Exhaustion of administrative remedies as optional requirementAgotamiento de la vía administrativa como requisito facultativo

Res. 03669-2006 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hundred hours on the fifteenth of March, two thousand six.

Judicial consultation of constitutionality submitted by the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by resolution No. 890-2004 of 11:00 a.m. on July 30, 2004, in the ordinary proceeding processed under case file No. 97-001083-163-CA, filed by Nombre01 against Nombre02, Nombre03 and the State, regarding articles 21, paragraph 1, subsection a), and 31, paragraph 1, of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966).

WHEREAS:

1.- By resolution No. 890-2004 of 11:00 a.m. on July 30, 2004, the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, issued in the ordinary proceeding filed by Nombre01 against Nombre02, Nombre03 and the State (case file No. 97-001083-163-CA), submits a judicial consultation of constitutionality regarding articles 31, paragraph 1, and 21, paragraph 1, subsection a), of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966). It states that in the jurisdictional proceeding, the State's representation raised the preliminary defenses of formal defect, failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), and consented act. Although the court, in resolution No. 462-2003 of 3:00 p.m. on June 12, 2003, rejected them, it indicated that "without prejudice to them being reviewed again at the time of issuing the final judgment on the merits," therefore, it considers that the exceptions remain pending resolution. The consulting judge considers that he has well-founded doubts regarding the constitutionality of the cited articles of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, as they contravene the principle of equality of procedural burdens, without sufficient material justice foundation, since the mandatory exhaustion prevents access to judicial remedies, restricting the possibilities of obtaining adequate interim relief. He considers having doubts about the proportionality of the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies insofar as it restricts the fundamental rights to action and effective judicial protection, in safeguarding the public interest. In his opinion, the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies established by law restricts fundamental rights, infringing, in his view, the principle of constitutional supremacy derived from articles 195 and 196 of the fundamental text. Regarding the legal unchallengeability of the tacitly consented act, he raises doubts about its consistency with the fundamental right to legality review or to appeal public authority acts through judicial channels.

2.- The representative of the State, by brief filed on August 20, 2004, appeared and stated that the consulting judicial body has no valid reason, since the prior requirement of exhausting administrative remedies does not limit the individual's rights or guarantees to effective judicial protection; on the contrary, it is a prerequisite for implementing the principle of "administrative justice," to settle differences within the administrative sphere. This requirement fulfills a function of administrative oversight by the superior authority for the benefit of the individual, thus implementing the principles of security and certainty. In his opinion, the mandatory exhaustion also does not violate the principle of equality of procedural burdens.

3.- By memorial filed on August 30, 2004, the representative of the State expanded on his statements, citing doctrine, considering that exhausting administrative remedies is beneficial for the individual, since the administration has the possibility of modifying or revoking its decision, acknowledging the individual's position. Regarding the tacitly consented act, he considers it a final act that cannot be challenged indefinitely and at the interested party's will.

4.- By resolution of 11:40 a.m. on November 18, 2004, the acting presidency of the Constitutional Chamber acknowledged the appearances of Vivian Ávila Jones as Deputy Attorney General and Licenciada Nombre03 as judicial representative of Nombre02.

5.- In the processing of the proceeding, legal requirements have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta; and, WHEREUPON:

I.- ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS OF JUDICIAL CONSULTATIONS. Article 102 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes the admissibility requirements for judicial consultations, a provision from which four conditional and fundamental elements for its propriety are derived, as follows: a) that it is submitted by a judge; b) that "well-founded doubts" exist regarding the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission to be applied or judged; c) that there is a case pending before the judge or tribunal, and d) that in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged. These requirements were analyzed in detail in judgment No. 1617-97 of 2:54 p.m. on March 17, 1997, as follows:

"A. That it be submitted by a 'judge,' a generic term that—of course—applies both to single judges and collegiate tribunals, about which it is unnecessary to specify more than: a) that it must involve authorities vested with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations submitted by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators in the context of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is being in the process of a proceeding leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitral award, endowed with res judicata authority); and, b) that the judge must be, at the time of submitting the consultation, duly authorized to exercise this competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the relevant proceeding could have the effect of initiating a process that, like this one, possesses a purely incidental character).

B. That 'well-founded doubts' exist regarding the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission to be applied or judged. This means that the questioning must be reasonable and carefully weighed. It also implies that it cannot concern aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would imply ignoring the erga omnes effect of this jurisdiction's resolutions, but also because a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it should be emphasized, for its relevance to the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the conformity of the norm, act, conduct, or omission with constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a norm has previously passed explicit constitutional scrutiny (by means of an action or consultation), a new challenge on the same point would not be viable, but it could be viable regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on that same norm, particularly because—in this case—there is always the possibility of a constitutional breach, no longer in the norm itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps through an amparo or habeas corpus proceeding) does not mean that doubts cannot exist about the constitutionality of the norm itself on which those are based. And, in this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.

C. That there is a case pending before the judge or tribunal. As with an unconstitutionality action, a judicial consultation never occurs in a vacuum or for mere academic interest, but it must be relevant for the decision or resolution of the so-called 'prior or main matter.' Finally, D. That, in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that—due to its relevance for the case—it is convenient to specify. Indeed, the expression 'the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be judged,' carries a very defined current meaning and is totally different from if the law spoke in terms of 'the norm could be applied or the act, conduct, or omission could be judged.' The judicial consultation is not appropriate in the mere eventuality that those circumstances may occur, since—as explained above—this conception would equate to expending the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction on a simple academic or doctrinal exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be confronted, with certainty and in the present tense, with the application of the norm or the judgment of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality for him." II.- OBJECT AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE JUDICIAL CONSULTATION. The consulting contentious-administrative judge considers having a well-founded doubt of constitutionality regarding articles 31, paragraph 1, of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction "(…) insofar as it establishes that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition of admissibility for an ordinary proceeding before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction" and 21, paragraph 1, subsection a), "(…) insofar as it provides that the tacitly consented act, for not having been appealed in time and proper form, shall determine the inadmissibility of the contentious-administrative action (…)". He considers that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies aims to get the public entity or body to rectify its decision, which, ordinarily, does not happen in administrative and judicial experience. Additionally, he considers that the litigant, during the pendency of the appeal, must endure the execution of the administrative act, since, by virtue of article 148 of the General Law of Public Administration, the filing of appeals does not have a suspensive effect. In the consulting judge's opinion, the foregoing causes him to doubt the constitutionality of this privilege of the public administration because it contravenes articles 33 and 41 of the Political Constitution, given that, through the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, access to the jurisdiction and effective judicial protection is hindered, as well as the stronger binding force of fundamental rights. Regarding the administrative act tacitly consented to by the individual, the judge considers that it may imply the impossibility for the individual to exercise the fundamental right to challenge it through judicial channels or to exercise legality review. In the present consultation, the requirements and conditions referred to in the preceding whereas clause for the admissibility of the consultation are present, since it is submitted by resolution of a jurisdictional body that has well-founded motives of constitutionality regarding the norms it must apply in an ordinary proceeding. Indeed, in the ordinary proceeding processed before the Contentious-Administrative Court, under case file No. 97-001083-163-CA, the Attorney General's Office, by memorial filed on March 17, 2000 (visible at folios 134-136 of that case file), raised, among other preliminary defenses, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies and consented act. Subsequently, when answering the complaint by document filed on May 24, 2000 (visible at folios 158-166 of the cited case file), it again raised, among other substantive defenses, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies and consented act. The Contentious-Administrative Court, by resolution No. 462-2003 of 3:00 p.m. on June 12, 2003 (visible at folios 288-289 of the cited case file), rejected, among others, the preliminary defenses of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and consented act, as time-barred for having been raised not in the first two-thirds of the summons period but in the last third, and indicated "without prejudice to them being reviewed again at the time of issuing the final judgment on the merits." So, having also been alleged as substantive defenses by the Attorney General's Office when answering the complaint, the challenged norms may again be applied to that litigation at the time of issuing the judgment on the merits, a stage that is practically imminent, since the proceeding is ready for judgment after having completed the offered evidence.

III.- NORMS CONSULTED. The consulted norms of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), in relevant part, establish the following:

"Article 31.- 1. Exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be a requirement to admit the contentious-administrative action (…)" "Article 21.- 1. The contentious-administrative action shall not be admitted regarding: a) Acts consented to expressly or for not having been appealed in time and proper form, those that are a reproduction of prior acts that are already definitive or final, and those confirmatory of consented acts (…)" IV.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS. In the classic conception of substantive and formal Administrative Law, public administrations, insofar as they procure and attend to public interests or the satisfaction of collective needs, must be provided with a series of extraordinary prerogatives. Thus, in the field of Administrative Procedural Law, traditionally, the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies or the prior governmental remedy phase was admitted as a privilege of a formal nature, that is, that individuals who consider themselves injured or aggrieved by an administrative act must, prior to resorting to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, exhaust all ordinary administrative appeals available against it within the administrative sphere. Consequently, the exhaustion of administrative remedies becomes a requirement for the admissibility of the contentious-administrative proceeding in its objective or classic reviewing version. At the base of this institution lies the so-called prerogative of declaratory and executive self-help (autotutela declarativa y ejecutiva) of public administrations, which has, at the same time, found support in principles such as effectiveness, efficiency, and good administration. Declaratory self-help means that public entities can, by themselves and before themselves, without needing to resort to a judge, impose obligations on individuals or else suppress or modify their substantial legal situations—whether called subjective rights or legitimate interests. The unavoidable legislative obligation of the individual to exercise or raise all ordinary administrative appeals against an administrative act before resorting to the contentious-administrative judge constitutes a specific manifestation of the declaratory self-help of public administrations, since the legislator expects the public administration itself to be able to defend the challenged administrative act or else annul or modify it, avoiding having to appear before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In this way, in the administrative remedy phase, the public administration becomes, at the same time, judge and party, since it must attend to the applications or petitions formulated by individuals and resolve the ordinary administrative appeals that proceed against the final act it issues itself. As can be seen, self-help (autotutela) is a concept diametrically opposed to that which prevails in the rest of the legal branches, where heterotutela operates, that is, protection exercised by a third party supra partes with the constitutional guarantees of impartiality, independence, and objectivity, as is a jurisdictional body. Thus, by way of example, in the field of Private Law, an individual can impose an obligation or affect the substantial legal situations of another, only and exclusively, if it arises consensually through the application of the principle of autonomy of will (article 28 of the Political Constitution) or through the intervention of a judge (article 41 of the Political Constitution). However, the guiding principles of administrative organization and function, effectiveness and efficiency, embodied in the Political Constitution itself (articles 140, subsection 8, and 191), must be understood, at all times and under any circumstance, as subordinated to fundamental rights and must yield to them, since they constitute the foundation and basis of the entire legal system. Modernly, public administrations must be conceived and understood as just another subject of Law within the legal system, so that the chronic asymmetry or inequality that pervades the contentious-administrative jurisdiction between the individual or citizen and the respective public entity is repugnant to Constitutional Law. The legislative recognition and granting of a series of formal or procedural prerogatives to public entities in the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order has no objective and reasonable justification if their administrative function, in accordance with the constitutional parameter (articles 33 and 49 of the Political Constitution), must be subject to full and universal legality review, without fissures or exempt redoubts, and, above all, if they are created and put into operation to serve or attend to the needs of citizens or individuals—service organizations (organizaciones serviciales).

V.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MANDATORY NATURE OF EXHAUSTING ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. Currently, especially in light of the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and the stronger binding force of fundamental rights, as well as their expansive and progressive effectiveness and most favorable interpretation, it is understood that the obligatory or mandatory nature of exhausting administrative remedies conflicts with the fundamental right of individuals to obtain prompt and fulfilled justice under articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution (effective judicial protection) and with the principle of equality, since only in the contentious-administrative proceeding—and not so in the rest of the jurisdictions—is the litigant obliged, before resorting to judicial channels, to exhaust all available ordinary administrative appeals. The infringement of the fundamental right to prompt and fulfilled justice arises from the following aspects: a) Normally, when an individual files ordinary appeals for reconsideration (revocatoria), appeal (apelación), or review (reposición)—the latter understood as the horizontal appeal available against acts of the head or supreme hierarchical superior—the individual does not get the body itself or its superior to modify or annul it, so that exhausting administrative remedies is like drawing water from a dry well, obtaining nothing from filing the appeals, thus becoming a heavy burden or a kind of via crucis for the individual; b) it is known that the administrative procedure and its appeal or review stage tends to extend beyond legal deadlines and beyond what can be conceived as a reasonable period, thereby indefinitely prolonging, even for years, access to effective judicial protection, without having the possibility of doing so immediately and when deemed appropriate; c) the sum of the time required to exhaust administrative remedies plus that required by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction causes individuals to obtain delayed justice, which, eventually, can transform—depending on its prolongation and the particular circumstances of the litigants—into a denial of justice; the foregoing constitutes a clear and evident relative advantage for public entities which, on occasion, they take advantage of, since the individual or citizen passes—due to their ordinary condition as a natural person—while the public administration remains prolonged in time. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, it must be indicated that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, derived from the privilege of declaratory self-help, exposes the litigant who sues a public administration to a discriminatory situation, since there is no objective and reasonable motive to subject them to that obligatory requirement, unlike the rest of the jurisdictional orders. It must be considered that, even the freedom of legislative configuration or discretion when designing the various processes has the principle of equality as an insurmountable limit. The foregoing is reinforced if one considers that public administrations are just another subject of Law that do not have any reason to enjoy such privileges or prerogatives, and that the central axis in a service-providing administration or in a Social and Democratic State of Law is the person, that is, the user or consumer of public goods and services. In essence, public interests and the satisfaction of collective needs cannot be taken as empowering clauses to undermine the fundamental rights of individuals or, simply, as the altar upon which they are sacrificed.

VI.- CONFORMITY OF EXHAUSTING ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETER: FACULTATIVE OR OPTIONAL NATURE FOR THE INDIVIDUAL. The interpretation most favorable to the expansive and progressive effectiveness of the fundamental rights of individuals to prompt and fulfilled justice and to equality requires a qualitative rethinking of the obligatory nature of exhausting administrative remedies imposed by the legislator. Indeed, it must be understood that the exhaustion of administrative remedies should be left to the absolutely free choice of the individual, so that it is the individual who, after conducting a probability judgment regarding the eventual success of their action within the administrative sphere, decides whether or not to file the available administrative appeals. It is to be expected that the individual's possibilities are reinforced when dealing with so-called "administrative tribunals" (e.g., Environmental Tribunal, Administrative Fiscal Tribunal, National Customs Tribunal, Civil Service Tribunal, Teaching Career Tribunal, Administrative Registry Tribunal, Transport Tribunal, etc.), since, as these have been constituted, almost usually, as bodies decentralized to the maximum degree, a greater guarantee of technical specialty, impartiality, and objectivity is obtained, as the hierarchical relationship is diffused and any political criteria are diluted. The idea of the facultative nature of exhausting administrative remedies is not alien or foreign to the infra-constitutional legal system; the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction itself establishes four scenarios where it is optional. Thus, article 32 exempts from the appeal for review (recurso de reposición) presumed acts due to negative silence when issued by the head, acts not expressed in writing—tacit acts—and regulations. Article 87, in the case of the special process for the removal of directors of decentralized entities, establishes that it is not necessary to file the prior appeal for review. For its part, article 357 of the General Law of Public Administration stipulates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge acts constituting a fait accompli (vías de hecho). Finally, the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law itself, in its article 31, indicates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to file an amparo proceeding. It is worth clarifying and warning, although it is not the object of the present judicial consultation, due to its transcendental importance, that the statute of limitations for the action—whatever it may be—when the individual chooses not to exhaust administrative remedies, shall start to run from the notification of the unappealed final act. In sum, the elective nature of the administrative remedy phase is absolutely congruous with the fundamental rights of individuals regarding access to the jurisdiction, to prompt and fulfilled justice (article 41 of the Political Constitution), to equality (article 33 of the Political Constitution), and to reviewing the legality of the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution). Now, it must be highlighted that it is just as constitutional for the individual to choose to resort directly to the judicial route, without exhausting administrative remedies, as when they choose to do so.

VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT. The original constituent established several hypotheses in which exhausting administrative remedies is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act guarantees correctness, speed, and economy for the individual. In such circumstances are articles 173 regarding municipal agreements, as paragraph 2 of that article establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or reformed, the background file shall pass to the Tribunal depending on the Judicial Branch indicated by law for it to resolve definitively, and 184 insofar as it reserves to the General Comptroller of the Republic the improper hierarchical review of administrative acts issued regarding public procurement. In these two scenarios, as a constitutional norm exists that covers the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, this obligatory prerequisite for admitting a contentious-administrative proceeding cannot be deemed unconstitutional.

VIII.- TACITLY CONSENTED ACT: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS. Another of the formal privileges of public administrations in the contentious-administrative proceeding is the dogmatic and legislative figure of the tacitly consented act, which has an irrefutable logic in relation to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies—supported by the privilege of declaratory self-help—is a mandatory admissibility requirement, consequently, if the individual does not exercise in time and proper form the available administrative appeals, the legislator presumes, based on the individual's omission, that they have tacitly consented to the administrative act by not appealing it within the time limits and through the means provided by the legal system. This procedural institution frontally infringes the fundamental right of individuals to access the jurisdiction (article 41 of the Political Constitution), since it perpetually prevents them from discussing the matter before the jurisdiction established by the constituent to exercise legality review over the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution), simply for not having exercised and filed the available administrative appeals. Consequently, if conformity of the exhaustion of administrative remedies with the constitutional parameter requires considering it facultative or optional for the individual, the figure of the consented act must be deemed unconstitutional insofar as it implicitly assumes that such a requirement must be complied with mandatorily.

IX.- CONNECTED NORMS. Article 89 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law prescribes that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a norm or law shall also declare that of the other precepts thereof whose annulment is evidently necessary by connection or consequence. That article, by virtue of article 108 ibidem, is supplementarily applicable to judicial consultations. For the foregoing reasons, this Constitutional Tribunal considers that by connection with the consulted norms, the following articles of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction are also unconstitutional: a) The phrase of article 18, paragraph 1 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction insofar as it establishes "(…) that are not susceptible to further appeal through administrative channels (…)"; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1 of article 41 of that normative body insofar as it provides "d) That administrative remedies have not been exhausted"; c) Paragraph 3 of article 33 of that law when prescribing "3.

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) shall give rise to its being alleged, by way of a preliminary defense (defensa previa), if the Court does not recognize the defect at the time provided for in Article 41”; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4 of Article 33 when it states “(…) for not having been challenged administratively in time and form (por no haber sido recurridos administrativamente en tiempo y forma)”; e) subsection c) of Article 50 of the aforementioned law when it indicates “c) The failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa)”.

X.- COROLLARY. By virtue of the foregoing, it is necessary to resolve the judicial consultation of constitutionality in the sense that the first and second paragraphs of Article 31, insofar as they establish that the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) is a mandatory requirement to access the contentious-administrative jurisdiction and when it will be deemed fulfilled, and subsection a) of paragraph 1 of Article 21, when prescribing that a contentious-administrative action (acción contencioso administrativa) shall not be admissible with respect to tacitly consented acts (actos tácitamente consentidos), both of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), are unconstitutional for infringing the fundamental rights of access to the jurisdiction, to a prompt and complete justice, to equality, and to control of the legality of the administrative function, for which reason they must be annulled in what is pertinent along with the related norms. In accordance with Article 107 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, it is necessary to communicate this ruling to the consulting Court, to the Attorney General of the Republic, and to the parties appearing in the ordinary proceeding in which the consulted norms are applied. Likewise, pursuant to provisions 90, 107, and 108 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, its full publication in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) and summarization in the Official Gazette La Gaceta (Diario Oficial La Gaceta) must be ordered.

XI.- Magistrates Solano and Vargas dissent from the majority opinion and declare the consultation without merit for not considering the consulted matters unconstitutional.

THEREFORE:

The judicial consultation is resolved in the sense that paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 31, insofar as they provide “1. The exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) shall be a requirement for admitting the contentious-administrative action. 2. This procedure shall be deemed fulfilled: a) When all administrative remedies available in the matter have been used in time and form; and b) when the law expressly so provides. (…)” and subsection a) of paragraph 1 of Article 21, when prescribing that a contentious-administrative action shall not be admissible with respect to tacitly consented acts, both of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), are unconstitutional. Therefore, the entirety of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 31 and the phrase “(…) or for not having been challenged in time and form (…) of subsection a) of paragraph 1 of Article 21, both of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, are annulled. Due to their connection with the consulted norms, the following are annulled as unconstitutional: a) The phrase of Article 18, paragraph 1 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, insofar as it establishes “(…) that are not susceptible to further remedy in the administrative route (vía administrativa) (…)”; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1 of Article 41 of that normative body insofar as it provides “d) That the administrative route (vía administrativa) has not been exhausted”; c) Paragraph 3 of Article 33 of that law when prescribing “3. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) shall give rise to its being alleged, by way of a preliminary defense (defensa previa), if the Court does not recognize the defect at the time provided for in Article 41”; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4 of Article 33 when it states “(…) for not having been challenged administratively in time and form (por no haber sido recurridos administrativamente en tiempo y forma)”; e) subsection c) of Article 50 of the aforementioned law when it indicates “c) The failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa)”. This ruling has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the consulted and connected norms, all without prejudice to acquired rights and consolidated legal situations by virtue of a judgment having the authority of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). Notify the consulting Court, the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, and the parties appearing in the proceeding. Publish fully in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) and summarize in the Official Gazette La Gaceta (Diario Oficial La Gaceta).

Luis Fernando Solano C.

President Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

DISSENTING OPINION OF MAGISTRATES SOLANO AND VARGAS Magistrates Solano and Vargas dissent and declare that the consulted norms are not unconstitutional, based on the following arguments drafted by the former:

I. Exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) as a matter of lege ferenda

Having analyzed the object of this action, we reach the conclusion that it is the positive legislator, and not the Constitutional Chamber, who must devise a suitable design for the processing of the administrative procedure, which allows for the effective management of public affairs without impeding the full exercise of the rights of the administered individuals. The challenged norms are not unconstitutional per se, since they establish, in principle, rules that allow for an alternative resolution of the conflict, avoiding the "judicialization" of all disputes that arise between the Administration and the citizens. If what is inadequate is the manner in which self-review (autotutela) procedures are carried out, it will be the legislator who must design effective mechanisms to preserve the delicate balance that must exist in every society between the general interest and individual rights.

II.Prior exhaustion as an obstacle to effective access to justice (the case of "step-ladder remedies" in municipal matters).

In accordance with what was resolved by this Chamber in rulings numbers 2004-00629-04, 4842-04, 5138-04, and 12060-05, the single-instance system in remedy matters provided for in subsection 1) of Article 350 of the General Public Administration Law is broken in municipal matters, because pursuant to Article 153 of the Municipal Code, a system of step-ladder remedies (recursos en escalerilla) is provided for (see to the contrary, what was resolved by this Chamber in rulings 2001-04197 and 2004-4110), which means that, on the basis that Article 173 of the Political Constitution establishes as an indispensable requirement to challenge in the contentious-administrative route (vía contencioso administrativo) those municipal conducts deemed illegal, the administrative route (vía administrativa) must be previously exhausted, the administered individual will have to traverse a tortuous path of six instances –including an improper biphasic hierarchical superior, namely: the Contentious-Administrative Court–, in order to be able to bring an action in that jurisdictional route.

Based on that criterion, it is paradoxical that if one of the foundations upon which the declaration of unconstitutionality of Articles 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31, and 34 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction and related norms is based, is that the principle of irrevocability of administrative acts constitutes an obstacle that prevents the administered individual from having expeditious access to the contentious-administrative route (vía contencioso administrativa) for the timely protection of their rights, on the basis –not empirically proven in the record– that practically the Public Administrations almost never nullify conducts presumably harmful to the rights of the former –a situation that has been compared in doctrine to drawing water from an empty well–; that in municipal matters and under the supposed protection of Articles 153, 156, 161, and 162 of the Municipal Code, it is categorically affirmed that the administered individual must exhaust –depending on the scenario in which they find themselves according to those norms– from two to six instances to have access to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, which implies subjecting persons who are harmed by actions or omissions of the Municipal Governments to a long and uncertain path for the protection of their rights, unlike those who are not in these scenarios, which is contrary to the norms, values, and principles of Constitutional Law, despite the fact that –in principle– maintaining the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) is based on a constitutional norm (Article 173), which could well be interpreted –on the basis of the doctrinal foundations that support the majority vote and the very values and principles that inform Constitutional Law– in the sense that it is not a case of biphasic improper hierarchy, but rather, of access to the competent jurisdictional route once the remedies established by law have been exhausted at the municipal level, without this being able to imply a more burdensome remedial system that prevents rapid access to that route –such as the step-ladder system–. This system, moreover, is not expressly provided for in the Municipal Code, since what is actually established are three remedial systems, depending on whether the act was issued by the Council, by an authority dependent on the Council, or by an official dependent on the Municipal Mayor, which cannot be interpreted to mean that all those instances –totaling six– must be exhausted to have access to the contentious-administrative route (vía contencioso administrativa). Such an interpretation becomes necessary in light of what was resolved by the majority, under penalty of enshrining a manifest inequality for the administered individual at the municipal level.

To assert otherwise would thus imply placing administered individuals of the municipal remedial system in a situation of inequality by making them exhaust from two to six instances to have access to the contentious-administrative route (vía contencioso), even though the Political Constitution only provides that “…if the Municipality does not revoke or reform the objected or appealed agreement, the background records shall be sent to the Court of the Judicial Branch indicated by the law for definitive resolution…” (the underlining is ours). It is thus easily concluded that mandatory exhaustion is not the factor that generates this distortion, but rather it is the way in which the provisions of the Municipal Code are currently being applied.

III.The containment mechanisms provided for in the Draft Contentious-Administrative Code to avoid the multiplicity of routes and thereby the detriment to the principle of legal certainty and to the fundamental rights of administered individuals, which could derive from contradictory resolutions in the administrative or jurisdictional routes.

Although it is true, the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) would be optional from the majority vote –except in the cases provided for by the Political Constitution–, it should be added that containment mechanisms must be established to avoid the multiplicity of routes and thereby, not to cause detriment to the principle of legal certainty, which also has constitutional rank.

And this is precisely the purpose fulfilled by the Draft Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, as can be seen from the following articles related to the subject under analysis:

“Article 31.- 1.- The exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) shall be optional, except for the provisions of Articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution, as well as in cases of improper hierarchies created by law.

2.- In any case, the improper hierarchical superior must resolve the administrative remedy filed within a maximum period of one month.

3.- If the jurisdictional route has been directly accessed, without having exhausted the administrative route (vía administrativa), the supreme hierarchical superior of the competent body or entity, in accordance with the rules of Article 126 of the General Public Administration Law, may confirm, modify, annul, revoke, or cease the challenged administrative conduct, for the benefit of the administered individual, within the first five days of the summons, without suspension of the proceedings.

4.- If within the period indicated in the preceding subsection, the Public Administration modifies, annuls, revokes, ceases, amends, or corrects the adopted administrative conduct, for the benefit of the administered individual, the proceeding shall be deemed terminated in the pertinent part without a special award of costs, and without prejudice to its continuation for the recognition of the rights relating to the restoration of the legal situation of the plaintiff, including the eventual compensation for the damages and losses caused.

5.- When the corresponding ordinary remedy is filed before the Public Administration and it does not notify its resolution within one month, it may be deemed denied and the administrative route (vía administrativa) exhausted.

6.- If the remedy is expressly resolved, the period for filing the claim shall be counted from the day following the respective notification.” “Article 35.- 1.- When an omissive conduct of the Public Administration is challenged, the interested party may require the respective body or entity to adopt the due conduct within a period of fifteen days. If after said period the omission persists, the contentious-administrative route (vía contencioso-administrativa) shall be clear.

2.- If the jurisdictional route has been directly accessed, the supreme hierarchical superior of the competent entity or body may request the Judge or Court to suspend the proceeding for a maximum period of eight days to carry out the due conduct. If so done, the proceeding shall be deemed terminated without a special award of costs, without prejudice to the continuation of the same for the full restoration of the legal situation of the injured person.” “Article 115.- 1.- If, after the proceeding has been initiated, the sued Public Administration recognizes, totally or partially, in the administrative route (vía administrativa), the plaintiff's claims, either party may bring it to the knowledge of the Processing Judge or Court.

2.- The Processing Judge or Court, after granting a hearing to the plaintiff for a maximum period of five business days, and prior verification of what is alleged, shall declare the proceeding terminated in the pertinent part…” Given its particular nature, the majority opinion contained in ruling number 2006-3669 does not have a dimensioning –in accordance with the provisions of Article 108 in relation to Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction– that allows the administered individual, and especially legal operators, to know what to expect regarding the scope of the declaration of unconstitutionality of Articles 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31, and 34 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, which produces uncertainty, especially regarding the scope of its practical application, scenarios that are indeed provided for in the Draft Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, since it contains mechanisms that not only tend to safeguard the principle of legal certainty, but also give preeminence –in some cases– to the application of means for early termination of conflicts raised before the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, which could have a positive impact on reducing the percentage of litigation in that venue.

That by virtue of the foregoing, even though the majority vote advocates for more expeditious and timely access to the contentious-administrative route (vía contencioso administrativa), its execution in practice could lead –given its lack of dimensioning of the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality and the absence of current regulations establishing containment mechanisms to avoid the serious problem of route duplication– to a situation of uncertainty and legal insecurity, as both administered individuals and legal operators lack clear rules regulating access to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. And this is a matter of constitutional repercussion, without a doubt.

In summary, the declaration of unconstitutionality of Articles 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31, and 34 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, turns out to be not only untimely, if we take into consideration that there exists a Draft Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code –which had already received first debate in the Legislative Assembly but was returned to the Permanent Commission on Legal Affairs–, in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) becomes optional except in cases expressly provided for in that normative body (see Article 31 subsection 1: “The exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) shall be optional, except for the provisions of Articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution, as well as in cases of improper hierarchies created by law…”) and whose practical execution once it came into force would be accompanied by a series of normative derogations and containment mechanisms, so that its application responds to an entire, faster, and more effective comprehensive system of contentious-administrative justice; but also incomplete, since the mere declaration of unconstitutionality of said norms does not guarantee that at this moment, and with the shortcomings that have been noted, the administered individual can have faster and more timely access to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, which definitively could cause a greater problem for the public interest and the protection of fundamental rights than what was intended to be resolved with that ruling.

IV. On access to justice

Moreover, it is difficult to accept that the mere mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) is the cause of a violation of the principle (right) of access to justice that this Chamber has extensively enhanced in its jurisprudence, particularly since ruling number 1739-92, at 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992. The facts indicate rather that the parties (and very particularly the legal profession) try to extend the duration of administrative procedures over time, with the aim of preventing the issuance of the final act. Within that framework, even, "short deadlines" established by Article 346 of the General Public Administration Law have been challenged before this very Chamber, accusing them of violating fundamental rights. This claim was dismissed by the Chamber in ruling number 2003-13140 at 2:37 p.m. on November 12, 2003.

In parallel, it must be noted that the amparo remedy, through the provisions of Article 32 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, has served to a large extent to regularize the functioning of the different public administrations, although analyzing case by case and without leading to the constitutionalization of deadlines, as has been stated in this venue. Vid., among others, ruling 2005-04287.

The same can be said of the specific configuration with which the Law has endowed the contentious-administrative process up to now, which allows that in an apparently simple case, like the one serving as the basis for the present consultation, more than nine years have passed without a pronouncement on the merits. With which, it would be worth asking whether it is the administrative route (vía administrativa), or the jurisdictional one itself, that has been indebted to the people, since the right to access justice is not limited to the mere possibility of asserting a specific claim before a judge or court, but also the right for justice to be administered in a complete and prompt manner, that is, within a reasonable time, without unjustified delays –effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), full judicial protection (tutela judicial plena)–. Simply determining that all disputes with the Administration can be resolved directly before the courts without endowing them with procedural tools that allow them to provide a swift and effective service implies condemning administered individuals to suffer, before justice, the delays and deprivations that the Administration currently provides them. It is as violative of Article 41 of the Constitution to lack the possibility of exercising the right of action as it is to subject people to eternal, complex, and ineffective processes for the solution of the conflicts that generated them.

For the reasons stated, we are of the opinion that the consultation formulated must be resolved negatively and we so order.

Luis Fernando Solano Carrera Adrián Vargas Benavides Magistrate Magistrate Article 102 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the admissibility requirements for judicial consultations, a provision from which four conditioning and fundamental elements for its proceeding emerge, which are the following: a) that it is formulated by a judge; b) that there exist "founded doubts" about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged; c) that there is a case pending before the judge or court, and d) that in said prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged. These requirements were analyzed in detail in judgment No. 1617-97 of 14:54 hrs. of March 17, 1997, in the following manner:

"A. That it be formulated by a «judge», a generic term that –of course– applies to both single-judge bodies and collegiate courts, and about which it is unnecessary to specify more than: a) that it must involve authorities endowed with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators within the framework of the matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that one is before the processing of a proceeding leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitration award, endowed with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must, at the moment of formulating the consultation, be duly authorized to exercise that competence (since it could hardly be thought that a resolution that is invalid in the proceeding in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure which, like this one, is of a purely incidental nature).

B. That there exist «founded doubts» about the constitutionality of the norm, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged. This means that the questioning must be reasonable and considered. Furthermore, it implies that it cannot address aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would imply ignoring the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack a current interest. But it must be stressed, for its relevance to the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only arises from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the adequacy of the norm, act, conduct, or omission to constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a norm has previously passed explicit constitutional scrutiny (through an action or consultation), a new questioning on the same point would not be viable, but it could be so regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on that same norm, particularly because –in this case– there is always the possibility of a constitutional violation, no longer in the norm itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been previously endorsed (perhaps through an amparo or habeas corpus) does not mean that doubts cannot exist about the constitutionality of the norm itself on which they are based. And, in this scenario, the judicial consultation is pertinent.

C. That there is a case pending before the judge or court. As with the constitutional complaint (acción de inconstitucionalidad), a judicial consultation never takes place in a vacuum or for mere academic interest; rather, it must be relevant to the decision or resolution of the so-called 'prior' or 'principal' matter. Finally, D. That, in that prior matter, the norm must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that –for its relevance to the case– it is appropriate to clarify. Indeed, the expression 'must be applied the norm or judged the act, conduct, or omission' carries a very defined present meaning and is entirely distinct from the law speaking in terms of 'could be applied the norm or judged the act, conduct, or omission.' The judicial consultation does not proceed upon the mere eventuality that these circumstances may occur, since –as explained above– this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a mere academic or doctrinal exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the norm or the judgment of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality." **II.- OBJECT AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE JUDICIAL CONSULTATION.** The consulting contentious-administrative judge believes he has a founded doubt regarding the constitutionality of articles 31, paragraph 1, of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction "(...) insofar as it establishes that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition for the admissibility of an ordinary proceeding before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction" and 21, paragraph 1, subsection a), "(...) insofar as it provides that an act tacitly consented to, by not having been appealed in time and form, will determine the inadmissibility of the contentious-administrative action (...)". He deems that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento obligatorio de la vía administrativa) has the purpose of getting the public entity or body to rectify its decision, which, ordinarily, does not occur in administrative and judicial experience. Additionally, he deems that the litigant, during the pendency of the appeal, must endure the enforcement of the administrative act, since, by provision of numeral 148 of the General Law on Public Administration, the filing of appeals does not have a suspensive effect. In the opinion of the consulting judge, the foregoing makes him doubt the constitutionality of this privilege of the public administration for contravening articles 33 and 41 of the Political Constitution, given that, through the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa), access to the jurisdiction and effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) are hindered, as well as the stronger binding force of fundamental rights. Regarding the administrative act tacitly consented to by the administered party, the judge believes it may imply the impossibility for the administered party to exercise the fundamental right to challenge it in the jurisdictional avenue or to exercise judicial review of legality. The requirements and conditions referred to in the preceding recital (considerando) for the admissibility of the consultation are met in this consultation, since it is formulated by resolution of a jurisdictional body that has founded reasons regarding the constitutionality of the norms it must apply in an ordinary proceeding. Indeed, in the ordinary proceeding processed in the Contencioso-Administrativo Court, under expediente No. 97-001083-163-CA, the Procuraduría General de la República, by brief filed on March 17, 2000 (visible at folios 134-136 of that expediente), raised, among other preliminary defenses, that of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa) and act consented to (acto consentido). Subsequently, when answering the complaint by the pleading filed on May 24, 2000 (visible at folio 158-166 of the referenced expediente), it again raised, among other substantive defenses, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies and act consented to. The Contencioso-Administrativo Court, by resolution No. 462-2003 of 15 hrs. on June 12, 2003 (visible at folios 288-289 of the cited expediente), rejected, among others, the preliminary defenses of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and act consented to, as being time-barred for having been filed not in the first two-thirds of the summons period but in the last, and indicated "without prejudice to them being reviewed again at the time of issuing the final judgment on the merits." Thus, since they were also alleged as substantive defenses by the Procuraduría General de la República when answering the complaint, the challenged norms may be applied again to that litis at the time of issuing the judgment on the merits, a stage that is practically imminent, since the proceeding is ready for judgment as the evidence offered has been completed.

**III.- CONSULTED NORMS.** The consulted norms of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), in the pertinent part, establish the following:

"*Article 31.-* *1. The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be a requirement for admitting the contentious-administrative action (...)*" "*Article 21.-* *1. The contentious-administrative action shall not be admitted regarding:* *a) Acts consented to expressly or by not having been appealed in time and form, those that are a reproduction of previous ones already definitive or final, and those confirming consented ones (...)*" **IV.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS.** In the classic conception of substantive and formal Administrative Law, public administrations, insofar as they procure and attend to public interests or the satisfaction of collective needs, must be provided with a series of extraordinary prerogatives. Thus, in the sphere of Administrative Procedural Law, traditionally, the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa) or the prior governmental avenue was admitted as a formal privilege, that is, that administered parties who consider themselves injured or aggrieved by an administrative act must, prior to resorting to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, exhaust all ordinary administrative appeals admissible against it before the administrative body. Consequently, the exhaustion of administrative remedies becomes an admissibility requirement for the contentious-administrative process in its classic and traditional objective or reviewing version. Underlying this institution is the so-called prerogative of the declaratory and executive self-protection (autotutela declarativa y ejecutiva) of public administrations, which has found support, at the same time, in principles such as effectiveness, efficiency, and good administration. Declaratory self-protection means that public entities can, by themselves and before themselves, without needing to resort to a judge, impose obligations on administered parties or suppress or modify their substantial legal situations –be they subjective rights or legitimate interests (intereses legítimos)–. The unavoidable legislative obligation of the administered party to exercise or raise all ordinary administrative appeals against an administrative act before resorting to the contentious-administrative judge constitutes a specific manifestation of the declaratory self-protection of public administrations, since the legislature expects that the public administration itself can defend the challenged administrative act or annul or modify it, avoiding having to appear before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In this way, in the administrative avenue, the public administration becomes, simultaneously, judge and party, since it must attend to the requests or petitions formulated by the administered parties and resolve the ordinary administrative appeals that proceed against the final act that it itself dictates. As can be seen, self-protection (autotutela) is a concept diametrically opposed to that which prevails in the rest of the legal branches, in which external protection (heterotutela) operates, that is, that exercised by a third party supra partes with the constitutional guarantees of impartiality, independence, and objectivity, such as a jurisdictional body. Thus, for example, in the sphere of Private Law, an individual can impose an obligation or affect the substantial legal situations of another, solely and exclusively, if this arises consensually through the application of the principle of autonomy of will (article 28 of the Political Constitution) or from the intervention of a judge (article 41 of the Political Constitution). Nevertheless, the guiding principles of the administrative organization and function of efficiency and effectiveness, embodied in the Political Constitution itself (articles 140, subsection 8, and 191), must be understood, at all times and under any circumstance, as subordinated to fundamental rights and must yield to them, since the latter constitute the foundation and basis of the entire legal order. In modern times, public administrations must be conceived of and understood as another legal subject within the legal order, such that the chronic asymmetry or inequality that prevails within the contentious-administrative jurisdiction between the administered party or citizen and the respective public entity is repugnant to the Law of the Constitution. The legislative recognition and granting of a series of formal or procedural prerogatives to public entities in the contentious-administrative jurisdictional order has no objective and reasonable justification if its administrative function, in accordance with the constitutional parameter (articles 33 and 49 of the Political Constitution), must be the object of plenary and universal judicial review of legality, without fissures or exempt enclaves and, above all, if they are created and put into operation to serve or attend to the needs of citizens or administered parties –service organizations (organizaciones serviciales)–.

**V.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MANDATORY NATURE OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.** Currently, especially in light of the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and the stronger binding force of fundamental rights, as well as their expansive and progressive effectiveness and most favorable interpretation, it is understood that the obligatory or mandatory nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies conflicts with the fundamental right of administered parties to obtain prompt and complete justice under articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution (effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva)) and with the principle of equality, given that only in the contentious-administrative process –and not in the rest of the jurisdictions– is the litigant obliged, before resorting to the jurisdictional avenue, to exhaust all ordinary administrative appeals that proceed. The infringement of the fundamental right to prompt and complete justice arises from the following aspects: a) Normally, when the administered party files ordinary appeals for reconsideration (revocatoria), appeal (apelación), or for reposición –the latter understood as the horizontal appeal available against the acts of the head or supreme hierarchical superior–, it does not achieve its modification or annulment by the body itself or its superior; thus, exhausting administrative remedies (vía administrativa) is like drawing water from a dry well, as nothing is obtained from filing the appeals, thus transforming it into a heavy burden or a kind of via crucis for the administered party; b) it is known that the administrative procedure and its appeal or review stage usually extends beyond the legal deadlines and what can be conceived as a reasonable period, thereby indefinitely prolonging, even for years, the access to effective judicial protection, without the possibility of doing so immediately and when deemed opportune; c) the sum of the time needed to exhaust administrative remedies plus that required by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction causes administered parties to obtain late justice, which, eventually, can transform –depending on its prolongation and the particular circumstances of the litigant administered parties– into a denial of justice; the foregoing constitutes a clear and evident relative advantage for public entities of which they sometimes avail themselves, given that the administered party or citizen passes –given their ordinary condition as a natural person– and the public administration remains prolonged in time. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, it must be indicated that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa), derived from the privilege of declaratory self-protection (autotutela declarativa), exposes the litigant who litigates against a public administration to a discriminatory situation, since there is no objective and reasonable reason to subject them to this obligatory requirement, unlike the other jurisdictional orders. It must be taken into consideration that even the freedom of legislative configuration or discretion when designing the various proceedings has the principle of equality as an insurmountable limit. The foregoing is reinforced if one considers that public administrations are just another legal subject that should not enjoy such privileges or prerogatives, and that the central axis of a welfare administration or a Social and Democratic State of Law is the individual, that is, the user or consumer of public goods and services. In essence, public interests and the satisfaction of collective needs cannot be considered as empowering clauses to undermine the fundamental rights of administered parties, or simply as the altar upon which to sacrifice them.

**VI.- ADAPTATION OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETER: FACULTATIVE OR OPTIONAL NATURE FOR THE ADMINISTERED PARTY.** The interpretation most favorable to the expansive and progressive effectiveness of the fundamental rights of administered parties to prompt and complete justice and to equality compels a qualitative reconsideration of the obligatory nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) imposed by the legislature. Indeed, it must be understood that the exhaustion of administrative remedies must be left to the free choice of the administered party, so that it is the latter who, after making a judgment of probability regarding the eventual success of their claim before the administrative body, decides whether or not to file the applicable administrative appeals. It is to be expected that the possibilities of the administered party are reinforced when it involves so-called "administrative tribunals" (e.g., Environmental Tribunal (Tribunal Ambiental), Tax Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo), National Customs Tribunal (Tribunal Aduanero Nacional), Civil Service Tribunal (Tribunal del Servicio Civil), Teaching Career Tribunal (Tribunal de Carrera Docente), Administrative Registry Tribunal (Tribunal Registral Administrativo), Transport Tribunal (Tribunal de Transportes), etc.), since, as these have been constituted, almost usually, as bodies decentralized to the maximum degree, a greater guarantee of technical specialty, impartiality, and objectivity is obtained, as the hierarchy relationship is diffused and any political criterion is diluted. The idea of the facultative nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) is not alien or foreign to the sub-constitutional legal order; the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction itself establishes four scenarios where it is optional. Thus, article 32 exempts from the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) the presumed act based on negative silence when it emanates from the head of the body, acts not manifested in writing –tacit (tácitos)–, and regulations. Article 87, in the case of the special proceeding for the removal of directors of decentralized entities, establishes that it is not necessary to file the prior motion for reconsideration. For its part, article 357 of the General Law on Public Administration stipulates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge de facto actions. Finally, the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction itself, in its article 31, indicates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to resort to the amparo process. It is necessary to clarify and warn, although it is not the object of this judicial consultation, due to its transcendental importance, that the statute of limitations (plazo de caducidad) of the action –whatever it may be–, when the administered party chooses not to exhaust administrative remedies, will begin to run from the notification of the final act not appealed. In sum, the elective nature of the administrative avenue is absolutely congruent with the fundamental rights of administered parties to access to the jurisdiction, to prompt and complete justice (article 41 of the Political Constitution), to equality (article 33 of the Political Constitution), and to review the legality of the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution). However, it must be highlighted that it is equally constitutional for the administered party to choose to resort directly to the jurisdictional avenue, without exhausting administrative remedies, as when they choose to do so.

**VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT.** The original constituent established several scenarios in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or supervises a specific administrative act is a guarantee of correctness, speed, and economy for the administered party. Such circumstances are found in numerals 173 regarding municipal agreements, as paragraph 2 of that numeral establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or reformed, the background information will go to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch indicated by law for final resolution, and 184 insofar as it reserves for the Contraloría General de la República the improper hierarchy over administrative acts issued in matters of public procurement. In these two scenarios, since there is a constitutional norm that provides coverage for the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa), it cannot be considered that this obligatory admissibility requirement of a contentious-administrative process is unconstitutional.

**VIII.- TACITLY CONSENTED TO ACT: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS.** Another of the formal privileges of public administrations in the contentious-administrative process is the dogmatic and legislative figure of the tacitly consented to act (acto tácitamente consentido), which has an irrefutable logic in relation to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies –sustained by the privilege of declaratory self-protection (autotutela declarativa)– is a mandatory admissibility requirement, consequently, if the administered party does not exercise the available administrative appeals in time and form, the legislature presumes, based on the omissive conduct of the administered party, that they have tacitly consented to the administrative act by not appealing it within the deadlines and through the means provided by the legal order. That procedural institute frontally infringes upon the fundamental right of administered parties to access the jurisdiction (article 41 of the Political Constitution), since it perpetually prevents them from discussing the matter before the jurisdiction designated by the constituent to exercise judicial review over the legality of the administrative function (article 49 of the Political Constitution), simply for not having exercised and filed the applicable administrative appeals. Consequently, if the conformity of the exhaustion of administrative remedies to the constitutional parameter compels considering it as facultative or optional for the administered party, the figure of the act consented to (acto consentido) must be deemed unconstitutional insofar as it implicitly supposes that such a requirement must be obligatorily fulfilled.

**IX.- RELATED NORMS.** Article 89 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction prescribes that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a norm or law shall also declare that of the other precepts thereof whose annulment appears evidently necessary by connection or consequence. This numeral, by provision of article 108 ibidem itself, is supplementally applicable to judicial consultations. Therefore, this Constitutional Court deems that, by connection with the consulted norms, the following provisions of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction are also unconstitutional: a) The phrase of article 18, paragraph 1 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction insofar as it establishes "*... that are not susceptible to further appeal through administrative remedies (vía administrativa)...*"; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1 of article 41 of that normative body insofar as it provides "*d) That the administrative remedies (vía administrativa) have not been exhausted*"; c) Paragraph 3 of article 33 of that law when prescribing:

The failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) shall give rise to its being raised, by way of a preliminary defense (defensa previa), if the Court does not notice the defect at the time provided for in Article 41”; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4 of Article 33 when it states “(…) for not having been administratively appealed in time and form”; e) subsection c) of Article 50 of the aforementioned law when it indicates “c) The failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa)”.

**X.- COROLLARY.** In view of the foregoing, it is necessary to resolve the judicial consultation of constitutionality in the sense that the first and second paragraphs of Article 31, insofar as they establish that the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) is a mandatory requirement to access the contentious-administrative jurisdiction and when it shall be deemed fulfilled, and subsection a) of paragraph 1 of Article 21, by prescribing that the contentious-administrative action shall not be admissible with respect to tacitly consented acts, both of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), are unconstitutional for infringing the fundamental rights of access to jurisdiction, to a prompt and complete justice, to equality, and to control of the legality of the administrative function, and therefore must be annulled as appropriate together with the related norms. In accordance with Article 107 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), it is necessary to communicate this judgment to the consulting Court, to the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuradora General de la República), and to the parties appearing in the ordinary proceeding in which the consulted norms are applied. Likewise, pursuant to articles 90, 107, and 108 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, it must be ordered published in its entirety in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) and summarized in the Official Gazette La Gaceta.

**XI.-** Magistrates Solano and Vargas dissent (salvan el voto) and dismiss the consultation, not deeming the consulted matter unconstitutional.

**POR TANTO:** The judicial consultation is resolved in the sense that paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 31, insofar as they provide “*1. The exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) shall be a requirement for admitting the contentious-administrative action. 2. This procedure shall be understood to be fulfilled: a) When all administrative remedies available in the matter have been used in time and form; and b) When the law expressly so provides. (…)*” and subsection a) of paragraph 1 of Article 21, by prescribing that the contentious-administrative action shall not be admissible with respect to tacitly consented acts, both of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), are unconstitutional. Therefore, the entirety of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 31 and the phrase “(…) *or for not having been appealed in time and form* (…)” of subsection a) of paragraph 1 of Article 21, both of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, are annulled. By connection (conexidad) with the consulted norms, the following are annulled, as unconstitutional: a) The phrase of Article 18, paragraph 1 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, insofar as it establishes “(…) *that are not susceptible to further remedy through administrative channels* (…)”; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1 of Article 41 of that normative body insofar as it provides “*d) That the administrative remedies have not been exhausted (agotamiento de la vía administrativa)*”; c) Paragraph 3 of Article 33 of that law by prescribing “*3. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) shall give rise to its being raised, by way of a preliminary defense (defensa previa), if the Court does not notice the defect at the time provided for in Article 41*”; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4 of Article 33 when it states “*(…) for not having been administratively appealed in time and form*”; e) subsection c) of Article 50 of the aforementioned law when it indicates “*c) The failure to exhaust administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa)*”. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the consulted and related norms, all without prejudice to acquired rights and consolidated legal situations by virtue of a judgment having the authority of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). Notify the consulting Court, the Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República), and the parties appearing in the proceeding. Publish in its entirety in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) and summarize in the Official Gazette La Gaceta.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

**DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATES SOLANO AND VARGAS** Magistrates Solano and Vargas dissent (salvan el voto) and declare that the consulted norms are not unconstitutional, based on the following arguments drafted by the former:

**I. Exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) as a matter of lege ferenda.** Having analyzed the object of this action, we reach the conclusion that it is the positive legislator, and not the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), who must design a suitable model for the processing of the administrative procedure (procedimiento administrativo), which allows for the efficient management of public affairs without impeding the full exercise of the rights of individuals (administrados). The challenged norms are not unconstitutional *per se*, since they establish, in principle, rules that allow for an alternative resolution of the conflict, avoiding the "judicialization" of all disputes that arise between the Administration and citizens. If what is inadequate is the manner in which the self-review (autotutela) procedures are carried out, it shall be the legislator who must design effective mechanisms to preserve the delicate balance that must exist in every society between the general interest and private rights.

**II. Prior exhaustion as an obstacle to effective access to justice (the case of "ladder resources" in municipal matters).** In accordance with what was resolved by this Chamber in judgments numbers 2004-00629-04, 4842-04, 5138-04, and 12060-05, the single-instance system in remedial matters provided for in subsection 1) of Article 350 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) is broken in municipal matters, because, in accordance with the provisions of Article 153 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), a system of ladder resources (recursos en escalerilla) is provided for (see, to the contrary, what was resolved by this Chamber in judgments 2001-04197 and 2004-4110), which implies that, if one starts from the basis that Article 173 of the Political Constitution establishes as an indispensable requirement for challenging municipal conduct deemed illegal in the contentious-administrative venue, the administrative remedies must be previously exhausted, the individual will have to go through a tortuous path of six instances –including an improper two-phase superior (jerarca impropio bifásico), namely: the Contentious-Administrative Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo)– in order to be able to bring an action in that jurisdictional venue. Based on that criterion, it is paradoxical that, if one of the foundations on which the declaration of unconstitutionality of Articles 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31, and 34 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction and related norms is based, is that the principle of irrevocability of administrative acts constitutes an obstacle that prevents the individual from having expeditious access to the contentious-administrative venue for the timely protection of their rights, on the basis –not empirically proven in the case file–, that Public Administrations practically never set aside conduct presumably harmful to the rights of those individuals – a situation that has been compared in doctrine to drawing water from an empty well–; that in municipal matters and under the supposed protection of the provisions of Articles 153, 156, 161, and 162 of the Municipal Code, it is categorically affirmed that the individual must exhaust –depending on the situation they find themselves in according to said norms– from two to six instances to have access to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, which implies subjecting people who are harmed by actions or omissions of Municipal Governments to a long and uncertain path for the protection of their rights, unlike those who are not in these situations, which is contrary to the norms, values, and principles of the Law of the Constitution, despite the fact that –in principle– maintaining the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) is based on a constitutional norm (Article 173), which could well be interpreted –on the basis of the doctrinal foundations that support the majority vote and the very values and principles that inform the Law of the Constitution– in the sense that this is not a case of improper two-phase hierarchy, but rather, of access to the competent jurisdictional venue once the remedies established by law have been exhausted at the municipal level, without this being able to imply a more burdensome remedial system that prevents rapid access to that venue –such as the ladder system. This system, furthermore, is not expressly provided for in the Municipal Code, since what is actually established are three remedial systems, depending on whether the act was issued by the Council (Concejo), by an authority dependent on the Council, or by an official dependent on the Municipal Mayor (Alcalde Municipal), which cannot be interpreted to mean that all those instances must be exhausted –which in total sum six– to have access to the contentious-administrative venue. An interpretation of this style becomes necessary in light of what was resolved by the majority, under penalty of enshrining a manifest inequality for the individual in the municipal venue. To argue otherwise would imply, therefore, placing individuals in the municipal remedial system in a situation of inequality by making them exhaust from two to six instances to have access to the contentious-administrative venue, even though the Political Constitution only provides that “…if the Municipality does not revoke or reform the objected or appealed agreement, the background records shall pass to the Court of the Judicial Branch indicated by law *to resolve definitively*…” (underline is ours). It is thus easily concluded that mandatory exhaustion is not the factor that generates this distortion, but rather it is the manner in which the provisions of the Municipal Code are currently being applied.

**III. The containment mechanisms provided for in the Draft Contentious-Administrative Code to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings and, consequently, the impairment of the principle of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and the fundamental rights of individuals, which could derive from contradictory resolutions in the administrative or jurisdictional venues.** Although it is true that the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) would be optional from the majority vote forward –except in the cases provided for by the Political Constitution–, it should be added that containment mechanisms must be established aimed at avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings and, consequently, in order not to cause impairment to the principle of legal certainty, which also has constitutional rank. And this is precisely the purpose that is fulfilled with the Draft Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Proyecto de Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo), as is evident from the following articles, related to the subject under analysis:

“***Article 31.-*** ***1.-*** ***The exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) shall be optional, except as provided for in Articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution, as well as in cases of improper hierarchies (jerarquías impropias) created by law.*** ***2.-*** ***In any case, the improper superior (jerarca impropio) must resolve the administrative appeal filed within a maximum period of one month.*** ***3.-*** ***If the jurisdictional venue has been directly resorted to, without having exhausted the administrative remedies, the supreme hierarchical superior of the competent body or entity, in accordance with the rules of Article 126 of the General Law of Public Administration, may confirm, modify, annul, revoke, or cease the challenged administrative conduct, for the benefit of the individual, within the first five days of the service of process (emplazamiento), without suspension of the proceedings.*** ***4.-*** ***If, within the period indicated in the preceding paragraph, the Public Administration modifies, annuls, revokes, ceases, amends, or corrects the adopted administrative conduct, for the benefit of the individual, the proceeding shall be deemed terminated to the relevant extent without a special award of costs, and without prejudice to it continuing for the recognition of rights relating to the restoration of the legal situation of the plaintiff, including the eventual compensation for the damages caused.*** ***5.-*** ***When the ordinary appeal that corresponds is filed before the Public Administration and it does not notify its resolution within one month, it may be deemed dismissed and the administrative remedies (vía administrativa) deemed exhausted.*** ***6.-*** ***If the appeal is expressly resolved, the period to file the claim shall be counted from the day following the respective notification.”*** ***“Article 35.-*** ***1.-*** ***When challenging an omission by the Public Administration, the interested party may request the respective body or entity to adopt the required conduct within a period of fifteen days. If after said period the omission persists, the contentious-administrative venue shall be open.*** ***2.-*** ***If the jurisdictional venue has been directly resorted to, the supreme head (jerarca supremo) of the competent entity or body may request the Judge or Court to suspend the proceeding for a maximum period of eight days to fulfill the required conduct.*** If this is done, the process shall be deemed terminated without a special ruling on costs, without prejudice to its continuation for the full restoration of the legal situation of the injured person.”</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">“Article 115.-</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">1.-</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> If, after the process has been initiated, the respondent Public Administration acknowledges, in whole or in part, in the administrative sphere, the claims of the plaintiff, either party may bring this to the attention of the Examining Judge or Court.</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">2.-</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-style:italic"> The Examining Judge or Court, after granting the plaintiff a hearing for a maximum period of five business days, and upon prior verification of what is alleged, shall declare the process terminated in the appropriate part…”</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span>Given its particular nature, the majority vote contained in judgment number 2006-3669 does not have a dimensioning of effects –in accordance with the provisions of Article 108 in relation to Article 91 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional– that allows the administered party and, above all, legal operators, to know what to expect regarding the scope of the declaration of unconstitutionality of Articles 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31, and 34 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, which produces uncertainty, especially regarding the scope of its practical application, scenarios that are indeed foreseen in the Draft Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, as it contains mechanisms that not only tend to safeguard the principle of legal certainty, but also give preeminence –in some cases– to the application of</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> means for the early termination of conflicts filed before the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction, which could have a positive impact by reducing the percentage of litigation in that venue.</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> That by virtue of the foregoing, even though the majority vote advocates for more expeditious and timely access to the administrative litigation venue, its execution in practice could lead –given its lack of a dimensioning of effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality and the non-existence of current regulations establishing containment mechanisms to avoid the serious problem of duplicity of venues– to a situation of uncertainty and legal insecurity, as both the administered parties and legal operators lack clear rules governing access to the administrative litigation jurisdiction. And this is a matter of constitutional repercussion, without a doubt.</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> In summary,</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> the declaration of unconstitutionality of Articles 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31, and 34 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa is not only untimely, if we take into consideration that there is a Draft Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo –which had already been given a first debate in the Asamblea Legislativa, but was returned to the Comisión Permanente de Asuntos Jurídicos– in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) becomes optional except in cases expressly provided for in that regulatory body (see Article 31, subsection 1: </span><span style="font-style:italic">“The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be optional, except as provided for in Articles 173 and 182 of the Constitución Política, as well as in the cases of improper hierarchies created by law…”</span><span>) and whose practical execution, once it came into force, would be accompanied by a series of regulatory derogations and containment mechanisms, so that its application responds to a comprehensive, faster, and more effective system of administrative litigation justice; but also incomplete, since the mere declaration of unconstitutionality of those norms does not guarantee that at this moment and with the deficiencies that have been noted, the administered party may have faster and more timely access to the administrative litigation jurisdiction, which ultimately could cause a greater problem for the public interest and for the protection of fundamental rights than the one that was intended to be resolved with that judgment. </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span style="font-weight:bold">IV. Regarding access to justice. </span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span>Furthermore, it is difficult to accept that the mere mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) is the sole cause of a violation of the principle (right) of access to justice that this Chamber has extensively enhanced in its case law, particularly since judgment number 1739-92, of 11:45 a.m. on July first, nineteen ninety-two. The facts rather indicate that the parties (and very particularly the stratum of lawyers) try to extend the duration of administrative proceedings over time, with the aim of preventing the issuance of the final act. In this vein, the “short time limits” established by Article 346 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública have even been challenged before this very Chamber, accused of violating fundamental rights. This claim was dismissed by the Chamber in judgment number 2003-13140 of two thirty-seven p.m. on November twelfth, two thousand three.</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span>Simultaneously, it must be pointed out that the amparo remedy, through what is established by Article 32 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, has to a large extent served to regularize the functioning of the different public administrations, albeit by analyzing case by case and without reaching the constitutionalizing of time limits, as has been stated in this venue. See, among others, judgment 2005-04287.</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span>The same can be said of the specific configuration with which the Law has thus far endowed the administrative litigation process, which allows that in an apparently simple case, such as the one serving as the basis for this constitutional query (consulta), more than nine years have passed without a ruling on the merits. With which, it would be worth asking whether it is the administrative venue, or the jurisdictional venue itself, that has been in debt to the people, since the right to access justice is not limited to the mere possibility of bringing a specific claim before a judge or court, but also to the right that justice be administered fully and promptly, that is, within a reasonable time, without unjustified delays –effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), full judicial protection (tutela judicial plena). Plainly determining that all disputes with the Administration can be resolved directly before the courts without providing them with procedural tools that allow them to offer a swift and efficient service implies condemning the administered parties to suffer, before the justice system, the delays and deprivations that the Administration currently provides. As violative of Article 41 of the Constitution is lacking the possibility of exercising the right of action as it is to subject persons to eternal, complex, and ineffective processes for the resolution of the conflicts that generated them.</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span>In light of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the constitutional query (consulta) filed must be answered negatively, and we so rule.</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:150%"><span>Luis Fernando Solano Carrera</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> Adrián Vargas Benavides</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:150%"><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> Judge</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> </span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> </span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span>Judge</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html> Regarding the legal unchallengeability of the tacitly consented act, it raises doubts about its consistency with the fundamental right to judicial review or to challenge the acts of public authorities through the jurisdictional route.

**2.-** The representative of the State, by brief filed on August 20, 2004, appeared and stated that the inquiring judicial body has no basis, since the prior requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not limit the rights or guarantees of the administered party to effective judicial protection; on the contrary, it is a measure to implement the principle of “administrative justice,” to settle differences in the administrative forum. This requirement fulfills an administrative control function on the part of the superior for the benefit of the administered party, such that it implements the principles of security and certainty. In his opinion, the mandatory exhaustion also does not violate the principle of equality of procedural burdens.

**3.-** By brief filed on August 30, 2004, the representative of the State expanded his statements, citing doctrine, believing that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is beneficial for the administered party, since the administration has the possibility of modifying or revoking its criteria, proving the former right. Regarding the tacitly consented act, he believes it is a final act (acto firme) that cannot be challenged indefinitely and at the will of the interested party.

**4.-** By resolution at 11:40 a.m. on November 18, 2004, the acting presidency of the Constitutional Chamber acknowledged the appearance of Vivian Ávila Jones in her capacity as Deputy Attorney and of Licenciada Nombre03 as judicial representative of Nombre02.

**5.-** In the substantiation of the process, the prescriptions of law have been observed.

**Drafted by Magistrate Jinesta; and,** **WHEREAS:** **I.- PREREQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL CONSULTATIONS.** Article 102 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes the prerequisites for the admission of judicial consultations, a provision from which four conditioning and fundamental elements for its origin arise, which are the following: a) that it is formulated by a judge; b) that there are "founded doubts" about the constitutionality of the rule, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged; c) that there is a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court, and d) that in that prior matter, the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged. These prerequisites were analyzed in detail in judgment No. 1617-97 at 2:54 p.m. on March 17, 1997, in the following manner:

"A. That it is formulated by a «judge», a generic term that –of course– applies to both single judges and collegiate courts, and regarding which it is unnecessary to specify more than: a) that they must be authorities endowed with jurisdictional power, which excludes consultations formulated by administrative tribunals, but does include those made by arbitrators in the framework of matters subject to their decision (note that what is relevant in all cases is that it concerns the processing of a process leading to the issuance of a judgment or arbitral award, endowed with the authority of res judicata); and, b) that the judge must be, at the time of formulating the consultation, duly empowered to exercise that competence (since one could hardly think that a resolution that is invalid in the process in question could have the effect of initiating a procedure that, like this one, is purely incidental in nature).

B. That there are «founded doubts» about the constitutionality of the rule, act, conduct, or omission that must be applied or judged. This means that the questioning must be reasonable and considered. It also implies that it cannot concern aspects on whose constitutionality the Chamber has already ruled. This is so not only because accepting the contrary would imply ignoring the erga omnes effect of the resolutions of this jurisdiction, but also because a consultation under those circumstances would evidently lack current interest. But it should be emphasized, due to its relevance for the sub examine, that the explained circumstance only derives from those pronouncements in which the Chamber has expressly validated the conformity of the rule, act, conduct, or omission with constitutional parameters. Consequently, if a rule has previously passed explicit scrutiny of constitutionality (through an action or consultation), a new questioning on the same point would not be viable, but it could be regarding an act, conduct, or omission based on the same rule, particularly because –in this case– there is always the possibility of a constitutional breach, no longer in the rule itself, but in its interpretation or application. Conversely, the fact that an act, conduct, or omission has been endorsed previously (perhaps through an amparo or habeas corpus) does not mean there cannot be doubts about the constitutionality of the very rule on which they are based. And, in this hypothesis, the judicial consultation is pertinent.

C. That there is a case submitted to the knowledge of the judge or court. Just like in an action of unconstitutionality, the judicial consultation never occurs in a vacuum or out of mere academic interest, but must be relevant to the decision or resolution of the so-called «prior» or «principal» matter. Finally, D. That, in that prior matter, the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission that raises the doubt of constitutionality must be judged, an aspect that –due to its relevance for the case– is convenient to clarify. Indeed, the expression «the rule must be applied or the act, conduct, or omission must be judged» entails a very defined current meaning and is totally different from if the law spoke in terms that «the rule may be applied or the act, conduct, or omission may be judged.» The judicial consultation is not applicable before the mere eventuality that those circumstances might occur, since –as explained above– this conception would be equivalent to investing the resources of the constitutional jurisdiction in a simple academic or doctrinaire exercise. For the consultation to be viable, the judge must be faced, with certainty and in the present time, with the application of the rule or the judgment of the act, conduct, or omission that raises a doubt of constitutionality." **II.- OBJECT AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE JUDICIAL CONSULTATION.** The inquiring administrative litigation judge considers he has a founded doubt about the constitutionality of Articles 31, paragraph 1, of the Regulatory Law of the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction “(…) insofar as it establishes that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition of admissibility for an ordinary proceeding before the administrative litigation jurisdiction” and 21, paragraph 1, subsection a), “(…) insofar as it provides that the act tacitly consented, for not having been challenged in time and form, will determine the inadmissibility of the administrative litigation action (…)”. He considers that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies aims to get the public entity or body to rectify its decision, which ordinarily does not occur in administrative and judicial experience. Additionally, he considers that the party subject to justice, during the pendency of the recourse, must endure the execution of the administrative act, since, under the provisions of numeral 148 of the General Law of Public Administration, the filing of recourses does not have a suspensive effect. In the opinion of the inquiring judge, the foregoing causes him to doubt the constitutionality of that privilege of the public administration for contravening ordinals 33 and 41 of the Political Constitution, given that, through the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, access to the jurisdiction and effective judicial protection is hindered, as well as the stronger linkage of fundamental rights. Regarding the administrative act tacitly consented by the administered party, the judge considers that it may imply the impossibility for the administered party to exercise the fundamental right to challenge it through the jurisdictional route or to exercise judicial review. In this consultation, the requirements and conditions referred to in the preceding whereas clause are met for the admissibility of the consultation, since it is formulated by resolution of a jurisdictional body that has founded grounds of unconstitutionality regarding the rules it must apply in an ordinary proceeding. Indeed, in the ordinary proceeding processed in the Administrative Litigation Court, under case file No. 97-001083-163-CA, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, by brief filed on March 17, 2000 (visible at folios 134-136 of that file), raised, among other preliminary defenses, that of lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies and consented act. Subsequently, when answering the complaint by brief filed on May 24, 2000 (visible at folio 158-166 of the referred file), it again raised, among other defenses on the merits, that of lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies and consented act. The Administrative Litigation Court, by resolution No. 462-2003 at 3:00 p.m. on June 12, 2003 (visible at folios 288-289 of the cited file), rejected, among others, the preliminary defenses of lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies and consented act, for being untimely as they had been raised not in the first two-thirds of the summons period but in the last third, and indicated “without prejudice to their being reviewed again at the time of issuing the final judgment.” Thus, having also been alleged as defenses on the merits by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic when answering the complaint, the challenged rules may again be applied to that litigation at the time of issuing the judgment on the merits, a stage that is practically imminent, since the process is ready for judgment, the offered evidence having been taken.

**III.- CONSULTED RULES.** The consulted rules of the Regulatory Law of the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), in the pertinent parts, establish the following:

“Article 31.- 1. It shall be a requirement for admitting the administrative litigation action the exhaustion of administrative remedies (…)” “Article 21.- 1. The administrative litigation action shall not be admitted regarding:

• a)Acts consented expressly or by not having been challenged in time and form, those that are a reproduction of other previous definitive or final acts (definitivos o firmes), and those confirming consented acts (…)” **IV.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS.** In the classic conception of substantial and formal Administrative Law, public administrations, insofar as they procure and attend to public interests or the satisfaction of collective needs, must be provided with a series of extraordinary prerogatives. Thus, in the field of Administrative Procedural Law, traditionally, the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies or prior administrative proceedings was admitted as a formal privilege, that is, that administered parties who consider themselves injured or aggrieved by an administrative act must, prior to resorting to the administrative litigation jurisdiction, exhaust all ordinary administrative recourses applicable against it in the administrative forum. Consequently, the exhaustion of administrative remedies becomes a requirement for the admissibility of the administrative litigation process in its objective or classic and traditional reviewing version. Underlying this institute is the so-called prerogative of declarative and executive self-tutelage (autotutela) of public administrations, which has simultaneously found support in principles such as efficiency, efficacy, and good administration. Declarative self-tutelage means that public entities can, by themselves and before themselves, without needing to go before a judge, impose obligations on administered parties or suppress or modify their substantial legal situations – be they subjective rights or legitimate interests. The unavoidable legislative obligation of the administered party to exercise or raise all ordinary administrative recourses against an administrative act before going before the administrative litigation judge constitutes a specific manifestation of the declarative self-tutelage of public administrations, since the legislator expects that the public administration itself can defend the challenged administrative act or annul or modify it, avoiding having to appear before the administrative litigation jurisdiction. In this way, in the administrative route, the public administration becomes, at the same time, judge and party, since it must attend to the requests or petitions formulated by the administered parties and resolve the ordinary administrative recourses that are applicable against the final act that it itself issues. As can be seen, self-tutelage is a concept diametrically opposed to that which prevails in the rest of the legal branches, where hetero-tutelage operates, that is, that exercised by a third party above the parties with the constitutional guarantees of impartiality, independence, and objectivity, such as a jurisdictional body. Thus, by way of example, in the field of Private Law, an individual can impose an obligation or affect the substantial legal situations of another, solely and exclusively, if this arises consensually through the application of the principle of freedom of contract (Article 28 of the Political Constitution) or through the intervention of a judge (Article 41 of the Political Constitution). However, the guiding principles of administrative organization and function of efficiency and efficacy, embodied in the Political Constitution itself (Articles 140, subsection 8, and 191), must be understood, at all times and under any circumstance, as subordinated to fundamental rights and must yield before them, since they constitute the foundation and basis of the entire legal system. In modern times, public administrations must be conceived and understood as just another subject of law within the legal system, so that the chronic asymmetry or inequality that prevails in the field of the administrative litigation jurisdiction between the administered party or citizen and the respective public entity is repugnant to the Law of the Constitution. The legislative recognition and granting of a series of formal or adjective prerogatives to public entities in the administrative litigation jurisdictional order has no objective and reasonable justification if their administrative function, according to the constitutional parameter (Articles 33 and 49 of the Political Constitution), must be subject to plenary and universal judicial review, without fissures or exempt enclaves and, above all, if they are created and put into operation to serve or attend to the needs of citizens or administered parties – service-oriented organizations.

**V.- UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MANDATORY CHARACTER OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.** Currently, especially in light of the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and the stronger linkage of fundamental rights, as well as their expansive and progressive efficacy and most favorable interpretation, it is understood that the obligatory or mandatory character of the exhaustion of administrative remedies conflicts with the fundamental right of administered parties to obtain prompt and complete justice under Articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution (effective judicial protection) and with the principle of equality, since only in the administrative litigation process –and not in the rest of the jurisdictions– is the party subject to justice obliged, before going to the jurisdictional route, to exhaust all ordinary administrative recourses applicable. The infringement of the fundamental right to prompt and complete justice derives from the following aspects: a) Normally, when the administered party files the ordinary recourses of reconsideration (revocatoria), appeal (apelación), or reposición –the latter understood as the horizontal recourse applicable against the acts of the superior or supreme superior–, it does not manage to get the body itself or its superior to modify or annul it, so that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is like drawing water from a dry well, as nothing is achieved by filing the recourses, thus becoming a heavy burden or a kind of via crucis for the administered party; b) it is known that the administrative procedure and its recourse or review stage usually extends beyond legal deadlines and beyond what can be conceived as a reasonable time, thereby indefinitely prolonging, even for years, access to effective judicial protection, without having the possibility of doing so immediately and when deemed opportune; c) the sum of the time required to exhaust administrative remedies plus that required by the administrative litigation jurisdiction causes administered parties to obtain tardy justice, which, eventually, can become –depending on its prolongation and the particular circumstances of the administered litigants– a denial of justice; the foregoing constitutes a clear and evident relative advantage for public entities which, on occasions, they avail themselves of, since the administered party or citizen passes –due to their ordinary condition as a natural person– and the public administration remains permanently over time. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality, it must be indicated that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, derived from the privilege of declarative self-tutelage, exposes the litigant who sues a public administration to a discriminatory situation, since there is no objective and reasonable motive for subjecting them to this obligatory requirement, unlike the rest of the jurisdictional orders. It must be taken into consideration that, even the freedom of legislative configuration or discretion when designing the various processes has the principle of equality as an insurmountable limit. The foregoing is reinforced if it is considered that public administrations are just another subject of law that should not have to enjoy such privileges or prerogatives and that the central axis in a service-providing administration or in a Social and Democratic State of Law is the person, that is, the user or consumer of public goods and services. In essence, public interests and the satisfaction of collective needs cannot be taken as empowerment clauses to undermine the fundamental rights of administered parties or, simply, as the altar upon which to sacrifice them.

**VI.- CONFORMITY OF THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETER: OPTIONAL OR ELECTIVE CHARACTER FOR THE ADMINISTERED PARTY.** The interpretation most favorable to the expansive and progressive efficacy of the fundamental rights of administered parties to prompt and complete justice and equality compels a qualitative rethinking of the obligatory nature of the exhaustion of administrative remedies imposed by the legislator. Indeed, it must be understood that the exhaustion of administrative remedies should be left to the free choice of the administered party, so that it is the latter who, after making a judgment of probability about the potential success of their action in the administrative forum, decides whether or not to file the applicable administrative recourses. It is to be expected that the possibilities of the administered party are strengthened when it concerns the so-called "administrative tribunals" (e.g., Environmental Tribunal, Tax Administrative Tribunal, National Customs Tribunal, Civil Service Tribunal, Teaching Career Tribunal, Administrative Registry Tribunal, Transport Tribunal, etc.), since, as these have been constituted, almost usually, as highly decentralized bodies, a greater guarantee of technical specialty, impartiality, and objectivity is obtained, as the hierarchical relationship fades and any political criterion is diluted. The idea of the optional character of the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not alien or strange to the infra-constitutional legal system; the Regulatory Law of the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction itself establishes four cases in which it is optional. Thus, Article 32 exempts from the recourse of reposición the presumed act by negative silence when it emanates from the superior, acts not manifested in writing –tacit–, and regulations. Article 87, in the case of the special process for the removal of directors of decentralized entities, establishes that it is not necessary to file the prior recourse of reposición. For its part, Article 357 of the General Law of Public Administration stipulates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge de facto actions (vías de hecho). Finally, the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law itself, in its Article 31, indicates that it is not necessary to exhaust administrative remedies to resort to the amparo process. It is worth clarifying and noting, although it is not the object of this judicial consultation, due to its transcendental importance, that the statute of limitations for the action –whatever it may be–, when the administered party chooses not to exhaust administrative remedies, will begin to run from the notification of the unchallenged final act. In summary, the elective character of the administrative route is absolutely consistent with the fundamental rights of administered parties to access the jurisdiction, to prompt and complete justice (Article 41 of the Political Constitution), to equality (Article 33 of the Political Constitution), and to judicial review of the legality of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Political Constitution). Now then, it must be emphasized that it is just as constitutional for the administered party to choose to go directly to the jurisdictional route, without exhausting administrative remedies, as when they choose to do so.

**VII.- MANDATORY EXHAUSTION IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT.** The original constituent established several hypotheses in which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory, understanding that the body or instance that reviews or oversees a specific administrative act is a guarantee of correctness, speed, and economy for the administered party. In such circumstances, are numerals 173 regarding municipal agreements, as paragraph 2 of that numeral establishes that if the objected or appealed agreement is not revoked or reformed, the records shall be sent to the Court dependent on the Judicial Branch indicated by law for definitive resolution, and 184 as it reserves for the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic the improper hierarchy of administrative acts issued in matters of public procurement.

In these two scenarios, since a constitutional norm provides coverage for the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies, this obligatory prerequisite for the admissibility of an administrative contentious proceeding cannot be deemed unconstitutional.

**VIII.- TACITLY CONSENTED ACT (ACTO TÁCITAMENTE CONSENTIDO): UNJUSTIFIED FORMAL PRIVILEGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS.** Another of the formal privileges of public administrations in the administrative contentious proceeding is the dogmatic and legislative figure of the tacitly consented act (acto tácitamente consentido), which has an irrefutable logic in relation to the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies – based on the privilege of declaratory self-protection (autotutela declarativa) – is a mandatory admissibility requirement, consequently, if the individual fails to exercise the appropriate administrative appeals (recursos administrativos) in a timely and proper manner, the legislator presumes, based on the individual's omission, that they have tacitly consented to the administrative act by not appealing it within the timeframes and through the means provided by the legal system. This procedural institute directly infringes upon the fundamental right of individuals to access the jurisdiction (Article 41 of the Constitución Política), since it perpetually prevents them from discussing the matter before the jurisdiction established by the constituent power to exercise control over the legality of the administrative function (Article 49 of the Constitución Política), simply because they did not exercise and file the appropriate administrative appeals (recursos administrativos). Consequently, if the adaptation of the exhaustion of administrative remedies to the constitutional parameter requires it to be considered optional or voluntary for the individual, the figure of the consented act must be deemed unconstitutional insofar as it implicitly assumes that such a requirement must be mandatorily fulfilled.

**IX.- CONNECTED NORMS.** Article 89 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional prescribes that the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of a norm or law shall also declare that of the other precepts thereof whose annulment is evidently necessary due to connection or consequence. That provision, by virtue of Article 108 ibidem, is supplementarily applicable to judicial consultations (consultas judiciales). For the reasons stated, this Constitutional Court finds that, due to connection with the consulted norms, the following provisions of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa are also unconstitutional: a) The phrase in Article 18, paragraph 1 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa that establishes “(…) that are not susceptible to a further appeal in administrative proceedings (recurso en vía administrativa) (…)”; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1 of Article 41 of that regulatory body that provides “d) That the administrative remedies have not been exhausted”; c) Paragraph 3 of Article 33 of that law when prescribing “3. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies shall give rise to its assertion, by way of preliminary defense (defensa previa), if the Court does not appreciate the defect at the opportunity provided in Article 41”; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4 of Article 33 when indicating “(…) for not having been appealed administratively in a timely and proper manner”; e) subsection c) of Article 50 of the referenced law when indicating “c) The failure to exhaust administrative remedies”.

**X.- COROLLARY.** In view of the foregoing, it is necessary to resolve the judicial consultation (consulta judicial) on constitutionality in the sense that the first and second paragraphs of Article 31, insofar as they establish that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory requirement to access the administrative contentious jurisdiction and when it will be deemed fulfilled, and subsection a) of paragraph 1 of Article 21, when prescribing that the administrative contentious action shall not be admissible regarding tacitly consented acts, both from the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), are unconstitutional for infringing the fundamental rights of access to jurisdiction, to prompt and complete justice, to equality, and to control of the legality of the administrative function, and therefore must be annulled where relevant, along with the connected norms. In accordance with Article 107 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, this judgment must be communicated to the consulting Court, to the Procuradora General de la República, and to the parties appearing in the ordinary proceeding in which the consulted norms are applied. Likewise, pursuant to sections 90, 107, and 108 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, its full publication in the Boletín Judicial must be ordered, and it must be summarized in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta.

**XI.-** Magistrates Solano and Vargas dissent (salvan el voto) and declare the consultation without merit, as they do not find the consulted provisions unconstitutional.

**POR TANTO:** The judicial consultation (consulta judicial) is resolved in the sense that paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 31, insofar as they provide “1. Exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be a requirement to admit the administrative contentious action. 2. This procedure shall be deemed fulfilled: a) When all administrative appeals (recursos administrativos) available for the matter have been used in a timely and proper manner; and b) when the law expressly so provides. (…)” and subsection a) of paragraph 1 of Article 21, when prescribing that the administrative contentious action shall not be admissible regarding tacitly consented acts, both from the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (No. 3667 of March 12, 1966), are unconstitutional. Therefore, the entirety of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 31 and the phrase “(…) or for not having been appealed in a timely and proper manner (…)” from subsection a) of paragraph 1 of Article 21, both from the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, are annulled. By connection with the consulted norms, the following are annulled as unconstitutional: a) The phrase in Article 18, paragraph 1 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, insofar as it establishes “(…) that are not susceptible to a further appeal in administrative proceedings (recurso en vía administrativa) (…)”; b) subsection d) of paragraph 1 of Article 41 of that regulatory body that provides “d) That the administrative remedies have not been exhausted”; c) Paragraph 3 of Article 33 of that law when prescribing “3. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies shall give rise to its assertion, by way of preliminary defense (defensa previa), if the Court does not appreciate the defect at the opportunity provided in Article 41”; d) the final phrase of paragraph 4 of Article 33 when indicating “(…) for not having been appealed administratively in a timely and proper manner”; e) subsection c) of Article 50 of the referenced law when indicating “c) The failure to exhaust administrative remedies”. This judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the consulted and connected norms, all without prejudice to acquired rights and consolidated legal situations by virtue of a judgment that has the authority of material res judicata (cosa juzgada material). Communicate to the consulting Court, the Procuraduría General de la República, and the parties appearing in the proceeding. Publish fully in the Boletín Judicial and summarize in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

**VOTO SALVADO DE LOS MAGISTRADOS SOLANO y VARGAS** Magistrates Solano and Vargas dissent (salvan el voto) and declare that the consulted norms are not unconstitutional, based on the following arguments drafted by the former:

**I. Exhaustion of administrative remedies as a lege ferenda issue.** Having analyzed the object of this action, we conclude that it is the positive legislator, and not the Constitutional Chamber, who must develop a suitable design for the processing of the administrative procedure, allowing for the effective management of public affairs without impeding the full exercise of individuals' rights. The challenged norms are not unconstitutional *per se*, since they establish, in principle, rules that allow for an alternative resolution of the conflict, avoiding "judicializing" all disputes that arise between the Administration and citizens. If what is inadequate is the manner in which self-protection (autotutela) procedures are carried out, it will be the legislator who must design effective mechanisms to preserve the delicate balance that, in every society, must exist between the general interest and individual rights.

**II. Prior exhaustion as an obstacle to effective access to justice (the case of the "ladder appeals" in municipal matters.** In accordance with what was resolved by this Chamber in judgments numbers 2004-00629-04, 4842-04, 5138-04, and 12060-05, the single-instance system in appeal matters provided for in subsection 1) of Article 350 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública is broken in municipal matters, since, in accordance with the provisions of Article 153 of the Código Municipal, a system of ladder appeals (recursos en escalerilla) is provided (see, to the contrary, what was resolved by this Chamber in judgments 2001-04197 and 2004-4110). This implies that if one assumes that, under Article 173 of the Constitución Política, which establishes as an indispensable requirement to challenge, in the administrative contentious venue, those municipal conducts deemed illegal, the administrative remedies must be exhausted beforehand, the individual will have to undergo a tortuous path of six instances – including an improper biphasic superior (jerarca impropio bifásico), namely: the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo – in order to be able to bring an action in that jurisdictional venue. Based on that criterion, it is paradoxical that, if one of the foundations on which the declaration of unconstitutionality of Articles 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31, and 34 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa and connected norms is based is that the principle of irrevocability of administrative acts constitutes an obstacle that prevents the individual from having expeditious access to the administrative contentious venue for the timely protection of their rights, on the basis – not empirically verified in the case file – that Public Administrations practically never annul conducts allegedly harmful to the rights of those individuals *– a situation that has been compared in doctrine to drawing water from an empty well –*; that in municipal matters, and under the supposed protection of the provisions of Articles 153, 156, 161, and 162 of the Código Municipal, it is categorically affirmed that the individual must exhaust – depending on the situation they find themselves in according to those norms – from two to six instances to gain access to the administrative contentious jurisdiction. This implies subjecting individuals harmed by actions or omissions of Municipal Governments to a long and uncertain path for the protection of their rights, unlike those who are not in these situations, which is contrary to the norms, values, and principles of Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución). This is despite the fact that – in principle – maintaining the exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on a constitutional norm (Article 173), which could well be interpreted – on the basis of the doctrinal foundations supporting the majority vote and the very values and principles informing Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución) – in the sense that this is not a case of improper biphasic hierarchy, but rather of access to the competent jurisdictional venue once the appeals established by law have been exhausted at the municipal level, without this implying a more burdensome appeal system that impedes rapid access to that venue – like the ladder system. This system, furthermore, is not expressly provided for in the Código Municipal, as what is actually established are three appeal systems, depending on whether the act was issued by the Council (Concejo), by an authority dependent on the Council, or by an official dependent on the Municipal Mayor (Alcalde Municipal). This cannot be interpreted to mean that all these instances – totaling six – must be exhausted to gain access to the administrative contentious venue. Such an interpretation is necessary in light of what was resolved by the majority, under penalty of enshrining a manifest inequality for the individual at the municipal level. To argue otherwise would imply, therefore, placing individuals within the municipal appeal system in a situation of inequality by making them exhaust from two to six instances to gain access to the administrative contentious venue, even though the Constitución Política only provides that *“…if the Municipality does not revoke or modify the challenged or appealed resolution, the proceedings shall be referred to the Court of the Judicial Branch indicated by law* *for it to resolve definitively* *…”* (underlining added). It is thus easily concluded that mandatory exhaustion is not the factor generating this distortion, but rather it is the manner in which the provisions of the Código Municipal are currently being applied.

**III.** The containment mechanisms provided for in the Draft Code of Administrative Procedure (Proyecto de Código Contencioso Administrativo) to avoid the multiplicity of avenues and, consequently, the impairment of the principle of legal certainty (principio de seguridad jurídica) and the fundamental rights of the administered parties, which could arise from contradictory resolutions in the administrative or jurisdictional avenues.

While it is true that the exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) would be optional from the majority vote onward—except in the cases provided for by the Political Constitution—it should be added that containment mechanisms must be established to prevent the multiplicity of avenues and, therefore, to avoid causing impairment to the principle of legal certainty, which also has constitutional rank.

And this is precisely the purpose fulfilled by the Draft Code of Administrative Procedure, as is evident from the following articles, related to the subject under analysis:

"Article 31.- 1.- The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be optional, except as provided in articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution, as well as in cases of improper hierarchies (jerarquías impropias) created by law.

2.- In any case, the improper hierarchical superior (jerarca impropio) must resolve the filed administrative appeal (recurso administrativo) within a maximum period of one month.

3.- If the jurisdictional avenue has been directly pursued, without having exhausted the administrative avenue, the supreme hierarchical superior of the competent body or entity, in accordance with the rules of article 126 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), may confirm, modify, annul, revoke, or cease the challenged administrative conduct, for the benefit of the administered party, within the first five days of the summons (emplazamiento), without suspension of the proceedings.

4.- If within the period indicated in the preceding paragraph, the Public Administration modifies, annuls, revokes, ceases, amends, or corrects the adopted administrative conduct, for the benefit of the administered party, the proceeding shall be deemed terminated in the relevant part without a special award of costs (costas), and without prejudice to its continuation for the recognition of rights relating to the restoration of the plaintiff's legal situation, including the eventual compensation for the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused.

5.- When the corresponding ordinary appeal (recurso ordinario) is filed before the Public Administration and it does not notify its resolution within one month, it may be deemed dismissed and the administrative avenue exhausted.

6.- If the appeal is expressly resolved, the period to file the claim (demanda) shall be counted from the day following the respective notification." "Article 35.- 1.- When an omission (conducta omisiva) by the Public Administration is challenged, the interested party may require the respective body or entity to adopt the due conduct within a period of fifteen days. If the omission persists after said period, the administrative-litigation avenue (vía contencioso-administrativa) shall be available.

2.- If the jurisdictional avenue has been directly pursued, the supreme hierarchical superior of the competent entity or body may request the Judge or Tribunal to suspend the proceeding for a maximum period of eight days to fulfill the due conduct. If this is done, the proceeding shall be deemed terminated without a special award of costs, without prejudice to its continuation for the full restoration of the legal situation of the injured person." "Article 115.- 1.- If, after the proceeding has been initiated, the defendant Public Administration recognizes, totally or partially, in the administrative avenue, the claims of the plaintiff, either party may bring this to the attention of the Processing Judge (Juez Tramitador) or Tribunal.

2.- The Processing Judge or Tribunal, after granting a hearing to the plaintiff for a maximum period of five business days, and upon verification of what has been alleged, shall declare the proceeding terminated in the pertinent part…" Given its particular nature, the majority vote contained in judgment number 2006-3669 does not have a dimensioning—pursuant to the provisions of article 108 in relation to article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)—that allows the administered party and, above all, legal operators, to know what to expect regarding the scope of the declaration of unconstitutionality (declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad) of articles 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31, and 34 of the Regulatory Law of the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), which produces uncertainty, especially regarding the scope of its practical application, scenarios that are indeed provided for in the Draft Code of Administrative Procedure, since it contains mechanisms that not only tend to safeguard the principle of legal certainty, but also give preeminence—in some cases—to the application of means for the early termination of conflicts brought before the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction, which could have a positive impact on reducing the litigation rate in that venue.

Therefore, even though the majority vote advocates for more expeditious and timely access to the administrative litigation avenue, its execution in practice could lead—given its lack of a dimensioning of the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality and the lack of current regulations establishing containment mechanisms to avoid the serious problem of duplicity of avenues—to a situation of uncertainty and legal insecurity (inseguridad jurídica), as both the administered parties and legal operators lack clear rules regulating access to the administrative litigation jurisdiction. And this is a matter of constitutional repercussion, without any doubt.

In summary, the declaration of unconstitutionality of articles 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31, and 34 of the Regulatory Law of the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction is not only untimely, if we consider that there is a Draft Code of Administrative Procedure—which had already been given its first debate in the Legislative Assembly, but was returned to the Permanent Commission on Legal Affairs—in which the exhaustion of the administrative avenue becomes optional except in the cases expressly provided for in that normative body (see article 31, subsection 1: "The exhaustion of administrative remedies shall be optional, except as provided in articles 173 and 182 of the Political Constitution, as well as in cases of improper hierarchies created by law…") and whose practical execution, once it came into force, would be accompanied by a series of normative repeals (derogatorias) and containment mechanisms, so that its application responds to an entire, faster, and more effective integrated administrative litigation justice system; but it is also incomplete, since the mere declaration of unconstitutionality of those norms does not guarantee that at this moment, and with the shortcomings that have been pointed out, the administered party can have faster and more timely access to the administrative litigation jurisdiction, which, ultimately, could cause a greater problem for the public interest and the protection of fundamental rights than the one intended to be resolved with that judgment.

IV. On access to justice

Furthermore, it is difficult to accept that the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies alone is the cause of a violation of the principle (right) of access to justice that this Chamber has extensively enhanced in its jurisprudence, particularly since judgment number 1739-92, at 11:45 a.m. on July first, nineteen ninety-two. The facts rather indicate that the parties (and very particularly the legal profession) try to extend the duration of administrative procedures over time, with the aim of preventing the issuance of the final act (acto final). In this vein, even the "short deadlines" established by article 346 of the General Law of Public Administration have been challenged before this very Chamber, accused of violating fundamental rights. This claim was dismissed by the Chamber in judgment number 2003-13140 at two thirty-seven p.m. on November twelfth, two thousand three.

In parallel, it must be noted that the amparo appeal (recurso de amparo), through what is established by article 32 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, has served to a large extent to regularize the functioning of the different public administrations, albeit analyzing case by case and without reaching the constitutionalization of deadlines, as has been stated in this venue. See, among others, judgment 2005-04287.

The same can be said of the specific configuration with which the Law has endowed the administrative litigation process up to now, which allows that in an apparently simple case, such as the one that serves as the basis for this consultation, more than nine years have passed without a ruling on the merits. With this, it would be worth asking whether it is the administrative avenue, or the jurisdictional avenue itself, that has been in debt to the people, since the right to access justice is not limited to the mere possibility of bringing a specific claim before a judge or tribunal, but also to the right that justice be administered fully and promptly, that is, within a reasonable time, without unjustified delays—effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), full judicial protection (tutela judicial plena). Simply determining that all disputes with the Administration can be resolved directly before the courts without providing them with procedural tools that allow them to offer a swift and efficient service implies condemning the administered parties to suffer, before the justice system, the delays and deprivations that the Administration currently provides them. It is as violative of article 41 of the Constitution to lack the possibility of exercising the right of action as it is to subject people to eternal, complex, and ineffective processes for the solution of the conflicts that generated them.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the consultation formulated must be answered negatively, and we so order.

Luis Fernando Solano Carrera Adrián Vargas Benavides Magistrate Magistrate

Res. 03669-2006 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas del quince de marzo del dos mil seis.

Consulta judicial de constitucionalidad formulada por el Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, por resolución No. 890-2004 de las 11 hrs. del 30 de julio del 2004, en el proceso ordinario, tramitado en el expediente No. 97-001083-163-CA, de Nombre01 contra Nombre02, Nombre03 y el Estado, de los artículos 21, párrafo 1°, inciso a), y 31, párrafo 1°, de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa (No. 3667 del 12 de marzo de 1966) .

RESULTANDO:

1.- Por resolución No. 890-2004 de las 11 hrs. del 30 de julio del 2004, el Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, dictada en el proceso ordinario de Nombre01 contra Nombre02, Nombre03 y el Estado (expediente No. 97-001083-163-CA), formula consulta de constitucionalidad de los artículos 31, párrafo 1°, y 21, párrafo 1°, inciso a), de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (No. 3667 del 12 de marzo de 1966). Refiere que en el proceso jurisdiccional la representación del Estado opuso las defensas previas de defecto formal, falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y de acto consentido. Si bien el juzgado en resolución No. 462-2003 de las 15 hrs. del 12 de junio del 2003, las rechazó indicó que “sin perjuicio de que puedan ser revisadas nuevamente al momento del dictado de la sentencia de fondo”, por lo que considera que la excepciones se encuentran pendientes de resolver. El juez consultante estima que tiene dudas fundadas de constitucionalidad de los referidos numerales de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, por contrariar el principio de igualdad de las cargas procesales, sin un fundamento de justicia material suficiente, puesto que, con el agotamiento preceptivo se obstaculiza el acceso a los medios jurisdiccionales, restringiendo las posibilidades de obtener una tutela cautelar adecuada. Considera tener dudas sobre la proporcionalidad del agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa en cuanto restringe los derechos fundamentales a la acción y a la tutela judicial efectiva, en salvaguarda del interés público. En su criterio con el agotamiento obligatorio de la vía administrativa establecido en la ley se restringen derechos fundamentales, infringiéndose, en su opinión, el principio de supremacía constitucional derivado de los artículos 195 y 196 del texto fundamental. En lo relativo a la inimpugnabilidad legal del acto tácitamente consentido, formula dudas acerca de su congruencia con el derecho fundamental al control de legalidad o de recurrir en vía jurisdiccional los actos de las autoridades públicas.

2.- El representante del Estado, por escrito presentado el 20 de agosto del 2004 se apersono y manifestó que ninguna razón le asiste al órgano jurisdiccional consultante, puesto que, el requisito previo del agotamiento de la vía administrativa, no limita los derechos o garantías del administrado a una tutela judicial efectiva, por el contrario es un recaudo para implementar el principio de “justicia administrativa”, para zanjar las diferencias en sede administrativa. Ese requisito cumple una función de control administrativo de parte del jerarca en beneficio del administrado, de modo que con el mismo se implementan los principios de seguridad y certeza. En su opinión el agotamiento preceptivo tampoco quebranta el principio de igualdad de cargas procesales.

3.- Por memorial presentado el 30 de agosto del 2004, el representante del Estado, amplió sus manifestaciones, con cita de doctrina, al estimar que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa resulta beneficioso para el administrado, puesto que, la administración tiene la posibilidad de modificar o revocar su criterio, dándole la razón a aquél. En lo relativo al acto tácitamente consentido, estima que es un acto firme que no puede ser impugnable por tiempo indefinido y a voluntad del interesado.

4.- Por resolución de las 11:40 hrs. del 18 de noviembre del 2004, la presidencia a.i. de la Sala Constitucional tuvo por apersonados a Vivian Ávila Jones en su condición de Procurador adjunto y a la Licenciada Nombre03 como apoderarada judicial de Nombre02.

5.- En la sustanciación del proceso se han observado las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Jinesta; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- PRESUPUESTOS DE ADMISIBILIDAD DE LAS CONSULTAS JUDICIALES. El artículo 102 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece los presupuestos de admisión de las consultas judiciales, disposición de la que se desprenden cuatro elementos condicionantes y fundamentales para su procedencia que son los siguientes: a) que sea formulada por un juez; b) que existan "dudas fundadas" sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión que se deba aplicar o juzgar; c) que exista un caso sometido al conocimiento del juzgador o tribunal, y d) que en ese asunto previo, deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda de constitucionalidad. Estos presupuestos fueron analizados en detalle en la sentencia No. 1617-97 de las 14:54 hrs. del 17 de marzo de 1997, de la siguiente manera:

"A. Que la formule un «juez», término genérico que –desde luego– se aplica tanto a los juzgadores unipersonales como a los tribunales colegiados, y sobre lo cual es innecesario precisar más que: a) que debe tratarse de autoridades dotadas de poder jurisdiccional, lo cual excluye las consultas formuladas por tribunales administrativos, pero sí incluye las que hagan los árbitros en el marco de los asuntos sujetos a su decisión (nótese que lo relevante en todos los casos es que se esté ante el trámite de un proceso conducente al dictado de una sentencia o laudo arbitral, dotados de la autoridad de la cosa juzgada); y, b) que el juzgador debe estar, al momento de formular la consulta, debidamente habilitado para ejercer esa competencia (ya que mal podría pensarse que una resolución que sea inválida en el proceso en cuestión pueda surtir el efecto de dar inicio a un trámite que, como éste, posee un carácter puramente incidental).

B. Que existan «dudas fundadas» sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión que se deba aplicar o juzgar. Esto quiere decir que el cuestionamiento debe ser razonable y ponderado. Además implica que no puede versar sobre aspectos sobre cuya constitucionalidad la Sala ya se haya pronunciado. Ello es así no sólo porque aceptar lo contrario implicaría desconocer la eficacia erga omnes de las resoluciones de esta jurisdicción, sino también dado que una consulta bajo esas circunstancias evidentemente carecería de interés actual. Pero subráyese, por su relevancia para el sub examine, que la explicada circunstancia sólo deriva de aquellos pronunciamientos en que la Sala haya validado expresamente la adecuación de la norma, acto, conducta u omisión a los parámetros constitucionales. En consecuencia, si una norma ha superado anteriormente el examen explícito de constitucionalidad (en vía de acción o consulta), no sería viable un nuevo cuestionamiento sobre el mismo punto, pero sí podría serlo respecto de un acto, conducta u omisión basados en la misma norma, particularmente porque –en este caso– siempre existe la posibilidad de un quebranto constitucional, ya no en la norma en sí, sino en su interpretación o aplicación. A la inversa, el hecho de que un acto, conducta u omisión haya sido refrendado anteriormente (quizás en vía de amparo o hábeas corpus) no significa que no puedan existir dudas sobre la constitucionalidad de la norma misma en que aquellos se fundamenten. Y, en esta hipótesis, la consulta judicial es pertinente.

C. Que exista un caso sometido al conocimiento del juzgador o tribunal. Al igual que en la acción de inconstitucionalidad, la consulta judicial nunca se da en el vacío o por mero afán académico, sino que ella debe ser relevante para la decisión o resolución del llamado «asunto previo» o «principal». Finalmente, D. Que, en ese asunto previo, deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión que suscite la duda de constitucionalidad, aspecto que –por su relevancia para el caso– resulta conveniente precisar. En efecto, la expresión «deba aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión», conlleva un sentido actual muy definido y totalmente distinto a que si la ley hablara en términos de que «pueda aplicarse la norma o juzgarse el acto, conducta u omisión». La consulta judicial no procede ante la mera eventualidad de que acaezcan esas circunstancias, ya que –como se explicó arriba– esta concepción equivaldría a que se inviertan los recursos de la jurisdicción constitucional en un simple ejercicio académico o doctrinario. Para que la consulta sea viable, el juzgador debe estar enfrentado, con certidumbre y en tiempo presente, a la aplicación de la norma o al juzgamiento del acto, conducta u omisión que le suscite una duda de constitucionalidad." II.- OBJETO Y ADMISIBILIDAD DE LA CONSULTA JUDICIAL. El juez contencioso-administrativo consultante estima tener duda fundada de constitucionalidad de los artículos 31, párrafo 1°, de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa “(…) en tanto establece que el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa, es condición de admisibilidad de un proceso ordinario ante la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa” y 21, párrafo 1°, inciso a), “(…) en el tanto se dispone que el acto consentido tácitamente, por no haber sido recurrido en tiempo y forma determinará la inadmisibilidad de la acción contencioso-administrativa (…)”. Estima que el agotamiento obligatorio de la vía administrativa tiene por propósito lograr que el ente u órgano público rectifique su decisión, lo que, ordinariamente, no ocurre en la experiencia administrativa y judicial. Adicionalmente, estima que el justiciable durante la pendencia del recurso debe soportar la ejecución del acto administrativo, puesto que, por lo dispuesto en el numeral 148 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública la interposición de los recursos no tiene un efecto suspensivo. En criterio del juzgador consultante lo anterior lo hace dudar de la constitucionalidad de ese privilegio de la administración pública por contrariar los ordinales 33 y 41 de la Constitución Política, dado que, a través del agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa se obstaculiza el acceso a la jurisdicción y a la tutela judicial efectiva, así como la vinculación más fuerte de los derechos fundamentales. En lo tocante, al acto administrativo consentido tácitamente por el administrado, estima el juez que puede implicar la imposibilidad para el administrado de ejercer el derecho fundamental a impugnarlo en la vía jurisdiccional o de ejercer el control de legalidad. En la presente consulta concurren los requisitos y condiciones que se refirieron en el considerando anterior para la admisibilidad de la consulta, puesto que, es formulada por resolución de un órgano jurisdiccional que tiene motivos fundados de constitucionalidad sobre las normas que debe aplicar en un proceso ordinario. En efecto, en el proceso ordinario tramitado en el Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo, bajo el expediente No. 97-001083-163-CA, la Procuraduría General de la República por memorial presentado el 17 de marzo del 2000 (visible a folios 134-136 de ese expediente) interpuso, entre otras defensas previas, la de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y de acto consentido. Ulteriormente, al contestar la demanda por libelo presentado el 24 de mayo del 2000 (visible a folio 158-166 del referido expediente), nuevamente interpuso, entre otras defensas propias la de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y de acto consentido. El Juzgado Contencioso-Administrativo por resolución No. 462-2003 de las 15 hrs. del 12 de junio del 2003 (visible a folios 288-289 del citado expediente), rechazó, entre otras las defensas previas de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y de acto consentido, por extemporáneas al haber sido interpuestas no en los dos primeros tercios del emplazamiento sino en el último e indicó “sin perjuicio de que puedan ser revisadas nuevamente al momento del dictado de la sentencia de fondo”. De modo que, al haber sido también alegadas como defensas propias por la Procuraduría General de la República al contestar la demanda, las normas impugnadas pueden ser nuevamente aplicadas a esa litis al momento de dictarse la sentencia de mérito, etapa que se encuentra, prácticamente, en ciernes, puesto que, el proceso se encuentra listo para fallo al haberse evacuado la prueba ofrecida.

III.- NORMAS CONSULTADAS. Las normas consultadas de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa (No. 3667 del 12 de marzo de 1966), en lo conducente, establecen lo siguiente:

“Artículo 31.- 1. Será requisito para admitir la acción contencioso- administrativa el agotamiento de la vía administrativa (…)” “Artículo 21.- <![if !supportLists]>1. <![endif]>No se admitirá la acción contencioso-administrativa respecto de:

• a)Los actos consentidos expresamente o por no haber sido recurridos en tiempo y forma, los que sean reproducción de otros anteriores ya definitivos o firmes, y los confirmatorios de los consentidos (…)” IV.- AGOTAMIENTO PRECEPTIVO DE LA VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA: PRIVILEGIO INJUSTIFICADO FORMAL DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS. En la concepción clásica del Derecho Administrativo sustancial y formal, las administraciones públicas, en cuanto procuran y atienden los intereses públicos o la satisfacción de las necesidades colectivas, deben estar provistas de una serie de prerrogativas extraordinarias. Así, en el ámbito del Derecho Procesal Administrativo, tradicionalmente, se admitió como un privilegio de carácter formal el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa o la vía gubernativa previa, esto es, que los administrados que se estiman lesionados o agraviados por un acto administrativo deben, de previo a acudir a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, agotar todos los recursos administrativos ordinarios procedentes contra el mismo en sede administrativa. Consecuentemente, el agotamiento de la vía administrativa, se convierte en un requisito de admisibilidad del proceso contencioso-administrativo en su versión objetiva o revisora clásica y tradicional. En la base de este instituto subyace la denominada prerrogativa de la autotutela declarativa y ejecutiva de las administraciones públicas, la cual ha encontrado sustento, al propio tiempo, en principios tales como los de eficacia, eficiencia y buena administración. La autotutela declarativa significa que los entes públicos pueden, por sí y ante sí, sin necesidad de acudir ante un juez, imponerle obligaciones a los administrados o bien suprimirles o modificarles sus situaciones jurídicas sustanciales –llámense derechos subjetivos o intereses legítimos-. La obligación legislativa ineludible del administrado de ejercer o plantear todos los recursos administrativos ordinarios contra un acto administrativo antes de acudir ante el juez contencioso-administrativo, constituye una manifestación específica de la autotutela declarativa de las administraciones públicas, puesto que, el legislador espera que la propia administración pública pueda defender el acto administrativo impugnado o bien anularlo o modificarlo, evitándole tener que comparecer ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. De esta forma, en la vía administrativa la administración pública se convierte, al mismo tiempo, en juez y parte, puesto que, debe atender las solicitudes o pedimentos formulados por los administrados y resolver los recursos administrativos ordinarios que procedan contra el acto final que ella misma dicte. Como se ve, la autotutela es un concepto diametralmente opuesto al que impera en el resto de las ramas jurídicas, en las que opera la heterotutela, esto es, la ejercida por un tercero supra partes con las garantías constitucionales de imparcialidad, independencia y objetividad, como lo es un órgano jurisdiccional. Así, a modo de ejemplo, en el ámbito del Derecho Privado un particular puede imponerle una obligación o afectar las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de otro, única y exclusivamente, si ello surge de forma consensuada a través de la aplicación del principio de la autonomía de la voluntad (artículo 28 de la Constitución Política) o de la intervención de un juez (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política). No obstante, los principios rectores de la organización y función administrativa de la eficiencia y eficacia, plasmados en la propia Constitución Política (artículos 140, inciso 8°, y 191), deben entenderse, en todo momento y bajo cualquier circunstancia, subordinados a los derechos fundamentales y deben ceder ante éstos, puesto que, constituyen el fundamento y la base de entero ordenamiento jurídico. Modernamente las administraciones públicas deben ser concebidas y entendidas como un sujeto de Derecho más del ordenamiento jurídico, de modo que resulta repugnante para el Derecho de la Constitución la asimetría o desigualdad crónica que campea en el ámbito de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa entre el administrado o el ciudadano y el respectivo ente público. El reconocimiento y otorgamiento legislativo de una serie de prerrogativas formales o adjetivas a los entes públicos en el orden jurisdiccional contencioso-administrativo no tiene justificación objetiva y razonable si su función administrativa, de acuerdo con el parámetro constitucional (artículos 33 y 49 de la Constitución Política) debe ser objeto de un control de legalidad plenario y universal, sin fisuras o reductos exentos y, sobre todo, si son creados y puestos en funcionamiento para servir o atender las necesidades de los ciudadanos o administrados –organizaciones serviciales-.

V.- INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL CARÁCTER PRECEPTIVO DEL AGOTAMIENTO DE LA VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA. Actualmente, sobre todo a la luz de los principios de la supremacía de la Constitución y de la vinculación más fuerte de los derechos fundamentales, así como de su eficacia expansiva y progresiva e interpretación más favorable, se entiende que el carácter obligatorio o preceptivo del agotamiento de la vía administrativa riñe con el derecho fundamental de los administrados a obtener una justicia pronta y cumplida ex artículos 41 y 49 de la Constitución Política (tutela judicial efectiva) y con el principio de igualdad, puesto que, sólo en el proceso contencioso-administrativo –y no así en el resto de las jurisdicciones- se le obliga al justiciable, antes de acudir a la vía jurisdiccional, agotar todos los recursos administrativos ordinarios procedentes. La infracción al derecho fundamental a una justicia pronta y cumplida deviene de los siguientes aspectos: a) Normalmente, cuando el administrado interpone los recursos ordinarios de revocatoria, apelación o de reposición –entendido este último como el recurso horizontal que cabe contra los actos del jerarca o superior jerárquico supremo-, no logra que el propio órgano o su superior lo modifique o anule, de modo que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa es como sacar agua de un pozo seco, al no lograrse obtener nada de la interposición de los recursos, transformándose así en una pesada carga o especie de via crucis para el administrado; b) es sabido que el procedimiento administrativo y su etapa recursiva o de revisión, suele prolongarse más allá de los plazos legales y de lo que puede concebirse como un plazo razonable, con lo cual se prolonga indefinidamente, incluso por años, el acceso a la tutela judicial efectiva, sin tener posibilidad de hacerlo inmediatamente y cuando lo estime oportuno; c) la sumatoria del plazo necesario para agotar la vía administrativa con el requerido por la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, provoca que los administrados obtengan una justicia tardía, la cual, eventualmente, puede transformarse –según su prolongación y las circunstancias particulares de los administrados justiciables- en una denegación de justicia; lo anterior constituye una clara y evidente ventaja relativa para los entes públicos de la cual, en ocasiones, se prevalen, puesto que, el administrado o ciudadano pasa –por su condición ordinaria de persona física- y la administración pública permanece prolongadamente en el tiempo. En lo que atañe a la vulneración del principio de igualdad, debe indicarse que el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa, derivado del privilegio de la autotutela declarativa, expone al justiciable que litiga contra una administración pública a una situación discriminatoria, puesto que, no existe un motivo objetivo y razonable para someterlo a ese requisito obligatorio, a diferencia del resto de los ordenes jurisdiccionales. Debe tenerse en consideración que, incluso, la libertad de configuración o discrecionalidad legislativa al diseñar los diversos procesos, tiene como límite infranqueable el principio de igualdad. Lo anterior, queda reforzado si se considera que las administraciones públicas son un sujeto de Derecho más que no tienen por qué gozar de tales privilegios o prerrogativas y que el eje central en una administración prestacional o en un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho lo es la persona, esto es, el usuario o consumidor de los bienes y servicios públicos. En esencia, los intereses públicos y la satisfacción de las necesidades colectivas no pueden tenerse como cláusulas de apoderamiento para enervar los derechos fundamentales de los administrados o, sencillamente, como el altar para ser sacrificados.

VI.- ADECUACIÓN DEL AGOTAMIENTO DE LA VÍA ADMINISTRATIVA AL PARÁMETRO CONSTITUCIONAL: CARÁCTER FACULTATIVO U OPTATIVO PARA EL ADMINISTRADO. La interpretación más favorable a la eficacia expansiva y progresiva de los derechos fundamentales de los administrados a una justicia pronta y cumplida y a la igualdad, impone replantearse cualitativamente el carácter obligatorio del agotamiento de la vía administrativa impuesto por el legislador. En efecto, debe entenderse que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa debe quedar a la libérrima elección del administrado, de modo que sea éste quien, después de efectuar un juicio de probabilidad acerca del éxito eventual de su gestión en sede administrativa, decida si interpone o no los recursos administrativos procedentes. Es de esperar que las posibilidades del administrado se refuercen cuando se trata de los denominados “tribunales administrativos” (v. gr. Tribunal Ambiental, Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, Tribunal Aduanero Nacional, Tribunal del Servicio Civil, Tribunal de Carrera Docente, Tribunal Registral Administrativo, Tribunal de Transportes, etc.), puesto que, como los mismos han sido constituidos, casi de forma usual, como órganos desconcentrados en grado máximo, se obtiene una mayor garantía de especialidad técnica, imparcialidad y objetividad, al difuminarse la relación de jerarquía y diluirse cualquier criterio político. La idea del carácter facultativo del agotamiento de la vía administrativa, no es ajena o extraña al ordenamiento jurídico infraconstitucional, la propia Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa establece cuatro supuestos en que resulta optativa. Así, el artículo 32 exceptúa del recurso de reposición el acto presunto por silencio negativo cuando emana del jerarca, los actos no manifestados por escrito –tácitos- y los reglamentos. El artículo 87, en tratándose del proceso especial de separación de directores de las entidades descentralizadas, establece que no es necesario plantear el recurso previo de reposición. Por su parte el artículo 357 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública estatuye que no es necesario agotar la vía administrativa para impugnar las vías de hecho. Por último, la propia Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en su artículo 31 indica que no es necesario agotar la vía administrativa para acudir al proceso de amparo. Cabe aclarar y advertir, aunque no es objeto de la presente consulta judicial, por su trascendental importancia que el plazo de caducidad de la acción –cualquiera que este sea-, cuando el administrado opta por no agotar la vía administrativa, empezará a correr a partir de la notificación del acto final no impugnado. En suma, el carácter electivo de la vía administrativa, resulta absolutamente congruente con los derechos fundamentales de los administrados de acceso a la jurisdicción, a una justicia pronta y cumplida (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), a la igualdad (artículo 33 de la Constitución Política) y a controlar la legalidad de la función administrativa (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política). Ahora bien, debe resaltarse que tan constitucional es que el administrado opte por acudir directamente a la vía jurisdiccional, sin agotar la vía administrativa, como cuando elige hacerlo.

VII.- AGOTAMIENTO PRECEPTIVO IMPUESTO POR EL TEXTO CONSTITUCIONAL. El constituyente originario estableció varias hipótesis en que el agotamiento de la vía administrativa resulta preceptivo, al entender que el órgano o instancia que revisa o fiscaliza un acto administrativo determinado es una garantía de acierto, celeridad y economía para el administrado. En tales circunstancias, se encuentran los numerales 173 respecto de los acuerdos municipales, en cuanto el párrafo 2°, de ese numeral establece que si no es revocado o reformado el acuerdo objetado o recurrido, los antecedentes pasarán al Tribunal dependiente del Poder Judicial que indique la ley para que resuelva definitivamente y 184 en cuanto le reserva a la Contraloría General de la República la jerarquía impropia de los actos administrativos dictados en materia de contratación administrativa. En estos dos supuestos, al existir norma constitucional que le brinda cobertura al agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa no puede estimarse que sea inconstitucional ese presupuesto obligatorio de admisibilidad de un proceso contencioso-administrativo.

VIII.- ACTO TÁCITAMENTE CONSENTIDO: PRIVILEGIO FORMAL INJUSTIFICADO DE LAS ADMINISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS. Otro de los privilegios formales de las administraciones públicas en el proceso contencioso-administrativo lo constituye la figura dogmática y legislativa del acto tácitamente consentido que tiene una lógica irrefutable en relación con el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa. Si el agotamiento de la vía administrativa –sustentado en el privilegio de la autotutela declarativa- es un requisito de admisibilidad de carácter obligatorio, consecuentemente, si el administrado no ejerce en tiempo y forma los recursos administrativos procedentes, el legislador presume, a partir de la conducta omisa del administrado, que ha consentido tácitamente el acto administrativo al no recurrirlo en los plazos y por los medios dispuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico. Ese instituto procesal infringe frontalmente el derecho fundamental de los administrados de acceder a la jurisdicción (artículo 41 de la Constitución Política), puesto que, le impide perpetuamente, discutir el asunto ante la jurisdicción dispuesta por el constituyente para ejercer el control de legalidad de la función administrativa (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política), simplemente, por no haber ejercido e interpuesto los recursos administrativos procedentes. Consecuentemente, si la adecuación del agotamiento de la vía administrativa al parámetro constitucional impone estimarla como facultativa u optativa para el administrado, la figura del acto consentido debe ser reputada como inconstitucional en cuanto supone de forma implícita que debe cumplirse obligatoriamente con tal recaudo.

IX.- NORMAS CONEXAS. El artículo 89 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional preceptúa que la sentencia que declare la inconstitucionalidad de una norma o ley, declarará también la de los demás preceptos de ella cuya anulación resulte evidentemente necesaria por conexión o consecuencia. Ese numeral, por lo dispuesto en el propio artículo 108 ibidem, resulta aplicable supletoriamente a las consultas judiciales. Por lo expuesto, este Tribunal Constitucional estima que por conexión con las normas consultadas, también resultan inconstitucionales las siguientes de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa: a) La frase del artículo 18, párrafo 1° de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa en cuanto establece “(…) que no sean susceptibles de ulterior recurso en vía administrativa (…)”; b) el inciso d) del párrafo 1° del artículo 41 de ese cuerpo normativo en cuanto dispone “d) Que no está agotada la vía administrativa”; c) El párrafo 3° del artículo 33 de esa ley al preceptuar“3. La falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa dará lugar a su alegación, por vía de defensa previa, si el Tribunal no apreciare el defecto en la oportunidad prevista en el artículo 41”; d) la frase final del párrafo 4° del artículo 33 al señalar “(…) por no haber sido recurridos administrativamente en tiempo y forma”; e) el inciso c) del artículo 50 de la ley referida al indicar “c) La falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa”.

X.- COROLARIO. En mérito de lo expuesto, se impone evacuar la consulta judicial de constitucionalidad en el sentido que los párrafos primero y segundo del artículo 31, en cuanto establecen que es requisito preceptivo para acceder a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa el agotamiento de la vía administrativa y cuando se tendrá por cumplido, y el inciso a) del párrafo 1° del artículo 21, al preceptuar que no será admisible la acción contencioso administrativa respecto de los actos tácitamente consentidos, ambos de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (No. 3667 del 12 de marzo de 1966), son inconstitucionales por infringir los derechos fundamentales de acceso a la jurisdicción, a una justicia pronta y cumplida, a la igualdad y de control de la legalidad de la función administrativa, por lo que deben ser anulados en lo conducente junto con las normas conexas. De conformidad con el artículo 107 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se impone comunicar esta sentencia al Tribunal consultante, a la Procuradora General de la República y a las partes apersonadas en el proceso ordinario en que se aplican las normas consultadas. Asimismo, a tenor de los ordinales 90, 107 y 108 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se debe ordenar publicarla íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial y reseñarse en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta.

XI.- Los Magistrados Solano y Vargas salvan el voto y declaran sin lugar la consulta por no estimar inconstitucional lo consultado.

POR TANTO:

Se evacua la consulta judicial en el sentido que los párrafos 1° y 2° del artículo 31, en cuanto disponen “1. Será requisito para admitir la acción contencioso-administrativa el agotamiento de la vía administrativa. 2. Este trámite se entenderá cumplido: a) Cuando se haya hecho uso en tiempo y forma de todos los recursos administrativos que tuviere el negocio; y b) cuando la ley lo disponga expresamente.(…)” y el inciso a) del párrafo 1° del artículo 21, al preceptuar que no será admisible la acción contencioso administrativa respecto de los actos tácitamente consentidos, ambos de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (No. 3667 del 12 de marzo de 1966), son inconstitucionales. Por lo que se anula la totalidad de los párrafos 1° y 2° del artículo 31 y la frase “(…) o por no haber sido recurridos en tiempo y forma (…) del inciso a) del párrafo 1° del artículo 21, ambos de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa. Por conexidad con las normas consultadas se anulan, por inconstitucionales, las siguientes: a) La frase del artículo 18, párrafo 1° de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, en cuanto establece “(…) que no sean susceptibles de ulterior recurso en vía administrativa (…)”; b) el inciso d) del párrafo 1° del artículo 41 de ese cuerpo normativo en cuanto dispone “d) Que no está agotada la vía administrativa”; c) El párrafo 3° del artículo 33 de esa ley al preceptuar “3. La falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa dará lugar a su alegación, por vía de defensa previa, si el Tribunal no apreciare el defecto en la oportunidad prevista en el artículo 41”; d) la frase final del párrafo 4° del artículo 33 al señalar “(…) por no haber sido recurridos administrativamente en tiempo y forma”; e) el inciso c) del artículo 50 de la ley referida al indicar “c) La falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa”. Esta sentencia tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de las normas consultadas y conexas, todo sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas en virtud de sentencia pasada en autoridad de cosa juzgada material. Comuníquese al Juzgado consultante, la Procuraduría General de la República y las partes apersonas en el proceso. Publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial y reséñese en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

VOTO SALVADO DE LOS MAGISTRADOS SOLANO y VARGAS Los Magistrados Solano y Vargas salvan el voto y declaran que no son inconstitucionales las normas consultadas, con base en los siguientes argumentos que redacta el primero:

I. Agotamiento de la vía administrativa como un tema de lege ferenda

Analizado el objeto de esta acción, llegamos a la conclusión de que es el legislador positivo, y no la Sala Constitucional, la que debe elaborar un diseño idóneo para la tramitación del procedimiento administrativo, que permita la eficaz gestión de los asuntos públicos sin impedir el pleno ejercicio de los derechos de los administrados. Las normas impugnadas no son inconstitucionales per se, ya que establecen en principio reglas que permiten una resolución alterna del conflicto, evitando “judicializar” todas las disputas que surjan entre la Administración y los ciudadanos. Si lo inadecuado es la forma como son llevados a cabo los procedimientos de autotutela, será el legislador quien deberá diseñar mecanismos eficaces para conservar el delicado equilibrio que en toda sociedad debe existir entre el interés general y los derechos particulares.

II.El agotamiento previo como obstáculo del acceso efectivo a la justicia (caso de los “recursos en escalerilla” en materia municipal.

De conformidad con lo resuelto por esta Sala en sentencias números 2004-00629-04, 4842-04, 5138-04 y 12060-05, el sistema de única instancia en materia recursiva previsto en el inciso 1) del artículo 350 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, se rompe en materia municipal, pues de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 153 del Código Municipal se prevé un sistema de recursos en escalerilla (véase en sentido contrario, lo resuelto por esta Sala en sentencias 2001-04197 y 2004-4110), lo cual implica, que si se parte de que en el artículo 173 de la Constitución Política, se establece como requisito indispensable para impugnar en la vía contencioso administrativo aquellas conductas municipales que se estimen ilegales, debe agotarse de previo la vía administrativa, el administrado tendrá que pasar un tortuoso camino de seis instancias –incluyendo un jerarca impropio bifásico, a saber: el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo-, a efecto de poder accionar en esa vía jurisdiccional.

Con base en ese criterio, resulta paradójico que si uno de los fundamentos en que se basa la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31 y 34 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa y normas conexas, es que el principio de irrevocabilidad de los actos administrativos, constituye un obstáculo que impide al administrado tener acceso expedito a la vía contencioso administrativa en tutela oportuna de sus derechos, sobre la base –no comprobada empíricamente en el expediente- , de que prácticamente las Administraciones Públicas casi nunca dejan sin efecto las conductas presuntamente lesivas a los derechos de aquellos –situación que se ha comparado en doctrina como sacar agua de un pozo vacío-; que en materia municipal y al supuesto amparo de lo dispuesto en los artículos 153, 156, 161 y 162 del Código Municipal, se afirme de manera categórica que el administrado tenga que agotar –dependiendo del supuesto en que se encuentre conforme a lo previsto en dichos normas- desde dos hasta seis instancias para tener acceso a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativo, lo que implica, someter a las personas que se ven perjudicadas por acciones u omisiones de los Gobiernos Municipales, a un largo e incierto camino para la tutela de sus derechos, a diferencia de aquellos que no se encuentran en estos supuestos, lo que resulta contrario a las normas, valores y principios del Derecho de la Constitución, a pesar de que -en principio- el mantener el agotamiento de la vía administrativa se basa en una norma constitucional (artículo 173), que bien podría interpretarse –sobre la base de los fundamentos doctrinarios que sustentan el voto de mayoría y de los propios valores y principios que informan el Derecho de la Constitución- en el sentido de que no se está ante un caso de jerarquía impropia bifásica, si no más bien, de acceso a la vía jurisdiccional competente una vez que en sede municipal se hayan agotado los recursos que establezca la ley, sin que ello pueda implicar un sistema recursivo más gravoso que impida el acceso rápido a esa vía –como el sistema de escalerilla-. Este sistema, además, no está previsto de manera expresa en el Código Municipal, pues lo que en realidad se establece son tres sistemas recursivos, dependiendo de si el acto fue dictado por el Concejo, por una autoridad dependiente del Concejo o bien, de un funcionario dependiente del Alcalde Municipal, lo que no puede interpretarse que deben agotarse todas esas instancias –que en total suman seis- para tener acceso la vía contencioso administrativa. Una interpretación de ese estilo se hace necesaria a la luz de lo resuelto por la mayoría, so pena de consagrar una desigualdad manifiesta para el administrado en sede municipal.

Sostener otra cosa, implicaría, pues, colocar a los administrados del sistema recursivo municipal, en una situación de desigualdad al hacerlos agotar desde dos hasta seis instancias para tener acceso a la vía contencioso, aún y cuando, la Constitución Política únicamente disponga que “…si la Municipalidad no revoca o reforma el acuerdo objetado o recurrido, los antecedentes pasarán al Tribunal del Poder Judicial que indique la ley para que resuelva definitivamente…”(el subrayado corre por nuestra cuenta). Se concluye así fácilmente que el agotamiento obligatorio no es el factor que genera esta distorsión, sino que es la forma como están siendo aplicadas en la actualidad, las disposiciones del Código Municipal.

III.Los mecanismos de contención previstos en el Proyecto de Código Contencioso Administrativo para evitar la multiplicidad de vías y por ende, el menoscabo al principio de seguridad jurídica y a los derechos fundamentales de los administrados, que podrían derivarse de resoluciones contradictorias en las vías administrativa o jurisdiccional.

Si bien es cierto, el agotamiento de la vía administrativa sería facultativo a partir del voto de mayoría –salvo en los supuestos previstos por la Constitución Política-, cabe agregar que deben establecerse mecanismos de contención tendentes a evitar la multiplicidad de vías y por ende, a fin de no causar menoscabo al principio de seguridad jurídica, que tiene también rango constitucional.

Y esta es, precisamente la finalidad que se cumple con el Proyecto de Código Procesal Contencioso- Administrativo, tal y como se desprende de los siguientes artículos, relacionados con el tema bajo análisis:

“Artículo 31.- 1.- El agotamiento de la vía administrativa será facultativo, salvo para lo dispuesto en los artículos 173 y 182 de la Constitución Política, así como en los casos de las jerarquías impropias creadas por ley.

2.- En todo caso, el jerarca impropio deberá resolver el recurso administrativo planteado dentro del plazo máximo de un mes.

3.- Si se hubiera acudido directamente a la vía jurisdiccional, sin haber agotado la vía administrativa, el superior jerárquico supremo del órgano o entidad competente, de acuerdo con las reglas del artículo 126 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, podrá confirmar, modificar, anular, revocar, o cesar la conducta administrativa impugnada, en beneficio del administrado, dentro de los cinco primeros días del emplazamiento, sin suspensión de los procedimientos.

4.- Si dentro del plazo señalado en el apartado anterior, la Administración Pública modifica, anula, revoca, cesa, enmienda o corrige la conducta administrativa adoptada, en beneficio del administrado, se tendrá por terminado el proceso en lo pertinente sin especial condenatoria en costas, y sin perjuicio de que continúe para el reconocimiento de los derechos relativos al restablecimiento de la situación jurídica del actor, incluyendo la eventual indemnización de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados.

5.- Cuando se formulare el recurso ordinario que corresponda ante la Administración Pública y esta no notificare su resolución dentro de un mes, podrá tenerse por desestimado y por agotada la vía administrativa.

6.- Si el recurso fuere resuelto expresamente, el plazo para formular la demanda se contará desde el día siguiente de la notificación respectiva.” “Artículo 35.- 1.- Cuando se impugne una conducta omisiva de la Administración Pública, el interesado podrá requerir al órgano o ente respectivo para que adopte la conducta debida en el plazo de quince días. Si transcurrido dicho plazo persiste la omisión, quedará expedita la vía contencioso-administrativa.

2.- De haberse acudido directamente a la vía jurisdiccional, el jerarca supremo de la entidad u órgano competente, podrá solicitar al Juez o Tribunal, la suspensión del proceso por el plazo máximo de ocho días para cumplimentar la conducta debida. De hacerlo así, se dará por terminado el proceso sin especial condenatoria en costas, sin perjuicio de la continuación del mismo para el restablecimiento pleno de la situación jurídica de la persona lesionada.” “Artículo 115.- 1.- Si habiéndose incoado el proceso, la Administración Pública demandada reconociere total o parcialmente, en vía administrativa, las pretensiones del demandante, cualquiera de las partes podrá ponerlo en conocimiento de Juez Tramitador o Tribunal.

2.- El Juez Tramitador o Tribunal, luego de concedida audiencia al demandante por un plazo máximo de cinco días hábiles, y previa comprobación de lo alegado, declarará terminado el proceso en lo conducente…” Dada su naturaleza particular, el voto de mayoría contenido en la sentencia número 2006-3669 no tiene un dimensionamiento –conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 108 en relación con el 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional- que permita al administrado y sobre todo a los operadores jurídicos, saber a qué atenerse con relación a los alcances de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31 y 34 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, lo que produce incertidumbre, especialmente respecto a los alcances de su aplicación práctica, supuestos que sí se prevén en el Proyecto de Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, pues éste contiene mecanismos que no sólo tienden a salvaguardar el principio de seguridad jurídica, sino que además, dan preeminencia –en algunos casos- a la aplicación de medios de terminación anticipada de los conflictos que se planteen ante la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, lo cual, podría incidir positivamente en disminuir el porcentaje de litigiosidad en dicha sede.

Que en virtud de lo anterior, aún y cuando el voto de mayoría propugna por un acceso más expedito y oportuno a la vía contencioso administrativa, su ejecución en la práctica podría derivar –dada su carencia de un dimensionamiento de los efectos de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad y de la inexistencia de normativa vigente que establezca mecanismos de contención, a fin de evitar el grave problema de la duplicidad de vías- en una situación de incertidumbre y de inseguridad jurídica, al carecer tanto los administrados como los operadores del derecho, de reglas claras que regulen el acceso a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa. Y esta es una cuestión de repercusión constitucional, sin duda alguna.

En síntesis, la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 18.1, 19.1, 21, 31 y 34 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, resulta no sólo inoportuna, si tomamos en consideración que existe un Proyecto de Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo –al que ya se le había dado primer debate en la Asamblea Legislativa, pero que fue devuelto a la Comisión Permanente de Asuntos Jurídicos-, en que se torna facultativo el agotamiento de la vía administrativa salvo en los casos expresamente previstos en ese cuerpo normativo (ver artículo 31 inciso 1: “El agotamiento de la vía administrativa será facultativo, salvo para lo dispuesto en los artículos 173 y 182 de la Constitución Política, así como en los casos de las jerarquías impropias creadas por ley…”) y cuya ejecución práctica una vez que entrara en vigencia, vendría aparejada de una serie de derogatorias normativas y de mecanismos de contención, a efecto de que su aplicación responda a todo un sistema integral de justicia contencioso administrativa más rápido y efectivo; sino también incompleta, pues la sola declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de dichas normas, no garantiza que en este momento y con las carencias que se han apuntado, el administrado pueda tener un acceso más rápido y oportuno a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa, lo que en definitiva, podría provocar un problema mayor al interés público y a tutela de los derechos fundamentales, del que se pretendía resolver con esa sentencia.

IV. Sobre el acceso a la justicia

Por lo demás, resulta difícil aceptar que sea el solo agotamiento obligatorio de la vía administrativa el causante de una violación al principio (derecho) de acceso a la justicia que esta Sala ha potenciado extensamente en su jurisprudencia, particularmente desde la sentencia número 1739-92, de las 11:45 horas del primero de julio de mil novecientos noventa y dos. Los hechos indican más bien que las partes (y muy particularmente el estamento de los abogados) tratan de extender en el tiempo la duración de los procedimientos administrativos, con el ánimo de impedir el dictado del acto final. Dentro de esa tesitura, incluso, ha sido impugnados ante esta misma Sala, acusándolos de violatorios de derechos fundamentales los “cortos plazos” establecidos por el artículo 346 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Esta pretensión fue desestimada por la Sala en sentencia número 2003-13140 de las catorce horas con treinta y siete minutos del doce de noviembre de dos mil tres.

Paralelamente, hay que señalar que el recurso de amparo, a través de lo establecido por el artículo 32 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, ha servido en gran medida para regularizar el funcionamiento de las diferentes administraciones públicas, si bien analizando caso por caso y sin llegar a la constitucionalización de plazos, como se ha dicho en esta sede. Vid. entre otras, sentencia 2005-04287.

Otro tanto cabe decir de la específica configuración con que la Ley ha dotado hasta ahora al proceso contencioso administrativo, que permite que en un caso aparentemente simple, como el que sirve de base a la presente consulta, hayan pasado más de nueve años sin un pronunciamiento sobre el fondo. Con lo cual, valdría preguntarse si es la vía administrativa, o la propia jurisdiccional, la que ha estado en deuda con las personas, pues el derecho de acceder a la justicia no se limita a la mera posibilidad de deducir ante un juez o tribunal una pretensión determinada, sino también al derecho de que la justicia se administre en forma cumplida y prontamente, valga decir, en un plazo razonable, sin dilaciones injustificadas –tutela judicial efectiva, tutela judicial plena-. Determinar llanamente que todas las disputas con la Administración pueden ser resueltas directamente ante los tribunales sin dotar a éstos de herramientas procesales que les permitan brindar un servicio célere y eficaz implica condenar a los administrados a sufrir, ante la justicia, las dilaciones y privaciones que actualmente le brinda la Administración. Tan violatorio del artículo 41 constitucional es carecer de la posibilidad de ejercer el derecho de acción como someter a las personas a procesos eternos, complejos y poco efectivos para la solución de los conflictos que los generaron.

Por lo expuesto, somos del criterio de que hay que evacuar negativamente la consulta formulada y así lo disponemos.

Luis Fernando Solano Carrera Adrián Vargas Benavides Magistrado Magistrado