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Res. 00114-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · 17/12/2013
OutcomeResultado
The dismissal of the Executive Director of JUDESUR was annulled for lack of due process, reinstatement was ordered along with payment of back wages and moral damages, but the requested amount for moral damages was reduced.Se anuló el despido del Director Ejecutivo de JUDESUR por falta de debido proceso, se ordenó su reinstalación y el pago de salarios caídos y daño moral, pero se redujo el monto solicitado por daño moral.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Litigation Tribunal annulled the agreement of the Board of Directors of JUDESUR that dismissed the Executive Director, Nelson Loaiza Sojo, on the grounds that the act was null due to lack of motivation, absence of an objective cause for dismissal, and violation of due process. The authority acted arbitrarily by invoking an alleged loss of confidence without following a prior disciplinary administrative procedure, even though the applicable regulations required sufficient cause for termination and ensured the right to defense. As a result, the court ordered the reinstatement of the employee, payment of back wages, and compensation for subjective moral damages in the amount of six million colones.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo anuló el acuerdo de la Junta Directiva de JUDESUR que cesó al Director Ejecutivo, Nelson Loaiza Sojo, por considerar que el acto fue nulo debido a la falta de motivación, ausencia de causa objetiva para el despido y violación del debido proceso. La autoridad actuó de manera arbitraria al invocar una supuesta pérdida de confianza sin seguir un procedimiento administrativo disciplinario previo, a pesar de que la normativa aplicable exigía una causal suficiente para el cese y la garantía del derecho de defensa. Como consecuencia, el tribunal ordenó la reinstalación del funcionario, el pago de salarios caídos y una indemnización por daño moral subjetivo de seis millones de colones.
Key excerptExtracto clave
In accordance with the above, it is not true that Mr. Loaiza could be freely removed, as was done in the contested act, since although his position is appointed by the Board of Directors, the applicable regulations limit the exercise of the power to terminate the employment relationship to the existence of an objective reason that grounds such decision. [...] For this reason, if the Board of Directors had an interest in choosing to apply a disciplinary regime against the plaintiff, it should have conducted a disciplinary administrative process that met the conditions imposed by the legal system itself for the termination to be considered valid and effective. [...] It is not evident from the respective administrative act either a reason or a motivation that would support the content of the contested act, much less a prior procedure that verified the facts that gave rise to the alleged loss of confidence, therefore the contested act becomes null due to the lack of these essential elements and sine qua non requirements.De conformidad con lo anterior, no es cierto que el Señor Loaiza pudiera ser removido libremente, tal y como fue realizado en el acto objetado, en tanto que si bien su cargo es nombramiento de la Junta Directiva, la normativa aplicable, limita el ejercicio de la potestad de cese de la relación de empleo, a la existencia de un motivo objetivo que así funde tal decisión. [...] Por este motivo, si la Junta Directiva tenía interés por optar en aplicar un régimen disciplinario en contra del actor, debió haber realizado un proceso administrativo disciplinario que cumpliera las condiciones impuestas por el propio ordenamiento para que el cese pudiera ser considerado como válido y eficaz. [...] no se advierte del acto administrativo respectivo tanto un motivo como una motivación que dieran base al contenido del acto objetado, ni mucho menos un procedimiento previo que constatara los hechos que dieron origen a la pérdida de confianza invocada, por lo que el acto impugnado deviene en nulo por la carencia de dichos elementos propios y requisitos sine qua non del mismo.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"La motivación se traduce en la fundamentación fáctica y jurídica, con la que la Administración justifica la legalidad y oportunidad del acto que adopta y normalmente se exterioriza en los considerandos del acto."
"Motivation translates into the factual and legal foundation with which the Administration justifies the lawfulness and timeliness of the act it adopts and is usually externalized in the recitals of the act."
Considerando V.IV del voto, citando doctrina
"La motivación se traduce en la fundamentación fáctica y jurídica, con la que la Administración justifica la legalidad y oportunidad del acto que adopta y normalmente se exterioriza en los considerandos del acto."
Considerando V.IV del voto, citando doctrina
"La pérdida de confianza, como se ha establecido en reiterados fallos, debe estar sustentada en hechos de tal entidad, que impidan la continuación del contrato de trabajo. Se trata, entonces, de que esa pérdida de confianza se derive de hechos o situaciones constatadas, y no de la mera voluntad del empleador; por eso, normalmente, se habla de pérdida de confianza objetiva."
"Loss of confidence, as established in repeated rulings, must be based on facts of such gravity that they prevent the continuation of the employment contract. It is, then, about that loss of confidence deriving from verified facts or situations, and not from the mere will of the employer; that is why we normally speak of objective loss of confidence."
Cita de jurisprudencia de la Sala Segunda, Voto 20-2010
"La pérdida de confianza, como se ha establecido en reiterados fallos, debe estar sustentada en hechos de tal entidad, que impidan la continuación del contrato de trabajo. Se trata, entonces, de que esa pérdida de confianza se derive de hechos o situaciones constatadas, y no de la mera voluntad del empleador; por eso, normalmente, se habla de pérdida de confianza objetiva."
Cita de jurisprudencia de la Sala Segunda, Voto 20-2010
Full documentDocumento completo
V.III.- Considerations regarding the public employment regime:
In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations arise. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, by establishing the following: "Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration" and "Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof." In accordance with the indicated constitutional norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of their own normative regulation, stability in employment - limiting the free removal regime characteristic of private labor regulation - and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons covered by a subordination regime, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (making the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber).
Correlative with the above rights, the public servant possesses a series of obligations of a functional nature, inherent to the public purposes sought with their activity and which must always guide their management, so as not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary liability. Without pretending to be exhaustive, some of the duties proper to the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (art. 3 Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Administration), b) duty of compliance with the principles of public service - continuity, efficiency, adaptation to change in the legal regime, and equality of treatment- (art. 4 General Law of Public Administration), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control) d) duty to protect the best interests of children (art. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code) e) duty to comply with the legal system (art. 13 and concordant articles of the General Law of Public Administration, art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute), f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (art. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excessive Requirements and Administrative Procedures), g) duty of obedience (art. 108 of the General Law of Public Administration), h) duty to act with effectiveness (art. 5 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets) i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (art. 114 of the General Law of Public Administration and art. 39. d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute) j) duty to respond in case of having acted with intent or gross negligence (art. 199 and 211 General Law of Public Administration) k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (art. 11 of said normative body).
Additionally, in a supplementary manner, based on article 9 of the General Law of Public Administration and 51 of the indicated Statute, the provisions of the Labor Code and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching, Law for the Regulation of Smoking, Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, among others. In this order of ideas, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters, given the existence of a statutory and not contractual relationship, (article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration), we cannot ignore the existence of general guiding lines of the relationship that are common, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in article 19 of the Labor Code.
Regarding the disciplinary regime to be applied in case of non-compliance with said duties, in accordance with various votes of the Constitutional Chamber, the principle of specificity (tipicidad) is more lax, such that a specific legal classification of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants. In this sense, vote 2007-013903 of fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes of October third, two thousand seven, of the Constitutional Chamber, indicates the following: "V.- On the principle of specificity (tipicidad) in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of specificity (tipicidad) is an application of the principle of legality that requires, on one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reprehensible for the purposes of their sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to be applied, it being possible to affirm that the principle of specificity (tipicidad) constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary liability.
Regarding the concrete delimitation of the reprehensible conduct, this Chamber has held on previous occasions (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 of twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes of May thirty-first, two thousand five and 94-5594 of fifteen hours forty-eight minutes of September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although certainly this principle in this matter does not have the same form as in the criminal-legal sphere - since faults not literally foreseen may be sanctioned discretionally - it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text. That is, faults not literally foreseen, but that are understood to be included in the text, may be sanctioned discretionally and provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary fault, through a procedure created for that purpose. Now, regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this one must be clearly and previously established, without the Administration being able to create new sanctions that are not contemplated in the applicable norms.
In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable - since they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the subjects - and that the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and requirement that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of specificity (tipicidad), that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be – this one yes- clearly pre-established." The foregoing generates what is known in doctrine as the principle of relative classification (tipificación relativa) in the understanding that the fault must be foreseen in the disciplinary system, but without the level of rigor typical of criminal matters insofar as it derives from the service relationship in particular.
By reason of the above, both the non-compliance with general functional duties and the legally classified conducts (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, statutory norms proper to the regime or Labor Code, for example), and those that are contemplated in norms of a lower rank, such as those contained in the autonomous service regulations or in cases where the classification occurs with respect to the sanction to be imposed, are sanctionable. This relative classification (tipificación relativa) makes the need for positive norms in the nature of formal law more flexible, making it possible for their regulation to be generated by a positive norm of lower rank. The foregoing considerations, without prejudice to the fact that there exists a series of principles of sanctioning law derived from criminal law, of necessary compliance in all cases, e.g., proportionality, non bis in idem, innocence, due process, due reasoning of the respective resolution.
In this order of ideas, it must be noted that in matters of defining conducts that can be considered as part of the proper duties of public officials or subject to sanction in case of non-compliance, our country possesses a diffuse system, given that they are not detailed in a single normative body, but rather dispersed among different norms of different rank, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to dictate, according to article 27 of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-normative powers of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility of regulating through legal means each and every one of the specific conducts that public servants incur, and in the understanding that the exercise of the regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal system. In a transversal manner to this set of principles and norms of different rank, in this matter we find public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any decision or formal or informal conduct of the Administration with respect to its servants.
Said interest understood in accordance with article 113 of the General Law of Public Administration, provides: "1. The public servant must perform their functions in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered parties. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the assessment of the public interest, account shall be taken, in the first place, of the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual, to which mere convenience may in no case be placed before." By reason of the foregoing, any analysis in matters of public employment must not ignore the analysis of compliance with the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference of its underlying motivation.
V.IV.- On the merits of the matter submitted to this Court for analysis: The plaintiff in their complaint invokes that the act of their dismissal is vitiated by absolute nullity, because no due process was followed against them, nor was their right of defense respected, and furthermore, there was an evidentiary deficit and a lack of reasoning in the challenged agreement. They consider that Mr. Loaiza Sojo holds a permanent appointment for an indefinite term, and therefore cannot be dismissed except based on the existence of serious misconduct. For their part, the co-defendants allege that the plaintiff’s appointment was discretionary and as a position of trust as Executive Director of the entity. In this regard, upon analyzing the reasoning employed and the evidence admitted and produced, this Court finds that the plaintiff is correct in their reasoning. In this sense, it is evident in the record that Mr.
Nelson Loaiza Sojo was appointed as Executive Director of JUDESUR, first for a probationary period and subsequently for an indefinite period (see agreement ACU-23-572-2010 of ordinary session Number 572-2010 of December 20, 2010, of the Board of Directors of JUDESUR). In this line of thought, it must be taken into consideration that the position of Executive Director of the defendant entity was provided for in Article 10 of Law 7012, the Law Creating the Golfito Commercial Free Depot, as it states: “To execute the tasks proper to the Board, an Executive Director and the necessary personnel shall be appointed, whose functions shall be determined by the organic regulation.” Based on this norm, the Regulation on the Organization and Services of the Regional Development Board of the Southern Zone of the Province of Puntarenas, Executive Decree No. 30251-P-H, provided in its Article 10, subsection 2), the following competence of the Board: “2.7.
Appoint by qualified majority the Executive Director and Internal Auditor and remove them from their positions when sufficient cause exists, in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code.” As noted from the indicated norm, in the specific regulation of the plaintiff’s position, there was a will to protect it under a regime of stability, by which liability for termination was only foreseen on grounds of justified dismissal, that is, upon demonstration of the commission of a disciplinary cause, and therefore, the unilateral breaking of said employment relationship without cause, by the mere will of the decision-making body, is not permissible. In accordance with the foregoing, it is not true that Mr. Loaiza could be freely removed, as was done in the challenged act, since although his position is appointed by the Board of Directors, the applicable regulations limit the exercise of the power to terminate the employment relationship to the existence of an objective reason that grounds such a decision.
As is clearly noted, the phrase “… when sufficient cause exists…”, implies the necessity that the employer’s decision be based on said cause, which must be objective, concrete, and duly individualized, and not a mere abstract invocation, without greater legal foundation, and as a corollary thereof, grounded on a prior demonstration of its existence, through compliance with a due process that can serve as the basis for the reasoning of the respective administrative act. In this line of thought, it must be recalled that the formal action of the Public Administration materializes in the adoption of administrative acts, understood as unilateral declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge issued in the exercise of the administrative function, generating internal or external effects, whether individual or general, with or without normative scope. Such acts may have a concrete or general scope, depending on whether their effects apply to one or several specific administered parties or have a more indeterminate scope.
In the case of acts of concrete scope, the General Law of Public Administration establishes as material or substantial elements, the competence of the subject issuing the act, the grounds (motivo) that give rise to it—understood as the legal or factual antecedents or premises of the administrative conduct—the content, that is, what the act itself provides (which must be lawful, possible, clear, proportional, and in accordance with the grounds), and the public purpose pursued by its adoption. As formal elements, both the procedure adopted for its materialization and its reasoning (motivación) are considered, the latter being the foundation of the administrative conduct. With respect to this element of the administrative act, it has been defined as follows: “Thus, reasoning comprises the exposition of the reasons that have led the agency to issue it and, in particular, the expression of the factual and legal antecedents that precede and justify the issuance of the act.
This is certainly not the criterion of classical doctrine, which limits reasoning to the enunciation of the factual and legal antecedents (i.e., to the expression of the cause). It seems more appropriate to base the requirement of reasoning on the enunciation of the reasons that have determined the issuance of the act, which allows for the inclusion of the externalization of another element considered essential: the purpose. Although this conclusion is not expressly recognized, many scholars admit it virtually by affirming that the requirement of reasoning constitutes one of the first steps toward the recognition of the remedy for misuse of power, but the fact is that by limiting the concept of reasoning to the expression of the cause, not all doctrine notices the importance it may have in proving the existence of a defect or vice in the element of purpose.” (CASSAGNE, Juan Carlos, El Acto Administrativo, Buenos Aires, Second Edition, Abeledo-Perrot, pp. 212-213).
National doctrine, for its part, has expressed it as follows: “... it is a declaration of what are the factual and legal circumstances that have led the respective public administration to the issuance or emanation of the administrative act. The reasoning is the formal expression of the grounds and, normally, in any administrative resolution, it is contained in the so-called ‘recitals’ (considerandos)—recital section—. The reasoning, consisting of an enunciation of the facts and the legal foundation that the public administration took into account to issue its decision or will, constitutes a means of proof of its intentionality and an indispensable guideline for interpreting and applying the respective administrative act.” (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Volume I. (General Part). Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. Ius Consultec. S.A. 2007). For its part, Article 136 of the General Law of Public Administration refers to this element as follows: “Article 136.- 1. The following shall be reasoned with mention, at least succinct, of their foundations:
By reason of the foregoing, the exercise of regulated powers reduces the administration to verifying the legally defined factual premise completely and, in its presence, applying what the Law itself has also determined. There is then a process of applying the Law that leaves no room for any subjective judgment, except for the verification or confirmation of the premise itself to contrast it with the legal type. The decision that constitutes the exercise of the power is mandatory in the presence of said premise, and its content cannot be freely configured by the Administration, but must be limited to what the law itself has provided regarding that content in a precise and complete manner. In the case of the latter, there is a greater or lesser scope of possibilities for nuance and autonomous decision by the Administration. In this latter scenario, a margin of appreciation exists regarding whether to act, or how and when to act in a specific case.
However, it must be noted that such discretion is not synonymous with arbitrariness, nor is it unrestricted, since it is limited by logic, justice, and reasonableness. In this vein, Articles 15 and 16 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública) provide as follows: "Article 15.- 1. Discretion may even arise from an absence of law in the specific case, but it shall in all cases be subject to the limits imposed upon it by the legal system, expressly or implicitly, to ensure that its exercise is efficient and reasonable. 2. The Judge shall exercise legality control over the regulated aspects of the discretionary act and over the observance of its limits." "Article 16.- 1. In no case may acts contrary to unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience be issued. 2. The Judge may control the conformity of the discretionary elements of the act with these non-legal rules, as if exercising legality control." Regarding the scope of the control of discretion, Ruling 84-2002 at 11:00 a.m. on April 5, 2002, of the Second Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, resolved as follows: "VI.- A different matter arises with regard to the intensity of said control and the existence or not of some discretionary aspects excluded from jurisdictional oversight.
On this subject, before any other consideration, it is necessary to point out that there are no fully discretionary administrative powers or acts, since only certain discretionary elements of the administrative power exist, which already considerably reduces the quantitative scope of the challenge. On the other hand, it is worth recalling, by way of a general guideline, that discretion in no way implies or permits arbitrariness, for while it is true that undefined legal concepts grant a margin of negative and positive appreciation to the administrative body, they cannot 'authorize or justify arbitrary actions, for the margin of appreciation and the halo of uncertainty implicit in every undefined legal concept or in the use of discretionary powers is one thing, and arbitrariness is quite another. It must not be forgotten that the prohibition of arbitrariness is a principle that permeates all of Administrative Law' (First Chamber of the Court.
No. 48, at 2:50 p.m. on May 19, 1995). In this sense, this Section of the Tribunal has expressed itself in some precedents, in which it has been recalled that discretion 'operates when the Public Administration faces equally valid alternatives among which it must lean towards one of them, and also that there are no fully discretionary powers, but only discretionary elements of administrative powers, so that legality control over their regulated elements is indisputable. In addition to this, it must also be noted that discretion is partial, as it is subject to certain parameters of action that cannot be violated without falling into illegality, because discretion in no way entails arbitrariness' (Contentious-Administrative Tribunal. Second Section. 320-99 at 10:30 a.m. on October 6, 1999). From this point of view, the removal of directors representing the State must obey verifiable circumstances, which can be classified as a true disappearance of trust, understood as an objective valuation, the product of the circumstances and the real truth that precede and surround the administrative decision.
In this same vein, domestic case law has expressed itself, when, in reference to the expression at issue, it has pointed out that 'it should not be understood as an absolutely discretionary power conferred upon the person who appointed the confidence employee, but rather that its exercise must involve objective and reasonable circumstances that justify the declaration of loss of trust' (Second Chamber of the Court of Justice. Nos. 76 at 9:10 a.m. on July 15, 1987; 161 at 9:00 a.m. on July 17, 1992; 305 at 10:00 a.m. on December 11, 1992; 51 at 9:50 a.m. on March 18, 1993, and 215 at 9:00 a.m. on August 5, 1994). ... Therefore, that halo of discretion is subject to judicial control under the strict limits of juridicity (legality in the broad sense), which our own legal system expressly sets out, when it clearly and forcefully states that in addition to the legal control of the regulated aspects of the discretionary act, the Judge shall verify that acts of this nature are not issued contrary to the unequivocal rules of science or technique, or to elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience, and as part of these, proportionality, reasonableness, and rationality, which must govern all administrative conduct, are added here." Thus, it is evident that the Contentious-Administrative Judge can and must exercise legality control both over the regulated aspects of the act and in the face of any violation of the stated limits of discretion—called a defect of excess of power—such that the Administration's action, even where the legal system grants it freedom of choice, must be subject to the indicated rules and principles when adopting a specific decision.
A corollary of the foregoing is that the Judges are in a position to determine that conduct considered by the Administration as discretionary is not so, given the existence of regulated elements in a specific act. In the specific case under analysis, this Tribunal considers that for its proper resolution, a distinction must be made between different moments in the procedure for the appointment and removal of a servant. In this vein, although, given a diversity of eligible candidates for a position such as the one under analysis, the body responsible for the appointment has discretion for the respective designation, it is evident that this discretion is slowed down, given the premise at issue in this proceeding, for purposes of removal. The foregoing, insofar as the rule that provides for the competence of the Board of Directors expressly indicates that the servant's dismissal is only possible given the existence of a cause deemed 'sufficient', which has two relevant aspects as an immediate legal consequence.
On the one hand, the power cannot be exercised without the prior verification of the existence of a real and objective cause that substantiates it as 'sufficient', which implies that it is not just any type of conduct or omission that would result in dismissal, but rather that which is proportionally considered as such. On the other, the verification of the cause for dismissal must necessarily be carried out using an administrative procedure that fully guarantees the party's rights to defense and a hearing. For the foregoing reasons, for this Court it is evident that for the position of Executive Director of JUDESUR, a discretionary dismissal with the breadth invoked by its representation is not possible, much less without prior due process. For this reason, if the Board of Directors had an interest in opting to apply a disciplinary regime against the plaintiff, it should have conducted a disciplinary administrative procedure that met the conditions imposed by the legal system itself so that the dismissal could be considered valid and effective.
In accordance with the foregoing, in addition to what has been indicated, this Tribunal considers that no reason or motivation that supported the content of the challenged act is apparent from the respective administrative act, much less any prior procedure that verified the facts that gave rise to the invoked loss of trust, for which reason the challenged act is void due to the lack of its own elements and sine qua non requirements. Therefore, although the appointment of Mr. Loaiza Sojo involves a discretionary appointment, given the confidence nature of his position as Executive Director of the entity, his dismissal is regulated regarding the motives on which it can operate and consequently in the limits to the exercise of the disciplinary power. Thus, this power may be exercised only after compliance with due process and the protection of his fundamental rights to a hearing and defense, his attendance at the respective session not being appropriate, since the dynamics of that session in no way substitute the entire procedural guarantee framework protected by Book Two of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública).
In this vein, the payment of certain employment-related items does not exempt JUDESUR from compliance with due process, since in the case of Mr. Loaiza Sojo, he was dismissed for a disciplinary reason, as is evident from the challenged act, and it is the case that when this reason applies, necessarily, prior administrative due process must be carried out, given that the impact on the servant transcends the mere economic settlement of certain employment-related items to other injuries to his legal sphere. The invocation of isolated rulings from the Constitutional Chamber applied to the situations of other positions, in which there is no explicit rule like the one applied to the plaintiff's specific case—who was appointed for an indefinite term and where said rule, without a margin of doubt, requires the existence of a sufficient cause for dismissal and which, as has been stated, has as a natural consequence the prior implementation of a disciplinary administrative procedure that verifies its existence—is not appropriate.
In any case, it must be noted that although Ruling 2235-2007 at 3:45 p.m. on February 20, 2007, of the Constitutional Chamber provides for the possibility of the dismissal of a confidence servant without prior due process, this must be carried out after payment of all respective employment items, but it does not refer to the situation provided for in the case under review. In this vein, the indicated ruling states: 'Confidence officials are not subject to the stability provided for in Article 192 of the Political Constitution, but they must be previously defined as such by a special legal norm. This authorizes the respective head to freely appoint the person who will occupy the position, without having to follow the ordinary rules or procedures established in the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), but rather only the discretion of the head making the appointment, for which reason the appointment is made independently of the personal attributes that may make a person suitable for the exercise of the position they hold.
Thus, given that the person making the appointment can freely choose them without any subjection, procedure, or process, they can also render the appointment without effect from the moment they deem it opportune. This is so because the appointment was made with complete discretion, and without this being to the detriment or any demerit of the person who was dismissed from their functions, since maintaining them there or not does not question their capabilities or performance, but is a purely subjective appreciation of the head regarding the trust to hold the position. In this way, the employment contract can be terminated before the end of the term for which the appointment was granted. If the removal occurs with employer liability, it is not necessary to follow due process, but only prior communication to the servant. But if, instead, the removal occurs without employer liability, since the cause that gave rise to such removal must be proven, the rules of due process must be respected (see in this regard resolution 2000-10135 and in a similar sense 2004-05025, 2002-11884, 2002-06903, 2001-04600, 2000-09631, 2000-06522).' In the plaintiff's case, it is noted that even though he was appointed discretionally, there is an express rule that imposes the removal procedure, which was not complied with in the specific case; coupled with the above, no unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía) was paid to him for the months worked, despite his relationship being for an indefinite term. Thus, as has been indicated, the regulations also provided for his dismissal only for disciplinary reasons, so the impropriety of the act adopted by JUDESUR in his particular case is evident.
V.V.— As a consequence of the decision, it is appropriate to annul the agreement ACU 21-585-2011 of April 7, 2011, of the Board of Directors of the Junta de Desarrollo Regional de la Zona Sur, communicated by official communication JD-O-024-2011 of April 7, 2011, and by virtue of said annulment, upon extracting the indicated ablative act from the legal system and given that the plaintiff had been appointed for an indefinite term, in accordance with articles 22, subsection d) and 122, subsection d) of the CPCA, the Board of Directors of the Junta de Desarrollo Regional de la Zona Sur (JUDESUR) must be ordered to proceed to reinstate Mr. Nelson Loaiza Sojo as Executive Director with all his rights and powers as of the day immediately following the finality of this judgment.
V.VI.— The plaintiff requests in their claim to be paid the differences for salaries from the moment of their dismissal until their reinstatement. In this regard, this Tribunal considers that the logical and natural consequence of the annulment of the dismissal acts of a public servant's appointment is the payment of the remuneration they would have received had the employment relationship not ended due to the annulled act. The foregoing, inasmuch as it would result in placing the Administered party in the identical legal situation they were in prior to their rights being harmed by the declared null act. The annulment declared in the preceding recital has a declaratory and retroactive effect to the date of the issuance of the act being annulled, which means that any prior legal situation must recover its state at that moment. Regarding so-called consolidated legal situations (situaciones jurídicas consolidadas), the decision 07642-2005 of 11:39 hours on June 17, 2005, of the Sala Constitucional is especially relevant, stating: "The concepts of 'acquired right' (derecho adquirido) and 'consolidated legal situation' (situación jurídica consolidada) appear closely related in constitutional doctrine.
It is possible to affirm that, in general terms, the first denotes that consummated circumstance in which a thing - material or immaterial, whether a previously alien good or a previously non-existent right - has entered into (or impacted upon) the person's patrimonial sphere, such that the person experiences an ascertainable advantage or benefit. For its part, the 'consolidated legal situation' represents not so much a patrimonial surplus, but a state of affairs fully defined in terms of its legal characteristics and effects, even though these have not yet been extinguished. What is relevant regarding the consolidated legal situation, precisely, is not whether those effects still persist or not, but that - by virtue of a legal mandate or a judgment that has so declared - a clear and defined rule has already emerged in legal life, connecting a factual premise (conditioning fact) with a given consequence (conditioned effect).
From this perspective, the person's situation is given by a logical proposition of the 'if..., then...' type; that is to say: if the conditioning fact has occurred, then the 'consolidated legal situation' implies that, necessarily, the conditioned effect must also occur..." Applying the foregoing considerations, it is determined that the award for various items is the consequence, on one hand, of the recognition of the non-existence of any effect resulting from the null dismissal as an expression of an act possessing such a defect - expressed in a declaratory judgment - and on the other, of the recognition of an individualized legal situation affected by the act and the full restoration thereof - expressed in a condemnatory judgment - under the same conditions as if the defective act had not been issued - given that its precarious or spurious effects disappeared absolutely from legal life - (art. 22, subsection d) and 122, subsection d) of the CPCA).
Thus, the Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia indicated in its decision 2005-00181 of nine hours forty minutes on March nine, two thousand five, in ordering the following: "...in the specific case, fundamental rights of the appellant are violated, such as the right to work by unjustifiably preventing them from maintaining it, dignity and equality, by opening up regarding them, new causes, conditions, and procedures for dismissal, not applicable to other public officials and not provided for by the legal system, all the more reason for the Administration's actions not to be endorsed by the judges, given the presence of defects and actions contrary to the principle of legality (Articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 of the General Law of Public Administration). Consequently, as we are in the presence of a null dismissal, the effects of its declaration of nullity must be retrotracted to the moment or date of said act, in accordance with article 171 of the aforementioned law, so that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance; in other words, the appellant must be restored to their job, with all the rights they had upon being dismissed and those they would legally have accumulated during it...." (Our emphasis) In the same line of thought, the indicated Chamber noted: "It proves to be an unavoidable consequence of reinstatement to order the payment of back pay (salarios caídos), that is, those the plaintiff would have received, from the moment of dismissal until their effective reinstatement in the company, as if they had been working; that is, including any improvement, raise, incentive, or advantage they would have received had they been working (in this regard see, among others, ERMIDA URIARTE, Oscar.
"LA ESTABILIDAD DEL TRABAJADOR EN LA EMPRESA, PROTECCION REAL O FICTICIA", Alcalí Editorial, Montevideo 1983, Pg. 32. MURGAS TORRAZZA, Rolando, "LA TERMINACION DE LA RELACION DE TRABAJO EN EL DERECHO PANAMEÑO" EN LA EXTINCION DE LA RELACION LABORAL, AELE Editores Lima, Peru, 1987; pg. 201. PASCO COSMOPOLIS, Mario, "EXTINCION DE LA RELACION LABORAL EN EL PERU en la Extinción de la relación laboral, AELE Editorial, Lima, Peru, 1987, Pg. 241)." (Resolution N° 260 bis, of 9:30 hours, on January 16, 1998) (Our emphasis). The decision by the Sala Segunda is an immediate and direct consequence of the existence of a null dismissal, inasmuch as doctrinally it has been considered that "Those dismissals whose purpose or effect is the harm of fundamental rights, understanding by these - as previously indicated - those that make up the block of constitutionality, must be deemed null by imperative of the principle of constitutional integrity and primacy....
Consequently, such (vitiated) dismissals, given the constitutional harm they entail, must be excluded from the regime of relative or improper stability, and therefore, extinguishing effects on the employment relationship cannot be attributed to them.... the nullity of the dismissal, in order to be such, must lead to the restoration of the employment relationship, through reincorporation to the job position... In legislation where the nullity of dismissal is directly or indirectly established, it is common that part of the object of the proceeding is the discussion on the payment of salaries the worker failed to receive from the moment of dismissal. This equally posits that the judgment may have the additional effect of ordering the payment of back pay. There are variants regarding the extent of the right to claim those salaries and the possibility that the norms allow the reduction or elimination of the award with or without the court's discretionary power.." Murgas Torrazza Rolando.
La Tutela Judicial contra los Despidos nulos por Discriminación. Revista Derecho del Trabajo N. 3. 2007. Fundación Universitas. That being the case, it would be appropriate to grant what is requested, that is, the payment of back pay, as damages, as a direct consequence of the declaration of nullity of the plaintiff's dismissal, in accordance with the provisions of subsection d) of article 122 of the CPCA, insofar as it provides that in a judgment one may: "Recognize, restore or declare any tutable legal situation, adopting any measures that are necessary and appropriate for it". By reason of the foregoing, it is appropriate to grant these items of the complaint and JUDESUR is ordered to pay the plaintiff the salary differences, from the moment of their dismissal until their reinstatement.
V.VII.–As a claim for damages, the plaintiff requests moral damages for the harm suffered as a result of having been dismissed through an act vitiated by nullity in which her lack of suitability for the position she held was determined. Regarding the possibility of compensating the moral damage that may have been caused by conduct of the Administration, the following preliminary considerations must be made: The recognition of State liability for purely moral damages is implicit in the complementary reading of Articles 9 and 41 of the Political Constitution, given that the former makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to State liability, and the latter expressly refers to the possibility of protecting "moral" interests, among which is the possibility of compensating both subjective moral damage and objective moral damage. Moreover, the American Convention on Human Rights provided on this subject: "Article 11: 1.
Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family’s, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. 3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." Article 24: All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law." "Article 5.1: Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected." Even prior to the entry into force of the Political Constitution of 1949 or the approval of said Convention at the end of the 1960s, since the 19th century, Article 59 of the Civil Code prescribes: “The right to obtain compensation for moral damage is established, in cases of injury to personality rights.” In national administrative law proper, Article 197 of the General Law on Public Administration provided: "There shall be liability for damage to purely moral assets, as well as for the moral suffering and physical pain caused by death or by the injury inflicted, respectively." Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is appropriate to make some clarifications on the matter, based on doctrine and respective judicial resolutions issued on the matter, given the particularities existing with respect to this type of damage, given that in the case of subjective moral damage, since the most intimate sphere of the individual is affected, the common rules regarding proof of damage cannot be applied when the harm is to the subject's property.
In this vein, it has been said, "To prove moral damage in its existence and entity, it is not necessary to provide direct proof; rather, the judge must assess the circumstances of the act and the moral qualities of the victim to objectively and presumptively establish the moral injury in the reserved sphere of the passive subject's intimacy. We do not believe that moral injury must be the object of direct proof, as this is absolutely impossible due to the nature of the injury itself, which resides in the most intimate part of the personality, although it sometimes manifests itself through external signs that may not be an authentic expression ... no one can probe the spirit of another so deeply as to be able to affirm with certainty the existence and intensity of pain, the truth of suffering, the reality of anguish or disappointment" ( Bustamante Alsina, "Equitativa valuación del daño no mensurable", 1990. pp. 655 and 656).
The foregoing considerations are based on the appreciation that moral damage must be seen as *in re ipsa* or in itself, given that to have configured a spiritual injury, it is not necessary to prove suffering or depression externalized to third parties, given that it rather implies the alteration of the existential balance of individuals, within their most intimate sphere and not necessarily made known or externalized in all its dimension to third parties, as the latter depends on the personality of each injured individual and on the basis that human reactions have diverse forms and opportunities for manifestation. Therefore, in the event that the existence of conduct is demonstrated (death of a loved one, loss of or injury to a moral or patrimonial asset, harm to fundamental rights, etc.) that could affect the sphere of intimacy of the person – by causing pain, anguish, suffering, etc.–, it is interpreted that moral damage necessarily exists, and so the intensity thereof and consequently the means for its compensation will be determined in accordance with the criteria that we will analyze further on in this same considerando.
It is then, based on the subjective rights impaired, that we can speak of the existence of moral damage, given that it will arise from the violation of any of the inherent rights of the personality and which are therefore considered extra-patrimonial. It is for this reason that it is said that moral damage arises with the mere demonstrated occurrence of the formal or material action of the Administration or omission of action that violates said rights. In this vein, it is worth referring to the following: "Since moral injury is the necessary and inescapable consequence of the violation of some of the personality rights of a subject, the demonstration of the existence of said transgression will simultaneously entail proof of the existence of the damage. The determination of the existence of moral damage can be carried out as objectively as the verification of patrimonial injury. It is necessary for this purpose only to compare a fact with the legal norm that grants a subject an inherent right of personality, to verify whether the former constitutes or does not constitute a violation of what is prescribed in the latter..." Brebbia Roberto.
El Daño Moral. Editorial Orbir. On the other hand, it should be noted that it has been accepted that within the framework of the theory of Public Administration liability, in principle it would be valid to accept the possibility that the defendant can prove the existence of one of the exemption circumstances from liability established in Article 190 of the General Law on Public Administration, namely, force majeure, the fault of the victim, or the act of a third party; or even prove its non-existence or lesser severity than that invoked. Thus, it has been indicated that "The amount set must be a faithful reflection of the circumstances described in the case file, so that it results in an appropriate sum, given the problems suffered by the injured party, caused by the criminal or civil illicit acts of the agent or agents producing the damage. Because these presumptions are *iuris tantum*, they admit proof to the contrary, in which the defendant or active subject of the damage must be extremely diligent, since the burden of proof falls on him to refute the presumptions of pain, suffering, mortification, or injury, and for this he may resort to any type of ordinary evidence." (Montero Piña Fernando.
El Daño Moral, Page 61. Impresión Gráfica del este). Not without noting that some doctrine has held that for any damage resulting from licit and normal conduct, when the level of intensity is excessive, no type of exemption applies. In this vein, this Tribunal considers that it is appropriate to make some clarifications regarding moral damage that will be fully applicable for the resolution of the enforcement submitted to its knowledge. Firstly, it must be emphasized that in matters of moral damage we speak of a compensatory function and not the equivalence sought in the case of material damage. Additionally, it must not be overlooked that moral damage does not escape the certainty that it must be a consequence of the action or omission of the administration, just as the injured interest of the person invoking it must be certain. In this vein, the following has been indicated:" Moral damage is not pain, grief, or anguish, but the spiritual diminution derived from the injury to a non-patrimonial interest.
Said detriment exists even if the injured party lacks understanding of the harm suffered; in the absence of tears; even when the victim is not in physical or "psychic" condition to "feel" grief, pain, or anguish (e.g., a brain-dead person). The subjective disvalue exists when the victim has "matured" that pain and perhaps stopped "feeling" it. Thus conceived, it is immediately noticeable that moral damage can project its effects into the future, with a sufficient degree of certainty..." (Daniel Pizarro Ramón Daño Moral. Ed. Hammurabi. Page 105) Furthermore, moral damage is personal in nature, based on the harm to a legitimate interest of the affected party. Regarding the scope of moral damage in our country, the First Chamber in its ruling N 112 at 14 hours 15 minutes on July 15, 1992, repeatedly cited and applied by different jurisdictional instances, indicated: " IV.- Damage constitutes one of the presuppositions of extracontractual civil liability, inasmuch as the duty to compensate is only configured if there has been an illicit harmful act that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system.
Damage, in a legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal right, regarding which its preservation was objectively expected had the harmful act not occurred. Under this approach, there is no civil liability if no damage has occurred, just as there is no damage if there is no injured party. Furthermore, only damage that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable, this being a question of fact reserved for the prudent discretion of the judge. In sum, damage constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the illicit act with the one after it. V.- On many occasions, the expressions "damages" and "losses" are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to clarify and distinguish both concepts. Damage constitutes the loss caused to the injured party (damnum emergens), while loss is made up of the frustrated or ceased gain or profit (lucro cessans), which was reasonably and probably expected had the illicit act not occurred.
VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically converge to be "compensable damage": A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical, it cannot be based on supposed or conjecturable realizations. The damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification proves uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to assess or prove; certainty should not be confused with currentness either, as the reparation of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with lost profits or loss, as the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating act of the damage, that is, its repercussions are not projected at the initiation of the proceeding. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes an extreme of unique subjective concern to the injured party, however, the law cannot deal with claims based on insignificant damage, derived from excessive susceptibility.
In patrimonial damage, the impairment generated proves to be economically assessable. VIII.- Moral damage (also called in doctrine incorporeal, extra-patrimonial, emotional, etc.) occurs when the sphere of extra-patrimonial interest of the individual is injured; however, as its violation can generate patrimonial consequences, it is worth distinguishing between subjective moral damage "pure," or emotional, and objective or "objectified" moral damage. Subjective moral damage occurs when an extra-patrimonial right has been injured, without affecting the patrimony, normally involving an unjust disturbance of the individual's mental conditions (displeasure, discouragement, despair, loss of life satisfaction, etc., e.g., injury against honor, dignity, intimacy, the so-called damage to life in relation, grief over the death of a relative or loved one, etc.). Objective moral damage injures an extra-patrimonial right with repercussion in the patrimony, that is, it generates economically assessable consequences (e.g., the case of the professional who, due to the attributed act, loses his clientele in whole or in part).
This distinction serves to differentiate the damage suffered by the individual in his social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual sphere (grief over the death of a relative), as one refers to the social part and the other to the affective part of the patrimony. This distinction originally arose to determine the scope of compensable moral damage, since initially doctrine was reluctant to compensate pure moral damage due to its difficult quantification. For the indemnification, a distinction must be made between the different types of moral damage. In the case of objective, the corresponding demonstration must be made as occurs with patrimonial damage; but in the case of subjective moral damage, since its amount cannot be structured and demonstrated precisely, its determination remains at the prudent discretion of the judge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity, the lack of evidence regarding the magnitude of the damage not constituting an obstacle to setting its amount.
The dogmatic difference between patrimonial and moral damage does not exclude that, in practice, one and the other may occur concurrently, as could be the case of injuries that generate physical pain or cause disfigurement or physical deformity (damage to health) and aesthetic damage (disruption of the physical harmony of the face or any other exposed part of the body), without moral damage thereby being deemed secondary or accessory, as it evidently has autonomy and peculiar characteristics. In sum, moral damage consists of pain or physical, psychic, emotional or moral suffering inflicted by an illicit act. Normally the fertile field for moral damage is that of personality rights when they are violated." Based on the foregoing, it is evidenced that in the case of subjective moral damage, the existence of direct evidence is not required; rather, certain criteria apply that delimit the discretion of the Judge and that derive from its own legal nature and have been developed by national case law.
Thus, in the resolution mentioned *ut supra*, the first delimiting criterion is established as the general principles of law and equity, such that through vote 556-2003 of the Second Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, the following was also provided as a criterion: VI.- Regarding subjective moral damage, the situation is different, and it is hereby made clear from the outset, that the State is not correct in its opposition. It is an undeniable fact that there was injury due to unlawful conduct by the Ministry of Education, as declared by the Constitutional Chamber, the consequence of which is, therefore, to seek, as much as possible, the effective restoration of the affected subjective sphere, given the lack of a timely response to an administrative claim, for the granting of which, when dealing with this type of damage, proof is unnecessary, the mere verification of the generating event sometimes being sufficient for its indemnification to proceed, independently of the recognition or rejection of other merely patrimonial aspects, for which physical demonstration of those produced is indeed essential.
The foregoing does not mean that it can be granted simply because of the claim, since accreditation of its existence and severity is necessary, a burden that, without a doubt, falls on the victim; however, it has been allowed that its verification can be achieved based on indicia, since it occurs when intimacy, honor, the psyche, health, and physical integrity are affected, among others, the severity of which, without a doubt, corresponds to the claimant, their existence being demonstrable through presumptions of fact inferred from circumstantial elements, and therefore its proof is *in re ipsa*, as repeatedly expressed by the First Chamber of the Court". (Emphasis added). We have then that a second delimiting criterion for subjective moral damage are the presumptions of fact inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis. Likewise, from various judicial resolutions and from judgment 413 of November 19, 2002 of the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal Section I, other criteria are evidenced, namely: "III.
By subjective moral damage, doctrine has understood that affection that impacts the emotional sphere of individuals, causing worry, suffering, anxiety, and other negative and harmful emotions, the origin of which is the illicit acts caused by the plaintiff. Given their nature, they are difficult to prove by ordinary means, so the judge may estimate it through examination of the circumstances found in the case file and by applying his experience, the general principles of law and those of reasonableness and proportionality." (Emphasis added). These latter criteria have been developed in a relevant manner to limit the possibility of recognition of exaggerated or disproportionate indemnifications. In this vein, the First Chamber has stated: " It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are priceless assets, but about setting monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism the law can avail itself of to thereby repair, at least in part, the offense.
It would not be fitting within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant indemnifications, as occurs in other legal systems, as this would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profit from one's own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our milieu with the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber Nos. 1739-92 of 11:45 hours on July 1st and 3495-92 of 14:30 hours on November 19th, both of 1992). Applying them to situations such as the present one, it is indispensable, when setting obligations arising from legal indemnification situations, to consider the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, moral damage, in cases like the one analyzed, could not give rise to multi-million dollar indemnifications, as sought.
This would open an inconvenient loophole to give way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to an unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing sullied dignity, would undermine its foundations, reducing it to eminently economic values (First Chamber vote 141 of 15:00 hrs. on June 18, 1993 and No. 99 of 16 hours on September 20, 1995) (Emphasis added). The causality of the damage is another criterion of unavoidable nature, as the real cause thereof can determine the scope and limits of the reparatory estimate. Furthermore, always within the order of proportionality, there is talk of the "prudent assessment of the Judge" of the damage and its compensation, in the following manner: "Therefore, the tribunal must consider the appropriateness of the issue under comment; to this effect, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court has stated: " VI.
Although moral damage – in relation to the matter at hand – due to its nature, allows a wide margin of discretion to the judge in terms of its determination, this must necessarily be observed within certain unavoidable parameters, for example, the former Court of Cassation, in judgment No. 114 of 16 hrs. on November 2, 1979, endorses the prudent assessment of the judges "...when it is possible for them to infer the damage based on circumstantial evidence. This Chamber, in its ruling No. 114-93, states that the prudent discretion alluded to must take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the general principles of law, and equity. Around such concepts, the Chamber, in a later pronouncement, reasons in the following terms: 'It is not, then, about quantifying the value of a subject's honor and dignity, as these are priceless assets, but about setting monetary compensation for their injury, the only mechanism the law can avail itself of to thereby repair, at least in part, the offense.
It would not be fitting within such a philosophy to establish exorbitant indemnifications, as occurs in other legal systems, as this would produce the unjust enrichment of the offended party, through immoral profit from one's own honor and dignity. Among the fundamental principles of law are those of reasonableness and proportionality, which have been recognized in our milieu with the rank of constitutional principles (see in this regard, resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber Nos. 1739-92 of 11:45 hours on July 1st and Nº 3495-92 of 14:30 hrs. on November 19th, both of 1992). Applying them to situations such as the present one, it is indispensable, when setting the obligations arising from legal indemnification situations, to consider the position of the parties and the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, without creating absurd, harmful, or gravely unjust situations. In this sense, moral damage, in cases like the one analyzed, could not give rise to multi-million dollar indemnifications, as sought.
This would open an inconvenient loophole to give way to disproportionate claims which, under the pretext of protecting the subjective sphere of the individual, would lead to an unjustified enrichment that, far from repairing sullied dignity, would undermine its foundations, reducing it to eminently economic values (First Chamber Nº 41 of 15:00 hours on June 18, 1993). VII. Recapitulating, it is understood that the prudent discretion to be used by the Judge in situations such as the present one requires the observance of unavoidable parameters such as circumstantial evidence, the specific circumstances of the particular case, the general principles of law, equity, the position of the parties; the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. On such extremes, the interested party can and must offer evidence where possible. Only thus can a prudent discretion be reached.
Aside from such considerations, discretionary determination runs the serious risk of incurring an excess of power that distorts or undermines the executed decision. That is, the prudent assessment of the judge, even with the realization of the generating event – as occurs in the present case – (principle 'in re ipsa'), requires the considerations or parameters commented on regarding the damage, in order to, according to them, establish the award. In the event that there are no elements of judgment on the matter in the record, the judge will have to act in accordance with such situation, adopting a conservative attitude in the determination, for failure to do so could incur an excess of power." Vote 00093-2000 of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal Section II. In accordance with the foregoing, the recognition of moral damage must be carried out with the understanding that, while it does not require direct evidence, the Judges must exercise special prudence and proceed to its assessment under their prudent assessment, under criteria of equity, applying the presumptions of fact inferred from the circumstantial elements of the case under analysis, in order to determine the appropriateness and the quantum of the condemnatory judgment on this issue within the limits of reasonableness and proportionality.
In the present proceeding, the plaintiff invokes a moral damage that is inferred, consisting of the moral harm suffered, anguish, pain, suffering, caused as a result of having determined, through a null, unmotivated, and technically flawed act, an alleged lack of confidence against her and consequently the untimely and unilateral termination of the employment relationship she possessed at that time. In this regard, this Tribunal believes that the plaintiff is correct in invoking the existence of said moral harm, but on the understanding that the amount to be recognized by this Tribunal must be proportional and rational, deeming the amount requested by the party to be excessive. In this vein, it must be taken into consideration that the existence of such a decision that implied a rupture of the employment relationship means in itself a serious subjective injury to any person who suffers it, but it must be taken into consideration that the immediate and economic harm was prolonged over time.
This Tribunal believes that the circumstances in which the termination of the plaintiff's appointment occurred result in a situation of emotional harm, both due to what was imputed and the very fact of not knowing the concrete situations that determined such an assessment, without having the opportunity to hear a justification, at least verbal, for what happened, as was demonstrated at trial, occurred in the concrete case. It should be recalled that job stability and continuity therein, as a generating source of family income, are a fundamental basis for the emotional security of a human being. An abrupt and unfounded termination thereof, in itself, is a cause of pain and an impact on the person's intimate sphere, without there being evidence at trial to the contrary on this aspect. Consequently, JUDESUR is ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of six million colones for subjective moral damage, this amount being considered consistent with the harm suffered as a direct consequence of the conduct annulled in the present resolution.
V.VIII.– Defenses: Having carried out the ex officio analysis of the prerequisites of the claim, sufficient active and passive standing of both parties is observed, as the legal effects of the challenged act directly affect the plaintiff's legal sphere, and this conduct was issued by JUDESUR. Furthermore, a current interest is observed in the outcome of the proceeding, as the harmful effects of the act continue to take effect.”
“V.III.- Consideraciones sobre el régimen de empleo público: En Costa Rica el servidor público se encuentra sometido a un régimen particular, diferenciado del trabajador privado, y del cual dimanan una serie de derechos y obligaciones específicas. Los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política es la base fundamental para establecer tal distinción, al establecer lo siguiente: “Artículo 191.- Un estatuto de servicio civil regulará las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, con el propósito de garantizar la eficiencia de la administración” y “Artículo 192.- Con las excepciones que esta Constitución y el estatuto de servicio civil determinen, los servidores públicos serán nombrados a base de idoneidad comprobada y sólo podrán ser removidos por las causales de despido justificado que exprese la legislación de trabajo , o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, ya sea por falta de fondos o para conseguir una mejor organización de los mismos”.
De conformidad con las indicadas normas de rango constitucional se evidencia que el servidor del Estado y sus Instituciones, goza de los derechos de una regulación normativa propia, estabilidad en el empleo - limitando el régimen de libre remoción propio de la regulación laboral privada- y de una carrera administrativa, junto con los demás garantías existentes para las personas amparadas a un régimen de subordinación, como son el pago de un salario, vacaciones, jornadas máximas, huelga, etc. (haciendo la salvedad del derecho a la negociación colectiva, excluÍda por votos 4453-2000 y 9690-2000 de la Sala Constitucional). Correlativo con las anteriores derechos, el servidor público posee una serie de obligaciones de carácter funcionarial, inherentes a los fines públicos buscados con su actividad y que deben orientar siempre su gestión, a fin de no incurrir en una falta personal generadora de responsabilidad disciplinaria.
Sin pretender ser exhaustivos, algunos de los deberes propios del régimen de empleo público, son: a) deber de probidad (art. 3 Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública), b) deber de cumplimiento de los principios del servicio público - continuidad, eficiencia, adaptación al cambio en el régimen legal e igualdad de trato- (art. 4 Ley General de la Administración Pública), c) deber de cautelar un adecuado ambiente de control interno (art. 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno) d) deber de proteger el interés superior de los niños y las niñas (art. 4 y 5 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) e) deber de cumplir el ordenamiento jurídico (art. 13 y concordantes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, art. 39.a del Estatuto de Servicio Civil), f) deber de dar pronta respuesta e información al usuario (art. 5 y 10 de la Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos),
V.IV.- Sobre el fondo del asunto sometido a análisis de este Tribunal: La parte actora en su demanda invoca que el acto de su despido se encuentra viciado de nulidad absoluta, por cuanto no se siguió un debido proceso en su contra, así como su derecho de defensa, siendo así que además, existió un déficit probatorio y una falta de fundamentación del acuerdo impugnado. Considera que el señor Loaiza Sojo, se encuentra nombrado en propiedad y por tiempo indefinido, por lo no puede ser despedido, sino es fundado en la existencia de una falta grave. Por su parte, los codemandados alegan que el nombramiento del actor lo fue con carácter discrecional y como un puesto de confianza de Director Ejecutivo del ente. Al respecto, hecho un análisis de los razonamientos empleados y la prueba admitida y evacuada, estima este Tribunal que lleva razón la parte actora en sus razonamientos. En este sentido, consta en autos que el Señor Nelson Loaiza Sojo fue nombrado como Director Ejecutivo de JUDESUR, primero, a período de prueba y con posterioridad, por un período indefinido (ver acuerdo ACU-23-572-2010 de sesión ordinaria Número 572-2010 de 20 de diciembre de 2010 de la Junta Directiva de JUDESUR).
En este orden de ideas, debe tomarse en consideración que la figura de Director Ejecutivo del ente demandado, fue prevista en el artículo 10 de la Ley 7012, Ley de Creación del Depósito Libre Comercial de Golfito, en tanto dispone: “Para ejecutar las tareas propias de la Junta, se nombrará a un Director Ejecutivo y el personal necesario, cuyas funciones determinará el reglamento orgánico.” Con base en esta norma, el Reglamento de Organización y Servicios de la Junta de Desarrollo Regional de la Zona Sur de la Provincia de Puntarenas, decreto ejecutivo Nº 30251-P-H, dispuso en su artículo 10, inciso 2) la siguiente competencia de la Junta: “ 2.7. Nombrar por mayoría calificada al Director Ejecutivo y Auditor Interno y removerlos de sus cargos cuando exista causal suficiente, de acuerdo con lo estipulado en el Código de Trabajo”. Como se advierte de la norma indicada, en la regulación propia del cargo del actor, se dio la voluntad de ampararlo a un régimen de estabilidad, mediante el cual, sólo se previó la responsabilidad de su cese, por motivo de despido justificado, sea ante la demostración de la comisión de una causal disciplinaria, por lo que no es procedente, el rompimiento unilateral de dicho vínculo de manera incausado, por la sola voluntad del órgano decisor.
De conformidad con lo anterior, no es cierto que el Señor Loaiza pudiera ser removido libremente, tal y como fue realizado en el acto objetado, en tanto que si bien su cargo es nombramiento de la Junta Directiva, la normativa aplicable, limita el ejercicio de la potestad de cese de la relación de empleo, a la existencia de un motivo objetivo que así funde tal decisión. Como bien se advierte, la frase “… cuando exista causal suficiente…”, implica la necesidad de que la decisión patronal sea fundada en la misma, la cual, debe ser objetiva, concreta y debidamente individualizada y no una mera invocación abstracta, sin mayor fundamento jurídico y como corolario de la misma, fundada en una previa demostración de su existencia, mediante el cumplimiento de un debido proceso que pueda dar base a la motivación del respectivo acto administrativo. En este orden de ideas, debe recordarse que la actuación formal de la Administración Pública se materializa en la adopción de actos administrativos, entendidos éstos como las declaraciones unilaterales de voluntad, juicio o conocimiento que se emiten en ejercicio de la función administrativa, generadoras de efectos internos o externos, individuales o generales de alcance normativo o no. Dichos actos pueden tener alcance concreto o general, según sus efectos vayan a uno o varios administrados específicos o que tengan un alcance más indeterminado.
En el caso de los actos de alcance concreto, la Ley General de la Administración Pública establece como elementos materiales o sustanciales, la competencia del sujeto que emite el acto, el motivo que le da origen-, (entendido éste como los antecedentes o presupuestos jurídicos o fácticos de la conducta administrativa), el contenido o sea lo que en sí dispone el acto (el cual deberá ser lícito, posible, claro, proporcional y acorde al motivo) y el fin público perseguido con su adopción. Como elementos formales, se considera tanto el procedimiento adoptado para su materialización, como su motivación, sea el fundamento de la conducta administrativa. Con respecto a este elemento del acto administrativo, se ha definido de la siguiente manera: "Así, la motivación comprende la exposición de las razones que han llevado al órgano a emitirlo y, en especial, la expresión de los antecedentes de hecho y de derecho que preceden y justifican el dictado del acto.
No es éste desde luego el criterio de la doctrina clásica que limita la motivación a la enunciación de los antecedentes de hecho y de derecho (es decir a la expresión de la causa). Nos parece más adecuado basar el requisito de la motivación en la enunciación de las razones que han determinado el dictado del acto, lo cual permite incluir la exteriorización de otro elemento considerado esencial: la finalidad. Si bien esta conclusión no es reconocida en forma expresa, muchos tratadistas la admiten virtualmente en cuanto afirman que el requisito de la motivación constituye uno de los primeros pasos hacia el reconocimiento del recurso de desviación de poder, pero lo cierto es que al limitar el concepto de motivación a la expresión de la causa, no toda la doctrina advierte la importancia que ella puede tener para acreditar la existencia de un defecto o vicio en el elemento finalidad." (CASSAGNE, Juan Carlos, El Acto Administrativo, Buenos Aires, Segunda Edición, Abeledo-Perrot, p. 212-213) La doctrina nacional por su parte lo ha expresado de la siguiente manera: "... es una declaración de cuáles son las circunstancias de hecho y de derecho que han llevado a la respectiva administración pública al dictado o emanación del acto administrativo.
La motivación es la expresión formal del motivo y, normalmente, en cualquier resolución administrativa, está contenida en los denominados 'considerandos' -parte considerativa-. La motivación, al consistir en una enunciación de los hechos y del fundamento jurídico que la administración pública tuvo en cuenta para emitir su decisión o voluntad, constituye un medio de prueba de la intencionalidad de esta y una pauta indispensable para interpretar y aplicar el respectivo acto administrativo." (JINESTA LOBO, Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Tomo I. (Parte General). Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A Ius Consultec. S.A.2007.) Por su parte, el artículo 136 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública se refiere a este elemento de la siguiente manera: "Artículo 136.- 1. Serán motivados con mención, sucinta al menos, de sus fundamentos:
V.V.- Como consecuencia de lo resuelto, procede anular el acuerdo ACU 21-585-2011 de 7 de abril de 2011 de la Junta Directiva de la Junta de Desarrollo Regional de la Zona Sur, comunicado mediante oficio JD-O-024-2011 de 7 de abril de 2011 y en virtud de dicha nulidad, al extraerse del ordenamiento jurídico el indicado acto ablatorio y al haber estado nombrado el actor por plazo indefinido, de conformidad con los ordinales 22, inc d) y 122 inc d) del CPCA, se debe ordenar a la Junta Directiva de la Junta de Desarrollo Regional de la Zona Sur (JUDESUR), proceder a reinstalar al señor Nelson Loaiza Sojo como Director Ejecutivo con todos sus derechos y potestades a partir del día inmediato siguiente a la firmeza de la presente sentencia.
V.VI.- La parte actora solicita en su pretensión se le paguen las diferencias por concepto de salarios desde el momento de su cese y hasta su reinstalación. Al respecto, este Tribunal estima que la consecuencia lógica y natural de la nulidad de los actos de cese de un nombramiento de un servidor público, es el pago de las remuneraciones que habría percibido de no haber finalizado la relación de empleo por el acto anulado. Lo anterior, en tanto que devendría en situar al Administrado en idéntica situación jurídica a la que se encontraba de previo a que se lesionaran sus derechos con el acto declarado nulo. La nulidad que se declara en el considerando anterior tiene efecto declarativo y retroactivo a la fecha del dictado de acto que se anula, lo que significa que cualquier situación jurídica previa deberá recuperar su estado a dicho momento. Con respecto a las denominadas situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, resulta especialmente relevante el voto 07642-2005 de 11:39 horas de 17 de junio de 2005 de la Sala Constitucional indicó: "Los conceptos de 'derecho adquirido' y 'situación jurídica consolidada' aparecen estrechamente relacionados en la doctrina constitucionalista.
Es dable afirmar que, en términos generales, el primero denota a aquella circunstancia consumada en la que una cosa -material o inmaterial, trátese de un bien previamente ajeno o de un derecho antes inexistente- ha ingresado en (o incidido sobre) la esfera patrimonial de la persona, de manera que ésta experimenta una ventaja o beneficio constatable. Por su parte, la 'situación jurídica consolidada' representa no tanto un plus patrimonial, sino un estado de cosas definido plenamente en cuanto a sus características jurídicas y a sus efectos, aun cuando éstos no se hayan extinguido aún. Lo relevante en cuanto a la situación jurídica consolidada, precisamente, no es que esos efectos todavía perduren o no, sino que -por virtud de mandato legal o de una sentencia que así lo haya declarado- haya surgido ya a la vida jurídica una regla, clara y definida, que conecta a un presupuesto fáctico (hecho condicionante) con una consecuencia dada (efecto condicionado).
Desde esta óptica, la situación de la persona viene dada por una proposición lógica del tipo 'si..., entonces...'; vale decir: si se ha dado el hecho condicionante, entonces la 'situación jurídica consolidada' implica que, necesariamente, deberá darse también el efecto condicionado.." Aplicando las anteriores consideraciones, se determina que la condenatoria al pago diferentes extremos, son consecuencia, por una parte del reconocimiento de la inexistencia de todo efecto producto del despido nulo como expresión de un acto poseedor de tal vicio - expresado en una sentencia declarativa- y por otra, del reconocimiento de una situación jurídica individualizada afectada por el acto y el pleno restablecimiento de ésta, - expresado en una sentencia de condena- en las mismas condiciones como si el acto viciado no se hubiera emitido, - dado que sus efectos precarios o espúreos desaparecieron absolutamente de la vida jurídica- (art. 22 inc., d) y 122 inc) del CPCA).
Así lo indicó la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en su voto 2005-00181 de las nueve horas cuarenta minutos del nueve de marzo de dos mil cinco, al disponer lo siguiente: "...en el caso concreto, se violentan derechos fundamentales del recurrente como son el derecho al trabajo al impedirle injustificadamente mantener éste, la dignidad e igualdad, al abrirse respecto a él, causales, condiciones y procedimientos nuevos de despido, no aplicables a los demás funcionarios públicos y no previstas por el ordenamiento jurídico, razón de más para que la actuación de la Administración no deba ser avalada por los juzgadores, al encontrarse vicios y actuaciones contrarias al principio de legalidad (Artículos 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Consecuentemente, al estar en presencia de un despido nulo, los efectos de su declaratoria de nulidad deben retrotraerse al momento o fecha de dicho acto, de conformidad con el artículo 171 de la citada ley, de manera que las cosas deben volver al estado en que se encontraban antes de su emisión; en otras palabras, el recurrente debe ser restituido en su trabajo, con todos los derechos que tenía al ser despedido y los que legalmente hubiese acumulado durante éste...." (El destacado es nuestro) En el mismo orden de ideas, la indicada Sala señaló: “Resulta ser una consecuencia ineludible de la reinstalación, el ordenar el pago de los salarios caídos, esto es, aquellos que habría percibido el actor, desde el momento del despido, hasta su efectivo reintegro en la empresa, como si hubiere trabajado; sea, incluyendo cualquier mejora, aumento, incentivo o ventaja que hubiere percibido de haber estado laborando (en este sentido véase, entre otros, ERMIDA URIARTE, Oscar.
"LA ESTABILIDAD DEL TRABAJADOR EN LA EMPRESA, PROTECCION REAL O FICTICIA", Alcalí Editorial, Montevideo 1983, Pág. 32. MURGAS TORRAZZA, Rolando, "LA TERMINACION DE LA RELACION DE TRABAJO EN EL DERECHO PANAMEÑO" EN LA EXTINCION DE LA RELACION LABORAL, AELE Editores Lima, Perú, 1987; pag. 201. PASCO COSMOPOLIS, Mario, "EXTINCION DE LA RELACION LABORAL EN EL PERU en la Extinción de la relación laboral, AELE Editorial, Lima, Perú, 1987, Pag. 241).” (Resolución N° 260 bis, de las 9:30 horas, del 16 de enero de 1998) (El destacado es nuestro). Lo resuelto por la Sala Segunda es consecuencia inmediata y directa de la existencia de un despido nulo, en tanto que doctrinariamente se ha considerado que " Aquellos despidos que tuvieren por objeto o efecto la lesión de derechos fundamentales, entendiendo por éstos - como antes se indicó- aquellos que integran el bloque de constitucionalidad, deberán reputarse nulos por imperativo del principio de integridad y primacía constitucional....
En consecuencia, tales despidos (desvirtuados), habida cuenta la lesión constitucional que entrañan, han de excluirse del régimen de estabilidad relativa o impropia, y por ende, no podrá atribuírseles efectos extintivos del vínculo laboral....la nulidad del despido, para que sea tal, debe conducir al restablecimiento de la relación laboral, mediante la reincorporación al puesto de trabajo... En las legislaciones donde directa o indirectamente se establece la nulidad del despido, es común que parte del objeto del proceso sea la discusión sobre el pago de los salarios dejados de percibir por el trabajador desde el momento del despido. Esto plantea igualmente que la sentencia pueda tener como efecto adicional la orden de pagar los salarios caídos. Se dan variantes en torno a la extensión del derecho a reclamar esos salarios y la posibilidad de que las normas permitan la reducción o la eliminación de la condena con o sin poder discrecional del tribunal.." Murgas Torrazza Rolando.
La Tutela Judicial contra los Despidos nulos por Discriminación. Revista Derecho del Trabajo N. 3. 2007.Fundación Universitas. Así las cosas, procedería acoger lo solicitado, sea el pago de salarios caídos, a título de perjuicios, como consecuencia directa de la declaratoria de nulidad del despido del actor, de conformidad con lo establecido en el inciso d) del artículo 122 del CPCA, en tanto dispone que en sentencia se podrá: "Reconocer, restablecer o declarar cualquier situación jurídica tutelable, adoptando cuantas medidas resulten necesarias y apropiadas para ello". En razón de lo anterior, procede acoger estos extremos de la demanda y se condena a JUDESUR al pago de las diferencias de salarios a la actora, desde el momento de su cese y hasta su reinstalación.
V.VII.-Como pretensión indemnizatoria, la parte actora solicita daño moral por la afectación sufrida con motivo de haber sido cesada mediante un acto viciado de nulidad en donde se determinó su falta de idoneidad para el puesto que ocupaba. Con respecto a la posibilidad de indemnizar el daño moral que pudiere haberse ocasionado con motivo de una conducta de la Administración, debe realizarse las siguientes consideraciones previas: El reconocimiento de la responsabilidad del Estado por daños puramente morales se encuentra implícito en la lectura complementaria de los artículos 9 y 41 de la Constitución Política, habida cuenta que en el primero no se realiza en ningún tipo de distincion con respecto a la responsabilidad del Estado y en el segundo, se hace expresamente referencia a la posibilidad de tutelar intereses "morales", entre los cuales, se encuentra la posibilidad de resarcir tanto el daño moral subjetivo, como el objetivo.
Por otra parte, la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, dispuso sobre este tema: "Artículo 11: 1. Toda persona tiene derecho al respeto de su honra y al reconocimiento de su dignidad. 2. Nadie puede ser objeto de injerencias arbitrarias o abusivas en su vida privada, en la de su familia, en su domicilio o en su correspondencia, ni de ataques ilegales a su honra o reputación. 3. Toda persona tiene derecho a la protección de la ley contra esas injerencias o esos ataques." Artículo 24: Todas las personas son iguales ante la ley. En consecuencia, tienen derecho, sin discriminación, a igual protección de la ley." "Artículo 5.1: Toda persona tiene derecho a que se respete su integridad física, psíquica y moral." Inclusive de manera previa a que entrara a regir la Constitución Política de 1949 o se aprobara dicha Convención a finales de la década de los 60, desde el siglo XIX, el numeral 59 del Código Civil preceptúa: “Se establece el derecho a obtener indemnización por daño moral, en los casos de lesión a los derechos de la personalidad” En materia del derecho administrativo nacional propiamente, el artículo 197 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, dispuso: "Cabrá responsabilidad por el daño de bienes puramente morales, lo mismo que por el padecimiento moral y el dolor físico causados por la muerte o por la lesión inferida, respectivamente".
No obstante lo anterior, procede realizar algunas precisiones sobre la materia, con base en la doctrina y sendas resoluciones judiciales emitidas en la materia, dadas las particularidades existentes con respecto a este tipo de daño, habida cuenta que en el caso del daño moral subjetivo, al afectarse la esfera más íntima del individuo, no pueden aplicarse las reglas comunes con respecto a la prueba del daño, cuando la afectación se realiza en el patrimonio del sujeto. En este orden de ideas, se ha dicho, "Para probar el daño moral en su existencia y entidad no es necesario aportar prueba directa, sino que el juez deberá apreciar las circunstancias del hecho y las cualidades M. de la víctima para establecer objetiva y presuntivamente el agravio moral en la órbita reservada de la intimidad del sujeto pasivo. No creemos que el agravio moral deba ser objeto de prueba directa, pues ello resulta absolutamente imposible por la índole del mismo que reside en lo más íntimo de la personalidad, aunque se manifiesta a veces por signos exteriores que pueden no ser una auténtica expresión ... nadie puede indagar el espíritu de otro tan profundamente como para poder afirmar con certeza la existencia y la intensidad del dolor, la verdad de un padecimiento, la realidad de la angustia o de la decepción" ( Bustamante Alsina, "Equitativa valuación del daño no mensurable", 1990. p 655 y 656).
Las anteriores consideraciones tienen como fundamento la apreciación de que el daño moral debe ser visto como in re ipsa o en sí mismo, dado que para tener configurado un perjuicio espiritual, no resulta necesario probar sufrimiento o depresión exteriorizados hacia terceros, dado que implica más bien la alteración del equilibrio existencial de las personas, dentro de su ámbito más íntimo y no necesariamente dado a conocer o exteriorizado en toda su dimensión hacia terceros, en tanto que esto último está en función de la personalidad de cada individuo lesionado y partiendo de que las reacciones del humano tienen diversas formas y oportunidades de manifestación. Por lo anterior, en el caso de que se demostrara la existencia de una conducta (muerte de un ser querido, pérdida o lesión de un bien moral o patrimonial, afectación a derechos fundamentales, etc) que pudiere afectar el ámbito de intimidad de la persona - por provocar dolor, angustia, sufrimiento, etc-, se interpreta que necesariamente existe un daño moral, siendo así que la intensidad de éste y por ende el medio para su resarcimiento, se determinarán de conformidad con los criterios que a continuación analizaremos en este mismo considerando.
Es entonces, en función de los derechos subjetivos menoscabados, que podemos hablar de la existencia de un daño moral, dado que éste se producirá ante la violación de alguno de los derechos inherentes de la personalidad y que por ende son considerados extrapatrimoniales. Es por ello, que se habla que el daño moral surge con el mero acaecimiento demostrado de la actuación formal o material de la Administración u omisión de actuación que vulnera dichos derechos. En este orden de ideas, conviene hacer referencia a lo siguiente:"Siendo el agravio moral la consecuencia necesaria e ineludible de la violación de algunos de los derechos de la personalidad de un sujeto, la demostración de la existencia de dicha transgresión importará, al mismo tiempo, la prueba de la existencia del daño. La determinación de la existencia de un daño moral puede efectuarse de una manera tan objetiva como la comprobación de un agravio patrimonial.
Se hace necesario a tal fin sólo confrontar un hecho con la norma jurídica que otorga a favor de un sujeto un derecho inherente a la personalidad, para comprobar si el primero constituye o no violación de lo preceptuado en la segunda.." Brebbia Roberto. El Daño Moral. Editorial Orbir. Por otra parte, debe advertirse que se ha aceptado que dentro del marco de la teoría de la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública, en tesis de principio, sería válido aceptar la posibilidad de que el demandado puede probar la existencia de una de las circunstancias eximentes de responsabilidad establecidas en el artículo 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, a saber, la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima o de un hecho de un tercero; o inclusive probar su inexistencia o menor gravedad de lo invocada. Es así como se ha indicado que "La cantidad que se fije, debe ser fiel reflejo de las circunstancias descritas en el expediente, para que resulte una suma apropiada, dado los problemas sufridos por el perjudicado, causados por los actos ilícitos penales o civiles del agente o de los agentes productores del daño.
En razón de que esas presunciones son iuris tantum, admiten prueba en contrario, de lo cual debe ser sumamente diligente el demandado o sujeto activo del daño, ya que le corresponde la carga de la prueba para desvirtuar las presunciones de dolor, sufrimiento, mortificación o agravio y para ello puede acudir a cualquier tipo de prueba ordinaria." (Montero Piña Fernando. El Daño Moral, Página 61. Impresión Gráfica del este). No sin advertir que alguna doctrina ha sostenido que cualquier daño producto de una conducta lícita y normal, cuando el nivel de intensidad es excesivo, no procede ningún tipo de eximente. En este orden de ideas, considera este Tribunal que conviene hacer algunas precisiones con respecto al daño moral que serán plenamente aplicables para la resolución de la ejecución sometida a su conocimiento. En primer término, debe destacarse que en materia de daño moral hablamos de una función compensadora y no de la equivalencia buscada en el caso del daño material.
Adicionalmente, no debe obviarse que el daño moral no escapa de la certeza con relación a que éste debe ser consecuencia de la actuación u omisión de la administración, así como debe ser cierto el interés lesionado de la persona que lo invoca. En este orden de ideas, se ha indicado lo siguiente:" El daño moral no es el dolor, la pena, la angustia sino la minoración espiritual derivada de la lesión a un interés no patrimonial. Dicho detrimento existe aunque falte comprensión por parte del damnificado del perjuicio sufrido; en ausencia de lágrimas; inclusive cuando la víctima no se encuentre en condiciones físicas o "síquicas" para "sentir" pena, dolor o angustia (v.gr. una persona descerebrada). El disvalor subjetivo existe cuando la víctima haya "madurado" ese dolor y quizás, dejado de "sentirlo". Así concebida la cuestión, se advierte de inmediato que el daño moral puede derivar sus efectos hacia el futuro, con suficiente grado de certeza..." (Daniel Pizarro Ramón Daño Moral.
Ed. Hammurabi. Página 105) Por otra parte, el daño moral es de orden personal, en función de la afectación de un interés legítimo del afectado. Con respecto a los alcances del daño moral en nuestro país, la Sala Primera en su voto N 112 de las 14 horas 15 minutos del 15 de julio de 1992, reiteradamente citado y aplicado por diferentes instancias jurisdiccionales, indicó: " IV.- El daño constituye uno de los presupuestos de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, por cuanto el deber de resarcir solamente se configura si ha mediado un hecho ilícito dañoso que lesione un interés jurídicamente relevante, susceptible de ser tutelado por el ordenamiento jurídico. El daño, en sentido jurídico, constituye todo menoscabo, pérdida o detrimento de la esfera jurídica patrimonial o extrapatrimonial de la persona (damnificado), el cual provoca la privación de un bien jurídico, respecto del cual era objetivamente esperable su conservación de no haber acaecido el hecho dañoso.
Bajo esta tesitura, no hay responsabilidad civil si no media daño, así como no existe daño si no hay damnificado. Por otra parte, sólo es daño indemnizable el que se llega a probar (realidad o existencia), siendo ello una cuestión de hecho reservada al prudente arbitrio del juzgador. En suma, el daño constituye la brecha perjudicial para la víctima, resultante de confrontar la situación anterior al hecho ilícito con la posterior al mismo. V.- En muchas ocasiones se utilizan indiscriminadamente las expresiones "daños" y "perjuicios". Es menester precisar y distinguir ambos conceptos. El daño constituye la pérdida irrogada al damnificado (damnum emergens), en tanto el perjuicio está conformado por la ganancia o utilidad frustrada o dejada de percibir (lucro cesans), la cual era razonable y probablemente esperable si no se hubiese producido el hecho ilícito. VI.- No cualquier daño da pie a la obligación de resarcir.
Para tal efecto, han de confluir, básicamente las siguientes características para ser un "daño resarcible": A) Debe ser cierto; real y efectivo, y no meramente eventual o hipotético, no puede estar fundado en realizaciones supuestas o conjeturables. El daño no pierde esta característica si su cuantificación resulta incierta, indeterminada o de difícil apreciación o prueba; tampoco debe confundirse la certeza con la actualidad, pues es admisible la reparación del daño cierto pero futuro; asimismo, no cabe confundir el daño futuro con el lucro cesante o perjuicio, pues el primero está referido a aquél que surge como una consecuencia necesaria derivada del hecho causal o generador del daño, es decir, sus repercusiones no se proyectan al incoarse el proceso. En lo relativo a la magnitud o monto (seriedad) del daño, ello constituye un extremo de incumbencia subjetiva única del damnificado, empero el derecho no puede ocuparse de pretensiones fundadas en daños insignificantes, derivadas de una excesiva susceptibilidad.
La segunda parece ser la expresión más feliz, pues el daño corporal suele afectar intereses patrimoniales del damnificado (pago de tratamiento médico, gastos de hospitalización, medicamentos, etc.), ganancias frustradas si el daño lo ha incapacitado para realizar sus ocupaciones habituales (perjuicios), etc.. Esta distinción nació en el Derecho Romano, pues se distinguía entre el daño inferido a las cosas directamente (damnun) y el que lesionaba la personalidad física del individuo (injuria). En el daño patrimonial el menoscabo generado resulta ser valorable económicamente. VIII.- El daño moral (llamado en doctrina también incorporal, extrapatrimonial, de afección, etc.) se verifica cuando se lesiona la esfera de interés extrapatrimonial del individuo, empero como su vulneración puede generar consecuencias patrimoniales, cabe distinguir entre daño moral subjetivo "puro", o de afección, y daño moral objetivo u "objetivado".
El daño moral subjetivo se produce cuando se ha lesionado un derecho extrapatrimonial, sin repercutir en el patrimonio, suponiendo normalmente una perturbación injusta de las condiciones anímicas del individuo (disgusto, desánimo, desesperación, pérdida de satisfacción de vivir, etc., vg. el agravio contra el honor, la dignidad, la intimidad, el llamado daño a la vida en relación, aflicción por la muerte de un familiar o ser querido, etc.). El daño moral objetivo lesiona un derecho extrapatrimonial con repercusión en el patrimonio, es decir, genera consecuencias económicamente valuables (vg. el caso del profesional que por el hecho atribuido pierde su clientela en todo o en parte). Esta distinción sirve para deslindar el daño sufrido por el individuo en su consideración social (buen nombre, honor, honestidad, etc.) del padecido en el campo individual (aflicción por la muerte de un pariente), así uno refiere a la parte social y el otro a la afectiva del patrimonio.
Esta distinción nació, originalmente, para determinar el ámbito del daño moral resarcible, pues en un principio la doctrina se mostró reacia a resarcir el daño moral puro, por su difícil cuantificación. Para la indemnización debe distinguirse entre los distintos tipos de daño moral. En el caso del objetivo, se debe hacer la demostración correspondiente como acontece con el daño patrimonial; pero en el supuesto del daño moral subjetivo al no poder estructurarse y demostrarse su cuantía de modo preciso, su fijación queda al prudente arbitrio del juez, teniendo en consideración las circunstancias del caso, los principios generales del derecho y la equidad, no constituyendo la falta de prueba acerca de la magnitud del daño óbice para fijar su importe. La diferencia dogmática entre daño patrimonial y moral no excluye que, en la práctica, se presenten concomitantemente uno y otro, podría ser el caso de las lesiones que generan un dolor físico o causan una desfiguración o deformidad física (daño a la salud) y el daño estético (rompimiento de la armonía física del rostro o de cualquier otra parte expuesta del cuerpo), sin que por ello el daño moral se repute como secundario o accesorio, pues evidentemente tiene autonomía y características peculiares.
En suma el daño moral consiste en dolor o sufrimiento físico, psíquico, de afección o moral infligido con un hecho ilícito. Normalmente el campo fértil del daño moral es el de los derechos de la personalidad cuando resultan conculcados." Con base en lo anterior, se evidencia que en el caso del daño moral subjetivo, no se requiere de la existencia de una prueba directa, sino que le es aplicable determinados criterios que delimitan la discrecionalidad del Juzgador y que desprenden de su propia naturaleza jurídica y que han sido desarrollados por la jurisprudencia nacional. Así, en la resolución mencionada ut supra se establece como primer criterio delimitador, los principios generales del derecho y la equidad, siendo así que mediante voto 556-2003 de la Sección Segunda del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, se dispuso además como criterio, lo siguiente: VI.- Referente al daño moral subjetivo, la situación es distinta, y desde ya se deja de manifiesto, que no lleva razón el Estado en cuanto a su oposición.
Es un hecho innegable, que hubo lesión por conducta antijurídica del Ministerio de Educación, según lo declaró la Sala Constitucional, cuya consecuencia es, entonces, procurar en lo posible, el restablecimiento efectivo de la esfera subjetiva afectada, dada la falta de respuesta oportuna a un reclamo administrativo, para cuya concesión, al tratarse de este tipo de daño, es innecesaria la prueba, bastando en ocasiones, la simple constatación del hecho generador para que proceda su indemnización, con independencia del reconocimiento o rechazo de otros aspectos meramente patrimoniales, para los cuales sí es imprescindible la demostración física de los producidos. No significa lo anterior, que por el simple reclamo pueda otorgarse, ya que es necesaria la acreditación de su existencia y gravedad, carga que, sin lugar a dudas, le corresponde a la víctima no obstante, se ha permitido, que su comprobación pueda lograrse a base de indicios, ya que éste se produce, cuando se afecta la intimidad, el honor, la psiquis, la salud y la integridad física, entre otros, cuya gravedad, sin lugar a dudas, corresponde al reclamante, pudiendo acreditarse su existencia a través de presunciones de hombre inferidas de elementos circunstanciales, y por ello su prueba, es in re ipsa, tal y como reiteradamente lo ha expresado la Sala Primera de la Corte".
(El destacado es nuestro). Tenemos entonces que un segundo criterio delimitador del daño moral subjetivo son las presunciones del hombre inferidas de los elementos circunstanciales del caso de análisis. Asimismo de diversas resoluciones judiciales y de la sentencia 413 de 19 de noviembre de 2002 de la Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Adm. Sección I, se evidencian otros criterios, a saber: "III. Por daño moral subjetivo, ha entendido la doctrina aquella afección que incide sobre la esfera emocional de las personas causando preocupación, sufrimiento, ansiedad y otras emociones negativas y perjudiciales, cuyo origen sea los actos ilícitos provocados por el accionante. Por su naturaleza, son difíciles de probar por los medio ordinarios, por lo que puede el juzgador estimarlo con examen de las circunstancias que consten en el expediente y aplicado su experiencia, los principios generales de derecho y los de racionalidad y proporcionalidad.
" (El destacado es nuestro). Estos últimos criterios han sido desarrollados de manera relevante para limitar la posibilidad de reconocimiento de indemnizaciones exageradas o desproporcionadas. En este orden de ideas, la Sala Primera ha señalado: " No se trata, entonces, de cuantificar el valor de la honra y dignidad de un sujeto, pues estos son bienes inapreciables, sino de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión , único mecanismo del cual puede echar mano el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte su ofensa. No cabría dentro de tal filosofía, establecer indemnizaciones exorbitantes, como sucede en otros sistemas jurídicos, pues ello produciría el enriquecimiento injusto del ofendido, mediante el lucro inmoral con la honra y dignidad propias. Dentro de los principios fundamentales del derecho, hállanse los de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad , a los cuales se les ha reconocido en nuestro medio el rango de principios constitucionales (ver al respecto, las resoluciones de la Sala Constitucional #1739 - 92 de las 11:45 horas del primero de julio y 3495-92 del las 14:30 horas del diecinueve de noviembre, ambas de 1992).
Aplicándolos a situaciones como la presente, resulta indispensable, al fijar las obligaciones nacidas en situaciones jurídicas indemnizatorias, atender la posición de las partes y la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento, sin llegar a crear situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas. En tal sentido, el daño moral, en casos como el analizado, no podría dar lugar a indemnizaciones millonarias, como la pretendida. Ello abriría un portillo inconveniente , para dar paso a pretensiones desproporcionadas las cuales, so pretexto de tutelar el ámbito subjetivo del individuo, conducirían a un enriquecimiento injustificado que lejos de reparar la dignidad mancillada, socavaría sus fundamentos haciéndola caer en valores eminentemente económicos (Sala Primera voto 141 de 15:00 hrs. del 18 de junio de 1993 y No. 99 de 16 horas de 20 de setiembre de 1995) (El destacado es nuestro). La causalidad del daño es otro criterio de naturaleza insoslayable, en tanto que la causa real de éste puede determinar los alcances y límites de la estimación reparadora.
Por otra parte, siempre dentro del orden de la proporcionalidad, se habla de la "prudente apreciación del Juez" del daño y su resarcimiento, de la siguiente manera: "Por lo anterior, el tribunal debe considerar la procedencia del extremo en comentario, al efecto la Sala 1º. de la Corte Suprema ha dicho: " VI. Si bien el daño moral -en relación con el tema en cuestión- debido a su naturaleza, permite un amplio margen de discrecionalidad al juzgador en cuanto a su fijación, éste debe observarse necesariamente dentro de ciertos parámetros insoslayables, por ejemplo, la antigua Sala de Casación, en sentencia Nº 114 de las 16 hrs. del 2 de noviembre de 1979 avala la prudente apreciación de los jueces "...cuando les es dable inferir el daño con fundamento en la prueba de indicios. Esta Sala, en su fallo Nº 114-93 señala que el prudente arbitrio aludido, ha de tener en consideración las circunstancias del caso, los principios generales del derecho y la equidad.
Alrededor de tales conceptos, la Sala, en un pronunciamiento posterior razona en los siguientes términos: "No se trata, entonces, de cuantificar el valor de la honra y dignidad de un sujeto, pues estos son bienes inapreciables, sino de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión, único mecanismo del cual puede echar mano el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte su ofensa. No cabría dentro de tal filosofía, establecer indemnizaciones exorbitantes, como sucede en otros sistemas jurídicos, pues ello produciría el enriquecimiento injusto del ofendido, mediante el lucro inmoral con la honra y dignidad propias. Dentro de los principios fundamentales del derecho, hállanse los de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, a los cuales se les ha reconocido en nuestro medio el rango de principios constitucionales (ver al respecto, las resoluciones de la Sala Constitucional Nº 1739-92 de 11,45 horas del 1 de julio y Nº 3495-92 de 14,30 hrs. del 19 de noviembre, ambas de 1992).
Aplicándolos a situaciones como la presente, resulta indispensable, al fijar las obligaciones nacidas en situaciones jurídicas indemnizatorias, atender la posición de las partes y la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento, sin llegar a crear situaciones absurdas, dañinas o gravemente injustas. En tal sentido, el daño moral, en casos como el analizado, no podría dar lugar a indemnizaciones millonarias, como la pretendida. ello abriría un portillo inconveniente, para dar paso a pretensiones desproporcionadas las cuales, so pretexto de tutelar el ámbito subjetivo del individuo, conducirían a un enriquecimiento injustificado que lejos de reparar la dignidad mancillada, socavaría sus fundamentos haciéndola caer en valores eminentemente económicos (Sala Primera Nº 41 de 15,00 de 18 de junio de 1993 ). VII. Recapitulando, se tiene que el prudente arbitrio a emplear por el Juzgador en situaciones como la presente, supone la observancia de parámetros ineludibles como la prueba indiciaria, las circunstancias propias del caso concreto, los principios generales del derecho, la equidad, la posición de las partes; la naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento y los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.
Sobre tales extremos puede y debe la parte interesada ofrecer prueba en lo posible. Solo así puede arribarse a un prudente arbitrio. Al margen de tales consideraciones la fijación discrecional corre el grave riesgo de incurrir en un exceso de poder que desfigure o desvirtúe lo ejecutoriado. Sea, la prudente apreciación del juez, aún contando con la realización del hecho generador -cual ocurre en la especie- (principio "in re ipsa"), precisa de las consideraciones o parámetros comentados, en torno al daño, para, con arreglo a ellos establecer el motivo. En el evento de que no militaren en autos elementos de juicio sobre el particular, tendrá el juzgador que actuar en consonancia con tal situación adoptando una actitud conservadora en la fijación, pues de no hacerlo así podría incidir en exceso de poder." Voto 00093-2000 del Tribunal Contencioso Adm. Sección II. De conformidad con lo anterior, el reconocimiento del daño moral debe realizarse en el entendido de que si bien no requiere prueba directa, los Juzgadores deben tener especial prudencia y proceder a su valoración bajo su prudente apreciación, bajo criterios de equidad, aplicando las presunciones del hombre inferidas de los elementos circunstanciales del caso de análisis, a efecto de determinar la procedencia y el quantum de la sentencia condenatoria por este extremo dentro de los límites de la razonabilidad y la proporcionalidad.
En el presente proceso, la parte actora invoca un daño moral que se infiere, consiste en la afectación moral sufrida, angustia, dolor, sufrimiento, provocada con motivo de haberse determinado mediante un acto nulo, inmotivado y contrario a la técnica una presunta falta de confianza en su contra y por consiguiente devino en el cese intempestivo e unilateral de la relación de empleo que poseía en ese momento. Al respecto, estima este Tribunal que lleva razón la parte actora al invocar la existencia de la afectación moral dicha, mas en el entendido de que el monto a reconocer por este Tribunal debe ser proprocional y racional, estimándose excesivo lo pedido por la parte. En este orden ideas debe tomarse en consideración que la existencia de una decisión tal que implicó un rompimiento de la relación de empleo significa en sí misma una lesión grave subjetiva a cualquier persona que la sufra , mas debe tomarse en consideración que la afectación inmediata y económica se prolongó en el tiempo.
Estima este Tribunal que las circunstancias en que se dio el cese del nombramiento del actor, deviene en una situación de afectación emocional, tanto por lo imputado como por el hecho mismo de desconocer las situaciones concretas que determinaron tal valoración, sin que tuviera oportunidad de escuchar una justificación al menos verbal de lo ocurrido, tal y como se demostró en juicio, ocurrió en el caso concreto. Debe recordarse que la estabilidad en el empleo y la continuidad en el mismo, como fuente generadora del ingreso familiar, son base fundamental en la seguridad emocional de un ser humano. Un cese abrupto e infundado del mismo, por sí mismo es motivo de dolor e incidencia en el ámbito íntimo de la persona, sin que haya prueba en el juicio en contrario sobre este aspecto. En consecuencia, se condena a JUDESUR al pago a la actora de la suma de seis millones de colones por concepto de daño moral subjetivo, considerándose que dicho monto es acorde con la afectación sufrida como consecuencia directa de la conducta anulada en la presente resolución.
V.VIII.- Defensas: Realizado el análisis oficioso de los presupuestos de la demanda, se advierte suficiente legitimación activa y pasiva de ambas partes, en tanto que los efectos jurídicos del acto impugnado incide directamente en la esfera jurídica del actor, siendo así que dicha conducta fue emitida por JUDESUR. Además se advierte un interés actual en el resultado del proceso, en tanto que los efectos lesivos del acto continúan surtiendo sus efectos.”
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