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Res. 00337-2013 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal II Circuito Judicial de San José · Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal II Circuito Judicial de San José · 19/02/2013
OutcomeResultado
The conviction and confiscation are reversed; the defendant is acquitted of money laundering, his immediate release is ordered, and the return of seized property is mandated.Se revoca la condena y el comiso, se absuelve al acusado del delito de legitimación de capitales y se ordena su libertad inmediata y la restitución de bienes.
SummaryResumen
The ruling examines the crime of money laundering in Costa Rica, emphasizing it is a derivative offense requiring a proven prior criminal act established by a final conviction, except where direct attribution is impossible. The Court finds no objective criminality because the prior act—sale of untaxed cigarettes in the United States—did not qualify as a 'serious crime' under applicable Costa Rican law (minimum penalty below four years), double criminality was not proven, the evaded tax amount was not itemized per period, and the statute of limitations was not analyzed. Subjectively, the defendant acted under a defeasible mistake of fact excluding intent, as he did not know—and could not know with certainty—the illicit origin of the funds. The Chamber reverses the conviction and confiscation, orders the defendant’s release, and mandates return of seized property.La sentencia analiza el delito de legitimación de capitales en Costa Rica, destacando que es un delito de relación que exige un hecho delictivo previo acreditado mediante sentencia condenatoria firme, salvo imposibilidad de atribución directa. La Sala concluye que no existe tipicidad objetiva porque el hecho previo —venta de cigarrillos sin pago de impuestos en Estados Unidos— no era delito grave conforme a la legislación costarricense aplicable (pena mínima inferior a cuatro años), no se acreditó la doble incriminación, se omitió individualizar pericialmente la cuota tributaria evadida por período anual, y no se probó la vigencia de la acción penal. Subjetivamente, el acusado actuó bajo un error de tipo vencible que excluye el dolo, pues no conocía —ni podía conocer con certeza— el origen ilícito de los fondos. La Sala revoca la condena y el comiso, ordena la libertad del imputado y la restitución de bienes.
Key excerptExtracto clave
The defense’s argument is valid that in this case the money did not originate per se from an illicit activity, as would be the case with a prohibited object; the object (sale of cigarettes) was not illicit but, eventually, the non-payment of taxes. However, a conviction is not possible here because: 1) double criminality is absent, since when fitting the acts committed by [Name7] (the underlying material object) into national law, they carried a minimum penalty below four years, which was the threshold under the law applicable to this case; 2) [Name7] has not yet been sentenced in the United States, so the specific penalty that may be imposed remains unknown and whether it meets the national definition of ‘serious crime’ under the applicable national law; 3) the amount of tax quota left unpaid each year was not individualized, which varies the criminal type, and a cumulative calculation cannot be made; 4) the defendant had no knowledge that the money came from a 'serious crime' because the origin activity was licit (sale of tobacco), even if the tax payment was not licit, and there is no evidence the defendant knew about it; 5) nor was his purpose to conceal the activity from which the funds originated; 6) the issue of statute of limitations in both countries was not analyzed in relation to the annual amounts received.Es válida la argumentación defensiva de que en este caso no se trató de dinero proveniente per se de una actividad ilícita, como lo sería de algún objeto prohibido; el objeto (venta de cigarrillos) no lo era sino, eventualmente, el no pago de los tributos. No obstante, en este asunto no resulta posible una condena porque: 1) no se da la doble incriminación, pues al hacer el encuadre a la legislación nacional, los hechos cometidos por [Nombre7] (objeto material del que provenían) tenían pena mínima prevista inferior a cuatro años, que era el monto que regía con la ley aplicable a este asunto; 2) [Nombre7] no ha sido, aún, sentenciado en Estados Unidos, por lo que se ignora la pena concreta que se le puede imponer y si ésta encaja en la definición nacional de ‘delito grave’ según la referida ley nacional aplicable; 3) no se individualizó el monto de la cuota tributaria dejada de pagar en cada año, en que varía el tipo penal, sin que pueda hacerse un cálculo acumulativo; 4) el encartado no tenía conocimiento de que el dinero provenía de un 'delito grave' pues la actividad de origen de los fondos era lícita (venta de tabaco), aunque no lo fuera el pago de los tributos, aspecto sobre el que no hay prueba que el encartado conociera; 5) tampoco fue su fin ocultar la actividad de la que procedía; 6) no se analizó el tema de la prescripción de la acción penal en ambos países en función de los montos anuales recibidos.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"el dolo requiere, pues, el conocimiento del riesgo concreto o peligro de que exista una sentencia condenatoria, única que puede dar contenido al elemento normativo 'delito' en los tipos de lavado de capitales."
"intent therefore requires knowledge of the concrete risk or danger that a conviction exists, which alone can give substance to the normative element 'crime' in money laundering offenses."
Considerando §1
"el dolo requiere, pues, el conocimiento del riesgo concreto o peligro de que exista una sentencia condenatoria, única que puede dar contenido al elemento normativo 'delito' en los tipos de lavado de capitales."
Considerando §1
"La adquisición del objeto sin conocer su origen ilícito implica una adquisición de la posesión de buena fe, que excluye el delito de legitimación de capitales."
"Acquiring an object without knowing its illicit origin constitutes possession in good faith, which precludes the crime of money laundering."
Considerando §3
"La adquisición del objeto sin conocer su origen ilícito implica una adquisición de la posesión de buena fe, que excluye el delito de legitimación de capitales."
Considerando §3
Full documentDocumento completo
§1. The crime of money laundering (legitimación de capitales) is defined, by the majority doctrine, as a relationship or link crime (not as an autonomous crime), meaning it requires a connection to a prior criminal act (Cfr. [Name1], . Reflexiones técnicas y de política criminal sobre el delito de lavado de capitales. Cuadernos de Política Criminal No. 91, 2007, pp. 5-26 and BAJO [Name2], and [Name3], . Política criminal y blanqueo de capitales. Marcial Pons, 2009 and the authors cited therein). This prior act can be defined by the legislator in very diverse ways (alluding to a list of crimes, to the severity of the sanctions, or, in much broader terms, assuming any other crime as possible) but it is necessary that it exists and that means that—if it is to be attributed to a particular subject—that subject must have been tried and found firmly responsible for the crime (unless that was not possible due to personal circumstances, grounds for exemption from punishment, in which case the demonstration of the criminal wrong will suffice, provided this is not incompatible with the specific legislation of each country).
Only when such direct attribution is not possible (either because the perpetrator was not identified, because the perpetrator died, or because the criminal action was extinguished for certain reasons, excluding the statute of limitations for the criminal action because the validity of said action in both legislations is necessary, for the purposes of that assessment, unless there is a rule to the contrary, which there is not here), can that prior act be demonstrated within the trial concerning money laundering, obviously according to the evidentiary rules of the prosecuting country. As has been indicated, this is generally the case, without ignoring that there are modern trends which, to circumvent the evidentiary issue of the prior "serious crime" (in singular), prefer to allude, on one hand, to "criminal activity" (which implies shifting the emphasis on the level of prior accreditation that the different strata of the Theory of Crime must have, according to the system followed), making it possible for the crime to be committed by the same agent of the preceding event (which is not possible if it is considered a relationship crime) and, on the other hand, to give this crime the nature of an autonomous illicit act, establishing a differentiated legal interest (which is no longer the administration of justice, as is usually the case in concealment crimes, but rather the socio-economic order) which, a certain doctrinal sector has forcefully condemned: "...this perspective, generally unconfessedly open and camouflaged under the generic formula of protecting the socioeconomic order, has led to legal and interpretative perversions, which have not only led to an abusive application of the money laundering statutes, but have also, and paradoxically, detracted from the efficacy of the criminal statutes in relation to their criminal political interest.
The first perversion of this criminal political idea consists of the expansion of the predicate crimes for money laundering to any crime, not even a serious one and including tax fraud. The second, related to the previous one and, like the previous one, based on the unconfessed attempt to evade the requirements of proof in criminal procedural law, has to do with the loss of secure contours of the typical element that the perpetrator act with knowledge that the assets being laundered originate from a crime" (Cfr. [Name1], . Reflexiones técnicas y de política criminal sobre el delito de lavado de capitales. Cuadernos de Política Criminal No. 91, 2007, pp. 5-26. Also on the website: www.revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpen/article/.../98, p. 66). With this, it is intended to be stated from the outset that this Chamber agrees with that author when he points out that: "...dolus (dolo) requires, therefore, knowledge of the concrete risk or danger that a conviction exists, which is the only thing that can give content to the normative element 'crime' in the money laundering statutes.
The existence of a prior conviction is, therefore, an indispensable part of this normative element of the money laundering statute, however much it is wished to be ignored in doctrine and jurisprudence. The best proof that this is so is that proof that the assets do not proceed from any crime whatsoever, that is, that there is no conviction, must imply the acquittal of the alleged launderer due to objective atypicality of his conduct" (Op. cit., p. 78) for which reason it is truly nonsensical that a proceeding for money laundering was initiated in our country for funds originating from a prior activity that is not, per se, illicit, when the case that supposedly gave rise to that event (the sale of cigarettes, to non-indigenous persons, without the prior payment of taxes) does not have, to this date (and much less at the date of the accusation), a final judgment (sentencia firme) in the country of origin, since the penalty that could be imposed on [Name4], brother of the accused here, in the United States of North America for such conduct is still unknown, and without it being sufficient, to resolve that issue (which is a normative element of the statute as stated before), the testimony of some persons who mention the probable penalty that might be imposed, which, it should be noted, due to that same national ignorance, might not have been interrogated and, therefore, might omit all the punitive particularities of the Anglo-Saxon system, such as the minimum limits of that crime, which will be taken up again later.
Additionally, it is necessary to point out that, if the countries in which the prior act was committed (understood as 'crime' or 'criminal activity,' which is not just a matter of terminology but, as indicated, has important legal consequences) and the act of money laundering being judged are different, dual criminality or double incrimination must exist, that is, that the prior act, from which the capital sought to be laundered is said to originate, must also be a crime in the country where the said money laundering is being judged and, unless there is express legislation regulating it otherwise, must not be time-barred in either of the two. In this regard, national doctrine states: "The prior act from which the object of economic interest derives, itself the material object of the crime of money laundering (legitimación de capitales), must be at least typical and unlawful, that is, provided for as a crime in a criminal law and not covered by a ground for justification (causa de justificación), without it being necessary that it be culpable (limited accessoriness), that is, it does not require that the act be committed culpably by the prior perpetrator nor that it be punishable in general, save for exceptions. §261 of the German StGB explicitly says that the object of economic interest must come from a "rechtwidrige Tat" (unlawful act).
The death of the prior perpetrator of a typical and unlawful act has no influence regarding the prosecution of the crime of money laundering. The prior act must be sufficiently concretized and determined. The prior act, which is suitable for connecting with the crime of money laundering, must be punishable in the Costa Rican jurisdiction, and if it is located outside the national territory, it must also be punishable in the foreign jurisdiction. When the prior act has prescribed, the question arises whether prosecution for the crime of money laundering is possible. The prior crime must be punishable under Costa Rican criminal law, and a time-barred act generally is not. Some German authors consider that if the prior act is time-barred, it is an irrelevant act for the prosecution of the crime of money laundering. However, the majority German doctrine and almost the entirety of Swiss doctrine consider that when the prior act is already time-barred, a conviction for the crime of money laundering is not possible.
The reason for the foregoing is that the crime of money laundering is a crime connected to the prior crime, and if the State has renounced the prosecution of the latter, it is not possible to prosecute the connected crime (...) It is not necessary that the perpetrator of the prior act be known or be alive or, when located abroad, that there be a final judgment (sentencia firme) convicting for the prior act or that it be prosecuted by the competent foreign authorities (...) I believe it is necessary for the Court to determine the existence of the prior act and its typical and unlawful character, without mere suspicion that the object comes from a punishable act being sufficient. The establishment of proof of the prior act can be done by final judgment (sentencia firme), if it was known by a competent authority. If such proof is lacking, the typical and unlawful character of the prior act, which is a normative element of the money laundering statute, can be proven.
This proof must be made by the judge hearing the case in the country of the money laundering crime, in accordance with the criteria of freedom of evidence and free assessment of evidence. In any case, the establishment of the prior act by the national judge as a normative element of the money laundering criminal statute does not imply issuing a sentence on national soil regarding the prior act that occurred abroad" (CASTILLO [Name5], . El delito de legitimación de capitales. Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, 2012, 1st edition, pp. 91-94; emphases supplied). A thesis which, in principle and except as will be stated, this Chamber shares, with the caveats that, while German legislation may require a criminal wrong for the prior act, this is not unanimous in all legal systems since many refer to 'crime' and it is necessary to adhere to what each one regulates, on one hand and, on the other hand, that we do consider it necessary that, if the act is deemed committed abroad, that a proceeding has been or is intended to be pursued and, if one existed, that the foreign conviction (sentencia condenatoria) be provided (which is not a procedural prerequisite but rather a normative element of the statute), unless, as already stated, it is impossible to determine the perpetrator or personal grounds for exclusion of punishability have occurred, for otherwise, an illegal judgment of the prior act would occur, by a non-competent authority.
Moreover, both crimes, that is, the base act with the link crime, must have a logical relationship with each other, for, however much a prior act is criminal in two different legal systems and all legal provisions are met to validly consider it as a preceding act (that is, it has the minimum penalty amount or is on the list of those stated as such by the legislator), if there is no logical connection between the prior event and the subsequent one, it would be wrongly done to seek any sanction: "The nature of the link between the asset suitable for laundering and the prior act is another of the problems to be resolved. A doctrinal sector admits that the connection between the two must be of a causal type. This seems logical insofar as the assets susceptible to being laundered must have their origin, their cause, in a prior criminal act, derive from it (...) it seems then necessary to set limits, that is, the determination of the criteria that produce the rupture of the causal link.
This way of reasoning leads us to the analysis of a series of criteria, as a consequence of which an interruption of the causal nexus may occur, determining that the assets can no longer be considered as originating from the prior act. This need for limitation is linked to the fact that the question of origin would ground a regressus ad infinitum not admissible in principle. An essential part of the legal economy could become contaminated in a short period of time as a consequence of an excessively broad and limitless interpretation of the criterion of origin or provenance. This situation has been criticized by Swiss doctrine for being contrary to the constitutional guarantee of property acquired in good faith" (BLANCO [Name6], . El delito de blanqueo de capitales. Aranzadi, 3rd edition, 2012, p. 341). This requires both establishing objective limits prior to the possession of the allegedly laundered object, and subsequent limits, a topic for which the theories of equivalence of conditions, adequacy, and objective imputation have been used to, in cases of mixing lawful and unlawful assets, determine whether total contamination, total decontamination, partial contamination, etc., applies.
In what interests us here, for now, it is clear that, for example, if a millionaire drives drunk in his country and that conduct is punishable by imprisonment, the fact that he transfers millions of dollars in money to another country, however much he intends to evade the criminal consequences (fine) or civil consequences (liability) derived from that driving, could not be considered to be money laundering, because the money did not originate in the crime, but rather pre-existed it, and, therefore, the evasion of liability cannot be punished using the crime we are dealing with. On the other hand, by virtue of the principles of innocence and non bis in ídem, if the prior act was tried abroad and the accused person was acquitted or the judgment held that the illicit act was not committed, it is not feasible for it to constitute the basis for a subsequent money laundering, nor is it possible for the national courts to hear it again, with new evidence or re-evaluating differently what was weighed there, because the principle of res judicata (cosa juzgada material) guaranteed both by our Political Constitution (numeral 42) and by international human rights instruments signed by the country (see Articles 8.4 of the American Convention on Human Rights and 14.7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) would be affected.
That is, in general terms, since a specific analysis must be made of the criminal statute applicable to the factual matter submitted to our knowledge, to determine if all those doctrinal criteria can be extrapolated to domestic law and if the selected criminal statute contains other important elements (principle of legality). To do this, it is necessary to determine which is the criminal law applicable to this matter, given that there have been several that regulate the subject.
§2. Law applicable to this case and objective elements of the offense: (a) In Costa Rica, before 1988, no crime similar to the one in question existed, neither in name nor in elements. Rather, criminal legislation, mostly collected, as it should be, in the Penal Code—and not scattered, as now, across multiple special laws—only provided for some concealment offenses, such as receiving stolen property, receiving property of suspicious origin, real aiding and abetting, and personal aiding and abetting (cf. articles 330 to 332 of the Penal Code, renumbered by laws Nº 7732 and 9048 and according to the SINALEVI system). (b) It was with law Nº 9093, of April 22, 1988 (published in Supplement Nº 16 to La Gaceta Nº 83 of May 2, 1988), the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, and Related Activities, that this matter was regulated for the first time in a manner very similar to the current one, in Article 15, which stated: "A prison sentence of eight to fifteen years shall be imposed on anyone who performs any act or contract, real or simulated, for the acquisition, possession, transfer, or disposition of property, aimed at hiding or concealing the origin of economic resources obtained through illicit drug trafficking or crimes related to that activity, regardless of the place where the illicit act was committed.
When the act has been committed abroad, its commission may be proven by any means" (emphasis added). Note how this first regulation circumscribed the scope of application of money laundering to those proceeds obtained from activities related to drug trafficking. What should be understood by drug? Article 1 of that law referred to substances that cause dependency. However, although there are many substances that cause it (including alcohol, tobacco, some sodas, and even coffee), it was not the medical-cultural criterion that should be used to unravel the meaning of the term. Instead, "drugs" is a normative, legal-type concept that must be filled from legal definitions adopted by the country and which, because they exist, are restrictive and prevail over cultural criteria (Article 1 of the Penal Code). Thus, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (signed by Costa Rica on March 30, 1961, and incorporated into national law through law Nº 4544 of March 11, 1970) established several lists (I, II, III, and IV) of substances subject to state control, among which tobacco was not mentioned—tobacco being what was traded here and from whose sale the profits underlying this proceeding originate.
It should be added that this international regulation already referred to crimes related to drugs and narcotics as "serious offenses," without defining this term (see articles 36.1; 36.2.a.iv). Nothing was expressed regarding tobacco either in the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (signed by our country on March 25, 1972, and incorporated into national law through law Nº 5168 of December 26, 1972); in the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (signed by Costa Rica on May 31, 1972, and incorporated into national law through law Nº 4990 of June 10, 1972); nor, finally, in the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (signed by Costa Rica on April 25, 1989, and incorporated into national law through law Nº 7198 of November 1, 1990). ([Nombre7]) That first law against drug trafficking was reformed by law Nº 7233 (Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, and Related Activities, published on May 21, 1991), which, in its section 17, established: "A prison sentence of eight to twenty years shall be imposed on anyone who intervenes in any type of contract, whether real or simulated, for the alienation, investment, pledging, assignment, conversion, transfer, safekeeping, or concealment of the nature, origin, location, destination, or movement of the profits, things, values, securities, or property derived from the criminal acts defined in this law or from the economic benefit obtained from such crimes, provided they knew that origin and tend with those actions to hide or conceal the origin of the resources or to evade the legal consequences thereof, regardless of the place where those illicit acts were committed.
The personal aiding and abetting of the crime established in this article shall be punished with the penalty provided for the perpetrator. When drug trafficking or crimes related to that activity, even those referring to the conduct defined in this article, have been carried out abroad, their respective demonstration may be proven by any means of evidence, provided that the guarantees established in national legislation and in international conventions accepted by Costa Rica for the protection of the rights of the accused are respected. The banks of the National Banking System must provide the reports related to the conduct typified in this article, which are requested by the Public Ministry or the judges of the Republic, even in the preliminary investigation phase. Judges may also order that any documentation or means of evidence that the banks have in their possession be delivered to them, when necessary for an investigation.
The resolution ordering the above must duly substantiate the need for the report or the contribution of the evidentiary means" (emphasis added). In this legislation, the referred article no longer remitted to a normative-legal concept not contemplated in the norm, but rather, expressly, it linked the legitimization of assets with the other crimes typified therein, among which, it should be noted, there was none alluding to the tobacco trade or different from drug trafficking. (d) In a similar sense, law Nº 7786 was enacted, in effect since its publication on May 15, 1998. In its section 1, it circumscribed the scope of application of that regulation to activities related to the substances described in those international instruments (within which, as already stated, tobacco was not included), stating: "This law regulates the prevention, use, possession, trafficking, and commercialization of narcotics, psychotropic substances, inhalable substances, and other drugs and pharmaceuticals susceptible to producing physical or psychological dependence, included in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations, of May 30, 1961, approved by Costa Rica through Law No. 4544, of March 18, 1970, amended in turn by the Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Law No. 5168, of January 8, 1973; as well as in the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances, of February 21, 1971, approved by Costa Rica through Law No. 4990, of June 10, 1972; also, in the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, of December 19, 1988, approved by Costa Rica through Law No. 7198, of September 25, 1990; in addition, the regulations on this matter that are approved for inclusion in the lists that the Ministry of Health must prepare, keep updated, and publish annually in La Gaceta.
Furthermore, the control, inspection, and supervision of activities related to inhalable substances, drugs or pharmaceuticals, and the products, materials, and chemical substances that intervene in the elaboration or production of such substances are regulated; all without prejudice to what is stipulated on this matter in the General Health Law, No. 5395, of October 30, 1973. Likewise, financial activities are prevented and sanctioned, as a way of avoiding the penetration of capital from the crimes of illicit trafficking and other related offenses and all procedures that may serve as means to legitimize capital from drug trafficking. It is a function of the State and is declared of public interest to adopt the necessary measures to prevent, control, investigate, avoid, or repress any illicit activity related to the subject matter of this law." And in its section 72, it typified: "Shall be sanctioned with a prison sentence of eight to twenty years whoever: a) Converts, transfers, or transports property of economic interest that proceeds directly or indirectly from illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances, or related crimes, to hide or conceal its illicit origin or to help, through such conversion, transport, or transfer, any participant in the commission of one of these crimes to evade the legal consequences of their acts. b) Hides or conceals the nature, origin, location, destination, movement, or true ownership of resources, property, or rights relating thereto, knowing that they proceed directly or indirectly from illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances, or related crimes.
The penalty shall be ten to twenty years when the preceding acts are committed by employees, officials, directors, owners, or other authorized representatives of financial institutions" (emphasis added). Said law was in effect until January 10, 2002. (e) On January 11, 2002, Law Nº 8204, called "Comprehensive Reform of the Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Money Laundering, and Related Activities," was published in La Gaceta No. 8. This set of articles had the peculiarity of expanding the criminal spectrum it regulated, since its Article 1, in addition to referring to the substances mentioned in those international conventions accepted by the country, mentions, in the fourth and fifth paragraphs: "Furthermore, financial activities are regulated and sanctioned, in order to prevent the penetration of capital from serious crimes and all procedures that may serve as means to legitimize said capital.
For the purposes of this Law, a serious crime shall be understood as conduct that constitutes a crime punishable by a deprivation of liberty of four years, at a minimum, or a more serious penalty" (boldface emphasis added). In this context, section 69 stated: "Shall be sanctioned with a prison sentence of eight to twenty years: a) Whoever acquires, converts, or transmits property of economic interest, knowing that it originates from a serious crime, or performs any other act to hide or conceal the illicit origin or to help the person who has participated in the offenses to evade the legal consequences of their acts. b) Whoever hides or conceals the true nature, origin, location, destination, movement, or rights over the property or its ownership, knowing that it proceeds, directly or indirectly, from a serious crime. The penalty shall be ten to twenty years of prison when the property of economic interest originates from any of the crimes related to illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances, money laundering, diversion of precursors or essential chemical substances, and related crimes" (emphasis is not original).
Of course, legislative activism did not stop there. Three additional regulatory changes followed that are important to review: (f) On October 29, 2004, Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, No. 8422 of September 14, 2004, was published in La Gaceta No. 212. Its Article 47 states: "Receiving stolen property, legalization, or concealment of property. Shall be sanctioned with prison from one to eight years, whoever hides, secures, transforms, invests, transfers, guards, administers, acquires, or gives an appearance of legitimacy to property or rights, knowing that they have been the product of illicit enrichment or criminal activities of a public official, committed on the occasion of the office or through the means and opportunities it provides." That is, a crime of money laundering was created specifically for proceeds from functional crimes. (g) Likewise, in Supplement No. 29 to La Gaceta No. 143, on July 24, 2009, the Law against Organized Crime, No. 8754, was published.
Its Article 1 stated: "Interpretation and application. Organized crime shall be understood as a structured group of two or more persons that exists for a certain time and acts in concert with the purpose of committing one or more serious crimes. The provisions of this Law shall apply exclusively to investigations and judicial proceedings in cases of national and transnational organized crime crimes. For all matters not regulated by this Law, the Penal Code, Law No. 4573; the Criminal Procedure Code, Law No. 7594; and other concordant laws shall apply. For the entire criminal system, a serious crime is one that, within its sentencing range, can be punished with imprisonment of four years or more" (boldface emphasis added). Regarding this regulation, it is worth noting that it defined 'serious crime' as one punishable with a penalty of four years or more, regardless of at which end of the punitive scale that amount falls (minimum or maximum extreme), but rather, it was sufficient that the act could be punished with such a sanction.
However, the article is contradictory because, on one hand, it states that this definition is for the entire criminal system while, immediately before, it had stated that the provisions of that regulation would only apply to cases of organized crime. This law arose due to the obligations contracted by the Costa Rican State upon signing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, known as the Palermo Convention, adopted on November 15, 2000, and approved through law No. 8302, published in La Gaceta No. 123 of June 27, 2003. This international instrument, in Article 2.b), defined a 'serious crime' as follows: "...shall mean conduct constituting an offense punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty" (underline is external), which is a contradiction because if it is a maximum penalty, it cannot be affirmed that it is "at least" or that it could be a higher penalty.
In any case, both laws are subsequent to the accusation that concerns us here and, as will be seen, are not more beneficial for the accused, so they cannot be applied retroactively (Articles 11 and 12 of the Penal Code and 34 of the Constitution). Finally, (h) Article 2°, point 1, subparagraph a) of the Law on Strengthening Legislation against Terrorism, No. 8719 of March 4, 2009 (published in La Gaceta No. 52 of March 16, 2009, and in effect since then), changed the name of the law in question so that, henceforth, it would be called "Law on Narcotics, Psychotropic Substances, Drugs of Unauthorized Use, Related Activities, Money Laundering, and Financing of Terrorism," and, through said law, the content of Article 1 was reformed. There, the reference to and definition of 'serious crime' was removed, establishing broadly instead that, with said law: "Furthermore, financial activities are regulated and sanctioned, in order to prevent money laundering and actions that may serve to finance terrorist activities, as established in this Law." For its part, in Article 2°, point 1, subparagraph b) of the referred Law No. 8719 of March 4, 2009, the content of section 69 was modified to read as follows: "Shall be sanctioned with a prison sentence of eight (8) to twenty (20) years: a) Whoever acquires, converts, or transmits property of economic interest, knowing that it originates from a crime that, within its sentencing range, can be sanctioned with a prison sentence of four (4) years or more, or performs any other act to hide or conceal the illicit origin, or to help the person who has participated in the offenses to evade the legal consequences of their acts. b) Whoever hides or conceals the true nature, origin, location, destination, movement, or rights over the property or its ownership, knowing that it proceeds, directly or indirectly, from a crime that, within its sentencing range, can be sanctioned with a prison sentence of four (4) years or more.
The penalty shall be ten (10) to twenty (20) years of prison, when the property of economic interest originates from any of the crimes related to illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances, money laundering, diversion of precursors, essential chemical substances, and related crimes, conduct typified as terrorist, in accordance with current legislation, or when it is intended for the financing of acts of terrorism and terrorist organizations" (emphasis added). In this last regulation, money laundering in chain (proceeding from a previous crime of the same nature) was regulated, unnecessarily given the definition of 'serious crime', and a legislative errata was needed to correct some internal defects (see publication in La Gaceta No. 63 of March 31, 2009), which speaks volumes about the criminal policy and criminal technique it incorporated. It is true that, in addition to the law, many of the cited international instruments, ratified by the Costa Rican State, established the state obligation to punish money laundering or the laundering of assets.
However, the assumption of an international obligation does not, ipso facto, generate the creation of criminal norms, since these require a formal law—that is, one emanating from the Legislative Assembly, following the procedure established for that purpose by the legal system—and the establishment of a specific penalty per conduct, none of which those conventions have. They refer to the need to prevent certain conducts, define them, and may recommend punitive frameworks, etc., but they do not fulfill those requirements derived from the Principle of Criminal Legality. From the preceding "legal archaeology," the following can be drawn as first important conclusions for the matter at hand: (i) In Costa Rica, the crime of money laundering did not exist until May 2, 1988, because, before that date, what was regulated in the Penal Code were crimes of concealment, without providing for many of the conducts aimed at diverting the proceeds of crime now listed in other special provisions; (ii) From May 2, 1988, until January 10, 2002, the only money laundering that was penalized was that arising from the trade of drugs, narcotics, or psychotropic substances.
These substances did not include all those that generate addiction, but only those listed internationally, among which tobacco was not provided for; (iii) Starting from January 11, 2002, the punitive spectrum was expanded to sanction money laundering from 'serious crimes,' and this term (a normative-legal element of the criminal type) was legally defined as any crime that had a minimum extreme of four years of prison. This was maintained until March 15, 2009, except for property from crimes committed by public officials, taking advantage of their positions, which, from October 29, 2004, to date, came to be regulated in an independent norm that, incidentally, despite the proclamations embodied in the Statement of Motives for the bill, actually notably lowered the penalty for this event; (iv) As of March 16, 2009, money laundering can originate from any crime punishable by imprisonment of four years or more (except, as already stated, for functional crimes regulated more leniently in the special regulation), regardless of whether this is, or is not, the minimum or maximum extreme of the sanction, but rather, it sufficing that, in the abstract punitive range, this is one of the possible penalties to impose.
This account is of special importance in this matter, given the principle contained in Article 11 of the Penal Code, derived from the old aphorism nullum crimen nulla poena sine previa lege, according to which "Punishable acts shall be judged in accordance with the laws in effect at the time of their commission," except, of course, if later laws are enacted that are more favorable to the accused (Article 12 of the Penal Code), which, it should be stated outright, is not the case here because, as can be seen from the account given, not only did subsequent laws maintain the same penalty or increase it with respect to previous ones—save for the case of functional crimes, not applicable to the species—but also expanded the normative spectrum of the prior acts that can give rise to money laundering. Likewise, because, by virtue of the principle of correlation between accusation and sentence (Article 365 of the Criminal Procedure Code), only the accused facts could be taken as proven. Thus, the proven facts of the sentence, keeping intact what was attributed, state, as relevant: "As proven facts of interest for the resolution of this matter, the Court lists the following:
It is important to emphasize this because, in the oral hearing held in this office, the prosecutor even referred to the other crimes, which constitutes, at the very least, a regrettable omission on her part, especially considering that it was the same prosecutor who attended the trial and witnessed the evidence, so the duty of objectivity that assists her (Article 63 of the Código Procesal Penal) would oblige her, at the very least, to leave it so mentioned, which she not only did not do, but attempted to disregard with the sole reference to the U.S. criminal charges; 2)- the defendant was accused of receiving money from his part, proceeding from those activities and then investing it; 3)- it was taken as proven that [Nombre7], the defendant's brother, transferred to the country, between 2002 and 2004, slightly more than sixteen million dollars, leaving some sums in his name and others in the accounts of the accused here to whom, on July 17, 2000, he granted a generalísimo power of attorney without limit of sum for the administration and disposition of his assets.
With part of that money, on October 3, 2000, a growth fund in dollars was set up in the Banco de Costa Rica and, approximately four million dollars of that sum were transferred, on August 6, 2004, the date on which the defendant's brother was arrested in the United States. On August 12, 2004, the accused redeemed that fund, transferring the monies to accounts in his name, it not being until after 2007 that [Nombre7] began to invest part of that money in the acquisition of various types of movable or immovable property, which he registered both in his name and in the name of companies where he was the principal shareholder. Relating the accused and proven facts with the normative recount carried out above, it must be said, then, that any event of that accusation, concerning the money acquired, administered, and disposed of from the illegal sale of tobacco, attributed to the defendant prior to January 10, 2002, is atypical.
In this condition is the period that begins in the year 2000 and until that date, since he was never accused that this money came from crimes related to drugs or narcotics, the only crimes that, at that time, could configure the basis of money laundering, but rather the attribution is the tobacco activity and its tax-free sale, which is what, ultimately, must be assessed in this case. As already stated, for the remaining crimes, the accused's brother was definitively acquitted, and the unlawful act of possession of a single firearm without a permit is not an act capable of generating money laundering (legitimación de capitales), even though it has a wide punitive range in the country of origin that would allow it to be considered a 'serious crime', as it would lack a causal relationship with the obtaining of the money intended to be laundered. This, it is insisted, when dealing with a single weapon, since it could be different if referring to an entire arsenal, which implies its subsequent commercialization, which escapes the factual hypothesis of this matter.
Likewise, given that the last proven facts occur in 2007 (when he disposes of the assets), it is not possible to apply the subsequent regulations to the defendant, that is, the reforms introduced through Ley N° 8719 of March 4, 2009, which modified the content of numeral 69 of Ley Nº 8204, and which stated that money laundering could come from any crime punishable by imprisonment of four years or more, regardless of whether that was, or was not, the minimum extreme of the penalty, it being sufficient that it was within the punitive range, since that is a later, more prejudicial norm. In other words, the law applicable to the facts occurring after January 10, 2002 —all the remaining accused facts— is the one that expressly states that a 'serious crime' is one that has a minimum penalty of four years. Therefore, the statement contained in the lower court judgment is not acceptable, according to which "...By virtue of the temporal validity of the norms provided for in the Código Penal, the norm applicable to the facts under examination is the one in force from the year two thousand two to the year two thousand four, that is, the one that links the assets being laundered to a serious crime, without endorsing a penalty to that concept of seriousness" (cf. folio 935; highlighting supplied) because, although the applicable law was correctly selected, it was not analyzed in its entirety, that is, in relation to Article 1 of that same regulation, where the criminal seriousness was indeed linked to a penalty amount that, including, the legislator expressly established had to be the minimum extreme of each criminal type.
Having drawn the two previous conclusions, it must be added that the entire reasoning of the Trial Court, considering tax evasion on cigarettes as the prior crime (and not the possession of a weapon which, it is insisted, lacks a causal link with the fact at hand; nor the other facts for which the defendant's brother was prosecuted and acquitted) was based on that: "...in the case of the crime of contraband indicated, whose maximum penalty is five years, it does meet the requirement of having a maximum penalty greater than four years. In the Court's opinion, the norm that corresponds in our legal system to comply with the Principle of Double Incrimination, is Article 92 of the law No. 4755 of May 3, 1971, Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios which punishes with a penalty that corresponds to the crime attributed in the charges filed against [Nombre4] since the year (sic) that is, that the money from the cigarette contraband attributed to [Nombre4], proceeds from a serious crime that is also contemplated in the Costa Rican legal system, for which reason the argument of the defense attorney that the Conventional Principle of double incrimination is not met is not admissible; and on the contrary, the Court considers it a demonstrated fact certainly that the money remitted to the Banco de Costa Rica by [Nombre4], originated from a serious crime contemplated by the Costa Rican criminal legal system" (cf. folio 936, highlighting is supplied).
Note how the same female judges and the male judge of the lower court point out that the conduct of [Nombre7], in the United States, has its equivalent, in Costa Rican legislation, in that crime, which has a maximum, not minimum, penalty of over five years, which would imply that the mentioned requirement is not met since, as will be said, the abstract minimum penalty is less than four years, none of which the a quo mentioned. Nor did the lower court make any analysis of whether [Nombre7]'s act could be considered 'serious' in U.S. legislation, that is, if there it was punishable by an abstract minimum penalty of four years, which was important for the purposes of said double incrimination. Recall that, due to the national investigative haste, the derivative process advanced more quickly than the base cause and, as of the date of this decision, there is no official record that, in the United States of America, a penalty has been imposed on [Nombre7] for that act which, in addition, it is unknown whether it is a 'serious crime' in the terms defined by our regulations.
To resolve this issue, it is not enough that it be said that [Nombre7], the defendant's brother, while the national process was developing in parallel, specifically on July 16, 2012, was found guilty of illegal possession —that is, without prior payment of taxes— of cigarettes, in the United States, on which occasion the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, upheld a government appeal against the ruling of Judge [Nombre14] of the District Court for the Eastern District who, in turn, in January 2010, had dismissed the jury conviction he had received, in May 2008. And it is not enough, because the witnesses stated that he still has a penalty to be imposed. Although the judgment mentioned that: "The penalty to be imposed for this crime (…) according to [Nombre15] could be up to 20 years in prison" (see folio 897) nothing was said about the minimum limits that, in the legislation of that country, that penalty could have, which has not yet been imposed, which is highly relevant, as will be seen.
Neither was any proof provided about the scope of the foreign legislation which, as determined by Article 30 of the Código Civil (applicable to this matter by so providing numeral 14 of that same regulation) which states: "He who bases his right on foreign laws must prove their existence" should have been done, as it concerns foreign regulations that the party using it is responsible for proving, which, in this case, is the Costa Rican State through the prosecuting entity, given that the defendant is protected by his constitutional state of innocence (Article 39 of the Carta Magna). Even more, if the statement that served as the basis for that information of the Court is analyzed, that is, the one given by [Nombre16] (see folios 850 to 855), assistant attorney in the United States, it is clear that she stated, specifically, on this topic, the following: "I am an attorney's assistant in the United States, I am responsible for representing the Government in civil and criminal cases (...) my position is similar to a prosecutor but at the federal level, we investigate federal crimes, the prosecutor is at the state level (...) Mr. [Nombre7] is accused of being part of this organization, he also committed violent crimes to help in this negotiation (...) the trial lasted (sic) until May 2008, the jury found him guilty of the conspiracy that was based on cigarette contraband, also of having weapons in his possession, the other charges the jury found him not guilty, after the jury gave the verdict, in the U.S. system (sic) the defendant can request that the charge be eliminated (...) the judge had dismissed the matter related to the conspiracy (sic), when the sentence was given the only thing left was the charge for carrying a weapon (...) Judge [Nombre14] eliminated (sic) the verdict saying he was not guilty of the contraband conviction, the United (sic) States took this decision to a higher court, our procedures take place in the District Court, the appeal was in the Court of Appeals, in July of this year the Court of Appeals overturned (sic) Judge [Nombre14]'s verdict and the decision is obtained in the month of July 2012, the charges brought against him for contraband were reinstated, a new sentence has not yet been issued, but he is going to receive this sentence for the acts of contraband, this judge's decision establishes [Nombre7] as guilty of the crime of contraband, this decision confirmed (sic) the jury's decision, there is no new trial, what the jury established in May 2008 is simply reinstated, the sentencing has not yet been done, what he faces is a penalty of up to twenty years in prison (...) In fact, this case is not in New York City, in federal law there is a law that refers to contraband which is the CCTA Law, under federal law it is a crime to possess cigarettes that do not pay taxes, at the time of the case it was having more than 360,000 cigarettes, not paying taxes on the cigarettes makes them illegal to possess, the possession of cigarettes that have not paid the tax is contraband, the act of contraband carries up to 5 years, but in the case of Mr. [Nombre7] he was accused (sic) of extortion and part of the extortion was the contraband, in the pending crime the penalty will be for the extortion, they are called acts referring to the crime (...) the crimes where the jury declared (sic) [Nombre7] innocent, these charges cannot be appealed further, but I believe Judge [Nombre14] would consider the robbery and murder as part of the conspiracy, there are laws in the United States and New York for tax evasion" (highlighting supplied).
That is, the witness starts from her own speculations and did not state, since no one inquired about it, the punitive limits of the crime of contraband, mentioning, based on her position within that country's criminal process, two very different punitive amounts: five and up to twenty years, but without indicating the abstract minimum provided for in the norm, which is what ours requires, and referring to facts for which the defendant was acquitted, as if he had been convicted, aspects that not only speak to her credibility but also to the impossibility of using her testimony to prove what is missing in our context, since it would violate the principle of res judicata. Indeed, if it is valid in the United States of America to use the circumstances of a person's acquittal as relevant facts to impose a penalty for another crime, the same cannot be said in Costa Rica, where numeral 8.4 of the Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (not signed by that country) states: "The accused acquitted by a final judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial for the same facts" so that the abstract penalty amount to be imposed could not consider aggravating factors derived from conduct for which he was acquitted.
In any case, the reference made by the female judges and the male judge, as already stated, was only to whether the equivalent act, in Costa Rica, was a serious crime and they assumed it was, alluding to a maximum penalty of five years. However, that fact, underlined above in the transcribed text, seems to result from an error by the lower court body, since Article 92 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (modified by numeral 2 of law Nº 7900 of August 3, 1999, and before the reform by Article 1 of law N° 9069 of September 10, 2012, "Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria", a later and more prejudicial law), stated: Article 92.- Inducing error in the Tax Administration. When the amount defrauded exceeds two hundred base salaries, whoever induces error in the Tax Administration, through data simulation, deformation or concealment of true information or any other form of deception suitable to induce error, with the purpose of obtaining, for oneself or a third party, a patrimonial benefit, an exemption or a refund to the detriment of the Public Treasury, shall be punished with imprisonment of five to ten years.
For the purposes of the provisions of the preceding paragraph, it must be understood that: a) The defrauded amount shall not include interest, fines or penalty surcharges. b) To determine the mentioned amount, if dealing with tributes whose period is annual, the defrauded quota in that period shall be considered; for taxes whose periods are less than twelve months, the defrauded amounts shall be added during the period between January 1 and December 31 of the same year. In other tributes, the amount shall be understood as referring to each of the concepts for which a taxable event is susceptible to determination. It shall be considered a legal acquittal excuse that the subject remedies his non-compliance, without any requirement or action by the Tax Administration to obtain the remediation. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, an action of the Administration shall be understood as any action carried out with notification to the taxpayer, conducive to verifying compliance with the tax obligations referring to the tax and period in question" (highlighting is supplied).
That is, that regulation did contemplate, as a minimum penalty, five years in prison, which denotes an error in the foundation of what was transcribed in the lower court judgment (since that amount is mentioned as a maximum penalty) but also an omission, since, as the appellant rightly points out, not only is there no reasoning but, worse yet, no proof, neither expert nor of any other kind, that states what the amount of the unpaid taxes to the United States Government was, which is the only illegal thing about that money (and not the totality of the income arising from the cigarette sales), without it being possible to presume (against the principle of innocence) that it accounts for all the money transferred, since the sale of tobacco or cigarettes, like all commercial activity, generates some profit, after paying taxes, in addition to which, as was established with the very statement of D (see folio 854) and of E (folio 872) the money transferred by [Nombre7] also came from other diverse activities he had in that country.
Having reached this point, it is necessary to point out how controversial it is, in comparative law, to consider tax evasion as a prior crime. To this effect, it has been stated: “The fiscal voracity of developed States, especially European ones, has imposed a gradual and perverse shift of the crime of money laundering from its strict original meaning, that is, from the aim of criminally prosecuting the laundering of assets proceeding from certain criminal activities –narcotrafficking, corruption, and organized crime, above all– to serving as an instrument of tax control and collection (…) it has reached the point of admitting that it is sufficient to commit the crime of money laundering if the assets proceed from any crime –which does not even have to be serious– (…) and, furthermore, that it is not necessary for the assets to proceed from a prior criminal activity that acts as the cause or source of their obtaining, but rather it is sufficient that they have not been subject to the corresponding taxation to already be able to subject them to the criminal regime of money laundering.
This way of understanding the crime (…) is criminal-politically incoherent and technically inconsistent, because (…) it not only ignores the criminal-political reason for the existence of these crimes and turns a large part of the population into money laundering criminals, confirming, by the way, the preventive ineffectiveness of these criminal types, but also, is based on a contra legem interpretation of the typical requirement that the crimes being laundered have a criminal origin (…) The technical and criminal-political basis of the money laundering types is that the typical element ‘assets that originate in a crime’ (…) means that the cause of obtaining the assets is a prior crime, that is, prior to their obtaining and that, therefore, money laundering does not target assets that, once obtained licitly, are simply concealed from fulfilling their tax obligations, because these assets do not ‘have their origin in a crime’ and, furthermore, are usually patrimonially indistinguishable from those that have been subject to taxation.
What is technically and criminal-politically decisive for the typicality of money laundering is, therefore, that the origin of the assets, that is, the cause of their obtaining, are predicate crimes –narcotrafficking, bribery, kidnapping…– different from tax fraud, because tax fraud in itself does not generate the assets, is not the origin of the assets, but rather, simply hides the assets obtained licitly from the Public Treasury” (Cf. [Nombre1], . Reflexiones técnicas y de política criminal sobre el delito de lavado de capitales. Cuadernos de Política Criminal No. 91, 2007, pp. 72 and 74. Also at the following electronic address of the Universidad Externado de Colombia: www.revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpen/article/.../98). A discussion that is picked up by national doctrine in the following terms: "...the legislations of some countries such as Spain [In Spain, the 2010 law (...) expressly admits that the defrauded tax quota can constitute the material object of money laundering] as well as Germany expressly declare that profits generated by a fiscal crime can be a preceding act for the crime of money laundering.
In France, Belgium and Italy, it has been case law that has said that fiscal crime can be a preceding act in money laundering. In Switzerland, it has been doctrine (...) Part of Spanish doctrine [Gómez [Nombre17] (...) (...)] believes that the crime of tax fraud cannot be a prior act for the crime of money laundering, because the quota to be paid for taxes does not originate nor have its origin in a crime, but rather the taxes were acquired licitly by the author (...) [Nombre18] adds that the crime of tax fraud is a crime of omission, and that crimes of omission cannot be prior acts (...) because a causal relationship cannot be established between the omitted action (the payment of taxes) and the assets already incorporated into the subject's patrimony by virtue of a prior act not constituting a crime. According to this author, hypothetical causality could not be resorted to in the sense of considering as illicit the circumstance that if the due action had been carried out (the payment of taxes), the part of the patrimony affected by the fulfillment of the obligation would not be part of the active subject's patrimony.
According to this thesis, the profit (sic) from a licit activity does not become illicit by the sole circumstance that it is not taxed or because it is hidden to avoid paying taxes (...) Article 174 of the Russian penal code (in force since 1996), starting from the thesis that the person obligated to pay taxes has earned their resources licitly, considers that there is no money laundering in the case that the prior act is tax fraud, because there are no resources that come from a crime" (CASTILLO [Nombre5], . El delito de legitimación de capitales. Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, 2012, 1st edition, pp. 83-85; highlighting supplied). The last author approaches the topic, for national legislation, considering that a distinction must be made between tax fraud and withholding of tributes collected and not delivered to the Treasury, but concludes by stating: "The amount of the defrauded taxes is an amount of money that is a proportion applied to the taxable base (levy).
It is true that the agent, as a product of his fraud, does not receive anything, but rather stops paying the tax quota that corresponds to him. But this tax quota not paid by virtue of tax fraud, which is measured in money, is an object suitable for the crime of money laundering" (CASTILLO [Nombre5], . El delito de legitimación de capitales. Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, 2012, 1st edition, p. 87). From these positions, it is evident that the solution is, therefore, not settled and was absolutely ignored in the lower court pronouncement, despite the fact that the national typical formula is very similar to those commented on by foreign authors by providing that the assets “…originate in a serious crime” without, therefore, the obtaining of the assets having been the fiscal crime, but rather the activity of selling tobacco, even though the profits from it may have been magnified by the non-payment of those tributes, which is a different thing.
Despite the above, even if it were accepted that a fiscal crime can be a 'prior act' for money laundering, it would still be required not only that the fiscal crime has, in Costa Rica, an abstract minimum penalty of four years (according to the legislation we are applying, which is not the same one commented on by the Costa Rican professor) but also that, in such a situation, it be specified whether the tax quota, left unpaid in each fiscal period, exceeds the amount in base salaries that make that penalty possible. In this Court's view, without completely discarding the profound dogmatic objections referred to above, what prior tax crimes pose as a basis for money laundering are other issues: on the one hand, of an evidentiary nature, to distinguish the net capital flow transmitted, mostly coming from a licit activity, from the —illicit— quota that should have been paid, a distinction that was not made in this case and, on the other, referring to the way in which the active subject's intent is reconstructed, a posteriori, given the general licit activity that originates the capital on which taxes were not paid: “The problem (…) is not so much the criminal origin or provenance of the assets, as the difficulty of specifying and individualizing them in the taxpayer's patrimony (something that in principle will occur in all cases in which what is obtained is money, the fungible good par excellence).
The taxpayer is liable for the tax debt with all the assets of their patrimony (the same as in punishable insolvencies), but it is practically impossible to determine which assets are those that become contaminated. What is not admissible is the theory of total contagion, according to which the taxpayer's entire patrimony becomes contaminated. That would be excessive and disproportionate. Anyone who did business with them would be committing a crime of money laundering, if all its elements were present, especially the subjective ones (knowledge of the origin, or recklessness at the time of receipt). In all causal relationships, it is necessary that the cause precede the result, in this case it is required that the fiscal crime precede in time the tax quota that constitutes the material object of the money laundering crime. There is no problem when the moment of commission of the crime that generates the laundered assets can be safely determined; for example, if it concerns drug trafficking in which the moment of sale and the amount obtained can be determined.
Now, fiscal crime presents some peculiarities that can generate practical difficulties of difficult solution. The moment of contamination of the assets composing the defrauded tax quota will occur when the administrative deadlines established to declare them to the Tax Administration expire. Until these deadlines end, there is a period of time during which it is not possible to determine whether it exists or not. So indicates [Nombre19], , “Lavado de dinero y delito fiscal. Posibilidad de que delito fiscal sea el delito precedente al de blanqueo”, La Ley: Revista jurídica española de doctrina, jurisprudencia y bibliografía, No. 5, 2005, pp. 1402-1410. In the same sense, [Nombre20], Blanqueo de capitales, cit., pg. 163 (…) [Nombre21]”, cit., nm. 28. Thus [Nombre22], “Delito fiscal y blanqueo: dos sanciones para una actuación”, cit., pg. 5.” (Cf. [Nombre23], . El delito fiscal como actividad delictiva previa del blanqueo de capitales.
En: Revista Electrónica de Ciencia Penal y Criminológica. 13-01, 2011. Also on the following internet page: http://criminet.ugr.es/recpc/13/recpc13-01.pdf). In this matter, it has already been said that there was no proof whatsoever establishing the specific years in which each sum of money was produced and in which the payment of the tribute was omitted, which was necessary because our criminal type refers to base salaries, which change annually and, therefore, it was necessary to determine the year of each money flow and what of it was exclusively from the evasion (that is, exclude the licit profits), to carry out the parallel typical classification, without this being done in the lower court judgment nor, worse yet, even being proven. Even more, the Trial Court took all the money entering the country, without making any division by period, which caused it to account for amounts entered when that conduct was not a crime, that is, before 2002, for it stated: "...the money sent by [Nombre4] since the year two thousand to his accounts in the Banco de Costa Rica and in August 2004 to the account in that same bank of the accused [Nombre7] was the product of the sale of cigarettes without taxes, which is a federal crime in that country" (cf. folio 936).
In another turn, first, the money entering before January 10, 2002, should have been separated, since all that money could not be considered the product of money laundering (legitimación de capitales), even if it originated from a crime, considering that, until that date in our country, only assets, in a broad sense, coming from narcotrafficking could be typical of that conduct, and it has already been seen that this was not the case. Then, of all the money entering from the year 2002 onwards, it should have been established how much entered in each annual period, as this was necessary for the purposes of determining the annual changes in amount to make the proper typical classification for that crime, in case it exceeded the referred base salaries, and, finally, to indisputably prove the proportion of that money that was the product of tax evasion, and which was not, to see if those exceeded the Costa Rican typical requirement of amounting to a certain amount, given that it was only that proportion that allowed the typical framing to be made.
None of this was elaborated in the judgment and, much less, is there proof of the amount left unpaid in taxes: “…the fiscal crime is quite different from other predicate crimes of money laundering (for example, drug trafficking). Its peculiarities are going to demand a very intense evidentiary activity, so that the existence of an unpaid tax quota exceeding the amount fixed in the Código Penal can be affirmed. Unlike what case law considers regarding drug trafficking crimes, in the fiscal crime it is indeed going to be necessary to prove the specific criminal act that generates the laundered assets. And it is that the commission of a fiscal crime requires proving, in a specific manner, several typical elements of a temporal and personal nature. Let us remember that the existence of the defrauded tax quota must be verified within strictly fixed time periods (…) Proving these time periods is essential for the existence of the fiscal crime.
And to do so clearly because, as we know, the amount must be determined with regard to each tax and tax period, without the possibility of adding the different amounts, which are below the minimum (…) to turn into a crime what are merely administrative infractions…” (Cfr. [Nombre23], . El delito de blanqueo de capitales. Aranzadi, Spain, 2012, pp. 426-427). But, as if the foregoing were not enough, it turns out that, as the appellants rightly point out, it was not contemplated that it was not that law that permitted dual criminality to be established. The Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, in its Article 1, states: "Scope of application. The provisions of this Code are applicable to all taxes and the legal relationships derived from them, except as regulated by special legislation" (boldface supplied). The prior acts of which [Nombre7] is accused, in the United States, allude to smuggling, that is, having come into illicit possession of cigarettes, without paying the prior taxes.
The trial court judgment states in this regard: "In the year 2000, the Office of the District Attorney for the Eastern District of New York initiated a formal investigation against [Nombre4], for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (Ley RICO), based on an illegal sale of cigarettes, which were sold without prior payment of taxes (...) [Nombre7] is being prosecuted for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (Ley Rico), arising from his control over a tax-free cigarette distribution business, operating on an indigenous reservation located on the Poospatuck Reservation, in the Town of Mastic, State of New York. At that location is the company [Nombre8], which sells large volumes of tax-free cigarettes, nationwide and through the website www.smokersden.com. It is also noted that the indigenous reservation is home to the Unkechaug Tribe, recognized by the State of New York, though not by the Federal Government.
Since [Nombre7] is the wife of [Nombre4], a Native American member of the Unkechaug Tribe, and living on the Reservation […], she has the right to operate the cigarette store inside the Reservation, but [Nombre7] does not (...) This information, moreover, is cross-referenced and coincides with the document identified as 'Introduction of all charges' (...) In said document, the Federal Government establishes that [Nombre8] was a partnership formed under the laws of the State of New York, with a principal place of business located at [Dirección1], Mastic, New York, and was a company that sold cartons and packs of cigarettes that do not show evidence of payment of taxes and duties applied by the State of New York; it also operated through the website smokersden.com. The foregoing coincides with the information provided by the United States Department of Justice to the Government of Costa Rica (...) the significance of [Nombre8] with respect to the criminal activity of [Nombre7].
Thus, [Nombre8], as the witness [Nombre24] indicated, was a company dedicated to the sale of tax-free cigarettes. The exemption from tax payment had, as a limitation, that the cigarettes could only be sold inside the reservation, to indigenous subjects, for their personal consumption, and not for resale. Furthermore, the company could only be operated by an indigenous person. [Nombre7], wife of [Nombre4], a member of that indigenous community, was therefore the person authorized for the sale of cigarettes. For his part, the witness [Nombre25] testified that on behalf of the City he filed a civil claim against [Nombre4] and [Nombre7], because the store [Nombre8] sold cigarettes that had not paid state taxes. For this reason, the cigarettes were very cheap, to the point that people came from New York City (125 miles from the reservation), bought the untaxed cigarettes, loaded them into their vehicles, and took them back to New York, to then resell them in grocery stores, which caused the City significant losses due to the uncollected taxes.
He also explained that [Nombre7]'s business advertised on the internet, through newspapers, and shipped cigarettes by mail. Based on the monitoring carried out on the company, it was even determined that [Nombre8] bought millions of cartons of cigarettes per year, which had not paid taxes, and were resold in identical conditions, that is, without the payment of taxes required by the State (...) [Nombre8] was a company that sold that product without taxes, according to E, under the protection of a law that the Government issued—a non-existent law—and where the cartons of cigarettes were bought directly from the distributor without the tax stamp, then taken to the reservation, and sold through [Nombre8] without the payment of taxes. This sales activity was absolutely illegal under federal and state law, since the commercialization of that product, in any case, was not only inside the reservation, or to members of the indigenous community, but rather, and this is understood from the testimony of [Nombre25], was a nationwide sale (...) What was explained by E will be seen to be endorsed in the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Thus, for the Court of Appeals, the CCTA defines that any person who intentionally ships, transports, receives, possesses, sells, distributes, or buys contraband cigarettes violates the law. Contraband cigarettes are defined as a quantity exceeding sixty thousand cigarettes that lack evidence of tax payment. For its part, the New York Tax Law 471, analyzed by this Court, indicates that a tax must be paid on all cigarettes possessed for sale, and it must be assumed that all cigarettes within the State are subject to taxes. Also, the Court analyzes how, over the years, the State of New York has been involved in a dialogue with Native American retail merchants and with the Federal Courts regarding the possibilities of the State of New York to impose taxes on cigarette sales on reservations, which has generated significant conflicts. However, the tribe's immunity prevented the State from suing Native Americans who refused to pay the tax.
Even when the State sought to adopt drastic measures to achieve tax payment, such as intercepting and seizing cigarette shipments destined for indigenous reservations, the Native Americans resisted, engaging in acts of violence and civil disturbances on the New York highways, which—and this is inferred from the entirety of this resolution—led to a policy of tolerance regarding the payment of tax on cigarettes sold on reservations. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals is clear and categorical in establishing that the regulation contained in New York Tax Law 471 always remained in force. For the Court, the policy of tolerance in no way signaled the State of New York's choice not to apply its tax laws, but rather presented a concession by the State, besieged by the difficult and dangerous application of state law, given the complex jurisdictional and political problems surrounding cigarette sales on reservations, and how volatile smuggling prosecutions would prove to be" (cfr. folios 888 et seq.).
That is, it is not attributed to him (only) that he sold cigarettes and did not pay taxes on the sales, but rather that he obtained cigarette shipments without having the seal (prior to those sales) showing that, in turn, the distributors had paid the prior taxes. This means that, for dual criminality purposes, we are not talking about what in our system would be sales tax evasion, but rather about coming into possession of the object, without the payment, prior to the subsequent sale, of taxes. It is the equivalent, in our jurisdiction, of import or customs duties. That conduct is provided for, in Costa Rica, in a special law that, therefore, prevails over that general regulation, even if it concurs with other tax transgressions referring to sales tax. This is the Ley General de Aduanas No. 7557 of October 20, 1995 (published in La Gaceta 212 of November 8, 1995, and in force on the date of the charged acts) which establishes: "ARTICLE 1.- Scope of application.
This law regulates the entries into and exits from the national territory of goods, vehicles, and transport units; also, customs clearance and the facts and acts derived from it or from the entries and exits, in accordance with community and international standards, the application of which is the responsibility of the Servicio Nacional de Aduanas" (boldface supplied), adding numeral 223: "Relationship with crimes defined in other tax regulations. If the conducts defined in this law also constitute a crime or a violation established in tax legislation, the special provisions of this law shall apply, provided that those conducts relate to the breach of customs tax obligations or duties before the customs authority" (emphasis is external). This regulation established customs crimes: initially, from its entry into force in 1995 until 2003, and subsequently from that date, when a reform occurred, until now.
Since the accused here was improperly attributed with receiving money from his brother, from the year 2002 onward, which has already been said to be an atypical conduct since the capital arose from alleged crimes unrelated to drug trafficking, one must again take into account the legislative changes carried out in customs legislation. Thus, in 2002 until 2003, the original Ley General de Aduanas was applicable, and from that date until 2007 (when the cycle of charged acts closes), the regulation currently in force would govern. The first regulatory version (applicable for the period January 2002–August 2003) stated: "ARTICLE 214.- Basic crime. Shall be punished with imprisonment from one to three years and a fine equivalent to twice the amount of the uncollected taxes, with their interest and surcharges, whoever, through simulation, maneuver, or any other form of deception, totally or partially eludes or evades the payment of the customs tax obligation, provided that the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos.
ARTICLE 215.- Specific cases of customs tax fraud. Shall incur the penalties indicated in the preceding article, provided that the customs value of the goods exceeds five thousand Central American pesos: a) Whoever, without authorization from the competent body, gives a purpose different from that provided in the authorizing regulation to goods benefited with exemption or franchise or that have entered free of taxes. b) Whoever, using or declaring false information, requests or obtains preferential customs treatment. [Nombre7]) Whoever, using or declaring false information, justifies compliance with their duties, obligations, or requirements in their capacity as beneficiary or user of a customs regime or modality, to request or obtain preferential customs treatment. d) Whoever totally or partially simulates an export or import operation of goods or alters the description of some, with the aim of illicitly obtaining a customs incentive or an economic benefit. e) The official, public employee, or public attestation officer who falsely certifies or records that a tax was totally or partially satisfied.
ARTICLE 216.- Aggravating circumstances. The penalty shall be from three to five years and the fine equivalent to three times the amount of the uncollected taxes, with their interest and surcharges, when, in any of the two preceding articles, any of the following circumstances concur: a) Three or more persons participate in the act, as perpetrators. b) A public official participates as perpetrator, instigator, or accomplice, in the exercise of their functions, on the occasion thereof, or through abuse of their position" (the boldface does not belong to the original text). But Article 1 of Law No. 8373 of August 18, 2003, amended that regulation, so the law in force in the other period of charged acts (August 2003 to 2007) was worded in these terms: "Article 214.— Customs tax fraud. Whoever, using cunning, deception, or trickery, simulation of false facts, or distortion or concealment of true facts, used to obtain a pecuniary benefit for themselves or a third party, totally or partially eludes or evades the payment of taxes, shall be sanctioned with a fine of twice the amount of the uncollected taxes plus their interest and a prison sentence, in accordance with the following: a) From six months to three years, when the amount of uncollected taxes exceeds five thousand Central American pesos and does not exceed fifteen thousand Central American pesos. b) From one to five years, when the amount of uncollected taxes exceeds fifteen thousand Central American pesos.
The amount of uncollected taxes shall be determined in court through expert assistance, in accordance with applicable regulations. Article 216. —Aggravating circumstances. The penalty shall be from five to nine years of imprisonment and a fine equivalent to twice the amount of the uncollected taxes plus their interest, when in any of the circumstances set forth in Article 214 of this Law, at least one of the following conducts or situations concurs: a) Two or more persons participate in the criminal act as perpetrators. b) A public official or an auxiliary of the public customs function participates as perpetrator, accomplice, or instigator, in the exercise of their functions, on the occasion thereof, or through abuse of their position. [Nombre7]) Natural or legal persons that are non-existent are listed as consignees in the documents relating to the clearance of goods. d) The act is perpetrated, facilitated, or its discovery prevented through the use of violence or intimidation.
Article 220 bis. —Falsity of the customs declaration and other customs-type crimes. Shall be punished with imprisonment from two months to three years: a) Whoever introduces goods into the national customs territory by means of a false declaration related to the regime, classification, quality, value, weight, quantity, and/or measurement of such goods, or by means of a lower payment of taxes than those to which they were legally obligated, or both. b) Whoever clandestinely brings in goods in transit, without paying the corresponding taxes. [Nombre7]) Whoever transports, stores, acquires, sells, donates, conceals, uses, gives or receives on deposit, destroys, or transforms goods introduced into the country evading customs control. d) Whoever substitutes goods from the customs warehouse, transport units, transient parking areas, or port zones." Note that under none of those laws, the former or the latter, and under none of the simple criminal modalities, would the requirement of a serious prior crime be met because, in our law, at the date of the charged acts, none of those conducts carried an abstract minimum penalty of four years.
The only exception is the aggravated conduct set forth in numeral 216 of the latter cited customs legislation, but dual criminality under that criminal type could not be established because [Nombre7] was accused and sentenced for an individual activity, without it being proven that he acted jointly, with violence, or using non-existent legal entities. Rather, when he was so accused, he was definitively acquitted, a judgment that is the only one that has value, as in our legal system, dismissed conducts cannot be contemplated for punitive purposes of other crimes. To continue with the chain of omissions, both evidentiary and analytical, the Trial Court also failed to consider, when analyzing the issue of dual criminality (even under the regulation it used), the matter of the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution in these crimes, which was necessary because, as already noted, the validity of the criminal action is inherent to dual criminality: “In the opinion of a sector of doctrine, the expiration of the statute of limitations for the prior act from which the assets originate causes the break in the connection between the asset and the act that originates it.
At the moment a crime can no longer be prosecuted due to its statute of limitations, all assets originating from it will be decontaminated. It is not reasonable, it is argued, to prolong the criminal origin beyond the period in which the crime is prosecutable. It is not correct to sanction a person for the laundering of assets originating from a crime already barred by the statute of limitations, whose perpetrators cannot be criminally sanctioned. Otherwise, there would be a disproportionate extension of the time during which the assets have a tainted character, so that, if no limit is set, such as the statute of limitations for the prior crime, they would continue to maintain that character indefinitely” (Cfr. [Nombre23], . El delito de blanqueo de capitales. Aranzadi, Spain, 2012, pp. 428-429). And, regarding that issue, tax legislation has special rules, different from those of the rest of ordinary procedural legislation.
Thus, in the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (legislation under which the Trial Court established dual criminality), the statute of limitations period for criminal prosecution is set at three years in most cases and five years if the case is based on false data in tax returns, adding: Article 52.- Computation of terms. The prescription term must be counted from January first of the calendar year following that in which the tax must be paid. (...) Article 91.— Prescription rules. The prescription of tax crimes shall be governed by the general provisions of the Código Penal and those of the Código Procesal Penal. (Ref. by Law 7900 of August 3, 1999)” (the emphasis does not belong to the original text). On the other hand, in the Ley General de Aduanas, the statute of limitations period for criminal prosecution is four years, according to numeral 62. From this perspective, if [Nombre26] was arrested on August 2, 2004, and is attributed with sending money to [Nombre7] from long before (even if the latter used it later), the analysis of each monetary flow and the annual evaded amount was essential, for the purposes of both objective criminality and the validity of the criminal action according to the computation of the statute of limitations periods, none of which was done in the trial ruling nor, given the lack of annual accounting data, can be done now.
It has also been said that no evidence was provided regarding the legal rules of punishment, much less those of the statute of limitations, for that event in North America. That alone would be enough, even under the first typical framework used by the Trial Court—which was said to be incorrect—to resolve the merits of the matter, which, with greater reason, can be done with the other framework referred to. In short, without further analysis and accepting, inclusive, the proven facts and the evidentiary and legal analysis carried out in the trial judgment (which, it is insisted, is not entirely correct and, much less, complete), there would be no objective criminality, and this implies that the appeals must be granted and the accused acquitted from this instance, since a remand would lead nowhere, given that the foregoing arises from a legal analysis and absence of evidence that cannot be introduced at this procedural stage.
§3. Subjective elements of the offense: On the other hand, when numeral 69 of the Law on Psychotropic Substances, applicable to the facts, stated: "Shall be punished with a prison sentence of eight to twenty years: a) Whoever acquires, converts, or transfers assets of economic interest, knowing that they originate from a serious crime, or performs any other act to conceal or cover up the illicit origin or to help the person who has participated in the offenses to evade the legal consequences of their acts. b) Whoever conceals or covers up the true nature, origin, location, destination, movement, or rights over the assets or their property, knowing that they come, directly or indirectly, from a serious crime. The penalty shall be ten to twenty years of imprisonment when the assets of economic interest originate from one of the crimes related to illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances, money laundering (legitimación de capitales), diversion of precursors or essential chemical substances, and related crimes" (emphasis added), it was requiring direct intent of the first degree.
It is known that there are three types of intent (dolo): direct of the first degree; indirect or direct of the second degree, also known as of necessary consequences, and eventual intent. In principle, any intentional act can be committed by any of these forms of intent, unless the legislation expressly establishes the contrary. Thus, the legislative use of the forms 'knowingly' ('a sabiendas') or 'knowing' ('sabiendo') implies that direct intent is required: "When the legislator uses expressions such as 'a sabiendas' they accentuate the cognitive side of intent and imply, regarding the specific element for which they require direct intent of the second degree (sic), they renounce punishment for eventual intent. Articles 69 of the Law on Psychotropic Substances (...) require 'the knowledge' that the object of economic interest comes from a specific crime (...) It is sufficient that the agent knows the factual circumstances that characterize the prior act.
It is not necessary that they know the particularities of the prior act…" (CASTILLO [Name5], . El delito de legitimación de capitales. Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, 2012, 1st edition, pp. 125-126, bold text supplemented). In the opinion of this Chamber, there may be some confusion in the text transcribed above in the denomination of that emphasis on the 'knowledge' element (since it is indicated that it is direct intent of the second degree, when it is of the first, because the second degree is the so-called 'intent of necessary consequences' where knowledge is not so important, but rather will predominates, cf. [Name27], . El dolo. Editorial Juritexto. San José, 1999, pp. 268-270). Despite this terminological difference, this Chamber agrees with said author, and with an important doctrinal sector cited in previous references, that the expression excludes other forms of intent (e.g., eventual) and admits only the direct form which, definitively, is not a mere suspicion: "…the cognitive element of intent (dolo) is not a mere suspicion about the concurrence of the objective elements of the offense, nor, at the opposite pole, does it require certainty regarding this (…) It is not, therefore, necessary to describe intent (dolo) (…) to resort to statements incompatible with legal certainty and with the criminal law concept of intent, such as the very frequent one in doctrine and jurisprudence that knowledge that the assets 'proceed from a criminal activity in a generic way' is sufficient, as if our criminal law were based on the author and not on the act (…) the intent in the crime of money laundering always targets crimes and not generic criminal activities" (Cf. [Name1], .
Reflexiones técnicas y de política criminal sobre el delito de lavado de capitales. Cuadernos de Política Criminal No. 91, 2007, pp. 5-26. Also on the following website: www.revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpen/article/.../98, pp. 76-77). With this caveat, the doctrine indicates that, because it is a normative element, this intent (dolo) has two substrates, one factual and one evaluative: "The factual substrate is comprised of the constitutive acts of a criminal activity. The perpetrator must know those factual circumstances perceptible by the senses, which must serve as a basis for evaluating their criminal nature. This involves, as with the descriptive elements of the offense, knowledge of the circumstances of fact (…) The perpetrator of the crime of money laundering must carry out an evaluation of the facts they have perceived. From such an evaluation, it must be derived that such facts constitute criminal conduct" (Cf. [Name23], .
El delito de blanqueo de capitales. Aranzadi, Spain, 2012, pp. 660-661). This is important because, from the factual substrate, the activity carried out by [Name7] in the United States, of selling tobacco without taxes to non-indigenous people, was done publicly, advertising through an internet page, with deliveries to various parts of the Union through that country's postal service, there were multiple businesses of that same line in the same indigenous reservation, and no person had even been prosecuted for such activity, as is unanimously evident from the oral evidence received at trial. Ergo, from the factual substrate, [Name7], who had gone to work with [Name4] in that business, had no element whatsoever even to doubt that a criminal activity was being carried out, especially since the remittances were sent through banks, both from the United States and from a state bank in Costa Rica, which involve important controls to prevent the movement of illicit money.
From the evaluative substrate, no additional data arise either, since if the original activity was apparently lawful, there was no reason to question its illegality. On the other hand, the doctrine insists that this intent (dolo) must be present at the moment of acquiring the asset, that is, it must be current, without it being sufficient that it exists at other moments: "The perpetrator must know the origin of the object at the moment of its obtention. Subsequent knowledge ('dolus subsequens') is not criminally relevant ('dolus subsequens non nocet') nor does it generate a guarantor position, pursuant to article 18 of the Penal Code. The acquisition of the object without knowing its illicit origin implies an acquisition of possession in good faith, which excludes the crime of money laundering (legitimación de capitales) (...) they are not permanent crimes" (CASTILLO [Name5], . El delito de legitimación de capitales.
Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, 2012, 1st edition, pp. 125-126, bold text supplemented). "The intent (dolo) must be antecedent or concurrent with the action. Subsequent intent is irrelevant…" (CALDERÓN [Name28], . El marco jurídico del blanqueo de capitales: aspectos penales y administrativos. At the following electronic address: http://www.datadiar.com/actual/novedades_05/penal/blanqueo/d_may_02c.htm). "The intent (dolo) must exist during the performance of the conduct, that is, during its execution. Therefore, dolus antecedens, that is, intent prior to the commission, is not sufficient (…) like dolus antecedens, it is accepted that dolus subsequens or intent subsequent to the act, is not intent in the sense of Criminal Law. From the requirement that the knowledge corresponding to intent be current, it follows that knowledge subsequent to the performance of the conduct has no criminal-legal consequence (…) This is a mention expressly included in the Vienna Convention of 1988 which, in its article 3.c).i), refers to 'the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property proceeds from some or some of the typified crimes…' The same reference is contained in the Palermo Conventions (art. 6.1.b.i) (…) It is irrelevant from the criminal point of view if the knowledge of the criminal origin of the assets is obtained after the performance of the money laundering actions.
The principle dolus superveniens non nocet has full force (…)" (Cf. [Name23], . El delito de blanqueo de capitales. Aranzadi, Spain, 2012, pp. 662-663). Therefore, it is not acceptable that the Trial Court stated: "Although in fact five of the accusation, the Public Prosecutor's Office includes the remittance from [Name8]'s account from the United States of the sum of Sixteen million seven hundred ninety-three thousand nine hundred eighty dollars, to the dollar savings account at the Banco de Costa Rica of [Name7]. These remittances, as can be seen in Appendix No. 4 of Report No. 212-DEF-R-140-11 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Section of the O.I.J., began in October of the year two thousand and extended without any interruption during the years two thousand one, two thousand two, two thousand three until March 19, 2004. It must be taken into account that on that date, [Name4] had not been arrested in the United States, on the charge of cigarette smuggling, and therefore it could not be affirmed with certainty that his brother [Name7] knew the illegality of that business that generated -in its entirety- the funds remitted to the Banco de Costa Rica.
Because knowledge about the illicit origin of the laundered funds is necessary for the purposes of the elements of the crime (tipicidad), the Court should have considered that the knowledge in relation to these money remittances arose from the arrest of [Name4] in New York, on August 2, 2004, so only one deposit, the one made on the sixth of August of that same year and received in [Name7]'s account, can be considered tainted by the knowledge of the illegality of its origin. It should be commented, as it is of interest at this point, that this last deposit has different conditions in relation to all the previous deposits that can be seen in the cited Appendix 3, namely: the amount of four million four hundred thousand dollars far exceeds the previous ones whose figures usually range between two hundred and three hundred thousand dollars - with the exception of a deposit made by the fund operator Lloyd of two million five hundred thousand dollars in November two thousand two - and represents a quarter of all deposits made over three years and ten months into that savings account.
It differs from the preceding deposits in that the money is not sent by [Name8], but by TMG RAMSR Partners. The explanation for this change in the sender arises from the temporality of the deposit, four days after the illicit nature of his commercial activity carried out through [Name8] becomes 'official' with the arrest of [Name4]. However, the identity of [Name4] is also present in this deposit, because his initials RAMSr., which according to the witness [Name25] were imposed by [Name4] on all his belongings and businesses to identify them with him, are in the name of the depositor, so it cannot be denied that its origin is related to [Name4] and his illicit activity, known at that moment by the accused [Name7]. The Court also considers that at the time of redeeming the funds deposited by [Name4] in the Banco de Costa Rica, ten days after the arrest of [Name4], the accused [Name7] knows the origin of the funds and under that knowledge agrees to erase all trace of his brother's investments and banking activity in the Banco de Costa Rica, because as indicated in Report No. 212-DEF-R-140-11 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Section of the O.I.J., and can be seen on folio 356 verso of the main file, even the sum of five thousand eight hundred dollars deposited in an account of [Name4] were deposited, together with the fund for ten million three hundred fifty thousand two hundred forty-eight dollars into [Name7]'s savings account to then constitute a new Growth Fund in dollars in the name of [Name7] at the Banco de Costa Rica.
It must therefore be concluded that all the funds sent by [Name4] to his account and which constituted the money of the Fund in whose redemption both [Name26] and [Name7] participated, and the four million four hundred thousand dollars that were sent after the arrest of [Name4] came from the illicit activity of cigarette smuggling by [Name4], a situation that was known to [Name7] at the time of receiving and maintaining those funds in his account and participating in the redemption of the Growth Fund in dollars of the Banco de Costa Rica" (cf. folios 938-939, emphasis added). Note that although the trial judges initially stated that it could not be considered that the accused knew that all the money he received from his brother, before his arrest in the United States, came from a crime, immediately afterward they make the knowledge of the intent (dolo) arise, no longer in the acquisition but in the maintenance, in his account, of those remittances, by the redemption of the Fund and in the subsequent investments, meaning that although the accused, upon receiving the money, did not have intent (knowledge of the originating crime), he later acquired said knowledge and it is for this supervening circumstance that they make the reproach, stated thus, retroactively, which is nothing other than applying the theme of subsequent intent (dolo subsecuente) which, as stated above, is not acceptable.
It is true that the commented article establishes: "a) Whoever acquires, converts, or transfers assets of economic interest, knowing that they originate from a serious crime, or performs any other act to conceal or cover up the illicit origin or to help the person who has participated in the offenses to evade the legal consequences of their acts. b) Whoever conceals or covers up the true nature, origin, location, destination, movement, or rights over the assets or their property, knowing that they come, directly or indirectly, from a serious crime..." so it could be said that the intent (dolo) can be at three moments: that of acquisition, that of conversion, and that of transmission, and that, in this matter, the trial judges considered that, for one sum, it existed from the acquisition (since it was transferred after the arrest of [Name4]) and, for the remaining sums, from the conversion and transmission.
However, the actions cannot be artificially split because, as has been shown with the cited dogmatics, the international instruments from which these three moments arise are emphatic in requiring that the active subject's knowledge be at the moment of receiving the assets, not at the remaining moments. Thus, in the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (approved by the UN at the session held on December 19, 1988, in Vienna, Austria, and ratified by Costa Rica in 1990), article 3.1.c.i provides: "Article 3 OFFENCES AND SANCTIONS. 1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally: c) Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system: i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such offence or offences" (emphasis added).
In the same sense, the Palermo Convention states: "Article 6. Criminalization of the laundering of proceeds of crime 1. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: b) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system: i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime" (bold text supplemented). It has already been said that this instrument is not applicable here, being a later law, but it is mentioned for the purpose of evidencing how, despite being extremely broad in its regulations, it limits the intent, of subsequent possession, to it having been present at the moment of receiving the asset or object, therefore both regulations become interpretive limits of the law enacted as a result of the subscription of that international obligation.
Ergo, the three verbs allude to acts where there is initial intent (dolo) at the reception, without it being possible for an act carried out without intent, without knowledge or will to commit the objective elements of the offense, that is, in good faith, to later become an illicit act by the mere passage of time, since, in such cases, the conversion and transmission are acts inherent to the exercise of the rights of ownership and possession (originally in good faith). In other words, it would be a legal absurdity to consider that if the person received in good faith, without intent, and subsequently comes to know the illicit nature of the act from which the money came, they are required either to hand over the thing to the State or not to perform any possessory act with it. Now, this would lead to making a differentiation (both for the purposes of the objective elements of the offense and intent, as well as for those of confiscation) between the monies received by [Name7] before his brother's arrest (received without intent, and therefore, not constituting the criminal offense that concerns us) from that received after.
That is, it would be necessary to establish the total amount received by the accused. From this, subtract what was received before January 10, 2002 (when there was no objective criminality (tipicidad) for the act). From what remains, subtract what was received before August 2, 2004 (date of [Name4]'s arrest in the United States, which the Court sets as the date from which the intent (dolo) arises), sums that were received without intent by the accused and, therefore not susceptible, from the subjective criminality, of being criminal. From what remains, that is, approximately four million dollars, one would have to extract, for each annual period (for the purposes of double tax incrimination), what was left unpaid in taxes because only this (and not the rest of the profit) is what would constitute the crime. That resulting sum would have to be demonstrated in what periods it was obtained, to see if it is possible to make the adaptation to the objective elements of the offense in Costa Rica, obviously without taking into account interest or other profits generated in the country, but only the resulting original amount.
None of this was done, and an approach was chosen to refer, in bulk, to all the money, its interest, and the rest, both for the purposes of the conviction and, subsequently, the general confiscation. To do the latter, the Court (ignoring the anachronism it incurs by indicating that the paragraph it will apply, from Law No. 8204, has its inspiration in numeral 6 of the Palermo Convention, see folio 940, when it has already been seen that the law applicable to this matter is that of 2002 and that this Convention, although adopted at the United Nations in the year 2000, was not ratified by the country until 2003) opts to indicate that it is not those first verbs that apply but rather: "The accused facts, in the Court's opinion, do not fit the first part of the cited article 69 'Whoever acquires, converts or transfers assets of economic interest (...)' but rather in what reads 'or whoever performs any other act to cover up the illicit origin or to help the person who has participated in the offenses to evade the legal consequences of their acts (knowing that these originate from a serious crime)' (...) we will proceed to decompose the criminal offense (...) with the intention of relating each part of the offense to the accused's conduct and the circumstances of the case (...) Analysis of the Objective Elements of the Offense (Tipicidad Objetiva).
Article 69 first paragraph: '(...) whoever performs any other act to cover up the illicit origin or to help the person who has participated in the offenses to evade the legal consequences of their acts.' A.- Whoever performs any other act.- The verb that defines the typical action is to perform any other act, in allusion to the fact that it is not the actions 'acquire, convert or transfer' that precede this part of the first paragraph of article 69. The Court opts for this verbal form because the conducts of Mr. [Name7], which have been taken as proven in the corresponding section of this judgment, are not contained in those verbal forms, but are rather of a banking nature in some cases and in others are dispositive acts from those monies received through transnational banking operations. The analysis of the acts performed must begin with the first ones that occurred chronologically. i.- Receive and maintain in his dollar account No. 230-0042636-9 at the Banco de Costa Rica money coming from the illicit cigarette trade of [Name4] in the Indigenous Reservation of […].
On August 6, 2004, a transfer was sent from the United States from TGM RAMSr Partners, for the sum of four million four hundred thousand dollars to the aforementioned account, and Mr. [Name7] received and kept them deposited in his name, knowing that they came from the criminal activity for which his brother had been arrested four days earlier in New York. ii.- The Redemption of the Growth Fund in Dollars and subsequent operations. Five days after the aforementioned deposit was received in Mr. [Name7]'s account, that is on August eleventh, two thousand four, [Name4] sends to '[Name29]' his trusted executive at the Banco de Costa Rica, who turns out to be the defense witness [Name29], the document that can be seen on folio 28 of the Main File, where he authorizes him to transfer all, in capital letters, bold and underlined, the funds from his investment account, and indicates that if he has any doubt, he should contact [Name7]'s mobile phone, whose number is included in the communication.
In this concise manifestation of will by [Name4], the urgency and imminent risk in which the permanence of that money in his patrimony and without restrictions finds itself is observed, a situation to which his brother [Name7] responds efficiently, quickly, and faithfully, who one day later, on August twelfth, sends a communication to Licentiate [Name29], who had managed up to that moment [Name4]'s investments and his own at the Banco de Costa Rica, for the redemption of those funds and their deposit into Mr. [Name7]'s dollar savings account, which is scrupulously fulfilled by the Bank. Once the more than ten million dollars were deposited into his account, Mr. [Name7] constitutes another growth fund -this time in his own name- for the indicated sum, to which five thousand eight hundred dollars that still remained deposited in [Name4]'s savings account at Banco de Costa Rica were added, so that [Name4]'s design that no money remained in his name at the Banco de Costa Rica and therefore liable to be frozen by the federal authorities who had arrested him nine days earlier in New York was fulfilled. iii.- Purchase of properties and movable assets.- In Dossier 1 of the evidence offered by the Public Prosecutor's Office, all the notarial and registry information concerning the transactions by virtue of which, from the year two thousand seven until November two thousand ten, Mr. [Name7] in his personal capacity or in the name of the company [Name7] del Caribe S.A. in which he had a majority participation, acquired movable and immovable assets with the money sent by [Name4] is included.
The Report of the Economic and Financial Crimes Section of the O.I.J. No. 212-DEF-R-140-11, from folio 343 to folio 346 verso of the Main Dossier of this case, describes all the real estate that was acquired by [Name7], who appears in his personal capacity and takes ownership of those assets, and in the section of the study dedicated to the company H, constituted by Mr. [Name7] and his wife [Name30], it is indicated that this company bought five properties in the Province of Limón. Regarding the value of those acquisitions, the aforementioned Expert Opinion records that the value of the real estate amounts to the astronomical sum of one billion nine hundred eighty-two million six hundred fifty-three thousand seven hundred fifty-six colones. Regarding the movable assets, their description and notarial and registry information can be seen in Evidence Dossier one and in the Report of the Economic and Financial Crimes Section, in Annexes No. 1 and No. 2 the description of these assets is recorded, and their value is set at the sum of one hundred sixty-five million seven hundred forty thousand colones, those of the first annex, and in the second annex concerning vessels, a value of Sixty-four million two hundred eighty thousand two hundred fifty-one colones is recorded, which total two hundred thirty million twenty thousand two hundred fifty-one colones.
It must be mentioned that the time during which the acquisition of real estate was made, between 2007 and 2010, is not casual, but rather must be related to the situation of the judicial process followed by the federal criminal authorities of the United States, because according to what the witness D Federal Prosecutor in that case said, the Trial against [Name4] began in the year two thousand seven, in October, and lasted until May 2008, and the properties began to be bought in July 2007. The Court concludes from this temporal proximity between the trial and the real estate acquisitions that the change in [Name4]'s procedural situation, which leads him to face a federal trial, imposes on him the need not to limit the concealment to banking operations but to diversify through real estate investment to distance [Name4]'s patrimony even further from its illicit origin, it is a laundering, -so to speak- of a second degree, in which the laundered money is converted into properties, with which the trace of the money is diluted, as it is no longer only in the Banco de Costa Rica but in various real estate investments" (cf. folios 940 to 942; bold text does not belong to the original text).
But, even if what is attributed to him is having kept those monies in his power, redeeming the funds, and then making the investments, it turns out that the intent (dolo) had to be at the moment of receiving the money, since that is what the different conventional instruments, even later ones and of broader scope than the legislation applicable to this matter, privilege, as has been indicated, even if it is not the acquisition that is punished, but the subsequent acts. It is also evident that there is no evidence whatsoever in the record that allows establishing, neither in this instance nor through a referral, those items nor distinguishing them from the amounts received before the double incrimination existed (to also weigh the issue of the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution) so as to make a differentiation between one and the other, but rather this would require a new investigation or the production of new evidence which, as will be said, is not possible.
Now, without dwelling on those evidentiary problems referring to the sum received by the accused after his brother's arrest (regarding which, it is insisted, it is not determined what portion of it, if all or not, comes from tax evasion and which part, from the lawful profits of such activity), it turns out that the construction of the knowledge of the intent (dolo) from the fact of that arrest is also not something that this Chamber endorses. Note that the prior act with a causal relationship (the sale of cigarettes; not the possession of a weapon which has no relationship with the capital or the facts for which he was acquitted) was an element that was even widely discussed and controversial within the U.S. justice system itself, to the point that a judge of that country dismissed the charges, citing the ambiguity of the laws applied and the possibility that [Name4] was unaware of the illicit nature of what he was doing.
That is, the dismissal of charges by a judge was based on the possibility that [Name4] incurred what, in our system, would be the equivalent of an invincible mistake of law. Although that decision was later reversed by another [Name30] jurist [Name30], it is important, for the purposes of the mistake of fact alleged by the defense, in this specific case because... if in the eyes of a U.S. jurisdictional authority, with broad knowledge of that country's laws, it was reasonable for [Name4] to doubt about the tax issue of the matter in question (sale of cigarettes in the indigenous reservation to which his wife belonged)... is it not more valid that [Name4] himself, a man not versed in law, who had gone to the United States and worked in the commercial premises, which was open to the public and widely advertised in that country through mass media including the internet and whose tobacco cigarettes were sent even using that country's postal service, doubted about it?
Was it not more expected that [Name7], who had been receiving money from his brother for more than four years (as of August 2, 2004), doubted whether the proceeds of that subsequent sum were lawful or not?
It is true that, as the trial court's judgment correctly states, quoting a foreign author: "'In any case, the use of the banking and financial system to recycle the profits obtained from various criminal activities has been a widespread and unpunished practice for many years, practically throughout the world. Based on a certain complicity of the financial system, said system has been used to transform capital of illicit origin, derived from the commission of serious crimes, into money free of suspicion. Without a doubt, none of this would have been possible if banking entities and financial intermediaries had exercised a little diligence and collaboration, detecting transactions of unclear origin. But some financial entities have decided to ignore the illicit origin of the capital, insofar as they obtained significant economic benefits. The free movement of capital in Europe obliges improved inspections of said capital at origin, without this intervention policy being interpreted as an obstacle to its free circulation.
For this reason, successive directives regulating banking, credit, and professional activities that affect the transformation of capital and goods have been successively approved.' [Name31], , op. cit. p. 168. Contrary to the idea that exists in common knowledge, that the remittance of funds through banking channels inherently excludes the crime of Money Laundering (Legitimación de Capitales), as has occurred in the case under review, banking and financial entities can be used to launder money, so that they can actively contribute to producing the harmful results of this criminal activity in the socioeconomic order" (cf. folios 932-933, emphasis supplied). However, although the banking system may and has been used in other cases and in different latitudes for money laundering purposes, it is clear that this element must be weighed, together with others, to extract criminal intent (dolo), since it is not the same for someone who sends a transfer of money covertly ("in bags," as the appellant states) as for someone who does so using banking institutions of two countries, both of which stand out, although one more than the other, for their not insignificant controls over monetary origins.
Nor should the evidence be treated in the same way if the generating activity is illicit per se (goods obtained from drug trafficking, for example) as if it comes from tax evasion where there is a lawful origin of the money, although the payment of taxes is subsequently omitted. Therefore, if in the specific case, [Name7] had been transferring sums of money for years (sometimes for several million dollars, as reviewed earlier in a transfer for more than two million, prior to the four million dollar transfer of interest) using U.S. and national banks, to which he reported the origin of those funds to the point that, in Costa Rica, banking authorities went to make a visit to the aforementioned business, confirming its existence and the publicity of its operations, that is important to consider for the purposes of the criminal intent (dolo) charged here...could the arrest of his brother have changed his conception?
In the opinion of this Chamber, no, because that arrest occurred attributing a series of charges to him (homicide, arson, extortion, possession of a weapon) that had no direct relation to the origin of those funds. This on one hand but, on the other, as the appellants correctly state, for this type of relational crimes it was necessary that, for having initiated a proceeding in that country, said proceeding had concluded with a final conviction (sentencia condenatoria firme) to generate knowledge, which is not potential or probable, but must be certain and current. Thus, this Court asks...what would have happened if the trial of [Name7] had taken place in parallel, or immediately after, the moment when the U.S. judge [Name14] excluded the smuggling charges against [Name7] and before the decision of the Court of Appeals? Had this been done, that element would have generated a reasonable probability of doubt regarding the accused's criminal intent (dolo).
Moreover...if [Name7] had been acquitted in the United States for those acts, could the judgment's statement that his arrest was sufficient for [Name7] to know the illicit nature of his acts be maintained? It is obvious that it could not. What is meant is that, depending on the stages of the U.S. proceeding at which this was carried out, the answer to the question regarding the criminal intent (dolo) of the defendant here would have been different, which is neither reasonable nor acceptable. It is not legitimate, consequently, to give a variable solution, depending on the stages of a foreign proceeding, to the same issue (whether there is criminal intent on the part of the accused). That invalidates the "inference" of criminal intent (dolo) that the Court makes from a procedural act (the arrest of [Name7]) when he was acquitted of the majority of the charges; convicted of one without causal significance for the flow of money and with another whose case was widely discussed in that country, before jurisdictional authorities that, inclusively, came to exonerate him, temporarily, from responsibility.
Therefore, the allegation of error made by the defense is valid when considering a joint series of situations: a)- the transfer over years; b)- the use of banking institutions of both countries; [Name7])- the declaration of the origin of the goods; d)- the lack of prior prosecution of any person for such acts in the United States, [Name7] being the first sentenced for such conduct; e)- the public and publicized activity of his company; f)- the type of business line, sale of tobacco cigarettes, which is not an activity, per se, illicit. For this Court, based on all these elements, the accused [Name7] had no reason to know that the money came from a serious crime (which, we have already seen, was not such) and, even if his error (error) was avoidable (vencible), there is no parallel regulation for negligent acts of that nature in our system, so that, being, effectively, as the defender indicates, an error regarding the elements of the offense (error de tipo) and not one of prohibition (error de prohibición), the exclusion of criminal intent (dolo) made his conduct atypical: "The ignorance or defective knowledge of some fact constituting the criminal offense excludes criminal intent (dolo), and gives rise to an error regarding the elements of the offense (error de tipo).
In the crime of money laundering, the exclusion of criminal intent (dolo) can occur as a consequence of ignorance or defective knowledge of the typical action or the material object (…) More problematic is the issue relating to ignorance that falls on the material object, fundamentally because the criminal regulations relating to money laundering use normative elements in the definition of the offense (tipo) to describe the suitable objects (…) legal doctrine does not consider it sufficient, for the purposes of typical criminal intent (dolo típico), to know the data configuring the factual circumstances of the normative element. It is required that the author makes a parallel assessment in the layperson's sphere that allows him to understand the content of the social meaning of the circumstances" (Cf. [Name23], . El delito de blanqueo de capitales. Aranzadi, Spain, 2012, pp. 763 and 765).
It must be clarified, on this topic, that the trial court assessed this allegation as if it were an error of prohibition (error de prohibición), when stating: "...the technical defense of Mr. [Name7] argued that he acted under an error of prohibition because he had no way of knowing that the money sent was related to an illicit activity. The Court cannot admit this argument of the Defense because, in accordance with the provisions of Article 35 of the Penal Code, error of law (error de derecho) supposes that the author of the conduct believes -by virtue of an invincible error (error invencible)- that the act he performs is not subject to penalty. In this case, after the arrest of [Name7] in the United States, on August second, two thousand four, his brother [Name7] does not act -by participating in the redemption of the Growth Fund and the constitution of a new one in his name and by maintaining in his dollar savings accounts sums of money in the millions of dollars- being a victim of an invincible error, because he knows that the conduct different from that which [Name7] had been carrying out -depositing the illicit money from the account of [Name8] and maintaining the dollar Growth Fund in his name at the Banco de Costa Rica- changes as of August sixth and the only origin of the change is the arrest of [Name7] under various criminal charges, among which is cigarette smuggling, whereby Mr. [Name7] acquires the certainty -which excludes invincible error- that all the money remitted from New York is linked to the illicit activity to the detriment of U.S. justice and that the acts subsequent to that knowledge have the purpose of removing from possible immobilization and/or seizure by those authorities, the money derived from the aforementioned crime that was not paid to the U.S. treasury, which stopped receiving millions in sums for the taxes that were not collected by [Name7] in his business, as witnesses [Name8] and [Name16] said in the Trial.
As a consequence of the reasoning set forth, it is concluded that Mr. [Name7] did not act under an invincible error in the terms of Article 35 of the Penal Code- because the origin of the money is undoubtedly revealed as illicit, for Mr. [Name7], from the arrest of [Name7] on August 2, 2004, in the United States" (cf. folios 939-940, emphases supplied). Note that, on one hand, reference is made, again, to subsequent criminal intent (dolo subsecuente): not for the receipt but for maintaining the money and making the redemption of the Fund, which, additionally, was being nourished with funds that, we already said, did not arise from an activity that generated dual criminality until a date (2002) or the same trial court affirmed were received without criminal intent (dolo) until another date (August 2, 2004) and that, definitively, the tax quota left unpaid is not recorded. But, most relevantly, the Court assumed that the allegation concerned an error of prohibition (error de prohibición), which is an erroneous reasoning because what was alleged was that [Name7] did not know that the money came from a 'serious crime' (delito grave) and, this being a normative concept of the definition of the offense (tipo), ignorance of an objective element of the definition of the offense (tipo) was being alleged and, therefore, the allegation effectively corresponded to an error regarding the elements of the offense (error de tipo), where the consequences regarding the avoidability (vencibilidad), or not, of the error, we well know, are different.
In any case, it is appropriate to reiterate the position that this Chamber, with an integration partially similar to the current one (Chinchilla, [Name32] and [Name33]) has outlined in similar cases, where the criminal definition of the offense (tipo penal) is constructed by the legislator with legal normative elements, cases in which it has been indicated: "(1) On the nature of the error invoked. In principle, there is no great confusion when error regarding the elements of the offense (error de tipo) is defined as that which falls on the objective elements of the criminal definition of the offense (tipo penal) nor when error of prohibition (error de prohibición) is referred to as that which occurs both when the agent is unaware of the norm, considers it not in force, or interprets it mistakenly (direct) and when he is mistaken about the existence or limits of justifications (error of permission or indirect error of prohibition) (...) What is necessary, however, is to determine the nature of the error involved when the criminal definition of the offense (tipo penal) is constructed in such a way that, in its objective elements, it introduces terms such as "illicitly," "illegitimately," "illegally," "unlawfully," etc., since these terms then become normative elements of a legal nature which, by integrating the criminal definition of the offense (tipo penal), would eventually mean that the error alleged regarding them is, no longer one of prohibition but of elements (de tipo).
On this point, doctrine states: ¬"...it was [Name34] himself who realized the novelty that the normative elements of the definition of the offense (tipo) 'discovered' by him posed with a general character; stated succinctly: despite being components of unlawfulness (antijuridicidad), as they do not cease to be elements of the definition of the offense (tipo), they would fall, for this author, under the rule of error regarding circumstances of the fact (...) that is, they would require -unlike unlawfulness (antijuridicidad)- to be encompassed by the criminal intent (dolo) of the subject, as they would form part of the factual circumstances on which the value judgment of unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) falls, so that the error regarding a normative element of the definition of the offense (tipo) would be what we today call an error regarding the elements of the offense (error de tipo), or if preferred, in more neutral terminology, an error excluding criminal intent (error excluyente del dolo)." [Name35] And [Name36], [Name37].
El error sobre elementos normativos del tipo penal. La Ley, 1st edition, Madrid, 2008, p. 42. Understood this way, the criminal intent (dolo) of the active subject must also encompass that legal-normative element (...) If, as has been stated, the vicissitudes of the permit are normative elements of the definition of the offense (tipo), errors regarding the scope of said permit then constitute errors regarding the elements of the offense (errores de tipo). That is, in this specific case, the active subject must know not only that he lacks a permit for carrying but, additionally, be clear that said permit is needed. Any false representation regarding the scope of those situations where that permit is not necessary which is, precisely, what is raised in the specific case, means that one is facing an error regarding the elements of the offense (error de tipo). Therefore, the error invoked in this case is not an error of prohibition (which would imply the general ignorance that carrying a weapon is a crime in Costa Rica, an issue that is not the one raised) but one of elements (de tipo), that is, the false assumption alleged by the active subject that he did not require the permit because he was not carrying a weapon, but rather transporting it (as the gunsmith distinguished), and that to do the latter it was sufficient to comply with the requirements established in the directive issued by the Ministry of Public Security, transcribed below." Criminal Cassation Court, vote number 2010-641, emphases supplied.
If in this matter it is alleged that the accused received the money unaware that it came from a 'serious crime' (delito grave) and this is a legal-normative element of the criminal definition of the offense (tipo penal), the error alleged is one of elements (de tipo), and not of prohibition, the distinction being relevant because the avoidability (vencibilidad) of the error, in the first case, excludes the crime if there does not exist, as there does not in this matter, a parallel negligent definition of the offense (tipo culposo), whereas, in the second, it only reduces the penalty. Therefore, the arrest of [Name7] in the United States on August 2, 2004, the most it could produce was an alert about the possibility of the unlawfulness of the conduct from which the funds originated, a probability that does not have the firmness to be certainty, given the elements noted earlier. But if, from what has been indicated so far, important doubts can be inferred regarding the configuration of a 'serious crime' (delito grave) (because, due to evidentiary issues, the amount of what was evaded in the United States relative to what was transferred is unknown; no financial analysis was made of what was received in each period and, due to the date of the facts, many of the funds transferred were so before the regulation applicable to this matter, in addition to the issue of dual criminality regarding the minimum penalty and the statute of limitations for the criminal action) as a preceding element and, additionally, there are ample and well-founded reasons for doubting the knowledge of that material object of the crime by the accused here, it happens, as if that were not enough, that the analysis of the matter cannot be exhausted in such aspects, because the criminal definition of the offense (tipo penal) cited so many times contains subjective elements different from criminal intent (dolo), which must be analyzed forthwith.
§4. Other subjective elements of the offense, different from intent: "Alongside the cognitive element, the offense of money laundering must include a will to conceal or disguise the origin, location, etc. of the assets that the agent knows are derived from a crime. Whoever receives, transfers, converts objects they know are derived from a crime in order to conceal or disguise their location, destination, ownership, etc., acts with the required intent of danger (...) The intent must extend to the elements of the objective offense..." (CASTILLO [Name5], . El delito de legitimación de capitales. Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, 2012, 1st edition, pp. 127-128). Does this occur in the present case? When the money was received at the Banco de Costa Rica, it was declared to come from that cigarette sale, to the point that the national banking authorities visited the company and issued a report on the matter.
A record was kept of the fund transfers to the account of [Name7] and that he acquired properties or assets in his name or in the name of companies in which he is the sole or majority partner. Furthermore, those assets were identified with a seal used by [Name7], and the people who worked for each business used a uniform with his logo, as related at trial by [Name38], [Name39], and [Name29] (see folios 861 to 870). [Name7], in the United States, declared the existence of such assets for the purpose of offering them as collateral as part of the bail for his freedom that he was requesting, as also evidenced in the documentary evidence coming from that country and in the statements of its government officials who testified at the hearing… so… is there an intent to conceal? In the opinion of this Chamber, no, because the trail was easily verifiable, absent the indications that, indeed not necessarily, usually appear in these cases: “…the usual way to prove such knowledge is through circumstantial evidence (...) among which jurisprudence usually highlights a series of irregular or atypical acts in normal financial or commercial operation, such as knowledge of the use of fictitious identities, the use of companies with no capacity or no real economic activity, the absence of known economic activity, unjustified increase in assets, etc. But all these circumstantial elements cannot dispense with that or those that demonstrate, even by circumstantial evidence, the causal connection between the assets…” (Cfr. [Name1], .
Reflexiones técnicas y de política criminal sobre el delito de lavado de capitales. Cuadernos de Política Criminal No. 91, 2007, pp. 5-26. Also on the website of the Universidad Externado de Colombia: www.revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpen/article/.../98, p. 81). Therefore, this is an additional reason to grant the challenges and modify the judgment under appeal.
§ 6. In summary. The defense argument is valid that in this case the issue was not money derived per se from an illicit activity, as would be the case with a prohibited object; the object (cigarette sale) was not so, but rather, eventually, the non-payment of taxes. However, in this matter, a conviction is not possible because:
IV.- […] The challenge is rejected. As already stated, for this Chamber the appropriate action is to acquit the defendant of all penalty and responsibility for the acts attributed to him, and therefore, there is no legal basis to order the forfeiture (comiso) of assets exempted from that measure by the lower court; rather, said measure must be lifted on the assets for which it was ordered, as indicated in the previous section. Regarding the legal nature, characteristics, and principles governing the measure of forfeiture (comiso), this Chamber, under the name of Penal Cassation Court and with its current composition, has stated, for example, in vote number [Telf1]: “ ... the first thing that must be done to determine the legal nature of forfeiture (comiso) is to establish the characteristics, effects, and situations in which it is applicable. Pursuant to cited Article 110, forfeiture (comiso) requires, for its applicability: C.1) that a crime (delito) is being investigated, not a misdemeanor or infraction, because the numeral begins by stating ‘Every crime’ (Todo delito) and that expression, in a restrictive sense (Article 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code), can only be understood as referring to acts classified as such by the legislator (Book II of the Criminal Code or special laws), who made the distinction with misdemeanors, which have a different location in the normative body (Book III); C.2) that this crime (delito) is intentional.
The norm does not expressly indicate this, but it states that what is lost are the instruments used to commit the unlawful act and the things derived from its commission. Authors on the matter have stated, in our view in accordance with a restrictive interpretation consistent with the principle of legality, that the intentional nature of the measure is extracted from the provision regarding ‘instruments’ contemplated by the law, since these: ‘...for the generality of doctrine are those that have been used ‘intentionally’ to commit the crime (...) thereby excluding, of course, those (...) of a negligent crime’ (CREUS, [Name7]. Derecho penal. Parte general. Editorial Astrea, 3rd edition, Buenos Aires, p. 519. In the same sense: [Name40], ; [Name41], and [Name42], . Manual de derecho penal. Parte general. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 1st edition, 2005, p. 734; [Name43], . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar.
Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, p. 59 and 64 and others cited in [Name44], . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José, 1st edition, 2006, pp. 70-73); C.3) it would be applicable, in principle, to any intentional crime (delito doloso), as it is an institution regulated in the general part of the Criminal Code, which is characterized precisely by affecting codified criminal offenses or those of special laws; C.4) it may affect third parties provided they are included as parties in the proceedings. The norm does not establish this, and if interpreted in isolation, it would lead to overlooking this requirement, which arises from a systematic interpretation of the legal system and places Constitutional Law as what it is, the foundation of the rest of the normative hierarchy (see, in this regard, votes number 712-2006 of the Third Chamber and 637-2010 of the Penal Cassation Court of San José); C.5) forfeiture (comiso) does not affect the rights of the offended party or third parties acting in good faith; rather, these prevail over the state interest (in this sense, votes of the Penal Cassation Court of San José, numbers 2000-76, 2000-323, 2003-383, and 2004-101, and those of the Third Chamber, numbers 512-2001 and 1273-2005, among others); C.6) the effects arise from the crime (delito), whereby it is normatively provided that forfeiture (comiso) be decreed upon a conviction (sentencia condenatoria) (Article 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code).
Should ‘crime’ (delito) be understood as a typical, unlawful, and culpable act or as the abstract stipulation of illegality defined by the legislator? National jurisprudence, in general terms, has understood it as a legislative provision, without a specific declaration of responsibility, to the point that it has provided for the possibility of forfeiture (comiso) with dismissals, prosecutorial archiving, orders of final dismissal, even for expiration of the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution, acquittals, with alternative measures such as conciliations, suspensions of the trial process, integral reparation of damages and payment of fines, among others (see the recount of votes made by [Name44], . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José, 1st edition, 2006, pp. 230-263); C.7) it lacks indemnification, as it arises from a prior illegality, so it is an exception to the state's impossibility of assuming ownership of property without paying the value of the asset (Article 45 of the Political Constitution); C.8) it is a public order measure, so it does not require a request by a party but may be decreed ex officio; C.9) as a measure arising from the State's sovereign power, it must be provided for by law (Third Chamber, vote number 1217-1999), issued in a reasoned or substantiated manner, and after prior demonstration of the link or nexus between the object and the criminal act, meaning it is not a case of strict liability (Third Chamber, vote number 505-99); C.10) principles such as the presumption of innocence, due process, and the right to defense apply, meaning the burden of proof falls upon the State; C.11) in Costa Rica, the forfeiture (comiso) of property used in the preparatory phase that does not become the execution phase is not normatively regulated; C.12) the destination of the property, once the State obtains ownership, is expressly fixed by law (cfr.: Law on Distribution of Confiscated or Forfeited Property, its regulation, and manual).
From this perspective, forfeiture (comiso) would also not respond to the principle of culpability, which requires not only culpability to be imposed (meaning a sanction cannot be imposed without culpability, so it could not be imposed in the absence of a principal penalty or in cases where the perpetrator is not sanctioned, even though a criminal wrong exists) but also considers that this is gradable, which clashes with the rigid nature of the figure. Likewise, if it were a penalty, it would violate the principle concerning its highly personal nature, since forfeiture (comiso) is applicable even against third parties, provided they are heard in the respective proceedings and the property, with their consent, was used in the commission of crimes (...) Forfeiture (comiso) is also not provided for as an accessory penalty in Article 50.2 of the Criminal Code, which regulates as such only the special disqualification defined in numeral 58 ibidem as the deprivation or restriction of one or more rights.
This objection is both systematic (regarding the placement of the figure) and in view of constitutional principles, as it would clash with the principle of legality by overextending the catalog of accessory penalties expressly contemplated by the Criminal Code and the regulations specific to them. The difficulty could be overcome by stating that there is a prior law ordering it for all crimes (Article 110 of the Criminal Code); that there are other special norms that designate it as a penalty (for example, the Wildlife Conservation Law), and that the figure contemplates the deprivation of a right: property. However, the same numeral 58 of the Criminal Code states that accessory penalties provided for as such by the legislator have a term, which is the same as absolute disqualification, ranging from 6 months to 12 years (Article 57), which is incompatible with the loss of title to the property, which is definitive.
Likewise, against any penalty, principal or accessory, there is the possibility of bringing a review motion, which the Constitutional Chamber has indicated is incompatible with the res judicata effect derived from forfeiture (comiso) (see vote number [Telf2]). Finally, it must not be forgotten that pursuant to Article 110 of the Criminal Code: ‘...the weighing of forfeiture (comiso) shall be made once the civil liabilities arising from the crime have been satisfied (...) undoubtedly, if forfeiture (comiso) retained the character of a penalty, it would not be admissible for the imposition of the penalty to depend on the satisfaction of civil liability.’ [Name45], ; [Name46], and [Name47], . La responsabilidad civil ex delicto. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, pp. 45, 47. Therefore, either forfeiture (comiso) is not an accessory penalty, or if it were, it would be unconstitutional for violating the cited precepts, making it necessary to evaluate other possibilities.
D.2) Forfeiture (comiso) as a security measure: Based on these questions, the doctrine indicated that, in reality, the issue was not that the measure was unconstitutional but that it should not be seen as a penalty and, in trying to provide an explanation, it was thought that its nature was that of a security measure, thereby overcoming the objection that it responded to a principle of culpability, since this escapes security measures whose basis is, rather, the dangerousness of the active subject. Forfeiture (comiso) and security measures also shared the characteristic of responding more to special prevention criteria assumed in international instruments than to general prevention. But criticism arose again. First, because the dangerousness in security measures arises from the existence of a wrong that may not be present in forfeiture (comiso), which is based on a presumed objective dangerousness of the thing per se (in the case of instruments used for the commission of the crime, and particularly certain types thereof, such as weapons).
Moreover, because this explanation did not overcome the highly personal character that security measures also have, and which the figure of forfeiture (comiso) escapes (...) Furthermore, in Costa Rican criminal law, the Constitutional Chamber declared security measures for imputable persons unconstitutional, leaving only curative security measures (see Article 98 subsections 3, 4, and 5 and votes numbers 88-92 and 1588-98 of the Constitutional Chamber), and forfeiture (comiso), most of the time, is attached to a declaration of sanction for imputable persons and is not mentioned as a security measure (Articles 101 and 102 of the Criminal Code), which are also governed by the principle of specificity and the prohibition of creation by analogy (Articles 97 and 2 of the Criminal Code), besides the fact that they also have the possibility of cessation (Articles 100 of the Criminal Code and 478 of the Criminal Procedure Code), which is incompatible with forfeiture (comiso).
Given this, another option was proposed. D.3) Forfeiture (comiso) as a civil consequence or a restorative measure derived from the crime: although the Constitutional Chamber has referred to the figure from this perspective (thus in vote number [Telf2]: ‘forfeiture (comiso) is one of the civil consequences of the punishable act, together with restitution and the reparation and indemnification of damages’), which has also been accepted by some cassation jurisprudence (see, for example, and among others, vote number 787-2006 of the Third Chamber), the truth is that, technically, forfeiture (comiso) cannot be considered a civil consequence. First, because, as stated, in Costa Rica it can be decreed ex officio, which is alien to the principle of party disposition and consistency of civil matters. Second, because it does not have a restorative, restitutive, or compensatory nature, to the point that Article 103 of the Criminal Code lists it separate from those purposes, which are characteristic of consequences derived from a crime.
Third, because ‘Civil liability ex delicto constitutes a matter of an essentially civil nature, regardless of whether it is examined in the criminal process, which explains why there is no obstacle to its determination being deferred, as the case may be, to the civil jurisdiction. And although the crime, regarding the birth of this liability, is a necessary prerequisite, it is not sufficient, as it also requires the production of damage, an essential element for the birth of all civil liability, whether or not the act that caused it is defined in the Criminal Code’ (CEREZO [Name48], . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, p. 29), without it being possible to file, in the civil courts, an isolated claim for forfeiture (comiso). Furthermore, because ‘Civil liability is transmitted to the heirs (...) but the same cannot be sustained regarding the heirs of the person responsible for the act.
In cases of the death of the accused or defendant without forfeiture (comiso) having been agreed upon, it is not possible to apply...’ (QUINTERO [Name49], ; [Name46], and [Name47], . La responsabilidad civil ex delictio. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, p. 46). National doctrine adds that its effects are not of private law but in favor of the State, even though Costa Rica did not follow the recommendations discussed in the drafting of the Model Criminal Code for Latin America and placed the figure within civil consequences. This, as stated, does not affect its real legal nature, and what must be deduced is that the provision was erroneously placed, without this affecting its effects, concluding that ‘forfeiture (comiso) cannot be an effect of civil liability ex delicto; in its essence, it is not a civil sanction’ (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible.
Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, p. 376). Based on these reflections, another possibility was proposed. D.4) forfeiture (comiso) as a complex act, an accessory, legal, mixed, or sui generis consequence of the crime: There are consequences derived from the crime that are so by legal mandate, without sharing the nature of those figures. In Costa Rican law, examples include the matter of sentencing the losing party to costs (Article 267 of the Criminal Procedure Code); the publication of the judgment in crimes against honor (Article 155 of the Criminal Code); the reconstruction, suppression, reform, restitution, or rectification in public registries derived from the falsity of public instruments (Article 483 of the Criminal Procedure Code); the registration of certain types of orders (Articles 30 subsections j and k, 25 first paragraph, 36 ninth and tenth paragraphs of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the Law of Judicial Registry and Archives); and forfeiture (comiso).
This has been regulated in countries such as Germany and Spain and accepted by the majority of doctrine, although without agreeing on the ideal name to use, but making it clear that it does not share the characteristics of the institutions mentioned in previous sections: ¬‘...Henao [Name50] criticizes the unitary positions (...) pointing out that (...) forfeiture (comiso) is a phenomenon of a complex nature with a very broad functional scope, as it not only fulfills a penalty task, but also those of restitution, compensation, policing, and assurance, and even procedural tasks of an evidentiary and precautionary type (...) In the same sense, [Name51] and [Name52] are of the opinion of the complex nature of forfeiture (comiso) (...) [Name53] (...) proposes the mixed character of the institution (...) In contrast to penalties or security measures, accessory consequences are coercive acts or sanctions of their own nature, legally linked to the imposition of a penalty for an intentional crime or misdemeanor, or may be linked to it through a judicial pronouncement in certain cases.
Thus, the placement of forfeiture (comiso) (...) as an accessory consequence implies that its basis is neither the culpability nor the dangerousness of the active subject of the crime.’ [Name54], [Name55]. El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1st edition, Bogotá, 2007, pp. 59-60 and 62. Our legislation even arises from the Model Criminal Code for Latin America, where the topic of the legal nature and correct placement of forfeiture (comiso) was extensively discussed: ‘Finally, the opinion prevailed to place forfeiture (comiso) with a criminal character, but not as a penalty, and outside the civil consequences of the punishable act, discarding the idea of this phenomenon as a procedural measure (...) One of the agreements of the Fourth Plenary Meeting held in Caracas, Venezuela from January 20 to 30, 1969, No. 89, was to include a text on forfeiture (comiso), but on the understanding that it did not have the character of a penalty nor an effect of civil liability (...) Why then, when ordering the norms of that Code, was forfeiture (comiso) included (...) under the Title (...) related to ‘Civil liability derived from the crime’?
(ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible. Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, pp. 369-370). G) Having said the above, this Court considers that, indeed, Costa Rican forfeiture (comiso) is simply a consequence established by the legislator for the crime (for certain types of crimes, as stated and will be revisited), which, although it has criminal features (legality, burden of proof, innocence, nexus with the act), civil features (applies against third parties), and administrative features (state coerciveness and ex officio authority), does not precisely fit any of them, and therefore, principles specific to penalties (such as culpability or temporality), security measures (such as personality), or reparation (such as party disposition) cannot be applied to it. Hence, it is valid for the legislator to regulate it to be applied ex officio, establishing the loss of title as definitive, etc. However, this does not mean that, as a measure that deprives rights, which it ultimately is, it is not subject to principles such as legality and proportionality, which are characteristic of any punitive matter, including in the area of administrative law, as they are the only limiters of the State's sovereign power, as will be addressed in greater detail forthwith” (emphasis supplied).
In the present case, there is no typical, unlawful, and culpable act to decree such a measure, nor can any factual or legal basis be deduced to consider that the movable or immovable property of the defendant should receive said measure, because not only has the existence of any (criminal) crime not been proven, but neither have civil or administrative debts or wrongdoings, or the breach of regulations of any other nature, been under discussion for making such a decision. Therefore, it is not necessary to delve into the prosecution's appeal, which presupposes the unlawfulness of the conduct, which this Chamber does not agree with, according to the reasons extensively outlined above.”
“§1. El delito de legitimación de capitales es definido, por la doctrina mayoritaria, como un delito de relación o de enlace (no como un delito autónomo), es decir, que requiere la conexión con un hecho delictivo previo (Cfr. [Nombre1] , . Reflexiones técnicas y de política criminal sobre el delito de lavado de capitales. Cuadernos de Política Criminal Nº 91, 2007, págs. 5-26 y BAJO [Nombre2] , y [Nombre3] , . Política criminal y blanqueo de capitales. Marcial Pons, 2009 y los autores allí referidos). Este hecho previo puede ser definido por el legislador de muy diversas maneras (aludiendo a un listado de delitos, a la gravedad de las sanciones o, en términos mucho más amplios, asumiendo como posible cualquier otro delito) pero es necesario que exista y eso significa que —de atribuírsele a un sujeto en particular— éste haya sido juzgado y encontrado responsable, en firme, del delito (salvo que ello no haya sido posible por circunstancias personales, eximentes de pena , en cuyo caso bastará la demostración del injusto penal, siempre y cuando ello no sea incompatible con la legislación específica de cada país).
Solo cuando no sea posible esa imputación directa (ya sea porque no se identificó al autor, porque éste falleció o porque la acción penal se extinguió por ciertos motivos, excluida la prescripción de la acción penal porque es necesaria la vigencia de dicha acción en ambas legislaciones, a los efectos de esa valoración, salvo norma en contrario, que aquí no la hay), dicho hecho previo puede ser demostrado, dentro del juicio referente a la legitimación de capitales, obviamente a partir de las reglas probatorias del país que juzga. Como se ha indicado, esto es así en términos generales y sin desconocer que hay tendencias modernas que, para soslayar el tema probatorio del ' delito grave ' previo (en singular), prefieren aludir, por un lado, a ' actividad delictiva ' ( lo que implica desplazar el acento en el nivel de acreditación previ a que han de tener los diferentes estratos de la Teoría del Delito, según el sistema que se siga ) , posibilitando que el delito sea cometido por el mismo agente del evento precedente (lo que no es posible de considerarse delito de relación) y, por el otro, a darle a este delito una naturaleza de ilícito autónomo, estableciendo un bien jurídico diferenciado (que ya no es la administración de justicia como suele suceder en los delitos de encubrimiento sino el orden socio-económico) lo cual, algún sector doctrinal ha condenado en forma contundente: "...esta perspectiva generalmente inconfesada abiertamente y camuflada bajo la fórmula genérica de la protección al orden socioeconómico, ha conducido a perversiones legales e interpretativas, que no solo han llevado a una aplicación abusiva de los tipos de lavado de capitales, sino que, además y paradójicamente, han restado eficacia a los tipos penales con relación a su interés político criminal.
La primera perversión de esta idea político criminal consiste en la ampliación de los delitos base del lavado de capitales a cualquier delito, ni siquiera grave e incluido el fraude fiscal. La segunda, relacionada con la anterior y, al igual que la anterior, basada en la inconfesada pretensión de eludir las exigencias de la prueba en Derecho procesal penal, tiene que ver con la pérdida de contornos seguros del elemento típico de que el autor actúe con conocimiento de que los bienes objeto del lavado tienen su origen en un delito" (Cfr. [Nombre1] , . Reflexiones técnicas y de política criminal sobre el delito de lavado de capitales. Cuadernos de Política Criminal Nº 91, 2007, págs. 5-26. También en el sitio web: www.revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpen/article/.../98, pág. 66). Con esto se quiere adelantar, desde ya, que esta Cámara concuerda con tal autor cuando señala que: "...el dolo requiere, pues, el conocimiento del riesgo concreto o peligro de que exista una sentencia condenatoria, única que puede dar contenido al elemento normativo 'delito' en los tipos de lavado de capitales.
La existencia de sentencia condenatoria previa es, pues, parte imprescindible de este elemento normativo del tipo de lavado de capitales, por mucho que se quiera ignorar en la doctrina y en la jurisprudencia. La mejor demostración de que esto es así es que la prueba de que los bienes no proceden de delito alguno, es decir, de que no hay sentencia condenatoria alguna, debe implicar la absolución del supuesto blanqueador por atipicidad objetiva de su conducta" (Op. cit., pág. 78) por lo cual resulta un verdadero sinsentido que se haya iniciado en nuestro país un proceso por legitimación de capitales provenientes de una actividad previa que no es, per se, ilícita, cuando la causa que supuestamente originó ese evento (la venta de cigarrillos, a personas no indígenas, sin el pago previo de impuestos) no tiene, a esta fecha (y mucho menos a la data de la acusación) sentencia firme en el país de origen, desde que aún se desconoce la pena que podría llegar a imponérsele a [Nombre4], hermano del aquí acusado, en Estados Unidos de Norteamérica por tal conducta y sin que sea suficiente, para solventar ese tema (que es un elemento normativo del tipo según se adelantó), el testimonio de algunas personas que mencionan la pena probable que se le puede imponer que, dicho sea de paso, por ese mismo desconocimiento nacional, pudieron no haber sido interrogados y, por ende, omitir sobre todas las particularidades punitivas del sistema anglosajón, como los extremos mínimos de ese delito, lo que se retomará luego.
Adicionalmente, es preciso señalar que, de ser diferentes los países en los que se cometió el hecho previo (entiéndase 'delito' o 'actividad delictiva' lo que no es solo cuestión de terminología sino que , como se indicó, tiene importantes consecuencias jurídicas) y el hecho de legitimación juzgado, debe darse la doble identidad o doble incriminación, es decir, que el hecho previo, del que se dice proviene el capital que se busca legitimar, debe ser delito también en aquel país en donde se juzga la referida legitimación y, salvo que haya legislación expresa que lo regule de otro modo, no debe estar prescrito en ninguno de los dos. Al respecto señala la doctrina nacional: "El hecho previo del cual deriva el objeto de interés económico, a su vez objeto material del delito de legitimación de capitales, debe ser al menos típico y antijurídico, es decir, previsto como delito en una ley penal y que no esté amparado a una causa de justificación, sin que sea necesario que sea culpable (accesoriedad limitada), es decir, que no requiere que el hecho sea cometido culpablemente por el autor previo ni que sea punible en general, salvo excepciones.
El §261 StGB alemán dice explícitamente que el objeto de interés económico debe provenir de un "rechtwidrige Tat" (hecho antijurídico). La muerte del autor previo, típico y antijurídico, no tiene influencia con relación a (sic) la persecución del delito de legitimación de capitales. El hecho previo debe ser lo suficientemente concretizado y determinado. El hecho previo, que es apto para conectarse con el delito de legitimación de capitales debe ser punible en la jurisdicción costarricense y si se sitúa fuera del territorio nacional y (sic) tiene que se (sic) punible igualmente en la jurisdicción extranjera. Cuando el hecho previo prescribió se plantea la pregunta de si es posible la persecución por el delito de legitimación de capitales. El delito previo debe ser punible en el Derecho penal costarricense y un hecho prescrito en general no lo es. Algunos autores alemanes consideran que si el hecho previo está prescrito es un hecho irrelevante para la persecución por el delito de legitimación de capitales.
Sin embargo, la doctrina mayoritaria alemana y la casi totalidad de la doctrina suiza consideran que cuando el hecho previo ya está prescrito no es posible una condenatoria por el delito de legitimación de capitales. La razón de lo anterior es que el delito de legitimación de capitales es un delito conexo con el delito previo y si el Estado renunció a la persecución de éste no es posible perseguir el delito conexo (...) No es necesario que el autor del hecho previo sea conocido o que viva o, cuando radicó en el extranjero, que haya sentencia firme que condene el hecho previo o que éste sea perseguido por las autoridades extranjeras competentes (...) Creo que es necesario que el Tribunal determine la existencia del hecho previo y su carácter típico y antijurídico, sin que baste la simple sospecha de que el objeto proviene de un hecho punible. El establecimiento de la prueba del hecho previo puede hacerse por sentencia firme, si fue conocido por una autoridad competente.
Si ésta prueba falta puede probarse el carácter típico y antijurídico del hecho previo, que es un elemento normativo del tipo de legitimación de capitales. Esta prueba debe hacerla el juez que conoce en el país del delito de legitimación de capitales conforme a los criterios de la libertad probatoria y de la libre valoración de la prueba. En todo caso el establecimiento del hecho previo por el juez nacional como un elemento normativo del tipo penal de legitimación de lavado (sic) no implica dictar una sentencia en el suelo nacional sobre el hecho previo ocurrido en el extranjero" (CASTILLO [Nombre5] , . El delito de legitimación de capitales. Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, 2012, 1ª edición, págs. 91-94; se suplen los destacados). Tesis que, en principio y salvo en lo que se dirá, esta Cámara comparte, con las advertencias de que si bien la legislación alemana puede requerir un injusto penal para el hecho previo, ello no es unánime en todos los ordenamientos pues muchos aluden a 'delito' y habrá de estarse a lo que cada una regule, por un lado y, por el otro, que sí consideramos necesario que, de reputarse el hecho como cometido en el extranjero, se haya seguido o pretenda seguir proceso y, de haberlo habido, se aporte la sentencia condenatoria extranjera (que no es un requisito de procedibilidad sino un elemento normativo del tipo), salvo que, como ya se adelantó, sea imposible determinar el autor o se hayan producido causas personales de exclusión de la punibilidad pues, de lo contrario, se produciría un juzgamiento ilegal del hecho previo, por una autoridad no competente.
Por otra parte, ambos delitos, es decir el hecho base con el delito de enlace, deben de tener una relación lógica entre sí, pues, por mucho que un hecho previo sea delictivo en dos ordenamientos diferentes y se cumplan todas las previsiones legales para considerarlo válidamente como hecho precedente (es decir, que tenga el monto mínimo de pena o esté en la lista de los enunciados como tales por el legislador), si no hay un nexo lógico de conexión entre el evento previo y el posterior mal se haría con pretender alguna sanción: "La naturaleza de la unión entre el bien apto para el blanqueo y el hecho previo es otro de los problemas a resolver. Un sector doctrinal admite que la conexión entre ambos ha de ser de tipo causal. Ello parece lógico en la medida en que los bienes susceptibles de ser blanqueados han de tener su origen, su causa, en un hecho delictivo previo, derivarse de él (...) parece entonces necesaria la fijación de límites, esto es, la determinación de los criterios que producen la ruptura de la unión causal.
Esta manera de razonar nos conduce al análisis de una serie de criterios, a consecuencia de los cuales se pueda producir una interrupción del nexo causal, determinando que los bienes no puedan ser considerados ya procedentes del hecho previo. Esta necesidad de limitación va unida al hecho de que la cuestión de la procedencia fundamentaría un regresus ad infinitum en principio no admisible. Se podría llegar a considerar contaminada en un plazo corto de tiempo una parte esencial de la economía legal como consecuencia de una interpretación excesivamente amplia y sin limitaciones del criterio de la procedencia o del origen. Esta situación ha sido criticada por la doctrina suiza por ser contraria a la garantía constitucional de la propiedad adquirida de buena fe" (BLANCO [Nombre6] , . El delito de blanqueo de capitales. Aranzadi, 3ª edición, 2012, pág. 341). Ello obliga, tanto a establecer límites objetivos previos a la tenencia del objeto presuntamente blanqueado , como posteriores, tema para el cual se han usado las teorías de la equivalencia de las condiciones, de la adecuación y de imputación objetiva para, en supuestos de mezcla de bienes lícitos e ilícitos, determinar si aplica la contaminación total, la descontaminación total, la contaminación parcial, etc. En lo que acá interesa, por ahora, es claro que, por ejemplo, si un millonario conduce ebrio en su país y esa conducta es sancionada con prisión, el que traslade millonarias sumas de dinero a otro país, por mucho que pretenda evadir las consecuencias penales (multa) o civiles (responsabilidad) derivadas de aquella conducción, no podría considerarse que sea una legitimación de capitales, pues el dinero no tenía origen en el delito, sino que preexistía y, entonces, la evasión de responsabilidad no puede sancionarse usando el delito que nos ocupa.
Por otra parte, en virtud de los principios de inocencia y non bis in ídem, si el hecho previo fue enjuiciado en el extranjero y la persona acusada fue absuelta o la sentencia tuvo por demostrado que el ilícito no se cometió, no es factible que se constituya como base para una posterior legitimación de capitales , ni es posible que los tribunales nacionales lo vuelvan a conocer, con nueva prueba o revalorando en forma distinta la ahí ponderada, porque se afectaría el principio de cosa juzgada material garantizado tanto por nuestra Constitución Política (numeral 42) como por los instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos suscritos por el país (ver los artículos 8.4 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y 14.7 del Pacto Internacional sobre Derechos Civiles y Políticos). Eso, en términos generales, pues hay que hacer un análisis específico del tipo penal aplicable a la especie fáctica sometida a nuestro conocimiento, para determinar si todos esos criterios doctrinales son extrapolables al derecho interno y si, el tipo penal seleccionado contiene otros elementos importantes (principio de legalidad). Para ello, se requiere determinar cuál es la ley penal aplicable a este asunto, dado que ha n habido varias que regulan el tema.
§2. Ley aplicable a este caso y elementos objetivos del tipo: (a) En Costa Rica, antes de 1988, no existía ningún delito similar al que se comenta, ni en nombre ni en elementos, sino que la legislación penal, en su mayoría recogida, como debía ser, en el Código Penal —y no desperdigada, como ahora, en múltiples leyes especiales— solo preveía algunos delitos de encubrimiento, como la receptación, la receptación de cosas de procedencia sospechosa, el favorecimiento real y el personal (cfr. artículos 330 a 332 del Código Penal, renumerado por leyes Nº 7732 y 9048 y según el sistema SINALEVI). (b) Es con la ley Nº 9093, del 22 de abril de 1988 (publicada en el Alcance Nº 16 de La Gaceta Nº 83 del 02 de mayo de 1988), Ley sobre Estupefacientes, Sustancias Psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado y actividades conexas, en que, por primera vez, se regula este tema de forma muy similar a la actual, en el artículo 15 que señalaba "Se impondrá prisión de ocho a quince años a quien realice cualquier acto o contrato, real o simulado, de adquisición, posesión, transferencia o disposición de bienes, tendente a ocultar o a encubrir el origen de recursos económicos obtenidos por medio del tráfico ilícito de drogas o de delitos relacionados con esa actividad independientemente del lugar en donde el acto ilícito se haya cometido.
Cuando el hecho se hubiere cometido en el extranjero, su comisión podrá acreditarse por cualquier medio" (el destacado es suplido). Nótese cómo esta primera normativa circunscribió el ámbito de aplicación de la legitimación de capitales a aquellos obtenidos de la actividad relacionada con el tráfico de drogas. ¿Qué debe entenderse por droga? El artículo 1 de esa ley hacía una referencia a sustancias que causaran dependencia. No obstante, aunque hay muchas sustancias que la causan (incluido el alcohol, el tabaco, algunas gaseosas y hasta el café), no era el criterio médico-cultural el que debía usarse para desentrañar el sentido del término, sino que "drogas" es un concepto normativo, de tipo jurídico, que debe llenarse a partir de definiciones legales adoptadas por el país y que, por haberlas, son restrictivas y predominan por sobre criterios culturales (artículo 1 del Código Penal). Es así como la Convención única sobre estupefacientes (suscrita por Costa Rica el 30 de marzo de 1961 e incorporada al ordenamiento nacional mediante ley Nº 4544 del 11 de marzo de 1970) estableció varias listas (I, II, III y IV) de sustancias sujetas a la fiscalización estatal, entre las cuales no se mencionó el tabaco, que es lo que aquí se comerció y de cuya venta se originan las ganancias base de este proceso.
Cabe agregar que ya en esa normativa internacional se aludía a los delitos relacionados con drogas y estupefacientes como "delitos graves", sin llegar a definirse este término (ver artículo s 36.1; 36.2.a.iv). Tampoco se expresaba nada en cuanto al tabaco en el Protocolo de Modificación de la Convención Única sobre estupefacientes (firmado por nuestro país el 25 de marzo de 1972 e incorporado al ordenamiento nacional mediante ley Nº 5168 del 26 de diciembre de 1972); en el Convenio sobre sustancias psicotrópicas (suscrito por Costa Rica el 31 de mayo de 1972 e incorporado al ordenamiento nacional mediante ley Nº 4990 del 10 de junio de 1972) ni, finalmente, en la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes o sustancias psicotrópicas (suscrita por Costa Rica el 25 de abril de 1989 e incorporada al ordenamiento nacional mediante ley Nº 7198 del 01 de noviembre de 1990).
([Nombre7]) Aquella primera ley contra el tráfico de drogas, fue reformada mediante ley Nº 7233 (Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado y actividades conexas, publicada el 21 de mayo de 1991) que, en su numeral 17, establecía: "Se impondrá prisión de ocho a veinte años a quien interviniera en cualquier tipo de contrato, ya sea real o simulado, de enajenación, de inversión, de pignoración, de cesión, de conversión, de transferencia, de guarda, o de encubrimiento de la naturaleza, origen, ubicación, destino o circulación de las ganancias, cosas, valores, títulos o bienes provenientes de los hechos delictivos tipificados en esta ley o del beneficio económico obtenido de dichos delitos, siempre que hubiera conocido ese origen y tienda con esas acciones a ocultar o encubrir el origen de los recursos o a eludir las consecuencias jurídicas de ellas, independientemente del lugar donde esos actos ilícitos se hubieran cometido.
El favorecimiento personal del delito establecido en este artículo, será sancionado con la pena señalada para el autor. Cuando el tráfico de drogas o los delitos relacionados con esa actividad, aun los referidos a las conductas tipificadas en este artículo, se hayan ejecutado en el extranjero, su respectiva demostración podrá acreditarse por cualquier medio de prueba, siempre que se respeten las garantías establecidas en la legislación nacional y en las convenciones internacionales aceptadas por Costa Rica en protección de los derechos del imputado. Los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional deberán rendir los informes relacionados con las conductas tipificadas en el presente artículo, los cuales les soliciten el Ministerio Público o los jueces de la República, aun en la fase de instrucción preparatoria. Los jueces podrán también ordenar que les sea entregada cualquier documentación o medio de prueba que los bancos tuvieran en su poder, cuando fuera necesario para una investigación.
La resolución que acuerde lo anterior deberá fundamentar, debidamente, la necesidad del informe o del aporte del medio probatorio" (el destacado es suplido). En esta legislación ya no se remitía, en el artículo referido, a un concepto normativo-jurídico no contemplado en la norma, sino que, expresamente, allí mismo se relacionaba la legitimación de bienes con los otros delitos allí tipificados, dentro de los que, cabe indicar, no había ninguno alusivo al comercio de tabaco o diferente al tráfico de estupefacientes. (d) En sentido similar se pronunció la ley Nº 7786, vigente desde su publicación el 15 de mayo de 1998 que, en su numeral 1, circunscribía el ámbito de acción de tal normativa a las actividades relacionadas con las sustancias descritas en aquellos instrumentos internacionales (dentro de las que, ya se dijo, no figuraba el tabaco) pues señalaba: "La presente ley regula la prevención, el uso, la tenencia, el tráfico y la comercialización de los estupefacientes, los psicotrópicos, las sustancias inhalables y demás drogas y fármacos susceptibles de producir dependencia física o psíquica, incluidos en la Convención Única sobre Estupefacientes de las Naciones Unidas, de 30 de mayo de 1961, aprobada por Costa Rica mediante la Ley No. 4544, de 18 de marzo de 1970, enmendada a la vez por el Protocolo de modificación de la Convención Única sobre Estupefacientes, Ley No. 5168, de 8 de enero de 1973; así como en el Convenio de Viena sobre Sustancias Psicotrópicas, de 21 de febrero de 1971, aprobado por Costa Rica mediante la Ley No. 4990, de 10 de junio de 1972; asimismo, en la Convención de las Naciones Unidas Contra el Tráfico Ilícito de Estupefacientes y Sustancias Psicotrópicas, de 19 de diciembre de 1988, aprobada por Costa Rica mediante la Ley No. 7198, de 25 de setiembre de 1990; además, las regulaciones sobre esta materia que se apruebe incluir en las listas que el Ministerio de Salud deberá elaborar, mantener actualizadas y publicar anualmente en La Gaceta.
Además, se regulan el control, la inspección y la fiscalización de las actividades relacionadas con las sustancias inhalables, drogas o fármacos y de los productos, materiales y sustancias químicas que intervienen en la elaboración o producción de tales sustancias; todo ello sin perjuicio de lo estipulado sobre esta materia en la Ley General de Salud, No. 5395, de 30 de octubre de 1973. De igual modo se previenen y sancionan las actividades financieras, como forma de evitar la penetración de capitales provenientes de los delitos del tráfico ilícito y otros conexos y de todos los procedimientos que puedan servir como medios para legitimar capitales provenientes del narcotráfico. Es función del Estado y se declara de interés público la adopción de las medidas necesarias para prevenir, controlar, investigar, evitar o reprimir toda actividad ilícita relativa a la materia de esta ley" y que, en su numeral 72, tipificaba: "Será sancionado con pena de prisión de ocho a veinte años quien: a) Convierta, transfiera o transporte bienes de interés económico que procedan, directa o indirectamente, del tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas o delitos conexos, para ocultar o encubrir su origen ilícito o ayudar, mediante tal conversión, transporte o transferencia, a cualquier participante en la comisión de uno de estos delitos a eludir las consecuencias jurídicas de sus actos. b) Oculte o encubra la naturaleza, el origen, la ubicación, el destino, el movimiento o la propiedad verdadera de recursos, bienes o derechos relativos a ellos, con conocimiento de que proceden directa o indirectamente del tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas o delitos conexos.
La pena será de diez a veinte años cuando los hechos anteriores sean cometidos por empleados, funcionarios, directores, propietarios u otros representantes autorizados de las instituciones financieras" (el destacado es suplido). Dicha ley estuvo vigente hasta el 10 de enero de 2002. (e) El 11 de enero de 2002 fue publicada, en La Gaceta Nº 8, la ley Nº 8204 denominada "Reforma integral de la Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, legitimación de capitales y actividades conexas". Este articulado tuvo la particularidad de ampliar el espectro delictual que regulaba, pues su artículo 1, además de hacer referencia a las sustancias mencionadas en aquellas convenciones internacionales aceptadas por el país, menciona, en los párrafos cuarto y quinto "Además se regulan y sancionan las actividades financieras, con el fin de evitar la penetración de capitales provenientes de delitos graves y de todos los procedimientos que puedan servir como medios para legitimar dichos capitales.
Para los efectos de esta Ley, por delito grave se entenderá la conducta que constituya un delito punible con una privación de libertad de cuatro años, como mínimo, o una pena más grave" (se suplen las negritas). En tal tesitura, el numeral 69 señalaba: "Será sancionado con pena de prisión de ocho a veinte años: a) Quien adquiera, convierta o transmita bienes de interés económico, sabiendo que estos se originan en un delito grave, o realice cualquier otro acto para ocultar o encubrir el origen ilícito o para ayudar, a la persona que haya participado en las infracciones, a eludir las consecuencias legales de sus actos. b) Quien oculte o encubra la verdadera naturaleza, el origen, la ubicación, el destino, el movimiento o los derechos sobre los bienes o la propiedad de estos, a sabiendas de que proceden, directa o indirectamente, de un delito grave. La pena será de diez a veinte años de prisión cuando los bienes de interés económico se originen en alguno de los delitos relacionados con el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, legitimación de capitales, desvío de precursores o sustancias químicas esenciales y delitos conexos" (el destacado no es original).
Por supuesto que el activismo legislativo no se quedó ahí, sino que luego se dieron tres cambios normativos adicionales que es importante reseñar: (f) El 29 de octubre de 2004 se publicó, en La Gaceta Nº 212, la Ley contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito en la función pública Nº 8422 del 14 de setiembre de 2004 que, en su artículo 47 refiere: "Receptación, legalización o encubrimiento de bienes. Será sancionado con prisión de uno a ocho años, quien oculte, asegure, transforme, invierta, transfiera, custodie, administre, adquiera o dé apariencia de legitimidad a bienes o derechos, a sabiendas de que han sido producto del enriquecimiento ilícito o de actividades delictivas de un funcionario público, cometidas con ocasión del cargo o por los medios y las oportunidades que este le brinda." Es decir, se creó un delito de legitimación de capitales provenientes, específicamente, de delitos funcionales.
(g) Asimismo, en el Alcance Nº 29 a La Gaceta Nº 143, el 24 de julio de 2009 se publicó la Ley contra la Delincuencia organizada Nº 8754, en cuyo artículo 1 se indicaba: "Interpretación y aplicación. Entiéndese por delincuencia organizada, un grupo estructurado de dos o más personas que exista durante cierto tiempo y que actúe concertadamente con el propósito de cometer uno o más delitos graves. Lo dispuesto en la presente Ley se aplicará, exclusivamente, a las investigaciones y los procedimientos judiciales de los casos de delitos de delincuencia organizada nacional y transnacional. Para todo lo no regulado por esta Ley se aplicarán el Código Penal, Ley Nº 4573; el Código Procesal Penal, Ley Nº 7594, y otras leyes concordantes. Para todo el sistema penal, delito grave es el que dentro de su rango de penas pueda ser sancionado con prisión de cuatro años o más" (se suplen las negritas). De esa normativa cabe comentar que definió ‘delito grave’ como aquel reprimido con una penalidad de cuatro años o superior, sin importar en cuál rango de la escala punitiva estuviera ese monto (extremo mínimo o máximo), sino bastando que el hecho pudiera ser reprimido con tal sanción.
No obstante, el artículo es contradictorio pues, por un lado, señala que esa definición es para todo el sistema penal cuando, inmediatamente antes, había referido que lo dispuesto en esa normativa solo se aplicaría a los casos de delincuencia organizada. Esta ley surgió con motivo de las obligaciones contraídas por el Estado costarricense al suscribir la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Delincuencia Organizada Transnacional, conocida como Convención de Palermo, adoptada el 15 de noviembre de 2000 y aprobada mediante ley Nº 8302, publicada en La Gaceta Nº 123 del 27 de junio de 2003. Este instrumento internacional, en el artículo 2.b) definía el ' delito grave ' de la siguiente manera: "...se entenderá la conducta que constituya un delito punible con una privación de libertad máxima de al menos cuatro años o con una pena más grave" (el subrayado es externo) lo que es un contrasentido porque si es pena máxima no puede afirmarse que sea de "al menos" o que pueda ser una pena superior.
En todo caso, ambas leyes son posteriores a la imputación que aquí nos atañe y, como se verá, no resultan más beneficiosas para el encartado, de modo que no pueden aplicarse retroactivamente (artículos 11 y 12 del Código Penal y 34 constitucional). Por último, (h) el artículo 2°, punto 1, aparte a) de la Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Legislación contra el Terrorismo, N° 8719 de 4 de marzo de 2009 (publicada en La Gaceta Nº 52 del 16 de marzo de 2009 y vigente desde entonces), varió el nombre de la ley que nos ocupa para que, en adelante, se denominara "Ley sobre estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, drogas de uso no autorizado, actividades conexas, legitimación de capitales y financiamiento al terrorismo" reformándose, por dicha ley, el contenido del artículo 1, en donde se suprime la referencia y definición de ' delito grave ' para, en su lugar, establecer ampliamente que, con dicha ley: "Además, se regulan y sancionan las actividades financieras, con el fin de evitar la legitimación de capitales y las acciones que puedan servir para financiar actividades terroristas, tal como se establece en esta Ley." Por su parte, en el artículo 2°, punto 1, aparte b) de la referida Ley N° 8719 de 4 de marzo de 2009, se modificó el contenido del numeral 69 para que se leyera así: "Será sancionado con pena de prisión de ocho (8) a veinte (20) años: a) Quien adquiera, convierta o transmita bienes de interés económico, sabiendo que estos se originan en un delito que, dentro de su rango de penas, puede ser sancionado con pena de prisión de cuatro (4) años o más, o realice cualquier otro acto para ocultar o encubrir el origen ilícito, o para ayudarle a la persona que haya participado en las infracciones, a eludir las consecuencias legales de sus actos. b) Quien oculte o encubra la verdadera naturaleza, el origen, la ubicación, el destino, el movimiento o los derechos sobre los bienes o la propiedad de estos, a sabiendas de que proceden, directa o indirectamente, de un delito que dentro su rango de penas puede ser sancionado con pena de prisión de cuatro (4) años o más.
La pena será de diez (10) a veinte (20) años de prisión, cuando los bienes de interés económico se originen en alguno de los delitos relacionados con el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, legitimación de capitales, desvío de precursores, sustancias químicas esenciales y delitos conexos, conductas tipificadas como terroristas, de acuerdo con la legislación vigente o cuando se tenga como finalidad el financiamiento de actos de terrorismo y de organizaciones terroristas" (el destacado es suplido). En esta última normativa se reguló, innecesariamente dada la definición de 'delito grave', la legitimación de capitales en cadena (procedente de un delito de esa misma naturaleza anterior) y se necesitó una errata legislativa para corregir algunos defectos internos (ver publicación en La Gaceta N° 63 del 31 de marzo del 2009) , lo que dice mucho de la política criminal y técnica penal que incorpor ó .
Es cierto que, además de la ley, en muchos de los instrumentos internacionales citados, ratificados por el Estado costarricense, se establecía la obligación estatal de reprimir la legitimación de capitales o el lavado de activos, pero la asunción de una obligación internacional no genera, ipso facto, la creación de normas penales, ya que éstas requieren de una ley formal, es decir, emanada de la Asamblea Legislativa, siguiendo el procedimiento al efecto fijado por el ordenamiento jurídico y el establecimiento de una pena concreta por conducta, nada de lo cual tienen aquellos convenios, que aluden a la necesidad de impedir ciertas conductas, las definen, pueden recomendar marcos punitivos, etc., sin que llenen aquellos requerimientos derivados del Principio de Legalidad Penal. De la anterior "arqueología jurídica" se pueden extraer, como primeras conclusiones importantes para el asunto que nos ocupa, las siguientes: (i) En Costa Rica no existió el delito de legitimación de capitales sino hasta 02 de mayo 1988 pues, antes de esa fecha, lo que se regulaba, en el Código Penal, eran delitos de encubrimiento, sin que se previeran muchas conductas tendientes a distraer el producto del delito ahora enumeradas en otras disposiciones especiales; (ii) A partir del 02 de mayo de 1988 y hasta el 10 de enero de 2002, la única legitimación de capitales que se penalizó fue la de aquellos surgidos del comercio de drogas, estupefacientes o psicotrópicos, sustancias esas que no contemplan todas aquellas que generen adicción, sino solo las enlistadas internacionalmente y dentro de las que no se previó el tabaco; (iii) A partir del 11 de enero de 2002 se amplió el espectro punitivo para sancionar la legitimación de capitales provenientes de ‘delitos graves’ y se definió jurídicamente este término (elemento normativo-jurídico del tipo penal) como todo aquel delito que tuviera un extremo mínimo de cuatro años de prisión, lo que se mantuvo hasta el 15 de marzo de 2009, salvo para los bienes provenientes de delitos cometidos por funcionarios públicos, aprovechándose de sus cargos, los cuales, desde el 29 de octubre de 2004 y hasta la fecha, pasaron a regularse en una normativa independiente que, dicho sea de paso, pese a las proclamas plasmadas en la Exposición de Motivos del proyecto de ley, más bien bajaron notablemente la pena para este evento; (iv) A partir del 16 de marzo de 2009 la legitimación de capitales puede provenir de cualquier delito sancionado con prisión de cuatro años o más (salvo, ya se dijo, de los delitos funcionales regulados más benignamente en la normativa especial), sin importar si ese es, o no, el extremo mínimo o máximo de la sanción, sino bastando que, en el rango punitivo abstracto, esa sea una de las posibles penas a imponer.
Este recuento es de especial importancia en este asunto, habida cuenta del principio contenido en el artículo 11 del Código Penal, derivado del viejo aforismo nullum crimen nulla poena sine previa lege, según el cual "Los hechos punibles se juzgarán de conformidad con las leyes vigentes en la época de su comisión" salvo, claro está, que se promulguen leyes posteriores más favorables para el acusado (artículo 12 del Código Penal) que, dicho sea de una vez, no sucede en este caso pues, como puede verse del recuento efectuado, no solo las leyes posteriores mantuvieron la misma pena o la aumentaron, respecto a las previas —salvado el caso de los delitos funcionales, no aplicable a la especie— sino que ampliaron el espectro normativo de los hechos previos que pueden dar pie a la legitimación de capitales. Asimismo, porque, en virtud del principio de correlación entre acusación y sentencia (artículo 365 del Código Procesal Penal), solo podían tenerse por demostrados los hechos acusados.
Fue así como los hechos probados de la sentencia, manteniendo incólume lo atribuido, señalan, en lo que interesa: "Como hechos probados de interés para la resolución del presente asunto, el Tribunal en lista los siguientes:
§3. Elementos subjetivos del tipo: Por otro lado, cuando el numeral 69 de la Ley de Psicotrópicos, aplicable a los hechos, disponía: "Será sancionado con pena de prisión de ocho a veinte años: a) Quien adquiera, convierta o transmita bienes de interés económico, sabiendo que estos se originan en un delito grave, o realice cualquier otro acto para ocultar o encubrir el origen ilícito o para ayudar, a la persona que haya participado en las infracciones, a eludir las consecuencias legales de sus actos. b) Quien oculte o encubra la verdadera naturaleza, el origen, la ubicación, el destino, el movimiento o los derechos sobre los bienes o la propiedad de estos, a sabiendas de que proceden, directa o indirectamente, de un delito grave. La pena será de diez a veinte años de prisión cuando los bienes de interés económico se originen en alguno de los delitos relacionados con el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas, legitimación de capitales, desvío de precursores o sustancias químicas esenciales y delitos conexos" (el destacado es suplido), estaba exigiendo un dolo directo de primer grado.
Es sabido que hay tres tipos de dolo: directo de primer grado; indirecto o directo de segundo grado, también conocido como de consecuencias necesarias y dolo eventual. En principio cualquier hecho doloso puede ser cometido por cualquiera de esas formas de dolo, salvo que en la legislación se establezca, expresamente, lo contrario. Así, el us o legislativo de las formas ‘a sabiendas’ o ‘sabiendo’ implica que se requiere un dolo directo: "Cuando el legislador emplea expresiones tales como 'a sabiendas' acentúa el lado cognitivo del dolo e implica respecto al elemento concreto para el cual requiere dolo directo de segundo grado (sic) renuncia a la punición por dolo eventual. Los artículos 69 de la Ley de Psicotrópicos (...) requieren 'el conocimiento' de que el objeto de interés económico proviene de un delito específico (...) Basta que el agente conozca las circunstancias fácticas que caracterizan el hecho previo.
No es necesario que conozca las particularidades del hecho previo…" (CASTILLO [Nombre5] , . El delito de legitimación de capitales. Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, 2012, 1ª edición, págs. 125-126, se suplen las negritas). En criterio del Tribunal , puede haber, en el texto transcrito antes, alguna confu sión en la denominación de ese énfasis en el elemento ‘conocimiento’ (pues se señala que es un dolo directo de segundo grado, cuando es de primero, pues el de segundo grado es el denominado ‘dolo de consecuencias necesarias’ en donde no interesa tanto el conocimiento, sino que predomina la voluntad , cfr. [Nombre27] , . El dolo. Editorial Juritexto. San José, 19 99 , pág s . 268-270 ). Pese a esa diferencia terminológica, se coincid e con dicho autor , y con un importante sector doctrinal citado en anteriores referencias , en que la expresión excluye otras formas de dolo (vgr. el eventual) y admite, solo, el directo que, definitivamente, no es una mera sospecha: “…el elemento cognitivo del dolo no es una mera sospecha sobre la concurrencia de los elementos objetivos del tipo, ni tampoco, en el polo opuesto, exige la certeza al respecto (…) No es, por tanto, necesario para describir el dolo (…) acudir a afirmaciones incompatibles con la seguridad jurídica y con el concepto penal de dolo, como la muy frecuente en doctrina y jurisprudencia de que es suficiente el conocimiento de que los bienes ‘proceden de una actividad delictiva de modo genérico’ como si nuestro derecho penal fuera de autor y no de hecho (…) el dolo en el delito de blanqueo de capitales siempre tiene por objeto delitos y no actividades delictivas genéricas” (Cfr. [Nombre1] , .
Reflexiones técnicas y de política criminal sobre el delito de lavado de capitales. Cuadernos de Política Criminal Nº 91, 2007, págs. 5-26. También en la siguiente página web : www.revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpen/article/.../98, págs. 76-77). Con esa advertencia, la doctrina señala que, por tratarse de un elemento normativo, ese dolo tiene dos sustratos, uno fáctico y otro valorativo: “El sustrato fáctico está integrado por los hechos constitutivos de una actividad delictiva. El autor ha de conocer aquellas circunstancias fácticas perceptibles por los sentidos, que han de servirle de base para valorar su carácter delictivo. Se trata, al igual que en los elementos descriptivos del tipo, del conocimiento de las circunstancias de hecho (…) El autor del delito de blanqueo ha de proceder a una valoración de los hechos que ha percibido. De tal valoración ha de derivarse que tales hechos constituyen una conducta delictiva” (Cfr. [Nombre23] , .
El delito de blanqueo de capitales. Aranzadi, España, 2012, págs. 660-661). Esto es importante porque, desde el sustrato fáctico, la actividad desplegada por [Nombre7] en Estados Unidos, de venta de tabaco sin impuestos a no indígenas, se hacía en forma pública, anunciándose por medio de una página por internet, con entregas a diversas partes de La Unión a través del correo postal de ese país, existían múltiples comercios de ese mismo giro en la misma reserva indígena y ninguna persona había sido , siquiera , procesada por tal actividad , según se desprende, de forma unánime, de la prueba oral recibida en el juicio . Ergo, desde el sustrato fáctico, [Nombre7], quien había ido a trabajar con [Nombre7] a ese negocio, no tenía ningún elemento ni siquiera para dudar de que se estuviera efectuando una actividad delictiva , máxime que los envíos de remesas se hacían a través de bancos , tanto de Estados Unidos como de uno estatal en Costa Rica, que suponen controles importantes para evitar el trasiego de dinero ilícito.
Desde el sustrato valorativo tampoco surgen datos adicionales , pues si la actividad original era aparentemente lícita, no había ninguna razón para cuestionarse su ilicitud. Por otra parte, la doctrina insiste en que ese dolo debe estar al momento de la adquisición del bien , es decir, debe ser actual , sin que baste que esté en otros momentos: “El autor debe conocer el origen del objeto en el momento de su obtención. El conocimiento posterior ('dolus subsequens') no es penalmente relevante ('dolus subsequens non nocet') ni genera una posición de garante, conforme al artículo 18 cod. pen. La adquisición del objeto sin conocer su origen ilícito implica una adquisición de la posesión de buena fe, que excluye el delito de legitimación de capitales (...) no son delitos permanentes" (CASTILLO [Nombre5] , . El delito de legitimación de capitales. Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, 2012, 1ª edición, págs. 125-126, se suplen las negritas).
“El dolo ha de ser antecedente o concurrente en la acción. El subsiguiente es irrelevante…” (CALDERÓN [Nombre28] , . El marco jurídico del blanqueo de capitales: aspectos penales y administrativos. En la siguiente dirección electrónica: http://www.datadiar.com/actual/novedades_05/penal/blanqueo/d_may_02c.htm). “El dolo debe existir durante la realización del comportamiento, esto es, durante su ejecución. Por tanto, el dolus antecedents, es decir, un dolo anterior a la comisión, no es suficiente (…) al igual que el dolus antecedents, se admite que el dolus subsequens o dolo posterior al hecho, no es dolo en el sentido del Derecho Penal. De la exigencia de que el conocimiento correspondiente al dolo sea actual, se deriva que no tenga ninguna consecuencia jurídico-penal el conocimiento posterior a la realización de la conducta (…) Se trata de una mención expresamente recogida en el Convenio de Viena de 1988 que, en su artículo 3.c).i), se refiere a ‘la adquisición, posesión o utilización de bienes, a sabiendas, en el momento de recibirlos, de que tales bienes proceden de alguno de alguno o algunos de los delitos tipificados…’ La misma referencia se contiene en los Convenios de Palermo (art. 6.1.b.i) (…) Es irrelevante desde el punto de vista penal si el conocimiento del origen delictivo de los bienes es obtenido con posterioridad a la realización de las acciones de blanqueo de capitales.
Tiene plena vigencia (…) el principio dolus superveniens non nocet” (Cfr. [Nombre23] , . El delito de blanqueo de capitales. Aranzadi, España, 2012, págs. 662-663). Por ello no es aceptable que el Tribunal de instancia haya referido: "Si bien en el hecho quinto de la acusación, el Ministerio Público incluye la remisión de la cuenta de [Nombre8] desde Estados Unidos de la suma de Dieciséis millones setecientos noventa y tres mil, novecientos ochenta dólares, a la cuenta de ahorro en dólares en el Banco de Costa Rica de [Nombre7]. Estos envíos según puede verse en el Apéndice N°4 del Informe No. 212-DEF-R-140-11 de la Sección de Delitos económicos y financieros del O.I.J., se iniciaron en octubre del año dos mil y se extendieron sin ninguna interrupción durante los años, dos mil uno, dos mil dos, dos mil tres hasta el 19 de marzo de 2004. Debe tomarse en cuenta, que a esa fecha no había sido detenido [Nombre4] en Estados Unidos, por el cargo de contrabando de cigarrillos, y por ello no podría afirmarse con certeza que su hermano [Nombre7] conocía la ilicitud de ese negocio que generaba -en su totalidad- los fondos remitidos al Banco de Costa Rica.
Por ser necesario el conocimiento acerca del origen ilícito de los fondos legitimados, a los efectos de la tipicidad del delito, el Tribunal ha debido considerar que el conocimiento en relación con esos envíos de dinero surge a partir de la detención de [Nombre4] en Nueva York, el 2 de agosto de 2004, por lo que sólo un depósito, el efectuado el seis de agosto de ese mismo año y recibido en la cuenta de [Nombre7], se puede considerar teñido por el conocimiento de la ilicitud de su origen. Debe comentarse por ser de interés en este punto, que ese último depósito reviste condiciones diferentes en relación con todos los depósitos anteriores que pueden verse en el Apéndice 3 citado, a saber: el monto de cuatro millones cuatrocientos mil dólares supera con creces los anteriores cuyas cifras suelen oscilar entre los doscientos y los trescientos mil dólares -con excepción de un depósito efectuado por la operadora de fondos Lloyd de dos millones quinientos mil dólares en noviembre de dos mil dos- y representa una cuarta parte de todos los depósitos efectuados a lo largo de tres años y diez meses en esa cuenta de ahorros.
Se diferencia de los depósitos precedentes en que el dinero no lo remite [Nombre8], sino TMG RAMSR Partners. La explicación de este cambio en el remitente surge de la temporalidad del depósito, cuatro días después de que se "hace oficial" con la detención de [Nombre7], el carácter ilícito de su actividad comercial que realiza por medio de [Nombre8]. Sin embargo, la identidad de [Nombre7] está presente también en este depósito, pues sus iniciales RAMSr., que según dijo el testigo [Nombre25], imponía [Nombre7] en todas sus pertenencias y negocios para que se identificaran con él, están en el nombre del depositante, de modo que no puede negarse que su origen está relacionado con [Nombre7] y su actividad ilícita, conocida a ese momento por el imputado [Nombre7]. También considera el Tribunal que al momento de efectuar la redención de los fondos depositados por [Nombre7] en el Banco de Costa Rica, diez días después de la detención de [Nombre7], el imputado [Nombre7] conoce el origen de los fondos y bajo ese conocimiento accede a borrar toda huella de las inversiones y actividad bancaria de su hermano en el Banco de Costa Rica, pues según se indica en el Informe No. 212-DEF-R-140-11 de la Sección de Delitos económicos y financieros del O.I.J, y puede verse al folio 356 vuelto del expediente principal, hasta la suma de cinco mil ochocientos dólares depositados en una cuenta de [Nombre7] fueron depositados, junto con el fondo por diez millones trescientos cincuenta mil, doscientos cuarenta y ocho dólares en la cuenta de ahorros de [Nombre7] para luego constituir un nuevo Fondo de Crecimiento en dólares a nombre de [Nombre7] en el Banco de Costa Rica.
De concluirse entonces que todos los fondos remitidos por [Nombre7] a su cuenta y que constituyeron los dineros del Fondo en cuya redención participaron tanto [Nombre26] como [Nombre7] y los cuatro millones cuatrocientos mil dólares que fueron remitidos con posterioridad a la detención de [Nombre7] provinieron de la actividad ilícita de contrabando de cigarrillos de [Nombre7], situación que era conocida por [Nombre7] al momento de recibir y mantener en su cuenta esos fondos y al participar en la redención del Fondo de Crecimiento en dólares del Banco de Costa Rica" (cfr. folios 938-939, el destacado es suplido). Nótese que si bien las juezas y juez de instancia, inicialmente refirieron que no podía considerarse que el encartado supiera que todo el dinero que él recibi ó de su hermano, antes de la detención de éste en Estados Unidos, proviniera de un delito, inmediatamente después hacen surgir el conocimiento del dolo, ya no en la adquisición sino en la manutención , en su cuenta , de esas remesas, por la redención del Fondo y en las inversiones subsiguientes, con lo que quieren decir que si bien el encartado, al recibir el dinero , no tenía dolo (conocimiento del delito procedente), luego adquirió dicho conocimiento y es , por esa circunstancia sobreviniente , que le hacen el reproche, di cho así, retroactivo, lo que no es sino aplicar el tema del dolo subsecuente que, conforme a lo enunciado atrás, no es aceptable.
Es cierto que el artículo comentado establece: "a) Quien adquiera, convierta o transmita bienes de interés económico, sabiendo que estos se originan en un delito grave, o realice cualquier otro acto para ocultar o encubrir el origen ilícito o para ayudar, a la persona que haya participado en las infracciones, a eludir las consecuencias legales de sus actos. b) Quien oculte o encubra la verdadera naturaleza, el origen, la ubicación, el destino, el movimiento o los derechos sobre los bienes o la propiedad de estos, a sabiendas de que proceden, directa o indirectamente, de un delito grave..." por lo que podría decirse que el dolo puede estar en tres momentos: el de la adquisición, el de la conversión y el de la transmisión y que, en este asunto, las juezas y juez de instancia consideraron que, para una suma, estuvo desde la adquisición (pues fue traslada luego de la detención de [Nombre7]) y, para las restantes, a partir de la conversión y la transmisión.
Sin embargo, no pueden escindirse artificialmente las acciones pues, como ha quedado de manifiesto con la dogmática citada , los instrumentos internacionales de los que surgen esos tres momentos son enfáticos en exigir que el conocimiento del sujeto activo esté en el momento de la recepción de los bienes, no en los restantes momentos. Así, en la [Nombre7]onvención de las Naciones Unidas contra el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes y sustancias sicotrópicas (aprobada por la ONU en la sesión celebrada el 19 de diciembre de 1988 en Viena, Austria y ratificada por Costa Rica en 1990), el artículo 3.1.c.i dispone: "Artículo 3 DELITOS Y SANCIONES. 1. Cada una de las Partes adoptará las medidas que sean necesarias para tipificar como delitos penales en su derecho interno, cuando se cometan intencionalmente: [Nombre7]) a reserva de sus principios constitucionales y a los conceptos fundamentales de su ordenamiento jurídico: i) la adquisición, la posesión o la utilización de bienes, a sabiendas, en el momento de recibirlos, de que tales bienes proceden de alguno o algunos de los delitos tipificados de conformidad con el inciso a) del presente párrafo o de un acto de participación en tal delito o delitos" (se suple el destacado).
En igual sentido se pronuncia la Convención de Palermo que refiere: "Artículo 6. Penalización del blanqueo del producto del delito 1. Cada Estado Parte adoptará, de conformidad con los principios fundamentales de su derecho interno, las medidas legislativas y de otra índole que sean necesarias para tipificar como delito, cuando se cometan intencionalmente: b) Con sujeción a los conceptos básicos de su ordenamiento jurídico: i) La adquisición, posesión o utilización de bienes, a sabiendas, en el momento de su recepción, de que son producto del delito" (se suplen las negritas). Ya se dijo que este instrumento no es aplicable aquí, por ser ley posterior, pero se menciona a los fines de evidenciar cómo, a pesar de ser extremadamente amplio en sus regulaciones, limita el dolo, de la tenencia posterior, a que éste estuviera presente al momento de la recepción del bien u objeto, por lo que ambas normativas se convierten en límites interpretativos de la ley promulgada como resultado de la suscripción de esa obligación internacional.
Ergo, los tres verbos aluden a actos en donde haya dolo inicial en la recepción , sin que sea posible que un acto efectuado sin dolo, sin conocimiento ni voluntad de cometer el tipo objetivo, es decir, con buena fe, pase a convertirse luego, por el solo transcurso del tiempo, en un hecho ilícito desde que, en tales supuestos, la conversión y transmisión son actos propios del ejercicio de los derechos de titularidad y posesión (originalmente de buena fe). En otras palabras, sería un absurdo jurídico considerar que si la persona recibió de buena fe, sin dolo y, posteriormente, llega a conocer el carácter ilícito del hecho del que provenía el dinero, se le exija o bien que entregue la cosa al Estado o que no haga ningún acto posesorio con ella. Ahora bien, esto conduciría a hacer una diferenciación (tanto para efectos de tipo objetivo y dolo, como a los del comiso) entre los dineros recibidos por [Nombre7], antes de la detención de su hermano (recibidos sin dolo, y por tanto, no configurativos del tipo penal que nos ocupa) del recibido después.
Es decir, habría que establecer el monto total de lo recibido por el encartado. A esto restarle lo recibido antes del 10 de enero de 2002 (en que no había tipicidad objetiva para el hecho). A lo que queda, restarle lo recibido antes del 02 de agosto de 2004 (fecha de detención de [Nombre7] en Estados Unidos, que el Tribunal fija como aquella de la que surge el dolo), sumas esas que fueran recibidas sin dolo por el encartado y, por tanto no susceptibles, desde la tipicidad subjetiva, de ser delictivas. A lo que queda, es decir, aproximadamente cuatro millones de dólares, debería extraerse, por cada período anual (a los fines de la doble incriminación impositiva) lo dejado de pagar en impuestos pues solo esto (y no el resto de la ganancia) es lo que constituiría el delito. Esa suma resultante habría que demostrarse en qué períodos se obtuvo, para ver si es posible hacer la adecuación al tipo objetivo en Costa Rica, obviamente sin tomar en cuenta intereses u otras ganancias generadas en el país, sino solo el monto original resultante.
Nada de eso se hizo y se optó por, en bulto, aludir a todo el dinero, sus intereses y demás, tanto para los efectos de la condena como, posteriormente, del comiso generalizado. Para hacer esto último, el Tribunal (obviando el anacronismo en que incurre al señalar que el párrafo que aplicará , de la ley Nº 8204 , tiene su inspiración en el numeral 6 de la Convención de Palermo, ver folio 940, cuando ya se vio que la ley aplicable a este asunto es la de 2002 y que esta Convención , si bien fue adoptada en las Naciones Unidas en el año 2000, el país la ratificó hasta el 2003 ) opta por señalar que no son aquellos primeros verbos los que se aplican sino que: "Los hechos acusados, en criterio del Tribunal no encuentran adecuación en la primera parte del artículo 69 citado "Quien adquiera, convierta o transmita bienes de interés económico (...)" sino en la que se lee "o quien realice cualquier otro acto para encubrir el origen ilícito o para ayudar la persona que haya participado en las infracciones a eludir las consecuencias legales de sus actos (sabiendo que estos se originan en un delito grave)" (...) procederemos a descomponer el tipo penal (...) con la intención de relacionar cada parte del tipo con la conducta del imputado y las circunstancias del caso (...) Análisis de la Tipicidad Objetiva.
Artículo 69 párrafo primero: "(...) quien realice cualquier otro acto para encubrir el origen ilícito o para ayudar la persona que haya participado en las infracciones a eludir las consecuencias legales de sus actos." A.- Quien realice cualquier otro acto.- El verbo que define la acción típica es realizar cualquier otro acto, en alusión a que no se trata de los (sic) acciones "adquiera, convierta o transmita "que preceden esta parte del párrafo primero del artículo 69. El Tribunal se decanta por esta forma verbal porque las conductas de don [Nombre7], que se han tenido por demostradas en el acápite correspondiente de esta sentencia, no están contenidas en esas formas verbales, sino que son de naturaleza bancaria en unos casos y en otros son actos dispositivos a partir de esos dineros recibidos por medio de operaciones bancarias de carácter transnacional. El análisis de los actos realizados debe iniciarse con los primeros que se dieron cronológicamente. i.- Recibir y mantener en su cuenta en dólares No. 230-0042636-9 del banco de Costa Rica dinero proveniente del comercio ilícito de cigarrillos de [Nombre4] en la Reserva Indígena […].
El 6 de agosto de 2004, se envió desde los Estados Unidos una transferencia de TGM RAMSr Partners, por la suma de cuatro millones cuatrocientos mil dólares a la cuenta aludida, y don [Nombre7] los recibió y mantuvo depositados a su nombre, sabiendo que provenían de la actividad delictiva por la cual había sido detenido su hermano cuatro días antes en Nueva York. ii.- La Redención del Fondo de Crecimiento en Dólares y las operaciones subsecuentes. Cinco días después de recibirse en la cuenta de Don [Nombre7] el depósito aludido, o sea el once de agosto de dos mil cuatro, [Nombre4], envía a "[Nombre29]" su ejecutivo de confianza en el Banco de Costa Rica, que resulta ser el testigo de la defensa [Nombre29], el documento que puede verse a folio 28 del Expediente Principal, donde le autoriza a transferir todos, en mayúscula, negrita y subrayado los fondos de su cuenta de inversión, y le indica que sin (sic) tiene alguna duda se comunique al teléfono móvil de [Nombre7] cuyo número incluye en la comunicación.
En esta escueta manifestación de voluntad de [Nombre7] se advierte la urgencia e inminente riesgo en que se encuentra permanencia de ese dinero en su patrimonio y sin restricciones, situación a la que responde eficiente, rápida y fielmente su hermano [Nombre7], que un día después, el doce de agosto dirige una comunicación al Licenciado [Nombre29], quien ha manejado hasta ese momento las inversiones de [Nombre7] y las suyas en el Banco de Costa Rica, la redención de esos fondos y su depósito en la cuenta de ahorro en dólares de don [Nombre7], lo que se cumple escrupulosamente por parte del Banco. Una vez depositados los más de diez millones de dólares en su cuenta, don [Nombre7] constituye otro fondo de crecimiento -esta vez a su nombre- por la suma señalada a la que se agregan cinco mil ochocientos dólares que permanecían aún depositados en la cuenta de ahorros de [Nombre7] en Banco de Costa Rica, de modo que se deja cumplido el designio de [Nombre7] de que ningún dinero permaneciera a su nombre en el Banco de Costa Rica y por ello fuera pasible de ser inmovilizado, por parte de las autoridades federales que lo habían detenido nueve días antes en Nueva York. iii.- Compra de propiedades y bienes muebles.- En el Legajo 1 de la prueba ofrecida por el Ministerio Público, se incluye toda la información notarial y registral concerniente a las transacciones en virtud de las cuales, a partir del año dos mil siete y hasta noviembre de dos mil diez, don [Nombre7] en su condición personal o a nombre de la sociedad [Nombre7] del Caribe S.A. en la que tuvo participación mayoritaria, adquirió bienes muebles e inmuebles con el dinero enviado por [Nombre4].
El Informe de la Sección de Delitos Económicos y Financieros del O.I.J. No. 212-DEF-R-140-11, a partir del folio 343 y hasta el folio 346 vto. del Legajo Principal de esta causa, describe todos los bienes inmuebles que fueron adquiridos por [Nombre7], quien comparece en su condición personal y se hace con la propiedad de esos bienes, y en el apartado del estudio dedicado a la sociedad H, constituida por don [Nombre7] y su esposa [Nombre30] se indica que esta sociedad compró cinco fincas en la Provincia de Limón. Acerca del valor de esas adquisiciones, el Dictamen referido consigna que el valor de los bienes inmuebles asciende a la suma astronómica de un mil novecientos ochenta y dos millones seiscientos cincuenta y tres mil setecientos cincuenta y seis colones. En relación con los bienes muebles su descripción e información notarial y registral puede verse en el Legajo de Prueba uno y en el Informe de la Sección de delitos Económicos y Financieros, en los anexos No.1 y No. 2 se consigna la descripción de esos bienes y el valor de ellos se fija en la suma de ciento sesenta y cinco millones, setecientos cuarenta mil colones, los del primer anexo y en el segundo anexo concerniente a embarcaciones se consigna un valor de Sesenta y cuatro millones doscientos ochenta mil, doscientos cincuenta y un colón, que suman en total, doscientos treinta millones, veinte mil doscientos cincuenta y un colón.
Debe mencionarse que el tiempo en el cual se efectúa la adquisición de bienes inmuebles, entre 2007 y 2010, no es casual, sino que se debe relacionar con la situación del proceso judicial seguido por las autoridades criminales federales de los Estados Unidos, porque según dijo la testiga D Fiscala Federal en ese caso, el Juicio en contra de [Nombre7] se inició en el año dos mil siete, en octubre y se prolongó hasta mayo de 2008, y las propiedades se empiezan a comprar en julio de 2007. El Tribunal concluye de esta proximidad temporal entre el juicio y las adquisiciones de bienes inmuebles que el cambio en la situación procesal de [Nombre7], que lo lleva a enfrentar un juicio federal, le impone la necesidad de no limitar el encubrimiento a las operaciones bancarias sino a diversificarse mediante la inversión inmobiliaria para alejar el patrimonio de [Nombre7] aún más de su origen ilícito, se trata de una legitimación, -por decirlo de algún modo- de segundo grado , en que el dinero legitimado se convierte en propiedades, con lo que se diluye el rastro del dinero, que ya no está solamente en el Banco de Costa Rica sino en diversas inversiones inmobiliarias" (cfr. folios 940 a 942; las negritas no pertenecen al texto original).
Pero, aunque lo que se le atribuya sea el haber mantenido esos dineros en su poder, redimir los fondos y luego hacer las inversiones, resulta que el dolo debía estar al momento de la recepción del dinero, desde que eso es lo que privilegia, como se ha indicado, los diferentes instrumentos convencionales, aún posteriores y de más amplio alcance que la legislación aplicable a este asunto, aunque no sea la adquisición lo que se reprima, sino los actos posteriores . También es evidente que no hay, en autos, ninguna prueba que permita establecer, ni en esta sede ni a través de un reenvío, esos rubros ni distinguirlos de los montos recibidos antes de que se diera la doble incriminación (para ponderar, también, el tema de la prescripción de la acción penal) como para hacer una diferenciación entre unos y otros , sino que ello requeriría una nueva investigación o la producción de prueba nueva la que, como se dirá, no es posible .
Ahora bien, sin parar mientes en esos problemas probatorios referentes a la suma recibida por el encartado luego de la detención de su hermano (de la que, se insiste, no se determina qué monto de ella, si es toda o no, proviene de la evasión fiscal y cuál , de las ganancias, lícitas, de tal actividad) resulta que la construcción del conocimiento del dolo a partir del hecho de esa detención, tampoco es algo que esta Cámara avale. Nótese que el hecho previo con relación causal (la venta de cigarrillos; no la posesión de arma que ninguna relación tiene con el capital ni los hechos por los que fue absuelto) fue un elemento, inclusive, ampliamente discutido y polémico en el mismo sistema de justicia norteamericano, al punto que un juez de ese país eliminó los cargos, aduciendo la ambigüedad de las leyes aplicadas y la posibilidad de que [Nombre7] ignorara el carácter ilícito de lo que hacía. Es decir, la anulación de cargos por un juez se basó en la posibilidad de que [Nombre7] incurriera en lo que, en nuestro sistema, sería el equivalente a un error de prohibición invencible.
Aunque esa decisión fue luego revertida por otro [Nombre30] togado [Nombre30] , es importante , a los efectos del error de tipo alegado por la defensa , en este caso concreto pues...si a los ojos de una autoridad jurisdiccional norteamericana, con amplio conocimiento en leyes de ese país, era razonable que [Nombre7] dudara sobre el tema impositivo de la materia de que se trataba (venta de cigarrillos en la reserva indígena a la que pertenecía su esposa)...¿no es más válido que de ello dudara el propio [Nombre7], un hombre no versado en leyes, que había ido a Estados Unidos y trabajado en el local comercial, que estaba abierto al público y se publicitaba ampliamente en ese país por los medios de comunicación masiva incluido internet y cuyos cigarrillos, de tabaco, se enviaba n usando hasta el correo postal de ese país? ¿no era más esperable que [Nombre7], quien venía recibiendo dinero de su hermano desde hacía más de cuatro años (al 02 de agosto de 2004), dudara de si la procedía de esa suma ulterior era lícita o no? Es cierto que, como bien lo dice la sentencia de instancia, citando a un autor extranjero: "'En cualquier caso, la utilización del sistema bancario y financiero para reciclar los beneficios que se obtienen de distintas actividades delictivas ha sido una práctica extendida e impune durante muchos años, prácticamente en todo el mundo.
Partiendo de cierta complicidad del sistema financiero, se ha utilizado dicho sistema para la transformación de capitales de origen ilícito, provenientes de la comisión de delitos graves, en dinero libre de sospecha. Sin duda, todo ello no hubiera sido posible si las entidades bancarias e intermediarios financieros hubieran puesto un poco de diligencia y colaboración, detectando las transacciones de origen poco claro. Pero algunas entidades financieras han decidido ignorar el origen ilícito de los capitales, en la medida que obtenían importantes beneficios económicos. El libre tránsito de capitales en Europa obliga a mejorar las inspecciones sobre dichos capitales en origen, sin que esta política de intervención pueda ser interpretada como una traba a su libre circulación. Por ese motivo se han ido aprobando sucesivas directivas reguladoras de las actividades bancarias, crediticias y profesionales que inciden en la transformación de capitales y bienes.' [Nombre31] , , op. cit. p. 168.
Contrariamente a la idea que existe en el conocimiento común, de que la remisión de fondos por la vía bancaria excluye de suyo el delito de Legitimación de Capitales, tal y como ha sucedido en el caso bajo examen las entidades bancarias y financieras pueden ser utilizadas para legitimar capitales, de modo que pueden contribuir activamente en la producción de los resultados dañosos de esta actividad delictiva en el orden socioeconómico" (cfr. folios 932-933, se suple el destacado). No obstante, aunque el sistema bancario pueda y haya sido usado en otros casos y en diferentes latitudes a los fines de la legitimación, es claro que ese elemento debe ponderarse, junto con otros, para extraer el dolo, desde que no es lo mismo quien envía un trasiego de dinero a escondidas ("en sacos", refiere el impugnante) respecto de quien lo hace usando instituciones bancarias de dos países, destacándose ambas, aunque una más que otra, por sus nada despreciables controles sobre los orígenes monetarios.
Tampoco es igual el trato que debe dársele a la prueba si la actividad generadora es ilícita per se (bienes obtenidos del narcotráfico, por ejemplo) a si proviene de una evasión fiscal donde hay un origen lícito del dinero, aunque posteriormente se omita pagar los impuestos. Entonces, si en el caso concreto, [Nombre7] trasladaba sumas de dinero desde hacía años (a veces por varios millones de dólares, como se reseñó atrás en una transferencia por más de dos millones, antes de la de cuatro millones de dólares que interesa) usando bancos norteamericanos y nacionales, a los que reportaba el origen de esos dineros al punto que, en Costa Rica autoridades bancarias fueron a hacer una visita al referido negocio, constatándose su existencia y la publicidad de sus actuaciones, eso es importante considerarlo a los efectos del dolo del aquí endilgado...¿pudo cambiar su concepción la detención de su hermano?
En criterio de esta Cámara no, porque tal detención se produjo atribuyéndole una serie de cargos (homicidio, incendio, extorsión, posesión de arma) que ninguna relación directa tenían con el origen de esos dineros. Esto por un lado pero, por otro, como bien lo refieren los impugnantes, para este tipo de delitos de relación era necesario que, por haberse iniciado un proceso en aquel país, dicho proceso hubiera fenecido con una sentencia condenatoria firme para generar un conocimiento, que no es potencial, probable, sino que debe ser cierto y actual. Entonces, se pregunta este Tribunal ...¿qué hubiera ocurrido si el juicio de [Nombre7] se hubiera dado en forma paralela, o inmediatamente posterior, al momento en que el juez norteamericano [Nombre14] excluyó los cargos de contrabando contra [Nombre7] y antes de la decisión de la Corte de Apelaciones? De haberse procedido así, ese elemento habría generado la probabilidad razonable de duda en el dolo del encartado.
Es más...¿si [Nombre7] hubiera sido absuelto en Estados Unidos por esos hechos, podría mantenerse la afirmación de la sentencia de que bastaba su detención para que [Nombre7] supiera el carácter ilícito de sus hechos? Es obvio que no . Lo que se quiere indicar es que, dependiendo de las etapas del proceso norteamericano en que se hubiera efectuado éste, la respuesta a la interrogante sobre el dolo del aquí imputado habría sido diferente, lo que no es razonable ni aceptable. No es legítimo, en consecuencia, dar una solución variable, según las etapas de un proceso extranjero, ante una misma cuestión (de si hay dolo del encartado). Eso hace inválida la "inferencia" del dolo que hace el Tribunal de un acto procesal (la detención de [Nombre7]) cuando él fue absuelto por la mayoría de los cargos; condenado por uno sin trascendencia causal con el flujo dinerario y por otro ampliamente discutido su caso en aquel país, ante autoridades jurisdiccionales que, inclusive, llegaron a exonerarlo, temporalmente, de responsabilidad.
Por ende, es válido el alegato de error formulado por la defensa al considerar una serie conjunta de situaciones: a)- la transferencia desde hacía años; b)- el uso de instituciones bancarias de ambos países; [Nombre7])- la declaración del origen de los bienes; d)- el no procesamiento previo de ninguna persona por tales hechos en Estados Unidos siendo [Nombre7] el primer sentenciado por tal conducta; e)- la actividad pública y publicitada de la empresa de este ; f)- el tipo de giro, venta de cigarrillos de tabaco , que no es una actividad, per se, ilícita. Para este Tribunal, a partir de todos esos elementos, el encartado [Nombre7] no tenía por qué saber que el dinero prevenía de un delito grave (que, ya vimos, que no era tal) y, aunque su error fuera vencible, no hay regulación paralela para hechos culposos de esa naturaleza en nuestro medio, por lo que, tratándose, efectivamente, como lo señala el defensor, de un error de tipo y no de uno de prohibición, la exclusión del dolo hacía atípico su comportamiento: “El desconocimiento o conocimiento defectuoso de algún hecho constitutivo de la infracción penal excluye el dolo, y origina un error de tipo.
En el delito de blanqueo de capitales, la exclusión del dolo puede producirse como consecuencia de un desconocimiento o de un conocimiento defectuoso de la acción típica o del objeto material (…) Más problemática es la cuestión relativa al desconocimiento que recae sobre el objeto material, fundamentalmente porque la normativa penal relativa al blanqueo emplea elementos normativos en el tipo para describir los objetos idóneos (…) la doctrina no considera suficiente, a efectos del dolo típico, con conocer los datos configuradores del supuesto de hecho del elemento normativo. Se exige que el autor realice una valoración paralela en la esfera del profano que le permita entender el contenido del significado social del supuesto” (Cfr. [Nombre23] , . El delito de blanqueo de capitales. Aranzadi, España, 2012, págs. 763 y 765). Hay que aclarar, en este tema, que el Tribunal de instancia valoró este alegato como si se tratara de un error de prohibición, al referir: "...la defensa técnica de don [Nombre7] argumentó que él actuó bajo un error de prohibición porque no tenía modo de conocer que el dinero enviado estaba relacionado con una actividad ilícita.
El Tribunal no puede admitir esta argumentación de la Defensa porque, de conformidad con lo que dispone el artículo 35 del Código Penal el error de derecho supone que el autor de la conducta crea -en virtud de un error invencible- que el hecho que realiza no está sujeto a pena. En este caso, luego de la detención de [Nombre7] en los Estados Unidos, el dos de agosto de 2004, su hermano [Nombre7] no actúa -al participar en la redención del Fondo de Crecimiento y la constitución de uno nuevo a su nombre y al mantener en sus cuentas de ahorro en dólares sumas de dinero por millones de dólares- siendo víctima de un error invencible, porque él conoce que la conducta diversa a la que había venido desarrollando [Nombre7] -depositar los dineros ilícitos desde la cuenta de [Nombre8] y mantener el fondo de Crecimiento en dólares a su nombre en el Banco de Costa Rica- cambia a partir del seis de agosto y el único origen del cambio es la detención de [Nombre7] bajo cargos criminales diversos, entre los que se encuentra el contrabando de cigarrillos, con lo que don [Nombre7] adquiere la certeza -que excluye el error invencible- de que todo el dinero remitido desde Nueva York, está vinculado a la actividad ilícita en perjuicio de la justicia estadounidense y que los actos posteriores a ese conocimiento tienen el propósito de sustraer de la posible inmovilización y/o incautación por parte de esas autoridades, del dinero proveniente del delito aludido y que no fue pagado al fisco estadounidense que dejó de percibir sumas millonarias por los impuestos que no fueron recaudados por [Nombre7] en su negocio, según dijeron los testigos [Nombre8] y [Nombre16] en el Debate.
Como consecuencia de los razonamientos expuestos se concluye que don [Nombre7] no actuó bajo un error invencible en los términos del artículo 35 del Código Penal- porque el origen del dinero se revela indudablemente ilícito, para don [Nombre7], a partir de la detención de [Nombre7] el 2 de agosto de 2004, en los Estados Unidos" (cfr. folios 939-940, se suplen los destacados). Nótese, que, por una parte, se alude, nuevamente, a un dolo subsecuente: no por la recepción sino por mantener el dinero y hacer la redención del Fondo, que, adicionalmente, venía nutriéndose con dineros que, ya dijimos, no surgieron de una actividad que generara la doble incriminación hasta una fecha (2002) o el mismo Tribunal a quo afirmó que se recibieron sin dolo hasta otra data (02 de agosto de 2004) y que, en definitiva, no consta la cuota tributaria dejada de pagar. Pero, en lo que más interesa, el Tribunal partió de que el alegato concernía a un error de prohibición, lo que es un razonamiento equivocado porque lo que se alegó era que [Nombre7] no sabía que los dineros provinieran de un ' delito grave ' y, siendo este, un concepto normativo del tipo, se estaba alegando desconocimiento de un elemento objetivo del tipo y, por ende, el alegato efectivamente correspondía a un error de tipo, en donde las consecuencias sobre la vencibilidad, o no, del error, bien sabemos, son diferentes.
En todo caso, conviene reiterar la posición que esta Cámara, con una integración parcialmente similar a la actual (Chinchilla, [Nombre32] y [Nombre33]) ha esbozado en casos similares, en donde el tipo penal lo construye el legislador con elementos normativos jurídicos, supuestos en los que se ha indicado: "(1) Sobre la naturaleza del error invocado. En principio, no hay mayor confusión cuando se define el error de tipo como el que recae sobre los elementos objetivos del tipo penal ni cuando se alude al error de prohibición como el que se produce tanto cuando el agente desconoce la norma, la considera no vigente o la interpreta equivocadamente (directo) como cuando se equivoca sobre la existencia o límites de justificantes (error de permisión o de prohibición indirecto) (...) Lo que sí resulta necesario, es determinar la naturaleza del error involucrado cuando el tipo penal se construye de tal manera que, en sus elementos objetivos, introduce términos tales como "ilícitamente" "ilegítimamente" "ilegalmente" "antijurídicamente", etc. pues éstos términos se convierten, entonces, en elementos normativos de carácter jurídico que, al integrar el tipo penal, eventualmente harían que el error que se alegue sobre ellos sea, ya no uno de prohibición sino de tipo.
Sobre el particular la doctrina refiere: ¬"...fue el propio [Nombre34] . quien se dio cuenta de la novedad que con carácter general planteaban los elementos normativos del tipo por él 'descubiertos'; dicho resumidamente: pese a ser componentes de la antijuridicidad, como no dejan de ser elementos del tipo, caerían, para este autor, bajo la regla del error sobre circunstancias del hecho (...) es decir, requerirían -al contrario que la antijuridicidad- ser abarcados por el dolo del sujeto, pues formarían parte del supuesto de hecho sobre el que recae el juicio valorativo de antijuridicidad, de modo que el error sobre un elemento normativo del tipo sería lo que hoy llamamos un error de tipo, o si se prefiere, con terminología más neutral, un error excluyente del dolo." [Nombre35] Y [Nombre36] , [Nombre37]. El error sobre elementos normativos del tipo penal. La Ley, 1ª edición, Madrid, 2008, p. 42.
Así entendido, el dolo del sujeto activo debe abarcar también ese elemento normativo-jurídico (...) Si, como se viene diciendo, las vicisitudes del permiso son elementos normativos del tipo, errores sobre los alcances de dicho permiso constituyen, entonces, errores de tipo. Es decir, en este caso concreto, el sujeto activo debe saber no sólo que no cuenta con permiso para la portación sino, además, tener claro que dicho permiso se necesita. Cualquier representación falsa sobre los alcances de aquellas situaciones en que no sea necesario ese permiso que es, justamente, lo que se plantea en el caso concreto, hacen que se esté ante un error de tipo. Por ello, el error invocado en este caso, no es un error de prohibición (que implicaría el desconocimiento general que portar un arma sea delito en Costa Rica, tema que no es el planteado) sino uno de tipo, es decir, la falsa suposición que alega el sujeto activo de que él no requería el permiso porque no portaba arma, sino que la transportaba (como distinguiera el armero), y que para hacer ésto último bastaba cumplir con los requisitos establecidos en la directriz emitida por el Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, transcrita infra." Tribunal de Casación Penal, voto número 2010-641, se suplen los destacados.
Si en este asunto se alega que el encartado recibió el dinero desconociendo que provenía de un ‘delito grave’ y este es un elemento normativo-jurídico del tipo penal, el error alegado es de tipo, y no de prohibición, siendo relevante la distinción porque la vencibilidad del error, en el primer caso, excluye el delito si no existe, como no lo hay en este asunto, tipo culposo paralelo, en tanto que, en el segundo, solo disminuye la sanción. Entonces, la detención de [Nombre7] en Estados Unidos el 02 de agosto de 2004 lo más que pudo producir era una alerta sobre la posibilidad de la ilicitud de la conducta de la que se originaban los fondos, probabilidad esa que no tiene la firmeza para ser certeza, habida cuenta de los elementos señalados atrás. Pero si, de lo que hasta aquí se ha señalado, pueden colegirse dudas importantes en cuanto a la configuración de un ‘delito grave’ (porque, por temas probatorios, se desconoce el monto de lo evadido en Estados Unidos respecto de lo trasladado; no se hizo un análisis financiero de lo recibido en cada período y, por la fecha de los hechos, muchos de los dineros trasladados lo fueron antes de la regulación aplicable a este asunto, a más del tema de la doble incriminación en cuanto a la pena mínima y la prescripción de la acción penal) como elemento precedente y, además, hay amplias y fundadas razones por las cuales poner en duda el conocimiento de ese objeto material del delito por parte del aquí encartado sucede, como si fuera poco, que el análisis del asunto no puede agotarse en tales aspectos, pues el tipo penal tantas veces citado contiene elementos subjetivos diferentes del dolo, que deben ser analizados enseguida.
§4. Otros elementos subjetivos del tipo, diferentes del dolo: "Al lado del elemento cognitivo debe existir en el delito de legitimación de capitales una voluntad de ocultar o encubrir el origen, la ubicación, etc. de los bienes que el agente sabe provenientes de un delito. Quien recibe, transfiere, convierte objetos que él sabe provenientes de un delito para ocultar o encubrir su ubicación, su destino, su propiedad, etc. actúa con el dolo de peligro requerido (...) El dolo debe extenderse a los elementos del tipo objetivo..." (CASTILLO [Nombre5] , . El delito de legitimación de capitales. Editorial Jurídica Continental, San José, 2012, 1ª edición, págs. 127-128). ¿Se da eso en la especie? Mientras se recibió el dinero en el Banco de Costa Rica se declaró que provenía de esa venta de cigarrillos , al punto de que las autoridades bancarias nacionales visitaron la empresa y dieron un informe al respecto .
Se dejó constancia de los traslados de fondos a la cuenta de [Nombre7] y que este adquirió fincas o bienes a su nombre o de sociedades en donde es socio único o mayoritario . Inclusive, esos activos eran identificados con un sello que usaba [Nombre7] y las personas que trabajaban para cada negocio u tilizaban un uniforme con su logo , según lo relataron, en juicio, [Nombre38], [Nombre39] y [Nombre29] (ver folios 861 a 870) . [Nombre7] , en Estados Unidos, declaró la existencia de tales bienes a los efectos de darlos en garantía como parte de la fianza por su libertad que estaba solicitando, como también consta en la prueba documental venida de ese país y en las declaraciones de sus oficiales gubernamentales que depusieron en el debate …entonces…¿hay afán de ocultar? En criterio de esta Cámara no, porque el rastro era fácilmente verificable, sin que se den los indicios que, ciertamente no de modo necesario, suelen presentarse en estos casos: “…la forma habitual de probar ese conocimiento es la prueba indiciaria (…) entre los que la jurisprudencia suele destacar una serie de actos irregulares o atípicos en el funcionamiento financiero o mercantil habitual, como el conocimiento de la utilización de identidades ficticias, la utilización de sociedades sin capacidad o sin actividad económica real, la inexistencia de actividad económica conocida, el incremento patrimonial injustificado, etc. Pero todos estos indicios no pueden prescindir de aquél o aquéllos que evidencien, siquiera vía indiciaria, la conexión causal entre los bienes…” (Cfr. [Nombre1] , .
Reflexiones técnicas y de política criminal sobre el delito de lavado de capitales. Cuadernos de Política Criminal Nº 91, 2007, págs. 5-26. También en el sitio web de la Universidad Externado de Colombia : www.revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpen/article/.../98, pág. 81). Entonces, esta es una razón adicional para acoger las impugnaciones y modificar la sentencia venida en apelación.
§ 6 . En resumen. Es válida la argumentación defensiva de que en este caso no se trató de dinero proveniente per se de una actividad ilícita, como lo sería de algún objeto prohibido; el objeto (venta de cigarrillos) no lo era sino, eventualmente, el no pago de los tributos. No obstante, en este asunto no resulta posible una condena porque: 1) no se da la doble incriminación, pues al hacer el encuadre a la legislación nacional, los hechos cometidos por [Nombre7] (objeto material del que provenían) tenían pena mínima prevista inferior a [Nombre7] uatro años, que era el monto que regía con la ley aplicable a este asunto; 2 ) [Nombre7] no ha sido, aún, sentenciado en Estados Unidos, por lo que se ignora la pena concreta que se le puede imponer y si ésta encaja en la definición nacional de ‘delito grave’ según la referida ley nacional aplicable ; 3 ) no se individualizó el monto de la cuota tributaria dejada de pagar en cada año, en que varía el tipo penal, sin que pueda hacerse un cálculo acumulativo; 4 ) el encartado no tenía conocimiento de que el dinero provenía de un ' delito grave ' pues la actividad de origen de los fondos era lícita (venta de tabaco), aunque no lo fuera el pago de los tributos, aspecto sobre el que no hay prueba que el encartado conociera ; 5 ) tampoco fue su fin ocultar la actividad de la que procedía ; 6 ) no se analizó el tema de la prescripción de la acción penal en ambos países en función de los montos anuales recibidos .
En síntesis, pese a que la sentencia de instancia es una pieza jurídica importante que, con esmero y exhaustividad, abordó el asunto que nos ocupa, este Tribunal no coincide co n las conclusiones a las que llegó, ni avala la omisión de aspectos que resultan indispensables e inciden en el fondo de lo decidido, sin que demeriten la forma, desde que la sentencia sí contiene la motivación requerida para su validez y tales omisiones surgen desde la misma investigación fiscal, que no pueden ser suplidas con nueva prueba y que marcan la diferencia de criterio y resultado entre dicha decisión y esta. Empero, el esfuerzo objetivo del Tribunal (al punto de rechazar pretensiones fiscales y señalarle a ese órgano sus abusos, incluido el referente al despliegue policial para la detención del endilgado: ver folio 970), no es vano pues, a más de respetarse el criterio allí vertido, ha permitido a esta Cámara hacer pronunciamiento desde esta instancia, sin ordenar reenvío alguno , habida cuenta que los errores y omisiones señalados no pueden ser subsanados en instancia, pues ello requeriría nueva prueba o reabrir la investigación, lo que no es posible hacer ante un recurso interpuesto (en tales extremos) solo a favor del encartado (ver artículo 447 del Código Procesal Penal) pues ello violentaría el principio de prohibición de reforma en perjuicio .
Por ello, deben acoger se ambas impugnaciones en los extremos referidos y lo que procede es revocar parcialmente la sentencia condenatoria decretada en autos, así como la decisión de comiso de bienes y, en su lugar, absolver de toda pena y responsabilidad a [Nombre7] por el delito de legitimación de capitales que se le ha venido atribuyendo, ordenándose la plena restitución de los bienes decomisados, secuestrados o anotados, sobre los que se rechaza su comiso; así como su inmediata libertad y el cese de cualquier medida cautelar emitida en su contra, si otra causa no lo impide y se resuelve sin especial pronunciamiento en costas.
IV.- […]Se rechaza la impugnación. Como ya se adelantó, para esta Cámara lo que procede es absolver al encartado de toda pena y responsabilidad por los hechos que se le han atribuido y, entonces, no hay ninguna base legal para ordenar el comiso de los bienes exentos de esa medida por el tribunal a quo, antes bien, debe levantarse dicha medida sobre los bienes sobre los que se ordenó, conforme se indicó en el acápite anterior. Sobre la naturaleza jurídica, características y principios que rigen la medida de comiso, esta Cámara, bajo el nombre de Tribunal de Casación Penal y con la integración actual, ha referido, por ejemplo en el voto número [Telf1]: “ ... lo primero que debe hacerse para determinar la naturaleza jurídica del comiso es establecer las características, efectos y supuestos en los que procede. Conforme al artículo 110 citado, el comiso requiere, para su procedencia: C.1) que se esté investigando un delito, no una falta o contravención, esto así porque el numeral inicia indicando "Todo delito" y esa expresión, en sentido restrictivo (artículo 2 del Código Procesal Penal) sólo puede entenderse como referido a los hechos calificados como tales por el legislador (Libro II del Código Penal o leyes especiales) quien hizo la distinción con las faltas que tienen una ubicación diversa en el cuerpo normativo (Libro III); C.2) que ese delito sea doloso.
Esto no lo indica expresamente la norma, pero señala que lo que se pierde son los instrumentos con los que se cometió el ilícito y las cosas provenientes de su realización. Los autores de la materia, han referido, a nuestro modo de ver conforme a una interpretación restrictiva acorde con el principio de legalidad, que el carácter doloso de la medida se extrae de la previsión de "instrumentos" que contempla la ley, pues éstos: "...para la generalidad de la doctrina son los que se han empleado 'intencionalmente' para cometer el delito (...) con lo cual quedan excluidos, por supuesto, los (...) de un delito culposo" (CREUS, [Nombre7]. Derecho penal. Parte general. Editorial Astrea, 3ª edición, Buenos Aires, pág. 519. En igual sentido: [Nombre40] , ; [Nombre41] , y [Nombre42] , . Manual de derecho penal. Parte general. Ediar, Buenos Aires, 1ª edición, 2005, pág. 734; [Nombre43] , . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar.
Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, pág. 59 y 64 y otros citados en [Nombre44] , . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José,1ª edición, 2006, págs. 70-73); C.3) resultaría aplicable, en principio, a cualquier delito doloso, por tratarse de un instituto regulado en la parte general del Código Penal, la cual se caracteriza, precisamente, por incidir en los tipos penales codificados o de leyes especiales; C.4) puede afectar a terceros siempre que se les dé parte en el proceso. Esto no lo establece la norma que, de interpretarse aisladamente, conduciría a que se obviara este requisito que dimana de una interpretación sistemática del ordenamiento jurídico y que coloca al Derecho de la Constitución como lo que es, sustento del resto de la jerarquía normativa (ver, al respecto, los votos número 712-2006 de la Sala Tercera y 637-2010 del Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José); C.5) el comiso no afecta los derechos del ofendido o de terceros de buena fe, sino que éstos predominan por sobre el interés estatal (en tal sentido, los votos del Tribunal de Casación Penal de San José, números 2000-76, 2000-323, 2003-383 y 2004-101 y los de la Sala Tercera, números 512-2001 y 1273-2005, entre otros); C.6) los efectos surgen del delito, por lo que normativamente se prevé que se dicte el comiso ante sentencia condenatoria (artículo 367 del Código Procesal Penal).
¿'Delito' ha de entenderse como hecho típico, antijurídico y culpable o como la estipulación abstracta de ilicitud referida por el legislador? La jurisprudencia nacional, en términos generales, lo ha entendido como previsión legislativa, sin declaración concreta de responsabilidad, al punto que ha previsto la posibilidad del comiso con desestimaciones, archivos fiscales, sentencias de sobreseimiento definitivo, aún por prescripción de la acción penal, absolutorias, con medidas alternas como conciliaciones, suspensiones del proceso a prueba, reparación integral del daño y pago de multa, entre otros (ver el recuento de votos que hace [Nombre44] , . El comiso de bienes. IJSA, San José, 1° edición, 2006, págs. 230-263); C.7) carece de indemnización, pues surge ante una ilicitud previa, de modo que es una excepción a la imposibilidad estatal de asumir el dominio de la propiedad sin pagar el valor del bien (artículo 45 de la Constitución Política); C.8) es una medida de orden público, por lo que no se requiere instancia de parte sino que puede dictarse oficiosamente; C.9) como medida surgida del poder de imperio del Estado, requiere estar prevista en la ley (Sala Tercera, voto número 1217-1999), emitirse en forma motivada o fundamentada y habiendo existido demostración previa del vínculo o nexo entre el objeto y el hecho delictivo, por lo que no se trata de una responsabilidad objetiva (Sala Tercera, voto número 505-99); C.10) rigen principios como la presunción de inocencia, el debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, por lo que la carga probatoria le incumbe al Estado; C.11) en Costa Rica no se regula normativamente el comiso de los bienes usados en la fase preparatoria que no llega a ser ejecutiva; C.12) el destino de los bienes, una vez obtenido su dominio por el Estado, está expresamente fijado por ley (cfr.: Ley de distribución de bienes confiscados o caídos en comiso, su reglamento y manual).
El comiso tampoco respondería, desde esta perspectiva, al principio de culpabilidad que requiere no solo la culpabilidad para imponerse (es decir, no cabría imponer una sanción sin culpabilidad, por lo que no podría imponerse ante la inexistencia de pena principal ni ante supuestos en que el autor no es sancionado, aunque hubiese un injusto penal) sino que considera que esta es graduable, lo que choca con el carácter rígido de la figura. Asimismo, de ser pena, violentaría el principio referente a su carácter personalísimo ya que el comiso cabe aún contra terceros, siempre y cuando se les dé audiencia en el proceso respectivo y los bienes, con su consentimiento, hayan sido usados en la comisión de delitos (...) El comiso tampoco está previsto, como pena accesoria, en el artículo 50.2 del Código Penal, que regula como tales solo la inhabilitación especial definida en el numeral 58 ibídem como la privación o restricción de uno o más derechos.
Esta objeción es tanto sistemática (en cuanto a la ubicación de la figura), como de cara a principios constitucionales, pues chocaría con el principio de legalidad al extralimitarse el catálogo de penas accesorias que expresamente contempla el Código Penal y las regulaciones que a ellas le son propias. Podría superarse la dificultad refiriendo que hay una ley previa que lo dispone para todos los delitos (artículo 110 del Código Penal); que hay otras normas especiales que lo señalan como penas (por ejemplo la Ley de conservación de la vida silvestre) y que la figura contempla la privación de un derecho: la propiedad. No obstante, el mismo numeral 58 del Código Penal refiere que las penas accesorias previstas como tales por el legislador tienen un plazo, que es el mismo de la inhabilitación absoluta y que va de 6 meses a 12 años (artículo 57), lo cual es incompatible con la pérdida de la titularidad del bien, que es definitiva.
Asimismo, contra toda pena, principal o accesoria, cabe la posibilidad de plantear revisión, lo que la Sala Constitucional ha señalado como incompatible con la cosa juzgada que deriva del comiso (ver voto número [Telf2]). Por último, no debe olvidarse que conforme al artículo 110 del Código Penal: "...la ponderación del comiso se hará a partir de que estén satisfechas las responsabilidades civiles dimanantes del delito (...) indudablemente si el comiso mantuviera el carácter de pena no sería admisible que la imposición de la pena pendiera de la satisfacción de la responsabilidad civil." [Nombre45] , ; [Nombre46] , y [Nombre47] , . La responsabilidad civil ex delicto. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, págs. 45, 47. Entonces, o el comiso no es una pena accesoria o, si lo fuera, sería inconstitucional por violar los citados preceptos, por lo que se hace necesario evaluar otras posibilidades. D.2) El comiso como medida de seguridad: A partir de esos cuestionamientos, la doctrina señaló que, en realidad, no se trataba de que la medida fuera inconstitucional sino que no debía verse como una pena y, al intentar darle una explicación, se pensó que su naturaleza era la de ser una medida de seguridad, con lo que se superaba la objeción de que respondiera a un principio de culpabilidad pues este escapa a las medidas de seguridad cuyo fundamento es, más bien, la peligrosidad del sujeto activo.
Comiso y medidas de seguridad tenían en común, además, el responder más a criterios de prevención especial asumidos en instrumentos internacionales que a los de prevención general. Pero nuevamente arreciaron las críticas. Primero, porque la peligrosidad en las medidas de seguridad surge ante la existencia de un injusto que puede no estar presente en el comiso, que se basa en una presunta peligrosidad objetiva de la cosa per se (en el caso de instrumentos usados para la comisión del delito y en particular de algunos tipos de ellos, como las armas). Además, porque esta explicación no sorteó el carácter personalísimo que también tienen las medidas de seguridad y que escapa a la figura del comiso (...) Además, en el derecho penal costarricense, la Sala Constitucional declaró inconstitucionales las medidas de seguridad para imputables, dejando solo las medidas de seguridad curativas (ver artículo 98 incisos 3,4 y 5 y votos números 88-92 y 1588-98 de la Sala Constitucional) y el comiso, la mayor parte de las veces, va anexo a una declaratoria de sanción de imputables y no es mencionado como medida de seguridad (artículos 101 y 102 del Código Penal) que también se rigen por el principio de tipicidad y la prohibición de creación por analogía (artículos 97 y 2 del Código Penal), a más de que tienen, también, la posibilidad de cese (artículos 100 del Código Penal y 478 del Código Procesal Penal) incompatible con el comiso.
Ante ello, se planteó otra opción. D.3) El comiso como consecuencia civil o medida reparadora derivada del delito: aunque la Sala Constitucional se ha referido a la figura desde esta perspectiva (así en el voto número [Telf2]: "el comiso es una de las consecuencias civiles del hecho punible, junto con la restitución y la reparación e indemnización de daños y perjuicios"), lo que también ha aceptado alguna jurisprudencia de casación (ver, por ejemplo y entre otros, el voto número 787-2006 de la Sala Tercera), es lo cierto que, en forma técnica, el comiso no puede considerarse que sea una consecuencia civil. Primero porque, como se dijo, en Costa Rica se puede decretar oficiosamente, lo que es ajeno al principio dispositivo y de congruencia de lo civil. Segundo, porque no tiene carácter reparador, restitutivo o indemnizatorio, al punto que el artículo 103 del Código Penal lo enumera ajeno a esos fines, que son propios de las consecuencias derivadas de delito.
Tercero porque "La responsabilidad civil ex delicto constituye una cuestión de naturaleza esencialmente civil, con independencia de que sea examinada en el proceso penal, lo que explica que no haya obstáculo a que su conocimiento sea diferido, en su caso, a la jurisdicción civil. Y si bien el delito, respecto del nacimiento de esta responsabilidad, es un presupuesto necesario, no lo es suficiente, pues se requiere además la producción de un daño, elemento imprescindible para el nacimiento de toda responsabilidad civil, se encuentre o no tipificado en el Código penal el hecho que lo ocasionó" (CEREZO [Nombre48] , . Análisis jurídico-penal de la figura del comiso. Editorial Comares, Granada, 2004, pág. 29), sin que sea posible plantear, en la vía civil, un reclamo aislado por comiso. Además, porque "La responsabilidad civil se trasmite a los herederos (...) pero eso no puede sostenerse igualmente respecto de los herederos del responsable del hecho.
En los casos del fallecimiento del acusado o procesado sin que se haya llegado a acordar el comiso no es posible aplicar..." (QUINTERO [Nombre49] , ; [Nombre46] , y [Nombre47] , . La responsabilidad civil ex delictio. Aranzadi, Navarra, 2002, pág. 46). A ello agrega la doctrina nacional que sus efectos no son de derecho privado sino a favor del Estado, a pesar de que Costa Rica no siguiera las recomendaciones discutidas en la elaboración del Código Penal tipo para América Latina y colocara la figura dentro de las consecuencias civiles. Esto, como se dijo, no afecta su naturaleza jurídica real y lo que cabe derivar es que la disposición fue erróneamente ubicada, sin que eso incida sus efectos, concluyéndose que "el comiso no puede ser un efecto de las responsabilidad civil ex delicto, en su esencia no está el ser una sanción civil" (ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible.
Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, pág. 376). A partir de estas reflexiones se planteó otra posibilidad. D.4) el comiso como un acto complejo, una consecuencia accesoria, jurídica, mixta o sui géneris del delito: Hay consecuencias derivadas del delito que lo son por disposición de ley, sin participar de la naturaleza de aquellas figuras. En el derecho costarricense se ubican como tales el tema de la condena en costas a la parte vencida (artículo 267 del Código Procesal Penal); la publicación de la sentencia en delitos contra el honor (artículo 155 del Código Penal); la reconstrucción, supresión, reforma, restitución o rectificación registral derivada de la falsedad de instrumentos públicos (artículo 483 del Código Procesal Penal); la inscripción de cierto tipo de resoluciones (artículos 30 incisos j y k, 25 párrafo primero, 36 párrafos noveno y décimo del Código Procesal Penal y Ley del Registro y Archivo Judiciales) y el comiso.
Así se ha regulado en países como Alemania y España y lo acepta la mayoría de la doctrina, aunque sin concordar sobre el nombre idóneo a usar, pero dejando claro que no participa de las características de los institutos señalados en acápites anteriores: ¬"...Henao [Nombre50] critica las posiciones unitarias (...) señalando que (...) el comiso es un fenómeno de naturaleza compleja con un alcance funcional muy amplio, pues no solamente cumple tarea de pena, sino también las de restitución, compensación, policivas y de aseguramiento, e inclusive procesales de tipo probatorio y cautelar (...) En el mismo sentido, [Nombre51] y [Nombre52] son del parecer de la naturaleza compleja del comiso (...) [Nombre53] (...) plantea el carácter mixto de la institución (...) En contraste con las penas o las medidas de seguridad, las consecuencias accesorias son actos coercitivos o sanciones de naturaleza propia, vinculados legalmente a la imposición de una pena por un delito o falta dolosos o pueden vincularse con ella mediante el pronunciamiento judicial en determinados casos.
Así, la ubicación del comiso (...) como consecuencia accesoria implica que su fundamento no es la culpabilidad ni la peligrosidad del sujeto activo del delito." [Nombre54] , [Nombre55] . El comiso: análisis sistemático e instrumentación cautelar. Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 1ª edición, Bogotá, 2007, págs. 59-60 y 62. Inclusive, nuestra legislación surge del Código Penal tipo para América Latina, en donde se discutió ampliamente el tema de la naturaleza jurídica y correcta ubicación del comiso: "Finalmente privó la opinión de situar el comiso con un carácter penal, más no como una pena, y fuera de las consecuencias civiles del hecho punible, desechándose la idea de este fenómeno como una medida de carácter procesal (...) Uno de los acuerdos de la Cuarta Reunión Plenaria celebrada en Caracas, Venezuela del 20 al 30 de enero de 1969, el N° 89, fue el de incluir un texto sobre el comiso, pero en el entendido de que no tenía el carácter de pena ni de efecto de la responsabilidad civil (...) ¿Por qué entonces a la hora de ordenar la normativa de ese Código se incluyó (...) el comiso bajo el Título (...) relativo a la 'Responsabilidad civil derivada del delito'?
(ABDELNOUR GRANADOS, Rosa María. La responsabilidad civil derivada del hecho punible. Editorial Juricentro, San José, 1984, págs. 369-370). G) Dicho lo anterior, este Tribunal estima que, en efecto, el comiso costarricense es, simplemente, una consecuencia señalada por el legislador para el delito (para cierto tipo de delitos, según se dijo y retomará) que, aunque tiene rasgos penales (legalidad, carga de la prueba, inocencia, nexo con el hecho), civiles (procede contra terceros) y administrativos (coercitividad y oficiosidad estatal), no se ajusta con precisión a ninguno de ellos y, por eso, no le pueden ser aplicables principios propios de la pena (como la culpabilidad o temporalidad), de las medidas de seguridad (como la personalidad) o de la reparación (como el dispositivo). De allí que resulte válido que el legislador lo regule para aplicarse oficiosamente, estableciendo la pérdida de titularidad como definitiva, etc. No obstante, ello no significa que, como medida privativa de derechos que al fin y al cabo es, no esté sometida a principios como el de legalidad y de proporcionalidad que son propios, inclusive, de cualquier materia sancionatoria, inclusive en el área del derecho administrativo, por ser los únicos limitadores del poder de imperio del Estado, tal y como se abordará con mayor detalle enseguida” (se suplen los destacados).
En el presente caso , no hay ningún hecho típico, antijurídico y culpable para decretar tal medida, ni, tampoco, puede deducirse alguna base fáctica o jurídica para estimar que los bienes muebles o inmuebles del encartado deban recibir dicha medida, pues no solo no se ha demostrado la existencia de ningún delito (penal), sino que tampoco han estado en discusión deudas o ilícitos civiles o administrativos, o el incumplimiento de normativa de cualquier otra índole, para tomar dicha decisión. Por ello, no es necesario ahondar en el recurso fiscal que presupone la ilicitud de la conducta, que esta Cámara no comparte según las razones ampliamente esbozadas atrás.”
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