Coverage of Collective Agreements for Municipal Legal AdvisorsCobertura de convención colectiva para asesores legales municipales

*080000140166LA* *[Placa1]* Supreme Court of Justice SECOND CHAMBER Res: 2010-001277 SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours thirty-two minutes on September ninth, two thousand ten.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Nombre1], against the MUNICIPALITY OF TIBÁS, represented by its mayor, Lic. Jorge Salas Bonilla. Both of legal age, married attorneys, and residents of San José.

WHEREAS:

1.- The plaintiff, in a brief dated December twenty-first, two thousand seven, filed this action so that the judgment would order the defendant to pay severance in accordance with article 46 of the Collective Labor Agreement governing that institution, interest, and costs of the proceeding.

2.- The municipal mayor answered in the terms indicated in the brief dated February nineteenth, two thousand eight, and raised the defense of lack of right.

3.- The judge, Lic. José Francisco López Chaverri, in a judgment at ten hours nine minutes on February twenty-third, two thousand nine, ordered: In accordance with the foregoing, articles 15, 452, 490, 495; articles 3 and 46 of the Municipality's Collective Labor Agreement, the lawsuit filed by [Nombre1], holder of identity card number CED1, against the MUNICIPALITY OF TIBÁS, represented by [Nombre2], is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The defense of lack of right is denied. The defendant municipality must pay the plaintiff the severance claim in accordance with the provisions of article 46 of the Collective Labor Agreement governing said entity, in the final sum of two million seven hundred forty thousand colones. Likewise, on the total sum, interest must be recognized, equivalent to that generated by six-month term deposits at the National Bank of Costa Rica, from March 24, 2007, and until its effective payment. Regarding costs, the matter is resolved without special condemnation.

4.- The defendant party appealed, and the Labor Tribunal, Fourth Section, Second Judicial Circuit of San José, composed of Lic. Óscar Ugalde Miranda, Lic. Ana Ruth Fallas Gómez, and Lic. Ingrid Gregory Wang, in a judgment at eighteen hours twenty-five minutes on April twenty-third, two thousand ten, resolved: In the processing of this matter, no defects or omissions capable of causing nullity or defenselessness to the parties are observed. The appealed judgment is confirmed.

5.- The representative of the defendant municipality filed an appeal before this Chamber in a brief dated June eighteenth, two thousand ten, which is based on the grounds that will be stated in the recitals section.

6.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions and terms of law have been observed.

Drafted by Magistrate Vega Robert; and, RECITALS:

I.- BACKGROUND: Mr. [Nombre1] filed an ordinary lawsuit against the Municipality of Tibás, claiming that he provided services for that municipal corporation as a legal advisor since 1984, first on an ad hoc basis, and then (since 1986), as a "public employee (funcionario)", working a quarter-time schedule, which corresponded to the duration of the sessions of the Municipal Council, which he advised. He stated that at the beginning of the employment relationship—because the defendant entity did not have a legal department—he had to advise its different units (including the Municipal Council and the Executive—now mayor). He stated that from the beginning of the employment relationship, he remained covered by the benefits of the collective labor agreement governing the defendant municipality, in his capacity as an employee assigned to the General Management and Administration of the institution. He indicated that after the gradual implementation of a Legal Department in the defendant entity, he continued with his functions and set schedule, with direct payment from the administration, and consequently under the command of the Municipal Executive—now mayor. He stated that he did not hold any supervisory position or section head role, but rather that of an attorney for the administration, without receiving any payment for prohibition (prohibición), availability, or exclusive dedication for his functions. He said that the last salary received was twenty-seven thousand nine hundred colones per week, in addition to receiving payment for school salary (salario escolar) in the month of January. He expressed that at the end of 2006, he requested the mayor's office to prepare a draft calculation of his labor benefits in order to avail himself of article 46 of the collective labor agreement, an aspect that was endorsed by the Legal Department of the defendant entity, which, through official communication no. LI.057-2007, dated January 23, 2007, clarified that the payment of severance was appropriate in the event that he submitted his resignation, in accordance with the provisions of the conventional norm. He pointed out that, covered by that opinion, he submitted his resignation; however, the payment of his benefits was left in abeyance by the defendant, alleging that a consultation was pending before the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) regarding the appropriateness of paying such claims. Finally, he stated that on November 22, 2007, he was notified by the Personnel Department of the defendant through official communication D.E.P. 702-2007, of the opinion C-271-2007 issued by the Attorney General's Office, which determined that legal advisors of municipalities are not covered by the norms of the respective collective labor agreements. He argued that this was used by the mayor to deny him payment of the severance claim derived from article 46 of the collective labor agreement in force in the defendant municipal corporation. According to his criterion, this meant that the sum of two million seven hundred forty thousand colones exactly had not been paid to him for that concept (folios 1 to 7). The defendant answered the lawsuit in the negative. It argued that the refusal to pay the plaintiff the severance claim derived from article 46 of the collective labor agreement signed between that entity and the representatives of its workers was due to the existence of a pronouncement issued by the Attorney General's Office (No. C-271-2007), which determined that the legal advisors of the Municipality of Tibás are not covered by the benefits of the collective labor agreement, regardless of whether they had not been expressly excluded from its scope of application. Likewise, it was determined that since the severance benefit (auxilio de cesantía) is an expectation of right, it does not constitute a vested right that must be recognized to any of its attorneys. Based on these arguments, it raised the defense of lack of right (folios 42 to 49). The first-instance judgment partially granted the lawsuit, ordering the payment of two million seven hundred forty thousand colones for the concept of severance benefit in accordance with the provisions of article 46 of the collective labor agreement governing the defendant entity; as well as the payment of interest on said sum, equivalent to that generated by six-month term deposits at the National Bank of Costa Rica, from March 24, 2007, and until its effective payment, resolving the matter without special condemnation in costs (folios 80 to 87). The defendant filed an appeal (folios 90 to 93), and the tribunal issued a confirmation (folios 112 to 114).

II.- OBJECTIONS: Before this Chamber, the defendant party files a cassation appeal against the second-instance judgment. In summary, it argues that prior to paying the plaintiff the benefit derived from article 46 of the collective labor agreement in force in the entity (payment of the severance benefit upon resignation), the municipal administration consulted the Attorney General's Office to determine the legality and appropriateness of the payment. It states that, in view of the conclusions reached by the advisory body in its opinion (according to which the legal advisors (asesores jurídicos) of municipal corporations are excluded from the scope of application of the collective agreement, because they influence the negotiation process of the collective instrument, as well as for performing public management (gestión pública) work—regardless of whether such exclusion was not expressly included in the collective agreement—and that the existence of a vested right cannot be considered in their favor, as the severance benefit constitutes a mere expectation of right), it proceeded to deny the plaintiff's claim. As a second element to support its appeal, it points out that in the relationship that existed with Mr. [Nombre1], one of the essential elements of the employment contract was missing, namely, subordination. Based on these arguments, it requests "... that the appealed resolution be annulled and that Opinion C-271-2007 be confirmed." (Folios 122 to 125).

III.- LIMITATION OF THE APPEAL BY PRECLUSION: Articles 598 and 608 of the Civil Procedure Code, applicable to this matter pursuant to article 452 of the Labor Code, establish the conditions that regulate the admissibility of the appeal. In accordance with the former, the party that has not appealed the first-instance ruling cannot file the appeal when the judgment of the higher court is exclusively confirmatory. Likewise, according to article 608, those issues that have not been timely proposed and debated by the parties cannot be the subject of the appeal. It has been repeatedly indicated that the objections formulated before this Chamber, in order to be heard, must have been presented before the judges of the preceding instances; and, in addition, they must necessarily have been invoked previously before the second-instance court, when the judgment issued by it is merely confirmatory of the first-instance judgment and contrary to the party appealing before this Chamber. Consequently, the competence of this Chamber is limited by virtue of the principle of preclusion, as claims not timely formulated before the tribunal that heard and resolved the appeal cannot be raised before it. (In the same vein, see, among others, judgments number 489, at 10:20 hours on June 4, 2008; number 347, at 15:10 hours on June 6; number 368, at 15:20 hours on June 13; and number 605, at 11:05 hours on August 29, all from 2007). The appellant partially bases its appeal in this instance on alleging the non-existence of an employment relationship due to the absence of the element of subordination. The review of the briefs answering the lawsuit (folios 42 to 49) and the appeal brief that it timely filed against the first-instance judgment (folios 90 to 93) reveals that these arguments to support its disagreement with the plaintiff's claim regarding the payment of severance benefit in accordance with article 46 of the current collective labor agreement never formed part of the debate. Furthermore, it has been an undisputed fact that Mr. [Nombre1] Sandí worked in a subordinated manner for the Municipality of Tibás (see answer to facts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the lawsuit), and there is abundant documentary evidence to that effect in the administrative file of the worker (personnel actions reflecting salary increases, payment of annual increments (anualidades), recognition of vacations, payment of school salary, verbal and written reprimands, etc.). Consequently, preclusion has operated in this regard, and this Chamber cannot address that discussion at this stage of the proceeding.

IV.- ON THE SUBJECTIVE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO IN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: Our Political Constitution, in its chapter on "Social Rights and Guarantees," enshrines the protection of trade union freedom in its three spheres (freedom to associate in autonomous organizations for the defense of the rights of workers or employers, freedom to negotiate collectively, and freedom to exercise the right to strike and lockout), as an essential element that contributes to sustaining the social system and the rule of law governing our country. Thus, Article 60 of the Constitution states: "Both employers and workers may freely unionize, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and conserving economic, social, or professional benefits./Foreigners are prohibited from exercising direction or authority in unions." For its part, Article 62 elevates to constitutional rank the right to engage in collective bargaining, stating: "Collective labor agreements that, in accordance with the law, are agreed upon between employers or employers' unions and legally organized workers' unions shall have the force of law." As part of strengthening the constitutional block in matters of freedom of association, our country has signed a series of international treaties that guarantee the protection of that freedom for lawful purposes for all persons, logically including workers, as does the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Bogotá, May 1948) in its Article XXII: "Every person has the right to associate with others to promote, exercise and protect his legitimate interests of a political, economic, religious, social, cultural, professional, trade union or any other nature." Similarly, Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, December 1948) recognizes the right of association: Article 20.1: "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association." For its part, Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, December 1966) states in relevant part: Article 22.- 1.- "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests." Expanding on the issue, Article 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, November 1969) provides: Article 16. 1.- "Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes." The International Labour Organization (ILO) has also been interested in reaffirming this right—specifically referred to freedom of association for the defense of trade union or professional interests—adopting Conventions and Recommendations, seeking that States recognize it and, in turn, implement effective mechanisms for its protection. In that vein, the country has ratified, and they are fully in force as part of the domestic legal system, Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize; and Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (both ratified by Law number 2561, of May 11, 1960). However, in accordance with the jurisprudence emanating from the Constitutional Chamber itself, which equally integrates that constitutional block (Article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law), the right of workers who work for any state agency (organized under a public or private law regime) to enter into collective labor agreements has nuances that differentiate it from the exercise of this right in the sphere of private employment, in view of the special nature governing the relations of the State with its servants or workers. Thus, opinion (voto) 1696-92 at 15:30 hours on August 23, 1992, provided: "XI In the opinion of the Chamber, then, Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution support the existence, in principle, of an employment regime governed by Public Law within the public sector, as has been clear from the debate in the National Constituent Assembly and as the General Public Administration Law incipiently reflects. This public employment regime implies, necessarily, consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, which are not only different from those of (private) labor law but often contrary to them. Obviously, the declaration contained in this judgment encompasses the employment relationship that exists between the (or better, public) administrations and their servants, but in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that remits to a private employment regime, the solution must be different. In those cases, there would be a submission to arbitration procedures, but with certain limitations, such that they cannot dispense with or make exceptions to current laws, regulations, or government directives, so even in these cases decisions (awards) in equity (en conciencia) would not apply, nor tribunals formed by non-attorney individuals." Thus, the constitutional court establishes, in the first place, a difference between the exercise of collective rights by State servants and workers subject to a private employment regime, and also makes a distinction regarding access to the exercise of collective labor rights within the Public Administration, between workers who perform public management and those who, even if working for a state agency, are considered workers subject to common labor law, establishing that the possibility of signing collective labor agreements is prohibited for the former, but not for the latter. This position was reaffirmed in opinion 3053 at 9:45 hours on June 24, 1994, where, specifically referring to the possibility of signing collective labor agreements in state agencies, it indicated: "(…) It is not appropriate to grant, as it has already been resolved in the opposite sense in the mentioned unconstitutionality action, the requested protection with respect to the denial of collective bargaining opposed to the 'public servants' of the [Nombre3]. But it is appropriate to grant protection to the appealing Union inasmuch as the resolution of the Attorney General's Office of June 24, 1993 (see folios 134 to 139), should have reconsidered ex officio the opinion rendered on December 12, 1985 (subsection b of Article 3 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General’s Office) and distinguish between public officials (funcionarios públicos) and workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration, because subjecting all of them to the aforementioned prohibition contradicts the ruling cited several times and the guarantee provided by Article 62 of the Political Constitution, obviously with the understanding that the determination of the category of workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration is a matter of mere legality." (The highlighting is not from the original). Later, by virtue of a constitutional query formulated by this Chamber, the Constitutional Chamber, in its opinion 4453-2000 at 14:56 hours on May 24, 2000, following the trend set by the previously transcribed opinions, concludes that: "Based on all the foregoing and by way of synthesis, the Chamber arrives at the following conclusions: in the exercise of the competence of maximum interpreter of the Political Constitution, when examining the issue of the organization and administrative structure of the State and the appropriateness or not of collective labor agreements in the public sector, the Chamber cannot limit itself solely to the application of the provisions that make up the Chapter of the so-called 'Social Guarantees'. It is also necessary to examine that legal institution in coordination with the principles contained in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution; in carrying out this exercise, the full conviction is acquired that the will of the constituent, following the historical line of development of Labor Law institutions, was to abstract the servants of the public sector from the general rules that inform Collective Labor Law, subjecting it to a special public employment relationship, also commonly called the 'statutory relationship', which is governed by Public Law. This implies, without a doubt and as a general thesis, that no public official can negotiate their employment conditions as if it were a contractual nexus subject to Labor Law. However, the development of legal ideas, the adoption of conventions promoted by the International Labour Organization, and the jurisprudence of this Chamber, have led the evolution of the institutions involved to the level of admitting as compatible with Constitutional Law, the collective labor agreements negotiated by the category of employees and servants who, despite being part of the public sector, govern their relationships by Labor Law, especially under the terms of the definitions contained in Articles 111 and 112 of the General Public Administration Law, that is, when it concerns State enterprises or economic services engaged in activities subject to common law (Derecho común), as well as service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration and who are governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be. It is in this sense that the query is answered, but warning, however, that it is the responsibility of the Administration itself, legal operators in general, and ultimately the Judge, when hearing specific cases, to determine whether a State institution or a group of its servants or officials constitutes the core of the exception that may negotiate collectively, or whether, on the contrary, that path is prohibited to them. And finally, according to what the Attorney General's Office has expressed in its report, which this Chamber also accepts, the personnel working in the Municipalities of the country are limited in collective bargaining under the terms of this judgment, since, barring proof to the contrary, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship. (…)" (the highlighting is the drafter's). From what has been expressed by the high Constitutional Court, it can be concluded that the possibility of negotiating collective labor agreements is not limited for all workers who work for the administration, but solely for those who, from their position, carry out "public management." Thus, for example, the Constitutional Chamber has said that those who work for State enterprises may negotiate collectively in accordance with the provisions informing Collective Labor Law, as is the case of the Administrative Board of the Port Authority of the Atlantic Slope “JAPDEVA” (opinion No. 6730 at 14:45 hours on May 17, 2002), likewise those who work for "the State's economic services" engaged in matters subject to common law, as occurs with the Board of Social Protection (Junta de Protección Social) (opinion No. 6727 at 14:52 hours on May 17, 2006), public universities (opinion No. 1144 at 15:21 hours on January 30, 2007), state banks (opinion No. 1145 at 15:22 hours on January 30, 2007), municipal corporations (opinion No. 18485 at 18:02 hours on December 19, 2007), Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo S.A. “RECOPE” (opinions Nos. 2000-7730 at 14:47 hours on August 30, 2000, and 3936 at 14:49 hours on March 12, 2008). Now, the individualization of workers excluded from the possibility of negotiating collectively, and therefore, from benefiting from the rights incorporated within this type of collective instrument, has been defined by the Constitutional Chamber itself as a matter of mere legality, whose determination corresponds to the administration itself and ultimately to the judge. In that sense, this Chamber, in strict adherence to the provisions of Article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, has established some parameters in response to specific cases to define whether a particular worker (or group of workers) of the State is or is not enabled to define, through the instrument of collective bargaining, their employment conditions, always starting from the premise established by the Constitutional Chamber, which reaffirms the possibility of collective bargaining held by laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, as well as for employees of State enterprises or economic services engaged in activities subject to common law. (See in this regard from this Chamber, opinion No. 0008 at 10:05 hours on January 6, 2010). Specifically referring to the subjective scope of application of the Collective Labor Agreement, once the possibility of signing this type of agreement in municipal corporations has been recognized (under the protection of the constitutional block), this Chamber has established which municipal officials are outside the application of the collective instrument, based on the particularities associated with the type of work the person performs for the local government; thus, those who are in charge of carrying out the public management (gestión pública) of the municipality, or those who execute acts of government, may not benefit from the conventional norms in force in the municipal entity. Thus, in opinion No. 550 at 9:55 hours on August 15, 2007, it was stated: "V.- Which public servants are excluded from collective bargaining, that is, which are those for whom the path of collective labor law is closed to establish their employment conditions? The doctrine of the commentary judgment, No. 4453-2000, follows a classificatory or taxonomic orientation of rights; according to which there would be groups of servants who would be excluded from the collective labor agreements entered into. The majority of this Chamber understands that those servants are those who participate in public management, that is, those who lead and direct the powers of the State, the heads of autonomous institutions, executive presidencies, as well as the heads (management group) of State enterprises, etc., which is due to the need to ensure the continuity of the functioning of the Public Administration, constituted by the State and other public entities (Articles 1 and 4 of the General Public Administration Law), as well as to avoid conflicts of interest due to the dual condition of workers and heads of the Administration. Also excluded would be those servants who, due to their participation in collective bargaining, may be directly benefited from those negotiations, a matter which is certainly not advisable. (Cf. Constitutional Chamber, judgment No. 2531-94 at 15:42 hours on May 31, 1994). Executive Decree No. 29576 of May 31, 2001, called the Regulation for the Negotiation of Collective Labor Agreements in the Public Sector, provides in its Article 6, paragraph 2: 'No person who is to actually or potentially receive any benefit from the collective labor agreement that is signed may be part of that delegation (employer's representation).' The Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, No. 8422 of October 6, 2004, incorporates this doctrine in the following terms: 'Article 48.- Legislating or administering for one's own benefit. … The same shall apply to anyone who favors their spouse, partner, companion, or cohabitant, or their relatives, even up to the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, or favors themselves, with patrimonial benefits contained in collective labor agreements, in whose negotiation they have participated as a representative of the employer.' Translating all the foregoing to the municipal sphere, only those responsible for public management would then be excluded from the norms of a collective bargaining agreement, such as the municipal mayor, the council members (regidores), district councilors (síndicos), who are officials of popular election (Article 586, paragraph 2, of the Labor Code, in relation to Articles 12 and 14 of the Municipal Code, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998), and members of the municipal government (Article 169 of the Political Constitution, and Article 3 of the Municipal Code), as well as those officials who, by the exercise of their positions, have had direct participation in the negotiation of the collective labor agreement." This interpretation is harmonious with that resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, which, upon recognizing the possibility of collective bargaining in municipal corporations, strengthened this right for their workers, and therefore, a restrictive interpretation in this area (adjusted to the statutory regime governing them), would lead us to completely empty it of its essential minimum content, which ultimately would be contrary to the very theory of the progressivity of fundamental rights (according to which the State has a duty to achieve increasingly higher levels of satisfaction of social rights through gradualness and progressivity, avoiding all kinds of regressive measures in their satisfaction) developed by the High Constitutional Court in its jurisprudence (see on this matter, from the Constitutional Chamber, votes nos. 2771 of 11:40 a.m. on April 4, 2003, 10553 of 2:54 p.m. on July 1, 2009, 4806 of 2:50 p.m. on March 10, 2010). Having said the foregoing, we must now carry out an analysis of the specific case, to verify whether the plaintiff falls within the assumptions of exclusion from the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) in force at the time his employment relationship with the Municipality of Tibas ended.

V.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE: Having analyzed the conventional norm signed between the Municipality of Tibás and the Union of Municipal Workers of Costa Rica (Sindicato de Trabajadores Municipales de Costa Rica), in force at the time the employment relationship that bound the plaintiff to that municipal corporation ended, it can be verified that the collective agreement (convenio colectivo) does not contain –expressly– a category of workers excluded from the conventional benefits. In this regard, its article 3 provides: "This Convention has the character of a professional law:/ A-) for the parties that sign it. B-) For all persons who, at the time it comes into force, work in the Municipality./ C-) For all those who in the future come to work in the service of the Municipality". Therefore, in accordance with the provisions on the matter in the votes of the Constitutional Chamber cited in the preceding recital (considerando), it is the task of the ordinary jurisdiction to determine –in the specific case– whether the worker was covered by the professional norm. Once the facts of the lawsuit have been assessed in light of the evidence in the record, the Chamber concludes that the plaintiff was always protected by the benefits of the Collective Labor Convention (Convención Colectiva de Trabajo), as he states in his lawsuit (third fact visible on page 7) and as the defendant entity accepts in its response (see page 42). An aspect that in turn finds absolute support in the documentary evidence contained in the plaintiff's personnel file, especially in the personnel actions that show how vacations, annual increases, recognition of seniority salary bonuses, etc., were governed by the provisions of the conventional norm (see the administrative file binder). Therefore, if the defendant, administratively always recognized that the worker fell within the scope of application of that instrument, and now intends that the benefit related to the payment of severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) for resignation not be applied to him, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 46 of the professional norm, it had to prove –in accordance with the provisions of numeral 371 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), of supplementary application in this case in accordance with the provisions of article 452 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)– during the process, that Mr. [Nombre1] Sandí held a management position in which he executed "public management (gestión pública)", or that he participated advising the employer's representative during the process of signing the collective agreement, both aspects of which are completely lacking in evidence. This being the case, there are no elements of judgment that would allow this Chamber to vary what was resolved in previous instances, but not for the reasons expressed there (related to the workday and the non-payment of salary bonuses for prohibition, exclusive dedication, or availability, aspects that have nothing to do with the nature of the functions that the plaintiff performed for the municipality), but rather because the defendant did not demonstrate –as was its procedural duty– that by virtue of the functions performed by the plaintiff for the municipality, he should be considered excluded from the application of conventional benefits.

VI.- As a corollary of the foregoing, there being no reason whatsoever to uphold the grievances of the defendant, the appropriate course is to confirm the appealed judgment in all its aspects.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO) The appealed judgment is confirmed.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Rolando Vega Robert Eva María Camacho Vargas Ana Luisa Meseguer Monge cgutic 2 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Electronic Mail: [...]. y [...]

Likewise, according to article 608, those matters not timely raised or debated by the parties may not be the subject of the appeal. It has been repeatedly indicated that the grievances presented before this Chamber, to be addressed, must have been set forth before the judges of the previous instances; and, furthermore, they must necessarily have been previously invoked before the second-instance court, when the judgment issued by said court is merely confirmatory of the first-instance judgment and adverse to the party appealing before the Chamber. Consequently, the competence of this Chamber is limited by virtue of the principle of preclusion (preclusión), as claims not timely filed before the court that heard and resolved the appeal cannot be raised before it. (In the same vein, see, among others, judgments numbers 489, at 10:20 hours on June 4, 2008; 347, at 15:10 hours on June 6; 368, at 15:20 hours on June 13; and 605, at 11:05 hours on August 29, all of 2007). The appellant partially bases the appeal in this instance on the non-existence of an employment relationship due to the absence of the element of subordination. The review of the answer briefs to the complaint (folios 42 to 49) and the appeal brief timely filed against the first-instance judgment (folios 90 to 93) reveals that these arguments to support its disagreement with the plaintiff's claim regarding the payment of severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) in accordance with numeral 46 of the current collective labor agreement were never part of the debate; in fact, it has been a non-controverted fact that Mr. [Name1] Sandí worked in a subordinate capacity for the Municipalidad de Tibás (see response to facts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the complaint), and there is abundant documentary evidence to that effect in the worker's administrative file (personnel actions reflecting salary increases, payment of annuities, recognition of vacations, payment of school salary, verbal and written warnings, etc.). Consequently, preclusion has occurred in this regard, and this Chamber cannot address this discussion at this stage of the proceedings.

**IV.- ON THE SUBJECTIVE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS:** Our Political Constitution, in its chapter on "Social Rights and Guarantees," enshrines the protection of union freedom in its three spheres (freedom to associate in autonomous organizations for the defense of the rights of working persons or employers, freedom to bargain collectively, and freedom to exercise the right to strike and lockout), as an essential element contributing to the sustainability of the social and legal system governing our country. Thus, Article 60 of the Constitution provides: "*Both employers and workers may freely unionize, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and preserving economic, social, or professional benefits./ Foreigners are prohibited from exercising leadership or authority in unions.*" For its part, numeral 62 elevates the right to engage in collective bargaining to constitutional status, stating: "*Collective labor agreements that, pursuant to law, are concluded between employers or employer unions and legally organized worker unions shall have the force of law.*" As part of strengthening the block of constitutionality (bloque de constitucionalidad) regarding freedom of association, our country has signed a series of international treaties guaranteeing the protection of that freedom for lawful purposes for all persons, logically including working persons, as does the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Bogotá, May 1948) in its Article XXII.- "*Every person has the right to associate with others to promote, exercise and protect their legitimate interests of a political, economic, religious, social, cultural, professional, trade union or any other nature.*" In the same vein, Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, December 1948) recognizes the right of association: *Article 20.1- Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.* For its part, Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, December 1966) states, insofar as relevant: *Article 22.- 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.* Expanding on the subject, Article 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, November 1969) provides: *Article 16. 1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes.* The International Labour Organization (ILO) has also been interested in reaffirming this right –specifically referring to the freedom of association for the defense of union or professional interests– adopting Conventions and Recommendations, seeking that States recognize it and, in turn, implement effective mechanisms for its protection. In this vein, the country has ratified and they are fully in force, as part of the domestic legal order, Convention 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise; and Convention 98 concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (both ratified by Law number 2561, of May 11, 1960). Now then, in accordance with the jurisprudence emanating from the Constitutional Chamber itself, which equally integrates that block of constitutionality (article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction), the right of workers who labor for any state entity (organized under a public or private law regime) to enter into collective labor agreements has nuances that differentiate it from the exercise of this right in the private employment sphere, in consideration of the special nature governing the State's relations with its servants or workers. Thus, ruling 1696-92 at 15:30 hours on August 23, 1992, stated: "*XI In the opinion of the Chamber, then, articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution establish the existence, in principle, of an employment regime governed by Public Law within the public sector, as has been clear from the debate in the National Constituent Assembly and early reflected in the General Law of Public Administration. This public employment regime necessarily implies consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, not only different from those of (private) labor law, but often opposed to them. Obviously, the declaration contained in this ruling encompasses the employment relationship that exists between the public administration (or rather, administrations) and its servants, but in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation referring to a private employment regime, the solution must be different. In those cases, there would be a submission to arbitration procedures, but with certain limitations, such as that they cannot dispense with or except current laws, regulations, or governmental directives, so even in these cases, decisions (awards) in equity would not proceed, nor would tribunals formed by non-lawyer subjects.*" Thus, the Constitutional Court establishes, first, a difference between the exercise of collective rights by State servants and workers subject to a private employment regime, and also makes a distinction regarding access to the exercise of collective labor rights within the Public Administration, between workers who perform public management and those who, even working for a state entity, are considered workers subject to common labor law, establishing a prohibition on the possibility of signing collective agreements for the former, but not for the latter. This position was reaffirmed in ruling 3053 at 9:45 hours on June 24, 1994, where specifically referring to the possibility of signing collective agreements in state entities, it indicated: "(...) *It is not appropriate to grant the relief requested, as it was already resolved in the opposite sense in the aforementioned unconstitutionality action, regarding the denial of collective bargaining opposed to the \"public servants\" of the [Name3]. However, it is appropriate to grant relief to the petitioning Union insofar as the resolution of the Procuraduría of June 24, 1993 (see folios 134 to 139), should have reconsidered ex officio the opinion rendered on December 12, 1985 (subsection b of article 3 of the Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República) and distinguish between public officials and workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration, because subjecting all of them to the aforementioned prohibition contradicts the ruling cited several times and the guarantee provided for in article 62 of the Political Constitution, obviously with the understanding that the determination of the category of workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration is a matter of mere legality.*" (Emphasis is not in the original). Later, by virtue of a constitutional consultation filed by this Chamber, the Constitutional Chamber in its ruling 4453-2000 at 14:56 hours on May 24, 2000, following the trend set by the rulings transcribed above, concluded that: "*Based on all the foregoing and as a summary, the Chamber reaches the following conclusions: in the exercise of its competence as the ultimate interpreter of the Political Constitution, when examining the issue of the organization and administrative structure of the State and the appropriateness or not of collective agreements in the public sector, the Chamber cannot limit itself solely to the application of the provisions that make up the Chapter of so-called \"Social Guarantees\". It is also necessary to examine this legal institution in coordination with the principles contained in articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution; upon performing this exercise, a firm conviction is acquired that the will of the constituent, following the historical line of development of Labor Law institutions, was to abstract public sector servants from the general rules governing Collective Labor Law, subjecting them to a special public employment relationship, also commonly called the \"statutory relationship,\" which is governed by Public Law. This implies, without a doubt and as a general thesis, that no public official can negotiate their employment conditions as if it were a contractual nexus subject to Labor Law. However, the development of legal ideas, the adoption of conventions promoted by the International Labour Organization, and the jurisprudence of this Chamber have led the evolution of the institutions involved to the level of admitting as compatible with the Law of the Constitution the collective agreements negotiated by the category of employees and servants who, despite being part of the public sector, govern their relations by Labor Law, especially in the terms of the definitions contained in articles 111 and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, that is, when dealing with economic enterprises or services of the State responsible for activities subject to common Law, as well as service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration and who are governed by Labor or Commercial Law, as appropriate. This is how the consultation is resolved, but warning, of course, that it corresponds to the Administration itself, to law operators in general, and ultimately to the Judge, when hearing specific cases, to determine if a State institution or a group of its servants or officials make up the core of the exception that can bargain collectively, or if, on the contrary, that path is closed to them. And finally, according to what the Procuraduría General de la República has expressed in its report, which this Chamber also accepts, the personnel working in the Municipalities of the country are limited for collective bargaining, in the terms of this ruling, since, barring proof to the contrary, they are public servants governed by the public employment relationship. (…)*” (emphasis is the drafter's). From what the high Constitutional Court expressed, it can be concluded that the possibility of negotiating collective agreements is not limited for every worker who labors for the administration, but only for those who, from their position, carry out "public management." Thus, by way of example, the Constitutional Chamber has stated that those who work for State enterprises can indeed bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions governing Collective Labor Law, as is the case of the Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica "JAPDEVA" (ruling no. 6730 at 14:45 hours on May 17, 2002), likewise those who work for "the economic services of the State" in charge of matters subject to Common Law, as occurs with the Junta de Protección Social (ruling no. 6727 at 14:52 hours on May 17, 2006), public universities (ruling no. 1144 at 15:21 hours on January 30, 2007), state banks (ruling no. 1145 at 15:22 hours on January 30, 2007), municipal corporations (ruling no. 18485 at 18:02 hours on December 19, 2007), Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo S.A. "RECOPE" (rulings nos. 2000-7730 at 14:47 hours on August 30, 2000 and 3936 at 14:49 hours on March 12, 2008). Now then, the identification of the workers excluded from the possibility of bargaining collectively, and therefore, from benefiting from the rights incorporated within this type of collective instruments, has been defined by the Constitutional Chamber itself as a matter of mere legality, the determination of which corresponds to the administration itself and ultimately to the judge. In that sense, this Chamber, in strict adherence to the provisions of article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, has issued certain parameters regarding specific cases to define whether a specific State worker (or group of workers) is or is not allowed to define, through the instrument of collective bargaining, their employment conditions, always based on the premise set by the Constitutional Chamber, which reaffirms the possibility of collective bargaining that laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration have, as well as for employees of State economic enterprises or services responsible for activities subject to common law. (See in this regard from this Chamber ruling no. 0008 at 10:05 hours on January 6, 2010). Specifically referring to the subjective scope of application of the Collective Labor Agreement (Convención Colectiva), once the possibility of signing this type of agreement in municipal corporations has been recognized (under the protection of the block of constitutionality), this Chamber has established which municipal officials are outside the application of the collective instrument, based on the particularities associated with the type of work performed by the person for the local government, such that those responsible for carrying out the municipality's public management, or those who execute acts of government, may not benefit from the conventional norms in force in the municipal entity. Thus, in ruling no. 550 at 9:55 hours on August 15, 2007, it was stated: "*V.- Which public servants are excluded from collective bargaining, that is, which ones have the path of collective labor law closed off for establishing their employment conditions? The doctrine of the commentary judgment, No. 4453-2000, follows a classificatory or taxonomic orientation of rights; according to which there would be groups of servants who would be excluded from the collective agreements entered into. The majority of this Chamber understands that these servants are those who participate in public management, that is, those who lead and direct the branches of the State, the heads of autonomous institutions, executive presidencies, as well as the heads (management group) of State enterprises, etc., which stems from the need to ensure the continuity of the functioning of the Public Administration, constituted by the State and other public entities (articles 1 and 4 of the General Law of Public Administration), as well as to avoid conflicts of interest due to the dual condition of workers and heads of the Administration. Also excluded would be servants who, due to their participation in the collective negotiations, could be directly benefited from those negotiations, a matter which is clearly not advisable. (Cf. Constitutional Chamber, judgment No. 2531-94 at 15:42 hours on May 31, 1994). Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 29576 of May 31, 2001, called Regulation for the Negotiation of Collective Agreements in the Public Sector, provides in its article 6, paragraph 2: 'No person who would actually or potentially receive any benefit from the collective agreement signed may be part of that delegation (employer representation).'* *Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, No. 8422 of October 6, 2004, incorporates this doctrine in the following terms: '**Article 48.- Legislation or administration for personal gain.** … The same shall apply to anyone who favors their spouse, companion, partner, or cohabitant, or their relatives, even up to the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, or favors themselves, with patrimonial benefits contained in collective agreements, in whose negotiation they participated as representative of the employer party.'* *Translated all the foregoing to* *the municipal sphere, those excluded from the norms of a collective bargaining process would then be only those responsible for public management, such as the municipal mayor, the council members (regidores), district trustees (síndicos), who are officials of popular election (article 586, paragraph 2, of the Labor Code, in relation with articles 12 and 14 of the Municipal Code, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998), and members of the municipal government (article 169 of the Political Constitution, and article 3 of the Municipal Code), as well as those officials who, by the exercise of their positions, had direct participation in the negotiation of the collective agreement.*" This interpretation is harmonious with that resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, which upon recognizing the possibility of bargaining collectively in municipal corporations strengthened this right for their workers, and therefore, a restrictive interpretation in this area (adjusted to the statutory regime governing them) would lead us to completely empty it of its essential minimum content, which would ultimately be contrary to the very theory of the progressivity of fundamental rights (according to which the State has a duty to achieve increasingly higher levels of satisfaction of social rights through gradualness and progressivity, avoiding all types of regressive measures in their satisfaction) developed by the High Constitutional Court in its jurisprudence (see on this point, from the Constitutional Chamber, rulings nos. 2771 at 11:40 hours on April 4, 2003, 10553 at 14:54 hours on July 1, 2009, 4806 at 14:50 hours on March 10, 2010). Having said the above, we must now conduct an analysis of the specific case to verify if the plaintiff is located within the assumptions for exclusion from the collective agreement in force at the time his employment relationship with the Municipalidad de Tibas ended.

**V.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE:** After analyzing the conventional norm signed between the Municipalidad de Tibás and the Sindicato de Trabajadores Municipales de Costa Rica, in force at the time the employment relationship linking the plaintiff to that municipal corporation ended, it can be verified that the collective agreement does not contain –expressly– a category of workers excluded from the conventional benefits. In this regard, its article 3 provides: "*This Convention has the character of professional law:/ A-) for the parties signing it./ B-) For all persons working in the Municipality at the time it comes into force./ C-) For all those who in the future begin to work in the service of the Municipality.*" Therefore, in accordance with the provisions on the matter in the Constitutional Chamber rulings cited in the preceding recital (considerando), it is the task of the ordinary jurisdiction to determine –in the specific case– whether the worker was covered by the professional norm. Once the facts of the complaint have been evaluated in light of the evidence in the case file, the Chamber concludes that the plaintiff was always protected by the benefits of the Collective Labor Agreement, as he affirms in his complaint (third fact visible at folio 7) and as the defendant entity accepts in its answer (see folio 42). An aspect that in turn finds absolute support in the documentary evidence contained in the plaintiff's personnel file, especially in the personnel actions showing how vacations, annual increases, recognition of salary bonuses for seniority, etc., were governed by the provisions of the conventional norm (see dossier of the administrative file). Therefore, if the defendant administratively always recognized that the worker fell within the scope of application of that instrument, and now seeks not to apply the benefit related to the payment of severance pay upon resignation, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 46 of the professional norm, it should have demonstrated –in accordance with the provisions of numeral 371 of the Civil Procedure Code, of supplementary application in this case in accordance with the provisions of article 452 of the Labor Code– during the proceeding, that Mr. [Name1] Sandí occupied a managerial position in which he executed "public management," or that he participated advising the employer representative during the process of signing the collective agreement, both aspects of which are completely devoid of proof. Thus, there are no elements for judgment that allow this Chamber to vary what was resolved in prior instances, not for the reasons expressed there (related to the workday and the non-payment of salary bonuses for prohibition, exclusive dedication, or availability, aspects which bear no relation to the nature of the functions performed by the plaintiff for the municipality), but rather because the defendant did not demonstrate –as was its procedural duty– that by virtue of the functions performed by the plaintiff for the municipality, he should be understood as excluded from the application of the conventional benefits.

</p> VI.- As a corollary of the foregoing, there being no reason whatsoever to uphold the grievances of the defendant, the appropriate course is to confirm the appealed judgment in all its parts.

POR TANTO

The appealed judgment is confirmed.

***Orlando Aguirre Gómez*** ***Julia Varela Araya*** ***Rolando Vega Robert*** ***Eva María Camacho Vargas*** ***Ana Luisa Meseguer Monge*** ***cgutic*** 2 y [...]

In those cases, there would be a submission to arbitration procedures, but with certain limitations, such as that in them, current laws, regulations, or governmental directives cannot be dispensed with or excepted, so even in these cases, decisions (awards) in equity would not be appropriate, nor would tribunals formed by non-lawyers. Thus, the constitutional court establishes, in the first place, a difference between the exercise of the collective rights of State employees and workers subject to a private employment regime, and equally makes a distinction regarding access to the exercise of collective labor rights within the Public Administration, between workers who perform public administration functions (gestión pública) and those who, even though working for a state agency, are considered workers subject to common labor law, establishing that the possibility of entering into collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas) is barred for the former, but not for the latter. This position was reaffirmed in vote 3053 of 9:45 a.m. on June 24, 1994, where, specifically referring to the possibility of entering into collective bargaining agreements in state agencies, it indicated: “(…) It is not appropriate to grant, having already been resolved to the contrary in the aforementioned unconstitutionality action, the protection requested regarding the denial of collective bargaining opposed to the 'public employees' of [Nombre1]. However, it is appropriate to protect the appealing Union insofar as the resolution of the Attorney General's Office of June 24, 1993 (see folios 134 to 139), should have reconsidered ex officio the opinion rendered on December 12, 1985 (subsection b) of Article 3 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic) and distinguished between public officials and workers who do not participate in the public administration functions of the administration, because subjecting all of them to the aforementioned prohibition contradicts the ruling cited several times and the guarantee provided for in Article 62 of the Political Constitution, obviously with the understanding that the determination of the category of workers who do not participate in the public administration functions of the administration is a matter of mere legality.” (The highlighting is not from the original).

Subsequently, by virtue of a constitutional consultation formulated by this Chamber, the Constitutional Chamber, in its vote 4453-2000 of 2:56 p.m. on May 24, 2000, following the trend marked by the previously transcribed votes, concludes that: “Based on all the foregoing and by way of synthesis, the Chamber reaches the following conclusions: in the exercise of its competence as the maximum interpreter of the Political Constitution, when examining the issue of the organization and administrative structure of the State and the appropriateness or not of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, the Chamber cannot limit itself solely to the application of the provisions that make up the Chapter of the so-called 'Social Guarantees'. It is also necessary to examine this legal institution in coordination with the principles contained in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution; when performing this exercise, one acquires the full conviction that the will of the constituent, following the historical line of the development of Labor Law institutions, was to abstract public sector employees from the general rules that inform Collective Labor Law, subjecting them to a special public employment relationship, also and commonly called a 'statutory relationship', which is governed by Public Law. This implies, without a doubt and as a general thesis, that no public official can negotiate their employment conditions as if it were a contractual nexus subject to Labor Law. However, the development of legal ideas, the adoption of conventions promoted by the International Labor Organization, and the jurisprudence of this Chamber, have led to the evolution of the institutions involved, to the level of admitting as compatible with Constitutional Law, the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the category of employees and public employees who, despite forming part of the public sector, govern their relations by Labor Law, especially in the terms of the definitions contained in Articles 111 and 112 of the General Public Administration Act, that is, when dealing with State enterprises or economic services responsible for activities subject to common law, as well as service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public administration functions of the Administration and who are governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be. It is in this sense that the consultation is resolved, but warning, of course, that it is up to the Administration itself, to legal operators in general, and, in the last instance, to the Judge, when hearing specific cases, to determine if a State institution or a group of its employees or officials, form the core of the exception that can indeed bargain collectively, or if, on the contrary, that path is barred to them. And lastly, according to what the Attorney General's Office of the Republic has expressed in its report, which this Chamber also accepts, the personnel working in the Municipalities of the country are limited for collective bargaining, in the terms of this ruling, since, unless proven otherwise, they are public employees, governed by the public employment relationship. (…)” (the highlighting is by the drafter). From what has been expressed by the high Constitutional Court, it can be concluded that the possibility of negotiating collective bargaining agreements does not appear limited for every worker who works for the administration, but only for those who, from their position, carry out “public administration functions (la gestión pública)”. Thus, by way of example, the Constitutional Chamber has said that those who work for State enterprises can indeed bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions that inform Collective Labor Law, as is the case of the Board of Port Administration of the Atlantic Slope “JAPDEVA” (vote no. 6730 of 2:45 p.m. on May 17, 2002), likewise those who work for “the economic services of the State” responsible for matters subject to common law, as occurs with the Social Protection Board (vote no. 6727 of 2:52 p.m. on May 17, 2006), public universities (vote no. 1144 of 3:21 p.m. on January 30, 2007), state banks (vote no. 1145 of 3:22 p.m. on January 30, 2007), municipal corporations (vote no. 18485 of 6:02 p.m. on December 19, 2007), the Costa Rican Oil Refinery S.A. “RECOPE” (votes nos. 2000-7730 of 2:47 p.m. on August 30, 2000, and 3936 of 2:49 p.m. on March 12, 2008).

Now, the identification of workers excluded from the possibility of collective bargaining, and therefore, from benefiting from the rights incorporated within this type of collective instruments, has been defined by the Constitutional Chamber itself as a matter of mere legality, whose determination corresponds to the administration itself and, in the last case, to the judge. In that sense, this Chamber, in strict adherence to the provisions of Article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Act, has issued some parameters in response to specific cases to define whether a particular State worker (or group of workers) is or is not enabled to define, through the instrument of collective bargaining, their employment conditions, always starting from the premise set by the Constitutional Chamber, which reaffirms the possibility of collective bargaining that laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public administration functions of the administration have, as well as for the employees of State enterprises or economic services responsible for activities subject to common law. (See in this regard, from this Chamber, vote no. 0008 of 10:05 a.m. on January 6, 2010). Specifically referring to the subjective scope of application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), once the possibility of entering into this type of agreements in municipal corporations has been recognized (under the umbrella of the constitutional block), this Chamber has established which municipal officials are outside the application of the collective instrument, based on the particularities associated with the type of work the person performs for the local government, thus those who are in charge of carrying out the public administration functions of the municipality, or those who execute government acts, will not be able to benefit from the conventional norms in force in the municipal entity.

Thus, in vote no. 550 of 9:55 a.m. on August 15, 2007, it was said: “V.- Which public employees are excluded from collective bargaining, that is, which are the ones whose path to collective labor law, to establish their employment conditions, is closed? The doctrine of the commentary ruling, No. 4453-2000, follows a classificatory or taxonomic orientation of rights; according to which there would be groups of employees who would be excluded from the collective bargaining agreements that are entered into. The majority of this Chamber understands that these employees are those who participate in public administration functions (gestión pública), that is, those who lead and direct the powers of the State, the heads of autonomous institutions, executive presidencies, as well as the heads (managerial group) of State enterprises, etc., which is due to the need to ensure the continuity of the functioning of the Public Administration, constituted by the State, and the other public entities (Articles 1 and 4 of the General Public Administration Act), as well as to avoid conflicts of interest due to the dual condition of workers and heads of the Administration. Also excluded would be those employees who, due to their participation in collective bargaining, may be directly benefited from those negotiations, an issue that is certainly not advisable. (Cf. Constitutional Chamber, ruling No. 2531-94 of 3:42 p.m. on May 31, 1994). Executive Decree No. 29576 of May 31, 2001, called Regulation for the Negotiation of Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Public Sector, provides in its Article 6, paragraph 2: 'No person who is to currently or potentially receive any benefit from the collective bargaining agreement that is signed may form part of that delegation (employer representation)'. Translated all of the above to the municipal sphere, only those responsible for public administration functions would then be excluded from the norms of a collective bargaining, such as the municipal mayor, the council members, district councilors, who are officials elected by popular vote (Article 586, paragraph 2, of the Labor Code, in relation to 12 and 14 of the Municipal Code, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998), and members of the municipal government (Article 169 of the Political Constitution, and 3 of the Municipal Code), the same as those officials who, by the exercise of their positions, have had direct participation in the negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement”. This interpretation is harmonious with what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, which, by recognizing the possibility of collective bargaining in municipal corporations, strengthened this right for its workers, and therefore, a restrictive interpretation in this area (adjusted to the statutory regime that governs them), would lead us to completely empty it of its minimum essential content, which in the end would be contrary to the very theory of the progressivity of fundamental rights (according to which there is a duty of the State, to achieve increasingly higher levels in the satisfaction of social rights through graduality and progressivity, avoiding all kinds of regressive measures in their satisfaction) developed by the High Constitutional Court in its jurisprudence (see on this point, from the Constitutional Chamber, votes nos. 2771 of 11:40 a.m. on April 4, 2003, 10553 of 2:54 p.m. on July 1, 2009, 4806 of 2:50 p.m. on March 10, 2010).“ 5.- The representative of the defendant municipality filed an appeal before this Chamber in a brief dated June eighteenth, two thousand ten, which is based on the grounds that will be set forth in the recitals section.

6.- The prescriptions and terms of law have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge Vega Robert; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- BACKGROUND: Mr. [Nombre1] filed an ordinary lawsuit against the Municipality of Tibás, claiming that he provided services to that municipal corporation as a legal advisor since 1984, first on an ad hoc basis, and later (since 1986), as a “public employee (funcionario)”, working a quarter-time shift, which corresponded to the duration of the Municipal Council sessions, which he advised. He stated that at the beginning of the employment relationship —by virtue of the fact that the defendant entity did not have a legal department— he had to advise its different units (including the Municipal Council and the Executive —now the mayor—). He reported that from the beginning of the employment relationship, he remained covered by the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva de trabajo) in force at the defendant municipality, in his capacity as an employee assigned to the institution’s General Administration and Management. He indicated that after the gradual implementation of a Legal Department in the defendant entity, he continued with his duties and set schedule, with direct payment from the administration, and consequently under the command of the Municipal Executive —now the mayor—. He stated that he did not hold any managerial or section-head position, but rather that of an attorney who was part of the administration, without receiving payment for exclusivity, availability, or full-time dedication for his duties. He said the last salary received was twenty-seven thousand nine hundred colones per week, in addition to receiving payment for school salary in the month of January. He expressed that at the end of 2006, he requested the mayor’s office to prepare a draft calculation of his severance pay in order to avail himself of Article 46 of the collective bargaining agreement, an aspect that was endorsed by the Legal Department of the defendant entity, which, through official letter No. LI.057-2007, dated January 23, 2007, clarified that the payment of unemployment benefits (cesantía) was applicable in the event he submitted his resignation in accordance with the provisions of the conventional norm. He pointed out that, protected by that opinion, he submitted his resignation; however, the payment of his severance was suspended by the defendant, claiming that a query was pending before the Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República) regarding the applicability of the payment of such items. Finally, he reported that on November 22, 2007, he was notified by the defendant’s Personnel Department, through official letter D.E.P. 702-2007, of Opinion C-271-2007 issued by the Attorney General’s Office, which stipulated that the legal advisors of municipalities are not covered by the norms of the respective collective bargaining agreements. He argued that this was used by the mayor to deny him payment of the unemployment benefits item derived from numeral 46 of the collective bargaining agreement in force at the defendant municipal corporation. The foregoing implied —in his opinion— that he was not paid —for this concept— the sum of exactly two million seven hundred forty thousand colones (folios 1 to 7). The defendant responded negatively to the lawsuit. It argued that the refusal to pay the claimant the unemployment benefits item derived from numeral 46 of the collective bargaining agreement signed between that entity and the representatives of its workers, was due to the existence of a pronouncement emanating from the Attorney General’s Office (No. C-271-2007), which stipulated that the legal advisors of the Municipality of Tibás are not covered by the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement, regardless of whether they have not been expressly excluded from its scope of application. It was also stipulated that since unemployment assistance is an expectation of a right, it does not constitute a vested right that must be recognized for any of its attorneys. Based on these arguments, it raised the defense of lack of right (folios 42 to 49). The first-instance judgment partially granted the lawsuit, ordering the payment of two million seven hundred forty thousand colones for the concept of unemployment assistance in accordance with the provisions of numeral 46 of the collective bargaining agreement in force at the defendant entity; as well as the payment of interest on said sum, equivalent to that generated by six-month term deposits at the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, from March 24, 2007, until its effective payment, resolving the matter without a special award of costs (folios 80 to 87). The defendant filed an appeal (folios 90 to 93), and the tribunal affirmed the decision (folios 112 to 114).

II.- GRIEVANCES: Before the Chamber, the defendant party files a cassation appeal against the second-instance judgment. In summary, it argues that the municipal administration, prior to paying the claimant the benefit derived from Article 46 of the collective bargaining agreement in force at the entity (payment of the unemployment assistance item upon resignation), consulted the Attorney General’s Office to determine the legality and applicability of the payment. It states that in view of the conclusions reached by the advisory body in its opinion (according to which the legal advisors of municipal corporations are excluded from the scope of application of the agreement, because they influence the negotiation process of the collective instrument, as well as because they perform public administration (gestión pública) —regardless of whether such exclusion has not been expressly included in the collective agreement—, and it cannot be considered that a vested right exists in their favor, as unemployment assistance constitutes a mere expectation of a right), the claimant’s demand was denied. As a second element to support its appeal, it points out that in the relationship that existed with Mr. [Nombre1], one of the essential elements of an employment contract was missing, namely subordination. Based on these arguments, it requests “… that the appealed resolution be annulled and that Opinion C-271-2007 be upheld”. (Folios 122 to 125).

III.- LIMITATION OF THE APPEAL DUE TO PRECLUSION: Articles 598 and 608 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), applicable to this matter by virtue of the provisions of numeral 452 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), establish the conditions that regulate the admissibility of the appeal. In accordance with the former, a party that has not appealed the first-instance ruling may not bring the appeal, when the judgment of the appellate body is exclusively confirmatory. Likewise, according to Article 608, those questions that have not been timely raised or debated by the parties cannot be the subject of the appeal. It has been repeatedly indicated that the grievances formulated before this Chamber, in order to be heard, must have been presented before the judges of the preceding instances; and, in addition, they must necessarily have been invoked, previously, before the second-instance jurisdictional body, when the judgment issued by it is merely confirmatory of the first-instance one and contrary to the party appealing before the Chamber. Consequently, the competence of this Chamber is limited by virtue of the principle of preclusion, as claims not timely formulated before the tribunal that heard and resolved the appeal cannot be raised before it. (In the same sense, see, among others, judgments numbers 489, at 10:20 a.m. on June 4, 2008; 347, at 3:10 p.m. on June 6; 368, at 3:20 p.m. on June 13; and 605, at 11:05 a.m. on August 29, all from 2007). The appellant partly bases the appeal in this instance on the argument that no employment relationship existed because the element of subordination was absent. A review of the briefs answering the lawsuit (folios 42 to 49) and the appeal brief that it timely filed against the first-instance judgment (folios 90 to 93), allows us to determine that these arguments to sustain its disagreement with the claimant’s demand, regarding the payment of unemployment assistance in accordance with numeral 46 of the collective bargaining agreement in force, were never part of the debate; moreover, it has been a non-controverted fact that Mr. [Nombre1] Sandí worked in a subordinate manner for the Municipality of Tibás (see response to facts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the lawsuit), and there is abundant documentary evidence in this regard in the worker’s administrative file (personnel actions reflecting salary increases, payment of annual bonuses, recognition of vacations, payment of school salary, verbal and written reprimands, etc.). Consequently, preclusion has operated in this regard, and this Court cannot address this discussion at this stage of the process.

IV.- ON THE SUBJECTIVE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO IN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: Our Political Constitution, in its chapter on “Social Rights and Guarantees”, enshrines the protection of union freedom in its three spheres (freedom to associate in autonomous organizations defending the rights of workers or employers, freedom to bargain collectively, and freedom to exercise the right to strike and lockout), as an essential element contributing to the sustainability of the social and rule-of-law system that governs our country. Thus, Article 60 of the Magna Carta provides: “Both employers and workers may unionize freely, for the exclusive purpose of obtaining and conserving economic, social, or professional benefits./Foreigners are prohibited from exercising direction or authority in unions.” For its part, numeral 62 raises the right to engage in collective bargaining to constitutional rank, when it states: “Collective bargaining agreements (convenciones colectivas de trabajo) that, in accordance with the law, are entered into between employers or unions of employers and legally organized unions of workers, shall have the force of law.” As part of the strengthening of the constitutionality block in matters of freedom of association, our country has signed a series of international treaties guaranteeing the protection of that freedom for lawful purposes for all persons, logically including workers, as does the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Bogotá, May 1948) in its Article XXII.- “Every person has the right to associate with others to promote, exercise and protect his legitimate interests of a political, economic, religious, social, cultural, professional, labor union or any other nature.” In the same sense, Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Paris, December 1948), recognizes the right of association: Article 20.1- “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.” For its part, Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, December 1966) states, in what is relevant: Article 22.- “1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” Expanding on the subject, Article 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, November 1969), provides: Article 16. “1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes.” Likewise, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has taken an interest in reaffirming this right —specifically referring to the freedom of association for the defense of trade union or professional interests—, adopting Conventions and Recommendations, seeking that States recognize it and, in turn, implement effective mechanisms for its protection. In that vein, the country has ratified, and they are fully in force as part of the domestic legal system, Convention 87, concerning the freedom of association and protection of the right to organize; and Convention 98, concerning the application of the principles of the right to organize and to bargain collectively (both ratified by Law number 2561, of May 11, 1960). Now, in accordance with the jurisprudence emanating from the Constitutional Chamber itself, which equally integrates that constitutionality block (Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction), the right of workers who work for any state agency (organized under a public or private law regime) to enter into collective bargaining agreements has nuances that differentiate it from the exercise of this right in the realm of private employment, in consideration of the special nature governing the relationship of the State with its servants or workers. Thus, Ruling 1696-92 at 3:30 p.m. on August 23, 1992, provided: “XI. In the opinion of the Chamber, then, Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, substantiate the existence, in principle, of an employment regime governed by Public Law within the public sector, as has become clear from the debate in the National Constituent Assembly and which the General Law of Public Administration incipiently collects. This public employment regime necessarily implies consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, no longer only distinct from those of (private) labor law, but often opposed to them. Obviously, the declaration contained in this judgment covers the employment relationship that exists between the public administration (or rather, administrations) and its servants, but in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that refers to a private employment regime, the solution must be different. In those cases, there would be a submission to arbitration procedures, but with certain limitations, such as that they cannot dispense with or make exceptions to current laws, regulations, or governmental directives, so that even in these cases, decisions (awards) in good conscience would not be applicable, nor tribunals formed by subjects who are not lawyers.” Thus, the constitutional court first establishes a difference between the exercise of the collective rights of State servants and workers subject to a private employment regime, and likewise makes a distinction regarding access to the exercise of collective labor rights within the Public Administration, between workers who perform public administration (gestión pública) and those who, even though working for a state agency, are considered workers subject to common labor law, establishing the prohibition of signing collective bargaining agreements for the former, but not for the latter. This position was reaffirmed in Ruling 3053 at 9:45 a.m. on June 24, 1994, where, specifically referring to the possibility of signing collective bargaining agreements in state agencies, it indicated: “(…) It is not appropriate to grant, because it has already been resolved to the contrary in the mentioned unconstitutionality action, the protection requested regarding the denial of collective bargaining opposed to the ‘public servants’ of [Nombre3]. But it is possible to protect the appealing Union in that the resolution of the Attorney General’s Office of June 24, 1993 (see folios 134 to 139), should have reconsidered ex officio the opinion rendered on December 12, 1985 (subsection b) of Article 3 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General’s Office) and distinguished between public officials (funcionarios públicos) and workers who do not participate in the public administration of the administration, because subjecting them all to the aforementioned prohibition contradicts the ruling cited several times and the guarantee provided in Article 62 of the Political Constitution, obviously on the understanding that determining the category of workers who do not participate in the public administration of the administration is a matter of mere legality.” (Highlighting is not from the original). Subsequently, by virtue of a constitutional query formulated by this Court, the Constitutional Chamber, in its Ruling 4453-2000 at 2:56 p.m. on May 24, 2000, following the trend set by the previously transcribed rulings, concludes that: “Based on all the foregoing and by way of summary, the Chamber arrives at the following conclusions: in the exercise of the competence of the maximum interpreter of the Political Constitution, when examining the issue of the organization and administrative structure of the State and of the applicability or not of collective bargaining agreements in the public sector, the Chamber cannot limit itself, solely, to the application of the provisions that make up the Chapter of the so-called ‘Social Guarantees’. It is also necessary to examine that legal institution in coordination with the principles contained in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution; in carrying out this exercise, one acquires the full conviction that the will of the constituent, following the historical line of development of Labor Law institutions, was to abstract the servants of the public sector from the general rules that inform Collective Labor Law, subjecting it to a special public employment relation, also and commonly called ‘statutory relation’, which is governed by Public Law. This undoubtedly implies, and as a general thesis, that no public official can negotiate his conditions of employment as if it were a contractual nexus subject to Labor Law. However, the development of legal ideas, the adoption of the conventions promoted by the International Labor Organization and the jurisprudence of this Chamber, have led the evolution of the institutions involved to the level of admitting as compatible with Constitutional Law, the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the category of employees and servants who, despite being part of the public sector, govern their relations by Labor Law, especially in terms of the definitions contained in Articles 111 and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, that is, when it concerns State economic enterprises or services charged with activities subject to common Law, as well as service relations with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public administration of the Administration and who are governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be. It is in this sense that the query is answered, but warning, indeed, that it is up to the Administration itself, to legal operators in general, and ultimately to the Judge, when hearing specific cases, to determine whether a State institution or a group of its servants or officials, form the core of the exception that can bargain collectively, or if, on the contrary, that path is forbidden to them. And finally, according to what the Attorney General’s Office has expressed in its report, which this Chamber also accepts, the personnel working in the country’s Municipalities are limited in collective bargaining, under the terms of this judgment, because, unless there is proof to the contrary, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship. (…)” (highlighted by the drafter). From what has been expressed by the high Constitutional Tribunal, it can be concluded that the possibility of negotiating collective bargaining agreements is not limited for every worker who works for the administration, but only for those who, from their position, carry out “public administration (gestión pública)”. Thus, by way of example, the Constitutional Chamber has said that those who work for State companies can bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions that inform Collective Labor Law, as is the case of the Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica “JAPDEVA” (Ruling No. 6730 at 2:45 p.m. on May 17, 2002), likewise those who work for the “economic services of the State” in charge of matters subject to common Law, as occurs with the Junta de Protección Social (Ruling No. 6727 at 2:52 p.m. on May 17, 2006), public universities (Ruling No. 1144 at 3:21 p.m. on January 30, 2007), state banks (Ruling No. 1145 at 3:22 p.m. on January 30, 2007), municipal corporations (Ruling No. 18485 at 6:02 p.m. on December 19, 2007), Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo S.A. “RECOPE” (Rulings Nos. 2000-7730 at 2:47 p.m. on August 30, 2000, and 3936 at 2:49 p.m. on March 12, 2008).

Now, the identification of workers excluded from the possibility of collective bargaining, and therefore, from benefiting from the rights incorporated into these types of collective instruments, has been defined by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself as a matter of mere legality, whose determination corresponds to the administration itself and, ultimately, to the judge. In that sense, this Chamber, in strict adherence to the provisions of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), has issued certain parameters in response to specific cases to define whether a particular State worker (or group of workers) is or is not able to define, through the instrument of collective bargaining, their employment conditions, always starting from the premise set by the Constitutional Chamber, which reaffirms the possibility of collective bargaining for laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management (gestión pública) of the administration, as well as for employees of State economic enterprises or services responsible for activities subject to common law. (See in this regard from this Chamber, vote no. 0008 at 10:05 a.m. on January 6, 2010). Specifically referring to the subjective scope of application of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), once the possibility of signing this type of agreement in municipal corporations has been recognized (under the protection of the constitutionality block), this Chamber has established which municipal officials are excluded from the application of the collective instrument, based on the particularities associated with the type of work performed by the person for the local government, so that those who are responsible for carrying out the public management of the municipality, or those who execute acts of government, may not benefit from the conventional norms in force in the municipal entity.

Thus, in vote no. 550 at 9:55 a.m. on August 15, 2007, it was stated: “V.- Which public servants are excluded from collective bargaining, that is, which are those who have the avenue of collective labor law closed to them for establishing their employment conditions? The doctrine of the commentary judgment, No. 4453-2000, follows a classificatory or taxonomic orientation of rights; according to which there would be groups of servants who would be excluded from the collective bargaining agreements that are concluded. The majority of this Chamber understands that these servants are those who participate in public management, that is, those who lead and direct the branches of State power, the heads of autonomous institutions, executive presidencies, as well as the heads (managerial group) of State enterprises, etc., which is due to the need to ensure the continuity of the functioning of the Public Administration, constituted by the State and other public entities (Articles 1 and 4 of the General Law of Public Administration, Ley General de Administración Pública), as well as to avoid conflicts of interest due to the dual condition of workers and heads of the Administration. Also excluded would be those servants who, due to their participation in collective bargaining, may be directly benefited from those negotiations, a situation which is of course not advisable. (Cf. Constitutional Chamber, judgment No. 2531-94 at 3:42 p.m. on May 31, 1994). Executive Decree No. 29576 of May 31, 2001, called the Regulation for the Negotiation of Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Public Sector, provides in its Article 6, paragraph 2: ‘No person who is currently or potentially to receive any benefit from the collective bargaining agreement to be signed may form part of that delegation (employer representation).’ Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), No. 8422 of October 6, 2004, incorporates this doctrine in the following terms: ‘Article 48.- Legislation or administration for one's own benefit. … The same shall apply to whoever favors their spouse, partner, or cohabitant or their relatives, even up to the third degree of consanguinity or affinity, or favors themselves, with patrimonial benefits contained in collective bargaining agreements, in whose negotiation they have participated as a representative of the employer party’. Translated all of the above to the municipal sphere, those excluded from the norms of collective bargaining would then be only those responsible for public management, such as the municipal mayor, the council members (regidores), district councilors (síndicos), who are officials of popular election (Article 586, paragraph 2, of the Labor Code, in relation to Articles 12 and 14 of the Municipal Code, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998), and members of the municipal government (Article 169 of the Political Constitution, and Article 3 of the Municipal Code), as well as those officials who, by the exercise of their positions, have had direct participation in the negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement.” This interpretation is harmonious with what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, which, upon recognizing the possibility of collective bargaining in municipal corporations, strengthened this right for their workers, and therefore, a restrictive interpretation in this area (adjusted to the statutory regime that governs them) would lead us to completely empty it of its essential minimum content, which would ultimately be contrary to the very theory of the progressivity of fundamental rights (according to which there is a duty of the State to achieve increasingly higher levels in the satisfaction of social rights through gradualism and progressivity, avoiding all types of regressive measures in their satisfaction) developed by the High Constitutional Court in its jurisprudence (see on this matter, from the Constitutional Chamber, votes nos. 2771 at 11:40 a.m. on April 4, 2003, 10553 at 2:54 p.m. on July 1, 2009, 4806 at 2:50 p.m. on March 10, 2010). Having said the above, we must now carry out an analysis of the specific case, to verify if the plaintiff falls within the assumptions for exclusion from the collective bargaining agreement in force at the time his employment relationship with the Municipality of Tibás ended.

V.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE: Upon analyzing the conventional norm signed between the Municipality of Tibás and the Union of Municipal Workers of Costa Rica (Sindicato de Trabajadores Municipales de Costa Rica), in force at the time the employment relationship that bound the plaintiff to that municipal corporation ended, it can be verified that the collective agreement does not expressly contain a category of workers excluded from the conventional benefits. In this regard, its Article 3 provides: “This Agreement has the character of professional law:/ A-) for the parties that sign it. B-) For all persons who, at the time of its entry into force, work in the Municipality./ C-) For all those who in the future enter to work in the service of the Municipality.” Therefore, in accordance with the provisions on this matter in the votes of the Constitutional Chamber cited in the preceding recital (considerando), it is the task of the ordinary jurisdiction to determine—in the specific case—if the worker was covered by the professional norm. Once the facts of the lawsuit have been assessed in light of the evidence in the record, the Chamber concludes that the plaintiff was always covered by the benefits of the Collective Labor Agreement, as he states in his complaint (third fact visible on folio 7) and as the defendant entity accepts in its response (see folio 42). An aspect that, in turn, finds absolute support in the documentary evidence contained in the plaintiff's personnel file, especially in the personnel actions that show how vacations, annual increases, recognition of salary bonuses for seniority, etc., were governed by the provisions of the conventional norm (see file of the administrative record). Therefore, if the defendant administratively always recognized that the worker fell within the scope of application of that instrument, and now intends that the benefit related to the payment of severance assistance for resignation (auxilio de cesantía) not be applied to him, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 46 of the professional norm, it had to prove—in accordance with the provisions of numeral 371 of the Civil Procedure Code, which is of supplementary application in this case in accordance with the provisions of Article 452 of the Labor Code—during the proceeding, that Mr. [Name 1] Sandí occupied a management position in which he executed “public management,” or that he participated by advising the employer representative during the process of signing the collective agreement, both aspects of which are completely devoid of evidence. Thus, there are no elements of judgment that allow this Chamber to vary what was resolved in preceding instances, not for the reasons expressed therein (related to the workday and the non-payment of salary bonuses for prohibition, exclusive dedication, or availability, aspects that are in no way related to the nature of the functions performed by the plaintiff for the municipality), but because the defendant did not demonstrate—as was its procedural duty—that by virtue of the functions performed by the plaintiff for the municipality, he should be understood as excluded from the application of the conventional benefits.

VI.- As a corollary of the foregoing, there being no reason whatsoever to uphold the grievances of the defendant party, the proper course is to confirm the appealed judgment in all its aspects.

POR TANTO

The appealed judgment is confirmed.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Rolando Vega Robert Eva María Camacho Vargas Ana Luisa Meseguer Monge cgutic 2 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Electronic Mail: [...]. and [...]

*080000140166LA* *[Placa1]* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2010-001277 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas treinta y dos minutos del nueve de setiembre de dos mil diez.

Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, por [Nombre1] , contra MUNICIPALIDAD DE TIBÁS, representada por su alcalde el licenciado Jorge Salas Bonilla. Ambos mayores, casados y abogados y vecinos de San José.

RESULTANDO:

1.- El actor, en escrito fechado veintiuno de diciembre de dos mil siete, promovió la presente acción para que en sentencia se condenara a la demandada al pago de cesantía conforme al numeral 46 de la Convención Colectiva de Trabajo que rige en dicha institución, intereses y ambas costas del proceso.

2.- El alcalde municipal contestó en los términos que indicó en el memorial de fecha diecinueve de febrero de dos mil ocho y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho.

3.- El juez, licenciado José Francisco López Chaverri, por sentencia de las diez horas nueve minutos del veintitrés de febrero de dos mil nueve, dispuso: De conformidad con lo expuesto, ordinales 15, 452, 490, 495; artículos 3 y 46 de la Convención Colectiva de la Municipalidad se declara CON LUGAR PARCIALMENTE la demanda interpuesta por [Nombre1] , portador de la cédula de identidad número CED1 contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE TIBÁS, representada [Nombre2] . Se rechaza la defensa de falta de derecho. Deberá la municipalidad demandada, cancelarle al accionante el pago del extremo de cesantía conforme a las previsiones del numeral 46 de la Convención Colectiva de Trabajo que rige dicha entidad, en la suma final de dos millones setecientos cuarenta mil colones. Asimismo sobre la totalidad de la suma, deberá reconocerse intereses que serán iguales a los que generen los depósitos a plazo de seis meses del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, a partir del 24 de marzo de 2007 y hasta su efectivo pago. Sobre las costas, se resuelve el presente asunto sin especial condenatoria.

4.- La parte demandada apeló y el Tribunal de Trabajo, Sección Cuarta, Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, integrado por los licenciados Óscar Ugalde Miranda, Ana Ruth Fallas Gómez e Ingrid Gregory Wang, por sentencia de las dieciocho horas veinticinco minutos del veintitrés de abril de dos mil diez, resolvió: En la tramitación de este asunto, no se observan defectos u omisiones capaces de producir nulidad o indefensión a las partes. Se confirma la sentencia recurrida.

5.- El representante de la municipalidad demandada formuló recurso para ante esta Sala en memorial de data dieciocho de junio de dos mil diez, el cual se fundamenta en los motivos que se dirán en la parte considerativa.

6.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones y términos de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Vega Robert; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- ANTECEDENTES: El señor [Nombre1] estableció demanda ordinaria contra la Municipalidad de Tibás, aduciendo que brindó servicios para esa corporación municipal como asesor legal desde el año 1984, primero de forma ad hoc, y luego (desde el año 1986), como “funcionario”, laborando en jornada de un cuarto de tiempo, la cual correspondía a la duración de las sesiones del Consejo Municipal, al que asesoraba. Manifestó que al inicio de la relación laboral –en virtud de que la entidad accionada no contaba con un departamento legal– debió asesorar a sus diferentes dependencias (entre ellas al Consejo Municipal y al Ejecutivo –hoy alcalde-). Refirió que desde el inicio de la relación laboral permaneció amparado por los beneficios de la convención colectiva de trabajo que rige en la municipalidad demandada, en su condición de empleado adscrito a la Dirección y Administración General de la institución. Indicó que tras la paulatina implementación de un Departamento Legal en la entidad accionada, él siguió con sus funciones y horario determinado, con pago directo de la administración, y por consiguiente bajo el mando del Ejecutivo Municipal –hoy alcalde-. Manifestó que no ocupó ningún cargo de jefatura o de encargado de sección, sino el de abogado parte de la administración, sin recibir por sus funciones pago de prohibición, disponibilidad o dedicación exclusiva. Dijo que el último salario percibido fue de veintisiete mil novecientos colones semanales, además de recibir el pago por salario escolar en el mes de enero. Expresó que a finales del año 2006, solicitó al despacho del señor alcalde que se realizara un borrador del cálculo de sus prestaciones con el fin de acogerse al artículo 46 de la convención colectiva, aspecto que fue avalado por el Departamento Legal de la entidad accionada, la cual mediante oficio n° LI.057-2007, de fecha 23 enero de 2007, aclaró que si procedía el pago de la cesantía en la eventualidad en que presentara su renuncia de conformidad con lo dispuesto en la norma convencional. Señaló que amparado en ese dictamen presentó su renuncia, sin embargo, se dejó en suspenso el pago de sus prestaciones por parte de la demandada, alegando que existía pendiente una consulta ante la Procuraduría General de la República respecto de la procedencia del pago de tales extremos. Finalmente, refirió que el 22 de noviembre de 2007, fue notificado por el Departamento de Personal de la accionada mediante oficio D.E.P. 702-2007, del dictamen C-271-2007 emitido por la Procuraduría, en el que se dispuso que los asesores legales de las municipalidades no se encuentran cubiertos por las normas de las respectivas convenciones colectivas, argumentó que fue empleado por el alcalde para negarle el pago del extremo de cesantía derivado del numeral 46 de la convención colectiva vigente en la corporación municipal accionada. Lo anterior implicó –según su criterio– que se le haya dejado de cancelar –por ese concepto- la suma de dos millones setecientos cuarenta mil colones exactos (folios 1 a 7). La demandada contestó de forma negativa la demanda. Argumentó que la negativa para pagarle al actor el extremo de cesantía derivado del numeral 46 de la convención colectiva suscrita entre esa entidad y los representantes de sus trabajadores, obedeció a la existencia de un pronunciamiento emanado de la Procuraduría General de la República (el n° C-271-2007), en el que se dispuso que los asesores legales de la Municipalidad de Tibás no se encuentran cubiertos por los beneficios de la convención colectiva, independientemente de que no hayan sido excluidos de su ámbito de aplicación de forma expresa. Igualmente se dispuso que al ser el auxilio de cesantía una expectativa de derecho, no constituye un derecho adquirido que le deba ser reconocido a ninguno de sus abogados. Con base en estos argumentos opuso la excepción de falta de derecho (folios 42 a 49). La sentencia de primera instancia declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda, ordenando el pago de dos millones setecientos cuarenta mil colones por concepto de auxilio de cesantía de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el numeral 46 de la convención colectiva de trabajo que rige en la entidad demandada; así como al pago de intereses sobre dicha suma, iguales a los que generen los depósitos a plazo de seis meses del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, a partir del 24 de marzo de 2007 y hasta su efectivo pago, resolviendo el asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas (folios 80 a 87). La demandada interpuso recurso de apelación (folios 90 a 93), y el tribunal impartió confirmatoria (folios 112 a 114).

II.- AGRAVIOS: Ante la Sala, la parte demandada interpone recurso de casación contra la sentencia de segunda instancia. En resumen, aduce que la administración municipal de previo a cancelarle al actor el beneficio derivado del artículo 46 de la convención colectiva de trabajo vigente en la entidad (pago del extremo de auxilio de cesantía por renuncia), realizó consulta a la Procuraduría General de la República para determinar la legalidad y procedencia del pago. Manifiesta que en vista de las conclusiones a las que arribó el órgano asesor en su dictamen (según las cuales los asesores jurídicos de las corporaciones municipales se encuentran excluidos del ámbito de aplicación de la convención, por influir en el proceso de negociación del instrumento colectivo, así como por realizar gestión pública –sin importar que tal exclusión no se haya incluido expresamente en el pacto colectivo-, sin que pueda considerarse la existencia de un derecho adquirido a su favor, al constituir el auxilio de cesantía una mera expectativa de derecho) se procedió a denegar el reclamo del actor. Como segundo elemento para sustentar su recurso señala, que en la relación que existió con el señor [Nombre1], se extrañó uno de los elementos esenciales del contrato de trabajo como lo es la subordinación. Con fundamentos en estos argumentos solicita “… se anule la resolución recurrida y se confirme el Dictamen C-271-2007”. (Folios 122 a 125).

III.- LIMITACIÓN DEL RECURSO POR PRECLUSIÓN: Los artículos 598 y 608 del Código Procesal Civil, aplicables a esta materia por lo dispuesto en el numeral 452 del de Trabajo, establecen las condiciones que regulan la admisibilidad del recurso. De conformidad con el primero, no podrá incoarlo la parte que no haya apelado el fallo de primera instancia, cuando la sentencia del órgano de alzada sea exclusivamente confirmatoria. Asimismo, según el artículo 608, no podrán ser objeto del recurso aquellas cuestiones que no hayan sido oportunamente propuestas ni debatidas por las partes. De forma reiterada se ha indicado que los agravios formulados ante esta Sala, para ser atendidos, deben haberse expuesto ante los juzgadores de las instancias precedentes; y, además, deben necesariamente haber sido invocados, previamente, ante el órgano jurisdiccional de segunda instancia, cuando la sentencia por éste emitida sea meramente confirmatoria de la de primera instancia y contraria a quien recurre ante la Sala. Consecuentemente, la competencia de esta Sala se ve limitada en virtud del principio de preclusión, al no poderse plantear ante ella los reclamos no formulados oportunamente ante el tribunal que conoció y resolvió la apelación. (En el mismo sentido pueden consultarse, entre otras, las sentencias números 489, de las 10:20 horas del 04 de junio del año 2008; la 347, de las 15:10 horas del 6 de junio; 368, de las 15:20 horas del 13 de junio y 605, de las 11:05 horas del 29 de agosto, todas de 2007). La parte recurrente fundamenta, en parte, el recurso en esta instancia, alegando la inexistencia de relación laboral por encontrarse ausente en elemento de la subordinación. La revisión de los memoriales de contestación de demanda (folios 42 a 49) y del escrito de apelación que oportunamente presentara contra la sentencia de primera instancia (folios 90 a 93), permite determinar que estos argumentos para sostener su inconformidad con el reclamo del actor, respecto del pago del auxilio de cesantía de conformidad con el numeral 46 de la convención colectiva de trabajo vigente, nunca formaron parte del debate, es más, ha sido un hecho no controvertido que el señor [Nombre1] Sandí laboró de forma subordinada para la Municipalidad de Tibás (ver contestación a los hechos 1, 3, 4, 5 y 6 de la demanda), y existe abundante prueba documental en ese sentido en el expediente administrativo del trabajador (acciones de personal que reflejan los aumentos de sueldo, el pago de anualidades, el reconocimiento de vacaciones, pago de salario escolar, amonestaciones verbales y escritas, etc.). En consecuencia, al respecto ha operado preclusión, sin que esta Cámara pueda abordar a estas alturas del proceso esa discusión.

IV.- SOBRE EL ÁMBITO SUBJETIVO DE APLICACIÓN DE LAS CONVENCIONES COLECTIVAS CELEBRADAS EN LAS CORPORACIONES MUNICIPALES: Nuestra Constitución Política en su capítulo sobre “Derechos y Garantías Sociales”, consagra la protección de la libertad sindical en sus tres esferas (libertad de asociarse a organizaciones autónomas de defensa de los derechos de las personas trabajadoras o empleadoras, libertad de negociar colectivamente, y libertad del ejercicio del derecho de huelga y paro patronal), como un elemento esencial que contribuye al sostenimiento del sistema social y de derecho que rige nuestro país. Así el artículo 60 de la Carta Magna dispone: “Tanto los patronos como los trabajadores podrán sindicalizarse libremente, con el fin exclusivo de obtener y conservar beneficios económicos, sociales o profesionales./Queda prohibido a los extranjeros ejercer dirección o autoridad en los sindicatos”. Por su parte el numeral 62 eleva a rango constitucional el derecho a celebrar negociaciones colectivas, al referir que: “Tendrán fuerza de ley las convenciones colectivas de trabajo que, con arreglo a la ley, se concierten entre patronos o sindicatos de patronos y sindicatos de trabajadores legalmente organizados”. Como parte del fortalecimiento del bloque de constitucionalidad en materia de libertad de asociación nuestro país ha suscrito una serie de tratados internacionales en los que se garantiza la protección de esa libertad para fines lícitos para todas las personas, incluyendo lógicamente a las personas trabajadoras, tal y como lo hace la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre (Bogotá, mayo de 1948) en su artículo XXII.- “Toda persona tiene el derecho de asociarse con otras para promover, ejercer y proteger sus intereses legítimos, de orden político, económico, religioso, social, cultural, profesional, sindical o de cualquier otro orden". En igual sentido el artículo 20 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos (París, diciembre de 1948), reconoce el derecho de asociación: Artículo 20.1- Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad de reunión y de asociación pacífica. Por su parte el artículo 22 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (New York, diciembre de 1966) dice en lo que interesa: Artículo 22.- 1.- Toda persona tiene derecho a asociarse libremente con otras, incluso el derecho a formar sindicatos y afiliarse a ellos para la protección de sus intereses. Abundando en el tema el artículo 16 de la Convención Americana sobre los Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José, noviembre de 1969), dispone: Artículo 16. 1- Todas las personas tienen derecho a asociarse libremente con fines ideológicos, religiosos, políticos, económicos, laborales, sociales, culturales, deportivos o de cualquier otra índole. También la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (O.I.T.) se ha interesado por reafirmar este derecho –referido concretamente a la libertad de asociación para la defensa de interese gremiales o profesionales-, adoptando Convenios y Recomendaciones, en procura de que los Estados lo reconozcan y, a su vez, pongan en práctica mecanismos efectivos para su tutela. En ese orden de ideas, el país ha ratificado y están plenamente vigentes, como parte del ordenamiento jurídico interno, el Convenio 87, relativo a la libertad sindical y a la protección del derecho de sindicación; y el Convenio 98, relativo a la aplicación de los principios del derecho de sindicación y de negociación colectiva (ambos ratificados por Ley número 2561, del 11 de mayo de 1960). Ahora bien, de conformidad con la jurisprudencia emanada de la propia Sala Constitucional, la cual integra en igual medida ese bloque de constitucionalidad (artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), el derecho de los trabajadores que laboren para alguna dependencia estatal (organizada bajo un régimen de derecho público o privado), para celebrar convenciones colectivas, tiene matices que lo diferencian del ejercicio de este derecho en el ámbito de empleo privado, en atención a la especial naturaleza que rige las relaciones del Estado con sus servidores o trabajadores. Así el voto 1696-92 de las 15:30 horas del 23 de agosto de 1992, dispuso: “XI En opinión de la Sala, entonces, los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política, fundamentan la existencia, de principio, de un régimen de empleo regido por el Derecho Público, dentro del sector público, como ha quedado claro del debate en la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente y recoge incipientemente la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Este régimen de empleo público implica, necesariamente, consecuencias derivadas de la naturaleza de esa relación, con principios generales propios, ya no solamente distintos a los del derecho laboral (privado), sino muchas veces contrapuestos a éstos. Obviamente, la declaración contenida en esta sentencia abarca la relación de empleo que se da entre la administración (o mejor, administraciones) pública y sus servidores, más en aquellos sectores en que hay una regulación (racional) que remita a un régimen privado de empleo, la solución debe ser diferente. En esos casos, se daría un sometimiento a los procedimientos de arbitraje, pero con ciertas limitaciones, tales como que en ellos no pueden dispensarse o excepcionarse leyes, reglamentos o directrices gubernamentales vigentes, por lo que incluso en estos casos no procederían decisiones (laudos) en conciencia, ni tribunales formados por sujetos no abogados”. Así las cosas, el tribunal constitucional establece en primer lugar una diferencia entre el ejercicio de los derechos colectivos de los servidores del Estado y los trabajadores sujetos a un régimen de empleo privado, e igualmente hace una distinción en cuanto al acceso al ejercicio de los derechos laborales colectivos a lo interno de la Administración Pública, entre trabajadores que realizan gestión pública y quienes aún trabajando para una dependencia estatal, se consideran trabajadores sujetos al derecho laboral común, estableciendo vedada la posibilidad de suscribir convenciones colectivas para los primeros, no así para los segundos. Esta posición fue reafirmada en el voto 3053 de las 9:45 horas del 24 de junio de 1994, donde concretamente refiriéndose a la posibilidad de suscribir convenciones colectivas en las dependencias estatales indicó: “(…) No procede acoger, por haber sido ya resuelto en sentido contrario en la acción de inconstitucionalidad mencionada, el amparo pedido en cuanto a la denegatoria de negociación colectiva opuesta a los "servidores públicos" de la [Nombre3]. Pero sí cabe amparar al Sindicato recurrente en cuanto la resolución de la Procuraduría del 24 de junio de l993 (ver folios 134 a 139), debió reconsiderar de oficio el dictamen rendido el 12 de diciembre de l985 (inciso b del artículo 3 de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República) y distinguir entre funcionarios públicos y trabajadores que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración, porque someterlos a todos a la prohibición aludida contradice el fallo varias veces citado y la garantía prevista por el artículo 62 de la Constitución Política, obviamente en el entendido de que la determinación de la categoría de trabajadores que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración es cuestión de mera legalidad”. (Lo destacado no es del original). Más adelante, en virtud de una consulta de constitucionalidad formulada por esta Cámara, la Sala Constitucional en su voto 4453-2000 de las 14:56 horas del 24 de mayo de 2000, siguiendo la tendencia marcada por los votos anteriormente transcritos, concluye que: “Con fundamento en todo lo expuesto y a manera de síntesis, la Sala arriba a las siguientes conclusiones: en el ejercicio de la competencia de máximo intérprete de la Constitución Política, al examinar el tema de la organización y estructura administrativa del Estado y de la procedencia o no de las convenciones colectivas en el sector público, no puede la Sala limitarse, únicamente, a la aplicación de las disposiciones que integran el Capítulo de las llamadas "Garantías Sociales". Se necesita, además, examinar esa institución jurídica en coordinación con los principios contenidos en los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política; al hacer este ejercicio, se adquiere la plena convicción de que la voluntad del constituyente, siguiendo la línea histórica del desarrollo de las instituciones del Derecho Laboral, fue la de abstraer a los servidores del sector público de las reglas generales que informan al Derecho Colectivo del Trabajo, sujetándolo a una relación especial de empleo público, llamada también y comúnmente "relación estatutaria", que se rige por el Derecho Público. Esto implica, sin duda y como tesis general, que ningún funcionario público puede negociar sus condiciones de empleo como si se tratara de un nexo contractual sujeto al Derecho Laboral. Sin embargo, el desarrollo de las ideas jurídicas, la adopción de los convenios impulsados por la Organización Internacional del Trabajo y la jurisprudencia de esta Sala, han conducido la evolución de las instituciones involucradas, al nivel de admitir como compatibles con el Derecho de la Constitución, las convenciones colectivas que negocie la categoría de los empleados y servidores que, no obstante integrar el sector público, rigen sus relaciones por el Derecho Laboral, especialmente en los términos de las definiciones que contienen los artículos 111 y 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, o sea, cuando se trata de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al Derecho común, así como las relaciones de servicio con obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración y que se rigen por el Derecho laboral o mercantil, según los casos. En este sentido es que se evacua la consulta, pero advirtiendo, eso sí, que le corresponde a la propia Administración, a los operadores del Derecho en general y en última instancia al Juez, cuando conocen de los casos específicos, determinar si una institución del Estado o un grupo de sus servidores o funcionarios, conforman el núcleo de la excepción que sí puede negociar colectivamente, o si por el contrario, les está vedado ese camino. Y por último, según lo que ha expresado en su informe la Procuraduría General de la República, que esta Sala también acoge, el personal que se desempeña en las Municipalidades del país, está limitado para la negociación colectiva, en los términos de esta sentencia, pues, salvo prueba en contrario, se trata de servidores públicos, regidos por la relación de empleo público.(…)” (lo destacado es del redactor). De lo expresado por el alto Tribunal Constitucional, puede concluirse que la posibilidad de negociar convenciones colectivas no aparece limitada para todo aquel trabajador que labore para la administración, sino únicamente para quienes desde su cargo desarrollen “la gestión pública”. Así a modo de ejemplo, la Sala Constitucional ha dicho que quienes laboren para las empresas del Estado, sí pueden negociar colectivamente de conformidad con las disposiciones que informan el Derecho Colectivo del Trabajo, como es el caso de la Junta de Administración Portuaria de la Vertiente Atlántica “JAPDEVA” (voto n° 6730 de las 14:45 horas del 17 de mayo de 2002), igualmente quienes trabajen para “los servicios económicos del Estado” encargados de cuestiones sometidas al Derecho común, tal y como ocurre con la Junta de Protección Social (voto n° 6727 de las 14:52 horas del 17 de mayo de 2006), las universidades públicas (voto nº 1144 de las 15:21 horas del 30 de enero de 2007), los bancos estatales (voto n° 1145 de las 15:22 horas del 30 de enero de 2007), las corporaciones municipales (voto nº 18485 de las 18:02 minutos del 19 de diciembre de 2007), la Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo S.A. “RECOPE” (votos nºs 2000-7730 de las 14:47 horas del 30 de agosto de 2000 y 3936 de las 14:49 horas del 12 de marzo de 2008). Ahora bien, la individualización de los trabajadores excluidos de la posibilidad de negociar colectivamente, y por ende, de beneficiarse de los derechos incorporados dentro de este tipo de instrumentos colectivos, ha sido definido por la misma Sala Constitucional como un asunto de mera legalidad, cuya determinación corresponde a la propia administración y en último caso al juez. En ese sentido, esta Sala en estricto apego a lo dispuesto por el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional ha dictado algunos parámetros en atención a casos concretos para definir si determinado trabajador (o grupo de trabajadores) del Estado se encuentra o no posibilitado para definir, a través del instrumento de la negociación colectiva, su condiciones de empleo, partiendo siempre de la premisa sentada por la Sala Constitucional, que reafirma la posibilidad de negociación colectiva que tienen los obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración, así como para los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común. (Ver al respecto de ésta Sala el voto n° 0008 de las 10:05 horas del 6 de enero de 2010). Concretamente refiriéndonos al ámbito de aplicación subjetivo de la Convención Colectiva, una vez que ha sido reconocida la posibilidad de suscribir este tipo de acuerdos en las corporaciones municipales (al amparo del bloque de constitucionalidad), esta Sala ha establecido cuales funcionarios municipales se encuentran al margen de la aplicación del instrumento colectivo, con base a las particularidades asociadas con el tipo de labor que realiza la persona para el gobierno local, así quienes se encarguen de llevar a cabo la gestión pública del municipio, o quienes ejecuten actos de gobierno, no podrán beneficiarse de las normas convencionales vigentes en la entidad municipal. Así en el voto n° 550 de las 9:55 horas del 15 de agosto de 2007 se dijo: “V.- Cuáles servidores públicos están excluidos de la negociación colectiva, es decir, cuáles son los que tienen clausurada la vía del derecho colectivo del trabajo, para establecer las condiciones de su empleo? La doctrina de la sentencia de comentario, Nº 4453-2000, sigue una orientación clasificatoria o taxonómica de derechos; según lo cual existirían grupos de servidores que estarían excluidos de las convenciones colectivas que se celebren. La mayoría de esta Sala entiende que esos servidores son los que participan de la gestión pública, es decir, quienes conducen y dirigen los poderes del Estado, los jerarcas de instituciones autónomas, presidencias ejecutivas, así como los jerarcas (grupo gerencial) de las empresas del Estado, etc., lo que obedece a la necesidad de asegurar la continuidad del funcionamiento de la Administración Pública, constituida por el Estado, y los demás entes públicos (artículos 1º y 4º de la Ley General de Administración Pública), así como para evitar conflictos de intereses por la doble condición de trabajadores y jerarcas de la Administración. También estarían excluidos los servidores que por su participación en las negociaciones colectivas puedan verse directamente beneficiados de esas negociaciones, cuestión que desde luego no es conveniente. (Cfr. Sala Constitucional, sentencia Nº 2531-94 de 15:42 horas de 31 de mayo de 1994). El Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 29576 de 31 de mayo de 2001, denominado Reglamento para la Negociación de Convenciones Colectivas en el Sector Público, dispone en su artículo 6º, párrafo 2º: “No podrá formar parte de esa delegación (representación patronal) ninguna persona que fuere a recibir actual o potencialmente algún beneficio de la convención colectiva que se firme”. La Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, Nº 8422 de 6 de octubre de 2004, recoge esta doctrina en los siguientes términos: “Artículo 48.- Legislación o administración en provecho propio. … Igual se aplicará a quien favorezca a su cónyuge, su compañero, compañera o conviviente o a sus parientes, incluso hasta el tercer grado de consanguinidad o afinidad, o se favorezcan a sí mismo, con beneficios patrimoniales contenidos en convenciones colectivas, en cuya negociación haya participado como representante de la parte patronal”. Traducido todo lo anterior al ámbito municipal, quedarían excluidos entonces de las normas de una negociación colectiva, solamente los responsables de la gestión pública, tales como el alcalde municipal, los regidores, síndicos, quienes son funcionarios de elección popular (artículo 586, párrafo 2º, del Código de Trabajo, en relación con el 12 y 14 del Código Municipal, Ley Nº 7794 de 30 de abril de 1998), e integrantes del gobierno municipal (artículo 169 de la Constitución Política, y 3º del Código Municipal), lo mismo que aquellos funcionarios que por el ejercicio de sus cargos hayan tenido una participación directa en la negociación de la convención colectiva”. Esta interpretación resulta armoniosa con lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional, quien al reconocer la posibilidad de negociar colectivamente en las corporaciones municipales fortaleció este derecho para sus trabajadores, y por ende, una interpretación restrictiva en este ámbito (ajustada al régimen estatutario que los rija), nos llevaría a vaciarlo totalmente de su contenido mínimo esencial, lo que a la postre resultaría contrario a la propia teoría de la progresividad de los derechos fundamentales (según la cual existe un deber del Estado, de lograr niveles cada vez más altos en la satisfacción de los derechos sociales a través de la gradualidad y la progresividad, evitando todo género de medidas regresivas en su satisfacción) desarrollada por el Alto Tribunal Constitucional en su jurisprudencia (ver sobre el particular, de la Sala Constitucional los votos n°s 2771 de las 11:40 horas del 4 de abril de 2003, 10553 de las 14:54 horas del 1° de julio de 2009, 4806 de las 14:50 horas del 10 de marzo de 2010). Dicho lo anterior, debemos ahora efectuar un análisis del caso concreto, para verificar si el actor, se ubica dentro de los supuestos de exclusión de la convención colectiva vigente al momento de finalizar su relación laboral con la Municipalidad de Tibas.

V.- ANÁLISIS DEL CASO CONCRETO: Analizada la norma convencional suscrita entre la Municipalidad de Tibás y el Sindicato de Trabajadores Municipales de Costa Rica, vigente al momento de finalizar la relación laboral que vinculó al actor con esa corporación municipal, puede constatarse que el convenio colectivo no contiene –expresamente– una categoría de trabajadores excluidos de los beneficios convencionales. Al respecto su artículo 3 dispone: “La presente Convención tiene carácter de ley profesional:/ A-) para las partes que la suscriben. B-) Para todas las personas que en el momento de entrar en vigencia trabajan en la Municipalidad./ C-) Para todos los que un futuro entren a trabajar al servicio de Municipalidad”. Por ello, de conformidad con lo dispuesto sobre el particular en los votos de la Sala Constitucional citados en el considerando anterior, es tarea de la jurisdicción ordinaria determinar -en el caso concreto– si el trabajador se encontraba cubierto por la norma profesional. Una vez que han sido valorados los hechos de la demanda a la luz de la prueba que obra en autos, la Sala concluye que el actor siempre estuvo amparado por los beneficios de la Convención Colectiva de Trabajo, tal y como lo afirma en su demanda (hecho tercero visible a folio 7) y lo acepta la entidad demandada en su contestación (ver folio 42). Aspecto que a su vez encuentra absoluto respaldo en la prueba documental que consta en el expediente personal del actor, especialmente en las acciones de personal que muestran como las vacaciones, aumentos anuales, reconocimiento de pluses salariales por antigüedad, etc., se regía por lo dispuesto en la norma convencional (ver legajo del expediente administrativo). Por lo que si la demandada, administrativamente siempre reconoció que el trabajador se ubicaba dentro del ámbito de aplicación de ese instrumento, y ahora pretende que no se le aplique el beneficio relacionado con el pago del auxilio de cesantía por renuncia, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 46 de la norma profesional, debió acreditar –de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 371 del Código Procesal Civil de aplicación supletoria en este caso de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 452 del Código de Trabajo- durante el proceso, que el señor [Nombre1] Sandí ocupaba un cargo de jefatura en el que ejecutaba “gestión pública”, o que participó asesorando al representante patronal durante el proceso de suscripción del acuerdo colectivo, aspectos ambos que se encuentran totalmente ayunos de prueba. Así las cosas, no existen elementos de juicio que le permitan a esta Cámara variar lo resuelto en instancias precedentes, más no por los motivos que allí se expresan (relacionados con la jornada de trabajo y el no pago de pluses salariales por prohibición, dedicación exclusiva o disponibilidad, aspectos que en nada guardan relación con la naturaleza de las funciones que ejecutaba el actor para la municipalidad), sino por cuanto la accionada no demostró –como era su deber procesal– que en virtud de las funciones desempeñadas por el actor para el municipio, éste debía entenderse excluido de la aplicación de los beneficios convencionales.

VI.- Corolario de lo expuesto, no existiendo motivo alguno para acoger los agravios de la parte demandada lo procedente es confirmar la sentencia recurrida en todos sus extremos.

POR TANTO

Se confirma la sentencia recurrida.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Rolando Vega Robert Eva María Camacho Vargas Ana Luisa Meseguer Monge cgutic 2