Inadmissibility of reinstating an interim worker upon the return of the permanent holderImprocedencia de reinstalación de trabajador interino por regreso del titular

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Central 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Email ...01 Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Dirección05 ( ) ACTOR: María Jimena Campos Vallejos DEMANDADO: El Estado No. 61- 2013-IV.

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN CUARTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, Dirección04 , at sixteen hours and twenty-five minutes on the twenty-sixth of June of the year two thousand thirteen.

Ordinary Proceeding (Proceso de Conocimiento) filed by Miss María Jimena Campos Vallejo, of legal age, single, Physician, resident of Goicochea, bearer of identity card number CED88725- - , represented at the trial hearing by Nombre112145 , of legal age, married in first nuptials, resident of Tibás, bearer of identity card number CED88726- - , in his capacity as Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact (Apoderado Especial Judicial), against El Estado, represented by Nombre17426 , of legal age, attorney, resident of San José, in her capacity as Deputy Procuradora (Procuradora Adjunta).-

RESULTANDO

1.- That on the 14th of September of the year 2010, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit and, in accordance with the ratification made at the preliminary hearing, requests: 1) That the Ministerio de Justicia be ordered to report on what occurred regarding the appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación) filed against the resolution of 3:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, which is the resolution imposing a disciplinary sanction of suspension for three days without pay. 2) In the event that the previous resolution is not final, that she be reinstated to the position of general physician G1 in any position as interim. 3) That payment be made for lost wages from March 7, 2010, onward. 4) That subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) be compensated in the amount of fifteen million colones. 5) That El Estado be ordered to pay interest and procedural and personal costs. Likewise, at the trial hearing, the party requests as a subsidiary claim that El Estado be ordered to pay severance notice (preaviso) and unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía) and any other unpaid emolument.

2.- That once the mandatory transfer was made by resolution at ten hours and thirty-five minutes on February twenty-first, two thousand eleven, the representation of El Estado denied the lawsuit and raised the defenses of lack of interest (falta de interés), payment (pago), and lack of right (falta de derecho), as well as requested a condemnation of costs. (folio 084 of the judicial file) 3.- That at eight hours and fifty minutes on November nineteenth, two thousand twelve, a preliminary hearing was held in this proceeding with the presence of the representatives of the parties. The disputed facts were identified. It was indicated that there are no preliminary defenses, and the plaintiff's testimony (declaración de parte) was admitted as evidence. (folios 232 to 234 of the judicial file) 4.- That at eight hours and thirty minutes on June twentieth, two thousand thirteen, the oral and public trial hearing was held in this proceeding, with the presence of the parties and their attorneys, before the same Tribunal issuing the judgment.

5.- That in the proceedings before this Tribunal, no nullities have been observed that must be corrected, and the judgment is issued within the period established for this purpose by Article 111.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, after deliberation and by majority.- Drafted by Judge Campos Hidalgo

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Proven Facts: Of this nature, and of importance for the resolution of the matter, the following have been demonstrated during the proceeding:

I.I.- That Miss María Jimena Campos Vallejos was appointed on an interim basis as of August 4, 2008, as general attending physician Nombre1620 in the Ministerio de Justicia y Paz, specifically at the Center called El Buen Pastor, replacing Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas and for the time during which the latter would be on interim promotion (folios 37, 38, 88, 39, 153 of the administrative file, white folder).

I.II.- That by resolution 002-146-2009 of 8:30 a.m. on September 11, 2009, an administrative proceeding was initiated against the plaintiff (folio 33 to 40 of the disciplinary administrative file).

I.III.- That by resolution 012-146-2009 of eleven hours on January twenty-sixth, two thousand ten, the Directing Body of the Administrative Proceeding (Órgano Director del Procedimiento Administrativo) recommended dismissing the plaintiff without employer liability (folios 99 to 109 of the administrative file, white folder).

I.IV.- That by resolution at sixteen hours and fifteen minutes on February seventeenth, two thousand ten, it was ordered to dismiss Miss Campos Vallejos without employer liability (folios 99 to 109 of the administrative file, white folder, and 223 to 235 of the disciplinary administrative file).

I.V.- That the plaintiff was terminated without employer liability by reason of the resolution at sixteen hours and fifteen minutes on February seventeenth, two thousand ten, as of March 7, 2010 (folio 128 of the administrative file, white folder).

I.VI.- That by official letter DRH-PCAL-107-10 of February 23, 2010, the plaintiff was notified of her dismissal without employer liability as of March 8 of that year, after the enjoyment of the 11 days of prophylactic vacations (vacaciones profilácticas) to which she is entitled. Likewise, she was informed that the eventual filing of appeals does not entail the suspension of the ordered act, and therefore she must accept the imposed sanction (folios 117 and 118 of the administrative file, white folder).

I.VII.- That by official letter D.G.846.2010 of March 10, 2010, the Director of Human Resources of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social was instructed to process the termination of Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas as Regional Medical Supervisor G.4, so that he return to his position as general attending physician G-1, as of March 16, 2010. By reason of the foregoing, by official letter DRH-CGAC-0127-2010 of March 11, 2010, the indicated physician was notified of the termination of his interim promotion, this being the reason for the termination of the plaintiff's interim appointment. (folio 48, 49 and 214 of the judicial file, plaintiff's testimony (declaración de parte)) I.VIII.- That by resolution at nine hours on March 9, 2010, of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social, the plaintiff's appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) against the resolution of February seventeenth, two thousand ten, was rejected (folio 264 to 281 of the disciplinary administrative file).

I.IX.- That by resolution 177-2010 at eight hours on April twelfth, two thousand ten, of the Ministro de Justicia y Gracia, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the plaintiff against the resolution at sixteen hours and fifteen minutes on February seventeenth, two thousand ten, was rejected for being considered untimely (folios 135 to 137 of the administrative file, white folder; 299 to 301 of the administrative proceeding file).

I.X.- That by resolution number 235-2010 at eleven hours and fifteen minutes on May twelfth, two thousand ten, it was ordered to partially grant a claim filed by the plaintiff and order the disbursement of the sum of two hundred forty-three thousand one hundred sixty-six colones with seventeen céntimos for vacation pay. Likewise, the payment of proportional Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) and school salary (salario escolar) was ordered, and the payment of unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía) and severance notice (preaviso) was rejected. (folios 7 to 11 of the administrative file, white folder) I.XI.- That by resolution No. 365-2010 at ten hours and thirty minutes on August fifth, a motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) filed by the plaintiff against resolution number 235-2010 at eleven hours and fifteen minutes on May twelfth, two thousand ten, was rejected (folios 22 to 26 of the administrative file, white folder).

I.XII.- That by resolution 391-2010 at eight hours on August fourth, two thousand ten, the resolution at sixteen hours and fifteen minutes on February seventeenth, two thousand ten, and its subsequent acts were totally annulled (folios 158 to 164 of the administrative file, white folder; 312 to 318 of the disciplinary administrative file).

I.XIII.- That by note dated August 9, 2010, the plaintiff requested the Human Resources Unit of the Ministerio de Justicia y Paz to proceed to reinstate her to her position, given what was resolved in resolution 391-2010 at eight hours on August fourth, two thousand ten. By reason of the foregoing, by official letter DGIRH-PGAL-0387-10 of August 12, 2010, she was informed that what was requested was not possible given that the permanent holder of the respective position was occupying it again as of March 15 of that year. (folios 166 and 171 of the administrative file, white folder; 323 and 324 of the disciplinary administrative file) I.XIV.- That by resolution at fifteen hours on October nineteenth, two thousand ten, of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social, it was ordered to modify the sanction imposed on the plaintiff to a suspension without pay for three days (folios 223 to 234, 236 to 247 of the administrative file, white folder; 330 to 341 of the disciplinary administrative file).

I.XV.- That by official letter DGIRH-PGAL-0515-10 of October 25, 2010, the Coordinator of the Work Environment Management Process (Proceso Gestión del Ambiente Laboral) notified the plaintiff of the imposed sanction and informed her that an appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) was available against the decision (folio 252 of the administrative file, white folder; 342 of the disciplinary administrative file).

I.XVII.- That by resolution 02-2011 at eight hours on January fifth, two thousand eleven, of the Ministro de Justicia y Paz, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the plaintiff against the resolution at fifteen hours on October nineteenth, two thousand ten, of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social was resolved. In said resolution, the following was ordered: "To reject in all its parts the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by Dr. María Jimena Campos Vallejos, against the resolution at fifteen hours on October nineteenth, two thousand ten, issued by the Dirección General de Adaptación Social, through which a disciplinary sanction was imposed consisting of the suspension of her duties for three days without pay. However, there is a material impossibility of applying said sanction, by virtue of the fact that Dr. Campos Vallejos stopped working for the institution as of March 08, 2010, due to the return of the permanent holder of the position she occupied on an interim basis, since August 08, 2008." Said resolution was notified to the plaintiff on February 15, 2011 (folios 121 to 133 of the judicial file).

I.XVIII.- That the plaintiff was paid her respective salary up to March 7, 2010 (folio 57 of the judicial file).

I.XIX.- That as of November 2010, the certificates and certifications issued by the Ministerio de Justicia y Gracia still stated that the plaintiff was dismissed for employer liability (folio 41 to 45 and 57 of the judicial file).

I.XX.- That the plaintiff was paid by transfer the amount recognized under number 235-2010 at eleven hours and fifteen minutes on May twelfth, two thousand ten, according to certification 02-2010 of November twenty-sixth, two thousand ten, from the Financial Director of the Ministerio de Justicia y Paz (folio 39 of the judicial file).

II.- Unproven Facts: The following have been considered of importance:

II.I.- That Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas was called to return to his original position in Dirección13480 within a persecutory context or with an interest in affecting the plaintiff in this proceeding.

II.II.- That the plaintiff had appointments in other public entities rejected due to erroneous information issued or provided by the Ministerio de Justicia y Paz regarding the sanction imposed on her.

II.III.- That El Estado made payment of the labor entitlements of severance notice (preaviso) and unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía) that corresponded to the plaintiff.

II.IV.- That there are vacant positions in the Ministerio de Justicia y Paz for general attending physician Nombre1620.

III.- Arguments of the parties: On the occasion of this proceeding, the parties have expressed the following relevant arguments in order to be taken into consideration for their due resolution in judgment:

III.I.- Arguments of the plaintiff: The representation of the plaintiff expresses the following considerations on the merits, regarding the claims:

III.I.I.- That the plaintiff was terminated without employer liability, and subsequently the sanction was reduced to three days of suspension without pay.

III.I.II.- That notwithstanding the foregoing, the Administration called the permanent physician of the position she occupied in order to indirectly terminate her appointment.

III.I.III.- That in the records of the Ministerio de Justicia, it still appears that the plaintiff was dismissed, which has resulted in her not being hired or having appointments extended in other public entities.

III.I.IV.- That the plaintiff is unaware of the result of her appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against the resolution imposing the three-day suspension without pay.

III.I.V.- That the termination of her appointment caused the plaintiff serious material and moral damages.

III.I.VI.- That the plaintiff was left defenseless, given that between the time of the termination of her appointment and the suspension resolution, the plaintiff was not appointed to any position, a situation that persists over time.

III.II.- Arguments of El Estado: The Procuradora representing El Estado expresses the following considerations on the merits:

III.II.I.- That the plaintiff was notified of the resolution regarding her appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against the resolution at fifteen hours on October nineteenth, two thousand ten.

III.II.II.- That the termination of the plaintiff's employment relationship was due to the return to his position of the permanent holder of the post, not corresponding to a dismissal at the employer's will.

III.II.III.- That there is no proof of the plaintiff's assertions regarding the existence of errors in the information provided by the Ministerio de Justicia about the reason for the termination of the plaintiff's employment relationship, nor that these have resulted in her not being hired or having appointments extended in other public entities.

III.II.IV.- That the plaintiff has no right to collect lost wages, given that she was not terminated at the employer's will.

III.II.V.- That the plaintiff is not entitled to collect damages.

IV.- On the object of the proceeding: From what has been expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the object of this proceeding is to determine whether liability has been generated on account of the termination of the plaintiff from the position she occupied in the Ministerio de Justicia y Gracia, as well as the appropriateness of her reinstatement to that same position.

V.- On the alleged lack of interest (falta de interés): As a first claim, the plaintiff requests that the Ministerio de Justicia be ordered to report on what occurred regarding the appeal for reversal with appellate review (recurso de revocatoria con apelación) filed against the resolution of 3:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010. In this regard, it has been proven that by resolution 02-2011 at eight hours on January fifth, two thousand eleven, of the Ministro de Justicia y Paz, the filed appeal was resolved, and that said resolution was notified to the plaintiff on February 15, 2011, when the respective ordinary proceeding had already been filed. By reason of the foregoing, it is evident to this Panel that in the case under examination, there is a lack of current interest (falta de interés actual) with respect to this claim, given that what was requested was already resolved timely in the administrative venue and, consequently, it is appropriate to grant the defense of El Estado in this regard.

VI.- In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations emanate. Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitución Política are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, by establishing the following: "Article 191.- A civil service statute (estatuto de servicio civil) shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration" and "Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, either due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof." In accordance with the indicated constitutional norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of a specific normative regulation, stability in employment - limiting the regime of free removal characteristic of private labor regulation - and of an administrative career, along with the other existing guarantees for persons protected under a subordination regime, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (with the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Sala Constitucional). Correlative to the foregoing rights, the public servant possesses a series of civil service obligations (obligaciones de carácter funcionarial), inherent to the public purposes sought by their activity and which must always guide their management, in order not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary liability. Without intending to be exhaustive, some of the duties proper to the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3 Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública), b) duty of compliance with the principles of public service - continuity, efficiency, adaptation to changes in the legal regime, and equality of treatment - (Art. 4 Ley General de la Administración Pública), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno) d) duty to protect the best interests of children (Art. 4 and 5 of the Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) e) duty to comply with the legal system (Art. 13 and concordant articles of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, Art. 39.a of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil), f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (Art. 5 and 10 of the Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos), g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), h) duty to act with efficacy (Art. 5 of the Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos) i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (Art. 114 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and Art. 39. d) and e) of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil) j) duty to respond in case of having acted with intent or gross negligence (Art. 199 and 211 Ley General de la Administración Pública) k) duty to abide by the Constitución Política (Art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, in a supplementary manner, based on Article 9 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and 51 of the indicated Estatuto, the provisions of the Código de Trabajo and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as the Ley de Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia, Ley de Regulación del Fumado, Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para Personas con Discapacidad, among others. In this line of thought, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters given the existence of a statutory relationship (relación estatutaria) and not a contractual one (Article 111 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), the existence of general guiding lines of the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article 19 of the Código de Trabajo. Regarding the disciplinary regime to be applied in case of non-compliance with said duties, in accordance with various votes of the Sala Constitucional, the principle of specificity (principio de tipicidad) becomes more lax, so that a specific legal classification of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants. In this sense, vote 2007-013903 at fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes on October third, two thousand seven, of the Sala Constitucional, indicates the following: "V.- On the principle of specificity (principio de tipicidad) in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of specificity is an application of the principle of legality that requires, on one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reproachable for the purposes of their sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to apply, it being possible to affirm that the principle of specificity constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary liability. As for the concrete delimitation of the reproachable conduct, this Chamber has held on previous occasions (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 at twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes on May thirty-first, two thousand five, and 94-5594 at fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although this principle in this matter certainly does not have the same form as in the criminal-legal sphere - since faults not literally provided for may be sanctioned discretionarily - it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text. That is to say, faults not literally provided for, but which are understood to be included in the text, may be sanctioned discretionarily, provided they result from the verification of the disciplinary fault, through a procedure created for that purpose. Now then, regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must be clearly and previously established, without the Administration being able to create new sanctions that are not contemplated in the applicable norms. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable - as they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the subjects - and that the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and exactingness that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of specificity, that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be - this one must be - clearly pre-established". The foregoing generates what in doctrine is known as the principle of relative specificity (principio de tipificación relativa), on the understanding that the fault must be provided for in the disciplinary system, but without the level of rigor typical of criminal matters insofar as it derives from the specific service relationship. By reason of the foregoing, both the breach of general functional duties, and legally classified conducts (at the level of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil, own statutory norms of the regime or Código de Trabajo, for example), and those found contemplated in norms of a lower rank, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations (reglamentos autónomos de servicio) or in cases where the classification is given with respect to the sanction to be imposed, are sanctionable. This relative specificity relaxes the need for positive norms of formal law status, making it possible for their regulation to be generated by a positive norm of lower rank. The foregoing considerations, without prejudice to the fact that there exists a series of principles of sanctioning law derived from criminal law, of necessary compliance in all cases, e.g., proportionality, non bis in idem, presumption of innocence, due process, due substantiation of the respective resolution. In this line of thought, it must be noted that in matters of defining conducts that can be considered part of the duties of public officials or subject to sanction in case of non-compliance, our country has a diffuse system, given that these are not detailed in a single normative body, but rather dispersed among different norms of different ranks, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to issue, according to Article 27 of the Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-regulatory powers (potestades auto normativas) of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility of legally regulating each and every one of the specific conducts incurred by public servants, and on the understanding that the exercise of regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal system. Transversally to this set of principles and norms of different ranks, in this matter we find the public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any formal or informal decision or conduct by the Administration with respect to its servants. Said interest understood in accordance with Article 113 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, provides: "1. The public servant must perform their functions in such a way that they primarily satisfy the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered parties. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the assessment of the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, first and foremost, to which mere convenience cannot in any case be placed above." By reason of the foregoing, any analysis in matters of public employment must not ignore the analysis of compliance with the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference for its underlying motivation.

VII.- On the merits: As a second claim, the plaintiff requests that in the event that the resolution of 3:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, of the Ministro de Justicia y Gracia is not final, she be reinstated to the position of general physician G1 in any position as interim. In this regard, firstly, it must be taken into consideration that the decision is final and was not challenged in the jurisdictional venue by the plaintiff. In this line of thought, as noted, the three-day suspension without pay for the plaintiff was decided by means of a formal administrative act on the part of the Administration, regarding which, the representation of Miss Campos Vallejos did not make any allegation of defect of nullity against it as part of her claims. Rather, it must be taken into consideration that at the preliminary hearing, her representation indicated that she did not have a request to return to the position she occupied (for that reason, the permanent holder thereof, Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas, was excluded as a defendant), given that what is requested is reinstatement in any existing position in the Ministry. Therefore, neither explicitly nor implicitly did the party challenge the indicated act as such, and consequently, the conformity of Miss Campos Vallejos with its validity and efficacy must be understood. On the other hand, this Tribunal considers that there is no generic right of the interim official to be appointed to any position holding such status; rather, their improper stability is limited to remaining in the position they occupy, until such time as the permanent holder arrives or the position is opened to competitive examination for permanent appointment (in this sense, see, among others, judgments No. 8544-2002 at 15 hours 24 minutes on September 3, 2002, No. 9755-2011, issued at 16 hours 22 minutes on July 16, 2011, and No. 10288-2011, issued at 10 hours 41 minutes on August 5, 2011, all from the Sala Constitucional). In this sense, the Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has indicated: "An interim official is understood as one who is appointed to a position or assigned to a service due to the temporary or definitive absence of the permanent holder. The interim worker knows that the labor stability they enjoy is momentary (improper), as it is reduced to the period covered by their appointment. Thus, -strictly speaking- there is no conceptual legal affinity between the interim servant and the principle of labor stability, as it is understood for the case of a public official fully vested in property." While this Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber have affirmed that an interim appointment (nombramiento interino) is not a legitimate mechanism for acceding to the ownership of a position, both courts have been emphatic in recognizing for officials appointed under that precarious condition the right to a relative stability which they have also termed “improper”." Vote 00385-2013 of April 12, 2013. In the same vein, vote no. 9462-2002 of 2:48 p.m. on October 1, 2002, of the Constitutional Chamber stated: “Regarding the right to job stability, contained in the same numeral, this Chamber has recognized an improper stability for interim officials, such that while it is true that they do not have a subjective right to have their appointment extended indefinitely, they do have the right not to have another official appointed in their place under the same circumstances, that is, on an interim basis, until such time as the Administration appoints — through the corresponding legal procedure — a permanent official or, as the case may be, the position is again occupied by its incumbent. It must be kept in mind that the interim servant can assert their right against another interim servant intended to be appointed as their replacement, but this does not imply that the Administration must appoint them indefinitely, since once their appointment term has expired, the State may dispense with their services provided it does not appoint another interim official under the same conditions in the position and specialty.” As noted, the rights of the interim official are intimately and permanently linked to the specific fate of the vacant position to which they were appointed and do not transcend beyond it. Therefore, if the position is occupied again, put out to competitive examination, or disappears (due to restructuring), upon the expiration of the incumbent vacancy thereof, all right of improper stability of the interim official per se expires. This being the case, once the condition that originally granted the improper stability disappears, the interim official’s ability to claim permanence in the respective public administration disappears, and if they wish to continue therein, a new legal relationship of an interim or permanent nature, different and independent from the previous one, must be configured. To consider the contrary would be a violation of the principle of equality of treatment (Art. 4 LGAP) towards other subjects who, in an equal condition as interim officials, are opting to be appointed to any position alternative that may eventually become available. In the case under analysis, it is noted that at this time, the position occupied by the plaintiff is held by its permanent incumbent, Nombre8672. Carlos Calderón Rojas as a general attending physician G-1, as of March 16, 2010, and therefore Ms. María Jimena Campos Vallejos does not possess any right to be appointed on an interim basis to any existing position within the Ministry of Justice and Grace. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the plaintiff has not even bothered to demonstrate the existence of eventual vacant positions under such conditions that could give rise to the possibility of granting her petition, had she demonstrated that she possessed a right in that sense. On the other hand, while the plaintiff alleges that Dr. Calderón Rojas did not return to his position voluntarily but was called to it by the Administration itself, and this is evident in the case file, there is no proof whatsoever that this situation was due to a persecutory intent against her or that the exercise of the employer’s powers was carried out as an exercise of a misuse of power (desviación de poder), by pursuing ends through said conduct other than the public ones that must guide the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi in the administrative venue. The plaintiff’s mere statement in her party declaration is not sufficient proof nor does it in any way support a generic claim for reinstatement (reintalación) as the one made. This Tribunal considers that in her request, the plaintiff ignores her interim condition and the limited rights that it entails. In this line of thought, the doctrine has indicated regarding the interim official that such a figure “…arises when there is no servant who automatically occupies the vacant position nor provides the service, upon the absence of the regular servant. Given the origin of the interim official, the same is a necessarily temporary servant and subject to a term, expired which they automatically cease in their position or become regular” (Eduardo Ortiz, Ortiz, Tesis de Derecho Administrativo II First Edition, Editorial Stradtmann, San José, Costa Rica, 2000, pages 121 and 122). In the foregoing line of reasoning, vote 00318-2013 of 9:50 a.m. on March 22, 2013, of the Second Chamber indicates the following: “Within the statutory regime, the appointment of an interim official is only permitted when no substitute exists, or a promotion is possible, and it is necessary to cover the absence of the incumbent. The interim worker knows that the labor stability they enjoy is momentary (improper), since it is reduced to the period covered by their appointment. Thus, — strictly speaking — there is no conceptual legal affinity between the interim worker and the principle of labor stability, as is understood for the case of a permanently appointed public official. .... The Constitutional Chamber provided that in matters of interim status, the officials enjoy improper labor stability, which is not the same as that held by a permanent worker (on this topic, resolution number 2329 of that Chamber, at 9:57 a.m. on April 25, 1997, may be consulted). If a public official is appointed on an interim basis to perform a specific position and for a prolonged time, it does not imply an obligation for the Administration to appoint them permanently, although it is logical and reasonable that if they have demonstrated suitability and meet the requirements of the position, they be taken into account for the appointment; the competent body for appointing being responsible for making the selection that best guarantees the public service, pursuant to what is provided in numeral 192 of the Political Constitution.” In accordance with the foregoing, just as the interim official does not possess an acquired right to obtain an automatic permanent appointment, they also cannot expect to continue being appointed to other positions different from those where their relationship originated. In the same line of reasoning as resolved in this decision, vote 00353-2010 of March 17, 2010, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, faced with similar claims, resolved: “From the evidence gathered, it is inferred that the plaintiff had always been working on an interim basis at the University of Costa Rica since the year nineteen eighty-five. However, this does not give her the right to be considered as an indefinite-term servant; since she continues being an interim, and has not acquired the rights of stability, of immovability, and the administrative career (carrera administrativa). The Constitutional Chamber, in vote 1119-90 at 2:00 p.m. on September 18, 1990, stated in this regard: ‘...It should be recalled that the immediate effect of the transformation of the nature of the contract (it refers from a fixed-term to an indefinite term), is not the acquisition of the rights of stability, of immovability, and the administrative career, but solely the mere payment of the elements of notice, severance pay, and unemployment assistance, once the cessation of functions is agreed...’. (See also on this same topic judgments nos. 1696-92 and 1490-96 at three thirty p.m. on August twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two, and at ten twenty-four a.m. on November first, nineteen ninety-six, respectively, of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, and No. 40-1996 at ten a.m. on February second, 1996, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). This being the case, the rights of an interim official are equated to those of career officials, or as they have been called in our country permanent officials, with the exclusion of the right to the position, or also called the right to stability and immovability; but merely by the passage of time occupying a public position, without the legal procedures provided for this purpose, it does not give them the right to remain in it...” The limits of the nature of said appointment do not constrain the administrative discretion in the matter nor impose an objective and temporal indeterminacy of their right. In line with the above, it has been indicated that “there are no acquired rights against the organizational power of the Administration... there are no acquired rights against the norms regulating the internal regime of the Administration.” (PALOMAR OLMEDA, Alberto. Derecho de la Función Pública. Régimen Jurídico de los Funcionarios Públicos, Madrid, second edition, Editorial DYKINSON, S.L., 1992, p. 38). Once the cause of the original appointment expires, the right expires, without prejudice to the right to reapply under new conditions for another position. There is no right to be appointed in the Public Administration that can be considered abstract and intangible and that is divorced from a specific position in which the existence of a right in their favor is alleged and demonstrated. This being the case, this aspect of the claim must be rejected.

VIII.- As a third claim, the plaintiff requests payment of salaries not received from March 7, 2010, onwards. In this regard, it must be taken into consideration that, as indicated previously, as of March 16, 2010, the position occupied by the plaintiff was occupied by its permanent incumbent, Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas, as a general attending physician G-1. Due to the foregoing, it is evident that just as the plaintiff could not aspire to have a right to continue being appointed to said position as of that date or to another similar post, the plaintiff could also not expect that her salary should continue to be paid to her as of March 16, 2010, since as of that date all right regarding the respective appointment expired. The possibility that the plaintiff be paid back wages as compensation is the immediate consequence of one of two scenarios. Either she was not paid despite being in a subjective legal situation that obligated it, or an administrative conduct was annulled, which entails as a consequence the reestablishment of the affected person's condition to a situation similar to that state they would have enjoyed had the annulled conduct not existed within the legal system. In the case under examination, we are not, in principle, in either of those scenarios. The plaintiff is not in a subjective legal situation in which she can wield a right that accrues to the payment of back wages to date, given that the condition that generated any right in her favor expired on March 16, 2010, with the arrival of the incumbent of the position to their post. Neither did the plaintiff request annulment of any administrative conduct nor did she bring the claim as a consequence of the reestablishment of a particular legal situation that she has demonstrated as violated. Consequently, it must be understood that she does not possess any right to the claim for salaries as of the indicated date. Notwithstanding the above, it must be taken into consideration that although by resolution at four fifteen p.m. on February seventeenth, two thousand ten, it was ordered to dismiss Ms. Campos Vallejos without employer liability, for which she was paid the respective salary until March 7, 2010, in a resolution at three p.m. on October nineteenth, two thousand ten, of the General Directorate of Social Adaptation (Dirección General de Adaptación Social), it was ordered to modify the sanction imposed on the plaintiff to a suspension without pay for three days. Given the foregoing, and taking into consideration that this last act has retroactive effects (Art. 142 LGAP), for this Tribunal it is evident that between March 7, 2010, and March 16 of said year, the plaintiff should have been paid her salary, minus, however, the three days of suspension subject to the sanction modified on October nineteenth, two thousand ten. The foregoing, insofar as the original resolution that established the dismissal without employer liability of the plaintiff only became final through resolution 02-2011 at eight a.m. on January fifth, two thousand eleven, of the Minister of Justice and Peace. While the execution of the administrative act of dismissal at the time was not unlawful (given what is established in Article 148 LGAP), it is evident that what was subsequently resolved and the reduction of the sanction implied that at the time, the plaintiff's salary should have continued to be paid, notwithstanding which, the demonstrated arrival of the incumbent of the position, as has been indicated, had an interrupting effect on any possibility of continuity of the plaintiff as a general attending physician Nombre1620. This being the case, if from March 7 to 16, 2010, there are 9 days that should have been paid, deducting the sanction of 3 days, the payment to the plaintiff of 6 days of unpaid salary would be appropriate, in accordance with the reasoning employed previously.

IX.- As a fourth claim, the plaintiff requests compensation for subjective moral damage in the sum of fifteen million colones. In this regard, as has been indicated, neither have any nullity defects been alleged in the formal administrative conducts that have been demonstrated in the trial, nor is there proof in that sense. Neither is an abnormal functioning of the Administration determined that would imply the recognition of liability for moral damage to the plaintiff. Once again, it is indicated that the cessation of her employment relationship did not originate as of March 16, 2010, due to the employer's will, but rather due to the arrival of the incumbent of the position, which has as a natural consequence the displacement of the interim official from it. No illegality has been demonstrated in what was resolved through the administrative act that modifies the provisions of the resolution at four fifteen p.m. on February seventeenth, two thousand ten, regarding Ms. Campos Vallejos, and its execution was in accordance with what is established in Article 148 of the General Law of Public Administration. This being the case, since the existence of unlawful or abnormal conduct generating administrative liability has not been demonstrated, it is appropriate to reject this aspect of the claim.

X.- As a subsidiary claim, the plaintiff requests payment of notice (preaviso), unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía), and any other unpaid emolument. Regarding the payment of notice, it must be taken into consideration that it is based on the need to avoid a sudden unilateral break of the employment relationship. Article 28 of the Labor Code provides for the payment of this element and establishes as a condition: "to put an end to the employment contract without just cause," unlike unemployment assistance which, in addition to the above, provides for other causes, such as those inserted in Article 83 of the Labor Code or another cause beyond the worker's will. Thus, when Article 85 ibidem indicates which causes terminate the employment contract, without extinguishing the worker's rights to claim the payment of benefits that may be due to them, it is clear that notice is not among them, as it corresponds only in the case of dismissal without just cause. In the case under examination, it is noted that, as indicated, the breaking of the employment relationship was due to the fact that the position the plaintiff held on an interim basis was occupied by its permanent incumbent. In this line of thought, it must be remembered that in matters of public employment, the service relationship may be broken either due to a cause duly motivated by unlawful conduct of the official, due to forced reduction of services (restructuring), promotion or transfer to another position, or by the fulfillment of the condition that gives rise to the appointment, such as the designation to a position on an interim basis due to vacancy or temporary absence of the incumbent or the expiration of the appointment term (case of popularly elected officials). It is thus that the arrival of the incumbent of the position to a post that was being occupied by an interim official is a just cause for termination of the employment contract and, consequently, pursuant to what was indicated above, the corresponding payment of notice would not be appropriate. In the case of the plaintiff, her designation must be considered an act subject to a condition (Art. 132.4 LGAP), such that once the condition is fulfilled – return of the incumbent of the position – the appointment disappears, not by the employer's will, but rather by an objective reason foreign to it and where there is just cause that motivates the cessation of the relationship. Therefore, the rejection of the claim for payment of notice is appropriate. In the foregoing line of reasoning, given what was indicated about the reason for the cessation of the employment relationship and given that the plaintiff did not demonstrate unlawfulness in the Administration's conduct nor object to any act, limiting herself to making mere invocations about what she estimated her right to be, the payment of unemployment assistance is inappropriate, since the same is applicable upon a unilateral and unmotivated decision to break an employment relationship, which did not occur in the present case, given that it occurred due to the return of Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas to his position as a general attending physician G-1. This being the case, this aspect of the claim must be rejected.- XI.- This Tribunal deems it opportune to advise the Human Resources Unit of the Ministry of Justice and Peace that the plaintiff possesses a right that in the records, both physical and electronic, as well as in the certificates and certifications that are issued, the effective, final sanction imposed on her be recorded, eliminating any reference to the sanction that was eventually rendered ineffective, given that she was not dismissed, but rather a severance of the bond occurred due to the demonstrated arrival of the incumbent of the position. Due to the foregoing, the Minister of Justice and Peace and said administrative unit must take note of what is stated in this recital (considerando), for their respective duty. If there is an outdated record in that sense, it must be removed from her personnel file so as not to cause further labor and personal harm to the plaintiff.

XII.- Interests and indexation: XII.I.- Regarding the request for recognition of interests, it is accepted, and the State is ordered to pay interests, in accordance with Article one thousand one hundred sixty-three of the Civil Code, from the moment the corresponding sums should have been paid and until their effective payment. XII.II.- Regarding indexation, the same is imposed ex officio in accordance with Article one hundred twenty-three of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. It is a recognition of the loss of the purchasing power of money. Not granting it would mean giving the plaintiff less money (with respect to its purchasing power), such that on the items established in this decision, the recognition of the benefit is appropriate from the finality of the decision that specifies them, until definitive payment.

XIII.- Defenses: XIII.I.- Regarding the defense of lack of interest (falta de interés) raised, it has already been resolved. XIII.II.- In relation to the defense of payment, it must be accepted solely with respect to the payment of vacations, year-end bonus (aguinaldo), and school salary (salario escolar). XIII.III.- Regarding the defense of lack of right, it is partially accepted and rejected only with respect to the payment of salaries for six days.- XIV.- Costs: Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, pursuant to numeral 119.2 ibidem. Since the defendant is not within the scenarios for being exonerated from them, their condemnation is appropriate as requested by the plaintiff. It is not superfluous to recall that every process generates expenses for the party, and its recognition for the winning party depends on the condemnation of costs. In this case, to obtain her right for the five unpaid days, the plaintiff has legitimately appeared before the courts, which obliges its recognition in the judgment.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO) The defense of lack of right is partially rejected with respect to the payment of salaries for six days. The defense of lack of interest is accepted with respect to claim number 1 of the complaint, as well as the defense of payment with respect to the payment of vacations, year-end bonus, and school salary. In all other respects, the defense of lack of right is accepted. Consequently, the claim is partially granted as will be indicated hereafter, on the understanding that it is rejected in what is not expressly stated. Therefore, the State is ordered to pay the amount corresponding to six days of salary not received by the plaintiff. Said sum shall be liquidated in the judgment enforcement phase. Indexation is recognized on said item in accordance with Article one hundred twenty-three of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, from the finality of the resolution that sets it, until definitive payment. The State is ordered to pay interests on the sum subject to condemnation, in accordance with Article one thousand one hundred sixty-three of the Civil Code, from the moment the corresponding sums should have been paid and until their effective payment. Costs are to be borne by the State. The Ministry of Justice and Peace shall take note of what is indicated in recital number XI.- Judge Espinoza Salas dissents from the vote.

Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo Grace Loaiza Sánchez Carlos Espinoza Salas DISSENTING VOTE I respectfully separate myself from the majority vote of my colleagues, solely with regard to the denial of the elements regarding notice and unemployment assistance, fully sharing the resolution of the rest. In that sense, the undersigned accepts the claim regarding said labor elements, granting the corresponding notice and the labor unemployment assistance for the time the plaintiff worked for the Ministry of Justice and Grace, the amounts of which will be determined in the judgment enforcement phase. This is so, given that, as was reliably proven, Ms. Campos Vallejos was terminated without employer liability as of March 8, 2010, a situation for which there was no merit, which converts the removal into a dismissal with employer liability, because it occurred prior to the incumbent of the position rejoining their permanent post and because the Administration itself recognized the error it incurred. By having annulled the dismissal, the State automatically converts the cessation of the position into removal with employer liability, therefore the plaintiff must be recognized unemployment assistance and notice. This is demonstrated by the fact that the State, without the resolution of 4:15 p.m. on February 17, 2010 being final, terminated the plaintiff from the post she had been holding as general attending physician Nombre1620 in the Ministry of Justice and Peace, which constitutes the breaking of the employment relationship with employer liability, since it happened before the incumbent returned to their position. Furthermore, it must be taken into consideration that the plaintiff was not reinstated prior to the incumbent’s return, and although the Administration subsequently annulled said termination, the harmful effects of the dismissal had already materialized, and such unilateral conduct of the State cannot be dictated to the detriment of the plaintiff's labor rights, nor can the Administration take advantage of its own carelessness, negligence, and nullity defects it incurred, which led it to issue such a vexatious act against the plaintiff's labor rights. While the cessation is rendered without effect, the defendant must assume the payment of the labor rights, as the plaintiff was never reinstated and the cessation was carried out by the State illegally before the incumbent of the position returned, which undoubtedly entails the payment of notice and unemployment assistance, for termination of the employment relationship with employer liability, having the State unilaterally accepted that there was no merit for the dismissal. Such a situation is verified by the fact that the State annulled the plaintiff’s termination through resolution 381-2010 at eight a.m. on August fourth, two thousand ten, but without reinstating her before the incumbent's return, nor paying her the labor rights, but rather improperly called the incumbent of the position, waited for his return, so that, taking advantage of said situation, the payment of notice and unemployment assistance could be denied, a situation that cannot be admitted, as it implies a clear violation of the plaintiff's legitimate labor elements, unjust enrichment, and conduct injurious to the plaintiff's patrimonial rights.

Carlos Espinoza Salas Email ...01 Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Dirección05 ( )

No. 61- 2013-IV.

**TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN CUARTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ.** Goicoechea, Dirección04 , at sixteen hours and twenty-five minutes on the twenty-sixth of June of the year two thousand thirteen.

**Ordinary Proceeding (Proceso de Conocimiento)** filed by Miss **María Jimena Campos Vallejo**, of legal age, single, Physician, resident of Goicoechea, bearer of identity card number CED88725- - , represented at trial hearing by Nombre112145 , of legal age, married in first nuptials, resident of Tibás, bearer of identity card number CED88726- - , in his capacity as Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact, against **El Estado**, represented by Nombre17426 , of legal age, attorney, resident of San José, in her capacity as Deputy Procuradora.- **RESULTANDO** **1.-** That on the 14th of September of the year 2010, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit and, in accordance with the ratification made at the preliminary hearing, requests: 1) That the Ministry of Justice be ordered to report on what happened regarding the appeal for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación) filed against the resolution of 15:00 hours of October 19, 2010, which is a resolution applying a disciplinary sanction of suspension for three days without pay. 2) In the event that the aforementioned resolution is not final, that she be reinstated to the position of general practitioner G1 in any post as an interim. 3) That payment be made for lost wages from March 7, 2010. 4) That subjective moral damages be compensated in the sum of fifteen million colones. 5) That El Estado be ordered to pay interest and procedural and personal costs. Likewise, at the trial hearing, the party requests as a subsidiary claim that El Estado be ordered to pay severance notice (preaviso) and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) and any other unpaid emolument.

**2.-** That once the mandatory transfer was carried out by resolution of ten hours and thirty-five minutes of February twenty-first, two thousand eleven, the representation of El Estado rejected the lawsuit and raised the defenses of lack of interest, payment, and lack of right, and also requested an award of costs. **(folio 084 of the judicial file)** **3.-** That at eight hours and fifty minutes on November nineteenth, two thousand twelve, a preliminary hearing was held in the present proceeding with the presence of the parties' representatives. The disputed facts are set forth. It is indicated that there are no preliminary defenses, and the plaintiff's party deposition is admitted as evidence. **(folios 232 to 234 of the judicial file)** **4.-** That at eight hours and thirty minutes on the day of June twentieth of the year two thousand thirteen, the oral and public trial hearing was held in the present proceeding, with the presence of the parties and their attorneys and before the same Court that issues the judgment.

**5.-** That in the proceedings before this Court, no nullities requiring correction have been observed, and the judgment is issued within the period established for this purpose by numeral 111.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, after deliberation and by majority.- Drafted by Judge **Campos Hidalgo** **CONSIDERANDO** **I.- Underlying facts (Hechos probados):** Of this nature, and of importance for the resolution of the matter, the following have been demonstrated during the proceeding:

**I.I.-** That Ms. María Jimena Campos Vallejos was appointed on an interim basis effective August 4, 2008, as general medical assistant Nombre1620 in the Ministry of Justice and Peace, specifically at the Center called El Buen Pastor, replacing Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas and for the time that he would enjoy an interim promotion **(folios 37, 38, 88, 39, 153 of the administrative file, white folder)** **I.II.-** That by resolution 002-146-2009 of 8:30 hours of September 11, 2009, an administrative proceeding was initiated against the plaintiff **(folio 33 to 40 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.III.-** That by resolution 012-146-2009 of eleven hours of January twenty-sixth, two thousand ten, the Directing Body of the Administrative Proceeding recommended dismissing the plaintiff without employer liability **(folios 99 to 109 of the administrative file, white folder)** **I.IV.-** That by resolution of sixteen hours fifteen minutes on the day of February seventeenth, two thousand ten, it was ordered to dismiss Ms. Campos Vallejos without employer liability **(folios 99 to 109 of the administrative file, white folder, and 223 to 235 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.V.-** That the plaintiff was terminated without employer liability by reason of the resolution of sixteen hours fifteen minutes on the day of February seventeenth, two thousand ten, effective March 7, 2010 **(folio 128 of the administrative file, white folder)** **I.VI.-** That by official letter DRH-PCAL-107-10 of February 23, 2010, the plaintiff was notified of her dismissal without employer liability effective March 8 of said year, after the enjoyment of the 11 days of prophylactic vacations to which she is entitled. Likewise, she was informed that the eventual filing of appeals does not entail the suspension of the ordered act, so she must abide by the imposed sanction **(folios 117 and 118 of the administrative file, white folder)** **I.VII.-** That by official letter D.G.846.2010 of March 10, 2010, the Director of Human Resources of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social was instructed to process the termination of Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas as Regional Medical Supervisor G.4, so that he returns to his position as general medical assistant G-1, effective March 16, 2010. Due to the foregoing, by official letter DRH-CGAC-0127-2010 of March 11, 2010, the indicated physician was informed of the termination of his interim promotion, this being the reason for the termination of the plaintiff's interim appointment.

(folio 48, 49 and 214 of the judicial file, plaintiff's party statement) **I.VIII.-** That by resolution of nine o'clock on March 9, 2010, of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social, the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) against the resolution of February 17, 2010, was rejected **(folio 264 to 281 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.IX.-** That by resolution 177-2010 of eight o'clock on April 12, 2010, of the Minister of Justice and Grace, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the plaintiff against the resolution of sixteen hours fifteen minutes on February 17, 2010, was rejected, being deemed untimely **(folios 135 to 137 of the administrative file white folder, 299 to 301 of the administrative procedure file)** **I.X.-** That by resolution number 235-2010 of eleven hours and fifteen minutes on May 12, 2010, it was ordered to partially grant a claim filed by the plaintiff and to order the payment of the sum of two hundred forty-three thousand one hundred sixty-six colones and seventeen céntimos for vacation time. Likewise, the payment of proportional Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) and school salary was ordered, and the payment of severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía) and prior notice (preaviso) was rejected. **(folios 7 to 11 of the administrative file white folder)** **I.XI.-** That by resolution No. 365-2010 of ten hours thirty minutes on August 5, the motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) filed by the plaintiff against resolution number 235-2010 of eleven hours and fifteen minutes on May 12, 2010, was rejected **(folios 22 to 26 of the administrative file white folder)** **I.XII.-** That by resolution 391-2010 of eight o'clock on August 4, 2010, the resolution of sixteen hours fifteen minutes on February 17, 2010, and subsequent acts were fully annulled **(folios 158 to 164 of the administrative file white folder, 312 to 318 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.XIII.-** That by note dated August 9, 2010, the plaintiff requested the Human Resources Unit of the Ministry of Justice and Peace to reinstate her in her position, given what was decided in resolution 391-2010 of eight o'clock on August 4, 2010. Due to the foregoing, by official letter DGIRH-PGAL-0387-10 of August 12, 2010, she was informed that the request was not possible because the titular holder of the respective position is occupying it again as of March 15 of that year. **(folios 166 and 171 of the administrative file white folder, 323 and 324 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.XIV.-** That by resolution of fifteen hours on October 19, 2010, of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social, it was ordered to modify the sanction imposed on the plaintiff to a three-day suspension without pay **(folios 223 to 234, 236 to 247 of the administrative file white folder, 330 to 341 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.XV.-** That by official letter DGIRH-PGAL-0515-10 of October 25, 2010, the Coordinator of the Labor Environment Management Process notifies the plaintiff of the imposed sanction and indicates that the motion for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) is available against the decision **(folio 252 of the administrative file white folder, 342 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.XVII.-** That by resolution 02-2011 of eight o'clock on January 5, 2011, of the Minister of Justice and Peace, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the plaintiff against the resolution of fifteen hours on October 19, 2010, of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social was decided. In said resolution, the following was ordered: "*To reject in all its aspects the appeal filed by Dr. María Jimena Campos Vallejos, against the resolution of fifteen hours on October 19, 2010, issued by the Dirección General de Adaptación Social, by which a disciplinary sanction was imposed consisting of the suspension of her duties for three days without pay. However, there is material impossibility of applying said sanction, by virtue of the fact that Dr. Campos Vallejos ceased working for the institution as of March 8, 2010, because the titular holder of the position she occupied on an interim basis returned, as of August 8, 2008*". Said resolution was notified to the plaintiff on February 15, 2011 **(folios 121 to 133 of the judicial file)** **I.XVIII.-** That the plaintiff was paid the respective salary up to March 7, 2010 **(folio 57 of the judicial file)** **I.XIX.-** That as of November 2010, the certifications and attestations issued by the Ministry of Justice and Grace still stated that the plaintiff was dismissed due to employer responsibility **(folio 41 to 45 and 57 of the judicial file)** **I.XX.-** That payment was made to the plaintiff by transfer of the amounts recognized by resolution number 235-2010 of eleven hours and fifteen minutes on May 12, 2010, according to certification 02-2010 of November 26, 2010, of the Financial Director of the Ministry of Justice and Peace **(folio 39 of the judicial file)** **II.- Unproven Facts**: The following have been considered of importance:

**II.I.-** That Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas was called back to his original position in the Dirección13480 within a persecutory context or with an interest in affecting the plaintiff in this proceeding.

**II.II.-** That the plaintiff's appointments in other public entities were rejected, due to erroneous information issued or supplied by the Ministry of Justice and Peace regarding the sanction imposed on her.

**II.III.-** That the State has paid the labor items of prior notice (preaviso) and severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía) that belonged to the plaintiff.

**II.IV.-** That there are vacant positions in the Ministry of Justice and Peace for general attending physician Nombre1620 **III.- Arguments of the parties**: On the occasion of this proceeding, the parties have expressed the following relevant allegations to be taken into consideration for their due resolution in judgment:

**III.I.- Arguments of the plaintiff**: The representation of the plaintiff expresses the following substantive considerations regarding the claims:

**III.I.I.-** That the plaintiff was terminated without employer responsibility, and subsequently, the sanction was reduced to three days of suspension without pay.

**III.I.II.-** That notwithstanding the foregoing, the Administration called back the titular physician of the position she occupied in order to indirectly terminate her appointment.

**III.I.III.-** That in the records of the Ministry of Justice, it still appears that the plaintiff was dismissed, which has meant that she is not hired or that her appointments are not extended in other public entities.

**III.I.IV.-** That the plaintiff is unaware of the result of her motion for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against the resolution imposing the three-day suspension without pay.

**III.I.V.-** That the termination of her appointment caused the plaintiff serious material and moral damages.

**III.I.VI.-** That the plaintiff was left defenseless, given that between the time of the termination of the appointment and the suspension resolution, the plaintiff was not appointed to any position, a situation that persists over time.

**III.II.- Arguments of the State**: The Procuradora representing the State expresses the following substantive considerations:

**III.II.I.-** That the plaintiff was notified of the decision regarding her motion for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against the resolution of fifteen hours on October 19, 2010.

**III.II.II.-** That the termination of the plaintiff's employment relationship was due to the return of the titular holder of the position, not corresponding to a dismissal by the employer's will.

**III.II.III.-** That there is no proof of the plaintiff's assertions regarding the existence of errors in the information supplied by the Ministry of Justice about the reason for the termination of the plaintiff's employment relationship, or that these have meant that she is not hired or that her appointments are not extended in other public entities.

**III.II.IV.-** That the plaintiff is not entitled to collect lost wages, given that she was not terminated by the employer's will.

**III.II.V.-** That the plaintiff is not entitled to collect damages.

**IV.- Regarding the object of the proceeding**: From what has been expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the object of this proceeding is to determine if liability has been generated due to the termination of the plaintiff from the position she occupied in the Ministry of Justice and Grace, as well as the appropriateness of her reinstatement to the same.

**V.- Regarding the alleged lack of interest**: As a first claim, the plaintiff requests that the Ministry of Justice be ordered to report on what happened regarding the motion for reconsideration with appended appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación) filed against the resolution of 15:00 hours on October 19, 2010. In this regard, it has been proven that by resolution 02-2011 of eight o'clock on January 5, 2011, of the Minister of Justice and Peace, the filed appeal was decided, and said resolution was notified to the plaintiff on February 15, 2011, when the respective declaratory proceeding had already been filed.

In light of the foregoing, it is evident to this Chamber that in the case under examination there is a lack of current interest with respect to this claim, given that what was requested has already been duly resolved at the administrative level and, consequently, the State's defense in that regard must be upheld.

**VI.-** In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, distinct from that of the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations emanate. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, by establishing the following: *"Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration"* and *"Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of* ***proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in******<span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">the labor legislation</span>******,*** ***or in the case of a forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof."*** In accordance with the indicated constitutional provisions, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights to their own regulatory framework, job stability - limiting the regime of free removal characteristic of private labor regulation - and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons covered by a subordination regime, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (with the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by rulings Votos 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber). Correlative to the aforementioned rights, the public servant possesses a series of obligations of an official nature, inherent to the public purposes sought by their activity and which must always guide their management, in order not to incur personal misconduct generating disciplinary responsibility. Without attempting to be exhaustive, some of the duties inherent to the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Administration), b) duty of compliance with the principles of public service - continuity, efficiency, adaptation to changes in the legal regime, and equality of treatment - (Art. 4 of the General Public Administration Act), c) duty to safeguard an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the General Internal Control Act), d) duty to protect the best interests of children (Art. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code), e) duty to comply with the legal order (Art. 13 and concordant articles of the General Public Administration Act, Art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute), f) duty to provide prompt response and information to the user (Art. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excess Requirements and Administrative Procedures), g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the General Public Administration Act), h) duty to act with effectiveness (Art. 5 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law), i) duty to maintain decorum and to provide due attention to the user (Art. 114 of the General Public Administration Act and Art. 39. d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute), j) duty to respond in case of having acted with intent or gross negligence (Art. 199 and 211 of the General Public Administration Act), k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (Art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, on a supplementary basis, based on Article 9 of the General Public Administration Act and Article 51 of the indicated Statute, the provisions of the Labor Code and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching, the Law for the Regulation of Smoking, the Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, among others. In this vein, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters given the existence of a statutory and not a contractual relationship (Article 111 of the General Public Administration Act), the existence of general lines of guidance for the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article 19 of the Labor Code.

Regarding the disciplinary regime to be applied in case of non-compliance with said duties, in accordance with various rulings of the Constitutional Chamber, the principle of legality in defining offenses becomes more flexible, so a specific legal typification of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants. In this sense, ruling Voto 2007-013903 of fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes of October third, two thousand seven, of the Constitutional Chamber, indicates the following: ***"V.- On the principle of legality in defining offenses in the disciplinary regime*** *.- The principle of legality in defining offenses is an application of the principle of legality that requires, on one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reproachable for the purposes of their sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to be applied, it being possible to affirm that the principle of legality in defining offenses constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary responsibility. Regarding the concrete delimitation of the reproachable conduct, this Chamber has held on previous occasions (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 of twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes of May thirty-first, two thousand five, and 94-5594 of fifteen hours forty-eight minutes of September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although certainly this principle in this matter does not have the same form as in the criminal-legal sphere -since offenses not literally foreseen may be sanctioned discretionally* ***- it must always be understood that these offenses are included in the text. That is, offenses not literally foreseen may be sanctioned discretionally, but which are understood to be included in the text and as long as they result from the verification of the disciplinary offense, through a procedure created for that effect*** *. Now,* ***<span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must be clearly and previously established, and the Administration may not create new sanctions that are not contemplated in the applicable rules</span>*** *. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary offenses are innumerable - since they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the subjects - and that the principles "nullum crimen sine lege", "nullum poena sine lege" do not have the rigidity and demand that characterizes them in substantive criminal law,* ***it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of legality in defining offenses, that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be –this one indeed– clearly pre-established*** *".* The foregoing generates what is known in doctrine as the principle of relative typification, in the understanding that the offense must be foreseen in the disciplinary order, but without the level of rigor characteristic of the criminal matter insofar as it derives from the specific service relationship. In light of the foregoing, both non-compliance with general functional duties and legally typified conducts (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, own statutory norms of the regime, or the Labor Code, for example), and those contemplated in norms of a lower rank, such as those contained in autonomous service regulations or in cases where the typification occurs with respect to the sanction to be imposed, are sanctionable. This relative typification makes the need for positive law in the nature of formal law more flexible, making it possible for its regulation to be generated by a positive norm of a lower rank. The foregoing considerations, without prejudice to the existence of a series of principles of sanctioning law derived from criminal law, of mandatory compliance in all cases, e.g., proportionality, *non bis in idem*, innocence, due process, and due reasoning of the respective resolution. In this vein, it should be noted that in matters of defining conducts that can be considered part of the duties proper to public officials or subject to sanction in case of non-compliance, our country possesses a diffuse system, given that they are not detailed in a single normative body but rather dispersed among different norms of distinct rank, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to issue, according to Article 27 of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-regulatory powers of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility that, through legal channels, each and every one of the concrete conducts incurred by public servants can be regulated, and in the understanding that the exercise of the regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal order. Transversally to this set of principles and norms of different ranks, in this matter we find the public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any decision or formal or informal conduct of the Administration with respect to its servants. Said interest understood in accordance with Article 113 of the General Public Administration Act, provides: *"1. The public servant must perform their functions in a way that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the appreciation of the public interest, account shall be taken, firstly, of the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual, to which mere convenience may not in any case take precedence".* In light of the foregoing, any analysis in matters of public employment must not overlook the analysis of compliance with the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference for its underlying motivation.

**VII.- <span style="text-decoration:underline">On the merits</span>**: As a second claim, the plaintiff requests that in the event the resolution of 15:00 hours of October 19, 2010, of the Minister of Justice and Grace is not final, she be reinstated to the position of general physician G1 in any position as an interim. In this regard, in the first place, it must be taken into consideration that the resolved matter is final and was not challenged in the jurisdictional venue by the plaintiff. In this vein, as is observed regarding the three-day suspension without pay imposed on the plaintiff, it was resolved by means of a formal administrative act by the Administration, regarding which, the representation of Mrs. Campos Vallejos did not make any allegation of nullity defect against it as part of her claims. Rather, it must be taken into consideration that at the preliminary hearing, her representation indicated that she did not have a request to return to the position she held (for this reason, the holder of the same, Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas, was excluded as a defendant), given that what is requested is reinstatement to any existing position within the Ministry. Therefore, neither explicitly nor implicitly, did the party challenge the indicated act as such, and consequently, Mrs. Campos Vallejos' conformity with its validity and effectiveness must be understood. On the other hand, this Tribunal considers that there is no generic right of the interim official to be appointed to any position that holds such condition, but rather that their improper stability is limited to staying in the one they occupy, until its holder returns or it is subject to a competition process for permanent appointment *(in this sense, see, among others, rulings No. 8544-2002 of 15 hours 24 minutes of September 3, 2002, No. 9755-2011, issued at 16 hours 22 minutes of July 16, 2011, and No. 10288-2011, issued at 10 hours 41 minutes of August 5, 2011, all of the Constitutional Chamber).* In this sense, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated: *"An interim official is understood to be one who is appointed to a position or assigned to a service due to the temporary or definitive absence of the holder. The interim worker is aware that the job stability they enjoy is momentary (improper), as this is reduced to the period his appointment covers. Therefore -in a strict sense- there is no conceptual legal affinity between the interim servant and the principle of job stability, as understood for the case of a public official invested in permanent status.* *Although both this Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber have affirmed that interim appointment is not a legitimate mechanism for accessing permanent status in a position, both courts have been emphatic in recognizing for officials appointed in that precarious condition, the right to a relative stability which they have also denominated “improper”".* Ruling Voto 00385-2013 of April 12, 2013. In the same sense, ruling Voto n° 9462-2002 of 14:48 hours of October 1, 2002, of the Constitutional Chamber stated: *"Regarding the right to job stability, contained in the same article, this Chamber has recognized an improper stability for interim officials, so while it is true that they do not have a subjective right to have their appointment extended indefinitely, they do have the right not to be replaced in their position by another official under the same circumstances, i.e., on an interim basis, until the Administration appoints -through the corresponding legal procedure- a permanent official or, if applicable, the position is occupied again by its holder. It must be kept in mind that the interim servant can assert their right against another interim servant intended to be appointed as their replacement, but this does not imply that the Administration must appoint them indefinitely, since once their appointment period has expired, the State may dispense with their services as long as it does not appoint another interim official under his same conditions in the position and specialty".* As noted, the interim's rights are intimately and permanently linked to the specific destiny of the vacant position to which they were appointed and do not transcend beyond it. Therefore, if the position is re-occupied, goes to competition, or disappears (due to restructuring), upon the extinction of the holder's vacancy thereof, any right of improper stability of the interim *per se* expires. This being so, once the condition that originally granted the improper stability has disappeared, the possibility of the interim to claim permanence in the respective public administration disappears, and if they wish to continue in it, a new legal relationship of interim status or permanent status, different and independent from the previous one, must be configured. To consider otherwise would be a violation of the principle of equality of treatment (Art. 4 of the General Public Administration Act, LGAP) with respect to other subjects who, in the same condition of interim status, are opting to be appointed to any alternative position that may eventually open. In the case under analysis, it is noted that at this moment, the position that the plaintiff occupied is held by its permanent holder, Name8672. Carlos Calderón Rojas, as general assistant physician G-1, as of March 16, 2010, so Mrs. María Jimena Campos Vallejos has no right to be appointed on an interim basis to any existing position in the Ministry of Justice and Grace. It should also be noted that the plaintiff has not even bothered to demonstrate the existence of potential vacant positions under such conditions that could give rise to the possibility of granting her petition, had she demonstrated that she possessed a right in that sense. On the other hand, although the plaintiff alleges that Dr. Calderón Rojas did not voluntarily return to his position, but rather was called to it by the Administration itself, and this is on record, there is no proof whatsoever that this situation is due to a persecutory intent against her or that the exercise of the employer's powers was carried out with a misuse of power, seeking purposes distinct from the public ones that should guide the legitimate exercise of *ius variandi* at the administrative level.

The mere statement of the plaintiff in her party testimony is not sufficient proof nor does it in any way substantiate a generic claim for reinstatement as made. This Tribunal considers that the plaintiff, in what she requests, overlooks her status as an interim employee and the limited rights that status entails. In this vein, doctrine has indicated with respect to the interim public servant that such a figure "…arises when there is no servant who automatically occupies the vacant post or provides the service, upon the absence of the regular servant. Given the origin of the interim, this servant is necessarily temporary and subject to a term, upon the expiration of which they automatically cease in their post or become regular" (Eduardo Ortiz, Ortiz, Tesis de Derecho Administrativo II First Edition, Editorial Stradtmann, San José, Costa Rica, 2000, pages 121 and 122). In the foregoing line of reasoning, vote 00318-2013 of 9:50 of March 22, 2013, of the Second Chamber indicates the following: "Within the statutory regime, the appointment of an interim public servant is only permitted when there is no substitute, or a promotion is possible, and it is necessary to cover the absence of the permanent employee (titular). The interim worker is aware that the employment stability they enjoy is momentary (improper), as it is reduced to the period covered by their appointment. Therefore, strictly speaking, there is no conceptual legal affinity between the interim worker and the principle of employment stability, as understood for the case of a public servant appointed with permanent status (propiedad). .... The Constitutional Chamber ruled that in matters of interim status (interinidad), public servants enjoy improper employment stability, which is not the same as that held by a permanent worker (sobre el tema puede consultarse la resolución número 2329, de esa Sala, de las 9:57 horas del 25 de abril de 1997). If a public servant is appointed on an interim basis (interinamente) to a specific post for a prolonged period, it does not imply an obligation for the Administration to appoint them to a permanent post, although it is logical and reasonable that if they have demonstrated suitability and meet the requirements of the position, they be taken into account for the appointment; the competent appointing body being responsible for making the selection that best guarantees public service, in accordance with the provisions of Article 192 of the Political Constitution." In accordance with the foregoing, just as the interim employee does not possess an acquired right to obtain an automatic permanent appointment, neither can they claim to continue being appointed to other posts different from the one that originated their relationship. In the same line of reasoning as decided in this resolution, vote 00353-2010 of March 17, 2010, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, regarding similar claims, resolved: "From the evidence gathered, it is clear that the plaintiff had always been working on an interim basis at the University of Costa Rica since 1985. However, this does not give her the right to be considered an indefinite-term servant; because she continues to be an interim employee, and she has not acquired the rights of stability, of immovability, and the administrative career. The Constitutional Chamber in vote 1119-90 of 14:00 on September 18, 1990, on this matter stated: '...It should be remembered that the immediate effect of the transformation of the nature of the contract (referring to a fixed-term to indefinite-term contract), is not the acquisition of the rights of stability, of immovability and the administrative career, but solely the mere payment of the severance components of prior notice, dismissal, and unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía), once the termination of duties is agreed...' (See also on this same subject judgments No. 1696-92 and 1490-96 of fifteen hours thirty minutes of August twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two and of ten hours twenty-four minutes of November first, nineteen ninety-six respectively of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and No. 40-1996 of ten hours of February two, 1996 of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Thus, the rights of an interim public servant are equated with those of career public servants, or as they have been called in our country, permanent employees, with the exclusion of the right to the post, or also called the right to stability and immovability; but the mere passage of time occupying a public post, without the legal procedures provided for such, does not give them the right to remain in it..." The limits of the nature of said appointment do not constrain administrative discretion in the matter nor impose objective and temporal indeterminacy on their right. In line with the above, it has been indicated that "there are no acquired rights against the organizational power of the Administration... there are no acquired rights against the norms regulating the internal regime of the Administration." (PALOMAR OLMEDA, Alberto. Derecho de la Función Pública. Régimen Jurídico de los Funcionarios Públicos, Madrid, second edition, Editorial DYKINSON, S.L., 1992, p. 38). Once the original cause for the appointment is extinguished, the right is extinguished, without prejudice to the right to re-apply under new conditions for another post. There is no right to be appointed in the Public Administration that can be considered abstract and intangible and that is divorced from a specific post in which the existence of a right in one's favor is claimed and demonstrated. Thus, this part of the claim must be dismissed.

**VIII.-** As a third claim, the plaintiff requests that payment be made for lost wages (salarios dejados de percibir) from March 7, 2010. In this regard, it must be taken into consideration that, as indicated previously, from March 16, 2010, the post occupied by the plaintiff was occupied by its permanent owner, Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas, as a general assistant physician G-1. Due to the foregoing, it is evident that just as the plaintiff could not aspire to have a right to continue being appointed to that post as of that date or to another similar position, neither could the plaintiff claim that she should have continued to be paid her salary as of March 16, 2010, since as of that date any right regarding the respective appointment was extinguished. The possibility of the plaintiff being paid back wages (salarios caídos) as compensation is an immediate consequence of one of two scenarios. Either she was not paid despite being in a subjective legal situation that so obligated it, or an administrative conduct was annulled that entails as a consequence the re-establishment of the condition of the person affected by it to a situation similar to that state they would have enjoyed had the annulled conduct not existed in the legal system. In the case under review, we are, in principle, in neither of these two scenarios. The plaintiff is not in a subjective legal situation in which she can wield a right that results in the payment of back wages (salarios caídos) up to the present date, given that the condition that generated any right in her favor was extinguished on March 16, 2010, with the arrival of the permanent post owner to their position. Nor did the plaintiff request the annulment of any administrative conduct or present the claim as a consequence of the re-establishment of a particular legal situation that she has demonstrated was violated. Consequently, it must be understood that she has no right whatsoever to the claim for wages as of the indicated date.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be taken into consideration that although by resolution at sixteen hours fifteen minutes on February seventeenth, two thousand ten, it was ordered to dismiss Mrs. Campos Vallejos without employer liability (responsabilidad patronal), for which she was paid the respective salary until March 7, 2010, in a resolution at fifteen hours on October nineteenth, two thousand ten, by the General Directorate of Social Adaptation (Dirección General de Adaptación Social), it was ordered that the sanction imposed on the plaintiff be modified to a suspension without pay for three days. Given the above, and taking into consideration that this last act has retroactive effects (art. 142 LGAP), for this Tribunal it is evident that between March 7, 2010, and March 16 of that same year, the plaintiff should have been paid her salary, albeit deducting the three days of suspension subject to the modified sanction on October nineteenth, 2010. The above, since the original resolution establishing the dismissal without employer liability of the plaintiff only became final through resolution 02-2011 at eight hours on January fifth, two thousand eleven, by the Minister of Justice and Peace. Although the execution of the administrative act of dismissal at the time was not unlawful (given the provisions of article 148 LGAP), it is evident that what was subsequently resolved and the reduction of the sanction implied that at the time, the plaintiff's salary should have continued to be paid, notwithstanding which, the proven arrival of the permanent post owner, as indicated, had an interrupting effect on any possibility of her continuity as a general assistant physician Nombre1620. Thus, if from March 7 to 16, 2010, there are 9 days that should have been paid, deducting the 3-day sanction, payment to the plaintiff for 6 days of unpaid salary would be appropriate, in accordance with the reasoning employed above.

**IX.-** As a fourth claim, the plaintiff asks that subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) be compensated for the sum of fifteen million colones. In this regard, as has been indicated, no defects of nullity have been alleged in the formal administrative conducts that have been demonstrated at trial, nor is there evidence to that effect. Nor is an abnormal functioning of the Administration determined that would imply the recognition of liability for moral damages (daño moral) in the plaintiff. It is again pointed out that the cessation of her employment relationship did not originate from March 16, 2010, by the employer's will, but rather from the arrival of the permanent post owner, which has as a natural consequence the displacement of the interim public servant from it. No illegality has been demonstrated in what was resolved through the administrative act modifying the provisions of the resolution at sixteen hours fifteen minutes on February seventeenth, two thousand ten, regarding Mrs. Campos Vallejos, and its execution was in accordance with the provisions of article 148 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Thus, not having demonstrated the existence of an unlawful or abnormal conduct generating administrative liability, it is appropriate to reject this part of the claim.

**X.-** As a subsidiary matter, the plaintiff requests payment of prior notice (preaviso), unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía), and any other unpaid emoluments. Regarding the payment of prior notice, it must be taken into consideration that it is based on the need to prevent a unilateral, abrupt termination of the employment relationship. Article 28 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) provides for the payment of this component and establishes as a condition: "terminating the employment contract without just cause (justa causa)," unlike unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía) which, in addition to the above, provides for other causes, such as those inserted in article 83 of the Labor Code or another cause beyond the worker's will. Thus, when article 85 ibidem indicates that there are causes that terminate the employment contract, without extinguishing the worker's rights to claim payment of benefits that may correspond to them, it is clear that prior notice (preaviso) is not among them, as it applies only in the case of dismissal without just cause. In the case under review, it is noted that, as has been indicated, the termination of the employment relationship was due to the fact that the post held on an interim basis by the plaintiff was occupied by its permanent owner. In this vein, it must be remembered that in public employment matters, the service relationship can be terminated either by a cause duly motivated by an unlawful conduct of the public servant, by forced reduction of services (restructuring), promotion or transfer to another post, or with the fulfillment of the condition that gives rise to the appointment, such as the designation to a post with an interim nature due to vacancy or temporary absence of the permanent owner, or the expiration of the appointment term (case of officials elected by popular vote). Thus, the advent of the permanent post owner to a post that was being occupied by an interim employee is a just cause for termination of the employment contract and consequently, according to what was indicated ut supra, the payment of the corresponding prior notice would not be appropriate. In the plaintiff's case, her designation must be considered as an act subject to a condition (art. 132.4 LGAP), so that once the condition is fulfilled—return of the permanent post owner—the appointment disappears, not by the employer's will, but rather due to an objective reason foreign to it, and where there is a just cause that motivates the cessation of the relationship. Therefore, the rejection of the claim for payment of prior notice is appropriate. In the foregoing line of reasoning, given what was indicated about the reason for the cessation of the employment relationship and given that the plaintiff did not demonstrate unlawfulness in the Administration's conduct nor object to any act, limiting herself to making mere invocations about what she considered her right, the payment of unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía) is improper, since it applies only to a unilateral and unmotivated decision to terminate an employment relationship, which did not occur in the present case, given that it happened on the occasion of Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas's return to his post as a general assistant physician G-1. Thus, this part of the claim must be rejected.

**XI.-** This Tribunal considers it opportune to advise the Human Resources Unit (Unidad de Recursos Humanos) of the Ministry of Justice and Peace that the plaintiff has a right to have the effective, final sanction imposed on her recorded in both physical and electronic records, as well as in the certifications and attestations so issued, eliminating any reference to the sanction that was eventually rendered ineffective, given that she was not dismissed, but rather a termination of the bond occurred due to the proven arrival of the permanent post owner. In light of the above, the Minister of Justice and Peace and said administrative unit must take note of what is set forth in this whereas clause, for their respective responsibilities. Should an out-of-date record exist in that sense, it must be eliminated from her personnel file so as not to cause further employment and personal harm to the claimant.

XII.- Interest and indexation: XII.I.- Regarding the request for recognition of interest, it is granted and the State is ordered to pay interest, in accordance with article one thousand one hundred sixty-three of the Civil Code, from the moment the corresponding sums should have been paid until their effective payment. XII.II.- As for indexation (indexación), it is imposed ex officio in accordance with article one hundred twenty-three of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure. It constitutes recognition of the loss of the purchasing power of money. If it were not granted, the plaintiff would be receiving less money (with respect to its purchasing power), such that on the items established in this resolution, the recognition of the benefit is appropriate from the finality of the resolution that specifies them until the definitive payment.

XIII.- Defenses: XIII.I.- Regarding the defense of lack of interest (falta de interés) raised, it has already been resolved. XIII.II.- Regarding the defense of payment, it must be granted with respect to the payment of vacation leave, year-end bonus (aguinaldo), and school salary (salario escolar), only. XIII.III.- Regarding the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho), it is partially granted and is rejected only with respect to the payment of six days' salary.

XIV.- Costs: Article 193 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party for the sole fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, according to the terms of numeral 119.2 ibid. Because the defendant party is not within the assumptions for exemption from these costs, its condemnation is appropriate as requested by the plaintiff. It is not superfluous to recall that every process generates expenses for the party and its recognition for the victorious party depends on the condemnation to pay costs. In this case, to obtain her right regarding the five unpaid days, the plaintiff legitimately appeared before the court, which obligates its recognition in judgment.

POR TANTO

The defense of lack of right is partially rejected with respect to the payment of six days' salary. The defense of lack of interest is granted with respect to claim number 1 of the complaint, as well as the defense of payment regarding the payment of vacation leave, year-end bonus, and school salary. In all other respects, the defense of lack of right is granted. Consequently, the complaint is partially granted as indicated below, on the understanding that it is rejected in what is not expressly indicated. Accordingly, the State is ordered to pay the amount corresponding to the payment of six days' salary not received by the plaintiff. Said sum must be liquidated in the sentence execution phase. On said item, indexation is recognized in accordance with article one hundred twenty-three of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure, from the finality of the resolution that sets it, until the definitive payment. The State is ordered to pay interest on the sum subject to condemnation, in accordance with article one thousand one hundred sixty-three of the Civil Code, from the moment the corresponding sums should have been paid until their effective payment. Costs shall be borne by the State. Let the Ministry of Justice and Peace take note of what is indicated in Considerando number XI.- Judge Espinoza Salas dissents.

Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo Grace Loaiza Sánchez Carlos Espinoza Salas DISSENTING VOTE I respectfully separate myself from the majority vote of my colleagues, only with respect to the denial of the claims regarding advance notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía), sharing fully with the others in everything else resolved. In that sense, the undersigned grants the complaint regarding said labor claims, granting the corresponding advance notice and labor severance pay for the time the plaintiff worked for the Ministry of Justice and Grace, the amounts of which shall be determined in the sentence execution phase. This is so, given that as was reliably proven, Miss Campos Vallejos was dismissed without employer liability as of March 8, 2010, a situation for which there was no merit, which converts the removal into a dismissal with employer liability, because it occurred before the permanent holder of the position returned to his tenured post and because the Administration itself recognized the error it incurred. By the State having annulled the dismissal, this automatically converts the cessation of the position into a removal with employer liability, and therefore the plaintiff must be recognized severance pay and advance notice. This is demonstrated by the fact that the State, without the resolution of 4:15 p.m. on February 17, 2010, being final, dismissed the plaintiff from the post she had been holding as general attending physician Nombre1620 in the Ministry of Justice and Peace, which constitutes the breaking of the employment relationship with employer liability, since it occurred before the permanent holder returned to his position. Furthermore, it must be taken into consideration that the plaintiff was not reinstated before the permanent holder returned, and although the Administration subsequently annulled said dismissal, the harmful effects of the dismissal had already been consummated, and such unilateral conduct by the State cannot be dictated to the detriment of the plaintiff's labor rights, nor can the Administration take advantage of its own negligence, carelessness, and nullity defects it incurred, which led it to dictate such a vexatious act against the plaintiff's labor rights. Even though the dismissal is rendered void, the defendant must assume the payment of labor rights, since the plaintiff was never reinstated and the dismissal was carried out by the State illegally before the permanent holder of the position returned, which undoubtedly constitutes the payment of advance notice and severance pay, for termination of the employment relationship with employer liability, given that the State unilaterally accepted that there was no merit for the dismissal.

This situation is evidenced by the fact that the State annulled the plaintiff's dismissal through resolution 381-2010 of eight o'clock on August fourth, two thousand ten, but without reinstating her prior to the incumbent's return, nor paying her labor rights; instead, it improperly summoned the incumbent of the position, waited for him to return, so that, taking advantage of said situation, it could deny payment of notice of termination (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía). This situation cannot be admitted, as it implies a clear violation of the legitimate labor claims of the petitioner, unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa), and conduct harmful to the property rights of the plaintiff.

**Carlos Espinoza Salas** **IV.- Regarding the object of the proceeding:** Based on what the parties have expressed, both in their claims and arguments, the object of the present proceeding lies in determining whether liability was generated on the occasion of the plaintiff's dismissal from the position she held in the Ministry of Justice and Grace (Ministerio de Justicia y Gracia), as well as the appropriateness of her reinstatement to the same.

**VI.-** In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which a series of specific rights and obligations emanate. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, by establishing the following: *“Article 191.- A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration”* and *“Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on **proven suitability (idoneidad comprobada) and may only be removed for the justified dismissal causes expressed in the labor legislation (legislación de trabajo),** or in the case of forced reduction of services, either due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof.”* In accordance with the indicated norms of constitutional rank, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of its own normative regulation, stability in employment - limiting the regime of free removal characteristic of private labor regulation - and an administrative career, along with the other guarantees existing for persons protected under a regime of subordination, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (making the exception of the right to collective bargaining, excluded by votes 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber). Correlative with the aforementioned rights, the public servant possesses a series of obligations of a functional nature, inherent to the public purposes sought with their activity and which must always guide their management, in order not to incur in a personal fault generating disciplinary responsibility. Without pretending to be exhaustive, some of the duties characteristic of the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (art. 3 Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Administration), b) duty of compliance with the principles of public service - continuity, efficiency, adaptation to change in the legal regime and equality of treatment- (art. 4 General Law of Public Administration), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control) d) duty to protect the best interests of children (art. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code) e) duty to comply with the legal system (art. 13 and concordant articles of the General Law of Public Administration, art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute), f) duty to give prompt response and information to the user (art. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from the Excess of Requirements and Administrative Procedures), g) duty of obedience (art. 108 of the General Law of Public Administration), h) duty to act with efficacy (art. 5 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets) i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (art. 114 of the General Law of Public Administration and art. 39. d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute) j) duty to respond in case of having acted with intent or gross negligence (art. 199 and 211 General Law of Public Administration) k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, in a supplementary manner, based on article 9 of the General Law of Public Administration and 51 of the indicated Statute, the provisions characteristic of the Labor Code and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching, Law Regulating Smoking, Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, among others. In this vein, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters given the existence of a statutory and not contractual relationship (article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration), the existence of general guiding lines of the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in article 19 of the Labor Code. In relation to the disciplinary regime to apply in case of non-compliance with said duties, in accordance with numerous votes of the Constitutional Chamber, the principle of specificity (tipicidad) becomes more lax, so a specific legal classification of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants. In this sense, vote 2007-013903 of fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes of October third, two thousand seven of the Constitutional Chamber, indicates the following: ***"V.- On the principle of specificity in the disciplinary regime**.- The principle of specificity is an application of the principle of legality that demands, on the one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reproachable for the purposes of their sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to apply, being able to affirm that the principle of specificity constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary responsibility. Regarding the concrete delimitation of the reproachable conduct, this Chamber has sustained on previous occasions (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 of twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes of May thirty-first, two thousand five and 94-5594 of fifteen hours forty-eight minutes of September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-four) that although certainly this principle in this matter does not have the same form as in the criminal-legal field -since faults not literally foreseen can be sanctioned discretionally**- it must always be understood that these faults are included in the text. That is, faults not literally foreseen can be sanctioned discretionally, but which are understood to be included in the text and always provided that they result from the verification of the disciplinary fault, by means of a procedure created for this purpose.** Now then, **regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must indeed be clearly and previously established, without the Administration being able to create new sanctions that are not contemplated in the applicable norms**. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary faults are innumerable -for they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the subjects- and that the principles "nullum crimen sine lege", "nullum poena sine lege" do not have the rigidity and demand that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, **it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of specificity, that the conduct be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction be –this one is– clearly pre-established**".* The foregoing generates what in doctrine is known as the principle of relative classification (tipificación relativa) in the understanding that the fault must be foreseen in the disciplinary system, but without the level of rigor characteristic of criminal matters insofar as it derives from the service relationship in concrete. By reason of the foregoing, both the non-compliance with general functional duties, conduct legally classified (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, statutory norms specific to the regime or Labor Code, for example), and those that are contemplated in norms of inferior character, such as those contained in the autonomous service regulations or in cases where the classification exists with respect to the sanction to impose, are sanctionable. This relative classification makes the need for positive norms with the character of formal law more flexible, it being possible for their regulation to be generated by a positive norm of lower rank. The foregoing considerations, without prejudice to the fact that there exist a series of principles of sanctioning law derived from criminal law, of necessary compliance in all cases, e.g., proportionality, *non bis in idem*, innocence, due process, due substantiation of the respective resolution. In this vein, it is to be noted that in matters of defining conducts that can be considered part of the duties characteristic of public officials or subject to sanction in case of non-compliance, our country possesses a diffuse system, given that they are not detailed in a single normative body, but rather dispersed among different norms of different rank, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to dictate, according to article 27 of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute. The foregoing, in accordance with the autonomous normative powers of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility that all and every one of the concrete conducts incurred by public servants can be regulated by legal means, and in the understanding that the exercise of regulatory authority is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal system. Transversally to this set of principles and norms of different rank, in this matter we find the public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any formal or informal decision or conduct of the Administration with respect to its servants. Said interest, understood in accordance with article 113 of the General Law of Public Administration, provides: *"1. The public servant must perform their functions in a manner that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coincident individual interests of the administered persons. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the appraisal of the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, in the first place, to which mere convenience cannot in any case take precedence."* By reason of the foregoing, any analysis in matters of public employment must not ignore the analysis of the fulfillment of the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference of its underlying motivation.

**VII.- On the merits**: As a second claim, the plaintiff requests that in case the resolution of 3:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, of the Minister of Justice and Grace is not final, she be reinstated in the position of general physician G1 in any post as an interim. In this regard, in the first place, it must be taken into consideration that what was resolved is final and was not challenged in jurisdictional venue by the plaintiff. In this vein, as noted, the suspension of three days without salary to the plaintiff was resolved by means of a formal administrative act by the Administration, regarding which, the representation of Mrs. Campos Vallejos did not make any allegation of vice of nullity against it as part of her claims. Rather, it must be taken into consideration that in the preliminary hearing, her representation indicated that she did not have a request to return to the position she held (for that reason the holder thereof, Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas, was excluded as a defendant), given that what is requested is reinstatement in any existing post in the Ministry. Therefore, neither explicitly nor implicitly, the party challenged the indicated act as such and consequently, the conformity of Mrs. Campos Vallejos with its validity and efficacy must be understood. On the other hand, this Tribunal considers that there is no generic right of the interim official to be appointed to any post that holds such condition, but rather their improper stability is limited to remaining in the one they occupy, until its holder arrives or it is put up for competition for a permanent appointment (in that sense, one can see, among others, judgments No. 8544-2002 of 3:24 p.m. on September 3, 2002, No. 9755-2011, issued at 4:22 p.m. on July 16, 2011, and No. 10288-2011, issued at 10:41 a.m. on August 5, 2011, all from the Constitutional Chamber). In this sense, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated: *"An interim official is understood to be one who is appointed to a position or assigned to a service due to the temporary or definitive absence of the holder. The interim worker has knowledge that the labor stability they enjoy is momentary (improper), as this is reduced to the period covered by their appointment. So -in a strict sense- there is no conceptual legal affinity between the interim servant and the principle of labor stability, as is understood for the case of a public official vested in a permanent capacity (propiedad). Although both this Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber have affirmed that the interim appointment is not a legitimate mechanism to access the permanent status of a position, both courts have been emphatic in recognizing to officials appointed in that precarious condition, the right to a relative stability which they have also called "improper"*. Vote 00385-2013 of April 12, 2013. In the same sense, vote no. 9462-2002 of 2:48 p.m. on October 1, 2002, of the Constitutional Chamber said: *“Regarding the right to labor stability, contained in the same numeral, this Chamber has recognized an improper stability for interim officials, so that while it is true that they do not have a subjective right to have their appointment extended indefinitely, they do have the right that another official not be appointed in their place under the same circumstances, that is, in an interim capacity, until the Administration appoints -through the corresponding legal procedure- a permanent official or, in its case, the post is once again occupied by its holder. It must be kept in mind that the interim servant can assert their right against another interim servant who is intended to be appointed to replace them, but that does not imply that the Administration must appoint them indefinitely, for once their appointment term expires, the State can dispense with their services provided it does not appoint another interim official under their same conditions in the post and specialty.”* As noted, the rights of the interim are intimately and permanently linked to the destiny specific to the vacant post in which they were appointed and do not transcend beyond it. Therefore, if the post becomes occupied again, is put up for competition, or disappears (due to restructuring), upon the expiration of the holders' vacancy of the same, all right to improper stability of the interim per se expires. Thus, the condition that originally granted improper stability having disappeared, the possibility of the interim to claim permanence in the respective public administration disappears, and if they wish to continue in it, a new legal relationship of interim or permanent status, different and independent from the previous one, must be configured. Considering the contrary would be a violation of the principle of equality of treatment (art. 4 LGAP) towards other subjects who, in equal condition as interims, are opting to be appointed to any alternative post that may eventually open. In the case under analysis, it is noted that at this moment, the post that the plaintiff occupied is occupied by its permanent holder, Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas, as general assistant physician G-1, as of March 16, 2010, for which Mrs. María Jimena Campos Vallejos does not possess any right to be appointed to any post on an interim basis that may exist in the Ministry of Justice and Grace. It is even noteworthy that the plaintiff has not even bothered to demonstrate the existence of potential vacant posts in such conditions that could give rise to the possibility of accepting her petition, had she demonstrated she possessed a right in such sense. On the other hand, although the plaintiff alleges that Dr. Calderón Rojas did not return voluntarily to his post, but was called to it by the Administration itself and it is so recorded in the case file, there is no proof whatsoever that said situation is due to a persecutory intent against her or that the exercise of the employer's powers was carried out in the exercise of a deviation of power (desviación de poder), by seeking purposes different from the public ones through said conduct that must guide the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi in administrative venue. The mere statement of the plaintiff in her party testimony is not sufficient proof nor does it substantiate in any way a generic claim of reinstatement such as the one made. This Tribunal considers that the plaintiff in what is requested overlooks her interim condition and the limited rights that it entails. In this vein, the doctrine has indicated with respect to the interim official that such figure *"…arises when there is no servant who automatically occupies the vacant position or provides the service, upon the absence of the regular servant. Given the origin of the interim, the same is a necessarily temporary servant and subject to a term, upon whose expiration they automatically cease in their position or become regular”* (Eduardo Ortiz, Ortiz, Tesis de Derecho Administrativo II First Edition, Editorial Stradtmann, San José, Costa Rica, 2000, pages 121 and 122). In the previous line of reasoning, vote 00318-2013 of 9:50 a.m. on March 22, 2013, of the Second Chamber indicates the following: *"Within the statutory regime, the appointment of an interim official is only permitted when there is no substitute, or a promotion is possible, and it is necessary to cover the absence of the holder. The interim worker has knowledge that the labor stability they enjoy is momentary (improper), as this is reduced to the period covered by their appointment. So -in a strict sense- there is no conceptual legal affinity between the interim worker and the principle of labor stability, as is understood for the case of a public official appointed in a permanent capacity. .... The Constitutional Chamber provided that in matters of interim status, the officials enjoy improper labor stability, which is not the same as that held by a permanent worker (on the topic, resolution number 2329, of that Chamber, of 9:57 a.m. on April 25, 1997, can be consulted). If a public official is appointed on an interim basis to perform a certain position and for a prolonged time, it does not imply for the Administration the obligation to appoint them in a permanent capacity, although it is logical and reasonable that if they have demonstrated suitability and meet the requisites of the position, they be taken into account for the appointment; the competent body to appoint being responsible for making the choice that best guarantees the public service, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 192 of the Political Constitution”.* In accordance with the foregoing, just as the interim does not possess an acquired right to obtain an automatic permanent appointment, they also cannot pretend to continue being appointed in other posts different from those in which their relationship originated. In the same line of reasoning as resolved in the present resolution, vote 00353-2010 of March 17, 2010, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in the face of similar claims, resolved: *"From the evidence gathered, it is inferred that the plaintiff had always been working on an interim basis at the University of Costa Rica, since the year nineteen eighty-five. However, this does not give her the right to be considered as a servant for an indefinite time; because she continues being an interim, and has not acquired the rights of stability, of irremovability (inamovibilidad), and the administrative career. The Constitutional Chamber in vote 1119-90 of 14:00 hours on September 18, 1990, in this respect said: '…It bears recalling that the immediate effect of the transformation of the nature of the contract, (it refers to a fixed-term to an indefinite one), is not the acquisition of the rights of stability, of irremovability and the administrative career, but solely the mere payment of the severance pay items of prior notice, dismissal, and unemployment assistance, once the cessation of functions is agreed upon...'. (See also on this same topic judgments nos. 1696-92 and 1490-96 of fifteen hours thirty minutes on August twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two and of ten hours twenty-four minutes on November first, nineteen ninety-six, respectively, of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and No. 40-1996 of ten hours on February second, nineteen ninety-six, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice).* This being the case, the rights of an interim official are equivalent to those of career officials, or as they have been called in our country, permanent officials, with the exclusion of the right to the position, also called the right to stability and immovability; but the mere passage of time occupying a public position, without the legal procedures provided for that purpose, does not give the right to remain in it..." The limits of the nature of such appointment do not constrain administrative discretion in the matter nor impose objective and temporal indeterminacy of their right. In accordance with the foregoing, it has been indicated that *"there are no acquired rights against the organizational power of the Administration... there are no acquired rights against the rules regulating the internal regime of the Administration."* (PALOMAR OLMEDA, Alberto. Derecho de la Función Pública. Régimen Jurídico de los Funcionarios Públicos, Madrid, second edition, Editorial DYKINSON, S.L., 1992, p. 38). Once the cause for the original appointment has expired, the right expires, without prejudice to the right to reapply under new conditions for another position. There is no right to be appointed in the Public Administration that can be considered abstract and intangible and that is disconnected from a specific position in which the existence of a right in one's favor is alleged and proven. This being the case, this claim in the lawsuit must be rejected." Carlos Calderón Rojas and for the time during which he enjoyed an interim promotion **(folios 37, 38, 88, 39, 153 of the administrative file, white folder)** **I.II.-** That by resolution 002-146-2009 at 8:30 a.m. on September 11, 2009, an administrative proceeding was initiated against the plaintiff **(folios 33 to 40 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.III.-** That by resolution 012-146-2009 at eleven o'clock on January 26, two thousand ten, the Directing Body of the Administrative Proceeding recommended dismissing the plaintiff without employer liability **(folios 99 to 109 of the administrative file, white folder)** **I.IV.-** That by resolution at four fifteen p.m. on February 17, two thousand ten, it was ordered to dismiss Mrs. Campos Vallejos without employer liability **(folios 99 to 109 of the administrative file, white folder, and 223 to 235 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.V.-** That the plaintiff was terminated without employer liability by reason of the resolution at four fifteen p.m. on February 17, two thousand ten, effective March 7, 2010 **(folio 128 of the administrative file, white folder)** **I.VI.-** That by official letter DRH-PCAL-107-10 of February 23, 2010, the plaintiff was notified of her dismissal without employer liability effective March 8 of that year, following the enjoyment of the 11 days of prophylactic leave to which she is entitled. Likewise, she was informed that the eventual filing of appeals does not entail the suspension of the ordered act, and therefore she must abide by the imposed sanction **(folios 117 and 118 of the administrative file, white folder)** **I.VII.-** That by official letter D.G.846.2010 of March 10, 2010, the Director of Human Resources of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social was instructed to process the termination of Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas as Regional Medical Supervisor G.4, so that he would return to his position as general attending physician G-1, effective March 16, 2010. By reason of the foregoing, by official letter DRH-CGAC-0127-2010 of March 11, 2010, the indicated physician was informed of the termination of his interim promotion, this being the reason for the termination of the plaintiff's interim appointment. **(folio 48, 49, and 214 of the judicial file, plaintiff's party statement)** **I.VIII.-** That by resolution at nine o'clock on March 9, 2010, of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social, the plaintiff's appeal for revocation against the resolution of February 17, two thousand ten, was rejected **(folios 264 to 281 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.IX.-** That by resolution 177-2010 at eight o'clock on April 12, two thousand ten, of the Minister of Justice and Grace, the appeal for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff against the resolution at four fifteen p.m. on February 17, two thousand ten, was rejected for being deemed untimely **(folios 135 to 137 of the administrative file, white folder, 299 to 301 of the administrative proceeding file)** **I.X.-** That by resolution number 235-2010 at eleven fifteen on May 12, two thousand ten, it was ordered to partially grant the claim filed by the plaintiff and to order the payment of the sum of two hundred forty-three thousand one hundred sixty-six colones and seventeen céntimos for the concept of vacations. Likewise, the payment of the proportional year-end bonus and school salary was ordered, and the payment of the severance pay and notice period was rejected. **(folios 7 to 11 of the administrative file, white folder)** **I.XI.-** That by resolution No. 365-2010 at ten thirty on August 5, the appeal for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff against resolution number 235-2010 at eleven fifteen on May 12, two thousand ten, was rejected **(folios 22 to 26 of the administrative file, white folder)** **I.XII.-** That by resolution 391-2010 at eight o'clock on August 4, two thousand ten, the resolution at four fifteen p.m. on February 17, two thousand ten, and the subsequent acts were totally annulled **(folios 158 to 164 of the administrative file, white folder, 312 to 318 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.XIII.-** That by note dated August 9, 2010, the plaintiff requested the Human Resources Unit of the Ministry of Justice and Peace to proceed to reinstate her in her position, given what was resolved in resolution 391-2010 at eight o'clock on August 4, two thousand ten. By reason of the foregoing, by official letter DGIRH-PGAL-0387-10 of August 12, 2010, she was informed that what was requested was not possible given that the permanent holder of the respective position is occupying it again effective March 15 of that year. **(folios 166 and 171 of the administrative file, white folder, 323 and 324 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.XIV.-** That by resolution at three p.m. on October 19, two thousand ten, of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social, it was ordered to modify the sanction imposed on the plaintiff to a suspension without pay for three days **(folios 223 to 234, 236 to 247 of the administrative file, white folder, 330 to 341 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.XV.-** That by official letter DGIRH-PGAL-0515-10 of October 25, 2010, the Coordinator of the Labor Environment Management Process notified the plaintiff of the imposed sanction and informed her that against what was resolved, the appeal for revocation with subsidiary appeal for reconsideration is applicable **(folio 252 of the administrative file, white folder, 342 of the disciplinary administrative file)** **I.XVII.-** That by resolution 02-2011 at eight o'clock on January 5, two thousand eleven, of the Minister of Justice and Peace, the appeal for reconsideration filed by the plaintiff against the resolution at three p.m. on October 19, two thousand ten, of the Dirección General de Adaptación Social was resolved. In said resolution, the following was ordered: "*Reject in all its aspects the appeal for reconsideration filed by Dr. María Jimena Campos Vallejos, against the resolution at three p.m. on October 19, two thousand ten, issued by the Dirección General de Adaptación Social, by which a disciplinary sanction was imposed on her consisting of suspension from her duties for three days without pay. However, material impossibility exists to apply said sanction, by virtue of the fact that Dr. Campos Vallejos stopped working for the institution as of March 8, 2010, due to the return of the permanent holder of the position she occupied on an interim basis, since August 8, 2008*". Said resolution was notified to the plaintiff on February 15, 2011 **(folios 121 to 133 of the judicial file)** **I.XVIII.-** That the plaintiff was paid the respective salary up to March 7, 2010 **(folio 57 of the judicial file)** **I.XIX.-** That as of November 2010, the certificates and certifications issued by the Ministry of Justice and Grace still stated that the plaintiff was dismissed with employer liability **(folios 41 to 45 and 57 of the judicial file)** **I.XX.-** That the plaintiff was paid by transfer the amount recognized by number 235-2010 at eleven fifteen on May 12, two thousand ten, according to certification 02-2010 of November 26, two thousand ten, of the Financial Director of the Ministry of Justice and Peace **(folio 39 of the judicial file)** **II.- Unproven Facts**: The following have been deemed of importance:

**II.I.-** That Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas was called back to his original position in the Dirección13480 within a context of persecution or interest in harming the plaintiff in this proceeding.

**II.II.-** That the plaintiff's appointments in other public entities were rejected due to erroneous information issued or provided by the Ministry of Justice and Peace regarding the sanction imposed on her.

**II.III.-** That the State has paid the labor entitlements of notice period and severance pay that corresponded to the plaintiff.

**II.IV.-** That there are vacant positions in the Ministry of Justice and Peace for general attending physician Nombre1620 **III.- Arguments of the parties**: In the context of this proceeding, the parties have expressed the following relevant allegations in order to be taken into consideration for their proper resolution in judgment:

**III.I.- Arguments of the plaintiff**: The plaintiff's representation expresses the following substantive considerations with respect to the claims:

**III.I.I.-** That the plaintiff was terminated without employer liability, and subsequently the sanction was reduced to three days of suspension without pay.

**III.I.II.-** That notwithstanding the foregoing, the Administration called back the permanent physician of the position she occupied in order to terminate her appointment indirectly.

**III.I.III.-** That the records of the Ministry of Justice still state that the plaintiff was dismissed, which has meant that she is not hired or her appointments in other public entities are not extended.

**III.I.IV.-** That the plaintiff is unaware of the result of her appeal for revocation with subsidiary appeal for reconsideration against the resolution that imposed the three-day suspension without pay.

**III.I.V.-** That the termination of her appointment caused the plaintiff serious material and moral damages.

**III.I.VI.-** That the plaintiff was left defenseless, given that between the time of the termination of the appointment and the suspension resolution, the plaintiff was not appointed to any position, a situation that persists over time.

**III.II.- Arguments of the State**: The Deputy Attorney representing the State expresses the following substantive considerations:

**III.II.I.-** That the plaintiff was notified regarding what was resolved with respect to her appeal for revocation with subsidiary appeal for reconsideration against the resolution at three p.m. on October 19, two thousand ten.

**III.II.II.-** That the termination of the plaintiff's employment relationship was due to the return to his position of the permanent holder of the position, and does not correspond to a dismissal at the employer's will.

**III.II.III.-** That there is no proof of the plaintiff's assertions regarding the existence of errors in the information provided by the Ministry of Justice about the reason for the termination of the plaintiff's employment relationship, nor that these errors meant that she was not hired or her appointments in other public entities were not extended.

**III.II.IV.-** That the plaintiff is not entitled to collect the salaries she stopped receiving, given that she was not terminated at the employer's will.

**III.II.V.-** That the plaintiff is not entitled to the collection of damages.

IV.- Regarding the object of the proceeding: Based on what was expressed by the parties, both in their claims and arguments, the object of the present proceeding rests on determining whether liability has been generated due to the plaintiff's termination from the position she held in the Ministry of Justice and Grace, as well as the appropriateness of her reinstatement to the same.

V.- Regarding the lack of interest alleged: As a first claim, the plaintiff requests that the Ministry of Justice be ordered to report on what happened regarding the motion for revocation with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación) filed against the resolution of 3:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010. In this regard, it has been proven that through resolution 02-2011 at eight o'clock on January 5, 2011, from the Minister of Justice and Peace, the filed appeal was resolved, such that said resolution was notified to the plaintiff on February 15, 2011, when the respective ordinary proceeding had already been filed. Due to the foregoing, it is evident to this Court that in the case under examination, a current lack of interest applies with respect to this claim, given that what was requested has already been timely resolved in the administrative venue (sede administrativa) and consequently, it is appropriate to accept the State's defense in this regard.

VI.- In Costa Rica, the public servant is subject to a particular regime, differentiated from the private worker, from which stem a series of specific rights and obligations. Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution are the fundamental basis for establishing such a distinction, when establishing the following: "Article 191.- A civil service statute (estatuto de servicio civil) shall regulate the relations between the State and the public servants, with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration" and "Article 192.- With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of proven suitability (idoneidad comprobada) and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal that the labor legislation expresses, or in the case of forced reduction of services, either due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the same." In accordance with the indicated constitutional norms, it is evident that the servant of the State and its Institutions enjoys the rights of its own regulatory framework, stability in employment - limiting the regime of free removal (libre remoción) typical of private labor regulation - and an administrative career (carrera administrativa), together with the other guarantees existing for persons protected under a regime of subordination, such as the payment of a salary, vacations, maximum working hours, strike, etc. (making the exception for the right to collective bargaining, excluded by rulings 4453-2000 and 9690-2000 of the Constitutional Chamber). Correlative to the previous rights, the public servant possesses a series of obligations of an official nature, inherent to the public purposes sought with their activity and which must always guide their management, in order not to incur a personal fault generating disciplinary liability. Without intending to be exhaustive, some of the duties inherent to the public employment regime are: a) duty of probity (Art. 3 Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Administration), b) duty of compliance with the principles of public service - continuity, efficiency, adaptation to change in the legal regime and equality of treatment- (Art. 4 General Law of Public Administration), c) duty to ensure an adequate internal control environment (Art. 39 of the General Law of Internal Control) d) duty to protect the best interests of children (Art. 4 and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code) e) duty to comply with the legal system (Art. 13 and concordant articles of the General Law of Public Administration, Art. 39.a of the Civil Service Statute), f) duty to provide a prompt response and information to the user (Art. 5 and 10 of the Law for the Protection of the Citizen from Excessive Requirements and Administrative Procedures), g) duty of obedience (Art. 108 of the General Law of Public Administration), h) duty to act with effectiveness (Art. 5 of the Law of Financial Administration and Public Budgets) i) duty to maintain decorum and provide due attention to the user (Art. 114 of the General Law of Public Administration and Art. 39. d) and e) of the Civil Service Statute) j) duty to respond in case of having acted with fraud (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) (Art. 199 and 211 General Law of Public Administration) k) duty to abide by the Political Constitution (Art. 11 of said normative body). Additionally, in a supplementary manner, based on Article 9 of the General Law of Public Administration and 51 of the indicated Statute, the provisions of the Labor Code and other provisions related to the employment relationship are applicable to said public employment relationship, such as the Law on Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching, Law on Regulation of Smoking, Law on Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, among others. In this vein, although in matters of public employment we cannot speak of a full integration of the legal system and principles in labor matters given the existence of a statutory relationship (relación estatutaria) and not a contractual one, (Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration), the existence of general guidelines of orientation for the relationship that are common cannot be ignored, such as, for example, the application of the principle of good faith between both parties, contemplated in Article 19 of the Labor Code. Regarding the disciplinary regime to apply in case of breach of said duties, in accordance with multiple rulings of the Constitutional Chamber, the principle of specificity (principio de tipicidad) becomes more lax, so that a specific legal definition of the conduct is not required, given the very nature of the legal situation of the servants. In this sense, ruling 2007-013903 at fifteen hours and twenty-five minutes on October 3, 2007, of the Constitutional Chamber, indicates the following: "V.- On the principle of specificity in the disciplinary regime.- The principle of specificity is an application of the principle of legality that requires, on one hand, the concrete delimitation of the conducts that are made reproachable for the purposes of their sanction, and on the other hand, the concrete delimitation of the possible sanctions to apply, it being possible to affirm that the principle of specificity constitutes a fundamental principle in disciplinary liability. Regarding the concrete delimitation of the reproachable conduct, this Chamber has held on previous occasions (see in this regard resolution 2005-06616 at twenty hours and fifty-eight minutes on May 31, 2005, and 94-5594 at fifteen hours forty-eight minutes on September 27, 1994) that although certainly this principle in this matter does not have the same form as in the criminal-legal sphere - since offenses not literally foreseen may be sanctioned discretionally - it must always be understood that these offenses are included in the text. That is, offenses not literally foreseen may be sanctioned discretionally, but which are understood to be included in the text and always provided that they result from the verification of the disciplinary offense, through a procedure created for that purpose. Now then, regarding the concrete delimitation of the sanction, unlike what has just been said, this must indeed be clearly and previously established, without the Administration being able to create new sanctions that are not contemplated in the applicable norms. In summary, although it is inferred that the determining facts of disciplinary offenses are innumerable - since they depend on the nature of the behaviors or conducts of the subjects - and that the principles 'nullum crimen sine lege', 'nullum poena sine lege' do not have the rigidity and exigency that characterizes them in substantive criminal law, it is always necessary in disciplinary matters, in attention to the principle of specificity, that the conduct can be inferred from the normative text and that the sanction is – this yes – clearly pre-established". The foregoing generates what in doctrine is known as the principle of relative specification (tipificación relativa) in the understanding that the offense must be foreseen in the disciplinary system, but without the level of rigor typical of criminal matters as long as it derives from the specific service relationship. Due to the foregoing, both the breach of general functional duties, and conducts legally defined (at the level of the Civil Service Statute, own statutory norms of the regime or Labor Code, for example), and those that are contemplated in lower-ranking norms, such as those contained in the autonomous service regulations or in cases in which the specification occurs with respect to the sanction to impose, are sanctionable. This relative specification makes the need for positive norms in the character of formal law more flexible, it being possible for its regulation to be generated by a positive norm of lower rank. The previous considerations, without prejudice to the fact that there are a series of principles of sanctioning law derived from criminal law, of necessary compliance in all cases, e.g. proportionality, non bis in idem, innocence, due process, due reasoning of the respective resolution. In this vein, it should be noted that regarding the definition of conducts that can be considered as part of the duties of public officials or subject to sanction in case of breach, our country possesses a diffuse system, given that they are not detailed in a single normative body, but rather dispersed among different norms of distinct rank, with greater specificity prevailing in the regulatory norms that each entity chooses to dictate, according to Article 27 of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute. The foregoing, in accordance with the self-regulatory powers (potestades auto normativas) of the Public Administration, and given the impossibility that all and each of the concrete conducts incurred by public servants can be regulated by legal means, and in the understanding that the exercise of the regulatory power is limited by the general framework of the supra-legal system. In a transversal manner to this set of principles and norms of different rank, in this matter we find the public interest as a constant reference in the adoption of any decision or formal or informal conduct of the Administration with respect to its servants. Said interest understood in accordance with Article 113 of the General Law of Public Administration, provides: "1. The public servant shall perform their functions in a way that primarily satisfies the public interest, which shall be considered as the expression of the coinciding individual interests of the administered parties. 2. The public interest shall prevail over the interest of the Public Administration when they may be in conflict. 3. In the appreciation of the public interest, the values of legal certainty and justice for the community and the individual shall be taken into account, first and foremost, to which mere convenience may in no case be placed above." Due to the foregoing, any analysis in matters of public employment must not overlook the analysis of the fulfillment of the public interest in the adoption of the respective administrative decision, as a fundamental reference of its underlying motivation.

VII.- On the merits: As a second claim, the plaintiff requests that in the event the resolution of 3:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, from the Minister of Justice and Grace is not final, she be reinstated to the position of general physician G1 in any position as an interim (interino). In this regard, in the first place, it must be taken into consideration that what was resolved is final and was not objected to in the jurisdictional venue by the plaintiff. In this vein, as noted, the suspension of three days without pay to the plaintiff was resolved through a formal administrative act by the Administration, regarding which, the representation of Mrs. Campos Vallejos did not make any allegation of a nullity defect against it as part of her claims. Rather, it must be taken into consideration that in the preliminary hearing, her representation indicated that she did not have a request to return to the position she held (for that reason, the holder of the same, Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas, was excluded as a defendant), given that what is requested is reinstatement in any existing position in the Ministry. For the foregoing, neither explicitly nor implicitly did the party object to the indicated act as such and consequently, Mrs. Campos Vallejos' conformity with its validity and effectiveness must be understood. On the other hand, this Court considers that there is no generic right of the interim official to be appointed to any position that holds such condition, but rather that their improper stability (estabilidad impropia) is limited to remaining in the one they occupy, until its holder arrives or it is opened for competition for a permanent appointment (nombramiento en propiedad) (in that sense, see, among others, judgments No. 8544-2002 at 15 hours 24 minutes on September 3, 2002, No. 9755-2011, issued at 16 hours 22 minutes on July 16, 2011, and No. 10288-2011, issued at 10 hours 41 minutes on August 5, 2011, all from the Constitutional Chamber). In this sense, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated: "An interim official is understood to be one who is appointed to a position or assigned to a service due to the temporary or definitive absence of the holder.

The interim worker is aware that the employment stability they enjoy is momentary (improper), as it is limited to the period covered by their appointment. Thus—strictly speaking—there is no conceptual legal affinity between the interim servant and the principle of employment stability, as understood for the case of a public official invested with permanent status (propiedad). While both this Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber have affirmed that an interim appointment is not a legitimate mechanism for accessing permanent status (propiedad) in a position, both courts have been emphatic in recognizing that officials appointed under that precarious condition have a right to a relative stability, which they have also called “improper” (impropia). Voto 00385-2013 of April 12, 2013. In the same vein, ruling no. 9462-2002 of 2:48 p.m. on October 1, 2002, of the Constitutional Chamber stated: “Regarding the right to employment stability, contained in the same article, this Chamber has recognized an improper stability for interim officials, so that while it is true that they do not have a subjective right to have their appointment extended indefinitely, they do have the right not to have another official appointed in their place under the same circumstances, that is, on an interim basis, until the Administration appoints—through the corresponding legal procedure—an official with permanent status (propiedad) or, as the case may be, the position is again occupied by its permanent holder (titular). It must be borne in mind that the interim servant can assert their right against another interim servant whom it is sought to appoint in their place, but this does not imply that the Administration must appoint them indefinitely, since once their appointment period has expired, the State may dispense with their services provided it does not appoint another interim official under the same conditions in the position and specialty.” As can be seen, the rights of the interim are intimately and permanently linked to the specific fate of the vacant position to which they were appointed and do not transcend beyond it. Therefore, if the position is again occupied, put to competition, or disappears (due to restructuring), the vacancy of the permanent holder (titular) having ended, all rights of improper stability of the interim per se cease. Thus, once the condition that originally granted the improper stability disappears, the interim’s possibility of claiming permanence in the respective public administration disappears, and if they wish to continue therein, a new legal relationship of interim status or permanent status (propiedad), different and independent from the previous one, must be established. To consider the contrary would violate the principle of equal treatment (Art. 4 LGAP) with respect to other subjects who, in the same condition as interims, are opting to be appointed to any alternative position that may eventually become available.

In the case under analysis, it is noted that at this time, the position held by the plaintiff is occupied by its permanent holder (titular) with permanent status (propiedad), Nombre8672. Carlos Calderón Rojas, as a general assistant physician G-1, effective March 16, 2010, and therefore Ms. María Jimena Campos Vallejos has no right whatsoever to be appointed on an interim basis to any position existing in the Ministry of Justice and Grace. It should even be noted that the plaintiff has not even bothered to demonstrate the existence of potential vacant positions under such conditions that could give rise to the possibility of granting her petition, had she demonstrated that she possessed a right in that regard.

On the other hand, while the plaintiff alleges that Dr. Calderón Rojas did not voluntarily return to his position, but was called to it by the Administration itself, as is recorded in the case file, there is no evidence whatsoever that this situation was due to a persecutory intent against her or that the exercise of the employer's powers was carried out through an abuse of power (desviación de poder), by seeking purposes other than the public purposes that should guide the legitimate exercise of the ius variandi in administrative venues. The plaintiff's mere statement in her party deposition is not sufficient proof nor does it in any way support a generic claim for reinstatement such as the one made. This Court considers that the plaintiff, in her request, overlooks her interim condition and the limited rights it entails. In this vein, the doctrine has indicated with respect to the interim official that such a figure “… arises when there is no servant who automatically occupies the vacant position or provides the service, upon the absence of the regular servant. Given the origin of the interim, they are necessarily a temporary servant and subject to a term, upon expiration of which they automatically cease in their position or become a regular one” (Eduardo Ortiz, Ortiz, Tesis de Derecho Administrativo II, First Edition, Editorial Stradtmann, San José, Costa Rica, 2000, pages 121 and 122). In the foregoing line of reasoning, ruling 00318-2013 of 9:50 a.m. on March 22, 2013, of the Second Chamber states the following: "Within the statutory regime, the appointment of an interim official is only permitted when there is no substitute, or a promotion is possible, and it is necessary to cover the absence of the permanent holder (titular). The interim worker is aware that the employment stability they enjoy is momentary (improper), as it is limited to the period covered by their appointment. Thus—strictly speaking—there is no conceptual legal affinity between the interim worker and the principle of employment stability, as understood for the case of a public official appointed with permanent status (propiedad). .... The Constitutional Chamber held that in matters of interim status, officials enjoy improper employment stability, which is not the same as that held by a worker with permanent status (propiedad) (on the subject, consult resolution number 2329, of that Chamber, at 9:57 a.m. on April 25, 1997). If a public official is appointed on an interim basis to perform a specific position for a prolonged period, this does not imply an obligation for the Administration to appoint them with permanent status (propiedad), although it is logical and reasonable that if they have demonstrated suitability and meet the requirements of the position, they should be considered for the appointment; the competent appointing body being responsible for making the selection that best guarantees the public service, in accordance with the provisions of Article 192 of the Political Constitution." In accordance with the foregoing, just as the interim possesses no acquired right to obtain an automatic appointment with permanent status (propiedad), neither can they claim to continue being appointed to other positions different from the one that originated their relationship. In the same line of reasoning as the decision in this resolution, ruling 00353-2010 of March 17, 2010, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in the face of similar claims, resolved: "From the evidence gathered, it is clear that the plaintiff had always been working on an interim basis at the University of Costa Rica since the year nineteen eighty-five. However, this does not give her the right to be considered an indefinite-term servant; for she continues to be an interim, and has not acquired the rights of stability, of tenure (inamovibilidad), or the administrative career. The Constitutional Chamber in ruling 1119-90 at 2:00 p.m. on September 18, 1990, stated in this regard: '...It should be recalled that the immediate effect of the transformation of the nature of the contract (it refers to a fixed-term indefinite contract), is not the acquisition of the rights of stability, of tenure (inamovibilidad), and the administrative career, but solely the mere payment of the severance items of prior notice, dismissal, and termination assistance, once the termination of functions is agreed...' (See also on this same subject rulings nos. 1696-92 and 1490-96 at three thirty p.m. on August twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two, and at ten twenty-four a.m. on November first, nineteen ninety-six, respectively, of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and No. 40-1996 at ten a.m. on February second, 1996, of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice). Thus, the rights of an interim official are comparable to those of career officials, or as they have been called in our country with permanent status (propiedad), excluding the right to the position, or also called that of stability and tenure (inamovilidad); but merely by the passage of time occupying a public position, without the legal procedures provided for this, they are not entitled to remain in it..." The limits of the nature of said appointment do not constrain administrative discretion in the matter nor impose objective and temporal indeterminacy of their right. In light of the foregoing, it has been stated that “there are no acquired rights against the organizational power of the Administration... there are no acquired rights against the rules governing the internal regime of the Administration.” (PALOMAR OLMEDA, Alberto. Derecho de la Función Pública. Régimen Jurídico de los Funcionarios Públicos, Madrid, second edition, Editorial DYKINSON, S.L., 1992, p. 38). Once the cause of the original appointment has ended, the right ceases, without prejudice to the right to opt again under new conditions for another position. There is no right to be appointed in the Public Administration that can be considered abstract and intangible and that is detached from a specific position in which the existence of a right in their favor is alleged and demonstrated. Therefore, this claim must be rejected.

VIII.- As a third claim, the plaintiff requests the payment of lost wages from March 7, 2010, onward. In this regard, it must be taken into consideration that, as previously stated, as of March 16, 2010, the position held by the plaintiff was occupied by its permanent holder (titular) with permanent status (propiedad), Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas, as a general assistant physician G-1. For this reason, it is evident that just as the plaintiff could not aspire to have a right to continue being appointed to that position as of that date or to another similar post, neither could the plaintiff claim that her salary should have continued to be paid to her as of March 16, 2010, since as of that date any right regarding the respective appointment ceased. The possibility that the plaintiff be paid back pay (salarios caídos) as a form of compensation is an immediate consequence of one of two scenarios: either she was not paid despite being in a subjective legal situation that obligated it, or an administrative action was annulled, bringing as a consequence the restoration of the affected party's condition to a state similar to that which they would have enjoyed had the annulled action not existed in the legal system. In the case under review, we are not, in principle, in either of these scenarios. The plaintiff is not in a subjective legal situation in which she can wield a right that results in the payment of back pay (salarios caídos) to date, given that the condition that generated any right in her favor ceased on March 16, 2010, with the permanent holder (titular) of the position's arrival at his post. Neither did the plaintiff request the annulment of any administrative action nor did she assert the claim as a consequence of the restoration of a particular legal situation that she demonstrated was violated. Consequently, it must be understood that she has no right whatsoever to claim wages from the indicated date onward. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it must be taken into consideration that although by resolution at four fifteen p.m. on February seventeenth, two thousand ten, it was ordered to dismiss Ms. Campos Vallejos without employer liability, and therefore she was paid the respective salary through March 7, 2010, in a resolution at three p.m. on October nineteenth, two thousand ten, of the General Directorate of Social Adaptation, it was ordered to modify the sanction imposed on the plaintiff to a three-day suspension without pay. Given the foregoing, and taking into consideration that this last act has retroactive effects (Art. 142 LGAP), for this Court it is evident that between March 7, 2010, and March 16 of that year, the plaintiff should have been paid her salary, necessarily deducting, however, the three days of suspension subject to the sanction modified on October nineteenth, 2010. This is because the original resolution establishing the plaintiff's dismissal without employer liability only became final (firmeza) through resolution 02-2011 at eight a.m. on January fifth, two thousand eleven, of the Minister of Justice and Peace. Although the execution of the dismissal administrative act at the time was not unlawful (given what is set forth in Article 148 LGAP), it is evident that what was subsequently decided and the reduction of the sanction implied that the plaintiff's salary should have continued to be paid at the time, notwithstanding which, the demonstrated arrival of the permanent holder (titular) of the position, as stated, had an interrupting effect on any possibility of continuity for her as general assistant physician Nombre1620. Therefore, if from March 7 to March 16, 2010, there are 9 days that should have been paid, deducting the 3-day sanction, payment to the plaintiff of 6 days of unpaid wages would be appropriate, in accordance with the reasoning employed above.

IX.- As a fourth claim, the plaintiff requests compensation for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) in the amount of fifteen million colones. In this regard, as has been stated, no nullity defects have been alleged in the formal administrative actions demonstrated at trial, nor is there evidence to that effect. Neither is an abnormal functioning of the Administration that would entail the recognition of liability for moral damages (daño moral) on the part of the plaintiff determined. It is again stated, the cessation of her employment relationship did not originate as of March 16, 2010, due to the employer's will, but rather due to the arrival of the permanent holder (titular) of the position, which has as its natural consequence the displacement of the interim official from the same. No illegality has been demonstrated in the decision made by administrative act that modified the provisions of the resolution at four fifteen p.m. on February seventeenth, two thousand ten, with respect to Ms. Campos Vallejos, and its execution was in accordance with the provisions of Article 148 of the General Law of Public Administration. Therefore, since the existence of unlawful or abnormal conduct generating administrative liability has not been demonstrated, this claim must be rejected.

X.- In a subsidiary manner, the plaintiff requests the payment of prior notice (preaviso), termination assistance (auxilio de cesantía), and any other unpaid emolument. Regarding the payment of prior notice (preaviso), it must be taken into consideration that it is based on the need to avoid an untimely unilateral severance of the employment relationship. Article 28 of the Labor Code provides for the payment of this item and establishes as a condition: "terminating the employment contract without just cause," unlike termination assistance (auxilio de cesantía), which, in addition to the above, provides for other causes, such as those inserted in Article 83 of the Labor Code or another cause beyond the worker's control. Therefore, when Article 85 ibidem indicates that there are causes that terminate the employment contract without extinguishing the worker's rights to claim the payment of benefits that may correspond to them, it is clear that prior notice (preaviso) is not among them, as it corresponds only in the case of dismissal without just cause. In the case under review, it is noted that, as indicated, the severance of the employment relationship was due to the fact that the position the plaintiff held on an interim basis was occupied by its permanent holder (titular) with permanent status (propiedad). In this vein, it must be recalled that in public employment matters, the service relationship may be severed either by a duly motivated cause based on unlawful conduct by the official, by forced reduction of services (restructuring), promotion or transfer to another position, or by the fulfillment of the condition giving rise to the appointment, such as the appointment to a position on an interim basis due to vacancy or temporary absence of the permanent holder (titular) or the expiration of the appointment term (the case of officials by popular election). Thus, the advent of the permanent holder (titular) of the position to a place that was being occupied by an interim is a just cause for termination of the employment contract and, consequently, in accordance with the provisions indicated above, the corresponding prior notice (preaviso) payment would not be appropriate. In the case of the plaintiff, her appointment must be considered a conditional act (Art. 132.4 LGAP), so that once the condition is fulfilled—return of the permanent holder (titular) of the position—the appointment disappears, not by the employer's will, but rather due to an objective reason extraneous to it, and where there is a just cause that motivates the cessation of the relationship. Therefore, the rejection of the claim for payment of prior notice (preaviso) is appropriate. In the foregoing line of reasoning, given what has been indicated regarding the reason for the cessation of the employment relationship and given that the plaintiff did not demonstrate unlawfulness in the Administration's conduct nor did she object to any act, limiting herself to making mere invocations regarding what she considered her right, the payment of termination assistance (auxilio de cesantía) is inappropriate, since such payment applies in cases of a unilateral and unmotivated decision to sever an employment relationship, which did not occur in the present case, given that it happened due to the return of Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas to his position as general assistant physician G-1.

Thus, this aspect of the claim must be dismissed.

**XI.-** This Court deems it appropriate to advise the Human Resources Unit of the Ministry of Justice and Peace that the plaintiff has a right to have the effective, final disciplinary measure (sanción) that was imposed on her recorded in all records, both physical and electronic, as well as in any certificates and certifications issued, eliminating any reference to the disciplinary measure that was eventually rendered void, given that she was not dismissed, but rather the employment relationship was terminated due to the proven arrival of the permanent holder of the position. By reason of the foregoing, the Minister of Justice and Peace and said administrative unit must take note of what is set forth in this considering clause for their respective responsibilities. Should any outdated record exist in that regard, it must be removed from her personnel file so as not to cause further labor and personal harm to the plaintiff.

**XII.- Interest and indexation**: **XII.I.-** Regarding the request for the recognition of interest, it is granted, and the State is ordered to pay interest, in accordance with Article one thousand one hundred sixty-three of the Civil Code, from the moment the corresponding sums should have been paid until their effective payment. **XII.II.-** As for indexation, it is imposed ex officio in accordance with Article one hundred twenty-three of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code. This constitutes a recognition of the loss of the purchasing power of money. If it were not granted, the plaintiff would be receiving less money (in terms of its purchasing power), so that on the amounts established in this decision, the recognition of this benefit is applicable from the moment the decision that sets them becomes final (firmeza) until definitive payment.

**XIII.- Defenses:** **XIII.I.-** Regarding the defense of lack of interest raised, it has already been resolved. **XIII.II.-** Regarding the defense of payment, it must be accepted only with respect to the payment of paid leave (vacaciones), Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), and school salary (salario escolar). **XIII.III.-** Regarding the defense of lack of right, it is partially accepted and dismissed only with respect to the payment of wages for six days.

**XIV.- Costs:** Article 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a ruling that must even be made ex officio, pursuant to section 119.2 thereof (ibídem). As the defendant is not within the grounds for exemption from such costs, its order to pay them is applicable as requested by the plaintiff. It is worth remembering that every proceeding generates expenses for the party and their recognition for the victorious party depends on the order to pay costs. In this case, to obtain her right regarding the five unpaid days, the plaintiff legitimately resorted to the courts, which obliges its recognition in the judgment.

**POR TANTO** The defense of lack of right is partially dismissed regarding the payment of wages for six days. The defense of lack of interest is accepted regarding claim number 1 of the lawsuit, as is the defense of payment regarding the payment of paid leave, Christmas bonus, and school salary. In all other respects, the defense of lack of right is accepted. Consequently, the lawsuit is partially granted as will be indicated, with the understanding that it is dismissed where not expressly indicated. Therefore, the State is ordered to pay the amount corresponding to the payment of six days of wages not received by the plaintiff. Said sum shall be liquidated in the judgment enforcement stage. On that item, indexation is recognized in accordance with Article one hundred twenty-three of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, from the moment the decision that sets it becomes final until definitive payment. The State is ordered to pay interest on the sum subject to judgment, in accordance with Article one thousand one hundred sixty-three of the Civil Code, from the moment the corresponding sums should have been paid until their effective payment. Costs are to be borne by the State. The Ministry of Justice and Peace shall take note of what is indicated in considering clause number XI.- Judge Espinoza Salas issues a dissenting vote.

**Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo** **Grace Loaiza Sánchez** **Carlos Espinoza Salas** **DISSENTING VOTE** Respectfully, I depart from the majority vote of my colleagues, solely with regard to the denial of the items relating to notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía), concurring with all other aspects of the ruling. In that sense, the undersigned grants the claim regarding said labor items, awarding the corresponding notice (preaviso) and the labor severance pay (cesantía) for the time the plaintiff worked for the Ministry of Justice and Grace, the amounts of which shall be determined in the judgment enforcement stage. This is so because, as was reliably proven, Miss Campos Vallejos was terminated without employer liability as of March 8, 2010, a situation for which there was no merit, which turns the removal into a dismissal with employer liability, because it occurred before the permanent holder of the position was reinstated to his permanent post and because the Administration itself acknowledged the error it incurred. The State having annulled the dismissal automatically turns the cessation of the post into a removal with employer liability, so the plaintiff must be recognized severance pay (cesantía) and notice (preaviso). This is demonstrated by the fact that the State, without the decision of 4:15 p.m. on February 17, 2010, being final, terminated the plaintiff from the position she had been holding as general assistant physician Name1620 in the Ministry of Justice and Peace, which constitutes the breaking of the employment relationship with employer liability, since it occurred before the permanent holder returned to his position. Furthermore, it must be considered that the plaintiff was not reinstated prior to the permanent holder's return, and although the Administration later annulled said termination, the harmful effects of the dismissal had already been consummated, and such unilateral conduct by the State cannot be dictated to the detriment of the plaintiff's labor rights, nor can the Administration benefit from its own carelessness, negligence, and nullity defects it incurred, which led it to issue such a vexatious act against the plaintiff's labor rights. Although the termination is nullified, the defendant must assume the payment of the labor rights, since the plaintiff was never reinstated and the termination was carried out illegally by the State before the permanent holder of the position returned, which undoubtedly constitutes the obligation to pay notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía), due to the termination of the employment relationship with employer liability, given the State unilaterally accepted that there was no merit for the dismissal. Such a situation is proven by the fact that the State annulled the plaintiff's termination by resolution 381-2010 of eight hours on August fourth, two thousand ten, but without reinstating her prior to the permanent holder's return, nor paying her labor rights, but rather improperly called the permanent holder of the position, waited for him to return, in order to take advantage of that situation to deny the payment of notice and severance pay, a situation that cannot be admitted, as it implies a clear violation of the plaintiff's legitimate labor claims, unjust enrichment, and conduct harmful to the plaintiff's asset rights.

**Carlos Espinoza Salas**

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Central 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Correo Electrónico ...01 Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Dirección05 ( ) ACTOR: María Jimena Campos Vallejos DEMANDADO: El Estado No. 61- 2013-IV.

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN CUARTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, Dirección04 , a las dieciseis horas con veinticinco minutos del veintiseis de junio del año dos mil trece.

Proceso de Conocimiento interpuesto por la señor a María Jimena Campos Vallejo, mayor de edad, soltera, Médico , vecina de Goicochea , portadora de la cédula de identidad número CED88725- - , representada en audiencia de juicio por Nombre112145 , mayor de edad, casado en primeras nupcias, vecino de Tibás, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED88726- - , en su condición de Apoderado Especial Judicial, contra El Estado, representado por Nombre17426 , mayor de edad, abogada, vecina de San José, en su condición de Procuradora Adjunta.-

RESULTANDO

1.- Que el día 1 4 de setiembre del año 201 0, la parte actora interpone demanda y de conformidad con la ratificación hecha en la audiencia preliminar, solicita: 1) Se ordene al Ministerio de Justicia informar sobre lo sucedido con respecto a recurso de revocatoria con apelación opuesto contra la resolución de 15:00 horas de 19 de octubre de 2010, que es resolución que aplica una sanción disciplinaria de suspensión por tres días sin goce de salario. 2) En caso de que no se encuentre firme la anterior resolución, se le restituya en el puesto de médico general G1 en cualquier plaza como interino. 3) Se le realice el pago de salarios dejados de percibir a partir del 7 de marzo de 2010. 4) Se indemnice el daño moral subjetivo por la suma de quince millones de colones 5) Se condene al Estado al pago de intereses y costas procesales y personales. Asimismo en audiencia de juicio, la parte solicita como pretensión subsidiaria se condene al Estado al pago de preaviso y auxilio de cesantía y cualquier otro emolumento no pagado.

2.- Que corrido el traslado de rigor mediante resolución de diez horas y treinta y cinco minutos del veintiuno de febrero de dos mil once, la representación del Estado rechazó la demanda y opuso las defensas de falta de interés, pago y de falta de derecho, así como solicitó la condena en costas. (folio 084 del expediente judicial) 3.- Que a las ocho horas y cincuenta minutos del diecinueve de noviembre de dos mil doce, se realizó audiencia preliminar en el presente proceso con la presencia de los representantes de las partes. Se señala los hechos controvertidos. Se indica que no hay defensas previas y se admite como prueba la declaración de parte de la actora. (folios 232a 234 del expediente judicial) 4.- Que a las ocho horas con treinta minutos del día veinte de junio del año dos mil trece, se realizó la audiencia de juicio oral y pública en el presente proceso, con la presencia de las partes y sus abogados y ante el mismo Tribunal que dicta la sentencia.

5.- Que en los procedimientos ante este Tribunal no se han observado nulidades que deban ser subsanadas y la sentencia se dicta dentro del plazo establecido al efecto por el numeral 111.1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, previa deliberación y por ,mayoría .- Redacta el Juez Campos Hidalgo

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Hechos probados: De esta naturaleza, y de importancia para la resolución del asunto, durante el proceso han quedado demostrados los siguientes:

I.I.- Que la Señora María Jimena Campos Vallejos fue nombrada de manera interina a partir del 4 de agosto de 2008 como médico asistente general Nombre1620 en el Ministerio de Justicia y Paz, específicamente en el Centro denominado El Buen Pastor,en sustitución del Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas y por el tiempo en que éste disfrutare de ascenso interino (folios 37,38, 88, 39, 153 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca) I.II.- Que mediante resolución 002-146-2009 de 8:30 horas de 11 de setiembre de 2009, se le instauró un procedimiento administrativo a la actora (folio 33 a 40 del expediente administrativo disciplinario) I.III.- Que mediante resolución 012-146-2009 de once horas de veintiséis de enero de dos mil diez el Organo Director del Procedimiento Administrativo recomendó despedir sin responsabilidad patronal a la actora (folios 99 a 109 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca) I.IV.- Que mediante resolución de las dieciseis horas quince minutos del día diecisiete de febrero de dos mil diez se dispuso despedir sin responsabilidad patronal a la señora Campos Vallejos (folios 99 a 109 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca y 223 a 235 del expediente administrativo disciplinario) I.V.- Que a la actora se le cesó sin responsabilidad patronal con motivo de la resolución de las dieciseis horas quince minutos del día diecisiete de febrero de dos mil diez a partir del 7 de marzo de 2010 (folio 128 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca) I.VI.- Que mediante oficio DRH-PCAL-107-10 de 23 de febrero de 2010 se le comunica a la actora su despido sin responsabilidad patronal a partir del 8 de marzo de dicho año, posterior al disfrute de los 11 días de vacaciones profilácticas que le corresponden. Asimismo, se le indica que la eventual interposición de recursos no apareja la suspensión del acto ordenado, por lo que debe acogerse a la sanción impuesta (folios 117 y 118 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca) I.VII.- Que mediante oficio D.G.846.2010 de 10 de marzo de 2010 se le indica al Director de Recursos Humanos de la Dirección General de Adaptación Social que se haga el trámite de cese del Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas como Supervisor Médico Regional G.4, con el fin de que regrese a su cargo como médico asistente general G-1, a partir del 16 de marzo del 2010. En razón de lo anterior, mediante oficio DRH-CGAC-0127-2010 de 11 de marzo de 2010 se le indica al indicado médico el cese de su ascenso interino, siendo este el motivo del cese del nombramiento interino de la actora. (folio 48, 49 y 214 del expediente judicial, declaración de parte de la actora) I.VIII.- Que mediante resolución de nueve horas de nueve de marzo de 2010 de la Dirección General de Adaptación Social se rechazó recurso de revocatoria de la actora contra la resolución de diecisiete de febrero de dos mil diez (folio 264 a 281 del expediente administrativo disciplinario) I.IX.- Que mediante resolución 177-2010 de ocho horas de doce de abril de dos mil diez del Ministro de Justicia y Gracia se rechaza recurso de apelación opuesto por la actora contra la resolución de las dieciseis horas quince minutos del día diecisiete de febrero de dos mil diez por estimarse extemporáneo (folios 135 a 137 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca, 299 a 301 del expediente del procedimiento administrativo) I.X.- Que mediante resolución número 235-2010 de once horas y quince minutos del doce de mayo de dos mil diez se dispuso acoger parcialmente reclamo interpuesto por la actora y ordenar el giro de la suma de doscientos cuarenta y tres mil ciento sesenta y seis colones con diecisiete céntimos por concepto de vacaciones. Asimismo, se dispuso el pago de aguinaldo proporcional y salario escolar y se rechazó el pago de auxilio de cesantía y preaviso.(folios 7 a 11 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca) I.XI.- Que mediante resolución N. 365-2010 de diez horas treinta minutos del cinco de agosto se rechazó recurso de reposición interpuesto por la actora contra la resolución número 235-2010 de once horas y quince minutos del doce de mayo de dos mil diez (folios 22 a 26 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca) I.XII.- Que mediante resolución 391-2010 de ocho horas de cuatro de agosto de dos mil diez se anuló totalmente la resolución de las dieciseis horas quince minutos del día diecisiete de febrero de dos mil diez y los actos subsecuentes (folios 158 a 164 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca, 312 a 318 del expediente administrativo disciplinario) I.XIII.- Que mediante nota de fecha 9 de agosto de 2010, la actora solicitó a la Unidad de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Justicia y Paz que se le proceda a restituirla en su puesto, dado lo resuelto en la resolución 391-2010 de ocho horas de cuatro de agosto de dos mil diez. En razón de lo anterior, mediante oficio DGIRH-PGAL-0387-10 de 12 de agosto de 2010 se le indicó que lo pedido no era posible dado que el titular de la plaza respectiva la está ocupando nuevamente a partir del 15 de marzo de dicho año. (folios 166 y 171 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca, 323 y 324 del expediente administrativo disciplinario) I.XIV.- Que mediante resolución de quince horas del diecinueve de octubre de dos mil diez de la Dirección General de Adaptación Social se dispuso modificar la sanción impuesta a la actora a una suspensión sin goce de salario por tres días (folios 223 a 234, 236 a 247 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca, 330 a 341 del expediente administrativo disciplinario) I.XV.- Que mediante oficio DGIRH-PGAL-0515-10 de 25 de octubre de 2010 el Coordinador del Proceso Gestión del Ambiente Laboral comunica a la actora la sanción impuesta y le indica que contra lo resuelto procede el recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio (folio 252 del expediente administrativo carpeta blanca, 342 del expediente administrativo disciplinario) I.XVII.- Que mediante resolución 02-2011 de ocho horas de cinco de enero de dos mil once del Ministro de Justicia y Paz se resolvió recurso de apelación interpuesto por la actora contra la resolución de quince horas del diecinueve de octubre de dos mil diez de la Dirección General de Adaptación Social. En dicha resolución se dispuso lo siguiente: "Rechazar en todos sus extremos el recurso de apelación interpuesto por la doctora María Jimena Campos Vallejos, contra la resolución de las quince horas del diecinueve de octubre del dos mil diez, emitida por la Dirección General de Adaptación Social, mediante la cual se le impuso una sanción disciplinaria consistente en la suspensión de sus labores por tres días sin goce de salario. Sin embargo, existe imposibilidad material de aplicar dicha sanción, en virtud de que la doctora Campos Vallejos dejó de laborar para la institución a partir del 08 de marzo de 2010, por haber regresado el titular de la plaza que ocupaba en forma interina, desde el 08 de agosto de 2008". Dicha resolución fue notificada a la actora el día 15 de febrero de 2011 (folios 121 a 133 del expediente judicial) I.XVIII.- Que a la actora se le pagó el salario respectivo hasta el día 7 de marzo de 2010 (folio 57 del expediente judicial) I.XIX.- Que al mes de noviembre de 2010 aún las constancias y certificaciones emitidas por el Ministerio de Justicia y Gracia hacían constar que la actora fue despedida por responsabilidad patronal (folio 41 a 45 y 57 del expediente judicial) I.XX.- Que a la actora se le hizo pago mediante transferencia de lo reconocido mediante número 235-2010 de once horas y quince minutos del doce de mayo de dos mil diez, según certificación 02-2010 de veintiséis de noviembre de dos mil diez del Director Financiero del Ministerio de Justicia y Paz (folio 39 del expediente judicial) II.- Hechos No probados: Se han tenido los siguientes de importancia:

II.I.- Que el Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas haya sido llamado a volver a su plaza original en el Dirección13480 dentro de un contexto persecutorio o de interés de afectar a la actora del presente proceso.

II.II.- Que a la actora se le hayan rechazado nombramientos en otros entes públicos, con motivo de información errónea emitida o suministrada por el Ministerio de Justicia y Paz sobre la sanción que le fue impuesta.

II.III.- Que el Estado haya hecho pagado de los extremos laborales de preaviso y auxilio de cesantía que le correspondían a la actora.

II.IV.- Que existan plazas vacantes en el Ministerio de Justicia y Paz de médico asistente general Nombre1620 III.- Argumentos de las partes: Con motivo del presente proceso, las partes han expresado los siguientes alegatos de relevancia a fin de ser tomados en consideración para su debida resolución en sentencia:

III.I.- Argumentos de la parte actora: La representación de la parte actora, expresa las siguientes consideraciones de fondo, con respecto a las pretensiones:

III.I.I.- Que la actora fue cesada sin responsabilidad patronal, siendo así que con posterioridad se redujo la sanción a tres días de suspensión sin goce de salario.

III.I.II.- Que no obstante lo anterior, la Administración llamó al médico titular de la plaza que ella ocupaba con el fin de cesar su nombramiento de manera indirecta.

III.I.III.- Que en los registros del Ministerio de Justicia aún consta que la actora fue despedida por lo que ha significado que no se le contrate o prorrogue nombramientos en otros entes públicos.

III.I.IV.- Que la parte actora desconoce el resultado de su recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra la resolución que le impuso la suspensión de tres días sin goce de salario.

III.I.V.- Que el cese en su nombramiento, provocó a la actora graves daños materiales y morales.

III.I.VI.- Que a la actora se le dejó en indefensión,dado que entre el tiempo del cese del nombramiento y la resolución de suspensión no se le nombró a la actora en plaza alguna, situación que se mantiene en el tiempo.

III.II.- Argumentos del Estado: La Procuradora representante del Estado expresa las siguientes consideraciones de fondo:

III.II.I.- Que a la actora se le notificó sobre lo resuelto con respecto a su recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra la resolución de quince horas de diecinueve de octubre de dos mil diez.

III.II.II.- Que el cese de la relación de empleo de la actora lo fue con motivo de la vuelta a su cargo, del titular del cargo, no correspondiendo a un despido por voluntad patronal.

III.II.III.- Que no hay prueba de las afirmaciones de la actora respecto de la existencia de errores en la información suministrada por el Ministerio de Justicia sobre el motivo de cese de la relación de empleo de la actora ni de que los mismos hayan significado que no se le contrate o prorrogue nombramientos en otros entes públicos.

III.II.IV.- Que la actora no tiene derecho al cobro de salarios dejados de percibir, dado que no fue cesada por voluntad patronal.

III.II.V.- Que a la actora no le asiste el derecho al cobro de daños y perjuicios.

IV.- Del objeto del proceso: De lo expresado por las partes, tanto en sus pretensiones como argumentos, el objeto del presente proceso estriba en determinar si se ha generado responsabilidad con motivo del cese de la actora en la plaza que ocupaba en el Ministerio de Justicia y Gracia, así como la procedencia de su restitución a la misma.

V.- Sobre la falta de interés alegada :Como primera pretensión, la parte actora solicita se ordene al Ministerio de Justicia informar sobre lo sucedido con respecto a recurso de revocatoria con apelación opuesto contra la resolución de 15:00 horas de 19 de octubre de 2010. Al respecto, se ha tenido por demostrado que mediante resolución 02-2011 de ocho horas de cinco de enero de dos mil once del Ministro de Justicia y Paz se resolvió recurso de apelación interpuesto, siendo así que dicha resolución fue notificada a la actora el día 15 de febrero de 2011, cuando ya estaba interpuesto el respectivo proceso de conocimiento. En razón de lo anterior, es evidente para este Colegio que en el caso en examen opera una falta de interés actual con respecto a esta pretensión, dado que lo pedido ya fue resuelto oportunamente en sede administrativa y por consiguiente, procede acoger la defensa del Estado en tal sentido.

VI.- En Costa Rica el servidor público se encuentra sometido a un régimen particular, diferenciado del trabajador privado, y del cual dimanan una serie de derechos y obligaciones específicas. Los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política es la base fundamental para establecer tal distinción, al establecer lo siguiente: “Artículo 191.- Un estatuto de servicio civil regulará las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, con el propósito de garantizar la eficiencia de la administración” y “Artículo 192.- Con las excepciones que esta Constitución y el estatuto de servicio civil determinen, los servidores públicos serán nombrados a base de idoneidad comprobada y sólo podrán ser removidos por las causales de despido justificado que exprese la legislación de trabajo, o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, ya sea por falta de fondos o para conseguir una mejor organización de los mismos”. De conformidad con las indicadas normas de rango constitucional se evidencia que el servidor del Estado y sus Instituciones, goza de los derechos de una regulación normativa propia, estabilidad en el empleo - limitando el régimen de libre remoción propio de la regulación laboral privada- y de una carrera administrativa, junto con los demás garantías existentes para las personas amparadas a un régimen de subordinación, como son el pago de un salario, vacaciones, jornadas máximas, huelga, etc. (haciendo la salvedad del derecho a la negociación colectiva, exclu ida por votos 4453-2000 y 9690-2000 de la Sala Constitucional). Correlativo con las anteriores derechos, el servidor público posee una serie de obligaciones de carácter funcionarial, inherentes a los fines públicos buscados con su actividad y que deben orientar siempre su gestión, a fin de no incurrir en una falta personal generadora de responsabilidad disciplinaria. Sin pretender ser exhaustivos, algunos de los deberes propios del régimen de empleo público, son: a) deber de probidad (art. 3 Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Administración Pública), b) deber de cumplimiento de los principios del servicio público - continuidad, eficiencia, adaptación al cambio en el régimen legal e igualdad de trato- (art. 4 Ley General de la Administración Pública), c) deber de cautelar un adecuado ambiente de control interno (art. 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno) d) deber de proteger el interés superior de los niños y las niñas (art. 4 y 5 del Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) e) deber de cumplir el ordenamiento jurídico (art. 13 y concordantes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, art. 39.a del Estatuto de Servicio Civil), f) deber de dar pronta respuesta e información al usuario (art. 5 y 10 de la Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos), g) deber de obediencia (art. 108 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), h) deber de actuar con eficacia (art. 5 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos) i) deber de guardar decoro y de brindar debida atención al usuario (art. 114 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y art. 39. d) y e) del Estatuto de Servicio Civil) j) deber de responder en caso de haber actuado con dolo o culpa grave (art. 199 y 211 Ley General de la Administración Pública) k) deber de acatar la Constitución Política (art. 11 de dicho cuerpo normativo). Adicionalmente, de manera supletoria, con base en el artículo 9 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 51 del indicado Estatuto, le son aplicables a dicha relación de empleo público, las disposiciones propias del Código de Trabajo y demás disposiciones relacionadas con la relación de trabajo, como por empleo la Ley de Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia, Ley de Regulación del Fumado, Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para Personas con Discapacidad, entre otras. En este orden de ideas, si bien en materia de empleo público no podemos hablar de una plena integración del ordenamiento jurídico y principios en materia laboral habida cuenta de la existencia de una relación estatutaria y no contractual, (artículo 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), no puede obviarse la existencia de líneas generales de orientación de la relación que son comunes, como por ejemplo, la aplicación del principio de buena fe entre ambas partes, contemplado en el artículo 19 del Código de Trabajo. Con relación al régimen disciplinario a aplicar en caso de incumplimiento de dichos deberes, de conformidad con sendos votos de la Sala Constitucional, el principio de tipicidad se torna más laxo, por lo que no se requiere una específica tipificación legal de la conducta, dada la naturaleza misma de la situación jurídica de los servidores. En este sentido, el voto 2007-013903 de las quince horas y veinticinco minutos del tres de octubre del dos mil siete de la Sala Constitucional, indica lo siguiente: "V.- Sobre el principio de tipicidad en el régimen disciplinario.- El principio de tipicidad es una aplicación del principio de legalidad que exige por un lado, la delimitación concreta de las conductas que se hacen reprochables a efectos de su sanción, y por otro lado, la delimitación concreta de las posibles sanciones a aplicar, pudiendo afirmarse que el principio de tipicidad constituye un principio fundamental en la responsabilidad disciplinaria. En cuanto a la delimitación concreta de la conducta reprochable, esta Sala ha sostenido en anteriores oportunidades (ver al respecto la resolución 2005-06616 de las veinte horas con cincuenta y ocho minutos del treinta y uno de mayo del dos mil cinco y 94-5594 de las quince horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del veintisiete de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro) que aunque ciertamente este principio en esta materia no tiene la misma forma que en el ámbito jurídico- penal -ya que puede sancionarse discrecionalmente las faltas no previstas literalmente- siempre debe entenderse que estas faltas están incluidas en el texto. Es decir, puede sancionarse discrecionalmente las faltas no previstas literalmente, pero que se entienden incluidas en el texto y siempre y cuando resulten de la comprobación de la falta disciplinaria, mediante un procedimiento creado al efecto . Ahora bien, en cuanto a la delimitación concreta de la sanción, a diferencia de lo que se viene de decir, ésta sí debe estar clara y previamente establecida, sin que pueda la Administración crear sanciones nuevas que no estén contempladas en las normas aplicables. En resumen, aunque se infiere que los hechos determinantes de las faltas disciplinarias son innumerables -pues dependen de la índole de los comportamientos o conductas de los sujetos- y que los principios "nullum crimen sine lege", "nullum poena sine lege" no tienen la rigidez y exigencia que les caracteriza en el derecho penal sustantivo, siempre es necesario en materia disciplinaria, en atención al principio de tipicidad, que la conducta se infiera del texto normativo y que la sanción esté –está si- claramente preestablecida". Lo anterior genera lo que en doctrina es conocido como el principio de tipificación relativa en el entendido que la falta debe estar prevista en el ordenamiento disciplinario, pero sin el nivel de rigurosidad propio de la materia penal en cuanto se derive de la relación de servicio en concreto. En razón de lo anterior, son sancionables, tanto el incumplimiento de los deberes funcionales generales, como las conductas tipificadas legalmente (a nivel de Estatuto de Servicio Civil, normas estatutarias propias del régimen o Código de Trabajo, por ejemplo), y aquellas que se encuentren contempladas en normas de carácter inferior, como las contenidas en los reglamentos autónomos de servicio o en los casos en los cuales la tipificación se de con respecto a la sanción a imponer. Esta tipificación relativa flexibiliza la necesidad de normas positiva en carácter de ley formal, siendo posible que su regulación se genere por norma positiva de menor rango. Las anteriores consideraciones, sin perjuicio de que existen una serie de principios del derecho sancionatorio derivados del derecho penal, de necesario cumplimiento en todos los casos, v.g. proporcionalidad, non bis in idem, inocencia, debido proceso, debida fundamentación de la resolución respectiva. En este orden de ideas, es de advertir que en materia de definición de conductas que pueden ser consideradas como parte de los deberes propios de los funcionarios públicos u objeto de sanción en caso de incumplimiento, nuestro país posee un sistema difuso, habida cuenta que las mismas no se encuentran detalladas en un solo cuerpo normativo, sino dispersas entre diferentes normas de distinto rango, privando mayor especificidad en las normas reglamentarias que cada ente opte por dictar, según el artículo 27 del Reglamento del Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Lo anterior, de conformidad con las potestades auto normativas de la Administración Pública, y habida cuenta de la imposibilidad de que por la vía legal se puedan normar todas y cada una de las conductas concretas en que incurren los servidores públicos, y en el entendido de que el ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria se encuentra limitado por el marco general del ordenamiento supra legal. De manera transversal a este conjunto de principios y normas de diferente rango, en esta materia encontramos el interés público como un referente constante en la adopción de cualquier decisión o conducta formal o informal de la Administración con respecto a sus servidores. Dicho interés entendido de conformidad con el artículo 113 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, dispone: "1. El servidor público deberá desempeñar sus funciones de modo que satisfagan primordialmente el interés público, el cual será considerado como la expresión de los intereses individuales coincidentes de los administrados. 2. El interés público prevalecerá sobre el interés de la Administración Pública cuando pueda estar en conflicto. 3. En la apreciación del interés público se tendrá en cuenta, en primer lugar, los valores de seguridad jurídica y justicia para la comunidad y el individuo, a los que no puede en ningún caso anteponerse la mera conveniencia". En razón de lo anterior, todo análisis en materia de empleo público no debe obviar el análisis del cumplimiento del interés público en la adopción de la respectiva decisión administrativa, como fundamental referente de su motivación subyacente.

VII.- Sobre el fondo: Como segunda pretensión la parte actora solicita que e n caso de que no se encuentre firme la resolución de 15:00 horas de 19 de octubre de 2010 del Ministro de Justicia y Gracia, se le restituya en el puesto de médico general G1 en cualquier plaza como interino. Al respecto, en primer término, debe tomarse en consideración que lo resuelto se encuentra firme y no fue objetado en sede jurisdiccional por la parte actora. En este orden de ideas, como se advierte la suspensión de tres días sin goce de salario a la actora, aquella fue resuelta mediante un acto administrativo formal por parte de la Administración, sobre el cual, la representación de la Señora Campos Vallejos no realizó ningún alegato de vicio de nulidad en su contra como parte de sus pretensiones. Más bien, debe tomarse en consideración que en audiencia preliminar, su representación indicó que no tenía una petición de regresar al cargo que ocupaba (por tal motivo se excluyó como demandado al titular del mismo, Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas), dado que lo pedido es la reinstalación en cualquier plaza existente en el Ministerio. Por lo anterior, ni de manera explícita ni implícita, la parte objetó el indicado acto como tal y por consiguiente, debe entenderse la conformidad de la Señora Campos Vallejos con su validez y eficacia. Por otra parte, estima este Tribunal que no existe un derecho genérico del funcionario interino a ser nombrado en cualquier plaza que ostente tal condición, sino que su estabilidad impropia se limita a mantenerse en aquella que ocupe, hasta tanto no llegue su titular o se saque la misma a concurso para su nombramiento en propiedad (en ese sentido pueden verse, entre otras, las sentencias No. 8544-2002 de las 15 horas 24 minutos del 3 de setiembre de 2002, No. 9755-2011, dictada a las 16 horas 22 minutos del 16 de julio de 2011 y la No. 10288-2011, dictada a las 10 horas 41 minutos del 5 de agosto de 2011, todas de la Sala Constitucional). En este sentido, ha indicado la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia: "Se entiende por funcionario interino aquel que se nombra en un cargo o es asignado a un servicio por la ausencia temporal o definitiva del titular. El trabajador interino tiene conocimiento de que la estabilidad laboral de que goza es momentánea (impropia), pues esta se reduce al período que abarca su nombramiento. De manera que -en sentido estricto- no existe afinidad jurídica conceptual entre el servidor interino y el principio de estabilidad laboral, como se entiende para el caso de un funcionario público investido en propiedad. Si bien, tanto esta Sala como la Constitucional, han afirmado que el nombramiento interino no es un mecanismo legítimo para acceder a la propiedad de un puesto, ambos tribunales han sido enfáticos en reconocerle a los funcionarios y funcionarias nombradas en esa precaria condición, el derecho a una estabilidad relativa a la que también han denominado “impropia”". Voto 00385-2013 de 12 de abril de 2013. En el mismo sentido, el voto n° 9462-2002 de 14:48 horas de 1° de octubre de 2002 de la Sala Constitucional dijo:“En cuanto al derecho a la estabilidad laboral, contenido en el mismo numeral, esta Sala ha reconocido una estabilidad impropia a los funcionarios interinos, de manera que si bien es cierto que éstos no tienen un derecho subjetivo a que se les prorrogue el nombramiento en forma indefinida, si tienen derecho a que no se nombre en su lugar a otro funcionario en las mismas circunstancias, sea, en forma interina, hasta tanto la Administración no nombre -a través del procedimiento legal correspondiente- a un funcionario en propiedad o, en su caso, la plaza sea nuevamente ocupada por su titular. Debe tenerse presente que el servidor interino puede oponer su derecho frente a otro servidor interino que se pretenda nombrar en su sustitución, pero ello no implica que la Administración deba nombrarlo indefinidamente, pues vencido su plazo de nombramiento, el Estado puede prescindir de sus servicios siempre y cuando no nombre a otro funcionario interino bajo sus mismas condiciones en el puesto y especialidad”. Como se advierte, los derechos del interino están ligados de manera íntima y permanente con el destino propio de la plaza vacante en la que fue nombrado y no trascienden más allá de la misma. Por lo anterior, si la plaza vuelve a ser ocupada, sale a concurso o desaparece (por reestructuración), al fenecer la vacancia titular de la misma, fenece todo derecho de estabilidad impropia del interino per se. Así las cosas, desaparecida la condición que originalmente otorgaba la estabilidad impropia, desaparece la posibilidad del interino a reclamar la permanencia en la respectiva administración pública y si desea por continuar en la misma, deberá configurarse una nueva relación jurídica de interinazgo o propiedad diferente e independiente a la anterior. Considerar lo contrario, sería atentatorio del principio de igualdad de trato (art. 4 LGAP) para con otros sujetos que en igualdad condición de interinos estén optando por ser nombrados en cualquier alternativa de plaza que se llegue eventualmente a abrir. En el caso de análisis, se advierte que a este momento, la plaza que ocupaba la actora se encuentra ocupada por su titular en propiedad, Nombre8672. Carlos Calderón Rojas como médico asistente general G-1, a partir del 16 de marzo del 2010, por lo que no posee ningún derecho la Señora María Jimena Campos Vallejos a que se le nombre en alguna plaza de manera interina que exista en el Ministerio de Justicia y Gracia. Inclusive es de advertir que la parte actora ni siquiera se ha preocupado en demostrar la existencia de eventuales plazas vacantes en tales condiciones y que pudieran dar lugar a la posibilidad de acoger su petición, de haber demostrado que poseía un derecho en tal sentido. Por otra parte, si bien la actora alega que el Dr. Calderón Rojas no regresó voluntariamente a su plaza, sino que fue llamado a la misma por la propia Administración y así consta en autos, no hay prueba alguna de que dicha situación obedezca a un ánimo persecutorio en su contra o que el ejercicio de las potestades patronales se haya realizado en ejercicio de una desviación de poder, al buscar fines distintos con dicha conducta a los públicos que deben orientar el legítimo ejercicio del ius variandi en sede administrativa. El mero dicho de la actora en su declaración de parte no es prueba suficiente ni fundamenta de modo alguno una pretensión de reintalación genérica como la realizada. Este Tribunal estima que la actora en lo pedido obvia su condición de interina y los derechos limitados que la misma conlleva. En este orden de ideas, la doctrina ha indicado con respecto al funcionario interino que tal figura "…surge cuando no hay servidor que automáticamente ocupe el cargo vacante ni preste el servicio, al ocurrir la ausencia del servidor regular. Dado el origen del interino, el mismo es servidor necesariamente temporal y sujeto a plazo, expirado el cual cesa automáticamente en su cargo o se convierte en regular” (Eduardo Ortiz, Ortiz, Tesis de Derecho Administrativo II Primera Edición, Editorial Stradtmann, San José, Costa Rica, 2000, páginas 121 y 122). En el anterior orden de razonamientos, el voto 00318-2013 de 9:50 de 22 de marzo de 2013 de la Sala Segunda indica lo siguiente: "Dentro del régimen estatutario el nombramiento de un funcionario interino solo es permitido cuando no existe suplente, o es posible un ascenso, y es necesario cubrir la falta del titular. El trabajador o trabajadora interina tiene conocimiento de que la estabilidad laboral que goza es momentánea (impropia), pues esta se reduce al períodoque cubre su nombramiento. De manera que -en sentido estricto- no existe afinidad jurídica conceptual entre el trabajador interino y el principio de estabilidad laboral, como se entiende para el caso de un funcionario público nombrado en propiedad. .... La Sala Constitucional dispuso que en materia de interinidad los funcionarios o funcionarias gozan de estabilidad laboral impropia, que no es la misma que ostenta un trabajador o trabajadora en propiedad (sobre el tema puede consultarse la resolución número 2329, de esa Sala, de las 9:57 horas del 25 de abril de 1997). Si a un funcionario o funcionaria pública se le nombra interinamentepara desempeñar un determinado cargo y por tiempo prolongado, no implica para la Administración la obligación de nombrarlo o nombrarla en propiedad, aunque es lógico y razonable que si ha demostrado idoneidad y cumple con los requisitos del puesto, sea tomado o tomada en cuenta para el nombramiento; siendo responsable el órgano competente para nombrar de hacer la escogencia que mejor garantice el servicio público, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el numeral 192 de la Constitución Política". De conformidad con lo anterior, así como el interino no posee un derecho adquirido a obtener un nombramiento automático en propiedad, tampoco puede pretender a continuar siendo nombrado en otras plazas diferentes a las cuales se originó su relación. En el mismo orden de ideas a lo resuelto en la presente resolución, el voto 00353-2010 de 17 de marzo de 2010 de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ante pretensiones similares, resolvió: "De la prueba recabada, se desprende, que la actora había estado siempre laborando en forma interina en la Universidad de Costa Rica, desde el año mil novecientos ochenta y cinco. Sin embargo, esto no le da derecho a ser considerada como una servidora por tiempo indefinido; pues continúa siendo interina, y no ha adquirió los derechos de estabilidad, de inamovibilidad, y la carrera administrativa. La Sala Constitucional en el voto 1119-90 de las 14 horas del 18 de septiembre de 1990 al respecto dijo: “...Cabe recordar que el efecto inmediato de la transformación de la naturaleza del contrato, (se refiere de fijo a plazo indeterminado), no es la adquisición de los derechos de estabilidad, de inamovibilidad y la carrera administrativa, sino únicamente, el mero pago de los extremos de preaviso, de despido y auxilio de cesantía, una vez que se acuerde el cese de funciones...”. (Ver también sobre este mismo tema las sentencias n°s 1696-92 y 1490-96 de las quince horas treinta minutos del veintitrés de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y dos y de las diez horas veinticuatro minutos del primero de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y seis respectivamente de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y la No 40-1996 de las diez horas del dos de febrero de 1996 de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Así las cosas, los derechos de una funcionario/a interino/a, se equiparan a los/as funcionarios/as de carrera, o como se han llamado en nuestro país en propiedad, con exclusión del derecho al cargo, o llamado también al de la estabilidad e inamovilidad; pero por el sólo transcurso del tiempo ocupando un cargo público, sin los trámites legales previstos para ello, no le da derecho a permanecer en él..." Los lìmites de la naturaleza de dicho nombramiento no constriñen la discrecionalidad administrativa en la materia ni imponen indeterminación objetiva y temporal de su derecho. En orden da lo anterior se ha indicado que “no existen derechos adquiridos frente al poder organizatorio de la Administración... no existen derechos adquiridos frente a las normas reguladoras del régimen interno de la Administración.” (PALOMAR OLMEDA, Alberto. Derecho de la Función Pública. Régimen Jurídico de los Funcionarios Públicos, Madrid, segunda edición, Editorial DYKINSON, S.L., 1.992, p. 38). Fenecida la causa de nombramiento original, fenece el derecho, sin perjuicio del derecho a volver a optar en nuevas condiciones a otra plaza. No existe un derecho a ser nombrado en la Administración Publica que pueda ser considerado abstracto e intangible y que sea desvinculado de una plaza en concreto en la cual se alegue y demuestre la existencia de un derecho en su favor. Así las cosas, debe rechazarse este extremo de la demanda.

VIII.- Como tercera pretensión la parte actora solicita que s e le realice el pago de salarios dejados de percibir a partir del 7 de marzo de 2010. Al respecto, debe tomarse en consideración que tal y como se ha indicado anteriormente, a partir del día 16 de marzo de 2010, la plaza que ocupaba la actora fue ocupada por su titular en propiedad, Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas como médico asistente general G-1. En razón de lo anterior, es evidente que así como la actora no podía aspirar a tener un derecho a continuar siendo nombrada en dicha plaza a partir de dicha fecha o a otro puesto similar, tampoco podría la demandante pretender que se le debía continuar pagando su salario a partir del 16 de marzo de 2010, en tanto que a partir de esa fecha feneció todo derecho sobre el nombramiento respectivo. La posibilidad de que a modo de indemnización se le pagara la actora salarios caídos es consecuencia inmediata de alguno de dos supuestos. O no se le pagó a pesar de que se estaba en una situación jurídica subjetiva que así lo obligaba o se anuló una conducta administrativa que apareja como consecuencia el reestablecimiento de la condición del afectado por la misma a una situación tal y similar a aquel estado que habría disfrutado de no haber existido en el ordenamiento la conducta anulada. En el caso en examen no estamos en principio, en ninguno de ambos supuestos. La actora no está en una situación jurídica subjetiva en la que pueda enarbolar un derecho que devenga en el pago de salarios caídos hasta la fecha, dado que la condición que generaba cualquier derecho en su favor feneció el día 16 de marzo de 2010, con la llegada del titular de la plaza a su puesto. Tampoco la actora solicitó nulidad de conducta administrativa alguna ni esgrimió la pretensión como consecuencia del reestablecimiento de una situación jurídica en particular que haya demostrado como violentada. Por consiguiente, debe entenderse que no posee derecho alguno al reclamo de salarios a partir de la fecha indicada. No obstante lo anterior, debe tomarse en consideración que si bien mediante resolución de las dieciseis horas quince minutos del día diecisiete de febrero de dos mil diez se dispuso despedir sin responsabilidad patronal a la señora Campos Vallejos, por lo que se le pagó el salario respectivo hasta el día 7 de marzo de 2010, en resolución de quince horas del diecinueve de octubre de dos mil diez de la Dirección General de Adaptación Social se dispuso modificar la sanción impuesta a la actora a una suspensión sin goce de salario por tres días. Dado lo anterior, y tomando en consideración que este último acto posee efectos retroactivos (art. 142 LGAP), para este Tribunal es evidente que entre el día 7 de marzo de 2010 y el 16 de marzo de dicho año, se le debió haber pagado a la actora su salario, debiendo eso sí, deducir los tres días de suspensión objeto de la sanción modificada el día diecinueve de octubre de 2010. Lo anterior, en tanto que la resolución original que fijaba el despido sin responsabilidad patronal de la actora sólo adquirió firmeza mediante resolución 02-2011 de ocho horas de cinco de enero de dos mil once del Ministro de Justicia y Paz. Si bien la ejecución del acto administrativo de despido en su momento no es antijurídica (dado lo estatuído en el artículo 148 LGAP), es evidente que lo resuelto posteriormente y el rebajo de la sanción, implicó que en su momento se debió continuar pagando el salario de la actora, no obstante lo cual, la demostrada llegada del titular de la plaza, como se ha indicado, tuvo un efecto interruptor de cualquier posibilidad de continuidad de aquella como médico asistente general Nombre1620. Así las cosas, si del 7 al 16 de marzo de 2010 hay 9 días que debieron ser pagados, deduciendo la sanción de 3 días, procedería el pago a la actora de 6 días de salario dejados de pagar, de conformidad con los razonamientos empleados anteriormente.

IX.- Como cuarta pretensión la parte actora pide que s e indemnice el daño moral subjetivo por la suma de quince millones de colones. Al respecto, como se ha indicado, ni se ha alegado vicios de nulidad alguno en las conductas administrativas formales que se han demostrado en juicio, ni hay prueba en tal sentido. Tampoco se determina un funcionamiento anormal de la Administración que implique el reconocimiento de responsabilidad por daño moral en la actora. Nuevamente se indica, el cese de la relación de empleo de ésta, no se origina a partir del día 16 de marzo de 2010 por voluntad patronal, sino más bien por la llegada del titular de la plaza, lo que tiene como consecuencia natural, el desplazamiento del funcionario interino de la misma. No se ha demostrado ilegalidad en lo resuelto mediante acto administrativo que modifica lo dispuesto en la resolución de las dieciseis horas quince minutos del día diecisiete de febrero de dos mil diez, con respecto a la señora Campos Vallejos y su ejecución fue acorde con lo establecido en el artículo 148 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Así las cosas, al no demostrarse la existencia de conducta ilícita o anormal generadora de responsabilidad administrativa, procede rechazar este extremo de la demanda.

X.- De manera subsidiaria solicita la actora el pago de preaviso, auxilio de cesantía y cualquier otro emolumento no pagado. Con respecto al pago del preaviso, debe tomarse en consideración que el mismo se funda en la necesidad de evitar un rompimiento unilateral intempestivo de la relación laboral. El artículo 28 Código de Trabajo prevé el pago de este extremo y dispone como condición: "ponerle fin al contrato de trabajo sin justa causa", a diferencia del auxilio de cesantía que además de lo anterior dispone otras causas, como las insertas en el artículo 83 del Código de Trabajo u otra ajena a la voluntad del trabajador. De manera, que cuando el artículo 85 ibidem, indica que son causas que terminan con el contrato de trabajo, sin que se extingan los derechos del trabajador para reclamar el pago de prestaciones que pudieren corresponderle, es claro que dentro de ellos no se encuentra el preaviso, el que corresponde sólo en caso de despido sin justa causa. En el caso de examen se advierte que tal y como se ha indicado, el rompimiento de la relación de empleo lo fue con motivo de que la plaza que ostentaba de manera interina la actora fue ocupada por su titular en propiedad. En este orden de ideas debe recordarse que en materia de empleo público la relación de servicio puede romperse ya sea por una causal debidamente motivada en una conducta antijurídica del funcionario, por reducción forzosa de servicios (reestructuración), ascenso o traslado a otro cargo o bien, con el cumplimiento de la condición que da origen al nombramiento, como es la designación en un cargo con carácter interino por vacancia o ausencia temporal del titular o el vencimiento del término de nombramiento (caso de funcionarios de elección popular). Es así como el advenimiento del titular del cargo a una plaza que estaba siendo ocupada por un interino, es una justa causa de terminación del contrato de empleo y por consiguiente, al tenor de lo indicado ut supra, no procedería el pago del preaviso correspondiente. En el caso de la actora, su designación debe ser considerada como un acto sujeto a condición (art. 132.4 LGAP), por lo que una vez cumplida la condición - regreso del titular de la plaza- desaparece el nombramiento, no ya por voluntad patronal, sino más bien por un motivo objetivo y extraño a ésta y en donde hay una causa justa que motiva el cese de la relación. Por lo anterior, procede el rechazo de la pretensión del pago de preaviso. En el anterior orden de ideas, dado lo indicado sobre el motivo del cese de la relación de empleo y dado que la parte actora no demostró antijuricidad en la conducta de la Administración ni objetó acto alguno, limitándose a realizar meras invocaciones sobre lo que estimaba su derecho, resulta improcedente el pago de auxilio de cesantía, toda vez que el mismo procede ante una decisión unilateral e inmotivada de romper una relación de empleo, lo cual no operó en el presente caso, dado que se dio con motivo del regreso del Dr. Carlos Calderón Rojas a su plaza como médico asistente general G-1. Así las cosas debe rechazarse este extremo de la demanda.- XI.- Este Tribunal estima oportuno advertir a la Unidad de Recursos Humanos del Ministerio de Justicia y Paz que la parte actora posee un derecho a que en los registros, tanto físicos como electrónicos, así como en las constancias y certificaciones que así se emitan, se consigne la efectiva sanción que le fue impuesta como firme, eliminando toda referencia a la sanción que eventualmente fue dejada sin efecto, dado que no se le despidió, sino se dio un rompimiento del vínculo con motivo de la demostrada llegada del titular de la plaza. En razón de lo anterior, deberá tomar nota la Señora Ministra de Justicia y Paz y dicha unidad administrativa de lo consignado en el presente considerando, para lo de su cargo. De existir un registro desactualizado en tal sentido, debe ser eliminado de su expediente personal a fin de que no se provoque ulteriores afectaciones laborales y personales a la promovente.

XII.- Intereses e indexación: XII.I.- Con respecto a la petición del reconocimiento de intereses, se acoge la misma y se condena al Estado al pago de intereses, de conformidad con el artículo mil ciento sesenta y tres del Código Civil, desde el momento de que debieron haber pagado las correspondientes sumas y hasta su efectivo pago. XII.II.- En cuanto a la indexación la misma viene impuesta de manera oficiosa conforme con el artículo ciento veintitrés del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Se trata de un reconocimiento a la pérdida del valor adquisitivo del dinero. De no otorgarse se estaría entregando al actor menos dinero (con respecto a su capacidad adquisitiva), de manera que sobre los rubros establecidos en esta resolución procede el reconocimiento del beneficio desde la firmeza de la resolución que así los concrete, hasta el pago definitivo.

XIII.- Defensas: XIII.I.- Con respecto a la defensa de falta de interés opuesta, la misma ya fue resuelta. XIII.II.- Con relación a la defensa de pago, debe acogerse en lo que respecta al pago de vacaciones, aguinaldo y salario escolar, únicamente. XIII.III.- Respecto a la defensa de falta de derecho se acoge parcialmente y se rechaza únicamente en lo que corresponde al pago de salarios por seis días.- XIV.- Costas: El artículo 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establece que las costas procesales y personales se imponen al vencido por el solo hecho de serlo, pronunciamiento que debe hacerse incluso de oficio, al tenor del numeral 119.2 ibídem . En razón de no encontrarse la parte demandada, dentro de los supuestos para que se le exonere de aquellas, procede su condena tal y como lo solicitó la parte actora. No está demás recordar que todo proceso produce gastos para la parte y su reconocimiento para la victoriosa depende de la condena en costas. En este caso para obtener su derecho sobre los cinco días impagos, la actora ha concurrido legítimamente a estrados, lo cual obliga a su reconocimiento en sentencia.

POR TANTO

Se rechaza parcialmente la defensa de falta de derecho en lo que corresponde al pago de salarios por seis días. Se acoge la defensa de falta de interés en lo que respecta a la pretensión número 1 de la demanda, así como la de pago en lo que se refiere al pago de vacaciones, aguinaldo y salario escolar. En todo lo demás se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho. En consecuencia se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda en lo que se indicará, en el entendido de que se rechaza en lo que no se indica expresamente. Por consiguiente se condena al Estado a pagar lo correspondiente al pago de seis días de salario dejados de percibir por la actora. Dicha suma deberá ser liquidada en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia. Sobre dicho rubro se reconoce indexación conforme con el artículo ciento veintitrés del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, a partir de la firmeza de la resolución que lo fija; hasta el pago definitivo. Se condena al pago de intereses sobre la suma objeto de condena, de conformidad con el artículo mil ciento sesenta y tres del Código Civil, desde el momento de que debieron haber pagado las correspondientes sumas y hasta su efectivo pago. Corren las costas a cargo del Estado. Tome nota el Ministerio de Justicia y Paz de lo indicado en el considerando número XI.- El Juez Espinoza Salas salva su voto.

Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo Grace Loaiza Sánchez Carlos Espinoza Salas VOTO SALVADO Respetuosamente me separo del voto de mayoría de mis compañeros, únicamente en lo referente a la denegación de los extremos referentes al preaviso y la cesantía, compartiendo con los demás en un todo lo resuelto. En ese sentido el suscrito acoge la demanda respecto a dichos extremos laborales, otorgando el preaviso correspondiente y la cesantía laboral del tiempo que laboró la promovente para el Ministerio de Justicia y Gracia, cuyos montos se determinarán en etapa de ejecución de sentencia. Ello así, toda vez que como se acreditó fehacientemente, a la señorita Campos Vallejos se le cesó sin responsabilidad patronal a partir del 8 de marzo del 2010, situación para la cual no había mérito, lo que convierte la remoción en despido con responsabilidad patronal, por haber acontecido de previo a que el titular de la plaza se reincorporara a su plaza en propiedad y por haber reconocido la propia Administración el error en que incurrió. Al haber anulado el Estado el despido, éllo convierte automáticamente la cesación del cargo en remoción con responsabilidad patronal, por lo que se le debe reconocer a la promovente la cesantía y el preaviso. Eso se demuestra por el hecho de que Estado sin estar firme la resolución de las 16 horas y 15 minutos del 17 de febrero del 2010, cesó a la promovente del puesto que venía ostentando como médico asistente general Nombre1620 en el Ministerio de Justicia y Paz, lo cual constituye el rompimiento de la relación laboral con responsabilidad patronal, toda vez que aconteció antes de que el titular regresara a su plaza. Además, debe tomarse en consideración que la promovente no fue reinstalada de previo a que regresara el titular y aunque posteriormente la Administración anuló dicho cese, los efectos perjudiciales del despido ya se habían consumado y tal conducta unilateral del Estado no puede dictarse en detrimento de los derechos laborales de la actor, ni puede la Administración sacar provecho de su propia incuria, negligencia y vicios de nulidad en que incurrió, que la llevó a dejar a dictar tal acto vejatorio de los derechos laborales de la promovente. Si bien el cese queda sin efecto, debe asumir la accionada el pago de los derechos laborales, toda vez que a la actora nunca se le reinstaló y el cese se efectuó por parte del Estado en forma ilegal antes de que el titular de la plaza regresara, lo que configura sin duda el pago del preaviso y la cesantía, por terminación de la relación laboral con responsabilidad patronal al haber el Estado aceptado unilateralmente que no había mérito para el despido. Tal situación se comprueba del hecho de que el Estado anuló el cese de la actora mediante resolución 381-2010 de ocho horas de cuatro de agosto de dos mil diez, pero sin que la reinstalara previamente al regreso del titular, ni le cancelara los derechos laborales, sino que indebidamente llamó al titular de la plaza, se esperó a que éste regresara, para que aprovechándose dicha situación denegar el pago del preaviso y cesantía, situación que no puede admitirse, al implicar una clara vulneración de los legítimos extremos laborales de la promovente, un enriquecimiento sin causa y una conducta lesiva a los derechos patromoniales de la actora.

Carlos Espinoza Salas