ICE Is Not Exempt from Real Property TaxICE no está exento del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Correo Electrónico ...01 __________________________________________________________________ ASUNTO: Apelación Municipal ACCIONANTE: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad RECURRIDO: Municipalidad de El Guarco.

No. 124-2014 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN TERCERA, ANEXO A DEL II CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at ten hours twenty-five minutes on the twelfth of March, two thousand fourteen.- This Tribunal hears, in its capacity as non-hierarchical legality reviewer, the appeal filed by the INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD –ICE-, legal identification number CED35574, represented by its Special Administrative Attorney-in-Fact, Licenciado Juan Carlos Araya González, of legal age, married, resident of Grecia, with identity card number CED79140, against resolution CED80188° of ten hours on the ninth of May, two thousand twelve, issued by the Mayor of the Municipalidad de El Guarco.

Judge Leiva Poveda writes, and:

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- PROVEN FACTS: For a correct resolution of this matter, the following is considered proven: 1) By Official Letter No. 5104-0421-2012 dated March 1, 2012, the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad requested the Municipalidad de El Guarco for an exoneration from the payment of the real estate tax (impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles) and that the collection be ordered eliminated from the Computer Systems held by that Municipality, regarding each of the following properties: Folio Real No. 98080; No. 82848; No. 142748; No. 189500 (folios 1 to 8). 2) By means of Resolution No. 006-2012 of ten hours on the ninth of May, two thousand twelve, the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco resolved: “POR TANTO: According to the powers entrusted to me by the Código Municipal, among them exercising functions inherent to the condition of general administrator and head of municipal dependencies, overseeing the organization, functioning, coordination, and faithful compliance with municipal agreements, laws, and regulations in general, I proceed to REJECT THE PRESENT REQUEST FOR EXONERATION FROM THE REAL ESTATE TAX (IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES), FILED BY THE INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD. Likewise, they are requested to appear at the Municipality to make the respective declaration of real estate property owned by the institute…” (folios 32 to 35). 3) By Official Letter 257-472-2012 of May 31, 2012, the representative of Nombre9574 filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal against resolution No. 006-2012 of ten hours on the ninth of May, two thousand twelve, described above (folios 36 to 41). 4) By resolution No. 008-2012 of nine hours forty-nine minutes on the twenty-ninth of June, two thousand twelve, the Mayor of the Municipalidad de El Guarco rejected the motion for reconsideration filed by Nombre9574 against Resolution No. 006-2012 described above and admitted the appeal to this Collegiate Body (folios 56 to 62).

II.- PURPOSE OF THE APPEAL: The appellant alleges that Nombre9574 has been exempt from the payment of the Real Estate Tax since the enactment of Decree-Law number 449, in which article 20 provides that “…The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege.” It indicates that article 4, subsection a) of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles (Law No. 7509 of May 9, 1995), excludes Nombre9574, as an autonomous institution, from the obligation to pay that tax. It maintains that the legal landscape for Nombre9574 regarding national and municipal taxes was expressly reaffirmed in the Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las entidades públicas en telecomunicaciones (Law No. 8660), which in article 18 expressly reiterates the exemptions granted to Nombre9574 via its founding law number 449, and only subjects Nombre9574 to some of the income and sales taxes. It indicates that article 2, subsection l) of the Ley Reguladora de todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su Derogatoria y sus Excepciones (Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992), did not modify anything provided in article 20 of Decree-Law number 449, and therefore, this article remains in force to date. In addition to the foregoing, it points out that article 34 of Law No. 7293 itself, which modified article 4 of the Ley del Impuesto Territorial (Law No. 27 of March 3, 1939), established that the properties of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad were not subject to this tax, which implies—in its judgment—a reaffirmation once more of the exemption in force contemplated by article 20 of Decree-Law number 449. It considers that while it is true that article 50 of Law No. 7293 modified numeral 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios in the sense that “…Even if there is an express provision in the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation…”; it is also true that, contrary to the criteria put forth by the Procuraduría General de la República and the Órgano de Normalización Técnica of the Ministerio de Hacienda, although article 37 of Law No. 7509 repealed the Ley del Impuesto Territorial, this does not imply that a new tax was created, because the objective, before and after, continues to be lands and properties, with no variation whatsoever in the assumptions of the repealed law, since, on the contrary, both laws maintain the same objective assumptions of the tax. They allege that, in any event, the core point of their divergence is that the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles itself establishes an exonerative regime, which in their judgment cannot be ignored by considering that article 4 does not make express reference to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, because said numeral establishes that the properties of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that, by special law, enjoy an exemption, shall not be subject to that tax. On that point, it considers it necessary to revisit the provisions of article 20 of Decree-Law 449, in which, in its judgment, it is clearly defined that Nombre9574, by special law, enjoys an exemption from the payment of national taxes, as is the case of the Real Estate Tax, which is why Laws 7293 and 7509 in their articles 2 subsection l) and 4 subsection a), maintain the generic exemptions granted by Decree-Law number 449 in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. They maintain that said generic exemption was reinforced by article 18 of Law 8660, a norm that keeps in force both the exemptions conferred in Decree-Law 449 and any others conferred by the legal system, except in those cases when Nombre9574 and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, in which case they will be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes, excluding from the first tax (income) the traditional basic telephone service. They deem it evident that Law 8660 reiterated the generic tax exemption in favor of ICE, just as the Procuraduría General de la República itself establishes in opinion C-171-2009 of June 19, 2009. Consequently, it considers that the subjective generic exemption granted by Decree-Law number 449 has remained in force over time, as established in judgments number 364-2002 issued by Section One of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, and 037-F-04 at ten hours thirty-five minutes on the twenty-first of January, two thousand four, issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice; as well as in judgments 759-2010, 1037-2010, and 983-2010 issued by the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo, when resolving the appeal filed against the first-instance judgment issued in enforcement proceedings filed by the Municipalities of Montes de Oro, Tilarán, and San Carlos against Nombre9574 for alleged debts of the Real Estate Tax. On its part, the appealed municipal authority indicates that the Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles No. 7509, in force since 1995, expressly repeals the Ley sobre Impuesto Territorial No. 27 of March 2, 1939, and its amendments, and simultaneously creates a new tax in favor of the Municipalities, whose object is lands, fixed and permanent installations or constructions. In its criteria, these laws differ in several aspects: on one hand, the object varies, as does the form of distributing the tax, the way the tax is established, the regime of non-subjection to the tax; and on the other hand, unlike the repealed Law No. 27, it grants the administration of the tax to the municipalities. It argues that the exemption alleged by ICE found support in the Ley sobre Impuesto Territorial of 1949, which was eliminated through article 4 of the Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, by restrictively establishing the application of that privilege solely in favor of institutions that by special law enjoy an exemption. It adds that the Ley de Impuestos sobre Bienes Inmuebles is subsequent to the Ley sobre Impuesto Territorial, and according to the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, it is not possible to attempt to encompass future taxes. It adds that as of Law No. 7293, Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones, in force as of April 3, 1992, all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and related legal norms are repealed, because it was unnecessary to eliminate the quantity of existing exemptions, and among them, in its criteria, the exemption alleged by ICE is affected. Additionally, it cites the Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones No. 8660 of August 8, 2008, and alleges that although article 18 provides for the validity of the exemptions conferred by Law No. 449, as well as by any other granted by the legal system, in its opinion, in accordance with the principle of reserve of law and tax legality, the exemption from future taxes must be clearly specified in the law that establishes it, a situation that it maintains does not occur with the cited law. The representative of the appealed Municipality, in support of its thesis, alludes to the opinions issued by the Procuraduría General de la República No. C-109-2006; C-151-2007; C-171-2009; Official Letter No. DONT-052 of February 20, 2012; Judgment No. 472-12 of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Third Section; and requests that the filed appeal be dismissed and the challenged resolution be confirmed.

III.- REGARDING THE LIMITS AND SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RESERVE OF LAW AND LEGALITY IN TAX MATTERS. In accordance with the provisions of article 121, subsection 13 of the Constitución Política, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly to establish national taxes and contributions and to authorize municipal ones. This implies that there exists a principle of reserve of law in tax matters, also called the principle of tax legality. In that sense, article 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública establishes that regulations, circulars, instructions, and other administrative provisions of a general nature may not establish penalties nor impose exactions, fees, fines, or other similar charges. For its part, article 5 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, in relation to articles 5 and 62 of that same body of norms, establishes which essential elements of the tax are reserved to the law, namely: a) To create, modify, or suppress taxes; to define the taxable event of the tax relationship; to establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and to indicate the taxpayer; b) To typify infractions and establish the respective sanctions; c) To establish privileges, preferences, and guarantees for tax credits; d) To regulate the modes of extinguishment of tax credits. In accordance with subsection b) of article 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, only the law can grant exemptions, reductions, or benefits, which consequently cannot be created by analogy, but rather by formal and material law (article 6 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), a legal norm that, in accordance with the principle of tax legality, must specify the conditions and requirements fixed for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it covers, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be liquidated, or whether a transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions (articles 5 and 62, paragraph 1 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). The foregoing implies that even if there is an express provision in the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation, as this would imply a limitation on the future tax power of the State, to the detriment of the principle of equality before the tax and public charges (article 18 in fine of the Constitución Política). Now then, this Tribunal considers that in view of the indicated norms and in accordance with the jurisprudence issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, the principle of reserve of law in tax matters is not absolute in nature but relative, since while it is true that the essential elements must be established by law, it is also true that the legal norm must at least establish the concrete limits or criteria based on which infra-legal norms—article 2, subsection d) of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios—may or must complete the normative discipline of said essential elements, in order to execute and apply said legal norms (articles 140 subsections 3 and 18 in fine of the Constitución Política and article 99, second paragraph of article 99 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: “...Our jurisprudence, (...) has recognized, given certain circumstances, the possibility that a 'relative delegation' of said powers may operate—within certain reasonable limits—provided that the margins of the respective tax are specified in the law, because otherwise we would be in the presence of an 'absolute delegation' of such powers, a procedure that lacks, as stated, constitutional validity (...) The Chamber has ruled in favor of relative delegation in tax matters, but not regarding the constitutional elements of the tax obligation (tax authority and taxpayer, object of the obligation, cause, tax rate), in which the so-called reserve of law does apply...” (judgment number 1996-00687, and in a similar sense, judgment number 1995-000739 at fourteen hours fifty-one minutes on the eighth of February, nineteen ninety-six).

IV.- SOME GENERALITIES OF THE REAL ESTATE TAX (IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES). This tax is created by Law No. 7509, according to which a tax on real estate is established in favor of the municipalities, whose object is the lands, the fixed and permanent installations or constructions that exist there. Regarding its nature, it is necessary to point out that the Constitutional Chamber has established that it is a “tax of a municipal order by reason of its destination—only—, but it is not so by virtue of its procedure of origin or promulgation, given that it did not arise from the initiative of local governments, but from the exercise of the tax power granted to the Legislative Assembly, by virtue of the provisions of article 121, subsection 13) of the Constitución Política, that is, it is a product of ordinary legislative work itself. It bears reiterating that the Legislative Assembly is sovereign, regarding the use of tax power, to establish the taxes that are required, whether national or municipal.” (SCV 5669-99). Thus, it is not a municipal tax that derives from the derived and inherent tax power of the municipal corporations derived from numeral 121, subsection 13) of the Constitución Política; but rather from what Spanish doctrine calls transferred taxes (tributos cedidos). Although both are local tax sources, the former are those that, as indicated, are created through the special legislative procedure provided for in article 121, subsection 13) of the Constitution, which is considered special both due to the municipal initiative and the prohibition of amendment that the Legislative Assembly has, which must limit itself to approving or rejecting the respective municipal agreement. On its part, the transfer of taxes is a financing mechanism developed mainly by the Spanish Autonomous Communities. It is said that in these, the State reserves the tax power; while the Autonomous Community individually holds the competence over the yields, through connection points of a territorial nature. Thus, in the management of the transferred tax, the tax power is retained by the State, which delegates the exercise of competence to the Autonomous Community, all without prejudice to the “collaboration” that can be established between the Administrations of both territorial entities, State and Autonomous Community. According to what has been indicated, the transfer of taxes implies the delegation of administrative competencies, without prejudice to the obligatory coordination and collaboration between the Tax Administrations. In the case of Costa Rica, this figure can be associated, in the judgment of this body, with the situation of the Real Estate Tax, by virtue of the characteristic features of this tax. Although they emanate from the exercise of the normative and tax power of the State, the competence over collection belongs to the Municipalities, taking into account the location of the property within the municipal territory as a connection point. Likewise, the administrative power of tax management also belongs to the municipalities, without this preventing the existence of coordination with the State Tax Administration, which to date is manifested in the existence of the Technical Normalization Body (Órgano de Normalización Técnica) introduced by article 2, subsection c) of Law 7729. It must be noted that our constitutional jurisprudence has admitted the figure of transferred taxes, when in Voto 3930-95, it indicated regarding taxes created by the State for the benefit of the municipalities “...But that does not mean that the legislator cannot provide Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax…” It must be indicated that it is an annual tax, the period of which begins on January 1 and ends on December 31 of each calendar year. Its payment must be made annually or semi-annually or in four quarterly installments, as determined by each municipality. Likewise, the following are considered taxpayers of this tax: the owners of the real estate property; the concessionaires, permit holders, or occupants of the border strip or the maritime-terrestrial zone; the occupants or possessors with a title, whether registrable or not in the Public Registry, for more than one year and who are in the following conditions: possessors, agricultural entrepreneurs, usufructuaries, rural sharecroppers, esquilmos, gratuitous borrowers of land, and precarious occupants; the plot holders of the IDA under certain circumstances. The taxable base for calculating the tax shall be the value of the property registered with the Tax Administration as of January 1 of the corresponding year, which means that for tax purposes, every property must be valued, which is a task of each Municipality within the framework of the powers of administration, management, and collection of the tax imposed by Law No. 7509 itself. Throughout the country, the tax percentage shall be one quarter of one percent (0.25%) and shall be applied to the value of the property registered by the Tax Administration. As was already indicated, for the management of this tax, the law grants the municipalities the character of Tax Administration, which means they are responsible for retaining and receiving said tax, in accordance with the doctrine of article 99 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. This law also attributes to them a series of prerogatives and duties in order to be able to fulfill the management of this tax, among them “(…) to carry out valuations of real estate property, to invoice, collect, and process judicial collection and to administer, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by the present Law. (…).” (Article 3). Finally, it should be kept in mind that the municipal corporations, in exercise of the regulatory power that is inherent to them, by reason of the autonomy guaranteed to them by the Constitución Política, may well approve the internal organization norms that they require in order to make effective the collection and receipt of the Real Estate Tax (see in the same sense, judgment number 1565-2009 issued by the Sixth Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, at sixteen hours fifteen minutes on the eleventh of August, two thousand eight).

V.- REGARDING THE SCOPE OF THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE C.N.P.T. BY LAW 7293 AND ITS INCIDENCE ON THE GENERIC, SUBJECTIVE, AND FUTURE EXEMPTION PROVIDED IN NUMERAL 20 OF DECREE-LAW 449. This Tribunal, by majority, considers that the appellant entity is not exempt from paying the Real Estate Tax, for the reasons set forth below. The Decree-Law that creates the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad was added to by Law No. 764 of October 25, 1949, for the purpose of establishing: “Article 20.- The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege.” Said norm created a generic subjective exemption that was applicable to all present and future taxes that could affect Nombre9574, but the Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su derogatoria y sus excepciones -Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992- eliminated this last condition, because in article 2, subsection l) it provided for maintaining only the exemptions in force as of the date of its promulgation in favor of all autonomous institutions, thereby affecting Nombre9574 insofar as it holds such a nature, which was reinforced by the reform of articles 63 and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios -contained in that same legal body-, which provided:

“…ARTICULO 63: Limit of application. Even if there is an express provision in the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation. (Thus amended by article 50 of Law No. 7293 of March 26, 1992)." " ARTICULO 64.- Validity. The exemption, even when granted based on certain factual conditions, may be repealed or modified by subsequent law, without liability for the State.” Likewise, its effectiveness was subject \"…to full compliance with the precepts, requirements, and purposes that regulate the granting, as well as to the correct use and intended destination, of the goods and services on which the exemption enjoyed by a certain subject has fallen…” (Article 37 of Law 7293). Consequently, the effects of the exemption were limited, such that as of the effective date of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the amendment to the Código Tributario, it cannot attempt to encompass future taxes, even when it has been so established. Thus, the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law. Applying the foregoing to the situation of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, it follows that—in principle and without prejudice to the provisions of article 18 of Law 8660, which will be analyzed below—said institution would be obligated to pay any tax established after Law 7293, except in those cases where an exemption has been expressly granted in its favor (see in this regard, judgment number 000037-F-04 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at ten hours thirty-five minutes on the twenty-first of January of the year two thousand four). By reason of the foregoing, this Tribunal does not share the criterion rendered by the First Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil in judgment number 364-2002 at sixteen hours twenty-eight minutes on the eleventh of October, two thousand two, given that there it is maintained that the generic and subjective exemption for future taxes is maintained in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, upon considering that: “… Regarding the validity of article 20 of the Foundational Law of ICE, we must refer to Law 7293 of March 31, 1992 “Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su Derogatoria y sus Excepciones”; which in its article 1° repeals \"all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws\", and in article 50, modifies numeral 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, to establish that those issued affect only the preceding laws, not the future ones. However, in article 2 ° of the regulation under commentary, it is expressly indicated that excluded from the repeal of the preceding article are the tax exclusions established in the same Law and those others that: \"…l) Have been granted … to decentralized institutions…\". This being so, the exemption from the payment of national and municipal taxes established in article 20 of Decree-Law 449 is maintained…”; an assertion that in any event was nuanced by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in judgment number 000037-F-04 issued at ten hours thirty-five minutes on the twenty-first of January of the year two thousand four, by indicating—in what is relevant—that “… Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment forward, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under the protection of norms prior to those in which the tax is regulated and preserve the exemptions granted by norms prior to that date (…) Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply regarding taxes created after that date…”. Consequently, as of April 3, 1992, the generic and subjective exemption provided in favor of Nombre9574 in article 20 of Decree-Law 449 is maintained, albeit limited in its future scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121 subsection 3) of the Constitución Política; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 2 subsection l) of Law 7293; and 5, 63, and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.

VI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF THE REAL ESTATE TAX PRESUMABLY ESTABLISHED BY ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A) OF LAW 7509 IN FAVOR OF I.C.E. Now then, in the case of the real estate tax, although article 34 of Law 7293 modified article 4 of the Ley del Impuesto Territorial (Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939, and its amendments), in the sense that “…Not subject to this tax are the real estate properties of: (…) - Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad…”; it is also true that with the entry into force on June 19, 1995, of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles (Law number 7509), not only was the Ley del Impuesto Territorial repealed (article 38), but it also imposed as a condition for the real estate of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Real Estate Tax, that they enjoy an exemption by special law (article 4, subsection a of Law 7509).

At this point, it is necessary to indicate that while it is true that the object of both taxes is practically the same, namely: the land, the fixed and permanent installations or constructions existing thereon (article 2 of Laws 27 and 7509); that it is a tax of a national character that was established in favor of the Municipalities (article 1 of Laws 27 and 7509); and that in general terms, the taxable base for the calculation of the tax shall be the value of the property registered with the Tax Administration –now under the charge of the municipal administrative body responsible for the collection and oversight of the taxes (article 9 and following of Law 7509), previously by the Dirección General de Tributación (article 5 of Law 27)–; it is also true that it is contrary to the principle of tax legality (principio de legalidad tributaria), provided for in numerals 121 subsection 13 of the Constitución Política; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 5 and 62 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, to affirm that due to these similarities, the exemption provided for in article 4 of the Ley del Impuesto Territorial remains in force over time in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, despite the fact that it was repealed by article 38 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles. Nor is the principle of fiscal immunity (principio de inmunidad fiscal) applicable to the specific case, because although the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles constitutes a tax of a national character, it is also true that there is no identity between the active subject, the passive subject (ICE), and the beneficiary subject, who is also competent for the collection and management of the tax (Municipalities), a sine qua non condition for the application of that principle, given that “… The principle of fiscal immunity frees the State from the obligation to pay taxes created by it. The active subject of the tax obligation must be the State itself. It would be illogical for a State to create taxes to collect from itself. The higher entity assumes a dual consideration of active and passive subject of the tax legal relationship, the consequence of which would be the extinction of the tax obligation by confusion. Hence the reason (article 49 of the Código de normas y procedimientos tributarios) for establishing confusion as a cause for the extinction of the tax obligation. When the State goes from being the active subject to the passive subject of the tax, the tax obligation is nonexistent because the intersubjective relationship does not exist. Regarding the municipal regime, the principle of fiscal immunity of the State is inoperative (…) For fiscal immunity to operate –by confusion– the subjective identity must be full…” (judgment number 12-1994 issued by the Sala Primera de la Corte, at eleven o'clock on the twenty-fifth of March, nineteen ninety-four. The highlighting is not from the original). So much so, that article 5 subsection a) paragraph 2 of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, establishes that “…The State and the municipalities do not require the presentation of any requirement, since by definition they are not subject (no afectos)…”. In addition to the foregoing, it is also not valid to affirm that subsection a) of article 4 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles establishes an exoneration from the payment of that tax in favor of the Nombre9574, not only because it imposes as a condition for the properties of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles, that by special law, they enjoy an exemption; but also, because in accordance with the principle of tax legality, specifically the provisions of articles 62 and 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Código Tributario, the generic subjective exemption provided for in article 20 of Decreto Ley number 449 cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established. In such a way that the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law, which does not happen in the case of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, which is why referring to the provisions of article 20 of Decreto Ley number 449 as the source of exoneration from that tax is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legal reserve (reserva de ley). In that sense, it is worth citing what was resolved by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, in judgment number 037-F-04 at ten thirty-five on January 21, two thousand four, which, contrary to what the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad claims regarding the supposed maintenance of the future scope of the generic and subjective exemption contained in article 20 of Decreto Ley 449, established the following: “…Subsection l) of the second article of Law 7293 excludes from the repeal the exemptions granted to decentralized institutions. Additionally, in its article 63 the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (reformed by ordinal 50 of Law No. 7293) indicates that there cannot be rules granting exonerations prior to the date on which the tax is created, ergo, the exoneration cannot be prior to the tax. This rule has effects as of its enactment, that is, April 3, 1992. Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as ICE, as of that moment and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exonerations created under the protection of rules prior to those regulating the tax, and they retain the exonerations granted by rules prior to that date. It should not be lost sight of that the Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones arises, among other things, with the purpose of organizing the tangle of existing exemptions through a high number of laws, however the restrictions on the benefits that various activities and institutions had been holding cannot be applied with retroactive effect, which is why the tax exonerations granted before the entry into force of that law are maintained. Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply with respect to taxes created after that date. The contrary would entail a reprehensible retroactive application of the law. It is precisely for these reasons that the exoneration granted in favor of ICE is not affected by Law No. 7283 of Municipal Tariffs and Taxes of the Canton of Tilarán, because it was enacted on a date prior to the Ley Reguladora of all existing exonerations, and it is not until this moment when an express rule prohibits granting exemptions under the protection of old-date rules. The factual situation provided for in Law 7283 could only have been applied to the defendant if the rule was enacted after April 3, 1992. Thus, as it is a tax prior to the law repealing exonerations, the exemption regime set forth in the law creating the Nombre9574 continued to benefit it at the time of the entry into force of Law No. 7283. To hold the contrary, it is reiterated, would entail a retroactive application of article 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, which is prohibited by constitutional provision…” (the highlighting is not from the original). In this case, as analyzed supra, affirming that due to the similarities existing between the Impuesto Territorial and the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles –mainly regarding the object, the determination of the taxable base, the subject benefited by the tax, and its national nature–, the exemption provided for in article 4 of the Ley del Impuesto Territorial (amended in that sense by article 34 of Law 7293), remains in force over time in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, despite being repealed by article 38 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legal reserve in this matter. Even more so, when article 4 subsection a) of Law 7509 itself –which entered into force on June 19, 1995– conditioned the non-subjection (no afectación) to the tax regulated therein on a special law establishing an exemption –in the terms of articles 5 and 62 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, that is, in an express, concrete, and clear manner– for the real estate of autonomous institutions –which are the ones of interest for this case–, which does not occur in this instance, since as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Código Tributario, the generic subjective exemption provided for in article 20 of Decreto Ley number 449 cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established. For the reasons stated, this Tribunal does not share the criteria expressed in judgments 759-2010, 1037-2010, and 983-2010 issued by the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo, in resolving the appeals (recursos de apelación) filed against the first-instance judgment issued in enforcement proceedings (procesos ejecutivos) initiated by the Municipalities of Montes de Oro, Tilarán, and San Carlos, against ICE, for alleged debts of the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles; given that in these, it is assumed that subsection a) of article 4 of Law 7509 does contain an exoneration in favor of the Nombre9574 or that it finds support in article 20 of Decreto Ley 449, without analyzing that the scope of the latter is conditioned by the provisions of articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimiento Tributarios. In summary, once the Ley del Impuesto Territorial was repealed, there does not exist, as of June 19, 1995 (the date of entry into force of Law 7509), a special law granting the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad an express, clear, and concrete exemption in accordance with the provisions of article 62 of the Código de Normas Procedimientos Tributarios, establishing that the properties of the appellant entity are not subject (no afectos) to the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles.

VII.- IN RELATION TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 18 OF LAW 8660 FOR THE SPECIFIC CASE. The Ley de Modernización y Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones (Law 8660, which entered into force as of August 13, 2008), establishes in article 18 that: “Article 18.- Tax treatment. When the Nombre9574 and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. In all other cases, the exemptions granted in Decreto Ley No. 449 of April 8, 1949, as well as any others granted to them by the legal system, shall remain in force. The traditional basic telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax”. (the highlighting is added). The transcribed rule contains two essential scenarios in tax matters in relation to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad: i) The general rule is the exemption from tax payment, consequently, said entity retains the exemption contained in the Decreto Ley that created it and any other Law granting it exoneration. However, in accordance with the principles of legal reserve and tax legality, the exemption provided for in article 20 of Decreto Ley number 449 is limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121 subsection 13) of the Constitución Política; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 5, 62, 63, and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; ii) The exception referring to the obligation to pay income and sales taxes, which is conditioned on the existence of a competitive market. Now, it should be clarified that Law 8660 entered into force as of August 13, 2008, without it being able to be applied retroactively, therefore, the tax rules, including the tax exemption, are effective as of that date, although –it is insisted– limited in their scope and validity to the provisions of articles 2, 62, 63, and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. This is because it could not be maintained that the Nombre9574 recovered a generic, subjective exemption for future taxes –as originally provided for in numeral 20 of Decreto Ley 449–, given that as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Código Tributario, it cannot purport to cover future taxes, even if so established (see in a similar sense, resolutions number 417-2012 at fourteen hundred hours on October eleven; 431-2012 at fourteen hundred hours on October eighteen; 432-2012 at fourteen hundred and five minutes on October eighteen, all of two thousand twelve, issued by the Sección Tercera of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda). In such a way, that the provisions of article 18 of Law 8660 do not have the virtue of repealing, for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, the provisions of articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos, which develop at the legal level the principles of legal reserve in tax matters and legality, provided for in articles 11 and 121 subsection 13) of the Constitución Política, meaning that the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law, which does not happen in the case of the Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles. In that sense, this Tribunal considers that it cannot be validly alleged that the Nombre9574 recovered the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as provided for in numeral 20 of Decreto Ley 449, and that consequently, since Law 8660 is a special law, it prevails over a general law (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), given that this would imply disregarding, for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, two basic principles in tax matters, namely: i) Legal reserve and Tax Legality, in the sense that the law must specify the conditions and requirements set for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or whether the taxes must be settled, or whether the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions (article 62 paragraph 1 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios); ii) Equality before the tax and public burdens, because even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established subsequent to its creation –as in the case of the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles–, since this would imply a future limitation of the tax power (potestad tributaria) of the State, to the detriment of that principle (article 18 in fine of the Constitución Política). It should be remembered that the principle of fiscal immunity is not applicable to the specific case, because although the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles constitutes a tax of a national character, it is also true that there is no identity between the active subject, the passive subject (ICE), and the beneficiary subject, who is also competent for the collection and management of the tax (Municipalities), a sine qua non condition for the application of that principle, given that “… The principle of fiscal immunity frees the State from the obligation to pay taxes created by it. The active subject of the tax obligation must be the State itself. It would be illogical for a State to create taxes to collect from itself. The higher entity assumes a dual consideration of active and passive subject of the tax legal relationship, the consequence of which would be the extinction of the tax obligation by confusion. Hence the reason (article 49 of the Código de normas y procedimientos tributarios) for establishing confusion as a cause for the extinction of the tax obligation. When the State goes from being the active subject to the passive subject of the tax, the tax obligation is nonexistent because the intersubjective relationship does not exist. Regarding the municipal regime, the principle of fiscal immunity of the State is inoperative (…) For fiscal immunity to operate –by confusion– the subjective identity must be full…” (judgment number 12-1994 issued by the Sala Primera de la Corte, at eleven o'clock on the twenty-fifth of March, nineteen ninety-four. The highlighting is not from the original). So much so, that article 5 subsection a) paragraph 2 of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, establishes that “…The State and the municipalities do not require the presentation of any requirement, since by definition they are not subject (no afectos)…”. It should be clarified that while it is true that, through judgment number 2008-11210 at fifteen hundred hours on July sixteen, two thousand eight, the Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ruled –among other aspects– on the constitutionality of article 15 –actually 18– of the draft law “Ley de fortalecimiento y modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector de Telecomunicaciones”, which was processed in legislative file No. Placa1952; it is also true that said ruling only referred to the following point: “…This Tribunal is powerfully struck by the argumentation of the consultants, when the tax power (article 121, subsection 13 of the Constitución Política) and the principle of equality in the bearing of public burdens (articles 18 and 33 of the Constitution) are absolutely inherent to the Social and Democratic State of Law. Without the tax power and the correlative duty of every person to contribute to public expenses, the various public entities that provide positive services to the inhabitants to eradicate real and effective inequalities –proper to and typical of a Social State of Law– could not exercise their functions, fulfill their competencies, and satisfy the public interest, since it would be impossible for them to have public resources for that purpose. Subjecting the Nombre9574 and its companies to the payment of sales and income tax, in the framework of an open telecommunications market, where the actors –network operators or service providers– can be of a public or private nature, prevents any competitive distortion or asymmetry –which does violate the principle of equality–, that could dissuade other subjects from participating and investing in that segment of the economy, an extreme that would negatively impact the options or freedom of choice of the consumer or user, the cost of services or products, and the increase in productivity”. In addition to the foregoing, it is necessary to remember that in accordance with the provisions of article 101 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, “…The opinion of the Chamber shall only be binding insofar as it establishes the existence of unconstitutional procedures in the consulted draft law…”. For all the reasons stated, this Tribunal considers that the provisions of article 18 of Law 8660 are limited in their scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121 subsection 13) of the Constitución Política; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 5, 62, 63, and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; which implies that the Nombre9574 did not recover the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as provided for in numeral 20 of Decreto Ley 449, and therefore, it cannot serve as a basis to fulfill the condition provided for in subsection a) of article 4 of Law 7509, as a prerequisite for its properties not to be subject (no queden afectos) to the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles.

VIII.- SOME CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE UNATTACHABILITY (INEMBARGABILIDAD) OF PUBLICLY OWNED ASSETS DIRECTLY LINKED TO ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES. It is necessary to indicate that, at the time of executing the collection of the amounts that the Nombre9574 has pending payment for the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles –of course, provided that the prescriptive period (plazo de prescripción) provided for in article 8 of Law number 7509 has not lapsed and that it has been alleged by the aggrieved entity–, the Municipalities and other legal operators must take into consideration the rules provided for in articles 261, 262 of the Código Civil, and 169, 170 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, regarding the assets of the Nombre9574 on which a lien (embargo) may or may not be ordered and executed, for such purposes. In that sense, through resolution number 019-2009-SVII issued at thirteen thirty on February twelve, two thousand nine, the Sección Sétima of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, considered, regarding the concept of public domain and private domain assets of public administrations, that: \"(...) The State and other public entities possess two types of assets: public and private. Article 261 of the Código Civil provides: “Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those that everyone can use because they are given over to public use. All other things are private and subject to private ownership, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, are no different from any other person.” The foregoing must be related to article 121 subsection 4) of the Constitución Política, which establishes as an attribution of the Asamblea Legislativa, to decree the alienation or application to public uses of the Nation’s own assets”. Public domain assets are characterized by being inalienable, imprescriptible, and unattachable (inembargables), consequently, outside the commerce of men. On the subject, the Sala Constitucional has expressed: / “II.- THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THE LEGAL MEANS TO INTEGRATE IT.- By public domain is understood the set of assets subject to a special and distinct legal regime from that which governs private domain, which, besides belonging to or being under the administration of public legal persons, are affected or destined for purposes of public utility and are manifested in the direct or indirect use that any person may make of them. The doctrine recognizes public domain under different terms, such as dominical assets, public things, public assets, or demanial assets. On this concept, the Chamber expressed (sic) in its Judgment No. 2306-91 at 14:45 hours on November six, nineteen ninety-one the following: / “The public domain is integrated by assets that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special destiny to serve the community, the public interest. These are the so-called dominical assets, demanial assets, public things or public assets, which do not belong individually to private parties and which are destined for a public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected to the service they provide, which is invariably essential by virtue of an express rule. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, cannot be mortgaged, nor be susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes for interdicts to recover domain...Consequently, the national regime of public domain assets, such as the roadways of the Capital City, be they municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks and other public places, places them outside the commerce of men...” (see in a similar sense, judgment number 035-2009-SVII issued by the Sección Sétima of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, at fourteen forty on March thirteen, two thousand nine). Consequently, the private domain assets of the Administration that are not affected to a public purpose shall be attachable (artículo 169.1.a of the CPCA). On the contrary, publicly owned assets destined for common use and enjoyment shall not be attachable, nor shall those directly linked to the provision of public services of an essential nature –such as, for example: electricity and telecommunications–, or those that are indispensable or irreplaceable for the fulfillment of public purposes or services (articles 261 of the Código Civil and 170 of the CPCA).

IX.- COROLLARY. For the reasons given, this Tribunal rejects the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed and confirms the resolution at ten thirty on April nineteen, two thousand twelve, issued by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco, for not being substantially contrary to the provisions of articles 11, 18 in fine, 33, 121 subsection 13) of the Constitución Política; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 20 of Decreto Ley 449; 2 subsection l); 35 and 50 of Law 7293; 4 subsection a) and 38 subsection a) of Law 7509; 5, 62, 63 and 54 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; 18 of Law 8860; 5 subsection a) paragraph 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo 27601-H. Now, given that it was not the subject of the arguments raised in the recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio, filed by the appealing entity against the challenged act (folios 141 to 145, 149 to 155 of the file), this Tribunal does not proceed to determine whether some of the periods charged by the Municipality of El Guarco might or might not be prescribed. As there is no further recourse in administrative venue, the administrative venue (vía administrativa) is deemed exhausted. With the dissenting vote of Judge Solano Ulloa, who grants the recourse, annuls the challenged resolution, and deems the administrative venue exhausted.-

POR TANTO.

For the reasons given, by majority the resolution at ten thirty on April nineteen, two thousand twelve, issued by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco is confirmed. The administrative venue is deemed exhausted. With the dissenting vote of Judge Solano Ulloa, who grants the recourse, annuls the challenged resolution, and deems the administrative venue exhausted.- Jorge Leiva Poveda Marianella Álvarez Molina Siria Carmona Castro Dissenting vote of Judge Carmona Castro.

CONSIDERANDO

With the respect and consideration due, this judge separates from the majority vote, specifically regarding the substantive criteria in this matter put forth by my fellow Tribunal members. On this particular, the legal foundations based on which it is considered that the actions of the Municipality of El Guarco must be annulled are set forth below.

I.- ON THE BIRTH OF THE TAX OBLIGATION. In Tax Law, more concretely in the legal tax relationship, we are before the presence of two types of subjects: active and passive. The active subject is the State or some lesser public entity, which holds the so-called power of imperium (potestad de imperio), from which the financial power derives (Article 14 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). The State is the primary active subject, but there are other secondary or delegated active subjects, as is the case with the Municipalities, which have the power to create taxes. The tax power (potestad tributaria) is that faculty of the State to coercively obtain from the private sphere of the taxpayer a certain amount of wealth to finance public expenses, and the passive subject is the one upon whom the Law imposes obligations and corresponds to whom is subject to the power of imperium of the State. From this perspective, in very general terms, the taxpayer is that person with respect to whom the generating event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation is verified. The obligations assumed by taxpayers consist mainly of the provision of the tax of the substantial tax obligations, the source of the tax obligation being the generating event, which can arise only by mandate of a law. The substantial obligation, also called the principal obligation, consists of that provision of a patrimonial character, which, viewed from a double perspective, can be expressed as an obligation to give (the taxpayer) and receive (the treasury). However, the passive subjects also bear the obligation to comply with formal or administrative duties, which are accessory and revolve around the principal obligation, arising with the purpose of facilitating its compliance. (Article 18 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). It is the Law that, for the satisfaction of a higher public interest, destined for the fulfillment of State obligations, subjects the taxpayer to a regime of additional obligations. The burdens weighing on the taxpayer, by their very reason for being such, are imposed by Law, which must make them cede their sphere of private interests in favor of a higher public interest. Their obligation derives from a factor totally alien to the will of the Tax Administration, since their simple condition as a taxpayer subjects them to the formal regime of obligations and duties that transcend the strictly pecuniary sphere.

II. ON FISCAL BENEFITS AND THEIR CREATION

There are state policies through which exceptions to the application of taxes are created, among which are tax benefits (beneficios fiscales), understood as the granting of a protectionist fiscal measure, which can include various mechanisms or manifestations, such as tax exemptions (exoneraciones fiscales) or the granting of subsidies of various kinds, for example, the granting of State bonds for certain activities (productive or cultural), access to official credit at reduced interest rates and deferred amortization periods, customs franchises, etc. It is therefore a matter of "support measures or instrumental stimulus through a tax relief mechanism" (SOLER ROCH,M.T. Incentivos a la inversión y justicia tributaria, Civitas, Madrid, 1983, p.20), within which we find the typical case of deductions for investments or job creation, Tax Credit Certificates (Certificados de Abono Tributario, CATs), and within which tax exemptions (exoneraciones tributarias) fit par excellence. Specifically with exemptions, the aim is to prevent the creation of the tax obligation —total exemption— or to reduce the amount of the tax —partial exemption—, through bonuses or deductions in certain factual situations included within the scope of the taxable event, the realization of which does not give rise to the tax payment obligation, constituting an exception to the normal effects derived from the realization of that event. The tax exemption rule has the power to nullify the effects of the rule that creates the tax, since it affects either the subjective or objective element of the taxable event, or the elements of tax quantification, that is, the tax base (tax base, base imponible) (deductions and reductions) or the tax rate. The classical theory of exemption defines exemptions as a legal dispensation from the tax obligation, whether as a derogation of the payment obligation, despite the occurrence of the taxable event, which is the effect they produce, or as the exception of the obligation to contribute to public expenses for certain subjects (subjective exemption), or for certain situations or facts (objective exemption). Thus, tax exemption occurs when a rule provides that in those cases expressly foreseen by it, despite the occurrence of the taxable event, its main effect does not develop: the duty to pay the tax or tax obligation.

III.- ON THE EXEMPTION FROM PAYING THE REAL PROPERTY TAX (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles) FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD. ON THE WILL OF THE LEGISLATOR. The levy on the ownership of real property has existed for a long time, since it was created by the now-repealed Ley de Impuesto Territorial No. 27 of March 2, 1939, and its amendments. Article 4 of that same law provided for a general subjective exemption in favor of ICE, stipulating the following:

"Article 4.- Non-taxable situations. The following real property is not subject to this tax:

- The Legislative Branch; the Executive Branch; the Judicial Branch; the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and the municipalities.

- The Juntas de Educación, the public radiotelegraphic and radiotelephonic stations.

- The Servicio Nacional de Electricidad.

- The Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas (IICA) and its staff members who are not Costa Rican citizens.

- The Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

- The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad..." Subsequently, Decreto Ley 449 of April 8, 1949, reaffirmed the exemption already in force in favor of ICE, as it provided that:

"Article 20.- The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from paying national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franchise." (Thus added by article 1 of Ley 764 of October 25, 1949.)

On May 3, 1971, the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios came into force, creating new regulations in Article 62 for exemptions, as the original text of the article provided:

"Article 62.- Conditions and requirements demanded. The law that establishes exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements demanded for their granting, the taxes it includes, whether it is total or partial, and, where applicable, the duration of its term." (Note: this rule was subsequently amended by Article 1 of Law No. 7900 of August 3, 1999, and by Article 1 of Law No. 9069 of September 10, 2012, "Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria," its current text being as follows:

"Article 62.- Conditions and requirements demanded. The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements set for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it includes, whether it is total or partial, the duration of its term, and whether at the end of or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be settled, or whether the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions.

In all cases, natural or legal persons requesting exemptions must be up-to-date in the payment of taxes administered by the Administración Tributaria of the Ministerio de Hacienda, as a condition for their granting.") In Transitory Provision 169, subsection c) of that Code, several express derogations of the Ley de Impuesto Territorial were made, but none modified numeral 4, the creator of the exemption in favor of ICE. This judge understands that, if there had been the will within the legislative body to repeal said exemption, the legislator would have so provided, but that did not occur, thus allowing the coexistence of the regulation contained in Article 62 with the validity and application of the rule creating the benefit in favor of ICE. Furthermore, the exemption from paying the territorial tax survived the entry into force of the Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su Derogatoria y sus Excepciones - Law 7293, in force since April 3, 1992 -, as Article 34 itself expressly so provided. Three years later, the Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles - Law No. 7509 of May 9, 1995, in force as of June 19 of that same year - was enacted, through which the Ley del Impuesto Territorial was repealed, in which the elements of the territorial tax are preserved (taxable event and active and passive subjects), but everything concerning the management, administration, and use of the same tax is reformed. That is, it was not a new tax, as it had already existed for years. However, regarding exemptions, it provided the following:

"Article 4.- Real property not subject to the tax. The following are not subject to this tax:

• a)Real property of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that, by special law, enjoy an exemption..." As can be seen, in that rule the legislator foresaw that, for the purposes of autonomous institutions, there would be a permanence of the exemptions established in special laws. With respect to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, even with the repeal of the Ley del Impuesto Territorial, Article 20 of Decreto Ley 449 of April 8, 1949, previously transcribed, pre-existed, a special rule that introduced a general subjective exemption by virtue of the institution to which it is directed, regarding all national and municipal taxes. If the tax was not new, therefore, the exemption was also not new, and it has not been declared unconstitutional, so it maintains its validity, an express derogation by the same legislator that created it being deemed necessary in order to eliminate its efficacy, in application of the principles of legal reserve in tax matters and parallelism of forms. This historical analysis of the normative development, while useful and necessary to contextualize the unfolding of the tax and its exemption, leads today to the main rule governing the matter, contained in the Ley de Modernización y Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones - Law 8660, which came into force as of August 13, 2008 -, born within the normative framework required by the Free Trade Agreement with the United States of America, wherein the legislator, through a subsequent law, expressly retakes the validity of all ICE exemptions, making an express exception for income and sales tax, imposing, for the first time, the payment of these two sole taxes. In this regard, the rule is transcribed:

"Article 18. Tax treatment.

When Nombre9574 and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. In all other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decreto Ley No. 449, of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred upon them by the legal system, shall remain in force..." (Emphasis added).

The application of this rule is immediate upon its validity, and despite the fact that the exemption contained in the Decreto Ley is broad, general, and subjective based on the specialty of the Institution to which it is directed, its application is definitively binding by reason that the cited Article 18 is a special rule and subsequent to the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Interpreting that the provisions of this rule are limited in their scope and validity to what is established in numeral 62 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tribuntarios raises several important questions that, in the opinion of the undersigned, are contrary to the democratic system of the Costa Rican state and are analyzed hereinbelow. First, because in the process of law formation, the Legislative Branch finds its limits solely in the constitutional text and in the regulations that govern the procedures for law formation, from which it follows that the rule provided in the cited Article 62 cannot be understood as a condition on the power to enact and reform tax law held by the Asamblea Legislativa, even when done in a different sense. Second, because to do that would be to disregard the express will of the legislator who, according to Article 105 of the Constitution, assumes that power by delegation of the people without being subject to limitations -except in the case of treaties-, in full and legitimate exercise of popular representation. Therefore, if in the current historical context of market opening and commercial competitiveness, the legislator chose to maintain such fiscal benefits for the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, given that it has been and continues to be the main national provider of indispensable public services, such legislative will must be respected. To consider the contrary is to disregard the content of a "substantive tax law," born under the protection of a "formal law" that derives from the exercise of legislative power, which responds to the conjunctural demands of redefining national commercial and institutional concepts, as a consequence of the recent demands of economic policy, with full powers to detail the national tax scheme and the incentives and benefits it provides, including this type of tax exclusion. Third, because the letter of the rule is clear and precise, binding municipal authorities and this improper hierarchy to its application, it not being possible to make interpretations and normative integrations to the contrary, as this would go against numerals 9, subsection 2), and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, through which the Administration is subjected to the legal system and the disapplication of the administrative rule for specific cases is prohibited. This is where the substantial difference with the majority criterion of this Voto is concretized and summarized, as we are not even dealing with a case of incompatibility or normative antinomy, given that it cannot be conceived, in this case, that we are in the presence of two valid provisions of equal rank that regulate the same factual situation in a contradictory manner. It is therefore clear that the valid and applicable legislation is that contained in Article 18 of Law 8660, which in turn refers to the application of the exemptions contained in Article 20 of Decreto Ley 449, for which there is no other option but to conclude that Nombre9574 is indeed exempt from paying the Real Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles), and therefore the grievances expressed by its representative are admissible. Consequently, defects of absolute nullity are observed in the ruling of the resolution issued at ten hours and thirty minutes on April nineteenth, two thousand twelve, by the Alcalde Municipal of El Guarco, insofar as it ordered the collection of said tax from ICE to be maintained, for which reason said administrative act must be annulled in this act, for violation of the legality block in its legal basis and content. There being no further recourse, the administrative channel must be deemed exhausted.

POR TANTO

The resolution issued at ten hours and thirty minutes on April nineteenth, two thousand twelve, by the Alcalde Municipal of El Guarco, is annulled. The administrative channel is deemed exhausted.

Siria Carmona Castro ASUNTO: Apelación Municipal ACCIONANTE: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad RECURRIDO: Municipalidad de El Guarco.

It maintains that the legal landscape of Nombre9574 regarding national and municipal taxes was expressly reaffirmed in the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Telecommunications Entities (Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las entidades públicas en telecomunicaciones, Ley nº 8660), which in Article 18 expressly reiterates the exemptions granted to Nombre9574 via its constitutive law number 449, and only subjects Nombre9574 to some income and sales taxes. It indicates that Article 2, subsection l) of the Regulatory Law for All Current Exemptions, their Derogation and their Exceptions (Ley Reguladora de todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su Derogatoria y sus Excepciones, Ley nº 7293 of March 31, 1992), did not modify in any way the provisions of Article 20 of Decree Law number 449, and therefore, this article remains in force to date. In addition to the above, it points out that Article 34 of Ley nº 7293 itself, which modified Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto Territorial, Ley nº 27 of March 3, 1939), established that the real estate properties of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad were not subject to this tax, which implies–in its view–that the current exemption contemplated in Article 20 of Decree Law number 449 is reaffirmed once again. It considers that while it is true that Article 50 of Ley nº 7293 modified numeral 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) in the sense that “…Even if there is an express provision in the Tax Law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established subsequent to its creation…”; it is also true that, contrary to the opinions argued by the Procuraduría General de la República and the Technical Standardization Body (Órgano de Normalización Técnica) of the Ministry of Finance, although Article 37 of Ley nº 7509 repealed the Territorial Tax Law, this does not imply that a new tax was created, because the objective before and after, continues to be land and properties, with no variation whatsoever in the assumptions of the repealed Law, since, on the contrary, both laws maintain the same objective assumptions of the tax. They allege that in any case, the core point of the divergence they maintain is that the Real Estate Property Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles) itself establishes an exemption regime, which in their view, cannot be ignored by considering that Article 4 does not expressly refer to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, because said numeral establishes that real estate properties of the State, municipalities, autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that, by special law, enjoy exemption, will not be subject to that tax. On this point, it considers that it is necessary to revisit the provisions of Article 20 of Decree Law 449, in which, in its view, it is clearly defined that Nombre9574 by special law enjoys an exemption from the payment of national taxes, as is the case with the Real Estate Property Tax, which is why Laws 7293 and 7509 in their Articles 2, subsection l) and 4, subsection a), maintain the generic exemptions granted by Decree Law number 449 in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. They maintain that said generic exemption was reinforced by Article 18 of Ley 8660, a rule that keeps in force both the exemptions conferred in Decree Law 449 and any others conferred by the legal system, except in those cases when Nombre9574 and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, in which case they will be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes, excluding basic traditional telephone service from the first tax (income). They estimate it is evident that through Ley 8660, the generic tax exemption in favor of ICE was reiterated, as established by the Procuraduría General de la República itself in opinion C-171-2009 of June 19, 2009. Consequently, it considers that the subjective generic exemption granted through Decree Law number 449 has remained in force over time, as established in judgments number 364-2002 issued by the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), and 037-F-04 of ten thirty-five hours on January twenty-first, two thousand four, issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia); as well as in judgments 759-2010, 1037-2010, and 983-2010 issued by the Contentious-Administrative Court (Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo), when resolving on the appeal filed against the first-instance judgment issued in enforcement proceedings brought by the Municipalities of Montes de Oro, Tilarán, and San Carlos, against Nombre9574 for alleged debts of the Real Estate Property Tax. For its part, the appealed municipal authority indicates that the Real Estate Property Tax Law N° 7509, in force since 1995, expressly repeals the Territorial Tax Law N° 27 of March 2, 1939, and its reforms, and simultaneously creates a new tax in favor of the Municipalities, the object of which is land, fixed and permanent installations or constructions. In its opinion, these laws differ in several aspects: on one hand, the object, the method of tax distribution, the way the tax is established, and the regime of non-subjection to the tax vary; and on the other hand, unlike the repealed Law N° 27, it grants the administration of the tax to the municipalities. It argues that the exemption alleged by ICE found support in the Territorial Tax Law of 1949, which was eliminated by Article 4 of the Real Estate Property Tax Law, by restrictively establishing the application of that privilege only in favor of institutions that by special law enjoy an exemption. It adds that the Real Estate Property Tax Law is subsequent to the Territorial Tax Law, and according to the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, it is not possible to claim to encompass future taxes. It adds that as of Ley N° 7293, the Regulatory Law for Current Exemptions, Derogations, and Exceptions, in force as of April 3, 1992, all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and related legal rules are repealed, because it was necessary to eliminate the quantity of existing exemptions, and among them, in its opinion, the exemption alleged by ICE is affected. Additionally, it cites the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector N° 8660 of August 8, 2008, and alleges that although Article 18 provides for the validity of the exemptions conferred by Ley N° 449, as well as any other granted by the legal system, in its view, in accordance with the principle of legal reservation and tax legality, the exemption from future taxes must be clearly specified in the law that establishes it, a situation it maintains does not occur with the cited law. The legal representative of the appealed Municipality, in support of its thesis, alludes to opinions issued by the Procuraduría General de la República N° C-109-2006; C-151-2007; C-171-2009; Official Communication N° DONT-052 of February 20, 2012; Judgment N° 472-12 of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Third Section; and requests that the filed appeal be declared without merit, and the challenged resolution be confirmed.

**III.- REGARDING THE LIMITS AND SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL RESERVATION AND LEGALITY IN TAX MATTERS.** In accordance with the provisions of Article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly to establish national taxes and contributions, and to authorize municipal ones, this implies that **there is a principle of legal reservation in tax matters, also called the principle of tax legality**. In this sense, Article 124 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that regulations, circulars, instructions, and other administrative provisions of a general nature may not establish penalties nor impose levies, fees, fines, or other similar charges. For its part, Article 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures in relation to Articles 5 and 62 of that same regulatory body, establishes what the essential elements of the tax are that are reserved to the law, namely: **a)** Create, modify, or suppress taxes; define the taxable event of the tax relationship; establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and indicate the taxpayer; **b)** Typify infractions and establish the respective sanctions; **c)** Establish privileges, preferences, and guarantees for tax credits; **d)** Regulate the modes of extinguishment of tax credits. In accordance with subsection b) of Article 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, **only the law can grant exemptions**, **reductions or benefits, which consequently cannot be created by analogy, but by formal and material law** *(Article 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures)*, a **legal rule that, in accordance with the principle of tax legality**, must specify the conditions and requirements set for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or if they must settle the taxes, or whether the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions *(Articles 5 and 62, paragraph 1 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures).* The foregoing implies that even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established subsequent to its creation, as this would imply a future limitation on the State's tax authority, to the detriment of the principle of equality before the tax and public burdens *(Article 18 in fine of the Political Constitution)*. Now, this Tribunal considers that in view of the indicated rules and in accordance with the jurisprudence issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), **the principle of legal reservation in tax matters is not absolute in nature, but relative, since while it is true that the essential elements must be established by law, it is also true that the legal rule must at least establish the concrete limits or criteria based on which, the infra-legal rules –Article 2, subsection d) of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures– may or must complete the normative discipline of said essential elements, in order to execute and apply said legal rules** *(Articles 140, subsections 3 and 18 in fine of the Political Constitution and Article 99, second paragraph of Article 99 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures)*. In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: *“...Our jurisprudence, (...) has recognized, given certain circumstances, the possibility of a 'relative delegation' of said powers operating –within certain reasonable limits–, provided that the margins of the respective tax are specified in the law, because otherwise, we would be in the presence of an 'absolute delegation' of such powers, a procedure that lacks, as stated, constitutional validity (...) the Chamber has ruled in favor of relative delegation in tax matters, but not so regarding the constitutional elements of the tax obligation (active and passive subjects, object of the obligation, cause, tax rate), in which the so-called legal reservation does apply...”* (judgment number 1996-00687, and in a similar sense, judgment number 1995-000739 of fourteen fifty-one hours on February eighth, nineteen ninety-six).

**IV.- SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE REAL ESTATE PROPERTY TAX.** This tax is created by Law No. 7509, according to which a tax on real estate properties is established in favor of the municipalities, the object of which is the land and the fixed and permanent installations or constructions existing thereon. Regarding its nature, it is necessary to point out that the Constitutional Chamber has established that it is a *“tax of a municipal order by reason of its destination –only–, but it is not so by virtue of its procedure of origin or promulgation, given that it did not arise from the initiative of local governments, but from the exercise of the tax authority granted to the Legislative Assembly, by virtue of the provisions of Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, that is, it is a product of ordinary legislative work itself. It should be reiterated that the Legislative Assembly is sovereign, regarding the use of tax power, to establish the taxes that are required, be they national or municipal.” (SCV 5669-99).* Thus, it is not a municipal tax arising from the derived and own tax authority of municipal corporations that derives from numeral 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; but rather what Spanish doctrine calls ceded taxes (tributos cedidos). Although both are local tax sources, the former are those that, as indicated, are created through the special legislative procedure provided for in Article 121, subsection 13) constitutional, which is considered special both due to the municipal initiative and the prohibition on amendment that the Legislative Assembly has, which must limit itself to approving or disapproving the respective municipal agreement. For its part, the ceding of taxes (cesión de tributos) is a financing mechanism developed mainly by the Spanish Autonomous Communities. It is said that in these, the State reserves the tax power; while the Autonomous Community individually holds the competence over the yields, through territorial connection points. Thus, in the management of the ceded tax, the tax authority is retained by the State, which delegates the exercise of the competence to the Autonomous Community, all without prejudice to the "collaboration" that can be established between the Administrations of both territorial entities, State and Autonomous Community. According to what has been indicated, the ceding of taxes implies the delegation of administrative competences, without prejudice to the mandatory coordination and collaboration between the Tax Administrations. In the case of Costa Rica, this figure can be associated, in the judgment of this body, with the situation of the Real Estate Property Tax, by virtue of the characteristics of this tax. **Although they emanate from the exercise of the State's normative and tax authority, the competence over collection belongs to the Municipalities, taking into account the location of the property within the municipal territory as a connection point.** **Likewise, the administrative authority for managing the tax also belongs to the municipalities, without this preventing coordination with the State Tax Administration, which, to date, is manifested in the existence of the Technical Standardization Body (Órgano de Normalización Técnica)** introduced by Article 2, subsection c) of Law 7729. It should be noted that **our constitutional jurisprudence has admitted the figure of ceded taxes, when in Voto 3930-95,** it pointed out regarding the taxes that the State creates for the benefit of the municipalities *“...But this does not mean that the legislator cannot endow the Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax…”* It should be indicated that it is an annual tax, the period of which begins on January 1 and ends on December 31 of each calendar year. Its payment must be made annually or semi-annually or in four quarterly installments, as determined by each municipality. Likewise, the owners of real estate properties, concession holders, permit holders or occupants of the border strip or the maritime-terrestrial zone, occupants or possessors with title, registrable or non-registrable in the Public Registry, with more than one year and who are in the following conditions are considered taxpayers of this tax: possessors, agricultural entrepreneurs, usufructuaries, rural sharecroppers, produce, gratuitous land borrowers and precarious occupants, and IDA parcel holders in certain circumstances. The taxable base for the tax calculation will be the value of the property registered with the Tax Administration, as of January 1 of the corresponding year, which means that for tax purposes, every property must be valued, which is a task of each Municipality within the framework of the powers of administration, management, and collection of the tax imposed by Law No. 7509 itself. Throughout the country, the tax percentage will be one quarter of one percent (0.25%) and will be applied to the value of the property registered by the Tax Administration. As already indicated, for the management of this tax, the law grants the municipalities the status of Tax Administration, which means they are responsible for withholding and receiving said tax, in accordance with the doctrine of Article 99 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. This law also attributes to them a series of prerogatives and duties in order to fulfill the management of this tax, among them *“(…) carry out valuations of real estate properties, invoice, collect and process judicial collection and administer, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. (…).” (Article 3).* Finally, it should be noted that municipal corporations, in the exercise of their own regulatory authority, by reason of the autonomy guaranteed to them by the Political Constitution, can approve the internal organization rules they require in order to make effective the collection and receipt of the Real Estate Property Tax *(see in the same sense, judgment number 1565-2009 issued by the Sixth Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), at sixteen fifteen hours on August eleventh, two thousand eight).* **V.- ON THE SCOPE OF THE MODIFICATION TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE C.N.P.T. BY LAW 7293 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GENERIC, SUBJECTIVE, AND FUTURE EXEMPTION PROVIDED FOR IN NUMERAL 20 OF DECREE LAW 449.** This Tribunal, by majority, considers that the appellant entity is not exempt from paying the Real Estate Property Tax, for the reasons set forth below. The Decree Law that creates the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad was added to by Law N° 764 of October 25, 1949, for the purpose of establishing: *“Article 20.- The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege”.* Said rule, **created a subjective generic exemption that was applicable to all present and future taxes that could affect Nombre9574**, but the Regulatory Law for All Current Exemptions, their Derogation and their Exceptions -Law N° 7293 of March 31, 1992- eliminated this last condition, because in Article 2, subsection l) **it provided for maintaining only the exemptions in force as of the date of its promulgation in favor of all autonomous institutions, affecting Nombre9574 insofar as it holds such nature, which was reinforced by the reform of Articles 63 and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures** -contained in that same regulatory body-, which provided:

“…ARTICLE 63: Limit of application. Even if there is an express provision in the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established subsequent to its creation. (Thus reformed by Article 50 of Law Nº 7293 of March 26, 1992)." " ARTICLE 64.- Validity. The exemption, even when it was granted based on certain factual conditions, may be repealed or modified by a later law, without liability for the State.” Likewise, its effectiveness was subject *"…to full compliance with the precepts, requirements, and purposes that regulate the granting, as well as to the correct use and intended destination, of the goods and services on which the exemption enjoyed by a certain subject has fallen…”* (Article 37 of Law 7293). Consequently, **the effects of the exemption were limited, such that as of the entry into force of Law N° 7293 and, consequently, of the reform to the Tax Code**, **it cannot claim to encompass future taxes, even if it was so established**. In such a way that **the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law**. **Applying the foregoing to the situation of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, it follows that –in principle and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 18 of Law 8660, which will be analyzed below–, said institution would be obliged to pay any tax established after Law 7293, except in those cases where an exemption has been expressly granted in its favor** *(see in this regard, judgment number 000037-F-04 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at ten thirty-five hours on January twenty-first, year two thousand four).* In view of the foregoing, this Court does not share the opinion expressed by the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Court, in judgment number 364-2002 of sixteen hours twenty-eight minutes of October eleventh, two thousand two, insofar as it holds that the generic and subjective exemption for future taxes is maintained in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, considering that: <span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101">“…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">Regarding the validity of Article 20 of the Constitutive Law of the ICE, we must refer to Law 7293 of March 31, 1992, “Law Regulating All Existing Exemptions, their Derogation, and their Exceptions”; which in its Article 1° derogates \"all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in different laws\", and in Article 50, amends numeral 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, to establish that those issued affect only preceding laws, not future ones. However, in Article 2° of the regulation in question, it is expressly indicated that the tax exclusions established in the same Law and those others that: \"…l) Have been granted … to decentralized institutions…\" are excepted from the derogation of the preceding article. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">This being so, the exemption from payment of national and municipal taxes, established in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449, is maintained…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">”</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">; an assertion that, in any case, was nuanced by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 000037-F-04 issued at ten hours thirty-five minutes of January twenty-first of the year two thousand four, by indicating—in relevant part—that</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic"> “…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as the ICE, from that moment, and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under the protection of rules prior to those in which the tax is regulated and they retain the exemptions granted by rules prior to that date</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic"> (…) Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply with respect to taxes created after that date…”. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">Consequently, as of April 3, 1992, the generic and subjective exemption provided for in favor of ICE in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449 is maintained, although limited in its scope and future validity to the provisions of Articles 121 subsection 3) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 2 subsection l) of Law 7293 and 5, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">VI.-</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">REGARDING THE ALLEGED EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX (IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES) THAT SUBSUBSECTION A) OF ARTICLE 4 OF LAW 7509 PRESUMABLY ESTABLISHES IN FAVOR OF THE I.C.E.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Now then, in the case of the real property tax (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles), although Article 34 of Law 7293 modified Article 4 of the Land Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto Territorial) (Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939, and its amendments), in the sense that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">“…The following properties are not subject to this tax: (…) - Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad…”;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> it is also true that, with the entry into force on June 19, 1995, of the Real Property Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles) </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(Law number 7509),</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> the Land Tax Law was not only derogated </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(Article 38)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, but also, it imposed as a condition for properties of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Real Property Tax (Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles), that by special law they enjoy exemption </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(Article 4 subsection a of Law 7509). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">At this point, it is necessary to state that while it is true that the object of both taxes is practically the same, namely: land, facilities, or fixed and permanent constructions existing thereon </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(Article 2 of Laws 27 and 7509); </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">that it is a national tax that was established in favor of the Municipalities </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(Article 1 of Laws 27 and 7509)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> and that, in general terms, the taxable base for the calculation of the</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:10pt"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">tax will be the value of the property registered with the Tax Administration—now under the charge of the municipal administrative body responsible for the collection and oversight of taxes </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(Article 9 and following of Law 7509)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, previously by the General Directorate of Taxation </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(Article 5 of Law 27)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">; it is also true, that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">it is contrary to the principle of tax legality (principio de legalidad tributaria),</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> provided for in numerals 121 subsection 13 of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 5 and 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline">to affirm that due to those similarities, the exemption provided for in Article 4 of the Land Tax Law remains in force over time in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, despite having been derogated by Article 38 of the Real Property Tax Law</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">Nor is the principle of fiscal immunity (principio de inmunidad fiscal) applicable to the specific case,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> for although the Real Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles) constitutes a national tax, it is also true that there is no identity between the active subject, the passive subject (ICE), and the beneficiary subject, and furthermore, the entity competent for the collection and management of the tax (Municipalities), a condition sine qua non for the application of that principle, given that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">“… </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">The principle of fiscal immunity frees the State from the obligation to pay taxes created by it. The active subject of the tax obligation must be the State itself. It would be illogical for a State to create taxes to charge itself</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">The greater entity assumes a dual consideration of active and passive subject of the legal-tax relationship, the consequence of which would be the extinction of the tax obligation by merger (confusión)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">. Hence the reason (Article 49 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures) for establishing merger (confusión) as a cause for the extinction of the tax obligation. When the State goes from being the active subject to the passive subject of the tax, the tax obligation is nonexistent since the intersubjective relationship does not exist. Regarding the municipal regime, the principle of fiscal immunity of the State is inoperative (…) For fiscal immunity to operate—by merger (confusión)—the subjective identity must be complete…” (judgment number 12-1994 issued by the First Chamber of the Court, at eleven hours of March twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-four. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">The highlighting is not from the original</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">So much so, that in Article 5 subsection a) paragraph 2 of the Regulations to the Real Property Tax Law, it is established that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">“…The State and the municipalities do not require the presentation of any requirement, since by definition they are not subject…”. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">In addition to the above, it is also not valid to affirm that subsection a) of Article 4 of the Real Property Tax Law establishes in favor of ICE an exemption (exoneración) from payment of that tax, not only because it imposes as a condition for the properties of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Real Property Tax (Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles), </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">that by special law, they enjoy exemption;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> but also, because in accordance with the principle of tax legality (principio de legalidad tributaria), specifically the provisions of Articles 62 and 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, as of the effective date of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the amendment to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided for in Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">cannot purport to encompass future taxes, even if it was so established</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline">In such a way that the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law, which does not occur in the case of the Real Property Tax Law, which is why referring to the provisions of Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449 as the source of exemption from that tax is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legislative reserve (reserva de ley)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. In that sense, it is worth citing the decision of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101">in judgment number 037-F-04 of ten hours thirty-five minutes of January 21, two thousand four, which, contrary to what the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad affirms regarding the alleged maintenance of the future scope of the generic and subjective exemption contained in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449, established the following:</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> “…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">Subsection l) of the second article of Law 7293 excludes from the derogation the exemptions granted to decentralized institutions. Additionally, in its Article 63, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (amended by ordinal 50 of Law No. 7293) indicates that there can be no rules granting exemptions (exoneraciones) dated prior to the date on which the tax is created, ergo, the exemption cannot be anterior to the tax. This rule has effects as of its enactment, that is, April 3, 1992</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as the ICE, from that moment, and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under the protection of rules prior to those in which the tax is regulated and they retain the exemptions granted by rules prior to that date</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic"> It should not be lost sight of that the Law Regulating Existing Exemptions, Derogations, and Exceptions arose, among other things, with the purpose of organizing the tangle of existing exemptions through a high number of laws; however, the restrictions on the benefits that various activities and institutions had been holding cannot be applied with retroactive effect, therefore, the tax exemptions granted before the entry into force of that law are maintained. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply with respect to taxes created after that date. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">The contrary would entail a repudiable retroactive application of the law. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">It is precisely for these reasons that the exemption granted in favor of the ICE is not affected by Law No. 7283 on Municipal Tariffs and Taxes of the Canton of Tilarán, because it was enacted on a date prior to the Law Regulating all existing exemptions</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">, and it is not until this moment when, by express rule, granting exemptions under the protection of old-date rules is prohibited. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">The factual assumption provided for in Law 7283 could only have been applied to the defendant if the rule was enacted after April 3, 1992</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">. Thus, as it involves a tax prior to the law derogating exemptions, the exemption regime set forth in the law creating the ICE continued to benefit it at the time of the entry into force of Law No. 7283. To hold otherwise, it is reiterated, would entail a retroactive application of Article 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, which is prohibited by constitutional provision…” (the highlighting is not from the original). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">In this case, as analyzed supra, to affirm that due to the existing similarities between the Land Tax (Impuesto Territorial) and the Real Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles)—mainly regarding the object, the determination of the taxable base, the subject benefited by the tax, and the national nature thereof—the exemption provided in Article 4 of the Land Tax Law (amended in that sense by Article 34 of Law 7293) remains in force over time in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, despite having been derogated by Article 38 of the Real Property Tax Law, is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legislative reserve in that matter. Even more so, when Article 4 subsection a) of Law 7509 itself—which entered into force on June 19, 1995—conditioned the non-subjection to the tax regulated therein upon a special law establishing an exemption </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">—in the terms of Articles 5 and 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, that is, in an express, concrete, and clear manner—</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">for the real estate of autonomous institutions—which are the ones of interest in this case—, which does not occur in the matter at hand, since as of the effective date of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the amendment to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided for in Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">cannot purport to encompass future taxes, even if it was so established</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. For the reasons stated, this Court does not share the opinions expressed in judgments 759-2010, 1037-2010, and 983-2010 issued by the Contentious-Administrative Court, when resolving the appeals filed against the first-instance judgment issued in executive proceedings initiated by the Municipalities of Montes de Oro, Tilarán, and San Carlos, against the ICE, for alleged debts of the Real Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles); given that these judgments assume that subsection a) of Article 4 of Law 7509 does contain an exemption in favor of ICE or that it finds support in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449, without analyzing that the scope of the latter is conditioned upon the provisions of Articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline">In summary, once the Land Tax Law was derogated, there does not exist, as of June 19, 1995 (the date of entry into force of Law 7509), a special law that grants the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad an express, clear, and concrete exemption (exención) in accordance with the provisions of Article 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, establishing that the real estate of the appellant entity is not subject to the Real Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">VII.- IN RELATION TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 18 OF LAW 8660 FOR THE SPECIFIC CASE. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">The Law for the Modernization and Strengthening of Public Entities of the Telecommunications Sector (Law 8660, which entered into force as of August 13, 2008),</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> establishes in Article 18 that: “</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">Article 18.- </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Tax treatment (Tratamiento tributario). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">When the ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">In all other cases, the exemptions (exenciones) conferred in Decree-Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred by the legal system, shall remain in force</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">. The basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax”.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> (the highlighting is added). The transcribed rule contains two essential tax assumptions in relation to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad: </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">i)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> The general rule is the exemption from tax payment; consequently, said entity retains the exemption contained in the Decree-Law that created it and any other Law that grants it an exemption (exoneración). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline">However, in accordance with the principles of legislative reserve (reserva de ley) and tax legality (legalidad tributaria), the exemption provided in Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449 is limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of Articles 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 5, 62, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">ii)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> The exception regarding the obligation to pay income and sales taxes, which is conditioned upon the existence of a competitive market.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Now then, it should be clarified that Law 8660 entered into force as of August 13, 2008, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">without being able to be applied retroactively; therefore, the tax rules, including the tax exemption, govern as of that date,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> although –it is insisted– </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline">limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of Articles 2, 62, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. This is because it could not be maintained that the ICE recovered a generic, subjective exemption for future taxes—as originally provided for in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449—, given that as of the effective date of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the amendment to the Tax Code</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">it cannot purport to encompass future taxes, even if it was so established </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(see in a similar sense, resolutions number 417-2012 of fourteen hours of October eleventh; 431-2012 of fourteen hours of October eighteenth; 432-2012 of fourteen hours five minutes of October eighteenth, all of two thousand twelve, issued by the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. In such a way, that the provisions of Article 18 of Law 8660 do not have the virtue of derogating, for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, the provisions of Articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Code of Rules and Procedures, which develop at the legal level the principles of legislative reserve in tax matters (reserva de ley en materia tributaria) and legality (legalidad), provided for in Articles 11 and 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, so that, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline">the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law, which does not occur in the case of the Real Property Tax (Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. In that sense, this Court considers that it cannot be validly alleged that the ICE recovered the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as provided for in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449, and that consequently, as Law 8660 is a special law, it prevails over a general law (Code of Tax Rules and Procedures), </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">since that would imply disapplying, for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, two basic principles in tax matters</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, which are:</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">i)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold"> Legislative Reserve (Reserva de ley) and Tax Legality (Legalidad Tributaria),</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> in the sense that the law </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline">must specify the conditions and requirements set for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline"> its duration, and if at the end or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be settled, or whether the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(Article 62 paragraph 1 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures); </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">ii)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">Equality before the tax and public burdens,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> for even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption (exención) does not extend to taxes established subsequent to their creation—as in the case of the Real Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles)—, for that would imply a future limitation of the State's taxing power, to the detriment of that principle </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">(Article 18 in fine of the Political Constitution)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> . It is worth recalling that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">the principle of fiscal immunity (principio de inmunidad fiscal) is not applicable to the specific case,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> for although the Real Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles) constitutes a national tax, it is also true that there is no identity between the active subject, the passive subject (ICE), and the beneficiary subject, and furthermore, the entity competent for the collection and management of the tax (Municipalities), a condition sine qua non for the application of that principle, given that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">“…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">The principle of fiscal immunity frees the State from the obligation to pay taxes created by it. The active subject of the tax obligation must be the State itself. It would be illogical for a State to create taxes to charge itself</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">The greater entity assumes a dual consideration of active and passive subject of the legal-tax relationship, the consequence of which would be the extinction of the tax obligation by merger (confusión)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">. Hence the reason (Article 49 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures) for establishing merger (confusión) as a cause for the extinction of the tax obligation. When the State goes from being the active subject to the passive subject of the tax, the tax obligation is nonexistent since the intersubjective relationship does not exist. Regarding the municipal regime, the principle of fiscal immunity of the State is inoperative (…) For fiscal immunity to operate—by merger (confusión)—the subjective identity must be complete…” (judgment number 12-1994 issued by the First Chamber of the Court, at eleven hours of March twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-four. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">The highlighting is not from the original</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">So much so, that in Article 5 subsection a) paragraph 2 of the Regulations to the Real Property Tax Law, it is established that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">“…The State and the municipalities do not require the presentation of any requirement, since by definition they are not subject…”. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">It should be clarified, that while it is true that, through judgment number 2008-11210 of fifteen hours of July sixteenth, two thousand eight, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice ruled—among other aspects—on the constitutionality of Article 15—actually 18—of the bill </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">“Law for the strengthening and modernization of Public Entities of the Telecommunications Sector”</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, which was processed in legislative file No. Placa1952; it is also true that said pronouncement only referred to the following point: </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">“…This Court is strongly struck by the argumentation of the consultants, when the taxing power (Article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution) and the principle of equality in the bearing of public burdens (Articles 18 and 33 of the Constitution) are absolutely consubstantial to the Social and Democratic Rule of Law. Without the taxing power and the correlative duty of every person to contribute to public expenses, the various public entities that provide positive benefits to the inhabitants to eradicate real and effective inequalities—proper and typical of a Social Rule of Law—could not exercise their functions, fulfill their competencies, and satisfy the public interest, since it would be impossible for them to have public resources for such purpose.</span></p> <span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">The fact that Nombre9574 and its companies are subject to the payment of sales and income tax, within the framework of an open telecommunications market,</span><span style="font-style:italic"> where the actors -network operators or service providers- can be of a public or private nature, avoids any competitive distortion or asymmetry -which does violate the principle of equality-, that could dissuade other subjects from participating and investing in that segment of the economy, an extreme that would negatively impact the options or freedom of choice of the consumer or user, the cost of services or products, and the increase in productivity.”</span> In addition to the foregoing, it is necessary to recall that in accordance with the provisions of Article 101 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, <span style="font-style:italic">“…The opinion of the Chamber shall only be binding insofar as it establishes the existence of unconstitutional procedures in the consulted bill…”</span> <span style="text-decoration:underline">For all the foregoing reasons, this Court considers that the provisions of Article 18 of Law 8660 are limited in their scope and validity to the provisions of Articles 121(13) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Public Administration Law; 5, 62, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures; which implies that Nombre9574 did not recover the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as was provided in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449, and therefore, it cannot serve as a basis to fulfill the condition set forth in subsection a) of Article 4 of Law 7509, as a prerequisite for its properties not to be subject to the Real Property Tax.</span> **VIII.- SOME CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE NON-SEIZURE (INEMBARGABILIDAD) OF PUBLICLY OWNED ASSETS DIRECTLY LINKED TO ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES.** It is necessary to indicate that, at the time of executing the collection of the amounts that Nombre9574 has pending payment for the Real Property Tax—of course, provided that the statute of limitations period provided in Article 8 of Law number 7509 has not elapsed and that said statute has been invoked by the aggrieved entity—the Municipalities and other legal operators must take into consideration the rules provided in Articles 261, 262 of the Civil Code, and 169, 170 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, regarding the assets of Nombre9574 on which seizure (embargo) can or cannot be ordered and executed for such purposes. In that sense, through resolution number 019-2009-SVII issued at thirteen hours thirty minutes on February twelfth, two thousand nine, the Seventh Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, considered regarding the **concept of public domain and private assets of public administrations** that: <span style="font-style:italic">"(…) </span><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">The State and other public entities possess two types of assets: public and private</span><span style="font-style:italic">. </span><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Article 261 of the Civil Code provides: “Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those that everyone can enjoy because they are given over to public use. All other things are private and objects of particular property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person.” The foregoing must be related to Article 121(4) of the Political Constitution, which establishes as an attribution of the Legislative Assembly to decree the alienation or application to public uses of the Nation's own assets”.</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Public domain assets are characterized by being inalienable, imprescriptible, and not subject to seizure (inembargables), consequently outside the commerce of men</span><span style="font-style:italic">. On the subject, the Constitutional Chamber has expressed: / “II.- THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THE LEGAL MEANS TO INTEGRATE IT.- </span><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Public domain is understood as the set of assets subject to a special legal regime distinct from that governing private domain, which in addition to belonging to or being under the administration of public legal persons, are affected or destined for purposes of public utility and which manifests itself in the direct or indirect use that every person can make of them</span><span style="font-style:italic">. The doctrine recognizes public domain under different meanings, such as dominical assets, dominical assets, public things, public assets, or demanial assets. On this concept, the Chamber expressed (sic) in its Judgment No. 2306-91 at 14:45 hours on November sixth, nineteen ninety-one, the following: / “The public domain is composed of assets that manifest, by express will of the legislator, a special destiny of serving the community, the public interest. These are the so-called dominical assets, demanial assets, public assets or things, or public assets, which do not belong individually to private parties and which are destined for a public use and subjected to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. This means, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, are affected by the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express rule. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, not subject to seizure (inembargables), cannot be mortgaged or be susceptible to liens in the terms of Civil Law, and the administrative action substitutes for interdicts to recover the domain... Consequently, the national regime of public domain assets, such as the roadways of the Capital City, be they municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public sites, places them outside the commerce of men...” </span> (see in a similar sense, judgment number 035-2009-SVII issued by the Seventh Section of the Contentious-Administrative Court, at fourteen hours forty minutes on March thirteenth, two thousand nine). Consequently, **subject to seizure (embargables)** **will be** the private domain assets of the Administration that are not affected to a public purpose <span style="font-style:italic">(article 169.1.a of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code).</span> On the contrary, **not subject to seizure (inembargables) will be** the publicly owned assets destined for common use and enjoyment, nor those directly linked to the provision of essential public services—such as, for example: electricity and telecommunications—**,** or that are indispensable or irreplaceable for the fulfillment of public purposes or services <span style="font-style:italic">(articles 261 of the Civil Code and 170 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code).</span> **IX.- COROLLARY.** For the reasons given, this Court rejects the appeal filed and confirms the resolution of ten hours thirty minutes on April nineteenth, two thousand twelve, issued by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco, as it is not substantially contrary to the provisions of Articles 11, 18 in fine, 33, 121(13) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Public Administration Law; 20 of Decree-Law 449; 2 subsection l); 35 and 50 of Law 7293; 4 subsection a) and 38 subsection a) of Law 7509; 5, 62, 63 and 54 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures; 18 of Law 8860; 5 subsection a) paragraph 2 of Executive Decree 27601-H. However, given that it was not the subject of the arguments raised in the motion to reverse with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio), filed by the appealing entity against the contested act <span style="font-style:italic">(folios 141 to 145, 149 to 155 of the expediente)</span>, this Court does not determine whether some of the periods charged by the Municipality of El Guarco may or may not be time-barred. As there is no further recourse in administrative venue, the administrative venue is hereby deemed exhausted. <span style="color:#010101">With the dissenting opinion (voto salvado) of Judge Solano Ulloa, who upholds the appeal, annuls the contested resolution, and deems the administrative venue exhausted.-</span> **POR TANTO.** <span style="color:#010101">For the reasons given, by majority vote, the resolution of ten hours thirty minutes on April nineteenth, two thousand twelve, issued by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco is confirmed. The administrative venue is hereby deemed exhausted. With the dissenting opinion (voto salvado) of Judge Solano Ulloa, who upholds the appeal, annuls the contested resolution, and deems the administrative venue exhausted.-</span> **Jorge Leiva Poveda** **Marianella Álvarez Molina** **Siria Carmona Castro** **Dissenting opinion (Voto salvado) of Judge Carmona Castro.** **CONSIDERANDO** With the due respect and consideration, this judge separates from the majority vote, specifically regarding the criteria on the merits in the present matter put forth by my colleagues on the Court. On this particular, the legal grounds are set forth below, based on which it is considered that the action taken by the Municipality of El Guarco must be annulled.

**I.-** **ON THE ORIGIN OF THE TAX OBLIGATION.** In Tax Law, more specifically in the tax legal relationship, we are in the presence of two types of subjects: active and passive. The active subject is the State or some lesser public entity, which holds the so-called power of imperium, from which derives the financial power (Article 14 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures). The State is the primary active subject, but there exist other active subjects that are sub-primary or by delegation, as is the case of the Municipalities, which have the power to create taxes. The tax authority is that faculty of the State to coercively obtain from the private sphere of the taxpayer a certain amount of wealth to finance public expenditures, and the passive subject is that to whom the Law imposes obligations and corresponds to who is subject to the State's power of imperium. From this perspective, in very general terms, the taxpayer comes to be that person with respect to whom the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation is verified. The obligations assumed by taxpayers consist mainly in the <span style="text-decoration:underline">payment of the tax of the substantial tax obligations</span>, the source of the tax obligation being the <span style="text-decoration:underline">taxable event (hecho generador)</span>, which can arise only by mandate of a <span style="text-decoration:underline">law</span>. The substantial obligation, also called the principal obligation, consists of that <span style="text-decoration:underline">patrimonial</span> performance, which seen from a double perspective can be expressed as an obligation to give (the taxpayer) and receive (the tax authority). However, the passive subjects are also burdened with the obligation to comply with the <span style="text-decoration:underline">formal or administrative duties</span>, which are accessory and <span style="text-decoration:underline">revolve around the principal obligation</span>, arising with the purpose of <span style="font-style:italic">facilitating its compliance</span>. (Article 18 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures). It is the <span style="text-decoration:underline">Law</span> which, in the interest of satisfying a superior public interest, destined for the fulfillment of state obligations, subjects the taxpayer to a regime of additional obligations. The burdens that weigh on the taxpayer, by their very reason for being such, are imposed by Law, which must cause their sphere of private interests to yield in favor of a superior public interest. Their obligation derives from a factor totally foreign to the will of the Tax Administration, because their simple condition as a taxpayer subjects them to the formal regime of obligations and duties that transcend the strictly pecuniary sphere.

**II. ON TAX BENEFITS AND THEIR CREATION.** There are state policies through which exceptions to the application of taxes are created, within which are tax benefits (beneficios fiscales), understood as the granting of a protectionist fiscal measure, which can comprise various mechanisms or manifestations, such as tax exemptions (exoneraciones fiscales) or the granting of subsidies of diverse kinds, such as, for example, the granting of State bonds for specific activities (productive or cultural), access to official credits with reduced interest rates and dilatory amortization periods, customs franchises, etc.

It is therefore a matter of "support measures or instrumental stimulus through a tax relief mechanism" (SOLER ROCH, M.T. *Incentivos a la inversión y justicia tributaria*, Civitas, Madrid, 1983, p.20), within which we find the typical case of deductions for investments or job creation, the Tax Payment Certificates (Certificados de Abono Tributario, CATs), and within which fit, par excellence, **tax exemptions (exoneraciones tributarias)**. Specifically with exemptions, the aim is either to prevent the birth of the tax obligation—total exemption—or to reduce the amount of the tax—partial exemption—through credits or deductions in the face of certain factual situations included within the scope of the taxable event, the realization of which does not give rise to the tax payment obligation, constituting an exception to the normal effects derived from the realization of that event. The tax exemption norm has the force to enervate the effects of the norm that creates it, since it affects either the subjective or objective element of the taxable event, or the quantification elements of the tax, that is, the taxable base (deductions and reductions) or the tax rate. The classic theory of exemption defines exemptions as a **legal dispensation from the tax obligation**, whether as a derogation of the payment obligation, despite the taxable event occurring, which is the effect they produce, or as the exception from the obligation to contribute to public expenses for certain subjects (subjective exemption), or for certain situations or facts (objective exemption). Thus, the tax exemption takes place when a norm provides that in those cases expressly foreseen by it, despite the taxable event occurring, its principal effect does not develop: the duty to pay the tax or tax obligation.

**III.- ON THE EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF THE PROPERTY TAX (IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES) IN FAVOR OF THE INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD. ON THE LEGISLATOR'S INTENT.** The levy on the ownership of real estate has existed for a long time, since it was created by the now repealed Territorial Tax Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939, and its amendments. In Article 4 of that same law, a generic subjective exemption in favor of ICE was established, by providing the following:

**"***Article 4.- Non-subjections. The following real estate properties are not subject to this tax:* *- The Legislative Branch; the Executive Branch; the Judicial Branch; the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) and the municipalities.* *- The Boards of Education (Juntas de Educación), public radiotelegraphic and radiotelephonic stations.* *- The National Electricity Service (Servicio Nacional de Electricidad).* *- The Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas, IICA) and its staff members who are not Costa Rican citizens.* *- The Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.* *- **The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad**...*" Subsequently, Decree Law 449 of April 8, 1949, reaffirmed the exemption already in force in favor of ICE, insofar as it provided that:

"*Article 20.-* *The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege.*" (Thus added by Article 1 of Law 764 of October 25, 1949.)

On May 3, 1971, the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) entered into force, creating new regulations in Article 62 for exemptions, since the original text of the ordinal provided:

"*Article 62.- Conditions and requirements demanded. The law establishing exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements demanded for their granting, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, and, where applicable, the term of its duration.*" (Note: this norm was subsequently amended by Article 1 of Law No. 7900 of August 3, 1999, and by Article 1 of Law No. 9069 of September 10, 2012, "Law for the Strengthening of Tax Management" (Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria), with its current text reading as follows:

"*Article 62.- Conditions and requirements demanded. The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements established to grant them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be liquidated, or if the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions.* *In all cases, the individuals or legal entities that request exemptions must be up to date in the payment of the taxes administered by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) of the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda), as a condition for their granting."* ) In Transitory Provision 169 subsection c) of that Code, several express repeals of the Territorial Tax Law were made, but none modified numeral 4, the creator of the exemption in favor of ICE. This judge understands that, had there been the intent within the legislative body to repeal said exemption, it would have been so provided by the legislator in that sense, but that did not occur, thus allowing the coexistence of the regulation contained in Article 62 and the validity and application of the norm creating the benefit in favor of ICE. Even the exemption from payment of the territorial tax survived the entry into force of the Regulatory Law of All Current Exemptions, Their Derogation and Their Exceptions—Law 7293 in force since April 3, 1992—since Article 34 itself expressly so provided. Three years later, the Property Tax Law (Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles)—Law No. 7509 of May 9, 1995, in force as of June 19 of that same year—was enacted, by means of which the Territorial Tax Law was repealed, in which the elements of the territorial tax (taxable event and active and passive subjects) were preserved, but everything concerning the management, administration, and use of the same tax was reformed. That is, it was not a new tax, since it had already existed for years. However, regarding exemptions, it provided the following:

"*Article 4.- Real estate not subject to the tax. The following are not subject to this tax:* *a) The real estate of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that, by special law, enjoy exemption...*" As can be seen, in that norm the legislator foresaw that, for the purposes of autonomous institutions, there would be a permanence of the exemptions established in special laws. As regards the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, even with the repeal of the Territorial Tax Law, Article 20 of Decree Law 449 of April 8, 1949, transcribed above, pre-existed, a special norm that introduced a generic exemption of a subjective nature by virtue of the institution to which it is directed, with respect to all national and municipal taxes. If the tax was not new, therefore, the exemption was not new either, and it has not been declared unconstitutional, so it maintains its validity, an express repeal by the same legislator that created it being deemed necessary in order to eliminate its effectiveness, in application of the principles of legal reserve in tax matters and parallelism of forms. This historical analysis of the normative development, while useful and necessary to contextualize the unfolding of the tax and its exemption, leads today to the principal norm governing the matter, contained in the **Law for the Modernization and Strengthening of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector**—**Law 8660, which entered into force on August 13, 2008**—, born within the normative framework required by the Free Trade Agreement with the United States of America, in which the legislator, through a later law, expressly takes up again the validity of all of ICE's exemptions, making an express exception for income tax and sales tax, imposing for the first time, the payment of these two sole taxes. In this regard, the norm is transcribed:

"*Article 18. Tax treatment.* *When Nombre9574 and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. **In all other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decree Law No. 449, of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred upon them by the legal system, shall remain in force...***" (The highlighting is added).

The application of this norm is immediate upon its effectiveness and, despite the fact that the exemption contained in the Decree Law is broad, generic, and subjective in function of the special nature of the Institution to which it is directed, its application is definitively binding because the cited Article 18 is a special norm and subsequent to the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures. Interpreting that what is provided in this norm is limited in its scope and validity to what is established in numeral 62 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures presents several important questions that, in the opinion of the undersigned, are contrary to the democratic system of the Costa Rican state and are analyzed below. **First,** because in the law-making process, the Legislative Branch finds its limits only in the constitutional text and in the regulations governing the procedures for the formation of the law, from which it follows that it cannot be understood that the norm established in the cited Article 62 is a condition on the power to enact and amend tax law held by the Legislative Assembly, even when it is in a different sense. **Second,** because doing so would be to disregard the express will of the legislator who, pursuant to Article 105 of the Constitution, assumes said power by delegation of the people without being subject to limitations—except in the case of treaties—, in full and legitimate exercise of popular representation. Therefore, if in the current historical context of market opening and commercial competitiveness, the legislator opted to maintain such fiscal benefits for the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, given that it has been and continues to be the main national provider of indispensable public services, such legislative will must be respected. Considering the contrary is to disregard the content of a "substantive tax law," born under the protection of a "formal law" derived from the exercise of legislative power, which responds to the conjunctural demands of redefining national commercial and institutional concepts, as a consequence of the recent demands of economic policy, with full powers to specify the national tax scheme and the incentives and benefits it provides, including this class of tax exclusions. **Third,** because the letter of the norm is clear and precise, binding the municipal authorities and this improper jurisdictional hierarchy to its application, interpretations and normative integrations to the contrary not being possible, as this would go against numerals 9 subsection 2) and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), by means of which the Administration is subjected to the legal system and the disapplication of the administrative norm for specific cases is prohibited. This embodies and summarizes the substantial difference with the majority opinion of this Vote, since we are not even facing a case of incompatibility or normative antinomy, given that it cannot be conceived, in this case, that we are in the presence of two provisions in force of equal rank that regulate in a contradictory manner the same factual situation. It is clear then that the legislation in force and applicable is that contained in ordinals 18 of Law 8660, which refers in turn to the application of the exemptions contained in Article 20 of Decree Law 449, so there is no choice but to conclude that Nombre9574 is indeed exempt from payment of the Property Tax, so the grievances expressed by its representation are admissible. Consequently, defects of absolute nullity are apparent in the ruling contained in the resolution of ten thirty hours on April nineteenth, two thousand twelve, issued by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco, insofar as it ordered the maintenance of the charging of said tax to ICE, reason for which said administrative act must be annulled in this act, for transgression of the principle of legality in its basis and content. There being no further appeal, the administrative channel should be deemed exhausted.

**POR TANTO** The resolution of ten thirty hours on April nineteenth, two thousand twelve, issued by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco, is annulled.

The administrative route is deemed exhausted.

Siria Carmona Castro ASUNTO: Municipal Appeal ACCIONANTE: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad RECURRIDO: Municipalidad de El Guarco.

I.Inadmissibility of the exemption in favor of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, ICE). The appellant requests a declaration that it is exempt from the payment of the tax on real estate (impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles) for its property 75870. Its claim is based on article 20 of its Creating Law (Ley de Creación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE)), Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, in relation to articles 4 and 5 of the Land Tax Law (Ley sobre Impuesto Territorial), Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939. First of all, it should be noted that the tax on real estate is currently regulated by Law No. 7509 of May 9, 1995, published in La Gaceta No. 105 of June 2, 1995, which according to its article 4, came into effect on July 1 of that same year. Regarding the specific point, article 4 of Law No. 7509, in its subparagraph e), establishes that the following are exempt from the payment of this tax: "e) Properties owned by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute." In this regard, it should be considered that article 2 of Law No. 7729 of December 15, 1997, in its second paragraph, repealed subparagraph e) of article 4 of the cited Law No. 7509. Even though at the time the assessment was made by the Municipality, said exemption provision was in force, the truth is that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), through Voto 4654-2003, declared the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of article 2 of Law No. 7729 of December 15, 1997, and by connection, of article 18 of Law No. 8660 of August 8, 2008, which contained the same provision. The effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the repeal of subparagraph e) of article 4 of Law No. 7509 is that the exemption is reinstated and remains in force for the benefit of ICE. However, it is necessary to consider that article 2 of the Law Regulating Existing Exemptions, Repeals, and Exceptions (Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones), Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992, provides as general principles that: "For the granting and enjoyment of tax exemptions, the principle of legality in tax matters must be observed" and "Exemptions, even if granted by law, must be justified" (Constitutional Chamber, Voto 4654-2003, of 15:08 hrs. of May 28, 2003).

...

[...] “**II. PURPOSE OF THE APPEAL:** <span style='color:#010101'>The</span> **appellant** argues that the ICE was exempted from payment of the Real Property Tax, since the promulgation of *Decreto Ley* number 449, in whose Article 20 it is provided that *“…The Costa Rican Electricity Institute is exempt from payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege”*. It indicates that Article 4, subsection a) of the Real Property Tax Law (Law No. 7509 of May 9, 1995), excludes the ICE, as an autonomous institution, from the obligation to pay that tax.

It maintains that the legal landscape for ICE regarding national and municipal taxes was expressly reaffirmed in the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in Telecommunications (Law No. 8660), which in Article 18 expressly reiterates the exemptions granted to ICE via its organic Law No. 449, and only subjects ICE to some aspects of income and sales taxes. It indicates that Article 2, subsection l) of the Law Regulating All Current Exemptions, Their Repeals, and Their Exceptions (Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992), did not modify in any way the provisions of Article 20 of Decree-Law No. 449, and therefore, this article remains in force to date. In addition to the above, it points out that Article 34 of Law No. 7293 itself, which modified Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (Law No. 27 of March 3, 1939), established that the properties of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad were not subject to this tax, which implies—in its opinion—that the current exemption contemplated in Article 20 of Decree-Law No. 449 is reaffirmed once again. It considers that while it is true that Article 50 of Law No. 7293 modified Article 63 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures in the sense that <i>"…Even if there is an express provision in tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established subsequent to its creation…"</i>; it is also true that, contrary to the criteria argued by the Procuraduría General de la República and the Technical Standardization Body of the Ministry of Finance, although Article 37 of Law No. 7509 repealed the Territorial Tax Law, this does not imply that a new tax was created, because the objective, before and after, continues to be lands and properties, with no variation whatsoever in the assumptions of the repealed Law, since on the contrary, both laws maintain the same objective assumptions of the tax. They argue that in any case, the central point of the divergence they maintain is that the Real Property Tax Law itself establishes an exemption regime, which, in their opinion, cannot be ignored by considering that Article 4 makes no express reference to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, because said article establishes that the properties of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that, by special law enjoy exemption, will not be subject to that tax. On that point, it considers that it is necessary to revisit the provisions of Article 20 of Decree-Law 449, in which, in their opinion, it is clearly defined that ICE, by special law, enjoys an exemption from the payment of national taxes, as is the case with the Real Property Tax, which is why Laws 7293 and 7509, in their Article 2, subsection l) and Article 4, subsection a), maintain the generic exemptions granted by Decree-Law No. 449 in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. They maintain that said generic exemption was reinforced by Article 18 of Law 8660, a rule that keeps in force the exemptions conferred in Decree-Law 449, as well as any others granted by the legal system, except in those cases when ICE and its companies act as operators or suppliers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, in which case they will be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes, excluding the traditional basic telephone service from the first tax (income). They consider it evident that Law 8660 reiterated the generic tax exemption in favor of ICE, just as the Procuraduría General de la República itself established in opinion C-171-2009 of June 19, 2009. Consequently, it considers that the subjective generic exemption granted through Decree-Law No. 449 has remained in force over time, as has been established in judgments No. 364-2002 handed down by the First Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, and 037-F-04 at ten thirty-five hours on January twenty-first, two thousand four, handed down by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice; as well as in judgments 759-2010, 1037-2010, and 983-2010 handed down by the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo, when resolving an appeal filed against the first-instance judgment handed down in executive proceedings brought by the Municipalities of Montes de Oro, Tilarán, and San Carlos, against ICE for alleged debts of the Real Property Tax.</span> For its part, <b>the appealed municipal authority,</b> indicates that Law of Real Property Tax No. 7509, in force since 1995, expressly repeals the Law on Territorial Tax No. 27 of March 2, 1939, and its reforms, and at the same time creates a new tax in favor of the Municipalities, the object of which is lands, installations, or fixed and permanent constructions. In its view, these laws differ in several aspects: on one hand, the object, the method of distributing the tax, the way in which the tax is established, and the regime of non-subjection to the tax vary; and on the other hand, unlike the repealed Law No. 27, it grants the administration of the tax to the municipalities. It argues that the exemption claimed by ICE found support in the Territorial Tax Law of 1949, which was eliminated by Article 4 of the Real Property Tax Law, by restrictively establishing the application of that privilege only in favor of institutions that enjoy exemption by special law. It adds that the Real Property Tax Law is subsequent to the Territorial Tax Law, and according to the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures, it is not possible to attempt to encompass future taxes. It further states that as of Law No. 7293, the Law Regulating Current Exemptions, Repeals, and Exceptions, in force as of April 3, 1992, all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in different laws, decrees, and related legal norms are repealed, because it was unnecessary to eliminate the number of existing exemptions, and among them, in its opinion, the exemption claimed by ICE is affected. Additionally, it cites the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector No. 8660 of August 8, 2008, and argues that although Article 18 provides for the validity of the exemptions conferred by Law No. 449, as well as by any other granted by the legal system, in its view, in accordance with the principle of statutory reservation and tax legality, the exemption from future taxes must be clearly specified in the law that establishes it, a situation that, it maintains, does not occur with the cited law. The representative of the appealed Municipality, in support of their thesis, refers to opinions issued by the Procuraduría General de la República No. C-109-2006; C-151-2007; C-171-2009; Official Communication No. DONT-052 of February 20, 2012; Judgment No. 472-12 of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Third Section; and requests that the filed appeal be declared without merit, and that the challenged resolution be upheld.&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:1.0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>III.- REGARDING THE LIMITS AND SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY RESERVATION AND LEGALITY IN TAX MATTERS.</span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'> Pursuant to the provisions of Article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution, it is exclusively the responsibility of the Legislative Assembly to establish national taxes and contributions and to authorize municipal ones. This implies that <b>there exists a principle of statutory reservation in tax matters, also called the principle of tax legality</b>. In that sense, Article 124 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that regulations, circulars, instructions, and other administrative provisions of a general nature may not establish penalties nor impose levies, fees, fines, or other similar charges. For its part, Article 5 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures, in relation to Articles 5 and 62 of that same normative body, establishes the essential elements of the tax that are reserved to law, namely: <b>a)</b> To create, modify, or suppress taxes; to define the taxable event of the tax relationship; to establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and to indicate the taxpayer; <b>b)</b> To define violations and establish the respective sanctions; <b>c)</b> To establish privileges, preferences, and guarantees for tax credits; <b>d)</b> To regulate the methods of extinction of tax credits. Pursuant to subsection b) of Article 6 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures, <b>only the law may grant exemptions</b>, <b>reductions or benefits, which consequently cannot be created by analogy, but by formal and material law</b> <i>(Article 6 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures)</i>, <u>a legal rule that, in accordance with the <b>principle of tax legality</b>, must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes comprised, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end of or during said period the goods can be released or taxes must be paid, or whether it may be authorized to be transferred to third parties and under what conditions</u> <i>(Articles 5 and 62, paragraph 1 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures). </i>The foregoing implies that even if there is an express provision in tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established subsequent to its creation, as this would imply a future limitation on the State's taxing power, to the detriment of the principle of equality before tax and public burdens <i>(Article 18 in fine of the Political Constitution)</i>. However, this Tribunal considers that in view of the indicated rules and in accordance with the jurisprudence issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, <u>the principle of statutory reservation in tax matters is not absolute in nature, but relative, since while it is true that the essential elements must be established by law, it is also true that the legal rule must at least establish the limits or specific criteria based on which infra-legal norms —Article 2, subsection d) of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures— may or must complete the regulatory framework of said essential elements, for the purpose of executing and applying said legal rules</u><i> (Articles 140, subsections 3 and 18 in fine of the Political Constitution and Article 99, second paragraph, of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures)</i>. In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: <i>“...Our jurisprudence, (...) has recognized, taking into account certain circumstances, the possibility of a ‘relative delegation’ of said powers operating —within certain reasonable limits—, provided that the margins of the respective tax are indicated in the law, because otherwise, we would be in the presence of an ‘absolute delegation’ of such powers, a procedure that lacks, as stated, constitutional validity (...) the Chamber has ruled in favor of relative delegation in tax matters, but not with regard to the constitutional elements of the tax obligation (active and passive subjects, object of the obligation, cause, tax rate), in which the so-called statutory reservation does apply...”</i> (judgment No. 1996-00687, and in a similar sense, judgment No. 1995-000739 at fourteen fifty-one hours on February eighth, nineteen ninety-six).</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:1.0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>IV.- SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX.</span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'> This tax is created by Law No. 7509, which establishes a tax on real property in favor of the municipalities, the object of which is the lands, the installations, or the fixed and permanent constructions that exist there. Regarding its nature, it is necessary to point out that the Constitutional Chamber has established that it is a “<i>municipal tax due to its destination —only—, but it is not so by virtue of its origin or promulgation procedure, given that it did not arise from the initiative of local governments, but from the exercise of the taxing power granted to the Legislative Assembly, by virtue of the provisions of Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, meaning it is a product of ordinary legislative work itself. It is worth reiterating that the Legislative Assembly is sovereign, regarding the use of tax power, to establish the taxes that are required, whether national or municipal.” (SCV 5669-99).</i> Thus, it is not a municipal tax derived from the derived and own taxing power of municipal corporations that stems from Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; but rather what Spanish doctrine calls ceded taxes. Although both are local tax sources, the former are those that, as indicated, are created by the special legislative procedure provided for in Article 121, subsection 13) of the Constitution, which is considered special both for the municipal initiative and for the prohibition of amendments that the Legislative Assembly has, which must limit itself to approving or rejecting the respective municipal agreement. For its part, ceding of taxes is a financing mechanism developed mainly by the Spanish Autonomous Communities. It is said that in these, the State reserves the taxing power; while the Autonomous Community individually holds the competence over the revenue, through points of connection of a territorial nature. Thus, in the management of the ceded tax, the State retains the taxing power, and delegates the exercise of the competence to the Autonomous Community, all without prejudice to the "collaboration" that may be established between the Administrations of both territorial entities, State and Autonomous Community. As indicated, the ceding of taxes implies the delegation of administrative competences, without prejudice to the obligatory coordination and collaboration between the Tax Administrations. In the case of Costa Rica, this figure can be associated, in the judgment of this body, with the situation of the Real Property Tax, by virtue of the inherent characteristics of this tax. <u>Although they emanate from the exercise of the State's regulatory and taxing power, the Municipalities have the competence over collection, taking into account the location of the property within the municipal territory as a point of connection.</u> <u>Likewise, the municipalities also have the administrative power over the tax's management, without this preventing the existence of coordination with the State Tax Administration, which, to date, manifests itself in the existence of the Technical Standardization Body</u> introduced by Article 2, subsection c) of Law 7729. It should be noted that <b>our constitutional jurisprudence has admitted the figure of ceded taxes, when in Voto 3930-95,</b> it stated regarding taxes created by the State for the benefit of the municipalities: “<i>...But that does not mean that the legislator cannot provide the Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax…” </i>It must be indicated that it is an annual tax, whose period begins on January 1 and ends on December 31 of each calendar year. Its payment must be made annually, semiannually, or in four quarterly installments, as determined by each municipality. Likewise, the following are considered taxpayers of this tax: the owners of the real property, the concessionaires, the permit holders or occupants of the border strip or the maritime-terrestrial zone, the occupants or possessors with title, registrable or unregistrable in the Public Registry, with more than one year and who are in the following conditions: possessors, agricultural entrepreneurs, usufructuaries, rural sharecroppers, produce shares, gratuitous land borrowers, and precarious occupants, and IDA parcel owners under certain circumstances. The tax base for the calculation of the tax shall be the value of the property registered with the Tax Administration, as of January 1 of the corresponding year, which means that for tax purposes, every property must be valued, which is a task of each Municipality within the framework of the powers of administration, management, and collection of the tax imposed by Law No. 7509 itself. Throughout the country, the tax rate shall be one quarter of one percent (0.25%) and shall be applied to the value of the property registered by the Tax Administration. As already indicated, for the management of this tax, the law grants the municipalities the status of Tax Administration, which means they are responsible for withholding and receiving said tax, in accordance with the doctrine of Article 99 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures. This law also grants them a series of prerogatives and duties in order to be able to fulfill the management of this tax, among them, <i>“(…) performing valuations of real property, invoicing, collecting, and processing judicial collection and administering, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. (…).” (Article 3).</i> Finally, it must be considered that municipal corporations, in exercise of the regulatory power that is their own, by reason of the autonomy guaranteed to them by the Political Constitution, may well approve the internal organizational rules they require in order to make effective the collection and receipt of the Real Property Tax <i>(see, in the same sense, judgment No. 1565-2009 handed down by the Sixth Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, at sixteen fifteen on August eleventh, two thousand eight)</i>.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:1.0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>V.- ON THE SCOPE OF THE MODIFICATION TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE C.N.P.T. BY LAW 7293 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GENERIC, SUBJECTIVE, AND FUTURE EXEMPTION PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 20 OF DECREE-LAW 449. </span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>This Tribunal, by majority, considers that the appellant entity is not exempt from paying the Real Property Tax, for the reasons set forth below. </span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'>The Decree-Law that creates the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad was supplemented by Law No. 764 of October 25, 1949, to establish: <i>“Article 20.- The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege”.</i>&nbsp; Said rule, <u>created a subjective generic exemption that was applicable to all present and future taxes that could affect ICE</u>, but the Law Regulating All Current Exemptions, Their Repeals, and Their Exceptions -Law No. 7293 of March 31, 1992- eliminated this latter condition, as Article 2, subsection l) <u>provided to maintain only the exemptions in force at the date of its promulgation in favor of all autonomous institutions, thereby affecting ICE insofar as it holds such nature, which was reinforced by the reform of Articles 63 and 64 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures</u> -contained in that same normative body-, which provided: </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:5.65pt;line-height:150%'><i><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>“…ARTICLE 63: Limit of application. Even if there is an express provision in tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established subsequent to its creation.</span></i><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;color:#010101; mso-ansi-language:EN'> (Thus reformed by Article 50 of Law No. 7293 of March 26, 1992).&quot; </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:5.65pt;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>&quot; <i>ARTICLE 64.- Validity. The exemption, even when granted based on certain conditions of fact, may be repealed or modified by a subsequent law, without liability for the State.”</i> </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:36.85pt;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Likewise, its effectiveness was subject&nbsp; <i>“…to full compliance with the precepts, requirements, and purposes that regulate the granting, as well as to the correct use and intended destination, of the goods and services upon which the exemption enjoyed by a determined subject has fallen…” </i>(Article 37 of Law 7293) <i>.</i> Consequently, <u>the effects of the exemption were limited, such that as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code</u>, <b>it cannot seek to encompass future taxes, even if so established</b>. Thus, t<u>he exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and specific in the text of the law</u>. <b>Applying the foregoing to the situation of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, it follows that —in principle and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 18 of Law 8660, which will be analyzed next—, said institution would be obliged to pay any tax established subsequent to Law 7293, except in those cases where an exemption has been expressly granted in its favor </b><i>(see in this regard, judgment No. 000037-F-04 handed down by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at ten thirty-five hours on January twenty-first, two thousand four)</i>. By reason of the foregoing, this Tribunal does not share the criterion expressed by the First Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil, in judgment No. 364-2002 at sixteen twenty-eight hours on October eleventh, two thousand two, given that therein it is maintained that the generic and subjective exemption for future taxes remains in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, when considering that: <i>“…</i></span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language: EN'><i>Regarding the validity of Article 20 of the Organic Law of ICE, we must refer to Law 7293 of March 31, 1992, “Regulating All Current Exemptions, Their Repeals, and Their Exceptions”; which in its Article 1 repeals &quot;all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws&quot;, and in Article 50 modifies Article 63 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures, to establish that those enacted only affect preceding laws, not future ones. However, in Article 2 of the regulation under discussion, it is expressly indicated that the tax exemptions established in the same Law and those others that: &quot;…l) Have been granted … to decentralized institutions…&quot; are excepted from the repeal of the preceding article. <b>Thus, the exemption from the payment of national and municipal taxes, established in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449… is maintained</b>”</i>; a statement that in any case was nuanced by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 000037-F-04 handed down at ten thirty-five hours on January twenty-first, two thousand four, by indicating –in relevant part– that<i> “…Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment forward, and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under rules prior to those in which the tax is regulated, and they retain the exemptions granted by rules prior to that date (…) Consequently, the restriction of Article 63 ibidem may only apply regarding taxes created after that date…” .</i>Consequently, as of April 3, 1992, the generic and subjective exemption provided for in favor of ICE in Article 20 of Decree-Law 449 is maintained, although limited in its future scope and validity to the provisions of Articles 121, subsection 3) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 2, subsection l) of Law 7293; and 5, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:36.85pt;line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'>VI.-</span></b><span lang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'> <b>REGARDING THE ALLEGED EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX THAT ARTICLE 4, SUBSECTION A) OF LAW 7509 PRESUMABLY ESTABLISHES IN FAVOR OF I.C.E.</b> Now then, in the case of the real property tax, although Article 34 of Law 7293 modified Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939, and its reforms), in the sense that <i>“…The properties owned by: (…) - Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad… are not subject to this tax”;</i> it is also true that with the entry into force on June 19, 1995, of the Real Property Tax Law <i>(Law No. 7509),</i> not only was the Territorial Tax Law repealed <i>(Article 38)</i>, but also, it imposed as a condition for the properties of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Real Property Tax, that they enjoy exemption by special law <i>(Article 4, subsection a of Law 7509).</i></span></p> At this point, it is necessary to indicate that although it is true that the object of both taxes is practically the same, namely: the land, the installations, or the fixed and permanent constructions existing thereon *(article 2 of Laws 27 and 7509)*; that it is a national tax established in favor of the Municipalities *(article 1 of Laws 27 and 7509)*; and that, in general terms, the taxable base (base imponible) for the calculation of the tax will be the value of the real estate registered with the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) –now under the charge of the municipal administrative body responsible for the perception and oversight of the taxes *(article 9 and following of Law 7509)*, previously by the Directorate General of Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación) *(article 5 of Law 27)*–; it is also true that <b>it is contrary to the principle of tax legality (principio de legalidad tributaria)</b>, provided for in numerals 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); 5 and 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), <u>to affirm that due to these similarities, the exemption (exención) provided in article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto Territorial) remains in force over time in favor of the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad), despite having been repealed by article 38 of the Law on Real Estate Tax (Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles)</u>. <b>Neither is the principle of fiscal immunity (principio de inmunidad fiscal) applicable to this specific case,</b> because although the Real Estate Tax constitutes a tax of a national character, it is also true that there is no identity between the active subject (sujeto activo), the passive subject (sujeto pasivo) (ICE), and the beneficiary subject (sujeto beneficiario), who is also competent for the collection and management of the tax (Municipalities), a sine qua non condition for the application of that principle, given that *“… <u>The principle of fiscal immunity frees the State from the obligation to pay taxes created by it. The active subject of the tax obligation must be the same State. It would be illogical for a State to create taxes to charge itself</u>. <b>The larger entity assumes a double consideration as active subject and passive subject of the legal-tax relationship, the consequence of which would be the extinction of the tax obligation by confusion (confusión)</b>. Hence the reason (article 49 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures) for establishing confusion as a cause for extinction of the tax obligation. When the State changes from being the active subject to the passive subject of the tax, the tax obligation is non-existent because the intersubjective relationship does not exist. Regarding the municipal regime, the principle of fiscal immunity of the State is inoperative (…) For fiscal immunity to operate -by confusion- the subjective identity must be complete…” (judgment number 12-1994 issued by the First Chamber of the Court (Sala Primera de la Corte), at eleven hours on March twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-four. </i>The highlighting is not from the original<i>). </i>This is so much the case that article 5, subsection a), 2nd paragraph of the Regulations to the Law on Real Estate Tax (Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles), establishes that *“…The State and the municipalities do not require the presentation of any requirement, since by definition they are not subject (no afectos)…”*. In addition to the foregoing, it is also not valid to affirm that subsection a) of article 4 of the Law on Real Estate Tax establishes in favor of ICE an exoneration (exoneración) from paying that tax, not only because it imposes as a condition for the real estate of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Real Estate Tax, <b>that by special law, they enjoy an exemption;</b> but also, because in accordance with the principle of tax legality, specifically the provisions of articles 62 and 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in article 20 of Decree-Law number 449, <b>cannot purport to encompass future taxes, even if it was so established</b>. <u>In such a way that the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law, which is not the case in the instance of the Law on Real Estate Tax, for which reason, referring as a source of exoneration from that tax to the provisions of article 20 of Decree-Law number 449, is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legal reserve (reserva de ley)</u>. In this regard, it is worth citing the decision of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, <span style='color:#010101'>in judgment number 037-F-04 of ten hours thirty-five minutes on January 21, two thousand four, which, contrary to what the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity affirms regarding the supposed maintenance of the future scope of the generic and subjective exemption contained in article 20 of Decree-Law 449, established the following:<i> “…</i></span><i>Subsection l) of the second article of Law 7293, excludes from the repeal the exemptions granted to decentralized institutions. Additionally, in its article 63, the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (reformed by ordinal 50 of Law No. 7293) indicates that there cannot be rules granting exonerations dated prior to the date on which the tax is created, ergo, the exoneration cannot be prior to the tax. This rule has effects as of its promulgation, that is, April 3, 1992<b>. <u>Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as ICE, as of that moment, and for the future, cannot benefit from tax exonerations created under the protection of rules prior to those regulating the tax, and they retain the exonerations granted by rules prior to that date</u>.</b> It should not be lost sight of that the Law Regulating Existing Exonerations, Repeals, and Exceptions (Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones), arose, among other things, with the purpose of organizing the tangle of existing exemptions through a high number of laws; however, the restrictions on the benefits that various activities and institutions had been enjoying cannot be applied retroactively, therefore, the tax exonerations granted prior to the entry into force of that law are maintained. <b>Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply regarding taxes created after that date. </b>The contrary would entail a repudiable retroactive application of the law. <u>It is precisely for these reasons that the exoneration granted in favor of ICE is not affected by Law No. 7283 on Municipal Tariffs and Taxes of the Canton of Tilarán (Ley de Tarifas e Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Tilarán), because it was enacted on a date prior to the Law Regulating all existing exonerations</u>, and it is not until this moment when, by express rule, it is prohibited to grant exemptions under the protection of old rules. <u>The factual assumption provided in Law 7283 could only have been applied to the defendant if the rule was enacted after April 3, 1992</u>. This being the case, as it is a tax prior to the law derogating exonerations, the exemption regime provided in the law creating ICE continued to benefit it at the time Law No. 7283 entered into force. To hold otherwise, it is reiterated, would entail a retroactive application of article 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, which is prohibited by constitutional provision…” (the highlighting is not from the original). </i>In this case, as analyzed supra, to affirm that due to the existing similarities between the Territorial Tax and the Real Estate Tax –mainly regarding the object, the determination of the taxable base, the subject benefited by the tax, and the national nature of the same–, the exemption provided in article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (reformed in that sense by article 34 of Law 7293), remains in force over time in favor of the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity, despite having been repealed by article 38 of the Law on Real Estate Tax, is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legal reserve in this matter. Even more so, when article 4, subsection a) of Law 7509 itself –which entered into force on June 19, 1995–, conditioned the non-subjection to the tax regulated therein, on a special law establishing an exemption <b>–in the terms of articles 5 and 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, that is, in an express, concrete, and clear manner– </b>for the real estate of autonomous institutions –which are the ones of interest for this case–, which does not happen in the specific instance, since as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code, the generic subjective exemption provided in article 20 of Decree-Law number 449, <b>cannot purport to encompass future taxes, even if it was so established</b>. For the reasons stated, this Court does not share the criteria expressed in judgments 759-2010, 1037-2010, and 983-2010 issued by the Administrative Litigation Court (Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo), when resolving the appeals filed against the first-instance judgment issued in enforcement proceedings initiated by the Municipalities of Montes de Oro, Tilarán, and San Carlos, against ICE, for alleged debts of the Real Estate Tax; given that these judgments assume that subsection a) of article 4 of Law 7509 does contain an exoneration in favor of ICE, or that it finds support in article 20 of Decree-Law 449, without analyzing that the scope of the latter is conditioned on the provisions of articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. <u>In summary, once the Territorial Tax Law was repealed, as of June 19, 1995 (the date of entry into force of Law 7509), there is no special law granting the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity an express, clear, and concrete exemption in accordance with the provisions of article 62 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, establishing that the real estate of the appellant entity is not subject to the Real Estate Tax.</u> **VII.- IN RELATION TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 18 OF LAW 8660 FOR THE SPECIFIC CASE.** The Law for the Modernization and Strengthening of Public Entities of the Telecommunications Sector (Ley de Modernización y Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones) (Law 8660, which entered into force as of August 13, 2008), establishes in article 18 that: “**Article 18.- *Tax treatment.* ** *When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. <b>In all other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decree-Law No. 449 of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred upon them by the legal system, shall remain in force</b>. The traditional basic telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax.*” (the highlighting is added). The transcribed rule contains two essential assumptions in tax matters regarding the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity: <b><i>i)</i></b> The general rule is the exemption from paying taxes; consequently, said entity retains the exemption contained in the Decree-Law that creates it and any other Law that grants it an exoneration. <u>However, in accordance with the principles of legal reserve and tax legality, the exemption provided in article 20 of Decree-Law number 449 is limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 5, 62, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures</u>; <b><i>ii)</i></b> The exception referring to the obligation to pay income and sales taxes, which is conditioned on the existence of a competitive market. Now then, it is necessary to clarify that Law 8660 entered into force as of August 13, 2008, <b>without being susceptible to retroactive application, therefore, the tax rules, including the tax exemption, govern as of that date, although –it is insisted– </b><u>limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of articles 2, 62, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. This is because it could not be sustained that ICE recovered a generic, subjective exemption for future taxes –as originally provided in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449–, given that as of the entry into force of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, the reform to the Tax Code</u>, <b>it cannot purport to encompass future taxes, even if it was so established </b>*(see in a similar sense, resolutions number 417-2012 of fourteen hours on October eleventh; 431-2012 of fourteen hours on October eighteenth; 432-2012 of fourteen hours five minutes on October eighteenth, all of two thousand twelve, issued by the Third Section of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Litigation Court (Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda))*. In such a way, that the provisions of article 18 of Law 8660 do not have the power to repeal for the specific case of the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity, the provisions of articles 5, 62, and 63 of the Code of Rules and Procedures, which develop at the legal level the principles of legal reserve in tax matters and legality, provided for in articles 11 and 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, for which reason, <u>the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law, which is not the case for the Real Estate Tax</u>. In this sense, this Court considers that it cannot be validly argued that ICE recovered the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as provided in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449, and that consequently, Law 8660 being a special law, it prevails over a general law (Code of Tax Rules and Procedures), <b>given that this would imply disapplying for the specific case of the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity, two basic principles in tax matters</b>, which are: <b><i>i)</i> Legal reserve and Tax Legality,</b> in the sense that the law <u>must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be liquidated, or if the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions</u> *(article 62, 1st paragraph of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures); <b>ii)</b>* <b>Equality before the tax and public charges,</b> because even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation –as in the case of the Real Estate Tax–, since this would imply a future limitation on the tax power of the State, to the detriment of that principle *(article 18 in fine of the Political Constitution)*. It is worth recalling that <b>the principle of fiscal immunity is not applicable to this specific case,</b> because although the Real Estate Tax constitutes a tax of a national character, it is also true that there is no identity between the active subject, the passive subject (ICE), and the beneficiary subject, who is also competent for the collection and management of the tax (Municipalities), a sine qua non condition for the application of that principle, given that *“…* <i><u>The principle of fiscal immunity frees the State from the obligation to pay taxes created by it. The active subject of the tax obligation must be the same State. It would be illogical for a State to create taxes to charge itself</u>. <b>The larger entity assumes a double consideration as active subject and passive subject of the legal-tax relationship, the consequence of which would be the extinction of the tax obligation by confusion</b>. Hence the reason (article 49 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures) for establishing confusion as a cause for extinction of the tax obligation. When the State changes from being the active subject to the passive subject of the tax, the tax obligation is non-existent because the intersubjective relationship does not exist. Regarding the municipal regime, the principle of fiscal immunity of the State is inoperative (…) For fiscal immunity to operate -by confusion- the subjective identity must be complete…” (judgment number 12-1994 issued by the First Chamber of the Court, at eleven hours on March twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-four. </i>The highlighting is not from the original<i>). </i>This is so much the case that article 5, subsection a), 2nd paragraph of the Regulations to the Law on Real Estate Tax, establishes that *“…The State and the municipalities do not require the presentation of any requirement, since by definition they are not subject…”*. It is necessary to clarify that while it is true, through judgment number 2008-11210 of fifteen hours on July sixteen, two thousand eight, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), ruled –among other aspects– on the constitutionality of article 15 –in reality 18– of the project *“Law for the strengthening and modernization of Public Entities of the Telecommunications Sector”*, processed in legislative file No. 16,397; it is also true that said ruling only referred to the following point: *“…The argumentation of the consultants powerfully draws the attention of this Court, when the tax power (article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution) and the principle of equality in the support of public charges (articles 18 and 33 of the Constitution) are absolutely consubstantial to the Social and Democratic Rule of Law. Without the tax power and the correlative duty of every person to contribute to public expenses, the various public entities that provide positive benefits to the inhabitants to eradicate real and effective inequalities -proper and typical of a Social State of Law-, could not exercise their functions, fulfill their competencies, and satisfy the public interest, since it would be impossible for them to count on public resources for this purpose. <u>Subjecting ICE and its companies to the payment of sales and income tax, within the framework of an open telecommunications market,</u> where the actors -network operators or service providers- can be of a public or private nature, avoids any competitive distortion or asymmetry -which does violate the principle of equality-, which could dissuade other subjects from participating and investing in that segment of the economy, a point that would negatively impact the options or freedom of choice of the consumer or user, the cost of services or products, and the increase in productivity.”* In addition to the foregoing, it is necessary to remember that in accordance with the provisions of article 101 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), *“…The opinion of the Chamber shall only be binding insofar as it establishes the existence of unconstitutional procedures in the consulted project…”*. <u>For all the foregoing, this Court considers that the provisions of article 18 of Law 8660 are limited in their scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 5, 62, 63, and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures; which implies that ICE did not recover the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as provided in numeral 20 of Decree-Law 449, and therefore, it cannot serve as a basis to fulfill the condition provided in subsection a) of article 4 of Law 7509, as a prerequisite for its real estate not to be subject to the Real Estate Tax.</u> **VIII.- SOME CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE NON-SEIZABILITY (INEMBARGABILIDAD) OF PUBLICLY OWNED ASSETS DIRECTLY LINKED TO ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES.** It is necessary to indicate that at the time of executing the collection of the amounts that ICE owes for Real Estate Tax –of course, provided the prescription (prescripción) period provided in article 8 of Law number 7509 has not run and that this has been claimed by the aggrieved entity–, the Municipalities and other legal operators must take into consideration the rules provided in articles 261, 262 of the Civil Code, and 169, 170 of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), regarding the assets of ICE on which seizure (embargo) may or may not be ordered and carried out, for such purposes. In this sense, through resolution number 019-2009-SVII issued at thirteen hours thirty minutes on February twelve, two thousand nine, the Seventh Section of the Administrative Litigation Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Sección Sétima del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José), considered regarding the <b>concept of public domain and private assets of public administrations</b> that: <i>"(…) <u>The State and other public entities possess two types of assets: public and private</u>. <u>Article 261 of the Civil Code provides: “Public things (cosas públicas) are those which, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those which everyone can take advantage of because they are delivered for public use. All other things are private and objects of particular property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person.” The foregoing must be related to article 121, subsection 4) of the Political Constitution, which establishes as an attribution of the Legislative Assembly, to decree the alienation or application to public uses of the Nation's own assets.”</u> <u>Public domain assets (bienes de dominio público) are characterized by being inalienable, imprescriptible, and non-seizable, consequently outside the commerce of men</u>. On the subject, the Constitutional Chamber has stated: / “II.- THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND OF THE LEGAL MEANS TO INTEGRATE IT.- <u>Public domain is understood as the set of assets subject to a special and distinct legal regime from that governing private domain, which in addition to belonging to or being under the administration of public legal persons, are affected or destined for purposes of public utility and which manifests itself in the direct or indirect use that every person can make of them</u>. Doctrine recognizes public domain under different meanings, such as dominical assets (bienes dominicales), demanial assets (bienes demaniales), public things, public assets, or demanial goods. On this concept, the Chamber expressed (sic) in its Judgment No. 2306-91 of 14:45 hours on November six, nineteen ninety-one, the following: / “The public domain is composed of assets that manifest, by the express will of the legislator, a special destiny to serve the community, the public interest. They are called dominical assets, demanial goods, public things, or public assets, which do not belong individually to private persons and are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, they are affected to the service they provide, which invariably is essential by virtue of an express rule. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, non-seizable, they cannot be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance in the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes for interdicts to recover domain... Consequently, the national regime of public domain assets, such as the roads of the Capital City, be they municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public sites, places them outside the commerce of men...” </i>(see in a similar sense, judgment number 035-2009-SVII issued by the Seventh Section of the Administrative Litigation Court, at fourteen hours forty minutes on March thirteen, two thousand nine).<b> </b>Consequently, <b>those private domain assets of the Administration that are not affected to a public purpose will be seizable </b>*(article 169.1.a of the CPCA).* By contrast, <b>publicly owned assets destined for common use and enjoyment will not be seizable, </b>nor will those directly linked to the provision of essential public services –such as, for example: electricity and telecommunications–<b>,</b> or those that are indispensable or irreplaceable for fulfilling public purposes or services *(articles 261 of the Civil Code and 170 of the CPCA).* <b> </b> **IX.- COROLLARY.** For the reasons given, this Court rejects the appeal filed and confirms the resolution of ten hours thirty minutes on April nineteen, two thousand twelve, issued by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco, as it is not substantially contrary to the provisions of articles 11, 18 in fine, 33, 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the General Law of Public Administration; 20 of Decree-Law 449; 2, subsection l); 35 and 50 of Law 7293; 4, subsection a) and 38, subsection a) of Law 7509; 5, 62, 63 and 54 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures; 18 of Law 8860; 5, subsection a), 2nd paragraph of Executive Decree 27601-H. Now then, given that it was not the object of the arguments raised in the appeal for revocation with subsidiary appeal filed by the appellant entity against the contested act *(folios 141 to 145, 149 to 155 of the file)*, this Court does not proceed to determine whether or not some of the periods charged by the Municipality of El Guarco may be prescribed.

As there is no further recourse within the administrative venue, the administrative venue is deemed exhausted. With the dissenting vote of Judge Solano Ulloa, who grants the appeal, annuls the challenged resolution, and deems the administrative venue exhausted." The law that establishes exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements demanded for their granting, the taxes it encompasses, whether it is total or partial, and, if applicable, the term of its duration." </span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p><span style='font-family:Tahoma;color:#010101'>(Note: this provision was subsequently amended by Article 1 of Law No.7900 of August 3, 1999, and by Article 1 of Law No. 9069 of September 10, 2012, "Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria," its current text being as follows:</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p><i><span style='font-family:Tahoma;color:#010101'>"Article 62.- Conditions and requirements demanded. The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and the requirements set for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it encompasses, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end of or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be settled, or whether the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions.</span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p><i><span style='font-family:Tahoma;color:#010101'>In all cases, natural or legal persons requesting exemptions must be current in the payment of taxes administered by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) of the Ministry of Finance, as a condition for their granting." )</span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span style='font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101'>In Transitory Provision 169, subsection c) of that Code, several express repeals of the Ley de Impuesto Territorial were carried out, but none modified article 4, which created the exemption in favor of ICE. This judge understands that, had there been the will within the legislative body to repeal said exoneration, the legislator would have so provided, but this did not occur, thus allowing the coexistence of the regulation contained in Article 62 and the validity and application of the provision creating the benefit in favor of ICE. Indeed, the exemption from payment of the territorial tax survived the entry into force of the Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su Derogatoria y sus Excepciones - Law 7293 effective as of April 3, 1992 -, as Article 34 itself expressly provided. Three years later, the Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles - Law No. 7509 of May 9, 1995, effective as of June 19 of that same year - was enacted, through which the Ley del Impuesto Territorial was repealed, in which the elements of the territorial tax (taxable event (hecho generador) and active and passive subjects) are preserved, but everything concerning the management, administration, and utilization of the same tax is reformed. That is, it was not a new tax, since it had already existed for years. However, regarding exemptions, it provided the following:</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><i><span style='font-family:Tahoma'>"Article 4.- Properties not subject to the tax. The following are not subject to this tax:</span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><i><span style='font-family:Tahoma'>a) Properties of the State, municipalities, autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that, by special law, enjoy exemption..."</span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span style='font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101'>As can be seen, in that provision the legislator foresaw that, for the purposes of autonomous institutions, there would be a permanence of the exemptions provided in special laws. Regarding the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, even with the repeal of the Ley del Impuesto Territorial, Article 20 of Decreto Ley 449 of April 8, 1949, previously transcribed, pre-existed, a special provision that introduced a generic exemption of a subjective nature by virtue of the institution to which it is directed, regarding all national and municipal taxes. If the tax was not new, therefore, the exemption was not new either, and it has not been declared unconstitutional, so it maintains its validity, an express repeal by the same legislator that created it being deemed necessary in order to eliminate its effectiveness, in application of the principles of reservation of law in tax matters and parallelism of forms. This historical analysis of the regulatory development, while useful and necessary to contextualize the evolution of the tax and its exemption, today leads to the main provision governing the matter, contained in the <b>Ley de Modernización y Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones </b></span><b><span style='font-family:Tahoma'>-Law 8660 which entered into force as of August 13, 2008-</span></b><span style='font-family:Tahoma'> , created within the regulatory framework required by the Free Trade Agreement with the United States of America, where the legislator, through a later law, expressly takes up the validity of all of ICE's exonerations, making the express exception of the income tax (impuesto sobre la renta) and sales taxes, imposing upon it, for the first time, the payment of these two sole taxes. In this regard, the provision is transcribed:</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><i><span style='font-family:Tahoma'>"Article 18. Tax treatment.</span></i><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><i><span style='font-family:Tahoma'>When ICE and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. <b>In all other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decreto Ley No. 449, of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred upon them by the legal system, shall remain in force...</b>"</span></i><span style='font-family:Tahoma'> </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-family: Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'>(Emphasis added). </span></i><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language: EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span style='font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101'>The application of this provision is immediate upon its effectiveness and, despite the fact that the exemption contained in the Decreto Ley is broad, generic, and subjective based on the special nature of the Institution to which it is directed, its application is definitively binding because Article 18 cited is a special provision and later than the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Interpreting that what is provided in this provision is limited in its scope and validity to what is established in article 62 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, has several important questions that, in the opinion of the undersigned, are contrary to the democratic system of the Costa Rican state and are analyzed below. <b>First, </b>because in the law-making process, the Legislative Branch finds its limits solely in the constitutional text and in the regulations governing the procedures for the formation of law, from which it follows that it cannot be understood that the provision set forth in Article 62 cited is a condition on the power to issue and reform tax law that the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) holds, even if it is in a different sense.<b> Second, </b>because to do so would be to disregard the express will of the legislator who, in accordance with Article 105 of the Constitution, assumes said power by delegation of the people without subjection to limitations -except in the case of treaties-, in full and legitimate exercise of popular representation. Therefore, if in the current historical context of market opening and commercial competitiveness, the legislator opted to maintain such fiscal benefits for the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, given that it has been and continues to be, the main national provider of indispensable public services, such legislative will must be respected. To consider the contrary is to disregard the content of a "substantive tax law," created under the protection of a "formal law" that derives from the exercise of legislative power, which responds to the conjunctural demands of redefining national commercial and institutional concepts, as a consequence of the recent demands of economic policy, with full powers to specify the national tax scheme and the incentives and benefits it provides, including this class of tax exclusions. <b>Third, </b>because the letter of the provision is clear and precise, binding municipal authorities and this improper hierarchy to its application, it not being possible to make interpretations and normative integrations to the contrary, as this would go against articles 9 subsection 2) and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, by which the Administration is subject to the legal system and the non-application of the administrative provision for specific cases is prohibited. In this, the substantial difference with the majority opinion of this Vote is concretized and summarized, as we are not even facing a case of incompatibility or normative antinomy, given that it cannot be conceived, in this case, that we are in the presence of two valid provisions of equal rank that regulate the same factual situation in a contradictory manner. It is thus clear that the current and applicable legislation is that contained in articles 18 of Law 8660, which in turn refers to the application of the exonerations contained in Article 20 of Decreto Ley 449, so there is no choice but to conclude that ICE is exempt from the payment of the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, and therefore the grievances expressed by its representation are accepted. Consequently, defects of absolute nullity are perceived in what was resolved in the resolution issued at ten thirty hours on April nineteen, two thousand twelve, by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco, insofar as it ordered the collection of said tax from ICE to be maintained, for which reason said administrative act must be annulled in this act, for transgression of the legality block (bloque de legalidad) in its basis and content. There being no further appeal, the administrative channel must be deemed exhausted."</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span style='font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> </div> </body> </html> It argues that the legal landscape of Nombre9574 regarding national and municipal taxes was expressly reaffirmed in the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Telecommunications Entities (Ley nº 8660), which in Article 18 expressly reiterates the exemptions granted to Nombre9574 via its constitutive law number 449, and only subjects Nombre9574 to some income and sales taxes. It indicates that Article 2, subsection l) of the Regulatory Law of All Current Exemptions, Their Derogation, and Their Exceptions (Ley nº 7293 of March 31, 1992), did not modify in any way the provisions of Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449, and therefore, this article remains in force to date. In addition to the above, it points out that Article 34 of Ley nº 7293 itself, which modified Article 4 of the Territorial Tax Law (Ley nº 27 of March 3, 1939), established that the properties of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad were not subject to this tax, which implies – in its judgment – that the current exemption provided for in Article 20 of Decree-Law number 449 is reaffirmed once again. It considers that while it is true that Article 50 of Ley nº 7293 modified numeral 63 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures in the sense that "...Even if there is an express provision in the Tax Law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation..."; it is also true that, contrary to the criteria put forth by the Procuraduría General de la República and the Technical Standardization Body of the Ministry of Finance, although Article 37 of Ley nº 7509 repealed the Territorial Tax Law, this does not imply that a new tax was created, because the object before and after remains land and properties, with no variation whatsoever in the presuppositions of the repealed Law, since on the contrary both laws maintain the same objective presuppositions of the tax. They allege that in any case, the central point of their disagreement is that the Real Property Tax Law itself establishes an exemption regime, which in their judgment, cannot be disregarded by considering that Article 4 does not make express reference to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, because said numeral establishes that the properties of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that, by special law, enjoy an exemption, shall not be subject to that tax. On this point, it considers it necessary to revisit the provisions of Article 20 of Decree-Law 449, in which, in its judgment, it is clearly defined that Nombre9574, by special law, enjoys exemption from the payment of national taxes, as is the case with the Real Property Tax, which is why Leyes 7293 and 7509 in their articles 2 subsection l) and 4 subsection a), maintain the generic exemptions granted by Decree-Law number 449 in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. They maintain that said generic exemption was reinforced by Article 18 of Ley 8660, a rule that keeps in force both the exemptions conferred in Decree-Law 449, and any others conferred by the legal system, except in those cases when Nombre9574 and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, in which case they will be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes, excluding basic traditional telephone service from the first tax (income). They deem it evident that through Ley 8660, the generic tax exemption in favor of ICE was reiterated, just as the Procuraduría General de la República itself establishes in opinion C-171-2009 of June 19, 2009. Consequently, it considers that the subjective generic exemption granted through Decree-Law number 449 has remained in force over time, as has been established in judgments number 364-2002 issued by the First Section of the Administrative Litigation Court, and 037-F-04 at ten thirty-five hours on January twenty-first, two thousand four, issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice; as well as in judgments 759-2010, 1037-2010, and 983-2010 issued by the Administrative Litigation Court, when resolving the appeal filed against the first-instance judgment issued in enforcement proceedings initiated by the Municipalities of Montes de Oro, Tilarán, and San Carlos, against Nombre9574 for alleged debts of the Real Property Tax. For its part, the respondent municipal authority indicates that the Real Property Tax Law N° 7509, in force since 1995, expressly repeals the Territorial Tax Law N° 27 of March 2, 1939 and its reforms, and at the same time creates a new tax in favor of the Municipalities, which has as its object land, installations, or fixed and permanent constructions. In its view, these laws differ in several aspects: on one hand, the object varies, as does the form of distribution of the tax, the way the tax is established, the regime of non-subjection to the tax; and on the other hand, unlike the repealed Law N° 27, it grants the administration thereof to the municipalities. It argues that the exemption alleged by ICE found support in the Territorial Tax Law of 1949, which was eliminated by Article 4 of the Real Property Tax Law, by restrictively establishing the application of that privilege solely in favor of institutions that by special law enjoy an exemption. It adds that the Real Property Tax Law is subsequent to the Territorial Tax Law, and according to the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, it is not possible to seek to encompass future taxes. It adds that as of Ley N° 7293, the Regulatory Law of Current Exemptions, Derogations, and Exceptions, in force since April 3, 1992, all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws, decrees, and related legal rules are repealed, because it was unnecessary to eliminate the number of existing exemptions, and among them, in its view, the exemption alleged by ICE is affected. Additionally, it cites the Law for the Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector N° 8660 of August 8, 2008, and alleges that although Article 18 provides for the validity of the exemptions conferred by Law N° 449, as well as any other granted by the legal system, in its opinion, in accordance with the principle of legal reservation and tax legality, the exemption from future taxes must be clearly specified in the law that establishes it, a situation which, it maintains, does not happen with the cited law. The representative of the respondent Municipality, in support of its thesis, alludes to the opinions issued by the Procuraduría General de la República N° C-109-2006; C-151-2007; C-171-2009; Official Communication N° DONT-052 of February 20, 2012; Judgment N° 472-12 of the Administrative Litigation Court, Third Section; and requests that the filed appeal be declared without merit, and the contested resolution be confirmed.

**III.- REGARDING THE LIMITS AND SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL RESERVATION AND LEGALITY IN TAX MATTERS.** In accordance with the provisions of Article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly to establish national taxes and contributions, and to authorize municipal ones, which implies that **there is a principle of legal reservation in tax matters, also called the principle of tax legality**. In that sense, Article 124 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes that regulations, circulars, instructions, and other administrative provisions of a general nature may not establish penalties or impose levies, fees, fines, or other similar charges. For its part, Article 5 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, in relation to Articles 5 and 62 of that same normative body, establishes which are the essential elements of the tax that are reserved to law, namely: **a)** To create, modify, or suppress taxes; to define the taxable event of the tax relationship; to establish the tax rates and their calculation bases; and to indicate the taxpayer; **b)** To classify infractions and establish the respective sanctions; **c)** To establish privileges, preferences, and guarantees for tax credits; **d)** To regulate the modes of extinction of tax credits. In accordance with subsection b) of Article 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, **only the law can grant exemptions**, **reductions, or benefits, which consequently cannot be created by analogy, but rather by formal and material law** *(Article 6 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures)*, a legal rule which, in accordance with the **principle of tax legality**, must specify the conditions and requirements set to grant them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or if taxes must be settled, or if the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions *(Articles 5 and 62, paragraph 1 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures)*. The foregoing implies that even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation, as this would imply a future limitation of the tax power of the State, to the detriment of the principle of equality before taxes and public charges *(Article 18 in fine of the Political Constitution)*. Now, this Court considers that in view of the indicated rules and in accordance with the jurisprudence issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, **the principle of legal reservation in tax matters is not of an absolute nature, but rather relative, since while it is true that the essential elements must be established by law, it is also true that the legal rule must at least establish the concrete limits or criteria based on which infra-legal rules – Article 2, subsection d) of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures – may or must complete the normative discipline of said essential elements, in order to execute and apply said legal rules** *(Articles 140 subsections 3 and 18 in fine of the Political Constitution and Article 99, second paragraph of Article 99 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures)*. In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: *“...Our jurisprudence, (...) has recognized, given certain circumstances, the possibility of a “relative delegation” of said powers operating – within certain reasonable limits – provided that the margins of the respective tax are indicated in the law, because otherwise, we would be in the presence of an “absolute delegation” of such powers, a procedure which lacks, as stated, constitutional validity (...) the Chamber has ruled in favor of relative delegation in tax matters, but not with respect to the constitutional elements of the tax obligation (active and passive subjects, object of the obligation, cause, tax rate), in which the so-called legal reservation does apply...”* (judgment number 1996-00687, and in a similar sense, judgment number 1995-000739 at fourteen fifty-one hours on February eighth, nineteen ninety-six).

**IV.- SOME GENERALITIES OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX.** This tax is created by Law No. 7509, according to which a tax on real property is established in favor of the municipalities, whose object is the land, the installations, or the fixed and permanent constructions existing there. Regarding its nature, it is necessary to point out that the Constitutional Chamber has established that it is a *“municipal tax by reason of its destination – only –, but it is not so by virtue of its procedure of origin or promulgation, given that it was not born from the initiative of local governments, but from the exercise of the tax power granted to the Legislative Assembly, by virtue of the provisions of Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution, that is, it is the product of ordinary legislative work itself. It should be reiterated that the Legislative Assembly is sovereign, regarding the use of tax power, to establish the taxes that are required, be they national or municipal.” (SCV 5669-99).* Thus, it is not a municipal tax that originates from the derivative and own tax power of the municipal corporations that derives from numeral 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; but rather from what Spanish doctrine calls ceded taxes. Although both are local tax sources, the former are those that, as indicated, are created through the special legislative procedure provided for in Article 121, subsection 13) of the Constitution, which is considered special both due to the municipal initiative and the prohibition of amendment that the Legislative Assembly has, which must limit itself to approving or disapproving the respective municipal agreement. For its part, the ceding of taxes is a financing mechanism developed mainly by the Spanish Autonomous Communities. It is said that in these, the State reserves the tax power; while the Autonomous Community individually holds the competence over the yields, through territorial connecting points. Thus, in the management of the ceded tax, the tax power is retained by the State, which delegates the exercise of the competence to the Autonomous Community, all without prejudice to the "collaboration" that can be established between the Administrations of both territorial entities, State and Autonomous Community. According to what has been indicated, the ceding of taxes implies the delegation of administrative competences, without prejudice to the obligatory coordination and collaboration between the Tax Administrations. In the case of Costa Rica, this figure can be associated, in the judgment of this body, with the situation of the Real Property Tax, by virtue of the specific characteristics of this tax. **Although they emanate from the exercise of the normative and tax power of the State, the competence over collection belongs to the Municipalities, taking into account the location of the property within the municipal territory as a connecting point.** **Likewise, the administrative power of tax management also belongs to the municipalities, without this preventing coordination with the State Tax Administration, which, to date, is manifested in the existence of the Technical Standardization Body** introduced by Article 2, subsection c) of Law 7729. It should be noted that **our constitutional jurisprudence has admitted the figure of ceded taxes, when in Voto 3930-95,** it pointed out regarding the taxes created by the State for the benefit of the municipalities *“...But this does not mean that the legislator cannot provide the Municipalities with extraordinary resources through a general tax to be distributed, as in the case of the territorial tax…”* It should be indicated that it is an annual tax, whose period begins on January 1 and ends on December 31 of each calendar year. Its payment must be made annually or semi-annually or in four quarterly installments, as determined by each municipality. Likewise, considered as taxpayers of this tax are: the owners of real property; the concessionaires, the permit holders, or the occupants of the border strip or the maritime-terrestrial zone; the occupants or possessors with title, registrable or not registrable in the Public Registry, of more than one year and who are in the following conditions: possessors, agricultural entrepreneurs, usufructuaries, rural sharecroppers, emblements, gratuitous land borrowers, and precarious occupants; the IDA settlers under certain circumstances. The taxable base for the calculation of the tax shall be the value of the property registered with the Tax Administration, as of January 1 of the corresponding year, which entails that for tax purposes, every property must be valued, which is a task of each Municipality within the framework of the powers of administration, management, and collection of the tax imposed by Law No. 7509 itself. Throughout the country, the tax percentage shall be one quarter of one percent (0.25%) and shall be applied to the value of the property registered by the Tax Administration. As previously indicated, for the management of this tax, the law grants the municipalities the character of Tax Administration, which means they are responsible for withholding and receiving the cited tax, in accordance with the doctrine of Article 99 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. This law also attributes a series of prerogatives and duties to them in order to be able to comply with the management of this tax, among them *“(…) carry out valuations of real property, bill, collect, and process judicial collection and administer, in their respective territories, the taxes generated by this Law. (…).” (Article 3).* It should be considered, finally, that the municipal corporations, in the exercise of their own regulatory power, by reason of the autonomy guaranteed to them by the Political Constitution, may well approve the internal organization rules they require in order to make effective the charging and collecting of the Real Property Tax *(see in the same sense, judgment number 1565-2009 issued by the Sixth Section of the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court, at sixteen fifteen hours on August eleventh, two thousand eight)*.

**V.- ON THE SCOPE OF THE MODIFICATION TO ARTICLE 63 OF THE C.N.P.T. BY LAW 7293 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GENERIC, SUBJECTIVE, AND FUTURE EXEMPTION PROVIDED FOR IN NUMERAL 20 OF DECREE-LAW 449.** This Court, by majority, considers that the appellant entity is not exempt from paying the Real Property Tax, for the reasons set forth below. The Decree-Law that creates the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad was amended by Law N° 764 of October 25, 1949, for the purpose of establishing: *“Article 20.- The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege”.* Said rule **created a subjective generic exemption that was applicable to all present and future taxes that could affect Nombre9574**, but the Regulatory Law of All Current Exemptions, Their Derogation, and Their Exceptions - Law N° 7293 of March 31, 1992 - eliminated this last condition, since Article 2, subsection l) **provided for maintaining only the exemptions in force as of the date of its promulgation in favor of all autonomous institutions, Nombre9574 being affected insofar as it holds such nature**, which was reinforced with the reform of Articles 63 and 64 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures - contained in that same normative body -, which provided:

*“…ARTICLE 63: Limit of application. Even if there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation.* (Thus reformed by Article 50 of law Nº 7293 of March 26, 1992)." "*ARTICLE 64.- Validity. The exemption, even when granted based on certain de facto conditions, may be repealed or modified by subsequent law, without liability for the State.”* Likewise, its effectiveness was subjected *"…to full compliance with the precepts, requirements, and purposes that regulate the granting, as well as to the correct use and intended destination, of the goods and services on which the exemption enjoyed by a determined subject has fallen…”* (Article 37 of Law 7293)*.* Consequently, **the effects of the exemption were limited, such that as of the entry into force of Law N° 7293 and, consequently, of the reform to the Tax Code**, **it cannot seek to encompass future taxes, even if so established**. In such a way that **the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law**. **Applying the foregoing to the situation of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, it follows that – in principle and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 18 of Law 8660, which will be analyzed below –, said institution would be obliged to pay any tax established after Law 7293, except in those cases where an exemption in its favor has been expressly granted** *(see in this regard, judgment number 000037-F-04 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at ten thirty-five hours on January twenty-first, two thousand four)*.

By reason of the foregoing, this Tribunal does not share the criterion expressed by Section One of the Administrative and Civil Contentious Tribunal, in judgment number 364-2002 at sixteen hours twenty-eight minutes on October eleventh, two thousand two, inasmuch as it is held there that the generic and subjective exemption for future taxes is maintained in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, considering that: <span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101">“…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">As for the validity of article 20 of the Constitutive Law of ICE, we must refer to Law 7293 of March 31, 1992 “Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su Derogatoria y sus Excepciones”; which in its article 1° repeals \"all objective and subjective tax exemptions provided for in different laws\", and in 50, modifies numeral 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, to establish that those issued affect only preceding laws, not future ones. However, in article 2° of the regulation under commentary, it is expressly indicated that the tax exclusions established in the same Law and those others that are excepted from the repeal of the preceding article: \"…l) Have been granted … to decentralized institutions…\". </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">This being so, the exemption from the payment of national and municipal taxes, established in article 20 of Decreto Ley 449, is maintained…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic">”</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">; an affirmation that in any case, was nuanced by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment number 000037-F-04 issued at ten hours thirty-five minutes on January twenty-first, two thousand four, upon indicating –in what is relevant– that</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> “…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment onward, and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under the protection of norms prior to those in which the tax is regulated, and they retain the exemptions granted by norms prior to that date</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> (…) Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply with respect to taxes created after that date…”. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">Consequently, as of April 3, 1992, the generic and subjective exemption provided for in favor of Nombre9574 in article 20 of Decreto Ley 449, is maintained, although limited in its future scope and validity to the provisions of articles 121 subsection 3) of the Constitución Política; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 2 subsection l) of Law 7293 and 5, 63 and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">VI.-</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold">REGARDING THE ALLEGED EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX THAT ARTICLE 4 SUBSECTION A) OF LAW 7509 PRESUMABLY ESTABLISHES IN FAVOR OF I.C.E.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> Now then, in the case of the real property tax, although article 34 of Law 7293 modified article 4 of the Ley del Impuesto Territorial (Law No. 27 of March 2, 1939 and its amendments), in the sense that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…Not subject to this tax are the real properties owned by: (…) - Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad…”;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> it is also true that, with the entry into force on June 19, 1995, of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(Law number 7509),</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> not only was the Ley del Impuesto Territorial repealed </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(article 38)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, but it also imposed as a condition for the real properties of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Tax on Real Property, that they enjoy an exemption by special law </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(article 4 subsection a of Ley 7509). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">At this point, it is necessary to indicate that while it is true that the object of both taxes is practically the same, namely: the land, the installations or the fixed and permanent constructions existing there </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(article 2 of Laws 27 and 7509); </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">that it is a tax of a national character that was established in favor of the Municipalities </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(article 1 of Laws 27 and 7509)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> and that in general terms, the taxable base for the calculation of the</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:10pt"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">tax will be the value of the real property registered in the Tax Administration –now under the charge of the municipal administrative body responsible for the collection and oversight of the taxes </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(article 9 and following of Ley 7509)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">, previously by the Dirección General de Tributación </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(article 5 of Law 27)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">–; it is also true that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">it is contrary to the principle of tax legality,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> provided for in numerals 121 subsection 13 of the Constitución Política; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 5 and 62 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline\">to affirm that due to those similarities, the exemption provided for in article 4 of the Ley del Impuesto Territorial remains in force over time in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, despite the fact that it was repealed by article 38 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Neither is the principle of sovereign tax immunity applicable to the specific case,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma"> for although the Tax on Real Property constitutes a tax of a national character, it is also true that there is no identity between the active subject, the passive subject (ICE) and the beneficiary subject and, furthermore, the entity competent for the collection and management of the tax (Municipalities), a sine qua non condition for the application of that principle, since </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“… </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">The principle of sovereign tax immunity liberates the State from the obligation to pay taxes created by it. The active subject of the tax obligation must be the State itself. It would be illogical for a State to create taxes to charge itself</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">The higher entity assumes a dual consideration as active and passive subject of the legal-tax relationship, the consequence of which would be the extinguishment of the tax obligation by merger</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">. Hence the reason (article 49 of the Código de normas y procedimientos tributarios) for establishing merger as a cause for extinguishment of the tax obligation. When the State goes from being an active subject to a passive subject of the tax, the tax obligation is nonexistent because the intersubjective relationship does not exist. Regarding the municipal regime, the principle of sovereign tax immunity of the State is inoperative (…) For sovereign tax immunity to operate –by merger– the subjective identity must be full…” (judgment number 12-1994 issued by the First Chamber of the Court, at eleven hours on March twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-four. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">The highlighting is not from the original</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">So much so, that article 5 subsection a) paragraph 2 of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles establishes that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…The State and the municipalities do not require the presentation of any requirement, since by definition they are not subject…”. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">Added to the foregoing, it is also not valid to affirm that subsection a) of article 4 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles establishes in favor of Nombre9574 an exemption from the payment of that tax, not only because it imposes as a condition for the real properties of the State, the municipalities, the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions not to be subject to the Tax on Real Property, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">that they enjoy an exemption by special law; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">but also, because in accordance with the principle of tax legality, specifically the provisions of articles 62 and 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, as of the effective date of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the amendment to the Código Tributario, the generic subjective exemption provided for in article 20 of Decreto Ley number 449, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">cannot purport to encompass future taxes, even if it was so established</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline\">In such a way that the exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law, which does not occur in the case of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, which is why referring as a source of exemption from that tax to the provisions of article 20 of Decreto Ley number 449 is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legislative reservation</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. In that sense, it is worth citing what was resolved by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; color:#010101\">in judgment number 037-F-04 at ten hours thirty-five minutes on January 21, two thousand four, which, contrary to what the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad affirms, regarding the alleged maintenance of the future scope of the generic and subjective exemption contained in article 20 of Decreto Ley 449, established the following:</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> “…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">Subsection l) of the second article of Law 7293 excludes from the repeal the exemptions granted to decentralized institutions. Additionally, in its article 63 the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (amended by ordinal 50 of Law No. 7293) indicates that there can be no rules granting exemptions, dated prior to the date on which the tax is created, ergo, the exemption cannot be prior to the tax. This rule has effects as of its promulgation, that is, April 3, 1992</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">Under this predicate, decentralized institutions such as ICE, from that moment onward, and into the future, cannot benefit from tax exemptions created under the protection of norms prior to those in which the tax is regulated, and they retain the exemptions granted by norms prior to that date</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> It must not be lost sight of that the Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones, arises, among other things, with the purpose of organizing the tangle of existing exemptions through a high number of laws, however the restrictions on the benefits that various activities and institutions had been holding cannot be applied with retroactive effect, therefore the tax exemptions granted before the entry into force of that law are maintained. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Consequently, the restriction of canon 63 ibidem can only apply with respect to taxes created after that date. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">The contrary would entail a repudiable retroactive application of the law. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">It is precisely for these reasons that the exemption granted in favor of ICE is not affected by Law No. 7283 de Tarifas e Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Tilarán, because it was promulgated on a date prior to the Ley Reguladora de todas las exoneraciones vigentes</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">, and it is not until this moment when by express rule, it is forbidden to grant exemptions under the protection of old norms. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">The factual scenario provided for in Law 7283 could only have been applied to the defendant, if the rule is promulgated after April 3, 1992</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">. This being the case, as it is a tax prior to the derogatory law of exemptions, the exemption regime provided in the law creating Nombre9574 continued to benefit it at the time of the entry into force of Law No. 7283. To hold the contrary, it is reiterated, would entail a retroactive application of article 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, which is prohibited by constitutional provision…” (the highlighting is not from the original). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">In this case, as analyzed supra, to affirm that due to the similarities existing between the Impuesto Territorial and the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles –principally regarding the object, the determination of the taxable base, the subject benefited by the tax, and the national nature of the same–, the exemption provided for in article 4 of the Ley del Impuesto Territorial (amended in that sense by article 34 of Law 7293), remains in force over time in favor of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, despite the fact that it was repealed by article 38 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, is substantially contrary to the principle of tax legality and legislative reservation in that matter. Even more so, when article 4 subsection a) of Ley 7509 itself –which entered into force on June 19, 1995–, conditioned the non-subjection to the tax regulated therein, on an exemption being established by special law </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">–in the terms of articles 5 and 62 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, that is, in an express, concrete, and clear manner– </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">for the real properties of the autonomous institutions –which are the ones that interest us for this case–, which does not happen in the present case, since as of the effective date of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the amendment to the Código Tributario, the generic subjective exemption provided for in article 20 of Decreto Ley number 449, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">cannot purport to encompass future taxes, even if it was so established</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">. For the reasons stated, this Tribunal does not share the criteria expressed in judgments 759-2010, 1037-2010 and 983-2010 issued by the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo, upon resolving the appeals filed against the first-instance judgment issued in executory proceedings brought by the Municipalities of Montes de Oro, Tilarán and San Carlos, against ICE, for alleged debts of the Tax on Real Property; inasmuch as in these, it is assumed that subsection a) of article 4 of Ley 7509 does contain an exemption in favor of Nombre9574 or that this finds support in article 20 of Decreto Ley 449, without analyzing that the scope of the latter is conditioned on the provisions of articles 5, 62 and 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimiento Tributarios. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline\">In summary, once the Ley del Impuesto Territorial was repealed, there exists, as of June 19, 1995 (date of entry into force of Ley 7509), no special law that grants the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad an express, clear, and concrete exemption in accordance with the provisions of article 62 of the Código de Normas Procedimientos Tributarios, establishing that the real properties of the appellant entity are not subject to the Tax on Real Property</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VII.- IN RELATION TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 18 OF LAW 8660 FOR THE SPECIFIC CASE. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">The Ley de Modernización y Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones (Law 8660 which entered into force as of August 13, 2008),</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\"> establishes in article 18 that: “</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Article 18.- </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Tax treatment. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">When Nombre9574 and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets of telecommunication or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income and sales taxes. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">In all other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decreto Ley No. 449 of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred by the legal system, shall remain in force</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">. The basic traditional telephone service is excluded from the payment of income tax”.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\"> (the highlighting is added). The transcribed norm contains two essential scenarios in tax matters in relation to the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad: </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">i)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\"> The general rule is the exemption from the payment of taxes, consequently, said entity retains the exemption contained in the Decreto Ley that creates it and any other Law that grants it exemption. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline\">However, in accordance with the principles of legislative reservation and tax legality, the exemption provided for in article 20 of Decreto Ley number 449, is limited in its scope and validity, to the provisions of articles 121 subsection 13) of the Constitución Política; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 5, 62, 63 and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">; </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">ii)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\"> The exception referring to the obligation to pay income and sales taxes, which is conditioned on the existence of a competitive market.</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\"> Now then, it is necessary to clarify that Law 8660 entered into force as of August 13, 2008, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">without being able to be applied retroactively, therefore, the tax rules, including the tax exemption, govern as of that date,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\"> although –it is insisted– </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline\">limited in its scope and validity to the provisions of articles 2, 62, 63 and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. This is because it could not be sustained that Nombre9574 recovered a generic, subjective exemption for future taxes –as originally provided for in numeral 20 of Decreto Ley 449–, since as of the effective date of Law No. 7293 and, consequently, of the amendment to the Código Tributario</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">, </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">it cannot purport to encompass future taxes, even if it was so established </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(see in a similar sense, resolutions number 417-2012 at fourteen hours on October eleventh; 431-2012 at fourteen hours on October eighteenth; 432-2012 at fourteen hours five minutes on October eighteenth, all of two thousand twelve, issued by Section Three of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">. In such a way, that the provisions of article 18 of Law 8660 do not have the virtue of repealing for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, the provisions of articles 5, 62 and 63 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos, which develop at the legal level the principles of legislative reservation in tax matters and legality, provided for in articles 11 and 121 subsection 13) of the Constitución Política, therefore, t</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline\">he exemption for taxes established in the future must be express and concrete in the text of the law, which does not occur in the case of the Tax on Real Property</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">. In that sense, this Tribunal considers that it cannot be validly alleged that Nombre9574 recovered the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as provided for in numeral 20 of Decreto Ley 449, and that consequently, as Law 8660 is a special law, it prevails over a general law (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">since that would imply disapplying for the specific case of the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, two basic principles in tax matters</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">, such as:</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">i)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\"> Legislative Reservation and Tax Legality,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\"> in the sense that the law </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline\">must specify the conditions and the requirements set for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the period of</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline\"> its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or if the taxes must be liquidated, or whether the transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(article 62 paragraph 1 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios); </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">ii)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Equality before the tax and public burdens,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\"> for although there is an express provision of the tax law, the exemption does not extend to taxes established after its creation –as in the case of the Tax on Real Property–, since that would imply a future limitation on the taxing power of the State, to the detriment of that principle </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(article 18 in fine of the Constitución Política)</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">. It should be remembered that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">the principle of sovereign tax immunity is not applicable to the specific case,</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\"> for although the Tax on Real Property constitutes a tax of a national character, it is also true that there is no identity between the active subject, the passive subject (ICE) and the beneficiary subject and, furthermore, the entity competent for the collection and management of the tax (Municipalities), a sine qua non condition for the application of that principle, since </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\"> </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">The principle of sovereign tax immunity liberates the State from the obligation to pay taxes created by it. The active subject of the tax obligation must be the State itself. It would be illogical for a State to create taxes to charge itself</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">The higher entity assumes a dual consideration as active and passive subject of the legal-tax relationship, the consequence of which would be the extinguishment of the tax obligation by merger</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">. Hence the reason (article 49 of the Código de normas y procedimientos tributarios) for establishing merger as a cause for extinguishment of the tax obligation. When the State goes from being an active subject to a passive subject of the tax, the tax obligation is nonexistent because the intersubjective relationship does not exist. Regarding the municipal regime, the principle of sovereign tax immunity of the State is inoperative (…) For sovereign tax immunity to operate –by merger– the subjective identity must be full…” (judgment number 12-1994 issued by the First Chamber of the Court, at eleven hours on March twenty-fifth, nineteen ninety-four. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">The highlighting is not from the original</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">). </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">So much so, that article 5 subsection a) paragraph 2 of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles establishes that </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…The State and the municipalities do not require the presentation of any requirement, since by definition they are not subject…”. </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">It should be clarified, that while it is true that by means of judgment number 2008-11210 at fifteen hours on July sixteenth, two thousand eight, the Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, pronounced –among other aspects– on the constitutionality of article 15 –in reality 18– of the project </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“Ley de fortalecimiento y modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector de Telecomunicaciones”</span><span style="font-family:Tahoma\">, which was processed in legislative file No. Placa1952; it is also true that said pronouncement only referred to the following point: </span><span style="font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">“…The argumentation of the consultants powerfully calls the attention of this Tribunal, when the taxing power (article 121, subsection 13 of the Constitución Política) and the principle of equality in the support of public burdens (articles 18 and 33 of the Constitution) are absolutely consubstantial to the Social and Democratic State of Law. Without the taxing power and the correlative duty of every person to contribute to public expenses, the diverse public entities that provide positive benefits to the inhabitants to eradicate real and effective inequalities –proper and typical of a Social State of Law–, could not exercise their functions, fulfill their competencies and satisfy the public interest, since it would be impossible for them to have public resources for that purpose.</span> Subjecting Nombre9574 and its companies to the payment of sales and income tax, within the framework of an open telecommunications market, where the actors—network operators or service providers—may be of a public or private nature, avoids any distortion or competitive asymmetry—which does violate the principle of equality—that may dissuade other subjects from participating and investing in that segment of the economy, an extreme that would negatively impact the options or freedom of choice of the consumer or user, the cost of services or products, and the increase in productivity.” In addition to the foregoing, it is necessary to recall that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 101 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, “…The opinion of the Chamber shall only be binding insofar as it establishes the existence of unconstitutional procedures in the consulted bill…”. For all the foregoing reasons, this Court considers that the provisions of Article 18 of Law 8660 are limited in their scope and validity to the provisions of Article 121, subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; Article 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; Articles 5, 62, 63, and 64 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; which implies that Nombre9574 did not recover the generic, subjective exemption for future taxes, as was provided for in numeral 20 of Decree Law 449, and therefore, it cannot serve as a basis for fulfilling the condition set forth in subsection a) of Article 4 of Law 7509, as a prerequisite for its properties not to be subject to the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles.

**VIII.- SOME CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE SEIZURE IMMUNITY (INEMBARGABILIDAD) OF PUBLICLY OWNED ASSETS DIRECTLY LINKED TO ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES.** It is necessary to indicate that, when executing the collection of the amounts that Nombre9574 has pending payment for the concept of the Property Tax (Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles)—clearly, provided the statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) period provided for in Article 8 of Law No. 7509 has not run its course and that it has been alleged by the aggrieved entity—the Municipalities and other law operators must take into consideration the rules provided for in Articles 261 and 262 of the Civil Code, and 169 and 170 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, regarding the assets of Nombre9574 on which seizure (embargo) may or may not be ordered and carried out for such purposes. In that sense, through ruling number 019-2009-SVII issued at thirteen hours and thirty minutes on February twelfth, two thousand nine, the Seventh Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, considered regarding the concept of public and private domain assets (bienes de dominio público y privado) of public administrations that: "(...) The State and other public entities possess two types of assets: public and private. Article 261 of the Civil Code provides: 'Public things (cosas públicas) are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those from which everyone can benefit by being delivered for public use. All other things are private and the object of particular property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in this case, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person.' The foregoing must be related to Article 121, subsection 4) of the Political Constitution, which establishes as an attribution of the Legislative Assembly to decree the alienation or application to public uses of the Nation's own assets." Public domain assets (bienes de dominio público) are characterized by being inalienable, imprescriptible, and immune from seizure (inembargables), consequently outside the commerce of men. On the subject, the Constitutional Chamber has expressed: / "II.- THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THE LEGAL MEANS TO INTEGRATE IT.- By public domain (dominio público) is understood the set of assets subject to a special legal regime distinct from that which governs private domain, which, besides belonging to or being under the administration of public legal persons, are affected or destined for purposes of public utility and which manifests itself in the direct or indirect use that any person can make of them. Doctrine recognizes public domain under different meanings, such as dominical assets (bienes dominicales), public things (cosas públicas), public assets (bienes públicos), or demanial assets (bienes demaniales). On this concept, the Chamber expressed (sic) in its Judgment No. 2306-91 at 14:45 hours on November sixth, nineteen ninety-one, the following: / "The public domain is integrated by assets that manifest, by express will of the legislator, a special destiny to serve the community, the public interest. They are the so-called dominical assets (bienes dominicales), demanial assets (bienes demaniales), public assets or things (bienes o cosas públicas), or public assets (bienes públicos), which do not belong individually to private persons and which are destined for public use and subject to a special regime, outside the commerce of men. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation. Consequently, these assets belong to the State in the broadest sense of the concept, are affected to the service they provide and which is invariably essential by virtue of an express norm. Characteristic notes of these assets are that they are inalienable, imprescriptible, immune from seizure (inembargables), cannot be mortgaged nor susceptible to encumbrance in the terms of Civil Law, and administrative action substitutes for interdicts to recover the domain... Consequently, the national regime of public domain assets, such as the thoroughfares of the Capital City, be they municipal or national streets, sidewalks, parks, and other public sites, places them outside the commerce of men..." (see in a similar sense, judgment number 035-2009-SVII issued by the Seventh Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, at fourteen hours and forty minutes on March thirteenth, two thousand nine). Consequently, the private domain assets of the Administration that are not affected by a public purpose shall be subject to seizure (embargables) (Article 169.1.a of the CPCA). On the contrary, publicly owned assets destined for common use and enjoyment, as well as those directly linked to the provision of essential public services—such as, for example: electricity and telecommunications—, or those that are indispensable or irreplaceable for the fulfillment of public purposes or services, shall not be subject to seizure (no serán embargables) (Articles 261 of the Civil Code and 170 of the CPCA).

**IX.- COROLLARY.** For the reasons given, this Court rejects the appeal filed and confirms the ruling at ten hours and thirty minutes on April nineteenth, two thousand twelve, issued by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco, for not being substantially contrary to the provisions of Articles 11, 18 in fine, 33, 121 subsection 13) of the Political Constitution; 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; 20 of Decree Law 449; 2 subsection l); 35 and 50 of Law 7293; 4 subsection a) and 38 subsection a) of Law 7509; 5, 62, 63 and 54 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; 18 of Law 8860; 5 subsection a) paragraph 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo 27601-H. Now then, given that the determination of whether some of the periods charged by the Municipality of El Guarco might or might not be time-barred (prescritos) was not the object of the arguments raised in the appeal for reversal with a subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) filed by the appealed entity against the contested act (folios 141 to 145, 149 to 155 of the expediente), this Court does not enter into that determination. As there is no further recourse in the administrative venue, the administrative channel is deemed exhausted (se da por agotada la vía administrativa). With the dissenting vote (voto salvado) of Judge Solano Ulloa, who grants the appeal, annuls the contested ruling, and deems the administrative channel exhausted.- **POR TANTO.** For the reasons given, by majority the ruling at ten hours and thirty minutes on April nineteenth, two thousand twelve, issued by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco is confirmed. The administrative channel is deemed exhausted. With the dissenting vote of Judge Solano Ulloa, who grants the appeal, annuls the contested ruling, and deems the administrative channel exhausted.- **Jorge Leiva Poveda** **Marianella Álvarez Molina** **Siria Carmona Castro** **Dissenting vote of Judge Carmona Castro.** **CONSIDERANDO** With the due respect and consideration, this judge separates from the majority vote, specifically regarding the criteria on the merits in the present matter argued by my colleagues on the Court. On this point, the legal grounds are set forth below, based on which it is considered that the actions of the Municipality of El Guarco must be annulled.

**I.- ON THE ORIGINATION OF THE TAX OBLIGATION (NACIMIENTO DE LA OBLIGACIÓN TRIBUTARIA).** In Tax Law (Derecho Tributario), more specifically in the tax legal relationship (relación jurídico impositiva), we are in the presence of two types of active and passive subjects. The Active Subject (Sujeto activo) is the State or some lesser public entity, which holds the so-called power of empire (potestad de imperio), from which derives the financial power (potestad financiera) (Article 14 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). The State is the primary active subject, but there are other sub-primary or delegated active subjects, such as the Municipalities, which have the power to create taxes (tributos). The tax power (potestad tributaria) is that faculty of the State to coactively obtain a certain amount of wealth from the private sphere of the taxpayer to finance public expenditures, and the passive subject (sujeto pasivo) is the one upon whom the Law imposes obligations and corresponds to whoever is subject to the State's power of empire. From this perspective, in very general terms, it is understood that the taxpayer (contribuyente) comes to be that person regarding whom the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation (obligación tributaria) is verified. The obligations assumed by the taxpayers consist mainly in the provision of the tax (tributo) of the substantive tax obligations (obligaciones tributarias sustanciales), with the source of the tax obligation being the taxable event, which can only arise by mandate of a law. The substantive obligation (obligación sustancial), also called the main obligation, consists of that provision of a patrimonial nature, which viewed from a double perspective can be expressed as an obligation to give (the taxpayer) and to receive (the tax authorities - fisco). However, the passive subjects are also burdened with the obligation to comply with formal duties (deberes formales) or administrative duties, which are accessory and revolve around the main obligation, arising with the purpose of facilitating its compliance. (Article 18 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). It is the Law which, for the sake of satisfying a superior public interest, destined for the fulfillment of state obligations, subjects the taxpayer to a regime of additional obligations. The burdens borne by the taxpayer, by their very reason for being such, are imposed by Law, which must cause them to yield their sphere of particular interests in favor of a superior public interest. Their obligation derives from a factor entirely unrelated to the will of the Tax Administration, as their simple condition of taxpayer subjects them to the formal regime of obligations and duties that transcend the strictly pecuniary sphere.

**II. ON TAX BENEFITS (BENEFICIOS FISCALES) AND THEIR CREATION.** There are state policies through which exceptions to the application of taxes are created, among which are tax benefits, understood as the granting of a protectionist fiscal measure, which can encompass various mechanisms or manifestations, such as tax exemptions (exoneraciones fiscales) or the granting of subsidies of various kinds, such as, for example, the granting of State bonds for certain activities (productive or cultural), access to official credits with reduced interest rates and deferred amortization terms, customs franchises, etcetera.

It is therefore a matter of "support measures or instrumental stimulus through a tax relief mechanism" (SOLER ROCH, M.T. *Incentivos a la inversión y justicia tributaria*, Civitas, Madrid, 1983, p.20), among which we find the typical case of deductions for investments or job creation, the Certificados de Abono Tributario (CATs), and within which, par excellence, tax exemptions (exoneraciones tributarias) fit. Specifically with exemptions, the aim is to prevent the birth of the tax obligation—total exemption (exención total)—or to reduce the amount of the tax—partial exemption (exención parcial)—through credits or deductions in the face of certain factual situations included within the scope of the taxable event (hecho imponible) whose realization does not give rise to the obligation to pay, constituting an exception to the normal effects derived from its realization. The tax exemption norm has the force to nullify the effects of the norm that creates it, as it affects either the subjective or objective element of the taxable event, or the quantification elements of the tax, that is, the taxable base (base imponible) (deductions and reductions) or the tax rate. The classic theory of exemption defines tax exemptions (exoneraciones) as a legal dispensation from the tax obligation (dispensa legal de la obligación tributaria), either as a derogation of the payment obligation, despite the taxable event occurring, which is the effect they produce, or the exception from the obligation to contribute to public expenses for certain subjects (subjective exemption (exoneración subjetiva)), or for certain situations or facts (objective exemption (exoneración objetiva)). Thus, the tax exemption occurs when a norm provides that in those situations expressly foreseen by it, despite the taxable event occurring, its main effect does not arise: the duty to pay the tax or tax obligation.

III.- REGARDING THE EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX IN FAVOR OF THE INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD. REGARDING THE LEGISLATOR'S INTENT. The levy on the ownership of real property has existed for a long time, as it was created by the now-repealed Ley de Impuesto Territorial No. 27 of March 2, 1939, and its amendments. In Article 4 of that same law, a generic subjective exemption was established in favor of ICE, by providing the following:

"Article 4.- Non-liabilities (No sujeciones). The following properties are not liable to this tax:

- The Legislative Branch; the Executive Branch; the Judicial Branch; the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones and the municipalities. - The Juntas de Educación, public radiotelegraph and radiotelephone stations. - The Servicio Nacional de Electricidad. - The Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas (IICA) and its staff members who are not Costa Rican citizens. - The Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. - The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad..." Subsequently, Decreto Ley 449 of April 8, 1949, reaffirmed the exemption already in force in favor of ICE, inasmuch as it provided that:

"Article 20.- The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad is exempt from the payment of national and municipal taxes and enjoys postal and telegraphic franking privilege." (Thus added by Article 1 of Ley 764 of October 25, 1949.)

On May 3, 1971, the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios came into force, creating new regulations in Article 62 for exemptions, as the original text of the article provided:

"Article 62.- Conditions and requirements demanded. The law that establishes exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements demanded for their granting, the taxes they comprise, whether it is total or partial, and, where appropriate, the term of their duration." (Note: this norm was subsequently amended by Article 1 of Ley No. 7900 of August 3, 1999, and by Article 1 of Ley No. 9069 of September 10, 2012, "Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria," its current text remaining as indicated below:

"Article 62.- Conditions and requirements demanded. The law that contemplates exemptions must specify the conditions and requirements established for granting them, the beneficiaries, the goods, the taxes it comprises, whether it is total or partial, the term of its duration, and whether at the end or during said period the goods can be released or whether the taxes must be settled, or if transfer to third parties can be authorized and under what conditions.

In all cases, natural or legal persons requesting exemptions must be up to date in the payment of taxes administered by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) of the Ministry of Finance, as a condition for their granting.") In Transitorio 169, subsection c) of that Code, several express repeals of the Ley de Impuesto Territorial were made, but none modified Article 4 that created the exemption in favor of ICE. This judge understands that, had there been the intent within the legislative body to repeal said tax exemption (exoneración), the legislator would have so provided in that regard, but that did not occur, thus allowing the coexistence of the regulation contained in Article 62 and the validity and application of the norm creating the benefit in favor of ICE. Even the exemption from the payment of the territorial tax survived the entry into force of the Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su Derogatoria y sus Excepciones—Ley 7293 in force since April 3, 1992—as the same Article 34 expressly so provided. Three years later, the Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles was enacted—Ley No. 7509 of May 9, 1995, in force as of June 19 of that same year—whereby the Ley del Impuesto Territorial is repealed, preserving the elements of the territorial tax (taxable event (hecho generador) and active and passive subjects), but reforming everything concerning the management, administration, and use of the same tax. That is, it was not a new tax, as it had already existed for years. However, regarding exemptions, it provided the following:

"Article 4.- Properties not liable to the tax. The following properties are not liable to this tax: a) Properties of the State, municipalities, autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that, by special law, enjoy exemption..." As can be seen, in that norm the legislator foresaw that, for the purposes of autonomous institutions, there would be a permanence of the exemptions provided in special laws. Regarding the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, even with the repeal of the Ley del Impuesto Territorial, Article 20 of Decreto Ley 449 of April 8, 1949, previously transcribed, preexisted, a special norm that introduced a generic exemption of a subjective nature by virtue of the institution to which it is directed, regarding all national and municipal taxes. If the tax was not new, therefore, the exemption was not new either, and it has not been declared unconstitutional, so it maintains its validity, an express repeal being deemed necessary by the same legislator who created it, in order to eliminate its effectiveness, in application of the principles of legal reserve in tax matters and parallelism of forms. This historical analysis of the normative development, while useful and necessary to contextualize the evolution of the tax and its exemption, leads today to the main norm governing the matter, contained in the Ley de Modernización y Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones—Ley 8660, which entered into force as of August 13, 2008—born within the regulatory framework required by the Free Trade Agreement with the United States of America, where the legislator, through a later law, expressly reaffirms the validity of all exemptions for ICE, making the express exception of income tax and sales tax, imposing on it for the first time the payment of these two sole taxes. In this regard, the norm is transcribed:

"Article 18. Tax Treatment. When Nombre9574 and its companies act as operators or providers in competitive national markets for telecommunications or electricity services and products, they shall be subject to the payment of income taxes and sales taxes. In all other cases, the exemptions conferred in Decreto Ley No. 449, of April 8, 1949, as well as any others conferred by the legal system, shall remain in force..." (The highlighting is added).

The application of this norm is immediate upon its validity and, despite the exemption contained in the Decreto Ley being broad, generic, and subjective based on the specialty of the Institution to which it is directed, its application is definitively binding because the cited Article 18 is a special norm subsequent to the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Interpreting that what is provided in this norm is limited in its scope and validity to what is established in Article 62 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios has several important objections that, in the opinion of the undersigned, are contrary to the democratic system of the Costa Rican state and are analyzed below. First, because in the law-making process, the Legislative Branch finds its limits only in the constitutional text and in the regulations governing the procedures for the formation of the law, from which it follows that the norm set forth in the cited Article 62 cannot be understood as conditioning the power of the Asamblea Legislativa to enact and amend tax law, even if it is in a different sense. Second, because doing so would be to disregard the express will of the legislator who, pursuant to constitutional Article 105, assumes said power by delegation of the people without being subject to limitations—except in the case of treaties—in full and legitimate exercise of popular representation. Therefore, if in the current historical context of market opening and commercial competitiveness, the legislator chose to maintain such fiscal benefits for the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, given that it has been and continues to be the main provider, nationwide, of indispensable public services, such legislative will must be respected. Considering the contrary is to disregard the content of a "substantive tax law" (ley tributaria sustantiva), born under the protection of a "formal law" (ley formal) derived from the exercise of legislative power, which responds to the conjunctural demands of redefining national commercial and institutional concepts, as a consequence of the recent demands of economic policy, with full powers to specify the national tax scheme and the incentives and benefits it provides, including this class of tax exclusions. Third, because the letter of the norm is clear and precise, binding the municipal authorities and this improper hierarchy to its application, and interpretations and normative integrations to the contrary cannot be made, as this would go against Articles 9, subsection 2) and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, by which the Administration is submitted to the legal order and the disapplication of the administrative norm for specific cases is prohibited. Herein lies and is summarized the substantial difference with the majority opinion of this Voto, as we are not even facing a situation of incompatibility or normative antinomy, given that it cannot be conceived, in this case, that we are in the presence of two provisions of equal rank in force that regulate the same factual situation in a contradictory manner. It is clear then that the current and applicable legislation is that contained in Article 18 of Ley 8660, which refers in turn to the application of the exemptions (exoneraciones) contained in Article 20 of Decreto Ley 449, so there is no choice but to conclude that Nombre9574 is indeed exempt from the payment of the Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, and therefore the grievances expressed by its representation are accepted. Consequently, defects of absolute nullity are observed in what was resolved in the resolution of ten hours and thirty minutes of April 19, 2012, issued by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco, insofar as it ordered the maintenance of the collection of said tax from ICE, for which reason said administrative act must be annulled at this time, for transgression of the legality block in its reasoning and content. There being no further recourse, the administrative channel must be deemed exhausted.

POR TANTO

The resolution of ten hours and thirty minutes of April 19, 2012, issued by the Municipal Mayor of El Guarco, is annulled.

The administrative route is deemed exhausted.

Siria Carmona Castro ASUNTO: Apelación Municipal ACCIONANTE: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad RECURRIDO: Municipalidad de El Guarco.

Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Correo Electrónico ...01 __________________________________________________________________ ASUNTO: Apelación Municipal ACCIONANTE: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad RECURRIDO: Municipalidad de El Guarco.

No. 124-2014 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN TERCERA, ANEXO A DEL II CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las diez horas veinticinco minutos del doce de marzo de dos mil catorce.- Conoce este Tribunal en condición de contralor no jerárquico de legalidad, del recurso de apelación presentado por el INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD –ICE-, cédula jurídica número CED35574, representado por su Apoderado Especial Administrativo, Licenciado Juan Carlos Araya González, mayor, casado, vecino de Grecia, con cédula de identidad número CED79140, contra la resolución CED80188° de las diez horas del nueve de mayo de dos mil doce, emitida por el señor Alcalde de la Municipalidad de El Guarco.

Redacta el Juez Leiva Poveda, y:

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- HECHOS PROBADOS: Para una correcta resolución del presente asunto, se tiene por probado lo siguiente: 1) Mediante Oficio N° 5104-0421-2012 de fecha 01 de marzo de 2012, el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad solicitó a la Municipalidad de El Guarco, la exoneración del pago del impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles y que se ordenara la eliminación de cobro en los Sistemas Informáticos que posee esa Municipalidad, respecto de cada una de las siguientes propiedades: Folio Real N° 98080; N° 82848; N° 142748; N° 189500 (folio 1 a 8). 2) Por medio de Resolución N° 006-2012 de las diez horas del nueve de mayo de dos mil doce, el señor Alcalde Municipal de El Guarco, resolvió: “ POR TANTO: Según las atribuciones que por el Código Municipal me fueron encomendadas, entre ellas ejercer funciones inherentes a la condición de administrador general y jefe de las dependencias municipales, vigilando la organización, el funcionamiento, la coordinación y el fiel cumplimiento de los acuerdos municipales, las leyes y los reglamentos en general, procedo a RECHAZAR LA PRESENTE SOLICITUD DE EXONERACIÓN EN EL IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES, INCOADA POR EL INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD. Así mismo se les solicita presentarse a la Municipalidad a hacer la respectiva declaración de bienes inmuebles propiedad del instituto…” (folios 32 a 35). 3) Mediante Oficio 257-472-2012 del 31 de mayo de 2012, el personero del Nombre9574 formula recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio respecto de la resolución N° 006-2012 de las diez horas del nueve de mayo de dos mil doce antes descrita (folios 36 a 41). 4) Por resolución N° 008-2012 de las nueve horas cuarenta y nueve minutos del veintinueve de junio de dos mil doce, el señor Alcalde de la Municipalidad de El Guarco, rechaza el recurso de revocatoria formulado por el Nombre9574 en contra de la Resolución N° 006-2012 antes descrita y, admite la apelación para ante este Órgano Colegiado. (folios 56 a 62).

II.- OBJETO DEL RECURSO: El apelante alega que el Nombre9574 quedó exento del pago del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, desde que se promulgó el Decreto Ley número 449, en cuyo artículo 20 se dispone que “…El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad está exento del pago de impuestos nacionales y municipales y goza de franquicia postal y telegráfica”. Indica que el artículo 4 inciso a) de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles (Ley nº 7509 del 9 de mayo de 1995), excluye al Nombre9574 como institución autónoma, de la obligación de pago de ese tributo. Sostiene que el panorama jurídico del Nombre9574 respecto a los impuestos nacionales y municipales, fue reafirmado expresamente en la Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las entidades públicas en telecomunicaciones (Ley nº 8660), que en el artículo 18 expresamente reitera las exenciones otorgadas al Nombre9574 vía su ley constitutiva número 449, ý únicamente somete al Nombre9574 algo de los impuestos de renta y de ventas. Indica que el artículo 2 inciso l) de la Ley Reguladora de todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su Derogatoria y sus Excepciones (Ley nº 7293 del 31 de marzo de 1992), no modificó en nada lo dispuesto en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, por lo que, este artículo continúa vigente hasta la fecha. Aunado a lo anterior, señala que el propio artículo 34 de la Ley nº 7293, que modificó el artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto Territorial (Ley nº 27 del 3 de marzo de 1939), establecía que no estaban afectos a este impuesto, los inmuebles del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, lo cual implica –a su juicio- que se reafirma una vez más la exoneración vigente que contempla el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449. Considera que si bien es cierto, el artículo 50 de la Ley nº 7293 modificó el numeral 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios en el sentido de que “…Aunque haya disposición expresa de la Ley Tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente su creación…”; también lo es, que contrario a los criterios esgrimidos por la Procuraduría General de la República y el Órgano de Normalización Técnica del Ministerio de Hacienda, aunque el artículo 37 de la Ley nº 7509 derogó la Ley del Impuesto Territorial, ello no implica que se haya creado un nuevo tributo, porque el objetivo antes y después, sigue siendo los terrenos y las propiedades, no existiendo variación alguna en los presupuestos de la Ley derogada, ya que por el contrario ambas leyes mantienen los mismos presupuestos objetivos del tributo. Alegan que en todo caso, el punto medular de la divergencia que mantienen es que, la misma Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles establece un régimen exonerativo, que a su juicio, no puede ser obviado por considerar que el artículo 4 no hace referencia expresa al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, ello por cuanto dicho numeral establece que los inmuebles del Estado, las municipalidades, las instituciones autónomas y semi-autónomas que, por ley especial gocen de exención, no estarán afectos a ese impuesto. En ese punto, considera que es necesario retomar lo dispuesto en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449, en el cual y a su juicio, queda claramente definido que el Nombre9574 por ley especial goza de exención en el pago de impuestos nacionales, como es el caso, del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, razón por la cual, las Leyes 7293 y 7509 en sus artículos 2 inciso l) y 4 inciso a), mantienen las exoneraciones genéricas otorgadas por el Decreto Ley número 449 a favor del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad. Sostienen que dicha exoneración genérica fue reforzada por el artículo 18 de la Ley 8660, norma que mantiene vigentes tanto las exoneraciones conferidas en el Decreto Ley 449, como cualesquiera otras que le confiera el ordenamiento jurídico, excepto en aquellos supuestos cuando el Nombre9574 y sus empresas actúen como operadores o proveedores en mercados nacionales competitivos de servicios y productos de telecomunicaciones o electricidad, caso en que estarán sujetos al pago de los impuestos sobre la renta y de ventas, excluyéndose del primer impuesto (renta) el servicio telefónico básico tradicional. Estiman que resulta evidente, que mediante la Ley 8660 se reiteró la exención tributaria de carácter genérico a favor del ICE, tal y como la propia Procuraduría General de la República establece en el dictamen C-171-2009 del 19 de junio el 2009. En consecuencia, considera que la exención genérica subjetiva otorgada mediante Decreto Ley número 449, se ha mantenido vigente en el tiempo, tal y como se ha establecido en las sentencias número 364-2002 dictada por la Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, y 037-F-04 de las diez horas treinta y cinco minutos del veintiuno de enero del dos mil cuatro, dictada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia; así como también, en las sentencias 759-2010, 1037-2010 y 983-2010 dictadas por el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo, al resolver en recurso de apelación interpuesto contra la sentencia de primera instancia dictada en procesos ejecutivos incoados por las Municipalidades de Montes de Oro, Tilarán y San Carlos, contra el Nombre9574 por supuestos adeudos del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles. Por su parte, la autoridad municipal recurrida, indica que la Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles N° 7509 vigente a partir de 1995, en forma expresa deroga la Ley sobre Impuesto Territorial N° 27 del 02 de marzo de 1939 y sus reformas, y al tiempo crea un nuevo impuesto a favor de las Municipalidades, el cual tiene como objeto los terrenos, las instalaciones o las construcciones fijas y permanentes. En su criterio, esa leyes difieren en varios aspectos, por un lado varía el objeto, la forma de distribución del impuesto, la forma en que se establece el tributo, el régimen de no afectación al impuesto; y por otro lado, a diferencia de la Ley N° 27 derogada, le concede la administración del mismo a las municipalidades. Aduce, la exoneración alegada por el ICE, encontraba sustento en la Ley sobre Impuesto Territorial de 1949, misma que fue eliminada mediante el artículo 4 de la Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, al establecer de forma restrictiva la aplicación de ese privilegio únicamente en favor de las instituciones que por ley especial gocen de exención. Añade, la Ley de Impuestos sobre Bienes Inmuebles es posterior a la Ley sobre Impuesto Territorial, y de acuerdo al Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, no es posible pretender abarcar tributos futuros. Agrega, a partir de la Ley N° 7293, Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones, vigente a partir del 03 de abril de 1992, se derogan todas las exenciones tributarias objetivas y subjetivas, previstas en las diferentes leyes, decretos y normas legales referentes, en razón de que resultaba innecesario eliminar la cantidad de exoneraciones existentes, y dentro de ellas, en su criterio, se afecta la exoneración que alega el ICE. Adicionalmente, cita la Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones N° 8660 del 08 de agosto de 2008, y alega, que si bien en el artículo 18 dispone la vigencia de las exenciones conferidas por la Ley N° 449, así como por cualquier otra conceda el ordenamiento jurídico, en su parecer, de conformidad con el principio de reserva de ley y legalidad tributaria, la exención de tributos futuros debe ser claramente especificada en la ley que lo establece, situación que sostiene, no sucede con la ley de cita. El personero del Municipio recurrido, en apoyo de su tesis, alude a los dictámenes emitidos por la Procuraduría General de la República N° C-109-2006; C-151-2007; C-171-2009; Oficio N° DONT-052 del 20 de febrero de 2012; Sentencia N° 472-12 del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Tercera; y solicita se declare sin lugar el recurso formulado, y se confirme la resolución impugnada.

III.- RESPECTO A LOS LÍMITES Y ALCANCES DE LOS PRINCIPIOS DE RESERVA DE LEY Y DE LEGALIDAD EN MATERIA TRIBUTARIA. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 121 inciso 13 de la Constitución Política, corresponde exclusivamente a la Asamblea Legislativa, establecer los impuestos y contribuciones nacionales, y autorizar los municipales, ello implica que existe un principio de reserva de ley en materia tributaria, también denominado principio de legalidad tributaria. En ese sentido, el artículo 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública establece que los reglamentos, circulares, instrucciones y demás disposiciones administrativas de carácter general no podrán establecer penas ni imponer, exacciones, tasas, multas ni otras cargas similares. Por su parte, el artículo 5 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios en relación con los artículos 5 y 62 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, establece cuáles son los elementos esenciales del tributo que están reservados a la ley, a saber: a) Crear, modificar o suprimir tributos; definir el hecho generador de la relación tributaria; establecer las tarifas de los tributos y sus bases de cálculo; e indicar el sujeto pasivo; b) Tipificar las infracciones y establecer las respectivas sanciones; c) Establecer privilegios, preferencias y garantías para los créditos tributarios; d) Regular los modos de extinción de los créditos tributarios. De conformidad con el inciso b) del artículo 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, sólo la ley puede otorgar exenciones, reducciones o beneficios, las que en consecuencia no pueden crearse por analogía, sino por ley formal y material (artículo 6 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), norma legal que de conformidad con el principio de legalidad tributaria, debe especificar las condiciones y los requisitos fijados para otorgarlas, los beneficiarios, las mercancías, los tributos que comprende, si es total o parcial, el plazo de su duración, y si al final o en el transcurso de dicho período se pueden liberar las mercancías o si deben liquidar los impuestos, o bien si se puede autorizar el traspaso a terceros y bajo qué condiciones (artículos 5 y 62 párrafo 1º del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). Lo anterior implica, que aunque haya disposición expresa de la ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación, pues ello implicaría una limitación a futuro de la potestad tributaria del Estado, en detrimento del principio de igualdad ante el impuesto y las cargas públicas (artículo 18 in fine de la Constitución Política). Ahora bien, este Tribunal considera que con vista en las normas indicadas y de conformidad con la jurisprudencia emitida por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el principio de reserva de ley en materia tributaria no es de carácter absoluto, sino relativo, ya que si bien es cierto, los elementos esenciales deben ser establecidos por la ley, también lo es, que la norma legal deberá al menos establecer los límites o criterios concretos con base en los cuales, las normas infralegales –artículo 2 inciso d) del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios- puedan o deban completar la disciplina normativa de dichos elementos esenciales, a efecto de ejecutar y aplicar dichas normas legales (artículos 140 incisos 3 y 18 in fine de la Constitución Política y artículo 99 párrafo segundo del artículo 99 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). En ese sentido, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha considerado: “...Nuestra jurisprudencia, (...) ha reconocido, habida cuenta de determinadas circunstancias, la posibilidad de que opere -dentro de ciertos límites razonables- una “delegación relativa” de dichas facultades, siempre y cuando, se señalen en la ley los márgenes del tributo respectivo, pues de lo contrario, estaríamos en presencia de una “delegación absoluta” de tales facultades, proceder que carece, como se expuso, de validez constitucional (...) la Sala se pronunciado a favor de la delegación relativa en materia tributaria, pero no así en lo que se refiere a los elementos constitucionales de la obligación tributaria (sujetos activo y pasivo, objeto de la obligación, causa, tarifa del impuesto), en los que sí se da la llamada reserva de ley...” (sentencia número 1996-00687, y en sentido similar, la sentencia número 1995-000739 de las catorce horas cincuenta y un minutos del ocho de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y seis).

IV.- ALGUNAS GENERALIDADES DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES. Este impuesto es creado mediante Ley No. 7509, según la cual se establece en favor de las municipalidades, un impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles, cuyo objeto son los terrenos, las instalaciones o las construcciones fijas y permanentes que allí existan. En torno a su naturaleza, es menester señalar que la Sala Constitucional ha establecido que se trata de un “tributo de orden municipal en razón de su destino –únicamente–, pero no lo es en virtud de su procedimiento de origen o promulgación, dado que no nació de la iniciativa de los gobiernos locales, sino del ejercicio de la potestad tributaria otorgada a la Asamblea Legislativa, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, es decir, que es producto de la propia labor legislativa ordinaria. Cabe reiterar que la Asamblea Legislativa es soberana, en cuanto al uso del poder tributario, para establecer los impuestos que se requieran, sean estos nacionales o municipales.” (SCV 5669-99). Así, se trata, no de un tributo municipal que provenga de la potestad tributaria derivada y propia de las corporaciones municipales que deriva del numeral 121 inciso 13) del la Constitución Política; sino más bien de lo que la doctrina española denomina como tributos cedidos. Si bien ambos son fuentes tributarias locales, los primeros son aquellos que, como se indicó, se crean por el procedimiento legislativo especial previsto en el artículo 121 inciso 13) constitucional, el cual se considera especial tanto por la iniciativa municipal como por la prohibición de enmienda que tiene la Asamblea Legislativa, que debe limitarse a aprobar o improbar el acuerdo municipal respectivo. Por su parte, la cesión de tributos es un mecanismo de financiamiento desarrollado principalmente por las Comunidades Autónomas Españolas. Se dice que en éstos, el Estado se reserva el poder tributario; mientras que la Comunidad Autónoma individualmente detenta la competencia sobre los rendimientos, a través de puntos de conexión de carácter territorial. Así, en la gestión del tributo cedido, la potestad tributaria la retiene el Estado, quien delega el ejercicio de la competencia en la Comunidad Autónoma, todo ello sin perjuicio de la “colaboración” que se puede establecer entre las Administraciones de ambos entes territoriales, Estado y Comunidad Autónoma. Según lo indicado, la cesión de tributos implica la delegación de competencias administrativas, sin perjuicio de la obligada coordinación y colaboración entre las Administraciones Tributarias. En el caso de Costa Rica, esta figura puede asociarse, a juicio de este órgano, con la situación del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, en virtud de las características propias de este tributo. Si bien emanan del ejercicio de la potestad normativa y tributaria del Estado, la competencia sobre la recaudación la tienen las Municipalidades, tomando en cuenta la ubicación del inmueble dentro del territorio municipal como punto de conexión. Asimismo, la potestad administrativa de gestión del impuesto también la tienen los municipios, sin que ello obste para que exista una coordinación con la Administración Tributaria Estatal, misma que, a la fecha se manifiesta en la existencia del Órgano de Normalización Técnica introducido por el artículo 2, inciso c) de la Ley 7729. Debe señalarse que nuestra jurisprudencia constitucional ha admitido la figura de los tributos cedidos, cuando en el Voto 3930-95, señaló respecto de los tributos que crea el Estado en beneficio de las municipalidades “...Pero ello no quiere decir que el legislador no pueda dotar a las Municipalidades de recursos extraordinarios mediante un impuesto general a distribuir, como en el caso del impuesto territorial…” Debe indicarse que se trata de un impuesto anual, cuyo período inicia el 1 de enero y termina el 31 de diciembre de cada año calendario. Su pago debe realizarse anual o semestralmente o en cuatro cuotas trimestrales, según lo determine cada municipalidad. Asimismo, se consideran como sujetos pasivos de este impuesto, a los propietarios de los bienes inmuebles, los concesionarios, los permisionarios o los ocupantes de la franja fronteriza o de la zona marítimo terrestre, los ocupantes o los poseedores con título, inscribible o no inscribible en el Registro Público, con más de un año y que se encuentren en las siguientes condiciones: poseedores, empresarios agrícolas, usufructuarios, aparceros rurales, esquilmos, prestatarios gratuitos de tierras y ocupantes en precario, los parceleros del IDA en determinadas circunstancias. La base imponible para el cálculo del impuesto será el valor del inmueble registrado en la Administración Tributaria, al 1 de enero del año correspondiente, lo que conlleva que para efectos tributarios, todo inmueble debe ser valorado, lo cual es una labor de cada Municipalidad en el marco de las potestades de administración, gestión y recaudación del tributo impuestas por la propia Ley No. 7509. En todo el país, el porcentaje del impuesto será de un cuarto por ciento (0,25%) y se aplicará sobre el valor del inmueble registrado por la Administración Tributaria. Como ya fuera indicado, para la gestión de este impuesto, la ley le otorga a las municipalidades el carácter de Administración Tributaria, lo cual significa que son las encargadas de retener y percibir el citado impuesto, de conformidad con la doctrina del artículo 99 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Les atribuye también esta ley una serie de prerrogativas y deberes a fin de poder cumplir con la gestión de este tributo, entre ellas “(…) realizar valoraciones de bienes inmuebles, facturar, recaudar y tramitar el cobro judicial y de administrar, en sus respectivos territorios, los tributos que genera la presente Ley. (…).” (Artículo 3). Téngase en cuenta, finalmente, que las corporaciones municipales, en ejercicio de la potestad reglamentaria que les es propia, en razón de la autonomía que les garantiza la Constitución Política, bien pueden aprobar las normas de organización interna que requieran a fin de hacer efectivo el cobro y la recaudación del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles (ver en igual sentido, la sentencia número 1565-2009 dictada por la Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, a las dieciséis horas quince minutos del once de agosto del dos mil ocho).

V.- SOBRE LOS ALCANCES DE LA MODIFICACIÓN AL ARTÍCULO 63 DEL C.N.P.T. POR LA LEY 7293 Y SU INCIDENCIA EN LA EXENCIÓN GENÉRICA, SUBJETIVA Y A FUTURO PREVISTA EN EL NUMERAL 20 DEL DECRETO LEY 449. Este Tribunal, por mayoría, considera que la entidad recurrente no está exenta de pagar el Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, por las razones que de seguido se exponen. El Decreto Ley que crea el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, fue adicionado por Ley N° 764 de 25 de octubre de 1949, para efectos de establecer: “Artículo 20.- El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad está exento del pago de impuestos nacionales y municipales y goza de franquicia postal y telegráfica”. Dicha norma, creó una exención genérica subjetiva que resultaba aplicable para todos los impuestos presentes y futuros que pudieran afectar al Nombre9574, más la Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su derogatoria y sus excepciones -Ley N° 7293 de 31 de marzo de 1992- eliminó esta última condición, pues en el artículo 2 inciso l) dispuso mantener únicamente las exenciones vigentes a la fecha de su promulgación a favor de todas las instituciones autónomas, resultando afectado el Nombre9574 en el tanto ostenta tal naturaleza, lo cual se reforzó con la reforma de los artículos 63 y 64 el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios -contenida en ese mismo cuerpo normativo-, que dispuso:

“…ARTICULO 63: Límite de aplicación. Aunque haya disposición expresa de la ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación. (Así reformado por el artículo 50 de la ley Nº 7293 de 26 de marzo de 1992)." " ARTICULO 64.- Vigencia. La exención, aun cuando fuera concedida en función de determinadas condiciones de hecho, puede ser derogada o modificada por ley posterior, sin responsabilidad para el Estado.” Asimismo, se sujetó su eficacia "…al pleno acatamiento de los preceptos, requisitos y fines que regulan el otorgamiento, así como al correcto uso y destino previsto, de los bienes y servicios sobre los que haya recaído la exención que disfruta determinado sujeto…” (Artículo 37 de la Ley 7293) . En consecuencia, se limitaron los efectos de la exoneración, de manera tal que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido. De manera tal que la exención para los tributos que a futuro se establezcan, debe ser expresa y concreta en el texto de la ley. Aplicando lo anterior a la situación del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, se deriva que –en principio y sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 18 de la Ley 8660, que se analizará de seguido-, dicha institución se encontraría obligada al pago de todo tributo establecido con posterioridad a la Ley 7293, salvo en aquellos supuestos en que expresamente se haya otorgado una exención en su favor (ver al respecto, la sentencia número 000037-F-04 dictada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, a las diez horas treinta y cinco minutos del veintiuno de enero del año dos mil cuatro). En razón de lo anterior, este Tribunal no comparte el criterio vertido por la Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil, en sentencia número 364-2002 de las dieciséis horas veintiocho minutos del once de octubre del dos mil dos, toda vez que allí se sostiene que la exención genérica y subjetiva para impuestos futuros, se mantiene a favor del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, al considerar que: “… En cuanto a la vigencia del artículo 20 de la Ley Constitutiva del ICE, debemos remitirnos a la Ley 7293 de 31 de marzo de 1992 “Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su Derogatoria y sus Excepciones”; que en su artículo 1 ° deroga "todas las exenciones tributarias objetivas y subjetivas previstas en las diferentes leyes", y en el 50, modifica el numeral 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, para establecer que las que se dictan afectan solamente a las leyes precedentes, no a las futuras. Sin embargo, en el artículo 2 ° de la normativa en comentario, expresamente se indica, que se exceptúan de la derogatoria del artículo precedente, las exclusiones tributarias establecidas en la misma Ley y aquellas otras que: "…l) Se han otorgado … a las instituciones descentralizadas…". Siendo así, se mantiene la exención del pago de impuestos nacionales y municipales, establecida en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449…”; afirmación que en todo caso, fue matizada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia número 000037-F-04 dictada a las diez horas treinta y cinco minutos del veintiuno de enero del año dos mil cuatro, al indicar –en lo que interesa- que “… Bajo este predicado, instituciones descentralizadas como el ICE, a partir de ese momento, y hacia futuro, no pueden beneficiarse de exoneraciones tributarias creadas al amparo de normas anteriores a aquéllas en las que se regula el tributo y conservan las exoneraciones concedidas por normas anteriores a esa fecha (…)En consecuencia la restricción del canon 63 ibídem sólo puede aplicar respecto de impuestos creados luego de esa data…”. En consecuencia, a partir del 3 de abril de 1992, la exención genérica y subjetiva prevista a favor del Nombre9574 en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449, se mantiene, aunque limitada en sus alcances y vigencia futuras a lo dispuesto en los artículos 121 inciso 3) de la Constitución Política; 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 2 inciso l) de la Ley 7293 y 5, 63 y 64 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.

VI.- RESPECTO DE LA ALEGADA EXENCIÓN AL PAGO DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES QUE PRESUNTAMENTE ESTABLECE EL ARTÍCULO 4 INCISO A) DE LA LEY 7509 A FAVOR DEL I.C.E. Ahora bien, en el caso del impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles, aunque el artículo 34 de la Ley 7293 modificó el artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto Territorial (Ley Nº 27 del 2 de marzo de 1939 y sus reformas), en el sentido de que “…No están afectos a este impuesto, los inmuebles propiedad de: (…) - Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad…”; también lo es, que con la entrada en vigencia el 19 de junio de 1995 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles (Ley número 7509), no sólo se derogó la Ley del Impuesto Territorial (artículo 38), sino que además, impuso como condición para que los inmuebles del Estado, las municipalidades, las instituciones autónomas y semi-autónomas no estén afectos al Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles, a que por ley especial gocen de exención (artículo 4 inciso a de la Ley 7509). En este punto, es menester indicar que si bien es cierto, el objeto de ambos impuestos es prácticamente el mismo, a saber: los terrenos, las instalaciones o las construcciones fijas y permanentes que allí existan (artículo 2 de las Leyes 27 y 7509); que es un impuesto de carácter nacional que fue establecido a favor de las Municipalidades (artículo 1 de las Leyes 27 y 7509) y que en términos generales, la base imponible para el cálculo del impuesto será el valor del inmueble registrado en la Administración Tributaria –ahora a cargo del órgano administrativo municipal al que le corresponde la percepción y fiscalización de los tributos (artículo 9 y siguientes de la Ley 7509), antes por la Dirección General de Tributación (artículo 5 de la Ley 27)-; también lo es, que resulta contrario al principio de legalidad tributaria, previsto en los numerales 121 inciso 13 de la Constitución Política; 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 5 y 62 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, afirmar que por esas similitudes, la exención prevista en el artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto Territorial, se mantiene vigente en el tiempo a favor del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, a pesar de que fue derogada por el artículo 38 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles. Tampoco resulta aplicable al caso concreto, el principio de inmunidad fiscal, pues aunque el Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles constituye un impuesto de carácter nacional, también lo es, que no hay una identidad entre el sujeto activo, el sujeto pasivo (ICE) y el sujeto beneficiario y además, competente para la recaudación y gestión del impuesto (Municipalidades), condición sine qua non para la aplicación de ese principio, toda vez que “… El principio de inmunidad fiscal libera al Estado de la obligación de pagar tributos creados por él. El sujeto activo de la obligación tributaria debe ser el mismo Estado. Sería ilógico un Estado creando tributos para cobrarse a sí mismo. El ente mayor asume una doble consideración de sujeto activo y pasivo de la relación jurídico tributaria cuya consecuencia sería la extinción de la obligación tributaria por confusión. De ahí la razón (artículo 49 del Código de normas y procedimientos tributarios) de establecer como causal de extinción de la obligación tributaria la confusión. Cuando el Estado pasa de ser sujeto activo a sujeto pasivo del tributo la obligación tributaria es inexistente pues no existe la relación intersubjetiva. Respecto del régimen municipal el principio de inmunidad fiscal del Estado es inoperante (…) Para que opere la inmunidad fiscal -por confusión- la identidad subjetiva debe ser plena…” (sentencia número 12-1994 dictada por la Sala Primera de la Corte, a las once horas del veinticinco de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro. El resaltado no es del original). Tan es así, que en el artículo 5 inciso a) párrafo 2º del Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, se establece que “…El Estado y las municipalidades no requieren la presentación de requisito alguno, puesto que por definición se encuentran no afectos…”. Aunado a lo anterior, tampoco resulta válido afirmar que el inciso a) del artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles establece a favor del Nombre9574 una exoneración al pago de ese impuesto, no sólo porque impone como condición para que los inmuebles del Estado, las municipalidades, las instituciones autónomas y semi-autónomas no estén afectos al Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles, a que por ley especial, gocen de exención; sino también, porque de conformidad con el principio de legalidad tributaria, específicamente lo dispuesto en los artículos 62 y 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, la exención genérica subjetiva prevista en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido. De manera tal que la exención para los tributos que a futuro se establezcan, debe ser expresa y concreta en el texto de la ley, lo que no sucede en el supuesto de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, razón por la cual, remitir como fuente de exoneración de ese impuesto a lo dispuesto en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, resulta sustancialmente contrario al principio de legalidad tributaria y reserva de ley. En ese sentido, valga citar lo resuelto por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en sentencia número 037-F-04 de las diez horas treinta y cinco minutos del 21 de enero del dos mil cuatro, que contrario a lo que afirma el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, respecto al supuesto mantenimiento de los alcances futuros de la exención genérica y subjetiva contenida en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449, estableció lo siguiente: “…El inciso l) del segundo artículo de la Ley 7293, excluye de la derogatoria a las exenciones otorgadas a las instituciones descentralizadas. Adicionalmente, en su artículo 63 el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (reformado por el ordinal 50 de la Ley Nº 7293) señala que no pueden haber reglas que concedan exoneraciones, de fecha anterior a aquella data en la que se crea el tributo, ergo, la exoneración no puede ser anterior al impuesto. Esta regla tiene efectos a partir de su promulgación, esto es, el 3 de abril de 1992. Bajo este predicado, instituciones descentralizadas como el ICE, a partir de ese momento, y hacia futuro, no pueden beneficiarse de exoneraciones tributarias creadas al amparo de normas anteriores a aquéllas en las que se regula el tributo y conservan las exoneraciones concedidas por normas anteriores a esa fecha. No debe perderse de vista que la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones, surge, entre otras cosas, con la finalidad de organizar la maraña de exenciones existentes a través de una elevada cantidad de leyes, sin embargo las restricciones a los beneficios que vinieron ostentando diversas actividades e instituciones, no pueden aplicarse con efecto retroactivo, por lo cual se mantienen las exoneraciones de impuesto concedidas antes de la entrada en vigencia de esa ley. En consecuencia la restricción del canon 63 ibídem sólo puede aplicar respecto de impuestos creados luego de esa data. Lo contrario entrañaría una repudiable aplicación retroactiva de la ley. Es justamente por estas razones, que la exoneración concedida a favor del ICE, no se ve afectada por la Ley N° 7283 de Tarifas e Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Tilarán, porque se promulgó en fecha anterior a la Ley Reguladora de todas las exoneraciones vigentes, y no es sino hasta este momento cuando mediante norma expresa, se prohíbe otorgar exenciones bajo el amparo de normas de vieja data. El supuesto de hecho previsto en la Ley 7283 sólo podría habérsele aplicado a la demandada, si la norma se promulga luego del 3 de abril de 1992. Así las cosas, por tratarse de un tributo anterior a la ley derogatoria de exoneraciones, el régimen de exención dispuesto en la ley de creación del Nombre9574 continuaba beneficiándolo en el momento de entrada en vigencia de la Ley N° 7283. Sostener lo contrario, se reitera, entrañaría una aplicación retroactiva del artículo 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, lo cual está vedado por disposición constitucional…” (el resaltado no es del original). En este caso, tal y como se analizó supra, afirmar que por las similitudes existentes entre el Impuesto Territorial y el Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles –principalmente en cuanto al objeto, la determinación de la base imponible, el sujeto beneficiado con el impuesto, y la naturaleza nacional del mismo-, la exención prevista en el artículo 4 de la Ley del Impuesto Territorial (reformado en ese sentido por el artículo 34 de la Ley 7293), se mantiene vigente en el tiempo a favor del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, a pesar de que fue derogada por el artículo 38 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, resulta sustancialmente contraria al principio de legalidad tributaria y reserva de ley en esa materia. Más aún, cuando el propio artículo 4 inciso a) de la Ley 7509 -que entró en vigencia el 19 de junio de 1995-, condicionó la no afectación al impuesto allí regulado, a que por ley especial se estableciera una exención –en los términos de los artículos 5 y 62 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, o sea, de manera expresa, concreta y clara- a los bienes inmuebles de las instituciones autónomas –que son los que nos interesan para este caso-, lo que no sucede en la especie, ya que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, la exención genérica subjetiva prevista en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido. Por las razones expuestas, este Tribunal no comparte los criterios vertidos en las sentencias 759-2010, 1037-2010 y 983-2010 dictadas por el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo, al resolver los recursos de apelación interpuestos contra la sentencia de primera instancia dictada en procesos ejecutivos incoados por las Municipalidades de Montes de Oro, Tilarán y San Carlos, contra el ICE, por supuestos adeudos del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles; toda vez que en éstas, se parte de que el inciso a) del artículo 4 de la Ley 7509 si contiene una exoneración a favor del Nombre9574 o de que ésta encuentra sustento en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449, sin analizar que los alcances de ésta última está condicionada a lo dispuesto en los artículos 5, 62 y 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimiento Tributarios. En síntesis, una vez derogada la Ley del Impuesto Territorial, no existe a partir del 19 de junio de 1995 (fecha de entrada en vigencia de la Ley 7509), una ley especial que otorgue al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, una exención expresa, clara y concreta conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 62 del Código de Normas Procedimientos Tributarios, que establezca que los inmuebles de la entidad recurrente no están afectos al Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles.

VII.- CON RELACIÓN A LO DISPUESTO EN EL ARTÍCULO 18 DE LA LEY 8660 PARA EL CASO CONCRETO. La Ley de Modernización y Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones (Ley 8660 que entró en vigencia a partir del 13 de agosto del 2008), establece en el artículo 18 que: “Artículo 18.- Tratamiento tributario. Cuando el Nombre9574 y sus empresas actúen como operadores o proveedores en mercados nacionales competitivos de servicios y productos de telecomunicaciones o de electricidad, estarán sujetos al pago de los impuestos sobre la renta y de ventas. En los demás casos, se mantendrán vigentes las exenciones conferidas en el Decreto Ley N° 449 de 8 de abril de 1949, así como a cualesquiera otras que les confiera el ordenamiento. Se excluye del pago del impuesto sobre la renta el servicio telefónico básico tradicional”. (el resaltado es agregado). La norma transcrita contiene dos supuestos esenciales en materia tributaria con relación al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad: i) La regla general es la exención del pago de tributos, en consecuencia, dicha entidad conserva la exención contenida en el Decreto Ley que lo crea y cualquier otra Ley que le otorgue exoneración. No obstante, de conformidad con los principios de reserva de ley y de legalidad tributaria, la exención prevista en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley número 449, queda limitada en sus alcances y vigencia, a lo dispuesto en los artículos 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política; 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 5, 62, 63 y 64 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; ii) La excepción referida a la obligación de pago de los impuestos de renta y de ventas, la cual, está condicionada a la existencia de un mercado competitivo. Ahora bien, cabe aclarar que la Ley 8660 entró en vigencia a partir del 13 de agosto de 2008, sin que pueda ser de aplicación retroactiva, por ende, las reglas tributarias, incluida la exención de impuestos rige a partir de esa fecha, aunque –se insiste- limitada en sus alcances y vigencia a lo dispuesto en los artículos 2, 62, 63 y 64 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Ello por cuanto, no podría sostenerse que el Nombre9574 recuperó una exención genérica, subjetiva y para tributos futuros –tal y como originalmente fue prevista en el numeral 20 del Decreto Ley 449-, toda vez que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley N° 7293 y, consecuentemente, de la reforma al Código Tributario, no puede pretender abarcar los tributos futuros, aún cuando así se haya establecido (ver en sentido similar, las resoluciones número 417-2012 de las catorce horas del once de octubre; 431-2012 de las catorce horas del dieciocho de octubre; 432-2012 de las catorce horas cinco minutos del dieciocho de octubre, todas del dos mil doce, dictadas por la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda). De tal manera, que lo dispuesto en el artículo 18 de la Ley 8660 no tiene la virtud de derogar para el caso concreto del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, lo dispuesto en los artículos 5, 62 y 63 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos, que desarrollan a nivel legal los principios de reserva de ley en materia tributaria y de legalidad, previstos en los artículos 11 y 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política, por lo que, la exención para los tributos que a futuro se establezcan, debe ser expresa y concreta en el texto de la ley, lo que no sucede en el caso del Impuesto de Bienes Inmuebles. En ese sentido, este Tribunal considera que no puede válidamente alegarse que el Nombre9574 recuperó la exención genérica, subjetiva y para tributos futuros, tal y como fue prevista en el numeral 20 del Decreto Ley 449, y que en consecuencia, al tratarse la Ley 8660 de una ley especial prevalece sobre una ley general (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios), toda vez que ello implicaría desaplicar para el caso concreto del Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, dos principios básico en materia tributaria, como lo son: i) Reserva de ley y Legalidad Tributaria, en el sentido de que la ley debe especificar las condiciones y los requisitos fijados para otorgarlas, los beneficiarios, las mercancías, los tributos que comprende, si es total o parcial, el plazo de su duración, y si al final o en el transcurso de dicho período se pueden liberar las mercancías o si deben liquidar los impuestos, o bien si se puede autorizar el traspaso a terceros y bajo qué condiciones (artículo 62 párrafo 1º del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios); ii) Igualdad ante el impuesto y las cargas públicas, pues aunque haya disposición expresa de la ley tributaria, la exención no se extiende a los tributos establecidos posteriormente a su creación –como en el caso de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles-, pues ello implicaría una limitación a futuro de la potestad tributaria del Estado, en detrimento de ese principio (artículo 18 in fine de la Constitución Política) . Cabe recordar, que el principio de inmunidad fiscal no resulta aplicable al caso concreto, pues aunque el Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles constituye un impuesto de carácter nacional, también lo es, que no hay una identidad entre el sujeto activo, el sujeto pasivo (ICE) y el sujeto beneficiario y además, competente para la recaudación y gestión del impuesto (Municipalidades), condición sine qua non para la aplicación de ese principio, toda vez que “… El principio de inmunidad fiscal libera al Estado de la obligación de pagar tributos creados por él. El sujeto activo de la obligación tributaria debe ser el mismo Estado. Sería ilógico un Estado creando tributos para cobrarse a sí mismo. El ente mayor asume una doble consideración de sujeto activo y pasivo de la relación jurídico tributaria cuya consecuencia sería la extinción de la obligación tributaria por confusión. De ahí la razón (artículo 49 del Código de normas y procedimientos tributarios) de establecer como causal de extinción de la obligación tributaria la confusión. Cuando el Estado pasa de ser sujeto activo a sujeto pasivo del tributo la obligación tributaria es inexistente pues no existe la relación intersubjetiva. Respecto del régimen municipal el principio de inmunidad fiscal del Estado es inoperante (…) Para que opere la inmunidad fiscal -por confusión- la identidad subjetiva debe ser plena…” (sentencia número 12-1994 dictada por la Sala Primera de la Corte, a las once horas del veinticinco de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro. El resaltado no es del original). Tan es así, que en el artículo 5 inciso a) párrafo 2º del Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, se establece que “…El Estado y las municipalidades no requieren la presentación de requisito alguno, puesto que por definición se encuentran no afectos…”. Cabe aclarar, que si bien es cierto, mediante sentencia número 2008-11210 de las quince horas del dieciséis de julio del dos mil ocho, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, se pronunció –entre otros aspectos- sobre la constitucionalidad del artículo 15 –en realidad 18- del proyecto “Ley de fortalecimiento y modernización de las Entidades Públicas del Sector de Telecomunicaciones”, que se tramitó en el expediente legislativo No. Placa1952; también lo es, que dicho pronunciamiento sólo se refirió al siguiente extremo: “…Llama poderosamente la atención a este Tribunal la argumentación de los consultantes, cuando resultan absolutamente consustanciales al Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho la potestad tributaria (artículo 121, inciso 13 de la Constitución Política) y el principio de igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas (artículos 18 y 33 constitucionales). Sin la potestad tributaria y el deber correlativo de toda persona de contribuir con los gastos públicos, los diversos entes públicos que brindan prestaciones positivas a los habitantes para erradicar las desigualdades reales y efectivas -propios y típicos de un Estado Social de Derecho-, no podrían ejercer sus funciones, cumplir con sus competencias y satisfacer el interés público, puesto que, les resultaría imposible contar con recursos públicos para tal efecto. El que se someta al Nombre9574 y sus empresas al pago del impuesto de ventas y de renta, en el marco de un mercado de las telecomunicaciones abierto, donde los actores -operadores de redes o prestadores de servicios- pueden ser de naturaleza pública o privada, evita cualquier distorsión o asimetría competitiva -que sí violenta el principio de igualdad-, que puede disuadir a otros sujetos para participar e invertir en ese segmento de la economía, extremo que sí impactaría negativamente en las opciones o libertad de elección del consumidor o usuario, el costo de los servicios o productos y el incremento de la productividad”. Aunado a lo anterior, es menester recordar que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 101 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, “…El dictamen de la Sala sólo será vinculante en cuanto establezca la existencia de trámites inconstitucionales del proyecto consultado…”. Por todo lo expuesto, este Tribunal considera que lo dispuesto en el artículo 18 de la Ley 8660, queda limitado en sus alcances y vigencia, a lo dispuesto en los artículos 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política; 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 5, 62, 63 y 64 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; lo cual implica, que el Nombre9574 no recuperó la exención genérica, subjetiva y para tributos futuros, tal y como fue prevista en el numeral 20 del Decreto Ley 449 y por ende, no puede servir de base para cumplir la condición prevista en el inciso a) del artículo 4 de la Ley 7509, como presupuesto para que sus inmuebles no queden afectos al Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles.

VIII.- ALGUNAS CONSIDERACIONES RESPECTO A LA INEMBARGABILIDAD DE LOS BIENES DE TITULARIDAD PÚBLICA DIRECTAMENTE VINCULADOS A SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS DE NATURALEZA ESENCIAL. Es menester indicar, que al tiempo de ejecutar el cobro de los montos que el Nombre9574 tenga pendientes de pago por concepto del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles -claro está, siempre y cuando no haya operado el plazo de prescripción previsto en el artículo 8 de la Ley número 7509 y que ésta haya sido alegada por la entidad agraviada-, las Municipalidades y demás operadores del derecho, deberán tener en consideración las reglas previstas en los artículos 261, 262 del Código Civil, y 169, 170 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, respecto de los bienes del Nombre9574 sobre los que puede o no ordenarse y practicarse embargo, para tales efectos. En ese sentido, mediante resolución número 019-2009-SVII dictada a las trece horas treinta minutos del doce de febrero del dos mil nueve, la Sección Sétima del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, consideró respecto al concepto de bienes de dominio público y privado de las administraciones públicas que: "(...) El Estado y las demás entidades públicas, poseen dos tipos de bienes: públicos y privados. El artículo 261 del Código Civil dispone: “Son cosas públicas las que, por ley, están destinadas de un modo permanente a cualquier servicio de utilidad general, y aquellas de que todos pueden aprovecharse por estar entregadas al uso público. Todas las demás cosas son privadas y objeto de propiedad particular, aunque pertenezcan al Estado a los Municipios, quienes para el caso, como personas civiles, no se diferencian de cualquier otra persona ”. Lo anterior debe relacionarse con el artículo 121 inciso 4) de la Constitución Política, que establece como atribución de la Asamblea Legislativa, decretar la enajenación o la aplicación a usos públicos de los bienes propios de la Nación”. Los bienes de dominio público se caracterizan por ser inalienables, imprescriptibles e inembargables, en consecuencia fuera del comercio de los hombres. Sobre el tema, la Sala Constitucional ha expresado: / “II.- EL CONCEPTO DEL DOMINIO PUBLICO Y DE LOS MEDIOS JURÍDICOS PARA INTEGRARLO.- Por dominio público se entiende el conjunto de bienes sujeto a un régimen jurídico especial y distinto al que rige el dominio privado, que además de pertenecer o estar bajo la administración de personas jurídicas públicas, están afectados o destinados a fines de utilidad pública y que se manifiesta en el uso directo o indirecto que toda persona pueda hacer de ellos. La doctrina reconoce el dominio público bajo diferentes acepciones, como bienes dominicales, bienes dominicales, cosas públicas, bienes públicos o bienes demaniales. Sobre este concepto la Sala ha expresó (sic) en su Sentencia No. 2306-91 de las 14:45 horas del seis de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y uno lo siguiente: / “El dominio público se encuentra integrado por bienes que manifiestan, por voluntad expresa del legislador, un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, al interés público. Son los llamados bienes dominicales, bienes demaniales, bienes o cosas públicas o bienes públicos, que no pertenecen individualmente a los particulares y que están destinados a un uso público y sometidos a un régimen especial, fuera del comercio de los hombres. Es decir, afectados por su propia naturaleza y vocación. En consecuencia, esos bienes pertenecen al Estado en el sentido más amplio del concepto, están afectados al servicio que prestan y que invariablemente es esencial en virtud de norma expresa. Notas características de estos bienes, es que son inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables, no pueden hipotecarse ni ser susceptibles de gravamen en los términos del Derecho Civil y la acción administrativa sustituye a los interdictos para recuperar el dominio...En consecuencia, el régimen patrio de los bienes de dominio público, como las vías de la Ciudad Capital, sean calles municipales o nacionales, aceras, parques y demás sitios públicos, los coloca fuera del comercio de los hombres...” (ver en sentido similar, la sentencia número 035-2009-SVII dictada por la Sección Sétima del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, a las catorce horas cuarenta minutos del trece de marzo del dos mil nueve). En consecuencia, serán embargables los bienes de dominio privado de la Administración que no se encuentren afectos a un fin público (artículo 169.1.a del CPCA). Por el contrario, no serán embargables los bienes de titularidad pública destinados al uso y aprovechamiento común, como tampoco aquellos vinculados directamente con la presentación de servicios públicos de naturaleza esencial –como por ejemplo: electricidad y telecomunicaciones-, o bien, que resulten indispensables o insustituibles para el cumplimiento de fines o servicios públicos (artículos 261 del Código Civil y 170 del CPCA).

IX.- COROLARIO. Por las razones dadas, este Tribunal rechaza el recurso de apelación planteado y confirma la resolución de las diez horas treinta minutos del diecinueve de abril del dos mil doce, dictada por el Alcalde Municipal de El Guarco, por no resultar sustancialmente contraria a lo dispuesto en los artículos 11, 18 in fine, 33, 121 inciso 13) de la Constitución Política; 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 20 del Decreto Ley 449; 2 inciso l); 35 y 50 de la Ley 7293; 4 inciso a) y 38 inciso a) de la Ley 7509; 5, 62, 63 y 54 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; 18 de la Ley 8860; 5 inciso a) párrafo 2º del Decreto Ejecutivo 27601-H. Ahora bien, dado que no fue objeto de los alegatos planteados en el recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio, interpuesto por el ente recurrido contra el acto impugnado (folios 141 a 145, 149 a 155 del expediente), este Tribunal no entra a determinar si algunos de los períodos cobrados por la Municipalidad de El Guarco, podrían encontrarse o no prescritos. Al no existir ulterior recurso en sede administrativa, se da por agotada la vía administrativa. Con el voto salvado de la jueza Solano Ulloa, quien acoge el recurso, anula la resolución impugnada y da por agotada la vía administrativa.-

POR TANTO.

Por las razones dadas, por mayoría se confirma la resolución de las diez horas treinta minutos del diecinueve de abril del dos mil doce, dictada por el Alcalde Municipal de El Guarco. Se da por agotada la vía administrativa. Con el voto salvado de la jueza Solano Ulloa, quien acoge el recurso, anula la resolución impugnada y da por agotada la vía administrativa.- Jorge Leiva Poveda Marianella Álvarez Molina Siria Carmona Castro Voto salvado de la Jueza Carmona Castro.

CONSIDERANDO

Con el respeto y consideración del caso, esta juzgadora se separa del voto de mayoría, propiamente respecto de los criterios sobre el fondo en el presente asunto esgrimidos por mis compañeros de Tribunal. Sobre este particular, se procede a exponer, de seguido, los fundamentos de Derecho con base en los cuales se estima que lo actuado por la Municipalidad de El Guarco debe ser anulado.

I.- SOBRE EL NACIMIENTO DE LA OBLIGACIÓN TRIBUTARIA. En el Derecho Tributario, más concretamente en la relación jurídico impositiva, estamos ante la presencia de dos tipos de sujetos activos y pasivos. El Sujeto activo es el Estado o algún ente público menor, el cual ostenta la llamada potestad de imperio, de la que deriva la potestad financiera (Artículo 14 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). El Estado es el sujeto activo primario, pero existen otros sujetos activos subprimarios o por delegación, como es el caso de las Municipalidades, las cuales cuentan con la potestad de crear tributos. La potestad tributaria es aquella facultad del Estado de obtener coactivamente de la esfera privada del contribuyente cierta cantidad de riqueza para financiar gastos públicos, y el sujeto pasivo es aquel al que la Ley le impone obligaciones y corresponde a quien se encuentra sometido a la potestad de imperio del Estado. Desde esta perspectiva, en términos muy generales se tiene que el contribuyente viene a ser aquella persona respecto de la cual se verifica el hecho generador de la obligación tributaria. Las obligaciones que asumen los contribuyentes, consisten principalmente en la prestación del tributo de las obligaciones tributarias sustanciales , siendo la fuente de la obligación tributaria el hecho generador, el cual puede surgir únicamente por mandato de una ley. La obligación sustancial o también llamada obligación principal, consiste en aquella prestación de carácter patrimonial, que vista desde una doble perspectiva puede ser expresada en una obligación de dar (el contribuyente) y recibir (el fisco). Sin embargo, también pesa sobre los sujetos pasivos la obligación de cumplir con los deberes formales o administrativos, los cuales son accesorios y giran en torno a la obligación principal, que surgen con la finalidad de facilitar su cumplimiento. (Artículo 18 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios). Es la Ley la que, en aras de la satisfacción de un interés público superior, destinado al cumplimiento de las obligaciones estatales, somete al contribuyente a un régimen de obligaciones adicionales. Las cargas que sopesan sobre el contribuyente, por su sola razón de ser tal, son impuestas por Ley, el cual debe hacer ceder su esfera de intereses particulares en favor de un interés público superior. Su obligación deriva de un factor totalmente ajeno a la voluntad de la Administración Tributaria, pues su simple condición de contribuyente lo somete al régimen formal de obligaciones y deberes que trascienden la esfera estrictamente pecuniaria.

II.SOBRE LOS BENEFICIOS FISCALES Y SU CREACIÓN. Existen políticas estatales por medio de las cuales se crean excepciones a la aplicación de los tributos, dentro de los que se encuentran los beneficios fiscales, entendidos como la concesión de una medida fiscal proteccionista, que puede comprender diversos mecanismos o manifestaciones, tales como las exoneraciones fiscales o el otorgamiento de subvenciones de diversa índole, como por ejemplo, el otorgamiento de bonos del Estado para determinadas actividades (productivas o culturales), el acceso a créditos oficiales con tasas de interés reducidas y plazos dilatorios de amortización, las franquicias aduaneras, etcétera. Se trata entonces de " medidas de apoyo o estímulo instrumental a través de un mecanismo desgravatorio del tributo" (SOLER ROCH,M.T. Incentivos a la inversión y justicia tributaria , Civitas, Madrid, 1983, p.20), dentro de los que encontramos el típico caso de las deducciones por inversiones o creación de empleo, los Certificados de Abono Tributario (CATs), y dentro de los que encajan, por excelencia, las exoneraciones tributarias. Específicamente con las exoneraciones, se busca impedir el nacimiento de la obligación tributaria -exención total-, o reducir la cuantía del tributo -exención parcial-, a través de bonificaciones o deducciones ante ciertos supuestos de hecho incluidos en el ámbito del hecho imponible cuya realización no da lugar al surgimiento de la obligación tributaria de pago, constituyendo una excepción a los efectos normales derivados de la realización de aquel. La norma de exención del tributo tiene la fuerza de enervar los efectos de la que lo crea, pues afecta, o al elemento subjetivo u objetivo del hecho imponible, o los elementos de cuantificación del tributo, o sea, en la base imponible (deducciones y reducciones) o en el tipo de gravamen. La teoría clásica de la exención define las exoneraciones como una dispensa legal de la obligación tributaria, sea como una derogación de la obligación de pago, no obstante producirse el hecho imponible, que es el efecto que producen, sea la excepción de la obligación de contribuir con los gastos públicos determinados sujetos (exoneración subjetiva), o a determinadas situaciones o hechos (exoneración objetiva). Así, la exención tributaria tiene lugar cuando una norma contempla que en aquellos supuestos expresamente previstos por ella, no obstante producirse el hecho imponible, no se desarrolla su efecto principal: el deber de pagar el tributo u obligación tributaria.

III.- SOBRE LA EXONERACIÓN DEL PAGO DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE BIENES INMUEBLES EN BENEFICIO DEL INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ELECTRICIDAD. SOBRE LA VOLUNTAD DEL LEGISLADOR. El gravamen sobre la titularidad de bienes inmuebles existe desde vieja data, pues fue creado desde la ya derogada Ley de Impuesto Territorial del N° 27 del 2 de marzo de 1939 y sus reformas. En artículo 4 de esa misma ley, se dispuso la exención genérica subjetiva en favor del ICE, al disponer lo siguiente:

"Artículo 4.- No sujeciones. No están afectos a este impuesto, los inmuebles propiedad de:

- El Poder Legislativo; el Poder Ejecutivo; el Poder Judicial; el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y las municipalidades.

- Las Juntas de Educación, las estaciones radiotelegráficas y radiotelefónicas públicas.

- El Servicio Nacional de Electricidad.

- El Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas (IICA) y los miembros de su personal que no sean ciudadanos costarricenses.

- La Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.

- El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad..." Posteriormente, el Decreto Ley 449 del 08 de abril de 1949, reafirmó la exención ya vigente a favor del ICE, en en tanto dispuso que:

"Artículo 20.- El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad está exento del pago de impuestos nacionales y municipales y goza de franquicia postal y telegráfica." (Así adicionado por el artículo 1 de la Ley 764 de 25 de octubre de 1949.)

El 3 de mayo de 1971, entró en vigencia el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, creándose nuevas regulaciones en el artículo 62 para las exenciones, pues el texto original de ordinal dispuso:

"Artículo 62.- Condiciones y requisitos exigidos. La ley que establezca exenciones debe especificar las condiciones y requisitos exigidos para su otorgamiento, los tributos que comprende, si es total o parcial y, en su caso, el plazo de su duración." (Nota: esta norma fue reformada posteriormente por el artículo 1º de la ley No.7900 de 3 de agosto de 1999, y por el artículo 1° de la ley N° 9069 del 10 de setiembre del 2012, "Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Tributaria" quedando su texto actual como se indica seguidamente:

"Artículo 62.- Condiciones y requisitos exigidos La ley que contemple exenciones debe especificar las condiciones y los requisitos fijados para otorgarlas, los beneficiarios, las mercancías, los tributos que comprende, si es total o parcial, el plazo de su duración, y si al final o en el transcurso de dicho período se pueden liberar las mercancías o si deben liquidar los impuestos, o bien si se puede autorizar el traspaso a terceros y bajo qué condiciones.

En todos los casos, las personas físicas o jurídicas que soliciten exenciones deberán estar al día en el pago de los impuestos que administre la Administración Tributaria del Ministerio de Hacienda, como condición para su otorgamiento." ) En el Transitorio 169 inciso c) de ese Código, se realizaron varias derogatorias expresas de la Ley de Impuesto Territorial, mas ninguna modificó el numeral 4 creador de la exención en favor del ICE. Entiende esta juzgadora que, de haber existido la voluntad en el seno legislativo tendiente a derogar dicha exoneración, bien lo hubiera dispuesto en tal sentido el legislador, mas ello no ocurrió, permitiendo entonces la coexistencia de la regulación contenida en el artículo 62 y la vigencia y aplicación de la norma creadora del beneficio en favor del ICE. Inclusive, la exención del pago del impuesto territorial sobrevivió a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley Reguladora de Todas las Exoneraciones Vigentes, su Derogatoria y sus Excepciones -Ley 7293 vigente desde el 3 de abril de 1992-, pues el mismo artículo 34 así dispuso expresamente. Tres años después, se promulga la Ley de Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles -Ley N° 7509 del 9 de mayo de 1995, vigente a partir del 19 de junio de ese mismo año-, mediante la cual se deroga la Ley del Impuesto Territorial, en la que se preservan los elementos del impuesto territorial (hecho generador y sujetos activo y pasivo), pero se reforma todo lo concerniente a la gestión, administración y utilización del mismo impuesto. O sea, no se trató de un nuevo tributo, pues éste ya existía desde años atrás. Sin embargo, respecto de las exenciones, dispuso lo siguiente:

"Artículo 4.- Inmuebles no afectos al impuesto. No están afectos a este impuesto:

• a)Los inmuebles del Estado, las municipalidades, las instituciones autónomas y semiautónomas que, por ley especial, gocen de exención..." Como se aprecia, en esa norma el legislador previó que, para los efectos de las instituciones autónomas, se daría una permanencia de las exenciones dispuestas en leyes especiales. En lo que se refiere al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, aún con la derogatoria de la Ley del Impuesto Territorial, preexistía el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449 del 08 de abril de 1949 anteriormente transcrito, norma especial que introdujo una exención genérica de carácter subjetivo en virtud de la institución a la que se dirige, respecto de todos los impuestos nacionales y municipales. Si el impuesto no era nuevo, por ende, la exención tampoco lo era, y ella no ha sido declarada inconstitucional, por lo que mantiene su vigencia, estimándose necesaria una derogación expresa por parte del mismo legislador que la creó, a efecto de eliminar su eficacia, en aplicación de los principios de reserva de ley en materia tributaria y paralelismo de las formas. Este análisis histórico del desarrollo normativo, si bien útil y necesario para contextualizar el desenvolvimiento del tributo y su exención, desemboca hoy día en la principal norma que rige la materia, contenida en la Ley de Modernización y Fortalecimiento de las Entidades Públicas del Sector Telecomunicaciones -Ley 8660 que entró en vigencia a partir del 13 de agosto del 2008- , nacida dentro del marco normativo exigido por el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Unidos de América, en donde el legislador, mediante una ley posterior, retoma expresamente las vigencia de todas las exoneraciones del ICE, haciendo la salvedad expresa del impuesto sobre la renta y ventas, imponiéndole por primera vez, el pago de estos dos únicos tributos. Al respecto, se transcribe la norma:

"Artículo 18. Tratamiento tributario.

Cuando el Nombre9574 y sus empresas actúen como operadores o proveedores en mercados nacionales competitivos de servicios y productos de telecomunicaciones o de electricidad, estarán sujetos al pago de los impuestos sobre la renta y de ventas. En los demás casos, se mantendrán vigentes las exenciones conferidas en el Decreto Ley No. 449, de 8 de abril de 1949, así como cualesquiera otras que les confiera el ordenamiento..." (El resaltado es agregado).

La aplicación de esta norma es inmediata a su vigencia y, a pesar de que la exención contenida en el Decreto Ley es amplia, genérica y subjetiva en función de la especialidad de la Institución a la que se dirige, su aplicación es definitivamente vinculante en razón de que el artículo 18 de cita, es norma especial y posterior al Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Interpretar que lo dispuesto en esta norma se encuentra limitado en sus alcances y vigencia a lo establecido en el numeral 62 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tribuntarios, tiene varios e importantes cuestionamientos que, a criterio de quien suscribe, resultan contrarios al sistema democrático del estado costarricense y se analizan de seguido. Primero, porque en el proceso de formación de la Ley, el Poder Legislativo encuentra sus límites únicamente en el texto constitucional y en los reglamentos que regulan los procedimientos para la formación de la ley, de donde se desprende que no se puede entender que la norma dispuesta en el artículo 62 de cita sea una condicionante a la potestad de dictar y reformar la ley tributaria que ostenta la Asamblea Legislativa, aún cuando sea en sentido diverso. Segundo, porque hacer eso sería es desconocer la voluntad expresa del legislador quien, conforme el artículo 105 constitucional, asume dicha potestad por delegación del pueblo sin sujeción a limitaciones -salvo el caso de los tratados-, en ejercicio pleno y legítimo de la representación popular. Por ende, si en el actual entorno histórico de apertura de mercados y competitividad comercial, el legislador optó por mantener tales beneficios fiscales al Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, dado que ha sido y sigue siendo, el principal proveedor a nivel nacional, de servicios públicos indispensables, tal voluntad legislativa debe ser respetada. Considerar lo contrario es desconocer el contenido de una "ley tributaria sustantiva", nacida bajo el amparo de una "ley formal" que deriva del ejercicio del poder legislador, que responde a las exigencias coyunturales de redefinición de conceptos comerciales e institucionales patrios, como consecuencia de las recientes exigencias de la política económica, con plenas potestades para puntualizar el esquema tributario nacional y los incentivos y beneficios que provee, incluyéndose esta clase de exclusiones tributarias. Tercero, porque la letra de la norma es clara y precisa, vinculando a las autoridades municipales y a esta jerarquía impropia a su aplicación, no pudiéndose hacer interpretaciones e integraciones normativas en sentido contrario, pues ello iría en contra de los numerales 9 inciso 2) y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, mediante los cuales se somete a la Administración al ordenamiento jurídico y se prohíbe la desaplicación de la norma administrativa para casos concretos. En esto se concreta y resume la diferencia sustancial con el criterio de mayoría de este Voto, pues no estamos, ni siquiera, ante un supuestos de incompatibilidad o antinomia normativa, dado que no se puede concebir, en este caso, que estemos en presencia de dos disposiciones vigentes de igual rango que regulen en forma contradictoria un mismo supuesto de hecho. Queda claro entonces que la legislación vigente y aplicable es la contenida en los ordinales 18 de la Ley 8660, que remite a su vez a la aplicación de las exoneraciones contenidas en el artículo 20 del Decreto Ley 449, por lo que no queda más que concluir que el Nombre9574 sí está exento del pago del Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles, por lo que los agravios expresados por su representación son de recibo. Por ende, se aprecian vicios de nulidad absoluta en lo resuelto en la resolución de las diez horas treinta minutos del diecinueve de abril del dos mil doce, dictada por el Alcalde Municipal de El Guarco, en el tanto dispuso mantener el cobro de dicho impuesto al ICE, motivo por el cual dicho acto administrativo debe ser anulado en este acto, por transgresión al bloque de legalidad en su fundamentación y contenido. No habiendo ulterior recurso, debe darse por agotada la vía administrativa.

POR TANTO

Se anula la resolución de las diez horas treinta minutos del diecinueve de abril del dos mil doce, dictada por el Alcalde Municipal de El Guarco. Se da por agotada la vía administrativa.

Siria Carmona Castro ASUNTO: Apelación Municipal ACCIONANTE: Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad RECURRIDO: Municipalidad de El Guarco.