Collective bargaining agreements in the public sector: unconstitutionality for employees governed by public lawConvenciones colectivas en el sector público: inconstitucionalidad para servidores regidos por derecho público

Res: 2000-04453 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fourteen hours and fifty-six minutes on May twenty-fourth, two thousand.

Optional judicial consultation by the SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE, filed by resolution at sixteen hours and ten minutes on August eleventh, nineteen ninety-nine, issued within judicial file number 96-000287-213-LA, which is an ordinary labor proceeding of Nombre100510, identity card CED76765, against the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, initiated in the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José.

Resulting:

1.- Through a brief received in the Secretariat of the Constitutional Chamber at eight hours and ten minutes on August thirtieth, nineteen ninety-nine (folio 1), and based on articles 8, subsection 1), of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch; 2, subsection b), 3, 13, 102, and 104 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the consulting Chamber, "having well-founded doubts about the possibility and legitimacy of entering into and, carrying out eventual reforms to existing collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) in the public sector," requests this Chamber to rule on the constitutionality of the foregoing. The consulting Chamber points out, in essence, the following: a) that there is no provision in the constitutional and administrative legal framework authorizing the negotiation of this type of collective instruments, nor their substantive variations; b) that in the ordinary labor proceeding, the plaintiff seeks the application of certain provisions of the eighth reform to the Fifth Collective Bargaining Agreement (Quinta Convención Colectiva), agreed between the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and the Union of Employees of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (SEBANA); c) that the trial judges considered that at the time of the Plaintiff's resignation from his position, the reform of the indicated collective instrument had not been approved (homologada) by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, nor by the Budgetary Authority (Autoridad Presupuestaria), and therefore had not entered into force; d) that independently of the reasons contained in the judgments, the consulting Chamber believes there are problems of a constitutional nature and rank that prevent them from applying the collective bargaining agreement. From articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, it is understood that the framers intended to expressly differentiate public employment from private employment, creating a Public Employment Regime governed by the principles of Public Law, meaning that public servants can only perform certain actions if authorized by a provision empowering them, citing resolution 1472-94 of the Constitutional Chamber as precedent; e) notes that following the same criterion, the then Institute of Agrarian Development filed an unconstitutionality action against articles 368, second paragraph, and 521, second paragraph, both of the Labor Code, arguing that due to the statutory condition of public employment, collective bargaining agreements and the submission of disputes to Arbitration Tribunals were prohibited. The Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), when responding to the granted hearing, argued that these negotiation procedures violate articles 167 and 180 of the Political Constitution; f) the consultation transcribes Constitutional Chamber judgment No. 1696-92, which declared the unconstitutionality of articles 368, second part, and 497 through 535 of the Labor Code, for violation of articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, and from the study of this jurisprudential precedent, infers that the declaration of unconstitutionality affected direct settlements (arreglos directos) and conciliations, but omitted a ruling on collective bargaining agreements, even though it had been expressly requested. However, deduces the consultation, if the unconstitutionality of arbitration awards (laudos arbitrales), direct settlements (arreglos directos), and conciliations within public employment was due to a lack of a provision authorizing those procedures in the Public Administration, the same must apply to collective bargaining agreements. The limitation arises, in addition to the constitutional norms, from the application of the principles of legality and legislative reservation; g) that article 62 of the Constitution indicates that collective bargaining agreements that are concluded in accordance with the law have the force of law, and this implies that for State employees, there must be a provision allowing such activity; on the other hand, article 56 indicates that every private employer (patrono particular) has the obligation to enter into collective bargaining agreements; interpreting this provision, the former Court of Cassation, in judgment No. 58 of 15:10 hours on July 20, 1951, indicated that the term "private" refers to employers other than the State and its institutions, and therefore, public employees had to resort to the conciliation procedure, which was endorsed by the Courts of Justice. Later, when the General Law of the Public Administration entered into force, whose article 112 states that administrative law regulates the relations of public servants, the Attorney General's Office ruled that the State cannot enter into collective bargaining agreements, and the Government Council issued a directive to that effect in October 1979, but which was later supplemented by another stating that upon expiration, the collective bargaining agreements in force could be extended, which caused a conflict at the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, submitted to arbitration before the Supreme Court of Justice, which stated that collective bargaining agreements could be entered into, as long as they did not nullify articles of the Civil Service Statute or provisions of the Law Creating the Budgetary Authority. Subsequently, the Constitutional Chamber issued vote No. 1696-92, and from that moment on, collective bargaining agreements not referring to manual laborers or to employees not participating in the public management of the administration are unconstitutional, because there is no regulatory provision whatsoever, nor constitutional or legal principle, allowing public servants to do so.

2.- By resolution at sixteen hours and twenty minutes on August thirtieth, nineteen ninety-nine, a hearing was granted to the Attorney General's Office.

3.- In briefs filed before the Secretariat of the Chamber, at 14:19 hours on the 6th (folio 19), at 15:39 hours on the 8th (folio 24), and at 14:56 hours on the 13th, all of September 1999, the Union of Employees of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica requested to be admitted as a party to the consultation, which was resolved favorably by the Presidency of the Chamber, by resolution at 15:45 hours on the 30th of that same month (folio 42).

4.- In a brief filed at 15:45 hours on September 23, 1999 (folio 28), the Attorney General's Office responded to the granted hearing in the following terms: a) regarding the current directives issued by the Executive Branch on the matter, they are those corresponding to the Ordinary Session of the Government Council of October 22, 1986, which authorizes not only extensions but also modifications of existing collective bargaining agreements, covering both public servants governed by rules and principles of Public Law and personnel with an employment relationship of a labor nature, according to the distinction made in articles 111 and 112 of the General Law of the Public Administration; b) concerning the terms of the consultation, it points out aspects it does not share with the consulting Chamber: first, that the generality of personnel of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica does not qualify as a public servant, so, in terms of Constitutional Chamber judgment No. 1696-92, arbitration procedures can occur, but with certain limitations, such that laws cannot be dispensed with or excepted; second, that the consultation ignores judgment No. 3053-94 of 9:45 hours on June 24, 1994, in which the constitutionality of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector was analyzed; c) regarding the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber and the distinction made between public servants and those who do not qualify as such, it affirms that it is true that the issue was initially only referred to the matter of arbitration awards (laudos arbitrales); however, subsequent to Judgment 3053-94, the Constitutional Chamber extended the effects to collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, and in summary, two positions arise, depending on the nature of the relationship (public or labor) of the entity in question, as follows: 1) the situation of public servants is incompatible with the institute of the arbitration award and with collective bargaining agreements, by virtue of articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, and according to the official opinion of this Attorney General's Office set forth in opinion C-161-98 of August 10, 1998, which concludes that regarding this personnel, the only legally feasible modality of negotiation is that established in the so-called "Regulation of Collective Negotiation for Public Servants" (Agreement of the Government Council of Ordinary Session No. 25 of October 6, 1992). In summary, it was expressed in the opinion, and is now transcribed literally: "Such instrument (the one contained in the Regulation), is indisputably very different from the collective bargaining agreement contemplated in the Labor Code (article 54 and following) (...) It is then stated that the rulings of that Chamber "... what they disallowed for the case of public servants, was only the negotiation of employment conditions through the instrument called Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva de Trabajo), regulated by the cited Third Chapter of our Code. So there is no legal impediment whatsoever for the special negotiation modality for the public sector called "agreement" (convenio) (article 8 in fine of the cited regulatory body) to be used in practice. The foregoing, of course, on the understanding that the negotiations intended to be carried out fully conform to the provisions of the regulation, basically regarding the aspects that can be subject to negotiation... as well as the submission of what is agreed to the aforementioned control Commission." Likewise, the Attorney General's Office points out that its criterion has been that collective bargaining agreements are not appropriate in Municipalities, for the same reasons expressed (see opinion C-044-99 of February 22, 1999). In conclusion, extensions or modifications of collective bargaining agreements are no longer possible in institutions where a public employment regime exists; 2) regarding the situation of those who are not public servants because they do not participate in public management, in the judgment of the Attorney General's Office (opinion C-260-98 of December 3, 1998), in institutions with an employment regime of a labor (non-public) nature, according to the criteria expressed by the Constitutional Chamber and the relevant doctrine, it is indeed feasible to collectively negotiate employment conditions, but not unlimitedly, since, as stated, laws, regulations, or current governmental directives cannot be dispensed with or excepted. In conclusion, the Attorney General's Office textually states:

"a.- The institute of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva de Trabajo) regulated in our Labor Code (article 54 and following) is not applicable in the case of employment relationships of a public nature (public servants); what is applicable there is the so-called 'Regulation of Collective Negotiation for Public Servants.' b.- In the case of personnel who do not qualify as public servants (in the terms established in the General Law of the Public Administration), the collective negotiation of employment conditions is indeed appropriate; however, the laws, regulations, or current governmental directives related to the negotiated aspects must be respected in the respective instrument.

c.- Collective instruments that have been extended or modified in application of the Directives on Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Public Sector are also in accordance with the law; however, those covering personnel governed by a public employment relationship were disallowed by virtue of the rulings of this Chamber." 5.- In response to the granted hearing, the Union of Employees of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in a brief filed at 13:55 hours on October 26, 1999 (folios 79 and following), essentially states that it develops the topic in three sections aimed at demonstrating that collective bargaining agreements in the public sector have a legal foundation and are authorized by the most varied sources of the legal system, from the fundamental norms of the Political Constitution to ordinary legislation. It then develops the three sections as follows: I.- The collective bargaining agreement is a social right enshrined in the Political Constitution, without any distinction whatsoever. It begins by affirming that social rights and guarantees are composed of individual and collective rights, which together aspire to achieve a better distribution of national wealth and attain the values of social justice, principles contained in articles 50 and 74 of the Constitution; that union freedom (libertad sindical) is inherent to any democratic regime and, in doctrine, is considered to constitute a genus that includes, in addition to the guarantee of association, the right of union activity, which materializes in the right to collective bargaining and the measures of self-protection of the labor collective; that is, the freedom recognized to workers to unionize is inextricably linked to the right of collective bargaining or negotiation. It states that the collective bargaining agreement is the instrument that seeks to achieve the constitutional objective entrusted to union organizations in article 60 of the Political Constitution, and that this norm makes no distinction based on the legal nature of the relationship. On the other hand, it cites national doctrine indicating that "Art. 61 means that when the Constitution has wanted to deny a social guarantee – such as the strike – it expressly so provides, just as when it wants to grant it, it simply enshrines it for all workers, without making distinctions. And article 61 means, above all, express confirmation that the Constitution considers workers who labor in public services as beneficiaries of the social guarantees, otherwise it would not have expressly denied them the right to strike. All social guarantees for workers contained in Title V – Single Chapter – of the Constitution are guarantees of public servants, as human beings in need of the protection those guarantees provide, just like other common workers, unless otherwise provided in the same Constitution, as has been done by article 61 under discussion." Consequently, article 62 of the Constitution fulfills the requirement of the principle of legality, and the denial of the right implies discriminatory treatment contrary to the principle of equality; on the other hand, the principles of the Rule of Law and Democracy support the recognition of the right in favor of public servants. Finally, it states that the framers did not have in mind to suppress the social guarantees of public servants –except for the issue of the strike–. II.- The right to collective bargaining in the Public Administration also has a reinforced character in our legal system. It is stated that the collective bargaining agreement, including those of the public sector, is recognized in the main conventions on the matter of the International Labour Organization (Nos. 87 concerning freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, 98 concerning the application of the principles of the right to organize and to bargain collectively, 135 concerning protection and facilities to be afforded to workers' representatives in the undertaking, 151 concerning protection of the right to organize and procedures for determining conditions of employment in the public administration, and 154 concerning the promotion of collective bargaining). It then analyzes the norms of interest contained in the cited conventions. It clarifies that Conventions 87 and 98 are ratified by Costa Rica and, therefore, have the hierarchical rank stipulated by article 7 of the Constitution, while Convention 151 has not been, but nevertheless has value as a supplementary source in light of what is established in article 15 of the Labor Code. From what has been said, it concludes that in our legal system, the only ones who would not have the right to enter into collective bargaining agreements would be public officials (strictu sensu), included in subsection 2 of article 1 of Convention 151, linked by an organic relationship with the Administration, and highlights the content of the pronouncements of the International Labour Organization, in which the country has been required, in application of Conventions and Recommendations, to comply with those contents. III.- The labor legal regime of employees of State commercial banks.- It indicates that the distinction made by the General Law of the Public Administration between public and private servants, "... could never justify nor have the scope that it could be correctly interpreted to exclude any category of public servants from the right of collective bargaining, except of course those public officials who assume the representation of the public management of the administration and hold the status of representatives of the constitutional bodies and other public institutions, who in our opinion are the only ones who would be deprived of that right." It then analyzes the legal nature of State commercial banks, in light of the doctrine of decentralized entities and the process called "Entrepreneurial State," starting from the examination of the content of article 111 of the General Law of the Public Administration and alluding to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, which has referred to the commercial nature of the activity of public banks, to conclude with article 112 idem, noting that the law establishes a public employment regime for the servants of the Administration and a private or common employment regime for the workers of the economic services and enterprises of the State who do not participate in the public management of the Administration. According to the foregoing, it reaches the conclusion that the nature of the relationship of the employees of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is labor-related and, therefore, regulated by the Labor Code, and therefore, they can enter into collective bargaining agreements. It highlights the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of June 14, 1984. Finally, it requests that the validity and constitutionality of the collective bargaining agreements signed in the public sector be declared.

6.- In the file, briefs were received from the Union of Workers of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (folios 47 to 57); from the Union of Personnel of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Union of Petroleum, Chemical, and Allied Workers (folios 60 to 69); from the Union of Employees of the University of Costa Rica and its representative as Coordinator of the Federation of Higher Education Workers (folio 73); from the Union of Employees of the Consejo Nacional de Producción (folios 125 to 147); from the Union of Workers of the Universidad Nacional (folios 152 to 163), all referring to the topic, as well as support briefs from the workers of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (folios 149 to 151 and 164 to 210).

7.- The formalities of law were complied with in the procedure.

Judge Sancho González writes; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- ON THE REASONS FOR THE CONSULTATION. - The essential basis of the consultation is contained in the resolution of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at sixteen hours and ten minutes on August eleventh, nineteen ninety-nine, in which it reads, in relevant part:

"Having well-founded doubts about the possibility and legitimacy of entering into and, carrying out eventual reforms to existing collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) in the public sector (...) given the absence of a provision in the constitutional and legal administrative framework that permits the negotiation of this type of collective instruments, nor their substantive variations; nor principles of similar constitutional or legal rank that allow negotiating and reforming, under the collective instrument in the Public Sector." (Whereas I)

" (...) the framers themselves wanted to expressly differentiate the figure of the public employee from the private one, creating a Public Employment Regime, governed by the principles of Public Law (...) Said condition, characteristic of the Public Employment Regime, implies that public servants can only carry out certain actions if they are authorized by a provision that empowers them to do so." (Whereas IV)

"The Constitutional Chamber, in that vote, declared unconstitutional numerals 368 –second part– and 497 to 535 of the Labor Code, for violation of articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, insofar as they applied to the public employment regime … "(Whereas VI) "From a detailed study of that Vote, it is clear that the Constitutional Chamber declared unconstitutional the use of direct settlements (arreglos directos) and conciliations by State employees subject to the public employment regime; as well as arbitration procedures (…) From a strictly legal perspective, we consider that if the primary reason for declaring the unconstitutionality of Arbitration Awards (Laudos Arbitrales), Direct Settlements (Arreglos directos), and Conciliations, within the Public Employment Regime, was the lack of provisions authorizing those procedures in the Public Administration, the same applies to Collective Bargaining Agreements (Convenciones Colectivas) … " (Whereas VII) "Therefore, the Chamber considers that, as of Vote No. 1696-92 of the Constitutional Chamber, all collective bargaining agreements agreed upon within the Public Sector that do not refer to manual laborers (obreros trabajadores) or to employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, when the same are contracted by the State according to its capacity to exercise Private Law –articles 3 and 111 of the cited General Law–, are unconstitutional, as well as the reforms introduced to them, because there is no provision whatsoever that permits such reforms, nor any principle whatsoever, of constitutional or legal rank, from which such normative authorization could be obtained…" (Whereas VIII) II.- APPEARANCE OF UNION ASSOCIATIONS IN THE FILE.- As indicated in the resultings of this judgment, in addition to the legitimate parties, by reason of having been granted a hearing, the Union of Workers of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (folio 47) appeared jointly in the file, the Union of Personnel of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Union of Petroleum, Chemical, and Allied Workers (folio 60), also jointly, the Union of Employees of the University of Costa Rica and the Federation of Higher Education Workers (folio 73), the Union of Employees of the Consejo Nacional de Producción (folio 125), and the Secretary General of the Union of Workers of the Universidad Nacional (folio 152). All have presented briefs supporting their opinions on the topic of the consultation, and the Chamber has incorporated them into the file, but cannot refer to those arguments due to the special nature of the consultation process. This is limited to the parties expressly indicated by law, and in this specific case, it is only the Union of Employees of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which is the union entity that signed the collective bargaining agreement serving as the base matter of the consultation process.

III.- JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER ON THE TOPIC. - In the consultation and the arguments of the parties, the judgments of this Chamber numbers 1696-92, 3854-92, and 3053-94 are primarily cited. As is logical to understand, it is important to extract from these precedents the ideas relevant to the decision of this matter, as follows:

a). - judgment N.º 1696-92. at fifteen hours and thirty minutes on August twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two.

In this judgment, the topic of the incorporation of the statutory regime for State employees by the National Constituent Assembly of 1949 was analyzed, and it was stated, among other things:

“ VI. Therefore, the intervention of the Labor Courts, with the mandatory arbitration procedure for public services, under the terms of the challenged articles of the Labor Code, originated in another constitutional order, as said body of norms dates from 1943 and under other needs, without the existence -at that time- of the constitutional conception of a public labor regime, exclusive for State employees, in order to regulate and resolve the diverse situations affecting that relationship. A Political Constitution is currently in force that did provide for it and that, notwithstanding that, a common legal order continues to be used, subjecting the Public Administration and its employees to the resolution of their differences through a procedure of a private nature. This results in an unconstitutional application by virtue of the historical and legal mismatch that this matter evidences, which tacitly contravenes article 197 of the Political Constitution. It is clear that the intention of the framers was to create an administrative labor regime. From the reading of the records of the National Constituent Assembly, the figure of the public employee and the private worker is distinguished. There is no doubt that the absence of a legal regime that properly regulates the relations between the State and its employees violates article 191 of the Political Constitution, which also leads to the violation of article 11 of the Magna Carta since, "... any unconstitutional norm or act violates it, by definition, insofar as it enshrines the principle of legality according to which public officials cannot exercise functions other than those granted to them by the legal system, and this system does not grant them in any case to carry out those that are contrary to the Constitution" (Constitutional Chamber, Resolution N.º 550-91, at eighteen hours and fifty minutes on March fifteenth, nineteen ninety-one), making it clear that the principle of legality is violated because there is a lack of an administrative labor regime adequate to the Political Constitution, and an express administrative norm that allows the State to submit to arbitration tribunals in order to solve, among other problems, collective conflicts. This violation originated from the need, surely felt, to have some response from the legal system, only that, as set forth, the regulation of the matter must be carried out, which for now does not exist. -

VII.On the one hand, the Law that was issued (Civil Service Statute) has partial scope, since the initiative taken by the Executive Branch in this regard only aimed to regulate relations with its employees, that is, within its sphere of competence. From this approach, the regulation of service relations between minor public entities has been left out, as it was something the Executive was not interested in, or simply it did not consider it most urgent. On the other hand, the Civil Service Statute regulated only some of the aspects of the relationship of employees with the State, such as those relating to rights, duties of employees, their selection, classification, promotion, transfers, discipline, and dismissal regime - among the most important -, which evidently concern one of the concerns expressed in the National Constituent Assembly, that is, that related to the suitability and efficiency of the service, but did not touch on other no less important aspects, such as that underlying the filing of this action, that is, the regulation of the own economic regime of that relationship and the subjection of other administrative entities to the public labor regime. This gap, however, does not authorize the use of mechanisms provided for a private relationship for a public employment relationship that must be governed by its own and different principles. -

VIII.

This Court has no hesitation in pointing out the existence of a distinct legal order from 1949 onward, notwithstanding that many matters saw a reiteration of what had been in force up to that point, because despite the sparse wording of Article 191 and the Transitory Provision to Article 140(2), both of the Political Constitution, the examination of the discussions of those norms allows us to establish that there exists a mandate and not a mere recommendation to apply criteria specific or special to that employment relationship between the public administration and its servants. Pursuant to the repeatedly cited Transitory Provision, the Legislative Assembly was to enact, within the term from November 8, 1950, to June 1, 1953, the Civil Service Law which would have as its principal characteristic its gradual application in offices of different natures within the Public Administration, which—evidently—was not fully complied with, but in any event, it must be clear that the confusion existing in the National Constituent Assembly in using and mentioning the Labor Code in the Constitution was to establish, in some form, a normative parameter to govern the end of the employment relationship and not, as some have sought to understand, that its principles and norms inspire and govern the relationship between the State and the public servant.-

IX.Nor does this Court fail to acknowledge the fact that in 1978 the General Law of the Public Administration sought to define the relationship between public servants and the Administration as regulated by Administrative Law (Article 112.1). But once again we find that it is an insufficient attempt, with that sole declaration, to sweep from legal praxis an entire tradition that applies, to a greater or lesser extent, a regime more characteristic of private labor relations, where such flexible principles as the autonomy of will or that of minimum rights govern, whereas the administration is subject to an entire block of legality (this in turn ordinary and constitutional). Indeed, ordinary labor regulations are inscribed within a philosophy of minimum benefits, ergo, surpassable by the parties, in order to harmonize the factors of production (Article 397 of the Labor Code), which justifies even the participation of laypersons in law, who come to decide in conscience, that is to say, without subjection to clearly established parameters, as has already occurred with petitions of the most diverse quality and quantity. The experience of arbitration tribunals in matters of social economic conflicts has been plethoric in these recent years. It may even be added, as has been pointed out in specialized studies, that use of this avenue was resorted to when others that had been utilized, for various reasons, ceased to be so. -

XI.In the opinion of this Court, then, Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution ground the existence, in principle, of an employment regime governed by Public Law within the public sector, as has been made clear from the debate in the National Constituent Assembly and incipiently captured by the General Law of the Public Administration. This public employment regime necessarily entails consequences deriving from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, now not only distinct from those of (private) labor law, but often opposed to them. Obviously, the declaration contained in this judgment encompasses the employment relationship that exists between the public administration (or better, administrations) and its servants, but in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that refers to a private employment regime, the solution must be different. In those cases, there would be a subjection to arbitration procedures, but with certain limitations, such as that they cannot dispense with or make exceptions to laws, regulations, or governmental directives in force, such that even in these cases decisions (awards) in conscience would not be proper, nor tribunals formed by non-lawyer subjects. This declaration is formulated based on the legal powers held by this Court and is considered indispensable for the correct interpretation of the whole of its decision. As unnecessary, a ruling on other aspects alleged in the action is omitted."

Of relevance, derived from what was stated in the partially transcribed judgment, is the clear definition of the scope of the statutory system that regulates relations between the State and its servants, albeit with the very special connotations of not having been enacted as an integral system. This Court expressed itself, on that occasion, in favor of the unconstitutionality of the regulations that led to the resolution of collective labor disputes through conciliation and arbitration, declaring that awards in the public sector are null and void.

b). - Judgment No. 3854-92 of fifteen hours forty-two minutes of December 2, 1992.

Issued in an amparo proceeding, it resolves the case in which the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) are challenged, against the exclusion made of certain officials and servants by reason of their special link to the public entity. This precedent is invoked by the Union of Employees of the National Bank of Costa Rica (Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) as precedent backing the constitutional and legal principles that recognize collective bargaining agreements as having the force of law. This Court, indeed, in several case files has examined arguments for and against collective bargaining agreements, examining the alleged aspects very punctually, but never resolving the issue of whether or not collective bargaining agreements are constitutional, as the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has now posed.

c). - Judgment No. 3053-94 of nine hours forty-five minutes of June 24, 1994.

The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) places special emphasis on this judgment and points out two specific aspects: that in it this Court entered to expressly resolve the issue of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector and it is from this resolution that the judgment regarding so-called "arbitral awards" is complemented. It was stated textually:

“SECOND. The amparo sought by the petitioning Union is to be partially granted, and without it being necessary to grant it a period to formalize an unconstitutionality action against the resolution of the Attorney General's Office of June 24, 1991, that rejects the reconsideration sought by J.A.S.E.C. of the opinion rendered on December 12, 1985: in a ruling handed down at 15:30 hours on August 23, 1992, this Court resolved that workers, laborers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration may resort to the procedures for the resolution of collective economic and social conflicts provided for in Articles 497 and following of the Labor Code. That being the case, the regime is administrative, statutory, for 'public servants,' that is, for those who provide services to the administration or on its behalf and account, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture; however, the General Law of the Public Administration itself establishes that 'service relationships with workers, laborers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be' (General Law of the Public Administration, Article 112, subsection 2). It is not proper to grant, having already been resolved to the contrary in the cited unconstitutionality action, the amparo sought regarding the denial of collective bargaining opposed to the 'public servants' of J.A.S.E.C. But it is proper to grant amparo to the petitioning Union insofar as the resolution of the Attorney General's Office of June 24, 1993 (see folios 134 to 139), should have sua sponte reconsidered the opinion rendered on December 12, 1985 (subsection b of Article 3 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic) and distinguished between public officials and workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration, because subjecting them all to the aforementioned prohibition contradicts the ruling cited several times and the guarantee provided by Article 62 of the Political Constitution, obviously on the understanding that the determination of the category of workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration is a question of mere legality…” It can be noted that indeed this Constitutional Court has made a pronouncement on the issue of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, on the terms that have been indicated in the transcriptions.

IV.- PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC.- In the report rendered to this Tribunal, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic refers to three pronouncements it directed, in order, to the Ministry of Justice and Grace, to the Executive Presidency of the Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), and to the Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of the Canton of Tibás. It is important for evacuating the consultation to gloss those documents:

a). - C-161-98 of August 10, 1998.

The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is asked to reconsider prior opinions, in which it was indicated that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court prevents collective bargaining in the public sector, except in cases involving workers, laborers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration. The position sustained by the Office of the Attorney General is confirmed and, for that purpose, it bases its opinion on Judgment 3053-94, which is binding erga omnes by virtue of the provisions of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. It is added that the application of the Regulation on Collective Bargaining for Public Servants, approved by Agreement of the Government Council in Ordinary Session No. 25 of October 6, 1992, published in La Gaceta No. 45 of March 5, 1993, is possible to the extent that restrictions not present in the private regime must be observed, such as aspects having an incidence on the budgets of public entities and all subject to superior control, given that it was not affected by the pronouncements of the Constitutional Court.

b). - C-260-98 of December 3, 1998.

The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is asked which are the organs of the Decentralized Public Administration that participate in public management and how one defines the official who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The attorney general's opinion indicates that JAPDEVA "is an autonomous entity of the State, having the character of a public utility company, situated, according to national doctrine, within the companies-public entity, which carries out as its exclusive or principal activity that of an enterprise. It is the public economic entity." Then the report refers to the judgments of this Court, commenting on the legal scope of Articles 3, 111, and 112 of the General Law of the Public Administration, the national doctrine related to the topic, concerning the definition of which administrations are subject to the public regime and which are not, of who participates in the public management of the administration and who does not. In its conclusions, it indicates that the jurisprudence of this Court permits awards and collective bargaining agreements in State enterprises, which is reinforced and complemented by Articles 111 and 112 cited earlier, but warning, of course, that the possibility of bargaining cannot be unrestricted, and respect must be had, for example, for the limitations required to harmonize public spending with budgetary availability and that laws, regulations, or governmental directives in force cannot be dispensed with or excepted.

c). - C-044-99 of February 22, 1999.

A consultation is made regarding the validity of a clause incorporated in 1990, but whose extension was not homologated by the parties in 1993. Clearly, it is expressed in this opinion that the distinguishing issue, to define whether or not a collective bargaining agreement is proper in the public sector, lies in the examination of the nature of the service provided by the individual, for the purpose of establishing whether or not they participate in public management; from that classification, the juridical fields of relations between workers and the State are delimited for these purposes, so that if the relationship is statutory, it will be subject to Public Law, and in the opposite case, it will be regulated by Labor Law. The conclusion of the opinion is enclosed in the following basic concept: "there is no juridical basis for concluding, in the future, collective bargaining agreements in the public sector (with the exception made in relation to workers or laborers of State enterprises or economic services)." As a complement, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic indicates that it does not ignore the existence of collective bargaining agreements that are being applied and whose validity is in question, but which cannot be formally challenged, except through an unconstitutionality action. In summary of what has been stated in this consideration: the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, in the report to this Court in the case file of the consultation now being evacuated, reiterates its position that it has been sustaining in prior opinions, as has been expressed in the preceding lines, which is a historical synthesis of a juridical position long sustained.

V.- THE CONVENTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (ILO).- In the brief presented before this Court by the Union of Employees of the National Bank of Costa Rica (Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, SEBANA), it asserts that collective bargaining agreements in general and those of the public sector, with the scope that that report confers upon them, are recognized in the principal conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and alludes, specifically, to the conventions distinguished by numbers 87, 98, 135, and 151, which, for the purposes of this consultation, this Court examines individually:

a). - Convention No. 87 "concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise." This convention was adopted at the Thirty-first Session held in the City of San Francisco, from June 17 to July 10, 1948; it entered into force on July 4, 1950; it was approved in Costa Rica by Law 2561 of May 11, 1960, and regarding its content and for the purposes of the subject under analysis, the union SEBANA indicates that it contains four guarantees and two safeguard clauses, which in order are:

the right of workers and employers to establish trade union organizations, as well as to join them (Article 2); political, statutory, administrative, and programmatic autonomy, and the duty of public authorities to abstain from any intervention tending to limit this right or to hinder its legal exercise (Article 3); the special protection of trade union organizations against dissolution or administrative suspension, which is prohibited (Article 4); the free right of trade union associations to establish and to join federations and confederations and international organizations of workers and employers (Article 5); the first safeguard clause is that contained in Article 7, by virtue of which the exercise of the rights contained in Articles 2, 3, and 4 may not be conditioned in any way; and the second, which regulates the measures that local legislation may take in defense of public order and legality (relation of Articles 8, 10, and 11).

In reality, the text of the convention has great relevance, insofar as it proclaims freedom of association (libertad sindical); but this Court does not find in this document an express enunciation of the right to conclude collective bargaining agreements in the public sector; abstraction is made, for now, of the exercise carried out by Nombre128357 to assert that there cannot be freedom of association if the juridical possibility of signing collective labor agreements does not exist, regardless of whether the union belongs to the public or private sector, which will be analyzed later.

b). - Convention No. 98 "concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively." Adopted at the Thirty-second Session, held in Geneva, on June 8, 1949; it entered into force on July 18, 1951; it was also approved by Law No. 2561 of May 11, 1960, and regarding its content, Nombre128357 expressly alludes to Articles 5 and 6, to indicate that the first establishes the general principle that defers to the national legislation of each State as regards the application of the convention to the armed forces and police, a clause that is also contained in the previous convention; and alluding to the following article, which literally provides: "This Convention does not deal with the position of public servants in the administration of the State and shall not be construed, in any manner, as prejudicing their rights or their status." The union comments that this norm has been the subject of various analyses in the ILO, given that many governments have understood it in the sense that collective bargaining is not possible in the public sector, which goes beyond the raison d'être of the provision. In other words, Nombre128357 understands that the ILO, in examining Article 6 of the convention, gives a restricted scope to the limitation, leading to the interpretation of the need to differentiate between officials who perform activities typical of the administration of the State and other government employees, to conclude that the restriction "(…) only affects those public officials or high-ranking officers who represent the Administration of the State and its institutions and who act as organs of power of those administrations, by virtue of the organic relationship that links them to the Administration." c). - Convention No. 135 "concerning Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to Workers’ Representatives in the Undertaking." Adopted at the Fifty-sixth Session, held in Geneva from June 2 to 23, 1971; it was approved by Law 5968 of November 9, 1976. Although cited in its brief by Nombre128357, no express reference or analysis is made of it. However, it is important to highlight that it is conceived to provide trade union representatives with effective protection against any act that may prejudice them in the exercise of that representation, provided they act in accordance with the laws, collective contracts, or other joint agreements in force (Art. 1), and for this reason, in addition to the convention, the same Law approved Recommendation No. 142 concerning protection and facilities to be afforded to workers' representatives in the undertaking, agreed upon at the General Conference of the International Labour Organization, which is summarized in the content of its Article 5, which literally provides: "Workers' representatives in the undertaking should enjoy effective protection against any act prejudicial to them, including dismissal, based on their status or activities as a workers' representative or on union membership or participation in union activities, in so far as they act in conformity with existing laws or collective agreements or other jointly agreed arrangements." The topic serves as a basis for asserting that not permitting collective bargaining agreements in the public sector implies a manner of obstructing the free exercise of trade union representation.

d). - Convention No. 151 "concerning Protection of the Right to Organise and Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public Service." It was adopted at the Sixty-fourth Session, held in Geneva from June 7 to 28, 1978; it has not been approved by the Legislative Assembly and, consequently, has not been ratified by Costa Rica. From the document, for the purposes of this judgment, the paragraphs and articles that are transcribed and commented upon are extracted:

"Recalling that the Convention concerning the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, 1949, does not apply to certain categories of public employees and that the Convention and Recommendation concerning Workers' Representatives, 1971, apply to workers' representatives in the undertaking; Noting the considerable expansion of the services provided by the public administration in many countries and the need for sound labour relations between the public authorities and public employees' organisations; Observing the great diversity of the political, social, and economic systems of the Member States and the different practices applied by said States (for example, as regards the respective functions of central and local authorities; the functions of federal, state, and provincial authorities; those of State-owned enterprises and of the various types of autonomous and semi-autonomous public bodies, or as regards the nature of the employment relationship); Taking into account the particular problems posed by the delimitation of the field of application of an international instrument and the adoption of definitions for the purposes of the instrument by reason of the differences existing in many countries between public and private employment, as well as the difficulties of interpretation that have arisen concerning the application to public servants of the relevant provisions of the Convention concerning the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, 1949, and the observations by which the supervisory bodies of the ILO have pointed out on various occasions that certain governments have applied those provisions in such a way that large groups of public employees have been excluded from the field of application of the Convention (…)" From this content of the preamble (parte considerativa) of the Convention and from the doctrine of Labor Law, this Court understands that the following initial conclusions derive: a) that collective labor law finds its ratio legis in the worker's need to associate in order to counteract the inferiority in which they find themselves vis-à-vis the employer, and for that reason, its juridical basis is found in the right of association and, more specifically, in the right of unionization (derecho de sindicación); b) that in this branch of Law, two institutions are vital: collective labor agreements and collective disputes; c) that collective labor law is an innovative subject in the history of social claims and is structured as an institution of international relevance starting from the ILO Conventions of 1948 and 1949; d) that in the sense of the evolution over time of legal institutions, and as is a general principle of collective labor law, the right of collective bargaining is not applicable to the universe of public employees, which is why it has been necessary to elevate the content of ILO Convention No. 151 to the category of an international norm. Let us now examine the main normative provisions of the Convention as they pertain to this consultation:

Article 1.- indicates that the Convention shall apply to all employees of the public administration and it is for national legislation to determine the extent to which coverage extends to high-level employees (with decision-making power or managerial positions or who perform confidential functions); Article 8.- broadly indicates that the settlement of disputes arising from the determination of conditions of employment shall be resolved through negotiation between the parties or through independent and impartial procedures, such as mediation, conciliation, and arbitration; Article 9.- provides that public employees, like other workers, shall enjoy civil and political rights for the normal exercise of freedom of association, subject only to the obligations arising from their status and the nature of their functions; Article 11.- in its first paragraph states that the convention is binding only on ILO members whose ratifications have been registered by the Director-General; From the norms glossed, it can be seen, in summary, that the Convention is considered by the ILO as a necessity to promote the equalization of public administration employees or servants to the same condition that private enterprise employees have before the juridical institution of the collective bargaining agreement, and Article 11.1 is particularly clear in defining the binding force of the Convention over time and in determining the obligated subjects, making that binding force dependent on ratification of the same Convention. In summary: the four ILO Conventions that have been cited are the international documents of greatest relevance that frame the juridical context of collective bargaining agreements as one of the instruments of Collective Labor Law.

VI.- DOCTRINE ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, ACCORDING TO THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SEBANA UNION. The topic of collective bargaining agreements is one that has been profusely treated in Labor Law; it is included within the general theory comprising the branch called collective labor law, whose main constituent institutions are professional associations (trade union law), collective labor agreements, and collective disputes. In setting out its arguments, the Union of Employees of the National Bank of Costa Rica refutes the resolution of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice by means of which the present consultation is formulated, and from which are extracted the arguments in which the doubt of constitutionality lodges; the challenge is summarized in asserting that there is no norm in the constitutional and administrative legal order that authorizes collective bargaining agreements as instruments for regulating working conditions in the public sector. The Union's conclusions, which are set forth as an antithetical thesis to what was affirmed by the consulting Chamber, while also contradicting the jurisprudential precedents of this Tribunal and the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, are the following: a) that public servants are ordinary workers and, consequently, protected by the Chapter of Social Guarantees of the Political Constitution; as a consequence of the foregoing, any limitation on the enjoyment of those rights and guarantees is contrary to the principle of legality and to the fundamental values of the person; b) that the collective bargaining agreement is a social right and, as such, is influenced by the ends pursued with the principles contained in Articles 50 and 74 of the Constitution; c) that freedom of association is consubstantial to any democratic regime (there is no democracy if there is no freedom of association) and, furthermore, trade union law is indissolubly linked to the right to collective bargaining and contracting, which derives, in the case of the Costa Rican legal regime, from the contents of Articles 60 and 62 of the Constitution; d) the constitutional norms recognize, outright, the right to collective bargaining, without any distinction of any kind being made, and therefore, the harmonious interpretation made of the Constitution and the norms and principles of Labor Law must be oriented toward broadly recognizing that right and not toward unjustifiably restricting it to the detriment of a labor category that also requires the protection of the collective labor agreement. In conclusion: for Nombre128357, Article 62 of the Political Constitution fulfills the requirement of the principle of legality in this matter; the denial of that right is discriminatory and contrary to the principle of equality, the principle of the Rule of Law (Estado de Derecho), and the Democratic principle. And it concludes by affirming that the right of collective bargaining in the public administration has, in addition, a reinforced character in our legal order, since it derives from the ILO Conventions that have been analyzed in the previous consideration. This synthesis of the Union's allegations is what must be examined to arrive at the conclusions of this pronouncement.

VII.- CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION.- The issue of the possibility of applying the institution of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, as has been posed by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in this case file, as analyzed in the report presented to this Court by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, and as deduced from the arguments expressed by the interested Union, must now be studied from the perspective of constitutional interpretation.

To understand the context in which the problem raised is analyzed, it is important to recall certain basic postulates that the doctrine of Constitutional Law has consistently developed regarding its oversight function: a) the Constitution, from a formal point of view, is composed of a normative set or complex, which requires its provisions to be interpreted in a coordinated manner, as part of a fully cohesive legal system; that is, the norms must be considered as a whole and not individually; b) in the exercise of constitutional review jurisdiction, the principle of constitutional supremacy is always present; the Constitution is the supreme norm on which the entire legal and political order of the State is founded; c) the Constitution contains, expressly or tacitly, a series of principles, some of which are called general principles of Constitutional law, which project their influence over the entire legal structure of the State; d) the Constitution contains or presupposes fundamental values; e) constitutional norms are considered within the purposes, values, and principles of the State, such that they tend to possess generality and openness sufficient to enable diverse options and realizations, which is equivalent to affirming that several solutions can be considered, although not all of them are compatible with the Law of the Constitution. Starting from these essential notes for constitutional interpretation; based on the doctrinal criteria presented by the parties participating in the consultation, the jurisprudential precedents of this Chamber that have been cited, and the conventions of the International Labour Organization, the Chamber arrives at the following premises of the judgment:

First: It admits, as a general theory of Collective Labor Law, that it is mainly composed of a trilogy of rights that seek to make real and provide a solution to the need of workers to associate in order to compensate for the inferiority in which they find themselves when acting in isolation, vis-à-vis the employer and vis-à-vis minimal legislation protecting their rights; these are the right to unionize, to collective bargaining agreements (convención colectiva), and to collective conflicts. But it confirms, indeed, its own judgment No. 1696-92 of 3:30 p.m. on August 23, 1992, to indicate that the genesis of the express incorporation of these rights into our constitutional regime is found in the amendment to the 1871 Constitution that occurred during the legislative terms of 1942 and 1943, when the incorporation of the Chapter on Social Guarantees into the Political Constitution was approved, which was done under special political, social, and economic conditions but distinct from the vision held by the Constituent Assembly members upon promulgating the current Political Constitution. One of the purposes pursued with the new constitutional text that was approved – possibly one of those that sparked the most discussion – was to include the "constitutional conception of a public employment regime, exclusive to State servants, to regulate and resolve the diverse situations affecting that relationship," the fundamental bases of which are found in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution. From this, it is inferred, for the sake of obtaining the utmost clarity in this judgment, that what was expressed in the aforementioned jurisprudential precedent should be reiterated, in the part referring to the special circumstance that there are two extremes or systems in labor matters: one regulated by the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and the other, regulated by Public Law. Second: Starting from the immediate preceding conclusion, it is also reaffirmed that the relationship between the State and public servants, as a thesis of principle and with the exceptions that will be stated later, is a relationship called public employment or statutory (estatutaria), which, as such, is regulated by Public Law; consequently, there cannot be a relationship of equality or equivalence between the involved parties, as ideally should occur in a labor relationship of contractual origin, mainly because the Public Administration represents a general interest, due to the need for continuity in the provision of public services, and due to the limitations imposed by budgetary regulations. In other words, the servant under the public employment regime finds themselves in a state of subjection in relation to the Administration; it can unilaterally impose the conditions of the organization and provision of the service to guarantee the public good, which eliminates the possibility of the relationship being considered from a perspective of equivalence of rights susceptible to negotiation between the parties. This conclusion encompasses the fact that the possibility of collective bargaining in the public sector cannot be recognized, since the mere idea of negotiation, as a suitable means to review and approve the conditions of public employment, conflicts with the essential postulates of the State's organization, which in this field were introduced in constitutional Articles 191 and 192. Third: The position that the Chamber has been sustaining has been the one that has historically prevailed in Costa Rica. Thus, the legal impossibility of collective bargaining in the public sector was declared by the judgment of the Court of Cassation No. 58 at 3:00 p.m. on July 20, 1951. In May 1953 and December 1954, the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) and its Regulations (Reglamento) were promulgated, and in interpreting their contents – constitutional and legal – the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) repeatedly sustained the thesis of the legal impossibility of collective bargaining. In 1979, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) came into force, in which it is established, with complete clarity, that Administrative Law applies to the service relationships between the State and its servants, excluding labor legislation from the relationship, which can only be invoked by servants who do not participate in public management (see, in this regard and in considering clause IV (Considerando IV) of this judgment, the most recent pronouncements, which are a synthesis of the reiterated opinion of the Office of the Attorney General). In 1980, the Government Council prohibited, via a directive, the conclusion of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector; subsequently, in 1986, it authorized a mechanism for approving extensions to collective bargaining agreements predating the General Law of Public Administration, which later, in 1992, was transformed into the so-called Regulation of Collective Bargaining for Public Servants. Finally, in judgment No. 1696-92 of this Chamber, the unconstitutionality of the mechanisms of direct settlement, conciliation, and arbitration was declared. Fourth: To understand the foregoing, it is important to highlight what the Office of the Attorney General has already stated in this regard in developing the national doctrine, in the sense that "those who provide services to the Administration in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, are public officials, completely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity (Article 111(1) of the General Law of Public Administration). These servants, in accordance with the foregoing, are prevented from bargaining collectively, because their relationship is governed by public law (Article 112(1) id.). For their part, from the interrelation of Articles 112(2) and 111(3) (a norm to which the former refers and both of the same Law), it is also clear that those who are not officials subject to the public employment regime, but rather laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, employees of State enterprises or economic services, responsible for activities subject to common law (Derecho común), who in accordance with transcribed Article 112(2), are governed by labor law and not by public law, are authorized to bargain collectively. Fifth: The Chamber considers that the position that, in the historical development of the institution of collective bargaining agreements, the Office of the Attorney General has been sustaining in its report to this Chamber, is legally compatible with the Law of the Constitution, especially, from judgment number 3053-94 of 9:45 a.m. on June 24, 1994, in which it was expressed in the second considering clause, transcribed previously, that "this Chamber resolved that laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration can resort to the procedures for resolving collective conflicts of an economic and social nature provided for in Articles 497 and following of the Labor Code. As things stand, the regime is administrative, statutory, for 'public servants,' that is, for those who provide services to the administration or in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture; however, the General Law of Public Administration itself establishes that 'service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be.' Consequently, and based on this constitutional interpretation and the texts contained in the General Law of Public Administration, in the public sector, only servants who do not participate in public management can enter into collective labor agreements, such that entities with an employment regime of a labor nature (not public), such as, for example, State enterprises, about which national doctrine has said are 'those that function as if they were private enterprises, because they sell and do the same thing as private individuals; for example, the same INS when it sells policies does the same as any insurance company, the bank when it makes loans does the same as a common financial entity, the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, which sells electrical energy sells it under the same conditions that a private company could sell it,' among others, can indeed bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions that inform Collective Labor Law. Sixth: Despite the foregoing, it is important to clarify that even in the public sector where the application of the institution of collective bargaining agreements is constitutionally possible—that is, in the so-called enterprises or economic services of the State and in those personnel nuclei of public institutions and entities where the nature of the services provided does not participate in public management, in the terms of subsection 2 of Article 112 of the General Law of Public Administration—the Chamber repeats and confirms its jurisprudence in the sense that the authorization to negotiate cannot be unrestricted, that is, comparable to the situation in which any private employer would find themselves, since through that avenue, laws, regulations, or government directives in force cannot be dispensed with or excepted, nor can laws that grant or regulate the powers of public entities, attributed by reason of normative hierarchy or the special conditions of the Public Administration in relation to its workers, be modified or repealed, a conclusion that is inferred from Article 112(3) of the General Law of Public Administration and from considering clause XI of judgment No. 1696-92 of this Chamber. Seventh: All these conclusions are also founded on the doctrine derived from the conventions of the International Labour Organization; however, the Chamber considers it very useful to note that it is so clear that the generalization of the possibility of negotiating collective bargaining agreements in the public sector has been only an aspiration of workers and, as such, of restrictive interpretation, that the International Labour Organization itself has promoted adherence to Convention No. 151 concerning the protection of the right to organize and procedures for determining conditions of employment in the public service. The purposes of this convention are to promote the general and unrestricted recognition of collective labor bargaining in the public sector. But in our current legal organization, for the scope of the Convention to be potentially applicable, it is necessary that its principles and norms are compatible with those of the Political Constitution and, by virtue of what has been stated in this judgment, there exists, until now, an impediment of the highest rank, preventing the acceptance of the institution of collective bargaining agreements throughout the public sector, an impediment rooted in the lack of a norm of a rank superior to ordinary law that would allow the application of the institution throughout the public sector, making it compatible with the principles and values of the Political Constitution. The articulation of the institution of collective bargaining with the national legal system cannot be done solely from the point of view of the interests of the servants of the public sector; it must also be done based on the necessary examination of constitutional Articles 191 and 192, as has already been stated.

VIII.- CONCLUSIONS.- Based on all that has been set forth and by way of summary, the Chamber arrives at the following conclusions: in exercising its jurisdiction as the supreme interpreter of the Political Constitution, when examining the topic of the administrative organization and structure of the State and the appropriateness or not of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, the Chamber cannot limit itself solely to the application of the provisions that make up the Chapter of the so-called "Social Guarantees." It is also necessary to examine that legal institution in coordination with the principles contained in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution; in performing this exercise, full conviction is acquired that the will of the constituent, following the historical line of development of the institutions of Labor Law, was to abstract the servants of the public sector from the general rules that inform Collective Labor Law, subjecting them to a special public employment relationship, also commonly called a "statutory relationship" (relación estatutaria), which is governed by Public Law. This implies, without doubt and as a general thesis, that no public official can negotiate their conditions of employment as if it were a contractual nexus subject to Labor Law. However, the development of legal ideas, the adoption of conventions promoted by the International Labour Organization, and the jurisprudence of this Chamber have led the evolution of the institutions involved to the level of admitting, as compatible with the Law of the Constitution, the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the category of employees and servants who, despite being part of the public sector, govern their relations by Labor Law, especially within the terms of the definitions contained in Articles 111 and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, that is, when dealing with enterprises or economic services of the State charged with activities subject to common law, as well as service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration and who are governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be. It is in this sense that the consultation is answered, but warning, indeed, that it corresponds to the Administration itself, to legal operators in general, and ultimately to the Judge, when they take cognizance of specific cases, to determine whether a State institution or a group of its servants or officials constitute the core of the exception that can indeed bargain collectively, or if, on the contrary, this path is forbidden to them. And finally, according to what the Office of the Attorney General has expressed in its report, which this Chamber also adopts, the personnel working in the Municipalities of the country are limited in their ability to bargain collectively, under the terms of this judgment, since, barring proof to the contrary, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship. Given the effects of this judgment, in accordance with the provisions of Article 107 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), it is important to note that it will be incumbent upon the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice to determine whether the plaintiff's relationship in the Ordinary Labor Proceeding, Nombre100510, with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, was governed by public law or by common law. The judgment is declaratory and retroactive to the date of entry into force of each collective bargaining agreement in the public sector that is sought to be or is intended to be applied, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91 of the same Law, the Chamber proceeds to dimension the retroactive effects of the judgment to the date of publication of its summary in La Gaceta, a date from which the effects must cease for all those servants for whom the Law of the Constitution precludes the possibility of entering into collective bargaining agreements. Magistrate Arguedas dissents and declares that collective bargaining agreements concluded in the public sector are not unconstitutional per se. Magistrate Solano dissents regarding the dimensioning, so that the effective date of this judgment is from the expiration of the term of each collective bargaining agreement. Magistrates Piza and Molina issue separate notes.

THEREFORE

The consultation formulated by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice is answered in the following sense: a) collective bargaining agreements regulated by Articles 54 and following of the Labor Code that are concluded in the public sector are unconstitutional, when dealing with personnel governed by the public employment relationship (statutory relationship); b) collective bargaining agreements concluded in the public sector are not unconstitutional, when they are concluded by laborers, workers, officials, or employees of the public sector, whose labor relations are governed by common law; c) likewise, collective instruments that have been negotiated and have been extended or modified, in application of the general policy on collective bargaining agreements in the Public Sector, are compatible with the Law of the Constitution, unless they involve negotiations with personnel in a public employment relationship, in which case those instruments are unconstitutional; d) it is the responsibility of the administration and the judges taking cognizance in labor suits, as applicable, of the application of collective bargaining agreements, to determine whether the involved workers, given the nature of the functions they perform or performed, are governed by public law or common law, for the purposes of defining whether or not they can be active subjects in the application of collective bargaining agreements. This judgment is declaratory and retroactive to the date of entry into force of the respective Collective Bargaining Agreement, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Nevertheless, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the effects of the judgment are dimensioned to the date of publication of its summary in La Gaceta. Summarize in La Gaceta and publish in full in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial). File and notify.

R. E. PIZA E.

President Luis Fernando Solano C. Luis Paulino Mora M.

Eduardo Sancho G. Carlos M. Arguedas R.

José Luis Molina Q.. Gilbert Armijo S.

ES/mm/00 DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE SOLANO CARRERA The undersigned Magistrate records that he has concurred with the substance of the Chamber's ruling, but disagrees and separates from what is ordered therein, insofar as he considers that a special dimensioning should be given to the effects of judgment No. 4453-2000, as was done with the ruling in Judgment No. 1696-92 (judgment on arbitration awards (laudos) in the public sector).

Indeed, I believe that, in the same manner in which the Chamber ordered it for arbitration awards on that occasion, given the nature of collective bargaining agreements, the pronouncement regarding their unconstitutionality cannot have the retroactive effects that the system normally grants in such cases. I also think that doing so through the formula used by the majority of Magistrates, in the sense that the judgment takes effect as of its summary in La Gaceta, is insufficient, because of the sudden or surprising tone it contains. For this very reason, I believe that criteria of justice and equity must be used here again to maintain the full application of the current collective bargaining agreements until the very date of expiration of the term contemplated by them, so that their extinction is gradual and tempering the impact that this pronouncement in any case signifies, while, as I understand has been happening for some time, the legislative process for the approval of Conventions of the International Labour Organization, which would have the virtue of regularizing matters relating to this subject, is concluded.

In that sense, I explain my dissenting vote.

Luis Fernando Solano Carrera Magistrate SEPARATE NOTE BY MAGISTRATES PIZA ESCALANTE AND MOLINA QUESADA:

We have concurred with the majority vote in compliance with the provisions of Conventions No. 87, 98, 135, and 151 of the I.L.O., but we cannot refrain from expressing our concern that, in the public sector, whatever the nature of the entity in question, even if there is only State participation in its ownership or that of its shares, service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees governed by labor or common law do not imply, as in the private sector, a real distinction of interests risks, and has broad powers of action and negotiation; in the public sector, the managerial side is subject to limitations of Public Law that greatly diminish its bargaining capacity and completely eliminate its fear of loss, which is a fundamental ingredient of private businesses. Finally, we are concerned that collective bargaining agreements for workers subject to the private law regime produce inequalities vis-à-vis public officials proper, who lack this instrument, thereby accentuating the existing inequalities among employees of different institutions.

R.E. Piza E. José Luis Molina Q.

Res: 2000-04453 DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE ARGUEDAS RAMIREZ I dissent from the majority criterion, and, instead, I believe that collective bargaining agreements concluded in the public sector are not unconstitutional per se.

I.- The essential reason for my disagreement has to do with the interpretation that my colleagues make of the meaning and scope of constitutional Articles 191 and 192 regarding their impact on the sphere of the right to collective bargaining in the public sector and, more specifically, the right to collective bargaining agreements in this sector.

II.- I will begin by emphasizing that the majority goes back, in considering this matter, to the fact that even prior to the current Constitution, the rights to unionize, to collective bargaining agreements, and to collective conflicts had achieved constitutional recognition in the 1871 Constitution. In the majority's judgment, the incorporation into the current Constitution of Articles 191 and 192 founded a public employment regime that prevents now recognizing what was previously recognized as a right (and, I say, necessarily as a fundamental right), that is, the possibility of collective bargaining in the public sector; according to this criterion, henceforth, the mere idea of negotiation, as a suitable means to review and approve the conditions of public employment, conflicts with the essential postulates of the State's organization.

III.- I infer from this conclusion that, in the opinion of my colleagues, the current Constitution simply excluded from the public sector the guarantee of a right that, before this was done, had already been added to the list of rights recognized by the State for public servants as well, that is, for workers located in that sector. I do not see anything in what the majority has said that indicates this exclusion was reached because of the deliberate purpose (which is to say, voluntary and intentional) of the 1949 constituent to curtail the coverage of those rights, or to deny their exercise to certain persons or servants. On the contrary, regarding the fundamental rights of public servants, my opinion is that, in a general sense, the constituent was animated by the purpose of protecting their rights: Article 192 betrays this. But to my colleagues, this curtailment seems evident and inevitable due to the very nature of the statutory regime of public employment, as it is conceived in Articles 191 and 192, which, according to them, exposes the public servant to suffering or enduring (that is, passively) the working conditions unilaterally imposed by the State, without the possibility of participating in or influencing the determination of those conditions through negotiation, all for the public good.

IV.- I note, to begin with, that the prevailing criterion in this case has a hint of paradox. Indeed, the Chamber, in addressing the issue of strikes in the public sector (in judgment No. 1317-98 at ten hours twelve minutes on February twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-eight), opened up the previously non-existent possibility for public servants to resort to legal strikes. How can it now be explained that, while legal strikes can be carried out by these servants, they themselves find the avenue for resolving their disputes prior or subsequent to the state of strike through collective bargaining agreements or other modalities of binding negotiation for the parties barred, when collective bargaining, as is known, is the most logical and civilized way to bring an end to collective economic-social conflicts occurring within the sphere of labor relations?

V.- The insurmountable contradiction that the majority deduces from the provisions of Articles 191 and 192 with respect to the recognition of the rights to collective bargaining and collective bargaining agreements, is evidently obtained from their own interpretation of those articles, since, as I have mentioned, there is no indication that such a thing was a voluntary and intentional decision of the constituent themselves, nor is it literally expressed in the text of the Constitution. I admit that the letter of Article 191 is emphatic when it states that a civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants. That is, I do not doubt that the constituent wanted to give a primarily statutory configuration to employment relations in the public sector. But under the sign of the "State of fundamental rights" that characterizes the order of things proposed by the Constitution, markedly after the creation of this court in 1989, it seems to me that the interpreter of the Constitution cannot fail to notice the growing significance and impact of those rights in the regulation of the State's organization and its relations with public servants, and in the modulation or nuance that this influence works on the matter conceived by the 1949 constituent, which, consequently, to interpret it properly, must be exposed today to the light of those rights and their requirements. It seems to me that the interpreter cannot fail to notice this, unless they petrify the Constitution, as if regarding the evolution and the current meaning of fundamental rights little or nothing had happened since the constituent act.

VI.- From this perspective, it is worth repeating that the rights at issue here, involved in the question of constitutionality that has been brought before the Chamber, belong to the category of fundamental labor rights. That we are in the presence of this class of rights seems to me beyond all doubt. Thus, for example, the International Labour Organization, one of whose obligations (adopted at the General Conference in May 1944) is "the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining," includes in its "Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work" (adopted by the General Conference in June 1998), as a category of such rights, "freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining." VII.- Now then: these rights, as the Chamber itself has recognized in reiterated jurisprudence, due to their fundamental character, are inherent to the human being by their condition as such; they accompany them by their character as a person and are therefore superior to the State itself: the latter does not create or regulate them with constitutive effect, but rather recognizes, protects, and guarantees them normatively, but with a purely declaratory character.

Thus, the legal system can protect and shape their exercise, but not eliminate or disavow them by simply invoking that the requirements of State organization, or administrative efficiency, or a vague public good so demand; all because they hold a category and force superior to the legal system itself.

VIII.- Certainly, as the Chamber has also stated, fundamental rights are not unrestricted or absolute; they may be subject to certain limitations imposed by the legal system, in consideration of superior values and interests of the community; but these restrictions cannot go so far as to empty them of content, which would indeed be contrary to the entire ideology upon which the Constitution rests, as the superior catalog of fundamental rights.

IX.- I insist that in the case of the constitutional chapter relating to social guarantees, as the majority mentions, the rights included therein were already expressly incorporated into our legal regime since the amendment introduced to the 1871 Constitution in the legislative sessions of 1942 and 1943, which, it is worth highlighting, constitutes one of the greatest achievements recorded in the country's history in terms of protecting fundamental social rights, which, to a large extent, sustain the stability of the democratic regime we enjoy today.

X.- Upon the enactment of the 1949 Constitution, this chapter of guarantees was reproduced, as the contrary would have implied an inadmissible regression from the perspective of fundamental rights, since the evolution that these rights have undergone throughout history—from the consecration of the most essential public liberties to the so-called third-generation rights, a trajectory that has aimed at the increasingly integral development and well-being of the human being, from their individual, social, economic, and cultural perspective—cannot conceive a regression in their normative protection, without this signifying an affront to their freedom and dignity.

XI.- In my opinion, currently, Articles 191 and 192 neither escape nor could they be exempt from the influence of the fundamental right of public servants to participate, as much as possible, in defining the regime of their work. This is, it seems to me, the perception that gives rise to an essential discrepancy with the majority of the court. I have already mentioned that these articles give the public employment regime a primarily statutory configuration, such that the State, through the procedures established for normative production (which do not in themselves exclude means of participation by the public servants themselves), sets (in this sense, unilaterally) the conditions of public employment, but, as regards the State itself, "with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the public administration," which is the relevant justifying reason for the statutory nature of that regime: such provisions, by the authority of the two cited articles, are imposed as non-disposable regulations of the legal regime of employment, which, consequently, is not susceptible to being substituted, revoked, or altered through collective bargaining.

XII.- Naturally, this constitutional choice implies a severe limitation on the scope of the right to collective bargaining, but this restriction is, in my judgment, all that this right and its effective validity allow. I mean that the right is not extinguished, and the possibility remains for negotiation to achieve supplementary regulation (not necessarily supplemental) of working conditions, in areas, modalities, or aspects that the State refrained from unilaterally adding to the content of the employment legal system.

XIII.- Now then, all of the foregoing does not imply that a specific collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) negotiated in the public sector cannot incur defects that determine its invalidity, but that would be due to some illegality in the specific case, which may render the provisions contemplated therein inadmissible. That is why this dissenting opinion (voto salvado) has been indicated in the judgment to the effect that "collective bargaining agreements in the public sector are not unconstitutional per se," because this fundamental right can be limited but not suppressed to the detriment of a specific group of persons, due to their condition as public servants. At this point, it is worth mentioning that, if there is a certain group of public officials who by definition cannot be beneficiaries of this type of agreements—for example, the heads who represent the administration—it is not because they are deprived of this fundamental right, but because the position they hold at the time of collective bargaining creates an evident incompatibility for arranging any type of benefit in their favor, precisely because they are the ones who represent the State party in its capacity as employer, which clearly explains why they cannot take advantage of such an opportunity to "legislate" for their own benefit. In summary: the nuances that the exercise of this right can acquire in the case of the public sector arise, on the one hand, from limitations derived from the principle of legality and the public order rules governing the Administration's actions, and secondly, from the guidelines and restrictions in force regarding budgetary matters and public spending (when it involves clauses that contemplate economic benefits), since, due to the principle of budgetary legality—which is indeed expressly enshrined in Article 180 of the Constitution—no expenditure may be ordered or executed without the corresponding duly approved budget allocation. Thus, the correct dimension that this constitutional right enshrined in the chapter of social guarantees must acquire, in the case of the public sector, is not that of a total curtailment for the servant, but rather an understanding that its exercise is subject to certain limitations in consideration of compliance with the legal system, the limits of public spending, and the corresponding regulations that exist in this field.

Carlos Ml. Arguedas R.

It clarifies that Conventions 87 and 98 are ratified by Costa Rica and, therefore, have the hierarchical rank stipulated by Article 7 of the Constitution, while Convention 151 has not been, but nevertheless, it has value as a supplementary source in light of what is established in Article 15 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). From the foregoing, it concludes that in our legal system, the only ones who would not have the right to enter into collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) would be public officials (funcionarios públicos) (strictu sensu), included in subsection 2 of Article 1 of Convention 151, linked by an organic relationship with the Administration, and highlights the content of the pronouncements of the International Labour Organization, in which the country has been required, in application of Conventions and Recommendations, to comply with those contents. III.- The legal labor regime of employees of state commercial banks.- It indicates that the distinction made by the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), between public and private servants, "...could never justify or have the scope of being correctly interpreted, in the sense that it excludes any category of public servants from the right of collective bargaining, except of course those public officials who assume the representation of the public management of the administration and hold the status of representatives of constitutional bodies and other public institutions, who are in our opinion the only ones that would be deprived of that right." It then analyzes the legal nature of state commercial banks, in light of the doctrine of decentralized entities and the process called "Entrepreneurial State," starting from the examination of the content of Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration and alluding to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which has referred to the commercial nature of the activity of public banks, to conclude that with Article 112 of the same law, it indicates that the law establishes a public employment regime for the servants of the Administration and a private or common employment regime for the workers of the State's enterprises and economic services, who do not participate in the public management of the Administration. According to the foregoing, it reaches the conclusion that the nature of the relationship of the servants of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is labor-related and, therefore, regulated by the Labor Code and for this reason, they can enter into collective bargaining agreements. It highlights the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of June 14, 1984. Finally, it requests that the validity and constitutionality of the collective bargaining agreements entered into in the public sector be declared.

**6.-** In the case file, writings were received from the Sindicato de Trabajadores del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (folios 47 to 57); from the Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros, Químicos y Afines (folios 60 to 69); from the Sindicato de Empleados de la Universidad de Costa Rica and its representative as Coordinator of the Federación de Trabajadores de la Educación Superior (folio 73); from the Sindicato de Empleados del Consejo Nacional de Producción (folios 125 to 147); from the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional (folios 152 to 163), all of them referring to the issue, as well as writings of support from the workers of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (folios 149 to 151 and 164 to 210).

**7.-** The legal formalities were complied with in the procedure.

Drafted by Magistrate **Sancho González**; and, **CONSIDERING:** **I.- ON THE REASONS FOR THE CONSULTATION. -** The essential basis of the consultation is contained in the resolution of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice, at sixteen hours ten minutes on August eleven, nineteen ninety-nine, in which it reads, in what is of interest:

*"For having well-founded doubts about the possibility and legitimacy of entering into and, making eventual amendments to existing collective bargaining agreements in the public sector (...) as there is no norm in the constitutional and administrative legal system that allows the concertation of this type of collective instruments, nor their substantive changes; nor principles of similar constitutional or legal ranks that permit concertation and amendment, under the collective instrument in the Public Sector." (considerando I)* *"(...) the constituent himself wanted to expressly differentiate the figure of the public employee from the private one, creating a Public Employment Regime, governed by the principles of Public Law (...) This condition, characteristic of the Public Employment Regime, implies that public servants can only perform certain actions if they are authorized by a norm that empowers them to do so." (considerando IV)* *"The Constitutional Chamber, in that vote, declared unconstitutional numerals 368 –second part– and 497 to 535 of the Labor Code, for violation of Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, insofar as they would apply to the public employment regime ..." (considerando VI)* *"From the careful study of that Vote, it is clear that the Constitutional Chamber declared unconstitutional the conclusion of direct arrangements (arreglos directos) and conciliations (conciliaciones) by State servants subject to the public employment regime; as well as arbitration procedures (...) From a purely legal perspective, we consider that if the primary reason for proceeding to declare the unconstitutionality of Arbitration Awards (Laudos Arbitrales), Direct Arrangements, and Conciliations, within the Public Employment Regime, was the lack of norms authorizing those procedures in the Public Administration, the same occurs with Collective Bargaining Agreements ..." (considerando VII)* *"For this reason, the Chamber believes that, as of Vote No. 1696-92 of the Constitutional Chamber, all collective bargaining agreements agreed upon within the Public Sector that do not refer to blue-collar workers (obreros trabajadores) or to employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, when the same are contracted by the State according to its capacity to exercise Private Law –Articles 3 and 111 of the cited General Law– are unconstitutional, as well as the amendments introduced to them, because there is no provision whatsoever that allows such amendments, nor any principle, of constitutional or legal rank, from which such normative authorization can be obtained..." (considerando VIII)* **II.- APPEARANCE OF UNION ASSOCIATIONS IN THE CASE FILE.-** As indicated in the resultandos of this judgment, in addition to the legitimate parties, by reason of having been granted a hearing, the Sindicato de Trabajadores del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (folio 47) appeared in the case file, jointly, the Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros, Químicos y Afines (folio 60), also jointly, the Sindicato de Empleados de la Universidad de Costa Rica and the Federación de Trabajadores de la Educación Superior (folio 73), the Sindicato de Empleados del Consejo Nacional de Producción (folio 125), and the Secretario General of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional (folio 152). All have presented writings supporting their opinions on the subject of the consultation, and the Chamber has incorporated them into the file, but it cannot refer to those allegations, due to the special nature of the consultation process. This is limited to the parties expressly indicated by law, and in this specific case, it is only the Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which is the union entity that signed the collective bargaining agreement that serves as the base matter of the consultation process.

**III.- JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER ON THE SUBJECT. -** In the consultation and the allegations of the parties, the judgments of this Chamber numbered 1696-92, 3854-92, and 3053-94 are mainly cited. As is logical to understand, it is important to extract from these precedents the ideas that are of interest for the decision of this matter, as follows:

a). - Judgment No. 1696-92, at fifteen hours thirty minutes on August twenty-three, nineteen ninety-two.

In this judgment, the issue of the incorporation of the statutory regime for State servants by the 1949 National Constituent Assembly was analyzed, and it was stated, among other things:

*" VI. Due to the foregoing, the intervention of the Labor Courts, with the mandatory arbitration procedure for public services, under the terms of the challenged articles of the Labor Code, originated in another constitutional order since said body of norms dates from 1943 and under other needs, without there existing -at that time- the constitutional conception of a public labor regime, exclusive for the State's servants, in order to regulate and settle the various situations affecting that relationship. A Political Constitution currently governs that did provide for it and that, despite this, a common legal order continues to be used, subjecting the Public Administration and its employees to the resolution of their differences through a procedure of a private nature. This results in an unconstitutional application by virtue of the historical and legal gap that this matter evidences, which tacitly contravenes Article 197 of the Political Constitution. It is clear that the constituent's intention was to create an administrative labor regime. From the reading of the minutes of the National Constituent Assembly, the figure of the public employee and the private worker can be distinguished. It is undeniable that the absence of a legal regime that appropriately regulates the relations between the State and its servants violates Article 191 of the Political Constitution, which also leads to the violation of Article 11 of the Magna Carta because,* *"... every unconstitutional norm or act violates it, by definition, insofar as it enshrines the principle of legality according to which public officials cannot exercise functions other than those granted to them by the legal system, and this does not grant them in any case to carry out those that are contrary to the Constitution" (Constitutional Chamber, Resolution No. 550-91, at eighteen hours fifty minutes on March fifteen, nineteen ninety-one),* *it being clear that the principle of legality is violated because there is a lack of an administrative labor regime appropriate to the Political Constitution, and an express administrative norm that allows the State to submit to arbitration tribunals in order to solve, among other problems, collective conflicts. That violation originated in the need, surely felt, to have some response from the legal system, only that, as stated above, the regulation of the matter, which for the moment does not exist, must be carried out. -* *VII. On the one hand, the Law that was issued (Civil Service Statute - Estatuto del Servicio Civil) has partial scope, since the initiative taken by the Executive Branch in this regard only had the purpose of regulating relations with its servants, that is, within its scope of competence. From this angle of approach, the regulation of service relations between the minor public entities has been left out, because it was something in which the Executive was not interested, or it was simply not what it considered most urgent. On the other hand, the Civil Service Statute barely regulated some of the aspects of the relationship of servants with the State, such as those relating to rights, duties of servants, their selection, classification, promotion, transfers, discipline, and dismissal regime - among the most important - which evidently concern one of the concerns expressed in the National Constituent Assembly, that is, that which relates to suitability and efficiency of the service, but it did not touch other no less important aspects, such as that which underlies the approach of this action, that is, the regulation of the economic regime itself of that relationship and the subjection of the other administrative bodies to the public labor regime. This vacuum, however, does not authorize the use of mechanisms provided for a private relationship, for a public employment relationship that must be governed by its own and different principles. -* *VIII. The Chamber has no doubt in pointing out the existence of a distinct legal system as of 1949, notwithstanding that in many matters there was a reiteration of what had been governing until that date, because despite the sparse wording of Article 191 and the Transitory to Article 140, subsection 2), both of the Political Constitution, the examination of the discussions of those norms allow us to establish that there exists a mandate and not a simple recommendation to apply specific or special criteria to that employment relationship between the public administration and its servants. In accordance with the repeatedly cited transitory, the Legislative Assembly had to enact, within the term of November 8, nineteen fifty, to June 1, nineteen fifty-three, the Civil Service Law that would have as its main characteristic its gradual application in the offices of a different nature of the Public Administration, which -evidently- was not fully complied with, but in any case, it must be clear that the existing confusion in the National Constituent Assembly of using and mentioning the Labor Code in the Constitution was to establish, in some way, a normative parameter that would govern the end of the employment relationship and not as it has been sought to be understood, that its principles and norms inspire and govern the relationship between the State and the public servant.-* *IX. Nor does the Chamber ignore the fact that in 1978 the General Law of Public Administration intended to define the relationship between public servants and the Administration as regulated by Administrative Law (Article 112.1). But again, we find that it is an insufficient attempt, with that sole declaration, to sweep away from legal praxis an entire tradition that applies, to a greater or lesser extent, a regime more typical of private labor relations, where principles as flexible as that of the autonomy of the will, or that of minimum rights, govern, while the administration is subject by an entire block of legality (this in turn ordinary and constitutional). Indeed, the common labor regulations fall within a philosophy of minimum benefits, ergo, surpassable by the parties, in order to harmonize the factors of production (Article 397 of the Labor Code), which even justifies the participation of laypersons in law, who come to resolve in conscience, that is, without subjection to clearly established parameters as has already happened, petitions of the most diverse quality and quantity. The experience of arbitration tribunals in matters of social economic conflicts has been plethoric in these recent years. It can even be added, as has been pointed out in specialized studies, that the use of this path was resorted to when others that had been used, for various reasons, ceased to be so. -* *XI. In the Chamber's opinion, then, Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution underpin the existence, in principle, of an employment regime governed by Public Law, within the public sector, as has been clear from the debate in the National Constituent Assembly and is incipiently embodied in the General Law of Public Administration. This public employment regime necessarily implies consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, already not only different from those of (private) labor law, but often opposed to them. Obviously, the declaration contained in this judgment covers the employment relationship that occurs between the public administration (or rather, administrations) and its servants, but in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that refers to a private employment regime, the solution must be different. In those cases, there would be a subjection to arbitration procedures, but with certain limitations, such as that laws, regulations, or government guidelines in force cannot be dispensed with or excepted in them, so that even in these cases, decisions (awards) in conscience would not be appropriate, nor tribunals formed by non-lawyer subjects. This declaration is formulated based on the legal powers that the Chamber has and is considered essential for the correct interpretation of the entirety of its decision. As unnecessary, a pronouncement on other aspects alleged in the action is omitted."* Of relevance, derived from what was said in the partially transcribed judgment, is the clear definition of the scope of the statutory system that regulates relations between the State and its servants, although with the very special connotations of not having been enacted as a comprehensive system. The Chamber ruled, on that occasion, on the unconstitutionality of the regulations that led to the settlement of collective labor disputes, through the route of conciliation and arbitration, declaring that awards (laudos) in the public sector are null.

b). - Judgment No. 3854-92 at fifteen hours forty-two minutes on December two, nineteen ninety-two.

Issued in an amparo action, it resolves the case in which the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement are challenged, against the exclusion that was made of certain officials and servants, due to their special link with the public entity. This precedent is invoked by the Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica as a precedent that supports the constitutional and legal principles that recognize collective bargaining agreements as having the force of law. The Chamber, indeed, in several case files has examined allegations for and against collective bargaining agreements, examining alleged aspects very punctually, but never resolving the issue of whether or not collective bargaining agreements are constitutional, as the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has now raised it.

c). - Judgment No. 3053-94 at nine hours forty-five minutes on June twenty-four, nineteen ninety-four.

The Procuraduría General de la República places special emphasis on this judgment and points out two specific aspects: that in it, the Chamber entered to expressly resolve the issue of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, and it is from this resolution that the judgment on the so-called "arbitration awards" is complemented. It was textually expressed:

*"SECOND. It is appropriate to partially grant the amparo requested by the appealing Union and without it being necessary to grant it a deadline to formalize an unconstitutionality action against the resolution of the Procuduría of June 24, 1991, which rejects the reconsideration requested by J.A.S.E.C.* of the opinion rendered on December 12, 1985: in a ruling issued at 3:30 p.m. on August 23, 1992, this Chamber resolved that workers, laborers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration may resort to the procedures for resolving collective conflicts of an economic and social nature provided for in articles 497 and following of the Labor Code. Thus, the regime is administrative, statutory, for "public servants," that is, for those who provide services to the administration or on behalf of and for the account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture; however, the General Law of Public Administration itself establishes that "the service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be" (General Law of Public Administration, article 112, subsection 2). It is not appropriate to grant, as it has already been resolved to the contrary in the aforementioned unconstitutionality action, the amparo requested regarding the denial of collective bargaining opposed to the "public servants" of JASEC. But it is appropriate to grant amparo to the appellant Union insofar as the Attorney General's Office resolution of June 24, 1993 (see folios 134 to 139), should have reconsidered ex officio the opinion rendered on December 12, 1985 (subsection b of article 3 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic) and distinguished between public officials and workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration, because subjecting all of them to the aforementioned prohibition contradicts the ruling cited several times and the guarantee provided for by article 62 of the Political Constitution, obviously on the understanding that the determination of the category of workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration is a matter of mere legality…" It may be noted that this Constitutional Chamber has indeed pronounced on the topic of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, in the terms that have been indicated in the transcriptions.

**IV.- PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC. -** In the report rendered to this Court, the Attorney General's Office of the Republic refers to three pronouncements that it directed, in order, to the Ministry of Justice and Grace, to the Executive Presidency of the Board of Port Administration and Economic Development of the Atlantic Slope (JAPDEVA), and to the Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of the Canton of Tibás. It is important for resolving the consultation to gloss these documents:

a). - C-161-98 of August 10, 1998.

The Attorney General's Office of the Republic is asked to reconsider previous opinions, in which it was indicated that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber prevents collective bargaining in the public sector, except in cases involving workers, laborers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration. The position maintained by the Attorney General's Office is confirmed and, for this purpose, it bases its opinion on judgment 3053-94, which is binding erga omnes, by virtue of the provisions of article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. It is added that the application of the Regulation for Collective Bargaining for Public Servants, approved by Agreement of the Government Council, in Ordinary Session No. 25 of October 6, 1992, published in La Gaceta No. 45 of March 5, 1993, is possible, to the extent that restrictions not present in the private regime must be observed, such as aspects that have an impact on the budgets of public entities and all of this subjected to superior control, because it was not affected by the pronouncements of the Constitutional Chamber.

b). - C-260-98 of December 3, 1998.

The Attorney General's Office of the Republic is asked which are the organs of the Decentralized Public Administration that participate in public management and how the official who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement is defined. The Attorney's opinion indicates that JAPDEVA "is an autonomous entity of the State, with the character of a public utility enterprise, located, according to national doctrine, within the enterprise - public entity, which develops as its exclusive or principal activity that of an enterprise. It is the economic public entity." Then the report refers to the judgments of this Chamber, commenting on the legal scope of articles 3, 111, and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, the national doctrine related to the topic, regarding the definition of which administrations are subject to the public regime and which are not, of who participates in the public management of the administration and who does not. In its conclusions, it indicates that the jurisprudence of this Chamber permits arbitration awards and collective bargaining agreements in State enterprises, which is reinforced and complemented by articles 111 and 112 cited above, but warning, yes, that the possibility of negotiation cannot be unrestricted, and must respect, for example, the limitations required to harmonize public spending with budgetary availability and that laws, regulations, or governmental directives in force cannot be dispensed with or made exceptions to.

c). - C-044-99 of February 22, 1999.

A consultation is made regarding the validity of a clause incorporated in 1990, but whose extension was not approved by the parties in 1993. Clearly, it is expressed in this opinion that the topic of distinction, to define whether or not a collective bargaining agreement is appropriate in the public sector, lies in the examination of the nature of the service provided by the individual, for the purpose of establishing whether or not they participate in public management; based on that placement, the legal fields of the relations between workers and the State are delimited for these purposes, so that if the relationship is statutory, it will be subject to Public Law, and in the opposite case, it will be governed by Labor Law. The conclusion of the opinion is contained in the following basic concept: "there is no legal basis to conclude, in the future, collective bargaining agreements in the public sector (with the exception made in relation to laborers or workers of State enterprises or economic services)." As a complement, the Attorney General's Office of the Republic points out that it does not ignore the existence of collective bargaining agreements that are being applied and whose validity is in question, but that they cannot be formally challenged, except through the unconstitutionality action. In summary of what has been said in this recital: the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, in the report to this Chamber in the file of the consultation now being resolved, reiterates its position that it has been maintaining in previous opinions, according to what has been expressed in the preceding lines, which is a historical synthesis of a legal position long held.

**V.- THE CONVENTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO).-** In the brief submitted to the Chamber by the Union of Employees of the National Bank of Costa Rica, it states that collective bargaining agreements in general, and those of the public sector, with the scope that report confers on them, are recognized in the principal conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and it refers, specifically, to the conventions distinguished by numbers 87, 98, 135, and 151, which, for the purposes of this consultation, the Chamber examines individually:

a). - Convention No. 87 “concerning freedom of association and protection of the right to organize.” This convention was adopted at the Thirty-First Meeting held in the City of San Francisco, from June 17 to July 10, 1948; it entered into force on July 4, 1950; it was approved in Costa Rica by Law 2561 of May 11, 1960, and regarding its content and for the purposes of the topic under analysis, the union SEBANA indicates that it contains four guarantees and two safeguard clauses, which in order are:

- the right of workers and employers to form trade union organizations, as well as to affiliate with them (article 2); - political, statutory, administrative, and programmatic autonomy and the duty of the public authorities to refrain from any intervention tending to limit this right or to impede its legal exercise (article 3); - special protection for trade union organizations against administrative dissolution or suspension, which is prohibited (article 4); - the free right of trade union associations to form and affiliate with federations and confederations and with international organizations of workers and employers (article 5); - the first safeguard clause is that contained in article 7, by virtue of which the exercise of the rights contained in articles 2, 3, and 4 may not be conditioned in any way; - and the second, which regulates the measures that local legislation may take in defense of public order and legality (the relationship of articles 8, 10, and 11).

In reality, the text of the convention has great relevance, to the extent that it proclaims freedom of association; but the Chamber does not find in this document the express enunciation of the right to conclude collective bargaining agreements in the public sector; abstraction is made, for now, of the exercise carried out by Nombre128357 to affirm that there can be no freedom of association if there is no legal possibility of signing collective labor agreements, regardless of whether the union belongs to the public or private sector, which will be analyzed later.

b). - Convention No. 98 “concerning the application of the principles of the right to organize and to bargain collectively.” Adopted at the Thirty-Second Meeting, held in Geneva, on June 8, 1949; it entered into force on July 18, 1951; it was also approved by Law No. 2561 of May 11, 1960, and regarding its content, Nombre128357 refers expressly to articles 5 and 6, to indicate that the first establishes the general principle that defers to the national legislation of each State, with regard to the application of the convention to the armed forces and the police, a clause that is also contained in the previous convention; and referring to the following article, which literally provides: "This Convention does not deal with the situation of public servants in the administration of the State and shall not be interpreted, in any way, to the detriment of their rights or their status." The union comments that this norm has been the subject of several analyses in the ILO, because many governments have understood it in the sense that the collective bargaining agreement is not possible in the public sector, which goes beyond the rationale of the provision. In other words, Nombre128357 understands that the ILO, upon examining article 6 of the convention, gives a restricted scope to the limitation, to lead to the interpretation of the need to differentiate between officials who carry out activities proper to the administration of the State, from the other government employees, to conclude that the restriction "(…) would only affect those public officials or leaders who represent the Administration of the State and its institutions and who act as organs of power of those administrations, by virtue of the organic relationship that binds them to the Administration." c). - Convention No. 135 “concerning protection and facilities to be afforded to workers' representatives in the undertaking.” Adopted at the Fifty-Sixth Meeting, held in Geneva from June 2 to 23, 1971; it was approved by Law 5968 of November 9, 1976. Although cited in its brief by Nombre128357, no express reference or any analysis is made of it. However, it is important to highlight that it is conceived to provide union representatives with effective protection against any act that may harm them in the exercise of that representation, provided they act in accordance with the laws, collective contracts, or other common agreements in force (art. 1) and therefore, in addition to the convention, in the same Law, Recommendation No. 142 was approved, concerning protection and facilities to be afforded to workers' representatives in the undertaking, agreed upon at the General Conference of the International Labor Organization, which is summarized in the content of its article 5, which literally provides: "Workers' representatives in the undertaking should enjoy effective protection against any act that may harm them, including dismissal based on their status as workers' representatives, their activity as such representatives, their affiliation to the union, or their participation in trade union activity, provided that said representatives act in accordance with the laws, collective contracts, or other common agreements in force." - The topic serves as a basis for affirming that not allowing collective bargaining agreements in the public sector implies a way of hindering the free exercise of union representation.

d). - Convention No. 151 “concerning protection of the right to organise and procedures for determining conditions of employment in the public service.” It was adopted at the Sixty-Fourth Meeting, held in Geneva from June 7 to 28, 1978; it has not been approved by the Legislative Assembly and, consequently, has not been ratified by Costa Rica. From the document, for the purposes of this judgment, the paragraphs and articles that are transcribed and commented upon are extracted:

*"Recalling that the Convention on the right to organise and to bargain collectively, 1949, does not apply to certain categories of public employees and that the Convention and the Recommendation on workers' representatives, 1971, apply to workers' representatives in the undertaking;* *Noting the considerable expansion of the services provided by the public administration in many countries and the need for sound labor relations between public authorities and public employees' organisations;* *Observing the great diversity of the political, social and economic systems of the Member States and the different practices applied by said States (for example, with regard to the respective functions of central and local authorities; the functions of federal, state, and provincial authorities; those of enterprises owned by the State and of the various types of autonomous and semi-autonomous public bodies, or as regards the nature of the employment relationship);* *Taking into account the particular problems raised by the delimitation of the scope of application of an international instrument and the adoption of definitions for the purposes of the instrument by reason of the differences existing in many countries between public employment and private employment, as well as the difficulties of interpretation that have arisen regarding the application to public servants of the relevant provisions of the Convention on the right to organise and to bargain collectively, 1949, and the observations by which the ILO supervisory bodies have noted on several occasions that certain governments have applied said provisions in such a way that large groups of public employees have been excluded from the scope of application of the Convention (…)"* From this content of the recital part of the Convention and from the doctrine of Labor Law, the Chamber understands that the following initial conclusions are derived: a) that collective labor law finds its ratio legis in the worker's need to group together, to counteract the inferiority in which they find themselves vis-à-vis the employer, and for that reason its legal basis is found in the right of association and more specifically, in the right to unionize; b) that in this branch of Law, two institutions are vital: collective labor agreements and collective conflicts; c) that collective labor law is innovative material in the history of social claims and is structured as an institution of international relevance, starting from the ILO conventions of 1948 and 1949; d) that in the sense of the evolution over time of legal institutions, and as is a general principle of collective labor law, the right to collective bargaining is not applicable to the universe of public employees, for which reason it has become necessary to elevate to the category of an international norm the content of Convention No. 151 of the International Labor Organization. Let us now look at the main normative provisions of the Convention, as they pertain to this consultation:

- **Article 1.-** indicates that the Convention shall apply to all employees of the public administration, and it is for national legislation to determine to what extent the coverage extends to high-level employees (with decision-making power or managerial positions or who perform confidential functions); - **Article 8.-** indicates, in general terms, that the settlement of disputes that arise regarding the determination of conditions of employment shall be resolved through negotiation between the parties or through independent and impartial procedures, such as mediation, conciliation, and arbitration; - **Article 9.-** provides that public employees, like other workers, shall enjoy the civil and political rights necessary for the normal exercise of freedom of association, subject only to the obligations deriving from their status and the nature of their functions; - **Article 11.-** in its first paragraph, expresses that the convention is binding only on the members of the ILO whose ratifications have been registered by the Director General; From the norms glossed, it can be seen, in summary, that the Convention is considered by the ILO as a necessity to promote the equalization of public administration employees or servants to the same condition as private enterprise employees, vis-à-vis the legal institution of the collective bargaining agreement, and article 11.1 is particularly clear, in defining the binding force of the Convention over time and determining the obligated subjects, making that binding force dependent on the ratification of the same Convention. In synthesis: the four ILO Conventions that have been cited are the international documents of greatest relevance and that frame the legal environment of collective bargaining agreements as one of the instruments of Collective Labor Law.

**VI.- DOCTRINE ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, ACCORDING TO THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SEBANA UNION.** The topic of collective bargaining agreements is one that has been profusely dealt with in Labor Law; it is included within the general theory that makes up the branch called collective labor law, whose main constituent institutions are professional associations (trade union law), collective labor agreements, and collective conflicts. In setting forth its arguments, the Union of Employees of the National Bank of Costa Rica contests the resolution of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, by means of which the consultation now being resolved is formulated, and from which the arguments lodging the doubt of constitutionality are extracted; the questioning is summarized in affirming that there is no norm in the constitutional and administrative legal order that authorizes collective bargaining agreements as instruments for regulating working conditions in the public sector.

The conclusions of the Union, presented as an opposing thesis to that affirmed by the consulting Chamber, while also contradicting the jurisprudential precedents of this Tribunal and the opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República, are the following: a) that public servants are ordinary, common workers and therefore, protected by the Chapter on Social Guarantees of the Political Constitution; as a consequence of the foregoing, any limitation on the enjoyment of those rights and guarantees is contrary to the principle of legality and the fundamental values of the person; b) that the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) is a social right and as such, is influenced by the aims pursued by the principles contained in Articles 50 and 74 of the Constitution; c) that freedom of association (libertad sindical) is inherent to any democratic regime (there is no democracy without freedom of association) and, furthermore, the right to organize is inextricably linked to the right to collective bargaining and collective agreement, which derives, in the case of the Costa Rican legal regime, from the contents of Articles 60 and 62 of the Constitution; d) the constitutional norms recognize, without further ado, the right to collective bargaining agreements, without any distinction whatsoever, and therefore, the harmonious interpretation of the Constitution and the norms and principles of Labor Law must be oriented toward broadly recognizing that right and not unjustifiably restricting it to the detriment of a labor category that also requires the protection of the collective labor agreement. In conclusion: for Nombre128357, Article 62 of the Political Constitution fulfills the requirement of the principle of legality in this matter; the denial of that right is discriminatory and contrary to the principle of equality, the principle of the Rule of Law, and the Democratic principle. And it concludes by affirming that the right to collective bargaining in the public administration also has a reinforced character in our legal system, since it derives from the ILO Conventions, which have been analyzed in the preceding recital (considerando). This synthesis of the Union's arguments is what must be examined to arrive at the conclusions of this ruling.

**VII.- CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION. -** The issue of the possibility of applying the institution of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, as it has been raised by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in this case file (expediente), as analyzed in the report presented to this Chamber by the Procuraduría General de la República, and as deduced from the arguments expressed by the interested Union, must now be studied from the perspective of constitutional interpretation. To understand the context in which the problem posed is analyzed, it is important to recall certain basic postulates that the doctrine of Constitutional Law has consistently developed regarding its controlling function: a) the Constitution, from a formal point of view, is composed of a normative set or complex, which requires that its provisions be interpreted in a coordinated manner, as part of a fully cohesive legal system; that is, the norms must be considered as a whole and not individually; b) in the exercise of the competence of constitutional review, the principle of constitutional supremacy is always present; the Constitution is the supreme norm upon which the entire legal and political order of the State is founded; c) the Constitution contains, expressly or tacitly, a series of principles, some of them called general principles of constitutional Law, which radiate their light throughout the entire legal structure of the State; d) the Constitution contains or presupposes fundamental values; e) constitutional norms are considered within the aims, values, and principles of the State, such that they tend to have generality and openness sufficient to enable diverse options and realizations, which is equivalent to affirming that various solutions can be considered, although not all of them are compatible with the Law of the Constitution. Based on these essential notes for constitutional interpretation; on the foundation of the doctrinal criteria set forth by the parties involved in the consultation, the cited jurisprudential precedents of this Chamber itself, and the conventions of the International Labour Organization, the Chamber arrives at the following premises of the judgment:

**First:** It admits, as a general theory of Collective Labor Law, that this is mainly integrated by a trilogy of rights that seek to make reality and provide a solution to the need of workers to group together to compensate for the inferiority in which they find themselves when acting in isolation, vis-à-vis the employer and vis-à-vis the minimal legislation protecting their rights; these are the right to organize (derecho a la sindicación), to collective bargaining agreements (convención colectiva), and to collective conflicts (conflictos colectivos). But it confirms, indeed, its own judgment No. 1696-92 of 3:30 p.m. on August 23, 1992, to indicate that the genesis of the express incorporation of these rights into our constitutional regime is found in the modification of the 1871 Constitution that occurred during the legislative terms of 1942 and 1943, when the incorporation of the Chapter of Social Guarantees into the Political Constitution was approved, which was done under special political, social, and economic conditions that were different from the vision held by the Constituent Assembly when promulgating the current Political Constitution. One of the aims pursued with the new constitutional text that was approved – possibly one that generated the most discussion – was that of including the "constitutional conception of a public labor regime, exclusive to State servants, in order to regulate and resolve the diverse situations affecting that relationship," the primary foundations of which are found in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution. From this it is inferred, for the sake of achieving maximum clarity in this judgment, that what was expressed in the aforementioned jurisprudential precedent should be reiterated, in the part referring to the special circumstance that there are two extremes or sets of rules in labor matters: one regulated by the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and the other, regulated by Public Law.

**Second:** Starting from the immediate previous conclusion, it is also reaffirmed that the relationship between the State and public servants, as a thesis of principle and with the exceptions to be stated later, is a relationship called public or statutory employment, which, as such, is regulated by Public Law; consequently, there cannot exist a relationship of equality or equivalence between the parties involved, as ideally should happen in a labor relationship of contractual origin, principally because the Public Administration represents a general interest, due to the need for continuity in the provision of public services, and due to the limitations imposed by budgetary regulations. In other words, the servant under the public employment regime is, in relation to the Administration, in a state of subjection; the Administration can unilaterally impose the conditions of the organization and provision of the service to guarantee the public good, which eliminates the possibility that the relationship be considered from a perspective of equivalence of rights susceptible to negotiation between the parties. This conclusion entails that the possibility of collective bargaining in the public sector cannot be recognized, since the very idea of negotiation, as a suitable means to review and approve the conditions of public employment, conflicts with the essential postulates of the State's organization, which in this field were introduced in Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution.

**Third:** The position that the Chamber has been holding has been the one that has historically prevailed in Costa Rica. Thus, the legal impossibility of collective bargaining in the public sector was declared by the judgment of the Court of Cassation (Sala de Casación) No. 58 of 3:00 p.m. on July 20, 1951. In May 1953 and December 1954, the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) and its Regulations were enacted, and in interpreting their contents—constitutional and legal—the Procuraduría General de la República repeatedly held the thesis of the legal impossibility of collective bargaining. In 1979, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) came into force, which establishes, with complete clarity, that Administrative Law applies to service relations between the State and its servants, excluding from the relationship the labor legislation, to which only those servants who do not participate in public management may resort (see, in this regard and in Recital IV of this judgment, the most recent pronouncements, which are a synthesis of the reiterated opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República). In 1980, the Government Council prohibited, by way of a directive, the conclusion of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector; subsequently, in 1986, it authorized a mechanism for approving extensions to collective bargaining agreements predating the General Law of Public Administration, which later, in 1992, was transformed into the so-called Regulation for Collective Bargaining of Public Servants (Reglamento de Negociación Colectiva de los Servidores Públicos). Finally, in judgment No. 1696-92 from this Chamber, the unconstitutionality of the mechanisms of direct settlement (arreglo directo), conciliation (conciliación), and arbitration (arbitraje) was declared.

**Fourth:** To understand the above, it is important to highlight what the Procuraduría General de la República has already stated in this regard, in the development of national doctrine, to the effect that "public officials are those who provide services to the Administration on its behalf and account, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence from the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character of the respective activity (Article 111, subsection 1 of the General Law of Public Administration). These servants, in accordance with what has been stated, are unable to bargain collectively, because their relationship is governed by Public Law (Article 112, subsection 1 id.). For their part, from the interrelation of Articles 112 subsection 2) and 111 subsection 3) (a rule to which the first refers, both from the same Law) it is also clear that those who are not officials subject to the public employment regime, but rather laborers (obreros), workers (trabajadores), and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, the employees of State enterprises or economic services entrusted with activities subject to common Law, who, in accordance with the transcribed Article 112 subsection 2), are governed by Labor Law and not by Public Law, are authorized to bargain collectively.

**Fifth:** The Chamber considers that the position that, in the historical development of the institution of collective bargaining agreements, the Procuraduría General de la República has been holding in its report to this Chamber is legally compatible with the Law of the Constitution, especially, starting from judgment number 3053-94 of 9:45 a.m. on June 24, 1994, in which it was expressed in the second recital, transcribed earlier, that "this Chamber resolved that laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration may resort to the procedures for resolving collective conflicts of an economic and social nature provided for in Articles 497 and following of the Labor Code. Thus, the regime is administrative, statutory, for 'public servants', that is, for those who provide services to the administration or on its behalf and account, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture; however, the General Law of Public Administration itself establishes that 'the service relations with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be'." Consequently, and based on this constitutional interpretation and the texts contained in the General Law of Public Administration, in the public sector, only those servants who do not participate in public management may enter into collective labor agreements, such that entities with an employment regime of a laboral (non-public) nature, such as, for example, State enterprises, regarding which national doctrine has stated that they are "those that function as if they were private enterprises, because they sell and do the same as private individuals; for example, the INS itself, when it sells policies, does the same as any insurance company, the banks, when they make loans, do the same as a common financial entity, the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, which sells electric energy, sells it under the same conditions in which a private company could sell it," among others, can indeed bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions that inform Collective Labor Law.

**Sixth:** Notwithstanding what has been expressed, it is important to clarify that even in the public sector where the application of the institution of collective bargaining agreements is constitutionally possible, that is to say, in the so-called State enterprises or economic services and in those personnel groups of public institutions and entities where the nature of the services provided does not involve participation in public management, within the terms of subsection 2 of Article 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, the Chamber repeats and confirms its jurisprudence to the effect that the authorization to negotiate cannot be unrestricted, that is, comparable to the situation in which any private employer would find itself, since through this channel, current laws, regulations, or governmental directives cannot be waived or excepted, nor can laws that grant or regulate the competencies of public entities, attributed by reason of normative hierarchy or the special conditions of the Public Administration with respect to its workers, be modified or repealed, a conclusion that is inferred from Article 112 subsection 3) of the General Law of Public Administration and from Recital XI of judgment No. 1696-92 from this Chamber.

**Seventh:** All these conclusions are also based on the doctrine derived from the conventions of the International Labour Organization; however, the Chamber finds it very useful to warn that it is so clear that the generalization of the possibility of negotiating collective bargaining agreements in the public sector has been only an aspiration of the workers, and as such, subject to restrictive interpretation, that the International Labour Organization itself has promoted adherence to Convention No. 151 concerning the protection of the right to organize and procedures for determining conditions of employment in the public administration. The purposes of this convention are to promote the general and unrestricted recognition of collective labor bargaining in the public sector. But in our current legal organization, for the scope of the Convention to be potentially applicable, its principles and norms must be compatible with those of the Political Constitution, and by virtue of what has been stated in this judgment, there exists, until now, a bar of the highest rank to the acceptance of the institution of collective bargaining agreements throughout the public sector, a bar rooted in the lack of a norm of a rank superior to ordinary law that would permit the application of the institution throughout the public sector, making it compatible with the principles and values of the Political Constitution. The articulation of the institution of collective bargaining with the national legal system cannot be done solely from the point of view of the interests of the public sector servants; it must also be done based on the necessary examination of Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution, as has already been stated.

**VIII.- CONCLUSIONS.-** Based on all the foregoing and as a synthesis, the Chamber arrives at the following conclusions: in the exercise of its competence as the ultimate interpreter of the Political Constitution, when examining the topic of the administrative organization and structure of the State and the appropriateness or not of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, the Chamber cannot limit itself solely to the application of the provisions that make up the Chapter of the so-called "Social Guarantees". It is also necessary to examine that legal institution in coordination with the principles contained in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution; upon performing this exercise, the full conviction is acquired that the will of the constituent power, following the historical line of development of the institutions of Labor Law, was to abstract public sector servants from the general rules that inform Collective Labor Law, subjecting them to a special public employment relationship, also commonly called a "statutory relationship (relación estatutaria)", which is governed by Public Law. This implies, without a doubt and as a general thesis, that no public official can negotiate their conditions of employment as if it were a contractual nexus subject to Labor Law. However, the development of legal ideas, the adoption of the conventions promoted by the International Labour Organization, and the jurisprudence of this Chamber have led the evolution of the institutions involved to the level of admitting, as compatible with the Law of the Constitution, the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the category of employees and servants who, despite being part of the public sector, govern their relations by Labor Law, especially in the terms of the definitions contained in Articles 111 and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, that is, when dealing with State enterprises or economic services entrusted with activities subject to common Law, as well as service relations with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration and who are governed by Labor or Commercial Law, as the case may be. It is in this sense that the consultation is addressed, but warning, indeed, that it corresponds to the Administration itself, to legal practitioners in general, and ultimately to the Judge, when hearing specific cases, to determine whether a State institution or a group of its servants or officials constitute the core of the exception that can indeed bargain collectively, or if, on the contrary, that path is prohibited to them. And finally, according to what the Procuraduría General de la República has expressed in its report, which this Chamber also accepts, the personnel working in the Municipalities of the country are restricted from collective bargaining, in the terms of this judgment, since, unless proven otherwise, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship. Given the effects of this judgment, in accordance with the provisions of Article 107 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), it is important to note that it will be for the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice to determine whether the relationship of the plaintiff in the Ordinary Labor Trial, Nombre100510, with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, was regulated by Public Law or by common Law. The judgment is declarative and retroactive to the date of entry into force of each collective bargaining agreement in the public sector that is sought or intended to be applied, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91 of the same Law, the Chamber proceeds to dimension the retroactive effects of the judgment to the date of publication of its summary in La Gaceta, a date as of which the effects must cease for all servants for whom the Law of the Constitution has prohibited the possibility of entering into collective bargaining agreements. Magistrate Arguedas dissents (salva el voto) and declares that collective bargaining agreements entered into in the public sector are not unconstitutional per se. Magistrate Solano dissents regarding the dimensionalization, so that the effective date of this judgment should be from the expiration of the term of each collective bargaining agreement. Magistrates Piza and Molina append separate notes.

**POR TANTO** The consultation formulated by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice is addressed in the following sense: a) are unconstitutional the collective bargaining agreements regulated by Articles 54 and following of the Labor Code that are entered into in the public sector, when dealing with personnel governed by the employment relationship of a public nature (statutory relationship); b) are not unconstitutional the collective bargaining agreements entered into in the public sector, when entered into by laborers, workers, officials, or employees of the public sector whose labor relations are regulated by common Law; c) equally compatible with the Law of the Constitution are the collective instruments that have been negotiated and have been extended or modified, in application of the general policy on collective bargaining agreements in the Public Sector, unless it concerns negotiations with personnel under an employment relationship of a public nature, in which case those instruments are unconstitutional; d) it is for the administration and the judges hearing labor trials, as applicable, regarding the application of the collective bargaining agreements, to determine whether the workers involved, given the nature of the functions they perform or performed, are regulated by Public Law or common Law, for the purpose of defining whether or not they may be active subjects in the application of the collective bargaining agreements. This judgment is declarative and retroactive to the date of entry into force of the respective Collective Bargaining Agreement, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Notwithstanding, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the effects of the judgment are dimensionalized to the date of publication of its summary in La Gaceta. Let it be summarized in La Gaceta and published in full in the Judicial Bulletin. Let it be communicated and notified.

**R. E. PIZA E.** **President** **Luis Fernando Solano C.** **Luis Paulino Mora M.** **Eduardo Sancho G.** Carlos M. Arguedas R.

José Luis Molina Q..

Gilbert Armijo S.

ES/mm/00 **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE SOLANO CARRERA** The undersigned Magistrate records that he has concurred with the substance of what was resolved by the Chamber, but disagrees and separates from what was ordered therein, because he considers that a special dimensioning must be given to the effects of judgment No. 4453-2000, just as was done with what was resolved in judgment No. 1696-92 (judgment on arbitration awards (laudos) in the public sector).

Indeed, I believe that in the manner that the Chamber ordered for arbitration awards (laudos) on that occasion, given the nature of collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas), the pronouncement regarding their unconstitutionality cannot have the retroactive effects that the system normally grants in these cases. I also think that doing so through the formula used by the majority of Magistrates, in the sense that the judgment takes effect from its publication in La Gaceta, is insufficient, due to the sudden or surprising tone it contains. For that very reason, I believe that criteria of justice and equity must be used here, once again, to maintain the full application of current collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) until the very date of expiration of the term contemplated by them, so that their extinction is gradual, tempering the impact that this pronouncement signifies in any way, while, as I understand has been happening for some time, the legislative process for the approval of Conventions of the International Labour Organization is concluded, which would have the virtue of regularizing matters relating to this subject.

In that sense, I explain my dissenting vote.

**Luis Fernando Solano Carrera** **Magistrate** **SEPARATE NOTE OF MAGISTRATES PIZA ESCALANTE AND MOLINA QUESADA:** We have concurred with the majority vote in compliance with the provisions of Conventions No. 87, 98, 135, and 151 of the I.L.O., but we cannot refrain from expressing our concern that in the public sector, whatever the nature of the entity in question, even if there is only State participation in its ownership or that of its shares, the service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees governed by labor or common law do not imply, as in the private sector, a real distinction of interests and risks; the employer has broad powers of action and negotiation, whereas in the public sector, the managerial side is subject to Public Law limitations that strongly diminish its negotiating capacity and completely eliminate its stake to lose, which is a fundamental ingredient of private business. Lastly, we are concerned that collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) for workers subject to the private law regime produce inequalities compared to properly designated public officials, who lack that instrument, thus accentuating existing inequalities among employees of different institutions.

R.E. Piza E. José Luis Molina Q.

Res: 2000-04453 **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE ARGUEDAS RAMIREZ** I dissent from the majority's criterion, and, instead, I opine that collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) entered into in the public sector are not unconstitutional *per se*.

**I.-** The essential reason for my disagreement has to do with the interpretation my colleagues make of the meaning and scope of constitutional articles 191 and 192 regarding their impact on the scope of the right to collective bargaining in the public sector and, more specifically, the right to collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) in this sector.

**II.-** I will begin by emphasizing that the majority goes back, in considering this matter, to the fact that even before the current Constitution, the rights to unionization (sindicación), to collective bargaining agreements (convención colectiva), and to collective conflicts had already achieved constitutional recognition in the Constitution of 1871. In the majority's view, the incorporation in the current Constitution of articles 191 and 192 founded a public employment regime that now prevents recognizing what was previously recognized as a right (and, I say, necessarily as a fundamental right), that is, the possibility of collective bargaining in the public sector; according to this criterion, from now on, the very idea of negotiation, as an ideal means to review and approve public employment conditions, clashes with the essential postulates of the State's organization.

**III.-** I infer from this conclusion that, in my colleagues' opinion, the current Constitution simply excluded from the public sector the guarantee of a right that, before this was done, had already been added to the list of rights recognized by the State also for public servants, i.e., the workers located in that sector. I do not see in what the majority said anything indicating that this exclusion was reached due to the deliberate purpose (that is, voluntary and intentional) of the 1949 constituent legislator to curtail the coverage of those rights, or to deny their exercise to certain persons or servants. On the contrary, regarding the fundamental rights of public servants, my opinion is that, in a general sense, the constituent legislator was driven by the purpose of protecting their rights: article 192 betrays this. But to my colleagues, this curtailment seems evident and inevitable due to the very nature of the statutory regime of public employment, as conceived in articles 191 and 192, which, according to them, exposes the public servant to suffering or enduring (that is, passively) the working conditions unilaterally imposed by the State, without the possibility of participating in or influencing the determination of those conditions through negotiation, all for the public good.

**IV.-** I note, to begin with, that the prevailing criterion in this case has something paradoxical about it. In effect, the Chamber, when dealing with the issue of strikes in the public sector (in judgment No. 1317-98 of ten hours and twelve minutes on February twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-eight), opened the possibility, formerly nonexistent, for public servants to resort to legal strikes. How can it now be explained that while these servants can carry out legal strikes, they themselves find the path to resolving their disputes before or after the state of strike through collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) or other binding negotiation modalities forbidden, when collective bargaining, as is known, is the most logical and civilized way to end collective conflicts of an economic-social nature that occur in the sphere of labor relations?

**V.-** The unsolvable contradiction that the majority deduces from the provisions of articles 191 and 192 with respect to the recognition of the rights to collective bargaining and to collective bargaining agreements (convención colectiva) is obtained, evidently, from their own interpretation of those articles, since, as I have mentioned, there is no indication that such a thing was a voluntary and intentional decision of the constituent legislator itself, nor is it literally expressed in the text of the Constitution. I admit that the letter of article 191 is emphatic when it says that **a civil service statute will regulate the relations between the State and public servants.** That is, I do not doubt that the constituent legislator wanted to give employment relations in the public sector a **primarily** statutory configuration. But under the sign of the "State of fundamental rights" that characterizes the order of things proposed by the Constitution, markedly after the creation of this court in 1989, it seems to me that the interpreter of the Constitution cannot fail to notice the growing significance and incidence of those rights in the regulation of the State's organization and its relations with public servants, and in the modulation or nuance that this influence works on the matter devised by the 1949 constituent legislator, which, consequently, to interpret it properly must be exposed today in the light of those rights and their requirements. It seems to me that the interpreter cannot fail to notice this, unless they petrify the Constitution, as if with respect to the evolution and current meaning of fundamental rights little or nothing had happened since the constituent act.

**VI.-** From this perspective, it bears repeating that the rights at issue here, involved in the question of constitutionality that has been brought before the Chamber, belong to the category of fundamental labor rights. That we are in the presence of this class of rights seems to me beyond all doubt. Thus, for example, the International Labour Organization, one of whose obligations (adopted at the General Conference in May 1944) is "to achieve the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining," includes in its "Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work" (adopted by the General Conference in June 1998), as a category of such rights, "freedom of association and trade union freedom and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining." **VII.-** Now then: these rights, as the Chamber itself has recognized in reiterated jurisprudence, due to their character as **fundamental,** are inherent to the human being by their condition as such, accompany them by their character as a **person,** and are therefore superior to the State itself: the State does not create or regulate them with a constitutive effect, but rather recognizes, protects, and guarantees them normatively, but with a purely declaratory character. Hence, the legal system can protect them and shape their exercise, but not eliminate or disregard them with the simple invocation that the requirements of the State's organization, or the efficiency of the administration, or an imprecise public good demand it; all because they hold a status and force superior to the legal system itself.

**VIII.-** Certainly, as the Chamber has also said, fundamental rights are not unrestricted or absolute; they may be subject to certain limitations imposed by the legal system, in consideration of superior values and interests of the community; but those restrictions cannot reach the extreme of emptying them of content, which would indeed be contrary to all the ideology upon which the Constitution is based, as the superior catalog of fundamental rights.

**IX.-** I insist that in the case of the constitutional chapter relating to social guarantees, as the majority mentions, the rights included therein were already expressly incorporated into our legal regime since the modification introduced to the Constitution of 1871 in the legislatures of 1942 and 1943, which, it is worth highlighting, constitutes one of the greatest achievements recorded in the country's history in terms of protecting fundamental social rights, which, to a large extent, sustain the stability of the democratic regime we enjoy today.

**X.-** When the 1949 Constitution was enacted, this chapter of guarantees was reproduced, since the opposite would have implied an inadmissible setback from the point of view of fundamental rights, given that the evolution that these rights have been experiencing throughout history—from the consecration of the most essential public freedoms to the so-called third-generation rights, a trajectory that has had as its north the increasingly integral development and well-being of the human being, from their individual, social, economic, and cultural perspective—cannot conceive a setback in their normative protection, without that signifying an affront to their freedom and dignity.

**XI.-** In my opinion, currently articles 191 and 192 neither escape nor could they be removed from the influence of the fundamental right of public servants to participate, as much as possible, in the definition of their work regime. This is, it seems to me, the perception that gives rise to an essential disagreement with the majority of the tribunal. I already mentioned that these articles give the public employment regime a **primarily** statutory configuration, so that the State, through the procedures established for normative production (which do not, in themselves, exclude means of participation by the public servants themselves), fixes (in this sense, unilaterally) the conditions of public employment, but, as far as the State itself is concerned, "with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the public administration," which is the relevant justifying reason for the statutory nature of that regime: such provisions, by the force of the two cited articles, are imposed as non-disposable regulations of the legal employment regime, which, consequently, is not susceptible to being substituted, revoked, or altered by means of the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva).

**XII.-** Naturally, this constitutional option implies a severe limitation on the scope of the right to collective bargaining, but this restriction is, in my opinion, all that this right and its effective validity permits. I mean that the right is not extinguished, and the possibility of achieving supplementary regulation (not necessarily suppletory) of working conditions remains for negotiation, in areas, modalities, or aspects that the State refrained from unilaterally adding to the content of the legal framework of employment.

**XIII.-** Now then, all of the above does not imply that a specific collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) negotiated in the public sector cannot incur in defects that determine its invalidity, but that would be due to some illegality in the specific case, which may render the provisions contemplated therein inadmissible. That is why this dissenting vote has been noted in the judgment in the sense that "collective bargaining agreements (convenciones) in the public sector are not unconstitutional *per se*," because this fundamental right can be limited but not suppressed to the detriment of a specific group of persons, due to their status as public servants.

At this point, it is worth mentioning that, if there is a certain group of public officials who by definition cannot be beneficiaries of this type of collective agreements—for example, the senior officials (jerarcas) who hold the representation of the administration—it is not because they are deprived of this fundamental right, but rather because the position they hold at the time of collective bargaining gives rise to an evident incompatibility in granting any type of benefit in their favor, precisely because they are the ones who represent the state party in its character as employer, which clearly explains why they cannot take advantage of such an opportunity to "legislate" for their own benefit. In sum: the nuances that the exercise of this right may acquire in the case of the public sector stem, on the one hand, from limitations derived from the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) and the rules of public policy that govern the actions of the Administration, and secondly, from the guidelines and restrictions in force regarding budgetary matters and public spending (when it comes to clauses that contemplate economic benefits), since, due to the principle of budgetary legality (principio de legalidad presupuestaria)—which is indeed expressly enshrined in constitutional Article 180—no expenditure may be authorized or executed without the corresponding, duly approved, budgetary provision. Thus, the correct dimension that this constitutional right, enshrined in the chapter on social guarantees, must acquire in the case of the public sector is not that of a total curtailment for the servant, but rather an understanding that its exercise is subject to certain limitations in consideration of the observance of the legal system, the limits of public spending, and the corresponding regulations that exist in this field.

Carlos Ml. Arguedas R.

1696-92, arbitration procedures may be used, but with certain limitations, such as that laws cannot be dispensed with or excepted; second, that the consultation ignores judgment No. 3053-94 of 9:45 a.m. on June 24, 1994, in which the constitutionality of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector was analyzed; c) regarding the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber and the distinction made between public servants and those who do not qualify as such, it states that it is true that the issue was initially referred only to the matter of arbitration awards (laudos arbitrales); however, subsequent to Judgment 3053-94, the Constitutional Chamber extended the effects to collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) in the public sector, and in summary, two positions exist, depending on the nature of the relationship (public or labor) of the entity in question, as follows: 1) the situation of public servants is incompatible with the institution of the arbitration award and for collective bargaining agreements, by virtue of the provisions of articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, and according to the official opinion of this Attorney General's Office embodied in opinion C-161-98 of August 10, 1998, in which it is concluded that in relation to this personnel, the only legally feasible modality of negotiation is that established in the so-called "Reglamento de Negociación Colectiva para los Servidores Públicos" (Agreement of the Government Council from Ordinary Session No. 25 of October 6, 1992). In summary, it was expressed in the opinion and is now transcribed literally: "Such instrument (that contained in the Reglamento), is indisputably, very different from the collective bargaining agreement contemplated in the Labor Code (article 54 and following)(…) It is then expressed that the rulings of that Chamber '…what they disallowed for the case of public servants, was only the negotiation of employment conditions through the instrument called the Collective Labor Agreement (Convención Colectiva de Trabajo), regulated by the cited Third Chapter of our Code. So there is no legal impediment whatsoever for the special modality of negotiation for the public sector called "agreement" (convenio) (article 8 in fine of the cited regulatory body) to be used in practice. The foregoing, of course, on the understanding that the negotiations intended to be carried out fully conform to the provisions of the regulation, basically regarding the extremes that may be subject to negotiation… as well as the submission of what is agreed to the Control Commission referred to.'" Likewise, the Attorney General's Office indicates, its criterion has been that collective bargaining agreements are not permissible in Municipalities, for the same reasons expressed (see opinion C-044-99 of February 22, 1999). In conclusion, extensions or modifications of collective bargaining agreements are no longer possible in institutions where a public employment regime exists; 2) regarding the situation of those who are not public servants because they do not participate in public management, in the judgment of the Attorney General's Office (opinion C-260-98 of December 3, 1998), in institutions with an employment regime of a labor nature (not public), in accordance with the criteria set forth by the Constitutional Chamber and the relevant doctrine, it is indeed feasible to collectively negotiate employment conditions, but not in an unlimited manner, since, as has been said, laws, regulations, or governmental directives in force cannot be dispensed with or excepted. In conclusion, the Attorney General's Office of the Republic literally states:

"a.- The institution of the Collective Labor Agreement regulated in our Labor Code (article 54 and following), is not applicable in the case of employment relationships of a public nature (public servants); what is applicable there is the so-called 'Reglamento de Negociación Colectiva para los Servidores Públicos'.

b.- In the case of personnel who do not qualify as public servants (in the terms established in the General Law of Public Administration), the collective negotiation of employment conditions is indeed permissible; however, in the respective instrument, the laws, regulations, or governmental directives in force related to the negotiated extremes must be respected.

c.- Collective instruments that have been extended or modified in application of the Directives on Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Public Sector are also in accordance with the law; however, those covering personnel governed by an employment relationship of a public nature were disallowed by virtue of the rulings of that Chamber." **5.-** In response to the hearing granted, the Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in a brief filed at 1:55 p.m. on October 26, 1999 (folios 79 and following), essentially states that it develops the topic in three sections that aim to demonstrate that collective bargaining agreements in the public sector have a legal basis and are authorized in the most varied sources of the legal system, from the fundamental norms of the Political Constitution to ordinary legislation. It then develops the three sections, as follows: I.- The collective labor agreement is a social right enshrined in the Political Constitution, without distinction of any kind. It begins by affirming that social rights and guarantees are made up of individual and collective rights, which as a whole aspire to achieve a better distribution of national wealth and reach the values of social justice, principles contained in constitutional articles 50 and 74; that union freedom is consubstantial to any democratic regime and in doctrine is considered to constitute a genre, which comprises, in addition to the guarantee of association, the right to union activity, which is materialized in the right to collective bargaining and the self-protection measures of the labor collective; that is, the freedom recognized to workers to unionize is indissolubly linked to the right to collective negotiation or bargaining. It affirms that the collective bargaining agreement is the instrument that seeks the realization of the constitutional objective entrusted to union organizations in article 60 of the Political Constitution and that this norm makes no distinction based on the legal nature of the relationship. On the other hand, it cites national doctrine stating that "Art. 61 means that when the Constitution has wanted to deny a social guarantee –like the strike- it expressly so provides, just as, when it wants to grant it, it limits itself to enshrining it for all workers, without making distinctions. And art. 61 means, above all, express confirmation that the Constitution deems workers in public services to be beneficiaries of social guarantees, since otherwise it would not have expressly denied them the right to strike. All the social guarantees for workers contained in Title V –Single Chapter- of the Constitution are guarantees of public servants, as human beings in need of the protection that these guarantees provide, like other common workers, unless otherwise provided by the same Constitution, as has been done by art. 61 under discussion." Consequently, article 62 of the Constitution fulfills the requirement of the principle of legality and the denial of the right implies discriminatory treatment, contrary to the principle of equality; on the other hand, the principles of the Rule of Law and Democratic State support the recognition of the right in favor of public servants. Finally, it affirms that the constituent did not have in mind to suppress the social guarantees of public servants –except for the issue of strikes-. II.- The right to collective bargaining in the Public Administration also has a reinforced character in our legal system. It is affirmed that the collective bargaining agreement, including those of the public sector, are recognized in the main conventions on the matter of the International Labour Organization (Nos. 87 concerning freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, 98 concerning the application of the principles of the right to organize and to bargain collectively, 135 concerning the protection and facilities to be afforded to workers' representatives in the undertaking, 151 concerning the protection of the right to organize and procedures for determining conditions of employment in the public service and 154 concerning the promotion of collective bargaining). It then makes an analysis of the norms of interest, contained in the cited conventions. It clarifies that conventions 87 and 98 are ratified by Costa Rica and therefore, have the hierarchical rank stipulated by constitutional article 7, while 151 has not been, but nevertheless, has value as a supplementary source in light of what is established in article 15 of the Labor Code. From what has been said, it concludes that in our legal system, the only ones who would not have the right to enter into collective bargaining agreements would be public officials (strictu sensu), included in subsection 2 of article 1 of Convention 151, linked by an organic relationship with the Administration, and highlights the content of the pronouncements of the International Labour Organization, in which the country has been required, in application of Conventions and Recommendations, to comply with those contents. III.- The labor legal regime of employees of the commercial banks of the State.- It indicates that the distinction made by the General Law of Public Administration between public and private servants, "…could never justify or have the scope of being able to be correctly interpreted, in the sense that it excludes any category of public servants from the right to collective bargaining, except of course those public officials who assume the representation of the public management of the administration and hold the status of representatives of the constitutional bodies and other public institutions, who in our opinion are the only ones who would be deprived of that right." It then analyzes the legal nature of the commercial banks of the State, in light of the doctrine of decentralized entities and the process called the "Entrepreneurial State," starting from an examination of the content of article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration and alluding to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, which has referred to the commercial nature of the activity of public banks, to conclude with article 112 idem, pointing out that the law establishes a public employment regime for the servants of the Administration and a private or common employment regime, for the workers of the economic enterprises and services of the State, who do not participate in the public management of the Administration. According to the foregoing, it reaches the conclusion that the nature of the relationship of the servants of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica is labor-related and therefore, regulated by the Labor Code and therefore, they can enter into collective labor agreements. It highlights the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of June 14, 1984. Finally, it requests that the validity and constitutionality of the collective bargaining agreements entered into in the public sector be declared.

**6.-** Briefs were received in the file from the Sindicato de Trabajadores del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (folios 47 to 57); from the Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros, Químicos y Afines (folios 60 to 69); from the Sindicato de Empleados de la Universidad de Costa Rica and its representative as Coordinator of the Federación de Trabajadores de la Educación Superior (folio 73); from the Sindicato de Empleados del Consejo Nacional de Producción (folios 125 to 147); from the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional (folios 152 to 163), all of them referring to the topic, as well as briefs of support from the workers of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (folios 149 to 151 and 164 to 210).

**7.-** The legal formalities were complied with in the procedure.

Drafted by Magistrate **Sancho González**; and, **WHEREAS:** **I.- ON THE REASONS FOR THE CONSULTATION. -** The essential basis of the consultation is contained in the resolution of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at four ten p.m. on August eleventh, nineteen ninety-nine, in which it reads, in what is relevant:

"Having founded doubts about the possibility and legitimacy of entering into and, making eventual reforms to existing collective bargaining agreements in the public sector (…) given that there is no norm in the constitutional and administrative legal order that permits the concertation of this type of collective instruments, nor their substantive variations; nor are there principles of similar constitutional or legal rank that allow concerting and reforming, under the collective instrument in the Public Sector." (Whereas I) "(…) the constituent himself wanted to expressly differentiate the figure of the public employee from the private one, creating a Public Employment Regime, governed by the principles of Public Law (…) Said condition, characteristic of the Public Employment Regime, implies that public servants can only perform certain actions if they are authorized by a norm that empowers them to do so." (Whereas IV) "The Constitutional Chamber, in that vote, declared unconstitutional numerals 368 –second part- and 497 to 535 of the Labor Code, for violation of articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, insofar as they would apply to the public employment regime … " (Whereas VI) "From the careful study of that Vote, it is inferred that the Constitutional Chamber declared unconstitutional the holding of direct settlements (arreglos directos) and conciliations, by State servants, subject to the public employment regime; as well as arbitration procedures (…) Under a purely legal perspective, we consider that if the primary reason for proceeding to declare the unconstitutionality of Arbitration Awards, Direct Settlements, and Conciliations, within the Public Employment Regime, was the lack of norms authorizing those procedures in the Public Administration, the same occurs with Collective Bargaining Agreements … " (Whereas VII) "Therefore, the Chamber estimates that, as of Vote No. 1696-92 of the Constitutional Chamber, all collective bargaining agreements agreed upon within the Public Sector, that do not refer to laborer workers or to employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, when the same are contracted by the State in accordance with its capacity to act under Private Law -articles 3 and 111 of the cited General Law-, are unconstitutional, as well as the reforms introduced to them, because there is no provision whatsoever that permits such reforms, nor any principle, of constitutional or legal rank, from which such normative authorization can be obtained…" (Whereas VIII) **II.- APPEARANCE OF UNION ASSOCIATIONS IN THE FILE.-** As indicated in the resultandos of this judgment, in addition to the legitimized parties, by reason of having been granted a hearing, the Sindicato de Trabajadores del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (folio 47), jointly, the Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros, Químicos y Afines (folio 60), also jointly, the Sindicato de Empleados de la Universidad de Costa Rica and the Federación de Trabajadores de la Educación Superior (folio 73), the Sindicato de Empleados del Consejo Nacional de Producción (folio 125), and the Secretary General of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional (folio 152) appeared in the file. All have submitted briefs supporting their opinions on the subject of the consultation and the Chamber has incorporated them into the file, but it cannot refer to those allegations, due to the special nature of the consultation process. This is limited to the parties expressly indicated by law, and which in this specific case, is only the Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, which is the union entity that signed the collective bargaining agreement that serves as the base matter of the consultation process.

**III.- JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER ON THE TOPIC. -** In the consultation and the arguments of the parties, the judgments of this Chamber numbers 1696-92, 3854-92, and 3053-94 are mainly cited. As is logical to understand, it is important to extract from these precedents the ideas relevant to the decision of this matter, as follows:

a). - Judgment No. 1696-92. at three thirty p.m. on August twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two.

In this judgment, the topic of the incorporation of the statutory regime for State servants by the National Constituent Assembly of 1949 was analyzed, and it was said, among other things:

" VI. Therefore, the intervention of the Labor Courts, with the mandatory arbitration procedure for public services, under the terms of the challenged articles of the Labor Code, originated in another constitutional order since said body of norms dates from 1943 and under other needs, without the constitutional conception of a public labor regime, exclusive for State servants, existing -at that time- in order to regulate and settle the various situations affecting that relationship. A Political Constitution currently governs that did provide for it and, despite this, a common legal order continues to be used, subjecting the Public Administration and its employees to the resolution of their differences through a private procedure. This results in an unconstitutional application by virtue of the historical and legal mismatch that this matter evidences, which tacitly contravenes article 197 of the Political Constitution. It is clear that the intention of the constituent was to create an administrative labor regime. From the reading of the minutes of the National Constituent Assembly, the figure of the public employee and the private worker are distinguished. It is undeniable that the absence of a legal regime that appropriately regulates the relations between the State and its servants violates article 191 of the Political Constitution, which also leads to the violation of article 11 of the Magna Carta since, "... any unconstitutional norm or act violates it, by definition, insofar as it enshrines the principle of legality according to which public officials cannot exercise functions other than those granted to them by the legal system, and this does not grant them in any case to carry out those that are contrary to the Constitution" (Constitutional Chamber, Resolution No. 550-91, at six fifty p.m. on March fifteen, nineteen ninety-one), making it clear that the principle of legality is violated because an appropriate administrative labor regime is lacking for the Political Constitution, and an express administrative norm that allows the State to submit to arbitration tribunals in order to solve, among other problems, collective conflicts. That violation originated in the need, surely felt, to have some response from the legal system, except that, as stated, the regulation of the matter, which for now does not exist, must be carried out. -

VII.On the one hand, the Law that was issued (Civil Service Statute) has partial scope, since the initiative taken by the Executive Branch in this regard only had the purpose of regulating relations with its servants, that is, within its competency scope. From this angle of approach, the regulation of service relations among lesser public entities has been left aside, as it was something in which the Executive had no interest, or it simply was not what it considered most urgent. On the other hand, the Civil Service Statute regulated only some of the aspects of the relationship of servants with the State, such as those relating to rights, duties of servants, their selection, classification, promotion, transfers, discipline, and dismissal regime -among the most important-, which evidently concern one of the concerns expressed in the National Constituent Assembly, that is, the one related to the suitability and efficiency of the service, but it did not touch on other no less important aspects, such as the one underlying the approach of this action, that is, the regulation of the economic regime itself of that relationship and the subjection of the other administrative entities to the public labor regime. This vacuum, however, does not authorize the use of mechanisms provided for a private relationship, for a public employment relationship that must be governed by its own and different principles.

VIII.The Chamber has no doubt in pointing out the existence of a distinct legal order beginning in 1949, notwithstanding that on many topics there was a reiteration of what had been in force up to that date, because despite the sparse wording of Article 191 and the Transitory Provision to Article 140, subsection 2), both of the Political Constitution, the examination of the discussions of those norms allows us to establish that there is a mandate and not a simple recommendation to apply specific or special criteria to that employment relationship between the public administration and its servants. According to the repeatedly cited transitory provision, the Legislative Assembly was to promulgate, within the period from November 8, 1950, to June 1, 1953, the Civil Service Law, whose main characteristic would be its gradual application in the offices of different natures of the Public Administration, which—evidently—was not fully complied with, but in any case, it must be clear that the confusion existing in the National Constituent Assembly in using and mentioning the Labor Code in the Constitution was to establish, in some way, a normative parameter governing the end of the working relationship and not, as has been sought to be understood, that its principles and norms inspire and govern the relationship between the State and the public servant.-

IX.Nor does the Chamber ignore the fact that in 1978 the General Public Administration Law sought to define the relationship between public servants and the Administration as regulated by Administrative Law (Article 112.1). But again we find that this is an insufficient attempt to, with that single declaration, sweep from legal practice an entire tradition that applies, to a greater or lesser extent, a regime more typical of private labor relations, where principles as flexible as the autonomy of the will or minimum rights govern, while the administration is subject to an entire block of legality (this in turn ordinary and constitutional). Indeed, common labor regulations are inscribed within a philosophy of minimum benefits, ergo, surpassable by the parties, in order to harmonize the factors of production (Article 397 of the Labor Code), which even justifies the participation of laypersons in law, who come to decide in conscience, that is to say, without subjection to clearly established parameters, as has already happened, petitions of the most diverse quality and quantity. The experience of the arbitration tribunals in matters of economic and social conflicts has been plethoric in these recent years. It can even be added, as has been pointed out in specialized studies, that this route came to be used when others that had been used, for various reasons, ceased to be so. -

XI.In the opinion of the Chamber, then, Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution ground the existence, in principle, of an employment regime governed by Public Law within the public sector, as has become clear from the debate in the National Constituent Assembly and is incipiently collected by the General Public Administration Law. This public employment regime necessarily implies consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, now not only distinct from those of (private) labor law, but often opposed to them. Obviously, the declaration contained in this judgment covers the employment relationship that exists between the public administration (or better, administrations) and its servants, but in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that refers to a private employment regime, the solution must be different. In those cases, there would be a submission to arbitration procedures, but with certain limitations, such as that they cannot dispense with or create exceptions to laws, regulations, or government directives in force, so that even in these cases, decisions (arbitration awards) in conscience would not be appropriate, nor tribunals formed by non-lawyer subjects. This declaration is formulated based on the legal powers held by the Chamber and is considered indispensable for the correct interpretation of the entirety of its decision. As unnecessary, any pronouncement on other aspects alleged in the action is omitted."

Of relevance, derived from what was stated in the partially transcribed judgment, is the clear definition of the scope of the statutory system that regulates relations between the State and its servants, albeit with the very special connotations of not having been promulgated as a comprehensive system. The Chamber manifests itself, on that occasion, on the unconstitutionality of the regulations that led to the resolution of collective labor conflicts through conciliation and arbitration, declaring that arbitration awards (laudos) in the public sector are null.

b). - Judgment No. 3854-92 of fifteen hours forty-two minutes of December two, nineteen ninety-two.

Issued in an amparo appeal, it resolves the case in which the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) are questioned, against the exclusion made of certain officials and servants, due to their special link with the public entity. This precedent is invoked by the Union of Employees of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (SEBANA), as a precedent that supports the constitutional and legal principles that recognize collective bargaining agreements as having force of law. The Chamber, indeed, in several case files has examined arguments for and against collective bargaining agreements, examining alleged aspects very punctually, but never resolving the issue of whether or not collective bargaining agreements are constitutional, as the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has now indeed raised.

c). - Judgment No. 3053-94 of nine hours forty-five minutes of June twenty-four, nineteen ninety-four.

The Procuraduría General de la República places special emphasis on this judgment and points out two specific aspects: that in it, the Chamber proceeded to expressly resolve the issue of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector and it is from this resolution that the judgment on the so-called "arbitration awards" is complemented. It was expressed textually:

"SECOND. It is appropriate to partially grant the amparo requested by the appellant Union and without it being necessary to grant it a period to formalize an unconstitutionality action against the resolution of the Procuraduría of June 24, 1991, which rejects the reconsideration requested by JASEC of the opinion issued on December 12, 1985: in a ruling issued at 15:30 hours on August 23, 1992, this Chamber resolved that laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration may resort to the procedures for resolving collective economic and social conflicts provided for in Articles 497 et seq. of the Labor Code. Thus, the regime is administrative, statutory, for 'public servants,' that is, for those who provide services to the administration or on behalf and account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture; however, the General Public Administration Law itself establishes that 'the service relations with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be' (General Public Administration Law, Article 112, subsection 2). It is not appropriate to grant, having already been resolved in the opposite sense in the mentioned unconstitutionality action, the amparo requested regarding the denial of collective bargaining opposed to the 'public servants' of JASEC. But it is appropriate to grant amparo to the appellant Union insofar as the resolution of the Procuraduría of June 24, 1993 (see folios 134 to 139), should have reconsidered ex officio the opinion issued on December 12, 1985 (subsection b of Article 3 of the Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República) and distinguished between public officials and workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration, because subjecting them all to the aforementioned prohibition contradicts the repeatedly cited ruling and the guarantee provided for by Article 62 of the Political Constitution, obviously on the understanding that the determination of the category of workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration is a question of mere legality…" It can be noted that this Constitutional Chamber has indeed made a pronouncement on the issue of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, in the terms that have been indicated in the transcripts.

IV.- PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE PROCURADURIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA. - In the report submitted to this Court, the Procuraduría General de la República refers to three pronouncements it directed, in order, to the Ministry of Justice and Grace, to the Executive Presidency of the Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), and to the Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of the Canton of Tibás. It is important for the purpose of answering the consultation to gloss these documents:

a). - C-161-98 of August 10, 1998.

The Procuraduría General de la República is asked to reconsider previous opinions, in which it was indicated that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber prevents collective bargaining in the public sector, except in cases involving laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration. The position held by the Procuraduría General is confirmed and, for this purpose, it bases its opinion on judgment 3053-94, which is binding erga omnes, by virtue of the provisions of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. It is added that the application of the Collective Bargaining Regulation for Public Servants, approved by Agreement of the Government Council, in Ordinary Session No. 25 of October 6, 1992, published in La Gaceta No. 45 of March 5, 1993, is possible to the extent that restrictions not present in the private regime must be observed, such as aspects that have an impact on the budgets of public entities, and all subject to superior control, because it was not affected by the pronouncements of the Constitutional Chamber.

b). - C-260-98 of December 3, 1998.

The Procuraduría General de la República is asked which bodies of the Decentralized Public Administration participate in public management and how the official covered by a collective bargaining agreement is defined. The procurator's opinion indicates that JAPDEVA "is an autonomous entity of the State, with the character of a public utility company, located, according to national doctrine, within the companies-public entity, which develops as its exclusive or principal activity that of a company. It is the economic public entity." Then the report refers to the judgments of this Chamber, commenting on the legal scope of Articles 3, 111, and 112 of the General Public Administration Law, the national doctrine related to the topic, regarding the definition of which administrations are subject to the public regime and which are not, of who participates in the public management of the administration and who does not. In its conclusions, it points out that the jurisprudence of this Chamber permits arbitration awards and collective bargaining agreements in State companies, which is reinforced and complemented by Articles 111 and 112 cited above, but warning, yes, that the possibility of negotiation cannot be unrestricted, having to respect, for example, the limitations required to harmonize public spending with budgetary availability and that laws, regulations, or current government directives cannot be dispensed with or excepted.

c). - C-044-99 of February 22, 1999.

A consultation is made on the validity of a clause incorporated in 1990, but whose extension was not homologated by the parties in 1993. Clearly, this opinion expresses that the distinguishing issue, to define whether or not a collective bargaining agreement is appropriate in the public sector, lies in the examination of the nature of the service provided by the natural person, for the purposes of establishing whether or not they participate in public management; based on that classification, the legal fields of the relations between workers and the State are demarcated for these purposes, so that if the relationship is statutory, it will be subject to Public Law and in the opposite case, it will be regulated by Labor Law. The conclusion of the opinion is contained in the following basic concept: "there is no legal basis to conclude, in the future, collective bargaining agreements in the public sector (with the exception made in relation to laborers or workers of economic companies or services of the State)." As a complement, the Procuraduría General de la República points out that it does not ignore the existence of collective bargaining agreements that are being applied and whose validity is in question, but that they cannot be formally challenged, unless it is through the unconstitutionality action. In summary of what has been said in this recital: the Procuraduría General de la República, in the report to this Chamber in the case file of the consultation now being answered, reiterates its position that it has been sustaining in previous opinions, according to what has been expressed in preceding lines, which is a historical synthesis of a legal position long sustained.

V.- THE CONVENTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (ILO).- In the brief submitted to the Chamber by the Union of Employees of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (SEBANA), it affirms that collective bargaining agreements in general, and those of the public sector, with the scope that report confers upon them, are recognized in the main conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and alludes, specifically, to the conventions distinguished by numbers 87, 98, 135, and 151, which for the purposes of this consultation, the Chamber examines individually:

a). - Convention No. 87 "concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise." This convention was adopted at the Thirty-First Meeting held in the City of San Francisco, from June 17 to July 10, 1948; it entered into force on July 4, 1950; it was approved in Costa Rica by Law 2561 of May 11, 1960, and regarding its content and for the purposes of the topic under analysis, the SEBANA union points out that it contains four guarantees and two safeguard clauses, which in order are:

- the right of workers and employers to establish trade union organizations, as well as to join them (Article 2); - political, statutory, administrative, and programmatic autonomy and the duty of public authorities to refrain from any intervention that tends to limit this right or hinder its legal exercise (Article 3); - the special protection of trade union organizations against dissolution or administrative suspension, which is prohibited (Article 4); - the free right of trade union associations to establish and join federations and confederations and international organizations of workers and employers (Article 5); - the first safeguard clause is contained in Article 7, by virtue of which the exercise of the rights contained in Articles 2, 3, and 4 cannot be conditioned in any way; - and the second, which regulates the measures that local legislation may take in defense of public order and legality (relation of Articles 8, 10, and 11).

In reality, the text of the convention is of great relevance, to the extent that it proclaims freedom of association; but the Chamber does not find in this document the express enunciation of the right to conclude collective bargaining agreements in the public sector; abstraction is made, for now, of the exercise made by Nombre128357 to affirm that there can be no freedom of association if there is no legal possibility of subscribing collective bargaining agreements, regardless of whether the union belongs to the public or private sector, which will be analyzed later.

b). - Convention No. 98 "concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively." Adopted at the Thirty-Second Meeting, held in Geneva, on June 8, 1949; it entered into force on July 18, 1951; it was also approved by Law No. 2561 of May 11, 1960, and regarding its content, Nombre128357 expressly alludes to Articles 5 and 6, to indicate that the first establishes the general principle that refers to the national legislation of each State, regarding the application of the convention to the armed forces and police, a clause that is also contained in the previous convention; and alluding to the following article, which literally provides: "This Convention does not deal with the position of public servants engaged in the administration of the State, nor shall it be construed as prejudicing their rights or status in any way." The union comments that this norm has been the subject of several analyses in the ILO, because many governments have understood it to mean that collective bargaining is not possible in the public sector, which goes beyond the purpose of the provision. In other words, Nombre128357 understands that the ILO, when examining Article 6 of the convention, gives a restricted scope to the limitation, to lead to the interpretation of the need to differentiate between officials who carry out activities proper to the administration of the State, from other government employees, concluding that the restriction "(…) would only affect those public officials or high-ranking officers who represent the Administration of the State and its institutions and who act as organs of power of those administrations, by virtue of the organic relationship that links them to the Administration." c). - Convention No. 135 "concerning the Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to Workers’ Representatives in the Undertaking." Adopted at the Fifty-Sixth Meeting, held in Geneva from June 2 to 23, 1971; it was approved by Law 5968 of November 9, 1976. Although cited in its brief by Nombre128357, no express reference or analysis is made of it. However, it is important to highlight that it is conceived to provide union representatives with effective protection against any act that may prejudice them in the exercise of that representation, provided they act in accordance with the laws, collective contracts, or other common agreements in force (Art. 1), and for this reason, in addition to the convention, the same Law approved Recommendation No. 142, concerning the protection and facilities to be afforded to workers’ representatives in the undertaking, agreed upon at the General Conference of the International Labour Organization, which is summarized in the content of its Article 5, which literally provides: "Workers' representatives in the undertaking should enjoy effective protection against any act prejudicial to them, including dismissal, based on their status or activities as a workers' representative or on union membership or participation in union activities, in so far as they act in conformity with existing laws or collective agreements or other jointly agreed arrangements."- The topic serves as a basis for affirming that not permitting collective bargaining agreements in the public sector implies a way of hindering the free exercise of union representation.

d). - Convention No. 151 "concerning the Protection of the Right to Organise and Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public Service." It was adopted at the Sixty-Fourth Meeting, held in Geneva from June 7 to 28, 1978; it has not been approved by the Legislative Assembly and, consequently, has not been ratified by Costa Rica.

From the document, for the purposes of this judgment, the following paragraphs and articles are extracted, transcribed, and commented upon:</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:108%"><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">"Recalling that the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, does not apply to certain categories of public employees and that the Workers' Representatives Convention and Recommendation, 1971, apply to workers' representatives in the undertaking;</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:108%"><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">Noting the considerable expansion of services provided by the public administration in many countries and the need for sound labour relations between public authorities and public employees' organizations;</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:108%"><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">Observing the great diversity of political, social, and economic systems of the Member States and the different practices applied by said States (for example, regarding the respective functions of central and local authorities; the functions of federal, state, and provincial authorities; those of State-owned enterprises and various types of autonomous and semi-autonomous public bodies, or with respect to the nature of the employment relationship);</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:108%"><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">Taking into account the particular problems posed by the delimitation of the scope of application of an international instrument and the adoption of definitions for the purposes of the instrument due to the differences existing in many countries between public employment and private employment, as well as the difficulties of interpretation that have arisen concerning the application to public officials of the relevant provisions of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, and the observations by which the ILO supervisory bodies have repeatedly pointed out that certain governments have applied these provisions in such a way that large groups of public employees have been excluded from the scope of the Convention (…)"</span></p><p style="margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:108%"><span style="color:#010101">From this content of the recital part of the Convention and the doctrine of Labour Law, the Chamber understands that the following initial conclusions derive: a) that collective labour law finds its legislative policy (ratio legis) in the worker's need to associate in order to counterbalance the inferiority in which they find themselves vis-à-vis the employer, and therefore its legal basis lies in the right of association and, more specifically, in the right to unionize (sindicación);</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> b) that in this branch of</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> Law, two institutions are vital: collective labour agreements (convenios colectivos de trabajo) and collective disputes; c) that collective Labour Law is an innovative subject in the history of social claims and is structured as an institution of international relevance, stemming from the ILO Conventions of 1948 and 1949; d)</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> that in the sense of the evolution over time of legal institutions, and as is a general principle of collective labour law, the right of collective bargaining is not applicable to the universe of public employees, which has made it necessary to elevate</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> the content of Convention No. 151 of the International Labour Organization to the category of an international standard. Let us now look at the main normative provisions of the Convention, as they pertain to this inquiry:</span></p><ul type="disc" style="margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt"><li style="margin-top:12pt; margin-left:29pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:150%; font-family:serif; color:#010101; -aw-font-family:'Symbol'; -aw-font-weight:normal; -aw-number-format:''"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Article 1.-</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> indicates that the Convention shall apply to all employees of the public administration, and it is for national legislation to determine the extent to which coverage extends to high-level employees (with decision-making power or managerial positions or who perform confidential functions);</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> </span></li><li style="margin-top:12pt; margin-left:29pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:150%; font-family:serif; color:#010101; -aw-font-family:'Symbol'; -aw-font-weight:normal; -aw-number-format:''"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Article 8.-</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> states, in general terms, that the settlement of disputes that arise regarding the determination of conditions of employment shall be resolved through negotiation between the parties or through independent and impartial procedures, such as mediation, conciliation, and arbitration;</span></li><li style="margin-top:12pt; margin-left:29pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:150%; font-family:serif; color:#010101; -aw-font-family:'Symbol'; -aw-font-weight:normal; -aw-number-format:''"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Article 9.-</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> provides that public employees, like other workers, shall enjoy the civil and political rights for the normal exercise of freedom of association (libertad sindical), subject only to the obligations arising from their status and the nature of their functions;</span></li><li style="margin-top:12pt; margin-left:29pt; margin-bottom:12pt; line-height:150%; font-family:serif; color:#010101; -aw-font-family:'Symbol'; -aw-font-weight:normal; -aw-number-format:''"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-weight:bold">Article 11.-</span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'"> in its first paragraph states that the convention binds only those members of the ILO whose ratifications have been registered by the Director-General;</span></li></ul><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:108%"><span style="color:#010101">From the glossed norms, it can be seen, in summary, that the Convention is considered by the ILO</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> as a necessity to promote the equalization of employees or servants of the public administration to the same condition enjoyed by employees of the private sector, regarding the legal institution of the collective agreement (convención colectiva), and Article 11.1 is particularly clear in defining the binding force of the Convention over time and determining the obligated subjects, making that binding force dependent on the ratification of the same Convention.</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> In synthesis: the four ILO Conventions that have been cited are the international documents of greatest relevance that frame the legal environment of collective agreements as one of the instruments of Collective Labour Law.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:108%"><span style="font-weight:bold; color:#010101">VI.- DOCTRINE ON COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, ACCORDING TO THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SEBANA UNION.</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> The matter of collective agreements</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> is a topic that has been extensively addressed in Labour Law; it is included within the general theory that makes up the branch called collective labour law, whose main constituent institutions are professional associations (trade union law), collective labour agreements, and collective disputes. In presenting its arguments, the Union of Employees of the National Bank of Costa Rica (Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica) challenges the resolution of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, by which the inquiry now being addressed was formulated, and from which the arguments housing the doubt of constitutionality are extracted; the questioning can be summarized as affirming that no norm exists in the constitutional and administrative legal order that authorizes collective agreements as instruments for regulating working conditions in the public sector. The Union's conclusions, presented as an antithetical thesis to what was affirmed by the inquiring Chamber, while also contradicting the jurisprudential precedents of this Court and the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), are the following: a) that public servants are ordinary and common workers and, consequently, protected by the Chapter of Social Guarantees of the Political Constitution; as a consequence of the above, any limitation on the enjoyment of those rights and guarantees is</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> contrary to the principle of legality and the fundamental values of the person; b) that the collective agreement is a social right and, as such, is influenced by the aims pursued by the principles contained in Articles 50 and 74 of the Constitution; c) that trade union freedom is consubstantial to any democratic regime (there is no democracy if there is no trade union freedom) and, furthermore, trade union law is indissolubly linked to the right to collective bargaining and contracting, which derives, in the case of the Costa Rican legal regime, from the contents of Articles 60 and 62 of the Constitution;</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> d) constitutional norms recognize, without further ado, the right to a collective agreement (convención colectiva), without making any distinction whatsoever, and therefore, the harmonious interpretation made of the Constitution and the norms and principles of Labour Law must be oriented towards broadly recognizing that right and not unjustifiably restricting it to the detriment of a labour category that also requires the protection of the collective labour agreement. In conclusion: for Nombre128357, Article 62 of the Political Constitution meets the requirement of the principle of legality in this matter; the denial of that right is discriminatory and contrary to the principle of equality, the principle of the Rule of Law, and the Democratic principle. And it concludes by affirming that the right of collective bargaining in the public administration also has a reinforced character in our legal system, since it derives from the ILO Conventions that have been analyzed in the preceding recital. This synthesis of the Union's allegations is what must be examined to arrive at the conclusions of this ruling. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:108%"><span style="font-weight:bold; color:#010101">VII.- CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION. -</span><span style="color:#010101"> The issue of the possibility of applying the institution of collective agreements in the public sector, as raised by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in this case file, as analyzed in the report presented to this Chamber by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, and as deduced from the arguments expressed by the interested Union, must now be studied from the perspective of constitutional interpretation. To understand the context in which the problem posed is analyzed, it is important to recall certain basic postulates that the doctrine of Constitutional Law has consistently developed regarding its controlling function: a) the Constitution, from the formal point of view, is integrated by a normative set or complex, which obliges that its provisions be interpreted in a coordinated manner, as part of a fully cohesive legal system; that is, the norms must be considered as a whole and not individually; b) in the exercise of the competence of constitutional control, the principle of constitutional supremacy is always present; the Constitution is the supreme norm on which the entire legal and political order of the State is founded; c) the Constitution contains, expressly or tacitly, a series of principles, some of them called general principles of constitutional Law, which propagate their light throughout the entire legal structure of the State; d) the Constitution contains or presupposes fundamental values; e) constitutional norms are considered within the aims, values, and principles of the State, so that they usually possess generality and openness sufficient to enable diverse options and realizations, which is equivalent to affirming that several solutions can be considered, although not all of them are compatible with the Law of the Constitution. Starting from these essential notes for constitutional interpretation; based on the doctrinal criteria set forth by the parties intervening in the inquiry, the jurisprudential precedents of the Chamber itself that have been cited, and the conventions of the International Labour Organization, the Chamber arrives at the following premises of the judgment: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:108%"><span style="font-weight:bold; color:#010101">First:</span><span style="color:#010101"> It admits, as a general theory of Collective Labour Law, that this is mainly integrated by a trilogy of rights that seek to realize and provide a solution to the need of workers to associate in order to compensate for the inferiority they experience when acting alone, vis-à-vis the employer and vis-à-vis the minimal legislation protecting their rights; this involves the right to unionize (sindicación), to a collective agreement (convención colectiva), and to collective disputes. But it confirms, indeed, its own judgment No. 1696-92 of 15:30 hours on August 23, 1992, to indicate that the genesis of the express incorporation of these rights into our constitutional regime is found in the amendment of the 1871 Constitution during the legislative terms of 1942 and 1943, when the incorporation of the Chapter of Social Guarantees into the Political Constitution was approved, which was done under special political, social, and economic conditions distinct from the vision held by the Constituent Assembly members when enacting the current Political Constitution. One of the aims pursued by the new constitutional text that was approved – possibly one of the most discussed – was to include the "</span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">constitutional conception of a public labour regime, exclusive for the servants of the State, in order to regulate and settle the various situations affecting that relationship</span><span style="color:#010101">", whose fundamental bases are found in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution. From this it is inferred, for the sake of achieving maximum clarity in this judgment, that what was expressed in the aforementioned jurisprudential precedent should be reiterated, in the part referring to the special circumstance that there are two extremes or systems in labour matters: one regulated by the Labour Code (Código de Trabajo) and the other regulated by Public Law. </span><span style="font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Second:</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> Starting from the preceding immediate conclusion, it is also reaffirmed that the relationship between the State and public servants, as a thesis of principle and with the exceptions to be stated later, is a relationship called public or statutory employment, which, as such, is regulated by Public Law; consequently, a relationship of equality or equivalence cannot exist between the involved parties, as ideally should occur in a labour relationship of contractual origin, mainly because the Public Administration represents a general interest, due to the need for continuity in the provision of public services and the limitations imposed by budgetary regulations. In other words, the servant under the public employment regime finds themselves, in relation to the Administration, in a state of subjection; the latter can unilaterally impose the conditions of the organization and provision of the service to guarantee the public good, which eliminates the possibility that the relationship can be considered from a perspective of equivalence of rights susceptible to negotiation between the parties. This conclusion comprises the impossibility of recognizing the possibility of collective bargaining in the public sector, since the very idea of negotiation, as a suitable means to review and approve the conditions of public employment, conflicts with the essential postulates of the organization of the State, which were introduced in this field through Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution. </span><span style="font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Third:</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> The position that the Chamber has been maintaining has been the one that historically prevailed in Costa Rica. Thus, the legal impossibility of collective bargaining in the public sector was declared by the judgment of the Court of Cassation (Sala de Casación) No. 58 of 15:00 hours on July 20, 1951. In May 1953 and December 1954, the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) and its Regulations were enacted, and in interpreting their contents – constitutional and legal – the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic repeatedly held the thesis of the legal impossibility of collective bargaining. In 1979, the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) entered into force, establishing, with complete clarity, that Administrative Law applies to the service relationships between the State and its servants, excluding labour legislation from the relationship, to which only those servants who do not participate in public management may turn (see, in this regard and in Recital IV of this judgment, the most recent pronouncements, which are a synthesis of the reiterated opinion of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic). In 1980, the Government Council prohibited, through a directive, the conclusion of collective agreements (convenciones colectivas) in the public sector; later, in 1986, it authorized a mechanism for approving extensions to collective agreements prior to the General Law of the Public Administration, which later, in 1992, was transformed into the so-called Regulation on Collective Bargaining of Public Servants (Reglamento de Negociación Colectiva de los Servidores Públicos). Finally, in judgment No. 1696-92 of this Chamber, the unconstitutionality of the mechanisms of direct settlement, conciliation, and arbitration was declared.</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> Fourth: To understand the foregoing, it is important to highlight what the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic has already stated in this regard in the development of national doctrine, in the sense that "public officials are those who provide services to the Administration in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with complete independence from the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity (Article 111, subsection 1 of the General Law of the Public Administration). These servants, in accordance with what has been set forth, are prevented from bargaining collectively, as their relationship is governed by public Law (Article 112, subsection 1 id.). On the other hand, from the interrelation of Articles 112 subsection 2) and 111 subsection 3) (the norm to which the former refers, both of the same Law) it is also clear that those who are not officials subject to the public employment regime, but rather labourers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, the employees of companies or economic services of the State, in charge of activities subject to common Law, who, in accordance with transcribed Article 112 subsection 2), are governed by labour Law and not by public Law, which enables them to bargain collectively.</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> Fifth: The Chamber considers that the position that the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic has been maintaining in the historical development of the institution of collective agreements (convenciones colectivas), as expressed in its report to this Chamber, is legally compatible with the Law of the Constitution, especially as of judgment number 3053-94 of 9:45 hours on June 24, 1994, in which it was stated in the second recital, transcribed earlier, that "this Chamber resolved that labourers, workers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration may resort to the procedures for resolving collective disputes of an economic and social nature provided for in Articles 497 and following of the Labour Code. Thus, the regime is administrative, statutory, for 'public servants', that is, for those who provide services to the administration or in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture; however, the General Law of the Public Administration itself establishes that "</span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">service relationships with labourers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 111, shall be governed by labour or commercial law, as the case may be</span><span style="color:#010101">". Consequently, and based on this constitutional interpretation and the texts contained in the General Law of the Public Administration, in the public sector, only those servants who do not participate in public management may conclude collective labour agreements, such that entities with an employment regime of a labour (non-public) nature, such as, for example, State enterprises, which national doctrine has described as</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> "</span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">those that function as if they were private enterprises, because they sell and do the same as private individuals; for example, the INS itself, when selling policies, does the same as any insurance company, the banking sector when making loans does the same as a common financial entity, the National Power and Light Company (Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz), which sells electrical energy under the same conditions that a private company could sell it</span><span style="color:#010101">", among others, can indeed bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions that inform Collective Labour Law.</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Sixth:</span><span style="color:#010101"> Notwithstanding what has already been stated, it is important to clarify that even in the public sector where the application</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> of the institution of collective agreements (convenciones colectivas) is constitutionally possible, that is, in the so-called companies or economic services of the State and in those personnel nuclei of public institutions and entities where the nature of the services provided do not involve participation in public management, in the terms of subsection 2 of Article 112 of the General Law of the Public Administration, the Chamber reiterates and confirms its jurisprudence in the sense that the authorization to negotiate cannot be unrestricted, i.e., comparable to the situation of any private employer, since through that means, laws, regulations, or current governmental directives cannot be dispensed with or excepted, nor can laws that grant or regulate the competencies of public entities, attributed by reason of normative hierarchy or the special conditions of the Public Administration in relation to its workers, be modified or repealed, a conclusion inferred from Article 112 subsection 3) of the General Law of the Public Administration and from Recital XI of judgment No. 1696-92 of this Chamber.</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> Seventh: All these conclusions are also based on the doctrine derived from the conventions of the International Labour Organization; however, the Chamber considers it very useful to note that it is so clear that the generalization of the possibility of negotiating collective agreements in the public sector has been only an aspiration of workers, and as such,</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> of restrictive interpretation, that the International Labour Organization itself has promoted adherence to Convention No. 151 concerning the protection of the right to organize and procedures for determining conditions of employment in the public administration. The aims of this convention are to promote the general and unrestricted recognition of collective labour bargaining in the public sector. But in our current legal organization, for the scopes of the Convention to be of possible application, it is required that its principles and norms be compatible with those of the Political Constitution, and by virtue of what has been stated in this judgment, there exists, until now,</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> an impediment, of the highest rank, preventing the acceptance of the institution of collective agreements (convenciones colectivas) in the entire public sector, an impediment rooted in the lack of a norm of a rank superior to ordinary law that would permit the application of the institution throughout the public sector, making it compatible with the principles and values of the Political Constitution. The articulation of the institution of collective bargaining with the national legal system cannot be done solely from the point of view of the interests of the servants of the public sector; it must also be done based on the necessary examination of Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution, as has already been stated.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:34pt; line-height:108%"><span style="font-weight:bold; color:#010101">VIII.- CONCLUSIONS.-</span><span style="color:#010101"> Based on everything set forth and by way of synthesis, the Chamber arrives at the following conclusions: in the exercise of the competence as the ultimate interpreter of the Political Constitution, when examining the issue of the organization and administrative structure of the State and the appropriateness or not</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> of collective agreements (convenciones colectivas) in the public sector, the Chamber cannot limit itself solely to the application of the provisions that make up the Chapter of so-called "Social Guarantees". It is also necessary to examine that legal institution in coordination with the principles contained in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution;</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> in performing this exercise, the full conviction is acquired that the will of the constituent power, following the historical line of development of Labour Law institutions,</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> was to abstract the servants of the public sector from the general rules that inform Collective Labour Law, subjecting them to a special public employment relationship, also commonly called a "statutory relationship" (relación estatutaria), which is governed by Public Law. This undoubtedly implies, and as a general thesis, that no public official can negotiate their employment conditions as if it were a contractual nexus subject to Labour Law.</span></p> However, the development of legal ideas, the adoption of conventions promoted by the International Labour Organization, and the jurisprudence of this Chamber have driven the evolution of the institutions involved to the point of admitting as compatible with Constitutional Law the collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) negotiated by the category of employees and servants who, despite being part of the public sector, govern their relations under Labor Law, especially under the terms of the definitions contained in Articles 111 and 112 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), that is, when dealing with companies or economic services of the State charged with activities subject to common law, as well as service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration and who are governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be. This is the sense in which the consultation is answered, but warning, indeed, that it is up to the Administration itself, to legal operators in general, and ultimately to the Judge, when hearing specific cases, to determine whether a State institution or a group of its servants or officials constitutes the core of the exception that can engage in collective bargaining, or if, on the contrary, this path is forbidden to them. And finally, according to what the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) has expressed in its report, which this Chamber also accepts, the personnel working in the country's Municipalities are limited in collective bargaining, under the terms of this judgment, since, unless proven otherwise, they are public servants governed by the public employment relationship. Given the effects of this judgment, in accordance with the provisions of Article 107 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), it is important to note that it will be up to the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice to determine whether the relationship of the plaintiff in the Ordinary Labor Trial, Nombre100510, with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, was regulated by public law or by common law. The judgment is declaratory and retroactive to the date of entry into force of each collective bargaining agreement in the public sector that is sought or intended to be applied, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91 of the same Law, the Chamber proceeds to dimension the retroactive effects of the judgment to the date of the publication of its summary in La Gaceta, a date from which the effects must cease for all those servants whom Constitutional Law has prevented from concluding collective bargaining agreements. Magistrate Arguedas issues a dissenting vote and declares that collective bargaining agreements concluded in the public sector are not unconstitutional per se. Magistrate Solano issues a dissenting vote regarding the dimensioning, so that the effectiveness of this judgment is from the expiration of the term of each collective bargaining agreement. Magistrates Piza and Molina file separate notes.

POR TANTO

The consultation formulated by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice is answered in the following sense: a) the collective bargaining agreements regulated by Articles 54 and following of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) that are concluded in the public sector are unconstitutional when they involve personnel governed by a public employment relationship (statutory relationship); b) collective bargaining agreements concluded in the public sector are not unconstitutional when they are concluded by laborers, workers, officials, or employees of the public sector, whose labor relations are governed by common law; c) likewise, collective instruments that have been negotiated and have been extended or modified, in application of the general policy on collective bargaining agreements in the Public Sector, are compatible with Constitutional Law, unless they involve negotiations with personnel in a public employment relationship, in which case those instruments are unconstitutional; d) it is up to the administration and the judges hearing the labor trials, as applicable, regarding the application of collective bargaining agreements, to determine whether the workers involved, given the nature of the functions they perform or performed, are regulated by public or common law, for the purposes of defining whether or not they can be active subjects in the application of collective bargaining agreements. This judgment is declaratory and retroactive to the date of entry into force of the respective Collective Bargaining Agreement, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. However, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the effects of the judgment are dimensioned to the date of the publication of its summary in La Gaceta. Let it be summarized in La Gaceta and published in full in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial). Let it be communicated and notified.

R. E. PIZA E.

Luis Fernando Solano C. Luis Paulino Mora M.

Eduardo Sancho G. Carlos M. Arguedas R.

José Luis Molina Q.. Gilbert Armijo S.

ES/mm/00 DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE SOLANO CARRERA The undersigned Magistrate records that he has agreed with the substance of what was resolved by the Chamber, but disagrees and separates from what was ordered therein, as he considers that a special dimensioning must be given to the effects of judgment No. 4453-2000, as was done with what was resolved in Judgment No. 1696-92 (judgment on arbitration awards (laudos) in the public sector).

In effect, I believe that, in the manner that the Chamber ordered for arbitration awards on that occasion, given the nature of collective bargaining agreements, the pronouncement regarding their unconstitutionality cannot have the retroactive effects that the system normally grants in these cases. I also think that doing so through the formula used by the majority of Magistrates, in the sense that the judgment is effective as of its summary in La Gaceta, is insufficient, due to the sudden or surprising tone it contains. For that same reason, I believe that criteria of justice and equity must be used here, again, to maintain the full application of the collective bargaining agreements in force until the very date of the expiration of the term contemplated by them, so that their extinction is gradual and moderating the impact that this pronouncement signifies in any event, while, as I understand has been happening for some time, the legislative process for the approval of International Labour Organization Conventions is concluded, which would have the virtue of regularizing matters related to this subject.

In that sense, I explain my dissenting vote.

Luis Fernando Solano Carrera SEPARATE NOTE BY MAGISTRATES PIZA ESCALANTE AND MOLINA QUESADA:

We have concurred in the majority vote, abiding by the provisions of I.L.O. Conventions No. 87, 98, 135, and 151, but we cannot fail to express our concern that in the public sector, whatever the nature of the entity in question, even if only due to State participation in its ownership or its shares, service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees governed by labor or common law do not imply, as in the private sector, a real distinction of interests and risks; the managerial party has broad powers of action and negotiation, [while] in the public sector the managerial party is subject to Public Law limitations that greatly diminish its negotiation capacity and completely eliminate its fear of loss, which is a fundamental ingredient of private dealings. Finally, we are concerned that collective bargaining agreements for workers subject to the private law regime produce inequalities compared to public officials proper, who lack that instrument, thus accentuating existing inequalities among employees of different institutions.

R.E. Piza E. José Luis Molina Q.

Res: 2000-04453 DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE ARGUEDAS RAMIREZ I dissent from the criterion of the majority, and, instead, I opine that the collective bargaining agreements concluded in the public sector are not unconstitutional per se.

I.- The essential reason for my discrepancy has to do with the interpretation that my colleagues make of the meaning and scope of constitutional Articles 191 and 192 regarding their impact on the sphere of the right to collective bargaining in the public sector and, more specifically, the right to collective bargaining agreements in this sector.

II.- I will begin by emphasizing that the majority, in considering this matter, goes back to the fact that, prior to the current Constitution, the rights to unionization, collective bargaining agreements, and collective conflicts had already achieved constitutional recognition in the 1871 Constitution. In the majority's view, the incorporation of Articles 191 and 192 into the current Constitution founded a public employment regime that prevents now recognizing what was previously recognized as a right (and, I say, necessarily as a fundamental right), that is, the possibility of collective bargaining in the public sector; according to this criterion, henceforth, the very idea of negotiation, as a suitable means to review and approve the conditions of public employment, conflicts with the essential postulates of the State's organization.

III.- I infer from this conclusion that, in the opinion of my colleagues, the current Constitution simply excluded from the public sector the guarantee of a right that, prior to being so established, had already been added to the list of rights recognized by the State also for public servants, that is, for workers located in that sector. I do not see in what the majority has said anything indicating that this exclusion was reached because of the deliberate (that is to say, voluntary and intentional) purpose of the 1949 constituent assembly to curtail the coverage of those rights, or to deny their exercise to certain persons or servants. On the contrary, regarding the fundamental rights of public servants, my opinion is that, in a general sense, the constituent assembly was driven by the purpose of protecting their rights: Article 192 betrays this. But to my colleagues, this curtailment seems evident and inevitable due to the very nature of the statutory regime of public employment, as conceived in Articles 191 and 192, which, according to them, exposes the public servant to suffering or enduring (that is, passively) the working conditions unilaterally imposed by the State, without the possibility of participating or influencing the determination of those conditions through negotiation, all for the public good.

IV.- I observe, to begin, that the prevailing criterion in this case has something paradoxical about it. Indeed, the Chamber, when addressing the issue of strikes in the public sector (in Judgment No. 1317-98 of ten hours twelve minutes on February twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-eight), opened the possibility, previously non-existent, for public servants to resort to legal strikes. How can it be explained now that, while legal strikes can be carried out by these servants, they themselves find the path to resolving their disputes before or after the strike state through collective bargaining agreements or other modalities of negotiation binding on the parties, forbidden to them, when collective bargaining, as is known, is the most logical and civilized way to end social-economic collective conflicts that occur in the sphere of labor relations?

V.- The irreconcilable contradiction that the majority deduces from the provisions of Articles 191 and 192 regarding the recognition of the rights to collective bargaining and to collective bargaining agreements, is evidently obtained from its own interpretation of those Articles, since, as I have mentioned, there is no indication that such a thing was a voluntary and intentional decision by the constituent assembly itself, nor is it literally expressed in the text of the Constitution. I admit that the letter of Article 191 is emphatic when it says that a statute of civil service (estatuto de servicio civil) shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants. That is, I do not doubt that the constituent assembly wanted to give employment relations in the public sector a primarily statutory configuration.

But under the sign of the "State of fundamental rights" that characterizes the order of things proposed by the Constitution, markedly after the creation of this court in 1989, it seems to me that the interpreter of the Constitution cannot fail to notice the growing significance and incidence of those rights in the regulation of the organization of the State and of its relations with public servants, and in the modulation or nuance that this influence works on the matter devised by the constituent of 1949, which, consequently, in order to interpret it fully, must be examined today in light of those rights and their requirements. It seems to me that the interpreter cannot fail to notice it, unless he petrifies the Constitution, as if regarding the evolution and the current meaning of fundamental rights little or nothing had happened since the constituent act.

**VI.-** From this perspective, it bears repeating that the rights at issue here, involved in the question of constitutionality that has been brought before the Chamber, belong to the category of fundamental rights of labor. That we are in the presence of this class of rights seems to me beyond all doubt. Thus, for example, the International Labour Organization, one of whose obligations (adopted at the General Conference in May 1944) is "to achieve the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining", includes in its "Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work" (adopted by the General Conference in June 1998), as a category of such rights, "freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining".

**VII.-** Now then: these rights, as the Chamber itself has recognized in reiterated jurisprudence, by their character as **fundamental,** are inherent to the human being by his condition as such, they accompany him by his character as a **person** and therefore are superior to the State itself: the State does not create them nor regulate them with constitutive effect, but rather recognizes, protects and guarantees them normatively, but with a purely declaratory character. Hence the legal system can protect them and shape their exercise, but not eliminate them or disregard them with the simple invocation that the requirements of the organization of the State, or the efficiency of the administration, or an imprecise public good demand it; all because they hold a category and force superior to the legal system itself.

**VIII.-** Certainly, as the Chamber has also said, fundamental rights are not unrestricted or absolute; they may be subject to certain limitations imposed by the legal system, in consideration of superior values and interests of the community; but these restrictions cannot go to the extreme of emptying them of content, which is contrary to the entire ideology upon which the Constitution is based, as the superior catalog of fundamental rights.

**IX.-** I insist that in the case of the constitutional chapter relating to social guarantees, as the majority mentions, the rights included therein were already expressly incorporated into our legal regime since the amendment introduced to the Constitution of 1871 in the legislatures of 1942 and 1943, which, it is worth highlighting, constitutes one of the greatest achievements recorded in the country's history in matters of protection of fundamental social rights which, to a large extent, sustain the stability of the democratic regime we enjoy today.

**X.-** Upon the promulgation of the Constitution of 1949, this chapter of guarantees was reproduced, since the contrary would have implied an inadmissible regression from the point of view of fundamental rights, given that the evolution these rights have been experiencing throughout history—from the consecration of the most essential public freedoms to the so-called third-generation rights, a trajectory whose north has been the increasingly integral development and well-being of the human being, from his individual, social, economic and cultural perspective— cannot conceive a regression in their normative protection, without it signifying an affront to his liberty and dignity.

**XI.-** In my opinion, currently Articles 191 and 192 do not escape nor could they withdraw from the influence of the fundamental right of public servants to participate, as much as possible, in the definition of their work regime. This is, it seems to me, the perception that gives rise to an essential disagreement with the majority of the court. I already mentioned that these articles give the public employment regime a **primarily** statutory configuration, so that the State, through the procedures established for normative production (which do not in themselves exclude means of participation by the public servants themselves), sets (in this sense, unilaterally) the conditions of public employment, but, as far as the State itself is concerned, "with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the public administration", which is the relevant justifying reason for the statutory character of that regime: such provisions, by command of the two cited articles, are imposed as non-negotiable norms of the legal regime of employment, which, consequently, is not susceptible to being substituted, revoked or altered through the collective bargaining agreement.

**XII.-** Naturally, this constitutional option implies a severe limitation on the scope of the right of collective bargaining, but this restriction is all that, in my judgment, this right and its effective validity permit. I mean that the right is not extinguished, and there remains for negotiation the possibility of achieving supplementary regulation (not necessarily suppletory) of the conditions of work, in areas, modalities or aspects that the State abstained from adding unilaterally to the content of the legal system of employment.

**XIII.-** Now then, all the foregoing does not imply that a specific collective bargaining agreement negotiated in the public sector cannot incur defects that determine its invalidity, but that would be due to some illegality in the concrete case, which may generate the impropriety of the provisions that were contemplated therein. That is why this dissenting vote has been indicated in the judgment in the sense that "collective bargaining agreements in the public sector are not unconstitutional *per se*", because this fundamental right can be limited but not suppressed to the detriment of a specific group of persons, by reason of their condition as public servants. On this point, it is worth mentioning that, if there is a certain group of public officials who by definition cannot be beneficiaries of this type of agreement—for example, the high-ranking officials who hold the representation of the administration—it is not because they find themselves deprived of this fundamental right, but because the position they hold at the time of a collective bargaining gives rise to an evident incompatibility to dispose of some type of benefit in their favor, precisely because they are the ones who represent the State party in its capacity as employer, which clearly explains that they cannot take advantage of such an opportunity to "legislate" for their own benefit. In sum: the nuances that the exercise of this right may acquire in the case of the public sector are due, on one hand, to limitations derived from the principle of legality and the norms of public order that govern the actions of the Administration, and secondly, to the directives and restrictions in force regarding budgetary and public expenditure matters (when it involves clauses that contemplate economic benefits), given that, due to the principle of budgetary legality—which is expressly enshrined in Article 180 of the Constitution—no expenditure may be ordered or executed without the respective duly approved budgetary allocation. Thus, the correct dimension that this constitutional right enshrined in the chapter on social guarantees must acquire, in the case of the public sector, is not that of a total curtailment for the servant, but rather understanding that its exercise is subject to certain limitations in consideration of the observance of the legal system, the limits of public expenditure and the corresponding regulations that exist in this field.

**Carlos Ml. Arguedas R.**

Res: 2000-04453 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las catorce horas con cincuenta y seis minutos del veinticuatro de mayo del dos mil.

Consulta judicial facultativa de la SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA, formulada mediante resolución de las dieciséis horas diez minutos del once de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, dictada dentro del expediente judicial número 96-000287-213-LA, que es juicio ordinario laboral de Nombre100510 , cédula de identidad CED76765, contra el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, que se inició en el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala Constitucional a las ocho horas diez minutos del treinta de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y nueve (folio 1) y con fundamento en los artículos 8, inciso 1), de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial; 2, inciso b), 3, 13, 102 y 104 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la Sala consultante, "por tener fundadas dudas sobre la posibilidad y legitimación de celebrar y, efectuar eventuales reformas de las convenciones colectivas existentes en el sector público", solicita a esta Sala que se pronuncie sobre la constitucionalidad de lo anterior. Señala la Sala consultante, en lo medular, lo siguiente: a) que no existe norma en el ordenamiento constitucional y legal administrativo, que permita la concertación de este tipo de instrumentos colectivos, ni sus variaciones de fondo; b) que en el proceso ordinario laboral, el actor pretende que se apliquen ciertas disposiciones de la octava reforma a la Quinta Convención Colectiva, convenida entre el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica y el Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (SEBANA); c) que los Juzgadores de instancia consideraron que al momento de la renuncia del Actor a su puesto, la reforma del instrumento colectivo señalado, no había sido homologada por el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, ni por la Autoridad Presupuestaria, por lo que no había entrado en vigencia; d) que independientemente de las razones contenidas en los fallos, la Sala consultante estima que existen problemas, de índole y rango constitucionales, que no les permite la aplicación de la convención colectiva. De los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política se desprende que el propio constituyente quiso expresamente diferenciar la figura del empleo público del privado, creando un régimen de Empleo Público, regido por los principios del Derecho Público, lo que significa que los servidores públicos sólo pueden realizar determinadas actuaciones, si están autorizados por una norma que los faculte para ello y señala la sentencia 1472-94 de la Sala Constitucional, como precedente; e) señala que siguiendo ese mismo criterio, el entonces Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario formuló una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 368, párrafo segundo y 521, párrafo segundo, ambos del Código de Trabajo, alegando que por la condición estatutaria del empleo público, estaban prohibidas las convenciones colectivas y el sometimiento de los diferendos a los Tribunales de Arbitraje. La Procuraduría General de la República, al contestar la audiencia conferida, alegó que esos procedimientos de negociación, infringen los artículos 167 y 180 de la Constitución Política; f) la consulta transcribe la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional No. 1696-92, que declaró la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 368, parte segunda y del 497 al 535 del Código de Trabajo, por violación de los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política y del estudio de este precedente jurisprudencial, infiere que la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad afectó los arreglos directos y conciliaciones, pero omitió pronunciamiento sobre las convenciones colectivas, aunque se había solicitado expresamente. Pero deduce la consulta, que si la inconstitucionalidad de los laudos arbitrales, de los arreglos directos y las conciliaciones dentro del empleo público, fue por falta de norma que autorice esos procedimientos en la Administración Pública, lo mismo debe ocurrir en las convenciones colectivas. La limitación surge, además de las normas constitucionales, de la aplicación de los principios de legalidad y de reserva de ley; g) que el artículo 62 constitucional indica que tienen fuerza de ley las convenciones colectivas de trabajo que, con arreglo a la ley, se concierten y ello implica que para los servidores del Estado, debe existir una norma que les permita tal actividad; por otro lado, el artículo 56 señala que todo patrono particular, tiene la obligación de celebrar convenciones colectivas; interpretando esta norma, la otrora Sala de Casación, en sentencia No. 58 de las 15:10 horas del 20 de julio de 1951, indicó que el término "particular" se refiere a los patronos que no sean el Estado ni sus instituciones y por ello, los servidores públicos tuvieron que recurrir al procedimiento de conciliación, lo que fue avalado por los Tribunales de Justicia. Luego, al entrar en vigencia la Ley General de la Administración Pública, cuyo artículo 112 dispone que el Derecho administrativo regula las relaciones de los servidores públicos, la Procuraduría General de la República se pronunció en el sentido de que el Estado no puede celebrar convenciones colectivas y el Consejo de Gobierno, emitió una directriz en ese sentido en octubre de 1979, pero que luego fue adicionada por otra, en el sentido que al vencimiento, las convenciones colectivas que estaban vigentes, podían ser prorrogadas, lo que provocó un conflicto en el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, que fue sometido a arbitraje ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia, la que dijo que se podían celebrar convenciones colectivas, siempre y cuando, no dejaran sin efecto artículos del Estatuto del Servicio Civil ni disposiciones de la Ley de Creación de la Autoridad Presupuestaria. Después, la Sala Constitucional emitió el voto No. 1696-92 y a partir de ese momento, las convenciones colectivas que no se refieran a los obreros trabajadores o a los empleados que no participan en la gestión pública de la administración, son inconstitucionales, porque no existe disposición normativa alguna, ni principio constitucional o legal, que les permita a los servidores públicos hacerlo.

2.- Por resolución de las dieciséis horas veinte minutos del treinta de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, se confirió audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República.

3.- En escritos presentados ante la Secretaría de la Sala, a las 14:19 horas del día 6 (folio 19), de las 15:39 horas del día 8 (folio 24) y de las 14:56 horas del día 13, todos de setiembre de 1999, el Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, solicitó que se le tuviera como parte en la consulta, lo que fue resuelto favorablemente por la Presidencia de la Sala, mediante resolución de las 15:45 horas del 30 de ese mismo mes (folio 42).

4.- En escrito presentado a las 15:45 horas del 23 de setiembre de 1999 (folio 28), la Procuraduría General de la República contestó la audiencia conferida en los siguientes términos: a) en cuanto a las directrices vigentes emitidas por el Poder Ejecutivo sobre la materia, son las que corresponden a la Sesión Ordinaria del Consejo de Gobierno del 22 de octubre de 1986, que autoriza no solo prórrogas, sino también modificaciones de las convenciones colectivas existentes, lo que cubre tanto a los servidores públicos regidos por normas y principios de Derecho público como a personal con una relación de naturaleza laboral, según la diferencia que se hace en los artículos 111 y 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; b) sobre los términos de la consulta, señala aspectos que no comparte con la Sala consultante: primero, que la generalidad del personal del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica no califica como servidor público, por lo que, en los términos de la sentencia de la Sala Constitucional No. 1696-92, se pueden dar procedimientos de arbitraje, pero con ciertas limitaciones, como que no puedan dispensarse o excepcionarse leyes; segundo, que en la consulta se hace caso omiso a la sentencia No 3053-94 de las 9:45 horas del 24 de junio de 1994, en la que se analizó la constitucionalidad de las convenciones colectivas en el sector público; c) sobre la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional y la distinción que se hace entre los servidores públicos y quienes no califican como tales, afirma que es cierto que el tema quedó referido, inicialmente, solo a la materia de los laudos arbitrales; sin embargo, posteriormente a la Sentencia 3053-94, la Sala Constitucional tuvo por extendidos los efectos a las convenciones colectivas del sector público y en síntesis, se dan dos posiciones, según sea la naturaleza de la relación (pública o laboral) del organismo de que se trate, así: 1) la situación de los servidores públicos es incompatible con el instituto del laudo arbitral y para las convenciones colectivas, en virtud de lo dispuesto en los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política, y según la opinión oficial de esa Procuraduría plasmada en el dictamen C-161-98 de 10 de agosto de 1998, en el que se concluye que con relación a este personal, la única modalidad de negociación jurídicamente factible, es la establecida en el llamado "Reglamento de Negociación Colectiva para los Servidores Públicos" (Acuerdo del Consejo de Gobierno de la Sesión Ordinaria No. 25 de 6 de octubre de 1992). En síntesis, se expresó en el dictamen y se transcribe ahora literal: "Tal instrumento (el contenido en el Reglamento), resulta indiscutible, es muy diferente a la convención colectiva contemplada en el Código de Trabajo (artículo 54 y siguientes)(…) Se expresa luego que los fallos de esa Sala "…lo que desautorizaron para el caso de los servidores públicos, fue únicamente la negociación de las condiciones de empleo mediante el instrumento denominado Convención Colectiva de Trabajo, que regula el citado Capítulo Tercero de nuestro Código. De modo que no existe impedimento jurídico alguno para que la modalidad especial de negociación para el sector público denominada "convenio" (artículo 8 in fine del citado cuerpo reglamentario) puede ser utilizada en la práctica. Lo anterior, desde luego, en el entendido de que las negociaciones que se pretendan realizar se ajusten en un todo a las previsiones del reglamento, básicamente en cuanto a los extremos que pueden ser objeto de negociación… así como al sometimiento de lo convenido a la Comisión de control a que se ha hecho referencia." Igualmente, señala la Procuraduría, su criterio ha sido el de que no proceden las convenciones colectivas en las Municipalidades, por las mismas razones expresadas (ver dictamen C-044-99 de 22 de febrero de 1999). En conclusión, ya no son posibles en instituciones donde existe un régimen de empleo de naturaleza pública, las prórrogas o modificaciones de las convenciones colectivas; 2) sobre la situación de quienes no son servidores públicos porque no participan en la gestión pública, a juicio de la Procuraduría (dictamen C-260-98 de 3 de diciembre de 1998), en instituciones con régimen de empleo de naturaleza laboral (no pública), de acuerdo con los criterios vertidos por la Sala Constitucional y la doctrina de interés, sí es factible negociar colectivamente las condiciones de empleo, pero no en forma ilimitada, puesto que como se ha dicho, no pueden dispensarse o excepcionarse leyes, reglamentos o directrices gubernamentales vigentes. Como conclusión, expresa textualmente la Procuraduría General de la República:

"a.- El instituto de la Convención Colectiva de Trabajo regulado en nuestro Código Laboral (artículo 54 y siguientes), no resulta aplicable en el caso de relaciones de empleo de naturaleza pública (servidores públicos); lo que resulta allí aplicable es el llamado "Reglamento de Negociación Colectiva para los Servidores Públicos".

b.- En tratándose de personal que no califica como servidor público (en los términos establecidos en la Ley General de la Administración Pública) sí resulta procedente la negociación colectiva de las condiciones de empleo; no obstante, en el instrumento respectivo deberán respetarse las leyes, reglamentos o directrices gubernamentales vigentes relacionados con los extremos negociados.

c.- También se encuentran ajustados a derecho los instrumentos colectivos que se hayan venido prorrogando o modificando en aplicación de las Directrices sobre Convenciones Colectivas en el Sector Público; sin embargo, aquellos que cubran a personal regido por una relación de empleo de naturaleza pública, fueron desautorizados en virtud de los fallos de esa Sala." 5.- En respuesta a la audiencia concedida, el Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en escrito presentado a las 13:55 horas del 26 de octubre de 1999 (folios 79 y siguientes), en lo esencial, señala que desarrolla el tema en tres secciones que tienen como objeto demostrar que las convenciones colectivas en el sector público, tienen fundamento jurídico y están autorizadas en las más variadas fuentes del ordenamiento jurídico, desde las normas fundamentales de la Constitución Política, hasta la legislación ordinaria. Luego desarrolla las tres secciones, así: I.- La convención colectiva de trabajo es un derecho social consagrado en la Constitución Política, sin distingo de ninguna especie. Comienza por afirmar que los derechos y garantías sociales están conformados por derechos individuales y colectivos, que en su conjunto aspiran a lograr una mejor distribución de la riqueza nacional y alcanzar los valores de justicia social, principios contenidos en los artículos 50 y 74 constitucionales; que la libertad sindical es consustancial a todo régimen democrático y en doctrina se considera que constituye un género, que comprende además de la garantía de asociación, el derecho de actividad sindical, que se concreta en el derecho de negociación colectiva y las medidas de autotutela del colectivo laboral; es decir, que la libertad que se les reconoce a los trabajadores para sindicalizarse, está indisolublemente ligada al derecho de negociación o contratación colectiva. Afirma que la convención colectiva es el instrumento, que procura la realización del objetivo constitucional, que se encomienda a las organizaciones sindicales en el artículo 60 de la Constitución Política y que esta norma no hace distingo alguno en función de la naturaleza jurídica de la relación. Por otro lado, cita la doctrina nacional que señala que "El art. 61 significa que cuando la Constitución ha querido negar una garantía social –como la huelga- lo dispone expresamente, como asimismo que, cuando quiere concederla, se limita a consagrarla para todos los trabajadores, sin hacer distinciones. Y significa el art. 61, sobre todo, confirmación expresa de que la Constitución reputa trabajadores beneficiarios de las garantías sociales a los que laboren en servicios públicos, pues de lo contrario no les habría negado expresamente el derecho a la huelga. Todas las garantías sociales para los trabajadores contenidas en el Título V –Capítulo Unico- de la Constitución son garantías de los servidores públicos, en cuanto seres humanos necesitados de la protección que brindan esas garantías, como a los otros trabajadores comunes, salvo disposición en contrario de la misma Constitución, según la ha hecho el art. 61 en comentario." Consecuentemente, el artículo 62 constitucional cumple la exigencia del principio de legalidad y la negación del derecho, implica un trato discriminatorio, contrario al principio de igualdad; por otro lado, los principios de Estado de Derecho y Democrático, apoyan el reconocimiento del derecho a favor de los servidores públicos. Por último, afirma que el constituyente no tuvo en mente suprimir las garantías sociales de los servidores públicos –salvo el tema de la huelga-. II.- El derecho a la negociación colectiva en la Administración Pública, tiene además un carácter reforzado en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. Se afirma que la convención colectiva, incluyendo las del sector público, están reconocidas en los principales convenios sobre la materia de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (Nos. 87 relativo a la libertad sindical y a la protección del derecho de sindicalización, 98 relativo a la aplicación de los principios del derecho de sindicalización y de negociación colectiva, 135 relativo a la protección y facilidades que deben otorgarse a los representantes de los trabajadores en la empresa, 151 sobre la protección del derecho de sindicalización y los procedimientos para determinar las condiciones de empleo en la administración pública y 154 sobre el fomento de la negociación colectiva). Luego hace un análisis de las normas que le interesa, contenidas en los convenios citados. Aclara que los convenios 87 y 98 están ratificados por Costa Rica y por ello, tienen el rango jerárquico que estipula el artículo 7 constitucional, mientras que el 151 no lo ha sido, pero no obstante, tiene valor de fuente supletoria a la luz de lo que establece el artículo 15 del Código de Trabajo. De lo dicho concluye que en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, los únicos que no tendrían derecho a celebrar convenciones colectivas serían los funcionarios públicos (strictu sensu), comprendidos en el inciso 2 del artículo 1 del Convenio 151, vinculados por una relación orgánica con la Administración y resalta el contenido de los pronunciamientos de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, en los que se ha exigido al país, en aplicación de Convenios y Recomendaciones, que cumpla con esos contenidos. III.- El régimen jurídico laboral de los empleados de los bancos comerciales del Estado.- Indica que la distinción que hace la Ley General de la Administración Pública, entre servidores públicos y privados, "…nunca podría justificar o tener el alcance de que se pudiera interpretar correctamente, en el sentido que excluya a alguna categoría de servidores públicos del derecho de negociación colectiva, salvo desde luego a aquellos funcionarios públicos que asumen la representación de la gestión pública de la administración y ostentan la condición de representantes de los órganos constitucionales y demás instituciones públicas, que son en nuestra opinión los únicos que resultarían privados de ese derecho". Analiza luego la naturaleza jurídica de los bancos comerciales del Estado, a la luz de la doctrina de los entes descentralizados y del proceso llamado "Estado Empresario", partiendo del examen del contenido del artículo 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y aludiendo a la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, que se ha referido a la naturaleza mercantil de la actividad de los bancos públicos, para concluir que con el artículo 112 ídem, señalar que la ley establece un régimen de empleo público para los servidores de la Administración y un régimen de empleo privado o común, para los trabajadores de las empresas y servicios económicos del Estado, que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración. De acuerdo con lo expuesto, llega a la conclusión que la naturaleza de la relación de los servidores del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica es laboral y por ello, regulada por el Código de Trabajo y por ello, pueden celebrar convenciones colectivas de trabajo. Destaca la sentencia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia del 14 de junio de 1984. Finalmente, solicita que se declare la validez y constitucionalidad de las convenciones colectivas suscritas en el sector público.

6.- En el expediente se recibieron escritos del Sindicato de Trabajadores del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (folios 47 a 57); de la Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros y del Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros, Químicos y Afines (folios 60 a 69); del Sindicato de Empleados de la Universidad de Costa Rica y su representante como Coordinador de la Federación de Trabajadores de la Educación Superior (folio 73); del Sindicato de Empleados del Consejo Nacional de Producción (folios 125 a 147); del Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional (folios 152 a 163), todos ellos refiriéndose al tema, así como escritos de apoyo de los trabajadores del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (folios 149 a 151 y 164 a 210).

7.- En el procedimiento se cumplió con las formalidades de ley.

Redacta el magistrado Sancho González; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- SOBRE LAS RAZONES DE LA CONSULTA. - La base esencial de la consulta está contenida en la resolución de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de las dieciséis horas diez minutos del once de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y nueve en la que se lee en lo que interesa:

"Por tener fundadas dudas sobre la posibilidad y legitimación de celebrar y, efectuar eventuales reformas de las convenciones colectivas existentes en el sector público (…) al no existir norma en el ordenamiento constitucional y legal administrativo, que permita la concertación de este tipo de instrumentos colectivos, ni sus variaciones de fondo; tampoco de principios de similares rangos constitucional o legal que permitan concertar y reformar, bajo el instrumento colectivo en el Sector Público." (considerando I) " (…) el propio constituyente quiso expresamente diferenciar la figura del empleado público del privado, creando un Régimen de Empleo Público, regido por los principios del Derecho Público (…) Dicha condición, propia del Régimen de Empleo Público, implica que, los servidores públicos sólo puedan realizar determinadas actuaciones, si están autorizados por una norma que los faculte para ello." (considerando IV) "La Sala Constitucional, en ese voto, declaró inconstitucionales los numerales 368 –parte segunda- y 497 a 535 del Código de Trabajo, por violación de los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política, en cuanto se aplicarán al régimen de empleo público … "(considerando VI) "Del estudio detenido de ese Voto, se desprende que, la Sala Constitucional, declaró inconstitucional la celebración de arreglos directos y conciliaciones, por parte de los servidores del Estado, sujetos al régimen de empleo público; así como los procedimientos de arbitraje (…) Bajo una perspectiva netamente jurídica, consideramos que si la razón primordial, para proceder a declarar la inconstitucionalidad de los Laudos Arbitrales, los Arreglos directos y las Conciliaciones, dentro del Régimen de Empleo Público, fue la falta de normas que autorizaran esos procedimientos, en la Administración Pública, lo mismo ocurre con las Convenciones Colectivas … " (considerando VII) "Por esto, la Sala estima que, a partir del Voto No. 1696-92 de la Sala Constitucional, todas las convenciones colectivas pactadas, dentro del Sector Público, que no se refieran a los obreros trabajadores o a los empleados que no participan en la gestión pública de la administración, cuando los mismos sean contratados por el Estado conforme a su capacidad de ejercicio de Derecho Privado -artículos 3 y 111 de la Ley General citada-, son inconstitucionales, así como las reformas introducidas a las mismas, porque no existe disposición alguna que permita tales reformas, tampoco principio alguno, de rango constitucional o legal, del cual se pueda obtener tal autorización normativa…" (considerando VIII) II.- APERSONAMIENTO DE ASOCIACIONES SINDICALES EN EL EXPEDIENTE.- Como se ha indicado en los resultandos de esta sentencia, además de las partes legitimadas, en razón de habérseles conferido audiencia, se apersonaron en el expediente el Sindicato de Trabajadores del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (folio 47), conjuntamente, la Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros y el Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros, Químicos y Afines (folio 60), también en forma conjunta, el Sindicato de Empleados de la Universidad de Costa Rica y la Federación de Trabajadores de la Educación Superior (folio 73), el Sindicato de Empleados del Consejo Nacional de Producción (folio 125) y el Secretario General del Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Universidad Nacional (folio 152). Todos han presentado escritos respaldando sus opiniones sobre el tema de la consulta y la Sala los ha incorporado al expediente, pero que no puede referirse a esos alegatos, en razón de lo especial del proceso de consulta. Este queda limitado a las partes que señala expresamente la ley, y que en este caso concreto, solamente lo es el Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, que es el ente sindical que firmó la convención colectiva que sirve de asunto base del proceso de consulta.

III.- JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA SALA CONSTITUCIONAL SOBRE EL TEMA. - En la consulta y los alegatos de las partes se citan, principalmente, las sentencias de esta Sala números 1696-92, 3854-92 y 3053-94. Como es de lógica entender, resulta importante extraer de esos precedentes, las ideas que interesan para la decisión de este asunto, así:

a). - sentencia N.º 1696-92. de las quince horas treinta minutos del veintitrés de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y dos.

En esta sentencia se analizó el tema de la incorporación del régimen estatutario para los servidores del Estado, por la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de 1949 y se dijo, entre otras cosas:

“ VI. Por lo anterior, la intervención de los Tribunales de Trabajo, con el procedimiento de arbitraje obligatorio para los servicios públicos, en los términos de los artículos del Código de Trabajo impugnados, tuvo origen en otro orden constitucional pues dicho cuerpo de normas data de 1943 y bajo otras necesidades, sin que existiera -en ese momento- la concepción constitucional de un régimen laboral público, exclusivo para los servidores del Estado, a fin de regular y dirimir las diversas situaciones que afectan esa relación. Rige actualmente una Constitución Política que sí lo previó y que, no obstante ello, se sigue utilizando un orden legal común, sometiéndose a la Administración Pública y sus empleados, a la resolución de sus diferencias mediante un procedimiento de índole privado. Esto resulta en una aplicación inconstitucional en virtud del desfase histórico y jurídico que esta materia evidencia, lo que contraviene tácitamente el artículo 197 de la Constitución Política. Es claro que la intención del constituyente era la de crear un régimen laboral administrativo. De la lectura de las actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente se distingue la figura del empleado público y del trabajador privado. Es indudable que la ausencia de un régimen jurídico que regule apropiadamente las relaciones entre el Estado y sus servidores, quebranta el artículo 191 de la Constitución Política, lo que conlleva también al quebrantamiento del artículo 11 de la Carta Magna pues, "... toda norma u acto inconstitucional lo viola, por definición, en tanto que consagra el principio de legalidad según el cual los funcionarios públicos no pueden ejercer otras funciones que las que les están otorgadas por el ordenamiento y este no las otorga en ningún caso para realizar los que sean contrarios a la Constitución" (Sala Constitucional, Resolución N.º 550-91, de las dieciocho horas cincuenta minutos del quince de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y uno), quedando en claro que se quebranta el principio de legalidad pues falta un régimen administrativo laboral adecuado a la Constitución Política, y una norma administrativa expresa que permita al Estado someterse a los tribunales de arbitraje en aras de solucionar entre otros problemas, los conflictos colectivos. Ese quebrantamiento se originó en la necesidad, de seguro sentida, de contar con alguna respuesta del ordenamiento, solo que, como queda expuesto, deberá realizarse la regulación del asunto, que por lo pronto no existe. -

VII.Por una parte, la Ley que se emitió (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) tiene alcances parciales, ya que la iniciativa tomada por el Poder Ejecutivo al respecto solamente tuvo como propósito regular las relaciones con sus servidores, esto es, dentro de su ámbito competencial. Desde este ángulo de enfoque, se ha dejado por fuera la regulación de las relaciones de servicio entre los entes públicos menores, pues era algo en lo que no tenía interés el Ejecutivo, o simplemente no era lo que consideraba más urgente. Por otra parte, el Estatuto del Servicio Civil reguló apenas algunos de los aspectos de la relación de los servidores con el Estado como los relativos a derechos, deberes de los servidores, su selección, clasificación, promoción, traslados, disciplina y régimen de despido -entre los más importantes-, que evidentemente atañen a una de las preocupaciones expresadas en la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, esto es, la que tiene relación con la idoneidad y la eficiencia del servicio, pero no tocó otros aspectos no menos importantes, como es el que subyace en el planteamiento de esta acción, es decir, la regulación del propio régimen económico de esa relación y el sometimiento de los otros entes administrativos al régimen laboral público. Este vacío, sin embargo, no autoriza utilizar mecanismos previstos para una relación privada, a una relación de empleo público que se debe regir por principios propios y diferentes. -

VIII.No duda la Sala en señalar la existencia de un distinto ordenamiento jurídico a partir de 1949, no obstante que en muchos temas se dio reiteración de lo que a la fecha había venido rigiendo, porque a pesar de la parca redacción del artículo 191 y del Transitorio al artículo 140, inciso 2), ambos de la Constitución Política, el examen de las discusiones de esas normas nos permiten establecer que existe un mandato y no simple recomendación para aplicar a esa relación de empleo entre la administración pública y sus servidores, criterios propios o especiales. Conforme al transitorio de reiterada cita, debía la Asamblea Legislativa promulgar dentro del término del 8 de noviembre de mil novecientos cincuenta al 1 de junio de mil novecientos cincuenta y tres, la Ley de Servicio Civil que tendría como característica principal su aplicación paulatina en las oficinas de distinta naturaleza de la Administración Pública, lo cual -con evidencia- no fue cumplido a cabalidad, pero en todo caso, debe quedar claro que la confusión existente en la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de utilizar y mencionar el Código de Trabajo en la Constitución lo era para establecer, de alguna forma, un parámetro normativo que rigiera el fin de la relación de trabajo y no como se ha querido entender, que sus principios y normas inspiran y rigen la relación entre el Estado y el servidor público.-

IX.Tampoco desconoce la Sala el hecho de que en 1978 la Ley General de la Administración Pública pretendió definir la relación entre los servidores públicos y la Administración, como regulada por el Derecho Administrativo (artículo 112.1). Pero nuevamente encontramos que se trata de un intento insuficiente para con esa sola declaración, barrer de la praxis jurídica, toda una tradición que aplica en mayor o menor medida un régimen más propio de las relaciones laborales privadas, en donde rigen principios tan flexibles como el de la autonomía de la voluntad, o el de derechos mínimos, mientras que la administración está sujeta por todo un bloque de legalidad (esta a su vez ordinaria y constitucional). En efecto, la normativa laboral común se inscribe dentro de una filosofía de beneficios mínimos, ergo, superables por las partes, a fin de armonizar los factores de la producción (artículo 397 del Código de Trabajo), lo que justifica incluso la participación de personas legas en derecho, que llegan a resolver en conciencia, valga decir, sin sujeción a parámetros claramente establecidos como ha sucedido ya, peticiones de la más diversa calidad y cantidad. La experiencia de los tribunales de arbitraje en materia de conflictos económicos sociales, ha sido pletórica en estos años recientes. Incluso puede agregarse, como ha sido señalado en estudios especializados, que se llegó a la utilización de esta vía, cuando otros que se venían utilizando, por diversos motivos, dejaron de serlo. -

XI En opinión de la Sala, entonces, los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política, fundamentan la existencia, de principio, de un régimen de empleo regido por el Derecho Público, dentro del sector público, como ha quedado claro del debate en la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente y recoge incipientemente la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Este régimen de empleo público implica, necesariamente, consecuencias derivadas de la naturaleza de esa relación, con principios generales propios, ya no solamente distintos a los del derecho laboral (privado), sino muchas veces contrapuestos a éstos. Obviamente, la declaración contenida en esta sentencia abarca la relación de empleo que se da entre la administración (o mejor, administraciones) pública y sus servidores, más en aquellos sectores en que hay una regulación (racional) que remita a un régimen privado de empleo, la solución debe ser diferente. En esos casos, se daría un sometimiento a los procedimientos de arbitraje, pero con ciertas limitaciones, tales como que en ellos no pueden dispensarse o excepcionarse leyes, reglamentos o directrices gubernamentales vigentes, por lo que incluso en estos casos no procederían decisiones (laudos) en conciencia, ni tribunales formados por sujetos no abogados. Esta declaración se formula con base en la facultades legales que tiene la Sala y por considerarse indispensable para la correcta interpretación del conjunto de su decisión. Por innecesario, se omite pronunciamiento sobre otros aspectos alegados en la acción." De relevancia, derivado de lo dicho en la sentencia parcialmente transcrita, la clara definición de los alcances del sistema estatutario que regula las relaciones entre el Estado y sus servidores, aunque con las connotaciones tan especiales de no haberse promulgado como un sistema integral. La Sala se manifiesta, en esa oportunidad, por la inconstitucionalidad de la normativa que conducía a la solución de los conflictos colectivos de trabajo, por la vía de la conciliación y arbitraje, declarando que son nulos los laudos en el sector público.

b). - sentencia Nº3854-92 de las quince horas cuarenta y dos minutos del dos de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y dos.

Dictada en un recurso de amparo, resuelve el caso en el que se cuestionan las disposiciones de una convención colectiva, contra la exclusión que se hizo de ciertos funcionarios y servidores, en razón de su especial vinculación con el ente público. Este precedente es invocado por el sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, como precedente que respalda los principios constitucionales y legales que le reconocen a las convenciones colectivas fuerza de ley. La Sala, efectivamente, en varios expedientes ha examinado alegatos en pro y en contra de las convenciones colectivas, examinando aspectos alegatos muy puntualmente, pero nunca resolviendo el tema de si son o no constitucionales las convenciones colectivas, como ahora sí lo ha planteado la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.

c). - Sentencia N° 3053-94 de las nueve horas con cuarenta y cinco minutos del veinticuatro de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro.

Especial énfasis le concede la Procuraduría General de la República a esta sentencia y señala dos aspectos concretos: que en ella la Sala entró a resolver expresamente el tema de las convenciones colectivas en el sector público y es a partir de esta resolución, que se complementa la sentencia sobre los llamados "laudos arbitrales". Se expresó textualmente:

“SEGUNDO. Cabe acoger parcialmente el amparo pedido por el Sindicato recurrente y sin que sea necesario otorgarle plazo para formalizar acción de inconstitucionalidad contra la resolución de la Procuraduría del 24 de junio de l991 que rechaza la reconsideración solicitada por la J.A.S.E.C. del dictamen rendido el 12 de diciembre de l985: en fallo recaído a las 15:30 horas del 23 de agosto de l992, esta Sala resolvió que los obreros, trabajadores o empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración pueden ocurrir a los procedimientos de resolución de los conflictos colectivos de carácter económico y social previstos en los artículos 497 y siguientes del Código de Trabajo. Así las cosas, el régimen es administrativo, estatutario, para los "servidores públicos", o sea, para quienes prestan servicios a la administración o a nombre y por cuenta de ésta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura; sin embargo, la propia Ley General de la Administración Pública establece que "las relaciones de servicio con obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración, de conformidad con el párrafo 3 del artículo 111, se regirán por el derecho laboral o mercantil, según los casos" (Ley General de la Administración Pública, artículo 112, inciso 2). No procede acoger, por haber sido ya resuelto en sentido contrario en la acción de inconstitucionalidad mencionada, el amparo pedido en cuanto a la denegatoria de negociación colectiva opuesta a los "servidores públicos" de la J.A.S.E.C. Pero sí cabe amparar al Sindicato recurrente en cuanto la resolución de la Procuraduría del 24 de junio de l993 (ver folios 134 a 139), debió reconsiderar de oficio el dictamen rendido el 12 de diciembre de l985 (inciso b del artículo 3 de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República) y distinguir entre funcionarios públicos y trabajadores que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración, porque someterlos a todos a la prohibición aludida contradice el fallo varias veces citado y la garantía prevista por el artículo 62 de la Constitución Política, obviamente en el entendido de que la determinación de la categoría de trabajadores que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración es cuestión de mera legalidad…" Puede notarse que efectivamente esta Sala Constitucional ha hecho pronunciamiento sobre el tema de las convenciones colectivas en el sector público, en los términos que se han señalado en las transcripciones.

IV.- PRONUNCIAMIENTOS DE LA PROCURADURIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA. - En el informe rendido a este Tribunal, la Procuraduría General de la República se refiere a tres pronunciamientos que dirigió, por su orden, al Ministerio de Justicia y Gracia, a la Presidencia Ejecutiva de la Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA) y al Alcalde Municipal de la Municipalidad del Cantón de Tibás. Tiene importancia para evacuar la consulta, glosar esos documentos:

a). - C-161-98 de 10 de agosto de 1998.

Se le pide a la Procuraduría General de la República reconsiderar anteriores dictámenes, en los que se indicó que la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional impide la negociación colectiva en el sector público, salvo en los casos en que se trate de trabajadores, obreros y empleados, que no participen en la gestión pública de la Administración. La posición sostenida por la Procuraduría General es confirmada y para ello, fundamenta su opinión en la sentencia 3053-94, que resulta vinculante erga omnes, en virtud de lo que dispone el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Se agrega que es posible la aplicación del Reglamento de Negociación Colectiva para los Servidores Públicos, aprobado por Acuerdo del Consejo de Gobierno, en Sesión Ordinaria No. 25 de 6 de octubre de 1992, publicado en La Gaceta No. 45 de 5 de marzo de 1993, en la medida en que se deben observar restricciones que no tiene el régimen privado, como aspectos que tengan incidencia sobre los presupuestos de los entes públicos y todo ello sujeto a un control superior, en razón de que no fue afectado por los pronunciamientos de la Sala Constitucional.

b). - C-260-98 de 3 de diciembre de 1998.

Se pregunta a la Procuraduría General de la República, cuáles son los órganos de la Administración Pública Descentralizada que participan en la gestión pública y cómo se define el funcionario que está cubierto por una convención colectiva. El dictamen procurador indica que JAPDEVA "es un ente autónomo del Estado, con carácter de empresa de utilidad pública, ubicada, según la doctrina nacional, dentro de las empresas - ente público, que desarrolla como actividad exclusiva o principal la de empresa. Es el ente público económico". Luego el informe se refiere a las sentencias de esta Sala, comentando los alcances jurídicos de los artículos 3, 111 y 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, la doctrina nacional relacionada con el tema, en torno a la definición de cuáles administraciones están sujetas al régimen público y cuáles no, de quién participa en la gestión pública de la administración y quién no lo hace. En sus conclusiones señala que la jurisprudencia de esta Sala se permiten los laudos y las convenciones colectivas en las empresas del Estado, lo que resulta reforzado y complementado por los artículos 111 y 112 antes citados, pero advirtiendo, eso sí, que la posibilidad de negociación no puede ser irrestricta, debiendo respetarse, por ejemplo, las limitaciones que se exigen para armonizar el gasto público con la disponibilidad presupuestaria y que no pueden dispensarse o excepcionarse leyes, reglamentos o directrices gubernamentales vigentes.

c). - C-044-99 de 22 de febrero de 1999.

Se consulta sobre la validez de una cláusula incorporada en 1990, pero cuya prórroga no fue homologada por las partes en 1993. Claramente, se expresa en este dictamen que el tema de distinción, para definir si procede o no la convención colectiva en el sector público, radica en el examen de la naturaleza del servicio que presta la persona física, a los efectos de establecer si participa o no en la gestión pública; a partir de esa ubicación se deslindan los campos jurídicos de las relaciones entre los trabajadores y el Estado para esos efectos, de manera que si la relación es estatutaria, estará sujeta al Derecho Público y en el caso contrario, se regulará por el Derecho Laboral. La conclusión del dictamen, se encierra en el siguiente concepto básico: "no existe fundamento jurídico para celebrar, a futuro, convenciones colectivas en el sector público (con la excepción hecha en relación con obreros o trabajadores de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado)". Como complemento señala la Procuraduría General de la República, que no se desconoce la existencia de convenciones colectivas que se están aplicando y cuya validez está en entredicho, pero que no pueden ser cuestionadas formalmente, si no lo es por la vía de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. En resumen de lo dicho en este considerando: la Procuraduría General de la República, en el informe a esta Sala en el expediente de la consulta que ahora se evacua, reitera su posición que ha venido sosteniendo en dictámenes anteriores, según lo que se ha expresado en líneas precedentes, que es síntesis histórica de una posición jurídica largamente sostenida.

V.- LOS CONVENIOS DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DEL TRABAJO (OIT).- En el escrito que presentó ante la Sala el Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, afirma que las convenciones colectivas en general y las del sector público, con los alcances que ese informe les confiere, están reconocidas en los principales convenios de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) y alude, específicamente, a los convenios que se distinguen con los números 87, 98, 135 y 151, que para los efectos de esta consulta, la Sala examina individualmente:

a). - Convenio No. 87 “relativo a la libertad sindical y a la protección del derecho de sindicación".

Este convenio fue adoptado en la Trigésima Primera Reunión celebrada en la Ciudad de San Francisco, del 17 de junio al 10 de julio de 1948; entró en vigor el 4 de julio de 1950; fue aprobado en Costa Rica por la Ley 2561 de 11 de mayo de 1960, y sobre su contenido y para los efectos del tema bajo análisis, señala el sindicato SEBANA, que contiene cuatro garantías y dos cláusulas de salvaguardia, que por su orden son:

el derecho de los trabajadores y empleadores a constituir organizaciones sindicales, así como afiliarse a ellas (artículo 2); autonomía política, estatutaria, administrativa y programática y el deber de las autoridades públicas de abstenerse de toda intervención que tienda a limitar este derecho o a entorpecer su ejercicio legal (artículo 3); la protección especial de las organizaciones sindicales, frente a la disolución o suspensión administrativa, que queda prohibida (artículo 4); el libre derecho de las asociaciones sindicales de constituir y de afiliarse a federaciones y confederaciones y a organismos internacionales de trabajadores y de empleadores (artículo 5); la primera cláusula de salvaguardia es la contenida en el artículo 7, en virtud de la cual, no se puede condicionar, de ninguna forma, el ejercicio de los derechos contenidos en los artículos 2, 3 y 4; y la segunda, que regula las medidas que pueda tomar la legislación local en defensa del orden público y la legalidad (relación de los artículos 8, 10 y 11).

En realidad, el texto del convenio tiene gran relevancia, en la medida en que proclama la libertad sindical; pero la Sala no encuentra en este documento, la enunciación expresa al derecho a celebrar convenciones colectivas en el sector público; se hace abstracción, por ahora, del ejercicio que hace Nombre128357 para afirmar que no puede haber libertad sindical si no existe la posibilidad jurídica de suscribir convenciones colectivas de trabajo, independientemente de que el sindicato pertenezca al sector público o privado, lo que se analizará posteriormente.

b). - Convenio No. 98 "relativo a la aplicación de los principios del derecho de sindicación y de negociación colectiva".

Adoptado en la Trigésima Segunda Reunión, celebrada en Ginebra, el 8 de junio de 1949; entró en vigor el 18 de julio de 1951; fue aprobado, también, por la Ley No. 2561 de 11 de mayo de 1960, y sobre su contenido, Nombre128357 alude expresamente a los artículos 5 y 6, para indicar que en el primero se establece el principio general que remite a la legislación nacional de cada Estado, en lo que se refiere a la aplicación del convenio a las fuerzas armadas y policía, cláusula que también está contenida en el convenio anterior; y aludiendo al artículo siguiente, que literalmente dispone "El presente convenio no trata de la situación de los funcionarios públicos en la administración del Estado y no deberá interpretarse, en modo alguno, en menoscabo de sus derechos o de su estatuto". Comenta el sindicato que esta norma ha sido objeto de varios análisis en la OIT, en razón de que muchos gobiernos la han entendido en el sentido de que no es posible la convención colectiva en el sector público, lo que va más allá de la razón de ser de la disposición. En otras palabras, Nombre128357 entiende que la OIT al examinar el artículo 6 del convenio, le da un alcance restringido a la limitación, para conducir a la interpretación de la necesidad de diferenciar entre funcionarios que cumplen actividades propias de la administración del Estado, de los demás empleados del gobierno, para concluir que la restricción " (…) solo afectaría a aquellos funcionarios públicos o jerarcas que representan la Administración del Estado y sus instituciones y que actúan como órganos de poder de esas administraciones, en virtud de la relación orgánica que los liga a la Administración".

c). - Convenio No. 135 “relativo a la protección y facilidades que deben otorgarse a los representantes de los trabajadores en la empresa".

Adoptado en la Quincuagésima Sexta Reunión, celebrada en Ginebra del 2 al 23 de junio de 1971; fue aprobado por Ley 5968 del 9 de noviembre de 1976. Aunque citado en su escrito por Nombre128357, no se hace a él referencia expresa ni análisis alguno. Sin embargo, es importante resaltar que está concebido para dotar a los representantes sindicales de protección eficaz contra todo acto que pueda perjudicarlos en el ejercicio de esa representación, siempre y cuando actúen conforme con las leyes, contratos colectivos u otros acuerdos comunes en vigor (art. 1) y por ello, además del convenio, en la misma Ley se aprobó la Recomendación No. 142, sobre la protección y facilidades que deben otorgarse a los representantes de los trabajadores en la empresa, acordada en la Conferencia General de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, que se resume en el contenido de su artículo 5°, que literalmente dispone: "Los representantes de los trabajadores en la empresa deberían gozar de protección eficaz contra todo acto que pueda perjudicarlos, incluido el despido por razón de su condición de representante de los trabajadores, de su actividad como tales representantes, de su afiliación al sindicato, o de su participación en la actividad sindical, siempre que dichos representante actúen conforme a las leyes, contratos colectivos u otros acuerdos comunes en vigor".- El tema sirve de base, para que se afirme que no permitir las convenciones colectivas en el sector público, implica una manera de obstaculizar el libre ejercicio de la representación sindical.

d). - Convenio No. 151 "sobre la protección del derecho de la sindicación y los procedimientos para determinar las condiciones de empleo en la administración pública".

Fue adoptado en la Sexagésima Cuarta Reunión, celebrada en Ginebra del 7 al 28 de junio de 1978; no ha sido aprobado por la Asamblea Legislativa y en consecuencia, no ha sido ratificado por Costa Rica. Del documento, para los efectos de esta sentencia, se extraen los párrafos y artículos que se transcriben y comentan:

"Recordando que el Convenio sobre el derecho de sindicación y de negociación colectiva, 1949, no es aplicable a ciertas categorías de empleados públicos y que el Convenio y la Recomendación sobre los representantes de los trabajadores, 1971, se aplican a los representantes de los trabajadores en la empresa; Tomando nota de la considerable expansión de los servicios prestados por la administración pública en muchos países y de la necesidad de que existan sanas relaciones laborales entre las autoridades públicas y las organizaciones de empleados públicos; Observando la gran diversidad de los sistemas políticos, sociales y económicos de los Estados Miembros y las diferentes prácticas aplicadas por dichos Estados (por ejemplo, en lo atinente a las funciones respectivas de las autoridades centrales y locales; a las funciones de las autoridades federales, estatales y provinciales; a las de las empresas propiedad del Estado y de los diversos tipos de organismos públicos autónomos y semiautónomos, o en lo que respecta a la naturaleza de la relación de empleo); Teniendo en cuenta los problemas particulares que plantea la delimitación del campo de aplicación de un instrumento internacional y la adopción de definiciones a los fines del instrumento en razón de las diferencias existentes en muchos países entre el empleo público y el empleo privado, así como las dificultades de interpretación que se han planteado a propósito de la aplicación a los funcionarios públicos de las disposiciones pertinentes del Convenio sobre el derecho a la sindicación y de negociación colectiva, 1949, y las observaciones por las cuales los órganos de control de la OIT han señalado en diversas ocasiones que ciertos gobiernos han aplicado dichas disposiciones en forma tal que grupos numerosos de empleados públicos han quedado excluidos del campo de aplicación del Convenio (…) " De este contenido de la parte considerativa del Convenio y de la doctrina del Derecho del Trabajo, la Sala entiende que se derivan las siguientes conclusiones iniciales: a) que el derecho colectivo del trabajo, encuentra su ratio legis en la necesidad del trabajador de agruparse, para contrarrestar la inferioridad en que se encuentra frente al patrono y por ello es que su base jurídica se encuentra en el derecho de asociación y más específicamente, en el de sindicación; b) que en esta rama del Derecho son vitales dos instituciones: los convenios colectivos de trabajo y los conflictos colectivos; c) que el derecho colectivo del Trabajo, es materia innovadora en la historia de las reivindicaciones sociales y se estructura como institución de relevancia internacional, a partir de los convenios de la OIT de 1948 y 1949; d) que en el sentido de la evolución en el tiempo de las instituciones jurídicas, y como es principio general del derecho colectivo del trabajo, el derecho de negociación colectiva no es aplicable al universo de los empleados públicos, por lo que se ha hecho necesario elevar a la categoría de norma internacional el contenido del Convenio No. 151 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Veamos ahora, las principales disposiciones normativas del Convenio, en lo que atañe a esta consulta:

Artículo 1.- indica que el Convenio se deberá aplicar a todos los empleados de la administración pública y le corresponde a la legislación nacional, determinar hasta qué punto la cobertura se extiende a los empleados de alto nivel (con poder decisorio o cargos directivos o que desempeña funciones confidenciales); Artículo 8.- señala, en términos generales, que la solución de los conflictos que se planteen como motivo de la determinación de las condiciones de empleo, se deben resolver por la vía de la negociación entre las partes o mediante procedimientos independientes e imparciales, como la mediación, la conciliación y el arbitraje; Artículo 9.- dispone que los empleados públicos, al igual que los demás trabajadores, gozan de los derechos civiles y políticos para el ejercicio normal de la libertad sindical, a reserva solamente de las obligaciones que se deriven de su condición y de la naturaleza de sus funciones; Artículo 11.- en su párrafo primero expresa que el convenio obliga solo a los miembros de la OIT cuyas ratificaciones haya registrado el Director General; De las normas glosadas se puede ver, en resumen, que el Convenio es estimado por la OIT como una necesidad para promover la equiparación de los empleados o servidores de la administración pública a la misma condición que tienen los empleados de la empresa privada, frente a la institución jurídica de la convención colectiva y el artículo 11.1 es particularmente claro, al definir la fuerza obligatoria del Convenio en el tiempo y determinar los sujetos obligados, haciendo depender esa fuerza vinculante de la ratificación del mismo Convenio. En síntesis: los cuatro Convenios de la OIT que se han citado, son los documentos internacionales de mayor relevancia y que enmarcan el entorno jurídico de las convenciones colectivas como uno de los instrumentos del Derecho Colectivo del Trabajo.

VI.- DOCTRINA SOBRE LA CONVENCIONES COLECTIVAS EN EL SECTOR PUBLICO, SEGÚN LOS ALEGATOS DEL SINDICATO SEBANA. El de las convenciones colectivas es un tema que ha sido profusamente tratado en el Derecho del Trabajo; se incluye dentro de la teoría general que conforma la rama denominada derecho colectivo del trabajo, cuyas instituciones principales que lo integran son las asociaciones profesionales (derecho sindical), los convenios colectivos de trabajo y los conflictos colectivos. Al exponer sus argumentos, el Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica combate la resolución de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, por medio de la que se formula la consulta que ahora se evacua y de la que se extraen los argumentos en los que se aloja la duda de constitucionalidad; el cuestionamiento se resume en afirmar que no existe norma en el ordenamiento constitucional y legal administrativo, que autorice las convenciones colectivas como instrumentos de regulación de las condiciones de trabajo en el sector público. Las conclusiones del Sindicato, que se expone como tesis antagónica de lo afirmado por la Sala consultante, a la vez que contradice los precedentes jurisprudenciales de este Tribunal y la opinión de la Procuraduría General de la República, son las siguientes: a) que los servidores públicos son trabajadores comunes y corrientes y por consiguiente, protegidos por el Capítulo de las Garantías Sociales de la Constitución Política; como consecuencia de lo anterior, cualquier limitación al disfrute de esos derechos y garantías resulta contraria al principio de legalidad y a los valores fundamentales de la persona; b) que la convención colectiva es un derecho social y como tal, está influenciado por los fines que se persiguen con los principios contenidos en los artículos 50 y 74 constitucionales; c) que la libertad sindical es consustancial a todo régimen democrático (no existe democracia si no existe libertad sindical) y, además, el derecho sindical está indisolublemente ligado al derecho a la negociación y contratación colectiva, lo que se deriva, en el caso del régimen jurídico costarricense, de los contenidos de los artículos 60 y 62 constitucionales; d) las normas constitucionales reconocen, sin más, el derecho a la convención colectiva, sin que se haga distingo de ninguna especie y por ello, la interpretación armónica que se haga de la Constitución y las normas y principios del Derecho Laboral, debe orientarse a reconocer ampliamente ese derecho y no a restringirlo injustificadamente en perjuicio de una categoría laboral que también requiere la protección de la convención colectiva de trabajo. En conclusión: para Nombre128357 el artículo 62 de la Constitución Política cumple la exigencia del principio de legalidad en esta materia; la negación de ese derecho resulta discriminatorio y contrario al principio de igualdad, al principio de Estado de Derecho y al principio Democrático. Y concluye afirmando que el derecho de la negociación colectiva en la administración pública tiene, además, un carácter reforzado en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, puesto que deriva de los Convenios de la OIT, que se han analizado en el considerando anterior. Esta síntesis de los alegatos del Sindicato, es lo que debe examinarse para arribar a las conclusiones de este pronunciamiento.

VII.- LA INTERPRETACION CONSTITUCIONAL. - El tema de la posibilidad de aplicar el instituto de las convenciones colectivas en el sector público, tal y como ha sido planteado por la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en este expediente, como se analiza en el informe que ha presentado a esta Sala la Procuraduría General de la República y como se deduce de los argumentos expresados por el Sindicato interesado, debe ahora estudiarse desde la óptica de la interpretación constitucional. Para entender el contexto en el que se analiza el problema planteado, es importante recordar ciertos postulados básicos que la doctrina del Derecho Constitucional ha elaborado consistentemente sobre su función contralora: a) la Constitución, desde el punto de vista formal, está integrada por un conjunto o complejo normativo, que obliga a que sus disposiciones se interpreten en forma coordinada, como parte de un sistema jurídico totalmente cohesionado; es decir, las normas deben considerarse en su conjunto y no individualmente; b) en el ejercicio de la competencia del control constitucional está siempre presente el principio de la supremacía constitucional; la Constitución es la norma suprema en la que se funda todo el orden jurídico y político del Estado; c) la Constitución contiene, expresa o tácitamente, una serie de principios, algunos de ellos llamados generales del Derecho constitucional, que propagan su luz a toda la estructura jurídica del Estado; d) la Constitución contiene o presupone valores fundamentales; e) las normas constitucionales se consideran dentro de los fines, valores y principios del Estado, de manera que suelen tener generalidad y apertura como para habilitar opciones y realizaciones diversas, lo que equivale afirmar que se pueden considerar varias soluciones, aunque no todas ellas compatibles con el Derecho de la Constitución. Partiendo de estas notas esenciales para la interpretación constitucional; con fundamento en los criterios doctrinarios expuestos por las partes que intervienen en la consulta, los precedentes jurisprudenciales de la propia Sala que se han citado y los convenios de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, la Sala llega a las siguientes premisas de la sentencia:

Primera: Admite, como teoría general del Derecho Colectivo Laboral, que éste se integra, principalmente, por una trilogía de derechos que persiguen hacer realidad y dar solución a la necesidad de los trabajadores de agruparse para compensar la inferioridad en que se encuentran cuando actúan aislados, frente al patrono y frente a la mínima legislación de protección de sus derechos; se trata del derecho a la sindicación, a la convención colectiva y a los conflictos colectivos. Pero confirma, eso sí, su propia sentencia No. 1696-92 de las 15:30 horas del 23 de agosto de 1992, para indicar que la génesis de la incorporación expresa de esos derechos en nuestro régimen constitucional, se encuentra en la modificación de la Constitución de 1871 ocurrida en las legislaturas de 1942 y 1943, cuando se aprobó la incorporación del Capítulo de las Garantías Sociales a la Constitución Política, lo que se hizo bajo condiciones políticas, sociales y económicas especiales pero distintas de la visión que tuvieron los Constituyentes, al promulgar la Constitución Política vigente. Uno de los fines perseguidos con el nuevo texto constitucional que se aprobó – posiblemente de los que más discusión suscitó -, fue el de incluir la "concepción constitucional de un régimen laboral público, exclusivo para los servidores del Estado, a fin de regular y dirimir las diversas situaciones que afectan esa relación", cuyas bases primordiales se encuentran en los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política. De esto se infiere, en aras de obtener la máxima claridad en esta sentencia, que se deba reiterar lo expresado en el precedente jurisprudencial antes referido, en la parte en la que se refiere a la especial circunstancia de que existen dos extremos u ordenamientos en materia laboral: uno que se regula por el Código de Trabajo y el otro, que se regula por el Derecho Público. Segunda: Partiendo de la conclusión inmediata anterior se reafirma, también, que la relación entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, como tesis de principio y con las salvedades que luego se dirán, es una relación llamada de empleo público o estatutaria, que como tal, está regulada por el Derecho Público; consecuentemente, no puede existir una relación de igualdad o de equivalencia entre las partes involucradas, como idealmente debiera suceder en la relación laboral de origen contractual, principalmente porque la Administración Pública representa un interés general, por la necesidad de la continuidad en la prestación de los servicios públicos y por las limitaciones que se imponen en las regulaciones presupuestarias. En otras palabras, el servidor del régimen de empleo público se encuentra con relación a la Administración, en un estado de sujeción; ella puede imponer unilateralmente las condiciones de la organización y prestación del servicio para garantizar el bien público, lo que elimina la posibilidad de que la relación sea considerada desde una perspectiva de equivalencia de derechos susceptible de negociación entre las partes. Esta conclusión comprende el que no se pueda reconocer la posibilidad de la negociación colectiva en el sector público, pues la sola idea de la negociación, como medio idóneo para revisar y aprobar las condiciones del empleo público, riñe con los postulados esenciales de la organización del Estado, que en este campo se introdujeron en los artículos 191 y 192 constitucionales. Tercera: La posición que la Sala viene sosteniendo, ha sido la que históricamente ha imperado en Costa Rica. Así, la imposibilidad jurídica de la negociación colectiva en el sector público, fue declarada por la sentencia de la Sala de Casación No. 58 de las 15:00 horas del 20 de julio de 1951. En mayo de 1953 y diciembre de 1954, se promulgaron el Estatuto del Servicio Civil y su Reglamento, y en interpretación de sus contenidos –constitucionales y legales- la Procuraduría General de la República sostuvo la tesis de la imposibilidad jurídica de la negociación colectiva en forma reiterada. En 1979 entró en vigencia la Ley General de la Administración Pública en la que se establece, con toda claridad, que el Derecho Administrativo se aplica a las relaciones de servicio entre el Estado y sus servidores, excluyendo de la relación la legislación laboral, a la que solo pueden acudir los servidores que no participan en la gestión pública (véanse, en este aspecto y en el considerando IV de esta sentencia, los más recientes pronunciamientos, que son síntesis de la reiterada opinión de la Procuraduría General de la República). En 1980 el Consejo de Gobierno prohibió, por la vía de la directriz, que se celebraran convenciones colectivas en el sector público; luego, en 1986, autorizó un mecanismo de aprobación de prórrogas a las convenciones colectivas anteriores a la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que después, en 1992, se transforma en el llamado Reglamento de Negociación Colectiva de los Servidores Públicos. Por último, en la sentencia No. 1696-92 de esta Sala, se declaró la inconstitucionalidad de los mecanismos del arreglo directo, la conciliación y el arbitraje. Cuarta: Para comprender lo anterior, es importante resaltar lo que ya ha dicho al respecto la Procuraduría General de la República en desarrollo de la doctrina nacional, en el sentido de que "son funcionarios públicos quienes prestan servicios a la Administración a nombre y por cuenta de ésta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva (Artículo 111, inciso 1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Estos servidores, de conformidad con lo expuesto, están imposibilitados para negociar colectivamente, por estar su relación regida por el Derecho público (Artículo 112, inciso 1 id.). Por su parte, de la interrelación de los artículos 112 inciso 2) y 111 inciso 3) (norma a la cual remite la primera y ambos de la misma Ley) queda también claro que no son funcionarios sujetos al régimen de empleo público, sino obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración, los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado, encargados de gestiones sometidas al Derecho común, que de conformidad con el artículo 112 inciso 2) transcrito, se rigen por el Derecho laboral y no por el Derecho público, lo que les faculta para negociar colectivamente. Quinta: La Sala estima que es jurídicamente compatible con el Derecho de la Constitución, la posición que en el desarrollo histórico de la institución de las convenciones colectivas, ha venido sosteniendo la Procuraduría General de la República en su informe a esta Sala, en especial, a partir de la sentencia número 3053-94 de las 9:45 horas del 24 de junio de 1994, en la que se expresó en el considerando segundo, antes transcrito, que "esta Sala resolvió que los obreros, trabajadores o empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración pueden ocurrir a los procedimientos de resolución de los conflictos colectivos de carácter económico y social previstos en los artículos 497 y siguientes del Código de Trabajo. Así las cosas, el régimen es administrativo, estatutario, para los "servidores públicos", o sea, para quienes prestan servicios a la administración o a nombre y por cuenta de ésta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura; sin embargo, la propia Ley General de la Administración Pública establece que "las relaciones de servicio con obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración, de conformidad con el párrafo 3 del artículo 111, se regirán por el derecho laboral o mercantil, según los casos". Consecuentemente, y a partir de esta interpretación constitucional y de los textos contenidos en la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en el sector público solo pueden celebrar convenciones colectivas de trabajo los servidores que no participan en la gestión pública, de tal forma que entes con un régimen de empleo de naturaleza laboral (no pública), como por ejemplo, las empresas del Estado, de las que se ha dicho la doctrina nacional que son "aquellas que funcionan como si fueran empresas privadas, porque venden y hacen lo mismo que los particulares; por ejemplo el mismo INS cuando vende pólizas hace lo mismo que una compañía aseguradora cualquiera, la banca cuando hace préstamos, hace lo mismo que una entidad financiera común, la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, que vende energía eléctrica la vende en iguales condiciones en que podría venderla una compañía privada", entre otros, sí pueden negociar colectivamente de conformidad con las disposiciones que informan el Derecho Colectivo del Trabajo. Sexta: No obstante lo ya expresado, es importante aclarar que aún en el sector público en el que resulta constitucionalmente posible la aplicación de la institución de las convenciones colectivas, valga decir, en las llamadas empresas o servicios económicos del Estado y en aquellos núcleos de personal de instituciones y entes públicos en los que la naturaleza de los servicios que se prestan no participan de la gestión pública, en los términos del inciso 2 del artículo 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, la Sala repite y confirma su jurisprudencia en el sentido de que la autorización para negociar no puede ser irrestricta, o sea, equiparable a la situación en que se encontraría cualquier patrono particular, puesto que por esa vía, no pueden dispensarse o excepcionarse leyes, reglamentos o directrices gubernamentales vigentes, ni modificar o derogar leyes que otorgan o regulan competencias de los entes públicos, atribuidas en razón de la jerarquía normativa o de las especiales condiciones de la Administración Pública con relación a sus trabajadores, conclusión que se infiere del artículo 112 inciso 3) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y del considerando XI de la sentencia No. 1696-92 de esta Sala. Sétima: Todas estas conclusiones se fundamentan, también, en la doctrina que se deriva de los convenios de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo; sin embargo, la Sala estima de mucha utilidad advertir, que es tan claro que la generalización de la posibilidad de negociación de convenciones colectivas en el sector público, ha sido tan solo una aspiración de los trabajadores y como tal, de interpretación restrictiva, que la misma Organización Internacional del Trabajo ha promocionado la adhesión al Convenio No. 151 sobre la protección del derecho de sindicación y los procedimientos para determinar las condiciones de empleo en la administración pública. Los fines de este convenio son los de impulsar el reconocimiento general e irrestricto de la negociación colectiva de trabajo en el sector público. Pero en nuestra organización jurídica actual, para que los alcances del Convenio fueran de posible aplicación, se requiere que sus principios y normas sean compatibles con los de la Constitución Política y en virtud de lo que se ha dicho en esta sentencia existe, hasta ahora, un impedimento, del más alto rango, para que se pueda aceptar la institución de las convenciones colectivas en todo el sector público, impedimento que se radica en la falta de la norma de rango superior a la ley ordinaria, que permita la aplicación de la institución en todo el sector público, haciéndola compatible con los principios y valores de la Constitución Política. La articulación de la institución de la negociación colectiva con el ordenamiento jurídico nacional, no puede hacerse solamente desde el punto de vista de los intereses de los servidores del sector público; debe hacerse, también, a partir del necesario examen de los artículo 191 y 192 constitucionales, como ya ha quedado dicho.

VIII.- CONCLUSIONES.- Con fundamento en todo lo expuesto y a manera de síntesis, la Sala arriba a las siguientes conclusiones: en el ejercicio de la competencia de máximo intérprete de la Constitución Política, al examinar el tema de la organización y estructura administrativa del Estado y de la procedencia o no de las convenciones colectivas en el sector público, no puede la Sala limitarse, únicamente, a la aplicación de las disposiciones que integran el Capítulo de las llamadas "Garantías Sociales". Se necesita, además, examinar esa institución jurídica en coordinación con los principios contenidos en los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política; al hacer este ejercicio, se adquiere la plena convicción de que la voluntad del constituyente, siguiendo la línea histórica del desarrollo de las instituciones del Derecho Laboral, fue la de abstraer a los servidores del sector público de las reglas generales que informan al Derecho Colectivo del Trabajo, sujetándolo a una relación especial de empleo público, llamada también y comúnmente "relación estatutaria", que se rige por el Derecho Público. Esto implica, sin duda y como tesis general, que ningún funcionario público puede negociar sus condiciones de empleo como si se tratara de un nexo contractual sujeto al Derecho Laboral. Sin embargo, el desarrollo de las ideas jurídicas, la adopción de los convenios impulsados por la Organización Internacional del Trabajo y la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, han conducido la evolución de las instituciones involucradas, al nivel de admitir como compatibles con el Derecho de la Constitución, las convenciones colectivas que negocie la categoría de los empleados y servidores que, no obstante integrar el sector público, rigen sus relaciones por el Derecho Laboral, especialmente en los términos de las definiciones que contienen los artículos 111 y 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, o sea, cuando se trata de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al Derecho común, así como las relaciones de servicio con obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración y que se rigen por el Derecho laboral o mercantil, según los casos. En este sentido es que se evacua la consulta, pero advirtiendo, eso sí, que le corresponde a la propia Administración, a los operadores del Derecho en general y en última instancia al Juez, cuando conocen de los casos específicos, determinar si una institución del Estado o un grupo de sus servidores o funcionarios, conforman el núcleo de la excepción que sí puede negociar colectivamente, o si por el contrario, les está vedado ese camino. Y por último, según lo que ha expresado en su informe la Procuraduría General de la República, que esta Sala también acoge, el personal que se desempeña en las Municipalidades del país, está limitado para la negociación colectiva, en los términos de esta sentencia, pues, salvo prueba en contrario, se trata de servidores públicos, regidos por la relación de empleo público. Dados los efectos de esta sentencia, de conformidad con lo que dispone el artículo 107 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, resulta importante señalar que le corresponderá a la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia determinar si la relación del actor en el Juicio Ordinario Laboral, Nombre100510 , con el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, se regulaba por el Derecho público o por el Derecho común. La sentencia es declarativa y retroactiva a la fecha de entrada en vigencia de cada convención colectiva en el sector público que se quiera o pretenda aplicar, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. Igualmente, de conformidad con lo que dispone el artículo 91 de la misma Ley, procede la Sala a dimensionar los efectos retroactivos de la sentencia a la fecha de la publicación de su reseña en La Gaceta, fecha a partir de la que deben cesar los efectos para todos los servidores a los que le ha vedado el Derecho de la Constitución la posibilidad de celebrar convenciones colectivas. El Magistrado Arguedas salva el voto y declara que no son inconstitucionales per se las convenciones colectivas que se celebren en el sector público. El Magistrado Solano salva el voto en cuanto al dimensionamiento, para que la vigencia de esta sentencia lo sea a partir del vencimiento del plazo de cada convención colectiva. Los Magistrados Piza y Molina, ponen notas separadas.

POR TANTO

Se evacua la consulta formulada por la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el siguiente sentido: a) son inconstitucionales las convenciones colectivas reguladas por los artículos 54 y siguientes del Código de Trabajo que se celebran en el sector público, cuando se trata de personal regido por la relación de empleo de naturaleza pública (relación estatutaria); b) no son inconstitucionales las convenciones colectivas que se celebran en el sector público, cuando las celebran obreros, trabajadores, funcionarios o empleados del sector público, cuyas relaciones laborales se regulan por el Derecho común; c) igualmente son compatibles con el Derecho de la Constitución, los instrumentos colectivos que se han negociado y se han venido prorrogando o modificando, en aplicación de la política general sobre convenciones colectivas en el Sector Público, salvo que se trate de negociaciones con personal en relación de empleo de naturaleza pública, en cuyo caso esos instrumentos resultan inconstitucionales; d) corresponde a la administración y a los jueces que conocen en los juicios laborales, en su caso, de la aplicación de las convenciones colectivas, determinar si los trabajadores involucrados, dada la naturaleza de las funciones que cumplen o cumplían, están regulados por el Derecho público o el común, a los efectos de definir si pueden o no ser sujetos activos en la aplicación de las convenciones colectivas. Esta sentencia es declarativa y retroactiva a la fecha de entrada en vigencia de la respectiva Convención Colectiva, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. No obstante, de conformidad con lo que dispone el artículo 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se dimensionan los efectos de la sentencia a la fecha de la publicación de su reseña en La Gaceta. Reséñese en La Gaceta y publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial. Comuníquese y notifíquese.

R. E. PIZA E.

Luis Fernando Solano C. Luis Paulino Mora M.

Eduardo Sancho G. Carlos M. Arguedas R.

José Luis Molina Q.. Gilbert Armijo S.

ES/mm/00 VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO SOLANO CARRERA El suscrito Magistrado, deja constancia de que ha coincidido con el fondo de lo resuelto por la Sala, pero discrepa y se separa de lo allí dispuesto, por cuanto estima que debe darse un dimensionamiento especial a los efectos de la sentencia n°4453-2000, tal como se hizo con lo resuelto en sentencia N°1696-92 (sentencia de los laudos en el sector público).

En efecto, creo que al modo que en aquella ocasión lo dispuso la Sala para los laudos, dada la naturaleza de las convenciones colectivas, el pronunciamiento relativo a su inconstitucionalidad no puede tener los efectos retroactivos que normalmente el sistema acuerda en estos casos. Pienso también que hacerlo a través de la fórmula utilizada por la mayoría de Magistrados, en el sentido de que la sentencia rija a partir de su reseña en La Gaceta, es insuficiente, por el tono súbito o sorpresivo que contiene. Por eso mismo, creo que deben utilizarse aquí, nuevamente, criterios de justicia y equidad para mantener la aplicación plena de las convenciones colectivas vigentes hasta la propia fecha del vencimiento del plazo por ellas mismas contemplado, de modo que su extinción sea paulatina y atemperando el impacto que de cualquier forma significa este pronunciamiento, mientras, como entiendo que se ha venido haciendo desde hace algún tiempo, se concluye el trámite legislativo de aprobación de Convenios de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, que tendrían la virtud de regularizar lo relativo a esta materia.

En ese sentido explico mi voto salvado.

Luis Fernando Solano Carrera NOTA SEPARADA DE LOS MAGISTRADO PIZA ESCALANTE Y MOLINA QUESADA:

Hemos concurrido en el voto de la mayoría acatando lo dispuesto en los Convenios No. 87, 98, 135 y 151 de la 0.I. T., pero no podernos dejar de manifestar nuestra preocupación por que en el sector público, cualquiera que sea la naturaleza de la entidad de que se trate, aun sí sólo de participación del Estado en su propiedad o la de sus acciones, las relaciones de servicio con obre-os, trabajadores y empleados regidas por el da-echo laboral o común no suponen como en el privado, una distinción real de intereses riesgos, tiene amplios poderes de actuación y negociación, en el público la parte gerencial está sujeta a limitaciones de Derecho Público que le disminuyen fuertemente su capacidad de negociación y eliminan del todo su tan»- a perder, que es ingrediente fundamental de los negocios privados. Por último, nos preocupa que las convenciones colectivas para los trabajadores sometidos al régimen de derecho privado produzcan desigualdades frente a los funcionarios públicos propiamente dichos, que carecen de ese instrumento, acentuándose así las existentes entre los empleados de distintas instituciones.

R.E. Piza E. José Luis Molina Q.

Res: 2000-04453 VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO ARGUEDAS RAMIREZ Disiento del criterio de la mayoría, y, en cambio, opino que las convenciones colectivas que se celebren en el sector público no son inconstitucionales per se.

I.- El motivo esencial de mi discrepancia tiene que ver con la interpretación que mis compañeros hacen del sentido y alcance de los artículos 191 y 192 constitucionales en cuanto a su incidencia en el ámbito del derecho de negociación colectiva en el sector público y, más específicamente, del derecho a las convenciones colectivas en este sector.

II.- Comenzaré por subrayar que la mayoría se remonta, en la consideración de este asunto, al hecho de que ya con anterioridad a la actual Constitución, los derechos a la sindicación, a la convención colectiva y a los conflictos colectivos habían alcanzado reconocimiento constitucional en la Constitución de 1871. A juicio de la mayoría, la incorporación en la Constitución vigente de los artículos 191 y 192 fundó un régimen de empleo público que impide reconocer ahora lo que antes se reconocía como un derecho (y, digo yo, necesariamente como un derecho fundamental), sea, la posibilidad de la negociación colectiva en el sector público; según este criterio, en adelante, la sola idea de la negociación, como medio idóneo para revisar y aprobar las condiciones del empleo público, riñe con los postulados esenciales de la organización del Estado.

III.- Infiero de esta conclusión que, en opinión de mis colegas, la Constitución vigente simplemente excluyó del sector público la garantía de un derecho que con anterioridad a que así se hiciera ya había sido sumado al elenco de derechos reconocidos por el Estado también a los servidores públicos, es decir, a los trabajadores ubicados en aquel sector. No veo en lo dicho por la mayoría nada que indique que se hubiese llegado a esta exclusión a causa del propósito deliberado (valga decir, voluntario e intencionado) del constituyente de 1949 de recortar la cobertura de aquellos derechos, o de negarle su ejercicio a determinadas personas o servidores. Por el contrario, de cara a los derechos fundamentales de los servidores públicos, mi opinión es que, en sentido general, el constituyente fue animado por el propósito de proteger sus derechos: el artículo 192 lo delata. Pero a mis compañeros les parece evidente e inevitable este recorte por la propia naturaleza del régimen estatutario del empleo público, tal como está concebido en los artículos 191 y 192, que, según ellos, expone al servidor público a padecer o soportar (esto es, pasivamente) las condiciones de trabajo que le imponga unilateralmente el Estado, sin posibilidad de participar o influir en la determinación de esas condiciones por la vía de la negociación, todo por el bien público.

IV.- Observo, para comenzar, que el criterio prevaleciente en este caso tiene algo de paradójico. En efecto, la Sala, al tratar el tema de la huelga en el sector público (en sentencia No. 1317-98 de las diez horas doce minutos del veintisiete de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y ocho), abrió la posibilidad, otrora inexistente, de que los servidores públicos puedan recurrir a la huelga legal. ¿Cómo explicar ahora que pudiéndose realizar huelgas legales por parte de estos servidores, ellos mismos encuentren vedada la vía de resolución de sus diferendos anteriores o posteriores al estado de huelga mediante convenciones colectivas u otras modalidades de negociación vinculante para las partes, siendo la negociación colectiva, como se sabe, la forma más lógica y civilizada para dar terminación a los conflictos colectivos de carácter económicosocial que se dan en el ámbito de las relaciones de trabajo?

V.- La contradicción insalvable que la mayoría deduce de lo dispuesto en los artículos 191 y 192 con respecto al reconocimiento de los derechos a la negociación colectiva y a la convención colectiva, la obtiene, evidentemente, de su propia interpretación de aquellos artículos, puesto que, como lo he mencionado, no hay indicación de que tal cosa fuese una decisión voluntaria e intencionada del constituyente mismo, ni está literalmente expresada en el texto de la Constitución. Admito que la letra del artículo 191 es enfática cuando dice que un estatuto de servicio civil regulará las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos. Es decir, no dudo de que el constituyente quiso dar a las relaciones de empleo en el sector público una configuración prioritariamente estatutaria. Pero bajo el signo del "Estado de derechos fundamentales" que caracteriza el orden de cosas que propone la Constitución, marcadamente después de la creación de este tribunal en el año 1989, me parece que el intérprete de la Constitución no puede dejar de advertir la creciente significación e incidencia de aquellos derechos en la regulación de la organización del Estado y de las relaciones de éste con los servidores públicos, y en la modulación o matización que esa influencia obra en la materia ideada por el constituyente de 1949, que, en consecuencia, para interpretarla cabalmente hay que exponerla hoy día a la luz de aquellos derechos y de sus requerimientos. Me parece que el intérprete no puede dejar de advertirlo, a menos que petrifique la Constitución, como si en punto a la evolución y al sentido actual de los derechos fundamentales poco o nada hubiera pasado desde el acto constituyente.

VI.- Desde esta perspectiva, cabe repetir que los derechos de que aquí se trata, involucrados en la cuestión de constitucionalidad que se ha promovido ante la Sala, pertenecen a la categoría de derechos fundamentales del trabajo. Que estamos en presencia de esta clase de derechos, me parece fuera de toda duda. Así, por ejemplo, la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, una de cuyas obligaciones (adoptada en la Conferencia General en mayo de 1944) es "lograr el reconocimiento efectivo del derecho de negociación colectiva", incluye en su "Declaración relativa a los principios y derechos fundamentales en el trabajo" (adoptada por la Conferencia General en junio de 1998), como una categoría de tales derechos, "la libertad de asociación y la libertad sindical y el reconocimiento efectivo del derecho de negociación colectiva".

VII.- Ahora bien: estos derechos, como lo ha reconocido la propia Sala en reiterada jurisprudencia, por su carácter de fundamentales, son inherentes al ser humano por su condición de tal, le acompañan por su carácter de persona y por ende son superiores al Estado mismo: éste no los crea ni los regula con efecto constitutivo, sino que los reconoce, tutela y garantiza normativamente, pero con carácter puramente declarativo. De ahí que el ordenamiento jurídico puede tutelarlos y moldear su ejercicio, mas no eliminarlos o desconocerlos con la simple invocación de que así lo exigen los requerimientos de la organización del Estado, o la eficiencia de la administración, o un impreciso bien público; todo en razón de que ostentan una categoría y fuerza superior al propio ordenamiento.

VIII.- Ciertamente, como también ha dicho la Sala, los derechos fundamentales no son irrestrictos o absolutos; pueden estar sujetos a determinadas limitaciones impuestas por el ordenamiento, en atención a valores e intereses superiores de la colectividad; mas esas restricciones no pueden llegar al extremo de vaciarlos de contenido, lo que sí resulta contrario a toda la ideología en que se asienta la Constitución, como catálogo superior de los derechos fundamentales.

IX.- Insisto en que en el caso del capítulo constitucional relativo a las garantías sociales, como lo menciona la mayoría, los derechos allí incluidos ya se encontraban incorporados expresamente en nuestro régimen jurídico desde la modificación introducida a la Constitución de 1871 en las legislaturas de 1942 y 1943, lo que, valga resaltar, constituye una de las mayores conquistas que registra la historia del país en materia de protección de los derechos sociales fundamentales que, en buena medida, sostienen la estabilidad del régimen democrático de que hoy disfrutamos.

X.- Al promulgarse la Constitución de 1949, se reprodujo este capítulo de garantías, pues lo contrario hubiera implicado un retroceso inadmisible desde el punto de vista de los derechos fundamentales, toda vez que la evolución que han venido experimentando a lo largo de la historia estos derechos -desde la consagración de las más esenciales libertades públicas hasta los denominados derechos de la tercera generación, trayectoria que ha tenido como norte el desarrollo y bienestar cada vez más integral del ser humano, desde su perspectiva individual, social, económica y cultural- no puede concebir un retroceso en su protección normativa, sin que ello signifique una afrenta a su libertad y dignidad.

XI.- En mi opinión, actualmente los artículos 191 y 192 no escapan ni podrían sustraerse a la influencia del derecho fundamental de los servidores públicos de participar, todo lo posible, en la definición del régimen de su trabajo. Esta es, me parece, la percepción que origina una discrepancia esencial con la mayoría del tribunal. Ya mencioné que estos artículos dan al régimen de empleo público una configuración prioritariamente estatutaria, de manera que el Estado, mediante los procedimientos establecidos para la producción normativa (que no excluyen de por sí medios de participación de los propios servidores públicos), fija (en este sentido, unilateralmente) las condiciones del empleo público, pero, en cuanto al propio Estado se refiere, "con el propósito de garantizar la eficiencia de la administración pública", que es el motivo justificante relevante del carácter estatutario de ese régimen: tales disposiciones, por imperio de los dos artículos citados, se imponen como normativa indisponible del régimen jurídico del empleo, que, por consiguiente, no es susceptible de ser sustituido, revocado o alterado mediante la convención colectiva.

XII.- Naturalmente, esta opción constitucional implica una severa limitación de los alcances del derecho de negociación colectiva, pero esta restricción es todo lo que a mi juicio permite este derecho y su efectiva vigencia. Quiero decir que el derecho no se extingue, y queda para la negociación la posibilidad de alcanzar una regulación suplementaria (no necesariamente supletoria) de las condiciones del trabajo, en ámbitos, modalidades o aspectos que el Estado se abstuvo de sumarlas unilateralmente al contenido del ordenamiento jurídico del empleo.

XIII.- Ahora bien, todo lo anterior no implica que una determinada convención colectiva negociada en el sector público no pueda incurrir en vicios que determinen su invalidez, pero ello obedecería a alguna ilegalidad del caso concreto, que puede generar la improcedencia de las disposiciones que ahí se hayan contemplado. Por eso el presente voto salvado ha quedado indicado en la sentencia en el sentido de que "no son inconstitucionales per se las convenciones en el sector público", en razón de que este derecho fundamental puede ser limitado pero no suprimido en perjuicio de un grupo determinado de personas, por su condición de servidores públicos. En este punto, conviene mencionar que, si hay cierto grupo de funcionarios públicos que por definición no pueden resultar beneficiarios de este tipo de convenciones –por ejemplo, los jerarcas que ostentan la representación de la administración- no lo es en razón de que se encuentren privados de este derecho fundamental, sino porque la posición que tienen en el momento de una negociación colectiva hace surgir una evidente incompatibilidad para disponer algún tipo de beneficio a su favor, precisamente porque son quienes representan a la parte estatal en su carácter de patrono, lo que explica claramente que no puedan aprovechar tal oportunidad para "legislar" en beneficio propio. En suma: los matices que el ejercicio de este derecho puede adquirir tratándose del sector público obedecen, por una parte, a limitaciones derivadas del principio de legalidad y de las normas de orden público que rigen la actuación de la Administración, y en segundo término, a las directrices y restricciones vigentes en materia presupuestaria y de gasto público (cuando se trata de cláusulas que contemplan beneficios económicos), toda vez que, debido al principio de legalidad presupuestaria –que sí se encuentra consagrado expresamente en el artículo 180 constitucional- no puede disponerse ni ejecutarse ningún gasto si no se cuenta con el respectivo contenido presupuestario debidamente aprobado. Así, la correcta dimensión que debe adquirir este derecho constitucional consagrado en el capítulo de garantías sociales, en el caso del sector público, no es la de un cercenamiento total para el servidor, sino entender que su ejercicio está sujeto a ciertas limitaciones en atención a la observancia del ordenamiento jurídico, a los límites del gasto público y a las correspondientes regulaciones que existen en este campo.

Carlos Ml. Arguedas R.