Challenge to the Moín Container Terminal concessionImpugnación de la concesión de la Terminal de Contenedores de Moín

**IV.- On the standing (legitimación) of CANABA in this proceeding.** The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República, CGR), as well as the representation of the State, raise a defense of lack of active standing (legitimación activa) with respect to CANABA. In essence, it is argued that it does not represent the interests of the entire banana sector, as it does not affiliate all producers and even some of its affiliates withdrew their support. Specifically, the Comptroller's Office objects that, despite the regulation of the CPCA, it remains unclear which interests the lawsuit seeks to protect. Understanding that it invokes a guild-type interest (interés de carácter gremial), doubts arise as to whether that chamber is legitimately entitled to defend the guild as a whole. Furthermore, it stated that not all banana companies use container ships. It is not clear what the extensive prejudice to the entire sector is. It seems that only some companies would be affected, and therefore, it is those companies that should have filed the proceeding. It is noteworthy that despite the three rounds of objections to the bidding terms (cartel), CANABA never filed an objection appeal. It did not participate in the phase for refining the bidding terms. In this regard, it should be noted that CANABA's participation seeks to be established under the concept of guild interest protected by section 10, first paragraph, subparagraph b) of the CPCA. It can certainly be questioned whether this Chamber brings together all banana producers and exporters in the country; however, the concept in question does not require the adherence of all the persons engaged in a specific activity in order to exercise this character of representative defense of a specific guild or sector. It should be highlighted that this type of standing seeks to be established as a framework that allows the exercise of actions with supra-individual projection, that is, it seeks the protection of collective interests specific to the persons who make up the represented guild or corporation. From this standpoint, the organizational structure presented by CANABA empowers it to file actions like the present one, to the extent that, at least in degree of probability, the operation of the Container Terminal of Moín (Terminal de Contenedores de Moín, TCM) subject to challenge may have an impact on the framework of activities of its members, regardless of whether it includes all actors in the national banana sector. Note that no particular effect is requested for a specific company, in which case, the standing should be based not on the aforementioned subparagraph b), but on the direct standing of subparagraph a), which aims to protect subjective rights and legitimate interests. However, this cause of action rests on claims of a general nature from the perspective of the effects on the represented sector. The same should be noted regarding the argument of not using container ships, because the fact that a certain group of exporters does not use them at present, does not imply that the port management system that the TCM design intends to incorporate will not be used by those represented entities. Regarding the denial of active standing due to the lack of challenge to the bidding terms, this will be a matter addressed below. Consequently, this Court does not observe a defect in CANABA's standing, given the specific claims filed, and therefore, the defense must be rejected.

**V.- On the standing of ARESEP.** The representation of the regulatory body raises a defense of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva). It argues that no specific claim is deduced against ARESEP in which the content of acts issued by ARESEP is openly questioned. As has been noted, CANABA reformulated its claims in the writ expanding the lawsuit filed on April 12, 2012 (folios 4291-4366 of the main file). In this writ, nor in the original writ that generated this proceeding, is a single claim included that seeks the suppression of conduct attributable to ARESEP. Such a petition is also missing from the SINTRAJAP lawsuit, which is dedicated to seeking the nullity of the award and the respective concession contract. In effect, as ARESEP argues, in this cause of action, the co-plaintiffs have not established any specific claim of invalidity of acts referable to ARESEP, which would allow it to be considered a passive party in this dispute. While it is true that within the framework of the allegations presented, references are made to the economic feasibility of the TCM project and allusions are made to the veracity and validity of the information used to establish the rates that such concession proposes to charge the users of the port terminal, the truth of the matter is that it is not specifically and explicitly indicated what claim is intended to be opposed against the cited Regulatory Authority, in such a way that the object of this cause of action requires it to be considered a defendant party. In this line, it is worth specifying, Article 21 of Law No. 7762 indicates the mandatory nature of the consultation that the Technical Secretariat of the CNC must make to ARESEP regarding the rate structure and the adjustment parameters to be incorporated into the bidding terms; as well as the parameters to be used to evaluate the quality of service, an opinion to be issued within a period of ten days and whose nature will be binding. ARESEP's participation in the TCM procedure pursuant to Law No. 7762 allows its framework of passive standing to be questioned in accordance with sections 12.1 and 12.6 of the CPCA. Regarding the first paragraph alluded to, procedural regulations state that the Public Administration author of the administrative conduct subject to the proceeding shall be considered the defendant party. In this case, as has been noted, no conduct of ARESEP is directly questioned, given that the annulment petitions refer to the award, the contract, its addenda, the comptroller's approval (refrendo), and the bidding terms. The invocation of disagreements regarding rate calculations cannot be considered a direct challenge to acts referable to ARESEP. Even if the subsidiary petitions seek the suppression of the contract's rate structures, the truth is that this does not imply ARESEP's passive standing in this cause of action, in light of the provisions of subsection 6 of canon 12 of the CPCA, as explained below. Regarding subsection 6 mentioned, ARESEP's participation in this procedure does not allow it to be considered a defendant. The regulation in question stipulates the following: "When an entity issues an act or provision that, for its finality, requires prior control, authorization, approval, or acknowledgment by a State body or another administrative entity, the following shall be considered the defendant party: a) The State or the entity that issued the audited act or provision, if the result of the audit has been approving. (...)" Certainly, ARESEP does not approve the TCM rates; this is a matter to be included in the contract as established by canon 41 of Law No. 7762. The representative of this administrative body is correct in stating that its participation in the TCM procedure - in accordance with Law No. 7762 - is limited to addressing the consultation on rates, structure, adjustment models, and quality principles, as well as investment costs, according to canon 7 of the Regulation to Law No. 7762. In this procedure, ARESEP proposes a maximum rate, but it is the contract that sets the definitive compensation, as well as its adjustment mechanisms. Following this consultation, it only holds jurisdiction to hear the economic aspects of the concession if there is a divergence between the granting Administration and the concessionaire, insofar as an appeal is filed, or, if complaints for defective service provision are filed - Art. 41 Law No. 7762. Under this framework, ARESEP's opinion served as the basis for rates even lower than those quantified, from which it can be concluded that it issued its approval to the model consulted. In that case, in line with subparagraph a) of section 6 of Article 12 of the CPCA, and regardless of the criticism that may be made of such legal treatment, the truth of the matter is that this legal source establishes that in those cases, the defendant Administration will be the one issuing the act subject to oversight, and not the one exercising its oversight powers - as ARESEP does - which consequently implies its lack of passive standing in this proceeding. On the other hand, it must be added that this issued opinion constitutes a procedural, preparatory, mandatory, and binding act (acto de trámite), but internal in the end. Therefore, pursuant to canon 163.2 LGAP, that act can only be challenged together with the final act that contains it. However, as has been made evident, no action of ARESEP is criticized, but only those final acts. The foregoing is without prejudice to the analysis of the rate matter that will be conducted below. Therefore, the defense under analysis must be accepted. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by CANABA and by SINTRAJAP against ARESEP must be declared without merit. Regarding costs, this will be a matter to analyze in the corresponding section.

**VI.- On the passive standing of the CGR in relation to the SINTRAJAP lawsuit.** The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic raises a defense of lack of passive standing in relation to the lawsuit filed by SINTRAJAP. It indicates that there is no conduct of the CGR being challenged, which leads to a lack of standing, as there is no basis for the Union to sue the CGR. This is evident from the claims. The lawsuit seeks annulment and there is no request to annul any conduct or act of the Comptroller's Office. Only the nullity of the act of award is sought. There is no basis for it to appear as a defendant in this proceeding. Having thoroughly analyzed the argument of the Comptroller's Office as well as the action filed by SINTRAJAP, the CGR is correct for the reasons set forth below. When the CGR is a passive party to the proceeding, the matter deserves particular treatment. In effect, in these cases, the judge must distinguish when the challenged conduct, attributable to the CGR, is part of its external oversight function, that is, when it exercises its constitutional and legal powers of oversight and control over matters entrusted to it as a specialized technical body, from those cases in which the conduct subject to the cause of action is inherent to its internal regime. This latter regime should be understood as the set of actions in which it does not act as an oversight body, that is, its oversight function is not questioned, but rather an internal administrative function. In this case, when the CGR exercises its oversight powers of an external nature, a distinction must be made between the scenarios provided for in subsection 5 of Article 12 of the CPCA. On that level, when the proceeding’s object is the criticism of its own conduct (of the Comptroller's Office), related to the exercise of its constitutional and legal powers, the cause of action must be brought against the CGR in a necessary joinder of defendants (litisconsorcio pasivo necesario) jointly with the State. In this case, the former will be represented by its own representatives, while the State will be represented by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República). This is the scenario regulated by subparagraph a) of that precept. It is precisely, for clarity on the matter, what has happened in this dispute, since the debated matter being the CGR's own actions, the State was integrated as a passive party. However, when the proceeding’s object is an administrative conduct subject to its control, in the exercise of its oversight powers or superior guardianship of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), subparagraph b) of that same provision states that the CGR is a passive party to the proceeding, jointly with the audited entity, again, in a necessary joinder of defendants. However, in this scenario, the CGR's participation is valid when, in its oversight role, it has issued conduct, whether by having resolved the objection appeal (recurso de objeción), the appeal remedy (recurso de apelación), or having granted the comptroller's approval. In the case at hand, no act attributable to the CGR is questioned by SINTRAJAP. Note that according to the writ visible at folios 2330-2417, as well as its correction at pages 3639-3677 of the main file, what is challenged is the act of award. SINTRAJAP did not extend the object of this proceeding to the comptroller's approval or, in general, to any action attributable to the CGR. This does not arise either from the formal or material scope of the lawsuit, and therefore, this Court could not suppose a sort of material claim that involves the CGR in the set of claims asserted in this cause of action. From this standpoint, the conditions provided for in section 12.5 of the CPCA do not concur such that this specialized oversight body can be considered a defendant party in SINTRAJAP's action. Consequently, the proper course is to grant the lack of passive standing raised by the CGR against the SINTRAJAP lawsuit. Regarding this action, the lawsuit is declared without merit. Regarding costs, this will be a matter to analyze in the corresponding section." **VII.- On the subjection to legality in administrative contracting procedures.** Due to the allegations raised by the parties involved in this dispute and the very object of the proceeding, it is decisive to address, even briefly, the matter related to the legality that must prevail in the dynamics of administrative contracting procedures, their controls, as well as the mechanisms that regulate the scenarios in which those procedures are violated, as is the case of so-called irregular contracting. The activity of administrative contracting, like any manifestation of public powers, is subject to the legality framework (bloque de legalidad) in a broad sense, and its operation must be subject to the content and scope of the legal rules that regulate a given procedure. This subjection materializes in the so-called principle of legality (principio de legalidad) (whether in its positive version or in the classic negative version), whose normative support is grounded in precepts 11 of the Constitution (Carta Magna), 11, 12, 13, 59, and 66 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP). Hence, public contractual activity can only be understood as valid when it is substantially in conformity with the legal system (section 128 ibid.), just as canon 32 of the Law of Administrative Contracting effectively establishes. Therefore, procedures or actions within the course of the administrative contracting phase, as well as its execution, that deviate from the legal criteria imposed by the legal system in this area, produce nullities that can lead to the suppression of the contract or the specific acts that disregard such requirements, as can be inferred from section 3 of the Law of Administrative Contracting, a rule that refers to the ordinances of the General Law of Public Administration regarding the dynamics of the pathology of public contracting. This activity (contracting) constitutes a relevant instrument for the acquisition by public administrations of the goods and/or services required for the exercise of their activities, or for the satisfaction of the public interest. From this standpoint, public contracting must be understood under an instrumental prism, rather than as an end in itself, which means it constitutes a tool for achieving an ultimate end or purpose. Therefore, the perception and interpretation of this matter should aim to enhance the fulfillment of the efficiency and effectiveness characteristic of public operation. In this line, section 4 of the Law of Administrative Contracting clearly states: "All acts related to administrative contracting activity shall be oriented towards the fulfillment of the purposes, goals, and objectives of the administration, with the purpose of ensuring the effective satisfaction of the general interest, based on an efficient use of institutional resources." This constitutes a guiding criterion in hermeneutic matters of the various figures that converge in this dynamic and complex administrative area, in a manner that allows the satisfaction of the ultimate purpose for which they are issued, in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of the LGAP. Under this dynamic, it is clear that the purpose of the contracting system is none other than to provide the Administration with the procedural mechanisms that allow it to obtain the aforementioned inputs with a structure that seeks, as a matter of principle, the selection of the most favorable offer, understood as that which best meets the Administration's requirements in the specific case, which must be reflected in the bidding conditions that form the basis for the public tender. To achieve this, canon 5 of the cited legislation implements the principles of equality and free participation, so that there is freedom of proposal or offer to contract with the Administration, subject, of course, to the conditions that it establishes in the specific procedure and that do not imply a disregard for this participative openness and equity. By virtue of this, in the evaluation of bids, substance must prevail over form, applying a maxim of conservation of offers. It is evident that fulfilling this task requires flexible contracting mechanisms that do not subject the Administration to overly formalistic conditions that, far from satisfying its needs, frustrate them, because in that measure, the instrument would jeopardize the end. A public contracting system must adjust to this framework of needs, without losing sight of the prior or subsequent control phases that guarantee the correct fulfillment of the minimum procedures and principles pertinent to this field. Nevertheless, the adaptability inherent in public services should not be a phenomenon alien to administrative contracting, which must evolve and react to increasingly dynamic, and sometimes atypical, contractual modalities, allowing Administrations to use these mechanisms to better satisfy their needs—we insist, with respect for the controls proper to the administration of public resources. The transcendence of this institution is observed in its constitutional basis, specifically, in canon 182 of the Constitution, a rule from which the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself has conducted an extensive analysis, among many, in Resolution No. 998-98, in which it elevated to constitutional rank all the principles associated with administrative contracting, a position that it is not relevant to analyze in this case. However, it must be clear that although public contracting has a constitutional basis, which can also be observed in section 140, subsection 19, 121, subsection 14, and the cited section 182, its development is fundamentally legal, the Law of Administrative Contracting being the source that most thoroughly sets forth the regime pertinent to this area of public law. All this development, together with the other sectoral rules in this field (including the RLCA), constitutes the normative reference to which the Administrations that must adjust their contractual action framework to this regime are subject, thus constituting an essential and delimiting part of the legality of their actions. Now, given the bilateral nature of the administrative contract (in which, unlike the administrative act, two wills concur for the configuration and perfection of the contractual relationship), the characteristic mutual obligations (sinalagmasis) of the figure demand clarity of the rules governing the contract, in order to avoid actions that disapply this regime and seek, in contradiction to the principle of equality and free participation, agreements between the Administration and an offeror, outside these procedures, without having proven that it is the best offer. The notorious publicity of a public contracting system makes any attempt to plead ignorance of this regime inapplicable, under the application of the rule underlying constitutional mandate 129, by virtue of which no one can plead ignorance of the law. In the matter of public works concession (concesión de obra pública), the application of the nullity regime of Law No. 6227/78 is recognized in Article 4 of Executive Decree No. 27098-MOPT, of June 12, 1998, published in Supplement No. 27 to La Gaceta No. 115 of June 16, 1998, "Regulation to the General Law of Concession of Public Works with Public Services" (Reglamento a la Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos). Now, this validity comparison must be exercised within a special administrative appeal regime or in the judicial analysis of the validity of public conduct before this jurisdiction in accordance with section 49 of the Constitution. The latter will be addressed later. As for the administrative review of conducts issued during the administrative procedure, section 81 of Law No. 7494 regulates the matter of the objection appeal, to be filed within the first third of the period for receiving offers, by any interested party, potential offeror, or representation of collective interests - and even diffuse ones - that may be potentially affected. Within the framework of Law No. 7762, this possibility is materialized in section 34, a matter to be addressed below. Against the act of award, as established by sections 84 and 87, depending on the amount of the contract, an appeal before the CGR or an appeal for revocation (recurso de revocatoria) before the same Administration is available (which includes the so-called internal appeal, when the awarding body is not the head of the respective Administration). In Law No. 7762, being a special regime, section 35 only establishes the appeal before the CGR. This is a specialized appeal regime by virtue of which only this particular type of remedy can be filed against these acts, without the possibility of filing any other, which has been termed the "Principle of Taxatividad Impugnaticia" (Principle of Restricted Remedies). In this way, subjection to legality constitutes a fundamental north to which every Public Administration must submit in the course of administrative contracting procedures." **VIII.- On the contractual modality of public works concession with public services. Generalities. Legal Regime. Analysis of prior studies.** Through Law No. 7762 of April 14, 1998, published in Supplement No. 17 to La Gaceta 98, of May 22, 1998, the Law of Concession of Public Works with Public Services is enacted, a regulation that constitutes a specific normative order that specifies the rules that must be satisfied in the dynamics of administrative contracts whose object is the concession of a public work or, in cases where that concession is also granted under a system that includes the provision of public services. In this context, subsection 2 of Article One of that legal source establishes what is to be understood by each of both contractual modalities. In this sense, Public Works Concession is understood as the administrative contract by which the granting Administration entrusts a third party, which may be a public, private, or mixed entity, with the design, planning, financing, construction, conservation, expansion, or repair of any public real property, in exchange for consideration charged to the users of the work or the beneficiaries of the service, or for compensation of any type paid by the granting Administration. For its part, Works Concession with Public Service must be understood as the administrative contract by which the Administration entrusts a third party, which may be a public, private, or mixed entity, with the design, planning, financing, construction, conservation, expansion, or repair of any public real property, as well as its operation, providing the services foreseen in the contract in exchange for consideration charged to the users of the work or the beneficiaries of the service, or for compensation of any type paid by the granting Administration. As observed, the contract in question is far from being a contractual management method that simply seeks the construction of public works, but rather encompasses more complex aspects, which may include design, financing, operation, maintenance, remodeling, among other manifestations. It is not merely the acquisition by the granting administration of a requirement for work construction services, an aspect which, in any case, is just one of the variations that can occur in the scope of this modality of administrative contract law. Nevertheless, pursuant to section 113 of Law No. 6227/78, the use of this public management modality must be duly supported by the satisfaction of public interests, which requires the completion of a series of prior studies (análisis previos), of diverse nature —a topic to be addressed below— to justify the opening of a contracting procedure of this nature, as well as the proper reasoning to which every public decision is subject and conditioned (doctrine of mandate 136 LGAP). In the specific case of contracts undertaken under Law No. 7762, 7762, the second canon states clearly on this point: "Any work and its operation are susceptible to concession when there are reasons of public interest, which must be recorded in the file by means of a reasoned act." However, that same precept fixes the scope of application of the figure in question, by indicating its inapplicability to the matter of telecommunications, electricity, and health services (an exclusion incorporated by the reform carried out through Law No. 8643 of June 30, 2008). Likewise, with regard to the docks of Limón, Moín, Caldera, and Puntarenas, only new works or the expansions carried out there may be granted in concession, it being unfeasible to use that mechanism on already existing works. In such cases, 70% of the income obtained by the granting administration in accordance with the parameters of article 42 of Law No. 7762, by reason of the new works or expansions that are granted in concession in the cited docks, shall be remitted to the Junta de la Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica and the Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, as applicable, to be destined exclusively for investments in works in the respective provinces, without being able to be used to cover administrative expenses. A relevant part of the implications of this contractual typology within the framework of works in the cited docks is that, once the term of the agreement has expired, the public works built by the concessionaire become the property of JAPDEVA or the INCOOP, as applicable. Now, as has been noted, this Law No. 7762 incorporates a series of regulations related to this contractual type, whose principles and content prevail over other written norms. Thus, in matters of rights and obligations of the parties (grantor-concessionaire-users, articles 15-19 of said law), contractual procedure and stages (arts. 20-39), economic regime of the contract, a section in which the topics of financial and remunerative incidence of the contracting are established (arts. 40-48), sanctioning regime (arts. 49-55), term and forms of extinction of the contractual relationship (articles 56-69 ibid.). In light of this, it is worth highlighting that any controversies that may arise in the course of the instruction of a procedure according to this typology, divergences in the finalization of the contract, its signing, or execution, must be resolved applying, in the first instance, the ordinances of said legislation; however, it is clear to this Court that this is not an obstacle to the supplementary application of the Administrative Contracting Law and its regulations, in cases where, by integration, this is merited. Along those lines, article 4 of Law No. 7762 clearly states that those conflicts must be resolved applying, in order, said law and its regulations, the bidding documents (cartel de licitación), the awarded bidder's offer, the concession contract, as well as the other sources of the national legal system.

IX.- As has been noted, a fundamental part of this type of public works concession contracts, with or without public service, is the due motivation that allows establishing its necessity as a means of satisfying public interests, a topic that is concretized through the satisfaction of minimum requirements that determine the necessity of the work, but also its technical and legal pertinence. Similarly to article 7 of Law No. 7494, which requires the expression of the technical and legal reasons for the opening of an administrative contracting file (which must head the respective file), in the case of relationships governed by Law No. 7762, this mention is imposed by articles 5.2, 9, and 21. Before entering into the content of these norms, it should be noted that this legislation grants or concedes a leading role to the Consejo Nacional de Concesiones in the carrying out of contracting procedures, a body of maximum deconcentration with instrumental legal personality created in Article 6 of that legal source. This is evidenced throughout the entire law. Now, regarding the prior requirements to accredit the necessity and convenience of a specific public work and, with it, to grant a concession over it, Article 5 of Law No. 7762 indicates in its second paragraph: "2.- When the object of the concession is within the sphere of competence of an organ of the Executive Branch, the Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, once the legal, technical, environmental, economic, and financial feasibility of the project has been previously demonstrated, shall be the competent technical entity to act in the contracting procedure stage and, when necessary, during the execution of the contract. (...)" For its part, canon 9, first paragraph, section a, grants the Technical Secretariat of the CNC the power to "a) Contract, upon prior authorization of the Council, the technical studies required to accredit the feasibility of the concession projects." Both norms are congruent regarding the relevance of the cited technical studies, a relevance that is also visualized even in privately initiated projects, a case in which, in tune with mandate 20 ibid., those projects must be vested with public interest and accompanied by the respective technical, environmental, and economic feasibility studies, as well as a construction and operation plan. In canon 21 ejusdem, it is clearly established what type of studies a contracting of this nature requires, as well as the procedure -in general- applicable to these cases. The relevance of that norm for the purposes of this process requires its literal reference: "Article 21.-Procedure 1.- The Technical Secretariat of the Consejo Nacional de Concesiones shall be responsible for carrying out the activities and studies necessary to prepare the bidding for the concession. The studies must include the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental); for this, a hearing shall be granted for five business days to the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, so that it may determine the type of study to be carried out. Once the study is completed, a new hearing shall be granted to this Ministry, which shall have a non-extendable period of fifteen business days to rule, and its opinion shall be binding. If this period elapses without receiving any response, it shall be interpreted that the Ministry has no objections. 2.- The Technical Secretariat of the Consejo Nacional de Concesiones must consult the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos on the tariff structure and the adjustment parameters to be incorporated into the bidding documents (cartel de licitación); likewise, the parameters to be used to evaluate the quality of service. This Authority shall have ten business days to render its opinion, which shall be binding. If this period elapses without receiving a response, it shall be interpreted that the Authority has no objections. 3.- Once the studies have been carried out and the feasibility of the project demonstrated, the Technical Secretariat shall proceed to prepare the bidding documents (cartel de licitación), which shall be submitted for approval to the Consejo Nacional de Concesiones. 4.- When the Granting Administration is an entity of the decentralized, territorial, and institutional sector, or a public company, and has not agreed that the Consejo Nacional de Concesiones carry out the procedure for selecting the concessionaire and the execution of the concession contract, it shall be the responsibility of the respective public entity to carry out the studies and activities necessary to prepare the bidding for the concession, following the parameters established in this law and its regulations for the Technical Secretariat of the Consejo Nacional de Concesiones. 5.- Once the bidding documents (cartel) are approved by the Consejo Nacional de Concesiones or the head of the Granting Administration, a summary thereof must be published in La Gaceta, with which the bidding process shall be understood as initiated. The summary must also be published in two newspapers with the largest national circulation." Precisely, in this case, the violation of that article is alleged, insofar as, according to the claimants, the economic-financial and environmental feasibility has not been accredited through the rigorous technical studies. This requires entering into an analysis of the implications and content of the alluded studies, at this point, in a general manner, to then address each formulated grievance specifically. The first study required by the alluded regulations is the technical feasibility study. On this point, it concerns the accreditation of the necessity and/or pertinence of the work or of that management design from a purely technical standpoint, which may consider a series of variables that do not exist in isolation, as technical pertinence must be linked to the environmental topic that will be discussed later. In this first aspect, the Administration must accredit, by way of example, that the proposed design of the work conforms to the needs intended to be covered by that development. It is clear, it is insisted that this point cannot be dissociated from the others, as the economic incidences of the project, as well as the environmental ones, are primary in the adoption of final decisions. Regarding the environmental impact assessment, the following clarification must be made. The initial paragraph of the article under reference indicates the need to satisfy the variable of environmental impact. However, it indicates that the project shall be brought to the attention of MINAET for five days so that it may indicate the type of study to be carried out, which, once completed, shall be brought to its attention for a period of fifteen days so that it may issue a binding opinion, with administrative silence in such cases being considered indicative of having no objections to the project. As observed, that norm does not express a particular type of study, nor does it allude to environmental feasibility or viability, but rather to the power of MINAET to establish the class of study to be carried out, considering the particularities of the project. Hence, it cannot be affirmed that there is only one type of study to be prepared in that dynamic, as it is evident that the analysis to be carried out shall be that determined by the Environmental Administration. On the other hand, article 21 of Law No. 7762 indicates the obligation of the Technical Secretariat of the CNC to consult the ARESEP on the tariff structure and the adjustment parameters to be incorporated into the bidding documents (cartel de licitación); as well as the parameters to be used to evaluate the quality of service, a ruling to be issued within a period of ten days and whose nature shall be binding. Again, the silence of ARESEP shall be considered indicative of no objection to the project. From this standpoint, aspects related to the economic analyses carried out by ARESEP would not be attributable to the Granting Administration, to the extent of the binding nature of its analyses. Consequently, only when the satisfaction of these requirements is accredited in the file is it feasible to continue with the procedure. It would therefore concern the coverage of impassable presuppositions without which the legitimacy and validity of the procedure would be in doubt.

X.- On the challenge to the bidding document norms (cartelarias). Procedural preclusion. Possibility of modifications to the bidding documents (cartel de licitación) and subsequent phases. Before entering into the analysis of the completeness or satisfaction of the technical environmental and economic feasibility studies presented by the plaintiffs, it is necessary to specify what is set forth below. Certainly, in light of article 49 of the Magna Carta, this jurisdiction has been constitutionally established to exercise control over the validity of the administrative function (first paragraph), as well as the protection of the legal situations of persons (third paragraph), to the extent that they are affected by conducts or omissions of the public power, whether by the creation, modification, or extinction of those situations, which, of course, include, at a minimum, subjective rights and legitimate interests. This framework of protection rests on four constitutional pillars, namely: subjection of the State -in a broad sense- to the Law, universal control of the administrative function, distribution of functions, and prompt and complete justice. From this angle, the diverse manifestations of public power, save for exceptions expressly provided by the legislator, are controllable within the administrative contentious process (an example of that exclusion are the so-called acts of government or political acts, under the argument that they are not an administrative function; however, even in those cases, the responsibility arising from them must be heard in this venue). All in all, not every public act is open to reproach in this jurisdiction, because in tune with article 36, section c) of the CPCA, the claim, to the extent that it relates to a formal proceeding of a Public Administration (as it may also fall on omissions or material conducts), must be linked to a final act, a firm act, or a procedural act with its own effect. However, that provision must be clarified, given that in cases where the tradition of the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies (art. 31.1 CPCA, ruling 3669-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber) still survives, the petition must fall on a firm act, and the questioning of the final act is not possible. This would be reserved for the matter of challenging municipal decisions, provided that the appeal must be heard by Section III of the Administrative Contentious Court (because when such a circumstance does not arise, such a requirement would not be imperative), or, in administrative contracting matters, when the objection or appeal recourse -as applicable- must be heard by the Contraloría General de la República (CGR) (by parity of reasoning, when it is not thus provided, exhaustion would only be optional). Well then, within the framework of the recourse regime operating in the matter regulated in Law No. 7762, article 34 regulates what pertains to challenges or questions that may be made to the bidding documents (cartel de la licitación). Likewise, Article 35 ibid. alludes to the challenge regime against the award act. What is of interest in this section is that relating to the questions raised regarding the bidding documents (cartel de licitación). In the various written responses to the complaint, the State, APM Terminals, and the CNC formulated the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In the same sense, the CGR. As has been indicated supra, that defense was upheld through resolution No. 589-2011 of the procedural judge, and later the cited exhaustion was deemed satisfied through the order of 14 hours 37 minutes on May 25, 2011, visible on folios 1018-1020 of the main file, a criterion later confirmed through the order of 13 hours 35 minutes on June 17, 2011, in which, among other issues, the revocation recourse filed by the CGR against that first order was heard (folios 1036-1042 of the main file). In the single hearing held in this preferential proceeding, the State reiterated the cited defense, before which this Court indicated that the matter was already resolved by the procedural instance, so its invocation again in the preliminary phase of that hearing was not appropriate, without prejudice to hearing its arguments on the merits. An analysis of the arguments presented on this particular leads to establishing that the decision of the procedural judge regarding the cited defense was limited to resolving the opposability of that requirement regarding the annulment claims linked to the final award act within the International Public Tender process No. 2009-LI-000001-00200. However, that analysis does not include the weighing of the State's arguments regarding the petitions raised concerning the bidding documents (cartel de licitación). Regarding that particular, it is necessary to specify the following. In tune with article 34 of Law No. 7762, in the type of public contracting that concerns us, against the bidding documents (cartel de licitación), the filing of an objection recourse within the first third of the period granted to submit an offer is proper, a recourse that must be filed before the CGR. Certainly, in this matter, given the implications of the cited ruling 3669-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber, as well as the first paragraph of article 31 of the CPCA, the exercise of that recourse would be a mandatory requirement and a prerequisite for access to the administrative contentious process. Now, although what was resolved by the procedural judges on the prior defenses does not limit the decision on the merits of the matter, the foregoing applies to cases in which the prior defense was rejected, by virtue of which, in accordance with precepts 92.7 and 120 of the CPCA, the sentencing court may declare the claim inadmissible or request correction of the defect, as appropriate. Ergo, if the defense is upheld, such norm (92.7) is not applicable, because in cases like the one being analyzed, that estimation leads, in the specific case of the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a defense, to the application of mandate 92.1 CPCA and the granting of a period of five days for its correction or accreditation of having satisfied the requirement. In this case, the defense was upheld and the requirement was later deemed fulfilled (see folios 1018-1020 of the main file), a criterion that was later reiterated in the face of the revocation recourse filed by the CGR. It is therefore a matter already resolved, even though it is clear that that ruling did not expressly pronounce on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to the actions filed against the bidding documents (cartel). However, even if this Court were to detect the inaction in compliance with that requirement, without this meaning sharing the criterion of the procedural judge, article 120.4 CPCA indicates that in such cases, the defect shall be deemed cured. So, such an objection could not be upheld in this ruling when it had already been resolved in favor of the defendants, even though that extreme was later deemed fulfilled. Nevertheless, the foregoing is not an obstacle to what is stipulated below. The claimants' claims are directed against the award act, the contract, and the bidding documents (cartel de licitación) in this international public bidding procedure. Concretely regarding the bidding documents (cartel), there is no evidence whatsoever that CANABA filed the objection recourse against this particular act, or, alternatively, filed any direct judicial action against that conduct, prior to lodging the challenge that it now formulates. Given that inaction, and regardless of what was stated regarding the processing given by the preliminary judge concerning the defense in question, the truth of the matter is that, with respect to the bidding documents (cartel de licitación), a procedural preclusion has operated to the detriment of CANABA, which makes it impossible for it to argue what was provided in the bidding documents (cartel de licitación) as grounds for annulment of the award, the contract, or related acts. This Court holds the thesis that defects in the bidding documents (cartel de licitación) must be combated directly in an action filed directly against it, but its challenge is not appropriate in a reflexive manner by being invoked as grounds for annulment of the award act, or, as the claimant has done, petitioning its annulment at the moment of challenging the award. Along these lines, the State representation is correct in pointing out that, since the bidding documents (cartel de licitación) were not reproached in a timely manner, it is not feasible within the award stage or subsequent stages (formalization, execution, modification) to question the content or validity of this instrument. In the administrative contracting regime, the bidding documents (cartel de licitación) constitute an important tool that delimits, guides, and conditions the actions of the parties throughout the procedure. On the one hand, a close link arises between the bidding documents (cartel) of the contest and the bidder's offer, such that the latter is guided by the former, and will be, first admissible, then evaluable, and finally, potentially awardable, to the extent that it is the best offer among those that comply with the requirements set forth by the bidding documents (cartel de la licitación). The relevance of this instrument (the cartel) is established in canon 51 of the Regulations to the Administrative Contracting Law, Executive Decree No. 33411-H of September twenty-seventh, two thousand six, which establishes in relevant part: "The bidding documents (cartel) constitute the specific regulations of the contracting being promoted, and all applicable legal norms and constitutional principles applicable to the respective procedure are understood to be incorporated into its clauses. It must constitute a body of technical specifications that are clear, sufficient, concrete, objective, and broad in terms of the opportunity to participate. (...)" Even regarding the admissibility phase of the bids (plicas), canon 83 of the cited regulations clearly states: "Once the previous stage is completed, the Administration shall proceed to the study and assessment of the offers in relation to the conditions and admissibility specifications set in the bidding documents (cartel) and the regulatory norms of the matter. Those that fail to comply with essential aspects of the bidding terms or are substantially non-conforming with the legal system shall be declared out of the contest. Non-substantial failures to comply shall not imply the exclusion of the offer, but this must be expressly reasoned in the respective report. (...)" The foregoing highlights the relevance of the bidding documents (cartel) in establishing whether the specific offer surpasses the set of requirements imposed by the Administration through the bidding document provisions (disposiciones cartelarias). From this standpoint, canon 81 of the Administrative Contracting Law (170-173 of its regulations) establishes that the objection recourse is proper against the bidding documents (cartel), when it is considered that this instrument limits participation or else violates one of the postulates of the public contractual regime. In the dynamic of Law No. 7762, it is reiterated, that recourse provision finds support in the letter of article 34; however, such a recourse measure was not filed by the claimant. The bidding documents (cartel) can well be attacked directly, as it constitutes a procedural act that, given its relevance, generates its own effect in administrative contracting. Its content and implications mean that once it is firm, successive actions within the contracting procedure must adhere to its content, as established in canon 4 of Law No. 7762. Given this, a challenge regime is conferred with a broad framework of procedural legitimacy, as any interested party can formulate the objections it deems appropriate when the bidding document norms (cartelarias) violate legality or the principles inherent to administrative contracting (whose development has been noted, among many, by ruling No. 998-98 of the Constitutional Chamber). Therefore, actions (including judicial ones) that seek to reproach the content of the bidding documents (cartel), when it was not attacked in a timely manner, are not valid, even despite the broad possibilities that the legal system confers for this once an award act has been issued, nor when the contract has already been formalized and countersigned. The logical application of article 162 of Law No. 6227/78 implies that the invalidity of the bidding documents (cartel) —timely challenged— implies, by accessoriness, that of the subsequent acts that depend on it, but the annulment of acts issued after the bidding documents (cartel) does not lead to the accessory annulment of that document, because even the pathology of the award or the contract may originate from the violation of the bidding document norms (cartelarias), as could be the case of the non-application of one of its formulas or ignoring the offer award system. Thus, the regime for questioning the bidding documents (cartel) allows the competent authority to assess the reproaches and suppress the conditions that are contrary to legality and may end up affecting potential bidders, but also any interested party, among the latter, organized groups such as CANABA. It concerns a recourse regime that clearly tends to open the possibilities to correct the potential deficiencies of the bidding documents (cartel), given the relevance of this instrument for the posterior stages of the procedure. Ergo, the claim for annulment against award acts and the contract cannot constitute a valid way to reopen a debate already precluded, to the extent that it intends to question the bidding document norms (cartelarias) that were not timely reproached. As stated by the State representative, if the plaintiffs were in disagreement with the content of the bidding documents (cartel), they could very well have established the objection recourse measures at the opportune time and, if still not in agreement with what was resolved, resort to the jurisdictional instances to carry out the analysis of the validity of its content. However, it is not feasible to question the bidding documents (cartel) together with the challenge of the contract, when, at its opportunity, that document was not questioned, despite the broad possibilities to do so. The opposite would imply allowing the retrogression of the procedure in terms of enabling debates already precluded. It has been accredited that after the various phases of claim against the bidding documents (cartel), CANABA did not file recourses. Although SINTRAJAP filed them, ultimately, the issue was not timely debated in a judicial venue, so the opening of that debate at this time is improper. Consequently, any petition for annulment that concerns the bidding document norms (cartelarias) must be declared without merit by application of the principle of preclusion already indicated. It is not a matter of applying formalist rules or a criterion that can be considered antagonistic to the principle of plenary control of public conduct or access to jurisdiction. Such possibilities have not been denied in the slightest, given that the impossibility of addressing this thematic is due to the inaction of the promoters themselves, despite the valid opportunities they had at the time for those purposes; it consists, therefore, of remitting to a principle of preclusion, congruent with the technique proper to a matter that has a specific challenge regime, which in this case was not used correctly. On the topic, the Administrative Contentious and Civil Treasury Court, Section V, in resolution 80-2011 of 14 hours 25 minutes on April 25, 2011, expressed in that same direction: "As can be concluded, the basis of that recourse and that of this action are practically the same, but in any case, what is important to emphasize is that the instrument defined by the legislator to challenge the bidding documents (cartel) was declared untimely, with which the specifications set forth therein must remain unaltered, by reason of the so-called procedural preclusion operating, precisely in pursuit of legal certainty. In relation, Mr. Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz states in his book Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, volume III, Biblioteca jurídica Dike, pg. 140: 'If the individual does not challenge the 'bidding documents (cartel)' in time and form, it becomes, against him, a consented, firm, and unchallengeable act, both administratively and jurisdictionally.' In the same sense, in more recent doctrine, Dr. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, in his treatise on Administrative Law, Administrative Contracting, volume IV, ediciones Guayacán, 2010, pg. 291, refers to the topic in the following way: 'The lack of challenge to the bidding documents (cartel) by the interested parties, in time and form, has as a consequence, by application of the principle of procedural preclusion, the tacit consent and consolidation of the various clauses of the bidding terms.' And this is so, precisely because legal certainty and stability are required regarding what has been acted upon, as it directly affects the public interest immersed in the contracting. That is why articles 43 section g), 81, and 82 of the Administrative Contracting Law determine the moment in which questions regarding the bidding documents (cartel) can be formulated; if this does not occur, or as in this matter, it is done untimely, the procedure must continue with the rules stipulated therein and confirmed in the absence of challenges. Even the CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA itself, when resolving the appeals filed by the plaintiff here against the award and later against the re-award, emphasized the impossibility of resuming claims against the bidding documents (cartel), precisely because they were precluded, a circumstance that, as will be taken up infra, not only obliges the flat rejection of a potential appeal but also does not permit reopening the consideration of topics that are the exclusive subject matter of the objection recourse. And on this particular, it must be borne in mind that the bidding documents (cartel) correspond to a preparatory act with its own effect, and the legislation regulating administrative contracting expressly stipulates the possible recourses to act against it, and, by not exercising them as appropriate, it not only affects the possible legitimate interest of the non-conforming party, but also, as the exhaustion of administrative remedies is required mandatorily in this matter, it parallelly loses the necessary standing to proceed to the jurisdictional route." XI.- On environmental viability. (Difference between viability and feasibility). Nature of the Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial). Logic of viability versus the TCM, contract includes design -testimonial evidence-. Analysis of technical evidence. Assessment of precautionary and preventive principle. Design must integrate the environmental impact assessment (EIA). Impossibility of constructing without the EIA.

Without prejudice to what has been indicated in the previous points, it is necessary to address the analysis of the defects pointed out by the plaintiffs regarding the absence of the studies required for the TCM, pursuant to ordinals 9 and 21 of Law No. 7762. As a first point, the issue of environmental impact will be addressed. In essence, in the closing arguments phase SINTRAJAP points out that no environmental impact study was conducted, affecting the Organic Environmental Law. The seabed and an area of 630,000 square meters are affected for the construction of an artificial island. None of this has been seriously studied. It notes that Article 3 of Decree No. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MEIC is violated by not having performed the environmental assessment. These studies do not appear in the case files. Law 7762 requires conducting the Environmental Feasibility Studies before starting the project, and subsequently it can transfer the cost to the concessionaire, but it cannot cede or transfer the responsibility for conducting those studies. There is no rule indicating that the concessionaire may conduct those studies due to deficiencies of the Public Administrations. A Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) was granted for a vague and unknown project. It cannot serve to conduct the tender; an EIA was required. Studies that are not specific to the TCM are used. The RECOPE and Moín dredging projects were used, procedures unrelated to the TCM. The object of the TCM is very different. The sole instrument used was the D1 form. In essence, CANABA sustains this same position regarding the absence of accreditation of environmental feasibility. Regarding these allegations, it is worth noting what is set forth below.

As has been indicated ut supra, pursuant to numeral 21 of Law No. 7762, first paragraph, among the studies that the Technical Secretariat of the CNC must carry out regarding concessions governed by said legislation, is the environmental impact study. For such purposes, that rule indicates that the granting Administration shall grant a hearing of five business days to the Ministry of Environment and Energy, in order for it to determine the type of study to be conducted. Once the study is completed, a new hearing shall be granted to this Ministry, which shall have a non-extendable period of fifteen business days to issue its opinion, and its criterion shall be binding. After this period has elapsed without receiving any response, it shall be interpreted that the Ministry has no objections. There is no doubt whatsoever regarding the relevance that the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment holds in our legal system. It is a right protected in ordinal 50, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Magna Carta which has been the subject of extensive legal and regulatory development, within a matter that has also been addressed by international treaties to which Costa Rica is a signatory State. Within this broad regulatory framework, the need for instruments to measure the environmental variable in various human behaviors and activities that may be considered intrusive to the environment is established as a common rule.

The Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) is constituted as a procedure that boasts a complex convergence of legal-technical-administrative variables, whose purpose is none other than the measurement, identification, prediction or projection of the impacts that a determined human activity will probably produce on the environment, should it be carried out or its material execution be concretized. Said procedure is issued as a basis for a prior requirement of a subsequent authorization procedure and is formulated by the competent public administrations, with expertise in environmental matters. Thus seen, in simpler terms, it is the procedure by virtue of which the effects and consequences that a work project or human activity will generate on the environment are estimated. Given the transcendence of the protected legal good, its support is rooted in the doctrine of numeral 50, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Political Constitution; therefore, since the due, efficient and timely protection of the environment, both natural and scenic resources, is a duty of the State, it constitutes an important mechanism for exercising environmental policy, which has a direct and immediate application in productive activities, so as to achieve harmony and compatibility of those economic or social exploitations with the preservation of the environment, within a vision of sustainability or sustainable development.

In the national context, the General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures (Reglamento General sobre Procedimientos de Evaluaciones de Impactos Ambientales), Executive Decree number 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, in its Article 3, subsection 43, defines environmental impact (impacto ambiental) as follows: “Effect that an activity, work or project, or any of its actions and components has on the environment or its constituent elements. It can be positive or negative, direct or indirect, cumulative or non-cumulative, reversible or irreversible, extensive or limited, among other characteristics. It differs from environmental damage, in the measure and moment in which the environmental impact is evaluated in an ex-ante process, so that prevention, mitigation and compensation aspects may be considered to diminish its scope on the environment.” Of course, this environmental impact must be subject to measurement, which materializes in different instruments established by the same legal regulation, among these, environmental impact studies and environmental feasibility licenses. In this sense, the cited regulation, in numeral 3, subsection 37, conceptualizes the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) as the administrative scientific-technical procedure that allows identifying and predicting which effects an activity, work or project will exert on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to lead to decision-making. Generally, the Environmental Impact Assessment encompasses three essential constitutive phases: a) the first is the Initial Environmental Assessment; b) the second is the preparation of the Environmental Impact Study or other corresponding environmental assessment instruments; and c) the third refers to the Environmental Control and Follow-up of the activity, work or project through the established environmental commitments. For its part, subsection 18 of Article 7 of the Biodiversity Law considers environmental impact studies as follows: “Scientific-technical procedure that allows identifying and predicting which effects a specific action or project will exert on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to lead to decision-making. It includes the specific effects, their global assessment, the alternatives of greatest environmental benefit, a program for controlling and minimizing negative effects, a monitoring program, a recovery program, as well as the guarantee of environmental compliance.” From the above, it follows that the environmental license or feasibility (viabilidad ambiental), as indicated in subsection 63 of ordinal three of the aforementioned Regulation, represents the condition of harmony and acceptable, medium balance between the development and execution of human work and its potential environmental impacts, and the environment of the geographic space where it is desired to implement them. From the administrative and legal point of view, it corresponds to the act by which the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) process is approved, whether in its initial assessment phase, the study itself phase, or another impact document phase.

Now then, the implications of human works on the environment justify and demand the evaluation of that impact on the environment. From this standpoint, this collegiate body must cite what is established by canon 17 of the Organic Environmental Law, which on the aforementioned environmental assessment states: “Human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate toxic or hazardous waste or materials shall require an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat created in this law. Its prior approval by this organism shall be an indispensable requirement to initiate the activities, works or projects. The laws and regulations shall indicate which activities, works or projects shall require the environmental impact assessment.” It must be reiterated, the transcendence held by this instrument for measuring environmental impacts on human behaviors is undeniable for this Court. However, the development of these environmental measurement instruments has led to various types of studies depending on the type of human development being pursued. In the specific case of activities governed by Law No. 7762, the same ordinal 21 of that source indicates that the hearing granted to MINAET is so that, among other things "... it determines the type of study to be conducted...". The above implies that not all works to be carried out through the public works concession system, with or without public services, require the same type of study. It is the environmental authorities who are the competent instances to define the typology that is merited in each specific case.

To do so, a distinction must be made among concepts that could be considered equivalent. As has been indicated, the environmental impact (impacto ambiental) (consists of the effects or incidences that an activity, work or project, or any of its actions and components has on the environment or its constituent elements - subsection 43, art. 3 of the cited decree-). This impact can be potential (IAP), which is considered as the latent positive or negative environmental effect that the execution of an activity, work or project would cause on the environment. It can be pre-established, taking as a reference basis the environmental impact caused by the generality of similar activities, works or projects already in operation - subsection 44, art. 3 ejusdem -. For its part, the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) is the administrative scientific-technical procedure that allows identifying and predicting which effects an activity, work or project will exert on the environment, quantifying and weighing them to lead to decision-making - subsection 37, art. 3 ibidem -. This Assessment can in turn be Strategic (EAE): -Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) process applied to policies, plans and programs. Due to its characteristic and nature, this type of process can also be applied to projects of national, binational, Central American regional transcendence, or by multilateral agreements, as established in the current regulations.-, (subsection 34 ibid), or else an Initial Environmental Assessment (EAI): -Procedure for analyzing the environmental characteristics of the activity, work or project, with respect to its location to determine the significance of the environmental impact (impacto ambiental). It involves the presentation of an environmental document signed by the developer, with the character and scope of a sworn statement. From its analysis, the granting of environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) (license) may derive, or its conditioning on the presentation of other EIA instruments.- (subsection 35 ibid.). On its side, the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental, VLA) is the act that approves the EIA (be it initial, Environmental Impact Study - EsIA, or any other title), and that evidences the harmonization or acceptable balance, from the point of view of environmental load, between the development and execution of an activity, work or project and its potential environmental impacts (impactos ambientales), and the environment of the geographic space where it is desired to implement them - subsection 63 of art. 3 ibidem). This feasibility (viabilidad) can be potential (VAP), and consists of: "It is the temporary environmental approval that SETENA grants to those activities, works or projects that undergo the Initial Environmental Assessment and still require the presentation of other EIA documents to obtain the definitive VLA." - subsection 64, article 3 ejusdem -. Such analyses can be carried out through the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA), which consists of a technical instrument of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental), whose purpose is to analyze the proposed activity, work or project, concerning the environmental condition of the geographic space in which it is proposed and, on this basis, predict, identify and value the significant environmental impacts that certain actions may cause on that environment and define the set of environmental measures that allow their prevention, correction, mitigation, or failing that, compensation, in order to achieve the most harmonious and balanced possible insertion between the proposed activity, work or project and the environment in which it will be located. -subsection 34 of the cited art. 3 ejusdem- Given such plurality of concepts, it is that numeral 21 of Law No. 7762 indicates that MINAET is the instance that defines the type of study to be conducted.

XII.- In this concession, as can be deduced from folios 1189-1191 of the main dossier, through resolution No. 274-2009-SETENA at 8:00 a.m. on February 10, 2009, SETENA ordered the following in what is relevant to the case: "FIRST: ... Likewise, article 28 of that same regulatory body (referring to Decree No. 31849-MINAE-SALUD-MOPT-MAG-MEIC), despite referring to activities that must obligatorily present an Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA), clearly indicates that: 'Those activities, works or projects for which there is a specific law ordering the preparation and approval of an Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental), may alternatively comply with either of the following two procedures: 1. Compliance with the Initial Environmental Assessment procedure, presenting to SETENA the Environmental Assessment Document (D1) in order to obtain the potential environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental potencial) and the terms of reference for the preparation of the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA).' Finally, article 29 refers again to the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) and the possibility, and probable obligation, that this Secretariat has to grant it (...) It is clear that the granting of the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) would occur, and would be the logical consequence of corroborating compliance with the initial requirements requested by this Secretariat, which constitute the correct completion of the D-1. Once the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) is granted, it is necessary to inform the developer that they cannot carry out works until the definitive Environmental Feasibility (Viabilidad Ambiental definitiva) is granted, which would be the logical consequence if the terms of reference issued by this Authority are complied with, as well as the presentation of any additional documentation or information.'" Supported by said reasons, it ordered: "FIRST: The Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) is granted to the project, in order that it may carry out any prior procedures before banking entities or other state or private entities. The developer is warned that this granting does not confer any right to carry out works of any type, until the Definitive Environmental Feasibility (Viabilidad Ambiental Definitiva) is issued, once it complies with the additional information or documentation required by this Secretariat. (...) SECOND: The Developer is warned that, due to the characteristics of the project, for each phase or stage thereof, it must carry out the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación del Impacto Ambiental) process initiated with the presentation of the respective D1 form. (...)" The plaintiffs precisely reproach the granting of the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP), considering that given the magnitude of the project, a definitive Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) was required. As a first aspect, it is worth noting, in response to the allegations of the co-defendants, that the national relevance of a project, whether due to its intention to satisfy public interests or its primacy within government plans, does not constitute an exception to submitting to and complying with environmental regulations. If it were so, it would suffice to declare a project as of national interest to evade environmental assessments, in full contradiction of numeral 50 of the Constitution, 17 of Law No. 7554, 13 of Law No. 6227/78, among multiple norms. Hence, regardless of that allegation, it is necessary for every project or work to comply with environmental protection regulations to accredit its harmony with those referents.

In the closing arguments phase, SINTRAJAP's representative argued, relying on the testimony of the witness-expert Raúl Rojas, that the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) was made based on projects other than the TCM. A Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) was granted to a vague and unknown project. He estimates it cannot serve to conduct the tender; a definitive Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) was required. Studies that are not specific to the TCM are used. The RECOPE and Moín dredging projects were used, procedures unrelated to the TCM, when the object of the TCM is very different. The only instrument used was the D1 form, and as recorded in several statements, an under-assessment of the impacts is made. He estimates it was not appropriate to use that D1 but rather an EIA directly.

For the resolution of such allegations, the following must be indicated. Given that Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP), it must be noted that none of the actions resolved in this ruling directly attacked the specific act of SETENA through which the cited potential environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental potencial) is granted to the TCM project. Within the list of claims that were formulated in the complaint and sustained in the single hearing, the petition for invalidity of SETENA's acts is not invoked. Nevertheless, the complaining party fails to demonstrate those alleged pathologies that would cast doubt on the validity of the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) resolution issued by the environmental authority. It should be noted that in the considering part, SETENA indicates - second considering clause - that the request to grant this title meets the due requirements and demands. Ergo, it is up to the claimant to prove the causes of nullity, which it has ultimately failed to do.

XIII.- To this end, it is worth stating that this Court does not consider that the absence of an Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) or, in general, any title demonstrating the existence of an EIA, or, in conclusive terms, proof of an environmental feasibility license (viabilidad ambiental, VLA), entails an infringement of the protective regime of environmental law, nor of the requirements for prior analyses established by ordinal 21.1 of Law No. 7762. The proper solution to this conflict regarding this ecological variable requires understanding the type of work project to be undertaken. From this standpoint, it is worth highlighting that the challenged contract is a public works concession with public services, a public contractual modality which, in light of ordinal one of Law No. 7762, must be understood as: "an administrative contract by which the Administration entrusts a third party, which may be a public, private or mixed entity, with the design, planning, financing, construction, conservation, expansion or repair of any public immovable property, as well as its operation, providing the services foreseen in the contract in exchange for consideration charged to the users of the work or the beneficiaries of the service or counter-payments of any type paid by the granting Administration." That is, as noted above, far from being a modality seeking to contract the construction of public works, it addresses a more complex management system, which allows agreeing on the design of the work - among other activities mentioned in the norm -. It is a notorious fact for this process, undisputed, that the object of the contract that concluded the international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200 precisely sought, as part of its object, the offer of a port development design. The mere name of the public competition reveals this aspect, since the tender is called "Tender for the concession of public works for the design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the Moín Container Terminal". The above is decisive in the analysis of this point.

For this Court, it is clear that a work such as the TCM must have an Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) as well as a definitive EIA; however, that requirement, in cases such as the present one, where the contract includes the design of the infrastructure, must be satisfied prior to the start of works and not necessarily before the start of the public tender procedure. This does not entail any injury to the right protected by ordinal 50 of the Magna Carta; on the contrary, it seeks to match and harmonize the development of public works with the environmental variable. Nothing in the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) granted by SETENA allows assuming that the concessionaire has administrative consent to develop the works or actions aimed at building. On the contrary, as has been stated, that title makes it possible to carry out procedures before banking entities or other state or private entities, but with the express warning that this title -Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP)- does not confer any right whatsoever to carry out works of any type, until the Definitive Environmental Feasibility (Viabilidad Ambiental Definitiva) is issued, once it complies with the additional information or documentation required by SETENA. This also follows from ordinal 3, subsection 64 of Decree 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, when defining the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP). From this standpoint, the design of the work is a determining input to be able to weigh compliance with the environmental variable, because it is only at that moment that the type of work intended to be developed, as well as the specific site and concrete actions to carry out that infrastructure, are known with clarity and certainty. As the State rightly points out, if it were solely a public works contract, the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) would be imperative, for the elementary reason that the design of the work is already specified. However, this is not the case here, where a substantial and primary part of the contract is precisely the design of the port work. In this regard, the contracting of the design is proposed in terms of the bidding conditions based on parameters and characteristics imposed by the Master Plan contracted to the company Royal Haskoning, thus providing a conceptual design framework. Under that understanding, the continuation of the procedures, considering the object of the contract, made it feasible, just as SETENA determined, to grant the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP), so that, once the concrete design of the port works to be carried out is specified (at the technical proposal level), the definitive EIA is then initiated, through the environmental verification title that SETENA determines, so as to guarantee due environmental protection.

In this sense, it is clear to this collegiate body that the requirement for the definitive EIA, in logical and regulatory terms, in this specific case, is conditioned on the existence of a design proposal already specified according to the guidelines given by the master plan. In this orientation, the witness-expert Allan Astorga Gattgens, identity card number 3-0252-0451, indicated that the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) is an instrument designed to resolve conjunctural situations for certain activities, insofar as they need to advance in administrative procedures and cannot be subject to the EIA which requires a deep and detailed study. Likewise, said expert indicated that the key element in the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) is that its objective is not to generate a document to be transferred to an institution for its approval, but rather to carry out an environmental impact assessment (medición de impacto ambiental) of a design proposal, which must be enriched with the design data; ergo, what is sought is an environmental design of the project. He also clarified that some projects require an initial assessment and therefore a Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) is obtained, which indicates that the project cannot begin constructions and remains subject to a detailed Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA). The project can only begin constructive activity once it obtains the EIA approval. The Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) was created for this type of project, allowing the administrative and financial phase to advance, but conditioned on obtaining the definitive feasibility (viabilidad definitiva) once the EIA is completed. Such expressions are shared by this Court, given that, in essence, they are congruent with the regulations on environmental titles established by the cited Decree No. 31849 and the analysis or understanding that this Court carries out based on those regulations. Even the witness-expert offered by SINTRAJAP, namely, Mr. Raúl Ernesto Rojas Figueroa, in his testimony agreed with the nature and purpose of the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP), indicating that said title is only a prior procedure for subsequent studies to begin, which must be completed to obtain definitive feasibility (viabilidad definitiva). The Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) does not authorize the project's start. On that part of his statement, there is no antagonism with what has already been set forth. Now, when asked by the CGR whether, to start a project like the TCM, one must have definitive environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental definitiva), and how that feasibility (viabilidad) could be included in a project that includes the design and construction of the work: the witness stated that there are instruments established by SETENA. He likewise indicated, in essence, that in such cases, the potential impacts in the design are taken. The foregoing, in this Chamber's judgment, reveals that conducting the EIA requires a design that is not at all definitive. On the contrary, once the design is completed, as warned by SETENA, each stage, before its constructive commencement, must comply with the accreditation of the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental, VLA), without which, no work could be carried out. Once that project is prepared, the observations made by the Environmental Administration are integrated into the project-design, insofar as this project must adapt and harmonize with the observations and notes on the environmental topic made by the competent authorities, culminating in a final definitive design where the environmental facet is weighed. It is a composite procedure in which aspects of constructive programming and the corresponding analysis of the ecological impact are inextricably intermingled, including the mitigation measures and alterations that must be made to the design to make it "environmentally friendly". From this standpoint, there is no injury caused by the granting of the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP), given that the definitive measurement of the environmental impact (impacto ambiental) is subject to the existence of the definitive design, prior to which the concessionaire cannot carry out any type of building or work in general in the area. Such treatment was already incorporated into the contract, specifically in clause 5.3.3, as well as in 6.3.5, which regulates the topic of mitigation risks and environmental risks.

In this way, it is reiterated that this Court does not question the preponderance of the environmental variable. Nor are the concerns about the impact on the environment expressed by the plaintiffs questioned by this collegiate body. However, according to the foregoing, these are premature allegations, insofar as such risks must be weighed at the time the work design is presented and the verification process before MINAET occurs. The primary commitment assumed with the award of the challenged concession is precisely the preparation of the work design proposal, in accordance with the referential parameters given by the granting administration and in tune with the contractual provisions. Ergo, it is once that design is submitted for the knowledge of the competent administrations that compliance with the set of variables raised by the plaintiffs must be weighed, to the point that according to the contractual provisions, the concessionaire company must conduct the environmental study deemed appropriate and incorporate the binding aspects that the environmental authorities indicate in due course. It will be in that phase that the various allegations of environmental impact must be assessed, including, among others, the impact on aquifers, the proximity of the Cariari Wetland, the need to penetrate the seabed to make the dock access deeper to allow the arrival of larger-capacity and larger-size ships, and the construction of an artificial island. It is reiterated, they are aspects of great relevance to the environment, to the extent that they must be considered in the analysis. However, that examination cannot be demanded at this stage of the procedure, where the work design is not yet available, which constitutes, once again, one of the first phases in the execution of the contract. As has been said, that weighing must include the measurement of all aspects related to the surrounding environment of the area, to be considered at the appropriate procedural moment, with due publicity and full access to appellate remedies. It is not a matter of ignoring the duty to protect the environment, but of distinguishing and demarcating the phase in which, technically and logically, that measurement is appropriate and necessary, since the impact on those biotic and abiotic elements can only be determined with the existence of a preliminary design.

On the other hand, the inputs with which the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) was granted are reproached. On this matter, it is worth stating that the proponents make specifications regarding alleged deficiencies in the D1 form; however, they do not manage to discredit the appropriateness of granting the Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP). In this sense, it is worth noting what was indicated by the witness-expert Allan Astorga, offered for the analysis of the environmental variable, who stated, essentially, regarding the functionality of this form, that this form meets the requirement of entering basic technical information so that SETENA can know the general conditions of the project, its fundamental characteristics, and determine if it is potentially viable.

The fact that there are defects in the D1 filed does not affect the final product of the environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental). Indeed, in light of numeral 28.1 of Decreto No. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, in cases of construction projects regulated by special law where an environmental impact study is required, what is required as a prerequisite is "Compliance with the Initial Environmental Assessment procedure, submitting to SETENA the Environmental Assessment Document (D1) in order to obtain the potential environmental feasibility and the terms of reference for preparing the EsIA." As that regulation indicates, the form in question is what allows the Potential Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial, VAP) procedure to begin, which relieves SETENA of verifying compliance with the requirements due for obtaining that authorization for administrative procedures. Ultimately, as has been pointed out, SETENA considered that those requirements were met, as a result of which, it granted the aforementioned preliminary title. Regarding the procedure for the foregoing, reference must be made to annex II of Decreto 31849, which sets the guidelines for such purposes. Although the form—issued in the form of a sworn statement—sets out an evaluation for each of the items established therein, it is the Administration that sets a final score, which determines the type of subsequent study to be performed. It is worth reiterating here that the second operative paragraph of resolution No. 274-2009-SETENA, which grants VAP to the TCM project, warns the developer that: "... due to the characteristics of the project, for each phase or stage thereof, it must carry out the Environmental Impact Assessment process, beginning with the submission of the respective Form D1." This highlights that it is at each stage of development that this form must be concretely submitted to weigh the ecological variable of the project. Consequently, the deficiencies noted do not generate any invalidity in said resolution.

XIV.- Regarding the duty to carry out the EsIA and the burden of environmental risk. Separately, it is questioned that the contract imposed on the concessionaire the performance of the environmental impact study. From the beginning of the tender process, in the second part of the bidding documents, concerning the concession contract form, clause 5.3.3 of the bidding documents, referring to the environmental license (see folio 3238 verso of the main file), stipulated that based on the resolution that granted the VAP, the concessionaire was obligated to obtain from SETENA the resolution granting the definitive environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) for the new container terminal. Likewise, in bidding condition 6.3.5 (visible at folio 3241 verso), it states: "6.3.5 Environmental risks. All environmental risks related to the construction, operation, environmental mitigation works, and maintenance of the TCM are the Concessionaire's, as regulated in clause 6.3.1. Therefore, it must include in its bid the costs associated with meeting these risks; regulatory changes in this matter that, after the date of bid opening, affect the economic and financial balance of the Contract, shall be compensated by the granting Administration." For its part, in the respective contract, in clause 5.3.3, the concessionaire assumes the obligation to obtain the definitive environmental feasibility for the TCM. Likewise, in clause 6.3.56 of the contract, it is stated: "All environmental risks related to the construction, operation, environmental mitigation works, and maintenance of the TCM are the Concessionaire's, as regulated in clause 6.3.1. Therefore, it must include in this concession contract the costs associated with meeting these risks. For regulatory changes in this matter that are not contemplated and approved in the Environmental Impact Study, and that exceed the 1% contingency reserve offered, the Concessionaire may request that the economic balance be restored as established in clause 6.4.3 of this chapter." (Folio 7664 of the CNC administrative file -volume XIV-) Although numeral 21 of Ley No. 7762 states that "The Technical Secretariat of the National Concessions Council shall be responsible for carrying out the activities and studies necessary to prepare the concession bidding process...", the fact of the matter is that nothing prevents the burden of carrying out such environmental impact studies from being borne by the concessionaire. Certainly, numerals 59 and 66 of Ley No. 6227/78 speak of the inalienability and non-transferability of public powers of authority, however, in this case, it does not involve a waiver of the exercise of those powers. It involves a contractual condition by virtue of which the contractor is made responsible for formulating the steps to obtain the Environmental Viability License (Viabilidad Ambiental, VAL), given that, as has been stated, part of the contract is the completion of a design for the TCM. Therefore, by logical derivation, this Tribunal does not see how this condition—first in the bidding documents and later contractual—could violate environmental legislation or produce nullity due to an alleged defect of incompetence. In this type of public contract, nothing prevents the performance of such studies from being transferred to the concessionaire. It must be reiterated at this point that the purpose of the present contract is not the construction of an already designed public work, but rather the design, construction, financing, operation, and maintenance of port structures, a matter that must be taken into account when weighing this type of grievance. Ultimately, even within the argumentative line of the plaintiffs, what is crucial is that this Tribunal safeguards and protects the duty of every project, public or private, to submit to the environmental legal system. The referenced clause does not waive compliance with this variable, given that ultimately, the commitment is to carry out the respective study and submit it to the knowledge of MINAET and obtain the Environmental Viability License (Viabilidad Licencia Ambiental, VLA). For this purpose, even a clause for transferring environmental risks to the concessionaire is established, which states that the environmental risk related to the construction, operation, mitigation works, and maintenance of the works shall be assumed by the awardee, for which purpose, it must provide a detail of costs associated with meeting said risks. As can be observed, nothing denies that environmental feasibility must be obtained, so it is not considered that the criticized provision generates any harm to the regime of public competencies or environmental requirements. Such risk transfer rules, insofar as they stipulate a 1% contingency reserve, do not generate, as the plaintiff CANABA asserts, an economic distortion in the contract. It is a condition of economic foresight to address potential mitigation measures or actions that might become necessary to face the consequences of reducing or avoiding environmental effects, under a scope of preventive protection. From that standpoint, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated how that alleged financial alteration of the contract arises from the inclusion of a 1% reserve commitment for environmental risks, a figure that in any case, it is insisted, is deemed to be harmonious with a pro natura principle to the extent that it constitutes a reserve so that, should mitigation actions for the environment need to be taken, they can be addressed with those financial resources. On the other hand, the allegation regarding potential financial imbalance is generic and imprecise, as it does not specify how that effect could be generated, being a mere speculation not supported by technical bases. Nevertheless, it must be noted, in line with rulings 998-98 and 6432-96, both from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the financial balance of the contract is a right of the contractor, whose support is also rooted in the letter of numeral 18 of Ley No. 7494, as well as in numeral 17 of Ley No. 7762, being a matter that must be weighed in each specific case, independently of issues such as the one raised. It will be in each specific situation that it is appropriate to analyze whether there is a financial distortion that unbalances the contract, a scenario in which the causes of that distortion would have to be determined, since not in all cases is an adjustment warranted, given that in certain scenarios, the theory of contractual alea that the concessionaire must assume prevails, a matter that will not be addressed for now. Thus, such allegation lacks technical and legal support. Finally, regarding this aspect, the Constitutional Chamber itself has made it evident that there is no irregularity in the granting of a VAP and in transferring the duty to obtain the VLA to the awardee. In this line, in ruling No. 2007-017409 of 16 hours 50 minutes on November 28, 2007, citing vote 2002-011046 of 9 hours 53 minutes on November 22, 2002, that high Constitutional Tribunal relevantly stated: "The scenario analyzed in the partially transcribed judgment has been reiterated in judgments number 2003-15227 of thirteen hours thirteen minutes on December nineteen, two thousand three, and in judgment number 2004-01510 of eleven hours forty minutes on February thirteen, two thousand four, and in both, the Chamber has maintained the criterion that no harm or illegitimate threat to Article 50 of the Constitution is perceived from the fact that the environmental impact study is not carried out before the public bidding process begins and that the obligation to undertake the environmental impact study is established in the bidding documents to be borne by the awardee and not the bidder, just as it occurs in the specific matter, the Chamber considering that, in any case, the environmental feasibility analysis would always be carried out in accordance with the criteria and requirements made for each specific case by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat, which is the competent state body in the matter." This review must conclude by reiterating the following: the duty and importance of having the definitive EIA in this type of large-scale works is in no way denied. However, given the type of contract in which part of the public tender is precisely the design of the work, that requirement becomes premature, since it is with the preliminary design that the environmental assessments can be made, which, with a mandatory and binding nature, will go on to modify or adjust the design project. Hence, the granting of the VAP is not contrary to law but rather the appropriate means for the continuity of the project, which does not preclude the subsequent analysis proposed by the plaintiffs, a phase within which, publicly and openly, the series of risks and concerns that motivate their reproaches must be weighed. It must be remembered that the VAP does not permit any construction work or specific acts beyond the administrative procedures before financial entities or public administrations participating in the process to obtain the pertinent authorizations or approvals for the continuity of the procedure. Ergo, it is not a violation of environmental standards, but rather, precisely, their fulfillment, within a framework that is foreseeing and protective of the environment, which in no way fails to recognize its relevance, since all actions adopted are directed so that ultimately, prior to initiating actions, the cited VLA must be obtained. Consequently, the rejection of this charge must be ordered.

XV.- Regarding the technical feasibility study. The petitioner CANABA criticizes, in a first thematic axis—on this aspect—the absence of an economic feasibility study for the project, as well as total clarity about what is to be built, which it considers a limitation on the interest for participation by potential bidders. It deems it essential to have an input that allows determining the feasibility and costs of the project, which must be reasonable, updated, sufficient, complete, and credible. What exists is a master plan by the company Royal Haskoning that serves as a guide, since it is not specific. The cost projections of that plan are not updated and are general. It asserts a violation of the principle of distribution of functions to the extent that the State commissions a private third party to carry out the project design, its construction, and operation. The principle of selecting the best offer must be protected. In a public works concession, the Administration should not be a mere acquirer of financed assets, so the feasibility study is necessary. It says there is no reasoned act based on scientific and technical grounds for opening the bidding process. Given the absence of the economic feasibility study, it cannot be known if the project is self-financing. The projected demands cannot be guaranteed, so there is a great risk of a financial imbalance, which could lead to prohibitive tariffs. It says that a feasibility study must include an expression of the social impacts in the geographical area of influence, which the Royal Haskoning study does not fulfill. Analysis of what is alleged on this point. Regarding this matter, the following must be stated. For the purposes of international public bidding 2009LI-000001-0200, the CNC and JAPDEVA, on January 15, 2009, signed an inter-institutional management agreement aimed at coordinating the concession procedure process for works and services of common interest (folio 735 of the bidding file), for the basic reason of JAPDEVA's competence to provide port services on the Atlantic coast, a competence assigned by Ley No. 5337. As a derivation of this agreement, the performance of technical, legal, environmental, and financial studies related, in general, to the formulation of projects is made possible, as well as all documentation required to support a bidding process (see folios 731-735 of the bidding file). From this standpoint, this agreement constitutes the legitimizing basis for understanding, for the purposes of section 129 of Ley No. 6227/78, that the coordination to contract the technical studies ultimately carried out by the company Royal Haskoning was performed by the granting administration, to the extent that, as will be seen later, that contracting was established by JAPDEVA. Now then, in the sequence of grievances formulated by the plaintiff, it must be reiterated, its allegations are formulated against the bidding document rules, without it having been able to prove that at the appropriate time, pursuant to Article 34 of Ley No. 7662 in relation to Article 82 of the Law on Administrative Contracting, the already mentioned principle of preclusion set forth above applied to these allegations. Nevertheless, it must be stated that the petitioner is also wrong on the merits. Indeed, unlike what was stated by the plaintiffs, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that the Master Plan issued by the company Royal Haskoning is far from being a mere project profile and contains, in its core, the totality of inputs that allow it to be considered a feasibility study that constitutes the basis of the TCM project. The analysis and reading that this Tribunal makes of the cited Master Plan, considering the various components that, in general theory, an economic feasibility study must gather, lead to the conclusion, just as the co-respondents affirm, that this document, although it does not formally bear the name "Economic Feasibility Study," constitutes an input that incorporates an analysis and detail of a set of data and information that places potential interested parties in an objective and effective position to perform analyses of predictability of sufficiency and profitability of the proposed business. In the judgment of this Chamber, that report contains the necessary detail so that those interested in participating in the aforementioned public bidding could carry out an examination of the relevance or not of participating, as well as the technical-financial content of their eventual competitive bids. On the one hand, regarding the timeliness and relevance of the data used in that report (master plan), although the diagnosis dates from 2008, it is considered proven that given various observations made by those interested in the cited tender, and in response to the date of the data weighed by the company Royal Haskoning in that report, in 2010, that company was requested to update the projected demand data, information which, in its core, was used by the CNC to adjust and update the tariff model submitted to ARESEP. This is evidenced by official letters 0395 (DTS-OF-380-10) and 445 (DTS-OF-0432-10) dated March 12 and 23, 2010—both—addressed to said Regulatory Authority. This is recorded at folios 1446-2466 of the CNC administrative file. This update gave rise to the changes approved by the CNC in agreement 7 of ordinary session No. 06-2010 of March 11, 2010, later made known to the bidders and publicized as inferred from folio 2444 of the CNC administrative file. Returning to the issue of the usefulness of the Master Plan to serve as a financial feasibility study, it should be noted that this type of study is far from being a way to guarantee an income stream. It must be remembered that in every administrative contract of this nature, the variable of contractual risk is integrated, which in this sense is distributed between the parties. The grantor cannot ensure the profitability of the business in all cases, even more so when dealing with activities whose rate of return is associated and linked to the framework of service delivery efficiency of the delegated service. The opposite, i.e., the establishment of a level of guaranteed profits regardless of how the contract is executed, could disincentivize efficiency, without prejudice to the analysis of the financial balance of the contract, which it is insisted, is a matter to assess in each specific case. Even within the bidding documents, clause 3.2 warns: "Potential bidders will be solely responsible for making their own analyses and evaluations of the tender rules and the potential for income, profits, and expenses of the Concession, as well as for inspecting the area in which the works object of the concession will be developed, operation, and other elements necessary to make the decision to submit a formal offer to the tender and sign the Contract if awarded." -folio 3209 of the main file-. It is not a clause of uncertainty impairing the principle of transparency, efficiency, and participatory openness—plurality—but rather a directive to carry out measurements of feasibility and economic sufficiency to weigh the inherent risk in the business to be signed and, based on the inputs provided, decide whether to opt to enter the procedure by submitting the respective offer. Even within clause 6.2, second paragraph of the concession contract (folio 7666 of the CNC administrative file), it is clearly stated that the prior studies of the concession carried out by the Administration are of an informative and guiding nature, so they may not be taken as a frame of reference for the possible future activity of the concessionaire, and the grantor assumes no responsibilities for the information contained in those studies. Within the analysis of the evidence brought to the process in accordance with the principle of sound rational criticism -arts. 82 and 85 CPCA, 330 of the Civil Procedure Code-, it is the criterion of this Tribunal, based on the documentary evidence and the examination of the expert witness testimony, that it is feasible to conclude on the sufficiency of the data set forth in the contracting procedure so that potential bidders had financial feasibility information that would allow them to make their decision to submit bids or not. Regarding the structure of a financial feasibility study, Mr. Vidal Villalobos Rojas, identity card number 1-720-443, an expert witness provided by CANABA, essentially stated that this type of study should have the following components: it must be definitive, based on real data, credible, and objective; they seek to create their own data, timely, real, and updated information; it must be gradually validated with consultations, surveys, market studies, and real data; contain detail and analysis of income and expenses; weigh NPV (net present value)-IRR (internal rate of return), interest rates; finally, it must have feasibility: technical, economic, legal, political, managerial, and environmental. Regardless of his conclusions that the Master Plan is not a financial feasibility study, that structure essentially agrees with that indicated by the expert witness offered by APM Terminals, i.e., Mr. R, an economist, Honduran, international mission card 6412, passport c-719562. During the qualification phase, it was stated that Mr. Posas is an economist, holds a Master's degree in economics and project administration, works for the Central American Institute of Public Administration (ICAP), and directs the development management program. He is certified in the area of Project management – technical and professional in direction – under the European IPMA approach. ICAP helps governments in the training of human resources. His knowledge includes the subject matter of Project Finance. On the specific issue, after the meticulous weighing of the expert witness testimony, this collegiate body understands that the components of this type of study, according to the extensive and academic criteria of Mr. Vidal Villalobos, essentially match what was indicated by Mr. Posas, who in this regard stated that, in his opinion, the information provided in the master plan is suitable for anyone who wished to participate in the bidding process. He supported this with a clarification regarding what a feasibility study should be understood to be, warning that a lack of understanding of that study can lead to erroneous opinions. In that vein, he proceeded to explain what a feasibility study is, indicating its components as follows: Chapter 1. Must contain documents or minimum information that must be in the project identification chapter. Here there must be information on background, project proposal, criteria, and components. Chapter 2. Market study. Must contain demand, competition, tariffs, prices, and aspects related to strategies for entering the market. Chapter 3. Technical study. These contents are called the formulation of a project proposal. But it must also have other chapters. Chapter 4. Financial evaluation of the project. Chapter 5. Economic and social study. Chapter 6. Environmental impact assessment. In this particular case, it must have a chapter on legal aspects (Chap. 7). As can be observed, both expert references are congruent regarding the minimum content of a financial feasibility study, with Mr. Posas's detail even being more extensive than that provided by Mr. Vidal Campos. Now, regarding the specific question of whether the Master Plan contains information from a feasibility study, Mr. Villalobos stated that in his opinion, that report was not a study as petitioned. He considered that the Master Plan is a diagnosis that broadly establishes the action to be followed and indicates possible paths. It provides general data from secondary sources and provides ideas to be developed later. In essence, he concluded that the Master Plan is not a feasibility study; demand and traffic data have been improved but were not there at the beginning of the process; the work is on a larger scale than necessary. It was necessary to review the concessionaire's contributions regarding the necessity of the work; the risks are transferred to the concessionaire, as is the environmental issue; the uncertainty is transferred to the tariffs. He argued that the higher cost in tariffs is transferred to the consumers of the cargo product.

XVI.- For his part, the professional expert Posas Rosales indicated regarding this same questioning, after having conducted his analysis of the documentation analyzed, i.e., the Master Plan, that within the documents analyzed, he found information about a feasibility study: the document analyzed refers to a master plan, but it shows that most of the information of a feasibility study is contained, not in the form indicated, but throughout the document. At this point, Mr. Posas Rosales highlighted the location of each of the components of a feasibility study within the cited Master Plan, according to the following detail: Chap. 1: pp. 27-34: conceptual aspects, 35-41: project alternatives, 44-49: criteria and foundations of the best alternative, 50-53: project components, in the case of the plan, the development of the project phases. Chap. 2: Demand analysis 2-22, and Annex No. 2 with demand projections. On page 106 tariff analysis. Market strategies, p. 123. Chap. 3: 107-117 development of project components, 54-58 technical aspects of the proposal, Annex 7 plans necessary to build physical works. Chap. 4: the document contemplates operating costs, investment costs – for each of the items –, income, project profitability indicators. Financial indicators: 14% profitability. Chap. 5: contemplates economic and social evaluation. A comparative method is used with a situation with project and without project. He considers that the project is profitable from the socio-economic standpoint of the country. Chap. 6: are not integrated into the plan, they are annex documents. The same applies to the legal aspects of the project. When questioned about his expert opinion, he stated that from the perspective of potential bidders, the master plan would serve to support the decision to participate or not: its content is very significant for making a decision. He argued that this detail has the entire cost structure for a company that wishes to participate; the investment by phases is clear; profitability is clear; in addition, it contains a market study. In light of these elements of conviction, it is considered that the detail of information given in the master plan effectively contains the basic information of a financial feasibility study in a way that protects the right to information that allows any interested party to analyze whether the business proposed within the TCM bidding is attractive – profitable – to them and thus make the decision to participate in the tender. The review of the Master Plan in its content, versus the depositions of Mr. Posas, allows determining that, indeed, the components that that expert witness mentions are found contemplated in the pages of the Master Plan that were indicated. For this, it suffices to make a comparison of references and content of the cited Plan. A study of the data provided therein allows this Tribunal to conclude that the components analyzed in each section cover the variables set out above for the basic structure of a financial feasibility study. It should be noted that the reproach of the professional Vidal Villalobos is not as to content, but rather as to the quality of the information provided. The conclusions of that expert focus on preferences regarding the forms and decision-making on the project. See by way of simple reference that one of his conclusions was that the work is on a larger scale than necessary and that it was necessary to review the concessionaire's contributions regarding the necessity of the work. This is a matter inherent to the management system adopted and to the characteristics of the work itself, rather than regarding whether the information contained in the master plan allowed or did not allow potential bidders to have information to decide whether the project was financially viable or not. It should be emphasized that the credibility that this Tribunal grants to Mr. Posas's opinion is not related to the attempt at discreditation presented by the entity APM Terminals with respect to the expert Vidal Villalobos, but rather to the consideration of that testimonial element together with the documentary elements analyzed, specifically, the Master Plan itself and its content. Once again, the analysis of the Master Plan allows obtaining a series of information related to the financial viability of the project itself. That document contains analysis of background; cargo forecasts; port development and master plan strategies; setting out of various alternatives, with analysis of all aspectos involved in the matter (nautical, economic, social, environmental); the various phases proposed for the development of Puerto Moín; analysis of the requirements for container handling, for cargo handling at the dock, for dock operations and phase development; of all the equipment and works required for the provision of all services; the study of the concession process and port management models; the designs; the financial and economic analysis, all of which is accompanied by a total of six annexes (layout alternatives, traffic projections, operational analysis, cost estimation, income projections, financial analysis, and plans). This can be seen at folios 275-542, 2531-2795 of the judicial file—both references contain the same master plan.

On the other hand, in this dynamic, it should be noted that this is an international tender whose object is typical of complex projects, which allows us to assert that participation by thesis of principle would be viable for companies with specific knowledge of the port market and therefore, with the due technical capacity to perform analyses of the project's economic sufficiency. This links with what is stated in condition 3.2 of the tender specifications (cartel de licitación) already referred to supra. All in all, the data provided by the Master Plan (Plan Maestro) were not only updated as explained, but also supplemented with information that led to the review and updating of the original estimates that were submitted to the knowledge of ARESEP for the tariff and quality-of-service consultation procedure. In this way, it is insisted, it is the criteria of this Tribunal that the allegations of the plaintiffs in this regard seek to contradict a study that contains adequate information to constitute the benchmark of financial feasibility that is established by articles 9 and 21 of Law No. 7762.

XVII.- On the other hand, the allegation of injury to the principle of distribution of functions regarding the supposed delegation or commission to a third party of the realization of the project design, its construction, and operation is not receivable. It has already been explained that the public works concession contract regulated in article 1 of Law No. 7762 allows the contracting of the design, planning, financing, construction, conservation, expansion, or repair of any public real estate, and in the case of the modality that incorporates the transfer of public services, the exploitation of those works. Unlike what the petitioner seems to allege, it is not a matter of a waiver of the exercise of public competences—constitutionally or legally assigned—but rather the legally valid and viable subscription of an administrative contract whose object is to establish a model for the acquisition of goods and/or services for the satisfaction of public interests. The relevance of this mechanism as an instrument for the procurement of goods and services for Public Administrations is beyond any discussion. However, this model does not imply, not even remotely, the waiver of the exercise of public powers. Understanding the contrary would lead to the inadmissibility of the figures of issuing administrative authorizations for delegated provision of public services, or for private or personal uses of public domain goods, which of course has no place in the understanding that this Tribunal has of the administrative contracting regime. Even Article 121, subsection 14 of the Magna Carta clearly indicates the possibility of signing concession contracts for certain types of public goods, as well as special forms subject to a prior formal law in that regard, in other cases. In the matter of delegated provision of public services, the administrative contracting regime itself, of constitutional basis (Article 182 of the Magna Carta) and whose constitutional roots have been recognized by the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) in the well-known ruling 998-98, allows sustaining the validity of the figures for the transfer of public service provision. The legal framework of Law No. 7762 adjusts precisely to those requirements and to that model established by the Costa Rican State. Regarding that particular modality that this law regulates and specifies, it cannot be said that one is facing a waiver of public powers, but rather the contracting of various services to realize the construction, design, maintenance, financing, exploitation, and maintenance of a container port work on the Atlantic Slope. The very object of the contract eliminates from the outset any doubt that could be established about the ownership of the works, the service, and the public powers. The simple reading and understanding of the contractual typology and its ratio within the framework of Article 1 of Law No. 7762 suppresses doubts on the matter, so the allegation is inadmissible at the outset (ad portas). It can even be seen that within the obligations of the grantor, Article 16, subsection a of Law No. 7762 includes the duty to "Permanently supervise all construction and exploitation of concession works and services, in accordance with the construction and maintenance program for the works or the service regulation, in conformity with the tender specifications and the concession contract," which highlights the ownership of the work. Furthermore, Article 15, subsection b of the same law presupposes the right to rescue the work or concession, for reasons of public interest. More simply, the very concept of concession supposes the transfer of a right of operation, but never the transfer of ownership of the work or right itself, which, once the contract term has expired, is recovered by the granting Administration. Regarding the expiration of the contract and its recovery procedure, contractual conditions 18.3.2 and 18.3.3 can be seen, visible at folios 7569-7570 of the CNC administrative file, or folios 121 and 122 of the contract. In sum, a public good is not transferred, but rather a temporary exploitation right subject to a special contractual-legal regime is granted. For greater clarity, it suffices to refer to what was indicated by the Constitutional Court in ruling No. 1996-03451 at 15 hours 33 minutes on July 9, 1996, in which it stated regarding the disputed issue: “b.- the concession.- by means of the public service concession, the State satisfies general needs by availing itself of the voluntary collaboration of the administered in the provision of public services. By the public service concession contract, a person—physical or legal—is entrusted, for a determined time, with the organization and operation of a specific public service. The concessionaire carries out its task, at its own account and risk, receiving for its labor the corresponding retribution, which may consist of the price or tariffs paid by the users, subsidies or guarantees satisfied by the State, or both at the same time. The concessionaire is subject to the control typical of any administrative contract; that is, it is permanently subject to the supervision of the State, since in this type of contract a public interest always mediates, the concessionaire is linked to the Public Administration as co-contractor and also enters into relationship with the users in whose interest the concession was granted. In this type of contract, the concessionaire has a perfect and declared subjective right; that is, it derives a patrimonial right in the constitutional sense of the term, because upon granting a public service concession, an administrative contract in the strict sense is formalized. It is pertinent to clarify that the right of exploitation of the public service that is granted to private parties is not susceptible to being alienated, since that activity continues to be public, and therefore, subject to its essential legal regime. The concessionaire must enjoy a reasonable term to dedicate itself to the activity in question, so that by definition indefinite or short durations are excluded from the concession and are rather typical of permits, which are revocable at any time as was said. Moreover, it should be noted that the concession belongs to the category of administrative contracts that doctrine calls "collaboration" and its duration is temporary, but it must be for a period such that it reasonably allows the amortization of the invested capitals and the obtaining of an adequate profit for the concessionaire.” In the same line, ruling No. 2003-14606 at 12 hours 30 minutes on December 12, 2003, can be seen, in which the difference between the privatization of services and the public service concession regime was specified, in the following terms: "In another order of considerations, the privatization of public services, that is, the definitive transfer of their ownership and exercise to subjects of private law, should not be confused with their indirect management by a public entity through the figure of the concessionaire, since, in this hypothesis the granting administration maintains the ownership of the service and of the public domain goods necessary for its effective provision, given that it only temporarily transfers to the concessionaire the exercise of some powers for the management of the service—with or without infrastructure—or the construction of works that will continue to be publicly owned (Articles 121, subsection 14, of the Political Constitution and the General Law on Concession of Public Works with Public Services).” Moreover, this Tribunal does not share the allegation that the design of the work is completely ceded, leaving the collective in uncertainty regarding what is going to be built. For this, it suffices to refer to the Master Plan mentioned so many times, in which guidelines and parameters of the work to be built are given, which must be pondered for the contracted design, which, in any case, must be approved by the technical counterpart before proceeding in the contractual stage of construction. Ergo, it is not a waiver of the exercise of public powers (power-duty), but rather that a legally valid contractual figure has been resorted to, which in the specific case, the granting Administration deemed suitable to satisfy its public works construction programming. If the plaintiffs consider that it is most appropriate for the State itself (in a broad sense) to build the works and operate the TCM project, this is a deontological discussion about the management model for port services. However, that preference does not per se eliminate the validity of the contract that is being questioned in this matter, without having proven the technical insufficiency of that project, in accordance with articles 15, 16, and 160 of Law No. 6227/78. The suppression for invalidity of that contract due to the alleged injury to technique is not meritorious to the extent that within the framework of the indicated allegations, the deficiency in the information postulated by the plaintiff has not been proven, nor in the cession to a third party of the development of the TCM project, which includes the design, construction, financing, operation, and maintenance of those works. It is, it is insisted, the use of a contractual modality that has legal and constitutional permissibility. Moreover, in the judgment of this Tribunal, the fear of the plaintiffs about a possible risk of cost overrun due to the absence of a final design for the works is not receivable. On the one hand, as has already been previously stated, the adopted Master Plan, as well as the rules of the public tender contain parameters for the design to be proposed by the awarded firm, so there is no total disconnection from public intentions or forecasts on the development of the work, as seems to be argued. In any case, the granting Administration, before continuing with the various phases of the procedure, must supervise with the rigorousness that is necessary in this type of contract, the due fulfillment of the commitments assumed, as well as the conformity with the pre-established parameters, of the distinct actions of the contractor, in order to compare and verify the correct satisfaction of the public interest immersed in the TCM. For this, it must also be specified that Chapter 6 of the contract regulates the topic of risks within the agreement. In this section, it is worth highlighting what is indicated in clause 6.3.1 regarding risks related to the design and construction of works (folio 7665 of the CNC administrative file), from which it follows that the investment and construction costs formulated in the offer are recognized within the "ceiling" tariff—maximum—a topic in which ARESEP has participated, so that costs greater than those projected are issues that, pursuant to the aforementioned contractual condition, must be included as risk of the contractor in the formulation of its technical, economic, and design proposal. From this perspective, then, the allegations of CANABA stating that there can be no certainty that the TCM project is self-financing turn out to be capricious and lacking demonstrative support, consisting therefore of mere subjective appreciations. Note that what is sought is the nullity of an administrative public contracting procedure of complex technical basis, which involves a series of financial, technical, legal factors, among multiple facets. Hence, the simple allegation of supposed defects without accompanying sound elements of conviction that allow a serious analysis of those components is not pertinent. Contrary to what is alleged by the plaintiffs, the information base for participation existed prior to the instruction of the procedure and was expanded and updated by complementary information made known to the parties in the course of the procedure—an aspect in which no incorrectness is observed. It should also be noted that the plaintiff's concern may be valid when indicating that faced with the concurrence of uncertain situations in the markets, it cannot be guaranteed that the projected demands will be effective. However, that speculation constitutes part of the contractual risk analyzed above and which, pursuant to clause 6.3 of the respective contract, must be assumed by the concessionaire, specifically in contractual condition 6.3.6 on demand and commercial risk in which its literal tenor states: "The demand and commercial risk, as well as their growth projections correspond to the concessionaire"—folio 7664 of the CNC administrative file. The eventual variations of demand details is an inescapable risk in this type of services, hence the contractual establishment of a risk assessment system that must be pondered casuistically in the event of eventual conflicts. It should be remembered that from the tender specifications themselves, offerees are warned (clause 3.2) of the duty to carry out their own predictability studies. In this type of contract, it is insisted, certainty in the future demand for the service is an input that is difficult to obtain, as multiple factors converge in these matters, such as the service efficiency of the terminal, production levels, among other aspects. The length of the term foreseen in this type of contractual links makes risk an inherent theme of the contract, which is directly distributed between the parties, and in function of which, the contractor must assume, for logical reasons already raised, part of that risk, given that it is not feasible for the grantor to assure or guarantee determined demand levels. All in all, even in the hypothetical case of demand distortions that lead to excessive burdensomeness of the contract in detriment of the rights of one of the parties, in breach of the economic balance already indicated supra, it should be noted that clause 12.7 of the contract—folio 7625 of the CNC administrative file—establishes the procedure to establish the rebalancing of the contract in situations that cause prejudice to the concessionaire, so that, as has been indicated, the actions to be adopted to establish that financial adjustment must be examined in each case. However, a priori, one cannot speak of an invalidity of the contract due to the risk that tariffs may end up being increased. The guidelines for risk distribution are given by the contract, as well as the forms of tariff adjustment, so the formulation made by the plaintiff does not allow entering into the analysis it proposes, given that its affirmations are simple subjective appreciations, not supported by tangible elements that enable this Tribunal to conduct an in-depth analysis on this point. Mere speculations cannot technically sustain nullities of public acts, so the invoked reproaches cannot lead to the result sought by the plaintiff. Finally, regarding these allegations, it should be noted that, with what has been said, this Tribunal does not consider that the principle of plurality or participatory openness in this tendering procedure is affected. The mere circumstance that only one offer was presented within this international public tender cannot be taken as indicative that the maxim provided in Article 5 of the Administrative Contracting Law—free competition and equality—has been truncated or injured. The plaintiffs assume a syllogism in function of which, they start from the premise of an injury to equality in procedures and free competition due to the fact that only one entity participated. It thus constitutes an incomplete syllogism, which consists at its core of an enthymeme (truncated syllogism), which supposes assuming a premise that is taken for granted from which a conclusion is obtained without the accreditation of the factual basis that would justify it. The allegation then becomes a fallacy that is not receivable because it starts from a construction in which a conclusion is reached, without first establishing the causes to sustain it. Apart from the inference underlying the allegation (due to incomplete or truncated consequential judgment, it is insisted), no concrete reasons are addressed to justify the violation of the indicated principle. Consequently, the charge must be dismissed because the circumstance with which the alleged injury is intended to be associated remains a conjecture, not supported by logical and sound judgments.

XVIII.- Regarding project finance. CANABA indicates that in this type of financing option, the so-called cash flow, which is generated as a consequence of the exploitation of the concession, is used as the basic guarantee of the operation. It indicates that for the admissibility of this figure, it is required to know in advance the degree of feasibility of the concession to be granted, as well as its weaknesses, a requirement that has not been met since those studies with sufficient information did not exist, proof of which is the participation of a single offeror. The public decision to support the project through social economic interest is not adequately justified, data that is scant in the Master Plan. It accuses that the financing modality cannot be carried out solely based on the State's expectation. No tax efficiency analysis was done on the financial model. It says that in the contract, the control structure is very weak, since what is established is a concept or profile and not a specific work. Regarding this matter, what follows should be noted. As has been indicated, part of the object of the TCM contracting is the financing of the construction of the port work, which implies that it is the responsibility of the concessionaire to seek the financing options for the development of the public infrastructure. Evidently, the cash flows that are intended to be obtained from the operation of the service constitute the principal guarantee for the coverage of the credits that may eventually be obtained for the development of the various actions inherent to the execution of the contractual object. Given this, on the one hand, it should be reiterated, unlike what is stated by the plaintiff, it is the criteria of this Tribunal that the procedure does have financial feasibility studies and information on demand projections and relevant data that allow potential offerees to individually perform their analyses on the profitability of the proposed business. This topic has already been analyzed supra, so reiteration of what has already been discussed is unnecessary. Again, the existence of a single offer cannot be taken as a criterion to maintain that such an absence was configured in this case. All in all, the allegations presented by CANABA on this topic seem, at first instance, counterproductive, as despite the concern about project finance, it recognizes the solvency of the concessionaire and forecasts few problems in obtaining sources of financing for the development of the work. Now then, it is clear that prior to the granting of financing options, credit entities must perform risk and solvency analyses of the potential debtor before granting the respective options and making the corresponding monetary disbursements. Hence, the burden of obtaining the financing for the generation of the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the TCM corresponds to the concessionaire. The financial viability of the project is a topic already discussed, and which has been pondered by APM Terminals at the moment of presenting its tender bid, accepting the risk on this aspect. It can even be seen that clause 6.3.4 transfers the financial risk of the contract to the concessionaire—folio 7664 of the CNC administrative file—a clause in which it is indicated that this risk includes the financing conditions that it had foreseen to obtain in its respective offer. In fact, according to the tender specifications guidelines, each potential offeror must make its own estimates and structure its own financing schemes. Note that the tender specifications do not impose a specific financing option; however, it is reiterated that the duty to obtain it is transferred to the concessionaire, as well as the risks of this financial support. On the other hand, even if the State could have opted to first contract the design of the work and subsequently its construction and operation, again, it is a matter of option or choice of preferences in management models. However, regardless of the precisions on current trends in the matter of concessions for this type of projects made by the state representative, the truth of the matter is that one must again refer to the content of Article 1 of Law No. 7762, a norm that allows contracting not only the design, but also the construction, operation, financing, and maintenance of this type of infrastructure. It is a matter of programmatic policy whose validity has not been successfully discredited by the promoters of the present action. The convenience of unifying those actions within a single project may well not be shared by the plaintiffs, but it is insisted, it is ultimately a matter of choice among the probable management models applicable to this type of works. This does not imply that the conformity of public actions with the legal order cannot be reviewed; however, the deficiencies pointed out by the plaintiff have not succeeded in distorting the legitimacy of what was carried out by the granting Administration. Therefore, the consideration of whether international public tender 2009LI-000001-0200 fits or not within a project finance is of little relevance for the purposes of establishing the legality of the present matter, for the reasons pointed out. In another order of things, if what is reproached is the content or form of expressing the information related to the feasibility studies, it is a topic already discussed, an analysis within which it was established that those studies allowed the decision to participate or not to be adopted, reiterating the duty of each offeror to carry out its own studies. Certainly, among the options that may arise in this type of contract, the granting Administration may choose to guarantee the concessionaire a minimum level of income (or demand in this case), thus assuming the risk; however, in this case, as has been said, the risk in that sense was transferred to the concessionaire, configuring a decision by the grantor on that particular matter. In the course of the tender (and before), cargo projection data and a historical detail of the behavior of those movements were made available to the interested parties. It should be noted that the plaintiff's debate hinges on tender specification issues that it did not object to in a timely manner, but which nonetheless do not show the deficiencies it exposes in its demand. All in all, in the evacuation of the expert witness evidence, the correspondence of the information and studies provided in the tender procedure within the concept of project finance was an aspect widely considered. Thus, the CNC offered Mr. R, with the qualifications mentioned above, as an expert witness. In order to justify that the TCM has financial feasibility for the purposes of weighing financing decisions as an offeror, said deponent expressed in its core points that every project must have a clear tariff and contain the total investments regardless of the moment in which they are made, operating costs, company profit, recovery of investment costs. On the topic, CANABA questioned the expert, if Project finance is financed with future income, how income estimates are made in the master plan, to which he responded—in its core points—that they are made with the cash flow for what is going to be charged, they are sustained by demand. He clarified that the demand estimates and projections are incorporated in the document. Regarding the subsequent modifications of that projected demand, as CANABA argued in the cross-examination, he indicated that when a study is made—any study—and any type of variable is going to be projected, be it cargo, price, production, those projections must be sustained, and in the master plan there is a model that sustains those projections. He noted that the income of a project, demand, and competition must be projected, and the methods used are a particular matter of those who made the studies. Regarding the relevance of the concept of the value of money in a Project Finance, he expressed that when a financial flow is updated, two things are being done: incorporating the investor's profitability and taking into account whether the project can be accepted. It could not be advancing income and delaying investments. The weighing of what was stated by this professional—criteria that in the judgment of this Tribunal were not successfully distorted—again highlights that the information provided to the interested parties allowed decision-making in this tender, so the principles and institutes invoked by the plaintiffs in this regard are not injured. This being the case, the rejection of this element must be ordered.

XIX.- Regarding the allegation of absence of economic-financial balance in the contract. In another grievance, CANABA's legal representative reproaches the absence of financial harmony in the contract. It indicates that clause 6.2 of the tender specifications is illegal and absurd by stating that the previous studies have an informative character. It says that the equation of the contract is nothing more than a contractual procedure where it is about establishing a balance between the contractor's obligations and through the investments it must make and the consideration that the State must provide. It accuses that in this case, those previous analyses do not exist, since what was issued was a project in concept, without technical, environmental, or economic feasibility studies. All of which causes costs to increase unnecessarily, and which will obviously have to be charged by the offeree in the case of an imbalance. This balance must include the contractor's contingencies such as profit and financial capital. The contract proposal contained in "the tender" is not the tender of a well-defined project, but one yet to be defined. In the TCM, it is not known if said financial equation is based on the real costs of the project, as there is no updated technical economic feasibility study by the State. It estimates that the cost of construction, operation, and maintenance is lower than that estimated for the tariff setting, a condition that occurs in "the tender" because the data, also inaccurate, correspond to the year 2008. Therefore, all users would be harmed, as well as the country's competitiveness, by having to pay an overprice for the service being provided. This could result in the concessionaire, having a tariff previously assigned, being able to make changes in the design and functionality of the work to lower costs and yet maintain the tariff offered. It anticipates that the Costa Rican State could be sued and could have to compensate the damages and prejudices caused by the loss of profit from the tariff that was offered and accepted in the concession contract. Regarding these allegations, it should be indicated that from the outset and in thesis of principle, a reasonable doubt may arise about the standing (legitimación) of CANABA and SINTRAJAP to invoke a distortion in the balance of the economic-financial equation of the contract. The foregoing since it could be said that the only one who would be entitled to claim such distortion is precisely the concessionaire in favor of whom—or against whom—the tariffs for the TCM service are set. From the perspective of exercising a right of reaction to the adjustment of the contractual economic terms, that position would be technically correct, if what is intended is to declare the imbalance as a prerequisite for a tariff adjustment to return to the agreed profitability rates. However, this Tribunal considers that the plaintiffs' concern is directed not at the exercise of a right that in thesis of principle would correspond to the concessionaire—one might think exclusively—but in the sphere of the incidences that this contractual aspect could generate in the legal sphere of potential users or recipients of the public service. From that perspective, this Tribunal does not observe any defect in the framework of the active standing (legitimación activa) of the claimant.

The objection raised indeed fits from the perspective of possible economic adjustments to the contract via tariffs, or eventually through indemnification—due to claims of public contractual liability—which, by their economic impact on the service, would affect the project's end users. In this type of concession contract, it must be understood that the service relationship is tripartite, for although the granting Administration signs a public contract with a delegated service provider—concessionaire—so that in cases such as this one, it designs, builds, finances, operates, exploits, and maintains a container port terminal, the truth of the matter is that this bond is issued for the satisfaction of a public service directed toward the end users thereof. Certainly, the obligatory commitment arises between the grantor and the concessionaire, but far from constituting a classic contractualist binomial, it consists of the service delegation of a service whose end users—and ultimate justifying cause—are the users thereof. Hence, the national legal system establishes, as a derivation of the democratic principle, mechanisms for citizen or public participation in the oversight of these contracts. The design of Ley No. 7593 (Ley ARESEP) regarding tariff adjustment procedures provides evidence of this synergy. This is, therefore, a triangular relationship, since ultimately, the delegated service is directed at the users, who pay a tariff, set by the grantor in this case—unlike other contracts in which such authority falls to ARESEP—but which must be paid by the users, so that the concessionaire obtains the remuneration agreed upon in the contract. Such a connotation appears in the teleological dimension of the contract, which seeks to satisfy the public interests of the end users, to the point that improper service provision to those recipients of the administrative transaction's effects may lead to the cancellation of the concession, or else, to its recovery or the application of the established sanctioning regime. In the specific case of Ley No. 7762, it can even be observed that within Chapter III, Rights and Obligations of the Parties, Section III, Article 19, refers to the rights of users, which makes the aforementioned triangular relationship incontrovertible. This being the case, CNC's claim regarding the lack of standing on this aspect is not shared. However, once again, the claimant's arguments fail to concretely formulate sound and specific objections regarding alleged imperfections in the contracting process that would justify its annulment. To that end, it is necessary to make brief clarifications regarding the right in question.

XX.- Regarding the right to economic equilibrium. The legal system of administrative contracting grants the awardee or contractor a right to the economic equilibrium of the contract. This is a right deriving from the constitutional principle of the inviolability of assets (ordinals 33, 45, and 50 of the Magna Carta) and is aimed at maintaining equity in the distribution of contractual burdens, specifically regarding the economic and financial area of the contract, ensuring that the operator maintains the level of profitability initially agreed upon, or at least, that normal economic conditions persist. This equilibrium allows, on the one hand, granting the contractor the fair profit for providing a service, carrying out a work, or generally, fulfilling the object for which it was contracted. In the case of transportation contracts, which are characterized by successive performance, this level of financial health and economic equity is decisive for the proper execution of the agreed activity. An imbalance in the price structure of a service of this nature would entail a detriment to the operator's assets with the correlative benefit without legitimate cause to the granting or bidding Administration, as these are activities whose remuneration is below the due financial equilibrium. Conversely, a price readjustment to a quantitative level higher than fair would lead to unjust enrichment on the part of the contractor and to the detriment of the public interest, by paying a price higher than that which allows the agreed profit. Hence, a fair equilibrium allows the development of the activity for the benefit of the end user and the harmonious fulfillment of the duties assumed in the contracting. Ultimately, the price adjustment, when applicable, is a manifestation of the duty to comply with what was agreed upon (canon 15 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa); ergo, it is a duty of the Administration, not a power, that is, as long as the conditions justifying the readjustment are present, the Administration is obligated to order the increase to maintain the conditions originally agreed upon and thus satisfy a right that the same legislation grants to the contractor. This right is regulated in precept 18 of the aforementioned Ley de Contratación Administrativa, which relevantly states: "Article 18.- Maintenance of the economic equilibrium of the contract. Except when different parameters are expressly stipulated in the terms of the respective bidding documents (cartel), in contracts for works, services, and supplies, with persons or companies in the construction industry, the Administration shall readjust prices, increasing or decreasing them, when direct or indirect costs, strictly related to the work, the service, or the supply, vary, through the application of mathematical equations based on the official price and cost indices compiled by the Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Commerce. (...)" In the current context, it is further developed in numeral 31 of the Regulations to said law. As observed, the legislator started from the primary right of price readjustment as a way to maintain financial equilibrium in the contract. For such purposes, different forms of economic adjustment may well be established in the respective bidding documents (cartel) or in the contract itself, that is, economic updating of the contract, through mechanisms agreed upon between the parties, always remaining subject to the rules already established. However, this economic equilibrium must be guaranteed in the event of the concurrence of various causes that produce an alteration in the contract's order. Therefore, the contracting Administration must ensure this harmony when the effect of instability originates as a derivation of modifications it has ordered in the contract's regime or decisions that directly or indirectly affect it, as would be the case of unilateral modifications, which constitutes what is known as ius variandi. But furthermore, it must be safeguarded against acts of other Administrations that affect contractual execution (theory of the fait du prince) or when unforeseeable causes arise that make the contract financially unsustainable (theory of unforeseeability). Of course, those situations inherent to the risk or venture typical of the contracted activity, which in normal terms must be tolerated by the contractor as they form part of the aleatory element inherent to any activity susceptible to economic exploitation, would not be subject to consideration as sources for price readjustment. In that dimension, variations originating from circumstances foreseeable at the time of submitting the economic proposal, in principle, are not covered within the need for readjustment. Regarding the content of the price readjustment theory, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has had the opportunity to issue relevant rulings that provide an exhaustive development on the subject. Among many, in Voto 6432-1998 of 10:30 a.m. on September 4, 1998, it stated: "The readjustment of the contract price is identified with the principle of its revision, to temper it to the economic reality of the moment, which is done by three distinct means recognized both by Public Law doctrine and that which informs our legal system: the cláusula rebus sic stántibus, the theory of unforeseeability (imprevisión), and the theory of unjust enrichment. The three means aim to introduce a note of equity into the contractual relationship, which can preserve the harmony of the opposing interests of the contracting parties, while maintaining the equivalence of the committed obligations and equality regarding risks. The most qualified doctrine on administrative contracting is unanimous in affirming that the recognition of price variations is not a power of the State but an obligation, since the incidence of higher costs is of public order, as is everything concerning the recognition of consequences derived from the theory of unforeseeability (imprevisión). (...) In summary, price readjustments do not constitute compensation voluntarily recognized and paid by the State to the contractor, but rather, a legal mechanism for restoring the real value of the obligation, for restoring the financial equilibrium of the contract, so that what was previously agreed upon is paid, that is, it is the integral payment of the price, so that there is neither harm to the contractor, nor undue enrichment on the part of the State." XXI.- Now then, in the specific context of the present matter, in light of the summarized allegations, the alleged deficiencies are not observed. Indeed, the issue of the existence or non-existence of the financial feasibility study has already been the subject of extensive treatment, making it unnecessary to address it again, and reference must be made to what has already been stated. It must be indicated, however, that the claim for nullity of clause 6.2 must be dismissed, as it is the logical consequence of the analysis on the substantive issue already presented by this Chamber. Now then, the aspect of maintaining the economic equilibrium of the contract is dealt with not only in Articles 17 and 40 of Ley No. 7762, but also in Chapter 12 of the contract (included within the respective bidding documents (cartel)), entitled "OF THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ECONOMIC-FINANCIAL EQUILIBRIUM OF THE CONTRACT." Apart from the absence of the technical, economic, and environmental feasibility study, the claimants do not explain how the regulatory provisions of the contract could end up violating, to the detriment of potential users, that economic equilibrium and the impact that these distortions could generate on the tariffs that, in theory, they must pay for the supply of port services for loading and unloading containers. Beyond what has been indicated, no substantive argument is provided that would lead this Tribunal to conclude on the unlawfulness of the treatment that the contractual provisions give to the issue of the aforementioned financial equilibrium, such that one could at least infer an excessive advantage in favor of the concessionaire, or an objective risk that could harm the rights of the users of the TCM. Again, a structure proposed from the bidding documents (cartel) phase is challenged, without CANABA having challenged that specific act after several rounds of objection appeals. To this end, reference is made to what was stated regarding the preclusion that has operated to question the conditions of the bidding documents (cartel), without prejudice to the analysis that, regarding each issue presented, has been carried out in this ruling. It must be insisted, the same bidding document conditions, not timely challenged, indicate the duty of potential offerors to carry out their own projections to conclude on the sufficiency of the contract and participate. This is not an absurd provision as the plaintiffs claim, but rather aspects that, in the logic of the project, as proposed by the grantor, are inherent to the type of contract to be signed and the selected management model. On the other hand, the State's argument is relevant to this Tribunal when it points out that in a contract that includes the design of the work, it is not feasible to attempt an estimation of the project's real costs. Indeed, since part of the contract is the design, it makes no technical sense to attempt a projection of the project's real costs when, despite the existence of profiles of what the TCM is to be, the final design is not yet available, which, it is recalled, must include the consideration of the environmental variable—already analyzed. The same must be noted regarding the claim of outdated data (2008) from the Plan Maestro, when it has already been indicated that this data was subsequently adjusted by the firm Royal Haskoning and, later, in the tariff authority, considered again for the opinion that ARESEP must render in these fields of tariffs and quality of service. This topic will be detailed below. Regarding the higher profit margin due to changes in the work design and cost savings, this is a topic only mentioned, without evidentiary or argumentative support, so it must be summarily dismissed, as it constitutes mere speculation which, in any case, should it materialize, valid options exist to request the adjustment of tariffs so that the commitments made and the agreed profitability are respected with the same level of service quality and infrastructure level (qualitative and quantitative). Similarly, the allegation of potential administrative liability frameworks for economic disequilibrium is based on conjecture which, due to the abstract manner in which it is presented, does not merit further examination and must be rejected, as it is clear that the duties and rights of the parties lead to the possibility of breaches that must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. In any case, it is insisted, in those cases, one must adhere to the clauses on risk allocation, the right to economic equilibrium, among multiple factors, for the distortion may well fall within the freely assumed risks. For the adjustment of a potential disequilibrium in this case, it is worth noting, by resolution No. RRG430-2010 of 11:00 a.m. on July 22, 2010, ARESEP set the parameters for tariff adjustments and quality criteria. Regarding the adjustment parameters, it indicated that in the event of financial alterations, valid adjustment mechanisms to balance said equation would be the following: tariff review or adjustment, payment for economic and social development works in Limón, review or adjustment of the investment schedule, additional works or equipment in the port, a combination of the foregoing. -folios 796-801 of the ARESEP administrative file. It is not feasible, therefore, ab initio, to raise speculations about future liabilities for economic disequilibrium and, from that, seek the nullity of the project, when the contract contains clear provisions on the manner of addressing potential imbalances in the economic-financial equation, as well as in the binding opinion of ARESEP—already mentioned. Ergo, the rejection of the allegation under examination must be ordered.

[…] XXV.- Regarding the creation of a monopoly with the operation of the TCM. CANABA considers that Chapter 9.1 of the bidding documents (cartel) is contrary to numeral 46 of the Magna Carta as it establishes a monopoly. It cites ruling No. 08367-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). It points out that the public bidding (licitación) does not meet the requirement of the best offer and free competition (libre concurrencia). A public bidding existed that it considers a mere disguise, as there is no true intention for several specialized companies to achieve effective participation, thus the tender becomes a monopoly opposed to free competition (libre concurrencia). Regarding this particular, it should be noted that condition 9.1 of the bidding documents (cartel) states in essence: "According to the specialization proposed by the Plan Maestro that the TCM will be the specialized terminal for handling containers of the Limón/Moín Port Complex, and the sole entity responsible for attending 'Full Containers Vessels' destined for the import and export of cargo to and from Costa Rica, according to phases 2 and 3 of the Plan Maestro Portuario that serves as reference." -folio 3250 of the judicial file- The model presented in the procedure seeks specialization in the operation of a container port terminal in Moín, in accordance with the parameters established by the Plan Maestro developed by the company Royal Haskoning, in line with phases 2 and 3 of that plan. The cited document, in numeral 64. -folio 335 of the judicial file-, recommends three phases for the development of Puerto Moín, defined based on traffic projections, an estimation of the realistically required timeframe for completion, and operational analyses. From this perspective, Phase 1 integrates: a) increasing the capacity of existing infrastructure through the installation of equipment, construction of a new Oil Terminal, construction of a relatively light dock for general cargo; b) preparation of the concession and construction of a new port west of the present port, which includes: preparation of the preliminary design, preparation of the bidding documents (pliegos de licitación), preparation of the public bidding (licitación pública) process to attract a concessionaire, signing of the contract with the concessionaire, and construction of the breakwater and Phase 2. Meanwhile, Phase 2 includes: a) transfer of all cargo from Limón to Moín and handling of containers at the new port. Finally, Phase 3 includes the extension of the container dock by an additional 600 meters. The public bidding (licitación pública) procedure 2009LI-000001-0200 includes matters relating to phases 2 and 3, in the terms already indicated. On this aspect, the public bidding (licitación) aims to grant a concession for public works with public services (concesión de obra pública con servicios públicos) whose object, as has been stated, is the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the TCM. Ergo, it is a contract for the indirect provision of a public service and construction of a public work. From this perspective, regarding the claim of CANABA and SINTRAJAP about the existence of a monopoly, it is necessary to clarify that this Tribunal examines the matter from the perspective of the validity of the actions taken in the administrative sphere, using Constitutional Law as the control parameter, a source that, as ordered by Article 8 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, 6, 11, 13, 19, 128, 158 of Ley No. 6227/78 and canon 7 of the Magna Carta itself, as well as ordinal 138, subsection d of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. It is not, therefore, an analysis undertaken in the context of the concentrated constitutional control established by ordinal 10 of the Constitución Política, but rather an examination of substantial conformity with the legal system, of certain public conduct, a system that includes written and unwritten legal sources of public law. This clarification made, it should be noted that the pathology pointed out by the proponents does not exist in the actions taken. Indeed, the same resolution No. 8367-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), on which the plaintiff bases its objection, highlights the validity and legitimacy of a delegated (indirect) service provision management system for public services. There is no defect in the choice of this model of delegated provision of public service competencies. On the contrary, the same numeral 121, subsection 14 of the Magna Carta establishes a system of concessions for the exploitation of public domain assets (bienes demaniales) and, in general, the delegation of that service provision exercise. Of course, the selection of the concessionaire must be carried out in accordance with the procedures and requirements that the legislator establishes for each case, among these, the public bidding (licitación pública) procedure, in which, clearly, all the principles and requirements inherent to this matter must be safeguarded, including free competition (libre concurrencia), equality, the most favorable offer (oferta más favorable), among others. The compatibility of this public management model with Constitutional Law has been extensively analyzed by the Constitutional Court, and this collegiate body does not consider that in this specific case, there is any criterion allowing a departure from what was ordered by that Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), criteria with which the views expressed herein coincide. Thus, on the subject, it was indicated in Voto No. 5895-2005: "V.- CONFUSION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACT TO PROVIDE A PUBLIC SERVICE WITH A MONOPOLY. In the approach of the present amparo action, there lies a confusion between the administrative contract entered into for the 'provision of services for the creation and operation of stations for integrated vehicle technical inspection' and a monopoly. Public services, which are always publicly owned and, consequently, must be provided by a public entity or its organs, can be managed by them directly or indirectly. Direct management of a public service occurs when the public entity and its organs have sufficient human, financial, budgetary, material, and technological resources or means to provide it to the community immediately and directly, without any type of intermediation, organizing it and deploying the course of business required or demanded to satisfy public needs. On occasions, public entities and their organs, despite being the owners of a public service, do not have the sufficient management and investment capacity to provide it, whether due to budgetary deficiencies or limitations in resources and means; in such situations, recourse may be had to the administrative contract for the provision of services or the concession of public service (concesión de servicio público) so that a private individual provides it. Now then, in order for a subject of private law to provide a public service through a concession or a service provision contract, the public entity owning it must open, by constitutional imperative (Article 182 of the Constitución Política), an administrative contracting procedure called public bidding (licitación pública), which guarantees free competition (libre concurrencia), participation, equality of all potential and eventual offerors, as well as the transparency and publicity of the process; but, above all, its objective is for the public entity to choose the best offer formulated from a financial and technical standpoint. Once the public bidding (licitación pública) is awarded, whose object is the provision or management of a public service, the respective contract must be formalized, transferring to it, temporarily or provisionally—for the time equivalent to the duration of the contract—a series of public powers, without the public entity ever losing ownership of the service, such that it possesses broad powers of oversight and supervision and may rescind or terminate the service provision contract or unilaterally rescue the concession of public service (concesión de servicio público), assuming any eventual asset-related liabilities vis-à-vis the co-contractor or concessionaire, when it deems that the service is not being provided effectively and efficiently, or the contractual object is not being fully met. It is evident that an administrative contract for the provision of services or for the concession of public services (concesión de servicios públicos) does not entail the constitution of a monopoly, since, if that were the case, one would fall into the legal absurdity of maintaining that, absolutely, all contracts entered into by public entities for the supply of goods, the construction of public works, the concession or interested management of a public service, etc. would imply the constitution of a monopoly, with the consequent harmful and counterproductive effects for the effective and efficient administrative management, the protection of the general interest, and the adequate and timely satisfaction of the community's needs." The terms of that ruling make it unnecessary to elaborate further on the subject. Suffice it to note that public services, in themselves, are activities whose ownership corresponds to the Administration, which may delegate them to a third party in accordance with the indicated parameters. From this perspective, the claim of implementation of a monopoly regarding those delegated public services is not valid. Nevertheless, it is argued that the monopoly arises from the appearance of a public bidding (licitación) that seeks to minimize the participation of other offerors. In strict technical terms, the defects claimed by the proponents are not characteristic of a claim of creating a monopoly, but rather of a violation of the principles of administrative contracting, specifically, free competition (libre concurrencia), equality, transparency, and publicity. However, the complaint is limited to accusing the injury to these maxims, without providing any detail, beyond the claim that the procedure was constituted as a disguise, to support its objections. No specific reasons are given for actions or omissions that may have led to the breach of these principles, which prevents this Tribunal from undertaking a serious examination of what is alleged. Indeed, it must be reiterated, injury to the principles of administrative contracting must be invoked in the objection appeal (recurso de objeción) against the bidding documents (cartel), which was not done by CANABA. Nevertheless, it was already indicated in previous sections of this ruling that no injury to the indicated maxims was observed. The fact that only one company submitted an offer cannot be considered incontrovertible evidence of what is alleged. The principle of equality and free competition (libre concurrencia), regulated by ordinal 5 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, seeks to prevent the establishment of barriers in administrative contracting procedures to the participation of the greatest number of offerors, so that the bidding Administration has more options allowing it to concretize the maxim of the most favorable offer (oferta más favorable). However, this Tribunal shares the State's arguments in pointing out that this principle cannot guarantee that, in fact, multiple offers will be submitted, since the decision whether or not to participate in a public tender concerns only private parties and depends on a series of factors that are not for this ruling to analyze. Nevertheless, even in cases where only one sealed bid (plica) is submitted to the tender, to the extent that this proposal meets the requirements that the bidding Administration seeks to satisfy with the procedure, the award may well be made, since in such cases, upon compliance with the requirements imposed for those purposes, the offer is deemed favorable. Likewise, even if a plurality of offers had been submitted, if, in the Administration's judgment, none of them satisfies the public interest underlying the public bidding (licitación), it may declare the tender void (desierto) and not award it, as inferred from ordinal 86 of the Regulations to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H of September 27, 2006. This same treatment is set forth in ordinal 29 of Ley No. 7762, in that the award of the contract includes the maxim of the most favorable offer (oferta más favorable) and the possibility of declaring a tender void (concurso desierto) in the following sense: "The contract shall be awarded obligatorily to the bidder who formulates the best economic offer from among those declared technically acceptable, according to the formula defined in the bidding documents (cartel), without prejudice to the power of the granting administration to reject all offers for not being in the public interest. The offers submitted in tenders declared void (desiertos) or all offers rejected, shall lapse together with the tender." Thus, the breadth of offers submitted in quantitative terms, or the formulation of a single offer, is not a conclusive parameter to assert that the principle of free competition (libre concurrencia) and most favorable offer (oferta más favorable) has been safeguarded or harmed. It is true that the plaintiffs have postulated throughout this process that the bidding document provisions failed to comply with the feasibility studies mandated by precept 21 of Ley No. 7762, and thereby deprived the participation of other offerors; however, a conclusion has been reached on the non-existence of that defect. Therefore, these allegations are conjectures made by the plaintiffs that are directed, again, at proposing what, from their perspective, the procedure should have been, but this intentionality does not lead, as proposed, to the nullity of the actions taken. In the present case, the tender rules were duly publicized, subjected to several rounds of objection appeals (recursos de objeción), the bidding documents (cartel) were modified on several occasions thanks to those challenge measures, so it is not explained how what occurred in this procedure violates the commented principles. It is a public project requiring a high financial commitment due to the investment to be made in works and associated actions, which, of course, within a framework of strict logic, may influence the decision of third parties to participate in this type of tender. This Tribunal does not observe, therefore, any bidding document (cartel) provision that entails barriers to access to the public contracting procedure being challenged in the terms alleged by the plaintiffs; consequently, the rejection of the charge is required.

XXVI.- Regarding the impact on the country's competitiveness with the operation of the TCM and the impact on the banana sector. CANABA argues that the operation of the TCM will bring a significant impact on costs, which will place local fruit in a situation that prevents it from competing internationally, with the inevitable closure of the business and loss of hundreds of jobs in the most needy areas of the country. It claims that the cost increase will be approximately 160%.

Regarding this matter, it is worth mentioning that there is no doubt for this Court, nor is it the subject of discussion in this case, the relevance that the Costa Rican banana and pineapple export sector has for the public economy. However, it is precisely the dynamics and relevance of the demand mobilizations for these fruits that is one of the aspects that has supported the TCM project. Note that the basic proposal of the Master Plan is precisely the improvement of the port infrastructure in Moín through the establishment of 3 phases. Within this schedule, the technical studies have weighed the transactions and market situation of pineapple and banana. Precisely, in the tariff consultation, data related to these levels of cargo mobilization were updated, to adjust costs in such a way that the financial model would allow for the investment of nearly $998 million and the costs inherent to the operation and maintenance of the TCM. Although the tariff initially proposed was $169, later set at $223, even though ARESEP recommended a maximum tariff of $252, this adjustment was due precisely to the updating of data. In itself, the reproach seeks to challenge the established tariff, an issue already addressed, regarding the technical justification provided by ARESEP. That said, the plaintiff herself accepts the need to modernize the ports she uses for the development of her commercial activities, while expressing her disagreement with the costs that must be paid for these services to the cargo and the vessel. As was rightly pointed out in the single hearing within this process, according to data provided by ECLAC, Costa Rica ranks 15th in the Latin American ranking of container port movement (as recognized, for example, by witness Karla Piedra Alfaro and can be seen on the ECLAC website according to a query made on July 31, 2012, at 2:00 p.m. http://www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/Transporte/noticias/noticias/1/42881/P42881.xml&xsl=/Transporte/tpl/p1f.xsl&base=/Transporte/tpl/top-bottom.xsl). However, in the World Economic Forum ranking, considering port infrastructure service, Costa Rica ranks 132nd. From this perspective, it is evident that given the level of use of the services, it is understandable that some commercial agents prefer to maintain the current conditions of the ports and not their modernization. However, it is clear that within the port modernization project, phases 2 and 3 of the Master Plan demonstrate the relevance of the TCM. In the single hearing, the argument was raised that the current infrastructure of the Limón docks, accompanied by improvements and the provision of gantry cranes, would allow for obtaining the same benefit projected with the TCM. In this regard, reference can be made to the deposition of Mr. Luis Vargas Araya, who stated that Muelle 57 can assume that operation. However, these intentions refer to decisions regarding the port management model. As has been indicated, this service can be provided directly, as has been done by JAPDEVA, or indirectly, through concession contracts. The decision to maintain direct operation or opt for indirect operation is a matter of discretion, which, although subject to rules of science and technique, logic and convenience, and therefore controllable by this Court, its illegitimacy depends on the accreditation of the departure of those actions from the legal system. However, this has not been accredited in this case. Arguments of loss of competitiveness are raised that are antagonistic to the very purpose of the project, assuming that loss in a comparison of tariff costs, through a calculation, which it is insisted, is made on the basis of references that do not maintain the same conditions and that, therefore, their comparability depends on adding to the current tariff for JAPDEVA services, the inputs that are included unitarily in the TCM tariff. Without such an exercise, the comparison would be otherwise biased. For this, it is insisted, one must not only consider the rate for services to the cargo and the vessel, but also the additional costs for services provided by JAPDEVA, such as on-site loading and unloading, shipping cost for delays, as well as private stevedoring tariffs. Moreover, this comparison scheme should be carried out on a projected basis, bringing the current value of the JAPDEVA tariff to the historical moment when the TCM concession begins operations, in principle, projected for 2015, given that the economic burden of $223 of the latter is a value that will be exigible on the start date of operations. This calculation is absent in the formulated reproaches.

[…]

XXVIII.- Regarding the allegation of invalidity of the TCM for non-compliance with phase 1. In the closing arguments phase, CANABA's representative indicates that the master plan is a three-phase project that had to be completed in order; first the rehabilitation of Muelle 57 and then phases 2 and 3, these phases being the ones that could be tendered. It is by an arbitrary act of the Administration that phase 1 is removed and phases 2 and 3 are addressed. SINTRAJAP holds the same argument, indicating in that same closing arguments phase that the Master Plan proposed 3 phases. The first phase included the construction of the additional Muelle 57. Phases 2 and 3 were to be carried out after completing phase 1, which according to the master plan is urgent and is the fastest way to satisfy the public service. All the evidence demonstrates that the master plan is not being fulfilled as it was proposed by Royal Haskoning. To date, there is no document proving that the AP justified the changes made to the master plan, with the particularity that phases 2 and 3 were divided into five sections without completing phase 1, even though it should have been mostly ready in 2011. The legal representative of SINTRAJAP adds, all the evidence demonstrates that the master plan is not being fulfilled as it was proposed by Royal Haskoning. To date, there is no document proving that the AP justified the changes made to the master plan, with the particularity that phases 2 and 3 were divided into five sections without completing phase 1, even though it should have been mostly ready in 2011. He argues that it was accredited that serious non-compliance occurred. Phase 1 was not completed. Regarding the issue, it is worth highlighting, it is clear, as has been indicated, that the tender has been largely based on the content of the Master Plan for the Limón/Moín port development carried out by the company Royal Haskoning. As indicated ut supra, that plan, in section 64. -folio 335 of the judicial file-, recommends three phases for the development of Puerto Moín, defined based on traffic projections, a realistic estimate of the time required for completion, and operational analyses. From this perspective, Phase 1 integrates a) increasing the capacity of the existing infrastructure through the installation of equipment, construction of a new Oil Terminal, construction of a relatively light dock for general cargo; b) preparation of the concession and construction of a new port to the west of the current port which includes: preparation of the preliminary design, preparation of the tender documents, preparation of the public tender process to attract a concessionaire, signing of the contract with the concessionaire, and construction of the breakwater and Phase 2. For its part, Phase 2 includes: a) transfer of all cargo from Limón to Moín and handling of containers in the new port. Finally, Phase 3 includes the extension of the container dock by an additional 600 meters. The public tender procedure 2009LI-000001-0200 includes matters related to phases 2 and 3, in the terms already indicated. There is no doubt whatsoever that as of the date of initiation of the tender in question, the competent authorities had not complied with the cited plan regarding the works and investments to be carried out for phase 1, which sought the modernization of the so-called Muelle 57. Even within the single hearing held in this preferential proceeding, JAPDEVA's legal representative offered new documentary evidence, visible at folios 5276-5392 of the judicial file, consisting of documentary pieces that demonstrate the initiation of concrete actions to try to fulfill the tasks specific to the cited phase 1. Thus, it includes an agreement for the lifting of the strike in Limón (f.5276-5277), tender documents for a public tender with financing for the supply and commissioning of a new rail-mounted container gantry crane at Puerto Moín (f. 5278-5323), correction to Agreement No. 1004-2011 pertaining to tender documents for the port equipment reach stacker, trailers, and heads, referring to the public tender with financing 2011LN-000000-00 (f. 5323-5355), tender documents for public tenders under the financing mechanism for the acquisition of port equipment (f. 5356-5392). Now then, for this Court, it is necessary to call the attention of JAPDEVA and the CNC to the need to adopt concrete actions that allow for the fulfillment of phase 1 as provided for in the aforementioned Master Plan. The relevance of the modernization of that port terminal is as important as the establishment of the public works project intended with the TCM project. In fact, this Court estimates that the completeness of the integral functionality of that work will be achieved with the operability foreseen for Muelle 57, according to the design provided in the Master Plan. In this manner, the coherence of public actions requires directing the necessary efforts to materialize those works of phase 1, complementary to the action frameworks projected within the scheme and schedule of phases 2 and 3. Hence, it is necessary to call the attention of the public authorities regarding their legal obligations in this regard. Indeed, the Master Plan encompasses the port of Moín but has important connotations for the port of Limón. The first phase involved the construction of the oil berth, berth 57, and equipping of the ports. In the context of the Master Plan, it was for immediate implementation, and was projected to be completed in the year 2011, since there was no existing port on the coast that could address the port problem. The second phase is what is called the TCM, which is a new port. It is planned between 2016 and 2020. The Plan indicates that it will operate when cargo handling is transferred to Moín. According to the Plan, the importance of phase 1 was the immediacy of all the elements to do it quickly and efficiently. No other port solution could be implemented as quickly. The foregoing is evident from the reading itself of the document issued by the company Royal Haskoning, but also, it is evident from the deposition of Mr. Luis Vargas Araya, presented by SINTAJAP as a witness-expert. Under this lens, the cited witness considered that the main problems of the Limón Moín complex that would be solved by phase 1 were the reduction of the occupancy rate, since there would be one more berth, in addition to the equipment. The foregoing demonstrates the relevance of completing phase 1 in the shortest time possible. However, although this body respects the thesis of the claimants, it does not share the approach taken regarding the invalidity of the decisions adopted in the context of phases 2 and 3, due to phase 1 not having been completed. Indeed, from the analysis conducted of the documentary evidence, specifically, the Master Plan, as well as the testimonial deposition of Mr. L, J, and Mr. R, the inseparable link between phases 2 and 3, materialized through the tender under challenge, and phase 1, as expounded by the claimants, is not obtained. As has been indicated, the Plan is a single concept, however, the phases can be undertaken individually, because outside the framework of convenience, there is no insurmountable technical constraint to maintain that without phase 1 completed, actions for phases 2 and 3 could not be undertaken. From this perspective, the tender whose object is the TCM, while forming part of an integral project for the modernization of the ports, is not, in terms of validity, conditioned upon or dependent on the completion of phase 1. They are infrastructures that possess autonomy from each other, regardless of whether they maintain a link within the context of a unitary project. Under this context, the delay in the actions for fulfilling phase 1 would justify the delays or setbacks in the other phases, putting the overall intent of the entire project at risk. As has been indicated, certainly there has been a neglect of the works and equipment investments that support phase 1, however, this does not limit the legality of the contractual processes initiated in the context of the subsequent phases. It is, therefore, a desirable sequence, but not a mandatory one. Ergo, there is no ground for nullity in this course of action, while warning, in any case, of the need for JAPDEVA to immediately undertake actions to comply with the fulfillment plan for phase 1, without the implementation of the TCM constituting a reason to neglect works important for the national interest and, specifically, for the socio-economic development of the Atlantic Slope. On the other hand, regarding the allegation that Muelle 57, with some degree of investment, could temporarily perform the same port service provision tasks as the TCM, it is insisted, this is a public decision on the management model used for the development of a public service and the construction of a port work. One may well debate, on an eminently ideological plane, the benefits and disadvantages of each model (direct or indirect provision), however, such an analysis would be outside the scope of this dispute, insofar as the technical basis of what was decided by the public authorities has not been refuted, with the reproach becoming a debate of decisions and intentions, but not of the validity or lack thereof of those behaviors.

XXIX.- Regarding the modifications to the tender documents. In the closing arguments phase, the claimants reproach that in this public competition there were 13 variations to the tender documents, which reflects how non-transparent the process was. In itself, this reproach does not conform to the proper technique, as the claimants limit themselves to censuring the generic act of modifications to the tender documents, without providing any specific data or grievance regarding the manner in which these changes in the tender guidelines generate any degree of invalidity. As has been indicated ut supra, section 3 of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), in relation to canon 4 of Law No. 7762, establishes that in matters of public contracts, the regime of nullities shall be that regulated by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). From this perspective, it is worth clarifying that in the matter at hand, a principle of substantiality of nullities prevails, according to which only substantial defects that generate a state of defenselessness or deficiencies which, had they been avoided, would have allowed a different decision, can produce nullity of public conduct. This is evident from section 223 of the cited Law No. 6227/78. Note that section 128 of that legal body understands validity as substantial conformity with the legal system, and canon 158 ejusdem conceptualizes invalidity precisely as substantial non-conformity with that normative reference. From this perspective, it is not just any deficiency of the administrative act—of the public will—that leads to its suppression through nullity, but only that which, when confronted with the normative plexus that regulates that particular behavior, is substantially non-conforming. Thus, when the alleged defect is surmountable, because it does not fit within the indicated presupposition, it can be cured or validated, as established by precepts 187 and 188 of Law No. 6227/78. This doctrine also underlies the wording of section 197 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) in that it states, in relevant part: "... Nullity shall only be decreed when its pronouncement is absolutely indispensable to avoid defenselessness or to guide the normal course of the procedure. It shall also not prosper if it is possible to replenish the process or correct the action, without prejudice to other procedural acts. ..." In administrative procurement, a principle of efficiency and efficacy also prevails, by virtue of which, imperfections in the procedure do not annul the tender, unless they are substantial defects. Viewed thus, variations to the tender documents can only produce nullity of what has been done to the extent that procedures are substantially harmed or, in general, the principles inherent to administrative procurement are violated, including equality and free competition. According to what is prescribed by section 51 of Decree No. 33411-H "Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law" (Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), the tender documents consist of "... the specific regulation of the procurement being promoted, and all applicable legal norms and constitutional principles for the respective procedure are understood as incorporated into its clauses. It must constitute a body of technical specifications that are clear, sufficient, concrete, objective, and broad regarding the opportunity to participate. For its preparation, the Administration may hire or request the assistance of individuals or legal entities specialized in the matter in question, provided they have no direct or indirect particular interest in the business, when it does not have the necessary technical resources within its organization." Given these characteristics and utility for the procedure, it is customary in the context of complex public procurements such as the one analyzed in this ruling, to have modifications to that set of conditions, a faculty that is recognized in section 60 of the cited Decree No. 33411-H. It is worth indicating, however, that the tender documents can be modified ex officio or at the request of a party. In the latter hypothesis, variations may occur through the filing of the respective objection appeal (art. 81 Law No. 7494, 34 of Law No. 7762). Ergo, this Court does not observe how the mere variation of the tender documents can generate nullity, unless specific reasons are manifested that allow for the analysis of the impact on specific situations. It is insisted, to the extent that these alterations affect free competition, a defect would be configured that could lead to the nullity of what has been done, however, that would be a matter to be proven by the party invoking the cause of nullity. The tender documents must promote the greatest possible participation. By way of reference, regarding the prohibition of establishing conditions that violate freedom of competition, section 52 of Decree 33411-H indicates that "...The tender documents may not impose restrictions, nor demand compliance with requirements that are not indispensable or are not convenient to the public interest, if this limits the possibilities of competition to potential participants. ..." Consequently, the mere generic formulation and assertion to the effect that these modifications cause nullity is nothing more than a generic argument, typical of subjective assessments from which a hypothetical nullity is conjectured, which ultimately has not occurred, and which, moreover, does not provide this Court with concrete parameters for analysis. The same must be indicated regarding SINTRAJAP's argument concerning the lack of publication of the summary of the tender documents as per article 21.5 of Law No. 7762. In response to this argument, this collegiate body shares the statements of the CGR regarding the application of the principle of efficiency and efficacy in public procurement. The claimant limits itself to presenting this reproach from a formalistic standpoint without specifically indicating the manner in which the alleged omission of this step has generated a substantial defect that affects the protection of the principles of equality and free competition in public tenders. For this, one must refer to what was set forth above regarding the substantiality of nullities as an interpretive pillar within the analysis scheme of the validity of public conduct, as a derivation also of the maxims contained in sections 168 and 176 of Law No. 6227/78, which postulate the presumption of validity of acts. This argumentation and discursive construction that would allow concatenating what is alleged with the harmful effect of those supposed inaccuracies is lacking, which would be determinant and indispensable for approaching the deliberative exercise that would make it possible to arrive at a determination of the argued invalidity. Note that in the approval (refrendo) phase, the CGR itself did not detect substantial deficiencies in the tender process, which demonstrates the legal conformity of those actions. Certainly, CANABA's action is also directed against that approval act, however, given the existence of a technical analysis such as the one mentioned, the proper formulation of this charge, regardless of the analysis that will later be addressed regarding the cited comptroller's approval, required concrete propositions of nullity. In view of the imperfection of the argument therefore, and as no harm to the principles of procurement is evident from the analysis conducted by this Court, the rejection of the charge in question must consequently be ordered.

XXX.- Regarding the concessions granted by the grantor in the contract. The claimants reproach the invalidity of the concession contract, alleging that within it, a series of concessions or facilities were granted that were not present in the tender documents and which, had they been present, would have allowed the participation of a greater number of bidders. Regardless of the specific analysis of each of the supposed contractual deferments granted by the granting Administration, it is worth noting, once again, that the claim in this regard is limited to pointing out the existence of a hypothetical defect, without presenting an adequate technical construction of how these deficiencies could lead to nullity. Indeed, as has been demonstrated throughout this ruling, many of the claimants' arguments consist of generic discursive formulations in which a detailed and particularized analysis of the manner in which the defects they claim have effectively been produced, and in turn produce the degree of invalidity sought, is omitted. Certainly, in proceedings regulated by the Administrative Contentious Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), a principle of material truth of the facts prevails, according to sections 82 and 85 of that legal body. However, this principle operates for the evidentiary dynamics, and even in that topic, it does not mean that the process is inquisitorial in nature, where the judge can release or dispense the parties from their duty to prove the facts upon which they base their petitions. On the contrary, section 58 in relation to 63, both of the CPCA, establishes, together with section 317 of the Civil Procedure Code—of suppletory application by virtue of the integration clause of precept 220 CPCA—the principle of dynamic burden of proof, which requires the parties to have the duty to prove their facts or defenses. From the standpoint of annulment claims, this also implies the duty of the parties to precisely indicate the reasons and causes of invalidity of the conduct whose suppression is petitioned. This addresses the fact that, outside the cases provided for in section 182 of the LGAP, the judge cannot review ex officio the validity of public conduct. Even in the context of the analysis of related conduct, in certain cases such ex officio consideration would be pertinent, as is the case of nullity by accessoriness of canon 164.2 LGAP, but in others, it is necessary for the parties to invoke the grounds for nullity that must be considered. The opposite would lead to the simplism of requesting the judge to review the validity of a public act, so that, apart from the invoked causes, he analyzes all elements of it, thereby relieving the claimant of their duty of argumentation. Regarding the specific reproach, it is only indicated that if these incorporations had not occurred, more offers would have been contributed, but no detail is provided whatsoever as to how this effect would have been produced, in view of which, the reproaches under examination lack an empirical basis, being therefore mere speculations, conjectural formulations that are not supported by solvent elements, neither of argumentation nor of proof. For this, it would be imperative that the principle of free participation, equality, and competition be indeed violated, which has not been proven, but which in any event, as will be analyzed below, this Court does not deduce in the case at hand. Now then, it draws the attention of this collegiate body that the main parties affected by the alleged alteration to the principle of free competition did not appear in the process to raise such a circumstance. Indeed, no party interested in the development of the TCM project—a potential bidder—has come to this venue to point out the defect that the parties reproach. While this is not indicative of the non-existence of nullities, the truth of the matter is that it consists of a referential parameter that demonstrates the minimal impact produced on the effects of the right protected in article 5 of Law No. 7494. It is worth highlighting that this norm indicates: "In administrative procurement procedures, equal participation of all potential bidders shall be respected. /The regulations of this Law or the provisions governing the specific procedures for each procurement, may not include any regulation that impedes free competition among potential bidders. (...)" Thus, the alleged nullity could only be decreed when it is proven that this principle has been violated, which, it is insisted, has not happened here. Specifically, the following issues are presented which, according to the claimants, were not expressly stated in the tender documents: a) the possibility of presenting an alternative offer: from the review of the file and the diverse and abundant evidence presented in this case, the possibility of presenting an alternative offer is not located. The claimant parties do not point out this element specifically. On the contrary, APM Terminals' bid includes a discount offer that was accepted by the Administration; b) declaration of the project as being of public interest: it is not observed how this declaration, a discretionary power of the Administration, can generate an advantage that leads to the violation of free competition. It is clear that from the outset the project seeks to satisfy a public interest of relevance, as was set forth even from the master plan itself, and later in the tender documents themselves, reference is made to the public transcendence of the TCM project. Thus, one can see, v.gr., at folio 3202 verso of the judicial file, which contains clause 1.1 of the tender documents, "Justification of the tender process". In any case, the declaration of public interest for a project is a discretionary power of the Administration, which, by the way, has not been questioned here; c) commitment to cooperate in the processing of basic studies on waves and propagation, navigation studies, agitation, change of the coastline, soil and environmental studies, sources of materials: according to what is indicated in the tender documents and in the concession contract, issues already analyzed, these studies correspond to the concessionaire. However, it is undeniable that within public contracts, a duty of mutual collaboration is imposed for the correct execution of the contract, which of course does not imply a displacement of the obligations to be fulfilled in the contractual dynamic. In this manner, this duty of collaboration is an inherent part of the contract regardless of its formal expression within the contract. All these procedures are mandatory for the concessionaire, and the obligation of collaboration by the Administration exists, with or without written acceptance of its duty to collaborate. The commitment to collaborate is nothing more than that; it does not translate into patrimonial benefits of any kind and does not cause an undue advantage for the concessionaire; d) commitment to provide physical space on land for the installation of offices and a camp for the concessionaire during the construction stage: as argued by the CNC, this commitment does not constitute a transfer of public property, but rather an enablement of use that collaborates with and facilitates the inspection and control tasks regarding the destination, storage, and handling of materials. The claimants do not rebut the CNC's argument that this commitment was agreed upon to obtain a discount on the tariff for port services. This is evidenced, in this Court's judgment, by the fact that the tariff approved by ARESEP was $252, while the tariff incorporated into the contract—in the final version of the tender documents—was $223, which shows the verisimilitude of what was invoked by the CNC; e) collaboration in obtaining environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental) permits, Health permits, Water Authorization, electricity services, collaboration for the authorization of insurance policies and municipal permits: in view of the aforementioned duty of collaboration, it is clear that during the course of processing the obtaining of the VAL (definitive environmental feasibility), the concessionaire needs to obtain certifications, attestations, or information that the grantor must provide, therefore, no comparative advantage is observed that would lead to violating the principles mentioned above.

Similarly, given that a VAP (potential environmental viability) exists for the project as of this date, the procedures before financial entities require public information that public bodies must issue, and therefore it does not violate any principle. It must be remembered that the tender includes the financing of the port terminal, so this aspect requires due coordination and collaboration. In this way, the facilitation and collaboration provided for this particular matter is not spurious as alleged; f) The State would cooperate by designating the site for the disposal of dredged material not used as fill: it is an ordinary task of the State to approve the disposal site for these materials, hence no extraordinary commitment is acquired, nor any advantage not foreseen in the tender documents such as to modify the intention of participating or not in the proceeding; g) The State would designate the source of extraction of materials for fill if required for the construction of the TCM: the contract refers to an indirect management of public works, however, it must not be lost from sight that this is a work owned by the State (in a broad sense), and therefore it is necessary that it authorize the source of materials that might become necessary for construction, without this constituting an additional cost for the State or an advantage in terms of the tender for the concessionaire. In addition to that, as the CNC mentions, such authorizations would be subject to the regulations of the Reglamento para la actividad minera del Estado y sus contratistas, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 19789-MIRENEM of June 25, 1990, published in La Gaceta No. 145 of August 3, 1990; h) that the State would provide all the necessary facilities for the extraction and disposal of dredged material and for obtaining permits from the MINAET and SETENA: that commitment is inherent to the aforementioned duty of collaboration. Once the permits are obtained, it would be naive to think of the impropriety of that duty of collaboration, which, it is insisted, is a principle. Thus, it does not incorporate any comparative advantage that constitutes an advantage in a way that violates equality and free competition; i) that the State would request the authorization for exploitation required from the Department of Mines of MINAET in favor of the concessionaire: as has been indicated, this matter is regulated by Decreto No. 19789-MIRENEM, which finds no exception for being public works contracts or an advantage in favor of the concessionaire, ergo it is the State that is the owner of the work and who must petition those authorizations; j) that the State commits to starting provisional operations with the first berth of a phase 2A that did not exist in the tender documents: this eventuality allows the putting into operation of a first berth before the dates foreseen in the tender documents, which represents an advantage in favor of the potential users of the TCM, who could use this system voluntarily while the definitive and total transfer by specialization criterion of full container transport has not yet occurred. This Court does not consider that it constitutes an element that supports the requested nullity. Thus, in summary, the rejection of this charge must be ordered. In any case, reference must be made to what was stated regarding the principle of efficiency within administrative contracting procedures, which seeks the selection of the most suitable offer for the public interest, substance prevailing over form.

XXXI.- On the impact on this proceeding of the report issued by the Legislative Assembly. The claimants present to the proceeding as documentary evidence a report issued by the Legislative Assembly, titled "Informe Especial que investigará y Analizará todos los Procesos de Concesión que ha otorgado el Estado costarricense, o esté por otorgar al amparo de la Ley No. 7762 y su modificación parcial contenida en la Ley No. 8643. Informe APM Terminals Central América." In this document, visible at folios 4134-4290 of the judicial file (volume VII), a diagnosis is carried out by that Branch of the Republic on the terms under which the concession of the TCM was granted within the international public tender 2009LI-000001-0200. That document performs an extensive analysis of said contracting, weighing a series of issues that have been weighed in this ruling, among them, environmental feasibility (third part, pp. 54-86 of the cited report), appearance of the interested parties, and conclusions. These conclusions can be seen from folio 147 to 157 of that report (pages 4271-4281 of the judicial file). This Court has undertaken a thorough analysis of the complex and voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence that was admitted in this proceeding, including administrative and judicial files, within which, it has weighed with due rigor the deliberations recorded in the report issued by the Legislative Assembly. That is to say, it is a document that has been weighed by this Court in its examination of this case. However, despite the utmost respect for that exercise of political-parliamentary control, it is clear that it in no way conditions the analysis that this jurisdictional body is called upon to perform. That opinion is not binding for the decisions of this jurisdiction, given that there is no express rule that imbues the deliberations of that legislative instance with such strength and hierarchy. The principle of the autonomy of the judge, whose basis lies in the text of articles 153 and 154 of the Magna Carta (in relation to 166 ejusdem), supports the absence of a binding element in that documentary reference. Nevertheless, it has been considered as one more element of analysis in this case, contributed to enlarge and strengthen the elements of conviction to be considered for the decision finally adopted in this resolution. From that examination perspective, given that characteristic of not constituting a binding reference, it must be stated that what has been resolved so far does not fit for the most part with what that legislative analysis comprises, which, of course, does not cause any nullity in what has been resolved in this venue. Note that the same report warns of the existence of these judicial proceedings. The recommendations set forth therein are directed at public bodies that are sued in this cause, which is why, for the sake of clarity, a record is made of the due weighing of that report, which is not subject to challenge, but which also has not limited the analysis of this Court in this specific case.

[…] XXXIV.- On the alleged violation of the principles of contracting. In the first instance, CANABA alleges a violation of the principle of legality and transparency of procedures, arguing that none of the conditions imposed by the tender documents can be changed. This issue has already been addressed previously, noting that the complexity of these procedures requires, not infrequently, mutations or variations of the tender documents. However, once the contract is signed, the Administration has a set of exorbitant powers, among which is included the unilateral modification of the contract provided in Article 12 of Ley No. 7494. As the State argues, a thesis shared by this Court, every contract is subject to a principle of mutability that enables its adjustment to real conditions and context in order to ensure the due coverage of the public interest that sustains it. This has been recognized, among many, in judgment No. 998-98 of the Constitutional Chamber, in which regarding this principle it has been established that the administration has the necessary powers and prerogatives to introduce modifications to contracts, so that they fulfill the assigned public purpose that it must protect and achieve. Certainly, the contract, in principle, must be signed under the terms originally foreseen in the tender documents, but that does not prevent its modification to adjust it to the public interest in cases that so require. Even those variations may derive from the adaptability of conditions not weighed in the tender documents, or by the imperative of the Comptroller's approval (refrendo contralor). In sum, it has already been established that the variations to the tender documents in this public tender were carried out without detriment to the principles applicable to those tasks. Likewise, the final wording of the contract incorporates aspects included for reasons of convenience of the public interest, a topic in which it was already determined ut supra, there is no irregularity whatsoever. Moreover, again, it is a generic formulation, which does not specify the parts of the contract that violate the tender documents, beyond the topics already mentioned above. Which leads, without more, to the rejection of the charge. A violation of the principle of formalism of procedures is also alleged, stating that there must be a prior planning stage that has not occurred. On this particular, reference must be made to what has already been stated regarding that the present procedure includes the design of the works and not only their construction, which is clearly allowed by Article 1 of Ley No. 7762. On the other hand, it is reiterated, the Master Plan and the terms of the contracting include parameters of the design to be contracted, and therefore there is no violation of the stated principle. Principle of control of procedures. The absence of feasibility studies (estudios de factibilidad) to support the tender is alleged. This is a topic already resolved in this judgment, in which it has been concluded regarding compliance with the requirements set forth in Articles 9 and 21 of Ley No. 7762, for which reason, by parity of reasoning, that principle could not be infringed when the deficiency on which the claimant bases her claim has not been established. Principle of discretion of the Administration. At this point, an academic discourse is made on regulated and discretionary conducts, as well as the possibility of judicial control of discretionary powers, to sustain the possibility of analyzing the validity of the approval (refrendo). No argument to be analyzed at this point is provided, so its examination is not entered into. On Project finance, internal rate of return, and tariff system. At this point, the claimant reiterates the arguments already analyzed by this Court on the topic of project finance, feasibility studies, and criticisms regarding the tariff procedure carried out at ARESEP. The same plaintiff indicates that a reiteration of what was alleged in the initial filing is made, elaborating on the fact of the issuance of the approval (refrendo), without providing any novel element beyond theoretical references that add nothing to what has already been stated. Ergo, it suffices to refer to the analysis of those topics already addressed by this Court. The amplification actually provides a series of speculative data that serve as a basis for making a series of subjective formulations without a source of evidentiary accreditation, which, it is insisted, do not modify the examination already carried out on those points, including the topic of predicting demand mobilizations, an aspect also already analyzed. The same happens with the reiterated argument of the creation of a private monopoly in the provision of a public service, an aspect already treated with sufficient breadth, making it unnecessary to address it, a topic that includes the weighing of the non-violation of the principle of free competition solely because only one bid had been formulated. Regarding the argument of the relevance of the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) as a substantial requirement, it is an aspect already weighed extensively, so addressing it is futile.

XXXV.- On the regulation of the CGR's power of approval (refrendo) in public contracts. In light of the allegations made by the claimant regarding the Comptroller's approval (refrendo contralor), it is fitting to make some brief references about this institute or phase of administrative contracting. The constitutional competencies of the CGR are set forth in Article 184 of the Magna Carta, functions within which it is assigned a leading role in the control of public expenditure, guardianship of the public treasury, budgetary matters, among others. Nevertheless, its competencies are developed in another set of rules that seek to address those frameworks of action, such as Ley No. 7428 (Ley Orgánica de la CGR), Ley No. 8292, Ley No. 8131, Ley No. 8422, among others. In the tasks of administrative contracting, those competencies are developed with greater clarity in the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, No. 7494, in which it is assigned the competence, of interest here, to grant or deny the approval (refrendo) to public tender processes. The topic has been specifically developed in the so-called REGLAMENTO SOBRE EL REFRENDO DE LAS CONTRATACIONES DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA, No. R-CO-44-2007 from the Office of the Comptroller General, issued at 09:00 hours on October 11, 2007, published in La Gaceta No. 202 of October 22, 2007. On the relevance of the approval (refrendo) in the control of public contracting, in judgment No. 14421-2004, the Constitutional Chamber has stated, in what is relevant to the case: "Through the approval (refrendo), the Contraloría General de la República exercises oversight or control over the acts of passive subjects that may compromise the Public Treasury or public budgets, as a way to guarantee the correctness, transparency, and legality of expenditures that may be incurred. In the case of administrative contracts, the approval (referendo) takes place after the award decision is issued or after the contract perfection stage, that is, when the contract is valid because it is substantially in conformity with the legal system, so that the Contraloría General de la República, through that figure, examines and verifies that the clauses of the duly formalized contract conform to the block of legality, that is, to the tender documents which constitute the specific regulation or normative of the respective contract, the bid formulated, the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa and its regulations, and, in general, to the rest of the administrative legal system. The essential purpose or aim of the approval (refrendo) is to prevent the obligations contracted by public administrations in administrative contracts, duly recorded or formalized, from contravening the administrative legal system and, consequently, from producing an incorrectness or illegality in the disposition of public funds." Regarding the regulatory development of that task, the same Constitutional Court has indicated in judgment No. 2000-03027 of 09:03 hours on April 14, 2002: "IV.-ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHALLENGED REGULATION. The Reglamento sobre el refrendo de las contrataciones de la Administración Pública is not violative of the regulatory power recognized to the Executive Branch in subsections 3) and 18) of Article 140 of the Constitution, given that it is neither an executive regulation –according to the claimant's consideration–, but rather an autonomous regulation of organization or functioning, in that it seeks to issue norms and guidelines in order to carry out a competence that the Political Constitution itself grants it, that being the approval (refrendo) of contracts executed by the Public Administration. Thus, its legal-constitutional foundation and support do not derive from the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, nor from its Organic Law, but directly from Articles 182, 183, and 184 of the Political Constitution, and the constitutional principles that from these norms derive in relation to administrative contracting, in the terms previously stated by this Court, in judgment number 0998-98, at eleven thirty hours on February sixteen, nineteen ninety-eight (reiterated in judgments number 5947-98, at fourteen thirty-two hours on August nineteen; number 6432-98, at ten thirty hours on June four; and number 6754-98, at fifteen thirty-six hours on September twenty-two, all three of nineteen ninety-eight), which have been synthesized as follows: 'first: Article 182 of the Political Constitution enunciates the first constitutional obligation in matters of administrative contracting, by virtue of which, all contracts entered into by the State must be processed through the tender procedure; second: that the constituent body opted for the tender procedure, considering it the most suitable mechanism for the control of the public treasury and the correct use of the State's financial resources, with the purpose of promoting sound administration of public funds; third: the tender constitutes the ideal means for the selection of the Administration's co-contractor, as it is a procedure that guarantees the public interest, whose publicity ensures effective participation by all interested parties, so that the Administration selects the best option for the satisfaction of the public interest; fourth: tender must be understood as the mechanism, modality, means, or set of principles to which the State –in the broadest sense– must subject itself, in order to carry out its contracting activity, since in it the constitutional principles that inform administrative contracting are fulfilled: free competition, equal treatment among all potential offerors, publicity, legality or transparency of procedures, legal certainty, formalism of tender procedures, balance of interests, principle of good faith, mutuality of the contract, and control of procedures by and ultimately carried out directly by the Contraloría General de la República; fifth: from the principle "all administrative contracting shall be done by the tender procedure," contained in Article 182 of the Political Constitution, derive with constitutional rank, all principles of public law that inform administrative contracting, to the extent that they are reasonable and proportional to the purposes pursued; sixth: the administrative contracting system is shaped by the constitutional principles emanating from the Constitution itself, and as a complement, by the control system exercised directly by the constitutional body in charge of the surveillance and oversight of the public treasury –the Contraloría General de la República, as provided in constitutional Articles 183 and 184–, which is established as a guarantee of the correct use of public funds for the satisfaction of the public interest; seventh: the constitutional obligation deriving from Article 182 of the Fundamental Charter encompasses all the contractual activity of the State; therefore, no distinction can be made to except it based on the type of contract to be executed –services, execution of works, sales or leases of goods, purchases– or based on the subject matter involved; eighth: the constituent body defined that the most suitable procedure to carry out administrative contracting would be the public tender, and reserved the private tender only for quantitatively and qualitatively lesser contracts.' Since the control system exercised directly and exclusively by the Contraloría General de la República, a constitutional body charged with the oversight of the public treasury, constitutes an essential –and also constitutional– principle of administrative contracting, this Constitutional Court previously determined the competence in this matter to said body, so that it could design the various mechanisms to effect the control –or approval (refrendo)– of administrative contracting. Thus, in judgment number 9524-99, at nine hours six minutes on December three, nineteen ninety-nine, upon consultation by the Comptroller's Office itself regarding the competence of that body to issue guidelines in that matter, it stated: 'V.- ON THE APPROVAL (REFIRENDO) IN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING AS AN EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPTROLLER BODY. It was clarified in the appealed judgment –number 05947-98, at fourteen thirty-two hours on August nineteen, nineteen ninety-eight–, that the approval (refrendo) of administrative contracting by the Contraloría General de la República applies to the entire public administration, which includes not only the bodies financed by the expenditure plan of the Central Administration, that being the Legislative Assembly, the Executive Branch (President of the Republic and respective Minister), the Judicial Branch, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Contraloría General de la República, and the Defensoría de los Habitantes, but also the decentralized and deconcentrated bodies of the Public Administration, thereby extending it to the banks that make up the national banking system. Two constitutional principles provide the foundation for this position: Article 182 of the Political Constitution establishes that the constitutional principles guiding administrative contracting apply to the entire Public Administration, without any exception, as the constitutional norm does not distinguish whether it involves a central government institution, an autonomous institution, or a deconcentrated body; and from Article 184 of the Constitution derives the governing principle of the control of administrative contracting carried out directly and exclusively by the body constitutionally charged with the surveillance and oversight of the public treasury. It is an essential function of the Contraloría General de la República to oversee the public treasury, by constitutional mandate –Article 183 of the Constitution–, being able to perform this function through various modalities of control, be it approval (refrendo) and other means, such as auditing or inspections, or the appeal itself or subsequent intervention. In this sense, it must be taken into account that just as the constitutional norm refers to ordinary legislation for it to establish the various modalities of administrative contracting, based on its amount, thus configuring public tender, private tender, direct contracting, and auction with alternative procedure, according to the classification given by the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República, number 1279, of May two, nineteen fifty-one, repealed by the Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, number 7494, of May two, nineteen ninety-five, added and amended by Ley number 7612, of July twenty-two, nineteen ninety-six, which establishes the following classification: public tender, tender by registry, restricted tender, auction, and direct contracting; thus, it is the exclusive competence of the Contraloría General de la República to design various mechanisms and modes to effect the control of administrative contracting, based on the amount, subject matter, and public institution carrying out the contracting, in accordance with the principles provided by the Political Constitution itself, and obviously within the legal framework conferred by its own Organic Law. Therefore, the statement by the representative of the Contraloría General de la República in his action is correct, in considering that it is constitutionally possible that, in view of the nature, purpose, and amount of the contracting in question, this body may establish reasonable and proportional conditions to the authority that Article 184 of the Constitution grants it to approve (refrendar) State contracts, with the aim of not creating mechanisms that affect an expeditious administrative management, and in view of the public interest; given that the approval (refrendo) must be understood as part of the oversight powers regarding the public treasury that corresponds exclusively to the Comptroller, for the exercise of which it possesses absolute functional and administrative independence, by virtue of the provisions of Article 183 itself of the Fundamental Charter, reason why it can define the scope, mechanisms, and procedures of superior oversight, even against the legislator, if the latter affects its independence, as was previously noted in judgment number 00998-98.'" XXXVI.- The preceding precedent highlights the relevance of the functions of the CGR regarding the approval (refrendo). Now, the claimant criticizes that the Comptroller's office, in the approval (refrendo) procedure, requested the provision of information and then included conditioning norms for its granting. Regarding this, the following should be noted. The approval (refrendo) is an act of approval of the administrative contracting that, as such, affects the deployment of the contract's effects, hence it is linked to efficacy (see in this sense Article 145 of the LGAP). From that standpoint, it cannot constitute a mechanism that leads to the declaration of nullity of the conducts analyzed, even though by its means, it performs a conformity check with the norms to which the administrative contracting is subject. For these purposes, the development made by Article 2 of the Reglamento de Refrendos is clear when it indicates: "Article 2—Nature of the approval (refrendo). Approval (refrendo) is an act of approval, therefore it acts as a requirement for the efficacy of the administrative contract and not as a means by which the Contraloría General de la República may indirectly annul the award decision or the administrative contract. Through the approval (refrendo), the Contraloría General de la República examines and verifies that the clauses of the administrative contract substantially conform to the legal system, under the terms provided in Article 8 of this Regulation./ When the Contraloría General de la República denies the approval (refrendo) of an administrative contract, it shall indicate to the Administration the defects that must be corrected, emended, or rectified to obtain the respective approval (refrendo) in an eventual future procedure./ By virtue of the fact that the administrative contracting procedures and all aspects related to the formation and perfection of administrative contracts are imbued with celerity and summary nature in the due and unpostponable attention and satisfaction of public needs and requirements, the legality analysis carried out by the Contraloría General de la República in the approval (refrendo) is subject to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness developed in Article 4 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa and to the provisions of Article 10 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública./ The approval (refrendo) does not constitute an administrative procedure aimed at resolving conflicting interests of the parties or third parties, and therefore actions filed with that purpose during the procedure shall be rejected outright./ The approval (refrendo) is not a means by which the Contraloría General de la República exercises the powers to conduct audits and investigations, regulated in Articles 21 and 22 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. Consequently, the legality analysis is based on a review of the administrative file provided by the Administration, and therefore the veracity of the documentation incorporated therein is presumed, according to the principle of good faith that governs public contractual activity, all under the responsibility of the officials of the Administration entrusted with the formation and submission of the file." Now, in light of what is prescribed by Article 8 of said norm, the study carried out through this means by the Comptroller body is not one of opportunity or convenience, but of legality. Nonetheless, in this dynamic, what is regulated by the LGAP must be taken into account, in whose Article 16.2, which at the time indicates: "2. The Judge may control the conformity with these non-legal rules of the discretionary elements of the act, as if exercising a legality control." which, in certain positions, implies the possibility of considering included within the legality analysis, aspects typical of components related to convenience and opportunity – a topic that will not be addressed in this case–. Similarly, that precept –Article 8 of the Reglamento de Refrendos– stipulates that the examination does not entail a comprehensive review, but is limited to the specific aspects set forth in that article, whose transcription or reference is unnecessary, it being sufficient to refer to what is indicated therein. From that standpoint, in line with what is indicated by Article 9 ejusdem, the legality of the other aspects not addressed in the approval (refrendo) is presumed, aspects that in any case remain subject to the optional subsequent oversight and, in general, to the ordinary channels for challenging acts and contracts, both in administrative and judicial venues, and for which, the Administration maintains its responsibility. Among those other aspects may be mentioned the reasonableness of the price. For its part, Article 12 establishes the formal requirements that must be submitted for this procedure, without prejudice to the request for information that the CGR may validly make. In this sense, unlike what CANABA seems to indicate, the applicable legal order does allow the Comptroller body to request the provision of information in order to be able to validly fulfill its control role in the approval (refrendo) phase. What is stipulated by mandate 13 of the regulation in question is elementary in this sense, as it states: "Article 13.—Timeframe, suspensions and interruptions.

The Comptroller General of the Republic must resolve the request for countersignature (refrendo) of contracts within a period of twenty-five business days in the case of public tenders, and twenty business days in the remaining cases. During the countersignature procedure, the Comptroller General of the Republic may formulate additional information requests it deems essential for the substantive study of the respective contractual document, for which it will summon the Administration for a reasonable period it sets for such purposes, during which the final resolution period regulated in the preceding paragraph will be suspended. If the Administration does not timely remedy what was required by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the countersignature request shall be rejected. When, during the processing of a countersignature request, the Administration submits a modification document to the contractual text under review, whether on its own initiative or in response to a suggestion the Comptroller General of the Republic may make interlocutorily according to the rules of the preceding paragraph when a substantial defect in the legality of the contract has been detected in the prior analysis, the period provided in the first paragraph of this article shall be calculated anew from the day following receipt of the modification by the Comptroller General of the Republic." This provision dispels any doubt regarding the empowerment of the CGR to prevent or require the provision of information it deems necessary for the corresponding analysis, as well as to establish the conditions it deems necessary and pertinent, subject to the inclusion of the reasons leading to this criterion. It must be highlighted that the countersignature procedure is not a simple—automated—verification of compliance with requirements, but a verification of validity that includes weighing the entire set of sources to which the tender is subject, including not only legal norms, but also the offers and the tender documents or specifications.

XXXVII.- Regarding the alleged injury to the principles of administrative contracting in the countersignature act. Regarding the specific reproach made about the countersignature in the expansion of the lawsuit, without prejudice to what has already been noted in the previous sections regarding the reiteration of topics already addressed, it is appropriate to indicate more concretely how these topics do not affect the validity of the countersignature granted by the CGR. a) Principle of legality and transparency. On this aspect, it should be noted that in official communication No. 2739-2012 of March 21, 2012 (DCA-0692), in which the CGR grants the countersignature of the contract, it points out that this agreement included an improper hierarchy of the sources applicable to the procedure, which supposes, contrary to what was argued by the plaintiff, a manifestation of respect for the principle of legality. Likewise, the CGR warned in the countersignature of the applicable legal regime to the case, not only invoking the particularities of the countersignature regulations, but also pointing out the tender documents used for the contract analysis (point III.ii). Precisely in the exercise of the powers conferred in section 13 of the aforementioned regulations, the CGR made the request for additional information to the CNC through official communications DCA-2836 of October 28, 2011, and DCA-0082 of January 17, 2012, to verify that the contract conformed to the specifications of the promoted tender. Nevertheless, what was stated regarding the principle of effectiveness and efficiency in public procurement must be revisited. The plaintiff does not indicate the reasons why the alleged injuries to the denounced principle lead to a substantial nullity that merits the suppression of the competition. On the subject, it is worth citing what was resolved regarding the principle of efficiency and effectiveness by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling No. 14421-2004 at 11:00 a.m. on December 17, 2004, in the following sense: "Therefore, administrative contracting procedures and all aspects pertaining to the formation and perfection of administrative contracts are imbued with celerity and summariness in the due and urgent attention and satisfaction of the needs and requirements of the social organization. On this matter, it is necessary to remember that among the guiding principles of public services, within the framework of a service-providing Public Administration or a Social and Democratic Rule-of-Law State, are, among others, efficiency, effectiveness, continuity, regularity, and adaptation to socio-economic and technological needs, with the purpose of eradicating and overcoming the real inequalities of the social conglomerate. The control and oversight mechanisms designed by the legislator to guarantee transparency or publicity, free concurrence and equality, and rational management of public resources or funds—through the selection of the most advantageous offer for public entities, from a financial and technical point of view—in matters of administrative contracting, must have as their fundamental north to ensure that the same adheres to the law so that it is regular or substantially in conformity with the legal system, to avoid any act of corruption or deviation in the management of public funds. Under this intelligence, all formal requirements provided by the legal system to ensure regularity or validity in contracting procedures, the award act, and the administrative contract itself, must also seek the prompt satisfaction of the general interest through the effective construction of public works and the provision of public services, consequently they cannot be transformed into instruments to delay the efficient and effective provision of public services and, above all, their adaptation to the new socio-economic and technological needs of the community. On this particular, Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de la Contratación Administrativa) when enunciating the 'Principle of efficiency' establishes that '(…) In all stages of contracting procedures, content shall prevail over form. The acts and actions of the parties shall be interpreted in a way that favors their conservation and facilitates adopting the final decision, under conditions favorable to the general interest (…)'. It follows from the foregoing that the forms typical of administrative contracting procedures as well as the adjectival requirements established by the legal system for the validity and effectiveness of an administrative contract must be interpreted flexibly for the sake of the purpose of every administrative contract, without neglecting, of course, the soundness and correctness in the way public funds are invested. From this perspective, administrative contracting procedures are the shadow (form) that must, irremediably, follow the body (substance) which are the purposes and goals of the administrative contract to satisfy the general interest and, of course, to ensure the rational, due, and correct use of public funds. Finally, it must be remembered that the principles of efficiency and effectiveness, insofar as they inform administrative organization and management, have strong constitutional grounding (articles—all from the Political Constitution—140, subsection 8, insofar as it imposes on the Executive Branch the duty to 'Monitor the proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies,' 139, subsection 4, to the extent that it incorporates the concept of 'proper conduct of Government,' and 191 by gathering the principle of 'efficiency of the administration')" XXXVIII.- b) Regarding the principle of formalism. In the comptroller's countersignature act, allusion is made to the fact that although there were inaccuracies in the analyzed procedure, the faculty to apply the principle of conservation of acts is not disregarded, in accordance with section 4 of Law No. 7494. It has already been indicated that in our regime, including the matter of administrative contracting, a principle of substantiality of nullities prevails. It is therefore appropriate to refer to what was stated in that section to the effect that the plaintiffs fail to prove the substantiality of the pointed-out defects, in cases where it may be considered that errors existed. On the subject, the cited official communication DCA-0692 (countersignature) indicates in its core: "…this Division cannot ignore, much less fail to apply, the guiding principles of Administrative Contracting when studying the countersignature of this bidding procedure. This entails remembering the principles of effectiveness and efficiency of constitutional rank and regulated in Article 4 of the Administrative Contracting Law (which is supplementary applicable to the Law of Concessions of Public Works with Public Services) (…), In light of these principles, it can be affirmed that the omission of a formalism such as the one stated, which in this case is, in principle, the absence of publication of two opening dates for the competition, does not generate an impediment for this Office to grant the countersignature of the competition since precisely based on these principles the promoted contracting procedure can be preserved, coupled with the fact that the reference omissions are not considered to cause a defect such as to invalidate the promoted bidding procedure..." It is undeniable that in these matters, a subjection to the appropriate forms for conducting a public competition applies. However, the disregard of some procedural formula only leads to nullity to the extent that the defect is substantial, such that it causes defenselessness or serious harm to private parties—a topic already addressed. Furthermore, given the imprecision of the plaintiff's allegations regarding the specific defects of particular acts of the CGR that led to the injury of this maxim whose violation is invoked, there is no choice but to reject that charge. c) Principle of control of procedures. By virtue of this principle, it is postulated that the administrative contracting procedure must be subject to exhaustive control and oversight, to verify compliance with the minimum standards that prevail in said matter as well as the correct use of public finances. It is present in all phases of the procedure, from prior studies to contractual modifications and the execution phase. What has been said supposes that the verification of procedures can only be conceived from the plane of specific contracting phases, and not in a general manner. From that plane, the plaintiff presents formulations that are absolutely no different from those already raised in the reproaches formulated in the original lawsuit, so certainly, as the CGR warns, rather than an expansion, it refers to a reiteration of allegations, extendable against the act of granting countersignature. Such is the case of the absence of verification of the prior feasibility studies, a topic on which it has been indicated, on repeated occasions, that no incorrectness occurs. In any case, the comptroller instance, in application of section 8 of the Counter-signature Regulations, warned the managing Administration to indicate which were the studies supporting the selection of the contractual object. Given the response to that warning, ultimately, in the countersignature official communication, that is, DCA-0692, on the point it was stated: "That regarding the technical studies of this competition, the Granting Administration in the official communication cited in the preceding paragraph, points out as relevant background for the bidding process that gives rise to the contract of merit, the National Port Development Plan prepared in 1995 by the Japanese firm OCDI, and the Program for the Modernization of the Port Sub-sector of Costa Rica, prepared by the firm HPC Hamburg Port Consulting GMBH. Likewise, it points out as a study to support the bases of the bidding process under review, the Master Plan for the Limón-Moín Port Complex prepared by the company Royal Haskoning Nederland B.V., and the update carried out on the demand study. All of which is left under the responsibility of the Granting Administration." From that plane, the CGR considered the technical studies as provided according to the specifications given to it by the granting administration. In any case, the studies provided to justify said requirement are precisely those that this Tribunal has analyzed and determined their usefulness to support the international bidding process 2009LI-000001-200, the object of this case. It should also be noted that the validity of the studies provided in terms of the design of the works, according to the tender document clauses, is an aspect under the purview of the concessionaire, who, as has been repeatedly explained, assumes the consequences and risks of the design of the TCM.

XXXIX.- Regarding the allegations of injury to public discretion. Regarding the references relative to the principle of discretion of the Administration, the expansion formulated by CANABA is confusing and the concrete causes that the plaintiff intends to submit to the knowledge of this jurisdictional authority are not clearly discerned. On this topic, after making theoretical references about regulated powers and discretionary ones, it indicates that the action is formulated "… with a view to achieving the correction of arbitrariness and deviation of power carried out in the administrative venue, due to the interpretation of the Comptroller General of the Republic in the comptroller countersignature, an example of this being what is indicated on page 9, point vi)". In accordance with what is stated in the first paragraph of section 49 of the Magna Carta, this jurisdiction is competent to exercise control of validity over the administrative function. The aforementioned control parameter includes every form of manifestation of public will, within these, the conducts that arise from an exercise of powers of discretionary or regulated content. This is established in section 42.2, 122 subsection f, 127, 128 and in the case of precautionary measures, mandate 20 of that same legal body. However, for such purposes, a distinction must be made between political-programmatic administrative discretion (since there also exists judicial and legislative discretion), technical discretion, and legal discretion, because in these last two judicial control is more intense than in the first, which refers to the possibility of setting goals or action plans. Likewise, a distinction must be made between exercised discretion and non-exercised discretion, with the corrective measures, in case the invalidity of public conducts is deemed, being different depending on whether it is a positive exercise (exercised) or an omissive one (non-exercised). Likewise, the existence or not of residual discretion must be weighed. This is fundamental so that the contentious-administrative judge can set the course of action, whether imposing limits on the Administration so that it corrects the previously issued conduct—already annulled by judicial control—or setting the guidelines for the exercise that until that moment had not been formulated. This is established in section 128 CPCA insofar as it expresses in relevant part: "When the estimatory judgment deals with administrative powers with discretionary elements, whether due to omission or improper exercise, it shall condemn to the exercise of such powers, within the period set for that effect, in accordance with the limits and mandates imposed by the legal system and by the facts of the case, prior declaration of the existence, the content, and the scope of the limits and mandates, if the file so allows. (…)" In the residual, moreover, the judge must respect the survival threshold of the discretion that pertains to the Administration. This is the case of the annulment of an award act, in which, the file having been returned to the Administration so that it resolves in accordance with the applicable legal and tender document norms, the possibility survives of declaring the competition void for considering, under the new conditions, that no offer satisfies the public interest. Well then, there is no doubt about the possibility of judicial control of that discretionary exercise; however, the ambiguity of the lawsuit does not allow deducing whether the criticism is based on the idea that the CGR's conduct was oriented along paths of discretionary exercise when it should have been regulated, or if, on the contrary, the discretionary exercise carried out is invalid. In any case, the plaintiff does not explain to what extent that particular decision violates the legal system to which the CGR must submit in the exercise of its countersignature instance competencies. The point in question, visible on folio 9 of the countersignature official communication, provides in what is relevant to the case: "…Regarding the issue of obtaining the licenses, permits, clearances, or any other type of environmental instrument that must exist prior to and during the construction and operation phases of the contract, as determined by the competent authority in the matter, it is necessary to indicate that the corresponding endorsement by said authority, as well as its validity during the necessary period, remains under the responsibility and risk of the concessionaire firm itself. Therefore, it shall be the obligation of the Granting Administration to verify the obtaining of those permits, licenses, or others necessary to be obtained for the realization of the awarded concession, without the verification of said aspects during the countersignature procedure falling within the scope of competence of this comptroller organ…" This Tribunal shares the allegations of the CGR in pointing out that in matters of administrative contracting there is a high component of discretion in the phase of preparing the tender documents and in general prior stages, even though as the procedure advances that discretion is restricted and reduced. These powers must be considered in the various phases of control and oversight that the CGR performs in the course of the procedure, without prejudice to the possibility of ordering the invalidity of specific conducts due to infraction of the administrative contracting regime that it is called to protect in the instances in which it participates. However, it is insisted, the argument of the CGR is shared in that the cited point vi intends to establish that the concessionaire company is solely responsible, according to the contract, for obtaining a series of permits, licenses, or others, and that this obtaining must be verified by the Granting Administration. This is clear if it is considered that indeed, it does not correspond to the CGR to verify whether those permits, licenses, or, in general, administrative authorizations exist or not, so in accordance with the scope of section 9 of the countersignature regulations, it warns the grantor of its duty of verification on this particular. This Tribunal does not understand, as the plaintiff does not make this point clear, how that proceeding constitutes the defect of deviation of power (understood as the pursuit of a purpose different from the principal one to the detriment of the latter, art. 131.3 LGAP). It is a warning or reminder of the exercise of verification and oversight duties, in accordance with the norms applicable to the case.

XL.- Regarding the point related to Project finance, IRR, price cap. It must be insisted, this is an argument extensively addressed in the previous phases of this judgment. No novel argument on this particular is presented in the expansion of the lawsuit under analysis, the sole contribution being the reproachability of that aspect against the countersignature act, due to the circumstance of it not having been denied despite the defects the plaintiff alleges. However, no specific reference is made in relation to the questioned act of the CGR, in a manner that allows establishing the particular reasons why it is deemed that such conduct, regarding those specific topics, has a pathology that deserves to be declared in this venue. In the understanding of this Tribunal, the plaintiff's expositions are presented as a presentation of its own positions supporting a criticism to point out the way in which, from its perspective, the financial project of the TCM would be technically more correct. Nevertheless, the definition of the mechanism or design of project financing, whether it fits within the concept of Project finance, definition of risk strategy, is a topic that, certainly, regarding its viability and pertinence, is under the purview of the grantor. The same occurs with the debate now proposed on the IRR, insofar as it formulates a comparative scenario of having presented more than one offer with different IRRs; however, it is nothing more than a hypothetical panorama, and furthermore, the tender documents provide for a comparability analysis of this economic factor of the offers as an evaluation parameter of the bids. Regarding the criticisms of the acceptance of the clauses transferring risks to the concessionaire, it should be noted that such aspect corresponds exclusively to the grantor and the concessionaire. However, it must be noted that the comptroller instance made a series of observations and conditions issued in the context of exercising the verification competencies proper to the countersignature procedure, weighing that the terms of the contract adjust and remain in harmony with the sources that regulate it and to which it is subject (tender documents, bids, award, prior studies, etc.). On the other hand, the argument about price caps is a topic that, in accordance with section 21.1 of Law No. 7762, escapes the scope of the countersignature, as the opinion that must be rendered in these matters corresponds to ARESEP, which issues a mandatory and binding assessment. On that topic, it suffices to refer to what has already been developed regarding the criticisms presented about tariff and financial feasibility. Therefore, given this particular competency assignment, it is clear to this collegiate body that this aspect is beyond the powers of the CGR. Even that organ so established by pointing out in point vii) of section III of the countersignature official communication DCA-0692: "Regarding the issue of the tariff structure and its adjustment parameters, as well as the parameters that will be used to evaluate the quality of the service, in accordance with Article 21 Law of Concession of Public Works with Public Services, these have a positive technical criterion from the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, as observed in folios 925, 1479, 2484, 3603, and 3863-C of the bidding file. Therefore, since the competence in the matter lies with the referred Authority according to its law, this aspect is not within the competence of this Division to address in the countersignature procedure." Another point reproaches the suppression of the financial equilibrium regulation via IRR. Again, it is a topic not related to the countersignature, but to the analysis by ARESEP, so it must be rejected. However, CANABA makes a series of considerations alluding to specific acts of the CGR during the objection procedures against the tender documents of this bidding procedure. Specifically, in the first tender, SINTRAJAP and APM TERMINALS filed an objection regarding the condition that stipulated a 20% variation, positively or negatively, with respect to the IRR offered and accepted by the Administration, as a cause for financial disequilibrium of the contract. On this matter, resolution R-DJ-008-2009 stated: "Criterion to resolve: The objector limits itself to requesting that a paragraph of section 12.2 on the economic and financial equilibrium of the contract be voided, with the aim of eliminating the indicated percentage of decrease (+-20%) of the reference IRR, from which the rebalancing mechanisms are applied, and it offers no evidence of the harm that this defined percentage would supposedly be causing it for the application of the rebalancing mechanisms, nor any legal justification against it. Furthermore, the objector must bear in mind that the established mechanism is equitable, as it applies equally to the Administration and the concessionaire, both for benefits and for harms. Finally, for the sake of the principle of administrative efficiency, it would be too cumbersome for the Administration to be applying the economic and financial rebalancing mechanisms of the contract every time a decrease occurs, so the Administration has discretionarily considered it reasonable for these mechanisms to apply to both when a decrease greater than or less than 20% of the reference IRR is verified, so potential bidders can take the precautions they deem pertinent in their offer taking into account that percentage already defined by the Administration." Meanwhile, in act R-DJ-008-2009 Bis, dated July 2, 2009, it was pointed out: "4) Of the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) as a regulation variable. Clause 11.7.5.2, of the tender documents establishes that '...when a financial disequilibrium of the concession contract occurs, an extraordinary tariff adjustment may be made to compensate for said disequilibrium, provided that it is due to causes external to the responsibility of the concessionaire company. It shall be considered that disequilibrium exists when the IRR of the economic offer and accepted by the Administration as a reference for the concession varies by 20%, positively or negatively.' This clause also establishes that in such case, the procedure stipulated in Chapter 12 of the contract shall be followed. On this particular, this comptroller organ requests that Administration to take the required measures so that when using the IRR as a parameter to demonstrate contractual disequilibria, it must be ensured that the effect of the factors can be objectively individualized, which according to the tender document and contractual rules correspond only to those typified in article 12.2 of the contract. The foregoing, since the calculation of that IRR depends on parameters, variables, estimates, and assumptions, with multiple possible options and alternatives, and in this sense, it is required that these aspects be clearly established and regulated, for the purpose of contract oversight and the demonstration of the cited disequilibria. Likewise, it is indicated that it is the responsibility of the Administration to establish clear and objective rules within the tender specifications to provide for the use of the internal rate of return in regulating the financial equilibrium of the contract. In that same line of thought, this Office considers it essential that the application of the IRR as a regulation variable be assessed, because from our point of view, the structuring of this deal, which postpones phase 3 to the future, could present the possibility that some offers present multiple IRRs, which is obtained due to the fact that flows are generated that present two or more sign changes. Therefore, there is no knowledge of how the reference IRR would be determined." From this recounting, it can be deduced, unlike what was alleged by the plaintiff, that the CGR did not order the elimination of said economic adjustment mechanism. Subsequently, in the second tender documents, no guarantee regarding the IRR topic is included. In the third tender documents, which was objected to before the CGR, the regulation of the financial equilibrium of the contract in favor of the concessionaire was included when the calculated IRR was less than 300 basis points (3%) in relation to the offered IRR for the project. Likewise, the right of the Granting Administration to claim the economic equilibrium of the contract in its favor was included when the present value of the revenues quoted by the concessionaire (ITC) was reached before the 33 years of the concession, and the IRR of the project up to the review date was greater than the offered IRR plus 300 basis points (3%), in which case the profit would be shared equally between the Granting Administration and the Concessionaire. Regarding that point, in resolution DJ-215-2011 dated May 24, 2010, the CGR points out that it was necessary, as indicated by the plaintiff, for this comptroller organ, by reason of its competencies, to point out that the Granting Administration had to accredit in the administrative file the assessment and acceptance of the reasonableness of the bidder's financial projections model, since, as provided in the tender documents, this would be used for the calculation of the IRR. Likewise, it was warned that a base format for the cited projections model must be offered to potential bidders, requesting adjustment of the tender documents. From this, it is clear that no order from the comptroller organ intervened to order the elimination of the weighting of the percentage effect on the IRR as a financial adjustment parameter.

XLI.- In another argument, the allegations of the creation of a private monopoly, already thoroughly analyzed, are reiterated. No variation is included regarding the topic of countersignature, so reference must be made to what this Tribunal has already weighed by substantive criterion. It must be reiterated that the indirect management design postulated by the questioned contract finds support in the letter of section 1 of Law No. 7762. Hence, this allegation is not acceptable, as well as the reproaches regarding the exclusivity model in the transport of full containers, topics, it is reiterated, already addressed, making their treatment at this point unnecessary.

On the other hand, it is criticized that in the legality control inherent to the endorsement (refrendo), the environmental impact study should have been verified. However, on one hand, this issue has already been aired by this collegiate body, an analysis to which the set of arguments presented in the amendment under review must refer. Additionally, it has been made clear that according to the endorsement regulations (reglamento de refrendos), obtaining those ecological licenses is the responsibility of the concessionaire, and their verification is the responsibility of the grantor. This was stated in the endorsement act, in which on this point it noted: “vi) Regarding studies, permits, or others related to environmental aspects: As for the matter of obtaining licenses, permits, feasibilities, or any other type of environmental instrument that must exist prior to and during the construction and operation phases of the contract, as determined by the competent authority on the matter, it is necessary to indicate that obtaining the corresponding approval from said authority remains under the responsibility and risk of the concessionaire firm itself, as well as its validity during the necessary period of time. Therefore, it shall be the obligation of the Granting Administration to verify the obtaining of those permits, licenses, or others necessary to obtain for the execution of the awarded concession, without the verification of said aspects during the endorsement process falling within the scope of competence of this comptroller body. The foregoing in accordance with what was developed on the topic in section IV of this official communication, in relation to chapter 5, point 4) and chapter 8, point 11). In addition, the Granting Administration must ensure that the management carried out by the Concessionaire before the competent authorities on this matter is efficient.” On the other hand, through resolution R-DJ-008-2009 of 12:00 hours on July 2, 2009, in response to a question from SINTRAJAP, it was noted that through SETENA resolution 274-2009 of 8:00 hours on February 10, 2010, the VAP (potential environmental viability, viabilidad ambiental potencial) had been granted to the project, as recorded on folio 741 of the bidding file. Likewise, references were made on the topic in official communication R-DJ-008-2009 (bis). On the other hand, the endorsement official communication on the topic states: “That with reference to point 13) of clause 5.2.2 and to clause 5.3.3 called Environmental Viability License (Licencia de Vialidad Ambiental), both of the contract, it is important to reiterate the statements made by the concessionaire firm in the unnumbered official communication signed on November 21, 2011, provided as part of Annex 1 (Anexo 1) of official communication DST-OF-1888-2011, in which, among other things, it indicated: ‘Regarding Question No. 11 of the Comptroller General's Office (Contraloría General), corresponding to Chapter 5 of the Contract, we agree with the approach of the response provided by the National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones), in the sense that obtaining the definitive environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental definitiva) is within the sphere of responsibility of the concessionaire, so if a firm and definitive denial is issued by the competent authority, impossible to overcome through legitimate administrative or judicial means, the concession contract could not be executed, with the consequence that the concessionaire may not file financial claims against the Granting Administration. Likewise, in the event that the failure to obtain the aforementioned viability is due to causes attributable exclusively to the concessionaire, the latter could face the execution of the construction guarantee (garantía de construcción) rendered for the phase of conditions precedent (condiciones precedentes), following due process’ (underlining not from the original).” Such development fits fully with what has already been indicated in this ruling, regarding the clarity that implies the impossibility of starting works without obtaining the definitive environmental viability license (licencia de viabilidad ambiental definitiva), which runs at the concessionaire’s risk, given that, as has been anticipated, the risk of obtaining it is assumed, which would preclude any financial claims against the Granting Administration, should this enabling title not be obtained.

LXII.- Finally, regarding the conditions incorporated in the endorsement act that are considered as pertaining to the review of matters of convenience and opportunity, it is worth indicating what follows. In point IV of the endorsement official communication called “Of the conditions to which this comptroller endorsement is subject”, a total of approximately 80 conditions are included, divided into the following themes: CHAPTER 1. Generalities of the contract -1 aspect-. CHAPTER 2. Of the general provisions -1 aspect-. CHAPTER 3. Of the documents that form part of the contract -3 observations-; CHAPTER 4. Of the general obligations and rights of the Administration. –in which 12 specifications are made-; CHAPTER 5. Of the concession terms. -6 specifications-; CHAPTER 6. Risk regime (Régimen de riesgos) -6 specifications-; CHAPTER 7. General regime of guarantees (garantías) under the Concessionaire’s responsibility -2 specifications-; CHAPTER 8. Of the technical bases for the construction of the works -11 specifications-; CHAPTER 11. Of the economic regime, financial obligations and rights of the Concessionaire -16 observations-; CHAPTER 12. Of the maintenance of the economic-financial equilibrium of the contract and its renegotiation -3 specifications-; CHAPTER 13. Of subcontracting (subcontrataciones) -2 aspects-; CHAPTER 14. Control regime and sanctioning regime of the concession -4 specifications-; CHAPTER 15. Of the reports -3 observations-; CHAPTER 16. Tax Aspects (Aspectos Fiscales) -3 observations-; CHAPTER 17. Of the insurances -3 observations-; CHAPTER 18. Of the assignment of rights and obligations, suspension and termination of the contract -4 specifications-. The large number of conditions and the size of the endorsement file are criticized. However, unlike what the claimant parties argue, once the content of that endorsement official communication has been thoroughly analyzed, it is the opinion of this Court that these conditions, however extensive they may be considered, do not constitute clauses for analyzing the convenience or opportunity of the project that attempt to disguise a null contract as valid or to justify a management model without the due legal support. On the contrary, this type of conditioning aspects, this collegiate body understands, stand as relevant elements imposed by the CGR within the framework of its competences, as a derivation of the exercise of endorsement and that do not intend to substitute the grantor, but to set parameters for the legitimate effectiveness of the contract. In response to CANABA's allegations, it must be reiterated that the aspect of having requested additional information in the endorsement process (even when the file is voluminous –more than a thousand pages, it is argued-) does not constitute an illegality, but rather a power that finds support in the endorsement regulations, as has been indicated –Art. 13-. The length of a public dossier that supports a decision cannot be adventurously qualified as an abuse of power, without first proving a deviation from the public purpose, which has not been demonstrated here, nor has it occurred. On the other hand, the adaptation of the contract as a derivation of the endorsement process does not lead to supporting the reproach of illegitimacy that is analyzed, but on the contrary, it is the natural and expected result of the corrections that are viable in endorsement procedures. It could be counter-argued that this highlights the irregularity of the entire process, however, before that argument one would have to refer to what has already been indicated regarding the preservation of acts (conservación de los actos), the substantiality of nullities that applies in this matter, and the need to prove serious impacts to lead to the suppression of this type of acts, as a derivation of the principle underlying canon 4 of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa). Thus, the length of the file or the signing of a contract that incorporates the observations made in the endorsement does not imply, as the claimant affirms, that the CGR's analysis was of convenience and not of legality, or that its actions result in a deviation of power. In sum, the allegation is not admissible and therefore, must be rejected.

XLIII.- Regarding the alleged violation of Law No. 2906. In the single hearing, in his closing arguments, the representative of SINTRAJAP lightly refers to the eventual injury to Law No. 2906, pointing out that the area in which the TCM will be built is declared for tourist use. On this matter, it is worth indicating that the cited Law 2906 of November 24, 1961, declares the strip of land between Portete and 12 miles from Limón a recreation and tourism zone. In the first numeral of that legal source, it is established, in what is relevant to the case, “…the strip of two hundred meters wide, from the ordinary high tide, comprised within the Maritime Mile between the North limit of the urban zone of the city of Limón, that is Portete, and the place known as "12 Millas" or "Swamp Moth", North of the city of Limón, as well as the zone comprised within 100 meters on both sides of the Moín River in the section parallel to the beach. From the referred zone, twenty meters are reserved for a panoramic highway in the places where it does not currently exist. The rest shall be transferred to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Turismo),…”. For its part, Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 3729 of May 3, 1975, declares the works of the canals finished and assigns the administration of various lands and works to JAPDEVA. However, for the effects of what is debated, it should be noted, by Law No. 5337 of August 27, 1973 which comprehensively reforms the Organic Law of JAPDEVA (Ley Orgánica de JAPDEVA), Law No. 3091, it is established in its core: "CHAPTER II Assets (Patrimonio) of JAPDEVA Article 41.- The following are the property of JAPDEVA, in addition to its ordinary and extraordinary assets and income: a) The lands, buildings, equipment and in general all movable and immovable property destined for the activities of JAPDEVA, with the exception of those State properties that by Political Constitution cannot leave its assets and the properties of the National Atlantic Railroad (Ferrocarril Nacional al Atlántico). Also the future expansions thereof, which by mutual agreement between JAPDEVA and the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) it is determined to transfer, for which both entities are authorized to formalize the respective public deeds before the State Notary (Notaría del Estado). The properties that as of the date are the property of the institution shall not be subject to the transfer referred to in this article; and b) All State lands located in the area enabled by navigable canals, comprised in an area of ten kilometers from the sea inland, parallel to the coast and a strip of three kilometers wide, parallel to both sides of the rivers and canals administered by the Board (Junta)." Additionally, precept 45 of said Organic Law establishes: "Article 45.- For the fulfillment of this law and its regulations, JAPDEVA shall determine the port jurisdiction zones (zonas de jurisdicción portuaria) of each of the ports under its administration and shall communicate it to the Executive Branch. These areas must fundamentally contemplate: a) Terminals and rights of way; b) Anchorage sites, anchorages and beaconing of the roadstead; c) Access channels and maneuvering zone; and d) Berths and transit spurs, warehouses in general, offices, workshops, yards and railway spurs, merchandise storage zones and any other site destined for port and railway operations." In addition, Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, Maritime Terrestrial Zone Law (Ley de Zona Marítimo Terrestre), article 75, which partially modifies the previous reform states: "Article 75.- The Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Watershed (Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica) shall continue with the domain over the lands that were transferred to it by virtue of article 41, subsection b) of law No. 5337 of August 27, 1973, except in the maritime terrestrial zone corresponding to both sides of the system of main canals that connect the ports of Moín and Barra del Colorado. In that zone, the stipulations of this law shall govern with full force." From that angle of examination, the injury alleged by SINTRAJAP does not exist, given that, as has been indicated, the lands in question form part of the assets whose administration corresponds to JAPDEVA, therefore, within which, the development of port infrastructure may feasibly be carried out, whether through a direct or indirect management model. Such permissibility arises from legal authorizations created by the reforms introduced to the Organic Law of Japdeva. Ergo, the defects pointed out regarding the impossibility of changing the use (cambio de uso) of those lands are not present.

XLIV.- Corollary. Regarding CANABA's lawsuit and its amendment. In this proceeding, the National Chamber of Banana Growers (Cámara Nacional de Bananeros) filed the lawsuit so that the judgment declares the nullity of the following actions: “Main claim: The declaration of nullity of the following administrative acts: 1. The award made by the National Council of Concessions in agreement number 2 of the extraordinary session No. 2-2011 of February 28, 2011, of the international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with public service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín and awarded to the bidder APM Terminal Central America B.V. 2. The award act by JAPDEVA in agreement No. 073-11, article II-a of the ordinary session No. 08-2011 of February 24, 2011, of the international public tender 2009-LI-000001-200. 3. The agreement of the Executive Branch formed by the President of the Republic, the Minister of Public Works and Transport, and the Minister of Finance, signed on March 1, 2011, published in Digital Scope (Alcance Digital) No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54 of March 17, 2011, of the international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200. Subsidiary claims: 1. That the nullity of the tariff structure of the international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200 be declared, indicated in chapter 11, section 7. 2, for using as a basis in the traffic projection carried out in the master plan for the Limón/Moín complex, contracted to the company Royal Haskoning, which is not an updated economic feasibility study (estudio de factibilidad económica) and is not supported by realistic parameters according to the planting and export volume of fruits such as banana, pineapple, and melon. 2. That the nullity of the tariff structure of international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200 be declared, for contradiction to article 3, subsection b of the Law of ARESEP which establishes the principle of service at cost. 3. That the act awarding the international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200 be declared null, for lacking justification of the bidding process and a motivation of the act based on the univocal rules of science or technique for not having technical studies such as the environmental and economic feasibility studies. 4. That agreement number 018-MOPT-H published in Scope No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54 of March 17, 2001, in which the international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200 is awarded, be annulled for establishing that in order to receive a $20 discount on the tariff made in the economic offer, 15 measures are implemented in the award act, which will be contemplated in the contract.” In the brief amending the lawsuit, it adds the following claims: “Main: The declaration of nullity of the following administrative acts: 1.- The award act made by JAPDEVA in agreement No. 73-11, article II-a of the ordinary session No. 08-2011, of the international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín and awarded to the bidder APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 2.- The act of the National Council of Concessions in agreement number 2 of the extraordinary session No. 2-2011 of February 28, 2011, of the international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín and awarded to the bidder APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 3.- The award agreement made by the Executive Branch formed by the President of the Republic, the Minister of Public Works and Transport, the Minister of Finance and signed on March 1, 2011, published in Digital Scope No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54 of March 17, 2011, of the international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín and awarded to the bidder APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 4. The bidding documents (cartel de licitación) for international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín and awarded to the bidder APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 5.- The contract signed by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Watershed (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOIN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derived from the international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín, dated August 30, 2011. 6.- Addendum No. 1 to the Public Works Concession with Public Service Contract for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Moín Container Terminal, signed on November 29, 2011 and executed by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Watershed (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derived from the international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200. 7.- The new contract dated February 13, 2012, executed by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Watershed (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derived from the international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200 promoted for "Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Financing, Design, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the New Container Terminal of Moín". 8.- Official communication DCA-0692 from the Administrative Procurement Division (División de Contratación Administrativa) of the Comptroller General's Office of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) dated March 21, 2012, in which it grants endorsement to the contract derived from the international public tender Executive Presidency of the Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Watershed (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derived from the international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200 promoted for "Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Financing, Design, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the New Container Terminal of Moín". 9.- That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay procedural and personal costs.” For its part, SINTRAJAP formulated the following claims: “1. The nullity of the administrative act that awards the international public tender No. 2009LI-000001-00200 called "Bidding documents for the public works concession with public service for the design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the container terminal in port Moín" in favor of APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. This because: - the tender was conducted violating the regulations of both the concessions law (ley de concesiones) and the procurement law (ley de contratación), it was done with bidding documents that did not comply with the provisions of the Public Works Concession with Public Services Law (Ley de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos) in its article 21, subsections 1, 2 and 3, which was having all the corresponding technical studies that supported the economic and environmental viability of the project to be concessioned, also with violation contrary to the provisions of articles 27 to 29, both inclusive, of the cited concessions law, since these rules do not allow the modification of the offer after the offers have been formally received and by modifying the bidding documents and the dates for bid submission and not granting adequate terms. In addition, by granting 15 additional concessions or benefits to the awarded company, after the date of opening of the offers, benefits or concessions that, had they been disclosed, could have allowed other interested parties to bid. 2. In accordance with article 42, subsection b) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), I request that the administrative act awarding the international public tender No. 2009LI-000001-0200 called "Bidding documents for the public works concession with public service for the design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the container terminal in port Moín", to the company APM TERMINAL B.V., be declared null, for lacking justification for the bidding process, and motivation for the administrative act based on the univocal rules of science or technique for not having technical studies such as the environmental and economic feasibility studies. 3. That the defendants be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs incurred. Understanding personal costs as not only judicial expenses for the payment of experts, and fees of judicial officials, but also the attorney fees that correspond according to the applicable fee schedule.” XLV.- Having carried out the analysis of each and every one of the diverse and numerous allegations that were presented both in the written and oral phase of this proceeding, a task that was undertaken by this Court in a meticulous and objective manner, the existence of substantial defects that require the suppression of the challenged actions has not been detected, including the bidding documents and their modifications, award acts, concession contract at a general level and in its clauses, including the specific conditions challenged, modifications to the contract, endorsement act and the conditions it includes, addenda to the contract. In the previous sections of this decision are the considerations that have led this Court to this conclusion, reason for which, in accordance with the reasoning of fact and law already set forth broadly and in detail, this Court considers that the criticized acts do not suffer from substantial nullities that deserve to be declared in this proceeding, reason for which, the claim for nullity formulated must be rejected, both regarding the main petitions and the accessory or subsidiary ones raised in the lawsuit and its amendment -presented by CANABA-. For its part, and given the integrated analysis that has been carried out by this collegiate body, the action formulated by SINTRAJAP is also not accepted, since after the analysis of its allegations, raised in the oral phase –since in the written phase, the lawsuit did not include a development of the legal arguments on which they based their petitions-, the degree of invalidity reproached could not be determined, in view of which, its claims in general –including the annulment ones- are improper, in accordance with numeral 121 of the CPCA, therefore their rejection is ordered." ... See more Citas de Legislación y Doctrina Sentencias Relacionadas ASUNTO: PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR: Cámara Nacional de Bananeros, Sindicato Trabajadores JADPDEVA DEMANDADO: APM Terminal Central América B.V, Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, Contraloría General de la República, Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica y el Estado.

No. 0 153 -2012-VI.

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN SEXTA, ANEXO A del II Circuito Judicial de San José, Goicoechea, a las ocho horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del seis de agosto del dos mil doce.

Proceso de trámite preferente formulado por la Cámara Nacional de Bananeros (CANABA) , representada por su apoderado especial judicial Randall Quirós Bustamante, cédula de identidad número CED110934, y el Sindicato de Trabajadores de Nombre2401 APDEVA (SINTRAJAP) , representado por su apoderado especial judicial, Jorge Emilio Regidor Umaña, cédula de identidad número CED110935, contra el Estado, representado por la señora Procuradora, Andrea Calderón Gassman, cédula de identidad número CED1605, Consejo Nacional de Concesiones (CNC), representado en esta causa por el señor Nombre35826 , cédula de identidad número CED110090, la Contraloría General de la República (CGR), representada por su apoderado especial judicial, Nombre4349 , cédula de identidad número CED102428, la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP), representada por el señor Nombre71557 , cédula de identidad número CED53934, la Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), representada por su apoderada judicial, Nombre38445 , cédula de identidad CED110936 y APM Terminal Central América B.V y APM Terminals Moín S.A. , ambos representados por su apoderado especial judicial, Nombre35909 , cédula de identidad número CED90986.

RESULTANDO.

DEMANDA CANABA:

1.- En escrito visible a folios 1-37 del expediente principal, la Cámara Nacional de Bananeros (CANABA) formula demanda, para que en lo medular, en sentencia se disponga, pretensiones que fueron corregidas en escrito visible a folios 977-983 del legajo principal (tomo ii), de la siguiente manera: "Pretensión principal: La declaración de nulidad de los siguientes actos administrativos: 1. De adjudicación realizada por parte del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones en el acuerdo número 2 de la sesión extraordinaria No. 2-2011 del 28 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con servicio público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM Terminal Central America B.V. 2. Del acto de adjudicación por parte de Nombre141024 en el acuerdo No. 073-11, artículo II-a de la sesión ordinaria No. 08-2011 del 24 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-200. 3. El acuerdo del Poder Ejecutivo conformado por la Presidenta de la República, Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes y Ministro de Hacienda, firmado el 01 de marzo del 2011, publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2011 de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200. Pretensiones subsidiarias: 1. Se declare la nulidad de la estructura tarifaria de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, señalada en el capítulo 11, apartado 7. 2, por utilizar como base en la proyección del tráfico realizada en el plan maestro para el complejo Limón/Moín, contratado a la empresa Royal Haskoning, el cual no es un estudio de factibilidad económica actualizado y no se encuentra sustentado en parámetros realistas de acuerdo al volumen de siembra y exportación de las frutas como el banano, piña y melón. 2. Se declare la nulidad de la estructura tarifaria de licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, por contradicción al artículo 3 inciso b de la Ley de la Nombre628 que establece el principio del servicio al costo. 3. Se declare nulo el acto que adjudica la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, por carecer de justificación del proceso licitatorio de una motivación del acto basado en las reglas unívocas de la ciencia o la técnica por no tener estudios técnicos como los estudios de factibilidad ambiental y económico. 4. Se anule el acuerdo número 018-MOPT-H publicado en el Alcance No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2001 en el que se adjudica la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200 por establecer que para la recepción de un descuento de $20 a la tarifa hecha en la oferta económica, se implementan 15 medidas en el acto de adjudicación, que se contemplarán en el contrato." 2.- En escrito presentado en fecha 12 de abril del 2012, Nombre141025 presenta escrito de ampliación de la demanda, (folios 4291-4366 del principal), en el cual formula la siguiente pretensión: "Principal: La declaración de nulidad de los siguientes actos administrativos: 1.- El acto de adjudicación realizada por parte de Nombre141024 en el acuerdo No. 73-11, artículo II-a de la sesión ordinaria No. 08-2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V.

2.- The act of the National Concessions Council (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones) in agreement number 2 of the extraordinary session No. 2-2011 of 28 February 2011, regarding the international public bidding process 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Puerto Moín Container Terminal and awarded to the bidder APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 3.- The award agreement executed by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), comprised of the President of the Republic, the Minister of Public Works and Transport (Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes), the Minister of Finance (Ministro de Hacienda), and signed on 01 March 2011, published in Digital Supplement (Alcance Digital) No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54 of 17 March 2011, regarding the international public bidding process 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Puerto Moín Container Terminal and awarded to the bidder APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 4. The international public bidding documents (cartel de licitación) for 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Puerto Moín Container Terminal and awarded to the bidder APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 5.- The contract entered into by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), the Executive Presidency of the Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOIN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., deriving from the international public bidding process 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Puerto Moín Container Terminal, dated 30 August 2011. 6.- Addendum No. 1 to the Public Works Concession with Public Service Contract for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of the Moín Container Terminal, signed on 29 November 2011 and executed by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), the Executive Presidency of the Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., deriving from the international public bidding process 2009LI-000001-00200. 7.- The new contract dated 13 February 2012, executed by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), the Executive Presidency of the Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., deriving from the international public bidding process 2009LI-000001-00200 promoted for the "Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Financing, Design, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of the New Moín Container Terminal". 8.- Official communication DCA-0692 from the Administrative Contracting Division (División de Contratación Administrativa) of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) dated 21 March 2012, in which it grants approval (refrendo) to the contract deriving from the international public bidding process of the Executive Presidency of the Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., deriving from the international public bidding process 2009LI-000001-00200 promoted for the "Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Financing, Design, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of the New Moín Container Terminal". 9.- That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay procedural and personal costs. Subsidiary claims: In the event that the Court dismisses the principal claims, we request the following: 1.- A declaration of nullity of the economic assumption of the volume projection, used in the tariff structure formula of the international public bidding process 2009-LI-000001-00200, set forth in chapter 11, section 7.2 thereof, provided in the Master Plan (Plan Maestro) and updated based on the study provided by the company ICICOR DE COSTA RICA, which serve as support for establishing the tariff of $223. 2.- To require the granting administration to generate its own cargo volume estimates, using updated data from recent years and those generated in the annual reports of JAPDEVA. 3.- Given the current conditions of lower interest rates worldwide and the stimulus offered by governments to avoid falling into a new recession, that the debt financing costs and the recognition of capital gains contained in the financial model be evaluated. 4.- To lower the internal rate of return from 17.5% to 15%; a level that was increased with the argument of the crisis, but which the same administration acknowledges is cyclical." 3.- RESPONSE TO THE COMPLAINT: Once the statutory transfer was granted, the defendant parties responded to the complaint in the following terms: a) APM Terminal Central América B.V: folios 1196-1275 of the main file. It raises the defenses of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa) and lack of standing (falta de derecho). b) State (Estado): in the terms recorded at folios 1281-1357 of the main docket. It raises the defenses of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa), and lack of standing (falta de derecho). c) National Concessions Council (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones): In the terms recorded at folios 1358-1428 of the main file. It raises the defenses of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa) and lack of standing (falta de derecho). d) Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica) (Nombre141024): folios 1570-1664 of the main file. It raises the defense of lack of standing (falta de derecho). e) Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos): responds to the complaint in the terms set forth at folios 1665-1696. It raises the defenses of lack of standing (falta de derecho) and lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva). f) Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República): response at folios 1770. It raises the preliminary defense of improper joinder of parties (indebida integración de la litis), as well as lack of active standing, passive standing, and lack of standing (falta de derecho). Regarding the EXPANSION OF THE COMPLAINT, they responded in the following terms: 1) Nombre141024 (folios 4394-4405): raises the defenses of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) and lack of standing (falta de derecho); 2) Nombre628 (folios 4407-4418): reiterates the preliminary defenses of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa) and inadmissibility of the complaint because the deadline to challenge the bidding documents had expired (precluido); 3) APM Terminals Central America B.V. (folios 4420-4453); 4) Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) (folios 4457-4494): lack of active and passive standing, lack of standing (falta de derecho); 5) State (Estado) (folios 4495-4541): failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), lack of standing (falta de derecho); 6) National Concessions Council (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones) (folios 4574-4604): failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), lack of standing (falta de derecho); 7) APM Terminals Moín S.A. (folios 4607-4656, 4697-4774): lack of standing (falta de derecho) and defective complaint.

SINTRAJAP COMPLAINT.

4.- By order issued at ten-fifty hours on twenty-one February two thousand twelve, this Court decided to consolidate file No. 11-003975-1027-CA, consisting of a complaint filed by Nombre141024 against the same defendants in this proceeding, with case number 11-001347-1027-CA. The claims formulated by that union were the following, according to the document visible at folios 2330-2417 of the main file (the facts of which were reformulated in the brief visible at folios 3639-3677 of the main file): "1. The nullity of the administrative act awarding international public bidding process No. 2009LI-000001-00200 called "Bidding documents for the public works concession with public service for the design, financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of the container terminal in Puerto Moín" in favor of APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. This is because: - the bidding process was conducted in violation of the applicable regulations of both the Concessions Law (Ley de Concesiones) and the Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación), it was conducted with bidding documents that did not comply with the provisions of the Public Works with Public Services Concession Law (Ley de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos) in its Article 21, subsections 1, 2, and 3, namely having all the corresponding technical studies supporting the economic and environmental viability of the project to be concessioned, also in violation, contrary to the meaning, of Articles 27 through 29, inclusive, of the cited Concessions Law, because these rules do not permit modification of the offer after the offers have been formally received and by modifying the bidding documents and the dates for submission of offers and not providing adequate deadlines. Furthermore, by granting 15 concessions or additional benefits to the awarded company, after the date of opening of the offers, benefits or concessions that, had they been disclosed, could have allowed other interested parties to bid. 2. In accordance with Article 42, subsection b) of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), I request that the administrative act awarding international public bidding process No. 2009LI-000001-0200 called "Bidding documents for the public works concession with public service for the design, financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of the container terminal in Puerto Moín" be declared null, to the company APM TERMINAL B.V., for lacking a justification for the bidding process, a statement of reasons for the administrative act, based on unequivocal rules of science or technique due to the absence of technical studies such as the environmental and economic feasibility studies. 3. That the defendants be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs incurred. Understanding personal costs to include not only judicial orders for payment of experts and fees of judicial officers, but also the attorney's fees corresponding according to the applicable tariff." 5.- RESPONSE TO THE COMPLAINT: Once the statutory transfer was granted, the co-defendant parties responded to the complaint filed by Nombre141024 as follows: a) APM Terminal Central América B.V (f. 3761-3802 of the main file): Raises the defenses of lack of standing (falta de derecho) and defective complaint; b) Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) (f. 3809-3841 ibidem): Raises the defenses of lack of active and passive standing, as well as lack of standing (falta de derecho); c) Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) (F. 3842-3876 of the main file): raises the exceptions of lack of standing (falta de derecho) and lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva); d) National Concessions Council (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones) (f. 3881-3936 of the main file): Raised the defenses of defective complaint and lack of standing (falta de derecho); e) Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA) (F. 3939-3988 of the judicial file): Raises the defense of lack of standing (falta de derecho); f) State (Estado) (f. 3993-4055-bis of the judicial file): raises the preliminary defenses of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa) and defective complaint, as well as the substantive defense of lack of standing (falta de derecho).

6.- Through resolution No. 589-2011 of 08 hours 26 minutes on 15 April 2011, the procedural judge upheld the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa) and ordered that Nombre141025 be granted a period of 5 business days for such purposes (folios 989-990 of the judicial file). Ultimately, by order of 14 hours 37 minutes on 25 May 2011, visible at folios 1018-1020, the procedural judge deemed the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies fulfilled. In the respective single hearing (audiencia única), this Court noted that the cited defense of failure to exhaust had previously been resolved, in accordance with the foregoing detail.

7.- The single hearing (audiencia única) established in Article 60.3 of the CPCA was scheduled by order of 10 hours on 14 June 2012 and reiterated to the parties by order of 13:12 hours on 26 June 2012, and was held starting on 02 July 2012 and through 06 July 2012, with the attendance of all parties. In said hearing, the denial of the request for joinder as co-adjuvant (coadyuvancia) made by Mr. Nombre141026, formulated at folios 1194-1195 of the main file, was ordered, and no appeal was filed against such denial. Likewise, the formulated claims were maintained. Furthermore, the admission of evidence was conducted, and the witness testimony was taken starting on 03 July 2012 and through 05 July following. The parties presented their closing arguments on 06 July 2012.

8.- Within the cited single hearing (audiencia única), once the debate had concluded, the present matter was declared as a complex proceeding, in accordance with Article 111 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), advising the parties that in these cases the deadline to issue and notify the ruling is 15 business days after the conclusion of the single hearing, a deadline that would begin on 16 July 2012, given the collective recess granted by the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) between 09 and 13 July of the current year.

9.- Through an action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) on 20 July 2012, Article 2, subsections 2) and 3), and Article 5, subsection 4), both of the General Law on Public Works Concession with Public Service (Ley General de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público), are challenged, as well as the Public Works Concession with Public Service Contract for the design, financing, construction, and maintenance of the Moín Container Terminal, an action being processed in file number 12-9578-0007-CO. However, as of the date of issuance of this ruling, the admission of said proceeding has not been determined, so there is no impediment to the issuance of this ruling.

10.- In the proceedings before this Court, no nullities have been observed that must be remedied, and the judgment is issued within the deadline established for this purpose in Article 111 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).

Written by Judge Garita Navarro with the affirmative vote of Judges Álvarez Molina and Abarca Gómez.

CONSIDERING (Considerando) I.- Proven facts: Of relevance for the purposes of this case, the following are established: 1) The National Chamber of Banana Growers (Cámara Nacional de Bananeros, CANABA) is a legal entity registered with the Associations Registry (Registro de Asociaciones) of the National Registry (Registro Nacional) under legal identification number CED110937. That Nombre141025 was founded on 30 January 1967 as a result of the concern of a group of producers worried about the future of the Costa Rican banana activity. The purpose of Nombre141025 has been to promote relations between producers and marketing companies, always seeking to defend and protect the common interests of its associates, as its bylaws state. (Folios 37, 4122-4123, 1917-1957 of the judicial file) 2) The commercial activity of the members of Nombre141025 comprises the production, marketing, and shipment of fruit to various international markets, contributing to the development of the national economy. The shipment of the products produced by the members of the Chamber is carried out via maritime transport shipped from Puerto Moín, currently operated by the Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA). (Folios 1958-2202 of the judicial file) 3) On 14 August 2006, the JAPDEVA Workers' Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de JAPDEVA), hereinafter SINTRAJAP, formally presented to the Government of the Republic a Proposal for Port Modernization and Strengthening of JAPDEVA. SINTRAJAP's proposal, which was based on a diagnosis of the institution and port activity, was an alternative to the concession/privatization of the ports. The Port Modernization proposal made by Nombre141024 proposed 26 concrete measures for its modernization. On 30 October 2006, the Government responded to the port workers in a very restrictive manner, stating that the only path, the only option, the only measure they were willing to take was the concession of the national ports. This type of response from the government led Nombre141024 to present in December 2006 a document called “ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENT “RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC TO THE DOCUMENT PRESENTED BY Nombre141024 AND PROPOSAL OF THE GOVERNMENT” AND REITERATION of the PROPOSAL OF Nombre141024 FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF Nombre141024 FOR PORT MODERNIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIMÓN” (Folios 1348 to 1402, 1403 to 1414 of the judicial file) 4) Through official communication 5464/DCA-1765 dated 29 May 2007, from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), authorization was granted to directly contract the study called “Preparation of the Master Plan for the Limón-Moín Port Complex, and Evaluation of Dredging of northern channels and dredging equipment necessary for the maintenance of the navigation channels”. The Procurement Office (Proveeduría) of the Port Administration of JAPDEVA, on 7 June 2007, formally initiated “Direct Purchase #2007CD-000609-01”, for the “Direct Contracting of the Dutch Consortium HASKONING NEDERLAND B.V. OORD DREDGING AND MARINE CONTRACTORS B.V. – IHC MERWEDE B.V.”, to provide consultancy services for the “Preparation of the Master Plan for the Limón-Moín Port Complex and Evaluation of Dredging of Northern Channels and Dredging Equipment Necessary for the Maintenance of the Navigation Channels”. Subsequently, Nombre141024 signed on 29 October 2007 with ROYAL HASKONING a contract called “Contract for the Provision of Consultancy Services for the Preparation of the Master Plan for the Limón-Moín Port Complex and the Evaluation of Drainage of the Atlantic Slope and the Dredging Equipment Necessary for the Maintenance of the Navigation Channels”. In the Contract, in its SIXTH Clause called “Cost, Financing, and Method of Payment” (Folio 0174 of the Administrative File), it is indicated that the total cost of the study is €248,000 (two hundred forty-eight thousand euros) and that it will be financed as follows: a) A donation from the Dutch Government for €140,000 (one hundred forty thousand euros), b) The three Dutch companies that make up the Consultant contribute €15,000 (fifteen thousand euros), c) Payment by Nombre141024 for €93,000 (ninety-three thousand euros). The majority of the money for the payment of the cost of preparing the Master Plan (Plan Maestro) was provided by the Dutch government (56.45%) and the same contracted Dutch company (6.05%), which together contributed 62.5% of the cost. (Folios from 2424 to 2443 of the Judicial file). 5) The contract signed between Nombre141024 and the Dutch company Royal Haskoning (“Contract for the Provision of Consultancy Services …”) states in its second clause regarding its object: “the provision of professional consultancy services for the preparation of the master plan for the Limón-Moín port complex and the evaluation of the drainage of the Atlantic slope and the dredging equipment necessary for the maintenance of the navigation channels…”. (Folios from 2424 to 2443 of the Judicial file). 6) Through Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) N° 34307-MCI-MOPT-MTSS, published in La Gaceta N° 31, of 13 February 2008, the Government of the Republic ordered the initiation of the Modernization Process of the National Port Sub-sector on the Caribbean Slope and the creation of inter-institutional commissions for its implementation. (Folios 320-323 of the administrative docket of CNC) 7) That on 21 August 2008, at the request of the Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA), the Dutch company Royal Haskoning issued a document called “Master Plan for the Limón-Moín port complex. This plan was approved through agreement 654-2008. (Document visible at folios 275-542, 2531-2795 of the judicial file, 47-318, 320 of the CNC administrative file) 8) On 3 September 2008, the consulting company Royal Haskoning delivered the “Final Report of the Master Plan for Port Development for the Ports of Limón and Moín”. The document delivered by Nombre141027 was titled “Master Plan for the Limón-Moín Port Complex” (Plan Maestro para el Complejo Portuario de Limón-Moín), project number 9R4672.21 and dated 21 August 2008. (Folios 2531-2735 of the judicial file) 9) In the Master Plan (Plan Maestro) presented (and subsequently approved) for the Limón-Moín Port Complex, the consultant recommends the development of the port in the following 3 stages or phases: Phase 1: a) increase in the capacity of the existing infrastructure through: installation of equipment, construction of a new oil terminal, construction of pier 5.7 in the extension of the existing piers in Moín. b) preparation of the concession and construction of a new port to the west of the current port: preparation of preliminary design, preparation of bidding documents, preparation of a public bidding process (or restricted with pre-qualification of bidders) to attract a concessionaire, signing of a contract with the concessionaire, construction of the breakwater and Phase 2. Phase 2: a) Transfer of all cargo from Limón to Moín, b) Handling of containers in the new port (900m of container berth) and Phase 3: Extension of the container berth with an additional 600m. (Folios 2531-2735 of the judicial file) 10) The Board of Directors of JAPDEVA, through Firm and Unanimous Agreement (Acuerdo Firme y Unánime) N° 654-08, Sole Article of the Extraordinary Session N° 37-2008, held on 18 September 2008, decided: “1). To approve the Master Plan for the Limón-Moín Port Complex, prepared by Royal Haskoning Nederland BV…”; “2). To prepare an action implementation guide, for the modernization of the Limón-Moín Port Complex and its future development.”; “3). To order the Administration to initiate, process, formulate, and implement the Master Plan with all related instances”; (…); “5) To order the Administration to proceed with the necessary and pertinent negotiations with SINTRAJAP, the Central Government, the National Concessions Council, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, and the Ministry of Labor, in order to guarantee the negotiation of this process expeditiously and within a period not exceeding six months, in harmony with current legislation and respecting the rights of the workers”. (Folio 2447 of the judicial docket) 11) In the bidding documents of the international public bidding process 2009LI-000001-0200, in condition No. 1.5, the following is indicated regarding the object of the bidding: "1.5 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT OBJECT OF THE CONCESSION. Taking as reference the traffic projections of the Master Plan for the Limón/ Moín port complex, approximately 1.5 kilometers of berth length will be required over the next 20 years, therefore it is necessary to develop a new Terminal northwest of the current Port of Moín, providing the following: a) Port facilities protected by a breakwater to create a basin with waves below acceptable levels of agitation for loading and unloading container ships. b) Dredging of an access channel with a depth of -18 meters, a depth that may be less according to the hydraulic and operational modeling that the concessionaire must carry out before the final designs to be able to serve, at a minimum, Panamax-type container ships. In the event that the resulting dredging volume is lower or higher than the investment contemplated in the financial model of the offer in relation to that revealed by the hydraulic model, the tariff will be proportionally affected, taking into consideration the value per cubic meter offered for the variation in the dredging volume. For the start of operation of the third phase, the depth of the access channel must be at least -18 meters. c) Dredging of a maneuvering basin and approach areas to the terminals with a depth of -16 meters, a depth that may be less according to the hydraulic and operational modeling that the concessionaire must carry out. In the event that the resulting dredging volume is lower or higher than the investment contemplated in the financial model of the offer in relation to that revealed by the hydraulic model, the tariff will be proportionally affected, taking into consideration the value per cubic meter offered for the variation in capital dredging, to be able to serve, at a minimum, Panamax-type container ships. For the start of operation of the third phase, the depth of the maneuvering basin must be at least -16 meters. d) Yards for container handling. e) Specialized port equipment for handling containers necessary for the operation of the Terminal (container cranes, RTG, etc.), complying at least with the equipment recommended in the Master Plan. However, the concessionaire will have the authority to acquire the best technology equipment that guarantees efficiency and effectiveness in port operations. f) Maritime equipment for assistance in the berthing and deberthing maneuvers of ships (marine tugs to serve at a minimum Panamax ships with a minimum bollard pull capacity of 60 Tons). This equipment may be owned by the concessionaire or by third parties. (…) Taking the Master Plan as a reference, this terminal must be developed in two stages (Phases 2 and 3) defined based on traffic projections as follows: a. Phase 2: design, financing, construction, and equipping of three berthing positions 300 meters in length, 420 meters in width, and a minimum depth at the berths to serve Panamax-type container ships, and designed to be dredged in the future to -16 meters. b. Phase 3: design, financing, construction, and equipping of two berthing positions 300 meters in length, 420 meters in width, and a minimum depth at the berths to serve Panamax-type container ships, and designed to be dredged in the future to -16 meters. The Panamax-type container ships referred to in this clause are those with a total length of 250 meters and a beam of 32.30 meters and a draft of 12.6 meters, a dead weight tonnage of at least 50000 DWT (equivalent to the design vessel). (…) It is important to indicate in this context that the Administration seeks above all an improvement in port productivity and efficiency, for which it proposes a wide margin of maneuver for interested parties in the design and development of their respective projects. The works will be developed entirely on a landfill or land reclamation that must be carried out at sea, located in Moín, Limón District, Central Canton, Province of Limón”. (Folios 3842-3666 of the CNC administrative file) 12) Through official communication P.E.036-2009 on 3 February 2009, the Executive President of Nombre141024 forwarded to the Technical Secretary of the National Concessions Council what was ordered under agreement N° 037-09, of Ordinary Session N° 03-2009 held on 22 January 2009, in its Article VII-a; of the Board of Directors of JAPDEVA, through which the National Concessions Council is requested that in the procedure to grant the public works with public service concession; in addition to the construction and operation of the port terminals contemplated in Phases 2 and 3 of the Port Master Plan, also include “the construction and operation of Terminal 5-7 and the Towing and Pilotage services, all the foregoing as a single business unit.” (folio 738 Volume II of the CNC File) 13) On 26 November 2008, the Board of Directors of Nombre141024, through Agreement N° 814-08 under Article II of Extraordinary Session N°45-2008, approves requesting the National Concessions Council “…THE INITIATION OF THE PROCEDURE OR PROCEDURES TO GRANT IN PUBLIC WORKS CONCESSION WITH PUBLIC SERVICE, THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF THE PORT TERMINALS CONTEMPLATED IN PHASES TWO AND THREE OF THE PORT MASTER PLAN…”. (Folios 322 and 321 of the File). However, the so-called Phase 1 of the Port Master Plan is omitted. And through official communication P.E.309-2008 -visible at folio 000323 of the File-; the Executive President of JAPDEVA requests the Technical Secretary of the National Concessions Council that said Council initiate the legal process for the concession of phases 2 and 3 contemplated in the Master Plan “…whose investments are necessary to carry out, in the shortest possible time,…”. (Folios 321-322 of the CNC administrative file) 14) That through an agreement made in ordinary session N° 32-2008, of 9 October 2008, the Board of Directors of the National Concessions Council (CNC) approved the execution of an agreement with JAPDEVA, with the objective of assisting and collaborating with said entity in the preparation, drafting, and publication of the bidding documents so that subsequently, the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) could proceed to issue the act of award and execution of the concession contract for the Puerto Moín Container Terminals. (Folios 324-325 of the CNC administrative file) 15) That through a firm agreement of the Board of Directors of the Port Administration Board of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA), adopted in ordinary session N° 45-2008, held on 22 December 2008, art. VII-a Agreement N° 898-08, the Executive President was authorized to execute the respective Inter-institutional Management Agreement. (Folios 731-735 of the CNC administrative file) 16) On 15 January 2009, the National Concessions Council, through Fourth Agreement of Ordinary Session N°1-2009, agrees to “…the initiation of the procedure to grant in Public Works Concession with Public Service, the Construction and Operation of the Port Terminals contemplated in phases two and three of the Port Master Plan prepared by the Dutch firm Royal Haskoning…”. (Folios 324, 325, 915, 916 of the CNC administrative file).

• 17)By resolution No. Nombre141028 of 8:00 a.m. on February 10, 2009, SETENA granted potential environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental potencial) to the Moín Container Terminal (TCM) project. It ordered the following, which is relevant to the case: "FIRST: Potential Environmental Viability (VAP) is granted to the project, so that it may carry out any prior management before banking entities or other state or private entities. The developer is warned that this granting does not confer any right whatsoever to carry out works of any kind, until the Final Environmental Viability (Viabilidad Ambiental Definitiva) is issued, once it complies with the additional information or documentation required by this Secretariat. (...) SECOND: The Developer is warned that, due to the characteristics of the project, for each phase or stage thereof it must carry out the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación del Impacto Ambiental) process initiated with the submission of the corresponding D1 form. (...)." (folios 1189-1191 of the main case file) 18) The preparation of the tender documents (cartel) corresponding to the bidding process was carried out based on phases two and three contemplated in the Master Plan for the Limón-Moín Port Development, prepared by the Dutch firm Royal Haskoning, with the approval of MOPT, Nombre141024 and the CNC. (Uncontested fact. Folios 38-456 of the judicial file) (Folios 47-318, 897-904 of the CNC administrative file, 1901-1915 of the judicial file) 19) On March 3, 2009, the Coordinator of the Technical Committee sent to the Technical Secretary of the National Concessions Council the first version of the "Tender Documents for the Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Moín Port Container Terminal" (Folios 743-878 of the CNC administrative file -volume II-) 20) On Thursday, April 23, 2009, in La Gaceta No. 78, page 51, the first notice of "INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC TENDER No. 2009LI-000001-00200 Public Works Concession with Public Services for the financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the New Moín Container Terminal" was published. (Folio 1068 of the CNC administrative file -volume III-) 21) In La Gaceta No. 78 of April 23, 2009, the tender documents for the International Public Tender No. 2009-LI-000001-00200 were published for the "Public works concession with public services for the financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the New Moín Container Terminal". (Uncontested fact, folios 2476, 926-927, 932-1053 of the CNC administrative file) 22) The Tender Documents with International Invitation published in Nombre33221 a Gaceta No. 78 of April 23, 2009, with tender number 2009-LI-000001-00200, considers within the Methodology for setting rates, the traffic projection carried out in the Master Plan for the Limón/Moín Port complex, prepared by the Dutch company Royal Haskoning. (Uncontested, folios 38-456 of the main file, 75-77 ARESEP administrative file) 23) In 2010, the company Nombre141027 was petitioned for the updated projected demand data, information that was fundamentally used by the CNC to adjust and update the rate model sent to ARESEP. (Official letter 0395 (DTS-OF-380-10) and 445 (DTS-OF-0432-10) dated March 12 and 23, 2010 -both-, addressed to said Regulatory Authority. Thus stated at folios 1446-2466 of the CNC administrative file.)
• 24)The Tender Documents with International Invitation published in Nombre33221 a Gaceta No. 78 of April 23, 2009, with tender number 2009-LI-000001-00200, considers within the Methodology for setting rates, the number of annual operations calculated based on the traffic projections made in the Master Plan for the Limón/Moín Port complex, prepared by the Dutch company Royal Haskoning. (Uncontested, folios 38-456 of the main file) 25) Tender documents No. 2009-LI-000001-00200 were modified as a result of requests for clarification and objection appeals (recursos de objeción) filed, the last version being published in La Gaceta No. 146 of July 28, 2010; setting the date and time for the closing and receipt of bids for August 17, 2010, at 2:00 p.m., at the headquarters of the National Concessions Council. (Uncontested, folios 1437, 1483-1735, 1991-2243, 2253, 2406, 2415, 2581-2831, 2838, 3215, 3216, 3347, 32643283, 3843 of the CNC administrative file) 26) The tender documents did not establish that bidders could submit an alternative bid. (Folio 38-274 of the judicial file, 3353-3587 of the CNC administrative file) 27) The tender documents published in La Gaceta # 5 of January 8, 2010 established a possible port tariff for cargo mobilization per container of US$ 169. (Uncontested, folios 166-177 of the ARESEP administrative file) 28) On June 2, 2009, SINTRAJAP filed an Objection Appeal (Recurso de Objeción) before the Comptroller General of the Republic against the Tender Documents "International Public Tender No. 2009LI-000001-00200 Public Works Concession with Public Services for the design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the New Container Terminal in Puerto Moín". The tender documents were also objected to by the company APM Terminals. These objections were resolved on July 2, 2009, by the Comptroller General of the Republic through Resolution R-DJ-008-2009. That same day, July 2, 2009, the Comptroller General of the Republic also issued Resolution R-DJ-008-2009 (bis) with ex officio considerations by the Comptroller Body regarding the provisions of the tender documents. (Folios 3408-3451 of the judicial file) 29) On November 24, 2009, the companies CDG Environmental Advisor S.A. and APM Terminals B.V. individually filed an objection appeal against the modifications to the Tender Documents for International Public Tender No. 2009LI-000001-00200 Public Works Concession with Public Services for the design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the New Container Terminal in Puerto Moín". On December 18, 2009 at 9:00 a.m., through Resolution No. R-DJ-343-2009, the Comptroller General of the Republic resolves: "1) Declare with merit the Appeal filed by CDG Environmental Advisors S.A. 2) Declare partially with merit the appeal filed by APM Terminals B.V. …". In this resolution, the Comptroller General also notes ex officio considerations regarding the Tender Documents. (Folios 3454-3511 of the judicial file) 30) On April 20, 2010, the company VISION WIDE TECH S.A. filed an Objection Appeal against the modifications to the Tender Documents that were made known by publication in La Gaceta No. 71 of April 14, 2010. On May 24, 2010 at 9:00 a.m., through Resolution No. R-DJ-215-2010, the Comptroller General of the Republic resolves: "1) Dismiss outright the objection appeal filed against the tender documents (...) by VISION WIDE TECH S.A." (Folios 2921-2910 of the CNC administrative file and 3512-3555 of the judicial file) 31) On November 26, 2009, at 12:39 p.m. via official letter STJ-967-2009 addressed to the Manager of the Administrative Contracting Division of the Comptroller's Office, Nombre141024 filed a new Objection Appeal against the Tender Documents "International Public Tender No. 2009LI-000001-00200 Public Works Concession with Public Services for the design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the New Container Terminal in Puerto Moín". By resolution R-DJ-283-2009 of November 26, 2009 at 1:00 p.m., the Comptroller General dismissed outright the appeal filed by Nombre141024 for considering it untimely.
• 32)On August 17, 2010 at two o'clock in the afternoon; after several modifications to the dates for receiving bids, the receipt of bids was closed, resulting in only one bid being received. It was presented by the company APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. (folios 3868-3871 of the CNC administrative file) 32) At the set time and date for the receipt of bids, only the bid submitted by APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMÉRICA B.V. was received, which offered a tariff of US$ 246. (Uncontested, folios 3868-3871 of the CNC administrative file) 33) Through official letter DSET-OF-401-2009 of March 18, 2009, the CNC formally sent to Nombre628 the tariff structure and adjustment parameters that would be incorporated into the TCM tender documents. This procedure was assigned file OT-367-2008 (ARESEP file). (Folio 36 of the administrative file of Nombre628) 34) Through official letter 122-RG-2009 of April 1, 2009, ARESEP requested additional required information, which specifically includes an electronic copy of the master plan, feasibility studies to provide project viability, environmental feasibility, detail of tariffs to be incorporated, tariff schedule, CNC agreement initiating the procedure (see folios 34-35 of the ARESEP file). The information was sent, providing a CD with the Master Plan and the proposed tariff model. (Folios 7-33 of the administrative file of Nombre628).
• 35)By resolution No. RG-125-2009 of April 20, 2009, that regulatory body approved the project and indicated that the indicated tariffs were maximum prices. It also warned that the adjustment mechanisms are applied to the awarded tariffs, not the approved ones, and that Nombre141029 does not confer any right to carry out any work. (Folios 78-80 ARESEP file) 36) Through official letter 2295/DTS-OF-1424-2009, CNC requested a second pronouncement on the tariff structure, adjustment parameters, and evaluation of service quality (folios 84-145 of the ARESEP file).
• 37)Through official letters 1346-DITRA-2009 and 1380-DITRA-2009/32128 dated October 22 and 27, 2009, Nombre628 requested information from the CNC, which was sent via official letters 2359/DST-OF-1488-09 of October 26, 2009 and 2385/DST-OF-1522-09 of October 28, 2009. By resolution No. RRG-10208-2009 of 9:15 a.m. on October 29, 2009, the regulatory body established a ceiling tariff of $169 per container (service to the cargo). (See folios 163-179 of the administrative file of Nombre628) 38) Through official letter DST-OF-380-10 (0395) of March 12, 2010, a new tariff was requested, analyzing new demand projections and updated investment costs: the proposed tariff was $252. This request was made indicating that it is based on the updated demand of the tariff model. It proposed a tariff for service to the cargo of $252.00 (two hundred fifty-two dollars) (Folios 202-210 of the administrative file of Nombre628). That information was supplemented with inputs sent to Nombre628 via official letter DST-OF-0432-10 (445) of March 23, 2010, which indicated that the IRR is 17.5% (folios 211-219 of the ARESEP administrative file). Similarly, through official letter DST-OF-380-10 (0395) of the 12th, the estimate of cargo volumes and their comparison with the Royal Haskoning model for the TCM prepared by the entity ICICOR-Costa Rica S.A. dated January 12, 2010 was sent (folios 220-268 ibidem).
• 39)By resolution No. RRG-255-2010 of 3:30 p.m. on April 5, 2010, Nombre628 established that with an internal rate of return of 17.5%, the ceiling tariff for the cargo per container shall be $252.00 (two hundred fifty-two dollars) (folios 286-293 of the ARESEP administrative file).
• 40)Through official letter 902/DST-OF-673-2010 of July 5, 2010, CNC requested a fourth opinion on the tariffs in accordance with resolution R-DJ-215-2010 of the CGR. (Folios 550-787 of the administrative file of Nombre628) 41) This entity requested additional information on July 12, 2010, and it was sent on July 15, 2010. (Folios 789, 791-792 of the administrative file of Nombre628) -. By resolution No. RRG430-2010 of 11:00 a.m. on July 22, 2010, Nombre628 issued the final resolution setting the tariffs, adjustment parameters, and quality criteria. Regarding the adjustment parameters, it noted that in the event of financial alterations, the following would be valid adjustment mechanisms: tariff review or adjustment, payment for economic and social development works for Limón, revision or adjustment of the investment schedule, additional works or equipment at the port, combination of the foregoing. -folios 796-801 of the ARESEP administrative file) 42) According to Agreement No. 073-11, article II-a, of Ordinary Session No. 08-2011 of February 24, 2011 of the Board of Directors of Port Administration and Development of the Atlantic Slope (Junta Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica), it acknowledged the technical reports submitted by the Bid Evaluation Commission for the project known as TCM via official letter CTCM-004-2011 dated February 18, 2011, and agreed to accept the recommendation for award to the company APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMÉRICA B.V. (Uncontested, folios 6236-6280 of the CNC administrative file) 43) Through agreement No. 2 of Extraordinary Session No. 2-2011 of February 28, 2011 of the National Concessions Council, the Council acknowledged the technical reports submitted by the Bid Evaluation Commission for the project known as TCM via official letter CTCM-004-2011 dated February 18, 2011, and agreed to accept the recommendation for award to the company APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMÉRICA B.V. (Uncontested, folios 6296-6319 of the CNC administrative file) 44) Through decree No. 36443-MOPT-H, of February 28, 2011, published in Digital Supplement No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54 of Thursday, March 17, 2011, the bidding project known as the TCM was declared of public interest. (Uncontested, folios 6325-6328, 6407, 6408 of the CNC administrative file) 45) Through agreement 018-MOPT-H, published in Digital Supplement No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54, of March 17, 2011, the award was made to the company APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMÉRICA B.V. as the sole bidder, for a tariff of US$ 223. (Uncontested, folios 6320-6362 of the CNC administrative file) 46) Through agreement No. 018-MOPT-H, signed on March 1, 2011, published in Digital Supplement No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54 of Thursday, March 17, 2011, the State committed to assisting the Concessionaire in obtaining basic studies on waves and propagation, navigation, modeling, agitation, coastline change, soils and environmental studies, material sources, among others. (Uncontested, folios 6320-6362 of the CNC administrative file) 47) Through agreement No. 018-MOPT-H, signed on March 1, 2011, published in Digital Supplement No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54 of Thursday, March 17, 2011, the Costa Rican State assumed a series of commitments with the concessionaire that were not included in the respective tender documents, namely: 1) That the State would assist in the processing of basic studies on waves and propagation, navigation studies, modeling, agitation, coastline change, soil and environmental studies, material sources, among others; 2) That the State would facilitate a physical space on land of at least ten hectares, located as close as possible to the concession area, where the Concessionaire and its subcontractors would install offices, as well as where equipment, machinery, tools, piles, materials, offices, camps, and other needs for the work would be located, and the State committed to transfer said land. 3) That the State would assist in obtaining the Environmental Viability permits from the Technical Environmental Secretariat (SETENA), Health permit from the Department of Health (Ministry of Health-Limón Office), Water Authorizations and Review of potable water service availability from the Water and Sewer Authority (Acueductos y Alcantarillados) (Limón Office), Authorization regarding electricity and telecommunications services (review of availability of these services) from the Costa Rican Electricity Institute - ICE (Limón Office), Authorization regarding insurance policies (identification of applicable policies) and authorization regarding access availability from the Fire Department of the National Insurance Institute-INS (Limón Office), and Municipal Business License and Construction Permit-Land Use- from the Municipality of Limón, for the installation of the contractor's offices, workshops, and support yards by the Concessionaire; 4) That the State would assist and expedite the designation of the site for the disposal of dredged material not used as fill material in the construction of the TCM; 5) That the State would designate a specific area as a material extraction site (banco de extracción) for fill, if required for the construction of the TCM; 6) That the State would provide all facilities for the extraction and disposal of dredged material and the commitment to support obtaining permits from the Department of Mines of the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications and the Technical Environmental Secretariat (SETENA); 7) That the State would request the authorization for mining exploration and/or exploitation, granted by the Department of Mines of the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications, in favor of the Concessionaire; and, 8) That the State committed to commence provisional operations with the first berth of a phase called 2A, (Uncontested, folios 6320-6362 of the CNC administrative file) 48) On March 31, 2011, Nombre141024 filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) against the award act of the tender in question via official letter STJ-244-2011. On April 29, 2011, the Comptroller General, through Resolution No. R-DCA-202-2011, resolved to "DISMISS OUTRIGHT DUE TO MANIFEST IMPROPRIETY the Appeal filed by the Workers' Union of Nombre141024 (SINTRAJAP) against the award act…" (highlighted in bold in the original). (Folio 2448, Volume V of the CNC administrative file) 49) On May 4, 2011, via official letter STJ-335-2011, the Workers' Union of Nombre141024 requested from the Comptroller General, in a reasoned manner and with factual and legal grounds, a RECONSIDERATION of its Resolution R-DCA-202-2011 of 10:00 a.m. on April 29, 2011. By act R-DCA-223-2011 of 9:00 a.m. on May 11, 2011, the comptroller body ordered "Dismiss outright as improper the motion for reconsideration filed by Nombre141024 against resolution R-DCA-202-2011…”. (Uncontested) 50) On August 30, 2011, a contract was signed by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Board of Directors of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA and APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., derived from the international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200 promoted for the “Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Financing, Design, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the New Moín Container Terminal”. (Folios 8617-8771 of the CNC administrative file) 51) Within clause 11.8.2 of the concession contract, a tariff to the cargo of $223 (two hundred twenty-three dollars) per container was set. (Folio 7639 of the CNC file).
• 52)On September 13, 2011, the Legislative Assembly issued a majority report, file No. 17.835, called "Special Report to Investigate and Analyze all Concession Processes that the Costa Rican State has granted, or is about to grant under Law No. 7762 and its partial amendment contained in Law No. 8643. APM Terminals Central America Report." This document is visible at folios 4134-4290 of the judicial file (volume VII) 53) On September 14, 2011, official letter DST-OF-1491-2011 was issued by the National Concessions Council, sending the Public Works Concession Contract with Public Service for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Moín Container Terminal to the Comptroller General of the Republic for its approval (refrendo). (Folio 9932 CNC administrative file) 54) On October 28, 2011, official letter DCA-2836 was issued by the Administrative Contracting Division of the Comptroller General of the Republic, through which additional information was requested from the National Concessions Council before proceeding with the study of the approval (refrendo) request for the Public Works Concession Contract with Public Service for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Moín Container Terminal. (Folio 9932 of the CNC administrative file) 55) On November 21, 2011, a letter of formal acceptance was signed by APM Terminal Moín S.A., in which it agreed to supplement the information requested by the Comptroller General of the Republic for the signing of an addendum to the contract signed on August 30, 2011. (Folio 9932 of the CNC administrative file) 56) On November 24, 2011, agreement 5.1 of ordinary session 28-2011 was issued, in which the Board of Directors of the National Concessions Council (CNC) approved the signing of an addendum to the contract signed on August 30, 2011. (Folio 9932 of the CNC administrative file) 57) On November 24, 2011, agreement No. 491-11 of ordinary session 41-2011 was issued, in which the Board of Directors of Nombre141024 approved the signing of an addendum to the contract signed on August 30, 2011. (Folios 9248-9330 of the CNC administrative file) 58) On November 29, 2011, Addendum No. 1 to the Public Works Concession Contract with Public Service for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Moín Container Terminal was signed by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Board of Directors of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA and APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., derived from international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200. (Folios 9516-9599 of the CNC administrative file) 59) On November 30, 2011, official letter DST-OF-1888-2011 was issued by the Technical Secretariat of the National Concessions Council, consisting of the response to official letter DCA-2836 issued by the Administrative Contracting Division of the Comptroller General of the Republic dated October 28, 2011. (Folio 9932 of the CNC administrative file) 60) On January 17, 2012, official letter DCA-0082 was issued by the Administrative Contracting Division of the Comptroller General of the Republic, again requesting additional information to continue with the study for the approval (refrendo) of the Public Works Concession Contract with Public Service for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Moín Container Terminal. (Folio 9932 of the CNC administrative file) 61) On an unknown date and official letter number, the Fourth Technical-Legal Report TCM was issued to respond to official letter DCA-0082 issued by the Administrative Contracting Division of the Comptroller General of the Republic; signed by the institutional heads of JAPDEVA, its Executive President Allan Hidalgo and the Acting Technical Secretary of the CNC Edwin Rodríguez. It was also signed by officials Nombre56756, in his capacity as TCM project manager and director of the maritime port division of MOPT; Nombre141030, in his capacity as TCM environmental director; Nombre141031, in his capacity as director of port works for MOPT; Nombre141032, in his capacity regarding social capital matters on behalf of the C.N.C.; Nombre141033, in her capacity as legal director of the CNC; and finally Mr. Nombre141034, in his capacity as execution unit. (Folio 9815-9898 of the CNC administrative file) 62) On February 13, 2012, a new Contract was signed by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Board of Directors of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA and APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., derived from the international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200 promoted for the “Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Financing, Design, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the New Moín Container Terminal”. (Folio 9644-9813 of the CNC administrative file) 63) On February 13, 2012, official letter DST-OF-179-2012 was issued by the Technical Secretariat of the National Concessions Council, sending the response to official letter DCA-0082 dated January 17, 2012, to the Administrative Contracting Division of the Comptroller General of the Republic. (Folio 9932 of the CNC administrative file) 64) On March 21, 2012, official letter DCA-0692 was issued by the Administrative Contracting Division of the Comptroller General of the Republic, in which it granted approval (refrendo) to the contract derived from international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200 promoted for the “Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Financing, Design, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the New Moín Container Terminal”. (Folio 9932-9990 of the CNC administrative file) 65) The Master Plan submitted by the company Royal Haskoning contains the base information comprising the financial and economic feasibility studies. (Folios 38-456 of the main file, depositions of witnesses Nombre5836 and V) 66) According to data from ECLAC, Nombre141035 ica ranks 15th in the Latin American ranking of port container movement (as acknowledged, for example, by witness Nombre141036 and can be seen on the ECLAC website according to a query made on July 31, 2012, at 2:00 p.m. Placa27257).

II.- Unproven Facts: Of relevance for the purposes of this matter are those set forth below: 1) That by virtue of international public tender No. 2009Li-000001-00200, known as “Tender for the Public Works Concession for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Moín Port Container Terminal”, the members of the Chamber will have to use the services and pay the established tariffs, for the purpose of exporting their products. (It is not proven that all banana export and import movements will be carried out through the TCM) 2) That the area where the TCM project will be developed is included in the Amistad Caribe Conservation Area (ACLA) of the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC), as well as in areas under other management categories administered by NGOs and semi-autonomous institutions, where wetlands are protected, and where environmental damage will occur. (This situation is not proven) 3) That in the last 20 years, the country has not had an increase in banana cultivation production like that reflected in the Royal Haskoning Master Plan, the historical maximum average peak being around 100 million boxes. (There is no proof of this) 4) That according to the tariff structure proposed in the debated tender, it would imply a 160% increase in mobilization and shipping costs for banana exporters, compared to what they currently have. (This factual allegation is not verified) 5) That the international public tender No. 2009Li-000001-00200, known as “Tender for the Public Works Concession for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Moín Port Container Terminal”, was carried out without technical, financial, economic, and environmental studies. (This claim is not proven) 6) That the National Chamber of Banana Growers filed objection appeals against the various versions of the tender documents issued within the international public tender No. 2009Li-000001-00200, known as “Tender for the Public Works Concession for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Moín Port Container Terminal” (The records do not substantiate such appellate action) 7) That as of the date the aforementioned tender was initiated, the competent authorities had complied with the Master Plan regarding the works and investments to be made for phase 1, which sought the modernization of the so-called Pier 57. (This aspect is not proven) 8) That the international public tender procedure 2009LI-000001-0200 did not have financial feasibility studies and information on demand projections and relevant data that would allow potential bidders to individually carry out their analyses on the profitability of the proposed business. (This circumstance is not proven) III.- Purpose of the proceeding. In view of the parties' allegations, this proceeding revolves around determining the validity of a series of public acts carried out within the international public tender procedure 2009LI-000001-0200, which includes the tender documents and their amendments, the award act, the concession contract and its addenda, comptroller approval, among others.

The breadth of the arguments that make up the parties' pleadings makes it unnecessary to refer to them in this section, given that throughout this judgment an analysis and development of these topics will be carried out, a deliberation in which the parties' arguments will be weighed. Thus, it is clear that the object of the proceeding is demarcated by the set of claims formulated in the statements of claim and amendment filed by Nombre141025 and Nombre141024, petitions that were reiterated at the sole hearing of this proceeding, in the terms set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of the operative part (resultandos) of this judgment. We then proceed to examine the charges formulated that support the action being heard through this means.

IV.- On the standing (legitimación) of Nombre141025 in this proceeding. The Contraloría General de la República, as well as the State's representation, raise a defense of lack of active standing (legitimación activa) against CANABA. In essence, it is argued that it does not represent the interests of the entire banana sector, as it affiliates all producers and even some of its affiliates withdrew their support. Specifically, the Comptroller body reproaches that, despite the CPCA regulation, it has not been made clear which interests the lawsuit seeks to protect. Understanding that it invokes a trade association interest, doubts arise as to whether this chamber has standing to defend the trade association (gremio) as a whole. Furthermore, it indicated that not all banana companies use container ships. It is not clear what the extensive damage to the entire sector is. It seems that only some companies would be affected, so it is those that should have filed the proceeding. It is noteworthy that despite three rounds of objections to the tender document (cartel), Nombre141025 never filed an objection recourse (recurso de objeción). It did not participate in the tender document review phase. On this point, it should be noted that Nombre141025's participation seeks to be established under the concept of trade association interest (interés gremial) protected by section 10, first subsection, sub-subsection b of the CPCA. It may certainly be questioned whether this Chamber brings together all banana producers and exporters in the country, however, the concept in question does not require the adhesion of all individuals engaged in a specific activity to be able to exercise this character of representative defense of a specific trade association or sector. It should be highlighted that this type of standing seeks to be established as a framework that allows the exercise of actions with supra-individual projection, that is, it seeks the protection of collective interests belonging to the individuals who make up the represented trade association or corporation. From this perspective, the organizational scheme presented by CANABA empowers it to file actions such as the present one, insofar as, at least in probability, the operation of the TCM under challenge may have an impact on the scope of activities of its members, regardless of whether it encompasses all actors in the national banana sector. Note that no particular effect is sought for any specific company, in which case the standing should be based not on sub-subsection b) mentioned, but on the direct standing of sub-subsection a), which tends to protect subjective rights and legitimate interests. However, this cause is based on claims of a general nature from the point of view of the effects on the represented sector. The same must be said regarding the allegation of not using container ships, since the fact that at present a certain group of exporters does not use them does not imply that the port management system intended to be incorporated by the TCM design will not be used by those represented entities. Regarding the denial of active standing due to the lack of challenge to the tender document, this will be a matter addressed infra. Consequently, this Court does not find a defect in CANABA's standing, given the specific claims formulated, wherefore the defense must be rejected.

V.- On the standing of ARESEP. The representation of the regulatory body raises a defense of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva). It argues that no specific claim is deduced against Nombre628 in which the content of acts issued by Aresep is openly challenged. As noted, Nombre141025 reformulated its claims in the statement of amendment of the claim filed on April 12, 2012, (folios 4291-4366 of the main file). In this writing, as neither in the original writing that generated this proceeding, a single claim is incorporated seeking the suppression of conduct attributable to ARESEP. Such a petition is also lacking in the claim of SINTRAJAP, which is dedicated to petitioning the annulment of the award and the respective concession contract. Indeed, as ARESEP argues, in this cause, the co-plaintiffs have not established any specific claim of invalidity of acts referable to ARESEP, which would allow it to be considered a passive party in this dispute. Although it is true that within the framework of the allegations raised, references are made to the economic feasibility of the TCM project and allusions are made to the veracity and validity of the information used to establish the rates that such concession proposes to charge users of the port terminal, the truth of the matter is that it is not specifically and concretely indicated which claim is sought to be opposed against the cited Regulatory Authority, such that the object of this cause requires it to be considered a defendant party. In this line, it is appropriate to clarify Article 21 of Law No. 7762, which establishes the mandatory nature of the consultation that the Technical Secretariat of the CNC must carry out with Nombre628 regarding the tariff structure and the adjustment parameters to be incorporated into the bidding document (cartel de licitación); as well as the parameters to be used to evaluate service quality, a ruling to be issued within ten days and whose nature will be binding. Nombre628's participation in the TCM process in accordance with Law No. 7762 allows its passive standing framework to be questioned in accordance with sections 12.1 and 12.6 of the CPCA. Regarding the first subsection mentioned, procedural regulations state that the Public Administration author of the administrative conduct subject to the proceeding shall be considered the defendant party. In this case, as noted, no conduct of Nombre628 is directly challenged, as the annulment petitions fall upon the award, the contract, its amendments, the countersignature (refrendo), and the bidding document. The invocation of disagreements regarding tariff calculations cannot be considered a direct challenge to acts referable to ARESEP. Even if the subsidiary petitions seek the suppression of the contract's tariff structures, the truth is that this does not imply Nombre628's passive standing in this cause, in light of the provisions of subsection 6 of canon 12 of the CPCA, as explained below. Regarding subsection 6 mentioned, Nombre628's participation in this process does not allow it to be considered a defendant. The regulation in question stipulates the following: "When an entity issues any act or provision that, for its finality, requires prior control, authorization, approval, or knowledge by a State organ or another administrative entity, the following shall be considered the defendant party: a) The State or the entity that issued the supervised act or provision, if the result of the supervision has been approving. (...)" Certainly, Nombre628 does not approve the TCM rates; this is a matter to be included in the contract as established by canon 41 of Law No. 7762. The representative of this administrative entity is correct in that its participation in the TCM process - in accordance with Law No. 7762 - is limited to addressing the consultation on rates, structure, adjustment models, and quality principles, as well as investment costs, according to canon 7 of the Regulation to Law No. 7762. In this process, Nombre628 proposes a maximum rate, but the contract is the instrument that sets the final remuneration, as well as its adjustment mechanisms. After this consultation, it only has jurisdiction to hear economic aspects of the concession if there is a discrepancy between the granting Administration and the concessionaire, when the appeal (recurso de apelación) is filed, or if complaints are filed for defective service provision - art. 41 Law No. 7762 -. Under this scheme, Nombre628's ruling provided the basis for rates even lower than those quantified, from which it can be concluded that it issued its approval of the consulted model. In that case, in line with sub-subsection a of section 6 of Article 12 of the CPCA, and regardless of the criticism that may be made of such legal treatment, the truth of the matter is that this legal source establishes that in such cases, the defendant Administration shall be the one issuing the act subject to supervision, not the one exercising its supervisory powers - as is the case with ARESEP -, which consequently implies its lack of passive standing in this proceeding. Furthermore, it must be added, that issued ruling consists of a procedural, preparatory, mandatory, and binding act, but ultimately an internal one. Therefore, in accordance with canon 163.2 LGAP, that act can only be challenged together with the final act containing it. However, as has been evidenced, no action by ARESEP is criticized, but only those final acts. This is without prejudice to the analysis of the tariff issue to be performed infra. Therefore, the defense under analysis must be upheld. Consequently, the claim filed by Nombre141025 and by Nombre141024 against Nombre628 must be dismissed. Regarding costs, this will be an issue to be analyzed in the corresponding section.

VI.- On the passive standing of the CGR regarding Nombre141024's claim. The Contraloría General de la República raises a defense of lack of passive standing against the claim filed by Nombre141024. It points out that there is no conduct of the CGR being challenged, which leads to lack of standing, as there is no basis for the Union to sue the CGR. This is evidenced from the perspective of the claims. The claim is for annulment and there is no request for annulment of conduct or an act of the Comptroller body. Only the annulment of the award act is requested. There is no basis for it to appear as a defendant in this proceeding. After thoroughly analyzing the Comptroller body's argument as well as the action filed by Nombre18044, the CGR is correct for the reasons set forth below. When the CGR is a passive party to the proceeding, the matter deserves particular treatment. Indeed, in these cases, the adjudicator must discriminate when the challenged conduct, attributable to the CGR, is inherent to its external supervisory function, that is, when it exercises its constitutional and legal powers of supervision and control over matters entrusted to it as a specialized technical instance, from those cases in which the conduct subject to the cause is inherent to its internal regime. The latter must be understood as that set of actions in which it does not act as a supervisory instance, that is, its supervisory competence is not questioned, but rather an internal administrative function. In this case, when the CGR exercises its supervisory powers, of an external nature, a distinction must be made between the scenarios provided for in subsection 5 of Article 12 of the CPCA. On that plane, when the proceeding has as its object the reproach of its own conduct (of the Comptroller body), related to the exercise of its constitutional and legal competence, the cause must be filed against the CGR in necessary passive joinder (litisconsorcio pasivo necesario) jointly with the State. In this case, the former will be represented by its own representatives, while the State will be represented by the Procuraduría General de la República. This is the scenario regulated by sub-subsection a) of that precept. It is precisely, for clarity on the matter, what has happened in this dispute, since the actions proper to the CGR being debated, the State was joined as a passive party. Now, when the proceeding has as its object an administrative conduct subject to its control, in the exercise of its supervisory powers or superior guardianship of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), sub-subsection b) of that same provision states that the CGR is a passive party to the proceeding, jointly with the supervised entity, again, in necessary passive joinder. However, in this scenario, the CGR's participation is valid when, in its exercise of supervision, it has issued conduct, whether by having resolved the objection recourse, appeal recourse, or granted the countersignature (refrendo). In this case, no act attributable to the CGR is challenged by SINTRAJAP. Note that according to the written submission visible at folios 2330-2417, as well as its correction at pages 3639-3677 of the main file, what is challenged is the award act. Nombre141024 did not extend the object of this proceeding to the Comptroller's countersignature or, in general, to any action attributable to the CGR. This is not evident from either the formal or material scope of the claim, so this Court could not assume a kind of material claim involving the CGR within the set of claims deduced in this cause. From this perspective, the prerequisites provided in section 12.5 of the CPCA do not concur, such that this specialized supervisory instance could be considered a defendant party in Nombre141024's action. Consequently, the proper course is to uphold the lack of passive standing raised by the CGR against SINTRAJAP's claim. Regarding this action, the claim is dismissed. Regarding costs, this will be an issue to be analyzed in the corresponding section.

VII.- On the subjection to legality in administrative contracting procedures. By reason of the allegations raised by the parties involved in this dispute and the object of the proceeding itself, it is decisive to address, even briefly, the topic related to the legality that must prevail in the dynamics of administrative contracting procedures, their controls, as well as the mechanisms that regulate scenarios where these procedures are violated, as is the case of so-called irregular contracting (contratación irregular). The activity of administrative contracting, like any manifestation of public powers, is subject to the bloc of legality in a broad sense, its operation having to be subject to the content and scope of the legal norms that regulate a given procedure. This subjection is concretized in the so-called principle of legality (whether in its positive version, or in the classic negative version), whose normative basis rests on precepts 11 of the Magna Carta, 11, 12, 13, 59, and 66 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Hence, public contractual activity can only be understood as valid when it is substantially in accordance with the legal system (section 128 ibidem), as indeed established by canon 32 of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa). Therefore, procedures or actions within the course of the administrative contracting phase, as well as its execution, that become detached from the legal criteria imposed by the legal system in that matter, produce nullities that can lead to the suppression of the contracting or the specific acts that disregard such requirements, as deduced from section 3 of the Administrative Contracting Law, a norm that refers to the ordinances of the General Public Administration Law regarding the dynamics of public contracting pathology. This activity (contracting) constitutes a relevant instrument for the acquisition by public administrations of the goods and/or services required for the exercise of their activities, or for the satisfaction of the public interest. From this perspective, public contracting must be understood under an instrumental prism, rather than an end in itself, which means it constitutes a tool for the realization of an ultimate purpose or goal. Hence, the perception and interpretation of this matter should tend to enhance the fulfillment of the efficiency and effectiveness that are inherent to public functioning. In this line, section 4 of the Administrative Contracting Law clearly states that "All acts related to administrative contracting activity must be oriented toward the fulfillment of the administration's purposes, goals, and objectives, with the purpose of guaranteeing the effective satisfaction of the general interest, based on efficient use of institutional resources." This implies a guiding criterion in hermeneutical matters of the various concepts that converge in this dynamic and complex administrative matter, so as to allow the satisfaction of the ultimate purpose for which they are issued, in line with the provisions of Article 10 of the LGAP. Under this dynamic, it is clear that the purpose of the contracting system is none other than to provide the Administration with procedural mechanisms that allow obtaining the aforementioned inputs with a scheme that seeks, as a principle thesis, the selection of the most favorable offer, meaning by this, the one that best adjusts to the Administration's requirements in the specific case, which must be reflected in the tender document (cartel) conditions that form the basis of the public tender. For this, canon 5 of the cited legislation implements the principles of equality and free participation, so that there is freedom of proposal or offer to contract with the Administration, subject, of course, to the conditions that it establishes in the specific procedure and that do not imply a disregard for that participatory openness and equity. By virtue of this, in the evaluation of bids, substance must prevail over form, applying a maxim of conservation of offers. It is evident that fulfilling this task requires flexible contracting mechanisms that do not subject the Administration to extremely formalistic conditions that, far from satisfying its needs, frustrate them, because in that measure, the instrument would work against the purpose. A public contracting system must adjust to this framework of needs, without losing sight of the prior or subsequent control phases that guarantee the correct fulfillment of the minimum procedures and principles relevant to this field. However, the adaptability inherent in public services should not be a phenomenon foreign to administrative contracting, which must evolve and react to increasingly dynamic, and at times atypical, contractual modalities, allowing Administrations to use these mechanisms to better satisfy their needs, it is insisted, with respect for the controls inherent in the administration of public resources. The transcendence of this institute is observed in its constitutional basis, specifically, in canon 182 of the Magna Carta, a norm from which the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself has conducted a broad analysis, among many, in Resolution No. 998-98, in which it elevated to constitutional rank all the principles associated with administrative contracting, a position not appropriate to analyze in this case. However, it must be clear, although public contracting has a constitutional basis, which can also be observed in section 140 subsection 19, 121 subsection 14, and the cited section 182, its development is fundamentally legal, the Administrative Contracting Law being the source that sets forth in the most detailed way the regime proper to this area of public law. All this development, together with the other sectoral norms in that field (which includes the RLCA), constitutes the normative reference to which Administrations are subject, which must adjust their contractual action framework to that regime, thus constituting an essential and delimiting part of the legality of their actions. Now, given the bilateral nature of the administrative contract (in which, unlike the administrative act, two wills concur for the configuration and perfection of the contractual relationship), the synallagmatic nature inherent to the concept requires clarity of the norms governing the contracting, in order to avoid actions that disregard that regime and seek, in contradiction to the principle of equality and free participation, agreements between the Administration and an offeror, outside of those procedures, without having accredited that it is the best offer. The notorious publicity of a public contracting system makes any attempt to allege ignorance of that regime inapplicable, under the application of the rule underlying constitutional mandate 129, by virtue of which no one can allege ignorance of the law. In the matter of public works concession (concesión de obra pública), the application of the nullities regime of Law No. 6227/78 is recognized in Article 4 of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 27098-MOPT, of June 12, 1998, published in Supplement (Alcance) No. 27 to La Gaceta No. 115 of June 16, 1998, "Regulation to the General Law on Concession of Public Works with Public Services" (Reglamento a la Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos). Now, this validity check must be exercised within a special appellate regime at the administrative level or in the analysis of the validity of public conduct at the judicial phase before this jurisdiction in accordance with section 49 of the Magna Carta. This latter point will be addressed later. As regards the administrative review of conduct issued during the course of the administrative procedure, section 81 of Law No. 7494 regulates the issue of the objection recourse (recurso de objeción), to be filed within the first third of the period for receiving offers, by any interested party, potential offeror, or representation of collective interests - and even diffuse ones - that may potentially be affected. Within the framework of Law No. 7762, such possibility is realized in section 34, a matter to be addressed infra. Against the award act, as established by sections 84 and 87, depending on the amount of the contract, the appeal recourse (recurso de apelación) lies before the CGR or the revocation recourse (recurso de revocatoria) before the same Administration (which includes the so-called internal appeal, when the awarding body is not the head of the respective Administration). In Law No. 7762, as it is a special regime, section 35 only establishes the appeal recourse before the CGR. It is a specialized appellate regime by virtue of which only that particular type of recourse can be filed against those acts, without it being possible to file any other, which has come to be called the "Principle of Challenging Taxativeness" (Principio de Taxatividad Impugnaticia). In this way, subjection to legality constitutes a fundamental guiding principle to which every Public Administration must submit during the course of administrative contracting procedures.

VIII.- On the contractual modality of public works concession with public services. Generalities. Legal Regime. Analysis of prior studies. Through Law No. 7762 of April 14, 1998, published in Supplement No. 17 to La Gaceta 98, of May 22, 1998, the Law on Concession of Public Works with Public Services is issued, a regulation that constitutes a specific normative order that specifies the rules to be satisfied in the dynamics of administrative contracts whose object is the concession of a public work or, in cases where that concession is also granted under a system that includes the provision of public services. In this context, subsection 2 of Article one of that legal source establishes what is to be understood by each of both contractual modalities. In that sense, Public Works Concession (Concesión de obra pública) is understood as the administrative contract by which the granting Administration entrusts a third party, which may be a public, private, or mixed person, with the design, planning, financing, construction, conservation, expansion, or repair of any public immovable property, in exchange for consideration charged to the users of the work or the beneficiaries of the service or for consideration of any type paid by the granting Administration. For its part, the Concession of Work with Public Service (Concesión de Obra con Servicio Público) must be understood as the administrative contract by which the Administration entrusts a third party, which may be a public, private, or mixed person, with the design, planning, financing, construction, conservation, expansion, or repair of any public immovable property, as well as its exploitation, providing the services foreseen in the contract in exchange for consideration charged to the users of the work or the beneficiaries of the service or for consideration of any type paid by the granting Administration. As observed, the contract in question is far from being a contractual management method that simply seeks the construction of public works, but rather encompasses more complex aspects, which may include design, financing, operation, maintenance, remodeling, among other manifestations. It is not merely about the acquisition by the granting administration of a requirement for work construction services, an aspect that in any case consists of only one of the variations that can occur within the scope of this administrative contractual modality. However, according to section 113 of Law No. 6227/78, the use of this public management modality must be duly supported by the satisfaction of public interests, which requires the performance of a series of prior analyses, of various kinds - a topic to be discussed infra - to justify the opening of a contracting procedure of this nature, as well as the due justification (motivación) to which every public decision is subject and conditioned (doctrine of mandate 136 LGAP). In the specific case of contracts undertaken under Law No. 7762, canon two clearly states on this point: "Every work and its exploitation are susceptible to concession when there are reasons of public interest, which must be recorded in the file by means of a reasoned act." However, that same precept sets the scope of application of the concept in question, by stating its inapplicability to the matters of telecommunications, electricity, and health services (exclusion incorporated by reform through Law No. 8643 of June 30, 2008). Likewise, with regard to the docks of Limón, Moín, Caldera, and Puntarenas, only new works or expansions carried out there may be conceded, it being unfeasible to use this mechanism on existing works. In such cases, 70% of the income obtained by the granting administration according to the parameters of section 42 of Law No. 7762, by reason of the new works or expansions conceded at the cited docks, shall be transferred to the Junta de la Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica and the Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, as applicable, to be destined exclusively for investments in works in the respective provinces, without being able to be used to cover administrative expenses. A relevant part of the implications of this contractual typology within the framework of works at the cited docks is that once the term of the agreement expires, the public works erected by the concessionaire become the property of Nombre141024 or INCOOP, as applicable. Now, as noted, this Law No. 7762 incorporates a series of regulations pertaining to this contractual type, whose principles and content prevail over other written norms. Thus, in matters of rights and obligations of the parties (grantor-concessionaire-users, sections 15-19 of said law), contractual procedure and stages (arts. 20-39), economic regime of the contract, a part in which issues of financial and retributive incidence of the contract are established (arts. 40-48), penalty regime (arts. 49-55), term and forms of extinction of the contractual relationship (sections 56-69 ibidem). In light of this, it is worth highlighting that disputes that may arise during the course of the instruction of a procedure according to this typology, divergences in the perfection of the contract, its signing, or execution, must be resolved by applying in the first instance the ordinances of said legislation, however, it is clear to this Court that this is not an obstacle to the supplementary application of the Administrative Contracting Law and its regulation, in cases where by integration it is deemed appropriate. In this line, section 4 of Law No.

7762 clearly states that such conflicts must be resolved by applying, in order, said law and its regulations, the bidding documents (cartel de licitación), the successful bidder's offer, the concession contract, and the other sources of the national legal system.

IX.- As has been noted, a fundamental part of these types of public works concession contracts with or without public service is the proper justification that establishes their necessity as a means of satisfying public interests, a matter that is realized through the satisfaction of minimum requirements that determine the need for the work, but also its technical and legal relevance. Similar to numeral 7 of Law No. 7494, which requires the expression of technical and legal reasons for opening an administrative contracting file (which must head the respective file), in the case of relationships governed by Law No. 7762, this mention is imposed by ordinals 5.2, 9, and 21. Before delving into the content of these norms, it should be noted that this legislation grants or confers a leading role to the National Council of Concessions in conducting the contracting procedures, a maximum deconcentration body with instrumental legal personality created in Article 6 of that legal source. This is evident throughout the entire law. Now, regarding the prior requirements to certify the need and advisability of a specific public work and, with that, to grant a concession over it, Article 5 of Law No. 7762 states in its second paragraph: "2.- When the object of the concession falls within the scope of competence of an organ of the Executive Branch, the National Council of Concessions, having previously demonstrated the legal, technical, environmental, economic, and financial feasibility (factibilidad) of the project, shall be the competent technical entity to act in the contracting procedure stage and, when necessary during the execution of the contract. (...)" For its part, canon 9, first subsection, subparagraph a, grants the Technical Secretariat of the CNC the power to "a) Contract, with prior authorization from the Council, the technical studies required to certify the feasibility of the concession projects." Both norms are congruent regarding the relevance of the cited technical studies, a relevance that is also visualized even in privately initiated projects, a case in which, in line with mandate 20 ibid., those projects must be vested with public interest and accompanied by the respective technical, environmental, and economic feasibility studies, as well as a construction and operation plan. Canon 21 ejusdem clearly establishes what type of studies a contracting of this nature requires, as well as the procedure—in general—applicable to these cases. The relevance of that norm for the purposes of this proceeding requires its literal reference: "Article 21.-Procedure 1.- The Technical Secretariat of the National Council of Concessions shall be responsible for carrying out the activities and studies necessary to prepare the concession bidding process. The environmental impact study must be included among the studies; for this purpose, the Ministry of Environment and Energy shall be given a five-business-day hearing to determine the type of study to be carried out. Once the study is completed, a new hearing shall be given to this Ministry, which shall have a non-extendable period of fifteen business days to issue its opinion, and its criteria shall be binding. If this period elapses without receiving any response, it shall be interpreted that the Ministry has no objections. 2.- The Technical Secretariat of the National Council of Concessions must consult the Public Services Regulatory Authority on the tariff structure and adjustment parameters to be incorporated into the bidding documents; likewise, the parameters to be used to evaluate service quality. This Authority shall have ten business days to render its criteria, which shall be binding. If this period elapses without receiving a response, it shall be interpreted that the Authority has no objections. 3.- Once the studies are completed and the project's feasibility is demonstrated, the Technical Secretariat shall proceed to prepare the bidding documents, which shall be submitted to the National Council of Concessions for approval. 4.- When the Granting Administration is an entity of the decentralized, territorial, and institutional sector, or a public company, and has not agreed that the National Council of Concessions carry out the concessionaire selection procedure and the execution of the concession contract, the respective public entity shall be responsible for carrying out the necessary studies and activities to prepare the concession bidding process, following the parameters established in this law and its regulations for the Technical Secretariat of the National Council of Concessions. 5.- Once the bidding documents are approved by the National Council of Concessions or the head of the Granting Administration, a summary of them must be published in La Gaceta, by which the bidding process shall be understood to have commenced. The summary must also be published in two nationally circulated daily newspapers." Precisely, in this case, the violation of that numeral is alleged, to the extent that, according to the plaintiffs, economic-financial and environmental feasibility has not been certified through the rigorous technical studies. This requires an analysis of the implications and content of the alluded studies, at this point, in a general manner, and then, for each formulated grievance, to be specifically addressed. The first study required by the aforementioned regulation is the technical feasibility study. At this point, it concerns the certification of the need and/or relevance of the work or that management design from the eminently technical standpoint, which may consider a series of variables that do not exist in isolation, since technical relevance must be linked with the environmental issue that will be discussed later. In this first aspect, the Administration must certify, by way of example, that the proposed design of the work conforms to the needs intended to be met by that development. It is clear, it is insisted, that this point cannot be dissociated from the others, since the economic impacts of the project, as well as the environmental ones, are primary in the adoption of final decisions. Regarding the environmental study, the following clarification must be made. The initial paragraph of the article under reference indicates the need to satisfy the environmental impact variable. However, it indicates that the project will be brought to the attention of MINAET for five days so that it may indicate the type of study to be conducted, which, once completed, will be brought to its attention for a period of fifteen days so that it may issue a binding opinion, with administrative silence in such cases being considered indicative of having no objections to the project. As observed, that norm does not express a particular type of study, nor does it allude to environmental feasibility or viability, but rather to the power of MINAET to establish the type of study to be conducted, considering the particularities of the project. Hence, it cannot be affirmed that there is a single type of study to be prepared in that dynamic, since it is evident that the analysis to be carried out will be that determined by the Environmental Administration. On the other hand, numeral 21 of Law No. 7762 indicates the obligation of the Technical Secretariat of the CNC to consult the Name628 on the tariff structure and the adjustment parameters to be incorporated into the bidding documents (cartel de licitación); as well as the parameters to be used to evaluate service quality, an opinion to be issued within a period of ten days and whose nature shall be binding. Again, the silence of the Name628 shall be considered indicative of no objection to the project. From this standpoint, aspects related to the economic analyses carried out by ARESEP would not be attributable to the Granting Administration, to the extent that its analyses are binding. Consequently, only when the file certifies the satisfaction of these requirements, is it feasible to continue with the proceeding. It would therefore concern the coverage of insurmountable premises without which the legitimacy and validity of the procedure would be in doubt.

X.- Regarding the challenge to the bidding document rules. Procedural preclusion. Possibility of modifications to the bidding documents and subsequent phases. Prior to entering into the analysis of the completeness or satisfaction of the environmental and economic feasibility technical studies presented by the plaintiffs, it is necessary to clarify what is set forth below. Certainly, in light of ordinal 49 of the Magna Carta, this jurisdiction has been constitutionally established to exercise control over the validity of the administrative function (first paragraph), as well as the protection of the legal situations of persons (third paragraph), to the extent that they are affected by conducts or omissions of public power, whether by the creation, modification, or extinction of those situations, which of course, include, at a minimum, subjective rights and legitimate interests. This protective framework rests on the basis of four constitutional pillars, namely: submission of the State—in a broad sense—to the Law, universal control of the administrative function, distribution of functions, and prompt and complete justice. From this angle, the various manifestations of public power, except for the exceptions expressly provided by the legislator, are controllable within the contentious-administrative process (an example of such exclusion is the so-called acts of government or political acts, under the allegation that they are not an administrative function, however, even in those cases, the liability that arises from them must be heard in this venue). Nonetheless, not every public act is susceptible to reproach in this jurisdiction, because in line with ordinal 36, subsection c) of the CPCA, the claim, to the extent that it relates to a formal action of a Public Administration (since it can also relate to omissions or material conducts), must be linked to a final act, a firm act, or a procedural act with its own effect. However, that provision must be clarified, given that in cases where the tradition of mandatory exhaustion of the administrative procedure (art. 31.1 CPCA, ruling 3669-2006 Constitutional Chamber) still persists, the petition must be regarding a firm act, not allowing the questioning of the final act. This would be reserved for the matter of challenging municipal decisions, provided that the appeal is to be heard by Section III of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (since when such circumstance does not arise, such a requirement would not be mandatory), or, in matters of administrative contracting, when the objection or appeal remedy—as applicable—must be heard by the Comptroller General of the Republic (by parity of reasoning, when it is not so provided, exhaustion would be merely optional). Well then, within the framework of the remedial regime that operates in the matter regulated by Law No. 7762, numeral 34 regulates what pertains to challenges or questions that may be made to the bidding documents (cartel de la licitación). Similarly, Article 35 ibid. alludes to the regime for challenging the award act. What is of interest in this section is regarding the questions made about the bidding documents. In the various written responses to the lawsuit, the State, APM Terminals, and the CNC formulated the defense of failure to exhaust the administrative procedure. In the same sense, the CGR. As indicated ut supra, that defense was accepted through resolution No. 589-2011 of the procedural judge, and later the cited exhaustion was deemed satisfied by the order of 14 hours 37 minutes on May 25, 2011, visible at folios 1018-1020 of the main file, a criterion subsequently confirmed by the order of 13 hours 35 minutes on June 17, 2011, in which, among other matters, the revocation remedy filed by the CGR against that first order was heard (folios 1036-1042 of the main file). In the sole hearing held in this preferential proceeding, the State reiterates the cited defense, before which this Tribunal indicated that the matter had already been resolved by the procedural instance, so its invocation again in the preliminary phase of that hearing was not appropriate, without prejudice to hearing its arguments on the merits. An analysis of the arguments presented on this particular point leads to the establishment that the decision of the procedural judge regarding the cited defense was limited to resolving on the opposability of that requirement with respect to the annulment claims linked to the final award act within the International Public Bidding Process No. 2009-LI-000001-00200. However, that analysis does not include the weighing of the State's arguments regarding the petitions raised concerning the bidding documents. As for that particular, it is necessary to clarify the following. In line with ordinal 34 of Law No. 7762, in the type of public contracting at hand, an objection remedy (recurso de objeción) may be filed against the bidding documents within the first third of the period granted to submit an offer, a remedy that must be filed before the Comptroller General of the Republic. Certainly, in this matter, given the implications of the cited ruling 3669-2006, as well as of the first subsection of ordinal 31 of the CPCA, the exercise of that remedy would be a mandatory requirement and a prerequisite for access to the contentious-administrative process. Now, although what was resolved by the procedural judges regarding preliminary defenses does not limit the decision on the merits of the case, the above applies to cases where the preliminary defense was rejected, by virtue of which, in accordance with precepts 92.7 and 120 of the CPCA, the sentencing tribunal may declare the lawsuit inadmissible or request the correction of the defect, as applicable. Ergo, if the defense is accepted, that norm (92.7) is not applicable, because in cases such as the one being analyzed, that acceptance leads, in the specific case of the administrative procedure as a defense, to the application of mandate 92.1 CPCA and the granting of a period of five days for its correction or certification of having satisfied the requirement. In this case, the defense was accepted and later the requirement was considered fulfilled (see folios 1018-1020 of the main file), a criterion that was later reiterated upon the revocation remedy filed by the CGR. It is therefore an already resolved matter, even though it is clear that that ruling did not expressly pronounce on the failure to exhaust regarding the actions filed against the bidding documents. However, even if this Tribunal were to detect the inertia in the fulfillment of that requirement, without this implying agreement with the criterion of the procedural judge, ordinal 120.4 CPCA indicates that in such cases, the defect shall be deemed corrected. Therefore, this ruling could not accept such an exception when it had already been resolved in favor of the defendants, even though that point was later considered fulfilled. Nonetheless, the foregoing is not an obstacle to what is specified below. The plaintiffs' claims are directed against the award act, the contract, and the bidding documents in this international public bidding procedure. Specifically regarding the bidding documents, there is no evidence whatsoever that Name141025 filed the objection remedy against this particular act, or filed any direct judicial action against that conduct, prior to filing the challenge now formulated. Given that inertia, and regardless of what was stated regarding the handling given by the preliminary judge to the defense in question, the truth of the case is that, regarding the bidding documents, a procedural preclusion has operated to the detriment of Name141025, which makes it impossible to argue, as grounds for the nullity of the award, the contract, or related acts, the provisions set forth in the bidding documents. This Tribunal holds the thesis that defects in the bidding documents must be directly contested in an action filed directly against them, but their challenge is not permissible in a reflexive manner when invoked as grounds for the nullity of the award act, or, as the plaintiff has done, to petition its nullity at the moment of questioning the award. In this line, the State representation is correct in pointing out that, the bidding documents not having been reproached in a timely manner, it is not feasible within the award stage or subsequent to it (formalization, execution, modification) to question the content or validity of this instrument. In the regime of administrative contracting, the bidding documents constitute an important tool that delimits, guides, and conditions the actions of the parties throughout the procedure. On one hand, a close link arises between the bidding documents and the tenderer's offer, so that the latter is guided by the former, and will be, first admissible, then evaluable, and finally, potentially awardable, to the extent that it is the best offer among those that meet the requirements set forth by the bidding documents. The relevance of this instrument (the bidding documents) is established in canon 51 of the Regulations to the Administrative Contracting Law, Executive Decree No. 33411-H of September twenty-seventh, two thousand six, which states in relevant part: "The bidding documents constitute the specific regulations of the contracting that is being promoted, and all legal norms and constitutional principles applicable to the respective procedure are understood to be incorporated into its clauses. They must constitute a body of technical specifications that are clear, sufficient, concrete, objective, and broad in terms of the opportunity to participate. (...)" Even regarding the admissibility phase of the bids, canon 83 of the cited regulations clearly states: "Once the previous stage is completed, the Administration shall proceed to the study and evaluation of the bids in relation to the admissibility conditions and specifications set in the bidding documents and the norms regulating the matter. Those that fail to meet essential aspects of the bidding terms or are substantially inconsistent with the legal system shall be declared outside the tender. Insignificant non-compliances shall not imply the exclusion of the bid, but such must be expressly reasoned in the respective report. (...)" This highlights the relevance of the bidding documents in establishing whether the specific offer overcomes the set of requirements imposed by the Administration through the bidding document provisions. From this standpoint, canon 81 of the Administrative Contracting Law (170-173 of its regulations) establishes that the objection remedy may be filed against the bidding documents when it is considered that this instrument limits participation or violates any of the postulates of the public contractual regime. In the dynamic of Law No. 7762, it is insisted, that remedial provision finds support in the letter of ordinal 34, but such remedial measure was not filed by the plaintiff. The bidding documents can certainly be attacked directly, as they constitute a procedural act that, given its relevance, generates its own effect in administrative contracting. Its content and implications mean that, once firm, subsequent actions within the contracting procedure must adhere to its content, as established by canon 4 of Law No. 7762. Given this, a regime of challenge is granted with a broad framework of remedial standing, since any interested party may formulate the objections they consider appropriate when the bidding document rules violate legality or the principles inherent to administrative contracting (whose development has been accounted for, among many others, by ruling No. 998-98 of the Constitutional Chamber). Therefore, actions (including judicial ones) that seek to reproach the content of the bidding documents are not valid when they were not attacked in a timely manner, even with the broad possibilities that the legal system grants for that purpose, once the award act has been issued, and not even when the contract has already been formalized and endorsed. The logical application of numeral 162 of Law No. 6227/78 implies that the nullity of the bidding documents—timely contested—implies, by accessoriness, the nullity of subsequent acts that depend on it, but the nullity of acts issued after the bidding documents does not lead to the accessory nullity of the former, since even the pathology of the award or the contract may originate from the infringement of the bidding document rules, as could be the case of disapplying one of its formulas or disregarding the bid award system. Thus, the regime for questioning the bidding documents allows the competent authority to evaluate the objections and suppress conditions that are contrary to legality and could potentially affect potential bidders, but also any interested party, including among the latter, organized groups such as CANABA. It is a remedial regime that clearly tends to open possibilities to correct potential deficiencies in the bidding documents, given the relevance of this instrument for the subsequent stages of the procedure. Ergo, the nullity claim against award acts and the contract cannot constitute a valid way to reopen a debate already precluded, to the extent that it seeks to question the bidding document rules that were not timely objected to. As stated by the State representative, if the plaintiffs disagreed with the content of the bidding documents, they could well have established the objection remedies at the appropriate time and, if still dissatisfied with what was resolved, have resorted to jurisdictional instances to carry out the analysis of the validity of its content. However, it is not feasible to question the bidding documents together with the challenge to the contract, when, at the time, the former was not questioned, despite the ample possibilities to do so. The opposite would entail allowing the retrogression of the procedure in terms of enabling debates already precluded. It has been certified that, following the various phases of claim against the bidding documents, Name141025 did not file remedies. Although Name141024 filed them, ultimately, the issue was not debated in a timely manner in court, so opening that debate at this time is improper. Consequently, any nullity petition that deals with the bidding document rules must be declared without merit due to the application of the principle of preclusion already indicated. This is not about the application of formalistic rules or a criterion that could be considered antagonistic to the principle of plenary control of public conduct or access to the jurisdiction. Such possibilities have not been denied in any way, as the impossibility of addressing this issue lies in the inertia of the proponents themselves, despite the valid opportunities they had at the time for those purposes. It consists, therefore, of a reference to a principle of preclusion, congruent with the specific technique of a matter that has a specific challenge regime, which, in this case, was not used correctly. On the subject, the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, Section V, in resolution 80-2011 of 14 hours 25 minutes on April 25, 2011, stated in that same direction: "As can be concluded, the basis of that remedy and that of this action are practically the same, but in any case, what is important to emphasize is that the instrument defined by the legislator to challenge the bidding documents was declared untimely, whereby the specifications set forth therein must remain intact, by reason of the so-called procedural preclusion operating, precisely in pursuit of legal certainty. In this regard, Mr. Name28 states in his book Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, tomo III, Biblioteca jurídica Dike, pg. 140: 'If the individual does not challenge the "bidding documents" (cartel) in time and form, they become, against him, a consented, firm, and unchallengeable act, administratively and jurisdictionally.' In the same sense, in more recent doctrine, Dr. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, in his Administrative Law Treatise, Administrative Contracting, tomo IV, ediciones Guayacán, 2010, pg. 291, refers to the subject in the following way: 'The failure to challenge the bidding documents by interested parties, in time and form, has, as a consequence, by application of the principle of procedural preclusion, the tacit consent and consolidation of the various clauses of the bidding terms.' And this is so, because legal certainty and stability are precisely required, regarding what has been done, as it directly affects the public interest immersed in the contracting. That is why Articles 43 subsection g), 81, and 82 of the Administrative Contracting Law determine the moment when questions regarding the bidding documents can be formulated. If that does not occur, or, as in this matter, it is done untimely, the procedure must continue with the rules stipulated therein and confirmed in the absence of challenges. Even the COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC, when resolving the appeal remedies filed by the plaintiff here against the award and subsequently against the readjudication, emphasized such impossibility of retaking claims against the bidding documents, due, precisely, to them being precluded, a circumstance that, as will be revisited infra, not only obliges the outright rejection of a potential appeal remedy, but also does not allow reopening the knowledge of topics that are the exclusive subject matter of the objection remedy. And on this particular, it must be kept in mind that the bidding documents correspond to a preparatory act with its own effect, and the legislation that regulates administrative contracting expressly stipulates the possible remedial means to be exercised against them, and, by not exercising them as required, they not only affect the potential legitimate interest of the dissenter, but also, as the mandatory exhaustion of the administrative procedure is required in this matter, they concomitantly lose the necessary standing to proceed to the jurisdictional route." XI.- Regarding environmental viability. (Difference viability and feasibility). Nature of Potential Environmental Viability. Logic of viability in relation to the TCM, contract includes design—testimonial evidence—. Technical evidence analysis. Assessment of precautionary and preventive principle. Design must integrate EIA. Impossibility of building without EIA. Without prejudice to what was indicated in the previous points, it is necessary to address the analysis of the defects indicated by the plaintiffs regarding the absence of the studies required for the TCM, in accordance with ordinals 9 and 21 of Law No. 7762. As a first point, the issue of environmental impact will be addressed. In essence, in the closing arguments phase, Name141024 points out that no environmental impact study was conducted, affecting the Organic Environmental Law. The seabed and an area of 630,000 square meters for the construction of an artificial island are affected. None of that has been seriously studied. It notes, Article 3 of Decree No. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MEIC is violated by not having performed the environmental assessment. Those studies are not recorded in the files. Law 7762 requires the performance of Environmental Viability Studies before starting the project, and may later transfer the cost to the concessionaire, but cannot cede or transfer the responsibility for conducting those studies. There is no rule indicating that the concessionaire may do those studies due to the failure of the Public Administrations. A Name141029 was granted to a diffuse and unknown project. It cannot serve to carry out the bidding process; what was required was an EIA. Studies that are not specific to the TCM are used. The RECOPE and Moín dredging projects were used, procedures that are unrelated to the TCM. The object of the TCM is very diverse. The only instrument used was the D1 form. In essence, Name141025 maintains that same position regarding the absence of the certification of environmental feasibility. Regarding these allegations, what is set forth below must be noted. As indicated ut supra, in accordance with numeral 21 of Law No. 7762, first subsection, among the studies that, in the matter of concessions regulated by said legislation, must be conducted by the Technical Secretariat of the CNC, the environmental impact study is included. For such purposes, that norm indicates that the Granting Administration shall give a hearing for five business days to the Ministry of Environment and Energy, so that it may determine the type of study to be conducted. Once the study is completed, a new hearing shall be given to this Ministry, which shall have a non-extendable period of fifteen business days to issue its opinion, and its criteria shall be binding. If this period elapses without receiving any response, it shall be interpreted that the Ministry has no objections. The relevance that the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment holds in our legal regime is beyond any doubt.

This is a right protected under Article 50, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Magna Carta, which has been the subject of extensive legal and regulatory development, within a field that has also been addressed by international treaties to which Costa Rica is a signatory State. Within this broad normative framework, the common rule establishes the need to have instruments for measuring the environmental variable in the various human conducts and activities that may be considered intrusive to the environment. The Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, EIA) is constituted as a procedure that holds a complex convergence of legal-technical-administrative variables, whose purpose is none other than the measurement, identification, prediction, or projection of the impacts that a specific human activity will likely produce on the environment, should it be carried out or its material execution be concretized. This procedure is issued as a basis for a prior requirement of a subsequent authorization procedure and is formulated by the competent public administrations, with expertise in environmental matters. Seen this way, in simpler terms, it is the procedure by virtue of which the effects and consequences that a project for a work or human activity will generate on the environment are estimated. Given the importance of the protected legal interest, its foundation is rooted in the doctrine of Article 50, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Political Constitution; therefore, being a duty of the State to provide due, efficient, and timely protection of the environment, both natural and scenic resources, it constitutes an important mechanism for the exercise of environmental policy, which has a direct and immediate application in productive activities, so as to achieve harmony and compatibility between these economic or social exploitations and the preservation of the environment, within a vision of sustainability or sustainable development. In the national context, the General Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures, Executive Decree number 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, in its Article 3, subsection 43, defines environmental impact (impacto ambiental) as follows: "Effect that an activity, work, or project, or any of its actions and components has on the environment or its constituent elements. It can be of a positive or negative, direct or indirect, cumulative or non-cumulative, reversible or irreversible, extensive or limited type, among other characteristics. It differs from environmental damage (daño ambiental), in the measure and moment in which the environmental impact is evaluated in an ex-ante process, such that aspects of prevention, mitigation, and compensation can be considered to diminish its scope on the environment." Of course, this environmental impact must be subject to measurement, which materializes in different instruments that the same legal regulation establishes, among these, environmental impact studies (estudios de impacto ambiental) and environmental feasibility licenses (licencias de viabilidad ambiental). In this sense, the aforementioned regulation, in Article 3, subsection 37, conceptualizes the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) as the scientific-technical administrative procedure that allows for identifying and predicting which effects an activity, work, or project will exert on the environment, quantifying and pondering them to lead to decision-making. Generally, the Environmental Impact Assessment encompasses three essential constitutive phases: a) first is the Initial Environmental Assessment (Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, EAI), b) second is the preparation of the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EsIA) or other corresponding environmental assessment instruments, and c) third refers to the Environmental Control and Monitoring of the activity, work, or project through the established environmental commitments. For its part, subsection 18 of Article 7 of the Biodiversity Law considers environmental impact studies as follows: "Scientific-technical procedure that allows for identifying and predicting which effects a specific action or project will exert on the environment, quantifying and pondering them to lead to decision-making. It includes the specific effects, their global assessment, the alternatives of greatest environmental benefit, a program for the control and minimization of negative effects, a monitoring program, a recovery program, as well as the guarantee of environmental compliance." From the foregoing, it follows that the environmental license or feasibility (licencia o viabilidad ambiental), as indicated by subsection 63 of Article 3 of the previously cited Regulation, represents the condition of acceptable harmony and balance between the development and execution of human work and its potential environmental impacts, and the environment of the geographical space where it is intended to be implemented. From the administrative and legal point of view, it corresponds to the act approving the Environmental Impact Assessment process, whether in its initial assessment phase, the study itself, or another impact document. Now, the implications of human works on the environment justify and require the assessment of that impact on the environment. From this standpoint, this collegiate body must bring up what is established by Article 17 of the Organic Law of the Environment, which, regarding the cited environmental assessment, states: "Human activities that alter or destroy elements of the environment or generate waste, toxic or hazardous materials shall require an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental) by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional del Ambiente) created in this law. Its prior approval by this organism shall be an indispensable requirement to initiate the activities, works, or projects. The laws and regulations shall indicate which activities, works, or projects shall require the environmental impact assessment." It must be insisted, the importance that this instrument for measuring environmental impacts holds in human conduct is undeniable for this Tribunal. However, the development of these environmental measurement instruments has led to various types of studies depending on the type of human development intended. In the specific case of activities governed by Law No. Placa20097, Article 21 of that same source indicates that the hearing with MINAET is so that, among other things, "...it determines the type of study to be carried out...". The foregoing supposes that not in all works to be carried out through the system of public works concession with or without public services is the same type of study imperative. It is the environmental authorities that are the competent bodies to define the typology that is of merit in each specific case. To this end, one must discriminate between concepts that could be considered equivalent. As has been noted, environmental impact (impacto ambiental) consists of the effects or incidences that an activity, work, or project, or any of its actions and components, has on the environment or its constituent elements - subsection 43, Art. 3 of the cited decree. This impact can be potential (IAP), which is considered the latent positive or negative environmental effect that the execution of an activity, work, or project would cause on the environment. It can be pre-established, taking as a reference basis the environmental impact caused by the generality of similar activities, works, or projects that are already in operation - subsection 44, Art. 3 ejusdem. For its part, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is the scientific-technical administrative procedure that allows for identifying and predicting which effects an activity, work, or project will exert on the environment, quantifying and pondering them to lead to decision-making - subsection 37, Art. 3 ibid. This Assessment can, in turn, be Strategic (EAE): - Process of Environmental Impact Assessment applied to policies, plans, and programs. Due to its characteristic and nature, this type of process can also be applied to projects of national, binational, Central American regional transcendence, or by multilateral agreements, in accordance with current regulations - (subsection 34 ibid), or an Initial Environmental Assessment (EAI): - Procedure for analyzing the environmental characteristics of the activity, work, or project with respect to its location to determine the significance of the environmental impact. It involves the submission of an environmental document signed by the developer, with the nature and scope of an affidavit (declaración jurada). From its analysis, the granting of environmental feasibility (viabilidad, license) may result, or its conditioning to the submission of other EIA instruments - (subsection 35 ibid.). From its side, environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental, VLA) is the act that approves the EIA (be it initial, EsIA, or any other title), and that evidences the acceptable harmonization or balance, from the point of view of environmental load, between the development and execution of an activity, work, or project and its potential environmental impacts, and the environment of the geographical space where it is desired to be implemented - subsection 63 of Art. 3 ibid). This feasibility can be potential (VAP), and consists of: "It is the environmental approval, of a temporary type, granted by Nombre141028 to those activities, works, or projects that carry out the Initial Environmental Assessment and still require the submission of other EIA documents to obtain the definitive VLA." - subsection 64, Article 3 ejusdem -. Such analyses can be carried out through the Environmental Impact Study (EsIA), which consists of a technical instrument of the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental), whose purpose is to analyze the proposed activity, work, or project with respect to the environmental condition of the geographical space in which it is proposed and, on this basis, predict, identify, and assess the significant environmental impacts that certain actions may cause on that environment and to define the set of environmental measures that allow for their prevention, correction, mitigation, or failing that, compensation, in order to achieve the most harmonious and balanced insertion possible between the proposed activity, work, or project and the environment in which it will be located - subsection 34 of the cited Art. 3 ejusdem -. Faced with such a plurality of concepts, it is that Article 21 of Law No. 7762 indicates that MINAET is the body that defines the type of study to be carried out.

XII.- In this concession, as evident from folios 1189-1191 of the main file, through resolution No. Nombre141028 of 08:00 hours on February 10, 2009, SETENA resolved the following, relevant to the case: "FIRST: ... Likewise, Article 28 of that same normative body (referring to Decree No. 31849-MINAE-SALUD-MOPT-MAG-MEIC), despite referring to activities that must obligatorily present an EsIA, clearly indicates that: 'Those activities, works, or projects for which there is a specific law that orders the preparation and approval of an Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental), may alternatively comply with either of the following two procedures: 1. Fulfillment of the Initial Environmental Assessment procedure, by submitting to Nombre141028 the Environmental Assessment Document (D1) in order to obtain the potential environmental feasibility (viabilidad ambiental potencial) and the terms of reference for the preparation of the EsIA.' Finally, Article 29 refers again to Nombre141029 and to the possibility and probable obligation that this Secretariat has to grant it (...) It is clear that the granting of Nombre141029 would then occur, and would be a logical consequence of corroborating compliance with the initial requirements requested by this Secretariat and which consist of the correct completion of the D-1 form. Once the VAP is granted, it is necessary to indicate to the developer that no works may be carried out until the definitive Environmental Feasibility (Viabilidad Ambiental) is granted, which would be the logical consequence if the terms of reference issued by this Authority are complied with, as well as the submission of any additional documentation or information.'" Based on said reasons, it resolved: "FIRST: The Potential Environmental Feasibility (VAP) is granted to the project, for the purpose of enabling it to carry out any prior procedures before banking entities or other state or private entities. The developer is warned that this granting does not grant any right whatsoever to carry out works of any kind, until the Definitive Environmental Feasibility (Viabilidad Ambiental Definitiva) is issued, once it complies with the additional information or documentation required by this Secretariat. (...) SECOND: The Developer is hereby warned that, due to the project's characteristics, for each phase or stage of the same, it must carry out the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación del Impacto Ambiental) process initiated with the submission of the respective D1 form. (...)" The plaintiffs precisely criticize the granting of the VAP, considering that, given the magnitude of the project, what was required was a definitive EsIA. As a first aspect, it should be noted, in response to the co-defendants' arguments, that a project's national relevance, whether due to its intention to satisfy public interests or its primacy within government plans, does not constitute an exception to submitting to and adjusting to environmental norms. If that were the case, it would suffice to declare a project as of national interest to evade the environmental assessments, in direct contradiction to Article 50 of the Constitution, Article 17 of Law No. 7554, Article 13 of Law No. 6227/78, among multiple norms. Hence, regardless of that argument, it is a necessity for any project or work to comply with environmental protection regulations to prove its harmony with those referents. In the conclusions phase, the representative of Nombre141024 argues, relying on the deposition of expert witness Nombre141037, that the Nombre141029 was made based on other projects that are not the TCM's. A Nombre141029 was granted to a diffuse project without knowing it. They estimate that it cannot serve to carry out the bidding; what was required was an EsIA. Studies that are not specific to the TCM are being used. RECOPE's and Moín dredging projects were used, procedures that have nothing to do with the TCM, when the object of the TCM is very diverse. The only instrument used was the D1 form, and according to several statements, an undervaluation of impacts is being made. They estimate that completing this D1 was not appropriate, but rather a direct EIA was required. To resolve such arguments, the following must be stated. Given that VAP, it must be noted that none of the actions resolved in this ruling directly attacked the specific act of Nombre141028 through which the cited potential environmental feasibility was granted to the TCM project. Within the list of claims that were formulated in the complaint and sustained in the single hearing, the petition for invalidity of SETENA's acts is not invoked. Nevertheless, the complaining party fails to prove those alleged pathologies that would call into question the validity of the resolution for Nombre141029 issued by the environmental authority. Note that in the recitals section, Nombre141028 indicates - second recital - that the application to grant this title meets the due demands and requirements. Ergo, it is incumbent upon the claimant to prove the causes of nullity, which they have ultimately failed to do.

XIII.- For this purpose, it must be expressed that this Tribunal does not consider that the absence of an EsIA or, in general, any title that demonstrates the existence of an EIA or, in conclusive terms, the approval of an environmental feasibility license (VLA), constitutes an infringement of the protective regime of environmental law or the requirements for prior analyses established by Article 21.1 of Law No. 7762. The proper resolution of this conflict regarding this ecological variable requires an understanding of the type of work project to be undertaken. From this standpoint, it is worth highlighting that the questioned contract is a public works concession with public services, a public contractual modality that, in light of Article 1 of Law No. 7762, must be understood as: "an administrative contract by which the Administration entrusts a third party, which may be a public, private, or mixed entity, with the design, planning, financing, construction, conservation, expansion, or repair of any public immovable property, as well as its operation, by providing the services set forth in the contract in exchange for consideration charged to the users of the work or the beneficiaries of the service, or for consideration of any kind paid by the conceding Administration." That is, as noted above, far from being a modality that seeks to contract the construction of public works, it attends to a more complex management system, which allows for contracting the design of the work - among other activities mentioned in the norm. It is a notorious fact for this process, and unquestioned, that the object of the contract resulting from the international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200 sought precisely, as part of its object, the offer of a port development design. The very name of the public tender makes this aspect evident, as the tender is called "Tender for the public works concession for the design, financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Moín Container Terminal". The foregoing is determinant in the analysis of this aspect. For this Tribunal, it is clear that a work such as the TCM must have an EsIA as well as a definitive EIA; however, that requirement, in cases like the present one, where the contract includes the design of the infrastructure, must be satisfied prior to the start of works and not necessarily before the start of the public tender procedure. This does not represent any harm to the right protected by Article 50 of the Magna Carta; on the contrary, it seeks to match and harmonize public works developments with the environmental variable. Nothing in the Nombre141029 granted by Nombre141028 allows for assuming that the concessionaire has administrative consent for the development of works or actions aimed at building. On the contrary, as has been explained, that title makes it possible to carry out procedures before banking entities or other state or private entities, but with the express warning that this title - VAP - does not grant any right whatsoever to carry out works of any kind, until the Definitive Environmental Feasibility (Viabilidad Ambiental Definitiva) is issued, once it complies with the additional information or documentation required by Nombre141028. This is also evident from Article 3, subsection 64 of Decree 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, when defining the VAP. From this standpoint, the design of the work is a determining input to be able to assess compliance with the environmental variable, since it is only at that moment that the type of work intended to be developed is known with clarity and certainty, as well as the specific site and concrete actions to carry out that infrastructure. As the State correctly points out, if this were solely a public works contract, the EsIA would be imperative, for the elementary reason that the design of the work is already concretized. However, this does not occur in this case, where a substantial and primary part of the contract is precisely the design of the port work. At this point, the contracting of the design is proposed in the tender documents based on parameters and characteristics imposed by the Master Plan contracted to the company Royal Haskoning, thus providing a conceptual design framework. Under that understanding, the continuation of the procedures, attending to the object of the contract, made it feasible, as determined by SETENA, to grant the VAP, so that, once the concrete design of the port works to be carried out is finalized (at a technical proposal level), the definitive EIA would now begin, through the environmental verification title that SETENA determines, in such a way as to guarantee the due protection of the environment. In this sense, it is clear to this collegiate body that the requirement for the definitive EIA, in logical and normative terms, in this specific case, is conditioned on the existence of a design proposal already finalized according to the guidelines given by the master plan. In this orientation, the expert witness Nombre30219, identification card number CED110938, indicated that the Nombre141029 is an instrument designed to resolve circumstantial situations of certain activities, insofar as they need to advance in administrative procedures and cannot remain subject to the EIA, which requires a deep and detailed study. Similarly, this expert indicated that the key element in the EsIA is that its objective is not to generate a document to be transferred to an institution for approval, but rather to conduct an environmental impact measurement of a design proposal, which must be enriched with design data; ergo, what is sought is an environmental design of the project. He also clarified that some projects require an initial assessment and therefore a Nombre141029 is obtained, which indicates that the project cannot begin construction and remains subject to a detailed EsIA. Only upon obtaining EIA approval can the project begin construction activity. It was for this type of project that the VAP was created, which allows for the advancement of the administrative and financial phase, but conditioned on obtaining the definitive feasibility once the EIA is completed. Such expressions are shared by this Tribunal, as they are, at their core, congruent with the regulations on environmental titles established by the cited Decree No. 31849 and with the analysis or understanding that this Tribunal makes based on those regulations. Even the expert witness offered by SINTRAJAP, that is, Mr. Nombre141037, in his depositions agreed with the nature and purpose of the VAP, indicating that said title is only a prior procedure for subsequent studies to begin, which must be fulfilled to obtain definitive feasibility. The Nombre141029 does not authorize the start of the project. On that part of his declaration, there is no antagonism with what has already been explained. Now, in response to the CGR's question, in terms of whether a project like the TCM must have definitive environmental feasibility to begin, and how that feasibility could be included in a project that encompasses both the design and construction of the work: the witness stated that there are instruments established by Nombre141028. Likewise, he indicated, at the core, that in such cases, the potential impacts are taken into account during the design. The foregoing, in this Chamber's judgment, highlights that carrying out the EIA requires a design that is not at all definitive. On the contrary, once the design is completed, as warned by Nombre141028, each stage, before its construction begins, must comply with the approval of the VLA (environmental feasibility), without which, no work could be performed. Once this project is prepared, the observations made by the Environmental Administration become integrated into the project-design, insofar as this project must adapt and harmonize with the observations and notes that the competent authorities make on the environmental subject, culminating in a final, definitive design where the environmental aspect is weighed. This is a composite process in which aspects of construction programming and the corresponding analysis of ecological impact are indissolubly intermingled, including the mitigation measures and alterations to be made to the design to be "environmentally friendly". From this standpoint, there is no harm arising from the granting of the VAP, as the definitive measurement of the environmental impact is subject to the existence of the definitive design, prior to which, the concessionaire may not carry out any type of construction or work in general in the area. Such treatment was already incorporated into the contract, specifically in clause 5.3.3, as well as in clause 6.3.5, where the subject of mitigation risks and environmental risks is regulated. Thus, it is reiterated, this Tribunal does not call into question the preponderance of the environmental variable. Nor are the concerns regarding environmental impact raised by the plaintiffs questioned by this collegiate body. However, according to what has been explained, these are premature arguments, insofar as such risks must be weighed at the moment the work design is presented and the verification procedure before MINAET is carried out. The primary commitment assumed with the awarding of the questioned concession is precisely the development of the work design proposal, in accordance with the referential parameters given by the conceding administration and in tune with the contractual provisions. Ergo, it is once that design is submitted for the knowledge of the competent administrations that compliance with the set of variables raised by the plaintiffs must be weighed, to the point that, in accordance with the contractual provisions, the concessionaire company must conduct the environmental study that is of merit and incorporate the binding aspects that the environmental authorities indicate to it in due course. It will be in that phase that the various arguments of environmental impact must be assessed, including: incidence on aquifers (mantos acuíferos), proximity to the Cariari Wetland (Humedal Cariari), the need to penetrate the maritime soil to deepen access to the dock to allow the arrival of larger capacity and sized ships, construction of an artificial island, among others. It is insisted, these are aspects of great relevance to the environment, to the point that they must be considered in the analysis; however, that examination cannot be required at this stage of the procedure, when the design of the work is not yet available, which constitutes, again, one of the first phases in the execution of the contract. As has been stated, that weighting must include measuring all aspects related to the environment surrounding the area, to be considered at the appropriate procedural moment, with due publicity and full access to appeal mechanisms. This is not a disregard for the duty to protect the environment, but rather a distinction and demarcation of the phase in which, technically and logically, that measurement is appropriate and necessary, since the impact on these biotic and abiotic elements is only possible to determine with the existence of a preliminary design. Furthermore, the inputs with which the VAP was granted are criticized. On this particular point, it should be noted that the plaintiffs make specific points about alleged deficiencies in the D1 form; however, they do not manage to discredit the appropriateness of the VAP’s granting. In this sense, what was indicated by the expert witness Nombre30219, offered for the analysis of the environmental variable, deserves to be highlighted; regarding the functionality of this form, he stated, essentially, that this form meets the requirement of entering basic technical information so that Nombre141028 can know the general conditions of the project, its fundamental characteristics, and determine if it is potentially viable. The fact that there are defects in the D1 submitted does not affect the final product of the environmental feasibility. Indeed, in light of Article 28.1 of Decree No. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, in cases of work projects regulated by a special law in which an environmental impact study is required, there is a requirement for "Fulfillment of the Initial Environmental Assessment procedure, by submitting to Nombre141028 the Environmental Assessment Document (D1) in order to obtain the potential environmental feasibility and the terms of reference for the preparation of the EsIA." As this regulation indicates, the form in question is what allows for initiating the VAP procedure, which relieves Nombre141028 of verifying compliance with the necessary requirements for obtaining that enabling authorization for administrative procedures. Ultimately, as has been noted, Nombre141028 considered that those requirements were met, as a result of which it granted the cited preliminary title. Regarding the procedure for the above, reference must be made to Annex II of Decree 31849, which sets forth the guidelines for such purposes. Although in the form - issued as an affidavit (declaración jurada) - an assessment is recorded for each of the items established therein, it is the Administration that sets a final score, determining the type of subsequent study to be carried out. At this point, it is worth reiterating that the second point of the operative part of Resolution No. Nombre141028, which grants the Nombre141029 to the TCM project, warns the developer that: "...due to the characteristics of the project, for each phase or stage of the same, the Environmental Impact Assessment process must be carried out, beginning with the submission of the respective D1 Form." This highlights that, at each stage of development, this form must be presented concretely to weigh the project's ecological variable. Consequently, the noted deficiencies do not generate any invalidity in said resolution.

XIV.- Regarding the duty to carry out the EsIA and Nombre33221's environmental risk burden. In another order of things, it is questioned that the contract imposed on the concessionaire the responsibility for carrying out the environmental impact study.

From the start of the tender, in the second part of the bidding documents, regarding the format of the concession contract, clause 5.3.3 of the bidding documents, referring to the environmental license (see folio 3238 verso of the principal file), stipulated that based on the resolution granting the VAP, the concessionaire was obligated to obtain from Nombre141028 the resolution granting definitive environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) for the new container terminal. Similarly, in bidding condition 6.3.5 (visible at folio 3241 verso), it states "6.3.5 Environmental Risks. All environmental risks related to the construction, operation, environmental mitigation works (obras de mitigación ambiental), and maintenance of the TCM are borne by the Concessionaire, as regulated in clause 6.3.1. Therefore, the Concessionaire must include in its bid the associated costs for compliance with these risks; regulatory changes in this matter that, after the bid opening date, affect the economic and financial balance of the Contract shall be compensated by the Granting Administration." For its part, in the respective contract, in clause 5.3.3, the concessionaire assumes the obligation to obtain the definitive environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) for the TCM. Similarly, clause 6.3.56 of the contract states: "All environmental risks related to the construction, operation, environmental mitigation works (obras de mitigación ambiental), and maintenance of the TCM are borne by the Concessionaire, as regulated in clause 6.3.1. Therefore, the Concessionaire must include in this concession contract the associated costs for compliance with these risks. For regulatory changes in this matter not contemplated and approved in the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental), and exceeding the 1% contingency reserve offered, the Concessionaire may request the restoration of the economic balance as established in clause 6.4.3 of this chapter." (Folio 7664 of the CNC administrative file - Volume XIV). While numeral 21 of Law No. 7762 states that "The Technical Secretariat of the National Council of Concessions shall be responsible for carrying out the necessary activities and studies to prepare the concession tender...", the truth is that nothing prevents the burden of conducting such environmental impact studies from being undertaken by the concessionaire. Certainly, numerals 59 and 66 of Law No. 6227/78 speak of the inalienability and non-transferability of public powers of command, however, in this case, it does not involve a waiver of the exercise of those powers. It involves a contractual condition by virtue of which the contractor is responsible for formulating the steps to obtain the VAL (environmental viability - viabilidad ambiental), given that, as stated, part of the contract is the realization of a design for the TCM. Therefore, by logical derivation, this Tribunal does not see how that condition, initially in the bidding documents and subsequently contractual, could violate environmental legislation or produce nullity due to an alleged defect of lack of competence. In this type of public contract, nothing prevents the transfer of the realization of such studies to the concessionaire. It must be reiterated at this point that the purpose of this contract is not the construction of an already-designed public work, but rather the design, construction, financing, operation, and maintenance of port structures, a matter that must be considered when weighing these types of grievances. In short, even within the plaintiffs' line of argument, the determining factor is that this Tribunal safeguards and protects the duty of every project, public or private, to submit to the environmental legal system. The referenced clause does not waive compliance with this variable, the commitment being ultimately to carry out the respective study, submit it for the knowledge of MINAET, and obtain the VLA. To this end, a clause transferring environmental risks to the concessionaire is even established, stipulating that the environmental risk related to the construction, operation, mitigation works, and maintenance of the works shall be assumed by the awardee, for which the awardee must provide a detail of costs associated with compliance with said risks. As can be observed, nothing denies that environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) must be obtained, such that the criticized provision is not considered to generate any injury to the regime of public competences or environmental requirements. Such risk transfer rules, insofar as they stipulate a 1% contingency reserve, do not generate, as the plaintiff Nombre141025 warns, an economic distortion in the contract. It is an economic-content precautionary condition to address potential mitigation measures or actions that may become necessary to confront the consequences of reducing or avoiding environmental impacts, under a framework of preventive protection. From that standpoint, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated how that alleged financial alteration of the contract occurs from the inclusion of a 1% reserve commitment for environmental risks, a figure which, in any event, is reiterated, is considered harmonious with a pro natura principle to the extent that it constitutes a reserve that, should mitigation actions need to be carried out, can be addressed with those financial resources. On the other hand, the allegation regarding a potential financial imbalance is generic and imprecise, as it does not specify how that effect could be generated, being mere speculation unsupported by technical bases. Nevertheless, it should be noted, in line with rulings 998-98 and 6432-96, both from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the financial balance of the contract is a right of the contractor, whose support is also grounded in the letter of numeral 18 of Law No. Placa1264, as well as in numeral 17 of Law No. 7762, being an issue to be weighed in each specific case, independently of matters such as the one raised. It will be in each concrete situation that it must be analyzed whether a financial distortion exists that imbalances the contract, in which case the causes of that distortion must be determined, since an adjustment is not warranted in all cases, given that in certain situations the theory of contractual alea that the concessionaire must assume prevails, a topic that will not be addressed at this time. Thus, such an allegation lacks technical and legal support. Finally, regarding this aspect, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself has made it clear that there is no irregularity in the granting of a Nombre141029 and in the transfer of the duty to obtain the VLA at the awardee's expense. Along these lines, in ruling No. 2007-017409 at 16:50 on November 28, 2007, citing vote 2002-011046 at 09:53 on November 22, 2002, that high Constitutional Court indicated, in relevant part: "The scenario analyzed in the partially transcribed judgment has been reiterated in judgments number 2003-15227 at thirteen hours thirteen minutes on December nineteenth, two thousand three, and in judgment number 2004-01510 at eleven hours forty minutes on February thirteenth, two thousand four, and in both, this Chamber has maintained the criterion that no injury or illegitimate threat to Article 50 of the Constitution is perceived from the fact that the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) is not carried out before the public bidding process begins, and that the bidding documents establish the obligation, at the awardee's expense and not the bidder's, to undertake the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA), just as occurs in the case at hand, this Chamber considering that, in any event, the analysis of environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) would always be carried out in accordance with the criteria and requirements made for each specific case by the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental), which is the competent state body in the matter." This examination must be concluded by reiterating the following: the duty and importance of having the definitive EIA in this type of large-scale works is in no way denied. However, given the type of contract in which part of the public tender is precisely the design of the work, this requirement becomes premature because it is with the preliminary design that environmental assessments can be made, which, on a mandatory and binding basis, will modify or adjust the design project. Hence, the granting of the Nombre141029 is not contrary to law, but rather the appropriate means for the continuity of the project, which does not preclude the subsequent analysis proposed by the plaintiffs, a phase within which, publicly and openly, the series of risks and concerns motivating their reproaches must be weighed. It must be remembered that the Nombre141029 does not permit the construction of any work or concrete acts beyond administrative procedures before financial entities or public administrations participating in the process to obtain the merit authorizations or approvals for the continuity of the procedure. Ergo, it is not an injury to environmental norms, but rather, precisely, their fulfillment, within a framework that is precautionary and protective of the environment, which does not even remotely disregard its relevance, since all actions taken are directed so that ultimately, prior to initiating actions, the cited VLA must be obtained. Consequently, the rejection of this charge must be ordered.

XV.- Regarding the technical feasibility study. The promoter Nombre141025 reproaches, in a first thematic axis -regarding this aspect-, the absence of an economic feasibility study (estudio de factibilidad económica) of the project, as well as total clarity on what is to be built, which it considers a limitation on the interest of potential bidders to participate. It considers it essential to have an input that allows determining the project's viability and costs, which must be reasonable, updated, sufficient, complete, and credible. What exists is a master plan by the company Royal Haskoning that serves as a guide, since it is not specific. The cost projections of that plan are not updated and are general. It claims a violation of the principle of distribution of functions to the extent that the State commissions a private third party to carry out the project design, its construction, and operation. The principle of selecting the best offer must be protected. In a public works concession, the Administration should not be a mere acquirer of financed assets, so the feasibility study is necessary. It says there is no reasoned act founded on scientific and technical reasons for the opening of the bid. Due to the absence of the economic feasibility study (estudio de factibilidad económica), it cannot be known if the project is self-financing. Projected demands cannot be guaranteed, so there is a great risk of a financial imbalance, which could lead to prohibitive tariffs. It says a feasibility study must include an expression of the social impacts in the geographic area of influence, which the Nombre141027 study does not fulfill. Analysis of the allegations on this point. On this matter, it is pertinent to indicate what follows. For the purposes of the international public tender 2009LI-000001-0200, the CNC and JAPDEVA, on January 15, 2009, signed an inter-institutional management agreement aimed at coordinating the processing of concession procedures for works and services of common interest (folio 735 of the tender file), for the basic reason of Nombre141024's competence to provide port services on the Atlantic coast, a competence assigned by Law No. 5337. As a result of this agreement, the carrying out of related technical, legal, environmental, and financial studies, in general, for the formulation of projects, as well as all documentation required to support a bidding process, was made possible (see folios 731-735 of the tender file). From this standpoint, this agreement constitutes the legitimizing basis for understanding, for the purposes of ordinal 129 of Law No. Placa1975, that the coordination to contract the technical studies ultimately carried out by the company Royal Haskoning was performed by the granting administration, to the extent that, as will be seen later, that contracting was established by Nombre141024. Now then, in the sequence of grievances formulated by the plaintiff, it is necessary to reiterate that its allegations are formulated against the bidding rules, without having managed to prove that at the opportune time, in accordance with Article 34 of Law No. 7662 in relation to Article 82 of the Public Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa), the aforementioned principle of preclusion applied to these allegations has already operated. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the promoter is also incorrect on the merits. Indeed, contrary to what the plaintiffs state, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that the Master Plan issued by the company Royal Haskoning is far from being a mere project profile and contains, in its core, the totality of inputs that allow it to be considered a feasibility study constituting the basis of the TCM project. The analysis and reading that this Tribunal performs regarding the cited Master Plan, considering the various components that, in general theory, an economic feasibility study (estudio de factibilidad económica) must contain, lead to the conclusion, just as the co-defendants affirm, that this document, although it does not have the formal name of "Economic Feasibility Study," constitutes an input that incorporates an analysis and detail of a set of data and information that places potential interested parties in an objective and effective position to perform predictability analyses of the adequacy of the proposed business and its profitability. In this Chamber's judgment, that report contains the necessary detail so that those interested in participating in the public tender at hand could examine the pertinence, or lack thereof, of participating, as well as the technical-financial content of their eventual bids. On the one hand, regarding the timeliness and relevance of the data used in that report (master plan), while the diagnosis dates from 2008, it is considered proven that, due to various observations made by those interested in the cited tender, and in response to the date of the data weighed by the company Royal Haskoning in that report, in 2010, said company was requested to update the projected demand data, information that in its core was used by the CNC to adjust and update the tariff model submitted to ARESEP. The foregoing is evidenced by official communications 0395 (DTS-OF-380-10) and 445 (DTS-OF-0432-10) dated March 12 and 23, 2010 -both-, addressed to said Regulatory Authority. This is recorded at folios 1446-2466 of the CNC administrative file. This update gave rise to the changes approved by the CNC in agreement 7 of ordinary session No. 06-2010 of March 11, 2010, subsequently made known to the bidders and publicized as shown at folio 2444 of the CNC administrative file. Returning to the topic of the Master Plan's usefulness to serve as a financial feasibility study, it should be highlighted that these types of studies are far from being a way to guarantee a flow of income. It should be remembered that in all administrative contracts of this nature, the variable of contractual risk is integrated, which in this sense is distributed between the parties. The grantor cannot guarantee the profitability of the business in all cases, even more so when dealing with activities whose rate of return is associated with and linked to the framework of performance efficiency of the delegated service. The opposite, i.e., the establishment of a level of guaranteed profit regardless of how the contract is executed, could discourage efficiency, without prejudice to the analysis of the contract's financial balance, which, it is insisted, is a matter to be assessed in each specific case. Indeed, within the bidding documents, clause 3.2 warns: "Potential bidders will be solely responsible for making their own analyses and evaluations of the tender rules and of the revenue, profit, and expense potential of the Concession, as well as for the inspection of the area where the works subject to the concession will be developed, the operation, and other necessary elements to decide to submit a formal bid for the tender and sign the Contract if declared the Awardee." -folio 3209 of the principal file-. This is not a clause of uncertainty undermining the principle of transparency, efficiency, and participatory openness -plurality-, but rather a precept to perform measurements of feasibility and economic sufficiency to weigh the risk inherent in the business to be signed and, based on the inputs provided, decide whether to enter the procedure by submitting the respective bid. Furthermore, within clause 6.2, second paragraph of the concession contract (folio 7666 of the CNC administrative file), it is clearly stated that the prior studies of the concession carried out by the Administration are for informational and guidance purposes, and therefore cannot be taken as a reference framework for the possible future activity of the concessionaire, so the grantor assumes no responsibility for the information contained in those studies. Within the analysis of the evidence brought to the process in accordance with the principle of rational sound criticism (sana crítica racional) -Arts. 82 and 85 CPCA, 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure-, it is the criterion of this Tribunal, based on the documentary evidence and the examination of the expert witness testimony, that it is feasible to conclude on the sufficiency of the data presented in the procurement procedure for potential bidders to have financial feasibility information that would allow them to make their decision to submit bids or not. Regarding the structure of a financial feasibility study (estudio de factibilidad financiera), Mr. Nombre141038 , ID number CED110939, an expert witness provided by CANABA, essentially stated that this type of study should have the following components: it must be definitive, based on real data, credible, and objective; it seeks to create its own data, timely, real, and updated information; it must be progressively validated with consultations, surveys, market studies, and real data; it must contain detail and analysis of income and expenses; it must weigh NPV (net present value) and IRR (internal rate of return), and interest rates; finally, it must have viability: technical, economic, legal, political, managerial, and environmental. Apart from his conclusions to the effect that the Master Plan is not a financial feasibility study (estudio de factibilidad financiera), that structure, in its essence, agrees with that indicated by the expert witness provided by APM Terminals, i.e., Mr. Nombre5836, an economist, Honduran, international mission ID 6412, passport C-719562. In the accreditation phase, it was indicated that Mr. Nombre141039 is an economist, holds a master's degree in economics and project management, works for the Central American Institute of Public Administration (ICAP), and directs the development management program. He is certified in the area of Project Management – technical and professional in direction – under the European IPMA approach. ICAP assists governments in human resource training. His knowledge includes the topic of Project Finance. On the specific topic, after a meticulous weighing of the expert witness testimony, this collegiate body understands that the components of this type of study, according to the extensive and academic criterion of Mr. Nombre141038 , match in their core with what was indicated by Mr. Nombre141039, who in this sense stated that, in his opinion, the information provided in the master plan is suitable for anyone wanting to participate in the tender. He supported this with a clarification regarding what a feasibility study should be understood to be, warning that a lack of understanding of that study can lead to erroneous opinions. Along those lines, he proceeded to explain what a feasibility study is, indicating its components as follows: Chapter 1. Must contain minimum documents or information that should be in the project identification chapter. Here there should be information on background, project proposal, criteria, and components. Chapter 2. Market study. Must contain demand, competition, tariffs, prices, and aspects related to strategies to intervene in the market. Chapter 3. Technical study. These contents are called the formulation of a project proposal. But it must also have other chapters. Chapter 4. Financial evaluation of the project. Chapter 5. Economic and social study. Chapter 6. Environmental impact evaluation. In this particular case, it must have a chapter on legal aspects (Chap. 7). As can be observed, both expert references are consistent regarding the minimum content of a financial feasibility study (estudio de factibilidad financiera), with Mr. Nombre141039's detail even being more extensive than that given by Mr. Nombre141040 . Now, regarding the specific question of whether the Master Plan contains information constituting a feasibility study, Mr. Nombre141038 stated that, in his opinion, that report was not a study like the one requested. He considered that the Master Plan is a diagnosis that broadly establishes the path to follow and indicates possible routes. It provides general data from secondary sources and provides ideas to be developed later. In essence, he concluded that the Master Plan is not a feasibility study; demand and traffic data have been improved but were not present at the beginning of the process; the work is on a larger scale than necessary; it was necessary to review the concessionaire's contributions regarding the need for the work; risks are transferred to the concessionaire, such as the environmental aspect; uncertainty is transferred to the tariffs. He argued that the higher cost in tariffs is transferred to the consumers of the cargo product.

XVI.- For his part, the expert professional Nombre141039 indicated, regarding this same question, after having performed his analysis on the documentation reviewed, i.e., the Master Plan, that within the analyzed documents he found information pertaining to a feasibility study: the document analyzed refers to a master plan, but it shows that the majority of the information of a feasibility study is contained, not in the form indicated, but throughout the document. On this point, Mr. Nombre141039 highlighted the location of each of the components of a feasibility study within the cited Master Plan, according to the following detail: Ch. 1: Pg 27-34: conceptual aspects; 35-41: project alternatives; 44-49: criteria and foundations of the best alternative; 50-53: project components, in the case of the plan, the development of the project phases. Ch. 2: Demand analysis 2-22, and Annex No. 2 with demand projections. On page 106 analysis of tariffs. Market strategies, pg. 123. Ch. 3: 107-117 development of the project components, 54-58 technical aspects of the proposal, annex 7 plans necessary to build physical works. Ch. 4: the document contemplates operating costs, investment costs – for each of the line items –, income, project profitability indicators. Financial indicators: profitability of 14%. Ch. 5: contemplates economic and social evaluation. A method comparing the situation with the project and without the project is used. It considers the project profitable from the country's socio-economic plane. Ch. 6: not integrated into the plan; they are attached documents. The same happens with the legal aspects of the project. When questioned about his expert opinion, he stated that from the perspective of potential bidders, the master plan would serve to support the decision to participate or not: its content is very significant for making a decision. He argued that this detail has the entire cost structure for a company wanting to participate, the investment by phases is clear, profitability is clear, and it also contains a market study. In light of these elements of conviction, it is considered that the information detail given in the master plan indeed contains the basic information of a financial feasibility study (estudio de factibilidad financiera) in such a way that the right to information is protected, which allows any interested party to analyze whether the business proposed within the TCM tender is attractive -profitable- and thereby decide to participate in the tender. The review of the Master Plan's content, versus the statements of Mr. Nombre141039, allows determining that indeed the components mentioned by that expert witness are found to be considered in the pages of the Master Plan that were indicated. To do so, it suffices to make a comparison of references and the content of said Plan. A study of the data provided therein allows this Tribunal to conclude that the components analyzed in each section cover the variables set forth above for the basic structure of a financial feasibility study (estudio de factibilidad financiera). Note that the reproach of the professional Nombre141038 is not regarding content, but rather the quality of the information provided. That expert's conclusions focus on preferences regarding forms and decision-making on the project. See by way of simple reference that one of his conclusions was that the work is on a larger scale than necessary and that it was necessary to review the concessionaire's contributions regarding the need for the work. This is a matter inherent to the adopted management system and the characteristics of the work itself, rather than whether the information contained in the master plan allowed potential bidders or not to have information to decide if the project was financially viable or not. It should be emphasized that the credibility this Tribunal grants to Mr. Nombre141039's opinion is not related to the discrediting attempt presented by the entity APM Terminals regarding the expert Nombre141038 , but rather, to the consideration of that testimonial element together with the documentary elements analyzed, specifically, the Master Plan itself and its content. Again, the analysis of the Master Plan allows obtaining a series of information related to the financial viability of the project itself. That document contains analysis of background; cargo forecasts; port development and master plan strategies; presentation of various alternatives, with analysis of all aspects involved in the matter (nautical, economic, social, environmental); the various phases proposed for the development of Puerto Moín; analysis of the requirements for container handling, for dockside cargo handling, for dock operations and phase development; all equipment and works required for the provision of all services; the study of the concession process and port management models; the designs; the financial and economic analysis, all of which is accompanied by a total of six annexes (layout alternatives, traffic projections, operational analysis, cost estimation, income projections, financial analysis, and plans). This can be seen at folios 275-542, 2531-2795 of the judicial file -both references contain the same master plan-. On the other hand, in this dynamic, it should be pointed out that this is an international tender whose object is typical of complex projects, which allows sustaining that participation, by principle, would be viable for companies with specific knowledge of the port market and therefore, with the due technical capacity to perform economic sufficiency analysis of the project. This links with what is stated in condition 3.2 of the bidding documents already referred to above. In any event, the data provided by the Master Plan were not only updated as was stated, but also complemented with information that led to the review and updating of the original estimates that were submitted for the knowledge of Nombre628 for the tariff and service quality consultation process. Thus, it is insisted, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that the plaintiffs' allegations in this regard seek to contradict a study that contains adequate information to constitute the financial feasibility benchmark stipulated by ordinals 9 and 21 of Law No. 7762.

XVII.- On the other hand, the allegation of injury to the principle of distribution of functions regarding the alleged delegation or commission to a third party of the project design, its construction, and operation, is not acceptable. It has already been clarified that the public works concession contract regulated in ordinal 1 of Law No. 7662 allows the contracting of the design, planning, financing, construction, conservation, expansion, or repair of any public real estate property, and in the case of the modality that incorporates the cession of public services, the exploitation of those works. Contrary to what the promoter seems to allege, this is not a waiver of the exercise of public competences -constitutionally or legally assigned-, but rather the legally valid and viable signing of an administrative contract whose purpose is to establish a model for the acquisition of goods and/or services for the satisfaction of public interests.

The relevance of this mechanism as an instrument for the provision of goods and services to Public Administrations is beyond any discussion. However, this model does not imply, by any means, a renunciation of the exercise of public powers. Understanding otherwise would lead to the impropriety of the figures for issuing administrative authorizations for delegated provision of public services, or for private or personal uses of public domain assets, which, of course, has no place in this Court’s understanding of the administrative contracting regime. Even Article 121, subsection 14 of the Constitution clearly indicates the possibility of entering into concession contracts for certain types of public assets, as well as special forms subject to a prior formal law on the matter, in other cases. In matters of delegated provision of public services, the administrative contracting regime itself, which has a constitutional basis (Article 182 of the Constitution) and whose constitutional roots have been recognized by the Constitutional Court in the well-known ruling 998-98, allows the validity of the transfer-of-provision figures for public services to be sustained. The legal framework of Law No. 7762 precisely conforms to those requirements and to that model established by the Costa Rican State. Regarding that particular modality that this law regulates and specifies, it cannot be said that one is faced with a renunciation of public powers, but rather with the contracting of various services to realize the construction, design, maintenance, financing, exploitation, and maintenance of a container port facility on the Atlantic Coast. The very object of the contract eliminates, from the outset, any doubt that could be established regarding the ownership of the works, the service, and the public powers. The simple reading and understanding of the contractual typology and its ratio within the framework of Article 1 of Law No. 7762 eliminates doubts on the matter, so the claim is unfounded ab initio. It can even be seen that among the obligations of the grantor, Article 16, subsection a of Law No. 7762 includes the duty to "Permanently supervise all construction and exploitation of conceded works and services, in accordance with the construction and maintenance program for the works or the service regulations, in accordance with the tender documents and the concession contract," which highlights the ownership of the work. Furthermore, Article 15, subsection b ibid presupposes the right of rescue of the work or concession, for reasons of public interest. More simply, the very concept of concession implies the transfer of an operating right, but never the transfer of ownership of the work or right itself, which, once the contract term expires, is recovered by the granting Administration. Regarding the expiration of the contract and its recovery process, see contractual conditions 18.3.2 and 18.3.3, visible on pages 7569-7570 of the administrative file of CNC, or pages 121 and 122 of the contract. In summary, a public asset is not transferred; rather, a temporary exploitation right is granted, subject to a special contractual-legal regime. For greater clarity, it suffices to refer to what was indicated by the Constitutional Court in ruling No. 1996-03451 of 15:33 hours on July 9, 1996, in which it stated on the disputed topic: “b.- the concession.-through the public service concession, the State satisfies general needs by availing itself of the voluntary collaboration of the administered in the provision of public services. By the public service concession contract, a person -physical or legal- is entrusted, for a determined time, with the organization and operation of a specific public service. The concessionaire carries out its task, at its own account and risk, receiving for its work the corresponding compensation, which may consist of the price or fees paid by users, subsidies or guarantees satisfied by the State, or both at once. The concessionaire is subject to the control typical of any administrative contract; that is, it is permanently subject to State oversight, since in this type of contract there is always a public interest involved; the concessionaire is bound to the Public Administration as a co-contractor and also enters into relationship with the users in whose interest the concession was granted. In this type of contract, the concessionaire has a perfect and declared subjective right; that is, it derives a property right in the constitutional sense of the term, because by granting a public service concession, an administrative contract in the strict sense is formalized. It should be clarified that the right of exploitation of the public service granted to private parties is not susceptible to being alienated, since that activity remains public, and therefore, subject to its essential legal regime. The concessionaire must enjoy a reasonable term to dedicate itself to the activity in question, so by definition, indefinite or short-duration periods are excluded from the concession and are rather characteristic of permits, which are revocable at any time, as stated. Moreover, note that the concession belongs to the category of administrative contracts that doctrine calls 'of collaboration' and its duration is temporary, but it must be for a period such that it reasonably allows the amortization of the invested capital and the obtaining of an adequate profit for the concessionaire.” Along the same lines, see ruling No. 2003-14606 of 12:30 hours on December 12, 2003, in which the difference between the privatization of services and the public service concession regime was specified, in the following terms: “In another order of considerations, the privatization of public services, that is, the definitive transfer of their ownership and exercise to subjects of private law, should not be confused with their indirect management by a public entity through the figure of the concessionaire, since, in this hypothesis, the granting administration maintains the ownership of the service and of the public domain assets necessary for its effective provision, given that it only temporarily transfers to the concessionaire the exercise of some powers for the management of the service -with or without infrastructure- or the construction of works that will continue being under public ownership (Articles 121, subsection 14, of the Political Constitution and the General Law for the Concession of Public Works with Public Services).” Furthermore, this Court does not share the claim that the design of the work is completely ceded, leaving the community uncertain about what will be built. For this, it suffices to refer to the Master Plan mentioned so many times, in which guidelines and parameters for the work to be built are given, which must be considered for the contracted design, which, in any case, must be approved by the technical counterpart before proceeding to the construction stage of the contract. Ergo, this is not a renunciation of the exercise of public powers (power-duty), but rather a legally valid contractual figure has been used, which, in the specific case, the granting Administration deemed suitable to satisfy its public works construction schedule. If the plaintiffs believe it is more appropriate for the State itself (in a broad sense) to build the works and operate the TCM project, this is a deontological discussion about the port services management model. However, that preference does not per se eliminate the validity of the contract being challenged in this matter, without having proven the technical insufficiency of that project, in accordance with Articles 15, 16, 160 of Law No. 6227/78. The annulment of that contract for the alleged impairment of technical standards is not meritorious insofar as, within the framework of the allegations made, the deficiency in the information postulated by the plaintiff has not been proven, nor in the cession to a third party of the development of the TCM project, which includes the design, construction, financing, operation, and maintenance of those works. It is, we insist, the use of a contractual modality that has legal and constitutional permissibility. Furthermore, in this Court's judgment, the plaintiffs' fear about a possible risk of cost overruns due to the absence of a final design of the works is not admissible. On one hand, as has already been pointed out previously, the adopted Master Plan, as well as the rules of the public tender, contain parameters for the design to be proposed by the awarded firm, so there is no complete detachment from public intentions or forecasts regarding the development of the work, as seems to be argued. In any case, before continuing with the various phases of the procedure, the granting Administration must supervise, with the rigor necessary in this type of contract, the due compliance with the commitments assumed, as well as the conformity with the pre-established parameters, of the various actions of the contractor, in order to compare and verify the correct satisfaction of the public interest immersed in the TCM. For this, it must also be specified that Chapter 6 of the contract regulates the issue of risks within the agreement. In this section, it is worth highlighting what is stated in clause 6.3.1 regarding the risks related to the design and construction of works (page 7665 of the CNC administrative file), from which it follows that the investment and construction costs formulated in the offer are recognized within the "ceiling" tariff -maximum-, a matter in which ARESEP has participated, so that costs higher than those projected are issues that, under the mentioned contractual condition, must be included as a risk of the contractor in the formulation of its technical, economic, and design proposal. From this perspective, then, the allegations of Nombre141025 that it cannot be certain that the TCM project is self-financing are capricious and lack demonstrative support, constituting therefore mere subjective assessments. Note that what is sought is the nullity of a technically complex public procurement administrative procedure involving a series of financial, technical, legal factors, among many facets. Hence, the simple allegation of supposed defects without providing solid elements of conviction that allow for a serious analysis of those components is not pertinent. Contrary to what was alleged by the plaintiffs, the information base for participation existed prior to the instruction of the procedure and was expanded and updated by complementary information made known to the parties during the course of the procedure -an aspect in which no incorrectness is observed-. It should also be noted that the plaintiff's concern may be valid in that, given the concurrence of situations of uncertainty in the markets, it cannot be guaranteed that the projected demands will be effective. However, that speculation constitutes part of the contractual risk analyzed above and which, under clause 6.3 of the respective contract, must be assumed by the concessionaire, specifically in contractual condition 6.3.6 on demand and commercial risk in which it is stated in its literal wording: "The demand and commercial risk, as well as its growth projections, correspond to the concessionaire" -page 7664 of the CNC administrative file-. The eventual variations in demand details are an inseparable risk in this type of service, hence the contractual stipulation of a risk valuation system that, in the event of potential conflicts, must be weighed on a case-by-case basis. It should be remembered that from the tender documents themselves, offerors are warned (clause 3.2) of the duty to carry out their own predictability studies. In this type of contract, it bears repeating, certainty in the future demand for the service is a difficult input to obtain, as multiple factors converge in those matters, such as the terminal's service provision efficiency, production levels, among other aspects. The length of the term foreseen in this type of contractual relationship makes risk an inherent theme of the contract, which is directly distributed between the parties, and in function of which, the contractor must assume, for logical reasons already stated, part of that risk, as it is not feasible for the grantor to insure or guarantee specific demand levels. Even so, in the hypothetical case of demand distortions leading to an excessive burden of the contract to the detriment of the rights of one of the parties, in breach of the economic balance already indicated supra, it should be noted that clause 12.7 of the contract -page 7625 of the CNC administrative file- sets the procedure to establish the rebalancing of the contract in situations that cause harm to the concessionaire, so that, as has been indicated, the actions to adopt to establish that financial adjustment must be examined in each case. However, a priori, one cannot speak of an invalidity of the contract due to the risk that tariffs might increase. The guidelines for risk distribution are given by the contract, as are the forms of tariff adjustment, so the plaintiff's formulation does not allow entering into the proposed analysis, as their affirmations are simple subjective assessments, not supported by tangible elements that allow this Court an in-depth analysis on this point. Mere speculation cannot technically support the nullity of public acts, so the reproaches invoked cannot lead to the result intended by the plaintiff. Finally on these claims, it must be noted, with what has been said, this Court does not consider that the principle of plurality or participatory openness in this bidding procedure is affected. The mere circumstance that only one offer was submitted within this international public bidding cannot be taken as indicative that the principle provided in Article 5 of the Administrative Contracting Law -free competition and equality- has been truncated or injured. The plaintiffs assume a syllogism under which it starts from the premise of an injury to equality in procedures and free competition due to the fact that only one entity participated. It thus constitutes an incomplete syllogism, which consists, at its core, of an enthymeme (truncated syllogism), which means assuming a premise that is taken for granted, from which a conclusion is obtained without accreditation of the factual basis that would justify it. The allegation then becomes a fallacy that is inadmissible as it starts from a construction where a conclusion is reached without first establishing the causes to support it. Apart from the inference underlying the allegation (due to an incomplete or truncated consequential judgment, it is emphasized), no concrete reasons are addressed to justify the infringement of the principle mentioned. Consequently, the charge must be dismissed since the circumstance to which the supposed injury is intended to be associated remains a conjecture, not supported by logical and solid judgments.

XVIII.- Regarding project finance. Nombre141025 indicates that, in this type of financing option, the so-called cash flow, generated as a consequence of the exploitation of the concession, is used as the basic guarantee of the operation. It indicates that for the propriety of this figure, it is necessary to know in advance the degree of feasibility of the concession to be granted, as well as its weaknesses, a requirement that has not been met since those studies with sufficient information did not exist, proof of which is the participation of a single offeror. The public decision to support the project through social economic interest is not adequately justified, a fact that is sketchy in the Master Plan. It accuses that the financing modality cannot be carried out solely under the State's expectation. No tax efficiency analysis of the financial model was performed. It says that, in the contract, the control structure is very weak, since what is established is a concept or profile and not a specific work. On this matter, the following must be stated. As has been indicated, part of the object of the TCM contract is the financing of the construction of the port facility, which implies that it is the concessionaire's responsibility to seek financing options for the development of the public infrastructure. Evidently, the cash flows expected to be obtained from the operation of the service constitute the main guarantee for covering the credits that may eventually be obtained for the development of the various actions pertaining to the execution of the contractual object. In view of this, on one hand, it must be reiterated, unlike what was stated by the plaintiff, it is this Court's criterion that the procedure does have financial feasibility studies and demand projection information and relevant data that allow potential offerors to individually carry out their analyses on the profitability of the proposed business. This topic has already been analyzed supra, so the reiteration of what has already been addressed is unnecessary. Again, the existence of a single offer cannot be taken as a criterion to sustain that such an absence occurred in this case. Even so, the allegations presented by Nombre141025 on this topic seem, at first instance, counterproductive, as despite the concern about project finance, it recognizes the solvency of the concessionaire and predicts few problems in obtaining financing sources for the development of the work. Now, it is clear that prior to granting financing options, lending institutions must perform risk and solvency analyses of the potential debtor before granting the respective options and making the corresponding monetary disbursements. Hence, the burden of obtaining financing for the generation of the design, construction, maintenance, operation of the TCM corresponds to the concessionaire. The financial viability of the project is a matter already discussed, and which has been considered by APM Terminals at the time of submitting its bid, accepting the risk on this aspect. It can even be seen that clause 6.3.4 transfers the financial risk of the contract to the concessionaire -page 7664 of the CNC administrative file-, a clause indicating that this risk includes the financing conditions that it had planned to obtain in its respective offer. In fact, according to the tender document guidelines, each potential offeror must carry out its own estimates and structure its own financing schemes. Note that the tender documents do not impose a specific financing option; however, it is reiterated, the duty to obtain it and the risks of this financial support are transferred to the concessionaire. On the other hand, although the State could have chosen to first contract the design of the work and subsequently its construction and operation, this is again a matter of option or choice of preferences in management models. However, notwithstanding the clarifications on current trends in concessions for this type of project made by the state representative, the truth of the matter is that one must once again refer to the content of the first article of Law No. 7762, a norm that allows contracting not only the design but also the construction, operation, financing, and maintenance of this type of infrastructure. It is a matter of programmatic policy whose validity has not been discredited by the promoters of this action. The advisability of unifying those actions within a single project may well not be shared by the plaintiffs, but it is insisted, it is ultimately a matter of choice among the probable management models applicable to this type of work. This does not imply that the conformity of public actions with the legal system cannot be reviewed; however, the deficiencies pointed out by the plaintiff have not managed to distort the legitimacy of what was carried out by the granting Administration. Then, the consideration of whether international public bidding 2009LI-000001-0200 fits or not within a project finance is of little relevance for the purposes of establishing the legality of this matter, for the reasons pointed out. In another order of things, if what is reproached is the content or form of expressing the information related to the feasibility studies, it is a topic already dealt with, an analysis within which it was established that those studies allowed the decision to participate or not to be made, reiterating the duty of each offeror to carry out its own studies. Certainly, among the options that may exist in this type of contract, the granting Administration may choose to guarantee the concessionaire a minimum level of income (or demand in this case), thus assuming the risk; however, in this case, as has been said, the risk in that sense was transferred to the concessionaire, configuring a decision of the grantor on that matter. During the course of the bidding (and before), cargo projection data and a historical detail of the behavior of those movements were made available to interested parties. It should be highlighted that the plaintiff's debate revolves around tender document issues that they did not object to in a timely manner, but which, nonetheless, do not show the deficiencies alleged in their lawsuit. Even so, during the evidentiary expert witness examination, the correspondence of the information and studies provided during the bidding process within the concept of project finance was a widely considered aspect. Thus, CNC offered as an expert witness Mr. Nombre5836, of the qualifications mentioned above. In order to justify that the TCM has financial feasibility for the purposes of considering financing decisions as an offeror, this deponent essentially stated that every project must have a clear tariff and contain the total investments regardless of when they are made, operating costs, company profit, recovery of investment costs. On the topic, Nombre141025 questioned the expert: if Project finance is financed with future income, how are income estimates made in the master plan, to which he responded -in essence- that they are made with the cash flow for what will be charged, and are sustained by demand. He clarified that demand estimates and projections are incorporated into the document. Regarding subsequent modifications to that projected demand, as Nombre141025 claimed in the cross-examination, he indicated that when a study –any study- is done and any type of variable is going to be projected, be it cargo, price, production, those projections must be supported, and in the master plan there is a model that supports those projections. He noted that the income of a project, demand, and competition must be projected, and the methods used are a particular matter for those who conducted the studies. Regarding the relevance of the concept of the value of money in a Project Finance, he expressed that when a financial flow is updated, two things are being done: incorporating the investor's profitability and considering whether the project can be accepted. It could not be advancing income and delaying investments. The weighing of what was stated by this professional -criteria that, in this Court's judgment, could not be refuted- highlights again that the information provided to interested parties allowed for decision-making in this tender, so that the principles and institutes invoked on this matter by the plaintiffs are not injured. That being the case, the rejection of this element must be ordered.

XIX.- Regarding the allegation of the absence of economic-financial balance in the contract. In another grievance, the representative of Nombre141025 reproaches the lack of financial harmony in the contract. He states that clause 6.2 of the tender documents is illegal and absurd in stating that the prior studies are of an informative nature. He says the contract equation is no more than a contractual procedure where an attempt is made to establish a balance between the contractor's obligations through the investments it must make, and the consideration that the State must provide. He accuses that, in this case, those prior analyses do not exist, since what was issued was a project in concept, without technical, environmental, or economic feasibility studies. All of which causes costs to increase unnecessarily, and which, obviously, will have to be charged by the offeror in the case of an imbalance. This balance must include contingencies of the contractor, such as profit and financial capital. The contract proposal contained in "the bidding" is not the bidding of a well-defined project, but one yet to be defined. In the TCM, it is not known if said financial equation is based on the real project costs, as there is no updated technical-economic feasibility study by the State. He estimates that the cost of construction, operation, and maintenance is lower than the estimate used for tariff setting, a condition that occurs in "the bidding" because the data, also inaccurate, corresponds to the year 2008. Therefore, all users, as well as the country's competitiveness, would be harmed by having to pay an overprice for the service being provided. This could result in the concessionaire, having a pre-assigned tariff, being able to make changes to the design and functionality of the work to lower costs and yet maintain the offered tariff. He anticipates that the Costa Rican State could be sued and might have to compensate the damages and losses caused by the loss of profit from the tariff that was offered and accepted in the concession contract. Regarding these allegations, it should be indicated, from the very beginning and in principle, a reasonable doubt may arise about the standing of Nombre141025 and Nombre141024 to invoke a distortion in the economic-financial equation of the contract. This is because it could be said that the only one who could claim such a distortion is precisely the concessionaire in whose favor -or against whom- the tariffs for the TCM service are set. From the standpoint of the exercise of a right to react to the adjustment of the economic terms of the contract, that position would be technically correct, if what is intended is to declare the imbalance as a prerequisite for a tariff adjustment to return to the agreed profitability rates. However, this Court considers that the plaintiffs' concern is directed not at the exercise of a right that, in principle, would correspond to the concessionaire -one might think exclusively- but rather within the scope of the incidences that this contractual aspect could generate in the legal sphere of potential users or recipients of the public service. From this perspective, this Court does not observe any defect within the framework of the plaintiff's standing. What is reproached indeed fits from the perspective of possible economic adjustments of the contract via tariffs, or eventually compensatory -for claims of public contractual liability-, which, due to economic impact on the service, would affect the project's recipients. In this type of concession contract, it must be understood that the service provision relationship is tripartite, because although the granting Administration signs a public contract with a delegated provider -concessionaire-, so that in cases like this one it designs, builds, finances, operates, exploits, and maintains a container port terminal, the truth is that this bond is issued for the satisfaction of a public service directed toward the user recipients of that service. Certainly, the binding commitment arises between the grantor and the concessionaire, but far from constituting a classic contractualist binomial, it consists of the provision delegation of a service whose recipients -and ultimate justifying cause- are the users of that service. Hence, the domestic legal system establishes, as a derivation of the democratic principle, figures for citizen or public participation in the control of these contracts. The design of Law No. 7593 (ARESEP Law) regarding tariff adjustment procedures provides proof of that synergy. It is therefore a triangular relationship, since in the end, the delegated service is directed to the users, who pay a tariff, set by the grantor in this case -unlike other contracts in which such competence pertains to ARESEP- but which must be paid by the users so that the concessionaire obtains the compensation agreed upon in the contract. Such connotation is presented in the teleological dimension of the contract, which seeks to satisfy public interests of the recipients, to the point that improper provision to those receivers of the administrative business's effects can lead to the cancellation of the concession, or its recovery, or the application of the established sanctioning regime. In the specific case of Law No.

7762, it can even be observed that within chapter III Rights and Obligations of the Parties, section III, Article 19, alludes to the rights of users, which makes the aforementioned triangular relationship incontrovertible. As such, the argument of the CNC regarding the lack of standing on this aspect is not shared. However, once again, the claimant's arguments fail to materialize into sound and specific reproaches regarding alleged imperfections in the contracting process that would justify its annulment. To this end, it is necessary to make brief clarifications regarding the right in question.

XX.- Regarding the right to economic equilibrium. The legal framework of administrative contracting grants the awardee or contractor a right to the economic equilibrium of the contract. It is a right derived from the constitutional maxim of patrimonial intangibility (ordinals 33, 45, and 50 of the Magna Carta) and its aim is to maintain equity in the distribution of contractual burdens, specifically in the economic and financial area of the contract, ensuring that the operator maintains the level of profitability that was initially agreed upon, or at least, that normal economic conditions persist. This equilibrium allows, on one hand, for granting the contractor a fair profit for the provision of a service, the development of a work, or in general, the fulfillment of the object for which they were contracted. In the case of transportation contracts, which are characterized by successive execution, this level of financial health and economic equity is decisive for the proper execution of the agreed-upon activity. An imbalance in the price structure of a service of this nature would entail a detriment to the operator's patrimonial sphere, with a corresponding benefit without legitimate cause for the granting or tendering Administration, as it involves activities whose remuneration is below the due financial equilibrium. Conversely, adjusting prices to a quantitative level higher than the fair one would lead to unjust enrichment in the contractor's sphere and a detriment to the public interest, by paying a price higher than the agreed-upon profit allows. Hence, a just equilibrium allows for the development of the activity for the benefit of the recipient and the harmonious fulfillment of the duties assumed in the contract. Ultimately, price adjustment, when applicable, is a manifestation of the duty to fulfill what was agreed (canon 15 of the Administrative Contracting Law), ergo, it is a duty of the Administration, not a faculty, that is, as long as the conditions justifying the readjustment are present, the Administration is obligated to order the increase to maintain the originally agreed-upon conditions and thus satisfy a right that the same legislation grants to the contractor. That right is regulated in precept 18 of the aforementioned Administrative Contracting Law, which states in the relevant part: "Article 18.- Maintenance of the economic equilibrium of the contract. Except when expressly stipulated otherwise in the terms of the respective tender specifications, in contracts for works, services, and supplies with persons or companies from the construction industry, the Administration shall readjust prices, increasing or decreasing them, when direct or indirect costs strictly related to the work, service, or supply vary, through the application of mathematical equations based on official price and cost indices prepared by the Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Commerce. (...)" In the current context, it is further developed in numeral 31 of the Regulations to said law. As observed, the legislator started from the primary right of price readjustment as a way to maintain financial equilibrium in the contract. For such purposes, different forms of economic adaptation may well be established in the respective tender specifications or in the contract itself, that is, economic update of the contract, through mechanisms agreed upon by the parties, always maintaining subjection to the already established rules. However, this economic equilibrium must be guaranteed upon the concurrence of diverse causes that produce an alteration in the order of the contract. Therefore, the contracting Administration must ensure this harmony when the effect of instability originates as a derivation of modifications it has ordered in the contract's regime or decisions that directly or indirectly affect it, as would be the case of unilateral modifications, which constitutes the so-called ius variandi. But also, it must safeguard against acts of other Administrations that affect contractual execution (theory of the fait du prince) or when unforeseeable causes arise that make the contract financially unsustainable (theory of unforeseen circumstances, teoría de la imprevisibilidad). Of course, those situations inherent to the risk or venture typical of the contracted activity would not be subject to being considered as sources of price readjustment, which under normal terms must be tolerated by the contractor as they form part of the alea inherent to any activity susceptible to economic exploitation. In this dimension, variations originating from circumstances foreseeable at the time of proposing the economic offer are, in principle, not covered within the need for readjustment. Regarding the content of the price readjustment theory, the Constitutional Chamber has had the opportunity to issue relevant rulings that provide an exhaustive development on the subject. Among many, in Voto 6432-1998 at 10:30 a.m. on September 4, 1998, it stated: "The readjustment of the contract price is identified with the principle of its revision, to temper it to the current economic reality, which is done through three distinct means recognized both by Public Law doctrine and that which informs our legal system: the rebus sic stantibus clause, the theory of unforeseen circumstances, and the theory of unjust enrichment. The three means aim to introduce a note of equity into the contractual relationship, capable of preserving the harmony of the opposing interests of the contracting parties, while maintaining the equivalence of the committed obligations and equality before risks. The most qualified doctrine on administrative contracting is unanimous in affirming that recognizing price variations is not a power of the State but an obligation, since the incidence of higher costs is a matter of public order, as is everything related to recognizing the consequences derived from the theory of unforeseen circumstances. (...) In summary, price readjustments do not constitute an indemnity voluntarily recognized by the State and paid to the contractor, but rather, a legal mechanism for restoring the real value of the obligation, for restoring the financial equilibrium of the contract, so that what was previously agreed upon is paid, that is, it is the integral payment of the price, so that there is neither prejudice to the contractor, nor undue enrichment on the part of the State." XXI.- Now then, in the specific context of the present matter, in light of the summarized allegations, the reproached deficiencies are not observed. Indeed, the issue of the existence or not of the financial feasibility study has already been the subject of extensive treatment, so it is unnecessary to address it again, and reference must be made to what has already been stated. It must be indicated, however, that the claim for nullity of clause 6.2 must be dismissed, as it is the logical consequence of the analysis on the substantive issue that this Chamber has already set forth. Now then, the aspect of maintaining the economic equilibrium of the contract is addressed not only in Articles 17 and 40 of Law No. Placa20097, but also in chapter 12 of the contract (included within the respective tender specifications), called "ON THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ECONOMIC-FINANCIAL EQUILIBRIUM OF THE CONTRACT." Apart from the absence of the technical, economic, and environmental feasibility study, the claimants do not explain how the regulatory norms of the contract could potentially violate, to the detriment of potential users, that economic equilibrium and the impact that these distortions could generate on the tariffs that, in theory, they must pay for the supply of port services for loading and unloading containers. No substantive argument, beyond what has been indicated, is provided that would lead this Tribunal to conclude the unlawfulness of the treatment the contractual norms give to the issue of said financial equilibrium, in a way that would allow at least inferring an excessive advantage in favor of the concessionaire, or an objective risk that could harm the rights of TCM users. Again, a structure proposed from the bidding specifications phase is accused, without Nombre141025 having challenged that specific act after several rounds of objection appeals. For this, reference is made to what was stated regarding the preclusion that has operated to question the conditions of the bidding specifications, without prejudice to the analysis that has been conducted in this ruling regarding each presented issue. It must be insisted, the same specification conditions, not challenged in a timely manner, indicate the duty of potential bidders to carry out their own projections to conclude on the sufficiency of the contract and participate. It is not an absurd provision as the petitioners claim, but rather aspects that, in the logic of the project, as proposed by the grantor, are inherent to the type of contract to be signed and the selected management model. On the other hand, the State's argument is noteworthy for this Tribunal when it points out that for a contract that includes the design of the work, it is not feasible to claim an estimation of the project's real costs. Effectively, given that part of the contract is the design, it makes no technical sense to claim a projection of the project's real costs when, despite the existence of profiles of what the TCM is to be, the final design is not yet available, which, it is recalled, must contain the assessment of the environmental variable -already analyzed-. The same can be noted regarding the allegation of outdated data (2008) from the Master Plan, when it has already been noted that this data was later adjusted by the firm Royal Haskoning and then, in the tariff setting, considered again for the opinion that ARESEP must render in these fields of tariffs and service quality. This topic will be detailed infra. Regarding the higher profit margin from making changes in the work design and cost reduction, it is an issue that is only mentioned, without evidentiary or argumentative support, so it must simply be dismissed, constituting mere speculation that, in any case, if materialized, there are valid options to require tariff adjustments in order to respect the acquired commitments and the agreed-upon profitability with the same level of service quality and infrastructure level (qualitative and quantitative). Similarly, the allegation of potential administrative responsibility frameworks due to economic imbalance is based on conjectures that, due to the abstraction with which they are presented, do not merit further examination and must be rejected, as it is clear that the duties and rights of the parties lead to the possibility of non-compliance that must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. In any event, it is reiterated, in those cases one must adhere to the risk distribution clauses, the right to economic equilibrium, among multiple factors, as the distortion may well be within the freely assumed risks. For the adjustment of a potential imbalance in this case, it is worth noting that by Resolution No. RRG430-2010 at 11:00 a.m. on July 22, 2010, Nombre628 set the tariff adjustment parameters and quality criteria. Regarding the adjustment parameters, it noted that in the event of financial alterations, valid adjustment mechanisms to balance said equation would be the following: tariff review or adjustment, payment for economic and social development works in Limón, review or adjustment of the investment schedule, additional works or equipping in the port, combination of the above. -folios 796-801 of the ARESEP administrative file-. It is not feasible then, ab initio, to raise speculations about future responsibilities for economic imbalance and, based on that, seek the nullity of the project, when there are clear provisions in the contract on how to address potential imbalances in the economic-financial equation, as well as in the binding opinion of Nombre628 -already mentioned-. Ergo, the allegation under examination must be rejected.

XXII.- Regarding the TCM tariff and the export volumes taken for its calculation. On this topic, the lawsuit states that there cannot be coherence between the price paid, the value of the work, and the services provided, due to the absence of updated economic feasibility studies and the determined construction costs. It adds that all economic factors must be taken into account, which should encompass not only the construction of the work, but also the costs of its exploitation and operation. It states this is not possible given the lack of studies. In the opinion of the claimants, at this time, a public works concession contract is advisable, in which a tariff can be set with that data, which does not occur here. It reproaches that the estimate of growing export volume of "Full Containers Vessels" through Moín port, presented by the Master Plan, is completely unrealistic. It indicates that for 2010, the Plan states exports would be 129 million boxes of bananas, when the level for that year was 98 million. A growing banana export curve of 138 million boxes for the year 2015 and 173 million boxes for the year 2030 is presented, which it considers unattainable. The Master Plan data was not taken from official entities, but from Ecuador, data from 2003. It states that while the study forecasts annual increases of 1.5%, the reality has been a downward trend. It states that, having the data from the last 5 years, the volume that would use the TCM is 45%. The growth data is unrealizable. It highlights that the volumes in Banana and Pineapple will be considerably reduced compared to those used in the study; a 45% reduction in the volume transiting through the dock is estimated; the project scale needs to be regulated in terms of investment and phases to be developed. It points out that when conducting demand projection studies, as was done in the master plan by Nombre141027, it is customary to include, among other things: a) documentation and substantiation of the assumptions and how they affect the results; b) preparation of market research studies as support for the figures; c) verification with experts that the projected figures are credible and defensible against reasonable questioning. It censures that in the "bidding specifications," there is no substantiation for the first two points, and for the third, no consultation with the sector was conducted. On this matter, the following is to be noted. On one hand, the petitioner's allegations rest on the absence of the feasibility studies required by ordinals 9 and 21 of Law No. 7762. This issue, it is reiterated, has already been weighed in previous sections of this ruling, making it unnecessary to reiterate and elaborate on that point. Thus, the alleged nonexistence of said feasibility studies cannot constitute a valid cause to support the pathology claimed by the plaintiffs. Regarding the data contained in the Master Plan prepared for these purposes, it indeed dates from 2008. However, as has been repeatedly stated, that data was later updated, given the historical market reality as well as the public and notorious fact of impacts on the world economy generated at that time. Such situations led to the updating of that data due to the impact they had for tariff setting purposes and the project's financial viability. This is proven through the review of the file for the tariff consultation conducted with ARESEP, file OT-367-2008. It suffices to observe that the tariff initially proposed in the tender specifications was $169 (one hundred and sixty-nine United States dollars), which, given these variations, had to be adjusted, a tariff published in the specifications published in La Gaceta No. 5 of January 8, 2010. Given this panorama, interested parties warned of the differences between reality and the Master Plan projections, so the granting administration commissioned the company Royal Haskoning to update that data. Subsequently, the proceedings were sent to Nombre628 to carry out the tariff analysis (tariff structure). Indeed, through official communication DSET-OF-401-2009 of March 18, 2009, the CNC formally sent Nombre628 the tariff structure and adjustment parameters that would be incorporated into the TCM bidding specifications, as can be seen on folio 36 of the ARESEP administrative file. This procedure was assigned file OT-367-2008 (ARESEP file). For such purposes, through official communication 122-RG-2009 of April 1, 2009, ARESEP requested additional required information, which specifically included an electronic copy of the master plan, feasibility studies to provide viability to the project, environmental feasibility, detail of tariffs to be incorporated, tariff schedule, CNC agreement initiating the procedure (see folios 34-35 of the ARESEP file). The information was submitted, providing a CD with the Master Plan and the proposed tariff model. This is recorded on folios 7-33 of the ARESEP administrative file. By Resolution No. RG-125-2009 of April 20, 2009, that regulatory body approved the project and indicated that the stated tariffs were maximum prices. It also warned that the adjustment mechanisms are applied to the awarded tariffs, not the approved ones, and that Nombre141029 has no corresponding right to carry out any work. As a consequence of what was resolved in act R-DJ-008-2009 of July 2, 2009, by the CGR on objection appeals filed by Nombre141024 and the firm APM Terminals B.V, a comprehensive review of the tender specifications was conducted, as a result of which, by official communication 2295/DTS-OF-1424-2009, CNC requested a second pronouncement on the tariff structure, adjustment parameters, and service quality evaluation (folios 84-145 of the ARESEP file). Again, through official communications 1346-DITRA-2009 and 1380-DITRA-2009/32128 dated October 22 and 27, 2009, Nombre628 requested information from the CNC, which was sent by official communication 2359/DST-OF-1488-09 of October 26, 2009, and 2385/DST-OF-1522-09 of October 28, 2009. By Resolution No. RRG-10208-2009 at 09:15 a.m. on October 29, 2009, the regulatory body established a ceiling tariff of $169 per container (service to cargo) -see folios 163-179 of the ARESEP administrative file-. Subsequently, by official communication DST-OF-380-10 (0395) of March 12, 2010, a new tariff was requested, analyzing new demand projections and updated investment costs: the proposed tariff was $252. This request was made indicating that it is based on the demand update to the tariff model. In that official communication, visible on folios 202-210 of the Nombre628 administrative file, it is indicated that the Nombre141027 study did not contemplate the economic contraction, so the following relevant data is provided: demand projection fell due to the effect of the global economic crisis, the updated value of the works increased or raised the total project amount to 948.7 million dollars ($948,700,000.00), the prepared model maintains a 17% royalty rate, the projection scenario used in the reference model RRG-10208-2009 is maintained, the storage fee for full containers after 2 grace days decreased from $5 to $1.5 per TEUS (40-foot container), the concession period is 35 years, the internal rate of return (IRR, TIR) is 15%. Based on this detail, a service-to-cargo tariff of $252.00 (two hundred and fifty-two dollars) was proposed. This information was supplemented with inputs sent to Nombre628 by official communication DST-OF-0432-10 (445) of March 23, 2010, in which it is indicated that the IRR is 17.5% (folios 211-219 of the ARESEP administrative file). Similarly, by official communication DST-OF-380-10 (0395) of the 12th, the cargo volume estimate and its comparison with the Royal Haskoning model for the TCM carried out by the entity ICICOR-Costa Rica S.A. dated January 12, 2010, was submitted (folios 220-268 ibidem). By Resolution No. RRG-255-2010 at 3:30 p.m. on April 5, 2010, Nombre628 established that with an internal rate of return of 17.5%, the ceiling tariff for container cargo would be $252.00 (two hundred and fifty-two dollars) (folios 286-293 of the ARESEP administrative file). By official communication 902/DST-OF-673-2010 of July 5, 2010, CNC requested a fourth criterion on the tariffs in accordance with CGR Resolution R-DJ-215-2010 -folios 550-787 of the ARESEP administrative file-. This entity requested additional information on July 12, 2010, and it was submitted on July 15, 2010 -folios 789, 791-792 of the ARESEP administrative file-. Finally, by Resolution No. RRG430-2010 at 11:00 a.m. on July 22, 2010, Nombre628 issued the last resolution setting the tariffs, adjustment parameters, and quality criteria. Regarding the adjustment parameters, it noted that in the event of financial alterations, valid adjustment mechanisms would be: tariff review or adjustment, payment for economic and social development works in Limón, review or adjustment of the investment schedule, additional works or equipping in the port, combination of the above. -folios 796-801 ibidem-. Ultimately, within clause 11.8.2 of the concession contract, a cargo tariff of $223 (two hundred and twenty-three dollars) per container was set -folio 7639 of the CNC file-.

XXIII.- Based on this factual recount, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that, although the position of the petitioners is respectable, it is ultimately not shared. The data used for setting the tariffs to be applied to the TCM, contrary to what the petitioner states, was duly updated. Note that in the first instance, as indicated, by Resolution No. RRG-10208-2009 at 09:15 a.m. on October 29, 2009, Nombre628 established a maximum tariff of $169 per container, based on the information inputs provided at that date, specifically, the data contained in the Master Plan carried out by Nombre141027. However, in subsequent procedures, this data was updated, considering aspects such as the global economic crisis and its impact effect on projected demand, an increase in the estimated value of the works, royalty percentage, a reduction in the storage fee for full containers after 2 grace days, the concession period of 35 years, and the internal rate of return (IRR). The detail of these aspects was set forth in the previous section. It has also been noted that through official communication DST-OF-380-10 (0395) of the 12th, the cargo volume estimate and its comparison with the Nombre141027 model for the TCM carried out by the entity ICICOR-Costa Rica S.A. dated January 12, 2010 (folios 220-268 ibidem) was submitted. In this detail, updated data is sent under a comparative scheme with the information provided by the Master Plan, containing the following scheme: scope of the study, background of port activity, volume comparison with the master plan, cargo volume estimate, cargo forecasts, imports, exports of banana, pineapple, coffee and other exports, as well as conclusions and recommendations. -folios 220-268 of the ARESEP administrative file-. These benchmarks of information were weighed by Nombre628 in the course of exercising its competencies related to the diagnosis of the tariff element in the TCM project. It should be noted at this point what was resolved at the beginning of this ruling regarding the lack of passive standing of ARESEP, as no specific act of its own was challenged. However, it must be indicated that these data updates occurred as a consequence of the requests, made through the objection appeal of interested parties, to update demand estimates, an issue that clearly affects the project's financial viability. Hence, the modification of the maximum cargo tariffs went from $169 to $252 recommended by ARESEP. The complex detail of the procedure established before Nombre628 demonstrates the requirement for information from that regulatory body to the CNC in order to have parameters that would enable a technical definition of the tariff aspect and quality control. Therefore, the deficiency of updated information that is accused is not observed. On the other hand, the petitioner -unlike other parts of the lawsuit- accepts the public works concession model with public services, conditioning that management model on the objective setting of tariffs. In this line, the lack of inclusion in the tariffs of construction, operation, and maintenance costs is accused. However, it is an argument that is only presented as argumentation, without additional mention of the concrete financial-economic reasons leading to that conjecture. From the review this Tribunal has conducted of the various acts issued in the tariff consultation procedure, the outburst reproached by the plaintiffs is not apparent. This can be observed, by way of reference, in the justifying detail annexed to official communication DSET-OF-401-2009 of March 18, 2009, from the CNC, in which the consultation in question is formulated, wherein a document from the month of March 2009 is attached, setting forth details of the justification of the tariff structure and quality control submitted to ARESEP for its consideration. In that document, for example, point 1.2. "Technical characteristics of the project," alludes to the development of phases 2 and 3 of the Master Plan, related to the development of civil works specific to the TCM project -folio 41 of the ARESEP file-. Point 1.7.2.1 refers to various situations or items that must be weighed in adapting the economic-financial equilibrium of the contract. In general, the complexity of the information considered for the tariff proposal can be inferred from the financial model, the detail of which is found in point 1.9 of the cited technical annex from the CNC, in which, on the subject, among others, the following referential parameters are indicated: concession period, maritime traffic projection, estimated installed capacity, single port tariff, investment and demand estimates, rates and values defined for productivities, energy and fuel consumption, personnel expenses, equipment assessment in terms of functionality relative to the demand to be served, expected productivities, as well as maintenance and operation costs. This can be seen on folios 59-60 of the Nombre628 administrative file. Thus, the bias criticized by the petitioners is not apparent from this Tribunal's perspective. Furthermore, this collegiate body does not share the concern of petitioner Nombre141025 when it states that for setting tariffs, the value of the works, operation and maintenance costs, as well as the concessionaire's remuneration must be known, to avoid charging only the value of the work. In these types of long-term contracts, it is clear that the value of the infrastructure is amortized through the payment of tariffs, for which the total cost of investment, maintenance, costs, and profitability is diluted in the tariff structure over the concession term. It is not the grantor who, prior to the concessionaire's start of operations, pays the value of those works, but rather these are financed by the concessionaire, through credit options whose risk it assumes (clause 6.3.4 of the contract "Financial Risks"), a cost it later loads onto the unit tariffs. From this standpoint, the CNC is right when it points out that in the event of projecting resources only for construction but not for maintenance and operation, the concessionaire exposes itself to the imposition of contractual sanctions, given that the purpose of the contract is not limited to construction, but also to these last two performances. Likewise, the tariff structure does not allow the transfer or charging of costs that are inherent to the risks assumed by the contractor, a topic that has already been developed in previous sections of this ruling. For this, it suffices to refer to contractual conditions 6.3.1, 6.3.2, and 6.3.4 that deal with the issue of risk transfer to the concessionaire. Now then, regarding the detail of the data and graphs presented by CANABA, it is worth noting they are based on the data offered by the Master Plan, without weighing the updates that have already been referenced.

Therefore, they are issued based on an input that does not consider the latest data used by Nombre628 and the granting administration on this matter. Furthermore, in the context of the updated data used within the tariff analysis, details of information are observed that are close to the data provided by the plaintiff. Nombre29630, at folio 295 of the administrative file, contains “Table 2-3 Summary for the export forecast in the medium scenario (x1000 t) attached, section 2.3.1 which establishes, in essence, for the medium scenario, the banana export estimate as of August 2008, compared with the Tariff and Financial Viability Study, a study that on average reduced the demand estimate by 18% (initially 128.21 million), the banana export estimate for 2010 according to the adjusted Master Plan corresponds to 105 million boxes. Nevertheless, even with the differences that, in statistical terms, the data provided by the plaintiff project, the fact of the matter is that the technical soundness of the calculations made by the various administrative bodies during the consultation phase of the tariff structure is not discredited.

XXIV.- Regarding these aspects, the testimonial evidence presented leads to a conclusion about the relevance and sufficiency of that data for carrying out the tariff quantifications. The testimony of Mr. Nombre141041, identity card number CED110940, proposed by Nombre628 as a witness-official-expert, as one of the officials responsible for handling the consultation of the concession project regarding the quality of the proposal, when asked about the detail of information, stated in essence that, for the purposes of the analysis, statistical information from Nombre141024 from 1999 to 2011 was considered. He indicated that if the behavior of cargo in metric tons is analyzed, an increase is observed, with a slight decrease in 2008 regarding cargo. The same applies to container handling. The growth rate has not been that high. Even when consulted by the CNC about the conditioning of tariff approval to any requirement, the witness stated —in essence— that in that procedure, it was considered that the information was sufficient to issue the opinion. Regarding the components considered in the tariff and quality analysis, when asked by SINTRAJAP, he indicated that this analysis includes the weighting of investments in the financial system section, a criterion that connects and conforms to the analysis addressed above by this Tribunal on that subject. For her part, regarding the tariff analysis of the proposal, Ms. Nombre141042, identity card number CED110941, an economist, Technician of the Directorate of Transport, offered by Nombre628 as a witness-official-expert, stated fundamentally that within her analysis she had financial feasibility studies presented in the Master Plan, as well as an electronic tool that indicated the financial viability of the project. She details the process followed to approve the tariff structure, substantial variations: 4 consultations were presented: the first on tariff structure, adjustment, and quality of service, the second on variations in the tariff structure, development contribution and financial equilibrium was incorporated, in the third, modifications to the tariff, previously at $169 and modified to $252 per container due to adjustments in demand data and variations in investment costs, the project's internal rate from 15% to 17.5%, modification of the tariff for container storage outside the grace period. In the fourth, adjustment parameters for financial equilibrium. In the last procedure, the CNC was asked for operating and equipment costs, reasons for modification, demand projections to verify their evolution, clarifications on refrigerated containers, justification for the variation of the IRR. The IRR is an indicator of the profitability of an investment project. It is analyzed by comparing it with an opportunity cost, in that case of the TCM with a return on capital, which led to the conclusion that it was profitable. She also acknowledged that the concessionaire assumes the commercial risks, as well as that there is no clause referring to minimum or maximum income subject to tariffs. Regarding the modifications to demand, she expressed that global trends from different ports with cargo volume were taken into account. She indicated that in 2008-2009 there was a global decrease, which justified providing new demand projections; likewise, demand projections are a risk directly assumed by the concessionaire. For these purposes, she clarified that commercial risk is an index of variations that occur in demand, that the expected cargo volume does not arrive, in these cases there is no adjustment parameter. Regarding the update of the internal rate of return, when consulted by Nombre141025, she stated —in essence— that it was updated due to the adjustment of operating costs: dredging, fill, as well as unit cost, demand volumes. This witness's testimony again highlights the sufficiency of the information provided for the tariff analysis, which implies the impropriety of the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the deficiency of information and the absence of objective technical parameters in establishing the tariff proposal. On the statistical aspect, witness Nombre141043, ID card CED110942, a statistician, proposed by ARESEP, concluded that demand projections must take into account the behavior, estimating that the projected data from the CNC conformed to the historical series and the trend was toward growth. From the analysis of this technical testimonial evidence, the forcefulness and usefulness of the information made available to Nombre628 to issue the pronouncement required by section 21 of Law No. 7762 clearly emerges. In essence, it must be indicated regarding this evidence, there is no historical gap that the plaintiff warns of in the data used for those purposes, as Nombre628 required the provision of updated information and the statistical cargo prediction data were considered technically viable. Likewise, the tariff weights all the elements inherent to the concession within the financial structure proposal. Therefore, the evidence admitted along this line agrees with the deductions arising from the documentary evidence, so that, in accordance with sections 82 and 85 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, the deficiencies pointed out by the plaintiffs on this particular are not observed. In any case, the eventual divergence in the statistical data used by the CNC, ARESEP, Nombre141024 for the purposes of quantifying the tariffs to be applied to cargo and vessel services may be based on various reasons, such as, among many possible ones, the sources of information or the method of analysis. The plaintiff reproaches that official sources of information were not used, however, as has been indicated, the studies and detail of information were provided by Nombre141024 and by the CNC, therefore, they are reports issued by public authorities with competence in the area subject to the contract, in view of which, the allegation lacks support. It must be insisted, the variations in the cited demand projection data, although they may be heterogeneous, such divergence does not in itself entail a cause for nullity or invalidity of the analyses. Note that the promoters direct their allegations to exposing those supposed deficiencies in the information sources, alleging that this could increase tariffs or affect the sufficiency or profitability of the concession, and further, that with the demand projections such a large port infrastructure is not required, so costs could be reduced. In this direction, the statements made by witness Nombre141044, offered by CANABA, are noted, who referred to the projected demands for the banana sector, as well as the supposed costs that, with the unified tariff proposed for the TCM, would be avoided for port users, which she considers do not present the savings alleged by the grantor. The analysis of his testimony reveals, as Mr. Nombre141038 explained, who, as noted ut supra, concluded that the TCM project is on a scale larger than necessary. The evaluation of the evidence offered by the plaintiffs does not allow establishing the technical non-conformity of the assessments made by Nombre628 and the CNC regarding the costs for cargo services. The sources of information, the veracity of the data, or at least their statistical validity are reproached, but in essence, the impact that this treatment would produce on tariffs and, in general, on the costs associated with the operation of the TCM is not concretely accredited. Certainly, in light of precepts 15, 16, and 160 of Law No. Placa1975, public acts must conform to the unequivocal rules of science, technique, logic, and convenience. However, this disregard for such principles has not been demonstrated. The mere dissonance of data measuring cargo mobilization predictability does not per se presuppose the invalidity of the calculations made in that sense, especially when no act of Nombre628 on that aspect has been directly reproached, or when it has not been established that the conduct of that regulatory body contravenes technical rules governing its conduct. From that perspective, the formulation of allegations consisting of the parties' perceptions about possible future events that may occur with the operation of the container terminal do not in themselves constitute evidentiary elements upon which a hypothetical nullity of the actions taken can rest. It is worth noting, the terms of the contract state in clause 6.3.6 that the risks for demand and commercial matters, as well as their growth projections, correspond to the concessionaire, so the allegation of high tariff impacts is not receivable at this stage of the contract, as it is an issue that must be weighed in each scenario to establish if it corresponds to a risk that must be assumed. Even, it is reiterated, it was the then offeror, now concessionaire, who requested the review and update of the demand volume data, which caused the presentation of new procedures by the CNC to Nombre628 to update the tariff data and analyses. It should not be overlooked that the bidding conditions themselves established the offerors' responsibility to conduct their own studies, which is why that data adjustment was requested. Therefore, this Tribunal does not observe the pointed-out defects, and thus, the charge must be dismissed.

XXV.- Regarding the creation of a monopoly with the operation of the TCM. Nombre141025 considers that chapter 9.1 of the bidding conditions is contrary to section 46 of the Magna Carta since it establishes a monopoly. It cites ruling No. 08367-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber. It indicates that the bidding does not meet the requirement of the best offer and free concurrence. A bidding existed that is considered a mere disguise, as there is no true intention for several specialist companies to achieve effective participation, so the contest becomes a monopoly opposed to free concurrence. On this particular, it must be noted, bidding condition 9.1 states in essence: "According to the specialization proposed by the Master Plan, the TCM will be the specialized terminal for container handling in the Limón/Moín Port Complex, and the sole entity responsible for serving 'Full Container Vessels' destined for the import and export of cargo to and from Costa Rica, according to phases 2 and 3 of the Port Master Plan that serves as a reference." —folio 3250 of the judicial file— The model shown in the procedure seeks specialization in the operation of a container port terminal in Moín, according to the parameters established by the Master Plan developed by the company Royal Haskoning, in line with phases 2 and 3 of that plan. The cited document, in section 64 —folio 335 of the judicial file—, recommends three phases for the development of Puerto Moín, defined based on traffic projections, estimated time realistically required for completion, and operational analyses. From this perspective, Phase 1 integrates: a) increasing the capacity of the existing infrastructure through equipment installation, construction of a new Oil Terminal, construction of a relatively light dock for general cargo; b) preparation of the concession and construction of a new port to the west of the present port, which includes: preparation of the preliminary design, preparation of the bidding documents, preparation of the public bidding process to attract a concessionaire, signing of the contract with the concessionaire, and construction of the breakwater and phase 2. For its part, Phase 2 includes: a) transfer of all cargo from Limón to Moín and container handling in the new port. Finally, Phase 3 includes the extension of the container dock by an additional 600 meters. The public bidding procedure 2009LI-000001-0200 includes matters relating to phases 2 and 3, under the terms already indicated. On this aspect, the bidding aims to grant a concession of public works with public services whose object, as has been stated, is the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the TCM. Therefore, it is a contract for the indirect provision of a public service and construction of a public work. From that perspective, before the allegation by Nombre141025 and Nombre141024 about the existence of a monopoly, it should be clarified, this Tribunal examines the matter from the viewpoint of the validity of the actions taken in the administrative venue, having as a control parameter the Law of the Constitution, a source that, pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, 6, 11, 13, 19, 128, 158 of Law No. Placa1975 and canon 7 of the Magna Carta itself, as well as section 138 subsection d of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code. It is not, therefore, an analysis undertaken in the context of the concentrated control of constitutionality established by section 10 of the Political Constitution, but rather the examination of the substantial conformity with the legal system of certain public conduct, a legal system that includes the written and unwritten legal sources of public law. Having made this clarification, it should be noted, the pathology pointed out by the promoters in the actions taken does not exist. Indeed, the very resolution No. 8367-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber, on which the plaintiff bases its reproach, highlights the validity and legitimacy of a delegated (indirect) management system for public services. There is no defect whatsoever in the choice of this model of delegated provision of public service competencies. On the contrary, the very section 121 subsection 14 of the Magna Carta establishes a system of concessions for the exploitation of public domain assets and, in general, the delegation of that service provision function. Of course, the choice of the concessionaire must be carried out according to the procedures and requirements that the legislator establishes for each case, including the public bidding procedure, in which, clearly, all the principles and requirements inherent to this matter must be safeguarded, including free concurrence, equality, and the most favorable offer, among others. The compatibility of this public management model with the Law of the Constitution has been extensively analyzed by the Constitutional Tribunal, without this collegiate body considering that in this specific case, there is any criterion that would allow varying what was decided by that Constitutional Chamber, criteria with which what has been stated is shared. Thus, on the subject, it has been indicated in vote No. 5895-2005: "V.- CONFUSION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACT TO PROVIDE A PUBLIC SERVICE WITH A MONOPOLY. In the approach of this amparo, there is an underlying confusion between the administrative contract signed for the 'provision of services for the creation and operation of stations for the integrated vehicle technical inspection' and a monopoly. Public services, which are always publicly owned and, consequently, must be provided by a public entity or its organs, can be managed by them directly or indirectly. The direct management of a public service occurs when the public entity and its organs have sufficient human, financial, budgetary, material, and technological resources or means to provide it to the community immediately and directly, without any type of intermediation, organizing it and deploying the business it requires or demands to satisfy public needs. On occasion, public entities and their organs, despite being the owners of a public service, do not have sufficient management and investment capacity to provide it, whether due to budgetary shortcomings or limitations of resources and means; in such situations, one can resort to the administrative contract for the provision of services or the concession of public service so that a private individual provides it. Now then, in order for a private law subject to provide a public service through a concession or a service provision contract, the public entity that owns it must open, by constitutional imperative (article 182 of the Political Constitution), an administrative contracting procedure called public bidding, which guarantees free concurrence, participation, equality of all potential and eventual offerors, as well as the transparency and publicity of the process; but, above all, its objective is for the public entity to choose the best offer formulated from a financial and technical point of view. Once the public bidding is awarded, the object of which is the provision or management of a public service, the respective contract must be formalized, transferring, temporarily or provisionally —for the time equivalent to the duration of the contract—, a series of public powers, without the public entity ever losing ownership of the service, so much so that it has broad powers of inspection and supervision and can rescind or resolve the service provision contract or unilaterally rescue the public service concession, assuming any patrimonial responsibilities vis-à-vis the co-contractor or concessionaire, when it deems that the service is not provided effectively and efficiently or the contractual object is not fully met. It is evident that an administrative contract for the provision of services or the concession of public services does not imply the constitution of a monopoly, since, if it were so, we would fall into the legal absurdity of maintaining that, absolutely, all contracts signed by public entities for the supply of goods, the construction of public works, the concession or interested management of a public service, etc., would imply the constitution of a monopoly, with the consequent harmful and counterproductive effects for the effective and efficient administrative management, the protection of the general interest, and the adequate and timely satisfaction of the community's needs." The terms of that ruling make it unnecessary to elaborate further on the subject. Suffice it to say, public services in themselves are activities whose ownership corresponds to the Administration, which can delegate them to a third party according to the parameters indicated. From that perspective, the allegation of implementing a monopoly against these delegated public services is not valid. Even so, it is argued, the monopoly is produced by the appearance of a bidding that seeks to minimize the participation of other offerors. In strictly technical terms, the defects the promoters accuse are not inherent to an allegation of the creation of a monopoly, but rather to a violation of the principles of administrative contracting, specifically, that of free concurrence, equality, transparency, and publicity. However, the lawsuit limits itself to accusing the injury of these maxims, without providing any detail, outside the allegation that the procedure was constituted as a disguise, to support its reproaches. No concrete reasons are indicated for actions or omissions that may have led to the breach of those principles, which prevents this Tribunal from undertaking a serious examination of what is alleged. Even, it must be reiterated, injury to the principles of administrative contracting must be invoked in the objection appeal against the bidding conditions, which did not occur on the part of CANABA. Nevertheless, in previous sections of this ruling it was already indicated that no injury to the indicated maxims was observed. The fact that only one company made an offer cannot constitute incontrovertible proof of what is alleged. The principle of equality and free concurrence, regulated by section 5 of the Administrative Contracting Law, seeks to prevent barriers from being established in administrative contracting procedures for the participation of the greatest number of offerors, so that the contracting Administration has more options that allow it to realize the maxim of the most favorable offer. However, this Tribunal shares the State's arguments in that it indicates that this principle cannot guarantee that, in effect, multiple offers will be submitted, since the decision to participate or not in a public contest only concerns private individuals and depends on a series of factors that it is not appropriate to analyze in this ruling. Even so, even in cases where only one bid is submitted to the contest, to the extent that this proposal satisfies the requirements the contracting Administration seeks to satisfy with the procedure, the award can be made, because in those cases, upon compliance with the requirements imposed for those purposes, the offer is understood as favorable. Likewise, even if a plurality of offers had been submitted, if, in the Administration's judgment, none of them satisfies the public interest basis of the bidding, it can declare the contest void and not award, as inferred from section 86 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law, Executive Decree No. 33411-H of September 27, 2006. That same treatment is set forth in section 29 of Law No. 7762, insofar as the award of the contract includes the maxim of the most favorable offer and the possibility of declaring the contest void in the following sense: "The contract shall be mandatorily awarded to the bidder who formulates the best economic offer among those declared technically acceptable, according to the formula defined in the bidding conditions, without prejudice to the granting administration's power to reject all offers for not being convenient to the public interest. Offers submitted in contests declared void or when all offers are rejected shall expire together with the contest." In this way, the breadth of the offers submitted in quantitative terms, or the formulation of a single offer, is not a conclusive parameter to assert that the principle of free concurrence and the most favorable offer has been safeguarded or injured. It is true that the plaintiffs have postulated throughout this process that the bidding conditions rules did not comply with the feasibility studies mandated by precept 21 of Law No. 7762 and thereby deprived the participation of other offerors; however, it has been concluded that this defect does not exist. These allegations, then, are conjectures made by the plaintiffs that are directed, again, at proposing what, from their perspective, the procedure should have been, but that intention does not lead, as proposed, to the nullity of the actions taken. In the specific case, the competition rules were duly publicized, subjected to several rounds of objection appeals, the bidding conditions were modified on several occasions thanks to those challenge measures, such that it is not explained how what occurred in this procedure violates the commented principles. It is a public project that requires a high financial commitment for the investment to be made in works and associated actions, which of course, within a framework of strict logic, can influence the decision of third parties to participate in this type of contest. This Tribunal does not observe, therefore, any bidding conditions rule that implies barriers to access to the challenged public contracting procedure in the terms alleged by the plaintiffs, for which reason, the dismissal of the charge is required.

XXVI.- Regarding the impact on the country's competitiveness with the operation of the TCM and the impact on the banana sector. Nombre141025 argues that the operation of the TCM will bring a significant impact on costs, which will place local fruit in a situation that prevents it from competing internationally, with the inevitable closure of the business and loss of hundreds of jobs in the most needy areas of the country. It accuses that the cost increase will be approximately 160%. On this particular, it should be mentioned, there is no doubt for this Tribunal, nor is it a subject of discussion in this case, of the relevance that the Costa Rican banana and pineapple export sector has for the public economy. However, it is precisely the dynamics and relevance of the demand mobilizations for these fruits that is one of the aspects that has sustained the TCM project. Note that the basic proposal of the Master Plan is precisely the improvement of port infrastructure in Moín through the establishment of 3 phases. Within this schedule, the technical studies have weighed the transactions and market situation of pineapple and banana. Precisely, in the tariff consultation, data related to these cargo mobilization levels were updated, to adjust costs such that the financial model allowed for the investment close to $998 million and the costs inherent to the operation and maintenance of the TCM. Although the initially proposed tariff was $169, later established at $223, despite the fact that Nombre628 recommended a maximum tariff of $252, that adjustment was due precisely to the data update. In itself, the reproach seeks to challenge the fixed tariff, an issue already addressed, regarding the technical justification given by ARESEP. Now then, the plaintiff herself accepts the need to modernize the ports she uses for the development of her commercial activities, while expressing her disagreement with the costs that must be paid for those cargo and vessel services. As was well indicated in the sole hearing within this process, according to data provided by ECLAC, Nombre141035 i ca is placed in position number 15 in the Latin American ranking of port container movement (as acknowledged, for example, by witness Nombre141036 and can be seen on the ECLAC website according to a query made on July 31, 2012, at 2:00 p.m. Placa27257). However, in the World Economic Forum ranking, considering port infrastructure service, Costa Rica is placed in position 132. From that perspective, it is evident that given the level of use of the services, it is understandable that some commercial agents prefer to maintain the current conditions of the ports and not their modernization. However, it is clear that within the port modernization project, phases 2 and 3 of the Master Plan evidence the relevance of the TCM. In the sole hearing, the allegation was made that the current infrastructure of the Limón docks, accompanied by improvements and the provision of gantry cranes, would allow obtaining the same benefit projected with the TCM. In this sense, the testimony of Mr. Nombre44581, who stated that with the Dirección17041 he could assume that operation, can be seen as a reference. However, those intentions refer to decisions regarding the port management model. As has been indicated, this service can be provided directly, as has been done by JAPDEVA, or indirectly, through concession contracts. The decision to maintain direct operation or opt for indirect operation is a matter of discretion, which, although subject to the rules of science and technique, logic, and convenience, and therefore controllable by this Tribunal, its illegitimacy depends on proving the non-observance of those actions with the legal system. However, this has not been proven in this case. Allegations of loss of competitiveness are raised that are antagonistic to the very purpose of the project, assuming that loss based on a comparison of tariff costs, through a calculation that, it is insisted, is made on the basis of references that do not maintain the same conditions and therefore, their comparability depends on adding to the current tariff for JAPDEVA services the inputs that are included on a unitary basis in the TCM tariff. Without such an exercise, the comparison would be biased to say the least. For this, it is insisted, one should not consider only the rate for cargo and vessel services, but also the additional costs for services provided by Nombre141024, such as loading and unloading on premises, shipping cost for delays, as well as private stevedoring tariffs.

Even so, that comparison scheme should be carried out on a projected basis, taking the current value of the Nombre141024 tariff to the historical moment when the TCM concession begins operations, in principle, projected for 2015, given that the economic burden of $223 for the latter is a value that will be payable as of the operations start date. That calculation is notably absent from the objections raised.

XXVII.- On the subject, the witness Nombre141036, offered by JAPDEVA, stated fundamentally that, in the case of container ships, there are 4 services provided to the ship and 6 to the cargo. Within the 4, fixed and variable port attention, stay at berth, and service. In the cargo services, there are wharfage and various assistances. She indicated that to load or unload a container ship, a summation of all these services is made to obtain a cost of approximately $192. In the opinion of this JAPDEVA official, to evaluate whether a country is competitive, one must consider the cost of the logistics chain and not just the port cost, estimating that Costa Rica is at a competitive disadvantage with other countries, which is explained by the backlog in port infrastructure. Regarding the items that distinguish the tariff currently charged by Nombre141024 versus those proposed by the TCM, she stated that the latter is an all-inclusive service, from ship attention, berthing, unloading, and loading of containers, unlike the structure of Nombre141024 in which services are charged in a structured manner. Nombre141024 cannot currently provide this integrated service. The foregoing clearly reveals that the direct comparison made by the plaintiffs between the current tariff and the tariff that the TCM will charge is based on unequal parameters, insofar as the former does not incorporate a series of variables that are integrated, under the concept of a single tariff, into the TCM. In this line, the deposition of Mr. Nombre141044 – offered by CANABA – criticized that one of the arguments is that banana companies will have gains by dispensing with container yards. In response, he stated that many tasks are performed on the premises, such as quality control inspections, cleaning, structural repairs, and repairs to refrigeration equipment; the fruit is filtered to export one first-class container and one second-class container. They require spaces that allow them to have a buffer stock of containers. Yards will always be necessary. He added that the cargo must enter two days before the ship's arrival. The storage of the fruit requires the existence of yards. It may incur costs that never previously existed. While that testimony highlights the existence of another series of costs in the logistics chain, it does not eliminate the fact that the TCM tariff is integrated, so the 160% variation is based on an erroneous reference basis, as it does not comprise elements of the logistics chain that the TCM tariff does consider on a unitary basis. On the other hand, the same witness-expert, when asked by APM Terminals about the benefits of the TCM, stated that it would allow vessels with greater draft, but within the framework of banana boats, no company is going to have Panamax ships (large ships over 1000 TEUs). Furthermore, he indicated that this type of ship can generate a greater benefit. Any increase applied must be applied to the cost of the fruit, affecting the state of global competitiveness. However, he specified that 60% of fruit exports go in containers and 40% palletized, this latter percentage which would not use the TCM. The statements of Mr. Nombre141044 reflect that although the price increase is questioned, it is recognized that at least 40% of the banana cargo would not use the TCM service because it is palletized cargo, with which, again, the reference parameter that allows Nombre141025 to assert a total 160% variation in service prices loses coherence, by accepting that at least 40% of that cargo will continue to be moved through the services provided by JAPDEVA. Furthermore, the witness Nombre141036 stated that port costs represent 5% of the logistics chain of commercial activity (import/export), so there is no consistency shown with the level of serious and burdensome impact that, according to Nombre141025, would lead them to bankruptcy or exclusion from the market due to lack of opportunities to compete. Even, said official relevantly stated that Nombre141024's costs are not fixed costs; if infrastructure and equipment are compared, the costs would not be rising but rather equitable. For his part, the witness Nombre141044 indicated that with the new infrastructure they would have a savings of $563 per ship considering savings in bunker fuel and stay. This highlights a savings rate from the elimination of sunk waiting times, which, although they may be linked to various phenomena or causes, to the extent they are linked to delays due to berth occupancy, given the current insufficiency of port infrastructure. All in all, as a result of what was alleged by Nombre141044 about the use of 40% of the cargo in palletized mode (which will not use the TCM), it should be noted that nothing in the Master Plan suggests that the services currently provided by Nombre141024 are going to disappear. It is reiterated, the TCM is a full-container cargo specialization project, so there will be a complementary operation regime in which a specialized operation and the survival of current services exist. It is worth highlighting that the plaintiffs' disagreement regarding tariffs, demand prediction studies, among others, have already been a subject of debate. The comprehensive understanding of these elements leads to the consideration of the project's technical validity, such that the alleged impact cannot be based on mere conjectures but must be supported by elements of conviction that in this case were not provided. The evacuation of the expert-witness testimony, on the contrary, highlights the backlog of port infrastructure, its need for modernization, the comparative advantages of the new TCM model, the concurrent but specialized operation of port services, and the unification of costs to be passed on via tariffs, all elements that allow the denial of the arguments regarding the incorporation of assumptions of impact on competitiveness.

XXVIII.- Regarding the claim of invalidity of the TCM due to non-compliance with phase 1. In the closing arguments phase, the attorney of Nombre141025 states that the master plan is a project of three phases that had to be completed in order; first the rehabilitation of pier 57 and then phases 2 and 3, phases which could be put out to tender. It is by an arbitrary act of the Administration that phase 1 is taken out and phases 2 and 3 are addressed. The same claim is held by SINTRAJAP, when stating in that same closing arguments phase that the Master Plan proposed 3 phases. The first phase included the construction of the additional pier 57. Phases 2 and 3 had to be carried out after completing phase 1, which according to the master plan is urgent and is the quickest way to satisfy the public service. All the evidence demonstrates that the master plan is not fulfilled just as it was proposed by Nombre141027. To date, there is no document accrediting that the Administration justified the changes made to the master plan, with the particularity that phases 2 and 3 were divided into five sections without complying with phase 1, even though it should have been mostly ready in 2011. The attorney of Nombre141024 adds that all the evidence demonstrates that the master plan is not fulfilled just as it was proposed by Nombre141027. To date, there is no document accrediting that the Administration justified the changes made to the master plan, with the particularity that phases 2 and 3 were divided into five sections without complying with phase 1, even though it should have been mostly ready in 2011. He adduces that it was accredited that serious non-compliance occurred. Phase 1 was not fulfilled. On the subject, it is worth highlighting that it is clear, as has been pointed out, that the bidding process has been largely based on the content of the Master Plan for the Limón/Moín port development carried out by the company Royal Haskoning. As indicated ut supra, that plan, in paragraph 64. -folio 335 of the judicial file-, recommends three phases for the development of Puerto Moín, defined based on traffic projections, realistic estimation of the time required for completion, and operational analyses. From this perspective, Phase 1 integrates a) increasing the capacity of the existing infrastructure through the installation of equipment, construction of a new Oil Terminal, construction of a relatively light pier for general cargo; b) preparation of the concession and construction of a new port to the west of the present port which includes: preparation of the preliminary design, preparation of the bidding documents, preparation of the public bidding process to attract a concessionaire, signing of a contract with the concessionaire, and construction of the breakwater and phase 2. For its part, Phase 2 includes: a) transfer of all cargo from Limón to Moín and handling of containers in the new port. Finally, Phase 3 includes the extension of the container pier by an additional 600 meters. The public bidding procedure 2009LI-000001-0200 includes matters relating to phases 2 and 3, under the terms already indicated. There is no doubt whatsoever that, as of the date of the initiation of the bidding process in question, the competent authorities had not complied with the cited plan regarding the works and investments to be made with respect to phase 1, which sought the modernization of the so-called Pier 57. Indeed, within the single hearing held in this preferential proceeding, the attorney of Nombre141024 offered new documentary evidence, visible at folios 5276-5392 of the judicial file, consisting of documentary pieces that evidence the initiation of concrete actions to attempt to comply with the tasks belonging to the cited phase 1. Thus, included are an agreement for the lifting of a strike in Limón (f.5276-5277), a public tender notice with financing for the supply and commissioning of a new rail-mounted container gantry crane at Puerto Moín (f. Placa27258), a correction to Agreement No. 1004-2011 notices for port equipment reach stackers, trailers, and headboards, referring to the public tender with financing 2011LN-000000-00 (f. 5323-5355), and public tender notices under the financing model for the acquisition of port equipment (f. 5356-5392). Now, for this Court, it is necessary to call the attention of Nombre141024 and the CNC to the need to adopt the concrete actions that allow compliance with phase 1 provided for in the alluded Master Plan. The relevance of the modernization of that port terminal is as relevant as the establishment of the public work intended with the TCM project. In fact, this Court estimates that the completeness of the integral functionality of that work is achieved with the operability foreseen for pier 57, according to the design foreseen in the Master Plan. In this way, the coherence of public actions requires directing the due efforts to concretize those phase 1 works, complementarily to the action frameworks projected within the scheme and schedule of phases 2 and 3. Hence, it is necessary to call the attention of the public authorities regarding their legal obligations in this regard. Indeed, the Master Plan encompasses the port of Moín but has important connotations for the port of Limón. The first phase implied the construction of an oil dock, dock 57, and the equipping of the ports. In the context of the Master Plan, it was for immediate implementation and was projected to be completed in the year 2011, since there was no port on the coast that could address the port problem. The second phase is what is called TCM, which is a new port. It is foreseen between 2016 and 2020. The Plan indicates that it will operate when cargo handling is transferred to Moín. According to the Plan, the importance of phase 1 was the immediacy of all the elements to do it quickly and efficiently. No other port solution could be done as quickly. The foregoing is evident from the very reading of the document issued by the company Royal Haskoning, but furthermore, it is evident from the deposition of Mr. Nombre44581, offered by SINTRAJAP as a witness-expert. Under that prism, the cited witness considered that the main problems of the Limón Moín complex that would be solved with phase 1 were the decrease in the occupancy rate, because there would be one more berth, in addition to the equipment. The foregoing highlights the relevance of completing phase 1 in the shortest possible time. However, although this panel respects the thesis of the plaintiffs, it does not share the approach taken regarding the invalidity of the decisions adopted in the context of phases 2 and 3, due to phase 1 not having been completed. Indeed, from the analysis performed of the documentary evidence, specifically, the Master Plan, as well as the witness deposition of Mr. Nombre33221, Nombre2401, and Mr. Nombre5836, the inseparable link that the plaintiffs argue exists between phases 2 and 3 concretized through the bidding process under challenge and phase 1 is not obtained. As has been stated, the Plan is a single concept; however, the phases can be raised independently, since outside the framework of convenience, there is no insurmountable technical subjection to sustain that without phase 1 completed, actions for phases 2 and 3 could not be carried out. From that perspective, the bidding process whose object is the TCM, although it forms part of an integral project for the modernization of the ports, in terms of validity, it is not conditioned on or dependent upon the completion of phase 1. They are infrastructures that have autonomy one from the other, regardless of whether they have a link in the context of a unitary project. Under that context, the delay in the compliance actions of phase 1 would justify delays or setbacks in the other phases, putting the very intentionality of the entire project at risk. As has been pointed out, there has certainly been a neglect of the works and equipment investments that support phase 1; however, this does not limit the legitimacy of the contracts initiated in the context of the following phases. It is therefore a desirable sequence, but not a mandatory one. Ergo, there is no reason for nullity in that proceeding, warning, yes, of the need for Nombre141024 to immediately undertake the actions to conform to the phase 1 compliance plan, without the implementation of the TCM constituting a justification to leave important works neglected for the national interest and specifically, for the socioeconomic development of the Atlantic Slope. On the other hand, regarding the allegation that Pier 57 with some degree of investment could temporarily perform the same port service tasks as the TCM, it is reiterated that this is a public decision on the management model used for the development of a public service and the construction of a port work. The advantages and disadvantages of each model (direct or indirect provision) may well be debated on an eminently ideological level; however, that would be an analysis that falls outside the object of this dispute, insofar as the technical basis of what was decided by the public authorities has not been able to be refuted, making the reproach become a debate of decisions and intentions, but not of the validity or otherwise of those conducts.

XXIX.- Regarding the modifications to the bidding terms. In the closing arguments phase, the plaintiffs reproach that in this public tender, there were 13 variations to the bidding terms, which reflects how little transparent the process is. In itself, that reproach does not conform to proper technique, given that the plaintiffs limit themselves to censuring the generic act of modifications to the bidding terms, without providing any specific data or concrete grievance as to how those changes in the bidding guidelines generate some degree of invalidity. As has been stated ut supra, paragraph 3 of the Administrative Procurement Law, in relation to canon 4 of Law No. 7762, establishes that in matters of public contracts, the nullity regime shall be that regulated by the General Law of Public Administration. From that perspective, it must be specified that, in the matter at hand, a principle of substantiality of nullities prevails, according to which, public conduct can only be invalidated by substantial defects that generate a state of defenselessness or else, deficiencies which, had they been avoided, would have allowed a different decision. This is evident from ordinal 223 of the cited Law No. 6227/78. Note that paragraph 128 of that legal body understands validity as substantial conformity with the legal system, and canon 158 ejusdem conceptualizes invalidity precisely as substantial nonconformity with that normative reference. From that perspective, it is not just any deficiency in the administrative act - of public will - that leads to its elimination by nullity, but only that which, when confronted with the normative framework regulating that particular behavior, is substantially nonconforming. In this way, when the alleged defect can be overcome, because it does not fit within the stated assumption, it can be cured or validated, as established by precepts 187 and 188 of Law No. 6227/78. Such doctrine also underlies the letter of ordinal 197 of the Civil Procedure Code, insofar as it relevantly states: "... Nullity shall only be decreed when its pronouncement is absolutely indispensable to avoid defenselessness or to guide the normal course of the procedure. Nor shall it prosper if it is possible to replenish the procedure or correct the action, without prejudice to the other procedural acts. ..." In administrative procurement, a principle of efficiency and effectiveness also prevails, by virtue of which, the imperfections of the procedure do not annul the bidding process, unless they are substantial defects. Seen in this way, variations to the bidding terms can only produce nullity of the proceedings insofar as they substantially harm the procedures or, in general, violate the principles inherent to administrative procurement, including equality and free competition. According to what is prescribed by ordinal 51 of Decree No. 33411-H "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa" (Regulations to the Administrative Procurement Law), the bidding terms consist of "... the specific regulations of the procurement being promoted, and all the legal norms and constitutional principles applicable to the respective procedure are understood to be incorporated into its clauses. It must constitute a body of technical specifications that are clear, sufficient, concrete, objective, and ample regarding the opportunity to participate. For its preparation, the Administration may contract or request the assistance of natural or legal persons specialized in the matter in question, provided they have no direct or indirect particular interest in the business, when it does not have in its organization the necessary technical resources for it." Given these characteristics and utility for the procedure, modifications to those terms of reference are usual in the context of complex public procurements such as the one analyzed in this ruling, a faculty that is recognized in ordinal 60 of the cited Decree No. 33411-H. It should be noted, however, that the bidding terms may be modified ex officio or upon application by a party. In the latter hypothesis, variations can occur through the formulation of the respective objection remedy (art. 81 Law No. 7494, 34 of Law No. 7762). Ergo, this Court does not observe how the simple variation of the bidding terms of the tender can generate nullity, unless concrete reasons are manifested that allow an analysis of the impact on concrete situations. It is reiterated that, to the extent those alterations affect free competition, a defect would be configured that could lead to the nullity of what has been acted upon; however, that would be a subject to be proven by whoever invokes the cause for nullity. The bidding terms must promote the greatest possible participation. As a reference, regarding the prohibition of establishing conditions that undermine the freedom of competition, ordinal 52 of Decree 33411-H states that "... The bidding terms may not impose restrictions, nor demand the fulfillment of requirements that are not indispensable or convenient to the public interest, if it thereby limits the possibilities of competition for potential participants. ..." Consequently, the mere formulation and generic affirmation to the effect that those modifications cause nullity is nothing more than a generic allegation, characteristic of subjective assessments from which a hypothetical nullity is conjectured, one that definitively has not occurred, and which, moreover, does not grant this Court concrete parameters for analysis. The same must be stated regarding Nombre141024's allegation of the lack of publication of the summary of the bidding terms as per article 21.5 of Law No. 7762. Faced with this argument, this collegiate body shares the Comptroller General's Office's statements regarding the application of the principle of efficiency and effectiveness in public procurement. The plaintiff limits itself to expounding that reproach from a formalistic plane without concretely indicating the manner in which the supposed omission of that procedure has generated a substantial defect that affects the protection of the principles of equality and free competition in public bids. For that, reference must be made to what was stated above regarding the substantiality of nullities as an interpretative pillar within the scheme of validity analysis of public conducts, as a derivation also of the maxims contained in ordinals 168 and 176 of Law No. 6227/78 which postulate the presumption of validity of acts. That argumentation and discursive construction that would allow the concatenation of what is alleged with the harmful effect of those supposed inaccuracies is notably absent, which would be determinant and indispensable for undertaking the deliberative exercise that would enable arriving at a determination of the argued invalidity. Note that in the approval phase, the Comptroller General's Office itself did not detect substantial deficiencies in the bidding procedure, which demonstrates the legal conformity of those actions. Certainly, Nombre141025's action is also directed against that act of approval; however, with a technical analysis such as the one alluded to existing, the proper formulation of this charge, apart from the analysis that will later be addressed regarding the cited comptroller's approval, required concrete propositions of nullity. Given the imperfection of the allegation then, and since, from the analysis performed by this Court, no violation of the procurement principles is shown, the rejection of the charge in question must consequently be ordered.

XXX.- Regarding the concessions granted by the grantor in the contract. The plaintiffs reproach the invalidity of the concession contract, alleging that within it a series of concessions or facilities were granted that were not present in the bidding terms and that, had they been present, would have allowed the participation of a greater number of bidders. Regardless of the concrete analysis of each of the supposed contractual deferrals granted by the granting Administration, it should be noted, once again, that the lawsuit in this regard limits itself to pointing out the existence of a hypothetical defect, without presenting an adequate technical construction of how those deficiencies can produce nullity. Indeed, as has been demonstrated throughout this ruling, many of the plaintiffs' arguments consist of generic discursive formulations in which they omit to present a detailed, individualized analysis of the manner in which the defects they accuse have actually occurred and, in turn, produce the degree of invalidity intended. It is certainly true that in procedures regulated by the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, a principle of real truth of the facts prevails, according to ordinals 82 and 85 of that legal body. However, such principle operates for evidentiary dynamics, and even on that topic, it does not mean that the process is inquisitorial in nature, in which the judge can release or excuse the parties from their duty to prove the facts on which they base their petitions. On the contrary, ordinal 58 in relation to 63, both of the CPCA, establishes, together with ordinal 317 of the Civil Procedure Code - of supplementary application by the integration clause of precept 220 CPCA -, the principle of dynamic burden of proof, which demands from the parties the duty to prove their facts or defenses. From the plane of annulment claims, this also implies the duty of the parties to precisely indicate the reasons and causes for the invalidity of the conducts whose elimination is petitioned. This is because, outside the cases foreseen in paragraph 182 of the LGAP, the judge cannot review ex officio the validity of public conducts. Even in the context of the analysis of related conducts, in certain circumstances such ex officio consideration would be pertinent, as is the case of nullity due to accessory nature under canon 164.2 LGAP, but in others, it is necessary for the parties to invoke the reasons for nullity that must be considered. The opposite would lead to the simplistic approach of requesting the judge to review the validity of a public act, so that regardless of the causes invoked, they analyze all the elements of that act, thereby relieving the plaintiff of their duty of argumentation. Regarding the specific reproach, it is only stated that if those incorporations had not occurred, more offers would have been submitted, but it is not detailed in any way how that effect would have been produced, thus the reproaches under examination lack an empirical basis, being therefore mere speculations, conjectural formulations not supported by solvent elements, either of argumentation or of proof. For that, it would be imperative that the principle of free participation, equality, and competition be indeed violated, which has not been proven, but in any case, as will be analyzed below, this Court does not infer it in the case at hand. Now, it calls the attention of this collegiate body that the main parties affected by the supposed alteration to the principle of free competition did not appear in the process to raise such circumstance. Indeed, no party interested in the development of the TCM project – a potential bidder – has come to this venue to point out the defect that the parties reproach. Although this is not indicative of an absence of nullities, the fact of the matter is that it serves as a referential parameter that demonstrates the scant impact produced on the rights protected under article 5 of Law No. 7494. It is worth highlighting that this norm states: "In administrative procurement procedures, the equality of participation of all potential bidders shall be respected. /The regulations of this Law or the provisions governing the specific procedures of each procurement may not include any regulation that impedes free competition among potential bidders. (...)" In this way, the alleged nullity could only be decreed when it is accredited that this principle has been violated, which, it is reiterated, has not happened here. Specifically, the following issues are presented which the plaintiffs claim were not expressly set out in the bidding terms: a) the possibility of submitting an alternative offer: from the review of the file and the varied and abundant evidence presented in this case, the possibility of submitting an alternative offer is not found. The plaintiff parties do not point out this element concretely. On the contrary, what APM Terminals' bid includes is a discount offer that was accepted by the Administration; b) declaration of the project as being of public interest: it is not observed how that declaration, discretionary for the Administration, can generate an advantage that leads to the violation of free competition. It is clear that from the outset the project aims to satisfy a public interest of relevance, as was consigned even from the master plan itself, and later the bidding terms themselves refer to the public significance of the TCM project. This can be seen, e.g., at folio 3202 verso of the judicial file, which contains clause 1.1 of the bidding terms, "Justification for the bidding process". In any case, the declaration of a public project as being of public interest is a discretionary power of the Administration, which, by the way, has not been questioned here; c) commitment to assist in the processing of basic studies on waves and propagation, navigation studies, agitation, coastline change, soil and environmental studies, and material sources: according to what is stated in the bidding terms and in the concession contract, subjects already analyzed, those studies correspond to the concessionaire. However, it is undeniable that within public contracts, a duty of mutual collaboration is imposed for the correct execution of the contract, which of course does not imply a displacement of the obligations to be fulfilled in the contractual dynamic. In this way, that duty of collaboration is an inherent part of the contract, regardless of its formal expression within the contract.

all these procedures are mandatory for the concessionaire and the obligation of collaboration on the part of the Administration exists, with or without written acceptance of its duty to collaborate. The commitment to collaborate is nothing more than that, it does not translate into any kind of patrimonial benefit and does not cause any undue advantage for the concessionaire; d) commitment to provide physical space on land, for the installation of offices and camp for the concessionaire during the construction stage: as argued by the CNC, that commitment does not constitute a transfer of public property, but rather an enablement of use that collaborates with and facilitates the inspection and control of the destination, storage, and handling of materials. The plaintiffs do not rebut the CNC's argument that this commitment was agreed upon to obtain a discount on the port services tariff. This is evidenced, in this Court's judgment, by the fact that the tariff approved by Nombre628 was $252, while the one incorporated into the contract—in the final version of the tender specifications—was $223, which shows the plausibility of what the CNC invoked; e) collaboration in obtaining environmental viability permits, Health permits, Water Authorization, electricity services, collaboration for authorization of insurance policies and municipal permits: given the aforementioned duty of collaboration, it is clear that in the course of the paperwork (tramitología) for obtaining the VAL (definitive environmental viability, viabilidad ambiental definitiva), the concessionaire requires obtaining certificates, certifications, or information that the grantor must supply; therefore, no comparative advantage that would lead to a violation of the principles mentioned above is observed. Likewise, assuming that the Nombre141029 (potential environmental viability, viabilidad ambiental potencial) of the project currently exists, the procedures before financial entities require public information that the public entities must issue, and thus it does not violate any principle. It should be remembered that the tender includes the financing of the port terminal, so this aspect requires due coordination and collaboration. In this way, the facilitation and collaboration provided for in this particular regard is not spurious as alleged; f) The State would assist by designating the site for disposal of dredged material not used as fill: it is an ordinary task of the State to approve the disposal site for such materials, from which no extraordinary commitment is acquired, nor any advantage that was not foreseen in the tender specifications such as to modify the intention to participate or not in the procedure; g) The State would designate the extraction source of materials for fill if required for the construction of the TCM: the contract refers to an indirect management of public works; however, it should not be lost sight of that it concerns a work owned by the State (in a broad sense), and therefore it is necessary that it authorize the source of materials that may become necessary for construction, without this constituting an additional cost for the State or an advantage in terms of the tender for the concessionaire. In addition to this, as the CNC mentions, such authorizations would be subject to the regulations of the Mining Activity Regulation for the State and its Contractors (Reglamento para la actividad minera del Estado y sus contratistas), Executive Decree No. 19789-MIRENEM of June 25, 1990, published in Gazette No. 145 of August 3, 1990; h) that the State would provide all necessary facilities for the extraction and disposal of dredged material and in obtaining permits from MINAET and SETENA: this commitment is inherent to the aforementioned duty of collaboration. Once the permits were obtained, it would be naive to think of the impropriety of that duty of collaboration, which, it is insisted, is a matter of principle. Thus, it does not incorporate any comparative advantage that constitutes an advantage in a manner that violates equality and free competition (libre concurrencia); i) that the State would request the authorization for the exploitation required from the Department of Mines of MINAET on behalf of the concessionaire: as has been indicated, this matter is regulated by Decree No. 19789-MIRENEM, which does not find an exception because it concerns public works contracts or an advantage in favor of the concessionaire; ergo, the State is the owner of the work and the one who must petition for those authorizations; j) that Nombre5059 undertakes to begin provisional operations with the first berth of a phase 2A that did not exist in the tender specifications: this eventuality allows the start-up of a first berth before the dates foreseen in the tender specifications, which implies an advantage in favor of the potential users of the TCM, who could use this system voluntarily insofar as the definitive and total transfer by the specialization criterion of full-container-type container transport does not occur. This Court does not find that it constitutes an element that supports the requested nullity. Thus, in summary, the rejection of this charge must be ordered. In any case, reference should be made to what was stated regarding the principle of efficiency within administrative contracting procedures, which seeks the selection of the offer most convenient to the public interest, with substance prevailing over form.

XXXI.- On the incidence in this process of the report issued by the Legislative Assembly. The plaintiffs submit to the process as documentary evidence a report issued by the Legislative Assembly, titled "Special Report that will Investigate and Analyze all the Concession Processes that the Costa Rican State has granted, or is about to grant, under Law No. Placa20097 and its partial modification contained in Law No. 8643. Report APM Terminals Central América." In this document, visible on folios 4134-4290 of the judicial file (volume VII), that Branch of the Republic carries out a diagnosis of the terms under which the TCM concession was granted within international public tender 2009LI-000001-0200. That document performs an extensive analysis of said contracting, weighing a series of topics that have been weighed in this present judgment, among them, environmental feasibility (third part, pages 54-86 of the cited report), appearance of interested parties, and conclusions. These conclusions can be seen starting from folio 147 to 157 of that report (pages 4271-4281 of the judicial file). This Court has devoted itself to the in-depth analysis of the complex and voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence that was admitted in this process, including administrative and judicial files, within which it has weighed with due rigor the deliberations recorded in the report issued by the Legislative Assembly. That is to say, it is a document that has been weighed by this Court in its examination of this case. However, despite the fact that this exercise of political-parliamentary control is highly respected, it is clear that it in no way conditions the analysis that this jurisdictional body is called to perform. That opinion is not binding for the decisions of this jurisdiction, given that there is no express norm that imbues the considerations of that legislative instance with such strength and hierarchy. The principle of judicial autonomy, whose basis lies in the text of articles 153 and 154 of the Magna Carta (in relation to 166 ejusdem), supports the absence of a binding element of that documentary reference. Nonetheless, it has been considered as one more element of analysis in this case, contributed to enlarge and strengthen the elements of conviction to be contemplated for the decision finally adopted in this resolution. From that angle of examination, given that characteristic of not constituting a binding reference, it must be stated that what has been resolved so far mostly does not fit with what that legislative analysis comprises, which, of course, does not cause any nullity in what was resolved in this venue. It should be noted that the same report warns of the existence of these judicial processes. The recommendations made therein are directed to the public entities that are defendants in this cause, which is why, for purposes of clarity, a record is left of the due weighing of that report, which is not subject to challenge, but which has also not limited the analysis of this Court in this specific case.

XXXII.- On the extension of the claim by Nombre141025. In a brief filed on April 12, 2012, Nombre141025 submits a brief extending the claim (folios 4291-4366 of the main file), in which it formulates the following petition: "Principal: The declaration of nullity of the following administrative acts: 1.- The award act made by Nombre141024 in Agreement No. 73-11, Article II-a of Ordinary Session No. 08-2011, of international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Puerto Moín Container Terminal and awarded to the bidder APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 2.- The act of the National Concessions Council in Agreement Number 2 of Extraordinary Session No. 2-2011 of February 28, 2011, of international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Puerto Moín Container Terminal and awarded to the bidder APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 3.- The award agreement made by the Executive Branch, composed of the President of the Republic, the Minister of Public Works and Transport, the Minister of Finance, and signed on March 01, 2011, published in Digital No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54 of March 17, 2011, of international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Puerto Moín Container Terminal and awarded to the bidder APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 4. The tender specifications (cartel) of international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Puerto Moín Container Terminal and awarded to the bidder APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 5.- The contract entered into by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOIN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., derived from international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Puerto Moín Container Terminal, dated August 30, 2011. 6.- Addendum No. 1 to the Public Works Concession with Public Service Contract for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of the Moín Container Terminal, signed on November 29, 2011, and entered into by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Coast (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., derived from international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200. 7.- The new contract dated February 13, 2012, entered into by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Coast (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., derived from international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200 promoted for 'Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Financing, Design, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of the New Moín Container Terminal.' 8.- Official letter DCA-0692 from the Administrative Contracting Division of the Comptroller General of the Republic dated March 21, 2012, in which it grants endorsement (refrendo) to the contract derived from international public tender [sic] Executive Presidency of the Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Coast (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., derived from international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200 promoted for 'Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Financing, Design, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of the New Moín Container Terminal.' 9.- That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay procedural and personal costs. Subsidiary petitions: In the event that the Court dismisses the principal petitions, we request the following: 1.- The declaration of nullity of the economic assumption of the volume projection, used in the tariff structure formula of international public tender 2009-LI-000001-00200, indicated in Chapter 11, Section 7.2 thereof, given in the Master Plan and updated based on the study given by the company ICICOR DE COSTA RICA, which serve as support to establish the tariff of $223. 2.- Require the granting administration to generate its own cargo volume estimates, using updated data from recent years and those generated in the annual reports of JAPDEVA. 3.- Given the current conditions of low interest rates worldwide and the stimulus offered by governments to avoid falling into a new recession, assess the debt financing costs and the recognition of capital gains that the financial model contains. 4.- Reduce the internal rate of return from 17.5% to 15%; a level that was increased with the crisis argument, but which the same administration acknowledges is cyclical." XXXIII.- For the most part, the plaintiff's allegations reiterate points initially formulated in the claim and that concern aspects that have already been weighed in this judgment. The difference and contribution presented is the challenging of the endorsement (refrendo) granted by the CGR to the contract under challenge, with the plaintiff noting that this is the first time since the entry into force of the CPCA that this type of act has been challenged. Given this, it is reiterated, the plaintiff bases the majority of claims on tender-specification (cartelario) rules against which, at the appropriate time, it did not formulate the objections enabled by the applicable legal system; therefore, these would be allegations that are not admissible due to the application of the aforementioned preclusive principle that prevails in this type of technical matter. The challenge of the tender specifications (cartel) once the contract has already been awarded and the contract issued contravenes the principle of good faith and in certain cases can be considered an abuse of process, insofar as it disregards the relevance of the phase of constituting, publishing, and challenging the tender specifications, whose legal nature is inherently relevant for proceeding with the normal course of the procedure. It has already been indicated that the allegation of nullity of the award due to supposed deficiencies in the tender specifications is not admissible when the latter was not challenged at the time. A contrary practice would lead to the possibility of circumventing the challenge system in these cases, to the frank detriment of the certainty and legal certainty that are relevant in a matter of administrative contracting whose purpose is the procurement of goods and services for the provision of public services or the carrying out of activities proper to the competencies of Public Administrations. This aspect is considered punctually by this Court, not as a mechanism for exempting control of the validity of public acts, but as the objective dimensioning of the rules of challenge that prevail in these disputes for criteria of legal certainty. Therefore, having made that clarification, a summary description of the allegations or institutes that comprise the extension of the claim is presented below, indicating in each case which of these have already been weighed in this judgment, since, given the magnitude of this matter, the voluminous nature of the file and allegations, as well as the extent of the analysis carried out so far, it would become tedious and unnecessary to reiterate the examinations already noted, unless the contribution of novel elements so requires, clarifying however that regarding the analysis of the endorsement, it will be addressed in a separate section.

XXXIV.- On the alleged injury to the principles of contracting. On a primary level, Nombre141025 alleges injury to the principle of legality and transparency of procedures, stating that none of the conditions imposed by the tender specifications (cartel) can be changed. This topic has already been addressed previously, noting that the complexity of these procedures often requires mutations or variations in the tender specifications. However, once the contract is signed, the Administration has a set of exorbitant powers, among which is included the unilateral modification of the contract provided for in Article 12 of Law No. 7494. As the State argues, a thesis this Court shares, every contract is subject to a principle of mutability that enables its adjustment to real conditions and context in order to safeguard the due coverage of the public interest that underpins it. This has been recognized, among many others, in Judgment No. 998-98 of the Constitutional Chamber in which, regarding this principle, it has been established that the administration has the necessary powers and prerogatives to introduce modifications to contracts so that they fulfill the assigned public purpose that it must protect and achieve. Certainly, the contract in principle should be signed under the terms originally foreseen in the tender specifications, which does not prevent modification to adjust it to the public interest in cases that so require. Even these variations can derive from the adaptability of conditions not weighed in the tender specifications or by imperative of the comptroller's endorsement (refrendo contralor). In sum, it has already been established that the variations to the tender specifications in this public tender were made without detriment to the principles applicable to those tasks. Likewise, the final wording of the contract incorporates aspects included for reasons of convenience of the public interest, a matter in which it was already determined ut supra that there is no irregularity whatsoever. Furthermore, once again, this is a generic formulation that does not specify the parts of the contract that violate the tender specifications, beyond the topics already mentioned above. Which, without more, leads to the rejection of the charge. Injury to the principle of formalism of procedures is also alleged, noting that there must be a prior planning stage that has not occurred. On this subject, reference must be made to what has already been stated, to the effect that the present procedure includes the design of the works and not just their construction, which is clearly permitted by Article 1 of Law No. 7762. On the other hand, it is reiterated, the Master Plan and terms of the contract include design parameters to be contracted, so there is no injury to the stated principle. Principle of control of procedures. The absence of feasibility studies to support the tender is alleged. This is a topic already resolved in this judgment, in which a conclusion was reached regarding compliance with the requirements provided for in Articles 9 and 21 of Law No. 7762; therefore, for parity of reasoning, this principle could not be infringed upon when the deficiency on which the plaintiff bases its claim has not been established. Principle of discretion of the Administration. On this point, an academic discourse is made about regulated and discretionary conducts, as well as the possibility of judicial control of discretionary powers, to sustain the possibility of analyzing the validity of the endorsement (refrendo). No allegation whatsoever is provided to analyze on this point, so its examination is not entered into. On the Project Finance, internal rate of return, and tariff system. At this point, the plaintiff reiterates the arguments already analyzed by this Court on the topic of project finance, the feasibility studies, and reproaches regarding the tariff procedure carried out in the ARESEP venue. The same plaintiff states that it is a reiteration of what was alleged in the initial brief, expanding on the fact of the issuance of the endorsement, without providing any novel element beyond theoretical references that contribute nothing to what has already been stated. Ergo, it suffices to refer to the analysis that this Court has already carried out on those topics. The extension actually provides a series of speculative data that serve as a basis for making a series of subjective formulations without a source of probative accreditation, which, it is insisted, do not modify the examination already carried out on those points, including the topic of the prediction of demand mobilizations, an aspect also already analyzed. The same occurs with the reiterated allegation of the creation of a private monopoly in the provision of a public service, an aspect already addressed with sufficient breadth, making it unnecessary to address it, a topic that includes the consideration of the non-violation of the principle of free competition by the mere fact of having formulated a single bid in the tender. Regarding the allegation of relevance of the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) as a substantial requirement, it is an aspect already weighed with extensive breadth, so addressing it is futile.

XXXV.- On the regulation of the power of endorsement (refrendo) of the CGR in public contracts. Given the allegations made by the plaintiff regarding the comptroller's endorsement, it is appropriate to make some brief references to this institute or phase of administrative contracting. The constitutional competencies of the CGR are provided for in Article 184 of the Magna Carta, functions within which it is assigned a leading role regarding the control of public spending, guardianship of the public treasury, budgetary matters, among others. Nevertheless, its competencies are developed in another set of norms that seek to deal with these frameworks of action, as is the case with Law No. 7428 (Organic Law of the CGR), Law No. 8292, Law No. 8131, Law No. 8422, among others. In matters of administrative contracting, those competencies are developed most clearly in the Administrative Contracting Law, No. 7494, in which it is assigned the competency, of interest here, to grant or deny endorsement (refrendo) to public tender processes. The topic has been developed specifically in the so-called REGULATION ON THE ENDORSEMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING (REGLAMENTO SOBRE EL REFRENDO DE LAS CONTRATACIONES DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA), No. R-CO-44-2007 of the Office of the Comptroller General, issued at 09:00 hours on October 11, 2007, published in La Gaceta No. 202 of October 22, 2007. On the relevance of the endorsement in the control of public contracting, in Ruling No. 14421-2004, the Constitutional Chamber has stated, in what is relevant to the case: "Through the endorsement (refrendo), the Comptroller General of the Republic exercises oversight or control over the acts of passive subjects that may compromise the Public Treasury or public budgets, as a way of guaranteeing the correctness, transparency, and legality of the expenditures that may be incurred. In the case of administrative contracts, the endorsement occurs after the issuance of the award act or the contract perfection stage, that is, when it is valid for being substantially in conformity with the legal system, such that the Comptroller General of the Republic, through this figure, examines and verifies that the clauses of the duly formalized contract conform to the block of legality, that is, to the tender specifications (cartel) that are the specific regulation or norm of the respective contract, the offer formulated, the Administrative Contracting Law and its regulations, and, in general, with the rest of the administrative legal system. The essential purpose or aim of the endorsement is to prevent the obligations contracted by public administrations in administrative contracts, duly recorded or formalized, from contravening the administrative legal system and that, consequently, an incorrectness or illegality in the disposition of public funds occurs." On the regulatory development of that task, that same Constitutional Court indicated in Ruling No. 2000-03027 of 09:03 hours on April 14, 2002: "IV.-ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHALLENGED REGULATION. The Regulation on the endorsement of Public Administration contracting is not violative of the regulatory power recognized to the Executive Branch in sections 3) and 18) of Article 140 of the Constitution, given that it involves neither an executive regulation –according to the plaintiff's consideration– but rather an autonomous organization or functioning regulation, insofar as it intends to dictate rules and guidelines in order to carry out a competency that the Political Constitution itself grants it, namely the endorsement of contracting carried out by the Public Administration. Thus, its foundation and legal-constitutional support does not derive from the Administrative Contracting Law, nor from its Organic Law, but directly from Articles 182, 183, and 184 of the Political Constitution, and the constitutional principles that derive from these norms in relation to administrative contracting, in the terms previously indicated by this Court, in Judgment number 0998-98, of eleven hours thirty minutes on February sixteenth, nineteen hundred ninety-eight (reiterated in Judgments number 5947-98, of fourteen hours thirty-two minutes on August nineteenth; number 6432-98, of ten hours thirty minutes on June fourth; and number 6754-98, of fifteen hours thirty-six minutes on September twenty-second, all three of nineteen hundred ninety-eight), which have been synthesized as follows: "first: Article 182 of the Political Constitution states the first constitutional obligation in matters of administrative contracting, by virtue of which, any contract entered into by the State must be processed through the tender procedure (licitación); second: that the constituent opted for the tender procedure, considering it the most suitable mechanism for controlling the public treasury and the correct use of the State's financial resources, with the purpose of promoting sound administration of public funds; third: the tender constitutes the ideal means for selecting the co-contractor of the Administration, as it is a guarantee procedure for the public interest, whose publicity guarantees effective participation of all interested parties, so that the Administration selects the best option for the satisfaction of the public interest; fourth: tender should be understood as the mechanism, modality, means, or set of principles to which the State –in the broadest sense– must subject itself in order to carry out its contracting activity, since therein the constitutional principles that inform administrative contracting are fulfilled: free competition, equal treatment among all potential bidders, publicity, legality or transparency of procedures, legal certainty, formalism of tender procedures, balance of interests, principle of good faith, mutuality of the contract, and control of the procedures, in charge of and ultimately carried out directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic; fifth: from the principle 'all administrative contracting shall be done by the tender procedure,' contained in Article 182 of the Political Constitution, derive, with constitutional rank, all the principles of public law that inform administrative contracting, to the extent that they are reasonable and proportionate to the ends pursued; sixth: the administrative contracting system is made up of the constitutional principles that emanate from the Constitution itself, and as a complement, by the control system exercised directly by the constitutional body in charge and of vigilance of the public treasury, –Comptroller General of the Republic, as provided in Articles 183 and 184 of the Constitution–, which is established as a guarantee of the correct use of public funds in pursuit of the satisfaction of the public interest. seventh: the constitutional obligation deriving from Article 182 of the Fundamental Charter encompasses all contractual activity of the State; therefore, no distinction can be made to provide exceptions based on the type of contract to be performed –services, execution of works, sales or leases of goods, purchases– or on the basis of the subject matter involved; eighth: the constituent defined that the most suitable procedure for conducting administrative contracting would be the public tender, and reserved the private tender only for quantitatively and qualitatively smaller contracts." Since being established as an essential—and also constitutional—principle of public procurement, the system of control exercised directly and exclusively by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), the constitutional body responsible for oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública), this Constitutional Court previously determined the competence in this matter belongs to that body, so that it could design the various mechanisms for carrying out control—or countersignature (refrendo)—of public procurement. Thus, in judgment number 9524-99, at nine hours six minutes on December third, nineteen ninety-nine, in response to an inquiry from the Comptroller General’s Office itself regarding that body’s competence to issue directives on this matter, it stated: “V.- ON COUNTERSIGNATURE (REFRENDO) IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AS THE EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPTROLLER BODY. It was made clear in the appealed judgment—number 05947-98, at fourteen hours thirty-two minutes on August nineteenth, nineteen ninety-eight—that the countersignature of public procurement by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic applies to the entire public administration, which includes not only the bodies financed through the Central Administration’s spending plan, that is, the Legislative Assembly, the Executive Branch (President of the Republic and respective Minister), the Judicial Branch, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the Office of the Ombudsperson, but also the decentralized and deconcentrated bodies of the Public Administration, thereby extending it to the banks that make up the national banking system. Two constitutional principles underpin this position: Article 182 of the Political Constitution establishes that the constitutional principles guiding public procurement apply to the entire Public Administration, without any exception, as the constitutional norm does not distinguish whether it involves a central government institution, an autonomous institution, or a deconcentrated body; and Article 184 of the Constitution gives rise to the guiding principle of the control of public procurement carried out directly and exclusively by the constitutional body charged with the vigilance and oversight of the public treasury. Overseeing the public treasury is an essential function of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, by constitutional mandate—Article 183 of the Constitution—and it may perform this function through various forms of control, be it countersignature and other means, such as auditing or inspections, or the appeal itself or a posteriori intervention. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that just as the constitutional norm refers to ordinary legislation for it to establish the various forms of public procurement, based on their amount, thus creating public bidding (licitación pública), private bidding (licitación privada), direct contracting (contratación directa), and auction with an alternate procedure (remate con procedimiento alterno), according to the classification provided by the Financial Administration Law of the Republic, number 1279, of May second, nineteen fifty-one, repealed by the Public Procurement Law, number 7494, of May second, nineteen ninety-five, supplemented and amended by Law number 7612, of July twenty-second, nineteen ninety-six, which establishes the following classification: public bidding, registry bidding (licitación por registro), restricted bidding (licitación restringida), auction (remate), and direct contracting; thus, it is the exclusive competence of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic to design various mechanisms and modes for carrying out the control of public procurement, based on the amount, the subject matter, and the public institution carrying out the procurement, in accordance with the principles provided by the Political Constitution itself, and obviously within the legal framework conferred by its own Organic Law. Therefore, the assertion of the representative of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in his submission is correct, in considering that it is constitutionally possible for this body, taking into account the nature, purpose, and amount of the procurement at issue, to establish reasonable conditions proportionate to the power that Article 184 of the Constitution grants it to countersign State contracts, with a view to not creating mechanisms that affect expeditious administrative management, and in consideration of the public interest; since countersignature must be understood as part of the oversight powers over the public treasury that belong exclusively to the Comptroller General’s Office, for the exercise of which it has absolute functional and administrative independence, by virtue of the provisions of Article 183 of the Fundamental Charter itself, for which reason it may define the scope, mechanisms, and procedures of superior oversight, even vis-à-vis the legislator, if the latter affects its independence, as noted previously in judgment number 00998-98.” XXXVI.- The foregoing precedent highlights the relevance of the CGR’s functions regarding countersignature. Now, the plaintiff criticizes that the comptroller authority, during the countersignature process, requested (previno) the submission of information and subsequently included conditioning rules for its granting. On this point, the following should be noted. Countersignature is an act of approval of public procurement that, as such, affects the deployment of the contract’s effects, and is therefore linked to effectiveness (efficacy) (see in this regard Article 145 of the General Law of Public Administration, LGAP). From that standpoint, it cannot become a mechanism that leads to a declaration of nullity of the analyzed actions, even though, through it, the CGR performs a compliance check against the norms governing public procurement. For these purposes, the development provided by Article 2 of the Countersignature Regulations (Reglamento de Refrendos) is clear when it states: “Article 2—Nature of Countersignature. Countersignature is an act of approval, thus it serves as a requirement for the effectiveness (eficacia) of the public contract and not as a means by which the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic may indirectly annul the award act or the public contract. Through countersignature, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic examines and verifies that the clauses of the public contract substantially conform to the legal system, under the terms provided in Article 8 of these Regulations./ When the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic denies countersignature for a public contract, it shall point out to the Administration the defects that must be remedied, amended, or corrected in order to obtain the respective countersignature in a possible future proceeding./ By virtue of the fact that public procurement procedures and all aspects relating to the formation and perfection of public contracts are imbued with celerity and summary process in the due and unpostponable attention to and satisfaction of public needs and requirements, the legality analysis carried out by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic during countersignature is subject to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness (eficacia) developed in Article 4 of the Public Procurement Law and to the provisions of Article 10 of the General Law of Public Administration./ Countersignature does not constitute an administrative procedure designed to resolve conflicting interests of the parties or interested third parties, and therefore any filings made for that purpose during the proceeding shall be rejected outright./ Countersignature is not a means by which the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic exercises its powers to conduct audits and investigations, regulated in Articles 21 and 22 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. Consequently, the legality analysis is based on a review of the administrative record provided by the Administration, and therefore the veracity of the documentation incorporated therein is presumed, according to the principle of good faith that governs public contractual activity, all under the responsibility of the Administration officials charged with compiling and submitting the record.” Now, in light of the provisions of Article 8 of that regulation, the study carried out through this means by the comptroller body is not one of opportunity or convenience, but rather of legality. Nevertheless, in this dynamic, account must be taken of what is regulated by the LGAP, in its Article 16.2, which at the time states: “2. The Judge may control the conformity of the discretionary elements of the act with these non-legal rules, as if exercising control of legality.”, which in certain positions implies the possibility of considering aspects of components related to convenience and opportunity as included within the legality analysis—a topic that will not be addressed in this case. Likewise, that precept—Article 8 of the Countersignature Regulations—stipulates that the examination does not involve a comprehensive review but is limited to the specific aspects set out in that article, the transcription or reference to which is unnecessary, it being sufficient to refer to what is indicated therein. From that standpoint, in line with what is indicated by Article 9 of the same regulation, the legality of the other aspects not addressed in the countersignature is presumed, aspects which in any case remain subject to optional subsequent oversight and, in general, to the ordinary avenues for challenging acts and contracts, both in administrative and judicial venues, and for which the Administration retains its responsibility. Among those other aspects, the reasonableness of the price may be mentioned. For its part, Article 12 sets the formal requirements that must be submitted for this proceeding, without prejudice to the information requests that the CGR may validly make. In this regard, unlike what CANABA seems to suggest, the applicable legal order does allow the comptroller body to request the submission of information in order to validly fulfill its control role in the countersignature phase. What Article 13 of the regulation in question stipulates in this regard is elementary when it states: “Article 13.—Time Limit, Suspensions, and Interruptions. The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic must resolve the request for countersignature of contracts within a period of twenty-five business days, in the case of public bidding, and twenty business days, in the remaining cases./ During the countersignature proceeding, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic may formulate requests for additional information it deems essential for the substantive study of the respective contractual document, for which purpose it shall summon the Administration for the reasonable period it sets for such purposes, during which the time limit for the final resolution regulated in the preceding paragraph shall also be suspended. If the Administration does not remedy in time what was requested by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the countersignature request shall be rejected./ When, during the course of a countersignature request proceeding, the Administration submits a modification document to the contractual text under review, whether on its own initiative or in response to a suggestion the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic may make to it on an interlocutory basis according to the rules of the preceding paragraph when, during the preliminary analysis, a substantial defect in the legality of the contract has been detected, the time limit provided in the first paragraph of this article shall begin to run anew from the day following the receipt of the modification at the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.” This norm dispels any doubt about the CGR’s jurisdictional authority to request or require the submission of information it deems necessary for the corresponding analysis, as well as to establish the conditions it deems necessary and pertinent, without prejudice to the inclusion of the reasons leading to this criterion. It should be highlighted that the countersignature proceeding is not a simple—automated—comparison of the fulfillment of requirements but rather a comparison of validity that includes the weighing of the set of sources to which the bidding process is subject, including not only legal norms but also the bids and the bid conditions or specifications (cartel o pliego de condiciones).

XXXVII.- Regarding the alleged injury to the principles of public procurement in the countersignature act. Concerning the specific reproach made against the countersignature in the expansion of the complaint, without prejudice to what has already been indicated in the previous sections regarding the reiteration of topics already addressed, it is worth indicating more specifically how these topics do not affect the validity of the countersignature granted by the CGR. a) Principle of legality and transparency. Regarding this aspect, it should be noted that official communication No. 2739-2012 of March 21, 2012 (DCA-0692), in which the CGR grants the countersignature of the contract, points out that this agreement included an improper hierarchical ordering of the sources applicable to the procedure, which implies, contrary to what the plaintiff argued, a manifestation of respect for the principle of legality. Likewise, the CGR warned in the countersignature of the legal regime applicable to the case, not only invoking the particularities of the Countersignature Regulations but also pointing out the bid specifications (cartel de licitación) used for the contract analysis (point III.ii). Precisely in the exercise of the powers conferred by Article 13 of the aforementioned regulation, the CGR requested additional information from the CNC through communications DCA-2836 of October 28, 2011, and DCA-0082 of January 17, 2012, to verify that the contract conformed to the bid conditions of the promoted bidding process. In any case, what was set forth regarding the principle of effectiveness (eficacia) and efficiency in public procurements must be revisited. The plaintiff does not indicate the reasons why the alleged injuries to the denounced principle would lead to a substantial nullity that warrants the cancellation of the bidding process. On this topic, it is worth citing the ruling on the principle of efficiency and effectiveness by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in decision No. 14421-2004 at 11:00 hours on December 17, 2004, in the following sense: “Therefore, the public procurement procedures and all aspects pertaining to the formation and perfection of public contracts are imbued with celerity and summary process in the due and unpostponable attention to and satisfaction of the needs and requirements of the social organization. On this point, it is necessary to recall that among the guiding principles of public services, within the framework of a service-providing Public Administration or a Social and Democratic Rule of Law State, are, among others, efficiency, effectiveness (eficacia), continuity, regularity, and adaptation to socio-economic and technological needs, with the purpose of eradicating and overcoming the real inequalities of the social collective. The control and oversight mechanisms designed by the legislator to guarantee transparency or publicity, free concurrence and equality, and the rational management of public resources or funds—through the selection of the most advantageous offer for public entities, from a financial and technical point of view—in public procurement matters, must have as their fundamental goal to ensure that procurement conforms to the law so that it is regular or substantially in accordance with the legal system, to avoid any act of corruption or deviation in the handling of public funds. Under this understanding, all the formal requirements provided by the legal system to ensure the regularity or validity of the procurement procedures, the award act, and the public contract itself, must also seek the prompt satisfaction of the general interest through the effective construction of public works and the provision of public services; consequently, they cannot be transformed into instruments to delay the efficient and effective (eficaz) provision of public services and, above all, their adaptation to the new socio-economic and technological needs of the community. On this particular, Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Public Procurement Law, when enunciating the “Principle of Efficiency,” establishes that ‘(…) At all stages of the procurement procedures, substance shall prevail over form. The acts and actions of the parties shall be interpreted in a way that favors their preservation and facilitates the adoption of the final decision, under favorable conditions for the general interest (…)’. It follows from the foregoing that the forms characteristic of public procurement procedures, as well as the procedural requirements established by the legal system for the validity and effectiveness (eficacia) of a public contract, must be interpreted flexibly in pursuit of the purpose of all public contracts, without neglecting, of course, the soundness and correctness in the way public funds are invested. From this perspective, the administrative procurement procedures are the shadow (form) that must inevitably follow the body (substance), which are the purposes and goals of the public contract to satisfy the general interest and, of course, to ensure the rational, due, and correct use of public funds. Finally, it must be remembered that the principles of efficiency and effectiveness (eficacia), insofar as they inform administrative organization and management, have a strong constitutional basis (articles—all of the Political Constitution—140, subsection 8, insofar as it imposes on the Executive Branch the duty to ‘Monitor the proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies’; 139, subsection 4, to the extent it incorporates the concept of ‘proper functioning of the Government’; and 191, by encompassing the principle of ‘efficiency of the administration’).” XXXVIII.- b) Regarding the principle of formalism. In the comptroller’s countersignature act, reference is made to the fact that, although there were inaccuracies in the analyzed proceeding, the power to apply the principle of preservation of acts is not disregarded, in line with Article 4 of Law No. 7494. It has already been indicated that in our system, including in public procurement matters, a principle of substantiality of nullities prevails. Reference should therefore be made to what was stated in that section, to the effect that the plaintiffs failed to prove the substantiality of the alleged defects, in the cases where it may be considered that errors existed. On this matter, the aforementioned communication DCA-0692 (countersignature) states in its core: “…this Division cannot ignore, much less fail to apply, the guiding principles of Public Procurement when studying the countersignature of this bidding procedure. This entails recalling the principles of effectiveness (eficacia) and efficiency of constitutional rank and regulated in Article 4 of the Public Procurement Law (which applies supplementarily to the Law on Concessions of Public Works with Public Services) (…). In accordance with these principles, it can be stated that the omission of a formalism such as the one stated, which in this case is, as a matter of principle, the lack of publication of two dates for opening the bidding process, does not create an impediment for this Office to grant the countersignature of the process, since precisely based on these principles the promoted procurement procedure can be preserved, in addition to the fact that the omissions in question are not considered to cause a defect such as to invalidate the promoted bidding procedure...” It is undeniable that in these matters, subjection to the forms appropriate for carrying out a public bidding process applies. However, disregarding any procedural formula only leads to nullity to the extent that the defect is substantial, such that it causes defenselessness or serious harm to private parties—a topic already addressed. Moreover, given the imprecision of the plaintiff’s allegations regarding the specific defects in particular acts of the CGR that may have led to the injury of this maxim whose violation they invoke, there is no alternative but to reject this charge. c) Principle of control of procedures. By virtue of this principle, it is posited that the public procurement procedure must be subject to exhaustive control and oversight, to verify compliance with the minimum norms that govern this matter as well as the correct use of the public treasury. It is present in all phases of the procedure, from the preliminary studies to contractual modifications and the execution phase. What has been said implies that the verification of procedures can only be conceived from the standpoint of specific phases of the procurement, and not in a general manner. From that standpoint, the plaintiff presents formulations that are in no way different from those already raised in the reproaches formulated in the original complaint, such that indeed, as the CGR warns, rather than an expansion, it refers to a reiteration of arguments, extendable against the act of granting countersignature. Such is the case of the lack of verification of the preliminary feasibility studies (estudios previos de factibilidad), a topic on which it has been repeatedly stated that there is no impropriety whatsoever. In any case, the comptroller authority, in applying Article 8 of the Countersignature Regulations, asked (previno) the managing Administration to indicate which studies supported the selection of the contractual object. Given the response to that request, ultimately, in the countersignature communication, i.e., DCA-0692, on this point it was stated: “That regarding the technical studies for this bidding process, the Grantor Administration, in the communication cited in the preceding paragraph, indicates as relevant background for the bidding that gives rise to the contract at issue, the National Port Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Portuario) prepared in 1995 by the Japanese firm OCDI, and the Program for the Modernization of the Port Subsector of Costa Rica, prepared by the firm HPC Hamburg Port Consulting GMBH. It also indicates as a study to support the basis of the bidding under review, the Master Plan for the Limón-Moín Port Complex prepared by the company Royal Haskoning Nederland B.V., and the updated demand study carried out. All of which is left under the responsibility of the Grantor Administration.” From that standpoint, the CGR considered the technical studies to have been provided according to the clarifications made to it by the grantor administration. In any case, the studies provided to justify said requirement are precisely those that this Court has analyzed and determined their usefulness to support the international bidding 2009LI-000001-200 which is the subject of this case. It should also be noted that the validity of the studies provided in terms of the design of the works, according to the bid specification clauses, is an aspect within the domain of the concessionaire, who, as has been repeatedly explained, assumes the consequences and risks of the design of the TCM.

XXXIX.- Regarding the allegations of injury to public discretionary power. As for the references relating to the principle of discretion of the Administration, the expansion filed by Nombre141025 is confusing, and the specific causes that the plaintiff intends to bring to the attention of this jurisdictional authority are not clearly discernible. On this topic, after making theoretical references to regulated and discretionary powers, it indicates that the action is brought “… with a view to achieving the correction of arbitrariness and abuse of power carried out in the administrative venue, through the interpretation of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic in the comptroller countersignature, an example of this being what is indicated on page 9, point vi).” In line with what is indicated by the first paragraph of Article 49 of the Constitution (Carta Magna), this jurisdiction is competent to exercise control over the validity of the administrative function. The mentioned control parameter includes every form of manifestation of public will, among these, the conduct arising from the exercise of powers of discretionary or regulated content. This is established in Articles 42.2, 122 subsection f, 127, 128, and in the case of interim measures, Article 20 of that same legal body. However, for such purposes, a distinction must be made between political-programmatic administrative discretion (since there also exists judicial and legislative discretion), technical discretion, and legal discretion, given that in the latter two, judicial control is more intense than in the first, which refers to the possibility of setting goals or action plans. Likewise, a distinction must be made between exercised discretion and unexercised discretion, as the corrective measures, should the invalidity of the public conduct be deemed to exist, vary depending on whether it is an active exercise (exercised) or an omission (unexercised). Similarly, the existence or not of residual discretion must be considered. This is fundamental so that the administrative contentious judge can determine the course of action, be it imposing limits on the Administration to correct the conduct previously issued—already annulled by judicial control—or setting the guidelines for the exercise that had not been formulated up to that moment. This is established by Article 128 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA) when it states in relevant part: “When the favorable judgment deals with administrative powers containing discretionary elements, whether due to omission or improper exercise, it shall order the exercise of such powers, within the time limit set for that purpose, in accordance with the limits and mandates imposed by the legal system and by the facts of the case, after a declaration of the existence, content, and scope of the limits and mandates, if the record so allows. (…)” In the residual aspect, moreover, the judge must respect the surviving threshold of discretion that pertains to the Administration. This is the case of the annulment of an award act, in which, once the record is returned to the Administration so that it resolves in accordance with the applicable legal and bid specification norms, the possibility of declaring the process void (declarar desierto el concurso) persists, considering, under the new conditions, that no offer satisfies the public interest. Well then, there is no doubt as to the possibility of judicial control of that discretionary exercise; however, the ambiguity of the complaint does not allow for inferring whether the criticism lies in the fact that the CGR’s conduct followed paths of discretionary exercise when it should have been regulated, or if, on the contrary, the discretionary exercise carried out is invalid. In any case, the plaintiff does not specify to what extent that particular decision violates the legal system to which the CGR must submit in the exercise of its countersignature authority. The point in question, visible on page 9 of the countersignature communication, provides in what is relevant to the case: “…Regarding the issue of obtaining licenses, permits, environmental feasibility approvals (viabilidades), or any other type of environmental instrument (instrumento ambiental) that must exist prior to and during the construction and operation phases of the contract, as determined by the competent authority on the matter, it is necessary to state that obtaining the corresponding endorsement from said authority, as well as its validity for the necessary period of time, remains under the responsibility and risk of the concessionaire firm itself. Therefore, it shall be the obligation of the Grantor Administration to verify the obtaining of those permits, licenses, or other instruments necessary to obtain for the realization of the awarded concession, without the verification of said aspects falling within the scope of competence of this comptroller body during the countersignature proceeding…” This Court shares the CGR’s arguments in stating that in public procurement matters, there is a high component of discretion in the phase of drafting the bid specifications (cartel de licitación) and in the preliminary stages in general, even though as the procedure advances, that discretion is restricted and reduced. These powers must be considered in the various phases of control and oversight that the CGR carries out during the procedure, without prejudice to the possibility of ordering the invalidity of specific conduct for the infraction of the public procurement regime that it is called upon to protect in the instances in which it participates. However, it is reiterated, the CGR’s argument is shared to the effect that the cited point vi seeks to establish that the concessionaire company is solely responsible, according to the contract, for obtaining a series of permits, licenses, or others, and that this obtaining must be verified by the Grantor Administration. This is clear if one considers that it is indeed not the CGR’s role to verify whether those permits, licenses, or in general, administrative authorizations (habilitaciones administrativas), exist or not, and therefore, in accordance with the scope of Article 9 of the Countersignature Regulations, it warns the grantor of its duty of verification on this particular. This Court does not understand, as the plaintiff does not clarify this point, how that conduct constitutes the defect of abuse of power (desviación de poder) (understood as the pursuit of an end different from the principal one to the detriment of the latter, Art. 131.3 LGAP). It is a warning or reminder of the exercise of duties of verification and oversight, in accordance with the norms applicable to the case.

XL.- Regarding the matter pertaining to the point relating to Project Finance, IRR (TIR), price cap (tarifa tope).

It must be insisted, this is an argument extensively addressed in the prior phases of this judgment. In the amplification of the complaint under analysis, no novel argument on this particular is presented, the only contribution being the reproachability of that aspect against the endorsement act (acto de refrendo), due to the circumstance of it not having been denied despite the defects the plaintiff alleges. However, no concrete reference is made in relation to the challenged act of the CGR, such that the particular reasons why such conduct, regarding those specific issues, is deemed to suffer from a pathology that merits being declared in this venue can be established. In the understanding of this Court, the plaintiff’s expositions are presented as a presentation of their own positions on which they base a critique to point out the manner in which, from their perspective, the TCM’s financial project would be technically more correct. Nonetheless, the definition of the project’s financing mechanism or design, whether it fits within the concept of Project finance, definition of risk strategy, is a matter that certainly, as to its viability (viabilidad) and pertinence, falls within the purview of the grantor (concedente). The same occurs with the debate now proposed regarding the IRR (TIR), in which a comparative scenario is formulated had more than one offer with different IRRs been presented; however, it is nothing more than a hypothetical panorama, and furthermore, the bidding terms (cartel) provide for an analysis of comparability of that economic factor of the offers as a parameter for evaluating the bids (plicas). Regarding the criticisms of the acceptance of clauses for the transfer of risks to the concessionaire (concesionario), it is pertinent to note that such aspect corresponds exclusively to the grantor and the concessionaire. However, it must be noted that the controlling instance made a series of observations and conditions that are issued in the context of exercising its verification powers inherent to the endorsement procedure, weighing that the terms of the contract adjust to and are in harmony with the sources that regulate it and to which it is bound (bidding terms, bids, award, prior studies, etc.). On the other hand, the allegation regarding price caps (Price cap) is a matter that, in accordance with article 21.1 of Law No. 7762, falls outside the scope of the endorsement, given that the opinion that must be rendered in such matters is the purview of ARESEP, which issues a mandatory and binding assessment. On this matter, it suffices to refer to what has already been developed regarding the criticisms presented on tariff and financial feasibility. Therefore, given that particular competence allocation, it is clear to this collegiate body that such aspect is outside the powers of the CGR. This was even established by that body when it indicated in point vii) of section III of endorsement official letter DCA-0692: “Regarding the matter of the tariff structure and its adjustment parameters, as well as the parameters that will be used to evaluate the quality of service, in accordance with Article 21 of the Public Works Concession with Public Services Law, these have a positive technical opinion from the Public Services Regulatory Authority, as observed in folios 925, 1479, 2484, 3603, and 3863-C of the bidding file. Therefore, given that competence in the matter lies with the referred Authority according to its law, this aspect is not to be addressed by this Division in the endorsement procedure.” In another point, the suppression of the regulation of financial equilibrium via IRR is reproached. Again, it is a matter unrelated to the endorsement, but rather to the analysis of ARESEP, so it must be rejected. However, Nombre141025 makes a series of considerations in which it alludes to concrete acts of the CGR during the objection procedures to the bidding terms of this procurement process. Specifically, in the first bidding process, Nombre141024 and APM TERMINALS filed an objection appeal regarding the condition that established a variation of 20%, positive or negative, with respect to the IRR offered and accepted by the Administration as a cause for financial disequilibrium of the contract. On the matter, resolution R-DJ-008-2009 indicated: “Criterion to resolve: The objector merely requests that a paragraph of section 12.2 on the economic and financial equilibrium of the contract be left without effect, with the purpose of eliminating the indicated percentage of decrease (+-20%) of the reference IRR, from which the rebalancing mechanisms are applied, and offers no proof whatsoever of the harm that said defined percentage is supposedly causing for the application of the rebalancing mechanisms, nor any legal justification against it. Furthermore, the objector must keep in mind that the established mechanism is equitable, since it applies equally to the Administration and to the concessionaire, both for benefits and for losses. Finally, in the interest of the principle of administrative efficiency, it would be too cumbersome for the Administration to be applying the economic and financial rebalancing mechanisms of the contract every time a decrease occurs, which is why the Administration has discretionarily considered it reasonable that those mechanisms be applied to both when a decrease greater or lesser than 20% of the reference IRR is verified, therefore potential offerors can take the provisions they deem pertinent in their offer, taking into account that percentage already defined by the Administration.” For its part, in act R-DJ-008-2009 Bis, dated July 2, 2009, it was stated: “4) Of the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) as a regulatory variable. Clause 11.7.5.2 of the bidding terms establishes that ‘…when a financial disequilibrium of the concession contract occurs, an extraordinary tariff adjustment may be made to compensate said disequilibrium, provided it is due to causes external to the responsibility of the concessionaire company. It will be considered that there is a disequilibrium when the IRR of the economic offer and accepted by the Administration as a reference for the concession varies by 20%, positively or negatively.’ Said clause also establishes that in such case, the contract will proceed as stipulated in Chapter 12 of the contract. On this particular, this controlling body requests that Administration to take the required provisions so that when using the IRR as a parameter to demonstrate contractual disequilibria, it must be ensured that the effect of the factors can be objectively individualized, factors that according to the bidding terms and contractual rules correspond solely to those typified in Article 12.2 of the contract. The foregoing, since the calculation of that IRR depends on parameters, variables, estimates, and assumptions, with multiple possible options and alternatives, and in that sense, it is required that these aspects be clearly established and regulated, for the purpose of contract oversight and the demonstration of the cited disequilibria. Likewise, it is indicated that it is the responsibility of the Administration to establish clear and objective rules within the bidding conditions to provide for the use of the internal rate of return in the regulation of the contract’s financial equilibrium. Along the same line of thought, this Office considers it paramount that the application of the IRR as a regulatory variable be evaluated, given that from our point of view the structuring of this business, which postpones phase 3 to the future, could present the possibility that some of the offers present multiple IRRs, which is obtained due to the generation of flows that present two or more sign changes. Due to the foregoing, it is not known how the reference IRR would be determined.” From said recount it is deduced that, contrary to what was alleged by the plaintiff, the CGR did not order the elimination of said economic adjustment mechanism. Later, in the second bidding terms, no guarantee on the IRR issue was included. In the third bidding terms, which was objected to before the CGR, the regulation of the financial equilibrium of the contract in favor of the concessionaire was included when the calculated IRR was lower by 300 basis points (3%) in relation to the offered IRR of the project. Likewise, the right of the Granting Administration to claim in its favor the economic equilibrium of the contract when the present value of the income quoted by the concessionaire (ITC) was reached, before the 33 years of the concession, and the IRR of the project as of the review date was higher than the offered IRR plus 300 basis points (3%), in which case the profit would be shared in equal parts between the Granting Administration and the Concessionaire. As to that point, in resolution DJ-215-2011 dated May 24, 2010, the CGR indicates that it was a matter indicated by the plaintiff; this controlling body, by reason of its powers, indicated that the Granting Administration had to demonstrate in the administrative file the assessment and acceptance of the reasonableness of the offeror’s financial projections model, since according to the bidding terms, it would be used for the IRR calculation. Likewise, it was warned that a base format for the mentioned projections model must be offered to potential offerors, requesting that the bidding terms be adjusted. From this it follows that no order whatsoever was issued by the controlling body to eliminate the weighting of the percentage impact on the IRR as a financial adjustment parameter.

XLI.- In another allegation, the allegations of the creation of a private monopoly, already amply analyzed, are reiterated. No variation regarding the matter of endorsement is included, so it must be referred to what this Court has already weighed as a substantive criterion. It must be reiterated, the indirect management design postulated by the challenged procurement finds support in the letter of paragraph 1 of Law No. 7762. Ergo, that allegation is not admissible, nor are the reproaches regarding the exclusivity model in the transportation of full containers, matters, it is reiterated, already addressed, which makes addressing them at this point unnecessary. On the other hand, it is reproached that in the legality control inherent to the endorsement, the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) should have been verified. However, on one hand, such matter has already been aired by this collegiate body, an analysis to which the set of arguments set forth in the analyzed amplification must be referred. Additionally, it has been made clear that according to the endorsement regulation (reglamento de refrendos), the procurement of those ecological licenses is the responsibility of the concessionaire, and their verification is the purview of the grantor. This was set forth in the endorsement act, in which it was pointed out on this point: “vi) Of the studies, permits, or others related to environmental aspects: Regarding the matter of obtaining the licenses, permits, environmental approvals (viabilidades), or any other type of environmental instrument that must exist prior to and during the construction and operation phases of the contract, as determined by the competent authority in the matter, it is necessary to indicate that obtaining the corresponding endorsement from said authority falls under the responsibility and risk of the concessionaire firm itself, as well as its validity during the necessary period. Therefore, it shall be the obligation of the Granting Administration to verify the acquisition of those permits, licenses, or other instruments necessary to obtain for the execution of the awarded concession, without the verification of said aspects during the endorsement procedure falling within the scope of competence of this controlling body. The foregoing in accordance with what was developed on the matter in Section IV of this official letter, in relation to chapter 5, point 4) and chapter 8, point 11). Furthermore, the Granting Administration must monitor that the management carried out by the Concessionaire before the competent authorities on this matter is efficient.” On the other hand, through resolution R-DJ-008-2009 at 12:00 hours on July 2, 2009, in response to questioning from Nombre141024, it was indicated that through resolution 274-2009 Nombre141028 at 8:00 hours on February 10, 2010, the Nombre141029 (potential environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental potencial)) had been granted to the project, as recorded in folio 741 of the bidding file. Similarly, references on the matter were made in official letter R-DJ-008-2009 (bis). On the other hand, the endorsement official letter on the matter points out: “ That with reference to point 13) of clause 5.2.2 and to clause 5.3.3 named Environmental Viability License, both of the contract, it is important to reiterate the statements made by the concessionaire firm in the unnumbered official letter signed on November 21, 2011, provided as part of Anexo 1 of official letter DST-OF-1888-2011, in which, among other things, it indicated: ‘Regarding question No. 11 of the Comptroller General’s Office, corresponding to Chapter 5 of the Contract, we agree with the approach of the response foreseen by the National Council of Concessions, in the sense that obtaining the definitive environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental definitiva) is within the sphere of responsibility of the concessionaire, so that if a firm and definitive denial is produced by the competent authority, impossible to overcome by legitimate administrative or judicial means, the concession contract could not be executed, with the consequence that the concessionaire may not make pecuniary claims against the Granting Administration. Likewise, in the event that the failure to obtain the cited viability is due to causes exclusively attributable to the concessionaire, the latter could face the execution of the construction guarantee (garantía de construcción) posted for the preconditions phase, following due process’ (the underline is not original).” Such development fully aligns with what has already been indicated in this judgment, regarding the clarity that the impossibility of initiating works without obtaining the definitive environmental viability license entails, which runs under the risk of the concessionaire, given that as has been anticipated, the risk of its procurement is assumed, which would preclude any pecuniary claims against the Granting Administration, should this enabling title not be obtained.

LXII.- Finally, regarding the conditions incorporated in the endorsement act that are considered as typical of a review of matters of convenience and opportunity, it is pertinent to indicate what is set forth below. In point IV of the endorsement official letter named “Of the conditions to which the present controlling endorsement is subject”, a total approximate of 80 conditions is included, divided into the following subject matter: CHAPTER 1. Contract Generalities -1 aspect-. CHAPTER 2. Of the Provisions of a General Nature -1 aspect-. CHAPTER 3. Of the Documents that Form Part of the Contract -3 observations-; CHAPTER 4. Of the General Obligations and Rights of the Administration. –in which 12 precisions are made-; CHAPTER 5. Of the Concession Terms. -6 precisions-; CHAPTER 6. Risk Regime -6 precisions-; CHAPTER 7. General Regime of the Guarantees in Charge of the Concessionaire -2 precisions-; CHAPTER 8. Of the Technical Bases for the Construction of the Works -11 precisions-; CHAPTER 11. Of the Economic Regime, Financial Obligations, and Rights of the Concessionaire -16 observations-; CHAPTER 12. Of Maintaining the Economic-Financial Equilibrium of the Contract and its Renegotiation -3 precisions-; CHAPTER 13. Of Subcontracts -2 aspects-; CHAPTER 14. Control Regime and Sanctioning Regime of the Concession -4 precisions-; CHAPTER 15. Of the Reports -3 observations-; CHAPTER 16. Fiscal Aspects -3 observations-; CHAPTER 17. Of Insurances -3 observations-; CHAPTER 18. Of the Assignment of Rights and Obligations, Suspension, and Termination of the Contract -4 precisions-. The sheer number of conditions and the size of the endorsement file are criticized. However, unlike what the claimant parties argue, once the content of that endorsement official letter has been thoroughly analyzed, it is the criterion of this Court that these conditions, however broad they may be considered, do not constitute clauses of analysis of the project's convenience or opportunity that attempt to disguise a null contract as valid, or to justify a management model without due legal support. On the contrary, this type of conditioning aspect, this collegiate body understands, stand as relevant elements imposed by the CGR within the framework of its powers, as a derivation of the exercise of the endorsement and that do not intend to substitute for the grantor, but rather to set parameters for the legitimate efficacy of the contract. Given CANABA’s allegations, it must be reiterated that the aspect of having required additional information in the endorsement procedure (even if the file is voluminous –more than a thousand folios it is argued-) does not constitute an illegality, but a power that finds support in the endorsement regulation, as has been indicated –art. 13-. The length of a public dossier that supports a decision cannot be daringly qualified as an abuse of power, without first proving a deviation from the public purpose, which has not been demonstrated here, nor has it occurred. Moreover, the adaptation of the contract as a derivation of the endorsement procedure does not lead to sustaining the reproach of illegitimacy under analysis, but on the contrary, it is the natural and expected result of the corrections that are viable in endorsement procedures. It could be counter-argued that this highlights the irregularity of the entire process; however, in response to that argument one would have to refer to what has already been indicated regarding the preservation of acts, the substantiality of nullities that applies in this matter, and the need to prove serious impacts to lead to the suppression of this type of acts, as a derivation of the principle underlying canon 4 of the Administrative Procurement Law. Thus, the length of the file or the signing of a contract that incorporates the observations made in the endorsement does not imply, as the plaintiff claims, that the CGR’s analysis was one of convenience and not legality, or that its actions result in a deviation of power. In sum, the allegation is not admissible and therefore must be rejected.

XLIII.- On the alleged violation of Law No. 2906. In the sole hearing, in his closing arguments, the legal representative of Nombre141024 lightly refers to the potential injury to Law No. 2906, pointing out that the area where the TCM will be built is declared for tourist use. On this particular, it is pertinent to indicate that the cited Law 2906 of November 24, 1961, declares the strip of land between Portete and 12 millas of Limón a recreation and tourism zone. Paragraph one of that legal source establishes, in what is relevant to the case, “…the strip two hundred meters wide, from the ordinary high tide, comprised within the Maritime Mile between the North limit of the urban zone of the city of Limón, that is Portete, and the site known as ‘12 Millas’ or ‘Swamp Moth’, to the North of the city of Limón, as well as the zone comprised within 100 meters on both sides of the Moín River in the section parallel to the beach. From the referred zone, twenty meters are reserved for a panoramic road in sites where it currently does not exist. The rest shall be transferred to the Costa Rican Tourism Institute,…”. For its part, Executive Decree 3729 of May 3, 1975, declares the canal works completed and assigns the administration of various lands and works to Nombre141024. However, for the purposes of what is debated, it should be highlighted that by Law No. 5337 of August 27, 1973, which comprehensively reforms the Organic Law of JAPDEVA, Law No. 3091, it is established in its core: "CHAPTER II Heritage of Nombre141024 Article 41.- The following are property of Nombre141024, in addition to its assets and ordinary and extraordinary income: a) The lands, buildings, equipment, and in general all movable and immovable property destined for the activities inherent to Nombre141024, with the exception of those State assets that by Political Constitution cannot leave its patrimony and the assets of the National Railway to the Atlantic. Also the future expansions thereof, which by mutual agreement between Nombre141024 and the Executive Branch it is arranged to transfer, for which both entities are authorized to formalize the respective deeds before the State Notary. The assets that are currently the property of the institution shall not be subject to the transfer referred to in this article; and b) All State lands situated in the area enabled by navigable canals, comprised in an area of ten kilometers from the sea inward, parallel to the coast, and a strip three kilometers wide, parallel to both sides of the rivers and canals administered by the Board." Additionally, precept 45 of said Organic law stipulates: "Article 45.- For the fulfillment of this law and its regulations, Nombre141024 shall determine the port jurisdiction zones for each of the ports under its administration and shall communicate it to the Executive Branch. These areas must fundamentally contemplate: a) Terminals and rights of way; b) Anchoring sites, anchorages, and beaconing of the roadstead; c) Access channels and maneuvering zone; and d) Berths and transit spurs, general warehouses, offices, workshops, railway yards and spurs, merchandise storage zones, and any other site destined for port and railway operations." In addition, Law No. 6043 of March 2, 1977, Maritime Terrestrial Zone Law, article 75, which partially modifies the previous reform, states: "Article 75.- The Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Coast will continue with the dominion over the lands that were transferred to it by virtue of article 41, subsection b) of law Nº 5337 of August 27, 1973, except in the maritime terrestrial zone corresponding to both sides of the main canal system that connects the ports of Moín and Barra del Colorado. In that zone, the stipulations of this law shall apply in full force." From that examination angle, the injury reproached by SINTRAJAP does not exist, given that as has been indicated, the lands in question form part of the patrimony whose administration corresponds to Nombre141024; therefore, within which, the development of the port infrastructure can feasibly be carried out, whether through a direct or indirect management model. Such permissibility derives from legal authorizations created by the reforms introduced to the Organic Law of Japdeva. Ergo, the defects pointed out regarding the impossibility of a land-use change (cambio de uso) of those lands are not present.

XLIV.- Corollary. On the complaint of Nombre141025 and its amplification. In the present process, the Cámara Nacional de Bananeros formulated the complaint so that in judgment the nullity of the following conducts be declared: “Principal claim: The declaration of nullity of the following administrative acts: 1. The award (adjudicación) made by the National Council of Concessions in agreement number 2 of the extraordinary session No. 2-2011 of February 28, 2011, of the international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with public service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín and awarded to the offeror APM Terminal Central America B.V. 2. The award act by Nombre141024 in agreement No. 073-11, article II-a of the ordinary session No. 08-2011 of February 24, 2011, of the international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-200. 3. The agreement of the Executive Branch composed of the President of the Republic, the Minister of Public Works and Transport, and the Minister of Finance, signed on March 1, 2011, published in Alcance Digital No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54 of March 17, 2011, of the international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-00200. Subsidiary claims: 1. That the nullity of the tariff structure of the international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-00200 be declared, indicated in chapter 11, section 7. 2, for using as a basis in the traffic projection carried out in the master plan for the Limón/Moín complex, contracted to the company Royal Haskoning, which is not an updated economic feasibility study and is not supported by realistic parameters according to the volume of planting and exportation of fruits such as banana, pineapple, and melon. 2. That the nullity of the tariff structure of international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-00200 be declared, due to contradiction with article 3, subsection b of the Law of Nombre628, which establishes the principle of cost-of-service (servicio al costo). 3. That the act awarding the international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-00200 be declared null, for lacking justification in the bidding process and motivation for the act based on the univocal rules of science or technique due to not having technical studies such as the environmental and economic feasibility studies. 4. That agreement number 018-MOPT-H published in Alcance No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54 of March 17, 2001, in which the international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-00200 is awarded, be annulled for establishing that for the reception of a $20 discount on the tariff made in the economic offer, 15 measures are implemented in the award act, which will be contemplated in the contract.” In the writ of amplification of the complaint, it adds the following claims: “Principal: The declaration of nullity of the following administrative acts: 1.- The award act made by Nombre141024 in agreement No. 73-11, article II-a of the ordinary session No. 08-2011, of the international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín and awarded to the offeror APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 2.- The act of the National Council of Concessions in agreement number 2 of the extraordinary session No. 2-2011 of February 28, 2011, of the international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín and awarded to the offeror APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 3.- The award agreement made by the Executive Branch composed of the President of the Republic, the Minister of Public Works and Transport, the Minister of Finance, and signed on March 1, 2011, published in Alcance Digital No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 54 of March 17, 2011, of the international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín and awarded to the offeror APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 4. The bidding terms of international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín and awarded to the offeror APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 5.- The contract entered into by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOIN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., derived from the international public bidding 2009-LI-000001-00200, called Public Works Concession with Public Service for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Container Terminal of Puerto Moín, dated August 30, 2011. 6.- Addendum No. 1 to the Public Works Concession Contract with Public Service for the Design, Financing, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of the Moín Container Terminal, signed on November 29, 2011, and entered into by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., derived from the international public bidding 2009LI-000001-00200. 7.- The new contract dated February 13, 2012, entered into by the Executive Branch, the Executive Presidency of the Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., derived from the international public bidding 2009LI-000001-00200 promoted for ‘Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Financing, Design, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of the New Moín Container Terminal’.” 8.- Official communication DCA-0692 from the Division of Administrative Contracting (División de Contratación Administrativa) of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), dated March 21, 2012, in which it grants approval (refrendo) to the contract resulting from the executive international public tender of the Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), and the companies APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA AND APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., resulting from the international public tender 2009LI-000001-00200 promoted for the "Public Works Concession with Public Service for the Financing, Design, Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of the New Moín Container Terminal" (Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín). 9.- That procedural and personal costs be imposed jointly and severally (solidariamente) upon the defendant parties.” For its part, Nombre141024 formulated the following claims: “1. The annulment of the administrative act awarding international public tender No. Placa27259 called "Tender document for the public works concession with public service for the design, financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of the container terminal at Moín port" in favor of APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. This is because: - the tender was conducted in violation of the regulations proper to both the Concessions Law (Ley de Concesiones) and the Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación), it was done with a tender document that did not comply with the provisions of the Law on Public Works Concessions with Public Services (Ley de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos) in its Article 21, subsections 1, 2, and 3, which required having all the corresponding technical studies supporting the economic and environmental viability of the project to be concessioned, additionally in violation, a contrario sensu, of the norms from 27 to 29, both inclusive, of the cited Concessions Law, since these norms do not permit the modification of the offer after offers are formally received and by modifying the tender document and the dates for submission of offers and not providing adequate deadlines. Furthermore, by granting 15 concessions or additional benefits to the awarded company after the opening date of the offers, benefits or concessions which, had they been made known, could have allowed other interested parties to bid. 2. In accordance with Article 42, subsection b) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), I request that the administrative act awarding the international public tender No. 2009LI-000001-0200 called "Tender document for the public works concession with public service for the design, financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of the container terminal at Moín port" to the company APM TERMINAL B.V. be declared null, for lacking a justification of the tendering process, for lacking a statement of reasons (motivación) in the administrative act, based on unequivocal rules of science or technique due to not having technical studies such as the environmental and economic feasibility studies (estudios factibilidad ambiental y económico). 3. The defendants be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs incurred. Personal costs being understood not only judicial orders for the payment of experts and fees of judicial officials, but also the attorney's fees corresponding according to the applicable tariff.” XLV.- Having completed the analysis of each one of the diverse and numerous allegations presented in both the written and oral phases of the present process, a task that was undertaken by this Tribunal meticulously and objectively, no substantial defects (vicios sustanciales) have been detected that require the suppression of the contested conduct, which includes the tender document and its modifications, award acts, the concession contract generally and in its clauses, including the particular conditions contested, modifications to the contract, the act of approval (refrendo) and the conditions it includes, and addenda to the contract. In the previous sections of this present vote, the weightings that have led this Tribunal to this conclusion are on record, for which reason, in accordance with the factual and legal reasoning already set forth extensively and in detail, this Tribunal considers that the criticized acts do not suffer from substantial defects meriting declaration in this process, and therefore, the claim for annulment formulated must be rejected, both with respect to the main and the accessory or subsidiary claims raised in the complaint (demanda) and its expansion -presented by Nombre141025-. For its part, and given the integrated analysis carried out by this collegiate body, the action formulated by Nombre141024 is also not accepted, because after analyzing their allegations, raised in the oral phase—since in the written phase, the complaint (demanda) did not include a development of the legal arguments on which they based their claims—it was not possible to determine the degree of invalidity reproached, facing which, their claims in general—including the annulment claims—are improper, pursuant to numeral 121 of the CPCA, and therefore their rejection is ordered.

XLVI.- Analysis of the defenses asserted. COMPLAINT (DEMANDA) OF CANABA. Once the legally mandated transfer (traslado de ley) was granted, the sued parties answered the complaint (demanda) and opposed the following defenses: a) APM Terminal Central América B.V: failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa) and lack of merit (falta de derecho). b) State: failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa), and lack of merit (falta de derecho). c) National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones): failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa) and lack of merit (falta de derecho). d) Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA): lack of merit (falta de derecho). e) Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos): lack of merit (falta de derecho) and lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva). f) Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República): improper joinder of the dispute (indebida integración de la litis), as well as lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa), passive standing (legitimación pasiva), and lack of merit (falta de derecho). Regarding the EXPANSION OF THE COMPLAINT (AMPLIACIÓN DE LA DEMANDA), they answered in the following terms: a) APM Terminals Central America B.V.: did not oppose defenses; b) State (folios 4495-4541): failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), lack of merit (falta de derecho); c) National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones): failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa), lack of merit (falta de derecho); d) Nombre141024: lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) and lack of merit (falta de derecho); e) ARESEP: failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa) and inadmissibility of the complaint (demanda) because the deadline to challenge the tender document had precluded (por haber precluído el plazo); f) Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República): lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva), lack of merit (falta de derecho); g) APM Terminals Moín S.A.: lack of merit (falta de derecho) and defective complaint (demanda defectuosa).

XLVII.- Resolution of the defenses raised. Through resolution No. 589-2011 of 08 hours 26 minutes on April 15, 2011, the procedural judge accepted the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies (falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa) and ordered a period of 5 business days be granted to Nombre141025 for such purposes (folios 989-990 of the judicial file). Ultimately, by order of 14 hours 37 minutes on May 25, 2011, visible at folios 1018-1020, the procedural judge deemed the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) fulfilled. At the respective single hearing (audiencia única), this Tribunal noted that the cited defense of failure to exhaust had previously been resolved, as detailed above. Likewise, in said hearing, the defense of defective complaint (demanda defectuosa) was rejected.

XLVIII.- Merits defenses (Defensas de fondo). Consequently, in light of the analysis conducted in the present ruling, as it pertains to the complaint (demanda) filed by the National Chamber of Banana Growers (Cámara Nacional de Bananeros), the merits defenses must be resolved in the following sense: a) APM Terminal Central América B.V and APM Terminals Moín S.A.: lack of merit (falta de derecho): the defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) formulated by the company APM Terminal Central América B.V. and APM Terminals Moín S.A. is accepted, as nullities regarding the questioned actions could not be proven. b) State: lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) and lack of merit (falta de derecho). The defense of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) is rejected, given that the complaint (demanda) is filed under the protection of ordinal 10, first paragraph, numerals b and c of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), in the exercise of the defense of guild or, in any case, collective interests, by a group that, even partially, represents the interests of a national production sector, whose sphere of action is impacted by the questioned contracting. The defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) must be accepted in its entirety for the reasons set forth above regarding the non-existence of the alleged defects (vicios). c) National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones): lack of merit (falta de derecho). This defense must be fully accepted for the same reasons already indicated. d) Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA): lack of merit (falta de derecho). It is accepted in its entirety for the stated reasons. e) Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos): lack of merit (falta de derecho) and lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva). Regarding ARESEP, the defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) is accepted because no claim for annulment is made against any act issued by this public entity. A ruling on the defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) is omitted as unnecessary. f) Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República): lack of active standing, passive standing (falta de legitimación activa, pasiva), and lack of merit (falta de derecho). The defense of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) is rejected, given that the complaint (demanda) is filed under the protection of ordinal 10, first paragraph, numerals b and c of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), in the exercise of the defense of guild or, in any case, collective interests, by a group that, even partially, represents the interests of a national production sector, whose sphere of action is impacted by the questioned contracting. The defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) must be rejected based on ordinal 12.5, subsection a of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Part of the contested conduct is the act of approval (refrendo) issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), official communication DCA-0692, thus the action is directed against one of the administrations that issued the challenged conduct. The defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) must be accepted in its entirety. In summary, the defenses of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) formulated by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and the State are rejected. The defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) opposed by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is rejected. The defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) opposed by the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) is accepted. A ruling on the defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) opposed by that regulatory entity is omitted as unnecessary. The defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) opposed by the companies APM Terminal Central América B.V and APM Terminals Moín S.A., the State, the National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones), the Port Administration Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is accepted in its entirety. Consequently, the complaint (demanda) filed by the National Chamber of Banana Growers (Cámara Nacional de Bananeros) against the companies APM Terminal Central América B.V and APM Terminals Moín S.A., the State, the National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones), the Port Administration Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos), and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is declared without merit in all its aspects.

XLIX.- COMPLAINT (DEMANDA) OF SINTRAJAP. Regarding the complaint (demanda) of SINTRAJAP, the co-defendants formulated the following merits defenses (defensas de fondo), which are resolved in their order as follows: a) APM Terminal Central América B.V.: lack of merit (falta de derecho): the defense must be accepted as the concurrence of the alleged grounds for annulment was not proven; b) Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República): lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasivas), as well as lack of merit (falta de derecho). The defense of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) must be rejected, given that the action is pursued by an organization representing interests of collective connotation, under the protection of ordinal 10.1, subsection c of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). However, the defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) must be accepted because the complaint (demanda) of Nombre141024 does not include any claim against the actions issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), despite the fact that in the single hearing (audiencia única) it pointed out reproaches characteristic of the act of approval (refrendo), yet, in its complaint (demanda), it did not challenge this conduct. Ergo, the defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) must be accepted. A ruling on the defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) is omitted as unnecessary. c) Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) (F. 3842-3876 of the main file): raises the exceptions of lack of merit (falta de derecho) and lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva). Regarding ARESEP, the defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) is accepted because no claim for annulment is made against any act issued by this public entity. A ruling on the defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) is omitted as unnecessary. d) National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones) (f. 3881-3936 of the main file): Opposed the defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho): this defense must be accepted as no annulment to declare was determined. e) Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA): Raises the defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho); which must be accepted for the reasons stated regarding that same defense raised by the other sued parties. f) State: formulates the defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho). For parity of reason, this defense must be fully accepted. In summary, the defense of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) formulated by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is rejected. The defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) opposed by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) is accepted. A ruling on the defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) opposed by the comptroller organ and the aforementioned regulatory entity is omitted as unnecessary. The defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) opposed by the company APM Terminal Central América B.V., the State, the National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones), the Port Administration Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA) is accepted in its entirety. Consequently, the complaint (demanda) filed by the Workers' Union of Nombre141024 against the companies APM Terminal Central América B.V and APM Terminals Moín S.A., the State, the National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones), the Port Administration Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos), and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is declared without merit in all its aspects.

Nombre33221.- On costs (costas). In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. Exemption from this sentence is only viable when, in the judgment of the Tribunal, there existed sufficient grounds to litigate (motivo suficiente para litigar) or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. The same exemption applies when plus petitio occurs in the case, that is, as established in canon 194.1 of the CPCA, when the difference between the amount claimed and the amount obtained exceeds 15%, unless the bases of the complaint (demanda) are provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or expert opinion. In this case, after weighing the diverse positions presented in this judicial contest, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that this is a case characterized by high technical and legal complexity. The extent of the points analyzed in this ruling evidences the complexity of the matter. It is an issue in which it has been necessary to address a large number of aspects and which, due to its composition, required an extensive analysis. From this perspective of examination, this collegiate body considers that the positions expressed by each involved party, both plaintiffs and defendants, reflect good faith (buena fe) and sufficient grounds to litigate (motivo suficiente para litigar) to exercise the defense of their respective positions, which, within the scope of the analysis addressed, leads to the conclusion on the appropriateness of resolving the present case without special condemnation in costs (sin especial condena en costas). Indeed, the complex nature of the debated issues reflects the existence of sufficient grounds to litigate (motivo suficiente para litigar), which makes the aforementioned exemption possible. This criterion even applies to actions regarding which the defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) has been accepted, as is the case of the complaint (demanda) against Nombre628 and the case of the CGR regarding the action of SINTRAJAP. The complex processing of the international public tender that has been reviewed does not lead to the conclusion that the complaint (demanda) against those public entities was reckless or lacking in seriousness, because aside from the technical criteria used by this Tribunal to resolve the issue of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) in question, the truth of the matter is that part of the grievances presented involved those administrative units, whether participating in the consultation on the tariff aspects of the project—case of ARESEP—or in the objection phase to the tender document and appeal against the award act—in the particularity of the CGR. Consequently, this Chamber (Cámara) deems, for the reasons stated, that the proper course is to resolve the present matter without special condemnation in costs (sin especial condenatoria en costas).

THEREFORE (POR TANTO) 1. Regarding the complaint (demanda) filed by the National Chamber of Banana Growers (Cámara Nacional de Bananeros) (file 11-1347-1027-CA): The defenses of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) formulated by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and the State are rejected. The defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) opposed by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is rejected. The defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) opposed by the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) is accepted. A ruling on the defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) opposed by that regulatory entity is omitted as unnecessary. The defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) opposed by the companies APM Terminal Central América B.V and APM Terminals Moín S.A., the State, the National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones), the Port Administration Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is accepted in its entirety. Consequently, the complaint (demanda) filed by the National Chamber of Banana Growers (Cámara Nacional de Bananeros) against the companies APM Terminal Central América B.V and APM Terminals Moín S.A., the State, the National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones), the Port Administration Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos), and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is declared without merit in all its aspects. 2. Regarding the complaint (demanda) filed by the Workers' Union of Nombre141024 (file No. 11-3975-1027-CA): The defense of lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) formulated by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is rejected. The defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) opposed by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) is accepted. A ruling on the defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) opposed by the comptroller organ and the aforementioned regulatory entity is omitted as unnecessary. The defense of lack of merit (falta de derecho) opposed by the company APM Terminal Central América B.V., the State, the National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones), the Port Administration Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA) is accepted in its entirety. Consequently, the complaint (demanda) filed by the Workers' Union of Nombre141024 against the companies APM Terminal Central América B.V and APM Terminals Moín S.A., the State, the National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones), the Port Administration Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos), and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is declared without merit in all its aspects. 3. Costs (Costas): The present matter is resolved without special condemnation in costs (sin especial condena en costas), in accordance with ordinal 193, subsection b) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo).

José Roberto Garita Navarro Marianella Álvarez Molina Cynthia Abarca Gómez FILE: 11-001347-1027-CA (accumulates process 11-003975-1027-CA) MATTER: ORDINARY PROCEEDINGS (PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO) PLAINTIFF: National Chamber of Banana Growers (Cámara Nacional de Bananeros), Workers' Union JADPDEVA DEFENDANT: APM Terminal Central America B.V, Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos), National Council of Concessions (Consejo Nacional de Concesiones), Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), Port Administration and Economic Development Board of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica), and the State.

IGWT.HUP.JRGN..2012 Classification prepared by the JURISPRUDENTIAL INFORMATION CENTER (CENTRO DE INFORMACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIAL) of the Judicial Branch. Its reproduction and/or distribution for a fee is prohibited.

It is a faithful copy of the original - Taken from Nexus.PJ on: 09-05-2026 06:40:38.

Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI Clase de asunto: Proceso de conocimiento Analizado por: CENTRO DE INFORMACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIAL Sentencias Relacionadas Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: Derecho Procesal Contencioso Administrativo Tema: Legitimación en el proceso contencioso administrativo Subtemas:

Legitimación activa de CANABA para defensa de gremio al no exigirse adhesión del total de personas de ese sector específico.

Tema: Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos Subtemas:

Falta de legitimación pasiva al limitarse su competencia a resolver consulta sobre tarifas para concesión.

Tema: Contraloría General de la República Subtemas:

Falta de legitimación pasiva en demanda de nulidad de acto de adjudicación.

“IV.- Sobre la legitimación de CANABA en este proceso. La Contraloría General de la República, así como le representación del Estado formulan defensa de falta de legitimación activa respecto de CANABA. En lo medular, se esgrime, no reúne los intereses de todo el sector bananero, siendo que afilia a todos los productores e incluso, algunos de sus afiliados retiraron el apoyo. En concreto, el órgano contralor reprocha, pese a la regulación del CPCA, no ha quedado claro cuáles son los intereses que pretende tutelar la demanda. Entendiendo que invoca un interés de carácter gremial, surgen dudas si esa cámara está legitimada para defender el gremio en su conjunto. Además, indicó, no todas las compañías bananeras utilizan barcos porta-contenedores. No queda claro cuál es el perjuicio extensivo a todo el sector. Pareciera que son algunas empresas las que se verían afectadas, por lo que son aquellas las que debieron presentar el proceso. Llama la atención que pese a las tres rondas de objeción al cartel, CANABA nunca presentó recurso de objeción. No participó en la fase de depuración del cartel. Sobre el particular, cabe señalar, la participación de CANABA pretende establecerse conforme a la figura del interés gremial que tutela el numeral 10 inciso primero subinciso b del CPCA. Ciertamente puede cuestionarse si esa Cámara reúne a todos los productores y exportadores de banano del país, empero, la figura en cuestión no exige una adhesión de la totalidad de personas que se dedican a una determinada actividad para poder ejercitar ese carácter de defensa representativa de un gremio o sector específico. Cabe destacar que este tipo de legitimación busca establecerse como un marco que permite el ejercicio de acciones con proyección supra individual, es decir, busca la tutela de intereses colectivos propios de las personas que integran el gremio o corporación representada. Desde este plano, el esquema de organización que presenta CANABA, le empodera para formular acciones como la presente, en la medida en que, al menos en grado de probabilidad, la operación de la TCM objeto de cuestionamiento puede llegar a tener incidencia en el marco de actividades de sus agremiados, con independencia de si comprende a la totalidad de actores del sector bananero nacional. Nótese que no se peticiona efecto particular alguno para una determinada empresa, en cuyo caso, la legitimación debería ampararse no en el inciso b) aludido, sino en la legitimación directa del inciso a), que propende a tutelar derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos. Sin embargo, esta causa estriba en pretensiones de carácter general desde el punto de vista de los efectos en el sector representado. Lo mismo cabe señalar en cuanto al alegato de no utilizar barcos porta-contenedores, pues el que a la fecha determinado grupo de exportadores no los utilicen, no implica que el sistema de gestión portuaria que pretende incorporar el diseño de la TCM, no sea utilizado por esas entidades representadas. Sobre la negativa de la legitimación activa por la falta de cuestionamiento del cartel, será un tema a abordar infra. En consecuencia, no observa este Tribunal defecto en la legitimación de CANABA, dadas las pretensiones concretas formuladas, ante lo cual, la defensa debe ser rechazada.

V.- Sobre la legitimación de la ARESEP. La representación del ente regulador formula defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva. Aduce, no se deduce ninguna pretensión específica en contra de la ARESEP en la que se cuestione de manera abierta el contenido de actos emitidos por la Aresep. Como se ha señalado, CANABA reformuló sus pretensiones en escrito de ampliación de la demanda presentado en fecha 12 de abril del 2012, (folios 4291-4366 del principal). En este escrito, como tampoco en el escrito original que ha generado este proceso, se incorpora una sola pretensión en la que se busque la supresión de conductas imputables a la ARESEP. Tal pedimento se echa de menos además en la demanda de SINTRAJAP, la que se dedica a peticionar nulidad de la adjudicación y del contrato de concesión respectivo. En efecto, tal y como argumenta la ARESEP, en esta causa, no se ha establecido por los co-accionantes pretensión alguna concreta de invalidez de actos referibles a la ARESEP, que permitan tenerle como parte pasiva en esta contienda. Si bien es cierto dentro del marco de las alegaciones planteadas se hacen referencias a la factibilidad económica del proyecto de TCM y se exponen alusiones a la veracidad y validez de la información utilizada para establecer las tarifas que tal concesión propone cobrar a los usuarios de la terminal portuaria, lo cierto del caso es que no se indica concretamente y de manera específica, qué pretensión pretende oponerse frente a la citada Autoridad Reguladora, de manera que el objeto de esta causa exija tenerle como parte demandada. En esta línea, conviene precisar, el artículo 21 de la Ley No. 7762 señala la obligatoriedad de la consulta que la Secretaría Técnica del CNC debe realizar a la ARESEP sobre la estructura tarifaria y los parámetros de ajuste que se incorporarán en el cartel de licitación; así como de los parámetros que se utilizarán para evaluar la calidad del servicio, dictamen a emitirse en el plazo de diez días y cuya naturaleza será vinculante. La participación de la ARESEP en el trámite de la TCM conforme a la Ley No. 7762 permite cuestionarse su marco de legitimación pasivo conforme a los ordinales 12.1 y 12.6 del CPCA. En cuanto al inciso primero aludido, la normativa procesal señala que se tendrá como parte demandada a la Administración Pública autora de la conducta administrativa objeto del proceso. En este caso, como se ha señalado, no se cuestiona ninguna conducta de la ARESEP de manera directa, siendo que los pedimentos anulatorios recaen sobre la adjudicación, el contrato, sus adendas, el refrendo y el cartel de licitación. El que se invoquen disconformidades en cuanto a los cálculos tarifarios no puede tenerse como impugnación directa de actos referibles a la ARESEP. Aún cuando en las peticiones subsidiarias se busque la supresión de las estructuras tarifarias del contrato, lo cierto es que ello no implica la legitimación pasiva de la ARESEP en esta causa, a la luz de lo preceptuado por el inciso 6 del canon 12 del CPCA, como de seguido se explica. E n cuanto al inciso 6 mencionado, la participación de la ARESEP en este trámite no le permite tenerle como accionada. La normativa en cuestión estipula lo siguiente: "Cuando una entidad dicte algún acto o disposición que, para su firmeza, requiera previo control, autorización, aprobación o conocimiento, por parte de un órgano del Estado o de otra entidad administrativa, se tendrá como parte demandada: a) El Estado o la entidad que dictó el acto o la disposición fiscalizados, si el resultado de la fiscalización ha sido aprobatorio. (...)" Ciertamente la ARESEP no aprueba las tarifas de la TCM, es este un tema que ha de incluirse dentro del contrato según lo establece el canon 41 de la Ley No. 7762. Lleva razón el mandatario de este ente administrativo en cuanto a que su participación dentro del trámite de la TCM -acorde a la Ley No. 7762- se limita a atender la consulta sobre tarifas, estructura, modelos de ajuste y principios de calidad, así como los costos para inversión, según el canon 7 del Reglamento a la Ley No. 7762. En este trámite, la ARESEP propone una tarifa máxima, pero es el contrato el instrumento que fija la remuneración definitiva, así como sus mecanismos de ajuste. Luego de esta consulta, solo ostenta competencias de conocer de los aspectos económicos de la concesión si hay divergencia entre la Administración concedente y el concesionario, en tanto se formula el recurso de apelación, o bien, si se presentan denuncias por prestación defectuosa del servicio -art. 41 Ley No. 7762-. Bajo este esquema, el dictamen de la ARESEP dio base a tarifas incluso menores a las cuantificadas, de lo que se puede concluir, emitió su anuencia al modelo consultado. En ese caso, a tono con el inciso a del numeral 6 del artículo 12 del CPCA, y con independencia de la crítica que a tal tratamiento legal pueda realizarse, lo cierto del caso es que esa fuente legal establece que en esos supuestos, la Administración demandada será la que emite el acto sujeto a fiscalización, no así la que ejercita sus competencias de fiscalización -como lo es la ARESEP-, lo que supone en consecuencia, su falta de legitimación pasiva en este proceso. Por otro lado, debe añadirse, ese dictamen emitido consiste en un acto de trámite, preparatorio, obligatorio y vinculante, pero interno a fin de cuentas. Por ende, conforme el canon 163.2 LGAP, ese acto solo puede atacarse junto con el acto final que lo contiene. Sin embargo, como se ha puesto en evidencia, no se critica actuación alguna de la ARESEP, sino solo esos actos finales. Lo anterior sin perjuicio del análisis que del tema tarifario se realizará infra. Por ende, debe acogerse la defensa objeto de análisis. En consecuencia, debe declararse sin lugar la demanda incoada por CANABA y por SINTRAJAP contra la ARESEP . Sobre las costas, será un extremo a analizar en el aparte correspondiente.

VI.- Sobre la legitimación pasiva de la CGR ante la demanda de SINTRAJAP. La Contraloría General de la República formula defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva ante la demanda incoada por SINTRAJAP. Señala, no hay ninguna conducta de la CGR impugnada, lo que lleva a la falta de legitimación, ya que no hay ningún fundamento del Sindicato para demandar a la CGR. Esto queda evidenciado desde el plano de las pretensiones. La demanda es anulatoria y no hay ninguna solicitud de anulación de conducta o acto del órgano contralor. Solo se pide la nulidad del acto de adjudicación. No hay base para que figure como demandada en este proceso. Analizado a fondo el alegato del órgano contralor así como la acción presentada por SINT R AJAP, lleva razón la CGR por los motivos que de seguido se exponen. Cuando la CGR es parte pasiva del proceso, el tema merece un tratamiento particular. En efecto, en estos supuestos, el juzgador debe discriminar cuando la conducta impugnada, atribuible a la CGR, es propio de su ejercicio fiscalizador de carácter externo, es decir, cuando ejercita sus potestades constitucionales y legales de fiscalización y control de las materias que como instancia técnica especializada le han sido confiadas, de aquellos casos en que la conducta objeto de la causa es inherente a su régimen interno. Por este último ha de entenderse aquel conjunto de acciones en las que no funge como instancia fiscalizadora, es decir, no se cuestiona su competencia fiscalizadora, sino una función administrativa interna. En este caso, cuando la CGR ejerce sus potestades de fiscalización, de carácter externo, ha de distinguirse entre los supuestos previstos en el inciso 5 del artículo 12 del CPCA. En ese plano, cuando el proceso tenga por objeto el reproche de una conducta suya propia (del órgano contralor), relacionada con el ejercicio de su competencia constitucional y legal, la causa ha de formularse contra la CGR en litisconsorcio pasivo necesario conjuntamente con el Estado. En este caso, aquella será representada por sus propios mandatarios, en tanto que al Estado lo representará la Procuraduría General de la República. Este es el supuesto regulado por el inciso a) de ese precepto. Es precisamente, para claridad del tema, lo que ha sucedido en esta contienda, pues siendo lo debatido acciones propias de la CGR, se integró como parte pasiva al Estado. Ahora bien, cuando el proceso tenga por objeto una conducta administrativa sometida a su control, en el ejercicio de sus potestades de fiscalización o tutela superior de la Hacienda Pública, el inciso b) de ese mismo enunciado señala que la CGR es parte pasiva del proceso, conjuntamente con el ente fiscalizado, de nuevo, en litis consorcio pasivo necesario. Con todo, en este supuesto, la participación de la CGR es válida cuando en su ejercicio de fiscalización, haya emitido conductas, sea por haber resuelto el recurso de objeción, recurso de apelación o bien otorgado el refrendo. En la especie, no se cuestiona ningún acto imputable a la CGR por parte de SINTRAJAP. Nótese que según el escrito visible a folios 2330-2417, así como su corrección a planas 3639-3677 del principal, lo cuestionado es el acto de adjudicación. SINTRAJAP no extendió el objeto de este proceso al refrendo contralor o en general a alguna actuación imputable a la CGR. Ello no se desprende ni del ámbito formal ni material de la demanda, por lo que este Tribunal no podría suponer una suerte de pretensión material que involucre a la CGR en el conjunto de pretensiones deducidas en esta causa. Desde este plano, no concurren entonces los presupuestos previstos en el ordinal 12.5 del CPCA de modo que pueda tenerse como parte demandada de la acción de SINTRAJAP a esa instancia contralora especializada. En consecuencia, lo debido es declarar con lugar la falta de legitimación pasiva planteada por la CGR contra la demanda de SINTRAJAP. Respecto de esta acción, se declara sin lugar la demanda . Sobre las costas, será un extremo a analizar en el aparte correspondiente.” ... Ver más Citas de Legislación y Doctrina Contenido de Interés:

Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: Derecho Administrativo Tema: Contratación administrativa Subtemas:

Alcances del principio de legalidad.

Tema: Principio de legalidad en materia administrativa Subtemas:

Alcances del principio en la contratación administrativa.

“VII.- Sobre la sujeción a la legalidad en los procedimientos de contratación administrativa. En razón de las alegaciones planteadas por las partes involucradas en esta contienda y el objeto mismo del proceso, resulta determinante abordar, aún de manera breve la temática relacionada con la legalidad que ha de imperar en la dinámica de los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, sus controles, así como los mecanismos que regulan los supuestos en los que esos procedimientos resultan vulnerados, como es el caso de la denominada contratación irregular. La actividad de la contratación administrativa, como cualquier manifestación de las potestades públicas, se encuentra sujeta al bloque de legalidad en sentido amplio, debiendo sujetar su funcionamiento al contenido y alcance de las normas jurídicas que regulan determinado procedimiento. Esta sujeción se concreta en el denominado principio de legalidad (sea en su versión positiva, como en la clásica versión negativa), cuyo sustento normativo se afinca en los preceptos 11 de la Carta Magna, 11, 12, 13, 59 y 66 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. De ahí que la actividad contractual pública solo pueda entenderse válida cuando sea sustancialmente conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico (numeral 128 ibídem), tal y como en efecto lo establece el canon 32 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Por ende, los trámites o acciones dentro del curso de la fase de contratación administrativa así como de su ejecución, que se desliguen de los criterios jurídicos que impone el ordenamiento en tal materia, producen nulidades que pueden llevar a suprimir la contratación o los actos concretos que desatiendan tales exigencias, según se colige del ordinal 3 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, norma que remite a las ordenanzas de la Ley General de la Administración Pública en cuanto a la dinámica de la patología de la contratación pública. Esta actividad (contratación) se constituye en un instrumento relevante para la adquisición de parte de las administraciones públicas de los bienes y/o servicios que requiera para el ejercicio de sus actividades, o bien, para la satisfacción del interés público. Desde ese plano, debe entenderse la contratación pública bajo un prisma instrumental, que no un fin en sí mismo, lo que supone, se constituye en una herramienta para la concreción de un fin último o destino. De ahí que la percepción e interpretación de esta materia deba propender a potenciar el cumplimiento de la eficiencia y la eficacia que es propia del funcionamiento público. En esa línea, el numeral 4 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa señala con claridad que "Todos los actos relativos a la actividad de contratación administrativa deberán estar orientados al cumplimiento de los fines, las metas y los objetivos de la administración, con el propósito de garantizar la efectiva satisfacción del interés general, a partir de un uso eficiente de los recursos institucionales." Ello supone un criterio rector en cuestiones hermenéuticas de las diversas figuras que convergen en esta dinámica y compleja materia administrativa, de manera que permitan la satisfacción del fin último para el cual se emiten, a tono con lo preceptuado por el artículo 10 de la LGAP. Bajo esta dinámica, es claro que el fin del sistema de contratación no es otro que proporcionar a la Administración los mecanismos procedimentales que permitan obtener los insumos aludidos con un esquema que busca, como tesis de principio, la selección de la oferta más favorable, entendiendo por tal, aquella que se ajuste de mejor manera a las exigencias de la Administración en el caso concreto, las que deben ser reflejadas en las condiciones cartelarias que dan base al concurso público. Para ello, el canon 5 de la citada legislación implementa los principios de igualdad y libre participación, de modo que exista libertad de proposición u oferta de contratar con la Administración, sujeto claro está, a las condiciones que en el procedimiento específico, ésta establezca y que no supongan un desconocimiento de esa apertura participativa y equidad. En virtud de ello, en la valoración de las plicas, ha de prevalecer el fondo sobre la forma, aplicando una máxima de conservación de las ofertas. Es evidente que el cumplimiento de ese cometido requiere de mecanismos de contratación flexibles que no sujeten a la Administración a condiciones en extremo formalistas que lejos de satisfacer sus necesidades, las trunquen, pues en esa medida, el instrumento atentaría contra el fin. Un sistema de contratación pública debe ajustarse a ese marco de necesidades, sin perder de vista las fases de control previo o posterior que garanticen el correcto cumplimiento de los procedimientos y principios mínimos que son atinentes a este campo. Con todo, la adaptabilidad que es propia en los servicios públicos no ha de ser un fenómeno ajeno a la contratación administrativa, la que debe evolucionar y reaccionar frente a modalidades contractuales cada vez más dinámicas, en ocasiones atípicas, permitiendo a las Administraciones utilizar esos mecanismos para satisfacer de mejor manera sus necesidades, se insiste, con respeto de los controles que en materia de administración de recursos públicos es propia. La trascendencia de este instituto se observa en su basamento constitucional, en concreto, en el canon 182 de la Carta Magna, norma a partir de la cual, la misma Sala Constitucional ha realizado un amplio análisis, entre muchas, en la resolución No. 998-98, en la que elevó a rango constitucional todos los principios asociados a la contratación administrativa, posición que no corresponde analizar en este caso. Sin embargo, debe tenerse claridad, si bien la contratación pública es de base constitucional, lo que puede observase también en el numeral 140 inciso 19, 121 inciso 14 y el citado numeral 182, su desarrollo es fundamentalmente legal, siendo la Ley de Contratación Administrativa la fuente que expone de manera más prolija el régimen que es propio a esta área del derecho público. Todo este desarrollo, junto con las demás normas sectoriales de ese campo (lo que incluye el RLCA), constituye el referente normativo al que se encuentran sujetas las Administraciones que deben ajustar su marco de acción contractual a ese régimen, constituyendo así parte esencial y delimitadora de la legalidad de sus actuaciones. Ahora, dado el carácter bilateral del contrato administrativo (en el cual, a diferencia del acto administrativo, concurren dos voluntades para la configuración y perfeccionamiento de la relación contractual), la sinalagmasis propia de la figura exige la claridad de las normas que rigen la contratación, a fin de evitar acciones que desapliquen ese régimen y busquen, en contradicción del principio de igualdad y libre participación, acuerdos entre la Administración y un oferente, al margen de esos procedimientos, sin haber acreditado que se trata de la mejor oferta. La publicidad notoria de un sistema de contratación pública hace inaplicable cualquier intento de alegar desconocimiento de ese régimen, bajo la aplicación de la regla que subyace en el mandato 129 constitucional, en virtud del cual, nadie puede alegar desconocimiento de la ley. En materia de concesión de obra pública, la aplicación del régimen de nulidades de la Ley No. 6227/78 viene reconocida en el artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 27098-MOPT, del 12 de junio de 1998, publicado en Alcance No. 27 a La Gaceta No. 115 de 16 de junio de 1998, "Reglamento a la Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos". Ahora bien ese cotejo de validez debe ejercitarse dentro de un especial régimen recursivo en sede administrativa o bien, en el análisis de la validez de la conducta pública en fase judicial ante esta jurisdicción a tono con el ordinal 49 de la Carta Magna. Esto último será de tratamiento ulteriormente. En lo que respecta a la revisión administrativa de las conductas dictadas en el curso del procedimiento administrativo, el numeral 81 de la Ley No. 7494 regula el tema del recurso de objeción, a formularse dentro del primer tercio del plazo para recibir ofertas, por cualquier interesado, potencial oferente o representación de intereses colectivos -e incluso difusos- que puedan verse potencialmente afectados. En el marco de la Ley No. 7762, tal posibilidad se concreta en el numeral 34, tema a tratar infra. Contra el acto de adjudicación, según lo establecen los ordinales 84 y 87, según el monto de la contratación, procede el recurso de apelación ante la CGR o bien el de revocatoria ante la misma Administración (lo que incluye la denominada apelación interna, cuando el órgano adjudicador no sea el jerarca de la respectiva Administración). En la Ley No.7762, por ser régimen especial, el numeral 35 solo establece el recurso de apelación ante la CGR. Se trata de un régimen recursivo especializado en virtud del cual, solo ese tipo de recurso en particular puede formularse contra esos actos, sin que sea posible la formulación de algún otro, lo que se ha dado en llamar "Principio de Taxatividad Impugnaticia". De ese modo, la sujeción a legalidad se constituye en un norte fundamental al que debe someterse toda Administración Pública en el curso de los procedimientos de contratación administrativa.” ... Ver más Citas de Legislación y Doctrina Sentencias Relacionadas Contenido de Interés:

Temas Estrategicos: Ambiental Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: Derecho Administrativo Tema: Concesión de obra pública Subtemas:

Caso de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín. Régimen Jurídico, alcances de los estudios previos y equilibrio del contrato. Análisis de la factibilidad económico-financiera y ambiental de proyecto.

Tema: Concesión de servicio público Subtemas:

Caso de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín. Análisis de la factibilidad económico-financiera y ambiental de proyecto. Régimen Jurídico, alcances de los estudios previos y equilibrio del contrato.

Tema: Consejo Nacional de Concesiones Subtemas:

Análisis como órgano con personalidad jurídica instrumental. Competencias en el caso de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín.

Tema: Licitación pública Subtemas:

Impugnación de normas cartelarias en el caso de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín. Régimen Jurídico y alcances del equilibrio del contrato. Análisis de la factibilidad económico-financiera y ambiental de proyecto de concesión de obra con interés público.

Tema: Cartel de licitación pública Subtemas:

Impugnación de normas cartelarias en el caso de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín. Posibilidad de modificaciones de oficio o a gestión de parte.

Tema: Principio de preclusión Subtemas:

Aplicación en la impugnación de norma cartelarias en el caso de concesión de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín.

Tema: Viabilidad ambiental Subtemas:

Análisis con respecto a la concesión de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín.

Tema: Estudio de impacto ambiental Subtemas:

Fundamento, tipos y análisis en caso de la concesión de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín.

Tema: Monopolio estatal Subtemas:

Concesión de obra pública de la terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín no lo constituye.

Tema: Contraloría General de la República Subtemas:

Regulación de la potestad de refrendo en los contratos públicos.

Tema: Discrecionalidad administrativa Subtemas:

Aplicación en refrendo de la CGR de concesión de obra pública para Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín.

“VIII.- Sobre la modalidad contractual de concesión de obra pública con servicios públicos. Generalidades. Régimen Jurídico. Análisis sobre los estudios previos. Mediante la Ley No. de 14 abril 1998 p ublicado en Alcance No. 17 a la Gaceta 98, de 22 mayo 1998, se emite la Ley de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicios Públicos, normativa que se constituye en un orden normativo específico que precisa las reglas que han de ser satisfechas en la dinámica de las contrataciones administrativas cuyo objeto sea la concesión de una obra pública o bien, en los casos en que esa concesión se concede además, bajo un sistema que incluya la prestación de servicios públicos. En este contexto, el inciso 2 del artículo primero de esa fuente legal establece que ha de entenderse por cada una de ambas modalidades contractuales. En ese sentido, se entiende por Concesión de obra pública, el contrato administrativo por el cual la Administración concedente encarga a un tercero, el cual puede ser persona pública, privada o mixta, el diseño, la planificación, el financiamiento, la construcción, la conservación, ampliación o reparación de cualquier bien inmueble público, a cambio de contraprestaciones cobradas a los usuarios de la obra o a los beneficiarios del servicio o de contrapartidas de cualquier tipo pagadas por la Administración concedente. Por su parte, la Concesión de Obra con Servicio Público debe entenderse como el contrato administrativo por el cual la Administración encarga a un tercero, el cual puede ser persona pública, privada o mixta, el diseño, la planificación, el financiamiento, la construcción, conservación, ampliación o reparación de cualquier bien inmueble público, así como su explotación, prestando los servicios previstos en el contrato a cambio de contraprestaciones cobradas a los usuarios de la obra o a los beneficiarios del servicio o de contrapartidas de cualquier tipo pagadas por la Administración concedente. Como se observa, el contrato en cuestión dista mucho de ser una manera de gestión contractualista que busque simplemente la construcción de obras públicas, sino que comprende aspectos más complejos, que pueden incluir el diseño, el financiamiento, la operación, mantenimiento, remodelación, entre otras manifestaciones. No se trata solamente de la adquisición de parte de la administración concedente de un requerimiento de servicios de construcción de obra, aspecto que en todo caso consiste en solo una de las variaciones que en el ámbito de esta modalidad de contractualismo administrativo puede darse. Con todo, al tenor del ordinal 113 de la Ley No. 6227/78, la utilización de esta modalidad de gestión pública ha de estar sustentada debidamente en la satisfacción de intereses públicos, lo que exige, la realización de una serie de análisis previos, de diversa índole, -tema que se tratará infra- para justificar la apertura de un procedimiento de contratación de esta naturaleza, así como la debida motivación a que está sujeta y condicionada toda decisión pública (doctrina del mandato 136 LGAP). En el caso concreto de las contrataciones emprendidas al amparo de la Ley No. 7762, el canon segundo señala con claridad sobre este punto "Toda obra y su explotación son susceptibles de concesión cuando existan razones de interés público, que deberán constar en el expediente mediante acto razonado." No obstante, ese mismo precepto fija el ámbito de aplicación de la figura de marras, al señalar su inaplicabilidad para la materia de telecomunicaciones, la electricidad y los servicios de salud (exclusión incorporada por reforma realizada mediante la Ley No. 8643 de 30 de junio del 2008). De igual modo, en lo que atañe a los muelles de Limón, Moín, Caldera y Puntarenas, solo podrán concesionarse obras nuevas o las ampliaciones que ahí se realicen, siendo inviable utilizar ese mecanismo sobre las obras ya existentes. En tales casos el 70% de los ingresos obtenidos por la administración concedente conforme a los parámetros del ordinal 42 de la Ley No. 7762, en razón de las obras nuevas o ampliaciones que se concesionen en los citados muelles, será girado a la Junta de la Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica y el Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, según corresponda, para ser destinado exclusivamente a inversiones en obras de las respectivas provincias, sin que pueda utilizarse para cubrir gastos administrativos. Parte relevante de las implicaciones de esta tipología contractual en el marco de las obras en los citados muelles, es que una vez fenecido el plazo del pacto, las obras públicas levantadas por el concesionario pasan a ser titularidad de JAPDEVA o el INCOOP, según corresponda. Ahora bien, como se ha señalado, esta Ley No. 7762 incorpora una serie de regulaciones atinentes a este tipo contractual, cuyos principios y contenido prevalecen sobre otras normas escritas. Así, en materia de derechos y obligaciones de las partes (concedente-concesionario-usuarios, numerales 15-19 de dicha ley), procedimiento y etapas contractuales (arts. 20-39), régimen económico del contrato, aparte en el que se establecen los temas de incidencia financiera y retributiva de la contratación (arts. 40-48), régimen sancionatorio (arts. 49-55), plazo y formas de extinción de la relación contractual (numerales 56-69 ibídem). Atendiendo a esto, merece destacarse, las controversias que puedan generarse en el curso de la instrucción de un procedimiento acorde a esta tipología, divergencias en el perfeccionamiento del contrato, su suscripción o ejecución, deben ser resueltos aplicando en primera instancia las ordenanzas de dicha legislación, empero, es claro para este Tribunal, ello no es óbice para la aplicación supletoria de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y su reglamento, en los casos en que por integración así sea de mérito. En esa línea, el numeral 4 de la Ley No. 7762 señala con claridad, esos conflictos han de ser resueltos aplicando por su orden, dicha ley y su reglamento, el cartel de licitación, la oferta del adjudicatario, el contrato de concesión, así como las demás fuentes del ordenamiento jurídico nacional.

IX.- Como se ha señalado, parte fundamental de este tipo de contratos de concesión de obra pública con o sin servicio público, es la debida motivación que permita establecer su necesidad como medio de satisfacción de los intereses públicos, tema que se concreta mediante la satisfacción de exigencias mínimas que determinen la necesidad de la obra, pero además su pertinencia técnica y jurídica. De modo similar al numeral 7 de la Ley No. 7494 que exige la expresión de los motivos técnicos y jurídicos para la apertura de un expediente de contratación administrativa (que debe encabezar el respectivo expediente), en el caso de las relaciones regidas por la Ley No. 7762, esta mención viene impuesta por los ordinales 5.2, 9 y 21. De previo a ingresar sobre el contenido de estas normas, cabe señalar, esta legislación otorga o concede un papel protagónico al Consejo Nacional de Concesiones en el llevamiento de los procedimientos de contratación, órgano de desconcentración máxima con personalidad jurídica instrumental creado en el artículo 6 de esa fuente legal. Ello se pone en evidencia a lo largo de toda la ley. Ahora bien, sobre las exigencias previas para acreditar la necesidad y conveniencia de una determinada obra pública y con ello, de otorgar concesión sobre la misma, el artículo 5 de la Ley No. 7762 señala en su párrafo segundo: "2.- Cuando el objeto de la concesión se encuentre dentro del ámbito de competencia de un órgano del Poder Ejecutivo, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, demostrada previamente la factibilidad legal, técnica, ambiental, económica y financiera del proyecto, será la entidad técnica competente para actuar en la etapa de procedimiento de contratación y, cuando sea necesario durante la ejecución del contrato.(...)" De su lado, el canon 9 inciso primero, aparte, a, concede a la Secretaría Técnica del CNC la potestad de "a) Contratar, previa autorización del Consejo, los estudios técnicos requeridos para acreditar la factibilidad de los proyectos de concesión." Ambas normas son congruentes en la relevancia de los citados estudios técnicos, relevancia que además se visualiza incluso en los proyectos de iniciativa privada, supuesto en el que, a tono con el mandato 20 ibídem, esos proyectos deben estar revestidos de interés público y acompañados de los respectivos estudios de factibilidad técnica, ambiental y económica, así como de un plan de construcción y explotación. En el canon 21 ejusdem, se establece con claridad qué tipo de estudios requiere una contratación de esta índole, así como el trámite -en general- aplicable a estos casos. La relevancia de esa norma para efectos de este proceso exige su referencia literal: "Artículo 21.-Trámite 1.- Corresponderá a la Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones realizar las actividades y los estudios necesarios para preparar la licitación de la concesión. Dentro de los estudios deberá incluirse el de impacto ambiental; para ello se dará audiencia por cinco días hábiles al Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, a fin de que determine el tipo de estudio por realizar. Terminado el estudio, se dará nueva audiencia a este Ministerio, que dispondrá de un plazo improrrogable de quince días hábiles para pronunciarse y su criterio será vinculante. Transcurrido este plazo sin recibir ninguna respuesta, se interpretará que el Ministerio no tiene objeciones. 2.- La Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones deberá consultar, a la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, la estructura tarifaria y los parámetros de ajuste que se incorporarán en el cartel de licitación; asimismo, los parámetros que se utilizarán para evaluar la calidad del servicio. Esta Autoridad dispondrá de diez días hábiles para rendir su criterio, el cual será vinculante. Transcurrido este plazo sin recibir respuesta, se interpretará que la Autoridad no tiene objeciones. 3.- Realizados los estudios y demostrada la factibilidad del proyecto, la Secretaría Técnica procederá a elaborar el cartel de licitación, que será sometido a la aprobación del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones. 4.- Cuando la Administración concedente sea un ente del sector descentralizado, territorial e institucional, o una empresa pública y no haya convenido en que el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones realice el procedimiento de selección del concesionario y la ejecución del contrato de concesión, corresponderá al respectivo ente público realizar los estudios y actividades necesarios para preparar la licitación de la concesión, siguiendo los parámetros establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento, para la Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones. 5.- Una vez aprobado el cartel por el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones o el jerarca de la Administración concedente, deberá publicarse un resumen de él en La Gaceta, con lo cual se entenderá iniciado el proceso de licitación. El resumen deberá publicarse, además, en dos diarios de mayor circulación nacional." Precisamente, en esta causa se acusa la vulneración de ese numeral, en la medida en que, a decir de los accionantes, no se ha acreditado mediante los estudios técnicos de rigor, la factibilidad económico-financiera y ambiental. Ello exige ingresar a analizar las implicaciones y contenido de los estudios aludidos, en este punto, de manera general, para luego, en cada agravio formulado, abordarse de manera específica. El primer estudio que requiere la normativa aludida, es el de factibilidad técnica. En este punto, se trata de la acreditación de la necesidad y/o pertinencia de la obra o de ese diseño de gestión desde el plano eminentemente técnico, lo que puede considerar una serie de variables que no existen de manera aislada, pues la pertinencia técnica debe vincularse con el tema ambiental que adelante se tratará. En este primer aspecto, la Administración debe acreditar, a modo de ejemplo, que el diseño propuesto de la obra se ajusta a las necesidades que se pretenden cubrir con ese desarrollo. Es claro, se insiste que este punto no puede desvincularse de los demás, pues las incidencias económicas del proyecto, así como las ambientales son primarias en la adopción de decisiones finales. En lo tocante al estudio ambiental, cabe hacer la siguiente precisión. El párrafo inicial del artículo objeto de referencia señala la necesidad de satisfacer la variable del impacto ambiental. Sin embargo, se indica que el proyecto será puesto en conocimiento del MINAET por cinco días para que señale el tipo de estudio a realizar, el que una vez efectuado, será puesto a su conocimiento por el plazo de quince días para que emita criterio vinculante, teniéndose en tales casos el silencio administrativo como indicativo de no tener objeciones sobre el proyecto. Como se observa, no expresa esa norma un tipo de estudio en particular, ni alude a factibilidad o viabilidad ambiental, sino a la potestad del MINAET para establecer la clase de estudio a realizar, considerando las particularidades del proyecto. De ahí que no pueda afirmarse sobre la existencia de un solo tipo de estudio a elaborar en esa dinámica, pues resulta evidente que el análisis a realizar será el que determine la Administración Ambiental. Por otro lado, el numeral 21 de la Ley No. 7762 señala la obligatoriedad de la Secretaría Técnica del CNC de consultar a la ARESEP sobre la estructura tarifaria y los parámetros de ajuste que se incorporarán en el cartel de licitación; así como de los parámetros que se utilizarán para evaluar la calidad del servicio, dictamen a emitirse en el plazo de diez días y cuya naturaleza será vinculante. De nuevo, el silencio de la ARESEP se tendrá como indicativo de no objeción al proyecto. Desde este plano, no sería atribuible a la Administración concedente aspectos relacionados a los análisis económicos realizados por la ARESEP, en la medida de la vinculatoriedad de sus análisis. En consecuencia, solo cuando en el expediente se acredite la satisfacción de estas exigencias, es factible continuar con el trámite. Se trataría por ende de la cobertura de presupuestos infranqueables sin los cuales, la legitimidad y validez del procedimiento estaría en duda.

X.- Sobre la impugnación a las normas cartelarias. Preclusión procedimental. Posibilidad de modificaciones al cartel de licitación y fases posteriores. De previo a ingresar al análisis de la completez o satisfacción de los estudios técnicos de factibilidad ambiental y económica que presentan los demandantes, es menester precisar lo que de seguido se expone. Ciertamente, a la luz del ordinal 49 de la Carta Magna, esta jurisdicción se ha establecido constitucionalmente para ejercer un control de validez de la función administrativa (párrafo primero), así como la tutela de las situaciones jurídicas de las personas (párrafo tercero), en la medida en que se vean incididas por conductas u omisiones del poder público, sea por la creación, modificación o extinción de esas situaciones, que desde luego, incluyen, como mínimo, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos. Este marco de tutela descansa sobre la base de cuatro pilares constitucionales, a saber: sometimiento del Estado -en sentido amplio- al Derecho, control universal de la función administrativa, distribución de funciones y la justicia pronta y cumplida. Desde esta arista, las diversas manifestaciones del poder público, salvo las excepciones previstas expresamente por el legislador, son controlables dentro del proceso contencioso administrativo (ejemplo de esa exclusión son los denominados actos de gobierno o políticos, bajo el alegato que no son función administrativa, empero, aún en esos casos, la responsabilidad que de éstos se produzca debe ser conocida en esta sede). Con todo, no todo acto público es de posible reproche en esta jurisdicción, pues a tono con el ordinal 36 inciso c) del CPCA, la pretensión, en la medida que se relacione con un proceder formal de una Administración Pública (pues además puede recaer sobre omisiones o conductas materiales), debe vincularse con un acto final, firme o de trámite con efecto propio. Empero, ha de precisarse esa disposición, siendo que en los casos en que aún pervive la tradición del agotamiento obligatorio de la vía administrativa (art. 31.1 CPCA, fallo 3669-2006 Sala Constitucional), el pedimento debe recaer sobre un acto firme, no siendo posible el cuestionamiento del acto final. Esto quedaría reservado para la materia de impugnación de decisiones municipales, siempre que la apelación corresponda conocerla a la Sección III del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo (pues cuando tal circunstancia no se presente, tal requerimiento no sería imperativo), o bien, en menesteres de contratación administrativa, cuando el recurso de objeción o de apelación -según corresponda-, deba ser conocido por la Contraloría General de la República (por paridad de razón, cuando así no se encuentre previsto, el agotamiento sería solo facultativo). Pues bien, en el marco del régimen recursivo que opera en la materia regulada en la Ley No. 7762, el numeral 34 regula lo atinente a las impugnaciones o cuestionamientos que puedan realizarse al cartel de la licitación. De igual modo, el artículo 35 ibídem alude al régimen de impugnación contra el acto de adjudicación. Interesa en este aparte lo relativo a los cuestionamientos que se hacen sobre el cartel de licitación. En los diversos escritos de contestación de la demanda, el Estado, APM Terminal y el CNC formularon la defensa de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa. En igual sentido la CGR. Como se ha señalado ut supra, tal defensa fue acogida mediante la resolución No. 589-2011 del juzgador de trámite, y luego se tuvo por satisfecho el citado agotamiento mediante el auto de las 14 horas 37 minutos del 25 de mayo del 2011, visible a folios 1018-1020 del principal, criterio posteriormente confirmado mediante el auto de las 13 horas 35 minutos del 17 de junio del 2011, mismo en el que se conocía, entre otras cuestiones, el recurso de revocatoria que contra aquel primer auto presentó la CGR (folios 1036-1042 del principal). En la audiencia única celebrada en este trámite preferente, el Estado reitera la citada defensa, ante lo cual, este Tribunal indicó que ya el asunto estaba resuelto por la instancia de trámite, por lo que no cabía su invocación de nuevo en la fase preliminar de esa audiencia, sin perjuicio de conocer sus argumentaciones por el fondo. Un análisis de los alegatos presentados sobre este particular llevan a establecer que la decisión del juzgador de trámite en cuanto a la citada defensa se limitó a resolver en cuanto a la oponibilidad de ese requisito respecto de las pretensiones anulatorias vinculadas con el acto final de adjudicación dentro del proceso de Licitación Pública Internacional No. 2009-LI-000001-00200. Empero, ese análisis no incluye la ponderación de los alegatos del Estado respecto de los pedimentos planteados sobre el cartel de licitación. En cuanto a ese particular, es menester precisar lo siguiente. A tono con el ordinal 34 de la Ley No. 7762, en el tipo de contrataciones públicas que nos ocupa, contra el cartel de licitación procede la formulación del recurso de objeción dentro del primer tercio del plazo conferido para presentar oferta, recurso que deberá ser formulado ante la Contraloría General de la República. Ciertamente, en esta materia, dadas las implicaciones del citado voto 3669-2006, así como del inciso primero del ordinal 31 del CPCA, el ejercicio de ese recurso sería una exigencia obligatoria y presupuesto de acceso al proceso contencioso administrativo. Ahora, si bien lo resuelto por los juzgadores de trámite sobre las defensas previas no limita la decisión de fondo del asunto, lo anterior aplica para los casos en que la defensa previa fue rechazada, en virtud de lo cual, acorde con los preceptos 92.7 y 120 del CPCA, el tribunal sentenciador podrá declarar inadmisible la demanda o solicitar la corrección del defecto, según corresponda. Ergo, si se acoge la defensa, tal norma (92.7) no es aplicable, pues en casos como el que se analiza, esa estimación lleva, en el caso concreto de la vía administrativa como defensa, a la aplicación del mandato 92.1 CPCA y el conferimiento del plazo de cinco días para su corrección o acreditación de haber satisfecho la exigencia. En este caso, se acogió la defensa y luego se tuvo por cumplido el requisito (ver folios 1018-1020 del principal), criterio que fue luego reiterado ante el recurso de revocatoria formulado por la CGR. Se trata por ende de un tema ya resuelto, aún y cuando es claro que ese fallo no se pronunció expresamente sobre la falta de agotamiento respecto de las acciones planteadas contra el cartel. Sin embargo, aún de detectar este Tribunal la inercia en el cumplimiento de ese requisito, sin que esto suponga compartir el criterio del juzgador de trámite, el ordinal 120.4 CPCA señala que en tales casos, se tendrá por subsanado el defecto. Entonces, no podría en este fallo acogerse tal excepción cuando ya había sido resuelta a favor de los demandados, aún y cuando luego fue tenido por cumplido ese extremo. No obstante, lo anterior no es óbice para lo que de seguido se puntualiza. Las pretensiones de los accionantes se direccionan contra el acto de adjudicación, el contrato y el cartel de licitación en este procedimiento de licitación pública internacional. Concretamente en cuanto al cartel, no existe prueba alguna que CANABA haya formulado el recurso de objeción contra este acto en particular, o bien, haya planteado acción judicial directa alguna contra esa conducta, de previo a interponer el cuestionamiento que ahora formula. Ante esa inercia, y con independencia de lo expuesto en cuanto al trámite dado por el juzgador preliminar sobre la defensa en cuestión, lo cierto del caso es que frente al cartel de licitación ha operado en detrimento de CANABA una preclusión procesal, que le imposibilita argumentar como motivos de nulidad de la adjudicación, del contrato o actos conexos, lo dispuesto en el cartel de licitación. Este Tribunal es de la tesis que los defectos del cartel de licitación deben ser combatidos directamente en una acción formulada de manera directa contra éste, más no cabe su impugnación de manera refleja al invocarse como motivos de nulidad del acto adjudicatorio o bien, como lo ha realizado la accionante, peticionar su nulidad al momento de cuestionar la adjudicación. En esta línea, lleva razón la representación estatal en cuanto señala que al no haberse reprochado oportunamente el cartel de licitación, no es factible dentro de la etapa de adjudicación o posteriores a ésta (formalización, ejecución, modificación), cuestionar el contenido o validez de este instrumento. En el régimen de la contratación administrativa, el cartel de licitación constituye una importante herramienta que delimita, orienta y condiciona las acciones de las partes a lo largo del procedimiento. Por un lado, surge una vinculación estrecha entre el cartel del concurso y la oferta del postulante, de modo que ésta última es orientada por aquel primero, y resultará, primero admisible, luego evaluable y finalmente, potencialmente adjudicable, en la medida en que sea el mejor ofrecimiento dentro de aquellos que cumplan con las exigencias dispuestas por el cartel de la licitación. La relevancia de este instrumento (el cartel) se establece en el canon 51 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H del veintisiete de septiembre del dos mil seis, que establece en lo relevante: " El cartel, constituye el reglamento específico de la contratación que se promueve y se entienden incorporadas a su clausulado todas las normas jurídicas y principios constitucionales aplicables al respectivo procedimiento. Deberá constituir un cuerpo de especificaciones técnicas, claras, suficientes, concretas, objetivas y amplias en cuanto a la oportunidad de participar. (...)" Incluso, a propósito de la fase de admisibilidad de las plicas, el canon 83 del citado reglamento señala de manera clara: "Cumplida la anterior etapa, la Administración, procederá al estudio y valoración de las ofertas en relación con las condiciones y especificaciones de admisibilidad fijadas en el cartel y con las normas reguladoras de la materia. Serán declaradas fuera del concurso, las que incumplan aspectos esenciales de las bases de la licitación o sean sustancialmente disconformes con el ordenamiento jurídico. Los incumplimientos intrascendentes no implicarán la exclusión de la oferta, pero así deberá ser razonado expresamente en el respectivo informe. (...)" Lo anterior pone en evidencia la relevancia del cartel de cara a establecer si la oferta en concreto supera el conjunto de exigencias que impone la Administración mediante las disposiciones cartelarias. Desde este plano, el canon 81 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa (170-173 de su reglamento) establece que contra el cartel procede el recurso de objeción, cuando se considere que ese instrumento limita la participación o bien atenta contra alguno de los postulados del régimen contractualista público. En la dinámica de la Ley No. 7762, se insiste, esa previsión recursiva encuentra sustento en la letra del ordinal 34, empero, tal medida recursiva no fue formulada por la accionante. El cartel bien puede ser atacado de manera directa, al constituirse como un acto de trámite que dada su relevancia, genera un efecto propio en la contratación administrativa. Su contenido e implicaciones supone que una vez firme, las actuaciones sucesivas dentro del procedimiento de contratación, deben sujetarse a su contenido, tal y como lo establece el canon 4 de la Ley No. 7762. Ante ello, se confiere un régimen de impugnación con un marco de legitimación recursiva amplio, pues cualquier interesado puede formular las objeciones que considere convenientes cuando las normas cartelarias atenten contra legalidad o bien contra los principios propios de la contratación administrativa (de cuyo desarrollo ha dado cuenta, entre muchas, la sentencia No. 998-98 de la Sala Constitucional). Por ende, no resultan válidas las acciones (incluso las judiciales) que busquen reprochar el contenido del cartel, cuando no fue atacado de manera oportuna, aún las amplias posibilidades que para ello confiere el ordenamiento jurídico, una vez que ha recaído acto de adjudicación, como tampoco cuando se ha formalizado y refrendado ya el contrato. La aplicación lógica del numeral 162 de la Ley No. 6227/78 supone, la invalidez del cartel, -oportunamente combatido- implica por accesoriedad, la de los actos posteriores que dependan de aquel, más la nulidad de los actos dictados luego del cartel no llevan a la nulidad accesoria de aquel, pues incluso la patología de la adjudicación o del contrato pueden originarse por la infracción a las normas cartelarias, como podría ser el caso de desaplicación de una de sus fórmulas o desconocer el sistema de adjudicación de ofertas. Así las cosas, el régimen de cuestionamiento del cartel permite que la autoridad competente pueda valorar los reproches y suprimir las condiciones que sean contrarias a legalidad y puedan llegar a afectar a los potenciales oferentes, pero además a cualquier interesado, dentro de estos últimos, grupos organizados como CANABA. Se trata de un régimen recursivo que con claridad propende abrir las posibilidades para corregir las posibles deficiencias del cartel, dada la relevancia de este instrumento de cara a las etapas posteriores del procedimiento. Ergo, la pretensión de nulidad contra actos de adjudicación y el contrato no pueden constituirse en una forma válida para reabrir un debate ya precluido, en la medida en que pretenda cuestionar las normas cartelarias que no fueron oportunamente reprochadas. Tal y como lo manifiesta la mandataria estatal, si los accionantes estaban disconformes con el contenido del cartel, bien podían establecer las medidas recursivas de objeción en su momento oportuno y de no estar conformes aún con lo resuelto, acudir a las instancias jurisdiccionales a fin de realizar el análisis de validez de su contenido. Sin embargo, no resulta factible cuestionar el cartel junto con la impugnación del contrato, cuando en su oportunidad aquel no fue cuestionado, pese a las amplias posibilidades para hacerlo. Lo opuesto supondría permitir la retroacción del procedimiento en términos de posibilitar debates ya precluidos. Ha quedado acreditado que luego de las diversas fases de reclamación contra el cartel, CANABA no formuló recursos. Si bien SINTRAJAP los planteó, en definitiva, el tema no fue oportunamente debatido en sede judicial, por lo que la apertura de ese debate en este momento resulta improcedente. En consecuencia, debe declararse sin lugar cualquier pedimento de nulidad que verse sobre las normas cartelarias por aplicación del principio de preclusión ya señalado. No se trata de la aplicación de reglas formalistas o de un criterio que pueda considerarse antagónico con el principio de control plenario de las conductas públicas o acceso a la jurisdicción. Tales posibilidades no se han negado en lo absoluto, siendo que la imposibilidad de abordar esta temática estriba en la inercia propias de los promoventes, pese a las oportunidades válidas que en su momento tenían para esos efectos, consiste por ende en la remisión a un principio de preclusión, congruente con la técnica propia de una materia que cuenta con un régimen de impugnación específico, que en este caso, no fue utilizado de manera correcta. Sobre el tema, el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda Sección V, en resolución 80-2011 de las 14 horas 25 minutos del 25 de abril del 2011expresó en esa misma dirección: “Como se puede concluir, la base de aquel recurso y la de esta acción, son prácticamente iguales, pero en todo caso, lo que interesa recalcar, es que el instrumento definido por el legislador para impugnar el cartel, fue declarado extemporáneo, con lo cual, las especificaciones allí consignadas deben quedar incólumes, en razón de operar la denominada preclusión procesal, precisamente en pos de la seguridad jurídica. En relación, don Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz expresa en su libro Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, tomo III, Biblioteca jurídica Dike, pg. 140: "Si el particular no impugna en tiempo y forma el "cartel", el mismo se convierte, contra él, en acto consentido, firme e inimpugnable, administrativa y jurisdiccionalmente." En el mismo sentido, en doctrina más reciente, el doctor Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, en su tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Contratación Administrativa, tomo IV, ediciones Guayacán, 2010, pg. 291, refiere al tema de la siguiente forma: "La falta de impugnación del cartel por los interesados, en tiempo y forma, tiene por consecuencia, por aplicación del principio de la preclusión procedimental, el consentimiento tácito y consolidación de las diversas cláusulas del pliego". Y es que esto es así, porque precisamente se requiere de seguridad jurídica y estabilidad, respecto de lo actuado, pues incide de manera directa en el interés público inmerso en la contratación. Por eso los artículos 43 inciso g), 81 y 82 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, determinan el momento en que pueden formularse los cuestionamientos respecto del cartel, si ello no ocurre, o como en este asunto, se realiza en forma extemporánea, el procedimiento debe continuar con las reglas ahí estipuladas y confirmadas ante la ausencia de cuestionamientos. Incluso, la propia CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA, al resolver los recursos de apelación que interpuso la aquí actora contra la adjudicación y posteriormente contra la readjudicación, recalcó tal imposibilidad de retomar reclamos contra el cartel, por, precisamente, encontrarse precluídos, circunstancia que, como se retomará infra, no solo obliga al rechazo de plano de un eventual recurso de apelación, sino que además no permite reabrir el conocimiento de los tópicos que son materia exclusiva del recurso de objeción. Y es que sobre el particular, debe tenerse presente que el cartel corresponde a un acto preparatorio con efecto propio y la legislación que regula la contratación administrativa de manera expresa estipula los medios recursivos posibles de actuar en su contra y, al no ejercerlos como corresponde, no sólo afectan el posible interés legítimo del inconforme, sino que además, al requerirse el agotamiento de la vía administrativa en forma preceptiva en esta materia, pierde paralelamente la legitimación necesaria para continuar a la vía jurisdiccional.” XI.- Sobre la viabilidad ambiental. (Diferencia viabilidad y factibilidad). Naturaleza de la V iabilidad A mbiental P otencial . Lógica de la viabilidad frente al TCM, contrato incluye diseño -prueba testimonial-. Análisis prueba técnica. Valoración principio precautorio y preventivo. Diseño debe integrar EIA. Imposibilidad de construir sin EIA. Sin perjuicio de lo señalado en los puntos previos, es menester abordar el análisis de los defectos señalados por las accionantes respecto de la ausencia de los estudios requeridos para la TCM, conforme a los ordinales 9 y 21 de la Ley No. 7762. Como primer punto, se abordará la temática de la incidencia ambiental. En lo medular, en la fase de conclusiones SINTRAJAP señala, no se hace estudio de impacto ambiental, afectando la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Se afecta el fondo marino y un área de 630.000 metros cuadrados para la construcción de una isla artificial. Nada de eso ha sido seriamente estudiado. Acota, el artículo 3 del Decreto No. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MEIC se lesiona al no haber realizado la valoración ambiental. No constan esos estudios en los expediente. La Ley 7762 exige la realización de los Estudios de viabilidad ambiental antes de iniciar el proyecto, y luego puede trasladar el costo al concesionario, pero no puede ceder o trasladar la responsabilidad de realizar esos estudios. No hay norma que señale que el concesionario pueda hacer esos estudios por falencia de las Administraciones Públicas. Se otorgó una VAP a un proyecto difuso y sin conocerlo. No puede servir para realizar la licitación, lo debido era un EIA. Se utilizan estudios que no son específicos para la TCM. Se usaron los proyectos de RECOPE y dragado de Moín, trámites que no tienen que ver con la TCM. El objeto de la TCM es muy diverso. El único instrumento utilizado fue el formulario D1. En lo medular, CANABA sostiene esa misma posición en cuanto a la ausencia de la acreditación de la factibilidad ambiental. Respecto de dichas alegaciones cabe señalar lo que de seguido se expone. Según se ha indicado ut supra, conforme al numeral 21 de la Ley No. 7762, inciso primero, dentro de los estudios que en materia de las concesiones reguladas por dicha legislación debe realizar la Secretaría Técnica del CNC, se incluye el de impacto ambiental. Para tales efectos, esa norma señala que la Administración concedente dará audiencia por cinco días hábiles al Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, a fin de que determine el tipo de estudio por realizar. Terminado el estudio, se dará nueva audiencia a este Ministerio, que dispondrá de un plazo improrrogable de quince días hábiles para pronunciarse y su criterio será vinculante. Transcurrido este plazo sin recibir ninguna respuesta, se interpretará que el Ministerio no tiene objeciones. Se encuentra fuera de toda duda la relevancia que el derecho al ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado ostenta en nuestro régimen jurídico. Se trata de un derecho tutelado en el ordinal 50 párrafos 2º y 3º de la Carta Magna que ha sido objeto de un prolijo desarrollo legal y reglamentario, dentro de una materia que ha sido objeto de tratamiento además por tratados internacionales de los cuales, Costa Rica es Estado signatario. Dentro de este amplio marco normativo, se establece como regla común la necesidad de contar con instrumentos de medición de la variable ambiental en las diversas conductas y actividades humanas que puedan considerarse intrusivas al ambiente. La Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental se constituye como un procedimiento que ostenta una compleja convergencia de variables jurídico-técnico-administrativas, cuya finalidad no es otra que la medición, identificación, predicción o proyección de los impactos que una determinada actividad humana producirá, con probabilidad, en el ambiente, caso de que sea llevado a cabo o se concretice su ejecución material. Dicho procedimiento se emite como base a un requerimiento previo de un procedimiento autorizatorio posterior y se formula por parte de las administraciones públicas competentes, con experticia en los menesteres ambientales. Así visto, en términos más simplistas, es el procedimiento en virtud del cual, se estiman los efectos y consecuencias que un proyecto de obra o actividad humana va a generar en el ambiente. Dada la trascendencia del bien jurídico tutelado, su sustento se afinca en la doctrina del numeral 50 párrafo 2º y 3º de la Constitución Política, por tanto, siendo un deber del Estado la tutela debida, eficiente y oportuna del ambiente, tanto los recursos naturales como paisajísticos, se trata de un importante mecanismo de ejercicio de política ambiental, que tiene una aplicación directa e inmediata en las actividades productivas, de manera que logre la armonía y compatibilidad de esas explotaciones económicas o sociales, con la preservación del medio, dentro de una visión de sostenibilidad o desarrollo sostenible. En el contexto patrio, el Reglamento General sobre Procedimientos de Evaluaciones de Impactos Ambientales, Decreto Ejecutivo número 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, en su artículo 3 inciso 43, define el impacto ambiental de la siguiente manera: “Efecto que una actividad, obra o proyecto, o alguna de sus acciones y componentes tiene sobre el ambiente o sus elementos constituyentes. Puede ser de tipo positivo o negativo, directo o indirecto, acumulativo o no, reversible o irreversible, extenso o limitado, entre otras características. Se diferencia del daño ambiental, en la medida y el momento en que el impacto ambiental es evaluado en un proceso ex – ante, de forma tal que puedan considerarse aspectos de prevención, mitigación y compensación para disminuir su alcance en el ambiente.” Desde luego que este impacto ambiental debe ser objeto de medición, lo que se materializa en distintos instrumentos que la misma regulación jurídica establece entre éstos los estudios de impacto ambiental y las licencias de viabilidad ambiental. En este sentido, el citado reglamento, en el numeral 3, en su inciso 37 conceptualiza la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) como el procedimiento administrativo científico-técnico que permite identificar y predecir cuáles efectos ejercerá sobre el ambiente, una actividad, obra o proyecto, cuantificándolos y ponderándolos para conducir a la toma de decisiones. De forma general, la Evaluación del Impacto Ambiental, abarca tres fases constitutivas esenciales: a) una primera es la Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, b) la segunda es la confección del Estudio de Impacto Ambiental o de otros instrumentos de evaluación ambiental que corresponda, y c) un tercero se refiere al Control y Seguimiento ambiental de la actividad, obra o proyecto a través de los compromisos ambientales establecidos. Por su parte, el inciso 18 del artículo 7 de la Ley de Biodiversidad considera los estudios de impacto ambiental de la siguiente manera: “Procedimiento científico-técnico que permite identificar y predecir cuáles efectos ejercerá sobre el ambiente una acción o proyecto específico, cuantificándolos y ponderándolos para conducir a la toma de decisiones. Incluye los efectos específicos, su evaluación global, las alternativas de mayor beneficio ambiental un programa de control y minimización de los efectos negativos, un programa de monitoreo, un programa de recuperación, así como la garantía de cumplimiento ambiental.” De lo anterior se desprende que la licencia o viabilidad ambiental, tal y como lo señala el inciso 63 del ordinal tercero del Reglamento de previa cita, representa la condición de armonía y equilibrio medio y aceptable, entre el desarrollo y ejecución, obra humana y sus impactos ambientales potenciales, y el ambiente del espacio geográfico donde se desea implementar. Desde el punto de vista administrativo y jurídico, corresponde al acto en que se aprueba el proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, ya sea en su fase de evaluación inicial, estudio propiamente o de otro documento del impacto. Ahora bien, las implicaciones de las obras humanas en el ambiente justifica y exige la evaluación de ese impacto en el medio. Desde este plano, este órgano colegiado debe traer a colación lo estatuido por el canon 17 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, que sobre la citada evaluación ambiental señala: “Las actividades humanas que alteren o destruyan elementos del ambiente o generen residuos, materiales tóxicos o peligrosos, requerirán una evaluación de impacto ambiental por parte de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional del Ambiente creada en esta ley. Su aprobación previa, de parte de este organismo, será requisito indispensable para iniciar las actividades, obras o proyectos. Las leyes y los reglamentos indicarán cuáles actividades, obras o proyectos requerirán la evaluación de impacto ambiental.” Ha de insistirse, es innegable para este Tribunal la trascendencia que ostenta este instrumento de medición de los impactos ambientales en las conductas humanas. Empero, el desarrollo de esos instrumentos de medición ambiental han llevado a diversos tipos de estudios según se trate del tipo de desarrollo humano que se pretenda. En el caso concreto de las actividades regidas por la Ley No. 7762, el mismo ordinal 21 de esa fuente señala que la audiencia al MINAET lo es para que, entre otras cosas "... determine el tipo de estudio a realizar...". Lo anterior supone que no en todas las obras a realizar mediante el sistema de concesión de obra pública con o sin servicios públicos, es imperativo un mismo tipo de estudio. Son las autoridades ambientales las instancias competentes para definir la tipología que resulta de mérito en cada caso concreto. Para ello ha de discriminarse en conceptos que podrían considerarse equivalentes. Como se ha señalado, el impacto ambiental (consiste en los efectos o incidencias que una actividad, obra o proyecto, o alguna de sus acciones y componentes tiene sobre el ambiente o sus elementos constituyentes -inciso 43 art. 3 del citado decreto-. Este impacto puede ser potencial (IAP), el que se considera como el efecto ambiental positivo o negativo latente que ocasionaría la ejecución de una actividad, obra o proyecto sobre el ambiente. Puede ser preestablecido, tomando como base de referencia el impacto ambiental causado por la generalidad de actividades, obras o proyectos similares, que ya se encuentran en operación.-inciso 44 art.3 ejusdem-. Por su parte, la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) es el procedimiento administrativo científico-técnico que permite identificar y predecir cuáles efectos ejercerá sobre el ambiente, una actividad, obra o proyecto, cuantificándolos y ponderándolos para conducir a la toma de decisiones -inciso 37 art. 3 ibídem-. Esta Evaluación puede a su vez ser Estratégica (EAE): -Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental aplicado a políticas, planes y programas. Por su característica y naturaleza, este tipo de proceso, se puede aplicar, además, a los proyectos de trascendencia nacional, binacional, regional centroamericano, o por acuerdos multilaterales, conforme a lo establecido en la normativa vigente.-, (inciso 34 ibid), o bien Evaluación Ambiental Inicial (EAI): -Procedimiento de análisis de las características ambientales de la actividad, obra o proyecto, con respecto a su localización para determinar la significancia del impacto ambiental. Involucra la presentación de un documento ambiental firmado por el desarrollador, con el carácter y los alcances de una declaración jurada. De su análisis, puede derivarse el otorgamiento de la viabilidad (licencia) ambiental o en el condicionamiento de la misma a la presentación de otros instrumentos de la EIA.- (inciso 35 ibid.). De su lado, la viabilidad ambiental (VLA) es el acto que aprueba la EIA (sea inicial, EsIA, o cualquier otro título), y que evidencia la armonización o equilibrio aceptable, desde el punto de vista de carga ambiental, entre el desarrollo y ejecución de una actividad, obra o proyecto y sus impactos ambientales potenciales, y el ambiente del espacio geográfico donde se desea implementar -inciso 63 del art. 3 ibídem). Esta viabilidad puede ser potencial (VAP), y consiste en: "Es el visto bueno ambiental, de tipo temporal, que otorga la SETENA a aquellas actividades, obras o proyectos que realizan la Evaluación Ambiental Inicial y todavía requieren de la presentación de otros documentos de EIA para la obtención de la VLA definitiva."-inciso 64 artículo 3 ejusdem-. Tales análisis se pueden realizar mediante el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (EsIA) que consiste en un instrumento técnico de la evaluación de impacto ambiental, cuya finalidad es la de analizar la actividad, obra o proyecto propuesto, respecto a la condición ambiental del espacio geográfico en que se propone y, sobre esta base, predecir, identificar y valorar los impactos ambientales significativos que determinadas acciones puedan causar sobre ese ambiente y a definir el conjunto de medidas ambientales que permitan su prevención, corrección, mitigación, o en su defecto compensación, a fin de lograr la inserción más armoniosa y equilibrada posible entre la actividad, obra o proyecto propuesto y el ambiente en que se localizará. -inciso 34 del citado art. 3 ejusdem- Ante tal pluralidad de conceptos, es que el numeral 21 de la Ley No. 7762 señala, es el MINAET la instancia que define el tipo de estudio a realizar.

XII.- En esta concesión, según se desprende de folios 1189-1191 del legajo principal, mediante la resolución No. 274-2009-SETENA de las 08 horas del 10 de febrero del 2009, la SETENA, dispuso lo siguiente en lo que viene relevante al caso: "PRIMERO: ... Asimismo, el artículo 28 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo (se refiere al Decreto No. 31849-MINAE-SALUD-MOPT-MAG-MEIC), a pesar de estarse refiriendo a actividades que obligatoriamente deben presentar EsIA, claramente indica que: "Aquellas actividades, obras o proyectos para los cuales existe una ley específica que ordena la elaboración y aprobación de un Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, podrán cumplir alternativamente cualquiera de los siguientes dos procedimientos: 1. Cumplimiento del trámite de Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, presentando a la SETENA el Documento de Evaluación Ambiental (D1) con el fin de obtener la viabilidad ambiental potencial y los términos de referencia para la elaboración del EsIA." Finalmente, el artículo 29 hace referencia nuevamente a la VAP y a la posibilidad y probablemente obligación, que tiene esta Secretaría de otorgar la misma (...) Es claro que el otorgamiento de la VAP vendría a darse, y sería lógica consecuencia de corroborarse el cumplimiento de los requisitos iniciales que solicita esta Secretaría y que se constituyen en el llenado correcto del D-1. Una vez otorgada la VAP, se hace necesario indicar al desarrollador que no puede llevar a cabo obras hasta tanto no sea otorgada la Viabilidad Ambiental definitiva, la cual sería la consecuencia lógica si se cumpliera con los términos de referencia emitidos por esta Autoridad, así como la presentación de cualquier documentación o información adicional. " Sustentada en dichas razones, dispuso: "PRIMERO: Se otorga la Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial (VAP) al proyecto, a efectos de que pueda llevar a cabo cualquier gestión previa ante entidades bancarias u otras entidades estatales o privadas. Se advierte al desarrollador que el presente otorgamiento no le otorga derecho alguno para llevar a cabo obras de ningún tipo, hasta tanto no sea emitida la Viabilidad Ambiental Definitiva, una vez que cumpla con la información o documentación adicional requerida por esta Secretaría. (...) SEGUNDO: Se le previene al Desarrollador que, debido a las características del proyecto, para cada fase o etapa del mismo deberá realizar el proceso de Evaluación del Impacto Ambiental iniciado con la presentación del respectivo formulario D1. (...)" Las accionantes precisamente reprochan el otorgamiento de la VAP, considerando que dada la magnitud del proyecto, lo debido era el EsIA definitivo. Como primer aspecto, cabe señalar, ante los alegatos de los co-accionaddos, la relevancia nacional de un proyecto, sea por su intención de satisfacer intereses públicos o por su primacía dentro de los planes de gobierno, no constituye excepción para someterse y ajustarse a las normas ambientales. Si así fuese, basta declarar un proyecto como de interés nacional para evadir las evaluaciones ambientales, en plena contradicción del numeral 50 Constitucional, 17 de la Ley No. 7554, 13 de la Ley No. 6227/78, entre múltiples normas. De ahí que con independencia de ese alegato, es menester de todo proyecto u obra, cumplir con la normativa de resguardo ambiental para acreditar su armonía con esos referentes. En la fase de conclusiones, el representante de SINTRAJAP aduce, apoyándose en la deposición del testigo-perito Raúl Rojas, la VAP se hizo sobre la base de otros proyectos que no son la del TCM. Se otorgó una VAP a un proyecto difuso y sin conocerlo. Estima, no puede servir para realizar la licitación, lo debido era un EsIA. Se utilizan estudios que no son específicos para la TCM. Se usaron los proyectos de RECOPE y dragado de Moín, trámites que no tienen que ver con la TCM, cuando el objeto de la TCM es muy diverso. El único instrumento utilizado fue el formulario D1, y según consta de varias declaraciones, se hace una subvaloración de los impactos. Estima, no procedía hacer ese D1 sino un EIA de manera directa. Para la resolución de tales alegatos, debe indicarse lo siguiente. Dada esa VAP, debe señalarse, ninguna de las acciones que en este fallo se dirimen, atacaron de manera directa el acto concreto de la SETENA mediante el cual se concede al proyecto TCM la citada viabilidad ambiental potencial. Dentro del elenco de pretensiones que fueron formuladas en la demanda y sostenidas en la audiencia única, no se invoca la petición de invalidez de los actos de la SETENA. Con todo, la parte reclamante no logra acreditar esas supuestas patologías que pusieran en tela de duda la validez de la resolución de VAP emitida por la autoridad ambiental. Nótese que en la parte considerativa SETENA indica -considerando segundo- que la solicitud para otorgar este título cumple con las exigencias y requerimientos debidos. Ergo, corresponde al reclamante acreditar las causas de nulidad, lo que en definitiva no ha logrado realizar.

XIII.- Para ello cabe expresar, no considera este Tribunal que ante la ausencia de un EsIA o en general, cualquier título que ponga de manifiesto la existencia de un EIA o bien, en términos conclusivos, la acreditación de una licencia de viabilidad ambiental (VLA), suponga una infracción al régimen tutelar del derecho ambiental o bien, a las exigencias de análisis previos que establece el ordinal 21.1 de la Ley No. 7762. La debida solución de este conflicto en lo atinente a esta variable ecológica exige la comprensión del tipo de proyecto de obra a emprender. Desde este plano, merece destacar que el contrato cuestionado es una concesión de obra pública con servicios públicos, modalidad contractual pública que a la luz del ordinal primero de la Ley No. 7762 debe entenderse como: "contrato administrativo por el cual la Administración encarga a un tercero, el cual puede ser persona pública, privada o mixta, el diseño, la planificación, el financiamiento, la construcción, conservación, ampliación o reparación de cualquier bien inmueble público, así como su explotación, prestando los servicios previstos en el contrato a cambio de contraprestaciones cobradas a los usuarios de la obra o a los beneficiarios del servicio o de contrapartidas de cualquier tipo pagadas por la Administración concedente." Es decir, como se ha señalado arriba, lejos de ser una modalidad que busca contratar la construcción de obras públicas, atiende a un sistema de gestión más complejo, que permite pactar el diseño de la obra -entre otras actividades mencionadas en la norma-. Resulta un hecho notorio para este proceso, no cuestionado, que el objeto del contrato que culminó la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 buscaba precisamente, como parte de su objeto, la oferta de un diseño de desarrollo portuario. La sola denominación del concurso público pone en evidencia ese aspecto, siendo que la licitación se denomina "Licitación para la concesión de obra pública para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín". Lo anterior es determinante en el análisis de este aspecto. Para este Tribunal es claro que un a obra como la TCM, ha de c ontar con un EsIA así como una EIA definitiva, empero, esa exigencia, en casos como el presente , en que el contrato incluye el diseño de la infraestructura , debe ser satisfecho de previo al inicio de las obras y no necesariamente antes del inicio del procedimiento de licitación pública. Ello no supone lesión alguna al derecho tutelado por el ordinal 50 de la Carta Magna, por el contrario, pretende empatar y armonizar los desarrollos de obras públicas con la variable ambiental. Nada en la VAP otorgada por SETENA permite suponer que la concesionaria cuenta con anuencia administrativa para el desarrollo de las obras o acciones direccionadas a edificar. Por el contrario, según se ha expuesto, ese título lo que posibilita es realizar trámites ante entidades bancarias u otras entidades estatales o privadas, pero con la advertencia expresa que ese título -VAP-, no le otorga derecho alguno para llevar a cabo obras de ningún tipo, hasta tanto no sea emitida la Viabilidad Ambiental Definitiva, una vez que cumpla con la información o documentación adicional requerida por SETENA. Así se desprende además del ordinal 3 inciso 64 del Decreto 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, al definir la VAP. Desde este plano, el diseño de la obra es un insumo determinante para poder ponderar el cumplimiento de la variable ambiental, pues es hasta ese momento que se conoce con claridad y certeza el tipo de obra que se pretende desarrollar, así como el sitio específico y acciones concretas para llevar a cabo esa infraestructura. Como bien señala el Estado, si se tratarse de un contrato de obra pública solamente, el EsIA sería imperativo, por la razón elemental que el diseño de la obra ya se encuentra concretado. Ello no obstante no ocurre en este caso, en el que parte sustancial y primaria del contrato es precisamente el diseño de la obra portuaria. En este punto, la contratación del diseño se propone en términos cartelarios sobre la base de parámetros y características que impone el Plan Maestro contratado a la empresa Royal Haskoning, brindando así un marco de diseño conceptual. Bajo ese entendido, la prosecución de los procedimientos, atendiendo al objeto del contrato, hacía factible, tal y como lo determinó la SETENA, conceder la VAP, para que así, una vez concretado el diseño concreto de las obras portuarias a realizar (a nivel de propuesta técnica) se inicie ahora sí, la EIA definitiva, mediante el título de verificación ambiental que determine SETENA, de modo que se garantice el debido resguardo al ambiente. En este sentido, es claro para este cuerpo colegiado, la exigencia del EIA definitivo, en términos lógicos y normativos, en este caso concreto, se encuentra condicionado a la existencia de una propuesta de diseño ya concretada según los lineamientos dado por el plan maestro. En tal orientación, el testigo-perito Allan Astorga Gattgens, cédula de identidad número 3-0252-0451 señaló que la VAP es un instrumento diseñado para resolver situaciones coyunturales de ciertas actividades, en la medida que requieren avanzar en trámite administrativos y no pueden quedar sujetas al EIA que requiere un estudio profundo y detallado. De igual modo, dicho experto señaló que el elemento clave en el EsIA es que su objetivo no es generar un documento que se traslade a una institución para su aprobación, sino hacer una medición de impacto ambiental de una propuesta de diseño, la que debe enriquecerse con los datos del diseño, ergo, lo que se busca es un diseño ambiental del proyecto. Aclaró además, algunos proyectos requieren una evaluación inicial y por ende se obtiene una VAP que indica que el proyecto no puede iniciar construcciones, queda sujeto a un EsIA detallado. Hasta que obtenga la aprobación del EIA el proyecto puede iniciar actividad constructiva. Para este tipo de proyectos es que se creó la VAP, que permite adelantar fase administrativa y financiera, empero condicionadas a la obtención de la viabilidad definitiva una vez realizado el EIA. Tales expresiones son compartidas por este Tribunal, siendo que en lo medular, guardan congruencia con las regulaciones que sobre los títulos ambientales establece el citado Decreto No. 31849 y el análisis o comprensión que a partir de esas regulaciones realiza este Tribunal. Incluso, el testigo-perito ofrecido por SINTRAJAP, sea, señor Raúl Ernesto Rojas Figueroa, en sus deposiciones concordó con la naturaleza y finalidad de la VAP, siendo que indicó que dicho título es solo un trámite previo para que se inicien los estudios ulteriores, que deben ser cumplidos para obtener viabilidad definitiva. La VAP no faculta el inicio del proyecto. Sobre esa parte de su declaración no existe antagonismo con lo ya expuesto. Ahora, ante la pregunta de la CGR en términos de si para iniciar un proyecto como el TCM se debe contar con viabilidad ambiental definitiva, cómo se podría incluir esa viabilidad en un proyecto que incluye diseño y construcción de la obra: el testigo señaló que existen instrumentos fijados por Setena. De igual modo indicó, en lo medular, que en tales casos, se toman los impactos potenciales en el diseño. Lo anterior a juicio de esta Cámara pone en evidencia que la realización del EIA requiere de un diseño que no es para nada definitivo. Por el contrario, una vez levantado el diseño, tal y como lo advirtió SETENA, cada etapa antes de su inicio constructivo, ha de cumplir con la acreditación de la VLA (viabilidad ambiental), sin la cual, no se podría realizar ninguna obra. Una vez preparado ese proyecto, las observaciones que realice la Administración Ambiental pasan a integrarse al proyecto-diseño, en la medida en que este proyecto debe adaptarse y armonizar con las observaciones y apuntes que sobre el tema ambiental realicen las autoridades competentes, para culminar en un diseño final definitivo en el que se pondere la arista ambiental. Se trata de un trámite compuesto en el que se entremezclan de manera indisoluble aspectos de programación constructiva y el correspondiente análisis del impacto ecológico, comprendiendo las medidas de mitigación y alteraciones que han de realizarse al diseño para ser "amigable con el ambiente". Desde este plano, no existe lesión por el otorgamiento de la VAP, siendo que la medición definitiva del impacto ambiental se encuentra sujeta a la existencia del diseño definitivo, previo a lo cual, la concesionaria no podrá realizar ningún tipo de edificación u obra en general en la zona. Tal tratamiento ya estaba incorporado en el contrato, concretamente en la cláusula 5.3.3, así como en la 6.3.5 en la cual, se regula la temática de los riesgos de mitigación y riesgos ambientales. De este modo, se reitera, no pone en tela de juicio este Tribunal la preponderancia de la variable ambiental. Tampoco se cuestionan por este cuerpo colegiado las preocupaciones de incidencia en el ambiente que exponen los accionantes. Sin embargo, acorde a lo expuesto, se tratan de alegatos prematuros, en la medida en que tales riesgos deberán ser ponderados al momento de presentar el diseño de la obra y darse el trámite de verificación ante el MINAET. El compromiso primario que se asume con la adjudicación de la concesión cuestionada es precisamente el levantamiento de la propuesta de diseño de la obra, conforme a los parámetros referenciales dados por la administración concedente y a tono con las disposiciones contractuales. Ergo, es una vez que ese diseño sea sometido a conocimiento de las administraciones competentes, que deberá ponderarse el cumplimiento del conjunto de variables que exponen los accionantes, al punto que acorde a las disposiciones contractuales, la empresa concesionaria debe realizar el estudio ambiental que sea de mérito e incorporar los aspectos vinculantes que en su oportunidad le indiquen las autoridades ambientales. Será en esa fase que debe valorarse los diversos alegatos de afectación al ambiente que se exponen, dentro de ellos, incidencia en los mantos acuíferos, cercanía del Humedal Cariari, necesidad de penetrar el suelo marítimo para hacer más profundo el acceso al muelle para permitir llegada de barcos de mayor capacidad y tamaño, construcción de isla artificial, entre otros. Se insiste, son aspectos de gran relevancia para el ambiente, al punto que deberán ser considerados en el análisis, empero, ese examen no puede exigirse en esta etapa del procedimiento, en el cual, aún no se cuenta con el diseño de la obra, lo que constituye, de nuevo, una de las primeras fases en la ejecución del contrato. Como se ha dicho, esa ponderación debe incluir la medición de la totalidad de aspectos relacionados con el medio circundante a la zona, a considerar en el momento procesal oportuno, con la debida publicidad y total acceso a los medios recursivos. No se trata del desconocimiento del deber de protección al ambiente, sino de la distinción y demarcación de la fase en la que, técnica y lógicamente resulta conveniente y necesaria esa medición, pues la incidencia en esos elementos bióticos y abióticos solo es de posible determinación con la existencia de un diseño preliminar. Por otro lado, se reprocha los insumos con que se otorgó el VAP. Sobre el particular cabe exponer, los promoventes realizan precisiones sobre supuestas deficiencias en el formulario D1, empero, no se logra desacreditar la procedencia del otorgamiento de la VAP. En este sentido, merece rescatarse lo indicado por el testigo-perito Allan Astorga, ofrecido para el análisis de la variable ambiental, quien sobre la funcionalidad de este formulario señaló, en lo esencial, este formulario cumple el requisito de ingresar una información técnica básica para que SETENA conozca las condiciones generales del proyecto, características fundamentales y determinar si es potencialmente viable. El hecho de que existan defectos en el D1 entregado no afecta el producto final de la viabilidad ambiental. En efecto, a la luz del numeral 28.1 del Decreto No. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, en los casos de proyectos de obra regulados por ley especial en los que se requiera estudio de impacto ambiental, se requiere a modo de requisitos el "Cumplimiento del trámite de Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, presentando a la SETENA el Documento de Evaluación Ambiental (D1) con el fin de obtener la viabilidad ambiental potencial y los términos de referencia para la elaboración del EsIA." Como lo indica esa normativa, el formulario en cuestión lo que permite iniciar el trámite de la VAP, lo que releva a SETENA de la verificación de cumplimiento de las exigencias debidas para la obtención de esa habilitación para trámites administrativos. En definitiva, como se ha señalado, SETENA consideró que esos requerimientos estaban cubiertos, producto de lo cual, concedió el citado título preliminar. En cuanto al procedimiento para lo anterior, debe hacerse remisión al anexo II del Decreto 31849, que fija las pautas para tales efectos. Si bien en el formulario -emitido bajo la forma de declaración jurada-, se consigna una evaluación para cada uno de rubros allí establecidos, es la Administración la que fija un puntaje final, que determina el tipo de estudio posterior a realizar. Cabe en este punto reiterar que el punto segundo de la parte dispositiva de la resolución No. 274-2009-SETENA que condene VAP al proyecto TCM, previene al desarrollador que: "... debido a las características del proyecto, para cada fase o etapa del mismo deberá realizar el proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental iniciando con la presentación del respectivo Formulario D1." Ello pone en evidencia que es en cada etapa de desarrollo que deberá presentarse de manera concreta ese formulario para sopesar la variable ecológica del proyecto. En consecuencia, las deficiencias señaladas no generan invalidez alguna en dicha resolución.

XIV.- Sobre el deber de realización del EsiA y la carga de l riesgo ambiental. En otro orden de cosas, se cuestiona que el contrato haya impuesto al concesionario la realización del estudio de impacto ambiental. Desde el inicio del concurso, en la segunda parte del cartel, referente al formato de contrato de concesión, la cláusula 5.3.3 del cartel, referida a la licencia ambiental (ver folio 3238 vuelto del principal), se estipuló que con fundamento en la resolución que concedió la VAP, el concesionario estaba obligado a obtener de SETENA la resolución que otorgue la viabilidad ambiental definitiva para la nueva terminal de contenedores. De igual modo, en la condición cartelaria 6.3.5 (visible a folio 3241 vuelto), señala "6.3.5 Riesgos ambientales. Todos los riesgos ambientales relacionados con la construcción, operación, obras de mitigación ambiental y mantenimiento de la TCM son del Concesionario, según lo regulado en la cláusula 6.3.1. Por tanto, debe incluir en su oferta los costos asociados para el cumplimiento de estos riesgos, los cambios regulatorios en esta materia que, luego de la fecha de la apertura de las ofertas, afecten el equilibrio económico y financiero del Contrato, serán compensados por la Administración concedente". Por su parte, en el contrato respectivo, en la cláusula 5.3.3 el concesionario asume la obligación de obtener la viabilidad ambiental definitiva para la TCM. De igual modo, en la cláusula 6.3.56 del contrato se señala: "Todos los riesgos ambientales relacionados con la construcción, operación, obras de mitigación ambiental y mantenimiento de la TCM son del Concesionario, según lo regulado en la cláusula 6.3.1. Por tanto, debe incluir en este contrato de concesión los costos asociados para el cumplimiento de estos riesgos. Los cambios regulatorios en esta materia que no estén contemplados y aprobados en el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, y sobrepase la reserva de imprevistos del 1% ofertado podrá el Concesionario solicitar que se restablezca el equilibrio económico como lo establece la cláusula 6.4.3 de este capítulo." (Folio 7664 del expediente administrativo CNC -tomo XIV-) Si bien el numeral 21 de la Ley No. 7762 señala que "Corresponderá a la Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones realizar las actividades y los estudios necesarios para preparar la licitación de la concesión...", lo cierto del caso es que nada imposibilita que la carga de realización de tales estudios de incidencia ambiental sean desarrollados por el concesionario. Ciertamente los numerales 59 y 66 de la Ley No. 6227/78 dicen de la irrenunciabilidad e intransferibilidad de las potestades públicas de imperio, empero, en este caso, no se trata de una renuncia del ejercicio de esas potestades. Se trata de una condición contractual en virtud de la que, se deja a cargo del contratista la formulación de las gestiones para obtener la VAL (viabilidad ambiental), dado que como se ha dicho, parte del contrato es la realización de un diseño para la TCM. Luego, por derivación lógica, no observa este Tribunal como esa condición cartelaria en primera instancia y luego contractual, puede llegar a vulnerar la legislación ambiental o producir nulidad por un supuesto vicio de incompetencia. En este tipo de contratos públicos, nada obsta para que se traslade al concesionario la realización de ese tipo de estudios. Debe reiterarse en este punto, el presente contrato no tiene por objeto la construcción de una obra pública ya diseñada, sino, el diseño, construcción, financiamiento, operación y mantenimiento de estructuras portuarias, tema que debe tenerse en cuenta al momento de ponderar este tipo de agravios. En definitiva, incluso dentro de la línea argumentativa de los accionantes, lo determinante es que este Tribunal resguarde y tutele el deber de todo proyecto, público o privado, de someterse al ordenamiento jurídico ambiental. La cláusula aludida no renuncia al cumplimiento de esta variable, siendo que en definitiva, el compromiso es para realizar el estudio respectivo y someterlo a conocimiento del MINAET y obtener la VLA. Para ello, incluso, se establece una cláusula de transmisión de riesgos ambientales en cabeza del concesionario, que establece que el riesgo ambiental relacionado por la construcción, operación, obras de mitigación y mantenimiento de las obras, sea asumidos por la adjudicataria, para lo cual, debe aportar un detalle de costos asociados al cumplimiento de dichos riesgos. Como se observa, nada niega que deba obtenerse la viabilidad ambiental, de suerte que no se estima que la disposición criticada genere lesión alguna al régimen de competencias públicas o exigencias ambientales. Tales normas de traslación de riesgo, en cuanto estipula una reserva de imprevistos del 1%, no generan, como advierte la accionante CANABA, una distorsión económica en el contrato. Se trata de una condición de previsión de contenido económico para hacer frente a eventuales medidas de mitigación o acciones que puedan llegar a ser necesarias para afrontar las consecuencias de reducción o evasión de las incidencias ambientales, bajo un ámbito de protección preventiva. Desde ese plano, no se acredita de parte de los accionantes como se produce esa supuesta alteración financiera del contrato a partir de la inclusión de un compromiso de reserva del 1% para riesgos ambientales, figura que en todo, se insiste, se estima armónica con un principio pro natura en la medida en que constituye una reserva que en el dado caso de tener que realizar acciones de mitigación al medio, puedan ser afrontadas con esos recursos financieros. Por otro lado, el alegato sobre el eventual desequilibrio financiero resulta genérico e impreciso pues no se concreta de que manera puede generarse ese efecto, siendo una mera especulación no sustentada en bases técnicas. Con todo, cabe señalar, a tono con los fallos 998-98 y 6432-96, ambos de la Sala Constitucional, el equilibrio financiero del contrato es un derecho del contratista, cuyo sustento se afinca además, en la letra del numeral 18 de la Ley No. 7494, así como en el numeral 17 de la Ley No. 7762, siendo un tema que debe ponderarse en cada caso concreto, con independencia de cuestiones como la expuesta. Será en cada situación concreta que corresponda analizar si existe una distorsión financiera que desequilibre el contrato, supuesto en el que habría que determinar las causas de esa distorsión, pues no en todos los casos se amerita un ajuste, dado que en determinados supuestos, impera la teoría del álea contractualista que debe asumir el concesionario, tema que por el momento no se abordará. Así, tal alegación carece de sustento técnico y jurídico. Finalmente en cuanto a este aspecto, la misma Sala Constitucional ha puesto en evidencia, no existe irregularidad alguna en el otorgamiento de una VAP y en la transmisión del deber de obtener la VLA con cargo al adjudicatario. En esta línea, en el fallo No. 2007-017409 de las 16 horas 50 minutos del 28 de noviembre del 2007, citando el voto 2002-011046 de las 09 horas 53 minutos del 22 de noviembre del 2002, ese alto Tribunal Constitucional indicó en lo relevante: "El supuesto analizado en la sentencia parcialmente transcrita, ha sido reiterado en las sentencias número 2003-15227 de las trece horas trece minutos del diecinueve de diciembre del dos mil tres y en la sentencia número 2004-01510 de las once horas cuarenta minutos del trece de febrero del dos mil cuatro y en ambas, la Sala ha mantenido el criterio de que no se aprecia ninguna lesión ni amenaza ilegítima al artículo 50 constitucional con el hecho de que no se realice el estudio de impacto ambiental antes de que se inicie el proceso de licitación pública y de que se establezca en el cartel de licitación la obligación a cargo del adjudicatario y no del oferente, de asumir el estudio de impacto ambiental, tal y como ocurre en el asunto en concreto, estimando la Sala que, en todo caso, siempre se efectuaría el análisis de viabilidad ambiental en concordancia con los criterios y exigencias realizadas para cada caso concreto por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental que es el órgano estatal competente en la materia.” Debe culminarse este examen reiterando, lo siguiente; no se niega en modo alguno el deber e importancia de contar con el EIA definitivo en este tipo de obras de gran envergadura. Sin embargo, dado el tipo de contrato en el cual, parte del concurso público es precisamente el diseño de la obra, esa exigencia deviene en prematura, pues es con el diseño preliminar que se pueden realizar las ponderaciones ambientales, las que, con carácter obligatorio y vinculante, pasarán a modificar o ajustar el proyecto de diseño. De ahí que el otorgamiento de la VAP no sea contraria a derecho, sino el medio adecuado para la continuidad del proyecto, lo que no impide el análisis posterior que proponen los actores, fase dentro de la cual, de manera pública y abierta, deberán ponderarse la serie de riesgos y preocupaciones que motivan sus reproches. Debe recordarse que la VAP no permite la construcción de obra alguna ni actos concretos más allá de los trámites administrativos ante entes financieros o administraciones públicas partícipes del trámite para obtener las autorizaciones o aprobaciones de mérito para la continuidad del procedimiento. Ergo, no se trata de una lesión de las normas ambientales, sino, precisamente de su cumplimiento, en un marco previsor y tutelar del ambiente, que ni por asomo desconoce su relevancia, pues todas las acciones adoptadas se direccionan a que en definitiva, de previo a iniciar acciones, debe obtener la citada VLA. En consecuencia, debe disponerse el rechazo de este cargo.

XV.- Sobre el estudio de factibilidad técnica. La promovente CANABA reprocha en un primer eje temático -sobre este aspecto-, la ausencia de un estudio de factibilidad económica del proyecto, así como total claridad de lo que se va a construir, lo que estima, es una limitante para el interés de participación de potenciales oferentes. Estima indispensable contar con un insumo que permita determinar la viabilidad y costos del proyecto, que debe ser razonable, actualizado, suficiente, completo y creíble. Lo que existe es un plan maestro de la empresa Royal Haskoning que sirve de guía, ya que no es específico. Las proyecciones de costos de ese plan no están actualizadas y son generales. Sostiene violación al principio de distribución de funciones en la medida que el Estado comisiona a un tercero privado la realización del diseño del proyecto, su construcción y operación. Debe tutelarse el principio de selección a la mejor oferta. En la concesión de obra pública la Administración no debe ser un simple adquirente de activos financiados, por lo que el estudio de factibilidad es necesario. Dice que no existe un acto razonado fundamentado en razones de ciencia y de técnica para la apertura de la licitación. Ante la ausencia del estudio de factibilidad económica no se puede saber si el proyecto es auto-financiable. No se puede garantizar las demandas proyectadas, por lo que existe un gran riesgo en que se de un desequilibrio financiero, lo que podría llevar a tarifas prohibitivas. Dice, un estudio de factibilidad debe tener expresión de los impactos sociales en la zona geográfica de influencia, lo que no cumple el estudio de Royal Haskoning. Análisis de lo alegado en este punto. Sobre el particular cabe indicar lo que de seguido se expone. Para los efectos de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-0200, el CNC y JAPDEVA, en fecha 15 de enero del 2009, suscribieron un convenio de gestión inter-institucional tendiente a la coordinación del trámite de procedimientos de concesión para obras y servicios de interés común (folio 735 del expediente de la licitación), por la razón básica de la competencia de JAPDEVA para la prestación de servicios portuarios en la vertiente Atlántica, competencia asignada por la Ley No. 5337. Como derivación de este convenio, se posibilita la realización de estudios técnicos, legales, ambientales y financieros relacionados, en general, con la formulación de proyectos, así como toda documentación requerida para sustentar un proceso licitatorio (ver folios 731-735 del expediente de licitación). Desde este plano, este convenio constituye la base legitimante para entender, para los efectos del ordinal 129 de la Ley No. 6227/78, la coordinación para contratar los estudios técnicos en definitiva realizados por la empresa Royal Haskoning, fueron realizados por la administración concedente, en la medida en que como se verá luego, esa contratación fue establecida por JAPDEVA. Ahora bien, en la secuencia de agravios formulados por la accionante, cabe reiterar, sus alegaciones se formulan contra las normas cartelarias, sin que haya logrado acreditar que en su momento oportuno, conforme al artículo 34 de la Ley No. 7662 en relación al 82 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, operando en estos alegatos el ya mencionado principio de preclusión arriba expuesto. Con todo, cabe indicar, tampoco por el fondo lleva razón la promovente. En efecto, a diferencia de lo expuesto por los accionantes, es criterio de este Tribunal, el Plan Maestro emitido por la empresa Royal Haskoning dista de ser un mero perfil de proyecto y contiene en lo medular, la totalidad de insumos que permiten tenerle como un estudio de factibilidad que constituye la base del proyecto de la TCM. El análisis y lectura que hace este Tribunal respecto del citado Plan Maestro, considerando los diversos componentes que en teoría general, debe reunir un estudio de factibilidad económica, llevan a concluir, tal y como lo afirman los co-accionados, este documento, si bien no tiene la denominación formal de "Estudio de factibilidad económica" constituye un insumo que incorpora un análisis y detalle de un conjunto de datos e información que coloca en posibilidad objetiva y efectiva a potenciales interesados, de realizar análisis de predictibilidad de suficiencia del negocio propuesto y de rentabilidad. A juicio de esta Cámara, ese informe contiene el detalle necesario para que los interesados en participar en la licitación pública de marras, pudieran realizar un examen de la pertinencia o no de participar, así como del contenido técnico-financiero de sus eventuales plicas concursales. Por un lado, en cuanto a la actualidad y pertinencia de los datos utilizados en ese informe (plan maestro), si bien el diagnóstico data del 2008, se tiene por acreditado que ante diversas observaciones realizadas por los in t eresados en el citado concurso, y atendiendo a la fecha de los datos ponderados por la empresa Royal Haskoning en ese informe, en el año 2010 se peticionó a esa empresa la actualización de los datos de demanda proyectada, información que en lo medular fue utilizada por el CNC para ajustar y actualizar el modelo tarifario remitido a la ARESEP. De lo anterior da cuenta el oficio 0395 (DTS-OF-380-10) y 445 (DTS-OF-0432-10) de fechas 12 y 23 de marzo del 2010 -ambos-, dirigidos a dicha Autoridad Reguladora. Así consta a folios 1446-2466 del legajo administrativo del CNC. Esta actualización dio pie a los cambios aprobados por el CNC en el acuerdo 7 de la sesión ordinaria No. 06-2010 del 11 de marzo del 2010, luego puesto en conocimiento de los oferentes y publicitado según se desprende del folio 2444 del administrativo del CNC. Volviendo al tema de la utilidad del Plan Maestro para fungir como estudio de factibilidad financiera, cabe destacar, este tipo de estudios distan ser una forma de garantizar un flujo de ingresos. Cabe recordar que en todo contrato administrativo de esta naturaleza, se integra la variable del riesgo contractual, que en este sentido se distribuye entre las partes. El concedente no puede asegurar en todos los casos la rentabilidad del negocio, más aún cuando se trata de actividades cuya tasa de retorno se asocia y vincula al marco de eficiencia prestacional del servicio delegado. Lo opuesto, sea, el establecimiento de un nivel de ganancias aseguradas al margen de la forma en que se ejecute el contrato, podría desincentivar la eficiencia, ello sin desmedro del análisis del equilibrio financiero del contrato, que se insiste, es un tema a valorar en cada caso concreto. Incluso, dentro del cartel de licitación, cláusula 3.2 se advierte: "Los potenciales oferentes serán los únicos responsables de hacer sus propios análisis y evaluación de las reglas del concurso y del potencial de ingresos, ganancias, gastos de la Concesión, así como de la inspección del área en la cual se desarrollarán las obras objeto de la concesión, operación y demás elementos necesarios para tomar la decisión de presentar oferta formal al concurso y suscribir el Contrato en caso de resultar Adjudicatario." -folio 3209 del principal-. No se trata de una cláusula de incerteza en mengua del principio de transparencia, eficiencia y apertura -pluralidad- participativa, sino en la consigna de realizar mediciones de factibilidad y suficiencia económica para sopesar el riesgo inherente al negocio a suscribir y a partir de los insumos otorgados, decidir si opta por ingresar al procedimiento presentado la oferta respectiva. Incluso, dentro de la cláusula 6.2 párrafo segundo del contrato de concesión (folio 7666 del legajo administrativo del CNC), se señala con claridad que los estudios previos de la concesión realizado por la Administración tienen un carácter informativo y orientativo, por lo que no podrán ser asumidos como marco de referencia de la posible actividad futura del concesionario, por lo que la concedente no asume responsabilidades por la información contenida en esos estudios. Dentro del análisis de las probanzas traídas al proceso conforme al principio de la sana crítica racional -arts. 82 y 85 CPCA, 330 del Código Procesal Civil-, es criterio de este Tribunal, a partir de la prueba documental y el examen de la testimonial pericial, es factible concluir sobre la suficiencia de los datos expuestos en el procedimiento de contratación para que los potenciales oferentes tuvieran información de factibilidad financiera que les permitiera adoptar su decisión de presentar plicas o no. Sobre la estructura de un estudio de factibilidad financiera, el señor Vidal Villalobos Rojas, cédula de identidad número 1-720-443, testigo-perito aportado por CANABA, en lo medular señaló que este tipo de estudios debían contar con los siguientes componentes: debe ser definitivo, fundamentado en datos reales, creíble y objetivo; procuran crear sus propios datos, información oportuna, real y actualizada, debe ser validado paulatinamente con consultas, encuestas, estudios de mercado y datos reales, contener detalle y análisis de ingresos y gastos., ponderar VAN (valor actual neto)-TIR (tasa interna de retorno), tasas de interés, finalmente, debe tener viabilidad: técnica, económica, legal, política, de gestión y ambiental. Al margen de sus conclusiones en el sentido que el Plan Maestro no es un estudio de factibilidad financiera, esa estructura, en lo esencial, concuerda con la señalada por el testigo-perito ofrecido por APM Terminals, sea, señor R, economista, hondureño, carne de misión internacional 6412 pasaporte c-719562. En la fase de acreditación se señaló que el señor Posas es economista, máster en economía y administración de proyectos, trabaja para el Instituto Centroamericano de Administración Pública (ICAP), dirige el programa de gerencia de desarrollo. Es certificado en el área de Project managment –técnico y profesional en dirección- bajo el enfoque europeo IPMA. ICAP ayuda a los gobiernos en la formación de recursos humanos. Dentro de sus conocimientos se incluye la temática de Project Finance. Sobre el tema en concreto, luego de la ponderación minuciosa de la prueba testimonial pericial, entiende este cuerpo colegiado, los componentes de este tipo de estudios, según el criterio extenso y académico del señor Vidal Villalobos, empatan en lo medular con lo indicado por el señor Posas, quien en este sentido señaló que en su criterio, la i nformación aportada en el plan maestro es idónea para quien quisiera participar en la licitación. Lo anterior lo sustentó en una precisión referida a qué se debe entender que es un estudio de factibilidad, advirtiendo que la falta de comprensión de ese estudio puede llevar a opiniones erradas. En esa línea procedió a explicar que es un estudio de factibilidad, indicando sus componentes de la siguiente manera: Capítulo 1. Debe contener documentos o información mínima que debe estar en el capítulo identificación del proyecto. Acá debe haber información sobre antecedentes, propuesta del proyecto, criterios y componentes. Capítulo. 2. Estudio de mercado. Debe contener demanda, competencia, tarifas, precios y aspectos relacionados con estrategias para intervenir el mercado. Capítulo 3. Estudio técnico. A esos contenidos se les llama la formulación de una propuesta de proyecto. Pero además debe tener otros capítulos. Capítulo 4. Evaluación financiera del proyecto. Capítulo 5. Estudio económico y social. Capítulo 6. Evaluación del impacto ambiental. En este caso en particular, debe tener un capítulo de aspectos legales (Cap. 7) Como se observa, ambas referencias de expertos son congruentes en el contenido mínimo de un estudio de factibilidad financiera, siendo incluso el detalle del señor Posas más extenso que el dado por el señor Vidal Campos. Ahora, sobre la consulta concreta de si el Plan Maestro contiene información de un estudio de factibilidad, el señor Villalobos señaló que en su criterio ese informe no era un estudio como el peticionado. Consideró que el Plan maestro es un diagnóstico que establece en líneas generales la acción a seguir y señala posibles caminos. Brinda datos generales de fuentes secundarias y brinda ideas para que sean desarrolladas posteriormente. En lo medular concluyó que el Plan Maestro no es estudio de factibilidad, datos de demanda y de tráfico se han mejorado pero no estaban al inicio del proceso, obra es de una escala mayor a la necesaria. Era necesario revisar aportes de la concesionaria en cuanto a la necesidad de la obra, los riesgos se trasladan al concesionario, como es el tema ambiental, la incertidumbre se traslada a las tarifas. Adujo, el mayor costo en las tarifas se traslada a los consumidores del producto de carga.

XVI.- Por su parte, el profesional experto Posas Rosales indicó sobre este mismo cuestionamiento, una vez realizado su análisis sobre la documentación analizada, sea, el Plan Maestro, dentro de los documentos analizados encontró información sobre un estudio de factibilidad: el documento analizado se refiere a un plan maestro, pero se muestra que la mayor parte de la información de un estudio de factibilidad está contenida, no en la forma señalada, pero si a lo largo del documento. En este punto, el señor Posas Rosales destacó la ubicación de cada uno de los componentes de un estudio de factibilidad dentro del citado Plan Maestro, según el siguiente detalle: Cap. 1: Pag 27-34: aspectos conceptuales, 35-41: alternativas del proyecto, 44-49: criterios y fundamentos de la mejor alternativa, 50-53: componentes del proyecto, en el caso del plan, el desarrollo de las fases del proyectos. Cap. 2: Análisis de la demanda 2-22, y anexo No. 2 con proyecciones de demanda. En página 106 análisis de tarifas. Estrategias de mercado, pag. 123. Cap. 3: 107-117 desarrollo de los componentes del proyecto, 54-58 aspectos técnicos de la propuesta, anexo 7 planos necesarios para construir obras físicas. Cap. 4: documento contempla costos de operación, de inversión –por cada uno de los rubros-, ingresos, indicadores de rentabilidad del proyecto. Indicadores financieros: rentabilidad del 14%. Cap. 5: contempla evaluación económica y social. Se usa un método comparado con situación con proyecto y sin proyecto. Considera que el proyecto es rentable desde el plano socio-económico del país. Cap. 6: no se integran al plan, son documentos anexos. Lo mismo sucede con los aspectos legales del proyecto. Al ser cuestionado sobre su criterio experto señaló que desde la arista de los potenciales oferentes, el plan maestro serviría para sustentar la decisión de participar o no: su contenido es muy significativo para adoptar una decisión. Adujo que ese detalle tiene toda la estructura de costos para una empresa que quiera participar, está clara la inversión por fases, rentabilidad es clara, además de que contiene un estudio de mercado. A la luz de esos elementos de convicción se estima, el detalle de información dado en el plan maestro efectivamente contiene la información básica de un estudio de factibilidad financiera de manera que se tutela el derecho de información que permite a cualquier interesado analizar si el negocio propuesto dentro de la licitación de la TCM le resulta atractivo -rentable- y tomar así la decisión de participar dentro del concurso. La revisión del Plan Maestro en su contenido, versus las deposiciones del señor Posas permite determinar que en efecto, los componentes que ese testigo-perito menciona, se encuentran considerados en las planas del Plan Maestro que fueron indicadas. Para ello basta hacer un cotejo de referencias y contenido del citado Plan. Un estudio de los datos allí suministrados permite a este Tribunal concluir que los componentes que en cada sección se analizan cubren las variables arriba expuestas para la estructura básica de un estudio de factibilidad financiera. Nótese que el reproche del profesional Vidal Villalobos no es en cuanto a contenido, sino en cuanto calidad de la información suministrada. Las conclusiones de ese experto se concentran en preferencias en cuanto a las formas y toma de decisiones sobre el proyecto. Véase a modo de simple referencia, que una de sus conclusiones fue que la obra es de una escala mayor a la necesaria y que era necesario revisar aportes de la concesionaria en cuanto a la necesidad de la obra. Se trata de un tema propio del sistema de gestión adoptado y de características de la obra en sí, más no en cuanto a si la información contenida en el plan maestro permitía o no tener información para decidir por parte de potenciales oferentes, si el proyecto era financieramente viable o no. Cabe destacar, la credibilidad que este Tribunal concede al criterio del señor Posas no guarda relación con el intento de desacreditación presentado por la entidad APM Terminals respecto del experto Vidal Villalobos , sino, en la consideración de ese elemento testimonial junto con los elementos documentales analizados, en concreto, el Plan Maestro en sí y su contenido. De nuevo, el análisis del Plan Maestro permite obtener una serie de información relacionada con la viabilidad financiera del proyecto en sí. Ese documento contiene análisis sobre antecedentes; pronósticos de carga; estrategias de desarrollo portuario y de plan maestro; planteamiento de diversas alternativas, con análisis de todos los aspectos involucrados en la materia (náuticos, económicos, sociales, medio ambientales); las diversas fases propuestas para el desarrollo de Puerto Moín; análisis de los requerimientos para el manejo de contenedores, de la manipulación de carta en el muelle, de las operaciones de muelle y desarrollo de fases; de todos los equipos y obras requeridas para la prestación de todos los servicios; el estudio del proceso de concesión y los modelos de gestión portuaria; los diseños; el análisis financiero y económico, todo lo cual se acompaña de un total de seis anexos (alternativas de layout, proyecciones de tráfico, análisis operacional, estimación de costos, proyecciones de ingresos, análisis financiero y planos). Ello se puede apreciar a folios 275-542, 2531-2795 del expediente judicial -ambas referencias contienen el mismo plan maestro-. Por otro lado, en esta dinámica, cabe apuntar, se trata de una licitación internacional cuyo objeto es propio de proyectos complejos, lo que permite sostener, la participación por tesis de principio sería viable para empresas con determinado conocimiento del mercado portuario y por ende, con la capacidad técnica debida para realizar análisis de suficiencia económica del proyecto. Esto engarza con lo señalado en la condición 3.2 del cartel de licitación ya referida ut supra. Con todo, los datos suministrados por el Plan Maestro fueron no solo actualizados según fue expuesto, sino además complementado con información que llevó a la revisión y actualización de las estimaciones originales que fueron sometidas a conocimiento de la ARESEP para el trámite de consulta tarifaria y de calidad de servicio. De ese modo, se insiste, es criterio de este Tribunal, las alegaciones de los accionantes en este sentido pretenden contradecir un estudio que contiene la información adecuada para constituirse en el referente de factibilidad financiera que estatuyen los ordinales 9 y 21 de la Ley No. 7762.

XVII.- Por otro lado, no resulta de recibo el alegato de lesión al principio de distribución de funciones en cuanto a la supuesta delegación o comisión a un tercero de la realización del diseño del proyecto, su construcción y operación. Ya se ha explicitado, el contrato de concesión de obra pública regulado en el ordinal 1 de la Ley No. 7662, permite la contratación del diseño, la planificación, el financiamiento, la construcción, conservación, ampliación o reparación de cualquier bien inmueble público, y en el caso de la modalidad que incorpora la cesión de servicios públicos, la explotación de esas obras. A diferencia de lo que parece alegar el promovente, no se trata de una renuncia de ejercicio de competencias públicas -constitucional o legalmente asignadas-, sino en la suscripción jurídicamente válida y viable, de un contrato administrativo que tiene por objeto establecer un modelo de adquisición de bienes y/o servicios para la satisfacción de los intereses públicos. Se encuentra fuera de toda discusión la relevancia de este mecanismo como instrumento de aprovisionamiento de bienes y servicios para las Administraciones Públicas. Empero, este modelo no supone, ni por asomo, la renuncia al ejercicio de potestades públicas. Comprender lo contrario llevaría a la improcedencia de las figuras de emisión de habilitaciones administrativas para prestación delegada de servicios públicos, o bien, para usos privativos o personales de bienes demaniales, lo que desde luego, no tiene cabida en la comprensión que del régimen de la contratación administrativa tiene este Tribunal. Incluso el numeral 121 inciso 14 de la Carta Magna señala con toda claridad la posibilidad de suscribir contratos de concesión frente a determinado tipo de bienes públicos, así como formas especiales previa ley formal al respecto, en otros supuestos. En materia de prestación delegada de servicios públicos, el mismo régimen de contratación administrativa, de base constitucional (182 de la Carta Magna) y cuya raigambre constitucional ha sido reconocida por el Tribunal Constitucional en el conocido fallo 998-98, permite sostener la validez de las figuras de cesión prestacional de servicios públicos. El marco legal de la norma No. 7762 se ajusta precisamente a esas exigencias y a ese modelo fijado por el Estado costarricense. En cuanto a esa modalidad particular que regula y precisa esa ley, no se puede decir que se esté frente a una renuncia de potestades públicas, sino ante la contratación de servicios varios para concretar la construcción, diseño, mantenimiento, financiamiento, explotación y mantenimiento de una obra portuaria de contenedores en la Vertiente Atlántica. El objeto mismo del contrato elimina de pleno inicio cualquier duda que sobre la titularidad de las obras, del servicio y de las potestades públicas se pueda establecer. La simple lectura y comprensión de la tipología contractual y su ratio en el marco del artículo 1 de la Ley No. 7762 suprime dudas sobre el particular, por lo que alegato es improcedente ad portas. Puede verse incluso que dentro de las obligaciones de la concedente, se incluye en el artículo 16 inciso a de la Ley No. 7762, el deber de "Fiscalizar, permanentemente, toda construcción y explotación de obras y servicios concesionados, de acuerdo con el programa de construcción y mantenimiento de las obras o el reglamento del servicio, de conformidad con el cartel de licitación y el contrato de concesión.", lo que pone en evidencia la titularidad de la obra. Además, el ordinal 15 inciso b ibídem presupone el derecho de rescate de la obra o concesión, por causas de interés público. Más simple, el concepto mismo de concesión supone la cesión de un derecho de operación, pero nunca el traspaso de la titularidad de la obra o derecho en sí, el que una vez vencido el plazo del contrato, es recuperado por la Administración concedente. Sobre el vencimiento del contrato y su trámite de recuperación pueden verse las condiciones contractuales 18.3.2 y 18.3.3, visibles a folios 7569-7570 del administrativo de CNC, o bien, folios 121 y 122 del contrato. En suma, no se traspasa un bien público, sino que se otorga un derecho de explotación temporal sujeto a un régimen contractual-legal especial. Para mayor claridad, basta remitir a lo indicado por el Tribunal Constitucional en el voto No. 1996-03451 de las 15 horas 33 minutos del 09 de julio de 1996, en el que sobre el tema polemizado señaló: “b.- la concesión.-por medio de la concesión de servicio público el Estado satisface necesidades generales valiéndose para ello de la colaboración voluntaria de los administrados en la prestación de los servicios públicos. Por el contrato de concesión de servicio público se encomienda a una persona -física o jurídica-, por un tiempo determinado, la organización y el funcionamiento de un determinado servicio público. El concesionario lleva a cabo su tarea, por su cuenta y riesgo, percibiendo por su labor la retribución correspondiente, que puede consistir en el precio o tarifas pagadas por los usuarios, en subvenciones o garantías satisfechas por el Estado, o ambas a la vez. El concesionario queda supeditado al control propio de todo contrato administrativo; es decir, está sujeto permanentemente a la fiscalización del Estado, puesto que en este tipo de contrato siempre media un interés público, el concesionario queda vinculado a la Administración Pública como cocontratante y también entra en relación con los usuarios en cuyo interés se otorgó la concesión. En este tipo de contrato el concesionario tiene un derecho subjetivo perfecto y declarado; es decir, deriva un derecho patrimonial en el sentido constitucional del término, porque al otorgar una concesión de servicio público, se formaliza un contrato administrativo en sentido estricto. Conviene aclarar que el derecho de explotación del servicio público que se concede a particulares, no es susceptible de ser enajenado, puesto que esa actividad sigue siendo pública, y por ende, sometido a su régimen jurídico esencial. El concesionario debe gozar de un plazo razonable para dedicarse a la actividad de que se trate, de manera que por definición los tiempos indefinidos o de corta duración se encuentran excluidos de la concesión y resultan más bien propios de los permisos, que son revocables en cualquier momento como se dijo. Por lo demás, adviértase que la concesión pertenece a la categoría de contratos administrativos que la doctrina denomina de "colaboración" y su duración es temporaria, pero ha de serlo por un lapso tal que razonablemente permita la amortización de los capitales invertidos y la obtención de una ganancia adecuada para el concesionario.” En esa misma línea puede verse el fallo No. 2003-14606 de las 12 horas 30 minutos del 12 de diciembre del 2003, en la que se precisó la diferencia entre la privatización de servicios y el régimen de concesión de servicios públicos, en los siguientes términos: “En otro orden de consideraciones, no debe confundirse la privatización de los servicios públicos, esto es, la transferencia definitiva de su titularidad y ejercicio a sujetos de derecho privado con su gestión indirecta por un ente público a través de la figura del concesionario, puesto que, en esta hipótesis la administración concedente mantiene la titularidad del servicio y de los bienes de dominio público necesarios para su prestación efectiva, siendo que, únicamente, le transfiere temporalmente al concesionario el ejercicio de algunas potestades para la gestión del servicio -con o sin infraestructura- o la construcción de obras que seguirán siendo de titularidad pública (artículos 121, inciso 14, de la Constitución Política y Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos).” Por demás, no comparte este Tribunal el alegato que se cede de manera completa el diseño de la obra, dejando en incerteza al colectivo, respecto de qué se va a construir. Para ello basta remitir al Plan Maestro tantas veces mencionado, en el que se dan pautas y parámetros de la obra a construir, que han de ser ponderados para el diseño contratado, el cual, en todo caso, ha de ser aprobado por la contra parte técnica de previo a proseguir en la etapa contractual de construcción. Ergo, no se trata de una renuncia al ejercicio de potestades (poder-deber) públicas, sino que se ha acudido a una figura contractual legalmente válida, que en el caso concreto, la Administración concedente estimó la idónea para satisfacer su programación de construcción de obra pública. Si los accionantes estiman que lo más adecuado es que el mismo Estado (en sentido amplio) sea quien construya las obras y opere el proyecto TCM, se trata de una discusión deontológica sobre el modelo de gestión de los servicios portuarios. Empero, esa preferencia no elimina per se la validez del contrato que en este asunto se cuestiona, sin haber acreditado la insuficiencia técnica de ese proyecto, a tono con los ordinales 15, 16, 160 de la Ley No. 6227/78. La supresión por invalidez de ese contrato por la supuesta lesión a la técnica, no resulta de mérito en la medida en que en el marco de las alegaciones señaladas, no se ha logrado acreditar la deficiencia en la información que postula el accionante, así como en la cesión a un tercero del desarrollo del proyecto de TCM, que incluye el diseño, construcción, financiamiento, operación y mantenimiento de esas obras. Se trata, se insiste, del uso de una modalidad contractual que cuenta con permisibilidad legal y constitucional. Por demás, a juicio de este Tribunal, no resulta de recibo el temor de los accionantes sobre un posible riesgo por el sobrecosto por la ausencia de un diseño final de las obras. Por un lado, como se ha señalado ya de previo, el Plan Maestro adoptado, así como las reglas del concurso público contienen parámetros del diseño a proponer por la firma adjudicataria, de manera que no existe una total desvinculación con intenciones o previsiones públicas sobre el desarrollo de la obra, como parece argumentarse. En todo caso, la Administración concedente de previo a continuar con las diversas fases del procedimiento, deberá fiscalizar con la rigurosidad que resulta necesaria en este tipo de contratos, el debido cumplimiento de los compromisos asumidos, así como la conformidad con los parámetros pre-establecidos, de las distintas acciones del contratista, a fin de cotejar y verificar la correcta satisfacción del interés público inmerso en la TCM. Para ello debe precisarse además, el capítulo 6 del contrato, regula lo relativo al tema de riesgos dentro del convenio. En este aparte, vale rescatar lo señalado en la cláusula 6.3.1 relativa a los riesgos relativos al diseño y la construcción de obras (folio 7665 del administrativo del CNC), de lo que se desprende, los costos por inversión y construcción formulados en la oferta, son reconocidos dentro de la tarifa "techo" -máxima-, tema en el que ha participado la ARESEP, de suerte que los mayores costos a los proyectados, son cuestiones que en orden a la condición contractual aludida, deben ser incluidos como riesgo del contratista en la formulación de su propuesta técnica, económica y de diseño. Desde este plano, entonces, las alegaciones de CANABA en cuanto señalan que no se puede tener seguridad que el proyecto TCM sea auto-financiable, resultan ser antojadizas y carentes de soporte demostrativo, consistiendo por ende en meras apreciaciones subjetivas. Nótese que lo pretendido es la nulidad de un procedimiento administrativo de contratación pública de base técnica compleja, que involucra una serie de factores financieros, técnicos, legales, entre múltiples facetas. De ahí que no sea pertinente la simple alegación de supuestos vicios sin acompañar elementos de convicción solventes que permitan el análisis serio de esos componentes. Contrario a lo alegado por los accionantes, la base de información para la participación existía de previo a la instrucción del procedimiento y fue engrosada y actualizada por información complementaria puesta a conocimiento de las partes en el curso del procedimiento -aspecto en el que no se observa incorrección alguna-. Cabe acotar también, puede resultar válida la preocupación del accionante en cuanto indica que ante la concurrencia de situaciones de incertidumbre en los mercados, no se puede garantizar que las demandas proyectadas sean efectivas. Sin embargo, esa especulación constituye parte del riesgo contractual arriba analizado y que en orden a la cláusula 6.3 del respectivo contrato, debe asumir el concesionario, concretamente en la condición contractual 6.3.6 sobre riesgo de demanda y comerciales en la que se señala en su tenor literal: "El riesgo de la demanda y comerciales, así como sus proyecciones de crecimiento corresponden al concesionario" -folio 7664 del administrativo del CNC-. La eventual variaciones de detalles de demanda es un riesgo inescindible en este tipo de servicios, de ahí la fijación contractual de un sistema de valoración de riesgos que ante eventuales conflictos debe ponderarse casuísticamente. Cabe recordar que desde el propio cartel se advierte a los oferentes (cláusula 3.2) el deber de realizar sus propios estudios de predictibilidad. En este tipo de contratos, se insiste, la certeza en la futura demanda del servicio es un insumo de difícil obtención, pues múltiples factores convergen en esas lides, como es el caso de eficiencia prestacional de la terminal, niveles de producción entre otros aspectos. Lo extenso del plazo que se prevé en este tipo de vinculaciones contractuales hace que el riesgo sea un tema inherente al contrato, que de manera directa se distribuye entre las partes, y en función del cual, el contratista debe asumir, por cuestiones lógicas ya planteadas, parte de ese riesgo, siendo que no es factible que la concedente asegure o garantice niveles de demanda determinados. Con todo, aún en el hipotético caso de distorsiones de demanda que lleven a una excesiva onerosidad del contrato en mengua de los derechos de una de las partes, en quebranto del equilibrio económico ya señalado ut supra, cabe señalar, la cláusula 12.7 del contrato -folio 7625 del administrativo CNC- fija el procedimiento para establecer el reequilibrio del contrato ante situaciones que ocasionen perjuicios al concesionario, de modo que como se ha señalado, es en cada caso que ha de examinarse las acciones a adoptar para establecer ese ajuste financiero. Empero, a priori, no se puede decir de una invalidez del contrato por el riesgo de que lleguen a incrementarse las tarifas. Las pautas para distribución del riesgo están dadas por el contrato, así como las formas de ajuste tarifario, así que la formulación que hace el accionante no permite ingresar al análisis que propone, siendo que sus afirmaciones son simples apreciaciones subjetivas, no amparadas en elementos tangibles que posibiliten a este Tribunal un análisis a fondo sobre este punto. Las meras especulaciones no pueden sustentar técnicamente nulidades de actos públicos, de suerte que los reproches invocados no pueden llevar al resultado pretendido por el accionante. Por último sobre estos alegatos, cabe señalar, con lo dicho, no estima este Tribunal se afecte el principio de pluralidad o apertura participativa en este procedimiento de licitación. La sola circunstancia que se haya presentado solo una oferta dentro de esta licitación pública internacional no puede tenerse como indicativo que se ha truncado o lesionado esa máxima prevista en el artículo 5 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa -libre competencia e igualdad-. Los accionantes asumen un silogismo en función del cual, se parte de la premisa de una lesión a la igualdad en los procedimientos y la libre competencia por el hecho que solo una entidad haya participado. Se constituye así en un silogismo incompleto, que consiste en el fondo, en una entinema (silogismo truncado), lo que supone, asumir una premisa que se da por sobreentendida a partir de la cual, se obtiene una conclusión sin la acreditación de la base fáctica que la justificaría. El alegato entonces deviene en una falacia que no resulta de recibo pues se parte de una construcción en la que se llega a una conclusión, sin establecer de antemano las causas para sustentarla. Fuera de la inferencia que subyace en la alegación (por juicio consecuencial incompleto o truncado, se insiste), no se abordan razones concretas y para justificar la vulneración al principio señalado. En consecuencia, el cargo debe ser desestimado pues la circunstancia a la que pretende asociarse la supuesta lesión, no deja de ser una conjetura, no amparada en juicios lógicos y solventes.

XVIII.- Sobre el project finance. CANABA señala, en este tipo de opciones de financiamiento, se utiliza como garantía básica de la operación el denominado cash flow, que se genera como consecuencia de la explotación de la concesión. Señala que para la procedencia de esta figura se requiere conocer previamente el grado de factibilidad de la concesión a otorgar, así como sus debilidades, requisito que no se ha cumplido ya que no existían esos estudios con información suficiente, prueba de lo cual es la participación de un único oferente. No se justifica adecuadamente la decisión pública de respaldar el proyecto mediante el interés económico social, dato que resulta escueto en el Plan Maestro. Acusa, la modalidad de financiamiento no se puede realizar solo bajo la expectativa del Estado. No se hizo un análisis de eficiencia tributaria del modelo financiero. Dice, en el contrato, la estructura de control es muy débil, ya que lo que se establece es un concepto o perfil y no una obra específica. Sobre el particular cabe señalar lo que de seguido se expone. Como se ha señalado, parte del objeto de la contratación de la TCM es el financiamiento de la construcción de la obra portuaria, lo que implica, corre a cargo del concesionario buscar las opciones de financiamiento para el desarrollo de la infraestructura pública. Evidentemente, los flujos de efectivo que se pretende obtener por la operación del servicio constituyen la principal garantía para la cobertura de los créditos que eventualmente sean obtenidos para el desarrollo de las diversas acciones propias de la ejecución del objeto contractual. Ante ello, por un lado, cabe reiterar, a diferencia de lo expuesto por la accionante, es criterio de este Tribunal, el procedimiento si cuenta con los estudios de factibilidad financiera e información de proyecciones de demanda y datos relevantes que permiten a los potenciales oferentes, realizar individualmente sus análisis obre la rentabilidad del negocio propuesto. Este tema ya ha sido analizado ut supra, por lo que resulta innecesaria la reiteración de lo ya tratado. De nuevo, la existencia de un sola oferta no puede tenerse como criterio para sostener que tal ausencia se configuró en este caso. Con todo, los alegatos que presenta CANABA sobre este tema parecen, en primera instancia, contraproducentes, en tanto pese a la preocupación sobre el project finance, reconoce la solvencia de la concesionaria y pronostica pocos problemas en obtener fuentes de financiamiento para el desarrollo de la obra. Ahora bien, es claro que de previo al otorgamiento de opciones de financiamiento, las entidades de crédito han de realizar análisis de riesgo y de solvencia del potencial deudor de previo al otorgamiento de las respectivas opciones y realizar los giros monetarios correspondientes. De ahí que la carga de obtener el financiamiento para la generación del diseño, construcción, mantenimiento, operación de la TCM corresponde a la concesionaria. La viabilidad financiera del proyecto es un tema ya discutido, y que ha sido ponderado por APM Terminals al momento de presentar su plica concursal, aceptando el riesgo sobre este aspecto. Incluso, puede verse que la cláusula 6.3.4 traslada al concesionario el riesgo financiero del contrato -folio 7664 del administrativo de CNC-, numeral en el que se indica que ese riesgo incluye las condiciones de financiamiento que haya previsto obtener en su respectiva oferta. De hecho, acorde a las pautas cartelarias, cada potencial oferente debe realizar sus propias estimaciones, y estructurar sus propios esquemas de financiamiento. Nótese que el cartel no impone una determinada opción de financiamiento, empero, se reitera, se traslada al concesionario el deber de obtenerlo así como los riesgos de este apoyo financiero. Por otro lado, si bien el Estado pudo optar por contratar primero el diseño de la obra y con posterioridad su construcción y operación, de nuevo, es un tema de opción o elección de preferencias en los modelos de gestión. Sin embargo, al margen de las precisiones sobre las tendencias actuales en materia de concesiones para este tipo de proyectos que hace la mandataria estatal, lo cierto del caso es que ha de remitirse nuevamente al contenido del artículo primero de la Ley No. 7762, norma que permite contratar no solo el diseño, sino la construcción, operación, financiamiento y mantenimiento de este tipo de infraestructura. Es un tema de política programática cuya validez no ha logrado ser desacreditada por los promoventes de la presente acción. La conveniencia de unificar esas acciones dentro de un solo proyecto bien puede no ser compartida por los demandantes, pero se insiste, es a fin de cuentas un tema de escogencia entre los modelos probables de gestión aplicables a este tipo de obras. Ello no implica que no pueda revisarse la conformidad de las acciones públicas con el ordenamiento jurídico, empero, las deficiencias apuntadas por la demandante, no han logrado desvirtuar la legitimidad de lo actuado por la Administración concedente. Entonces, la consideración de si la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-0200 encaja o no dentro de un project finance, resulta poco relevante para efectos de establecer la legalidad del presente asunto, por las razones apuntadas. En otro orden de cosas, si lo reprochado es el contenido o forma de expresar la información relativa a los estudios de factibilidad, es una tema ya tratado, análisis dentro del cual se tuvo por establecido que esos estudios permitían adoptar la decisión de participar o no, reiterando el deber de cada oferente de realizar sus propios estudios. Ciertamente, dentro de las opciones que pueden darse en este tipo de contratos puede la Administración concedente optar por garantizar al concesionario un nivel mínimo de ingresos (o demanda en este caso), asumiendo así el riesgo, empero, en este caso, como se ha dicho, el riesgo en ese sentido fue traslado al concesionario, configurando una decisión de la concedente sobre ese particular. En el curso de la licitación (y antes), se puso a disposición de los interesados datos de proyecciones de carga y un detalle histórico del comportamiento de esos movimientos. Cabe resaltar, el debate del accionante estriba sobre cuestiones cartelarias que no objetó oportunamente, pero que sin embargo, no muestran las deficiencias que expone en su demanda. Con todo, en la evacuación de la prueba testimonial pericial, la correspondencia de la información y estudios brindados en el trámite de la licitación dentro del concepto de project financie, fue un aspecto ampliamente considerado. Así, el CNC ofreció como testigo-experto al señor R, de calidades arriba mencionadas. De cara a justificar que la TCM cuenta con factibilidad financiera para efectos de ponderar como oferente las decisiones de financiamiento, tal deponente expresó en lo medular, que todo proyecto ha de contar con una tarifa clara y contener el total de inversiones al margen del momento en que se realicen, costos de operación, utilidad de la empresa, recuperación de costos de inversión. Sobre el tema, CANABA cuestionó al experto, si el Project finance se financia con ingresos futuros, cómo se hacen estimaciones de ingresos en el plan maestro, a lo cual respondió -en lo medular- que se hacen con el flujo de caja por lo que se va a cobrar, se sustentan por demanda. Aclaró, en el documento se incorporan las estimaciones de demanda y proyecciones. Sobre las posteriores modificaciones de esa demanda proyectada, según adujo CANABA en el contrainterrogatorio, indicó, cuando se hace un estudio –cualquiera- y se va a proyectar cualquier tipo de variable, sea carga, precio, producción, se deben sustentar esas proyecciones, y en el plan maestro hay un modelo que sustenta esas proyecciones. Acotó, los ingresos de un proyecto, demanda y competencia deben proyectarse, los métodos utilizados es una cuestión particular de quienes hicieron los estudios. Sobre la relevancia del concepto del valor del dinero en un Project Finance, expresó que cuando se actualiza un flujo financiero está haciendo dos cosas, incorporando la rentabilidad del inversionista y tomando en cuenta si el proyecto puede ser aceptado. No podría ser adelantar ingresos y retrasar inversiones. La ponderación de lo expuesto por este profesional, -criterios que a juicio de este Tribunal no lograron ser desvirtuados-, pone en evidencia de nuevo, la información aportada a los interesados permitía la toma de decisiones en este concurso, por lo que, no se lesionan los principios e institutos que sobre el particular se invocan por los accionantes. Así las cosas, debe disponerse el rechazo de este elemento.

XIX.- Sobre el alegato de ausencia de equilibrio económico-financiero en el contrato. En otro agravio, el apoderado de CANABA reprocha la ausencia de armonía financiera en el contrato. Señala, la cláusula 6.2 del cartel es ilegal y absurda al señalar que los estudios previos tienen un carácter informativo. Dice, la ecuación del contrato, no es más que un procedimiento contractual donde se trata de establecer un equilibrio entre las obligaciones del contratista y por medio de las inversiones que éste deba hacer y las contraprestaciones que el Estado deba realizar. Acusa, en este caso, no se tienen esos análisis previos, ya que lo emitido fue un proyecto en concepto, sin estudios de factibilidad técnica, ambiental o económica. Todo lo cual ocasiona que se aumenten innecesariamente los costos y los cuales, obviamente van a tener que ser cobrados por el oferente en el caso de un desequilibrio. Este equilibrio debe incluir imprevistos del contratista como son la utilidad y capital financiero. La propuesta del contrato contenida en “la licitación”, no es la licitación de un proyecto bien definido, sino uno por definir. En la TMC no se sabe si dicha ecuación financiera está basada en los costos reales del proyecto, pues no existe un estudio técnico de factibilidad económico actualizado por parte del Estado. Estima, el costo de la construcción, operación y mantenimiento resulta menor al estimado para la fijación tarifaria, condición que ocurre en “la licitación” debido a que los datos, además inexactos, corresponden al año 2008. Por lo tanto, saldrían perjudicados, todos los usuarios, así como la competitividad del país, al tener que pagar un sobre precio por el servicio que se está brindando. Ello podría dar como resultado, que el concesionario al tener previamente una tarifa asignada, pueda hacer cambios en el diseño y en la funcionalidad de la obra para bajar los costos y sin embargo pueda mantener la tarifa ofertada. Anticipa, el Estado costarricense podría ser demandado y podría tener que indemnizar los daños y perjuicios ocasionados por el lucro cesante de la tarifa que se ofertó y se aceptó en el contrato de concesión. Sobre esos alegatos cabe indicar, de pleno inicio y en tesis de principio, puede surgir una duda razonable sobre la legitimación de CANABA y SINTRAJAP para invocar una distorsión en el equilibrio de la ecuación económico financiera del contrato. Lo anterior ya que podría decirse, el único que llevaría a reclamar tal distorsión es precisamente el concesionario a favor de quien, -o en contra de quien- se fijan las tarifas por el servicio de la TCM. Desde el plano del ejercicio de un derecho de reacción al ajuste de los términos económicos del contrato, esa postura sería técnicamente correcta, si lo que se pretende es declarar el desequilibrio como presupuesto de un ajuste tarifario para retornar a las tasas de rentabilidad pactadas. No obstante, estima este Tribunal, la preocupación de los accionantes se direcciona, no en el ejercicio de un derecho que en tesis de principio le correspondería al concesionario -podría pensarse que de manera exclusiva-, sino en el ámbito de las incidencias que ese aspecto contractual podría generar en la esfera jurídica de los potenciales usuarios o destinatarios del servicio público. Desde esa óptica, no observa este Tribunal defecto alguno en el marco de la legitimación activa del reclamante. Lo reprochado encaja efectivamente desde la perspectiva de posibles ajustes económicos del contrato vía tarifaria, o eventualmente indemnizatoria -por reclamos de responsabilidad pública contractual-, que por impacto económico en el servicio, afectarían a los destinatarios del proyecto. En este tipo de contratos de concesión debe entenderse que la relación prestacional es tri-compuesta, pues si bien la Administración concedente suscribe un contrato público con un prestatario delegado -concesionario-, para que en casos como el presente, diseñe, construya, financie, opere, explota y mantenga una terminal portuaria de contenedores, lo cierto del caso es que ese vínculo se emite para la satisfacción de un servicio público direccionado hacia usuarios destinatarios de aquel. Ciertamente el compromiso obligacional surge entre la concedente y el concesionario, pero lejos de constituirse en un binomio contractualista clás i co, consiste en la delegación prestacional de un servicio cuyos destinatarios -y causa justificante en último sentido- son los usuarios de aquel. De ahí que el ordenamiento jurídico patrio establezca, como derivación del principio democrático, figuras de participación ciudadana o pública en el control de esos contratos. El diseño de la Ley No. 7593 (Ley ARESEP) en cuanto a los trámites de ajustes tarifarios dan prueba de esa sinergia. Se trata entonces de una relación triangular, pues a fin de cuentas, el servicio delegado se direcciona a los usuarios, quienes cancelan una tarifa, fijada por la concedente en este caso -a diferencia de otros contratos en los que tal competencia ataña a la ARESEP- pero que ha de ser cancelada por los usuarios, para que el concesionario obtenga la retribución pactada en el contrato. Tal connotación se presenta en la dimensión teleológica del contrato, que busca satisfacer intereses públicos de los destinatarios, al punto que la indebida prestación a esos receptores de los efectos del negocio administrativo, puede desembocar en la cancelación de la concesión, o bien, en su recuperación o en la aplicación del régimen sancionatorio fijado. En el caso concreto de la Ley No. 7762, puede observarse incluso que dentro del capítulo III Derechos y Obligaciones de las Partes, la sección III, artículo 19, alude a los derechos de los usuarios, lo que hace incontrovertible la relación triangular aludida. Así las cosas, no se comparte el alegato del CNC en cuanto a la ausencia de legitimación sobre el aspecto. Empero, de nuevo, las argumentaciones del reclamante no logran llegar a concretar reproches solventes y concretos sobre supuestas imperfecciones en la contratación, que justifiquen su anulación. Para ello, resulta necesario realizar breves precisiones sobre el derecho en cuestión.

XX.- Sobre el derecho al equilibrio económico. El ordenamiento jurídico de la contratación administrativa confiere al adjudicatario o contratista un derecho al equilibrio económico del contrato. Se trata de un derecho que deriva de la máxima constitucional de la intangibilidad patrimonial (ordinales 33, 45 y 50 de la Carta Magna) y que tiene por norte mantener la equidad en la distribución de las cargas contractuales, específicamente en el tema del área económica y financiera del contrato, procurando que el operador mantenga el nivel de rentabilidad que inicialmente fue pactado o al menos, persistan las condiciones económicas normales. Este equilibrio permite por un lado otorgar al contratista la utilidad justa por la prestación de un servicio, el desarrollo de una obra o en general, el cumplimiento del objeto que le ha sido contratado. En el caso de los contratos de transporte, que se particularizan por ser de ejecución sucesiva, este nivel de sanidad financiera y equidad económica es determinante para la ejecución debida de la actividad pactada. El desequilibrio en la estructura de precios de un servicio de esta naturaleza supondría un detrimento en la esfera patrimonial del operador con el correlativo beneficio sin causa legítima de la Administración concedente o licitante, al estar frente a actividades cuya remuneración se encuentra por debajo del equilibrio financiero debido. Por el contrario, el reajuste de precios a un nivel cuantitativo superior al justo, llevaría a un enriquecimiento injustificado en la esfera del contratista y en mengua del interés público, al cancelarse un precio superior al que permite la utilidad acordada. De ahí que un justo equilibrio permite el desarrollo de la actividad para beneficio del destinatario y el cumplimiento armónico de los deberes asumidos en la contratación. A fin de cuentas, el ajuste de precios, cuando corresponda, es una manifestación del deber de cumplir con lo pactado (canon 15 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), ergo, se trata de un deber de la Administración, que no de una facultad, sea, en tanto se presenten las condiciones que justifiquen el reajuste, la Administración está obligada a disponer el aumento para mantener las condiciones convenidas originalmente y así satisfacer un derecho que la misma legislación otorga al contratista. Ese derecho se encuentra regulado en el precepto 18 de la citada Ley de Contratación Administrativa que en lo relevante señala: "Artículo 18.- Mantenimiento del equilibrio económico del contrato. Salvo cuando se estipulen, expresamente, parámetros distintos en los términos del cartel respectivo, en los contratos de obra, servicios y suministros, con personas o empresas de la industria de la construcción, la Administración reajustará los precios, aumentándolos o disminuyéndolos, cuando varíen los costos, directos o indirectos, estrictamente relacionados con la obra, el servicio o el suministro, mediante la aplicación de ecuaciones matemáticas basadas en los índices oficiales de precios y costos, elaborados por el Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio. (...)" En el contexto actual, se ve desarrollado además en el numeral 31 del Reglamento de dicha ley. Como se observa, el legislador partió del derecho primario del reajuste de precios como forma de mantener un equilibrio financiero en el contrato. Para tales efectos, bien pueden establecerse en el cartel respectivo o en el mismo contrato, formas de adecuación económica distintas, sea actualización económica del contrato, mediante mecanismos convenidos entre las partes, siempre guardando sujeción a las reglas ya fijadas. Empero, ese equilibrio económico ha de ser garantizado ante la concurrencia de diversas causas que produzcan una alteración en el orden del contrato. Por ello, la Administración contratante debe asegurar esta armonía cuando el efecto de inestabilidad se origine como derivación de modificaciones que haya dispuesto en el régimen del contrato o decisiones que le incidan de manera directa o indirecta, como sería el caso de las modificaciones unilaterales, lo que constituye el denominado ius variandi. Pero además, debe resguardarse frente a actos de otras Administraciones que incidan en la ejecución contractual (teoría del hecho del príncipe) o bien, cuando surjan causas imprevisibles que tornen insostenible financieramente el contrato (teoría de la imprevisibilidad). Desde luego que no estarían sujetas a ser consideradas como fuentes del reajuste de precios aquellas situaciones que sean inherentes al riesgo o ventura propias de la actividad contratada, las que en términos normales deben ser toleradas por el contratista al formar parte del álea consustancial a toda actividad de susceptible explotación económica. En esa dimensión, las variaciones originadas en circunstancias previsibles al momento de plantear la propuesta económica, en principio, no están cubiertas dentro de la necesidad de reajuste. Sobre el contenido de la teoría del reajuste de precios, la Sala Constitucional ha tenido la oportunidad de emitir fallos relevantes que hacen un exhaustivo desarrollo sobre el tema. Entre muchos, en el voto 6432-1998 de las 10 horas 30 minutos del 4 de septiembre de 1998 indicó: "El reajuste del precio del contrato se identifica con el principio de la revisión del mismo, para atemperarlo a la realidad económica del momento, lo que se hace por tres medios distintos que reconocen tanto la doctrina del Derecho Público como la que informa nuestro sistema jurídico: la cláusula rebus sic stántibus, la teoría de la imprevisión y la teoría del enriquecimiento injusto. Los tres medios tienen como fin introducir en la relación contractual una nota de equidad, que pueda conservar la armonía de los intereses contrapuestos de las partes contratantes, a la vez que mantiene la equivalencia de las prestaciones comprometidas y la igualdad ante los riesgos. La más calificada doctrina sobre contratación administrativa, es conteste en afirmar que el reconocimiento de las variaciones de precios no es una potestad del Estado sino una obligación, puesto que la incidencia de los mayores costos es de orden público, como lo es todo lo atinente al reconocimiento de las consecuencias derivadas de la teoría de la imprevisión.(...) En síntesis, los reajustes de precios no constituyen una indemnización que reconoce el Estado voluntariamente y paga al contratista, sino, más bien, un mecanismo jurídico de restitución del valor real de la obligación, de la restitución del equilibrio financiero del contrato, de manera que se pague lo que previamente se convino, es decir, es el pago integral del precio, para que no exista, ni perjuicio para el contratista, ni un enriquecimiento indebido de parte del Estado." X XI.- Ahora bien, en el contexto concreto del presente asunto, atendiendo a las alegaciones resumidas, no se observan las deficiencias reprochadas. En efecto, el tema de la existencia o no del estudio de factibilidad financiera ya ha sido objeto de vasto tratamiento, por lo que resulta innecesario abordarlo nuevamente, debiendo remitirse a lo ya expuesto. Debe indicarse empero, la pretensión de nulidad de la cláusula 6.2 debe desecharse, por ser la consecuencia lógica del análisis que sobre el tema de fondo ha expuesto ya esta Cámara. Ahora bien, el aspecto del mantenimiento del equilibrio económico del contrato se trata no solamente en el artículo 17y 40 de la Ley No. 7762, sino además en el capítulo 12 del contrato (incluido dentro del respectivo cartel), denominado "DEL MANTENIMIENTO DEL EQUILIBRIO ECONÓMICO-FINANCIERO DEL CONTRATO." Fuera de la ausencia del estudio de factibilidad técnica, económica y ambiental, no explicitan los reclamantes cómo las normas regulatorias del contrato pueden llegar a vulnerar en perjuicio de los potenciales usuarios, ese equilibrio económico y la incidencia que esas distorsiones pueden generar en las tarifas que en teoría, deban cancelar por el suministro de los servicios portuarios de carga y descarga de contenedores. No se aporta, fuera de lo indicado, alegato de fondo alguno que lleve a este Tribunal a concluir sobre la ilicitud del tratamiento que las normas contractuales dan al tema del citado equilibrio financiero, de manera que se pueda al menos inferir, la ventaja excesiva a favor del concesionario, o un riesgo objetivo que pueda llegar a lesionar los derechos de los usuarios de la TCM. De nuevo, se acusa una estructura propuesta desde la fase del cartel de licitación, sin que CANABA haya impugnado ese acto concreto luego de varias rondas de recursos de objeción. Para ello, se remite a lo expuesto sobre la preclusión que ha operado para cuestionar las condiciones del cartel de la licitación, sin perjuicio del análisis que frente a cada tema presentado se ha realizado en este fallo. Ha de insistirse, las mismas condiciones cartelarias, no atacadas oportunamente, señalan el deber de los potenciales oferentes de realizar sus propias proyecciones para concluir sobre la suficiencia del contrato y participar. No se trata de una disposición absurda como señalan los accionantes, sino de aspectos que en la lógica del proyecto, tal y como fue planteado por la concedente, son propias al tipo de contrato a suscribir y el modelo de gestión seleccionado. Por otro lado, merece relevancia para este Tribunal el alegato del Estado en cuanto señala que ante una contratación que incluye el diseño de la obra, no es factible pretender una estimación de costos reales del proyecto. Efectivamente, siendo que parte del contrato es el diseño, no guarda sentido técnico pretender una proyección de costos reales del proyecto, cuando pese a la existencia de perfiles sobre lo que ha de ser la TCM, no se tiene aún el diseño definitivo, lo que se recuerda, debe contener la ponderación de la variable ambiental -ya analizada-. Lo mismo cabe señalar sobre el alegato de datos desactualizados (2008) del Plan Maestro, cuando se ha tenido por señalado ya, esos datos fueron luego ajustados por la firma Royal Haskoning y luego, en la sede tarifaria, considerados nuevamente para el dictamen que en estos campos de tarifas y calidad de servicio, debe rendir la ARESEP. Sobre este tema se detallará infra. Sobre el mayor margen de ganancia por la realización de cambios en el diseño de obra y abaramiento de costos, es un tema que solo se menciona, sin soporte probatorio o argumentativo, por lo que sin más, debe ser desechado, al constituir una mera especulación que en todo caso, de concretarse, existen opciones válidas para requerir el ajuste de tarifas de manera que se respeten los compromisos adquiridos y la rentabilidad pactada con el mismo nivel de calidad de servicio y nivel de infraestructura (cualitativa y cuantitativa). De igual modo, la alegación de marcos de responsabilidad administrativa eventual por desequilibrio económico, parte de conjeturas que por la abstracción como se plantean, no merece mayor examen, debiendo ser rechazadas, al ser claro que los deberes y derechos de las partes llevan a la posibilidad de incumplimientos que han de ser analizados en cada caso concreto. En todo caso, se insiste, debe atenerse en esos casos, a las cláusulas de distribución de riesgos, derecho de equilibrio económico, entre múltiples factores, pues bien la distorsión puede encontrarse dentro de los riesgos libremente asumidos. Para el ajuste de un eventual desequilibrio en este caso, cabe señalar, por resolución No. RRG430-2010 de las 11 horas del 22 de julio del 2010, la ARESEP fijó los parámetros de ajuste de las tarifas y criterios de calidad. Sobre los parámetros de ajuste señaló que en caso de alteraciones financieras, serían mecanismos de ajuste válidos para equilibrar dicha ecuación los siguientes: revisión o ajuste de tarifas, pago para obras de desarrollo económico y social de Limón, revisión o ajuste de cronograma de inversiones, obras adicionales o equipamento en el puerto, combinación de las anteriores. -folios 796-801 del legajo administrativo ARESEP-. No es factible entonces, ab initio, plantear especulaciones sobre futuras responsabilidades por desequilibrio económico y a partir de ello, pretender la nulidad del proyecto, cuando existen en el contrato disposiciones claras sobre la forma de atender eventuales desajustes en la ecuación económico-financiera, así como en el dictamen vinculante de la ARESEP -ya mencionado-. Ergo, debe disponerse el rechazo de la alegación objeto de examen.

[…] XXV.- Sobre la creación de un monopolio con la operación de la TCM. Considera CANABA, el capítulo 9.1 del cartel de licitación es contraria al numeral 46 de la Carta Magna ya que establece un monopolio. Cita el fallo No. 08367-2006 de la Sala Constitucional. Señala, la licitación no cumple con el requisito de la mejor oferta y libre concurrencia. Existió una licitación que considera un mero disfraz, pues no existe la verdadera intención para que varias empresas especialistas logren una participación efectiva, por lo que el concurso se convierte en un monopolio opuesto a la libre concurrencia. Sobre el particular cabe señalar, la condición 9.1 cartelaria señala en lo medular: "Según la especialización planteada por el Plan Maestro de que la TCM será la terminal especializada para el manejo de contenedores del Complejo Portuario Limón/Moín, y la única encargada de atender barcos "Full Containers Vessels" destinados a la importación y exportación de carga hacia y desde Costa Rica, según las fases 2 y 3 del Plan Maestro Portuario que sirve de referencia." -folio 3250 del judicial- El modelo mostrado en el procedimiento busca la especialización en la operación de una terminal portuaria de contenedores en Moín, acorde a los parámetros establecidos por el Plan Maestro levantado por la empresa Royal Haskoning, a tono con las fases 2 y 3 de ese plan. El citado documento, en el numeral 64. -folio 335 del legajo judicial-, recomienda tres fases para el desarrollo de Puerto Moín, definidas con base en proyecciones de tráfico, estimación de plazo realísticamente requerido para la realización y los análisis operacionales. Desde este plano, la Fase 1 integra : a) aumento de la capacidad de la infraestructura existente mediante instalación de equipos, construcción de una nueva Terminal Petrolera, construcción de un muelle relativamente liviano para carga general; b) preparación de la concesión y construcción de un nuevo puerto al oeste del presente puerto que incluye: preparación del diseño preliminar, preparación de los pliegos de licitación, preparación del proceso de licitación pública para atraer un concesionario, firma de contrato con el concesionario y construcción del rompeolas y de la fase 2. Por su parte, la Fase 2 incluye: a) traslado de toda la carga de Limón a Moín y manejo de contenedores en el nuevo puerto. Finalmente, la Fase 3 incluye la extensión del muelle de contenedores con 600 metros adicionales. El procedimiento de licitación pública 2009LI-000001-0200 incluye lo relativo a las fases 2 y 3, en los términos ya indicados. Sobre este aspecto, la licitación pretende otorgar una concesión de obra pública con servicios públicos cuyo objeto, según se ha expuesto, es el diseño, la construcción, operación, mantenimiento de la TCM. Ergo, se trata de un contrato de prestación indirecta de un servicio público y construcción de obra pública. Desde ese plano, ante el alegato de CANABA y SINTRAJAP sobre la existencia de un monopolio, cabe precisar, este Tribunal examina el asunto desde la óptica de la validez de lo actuado en sede administrativa teniendo como parámetro de control el Derecho de la Constitución, fuente que en orden a lo establecido por el artículo 8 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, 6, 11, 13, 19, 128, 158 de la Ley No. 6227/78 y el canon 7 de la propia Carta Magna, así como el ordinal 138 inciso d del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. No se trata por ende de un análisis emprendido en el contexto del control concentrado de constitucionalidad que estatuye el ordinal 10 de la Constitución Política, sino del examen de conformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico, de determinadas conductas públicas, ordenamiento que incluye las fuentes jurídicas escritas y no escritas del derecho público. Hecha esta aclaración, cabe señalar, no existe la patología señalada por los promoventes en lo actuado. En efecto, la misma resolución No. 8367-2006 de la Sala Constitucional, en la que el accionante sustenta su reproche, pone en evidencia la validez y legitimidad de un sistema de gestión de prestación delegada (indirecta) de servicios públicos. No existe defecto alguno en la elección de este modelo de prestación delegada de competencias públicas prestacionales. Por el contrario, el mismo numeral 121 inciso 14 de la Carta Magna establece un sistema de concesiones para la explotación de bienes demaniales y en general, la delegación de ese ejercicio prestacional. Desde luego que la elección del concesionario ha de realizarse acorde a los procedimientos y exigencias que para cada caso fije el legislador, dentro de estos, el trámite de licitación pública, en el que, con claridad, han de tutelarse todos los principios y exigencias propias de esta materia, dentro de ellas, la libre concurrencia, igualdad, oferta más favorable, entre otros. La compatibilidad de este modelo de gestión pública con el Derecho de la Constitución ha sido ampliamente analizado por el Tribunal Constitucional, sin que considere este órgano colegiado que en este caso concreto, exista criterio alguno que permita variar lo dispuesto por esa Sala Constitucional, criterios en los que se comparte lo expuesto. Así, sobre el tema se ha indicado en el voto No. 5895-2005: “V.- CONFUSIÓN DEL CONTRATO ADMINISTRATIVO PARA PRESTAR UN SERVICIO PÚBLICO CON UN MONOPOLIO. En el planteamiento del presente amparo subyace una confusión entre el contrato administrativo celebrado para la “prestación de servicios para la creación y funcionamiento de estaciones para la revisión técnica integrada vehicular” con un monopolio. Los servicios públicos, que siempre son de titularidad pública y, por consiguiente, deben ser brindados por un ente público o sus órganos, pueden ser gestionados por éstos de forma directa o indirecta. La gestión directa de un servicio público se produce cuando el ente público y sus órganos cuentan con suficientes recursos o medios humanos, financieros, presupuestarios, materiales y tecnológicos para prestárselo a la colectividad inmediata y directamente, sin ningún tipo de intermediación, organizándolo y desplegando el giro que requiera o demande para satisfacer las necesidades públicas. En ocasiones, los entes públicos y sus órganos, a pesar de ser los titulares de un servicio público, no tienen la capacidad de gestión y de inversión suficiente para brindarlo, sea por carencias de orden presupuestario o limitaciones de recursos y medios, en tales situaciones, se puede recurrir al contrato administrativo de prestación de servicios o a la concesión de servicio público para que sea un particular quien lo preste. Ahora bien, para lograr que un sujeto de Derecho privado brinde un servicio público a través de una concesión o un contrato de prestación de servicios, el ente público titular de éste debe abrir, por imperativo constitucional (artículo 182 de la Constitución Política), un procedimiento administrativo de contratación denominado licitación pública, el cual garantiza la libre concurrencia, participación, igualdad de todos los potenciales y eventuales oferentes, así como la transparencia y publicidad del proceso; pero, sobre todo, su objetivo es que el ente público escoja la mejor oferta que se formula desde un punto de vista financiero y técnico. Una vez adjudicada la licitación pública, cuyo objeto es la prestación o gestión de un servicio público, debe formalizarse el respectivo contrato, transfiriéndole, temporal o provisionalmente –por el tiempo equivalente a la duración del contrato-, una serie de potestades públicas, sin que el ente público pierda, nunca, la titularidad del servicio, tanto que posee amplias potestades de fiscalización y supervisión y puede rescindir o resolver el contrato de prestación de servicios o rescatar, unilateralmente, la concesión de servicio público, asumiendo las eventuales responsabilidades de orden patrimonial frente al co-contratante o concesionario, cuando estime que no se presta de forma eficaz y eficiente o el objeto contractual no se cumple a cabalidad. Es evidente que un contrato administrativo de prestación de servicios o de concesión de servicios públicos no supone la constitución de un monopolio, puesto que, de ser así se caería en el absurdo jurídico de sostener que, absolutamente, todos los contratos celebrados por los entes públicos para el suministro de bienes, la construcción de obras públicas, la concesión o gestión interesada de un servicio público, etc. implicarían la constitución de un monopolio, con los consecuentes efectos nocivos y contraproducentes para la eficaz y eficiente gestión administrativa, la protección del interés general y la satisfacción adecuada y oportuna de las necesidades de la colectividad.” Los términos de ese fallo hacen innecesario abundar sobre el tema. Basta señalar, los servicios públicos en sí, son actividades cuya titularidad corresponde a la Administración, quien la puede delegar en un tercero conforme a los parámetros señalados. Desde ese plano, no es válido el alegato de implementación de un monopolio frente a esos servicios públicos delegados. Con todo, se argumenta, el monopolio se produce por la apariencia de una licitación que lo que pretende es minimizar la participación de otros oferentes. En rigor técnico, los defectos que acusan los promoventes no son propios de un alegato de la creación de un monopolio, sino de violación a los principios de la contratación administrativa, en concreto, el de libre concurrencia, igualdad, transparencia y publicidad. Sin embargo, la demanda se limita a acusar la lesión de estas máximas, sin aportar detalla alguno, fuera del alegato que el procedimiento se constituyó en un disfraz, para sustentar sus reproches. No se indican motivos concretos de actuaciones u omisiones que hayan llevado al quebranto de esos principios, lo que impide a este Tribunal abordar un examen serio de lo alegado. Incluso, ha de reiterarse, la lesión a los principios de la contratación administrativa deben ser invocados en el recurso de objeción contra el cartel de la licitación, lo que no ocurrió por parte de CANABA. Con todo, ya en apartes previos de este fallo se indicó que no se observaba lesión a las máximas señaladas. El hecho que solo una empresa haya ofertado no puede constituirse en indicativo incontrovertible de lo alegado. El principio de igualdad y libre concurrencia, regulado por el ordinal 5 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa busca evitar que en los procedimientos de contratación administrativa se establezcan barreras para la participación de la mayor cantidad de oferentes, de suerte que la Administración licitante cuente con mayores opciones que le permitan concretar la máxima de la oferta más favorable. Sin embargo, comparte este Tribunal las argumentaciones del Estado en cuanto señala, ese principio no puede garantizar que en efecto, se presenten múltiples ofertas, pues la decisión de participar o no dentro de un concurso público solo atañe a los particulares y depende de una serie de factores que no corresponde en este fallo analizar. Con todo, aún en los casos en que sea solo una la plica presentada al concurso, en la medida en que esa propuesta satisfaga los requerimientos que la Administración licitante busca satisfacer con el procedimiento, bien puede realizarse la adjudicación, pues en esos casos, ante el cumplimiento de los requisitos impuestos para esos efectos, la oferta se entiende como favorable. De igual modo, aun cuando se hubieren presentado pluralidad de ofertas, si a juicio de la Administración, ninguna de ellas satisface el interés público base de la licitación, puede declarar desierto el concurso y no adjudicar, según se colige del ordinal 86 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H del 27 de septiembre del 2006. Ese mismo tratamiento viene expuesto en el ordinal 29 de la Ley No. 7762, en cuanto a la adjudicación del contrato incluye la máxima de la oferta más favorable y la posibilidad de declaratoria de concurso desierto en el siguiente sentido: "El contrato se adjudicará obligatoriamente al licitante que formule la mejor oferta económica de entre las declaradas técnicamente aceptables, según la fórmula definida en el cartel, sin perjuicio de la facultad de la administración concedente para desestimar todas las ofertas por no convenir al interés público. Las ofertas presentadas en concursos declarados desiertos o desestimadas todas las ofertas, caducarán junto con el concurso." De ese modo, la amplitud de las ofertas presentadas e n términos cuantitativos, o bien, la formulación de una sola oferta no es un parámetro contundente para aseverar que se ha tutelado o lesionado el principio de libre concurrencia y oferta más favorable. Es lo cierto que las accionantes han postulado a lo largo de este proceso, las normas cartelarias incumplían con los estudios de factibilidad que manda el precepto 21 de la Ley No. 7762 y con ello, privaron la participación de otros oferentes, empero, se ha concluido sobre la inexistencia de ese vicio. Se trata entonces esas alegaciones de conjeturas realizadas por los accionantes que se direccionan, de nuevo, a plantear lo que desde su óptica, debió haber sido el procedimiento, pero esa intencionalidad no lleva, como se propone, a la nulidad de lo actuado. En la especie, las normas concursales fueron debidamente publicitadas, sometidas a varias rondas de recursos de objeción, el cartel fue modificado en varias oportunidades merced de esas medidas de impugnación, de suerte que no se explica cómo lo ocurrido en este procedimiento vulnera los principios comentados. Se trata de un proyecto público que requiere de un alto compromiso financiero por la inversión a realizar en obras y acciones asociadas, lo que desde luego, dentro de un marco de estricta lógica, puede incidir en la decisión de terceros de participar en este tipo de concursos. No observa entonces este Tribunal norma cartelaria que suponga barreras de acceso al procedimiento público de contratación impugnado en los términos que alegan los accionantes, por lo cual, se impone el rechazo del cargo.

XXVI.- Sobre la afectación a la competitividad del país con el funcionamiento de la TCM y la afectación al sector bananero. CANABA argumenta, la operación de la TCM traerá un importante impacto en los costos, lo que pondrá a la fruta local en una situación que le impide la competencia internacional con el inevitable cierre del negocio y pérdida de cientos de empleos en las zonas más necesitadas del país. Acusa, el incremento de costos será de un aproximado de 160%. Sobre el particular cabe mencionar, no existe duda para este Tribunal, ni es objeto de discusión en esta causa, la relevancia que para la economía pública tiene el sector de exportación de banano y piña costarricense. Empero, es precisamente la dinámica y relevancia de las movilizaciones de demanda de esas frutas, uno de los aspectos que ha sustentado el proyecto de la TCM. Nótese que la propuesta básica del Plan Maestro es precisamente el mejoramiento de la infraestructura portuaria en Moín mediante el establecimiento de 3 fases. Dentro de esta programación, los estudios técnicos han ponderado las transacciones y situación del mercado de la piña y el banano. Justamente, en la consulta tarifaria, se actualizaron datos relacionados con estos niveles de movilización de carga, para ajustar los costos de manera tal que el modelo financiero permitiera realizar la inversión cercana a los $998 millones y los costos propios de la operación y mantenimiento de la TCM. Si bien la tarifa inicialmente propuesta era de $169, luego establecida en $223, pese a que la ARESEP recomendó una tarifa tope de $252, ese ajuste obedeció precisamente a la actualización de datos. En sí, el reproche pretende combatir la tarifa fijada, tema ya tratado, en cuanto a la justificación técnica dada por la ARESEP. Ahora bien, la misma accionante acepta la necesidad de modernizar los puertos que utiliza para el desarrollo de sus actividades comerciales, mostrando empero su desacuerdo en los costos que deben cancelar por esos servicios a la carga y a la nave. Como bien fue señalado en la audiencia única dentro de este proceso, según los datos arrojados por CEPAL, Costa R i ca se coloca en el puesto número 15 en el ranking latinoamericano del movimiento portuario de contenedores (así lo reconoce por ejemplo la testigo Karla Piedra Alfaro y se puede ver en la página web de la CEPAL según consulta realizada el día 31 de julio del 2012 a las 14 horas http://www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/Transporte/noticias/noticias/1/42881/P42881.xml&xsl=/Transporte/tpl/p1f.xsl&base=/Transporte/tpl/top-bottom.xsl). Sin embargo, en el ranking del Foro Económico Mundial, considerando el servicio de infraestructura de puertos, Costa Rica se coloca en el puesto 132. Desde ese plano, es evidente que ante el nivel de uso de los servicios, sea comprensible que algunos agentes comerciales prefieran mantener las condiciones actuales de los puertos y no su modernización. Sin embargo, es claro que dentro del proyecto de modernización de puertos, las fases 2 y 3 del Plan Maestro evidencian la relevancia de la TCM. En la audiencia única, se planteó el alegato que la actual infraestructura de los muelles de Limón, acompañada de mejoramiento y dotación de grúas pórticas, permitiría obtener el mismo beneficio que se proyecta con la TCM. En este sentido puede verse a modo de referencia la deposición del señor Luis Vargas Araya, quien manifestó que con el Muelle 57 puede asumir esa operación. Sin embargo, esas intenciones se refieren a decisiones en cuanto al modelo de gestión portuaria. Como se ha señalado, este servicio puede prestarse de manera directa, como se ha venido haciendo por parte de JAPDEVA, o bien de manera indirecta, mediante contratos de concesión. La decisión de mantener la operación directa u optar por la indirecta, es una cuestión de discrecionalidad, que si bien se encuentra sujeta a reglas de la ciencia y de la técnica, lógica y conveniencia, controlable por ende por este Tribunal, su ilegitimidad pende de la acreditación del desapego de esas acciones con el ordenamiento jurídico. Sin embargo, ello no se ha acreditado en este caso. Se plantean alegatos de pérdida de competitividad que resultan antagónicos con la finalidad misma del proyecto, asumiendo esa pérdida en una comparación de costos tarifarios, mediante un cálculo, que se insiste, se hace sobre la base de referentes que no guardan las mismas condiciones y que por ende, su comparabilidad depende de la sumatoria a la tarifa actual de los servicios de JAPDEVA, de los insumos que se incluyen de modo unitario en la tarifa de la TCM. Sin tal ejercicio, la comparación sería por demás sesgada. Para ello, se insiste, no debe considerarse solamente la tasa por servicios a la carga y a la nave, sino además, los costos adicionales por servicios prestados por JAPDEVA, como son carga y descarga en predio, costo naviero por demoras, así como tarifas de estibas privadas. Incluso, ese esquema de comparación debería realizarse de manera proyectada, llevando el valor actual de la tarifa de JAPDEVA, al momento histórico en que la concesión de la TCM inicie operaciones, en principio, proyectada para el 2015, siendo que la carga económica de $223 de esta última es un valor que a la fecha de inicio de operaciones será la exigible. Ese cálculo se extraña en los reproches formulados.

[…] XXVIII.- Sobre el alegato de invalidez de la TCM por incumplimiento de fase 1. En la fase de conclusiones, el mandatario de CANABA señala, el plan maestro es un proyecto de tres fases que debían cumplirse en orden; primero la rehabilitación del muelle 57 y luego las fases 2 y 3, fases estas las cuales se podían licitar. Es por acto arbitrario de la Administración que se saca la fase 1 y se abordan las fases 2 y 3. Igual alegato sostiene SINTRAJAP, al señalar en esa misma fase de conclusiones, el Plan Maestro planteó 3 fases. La primera fase incluía la construcción del muelle adicional 57. Fases 2 y 3 debían efectuarse luego de cumplir con fase 1 que según el plan maestro es urgente y es la forma más rápida para satisfacer el servicio público. Toda la prueba demuestra que el plan maestro no se cumple tal y como fue planteado por Royal Haskoning. A la fecha no existe documento que acredite que la AP motivara los cambios celebrados al plan maestro, con la particularidad que las fases 2 y 3 fueron divididas en cinco secciones sin cumplir la fase 1, aunque debía estar en su mayoría lista en el 2011. Añade el apoderado de SINTRAJAP, toda la prueba demuestra que el plan maestro no se cumple tal y como fue planteado por Royal Haskoning. A la fecha no existe documento que acredite que la AP motivara los cambios celebrados al plan maestro, con la particularidad que las fases 2 y 3 fueron divididas en cinco secciones sin cumplir la fase 1, aunque debía estar en su mayoría lista en el 2011. Aduce, se acreditó que se dieron graves incumplimientos. No se cumplió fase 1. Sobre el tema cabe destacar, es claro, como se ha señalado, que la licitación se ha fundamentado en gran medida en el contenido del Plan Maestro para el desarrollo portuario Limón/Moín realizado por la empresa Royal Haskoning. Según se ha indicado ut supra, ese plan, en el numeral 64. -folio 335 del legajo judicial-, recomienda tres fases para el desarrollo de Puerto Moín, definidas con base en proyecciones de tráfico, estimación de plazo realísticamente requerido para la realización y los análisis operacionales. Desde este plano, la Fase 1 integra a) aumento de la capacidad de la infraestructura existente mediante instalación de equipos, construcción de una nueva Terminal Petrolera, construcción de un muelle relativamente liviano para carga general; b) preparación de la concesión y construcción de un nuevo puerto al oeste del presente puerto que incluye: preparación del diseño preliminar, preparación de los pliegos de licitación, preparación del proceso de licitación pública para atraer un concesionario, firma de contrato con el concesionario y construcción del rompeolas y de la fase 2. Por su parte, la Fase 2 incluye: a) traslado de toda la carga de Limón a Moín y manejo de contenedores en el nuevo puerto. Finalmente, la Fase 3 incluye la extensión del muelle de contenedores con 600 metros adicionales. El procedimiento de licitación pública 2009LI-000001-0200 incluye lo relativo a las fases 2 y 3, en los términos ya indicados. Se encuentra fuera de toda duda, a la fecha de instauración de la licitación de marras, las autoridades competentes no habían cumplido con el citado plan en cuanto a las obras e inversiones a realizar respecto de la fase 1, que buscaba la modernización del denominado Muelle 57. Incluso, dentro de la audiencia única realizada en este trámite preferente, el apoderado de JAPDEVA ofreció nueva prueba documental, visible a folios 5276-5392 del legajo judicial, consistentes en piezas documentales que ponen en evidencia la iniciación de acciones concretas para tratar de cumplir con las tareas propias de la citada fase 1. Así, se incluye un acuerdo para el levantamiento de huelga en Limón (f.5276-5277), cartel de licitación pública con financiamiento para el suministro de puesta en marcha de grúa nueva portacontenedores sobre rieles en puerto Moín (f. 5278-5323), corrección al acuerdo No. 1004-2011 carteles de los equipos portuarios reach staker, carretas y cabezales, referente a la licitación pública con financiamiento 2011LN-000000-00 (f. 5323-5355), carteles de licitación de licitaciones públicas bajo la figura de financiamiento para la adquisición de equipo portuario (f. 5356-5392). Ahora bien, para este Tribunal, es necesario llamar la atención a JAPDEVA y al CNC sobre la necesidad de adoptar las acciones concretas que permitan cumplir con la fase 1 prevista en el Plan Maestro aludido. La relevancia de la modernización de esa terminal portuaria es tan relevante como el establecimiento de la obra pública pretendida con el proyecto TCM. De hecho, este Tribunal estima, la completez de la funcionalidad integral de esa obra, se produce con la operatividad prevista para el muelle 57, acorde al diseño previsto en el Plan Maestro. De ese modo, la coherencia de las acciones públicas exige direccionar los esfuerzos debidos para concretar esas obras de la fase 1, complementariamente a los marcos de acción que se proyectan dentro del esquema y cronograma de las fases 2 y 3. De ahí que sea menester realizar un llamado de atención a las autoridades públicas respecto de sus obligaciones jurídicas en este sentido. En efecto, el Plan Maestro abarca puerto de Moín pero tiene connotaciones importantes para el puerto de Limón. La primera fase implicaba construcción de puesto petrolero, puesto 57 y equipamiento de los puertos. En el contexto del Plan Maestro, era de inmediata implementación, y estaba proyectada a ser culminada en el año 2011, pues no existía ningún puerto en la costa que pudiera dar atención al problema portuario. Segunda fase es lo que se denomina TCM que es un nuevo puerto. Está prevista entre el 2016 y el 2020. El Plan señala que va a operar cuando se traslada la manipulación de la carga a Moín. Acorde al Plan, la i mportancia de la fase 1 era la inmediatez de todos los elementos para hacerlo de manera rápida y eficiente. Ninguna otra solución portuaria podía hacerse tan rápido. Lo anterior se desprende de la lectura misma del documento emitido por la empresa Royal Haskoning, pero además, se desprende de la deposición del señor Luis Vargas Araya, ofrecido por SINTAJAP como testigo-perito. Bajo ese prisma, el citado testigo, consideró los principales problemas del complejo Limón Moín que se solventarían con fase 1 era la disminución de la tasa de ocupación, pues se tendría un puesto de atraque más, además del equipamiento. Lo anterior pone en evidencia la relevancia de culminar al menor tiempo posible, la fase 1. Sin embargo, pese a que este colegio respeta la tesis de los accionantes, no comparte el enfoque que se realiza en cuanto a la invalidez de las decisiones adoptadas en el contexto de las fases 2 y 3, por no haberse culminado la fase 1. En efecto, del análisis realizado de la prueba documental, en concreto, del Plan Maestro, así como de la deposición testimonial del señor L, J y el señor R, no se obtiene el ligamen inescindible que exponen los accionantes entre las fases 2 y 3 concretadas mediante la licitación objeto de cuestionamiento y la fase 1. Como se ha señalado, el Plan es un solo concepto, empero, las fases pueden levantarse individualmente, pues fuera del marco de la conveniencia, no existe sujeción técnica infranqueable para sostener que sin la fase 1 completada, no podían realizarse acciones para la fase 2 y 3. Desde ese plano, la licitación que tiene por objeto la TCM si bien forma parte de un proyecto integral para la modernización de los puertos, en términos de validez no se condiciona o depende de la culminación de la fase 1. Son infraestructuras que ostentan autonomía una de la otra, al margen de que guarden un ligamen en el contexto de un proyecto unitario. Bajo ese contexto, la dilación en las acciones de cumplimiento de la fase 1 justificaría las dilaciones o retrasos en las demás fases, poniendo en riesgo la intencionalidad propia de todo el proyecto. Como se ha señalado, ciertamente se ha dado un descuido de las obras e inversiones de equipamiento que sustentan la fase 1, empero, ello no limita la legitimidad de las contrataciones iniciadas en el contexto de las fases siguientes. Se trata por ende de una secuencia deseable, pero no obligatoria. Ergo, no existe motivo de nulidad en ese proceder, advirtiendo eso sí la necesidad que JAPDEVA emprenda de manera inmediata las acciones para sujetarse al plan de cumplimiento de la fase 1, sin que la implementación de la TCM constituya una justificante para dejar en descuido obras importantes para el interés nacional y en concreto, para el desarrollo socio-económico de la Vertiente Atlántica. Por otro lado, ante la alegación que el Muelle 57 con algún grado de inversión puede temporalmente hacer las mismas tareas de prestación de servicios portuarios que la TCM, se insiste, se trata de una decisión pública sobre el modelo de gestión utilizado para el desarrollo de un servicio público y la construcción de una obra portuaria. Bien puede debatirse, en un plano eminentemente ideológico, las bondades y desventajas de cada modelo (prestación directa o indirecta), empero, sería un análisis que se escapa del objeto de esta contienda, en la medida en que la base técnica de lo decidido por las autoridades públicas, no ha logrado ser refutada, pasando el reproche a ser de debate de decisiones e intenciones, más no así de validez o no de esas conductas.

XXIX.- Sobre las modificaciones al cartel. En la fase de conclusiones las accionantes reprochan que en este concurso público se dieron 13 variaciones al cartel de licitación, lo que refleja lo poco transparente del proceso. En sí, ese reproche no se ajusta a la técnica debida, siendo que los accionantes se limitan a censurar el acto genérico de modificaciones al cartel de licitación, sin aportar dato alguno o agravio concreto de la forma en que esos cambios en las pautas cartelarias generan algún grado de invalidez. Como se ha señalado ut supra, el numeral 3 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, en relación al canon 4 de la Ley No. 7762 establecen que en materia de contratos públicos, el régimen de nulidades será el regulado por la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Desde ese plano, cabe precisar, en la materia de marras, impera un principio de sustancialidad de las nulidades, según la cual, solo puede producir nulidad de las conductas públicas los vicios sustanciales que generen estado de indefensión o bien, deficiencias que de haberse evitado, hubieran permitido decisión diversa. Así se desprende del ordinal 223 de la citada Ley No. 6227/78. Nótese que el numeral 128 de ese cuerpo legal entiende como validez como la conformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico y el canon 158 ejusdem, conceptualiza como invalidez precisamente la disconformidad sustancial con ese referente normativo. Desde ese plano, no es cualquier deficiencia del acto administrativo -de la voluntad pública- la que lleva a la supresión por nulidad, sino solo aquella que confrontada con el plexo normativo que regula ese comportamiento en particular, es sustancialmente disconforme. De ese modo, cuando el vicio alegado sea superable, por no encajar dentro del presupuesto señalado, puede ser saneado o convalidado, según lo fijan los preceptos 187 y 188 de la Ley No. 6227/78. Tal doctrina subyace además en la letra del ordinal 197 del Código Procesal Civil en cuanto señala en lo relevante: "... La nulidad sólo se decretará cuando sea absolutamente indispensable su pronunciamiento para evitar indefensión o para orientar el curso normal del procedimiento. Tampoco deberá prosperar si es posible reponer el trámite o corregir la actuación, sin perjuicio de los demás actos procesales. ..." En contratación administrativa, además impera un principio de eficiencia y de eficacia, en virtud del cual, las imperfecciones del procedimiento no anulan la licitación, salvo que sean vicios sustanciales. Visto así, las variaciones al cartel solo pueden producir nulidad de lo actuado en la medida en que se lesionen sustancialmente los procedimientos o en general, vulneren los principios propios de la contratación administrativa, dentro de ellos, la igualdad y libre concurrencia. Acorde a lo preceptuado por el ordinal 51 del Decreto No. 33411-H "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", el cartel consiste en "... el reglamento específico de la contratación que se promueve y se entienden incorporadas a su clausulado todas las normas jurídicas y principios constitucionales aplicables al respectivo procedimiento. Deberá constituir un cuerpo de especificaciones técnicas, claras, suficientes, concretas, objetivas y amplias en cuanto a la oportunidad de participar. Para su confección, la Administración podrá contratar o solicitar la asistencia de personas físicas o jurídicas, especializadas en la materia de que se trate, siempre que no tengan ningún interés particular directo ni indirecto en el negocio, cuando no tuviere en su organización los recursos técnicos necesarios para ello." Dadas estas características y utilidad para el procedimiento, es usual en el contexto de contrataciones públicas complejas como la que en este fallo se analiza, las modificaciones a ese pliego de condiciones, facultad que se encuentra reconocida en el ordinal 60 del citado Decreto No. 33411-H. Cabe indicar empero, el cartel puede ser modificado de oficio o a gestión de parte. En esa última hipótesis, las variaciones pueden producirse por la formulación del respectivo recurso de objeción (art. 81 Ley No. 7494, 34 de la Ley No. 7762). Ergo, no observa este Tribunal como la simple variación del cartel de la licitación, puede generar nulidad, sino se manifiestan motivos concretos que permitan analizar la afectación a situaciones concretas. Se insiste, en la medida en que esas alteraciones afecten la libre concurrencia, se configuraría un vicio que puede llevar a la nulidad de lo actuado, empero, sería ese un tema a acreditar por parte de quien invoca la causal de nulidad. El cartel debe potenciar la mayor participación posible. A modo de referencia, sobre la prohibición de establecer condiciones que atenten contra la libertad de concurrencia, el numeral 52 del decreto 33411-H indica que "...El cartel, no podrá imponer restricciones, ni exigir el cumplimiento de requisitos que no sean indispensables o resulten convenientes al interés público, si con ello limita las posibilidades de concurrencia a eventuales participantes. ..." En consecuencia, la sola formulación y afirmación genérica en el sentido que esas modificaciones causan nulidad, no pasa de ser un alegato genérico, propio de apreciaciones subjetivas a partir de las cuales se conjetura una hipotética nulidad, que en definitiva no ha ocurrido, y que por otro lado, no concede a este Tribunal parámetros concretos de análisis. Lo mismo ha de indicarse sobre el alegato de SINTRAJAP de la falta de publicación del resumen del cartel del artículo 21.5 de la Ley No. 7762. Ante este argumento, este cuerpo colegiado comparte las manifestaciones de la CGR sobre la aplicación del principio de eficiencia y eficacia en las contrataciones públicas. El accionante se limita a exponer ese reproche desde un plano formalista sin señalar en concreto, la forma en que la supuesta omisión de ese trámite, ha generado un vicio sustancial que afecte la tutela de los principios de igualdad y libre concurrencia en las licitaciones públicas. Para ello debe remitirse a lo arriba expuesto sobre la sustancialidad de las nulidades como pilar interpretativo dentro del esquema de análisis de validez de las conductas públicas, como derivación además de las máximas contenidas en los ordinales 168 y 176 de la Ley No. 6227/78 que postulan la presunción de validez de los actos. Se extraña esa argumentación y construcción discursiva que permita concatenar lo alegado con el efecto lesivo de esas supuestas incorrecciones, lo que sería determinante e indispensable para abordar el ejercicio deliberativo que posibilitara llegar a determinar la invalidez argumentada. Nótese que en la fase de refrendo la misma CGR no detectó deficiencias sustanciales en el trámite de la licitación, lo que pone en evidencia la conformidad jurídica de esas actuaciones. Ciertamente la acción de CANABA se direcciona además contra ese acto de refrendo, empero, existiendo un análisis técnico como el aludido, la formulación debida de este cargo, al margen del análisis que luego se abordará sobre el citado refrendo contralor, exigía proposiciones concretas de nulidad. Ante la imperfección del alegato entonces, y al no mostrarse, del análisis realizado por este Tribunal lesión a los principios de la contratación, debe disponerse en consecuencia el rechazo del cargo en cuestión.

XXX.- Sobre las concesiones dadas por la concedente en el contrato. Los accionantes reprochan la invalidez del contrato de concesión alegando que dentro de este se dieron una serie de concesiones o facilidades que no estaban presentes dentro del cartel de licitación y que de haber estado presentes hubieran permitido la participación de una mayor cantidad de oferentes. Con independencia del análisis concreto que de cada una de las supuestas deferencias contractuales otorgadas por la Administración concedente cabe señalar, de nuevo, la demanda en este sentido se limita a señalar la existencia de un hipotético vicio, sin presentar una construcción técnica adecuada de la forma en cómo esas deficiencias pueden llegar a producir nulidad. En efecto, como se ha puesto en evidencia a lo largo de este fallo, muchas de las argumentaciones de los accionantes consisten en formulaciones discursivas genéricas en las que se omite presentar un detalle de análisis particularizado de la forma en que los vicios que acusan efectivamente se han producido y a su vez producen el grado de invalidez que pretende. Ciertamente en los procesos regulados por el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo impera un principio de verdad real de los hechos, acorde a los ordinales 82 y 85 de ese cuerpo legal. Empero, tal principio opera para la dinámica probatoria, y aún en ese tópico, no supone que el proceso sea de corte inquisitivo en el que el juzgador pueda liberar o dispensar a las partes de su deber de acreditar los hechos en que sustentan sus pedimentos. Por el contrario, el numeral 58 en relación al 63, ambos del CPCA, establece, junto con el ordinal 317 del Código Procesal Civil -de aplicación supletoria por la cláusula de integración del precepto 220 CPCA-, el principio de carga dinámica de la prueba, que exige a las partes el deber de acreditar sus hechos o defensas. Desde el plano de las pretensiones anulatorias ello supone también el deber de las partes de indicar con precisión los motivos y causas de invalidez de las conductas cuya supresión se peticiona. Esto atiende a que fuera de los casos previstos en el numeral 182 de la LGAP, el juzgador no puede revisar de oficio la validez de las conductas públicas. Incluso, en el contexto del análisis de conductas conexas, en determinados supuestos esa ponderación oficiosa sería pertinente, como es el caso de la nulidad por accesoriedad del canon 164.2 LGAP, pero en otros, es menester que las partes invoquen los motivos de nulidad que han de ser ponderados. Lo opuesto llevaría al simplismo de solicitar al juzgador que revise la validez de un acto público, para que al margen de las causas invocadas, analice todos los elementos de aquel, relevando por ende al accionante de su deber de argumentación. Ante el reproche concreto, se indica únicamente, de no haberse dado esas incorporaciones se hubieran aportado más ofertas, pero no se detalla en modo alguno como ese efecto se hubiera producido, ante lo cual, los reproches bajo examen carecen de base empírica, siendo por ende meras especulaciones, formulaciones conjeturales que no se sostienen en elementos solventes, ni de argumentación, ni de prueba. Para ello, sería imperativo que en efecto se vulnerara el principio de libre participación, igualdad y concurrencia, lo que no se ha acreditado, pero que en todo caso, como adelante se analizará, este Tribunal no desprende en el caso de marras. Ahora bien, llama la atención a este órgano colegiado, que los principales afectados con la supuesta alteración al principio de libre concurrencia, no se apersonaran al proceso a plantear tal circunstancia. En efecto, ningún interesado en el desarrollo del proyecto de la TCM -potencial oferente-, ha acudido a esta sede a señalar el defecto que las partes reprochan. Si bien ello no es indicativo de no existir nulidades, lo cierto del caso es que consiste en un parámetro referencial que pone en evidencia la poca afectación que para los efectos del derecho tutelado en el artículo 5 de la Ley No. 7494 se produce. Cabe resaltar, esta norma indica: "En los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, se respetará la igualdad de participación de todos los oferentes potenciales. /Los reglamentos de esta Ley o las disposiciones que rijan los procedimientos específicos de cada contratación, no podrán incluir ninguna regulación que impida la libre competencia entre los oferentes potenciales. (...)" De ese modo, la nulidad alegada solo podría decretarse cuando se acredite que se ha vulnerado ese principio, lo que se insiste, acá no ha sucedido. En concreto se presentan las siguientes cuestiones que a decir de los accionantes no estaban consignados expresamente en el cartel: a) la posibilidad de presentar una oferta alternativa: de la revisión del expediente y de la diversa y abundante prueba que se presentó en este caso no se ubica la posibilidad de presentar una oferta alternativa. Las partes accionantes no señalan ese elemento de manera concreta. Por el contrario, la plica de APM Terminals lo que incluye es una oferta de descuento que fue aceptada por la Administración; b) declaración del proyecto de interés público: no se observa como esa declaratoria, potestativa de la Administración, puede generar una ventaja que lleve a la vulneración de la libre concurrencia. Es claro que desde el inicio el proyecto pretende satisfacer un interés público de relevancia como fue consignado incluso desde el mismo plan maestro y luego en el mismo cartel de licitación se hace referencia a la trascendencia pública del proyecto de la TCM. Así puede verse, v.gr., a folio 3202 vuelto del judicial, que contiene la cláusula 1.1 del cartel, "Justificación del proceso licitatorio". En todo caso, la declaratoria de interés público de un proyecto es una potestad discrecional de la Administración, que dicho sea de paso, acá no se ha cuestionado; c) compromiso de coadyuvar en la tramitación de estudios básicos de oleajes y propagación, estudios de navegación, agitación, cambio de la línea de costa, estudios de suelos y ambientales, fuentes de materiales: acorde a lo señalado en el cartel de licitación y en el contrato de concesión, temas ya analizados, esos estudios corresponden al concesionario. Sin embargo, es innegable que dentro de los contratos públicos se impone un deber de colaboración mutua para correcta ejecución del contrato, lo que desde luego no implica un desplazamiento de las obligaciones a cumplir en la dinámica contractual. De ese modo, ese deber de colaboración es parte ínsita del contrato al margen de su expresión formal dentro del contrato. buscar la todos estos trámites son obligatorios para el concesionario y la obligación de colaboración de la Administración existe, con o sin aceptación escrita de su deber de colaborar. El compromiso de colaboración no pasa de ser eso, no traduce beneficios patrimoniales de ninguna especie y no ocasiona ventaja indebida para el concesionario; d) compromiso de facilitar espacio físico en tierra, para instalación de oficinas y campamento del concesionario durante etapa de construcción: según lo argumenta el CNC, ese compromiso no constituye una cesión de la propiedad pública, sino una habilitación de uso que colabora y facilita las labores de inspección y control del destino, almacenaje y manipulación de materiales. Los accionantes no rebaten el alegato del CNC en cuanto a que ese compromiso fue pactado para obtener un descuento en la tarifa por los servicios portuarios. Esto se evidencia a juicio de este Tribunal en el hecho que la tarifa aprobada por ARESEP fue de $252 en tanto que la incorporada en el contrato -en la versión final del cartel- fue de $223, lo que muestra la verosimilitud de lo invocado por el CNC; e) colaboración en la obtención de permisos de viabilidad ambiental, de permisos de Salud, Autorización de Aguas, servicios de electricidad, colaboración para autorización de pólizas de seguro y permisos municipales: ante el mencionado deber de colaboración, es claro que en el curso de la tramitología de la obtención de la VAL (viabilidad ambiental definitiva), el concesionario requiere de obtener constancias, certificaciones o información que ha de suministrar la concedente, por lo que no se observa ventaja comparativa que lleve a vulnerar los principios aludidos arriba. De igual modo, partiendo que existe a la fecha la VAP (viabilidad ambiental potencial) del proyecto, los trámites ante entidades financieras, requieren información pública que los entes públicos han de emitir, por lo que no conculca principio alguno. Debe recordarse que el concurso incluye el financiamiento de la terminal portuaria, por lo que este aspecto exige la coordinación y colaboración debida. De esa manera, la facilitación y colaboración prevista respecto de esta particular, no resulta espuria como se recrimina; f) El Estado coadyuvaría designando el sitio para disposición de material de dragado que no se utilice como relleno: es tarea ordinaria del Estado aprobar el sitio de disposición de esos materiales, de donde ningún compromiso extraordinario se adquiere, ni ventaja que no fuese prevista en el cartel como para modificar la intención de participar o no en el procedimiento; g) El Estado designaría la fuente de extracción de materiales para el relleno si fuera requerido para la construcción de la TCM: el contrato se refiere a una gestión indirecta de obras públicas, empero, no debe perderse de vista que se trata de una obra propiedad del Estado (en sentido amplio), por lo que es menester que autorice la fuente de materiales que llegase a ser necesaria para la construcción, sin que ello constituya un costo adicional para el Estado o una ventaja en términos del concurso para el concesionario. Aunado a ello, tal y como menciona el CNC, tales autorizaciones estarían sujetas a las regulaciones del Reglamento para la actividad minera del Estado y sus contratistas, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 19789-MIRENEM de 25 de junio de 1990, publicado en la Gaceta no. 145 del 3 de agosto de 1990; h) que el Estado brindaría todas las facilidades del caso para la extracción y disposición del material de dragado y en la obtención de permisos del MINAET y el SETENA: ese compromiso es inherente al deber de colaboración señalado. Obtenidos los permisos sería iluso pensar en la improcedencia de ese deber de colaboración, el cual, se insiste, es de principio. De ese modo, no incorpora ventaja comparativa alguna que constituya una ventaja de manera que vulnere la igualdad y libre concurrencia; i) que el Estado solicitaría la autorización para la explotación que se requiere del Departamento de Minas del MINAET a favor del concesionario: como se ha señalado, esta materia se regula por el Decreto No. 19789-MIRENEM, lo que no encuentra excepción por tratarse de contratos de obra pública o una ventaja a favor del concesionario, ergo es el Estado el titular de la obra y quien debe peticionar esas autorizaciones; j) que el Estado se compromete a dar inicio con las operaciones provisionales con el primer puesto de atraque de una fase 2A que no existía en el cartel: esta eventualidad permite la puesta en operación de un primer puesto de atraque antes de las fechas previstas en el cartel, lo que supone una ventaja a favor de los potenciales usuarios de la TCM, los que podrían utilizar este sistema de manera voluntaria en tanto no se da el traslado definitivo y total por criterio de especialización del transporte de contenedores tipo full container. No aprecia este Tribunal que constituya un elemento que sustente la nulidad peticionada. Así las cosas, en síntesis, debe disponerse el rechazo de este cargo. En todo caso, debe remitirse a lo señalado respecto del principio de eficiencia dentro de los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, que busca la elección de la oferta más conveniente al interés público, prevaleciendo el fondo sobre la forma.

XXXI.- Sobre la incidencia en este proceso del informe rendido por la Asamblea Legislativa. Las promoventes presentan al proceso como prueba documental informe rendido por la Asamblea Legislativa, titulado "Informe Especial que investigará y Analizará todos los Procesos de Concesión que ha otorgado el Estado costarricense, o esté por otorgar al amparo de la Ley No. 7762 y su modificación parcial contenida en la Ley No. 8643. Informe APM Terminals Central América." En este documento, visible a folios 4134-4290 del legajo judicial (tomo VII), se realiza un diagnóstico por parte de ese Poder de la República sobre los términos en que se otorgó la concesión de la TCM dentro de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-0200. Ese documento realiza un extenso análisis sobre dicha contratación, ponderando una serie de temas que han sido ponderados en el presente fallo, dentro de estos, la factibilidad ambiental (tercera parte, pag. 54-86 del citado informe), comparecencia de las partes interesadas y conclusiones. Estas conclusiones pueden verse a partir del folio 147 y hasta el 157 de ese informe (planas 4271-4281 del judicial). Este Tribunal se ha abocado al análisis a fondo de la compleja y cuantiosa prueba documental y testimonial que fue admitida en este proceso, incluyendo expedientes administrativos y judiciales, dentro de lo cual, ha ponderado con el rigor debido las deliberaciones consignadas en el informe vertido por la Asamblea Legislativa. Es decir, se trata de un documento que ha sido ponderado por este Tribunal en su examen de este caso. Sin embargo, pese a que se respeta por demás ese ejercicio de control político-parlamentario, es claro que no condiciona en modo alguno el análisis que está llamado a realizar este órgano jurisdiccional. No resulta vinculante ese dictamen para las decisiones de esta jurisdicción, siendo que no existe norma expresa que impregne de tal fortaleza y jerarquía a las ponderaciones de esa instancia legislativa. El principio de autonomía del juzgador cuya base radica en el texto del ordinal 153 y 154 de la Carta Magna (en relación al 166 ejusdem), sustenta la ausencia de elemento vinculante de ese referente documental. Con todo, se ha considerado como un elemento más de análisis en este caso, aportado para engrosar y fortalecer los elementos de convicción a contemplar para la decisión finalmente adoptada en esta resolución. Desde esa arista de examen, ante esa característica de no constituirse como un referente vinculante, debe expresarse, lo resuelto hasta el momento no encaja en su mayoría con lo que ese análisis legislativo comprende, lo que desde luego, no causa nulidad alguna en lo resuelto en esta sede. Nótese que el mismo informe advierte de la existencia de estos procesos judiciales. Las recomendaciones allí vertidas se direccionan a instancias públicas que son demandadas en esta causa, razón por la cual, para efectos de claridad, se deja constancia de la debida ponderación de ese informe, el que no es objeto de cuestionamiento, pero que tampoco ha limitado el análisis de este Tribunal en este caso concreto.

[…] XXXIV.- Sobre la supuesta lesión a los principios de la contratación. En un primer plano CANABA alega lesión al principio de legalidad y transparencia de los procedimientos, por lo que no puede cambiarse ninguna de las condiciones impuestas por el cartel. Este tema ya ha sido abordado con antelación, señalando que la complejidad de estos procedimientos exijen, no en pocas ocasiones, mutaciones o variaciones del cartel. Empero, ya suscrito el contrato, la Administración tiene un conjunto de potestades exorbitantes dentro de las cuales se incluye modificación unilateral del contrato prevista en el artículo 12 de la Ley No. 7494. Tal y como expone el Estado, tesis que comparte este Tribunal, todo contrato está afecto a un principio de mutabilidad que posibilita su ajuste a las condiciones y contexto real a fin de tutelar la debida cobertura del interés público que lo sustenta. Así se ha reconocido entre muchas, en la sentencia No. 998-98 de la Sala Constitucional en la que sobre este principio se ha establecido que la administración cuenta con los poderes y prerrogativas necesarias para introducir modificaciones a los contratos, con el objeto de que cumplan con el fin público asignado que debe proteger y realizar. Ciertamente el contrato en tesis de principio debe suscribirse en los términos previstos originalmente en el cartel, no que obsta para la modificación para ajustarlo al interés público en casos que así lo requieran. Incluso esas variaciones pueden derivar de adaptabilidad de condiciones no ponderadas en el cartel, o bien, por imperativo del refrendo contralor. En suma, ya se ha establecido que las variaciones al cartel en este concurso público se realizaron sin desmedro de los principios aplicables a esas tareas. Asimismo, la redacción final del contrato incorpora aspectos incluidos por aspectos de conveniencia del interés público, tema en el cual ya se determinó ut supra, no existe irregularidad alguna. Por demás, de nuevo, se trata de una formulación genérica, que no concreta los apartes del contrato que vulneran el cartel, fuera de los temas ya mencionados arriba. Lo que lleva sin más, al rechazo del cargo. Se alega además lesión al principio de formalismo de los procedimientos, señalando que debe existir una etapa previa de planeamiento que no se ha dado. Sobre el particular, debe remitirse a lo ya expuesto en cuanto a que el presente procedimiento incluye el diseño de las obras y no solamente su construcción, lo que permite claramente el numeral 1 de la Ley No. 7762. Por otro lado, se reitera, el Plan Maestro y términos de la contratación incluyen parámetros del diseño a contratar, por lo que no existe lesión al principio enunciado. Principio de control de los procedimientos. Se acusa la ausencia de estudios de factibilidad para sustentar la licitación. Se trata de un tema ya resuelto en este fallo, en el cual se ha concluido sobre el cumplimiento de las exigencias previstas en los ordinales 9 y 21 de la Ley No. 7762, por lo que por paridad de razón, no podría infraccionarse ese principio cuando no se ha tenido por establecida la falencia en que la accionante sustenta su reclamo. Principio de discrecionalidad de la Administración. En este punto, se hace un discurso academicista sobre conductas regladas y discrecionales, así como la posibilidad de control judicial de las potestades discrecionales, para sostener la posibilidad de analizar la validez del refrendo. No se aporta alegato alguno que analizar en este punto, por lo que no se ingresa a su examen. Sobre el Project finance, tasa interna de retorno y sistema de tarifas. En este punto el accionante reitera las argumentaciones ya analizadas por este Tribunal sobre el tópico del project finance, los estudios de factibilidad, reproches sobre el trámite tarifario realizado en sede ARESEP. La misma demandante señala que se hace una reiteración de lo alegado en el escrito inicial, abundando el hecho de la emisión del refrendo, sin que se aporte elemento novedoso alguno fuera de referencias teóricas que no vienen a aportar nada a lo ya expuesto. Ergo, basta remitir al análisis que sobre esos temas ya fueron abordados por este Tribunal. La ampliación en realidad aporta una serie de datos especulativos que sirven de base para realizar una serie de formulaciones subjetivas sin fuente de acreditación probatoria, que se insiste, no modifican el examen ya realizado sobre esos puntos, incluido el tema de la predicción de movilizaciones demanda, aspecto también, ya analizado. Lo mismo sucede con el alegato reiterado de la creación de un monopolio privado en la prestación de un servicio público, aspecto ya tratado con suficiente amplitud, por lo que se hace innecesario abordarlo, tema en el que se incluye la ponderación de la no violación al principio de la libre concurrencia por el solo hecho de haberse formulado una única plica concursal. Sobre el alegato de relevancia del estudio de impacto ambiental como requisito sustancial, es un aspecto ya ponderado con amplia extensión, por lo que su abordaje es fútil.

XXXV.- Sobre la regulación de la potestad de refrendo de la CGR en los contratos públicos. Ante las alegaciones realizadas por la accionante sobre el refrendo contralor, cabe realizar algunas breves referencias sobre este instituto o fase de la contratación administrativa. Las competencias constitucionales de la CGR se encuentran previstas en el ordinal 184 de la Carta Magna, funciones dentro de las cuales, se le asigna un papel protagónico en cuanto al control del gasto público, tutela de la hacienda pública, materia presupuestaria entre otras. Con todo, sus competencias se desarrollan en otro conjunto de normas que buscan tratar esos marcos de acción, como es el caso de la Ley No. 7428 (Ley Orgánica de la CGR), Ley No. 8292, Ley No. 8131, Ley No. 8422, entre otras. En menesteres de contratación administrativa, esas competencias se desarrollan con mayor claridad en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, No. 7494, en la cual, se le asigna la competencia, que aquí interesa, de conceder o denegar el refrendo a los procesos de licitación pública. El tema se ha desarrollado concretamente en el denominado REGLAMENTO SOBRE EL REFRENDO DE LAS CONTRATACIONES DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA, No. R-CO-44-2007 del Despacho de la Contralora General, emitido a las 09 horas del 11 de octubre del 2007, publicado en La Gaceta No. 202 del 22 de octubre del 2007. Sobre la relevancia del refrendo en el control de las contrataciones públicas, en el fallo No. 14421-2004, la Sala Constitucional ha señalado en lo relevante al caso: "A través del refrendo, la Contraloría General de la República ejerce una fiscalización o control sobre los actos de los sujetos pasivos que puedan comprometer la Hacienda Pública o los presupuestos públicos, como una forma de garantizar la corrección, transparencia y legalidad de los egresos en que puedan incurrir. Para el caso de los contratos administrativos, el referendo se produce después de dictado el acto de adjudicación o de la etapa de perfección del contrato, esto es, cuando el mismo resulta válido por ser sustancialmente conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico, de modo que la Contraloría General de la República a través de esa figura examina y verifica que el clausulado del contrato debidamente formalizado se ajuste al bloque de legalidad, esto es, al cartel de la licitación que es la regulación o normativa específica del contrato respectivo, la oferta formulada, la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa y su reglamento y, en general, con el resto del ordenamiento jurídico administrativo. El propósito o fin esencial del refrendo es evitar que las obligaciones contraídas por las administraciones públicas en los contratos administrativos, debidamente asentadas o formalizadas, se contrapongan al ordenamiento jurídico administrativo y que, por consiguiente, se produzca una incorrección o ilegalidad en la disposición de los fondos públicos.” Sobre el desarrollo reglamentario de esa tarea, ese mismo Tribunal Constitucional ha indicado en el fallo No. 2000-03027 de las 09 horas 03 minutos del 14 de abril del 2002: “IV.-DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL REGLAMENTO IMPUGNADO. El Reglamento sobre el refrendo de las contrataciones de la Administración Pública no es violatorio de la potestad reglamentaria reconocida al Poder Ejecutivo en los incisos 3) y 18) del artículo 140 constitucional, toda vez que no se trata ni de un reglamento ejecutivo –según la consideración del accionante-, sino más bien de un reglamento autónomo de organización o funcionamiento, en cuanto pretende dictar normas y directrices a fin de realizar una competencia que la propia Constitución Política le otorga, sea el refrendo de la contrataciones que realice la Administración Pública. De manera que su fundamento y sustento jurídico-constitucional no deriva de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, ni tampoco de su Ley Orgánico, sino directamente de los artículos 182, 183 y 184 de la Constitución Política, y los principios constitucionales que de estas normas derivan en relación con la contratación administrativa, en los términos señalados con anterioridad por este Tribunal, en la sentencia número 0998-98, de las once horas treinta minutos del dieciséis de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y ocho (reiterados en las sentencias número 5947-98, de las catorce horas treinta y dos minutos del diecinueve de agosto; número 6432-98, de las diez horas treinta minutos del cuatro de junio; y la número 6754-98, de las quince horas treinta y seis minutos del veintidós de setiembre, las tres, de mil novecientos noventa y ocho), los cuales han sido sintetizados de la siguiente manera: "primero: en el artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, se enuncia la primera obligación constitucional en materia de contratación administrativa, en virtud del cual, toda contratación que celebre el Estado debe tramitarse por medio del procedimiento de la licitación; segundo: que el constituyente optó por el procedimiento de la licitación, por considerarlo el mecanismo más apto para el control de la hacienda pública y del correcto uso de los recursos financieros del Estado, con la finalidad de promover una sana administración de los fondos públicos; tercero: la licitación constituye el medio idóneo para la selección del cocontratante de la Administración, por ser un procedimiento de garantía del interés público, cuya publicidad garantiza una efectiva participación de todos los interesados, para que la Administración seleccione la mejor opción para la satisfacción del interés público; cuarto: por licitación debe entenderse el mecanismo, modalidad, medio o conjunto de principios a los que debe sujetarse el Estado -en el sentido más amplio-, para poder realizar su actividad de contratación, por cuanto en ella se dan cumplimiento los principios constitucionales que informan la contratación administrativa: libre concurrencia, igualdad de trato entre todos los potenciales oferentes, publicidad, legalidad o transparencia de los procedimientos, seguridad jurídica, formalismo de los procedimientos licitatorios, equilibrio de intereses, principio de buena fe, mutualidad del contrato, y control de los procedimientos a cargo y en última realizado directamente por la Contraloría General de la República; quinto: del principio «toda contratación administrativa se hará por el procedimiento de la licitación», contenida en el artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, derivan con rango constitucional, todos los principios de derecho público que informan la contratación administrativa, en la medida en que resulten razonables y proporcionados a los fines que se persiguen; sexto: el sistema de contratación administrativa está conformado por los principios constitucionales que emanan de la propia Constitución, y como complemento, por el sistema de control ejercido directamente por el órgano constitucional encargado y vigilancia de la hacienda pública, -Contraloría General de la República, según se dispone en los artículos 183 y 184 constitucionales-, que se establece como garantía de la correcta utilización de los fondos públicos en aras de la satisfacción del interés público. sétimo: la obligación constitucional que deriva del artículo 182 de la Carta Fundamental comprende toda la actividad contractual del Estado; por lo que no puede distinguirse para exceptuarse en el tipo de contrato a realizar -de servicios, ejecución de obras, ventas o arrendamientos de bienes, compras- o en razón de la materia de que se trate; octavo: el constituyente definió que el procedimiento más apto para realizar la contratación administrativa sería la licitación pública, y reservó la licitación privada únicamente para las contrataciones cuantitativa y cualitativamente menores". Al constituirse en un principio esencial –y, además, constitucional- de la contratación administrativa el sistema de control ejercido directa y exclusivamente por la Contraloría General de la República, órgano constitucional encargado de la vigilancia de la hacienda pública, es que con anterioridad, este Tribunal Constitucional determinó la competencia en esta materia a dicho órgano, para que diseñara los diversos mecanismos para efectuar el control –o refrendo- de la contratación administrativa. De este modo, en sentencia número 9524-99, de las nueve horas seis minutos del tres de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, ante consulta de la propia Contraloría sobre la competencia de ese órgano para dictar directrices en esa materia, señaló:"V.- DEL REFRENDO EN LA CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA COMO COMPETENCIA EXCLUSIVA DEL ÓRGANO CONTRALOR CONSTITUCIONAL. Quedó claro en la sentencia recurrida –número 05947-98, de las catorce horas treinta y dos minutos del diecinueve de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y ocho-, que el refrendo de la contratación administrativa a cargo de la Contraloría General de la República es de aplicación a toda la administración pública, con lo que se incluye no sólo a los órganos que se financian con el plan de gastos de la Administración Central, sea la Asamblea Legislativa, Poder Ejecutivo (Presidente de la República y Ministro respectivo), el Poder Judicial, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la Contraloría General de la República y la Defensoría de los Habitantes, sino también a los órganos descentralizados y desconcentrados de la Administración Pública, con lo que se hace extensivo a los bancos que conforman el sistema bancario nacional. Dos son los principios constitucionales que dan fundamento a esta posición: el artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, establece que los principios constitucionales que orientan la contratación administrativa son de aplicación para toda la Administración Pública, sin excepción alguna, al no distinguir la norma constitucional si se trata de una institución del gobierno central, institución autónoma u órgano desconcentrado; y del artículo 184 constitucional deriva el principio rector del control de la contratación administrativa realizado directa y exclusivamente por el órgano constitucionalmente encargado de la vigilancia y fiscalización de la hacienda pública. Es función esencial de la Contraloría General de la República la fiscalización de la hacienda pública, por mandato constitucional –artículo 183 constitucional-, pudiendo realizar esta función a través de diversas modalidades de control, sea el refrendo y otros medios, como el auditoraje o las inspecciones, o la misma apelación o la intervención a posteriori. En este sentido, debe tenerse en cuenta que así como la norma constitucional refiere a la legislación ordinaria para que ésta establezca las diversas modalidades de la contratación administrativa, en razón de su monto, configurándose así, la licitación pública, la licitación privada, contratación directa, y remate con procedimiento alterno, según la clasificación dada por la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República, número 1279, de dos de mayo de mil novecientos cincuenta y uno derogada por la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, número 7494, de dos de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, adicionada y reformada por Ley número 7612, de veintidós de julio de mil novecientos noventa y seis, que establece la siguiente clasificación: licitación pública, licitación por registro, licitación restringida, remate y contratación directa; así, es competencia exclusiva de la Contraloría General de la República, el diseñar diversos mecanismos y modos para efectuar el control de la contratación administrativa, en razón del monto, la materia y la institución pública que realice la contratación, conforme a los principios que la propia Constitución Política da, y obviamente dentro del marco legal que le confiere su propia Ley Orgánica. Por ello, resulta acertada la afirmación del representante de la Contraloría General de la República en su gestión, al considerar que es constitucionalmente posible que en atención a la naturaleza, objeto y cuantía de la contratación de que se trate, éste órgano establezca condiciones razonables y proporcionadas a la facultad que el artículo 184 constitucional le otorga para refrendar los contratos del Estado, con miras a no crear mecanismos que afecten una expedita gestión administrativa, y en atención al interés público; toda vez que el refrendo debe entenderse como parte de las atribuciones de fiscalización de la hacienda pública que le corresponde en exclusiva a la Contraloría, para cuyo ejercicio posee absoluta independencia funcional y administrativa, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el propio artículo 183 de la Carta Fundamental, motivo por el cual puede definir los alcances, mecanismos y procedimientos de fiscalización superior, incluso frente al legislador, si éste afecta su independencia, según se anotó con anterioridad en la sentencia número 00998-98." XXXVI.- El anterior precedente pone en evidencia la relevancia de las funciones de la CGR en cuanto al refrendo. Ahora bien, la accionante censura que la instancia contralora en el trámite de refrendo haya prevenido el aporte de información y luego haya incluido normas de condicionamiento a su otorgamiento. Sobre esto cabe indicar. El refrendo es un acto de aprobación de la contratación administrativa que como tal, incide en el despliegue de efectos del contrato, por lo que se vincula con la eficacia (ver en este sentido el ordinal 145 LGAP). Desde ese plano, no puede constituirse en un mecanismo que lleve a la declaración de nulidad de las conductas analizadas, aún cuando por su medio, ejerce un cotejo de conformidad con las normas a las que se encuentra sujeta la contratación administrativa. Para los efectos, resulta diáfano el desarrollo que hace el ordinal 2 del Reglamento de Refrendos en cuanto indica: "Artículo 2º—Naturaleza del refrendo. El refrendo es un acto de aprobación, por lo que funge como un requisito de eficacia del contrato administrativo y no como un medio por el cual la Contraloría General de la República pueda anular de forma indirecta el acto de adjudicación ni el contrato administrativo. Por medio del refrendo la Contraloría General de la República examina y verifica que el clausulado del contrato administrativo se ajuste sustancialmente al ordenamiento jurídico, en los términos previstos en el artículo 8º de este Reglamento./ Cuando la Contraloría General de la República deniegue el refrendo a un contrato administrativo, señalará a la Administración los defectos que deben ser subsanados, enmendados o corregidos para obtener el respectivo refrendo en un eventual trámite futuro. / En virtud de que los procedimientos de contratación administrativa y todos los aspectos relativos a la formación y perfección de los contratos administrativos están imbuidos por la celeridad y sumariedad en la debida e impostergable atención y satisfacción de las necesidades y requerimientos públicos, el análisis de legalidad que realiza la Contraloría General de la República en el refrendo está sujeto a los principios de eficiencia y eficacia desarrollados en el artículo 4 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y a lo dispuesto en el artículo 10 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública./ El refrendo no constituye un procedimiento administrativo destinado a resolver intereses contrapuestos de las partes o de terceros interesados, por lo que las gestiones que con ese propósito se interpongan durante el trámite, serán rechazadas de plano./ El refrendo no es un medio por el cual la Contraloría General de la República ejerce las potestades de realizar auditorías y de investigación, reguladas en los artículos 21 y 22 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. En consecuencia el análisis de legalidad se basa en una revisión del expediente administrativo aportado por la Administración, por lo que se presume la veracidad de la documentación en él incorporada, según el principio de buena fe que rige la actividad contractual pública, todo bajo la responsabilidad de los funcionarios de la Administración encargados de la conformación y remisión del expediente." Ahora bien, a la luz de lo preceptuado por el numeral 8 de dicha norma, el estudio que realiza por este medio el órgano contralor no es de oportunidad o conveniencia, sino de legalidad.Con todo, en esta dinámica, ha de tenerse en cuanta lo regulado por la LGAP, en cuyo artículo 16.2 que a la sazón indica: "2. El Juez podrá controlar la conformidad con estas reglas no jurídicas de los elementos discrecionales del acto, como si ejerciera contralor de legalidad.", lo que en determinadas posturas supone la posibilidad de considerar incluidos dentro del análisis de legalidad, los aspectos propios de componentes relacionados a conveniencia y oportunidad -tema que no se abordará en este caso-. De igual modo, ese precepto -artículo 8 del reglamento de refrendos-, estipula que el examen no supone una revisión integral, sino que se limita a los aspectos puntuales que fija ese numeral, cuya transcripción o referencia resulta innecesaria, bastando remitir a lo allí indicado. Desde ese plano, a tono con lo indicado por el ordinal 9 ejusdem, se presume la legalidad de los demás aspectos no abordados en el refrendo, aspectos que en todo caso quedan sujetos a la fiscalización posterior facultativa y en general a las vías ordinarias de impugnación de los actos y contratos, tanto en sede administrativa como judicial, y sobre los cuales, la Administración mantiene su responsabilidad. Dentro de esos otros aspectos puede mencionarse la razonabilidad del precio. Por su parte, el artículo 12 fija las exigencias formales que deben ser presentadas para este trámite, sin perjuicio del requerimiento de información que puede válidamente realizar la CGR. En este sentido, a diferencia de lo que parece señalar CANABA, el orden jurídico aplicable si permite al órgano contralor prevenir el aporte de información para poder cumplir válidamente con su papel de control en la fase de refrendo. Elemental resulta lo que en este sentido estipula el mandato 13 del reglamento en cuestión en tanto señala: "Artículo 13.—Plazo, suspensiones e interrupciones. La Contraloría General de la República deberá resolver la solicitud de refrendo de los contratos dentro de un plazo de veinticinco días hábiles, cuando se trate de licitación pública, y de veinte días hábiles, en los casos restantes./ Durante el trámite de refrendo, la Contraloría General de la República podrá formular los requerimientos de información adicionales que estime imprescindibles para el estudio de fondo del documento contractual respectivo, para lo cual hará el emplazamiento a la Administración por el lapso razonable que fije a los efectos, durante el cual estará suspendido a su vez el plazo de resolución final regulado en el párrafo anterior. Si la Administración no subsana en tiempo lo requerido por la Contraloría General de la República, se procederá al rechazo de la solicitud de refrendo./ Cuando en el transcurso del trámite de una solicitud de refrendo la Administración remita un documento de modificación al texto contractual bajo examen, ya sea de oficio o en atención a la sugerencia que podrá hacerle la Contraloría General de la República de manera interlocutoria según las reglas del párrafo anterior cuando en el análisis previo se haya detectado algún vicio sustancial en la legalidad del contrato, el plazo previsto en el párrafo primero de este artículo se computará de nuevo a partir del día siguiente al del recibo de la modificación en la Contraloría General de la República." Dicha norma disipa cualquier duda sobre la habilitación competencial de la CGR para prevenir o requerir aporte de información que estime necesaria para el análisis correspondiente, así como poder establecer los condicionamientos que estime necesarios y pertinentes, a reserva de inclusión de los motivos que llevan a este criterio. Debe destacarse, el trámite de refrendo no es un simple cotejo -automatizado- de cumplimiento de requisitos, sino un cotejo de validez que incluye la ponderación del conjunto de fuentes a que está sujeta la licitación, incluidas no solo las normas jurídicas, sino además las ofertas y el cartel o pliego de condiciones.

XXXVII.- Sobre la supuesta lesión a los principios de la contratación administrativa en el acto de refrendo. Sobre el reproche específico que se hace sobre el refrendo en la ampliación de la demanda, sin perjuicio de lo ya señalado en los apartes previos sobre la reiteración de temas ya tratados, cabe indicar de manera más concreta, como esos temas no llegan afectar la validez del refrendo otorgado por la CGR. a) Principio de legalidad y transparencia. Sobre este aspecto cabe señalar, en el oficio No. 2739-2012 del 21 de marzo de 2012 (DCA-0692), en el que la CGR otorga el refrendo del contrato, señala que este convenio incluía una indebida jerarquización de las fuentes aplicables al procedimiento, lo que supone por el contrario a lo argüido por la accionante, una manifestación de respeto al principio de legalidad. De igual modo, la CGR advirtió en el refrendo, el régimen jurídico aplicable al caso, no solamente invocando a las particularidades propias del reglamento de refrendos, sino además, señalando que el cartel de licitación utilizado para el análisis del contrato (punto III.ii). Precisamente en el ejercicio de las potestades conferidas en el ordinal 13 del reglamento aludido, la CGR realizó la solicitud de información adicional al CNC mediante los oficios DCA-2836 del 28 de octubre del 2011 y el DCA-0082 del 17 de Enero del 2012, para verificar que el contrato se ajustara al pliego de condiciones de la licitación promovida. Con todo, debe retomarse lo expuesto en cuanto al principio de eficacia y eficiencia en las contrataciones públicas. No indica el accionante las razones por las cuales las supuestas lesiones al principio denunciado llevan a una nulidad sustancial que ameriten la supresión del concurso. Sobre el tema, vale traer a colación lo resuelto sobre el principio de eficiencia y eficacia por parte de la Sala Constitucional en el fallo No. 14421-2004 de las 11:00 horas del 17 de diciembre del 2004, en el siguiente sentido: "Por lo anterior, los procedimientos de contratación administrativa y todos los aspectos atinentes a la formación y perfección de los contratos administrativos están imbuidos por la celeridad y sumariedad en la debida e impostergable atención y satisfacción de las necesidades y requerimientos de la organización social. Sobre el particular, es menester recordar que dentro de los principios rectores de los servicios públicos, en el marco de una Administración Pública prestacional o de un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, se encuentran, entre otros, la eficiencia, la eficacia, la continuidad, la regularidad y la adaptación a las necesidades socio-económicas y tecnológicas, con el propósito de erradicar y superar las desigualdades reales del conglomerado social. Los mecanismos de control y fiscalización diseñados por el legislador para garantizar la transparencia o publicidad, libre concurrencia e igualdad y la gestión racional de los recursos o dineros públicos –a través de la escogencia de la oferta más ventajosa para los entes públicos, desde el punto de vista financiero y técnico- en materia de contratación administrativa, deben tener por norte fundamental procurar que la misma se ciña a la ley de modo que resulte regular o sustancialmente conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico, para evitar cualquier acto de corrupción o de desviación en el manejo de los fondos públicos. Bajo esta inteligencia, todos los requisitos formales dispuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico para asegurar la regularidad o validez en los procedimientos de contratación, el acto de adjudicación y el contrato administrativo mismo, deben, también, procurar la pronta satisfacción del interés general a través de la efectiva construcción de las obras públicas y la prestación de los servicios públicos, consecuentemente no pueden transformarse en instrumentos para retardar la prestación eficiente y eficaz de los servicios públicos y, sobre todo, su adaptación, a las nuevas necesidades socio-económicas y tecnológicas de la colectividad. Sobre este particular, el artículo 4°, párrafo 2°, de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa al enunciar el “Principio de eficiencia” estatuye que “(…) En todas las etapas de los procedimientos de contratación, prevalecerá el contenido sobre la forma. Los actos y las actuaciones de las partes se interpretarán de forma que se favorezca su conservación y se facilite adoptar la decisión final, en condiciones favorables para el interés general (…)”. Síguese de lo anterior que las formas propias de los procedimientos de la contratación administrativa así como los recaudos de carácter adjetivo que establece el ordenamiento jurídico para la validez y eficacia de un contrato administrativo deben interpretarse de forma flexible en aras del fin de todo contrato administrativo, sin descuidar, claro está, la sanidad y corrección en la forma en que son invertidos los fondos públicos. Desde esta perspectiva, los procedimientos administrativos de contratación son la sombra (forma) que debe seguir, irremisiblemente, al cuerpo (sustancia) que son los fines y propósitos del contrato administrativo de satisfacer el interés general y, desde luego, procurar por el uso racional, debido y correcto de los fondos públicos. Por último, debe recordarse que los principios de la eficiencia y la eficacia en cuanto informan la organización y gestión administrativa tienen fuerte asidero constitucional (artículos –todos de la Constitución Política- 140, inciso 8, en cuanto le impone al Poder Ejecutivo el deber de “Vigilar el buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas”, el 139, inciso 4, en la medida que incorpora el concepto de “buena marcha del Gobierno” y el 191 al recoger el principio de “eficiencia de la administración”)” XXXVIII.- b) Sobre el principio de formalismo. En el acto de refrendo contralor, se hace alusión a que si bien en el trámite analizado se dieron imprecisiones, no se desconoce la facultad de aplicar el principio de conservación de los actos, a tono con el ordinal 4 de la Ley No. 7494. Ya se ha indicado que en nuestro régimen impera, incluyendo la materia de contratación administrativa, un principio de sustancialidad de nulidades. Cabe remitir por ende a lo señalado en dicho aparte en cuanto a que las promoventes no logran acreditar lo sustancial de los defectos apuntados, en los casos en que pueda considerarse que existieron yerros. Sobre el tema, el citado oficio DCA-0692 (refrendo) indica en lo medular: “…esta División no puede desconocer, ni mucho menos dejar de aplicar, los principios rectores de la Contratación Administrativa al estudiar el refrendo de este procedimiento licitatorio. Ello implica recordar los principios de eficacia y eficiencia de rango constitucional y regulados en el artículo 4 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa (que resulta de aplicación supletoria a la Ley de Concesiones de Obra Pública con Servicios Públicos) (…), Al tenor de dichos principios, puede afirmarse que la omisión de un formalismo como el enunciado, que en este caso es, en tesis de principio, la ausencia de publicación de dos fechas de apertura del concurso, no genera impedimento a este Despacho para conceder el refrendo del concurso pues justamente con base en dichos principios es que se puede conservar el procedimiento de contratación promovido, aunado a que no se considera que las omisiones de referencia causen un vicio tal que invalide el procedimiento de licitación promovido..." Es innegable que en estos menesteres aplica una sujeción a las formas adecuadas para llevamiento de un concurso público. Empero, la desatención de alguna fórmula procedimental solo lleva a la nulidad en la medida en que el vicio sea sustancial, de manera que cause indefensión o perjuicio grave a los particulares -tema ya abordado-. Por demás, ante la imprecisión de las alegaciones del accionante en cuanto a los vicios concretos de actos particulares de la CGR que hayan llevado a la lesión de esta máxima cuya vulneración invoca, no queda más que rechazar ese cargo. c) Principio de control de los procedimientos. En virtud de este principio, se postula que el procedimiento de contratación administrativa debe ser sometido al control exhaustivo y fiscalización, para verificar el cumplimiento de las normas mínimas que imperan en dicha materia así como el correcto uso de la hacienda pública. Se encuentra presente en todas las fases del procedimiento, desde los estudios previos hasta las modificaciones contractuales y la fase de ejecución. Lo dicho supone que la verificación de los procedimientos solo puede concebirse desde el plano de fases concretas de la contratación, y no de manera general. Desde ese plano, el accionante presenta formulaciones que no distan en lo absoluto de las ya planteadas en los reproches formulados en la demanda original, por lo que ciertamente, tal y como advierte la CGR, más que una ampliación se refiere a una reiteración de alegatos, extensibles contra el acto de otorgamiento de refrendo. Tal es el caso de ausencia de verificación de los estudios previos de factibilidad, tema sobre el que se ha señalado, en reiteradas oportunidades, no se da incorrección alguna. En todo caso, la instancia contralora, en aplicación del ordinal 8 del Reglamento de refrendos previno a la Administración gestionante indicar cuáles eran los estudios que sustentaban la selección del objeto contractual. Dada la respuesta ante esa prevención, en definitiva, en el oficio de refrendo, sea, el DCA-0692, sobre el punto se expuso: “Que en cuanto a los estudios técnicos de este concurso, la Administración Concedente en el oficio citado en el párrafo anterior, señala como antecedentes relevantes para la licitación que da origen al contrato de mérito, el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Portuario elaborado en el año 1995 por la firma japonesa OCDI, y el Programa para la Modernización del Subsector Portuario de Costa Rica, elaborado por la firma HPC Hamburg Port Consulting GMBH. Asimismo, señala como estudio para fundamentar las bases de la licitación bajo examen, el Plan Maestro para el Complejo Portuario Limón-Moín elaborado por la empresa Royal Haskoning Nederland B.V., y la actualización realizada del estudio de demanda. Todo lo cual se deja bajo responsabilidad de la Administración Concedente. ” Desde ese plano, la CGR tuvo por aportados los estudios técnicos según las precisiones que le hiciera la administración concedente. En todo caso, los estudios aportados para justificar dicha exigencia, son precisamente los que este Tribunal ha analizado y determinado su utilidad para sustentar la licitación internacional 2009LI-000001-200 objeto de esta causa. Cabe señalar además, la validez de los estudios aportados en términos del diseño de las obras, conforme a las cláusulas cartelarias es un aspecto de resorte del concesionario, quien como se ha explicado reiteradamente, asume las consecuencias y riesgos del diseño de la TCM.

XXXIX.- Sobre las alegaciones de lesión a la discrecionalidad pública. En cuanto a las referencias relativas al principio de discrecionalidad de la Administración, la ampliación formulada por CANABA resulta confusa y no se desprende con claridad las causas concretas que el accionante pretende someter a conocimiento de esta autoridad jurisdiccional. Sobre este tema, luego de realizar referencias teóricas sobre las potestades regladas y las discrecionales, indica que la acción se formula “… con miras a lograr la corrección de arbitrariedades y desviación de poder realizado en sede administrativa, por la interpretación de la Contraloría General de la República en el refrendo contralor, siendo un ejemplo de ello lo que se indica en la página 9, punto vi)”. A tono con lo señalado por el párrafo primero del numeral 49 de la Carta Magna, esta jurisdicción es competente para ejercer control de validez de la función administrativa. El parámetro de control aludido incluye toda forma de manifestación de voluntad pública, dentro de estas, las conductas que se desprendan de un ejercicio de potestades de contenido discrecional o reglado. Así se establece en el ordinal 42.2, 122 inciso f, 127, 128 y en el caso de medidas cautelares el mandato 20 de ese mismo cuerpo legal. Con todo, para tales efectos, ha discriminarse entre la discrecionalidad administrativa (pues existe además la judicial y la legislativa) político-programática, la técnica y la jurídica, por cuanto en estas dos últimas el control judicial es más intenso que en la primera, que se refiere a la posibilidad de trazarse metas o planes de acción. De igual modo debe distinguirse entre la discrecionalidad actuada de la no actuada, siendo que las medidas correctivas caso de estimarse la invalidez de las conductas públicas, es diversa según se trate de un ejercicio positivo (actuada), o bien de uno omisivo (no actuada). De igual modo ha de ponderarse la existencia o no de una discrecionalidad residual. Ello es fundamental para el juzgador contencioso administrativo pueda fijar el curso de acción, sea imponiendo lo límites a la Administración para que corrija la conducta previamente emitida –ya anulada por control judicial-, o bien fijar las pautas para el ejercicio que hasta ese momento no se había formulado. Así lo establece el ordinal 128 CPCA en cuanto expresa en lo relevante: “Cuando la sentencia estimatoria verse sobre potestades administrativas con elementos discrecionales, sea por omisión o por su ejercicio indebido, condenará al ejercicio de tales potestades, dentro del plazo que al efecto se disponga, conforme a los límites y mandatos impuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico y por los hechos del caso, previa declaración de la existencia, el contenido y el alcance de los límites y mandatos, si así lo permite el expediente.(…)” En la residual, además, ha de respetar el juzgador el umbral de pervivencia de la discrecionalidad que atañe a la Administración. Es el caso de la anulación de un acto adjudicatorio, en el cual, devuelto el expediente a la Administración para que resuelva conforme a las normas jurídicas y cartelarias aplicables, pervive la posibilidad de declarar desierto el concurso por considerar, ante las nuevas condiciones, que ninguna oferta satisface el interés público. Pues bien, no existe duda en la posibilidad de control judicial de ese ejercicio discrecional, empero, la ambigüedad de la demanda no permite colegir si la crítica estriba en que la conducta de la CGR se orientó por sendas de ejercicio discrecional cuando debió ser reglada, o si por el contrario, el ejercicio discrecional realizado, es inválido. En cualquier caso, no explicita el accionante en qué medida esa decisión en particular vulnera el ordenamiento jurídico a que debe someterse la CGR en el ejercicio de sus competencias de instancia de refrendo. El punto en cuestión , visible a folio 9 del oficio de refrendo dispone en lo que viene relevante al caso: “…En cuanto al tema de la obtención de las licencias, permisos, viabilidades o cualquier otro tipo de instrumento ambiental que deba existir de previo y durante las fases de construcción y explotación del contrato, según lo determine la autoridad competente en la materia, es menester indicar que queda bajo responsabilidad y riesgo de la propia firma concesionaria la obtención del aval correspondiente por parte de dicha autoridad, así como su vigencia durante el lapso de tiempo que sea necesario. Por ende será obligación de la Administración Concedente verificar la obtención de esos permisos, licencias u otros necesarios de obtener para la realización de la concesión adjudicada, sin que recaiga dentro del ámbito de competencia de este órgano contralor la verificación de dichos aspectos durante el trámite del refrendo…” Este Tribunal comparte las alegaciones de la CGR en cuanto señala que en materia de contratación administrativa existe un alto componente de discrecionalidad en la fase de confección del cartel de licitación y en general etapas previas, aun cuando con el avance del procedimiento esa discrecionalidad se restringe y reduce. Esas potestades han de ser consideradas en las diversas fases de control y fiscalización que en el curso de procedimiento realice la CGR, sin perjuicio de la posibilidad de disponer la invalidez de conductas concretas por la infracción al régimen de la contratación administrativa que está llamada a tutelar en las instancias en que participe. No obstante, se insiste, se comparte el argumento de la CGR en cuanto a que el citado punto vi lo que pretende establecer es que la empresa concesionaria es la única responsable conforme al contrato de la consecución de una serie de permisos, licencias u otros, y que esa consecución debe ser constatada por la Administración Concedente. Esto es claro si se considera que en efecto, no corresponde a la CGR la verificación de si esos permisos, licencias o en general, habilitaciones administrativas, existen o no, por lo que conforme a los alcances del ordinal 9 del reglamento de refrendos advierte a la concedente su deber de verificación sobre este particular. No entiende este Tribunal, pues la demandante no deja claro este punto, como ese proceder configura el vicio de desviación de poder (entendido como la persecución de un fin distinto al principal con detrimento de éste, art. 131.3 LGAP). Se trata de una advertencia o recordatorio de ejercicio de deberes de verificación y fiscalización, acorde con las normas aplicables al caso.

XL.- En lo atinente al punto relativo al Project finance, TIR, tarifa tope. Ha de insistirse, se trata de un argumento ampliamente abordado en las fases previas de este fallo. No se presenta en la ampliación de la demanda objeto de análisis argumento novedoso sobre este particular, siendo el único aporte la reprochabilidad de ese aspecto frente al acto de refrendo, por la circunstancia de no haberse denegado pese a los vicios que el accionante alega. Sin embargo, no se hace una referencia concreta en relación al acto de la CGR cuestionado, de manera que se permita establecer las razones particulares por las cuales se estima que tal conducta, en cuanto a esos temas específicos, cuenta con patología que merezca ser declarada en esta sede. En el entendimiento de este Tribunal, las exposiciones del demandante se presentan como una presentación de posiciones propias en las que sustenta una crítica para señalar la manera que desde su óptica, el proyecto financiero de la TCM sería técnicamente más correcto. Con todo, la definición del mecanismo o diseño de financiamiento del proyecto, si encaja dentro del concepto de Project finance, definición de estrategia de riesgos, es un tema que ciertamente en cuanto a su viabilidad y pertinencia, es resorte de la concedente. Lo mismo ocurre con el debate que se propone ahora sobre la TIR, en cuanto formula un escenario comparativo de haberse presentado más de una oferta con TIR diferentes, sin embargo, no pasa de ser un panorama hipotético, pero además, el cartel de prevé un análisis de comparabilidad de ese factor económico de las ofertas como parámetro de evaluación de las plicas. Sobre las críticas sobre la aceptación de las cláusulas de traslado de riesgos al concesionario, cabe advertir, tal aspecto corresponde con exclusividad a la concedente y al concesionario. Sin embargo, debe tomarse nota que la instancia contralora realizó una serie de observaciones y condicionamientos que se emiten en el contexto del ejercicio de las competencias de verificación propias del trámite de refrendo, ponderando que los términos del contrato se ajusten y guarden armonía con las fuentes que lo regulan y a las cuales se encuentra afecto (cartel, plicas, adjudicación, estudios previos, etc). Por otro lado, el alegato de las tarifas tope (Price cap) es un tema que a tono con el ordinal 21.1 de la Ley No.7762, escapa de los alcances del refrendo, siendo que el dictamen que en esos menesteres debe rendirse, compete a la ARESEP, quien emite una valoración obligatoria y vinculante. Sobre ese tema, basta remitir a lo ya desarrollado en cuanto a las críticas presentadas sobre la factibilidad tarifaria y financiera. Por ende, ante esa asignación competencial particular, es claro para este cuerpo colegiado que tal aspecto es ajeno a las potestades de la CGR. Así incluso lo estableció ese órgano al señalar en el punto vii) del acápite III del oficio de refrendo DCA-0692: “En cuanto al tema de la estructura tarifaria y los parámetros de ajuste de la misma, así como los parámetros que se utilizarán para evaluar la calidad del servicio, de conformidad con el artículo 21 Ley de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicios Públicos, éstos cuentan con criterio técnico positivo de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, según se observa en los folios 925, 1479, 2484, 3603 y 3863-C del expediente de licitación. Por lo tanto, siendo que la competencia en la materia la tiene la Autoridad referida de acuerdo con su ley, este aspecto no compete ser abordado por esta División en el trámite de refrendo”. En otro punto se reprocha la supresión de la regulación de equilibrio financiero vía TIR. De nuevo, es un tema que no guarda relación con el refrendo, sino con el análisis de la ARESEP, por lo que debe ser rechazado. No obstante, CANABA realiza una serie de consideraciones en las que alude a actos concretos de la CGR durante los trámites de objeción al cartel de este procedimiento licitatorio. En concreto, en el primer de licitación, se formuló por SINTRAJAP y APM TERMINALS, recurso de objeción respecto de la condición que disponía como causal de desequilibrio financiero del contrato la variación de 20%, positiva o negativamente, con respecto a la TIR ofertada y aceptada por la Administración. Sobre el particular, en la resolución R-DJ-008-2009 se indicó: “Criterio para resolver: La objetante se limita a solicitar se deje sin efecto un párrafo del acápite 12.2 sobre el equilibrio económico y financiero del contrato, con la finalidad de que se elimine el porcentaje de la disminución señalado (+-20%) de la TIR de referencia, a partir de la cual se aplican los mecanismos de reequilibrio, y no ofrece prueba alguna del perjuicio que supuestamente la estaría ocasionando ese porcentaje definido al efecto para la aplicación de los mecanismos de reequilibrio, ni ninguna justificación jurídica en contra del mismo. Además, debe tener presente la objetante que el mecanismo fijado es equitativo, ya que se aplica por igual para la Administración y para el concesionario, tanto para los beneficios como para los perjuicios. Finalmente, en aras del principio de eficiencia administrativa, sería demasiado engorroso para la Administración estar aplicando los mecanismos de reequilibrio económico y financiero del contrato, cada vez que se produzca una disminución, por lo que la Administración discrecionalmente ha considerado razonable que esos mecanismos se apliquen para ambos cuando se verifique una disminución superior e inferior al 20% de la TIR de referencia, por lo que los eventuales oferentes pueden tomar las previsiones que estimen pertinentes en su oferta teniendo en cuenta ese porcentaje ya definido por la Administración.” Por su parte en el acto R-DJ-008-2009 Bis, de fecha 02 de julio de 2009, se señaló: “4) De la Tasa Interna de Retorno (TIR) como variable de regulación. La cláusula 11.7.5.2, del cartel establece que “…cuando se produzca un desequilibrio financiero del contrato de concesión, se podrá realizar un ajuste extraordinario de la tarifa para compensar dicho desequilibrio, siempre y cuando el mismo sea por causas externas a la responsabilidad de la sociedad concesionaria. Se considerará que se está en desequilibrio cuando la TIR de la oferta económica y aceptada por la Administración como referencia para la concesión varíe en un 20%, positiva o negativamente”. Asimismo establece dicha cláusula que en tal caso se procederá como se estipula en el Capitulo 12 del contrato. Sobre este particular, este órgano contralor solicita a esa Administración tomar las previsiones requeridas a efecto que al utilizar la TIR como parámetro para demostrar desequilibrios contractuales se debe asegurar que se puede individualizar de manera objetiva el efecto de los factores, que según las reglas cartelarias y contractuales corresponden únicamente a los que aparecen tipificados en el articulo 12.2 del contrato. Lo anterior, ya que el cálculo de esa TIR depende de parámetros, variables, estimaciones y supuestos, con múltiples opciones y alternativas posibles y en tal sentido, se requiere que estos aspectos queden claramente establecidos y normados, para efecto de la fiscalización del contrato y la demostración de los citados desequilibrios. Asimismo se indica que es responsabilidad de la Administración establecer reglas claras y objetivas dentro del pliego cartelario para disponer el uso de la tasa interna de retorno en la regulación del equilibrio financiero del contrato. En esa misma línea de pensamiento, este Despacho considera primordial que se valore la aplicación de la TIR como variable de regulación, debido a que desde nuestro punto de vista la estructuración de este negocio, que pospone la fase 3 a futuro, podría presentar la posibilidad de que alguna de las ofertas presente TIR múltiples, la que se obtiene por el hecho de que se generen flujos que presentan dos o más cambios de signo. Por lo anterior, no se tiene conocimiento de cómo se determinaría la TIR de referencia.” De dicho recuento se colige, a diferencia de lo alegado por el accionante, la CGR no ordenó la eliminación de dicho mecanismo de ajuste económico. Luego, en el segundo cartel, no se incluye garantía sobre el tema de la TIR. En el tercer cartel, el cual, fue objetado ante la CGR, se incluyó la regulación del equilibrio financiero del contrato a favor del concesionario cuando la TIR calculada fuera menor en 300 puntos base (3%) con relación a la TIR ofertada del proyecto. De igual forma se incluía el derecho de la Administración Concedente a reclamar a su favor el equilibrio económico del contrato cuando se alcanzara el valor presente de los ingresos cotizados por el concesionario (ITC), antes de los 33 años de la concesión, y la TIR del proyecto hasta la fecha de revisión fuese superior a la TIR ofertada más 300 puntos base (3%), en cuyo caso se compartiría la ganancia en partes iguales entre la Administración Concedente y el Concesionario. En cuanto a ese punto, en la resolución DJ-215-2011 de fecha 24 de mayo del 2010 la CGR señala que era menester señalada por la parte actora, este órgano contralor, en razón de sus competencias, señaló que la Administración Concedente debía acreditar en el expediente administrativo la valoración y aceptación de la razonabilidad del modelo de proyecciones financieras del oferente, toda vez que según disponía el cartel, éste sería utilizado para el cálculo de la TIR. Asimismo se advirtió que debía ofrecerse a los potenciales oferentes un formato base para el citado modelo de proyecciones, solicitando ajustar el cartel. De ello se desprende que no medió orden alguna del órgano contralor para disponer la eliminación de la ponderación de afectación porcentual de la TIR como parámetro de ajuste financiero.

XLI.- En otro alegato, se reitera las alegaciones de creación de monopolio privado, ya harto analizadas. No se incluye variación alguna en el tema de refrendo por lo que debe remitirse a lo que por criterio de fondo ya ha ponderado este Tribunal. Ha de reiterarse, el diseño de gestión indirecta que postula la contratación cuestionada, encuentra sustento en la letra del numeral 1 de la Ley No. 7762. Ergo, no resulta atendible ese alegato, así como los reproches sobre el modelo de exclusividad en el transportes de carga de los full containers, temas, se reitera, ya tratados, lo que hace innecesario su abordaje en este punto. Por otro lado, se reprocha que en el control de legalidad propio del refrendo debió verificarse el estudio de impacto ambiental. No obstante, por un lado, tal tema ya ha sido ventilado por este cuerpo colegiado, análisis al que se debe remitir el conjunto de argumentaciones expuestas en la ampliación analizada. Adicionalmente, se ha dejado claro que conforme al reglamento de refrendos, la obtención de esas licencias ecológicas corre a cargo del concesionario, y su verificación compete al concedente. Así se expuso en el acto de refrendo, en el que sobre este punto señaló: “vi) De los estudios, permisos u otros relacionados con los aspectos ambientales: En cuanto al tema de la obtención de las licencias, permisos, viabilidades o cualquier otro tipo de instrumento ambiental que deba existir de previo y durante las fases de construcción y explotación del contrato, según lo determine la autoridad competente en la materia, es menester indicar que queda bajo responsabilidad y riesgo de la propia firma concesionaria la obtención del aval correspondiente por parte de dicha autoridad, así como su vigencia durante el lapso de tiempo que sea necesario. Por ende será obligación de la Administración Concedente verificar la obtención de esos permisos, licencias u otros necesarios de obtener para la realización de la concesión adjudicada, sin que recaiga dentro del ámbito de competencia de este órgano contralor la verificación de dichos aspectos durante el trámite del refrendo. Lo anterior de conformidad con lo desarrollado sobre el tema en el apartado IV de este oficio, con relación al capítulo 5, punto 4) y al capítulo 8, punto 11). Además, la Administración Concedente deberá vigilar porque la gestión que realice la Concesionaria ante las autoridades competentes sobre esta materia sea eficiente.” Por otro lado, mediante la resolución R-DJ-008-2009 de las 12 horas del 2 de julio del 2009, ante cuestionamiento del SINTRAJAP se señaló que mediante resolución 274-2009 SETENA de las 8 horas del 10 de febrero del 2010 había otorgado la VAP (viabilidad ambiental potencial) al proyecto, según consta en el folio 741 del expediente de la licitación. De igual manera, se hicieron referencias sobre el tema en el oficio R-DJ-008-2009 (bis). Por otro lado el oficio de refrendo sobre el tema señala: “ Que con referencia al punto 13) de la cláusula 5.2.2 y a la cláusula 5.3.3 denominada Licencia de Vialidad Ambiental, ambas del contrato, resulta de importancia reiterar las manifestaciones efectuadas por la firma concesionaria en el oficio sin número suscrito el día 21 de noviembre del año 2011, aportado como parte del Anexo 1 del oficio DST-OF-1888-2011, en el cual, entre otras cosas, indicó: “En cuanto a la pregunta No. 11 de la Contraloría General, correspondiente al Capítulo 5 del Contrato, estamos de acuerdo con el enfoque de la respuesta prevista por el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, en el sentido de que la obtención de la viabilidad ambiental definitiva está en la esfera de responsabilidad del concesionario por lo que si se produce una denegatoria firme y definitiva por parte de la autoridad competente, imposible de superar por medios administrativos o judiciales legítimos, el contrato de concesión no podría ejecutarse, con la consecuencia de que el concesionario no podrá formular reclamaciones patrimoniales en contra de la Administración concedente. Asimismo, en caso de que la no obtención de la citada viabilidad obedezca a causas imputables en exclusiva al concesionario, este podría enfrentar la ejecución de la garantía de construcción rendida para la fase de condiciones precedentes, previa aplicación del debido proceso” (el subrayado no es del original).” Tal desarrollo encaja a plenitud con lo ya indicado en este fallo, en cuanto a la claridad que supone la imposibilidad de iniciar obras sin obtener la licencia de viabilidad ambiental definitiva, lo que corre bajo el riesgo del concesionario, siendo que como se ha anticipado, se asume el riesgo de su obtención, lo que privaría cualquier reclamo patrimoniales en contra de la Administración concedente, caso de no obtener este título habilitante.

LXII.- Finalmente, en cuanto a las condiciones incorporadas en el acto de refrendo que se consideran como propias de revisión de cuestiones de conveniencia y oportunidad, cabe indicar lo que de seguido se expone. En el punto IV del oficio de refrendo denominado “De los condicionamientos a los que queda sujeto el presente refrendo contralor”, se incluye un total aproximado de 80 condicionamientos divididos en la siguiente temática: CAPÍTULO 1. Generalidades del contrato -1 aspecto-. CAPÍTULO 2. De las disposiciones de carácter general -1 aspecto-. CAPÍTULO 3. De los documentos que forman parte del contrato -3 observaciones-; CAPÍTULO 4. De las obligaciones y derechos generales de la Administración. –en el que hace 12 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 5. De los plazos de la concesión. -6 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 6. Régimen de riesgos -6 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 7. Régimen general de las garantías a cargo del Concesionario -2 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 8. De las bases técnicas de la construcción de las obras -11 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 11. Del régimen económico, obligaciones y derechos financieros del Concesionario -16 observaciones-; CAPÍTULO 12. Del mantenimiento de equilibrio económico-financiero del contrato y su renegociación -3 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 13. De las subcontrataciones -2 aspectos-; CAPÍTULO 14. Régimen de control y régimen sancionador de la concesión -4 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 15. De los informes -3 observaciones-; CAPÍTULO 16. Aspectos Fiscales -3 observaciones-; CAPÍTULO 17. De los seguros -3 observaciones-; CAPÍTULO 18. De la cesión de derechos y obligaciones, suspensión y terminación del contrato -4 precisiones-. Se critica lo cuantioso de los condicionamientos y lo amplio del expediente de refrendo. Sin embargo, a diferencia de lo que argumentan las partes reclamantes, una vez analizado a fondo el contenido de ese oficio de refrendo, es criterio de este Tribunal, esos condicionamientos, por amplios que puedan considerarse, no se constituyen en cláusulas de análisis de conveniencia u oportunidad del proyecto que pretenden disfrazar de válido un contrato nulo o bien, justificar un modelo de gestión sin el debido soporte de legalidad. Por el contrario, este tipo de aspectos condicionantes, entiende este cuerpo colegiado, se erigen como elementos relevantes que impone la CGR en el marco de sus competencias, como derivación del ejercicio de refrendo y que no pretenden sustituir a la concedente, sino fijar parámetros para la eficacia legítima del contrato. Ante los alegatos de CANABA, debe reiterarse, el aspecto de haber requerido información adicional en el trámite de refrendo (aun y cuando el expediente sea voluminoso –más de mil folio se arguye-) no supone una ilegalidad, sino una potestad que encuentra respaldo en el reglamento de refrendos, como se ha señalado –art. 13-. La extensión de un legajo público que sustenta una decisión no puede calificarse aventuradamente como un abuso de poder, sin acreditar de antemano la desviación del fin público, lo que aquí no se ha demostrado, ni ha ocurrido. Por otra parte, la adaptación del contrato como derivación del trámite de refrendo no lleva a sustentar el reproche de ilegitimidad que se analiza, sino que por el contrario, es el resultado natural y esperado de las correcciones que son viables en los trámites de refrendo. Podría contra argumentarse que ello pone en evidencia lo irregular de todo el proceso, empero, ante ese argumento habría que remitir a lo ya señalado en cuanto a la conservación de los actos, la sustancialidad de las nulidades que aplica en esta materia y a la necesidad de acreditar afectaciones serias para llevar a la supresión de este tipo de actos, como derivación del principio que subyace en el canon 4 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Así, la extensión del expediente o bien la firma de un contrato que incorpore las observaciones realizadas en el refrendo, no supone, como afirma el accionante, que el análisis de la CGR haya sido de conveniencia y no de legalidad, o bien, que sus acciones desemboquen en una desviación de poder. En suma, el alegato no es atendible y por ende, debe ser rechazado.

XLIII.- Sobre la supuesta violación a la Ley No. 2906. En la audiencia única, en su alegato de conclusiones, el apoderado de SINTRAJAP refiere livianamente a la eventual lesión de la Ley No. 2906, al señalar que la zona en la que se construirá la TCM, está declarada de uso turístico. Sobre el particular, cabe indicar, la citada Ley 2906 del 24 de noviembre de 1961, declara zona de recreo y turismo la franja de terreno entre Portete y 12 millas de Limón. En el numeral primero de esa fuente legal se establece en lo que viene relevante al caso “…la faja de doscientos metros de ancho, desde la pleamar ordinaria, comprendida dentro de la Milla Marítima entre el límite Norte de la zona urbana de la ciudad de Limón, o sea Portete, y el sitio conocido con el nombre de "12 Millas" o "Swamp Moth", al Norte de la ciudad de Limón, así como la zona comprendida dentro de los 100 metros de ambos lados del Río Moín en la sección paralela a la playa. De la referida zona se reservan veinte metros para una carretera panorámica en los sitios en donde en la actualidad no existe. El resto se traspasará al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo,…”. Por su parte, el Decreto Ejecutivo 3729 del 03 de mayo de 1975, declara terminadas las obras de los canales y asigna la administración de distintos terrenos y obras a JAPDEVA. Sin embargo, para los efectos de lo debatido, cabe destacar, por la Ley No.5337 del 27 de agosto de 1973 que reforma integralmente la Ley Orgánica de JAPDEVA, Ley No. 3091, se establece en lo medular: "CAPÍTULO II Patrimonio de JAPDEVA Artículo 41.- Son propiedad de JAPDEVA, además de sus activos e ingresos ordinarios y extraordinarios, los siguientes: a) Los terrenos, edificios, equipos y en general todos los bienes muebles e inmuebles destinados a las actividades propias de JAPDEVA, con excepción de aquellos bienes del Estado que por Constitución Política no pueden salir de su patrimonio y los bienes del Ferrocarril Nacional al Atlántico. También las futuras expansiones del mismo, que de común acuerdo entre JAPDEVA y el Poder Ejecutivo se disponga traspasar, para lo cual ambas entidades quedan autorizadas para formalizar las respectivas escrituras ante la Notaría del Estado. Los bienes que a la fecha sean de propiedad la institución, no serán susceptibles del traspaso a que se refiere el presente artículo; y b) Todos los terrenos del Estado situados en el área habilitada por canales navegables, comprendidos en una área de diez kilómetros desde el mar hacia el interior, paralela a la costa y un faja de tres kilómetros de ancho, paralela a ambos lados de los ríos y canales que administre la Junta." Adicionalmente, el precepto 45 de dicha Ley orgánica estatuye: "Artículo 45.- Para el cumplimiento de esta ley y sus reglamentos, JAPDEVA determinará las zonas de jurisdicción portuaria de cada uno de los puertos bajo su administración y lo comunicará al Poder Ejecutivo. Estas áreas deberán contemplar fundamentalmente: a) Terminales y derechos de vía; b) Los sitios de anclaje, de fondeaderos y balizamiento de la rada; c) Los canales de acceso y zona de maniobras; y d) Los atracaderos y espuelas de tránsito, bodegas en general, oficinas, talleres, patios y espuelas de ferrocarril, zonas para almacenamiento de mercancías y cualquier otro sitio destinado a operaciones portuarias y ferroviarias." En adición, la Ley No. 6043 del 02 de marzo de 1977, Ley de Zona Marítimo Terrestre, artículo 75, que modifica parcialmente la anterior reforma señala: "Artículo 75.- La Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica continuará con el dominio sobre los terrenos que le fueron traspasados en virtud del artículo 41, inciso b) de la ley Nº 5337 de 27 de agosto de 1973, excepto en la zona marítimo terrestre correspondiente a ambos lados del sistema de canales principales que unen los puertos de Moín y Barra del Colorado. En esa zona regirán con pleno vigor las estipulaciones de esta ley." Desde esa arista de examen, no existe la lesión que se recrimina por parte de SINTRAJAP, siendo que como se ha señalado, los terrenos en cuestión forman parte del patrimonio cuya administración corresponde a JAPDEVA, por ende, dentro de los cuales, puede factiblemente realizarse el desarrollo de la infraestructura portuaria, sea mediante un modelo de gestión directa o indirecta. Tal permisibilidad deviene de habilitaciones legales creadas por las reformas introducidas a la Ley Orgánica de Japdeva. Ergo, no se presentan los vicios apuntados en cuanto a la imposibilidad de cambio de uso de esas tierras.

XLIV.- Corolario. Sobre la demanda de CANABA y su ampliación. En el presente proceso la Cámara Nacional de Bananeros formuló la demanda para que en sentencia se declare la nulidad de las siguientes conductas: “Pretensión principal: La declaración de nulidad de los siguientes actos administrativos: 1. De adjudicación realizada por parte del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones en el acuerdo número 2 de la sesión extraordinaria No. 2-2011 del 28 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con servicio público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM Terminal Central America B.V. 2. Del acto de adjudicación por parte de JAPDEVA en el acuerdo No. 073-11, artículo II-a de la sesión ordinaria No. 08-2011 del 24 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-200. 3. El acuerdo del Poder Ejecutivo conformado por la Presidenta de la República, Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes y Ministro de Hacienda, firmado el 01 de marzo del 2011, publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2011 de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200. Pretensiones subsidiarias: 1. Se declare la nulidad de la estructura tarifaria de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, señalada en el capítulo 11, apartado 7. 2, por utilizar como base en la proyección del tráfico realizada en el plan maestro para el complejo Limón/Moín, contratado a la empresa Royal Haskoning, el cual no es un estudio de factibilidad económica actualizado y no se encuentra sustentado en parámetros realistas de acuerdo al volumen de siembra y exportación de las frutas como el banano, piña y melón. 2. Se declare la nulidad de la estructura tarifaria de licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, por contradicción al artículo 3 inciso b de la Ley de la ARESEP que establece el principio del servicio al costo. 3. Se declare nulo el acto que adjudica la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, por carecer de justificación del proceso licitatorio de una motivación del acto basado en las reglas unívocas de la ciencia o la técnica por no tener estudios técnicos como los estudios de factibilidad ambiental y económico. 4. Se anule el acuerdo número 018-MOPT-H publicado en el Alcance No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2001 en el que se adjudica la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200 por establecer que para la recepción de un descuento de $20 a la tarifa hecha en la oferta económica, se implementan 15 medidas en el acto de adjudicación, que se contemplarán en el contrato.” En el escrito de ampliación de la demanda añade las siguientes pretensiones: “Principal: La declaración de nulidad de los siguientes actos administrativos: 1.- El acto de adjudicación realizada por parte de JAPDEVA en el acuerdo No. 73-11, artículo II-a de la sesión ordinaria No. 08-2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 2.- El acto del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones en el acuerdo número 2 de la sesión extraordinaria No. 2-2011 del 28 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 3.- El acuerdo de adjudicación realizado por el Poder Ejecutivo conformado por la Presidenta de la República, el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, el Ministro de Hacienda y firmado el 01 de Marzo del 2011, publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2011 de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 4. El cartel de licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 5.- El contrato que suscribió el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOIN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín, con fecha del 30 de agosto del 2011. 6.- La adenda No. 1 al Contrato de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Moín, firmada el día 29 de noviembre del 2011 y suscrita por el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200. 7.- El nuevo contrato de fecha 13 de febrero del 2012, suscrito por el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 promovida para "Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín". 8.- El oficio DCA-0692 por parte de la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República con fecha de 21 de marzo del 2012, en el cual concede refrendo al contrato derivado de la licitación pública internacional Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 promovida para "Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín". 9.- Se condene en costas procesales y personales de forma solidaria a las partes demandadas.” Por su parte, SINTRAJAP formuló las siguientes pretensiones: “1. La nulidad del acto administrativo que adjudica la licitación internacional pública No. 2009LI-000001-00200 llamada "Cartel de licitación para la concesión de obra pública con servicio público para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la terminal de contenedores en puerto Moín" a favor de APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. Ello por cuanto: - la licitación se realizó violentando la normativa propia tanto de la ley de concesiones como de la ley de contratación, se hizo con un cartel que no cumplía con lo dispuesto por la Ley de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos en su artículo 21 incisos 1, 2 y 3, cual era tener todos los estudios técnicos correspondientes que sustentaran la viabilidad económica y ambiental del proyecto a concesionar, además con violación a contrario sensu de las normas del 27 al 29, ambas inclusive de la ley de concesiones citada, pues en estas normas no se permite la modificación de la oferta luego de recibidas formalmente las ofertas y al modificar el cartel y las fechas de presentación de ofertas y no dar plazos adecuados. Además al otorgar 15 concesiones o beneficios más a la empresa adjudicada, luego de la fecha de apertura de las ofertas, beneficios o concesiones que de haberse dado a conocer, pudieron permitir que otros interesados ofertaran. 2. De conformidad con el artículo 42 inciso b) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, solicito se declare nulo el acto administrativo que adjudica la licitación internacional pública No. 2009LI-000001-0200 llamada "Cartel de licitación para la concesión de obra pública con servicio público para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la terminal de contenedores en puerto Moín", a la empresa APM TERMINAL B.V., por carecer de una justificación del proceso licitatorio, de una motivación del acto administrativo, basado en reglas unívocas de la ciencia o la técnica por no tener los estudios técnicos como los estudios factibilidad ambiental y económico. 3. Se condene a los demandados al pago de las costas personales y procesales causadas. Entendiendo por costas personales no solo las mandas judiciales para el pago de peritos, y honorarios de funcionarios judiciales, sino además los honorarios de abogado que corresponden según el arancel aplicable.” XLV.- Realizado el análisis de cada uno de los diversos y cuantiosos alegatos que se presentaron tanto en la fase escrita como oral del presente proceso, tarea que fue abordada por este Tribunal de manera minuciosa y objetiva, no se ha detectado la existencia de vicios sustanciales que exijan la supresión de las conductas impugnadas, en lo incluye el cartel de licitación y sus modificaciones, actos de adjudicación, contrato de concesión a nivel general y en su clausulado, incluyendo las condiciones particulares impugnadas, modificaciones al contrato, acto de refrendo y los condicionamientos que incluye, adendas al contrato. En los apartes previos del presente voto constan las ponderaciones que han llevado a este Tribunal a esta conclusión, razón por la cual, de conformidad con los razonamientos de hecho y de derecho ya expuestos de manera amplia y detallada, considera este Tribunal, no padecen los actos criticados de nulidades sustanciales que merezcan ser declaradas en este proceso, razón por la cual, la pretensión de nulidad formulada debe ser rechazada, tanto en lo que refiere a los pedimentos principales como los accesorios o subsidiarios planteados en la demanda y su ampliación -expuesta por CANABA-. Por su parte, y dado el análisis integrado que se ha realizado por este cuerpo colegiado, tampoco resulta de recibido la acción formulada por SINTRAJAP, pues luego del análisis de sus alegaciones, planteadas en la fase oral –pues en la escrita, la demanda no incluía un desarrollo de los alegatos de derecho en que sustentaron sus pedimentos-, no se logró determinar el grado de invalidez reprochado, ante lo cual, sus pretensiones en general –incluidas las anulatorias- resultan improcedentes, conforme al numeral 121 del CPCA, por lo que se dispone su rechazo." ... Ver más Citas de Legislación y Doctrina Sentencias Relacionadas ASUNTO: PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR: Cámara Nacional de Bananeros, Sindicato Trabajadores JADPDEVA DEMANDADO: APM Terminal Central Am é rica B.V, Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, Contraloría General de la República, Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica y el Estado.

No. 0 153 -2012-VI.

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN SEXTA, ANEXO A del II Circuito Judicial de San José, Goicoechea, a las ocho horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del seis de agosto del dos mil doce.

Proceso de trámite preferente formulado por la Cámara Nacional de Bananeros (CANABA) , representada por su apoderado especial judicial Randall Quirós Bustamante, cédula de identidad número CED110934, y el Sindicato de Trabajadores de Nombre2401 APDEVA (SINTRAJAP) , representado por su apoderado especial judicial, Jorge Emilio Regidor Umaña, cédula de identidad número CED110935, contra el Estado, representado por la señora Procuradora, Andrea Calderón Gassman, cédula de identidad número CED1605, Consejo Nacional de Concesiones (CNC), representado en esta causa por el señor Nombre35826 , cédula de identidad número CED110090, la Contraloría General de la República (CGR), representada por su apoderado especial judicial, Nombre4349 , cédula de identidad número CED102428, la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP), representada por el señor Nombre71557 , cédula de identidad número CED53934, la Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), representada por su apoderada judicial, Nombre38445 , cédula de identidad CED110936 y APM Terminal Central América B.V y APM Terminals Moín S.A. , ambos representados por su apoderado especial judicial, Nombre35909 , cédula de identidad número CED90986.

RESULTANDO.

DEMANDA CANABA:

1.- En escrito visible a folios 1-37 del expediente principal, la Cámara Nacional de Bananeros (CANABA) formula demanda, para que en lo medular, en sentencia se disponga, pretensiones que fueron corregidas en escrito visible a folios 977-983 del legajo principal (tomo ii), de la siguiente manera: "Pretensión principal: La declaración de nulidad de los siguientes actos administrativos: 1. De adjudicación realizada por parte del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones en el acuerdo número 2 de la sesión extraordinaria No. 2-2011 del 28 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con servicio público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM Terminal Central America B.V. 2. Del acto de adjudicación por parte de Nombre141024 en el acuerdo No. 073-11, artículo II-a de la sesión ordinaria No. 08-2011 del 24 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-200. 3. El acuerdo del Poder Ejecutivo conformado por la Presidenta de la República, Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes y Ministro de Hacienda, firmado el 01 de marzo del 2011, publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2011 de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200. Pretensiones subsidiarias: 1. Se declare la nulidad de la estructura tarifaria de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, señalada en el capítulo 11, apartado 7. 2, por utilizar como base en la proyección del tráfico realizada en el plan maestro para el complejo Limón/Moín, contratado a la empresa Royal Haskoning, el cual no es un estudio de factibilidad económica actualizado y no se encuentra sustentado en parámetros realistas de acuerdo al volumen de siembra y exportación de las frutas como el banano, piña y melón. 2. Se declare la nulidad de la estructura tarifaria de licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, por contradicción al artículo 3 inciso b de la Ley de la Nombre628 que establece el principio del servicio al costo. 3. Se declare nulo el acto que adjudica la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, por carecer de justificación del proceso licitatorio de una motivación del acto basado en las reglas unívocas de la ciencia o la técnica por no tener estudios técnicos como los estudios de factibilidad ambiental y económico. 4. Se anule el acuerdo número 018-MOPT-H publicado en el Alcance No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2001 en el que se adjudica la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200 por establecer que para la recepción de un descuento de $20 a la tarifa hecha en la oferta económica, se implementan 15 medidas en el acto de adjudicación, que se contemplarán en el contrato." 2.- En escrito presentado en fecha 12 de abril del 2012, Nombre141025 presenta escrito de ampliación de la demanda, (folios 4291-4366 del principal), en el cual formula la siguiente pretensión: "Principal: La declaración de nulidad de los siguientes actos administrativos: 1.- El acto de adjudicación realizada por parte de Nombre141024 en el acuerdo No. 73-11, artículo II-a de la sesión ordinaria No. 08-2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 2.- El acto del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones en el acuerdo número 2 de la sesión extraordinaria No. 2-2011 del 28 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 3.- El acuerdo de adjudicación realizado por el Poder Ejecutivo conformado por la Presidenta de la República, el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, el Ministro de Hacienda y firmado el 01 de Marzo del 2011, publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2011 de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 4. El cartel de licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 5.- El contrato que suscribió el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOIN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín, con fecha del 30 de agosto del 2011. 6.- La adenda No. 1 al Contrato de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Moín, firmada el día 29 de noviembre del 2011 y suscrita por el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200. 7.- El nuevo contrato de fecha 13 de febrero del 2012, suscrito por el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 promovida para "Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín". 8.- El oficio DCA-0692 por parte de la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República con fecha de 21 de marzo del 2012, en el cual concede refrendo al contrato derivado de la licitación pública internacional Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 promovida para "Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín". 9.- Se condene en costas procesales y personales de forma solidaria a las partes demandadas. Pretensiones subsidiarias: En el supuesto de que el Tribunal desestime las pretensiones principales, solicitamos lo siguiente: 1.- La declaración de nulidad del supuesto económico de la proyección de volumen, utilizado en la fórmula de la estructura tarifaria de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, señalada en el capítulo 11, apartado 7.2 de la misma dado en el Plan Maestro y actualizado con base al estudio dado por la empresa ICICOR DE COSTA RICA, que sirven de sustento para establecer la tarifa de $223. 2.- Exigir a la administración concedente generar sus propias estimaciones de volúmenes de carga, utilizando los datos actualizados de años recientes y que se generan en los informes anuales de JAPDEVA. 3.- Dadas las actuales condiciones de baja de interés a nivel mundial y al estímulo que ofrecen los gobiernos para no caer en una nueva recesión, se valoren los costos de financiamiento de la deuda y el reconocimiento a las ganancias de capital que el modelo financiero contiene. 4.- Rebajar la tasa interna de retorno del 17.5% al 15%; nivel que se incrementó con el argumento de la crisis, pero que la misma administración reconoce que esta es cíclica." 3.- CONTESTACIÓN DE LA DEMANDA: Conferido el traslado de ley, las partes accionadas contestaron la demanda en los siguientes términos: a) APM Terminal Central América B.V: folios 1196-1275 del principal. Interpone las defensas de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y falta de derecho. b) Estado: en los términos que consta en folios 1281-1357 del legajo principal. Formula las defensas de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, falta de legitimación activa y falta de derecho. c) Consejo Nacional de Concesiones: En los términos que consta a folios 1358-1428 del principal. Plantea defensas de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y falta de derecho. d) Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (Nombre141024): folios 1570-1664 del principal. Plantea la defensa de falta de derecho. e) Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos: demanda en los términos que rola a folios 1665-1696. Formula defensas de falta de derecho y legitimación pasiva. f) Contraloría General de la República: contestación a folios 1770. Opone la defensa previa de indebida integración de la litis, así como falta de legitimación activa, pasiva y falta de derecho. Respecto de la AMPLIACIÓN DE LA DEMANDA, contestaron en los siguientes términos:1) Nombre141024 (folios 4394-4405): formula defensas de falta de legitimación activa y falta de derecho; 2) Nombre628 (folios 4407-4418): reitera las defensas previas de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa e inadmisibilidad de la demanda por haber precluido el plazo para impugnar el cartel de licitación; 3) APM Terminals Central America B.V. (folios 4420-4453); 4) Contraloría General de la República (folios 4457-4494): falta de legitimación activa y pasiva, falta de derecho; 5) Estado (folios4495-4541): falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, falta de derecho; 6) Consejo Nacional de Concesiones (folios 4574-4604): falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, falta de derecho; 7) APM Terminals Moín S.A. (folios 4607-4656, 4697-4774): falta de derecho y demanda defectuosa.

DEMANDA DE SINTRAJAP.

4.- Por auto de las diez horas cincuenta del veintiuno de febrero del dos mil doce, este Tribunal dispuso acumular el expediente No. 11-003975-1027-CA consistente en demanda planteada por Nombre141024 contra las mismas partes demandadas en este proceso, a la causa número 11-001347-1027-CA. Las pretensiones formuladas por ese sindicato fueron las siguientes, según escrito visible a folios 2330-2417 del principal (cuyos hechos fueron reformulados en memorial visible a folios 3639-3677 del principal): "1. La nulidad del acto administrativo que adjudica la licitación internacional pública No. 2009LI-000001-00200 llamada "Cartel de licitación para la concesión de obra pública con servicio público para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la terminal de contenedores en puerto Moín" a favor de APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. Ello por cuanto: - la licitación se realizó violentando la normativa propia tanto de la ley de concesiones como de la ley de contratación, se hizo con un cartel que no cumplía con lo dispuesto por la Ley de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos en su artículo 21 incisos 1, 2 y 3, cual era tener todos los estudios técnicos correspondientes que sustentaran la viabilidad económica y ambiental del proyecto a concesionar, además con violación a contrario sensu de las normas del 27 al 29, ambas inclusive de la ley de concesiones citada, pues en estas normas no se permite la modificación de la oferta luego de recibidas formalmente las ofertas y al modificar el cartel y las fechas de presentación de ofertas y no dar plazos adecuados. Además al otorgar 15 concesiones o beneficios más a la empresa adjudicada, luego de la fecha de apertura de las ofertas, beneficios o concesiones que de haberse dado a conocer, pudieron permitir que otros interesados ofertaran. 2. De conformidad con el artículo 42 inciso b) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, solicito se declare nulo el acto administrativo que adjudica la licitación internacional pública No. 2009LI-000001-0200 llamada "Cartel de licitación para la concesión de obra pública con servicio público para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la terminal de contenedores en puerto Moín", a la empresa APM TERMINAL B.V., por carecer de una justificación del proceso licitatorio, de una motivación del acto administrativo, basado en reglas unívocas de la ciencia o la técnica por no tener los estudios técnicos como los estudios factibilidad ambiental y económico. 3. Se condene a los demandados al pago de las costas personales y procesales causadas. Entendiendo por costas personales no solo las mandas judiciales para el pago de peritos, y honorarios de funcionarios judiciales, sino además los honorarios de abogado que corresponden según el arancel aplicable." 5.- CONTESTACIÓN DE LA DEMANDA: Otorgado el traslado de ley, las partes co-accionadas contestaron la demanda incoada por Nombre141024 de la siguiente manera: a) APM Terminal Central América B.V (f. 3761-3802 del principal): Interpone las defensas de falta de derecho y demanda defectuosa; b) Contraloría General de la República (f. 3809-3841 ibídem): Opone las defensas de falta de legitimación activa y pasivas, así como la de falta de derecho; c) Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (F. 3842-3876 del principal): formula las excepciones de falta de derecho y falta de legitimación pasiva; d) Consejo Nacional de Concesiones (f. 3881-3936 del principal): Opuso las defensas de demanda defectuosa y falta de derecho; e) Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA) (F. 3939-3988 del judicial): Plantea la defensa de falta de derecho; f) Estado (f. 3993-4055-bis del judicial): formula las defensas previas de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y demanda defectuosa, así como la defensa de fondo de falta de derecho.

6.- Mediante la resolución No. 589-2011 de las 08 horas 26 minutos del 15 de abril del 2011, el juzgador de trámite acogió la defensa de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y dispuso conceder un plazo de 5 días hábiles a Nombre141025 para tales efectos (folios 989-990 del judicial. En definitiva, por auto de las 14 horas 37 minutos del 25 de mayo del 2011 visible a folios 1018-1020, el juzgador de trámite tuvo por cumplido el requisito de agotamiento de la vía administrativa. En la audiencia única respectiva este Tribunal señaló que la citada defensa de falta de agotamiento ya había sido resuelta por con antelación, conforme al anterior detalle.

7.- La audiencia única establecida en el numeral 60.3 del CPCA fue citada por auto de las 10 horas del 14 de junio del 2012 y reiterada a las partes por auto de las 13:12 horas del 26 de junio del 2012, y fue celebrada a partir del 02 de julio del 2012 y hasta el 06 de julio del 2012, con la asistencia de todas las partes. En dicha audiencia se dispuso el rechazo de la solicitud de coadyuvancia planteada por el señor Nombre141026 , formulada a folios 1194-1195 del principal, son que contra tal rechazo se haya formulado recurso alguno. De igual modo, se mantuvieron las pretensiones formuladas. Asimismo se realizó la admisión de los elementos probatorios, y las pruebas testimoniales fueron evacuadas a partir del 03 de julio del 2012 y hasta el 05 de julio siguiente. Las partes rindieron conclusiones en fecha 06 de julio del 2012.

8.- Dentro de la citada audiencia única, una vez terminado el debate, el presente asunto fue declarado de trámite complejo, acorde al numeral 111 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, advirtiendo a las partes que en estos casos el plazo para dictar y comunicar el fallo es de 15 días hábiles luego de culminada la audiencia única, plazo que iniciaría en fecha 16 de julio del 2012, dadas las vacaciones colectivas otorgadas por el Poder Judicial entre fechas 09 y 13 de julio del año en curso.

9.- Mediante acción de inconstitucionalidad presentada ante la Sala Constitucional en fecha 20 de julio del 2012, se cuestiona el artículo 2 incisos 2) y 3) y el artículo 5 inciso 4) ambos de la Ley General de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público, así como el Contrato de concesión de obra pública con servicio Público para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Moín, acción que se tramita en el expediente número 12-9578-0007-CO. Empero, a la fecha de emisión del presente fallo no se ha determinado la admisión de dicho trámite, por lo que no existe impedimento alguno para la emisión del presente fallo.

10.- En los procedimientos ante este Tribunal no se han observado nulidades que deban ser subsanadas y la sentencia se dicta dentro del plazo establecido al efecto el numeral 111 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

Redacta el juzgador Garita Navarro con el voto afirmativo de las juzgadoras Álvarez Molina y Abarca Gómez.

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Hechos probados: De relevancia para efectos de la presente se tienen los siguientes: 1) La Cámara Nacional de Bananeros (CANABA) es una entidad jurídica inscrita ante el Registro de Asociaciones del Registro Nacional bajo el número de cédula jurídica CED110937. Que Nombre141025 fue fundada el 30 de enero de 1967 resultado de la inquietud de un grupo de productores preocupados por el futuro de la actividad bananera costarricense. El objetivo de Nombre141025 ha sido fomentar las relaciones entre productores y compañías comercializadoras procurando siempre defender y proteger los intereses comunes de sus asociados, como expresan sus estatutos. (Folios 37, 4122-4123, 1917-1957 del judicial) 2) El giro comercial de los agremiados de Nombre141025 comprende la producción, comercialización y envío de fruta hacia diversos mercados internacionales, que contribuye al desarrollo de la economía nacional. El envío de los productos que producen los agremiados a la Cámara, se realiza mediante transporte marítimo embarcado desde el Puerto de Moín operado actualmente por la Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA). (Folios 1958-2202 del judicial) 3) El 14 de agosto del año 2006, el Sindicato de Trabajadores de JAPDEVA, en adelante SINTRAJAP, formalmente le presentó al Gobierno de la República una Propuesta de Modernización Portuaria y Fortalecimiento de JAPDEVA. La propuesta de SINTRAJAP, que se sustentó en un diagnóstico de la institución y de la actividad portuaria, era una alternativa a la concesión/privatización de los puertos. El planteamiento de Modernización Portuaria efectuado por Nombre141024 planteó 26 medidas concretas para su modernización. El 30 de octubre del 2006 el Gobierno responde a los trabajadores portuarios de forma muy restrictiva diciendo que el único camino, la única opción, la única medida que están dispuestos a tomar, es la concesión de los puertos nacionales. Este tipo de respuesta del gobierno llevó a Nombre141024 a presentar en diciembre del 2006 un documento denominado “ANÁLISIS DEL DOCUMENTO “RESPUESTA DEL GOBIERNO DE LA REPÚBLICA AL DOCUMENTO PRESENTADO POR Nombre141024 Y PROPUESTA DEL GOBIERNO” Y REITERACIÓN de la PROPUESTA DE Nombre141024 DE FORTALECIMIENTO DE Nombre141024 PARA LA MODERNIZACIÓN PORTUARIA Y EL DESARROLLO DE LIMÓN” (Folios 1348 al 1402, 1403 al 1414 del expediente judicial) 4 ) Mediante el oficio 5464/DCA-1765 fechado el 29 de mayo del 2007, de la Contraloría General de la República, se autoriza contratar en forma directa el estudio denominado “Elaboración del Plan Maestro para el Complejo Portuario Limón-Moín, y Evaluación del Dragado de canales de norte y equipo de dragado necesario para el mantenimiento de los canales de navegación”. La Proveeduría de la Administración Portuaria de JAPDEVA, el 7 de junio del año 2007 inicia formalmente con la “Compra Directa #2007CD-000609-01”, para la “Contratación Directa del Consorcio Holandés HASKONING NEDERLAND B.V. OORD DREDGING AND MARINE CONTRACTORS B.V. – IHC MERWEDE B.V.”, para que brinde los servicios de consultoría en la “Elaboración del Plan Maestro para el Complejo Portuario Limón-Moín y Evaluación del Dragado de Canales del Norte y Equipo de Dragado Necesario para el Mantenimiento de los Canales de Navegación”. Posteriormente, Nombre141024 firma el 29 de octubre del 2007 con ROYAL HASKONING un contrato denominado “Contrato de Prestación de Servicios de Consultoría para la Elaboración del Plan Maestro para el Complejo Portuario Limón-Moín y la Evaluación del Drenaje de la Vertiente Atlántica y el Equipo de Dragado Necesario para el Mantenimiento de los Canales de Navegación”. En el Contrato en su Cláusula SEXTA denominada “Costo, Financiamiento y Forma de Pago” (Folio 0174 del Expediente Administrativo), se indica que el costo total del estudio es de €248.000 (doscientos cuarenta y ocho mil euros) y que se financiarán de la siguiente forma: a) Una donación del Gobierno Holandés por €140.000 (ciento cuarenta mil euros), b) Las tres empresas holandesas que constituyen la Consultora contribuyen con €15.000 (quince mil euros), c) Pago de Nombre141024 por €93.000 (noventa y tres mil euros). La mayor parte del dinero para el pago del costo de la elaboración del Plan Maestro fue dado por el gobierno holandés (56.45%) y la misma empresa holandesa contratada (6.05%), que en su conjunto aportaron el 62.5% del costo. (Folios del 2424 al 2443 del Expediente judicial). 5 ) El contrato firmado entre Nombre141024 y la empresa holandesa Royal Haskoning (“Contrato de Prestación de Servicios de Consultoría …”) señala en su cláusula segunda sobre su objeto: “la prestación de los servicios profesionales de consultoría para la elaboración del plan maestro para el complejo portuario Limón-Moín y la evaluación del drenaje de la vertiente atlántica y el equipo de dragado necesario para el mantenimiento de los canales de navegación…”. (Folios del 2424 al 2443 del Expediente judicial). 6 ) Que mediante Decreto Ejecutivo N° 34307-MCI-MOPT-MTSS, publicado en La Gaceta N° 31, del 13 de febrero del 2008, el Gobierno de la República dispuso dar inicio al Proceso de Modernización del Sub-sector Portuario Nacional en la Vertiente del Caribe y la creación de comisiones interinstitucionales para su implementación. (Folios 320-323 del legajo administrativo del CNC) 7 ) Que en fecha 21 de agosto del 2008, a solicitud de la Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), la empresa holandesa Royal Haskoning emitió un documento denominado “Plan Maestro para el complejo portuario Limón-Moín. Este plan fue aprobado mediante el acuerdo 654-2008. (Documento visible a folios 275-542, 2531-2795 del judicial, 47-318, 320 del administrativo CNC) 8 ) El 3 de setiembre del 2008 la empresa consultora Royal Haskoning entrega el “Informe Final del Plan Maestro de Desarrollo Portuario para los Puertos de Limón y Moín”. El documento entregado por la Nombre141027 fue titulado “Plan Maestro para el Complejo Portuario de Limón-Moín”, número de proyecto 9R4672.21 y fechado 21 de agosto de 2008. (Folios 2531-2735 del judicial) 9 ) El Plan Maestro presentado (y posteriormente aprobado), para el Complejo Portuario Limón-Moín, el consultor recomienda el desarrollo del puerto en las siguientes 3 etapas o fases: Fase 1: a) aumento de la capacidad de la infraestructura existente mediante: instalación de equipos, construcción de un nuevo Terminal petrolero, construcción del muelle 5.7 en la extensión de los muelles existentes en Moín. b) preparación de la concesión y construcción de un nuevo puerto al oeste del presente puerto: preparación diseño preliminar, preparación pliegos de licitación, preparación proceso de licitación pública (o restringida con precalificación de postores) para atraer un concesionario, firma de contrato con el concesionario, construcción del rompeolas y de la fase 2. Fase 2: a) Traslado de toda la carga de Limón a Moín, b) Manejo de contenedores en el nuevo puerto (900m de muelle contenedores) y Fase 3: Extensión del muelle de contenedores con 600m adicionales. (Folios 2531-2735 del judicial) 10 ) El Consejo de Administración de JAPDEVA, mediante Acuerdo Firme y Unánime N° 654-08 Artículo Único de la Sesión Extraordinaria N° 37-2008, celebrada el 18 de setiembre del 2008, decidió: “1). Aprobar el Plan Maestro para el Complejo Portuario Limón-Moín, elaborado por Royal Haskoning Nederland BV…”; “2). Elaborar una guía de implementación de acciones, para la modernización del Complejo Portuario Limón-Moín y su futuro desarrollo.”; “3). Ordenar a la Administración el inicio, tramitación, formulación e implementación del Plan Maestro con todas las instancias relacionadas”; (…); “5) Ordenar a la Administración proceder a realizar las negociaciones necesarias y pertinentes con SINTRAJAP, el Gobierno Central, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes y el Ministerio de Trabajo, a efecto de garantizar la negociación de este proceso en forma expedita y en un plazo no mayor a seis meses, en armonía con la legislación vigente y respetando los derechos de los trabajadores”. (Folio 2447 del legajo judicial) 11 ) En el cartel de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-0200, en la condición No. 1.5, se indica lo siguiente en cuanto al objeto de la licitación: "1.5 DESCRIPCIÓN DEL PROYECTO OBJETO DE LA CONCESIÓN. Tomando como referencia las proyecciones de tráfico del Plan Maestro para el complejo portuario Limón/ Moín, se requerirán aproximadamente 1.5 kilómetros de longitud de muelles para los próximos 20 años, por lo que se requiere desarrollar una nueva Terminal al noroeste de Puerto actual de Moín, que proporcione lo siguiente: a) Instalaciones portuarias protegidas por un rompeolas para crear una dársena con olas por debajo de los niveles aceptables de agitación para cargar y descargar buques porta contenedores. b) Dragado de un canal de acceso con una profundidad de -18 metros, profundidad que podrá ser inferior de acuerdo al modelo hidráulico y operativo que deberá realizar el concesionario antes de los diseños finales para poder atender como mínimo barcos porta contenedores tipo Panamax. En caso que resulte un volumen de dragado menor o mayor a la inversión que contempla el modelo financiero de la oferta con relación al que revele el modelo hidráulico, la tarifa se verá afectada proporcionalmente tomando en consideración el valor por metro cúbico ofertado por la variación en el volumen de dragado. Para la entrada en operación de la tercera fase, la profundidad del canal de acceso deberá ser como mínimo -18 metros. c) Dragado de una dársena de maniobras y áreas de aproximación hacia las terminales con una profundidad de -16 metros, profundidad que podrá ser inferior de acuerdo al modelo hidráulico y operativo que deberá realizar el concesionario. En caso que resulte un volumen de dragado menor o mayor a la inversión que contempla el modelo financiero de la oferta con relación al que revele el modelo hidráulico, la tarifa se verá afectada proporcionalmente tomando en consideración el valor por metro cúbico ofertado por la variación en el dragado capital, para poder atender como mínimo barcos porta contenedores tipo Panamax. Para la entrada en operación de la tercera fase, la profundidad de la dársena de maniobras deberá ser como mínimo -16 metros. d) Patios para el manejo de contenedores. e) Equipos portuarios especializados para el manejo de contenedores necesarios para la operación de la Terminal (grúas portacontenedores, RTG, etc.), cumpliendo como mínimo con el equipo recomendado en el Plan Maestro. No obstante, el concesionario tendrá la facultad de adquirir el equipo de mejor tecnología que garantice la eficiencia y eficacia en las operaciones portuarias. f) Equipo marítimo para la asistencia en las maniobras de atraque y desatraque de los barcos (remolcadores marinos para atender como mínimo a barcos Panamax con una capacidad mínima de tiro a la bita 60 Toneladas). Este equipo podrá ser propio o de terceros. (…) Tomando como referencia el Plan Maestro, esta terminal deberá ser desarrollada en dos etapas (Fases 2 y 3) definidas con base en las proyecciones del tráfico como sigue: a. Fase 2: diseño, financiamiento, construcción y equipamiento de tres puestos de atraque de 300 metros de longitud, 420 metros de ancho y una profundidad mínima en los muelles para atender barcos portacontenedores tipo Panamax, y diseñados para ser dragados en un futuro a -16 metros. b. Fase 3: diseño, financiamiento, construcción y equipamiento de dos puestos de atraque de 300 metros de longitud, 420 metros de ancho y una profundidad mínima en los muelles para atender barcos portacontenedores tipo Panamax, y diseñados para ser dragados en un futuro a -16 metros. Los barcos porta contenedores tipo Panamax,a que se refiere esta cláusula son los de una eslora total de 250 metros y una manga de 32,30 metros y un calado de 12,6 metros, un peso muerto de al menos 50000 DWT (equivale al buque de diseño). (…) Es importante indicar en este contexto que la Administración busca ante todo una mejora de la productividad y eficiencia portuaria, por lo cual propone un amplio margen de maniobra a los interesados en el diseño y desarrollo de sus respectivos proyectos. Las obras se desarrollarán en su totalidad en un relleno o recuperación de terreno que se debe realizar en el mar, situado en Moín, Distrito Limón, Cantón Central, Provincia de Limón”. (Folios 3842-3666 del administrativo del CNC) 12 ) Mediante oficio P.E.036-2009 el 3 de febrero de 2009 el Presidente Ejecutivo de Nombre141024 le remite al Secretario Técnico del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, lo dispuesto mediante acuerdo N° 037-09, de la Sesión Ordinaria N° 03-2009 celebrada el 22 de enero del 2009 en su artículo VII-a; del Consejo de Administración de JAPDEVA, mediante el cual se solicita al Consejo Nacional de Concesiones que en el procedimiento para otorgar la concesión de obra pública con servicio público; además de la construcción y operación de las terminales portuarias contempladas en las Fases 2 y 3 del Plan Maestro Portuario, incluya también “la construcción y operación de la Terminal 5-7 y los servicios de Remolcaje y Pilotaje, todo lo anterior como una sola unidad de negocio.” (folio 738 Tomo II del Expediente del CNC) 13 ) El 26 de noviembre del 2008, el Consejo de Administración de Nombre141024 mediante el Acuerdo N° 814-08 bajo el Artículo II de la Sesión Extraordinaria N°45-2008, aprueba solicitar al Consejo Nacional de Concesiones “…EL INICIO DEL PROCEDIMIENTO O PROCEDIMIENTOS PARA OTORGAR EN CONCESIÓN DE OBRA PÚBLICA CON SERVICIO PÚBLICO, LA CONSTRUCCIÓN Y OPERACIÓN DE LAS TERMINALES PORTUARIAS CONTEMPLADAS EN LAS FASES DOS Y TRES DEL PLAN MAESTRO PORTUARIO…”. (Folios 322 y 321 del Expediente). Pero se omite la denominada Fase 1 del Plan Maestro Portuario. Y mediante oficio P.E.309-2008 -visible al folio 000323 del Expediente-; el Presidente Ejecutivo de JAPDEVA, solicita a la Secretario Técnico del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, que ese Consejo inicie el proceso legal para la concesión de las fases 2 y 3 contempladas en el Plan Maestro “…cuyas inversiones son necesarias llevarlas a cabo, en el menor tiempo posible,…”. (Folios 321-322 del administrativo de CNC) 14 ) Que mediante acuerdo tomado en la sesión ordinaria N° 32-2008, del 9 de octubre del 2008, el Consejo Directivo del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones (CNC) aprobó la suscripción de un convenio con JAPDEVA, con el objetivo de coadyuvar y colaborar con dicha entidad en la preparación, elaboración y publicación del cartel de licitación para que posteriormente, el Poder Ejecutivo procediera a emitir el acto de adjudicación y suscripción del contrato de concesión las Terminales de Contenedores de Puerto Moín. (Folios 324-325 del administrativo CNC) 15 ) Que mediante acuerdo firme del Consejo de Administración de la Junta Administradora Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), adoptado en la sesión ordinaria N° 45-2008, celebrada el 22 de diciembre del 2008, art. VII-a Acuerdo N° 898-08, se autorizó al Presidente Ejecutivo para la suscripción del respectivo Convenio de Gestión Interinstitucional. (Folios 731-735 del administrativo del CNC) 16 ) El 15 de enero del 2009 el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, mediante Acuerdo Cuarto de la Sesión Ordinaria N°1-2009 acuerda “…el inicio del procedimiento para otorgar en Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público, la Construcción y Operación de las Terminales Portuarias contempladas en las fases dos y tres del Plan Maestro Portuario elaborado por la firma Holandesa Royal Haskoning…”. (Folios 324,325, 915, 916 del administrativo CNC). 17 ) Que mediante la resolución No. Nombre141028 de las 08 horas del 10 de febrero del 2009, la SETENA, otorgó viabilidad ambiental potencial al proyecto de la Terminal de Contenedores de Moín (TCM). D ispuso lo siguiente en lo que viene relevante al caso: "PRIMERO: Se otorga la Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial (VAP) al proyecto, a efectos de que pueda llevar a cabo cualquier gestión previa ante entidades bancarias u otras entidades estatales o privadas. Se advierte al desarrollador que el presente otorgamiento no le otorga derecho alguno para llevar a cabo obras de ningún tipo, hasta tanto no sea emitida la Viabilidad Ambiental Definitiva, una vez que cumpla con la información o documentación adicional requerida por esta Secretaría. (...) SEGUNDO: Se le previene al Desarrollador que, debido a las características del proyecto, para cada fase o etapa del mismo deberá realizar el proceso de Evaluación del Impacto Ambiental iniciado con la presentación del respectivo formulario D1. (...)". (folios 1189-1191 del legajo principal) 18 ) Que la elaboración del cartel correspondiente al proceso licitatorio se realizó con base en las fases dos y tres contempladas en el Plan Maestro para el Desarrollo Portuario Limón-Moín, elaborado por la firma holandesa Royal Haskoning, con la aprobación del MOPT , Nombre141024 y el CNC. (Hecho no controvertido. Folios 38-456 del judicial) (Folios 47-318, 897-904 del administrativo CNC, 1901-1915 del judicial) 19 ) El 3 de marzo del 2009, el Coordinador del Comité Técnico; le remite al Secretario Técnico del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones la primera versión del “Cartel de Licitación para la Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín” (Folios 743-878 del administrativo del CNC -tomo II-) 20 ) El jueves 23 de abril del 2009 en La Gaceta N° 78, página 51; se publica el primer aviso de “LICITACIÓN PÚBLICA CON INVITACIÓN INTERNACIONAL N° 2009LI-000001-00200 Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicios Públicos para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín”. (Folio 1068 del administrativo CNC -tomo III-) 21 ) Que en la Gaceta No. 78 del 23 de Abril del año 2009, se publicó el cartel de la Licitación Pública con Invitación Internacional N° 2009-LI-000001-00200 para la “Concesión de obra pública con servicios públicos para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín”. (Hecho no controvertido, folios 2476, 926-927, 932-1053 del administrativo CNC) 22 ) Que el Cartel de Licitación con Invitación Internacional publicado en Nombre33221 a Gaceta No. 78 del 23 de Abril del año 2009, con número de licitación 2009-LI-000001-00200; considera dentro de la Metodología para la fijación de las tarifas, la proyección de tráfico realizada en el Plan Maestro para el complejo Portuario Limón/Moín, hecho por la empresa Holandesa Royal Haskoning. (No controvertido, folios 38-456 del principal, 75-77 expediente administrativo ARESEP) 23) Que e n el año 2010 se peticionó a la empresa Nombre141027 la actualización de los datos de demanda proyectada, información que en lo medular fue utilizada por el CNC para ajustar y actualizar el modelo tarifario remitido a la ARESEP. (O ficio 0395 (DTS-OF-380-10) y 445 (DTS-OF-0432-10) de fechas 12 y 23 de marzo del 2010 -ambos-, dirigidos a dicha Autoridad Reguladora. Así consta a folios 1446-2466 del legajo administrativo del CNC. ) 2 4 ) Que el Cartel de Licitación con Invitación Internacional publicado en Nombre33221 a Gaceta No. 78 del 23 de Abril del año 2009, con número de licitación 2009-LI-000001-00200; considera dentro de la Metodología para la fijación de las tarifas, el número de operaciones anuales calculadas con base en las proyecciones de tráfico realizadas en el Plan Maestro para el complejo Portuario Limón/Moín, hecho por la empresa Holandesa Royal Haskoning. (No controvertido, folios 38-456 del principal) 25 ) Que el cartel de licitación N° 2009-LI-000001-00200, fue modificado como consecuencia de solicitudes de aclaración y recursos de objeción presentados, siendo la última publicada en la Gaceta N° 146 del 28 de Julio del 2010; fijando la fecha y hora para el cierre y recepción de ofertas para el día 17 de Agosto del 2010, a las 14:00 horas, en la sede del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones. (No controvertido, folios 1437, 1483-1735, 1991-2243, 2253, 2406, 2415, 2581-2831, 2838, 3215, 3216, 3347, 32643283, 3843 del administrativo CNC ) 26 ) Que el cartel de la licitación no estableció que los oferentes podían presentar una oferta alternativa. (Folio 38-274 del judicial, 3353-3587 del administrativo CNC) 27 ) Que el cartel de licitación publicado en la Gaceta # 5 del 08 de enero de 2010 estableció una posible tarifa portuaria por movilización de carga por contenedor de US$ 169. (No controvertido, folios 166-177 del administrativo ARESEP) 28 ) El 2 de junio del 2009, SINTRAJAP, presentó ante la Contraloría General de la República Recurso de Objeción en contra del Cartel “Licitación Pública Internacional N° 2009LI-000001-00200 Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicios Públicos para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores en Puerto Moín”. También fue objetado el cartel por parte de la Empresa APM Terminals. Estas objeciones fueron resueltas el 2 de julio del 2009, por la Contraloría General de la República mediante la Resolución R-DJ-008-2009. Ese mismo día, el 2 de julio del 2009, la Contraloría General de la República también emite la Resolución R-DJ-008-2009 (bis) con consideraciones de oficio por parte del Órgano Contralor en relación con las disposiciones del cartel. (Folios 3408-3451 del expediente judicial) 29 ) El 24 de noviembre del 2009, las empresas CDG Environmental Advisor S.A. y APM Terminals B.V. presentaron individualmente recurso de objeción contra las modificaciones al Cartel Licitación Pública Internacional N° 2009LI-000001-00200 Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicios Públicos para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores en Puerto Moín”. El 18 de diciembre del 2009 a las 9:00 horas, mediante Resolución N° R-DJ-343-2009, la Contraloría General de la República resuelve: “1) Declarar con lugar el Recurso interpuesto por CDG Environmental Advisors S.A. 2) Declarar parcialmente con lugar el recurso interpuesto por APM Terminals B.V. …”. En esta resolución, además, la Contraloría General señala consideraciones de oficio respecto al Cartel. (Folios 3454-3511 del judicial) 30 ) En fecha 20 de abril del 2010, la empresa VISION WIDE TECH S.A. presentó Recurso de Objeción a las modificaciones al Cartel que se dieron a conocer mediante publicación en La Gaceta N° 71 del 14 de abril de 2010. El 24 de mayo del 2010 a las 9:00 horas, mediante Resolución N° R-DJ-215-2010, la Contraloría General de la República resuelve: “1) Rechazar de plano el recurso de objeción interpuesto en contra del cartel (…) por VISION WIDE TECH S.A." (Folios 2921-2910 del administrativo del CNC y 3512-3555 del judicial) 31 ) El 26 de noviembre del 2009; a las 12:39 horas mediante oficio STJ-967-2009 dirigido al Gerente de la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría; Nombre141024 presenta nuevo Recurso de Objeción en contra del Cartel “Licitación Pública Internacional N° 2009LI-000001-00200 Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicios Públicos para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores en Puerto Moín”. Por resolución R-DJ-283-2009 del 26 de noviembre del 2009 a las 13:00 horas, la Contraloría General rechaza de plano el recurso presentado por Nombre141024 por considerarlo extemporáneo. 32 ) El 17 de agosto del 2010 a las catorce horas; luego de varias mod i ficaciones de fechas para recibir plicas, se cierra la recepción de ofertas resultando que se recibe una sola oferta. La que es presentada por parte de la empresa APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. (folios 3868-3871 del administrativo CNC) 32 ) Que a la hora y fecha de recepción de las ofertas fijada, únicamente se recibió como oferta la presentada por APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMÉRICA B.V. quien ofertó una tarifa de US$ 246. (No controvertido, folios 3868-3871 del administrativo CNC) 33) Que mediante el oficio DSET-OF-401-2009 del 18 de marzo del 2009, el CNC remitió a la Nombre628 formalmente la estructura tarifaria y parámetros de ajuste que se incorporarían en el cartel de licitación de la TCM . A este trámite se asignó el expediente OT-367-2008 (expediente ARESEP). (F olio 36 del expediente administrativo de la Nombre628 ) 34) M ediante el oficio 122-RG-2009 del 01 de abril del 2009, la ARESEP, peticionó información adicional requerida, dentro de la que se incluye en concreto, copia electrónica de plan maestro, estudios de factibilidad para dar viabilidad al proyecto, factibilidad ambiental, detalle de tarifas a incorporar, pliego tarifario, acuerdo del CNC donde se inicia procedimiento (ver folios 34-35 del expediente ARESEP). La información fue remitida, aportando un CD con el Plan Maestro y el modelo tarifario propuesto. (F olios 7-33 del administrativo Nombre628 ) . 35) Por resolución No. RG-125-2009 del 20 de abril del 2009, ese ente regulador da visto bueno al proyecto y se indica que las tarifas señaladas eran precios máximos. Se advierte además que los mecanismos de ajuste se realizan a las tarifas adjudicadas, no a las aprobadas, y que el Nombre141029 no corresponde derecho alguno para llevar a cabo obra alguna. (Folios 78-80 expediente ARESEP) 36) P or oficio 2295/DTS-OF-1424-2009, CNC solicita un segundo pronunciamiento sobre la estructura tarifaria, parámetros de ajuste y evaluación de la calidad del servicio (folios 84-145 del expediente ARESEP). 37) Por oficios 1346-DITRA-2009 y 1380-DITRA-2009/32128 de fechas 22 y 27 de octubre del 2009, la Nombre628 previene información al CNC, la que es remitida por oficio 2359/DST-OF-1488-09 del 26 de octubre del 2009 y 2385/DST-OF-1522-09 del 28 de octubre del 2009. Por resolución No. RRG-10208-2009 de las 09 horas 15 minutos del 29 de octubre del 2009, el ente regulador establece una tarifa techo de $169 por contenedor (servicio a la carga) . (V er folios 163-179 del administrativo Nombre628 ) 38) P or oficio DST-OF-380-10 (0395) del 12 de marzo del 2010, se pide nueva tarifa analizando nuevas proyecciones de demanda y actualización de costos de inversión: tarifa propuesta era de $252. Tal solicitud se realiza indicando que se sustenta en la actualización de demanda del modelo tarifario. P ropuso una tarifa por servicio a la carga de $252.00 (doscientos cincuenta y dos dólares) (Folios 202-210 del administrativo Nombre628 ) Esa información se adicionó con insumos remitidos a la Nombre628 por oficio DST-OF-0432-10 (445) del 23 de marzo del 2010, en el que se indica que la TIR es del 17.5% (folios 211-219 del administrativo ARESEP). De igual modo por oficio DST-OF-380-10 (0395) del 12 se remite la estimación de volúmenes de carga y su comparación con el modelo de Royal Haskoning para la TCM realizado por la entidad ICICOR-Costa Rica S.A. de fecha 12 de enero del 2010 (folios 220-268 ibídem). 39) Por resolución No. RRG-255-2010 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 05 de abril del 2010, la Nombre628 se establece que con una tasa interna de retorno del 17.5%, la tarifa tope a la carga por contenedor será de $252.00 (doscientos cincuenta y dos dólares) (folios 286-293 del administrativo ARESEP). 40) Por oficio 902/DST-OF-673-2010 del 05 de julio del 2010, CNC pide un cuarto criterio sobre las tarifas de conformidad con la resolución R-DJ-215-2010 de la CGR . (F olios 550-787 del administrativo Nombre628 ) 41) Este ente pide información adicional en fecha 12 de julio del 2010 y es remitida en fecha 15 de julio del 2010 . (F olios 789, 791-792 del administrativo Nombre628 ) -. Por resolución No. RRG430-2010 de las 11 horas del 22 de julio del 2010, la Nombre628 última resolución que fija las tarifas, parámetros de ajuste y criterios de calidad. Sobre los parámetros de ajuste señaló que en caso de alteraciones financieras, serían mecanismos de ajuste válidos: revisión o ajuste de tarifas, pago para obras de desarrollo económico y social de Limón, revisión o ajuste de cronograma de inversiones, obras adicionales o equipamento en el puerto, combinación de las anteriores. -folios 796-801 del legajo administrativo ARESEP) 42 ) Que según Acuerdo N° 073-11, artículo II-a, de la Sesión ordinaria No. 08-2011 del 24 de febrero del 2011 de la Junta Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica, conoció informes técnicos presentados por la Comisión de evaluación de ofertas del proyecto conocido como TCM mediante oficio CTCM-004-2011 de fecha 18 de febrero del 2011 y acordó acoger la recomendación de adjudicación a la empresa APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMÉRICA B.V. (No controvertido, folios 6236-6280 del administrativo CNC) 43 ) Que mediante acuerdo No. 2 de la Sesión Extraordinaria No. 2-2011 del 28 de febrero del 2011 del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, el Consejo conoció informes técnicos presentados por la Comisión de evaluación de ofertas del proyecto conocido como TCM mediante oficio CTCM-004-2011 de fecha 18 de febrero del 2011 y acordó acoger la recomendación de adjudicación a la empresa APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMÉRICA B.V. (No controvertido, folios 6296-6319 del administrativo CNC) 44 ) Que mediante decreto No. 36443-MOPT-H, del 28 de Febrero del 2011, publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del jueves 17 de Marzo del 2011, se declara de interés público al proyecto de licitación conocida como la TCM. (No controvertido, folios 6325-6328, 6407,6408 del administrativo CNC) 45 ) Que mediante acuerdo 018-MOPT-H, publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 1 6 a La Gaceta No. 54, del 17 de marzo de 2011, se adjudica a la empresa APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMÉRICA B.V. como única oferente, por una tarifa de US$ 223. (No controvertido, folios 6320-6362 del administrativo CNC) 46 ) Que mediante el acuerdo No. 018-MOPT-H, firmado el 1 de Marzo del 2011, publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del jueves 17 de Marzo del 2011, el Estado se compromete a la coadyuvancia al Concesionario, en la obtención de los estudios básicos de oleajes y propagación, de navegación, modelajes, agitación, cambio de la línea de costa, de suelos y ambientales, fuentes de materiales, entre otros. (No controvertido, folios 6320-6362 del administrativo CNC) 47 ) Que mediante acuerdo No. 018-MOPT-H, firmado el 1 de Marzo del 2011 publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del jueves 17 de Marzo del 2011 el Estado costarricense asume una serie de compromisos con el concesionario, que no se incluían dentro del respectivo cartel de licitación, a saber: 1) Que el Estado coadyuvaría en la tramitación de los estudios básicos de oleajes y propagación, estudios de navegación, modelajes, agitación, cambio de la línea de costa, estudios de suelos y ambientales, fuentes de materiales, entre otros; 2) Que el Estado facilitaría un espacio físico en tierra, de al menos diez hectáreas, encontrándose el mismo lo más cerca posible del área de la concesión; en donde el Concesionario y sus sub-contratistas instalarían las oficinas, así como en donde se ubicarían los equipos, maquinarias, herramientas, pilotes, materiales, oficinas, campamentos y demás necesidades para la obra, en donde el Estado se compromete a ceder dicho terreno. 3) Que el Estado coadyuvaría para la obtención de los permisos de Viabilidad Ambiental de la Secretaría Técnica Ambiental (SETENA), permiso de Salud del Departamento de Salud (Ministerio de Salud-Oficina de Limón), Autorizaciones de Aguas y Revisión de disponibilidad del servicio de agua potable de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (Oficina de Limón), Autorización referente a servicios de electricidad y telecomunicaciones (revisión de disponibilidad de estos servicios) del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad- ICE (Oficina de Limón), Autorización referente pólizas de seguro (identificación de pólizas aplicables) y autorización referente a disponibilidad de acceso por parte del Departamento de Bomberos del Instituto Nacional de Seguros-INS (Oficina de Limón) y Patente Municipal y Permiso de Construcción-Uso de suelo- de la Municipalidad de Limón, para la instalación de las oficinas, talleres, patios de apoyo del contratista por parte del Concesionario; 4) Que el Estado coadyuvaría y expediría la designación del sitio para disposición del material de dragado que no se utilice como material de relleno en la construcción de la TCM; 5) Que el Estado designaría un área específica como banco de extracción de material para el relleno, si fuera requerido para la construcción de la TCM, 6) Que el Estado brindaría todas las facilidades del caso para la extracción y la disposición del material de dragado y el compromiso de apoyar la obtención de los permisos ante el Departamento de Minas del Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones y la Secretaría Técnica Ambiental (SETENA); 7) Que el Estado solicitaría la autorización para la exploración y/o explotación minera, que otorga el Departamento de Minas del Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones a favor del Concesionario; y, 8) Que el Estado se compromete a dar inicio con las operaciones provisionales con el primer puesto de atraque de una fase que llaman 2A, (No controvertido, folios 6320-6362 del administrativo CNC) 48 ) El 31 de marzo del 2011, Nombre141024 interpuso por medio del oficio STJ-244-2011 formuló recurso de apelación contra el acto de adjudicación de la licitación en cuestión. El 29 de abril del 2011, la Contraloría General mediante Resolución N° R-DCA-202-2011 resuelve “RECHAZAR DE PLANO POR IMPROCEDENCIA MANIFIESTA el Recurso de apelación interpuesto por el Sindicato de Trabajadores de Nombre141024 (SINTRAJAP) en contra del acto de adjudicación…” (destacado en negrita en el original). (Folio 2448, Tomo V del expediente administrativo del CNC) 49 ) El 4 de mayo del 2011, mediante oficio STJ-335-2011 el Sindicato de Trabajadores de Nombre141024 solicita a la Contraloría General, de forma razonada y con sustentos de hecho y de derecho, una RECONSIDERACIÓN de su Resolución R-DCA-202-2011 de las 10:00 horas del 29 de abril del 2011.Por acto R-DCA-223-2011 de las 9:00 horas del 11 de mayo del 2011, la instancia contralora dispuso "Rechazar de plano por improcedente el recurso de reconsideración interpuesto por Nombre141024 en contra de la resolución R-DCA-202-2011…”. (No controvertido) 50 ) Que en fecha 30 de Agosto del 2011 se suscribió un contrato por parte del Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA) y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V., derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 promovida para “Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín”. (Folios 8617-8771 del administrativo CNC) 51) D entro de la cláusula 11.8.2 del contrato de concesión, se fijó una tarifa a la carga de $223 (doscientos veintitrés dólares) por contenedor . (F olio 7639 del expediente CNC ) . 52 ) En fecha 13 de septiembre del 2011, la Asamblea Legislativa emite informe de mayoría, expediente No. 17.835, denominado "Informe Especial que investigará y Analizará todos los Procesos de Concesión que ha otorgado el Estado costarricense, o esté por otorgar al amparo de la Ley No. 7762 y su modificación parcial contenida en la Ley No. 8643. Informe APM Terminals Central América." En este documento, visible a folios 4134-4290 del legajo judicial (tomo VII) 53 ) Que el día 14 de Setiembre del 2011 se emitió el oficio DST-OF-1491-2011 del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones en donde remite a la Contraloría General de la República para su refrendo el Contrato de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Moín. (Folio 9932 administrativo CNC) 5 4 ) Que con fecha del 28 de Octubre del 2011 se emitió el oficio DCA-2836 de la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República, mediante el cual se solicita al Consejo Nacional de Concesiones información adicional previo a continuar con el estudio de solicitud de refrendo del Contrato de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Moín. (Folio 9932 del administrativo CNC) 55 ) Que en fecha 21 de noviembre del 2011 se suscribió una carta de aceptación formal de APM Terminal Moín S.A., en donde acepta adicionar la información solicitada por la Contraloría General de la República para la firma de una adenda, al contrato firmado el día 30 de Agosto del 2011. (Folio 9932 del administrativo CNC) 56 ) Que en fecha 24 de noviembre del 2011 se emitió el acuerdo 5.1 de la sesión ordinaria 28-2011 en donde la Junta Directiva del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones (CNC) otorgó visto bueno para la firma de una adenda, al contrato firmado el día 30 de Agosto del 2011. (Folio 9932 del administrativo CNC) 57 ) Que en fecha 24 de noviembre del 2011 se emitió el acuerdo No. 491-11 de la sesión ordinaria 41-2011, en donde la Junta Directiva de Nombre141024 aprueba la firma de una adenda, al contrato firmado el día 30 de Agosto del 2011. (Folios 9248-9330 del administrativo CNC) 58 ) Que el día 29 de noviembre del 2011 se suscribió la adenda No. 1 al Contrato de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Moín, por el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200. (Folios 9516-9599 del administrativo CNC) 59 ) Que en fecha del 30 de noviembre del 2011 se emitió el oficio DST-OF-1888-2011 por parte de la Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones; que consiste en la contestación al oficio DCA-2836 emitido por la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República con fecha del 28 de octubre del 2011. (Folio 9932 del administrativo CNC) 60 ) Que en fecha del 17 de Enero del 2012 se emitió el oficio DCA-0082 por parte de la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República; en donde nuevamente solicita información adicional para continuar con el estudio de refrendo del Contrato de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Moín. (Folio 9932 del administrativo CNC) 61 ) Que en fecha y número de oficio desconocido, se emitió el Cuarto Informe Técnico Jurídico TCM para dar respuesta al oficio DCA-0082 emitido por la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República; firmado por los jerarcas institucionales de JAPDEVA, su Presidente Ejecutivo Allan Hidalgo y el Secretario Técnico a.i del CNC Edwin Rodríguez. Así mismo se encuentra firmado por los funcionarios Nombre56756 , en su condición de gerente del proyecto TCM y director de la división marítima portuaria del MOPT; Nombre141030 , en su condición de director ambiental TCM; Nombre141031 , en su condición como director de obras portuarias del MOPT; Nombre141032 , en su condición en temas de capital social por parte del C.N.C.; Nombre141033 , en su condición como directora jurídica del CNC y por último el señor Nombre141034 , en su condición de unidad ejecutora. (Folio 9815-9898 del administrativo CNC) 62 ) Que con fecha 13 de febrero del 2012 se suscribió un nuevo Contrato; por el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 promovida para “Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín”. (Folio 9644-9813 del administrativo CNC) 63 ) Que con fecha 13 de febrero del 2012 se emitió el oficio DST-OF-179-2012 de la Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, en donde se remite respuesta del oficio DCA-0082 con fecha del 17 de Enero del 2012, a la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República. (Folio 9932 del administrativo CNC) 64 ) Que con fecha de 21 de Marzo del 2012 se emitió el oficio DCA-0692 por parte de la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República, en el cual concede refrendo al contrato derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 promovida para la “Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín”. (Folio 9932-9990 del administrativo CNC) 65) Que el Plan Maestro rendido por la empresa Royal Haskoning contiene la información base que comprenden los estudios de factibilidad financiera y económica. (Folios 38-456 del principal, deposición de los testigos Nombre5836 y V) 66) Que según los datos arrojados por CEPAL, Nombre141035 i ca se coloca en el puesto número 15 en el ranking latinoamericano del movimiento portuario de contenedores (así lo reconoce por ejemplo la testigo Nombre141036 y se puede ver en la página web de la CEPAL según consulta realizada el día 31 de julio del 2012 a las 14 horas Placa27257).

II.- Hechos no probados: De relevancia para los efectos del presente asunto se tienen los que de seguido se exponen: 1) Que en virtud de que la licitación pública internacional No. 2009Li-000001-00200, conocida como “Licitación para la Concesión de Obra Pública para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín”, los agremiados a la Cámara tendrán que utilizar los servicios y cancelar las tarifas establecidas, con la finalidad de exportar sus productos. (No se acredita que todos los movimientos de exportación e importación de banano se vaya a realizar mediante la TCM) 2) Que la zona donde se desarrollará el proyecto de la TCM se encuentra comprendida en el Área de Conservación Amistad Caribe (ACLA) del Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), así como en áreas bajo otras categorías de manejo en administración de ONG`s e instituciones semiautónomas, donde se protegen humedales , en las que se vaya a producir un daño ambiental . (No se acredita esa situación) 3) Que e n los últimos 20 años, el país no h ubiera t enido un aumento en la producción del cultivo del banano, como el que se refleja en el Plan Maestro de Royal Haskoning, siendo que el tope máximo histórico promedio ronda los 100 millones de cajas. (No hay prueba de ello) 4) Que según la estructura tarifaria propuesta en la licitación debatida, implicaría un aumento del 160% de los costos de movilización y embarque para los exportadores bananeros, en comparación a los que hoy tienen. (No se constata tal alegato fáctico) 5) Que la licitación pública internacional No. 2009Li-000001-00200, conocida como “Licitación para la Concesión de Obra Pública para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín” se haya realizado prescindiendo de estudios técnicos, financieros, económicos y ambientales. (No se acredita tal mención) 6) Que la Cámara Nacional de Bananeros haya formulado recursos de objeción contra las diversas versiones del cartel de licitación emitidos dentro de la licitación pública internacional No. 2009Li-000001-00200, conocida como “Licitación para la Concesión de Obra Pública para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín” (Los autos no permiten acreditar ese ejercicio recursivo) 7) Que a la fecha de instauración de la licitación de marras, las autoridades competentes hayan cumplido con el Plan Maestro en cuanto a las obras e inversiones a realizar respecto de la fase 1, que buscaba la modernización del denominado Muelle 57. (No se acredita tal aspecto) 8) Que el procedimiento de licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-0200 no contara con los estudios de factibilidad financiera e información de proyecciones de demanda y datos relevantes que permit ieran a los potenciales oferentes, realizar individualmente sus análisis obre la rentabilidad del negocio propuesto. (No se acredita tal circunstancia) III.- Objeto del proceso. Vistas las alegaciones de las partes el presente proceso estriba en la determinación de validez de una serie de conductas públicas que se han emitido dentro del procedimiento de licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-0200, que incluye el cartel de licitación y sus modificaciones, acto de adjudicación, contrato de concesión y sus adendas, refrendo contralor, entre otros. La amplitud de los debates que componen la argumentación de las partes hace innecesario en este aparte hacer referencia a los mismos, siendo que a lo largo del presente fallo se irá haciendo un análisis y desarrollo de estos tópicos, deliberación en la cual, se ponderarán los argumentos de las partes. De ese modo, es claro que el objeto del proceso viene demarcado por el conjunto de pretensiones formuladas en los escritos de demanda y ampliación presentados por Nombre141025 y Nombre141024, pedimentos que fueron reiterados en la audiencia única de este proceso, en los términos que fue señalado en los numerales 1, 2 y 4 de la parte de resultandos de la presente sentencia, Se ingresa entonces de seguido al examen de los cargos formulados que sustentan la acción que por este medio se conoce.

IV.- Sobre la legitimación de Nombre141025 en este proceso. La Contraloría General de la República, así como le representación del Estado formulan defensa de falta de legitimación activa respecto de CANABA. En lo medular, se esgrime, no reúne los intereses de todo el sector bananero, siendo que afilia a todos los productores e incluso, algunos de sus afiliados retiraron el apoyo. En concreto, el órgano contralor reprocha, pese a la regulación del CPCA, no ha quedado claro cuáles son los intereses que pretende tutelar la demanda. Entendiendo que invoca un interés de carácter gremial, surgen dudas si esa cámara está legitimada para defender el gremio en su conjunto. Además, indicó, no todas las compañías bananeras utilizan barcos porta-contenedores. No queda claro cuál es el perjuicio extensivo a todo el sector. Pareciera que son algunas empresas las que se verían afectadas, por lo que son aquellas las que debieron presentar el proceso. Llama la atención que pese a las tres rondas de objeción al cartel, Nombre141025 nunca presentó recurso de objeción. No participó en la fase de depuración del cartel. Sobre el particular, cabe señalar, la participación de Nombre141025 pretende establecerse conforme a la figura del interés gremial que tutela el numeral 10 inciso primero subinciso b del CPCA. Ciertamente puede cuestionarse si esa Cámara reúne a todos los productores y exportadores de banano del país, empero, la figura en cuestión no exige una adhesión de la totalidad de personas que se dedican a una determinada actividad para poder ejercitar ese carácter de defensa representativa de un gremio o sector específico. Cabe destacar que este tipo de legitimación busca establecerse como un marco que permite el ejercicio de acciones con proyección supra individual, es decir, busca la tutela de intereses colectivos propios de las personas que integran el gremio o corporación representada. Desde este plano, el esquema de organización que presenta CANABA, le empodera para formular acciones como la presente, en la medida en que, al menos en grado de probabilidad, la operación de la TCM objeto de cuestionamiento puede llegar a tener incidencia en el marco de actividades de sus agremiados, con independencia de si comprende a la totalidad de actores del sector bananero nacional. Nótese que no se peticiona efecto particular alguno para una determinada empresa, en cuyo caso, la legitimación debería ampararse no en el inciso b) aludido, sino en la legitimación directa del inciso a), que propende a tutelar derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos. Sin embargo, esta causa estriba en pretensiones de carácter general desde el punto de vista de los efectos en el sector representado. Lo mismo cabe señalar en cuanto al alegato de no utilizar barcos porta-contenedores, pues el que a la fecha determinado grupo de exportadores no los utilicen, no implica que el sistema de gestión portuaria que pretende incorporar el diseño de la TCM, no sea utilizado por esas entidades representadas. Sobre la negativa de la legitimación activa por la falta de cuestionamiento del cartel, será un tema a abordar infra. En consecuencia, no observa este Tribunal defecto en la legitimación de CANABA, dadas las pretensiones concretas formuladas, ante lo cual, la defensa debe ser rechazada.

V.- Sobre la legitimación de la ARESEP. La representación del ente regulador formula defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva. Aduce, no se deduce ninguna pretensión específica en contra de la Nombre628 en la que se cuestione de manera abierta el contenido de actos emitidos por la Aresep. Como se ha señalado, Nombre141025 reformuló sus pretensiones en escrito de ampliación de la demanda presentado en fecha 12 de abril del 2012, (folios 4291-4366 del principal). En este escrito, como tampoco en el escrito original que ha generado este proceso, se incorpora una sola pretensión en la que se busque la supresión de conductas imputables a la ARESEP. Tal pedimento se echa de menos además en la demanda de SINTRAJAP, la que se dedica a peticionar nulidad de la adjudicación y del contrato de concesión respectivo. En efecto, tal y como argumenta la ARESEP, en esta causa, no se ha establecido por los co-accionantes pretensión alguna concreta de invalidez de actos referibles a la ARESEP, que permitan tenerle como parte pasiva en esta contienda. Si bien es cierto dentro del marco de las alegaciones planteadas se hacen referencias a la factibilidad económica del proyecto de TCM y se exponen alusiones a la veracidad y validez de la información utilizada para establecer las tarifas que tal concesión propone cobrar a los usuarios de la terminal portuaria, lo cierto del caso es que no se indica concretamente y de manera específica, qué pretensión pretende oponerse frente a la citada Autoridad Reguladora, de manera que el objeto de esta causa exija tenerle como parte demandada. En esta línea, conviene precisar, el artículo 21 de la Ley No. 7762 señala la obligatoriedad de la consulta que la Secretaría Técnica del CNC debe realizar a la Nombre628 sobre la estructura tarifaria y los parámetros de ajuste que se incorporarán en el cartel de licitación; así como de los parámetros que se utilizarán para evaluar la calidad del servicio, dictamen a emitirse en el plazo de diez días y cuya naturaleza será vinculante. La participación de la Nombre628 en el trámite de la TCM conforme a la Ley No. 7762 permite cuestionarse su marco de legitimación pasivo conforme a los ordinales 12.1 y 12.6 del CPCA. En cuanto al inciso primero aludido, la normativa procesal señala que se tendrá como parte demandada a la Administración Pública autora de la conducta administrativa objeto del proceso. En este caso, como se ha señalado, no se cuestiona ninguna conducta de la Nombre628 de manera directa, siendo que los pedimentos anulatorios recaen sobre la adjudicación, el contrato, sus adendas, el refrendo y el cartel de licitación. El que se invoquen disconformidades en cuanto a los cálculos tarifarios no puede tenerse como impugnación directa de actos referibles a la ARESEP. Aún cuando en las peticiones subsidiarias se busque la supresión de las estructuras tarifarias del contrato, lo cierto es que ello no implica la legitimación pasiva de la Nombre628 en esta causa, a la luz de lo preceptuado por el inciso 6 del canon 12 del CPCA, como de seguido se explica. E n cuanto al inciso 6 mencionado, la participación de la Nombre628 en este trámite no le permite tenerle como accionada. La normativa en cuestión estipula lo siguiente: "Cuando una entidad dicte algún acto o disposición que, para su firmeza, requiera previo control, autorización, aprobación o conocimiento, por parte de un órgano del Estado o de otra entidad administrativa, se tendrá como parte demandada: a) El Estado o la entidad que dictó el acto o la disposición fiscalizados, si el resultado de la fiscalización ha sido aprobatorio. (...)" Ciertamente la Nombre628 no aprueba las tarifas de la TCM, es este un tema que ha de incluirse dentro del contrato según lo establece el canon 41 de la Ley No. 7762. Lleva razón el mandatario de este ente administrativo en cuanto a que su participación dentro del trámite de la TCM -acorde a la Ley No. 7762- se limita a atender la consulta sobre tarifas, estructura, modelos de ajuste y principios de calidad, así como los costos para inversión, según el canon 7 del Reglamento a la Ley No. 7762. En este trámite, la Nombre628 propone una tarifa máxima, pero es el contrato el instrumento que fija la remuneración definitiva, así como sus mecanismos de ajuste. Luego de esta consulta, solo ostenta competencias de conocer de los aspectos económicos de la concesión si hay divergencia entre la Administración concedente y el concesionario, en tanto se formula el recurso de apelación, o bien, si se presentan denuncias por prestación defectuosa del servicio -art. 41 Ley No. 7762-. Bajo este esquema, el dictamen de la Nombre628 dio base a tarifas incluso menores a las cuantificadas, de lo que se puede concluir, emitió su anuencia al modelo consultado. En ese caso, a tono con el inciso a del numeral 6 del artículo 12 del CPCA, y con independencia de la crítica que a tal tratamiento legal pueda realizarse, lo cierto del caso es que esa fuente legal establece que en esos supuestos, la Administración demandada será la que emite el acto sujeto a fiscalización, no así la que ejercita sus competencias de fiscalización -como lo es la ARESEP-, lo que supone en consecuencia, su falta de legitimación pasiva en este proceso. Por otro lado, debe añadirse, ese dictamen emitido consiste en un acto de trámite, preparatorio, obligatorio y vinculante, pero interno a fin de cuentas. Por ende, conforme el canon 163.2 LGAP, ese acto solo puede atacarse junto con el acto final que lo contiene. Sin embargo, como se ha puesto en evidencia, no se critica actuación alguna de la ARESEP, sino solo esos actos finales. Lo anterior sin perjuicio del análisis que del tema tarifario se realizará infra. Por ende, debe acogerse la defensa objeto de análisis. En consecuencia, debe declararse sin lugar la demanda incoada por Nombre141025 y por Nombre141024 contra la Nombre628 . Sobre las costas, será un extremo a analizar en el aparte correspondiente.

VI.- Sobre la legitimación pasiva de la CGR ante la demanda de Nombre141024. La Contraloría General de la República formula defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva ante la demanda incoada por Nombre141024. Señala, no hay ninguna conducta de la CGR impugnada, lo que lleva a la falta de legitimación, ya que no hay ningún fundamento del Sindicato para demandar a la CGR. Esto queda evidenciado desde el plano de las pretensiones. La demanda es anulatoria y no hay ninguna solicitud de anulación de conducta o acto del órgano contralor. Solo se pide la nulidad del acto de adjudicación. No hay base para que figure como demandada en este proceso. Analizado a fondo el alegato del órgano contralor así como la acción presentada por Nombre18044 , lleva razón la CGR por los motivos que de seguido se exponen. Cuando la CGR es parte pasiva del proceso, el tema merece un tratamiento particular. En efecto, en estos supuestos, el juzgador debe discriminar cuando la conducta impugnada, atribuible a la CGR, es propio de su ejercicio fiscalizador de carácter externo, es decir, cuando ejercita sus potestades constitucionales y legales de fiscalización y control de las materias que como instancia técnica especializada le han sido confiadas, de aquellos casos en que la conducta objeto de la causa es inherente a su régimen interno. Por este último ha de entenderse aquel conjunto de acciones en las que no funge como instancia fiscalizadora, es decir, no se cuestiona su competencia fiscalizadora, sino una función administrativa interna. En este caso, cuando la CGR ejerce sus potestades de fiscalización, de carácter externo, ha de distinguirse entre los supuestos previstos en el inciso 5 del artículo 12 del CPCA. En ese plano, cuando el proceso tenga por objeto el reproche de una conducta suya propia (del órgano contralor), relacionada con el ejercicio de su competencia constitucional y legal, la causa ha de formularse contra la CGR en litisconsorcio pasivo necesario conjuntamente con el Estado. En este caso, aquella será representada por sus propios mandatarios, en tanto que al Estado lo representará la Procuraduría General de la República. Este es el supuesto regulado por el inciso a) de ese precepto. Es precisamente, para claridad del tema, lo que ha sucedido en esta contienda, pues siendo lo debatido acciones propias de la CGR, se integró como parte pasiva al Estado. Ahora bien, cuando el proceso tenga por objeto una conducta administrativa sometida a su control, en el ejercicio de sus potestades de fiscalización o tutela superior de la Hacienda Pública, el inciso b) de ese mismo enunciado señala que la CGR es parte pasiva del proceso, conjuntamente con el ente fiscalizado, de nuevo, en litis consorcio pasivo necesario. Con todo, en este supuesto, la participación de la CGR es válida cuando en su ejercicio de fiscalización, haya emitido conductas, sea por haber resuelto el recurso de objeción, recurso de apelación o bien otorgado el refrendo. En la especie, no se cuestiona ningún acto imputable a la CGR por parte de SINTRAJAP. Nótese que según el escrito visible a folios 2330-2417, así como su corrección a planas 3639-3677 del principal, lo cuestionado es el acto de adjudicación. Nombre141024 no extendió el objeto de este proceso al refrendo contralor o en general a alguna actuación imputable a la CGR. Ello no se desprende ni del ámbito formal ni material de la demanda, por lo que este Tribunal no podría suponer una suerte de pretensión material que involucre a la CGR en el conjunto de pretensiones deducidas en esta causa. Desde este plano, no concurren entonces los presupuestos previstos en el ordinal 12.5 del CPCA de modo que pueda tenerse como parte demandada de la acción de Nombre141024 a esa instancia contralora especializada. En consecuencia, lo debido es declarar con lugar la falta de legitimación pasiva planteada por la CGR contra la demanda de SINTRAJAP. Respecto de esta acción, se declara sin lugar la demanda . Sobre las costas, será un extremo a analizar en el aparte correspondiente.

VII.- Sobre la sujeción a la legalidad en los procedimientos de contratación administrativa. En razón de las alegaciones planteadas por las partes involucradas en esta contienda y el objeto mismo del proceso, resulta determinante abordar, aún de manera breve la temática relacionada con la legalidad que ha de imperar en la dinámica de los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, sus controles, así como los mecanismos que regulan los supuestos en los que esos procedimientos resultan vulnerados, como es el caso de la denominada contratación irregular. La actividad de la contratación administrativa, como cualquier manifestación de las potestades públicas, se encuentra sujeta al bloque de legalidad en sentido amplio, debiendo sujetar su funcionamiento al contenido y alcance de las normas jurídicas que regulan determinado procedimiento. Esta sujeción se concreta en el denominado principio de legalidad (sea en su versión positiva, como en la clásica versión negativa), cuyo sustento normativo se afinca en los preceptos 11 de la Carta Magna, 11, 12, 13, 59 y 66 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. De ahí que la actividad contractual pública solo pueda entenderse válida cuando sea sustancialmente conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico (numeral 128 ibídem), tal y como en efecto lo establece el canon 32 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Por ende, los trámites o acciones dentro del curso de la fase de contratación administrativa así como de su ejecución, que se desliguen de los criterios jurídicos que impone el ordenamiento en tal materia, producen nulidades que pueden llevar a suprimir la contratación o los actos concretos que desatiendan tales exigencias, según se colige del ordinal 3 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, norma que remite a las ordenanzas de la Ley General de la Administración Pública en cuanto a la dinámica de la patología de la contratación pública. Esta actividad (contratación) se constituye en un instrumento relevante para la adquisición de parte de las administraciones públicas de los bienes y/o servicios que requiera para el ejercicio de sus actividades, o bien, para la satisfacción del interés público. Desde ese plano, debe entenderse la contratación pública bajo un prisma instrumental, que no un fin en sí mismo, lo que supone, se constituye en una herramienta para la concreción de un fin último o destino. De ahí que la percepción e interpretación de esta materia deba propender a potenciar el cumplimiento de la eficiencia y la eficacia que es propia del funcionamiento público. En esa línea, el numeral 4 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa señala con claridad que "Todos los actos relativos a la actividad de contratación administrativa deberán estar orientados al cumplimiento de los fines, las metas y los objetivos de la administración, con el propósito de garantizar la efectiva satisfacción del interés general, a partir de un uso eficiente de los recursos institucionales." Ello supone un criterio rector en cuestiones hermenéuticas de las diversas figuras que convergen en esta dinámica y compleja materia administrativa, de manera que permitan la satisfacción del fin último para el cual se emiten, a tono con lo preceptuado por el artículo 10 de la LGAP. Bajo esta dinámica, es claro que el fin del sistema de contratación no es otro que proporcionar a la Administración los mecanismos procedimentales que permitan obtener los insumos aludidos con un esquema que busca, como tesis de principio, la selección de la oferta más favorable, entendiendo por tal, aquella que se ajuste de mejor manera a las exigencias de la Administración en el caso concreto, las que deben ser reflejadas en las condiciones cartelarias que dan base al concurso público. Para ello, el canon 5 de la citada legislación implementa los principios de igualdad y libre participación, de modo que exista libertad de proposición u oferta de contratar con la Administración, sujeto claro está, a las condiciones que en el procedimiento específico, ésta establezca y que no supongan un desconocimiento de esa apertura participativa y equidad. En virtud de ello, en la valoración de las plicas, ha de prevalecer el fondo sobre la forma, aplicando una máxima de conservación de las ofertas. Es evidente que el cumplimiento de ese cometido requiere de mecanismos de contratación flexibles que no sujeten a la Administración a condiciones en extremo formalistas que lejos de satisfacer sus necesidades, las trunquen, pues en esa medida, el instrumento atentaría contra el fin. Un sistema de contratación pública debe ajustarse a ese marco de necesidades, sin perder de vista las fases de control previo o posterior que garanticen el correcto cumplimiento de los procedimientos y principios mínimos que son atinentes a este campo. Con todo, la adaptabilidad que es propia en los servicios públicos no ha de ser un fenómeno ajeno a la contratación administrativa, la que debe evolucionar y reaccionar frente a modalidades contractuales cada vez más dinámicas, en ocasiones atípicas, permitiendo a las Administraciones utilizar esos mecanismos para satisfacer de mejor manera sus necesidades, se insiste, con respeto de los controles que en materia de administración de recursos públicos es propia. La trascendencia de este instituto se observa en su basamento constitucional, en concreto, en el canon 182 de la Carta Magna, norma a partir de la cual, la misma Sala Constitucional ha realizado un amplio análisis, entre muchas, en la resolución No. 998-98, en la que elevó a rango constitucional todos los principios asociados a la contratación administrativa, posición que no corresponde analizar en este caso. Sin embargo, debe tenerse claridad, si bien la contratación pública es de base constitucional, lo que puede observase también en el numeral 140 inciso 19, 121 inciso 14 y el citado numeral 182, su desarrollo es fundamentalmente legal, siendo la Ley de Contratación Administrativa la fuente que expone de manera más prolija el régimen que es propio a esta área del derecho público. Todo este desarrollo, junto con las demás normas sectoriales de ese campo (lo que incluye el RLCA), constituye el referente normativo al que se encuentran sujetas las Administraciones que deben ajustar su marco de acción contractual a ese régimen, constituyendo así parte esencial y delimitadora de la legalidad de sus actuaciones. Ahora, dado el carácter bilateral del contrato administrativo (en el cual, a diferencia del acto administrativo, concurren dos voluntades para la configuración y perfeccionamiento de la relación contractual), la sinalagmasis propia de la figura exige la claridad de las normas que rigen la contratación, a fin de evitar acciones que desapliquen ese régimen y busquen, en contradicción del principio de igualdad y libre participación, acuerdos entre la Administración y un oferente, al margen de esos procedimientos, sin haber acreditado que se trata de la mejor oferta. La publicidad notoria de un sistema de contratación pública hace inaplicable cualquier intento de alegar desconocimiento de ese régimen, bajo la aplicación de la regla que subyace en el mandato 129 constitucional, en virtud del cual, nadie puede alegar desconocimiento de la ley. En materia de concesión de obra pública, la aplicación del régimen de nulidades de la Ley No. 6227/78 viene reconocida en el artículo 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 27098-MOPT, del 12 de junio de 1998, publicado en Alcance No. 27 a La Gaceta No. 115 de 16 de junio de 1998, "Reglamento a la Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos". Ahora bien ese cotejo de validez debe ejercitarse dentro de un especial régimen recursivo en sede administrativa o bien, en el análisis de la validez de la conducta pública en fase judicial ante esta jurisdicción a tono con el ordinal 49 de la Carta Magna. Esto último será de tratamiento ulteriormente. En lo que respecta a la revisión administrativa de las conductas dictadas en el curso del procedimiento administrativo, el numeral 81 de la Ley No. 7494 regula el tema del recurso de objeción, a formularse dentro del primer tercio del plazo para recibir ofertas, por cualquier interesado, potencial oferente o representación de intereses colectivos -e incluso difusos- que puedan verse potencialmente afectados. En el marco de la Ley No. 7762, tal posibilidad se concreta en el numeral 34, tema a tratar infra. Contra el acto de adjudicación, según lo establecen los ordinales 84 y 87, según el monto de la contratación, procede el recurso de apelación ante la CGR o bien el de revocatoria ante la misma Administración (lo que incluye la denominada apelación interna, cuando el órgano adjudicador no sea el jerarca de la respectiva Administración). En la Ley No.7762, por ser régimen especial, el numeral 35 solo establece el recurso de apelación ante la CGR. Se trata de un régimen recursivo especializado en virtud del cual, solo ese tipo de recurso en particular puede formularse contra esos actos, sin que sea posible la formulación de algún otro, lo que se ha dado en llamar "Principio de Taxatividad Impugnaticia". De ese modo, la sujeción a legalidad se constituye en un norte fundamental al que debe someterse toda Administración Pública en el curso de los procedimientos de contratación administrativa.

VIII.- Sobre la modalidad contractual de concesión de obra pública con servicios públicos. Generalidades. Régimen Jurídico. Análisis sobre los estudios previos. Mediante la Ley No. de 14 abril 1998 p ublicado en Alcance No. 17 a la Gaceta 98, de 22 mayo 1998, se emite la Ley de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicios Públicos, normativa que se constituye en un orden normativo específico que precisa las reglas que han de ser satisfechas en la dinámica de las contrataciones administrativas cuyo objeto sea la concesión de una obra pública o bien, en los casos en que esa concesión se concede además, bajo un sistema que incluya la prestación de servicios públicos. En este contexto, el inciso 2 del artículo primero de esa fuente legal establece que ha de entenderse por cada una de ambas modalidades contractuales. En ese sentido, se entiende por Concesión de obra pública, el contrato administrativo por el cual la Administración concedente encarga a un tercero, el cual puede ser persona pública, privada o mixta, el diseño, la planificación, el financiamiento, la construcción, la conservación, ampliación o reparación de cualquier bien inmueble público, a cambio de contraprestaciones cobradas a los usuarios de la obra o a los beneficiarios del servicio o de contrapartidas de cualquier tipo pagadas por la Administración concedente. Por su parte, la Concesión de Obra con Servicio Público debe entenderse como el contrato administrativo por el cual la Administración encarga a un tercero, el cual puede ser persona pública, privada o mixta, el diseño, la planificación, el financiamiento, la construcción, conservación, ampliación o reparación de cualquier bien inmueble público, así como su explotación, prestando los servicios previstos en el contrato a cambio de contraprestaciones cobradas a los usuarios de la obra o a los beneficiarios del servicio o de contrapartidas de cualquier tipo pagadas por la Administración concedente. Como se observa, el contrato en cuestión dista mucho de ser una manera de gestión contractualista que busque simplemente la construcción de obras públicas, sino que comprende aspectos más complejos, que pueden incluir el diseño, el financiamiento, la operación, mantenimiento, remodelación, entre otras manifestaciones. No se trata solamente de la adquisición de parte de la administración concedente de un requerimiento de servicios de construcción de obra, aspecto que en todo caso consiste en solo una de las variaciones que en el ámbito de esta modalidad de contractualismo administrativo puede darse. Con todo, al tenor del ordinal 113 de la Ley No. 6227/78, la utilización de esta modalidad de gestión pública ha de estar sustentada debidamente en la satisfacción de intereses públicos, lo que exige, la realización de una serie de análisis previos, de diversa índole, -tema que se tratará infra- para justificar la apertura de un procedimiento de contratación de esta naturaleza, así como la debida motivación a que está sujeta y condicionada toda decisión pública (doctrina del mandato 136 LGAP). En el caso concreto de las contrataciones emprendidas al amparo de la Ley No. 7762, el canon segundo señala con claridad sobre este punto "Toda obra y su explotación son susceptibles de concesión cuando existan razones de interés público, que deberán constar en el expediente mediante acto razonado." No obstante, ese mismo precepto fija el ámbito de aplicación de la figura de marras, al señalar su inaplicabilidad para la materia de telecomunicaciones, la electricidad y los servicios de salud (exclusión incorporada por reforma realizada mediante la Ley No. 8643 de 30 de junio del 2008). De igual modo, en lo que atañe a los muelles de Limón, Moín, Caldera y Puntarenas, solo podrán concesionarse obras nuevas o las ampliaciones que ahí se realicen, siendo inviable utilizar ese mecanismo sobre las obras ya existentes. En tales casos el 70% de los ingresos obtenidos por la administración concedente conforme a los parámetros del ordinal 42 de la Ley No. 7762, en razón de las obras nuevas o ampliaciones que se concesionen en los citados muelles, será girado a la Junta de la Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica y el Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico, según corresponda, para ser destinado exclusivamente a inversiones en obras de las respectivas provincias, sin que pueda utilizarse para cubrir gastos administrativos. Parte relevante de las implicaciones de esta tipología contractual en el marco de las obras en los citados muelles, es que una vez fenecido el plazo del pacto, las obras públicas levantadas por el concesionario pasan a ser titularidad de Nombre141024 o el INCOOP, según corresponda. Ahora bien, como se ha señalado, esta Ley No. 7762 incorpora una serie de regulaciones atinentes a este tipo contractual, cuyos principios y contenido prevalecen sobre otras normas escritas. Así, en materia de derechos y obligaciones de las partes (concedente-concesionario-usuarios, numerales 15-19 de dicha ley), procedimiento y etapas contractuales (arts. 20-39), régimen económico del contrato, aparte en el que se establecen los temas de incidencia financiera y retributiva de la contratación (arts. 40-48), régimen sancionatorio (arts. 49-55), plazo y formas de extinción de la relación contractual (numerales 56-69 ibídem). Atendiendo a esto, merece destacarse, las controversias que puedan generarse en el curso de la instrucción de un procedimiento acorde a esta tipología, divergencias en el perfeccionamiento del contrato, su suscripción o ejecución, deben ser resueltos aplicando en primera instancia las ordenanzas de dicha legislación, empero, es claro para este Tribunal, ello no es óbice para la aplicación supletoria de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y su reglamento, en los casos en que por integración así sea de mérito. En esa línea, el numeral 4 de la Ley No. 7762 señala con claridad, esos conflictos han de ser resueltos aplicando por su orden, dicha ley y su reglamento, el cartel de licitación, la oferta del adjudicatario, el contrato de concesión, así como las demás fuentes del ordenamiento jurídico nacional.

IX.- Como se ha señalado, parte fundamental de este tipo de contratos de concesión de obra pública con o sin servicio público, es la debida motivación que permita establecer su necesidad como medio de satisfacción de los intereses públicos, tema que se concreta mediante la satisfacción de exigencias mínimas que determinen la necesidad de la obra, pero además su pertinencia técnica y jurídica. De modo similar al numeral 7 de la Ley No. 7494 que exige la expresión de los motivos técnicos y jurídicos para la apertura de un expediente de contratación administrativa (que debe encabezar el respectivo expediente), en el caso de las relaciones regidas por la Ley No. 7762, esta mención viene impuesta por los ordinales 5.2, 9 y 21. De previo a ingresar sobre el contenido de estas normas, cabe señalar, esta legislación otorga o concede un papel protagónico al Consejo Nacional de Concesiones en el llevamiento de los procedimientos de contratación, órgano de desconcentración máxima con personalidad jurídica instrumental creado en el artículo 6 de esa fuente legal. Ello se pone en evidencia a lo largo de toda la ley. Ahora bien, sobre las exigencias previas para acreditar la necesidad y conveniencia de una determinada obra pública y con ello, de otorgar concesión sobre la misma, el artículo 5 de la Ley No. 7762 señala en su párrafo segundo: "2.- Cuando el objeto de la concesión se encuentre dentro del ámbito de competencia de un órgano del Poder Ejecutivo, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, demostrada previamente la factibilidad legal, técnica, ambiental, económica y financiera del proyecto, será la entidad técnica competente para actuar en la etapa de procedimiento de contratación y, cuando sea necesario durante la ejecución del contrato.(...)" De su lado, el canon 9 inciso primero, aparte, a, concede a la Secretaría Técnica del CNC la potestad de "a) Contratar, previa autorización del Consejo, los estudios técnicos requeridos para acreditar la factibilidad de los proyectos de concesión." Ambas normas son congruentes en la relevancia de los citados estudios técnicos, relevancia que además se visualiza incluso en los proyectos de iniciativa privada, supuesto en el que, a tono con el mandato 20 ibídem, esos proyectos deben estar revestidos de interés público y acompañados de los respectivos estudios de factibilidad técnica, ambiental y económica, así como de un plan de construcción y explotación. En el canon 21 ejusdem, se establece con claridad qué tipo de estudios requiere una contratación de esta índole, así como el trámite -en general- aplicable a estos casos. La relevancia de esa norma para efectos de este proceso exige su referencia literal: "Artículo 21.-Trámite 1.- Corresponderá a la Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones realizar las actividades y los estudios necesarios para preparar la licitación de la concesión. Dentro de los estudios deberá incluirse el de impacto ambiental; para ello se dará audiencia por cinco días hábiles al Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, a fin de que determine el tipo de estudio por realizar. Terminado el estudio, se dará nueva audiencia a este Ministerio, que dispondrá de un plazo improrrogable de quince días hábiles para pronunciarse y su criterio será vinculante. Transcurrido este plazo sin recibir ninguna respuesta, se interpretará que el Ministerio no tiene objeciones. 2.- La Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones deberá consultar, a la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, la estructura tarifaria y los parámetros de ajuste que se incorporarán en el cartel de licitación; asimismo, los parámetros que se utilizarán para evaluar la calidad del servicio. Esta Autoridad dispondrá de diez días hábiles para rendir su criterio, el cual será vinculante. Transcurrido este plazo sin recibir respuesta, se interpretará que la Autoridad no tiene objeciones. 3.- Realizados los estudios y demostrada la factibilidad del proyecto, la Secretaría Técnica procederá a elaborar el cartel de licitación, que será sometido a la aprobación del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones. 4.- Cuando la Administración concedente sea un ente del sector descentralizado, territorial e institucional, o una empresa pública y no haya convenido en que el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones realice el procedimiento de selección del concesionario y la ejecución del contrato de concesión, corresponderá al respectivo ente público realizar los estudios y actividades necesarios para preparar la licitación de la concesión, siguiendo los parámetros establecidos en esta ley y su reglamento, para la Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones. 5.- Una vez aprobado el cartel por el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones o el jerarca de la Administración concedente, deberá publicarse un resumen de él en La Gaceta, con lo cual se entenderá iniciado el proceso de licitación. El resumen deberá publicarse, además, en dos diarios de mayor circulación nacional." Precisamente, en esta causa se acusa la vulneración de ese numeral, en la medida en que, a decir de los accionantes, no se ha acreditado mediante los estudios técnicos de rigor, la factibilidad económico-financiera y ambiental. Ello exige ingresar a analizar las implicaciones y contenido de los estudios aludidos, en este punto, de manera general, para luego, en cada agravio formulado, abordarse de manera específica. El primer estudio que requiere la normativa aludida, es el de factibilidad técnica. En este punto, se trata de la acreditación de la necesidad y/o pertinencia de la obra o de ese diseño de gestión desde el plano eminentemente técnico, lo que puede considerar una serie de variables que no existen de manera aislada, pues la pertinencia técnica debe vincularse con el tema ambiental que adelante se tratará. En este primer aspecto, la Administración debe acreditar, a modo de ejemplo, que el diseño propuesto de la obra se ajusta a las necesidades que se pretenden cubrir con ese desarrollo. Es claro, se insiste que este punto no puede desvincularse de los demás, pues las incidencias económicas del proyecto, así como las ambientales son primarias en la adopción de decisiones finales. En lo tocante al estudio ambiental, cabe hacer la siguiente precisión. El párrafo inicial del artículo objeto de referencia señala la necesidad de satisfacer la variable del impacto ambiental. Sin embargo, se indica que el proyecto será puesto en conocimiento del MINAET por cinco días para que señale el tipo de estudio a realizar, el que una vez efectuado, será puesto a su conocimiento por el plazo de quince días para que emita criterio vinculante, teniéndose en tales casos el silencio administrativo como indicativo de no tener objeciones sobre el proyecto. Como se observa, no expresa esa norma un tipo de estudio en particular, ni alude a factibilidad o viabilidad ambiental, sino a la potestad del MINAET para establecer la clase de estudio a realizar, considerando las particularidades del proyecto. De ahí que no pueda afirmarse sobre la existencia de un solo tipo de estudio a elaborar en esa dinámica, pues resulta evidente que el análisis a realizar será el que determine la Administración Ambiental. Por otro lado, el numeral 21 de la Ley No. 7762 señala la obligatoriedad de la Secretaría Técnica del CNC de consultar a la Nombre628 sobre la estructura tarifaria y los parámetros de ajuste que se incorporarán en el cartel de licitación; así como de los parámetros que se utilizarán para evaluar la calidad del servicio, dictamen a emitirse en el plazo de diez días y cuya naturaleza será vinculante. De nuevo, el silencio de la Nombre628 se tendrá como indicativo de no objeción al proyecto. Desde este plano, no sería atribuible a la Administración concedente aspectos relacionados a los análisis económicos realizados por la ARESEP, en la medida de la vinculatoriedad de sus análisis. En consecuencia, solo cuando en el expediente se acredite la satisfacción de estas exigencias, es factible continuar con el trámite. Se trataría por ende de la cobertura de presupuestos infranqueables sin los cuales, la legitimidad y validez del procedimiento estaría en duda.

X.- Sobre la impugnación a las normas cartelarias. Preclusión procedimental. Posibilidad de modificaciones al cartel de licitación y fases posteriores. De previo a ingresar al análisis de la completez o satisfacción de los estudios técnicos de factibilidad ambiental y económica que presentan los demandantes, es menester precisar lo que de seguido se expone. Ciertamente, a la luz del ordinal 49 de la Carta Magna, esta jurisdicción se ha establecido constitucionalmente para ejercer un control de validez de la función administrativa (párrafo primero), así como la tutela de las situaciones jurídicas de las personas (párrafo tercero), en la medida en que se vean incididas por conductas u omisiones del poder público, sea por la creación, modificación o extinción de esas situaciones, que desde luego, incluyen, como mínimo, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos. Este marco de tutela descansa sobre la base de cuatro pilares constitucionales, a saber: sometimiento del Estado -en sentido amplio- al Derecho, control universal de la función administrativa, distribución de funciones y la justicia pronta y cumplida. Desde esta arista, las diversas manifestaciones del poder público, salvo las excepciones previstas expresamente por el legislador, son controlables dentro del proceso contencioso administrativo (ejemplo de esa exclusión son los denominados actos de gobierno o políticos, bajo el alegato que no son función administrativa, empero, aún en esos casos, la responsabilidad que de éstos se produzca debe ser conocida en esta sede). Con todo, no todo acto público es de posible reproche en esta jurisdicción, pues a tono con el ordinal 36 inciso c) del CPCA, la pretensión, en la medida que se relacione con un proceder formal de una Administración Pública (pues además puede recaer sobre omisiones o conductas materiales), debe vincularse con un acto final, firme o de trámite con efecto propio. Empero, ha de precisarse esa disposición, siendo que en los casos en que aún pervive la tradición del agotamiento obligatorio de la vía administrativa (art. 31.1 CPCA, fallo 3669-2006 Sala Constitucional), el pedimento debe recaer sobre un acto firme, no siendo posible el cuestionamiento del acto final. Esto quedaría reservado para la materia de impugnación de decisiones municipales, siempre que la apelación corresponda conocerla a la Sección III del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo (pues cuando tal circunstancia no se presente, tal requerimiento no sería imperativo), o bien, en menesteres de contratación administrativa, cuando el recurso de objeción o de apelación -según corresponda-, deba ser conocido por la Contraloría General de la República (por paridad de razón, cuando así no se encuentre previsto, el agotamiento sería solo facultativo). Pues bien, en el marco del régimen recursivo que opera en la materia regulada en la Ley No. 7762, el numeral 34 regula lo atinente a las impugnaciones o cuestionamientos que puedan realizarse al cartel de la licitación. De igual modo, el artículo 35 ibídem alude al régimen de impugnación contra el acto de adjudicación. Interesa en este aparte lo relativo a los cuestionamientos que se hacen sobre el cartel de licitación. En los diversos escritos de contestación de la demanda, el Estado, APM Terminal y el CNC formularon la defensa de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa. En igual sentido la CGR. Como se ha señalado ut supra, tal defensa fue acogida mediante la resolución No. 589-2011 del juzgador de trámite, y luego se tuvo por satisfecho el citado agotamiento mediante el auto de las 14 horas 37 minutos del 25 de mayo del 2011, visible a folios 1018-1020 del principal, criterio posteriormente confirmado mediante el auto de las 13 horas 35 minutos del 17 de junio del 2011, mismo en el que se conocía, entre otras cuestiones, el recurso de revocatoria que contra aquel primer auto presentó la CGR (folios 1036-1042 del principal). En la audiencia única celebrada en este trámite preferente, el Estado reitera la citada defensa, ante lo cual, este Tribunal indicó que ya el asunto estaba resuelto por la instancia de trámite, por lo que no cabía su invocación de nuevo en la fase preliminar de esa audiencia, sin perjuicio de conocer sus argumentaciones por el fondo. Un análisis de los alegatos presentados sobre este particular llevan a establecer que la decisión del juzgador de trámite en cuanto a la citada defensa se limitó a resolver en cuanto a la oponibilidad de ese requisito respecto de las pretensiones anulatorias vinculadas con el acto final de adjudicación dentro del proceso de Licitación Pública Internacional No. 2009-LI-000001-00200. Empero, ese análisis no incluye la ponderación de los alegatos del Estado respecto de los pedimentos planteados sobre el cartel de licitación. En cuanto a ese particular, es menester precisar lo siguiente. A tono con el ordinal 34 de la Ley No. 7762, en el tipo de contrataciones públicas que nos ocupa, contra el cartel de licitación procede la formulación del recurso de objeción dentro del primer tercio del plazo conferido para presentar oferta, recurso que deberá ser formulado ante la Contraloría General de la República. Ciertamente, en esta materia, dadas las implicaciones del citado voto 3669-2006, así como del inciso primero del ordinal 31 del CPCA, el ejercicio de ese recurso sería una exigencia obligatoria y presupuesto de acceso al proceso contencioso administrativo. Ahora, si bien lo resuelto por los juzgadores de trámite sobre las defensas previas no limita la decisión de fondo del asunto, lo anterior aplica para los casos en que la defensa previa fue rechazada, en virtud de lo cual, acorde con los preceptos 92.7 y 120 del CPCA, el tribunal sentenciador podrá declarar inadmisible la demanda o solicitar la corrección del defecto, según corresponda. Ergo, si se acoge la defensa, tal norma (92.7) no es aplicable, pues en casos como el que se analiza, esa estimación lleva, en el caso concreto de la vía administrativa como defensa, a la aplicación del mandato 92.1 CPCA y el conferimiento del plazo de cinco días para su corrección o acreditación de haber satisfecho la exigencia. En este caso, se acogió la defensa y luego se tuvo por cumplido el requisito (ver folios 1018-1020 del principal), criterio que fue luego reiterado ante el recurso de revocatoria formulado por la CGR. Se trata por ende de un tema ya resuelto, aún y cuando es claro que ese fallo no se pronunció expresamente sobre la falta de agotamiento respecto de las acciones planteadas contra el cartel. Sin embargo, aún de detectar este Tribunal la inercia en el cumplimiento de ese requisito, sin que esto suponga compartir el criterio del juzgador de trámite, el ordinal 120.4 CPCA señala que en tales casos, se tendrá por subsanado el defecto. Entonces, no podría en este fallo acogerse tal excepción cuando ya había sido resuelta a favor de los demandados, aún y cuando luego fue tenido por cumplido ese extremo. No obstante, lo anterior no es óbice para lo que de seguido se puntualiza. Las pretensiones de los accionantes se direccionan contra el acto de adjudicación, el contrato y el cartel de licitación en este procedimiento de licitación pública internacional. Concretamente en cuanto al cartel, no existe prueba alguna que Nombre141025 haya formulado el recurso de objeción contra este acto en particular, o bien, haya planteado acción judicial directa alguna contra esa conducta, de previo a interponer el cuestionamiento que ahora formula. Ante esa inercia, y con independencia de lo expuesto en cuanto al trámite dado por el juzgador preliminar sobre la defensa en cuestión, lo cierto del caso es que frente al cartel de licitación ha operado en detrimento de Nombre141025 una preclusión procesal, que le imposibilita argumentar como motivos de nulidad de la adjudicación, del contrato o actos conexos, lo dispuesto en el cartel de licitación. Este Tribunal es de la tesis que los defectos del cartel de licitación deben ser combatidos directamente en una acción formulada de manera directa contra éste, más no cabe su impugnación de manera refleja al invocarse como motivos de nulidad del acto adjudicatorio o bien, como lo ha realizado la accionante, peticionar su nulidad al momento de cuestionar la adjudicación. En esta línea, lleva razón la representación estatal en cuanto señala que al no haberse reprochado oportunamente el cartel de licitación, no es factible dentro de la etapa de adjudicación o posteriores a ésta (formalización, ejecución, modificación), cuestionar el contenido o validez de este instrumento. En el régimen de la contratación administrativa, el cartel de licitación constituye una importante herramienta que delimita, orienta y condiciona las acciones de las partes a lo largo del procedimiento. Por un lado, surge una vinculación estrecha entre el cartel del concurso y la oferta del postulante, de modo que ésta última es orientada por aquel primero, y resultará, primero admisible, luego evaluable y finalmente, potencialmente adjudicable, en la medida en que sea el mejor ofrecimiento dentro de aquellos que cumplan con las exigencias dispuestas por el cartel de la licitación. La relevancia de este instrumento (el cartel) se establece en el canon 51 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H del veintisiete de septiembre del dos mil seis, que establece en lo relevante: " El cartel, constituye el reglamento específico de la contratación que se promueve y se entienden incorporadas a su clausulado todas las normas jurídicas y principios constitucionales aplicables al respectivo procedimiento. Deberá constituir un cuerpo de especificaciones técnicas, claras, suficientes, concretas, objetivas y amplias en cuanto a la oportunidad de participar. (...)" Incluso, a propósito de la fase de admisibilidad de las plicas, el canon 83 del citado reglamento señala de manera clara: "Cumplida la anterior etapa, la Administración, procederá al estudio y valoración de las ofertas en relación con las condiciones y especificaciones de admisibilidad fijadas en el cartel y con las normas reguladoras de la materia. Serán declaradas fuera del concurso, las que incumplan aspectos esenciales de las bases de la licitación o sean sustancialmente disconformes con el ordenamiento jurídico. Los incumplimientos intrascendentes no implicarán la exclusión de la oferta, pero así deberá ser razonado expresamente en el respectivo informe. (...)" Lo anterior pone en evidencia la relevancia del cartel de cara a establecer si la oferta en concreto supera el conjunto de exigencias que impone la Administración mediante las disposiciones cartelarias. Desde este plano, el canon 81 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa (170-173 de su reglamento) establece que contra el cartel procede el recurso de objeción, cuando se considere que ese instrumento limita la participación o bien atenta contra alguno de los postulados del régimen contractualista público. En la dinámica de la Ley No. 7762, se insiste, esa previsión recursiva encuentra sustento en la letra del ordinal 34, empero, tal medida recursiva no fue formulada por la accionante. El cartel bien puede ser atacado de manera directa, al constituirse como un acto de trámite que dada su relevancia, genera un efecto propio en la contratación administrativa. Su contenido e implicaciones supone que una vez firme, las actuaciones sucesivas dentro del procedimiento de contratación, deben sujetarse a su contenido, tal y como lo establece el canon 4 de la Ley No. 7762. Ante ello, se confiere un régimen de impugnación con un marco de legitimación recursiva amplio, pues cualquier interesado puede formular las objeciones que considere convenientes cuando las normas cartelarias atenten contra legalidad o bien contra los principios propios de la contratación administrativa (de cuyo desarrollo ha dado cuenta, entre muchas, la sentencia No. 998-98 de la Sala Constitucional). Por ende, no resultan válidas las acciones (incluso las judiciales) que busquen reprochar el contenido del cartel, cuando no fue atacado de manera oportuna, aún las amplias posibilidades que para ello confiere el ordenamiento jurídico, una vez que ha recaído acto de adjudicación, como tampoco cuando se ha formalizado y refrendado ya el contrato. La aplicación lógica del numeral 162 de la Ley No. 6227/78 supone, la invalidez del cartel, -oportunamente combatido- implica por accesoriedad, la de los actos posteriores que dependan de aquel, más la nulidad de los actos dictados luego del cartel no llevan a la nulidad accesoria de aquel, pues incluso la patología de la adjudicación o del contrato pueden originarse por la infracción a las normas cartelarias, como podría ser el caso de desaplicación de una de sus fórmulas o desconocer el sistema de adjudicación de ofertas. Así las cosas, el régimen de cuestionamiento del cartel permite que la autoridad competente pueda valorar los reproches y suprimir las condiciones que sean contrarias a legalidad y puedan llegar a afectar a los potenciales oferentes, pero además a cualquier interesado, dentro de estos últimos, grupos organizados como CANABA. Se trata de un régimen recursivo que con claridad propende abrir las posibilidades para corregir las posibles deficiencias del cartel, dada la relevancia de este instrumento de cara a las etapas posteriores del procedimiento. Ergo, la pretensión de nulidad contra actos de adjudicación y el contrato no pueden constituirse en una forma válida para reabrir un debate ya precluido, en la medida en que pretenda cuestionar las normas cartelarias que no fueron oportunamente reprochadas. Tal y como lo manifiesta la mandataria estatal, si los accionantes estaban disconformes con el contenido del cartel, bien podían establecer las medidas recursivas de objeción en su momento oportuno y de no estar conformes aún con lo resuelto, acudir a las instancias jurisdiccionales a fin de realizar el análisis de validez de su contenido. Sin embargo, no resulta factible cuestionar el cartel junto con la impugnación del contrato, cuando en su oportunidad aquel no fue cuestionado, pese a las amplias posibilidades para hacerlo. Lo opuesto supondría permitir la retroacción del procedimiento en términos de posibilitar debates ya precluidos. Ha quedado acreditado que luego de las diversas fases de reclamación contra el cartel, Nombre141025 no formuló recursos. Si bien Nombre141024 los planteó, en definitiva, el tema no fue oportunamente debatido en sede judicial, por lo que la apertura de ese debate en este momento resulta improcedente. En consecuencia, debe declararse sin lugar cualquier pedimento de nulidad que verse sobre las normas cartelarias por aplicación del principio de preclusión ya señalado. No se trata de la aplicación de reglas formalistas o de un criterio que pueda considerarse antagónico con el principio de control plenario de las conductas públicas o acceso a la jurisdicción. Tales posibilidades no se han negado en lo absoluto, siendo que la imposibilidad de abordar esta temática estriba en la inercia propias de los promoventes, pese a las oportunidades válidas que en su momento tenían para esos efectos, consiste por ende en la remisión a un principio de preclusión, congruente con la técnica propia de una materia que cuenta con un régimen de impugnación específico, que en este caso, no fue utilizado de manera correcta. Sobre el tema, el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda Sección V, en resolución 80-2011 de las 14 horas 25 minutos del 25 de abril del 2011expresó en esa misma dirección: “Como se puede concluir, la base de aquel recurso y la de esta acción, son prácticamente iguales, pero en todo caso, lo que interesa recalcar, es que el instrumento definido por el legislador para impugnar el cartel, fue declarado extemporáneo, con lo cual, las especificaciones allí consignadas deben quedar incólumes, en razón de operar la denominada preclusión procesal, precisamente en pos de la seguridad jurídica. En relación, don Nombre28 expresa en su libro Tesis de Derecho Administrativo, tomo III, Biblioteca jurídica Dike, pg. 140: "Si el particular no impugna en tiempo y forma el "cartel", el mismo se convierte, contra él, en acto consentido, firme e inimpugnable, administrativa y jurisdiccionalmente." En el mismo sentido, en doctrina más reciente, el doctor Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, en su tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Contratación Administrativa, tomo IV, ediciones Guayacán, 2010, pg. 291, refiere al tema de la siguiente forma: "La falta de impugnación del cartel por los interesados, en tiempo y forma, tiene por consecuencia, por aplicación del principio de la preclusión procedimental, el consentimiento tácito y consolidación de las diversas cláusulas del pliego". Y es que esto es así, porque precisamente se requiere de seguridad jurídica y estabilidad, respecto de lo actuado, pues incide de manera directa en el interés público inmerso en la contratación. Por eso los artículos 43 inciso g), 81 y 82 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, determinan el momento en que pueden formularse los cuestionamientos respecto del cartel, si ello no ocurre, o como en este asunto, se realiza en forma extemporánea, el procedimiento debe continuar con las reglas ahí estipuladas y confirmadas ante la ausencia de cuestionamientos. Incluso, la propia CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA, al resolver los recursos de apelación que interpuso la aquí actora contra la adjudicación y posteriormente contra la readjudicación, recalcó tal imposibilidad de retomar reclamos contra el cartel, por, precisamente, encontrarse precluídos, circunstancia que, como se retomará infra, no solo obliga al rechazo de plano de un eventual recurso de apelación, sino que además no permite reabrir el conocimiento de los tópicos que son materia exclusiva del recurso de objeción. Y es que sobre el particular, debe tenerse presente que el cartel corresponde a un acto preparatorio con efecto propio y la legislación que regula la contratación administrativa de manera expresa estipula los medios recursivos posibles de actuar en su contra y, al no ejercerlos como corresponde, no sólo afectan el posible interés legítimo del inconforme, sino que además, al requerirse el agotamiento de la vía administrativa en forma preceptiva en esta materia, pierde paralelamente la legitimación necesaria para continuar a la vía jurisdiccional.” XI.- Sobre la viabilidad ambiental. (Diferencia viabilidad y factibilidad). Naturaleza de la V iabilidad A mbiental P otencial . Lógica de la viabilidad frente al TCM, contrato incluye diseño -prueba testimonial-. Análisis prueba técnica. Valoración principio precautorio y preventivo. Diseño debe integrar EIA. Imposibilidad de construir sin EIA. Sin perjuicio de lo señalado en los puntos previos, es menester abordar el análisis de los defectos señalados por las accionantes respecto de la ausencia de los estudios requeridos para la TCM, conforme a los ordinales 9 y 21 de la Ley No. 7762. Como primer punto, se abordará la temática de la incidencia ambiental. En lo medular, en la fase de conclusiones Nombre141024 señala, no se hace estudio de impacto ambiental, afectando la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Se afecta el fondo marino y un área de 630.000 metros cuadrados para la construcción de una isla artificial. Nada de eso ha sido seriamente estudiado. Acota, el artículo 3 del Decreto No. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MEIC se lesiona al no haber realizado la valoración ambiental. No constan esos estudios en los expediente. La Ley 7762 exige la realización de los Estudios de viabilidad ambiental antes de iniciar el proyecto, y luego puede trasladar el costo al concesionario, pero no puede ceder o trasladar la responsabilidad de realizar esos estudios. No hay norma que señale que el concesionario pueda hacer esos estudios por falencia de las Administraciones Públicas. Se otorgó una Nombre141029 a un proyecto difuso y sin conocerlo. No puede servir para realizar la licitación, lo debido era un EIA. Se utilizan estudios que no son específicos para la TCM. Se usaron los proyectos de RECOPE y dragado de Moín, trámites que no tienen que ver con la TCM. El objeto de la TCM es muy diverso. El único instrumento utilizado fue el formulario D1. En lo medular, Nombre141025 sostiene esa misma posición en cuanto a la ausencia de la acreditación de la factibilidad ambiental. Respecto de dichas alegaciones cabe señalar lo que de seguido se expone. Según se ha indicado ut supra, conforme al numeral 21 de la Ley No. 7762, inciso primero, dentro de los estudios que en materia de las concesiones reguladas por dicha legislación debe realizar la Secretaría Técnica del CNC, se incluye el de impacto ambiental. Para tales efectos, esa norma señala que la Administración concedente dará audiencia por cinco días hábiles al Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, a fin de que determine el tipo de estudio por realizar. Terminado el estudio, se dará nueva audiencia a este Ministerio, que dispondrá de un plazo improrrogable de quince días hábiles para pronunciarse y su criterio será vinculante. Transcurrido este plazo sin recibir ninguna respuesta, se interpretará que el Ministerio no tiene objeciones. Se encuentra fuera de toda duda la relevancia que el derecho al ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado ostenta en nuestro régimen jurídico. Se trata de un derecho tutelado en el ordinal 50 párrafos 2º y 3º de la Carta Magna que ha sido objeto de un prolijo desarrollo legal y reglamentario, dentro de una materia que ha sido objeto de tratamiento además por tratados internacionales de los cuales, Costa Rica es Estado signatario. Dentro de este amplio marco normativo, se establece como regla común la necesidad de contar con instrumentos de medición de la variable ambiental en las diversas conductas y actividades humanas que puedan considerarse intrusivas al ambiente. La Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental se constituye como un procedimiento que ostenta una compleja convergencia de variables jurídico-técnico-administrativas, cuya finalidad no es otra que la medición, identificación, predicción o proyección de los impactos que una determinada actividad humana producirá, con probabilidad, en el ambiente, caso de que sea llevado a cabo o se concretice su ejecución material. Dicho procedimiento se emite como base a un requerimiento previo de un procedimiento autorizatorio posterior y se formula por parte de las administraciones públicas competentes, con experticia en los menesteres ambientales. Así visto, en términos más simplistas, es el procedimiento en virtud del cual, se estiman los efectos y consecuencias que un proyecto de obra o actividad humana va a generar en el ambiente. Dada la trascendencia del bien jurídico tutelado, su sustento se afinca en la doctrina del numeral 50 párrafo 2º y 3º de la Constitución Política, por tanto, siendo un deber del Estado la tutela debida, eficiente y oportuna del ambiente, tanto los recursos naturales como paisajísticos, se trata de un importante mecanismo de ejercicio de política ambiental, que tiene una aplicación directa e inmediata en las actividades productivas, de manera que logre la armonía y compatibilidad de esas explotaciones económicas o sociales, con la preservación del medio, dentro de una visión de sostenibilidad o desarrollo sostenible. En el contexto patrio, el Reglamento General sobre Procedimientos de Evaluaciones de Impactos Ambientales, Decreto Ejecutivo número 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, en su artículo 3 inciso 43, define el impacto ambiental de la siguiente manera: “Efecto que una actividad, obra o proyecto, o alguna de sus acciones y componentes tiene sobre el ambiente o sus elementos constituyentes. Puede ser de tipo positivo o negativo, directo o indirecto, acumulativo o no, reversible o irreversible, extenso o limitado, entre otras características. Se diferencia del daño ambiental, en la medida y el momento en que el impacto ambiental es evaluado en un proceso ex – ante, de forma tal que puedan considerarse aspectos de prevención, mitigación y compensación para disminuir su alcance en el ambiente.” Desde luego que este impacto ambiental debe ser objeto de medición, lo que se materializa en distintos instrumentos que la misma regulación jurídica establece entre éstos los estudios de impacto ambiental y las licencias de viabilidad ambiental. En este sentido, el citado reglamento, en el numeral 3, en su inciso 37 conceptualiza la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) como el procedimiento administrativo científico-técnico que permite identificar y predecir cuáles efectos ejercerá sobre el ambiente, una actividad, obra o proyecto, cuantificándolos y ponderándolos para conducir a la toma de decisiones. De forma general, la Evaluación del Impacto Ambiental, abarca tres fases constitutivas esenciales: a) una primera es la Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, b) la segunda es la confección del Estudio de Impacto Ambiental o de otros instrumentos de evaluación ambiental que corresponda, y c) un tercero se refiere al Control y Seguimiento ambiental de la actividad, obra o proyecto a través de los compromisos ambientales establecidos. Por su parte, el inciso 18 del artículo 7 de la Ley de Biodiversidad considera los estudios de impacto ambiental de la siguiente manera: “Procedimiento científico-técnico que permite identificar y predecir cuáles efectos ejercerá sobre el ambiente una acción o proyecto específico, cuantificándolos y ponderándolos para conducir a la toma de decisiones. Incluye los efectos específicos, su evaluación global, las alternativas de mayor beneficio ambiental un programa de control y minimización de los efectos negativos, un programa de monitoreo, un programa de recuperación, así como la garantía de cumplimiento ambiental.” De lo anterior se desprende que la licencia o viabilidad ambiental, tal y como lo señala el inciso 63 del ordinal tercero del Reglamento de previa cita, representa la condición de armonía y equilibrio medio y aceptable, entre el desarrollo y ejecución, obra humana y sus impactos ambientales potenciales, y el ambiente del espacio geográfico donde se desea implementar. Desde el punto de vista administrativo y jurídico, corresponde al acto en que se aprueba el proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, ya sea en su fase de evaluación inicial, estudio propiamente o de otro documento del impacto. Ahora bien, las implicaciones de las obras humanas en el ambiente justifica y exige la evaluación de ese impacto en el medio. Desde este plano, este órgano colegiado debe traer a colación lo estatuido por el canon 17 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, que sobre la citada evaluación ambiental señala: “Las actividades humanas que alteren o destruyan elementos del ambiente o generen residuos, materiales tóxicos o peligrosos, requerirán una evaluación de impacto ambiental por parte de la Secretaría Técnica Nacional del Ambiente creada en esta ley. Su aprobación previa, de parte de este organismo, será requisito indispensable para iniciar las actividades, obras o proyectos. Las leyes y los reglamentos indicarán cuáles actividades, obras o proyectos requerirán la evaluación de impacto ambiental.” Ha de insistirse, es innegable para este Tribunal la trascendencia que ostenta este instrumento de medición de los impactos ambientales en las conductas humanas. Empero, el desarrollo de esos instrumentos de medición ambiental han llevado a diversos tipos de estudios según se trate del tipo de desarrollo humano que se pretenda. En el caso concreto de las actividades regidas por la Ley No. Placa20097, el mismo ordinal 21 de esa fuente señala que la audiencia al MINAET lo es para que, entre otras cosas "... determine el tipo de estudio a realizar...". Lo anterior supone que no en todas las obras a realizar mediante el sistema de concesión de obra pública con o sin servicios públicos, es imperativo un mismo tipo de estudio. Son las autoridades ambientales las instancias competentes para definir la tipología que resulta de mérito en cada caso concreto. Para ello ha de discriminarse en conceptos que podrían considerarse equivalentes. Como se ha señalado, el impacto ambiental (consiste en los efectos o incidencias que una actividad, obra o proyecto, o alguna de sus acciones y componentes tiene sobre el ambiente o sus elementos constituyentes -inciso 43 art. 3 del citado decreto-. Este impacto puede ser potencial (IAP), el que se considera como el efecto ambiental positivo o negativo latente que ocasionaría la ejecución de una actividad, obra o proyecto sobre el ambiente. Puede ser preestablecido, tomando como base de referencia el impacto ambiental causado por la generalidad de actividades, obras o proyectos similares, que ya se encuentran en operación.-inciso 44 art.3 ejusdem-. Por su parte, la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) es el procedimiento administrativo científico-técnico que permite identificar y predecir cuáles efectos ejercerá sobre el ambiente, una actividad, obra o proyecto, cuantificándolos y ponderándolos para conducir a la toma de decisiones -inciso 37 art. 3 ibídem-. Esta Evaluación puede a su vez ser Estratégica (EAE): -Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental aplicado a políticas, planes y programas. Por su característica y naturaleza, este tipo de proceso, se puede aplicar, además, a los proyectos de trascendencia nacional, binacional, regional centroamericano, o por acuerdos multilaterales, conforme a lo establecido en la normativa vigente.-, (inciso 34 ibid), o bien Evaluación Ambiental Inicial (EAI): -Procedimiento de análisis de las características ambientales de la actividad, obra o proyecto, con respecto a su localización para determinar la significancia del impacto ambiental. Involucra la presentación de un documento ambiental firmado por el desarrollador, con el carácter y los alcances de una declaración jurada. De su análisis, puede derivarse el otorgamiento de la viabilidad (licencia) ambiental o en el condicionamiento de la misma a la presentación de otros instrumentos de la EIA.- (inciso 35 ibid.). De su lado, la viabilidad ambiental (VLA) es el acto que aprueba la EIA (sea inicial, EsIA, o cualquier otro título), y que evidencia la armonización o equilibrio aceptable, desde el punto de vista de carga ambiental, entre el desarrollo y ejecución de una actividad, obra o proyecto y sus impactos ambientales potenciales, y el ambiente del espacio geográfico donde se desea implementar -inciso 63 del art. 3 ibídem). Esta viabilidad puede ser potencial (VAP), y consiste en: "Es el visto bueno ambiental, de tipo temporal, que otorga la Nombre141028 a aquellas actividades, obras o proyectos que realizan la Evaluación Ambiental Inicial y todavía requieren de la presentación de otros documentos de EIA para la obtención de la VLA definitiva."-inciso 64 artículo 3 ejusdem-. Tales análisis se pueden realizar mediante el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (EsIA) que consiste en un instrumento técnico de la evaluación de impacto ambiental, cuya finalidad es la de analizar la actividad, obra o proyecto propuesto, respecto a la condición ambiental del espacio geográfico en que se propone y, sobre esta base, predecir, identificar y valorar los impactos ambientales significativos que determinadas acciones puedan causar sobre ese ambiente y a definir el conjunto de medidas ambientales que permitan su prevención, corrección, mitigación, o en su defecto compensación, a fin de lograr la inserción más armoniosa y equilibrada posible entre la actividad, obra o proyecto propuesto y el ambiente en que se localizará. -inciso 34 del citado art. 3 ejusdem- Ante tal pluralidad de conceptos, es que el numeral 21 de la Ley No. 7762 señala, es el MINAET la instancia que define el tipo de estudio a realizar.

XII.- En esta concesión, según se desprende de folios 1189-1191 del legajo principal, mediante la resolución No. Nombre141028 de las 08 horas del 10 de febrero del 2009, la SETENA, dispuso lo siguiente en lo que viene relevante al caso: "PRIMERO: ... Asimismo, el artículo 28 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo (se refiere al Decreto No. 31849-MINAE-SALUD-MOPT-MAG-MEIC), a pesar de estarse refiriendo a actividades que obligatoriamente deben presentar EsIA, claramente indica que: "Aquellas actividades, obras o proyectos para los cuales existe una ley específica que ordena la elaboración y aprobación de un Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, podrán cumplir alternativamente cualquiera de los siguientes dos procedimientos: 1. Cumplimiento del trámite de Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, presentando a la Nombre141028 el Documento de Evaluación Ambiental (D1) con el fin de obtener la viabilidad ambiental potencial y los términos de referencia para la elaboración del EsIA." Finalmente, el artículo 29 hace referencia nuevamente a la Nombre141029 y a la posibilidad y probablemente obligación, que tiene esta Secretaría de otorgar la misma (...) Es claro que el otorgamiento de la Nombre141029 vendría a darse, y sería lógica consecuencia de corroborarse el cumplimiento de los requisitos iniciales que solicita esta Secretaría y que se constituyen en el llenado correcto del D-1. Una vez otorgada la VAP, se hace necesario indicar al desarrollador que no puede llevar a cabo obras hasta tanto no sea otorgada la Viabilidad Ambiental definitiva, la cual sería la consecuencia lógica si se cumpliera con los términos de referencia emitidos por esta Autoridad, así como la presentación de cualquier documentación o información adicional. " Sustentada en dichas razones, dispuso: "PRIMERO: Se otorga la Viabilidad Ambiental Potencial (VAP) al proyecto, a efectos de que pueda llevar a cabo cualquier gestión previa ante entidades bancarias u otras entidades estatales o privadas. Se advierte al desarrollador que el presente otorgamiento no le otorga derecho alguno para llevar a cabo obras de ningún tipo, hasta tanto no sea emitida la Viabilidad Ambiental Definitiva, una vez que cumpla con la información o documentación adicional requerida por esta Secretaría. (...) SEGUNDO: Se le previene al Desarrollador que, debido a las características del proyecto, para cada fase o etapa del mismo deberá realizar el proceso de Evaluación del Impacto Ambiental iniciado con la presentación del respectivo formulario D1. (...)" Las accionantes precisamente reprochan el otorgamiento de la VAP, considerando que dada la magnitud del proyecto, lo debido era el EsIA definitivo. Como primer aspecto, cabe señalar, ante los alegatos de los co-accionaddos, la relevancia nacional de un proyecto, sea por su intención de satisfacer intereses públicos o por su primacía dentro de los planes de gobierno, no constituye excepción para someterse y ajustarse a las normas ambientales. Si así fuese, basta declarar un proyecto como de interés nacional para evadir las evaluaciones ambientales, en plena contradicción del numeral 50 Constitucional, 17 de la Ley No. 7554, 13 de la Ley No. 6227/78, entre múltiples normas. De ahí que con independencia de ese alegato, es menester de todo proyecto u obra, cumplir con la normativa de resguardo ambiental para acreditar su armonía con esos referentes. En la fase de conclusiones, el representante de Nombre141024 aduce, apoyándose en la deposición del testigo-perito Nombre141037 , la Nombre141029 se hizo sobre la base de otros proyectos que no son la del TCM. Se otorgó una Nombre141029 a un proyecto difuso y sin conocerlo. Estima, no puede servir para realizar la licitación, lo debido era un EsIA. Se utilizan estudios que no son específicos para la TCM. Se usaron los proyectos de RECOPE y dragado de Moín, trámites que no tienen que ver con la TCM, cuando el objeto de la TCM es muy diverso. El único instrumento utilizado fue el formulario D1, y según consta de varias declaraciones, se hace una subvaloración de los impactos. Estima, no procedía hacer ese D1 sino un EIA de manera directa. Para la resolución de tales alegatos, debe indicarse lo siguiente. Dada esa VAP, debe señalarse, ninguna de las acciones que en este fallo se dirimen, atacaron de manera directa el acto concreto de la Nombre141028 mediante el cual se concede al proyecto TCM la citada viabilidad ambiental potencial. Dentro del elenco de pretensiones que fueron formuladas en la demanda y sostenidas en la audiencia única, no se invoca la petición de invalidez de los actos de la SETENA. Con todo, la parte reclamante no logra acreditar esas supuestas patologías que pusieran en tela de duda la validez de la resolución de Nombre141029 emitida por la autoridad ambiental. Nótese que en la parte considerativa Nombre141028 indica -considerando segundo- que la solicitud para otorgar este título cumple con las exigencias y requerimientos debidos. Ergo, corresponde al reclamante acreditar las causas de nulidad, lo que en definitiva no ha logrado realizar.

XIII.- Para ello cabe expresar, no considera este Tribunal que ante la ausencia de un EsIA o en general, cualquier título que ponga de manifiesto la existencia de un EIA o bien, en términos conclusivos, la acreditación de una licencia de viabilidad ambiental (VLA), suponga una infracción al régimen tutelar del derecho ambiental o bien, a las exigencias de análisis previos que establece el ordinal 21.1 de la Ley No. 7762. La debida solución de este conflicto en lo atinente a esta variable ecológica exige la comprensión del tipo de proyecto de obra a emprender. Desde este plano, merece destacar que el contrato cuestionado es una concesión de obra pública con servicios públicos, modalidad contractual pública que a la luz del ordinal primero de la Ley No. 7762 debe entenderse como: "contrato administrativo por el cual la Administración encarga a un tercero, el cual puede ser persona pública, privada o mixta, el diseño, la planificación, el financiamiento, la construcción, conservación, ampliación o reparación de cualquier bien inmueble público, así como su explotación, prestando los servicios previstos en el contrato a cambio de contraprestaciones cobradas a los usuarios de la obra o a los beneficiarios del servicio o de contrapartidas de cualquier tipo pagadas por la Administración concedente." Es decir, como se ha señalado arriba, lejos de ser una modalidad que busca contratar la construcción de obras públicas, atiende a un sistema de gestión más complejo, que permite pactar el diseño de la obra -entre otras actividades mencionadas en la norma-. Resulta un hecho notorio para este proceso, no cuestionado, que el objeto del contrato que culminó la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 buscaba precisamente, como parte de su objeto, la oferta de un diseño de desarrollo portuario. La sola denominación del concurso público pone en evidencia ese aspecto, siendo que la licitación se denomina "Licitación para la concesión de obra pública para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín". Lo anterior es determinante en el análisis de este aspecto. Para este Tribunal es claro que un a obra como la TCM, ha de c ontar con un EsIA así como una EIA definitiva, empero, esa exigencia, en casos como el presente , en que el contrato incluye el diseño de la infraestructura , debe ser satisfecho de previo al inicio de las obras y no necesariamente antes del inicio del procedimiento de licitación pública. Ello no supone lesión alguna al derecho tutelado por el ordinal 50 de la Carta Magna, por el contrario, pretende empatar y armonizar los desarrollos de obras públicas con la variable ambiental. Nada en la Nombre141029 otorgada por Nombre141028 permite suponer que la concesionaria cuenta con anuencia administrativa para el desarrollo de las obras o acciones direccionadas a edificar. Por el contrario, según se ha expuesto, ese título lo que posibilita es realizar trámites ante entidades bancarias u otras entidades estatales o privadas, pero con la advertencia expresa que ese título -VAP-, no le otorga derecho alguno para llevar a cabo obras de ningún tipo, hasta tanto no sea emitida la Viabilidad Ambiental Definitiva, una vez que cumpla con la información o documentación adicional requerida por Nombre141028. Así se desprende además del ordinal 3 inciso 64 del Decreto 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, al definir la VAP. Desde este plano, el diseño de la obra es un insumo determinante para poder ponderar el cumplimiento de la variable ambiental, pues es hasta ese momento que se conoce con claridad y certeza el tipo de obra que se pretende desarrollar, así como el sitio específico y acciones concretas para llevar a cabo esa infraestructura. Como bien señala el Estado, si se tratarse de un contrato de obra pública solamente, el EsIA sería imperativo, por la razón elemental que el diseño de la obra ya se encuentra concretado. Ello no obstante no ocurre en este caso, en el que parte sustancial y primaria del contrato es precisamente el diseño de la obra portuaria. En este punto, la contratación del diseño se propone en términos cartelarios sobre la base de parámetros y características que impone el Plan Maestro contratado a la empresa Royal Haskoning, brindando así un marco de diseño conceptual. Bajo ese entendido, la prosecución de los procedimientos, atendiendo al objeto del contrato, hacía factible, tal y como lo determinó la SETENA, conceder la VAP, para que así, una vez concretado el diseño concreto de las obras portuarias a realizar (a nivel de propuesta técnica) se inicie ahora sí, la EIA definitiva, mediante el título de verificación ambiental que determine SETENA, de modo que se garantice el debido resguardo al ambiente. En este sentido, es claro para este cuerpo colegiado, la exigencia del EIA definitivo, en términos lógicos y normativos, en este caso concreto, se encuentra condicionado a la existencia de una propuesta de diseño ya concretada según los lineamientos dado por el plan maestro. En tal orientación, el testigo-perito Nombre30219 , cédula de identidad número CED110938 señaló que la Nombre141029 es un instrumento diseñado para resolver situaciones coyunturales de ciertas actividades, en la medida que requieren avanzar en trámite administrativos y no pueden quedar sujetas al EIA que requiere un estudio profundo y detallado. De igual modo, dicho experto señaló que el elemento clave en el EsIA es que su objetivo no es generar un documento que se traslade a una institución para su aprobación, sino hacer una medición de impacto ambiental de una propuesta de diseño, la que debe enriquecerse con los datos del diseño, ergo, lo que se busca es un diseño ambiental del proyecto. Aclaró además, algunos proyectos requieren una evaluación inicial y por ende se obtiene una Nombre141029 que indica que el proyecto no puede iniciar construcciones, queda sujeto a un EsIA detallado. Hasta que obtenga la aprobación del EIA el proyecto puede iniciar actividad constructiva. Para este tipo de proyectos es que se creó la VAP, que permite adelantar fase administrativa y financiera, empero condicionadas a la obtención de la viabilidad definitiva una vez realizado el EIA. Tales expresiones son compartidas por este Tribunal, siendo que en lo medular, guardan congruencia con las regulaciones que sobre los títulos ambientales establece el citado Decreto No. 31849 y el análisis o comprensión que a partir de esas regulaciones realiza este Tribunal. Incluso, el testigo-perito ofrecido por SINTRAJAP, sea, señor Nombre141037 , en sus deposiciones concordó con la naturaleza y finalidad de la VAP, siendo que indicó que dicho título es solo un trámite previo para que se inicien los estudios ulteriores, que deben ser cumplidos para obtener viabilidad definitiva. La Nombre141029 no faculta el inicio del proyecto. Sobre esa parte de su declaración no existe antagonismo con lo ya expuesto. Ahora, ante la pregunta de la CGR en términos de si para iniciar un proyecto como el TCM se debe contar con viabilidad ambiental definitiva, cómo se podría incluir esa viabilidad en un proyecto que incluye diseño y construcción de la obra: el testigo señaló que existen instrumentos fijados por Nombre141028. De igual modo indicó, en lo medular, que en tales casos, se toman los impactos potenciales en el diseño. Lo anterior a juicio de esta Cámara pone en evidencia que la realización del EIA requiere de un diseño que no es para nada definitivo. Por el contrario, una vez levantado el diseño, tal y como lo advirtió Nombre141028, cada etapa antes de su inicio constructivo, ha de cumplir con la acreditación de la VLA (viabilidad ambiental), sin la cual, no se podría realizar ninguna obra. Una vez preparado ese proyecto, las observaciones que realice la Administración Ambiental pasan a integrarse al proyecto-diseño, en la medida en que este proyecto debe adaptarse y armonizar con las observaciones y apuntes que sobre el tema ambiental realicen las autoridades competentes, para culminar en un diseño final definitivo en el que se pondere la arista ambiental. Se trata de un trámite compuesto en el que se entremezclan de manera indisoluble aspectos de programación constructiva y el correspondiente análisis del impacto ecológico, comprendiendo las medidas de mitigación y alteraciones que han de realizarse al diseño para ser "amigable con el ambiente". Desde este plano, no existe lesión por el otorgamiento de la VAP, siendo que la medición definitiva del impacto ambiental se encuentra sujeta a la existencia del diseño definitivo, previo a lo cual, la concesionaria no podrá realizar ningún tipo de edificación u obra en general en la zona. Tal tratamiento ya estaba incorporado en el contrato, concretamente en la cláusula 5.3.3, así como en la 6.3.5 en la cual, se regula la temática de los riesgos de mitigación y riesgos ambientales. De este modo, se reitera, no pone en tela de juicio este Tribunal la preponderancia de la variable ambiental. Tampoco se cuestionan por este cuerpo colegiado las preocupaciones de incidencia en el ambiente que exponen los accionantes. Sin embargo, acorde a lo expuesto, se tratan de alegatos prematuros, en la medida en que tales riesgos deberán ser ponderados al momento de presentar el diseño de la obra y darse el trámite de verificación ante el MINAET. El compromiso primario que se asume con la adjudicación de la concesión cuestionada es precisamente el levantamiento de la propuesta de diseño de la obra, conforme a los parámetros referenciales dados por la administración concedente y a tono con las disposiciones contractuales. Ergo, es una vez que ese diseño sea sometido a conocimiento de las administraciones competentes, que deberá ponderarse el cumplimiento del conjunto de variables que exponen los accionantes, al punto que acorde a las disposiciones contractuales, la empresa concesionaria debe realizar el estudio ambiental que sea de mérito e incorporar los aspectos vinculantes que en su oportunidad le indiquen las autoridades ambientales. Será en esa fase que debe valorarse los diversos alegatos de afectación al ambiente que se exponen, dentro de ellos, incidencia en los mantos acuíferos, cercanía del Humedal Cariari, necesidad de penetrar el suelo marítimo para hacer más profundo el acceso al muelle para permitir llegada de barcos de mayor capacidad y tamaño, construcción de isla artificial, entre otros. Se insiste, son aspectos de gran relevancia para el ambiente, al punto que deberán ser considerados en el análisis, empero, ese examen no puede exigirse en esta etapa del procedimiento, en el cual, aún no se cuenta con el diseño de la obra, lo que constituye, de nuevo, una de las primeras fases en la ejecución del contrato. Como se ha dicho, esa ponderación debe incluir la medición de la totalidad de aspectos relacionados con el medio circundante a la zona, a considerar en el momento procesal oportuno, con la debida publicidad y total acceso a los medios recursivos. No se trata del desconocimiento del deber de protección al ambiente, sino de la distinción y demarcación de la fase en la que, técnica y lógicamente resulta conveniente y necesaria esa medición, pues la incidencia en esos elementos bióticos y abióticos solo es de posible determinación con la existencia de un diseño preliminar. Por otro lado, se reprocha los insumos con que se otorgó el VAP. Sobre el particular cabe exponer, los promoventes realizan precisiones sobre supuestas deficiencias en el formulario D1, empero, no se logra desacreditar la procedencia del otorgamiento de la VAP. En este sentido, merece rescatarse lo indicado por el testigo-perito Nombre30219 , ofrecido para el análisis de la variable ambiental, quien sobre la funcionalidad de este formulario señaló, en lo esencial, este formulario cumple el requisito de ingresar una información técnica básica para que Nombre141028 conozca las condiciones generales del proyecto, características fundamentales y determinar si es potencialmente viable. El hecho de que existan defectos en el D1 entregado no afecta el producto final de la viabilidad ambiental. En efecto, a la luz del numeral 28.1 del Decreto No. 31849-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC, en los casos de proyectos de obra regulados por ley especial en los que se requiera estudio de impacto ambiental, se requiere a modo de requisitos el "Cumplimiento del trámite de Evaluación Ambiental Inicial, presentando a la Nombre141028 el Documento de Evaluación Ambiental (D1) con el fin de obtener la viabilidad ambiental potencial y los términos de referencia para la elaboración del EsIA." Como lo indica esa normativa, el formulario en cuestión lo que permite iniciar el trámite de la VAP, lo que releva a Nombre141028 de la verificación de cumplimiento de las exigencias debidas para la obtención de esa habilitación para trámites administrativos. En definitiva, como se ha señalado, Nombre141028 consideró que esos requerimientos estaban cubiertos, producto de lo cual, concedió el citado título preliminar. En cuanto al procedimiento para lo anterior, debe hacerse remisión al anexo II del Decreto 31849, que fija las pautas para tales efectos. Si bien en el formulario -emitido bajo la forma de declaración jurada-, se consigna una evaluación para cada uno de rubros allí establecidos, es la Administración la que fija un puntaje final, que determina el tipo de estudio posterior a realizar. Cabe en este punto reiterar que el punto segundo de la parte dispositiva de la resolución No. Nombre141028 que condene Nombre141029 al proyecto TCM, previene al desarrollador que: "... debido a las características del proyecto, para cada fase o etapa del mismo deberá realizar el proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental iniciando con la presentación del respectivo Formulario D1." Ello pone en evidencia que es en cada etapa de desarrollo que deberá presentarse de manera concreta ese formulario para sopesar la variable ecológica del proyecto. En consecuencia, las deficiencias señaladas no generan invalidez alguna en dicha resolución.

XIV.- Sobre el deber de realización del EsiA y la carga de Nombre33221 riesgo ambiental. En otro orden de cosas, se cuestiona que el contrato haya impuesto al concesionario la realización del estudio de impacto ambiental. Desde el inicio del concurso, en la segunda parte del cartel, referente al formato de contrato de concesión, la cláusula 5.3.3 del cartel, referida a la licencia ambiental (ver folio 3238 vuelto del principal), se estipuló que con fundamento en la resolución que concedió la VAP, el concesionario estaba obligado a obtener de Nombre141028 la resolución que otorgue la viabilidad ambiental definitiva para la nueva terminal de contenedores. De igual modo, en la condición cartelaria 6.3.5 (visible a folio 3241 vuelto), señala "6.3.5 Riesgos ambientales. Todos los riesgos ambientales relacionados con la construcción, operación, obras de mitigación ambiental y mantenimiento de la TCM son del Concesionario, según lo regulado en la cláusula 6.3.1. Por tanto, debe incluir en su oferta los costos asociados para el cumplimiento de estos riesgos, los cambios regulatorios en esta materia que, luego de la fecha de la apertura de las ofertas, afecten el equilibrio económico y financiero del Contrato, serán compensados por la Administración concedente". Por su parte, en el contrato respectivo, en la cláusula 5.3.3 el concesionario asume la obligación de obtener la viabilidad ambiental definitiva para la TCM. De igual modo, en la cláusula 6.3.56 del contrato se señala: "Todos los riesgos ambientales relacionados con la construcción, operación, obras de mitigación ambiental y mantenimiento de la TCM son del Concesionario, según lo regulado en la cláusula 6.3.1. Por tanto, debe incluir en este contrato de concesión los costos asociados para el cumplimiento de estos riesgos. Los cambios regulatorios en esta materia que no estén contemplados y aprobados en el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, y sobrepase la reserva de imprevistos del 1% ofertado podrá el Concesionario solicitar que se restablezca el equilibrio económico como lo establece la cláusula 6.4.3 de este capítulo." (Folio 7664 del expediente administrativo CNC -tomo XIV-) Si bien el numeral 21 de la Ley No. 7762 señala que "Corresponderá a la Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones realizar las actividades y los estudios necesarios para preparar la licitación de la concesión...", lo cierto del caso es que nada imposibilita que la carga de realización de tales estudios de incidencia ambiental sean desarrollados por el concesionario. Ciertamente los numerales 59 y 66 de la Ley No. 6227/78 dicen de la irrenunciabilidad e intransferibilidad de las potestades públicas de imperio, empero, en este caso, no se trata de una renuncia del ejercicio de esas potestades. Se trata de una condición contractual en virtud de la que, se deja a cargo del contratista la formulación de las gestiones para obtener la VAL (viabilidad ambiental), dado que como se ha dicho, parte del contrato es la realización de un diseño para la TCM. Luego, por derivación lógica, no observa este Tribunal como esa condición cartelaria en primera instancia y luego contractual, puede llegar a vulnerar la legislación ambiental o producir nulidad por un supuesto vicio de incompetencia. En este tipo de contratos públicos, nada obsta para que se traslade al concesionario la realización de ese tipo de estudios. Debe reiterarse en este punto, el presente contrato no tiene por objeto la construcción de una obra pública ya diseñada, sino, el diseño, construcción, financiamiento, operación y mantenimiento de estructuras portuarias, tema que debe tenerse en cuenta al momento de ponderar este tipo de agravios. En definitiva, incluso dentro de la línea argumentativa de los accionantes, lo determinante es que este Tribunal resguarde y tutele el deber de todo proyecto, público o privado, de someterse al ordenamiento jurídico ambiental. La cláusula aludida no renuncia al cumplimiento de esta variable, siendo que en definitiva, el compromiso es para realizar el estudio respectivo y someterlo a conocimiento del MINAET y obtener la VLA. Para ello, incluso, se establece una cláusula de transmisión de riesgos ambientales en cabeza del concesionario, que establece que el riesgo ambiental relacionado por la construcción, operación, obras de mitigación y mantenimiento de las obras, sea asumidos por la adjudicataria, para lo cual, debe aportar un detalle de costos asociados al cumplimiento de dichos riesgos. Como se observa, nada niega que deba obtenerse la viabilidad ambiental, de suerte que no se estima que la disposición criticada genere lesión alguna al régimen de competencias públicas o exigencias ambientales. Tales normas de traslación de riesgo, en cuanto estipula una reserva de imprevistos del 1%, no generan, como advierte la accionante Nombre141025, una distorsión económica en el contrato. Se trata de una condición de previsión de contenido económico para hacer frente a eventuales medidas de mitigación o acciones que puedan llegar a ser necesarias para afrontar las consecuencias de reducción o evasión de las incidencias ambientales, bajo un ámbito de protección preventiva. Desde ese plano, no se acredita de parte de los accionantes como se produce esa supuesta alteración financiera del contrato a partir de la inclusión de un compromiso de reserva del 1% para riesgos ambientales, figura que en todo, se insiste, se estima armónica con un principio pro natura en la medida en que constituye una reserva que en el dado caso de tener que realizar acciones de mitigación al medio, puedan ser afrontadas con esos recursos financieros. Por otro lado, el alegato sobre el eventual desequilibrio financiero resulta genérico e impreciso pues no se concreta de que manera puede generarse ese efecto, siendo una mera especulación no sustentada en bases técnicas. Con todo, cabe señalar, a tono con los fallos 998-98 y 6432-96, ambos de la Sala Constitucional, el equilibrio financiero del contrato es un derecho del contratista, cuyo sustento se afinca además, en la letra del numeral 18 de la Ley No. Placa1264, así como en el numeral 17 de la Ley No. 7762, siendo un tema que debe ponderarse en cada caso concreto, con independencia de cuestiones como la expuesta. Será en cada situación concreta que corresponda analizar si existe una distorsión financiera que desequilibre el contrato, supuesto en el que habría que determinar las causas de esa distorsión, pues no en todos los casos se amerita un ajuste, dado que en determinados supuestos, impera la teoría del álea contractualista que debe asumir el concesionario, tema que por el momento no se abordará. Así, tal alegación carece de sustento técnico y jurídico. Finalmente en cuanto a este aspecto, la misma Sala Constitucional ha puesto en evidencia, no existe irregularidad alguna en el otorgamiento de una Nombre141029 y en la transmisión del deber de obtener la VLA con cargo al adjudicatario. En esta línea, en el fallo No. 2007-017409 de las 16 horas 50 minutos del 28 de noviembre del 2007, citando el voto 2002-011046 de las 09 horas 53 minutos del 22 de noviembre del 2002, ese alto Tribunal Constitucional indicó en lo relevante: "El supuesto analizado en la sentencia parcialmente transcrita, ha sido reiterado en las sentencias número 2003-15227 de las trece horas trece minutos del diecinueve de diciembre del dos mil tres y en la sentencia número 2004-01510 de las once horas cuarenta minutos del trece de febrero del dos mil cuatro y en ambas, la Sala ha mantenido el criterio de que no se aprecia ninguna lesión ni amenaza ilegítima al artículo 50 constitucional con el hecho de que no se realice el estudio de impacto ambiental antes de que se inicie el proceso de licitación pública y de que se establezca en el cartel de licitación la obligación a cargo del adjudicatario y no del oferente, de asumir el estudio de impacto ambiental, tal y como ocurre en el asunto en concreto, estimando la Sala que, en todo caso, siempre se efectuaría el análisis de viabilidad ambiental en concordancia con los criterios y exigencias realizadas para cada caso concreto por la Secretaría Técnica Nacional Ambiental que es el órgano estatal competente en la materia.” Debe culminarse este examen reiterando, lo siguiente; no se niega en modo alguno el deber e importancia de contar con el EIA definitivo en este tipo de obras de gran envergadura. Sin embargo, dado el tipo de contrato en el cual, parte del concurso público es precisamente el diseño de la obra, esa exigencia deviene en prematura, pues es con el diseño preliminar que se pueden realizar las ponderaciones ambientales, las que, con carácter obligatorio y vinculante, pasarán a modificar o ajustar el proyecto de diseño. De ahí que el otorgamiento de la Nombre141029 no sea contraria a derecho, sino el medio adecuado para la continuidad del proyecto, lo que no impide el análisis posterior que proponen los actores, fase dentro de la cual, de manera pública y abierta, deberán ponderarse la serie de riesgos y preocupaciones que motivan sus reproches. Debe recordarse que la Nombre141029 no permite la construcción de obra alguna ni actos concretos más allá de los trámites administrativos ante entes financieros o administraciones públicas partícipes del trámite para obtener las autorizaciones o aprobaciones de mérito para la continuidad del procedimiento. Ergo, no se trata de una lesión de las normas ambientales, sino, precisamente de su cumplimiento, en un marco previsor y tutelar del ambiente, que ni por asomo desconoce su relevancia, pues todas las acciones adoptadas se direccionan a que en definitiva, de previo a iniciar acciones, debe obtener la citada VLA. En consecuencia, debe disponerse el rechazo de este cargo.

XV.- Sobre el estudio de factibilidad técnica. La promovente Nombre141025 reprocha en un primer eje temático -sobre este aspecto-, la ausencia de un estudio de factibilidad económica del proyecto, así como total claridad de lo que se va a construir, lo que estima, es una limitante para el interés de participación de potenciales oferentes. Estima indispensable contar con un insumo que permita determinar la viabilidad y costos del proyecto, que debe ser razonable, actualizado, suficiente, completo y creíble. Lo que existe es un plan maestro de la empresa Royal Haskoning que sirve de guía, ya que no es específico. Las proyecciones de costos de ese plan no están actualizadas y son generales. Sostiene violación al principio de distribución de funciones en la medida que el Estado comisiona a un tercero privado la realización del diseño del proyecto, su construcción y operación. Debe tutelarse el principio de selección a la mejor oferta. En la concesión de obra pública la Administración no debe ser un simple adquirente de activos financiados, por lo que el estudio de factibilidad es necesario. Dice que no existe un acto razonado fundamentado en razones de ciencia y de técnica para la apertura de la licitación. Ante la ausencia del estudio de factibilidad económica no se puede saber si el proyecto es auto-financiable. No se puede garantizar las demandas proyectadas, por lo que existe un gran riesgo en que se de un desequilibrio financiero, lo que podría llevar a tarifas prohibitivas. Dice, un estudio de factibilidad debe tener expresión de los impactos sociales en la zona geográfica de influencia, lo que no cumple el estudio de Nombre141027 . Análisis de lo alegado en este punto. Sobre el particular cabe indicar lo que de seguido se expone. Para los efectos de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-0200, el CNC y JAPDEVA, en fecha 15 de enero del 2009, suscribieron un convenio de gestión inter-institucional tendiente a la coordinación del trámite de procedimientos de concesión para obras y servicios de interés común (folio 735 del expediente de la licitación), por la razón básica de la competencia de Nombre141024 para la prestación de servicios portuarios en la vertiente Atlántica, competencia asignada por la Ley No. 5337. Como derivación de este convenio, se posibilita la realización de estudios técnicos, legales, ambientales y financieros relacionados, en general, con la formulación de proyectos, así como toda documentación requerida para sustentar un proceso licitatorio (ver folios 731-735 del expediente de licitación). Desde este plano, este convenio constituye la base legitimante para entender, para los efectos del ordinal 129 de la Ley No. Placa1975, la coordinación para contratar los estudios técnicos en definitiva realizados por la empresa Royal Haskoning, fueron realizados por la administración concedente, en la medida en que como se verá luego, esa contratación fue establecida por Nombre141024. Ahora bien, en la secuencia de agravios formulados por la accionante, cabe reiterar, sus alegaciones se formulan contra las normas cartelarias, sin que haya logrado acreditar que en su momento oportuno, conforme al artículo 34 de la Ley No. 7662 en relación al 82 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, operando en estos alegatos el ya mencionado principio de preclusión arriba expuesto. Con todo, cabe indicar, tampoco por el fondo lleva razón la promovente. En efecto, a diferencia de lo expuesto por los accionantes, es criterio de este Tribunal, el Plan Maestro emitido por la empresa Royal Haskoning dista de ser un mero perfil de proyecto y contiene en lo medular, la totalidad de insumos que permiten tenerle como un estudio de factibilidad que constituye la base del proyecto de la TCM. El análisis y lectura que hace este Tribunal respecto del citado Plan Maestro, considerando los diversos componentes que en teoría general, debe reunir un estudio de factibilidad económica, llevan a concluir, tal y como lo afirman los co-accionados, este documento, si bien no tiene la denominación formal de "Estudio de factibilidad económica" constituye un insumo que incorpora un análisis y detalle de un conjunto de datos e información que coloca en posibilidad objetiva y efectiva a potenciales interesados, de realizar análisis de predictibilidad de suficiencia del negocio propuesto y de rentabilidad. A juicio de esta Cámara, ese informe contiene el detalle necesario para que los interesados en participar en la licitación pública de marras, pudieran realizar un examen de la pertinencia o no de participar, así como del contenido técnico-financiero de sus eventuales plicas concursales. Por un lado, en cuanto a la actualidad y pertinencia de los datos utilizados en ese informe (plan maestro), si bien el diagnóstico data del 2008, se tiene por acreditado que ante diversas observaciones realizadas por los in t eresados en el citado concurso, y atendiendo a la fecha de los datos ponderados por la empresa Royal Haskoning en ese informe, en el año 2010 se peticionó a esa empresa la actualización de los datos de demanda proyectada, información que en lo medular fue utilizada por el CNC para ajustar y actualizar el modelo tarifario remitido a la ARESEP. De lo anterior da cuenta el oficio 0395 (DTS-OF-380-10) y 445 (DTS-OF-0432-10) de fechas 12 y 23 de marzo del 2010 -ambos-, dirigidos a dicha Autoridad Reguladora. Así consta a folios 1446-2466 del legajo administrativo del CNC. Esta actualización dio pie a los cambios aprobados por el CNC en el acuerdo 7 de la sesión ordinaria No. 06-2010 del 11 de marzo del 2010, luego puesto en conocimiento de los oferentes y publicitado según se desprende del folio 2444 del administrativo del CNC. Volviendo al tema de la utilidad del Plan Maestro para fungir como estudio de factibilidad financiera, cabe destacar, este tipo de estudios distan ser una forma de garantizar un flujo de ingresos. Cabe recordar que en todo contrato administrativo de esta naturaleza, se integra la variable del riesgo contractual, que en este sentido se distribuye entre las partes. El concedente no puede asegurar en todos los casos la rentabilidad del negocio, más aún cuando se trata de actividades cuya tasa de retorno se asocia y vincula al marco de eficiencia prestacional del servicio delegado. Lo opuesto, sea, el establecimiento de un nivel de ganancias aseguradas al margen de la forma en que se ejecute el contrato, podría desincentivar la eficiencia, ello sin desmedro del análisis del equilibrio financiero del contrato, que se insiste, es un tema a valorar en cada caso concreto. Incluso, dentro del cartel de licitación, cláusula 3.2 se advierte: "Los potenciales oferentes serán los únicos responsables de hacer sus propios análisis y evaluación de las reglas del concurso y del potencial de ingresos, ganancias, gastos de la Concesión, así como de la inspección del área en la cual se desarrollarán las obras objeto de la concesión, operación y demás elementos necesarios para tomar la decisión de presentar oferta formal al concurso y suscribir el Contrato en caso de resultar Adjudicatario." -folio 3209 del principal-. No se trata de una cláusula de incerteza en mengua del principio de transparencia, eficiencia y apertura -pluralidad- participativa, sino en la consigna de realizar mediciones de factibilidad y suficiencia económica para sopesar el riesgo inherente al negocio a suscribir y a partir de los insumos otorgados, decidir si opta por ingresar al procedimiento presentado la oferta respectiva. Incluso, dentro de la cláusula 6.2 párrafo segundo del contrato de concesión (folio 7666 del legajo administrativo del CNC), se señala con claridad que los estudios previos de la concesión realizado por la Administración tienen un carácter informativo y orientativo, por lo que no podrán ser asumidos como marco de referencia de la posible actividad futura del concesionario, por lo que la concedente no asume responsabilidades por la información contenida en esos estudios. Dentro del análisis de las probanzas traídas al proceso conforme al principio de la sana crítica racional -arts. 82 y 85 CPCA, 330 del Código Procesal Civil-, es criterio de este Tribunal, a partir de la prueba documental y el examen de la testimonial pericial, es factible concluir sobre la suficiencia de los datos expuestos en el procedimiento de contratación para que los potenciales oferentes tuvieran información de factibilidad financiera que les permitiera adoptar su decisión de presentar plicas o no. Sobre la estructura de un estudio de factibilidad financiera, el señor Nombre141038 , cédula de identidad número CED110939, testigo-perito aportado por CANABA, en lo medular señaló que este tipo de estudios debían contar con los siguientes componentes: debe ser definitivo, fundamentado en datos reales, creíble y objetivo; procuran crear sus propios datos, información oportuna, real y actualizada, debe ser validado paulatinamente con consultas, encuestas, estudios de mercado y datos reales, contener detalle y análisis de ingresos y gastos., ponderar VAN (valor actual neto)-TIR (tasa interna de retorno), tasas de interés, finalmente, debe tener viabilidad: técnica, económica, legal, política, de gestión y ambiental. Al margen de sus conclusiones en el sentido que el Plan Maestro no es un estudio de factibilidad financiera, esa estructura, en lo esencial, concuerda con la señalada por el testigo-perito ofrecido por APM Terminals, sea, señor Nombre5836, economista, hondureño, carne de misión internacional 6412 pasaporte c-719562. En la fase de acreditación se señaló que el señor Nombre141039 es economista, máster en economía y administración de proyectos, trabaja para el Instituto Centroamericano de Administración Pública (ICAP), dirige el programa de gerencia de desarrollo. Es certificado en el área de Project managment –técnico y profesional en dirección- bajo el enfoque europeo IPMA. ICAP ayuda a los gobiernos en la formación de recursos humanos. Dentro de sus conocimientos se incluye la temática de Project Finance. Sobre el tema en concreto, luego de la ponderación minuciosa de la prueba testimonial pericial, entiende este cuerpo colegiado, los componentes de este tipo de estudios, según el criterio extenso y académico del señor Nombre141038 , empatan en lo medular con lo indicado por el señor Nombre141039, quien en este sentido señaló que en su criterio, la i nformación aportada en el plan maestro es idónea para quien quisiera participar en la licitación. Lo anterior lo sustentó en una precisión referida a qué se debe entender que es un estudio de factibilidad, advirtiendo que la falta de comprensión de ese estudio puede llevar a opiniones erradas. En esa línea procedió a explicar que es un estudio de factibilidad, indicando sus componentes de la siguiente manera: Capítulo 1. Debe contener documentos o información mínima que debe estar en el capítulo identificación del proyecto. Acá debe haber información sobre antecedentes, propuesta del proyecto, criterios y componentes. Capítulo. 2. Estudio de mercado. Debe contener demanda, competencia, tarifas, precios y aspectos relacionados con estrategias para intervenir el mercado. Capítulo 3. Estudio técnico. A esos contenidos se les llama la formulación de una propuesta de proyecto. Pero además debe tener otros capítulos. Capítulo 4. Evaluación financiera del proyecto. Capítulo 5. Estudio económico y social. Capítulo 6. Evaluación del impacto ambiental. En este caso en particular, debe tener un capítulo de aspectos legales (Cap. 7) Como se observa, ambas referencias de expertos son congruentes en el contenido mínimo de un estudio de factibilidad financiera, siendo incluso el detalle del señor Nombre141039 más extenso que el dado por el señor Nombre141040 . Ahora, sobre la consulta concreta de si el Plan Maestro contiene información de un estudio de factibilidad, el señor Nombre141038 señaló que en su criterio ese informe no era un estudio como el peticionado. Consideró que el Plan maestro es un diagnóstico que establece en líneas generales la acción a seguir y señala posibles caminos. Brinda datos generales de fuentes secundarias y brinda ideas para que sean desarrolladas posteriormente. En lo medular concluyó que el Plan Maestro no es estudio de factibilidad, datos de demanda y de tráfico se han mejorado pero no estaban al inicio del proceso, obra es de una escala mayor a la necesaria. Era necesario revisar aportes de la concesionaria en cuanto a la necesidad de la obra, los riesgos se trasladan al concesionario, como es el tema ambiental, la incertidumbre se traslada a las tarifas. Adujo, el mayor costo en las tarifas se traslada a los consumidores del producto de carga.

XVI.- Por su parte, el profesional experto Nombre141039 indicó sobre este mismo cuestionamiento, una vez realizado su análisis sobre la documentación analizada, sea, el Plan Maestro, dentro de los documentos analizados encontró información sobre un estudio de factibilidad: el documento analizado se refiere a un plan maestro, pero se muestra que la mayor parte de la información de un estudio de factibilidad está contenida, no en la forma señalada, pero si a lo largo del documento. En este punto, el señor Nombre141039 destacó la ubicación de cada uno de los componentes de un estudio de factibilidad dentro del citado Plan Maestro, según el siguiente detalle: Cap. 1: Pag 27-34: aspectos conceptuales, 35-41: alternativas del proyecto, 44-49: criterios y fundamentos de la mejor alternativa, 50-53: componentes del proyecto, en el caso del plan, el desarrollo de las fases del proyectos. Cap. 2: Análisis de la demanda 2-22, y anexo No. 2 con proyecciones de demanda. En página 106 análisis de tarifas. Estrategias de mercado, pag. 123. Cap. 3: 107-117 desarrollo de los componentes del proyecto, 54-58 aspectos técnicos de la propuesta, anexo 7 planos necesarios para construir obras físicas. Cap. 4: documento contempla costos de operación, de inversión –por cada uno de los rubros-, ingresos, indicadores de rentabilidad del proyecto. Indicadores financieros: rentabilidad del 14%. Cap. 5: contempla evaluación económica y social. Se usa un método comparado con situación con proyecto y sin proyecto. Considera que el proyecto es rentable desde el plano socio-económico del país. Cap. 6: no se integran al plan, son documentos anexos. Lo mismo sucede con los aspectos legales del proyecto. Al ser cuestionado sobre su criterio experto señaló que desde la arista de los potenciales oferentes, el plan maestro serviría para sustentar la decisión de participar o no: su contenido es muy significativo para adoptar una decisión. Adujo que ese detalle tiene toda la estructura de costos para una empresa que quiera participar, está clara la inversión por fases, rentabilidad es clara, además de que contiene un estudio de mercado. A la luz de esos elementos de convicción se estima, el detalle de información dado en el plan maestro efectivamente contiene la información básica de un estudio de factibilidad financiera de manera que se tutela el derecho de información que permite a cualquier interesado analizar si el negocio propuesto dentro de la licitación de la TCM le resulta atractivo -rentable- y tomar así la decisión de participar dentro del concurso. La revisión del Plan Maestro en su contenido, versus las deposiciones del señor Nombre141039 permite determinar que en efecto, los componentes que ese testigo-perito menciona, se encuentran considerados en las planas del Plan Maestro que fueron indicadas. Para ello basta hacer un cotejo de referencias y contenido del citado Plan. Un estudio de los datos allí suministrados permite a este Tribunal concluir que los componentes que en cada sección se analizan cubren las variables arriba expuestas para la estructura básica de un estudio de factibilidad financiera. Nótese que el reproche del profesional Nombre141038 no es en cuanto a contenido, sino en cuanto calidad de la información suministrada. Las conclusiones de ese experto se concentran en preferencias en cuanto a las formas y toma de decisiones sobre el proyecto. Véase a modo de simple referencia, que una de sus conclusiones fue que la obra es de una escala mayor a la necesaria y que era necesario revisar aportes de la concesionaria en cuanto a la necesidad de la obra. Se trata de un tema propio del sistema de gestión adoptado y de características de la obra en sí, más no en cuanto a si la información contenida en el plan maestro permitía o no tener información para decidir por parte de potenciales oferentes, si el proyecto era financieramente viable o no. Cabe destacar, la credibilidad que este Tribunal concede al criterio del señor Nombre141039 no guarda relación con el intento de desacreditación presentado por la entidad APM Terminals respecto del experto Nombre141038 , sino, en la consideración de ese elemento testimonial junto con los elementos documentales analizados, en concreto, el Plan Maestro en sí y su contenido. De nuevo, el análisis del Plan Maestro permite obtener una serie de información relacionada con la viabilidad financiera del proyecto en sí. Ese documento contiene análisis sobre antecedentes; pronósticos de carga; estrategias de desarrollo portuario y de plan maestro; planteamiento de diversas alternativas, con análisis de todos los aspectos involucrados en la materia (náuticos, económicos, sociales, medio ambientales); las diversas fases propuestas para el desarrollo de Puerto Moín; análisis de los requerimientos para el manejo de contenedores, de la manipulación de carta en el muelle, de las operaciones de muelle y desarrollo de fases; de todos los equipos y obras requeridas para la prestación de todos los servicios; el estudio del proceso de concesión y los modelos de gestión portuaria; los diseños; el análisis financiero y económico, todo lo cual se acompaña de un total de seis anexos (alternativas de layout, proyecciones de tráfico, análisis operacional, estimación de costos, proyecciones de ingresos, análisis financiero y planos). Ello se puede apreciar a folios 275-542, 2531-2795 del expediente judicial -ambas referencias contienen el mismo plan maestro-. Por otro lado, en esta dinámica, cabe apuntar, se trata de una licitación internacional cuyo objeto es propio de proyectos complejos, lo que permite sostener, la participación por tesis de principio sería viable para empresas con determinado conocimiento del mercado portuario y por ende, con la capacidad técnica debida para realizar análisis de suficiencia económica del proyecto. Esto engarza con lo señalado en la condición 3.2 del cartel de licitación ya referida ut supra. Con todo, los datos suministrados por el Plan Maestro fueron no solo actualizados según fue expuesto, sino además complementado con información que llevó a la revisión y actualización de las estimaciones originales que fueron sometidas a conocimiento de la Nombre628 para el trámite de consulta tarifaria y de calidad de servicio. De ese modo, se insiste, es criterio de este Tribunal, las alegaciones de los accionantes en este sentido pretenden contradecir un estudio que contiene la información adecuada para constituirse en el referente de factibilidad financiera que estatuyen los ordinales 9 y 21 de la Ley No. 7762.

XVII.- Por otro lado, no resulta de recibo el alegato de lesión al principio de distribución de funciones en cuanto a la supuesta delegación o comisión a un tercero de la realización del diseño del proyecto, su construcción y operación. Ya se ha explicitado, el contrato de concesión de obra pública regulado en el ordinal 1 de la Ley No. 7662, permite la contratación del diseño, la planificación, el financiamiento, la construcción, conservación, ampliación o reparación de cualquier bien inmueble público, y en el caso de la modalidad que incorpora la cesión de servicios públicos, la explotación de esas obras. A diferencia de lo que parece alegar el promovente, no se trata de una renuncia de ejercicio de competencias públicas -constitucional o legalmente asignadas-, sino en la suscripción jurídicamente válida y viable, de un contrato administrativo que tiene por objeto establecer un modelo de adquisición de bienes y/o servicios para la satisfacción de los intereses públicos. Se encuentra fuera de toda discusión la relevancia de este mecanismo como instrumento de aprovisionamiento de bienes y servicios para las Administraciones Públicas. Empero, este modelo no supone, ni por asomo, la renuncia al ejercicio de potestades públicas. Comprender lo contrario llevaría a la improcedencia de las figuras de emisión de habilitaciones administrativas para prestación delegada de servicios públicos, o bien, para usos privativos o personales de bienes demaniales, lo que desde luego, no tiene cabida en la comprensión que del régimen de la contratación administrativa tiene este Tribunal. Incluso el numeral 121 inciso 14 de la Carta Magna señala con toda claridad la posibilidad de suscribir contratos de concesión frente a determinado tipo de bienes públicos, así como formas especiales previa ley formal al respecto, en otros supuestos. En materia de prestación delegada de servicios públicos, el mismo régimen de contratación administrativa, de base constitucional (182 de la Carta Magna) y cuya raigambre constitucional ha sido reconocida por el Tribunal Constitucional en el conocido fallo 998-98, permite sostener la validez de las figuras de cesión prestacional de servicios públicos. El marco legal de la norma No. 7762 se ajusta precisamente a esas exigencias y a ese modelo fijado por el Estado costarricense. En cuanto a esa modalidad particular que regula y precisa esa ley, no se puede decir que se esté frente a una renuncia de potestades públicas, sino ante la contratación de servicios varios para concretar la construcción, diseño, mantenimiento, financiamiento, explotación y mantenimiento de una obra portuaria de contenedores en la Vertiente Atlántica. El objeto mismo del contrato elimina de pleno inicio cualquier duda que sobre la titularidad de las obras, del servicio y de las potestades públicas se pueda establecer. La simple lectura y comprensión de la tipología contractual y su ratio en el marco del artículo 1 de la Ley No. 7762 suprime dudas sobre el particular, por lo que alegato es improcedente ad portas. Puede verse incluso que dentro de las obligaciones de la concedente, se incluye en el artículo 16 inciso a de la Ley No. 7762, el deber de "Fiscalizar, permanentemente, toda construcción y explotación de obras y servicios concesionados, de acuerdo con el programa de construcción y mantenimiento de las obras o el reglamento del servicio, de conformidad con el cartel de licitación y el contrato de concesión.", lo que pone en evidencia la titularidad de la obra. Además, el ordinal 15 inciso b ibídem presupone el derecho de rescate de la obra o concesión, por causas de interés público. Más simple, el concepto mismo de concesión supone la cesión de un derecho de operación, pero nunca el traspaso de la titularidad de la obra o derecho en sí, el que una vez vencido el plazo del contrato, es recuperado por la Administración concedente. Sobre el vencimiento del contrato y su trámite de recuperación pueden verse las condiciones contractuales 18.3.2 y 18.3.3, visibles a folios 7569-7570 del administrativo de CNC, o bien, folios 121 y 122 del contrato. En suma, no se traspasa un bien público, sino que se otorga un derecho de explotación temporal sujeto a un régimen contractual-legal especial. Para mayor claridad, basta remitir a lo indicado por el Tribunal Constitucional en el voto No. 1996-03451 de las 15 horas 33 minutos del 09 de julio de 1996, en el que sobre el tema polemizado señaló: “b.- la concesión.-por medio de la concesión de servicio público el Estado satisface necesidades generales valiéndose para ello de la colaboración voluntaria de los administrados en la prestación de los servicios públicos. Por el contrato de concesión de servicio público se encomienda a una persona -física o jurídica-, por un tiempo determinado, la organización y el funcionamiento de un determinado servicio público. El concesionario lleva a cabo su tarea, por su cuenta y riesgo, percibiendo por su labor la retribución correspondiente, que puede consistir en el precio o tarifas pagadas por los usuarios, en subvenciones o garantías satisfechas por el Estado, o ambas a la vez. El concesionario queda supeditado al control propio de todo contrato administrativo; es decir, está sujeto permanentemente a la fiscalización del Estado, puesto que en este tipo de contrato siempre media un interés público, el concesionario queda vinculado a la Administración Pública como cocontratante y también entra en relación con los usuarios en cuyo interés se otorgó la concesión. En este tipo de contrato el concesionario tiene un derecho subjetivo perfecto y declarado; es decir, deriva un derecho patrimonial en el sentido constitucional del término, porque al otorgar una concesión de servicio público, se formaliza un contrato administrativo en sentido estricto. Conviene aclarar que el derecho de explotación del servicio público que se concede a particulares, no es susceptible de ser enajenado, puesto que esa actividad sigue siendo pública, y por ende, sometido a su régimen jurídico esencial. El concesionario debe gozar de un plazo razonable para dedicarse a la actividad de que se trate, de manera que por definición los tiempos indefinidos o de corta duración se encuentran excluidos de la concesión y resultan más bien propios de los permisos, que son revocables en cualquier momento como se dijo. Por lo demás, adviértase que la concesión pertenece a la categoría de contratos administrativos que la doctrina denomina de "colaboración" y su duración es temporaria, pero ha de serlo por un lapso tal que razonablemente permita la amortización de los capitales invertidos y la obtención de una ganancia adecuada para el concesionario.” En esa misma línea puede verse el fallo No. 2003-14606 de las 12 horas 30 minutos del 12 de diciembre del 2003, en la que se precisó la diferencia entre la privatización de servicios y el régimen de concesión de servicios públicos, en los siguientes términos: “En otro orden de consideraciones, no debe confundirse la privatización de los servicios públicos, esto es, la transferencia definitiva de su titularidad y ejercicio a sujetos de derecho privado con su gestión indirecta por un ente público a través de la figura del concesionario, puesto que, en esta hipótesis la administración concedente mantiene la titularidad del servicio y de los bienes de dominio público necesarios para su prestación efectiva, siendo que, únicamente, le transfiere temporalmente al concesionario el ejercicio de algunas potestades para la gestión del servicio -con o sin infraestructura- o la construcción de obras que seguirán siendo de titularidad pública (artículos 121, inciso 14, de la Constitución Política y Ley General de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos).” Por demás, no comparte este Tribunal el alegato que se cede de manera completa el diseño de la obra, dejando en incerteza al colectivo, respecto de qué se va a construir. Para ello basta remitir al Plan Maestro tantas veces mencionado, en el que se dan pautas y parámetros de la obra a construir, que han de ser ponderados para el diseño contratado, el cual, en todo caso, ha de ser aprobado por la contra parte técnica de previo a proseguir en la etapa contractual de construcción. Ergo, no se trata de una renuncia al ejercicio de potestades (poder-deber) públicas, sino que se ha acudido a una figura contractual legalmente válida, que en el caso concreto, la Administración concedente estimó la idónea para satisfacer su programación de construcción de obra pública. Si los accionantes estiman que lo más adecuado es que el mismo Estado (en sentido amplio) sea quien construya las obras y opere el proyecto TCM, se trata de una discusión deontológica sobre el modelo de gestión de los servicios portuarios. Empero, esa preferencia no elimina per se la validez del contrato que en este asunto se cuestiona, sin haber acreditado la insuficiencia técnica de ese proyecto, a tono con los ordinales 15, 16, 160 de la Ley No. 6227/78. La supresión por invalidez de ese contrato por la supuesta lesión a la técnica, no resulta de mérito en la medida en que en el marco de las alegaciones señaladas, no se ha logrado acreditar la deficiencia en la información que postula el accionante, así como en la cesión a un tercero del desarrollo del proyecto de TCM, que incluye el diseño, construcción, financiamiento, operación y mantenimiento de esas obras. Se trata, se insiste, del uso de una modalidad contractual que cuenta con permisibilidad legal y constitucional. Por demás, a juicio de este Tribunal, no resulta de recibo el temor de los accionantes sobre un posible riesgo por el sobrecosto por la ausencia de un diseño final de las obras. Por un lado, como se ha señalado ya de previo, el Plan Maestro adoptado, así como las reglas del concurso público contienen parámetros del diseño a proponer por la firma adjudicataria, de manera que no existe una total desvinculación con intenciones o previsiones públicas sobre el desarrollo de la obra, como parece argumentarse. En todo caso, la Administración concedente de previo a continuar con las diversas fases del procedimiento, deberá fiscalizar con la rigurosidad que resulta necesaria en este tipo de contratos, el debido cumplimiento de los compromisos asumidos, así como la conformidad con los parámetros pre-establecidos, de las distintas acciones del contratista, a fin de cotejar y verificar la correcta satisfacción del interés público inmerso en la TCM. Para ello debe precisarse además, el capítulo 6 del contrato, regula lo relativo al tema de riesgos dentro del convenio. En este aparte, vale rescatar lo señalado en la cláusula 6.3.1 relativa a los riesgos relativos al diseño y la construcción de obras (folio 7665 del administrativo del CNC), de lo que se desprende, los costos por inversión y construcción formulados en la oferta, son reconocidos dentro de la tarifa "techo" -máxima-, tema en el que ha participado la ARESEP, de suerte que los mayores costos a los proyectados, son cuestiones que en orden a la condición contractual aludida, deben ser incluidos como riesgo del contratista en la formulación de su propuesta técnica, económica y de diseño. Desde este plano, entonces, las alegaciones de Nombre141025 en cuanto señalan que no se puede tener seguridad que el proyecto TCM sea auto-financiable, resultan ser antojadizas y carentes de soporte demostrativo, consistiendo por ende en meras apreciaciones subjetivas. Nótese que lo pretendido es la nulidad de un procedimiento administrativo de contratación pública de base técnica compleja, que involucra una serie de factores financieros, técnicos, legales, entre múltiples facetas. De ahí que no sea pertinente la simple alegación de supuestos vicios sin acompañar elementos de convicción solventes que permitan el análisis serio de esos componentes. Contrario a lo alegado por los accionantes, la base de información para la participación existía de previo a la instrucción del procedimiento y fue engrosada y actualizada por información complementaria puesta a conocimiento de las partes en el curso del procedimiento -aspecto en el que no se observa incorrección alguna-. Cabe acotar también, puede resultar válida la preocupación del accionante en cuanto indica que ante la concurrencia de situaciones de incertidumbre en los mercados, no se puede garantizar que las demandas proyectadas sean efectivas. Sin embargo, esa especulación constituye parte del riesgo contractual arriba analizado y que en orden a la cláusula 6.3 del respectivo contrato, debe asumir el concesionario, concretamente en la condición contractual 6.3.6 sobre riesgo de demanda y comerciales en la que se señala en su tenor literal: "El riesgo de la demanda y comerciales, así como sus proyecciones de crecimiento corresponden al concesionario" -folio 7664 del administrativo del CNC-. La eventual variaciones de detalles de demanda es un riesgo inescindible en este tipo de servicios, de ahí la fijación contractual de un sistema de valoración de riesgos que ante eventuales conflictos debe ponderarse casuísticamente. Cabe recordar que desde el propio cartel se advierte a los oferentes (cláusula 3.2) el deber de realizar sus propios estudios de predictibilidad. En este tipo de contratos, se insiste, la certeza en la futura demanda del servicio es un insumo de difícil obtención, pues múltiples factores convergen en esas lides, como es el caso de eficiencia prestacional de la terminal, niveles de producción entre otros aspectos. Lo extenso del plazo que se prevé en este tipo de vinculaciones contractuales hace que el riesgo sea un tema inherente al contrato, que de manera directa se distribuye entre las partes, y en función del cual, el contratista debe asumir, por cuestiones lógicas ya planteadas, parte de ese riesgo, siendo que no es factible que la concedente asegure o garantice niveles de demanda determinados. Con todo, aún en el hipotético caso de distorsiones de demanda que lleven a una excesiva onerosidad del contrato en mengua de los derechos de una de las partes, en quebranto del equilibrio económico ya señalado ut supra, cabe señalar, la cláusula 12.7 del contrato -folio 7625 del administrativo CNC- fija el procedimiento para establecer el reequilibrio del contrato ante situaciones que ocasionen perjuicios al concesionario, de modo que como se ha señalado, es en cada caso que ha de examinarse las acciones a adoptar para establecer ese ajuste financiero. Empero, a priori, no se puede decir de una invalidez del contrato por el riesgo de que lleguen a incrementarse las tarifas. Las pautas para distribución del riesgo están dadas por el contrato, así como las formas de ajuste tarifario, así que la formulación que hace el accionante no permite ingresar al análisis que propone, siendo que sus afirmaciones son simples apreciaciones subjetivas, no amparadas en elementos tangibles que posibiliten a este Tribunal un análisis a fondo sobre este punto. Las meras especulaciones no pueden sustentar técnicamente nulidades de actos públicos, de suerte que los reproches invocados no pueden llevar al resultado pretendido por el accionante. Por último sobre estos alegatos, cabe señalar, con lo dicho, no estima este Tribunal se afecte el principio de pluralidad o apertura participativa en este procedimiento de licitación. La sola circunstancia que se haya presentado solo una oferta dentro de esta licitación pública internacional no puede tenerse como indicativo que se ha truncado o lesionado esa máxima prevista en el artículo 5 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa -libre competencia e igualdad-. Los accionantes asumen un silogismo en función del cual, se parte de la premisa de una lesión a la igualdad en los procedimientos y la libre competencia por el hecho que solo una entidad haya participado. Se constituye así en un silogismo incompleto, que consiste en el fondo, en una entinema (silogismo truncado), lo que supone, asumir una premisa que se da por sobreentendida a partir de la cual, se obtiene una conclusión sin la acreditación de la base fáctica que la justificaría. El alegato entonces deviene en una falacia que no resulta de recibo pues se parte de una construcción en la que se llega a una conclusión, sin establecer de antemano las causas para sustentarla. Fuera de la inferencia que subyace en la alegación (por juicio consecuencial incompleto o truncado, se insiste), no se abordan razones concretas y para justificar la vulneración al principio señalado. En consecuencia, el cargo debe ser desestimado pues la circunstancia a la que pretende asociarse la supuesta lesión, no deja de ser una conjetura, no amparada en juicios lógicos y solventes.

XVIII.- Sobre el project finance. Nombre141025 señala, en este tipo de opciones de financiamiento, se utiliza como garantía básica de la operación el denominado cash flow, que se genera como consecuencia de la explotación de la concesión. Señala que para la procedencia de esta figura se requiere conocer previamente el grado de factibilidad de la concesión a otorgar, así como sus debilidades, requisito que no se ha cumplido ya que no existían esos estudios con información suficiente, prueba de lo cual es la participación de un único oferente. No se justifica adecuadamente la decisión pública de respaldar el proyecto mediante el interés económico social, dato que resulta escueto en el Plan Maestro. Acusa, la modalidad de financiamiento no se puede realizar solo bajo la expectativa del Estado. No se hizo un análisis de eficiencia tributaria del modelo financiero. Dice, en el contrato, la estructura de control es muy débil, ya que lo que se establece es un concepto o perfil y no una obra específica. Sobre el particular cabe señalar lo que de seguido se expone. Como se ha señalado, parte del objeto de la contratación de la TCM es el financiamiento de la construcción de la obra portuaria, lo que implica, corre a cargo del concesionario buscar las opciones de financiamiento para el desarrollo de la infraestructura pública. Evidentemente, los flujos de efectivo que se pretende obtener por la operación del servicio constituyen la principal garantía para la cobertura de los créditos que eventualmente sean obtenidos para el desarrollo de las diversas acciones propias de la ejecución del objeto contractual. Ante ello, por un lado, cabe reiterar, a diferencia de lo expuesto por la accionante, es criterio de este Tribunal, el procedimiento si cuenta con los estudios de factibilidad financiera e información de proyecciones de demanda y datos relevantes que permiten a los potenciales oferentes, realizar individualmente sus análisis obre la rentabilidad del negocio propuesto. Este tema ya ha sido analizado ut supra, por lo que resulta innecesaria la reiteración de lo ya tratado. De nuevo, la existencia de un sola oferta no puede tenerse como criterio para sostener que tal ausencia se configuró en este caso. Con todo, los alegatos que presenta Nombre141025 sobre este tema parecen, en primera instancia, contraproducentes, en tanto pese a la preocupación sobre el project finance, reconoce la solvencia de la concesionaria y pronostica pocos problemas en obtener fuentes de financiamiento para el desarrollo de la obra. Ahora bien, es claro que de previo al otorgamiento de opciones de financiamiento, las entidades de crédito han de realizar análisis de riesgo y de solvencia del potencial deudor de previo al otorgamiento de las respectivas opciones y realizar los giros monetarios correspondientes. De ahí que la carga de obtener el financiamiento para la generación del diseño, construcción, mantenimiento, operación de la TCM corresponde a la concesionaria. La viabilidad financiera del proyecto es un tema ya discutido, y que ha sido ponderado por APM Terminals al momento de presentar su plica concursal, aceptando el riesgo sobre este aspecto. Incluso, puede verse que la cláusula 6.3.4 traslada al concesionario el riesgo financiero del contrato -folio 7664 del administrativo de CNC-, numeral en el que se indica que ese riesgo incluye las condiciones de financiamiento que haya previsto obtener en su respectiva oferta. De hecho, acorde a las pautas cartelarias, cada potencial oferente debe realizar sus propias estimaciones, y estructurar sus propios esquemas de financiamiento. Nótese que el cartel no impone una determinada opción de financiamiento, empero, se reitera, se traslada al concesionario el deber de obtenerlo así como los riesgos de este apoyo financiero. Por otro lado, si bien el Estado pudo optar por contratar primero el diseño de la obra y con posterioridad su construcción y operación, de nuevo, es un tema de opción o elección de preferencias en los modelos de gestión. Sin embargo, al margen de las precisiones sobre las tendencias actuales en materia de concesiones para este tipo de proyectos que hace la mandataria estatal, lo cierto del caso es que ha de remitirse nuevamente al contenido del artículo primero de la Ley No. 7762, norma que permite contratar no solo el diseño, sino la construcción, operación, financiamiento y mantenimiento de este tipo de infraestructura. Es un tema de política programática cuya validez no ha logrado ser desacreditada por los promoventes de la presente acción. La conveniencia de unificar esas acciones dentro de un solo proyecto bien puede no ser compartida por los demandantes, pero se insiste, es a fin de cuentas un tema de escogencia entre los modelos probables de gestión aplicables a este tipo de obras. Ello no implica que no pueda revisarse la conformidad de las acciones públicas con el ordenamiento jurídico, empero, las deficiencias apuntadas por la demandante, no han logrado desvirtuar la legitimidad de lo actuado por la Administración concedente. Entonces, la consideración de si la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-0200 encaja o no dentro de un project finance, resulta poco relevante para efectos de establecer la legalidad del presente asunto, por las razones apuntadas. En otro orden de cosas, si lo reprochado es el contenido o forma de expresar la información relativa a los estudios de factibilidad, es una tema ya tratado, análisis dentro del cual se tuvo por establecido que esos estudios permitían adoptar la decisión de participar o no, reiterando el deber de cada oferente de realizar sus propios estudios. Ciertamente, dentro de las opciones que pueden darse en este tipo de contratos puede la Administración concedente optar por garantizar al concesionario un nivel mínimo de ingresos (o demanda en este caso), asumiendo así el riesgo, empero, en este caso, como se ha dicho, el riesgo en ese sentido fue traslado al concesionario, configurando una decisión de la concedente sobre ese particular. En el curso de la licitación (y antes), se puso a disposición de los interesados datos de proyecciones de carga y un detalle histórico del comportamiento de esos movimientos. Cabe resaltar, el debate del accionante estriba sobre cuestiones cartelarias que no objetó oportunamente, pero que sin embargo, no muestran las deficiencias que expone en su demanda. Con todo, en la evacuación de la prueba testimonial pericial, la correspondencia de la información y estudios brindados en el trámite de la licitación dentro del concepto de project financie, fue un aspecto ampliamente considerado. Así, el CNC ofreció como testigo-experto al señor Nombre5836, de calidades arriba mencionadas. De cara a justificar que la TCM cuenta con factibilidad financiera para efectos de ponderar como oferente las decisiones de financiamiento, tal deponente expresó en lo medular, que todo proyecto ha de contar con una tarifa clara y contener el total de inversiones al margen del momento en que se realicen, costos de operación, utilidad de la empresa, recuperación de costos de inversión. Sobre el tema, Nombre141025 cuestionó al experto, si el Project finance se financia con ingresos futuros, cómo se hacen estimaciones de ingresos en el plan maestro, a lo cual respondió -en lo medular- que se hacen con el flujo de caja por lo que se va a cobrar, se sustentan por demanda. Aclaró, en el documento se incorporan las estimaciones de demanda y proyecciones. Sobre las posteriores modificaciones de esa demanda proyectada, según adujo Nombre141025 en el contrainterrogatorio, indicó, cuando se hace un estudio –cualquiera- y se va a proyectar cualquier tipo de variable, sea carga, precio, producción, se deben sustentar esas proyecciones, y en el plan maestro hay un modelo que sustenta esas proyecciones. Acotó, los ingresos de un proyecto, demanda y competencia deben proyectarse, los métodos utilizados es una cuestión particular de quienes hicieron los estudios. Sobre la relevancia del concepto del valor del dinero en un Project Finance, expresó que cuando se actualiza un flujo financiero está haciendo dos cosas, incorporando la rentabilidad del inversionista y tomando en cuenta si el proyecto puede ser aceptado. No podría ser adelantar ingresos y retrasar inversiones. La ponderación de lo expuesto por este profesional, -criterios que a juicio de este Tribunal no lograron ser desvirtuados-, pone en evidencia de nuevo, la información aportada a los interesados permitía la toma de decisiones en este concurso, por lo que, no se lesionan los principios e institutos que sobre el particular se invocan por los accionantes. Así las cosas, debe disponerse el rechazo de este elemento.

XIX.- Sobre el alegato de ausencia de equilibrio económico-financiero en el contrato. En otro agravio, el apoderado de Nombre141025 reprocha la ausencia de armonía financiera en el contrato. Señala, la cláusula 6.2 del cartel es ilegal y absurda al señalar que los estudios previos tienen un carácter informativo. Dice, la ecuación del contrato, no es más que un procedimiento contractual donde se trata de establecer un equilibrio entre las obligaciones del contratista y por medio de las inversiones que éste deba hacer y las contraprestaciones que el Estado deba realizar. Acusa, en este caso, no se tienen esos análisis previos, ya que lo emitido fue un proyecto en concepto, sin estudios de factibilidad técnica, ambiental o económica. Todo lo cual ocasiona que se aumenten innecesariamente los costos y los cuales, obviamente van a tener que ser cobrados por el oferente en el caso de un desequilibrio. Este equilibrio debe incluir imprevistos del contratista como son la utilidad y capital financiero. La propuesta del contrato contenida en “la licitación”, no es la licitación de un proyecto bien definido, sino uno por definir. En la TMC no se sabe si dicha ecuación financiera está basada en los costos reales del proyecto, pues no existe un estudio técnico de factibilidad económico actualizado por parte del Estado. Estima, el costo de la construcción, operación y mantenimiento resulta menor al estimado para la fijación tarifaria, condición que ocurre en “la licitación” debido a que los datos, además inexactos, corresponden al año 2008. Por lo tanto, saldrían perjudicados, todos los usuarios, así como la competitividad del país, al tener que pagar un sobre precio por el servicio que se está brindando. Ello podría dar como resultado, que el concesionario al tener previamente una tarifa asignada, pueda hacer cambios en el diseño y en la funcionalidad de la obra para bajar los costos y sin embargo pueda mantener la tarifa ofertada. Anticipa, el Estado costarricense podría ser demandado y podría tener que indemnizar los daños y perjuicios ocasionados por el lucro cesante de la tarifa que se ofertó y se aceptó en el contrato de concesión. Sobre esos alegatos cabe indicar, de pleno inicio y en tesis de principio, puede surgir una duda razonable sobre la legitimación de Nombre141025 y Nombre141024 para invocar una distorsión en el equilibrio de la ecuación económico financiera del contrato. Lo anterior ya que podría decirse, el único que llevaría a reclamar tal distorsión es precisamente el concesionario a favor de quien, -o en contra de quien- se fijan las tarifas por el servicio de la TCM. Desde el plano del ejercicio de un derecho de reacción al ajuste de los términos económicos del contrato, esa postura sería técnicamente correcta, si lo que se pretende es declarar el desequilibrio como presupuesto de un ajuste tarifario para retornar a las tasas de rentabilidad pactadas. No obstante, estima este Tribunal, la preocupación de los accionantes se direcciona, no en el ejercicio de un derecho que en tesis de principio le correspondería al concesionario -podría pensarse que de manera exclusiva-, sino en el ámbito de las incidencias que ese aspecto contractual podría generar en la esfera jurídica de los potenciales usuarios o destinatarios del servicio público. Desde esa óptica, no observa este Tribunal defecto alguno en el marco de la legitimación activa del reclamante. Lo reprochado encaja efectivamente desde la perspectiva de posibles ajustes económicos del contrato vía tarifaria, o eventualmente indemnizatoria -por reclamos de responsabilidad pública contractual-, que por impacto económico en el servicio, afectarían a los destinatarios del proyecto. En este tipo de contratos de concesión debe entenderse que la relación prestacional es tri-compuesta, pues si bien la Administración concedente suscribe un contrato público con un prestatario delegado -concesionario-, para que en casos como el presente, diseñe, construya, financie, opere, explota y mantenga una terminal portuaria de contenedores, lo cierto del caso es que ese vínculo se emite para la satisfacción de un servicio público direccionado hacia usuarios destinatarios de aquel. Ciertamente el compromiso obligacional surge entre la concedente y el concesionario, pero lejos de constituirse en un binomio contractualista clás i co, consiste en la delegación prestacional de un servicio cuyos destinatarios -y causa justificante en último sentido- son los usuarios de aquel. De ahí que el ordenamiento jurídico patrio establezca, como derivación del principio democrático, figuras de participación ciudadana o pública en el control de esos contratos. El diseño de la Ley No. 7593 (Ley ARESEP) en cuanto a los trámites de ajustes tarifarios dan prueba de esa sinergia. Se trata entonces de una relación triangular, pues a fin de cuentas, el servicio delegado se direcciona a los usuarios, quienes cancelan una tarifa, fijada por la concedente en este caso -a diferencia de otros contratos en los que tal competencia ataña a la ARESEP- pero que ha de ser cancelada por los usuarios, para que el concesionario obtenga la retribución pactada en el contrato. Tal connotación se presenta en la dimensión teleológica del contrato, que busca satisfacer intereses públicos de los destinatarios, al punto que la indebida prestación a esos receptores de los efectos del negocio administrativo, puede desembocar en la cancelación de la concesión, o bien, en su recuperación o en la aplicación del régimen sancionatorio fijado. En el caso concreto de la Ley No. 7762, puede observarse incluso que dentro del capítulo III Derechos y Obligaciones de las Partes, la sección III, artículo 19, alude a los derechos de los usuarios, lo que hace incontrovertible la relación triangular aludida. Así las cosas, no se comparte el alegato del CNC en cuanto a la ausencia de legitimación sobre el aspecto. Empero, de nuevo, las argumentaciones del reclamante no logran llegar a concretar reproches solventes y concretos sobre supuestas imperfecciones en la contratación, que justifiquen su anulación. Para ello, resulta necesario realizar breves precisiones sobre el derecho en cuestión.

XX.- Sobre el derecho al equilibrio económico. El ordenamiento jurídico de la contratación administrativa confiere al adjudicatario o contratista un derecho al equilibrio económico del contrato. Se trata de un derecho que deriva de la máxima constitucional de la intangibilidad patrimonial (ordinales 33, 45 y 50 de la Carta Magna) y que tiene por norte mantener la equidad en la distribución de las cargas contractuales, específicamente en el tema del área económica y financiera del contrato, procurando que el operador mantenga el nivel de rentabilidad que inicialmente fue pactado o al menos, persistan las condiciones económicas normales. Este equilibrio permite por un lado otorgar al contratista la utilidad justa por la prestación de un servicio, el desarrollo de una obra o en general, el cumplimiento del objeto que le ha sido contratado. En el caso de los contratos de transporte, que se particularizan por ser de ejecución sucesiva, este nivel de sanidad financiera y equidad económica es determinante para la ejecución debida de la actividad pactada. El desequilibrio en la estructura de precios de un servicio de esta naturaleza supondría un detrimento en la esfera patrimonial del operador con el correlativo beneficio sin causa legítima de la Administración concedente o licitante, al estar frente a actividades cuya remuneración se encuentra por debajo del equilibrio financiero debido. Por el contrario, el reajuste de precios a un nivel cuantitativo superior al justo, llevaría a un enriquecimiento injustificado en la esfera del contratista y en mengua del interés público, al cancelarse un precio superior al que permite la utilidad acordada. De ahí que un justo equilibrio permite el desarrollo de la actividad para beneficio del destinatario y el cumplimiento armónico de los deberes asumidos en la contratación. A fin de cuentas, el ajuste de precios, cuando corresponda, es una manifestación del deber de cumplir con lo pactado (canon 15 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa), ergo, se trata de un deber de la Administración, que no de una facultad, sea, en tanto se presenten las condiciones que justifiquen el reajuste, la Administración está obligada a disponer el aumento para mantener las condiciones convenidas originalmente y así satisfacer un derecho que la misma legislación otorga al contratista. Ese derecho se encuentra regulado en el precepto 18 de la citada Ley de Contratación Administrativa que en lo relevante señala: "Artículo 18.- Mantenimiento del equilibrio económico del contrato. Salvo cuando se estipulen, expresamente, parámetros distintos en los términos del cartel respectivo, en los contratos de obra, servicios y suministros, con personas o empresas de la industria de la construcción, la Administración reajustará los precios, aumentándolos o disminuyéndolos, cuando varíen los costos, directos o indirectos, estrictamente relacionados con la obra, el servicio o el suministro, mediante la aplicación de ecuaciones matemáticas basadas en los índices oficiales de precios y costos, elaborados por el Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Comercio. (...)" En el contexto actual, se ve desarrollado además en el numeral 31 del Reglamento de dicha ley. Como se observa, el legislador partió del derecho primario del reajuste de precios como forma de mantener un equilibrio financiero en el contrato. Para tales efectos, bien pueden establecerse en el cartel respectivo o en el mismo contrato, formas de adecuación económica distintas, sea actualización económica del contrato, mediante mecanismos convenidos entre las partes, siempre guardando sujeción a las reglas ya fijadas. Empero, ese equilibrio económico ha de ser garantizado ante la concurrencia de diversas causas que produzcan una alteración en el orden del contrato. Por ello, la Administración contratante debe asegurar esta armonía cuando el efecto de inestabilidad se origine como derivación de modificaciones que haya dispuesto en el régimen del contrato o decisiones que le incidan de manera directa o indirecta, como sería el caso de las modificaciones unilaterales, lo que constituye el denominado ius variandi. Pero además, debe resguardarse frente a actos de otras Administraciones que incidan en la ejecución contractual (teoría del hecho del príncipe) o bien, cuando surjan causas imprevisibles que tornen insostenible financieramente el contrato (teoría de la imprevisibilidad). Desde luego que no estarían sujetas a ser consideradas como fuentes del reajuste de precios aquellas situaciones que sean inherentes al riesgo o ventura propias de la actividad contratada, las que en términos normales deben ser toleradas por el contratista al formar parte del álea consustancial a toda actividad de susceptible explotación económica. En esa dimensión, las variaciones originadas en circunstancias previsibles al momento de plantear la propuesta económica, en principio, no están cubiertas dentro de la necesidad de reajuste. Sobre el contenido de la teoría del reajuste de precios, la Sala Constitucional ha tenido la oportunidad de emitir fallos relevantes que hacen un exhaustivo desarrollo sobre el tema. Entre muchos, en el voto 6432-1998 de las 10 horas 30 minutos del 4 de septiembre de 1998 indicó: "El reajuste del precio del contrato se identifica con el principio de la revisión del mismo, para atemperarlo a la realidad económica del momento, lo que se hace por tres medios distintos que reconocen tanto la doctrina del Derecho Público como la que informa nuestro sistema jurídico: la cláusula rebus sic stántibus, la teoría de la imprevisión y la teoría del enriquecimiento injusto. Los tres medios tienen como fin introducir en la relación contractual una nota de equidad, que pueda conservar la armonía de los intereses contrapuestos de las partes contratantes, a la vez que mantiene la equivalencia de las prestaciones comprometidas y la igualdad ante los riesgos. La más calificada doctrina sobre contratación administrativa, es conteste en afirmar que el reconocimiento de las variaciones de precios no es una potestad del Estado sino una obligación, puesto que la incidencia de los mayores costos es de orden público, como lo es todo lo atinente al reconocimiento de las consecuencias derivadas de la teoría de la imprevisión.(...) En síntesis, los reajustes de precios no constituyen una indemnización que reconoce el Estado voluntariamente y paga al contratista, sino, más bien, un mecanismo jurídico de restitución del valor real de la obligación, de la restitución del equilibrio financiero del contrato, de manera que se pague lo que previamente se convino, es decir, es el pago integral del precio, para que no exista, ni perjuicio para el contratista, ni un enriquecimiento indebido de parte del Estado." X XI.- Ahora bien, en el contexto concreto del presente asunto, atendiendo a las alegaciones resumidas, no se observan las deficiencias reprochadas. En efecto, el tema de la existencia o no del estudio de factibilidad financiera ya ha sido objeto de vasto tratamiento, por lo que resulta innecesario abordarlo nuevamente, debiendo remitirse a lo ya expuesto. Debe indicarse empero, la pretensión de nulidad de la cláusula 6.2 debe desecharse, por ser la consecuencia lógica del análisis que sobre el tema de fondo ha expuesto ya esta Cámara. Ahora bien, el aspecto del mantenimiento del equilibrio económico del contrato se trata no solamente en el artículo 17y 40 de la Ley No. Placa20097, sino además en el capítulo 12 del contrato (incluido dentro del respectivo cartel), denominado "DEL MANTENIMIENTO DEL EQUILIBRIO ECONÓMICO-FINANCIERO DEL CONTRATO." Fuera de la ausencia del estudio de factibilidad técnica, económica y ambiental, no explicitan los reclamantes cómo las normas regulatorias del contrato pueden llegar a vulnerar en perjuicio de los potenciales usuarios, ese equilibrio económico y la incidencia que esas distorsiones pueden generar en las tarifas que en teoría, deban cancelar por el suministro de los servicios portuarios de carga y descarga de contenedores. No se aporta, fuera de lo indicado, alegato de fondo alguno que lleve a este Tribunal a concluir sobre la ilicitud del tratamiento que las normas contractuales dan al tema del citado equilibrio financiero, de manera que se pueda al menos inferir, la ventaja excesiva a favor del concesionario, o un riesgo objetivo que pueda llegar a lesionar los derechos de los usuarios de la TCM. De nuevo, se acusa una estructura propuesta desde la fase del cartel de licitación, sin que Nombre141025 haya impugnado ese acto concreto luego de varias rondas de recursos de objeción. Para ello, se remite a lo expuesto sobre la preclusión que ha operado para cuestionar las condiciones del cartel de la licitación, sin perjuicio del análisis que frente a cada tema presentado se ha realizado en este fallo. Ha de insistirse, las mismas condiciones cartelarias, no atacadas oportunamente, señalan el deber de los potenciales oferentes de realizar sus propias proyecciones para concluir sobre la suficiencia del contrato y participar. No se trata de una disposición absurda como señalan los accionantes, sino de aspectos que en la lógica del proyecto, tal y como fue planteado por la concedente, son propias al tipo de contrato a suscribir y el modelo de gestión seleccionado. Por otro lado, merece relevancia para este Tribunal el alegato del Estado en cuanto señala que ante una contratación que incluye el diseño de la obra, no es factible pretender una estimación de costos reales del proyecto. Efectivamente, siendo que parte del contrato es el diseño, no guarda sentido técnico pretender una proyección de costos reales del proyecto, cuando pese a la existencia de perfiles sobre lo que ha de ser la TCM, no se tiene aún el diseño definitivo, lo que se recuerda, debe contener la ponderación de la variable ambiental -ya analizada-. Lo mismo cabe señalar sobre el alegato de datos desactualizados (2008) del Plan Maestro, cuando se ha tenido por señalado ya, esos datos fueron luego ajustados por la firma Royal Haskoning y luego, en la sede tarifaria, considerados nuevamente para el dictamen que en estos campos de tarifas y calidad de servicio, debe rendir la ARESEP. Sobre este tema se detallará infra. Sobre el mayor margen de ganancia por la realización de cambios en el diseño de obra y abaramiento de costos, es un tema que solo se menciona, sin soporte probatorio o argumentativo, por lo que sin más, debe ser desechado, al constituir una mera especulación que en todo caso, de concretarse, existen opciones válidas para requerir el ajuste de tarifas de manera que se respeten los compromisos adquiridos y la rentabilidad pactada con el mismo nivel de calidad de servicio y nivel de infraestructura (cualitativa y cuantitativa). De igual modo, la alegación de marcos de responsabilidad administrativa eventual por desequilibrio económico, parte de conjeturas que por la abstracción como se plantean, no merece mayor examen, debiendo ser rechazadas, al ser claro que los deberes y derechos de las partes llevan a la posibilidad de incumplimientos que han de ser analizados en cada caso concreto. En todo caso, se insiste, debe atenerse en esos casos, a las cláusulas de distribución de riesgos, derecho de equilibrio económico, entre múltiples factores, pues bien la distorsión puede encontrarse dentro de los riesgos libremente asumidos. Para el ajuste de un eventual desequilibrio en este caso, cabe señalar, por resolución No. RRG430-2010 de las 11 horas del 22 de julio del 2010, la Nombre628 fijó los parámetros de ajuste de las tarifas y criterios de calidad. Sobre los parámetros de ajuste señaló que en caso de alteraciones financieras, serían mecanismos de ajuste válidos para equilibrar dicha ecuación los siguientes: revisión o ajuste de tarifas, pago para obras de desarrollo económico y social de Limón, revisión o ajuste de cronograma de inversiones, obras adicionales o equipamento en el puerto, combinación de las anteriores. -folios 796-801 del legajo administrativo ARESEP-. No es factible entonces, ab initio, plantear especulaciones sobre futuras responsabilidades por desequilibrio económico y a partir de ello, pretender la nulidad del proyecto, cuando existen en el contrato disposiciones claras sobre la forma de atender eventuales desajustes en la ecuación económico-financiera, así como en el dictamen vinculante de la Nombre628 -ya mencionado-. Ergo, debe disponerse el rechazo de la alegación objeto de examen.

XXII.- Sobre la tarifa de la TCM y los volúmenes de exportación tomados para su cálculo. Sobre este tema, se señala en la demanda, no puede haber coherencia entre el precio pagado, el valor de la obra y los servicios prestados, por la ausencia de estudios de factibilidad económica actualizada y los costos determinados de construcción. Añade, debe tomarse en cuenta todos los factores económicos, que puedan abarcar no sólo la construcción de la obra, sino también los costos de la explotación y operación de la misma. Dice, ello no es posible ante la falta de estudios. A juicio de los reclamantes, en este momento, lo recomendable es un contrato de concesión de obra pública, en la que se pueda fijar una tarifa con esos datos, lo que acá no ocurre. Reprocha, la estimación de volumen creciente de exportación de “Full Containers Vessels” por puerto Moín, que presenta el Plan Maestro es totalmente irreal. Indica, para el 2010, el Plan dice que las exportaciones serían de 129 millones de cajas de banano, cuando el nivel para ese año fue de 98 millones. Se presenta una curva creciente de exportación de banano de 138 millones de cajas para el año 2015 y de 173 millones de cajas para el año 2030, los que considera inalcanzables. Los datos del Plan Maestro no se toman de entidades oficiales, sino de Ecuador, datos del 2003. Dice, mientras el estudio pronostica incrementos anuales del 1.5%, la realidad ha sido la tendencia a la baja. Expresa, teniendo los datos de los últimos 5 años, el volumen que utilizaría la TCM es del 45%. Los datos de crecimiento son irrealizables. Destaca, los volúmenes en Banano y Piña se van a reducir considerablemente a los usados en el estudio; se estima una reducción del 45% del volumen que transite por el muelle, se necesita regular la escala del proyecto en cuanto a inversión y fases a desarrollar. Señala, al realizar estudios de proyección de demanda como se hizo en el plan maestro de Nombre141027 se estila incluir, entre otras cosas: a) la documentación y fundamentación de los supuestos y la forma en que estos afectan los resultados; b) la preparación de estudios de investigación de mercados como respaldo de las cifras; c) la verificación con expertos que las cifras proyectadas son creíbles y defendibles ante cuestionamientos razonables. Censura, en el cartel de “la licitación” no hay fundamentación para los dos primeros puntos, y para el tercero, no se realizó consulta al sector. Sobre el particular cabe señalar lo que de seguido se expone. Por un lado, los alegatos de la accionante estriban sobre la ausencia de los estudios de factibilidad que exige los ordinales 9 y 21 de la Ley No. 7762. Ese tema, se insiste, ya ha sido ponderado en apartes previos de este fallo, por lo que resulta innecesario reiterar y abundar sobre ese extremo. De este modo, la supuesta inexistencia de dichos estudios de factibilidad, no puede constituirse en una causa válida para sustentar la patología acusada por los actores. En cuanto a los datos contenidos en el Plan Maestro elaborado para los efectos, ciertamente, data del 2008. Sin embargo, como se ha señalado en reiteradas ocasiones, esos datos fueron luego actualizados, dada la realidad histórica del mercado así como el hecho público y notorio de afectaciones a la economía mundial generada en esas fechas. Tales situaciones llevaron a la actualización de esos datos ante la incidencia que presentaban para efectos de la fijación tarifaria así como viabilidad financiera del proyecto. Esto se acredita mediante la revisión del expediente de la consulta tarifaria realizada a la ARESEP, expediente OT-367-2008. Para ello basta observar que la tarifa inicialmente propuesta en el cartel era de $169 (ciento sesenta y nueve dólares de Estados Unidos de América), la que ante esas variaciones debían ser ajustadas, tarifa publicada en el cartel publicitado en La Gaceta No. 5 del 08 de enero del 2010. Ante ese panorama, los interesados advirtieron de las diferencias de la realidad con las proyecciones del Plan Maestro, por lo que la administración concedente encargó a la empresa Royal Haskoning la actualización de esos datos. Luego, se remitieron los autos a la Nombre628 para que realizara el análisis tarifario (estructura tarifaria). En efecto, mediante el oficio DSET-OF-401-2009 del 18 de marzo del 2009, el CNC remitió a la Nombre628 formalmente la estructura tarifaria y parámetros de ajuste que se incorporarían en el cartel de licitación de la TCM, según se puede observar a folio 36 del expediente administrativo de la ARESEP. A este trámite se asignó el expediente OT-367-2008 (expediente ARESEP). Para tales efectos, mediante el oficio 122-RG-2009 del 01 de abril del 2009, la ARESEP, peticionó información adicional requerida, dentro de la que se incluye en concreto, copia electrónica de plan maestro, estudios de factibilidad para dar viabilidad al proyecto, factibilidad ambiental, detalle de tarifas a incorporar, pliego tarifario, acuerdo del CNC donde se inicia procedimiento (ver folios 34-35 del expediente ARESEP). La información fue remitida, aportando un CD con el Plan Maestro y el modelo tarifario propuesto. Así consta a folios 7-33 del administrativo ARESEP. Por resolución No. RG-125-2009 del 20 de abril del 2009, ese ente regulador da visto bueno al proyecto y se indica que las tarifas señaladas eran precios máximos. Se advierte además que los mecanismos de ajuste se realizan a las tarifas adjudicadas, no a las aprobadas, y que el Nombre141029 no corresponde derecho alguno para llevar a cabo obra alguna. Como consecuencia de lo resuelto en el acto R-DJ-008-2009 del 02 de julio del 2009 de la CGR sobre recursos de objeción planteados por Nombre141024 y la firma APM Terminals B.V, se realiza una revisión integral del cartel, producto de lo cual, por oficio 2295/DTS-OF-1424-2009, CNC solicita un segundo pronunciamiento sobre la estructura tarifaria, parámetros de ajuste y evaluación de la calidad del servicio (folios 84-145 del expediente ARESEP). De nuevo, por oficios 1346-DITRA-2009 y 1380-DITRA-2009/32128 de fechas 22 y 27 de octubre del 2009, la Nombre628 previene información al CNC, la que es remitida por oficio 2359/DST-OF-1488-09 del 26 de octubre del 2009 y 2385/DST-OF-1522-09 del 28 de octubre del 2009. Por resolución No. RRG-10208-2009 de las 09 horas 15 minutos del 29 de octubre del 2009, el ente regulador establece una tarifa techo de $169 por contenedor (servicio a la carga) -ver folios 163-179 del administrativo ARESEP-. Con posterioridad, por oficio DST-OF-380-10 (0395) del 12 de marzo del 2010, se pide nueva tarifa analizando nuevas proyecciones de demanda y actualización de costos de inversión: tarifa propuesta era de $252. Tal solicitud se realiza indicando que se sustenta en la actualización de demanda del modelo tarifario. En ese oficio, visible a folios 202-210 del administrativo Nombre628 se indica que el estudio de Nombre141027 no contemplaba la contracción económica, por lo que se aportan los siguientes datos relevantes: proyección de demanda bajó por el efecto de la crisis económica mundial, actualización del valor de las obras aumentó o incrementó el monto total del proyecto a 948.7 millones de dólares ($948.700.000.00), el modelo elaborado mantiene un 17% de royalties, se mantiene el escenario de proyección utilizado en el modelo referencial RRG-10208-2009, tarifa por almacenamiento de contenedores llenos después de 2 días de gracia disminuyó de $5 a $1.5 por TEUS (contenedor 40 pies), período de la concesión es de 35 años, tasa interna de retorno (TIR) es de 15%. Con fundamento en ese detalle, se propuso una tarifa por servicio a la carga de $252.00 (doscientos cincuenta y dos dólares) Esa información se adicionó con insumos remitidos a la Nombre628 por oficio DST-OF-0432-10 (445) del 23 de marzo del 2010, en el que se indica que la TIR es del 17.5% (folios 211-219 del administrativo ARESEP). De igual modo por oficio DST-OF-380-10 (0395) del 12 se remite la estimación de volúmenes de carga y su comparación con el modelo de Royal Haskoning para la TCM realizado por la entidad ICICOR-Costa Rica S.A. de fecha 12 de enero del 2010 (folios 220-268 ibídem). Por resolución No. RRG-255-2010 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 05 de abril del 2010, la Nombre628 se establece que con una tasa interna de retorno del 17.5%, la tarifa tope a la carga por contenedor será de $252.00 (doscientos cincuenta y dos dólares) (folios 286-293 del administrativo ARESEP). Por oficio 902/DST-OF-673-2010 del 05 de julio del 2010, CNC pide un cuarto criterio sobre las tarifas de conformidad con la resolución R-DJ-215-2010 de la CGR -folios 550-787 del administrativo ARESEP-. Este ente pide información adicional en fecha 12 de julio del 2010 y es remitida en fecha 15 de julio del 2010 -folios 789, 791-792 del administrativo ARESEP-. Finalmente, por resolución No. RRG430-2010 de las 11 horas del 22 de julio del 2010, la Nombre628 última resolución que fija las tarifas, parámetros de ajuste y criterios de calidad. Sobre los parámetros de ajuste señaló que en caso de alteraciones financieras, serían mecanismos de ajuste válidos: revisión o ajuste de tarifas, pago para obras de desarrollo económico y social de Limón, revisión o ajuste de cronograma de inversiones, obras adicionales o equipamento en el puerto, combinación de las anteriores. -folios 796-801 ibídem-. En definitiva, dentro de la cláusula 11.8.2 del contrato de concesión, se fijó una tarifa a la carga de $223 (doscientos veintitrés dólares) por contenedor -folio 7639 del expediente CNC-.

XXIII.- A partir de ese recuento fáctico, es criterio de este Tribunal, si bien la posición de las accionantes es respetable, en definitiva no se comparte. Los datos utilizados para la fijación de las tarifas a aplicar a la TCM, a diferencia de lo que expone la accionante fueron debidamente actualizados. Nótese que en primera instancia, según lo señalado, por resolución No. RRG-10208-2009 de las 09 horas 15 minutos del 29 de octubre del 2009, la Nombre628 establece una tarifa máxima de $169 por contenedor, atendiendo a los insumos de información dados a esa fecha, en específico, los datos contenidos en el Plan Maestro realizado por Nombre141027 . Empero, en posteriores trámites, esos datos se actualizan, considerando aspectos tales como la crisis económica mundial y el efecto de impacto en la demanda proyectada, aumento en el valor estimado de las obras, porcentaje de royalties, reducción en la tarifa por almacenamiento de contenedores llenos después de 2 días de gracia, período de la concesión es de 35 años y la tasa interna de retorno (TIR). El detalle de esos aspectos fue expuesto en el aparte previo. Se ha señalado además que mediante el oficio DST-OF-380-10 (0395) del 12 se remite la estimación de volúmenes de carga y su comparación con el modelo de Nombre141027 para la TCM realizado por la entidad ICICOR-Costa Rica S.A. de fecha 12 de enero del 2010 (folios 220-268 ibídem). En este detalle se remiten datos actualizados bajo un esquema comparativo con la información suministrada por el Plan Maestro, que contiene el siguiente esquema: alcances del estudio, antecedentes de la actividad portuaria, comparación de volúmenes con el plan maestro, estimación de volúmenes de carga, pronósticos de carga, importaciones, exportaciones de banano, piña, café y otras exportaciones, así como conclusiones y recomendaciones. -folios 220-268 del administrativo ARESEP-. Esos referentes de información fueron ponderados por la Nombre628 en el curso del ejercicio de sus competencias relativas al diagnóstico del elemento tarifario en el proyecto de la TCM. Cabe advertir en este punto lo resuelto al inicio de este fallo en cuanto a la falta de legitimación pasiva de la ARESEP, al no haberse cuestionado acto concreto suyo alguno. Sin embargo, debe indicarse, esas actualizaciones de datos se dieron como consecuencia de las peticiones, vía recurso de objeción de los interesados, de actualizar las estimaciones de demanda, tema que con claridad, incide en la viabilidad financiera del proyecto. De ahí que la modificación de las tarifas máximas a la carga pasara de $169 a $252 recomendados por la ARESEP. El complejo detalle del procedimiento instaurado ante la Nombre628 evidencia el requerimiento de información de parte de ese ente regulador al CNC para contar con parámetros que posibilitaran una definición técnica de la arista tarifaria y de control de calidad. De suerte entonces que no se observa la deficiencia de información actualizada que se acusa. Por otro lado, el accionante -a diferencia de otras partes de la demanda- acepta el modelo de concesión de obra pública con servicios públicos, condicionando ese modelo de gestión a la fijación objetiva de tarifas. En esta línea, se acusa la falta de comprensión en las tarifas de los costos de construcción, operación y mantenimiento. Sin embargo, se trata de un argumento que solo se expone a manera de argumentación, sin mención adicional de las razones concretas y financiero-económicas que llevan a esa conjetura. De la revisión que ha realizado este Tribunal de los diversos actos emitidos en el trámite de la consulta tarifaria, no se desprende el exabrupto que reprochan los actores. Ello puede observarse, a modo de referencia, en el detalle justificativo que se anexa con el oficio DSET-OF-401-2009 del 18 de marzo del 2009 del CNC, en el que se formula la consulta de marras, en el cual, se acompaña documento del mes de marzo del 2009 en el cual, se expone detalle de la justificación de la estructura tarifaria y de control de calidad sometida a conocimiento de la ARESEP. En ese documento, por ejemplo, en el punto 1.2. "Características técnicas del proyecto", se alude al desarrollo de las fases 2 y 3 del Plan Maestro, relacionadas con el desarrollo de obras civiles propias del proyecto TCM -folio 41 del expediente ARESEP-. El punto 1.7.2.1 refiere a diversas situaciones o rubros que han de ser ponderados en la adecuación del equilibrio económico-financiero del contrato. En general, la complejidad de la información considerada para la propuesta tarifaria puede colegirse del modelo financiero, cuyo detalle se encuentra en el punto 1.9 del citado anexo técnico del CNC, en el cual, sobre el tema se indican, entre otros, los siguientes parámetros referenciales: período de la concesión, proyección de tráfico marítimo, estimación de capacidad instalada, tarifa portuaria única, estimación de inversiones y de demanda, tasas y valores definidos para las productividades, consumo de energía y combustible, gastos de personal, ponderación de equipos en términos de funcionalidad en relación a la demanda a atender, productividades esperadas, así como costos de mantenimiento y operación. Así puede verse a folios 59-60 del administrativo Nombre628. De ese modo, el sesgo que critican los petentes no se pone de manifiesto desde la óptica de este Tribunal. Por otra parte, no comparte este órgano colegiado la preocupación del accionante Nombre141025 en cuanto señala que para la fijación de las tarifas debe contarse con el valor de las obras, costos de operación y mantenimiento, así como la remuneración del concesionario, para evitar que se cobre solo el valor de la obra. En este tipo de contratos de largo plazo, es claro que el valor de la infraestructura es amortizado por el pago de las tarifas, para lo cual, el costo total de inversión, mantenimiento, costos y rentabilidad se diluye en la estructura tarifaria a lo largo del plazo de la concesión. No es el concedente quien de previo a la entrada en operaciones del concesionario, cancela el valor de esas obras, sino que éstas son financiadas por el concesionario, mediante las opciones de crédito cuyo riesgo asume (cláusula 6.3.4 del contrato "Riesgos Financieros"), costo que luego carga a las tarifas unitarias. Desde este plano, lleva razón el CNC en cuanto señala que en caso de proyectar recursos solo para la construcción pero no para el mantenimiento y operación, el concesionario se expone a la imposición de sanciones contractuales, siendo que el objeto del contrato no se limita a la construcción, sino además a estos dos últimos comportamientos. Asimismo, la estructura tarifaria no permite el traslado o cargo de costos que son propios de los riesgos asumidos por el contratista, tema del que ya se ha realizado desarrollo en apartes previos de este fallo. Para ello basta remitir a las condiciones contractuales 6.3.1, 6.3.2 y 6.3.4 que tratan sobre el tema de traslado de riesgos al concesionario. Ahora bien, en cuanto al detalle de los datos y gráficos presentados por CANABA, vale señalar, se sustentan en los datos ofrecidos por el Plan Maestro, sin ponderar las actualizaciones a las que ya se ha hecho referencia. Por ende, se emiten respecto de un insumo que no considera los últimos datos utilizados por la Nombre628 y la administración concedente en este tema. Por demás, en el contexto de los datos actualizados utilizados dentro del análisis tarifario, se observan detalles de información que resultan cercanos a los datos aportados por la accionante. Nombre29630, a folio 295 del administrativo se encuentra la “Tabla 2-3 Resumen para el pronóstico de exportación en el escenario medio (x1000 t) adjunta, numeral 2.3.1 que establece, en lo medular, para el escenario medio la estimación de exportación de bananos con corte al mees de agosto del 2008, comparado con el Estudio Tarifario y de Viabilidad Financiera, estudio que en promedio redujo en un 18% la estimación de la demanda (inicialmente de 128,21 millones), la estimación de exportaciones de banano para el 2010 de acuerdo al Plan Maestro ajustado corresponde a 105 millones de cajas. Con todo, aún las diferencias que en términos estadísticos proyectan los datos aportados por el accionante, lo cierto del caso es que no se logra desacreditar la solvencia técnica de los cálculo realizados por las diversas instancias administrativas en la fase de la consulta de la estructura tarifaria.

XXIV.- Sobre estos aspectos, la prueba testimonial evacuada hace concluir sobre la pertinencia y suficiencia de esos datos para realizar las cuantificaciones tarifarias. La deposición del señor Nombre141041 , cédula de identidad número CED110940, propuesto por la Nombre628 como testigo-funcionario-perito, como uno de los funcionarios encargados de atender la consulta del proyecto de concesión en cuanto a la calidad de la propuesta, requerido sobre el detalle de información señaló en lo medular, para efectos del análisis se consideró información estadística de Nombre141024 desde 1999 al 2011. Señaló, si se analiza comportamiento de la carga por toneladas métricas, se observa un incremento, con una ligera baja en el 2008 en cuanto a la carga. Igual sucede con el manejo de contenedores. La tasa de crecimiento no ha sido tan alta. Incluso, ante consulta del CNC sobre el condicionamiento de la aprobación tarifaria a algún requisito, el testigo señaló –en lo esencial-, que en ese trámite, se consideró, la información era suficiente para emitir el criterio. En cuanto a los componentes considerados en el análisis de tarifas y calidad, ante pregunta de SINTRAJAP, señaló que dentro de este análisis se incluye la ponderación de las inversiones en el aparte del sistema financiero, criterio que engarza y se ajusta al análisis arriba abordado por este Tribunal sobre ese tema. Por su parte, en cuanto al análisis tarifario de la propuesta, la señorita Nombre141042 , cédula de identidad número CED110941, economista, Técnico de la Dirección de Transportes, ofrecida por la Nombre628 como testigo-funcionaria-perito, señaló fundamentalmente, dentro de su análisis contó con estudios de factibilidad financiera presentado en el Plan Maestro, así como con herramienta electrónica que señaló viabilidad financiera del proyecto. Detalla que el proceso seguido para dar visto bueno a la estructura tarifaria, variaciones sustanciales: se presentaron 4 consultas: la primera sobre estructura tarifaria, ajuste y calidad de servicio, la segunda variaciones en la estructura de tarifa, aporte de desarrollo y se incorporó el equilibrio financiero, en la tercera, modificaciones en la tarifa, antes en $169 y se modificó a $252 por contenedor por ajuste en datos de demanda y variaciones en costos de inversión, tasa interna del proyecto del 15% al 17.5%, modificación de tarifa para almacenamiento de contenedores fuera del período de gracia. En la cuarta, parámetros de ajuste para equilibrio financiero. En la última gestión se requirió al CNC costos operativos y de equipamiento, razones de modificación, proyecciones de demanda para verificar su evolución, aclaraciones sobre contenedores refrigerados, justificación de la variación de la TIR. La TIR es un indicador de rentabilidad de un proyecto de inversión. Se analiza comparándolo con un costo de oportunidad, en ese caso del TCM con un rendimiento de capital, lo que llevó a concluir que era rentable. Reconoció además que los riesgos comerciales los asume el concesionario, así como que no hay cláusula que se refiera a ingresos mínimos o máximos sujetos a tarifas. Sobre las modificaciones de la demanda expresó que se tomó en cuenta a nivel mundial las tendencias de diferentes puertos con el volumen de la carga. Indicó que en el 2008-2009 se dio una disminución mundial, por lo que se justificó aportar nuevas proyecciones de la demanda, de igual modo, las proyecciones de demanda es un riesgo que lo asume directamente en concesionario. Para los efectos aclaró que el riesgo comercial es un índice de variaciones que se presentan en la demanda, que no llegue el volumen de carga esperado, en estos casos no se da un parámetro de ajuste. Sobre la actualización de la tasa interna de retorno, ante consulta de Nombre141025 señaló –en lo medular-, que se actualizó por el ajuste de los costos de operación: dragado, relleno, así como del costo unitario, volúmenes de la demanda. La deposición de esta testigo pone en evidencia de nuevo, la suficiencia de la información suministrada para el análisis tarifario, lo que implica la improcedencia de las alegaciones de los accionantes sobre la deficiencia de la información y la ausencia de parámetros técnicos objetivos en el establecimiento de la propuesta tarifaria. Sobre la arista estadística, la testigo Nombre141043 , cédula CED110942, estadística, propuesta por la ARESEP, concluyó, las proyecciones de demanda deben tener en cuenta el comportamiento, estimando que los datos proyectados del CNC se ajustaban a la serie histórica y la tendencia fue al crecimiento. Del análisis de esa prueba testimonial técnica se desprende con claridad la contundencia y utilidad de la información puesta a disposición de la Nombre628 para emitir el pronunciamiento que exige el ordinal 21 de la Ley No. 7762. En lo medular, debe indicarse sobre esta evacuación, no existe el desfase histórico que advierte el accionante en los datos utilizados para esos efectos, siendo que la Nombre628 previno el aporte de información actualizada y los datos estadísticos de predicción de carga se consideraron técnicamente viables. Asimismo, la tarifa pondera la totalidad de elementos propios de la concesión dentro de la propuesta de estructura financiera. Ergo, la prueba admitida en esa línea concuerda con las deducciones que se desprenden de la documental, por lo que acorde a los ordinales 82 y 85 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, no se observan las deficiencias apuntadas por las demandantes sobre este particular. En todo caso, la eventual divergencia en los datos estadísticos utilizados por el CNC, ARESEP, Nombre141024 para los efectos de la cuantificación de las tarifas a aplicar a los servicios a la carga y a la nave, puede sustentarse en diversos motivos, como lo son, entre muchos posibles, las fuentes de información o bien, el método de análisis. El accionante reprocha que no se utilizaron fuentes oficiales de información, empero, como se ha señalado, los estudios y detalle de información fueron aportados por Nombre141024 y por el CNC, por lo que, se trata de informes emitidos por autoridades públicas con competencia en el área objeto del contrato, ante lo cual, el alegato carece de respaldo. Ha de insistirse, las variaciones en los citados datos de proyección de demanda si bien pueden ser heterogéneos, tal divergencia no conlleva en sí una causal de nulidad o invalidez de los análisis. Nótese que los promoventes direccionan sus alegatos a poner en evidencia esas supuestas deficiencias en las fuentes de información, alegando que eso puede encarecer las tarifas o bien, afectar la suficiencia o rentabilidad de la concesión, además, que con las proyecciones de demanda no se requiere de una infraestructura portuaria tan amplia, por lo que se pueden reducir costos. En esta dirección se anotan las declaraciones realizadas por el testigo Nombre141044 , ofrecido por CANABA, quien se refirió a las demandas proyectadas para el sector bananero, así como los supuestos costos que con la tarifa unificada propuesta para la TCM, se evitarían a los usuarios del puerto, las que considera, no presentan el ahorro alegado por la concedente. El análisis de su deposición pone en evidencia, al igual que expuso el señor Nombre141038 , quien, como se ha señalado ut supra, concluyó que la obra de la TCM tiene una escala mayor a la necesaria. La ponderación de la prueba ofrecida por los accionantes no permite establecer la disconformidad técnica de las valoraciones realizadas por la Nombre628 y el CNC sobre los costos por servicios a la carga. Se reprochan las fuentes de información, la veracidad de los datos o al menos su validez estadística, pero en el fondo, no se logra acreditar concretamente el impacto que ese tratamiento produciría en las tarifas y en general, en los costos asociados a la operación de la TCM. Ciertamente, a la luz de los preceptos 15, 16 y 160 de la Ley No. Placa1975, los actos públicos deben ajustarse a las reglas unívocas de la ciencia, la técnica, la lógica, conveniencia. Empero, no se ha demostrado esa desatención de tales principios. La sola disonancia de datos de medición de predictibilidad de movilización de carga, no presupone per se la invalidez de los cálculos realizados en ese sentido, máxime cuando no se ha reprochado de manera directa, acto alguno de la Nombre628 sobre ese aspecto, o bien, cuando no se ha establecido que el proceder de ese ente regulador contraviene reglas técnicas que rigen su proceder. Desde ese plano, la formulación de alegaciones que consisten en percepciones de las acciones sobre posibles eventos futuros que puedan llegar a ocurrir con la operación de la terminal de contenedores, no constituyen en si elementos de prueba sobre los cuales pueda descansar una hipotética nulidad de lo actuado. Cabe acotar, los términos del contrato señalan en la cláusula 6.3.6 que los riesgos por la demanda y comerciales, así como sus proyecciones de crecimiento corresponden al concesionario, por lo que el alegato de altos impactos tarifarios no es de recibo en esta etapa del contrato, siendo que es un tema que ante cada escenario ha de ser ponderado a fin de establecer si corresponde a un riesgo que debe ser asumido. Incluso, se reitera, fue la entonces oferente, hoy concesionaria, quien peticionó la revisión y actualización de los datos de volúmenes de demanda, lo que provocó la presentación de nuevas gestiones de parte del CNC a la Nombre628 para actualizar los datos y análisis tarifarios. No debe dejarse de lado que el mismo cartel fijaba la responsabilidad de los oferentes de hacer sus propios estudios, razón por la cual, se peticionó ese ajuste de datos. Por ende, no observa este Tribunal los defectos apuntados, ante lo cual, debe disponerse el rechazo del cargo.

XXV.- Sobre la creación de un monopolio con la operación de la TCM. Considera Nombre141025, el capítulo 9.1 del cartel de licitación es contraria al numeral 46 de la Carta Magna ya que establece un monopolio. Cita el fallo No. 08367-2006 de la Sala Constitucional. Señala, la licitación no cumple con el requisito de la mejor oferta y libre concurrencia. Existió una licitación que considera un mero disfraz, pues no existe la verdadera intención para que varias empresas especialistas logren una participación efectiva, por lo que el concurso se convierte en un monopolio opuesto a la libre concurrencia. Sobre el particular cabe señalar, la condición 9.1 cartelaria señala en lo medular: "Según la especialización planteada por el Plan Maestro de que la TCM será la terminal especializada para el manejo de contenedores del Complejo Portuario Limón/Moín, y la única encargada de atender barcos "Full Containers Vessels" destinados a la importación y exportación de carga hacia y desde Costa Rica, según las fases 2 y 3 del Plan Maestro Portuario que sirve de referencia." -folio 3250 del judicial- El modelo mostrado en el procedimiento busca la especialización en la operación de una terminal portuaria de contenedores en Moín, acorde a los parámetros establecidos por el Plan Maestro levantado por la empresa Royal Haskoning, a tono con las fases 2 y 3 de ese plan. El citado documento, en el numeral 64. -folio 335 del legajo judicial-, recomienda tres fases para el desarrollo de Puerto Moín, definidas con base en proyecciones de tráfico, estimación de plazo realísticamente requerido para la realización y los análisis operacionales. Desde este plano, la Fase 1 integra : a) aumento de la capacidad de la infraestructura existente mediante instalación de equipos, construcción de una nueva Terminal Petrolera, construcción de un muelle relativamente liviano para carga general; b) preparación de la concesión y construcción de un nuevo puerto al oeste del presente puerto que incluye: preparación del diseño preliminar, preparación de los pliegos de licitación, preparación del proceso de licitación pública para atraer un concesionario, firma de contrato con el concesionario y construcción del rompeolas y de la fase 2. Por su parte, la Fase 2 incluye: a) traslado de toda la carga de Limón a Moín y manejo de contenedores en el nuevo puerto. Finalmente, la Fase 3 incluye la extensión del muelle de contenedores con 600 metros adicionales. El procedimiento de licitación pública 2009LI-000001-0200 incluye lo relativo a las fases 2 y 3, en los términos ya indicados. Sobre este aspecto, la licitación pretende otorgar una concesión de obra pública con servicios públicos cuyo objeto, según se ha expuesto, es el diseño, la construcción, operación, mantenimiento de la TCM. Ergo, se trata de un contrato de prestación indirecta de un servicio público y construcción de obra pública. Desde ese plano, ante el alegato de Nombre141025 y Nombre141024 sobre la existencia de un monopolio, cabe precisar, este Tribunal examina el asunto desde la óptica de la validez de lo actuado en sede administrativa teniendo como parámetro de control el Derecho de la Constitución, fuente que en orden a lo establecido por el artículo 8 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, 6, 11, 13, 19, 128, 158 de la Ley No. Placa1975 y el canon 7 de la propia Carta Magna, así como el ordinal 138 inciso d del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. No se trata por ende de un análisis emprendido en el contexto del control concentrado de constitucionalidad que estatuye el ordinal 10 de la Constitución Política, sino del examen de conformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico, de determinadas conductas públicas, ordenamiento que incluye las fuentes jurídicas escritas y no escritas del derecho público. Hecha esta aclaración, cabe señalar, no existe la patología señalada por los promoventes en lo actuado. En efecto, la misma resolución No. 8367-2006 de la Sala Constitucional, en la que el accionante sustenta su reproche, pone en evidencia la validez y legitimidad de un sistema de gestión de prestación delegada (indirecta) de servicios públicos. No existe defecto alguno en la elección de este modelo de prestación delegada de competencias públicas prestacionales. Por el contrario, el mismo numeral 121 inciso 14 de la Carta Magna establece un sistema de concesiones para la explotación de bienes demaniales y en general, la delegación de ese ejercicio prestacional. Desde luego que la elección del concesionario ha de realizarse acorde a los procedimientos y exigencias que para cada caso fije el legislador, dentro de estos, el trámite de licitación pública, en el que, con claridad, han de tutelarse todos los principios y exigencias propias de esta materia, dentro de ellas, la libre concurrencia, igualdad, oferta más favorable, entre otros. La compatibilidad de este modelo de gestión pública con el Derecho de la Constitución ha sido ampliamente analizado por el Tribunal Constitucional, sin que considere este órgano colegiado que en este caso concreto, exista criterio alguno que permita variar lo dispuesto por esa Sala Constitucional, criterios en los que se comparte lo expuesto. Así, sobre el tema se ha indicado en el voto No. 5895-2005: “V.- CONFUSIÓN DEL CONTRATO ADMINISTRATIVO PARA PRESTAR UN SERVICIO PÚBLICO CON UN MONOPOLIO. En el planteamiento del presente amparo subyace una confusión entre el contrato administrativo celebrado para la “prestación de servicios para la creación y funcionamiento de estaciones para la revisión técnica integrada vehicular” con un monopolio. Los servicios públicos, que siempre son de titularidad pública y, por consiguiente, deben ser brindados por un ente público o sus órganos, pueden ser gestionados por éstos de forma directa o indirecta. La gestión directa de un servicio público se produce cuando el ente público y sus órganos cuentan con suficientes recursos o medios humanos, financieros, presupuestarios, materiales y tecnológicos para prestárselo a la colectividad inmediata y directamente, sin ningún tipo de intermediación, organizándolo y desplegando el giro que requiera o demande para satisfacer las necesidades públicas. En ocasiones, los entes públicos y sus órganos, a pesar de ser los titulares de un servicio público, no tienen la capacidad de gestión y de inversión suficiente para brindarlo, sea por carencias de orden presupuestario o limitaciones de recursos y medios, en tales situaciones, se puede recurrir al contrato administrativo de prestación de servicios o a la concesión de servicio público para que sea un particular quien lo preste. Ahora bien, para lograr que un sujeto de Derecho privado brinde un servicio público a través de una concesión o un contrato de prestación de servicios, el ente público titular de éste debe abrir, por imperativo constitucional (artículo 182 de la Constitución Política), un procedimiento administrativo de contratación denominado licitación pública, el cual garantiza la libre concurrencia, participación, igualdad de todos los potenciales y eventuales oferentes, así como la transparencia y publicidad del proceso; pero, sobre todo, su objetivo es que el ente público escoja la mejor oferta que se formula desde un punto de vista financiero y técnico. Una vez adjudicada la licitación pública, cuyo objeto es la prestación o gestión de un servicio público, debe formalizarse el respectivo contrato, transfiriéndole, temporal o provisionalmente –por el tiempo equivalente a la duración del contrato-, una serie de potestades públicas, sin que el ente público pierda, nunca, la titularidad del servicio, tanto que posee amplias potestades de fiscalización y supervisión y puede rescindir o resolver el contrato de prestación de servicios o rescatar, unilateralmente, la concesión de servicio público, asumiendo las eventuales responsabilidades de orden patrimonial frente al co-contratante o concesionario, cuando estime que no se presta de forma eficaz y eficiente o el objeto contractual no se cumple a cabalidad. Es evidente que un contrato administrativo de prestación de servicios o de concesión de servicios públicos no supone la constitución de un monopolio, puesto que, de ser así se caería en el absurdo jurídico de sostener que, absolutamente, todos los contratos celebrados por los entes públicos para el suministro de bienes, la construcción de obras públicas, la concesión o gestión interesada de un servicio público, etc. implicarían la constitución de un monopolio, con los consecuentes efectos nocivos y contraproducentes para la eficaz y eficiente gestión administrativa, la protección del interés general y la satisfacción adecuada y oportuna de las necesidades de la colectividad.” Los términos de ese fallo hacen innecesario abundar sobre el tema. Basta señalar, los servicios públicos en sí, son actividades cuya titularidad corresponde a la Administración, quien la puede delegar en un tercero conforme a los parámetros señalados. Desde ese plano, no es válido el alegato de implementación de un monopolio frente a esos servicios públicos delegados. Con todo, se argumenta, el monopolio se produce por la apariencia de una licitación que lo que pretende es minimizar la participación de otros oferentes. En rigor técnico, los defectos que acusan los promoventes no son propios de un alegato de la creación de un monopolio, sino de violación a los principios de la contratación administrativa, en concreto, el de libre concurrencia, igualdad, transparencia y publicidad. Sin embargo, la demanda se limita a acusar la lesión de estas máximas, sin aportar detalla alguno, fuera del alegato que el procedimiento se constituyó en un disfraz, para sustentar sus reproches. No se indican motivos concretos de actuaciones u omisiones que hayan llevado al quebranto de esos principios, lo que impide a este Tribunal abordar un examen serio de lo alegado. Incluso, ha de reiterarse, la lesión a los principios de la contratación administrativa deben ser invocados en el recurso de objeción contra el cartel de la licitación, lo que no ocurrió por parte de CANABA. Con todo, ya en apartes previos de este fallo se indicó que no se observaba lesión a las máximas señaladas. El hecho que solo una empresa haya ofertado no puede constituirse en indicativo incontrovertible de lo alegado. El principio de igualdad y libre concurrencia, regulado por el ordinal 5 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa busca evitar que en los procedimientos de contratación administrativa se establezcan barreras para la participación de la mayor cantidad de oferentes, de suerte que la Administración licitante cuente con mayores opciones que le permitan concretar la máxima de la oferta más favorable. Sin embargo, comparte este Tribunal las argumentaciones del Estado en cuanto señala, ese principio no puede garantizar que en efecto, se presenten múltiples ofertas, pues la decisión de participar o no dentro de un concurso público solo atañe a los particulares y depende de una serie de factores que no corresponde en este fallo analizar. Con todo, aún en los casos en que sea solo una la plica presentada al concurso, en la medida en que esa propuesta satisfaga los requerimientos que la Administración licitante busca satisfacer con el procedimiento, bien puede realizarse la adjudicación, pues en esos casos, ante el cumplimiento de los requisitos impuestos para esos efectos, la oferta se entiende como favorable. De igual modo, aun cuando se hubieren presentado pluralidad de ofertas, si a juicio de la Administración, ninguna de ellas satisface el interés público base de la licitación, puede declarar desierto el concurso y no adjudicar, según se colige del ordinal 86 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33411-H del 27 de septiembre del 2006. Ese mismo tratamiento viene expuesto en el ordinal 29 de la Ley No. 7762, en cuanto a la adjudicación del contrato incluye la máxima de la oferta más favorable y la posibilidad de declaratoria de concurso desierto en el siguiente sentido: "El contrato se adjudicará obligatoriamente al licitante que formule la mejor oferta económica de entre las declaradas técnicamente aceptables, según la fórmula definida en el cartel, sin perjuicio de la facultad de la administración concedente para desestimar todas las ofertas por no convenir al interés público. Las ofertas presentadas en concursos declarados desiertos o desestimadas todas las ofertas, caducarán junto con el concurso." De ese modo, la amplitud de las ofertas presentadas e n términos cuantitativos, o bien, la formulación de una sola oferta no es un parámetro contundente para aseverar que se ha tutelado o lesionado el principio de libre concurrencia y oferta más favorable. Es lo cierto que las accionantes han postulado a lo largo de este proceso, las normas cartelarias incumplían con los estudios de factibilidad que manda el precepto 21 de la Ley No. 7762 y con ello, privaron la participación de otros oferentes, empero, se ha concluido sobre la inexistencia de ese vicio. Se trata entonces esas alegaciones de conjeturas realizadas por los accionantes que se direccionan, de nuevo, a plantear lo que desde su óptica, debió haber sido el procedimiento, pero esa intencionalidad no lleva, como se propone, a la nulidad de lo actuado. En la especie, las normas concursales fueron debidamente publicitadas, sometidas a varias rondas de recursos de objeción, el cartel fue modificado en varias oportunidades merced de esas medidas de impugnación, de suerte que no se explica cómo lo ocurrido en este procedimiento vulnera los principios comentados. Se trata de un proyecto público que requiere de un alto compromiso financiero por la inversión a realizar en obras y acciones asociadas, lo que desde luego, dentro de un marco de estricta lógica, puede incidir en la decisión de terceros de participar en este tipo de concursos. No observa entonces este Tribunal norma cartelaria que suponga barreras de acceso al procedimiento público de contratación impugnado en los términos que alegan los accionantes, por lo cual, se impone el rechazo del cargo.

XXVI.- Sobre la afectación a la competitividad del país con el funcionamiento de la TCM y la afectación al sector bananero. Nombre141025 argumenta, la operación de la TCM traerá un importante impacto en los costos, lo que pondrá a la fruta local en una situación que le impide la competencia internacional con el inevitable cierre del negocio y pérdida de cientos de empleos en las zonas más necesitadas del país. Acusa, el incremento de costos será de un aproximado de 160%. Sobre el particular cabe mencionar, no existe duda para este Tribunal, ni es objeto de discusión en esta causa, la relevancia que para la economía pública tiene el sector de exportación de banano y piña costarricense. Empero, es precisamente la dinámica y relevancia de las movilizaciones de demanda de esas frutas, uno de los aspectos que ha sustentado el proyecto de la TCM. Nótese que la propuesta básica del Plan Maestro es precisamente el mejoramiento de la infraestructura portuaria en Moín mediante el establecimiento de 3 fases. Dentro de esta programación, los estudios técnicos han ponderado las transacciones y situación del mercado de la piña y el banano. Justamente, en la consulta tarifaria, se actualizaron datos relacionados con estos niveles de movilización de carga, para ajustar los costos de manera tal que el modelo financiero permitiera realizar la inversión cercana a los $998 millones y los costos propios de la operación y mantenimiento de la TCM. Si bien la tarifa inicialmente propuesta era de $169, luego establecida en $223, pese a que la Nombre628 recomendó una tarifa tope de $252, ese ajuste obedeció precisamente a la actualización de datos. En sí, el reproche pretende combatir la tarifa fijada, tema ya tratado, en cuanto a la justificación técnica dada por la ARESEP. Ahora bien, la misma accionante acepta la necesidad de modernizar los puertos que utiliza para el desarrollo de sus actividades comerciales, mostrando empero su desacuerdo en los costos que deben cancelar por esos servicios a la carga y a la nave. Como bien fue señalado en la audiencia única dentro de este proceso, según los datos arrojados por CEPAL, Nombre141035 i ca se coloca en el puesto número 15 en el ranking latinoamericano del movimiento portuario de contenedores (así lo reconoce por ejemplo la testigo Nombre141036 y se puede ver en la página web de la CEPAL según consulta realizada el día 31 de julio del 2012 a las 14 horas Placa27257). Sin embargo, en el ranking del Foro Económico Mundial, considerando el servicio de infraestructura de puertos, Costa Rica se coloca en el puesto 132. Desde ese plano, es evidente que ante el nivel de uso de los servicios, sea comprensible que algunos agentes comerciales prefieran mantener las condiciones actuales de los puertos y no su modernización. Sin embargo, es claro que dentro del proyecto de modernización de puertos, las fases 2 y 3 del Plan Maestro evidencian la relevancia de la TCM. En la audiencia única, se planteó el alegato que la actual infraestructura de los muelles de Limón, acompañada de mejoramiento y dotación de grúas pórticas, permitiría obtener el mismo beneficio que se proyecta con la TCM. En este sentido puede verse a modo de referencia la deposición del señor Nombre44581 , quien manifestó que con el Dirección17041 puede asumir esa operación. Sin embargo, esas intenciones se refieren a decisiones en cuanto al modelo de gestión portuaria. Como se ha señalado, este servicio puede prestarse de manera directa, como se ha venido haciendo por parte de JAPDEVA, o bien de manera indirecta, mediante contratos de concesión. La decisión de mantener la operación directa u optar por la indirecta, es una cuestión de discrecionalidad, que si bien se encuentra sujeta a reglas de la ciencia y de la técnica, lógica y conveniencia, controlable por ende por este Tribunal, su ilegitimidad pende de la acreditación del desapego de esas acciones con el ordenamiento jurídico. Sin embargo, ello no se ha acreditado en este caso. Se plantean alegatos de pérdida de competitividad que resultan antagónicos con la finalidad misma del proyecto, asumiendo esa pérdida en una comparación de costos tarifarios, mediante un cálculo, que se insiste, se hace sobre la base de referentes que no guardan las mismas condiciones y que por ende, su comparabilidad depende de la sumatoria a la tarifa actual de los servicios de JAPDEVA, de los insumos que se incluyen de modo unitario en la tarifa de la TCM. Sin tal ejercicio, la comparación sería por demás sesgada. Para ello, se insiste, no debe considerarse solamente la tasa por servicios a la carga y a la nave, sino además, los costos adicionales por servicios prestados por Nombre141024, como son carga y descarga en predio, costo naviero por demoras, así como tarifas de estibas privadas. Incluso, ese esquema de comparación debería realizarse de manera proyectada, llevando el valor actual de la tarifa de Nombre141024, al momento histórico en que la concesión de la TCM inicie operaciones, en principio, proyectada para el 2015, siendo que la carga económica de $223 de esta última es un valor que a la fecha de inicio de operaciones será la exigible. Ese cálculo se extraña en los reproches formulados.

XXVII.- Sobre el tema, la testigo Nombre141036 , ofrecida por JAPDEVA, señaló en lo fundamental, en el caso de los barcos de contenedores, existen 4 servicios que se dan al barco y 6 a la carga. Dentro de los 4, atención puerto fijo y variable, estadía en puesto de atraque y servicio. En los servicios a la carga, se da muellaje, asistencias varias. Indicó que para cargar o descargar un barco de contenedores, se hace una sumatoria de todos estos servicios para obtener un costo que es de aproximadamente $192. A juicio de esta funcionaria de JAPDEVA, para evaluar si un país es competitivo hay que considerar el costo de la cadena logística y no sólo el costo portuario, estimando que Costa Rica está en desventaja competitiva con otros países, lo que se explica en el rezago de la infraestructura portuaria. Sobre los rubros que distinguen la tarifa que en la actualidad cobra Nombre141024 versus los que propone la TCM, señaló que esta última es un servicio todo incluido, desde la atención al barco, atraque, descarga, carga de contenedores, a diferencia de la estructura de Nombre141024 en la que los servicios se cobran de manera estructurada. Este servicio integrado no lo puede dar Nombre141024 en la actualidad. Lo anterior permite desprender con claridad, la comparación directa que hacen los accionantes entre la tarifa actual y la que cobrará la TCM se sustenta sobre parámetros desiguales, en la medida en que aquella primera no incorpora una serie de variables que son integrados, bajo el concepto de tarifa única, a la TCM. En esta línea, la deposición del señor Nombre141044 -ofrecido por CANABA-, criticó, uno de los argumentos es que las compañías bananeras van a tener ganancias por prescindir de los patios de contenedores. Ante ello señaló, en los predios se hacen muchas labores, se hacen inspecciones de control de calidad, limpieza, reparaciones estructurales y a equipos de refrigeración, se filtra la fruta para exportar un contenedor de primera y otro de segunda. Requieren espacios que permitan tener un colchón de contenedores. Los patios siempre serán necesarios. Acotó, la carga debe ingresar dos días antes de la llegada de la nave. El depósito de la fruta requiere de la existencia de patios. Puede hacerse incurrir en costos que nunca había existido. Si bien esa exposición resalta la existencia de otra serie de costos en la cadena logística, no elimina que la tarifa de la TCM sea integrada, por lo que la variación del 160% se sustenta en una base referencial errada, siendo que no comprende elementos de la cadena logística que la tarifa TCM si considera de manera unitaria. Por otro lado, dicho testigo-perito señaló, requerido por parte de APM Terminals sobre los beneficios de la TCM, señaló que permitiría buques de mayor calado, pero en el marco de barcos bananeros, ninguna compañía va a tener barcos panamax (grandes de más de 1000 teus). Además, indicó que este tipo de barcos pueden generar un mayor beneficio. Cualquier incremento aplicado se debe aplicar al costo de la fruta afectando el estado de competitividad a nivel mundial. No obstante, precisó, el 60% de la exportación de la fruta va en contenedores y el 40% paletizado, porcentaje este último que no utilizaría la TCM. Las manifestaciones del señor Nombre141044 reflejan que si bien se cuestiona el incremento de precios, se reconoce que al menos el 40% de la carga de banano, no utilizaría el servicio de la TCM por ser carga paletizada, con lo cual, de nuevo, el parámetro referencial que permite a Nombre141025 afirmar una variación total del 160% en los precios por servicios, pierde coherencia, al aceptar que al menos un 40% de esa carga, seguirá movilizándose por los servicios brindados por JAPDEVA. Por demás, la testigo Nombre141036 señaló que los costos portuarios representan el 5% de la cadena logística de la actividad comercial (importación exportación), por lo que no se muestra congruencia con el nivel de afectación serio y gravoso que a decir de Nombre141025 les llevaría a la quiebra o exclusión del mercado por falta de oportunidades para competir. Incluso, dicha funcionaria señaló en lo relevante, que los costos de Nombre141024 no son costos fijos, si se compara la infraestructura y equipo, los costos no estarían en alzada sino en equidad. Por su parte, el testigo Nombre141044 indicó que con la nueva infraestructura tendrían un ahorro de $563 por nave considerando ahorro de bunker y estadía. Esto pone en evidencia una tasa de ahorro por supresión de los tiempos hundidos de espera, que si bien pueden vincularse a varios fenómenos o causas, en la medida en que se vinculen con el retraso por ocupación de puesto de embarque, dada la insuficiencia actual de la infraestructura portuaria. Con todo, a raíz de lo alegado por Nombre141044 sobre el uso del 40% de la carga por la modalidad paletizada (que no utilizarán la TCM), cabe indicar, nada en el Plan Maestro hace suponer que los servicios que actualmente presta Nombre141024 van a desaparecer. Se insiste, la TCM es un proyecto de especialización de carga de contenedores full containers, por lo que existirá un régimen de operación complementario en el que existe una operación especializada y la pervivencia de los servicios actuales. Cabe resaltar, la disconformidad de los promoventes sobre las tarifas, estudios de predicción de demanda, entre otros, han sido tema ya de debate. La comprensión integral de esos elementos llevan a considerar la validez técnica del proyecto, de suerte que la afectación aludida no puede sustentarse en meras conjeturas, sino que ha de ampararse en elementos de convicción que en este caso no fueron aportados. La evacuación de la testimonial pericial por el contrario pone en evidencia el rezago de la infraestructura portuaria, su necesidad de modernización, las ventajas comparativas del nuevo modelo de TCM, la operación concurrente pero especializada de servicios portuarios, unificación de costos a trasladar vía tarifas, elementos todos que permiten denegar los argumentos de incorporación de supuestos de afectación a la competitividad.

XXVIII.- Sobre el alegato de invalidez de la TCM por incumplimiento de fase 1. En la fase de conclusiones, el mandatario de Nombre141025 señala, el plan maestro es un proyecto de tres fases que debían cumplirse en orden; primero la rehabilitación del muelle 57 y luego las fases 2 y 3, fases estas las cuales se podían licitar. Es por acto arbitrario de la Administración que se saca la fase 1 y se abordan las fases 2 y 3. Igual alegato sostiene SINTRAJAP, al señalar en esa misma fase de conclusiones, el Plan Maestro planteó 3 fases. La primera fase incluía la construcción del muelle adicional 57. Fases 2 y 3 debían efectuarse luego de cumplir con fase 1 que según el plan maestro es urgente y es la forma más rápida para satisfacer el servicio público. Toda la prueba demuestra que el plan maestro no se cumple tal y como fue planteado por Nombre141027 . A la fecha no existe documento que acredite que la AP motivara los cambios celebrados al plan maestro, con la particularidad que las fases 2 y 3 fueron divididas en cinco secciones sin cumplir la fase 1, aunque debía estar en su mayoría lista en el 2011. Añade el apoderado de Nombre141024, toda la prueba demuestra que el plan maestro no se cumple tal y como fue planteado por Nombre141027 . A la fecha no existe documento que acredite que la AP motivara los cambios celebrados al plan maestro, con la particularidad que las fases 2 y 3 fueron divididas en cinco secciones sin cumplir la fase 1, aunque debía estar en su mayoría lista en el 2011. Aduce, se acreditó que se dieron graves incumplimientos. No se cumplió fase 1. Sobre el tema cabe destacar, es claro, como se ha señalado, que la licitación se ha fundamentado en gran medida en el contenido del Plan Maestro para el desarrollo portuario Limón/Moín realizado por la empresa Royal Haskoning. Según se ha indicado ut supra, ese plan, en el numeral 64. -folio 335 del legajo judicial-, recomienda tres fases para el desarrollo de Puerto Moín, definidas con base en proyecciones de tráfico, estimación de plazo realísticamente requerido para la realización y los análisis operacionales. Desde este plano, la Fase 1 integra a) aumento de la capacidad de la infraestructura existente mediante instalación de equipos, construcción de una nueva Terminal Petrolera, construcción de un muelle relativamente liviano para carga general; b) preparación de la concesión y construcción de un nuevo puerto al oeste del presente puerto que incluye: preparación del diseño preliminar, preparación de los pliegos de licitación, preparación del proceso de licitación pública para atraer un concesionario, firma de contrato con el concesionario y construcción del rompeolas y de la fase 2. Por su parte, la Fase 2 incluye: a) traslado de toda la carga de Limón a Moín y manejo de contenedores en el nuevo puerto. Finalmente, la Fase 3 incluye la extensión del muelle de contenedores con 600 metros adicionales. El procedimiento de licitación pública 2009LI-000001-0200 incluye lo relativo a las fases 2 y 3, en los términos ya indicados. Se encuentra fuera de toda duda, a la fecha de instauración de la licitación de marras, las autoridades competentes no habían cumplido con el citado plan en cuanto a las obras e inversiones a realizar respecto de la fase 1, que buscaba la modernización del denominado Muelle 57. Incluso, dentro de la audiencia única realizada en este trámite preferente, el apoderado de Nombre141024 ofreció nueva prueba documental, visible a folios 5276-5392 del legajo judicial, consistentes en piezas documentales que ponen en evidencia la iniciación de acciones concretas para tratar de cumplir con las tareas propias de la citada fase 1. Así, se incluye un acuerdo para el levantamiento de huelga en Limón (f.5276-5277), cartel de licitación pública con financiamiento para el suministro de puesta en marcha de grúa nueva portacontenedores sobre rieles en puerto Moín (f. Placa27258), corrección al acuerdo No. 1004-2011 carteles de los equipos portuarios reach staker, carretas y cabezales, referente a la licitación pública con financiamiento 2011LN-000000-00 (f. 5323-5355), carteles de licitación de licitaciones públicas bajo la figura de financiamiento para la adquisición de equipo portuario (f. 5356-5392). Ahora bien, para este Tribunal, es necesario llamar la atención a Nombre141024 y al CNC sobre la necesidad de adoptar las acciones concretas que permitan cumplir con la fase 1 prevista en el Plan Maestro aludido. La relevancia de la modernización de esa terminal portuaria es tan relevante como el establecimiento de la obra pública pretendida con el proyecto TCM. De hecho, este Tribunal estima, la completez de la funcionalidad integral de esa obra, se produce con la operatividad prevista para el muelle 57, acorde al diseño previsto en el Plan Maestro. De ese modo, la coherencia de las acciones públicas exige direccionar los esfuerzos debidos para concretar esas obras de la fase 1, complementariamente a los marcos de acción que se proyectan dentro del esquema y cronograma de las fases 2 y 3. De ahí que sea menester realizar un llamado de atención a las autoridades públicas respecto de sus obligaciones jurídicas en este sentido. En efecto, el Plan Maestro abarca puerto de Moín pero tiene connotaciones importantes para el puerto de Limón. La primera fase implicaba construcción de puesto petrolero, puesto 57 y equipamiento de los puertos. En el contexto del Plan Maestro, era de inmediata implementación, y estaba proyectada a ser culminada en el año 2011, pues no existía ningún puerto en la costa que pudiera dar atención al problema portuario. Segunda fase es lo que se denomina TCM que es un nuevo puerto. Está prevista entre el 2016 y el 2020. El Plan señala que va a operar cuando se traslada la manipulación de la carga a Moín. Acorde al Plan, la i mportancia de la fase 1 era la inmediatez de todos los elementos para hacerlo de manera rápida y eficiente. Ninguna otra solución portuaria podía hacerse tan rápido. Lo anterior se desprende de la lectura misma del documento emitido por la empresa Royal Haskoning, pero además, se desprende de la deposición del señor Nombre44581 , ofrecido por SINTAJAP como testigo-perito. Bajo ese prisma, el citado testigo, consideró los principales problemas del complejo Limón Moín que se solventarían con fase 1 era la disminución de la tasa de ocupación, pues se tendría un puesto de atraque más, además del equipamiento. Lo anterior pone en evidencia la relevancia de culminar al menor tiempo posible, la fase 1. Sin embargo, pese a que este colegio respeta la tesis de los accionantes, no comparte el enfoque que se realiza en cuanto a la invalidez de las decisiones adoptadas en el contexto de las fases 2 y 3, por no haberse culminado la fase 1. En efecto, del análisis realizado de la prueba documental, en concreto, del Plan Maestro, así como de la deposición testimonial del señor Nombre33221, Nombre2401 y el señor Nombre5836, no se obtiene el ligamen inescindible que exponen los accionantes entre las fases 2 y 3 concretadas mediante la licitación objeto de cuestionamiento y la fase 1. Como se ha señalado, el Plan es un solo concepto, empero, las fases pueden levantarse individualmente, pues fuera del marco de la conveniencia, no existe sujeción técnica infranqueable para sostener que sin la fase 1 completada, no podían realizarse acciones para la fase 2 y 3. Desde ese plano, la licitación que tiene por objeto la TCM si bien forma parte de un proyecto integral para la modernización de los puertos, en términos de validez no se condiciona o depende de la culminación de la fase 1. Son infraestructuras que ostentan autonomía una de la otra, al margen de que guarden un ligamen en el contexto de un proyecto unitario. Bajo ese contexto, la dilación en las acciones de cumplimiento de la fase 1 justificaría las dilaciones o retrasos en las demás fases, poniendo en riesgo la intencionalidad propia de todo el proyecto. Como se ha señalado, ciertamente se ha dado un descuido de las obras e inversiones de equipamiento que sustentan la fase 1, empero, ello no limita la legitimidad de las contrataciones iniciadas en el contexto de las fases siguientes. Se trata por ende de una secuencia deseable, pero no obligatoria. Ergo, no existe motivo de nulidad en ese proceder, advirtiendo eso sí la necesidad que Nombre141024 emprenda de manera inmediata las acciones para sujetarse al plan de cumplimiento de la fase 1, sin que la implementación de la TCM constituya una justificante para dejar en descuido obras importantes para el interés nacional y en concreto, para el desarrollo socio-económico de la Vertiente Atlántica. Por otro lado, ante la alegación que el Muelle 57 con algún grado de inversión puede temporalmente hacer las mismas tareas de prestación de servicios portuarios que la TCM, se insiste, se trata de una decisión pública sobre el modelo de gestión utilizado para el desarrollo de un servicio público y la construcción de una obra portuaria. Bien puede debatirse, en un plano eminentemente ideológico, las bondades y desventajas de cada modelo (prestación directa o indirecta), empero, sería un análisis que se escapa del objeto de esta contienda, en la medida en que la base técnica de lo decidido por las autoridades públicas, no ha logrado ser refutada, pasando el reproche a ser de debate de decisiones e intenciones, más no así de validez o no de esas conductas.

XXIX.- Sobre las modificaciones al cartel. En la fase de conclusiones las accionantes reprochan que en este concurso público se dieron 13 variaciones al cartel de licitación, lo que refleja lo poco transparente del proceso. En sí, ese reproche no se ajusta a la técnica debida, siendo que los accionantes se limitan a censurar el acto genérico de modificaciones al cartel de licitación, sin aportar dato alguno o agravio concreto de la forma en que esos cambios en las pautas cartelarias generan algún grado de invalidez. Como se ha señalado ut supra, el numeral 3 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, en relación al canon 4 de la Ley No. 7762 establecen que en materia de contratos públicos, el régimen de nulidades será el regulado por la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Desde ese plano, cabe precisar, en la materia de marras, impera un principio de sustancialidad de las nulidades, según la cual, solo puede producir nulidad de las conductas públicas los vicios sustanciales que generen estado de indefensión o bien, deficiencias que de haberse evitado, hubieran permitido decisión diversa. Así se desprende del ordinal 223 de la citada Ley No. 6227/78. Nótese que el numeral 128 de ese cuerpo legal entiende como validez como la conformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico y el canon 158 ejusdem, conceptualiza como invalidez precisamente la disconformidad sustancial con ese referente normativo. Desde ese plano, no es cualquier deficiencia del acto administrativo -de la voluntad pública- la que lleva a la supresión por nulidad, sino solo aquella que confrontada con el plexo normativo que regula ese comportamiento en particular, es sustancialmente disconforme. De ese modo, cuando el vicio alegado sea superable, por no encajar dentro del presupuesto señalado, puede ser saneado o convalidado, según lo fijan los preceptos 187 y 188 de la Ley No. 6227/78. Tal doctrina subyace además en la letra del ordinal 197 del Código Procesal Civil en cuanto señala en lo relevante: "... La nulidad sólo se decretará cuando sea absolutamente indispensable su pronunciamiento para evitar indefensión o para orientar el curso normal del procedimiento. Tampoco deberá prosperar si es posible reponer el trámite o corregir la actuación, sin perjuicio de los demás actos procesales. ..." En contratación administrativa, además impera un principio de eficiencia y de eficacia, en virtud del cual, las imperfecciones del procedimiento no anulan la licitación, salvo que sean vicios sustanciales. Visto así, las variaciones al cartel solo pueden producir nulidad de lo actuado en la medida en que se lesionen sustancialmente los procedimientos o en general, vulneren los principios propios de la contratación administrativa, dentro de ellos, la igualdad y libre concurrencia. Acorde a lo preceptuado por el ordinal 51 del Decreto No. 33411-H "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", el cartel consiste en "... el reglamento específico de la contratación que se promueve y se entienden incorporadas a su clausulado todas las normas jurídicas y principios constitucionales aplicables al respectivo procedimiento. Deberá constituir un cuerpo de especificaciones técnicas, claras, suficientes, concretas, objetivas y amplias en cuanto a la oportunidad de participar. Para su confección, la Administración podrá contratar o solicitar la asistencia de personas físicas o jurídicas, especializadas en la materia de que se trate, siempre que no tengan ningún interés particular directo ni indirecto en el negocio, cuando no tuviere en su organización los recursos técnicos necesarios para ello." Dadas estas características y utilidad para el procedimiento, es usual en el contexto de contrataciones públicas complejas como la que en este fallo se analiza, las modificaciones a ese pliego de condiciones, facultad que se encuentra reconocida en el ordinal 60 del citado Decreto No. 33411-H. Cabe indicar empero, el cartel puede ser modificado de oficio o a gestión de parte. En esa última hipótesis, las variaciones pueden producirse por la formulación del respectivo recurso de objeción (art. 81 Ley No. 7494, 34 de la Ley No. 7762). Ergo, no observa este Tribunal como la simple variación del cartel de la licitación, puede generar nulidad, sino se manifiestan motivos concretos que permitan analizar la afectación a situaciones concretas. Se insiste, en la medida en que esas alteraciones afecten la libre concurrencia, se configuraría un vicio que puede llevar a la nulidad de lo actuado, empero, sería ese un tema a acreditar por parte de quien invoca la causal de nulidad. El cartel debe potenciar la mayor participación posible. A modo de referencia, sobre la prohibición de establecer condiciones que atenten contra la libertad de concurrencia, el numeral 52 del decreto 33411-H indica que "...El cartel, no podrá imponer restricciones, ni exigir el cumplimiento de requisitos que no sean indispensables o resulten convenientes al interés público, si con ello limita las posibilidades de concurrencia a eventuales participantes. ..." En consecuencia, la sola formulación y afirmación genérica en el sentido que esas modificaciones causan nulidad, no pasa de ser un alegato genérico, propio de apreciaciones subjetivas a partir de las cuales se conjetura una hipotética nulidad, que en definitiva no ha ocurrido, y que por otro lado, no concede a este Tribunal parámetros concretos de análisis. Lo mismo ha de indicarse sobre el alegato de Nombre141024 de la falta de publicación del resumen del cartel del artículo 21.5 de la Ley No. 7762. Ante este argumento, este cuerpo colegiado comparte las manifestaciones de la CGR sobre la aplicación del principio de eficiencia y eficacia en las contrataciones públicas. El accionante se limita a exponer ese reproche desde un plano formalista sin señalar en concreto, la forma en que la supuesta omisión de ese trámite, ha generado un vicio sustancial que afecte la tutela de los principios de igualdad y libre concurrencia en las licitaciones públicas. Para ello debe remitirse a lo arriba expuesto sobre la sustancialidad de las nulidades como pilar interpretativo dentro del esquema de análisis de validez de las conductas públicas, como derivación además de las máximas contenidas en los ordinales 168 y 176 de la Ley No. 6227/78 que postulan la presunción de validez de los actos. Se extraña esa argumentación y construcción discursiva que permita concatenar lo alegado con el efecto lesivo de esas supuestas incorrecciones, lo que sería determinante e indispensable para abordar el ejercicio deliberativo que posibilitara llegar a determinar la invalidez argumentada. Nótese que en la fase de refrendo la misma CGR no detectó deficiencias sustanciales en el trámite de la licitación, lo que pone en evidencia la conformidad jurídica de esas actuaciones. Ciertamente la acción de Nombre141025 se direcciona además contra ese acto de refrendo, empero, existiendo un análisis técnico como el aludido, la formulación debida de este cargo, al margen del análisis que luego se abordará sobre el citado refrendo contralor, exigía proposiciones concretas de nulidad. Ante la imperfección del alegato entonces, y al no mostrarse, del análisis realizado por este Tribunal lesión a los principios de la contratación, debe disponerse en consecuencia el rechazo del cargo en cuestión.

XXX.- Sobre las concesiones dadas por la concedente en el contrato. Los accionantes reprochan la invalidez del contrato de concesión alegando que dentro de este se dieron una serie de concesiones o facilidades que no estaban presentes dentro del cartel de licitación y que de haber estado presentes hubieran permitido la participación de una mayor cantidad de oferentes. Con independencia del análisis concreto que de cada una de las supuestas deferencias contractuales otorgadas por la Administración concedente cabe señalar, de nuevo, la demanda en este sentido se limita a señalar la existencia de un hipotético vicio, sin presentar una construcción técnica adecuada de la forma en cómo esas deficiencias pueden llegar a producir nulidad. En efecto, como se ha puesto en evidencia a lo largo de este fallo, muchas de las argumentaciones de los accionantes consisten en formulaciones discursivas genéricas en las que se omite presentar un detalle de análisis particularizado de la forma en que los vicios que acusan efectivamente se han producido y a su vez producen el grado de invalidez que pretende. Ciertamente en los procesos regulados por el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo impera un principio de verdad real de los hechos, acorde a los ordinales 82 y 85 de ese cuerpo legal. Empero, tal principio opera para la dinámica probatoria, y aún en ese tópico, no supone que el proceso sea de corte inquisitivo en el que el juzgador pueda liberar o dispensar a las partes de su deber de acreditar los hechos en que sustentan sus pedimentos. Por el contrario, el numeral 58 en relación al 63, ambos del CPCA, establece, junto con el ordinal 317 del Código Procesal Civil -de aplicación supletoria por la cláusula de integración del precepto 220 CPCA-, el principio de carga dinámica de la prueba, que exige a las partes el deber de acreditar sus hechos o defensas. Desde el plano de las pretensiones anulatorias ello supone también el deber de las partes de indicar con precisión los motivos y causas de invalidez de las conductas cuya supresión se peticiona. Esto atiende a que fuera de los casos previstos en el numeral 182 de la LGAP, el juzgador no puede revisar de oficio la validez de las conductas públicas. Incluso, en el contexto del análisis de conductas conexas, en determinados supuestos esa ponderación oficiosa sería pertinente, como es el caso de la nulidad por accesoriedad del canon 164.2 LGAP, pero en otros, es menester que las partes invoquen los motivos de nulidad que han de ser ponderados. Lo opuesto llevaría al simplismo de solicitar al juzgador que revise la validez de un acto público, para que al margen de las causas invocadas, analice todos los elementos de aquel, relevando por ende al accionante de su deber de argumentación. Ante el reproche concreto, se indica únicamente, de no haberse dado esas incorporaciones se hubieran aportado más ofertas, pero no se detalla en modo alguno como ese efecto se hubiera producido, ante lo cual, los reproches bajo examen carecen de base empírica, siendo por ende meras especulaciones, formulaciones conjeturales que no se sostienen en elementos solventes, ni de argumentación, ni de prueba. Para ello, sería imperativo que en efecto se vulnerara el principio de libre participación, igualdad y concurrencia, lo que no se ha acreditado, pero que en todo caso, como adelante se analizará, este Tribunal no desprende en el caso de marras. Ahora bien, llama la atención a este órgano colegiado, que los principales afectados con la supuesta alteración al principio de libre concurrencia, no se apersonaran al proceso a plantear tal circunstancia. En efecto, ningún interesado en el desarrollo del proyecto de la TCM -potencial oferente-, ha acudido a esta sede a señalar el defecto que las partes reprochan. Si bien ello no es indicativo de no existir nulidades, lo cierto del caso es que consiste en un parámetro referencial que pone en evidencia la poca afectación que para los efectos del derecho tutelado en el artículo 5 de la Ley No. 7494 se produce. Cabe resaltar, esta norma indica: "En los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, se respetará la igualdad de participación de todos los oferentes potenciales. /Los reglamentos de esta Ley o las disposiciones que rijan los procedimientos específicos de cada contratación, no podrán incluir ninguna regulación que impida la libre competencia entre los oferentes potenciales. (...)" De ese modo, la nulidad alegada solo podría decretarse cuando se acredite que se ha vulnerado ese principio, lo que se insiste, acá no ha sucedido. En concreto se presentan las siguientes cuestiones que a decir de los accionantes no estaban consignados expresamente en el cartel: a) la posibilidad de presentar una oferta alternativa: de la revisión del expediente y de la diversa y abundante prueba que se presentó en este caso no se ubica la posibilidad de presentar una oferta alternativa. Las partes accionantes no señalan ese elemento de manera concreta. Por el contrario, la plica de APM Terminals lo que incluye es una oferta de descuento que fue aceptada por la Administración; b) declaración del proyecto de interés público: no se observa como esa declaratoria, potestativa de la Administración, puede generar una ventaja que lleve a la vulneración de la libre concurrencia. Es claro que desde el inicio el proyecto pretende satisfacer un interés público de relevancia como fue consignado incluso desde el mismo plan maestro y luego en el mismo cartel de licitación se hace referencia a la trascendencia pública del proyecto de la TCM. Así puede verse, v.gr., a folio 3202 vuelto del judicial, que contiene la cláusula 1.1 del cartel, "Justificación del proceso licitatorio". En todo caso, la declaratoria de interés público de un proyecto es una potestad discrecional de la Administración, que dicho sea de paso, acá no se ha cuestionado; c) compromiso de coadyuvar en la tramitación de estudios básicos de oleajes y propagación, estudios de navegación, agitación, cambio de la línea de costa, estudios de suelos y ambientales, fuentes de materiales: acorde a lo señalado en el cartel de licitación y en el contrato de concesión, temas ya analizados, esos estudios corresponden al concesionario. Sin embargo, es innegable que dentro de los contratos públicos se impone un deber de colaboración mutua para correcta ejecución del contrato, lo que desde luego no implica un desplazamiento de las obligaciones a cumplir en la dinámica contractual. De ese modo, ese deber de colaboración es parte ínsita del contrato al margen de su expresión formal dentro del contrato. buscar la todos estos trámites son obligatorios para el concesionario y la obligación de colaboración de la Administración existe, con o sin aceptación escrita de su deber de colaborar. El compromiso de colaboración no pasa de ser eso, no traduce beneficios patrimoniales de ninguna especie y no ocasiona ventaja indebida para el concesionario; d) compromiso de facilitar espacio físico en tierra, para instalación de oficinas y campamento del concesionario durante etapa de construcción: según lo argumenta el CNC, ese compromiso no constituye una cesión de la propiedad pública, sino una habilitación de uso que colabora y facilita las labores de inspección y control del destino, almacenaje y manipulación de materiales. Los accionantes no rebaten el alegato del CNC en cuanto a que ese compromiso fue pactado para obtener un descuento en la tarifa por los servicios portuarios. Esto se evidencia a juicio de este Tribunal en el hecho que la tarifa aprobada por Nombre628 fue de $252 en tanto que la incorporada en el contrato -en la versión final del cartel- fue de $223, lo que muestra la verosimilitud de lo invocado por el CNC; e) colaboración en la obtención de permisos de viabilidad ambiental, de permisos de Salud, Autorización de Aguas, servicios de electricidad, colaboración para autorización de pólizas de seguro y permisos municipales: ante el mencionado deber de colaboración, es claro que en el curso de la tramitología de la obtención de la VAL (viabilidad ambiental definitiva), el concesionario requiere de obtener constancias, certificaciones o información que ha de suministrar la concedente, por lo que no se observa ventaja comparativa que lleve a vulnerar los principios aludidos arriba. De igual modo, partiendo que existe a la fecha la Nombre141029 (viabilidad ambiental potencial) del proyecto, los trámites ante entidades financieras, requieren información pública que los entes públicos han de emitir, por lo que no conculca principio alguno. Debe recordarse que el concurso incluye el financiamiento de la terminal portuaria, por lo que este aspecto exige la coordinación y colaboración debida. De esa manera, la facilitación y colaboración prevista respecto de esta particular, no resulta espuria como se recrimina; f) El Estado coadyuvaría designando el sitio para disposición de material de dragado que no se utilice como relleno: es tarea ordinaria del Estado aprobar el sitio de disposición de esos materiales, de donde ningún compromiso extraordinario se adquiere, ni ventaja que no fuese prevista en el cartel como para modificar la intención de participar o no en el procedimiento; g) El Estado designaría la fuente de extracción de materiales para el relleno si fuera requerido para la construcción de la TCM: el contrato se refiere a una gestión indirecta de obras públicas, empero, no debe perderse de vista que se trata de una obra propiedad del Estado (en sentido amplio), por lo que es menester que autorice la fuente de materiales que llegase a ser necesaria para la construcción, sin que ello constituya un costo adicional para el Estado o una ventaja en términos del concurso para el concesionario. Aunado a ello, tal y como menciona el CNC, tales autorizaciones estarían sujetas a las regulaciones del Reglamento para la actividad minera del Estado y sus contratistas, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 19789-MIRENEM de 25 de junio de 1990, publicado en la Gaceta no. 145 del 3 de agosto de 1990; h) que el Estado brindaría todas las facilidades del caso para la extracción y disposición del material de dragado y en la obtención de permisos del MINAET y el SETENA: ese compromiso es inherente al deber de colaboración señalado. Obtenidos los permisos sería iluso pensar en la improcedencia de ese deber de colaboración, el cual, se insiste, es de principio. De ese modo, no incorpora ventaja comparativa alguna que constituya una ventaja de manera que vulnere la igualdad y libre concurrencia; i) que el Estado solicitaría la autorización para la explotación que se requiere del Departamento de Minas del MINAET a favor del concesionario: como se ha señalado, esta materia se regula por el Decreto No. 19789-MIRENEM, lo que no encuentra excepción por tratarse de contratos de obra pública o una ventaja a favor del concesionario, ergo es el Estado el titular de la obra y quien debe peticionar esas autorizaciones; j) que el Nombre5059 se compromete a dar inicio con las operaciones provisionales con el primer puesto de atraque de una fase 2A que no existía en el cartel: esta eventualidad permite la puesta en operación de un primer puesto de atraque antes de las fechas previstas en el cartel, lo que supone una ventaja a favor de los potenciales usuarios de la TCM, los que podrían utilizar este sistema de manera voluntaria en tanto no se da el traslado definitivo y total por criterio de especialización del transporte de contenedores tipo full container. No aprecia este Tribunal que constituya un elemento que sustente la nulidad peticionada. Así las cosas, en síntesis, debe disponerse el rechazo de este cargo. En todo caso, debe remitirse a lo señalado respecto del principio de eficiencia dentro de los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, que busca la elección de la oferta más conveniente al interés público, prevaleciendo el fondo sobre la forma.

XXXI.- Sobre la incidencia en este proceso del informe rendido por la Asamblea Legislativa. Las promoventes presentan al proceso como prueba documental informe rendido por la Asamblea Legislativa, titulado "Informe Especial que investigará y Analizará todos los Procesos de Concesión que ha otorgado el Estado costarricense, o esté por otorgar al amparo de la Ley No. Placa20097 y su modificación parcial contenida en la Ley No. 8643. Informe APM Terminals Central América." En este documento, visible a folios 4134-4290 del legajo judicial (tomo VII), se realiza un diagnóstico por parte de ese Poder de la República sobre los términos en que se otorgó la concesión de la TCM dentro de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-0200. Ese documento realiza un extenso análisis sobre dicha contratación, ponderando una serie de temas que han sido ponderados en el presente fallo, dentro de estos, la factibilidad ambiental (tercera parte, pag. 54-86 del citado informe), comparecencia de las partes interesadas y conclusiones. Estas conclusiones pueden verse a partir del folio 147 y hasta el 157 de ese informe (planas 4271-4281 del judicial). Este Tribunal se ha abocado al análisis a fondo de la compleja y cuantiosa prueba documental y testimonial que fue admitida en este proceso, incluyendo expedientes administrativos y judiciales, dentro de lo cual, ha ponderado con el rigor debido las deliberaciones consignadas en el informe vertido por la Asamblea Legislativa. Es decir, se trata de un documento que ha sido ponderado por este Tribunal en su examen de este caso. Sin embargo, pese a que se respeta por demás ese ejercicio de control político-parlamentario, es claro que no condiciona en modo alguno el análisis que está llamado a realizar este órgano jurisdiccional. No resulta vinculante ese dictamen para las decisiones de esta jurisdicción, siendo que no existe norma expresa que impregne de tal fortaleza y jerarquía a las ponderaciones de esa instancia legislativa. El principio de autonomía del juzgador cuya base radica en el texto del ordinal 153 y 154 de la Carta Magna (en relación al 166 ejusdem), sustenta la ausencia de elemento vinculante de ese referente documental. Con todo, se ha considerado como un elemento más de análisis en este caso, aportado para engrosar y fortalecer los elementos de convicción a contemplar para la decisión finalmente adoptada en esta resolución. Desde esa arista de examen, ante esa característica de no constituirse como un referente vinculante, debe expresarse, lo resuelto hasta el momento no encaja en su mayoría con lo que ese análisis legislativo comprende, lo que desde luego, no causa nulidad alguna en lo resuelto en esta sede. Nótese que el mismo informe advierte de la existencia de estos procesos judiciales. Las recomendaciones allí vertidas se direccionan a instancias públicas que son demandadas en esta causa, razón por la cual, para efectos de claridad, se deja constancia de la debida ponderación de ese informe, el que no es objeto de cuestionamiento, pero que tampoco ha limitado el análisis de este Tribunal en este caso concreto.

XXXII.- Sobre la ampliación de la demanda de Nombre141025. En escrito presentado en fecha 12 de abril del 2012, Nombre141025 presenta escrito de ampliación de la demanda, (folios 4291-4366 del principal), en el cual formula la siguiente pretensión: "Principal: La declaración de nulidad de los siguientes actos administrativos: 1.- El acto de adjudicación realizada por parte de Nombre141024 en el acuerdo No. 73-11, artículo II-a de la sesión ordinaria No. 08-2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 2.- El acto del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones en el acuerdo número 2 de la sesión extraordinaria No. 2-2011 del 28 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 3.- El acuerdo de adjudicación realizado por el Poder Ejecutivo conformado por la Presidenta de la República, el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, el Ministro de Hacienda y firmado el 01 de Marzo del 2011, publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2011 de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 4. El cartel de licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 5.- El contrato que suscribió el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOIN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín, con fecha del 30 de agosto del 2011. 6.- La adenda No. 1 al Contrato de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Moín, firmada el día 29 de noviembre del 2011 y suscrita por el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200. 7.- El nuevo contrato de fecha 13 de febrero del 2012, suscrito por el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 promovida para "Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín". 8.- El oficio DCA-0692 por parte de la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República con fecha de 21 de marzo del 2012, en el cual concede refrendo al contrato derivado de la licitación pública internacional Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 promovida para "Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín". 9.- Se condene en costas procesales y personales de forma solidaria a las partes demandadas. Pretensiones subsidiarias: En el supuesto de que el Tribunal desestime las pretensiones principales, solicitamos lo siguiente: 1.- La declaración de nulidad del supuesto económico de la proyección de volumen, utilizado en la fórmula de la estructura tarifaria de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, señalada en el capítulo 11, apartado 7.2 de la misma dado en el Plan Maestro y actualizado con base al estudio dado por la empresa ICICOR DE COSTA RICA, que sirven de sustento para establecer la tarifa de $223. 2.- Exigir a la administración concedente generar sus propias estimaciones de volúmenes de carga, utilizando los datos actualizados de años recientes y que se generan en los informes anuales de JAPDEVA. 3.- Dadas las actuales condiciones de baja de interés a nivel mundial y al estímulo que ofrecen los gobiernos para no caer en una nueva recesión, se valoren los costos de financiamiento de la deuda y el reconocimiento a las ganancias de capital que el modelo financiero contiene. 4.- Rebajar la tasa interna de retorno del 17.5% al 15%; nivel que se incrementó con el argumento de la crisis, pero que la misma administración reconoce que esta es cíclica." XXXIII.- En su mayoría, las alegaciones de la accionante reiteran sobre puntos formulados inicialmente en la demanda y que versan sobre aspectos que ya han sido ponderados en este fallo. La diferencia y aporte que se presenta es el cuestionamiento del refrendo otorgado por la CGR al contrato objeto de impugnación, señalando la promovente que es la primera vez desde la entrada en vigencia del CPCA, que ese tipo de acto se cuestiona. Ante ello, se reitera, la accionante sustenta la mayoría de reclamos sobre normas cartelarias contra las cuales en su momento oportuno no formuló las objeciones que le habilita el ordenamiento jurídico aplicable, por lo que se trataría de alegatos que no son atendibles por la aplicación del ya mencionado principio preclusivo que impera en este tipo de materia técnica. La impugnación del cartel una vez que el contrato ya está adjudicado y emitido el contrato, contraviene el principio de buena fe y en determinados casos puede considerarse como un abuso procesal, en la medida en que desatiende la relevancia de la fase de constitución, publicación e impugnación del cartel, cuya naturaleza jurídica es de suyo relevante para proseguir con el curso normal del procedimiento. Ya se ha señalado que no cabe la alegación de nulidad de la adjudicación por supuestas deficiencias del cartel, cuando este último no fue cuestionado en su momento. Práctica contraria llevaría a la posibilidad de burlar el sistema de impugnación de estos casos, en franco detrimento de la certeza y seguridad jurídica que resultan relevantes en una materia de contratación administrativa que tiene por fin el aprovisionamiento de bienes y servicios para la prestación de servicios públicos o realización de actividades propia de las competencias de las Administraciones Públicas. Tal aspecto es considerado puntualmente por este Tribunal, no como mecanismo de excepción de control de validez de actos públicos, sino como el dimensionamiento objetivo de las reglas de cuestionamiento que prevalecen en estas lides por criterio de seguridad jurídica. Por ende, hecha esa aclaración, de seguido se presenta una descripción sumaria de las alegaciones o institutos que conforman la ampliación de la demanda, señalando en cada caso, cuáles de estos ya han sido ponderados en este fallo, pues dada la magnitud del presente asunto, lo voluminoso del expediente y alegatos, así como la extensión del análisis hasta ahora realizado, se tornaría cansino e innecesario, reiterar los exámenes ya apuntados, salvo que el aporte de elementos novedosos, así lo exija, aclarando no obstante que en cuanto al análisis del refrendo, será tratado en una sección aparte.

XXXIV.- Sobre la supuesta lesión a los principios de la contratación. En un primer plano Nombre141025 alega lesión al principio de legalidad y transparencia de los procedimientos, por lo que no puede cambiarse ninguna de las condiciones impuestas por el cartel. Este tema ya ha sido abordado con antelación, señalando que la complejidad de estos procedimientos exijen, no en pocas ocasiones, mutaciones o variaciones del cartel. Empero, ya suscrito el contrato, la Administración tiene un conjunto de potestades exorbitantes dentro de las cuales se incluye modificación unilateral del contrato prevista en el artículo 12 de la Ley No. 7494. Tal y como expone el Estado, tesis que comparte este Tribunal, todo contrato está afecto a un principio de mutabilidad que posibilita su ajuste a las condiciones y contexto real a fin de tutelar la debida cobertura del interés público que lo sustenta. Así se ha reconocido entre muchas, en la sentencia No. 998-98 de la Sala Constitucional en la que sobre este principio se ha establecido que la administración cuenta con los poderes y prerrogativas necesarias para introducir modificaciones a los contratos, con el objeto de que cumplan con el fin público asignado que debe proteger y realizar. Ciertamente el contrato en tesis de principio debe suscribirse en los términos previstos originalmente en el cartel, no que obsta para la modificación para ajustarlo al interés público en casos que así lo requieran. Incluso esas variaciones pueden derivar de adaptabilidad de condiciones no ponderadas en el cartel, o bien, por imperativo del refrendo contralor. En suma, ya se ha establecido que las variaciones al cartel en este concurso público se realizaron sin desmedro de los principios aplicables a esas tareas. Asimismo, la redacción final del contrato incorpora aspectos incluidos por aspectos de conveniencia del interés público, tema en el cual ya se determinó ut supra, no existe irregularidad alguna. Por demás, de nuevo, se trata de una formulación genérica, que no concreta los apartes del contrato que vulneran el cartel, fuera de los temas ya mencionados arriba. Lo que lleva sin más, al rechazo del cargo. Se alega además lesión al principio de formalismo de los procedimientos, señalando que debe existir una etapa previa de planeamiento que no se ha dado. Sobre el particular, debe remitirse a lo ya expuesto en cuanto a que el presente procedimiento incluye el diseño de las obras y no solamente su construcción, lo que permite claramente el numeral 1 de la Ley No. 7762. Por otro lado, se reitera, el Plan Maestro y términos de la contratación incluyen parámetros del diseño a contratar, por lo que no existe lesión al principio enunciado. Principio de control de los procedimientos. Se acusa la ausencia de estudios de factibilidad para sustentar la licitación. Se trata de un tema ya resuelto en este fallo, en el cual se ha concluido sobre el cumplimiento de las exigencias previstas en los ordinales 9 y 21 de la Ley No. 7762, por lo que por paridad de razón, no podría infraccionarse ese principio cuando no se ha tenido por establecida la falencia en que la accionante sustenta su reclamo. Principio de discrecionalidad de la Administración. En este punto, se hace un discurso academicista sobre conductas regladas y discrecionales, así como la posibilidad de control judicial de las potestades discrecionales, para sostener la posibilidad de analizar la validez del refrendo. No se aporta alegato alguno que analizar en este punto, por lo que no se ingresa a su examen. Sobre el Project finance, tasa interna de retorno y sistema de tarifas. En este punto el accionante reitera las argumentaciones ya analizadas por este Tribunal sobre el tópico del project finance, los estudios de factibilidad, reproches sobre el trámite tarifario realizado en sede ARESEP. La misma demandante señala que se hace una reiteración de lo alegado en el escrito inicial, abundando el hecho de la emisión del refrendo, sin que se aporte elemento novedoso alguno fuera de referencias teóricas que no vienen a aportar nada a lo ya expuesto. Ergo, basta remitir al análisis que sobre esos temas ya fueron abordados por este Tribunal. La ampliación en realidad aporta una serie de datos especulativos que sirven de base para realizar una serie de formulaciones subjetivas sin fuente de acreditación probatoria, que se insiste, no modifican el examen ya realizado sobre esos puntos, incluido el tema de la predicción de movilizaciones demanda, aspecto también, ya analizado. Lo mismo sucede con el alegato reiterado de la creación de un monopolio privado en la prestación de un servicio público, aspecto ya tratado con suficiente amplitud, por lo que se hace innecesario abordarlo, tema en el que se incluye la ponderación de la no violación al principio de la libre concurrencia por el solo hecho de haberse formulado una única plica concursal. Sobre el alegato de relevancia del estudio de impacto ambiental como requisito sustancial, es un aspecto ya ponderado con amplia extensión, por lo que su abordaje es fútil.

XXXV.- Sobre la regulación de la potestad de refrendo de la CGR en los contratos públicos. Ante las alegaciones realizadas por la accionante sobre el refrendo contralor, cabe realizar algunas breves referencias sobre este instituto o fase de la contratación administrativa. Las competencias constitucionales de la CGR se encuentran previstas en el ordinal 184 de la Carta Magna, funciones dentro de las cuales, se le asigna un papel protagónico en cuanto al control del gasto público, tutela de la hacienda pública, materia presupuestaria entre otras. Con todo, sus competencias se desarrollan en otro conjunto de normas que buscan tratar esos marcos de acción, como es el caso de la Ley No. 7428 (Ley Orgánica de la CGR), Ley No. 8292, Ley No. 8131, Ley No. 8422, entre otras. En menesteres de contratación administrativa, esas competencias se desarrollan con mayor claridad en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, No. 7494, en la cual, se le asigna la competencia, que aquí interesa, de conceder o denegar el refrendo a los procesos de licitación pública. El tema se ha desarrollado concretamente en el denominado REGLAMENTO SOBRE EL REFRENDO DE LAS CONTRATACIONES DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA, No. R-CO-44-2007 del Despacho de la Contralora General, emitido a las 09 horas del 11 de octubre del 2007, publicado en La Gaceta No. 202 del 22 de octubre del 2007. Sobre la relevancia del refrendo en el control de las contrataciones públicas, en el fallo No. 14421-2004, la Sala Constitucional ha señalado en lo relevante al caso: "A través del refrendo, la Contraloría General de la República ejerce una fiscalización o control sobre los actos de los sujetos pasivos que puedan comprometer la Hacienda Pública o los presupuestos públicos, como una forma de garantizar la corrección, transparencia y legalidad de los egresos en que puedan incurrir. Para el caso de los contratos administrativos, el referendo se produce después de dictado el acto de adjudicación o de la etapa de perfección del contrato, esto es, cuando el mismo resulta válido por ser sustancialmente conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico, de modo que la Contraloría General de la República a través de esa figura examina y verifica que el clausulado del contrato debidamente formalizado se ajuste al bloque de legalidad, esto es, al cartel de la licitación que es la regulación o normativa específica del contrato respectivo, la oferta formulada, la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa y su reglamento y, en general, con el resto del ordenamiento jurídico administrativo. El propósito o fin esencial del refrendo es evitar que las obligaciones contraídas por las administraciones públicas en los contratos administrativos, debidamente asentadas o formalizadas, se contrapongan al ordenamiento jurídico administrativo y que, por consiguiente, se produzca una incorrección o ilegalidad en la disposición de los fondos públicos.” Sobre el desarrollo reglamentario de esa tarea, ese mismo Tribunal Constitucional ha indicado en el fallo No. 2000-03027 de las 09 horas 03 minutos del 14 de abril del 2002: “IV.-DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL REGLAMENTO IMPUGNADO. El Reglamento sobre el refrendo de las contrataciones de la Administración Pública no es violatorio de la potestad reglamentaria reconocida al Poder Ejecutivo en los incisos 3) y 18) del artículo 140 constitucional, toda vez que no se trata ni de un reglamento ejecutivo –según la consideración del accionante-, sino más bien de un reglamento autónomo de organización o funcionamiento, en cuanto pretende dictar normas y directrices a fin de realizar una competencia que la propia Constitución Política le otorga, sea el refrendo de la contrataciones que realice la Administración Pública. De manera que su fundamento y sustento jurídico-constitucional no deriva de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, ni tampoco de su Ley Orgánico, sino directamente de los artículos 182, 183 y 184 de la Constitución Política, y los principios constitucionales que de estas normas derivan en relación con la contratación administrativa, en los términos señalados con anterioridad por este Tribunal, en la sentencia número 0998-98, de las once horas treinta minutos del dieciséis de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y ocho (reiterados en las sentencias número 5947-98, de las catorce horas treinta y dos minutos del diecinueve de agosto; número 6432-98, de las diez horas treinta minutos del cuatro de junio; y la número 6754-98, de las quince horas treinta y seis minutos del veintidós de setiembre, las tres, de mil novecientos noventa y ocho), los cuales han sido sintetizados de la siguiente manera: "primero: en el artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, se enuncia la primera obligación constitucional en materia de contratación administrativa, en virtud del cual, toda contratación que celebre el Estado debe tramitarse por medio del procedimiento de la licitación; segundo: que el constituyente optó por el procedimiento de la licitación, por considerarlo el mecanismo más apto para el control de la hacienda pública y del correcto uso de los recursos financieros del Estado, con la finalidad de promover una sana administración de los fondos públicos; tercero: la licitación constituye el medio idóneo para la selección del cocontratante de la Administración, por ser un procedimiento de garantía del interés público, cuya publicidad garantiza una efectiva participación de todos los interesados, para que la Administración seleccione la mejor opción para la satisfacción del interés público; cuarto: por licitación debe entenderse el mecanismo, modalidad, medio o conjunto de principios a los que debe sujetarse el Estado -en el sentido más amplio-, para poder realizar su actividad de contratación, por cuanto en ella se dan cumplimiento los principios constitucionales que informan la contratación administrativa: libre concurrencia, igualdad de trato entre todos los potenciales oferentes, publicidad, legalidad o transparencia de los procedimientos, seguridad jurídica, formalismo de los procedimientos licitatorios, equilibrio de intereses, principio de buena fe, mutualidad del contrato, y control de los procedimientos a cargo y en última realizado directamente por la Contraloría General de la República; quinto: del principio «toda contratación administrativa se hará por el procedimiento de la licitación», contenida en el artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, derivan con rango constitucional, todos los principios de derecho público que informan la contratación administrativa, en la medida en que resulten razonables y proporcionados a los fines que se persiguen; sexto: el sistema de contratación administrativa está conformado por los principios constitucionales que emanan de la propia Constitución, y como complemento, por el sistema de control ejercido directamente por el órgano constitucional encargado y vigilancia de la hacienda pública, -Contraloría General de la República, según se dispone en los artículos 183 y 184 constitucionales-, que se establece como garantía de la correcta utilización de los fondos públicos en aras de la satisfacción del interés público. sétimo: la obligación constitucional que deriva del artículo 182 de la Carta Fundamental comprende toda la actividad contractual del Estado; por lo que no puede distinguirse para exceptuarse en el tipo de contrato a realizar -de servicios, ejecución de obras, ventas o arrendamientos de bienes, compras- o en razón de la materia de que se trate; octavo: el constituyente definió que el procedimiento más apto para realizar la contratación administrativa sería la licitación pública, y reservó la licitación privada únicamente para las contrataciones cuantitativa y cualitativamente menores". Al constituirse en un principio esencial –y, además, constitucional- de la contratación administrativa el sistema de control ejercido directa y exclusivamente por la Contraloría General de la República, órgano constitucional encargado de la vigilancia de la hacienda pública, es que con anterioridad, este Tribunal Constitucional determinó la competencia en esta materia a dicho órgano, para que diseñara los diversos mecanismos para efectuar el control –o refrendo- de la contratación administrativa. De este modo, en sentencia número 9524-99, de las nueve horas seis minutos del tres de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, ante consulta de la propia Contraloría sobre la competencia de ese órgano para dictar directrices en esa materia, señaló:"V.- DEL REFRENDO EN LA CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA COMO COMPETENCIA EXCLUSIVA DEL ÓRGANO CONTRALOR CONSTITUCIONAL. Quedó claro en la sentencia recurrida –número 05947-98, de las catorce horas treinta y dos minutos del diecinueve de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y ocho-, que el refrendo de la contratación administrativa a cargo de la Contraloría General de la República es de aplicación a toda la administración pública, con lo que se incluye no sólo a los órganos que se financian con el plan de gastos de la Administración Central, sea la Asamblea Legislativa, Poder Ejecutivo (Presidente de la República y Ministro respectivo), el Poder Judicial, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la Contraloría General de la República y la Defensoría de los Habitantes, sino también a los órganos descentralizados y desconcentrados de la Administración Pública, con lo que se hace extensivo a los bancos que conforman el sistema bancario nacional. Dos son los principios constitucionales que dan fundamento a esta posición: el artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, establece que los principios constitucionales que orientan la contratación administrativa son de aplicación para toda la Administración Pública, sin excepción alguna, al no distinguir la norma constitucional si se trata de una institución del gobierno central, institución autónoma u órgano desconcentrado; y del artículo 184 constitucional deriva el principio rector del control de la contratación administrativa realizado directa y exclusivamente por el órgano constitucionalmente encargado de la vigilancia y fiscalización de la hacienda pública. Es función esencial de la Contraloría General de la República la fiscalización de la hacienda pública, por mandato constitucional –artículo 183 constitucional-, pudiendo realizar esta función a través de diversas modalidades de control, sea el refrendo y otros medios, como el auditoraje o las inspecciones, o la misma apelación o la intervención a posteriori. En este sentido, debe tenerse en cuenta que así como la norma constitucional refiere a la legislación ordinaria para que ésta establezca las diversas modalidades de la contratación administrativa, en razón de su monto, configurándose así, la licitación pública, la licitación privada, contratación directa, y remate con procedimiento alterno, según la clasificación dada por la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República, número 1279, de dos de mayo de mil novecientos cincuenta y uno derogada por la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa, número 7494, de dos de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, adicionada y reformada por Ley número 7612, de veintidós de julio de mil novecientos noventa y seis, que establece la siguiente clasificación: licitación pública, licitación por registro, licitación restringida, remate y contratación directa; así, es competencia exclusiva de la Contraloría General de la República, el diseñar diversos mecanismos y modos para efectuar el control de la contratación administrativa, en razón del monto, la materia y la institución pública que realice la contratación, conforme a los principios que la propia Constitución Política da, y obviamente dentro del marco legal que le confiere su propia Ley Orgánica. Por ello, resulta acertada la afirmación del representante de la Contraloría General de la República en su gestión, al considerar que es constitucionalmente posible que en atención a la naturaleza, objeto y cuantía de la contratación de que se trate, éste órgano establezca condiciones razonables y proporcionadas a la facultad que el artículo 184 constitucional le otorga para refrendar los contratos del Estado, con miras a no crear mecanismos que afecten una expedita gestión administrativa, y en atención al interés público; toda vez que el refrendo debe entenderse como parte de las atribuciones de fiscalización de la hacienda pública que le corresponde en exclusiva a la Contraloría, para cuyo ejercicio posee absoluta independencia funcional y administrativa, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el propio artículo 183 de la Carta Fundamental, motivo por el cual puede definir los alcances, mecanismos y procedimientos de fiscalización superior, incluso frente al legislador, si éste afecta su independencia, según se anotó con anterioridad en la sentencia número 00998-98." XXXVI.- El anterior precedente pone en evidencia la relevancia de las funciones de la CGR en cuanto al refrendo. Ahora bien, la accionante censura que la instancia contralora en el trámite de refrendo haya prevenido el aporte de información y luego haya incluido normas de condicionamiento a su otorgamiento. Sobre esto cabe indicar. El refrendo es un acto de aprobación de la contratación administrativa que como tal, incide en el despliegue de efectos del contrato, por lo que se vincula con la eficacia (ver en este sentido el ordinal 145 LGAP). Desde ese plano, no puede constituirse en un mecanismo que lleve a la declaración de nulidad de las conductas analizadas, aún cuando por su medio, ejerce un cotejo de conformidad con las normas a las que se encuentra sujeta la contratación administrativa. Para los efectos, resulta diáfano el desarrollo que hace el ordinal 2 del Reglamento de Refrendos en cuanto indica: "Artículo 2º—Naturaleza del refrendo. El refrendo es un acto de aprobación, por lo que funge como un requisito de eficacia del contrato administrativo y no como un medio por el cual la Contraloría General de la República pueda anular de forma indirecta el acto de adjudicación ni el contrato administrativo. Por medio del refrendo la Contraloría General de la República examina y verifica que el clausulado del contrato administrativo se ajuste sustancialmente al ordenamiento jurídico, en los términos previstos en el artículo 8º de este Reglamento./ Cuando la Contraloría General de la República deniegue el refrendo a un contrato administrativo, señalará a la Administración los defectos que deben ser subsanados, enmendados o corregidos para obtener el respectivo refrendo en un eventual trámite futuro. / En virtud de que los procedimientos de contratación administrativa y todos los aspectos relativos a la formación y perfección de los contratos administrativos están imbuidos por la celeridad y sumariedad en la debida e impostergable atención y satisfacción de las necesidades y requerimientos públicos, el análisis de legalidad que realiza la Contraloría General de la República en el refrendo está sujeto a los principios de eficiencia y eficacia desarrollados en el artículo 4 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y a lo dispuesto en el artículo 10 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública./ El refrendo no constituye un procedimiento administrativo destinado a resolver intereses contrapuestos de las partes o de terceros interesados, por lo que las gestiones que con ese propósito se interpongan durante el trámite, serán rechazadas de plano./ El refrendo no es un medio por el cual la Contraloría General de la República ejerce las potestades de realizar auditorías y de investigación, reguladas en los artículos 21 y 22 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. En consecuencia el análisis de legalidad se basa en una revisión del expediente administrativo aportado por la Administración, por lo que se presume la veracidad de la documentación en él incorporada, según el principio de buena fe que rige la actividad contractual pública, todo bajo la responsabilidad de los funcionarios de la Administración encargados de la conformación y remisión del expediente." Ahora bien, a la luz de lo preceptuado por el numeral 8 de dicha norma, el estudio que realiza por este medio el órgano contralor no es de oportunidad o conveniencia, sino de legalidad.Con todo, en esta dinámica, ha de tenerse en cuanta lo regulado por la LGAP, en cuyo artículo 16.2 que a la sazón indica: "2. El Juez podrá controlar la conformidad con estas reglas no jurídicas de los elementos discrecionales del acto, como si ejerciera contralor de legalidad.", lo que en determinadas posturas supone la posibilidad de considerar incluidos dentro del análisis de legalidad, los aspectos propios de componentes relacionados a conveniencia y oportunidad -tema que no se abordará en este caso-. De igual modo, ese precepto -artículo 8 del reglamento de refrendos-, estipula que el examen no supone una revisión integral, sino que se limita a los aspectos puntuales que fija ese numeral, cuya transcripción o referencia resulta innecesaria, bastando remitir a lo allí indicado. Desde ese plano, a tono con lo indicado por el ordinal 9 ejusdem, se presume la legalidad de los demás aspectos no abordados en el refrendo, aspectos que en todo caso quedan sujetos a la fiscalización posterior facultativa y en general a las vías ordinarias de impugnación de los actos y contratos, tanto en sede administrativa como judicial, y sobre los cuales, la Administración mantiene su responsabilidad. Dentro de esos otros aspectos puede mencionarse la razonabilidad del precio. Por su parte, el artículo 12 fija las exigencias formales que deben ser presentadas para este trámite, sin perjuicio del requerimiento de información que puede válidamente realizar la CGR. En este sentido, a diferencia de lo que parece señalar CANABA, el orden jurídico aplicable si permite al órgano contralor prevenir el aporte de información para poder cumplir válidamente con su papel de control en la fase de refrendo. Elemental resulta lo que en este sentido estipula el mandato 13 del reglamento en cuestión en tanto señala: "Artículo 13.—Plazo, suspensiones e interrupciones. La Contraloría General de la República deberá resolver la solicitud de refrendo de los contratos dentro de un plazo de veinticinco días hábiles, cuando se trate de licitación pública, y de veinte días hábiles, en los casos restantes./ Durante el trámite de refrendo, la Contraloría General de la República podrá formular los requerimientos de información adicionales que estime imprescindibles para el estudio de fondo del documento contractual respectivo, para lo cual hará el emplazamiento a la Administración por el lapso razonable que fije a los efectos, durante el cual estará suspendido a su vez el plazo de resolución final regulado en el párrafo anterior. Si la Administración no subsana en tiempo lo requerido por la Contraloría General de la República, se procederá al rechazo de la solicitud de refrendo./ Cuando en el transcurso del trámite de una solicitud de refrendo la Administración remita un documento de modificación al texto contractual bajo examen, ya sea de oficio o en atención a la sugerencia que podrá hacerle la Contraloría General de la República de manera interlocutoria según las reglas del párrafo anterior cuando en el análisis previo se haya detectado algún vicio sustancial en la legalidad del contrato, el plazo previsto en el párrafo primero de este artículo se computará de nuevo a partir del día siguiente al del recibo de la modificación en la Contraloría General de la República." Dicha norma disipa cualquier duda sobre la habilitación competencial de la CGR para prevenir o requerir aporte de información que estime necesaria para el análisis correspondiente, así como poder establecer los condicionamientos que estime necesarios y pertinentes, a reserva de inclusión de los motivos que llevan a este criterio. Debe destacarse, el trámite de refrendo no es un simple cotejo -automatizado- de cumplimiento de requisitos, sino un cotejo de validez que incluye la ponderación del conjunto de fuentes a que está sujeta la licitación, incluidas no solo las normas jurídicas, sino además las ofertas y el cartel o pliego de condiciones.

XXXVII.- Sobre la supuesta lesión a los principios de la contratación administrativa en el acto de refrendo. Sobre el reproche específico que se hace sobre el refrendo en la ampliación de la demanda, sin perjuicio de lo ya señalado en los apartes previos sobre la reiteración de temas ya tratados, cabe indicar de manera más concreta, como esos temas no llegan afectar la validez del refrendo otorgado por la CGR. a) Principio de legalidad y transparencia. Sobre este aspecto cabe señalar, en el oficio No. 2739-2012 del 21 de marzo de 2012 (DCA-0692), en el que la CGR otorga el refrendo del contrato, señala que este convenio incluía una indebida jerarquización de las fuentes aplicables al procedimiento, lo que supone por el contrario a lo argüido por la accionante, una manifestación de respeto al principio de legalidad. De igual modo, la CGR advirtió en el refrendo, el régimen jurídico aplicable al caso, no solamente invocando a las particularidades propias del reglamento de refrendos, sino además, señalando que el cartel de licitación utilizado para el análisis del contrato (punto III.ii). Precisamente en el ejercicio de las potestades conferidas en el ordinal 13 del reglamento aludido, la CGR realizó la solicitud de información adicional al CNC mediante los oficios DCA-2836 del 28 de octubre del 2011 y el DCA-0082 del 17 de Enero del 2012, para verificar que el contrato se ajustara al pliego de condiciones de la licitación promovida. Con todo, debe retomarse lo expuesto en cuanto al principio de eficacia y eficiencia en las contrataciones públicas. No indica el accionante las razones por las cuales las supuestas lesiones al principio denunciado llevan a una nulidad sustancial que ameriten la supresión del concurso. Sobre el tema, vale traer a colación lo resuelto sobre el principio de eficiencia y eficacia por parte de la Sala Constitucional en el fallo No. 14421-2004 de las 11:00 horas del 17 de diciembre del 2004, en el siguiente sentido: "Por lo anterior, los procedimientos de contratación administrativa y todos los aspectos atinentes a la formación y perfección de los contratos administrativos están imbuidos por la celeridad y sumariedad en la debida e impostergable atención y satisfacción de las necesidades y requerimientos de la organización social. Sobre el particular, es menester recordar que dentro de los principios rectores de los servicios públicos, en el marco de una Administración Pública prestacional o de un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, se encuentran, entre otros, la eficiencia, la eficacia, la continuidad, la regularidad y la adaptación a las necesidades socio-económicas y tecnológicas, con el propósito de erradicar y superar las desigualdades reales del conglomerado social. Los mecanismos de control y fiscalización diseñados por el legislador para garantizar la transparencia o publicidad, libre concurrencia e igualdad y la gestión racional de los recursos o dineros públicos –a través de la escogencia de la oferta más ventajosa para los entes públicos, desde el punto de vista financiero y técnico- en materia de contratación administrativa, deben tener por norte fundamental procurar que la misma se ciña a la ley de modo que resulte regular o sustancialmente conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico, para evitar cualquier acto de corrupción o de desviación en el manejo de los fondos públicos. Bajo esta inteligencia, todos los requisitos formales dispuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico para asegurar la regularidad o validez en los procedimientos de contratación, el acto de adjudicación y el contrato administrativo mismo, deben, también, procurar la pronta satisfacción del interés general a través de la efectiva construcción de las obras públicas y la prestación de los servicios públicos, consecuentemente no pueden transformarse en instrumentos para retardar la prestación eficiente y eficaz de los servicios públicos y, sobre todo, su adaptación, a las nuevas necesidades socio-económicas y tecnológicas de la colectividad. Sobre este particular, el artículo 4°, párrafo 2°, de la Ley de la Contratación Administrativa al enunciar el “Principio de eficiencia” estatuye que “(…) En todas las etapas de los procedimientos de contratación, prevalecerá el contenido sobre la forma. Los actos y las actuaciones de las partes se interpretarán de forma que se favorezca su conservación y se facilite adoptar la decisión final, en condiciones favorables para el interés general (…)”. Síguese de lo anterior que las formas propias de los procedimientos de la contratación administrativa así como los recaudos de carácter adjetivo que establece el ordenamiento jurídico para la validez y eficacia de un contrato administrativo deben interpretarse de forma flexible en aras del fin de todo contrato administrativo, sin descuidar, claro está, la sanidad y corrección en la forma en que son invertidos los fondos públicos. Desde esta perspectiva, los procedimientos administrativos de contratación son la sombra (forma) que debe seguir, irremisiblemente, al cuerpo (sustancia) que son los fines y propósitos del contrato administrativo de satisfacer el interés general y, desde luego, procurar por el uso racional, debido y correcto de los fondos públicos. Por último, debe recordarse que los principios de la eficiencia y la eficacia en cuanto informan la organización y gestión administrativa tienen fuerte asidero constitucional (artículos –todos de la Constitución Política- 140, inciso 8, en cuanto le impone al Poder Ejecutivo el deber de “Vigilar el buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas”, el 139, inciso 4, en la medida que incorpora el concepto de “buena marcha del Gobierno” y el 191 al recoger el principio de “eficiencia de la administración”)” XXXVIII.- b) Sobre el principio de formalismo. En el acto de refrendo contralor, se hace alusión a que si bien en el trámite analizado se dieron imprecisiones, no se desconoce la facultad de aplicar el principio de conservación de los actos, a tono con el ordinal 4 de la Ley No. 7494. Ya se ha indicado que en nuestro régimen impera, incluyendo la materia de contratación administrativa, un principio de sustancialidad de nulidades. Cabe remitir por ende a lo señalado en dicho aparte en cuanto a que las promoventes no logran acreditar lo sustancial de los defectos apuntados, en los casos en que pueda considerarse que existieron yerros. Sobre el tema, el citado oficio DCA-0692 (refrendo) indica en lo medular: “…esta División no puede desconocer, ni mucho menos dejar de aplicar, los principios rectores de la Contratación Administrativa al estudiar el refrendo de este procedimiento licitatorio. Ello implica recordar los principios de eficacia y eficiencia de rango constitucional y regulados en el artículo 4 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa (que resulta de aplicación supletoria a la Ley de Concesiones de Obra Pública con Servicios Públicos) (…), Al tenor de dichos principios, puede afirmarse que la omisión de un formalismo como el enunciado, que en este caso es, en tesis de principio, la ausencia de publicación de dos fechas de apertura del concurso, no genera impedimento a este Despacho para conceder el refrendo del concurso pues justamente con base en dichos principios es que se puede conservar el procedimiento de contratación promovido, aunado a que no se considera que las omisiones de referencia causen un vicio tal que invalide el procedimiento de licitación promovido..." Es innegable que en estos menesteres aplica una sujeción a las formas adecuadas para llevamiento de un concurso público. Empero, la desatención de alguna fórmula procedimental solo lleva a la nulidad en la medida en que el vicio sea sustancial, de manera que cause indefensión o perjuicio grave a los particulares -tema ya abordado-. Por demás, ante la imprecisión de las alegaciones del accionante en cuanto a los vicios concretos de actos particulares de la CGR que hayan llevado a la lesión de esta máxima cuya vulneración invoca, no queda más que rechazar ese cargo. c) Principio de control de los procedimientos. En virtud de este principio, se postula que el procedimiento de contratación administrativa debe ser sometido al control exhaustivo y fiscalización, para verificar el cumplimiento de las normas mínimas que imperan en dicha materia así como el correcto uso de la hacienda pública. Se encuentra presente en todas las fases del procedimiento, desde los estudios previos hasta las modificaciones contractuales y la fase de ejecución. Lo dicho supone que la verificación de los procedimientos solo puede concebirse desde el plano de fases concretas de la contratación, y no de manera general. Desde ese plano, el accionante presenta formulaciones que no distan en lo absoluto de las ya planteadas en los reproches formulados en la demanda original, por lo que ciertamente, tal y como advierte la CGR, más que una ampliación se refiere a una reiteración de alegatos, extensibles contra el acto de otorgamiento de refrendo. Tal es el caso de ausencia de verificación de los estudios previos de factibilidad, tema sobre el que se ha señalado, en reiteradas oportunidades, no se da incorrección alguna. En todo caso, la instancia contralora, en aplicación del ordinal 8 del Reglamento de refrendos previno a la Administración gestionante indicar cuáles eran los estudios que sustentaban la selección del objeto contractual. Dada la respuesta ante esa prevención, en definitiva, en el oficio de refrendo, sea, el DCA-0692, sobre el punto se expuso: “Que en cuanto a los estudios técnicos de este concurso, la Administración Concedente en el oficio citado en el párrafo anterior, señala como antecedentes relevantes para la licitación que da origen al contrato de mérito, el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Portuario elaborado en el año 1995 por la firma japonesa OCDI, y el Programa para la Modernización del Subsector Portuario de Costa Rica, elaborado por la firma HPC Hamburg Port Consulting GMBH. Asimismo, señala como estudio para fundamentar las bases de la licitación bajo examen, el Plan Maestro para el Complejo Portuario Limón-Moín elaborado por la empresa Royal Haskoning Nederland B.V., y la actualización realizada del estudio de demanda. Todo lo cual se deja bajo responsabilidad de la Administración Concedente. ” Desde ese plano, la CGR tuvo por aportados los estudios técnicos según las precisiones que le hiciera la administración concedente. En todo caso, los estudios aportados para justificar dicha exigencia, son precisamente los que este Tribunal ha analizado y determinado su utilidad para sustentar la licitación internacional 2009LI-000001-200 objeto de esta causa. Cabe señalar además, la validez de los estudios aportados en términos del diseño de las obras, conforme a las cláusulas cartelarias es un aspecto de resorte del concesionario, quien como se ha explicado reiteradamente, asume las consecuencias y riesgos del diseño de la TCM.

XXXIX.- Sobre las alegaciones de lesión a la discrecionalidad pública. En cuanto a las referencias relativas al principio de discrecionalidad de la Administración, la ampliación formulada por Nombre141025 resulta confusa y no se desprende con claridad las causas concretas que el accionante pretende someter a conocimiento de esta autoridad jurisdiccional. Sobre este tema, luego de realizar referencias teóricas sobre las potestades regladas y las discrecionales, indica que la acción se formula “… con miras a lograr la corrección de arbitrariedades y desviación de poder realizado en sede administrativa, por la interpretación de la Contraloría General de la República en el refrendo contralor, siendo un ejemplo de ello lo que se indica en la página 9, punto vi)”. A tono con lo señalado por el párrafo primero del numeral 49 de la Carta Magna, esta jurisdicción es competente para ejercer control de validez de la función administrativa. El parámetro de control aludido incluye toda forma de manifestación de voluntad pública, dentro de estas, las conductas que se desprendan de un ejercicio de potestades de contenido discrecional o reglado. Así se establece en el ordinal 42.2, 122 inciso f, 127, 128 y en el caso de medidas cautelares el mandato 20 de ese mismo cuerpo legal. Con todo, para tales efectos, ha discriminarse entre la discrecionalidad administrativa (pues existe además la judicial y la legislativa) político-programática, la técnica y la jurídica, por cuanto en estas dos últimas el control judicial es más intenso que en la primera, que se refiere a la posibilidad de trazarse metas o planes de acción. De igual modo debe distinguirse entre la discrecionalidad actuada de la no actuada, siendo que las medidas correctivas caso de estimarse la invalidez de las conductas públicas, es diversa según se trate de un ejercicio positivo (actuada), o bien de uno omisivo (no actuada). De igual modo ha de ponderarse la existencia o no de una discrecionalidad residual. Ello es fundamental para el juzgador contencioso administrativo pueda fijar el curso de acción, sea imponiendo lo límites a la Administración para que corrija la conducta previamente emitida –ya anulada por control judicial-, o bien fijar las pautas para el ejercicio que hasta ese momento no se había formulado. Así lo establece el ordinal 128 CPCA en cuanto expresa en lo relevante: “Cuando la sentencia estimatoria verse sobre potestades administrativas con elementos discrecionales, sea por omisión o por su ejercicio indebido, condenará al ejercicio de tales potestades, dentro del plazo que al efecto se disponga, conforme a los límites y mandatos impuestos por el ordenamiento jurídico y por los hechos del caso, previa declaración de la existencia, el contenido y el alcance de los límites y mandatos, si así lo permite el expediente.(…)” En la residual, además, ha de respetar el juzgador el umbral de pervivencia de la discrecionalidad que atañe a la Administración. Es el caso de la anulación de un acto adjudicatorio, en el cual, devuelto el expediente a la Administración para que resuelva conforme a las normas jurídicas y cartelarias aplicables, pervive la posibilidad de declarar desierto el concurso por considerar, ante las nuevas condiciones, que ninguna oferta satisface el interés público. Pues bien, no existe duda en la posibilidad de control judicial de ese ejercicio discrecional, empero, la ambigüedad de la demanda no permite colegir si la crítica estriba en que la conducta de la CGR se orientó por sendas de ejercicio discrecional cuando debió ser reglada, o si por el contrario, el ejercicio discrecional realizado, es inválido. En cualquier caso, no explicita el accionante en qué medida esa decisión en particular vulnera el ordenamiento jurídico a que debe someterse la CGR en el ejercicio de sus competencias de instancia de refrendo. El punto en cuestión , visible a folio 9 del oficio de refrendo dispone en lo que viene relevante al caso: “…En cuanto al tema de la obtención de las licencias, permisos, viabilidades o cualquier otro tipo de instrumento ambiental que deba existir de previo y durante las fases de construcción y explotación del contrato, según lo determine la autoridad competente en la materia, es menester indicar que queda bajo responsabilidad y riesgo de la propia firma concesionaria la obtención del aval correspondiente por parte de dicha autoridad, así como su vigencia durante el lapso de tiempo que sea necesario. Por ende será obligación de la Administración Concedente verificar la obtención de esos permisos, licencias u otros necesarios de obtener para la realización de la concesión adjudicada, sin que recaiga dentro del ámbito de competencia de este órgano contralor la verificación de dichos aspectos durante el trámite del refrendo…” Este Tribunal comparte las alegaciones de la CGR en cuanto señala que en materia de contratación administrativa existe un alto componente de discrecionalidad en la fase de confección del cartel de licitación y en general etapas previas, aun cuando con el avance del procedimiento esa discrecionalidad se restringe y reduce. Esas potestades han de ser consideradas en las diversas fases de control y fiscalización que en el curso de procedimiento realice la CGR, sin perjuicio de la posibilidad de disponer la invalidez de conductas concretas por la infracción al régimen de la contratación administrativa que está llamada a tutelar en las instancias en que participe. No obstante, se insiste, se comparte el argumento de la CGR en cuanto a que el citado punto vi lo que pretende establecer es que la empresa concesionaria es la única responsable conforme al contrato de la consecución de una serie de permisos, licencias u otros, y que esa consecución debe ser constatada por la Administración Concedente. Esto es claro si se considera que en efecto, no corresponde a la CGR la verificación de si esos permisos, licencias o en general, habilitaciones administrativas, existen o no, por lo que conforme a los alcances del ordinal 9 del reglamento de refrendos advierte a la concedente su deber de verificación sobre este particular. No entiende este Tribunal, pues la demandante no deja claro este punto, como ese proceder configura el vicio de desviación de poder (entendido como la persecución de un fin distinto al principal con detrimento de éste, art. 131.3 LGAP). Se trata de una advertencia o recordatorio de ejercicio de deberes de verificación y fiscalización, acorde con las normas aplicables al caso.

XL.- En lo atinente al punto relativo al Project finance, TIR, tarifa tope. Ha de insistirse, se trata de un argumento ampliamente abordado en las fases previas de este fallo. No se presenta en la ampliación de la demanda objeto de análisis argumento novedoso sobre este particular, siendo el único aporte la reprochabilidad de ese aspecto frente al acto de refrendo, por la circunstancia de no haberse denegado pese a los vicios que el accionante alega. Sin embargo, no se hace una referencia concreta en relación al acto de la CGR cuestionado, de manera que se permita establecer las razones particulares por las cuales se estima que tal conducta, en cuanto a esos temas específicos, cuenta con patología que merezca ser declarada en esta sede. En el entendimiento de este Tribunal, las exposiciones del demandante se presentan como una presentación de posiciones propias en las que sustenta una crítica para señalar la manera que desde su óptica, el proyecto financiero de la TCM sería técnicamente más correcto. Con todo, la definición del mecanismo o diseño de financiamiento del proyecto, si encaja dentro del concepto de Project finance, definición de estrategia de riesgos, es un tema que ciertamente en cuanto a su viabilidad y pertinencia, es resorte de la concedente. Lo mismo ocurre con el debate que se propone ahora sobre la TIR, en cuanto formula un escenario comparativo de haberse presentado más de una oferta con TIR diferentes, sin embargo, no pasa de ser un panorama hipotético, pero además, el cartel de prevé un análisis de comparabilidad de ese factor económico de las ofertas como parámetro de evaluación de las plicas. Sobre las críticas sobre la aceptación de las cláusulas de traslado de riesgos al concesionario, cabe advertir, tal aspecto corresponde con exclusividad a la concedente y al concesionario. Sin embargo, debe tomarse nota que la instancia contralora realizó una serie de observaciones y condicionamientos que se emiten en el contexto del ejercicio de las competencias de verificación propias del trámite de refrendo, ponderando que los términos del contrato se ajusten y guarden armonía con las fuentes que lo regulan y a las cuales se encuentra afecto (cartel, plicas, adjudicación, estudios previos, etc). Por otro lado, el alegato de las tarifas tope (Price cap) es un tema que a tono con el ordinal 21.1 de la Ley No.7762, escapa de los alcances del refrendo, siendo que el dictamen que en esos menesteres debe rendirse, compete a la ARESEP, quien emite una valoración obligatoria y vinculante. Sobre ese tema, basta remitir a lo ya desarrollado en cuanto a las críticas presentadas sobre la factibilidad tarifaria y financiera. Por ende, ante esa asignación competencial particular, es claro para este cuerpo colegiado que tal aspecto es ajeno a las potestades de la CGR. Así incluso lo estableció ese órgano al señalar en el punto vii) del acápite III del oficio de refrendo DCA-0692: “En cuanto al tema de la estructura tarifaria y los parámetros de ajuste de la misma, así como los parámetros que se utilizarán para evaluar la calidad del servicio, de conformidad con el artículo 21 Ley de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicios Públicos, éstos cuentan con criterio técnico positivo de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, según se observa en los folios 925, 1479, 2484, 3603 y 3863-C del expediente de licitación. Por lo tanto, siendo que la competencia en la materia la tiene la Autoridad referida de acuerdo con su ley, este aspecto no compete ser abordado por esta División en el trámite de refrendo”. En otro punto se reprocha la supresión de la regulación de equilibrio financiero vía TIR. De nuevo, es un tema que no guarda relación con el refrendo, sino con el análisis de la ARESEP, por lo que debe ser rechazado. No obstante, Nombre141025 realiza una serie de consideraciones en las que alude a actos concretos de la CGR durante los trámites de objeción al cartel de este procedimiento licitatorio. En concreto, en el primer de licitación, se formuló por Nombre141024 y APM TERMINALS, recurso de objeción respecto de la condición que disponía como causal de desequilibrio financiero del contrato la variación de 20%, positiva o negativamente, con respecto a la TIR ofertada y aceptada por la Administración. Sobre el particular, en la resolución R-DJ-008-2009 se indicó: “Criterio para resolver: La objetante se limita a solicitar se deje sin efecto un párrafo del acápite 12.2 sobre el equilibrio económico y financiero del contrato, con la finalidad de que se elimine el porcentaje de la disminución señalado (+-20%) de la TIR de referencia, a partir de la cual se aplican los mecanismos de reequilibrio, y no ofrece prueba alguna del perjuicio que supuestamente la estaría ocasionando ese porcentaje definido al efecto para la aplicación de los mecanismos de reequilibrio, ni ninguna justificación jurídica en contra del mismo. Además, debe tener presente la objetante que el mecanismo fijado es equitativo, ya que se aplica por igual para la Administración y para el concesionario, tanto para los beneficios como para los perjuicios. Finalmente, en aras del principio de eficiencia administrativa, sería demasiado engorroso para la Administración estar aplicando los mecanismos de reequilibrio económico y financiero del contrato, cada vez que se produzca una disminución, por lo que la Administración discrecionalmente ha considerado razonable que esos mecanismos se apliquen para ambos cuando se verifique una disminución superior e inferior al 20% de la TIR de referencia, por lo que los eventuales oferentes pueden tomar las previsiones que estimen pertinentes en su oferta teniendo en cuenta ese porcentaje ya definido por la Administración.” Por su parte en el acto R-DJ-008-2009 Bis, de fecha 02 de julio de 2009, se señaló: “4) De la Tasa Interna de Retorno (TIR) como variable de regulación. La cláusula 11.7.5.2, del cartel establece que “…cuando se produzca un desequilibrio financiero del contrato de concesión, se podrá realizar un ajuste extraordinario de la tarifa para compensar dicho desequilibrio, siempre y cuando el mismo sea por causas externas a la responsabilidad de la sociedad concesionaria. Se considerará que se está en desequilibrio cuando la TIR de la oferta económica y aceptada por la Administración como referencia para la concesión varíe en un 20%, positiva o negativamente”. Asimismo establece dicha cláusula que en tal caso se procederá como se estipula en el Capitulo 12 del contrato. Sobre este particular, este órgano contralor solicita a esa Administración tomar las previsiones requeridas a efecto que al utilizar la TIR como parámetro para demostrar desequilibrios contractuales se debe asegurar que se puede individualizar de manera objetiva el efecto de los factores, que según las reglas cartelarias y contractuales corresponden únicamente a los que aparecen tipificados en el articulo 12.2 del contrato. Lo anterior, ya que el cálculo de esa TIR depende de parámetros, variables, estimaciones y supuestos, con múltiples opciones y alternativas posibles y en tal sentido, se requiere que estos aspectos queden claramente establecidos y normados, para efecto de la fiscalización del contrato y la demostración de los citados desequilibrios. Asimismo se indica que es responsabilidad de la Administración establecer reglas claras y objetivas dentro del pliego cartelario para disponer el uso de la tasa interna de retorno en la regulación del equilibrio financiero del contrato. En esa misma línea de pensamiento, este Despacho considera primordial que se valore la aplicación de la TIR como variable de regulación, debido a que desde nuestro punto de vista la estructuración de este negocio, que pospone la fase 3 a futuro, podría presentar la posibilidad de que alguna de las ofertas presente TIR múltiples, la que se obtiene por el hecho de que se generen flujos que presentan dos o más cambios de signo. Por lo anterior, no se tiene conocimiento de cómo se determinaría la TIR de referencia.” De dicho recuento se colige, a diferencia de lo alegado por el accionante, la CGR no ordenó la eliminación de dicho mecanismo de ajuste económico. Luego, en el segundo cartel, no se incluye garantía sobre el tema de la TIR. En el tercer cartel, el cual, fue objetado ante la CGR, se incluyó la regulación del equilibrio financiero del contrato a favor del concesionario cuando la TIR calculada fuera menor en 300 puntos base (3%) con relación a la TIR ofertada del proyecto. De igual forma se incluía el derecho de la Administración Concedente a reclamar a su favor el equilibrio económico del contrato cuando se alcanzara el valor presente de los ingresos cotizados por el concesionario (ITC), antes de los 33 años de la concesión, y la TIR del proyecto hasta la fecha de revisión fuese superior a la TIR ofertada más 300 puntos base (3%), en cuyo caso se compartiría la ganancia en partes iguales entre la Administración Concedente y el Concesionario. En cuanto a ese punto, en la resolución DJ-215-2011 de fecha 24 de mayo del 2010 la CGR señala que era menester señalada por la parte actora, este órgano contralor, en razón de sus competencias, señaló que la Administración Concedente debía acreditar en el expediente administrativo la valoración y aceptación de la razonabilidad del modelo de proyecciones financieras del oferente, toda vez que según disponía el cartel, éste sería utilizado para el cálculo de la TIR. Asimismo se advirtió que debía ofrecerse a los potenciales oferentes un formato base para el citado modelo de proyecciones, solicitando ajustar el cartel. De ello se desprende que no medió orden alguna del órgano contralor para disponer la eliminación de la ponderación de afectación porcentual de la TIR como parámetro de ajuste financiero.

XLI.- En otro alegato, se reitera las alegaciones de creación de monopolio privado, ya harto analizadas. No se incluye variación alguna en el tema de refrendo por lo que debe remitirse a lo que por criterio de fondo ya ha ponderado este Tribunal. Ha de reiterarse, el diseño de gestión indirecta que postula la contratación cuestionada, encuentra sustento en la letra del numeral 1 de la Ley No. 7762. Ergo, no resulta atendible ese alegato, así como los reproches sobre el modelo de exclusividad en el transportes de carga de los full containers, temas, se reitera, ya tratados, lo que hace innecesario su abordaje en este punto. Por otro lado, se reprocha que en el control de legalidad propio del refrendo debió verificarse el estudio de impacto ambiental. No obstante, por un lado, tal tema ya ha sido ventilado por este cuerpo colegiado, análisis al que se debe remitir el conjunto de argumentaciones expuestas en la ampliación analizada. Adicionalmente, se ha dejado claro que conforme al reglamento de refrendos, la obtención de esas licencias ecológicas corre a cargo del concesionario, y su verificación compete al concedente. Así se expuso en el acto de refrendo, en el que sobre este punto señaló: “vi) De los estudios, permisos u otros relacionados con los aspectos ambientales: En cuanto al tema de la obtención de las licencias, permisos, viabilidades o cualquier otro tipo de instrumento ambiental que deba existir de previo y durante las fases de construcción y explotación del contrato, según lo determine la autoridad competente en la materia, es menester indicar que queda bajo responsabilidad y riesgo de la propia firma concesionaria la obtención del aval correspondiente por parte de dicha autoridad, así como su vigencia durante el lapso de tiempo que sea necesario. Por ende será obligación de la Administración Concedente verificar la obtención de esos permisos, licencias u otros necesarios de obtener para la realización de la concesión adjudicada, sin que recaiga dentro del ámbito de competencia de este órgano contralor la verificación de dichos aspectos durante el trámite del refrendo. Lo anterior de conformidad con lo desarrollado sobre el tema en el apartado IV de este oficio, con relación al capítulo 5, punto 4) y al capítulo 8, punto 11). Además, la Administración Concedente deberá vigilar porque la gestión que realice la Concesionaria ante las autoridades competentes sobre esta materia sea eficiente.” Por otro lado, mediante la resolución R-DJ-008-2009 de las 12 horas del 2 de julio del 2009, ante cuestionamiento del Nombre141024 se señaló que mediante resolución 274-2009 Nombre141028 de las 8 horas del 10 de febrero del 2010 había otorgado la Nombre141029 (viabilidad ambiental potencial) al proyecto, según consta en el folio 741 del expediente de la licitación. De igual manera, se hicieron referencias sobre el tema en el oficio R-DJ-008-2009 (bis). Por otro lado el oficio de refrendo sobre el tema señala: “ Que con referencia al punto 13) de la cláusula 5.2.2 y a la cláusula 5.3.3 denominada Licencia de Vialidad Ambiental, ambas del contrato, resulta de importancia reiterar las manifestaciones efectuadas por la firma concesionaria en el oficio sin número suscrito el día 21 de noviembre del año 2011, aportado como parte del Anexo 1 del oficio DST-OF-1888-2011, en el cual, entre otras cosas, indicó: “En cuanto a la pregunta No. 11 de la Contraloría General, correspondiente al Capítulo 5 del Contrato, estamos de acuerdo con el enfoque de la respuesta prevista por el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, en el sentido de que la obtención de la viabilidad ambiental definitiva está en la esfera de responsabilidad del concesionario por lo que si se produce una denegatoria firme y definitiva por parte de la autoridad competente, imposible de superar por medios administrativos o judiciales legítimos, el contrato de concesión no podría ejecutarse, con la consecuencia de que el concesionario no podrá formular reclamaciones patrimoniales en contra de la Administración concedente. Asimismo, en caso de que la no obtención de la citada viabilidad obedezca a causas imputables en exclusiva al concesionario, este podría enfrentar la ejecución de la garantía de construcción rendida para la fase de condiciones precedentes, previa aplicación del debido proceso” (el subrayado no es del original).” Tal desarrollo encaja a plenitud con lo ya indicado en este fallo, en cuanto a la claridad que supone la imposibilidad de iniciar obras sin obtener la licencia de viabilidad ambiental definitiva, lo que corre bajo el riesgo del concesionario, siendo que como se ha anticipado, se asume el riesgo de su obtención, lo que privaría cualquier reclamo patrimoniales en contra de la Administración concedente, caso de no obtener este título habilitante.

LXII.- Finalmente, en cuanto a las condiciones incorporadas en el acto de refrendo que se consideran como propias de revisión de cuestiones de conveniencia y oportunidad, cabe indicar lo que de seguido se expone. En el punto IV del oficio de refrendo denominado “De los condicionamientos a los que queda sujeto el presente refrendo contralor”, se incluye un total aproximado de 80 condicionamientos divididos en la siguiente temática: CAPÍTULO 1. Generalidades del contrato -1 aspecto-. CAPÍTULO 2. De las disposiciones de carácter general -1 aspecto-. CAPÍTULO 3. De los documentos que forman parte del contrato -3 observaciones-; CAPÍTULO 4. De las obligaciones y derechos generales de la Administración. –en el que hace 12 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 5. De los plazos de la concesión. -6 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 6. Régimen de riesgos -6 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 7. Régimen general de las garantías a cargo del Concesionario -2 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 8. De las bases técnicas de la construcción de las obras -11 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 11. Del régimen económico, obligaciones y derechos financieros del Concesionario -16 observaciones-; CAPÍTULO 12. Del mantenimiento de equilibrio económico-financiero del contrato y su renegociación -3 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 13. De las subcontrataciones -2 aspectos-; CAPÍTULO 14. Régimen de control y régimen sancionador de la concesión -4 precisiones-; CAPÍTULO 15. De los informes -3 observaciones-; CAPÍTULO 16. Aspectos Fiscales -3 observaciones-; CAPÍTULO 17. De los seguros -3 observaciones-; CAPÍTULO 18. De la cesión de derechos y obligaciones, suspensión y terminación del contrato -4 precisiones-. Se critica lo cuantioso de los condicionamientos y lo amplio del expediente de refrendo. Sin embargo, a diferencia de lo que argumentan las partes reclamantes, una vez analizado a fondo el contenido de ese oficio de refrendo, es criterio de este Tribunal, esos condicionamientos, por amplios que puedan considerarse, no se constituyen en cláusulas de análisis de conveniencia u oportunidad del proyecto que pretenden disfrazar de válido un contrato nulo o bien, justificar un modelo de gestión sin el debido soporte de legalidad. Por el contrario, este tipo de aspectos condicionantes, entiende este cuerpo colegiado, se erigen como elementos relevantes que impone la CGR en el marco de sus competencias, como derivación del ejercicio de refrendo y que no pretenden sustituir a la concedente, sino fijar parámetros para la eficacia legítima del contrato. Ante los alegatos de CANABA, debe reiterarse, el aspecto de haber requerido información adicional en el trámite de refrendo (aun y cuando el expediente sea voluminoso –más de mil folio se arguye-) no supone una ilegalidad, sino una potestad que encuentra respaldo en el reglamento de refrendos, como se ha señalado –art. 13-. La extensión de un legajo público que sustenta una decisión no puede calificarse aventuradamente como un abuso de poder, sin acreditar de antemano la desviación del fin público, lo que aquí no se ha demostrado, ni ha ocurrido. Por otra parte, la adaptación del contrato como derivación del trámite de refrendo no lleva a sustentar el reproche de ilegitimidad que se analiza, sino que por el contrario, es el resultado natural y esperado de las correcciones que son viables en los trámites de refrendo. Podría contra argumentarse que ello pone en evidencia lo irregular de todo el proceso, empero, ante ese argumento habría que remitir a lo ya señalado en cuanto a la conservación de los actos, la sustancialidad de las nulidades que aplica en esta materia y a la necesidad de acreditar afectaciones serias para llevar a la supresión de este tipo de actos, como derivación del principio que subyace en el canon 4 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. Así, la extensión del expediente o bien la firma de un contrato que incorpore las observaciones realizadas en el refrendo, no supone, como afirma el accionante, que el análisis de la CGR haya sido de conveniencia y no de legalidad, o bien, que sus acciones desemboquen en una desviación de poder. En suma, el alegato no es atendible y por ende, debe ser rechazado.

XLIII.- Sobre la supuesta violación a la Ley No. 2906. En la audiencia única, en su alegato de conclusiones, el apoderado de Nombre141024 refiere livianamente a la eventual lesión de la Ley No. 2906, al señalar que la zona en la que se construirá la TCM, está declarada de uso turístico. Sobre el particular, cabe indicar, la citada Ley 2906 del 24 de noviembre de 1961, declara zona de recreo y turismo la franja de terreno entre Portete y 12 millas de Limón. En el numeral primero de esa fuente legal se establece en lo que viene relevante al caso “…la faja de doscientos metros de ancho, desde la pleamar ordinaria, comprendida dentro de la Milla Marítima entre el límite Norte de la zona urbana de la ciudad de Limón, o sea Portete, y el sitio conocido con el nombre de "12 Millas" o "Swamp Moth", al Norte de la ciudad de Limón, así como la zona comprendida dentro de los 100 metros de ambos lados del Río Moín en la sección paralela a la playa. De la referida zona se reservan veinte metros para una carretera panorámica en los sitios en donde en la actualidad no existe. El resto se traspasará al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo,…”. Por su parte, el Decreto Ejecutivo 3729 del 03 de mayo de 1975, declara terminadas las obras de los canales y asigna la administración de distintos terrenos y obras a Nombre141024. Sin embargo, para los efectos de lo debatido, cabe destacar, por la Ley No.5337 del 27 de agosto de 1973 que reforma integralmente la Ley Orgánica de JAPDEVA, Ley No. 3091, se establece en lo medular: "CAPÍTULO II Patrimonio de Nombre141024 Artículo 41.- Son propiedad de Nombre141024, además de sus activos e ingresos ordinarios y extraordinarios, los siguientes: a) Los terrenos, edificios, equipos y en general todos los bienes muebles e inmuebles destinados a las actividades propias de Nombre141024, con excepción de aquellos bienes del Estado que por Constitución Política no pueden salir de su patrimonio y los bienes del Ferrocarril Nacional al Atlántico. También las futuras expansiones del mismo, que de común acuerdo entre Nombre141024 y el Poder Ejecutivo se disponga traspasar, para lo cual ambas entidades quedan autorizadas para formalizar las respectivas escrituras ante la Notaría del Estado. Los bienes que a la fecha sean de propiedad la institución, no serán susceptibles del traspaso a que se refiere el presente artículo; y b) Todos los terrenos del Estado situados en el área habilitada por canales navegables, comprendidos en una área de diez kilómetros desde el mar hacia el interior, paralela a la costa y un faja de tres kilómetros de ancho, paralela a ambos lados de los ríos y canales que administre la Junta." Adicionalmente, el precepto 45 de dicha Ley orgánica estatuye: "Artículo 45.- Para el cumplimiento de esta ley y sus reglamentos, Nombre141024 determinará las zonas de jurisdicción portuaria de cada uno de los puertos bajo su administración y lo comunicará al Poder Ejecutivo. Estas áreas deberán contemplar fundamentalmente: a) Terminales y derechos de vía; b) Los sitios de anclaje, de fondeaderos y balizamiento de la rada; c) Los canales de acceso y zona de maniobras; y d) Los atracaderos y espuelas de tránsito, bodegas en general, oficinas, talleres, patios y espuelas de ferrocarril, zonas para almacenamiento de mercancías y cualquier otro sitio destinado a operaciones portuarias y ferroviarias." En adición, la Ley No. 6043 del 02 de marzo de 1977, Ley de Zona Marítimo Terrestre, artículo 75, que modifica parcialmente la anterior reforma señala: "Artículo 75.- La Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica continuará con el dominio sobre los terrenos que le fueron traspasados en virtud del artículo 41, inciso b) de la ley Nº 5337 de 27 de agosto de 1973, excepto en la zona marítimo terrestre correspondiente a ambos lados del sistema de canales principales que unen los puertos de Moín y Barra del Colorado. En esa zona regirán con pleno vigor las estipulaciones de esta ley." Desde esa arista de examen, no existe la lesión que se recrimina por parte de SINTRAJAP, siendo que como se ha señalado, los terrenos en cuestión forman parte del patrimonio cuya administración corresponde a Nombre141024, por ende, dentro de los cuales, puede factiblemente realizarse el desarrollo de la infraestructura portuaria, sea mediante un modelo de gestión directa o indirecta. Tal permisibilidad deviene de habilitaciones legales creadas por las reformas introducidas a la Ley Orgánica de Japdeva. Ergo, no se presentan los vicios apuntados en cuanto a la imposibilidad de cambio de uso de esas tierras.

XLIV.- Corolario. Sobre la demanda de Nombre141025 y su ampliación. En el presente proceso la Cámara Nacional de Bananeros formuló la demanda para que en sentencia se declare la nulidad de las siguientes conductas: “Pretensión principal: La declaración de nulidad de los siguientes actos administrativos: 1. De adjudicación realizada por parte del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones en el acuerdo número 2 de la sesión extraordinaria No. 2-2011 del 28 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con servicio público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM Terminal Central America B.V. 2. Del acto de adjudicación por parte de Nombre141024 en el acuerdo No. 073-11, artículo II-a de la sesión ordinaria No. 08-2011 del 24 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-200. 3. El acuerdo del Poder Ejecutivo conformado por la Presidenta de la República, Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes y Ministro de Hacienda, firmado el 01 de marzo del 2011, publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2011 de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200. Pretensiones subsidiarias: 1. Se declare la nulidad de la estructura tarifaria de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, señalada en el capítulo 11, apartado 7. 2, por utilizar como base en la proyección del tráfico realizada en el plan maestro para el complejo Limón/Moín, contratado a la empresa Royal Haskoning, el cual no es un estudio de factibilidad económica actualizado y no se encuentra sustentado en parámetros realistas de acuerdo al volumen de siembra y exportación de las frutas como el banano, piña y melón. 2. Se declare la nulidad de la estructura tarifaria de licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, por contradicción al artículo 3 inciso b de la Ley de la Nombre628 que establece el principio del servicio al costo. 3. Se declare nulo el acto que adjudica la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, por carecer de justificación del proceso licitatorio de una motivación del acto basado en las reglas unívocas de la ciencia o la técnica por no tener estudios técnicos como los estudios de factibilidad ambiental y económico. 4. Se anule el acuerdo número 018-MOPT-H publicado en el Alcance No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2001 en el que se adjudica la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200 por establecer que para la recepción de un descuento de $20 a la tarifa hecha en la oferta económica, se implementan 15 medidas en el acto de adjudicación, que se contemplarán en el contrato.” En el escrito de ampliación de la demanda añade las siguientes pretensiones: “Principal: La declaración de nulidad de los siguientes actos administrativos: 1.- El acto de adjudicación realizada por parte de Nombre141024 en el acuerdo No. 73-11, artículo II-a de la sesión ordinaria No. 08-2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 2.- El acto del Consejo Nacional de Concesiones en el acuerdo número 2 de la sesión extraordinaria No. 2-2011 del 28 de febrero del 2011, de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 3.- El acuerdo de adjudicación realizado por el Poder Ejecutivo conformado por la Presidenta de la República, el Ministro de Obras Públicas y Transportes, el Ministro de Hacienda y firmado el 01 de Marzo del 2011, publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 54 del 17 de marzo del 2011 de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 4. El cartel de licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín y adjudicada al oferente APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. 5.- El contrato que suscribió el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOIN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009-LI-000001-00200, llamada Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el financiamiento, diseño, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Puerto Moín, con fecha del 30 de agosto del 2011. 6.- La adenda No. 1 al Contrato de Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Diseño, Financiamiento, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Terminal de Contenedores de Moín, firmada el día 29 de noviembre del 2011 y suscrita por el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200. 7.- El nuevo contrato de fecha 13 de febrero del 2012, suscrito por el Poder Ejecutivo, la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 promovida para "Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín". 8.- El oficio DCA-0692 por parte de la División de Contratación Administrativa de la Contraloría General de la República con fecha de 21 de marzo del 2012, en el cual concede refrendo al contrato derivado de la licitación pública internacional Ejecutiva de la Junta Administradora Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), y las empresas APM TERMINALS MOÍN SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA Y APM TERMINALS CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. derivado de la licitación pública internacional 2009LI-000001-00200 promovida para "Concesión de Obra Pública con Servicio Público para el Financiamiento, Diseño, Construcción, Operación y Mantenimiento de la Nueva Terminal de Contenedores de Moín". 9.- Se condene en costas procesales y personales de forma solidaria a las partes demandadas.” Por su parte, Nombre141024 formuló las siguientes pretensiones: “1. La nulidad del acto administrativo que adjudica la licitación internacional pública No. Placa27259 llamada "Cartel de licitación para la concesión de obra pública con servicio público para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la terminal de contenedores en puerto Moín" a favor de APM TERMINAL CENTRAL AMERICA B.V. Ello por cuanto: - la licitación se realizó violentando la normativa propia tanto de la ley de concesiones como de la ley de contratación, se hizo con un cartel que no cumplía con lo dispuesto por la Ley de Concesión de Obras Públicas con Servicios Públicos en su artículo 21 incisos 1, 2 y 3, cual era tener todos los estudios técnicos correspondientes que sustentaran la viabilidad económica y ambiental del proyecto a concesionar, además con violación a contrario sensu de las normas del 27 al 29, ambas inclusive de la ley de concesiones citada, pues en estas normas no se permite la modificación de la oferta luego de recibidas formalmente las ofertas y al modificar el cartel y las fechas de presentación de ofertas y no dar plazos adecuados. Además al otorgar 15 concesiones o beneficios más a la empresa adjudicada, luego de la fecha de apertura de las ofertas, beneficios o concesiones que de haberse dado a conocer, pudieron permitir que otros interesados ofertaran. 2. De conformidad con el artículo 42 inciso b) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, solicito se declare nulo el acto administrativo que adjudica la licitación internacional pública No. 2009LI-000001-0200 llamada "Cartel de licitación para la concesión de obra pública con servicio público para el diseño, financiamiento, construcción, operación y mantenimiento de la terminal de contenedores en puerto Moín", a la empresa APM TERMINAL B.V., por carecer de una justificación del proceso licitatorio, de una motivación del acto administrativo, basado en reglas unívocas de la ciencia o la técnica por no tener los estudios técnicos como los estudios factibilidad ambiental y económico. 3. Se condene a los demandados al pago de las costas personales y procesales causadas. Entendiendo por costas personales no solo las mandas judiciales para el pago de peritos, y honorarios de funcionarios judiciales, sino además los honorarios de abogado que corresponden según el arancel aplicable.” XLV.- Realizado el análisis de cada uno de los diversos y cuantiosos alegatos que se presentaron tanto en la fase escrita como oral del presente proceso, tarea que fue abordada por este Tribunal de manera minuciosa y objetiva, no se ha detectado la existencia de vicios sustanciales que exijan la supresión de las conductas impugnadas, en lo incluye el cartel de licitación y sus modificaciones, actos de adjudicación, contrato de concesión a nivel general y en su clausulado, incluyendo las condiciones particulares impugnadas, modificaciones al contrato, acto de refrendo y los condicionamientos que incluye, adendas al contrato. En los apartes previos del presente voto constan las ponderaciones que han llevado a este Tribunal a esta conclusión, razón por la cual, de conformidad con los razonamientos de hecho y de derecho ya expuestos de manera amplia y detallada, considera este Tribunal, no padecen los actos criticados de nulidades sustanciales que merezcan ser declaradas en este proceso, razón por la cual, la pretensión de nulidad formulada debe ser rechazada, tanto en lo que refiere a los pedimentos principales como los accesorios o subsidiarios planteados en la demanda y su ampliación -expuesta por Nombre141025-. Por su parte, y dado el análisis integrado que se ha realizado por este cuerpo colegiado, tampoco resulta de recibido la acción formulada por Nombre141024, pues luego del análisis de sus alegaciones, planteadas en la fase oral –pues en la escrita, la demanda no incluía un desarrollo de los alegatos de derecho en que sustentaron sus pedimentos-, no se logró determinar el grado de invalidez reprochado, ante lo cual, sus pretensiones en general –incluidas las anulatorias- resultan improcedentes, conforme al numeral 121 del CPCA, por lo que se dispone su rechazo.

XLVI.- Análisis de las defensas alegadas. DEMANDA DE CANABA. Conferido el traslado de ley, las partes accionadas contestaron la demanda y opusieron las siguientes defensas: a) APM Terminal Central América B.V: falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y falta de derecho. b) Estado: falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, falta de legitimación activa y falta de derecho. c) Consejo Nacional de Concesiones: falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y falta de derecho. d) Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA): falta de derecho. e) Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos: falta de derecho y legitimación pasiva. f) Contraloría General de la República: indebida integración de la litis, así como falta de legitimación activa, pasiva y falta de derecho. Respecto de la AMPLIACIÓN DE LA DEMANDA, contestaron en los siguientes términos: a) APM Terminals Central America B.V.: no opuso defensas; b) Estado (folios4495-4541): falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, falta de derecho; c) Consejo Nacional de Concesiones: falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa, falta de derecho; d) Nombre141024: falta de legitimación activa y falta de derecho; e) ARESEP: falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa e inadmisibilidad de la demanda por haber precluído el plazo para impugnar el cartel de licitación; f) Contraloría General de la República: falta de legitimación activa y pasiva, falta de derecho; g) APM Terminals Moín S.A.: falta de derecho y demanda defectuosa.

XLVII.- Resolución de las defensas formuladas. Mediante la resolución No. 589-2011 de las 08 horas 26 minutos del 15 de abril del 2011, el juzgador de trámite acogió la defensa de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y dispuso conceder un plazo de 5 días hábiles a Nombre141025 para tales efectos (folios 989-990 del judicial. En definitiva, por auto de las 14 horas 37 minutos del 25 de mayo del 2011 visible a folios 1018-1020, el juzgador de trámite tuvo por cumplido el requisito de agotamiento de la vía administrativa. En la audiencia única respectiva este Tribunal señaló que la citada defensa de falta de agotamiento ya había sido resuelta con antelación, conforme al anterior detalle. De igual modo en dicha audiencia se rechazó la defensa de demanda defectuosa.

XLVIII.- Defensas de fondo. En consecuencia, atendiendo al análisis realizado en el presente fallo, en lo que atañe a la demanda planteada por la Cámara Nacional de Bananeros, deben resolverse las defensas de fondo en el siguiente sentido: a) APM Terminal Central América B.V y APM Terminals Moín S.A.: falta de derecho: se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho formulada por la empresa APM Terminal Central América B.V. y APM Terminals Moín S.A., al no haberse podido acreditar nulidades en cuanto a las acciones cuestionadas. b) Estado: falta de legitimación activa y falta de derecho. Se rechaza la defensa de falta de legitimación activa, siendo que la demanda se formula al amparo del ordinal 10 inciso primero numerales b y c del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, en el ejercicio de la defensa de intereses gremiales o en todo caso colectivos, por parte de una agrupación que aún parcialmente, representa intereses de un sector de producción nacional, cuyo giro de acción se ve incidido por la contratación cuestionada. La defensa de falta de derecho debe ser acogida en su totalidad por las razones arriba expuestas en cuanto a la inexistencia de los vicios alegados. c) Consejo Nacional de Concesiones: falta de derecho. Esta defensa debe ser acogida a plenitud por las mismas razones ya señaladas. d) Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA): falta de derecho. Se acoge en su totalidad por las razones dichas. e) Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos: falta de derecho y legitimación pasiva. Respecto de la ARESEP, se acoge la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva pues no se formula respecto de este ente público petición de nulidad sobre acto alguno que haya emitido. Se omite pronunciamiento sobre la defensa de falta de derecho por innecesario. f) Contraloría General de la República: falta de legitimación activa, pasiva y falta de derecho. Se rechaza la defensa de falta de legitimación activa, siendo que la demanda se formula al amparo del ordinal 10 inciso primero numerales b y c del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, en el ejercicio de la defensa de intereses gremiales o en todo caso colectivos, por parte de una agrupación que aún parcialmente, representa intereses de un sector de producción nacional, cuyo giro de acción se ve incidido por la contratación cuestionada. La de falta de legitimación pasiva se debe rechazar con fundamento en el ordinal 12.5 inciso a del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Parte de las conductas cuestionadas es el acto de refrendo emitido por la Contraloría General de la República, oficio DCA-0692, por lo que la acción se direcciona contra una de las administraciones emisoras de las conductas impugnadas. La defensa de falta de derecho debe acogerse en su totalidad. En síntesis, se rechazan las defensas de falta de legitimación activa formuladas por la Contraloría General de la República y el Estado. Se rechaza la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva opuesta por la Contraloría General de la República. Se acoge la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva opuesta por la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos. Se omite pronunciamiento por innecesario sobre la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por ese ente regulador. Se acoge en su totalidad la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por las empresas APM Terminal Central América B.V y APM Terminals Moín S.A., el Estado, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, la Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA) y la Contraloría General de la República. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda incoada por la Cámara Nacional de Bananeros contra las empresas APM Terminal Central América B.V y APM Terminals Moín S.A., el Estado, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, la Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos y la Contraloría General de la República.

XLIX.- DEMANDA DE SINTRAJAP. Respecto de la demanda de SINTRAJAP, las co-accionadas formularon las siguientes defensas de fondo, que en su orden se resuelven de la siguiente manera: a) APM Terminal Central América B.V.: falta de derecho: la defensa debe ser acogida al no haberse acreditado la concurrencia de las causales de nulidad acusadas; b) Contraloría General de la República: falta de legitimación activa y pasivas, así como la de falta de derecho. La defensa de falta de legitimación activa debe ser rechazada siendo que la acción se cursa por parte de una organización que representa intereses de connotación colectiva, al amparo del ordinal 10.1 inciso c del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. No obstante, la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva debe ser acogida pues la demanda de Nombre141024 no incluye pretensión alguna contra las acciones emitidas por la Contraloría General de la República, ello pese a que en la audiencia única señaló reproches propios del acto de refrendo, empero, en su demanda, no impugnó esta conducta. Ergo, debe acogerse la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva. Se omite pronunciamiento sobre la defensa de falta de derecho por innecesario. c) Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (F. 3842-3876 del principal): formula las excepciones de falta de derecho y falta de legitimación pasiva. Respecto de la ARESEP, se acoge la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva pues no se formula respecto de este ente público petición de nulidad sobre acto alguno que haya emitido. Se omite pronunciamiento sobre la defensa de falta de derecho por innecesario. d) Consejo Nacional de Concesiones (f. 3881-3936 del principal): Opuso la defensa de falta de derecho: esta defensa debe ser acogida al no haberse determinado nulidad que declarar. e) Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA): Plantea la defensa de falta de derecho; la cual, debe ser acogida por las razones dichas en cuanto a esa misma defensa planteada por las otras partes accionadas. f) Estado: formula la defensa de falta de derecho. Por paridad de razón, esta defensa debe ser acogida a plenitud. En síntesis, se rechaza las defensas de falta de legitimación activa formulada por la Contraloría General de la República. Se acoge la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva opuesta por la Contraloría General de la República y la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos. Se omite pronunciamiento por innecesario sobre la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por el órgano contralor y el mencionado ente regulador. Se acoge en su totalidad la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por la empresa APM Terminal Central América B.V., el Estado, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, la Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA). En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda incoada por el Sindicato de Trabajadores de Nombre141024 contra las empresas APM Terminal Central América B.V y APM Terminals Moín S.A., el Estado, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, la Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos y la Contraloría General de la República.

Nombre33221.- Sobre las costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. Igual dispensa se impone cuando en el caso concurra el denominado plus petitio, sea, conforme lo estatuye el canon 194.1 del CPCA, cuando la diferencia entre lo reclamado y lo obtenido exceda del 15%, salvo que las bases de la demanda sean provisionales o su determinación dependa del arbitrio judicial o dictamen de peritos. En la especie, luego de la ponderación de las diversas posiciones que se han presentado en esta contienda judicial, es criterio de este Tribunal, se está frente a un caso que se ha caracterizado por alta complejidad técnica y jurídica. Lo extenso de los puntos analizados en el presente fallo ponen en evidencia lo complejo del tema. Se trata de un asunto en el que ha sido menester abordar un gran número de aspectos y que por su composición, obligó un amplio análisis. Desde esa óptica de examen, considera este cuerpo colegiado, las posiciones vertidas por cada parte involucrada, tanto actoras como demandadas, refleja buena fe y motivo suficiente para ejercitar la defensa de sus respectivas posiciones, lo que dentro del ámbito de análisis abordado, lleva a concluir sobre la pertinencia de resolver la presente causa sin especial condena en costas. En efecto, la compleja naturaleza de las cuestiones debatidas refleja la existencia de motivo suficiente para litigar, lo que posibilita la dispensa señalada. Este criterio alcanza incluso las acciones respecto de las cuales se ha acogido la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva, como es el caso de la demanda contra la Nombre628 y el caso de la CGR respecto de la acción de SINTRAJAP. La compleja tramitación de la licitación pública internacional que se ha revisado, no hace concluir que la demanda contra esas instancias públicas sea temeraria, carente de seriedad, pues al margen de los criterios técnicos utilizados por este Tribunal para resolver el tema de la legitimación pasiva en cuestión, lo cierto del caso es que parte de los agravios presentados involucraba a esas unidades administrativas, sea participando en la consulta de los aspectos tarifarios del proyecto -caso de la ARESEP-, o bien, en la fase de objeción al cartel y apelación contra el acto adjudicatorio -en la particularidad de la CGR-. En consecuencia, estima esta Cámara, por las razones expuestas, lo debido es resolver el presente asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas.

POR TANTO

1. Respecto de la demanda formulada por la Cámara Nacional de Bananeros (expediente 11-1347-1027-CA) : Se rechazan las defensas de falta de legitimación activa formuladas por la Contraloría General de la República y el Estado. Se rechaza la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva opuesta por la Contraloría General de la República. Se acoge la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva opuesta por la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos. Se omite pronunciamiento por innecesario sobre la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por ese ente regulador. Se acoge en su totalidad la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por las empresas APM Terminal Central América B.V y APM Terminals Moín S.A., el Estado, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, la Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA) y la Contraloría General de la República. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda incoada por la Cámara Nacional de Bananeros contra las empresas APM Terminal Central América B.V y APM Terminals Moín S.A., el Estado, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, la Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos y la Contraloría General de la República. 2. Respecto de la demanda planteada por el Sindicato de Trabajadores de Nombre141024 (expediente No. 11-3975-1027-CA) : Se rechaza la defensa de falta de legitimación activa formulada por la Contraloría General de la República. Se acoge la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva opuesta por la Contraloría General de la República y la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos. Se omite pronunciamiento por innecesario sobre la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por el órgano contralor y el mencionado ente regulador. Se acoge en su totalidad la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por la empresa APM Terminal Central América B.V., el Estado, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, la Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA). En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda incoada por el Sindicato de Trabajadores de Nombre141024 contra las empresas APM Terminal Central América B.V y APM Terminals Moín S.A., el Estado, el Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, la Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos y la Contraloría General de la República. 3. Costas: S e resuelve el presente asunto sin especial condena en costas, de conformidad con el ordinal 193 inciso b) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo .

José Roberto Garita Navarro Marianella Álvarez Molina Cynthia Abarca Gómez ASUNTO: PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR: Cámara Nacional de Bananeros, Sindicato Trabajadores JADPDEVA DEMANDADO: APM Terminal Central America B.V, Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, Consejo Nacional de Concesiones, Contraloría General de la República, Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica y el Estado.

IGWT.HUP.JRGN..2012 Clasificación elaborada por CENTRO DE INFORMACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIALdel Poder Judicial. Prohibida su reproducción y/o distribución en forma onerosa.