Invalidity of collective agreement clause binding severance pay to labor relations board decisionInvalidez de cláusula de convención colectiva que vincula pago de cesantía a decisión de junta de relaciones laborales

*020019890166LA* *020019890166LA* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2008-000854 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at nine thirty hours on October eighth, two thousand eight.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Nombre1], messenger, against MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ, represented by its general judicial attorney, Licenciado Roberto Arias Olivares. The special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is Licenciado Luis Fernando Jiménez Quesada, divorced. All are of legal age, married, and residents of San José, with the exception noted.

WHEREAS:

1.- The plaintiff, in a document dated July twenty-second, two thousand two, brought this action so that the judgment would establish that his dismissal was unjustified, and therefore he must be reinstated to his position or be paid his legal severance benefits, as well as back wages from his dismissal until a final judgment is reached, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.

2.- The representative of the defendant answered the action in the terms indicated in the brief dated September nineteenth, two thousand two, and raised the defenses of lack of right and the generic defense sine actione agit.

3.- The judge, Licenciada Maureen Jiménez Gómez, by judgment at thirteen twenty-two hours on August seventh, two thousand seven, ordered: "The present lawsuit filed by [Nombre1] against MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSE, represented by its general judicial attorney, Licenciada Grace Sandino Uva, is declared WITHOUT MERIT in all its aspects. The defenses of lack of right and the generic sine actione agit, raised by the defendant, are upheld. The defeated plaintiff is ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding, setting attorney's fees at the prudential sum of one hundred thousand colones. The parties are advised that this judgment admits the appeal remedy, which must be filed before this Court within a term of three days. Within that same term and before this jurisdictional body, the factual or legal reasons on which the appealing party bases their disagreement must also be set forth, either verbally or in writing; under warning of declaring the appeal inadmissible (articles 500 and 501 subsections c) and d) of the Labor Code; resolutions of the Constitutional Chamber Numbers 5798 at 16:21 hours on August 11, 1998, and 1306 at 16:27 hours on February 23, 1999, and Resolution of the Second Chamber Number 386 at 14:20 hours on December 10, 1999)." [sic] 4.- The plaintiff appealed, and the Labor Tribunal, Second Section, of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, composed of Licenciados Eugenie Salas Chavarría, Víctor Ardón Acosta, and Ana Luisa Meseguer Monge, by judgment at eleven hours on February twenty-eighth, two thousand eight, resolved: "It is declared that there are no defects implying nullity or defenselessness in this proceeding. The appealed ruling is reversed in that which has been the object of the appeal. The defendant Municipalidad must pay the plaintiff the severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía), understood as a real right in accordance with the time served. The calculations are left for the judgment enforcement stage because the necessary data to perform them is not available. The granted items may be paid administratively, with the exception of what is established in Article 153 of the Political Constitution, if the plaintiff is not in agreement with them. The other requested aspects of reinstatement and back wages are denied. The defense of lack of right is rejected concerning the granted aspects and is upheld regarding those denied. The defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff legal interest from the date he was dismissed until its effective payment. This matter is resolved without special condemnation for costs." 5.- The defendant filed an appeal before this Chamber in a brief dated April twenty-ninth, two thousand eight, which is based on the grounds that will be stated in the considering part.

6.- The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Bogantes Rodríguez; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- BACKGROUND: Considering that he was dismissed without just cause, Mr. [Nombre1] filed the lawsuit to have the MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ ordered to reinstate him to his position or to pay him the legal severance benefits, as well as the wages not received from the date of dismissal until judgment was rendered, interest, and both costs (folios 1-4). The representative of the defendant entity answered negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right and the generic sine actione agit (folios 21-29). The first instance judge declared the plaintiff's claims without merit and imposed on him the payment of both costs (folios 185-194). The latter appealed the decision (folios 198-208), and the Second Section of the Labor Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José reversed it insofar as it denied the severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía), considering that this right applied independently of the existence of serious misconduct, as regulated in subsection b) of Article 27 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva). It ordered the payment of legal interest on the granted right and resolved without special condemnation for costs (folios 229-235).

II.- THE APPELLANT'S GRIEVANCES: The general judicial attorney for the municipal entity expresses disagreement regarding the order to pay severance pay (cesantía) to the plaintiff, based on the cited article. He argues that said conventional norm cannot benefit the plaintiff's interests, as it exceeds the legal content of a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), an instrument whose purpose is to review the minimum legal benefits. He indicates that, in accordance with Article 62 of the Political Constitution, collective bargaining agreements must be concluded according to law, for the purpose of improving upon minimum rights, but this does not mean that imperative and public order provisions can be derogated by this means (Article 129, idem), such as the displacement of competencies established by the legislature. Therefore, in this case, he affirms that the transfer of the legal consequences that may arise from the exercise of disciplinary power to the Junta de Relaciones Laborales is illegitimate, given that legally the disciplinary power, and consequently the results derived from its exercise, is conferred upon the head of the Municipalidad. The contrary would violate municipal autonomy and the principle of exclusivity in the formation of laws. Thus, the Junta de Relaciones Laborales can only have the nature of a consultative body, without being able to be attributed decision-making or imperative competencies corresponding to other bodies. Based on these arguments, he requests that the judgment be reversed, the lawsuit be declared without merit, and costs be imposed on the plaintiff (folios 244-255).

III.- ON THE NORMATIVE VALUE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: Article 62 of the Political Constitution confers the value of law upon the norms agreed between employers and workers through a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), by expressly stating the following: "Collective labor agreements which, in accordance with the law, are concluded between employers or unions of employers and legally organized unions of workers, shall have the force of law." For their part, Articles 54 and 55 of the Labor Code establish: "Article 54.- A collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) is that which is concluded between one or several workers' unions and one or several employers, or one or several employers' unions, for the purpose of regulating the conditions under which work is to be performed and other matters related to it. The collective bargaining agreement has the character of professional law, and all existing individual or collective contracts, or those subsequently executed in the companies, industries, or regions it affects, must conform to its norms./ In every collective bargaining agreement, at least all norms related to union guarantees established in the International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions ratified by our country must be understood to be included." (The bold text is not from the original) "Article 55. The stipulations of the collective bargaining agreement have the force of law for: a) The parties that have signed it,...; b) All persons who, at the time it enters into force, work in the company, companies, or production centers to which the agreement refers, insofar as they are benefited, even if they are not members of the workers' union or unions that entered into it; and c) Those who conclude future individual or collective contracts within the same company, companies, or production center affected by the agreement, in the understanding that such contracts may not be concluded under conditions less favorable for workers than those contained in the collective bargaining agreement." (The highlights are by the drafter). The binding nature, established in the Magna Carta and reiterated in the Labor Code, is necessary, as the agreements reached between employers and workers to resolve their conflicts would be meaningless if either party could freely decide whether or not to comply with them. Thus, by virtue of the nature of the collective agreement, the possibility exists to demand compliance with what was agreed. However, the force of law is conferred upon them insofar as the collective bargaining agreements have been agreed upon in accordance with the legislation. The foregoing implies a subordination of these to the legislative power of the State. This idea also emerges from the text of the final paragraph of Article 57 of the cited Code, when it states: "Said deposit shall be communicated directly to the Office of Union Affairs and Administrative Conciliation of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, so that it may order the parties to conform to the legal requirements in the event that the agreement contains any violation of the legal provisions of this Code." (Emphasis supplied). From the above, it follows that what is agreed upon in a collective agreement cannot contravene what is established in law; especially when it is of public order, since collective agreements, regarding their content, must be subject to legal regulations (Article 58 of the Labor Code) and serve to improve upon the minimum guarantees that have been established by the legislator. On this subject, [Nombre2] explains: "...what is forbidden, for violating the legal norm, is to modify a public order precept, not subject to waiver by its very essence before simple private initiative. One must, therefore, respect the established minimum norms... imperative legal precepts cannot be disregarded... an agreement approved by the administrative authority can be disregarded by the judicial authority; because, even though they achieve the same efficacy as a law, their opposition to public order labor laws, and therefore, those not subject to waiver by collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas), is not permissible. Thus, in our view, if a collective agreement, even approved by the administrative authority, is contrary to the law, it cannot be applied by the judicial authority; for the latter acts in a different sphere, and approval by administrative authorities may be insufficient for the judicial authority... In the same way that individual labor contracts must respect the public order legal norms that govern this matter, collective agreements cannot oppose said norms, unless they improve them for the benefit of the worker." ([Nombre2], Guillermo. Derecho Normativo Laboral, Buenos Aires, Bibliográfica Omeba, 1966, pp. 397-398). In resolution number 1,355 of the Constitutional Chamber, at 12:18 hours on March 22, 1996, on this topic, it was indicated:

"As expressly provided by Article 62 of the Political Constitution, collective labor agreements (convenciones colectivas de trabajo) concluded in accordance with the law have the force of law between the contracting parties. And as we have said that one of the objectives of collective labor agreements is to review the minimum content of the legal benefits established for workers, in principle, it is possible to argue that it is legally valid for a collective bargaining agreement to introduce modifications or reforms of a legal nature. But since Article 129 of the Political Constitution states that laws are obligatory and can only be derogated by a subsequent one, we must conclude that a norm of a collective bargaining agreement cannot remove the force of ordinary laws, but rather, in the case of labor relations, those existing minimums can indeed be exceeded, but only for the specific case in question, with the law maintaining its force. That is, the normative provisions of collective labor agreements must conform to the existing labor legal norms, which they can improve upon when granting benefits to workers, provided that imperative provisions are not affected or derogated, which means that collective labor agreements are subject to and limited by public order laws." Similarly, in judgment number 108 of this Chamber, at 9:40 hours on March 12, 2003, it was explained:

"IV.- However, under the provisions of Articles 54 and 55 of the Labor Code and in one of higher rank, Article 62 of the Political Constitution, the stipulations contained in a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) have the force of professional law for the parties that signed it and for those persons who, at the time of its entry into force, work for the company or in the profession it regulates, whether unionized or not, as well as for those hired in the future, while it is in effect. That principle essentially implies that, at least in the legal relationship between the employees and the employer entity, who are bound by such an agreement, its norms are situated above any other of a state nature, with a rank equal to –formal– law, and constitute the original source of labor rights and duties. This is not, of course, a derogation of ordinary legislation due to the collective agreement, as that remains fully valid and effective [numeral 129 of the Political Constitution]. What occurs is, undoubtedly, its inapplicability to the specific case, because the special regulation of the collective bargaining agreement is binding for it. The norms of a legal transaction of this nature have, then, an exceptional rigor and are imposed upon their recipients as public order rules, making their singular derogation impossible for them. Of course, for such a consequence to occur, it is required that its content was drafted respecting the legal limits, and, in the case of the public sector, that it was negotiated and agreed upon with the intervention of each and every one of the competent bodies and instances to do so. Thus, a collective agreement cannot leave without effect norms of an imperative or prohibitive nature, including those classified as public order, nor could it be enforceable if it was agreed upon without the participation of those who, by law, should have given their consent (see, on the subject, resolutions Nos. 119, at 9:30 hours, on June 13; 138, at 9:30 hours, on July 2; 145, at 10:10 hours, on July 9; 320, at 10 hours, on December 17, all of 1997; and 30, at 8:40 hours, on January 30, 1998)." Judgments numbers 2005-353, 2005-361, 2005-362, 2005-907, 2006-350, and 2006-1,062 may also be consulted.

IV.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE: The competence of this Chamber is limited to determining whether or not Mr. [Nombre1] has the right to be paid severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía), in light of subsection b) of Article 27 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), which was in force at the time his service relationship with the defendant entity concluded. This is because the issue of whether or not the dismissal was justified is precluded, since both the first instance judge and the members of the Tribunal indicated that just cause did exist on the part of the employer to terminate the relationship between the parties, without this aspect having been appealed before this Chamber by the plaintiff. Although in the document visible at folios 271-272, the plaintiff's special judicial attorney states that he ratifies the filed appeal, the fact is that the brief at folios 258 to 270 did not constitute an appeal before this third rogated instance, given that it was not only not identified as such, but also did not fulfill the requirements set forth in Article 557 of the Labor Code and, in any case, was filed outside the legal term, making it untimely and, consequently, inadmissible. Furthermore, it should be clarified that in this matter, the application, in general terms, of the collective bargaining agreement to the plaintiff is not under discussion, in light of resolution number 4453 of the Constitutional Chamber, at 14:56 hours on May 24, 2000, and, for that reason, the case is not analyzed from that perspective. In any event, what was resolved in that judgment does not affect this litigation, because according to what was ordered in the operative part, the effects of the ruling were dimensioned to the date of the publication of the summary in La Gaceta, which did not occur until September 26, 2001, when the plaintiff's dismissal had already occurred. Having clarified the foregoing, it is pertinent to cite the conventional norm on the basis of which the Tribunal granted severance pay (cesantía) to the plaintiff. Expressly, subsection b) of the related Article 27 established: "With the purpose of making the benefit of Severance Pay (Cesantía) a real right, when a worker is dismissed based on the grounds of Article 81 of the Labor Code, once the procedures established for that purpose in this Agreement are completed, the Junta de Relaciones Laborales may recommend to the Municipal Executive the payment of severance pay which shall be calculated at the rate of one month's salary for each year or fraction greater than 6 months of continuous service, without limit of years. For this recommendation to be binding on the Executive, it must be endorsed by a simple majority of the members of the Junta de Relaciones Laborales present at the session in which it is issued." (The underline is by the drafter). From the above transcription, it follows that by means of a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), the Junta de Relaciones Laborales was given the possibility of ordering, with binding effects, the consequences of a dismissal with just cause and, in the specific case, it agreed by majority to pay the plaintiff severance pay (cesantía), despite having incurred in just cause for dismissal (folio 112). The appellant argues that the norm is illegitimate, as it exceeds the normal content of a conventional provision, an instrument that, in its normative scope, must be limited to improving upon the minimum legal rights provided by the legislator, without it being valid to invade the field of competencies assigned by law to other bodies. Having analyzed the grievance, the majority of the members of this Chamber consider that the representative of the defendant entity is correct. On repeated occasions, both this body and the one in charge of constitutional review have held that it is not legitimate for norms that contravene public order laws to be included in collective bargaining agreements, as was set forth in the preceding considering part. In this specific case, the Junta de Relaciones Laborales would be encroaching upon a competence that by law corresponds to the Municipal Mayor (Alcalde Municipal) (Article 17, subsection k) of the Municipal Code), which is to intervene in the disciplinary power, to which the effects of a dismissal are undoubtedly ineluctably linked. Thus, it is deemed that it is not valid for a decision of said Junta regarding disciplinary matters to bind the head of a specific public entity. In a matter similar to the one being heard, this Chamber stated: "If, as was indicated in that precedent, the power to apply the disciplinary regime in public entities is always held by the head at the administrative level,... in no way can the norm of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva) that bound the head to the decision of a body foreign in its composition to said hierarchy, such as the Junta de Relaciones Laborales, be considered applicable... Thus, the Junta could only be considered a consultative, non-binding body, which in some way contributes to forming the employer's will and nothing more." (Judgment number 672, at 9:30 hours on August 18, 2004). Subsequently, the Constitutional Chamber, in also reiterated resolutions, has pronounced itself in the same vein. In resolution number 7,085, at 11:54 hours on October 2, 1998, it noted:

Regarding the criterion that the Chamber has expressed concerning the content of collective bargaining instruments and their reforming power within the legal system, in judgment No. 1355-96 at 12:18 hours on March 22, 1996, when examining the transfer of the disciplinary power of the Municipal Executive of Goicoechea to a Junta de Relaciones Laborales and to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, by means of a collective labor agreement (convención colectiva de trabajo), it was said that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 129 of the Political Constitution, laws are obligatory and can only be derogated by a subsequent one; that a norm of a collective bargaining agreement cannot remove the force of ordinary laws, but rather, in the case of labor relations, the existing minimums can be exceeded, but only for the specific case, with the law maintaining its force; that the normative provisions of collective bargaining agreements must conform to existing labor norms, which they can improve upon when granting benefits to workers, provided that imperative provisions are not affected or derogated; that collective labor agreements are subject to and limited by public order laws; that the collective bargaining agreement also cannot reform ordinary law that confers attributions to constitutional bodies, nor other legal provisions that are not related to the content of individual labor contracts; that the Municipal Executive, who is part of the local government, is the general administrator and head of municipal dependencies, cannot be deprived of such condition, transferring all disciplinary power to a Junta de Relaciones Laborales, created by a collective bargaining agreement, without infringing the principles of municipal autonomy and exclusivity in the formation of laws (articles 121 subsection 1) and 170 of the Political Constitution); that the Junta de Relaciones Laborales, in its role as a guarantee commission in charge of compliance with the agreement and other norms regulating relations between the institution and the employees, does not go beyond its condition as a consultative or control body, without decision-making attributions. Although the situation corresponding to the aforementioned judgment differs from the situation now examined in that, on one hand, the transfer of disciplinary power had been effected by a collective bargaining agreement, not as in this case, by a conciliation agreement, and on the other, the Municipalidad as an entity of territorial decentralization, regulated in the Political Constitution, enjoys the regime of autonomy provided therein, a situation that was not entirely clear concerning the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, and was finally defined with the enactment of Law No. 7789 of April 30, 1998, it is valid to use it as a precedent, as in its considering clauses it refers not only to the specific case of transfer of competencies belonging to autonomous institutions to other bodies via collective bargaining agreement, but also to the more general case of transfer, via collective bargaining agreement, of attributions conferred by law to a specific body. Neither is the fact that in the prior case it involved a collective bargaining agreement and in this case a conciliation agreement an obstacle that prevents using the precedent, since indeed the bargaining agreement enjoys the character of law between the parties in accordance with the provisions of Article 62 of the Political Constitution, whereas the conciliation agreement is a mechanism for negotiation and resolution of collective labor conflicts of an exclusively legal rank. Hence, if in the case of a collective bargaining agreement the Chamber interpreted that it could not modify imperative precepts, with even more reason such modification was not possible in the case of a conciliation agreement.../ Hence, it is clear that since the Sociedad de Servicios Públicos de Heredia was constituted, the disciplinary power was a matter reserved to the Manager, within the broader framework of his condition as administrator of the company. In that sense, from the text of Law No. 5889 of March 8, 1976, it cannot reasonably be inferred that the legislator intended to establish a regime where said administrator shared his attributions with the workers or with a Central Administration body, namely, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security; on the contrary, the disciplinary competence and the power to remove workers from their positions is an attribution conferred by law exclusively to the Company Manager... The truth is that said transfer clearly occurred also in violation of the principle regulated in Articles 12.1 and 59 of the General Law of Public Administration, which provides that the competence of bodies to which powers of imperium are attributed must be regulated by law, understanding law as a norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly by the procedure established for that purpose. With the substantial modification of the competence that the law grants to the Company Manager, there occurs, in turn, by means of a conciliation agreement, a usurpation of functions belonging to the legislator, which causes the unconstitutionality declared here, [...] (Resolutions 1996-1,355, 1999-5,445, 2001-11,946, 2004-6,843, 2007-18,485, and 2008-3,936 may also be consulted from that Chamber).

Apart from the reasons stated, there is an additional reason that would prevent granting the plaintiff severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía). The Constitutional Chamber has established that those normative clauses that provide for the payment of severance pay (cesantía) to employees who have been dismissed for the commission of serious misconduct are contrary to Constitutional Law. This decision is shared by those who subscribe to this vote; because, fundamentally, the contrary would lead to exempting the application of the disciplinary regime regarding those who have acted against the interests of the public entity where they work, granting them a right that does not correspond to them for having incurred in one of the causes for which the law provides for its loss. Thus, in judgment number 17437, at 7:35 hours on November 29, 2006, that Chamber indicated: "On the other hand, there is also no justification whatsoever for what is provided in subsection c) of Article 161, insofar as it permits the payment of severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía) even in cases of dismissal with just cause. As provided by constitutional article 63 already commented on, the indemnity is provided for cases of dismissal without just cause, as it is a logical consequence of the breaking of the employment contract by the unilateral decision of the employer. However, in those cases where the breaking of the employment contract is due to a cause attributable to the worker, the payment of severance assistance is not justified, as there is no cause that legitimizes it. Thus, this Tribunal deems unconstitutional what is provided in section iv of subsection a), section v of subsection b), and the entirety of subsection c) insofar as they exceed the twenty-year parameter that this Chamber has deemed reasonable as a ceiling for severance pay and for permitting payment even in cases of dismissal with just cause." (Judgment 1002, at 14:55 hours on January 23, 2008, may also be consulted).

V.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: In accordance with the reasons stated, the appealed ruling must be reversed and the first instance ruling confirmed.

THEREFORE:

The appealed judgment is reversed, and the first instance judgment is confirmed.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Zarela María Villanueva Monge Julia Varela Araya María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez Óscar Ugalde Miranda The undersigned magistrates Julia Varela Araya and Óscar Ugalde Miranda dissent from the vote and cast it as follows:

CONSIDERING:

SOLE: The undersigned Magistrates depart from the majority opinion because, in our view, subsection b) of Article 27 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement does not transfer the disciplinary authority of the Mayor to the Labor Relations Board, since the decision to dismiss without employer liability is exclusively the responsibility of the former, without the Board being able to make any binding recommendation in this regard. Therefore, the jurisprudential precedents invoked by the appellant are not applicable to this specific case, which, in turn, prevents the disapplication in this sub-lite matter of Article 27, subsection b) of the agreement based on numeral 8, subsection 1) of the Organic Law of the Judiciary. What the conventional provision in question establishes is an advantage for the workers consisting of, by way of exception, when dismissed with just cause (as occurred in this specific case), they may enjoy the severance pay benefit (auxilio de cesantía)—an aspect which can be perfectly binding on the Mayor—for which several requirements are listed: first, that the Labor Relations Board so recommends, which is optional for it (that is, it may not endorse it in a certain case, which refutes the notion that it is a true real right, since in such a hypothesis the payment of severance would always proceed, whatever the reason for the termination of the employment relationship); second, for that proposition to bind the Mayor, it must be agreed upon by a simple majority of the Board members present at the corresponding session. As all these requirements were met in this sub judice matter (since, of 12 members present, 10 supported the motion and only 2 opposed it, see folio 6), the Mayor could not depart from that recommendation, not even by justifying his decision on the indisputable seriousness of the fault, since the conventional norm—which has the force of law, and therefore must be respected—does not provide for that possibility of dissent. The broad majority obtained by the motion within the Labor Relations Board must be highlighted, a body that had the possibility of knowing the facts surrounding this matter much more closely, without the undersigned having greater elements than its members to decide on the advisability or not of said recommendation, which gave rise to a subjective right in favor of the plaintiff. As a corollary of the foregoing, we dismiss the appeal filed, proceeding to confirm the challenged judgment.

THEREFORE:

We confirm the ruling under review.

[Nombre3] Óscar Ugalde Miranda [Nombre4] 2 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Electronic Mail: [...]. and [...]

On this subject, [Name2] explains: “...what is prohibited, because it violates the legal norm, is modifying a precept of public order, in derogable by its very essence in the face of simple private initiative. One must respect, then, the established minimum norms... one cannot disregard imperative legal precepts... an agreement approved by the administrative authority can be disregarded by the judicial authority; because, even though they achieve the same effectiveness as a law, their opposition to labor laws of public order is not permissible and, therefore, they are in derogable by collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas). Thus, in our view, if a collective bargaining agreement (convenio colectivo), even when approved by the administrative authority, is contrary to the law, it cannot be applied by the judicial authority; since the latter acts in a distinct sphere, and the approval by the administrative authorities may prove insufficient for the judicial authority... In the same way that individual employment contracts must respect the legal norms of public order governing this matter, collective bargaining agreements (convenios colectivos) cannot oppose said norms, unless they improve them for the benefit of the worker.” ([Name2], Guillermo. *Derecho Normativo Laboral*, Buenos Aires, Bibliográfica Omeba, 1966, pp. 397-398). In ruling number 1,355 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), issued at 12:18 p.m. on March 22, 1996, on this subject, it was stated:

“Because Article 62 of the Political Constitution expressly so provides, collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas de trabajo) entered into in accordance with the law have the force of law between the contracting parties. And as we have said that one of the objectives of collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas de trabajo) is to review the minimum content of the legal benefits established for workers, in principle, it is possible to argue that it is legally valid for a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) to introduce modifications or reforms of a legal nature. But since Article 129 of the Political Constitution states that laws are obligatory and can only be repealed by a subsequent one, we must conclude that a norm of a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) cannot nullify the validity of ordinary laws, but rather, in the case of labor relations, those existing minimums can in fact be exceeded, but only for the specific case at hand, with the law maintaining its validity. That is, the normative provisions of collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas de trabajo) must conform to existing legal labor norms, which they can exceed when it comes to granting benefits to workers, provided that provisions of an imperative nature are not affected or repealed, by which it is meant that collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas de trabajo) remain subject to and limited by laws of public order.” Similarly, in judgment number 108 of this Chamber, issued at 9:40 a.m. on March 12, 2003, it was explained:

“IV.- Now, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 54 and 55 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and in another of higher rank, Article 62 of the Political Constitution, the stipulations contained in a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) have the force of professional law for the parties that signed it and for those persons who, at the time of its entry into force, work for the company or in the profession it regulates, whether or not they are unionized, as well as for those hired in the future, while it is in effect. That principle implies, basically, that, at least, in the legal relationship between the employees and the employer entity, who are bound by an agreement of that kind, its norms are placed above any other of a state nature, with a rank equal to the –formal– law and constitute the primary source of labor rights and duties. It is not, of course, a matter of the repeal of ordinary legislation due to the collective pact, since the former remains fully valid and effective [numeral 129 of the Political Constitution]. What undoubtedly occurs is its inapplicability to the specific case, because the special regulation of the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) is binding for the latter. The norms of a legal transaction of this nature have, then, an exceptional rigor and impose themselves upon their addressees as rules of public order, their singular derogation being impossible for them. Of course, for such a consequence to occur, it is required that its content has been elaborated respecting the legal limits and, in the case of the public sector, that it had been negotiated and agreed upon with the intervention of all and each one of the competent organs and instances to do so. Thus, a collective bargaining agreement (convenio colectivo) cannot render imperative or prohibitory norms ineffective, among them those classified as public order, nor could it be enforceable if it was agreed upon without the participation of those who, by law, should have manifested their assent (see, on the subject, rulings Nos. 119, at 9:30 a.m., of June 13; 138, at 9:30 a.m., of July 2; 145, at 10:10 a.m., of July 9; 320, at 10:00 a.m., of December 17, all of 1997; and 30, at 8:40 a.m., of January 30, 1998).” Judgments numbered 2005-353, 2005-361, 2005-362, 2005-907, 2006-350, and 2006-1,062 may also be consulted.

**IV.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE:** The competence of this Chamber is limited to determining whether Mr. [Name1] has or does not have the right to be paid the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), in light of subsection b), of Article 27 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), which was in effect at the time his service relationship with the defendant entity concluded. This is because the issue of whether the dismissal was justified or not is precluded, since both the first-instance judge and the members of the Tribunal indicated that there was indeed just cause on the part of the employer to terminate the relationship between the parties, without that aspect having been appealed before this Chamber by the plaintiff. Although in the document visible on folios 271-272 the special judicial representative of the plaintiff states that he ratifies the appeal filed, the fact is that the brief on folios 258 to 270 did not constitute an appeal before this third requested instance, given that not only was it not identified as such, but also the requirements set forth in Article 557 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) were not met and, in any case, it was filed outside the legal period, making it untimely and, consequently, inadmissible. Furthermore, it should be clarified that in this matter the application, in general terms, of the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) to the plaintiff is not discussed, in light of ruling number 4453 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), issued at 2:56 p.m. on May 24, 2000, and, for that reason, the case is not analyzed from that perspective. In any event, what was decided in that judgment does not affect this litigation, since according to the provisions in the operative part, the effects of the ruling were dimensioned as of the date of publication of the summary in La Gaceta, which occurred only on September 26, 2001, when the dismissal of the plaintiff had already occurred. Having clarified the foregoing, it is appropriate to cite the conventional norm on the basis of which the Tribunal granted the severance pay (cesantía) to the plaintiff. Expressly, the related subsection b), of Article 27 established: *“In order to make the benefit of Severance Pay (Cesantía) a real right, when a worker is dismissed based on the grounds of Article 81 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), having completed the procedures established for this purpose by this Convention, the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales) may recommend to the Municipal Executive the payment of severance pay (cesantía) which shall be calculated at the rate of one month’s salary for each year or fraction greater than 6 months of continuous services, with no limit of years. For this recommendation to be* binding *on the Executive, it must be endorsed by a simple majority of the members of the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales) present at the session in which it is issued.”* (The underlining is by the drafter). It is clear from the transcription made that through the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales) was granted the possibility to dispose, with binding effects, of the consequences of a dismissal with just cause and, in the specific case, it agreed by majority to pay the plaintiff the severance pay (cesantía), despite having incurred just cause for dismissal (folio 112). The appellant argues that the norm is illegitimate, because it exceeds the normal content of a conventional provision, an instrument that, in its normative scope, must confine itself to exceeding the minimum legal rights provided by the legislator, without it being valid to invade the field of competences assigned by law to other organs. Having analyzed the grievance, the majority of the members of this Chamber consider that the representative of the defendant entity is correct. On repeated occasions, both this body and the one in charge of constitutionality control have held that it is not legitimate for collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) to include norms that contravene laws of public order, as set forth in the preceding whereas clause (considerando). In the specific case, the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales) would be invading a competence that by law corresponds to the Municipal Mayor (Alcalde Municipal) (Article 17, subsection k), of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal)), which is to intervene in the disciplinary power, to which the effects of a dismissal are undoubtedly ineluctably linked. Thus, it is considered invalid that a decision of said Board regarding sanctioning matters can bind the head (jerarca) of a specific public entity. In a matter similar to the one at hand, this Chamber stated: *“If, as indicated in that precedent, the power to apply the disciplinary regime in public entities is always held by the head (jerarca) at the administrative level,... in no way can the norm of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva) that bound the head (jerarca) to the decision of a body whose composition is foreign to said hierarchy, such as the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), be considered applicable... As matters stand, the Board could only be considered a consultative body, not a binding one, which in some way contributes to forming the employer’s will and nothing more.”* (Judgment number 672, at 9:30 a.m. on August 18, 2004). Subsequently, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in also reiterated rulings, has pronounced in the same vein. In ruling number 7,085, at 11:54 a.m. on October 2, 1998, it noted:

*As for the criterion that the Chamber has expressed in relation to the content of collective bargaining instruments and their reforming power within the legal system, in judgment No. 1355-96 at 12:18 p.m. on March 22, 1996, upon examining the transfer of the disciplinary power from the Municipal Executive of Goicoechea to a Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales) and to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, by means of a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva de trabajo), it was stated that in accordance with the provisions of Article 129 of the Political Constitution, laws are obligatory and can only be repealed by a subsequent one; that the norm of a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) cannot nullify the validity of ordinary laws, but rather, in the case of labor relations, the existing minimums can be exceeded, but only for the specific case, with the law maintaining its validity; that the normative provisions of collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) must conform to existing labor norms, which they can exceed when it comes to granting benefits to workers, provided that provisions of an imperative nature are not affected or repealed; that collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas de trabajo) remain subject to and limited by laws of public order; that the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) cannot either reform the ordinary law that confers powers on constitutional organs, nor other legal provisions, which have nothing to do with the content of individual employment contracts; that the Municipal Executive, who forms part of the local government, is the general administrator and head of the municipal dependencies, cannot be deprived of such condition, transferring all the disciplinary power to a Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), created by a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), without infringing the principles of municipal autonomy and exclusivity in the formation of laws (Articles 121 subsection 1) and 170 of the Political Constitution); that the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), in its role as a guarantee commission in charge of complying with the agreement and other norms regulating relations between the institution and the employees, goes no further than its condition as a consultative or control body, without decision-making powers. Although the situation to which the aforementioned judgment corresponds differs from the situation now being examined in that, on one hand, the transfer of disciplinary power had been effected through a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), not as in this case, through a conciliation agreement (convenio conciliatorio), and on the other, the Municipality as an entity of territorial decentralization, regulated in the Political Constitution, enjoys the regime of autonomy provided therein, a situation that was not entirely clear in relation to the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, and which was finally defined with the enactment of Law No. 7789 of April 30, 1998, it is valid to use it as a precedent, since in its whereas clauses (considerandos) it refers not only to the specific case of transfer of competences proper to autonomous institutions to other organs through a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), but also to the more general situation of transfer, through a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), of powers conferred by law to a specific organ. Nor is the fact that in that situation it involved a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) and in this one a conciliation agreement (convenio conciliatorio) an obstacle preventing the use of the precedent, since the agreement (convención) rather enjoys the character of law between the parties in accordance with the provisions of Article 62 of the Political Constitution, while the conciliation agreement (convenio conciliatorio) is a mechanism for negotiation and resolution of collective labor conflicts of exclusively legal rank. Hence, if in the case of a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) the Chamber interpreted that it could not modify imperative precepts, with greater reason in the case of a conciliation agreement (convenio conciliatorio) such modification was not possible.../ Hence, it is clear that since the Sociedad de Servicios Públicos de Heredia was constituted, the disciplinary power was a matter reserved to the Manager (Gerente), within the broader framework of his condition as administrator of the company. In that sense, from the text of Law No. 5889 of March 8, 1976, it cannot reasonably be inferred that the legislator intended to establish a regime where said administrator shared his powers with the workers or with an organ of the Central Administration, namely, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security; on the contrary, the disciplinary competence and the power to remove workers from their positions is a power conferred by law exclusively on the Manager (Gerente) of the Company... The fact is that such transfer clearly occurred also in violation of the principle regulated in Articles 12.1 and 59 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which provides that the competence of the organs to which imperium powers are attributed must be regulated by law, understanding law as a norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly through the procedure established for that purpose. With the substantial modification of the competence that the law grants to the Manager (Gerente) of the Company, there occurs in turn, through a conciliation agreement (convenio conciliatorio), a usurpation of functions proper to the legislator, which causes the unconstitutionality that is declared here,* [...] *(From that Chamber, judgments 1996-1,355, 1999-5,445, 2001-11,946, 2004-6,843, 2007-18,485, and 2008-3,936 may also be consulted).* Apart from the reasons set forth, there is an additional reason that would prevent granting the plaintiff the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía). The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has established that those normative clauses that provide for the payment of severance pay (cesantía) to employees who have been dismissed for committing a serious fault are contrary to Constitutional Law. That decision is shared by those of us who sign this ruling; since, otherwise, at its core, it would entail exempting the application of the disciplinary regime with respect to those who have acted against the interests of the public entity in which they work, granting them a right that does not correspond to them for having incurred one of the causes for which the law provides for its loss. Thus, it is held that in judgment number 17437, at 7:35 a.m. on November 29, 2006, that Chamber indicated: *“On the other hand, there is also no justification whatsoever for the provision in subsection c) of Article 161, insofar as it allows the payment of the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) even in cases of dismissal with just cause. As provided by constitutional numeral 63 already commented upon, the indemnity is foreseen for cases of dismissal without just cause, as it is a logical consequence of the breaking of the employment contract by unilateral decision of the employer. However, in those cases where the breaking of the employment contract is due to a cause attributable to the worker, the payment of the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) is not justified, since there is no legitimate cause for it. As matters stand, this Tribunal considers unconstitutional the provisions in section iv of subsection a), section v of subsection b), and the entirety of subsection c) insofar as they exceed the twenty-year parameter that this Chamber has considered reasonable as a cap for severance pay (cesantía) and because payment is allowed even in cases of dismissal with just cause.”* (Judgment 1002, at 2:55 p.m. on January 23, 2008, may also be consulted).

**V.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** In accordance with the reasons set forth, the appealed judgment must be revoked and the first-instance one confirmed.

**POR TANTO:** The appealed judgment is revoked and the first-instance judgment is confirmed.

**Orlando Aguirre Gómez** **Zarela María Villanueva Monge** **Julia Varela Araya** **María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez** **Óscar Ugalde Miranda** The undersigned magistrates Julia Varela Araya and Óscar Ugalde Miranda issue a dissenting vote (salvamos el voto) and cast it as follows:

**CONSIDERING:** **SOLE:** The undersigned Magistrates depart from the majority opinion because, in our judgment, subsection b) of article 27 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva) does not transfer the disciplinary authority from the Mayor (Alcalde) to the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), inasmuch as the decision to dismiss without employer liability is the exclusive purview of the former, and the Board cannot make any binding recommendation to the Mayor on this matter. Therefore, the jurisprudential precedents invoked by the appellant are not applicable to this specific case, which, in turn, prevents the non-application, in the sub litem case, of the conventional article 27, subsection b), based on subsection 1) of article 8 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). What the conventional provision in question establishes is an advantage for workers, consisting of the ability, by way of exception, upon being dismissed with just cause (as occurred in this specific case), to receive the severance pay benefit (auxilio de cesantía)—an aspect that can indeed be perfectly binding on the Mayor—for which several requirements are listed: first, that the Labor Relations Board so recommends, which is optional for it (i.e., it may not endorse it in a given case, which disproves that it concerns a true substantive right, since in such a scenario the payment of severance would always proceed, whatever the reason for terminating the employment relationship); second, for this proposal to be binding on the Mayor, it must be agreed upon by a simple majority of the Board members present at the corresponding session. Since all of these requirements were met in the sub judice case (given that, of 12 members present, 10 supported the motion and only 2 opposed it, see folio 6), the Mayor could not deviate from this recommendation, not even by basing his decision on the indisputable gravity of the fault, as the conventional norm—which has the force of law and must therefore be respected—does not provide for that possibility of dissent. The broad majority obtained by the motion within the Labor Relations Board should be highlighted, as this body had the opportunity to become much more closely familiar with the facts surrounding this matter, and the undersigned do not have more elements than its members to decide on the advisability or inadvisability of said recommendation, which gave rise to a subjective right in favor of the plaintiff. As a corollary to the foregoing, we deny the appeal filed, thereby confirming the judgment under appeal.

**POR TANTO:** We confirm the ruling under review.

**[Name3]** **Óscar Ugalde Miranda** **[Name4]** 2 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Electronic Mail: [...]. and [...]

The collective agreement has the character of professional law and all existing individual or collective contracts, or those subsequently entered into in the companies, industries, or regions it affects, must adapt to its norms./ In every collective agreement, at least all the norms relating to union guarantees established in the conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO), ratified by our country, must be understood as included." (Bold is not from the original) "Article 55. The stipulations of the collective agreement have the force of law for: a) The parties that have signed it,...; b) All persons who, at the time it enters into force, work in the company, companies, or production centers to which the agreement refers, insofar as they are favored and even when they are not members of the trade union or unions that have concluded it; and c) Those who enter into future individual or collective contracts within the same company, companies, or production center affected by the agreement, in the understanding that such contracts may not be entered into under conditions less favorable to the workers than those contained in the collective agreement." (Highlights are by the editor). The binding nature, established in the Magna Carta and reiterated in the Labor Code, is necessary, since agreements reached between employers and workers to resolve their conflicts would be meaningless if one of the parties could freely decide whether or not to comply with them. Thus, by virtue of the nature of the collective agreement, the possibility exists of being able to demand compliance with what was agreed upon. However, the force of law is conferred to them insofar as the collective agreements have been agreed upon in accordance with the legislation. From the foregoing, a subordination of these to the legislative power of the State is inferred. This idea is also inferred from the text of the final paragraph of article 57 of the aforementioned Code, when it states: "Said deposit shall be communicated directly to the Office of Union Affairs and Administrative Conciliation of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, so that the latter may order the parties to conform to the legal requirements in case the agreement contains any violation of the legal provisions of this Code." (Emphasis supplied). From the foregoing transcribed text, it is deduced that what is agreed upon in a collective agreement cannot go against what is established in law; especially when it is a matter of public policy (orden público), since collective agreements, as to their content, must be subject to legal norms (article 58 of the Labor Code) and serve to exceed the minimum guarantees that have been established by the legislator. On this subject, [Name1] explains: "...what is prohibited, because it violates the legal norm, is to modify a precept of public policy (orden público), inherently non-derogable by simple private initiative. One must respect, then, the minimum norms established... one cannot disregard imperative legal precepts... an agreement approved by the administrative authority can be disregarded by the judicial authority; because, even though they achieve the same efficacy as a law, their opposition to labor laws of public policy (orden público) and, therefore, non-derogable by collective agreements, is not permissible. In this way, in our view, if a collective agreement, even approved by the administrative authority, is contrary to the law, it cannot be applied by the judicial authority; because the latter acts in a different sphere, and the approval by the administrative authorities may be insufficient for the judicial authority... In the same way that individual labor contracts must respect the legal norms of public policy (orden público) that govern this matter, collective agreements cannot oppose such norms, unless they improve them for the benefit of the worker." ([Name1], Guillermo. Derecho Normativo Laboral, Buenos Aires, Bibliográfica Omeba, 1966, pp. 397-398). In the vote of the Constitutional Chamber number 1,355, of 12:18 hours on March 22, 1996, on this subject, it was indicated: "Because article 62 of the Political Constitution expressly so provides, collective labor agreements that are entered into in accordance with the law have the force of law between the contracting parties. And as we have said that one of the objectives of collective labor agreements is to review the minimum content of the legal benefits established for workers, in principle, it is possible to argue that it is legally valid for a collective agreement to introduce modifications or reforms of a legal nature. But as article 129 of the Political Constitution indicates that laws are obligatory and can only be repealed by a subsequent one, we must conclude that a norm of a collective agreement cannot remove the validity of ordinary laws, rather, in the case of labor relations, those minimums can in fact be exceeded, but only for the specific case in question, with the law maintaining its validity. That is to say, the normative provisions of collective labor agreements must conform to the existing labor legal norms, which they can exceed when it comes to granting benefits to workers, provided that imperative provisions are not affected or repealed, which means that collective labor agreements are subject to and limited by laws of public policy (orden público)." Similarly, in the judgment of this Chamber, number 108, of 9:40 hours on March 12, 2003, it was explained: "IV.- Now then, pursuant to the provisions of articles 54 and 55 of the Labor Code and in another of higher rank, article 62 of the Political Constitution, the stipulations contained in a collective agreement have the force of professional law for the parties that signed it and for those persons who, at the moment of its entry into force, work for the company or in the profession it regulates, whether or not they are unionized, as well as for those who are hired in the future, while it is in force. This principle implies, basically, that, at least in the legal relationship between the employees and the employing entity, who are bound by such an agreement, its norms are placed above any other state norm, with a rank equal to the -formal- law and constitute the primary source of labor rights and duties. It is not, of course, a matter of the repeal of ordinary legislation, due to the collective agreement, since the former remains fully valid and effective [numeral 129 of the Political Constitution]. What occurs is, undoubtedly, its inapplicability to the specific case, since the special regulation of the collective agreement is binding for it. The norms of a legal transaction of this nature have, then, an exceptional rigor and are imposed on their recipients as rules of public policy (orden público), making it impossible for them to individually derogate from them. Of course, for such a consequence to occur, it is required that its content has been elaborated respecting legal limits and, in the case of the public sector, that it has been negotiated and agreed upon with the intervention of each and every one of the competent bodies and instances to do so. Thus, a collective agreement cannot nullify norms of an imperative or prohibitive nature, among them those classified as of public policy, nor could it be enforceable if it has been agreed upon without the participation of those who, by law, should have manifested their consent (see, on the subject, votes Nos. 119, of 9:30 hours, of June 13; 138, of 9:30 hours, of July 2; 145, of 10:10 hours, of July 9; 320, of 10:00 hours, of December 17, all of 1997; and 30, of 8:40 hours, of January 30, 1998)." Judgments numbers 2005-353, 2005-361, 2005-362, 2005-907, 2006-350, and 2006-1,062 may also be consulted. IV.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE: The competence of the Chamber is reduced to determining whether Mr. [Name2] has the right or not to be paid the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), in light of subsection b), of article 27 of the Collective Agreement, which was in force at the time of concluding his service relationship with the defendant entity. This, because the issue of whether the dismissal was justified or not is precluded, since both the first instance judge and the members of the Tribunal indicated that there was just cause on the part of the employer to end the relationship between the parties, without this aspect having been appealed before this Chamber by the plaintiff. Although in the brief visible on folios 271-272 the special judicial representative of the plaintiff states that he ratifies the appeal filed, the truth is that the brief on folios 258 to 270 did not constitute an appeal before this third rogated instance, given that not only was it not identified as such, but it also did not meet the requirements set forth in article 557 of the Labor Code and, in any case, it was filed outside the legal term, with which it would be untimely and, consequently, inadmissible. Furthermore, it is necessary to clarify that in this matter the application, in general terms, of the collective agreement to the plaintiff is not discussed, in light of the vote of the Constitutional Chamber, number 4453, of 14:56 hours on May 24, 2000 and, for that reason, the case is not analyzed from that perspective. In any case, what was resolved in that judgment does not affect this litigation, because according to the provisions in the operative part, the effects of the ruling were dimensioned to the date of the publication of the summary in La Gaceta, which happened until September 26, 2001, when the dismissal of the plaintiff had already occurred. Having specified the foregoing, it is pertinent to cite the conventional norm based on which the Tribunal granted severance pay to the plaintiff. Expressly, subsection b), of the related article 27 established: "In order to make the Severance Pay benefit a real right, when a worker is dismissed based on the causes of Article 81 of the Labor Code, having completed the procedures established for this purpose by this Agreement, the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales) may recommend to the Municipal Executive the payment of severance pay, which will be calculated at the rate of one month's salary for each year or fraction greater than 6 months of continuous service, with no limit on years. For this recommendation to be binding on the Executive, it must be endorsed by a simple majority of the members of the Labor Relations Board present at the session in which it is issued." (The underlining is by the writer). From the transcribed text, it is clear that through a collective agreement, the Labor Relations Board was granted the possibility of ordering, with binding effects, the consequences of a dismissal with just cause and, in the specific case, it agreed by majority to pay the plaintiff severance pay, despite having incurred just cause for dismissal (folio 112). The appellant maintains that the norm is illegitimate, because it exceeds the normal content of a conventional provision, an instrument that, in its normative scope, should be limited to exceeding the minimum legal rights provided by the legislator, without it being valid to invade the field of competences assigned by law to other bodies. Having analyzed the grievance, the majority of the members of this Chamber consider that the representative of the defendant entity is correct. On repeated occasions, both this body and the one in charge of constitutionality control have held that it is not legitimate for collective agreements to include norms that contravene laws of public policy (orden público), as was set forth in the preceding recital (considerando). In the specific case, the Labor Relations Board would be invading a competence that by law corresponds to the Municipal Mayor (article 17, subsection k), of the Municipal Code), which is to intervene in the disciplinary power, to which the effects of a dismissal are undoubtedly inextricably linked. Thus, it is deemed that it is not valid for a decision of said Board regarding sanctioning matters to be binding on the head (jerarca) of a specific public entity. In a matter similar to the one being heard, this Chamber stated: "If, as indicated in that precedent, the power to apply the disciplinary regime in public entities is always held by the head (jerarca) at the administrative level,... in no way can the norm of the Collective Agreement that bound the head to the decision of a body foreign in its composition to said hierarchy, such as the Labor Relations Board, be considered applicable... Thus, the Board could only be considered an advisory, non-binding body, that in some way contributes to forming the employer's will and nothing more." (Judgment number 672, of 9:30 hours on August 18, 2004). Then, the Constitutional Chamber, in also repeated resolutions, has ruled in the same sense. In vote number 7,085, of 11:54 hours on October 2, 1998, it stated: Regarding the criterion that the Chamber has expressed in relation to the content of collective bargaining instruments and their reforming power within the legal system, in judgment No.1355-96 of 12:18 hours on March 22, 1996, when examining the transfer of the disciplinary power of the Municipal Executive of Goicoechea to a Labor Relations Board and to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, through a collective labor agreement, it was said that in accordance with the provisions of article 129 of the Political Constitution, laws are obligatory and can only be repealed by a subsequent one; that the norm of a collective agreement cannot remove the validity of ordinary laws, rather, in the case of labor relations, the existing minimums can be exceeded, but only for the specific case, with the law maintaining its validity; that the normative provisions of collective agreements must conform to the existing labor norms, which they can exceed when it comes to granting benefits to workers, provided that imperative provisions are not affected or repealed; that collective labor agreements are subject to and limited by laws of public policy (orden público); that the collective agreement also cannot reform the ordinary law that confers powers to constitutional bodies, nor other legal provisions that have nothing to do with the content of individual labor contracts; that the Municipal Executive, who forms part of the local government, is the general administrator and head of municipal dependencies, cannot be deprived of such condition, transferring all disciplinary power to a Labor Relations Board, created by a collective agreement, without infringing the principles of municipal autonomy and exclusivity in the formation of laws (articles 121 subsection 1) and 170 of the Political Constitution); that the Labor Relations Board in its role as a guarantee committee in charge of compliance with the agreement and other norms regulating relations between the institution and the employees, does not go beyond its status as an advisory or control body, without decision-making powers. Despite the fact that the scenario corresponding to the aforementioned judgment differs from the situation now examined in that, on the one hand, the transfer of disciplinary power had been carried out through a collective agreement, not as in this case, by a conciliation agreement, and on the other, the Municipality as a territorial decentralization entity, regulated in the Political Constitution, enjoys the autonomy regime provided therein, a situation that was not entirely clear in relation to the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia (Public Services Company of Heredia), and which was finally defined with the enactment of Ley 7789 of April 30, 1998, it is valid to use it as precedent, because in its recitals (considerandos) it refers not only to the specific case of transfer of competences of autonomous institutions to other bodies through a collective agreement, but also to the more general scenario of transfer, through a collective agreement, of powers conferred by law to a specific body. Nor is the fact that in that scenario it was a collective agreement and in this one a conciliation agreement an obstacle that prevents using the precedent, since the agreement rather enjoys the character of law between the parties in accordance with the provisions of article 62 of the Political Constitution, while the conciliation agreement is a mechanism for negotiation and resolution of collective labor conflicts of an exclusively legal rank. Hence, if in the scenario of a collective agreement the Chamber interpreted that it could not modify imperative precepts, with even more reason in the case of a conciliation agreement such modification was not possible.../ Hence, it is clear that since the Sociedad de Servicios Públicos de Heredia was constituted, the disciplinary power was a matter reserved to the Manager, within the broader framework of his condition as administrator of the company. In that sense, from the text of Ley No. 5889 of March 8, 1976, it cannot be reasonably inferred that the legislator intended to establish a regime where said administrator shared his powers with the workers or with a body of the Central Administration, namely, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security; on the contrary, the disciplinary competence and the power to remove workers from their positions is a power conferred by law exclusively to the Manager of the Company... The truth is that said transfer clearly occurred also in violation of the principle regulated in articles 12.1 and 59 of the General Law of Public Administration, which provides that the competence of the bodies to which sovereign powers are attributed must be regulated by law, understanding law as a norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly through the procedure established for this purpose. With the substantial modification of the competence that the law grants to the Manager of the Company, there occurs in turn, by means of a conciliation agreement, a usurpation of functions proper to the legislator, which causes the unconstitutionality declared here, [...] (From that Chamber, judgments 1996-1355, 1999-5445, 2001-11946, 2004-6843, 2007-18485, and 2008-3936 may also be consulted). Apart from the reasons stated, there is an additional reason that would prevent granting the plaintiff the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía). The Constitutional Chamber has established that those normative clauses that provide for the payment of severance pay to public servants who have been dismissed for committing a serious fault are contrary to Constitutional Law. This decision is shared by those of us who subscribe to this vote; because, to the contrary, in its essence, it would entail exempting from the application of the disciplinary regime those who have acted against the interests of the public entity where they work, granting them a right to which they are not entitled for having incurred one of the causes for which the law provides for its loss. Thus, we have that in judgment number 17437, of 7:35 hours on November 29, 2006, that Chamber indicated: "On the other hand, there is also no justification whatsoever for what is provided in subsection c) of article 161, insofar as it allows the payment of the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) even in cases of dismissal with just cause. Just as the aforementioned constitutional numeral 63 provides, the compensation is provided for cases of dismissal without just cause, as it is a logical consequence of the breaking of the employment contract by unilateral decision of the employer. However, in those cases where the breaking of the employment contract is due to a cause attributable to the worker, the payment of the severance pay is not justified, as there is no cause that legitimizes it. Thus, this Tribunal deems unconstitutional what is provided in epigraph iv of subsection a), epigraph v of subsection b), and the entirety of subsection c) insofar as they exceed the twenty-year parameter that this Chamber has deemed reasonable as a ceiling for severance pay and for allowing payment even in cases of dismissal with just cause." (Judgment 1002, of 14:55 hours on January 23, 2008, may also be consulted). V.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: In accordance with the reasons stated, the appealed judgment must be revoked and the first instance judgment confirmed." Voto salvado de los magistrados Julia Varela Araya y Óscar Ugalde[Nombre1] Miranda :

"ÚNICO: The undersigned Magistrates depart from the majority criterion because, in our judgment, subsection b) of article 27 of the Collective Agreement does not transfer the disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) of the Mayor to the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), because the decision to dismiss without employer liability rests exclusively with the former, without the Board being able to make any binding recommendation in this regard. Therefore, the jurisprudential precedents invoked by the appellant are not applicable to the specific case, which, in turn, prevents the non-application in the sub litem of conventional article 27 subsection b) based on numeral 8 subsection 1) of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (Organic Law of the Judicial Branch). What the conventional provision in question establishes is an advantage for the workers consisting of, by way of exception, when they are dismissed with just cause (as occurred in the specific case), being able to enjoy the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) -an aspect that can indeed be perfectly binding on the Mayor-, for which several requirements are listed: first, that the Labor Relations Board recommends it, which is optional for it (that is, it may be that in a given case it does not endorse it, which disproves that it is a true real right, because in such scenario the payment of severance pay would always proceed, whatever the reason for the termination of the relationship); second, for that proposition to obligate the Mayor, it must be agreed by a simple majority of the members of the Board present at the corresponding session. As in the sub judice all those requirements were met (since, out of 12 members present, 10 supported the motion and only 2 opposed it, see folio 6), the Mayor could not depart from that recommendation, not even by basing his decision on the indisputable seriousness of the fault, since the conventional norm -which has the force of law, and therefore must be respected- does not provide for that possibility of dissent. The large majority that the motion obtained within the Labor Relations Board must be highlighted, a body that had the possibility of knowing the facts surrounding this matter much more closely, without the undersigned having greater elements than its members to decide on the advisability or not of said recommendation, which created a subjective right in favor of the plaintiff.

As a corollary to the foregoing, we deny the appeal filed, and proceed to confirm the contested judgment."</span><span>[Name1]</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify"><span style="font-family:Arial">[Name1]</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span></p></div></body></html>" In the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) number 1.355, of 12:18 p.m. on March 22, 1996, on this subject, it was stated:

“Because Article 62 of the Political Constitution expressly so provides, collective labor agreements (convenciones colectivas de trabajo) that are entered into in accordance with the law have the force of law between the contracting parties. And as we have said that one of the objectives of collective labor agreements is to revise the minimum content of the legal benefits established for workers, in principle, it is possible to argue that it is legally valid for a collective labor agreement to introduce modifications or reforms of a legal nature. But because Article 129 of the Political Constitution states that laws are obligatory and can only be repealed by a subsequent one, we must conclude that a norm of a collective labor agreement cannot remove the validity of ordinary laws; rather, in the case of labor relations, those existing minimums can in fact be exceeded, but only for the specific case at hand, with the law remaining in force. That is to say, the normative provisions of collective labor agreements must conform to the existing statutory labor norms, which they can exceed when it comes to granting benefits to workers, provided that provisions of an imperative nature are not affected or repealed, meaning that collective labor agreements remain subject to and limited by public order laws.” Similarly, in the judgment of this Chamber, number 108, of 9:40 a.m. on March 12, 2003, it was explained:

“IV.- Now then, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 54 and 55 of the Labor Code and another of higher rank, Article 62 of the Political Constitution, the stipulations contained in a collective labor agreement have the force of professional law for the parties that signed it and for those persons who, at the moment it enters into force, work for the company or in the profession it regulates, whether or not they are unionized, as well as for those who are hired in the future, while it is in force. That principle implies, basically, that, at least, in the legal relationship between the employees and the employer entity, who are bound by an agreement of this kind, its norms are situated above any other of a state nature, with a rank equal to formal law, and constitute the primary source of labor rights and duties. This is not, of course, a matter of the repeal of ordinary legislation due to the collective agreement, since the former remains fully valid and effective [numeral 129 of the Political Constitution]. What occurs is, without doubt, its inapplicability to the specific case, because the special regulation of the collective labor agreement is binding for it. The norms of a legal transaction of this nature have, therefore, an exceptional rigor and are imposed upon their recipients as public order rules, making their singular repeal impossible for them. Of course, for such a consequence to occur, it is required that its content has been drafted respecting legal limits and, in the case of the public sector, that it has been negotiated and agreed upon with the intervention of each and every one of the competent bodies and instances to do so. Thus, a collective agreement cannot render imperative or prohibitive norms ineffective, including those classified as public order, nor could it be enforceable if it has been agreed upon without the participation of those who, by law, should have expressed their consent (see, on the subject, rulings Nos. 119, of 9:30 a.m., on June 13; 138, of 9:30 a.m., on July 2; 145, of 10:10 a.m., on July 9; 320, of 10:00 a.m., on December 17, all of 1997; and 30, of 8:40 a.m., on January 30, 1998).” Judgments numbers 2005-353, 2005-361, 2005-362, 2005-907, 2006-350, and 2006-1.062 may also be consulted.

**IV.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE:** The competence of the Chamber is limited to determining whether Mr. [Nombre1] has or does not have the right to be paid the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), in light of subsection b), of Article 27 of the Collective Labor Agreement (Convención Colectiva), which was in force at the time his service relationship with the defendant entity concluded. This is because the issue of whether the dismissal was justified or not is precluded, since both the first-instance judge and the members of the Tribunal indicated that there was just cause on the part of the employer to end the relationship between the parties, without that aspect having been appealed before this Chamber by the plaintiff. Although in the document visible at folios 271-272 the plaintiff's special judicial representative states that he ratifies the filed appeal, the truth is that the brief at folios 258 to 270 did not constitute an appeal before this third instance requested, given that not only was it not identified as such, but neither were the requirements established in Article 557 of the Labor Code met, and, in any case, it was filed outside the legal deadline, which would make it untimely and, consequently, inadmissible. Furthermore, it should be clarified that in this matter, the application, in general terms, of the collective labor agreement to the plaintiff is not discussed, in light of the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, number 4453, of 2:56 p.m. on May 24, 2000, and, for that reason, the case is not analyzed from that perspective. In any event, what was resolved in that judgment does not affect this litigation, since according to the provisions of the operative part, the effects of the ruling were dimensioned to the date of publication of the notice in La Gaceta, which did not occur until September 26, 2001, when the plaintiff's dismissal had already occurred. Having specified the foregoing, it is appropriate to cite the conventional norm on the basis of which the Tribunal granted severance pay to the plaintiff. Expressly, subsection b), of the related Article 27 established: *“With the aim of making the benefit of Severance Pay a real right, when a worker is dismissed based on the grounds of Article 81 of the Labor Code, having completed the procedures established for that purpose in this Convention, the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales) may recommend to the Municipal Executive the payment of severance pay, which shall be calculated at the rate of one month's salary for each year or fraction greater than 6 months of continuous service, without limit of years. For this recommendation to be* <u>binding</u> *on the Executive, it must be endorsed by a simple majority of the members of the Labor Relations Board present at the session in which it is issued.”* (The underlining is the drafter's). From the transcription made, it appears that, through a collective labor agreement, the Labor Relations Board was granted the possibility of ordering, with obligatory effects, the consequences of a dismissal with just cause and, in the specific case, it agreed by majority to pay the plaintiff severance pay, despite having incurred just cause for dismissal (folio 112). The appellant argues that the norm is illegitimate, because it exceeds the normal content of a conventional provision, an instrument that, in its normative scope, must be limited to exceeding the minimum legal rights foreseen by the legislator, without it being valid to invade the field of competences assigned by law to other bodies. Having analyzed the grievance, the majority of the members of this Chamber consider that the representative of the defendant entity is correct. On repeated occasions, both this body and the one responsible for constitutional control have held that it is not legitimate for collective labor agreements to include norms that contravene public order laws, as was set forth in the preceding whereas clause. In the specific case, the Labor Relations Board would be invading a competence that by law corresponds to the Municipal Mayor (Article 17, subsection k), of the Municipal Code), which is that of intervening in the disciplinary power, to which the effects of a dismissal are undoubtedly inescapably linked. Thus, it is deemed that it is not valid for a decision of said Board regarding sanctioning matters to bind the head of a specific public entity. In a matter similar to the one under review, this Chamber stated: *“If, as indicated in that precedent, the power to apply the disciplinary regime in public entities is always held by the head at the administrative level,... in no way can the norm of the Collective Labor Agreement that bound the head to the decision of a body foreign in its composition to said hierarchy be considered applicable, as is the Labor Relations Board... Thus, the Board could only be considered a consultative, non-binding body, which in some way contributes to forming the employer's will and nothing more.”* (Judgment number 672, of 9:30 a.m. on August 18, 2004). Subsequently, the Constitutional Chamber, in also reiterated rulings, has pronounced itself in the same sense. In ruling number 7.085, of 11:54 a.m. on October 2, 1998, it noted:

*Regarding the criterion that the Chamber has expressed in relation to the content of collective bargaining instruments and their reforming power within the legal system, in judgment No. 1355-96 of 12:18 p.m. on March 22, 1996, when examining the transfer of the disciplinary power of the Municipal Executive of Goicoechea to a Labor Relations Board and to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), through a collective labor agreement, it was said that in conformity with the provisions of Article 129 of the Political Constitution, laws are obligatory and can only be repealed by a subsequent one; that the norm of a collective labor agreement cannot remove the validity of ordinary laws; rather, in the case of labor relations, the existing minimums can be exceeded, but only for the specific case, with the law remaining in force; that the normative provisions of collective labor agreements must conform to the existing statutory labor norms, which they can exceed when it comes to granting benefits to workers, provided that provisions of an imperative nature are not affected or repealed; that collective labor agreements remain subject to and limited by public order laws; that the collective labor agreement cannot either reform the ordinary law that confers powers on constitutional bodies, nor other legal provisions that have nothing to do with the content of individual employment contracts; that the Municipal Executive, who forms part of the local government, is the general administrator and head of the municipal dependencies, cannot be deprived of such condition by transferring all the disciplinary power to a Labor Relations Board, created by a collective labor agreement, without infringing the principles of municipal autonomy and exclusivity in the formation of laws (Articles 121 subsection 1) and 170 of the Political Constitution); that the Labor Relations Board in its role as a guarantee commission responsible for compliance with the agreement and other norms regulating relations between the institution and the employees, goes no further than its condition as a consultative or control body, without decision-making powers. Even though the situation to which the previously cited judgment corresponds differs from the situation now examined in that, on one hand, the transfer of disciplinary power had been effected through a collective labor agreement, not as in this case, through a conciliation agreement, and on the other, the Municipality, as a territorial decentralization entity, regulated in the Political Constitution, enjoys the regime of autonomy therein established, a situation that was not entirely clear in relation to the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, and which was finally defined with the enactment of Law No. 7789 of April 30, 1998, it is valid to use it as precedent, since its whereas clauses refer not only to the specific case of transfer of competences proper to autonomous institutions to other bodies through a collective labor agreement, but to the more general situation of transfer, through a collective labor agreement, of powers conferred by law to a specific body. Nor is it an obstacle that prevents the use of the precedent the fact that in that situation it was a collective labor agreement and in this one a conciliation agreement, since the agreement rather has the character of law between the parties in accordance with Article 62 of the Political Constitution, while the conciliation agreement is a mechanism for negotiation and resolution of collective labor conflicts of exclusively legal rank. Hence, if in the case of a collective labor agreement the Chamber interpreted that it could not modify imperative precepts, with more reason in the case of a conciliation agreement such modification was not possible.../ Hence, it is clear that since the Sociedad de Servicios Públicos de Heredia was constituted, the disciplinary power was a matter reserved to the Manager, within the broader framework of his condition as administrator of the company. In that sense, from the text of Law No. 5889 of March 8, 1976, it cannot reasonably be inferred that the legislator wished to establish a regime where said administrator shared his powers with the workers or with a body of the Central Administration, namely, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security; on the contrary, the disciplinary competence and the power to remove workers from their posts is a power conferred by law exclusively on the Manager of the Company... The truth is that said transfer occurred clearly with the infringement also of the principle regulated in Articles 12.1 and 59 of the General Law of Public Administration, which provides that the competence of bodies to which imperium powers are attributed must be regulated by law, understanding law as a norm issued by the Legislative Assembly through the procedure established for that purpose. With the substantial modification of the competence that the law grants to the Manager of the Company, there occurs in turn, by way of conciliation agreement, a usurpation of functions proper to the legislator, which causes the unconstitutionality that is hereby declared,* [...*] *(From that Chamber, judgments 1996-1.355, 1999-5.445, 2001-11.946, 2004-6.843, 2007-18.485, and 2008-3.936 may also be consulted).* Apart from the reasons set forth, there is an additional reason that would prevent granting the plaintiff the severance pay. The Constitutional Chamber has established that those normative clauses that provide for the payment of severance pay to employees who have been dismissed for committing a serious fault are contrary to Constitutional Law. That decision is shared by those who subscribe this ruling; since the contrary, in essence, would entail exempting the application of the disciplinary regime with respect to those who have acted against the interests of the public entity in which they work, granting them a right that does not correspond to them for having incurred in one of the causes for which the law provides for the loss of the same. Thus, it is held that in judgment number 17437, of 7:35 a.m. on November 29, 2006, that Chamber indicated: *“On the other hand, neither is there any justification for what is provided in subsection c) of Article 161, insofar as it allows the payment of severance pay even in cases of dismissal with just cause. As provided by the constitutional numeral 63 already commented on, the indemnity is foreseen for cases of dismissal without just cause, because it is a logical consequence of the breaking of the employment contract by unilateral decision of the employer. However, in those cases where the breaking of the employment contract is due to a cause attributable to the worker, the payment of severance pay is not justified, since there is no cause that legitimizes it. Thus, this Tribunal deems unconstitutional what is provided in heading iv of subsection a), heading v of subsection b), and the entirety of subsection c) insofar as they exceed the parameter of twenty years that this Chamber has deemed reasonable as a cap for severance pay and because payment is allowed even in cases of dismissal with just cause.”* (Judgment 1002, of 2:55 p.m. on January 23, 2008, may also be consulted).

**V.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** In accordance with the reasons set forth, the appealed ruling must be revoked and that of the first instance confirmed.

first instance.

**THEREFORE:** The appealed judgment is revoked and the first-instance judgment is confirmed.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Zarela María Villanueva Monge Julia Varela Araya María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez Óscar Ugalde Miranda The undersigned magistrates Julia Varela Araya and Óscar Ugalde Miranda dissent and issue our vote as follows:

**CONSIDERANDO:** **SOLE:** The undersigned Magistrates depart from the majority opinion because, in our judgment, subsection b) of Article 27 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva) does not transfer the disciplinary authority of the Mayor (Alcalde) to the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), since the decision to dismiss without employer liability rests exclusively with the former, without the Board being able to make any binding recommendation in that regard. Therefore, the jurisprudential precedents invoked by the appellant are not applicable to the specific case, which, in turn, prevents disregarding in the sub litem Article 27, subsection b) of the collective agreement based on Article 8, subsection 1) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). What the conventional provision in question establishes is an advantage for workers consisting of, by way of exception, upon being dismissed with just cause (as occurred in the specific case), being able to receive the severance pay benefit (auxilio de cesantía) – an aspect that can indeed be perfectly binding on the Mayor – for which several requirements are listed: first, that the Labor Relations Board so recommends, which is optional for it (meaning, it might not endorse it in a given case, which disproves that it involves a true vested right, since in such a hypothesis the payment of severance pay would always proceed, whatever the reason for the termination of the employment relationship); secondly, for that proposal to bind the Mayor, it must be agreed upon by a simple majority of the Board members present at the corresponding session. Since all these requirements were met in the sub judice (given that, out of 12 members present, 10 supported the motion and only 2 opposed it, see folio 6), the Mayor could not depart from that recommendation, not even by grounding his decision in the indisputable seriousness of the misconduct, since the conventional provision – which has the force of law and must therefore be respected – does not foresee that possibility of dissent. The broad majority that the motion obtained within the Labor Relations Board must be highlighted, a body that had the opportunity to become much more closely acquainted with the facts surrounding this matter, without the undersigned having any more elements than its members to decide on the advisability or not of said recommendation, which gave rise to a subjective right in favor of the plaintiff. As a corollary to the foregoing, we deny the appeal filed, proceeding to uphold the contested judgment.

**POR TANTO:** We uphold the ruling under review.

[Nombre3] Óscar Ugalde Miranda [Nombre4] 2

*020019890166LA* *020019890166LA* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2008-000854 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas treinta minutos del ocho de octubre del dos mil ocho.

Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, por [Nombre1] , mensajero, contra MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSÉ, representada por su apoderado general judicial el licenciado Roberto Arias Olivares. Figura como apoderado especial judicial del actor el licenciado Luis Fernando Jiménez Quesada, divorciado. Todos mayores, casados y vecinos de San José, con la excepción indicada.

RESULTANDO:

1.- El actor, en escrito fechado veintidós de julio de dos mil dos, promovió la presente acción para que en sentencia se establezca que su despido fue injustificado, por lo que deber ser reinstalado en su puesto o pagársele las prestaciones legales, así como los salarios caídos desde su despido hasta sentencia firme, intereses y ambas costas del proceso.

2.- La representación de la demandada contestó la acción en los términos que indicó en el memorial de fecha diecinueve de setiembre del dos mil dos y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho y la genérica sine actione agit.

3.- La jueza, licenciada Maureen Jiménez Gómez, por sentencia de las trece horas veintidós minutos del siete de agosto del dos mil siete, dispuso: "Se declara SIN LUGAR en todos sus extremos, la presente demanda interpuesta por [Nombre1] contra MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN JOSE, representada por su apoderada general judicial, Licenciada Grace Sandino Uva. Se acogen las defensas de falta de derecho y genérica sine actione agit, interpuestas por la parte accionada. Se condena al actor vencido al pago de ambas costas del proceso, fijándose los honorarios de abogado en la suma prudencial de cien mil colones. Se advierte a las partes que esta sentencia admite el recurso de apelación, el cual deberá interponerse ante este Juzgado en el término de tres días. En ese mismo plazo y ante este órgano jurisdiccional también se deberán exponer, en forma verbal o escrita, los motivos de hecho o de derecho en que la parte recurrente apoya su inconformidad; bajo el apercibimiento de declarar inatendible el recurso (artículos 500 y 501 incisos c) y d) del Código de Trabajo; votos de la Sala Constitucional Números 5798 de las 16:21 horas del 11 de agosto de 1998 y 1306 de las 16:27 horas del 23 de febrero de 1999 y Voto de la Sala Segunda Número 386 de las14:20 horas del 10 de diciembre de 1999". [sic] 4.- La parte actora apeló y el Tribunal de Trabajo, Sección Segunda, del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, integrado por los licenciados Eugenie Salas Chavarría, Víctor Ardón Acosta y Ana Luisa Meseguer Monge, por sentencia de las once horas del veintiocho de febrero de dos mil ocho, resolvió: "Se declara que en el presente proceso no existen vicios implicativos de nulidad o indefensión. Se revoca el fallo recurrido en lo que ha sido objeto del recurso. Debe la Municipalidad accionada pagarle al actor el auxilio de cesantía, entendido como un derecho real de conformidad con el tiempo servido. Los cálculos se dejan para la etapa de ejecución de sentencia por no contarse con los datos necesarios para realizarlos. Los rubros concedidos podrán ser cancelados en vía administrativa, con la salvedad de lo que establece el artículo 153 de la Constitución Política, si el actor no estuviere de acuerdo con los mismos. Se deniegan los demás extremos solicitados de reinstalación y salarios caídos. Se rechaza la excepción de falta de derecho en relación con los extremos concedidos y se acoge en lo denegado. Se obliga a la accionada a pagarle al demandante los intereses legales desde la fecha en que fue despedido hasta su efectivo pago. Se resuelve este asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas".

5.- La parte demandada formuló recurso para ante esta Sala en memorial de data veintinueve de abril de dos mil ocho, el cual se fundamenta en los motivos que se dirán en la parte considerativa.

6.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta la Magistrada Bogantes Rodríguez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- ANTECEDENTES: Por considerar que fue despedido sin justa causa, el señor [Nombre1] planteó la demanda con el fin de que se condenara a la Municipalidad de San José a reinstalarlo en su puesto o a pagarle las prestaciones legales, así como los salarios dejados de percibir desde la fecha de la destitución y hasta que se dictara sentencia, intereses y ambas costas (folios 1-4). La representación de la entidad demandada contestó negativamente y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho y la genérica sine actione agit (folios 21-29). La juzgadora de primera instancia declaró sin lugar las pretensiones del demandante y le impuso el pago de ambas costas (folios 185-194). Este último apeló lo resuelto (folios 198-208) y la Sección Segunda del Tribunal de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José lo revocó en cuanto denegó el auxilio de cesantía, al considerar que este derecho procedía con independencia de la existencia de falta grave, según lo regulado en el inciso b), del artículo 27 de la Convención Colectiva. Ordenó el pago de los intereses legales sobre el derecho concedido y resolvió sin especial condena en costas (folios 229-235).

II.- LOS AGRAVIOS DEL RECURRENTE: El apoderado general judicial del ente municipal muestra disconformidad en cuanto se ordenó el pago de la cesantía a favor del actor, con base en el numeral citado. Argumenta que dicha norma convencional no puede beneficiar los intereses del accionante, pues excede el contenido legal de una convención colectiva, instrumento que tiene como finalidad la revisión de los beneficios mínimos legales. Indica que de conformidad con el artículo 62 de la Constitución Política, las convenciones colectivas deben celebrarse conforme a la ley, con el fin de superar los derechos mínimos, pero ello no significa que por esa vía se puedan derogar disposiciones imperativas y de orden público (artículo 129, ídem), como el desplazamiento de competencias fijadas por el legislador. Por eso, en este caso, afirma que el traslado de las consecuencias legales que pueden derivarse del ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria a la Junta de Relaciones Laborales resulta ilegítimo, dado que legalmente el poder disciplinario, y consecuentemente los resultados que de su ejercicio se deriven, está conferido al jerarca de la Municipalidad. Lo contrario lesionaría la autonomía municipal y el principio de exclusividad en la formación de las leyes. De esa manera, la Junta de Relaciones Laborales solo puede tener la naturaleza de un órgano consultivo, sin que se le puedan atribuir competencias decisorias o imperativas, correspondientes a otros órganos. Con base en esos argumentos, solicita que se revoque la sentencia, se declare sin lugar la demanda y se le impongan las costas al accionante (folios 244-255).

III.- SOBRE EL VALOR NORMATIVO DE LAS CONVENCIONES COLECTIVAS: El artículo 62 de la Constitución Política confiere el valor de ley a las normas pactadas entre empleadores y trabajadores mediante una convención colectiva, al señalar, en forma expresa, lo siguiente: “Tendrán fuerza de ley las convenciones colectivas de trabajo que, con arreglo a la ley, se concierten entre patronos o sindicatos de patronos y sindicatos de trabajadores legalmente organizados”. Por su parte, los artículos 54 y 55 del Código de Trabajo, establecen: "Artículo 54.- Convención colectiva es la que se celebra entre uno o varios sindicatos de trabajadores y uno o varios patronos, o uno o varios sindicatos de patronos, con el objeto de reglamentar las condiciones en que el trabajo deba prestarse y las demás materias relativas a éste. La convención colectiva tiene carácter de ley profesional y a sus normas deben adaptarse todos los contratos individuales o colectivos existentes o que luego se realicen en las empresas, industrias o regiones que afecte./ En toda convención colectiva deben entenderse incluidas, por lo menos, todas las normas relativas a las garantías sindicales establecidas en los convenios de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT), ratificados por nuestro país." (La negrita no es del original) “Artículo 55. Las estipulaciones de la convención colectiva tienen fuerza de ley para: a) Las partes que la han suscrito,...; b) Todas las personas que en el momento de entrar en vigor trabajen en la empresa, empresas o centros de producción a que el pacto se refiera, en lo que aquellas resulten favorecidas y aun cuando no sean miembros del sindicato o sindicatos de trabajadores que los hubieren celebrado; y c) Los que concierten en los futuros contratos individuales o colectivos dentro de la misma empresa, empresas o centro de producción afectados por el pacto, en el concepto de que dichos contratos no podrán celebrarse en condiciones menos favorables para los trabajadores que las contenidas en la convención colectiva.” (Los destacados son de la redactora). El carácter vinculante, establecido en la Carta Magna y reiterado en el Código de Trabajo, resulta necesario, pues ningún sentido tendrían los acuerdos logrados entre empleadores y trabajadores para solucionar sus conflictos si alguna de las partes pudiera decidir libremente si los cumple o no. Así, en virtud de la naturaleza del convenio colectivo, existe la posibilidad de poder exigir el cumplimiento de lo pactado. No obstante, la fuerza de ley les está conferida en el tanto en que las convenciones colectivas se hayan acordado conforme a la legislación. Se desprende, de lo anterior, una subordinación de estas a la potestad legislativa del Estado. Esta idea también se desprende del texto del párrafo final del artículo 57 del citado Código, cuando señala: “Dicho depósito será comunicado directamente a la Oficina de Asuntos Gremiales y de Conciliación Administrativa del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, para que éste ordene a las partes ajustarse a los requisitos de ley en caso de que la convención contenga alguna violación de las disposiciones legales del presente Código.” (Énfasis suplido). De lo transcrito se deduce que lo pactado en un convenio colectivo no puede ir en contra de lo establecido en la ley; especialmente, cuando esta es de orden público, puesto que los convenios colectivos, en cuanto a su contenido, deben estar sujetos a la normativa legal (artículo 58 del Código de Trabajo) y sirven para superar las garantías mínimas que han sido establecidas por el legislador. Sobre este tema, [Nombre2] explica: “...lo vedado, por atentar contra la norma legal, es modificar un precepto de orden público, inderogable por esencia ante la simple iniciativa privada. Hay que respetar, pues, las normas mínimas establecidas... no cabe desconocer preceptos imperativos legales... un convenio aprobado por la autoridad administrativa puede ser desconocido por la autoridad judicial; pues, aunque logren la misma eficacia que una ley, no cabe su oposición con leyes laborales de orden público y, por tanto, inderogables por las convenciones colectivas. De esta manera, a nuestro parecer, si un convenio colectivo, aun aprobado por la autoridad administrativa, es contrario a la ley, no cabe aplicarlo por la autoridad judicial; pues ésta actúa en una esfera distinta, y la aprobación por las autoridades administrativas puede resultar insuficiente para la autoridad judicial... De la misma manera que los contratos individuales de trabajo deben respetar las normas legales de orden público que rijan en esta materia, los convenios colectivos no pueden oponerse a dichas normas, salvo que las mejoren en beneficio del trabajador.” ([Nombre2], Guillermo. Derecho Normativo Laboral, Buenos Aires, Bibliográfica Omeba, 1966, pp. 397-398). En el voto de la Sala Constitucional número 1.355, de las 12:18 horas del 22 de marzo de 1996, sobre este tema, se indicó:

“Por disponerlo así expresamente el artículo 62 de la Constitución Política, las convenciones colectivas de trabajo que se celebren conforme a la ley, tienen fuerza de ley entre las partes contratantes. Y como hemos dicho que uno de los objetivos de las convenciones colectivas de trabajo, es revisar el contenido mínimo de los beneficios legales establecidos para los trabajadores, en principio, es posible argumentar que es jurídicamente válido que una convención colectiva pueda introducir modificaciones o reformas de carácter legal. Pero como el artículo 129 de la Constitución Política señala que las leyes son obligatorias y sólo pueden ser derogadas por otra posterior, debemos concluir en que una norma de una convención colectiva no puede quitar vigencia a las leyes ordinarias, sino que, en tratándose de relaciones laborales, de hecho se pueden superar esos mínimos existentes, pero solo para el caso concreto de que se trata, manteniendo la ley su vigencia. Es decir, que las disposiciones normativas de las convenciones colectivas de trabajo, deben ajustarse a las normas legales laborales existentes, las que pueden superar cuando se trata de conceder beneficios a los trabajadores, siempre y cuando no se afecten o deroguen disposiciones de carácter imperativo, con lo que se quiere decir que las convenciones colectivas de trabajo, quedan sujetas y limitadas por las leyes de orden público”.

De igual forma, en la sentencia de esta Sala, número 108, de las 9:40 horas del 12 de marzo del 2003, se explicó:

“IV.- Ahora bien, al tenor de lo dispuesto en los artículos 54 y 55 del Código de Trabajo y en otro de mayor rango, el 62 de la Constitución Política, las estipulaciones contenidas en una convención colectiva, tienen fuerza de ley profesional para las partes que la suscribieron y para aquellas personas que, en el momento de su entrada en vigor, trabajen para la empresa o en la profesión que regula, estén o no sindicalizadas, así como para las que sean contratadas en el futuro, mientras esté vigente. Ese principio implica, básicamente, que, al menos, en la relación jurídica entre los y las servidoras y la entidad patronal, que se encuentran vinculados/as por un acuerdo de esa clase, sus normas se ubican por encima de cualquier otra de carácter estatal, con un rango igual a la ley -formal- y constituyen la fuente primigenia de los derechos y de los deberes laborales. No se trata, claro está, de la derogatoria de la legislación ordinaria, por causa del pacto colectivo, pues aquella sigue siendo plenamente válida y eficaz [numeral 129 de la Constitución Política]. Lo que se produce es, sin duda, su inaplicabilidad al caso concreto, por cuanto resulta vinculante, para éste, la regulación especial de la convención colectiva. Las normas de un negocio jurídico de esta índole tienen, entonces, un rigor excepcional y se imponen, a sus destinatarios, como reglas de orden público, siendo imposible, para ellos, su derogación singular. Por supuesto, para que tal consecuencia se produzca, se requiere que su contenido haya sido elaborado respetando los límites legales y, tratándose del sector público, que se hubiese negociado y acordado con la intervención de todos/as y cada uno/a de los órganos e instancias competentes para hacerlo. Así, un convenio colectivo no puede dejar sin efecto normas de carácter imperativo o prohibitivo, entre ellas las calificadas como de orden público, ni podría ser oponible si se ha pactado sin la participación de quienes, por ley, debieron haber manifestado su asentimiento (ver, sobre el tema, los votos N°s. 119, de las 9:30 horas, del 13 de junio; 138, de las 9:30 horas, del 2 de julio; 145, de las 10:10 horas, del 9 de julio; 320, de las 10 horas, del 17 de diciembre, todos de 1997; y 30, de las 8:40 horas, del 30 de enero de 1998).” También pueden consultarse las sentencias números 2005-353, 2005-361, 2005-362, 2005-907, 2006-350 y 2006-1.062.

IV.- ANÁLISIS DEL CASO CONCRETO: La competencia de la Sala se reduce a determinar si el señor [Nombre1] tiene o no derecho a que se le pague el auxilio de cesantía, a la luz del inciso b), del artículo 27 de la Convención Colectiva, que estuvo vigente al momento de concluir su relación de servicio con la entidad demandada. Esto, por cuanto el tema de si el despido fue o no justificado se encuentra precluido, pues tanto la juzgadora de primera instancia como los integrantes del Tribunal señalaron que sí medió justa causa por parte de la empleadora para poner fin a la relación entre las partes, sin que tal aspecto haya sido recurrido ante esta Sala por la parte actora. Si bien en el escrito visible a folios 271- 272 el apoderado especial judicial del demandante señala que ratifica el recurso planteado, lo cierto es que el libelo de folios 258 a 270 no constituyó un recurso ante esta tercera instancia rogada, dado que no solo no se identificó como tal, sino que tampoco se cumplieron los requisitos previstos en el artículo 557 del Código de Trabajo y, en cualquier caso, fue planteado fuera del plazo legal, con lo que resultaría extemporáneo y, por consiguiente, inadmisible. Además, cabe aclarar que en este asunto no se discute la aplicación, en términos generales, de la convención colectiva al actor, a la luz del voto de la Sala Constitucional, número 4453, de las 14:56 horas del 24 de mayo del 2000 y, por esa razón, no se entra a analizar el caso desde esa perspectiva. De cualquier modo, lo resuelto en esa sentencia no incide en este litigio, pues según lo dispuesto en la parte dispositiva, los efectos del fallo se dimensionaron a la fecha de la publicación de la reseña en La Gaceta, lo cual sucedió hasta el 26 de setiembre del 2001, cuando ya se había producido el despido del accionante. Precisado lo anterior, cabe citar la norma convencional con base en la cual el Tribunal otorgó la cesantía al actor. En forma expresa, el inciso b), del artículo 27 relacionado establecía: “Con el fin de hacer del beneficio de la Cesantía un derecho real, cuando un trabajador sea despedido con fundamento en las causales del Artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo, cumplidos los trámites que al efecto establece esta Convención, la Junta de Relaciones Laborales podrá recomendar al Ejecutivo Municipal el pago de cesantía que se calculará a razón de un mes de salario por cada año o fracción mayor de 6 meses de servicios continuos, sin límite de años. Para que esta recomendación sea vinculante para el Ejecutivo, la misma deberá ser avalada por la mayoría simple de los miembros de la Junta de Relaciones Laborales presentes en la sesión en que la misma sea emitida.” (El subrayado es de quien redacta). De la transcripción hecha se desprende que mediante convención colectiva se otorgó a la Junta de Relaciones Laborales la posibilidad de disponer, con efectos obligatorios, de las consecuencias de una destitución con justa causa y, en el caso concreto, acordó por mayoría pagarle al actor la cesantía, a pesar de haber incurrido en justa causa de despido (folio 112). El recurrente sostiene que la norma es ilegítima, por cuanto excede el contenido normal de una disposición convencional, instrumento que, en su ámbito normativo, debe circunscribirse a superar los derechos mínimos legales previstos por el legislador, sin que resulte válido invadir el campo de competencias asignadas por ley a otros órganos. Analizado el agravio, la mayoría de los integrantes de esta Sala consideramos que lleva razón el representante de la entidad demandada. En reiteradas ocasiones, tanto este órgano como el encargado del control de constitucionalidad han sostenido que no es legítimo que en las convenciones colectivas se incluyan normas que se contrapongan a leyes de orden público, tal y como quedó expuesto en el considerando anterior. En el caso concreto, la Junta de Relaciones Laborales estaría invadiendo una competencia que por ley le corresponde al Alcalde Municipal (artículo 17, inciso k), del Código Municipal), cual es la de intervenir en la potestad disciplinaria, a la que sin duda van ineludiblemente ligados los efectos de una destitución. Así, se estima que no es válido que una decisión de dicha Junta en lo tocante a materia sancionadora pueda vincular al jerarca de una determinada entidad pública. En un asunto similar al que se conoce, esta Sala señaló: “Si tal y como en ese antecedente se indicó, el poder para aplicar el régimen disciplinario en los entes públicos lo detenta siempre el jerarca a nivel administrativo,... en modo alguno puede considerarse aplicable la norma de la Convención Colectiva que vinculaba al jerarca a la decisión de un órgano ajeno en su composición a dicha jerarquía, como lo es la Junta de Relaciones Laborales... Así las cosas, la Junta sólo podría considerarse un órgano consultivo, no vinculante, que de alguna manera contribuye a formar la voluntad patronal y nada más.” (Sentencia número 672, de las 9:30 horas del 18 de agosto del 2004). Luego, la Sala Constitucional, en resoluciones también reiteradas, se ha pronunciado en igual sentido. En el voto número 7.085, de las 11:54 horas del 2 de octubre de 1998, apuntó:

En cuanto al criterio que la Sala ha expresado en relación con el contenido de los instrumentos de negociación colectiva y su poder reformador dentro del ordenamiento jurídico, en sentencia No.1355-96 de las 12:18 horas del 22 de marzo de 1996, al examinar la transferencia de la potestad disciplinaria del Ejecutivo Municipal de Goicoechea a una Junta de Relaciones Laborales y al Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, mediante una convención colectiva de trabajo, se dijo que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 129 de la Constitución Política, las leyes son obligatorias y solo pueden ser derogadas por otra posterior; que la norma de una convención colectiva no puede quitar vigencia a las leyes ordinarias, sino que, en tratándose de relaciones laborales, se pueden superar los mínimos existentes, pero solo para el caso concreto, manteniendo la ley su vigencia; que las disposiciones normativas de las convenciones colectivas deben ajustarse a las normas laborales existentes, las que pueden superar cuando se trata de conceder beneficios a los trabajadores, siempre y cuando no se afecten o deroguen disposiciones de carácter imperativo; que las convenciones colectivas de trabajo quedan sujetas y limitadas por las leyes de orden público; que la convención colectiva no puede tampoco reformar la ley ordinaria que confiere atribuciones a órganos constitucionales, ni otras disposiciones legales, que no tienen que ver con el contenido de los contratos individuales de trabajo; que al Ejecutivo Municipal, que forma parte del gobierno local, es administrador general y jefe de las dependencias municipales, no se le puede privar de tal condición, transfiriendo todo el poder disciplinario a una Junta de Relaciones Laborales, creada por una convención colectiva, sin infringir los principios de autonomía municipal y de exclusividad en la formación de las leyes (artículos 121 inciso 1) y 170 de la Constitución Política); que la Junta de Relaciones Laborales en su papel de comisión de garantía encargada del cumplimiento de la convención y demás normas reguladoras de las relaciones entre la institución y los servidores, no va más allá de su condición de órgano consultivo o de control, sin atribuciones decisorias. A pesar de que el supuesto que corresponde la sentencia antes referida se diferencia de la situación que ahora se examina en que, por un lado, la transferencia del poder disciplinario se había efectuado mediante convención colectiva, no como en este caso, por convenio conciliatorio, y por otro, la Municipalidad como entidad de descentralización territorial, regulada en la Constitución Política, goza del régimen de autonomía ahí dispuesto, situación que no era del todo clara en relación con la Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, y que finalmente se definió con la promulgación de la Ley No.7789 de 30 de abril de 1998, es válido utilizarla como precedente, pues en sus considerandos hace referencia no solo al caso específico de transferencia de competencias propias de instituciones autónomas a otros órganos mediante convención colectiva, sino al supuesto más general de traslado, mediante convención colectiva, de atribuciones conferidas por ley a determinado órgano. Tampoco resulta un obstáculo que impida utilizar el precedente el hecho de que en aquel supuesto se tratara de una convención colectiva y en este de un convenio conciliatorio, ya que más bien la convención goza del carácter de ley entre las partes de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 62 de la Constitución Política, en tanto que el convenio conciliatorio es un mecanismo de negociación y resolución de conflictos laborales colectivos de rango exclusivamente legal. De ahí que si en el supuesto de convención colectiva la Sala interpretó que no podía modificar preceptos imperativos, con más razón tratándose de un convenio conciliatorio dicha modificación no era posible.../ De ahí que resulte claro que desde que se constituyó la Sociedad de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, la potestad disciplinaria fue materia reservada al Gerente, dentro del marco más amplio de su condición de administrador de la empresa. En ese sentido, del texto de la Ley No.5889 de 8 de marzo de 1976, no se puede razonablemente inferir que el legislador haya querido establecer un régimen donde dicho administrador compartía sus atribuciones con los trabajadores o con un órgano de la Administración Central, a saber, el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social; por el contrario, la competencia disciplinaria y la potestad de remover a los trabajadores de su puesto es una atribución conferida por ley exclusivamente al Gerente de la Empresa... Lo cierto es que dicha transferencia se produjo claramente con infracción también del principio regulado en los artículos 12.1 y 59 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que dispone que la competencia de los órganos a los que se atribuyen potestades de imperio debe ser regulada por ley, entendiendo ley como norma emanada de la Asamblea Legislativa por el procedimiento establecido al efecto. Con la modificación sustancial de la competencia que la ley otorga al Gerente de la Empresa, se produce a su vez, por vía de convenio conciliatorio, una usurpación de funciones propias del legislador, lo que causa la inconstitucionalidad que aquí se declara, [...] (De esa Sala también pueden consultarse las sentencias 1996- 1.355, 1999-5.445, 2001-11.946, 2004-6.843, 2007-18.485 y 2008- 3.936).

Aparte de las razones expuestas, existe un motivo adicional que impediría conceder al actor el auxilio de cesantía. La Sala Constitucional ha establecido que resultan contrarias al Derecho de la Constitución aquellas cláusulas normativas que prevean el pago de la cesantía a los servidores que han sido despedidos por la comisión de una falta grave. Esa decisión es compartida por quienes suscribimos este voto; pues, lo contrario, en el fondo, conllevaría excepcionar la aplicación del régimen disciplinario respecto de quienes han procedido contra los intereses de la entidad pública en la que laboren, concediéndoles un derecho que no les corresponde por haber incurrido en alguna de las causas por las cuales la ley dispone la pérdida del mismo. Así, se tiene que en la sentencia número 17437, de las 7:35 horas del 29 de noviembre del 2006, aquella Sala indicó: “Por otro lado, tampoco se encuentra justificación alguna para lo dispuesto en el inciso c) del artículo 161, en el tanto se permite el pago del auxilio de cesantía aun en los casos de despido con justa causa. Tal como lo dispone el numeral 63 constitucional ya comentado, la indemnización está prevista para los casos de despido sin justa causa, pues es una consecuencia lógica del rompimiento del contrato de trabajo por decisión unilateral del patrono. Sin embargo, en aquellos casos donde el rompimiento del contrato de trabajo obedece a una causa imputable al trabajador, no se justifica el pago del auxilio de cesantía, pues no existe una causa que lo legitime. Así las cosas, este Tribunal estima inconstitucional lo dispuesto en epígrafe iv del inciso a), el epígrafe v del inciso b) y la totalidad del inciso c) en cuanto exceden el parámetro de veinte años que esta Sala ha estimado razonable como tope por concepto de cesantía y por permitirse el pago aun en los casos de despido con justa causa.” (También puede consultarse la sentencia 1002, de las 14:55 horas del 23 de enero del 2008).

V.- CONSIDERACIONES FINALES: De conformidad con las razones expuestas, debe revocarse el fallo recurrido y confirmarse el de primera instancia.

POR TANTO:

Se revoca la sentencia recurrida y se confirma la de primera instancia.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Zarela María Villanueva Monge Julia Varela Araya María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez Óscar Ugalde Miranda Los suscritos magistrados Julia Varela Araya y Óscar Ugalde Miranda salvamos el voto y lo emitimos de la siguiente manera:

CONSIDERANDO:

ÚNICO: Los suscritos Magistrados nos apartamos del criterio de mayoría por cuanto, a nuestro juicio, el inciso b) del artículo 27 de la Convención Colectiva no transfiere la potestad disciplinaria del Alcalde a la Junta de Relaciones Laborales, por cuanto la decisión de despedir sin responsabilidad patronal compete exclusivamente al primero, sin que la Junta pueda hacerle ninguna recomendación vinculante al respecto. Por ende, no resultan aplicables al caso concreto los antecedentes jurisprudenciales invocados por el recurrente, lo que, a su vez, impide desaplicar en el sublitem el artículo 27 inciso b) convencional con base en el numeral 8 inciso 1) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Lo que establece la disposición convencional en cuestión es una ventaja para los trabajadores consistente en que, por vía de excepción, al ser despedidos con justa causa (como ocurrió en el caso concreto), puedan disfrutar del auxilio de cesantía -aspecto que sí puede serle perfectamente vinculante al Alcalde-, para lo cual se enumeran varios requisitos: en primer lugar, que la Junta de Relaciones Laborales así lo recomiende, lo que es potestativo para ella (es decir, puede ser que en determinado caso no lo avale, lo que desvirtúa que se trate de un verdadero derecho real, pues en tal hipótesis el pago de la cesantía procedería siempre, fuere cual fuere el motivo de finalización del vínculo); en segundo término, para que esa proposición obligue al Alcalde, tiene que acordarse por mayoría simple de los miembros de la Junta presentes en la sesión correspondiente. Como en el subjúdice se cumplieron todas esas exigencias (ya que, de 12 integrantes presentes, 10 apoyaron la moción y solo 2 se opusieron, ver folio 6), no podía el Alcalde apartarse de esa recomendación, ni siquiera motivando su decisión en la indiscutible gravedad de la falta, ya que la norma convencional -que tiene fuerza de ley, por lo que debe ser respetada- no prevé esa posibilidad de disenso. Debe destacarse la amplia mayoría que obtuvo la moción en el seno de la Junta de Relaciones Laborales, órgano que tuvo la posibilidad de conocer mucho más de cerca los hechos que rodearon este asunto, sin que los infrascritos contemos con mayores elementos que sus integrantes para decidir sobre la conveniencia o no de dicha recomendación, que hizo surgir a favor del actor un derecho subjetivo. Como corolario de lo expuesto, denegamos el recurso incoado, procediendo a confirmar la sentencia impugnada.

POR TANTO:

Confirmamos el pronunciamiento de que se conoce.

[Nombre3] Óscar Ugalde Miranda [Nombre4] 2