cuanto el párrafo 2°, de ese numeral establece que si no es revocado o reformado el acuerdo objetado o recurrido, los antecedentes pasarán al Tribunal dependiente del Poder Judicial que indique la ley para que resuelva definitivamente y 184 en cuanto le reserva a la Contraloría General de la República la jerarquía impropia de los actos administrativos dictados en materia de contratación administrativa. En estos dos supuestos, al existir norma constitucional que le brinda cobertura al agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa no puede estimarse que sea inconstitucional ese presupuesto obligatorio de admisibilidad de un proceso contencioso-administrativo.

VIII.- ACTO TÁCITAMENTE CONSENTIDO: PRIVILEGIO FORMAL INJUSTIFICADO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS. Otro de los privilegios formales de las administraciones públicas en el proceso contencioso-administrativo lo constituye la figura dogmática y legislativa del acto tácitamente consentido que tiene una lógica irrefutable en relación con el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa. Si el agotamiento de la vía administrativa –sustentado en el privilegio de la autotutela declarativa- es un requisito de admisibilidad de carácter obligatorio, consecuentemente, si el administrado no ejerce en tiempo y forma los recursos administrativos procedentes, el legislador presume, a partir de la conducta omisa del administrado, que ha consentido tácitamente el acto administrativo al no recurrirlo en los plazos y por los medios dispuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico. Ese instituto procesal infringe frontalmente el derecho fundamental de los administrados de acceder a la jurisdicción (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), puesto que, le impide perpetuamente, discutir el asunto ante la jurisdicción dispuesta por el constituyente para ejercer el control de legalidad de la función administrativa (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política), simplemente, por no haber ejercido e interpuesto los recursos administrativos procedentes.Consecuentemente, si la adecuación del agotamiento de la vía administrativa al parámetro constitucional impone estimarla como facultativa u optativa para el administrado, la figura del acto consentido debe ser reputada como inconstitucional en cuanto supone de forma implícita que debe cumplirse obligatoriamente con tal recaudo.

IX.- NORMAS CONEXAS. El artículo 89 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional preceptúa que la sentencia que declare la inconstitucionalidad de una norma o ley, declarará también la de los demás preceptos de ella cuya anulación resulte evidentemente necesaria por conexión o consecuencia. Ese numeral, por lo dispuesto en el propio artículo 108 ibidem, resulta aplicable supletoriamente a las consultas judiciales. Por lo expuesto, este Tribunal Constitucional estima que por conexión con las normas consultadas, también resultan inconstitucionales las siguientes de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa: a) La frase del artículo 18, párrafo 1° de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa en cuanto establece “(…) que no sean susceptibles de ulterior recurso en vía administrativa (…)”; b) el inciso d) del párrafo 1° del artículo 41 de ese cuerpo normativo en cuanto dispone “d) Que no está agotada la vía administrativa”; c) El párrafo 3° del artículo 33 de esa ley al preceptuar“3. La falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa dará lugar a su alegación, por vía de defensa previa, si el Tribunal no apreciare el defecto en la oportunidad prevista en el artículo 41”; d) la frase final del párrafo 4° del artículo 33 al señalar “(…) por no haber sido recurridos administrativamente en tiempo y forma”; e) el inciso c) del artículo 50 de la ley referida al indicar “c) La falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa”.

No obstante que en la sentencia citada se reconoce la existencia del agotamiento de la vía administrativa como una exigencia en materia municipal y de contratación administrativa, la Sala estima que el razonamiento del Tribunal consultante es equívoco al darle a las normas constitucionales y jurisprudencia citada un alcance que no tienen. Ciertamente la Constitución establece el agotamiento de la vía administrativa en materia municipal y de contratación administrativa, pero no regula la forma en que ese agotamiento debe ser acreditado dentro del proceso judicial. La naturaleza del instituto por lógica exige que sea al inicio del mismo que el agotamiento sea alegado y exigido por la administración. Dado que el proceso es una secuencia lógica de acciones, el legislador bien puede ordenar en qué fase del procedimiento, de acuerdo a la naturaleza del instituto, hace cumplir una determinada exigencia, especialmente tomando en cuenta que en él coexisten varias normas constitucionales igualmente relevantes, que deben ser armonizadas para garantizar el debido proceso y la tutela judicial efectiva de las personas. En ese sentido, el principio de prontitud de la justicia y de tutela judicial efectiva, exigen que en este caso, si teniendo la parte interesada la oportunidad de alegar la falta de agotamiento de la vía al inicio del proceso, no lo hizo, esa etapa haya recluido a favor del administrado. Si se trata de resguardar el principio de autotutela y la oportunidad de corregir un acto nulo o que pueda generar responsabilidad al Estado, la administración puede corregirlo en cualquier tiempo. En el caso concreto la administración tuvo la oportunidad plena de alegar el vicio oportunamente y no lo hizo y si bien es cierto, le corresponde al juez de la etapa intermedia sanear el proceso, si tampoco lo hizo, teniendo la parte la posibilidad de invocar el defecto, no puede decirse que se dejó en indefensión a la administración, ni que el administrado deba cargar con las omisiones de ambos. Si tomamos el caso del derecho a apelar por ejemplo -derecho derivado del debido proceso-, no podría alegarse que ese derecho le asiste a la parte en forma abierta en todas las etapas del mismo, sino que es el legislador quien, atendiendo a su naturaleza, determina el tiempo, modo y plazo de ejercerse, derecho que declinado por la parte interesada, puede precluir la etapa, dependiendo del proceso que se trate. Se trata en definitiva de una ordenación del proceso, que como se indicó contiene varios derechos constitucionales que equilibrar y armonizar. Determinar que el agotamiento de la vía puede ser alegado abiertamente en cualquier fase del proceso, aún en la etapa de juicio, es poner este instituto por encima de derechos fundamentales esenciales como el de celeridad y justicia pronta y cumplida. Conforme lo ha señalado la jurisprudencia de esta Sala (8549-2002), es un imperativo constitucional que tanto los procedimientos administrativos como judiciales, sean, prontos, oportunos y cumplidos en aras de valores constitucionales trascendentales como la seguridad y la certeza jurídicas de los que son merecidos acreedores todos los administrados. Como bien señala la sentencia citada, por lo anterior, los procedimientos administrativos se encuentran informados por una serie de principios de profunda raigambre constitucional, tales como los de prontitud y oportunidad (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), más conocido como de celeridad o rapidez (artículos 225, párrafo 1°, y 269, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), eficacia y eficiencia (artículos 140, inciso 8, de la Constitución Política, 4°, 225, párrafo 1°, y 269, párrafo 1°, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), simplicidad y economía procedimentales (artículo 269, párrafo 1°, ibidem), que le imponen a los entes públicos la obligación imperativa de substanciarlos dentro de un plazo razonable y sin dilaciones indebidas, es decir, sin retardos graves e injustificados para evitar la frustración, la eventual extinción o la lesión grave de las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales invocadas por los administrados por el transcurso de un tiempo excesivo e irrazonable. “El privilegio sustancial y posicional de las administraciones públicas, denominado autotutela declarativa y que, a la postre, constituye una pesada carga para los administrados, no debe invertirse y ser aprovechado por éstas para causarle una lesión antijurídica al administrado con la prolongación innecesaria de los procedimientos administrativos.” Los mismos argumentos son válidos para los procesos judiciales, de tal forma que no tiene sentido que teniendo la administración la posibilidad -con conocimiento de las pretensiones de los accionantes-, de por un lado haber alegado el vicio de falta de agotamiento de la vía al inicio del proceso, o bien por otro, de revertir el acto si así lo estima, en ejercicio del principio de autotutela, no hiciera ninguno, y que ante su inercia y la del juez tramitador, se anteponga el interés de la administración a la del administrado, cuando se ha avanzado ya en el proceso para el inicio de la fase de juicio. El administrado no tiene porqué sufrir la inercia de la administración, o de la administración de justicia en perjuicio de su derecho constitucional a una justicia pronta y cumplida y de su derecho a ser efectivamente tutelado, especialmente tomando en cuenta que en esta materia, la administración goza de una ventaja –por disposición constitucional-, frente al administrado, la que no supo invocar o defender oportunamente.

VI.- COROLARIO. En suma, esta Sala interpreta que los artículos 120 inciso 4) Y 31 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, este último en su relación con el 173 de la Constitución Política, no son contrarios a la Constitución Política, en cuanto lo que hacen es regular la forma y momento procesal en que se puede hacer valer el agotamiento referido en las normas constitucionales. Los Magistrados Jinesta Lobo y Hernández Gutiérrez dan razones diferentes en cuanto a la constitucionalidad del artículo 120, párrafo 4°, del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo y el Magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara inconstitucional el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

POR TANTO

Se rechaza de plano la consulta en cuanto al artículo 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo en relación con el 182 de la Constitución Política. Se evacua la consulta formulada en el sentido de que no son contrarios a la Constitución Política, los artículos 120 inciso 4), y 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, éste último en su relación con el 173 de la Constitución Política. Los Magistrados Jinesta Lobo y Hernández Gutiérrez dan razones diferentes. El Magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y declara inconstitucional el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

Gilbert Armijo S.

Presidente a.i.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ernesto Jinesta L.

Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L. José Paulino Hernández G.

RAZONES DIFERENTES DE LOS MAGISTRADOS JINESTA LOBO Y HERNANDEZ GUTIERREZ Los Magistrados Jinesta Lobo y Hernández Gutiérrez, dan razones diferentes en cuanto a la constitucionalidad del artículo 120, párrafo 4°, del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo.Ciertamente el artículo 120, párrafo 4°, del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, Ley No. 8508 de 28 de abril de 2006, dispuso, literalmente, lo siguiente:

“Si, en la fase oral y pública, se determina que existe una falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, se tendrá por subsanado el defecto” Por virtud de lo resuelto por esta Sala Constitucional en el Voto No. 3669-06 y el numeral 31, párrafo 1°, la regla o principio constitucional es que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa sea facultativo u optativo, por virtud de los derechos fundamentales y humanos que le asisten al administrado justiciable que sostiene una controversia con una administración pública. Consecuentemente, el ordinal 120, párrafo 4°, del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo tiene, precisamente, sentido, únicamente, para los supuestos excepcionales en que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa es preceptivo. Ese numeral no tiene sentido y aplicación para el resto de las hipótesis ordinarias en que el agotamiento es facultativo u optativo. El fin de introducir un precepto de tal naturaleza en la legislación adjetiva, obedece a claras razones de constitucionalidad que son las siguientes:

a. El agotamiento de la vía administrativa no es un derecho de las administraciones públicas, sino un privilegio o prerrogativa que vulnera el principio y derecho a la igualdad.

b. Por aplicación de los principios constitucionales de seguridad y certeza jurídica, las administraciones públicas bien pueden –cuando sea excepcionalmente preceptivo el agotamiento de la vía administrativa- aducir como defensa previa, tal privilegio. Así lo confirma el artículo 66, párrafo 1°, inciso c), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo que habilita a los representantes de los poderes públicos demandados para alegar como defensa previa la “Falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, cuando proceda”. Consecuentemente, la administración pública demandada tiene una oportunidad procesal para aducir tal defensa, siendo que si no la aprovecha debe soportar las consecuencias de su propia incuria y de su representante. De otra parte, el nuevo modelo de justicia administrativa introdujo la figura del “Juez tramitador” encargado de sanear el proceso durante la audiencia preliminar (artículo 90, párrafo 1°, inciso a, del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), siendo que durante tal etapa se deben advertir todos los defectos del proceso e, incluso, debe resolverse la defensa previa del artículo 66, párrafo 1°, inciso c), del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, para que la parte interesada pueda subsanar cualquier defecto sobre el particular (artículo 92 del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo). En definitiva, por aplicación de los principios constitucionales de la seguridad y certeza jurídicas, existe un momento procesal específico para aducir la falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa en los casos en que sea preceptiva, de lo contrario opera la figura de la preclusión que tiene pleno sustento en los principios constitucionales ya indicados.

c. El derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva o justicia pronta y cumplida (artículo 41 constitucional) y a controlar la legalidad de todas las formas de manifestación de la función administrativa (artículo 49 constitucional), a quien asiste es al administrado justiciable, quién, si la administración pública demanda omitió plantear la defensa previa del agotamiento preceptivo y si el juez tramitador no advirtió tal defecto, no debe soportar las consecuencias de la conducta omisa tanto del ente público demandado como del juez tramitador.

d. La falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa como instrumento para enervar el conocimiento por el fondo de la cuestión, es una figura eminentemente formal que debe ceder ante las exigencias de la justicia material que asiste al justiciable que la impetra ante los estrados judiciales, en aras de conocer y resolver el mérito y buscar una solución definitiva a la controversia, sea de la regla constitucional de la “in dubio pro accione”, implícitamente contenida en el artículo 41 constitucional.

Por las razones expuestas estimamos que el artículo 120, párrafo 4°, del Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo resulta conforme con el parámetro de constitucionalidad.

Ernesto Jinesta L. José Paulino Hernández G.

VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA El suscrito Magistrado Rueda Leal me separo parcialmente de la decisión de mayoría pues estimo que la consulta se debe evacuar en el sentido que es inconstitucional el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Debo aclarar que comparto la apreciación que se hace en el voto de mayoría, en el sentido de rechazar de plano la consulta en cuanto al artículo 31 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo en relación con el 182 de la Constitución Política, ya que efectivamente no se da el supuesto de incidentalidad que exige que la norma cuestionada sea aplicable al caso que origina la consulta. Como lo informa el Tribunal consultante, el proceso que sirve de base a la consulta es de materia municipal, y en vista que el ordinal 31 inciso l) citado se refiere parcialmente a materia de contratación administrativa, no se daría uno de los supuestos de admisibilidad que exige la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional para conocer sobre la constitucionalidad de esa norma. Empero, respecto de la duda de constitucionalidad planteada por el órgano consultante relacionada con el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, sí considero que debe emitirse un pronunciamiento de fondo en el siguiente sentido:

Primero, considero que el Texto Constitucional claramente establece en su numeral 173 que, en materia municipal, se debe agotar la vía administrativa ante el “Tribunal dependiente del Poder Judicial que indique la ley para que resuelva definitivamente”. Es decir, que previo a interponer cualquier proceso o gestión de carácter jurisdiccional, el acto administrativo impugnado debe atravesar un último filtro ante el órgano jerarca impropio bifásico en materia municipal que señala el propio ordinal 173 de la Constitución y, en consecuencia, agotar la vía administrativa por medio de esa instancia. Bajo esa inteligencia, llevan razón los consultantes en el sentido que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa en materia municipal es de origen constitucional, por ello estimo que el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo sí atenta directamente contra la Constitución, toda vez que a partir de esta norma se permite tener por subsanado el defecto de no haber agotado previamente la vía administrativa en materia municipal, a pesar del mandamiento expreso dispuesto en la Constitución en el sentido que este tipo de agotamiento es obligatorio y preceptivo. Como se dijo en sentencia número […] por parte de esta Sala: “Debe advertirse que la única jerarquía impropia bifásica que el propio constituyente originario admitió, tanto que se ocupó de regularla de forma expresa en el propio texto constitucional –lo que confirma su carácter excepcionalísimo-, es la del artículo 173, párrafo 2°, de la Constitución Política, al señalar que la revisión y fiscalización de los acuerdos de los Concejos Municipales estará a cargo del “(…) Tribunal dependiente del Poder Judicial que indique la ley (…)” –Tribunal Contencioso-Administrativo-“. Ergo, por el carácter especial que dispone la propia Constitución respecto a este tipo de agotamiento de la vía en materia municipal, estimo que el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo sí es inconstitucional. Segundo, el órgano o instancia administrativa que revisa finalmente el acto impugnado en materia municipal, se constituye en una garantía de acierto, celeridad, economía, imparcialidad, independencia y objetividad para el administrado, debido a que dicha labor es encomendada a un jerarca impropio, diferente de la instancia donde se dictó el acto administrativo cuestionado, de ahí que el Constituyente Originario haya estimado oportuno agotar la vía administrativa en materia municipal, gracias a las garantías que implica acudir a una instancia independiente de la que dictó el acto.

Tercero, esta propia Sala, en sentencia número 3669-2006 de las 15:00 horas del 15 de marzo de 2006, estableció lo siguiente:

“VII.- AGOTAMIENTO PRECEPTIVO IMPUESTO POR EL TEXTO CONSTITUCIONAL. El constituyente originario estableció varias hipótesis en que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa resulta preceptivo, al entender que el órgano o instancia que revisa o fiscaliza un acto administrativo determinado es una garantía de acierto, celeridad y economía para el administrado. En tales circunstancias, se encuentran los numerales 173 respecto de los acuerdos municipales, en cuanto el párrafo 2°, de ese numeral establece que si no es revocado o reformado el acuerdo objetado o recurrido, los antecedentes pasarán al Tribunal dependiente del Poder Judicial que indique la ley para que resuelva definitivamente y 184 en cuanto le reserva a la Contraloría General de la República la jerarquía impropia de los actos administrativos dictados en materia de contratación administrativa. En estos dos supuestos, al existir norma constitucional que le brinda cobertura al agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa no puede estimarse que sea inconstitucional ese presupuesto obligatorio de admisibilidad de un proceso contencioso-administrativo” De modo que desconocer un pronunciamiento tan claro como ese, devendría en una situación generadora de inseguridad jurídica, al obviar el carácter preceptivo que ya han señalado los precedentes de este Tribunal en el tema del agotamiento de la vía administrativa en materia municipal.

Cuarto, no comparto la tesis de la mayoría de la Sala expuesta en el sub lite, en el sentido que la naturaleza del agotamiento de la vía administrativa, en materia municipal, por lógica exige que su falta de cumplimiento se invoque al inicio del proceso judicial, y que por ello también es lógico que el legislador pueda ordenar en qué fase del proceso judicial se debe invocar esa falta de agotamiento. Ello por cuanto al ser preceptivo ese agotamiento en temas municipales (por disposición directa de la Constitución), este puede invocarse en cualquier momento en que alguna de las partes se percate de ello. Tampoco es cierto que si teniendo la parte interesada la oportunidad de alegar la falta de agotamiento de la vía (en materia municipal) al inicio del proceso, no lo hizo, se deba considerar que esa etapa haya precluido, ya que como se explicó supra, el Texto Constitucional dispone que ese agotamiento es preceptivo, de modo que no podría prelucir, aun cuando lo disponga el legislador, so pena de incurrir en un vicio de inconstitucionalidad. Así las cosas, considero que –concretamente- el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo sí atenta directamente contra la Carta Fundamental, al tener por subsanado un defecto que la propia Constitución exige como preceptivo, es decir, que es obligatorio cumplir. En cuanto al artículo 31 inciso 1) consultado, no encuentro que exista algún choque de constitucionalidad, pues precisamente indica que “El agotamiento de la vía administrativa será facultativo, salvo para lo dispuesto en los artículos 173 y 182 de la Constitución Política”; contrario sensu, el agotamiento de la vía administrativa para los casos contemplados en el artículo 173 de la Constitución es preceptivo, tal como se ha venido sosteniendo en este voto disidente y como lo ha explicado la Sala en sus precedentes.

Ergo, el problema de constitucionalidad surge a partir de lo estipulado en el artículo 120 inciso 4) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y, por ello, considero que se debió haber evacuado la consulta en el sentido que esa norma resulta inconstitucional.

Paul Rueda Leal