Applicability of collective bargaining agreement to municipal legal advisorAplicabilidad de convención colectiva al asesor jurídico municipal

*073000210217LA* *[Placa1]* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2010-001162 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at twelve hours and ten minutes on August twelfth, two thousand ten.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Desamparados venue, by [Nombre1], attorney, against the MUNICIPALIDAD DE ASERRÍ, represented by its mayor, attorney Mario Morales Guzmán, single. The attorney Guiselle Mora Cordero, married, acts as special judicial representative of the plaintiff. All are of legal age and residents of San José.

WHEREAS:

1.- The plaintiff, in briefs dated February second and June seventh, two thousand seven, filed this action seeking a judgment ordering the defendant to restore his labor rights and pay severance pay for his entire employment relationship in the amount of e3,572,717.98, as well as damages, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.

2.- The representative of the defendant municipality answered in the terms indicated in the brief dated September eighteenth, two thousand seven, and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, lack of passive standing, and what it termed lack of cause.

3.- The judge, attorney Christian López Mora, by judgment at eight hours thirty minutes on September twenty-second, two thousand eight, ordered: In accordance with all the foregoing and cited legal provisions, the defenses of lack of right, lack of passive standing, lack of cause, and lack of current interest are dismissed. Consequently, the ordinary labor lawsuit filed by [Nombre1] against the MUNICIPALIDAD DE ASERRÍ is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the severance pay established in Article 50 of the Collective Labor Agreement entered into between the Municipalidad de Aserrí and the Sindicato de Trabajadores Municipales de la Provincia de San José, in force at the end of the employment relationship, that is, ninety percent of six months' salary, equivalent to the liquid sum of THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTEEN COLONES AND NINETY-EIGHT CÉNTIMOS. The claim for damages is dismissed as inadmissible. The procedural and personal costs of the action are borne by the defendant, the MUNICIPALIDAD DE ASERRÍ, setting attorney's fees at twenty percent of the liquid amount of the judgment, that is, the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE COLONES AND FIFTY-NINE CÉNTIMOS (art. 495 of the Labor Code). The parties are advised that this judgment is subject to appeal, which must be filed before this court within three days. Within that same period and before this jurisdictional body, the grounds of fact or law on which the appellant bases their disagreement must also be presented, either orally or in writing; under warning that the appeal will be declared inadmissible (articles 500 and 501 subsections c) and d); votes of the Constitutional Chamber numbers 5798, at 16:2 1 hours, of August 11, 1998 and 1306 at 16:27 hours of February 23, 1999 and vote of the Second Chamber number 386, at 14:20 hours, of December 10, 1999.

4.- The defendant appealed, and the Labor Tribunal, First Section, of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, composed of attorneys Juan Carlos Segura Solís, Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado, and Mariamarta Barrantes Ramírez, by judgment at eight hours ten minutes on April twenty-second, two thousand ten, resolved: In the proceedings followed, the legal requirements have been observed, and no defects or omissions capable of producing nullity are noted. The appealed judgment is affirmed.

5.- The mayor of the defendant municipality filed an appeal before this Chamber in a brief dated June twenty-first, two thousand ten, which is based on the grounds that will be discussed in the recitals section.

6.- The requirements of law have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafter: Judge Varela Araya; and, RECITALS:

I-. SUMMARY OF THE APPEAL BY THE DEFENDANT ENTITY: Firstly, an erroneous interpretation and application of Article 2 of the Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República is alleged, which establishes the obligation of the administration to comply with the pronouncements of the said procuraduría; in this case, numbers C-284-2001, OJ-039-2003, and C-029-2004, according to which the collective agreement did not cover the plaintiff. On the other hand, the violation of Article 586 of the Labor Code is denounced, which lists the public officials who are excluded from the concept of "State Worker and its Institutions" (canon 585 idem), stipulating that those persons, in their employment relationships, are not governed by common labor law. That class of servants is regulated by ordinals 111 and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, referring to statutory or public employment relationships. The plaintiff, in his capacity as legal director of the municipal government, was an agent of public management, in accordance with vote No. 4453-00 of the Constitutional Chamber, and therefore was not covered by the collective agreement, with the lower court judges having disregarded the ruling in question of the constitutional oversight body, binding erga omnes. Based on the grievances outlined, it is requested that the judgment on appeal be overturned and the lawsuit be dismissed in its entirety (folio 230).

II-. BACKGROUND: Mr. [Nombre1] served as Legal Advisor for the Municipalidad de Aserrí from May 2, 2000, to September 29, 2006 (folios 2, 34, and 47). On August 28, 2006, Mr. [Nombre1] notified the mayor of his intention to avail himself of Article 50 of the collective agreement in force in the municipal corporation, which at that time read: "The worker who wishes to terminate their employment contract (...) must notify the mayor in writing, giving the statutory notice, and will receive by way of severance pay the payment of one month's salary for each year of service and fraction greater than six months, according to the following percentages: a) 60% from 1 to 3 years of service, b) 90% from 4 to 7 years of service, c) 100% from 8 to 15 years of service maximum (...)" (folios 5 and 146-168). The Municipal Council, in ordinary session No. 23 of October 9, 2006, issued agreement No. 03-23, second article, authorizing the settlement for Attorney Mora Arias of the Christmas bonus, vacations, and school bonus (folio 33). As the severance pay was not recognized, Mr. [Nombre1] sued the municipality in the ordinary labor jurisdiction, seeking to compel it to pay him ¢3,572,717.98 for that concept, as well as the damages caused—consisting of interest—and both costs of the proceeding (folios 36 and 45). The response was negative, and the defenses of lack of right, lack of interest, lack of standing, and lack of cause were raised. The defense argument centered on the fact that Article 50 of the collective agreement was not applicable to this case because, given the position the plaintiff held, it was a public employment relationship under the terms of Article 586 of the Labor Code, and vote No. 4453-00 of the Constitutional Chamber ruled that those who participate in public management would not be covered by collective agreements because a statutory relationship governed by ordinals 111 and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration is involved, as has been repeatedly stated by the Procuraduría General de la República in its pronouncements Nos. C-284-2001, OJ-039-2003, and C-029-2004 (folio 111). In the first instance, the lawsuit was partially granted, compelling the defendant entity to pay the plaintiff the amount he claimed as severance pay, but not the damages, which were denied. All defenses raised were dismissed, and both costs of the litigation were imposed on the municipality. The trial court reasoned that the plaintiff's relationship with the municipal government was not of a statutory nature, because the labor relations of municipal servants are governed by the Municipal Code and, subsidiarily, by the Labor Code. Therefore, it did deem applicable to this case precept 50 of the collective agreement in light of vote 4453-00 of the Constitutional Chamber, which prohibited such instruments in the case of statutory relationships. Furthermore, the judge emphasized that no clause in the collective agreement excluded the plaintiff from its scope of coverage, besides the fact that said gentleman did not participate in the negotiation of that normative body (folio 175). That verdict was appealed by the defendant party (folio 194), but the superior court affirmed it based on the considerations summarized below. The public officials who are excluded from collective agreements are: a) those who carry out public management, that is, the heads—which in the case of municipalities would be the mayor, councilors, and district council members; and b) servants who, on the occasion of exercising their functions, have direct participation in the collective bargaining process, an incompatibility explained by the fact that they could exploit that situation to legislate for their own benefit, which would undoubtedly constitute a conflict of interest. Thus, if Mr. Mora Arias served as Legal Advisor, he was not involved in public management, and was therefore covered by the collective agreement. Finally, the tribunal pointed out: "The fact that in May 2003 he signed, as legal advisor of the municipality, the modifications to the collective agreement, does not prejudice his right, since the exclusion is for the heads, given their decision-making power to administer the public treasury, and they can benefit directly or indirectly from what was agreed, not for those who are not in that condition" (folio 209).

III-. REGARDING THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA: Ordinal 1 of the Organic Law of the Procuraduría establishes it as the superior technical-legal consultative body of the Public Administration and as the legal representative of the State in matters within its competence. The following numeral (2) establishes that the opinions and pronouncements of the Procuraduría constitute administrative jurisprudence and are of mandatory compliance for the Public Administration. Now, canon 154 of the Constitution, which enshrines the independence of judges as a guarantee of the democratic system, is extremely clear in stipulating: "The Judiciary is subject only to the Constitution and the law, and the resolutions it issues in matters within its competence impose no other responsibilities than those expressly indicated by legislative precepts." Judicial independence is also contemplated in Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, ratified by our country through Law No. 4534 of February 3, 1970. In accordance with numeral 2 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary, judges are only subject to "the Political Constitution and the law"; hence, the criterion that the Procuraduría may hold at a given moment can in no way be enforceable against the administrators of justice when issuing their rulings. On this matter, in judgment No. 747-05 of this Court, it was noted: "The administrative jurisprudence of the Procuraduría General de la República does not oblige the Chamber to consider it for its ruling, since it is only subject to the Constitution and the laws in force ...". In this vein, the pronouncements emanating from the Procuraduría General de la República in the exercise of its proper functions in no way affect the resolution of conflicts submitted to the knowledge of the jurisdictional bodies (regarding this topic, our rulings Nos. 892-00, 1023-06, 221-07, and 187-10 may be consulted).

IV-. REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF: This Court has already had the opportunity to rule in a case quite similar to the one now before us, in which the point under discussion was whether the legal director of a municipality was applicable to the benefits stipulated in a collective agreement, in light of vote No. 4453-00 of the Constitutional Chamber. This is our ruling No. 852-08, assigned to this same drafter, in which it was decided by majority:

"The collective agreement governing labor conditions in the Municipalidad de Goicoechea is indeed applicable to the plaintiff, as none of its clauses expressly excludes him. According to Article 154 of the Constitution, the judge is only subject to the Constitution and the law. On the other hand, numeral 62 ibidem reads: 'Collective labor agreements that, in accordance with the law, are entered into between employers or unions of employers and unions of legally organized workers shall have the force of law.' The function of the judge is to apply the law to the specific case. In the case at hand, there is a collective agreement—with the force of law—that has not been rendered ineffective by any provision of the legal system; therefore, being in force, the undersigned, as administrators of justice, must apply the stipulations of that instrument to that gentleman. Certainly, jurisprudence has accepted the validity of exemption clauses that in many cases exclude several groups of officials from the scope of coverage of the collective agreement, it being usual for this to occur with legal directors. In this regard, in judgment No. 5577-96 of the Constitutional Chamber, it was indicated: 'The challenged rule of the Agreement states in relevant part: "This collective labor agreement is of general application for workers who provide services to JAPDEVA in port and development activities and any other activity carried out by JAPDEVA in any part of the country (...). D) The Executive President, his assistants and advisors, the Vice-Executive President; Managers, their assistants; Auditor and Sub-Auditor, and Legal Advisors shall not be covered by this Agreement." The petitioner's complaint in relation to what is stipulated in this rule is based on the fact that it reflects evident discrimination against a specific group of persons, that is, legal advisors, solely because they are lawyers, which is contrary to their constitutional rights (...). It is notorious from that perspective that both in the case of managers (discussed in judgment number 2308-95, just cited) and for the legal advisors now examined, we find ourselves facing a particular and distinct situation in relation to the generality of employees of an organization, due to the decisive power of disposition and influence they have over the institution's future and their capacity to bind it, which entails that their decisions produce effects on themselves, without (in general and effective terms) existing controls for the reversal of such acts should they be harmful to the organization as a whole. Thus, it is logical that—as a protective mechanism for the organization—these officials are excluded from any potential advantages and benefits to which the institution might commit itself, with the aim of preventing concessions on matters with the hidden purpose of benefiting them. To the above, one only needs to add that it is reasonable to apply the expressed concepts to legal advisors—who, in a State rigidly bound to the principle of legality like ours, become pieces of singular importance for decision-making—so it is reasonable to consider them as part of the stratum of officials of trust within the organization and, therefore, excluded from the general characteristics that shape the institution's relationship with its employees in general. In conclusion, the Chamber considers that, as with the managers of the Junta de Administración Portuaria y Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), whose situation was previously analyzed and resolved, there is no inequality of treatment in relation to legal advisors when excluding them from the benefits of the Collective Agreement, if such distinction is due to a qualitatively different situation and, moreover, has been carried out within the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality' (ruling No. 10358-00 of that Chamber may be consulted in a similar vein). However, since in the sublitem there is no express clause that excludes the legal director from the benefits of the collective agreement (or at least it was not proven), these are fully applicable to the plaintiff." In this specific case, there are no weighty elements that would allow for a change of criterion, since the collective agreement of the Municipalidad de Aserrí also does not exclude legal advisors from its scope of protection; therefore, what was resolved by the instance judges deserves to be affirmed; not without first noting that on folio 150, the plaintiff's signature appears, in his capacity as legal advisor of the municipality, endorsing the reform of several articles of the collective agreement—among them Article 50, which serves as the basis for the lawsuit—a modification that was approved by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security through resolution No. DRT-241-2004 (folio 146), which could generate a conflict of interest that would render the regulation in question inapplicable to the plaintiff under ordinals 6 of the Regulation for the Negotiation of Collective Agreements in the Public Sector (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29576 of May 31, 2001) and 48 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (No. 8422 of October 6, 2004), but the ad quem estimated that: "The fact that in May 2003 he signed, as legal advisor of the municipality, the modifications to the collective agreement, does not prejudice his right, since the exclusion is for the heads, given their decision-making power to administer the public treasury, and they can benefit directly or indirectly from what was agreed, not for those who are not in that condition," reasoning that was not challenged in the third instance appeal sought; therefore, it is not possible for this Court to remove it and rule differently.

V-. CONCLUSION: As a corollary of the foregoing, the filed appeal must be denied and the appealed judgment affirmed.

THEREFORE:

The appealed ruling is affirmed.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Rolando Vega Robert Eva María Camacho Vargas María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez Judges Aguirre Gómez and Bogantes Rodríguez issue a dissenting vote and do so as follows.

I.- We disagree with the criterion set forth in the majority vote, for the reasons set forth below. To resolve the issue regarding the application of collective agreements in the Public Sector, it is necessary, in light of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, to start from what the Constitutional Chamber has ruled on the subject. For this purpose, vote number 1696, of 15:30 hours on August 23, 1992, which annulled the awards "...with respect to public administrations with a public-law employment regime," is of special interest. In that pronouncement, it was noted that the Political Constitution provided for an exclusive public labor regime for State servants. However, the enactment of the Civil Service Statute has only partial scope, as its purpose was solely to regulate the relationships of the Executive Branch with its servants, within its scope of competence, leaving aside the regulation of service relationships between minor public entities. In that vein, it argues that: "A Political Constitution is currently in force that did provide for it and that, despite this, a common legal order continues to be used, subjecting the Public Administration and its employees to the resolution of their differences through a procedure of a private nature. This results in an unconstitutional application by virtue of the historical and legal mismatch that this matter reveals, which tacitly contravenes Article 197 of the Political Constitution. It is clear that the constituent's intention was to create an administrative labor regime." It was also indicated that said statute regulated only some aspects of the relationship of State servants, such as those relating to the rights and duties of the servants, their selection, classification, promotion, transfers, discipline, and dismissal regime—among the most important—which respond to the concern of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente regarding suitability and efficiency of the service; "...but it did not touch upon other no less important aspects, such as the one underlying the filing of this action, that is, the regulation of the economic regime of that relationship itself and the subjection of other administrative entities to the public labor regime. This vacuum, however, does not authorize the use of mechanisms foreseen for a private relationship in a public employment relationship that must be governed by its own and different principles." And, it added that the confusion existing in the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente in using and mentioning the Labor Code in the Constitution was to somehow establish a normative parameter to govern the end of the relationship and "...not, as has been intended to be understood, that its principles and norms inspire and govern the relationship between the State and the public servant." It further considered: "In the opinion of the Chamber, then, Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution underpin the existence, in principle, of an employment regime governed by Public Law within the public sector, as has become clear from the debate of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente and is incipiently incorporated by the General Law of Public Administration. This public employment regime necessarily implies consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, which are not only distinct from those of (private) labor law, but often opposite to them. Obviously, the declaration contained in this judgment encompasses the employment relationship that exists between the public administration (or rather, administrations) and its servants, but in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that refers to a private employment regime, the solution must be different. In these cases, there would be submission to arbitration procedures but with certain limitations, such that in them, laws, regulations, or governmental directives in force cannot be dispensed with or excepted, meaning that even in these cases, decisions (awards) in equity would not be proper, nor tribunals composed of non-lawyers." It was also clarified that "... those workers, laborers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, when they are contracted by the State in the exercise of its Private Law capacity, should be considered excluded from this regime (Articles 3.2 and 112.2 and .3 of the General Law of Public Administration). This judgment also implies that the procedures for the 'resolution of collective economic and social conflicts,' foreseen in Articles 497 and following of the Labor Code, are not at all applicable to administrations governed by public employment law, and are not applicable to the rest of the administrations, including public utility companies—sociedades anónimas, until the omissions noted in this judgment are corrected by law." Citing the aforementioned judgment 1696-92, in number 4788, of 8:48 hours on September 30, 1993, regarding insurance agents, it was considered: "The foregoing means that the Chamber has delineated the meaning of Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, to interpret that the relationship of the State with its 'officials,' 'servants,' 'employees,' or 'agents,' is regulated within an employment regime governed by Public Law, with the exceptions that the legislator reasonably establishes, according to the special conditions that merit different treatment. And as an initial conclusion, the Chamber endorses the analysis made by the Procuraduría General de la República, to define that, based on the activity carried out by insurance agents, according to the definitions of Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration, it excludes them from the public employment regime referred to in constitutional Articles 191 and 192, and in accordance with what is established in subsection 2 of Article 112 of the referred General Law, those relationships must be regulated by labor or commercial law, as the case may be." Later, in judgment number 3053 of 9:45 hours on June 24, 1994, it reiterated the criterion expressed in vote number 1696-92, to indicate: "Thus, the regime is administrative, statutory, for 'public servants,' that is, for those who provide services to the administration or in the name and on behalf of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, however, the General Law of Public Administration itself establishes that 'the service relationships with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article III, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be' (General Law of Public Administration, Article 112, subsection 2)." To resolve that specific case, it argued that a distinction should have been made between public officials and workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration; the determination of the category of workers who do not participate in that management being a matter of legality. Now, this other Chamber (the Second) raised a constitutional question regarding the possibility of entering into collective agreements in the Public Sector, as well as to effect any eventual reforms with respect to them. For this purpose, among other reasons, we based our argument on the following: "...as of Vote No. 1696-92 of the Constitutional Chamber, all collective agreements agreed upon, within the Public Sector, that do not refer to laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, when they are contracted by the State in accordance with its capacity to exercise Private Law—Articles 3 and 111 of the General Law cited—are unconstitutional..." (emphasis added). Said consultation was addressed through vote number 4453 of 14:56 hours on May 24, 2000. In Considerando VII, several premises were established, which, in what is relevant, are summarized as follows: 1. There are two extremes or legal systems in labor matters: one regulated by the Labor Code and the other by Public Law. 2. With exceptions, the relationship between the State and public servants is called public employment or statutory, regulated by Public Law: "...consequently, there cannot be a relationship of equality or equivalence between the parties involved, as ideally should happen in a labor relationship of contractual origin, mainly because the Public Administration represents a general interest, because of the need for continuity in the provision of public services, and because of budgetary limitations. In other words, the servant under the public employment regime is, in relation to the Administration, in a state of subjection; it can unilaterally impose the conditions of the organization and provision of the service to guarantee the public good, which eliminates the possibility that the relationship be considered from a perspective of equivalence of rights susceptible to negotiation between the parties. This conclusion includes the impossibility of recognizing the possibility of collective bargaining in the public sector, since the very idea of negotiation, as a suitable means to review and approve the conditions of public employment, clashes with the essential postulates of the State's organization, which in this area were introduced in constitutional Articles 191 and 192." 3. The position expressed is the one that has been historically sustained. Furthermore, the General Law of Public Administration clearly establishes that Administrative Law applies to the service relationships between the State and its servants, excluding from the relationship labor legislation, which can only be resorted to by servants who do not participate in public management. 4.

Public officials are those who provide services to the administration in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independently of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity (article 111, subsection 1 of the General Law of Public Administration); servants who cannot bargain collectively. Those not considered officials subject to the public employment regime are, rather, laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, the employees of economic enterprises or services of the State “…entrusted with activities subject to common law (derecho común), who, in accordance with transcribed article 112 subsection 2), are governed by Labor Law and not by Public Law, which enables them to bargain collectively.” 5. Based on vote 3053-94 and the content of the General Law of Public Administration “…in the public sector, only those servants who do not participate in public management may conclude collective labor agreements, such that entities with an employment regime of a labor (non-public) nature, such as, for example, State enterprises, regarding which national doctrine has stated are ‘those that function as if they were private enterprises, because they sell and do the same as private parties; for example, the INS itself, when it sells policies, does the same as any insurance company; banking when it makes loans does the same as a common financial entity; the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, which sells electrical energy, sells it under the same conditions under which a private company could sell it,’ among others, may indeed bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions governing Collective Labor Law. 6. Even in the Public Sector where the application of collective agreements is constitutionally possible, that is to say “…in the so-called economic enterprises or services of the State and in those personnel nuclei of public institutions and entities in which the nature of the services provided does not involve public management, in the terms of subsection 2 of article 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, the Chamber repeats and confirms its jurisprudence to the effect that the authorization to negotiate cannot be unrestricted…”. In accordance with the foregoing, among other conclusions, it concluded that collective agreements concluded in the public sector are unconstitutional when they involve personnel governed by a public-law employment relationship (statutory relationship), and those subscribed in said sector with laborers, workers, officials, or employees, whose labor relations are regulated by common law, are not unconstitutional. It also concluded that collective instruments that have been negotiated and have been extended or modified, in application of the general policy on collective agreements in the Public Sector, are compatible with Constitutional Law, except in the case of negotiations with personnel in a public-law employment relationship, in which case those instruments are unconstitutional. It ordered that it is for the administration and for judges, when hearing matters regarding collective agreements, to determine whether the workers involved “…given the nature of the functions they perform or performed,” are regulated by public law or common law, for the purpose of defining whether or not they can be active subjects in the application of collective agreements. In relation to that ruling (number 4453-00), several requests for addition and clarification were filed, as well as motions for revocation and review, which were denied by vote number 9690 at 15:01 hours on November 1, 2000. However, it is worth noting that in that pronouncement, it was expressly stated that the unconstitutionality of the collective agreements of any defined set of State institutions had not been declared “…that is, for example, it has not been said that collective agreements can be concluded in municipalities or in universities. On the contrary, the judgment is extremely clear and does not require delving into its concepts to understand its tenor, that there are public servants for whom the path of collective labor law is prohibited, and that determining who those servants are, is a task corresponding to each of the public entities, in the exercise of their powers and, ultimately, to the judges responsible for adjudicating disputes that arise on this matter.” And, it was expressed that determining who is an official or servant governed by a public-law employment relationship and who is not, does not require a special law. For its part, in vote number 7730, at 14:47 hours, on August 30, 2000, regarding certain articles of the collective agreement of RECOPE, in addition to analyzing the issue of the legal nature of that entity, as a public enterprise forming part of the non-financial public sector of the economy. In its section referring to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber regarding collective agreements, by way of summary, it was indicated: “…based on the jurisprudence of the Chamber, it must be concluded that RECOPE is a public enterprise and therefore forms an integral part of the public sector in which the application of the institution of collective agreements is constitutionally possible; that is to say, in the so-called economic enterprises or services of the State and in those personnel nuclei of public institutions and entities in which the nature of the services provided does not involve public management, in the terms of subsection 2 of article 112 of the General Law of Public Administration. But the authorization to bargain collectively provided by the legal order is not unrestricted…”. Likewise, in vote number 10358 at 15:04 hours, on November 22, 2000, when hearing an action of unconstitutionality against a provision of the collective agreement of the National Production Council, it was considered: “…Both the Agreement and specifically the challenged article 12, are not applicable to public officials who provide services to the Administration in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independently of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity (article 111 subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration). On the contrary, it is possible to apply it to laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, the employees of economic enterprises or services of the State, entrusted with activities subject to common law (derecho común), who, in accordance with subsection 2) of article 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, are governed by labor law and not by public law.” Also, regarding the Collective Agreement of the Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, a pronouncement was issued, namely, number 3001 at 10:35 hours on March 9, 2006. In that resolution, it was stated that the constitutional oversight body has recognized the possibility of collective bargaining for workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration, the employees of economic enterprises or services of the State, entrusted with activities subject to common law (derecho común). And, it added: “This Chamber has therefore recognized that the relationship between the State and public servants, as a thesis of principle, is a public employment or statutory relationship; in other words, the servant under the public employment regime finds himself in a relationship with the Administration, in a state of subjection; the latter may unilaterally impose the conditions of the organization and provision of the service to guarantee the public good. This conclusion does not imply that collective bargaining cannot be tolerated in the public sector, but in accordance with the provisions of constitutional articles 191 and 192, it is only possible for those who do not carry out public management.” Finally, it is worth mentioning that in judgment 7261 at 14:45 hours on May 23, 2006, by which an action of unconstitutionality was resolved against certain articles of the Collective Labor Agreement of the National Insurance Institute, the possibility of collective bargaining available to laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, the employees of economic enterprises or services of the State entrusted with activities subject to common law, was reiterated once more; highlighting the premises established by ruling 4453-2000.

II.- Article 191 of the Political Constitution states: “A statute of civil service shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, for the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration.” Following this, article 192 provides: “With the exceptions that this Constitution and the statute of civil service determine, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal specified in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof.” Under these provisions, the Constitutional Chamber did not establish in general and absolute terms the validity or nullity of collective agreements in any specific sphere (including the municipal), as it expressly indicated that it had to be analyzed in each specific case whether the relationship of a particular employee is regulated by Common Law (Derecho Común) or by Public Law (Derecho Público). In this latter case, they are precluded from any possibility of concluding collective agreements. To carry out this task, consideration must be given to what said body has provided regarding awards and collective agreements, as well as the content of articles 3, 111, and 112, all of the General Law of Public Administration. For this, one must begin from the premise that, as reiterated by that Chamber in the pronouncements mentioned, the cited provisions 191 and 192 underpin the existence, in principle, i.e., as a rule, of an employment regime governed by Public Law, within the Public Sector; the exception in this matter being the contracting of workers subject to common labor law. This latter scenario can occur “…in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that refers to a private employment regime,” according to the conditions that warrant different treatment (vote 1696-92). This rule is applicable in all employment relationships in the Public Sector, including the municipal sphere, precisely because municipalities are minor territorial public entities contemplated in article 168 et seq. of the Political Constitution. Regarding them, it should be noted, a clear reference was made in Considerando VIII entitled “CONCLUSIONS”, of judgment 4453-00, when it was indicated: “And finally, according to what the Attorney General's Office has expressed in its report, which this Chamber also endorses, the personnel working in the Municipalities of the country are limited in their collective bargaining, in the terms of this judgment, since, barring proof to the contrary, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship.” On the other hand, for the purpose of determining whether Public Sector workers are subject to the administrative or statutory regime, the concept of “statute” should not be confusing, given that, as the Constitutional Chamber interpreted it, the Constitution did not restrict the concept of “statute” to that of a single legal instrument “…but rather aims to concretize a uniform regime of principles and guarantees that regulate the protection of the labor rights of the public servant, especially attending to their right to job stability” (vote number 6240 at 14:00 hours on November 26, 1993). The reiterated criterion of that body is that those excluded from the public employment regime and, therefore, could contract collectively with the limitations established by its jurisprudence, are: laborers, workers, and employees contracted by the Public Administration in the exercise of its Private Law capacity, as well as employees of economic enterprises or services of the State entrusted with activities subject to common law, who do not participate in the public management of the administration (articles 3.2, 111, and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration). These provisions, in order, provide: “Article 3 1. Public law shall regulate the organization and activity of public entities, unless expressly provided otherwise. / 2. Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, by their overall regime and the requirements of their business, can be considered as common industrial or commercial enterprises.” “Article 111.- 1. A public servant is a person who provides services to the Administration or in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independently of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. 2. For this purpose, the terms “public official (funcionario público),” “public servant (servidor público),” “public employee (empleado público),” “person in charge of a public service (encargado de servicio público)” and other similar terms are considered equivalent, and the regime of their relations shall be the same for all, unless the nature of the situation indicates otherwise. 3. Employees of economic enterprises or services of the State entrusted with activities subject to common law (derecho común) are not considered public servants.” And, “Article 112.- 1. Administrative law shall be applicable to service relations between the Administration and its public servants. 2. Service relations with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be. 3. However, the legal or regulatory provisions of public law that are necessary to guarantee administrative legality and morality, as determined by Executive Power Decree, shall also apply to the latter. 4. For criminal law purposes, said servants shall be considered public servants.” In accordance with the referenced provisions (to which, it is repeated, the judgments of the Constitutional Chamber on the subject refer), a public servant is a person who provides services to the administration or in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independently of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity; excluding, from the regulation specific to public employment relations, those maintained with laborers, workers, and employees contracted by the Public Administration in the exercise of its private law capacity and the employees of economic enterprises or services of the State entrusted with activities subject to common law, who do not participate in the public management of the administration. If, as a thesis of principle, those who provide services to the State and its institutions are governed by the regulations and principles specific to Public Law and not to Private Labor Law, which has constitutional roots, the exceptions, apart from having to be proven without any doubt, as such, must always have restrictive scopes; otherwise, it would contradict the interpretation made by the Constitutional Chamber of what the framers decreed. Hence, it can in no way be interpreted that only officials who have powers established or specifically defined in the law, or hierarchical superiors in general terms, are subject to a public employment regime, since, by that path, we would evidently turn the exception into the rule; that is, subjecting the majority of those who provide services in the Public Sector to a private employment regime, with all the consequences that entails, including, of course, the absence of job stability. Thus, it must be taken into account that the legislator introduced in subsection 2) of the cited article 112 a phrase that is extremely restrictive, stating that service relations with laborers, workers, and employees “…who do not participate in the public management of the Administration” shall be governed by labor or commercial law. For what is relevant, the Dictionary of the Spanish Language defines the term “participate (participar)” as “To take part in something” and, therefore, a “participant (partícipe)” is one who “…has a part in something, or joins with others to share in its distribution” (Real Academia Española. Diccionario de la Lengua Española. Volume II, Madrid, twenty-first edition, 1992, p. 1536). On the other hand, the concept “public management of the Administration” must be related to the so-called “administrative function” (which is set forth in constitutional article 49) defined from an eclectic perspective, as follows: “Despite the existing difficulties, as a product of the conjugation of the main criteria set forth so far (substantial, formal, and that of the legal regime of acts), we can define, from an eclectic perspective, the administrative function as that performed by public organs and entities for the concrete, immediate, and direct protection of public interests and which is subject to the law” ([Nombre2], Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Volume I General Part, San José, Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A., first edition, 2006, p. 349). From that perspective, the administrative function manifests itself in various forms, such as the acts and the facts of the administration. For the cited author, “The administrative function, whether legal or not, can manifest itself through acts or facts. Acts are declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge of the Public Administration, while facts are the material actions or technical operations carried out in the exercise of the administrative function” (op. cit., p. 357). In this vein, the administrative act is merely one “…of the many forms of externalization” (op. cit., p. 422). Hence, the administrative function is not only carried out by hierarchical superiors. Thus, it must be interpreted that a public servant is one who provides services to the administration or in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independently of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity; thus participating, to a greater or lesser extent, in the so-called “public management of the Administration,” with the aim of protecting public interests. So, it must be understood that those who do not participate in said management are laborers, workers, and employees who not only carry out activities unconnected to the concrete, immediate, and direct protection of public interests, but also do not form part of the organization of the respective public entity, lack a valid and effective act of investiture, and for that very reason, the respective administration contracted them in the exercise of its private law capacity, that is, as any private individual; to which it must resort reasonably and in compliance with the law, only exceptionally for carrying out specific and non-ordinary tasks. For the municipal sphere, this interpretation is reinforced based on the content of numeral 152, inserted in Title V of the Municipal Code, called “Municipal Personnel,” a section that regulates aspects related to entry into the municipal administrative career; the descriptive manual of positions, salaries, and wages; personnel selection; incentives and benefits; evaluation and qualification of service; municipal training; leave; rights of municipal servants; duties of municipal servants; prohibitions and sanctions; procedure for sanctions. The referenced provision 152 establishes: “The provisions contained in this title regarding the procedure for appointment and removal shall not be applied to officials who depend directly on the Council (Concejo) nor to occasional employees contracted against the budget lines for Special Services or Occasional Wages. The Council shall agree on actions affecting officials directly dependent on it.” III.- In the present case, it was the responsibility of the municipal administration, in the exercise of its powers, and ultimately the judges of this jurisdiction, to determine which of the defendant’s employees are regulated by public law or common law, for the purpose of defining whether or not they can benefit from the collective agreement. The officials who provide services to the defendant municipality, as part of its organization, serving on an interim or permanent basis in the positions set forth in the position scale of the sued municipality, undoubtedly form part of its structure, and therefore are officials who provide services to the Administration—Municipality of Aserrí—in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of valid and effective acts of investiture, through which the public nature of their respective relationships as servants of that municipality cannot be disregarded, irrespective of the type of activity they perform, since their relationship is one of public employment or statutory by express provision of law, specifically by what is provided in articles 115, 119 and 146 subsection a) of the Municipal Code, where the so-called municipal administrative career is established for municipal officials, without distinction of rank or functions, which encompasses the principles specific to a public employment relationship—statutory relationship—, hence in Considerando VIII entitled “CONCLUSIONS”, of vote 4453 at 14:56 hours on May 24, 2000, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that “…the personnel working in the Municipalities of the country are limited in their collective bargaining, in the terms of this judgment, since, barring proof to the contrary, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship,” therefore, those who have not been contracted by the defendant in the exercise of its private law capacity, it is evident that their service relationship is not regulated by Private Labor Law, but rather by Public Law. As a logical consequence of the foregoing, municipal officials could not derive any right from the invoked collective agreement, since, with respect to them, it becomes unconstitutional, in the terms of those partially transcribed constitutional resolutions (numbers 4453 and 9690, both from the year 2000), unless they are excluded from the public employment regime, that is, laborers, workers, and employees contracted by the municipal administration in the exercise of its private law capacity which empowers them to bargain collectively, and not for those who provide services in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, since they are officials subject to the public employment regime.

In accordance with the preceding considerations, we depart from the majority vote, overturn the appealed judgment, and dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety without special condemnation for costs.

[Nombre3] [Nombre4] cgutic 2 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Electronic Mails: [...]. and [...]

All older and residents of San José.

**RESULTANDO:** **1.-** The plaintiff, in writs dated February second and June seventh of two thousand seven, filed this action seeking judgment condemning the defendant to the restitution of his labor rights and payment of severance pay (cesantía) for his entire employment relationship in the amount of e3,572,717.98, as well as damages (daños y perjuicios), interest, and both costs of the proceeding.

**2.-** The representation of the defendant municipality responded in the terms stated in the brief dated September eighteenth of two thousand seven and raised the defenses (excepciones) of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of current interest (falta de interés actual), lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva), and what it termed lack of cause (falta de causa).

**3.-** The judge, Lic. Christian López Mora, by judgment at eight hours thirty minutes on September twenty-second of two thousand eight, **ordered:** Pursuant to the foregoing and the legal citations invoked, the defenses of lack of right, lack of passive standing, lack of cause, and lack of current interest are rejected. Consequently, the ordinary labor lawsuit filed by **[Nombre1]** against the **MUNICIPALIDAD DE ASERRÍ** is **DECLARED PARTIALLY GRANTED**. The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the severance pay (auxilio de cesantía) established in Article 50 of the Collective Labor Agreement (Convención Colectiva de Trabajadores) entered into by the Municipalidad de Aserrí and the Sindicato de Trabajadores Municipales de la Provincia de San José, in force at the end of the employment relationship, being ninety percent of six months' salary, equivalent to the net sum of **THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTEEN COLONES AND NINETY-EIGHT CÉNTIMOS.** The claim for damages is rejected due to being improper. The procedural and personal costs of the action are borne by the defendant party, **LA MUNICIPALIDAD DE ASERRÍ**, with attorney's fees set at twenty percent of the net amount of the judgment, being the sum of **SEVEN HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE COLONES AND FIFTY-NINE CÉNTIMOS** (Art. 495 of the Código de Trabajo). The parties are advised that this judgment admits the remedy of appeal (recurso de apelación), which must be filed before this court within three days. Within that same period and before this jurisdictional body, the grounds of fact or law on which the appellant bases its disagreement must also be presented, verbally or in writing; under warning of declaring the remedy inadmissible (Articles 500 and 501, subsections c) and d); votes of the Sala Constitucional numbers 5798, at 16:21 hours, of August 11, 1998, and 1306 at 16:27 hours of February 23, 1999, and vote of the Sala Segunda number 386, at 14:20 hours, of December 10, 1999).

**4.-** The defendant party appealed, and the Tribunal de Trabajo, Sección Primera, of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, composed of Lic. Juan Carlos Segura Solís, Lic. Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado, and Lic. Mariamarta Barrantes Ramírez, by judgment at eight hours ten minutes on April twenty-second of two thousand ten, **resolved:** The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings, and no defects or omissions capable of causing nullity are noted. The appealed judgment is confirmed.

**5.-** The mayor of the defendant municipality filed a remedy before this Chamber in a brief dated June twenty-first of two thousand ten, which is based on the grounds that will be addressed in the recitals section (parte considerativa).

**6.-** The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

**Drafted by Magistrate Varela Araya; and,** **CONSIDERANDO:** **I-. SUMMARY OF THE REMEDY OF THE DEFENDANT ENTITY:** First, an erroneous interpretation and application of Article 2 of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República is alleged, which establishes the obligation of the administration to abide by the pronouncements of said Procuraduría; in this case, numbers C-284-2001, OJ-039-2003, and C-029-2004, according to which the collective agreement did not cover the plaintiff. Furthermore, the violation of numeral 586 of the Código de Trabajo is denounced, which lists the public officials excluded from the concept of "Worker of the State and its Institutions" (canon 585 ibid.), stipulating that such persons, in their employment relations, are not governed by ordinary labor law. That class of servants is regulated by ordinals 111 and 112 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, concerning statutory or public employment relationships (vínculos estatutarios o de empleo público). The plaintiff, in his capacity as legal director of the city government, was an agent of public management, in accordance with vote no. 4453-00 of the Sala Constitucional, and therefore was not covered by the collective agreement, with the lower court judges disregarding said ruling of the constitutional review body, which is binding *erga omnes*. Based on the grievances summarized, the request is to revoke the appealed judgment and dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety (folio 230).

**II-. BACKGROUND:** Mr. [Nombre1] served as Legal Advisor at the Municipalidad de Aserrí from May 2, 2000, to September 29, 2006 (folios 2, 34, and 47). On August 28, 2006, Mr. [Nombre1] communicated to the mayor his intention to avail himself of Article 50 of the collective agreement in force in the municipal corporation, which at that time read: “*The worker who wishes to terminate his employment contract (…) must notify the mayor in writing, giving the legal prior notice and, as severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), shall receive payment of one month's salary for each year of service and fraction greater than six months, according to the following percentages: a) 60% from 1 to 3 years of service, b) 90% from 4 to 7 years of service, c) 100% from 8 to 15 years of service as a maximum (…)*” (folios 5 and 146-168). The Concejo Municipal, in ordinary session no. 23 of October 9, 2006, issued agreement no. 03-23, article two, authorizing the liquidation of the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, and school bonus (bono escolar) for Lic. Mora Arias (folio 33). Since the severance pay was not granted, Mr. [Nombre1] sued the municipality in the ordinary labor jurisdiction, seeking to compel it to pay him ¢3,572,717.98 for that concept, as well as the damages caused—consisting of interest—and both costs of the proceeding (folios 36 and 45). The response was negative, and the defenses of lack of right, lack of interest, lack of standing (falta de legitimación), and lack of cause were raised. The defense argument centered on the fact that section 50 of the agreement was not applicable to this case because, given the position held by the plaintiff, it was a public employment relationship under the terms of numeral 586 of the Código de Trabajo, and that vote no. 4453-00 of the Sala Constitucional held that those who participate in public management are not covered by collective agreements, as there is a statutory relationship (nexo de carácter estatutario) regulated by ordinals 111 and 112 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, as has been repeatedly expressed by the Procuraduría General de la República in its pronouncements nos. C-284-2001, OJ-039-2003, and C-029-2004 (folio 111). At first instance, the lawsuit was declared partially granted, compelling the defendant entity to pay the plaintiff the amount he claimed as severance pay; however, the claim for damages was denied. All defenses raised were rejected, and both costs of the lawsuit were imposed on the municipality. The *a quo* judge reasoned that the plaintiff's relationship with the city government was not of a statutory nature, since the labor relations of municipal servants are governed by the Código Municipal and, subsidiarily, by the Código de Trabajo. Therefore, precept 50 of the collective agreement was indeed deemed applicable to this case in light of vote 4453-00 of the Sala Constitucional, which prohibited such instruments in the case of statutory relationships (vínculos estatutarios). Furthermore, the judge highlighted that there was no clause in the agreement that removed the plaintiff from its scope of coverage, besides the fact that said gentleman did not participate in the negotiation of that normative body (folio 175). Such verdict was appealed by the defendant party (folio 194), but the superior court confirmed it, based on the considerations summarized below. The public officials excluded from collective agreements are: a) those who carry out public management, that is, the heads (jerarcas)—which in the case of municipalities would be the mayor, the council members (regidores), and the district trustees (síndicos)—; and b) servants who, on the occasion of exercising their functions, have direct participation in collective bargaining, an incompatibility explained by the fact that they could exploit such a situation to legislate for their own benefit, which would undoubtedly constitute a conflict of interest. Thus, since Mr. Mora Arias served as Legal Advisor, he was not involved in public management and was therefore covered by the collective agreement. Lastly, the tribunal noted: “*The fact that in May 2003 he signed the modifications to the collective agreement as the municipality's legal advisor does not prejudice his right, since the exclusion is for the heads, given their decision-making power to administer public funds, and they can benefit directly or indirectly from what is agreed upon, but not for those who are not in that condition*” (folio 209).

**III-. REGARDING THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA:** Ordinal 1 of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría establishes it as the superior technical-legal consultative body of the Public Administration and as the legal representative of the State in matters within its competence. The following numeral (2) establishes that the opinions and recommendations of the Procuraduría constitute administrative jurisprudence and are mandatory for the Public Administration. Now, canon 154 of the Magna Carta, which enshrines the independence of judges as a guarantee of the democratic system, is extremely clear in prescribing: “*The Judicial Branch is subject only to the Constitution and the law, and the resolutions it issues in matters of its competence impose no other responsibilities than those expressly indicated by legislative precepts*”. Judicial independence is also contemplated in Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, ratified by our country through Law No. 4534 of February 3, 1970. According to numeral 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, judges are solely subject to “the Political Constitution and the law”; hence, the criterion that the Procuraduría may hold at a given moment can in no way be enforceable against the administrators of justice when issuing their rulings. On this matter, judgment no. 747-05 of this Court noted: “*The administrative jurisprudence of the Procuraduría General de la República does not obligate the Chamber to consider it for resolving a case, since it is subject only to the Constitution and the laws in force* …”. Along these lines, the pronouncements emanating from the Procuraduría General de la República in the exercise of its proper functions in no way affect the resolution of disputes submitted to the knowledge of jurisdictional bodies (on this subject, our judgments nos. 892-00, 1023-06, 221-07, and 187-10 may be consulted).

**IV-. REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF:** This Office already had the opportunity to rule on a case quite similar to the one now before us, where the point of discussion was whether the legal director of a municipality was subject to the benefits stipulated in a collective agreement, in light of vote no. 4453-00 of the Sala Constitucional. This is our judgment no. 852-08, by this same drafter, in which the majority decided:

“The collective agreement that governs the working conditions at the Municipalidad de Goicoechea is indeed applicable to the plaintiff, since none of its clauses expressly exclude him. Under Article 154 of the Magna Carta, the judge is subject only to the Constitution and the law. Moreover, numeral 62 ibidem states: ‘Collective labor agreements that, in accordance with the law, are agreed upon between employers or employers' unions and legally organized workers' unions shall have the force of law.’ The function of those who judge is to apply the law to the specific case. In the instant case, there is a collective agreement—with the force of law—that has not been nullified by any provision of the legal system; therefore, being in force, the undersigned, as administrators of justice, must apply the stipulations of said instrument to this gentleman. Certainly, jurisprudence has accepted the validity of configuration clauses that in many cases exclude various groups of officials from the scope of coverage of the collective agreement, with it being common for this to occur with legal directors. In this regard, judgment no. 5577-96 of the Sala Constitucional stated: ‘*The challenged clause of the Agreement states, in pertinent part: “This collective labor agreement is of general application for the workers who provide services to JAPDEVA in port and development activities and any other activity performed by JAPDEVA anywhere in the country (…). D) The Executive President, his assistants and advisors, the Executive Vice-President; Managers, their assistants; Auditor and Sub-Auditor, and Legal Advisors shall not be covered by this Agreement.” The plaintiff's complaint regarding what is stipulated in this rule is based on the fact that it reflects evident discrimination towards a determined group of people, such as legal advisors, merely because they are lawyers, which is contrary to her constitutional rights (…). It is notorious from that perspective that both in the case of managers (as stated in the recently cited judgment number 2308-95) and for the legal advisors now examined, we are faced with a particular and different situation in relation to the generality of employees in an organization, due to the decisive power of disposition and influence they have over the institution's future and their ability to bind it, which means that their decisions produce effects on themselves, without (in general and effective terms) there being controls to reverse such acts if they prove harmful to the organization as a whole. Thus, it is logical that—as a protective mechanism for the organization—these officials are set apart and excluded from any eventual advantages and perquisites that the institution might undertake, with the purpose of preventing them from being able to acquiesce in matters with the hidden aim that it benefits them.

to what has been said, it is only fitting to add that it is reasonable to apply the concepts expressed to legal advisors, who—in a State rigidly bound to the principle of legality like ours—become pieces of singular importance for decision-making, and it is therefore reasonable to consider them as part of the stratum of trusted officials (funcionarios de confianza) of the organization and, thereby, excluded from the general characteristics that shape the institution's relationship with its employees in general. In conclusion, the Chamber considers that, as with the managers of the Board of Port Administration and Development of the Atlantic Coast (Junta de Administración Portuaria y Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica, JAPDEVA), whose situation was previously analyzed and resolved, there is no inequality of treatment in relation to legal advisors by excluding them from the benefits of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), if said distinction is due to a qualitatively different situation and has also been carried out within the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality” (in a similar sense, see ruling no. 10358-00 of that Chamber). However, since in the sub-litem there is no express clause that excludes the legal director from the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement (or at least it was not proven), these are fully applicable to the plaintiff.” In the specific case, there are no weighty elements that allow for a change of criteria, since the collective bargaining agreement of the Municipality of Aserrí also does not exclude legal advisors from its scope of protection, and therefore what was decided by the lower court judges deserves to be confirmed; not without first noting that on page 150 the signature of the plaintiff appears, in his capacity as legal advisor (consejero legal) of the municipality, endorsing the reform of several articles of the collective bargaining agreement—among them Article 50, which serves as the basis for the claim—a modification that was homologated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security through resolution no. DRT-241-2004 (page 146), which could generate a conflict of interest that would render the regulations in question inapplicable to the plaintiff in accordance with ordinals 6 of the Regulation for the Negotiation of Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Public Sector (Reglamento para la Negociación de Convenciones Colectivas en el Sector Público, Executive Decree No. 29576 of May 31, 2001) and 48 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, No. 8422 of October 6, 2004), but the ad quem estimated that: “The fact that in May 2003 he signed the modifications to the collective bargaining agreement as legal advisor of the municipality does not prejudice his right, since the exclusion is for the heads (jerarcas), given their decision-making power to administer the public treasury, and they can benefit directly or indirectly from what was agreed, not for those who are not in that condition”, reasoning that was not attacked in the third-instance appeal sought, so it is not feasible for this Collegiate Body to remove it and rule differently.

**V-. CONCLUSION:** As a corollary of the foregoing, the appeal filed must be denied and the appealed judgment confirmed.

**POR TANTO:** The appealed ruling is confirmed.

***Orlando Aguirre Gómez*** ***Julia Varela Araya*** ***Rolando Vega Robert*** ***Eva María Camacho Vargas*** ***María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez*** **The magistrates Aguirre Gómez and Bogantes Rodríguez, dissent and issue their vote as follows.** **I.-** We disagree with the criterion stated in the majority vote, which we state below. To resolve the issue regarding the application of collective bargaining agreements in the Public Sector, it is necessary, in light of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional), to start from what the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has established on the subject. For this, of special interest is Vote number 1696, of 3:30 p.m. on August 23, 1992, through which the awards were annulled “…with respect to public administrations with an employment regime of a public nature.” In that pronouncement, it was noted that the Political Constitution provided for an exclusive public labor regime (régimen laboral público) for State servants. However, the enactment of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) has only partial scope, since its sole purpose was to regulate the relations of the Executive Branch with its servants, within its jurisdictional scope, leaving out the regulation of service relations between minor public entities. In that vein, it argues that: “A Political Constitution is currently in force that did provide for it and, despite this, a common legal order continues to be used, subjecting the Public Administration and its employees to the resolution of their differences through a procedure of a private nature. This results in an unconstitutional application by virtue of the historical and legal lag that this matter evidences, which tacitly contravenes Article 197 of the Political Constitution. It is clear that the intention of the constituent was to create an administrative labor regime.” It also indicated that said statute barely regulated some aspects of the relationship of State servants, such as those relating to the rights and duties of servants, their selection, classification, promotion, transfers, discipline, and dismissal regime—among the most important—which respond to the concern of the National Constituent Assembly regarding suitability and efficiency of service; “…but it did not touch on other no less important aspects, such as the one underlying the approach of this action, that is, the regulation of the economic regime of that very relationship and the subjection of other administrative entities to the public labor regime. This void, however, does not authorize the use of mechanisms provided for a private relationship for a public employment relationship that must be governed by its own and different principles.” And, it added that the confusion existing in the National Constituent Assembly regarding using and mentioning the Labor Code in the Constitution was to establish, in some way, a normative parameter to govern the end of the relationship and “…not, as it has been sought to understand it, that its principles and norms inspire and govern the relationship between the State and the public servant.” Subsequently, it considered: “In the opinion of the Chamber, then, Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution ground the existence, in principle, of an employment regime governed by Public Law within the public sector, as has been made clear from the debate of the National Constituent Assembly and is incipiently embodied in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). This public employment regime necessarily implies consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, already not only distinct from those of labor law (private), but often opposed to them. Obviously, the declaration contained in this judgment encompasses the employment relationship that exists between the administration (or better, administrations) and its servants, but in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that refers to a private employment regime, the solution must be different. In these cases, there would be a subjection to arbitration procedures but with certain limitations, such that in them, laws, regulations, or government guidelines in force cannot be dispensed with or excepted, and therefore, even in these cases, decisions (awards) in equity would not be appropriate, nor would tribunals formed by non-lawyer subjects.” It was also clarified that “…workers, laborers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration must be considered excluded from this regime, when they are hired by the State according to the exercise of its Private Law capacity (Articles 3.2 and 112.2 and .3 of the General Law of Public Administration). This judgment also implies that the procedures for the ‘resolution of collective conflicts of an economic and social nature,’ provided for in Articles 497 and following of the Labor Code, are not fully applicable to administrations governed by public employment law, and that they are not applicable to the rest of the administrations, including public companies-corporations, while the omissions noted in this judgment are not remedied by law.” Citing the aforementioned judgment 1696-92, in number 4788, of 8:48 a.m. on September 30, 1993, regarding insurance agents, it was considered: “The foregoing means that the Chamber has delineated the meaning of Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, to interpret that the relationship of the State with its ‘officials,’ ‘servants,’ ‘employees,’ or ‘appointees’ is regulated within an employment regime governed by Public Law, except for the exceptions that the legislator may reasonably establish, according to the special conditions that merit different treatment. And by way of an initial conclusion, the Chamber adopts the analysis made by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) to define that, based on the activity carried out by insurance agents, according to the definitions of Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration, it excludes them from the public employment regime referred to in Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution, and in accordance with what subsection 2 of Article 112 of the referred General Law establishes, those relations must be regulated by labor or commercial law, as the case may be.” Then, in judgment number 3053 of 9:45 a.m. on June 24, 1994, it reiterated the criterion expressed in Vote number 1696-92, to indicate: “Thus, the regime is administrative, statutory, for ‘public servants,’ that is, for those who provide services to the administration or on behalf of and for account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture; however, the General Law of Public Administration itself establishes that ‘the service relations with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article III, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, according to the cases’ (General Law of Public Administration, Article 112, subsection 2).” To resolve that specific case, it argued that a distinction must have been made between public officials and workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration; the determination of the category of workers who do not participate in that management being a matter of legality. Now, this other Chamber (the Second) raised a constitutional query on the possibility of entering into collective bargaining agreements in the Public Sector, as well as regarding eventual reforms to them. For this, among other things, we supported it on the following: “…starting from Vote No. 1696-92 of the Constitutional Chamber, all collective bargaining agreements entered into within the Public Sector that do not refer to workers, laborers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, when they are hired by the State according to its capacity to exercise Private Law—Articles 3 and 111 of the cited General Law—are unconstitutional…” (emphasis supplied). Said query was answered through Vote number 4453 of 2:56 p.m. on May 24, 2000. In Considerando VII, several premises were established, which, for what is relevant, are summarized as follows: 1. There are two extremes or legal systems in labor matters: one regulated by the Labor Code and the other, by Public Law. 2. With exceptions, the relationship between the State and public servants is called public or statutory employment, regulated by Public Law: “…consequently, there cannot be a relationship of equality or equivalence between the parties involved, as should ideally occur in a labor relationship of contractual origin, mainly because the Public Administration represents a general interest, due to the need for continuity in the provision of public services and due to budgetary limitations. In other words, the servant under the public employment regime finds himself in a state of subjection in relation to the Administration; it can unilaterally impose the conditions of organization and provision of the service to guarantee the public good, which eliminates the possibility of the relationship being considered from a perspective of equivalence of rights susceptible to negotiation between the parties. This conclusion includes the fact that the possibility of collective bargaining cannot be recognized in the public sector, since the very idea of negotiation, as an ideal means to review and approve the conditions of public employment, clashes with the essential postulates of the organization of the State, which in this field were introduced in Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution.” 3. The position stated is the one historically held. Furthermore, the General Law of Public Administration clearly establishes that Administrative Law applies to service relations between the State and its servants, excluding labor legislation from the relationship, to which only servants who do not participate in public management may resort. 4. Public officials are those who provide services to the administration on behalf of and for account of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, with entire independence of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity (Article 111, subsection 1 of the General Law of Public Administration); servants who cannot bargain collectively. Those who are not officials subject to the public employment regime, but rather workers, laborers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, are the employees of State economic enterprises or services “…entrusted with activities subject to common law, which, in accordance with Article 112 subsection 2) transcribed above, are governed by Labor Law and not by Public Law, which empowers them to bargain collectively.” 5. Starting from Vote 3053-94 and the content of the General Law of Public Administration “…in the public sector, only servants who do not participate in public management may enter into collective bargaining agreements, in such a way that entities with an employment regime of a labor (non-public) nature, such as, for example, State enterprises, of which national doctrine has said are ‘those that function as if they were private companies, because they sell and do the same as private individuals; for example, the INS itself when it sells policies does the same as any insurance company, banking when it makes loans does the same as a common financial entity, the National Power and Light Company (Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz), which sells electrical energy, sells it under the same conditions under which a private company could sell it,’ among others, may indeed bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions that inform Collective Labor Law. 6. Even in the Public Sector where the application of collective bargaining agreements is constitutionally possible, that is, in “…the so-called State economic enterprises or services and in those personnel nuclei of public institutions and entities in which the nature of the services provided do not participate in public management, in the terms of subsection 2 of Article 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, the Chamber repeats and confirms its jurisprudence in the sense that the authorization to negotiate cannot be unrestricted…”. In accordance with the foregoing, among other things, it concluded that collective bargaining agreements entered into in the public sector are unconstitutional when they deal with personnel governed by the public nature employment relationship (statutory relationship), and those signed in said sector with laborers, workers, officials, or employees whose labor relations are regulated by common law are not unconstitutional. It also concluded that collective instruments that have been negotiated and have been extended or modified, in application of the general policy on collective bargaining agreements in the Public Sector, are compatible with Constitutional Law, unless they involve negotiations with personnel in a public nature employment relationship, in which case those instruments are unconstitutional.

It ordered that the administration and the judges, when hearing collective bargaining agreements, must determine whether the workers involved "…<span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">given the nature of the functions they perform or performed</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">," are governed by public or common law, for the purpose of defining whether or not they can be active subjects in the application of collective bargaining agreements. In relation to that ruling (number 4453-00), several motions for addition and clarification were filed, as well as appeals for revocation and review, which were denied by vote number 9690 at 3:01 p.m. on November 1, 2000. However, it is worth noting that in that pronouncement, it was expressly stated that the unconstitutionality of the collective bargaining agreements of any defined set of State institutions had not been declared "…</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">that is, for example, it has not said that collective bargaining agreements can be entered into in municipalities or universities. On the contrary, the judgment is extremely clear and does not require delving into its concepts to understand its tenor, that there are public servants for whom the path of collective labor law is prohibited, and that determining who those servants are is a task that corresponds to each of the public entities, in the exercise of their powers and, ultimately, to the judges responsible for adjudicating the disputes that arise on this matter</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">." And it was expressed that for the determination of who is an official or servant governed by a public-law employment relationship and who is not, a special law is not required. For its part, in vote number 7730, at 2:47 p.m., of August 30, 2000, related to some articles of the RECOPE collective bargaining agreement, in addition to analyzing the issue of the legal nature of that entity, as a public company that is part of the non-financial public sector of the economy, in its section referring to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) regarding collective bargaining agreements, by way of summary, it indicated: "…</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">based on the jurisprudence of the Chamber, it must be concluded that RECOPE is a public company and therefore forms an integral part of the public sector in which the application of the institution of collective bargaining agreements is constitutionally possible; that is to say, in the so-called State enterprises or economic services and in those personnel groups of public institutions and entities in which the nature of the services provided do not participate in public management, in the terms of subsection 2 of article 112 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). But the authorization to bargain collectively that the legal system provides is not unrestricted</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">…." Likewise, in vote number 10358 at 3:04 p.m., of November 22, 2000, when hearing an unconstitutionality action against a norm of the collective bargaining agreement of the National Production Council (Consejo Nacional de Producción), it was considered: "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">…Both the Convention and specifically the challenged Article 12 are not applicable to public officials who provide services to the Administration in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character of the respective activity (article 111 subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). On the contrary, it is possible to apply it to laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, the employees of State enterprises or economic services, in charge of tasks subject to common law, who, in accordance with article 112 subsection 2) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de Administración Pública), are governed by labor law and not by public law</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">." Also, regarding the Collective Bargaining Agreement of Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, a pronouncement was issued, namely, number 3001 at 10:35 a.m. on March 9, 2006. In that resolution, it was stated that the constitutional oversight body has recognized the possibility of collective bargaining for workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration, the employees of State enterprises or economic services, in charge of tasks subject to common law. And it added: "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">This Chamber has therefore recognized that the relationship between the State and public servants, as a thesis of principle, is a public or statutory employment relationship; in other words, the servant under the public employment regime is in a state of subjection with the Administration; it can unilaterally impose the conditions of the organization and provision of the service to guarantee the public good. This conclusion does not imply that collective bargaining cannot be tolerated in the public sector, but in accordance with the provisions of constitutional articles 191 and 192, it is only possible for those who do not carry out public management</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">."</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> Finally, it is worth mentioning that in judgment 7261 at 2:45 p.m. on May 23, 2006, by which an unconstitutionality action against some articles of the Collective Labor Agreement of the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) was resolved, the possibility of collective bargaining available to laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, the employees of State enterprises or economic services in charge of tasks subject to common law, was once again reiterated; highlighting the premises set by ruling 4453-2000. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">II.-</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">Article 191 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) states: "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">." Following this, Article 192 provides: "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">." Under these norms, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) did not establish in general and absolute terms the validity or nullity of collective bargaining agreements in any specific sphere (including municipal), as it expressly indicated that it must be analyzed in each specific case whether the relationship of a particular employee is regulated by Common Law or by Public Law. In this latter case, any possibility of entering into collective bargaining agreements is prohibited. To carry out this task, one must consider what was ordered by said body regarding awards and collective bargaining agreements as well as the content of articles 3, 111, and 112, all of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). For this, it must be based on the fact that, as that Chamber has reiterated in the pronouncements that have been mentioned, the cited norms 191 and 192 ground the existence, in principle, that is, as a rule, of an employment regime governed by Public Law, within the Public Sector; the exception in this matter being the hiring of workers subject to common labor law. The latter can occur "…</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that refers to a private employment regime</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">," according to the conditions that merit different treatment (vote 1696-92). This rule is applicable in all employment relationships in the Public Sector, including the municipal sphere, precisely because municipalities are minor territorial public entities contemplated in articles 168 and following of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). Regarding them, it should be said in passing, clear reference was made in Considering VIII (Considerando VIII) titled "CONCLUSIONS," of judgment 4453-00, when stating: "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">And finally, according to what the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República) has expressed in its report, which this Chamber also accepts, the personnel working in the Municipalities of the country are limited for collective bargaining, in the terms of this judgment, since, unless proven otherwise, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">."</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> On the other hand, for the purpose of determining the subjection of Public Sector workers to the administrative or statutory regime, the concept of "statute" should not cause confusion, since, as interpreted by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), the Constitution did not restrict the concept of "statute" to that of a single legal instrument "…</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">but rather intends to concretize a uniform regime of principles and guarantees that regulate the protection of the labor rights of the public servant, especially attending to their right to stability</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" (vote number 6240 at 2:00 p.m. on November 26, 1993).</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">The reiterated criterion of that body is that those excluded from the public employment regime and, therefore, who could collectively bargain with the limitations set by its jurisprudence are: the laborers, workers, and employees hired by the Public Administration in accordance with the exercise of its Private Law capacity, as well as the employees of State enterprises or economic services in charge of tasks subject to common law, who do not participate in the public management of the administration (articles 3.2, 111, and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)). These norms, in order, provide: "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Article 3° 1. Public law shall regulate the organization and activity of public entities, except for express norms to the contrary. / 2. Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, due to their overall regime and the requirements of their business, can be considered as common industrial or commercial enterprises."</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Article 111.- 1. A public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or in the name and on behalf of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character of the respective activity. 2. For this purpose, the terms 'public official', 'public servant', 'public employee', 'person in charge of a public service', and similar ones are considered equivalent, and the regime of their relations shall be the same for all, unless the nature of the situation indicates otherwise. 3. Employees of State enterprises or economic services in charge of tasks subject to common law are not considered public servants.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" And, "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Article 112.- 1. Administrative law shall be applicable to the service relations between the Administration and its public servants. 2. Service relations with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3°, of article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as appropriate. 3.- However, the legal or regulatory provisions of public law that are necessary to guarantee administrative legality and morality, as determined by Decree of the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), shall also apply to the latter. 4. For criminal purposes, said servants shall be deemed as public.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" In accordance with the aforementioned norms (to which, it is repeated, the judgments of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) alluding to the issue refer),</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">a public servant is the person who provides services to the administration or in the name and on behalf of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character of the respective activity; excluding from the regulation proper to public employment relations, those maintained with laborers, workers, and employees hired by the Public Administration in accordance with the exercise of its private law capacity and the employees of State enterprises or economic services in charge of tasks subject to common law, who do not participate in the public management of the administration. If, as a thesis of principle, those who provide services to the State and its institutions are governed by the norms and principles proper to Public Law and not Private Labor Law, which has constitutional roots, the exceptions, apart from having to be accredited without a doubt, as such, must always have restrictive scopes; otherwise, it would contradict the interpretation made by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of what was prescribed by the constituent power. Hence, it could in no way be interpreted that only officials who have competences fixed or defined specifically in the law or the heads in general terms are subject to a public employment regime, because, by that path, we would evidently turn the exception into the rule; that is, subjecting the majority of those who provide services in the Public Sector to a private employment regime, with all the consequences that this implies, including, of course, the absence of stability in employment. Thus, it must be taken into account that the legislator introduced in subsection 2) of the cited article 112 a phrase that is extremely restrictive, by indicating that service relations with laborers, workers, and employees "…</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">who do not participate in the public management of the Administration</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" shall be governed by labor or commercial law. As relevant, the Dictionary of the Spanish Language defines the term "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">participate</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" as "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">To take part in something</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" and, therefore, "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">participant</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" is one who "…</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">has a part in something, or enters with others in the distribution of it</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" (Real Academia Española. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Diccionario de la Lengua Española.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> Vol. II, Madrid, 21st ed., 1992, p. 1536). On the other hand, the concept "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">public management of the Administration</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">," must be related to the so-called "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">administrative function</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" (which is mentioned in constitutional article 49) defined from an eclectic perspective, as follows: "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Despite the existing difficulties, as a product of the conjunction of the main criteria presented so far (substantial, formal, and that of the legal regime of the acts), we can define, from an eclectic perspective, the administrative function as that carried out by public organs and entities for the concrete, immediate, and direct protection of public interests and which is subject to the law</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" ([Surname2], Ernesto. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Tratado de Derecho Administrativo</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">, Vol. I General Part, San José, Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A., 1st ed., 2006, p. 349). From that perspective, the administrative function manifests in diverse forms, such as the acts and facts of the administration. For the cited author "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">The administrative function, whether legal or not, can manifest through acts or facts. Acts are the declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge of the Public Administration, while facts are the material actions or technical operations carried out in the exercise of the administrative function</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" (</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">op. cit.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">, p. 357). In this line of thought, the administrative act is only one "…</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">of the many forms of externalization</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" (</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">op.cit.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">, p. 422). Hence, the administrative function is not only carried out by the heads. Thus, it must be interpreted that a public servant is the person who provides services to the administration or in the name and on behalf of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public character of the respective activity; thereby participating, to a greater or lesser extent, in the so-called "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">public management of the Administration</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">," for the purpose of protecting public interests. Therefore, it must be understood that those who do not participate in said management are the laborers, workers, and employees who not only carry out tasks unlinked from the concrete, immediate, and direct protection of public interests, but also who are not part of the organization of the respective public entity, lacking a valid and effective act of investiture, and for the same reason, the respective administration hired them in the exercise of private law capacity, that is, like any private individual; to which it must reasonably resort, in accordance with the law, only exceptionally for carrying out specific and non-ordinary tasks. For the municipal sphere, this interpretation is reinforced based on the content of numeral 152, inserted in Title V of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), called "The Municipal Personnel," a section that regulates aspects related to entry into the municipal administrative career; the descriptive manual of positions, salaries, and wages; personnel selection; incentives and benefits; service evaluation and qualification; municipal training; permits; rights of municipal servants; duties of municipal servants; prohibitions; sanctions; and sanction procedures. The referenced norm 152 establishes: "</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">The provisions contained in this title regarding the procedure for appointment and removal shall not be applied to officials directly dependent on the Council (Concejo) nor to occasional employees hired against the budget lines of Special Services (Servicios Especiales) or Occasional Day Labor (Jornales Ocasionales). The Council (Concejo) shall agree on the actions that affect the officials directly dependent on it</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">." </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">III.-</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">In the present case, it was up to the municipal administration, in the exercise of its powers, and ultimately to the judges of this jurisdiction, to determine which of the defendant's employees are governed by public law or common law, for the purpose of defining whether or not they can benefit from the collective bargaining agreement. The officials who provide services to the defendant municipality, as part of its organization, serving on an interim basis or with permanent status (en propiedad) in the positions provided for in the job scale of the sued municipality, undoubtedly form part of its structure; therefore</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">they are</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">officials who provide</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">services</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">to</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">the</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">Administration -Municipality of Aserrí- in the name and on behalf of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of valid and effective acts of investiture, through which the public nature of their respective relations as servants of that municipality cannot be ignored, regardless of the type of activity they carry out, since their relationship is one of public or statutory employment by express provision of law, specifically by the provisions of articles 115, 119, and 146 subsection a) of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), where the so-called municipal administrative career is established for municipal officials, without distinction of rank or functions, which encompasses the principles inherent in a public employment relationship -statutory relationship-; hence, in Considering VIII (Considerando VIII) titled "CONCLUSIONS," of vote 4453 at 2:56 p.m. on May 24, 2000, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) stated that </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">"…the personnel working in the Municipalities of the country are limited for collective bargaining, in the terms of this judgment, since, unless proven otherwise, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship"</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">; therefore, those who have not been hired by the defendant in the exercise of its private law capacity, it is evident that their service relationship is not regulated by Private Labor Law, but by Public Law. As a logical consequence of the foregoing, the municipal officials could not derive any right from the invoked collective bargaining agreement, since, with respect to them, it becomes unconstitutional, in the terms of those partially transcribed constitutional resolutions (numbers 4453 and 9690, both from the year 2000), unless they are excluded from the public employment regime, that is, the laborers, workers, and employees hired by the municipal administration in accordance with the exercise of its private law capacity which empowers them to bargain collectively, and not for those who provide services in the name and on behalf of it, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, because they are officials subject to the public employment regime. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">In accordance with the preceding considerations, we depart from the majority vote, revoke (revocamos) the appealed judgment, and dismiss the claim in all its aspects without special order as to costs (sin especial condenatoria en costas).</span></p> “**III- WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA (OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL):** Article 1 of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría establishes it as the higher technical-legal consultative body of the Public Administration and as the legal representative of the State in matters within its competence. The following article (2) establishes that the opinions and legal opinions of the Procuraduría constitute administrative case law (jurisprudencia administrativa) and are of mandatory compliance for the Public Administration. Now then, canon 154 of the Carta Magna, which enshrines the independence of judges as a guarantee of the democratic system, is extremely clear when it prescribes: “*The Judicial Branch is only subject to the Constitution and the law, and the resolutions it issues in matters of its competence impose no other responsibilities than those expressly indicated by legislative precepts*”. Judicial independence is also contemplated in Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, ratified by our country through Law No. 4534 of February 3, 1970. According to article 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, judges are only subject to “the Constitución Política and the law”; hence, the criterion that the Procuraduría may hold at any given time can in no way be binding upon the administrators of justice when issuing their rulings. On this matter, ruling No. 747-05 of this Chamber noted: “*The administrative case law of the Procuraduría General de la República does not obligate the Chamber to consider it for resolving a case, since the only thing it is subject to is the Constitution and the laws in force* …”. In this vein, the pronouncements emanating from the Procuraduría General de la República in the exercise of its own functions in no way affect the resolution of disputes submitted to the jurisdictional bodies (regarding this topic, see our rulings Nos. 892-00, 1023-06, 221-07 and 187-10).” In the specific case, there are no weighty elements that would allow a change of criteria, since the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) of the Municipality of Aserrí also does not exclude legal advisors (asesores jurídicos) from its scope of protection, so what was decided by the lower court judges deserves to be confirmed; not without first warning that at folio 150 the plaintiff's signature appears, in his capacity as legal counsel (consejero legal) of the municipality, endorsing the amendment of several articles of the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva)—among them article 50, which serves as the basis for the lawsuit—a modification that was approved (homologada) by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security through resolution no. DRT-241-2004 (folio 146), which could generate a conflict of interest that would render the regulations in question inapplicable to the plaintiff pursuant to ordinals 6 of the Reglamento para la Negociación de Convenciones Colectivas en el Sector Público (Regulation for the Negotiation of Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Public Sector) (Decreto Ejecutivo no. 29576 of May 31, 2001) and 48 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública (Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office) (no. 8422 of October 6, 2004), but the ad quem considered that: “The fact that in May 2003 he signed, as the municipality's legal advisor, the modifications to the collective bargaining agreement does not prejudice his right, since the exclusion is for the heads (jerarcas), given their decision-making power to administer the public treasury, and they can benefit directly or indirectly from what was agreed, not for those who are not in that condition,” reasoning that was not challenged in the appeal to the third instance requested (recurso de tercera instancia rogada), so it is not feasible for this Collegiate Body to remove it and rule differently.” Even in the Public Sector where the application of collective bargaining agreements is constitutionally possible, that is, in "... the so-called economic enterprises or services of the State and in those personnel units of public institutions and entities where the nature of the services rendered does not involve public management, under the terms of subsection 2 of Article 112 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, the Chamber reiterates and confirms its jurisprudence to the effect that the authorization to negotiate cannot be unrestricted...". In accordance with the foregoing, among other things, it concluded that collective bargaining agreements entered into in the public sector are unconstitutional when they involve personnel governed by a public-law employment relationship (statutory relationship), and those signed in said sector with laborers, workers, officials, or employees whose labor relations are governed by common law are not unconstitutional. It also concluded that collective instruments that have been negotiated and have been extended or modified, in application of the general policy on collective bargaining agreements in the Public Sector, are compatible with Constitutional Law, unless they involve negotiations with personnel in a public-law employment relationship, in which case such instruments are unconstitutional. It ordered that it is the responsibility of the administration and the judges, when hearing matters of collective bargaining agreements, to determine whether the workers involved "... given the nature of the functions they perform or performed", are regulated by public law or common law, in order to define whether or not they can be active subjects in the application of collective bargaining agreements. In relation to that ruling (number 4453-00), several motions for addition and clarification were filed, as well as appeals for revocation and review, which were denied by vote number 9690 at 15:01 hours on November 1, 2000. However, it is worth noting that in that pronouncement, it was expressly reported that the unconstitutionality of the collective bargaining agreements of any defined set of State institutions had not been declared "... that is, for example, it has not said that collective bargaining agreements can be entered into in municipalities or universities. On the contrary, the judgment is extremely clear and does not require delving into its concepts to understand its tenor, that there are public servants who are barred from the path of collective labor law and that determining who those servants are is a task that corresponds to each of the public entities, in the exercise of their powers and, ultimately, to the judges responsible for judging the disputes that arise on this matter". And, it was expressed that for the determination of who is a public official or servant governed by a public-law employment relationship and who is not, a special law is not required. For its part, in vote number 7730, at 14:47 hours, of August 30, 2000, related to some articles of the collective bargaining agreement of RECOPE, in addition to analyzing the issue of the legal nature of that entity, as a public enterprise part of the non-financial public sector of the economy. In its section referring to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber regarding collective bargaining agreements, by way of summary, it was indicated: "... based on the jurisprudence of the Chamber, it must be concluded that RECOPE is a public enterprise and therefore forms an integral part of the public sector in which the application of the institution of collective bargaining agreements is constitutionally possible; that is to say, in the so-called economic enterprises or services of the State and in those personnel units of public institutions and entities where the nature of the services rendered does not involve public management, under the terms of subsection 2 of Article 112 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. But the authorization to bargain collectively granted to it by the legal system is not unrestricted...". Likewise, in vote number 10358 at 15:04 hours, of November 22, 2000, when hearing an action of unconstitutionality against a norm of the collective bargaining agreement of the Consejo Nacional de Producción, it was considered: "... Both the Agreement and specifically the challenged Article 12, are not applicable to public officials who render services to the Administration in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the mandatory, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity (Article 111 subsection 1) of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). On the contrary, it is possible to apply it to laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, the employees of economic enterprises or services of the State, in charge of activities subject to common law, who in accordance with Article 112 subsection 2) of the Ley General de Administración Pública, are governed by labor law and not by public law". Also, regarding the Collective Bargaining Agreement of Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, a pronouncement was issued, namely, number 3001 at 10:35 hours on March 9, 2006. In that resolution, it was stated that the constitutional review body has recognized the possibility of collective bargaining for workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration, the employees of economic enterprises or services of the State, in charge of activities subject to common law. And, it added: "This Chamber has therefore recognized that the relationship between the State and public servants, as a thesis of principle, is a public or statutory employment relationship; in other words, the servant in the public employment regime is in a state of subjection with the Administration; the latter may unilaterally impose the conditions of the organization and provision of the service to guarantee the public good. This conclusion does not imply that collective bargaining cannot be tolerated in the public sector, but in accordance with the provisions of constitutional articles 191 and 192, it is only possible for those who do not perform public management".

**II.-** Article 191 of the Constitución Política reads: "A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration". Subsequently, Article 192 provides: "With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed by labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof". Under the protection of these norms, the Constitutional Chamber did not establish in general and absolute terms the validity or nullity of collective bargaining agreements in any specific sphere (including the municipal one), as it expressly indicated that it had to be analyzed in each specific case whether the relationship of a given employee is regulated by Common Law or by Public Law. In this latter case, any possibility of entering into collective bargaining agreements is barred. To carry out this task, attention must be paid to what has been ordered by said body regarding arbitration awards and collective bargaining agreements, as well as the content of Articles 3, 111, and 112, all of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. For this, one must begin from the premise that, as that Chamber has reiterated in the pronouncements already mentioned, the cited norms 191 and 192 support the existence, in principle, that is, as a rule, of an employment regime governed by Public Law within the Public Sector; with the exception in this matter being the hiring of workers subject to common labor law. This latter can occur "... in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that refers to a private employment regime", according to conditions that warrant different treatment (vote 1696-92). This rule is applicable in all employment relationships in the Public Sector, including the municipal sphere, precisely because municipalities are minor territorial public entities contemplated in Article 168 and following of the Constitución Política. Regarding them, it is worth noting, clear reference was made in Considerando VIII called "CONCLUSIONS", of judgment 4453-00, by indicating: "And finally, according to what the Procuraduría General de la República has expressed in its report, which this Chamber also accepts, the personnel who work in the Municipalities of the country are limited for collective bargaining, under the terms of this judgment, since, unless proven otherwise, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship".

On the other hand, for the purpose of determining the subjection of Public Sector workers to the administrative or statutory regime, the concept of "statute" should not lead to confusion, since, as the Constitutional Chamber interpreted it, the Constitution did not restrict the concept of "statute" to that of a single legal instrument "... but rather seeks to concretize a uniform regime of principles and guarantees that regulate the protection of the labor rights of the public servant, especially attending to their right to stability" (vote number 6240 at 14:00 hours of November 26, 1993). The reiterated criterion of that body is that excluded from the public employment regime and, therefore, able to contract collectively with the limitations set by its jurisprudence, are the laborers, workers, and employees hired by the Public Administration according to the exercise of its Private Law capacity, as well as the employees of economic enterprises or services of the State in charge of activities subject to common law, who do not participate in the public management of the administration (Articles 3.2, 111, and 112 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). These norms, in order, provide: "Article 3° 1. Public law shall regulate the organization and activity of public entities, unless an express norm indicates otherwise. / 2. Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, by their overall regime and the requirements of their operations, can be considered as ordinary industrial or commercial enterprises." "Article 111.- 1. A public servant is the person who renders services to the Administration or in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the mandatory, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. 2. For this purpose, the terms "public official," "public servant," "public employee," "person in charge of a public service," and other similar terms are considered equivalent, and the regime of their relations shall be the same for all, unless the nature of the situation indicates otherwise. 3. Employees of economic enterprises or services of the State in charge of activities subject to common law are not considered public servants." And, "Article 112.- 1. Administrative law shall be applicable to service relations between the Administration and its public servants. 2. Service relations with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3° of Article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as the case may be. 3.- However, legal or regulatory provisions of public law that are necessary to guarantee administrative legality and morality, as determined by the Poder Ejecutivo by Decree, shall also apply to the latter. 4. For criminal purposes, said servants shall be considered as public." In accordance with the aforementioned norms (to which, it is repeated, the judgments of the Constitutional Chamber alluding to the subject refer), a public servant is the person who renders services to the administration or in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the mandatory, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity; excluding, from the regulation proper to public employment relationships, those maintained with laborers, workers, and employees hired by the Public Administration according to the exercise of its private law capacity and the employees of economic enterprises or services of the State in charge of activities subject to common law, who do not participate in the public management of the administration. If, as a thesis of principle, those who render services to the State and its institutions are governed by the norms and principles of Public Law and not Private Labor Law, which has constitutional standing, the exceptions, apart from having to be duly proven beyond doubt, as such, must always have restrictive scopes; otherwise, it would contradict the interpretation made by the Constitutional Chamber of what was mandated by the constituent power. Hence, in no way could it be interpreted that only officials who have powers specifically established or defined by law, or high-ranking officials in general terms, are subject to a public employment regime, because, through that path, we would evidently turn the exception into the rule; that is, subjecting the majority of those who provide services in the Public Sector to a private employment regime, with all the consequences that this entails, including, of course, the absence of job stability. This being the case, it must be considered that the legislator introduced in subsection 2) of the cited Article 112 a phrase that is extremely restrictive, by stating that service relations with laborers, workers, and employees "... who do not participate in the public management of the Administration" shall be governed by labor or commercial law. As relevant here, the Diccionario de la Lengua Española defines the term "participate" as "To take part in something" and, therefore, a "participant" is one who "... has a part in something, or joins with others in the distribution of it" (Real Academia Española. Diccionario de la Lengua Española. Volume II, Madrid, twenty-first edition, 1992, p. 1536). On the other hand, the concept of "public management of the Administration" must be related to the so-called "administrative function" (which is mentioned in constitutional Article 49) defined from an eclectic perspective, as follows: "Despite the existing difficulties, as a product of the conjunction of the main criteria set forth so far (substantive, formal, and that of the legal regime of acts), we can define, from an eclectic perspective, the administrative function as that performed by public bodies and entities for the concrete, immediate, and direct protection of public interests and which is subject to the law" ([Name2], Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Volume I General Part, San José, Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A., first edition, 2006, p.349). From this perspective, the administrative function manifests itself in various forms, such as the acts and facts of the administration. For the cited author, "The legal or non-legal administrative function can manifest itself through acts or facts. Acts are the declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge of the Public Administration, while facts are the material actions or technical operations carried out in the exercise of the administrative function" (op. cit., p. 357). In this line of thought, the administrative act is just one "... of the many forms of expression" (op.cit., p. 422). Hence, the administrative function is not only carried out by high-ranking officials. This being the case, it must be interpreted that a public servant is one who renders services to the administration or in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the mandatory, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity; participating in this way, and to a greater or lesser extent, in the so-called "public management of the Administration," for the purpose of protecting public interests. So, it must be understood that not participating in said management are those laborers, workers, and employees who not only carry out activities unrelated to the concrete, immediate, and direct protection of public interests, but also who do not form part of the organization of the respective public entity, lacking a valid and effective act of investiture, and for that same reason, the respective administration hired them in the exercise of its private law capacity, that is, like any private individual; which must be resorted to reasonably and in compliance with the law, only on an exceptional basis for carrying out specific and non-ordinary tasks. For the municipal sphere, this interpretation is reinforced based on the content of numeral 152, inserted in Title V of the Código Municipal, called "Municipal Personnel," a section that regulates aspects related to entry into the municipal administrative career; the descriptive manual of positions, salaries, and wages; personnel selection; incentives and benefits; service evaluation and qualification; municipal training; leave; rights of municipal servants; duties of municipal servants; prohibitions and; sanctions; sanction procedure. The referenced norm 152 establishes: "The provisions contained in this title on the procedure for appointment and removal shall not be applied to officials who depend directly on the Concejo nor to occasional employees contracted against the budget lines of Special Services or Occasional Wages. The Concejo shall agree on the actions affecting the officials directly dependent on it." **III.-** In the present case, it was the responsibility of the municipal administration in the exercise of its powers and, ultimately, the judges of this jurisdiction, to determine which of the defendant's employees are regulated by public law or common law, for the purpose of defining whether or not they can benefit from the collective bargaining agreement. The officials who render services to the defendant municipality, as part of its organization, serving on an interim basis or permanently in the positions provided for in the pay scale of the sued municipality, undoubtedly form part of its structure, therefore they are officials who render services to the Administration -Municipalidad de Aserrí- in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of valid and effective acts of investiture, through which the public nature of their respective relations as servants of that municipality cannot be ignored, regardless of the type of activity they perform, since their relationship is one of public or statutory employment by express provision of law, specifically by what is provided in Articles 115, 119, and 146 subsection a) of the Código Municipal, where the so-called municipal administrative career is established for municipal officials, without distinction of rank or functions, which includes the principles specific to a public employment relationship - statutory relationship-, hence in considerando VIII called "CONCLUSIONS," of vote 4453 at 14:56 hours of May 24, 2000, the Constitutional Chamber stated that "... the personnel who work in the Municipalities of the country are limited for collective bargaining, under the terms of this judgment, since, unless proven otherwise, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship", therefore, as for those who have not been hired by the defendant in the exercise of its private law capacity, it is evident that their service relationship is not regulated by Private Labor Law, but by Public Law.

As a logical consequence of the foregoing, the municipal officials could not derive any right from the invoked collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), since, with respect to them, it becomes unconstitutional, in the terms of those partially transcribed constitutional rulings (numbers 4453 and 9690, both from the year 2000), unless they are excluded from the public employment regime, that is, the laborers (obreros), workers (trabajadores), and employees (empleados) hired by the municipal administration in accordance with the exercise of its capacity under private law, which empowers them to bargain collectively, and not for those who provide services in the name and on behalf of the administration, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, since they are officials subject to the public employment regime.

In accordance with the preceding considerations, we depart from the majority vote, revoke the appealed judgment, and dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety, without special assessment of costs." REGARDING THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA: Section 1 of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría establishes it as the senior technical-legal consultative body of the Public Administration and as the legal representative of the State in matters within its competence. The following provision (2) establishes that the opinions and views of the Procuraduría constitute administrative jurisprudence (jurisprudencia administrativa) and are binding on the Public Administration. That said, canon 154 of the Carta Magna, which enshrines the independence of judges as a guarantee of the democratic system, is exceedingly clear in prescribing: “The Judicial Branch is subject only to the Constitution and the law, and the resolutions it issues on matters within its competence impose no responsibilities other than those expressly indicated by legislative precepts.” Judicial independence is also contemplated in Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights, ratified by our country through Law No. 4534 of February 3, 1970. In accordance with section 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, judges are subject only to “the Political Constitution and the law”; hence, the position that the Procuraduría may hold at any given time can in no way be invoked against the administrators of justice when they issue their rulings. On this point, in judgment No. 747-05 of this Court, it was noted: “The administrative jurisprudence of the Procuraduría General de la República does not bind the Chamber to consider it when deciding, since it is subject only to the Constitution and the laws in force…”. In this vein, the pronouncements emanating from the Procuraduría General de la República in the exercise of its proper functions in no way affect the resolution of disputes submitted to the jurisdictional bodies (on this subject, our judgments No. 892-00, 1023-06, 221-07 and 187-10 may be consulted).

**IV-. REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF:** This Office has already had the opportunity to rule in a case quite similar to the one before us now, in which the point in dispute was whether the legal director of a municipality was entitled to the benefits stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva) in light of vote No. 4453-00 of the Sala Constitucional. This concerns our judgment No. 852-08, authored by this same drafter, in which it was decided by majority:

“The collective bargaining agreement that governs the labor conditions at the Municipalidad de Goicoechea is indeed applicable to the plaintiff, as none of its clauses expressly exclude him. Pursuant to Article 154 of the Carta Magna, the judge is subject only to the Constitution and the law. Moreover, numeral 62 of the same text states: ‘Collective bargaining agreements that, in accordance with the law, are concluded between employers or employer unions and legally organized worker unions shall have the force of law.’ The function of the judge is to apply the law to the specific case. In the case at hand, there is a collective bargaining agreement—with the force of law—that has not been rendered ineffective by any provision of the legal system; therefore, since it is in force, we, the undersigned, as administrators of justice, must apply the stipulations of that instrument to the aforementioned individual. Certainly, the jurisprudence has accepted the validity of configuration clauses that in many cases exclude various groups of officials from the scope of coverage of the collective bargaining agreement, it being common for this to occur with legal directors. In this regard, in judgment No. 5577-96 of the Sala Constitucional, it was stated: ‘The challenged provision of the collective bargaining agreement states, in relevant part: “This collective bargaining agreement applies generally to employees who provide services to JAPDEVA in port and development activities and any other activity carried out by JAPDEVA anywhere in the country (…). D) The following shall not be covered by this collective bargaining agreement: the Executive President, his assistants and advisors, the Vice-Executive President; Managers, their assistants; Auditor and Sub-Auditor and Legal Advisors.” The plaintiff's complaint regarding what is established in this rule is based on the fact that it contains evident discrimination against a specific group of persons, namely legal advisors, solely because they are lawyers, which is contrary to their constitutional rights (…). It is notorious from that perspective that in both the case of managers (discussed in recently cited judgment No. 2308-95) and that of the legal advisors now under review, we find ourselves facing a particular and distinct situation in relation to the general body of employees of an organization, due to their decisive power of disposition and influence over the institution's trajectory and their ability to commit it, which entails that their decisions produce effects on themselves, without (in general and effective terms) controls existing for the reversal of such acts if they prove harmful to the organization as a whole. Thus, it is logical that—as a protective mechanism for the organization—these officials be set apart and excluded from the potential advantages and benefits to which the institution commits itself, in order to prevent them from acquiescing in matters with the hidden purpose of benefiting themselves. To what has been said, one need only add that it is reasonable to apply the expressed concepts to legal advisors, who—in a State rigidly bound to the principle of legality like ours—become pieces of singular importance for decision-making; therefore, it is reasonable to consider them part of the stratum of confidential officials of the organization and, thereby, excluded from the general characteristics that shape the institution's relationship with its employees in general. In conclusion, the Chamber considers that, as with the managers of the Junta de Administración Portuaria y Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), whose situation was previously analyzed and resolved, no inequality of treatment exists in relation to legal advisors when they are excluded from the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement, if such a distinction is based on a qualitatively different situation and has been carried out within the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality’ (in a similar vein, judgment No. 10358-00 of that Chamber may be consulted). However, since in the underlying dispute there is no express clause that excludes the legal director from the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement (or at least it was not proven), these benefits are fully applicable to the plaintiff.” In the specific case, there are no significant elements that would allow a change of position, since the collective bargaining agreement of the Municipalidad de Aserrí also does not exclude legal advisors from its scope of protection; therefore, what was decided by the lower court judges must be confirmed; not without first noting that at folio 150 the plaintiff's signature appears, in his capacity as legal counsel for the municipality, endorsing the amendment of several articles of the collective bargaining agreement—among them Article 50, which serves as the basis for the lawsuit—, a modification that was homologated by the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social through resolution No. DRT-241-2004 (folio 146), which could create a conflict of interest that would render the regulations in question inapplicable to the plaintiff pursuant to provisions 6 of the Reglamento para la Negociación de Convenciones Colectivas en el Sector Público (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29576 of May 31, 2001) and 48 of the Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública (No. 8422 of October 6, 2004), but the lower court (ad quem) deemed that: “The fact that in May 2003 he signed, as the municipality's legal advisor, the amendments to the collective bargaining agreement does not prejudice his right, since the exclusion is for top officials, given their decision-making power to administer public funds, and they can benefit directly or indirectly from what was agreed, not for those who are not in that condition,” a reasoning that was not challenged in the appeal to the third instance; therefore, this Court cannot remove it and decide differently.

**V-. CONCLUSION:** As a corollary to the foregoing, the filed appeal must be denied and the appealed judgment confirmed.

**POR TANTO:** The appealed judgment is confirmed.

***Orlando Aguirre Gómez*** ***Julia Varela Araya*** ***Rolando Vega Robert*** ***Eva María Camacho Vargas*** ***María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez*** **Magistrates Aguirre Gómez and Bogantes Rodríguez dissent and issue their dissenting vote as follows.** **I.-** We disagree with the position set forth in the majority vote, for the reasons stated below. To resolve the issue concerning the application of collective bargaining agreements in the Public Sector, it is necessary, in light of Article 13 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, to start from what the Sala Constitucional has held on the subject. For this purpose, vote No. 1696, of 3:30 p.m. on August 23, 1992, is of special interest, by which the awards were annulled “…regarding public administrations with a public-law employment regime.” In that pronouncement, it was noted that the Political Constitution provided for an exclusive public labor regime for State servants. However, the enactment of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil has only partial scope, since its purpose was solely to regulate the relations of the Executive Branch with its servants, within its sphere of competence, leaving unregulated the service relations between non-central government public entities. In that vein, it argues that: “A Political Constitution is currently in force that did provide for it, and that, despite this, a common legal framework continues to be used, subjecting the Public Administration and its employees to the resolution of their disputes through a private-law procedure. This results in an unconstitutional application by virtue of the historical and legal lag that this matter evidences, which tacitly contravenes Article 197 of the Political Constitution. It is clear that the constituent’s intention was to create an administrative labor regime.” It was also indicated that said statute barely regulated some aspects of the relationship of State servants, such as those relating to servants' rights and duties, their selection, classification, promotion, transfers, discipline, and dismissal regime—among the most important—, which respond to the concern of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente regarding the suitability and efficiency of the service; “…but it did not touch upon other no less important aspects, such as that underlying the approach of this action, that is, the regulation of the economic regime of that relationship itself and the submission of the other administrative entities to the public labor regime. This gap, however, does not authorize the use of mechanisms designed for a private relationship for a public employment relationship that must be governed by its own and different principles.” And, it added that the existing confusion in the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente regarding using and mentioning the Código de Trabajo in the Constitution was to establish, in some way, a normative parameter to govern the termination of the relationship and “…not, as has been sought to be understood, that its principles and norms inspire and govern the relationship between the State and the public servant.” Subsequently, it considered: “In the Chamber’s opinion, then, Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution ground the existence, in principle, of an employment regime governed by Public Law within the public sector, as became clear from the debate of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente and as the Ley General de la Administración Pública incipiently reflects. This public employment regime necessarily implies consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, not only different from those of (private) labor law, but often opposed to them. Obviously, the declaration contained in this judgment encompasses the employment relationship that exists between the public administration (or better, public administrations) and its servants, but in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that refers to a private employment regime, the solution must be different. In these cases, there would be a submission to arbitration procedures but with certain limitations, such as that they cannot dispense with or create exceptions to laws, regulations, or government directives in force, so that even in these cases decisions (awards) in equity would not be appropriate, nor tribunals formed by persons who are not lawyers.” It was also clarified that those must be deemed “…excluded from this regime: laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, when they are contracted by the State pursuant to the exercise of its capacity under Private Law (Articles 3.2 and 112.2 and .3 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública). This judgment also implies that the procedures for the ‘resolution of collective disputes of an economic and social nature,’ provided for in Article 497 and following of the Código de Trabajo, are not entirely applicable to administrations governed by public employment law, and that they are not applicable to the rest of the administrations, including public enterprises-corporations, until the omissions noted in this judgment are remedied by law.” Citing the aforementioned judgment 1696-92, in judgment No. 4788, of 8:48 a.m. on September 30, 1993, regarding insurance agents, it was considered: “The foregoing means that the Chamber has demarcated the meaning of Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, to interpret that the relationship of the State with its ‘officials,’ ‘servants,’ ‘employees,’ or ‘agents’ is regulated within an employment regime governed by Public Law, except for those exceptions that the legislator reasonably establishes, according to special conditions warranting different treatment. And by way of an initial conclusion, the Chamber endorses the analysis made by the Procuraduría General de la República, to define that, based on the activity carried out by insurance agents, according to the definitions in Article 111 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, they are excluded from the public employment regime referred to in Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution, and in accordance with what is established in subsection 2 of Article 112 of the aforementioned Ley General, those relationships must be regulated by labor or commercial law, as the case may be.” Later, in judgment number 3053 of 9:45 a.m. on June 24, 1994, it reiterated the criterion expressed in vote number 1696-92, stating: “Thus, the regime is administrative, statutory, for ‘public servants (servidores públicos),’ that is, for those who provide services to the administration or on its behalf and account, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture; however, the General Law of Public Administration itself establishes that ‘service relationships with laborers (obreros), workers (trabajadores), and employees (empleados) who do not participate in the public management (gestión pública) of the administration, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article III, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as appropriate’ (General Law of Public Administration, Article 112, subsection 2).” To resolve that specific case, it argued that a distinction must be made between public officials and workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration; the determination of the category of workers who do not participate in that management being a matter of legality. Now, this other Chamber (the Second) raised a constitutional query regarding the possibility of entering into collective bargaining agreements in the Public Sector, as well as making eventual amendments thereto. To that end, among others, we based our argument on the following: “…as of Vote No. 1696-92 of the Constitutional Chamber, all collective bargaining agreements entered into within the Public Sector that do not refer to laborers, workers, or employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, when they are contracted by the State in accordance with its capacity to act under Private Law—Articles 3 and 111 of the cited General Law—are unconstitutional…” (emphasis supplied). Said query was resolved through vote number 4453 of 2:56 p.m. on May 24, 2000. In Considerando VII, several premises were established, which, for purposes of interest, are summarized as follows: 1. There are two extremes or orders in labor matters: one regulated by the Labor Code and the other by Public Law. 2. With exceptions, the relationship between the State and public servants is called public employment or statutory, regulated by Public Law: “…consequently, a relationship of equality or equivalence between the involved parties cannot exist, as ideally should occur in a contractual labor relationship, mainly because the Public Administration represents a general interest, due to the need for continuity in the provision of public services and due to budgetary limitations. In other words, the servant under the public employment regime finds himself, in relation to the Administration, in a state of subjection; it can unilaterally impose the conditions of organization and provision of the service to guarantee the public good, which eliminates the possibility that the relationship be considered from a perspective of equivalence of rights susceptible to negotiation between the parties. This conclusion includes the fact that the possibility of collective bargaining cannot be recognized in the public sector, since the mere idea of negotiation, as a suitable means to review and approve the conditions of public employment, conflicts with the essential postulates of the State’s organization, which in this field were introduced in Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution.” 3. The position expressed is the one that has been historically maintained. Furthermore, the General Law of Public Administration clearly establishes that Administrative Law applies to service relationships between the State and its servants, excluding labor legislation from the relationship, which can only govern those servants who do not participate in public management. 4. Public officials are those who provide services to the administration on its behalf and account, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity (Article 111, subsection 1 of the General Law of Public Administration); servants who cannot bargain collectively. Those not considered public officials subject to the public employment regime, but rather laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the administration, are employees of State economic enterprises or services “…tasked with activities subject to common law, who, in accordance with transcribed Article 112 subsection 2), are governed by labor law and not by public law, which empowers them to bargain collectively.” 5. As of vote 3053-94 and the content of the General Law of Public Administration “…in the public sector, only servants who do not participate in public management may enter into collective labor bargaining agreements, such that entities with an employment regime of a labor nature (non-public), such as, for example, State enterprises, which national doctrine has described as ‘those that operate as if they were private enterprises, because they sell and do the same things as private parties; for example, the INS itself when it sells policies does the same as any insurance company, banking when it makes loans does the same as a common financial entity, the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, which sells electric energy under the same conditions that a private company could sell it,’” among others, can indeed bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions governing Collective Labor Law. 6. Even in the Public Sector where the application of collective bargaining agreements is constitutionally possible, that is, in “…the so-called economic enterprises or services of the State and in those personnel groups of public institutions and entities in which the nature of the services provided do not participate in public management, under the terms of subsection 2 of Article 112 of the General Law of Public Administration, the Chamber repeats and confirms its jurisprudence in the sense that the authorization to negotiate cannot be unrestricted…”. In accordance with the foregoing, among others, it concluded that collective bargaining agreements entered into in the public sector are unconstitutional when dealing with personnel governed by an employment relationship of a public nature (statutory relationship), and those subscribed to in said sector with laborers, workers, officials, or employees whose labor relations are regulated by common law are not unconstitutional. It also concluded that collective instruments that have been negotiated and have been extended or modified, in application of the general policy on collective bargaining agreements in the Public Sector, are compatible with Constitutional Law, unless they are negotiations with personnel under an employment relationship of a public nature, in which case those instruments are unconstitutional. It ordered that it corresponds to the administration and to the judges, when hearing collective bargaining agreements, to determine whether the involved workers “…given the nature of the functions they perform or performed,” are regulated by public law or common law, for the purpose of defining whether or not they can be active subjects in the application of the collective bargaining agreements. In relation to that ruling (number 4453-00), several motions for addition and clarification were filed, as well as appeals for revocation and review, which were denied by vote number 9690 of 3:01 p.m. on November 1, 2000. However, it is worth noting that in that pronouncement, it was expressly stated that the unconstitutionality of the collective bargaining agreements of any defined set of State institutions had not been declared “…that is, for example, it has not been said that collective bargaining agreements can be entered into in municipalities or universities. On the contrary, the judgment is extremely clear and does not require deepening into its concepts to understand its tenor, that there are public servants for whom the path of collective labor law is prohibited, and determining who those servants are is a task that corresponds to each of the public entities, in the exercise of their competencies, and ultimately, to the judges tasked with adjudicating the disputes that arise on this matter.” And it was expressed that a special law is not required to determine who is a public official or servant governed by an employment relationship of a public nature and who is not. For its part, in vote number 7730, of 2:47 p.m., on August 30, 2000, related to some articles of the collective bargaining agreement of RECOPE, in addition to analyzing the issue of the legal nature of that entity, as a public enterprise part of the non-financial public sector of the economy, in its section referring to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber regarding collective bargaining agreements, by way of synthesis, it stated: “…based on the Chamber’s jurisprudence, it must be concluded that RECOPE is a public enterprise and therefore forms an integral part of the public sector in which the application of the institution of collective bargaining agreements is constitutionally possible; that is to say, in the so-called economic enterprises or services of the State and in those personnel groups of public institutions and entities in which the nature of the services provided do not participate in public management, under the terms of subsection 2 of Article 112 of the General Law of Public Administration. But the authorization to bargain collectively granted by the legal system is not unrestricted…”. Likewise, in vote number 10358 of 3:04 p.m., on November 22, 2000, when hearing an unconstitutionality action against a norm of the collective bargaining agreement of the Consejo Nacional de Producción, it was considered: “…Both the Agreement and specifically the challenged Article 12 are not applicable to public officials who provide services to the Administration on its behalf and account, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity (Article 111 subsection 1) of the General Law of Public Administration). On the contrary, it is possible to apply it to laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, employees of State economic enterprises or services tasked with activities subject to common law, who, in accordance with Article 112 subsection 2) of the General Law of Public Administration, are governed by labor law and not by public law.” Also, regarding the Collective Bargaining Agreement of Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, a pronouncement was issued, namely, number 3001 of 10:35 a.m. on March 9, 2006. In that resolution, it was stated that the constitutional review body has recognized the possibility of collective bargaining for workers who do not participate in the public management of the administration, employees of State economic enterprises or services tasked with activities subject to common law. And it added: “This Chamber has therefore recognized that the relationship between the State and public servants, as a matter of principle, is a public employment or statutory relationship; in other words, the servant under the public employment regime finds himself, in relation to the Administration, in a state of subjection; it can unilaterally impose the conditions of organization and provision of the service to guarantee the public good. This conclusion does not imply that collective bargaining cannot be tolerated in the public sector, but in accordance with the provisions of Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution, it is only possible for those who do not perform public management.” Finally, it is worth mentioning that in judgment 7261 of 2:45 p.m. on May 23, 2006, through which an unconstitutionality action was resolved against some articles of the Collective Labor Agreement of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, the possibility of collective bargaining held by laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, employees of State economic enterprises or services tasked with activities subject to common law, was reiterated once again; highlighting the premises established by ruling 4453-2000.

II.- Article 191 of the Political Constitution reads: “A civil service statute shall regulate the relations between the State and public servants, with the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the administration.” Subsequently, 192 provides: “With the exceptions that this Constitution and the civil service statute determine, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability and may only be removed for the causes of justified dismissal expressed in labor legislation, or in the case of forced reduction of services, whether due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization thereof.” Under the protection of these norms, the Constitutional Chamber did not establish in general and absolute terms the validity or nullity of collective bargaining agreements in any specific sphere (including the municipal one), since it expressly indicated that it must be analyzed in each specific case whether the relationship of a particular employee is regulated by Common Law or by Public Law. In this latter case, any possibility of entering into collective bargaining agreements is prohibited. To carry out this task, one must heed what is ordered by said body regarding awards and collective bargaining agreements, as well as the content of Articles 3, 111, and 112, all of the General Law of Public Administration. For this, it must be assumed that, as reiterated by that Chamber in the pronouncements mentioned, the cited norms 191 and 192 foundationally support the existence, in principle, that is, as a rule, of an employment regime governed by Public Law within the Public Sector; the exception in this matter being the contracting of workers subject to common labor law. The latter can occur “…in those sectors where there is a (rational) regulation that refers to a private employment regime,” according to conditions that merit different treatment (vote 1696-92). This rule is applicable in all employment relationships in the Public Sector, including the municipal sphere, precisely because municipalities are minor territorial public entities contemplated in Articles 168 and following of the Political Constitution. Regarding them, incidentally, clear reference was made in Considerando VIII called “CONCLUSIONS,” of judgment 4453-00, stating: “And finally, according to what the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic has expressed in its report, which this Chamber also accepts, personnel working in the country’s Municipalities are limited in their collective bargaining, under the terms of this judgment, because, barring proof to the contrary, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship.” On the other hand, for the purpose of determining the subjection of Public Sector workers to the administrative or statutory regime, the concept of “statute” should not cause confusion, given that, as interpreted by the Constitutional Chamber, the Constitution did not restrict the concept of “statute” to that of a single legal instrument “…but rather intends to realize a uniform regime of principles and guarantees that regulate the protection of the labor rights of the public servant, especially attending to their right to stability” (vote number 6240 of 2:00 p.m. on November 26, 1993). The reiterated criterion of that body is that excluded from the public employment regime, and therefore able to bargain collectively with the limitations established by its jurisprudence, are laborers, workers, and employees contracted by the Public Administration in accordance with the exercise of its Private Law capacity, as well as employees of State economic enterprises or services tasked with activities subject to common law, who do not participate in the public management of the administration (Articles 3.2, 111, and 112 of the General Law of Public Administration). These norms, in order, provide: “Article 3° 1. Public law shall regulate the organization and activity of public entities, except where expressly provided otherwise. / 2. Private law shall regulate the activity of entities that, by their overall regime and the requirements of their business, can be considered as common industrial or commercial enterprises.” “Article 111.- 1. A public servant is the person who provides services to the Administration or on its behalf and account, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. 2. For this purpose, the terms ‘public official (funcionario público),’ ‘public servant,’ ‘public employee (empleado público),’ ‘person in charge of a public service’ and other similar terms are considered equivalent, and the regime of their relations shall be the same for all, unless the nature of the situation indicates otherwise. 3. Employees of State economic enterprises or services tasked with activities subject to common law are not considered public servants.” And, “Article 112.- 1. Administrative law shall be applicable to service relations between the Administration and its public servants. 2. Service relations with laborers, workers, and employees who do not participate in the public management of the Administration, in accordance with paragraph 3° of Article 111, shall be governed by labor or commercial law, as appropriate. 3.- However, the legal or regulatory provisions of public law that are necessary to guarantee administrative legality and morality shall also apply to the latter, as determined by the Executive Branch by Decree. 4. For criminal purposes, said servants shall be deemed public.” In accordance with the referred-to norms (to which, it bears repeating, the judgments of the Constitutional Chamber alluding to the subject refer), a public servant is the person who provides services to the administration or on its behalf and account, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity; excluding, from the regulation specific to public employment relations, those maintained with laborers, workers, and employees contracted by the Public Administration in accordance with the exercise of its private law capacity and employees of State economic enterprises or services tasked with activities subject to common law, who do not participate in the public management of the administration. If, as a matter of principle, those who provide services to the State and its institutions are governed by the regulations and principles of Public Law and not Private Labor Law, which has constitutional roots, the exceptions, apart from needing to be proven beyond doubt, as such, must always have restrictive scope; otherwise, it would contradict the interpretation made by the Constitutional Chamber of what was mandated by the constituent power. Hence, it can in no way be interpreted that only officials who have competencies established or defined specifically in law, or the heads in general terms, are subject to a public employment regime, since, along that path, we would evidently turn the exception into the rule; that is, subjecting the majority of those who provide services in the Public Sector to a private employment regime, with all the consequences that entails, including, of course, the absence of job stability. Thus, it must be taken into account that the legislator introduced a phrase in subsection 2) of cited Article 112 that is extremely restrictive, by indicating that the service relations governed by labor or commercial law are those with laborers, workers, and employees “…who do not participate in the public management (gestión pública) of the Administration.” For purposes of interest, the Dictionary of the Spanish Language defines the term “participar” as “To take part in something” and, therefore, “partícipe” is one who “…has a part in something, or enters with others in the distribution of it” (Real Academia Española. Diccionario de la Lengua Española. Volume II, Madrid, twenty-first edition, 1992, p. 1536). On the other hand, the concept of “public management of the Administration (gestión pública de la Administración)” must be related to the so-called “administrative function (función administrativa)” (mentioned in Article 49 of the Constitution), defined from an eclectic perspective as follows: “Despite the existing difficulties, as a product of the conjugation of the main criteria exposed so far (substantive, formal, and the legal regime of the acts), we can define, from an eclectic perspective, the administrative function as that carried out by public organs and entities for the concrete, immediate, and direct protection of public interests and which is subject to the law” ([Nombre2] , Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Volume I General Part, San José, Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A., first edition, 2006, p.349). From that perspective, the administrative function manifests itself in various forms, such as the acts and facts of the administration. For the cited author “The administrative function, legal or not, can manifest itself through acts or facts. Acts are the declarations of will, judgment, or knowledge of the Public Administration, while facts are the material actions or technical operations carried out in the exercise of the administrative function” (op. cit., p. 357). In that order of ideas, the administrative act is merely one “…of the many forms of exteriorization” (op. cit., p. 422). Hence, the administrative function is not only carried out by the heads. Thus, it must be interpreted that a public servant is one who provides services to the administration or on its behalf and account, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, entirely independent of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity; thereby participating, to a greater or lesser extent, in the so-called “public management of the Administration (gestión pública de la Administración),” with the aim of protecting public interests.

Thus, it must be understood that workers and employees do not participate in such management not only when they perform tasks unrelated to the concrete, immediate, and direct protection of public interests, but also when they do not form part of the organization of the respective public entity, lacking a valid and effective act of investiture (acto de investidura), and for that same reason, the respective administration hired them in the exercise of its private law capacity, that is, like any private individual; to which it must resort reasonably and in accordance with the law, only exceptionally for the performance of specific and non-ordinary tasks. For the municipal sphere, this interpretation is reinforced based on the content of numeral 152, inserted in Title V of the Código Municipal, called “The Municipal Personnel” (“El Personal Municipal”), a section that regulates aspects relating to entry into the municipal administrative career (carrera administrativa municipal); the descriptive manual of positions, wages, and salaries; personnel selection; incentives and benefits; service evaluation and rating; municipal training; leaves; rights of municipal servants; duties of municipal servants; prohibitions and; sanctions; sanction procedure. The aforementioned rule 152 establishes: “The provisions contained in this title regarding the appointment and removal procedure shall not be applied to officials who depend directly on the Concejo nor to occasional employees hired against the budgetary items for Servicios Especiales or Jornales Ocasionales. The Concejo shall agree on the actions affecting the officials directly dependent on it”.

III.- In the present case, it was the responsibility of the municipal administration in the exercise of its powers and, ultimately, of the judges of this jurisdiction, to determine which of the defendant's employees are governed by public law or common law, for the purpose of defining whether or not they may benefit from the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva). The officials who provide services to the defendant municipality, as part of its organization, serving on an interim basis or permanently in the positions provided for in the position scale of the sued municipality, undoubtedly form part of its structure, therefore they are officials who provide services to the Administration —Municipalidad de Aserrí— in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of valid and effective acts of investiture, through which the public nature of their respective relationships as servants of that municipality cannot be disregarded, regardless of the type of activity they perform, since their relationship is one of public employment or statutory (empleo público o estatutario) by express provision of law, specifically by the provisions of articles 115, 119, and 146 subsection a) of the Código Municipal, where the so-called municipal administrative career is established for municipal officials, without distinction of rank or functions, which encompasses the principles inherent to a public employment relationship—a statutory relationship (relación estatutaria)—, hence in Considerando VIII called “CONCLUSIONS” (“CONCLUSIONES”), of Voto 4453 of 14:56 hours on May 24, 2000, the Sala Constitucional stated that “…the personnel working in the Municipalities of the country are limited in collective bargaining, under the terms of this judgment, since, except for proof to the contrary, they are public servants, governed by the public employment relationship”, therefore, those who have not been hired by the defendant in the exercise of its private law capacity, it is evident that their service relationship is not regulated by Private Labor Law, but by Public Law. As a logical consequence of the foregoing, municipal officials could not derive any right from the invoked collective bargaining agreement, since, with respect to them, it becomes unconstitutional, under the terms of those partially transcribed constitutional resolutions (numbers 4453 and 9690, both from the year 2000), unless they are excluded from the public employment regime, that is, the workers and employees hired by the municipal administration in accordance with the exercise of its private law capacity that empowers them to bargain collectively, and not for those who provide services in its name and on its behalf, as part of its organization, by virtue of a valid and effective act of investiture, since they are officials subject to the public employment regime.

In accordance with the preceding considerations, we depart from the majority vote, revoke the appealed judgment, and dismiss the lawsuit in all its aspects without special condemnation for costs.

[Nombre3] [Nombre4] cgutic 2

*073000210217LA* *[Placa1]* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2010-001162 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las doce horas y diez minutos del doce de agosto del dos mil diez.

Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, sede Desamparados, por [Nombre1] , abogado, contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE ASERRÍ, representada por su alcalde el licenciado Mario Morales Guzmán, soltero. Figura como apoderada especial judicial del actor la licenciada Guiselle Mora Cordero, casada. Todos mayores y vecinos de San José.

RESULTANDO:

1.- El actor, en escritos fechados dos de febrero y siete de junio de dos mil siete, promovió la presente acción para que en sentencia se condenara a la demandada a la restitución de sus derechos laborales y pago de cesantía de toda su relación laboral por un monto de e3.572.717,98, así como los daños y perjuicios, intereses y ambas costas del proceso.

2.- La representación de la municipalidad demandada contestó en los términos que indicó en el memorial de fecha dieciocho de setiembre de dos mil siete y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de interés actual, falta de legitimación pasiva y la que denominó como falta de causa 3.- El juez, licenciado Christian López Mora, por sentencia de las ocho horas treinta minutos del veintidós de setiembre de dos mil ocho, dispuso: Conforme a todo lo expuesto y citas de ley invocadas, se rechazan las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación pasiva, falta de causa y falta interés actual. En consecuencia se DECLARA PARCIALMENTE CON LUGAR la demanda ordinaria laboral interpuesta por [Nombre1] contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE ASERRÍ. Se condena a la demandada a pagarle al actor el auxilio de cesantía establecido en el artículo 50 de la Convención Colectiva de Trabajadores suscrita entre la Municipalidad de Aserrí y el Sindicato de Trabajadores Municipales de la Provincia de San José, vigente al finalizar la relación laboral, sean el noventa por ciento de seis meses de salario que equivalen a la suma líquida de TRES MILLONES QUINIENTOS SETENTA Y DOS MIL SETECIENTOS DIECISIETE COLONES CON NOVENTA Y OCHO CÉNTIMOS. Por improcedente se rechaza el extremo de daños y perjuicios.- Son las costas procesales y personales de la acción a cargo de la parte demandada LA MUNICIPALIDAD DE ASERRÍ, fijándose los honorarios de abogado en un veinte por ciento del importe líquido de la condenatoria, sea la suma de SETECIENTOS CATORCE MIL QUINIENTOS CUARENTA Y TRES COLONES CON CINCUENTA Y NUEVE CÉNTIMOS (art. 495 del Código de Trabajo). Se advierte a las partes que, esta sentencia admite el recurso de apelación, el cual deberá interponerse ante este juzgado en el término de tres días. En ese mismo plazo y ante este órgano jurisdiccional también se deberá exponer, en forma verbal o escrita, los motivos de hecho o de derecho en que la parte recurrente apoya su inconformidad; bajo el apercibimiento de declarar inatendible el recurso (artículos 500 y 501 incisos c) y d); votos de la Sala Constitucional números 5798, de las 16:2 1 horas, del 11 de agosto de 1998 y 1306 de las 16:27 horas del 23 de febrero de 1999 y voto de la Sala Segunda número 386, de las 14:20 horas, del 10 de diciembre de 1999.

4.- La parte demandada apeló y el Tribunal de Trabajo, Sección Primera, del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, integrado por los licenciados Juan Carlos Segura Solís, Luis Fdo. Salazar Alvarado y Mariamarta Barrantes Ramírez, por sentencia de las ocho horas diez minutos del veintidós de abril de dos mil diez, resolvió: En los procedimientos seguidos se han observado las prescripciones legales, y no se notan defectos u omisiones capaces de producir nulidad. Se confirma la sentencia apelada.

5.- El alcalde de la municipalidad demandada formuló recurso para ante esta Sala en memorial de data veintiuno de junio de dos mil diez, el cual se fundamenta en los motivos que se dirán en la parte considerativa.

6.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta la Magistrada Varela Araya; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I-. SÍNTESIS DEL RECURSO DE LA ENTIDAD DEMANDADA: En primer lugar, se acusa una errónea interpretación y aplicación del artículo 2 de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, que establece la obligatoriedad de la administración de acatar los pronunciamientos de la citada procuraduría; en este caso los n°s C-284-2001, OJ-039-2003 y C-029-2004, según los cuales la convención colectiva no amparaba al actor. Por otro lado, se denuncia la conculcación del numeral 586 del Código de Trabajo, que enlista los funcionarios públicos que se encuentran excluidos del concepto de “Trabajador del Estado y de sus Instituciones” (canon 585 ídem), estatuyéndose que esas personas, en sus relaciones de empleo, no se rigen por el derecho laboral común. Esa clase de servidores están regulados por los ordinales 111 y 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, referentes a los vínculos estatutarios o de empleo público. El accionante, en su condición de director jurídico del ayuntamiento, era un agente de la gestión pública, de conformidad con el voto n° 4453-00 de la Sala Constitucional, por lo que no lo cobijaba la convención colectiva, desconociendo los jueces de inferior grado el fallo en cuestión del órgano contralor de constitucionalidad, vinculante erga omnes. Con base en los agravios reseñados, se ruega revocar la sentencia venida en alzada y desestimar en su totalidad la demanda (folio 230).

II-. ANTECEDENTES: El señor [Nombre1] fungió como Asesor Legal en la Municipalidad de Aserrí del 2 de mayo de 2000 al 29 de setiembre de 2006 (folios 2, 34 y 47). El 28 de agosto de 2006, don [Nombre1] le comunicó al alcalde su intención de acogerse al artículo 50 de la convención colectiva vigente en la corporación municipal, que a la sazón rezaba: “El trabajador que desee dar por concluido su contrato de trabajo (…) deberá notificar por escrito al alcalde, dando el preaviso de ley y recibirá por concepto de auxilio de cesantía el pago de un mes de salario por cada año de servicio y fracción mayor de seis meses, de acuerdo con los siguientes porcentajes: a) 60% de 1 a 3 años de servicio, b) 90% de 4 a 7 años de servicio, c) 100% de 8 a 15 años de servicio como máximo (…)” (folios 5 y 146-168). El Concejo Municipal, en la sesión ordinaria n° 23 del 9 de octubre de 2006, dictó el acuerdo n° 03-23, artículo segundo, autorizando liquidarle al Lic. Mora Arias el aguinaldo, las vacaciones y el bono escolar (folio 33). Como no se le reconoció el auxilio de cesantía, don [Nombre1] accionó en la vía ordinaria laboral contra el municipio, con el objeto de que se le obligase a pagarle ¢3.572.717,98 por ese concepto, así como los daños y perjuicios ocasionados -consistentes en los intereses- y ambas costas del proceso (folios 36 y 45). La contestación fue negativa y se opusieron las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de interés, falta de legitimación y falta de causa. El argumento de defensa se centró en que no resultaba aplicable al subjúdice el apartado 50 convencional porque, dado el puesto que ocupaba el actor, se trataba de una relación de empleo público en los términos del numeral 586 del Código de Trabajo, siendo que el voto n° 4453-00 de la Sala Constitucional dispuso que a quienes participasen en la gestión pública no los cubrirían las convenciones colectivas por mediar un nexo de carácter estatutario regulado por los ordinales 111 y 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, tal y como lo ha externado reiteradamente la Procuraduría General de la República en sus pronunciamientos n°s C-284-2001, OJ-039-2003 y C-029-2004 (folio 111). En primera instancia se declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda, conminándose a la entidad accionada a abonarle al actor la cantidad por él reclamada a título de auxilio de cesantía; no así los daños y perjuicios, que fueron denegados. Todas las excepciones planteadas se rechazaron y ambas costas del pleito le fueron impuestas a la municipalidad. El a quo razonó que el ligamen del actor con el ayuntamiento no era de naturaleza estatutaria, por cuanto las relaciones laborales de los servidores municipales se rigen por el Código Municipal y, subsidiariamente, por el Código de Trabajo. Por ello, sí estimó aplicable al caso de marras el precepto 50 de la convención colectiva a la luz del voto 4453-00 de la Sala Constitucional, que prohibió dichos instrumentos tratándose de vínculos estatutarios. Además, el juzgador destacó que no existía en la convención ninguna cláusula que sacase de su ámbito de cobertura al accionante, amén de que dicho señor no participó en la negociación de ese cuerpo normativo (folio 175). Tal veredicto fue apelado por la parte demandada (folio 194), mas el superior le impartió confirmatoria con sustento en las consideraciones que de seguido se resumen. Los funcionarios públicos que se encuentran excluidos de las convenciones colectivas son: a) aquellos que llevan a cabo la gestión pública, o sea los jerarcas -que en el caso de las municipalidades serían el alcalde, los regidores y los síndicos-; y b) los servidores que, con ocasión del ejercicio de sus funciones, tengan una participación directa en la negociación colectiva, incompatibilidad esta que se explica porque podrían aprovechar tal situación para legislar en beneficio propio, lo que sin duda configuraría un conflicto de intereses. De este modo, si el señor Mora Arias se desempeñaba como Asesor Legal, no estaba involucrado en la gestión pública, quedando entonces cobijado por la convención colectiva. Por último, el tribunal apuntó: “El hecho de que en mayo de 2003 firmara como asesor legal de la municipalidad las modificaciones a la convención colectiva no perjudica su derecho, ya que la exclusión es para los jerarcas, dado su poder decisorio para administrar el erario público, y se pueden favorecer en forma directa o indirecta con lo convenido, no para quienes no están en esa condición” (folio 209).

III-. RESPECTO DE LOS PRONUNCIAMIENTOS DE LA PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA: El ordinal 1° de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría la instituye como órgano superior consultivo técnico-jurídico de la Administración Pública y como representante legal del Estado en las materias propias de su competencia. El numeral siguiente (2) establece que los dictámenes y opiniones de la Procuraduría constituyen jurisprudencia administrativa y son de acatamiento obligatorio para la Administración Pública. Ahora bien, el canon 154 de la Carta Magna, que consagra la independencia de los jueces como garantía del sistema democrático, es sumamente claro al preceptuar: “El Poder Judicial sólo está sometido a la Constitución y a la ley, y las resoluciones que dicte en los asuntos de su competencia no le imponen otras responsabilidades que las expresamente señaladas por los preceptos legislativos”. La independencia judicial también está contemplada en el artículo 8 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, ratificada por nuestro país mediante la Ley n° 4534 del 3 de febrero de 1970. De acuerdo con el numeral 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, los juzgadores únicamente están sometidos a “la Constitución Política y a la ley”; de ahí que el criterio que en determinado momento sostenga la Procuraduría en modo alguno puede ser oponible a los administradores de justicia a la hora de emitir sus fallos. Sobre el particular, en la sentencia n° 747-05 de este Colegio se acotó: “La jurisprudencia administrativa de la Procuraduría General de la República, no obliga a la Sala a considerarla para resolver, puesto que a lo único que se está sometido es a la Constitución y a las leyes vigentes …”. En este orden de ideas, los pronunciamientos emanados de la Procuraduría General de la República en el ejercicio de las funciones que le son propias en modo alguno inciden en la resolución de los conflictos sometidos a conocimiento de los órganos jurisdiccionales (acerca de este tema pueden consultarse nuestros fallos n°s 892-00, 1023-06, 221-07 y 187-10).

IV-. EN CUANTO A LA APLICABILIDAD DE LA CONVENCIÓN COLECTIVA AL ACCIONANTE: Ya este Despacho tuvo la oportunidad de pronunciarse en un caso bastante similar al que ahora nos ocupa, en el que el punto en discusión era si al director jurídico de una municipalidad le eran aplicables los beneficios estipulados en una convención colectiva, a la luz del voto n° 4453-00 de la Sala Constitucional. Se trata de nuestro fallo n° 852-08, a cargo de esta misma redactora, en el que por mayoría se decidió:

“Al actor sí le resulta aplicable la convención colectiva que rige las condiciones laborales en la Municipalidad de Goicoechea, pues ninguna de sus cláusulas lo excluye expresamente. Al tenor del artículo 154 de la Carta Magna, el juez/a sólo está sometido/a a la Constitución y a la ley. Por otro lado, el numeral 62 ibidem reza: “Tendrán fuerza de ley las convenciones colectivas de trabajo que, con arreglo a la ley, se concierten entre patronos o sindicatos de patronos y sindicatos de trabajadores legalmente organizados”. La función de quien juzga consiste en aplicar la ley al caso concreto. En el caso de marras existe una convención colectiva -con fuerza de ley- que no ha sido dejada sin efecto por ninguna disposición del ordenamiento jurídico, por lo que, al encontrarse vigente, los/as suscritos/as, como administradores/as de justicia, debemos aplicarle a dicho señor las estipulaciones de dicho instrumento. Ciertamente, la jurisprudencia ha aceptado la validez de las cláusulas de configuración que en muchos casos excluyen a varios grupos de funcionarios del ámbito de cobertura de la convención colectiva, siendo usual que ello ocurra con los directores jurídicos. Al respecto, en la sentencia n° 5577-96 de la Sala Constitucional se indicó: “La norma cuestionada de la Convención señala en lo que interesa: “La presente convención colectiva de trabajo es de aplicación general para los trabajadores que presten servicios a JAPDEVA en las actividades portuarias y de desarrollo y cualquier otra que desempeñe JAPDEVA en cualquier parte del país (…). D) No serán cubiertos por esta Convención el Presidente Ejecutivo, sus asistentes y asesores, el Vice- Presidente Ejecutivo; Gerentes, sus asistentes; Auditor y Sub-Auditor y Asesores Legales”. La queja de la accionante con relación a lo estatuido en esta regla, se funda en que en ella se recoge una evidente discriminación hacia un grupo determinado de personas, cual es el de los asesores legales, solamente por el hecho de ser abogados, lo cual resulta contrario a sus derechos constitucionales (…). Resulta notorio desde esa perspectiva que tanto en el caso de los gerentes, (que se expuso en la sentencia número 2308-95, recién citada) como para el de los asesores legales que ahora se examina, nos encontramos ante una particular y distinta situación con relación a la generalidad de empleados de una organización, esto por el decisivo poder de disposición e influencia que tienen sobre el devenir de la institución y su capacidad para comprometerla, lo que conlleva que sus decisiones produzcan efectos sobre ellos mismos, sin que (en términos generales y eficaces) existan controles para la reversión de tales actos si resultaren lesivos para la organización como un todo. Así, resulta lógico que -como un mecanismo protector de la organización- se aparte y excluya a estos funcionarios de las eventuales ventajas y prebendas a las que se comprometa la institución, ello con el fin de evitar que se puedan condescender en cuestiones con el oculto fin de que les beneficie. a lo dicho, solamente cabe agregar que resulta razonable aplicar los conceptos expresados a los asesores legales, -que en un Estado rígidamente atado al principio de legalidad como el nuestro- se convierten en piezas de singular importancia para la toma de decisiones, por lo que resulta razonable tenerlos como parte del estrato de funcionarios de confianza de la organización y, por allí, excluidos de las características generales que moldean la relación de la institución con sus empleados en general. En conclusión, la Sala considera que, al igual que con los gerentes de la Junta de Administración Portuaria y Desarrollo de la Vertiente Atlántica (JAPDEVA), cuya situación se analizó y resolvió anteriormente, no existe desigualdad de trato en relación a los asesores legales al excluirlos de los beneficios de la Convención Colectiva, si dicha distinción obedece a una situación cualitativamente distinta y además ha sido realizada dentro de los parámetros de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad” (en similar sentido puede consultarse el fallo n° 10358-00 de esa Sala). No obstante, como en el sublitem no existe una cláusula expresa que excluya al director jurídico de los beneficios de la convención colectiva (o al menos no se acreditó), estos le resultan plenamente aplicables al demandante”.

En el caso concreto no existen elementos de peso que permitan variar de criterio, ya que la convención colectiva de la Municipalidad de Aserrí tampoco excluye de su ámbito de protección a los asesores jurídicos, por lo que lo resuelto por los juzgadores de instancia merece ser confirmado; no sin antes advertir que a folio 150 aparece la firma del actor, en su condición de consejero legal de la municipalidad, avalando la reforma de varios artículos de la convención colectiva -entre ellos el 50, que sirve de fundamento a la demanda-, modificación que fue homologada por el Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social mediante resolución n° DRT-241-2004 (folio 146), lo que podría generar un conflicto de intereses que tornaría inaplicable la normativa en cuestión al demandante a tenor de los ordinales 6 del Reglamento para la Negociación de Convenciones Colectivas en el Sector Público (Decreto Ejecutivo n° 29576 del 31 de mayo de 2001) y 48 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública (n° 8422 del 6 de octubre de 2004), mas el ad quem estimó que: “El hecho de que en mayo de 2003 firmara como asesor legal de la municipalidad las modificaciones a la convención colectiva no perjudica su derecho, ya que la exclusión es para los jerarcas, dado su poder decisorio para administrar el erario público, y se pueden favorecer en forma directa o indirecta con lo convenido, no para quienes no están en esa condición”, razonamiento que no fue atacado en el recurso de tercera instancia rogada, por lo que no le es factible a este Colegio removerlo y fallar en forma distinta.

V-. CONCLUSIÓN: Como corolario de lo expuesto, ha de denegarse el recurso incoado y confirmarse la sentencia impugnada.

POR TANTO:

Se confirma el fallo recurrido.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Rolando Vega Robert Eva María Camacho Vargas María Alexandra Bogantes Rodríguez Los magistrados Aguirre Gómez y Bogantes Rodríguez, salvan el voto y lo emiten de la siguiente manera.

I.- Discrepamos del criterio enunciado en el voto de mayoría, por lo que de seguido enunciamos. Para resolver el tema relativo a la aplicación de las convenciones colectivas en el Sector Público, precisa a la luz del artículo 13 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, partir de lo dispuesto por la Sala Constitucional sobre el tema. Para ello, de especial interés resulta el voto número 1696, de las 15:30 horas del 23 de agosto de 1992, mediante el cual se anularon los laudos “…respecto de las administraciones públicas con régimen de empleo de naturaleza pública”. En ese pronunciamiento se dio cuenta que la Constitución Política previó un régimen laboral público exclusivo para los servidores del Estado. Mas, la promulgación del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, tiene tan solo alcances parciales, por cuanto tuvo como propósito únicamente regular las relaciones del Poder Ejecutivo con sus servidores, dentro de su ámbito competencial, dejándose por fuera la regulación de las relaciones de servicio entre los entes públicos menores. En ese orden de ideas aduce que: “Rige actualmente una Constitución Política que sí lo previó y que, no obstante ello, se sigue utilizando un orden legal común, sometiéndose a la Administración Pública y sus empleados, a la resolución de sus diferencias mediante un procedimiento de índole privado. Esto resulta en una aplicación inconstitucional en virtud del desfase histórico y jurídico que esta materia evidencia, lo que contraviene tácitamente el artículo 197 de la Constitución Política. Es claro que la intención del constituyente era la de crear un régimen laboral administrativo”. También se indicó que dicho estatuto reguló apenas algunos de los aspectos de la relación de los servidores del Estado como los relativos a derechos y deberes de los servidores, su selección, clasificación, promoción, traslados, disciplina y régimen de despido -entre los más importantes-, que responden a la preocupación de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente respecto de la idoneidad y la eficiencia del servicio; “…pero no tocó otros aspectos no menos importantes, como es el que subyace en el planteamientote de esta acción, es decir, la regulación del propio régimen económico de esa relación y el sometimiento de los otros entes administrativos al régimen laboral público. Este vacío sin embargo no autoriza utilizar mecanismos previstos para una relación privada, a una relación de empleo público que se debe regir por principios propios y diferentes”. Y, añadió que la confusión existente en la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de utilizar y mencionar el Código de Trabajo en la Constitución, lo fue para establecer de alguna forma un parámetro normativo que rigiera el fin de la relación y “…no como se ha querido entender, que sus principios y normas inspiran y rigen la relación entre el Estado y el servidor público”. Seguidamente consideró: “En opinión de la Sala, entonces, los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política, fundamentan la existencia, de principio, de un régimen de empleo regido por el Derecho Público, dentro del sector público, como ha quedado claro del debate de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente y recoge incipientemente la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Este régimen de empleo público implica, necesariamente, consecuencias derivadas de la naturaleza de esa relación, con principios generales propios, ya no solamente distintos a los del derecho laboral (privado), sino muchas veces contrapuestos a éstos. Obviamente, la declaración contenida en esta sentencia abarca la relación de empleo que se da entre la administración (o mejor, administraciones) pública y sus servidores, más en aquellos sectores en que hay una regulación (racional) que remita a un régimen privado de empleo, la solución debe ser diferente. En estos casos se daría un sometimiento a los procedimientos de arbitraje pero con ciertas limitaciones, tales como que en ellos no pueden dispensarse o excepcionarse leyes, reglamentos o directrices gubernamentales vigentes, por lo que incluso en estos casos no procederían decisiones (laudos) en conciencia, ni tribunales formados por sujetos no abogados”. También se aclaró que se deben tener “…por excluidos de este régimen, a los obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración, cuando los mismos sean contratados por el Estado conforme al ejercicio de su capacidad de Derecho Privado (artículos 3.2 y 112.2 y .3 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Esta sentencia implica, asimismo, que los procedimientos de “resolución de los conflictos colectivos de carácter económico y social”, previstos en los artículos 497 y siguientes del Código de Trabajo, no son aplicables del todo a las administraciones regidas por el derecho público de empleo, y que no son aplicables al resto de las administraciones, incluidas las empresas públicas- sociedades anónimas, mientras por ley no se subsanen las omisiones apuntadas en esta sentencia”. Con cita de la mencionada sentencia 1696-92, en la número 4788, de las 8:48 horas del 30 de setiembre de 1993, respecto de los agentes de seguros, se consideró: “Lo anterior quiere decir, que la Sala ha deslindado el sentido de los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política, para interpretar que la relación del Estado con sus "funcionarios", "servidores", "empleados" o "encargados", se regula dentro de un régimen de empleo regido por el Derecho Público, salvo las excepciones que razonablemente establezca el legislador, según las condiciones especiales que ameriten un trato distinto. Y a manera de conclusión inicial, la Sala prohíja el análisis que hace la Procuraduría General de la República, para definir que partiendo de la actividad que despliegan los agentes de seguros, según las definiciones del artículo 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, los excluye del régimen de empleo público a que aluden los artículos 191 y 192 constitucionales y en concordancia con lo que establece el inciso 2 del artículo 112 de la referida Ley General, esas relaciones deben ser reguladas por el derecho laboral o mercantil, según el caso”. Luego, en la sentencia número 3053 de las 9:45 horas del 24 de junio de 1994, reiteró el criterio externado en el voto número 1696-92, para indicar: “Así las cosas, el régimen es administrativo, estatutario, para los “servidores públicos”, o sea, para quienes prestan servicios a la administración o a nombre y por cuenta de esta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, sin embargo la propia Ley General de la Administración Pública establece que “las relaciones de servicio, con obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración, de conformidad con el párrafo 3 del artículo III, se regirán por el derecho laboral o mercantil, según los casos” (Ley General de la Administración Pública, artículo 112, inciso 2)”. Para resolver ese caso concreto adujo que debió distinguirse entre funcionarios públicos y trabajadores que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración; siendo que la determinación de la categoría de trabajadores que no participan de esa gestión es una cuestión de legalidad. Ahora bien, esta otra Sala (la Segunda) planteó una consulta de constitucionalidad sobre la posibilidad de celebrar convenciones colectivas en el Sector Público, así como para efectuar a su respecto eventuales reformas. Para ello, entre otros, lo sustentamos en lo siguiente: “…a partir del Voto N° 1696-92 de la Sala Constitucional, todas las convenciones colectivas pactadas, dentro del Sector Público, que no se refieran a los obreros trabajadores o a los empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración, cuando los mismos sean contratados por el Estado conforme a su capacidad de ejercicio de Derecho Privado -artículos 3 y 111 de la Ley General citada-, son inconstitucionales…” (énfasis suplido). Dicha consulta se evacuó mediante el voto número 4453 de las 14:56 horas del 24 de mayo de 2000. En el considerando VII, se establecieron varias premisas, que en lo que interesa, se resumen así: 1. Existen dos extremos u ordenamientos en materia laboral: uno regulado por el Código de Trabajo y el otro, por el Derecho Público. 2. Con excepciones, la relación entre el Estado y los servidores públicos es llamada de empleo público o estatutaria, regulada por el Derecho Público: “…consecuentemente, no puede existir una relación de igualdad o de equivalencia entre las partes involucradas, como idealmente debiera suceder en la relación laboral de origen contractual, principalmente porque la Administración Pública representa un interés general, por la necesidad de la continuidad en la prestación de los servicios públicos y por las limitaciones presupuestarias. En otras palabras, el servidor del régimen del empleo público se encuentra con relación a la Administración, en un estado de sujeción; ella puede imponer unilateralmente las condiciones de la organización y prestación del servicio para garantizar el bien público, lo que elimina la posibilidad de que la relación sea considerada desde una perspectiva de equivalencia de derechos susceptible de negociación entre las partes. Esta conclusión comprende el que no se pueda reconocer la posibilidad de la negociación colectiva el sector público, pues la sola idea de la negociación, como medio idóneo para revisar y aprobar las condiciones del empleo público, riñe con los postulados esenciales de la organización del Estado, que en este campo se introdujeron en los artículos 191 y 192 constitucionales”. 3. La posición que se externa es la que históricamente se ha sostenido. Además, en la Ley General de la Administración Pública se establece claramente que el Derecho Administrativo se aplica a las relaciones de servicio entre el Estado y sus servidores, excluyendo de la relación la legislación laboral, a la que solo pueden acudir los servidores que no participan de la gestión pública. 4. Son funcionarios públicos quienes prestan servicios a la administración a nombre y por cuenta de esta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva (artículo 111, inciso 1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública); servidores que no pueden negociar colectivamente. No son funcionarios sujetos al régimen de empleo público, sino, obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración, los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado “…encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común, que de conformidad con el artículo 112 inciso 2) transcrito, se rigen por el Derecho laboral y no por el Derecho público, lo que les faculta para negociar colectivamente”. 5. A partir del voto 3053-94 y del contenido de la Ley General de la Administración Pública “…en el sector público solo pueden celebrar convenciones colectivas de trabajo los servidores que no participan de la gestión pública, de tal forma que entes con un régimen de empleo de naturaleza laboral (no pública), como por ejemplo, las empresas del Estado, de las que se ha dicho la doctrina nacional que son “aquellas que funcionan como si fueran empresas privadas, porque venden y hacen lo mismo que los particulares; por ejemplo el mismo INS cuando vende pólizas hace lo mismo que una compañía aseguradora cualquiera, la banca cuando hace préstamos, hace lo mismo que una entidad financiera común, la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, que vende energía eléctrica la vende en iguales condiciones en que podría venderla una compañía privada”, entre otros, sí pueden negociar colectivamente de conformidad con las disposiciones que informan el Derecho Colectivo del Trabajo. 6. Aún en el Sector Público en el que resulta constitucionalmente posible la aplicación de las convenciones colectivas, es decir en “…las llamadas empresas o servicios económicos del Estado y en aquellos núcleos de personal de instituciones y entes públicos en los que la naturaleza de los servicios que se prestan no participan de la gestión pública, en los términos del inciso 2 del artículo 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, la Sala repite y confirma su jurisprudencia en el sentido de que la autorización para negociar no puede ser irrestricta…”. Conforme con lo anterior, entre otros, concluyó que son inconstitucionales las convenciones colectivas que se celebran en el sector público, cuando se trata de personal regido por la relación de empleo de naturaleza pública (relación estatutaria) y no son inconstitucionales las suscritas en dicho sector con obreros, trabajadores, funcionarios o empleados, cuyas relaciones laborales se regulan por el derecho común. También concluyó que son compatibles con el Derecho de la Constitución, los instrumentos colectivos que se han negociado y se han venido prorrogando o modificando, en aplicación de la política general sobre convenciones colectivas en el Sector Público, salvo que se trate de negociaciones con personal en relación de empleo de naturaleza pública, en cuyo caso esos instrumentos resultan inconstitucionales. Dispuso que corresponde a la administración y a los jueces al conocer de convenciones colectivas, determinar si los trabajadores involucrados “…dada la naturaleza de las funciones que cumplen o cumplían”, están regulados por el derecho público o el común, a los efectos de definir si pueden o no ser sujetos activos en la aplicación de las convenciones colectivas. Con relación a ese fallo (número 4453-00), se presentaron varias gestiones de adición y aclaración, así como recursos de revocatoria y revisión, los cuales fueron denegados por el voto número 9690 de las 15:01 horas del 1° de noviembre de 2000. Sin embargo, conviene reseñar que en ese pronunciamiento expresamente se dio cuenta de no haberse declarado la inconstitucionalidad de las convenciones colectivas de algún conjunto definido de instituciones del Estado “…esto es, por ejemplo, no ha dicho que se puedan celebrar convenciones colectivas en las municipalidades o en las universidades. Por el contrario, la sentencia es sumamente clara y no requiere profundizar en sus conceptos para comprender su tenor, de que hay servidores públicos a los que se les está vedada la vía del derecho colectivo de trabajo y que determinar quiénes son esos servidores, es labor que le corresponde a cada uno de los entes públicos, en el ejercicio de sus competencias y en última instancia, a los jueces encargados de juzgar las controversias que sobre esta materia surjan”. Y, se expresó que para la determinación de quién es funcionario o servidor regido por una relación de empleo de naturaleza pública y quién no lo es, no se requiere de una ley especial. Por su parte, en el voto número 7730, de las 14:47 horas, del 30 de agosto de 2000 relacionado con algunos artículos de la convención colectiva de RECOPE, además de analizarse el tema de la naturaleza jurídica de esa entidad, en tanto empresa pública parte del sector público no financiero de la economía. En su apartado referido a la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional con relación a las convenciones colectivas, a modo de síntesis, se indicó: “…con base en la jurisprudencia de la Sala, debe concluirse que RECOPE es una empresa pública y por ende forma parte integrante del sector público en el que resulta constitucionalmente posible la aplicación de la institución de las convenciones colectivas; valga decir, en las llamadas empresas o servicios económicos del Estado y en aquellos núcleos de personal de instituciones y entes públicos en los que la naturaleza de los servicios que se prestan no participan de la gestión pública, en los términos del inciso 2 del artículo 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Pero la autorización para negociar colectivamente que le brinda el ordenamiento jurídico no es irrestricta…”. Asimismo, en el voto número 10358 de las 15:04 horas, del 22 de noviembre de 2000, al conocer de una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra una norma de la convención colectiva del Consejo Nacional de Producción se consideró: “…Tanto la Convención y concretamente el artículo 12 impugnado, no resultan aplicables a los funcionarios públicos que prestan servicios a la Administración a nombre y por cuenta de esta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva (artículo 111 inciso 1) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Por el contrario, sí es posible aplicarlo a los obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración, los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado, encargados de gestiones sometidas al Derecho común, que de conformidad con el artículo 112 inciso 2) de la Ley General de Administración Pública, se rigen por el derecho laboral y no por el derecho público”. También a propósito de la Convención Colectiva del Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago se emitió pronunciamiento, a saber, el número 3001 de las 10:35 horas del 9 de marzo de 2006. En esa resolución se refirió que el órgano contralor de constitucionalidad ha reconocido la posibilidad de negociar colectivamente para los trabajadores que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración, los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado, encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común. Y, añadió: “Esta Sala ha reconocido por ende que la relación entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, como tesis de principio, es una relación de empleo público o estatutaria; en otras palabras, el servidor del régimen de empleo público se encuentra en relación con la Administración, en un estado de sujeción; aquella puede imponer unilateralmente las condiciones de la organización y prestación del servicio para garantizar el bien público. Esta conclusión no implica que no se pueda tolerar la negociación colectiva en el sector público, pero de conformidad con lo dispuesto en los artículos 191 y 192 constitucionales, únicamente resulta posible para quienes no realicen gestión pública”. Por último, valga hacer mención que en la sentencia 7261 de las 14:45 horas del 23 de mayo de 2006, por la cual se resolvió una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra algunos artículos de la Convención Colectiva de Trabajo del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, se reiteró una vez más la posibilidad de negociación colectiva que tienen los obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración, los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común; destacando las premisas fijadas por el fallo 4453-2000.

II.- El artículo 191 de la Constitución Política reza: “Un estatuto de servicio civil regulará las relaciones entre el Estado y los servidores públicos, con el propósito de garantizar la eficiencia de la administración”. Seguidamente, el 192 dispone: “Con las excepciones que esta Constitución y el estatuto de servicio civil determine, los servidores públicos serán nombrados a base de idoneidad comprobada y solo podrán ser removidos por las causales de despido justificado que exprese la legislación de trabajo, o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, ya sea por falta de fondos o para conseguir una mejor organización de los mismos”. Al amparo de dichas normas, la Sala Constitucional no estableció en términos generales y absolutos la validez o la nulidad de las convenciones colectivas en algún ámbito específico (incluido el municipal), pues, expresamente indicó que debía analizarse en cada caso concreto si la relación de un determinado empleado está regulada por el Derecho Común o por el Derecho Público. En este último supuesto, le está vedada toda posibilidad de celebrar convenciones colectivas. Para realizar esa labor, debe atenderse lo dispuesto por dicho órgano respecto de los laudos y las convenciones colectivas así como el contenido de los artículos 3, 111 y 112, todos de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Para ello, debe partirse, de que según lo ha reiterado esa Sala en los pronunciamientos a los cuales se ha hecho mención, las citadas normas 191 y 192 fundamentan la existencia, de principio, es decir, por regla, de un régimen de empleo regido por el Derecho Público, dentro del Sector Público; siendo la excepción en esta materia, la contratación de trabajadores sujetos al derecho laboral común. Esto último se puede dar “…en aquellos sectores en que hay una regulación (racional) que remita a un régimen privado de empleo”, según las condiciones que ameriten un trato distinto (voto 1696-92). Dicha regla es aplicable en todas las relaciones de empleo en el Sector Público, incluyendo el ámbito municipal, precisamente, porque las municipalidades son entes públicos menores territoriales contemplados en los artículos 168 y siguientes de la Constitución Política. Respecto de ellas, dicho sea de paso, se hizo clara referencia en el Considerando VIII denominado “CONCLUSIONES”, de la sentencia 4453-00, al indicarse: “Y por último, según lo que ha expresado en su informe la Procuraduría General de la República, que esta Sala también acoge, el personal que se desempeña en las Municipalidades del país, está limitado para la negociación colectiva, en los términos de esta sentencia, pues, salvo prueba en contrario, se trata de servidores públicos, regidos por la relación de empleo público”. Por otro lado, a efecto de la determinación de la sujeción de los trabajadores del Sector Público al régimen administrativo o estatutario, no debe llamar a confusión, el concepto de “estatuto”, toda vez que, tal y como lo interpretó la Sala Constitucional, la Constitución no restringió el concepto de “estatuto” al de un instrumento jurídico único “…sino que pretende concretar un régimen uniforme de principios y garantías que regulen la protección de los derechos laborales del servidor público, especialmente atendiendo al de su derecho a la estabilidad” (voto número 6240 de las 14:00 horas del 26 de noviembre de 1993). El criterio reiterado de ese órgano es que están excluidos del régimen público de empleo y, por ende podrían contratar colectivamente con las limitaciones fijadas por su jurisprudencia; los obreros, trabajadores y empleados contratados por la Administración Pública conforme al ejercicio de su capacidad de Derecho Privado, así como los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común, que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración (artículos 3.2, 111 y 112 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Estas normas, por su orden, disponen: “Artículo 3° 1. El derecho público regulará la organización y actividad de los entes públicos, salvo norma expresa en contrario. / 2. El derecho privado regulará la actividad de los entes que por su régimen de conjunto y los requerimientos de su giro puedan estimarse como empresas industriales o mercantiles comunes”. “Artículo 111.- 1. Es servidor público la persona que presta servicios a la Administración o a nombre y por cuenta de esta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva. 2. A este efecto considéranse equivalentes los términos “funcionario público”, servidor público”, “empleado público”, “encargado de servicio público” y demás similares, y el régimen de sus relaciones será el mismo para todos, salvo que la naturaleza de la situación indique lo contrario. 3. No se consideran servidores públicos los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común”. Y, “Artículo 112.- 1. El derecho administrativo será aplicable a las relaciones de servicio entre la Administración y sus servidores públicos. 2. Las relaciones de servicio con obreros, trabajadores y empleados que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración, de conformidad con el párrafo 3°, del artículo 111, se regirán por el derecho laboral o mercantil, según los casos. 3.- Sin embargo, se aplicarán también a estos últimos las disposiciones legales o reglamentarias de derecho público que resulten necesarias para garantizar la legalidad y moralidad administrativas, conforme lo determine por Decreto el Poder Ejecutivo. 4. Para efectos penales, dichos servidores se reputarán como públicos”. Conforme con las referidas normas (a las cuales, se repite, remiten las sentencias de la Sala Constitucional alusivas al tema), es servidor público la persona que presta servicios a la administración o a nombre y por cuenta de esta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva; excluyéndose, de la regulación propia de las relaciones de empleo público, las mantenidas con obreros, trabajadores y empleados contratados por la Administración Pública conforme al ejercicio de su capacidad de derecho privado y a los empleados de empresas o servicios económicos del Estado encargados de gestiones sometidas al derecho común, que no participan de la gestión pública de la administración. Si como tesis de principio, quienes prestan servicios al Estado y sus instituciones están regidos por la normativa y principios propios del Derecho Público y no del Derecho Laboral Privado, lo cual tiene raigambre constitucional, las excepciones aparte de que deben acreditarse sin lugar a dudas, como tales, deben tener siempre alcances restrictivos; caso contrario, se entraría en contradicción con la interpretación realizada por la Sala Constitucional de lo preceptuado por el constituyente. De ahí que en modo alguno podría interpretarse que solo están sujetos a un régimen público de empleo los funcionarios que tengan competencias fijadas o definidas específicamente en la ley o los jerarcas en términos generales, pues, por ese camino, evidentemente convertiríamos la excepción en la regla; es decir, sujetando a la mayoría de quienes prestan servicios en el Sector Público a un régimen de empleo privado, con todas las consecuencias que ello implica, incluyendo, por supuesto, la ausencia de estabilidad en el trabajo. Así las cosas, debe tomarse en cuenta que el legislador introdujo en el inciso 2) del artículo 112 citado una frase que es sumamente restrictiva, al señalar que se regirán por el derecho laboral o mercantil, las relaciones de servicio con obreros, trabajadores y empleados “…que no participan de la gestión pública de la Administración”. En lo que interesa, el Diccionario de la Lengua Española define el término “participar” como “Tomar uno parte en una cosa” y, por ende, es “partícipe” el que “…tiene parte en una cosa, o entra con otras a la parte en la distribución de ella” (Real Academia Española. Diccionario de la Lengua Española. Tomo II, Madrid, vigésima primera edición, 1992, p. 1536). De otro lado, el concepto “gestión pública de la Administración”, debe relacionarse con la llamada “función administrativa” (de la que se da cuenta en el artículo 49 constitucional) definida desde una perspectiva ecléctica, así: “Pese a las dificultades existentes, como producto de la conjugación de los principales criterios hasta ahora expuestos (sustancial, formal y el del régimen jurídico de los actos) podemos definir, desde una perspectiva ecléctica, la función administrativa como la realizada por los órganos y entes públicos para la tutela concreta, inmediata y directa de los intereses públicos y que se encuentra sujeta a la ley” ([Nombre2] , Ernesto. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, Tomo I Parte General, San José, Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A., primera edición, 2006, p.349). Desde esa perspectiva, la función administrativa se manifiesta de diversas formas, como lo son los actos y los hechos de la administración. Para el autor citado “La función administrativa jurídica o no, puede manifestarse mediante actos o hechos. Los actos son las declaraciones de voluntad, juicio o conocimiento de la Administración Pública, en tanto que los hechos son las actuaciones materiales u operaciones técnicas realizadas en el ejercicio de la función administrativa” (op. cit., p. 357). En ese orden de ideas, el acto administrativo viene a ser tan solo una “…de las tantas formas de exteriorización” (op.cit., p. 422). De ahí que, la función administrativa no solo la lleven a cabo los jerarcas. Así las cosas, debe interpretarse que es servidor público quien presta servicios a la administración o a nombre y por cuenta de esta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva; participando de esa manera y en mayor o menor medida de la llamada “gestión pública de la Administración”, con el fin de tutelar los intereses públicos. De modo que, debe entenderse que no participan de dicha gestión los obreros, trabajadores y empleados no solo que realizan gestiones desvinculadas de la tutela concreta, inmediata y directa de los intereses públicos, sino, también, que no forman parte de la organización del respectivo ente público, careciendo de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, y que por misma razón, la respectiva administración los contrató en el ejercicio de la capacidad de derecho privado, es decir, como cualquier particular; a lo cual debe recurrir razonablemente y con apego a la ley, solo de modo excepcional para la realización de tareas puntuales y no ordinarias. Para el ámbito municipal, esa interpretación se refuerza con base en el contenido del numeral 152, inserto en el Título V del Código Municipal, denominado “El Personal Municipal”, apartado que regula aspectos relativos al ingreso a la carrera administrativa municipal; al manual descriptivo de puestos, sueldos y salarios; selección del personal; incentivos y beneficios; evaluación y calificación del servicio; capacitación municipal; permisos; derechos de los servidores municipales; deberes de los servidores municipales; prohibiciones y; sanciones; procedimiento de sanciones. La referida norma 152 establece: “Las disposiciones contenidas en este título sobre el procedimiento de nombramiento y remoción no serán aplicadas a los funcionarios que dependan directamente del Concejo ni a los empleados ocasionales contratados con cargo a las partidas presupuestarias de Servicios Especiales o Jornales Ocasionales. El Concejo acordará las acciones que afectan a los funcionarios directamente dependientes de él”.

III.- En el presente caso, le correspondía a la administración municipal en el ejercicio de sus competencias y en última instancia a los jueces de esta jurisdicción, determinar cuales de los empleados de la demandada están regulados por el derecho público o el común, a los efectos de definir si pueden o no beneficiarse de la convención colectiva. Los funcionarios que prestan servicios a la municipalidad demandada, como parte de su organización, desempeñándose interinamente o en propiedad en los cargos previstos en la escala de puestos de la municipalidad accionada, a no dudarlo forman parte de su estructura, por ende son funcionarios que prestan servicios a la Administración -Municipalidad de Aserrí- a nombre y por cuenta de esta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de actos válidos y eficaces de investidura, por medio de los cuales no se puede desconocer la naturaleza pública de sus respectivas relaciones como servidores de ese municipio, con independencia del tipo de actividad que realicen, pues su relación es de empleo público o estatutario por disposición expresa de ley, concretamente por lo dispuesto en los artículos 115, 119 y 146 inciso a) del Código Municipal, donde se establece para los funcionarios municipales la denominada carrera administrativa municipal, sin distinción de rango o funciones, la cual recoge los principios propios de una relación de empleo público -relación estatutaria-, de ahí que en el considerando VIII denominado “CONCLUSIONES”, del voto 4453 de las 14:56 horas del 24 de mayo de 2000, la Sala Constitucional haya señalado que “…el personal que se desempeña en las Municipalidades del país, está limitado para la negociación colectiva, en los términos de esta sentencia, pues, salvo prueba en contrario, se trata de servidores públicos, regidos por la relación de empleo público”, por ende, quienes no han sido contratados por la demandada en el ejercicio de su capacidad de derecho privado, resulta evidente que su relación de servicio no está regulada por el Derecho Laboral Privado, sino, por el Derecho Público. Como lógica consecuencia de lo anterior, los funcionarios municipales no podrían derivar derecho alguno de la convención colectiva invocada, pues, a su respecto, esta deviene en inconstitucional, en los términos de aquellas resoluciones constitucionales parcialmente transcritas (números 4453 y 9690, ambas del año 2000), salvo que estén excluidos del régimen público de empleo, o sea, los obreros, trabajadores y empleados contratados por la administración municipal conforme al ejercicio de su capacidad de derecho privado que los faculta para negociar colectivamente, y no para quienes prestan servicios a nombre y por cuenta de esta, como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto válido y eficaz de investidura, por cuanto son funcionarios sujetos al régimen de empleo público.

De acuerdo con las consideraciones precedentes, nos apartamos del voto de mayoría, revocamos la sentencia recurrida y desestimamos la demanda en todos sus extremos sin especial condenatoria en costas.

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