Nullity of camouflaged dismissal under the guise of restructuringNulidad de despido encubierto bajo pretexto de reestructuración

*000092880166LA* *000092880166LA* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2009-001257 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at nine forty in the morning on the fourth of December, two thousand nine.

Ordinary proceeding (Proceso ordinario) filed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Nombre1], against the BANCO CENTRAL DE COSTA RICA, represented by its general agent (apoderado generalísimo) Roy González Rojas, Master in Business Administration, EDUARDO LIZANO FAIT, Licentiate in Economic Sciences, [Nombre2] civil engineer, and the SUPERINTENDENCIA GENERAL DE ENTIDADES FINANCIERAS, represented by its superintendent Francisco Lay Solano. Acting as special judicial attorneys (apoderados especiales judiciales); for the plaintiff, attorney Luis Ricardo Bogantes Villegas, resident of Alajuela; and for the defendant [Nombre2], attorney Karoll Molina Chaves. All are of legal age, married, lawyers, and residents of San José, with the exceptions noted.

RESULTANDO:

1.- The plaintiff, in a document dated the twenty-second of December, two thousand, brought the present action so that in judgment: 1) That this ordinary labor complaint be granted. 2) That since the dismissal of the undersigned was a "disguised" dismissal, given that the alleged cause does not exist, as the restructuring process does not comply with the postulates and legal requirements, the undersigned BE REINSTATED IN HER POSITION AND IN FULL ENJOYMENT OF HER LABOR RIGHTS. 3) That failing that, since the Banco Central, with its arbitrary and threatening attitude toward all the undersigned's labor rights and guarantees, has caused me damages of irreparable consideration, not only in the economic sphere, but also social, labor, and moral, preventing me, without any justification, from exercising my right to work that I efficiently performed for 23 years, the back pay (salarios caídos) from the moment of the undersigned's termination and the corresponding interest be paid to the undersigned as damages, until the time when the resolution approving my claims becomes final and is implemented. 4) In the alternative, in the event that the main petition is declared without merit, the present request be granted that the complementary amounts corresponding to the year worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, which was not recognized to me, be paid, plus the corresponding interest as of the date of payment. 5) That the sums over-withheld be returned to me, due to the Banco Central de Costa Rica's incorrect application of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta), and the corresponding legal interest, from the date these withholdings began and throughout the entire time the law was misapplied, plus the corresponding interest up to the date of its effective payment. 5) (sic) That the salary adjustment, implemented at the Banco Central de Costa Rica via job classification standardization (homologación), and the legal interest, be granted to me. 6) That I be recognized the equivalent of the 10% salary contribution for the Fondo de Garantías, which I had been enjoying by having started working at the Banco Central before November 1995, and its legal interest, given that the provisions of the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica (Ley 7558) were eliminated with retroactive effect to my detriment, that is, from November 1995 to the date of resolution of this request, plus the legal interest. 7) That the proportional part to which I am entitled be returned to me of the reserve for potential lawsuits of ¢125 million colones agreed by the Administrative Board of the Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco Central de Costa Rica, for not being in accordance with the law, and the respective legal interest. 8) That I be paid the unpaid difference corresponding to 6.49%, given that the BCCR Board of Directors approved a general salary increase of 11.49% to the base for cost-of-living increase for all employees of the Banco Central de Costa Rica and its decentralized bodies, effective July 1, 1995. That the Banco must make the salary recognition of 6.49%, which will be calculated on the base salary, from July 1, 1995, and its future salary incorporation. The legal interest be paid to me, as it became due and up to its effective payment. The existing differences be paid for the non-incorporation into the base salary of 6.49%, in relation to each and every one of the bonuses or components that make up my salary, as of July first, 1995, and as they became due. 9) That I be paid the equivalent of 65% of the salary as a prohibition (prohibición) benefit, from April 17, 2000, to the date of its effective payment, including legal interest, and the corresponding salary adjustments be made. 10) Plus the readjustment in the calculation of the severance pay (cesantía) that the salary recognitions favor me. 11) That the Banco Central de Costa Rica and jointly and severally, Engineer [Nombre2], in his capacity as Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, be ordered to pay back pay and interest as damages plus both procedural and personal legal costs (costas procesales y personales).

2.- The defendant [Nombre2], in his personal capacity, as Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, and as general agent (apoderado generalísimo) of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, answered the action in the terms he indicated in the brief dated March nineteenth, two thousand one, and raised the defenses (excepciones) of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of passive legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), the generic one of sine actione agit, and what he called lack of cause (falta de causa). For his part, the co-defendant [Nombre3] answered the litis in an extemporaneous manner.

3.- The judge, attorney Pedro Ubau Hernández, by judgment at ten hours and two minutes on the nineteenth of December, two thousand five, ordered: In accordance with the stated grounds, legal citations, and cited case law, the present ordinary complaint filed by [Nombre1] against BANCO CENTRAL DE COSTA RICA, [Nombre2], AND [Nombre3] is declared WITHOUT MERIT in all its claims. The defenses of lack of right, lack of passive legal standing, lack of cause, and the generic one of sine actione agit are upheld. This matter is resolved without special award of legal costs (costas) in accordance with articles 222 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) in relation to article 452 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). The parties are advised that this judgment admits the appeal (recurso de apelación), which must set forth, verbally or in writing, the factual or legal grounds on which the appealing party bases its disagreement; under warning of declaring the appeal inadmissible (article 500 and 501 subsection c) and d); votes of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) numbers 5798, at 16:21 hours, of August 11, 1998, and 1306 at 16:27 hours of February 23, 1999, and vote of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) number 386, at 14:20 hours, of December 10, 1999) (circular of the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court of Justice n° 79-2001).

4.- The plaintiff appealed, and the Labor Tribunal, Fourth Section, of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, composed of attorneys Óscar Ugalde Miranda, Álvaro Moya Arias, and Nelson Rodríguez Jiménez, by judgment at eighteen hours and fifty-five minutes on the seventeenth of November, two thousand six, resolved: It is declared that in the processing of this matter, no omission is noted that could have caused nullity (nulidad) or defenselessness (indefensión). The appealed judgment is revoked, and the Banco Central de Costa Rica is ordered to reinstate the appellant [Nombre1] to the position she held at the time of the dismissal she was subjected to, and must pay her the wages she failed to receive since the twenty-third of June of the year two thousand, with interest from the due date of each sum until effective payment. The quantum of these items shall be determined in the execution of judgment (ejecución de sentencia). The defenses of lack of right, lack of passive legal standing, lack of cause, and the generic one of sine actione agit are rejected. Both legal costs (costas) are to be borne by the defendant bank, with the personal costs being set at the prudential sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones.

5.- The Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and the plaintiff filed appeals (recursos) before this Chamber in briefs dated the twenty-first of February and the fourth of July, both of two thousand seven, which are based on the grounds that will be stated in the considerative part.

6.- The legal requirements have been observed in the proceedings.

Judge Aguirre Gómez writes; and,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- The plaintiff filed the lawsuit so that the dismissal to which she was subjected be declared null, as well as for: “1) That this ordinary labor complaint be granted. 2) That since the dismissal of the undersigned was a "disguised" dismissal, given that the alleged cause does not exist, as the restructuring process does not comply with the postulates and legal requirements, the undersigned BE REINSTATED IN HER POSITION AND IN FULL ENJOYMENT OF HER LABOR RIGHTS. 3) That failing that, since the Banco Central, with its arbitrary and threatening attitude toward all the undersigned's labor rights and guarantees, has caused me damages of irreparable consideration, not only in the economic sphere, but also social, labor, and moral, preventing me, without any justification, from exercising my right to work that I efficiently performed for 23 years, the back pay from the moment of the undersigned's termination and the corresponding interest be paid to the undersigned as damages, until the time when the resolution approving my claims becomes final and is implemented. 4) In the alternative, in the event that the main petition is declared without merit, the present request be granted that the complementary amounts corresponding to the year worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, which was not recognized to me, be paid, plus the corresponding interest as of the date of payment. 5) That the sums over-withheld be returned to me, due to the Banco Central de Costa Rica's incorrect application of the Income Tax Law, and the corresponding legal interest, from the date these withholdings began and throughout the entire time the law was misapplied, plus the corresponding interest up to the date of its effective payment. 5) That the salary adjustment, implemented at the Banco Central de Costa Rica via job classification standardization, and the legal interest, be granted to me. 6) That I be recognized the equivalent of the 10% salary contribution for the Fondo de Garantías, which I had been enjoying by having started working at the Banco Central before November 1995, and its legal interest, given that the provisions of the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica (Ley 7558) were eliminated with retroactive effect to my detriment, that is, from November 1995 to the date of resolution of this request, plus the legal interest. 7) That the proportional part to which I am entitled be returned to me of the reserve for potential lawsuits of ¢ 125 million colones agreed by the Administrative Board of the Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco Central de Costa Rica, for not being in accordance with the law, and the respective legal interest. 8) That I be paid the unpaid difference corresponding to 6.49%, given that the BCCR Board of Directors approved a general salary increase of 11.49% to the base for cost-of-living increase for all employees of the Banco Central de Costa Rica and its decentralized bodies, effective July 1, 1995. That the Banco must make the salary recognition of 6.49%, which will be calculated on the base salary, from July 1, 1995, and its future salary incorporation. The legal interest be paid to me, as it became due and up to its effective payment. The existing differences be paid for the non-incorporation into the base salary of 6.49%, in relation to each and every one of the bonuses or components that make up my salary, as of July first, 1995, and as they became due. 9) That I be paid the equivalent of 65% of the salary as a prohibition benefit, from April 17, 2000, to the date of its effective payment, including legal interest, and the corresponding salary adjustments be made. 10) Plus the readjustment in the calculation of the severance pay that the salary recognitions favor me. 11) That the Banco Central de Costa Rica and jointly and severally, Engineer [Nombre2], in his capacity as Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, be ordered to pay back pay and interest as damages plus both procedural and personal legal costs". As she indicated, she worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal from June 23, 1976, to April 31, 1977, when she resigned, and for the Banco Central de Costa Rica from the following May 1st to June 23, 2000, the date on which she was terminated due to administrative restructuring. She stated she had received her legal benefits under protest on July 27, 2000, calculated on the time served at the bank but not that worked at other Public Sector institutions (folios 1 to 33). Bernardo Alfaro Araya answered the complaint negatively, in his personal capacity and as general agent of the Banco Central de Costa Rica for the matters of the Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, raising the defenses of lack of right, lack of passive legal standing, lack of cause, and the generic one of sine actione agit. Eduardo Lizano Fait, in his personal capacity and as general agent of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, answered the complaint negatively in an extemporaneous manner (folios 42 to 70 and 121 to 161). The trial court upheld the defenses raised, declared the complaint without merit in all its claims, and resolved the matter without a special award of legal costs (folios 399 to 409). The plaintiff appealed the ruling, and the tribunal revoked the appealed judgment, denied the defenses raised, and ordered the Banco Central de Costa Rica to reinstate the plaintiff to the position she held at the time of dismissal, with the wages she failed to receive since June 23, 2000, to pay her the prohibition benefit item she stopped receiving since April 17, 2000, until it is applied to the salary, as well as the interest from the due date of each sum until effective payment, the quantum of which will be determined in the execution of judgment, with legal costs to be borne by the defendant bank, fixing the personal costs at the prudential sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones (folios 416 to 448, 580 to 593, and 614 to 618).

II.- The Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and the plaintiff are dissatisfied with what was resolved by the ad-quem; the former because the ruling of the a-quo was revoked and the Banco Central de Costa Rica was ordered to reinstate the plaintiff to the position she held when she was dismissed, to pay her what she stopped receiving since June 23, 2000, as well as the prohibition benefit item she stopped receiving since April 17, 2000, until it is applied to the salary, with interest from the due date of each sum until effective payment and both legal costs of the proceeding. It reproaches the finding that the plaintiff was illegitimately dismissed, since her termination was the product of an administrative reorganization or restructuring carried out by the Sugef, supported by real needs and technical studies that gave backing and solidity to the decision, approved by the Consejo Nacional de la Supervisión del Sistema Financiero and by the Board of Directors of the Banco Central de Costa Rica. It accuses the tribunal of having made an inadequate assessment of the evidence provided in the record, by questioning the validity and legality of the restructuring process that it has endorsed in identical cases. It considers irrelevant that the tribunal concluded "that the plaintiff was dismissed without an immediate elimination of her position and that another professional was appointed in her place, whereby it is clearly established that the restructuring was used as an excuse or pretext to dismiss the plaintiff". It points out that Article 192 of the Constitution establishes that the dismissal of an administrative official is justified by: a) forced reduction of services, b) lack of funds, and c) to achieve a better reorganization, so the tribunal made an erroneous assessment of the evidence by stating that the dismissal was illegitimate, because the elimination of the plaintiff's position occurred only some months after the dismissal — as another professional had been hired to occupy a position similar to the one she occupied —, when forced reduction is not the only assumption contemplated by Constitutional Article 192 to justify removal in the event of restructuring, and the process approved for the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras was based not only on a forced reduction of services, but also on a series of technical studies that established the ideal profile of the organization and of each of the positions to achieve greater efficiency and adaptation to the needs of the Financial System. It indicates that after applying all the procedures approved for the restructuring, the plaintiff was not found suitable to occupy the position she had been performing, because despite meeting the academic requirements, she did not meet the capacity and suitability required for the new structure, hence, if she was not fit to occupy the position she was to perform in the new structure, it was illogical to have to wait a prolonged time to refill the position she left vacant, so that, as with other positions that were in that situation, the necessary procedures were carried out to fill them with those who met the required profiles within the Banco Central and its decentralized bodies, through personnel recruitment evaluating the suitability, merit, and capacity of the offerors, for which reason about three months after the plaintiff's dismissal, professionals were hired to be incorporated into functional areas of the Superintendencia, including the legal professional for the Department of Legal Counsel (Departamento de Asesoría Jurídica). It qualifies the reasoning of the ad-quem as erroneous in deeming the dismissal illegal and arbitrary, and above all, the consideration of that tribunal as wrong in estimating that "the restructuring process was used as a pretext to dismiss the plaintiff" and hire a new person, especially when with said process approximately 75 people left the institution through voluntary mobility or dismissal. It reiterates that the termination at issue was not based on an elimination of positions, but rather was due to the fact that once the suitability tests of the officials were carried out, the plaintiff was found not suitable for the position she had been occupying as she did not fit the profile required for the new structure. It denies that the dismissal was illegal because there was no reduction of positions or because a new person was subsequently appointed to a similar position in the Legal Directorate (Dirección Legal) of the Superintendencia, because in restructuring processes where the aim, based on technical studies, is to improve the organization's performance, an official who does not meet the new profile defined for the position they had been occupying can be dismissed, so it cannot be affirmed that if a person is dismissed for not meeting said profile, it is a disguised dismissal or a discriminatory act, but rather a situation in which the employee does not meet the profile required for better performance in the organization, which empowers the employer to dispense with their services with the respective payment of all their labor rights. It points out that the tribunal erred in the appreciation of the facts and evidence adduced to the file, by considering that the restructuring process that served as the basis for the dismissal did not contemplate the Legal Counsel area, when the process approved by the competent bodies comprised all the administrative areas of the Superintendencia, including Legal Counsel. It alleges that the restructuring implied a change in the requirements of the Legal Counsel officials, which was evaluated through technical tests carried out for this purpose by prestigious companies with recognized experience hired for that end. It argues that the results of the tests applied to the plaintiff were not satisfactory, so that by not proving her suitability for the position according to the new structure, based on the comprehensive evaluation of criteria such as academic record, previous experience, the immediate supervisor's evaluation (forced ranking), and interviews, her services were dispensed with, so the plaintiff's dismissal cannot be considered unjustified. It maintains that the reasoning regarding the payment of the prohibition benefit is incorrect, since for the officials of the Auditoría General de Bancos, now Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, the benefit originally established in Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, was granted to them based on budget laws 6982 of December 19, 1984, article 14; 7015 of November 22, 1985, article 101; and 7018 of December 20, 1985, article 14, item 17), and not based on article 8 of session 4621-92 held by the Board of Directors of the Banco Central on December 9, 1992, which referred to article 27 of the collective agreement (convenio de partes) — regulations annulled by votes number 1962-92 and 3285-92 of the Constitutional Chamber —. It points out that those budget norms annulled by the Constitutional Chamber through vote 4647 of June 16, 1999, did not give economic content to the prohibition payment as the tribunal erroneously understood, but rather they amended Law 5867, extending the recognition of that regime to the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos (today Sugef). It accuses that in this case there was no administrative act that could be the object of a process of evident and manifest absolute nullity (article 173 of the General Law on Public Administration, Ley General de la Administración Pública) or of lesivity (lesividad) (articles 10 and 35 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), because such processes are designed for the nullity of administrative acts that declare rights or that produce legal effects, and the prohibition regime that covered the plaintiff as an official of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras was established by the budget norms declared unconstitutional by vote 4647-99, therefore one cannot speak of the annulment of any administrative act, since the regime had legislative not administrative support, hence the elimination of the prohibition regime in that dependency of the Banco Central was not something whimsical and arbitrary as the tribunal erroneously qualifies it. It notes that the prohibition is a technical requirement and condition inherent to the position, which imposes on its holder the duty not to exercise their profession or trade for the benefit of third parties — which in certain cases provided for by law, confers the correlative right to the payment of economic compensation for such limitation —, and given the public interest on which the prohibition is based, the State has the power to change such a situation, before which the interested parties cannot claim acquired rights to the permanence of the previous legal situation, that is, that there cannot be an acquired right to the immutability of the regime. It alludes that upon being obligated, the issuing entity, to eliminate the prohibition payment, it decided to compensate the loss of that item by decreeing an increase in basic salaries and modifying the salary scales into six categories, in order to thus maintain a competitive position in the institution's remunerations. It refers that the economic compensation for prohibition enjoyed by the employees of the SUGEF ceased in execution of the judgments or votes of the Constitutional Chamber No. 4647 at 16:20 hours on June 16, 1999, and No. 6327 at 10:03 hours on August 13, 1999, which declared unconstitutional and annulled the budget norms that had given legal support to the regime, an annulment that is retroactive to their entry into force without prejudice to good faith rights acquired under their protection. For that party, such rights comprise the payments definitively incorporated into the holder's patrimonial sphere, so that only those effectively received during the validity of the annulled budget regulations can be considered acquired rights, that is, that when the norms on which the prohibition payment was based are declared unconstitutional, the acquired rights consist of not having to repay what was paid for such concept, since after said declaration, what was appropriate was the immediate cessation of the payment of the prohibition compensation that had been made based on the cited norms, without being able to claim any acquired right to continue earning that benefit in the terms that had been done before the declaration of nullity, because it would constitute a breach of the principle of legality, as there is no legal norm justifying its payment. It affirms that the plaintiff and the ad-quem incur in error by estimating that the prohibition was eliminated in an arbitrary and illegal manner and that there was a defect due to lack of due process. With these arguments, it seeks the reversal of the challenged ruling and that the first-instance judgment be confirmed in its entirety. The plaintiff is dissatisfied because she was denied what she calls a typical increase or salary adjustment implemented by the Banco Central de Costa Rica via job classification standardization of the position classes, discriminating against the category 16 position she occupied in the Legal Counsel of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, despite its application being of a general nature, for which reason, in her understanding, the Board of Directors' agreement that did not standardize the referred position with a higher category is illegal. She also objects to the denial of the recognition of the bank's contribution of 10% of salary for the maintenance of the Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones, which was eliminated by the repeal ordered in Law No. 7558 of November 13, 1995, which meant the elimination of a right that is incorporated into her employment contract. She reproaches the setting of the amount of two hundred fifty thousand colones for personal legal costs, for not conforming to the complexity of the proceeding, to what was granted, and to the economic position of the parties, pointing out that an amount for this concept should be set ranging between 15% and 25% of what was estimated. She alleges that Article 495 of the Labor Code was violated due to lack of application or erroneous interpretation, and therefore requests that the setting be made on a percentage basis. Based on these arguments, she seeks the reversal of the challenged ruling in the appealed portion and that, instead, the petitioned claims be granted in the terms originally requested, maintaining what was resolved in what was granted (folios 626 to 647, 677 to 709, and 664 to 675).

III.- The dismissal of the plaintiff was justified on the basis of a process of organizational and human resource restructuring of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero in session No. 124-99, article 6, of November 9, 1999, and by the Board of Directors of the Banco Central de Costa Rica in session No. 5014-99, article 5, of November 12, 1999 (complaint, answer, and evidence No. 6 of the administrative file). As a fundamental principle of the public employment regime, Article 192 of the Constitution instituted the so-called “right to stability in employment,” which has been conceived as the right of the public employee to retain their position and to lose it only in the event of incurring one of the causes for dismissal established by labor legislation or when a forced reduction of services is necessary due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the service. Regarding banking employees, article 41, subsection 6) of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional), expressly recognizes in their favor the minimum benefits contemplated in the labor and civil service laws of the Republic, which results in the application in their favor of the rights contemplated by the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil). Article 43 of that statute establishes the removal of employees covered by that regulation only when they incur the causes contemplated in article 81 of the Labor Code and 41, subsection d), of that law, or in acts that imply a serious infraction of such regulation, its regulations, or the respective internal work regulations.

That law also contemplates the possibility of removal in those cases where a forced reduction of services becomes necessary due to an absolute lack of funds; or to achieve a more efficient and economical reorganization of the same, provided that said reorganization affects at least 60% of the employees of the respective unit. On the other hand, the “Convenio de Partes suscrito entre el Banco Central de Costa Rica y sus Trabajadores” in 1988, in its article 24, provides: “LIFETIME TENURE (INAMOVILIDAD). All employees of the Bank covered by an indefinite-term employment contract shall enjoy lifetime tenure as provided in article 188 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, a concept that must be interpreted as the guarantee of bank employees not to be arbitrarily dismissed...”. It is worth highlighting the provisions of the Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República No. 7107 of November 4, 1988, published in La Gaceta No. 222 of November 22, 1988, transitory annex 3 of the articles of the Sistema Bancario Nacional, article 188, which states: “Each State bank must have a roster in which its officials are guaranteed a banking career, as well as their lifetime tenure (inamovilidad) and promotions in such a way as to ensure them the right to advance in said institutions from the lowest scale to being able to occupy the highest positions, based on merit. Any modification carried out by the banks to adapt their regular rosters to the prevailing conditions at the time shall not affect in any way the employees who were hired previously…” (highlighting is not from the original). From the foregoing, it follows that since employment stability is a constitutional guarantee for the bank official, the specific cases of reorganization of services in which that right is curtailed must be assessed with absolute objectivity and in strict adherence to legality. The legal procedures established for that purpose must be respected, as well as the rights of the servants directly or indirectly involved, so that both the new proposed organizational forms, the criteria for determining which positions are maintained within the organ or entity and their conditions, as well as the proposal regarding the officials to be removed or transferred, are matters that must be handled with full transparency and objectivity, because otherwise, a dangerous loophole for arbitrariness would be opened, so that it is the will of the hierarch—or of those in charge of executing the changes—that decides these aspects, even without any substantiation or using improper mechanisms or discriminatory criteria. In this matter, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has recognized the constitutionality of restructuring processes in the Public Administration, in the following terms: “Right to work and stability in employment. In a public employment relationship, the projection of the right to work protected by article 56 of the Constitution contains as one of its postulates in favor of the worker that of stability in the position. Indeed, it cannot be ignored that this is what allows the servant to access a series of social and economic benefits that enable their academic and professional advancement, providing them with the necessary security for their personal development and that of the family nucleus that depends on them, which truly gives effect to the meaning of the right to work as an individual guarantee and obligation to society, in the expression used by the constitutional text. It is for this reason that servants can only be removed by way of exception, in the event of a justified cause for dismissal, or in the case of a forced reduction of services, one of the cases being precisely the restructuring processes to which an institution may be subjected, the latter also being in accordance with the principles derived from article 192 of the Constitución Política. Now, submission to a legitimate modernization process, which guarantees the optimal use of public funds and the highest efficiency in the provision of the services entrusted to an institution, is, of course, a legitimate reason to execute organizational changes that, in most cases, irremediably entail the suppression of certain positions. But precisely because it is an exception to the constitutional guarantee of stability for the worker, its application by the administration must be executed with absolute objectivity, transparency, and seriousness, and hence the requirement for qualified technical studies that can validate decision-making, based on a coherent and effective model. Under this line of reasoning, this Chamber admits that if the new structure cannot accommodate the reassignment of an official, since the substantive functions they had been performing disappear, being suppressed in consideration of efficiency and modernization criteria, their dismissal is legitimate in accordance with the commented constitutional provision.” (Highlighting is not from the original) (ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 4951-2000 of 4:37 p.m. on June 27, 2000). On the same subject, that Chamber also stated: “As the Chamber has indicated in repeated pronouncements, article 192 of the Constitución Política empowers the Public Administration to order the restructuring of the various dependencies that compose it, in order to achieve better performance and organization thereof, for which purpose it may order not only the elimination and reclassification of positions, but also the transfer of officials. The authorization provided by the legal system to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is dispensable in the current structure and also of impossible integration into the new institutional organization. Thus, the State may implement its power to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for reasons of reorganization, provided and whenever this is based on the real need—duly proven—to improve the public service and respects the procedure established for that purpose. In any case, and to make effective the protection of the rights of the administered, the constitutional jurisdiction of liberty is legitimized to review whether the figure of restructuring is used to conceal dismissals carried out for reasons unrelated to those merely organizational. This with the objective of preventing the need for reorganization and modernization of the State from serving to exempt the Administration from its elementary obligation to always act in respect of the rights and freedoms that the Social State of Law recognizes to individuals.” (The underlining is by the drafter) (rulings of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) Nos. 1846, of 2:57 p.m. on February 29; 2496, of 5:39 p.m. on March 21; 4951, of 4:37 p.m. on June 27 and 5783, of 4:01 p.m. on July 11, all of the year 2000). The foregoing establishes the scope that must be given to the concept of “reorganization” or “restructuring,” with which the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras dismissed the plaintiff. The reorganizations or restructurings, authorized by the constituent power, as an exception to the general principle of stability in the employment of public officials, refer to a transformation in the organizational structure of the entity, which motivates the elimination or change of unnecessary positions to achieve a more efficient and economical reorganization of services. It constitutes an objective cause for dismissal distinct from those causes established in the Código de Trabajo, which address faults committed by the worker or the inability to perform their functions, for which the employer may validly dismiss them. In no way could it be interpreted that, under the pretext of a reorganization to achieve that objective, the skills or performance of the servant in their position could be examined, since that would mean applying a subjective cause for dismissal, not contemplated in the constitutional norm, within the concept of reorganization. In several amparo appeals filed by officials of the defendant Bank, in relation to the restructuring process under study, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) ruled in these terms: “On the other hand, analyzing the statement of facts recorded in considerando (Considerando) II, it is observed that the restructuring process of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras is based on technical studies carried out by consulting firms specialized in the matter, and has the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the public service and the best use of public resources. Furthermore, the decision to execute a modernization plan was communicated in advance to the affected public officials, so that they could adopt the measures they deemed pertinent. Finally, the restructuring process was duly and opportunely approved by the competent bodies for that purpose, namely, the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero and the Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica. Consequently, it is not observed that the threat of dismissal of the protected parties stems from an untimely or arbitrary action on the part of the Administration” (ruling No. 2000-1846, of 2:57 p.m. on February 29, 2000). In rulings 3136, of 10:52 a.m. on April 14; 4362, of 12:21 p.m. on May 19 and 11357, of 10:08 a.m. on December 20, all of the year 2000, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) dismissed several amparo appeals in which the plaintiff appeared as appellant, and in the last of them it stated: “In a considerable number of amparo actions, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has had the opportunity to rule on the restructuring procedure in the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, its correctness from a formal point of view, and to declare that in itself that process does not violate the fundamental rights of public servants. Obviously, in that manner of resolving, no prejudgment is made, as it was not appropriate, about the individual impacts that may occur with the application of the reforming parameters that have been approved. It must be remembered that this restructuring is based on and intimately linked with the precedents of the one carried out at the Banco Central de Costa Rica, which this Chamber in some way endorsed. This being the basis from which the individual application of the review mechanisms of the pre-existing personnel is carried out, to declare whether or not they conform to the principles and values that inform the restructuring, such as, for example, whether the persons involved satisfactorily meet the approved profile and whether or not they obtain the minimum qualifications required from the application of objective and substantially equal criteria for all servants, those mechanisms turn out to be aspects of legality that cannot be examined through the constitutional review channel. This conclusion is reached by the Chamber not without first warning that to this general rule would apply, by exception, gross errors and evident arbitrariness that lead to pathological cases of abuse of power. However, in the present matter the Chamber does not find that the facts lead to such a classification. Indeed, what the protected party alleges is the manner in which she was evaluated and graded, which according to what is stated in the appeal, ‘is the result of the comparison of real profiles with the ideal ones of the project, based on the evaluations, among other aspects, of intellectual aptitudes, critical thinking, logical-abstract reasoning, verbal reasoning, personality factors, dominance, rational control, self-confidence, sociability, reliability, training, experience, foreign languages (English)’. If the result, in the case of the appellant, was an insufficient grade to place her in the intended category, if the evaluation or grade was correct or incorrect, if the application of the objective criteria on which the evaluation is based was done with scientific foundation or not, these are aspects of ordinary legality that this Chamber cannot review… and this Tribunal is not here to control the application of legislation to a specific case, as has been said, except for abuse of power that could result in the infringement of fundamental rights, which is not noted in the specific case.” So that in the plaintiff's case it cannot be considered that the validity of the procedure for her dismissal was endorsed by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). This judicial office, like that Chamber, has recognized the legality within the Public Administration of restructuring processes, which the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) declared regarding the restructuring carried out at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and this Chamber endorses, because the plaintiff's objections are not sustainable when she pointed out that the tests applied in the restructuring process did not meet minimum reliability parameters and she claimed that accumulated experience, technical skill, academic level, and performance were not assessed, since such affirmations have not been accredited; rather, from the documentary evidence in the record it appears that factors such as those indicated by the plaintiff were indeed taken into account (see evidence numbers 17, 26 and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file). For its part, the Colegio Profesional de Psicólogos de Costa Rica, whose intervention was requested by the union (pages 185 to 187), stated that it had not found any anomaly in the actions of the professionals in charge of developing the process (pages 170 and 171), and the defendant, regarding the tests or test batteries applied, acknowledged—in its amparo appeal No. 99-009337-0007-CO—that these were adapted to the national context (evidence number 39 of the administrative file). From the contributed documentary evidence numbers 26, 32, 33 and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file, it appears that the plaintiff had access to the result of the tests performed and was in a position to discuss them, with the assistance of a professional in the field (see also evidence numbers 35, 36 and annexes 23 and 24 of the cited file). Likewise, from the documentary evidence numbered as evidence 16A through 16F, it is drawn that communication was indeed maintained with the employees in relation to the process and that work experience was assessed. Information was also provided on the evaluated elements and on the interpretation of the tests (documentary evidence labeled as evidence number 23 and annexes 20 to 22 of the cited file). Then, from the evidence identified with number 15 of the administrative file, it is drawn that the workers were duly informed that the process could conclude in dismissals with employer liability. Furthermore, it is recorded in the file that all the personnel of the occupational structure of SUGEF, including the Legal Advisory Office (Asesoría Jurídica), were subject to the organizational and human resource restructuring plan of that dependency, and therefore subjected to the academic, psychological, and behavioral evaluation tests, as well as intellectual aptitude, personality, and work style tests to which all personnel were subjected, including the plaintiff, an evaluation with which it was determined whether or not the new profiles and requirements for the different positions were met. However, what is relevant in this sub lite case to resolve this matter is to analyze the legality of the worker's specific dismissal.

IV.- In the case at hand, the termination of the plaintiff was justified, as stated, by the existence of the restructuring process underway at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. Said restructuring had the following main objectives: “Introduce the necessary adjustments to the organizational scheme in accordance with the requirements of the risk-based supervision approach. / Establish an organization that allows a clear assignment of responsibilities, the specialization of functions, and a capacity for timely response to the needs and evolution of the Sistema Financiero Nacional. / Integrate the supervision processes through adequate coordination and communication between the different areas of SUGEF. / Ensure the rational use of human and financial resources allocated to the oversight of entities...” (annex 13 of the administrative file). From the note sent to the plaintiff, the reasons that motivated her dismissal are evident. In that communication she was informed:

“In my capacity as administrative chief of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, it is my responsibility to implement the approved restructuring, which as a first stage consisted of an evaluation of the competency-based skills of each official, for each of the positions, because each of them requires different degrees of critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work/management style, and personality factors. / The second stage consisted of the evaluation of staff through forced ranking. The immediate superiors of each of the officials were asked to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of their staff, in which they took into account both their technical skills and their competency-based skills. In this way, initiative, written communication, time management, planning, programming and control, problem-solving, decision-making, and technical skill were assessed. / The third stage consisted of the evaluation of the staff of this entity, through different instruments that allowed assessing compliance by said officials with the new requirements established in relation to academic training and professional experience. / Based on these evaluations and their results, I have had to make decisions regarding your permanence in this organization. In accordance with the evaluations carried out, you meet the academic requirements to hold the position of Banking Management Professional 3, of the General Directorate of Legal Advisory (Dirección General de Asesoría Jurídica), however, the competency evaluations indicate that your skills do not fit the competencies required to perform said position. Likewise, comparing your profile with other positions in the new structure, it was not possible to reassign you internally within this entity” (annex 11 and evidence No. 4 of the administrative file). (Bold and underlining are by the drafter).

It is observed from the transcribed documentation that the worker was terminated, after the following points were evaluated: 1) her skills in the position in aspects such as critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work/management style, and personality factors; 2) the evaluation carried out by her superior in relation to capacities such as initiative, written communication, time management, planning, problem-solving, decision-making, etc., and finally, 3) compliance with the new requirements established in relation to academic training and professional experience. The plaintiff was informed that she met the academic requirements established for the position of Banking Management Professional 3; however, she was dismissed because, according to the other evaluations carried out, she lacks the skills required to perform in that position. The foregoing means that the termination of her position did not correspond to an objective restructuring as a result of which her position disappeared, but rather to an examination of her aptitudes and skills from which it is inferred that the failure to meet the new established standards motivated her termination. Such a procedure is not authorized by the constituent power, because resolving in that manner is a veiled way through which the plaintiff was dismissed due to her personal conditions, thereby allowing a subjective cause for dismissal not authorized by law or by the Constitution, rendering the dismissal of the claimant arbitrary and illegal, using the restructuring process as an excuse or pretext to terminate her and appoint another professional in her place. If, in principle, the servants of the Public Administration are protected by stability in employment, it is not possible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, the requirements and personal conditions with which the servant accessed their position are modified, because that would open a dangerous loophole for arbitrariness and insecurity. In this sense, it must be mentioned that article 47 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil, when referring to dismissal due to reorganization, states that when dispensing with servants, criteria such as efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitudes, and other conditions resulting from the evaluation of services shall be considered, which is understood, for the scenario in which certain positions of the same category that is being eliminated are retained. But the case under study is different, because what operated in this instance was a re-evaluation of the aptitudes and skills with which the plaintiff was admitted and appointed to her position; a re-evaluation that was carried out with standards different from those with which she was initially hired and which, upon failing to meet them, motivated her termination. It must be clear that the right to stability of public officials can only be eliminated due to the causes expressly stated in the law, since no public entity is allowed to carry out reorganization processes that conclude with dismissals, deviating from constitutional and legal regulations. As restructuring, only what is contemplated in the constitutional norm and developed in subsections a) and b) of article 47 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil can be qualified, and not any other process. The so-called modernization processes or reviews of personnel structures can be called by many different names, be it job reclassification, reengineering, restructuring, transitional strategies, organizational re-architecture, structural redesign, organizational flattening, labor reversal, structural reinvention. All these measures that tend to reduce costs, invoking efficiency, must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and can in no way become a mechanism to review appointment acts that were carried out legally many years before. The legal system allows public entities to impose new requirements on positions, demand new profiles, and based on that, hire the suitable personnel to occupy them, without prejudice to the rights of those who occupy those positions. In the cited rulings of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), issued by that Chamber on the occasion of amparo appeals filed by officials of SUGEF against that institution, it is noted that the plaintiff also appealed through that channel the restructuring process that ultimately culminated in her dismissal. However, such amparo actions were rejected, among other reasons, for the following:

“In the specific case, apart from the foregoing considerations, it cannot be overlooked that the restructuring process at SUGEF is just being executed, the completion of which was agreed for June 30, 2000 (regardless of which session this agreement was issued in), and that it is not credited in the record that the protected party is one of the persons who are going to be dismissed, since there is also the institutional commitment that prior to making that type of decision, reassignment to another position within the same Body, at the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or in any of the other Órganos de Desconcentración Máxima of the issuing entity will be sought. Likewise, the Chamber understands, because the respondent expressly stated so, that the tests carried out so far will not constitute more than another additional element to consider along with academic training, professional experience, and knowledge of the English language, such that the fact of not having been ‘qualified’ in accordance with them is not determinative for a dismissal decision against her, as indicated under oath—with the consequences, even of a criminal nature, contemplated by the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional in the event of affirming inaccuracies or falsehoods before this Tribunal—by the Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras. In this context, the Chamber considers that at this moment the filing of this amparo is premature, given that there is no certain and imminent threat pending against the protected party of being dismissed without respect for her fundamental rights, (…) Far from it, the tests that have been being applied to all the staff of SUGEF will constitute an objective parameter to be used by the chief to make subsequent decisions in relation to the personnel that definitively will remain in that Body, jointly with others such as the academic and professional record of each servant and the evaluation by the immediate superior...” (ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 1856-00, of 3:07 p.m. on February 29, cited by No. 3136, of 10:52 a.m. on April 14, both of 2000).

In accordance with the reasons set forth, in consideration of the specific grievances raised by the appellant, it could well be said that the ad-quem incurred in an erroneous and inadequate assessment of the evidence by questioning in general terms the validity and legality of the restructuring process, but not so in pointing out that the plaintiff's dismissal was illegitimate because arbitrary and illegal, since, as stated, she was removed after examining her personal conditions and determining that she did not meet the position's requirements, according to a new profile established by the employer itself, to appoint another lawyer in her place. Consequently, we deem the dismissal to which the plaintiff was subjected null, and being in the presence of a null dismissal, the effects of that declaration must be retrotracted to the moment or date of said act, so that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. Consequently, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, specifying that from the amount that may correspond to the plaintiff, the sums paid for notice (preaviso), severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía), and other indemnities received by her must be deducted (annex 12 of the administrative file), as well as any other item that by way of salary she may have received after that settlement. On the amounts to be paid for such concept, social security contributions must also be deducted.

V.- The prohibition (prohibición) is not an employer liberality but a condition legally imposed on a specific position by reason of the nature of the functions that compose it, which requires a transparent, impartial, and objective exercise, far from any conflict of interest; it is an ethical requirement and a condition inherent to the position that imposes a specific legal situation on its holder, from which arises for the official appointed to the position the duty not to practice their profession or trade for the benefit of third persons, with the correlative right to the payment of financial compensation for said limitation. It involves an incompatibility between the exercise of the public function and that of the private profession due to the potential clash of interests between the two. In the specific case, the plaintiff was paid the prohibition (prohibición) based on the following budgetary norms:

“Article 14 Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República for 1985, number 6982 of December 19, 1984. Add a paragraph to article 1 of Law 5867 that reads:

"The benefits and prohibitions indicated in this article include the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos".- "Article 101 Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, number 7015 of November 22, 1985.- The technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos shall receive the financial benefits of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975 and its amendments subject to the prohibitions of said law." "Article 14 Ley de Presupuesto for 1986 number 7018 of December 20, 1985.- 1. ...

17. The prohibitions and benefits contained in article 1 of Law No. 5867 December 15, 1975, are applicable to the Auditing Offices of the Sistema Bancario Nacional.” (Bold is not in the original).

The payment of said financial compensation ceased with the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) Nos. 4647 of 4:20 p.m. on June 16, 1999 and 6327 of 10:03 a.m. on August 13, 1999, which declared unconstitutional and annulled the cited norms retroactively to their entry into force without prejudice to the good faith rights acquired under their protection, and not based on article 8 of session No. 4621 of December 9, 1992, which referred to article 27 of the Convenio de Partes—a provision that had also been annulled by rulings numbers 1962-92 and 3285-92 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)—without there being any other valid and effective legal provision that gave it support, as ordered by the principle of legality that must be observed in the public function.

From the foregoing, it is inferred that the representative of SUGEF is correct in stating that the budgetary norms annulled by Voto 4647 of June 16, 1999, did not provide economic content to the payment for prohibition (prohibición) as the court erroneously understood; on the contrary, they gave legal support to the regime, since the matter they regulated was not budgetary but rather matter typical of ordinary legislation through which Law 5867 was amended, extending the recognition of the prohibition to the technical staff of the General Auditing Office of Banks (today SUGEF). He is also correct in pointing out that, having declared unconstitutional and therefore null the norms that supported the payment of the prohibition in that entity, his represented party, in order to eliminate such benefit, did not need to resort to the process of Article 173 of the General Public Administration Act or Articles 10 and 35 of the Regulatory Law for the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, because such norms are designed for the annulment of administrative acts that declare rights or produce legal effects, and the prohibition regime that covered the plaintiff was established by the norms declared unconstitutional by Voto 4647-99. Therefore, one cannot speak of annulment of any administrative act, since the regime had legislative, not administrative, support. Consequently, the challenged judgment erred in considering that the prohibition was suppressed arbitrarily and illegally due to lack of due process.

VI.- The payment of the prohibition depends on the position held being under that regime and the official or servant meeting the prerequisites established by the regulation that imposes it. In the specific case, the legal support for the payment of the prohibition, as stated, was provided in the cited atypical norms, which for that reason were annulled. The compensation for prohibition was granted to the plaintiff subject to the validity of those provisions, so regardless of whether the bank's administration revoked the benefit in execution of the aforementioned votes of unconstitutionality, the truth is that this compensation was granted on the condition that the position in question continue to be subject to said regime, which is sufficient to find that this benefit did not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido), as it was contingent upon the position remaining under the prohibition regime. In light of what was decided by constitutional votes Nos. 4647-99 and 6327-99, which declared null the norms on which the prohibition was based, without prejudice to vested rights acquired under their validity, undoubtedly the right to payments received for that concept was consolidated as long as the prohibition regime existed, which must be considered irrecoverable to the extent that they definitively entered the plaintiff's assets before the extinction of that regulation, but it does not constitute a right to demand that the regime must continue to exist. It is clear that the cited budgetary norms supported the granting of the prohibition benefit in the General Auditing Office of Banks (today SUGEF), and that as of Voto 4647-99, said norms became void with the unconstitutionality declared therein. Therefore, if the Constitutional Chamber dimensioned the effects of its declaration of nullity stating that it was retroactive to the effective date of the annulled norms, without prejudice to vested rights acquired in good faith, it is from that date that the administration of the defendant bank was left without the necessary legal basis to continue applying the economic benefit of the prohibition questioned here, regarding the positions of officials of the General Superintendency of Financial Entities. Hence, the court a quo erred in considering that the plaintiff still had a legal basis to maintain the benefit of the prohibition, since, as stated, the budgetary norms on which her prohibition regime was based were found unconstitutional in light of the cited votes 4647-99 and 6327-99. Therefore, the only vested right the plaintiff has is that corresponding to the monies she received while the regime existed and the servant met the factual prerequisites that said regime established. Consequently, it cannot be considered that the mere fact of the plaintiff having received the payment for prohibition determined the existence of a vested right to that benefit for the rest of her working life with SUGEF. We are not in the presence of a right that has been incorporated into the employment contract, but rather before a benefit that, in order to be received, must have its respective legal basis, so that there can be no right to remain in the regime beyond the change that operates in the legal system, whether by a repeal through a subsequent law or an annulment by judgment through constitutional means. In other words, there is no right to the immutability of the regime. Consequently, as the appellant's objections are admissible in this third rogated instance, the challenged judgment must be reversed insofar as it granted the action regarding the prohibition issue, and instead, that specific point of the claims of the lawsuit is dismissed.

VII.- The plaintiff's objections to the effect that the claimed homologation issue was a salary adjustment of general application not recognized to the position she occupied are not admissible, because the record shows that in session No. 4975-98 of October 21, 1998, official communication [Placa1] of the 19th of that same month and year was considered, in which it is noted that some position classes of the Central Bank present differences in their classification and valuation when compared with their counterparts in the deconcentrated bodies, since even though they had substantially identical characteristics in terms of skill, effort, and responsibility factors, the salary category was different (lower in the Central Bank in relation to its deconcentrated bodies). Therefore, the Bank's Board of Directors, based on its power to dictate its salary regime and other remunerations for its officials, as well as its own policy on position classification and valuation (Article 28, subsections t) and m) of the Organic Law of the Central Bank), taking into account principles such as equity, reasonableness, and equality, in Article 10 of session No. 4980-98, of December 9, 1998, based on what was stated by the administration in memorandum [Placa2] of November 17, 1998, regarding the necessary homologation of the position classes existing in the Central Bank and its dependencies, agreed, among other things: "1.- Approve the homologation of the professional position classes located in categories 13 and 14, and the position classes related to Section Heads or Area Executives, currently in category 16, so that they are placed in categories 15, 16, and 18, respectively, of the Regular Salaries Scale in Force, an action that will take effect on July 1, 1999, according to the approval date of its budgetary content by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. / 2.- …The foregoing seeks to correct the distortions currently present regarding position classification and valuation, so that position classes whose characteristics are substantially equal in terms of skill factors (academic preparation, experience, and specific knowledge); effort and responsibility (decision-making, handling of funds, significance of the decision, supervision exercised), are assigned to the same salary category" (official communications [Placa1] and [Placa2] from pages 373 to 388 and evidence No. 40 of the administrative file). That is, the Central Bank decided to apply the homologation to positions that, despite having the same duties and meeting the same requirements demanded of their namesakes located in the Legal Advisory Office of SUGEF, received different salary remunerations, resulting from dissimilar categories. In the plaintiff's case, by administrative resolution SUGEF-02-98 of July 13, 1998, provided as evidence in Annex 30 of the administrative file, it was determined that SUGEF lawyers would be reclassified to a category 16, when that type of professional at the Central Bank continued with a category 13 or 14. This caused one of the distortions that were intended to be corrected through the position homologation process, when it was decided to equalize the position classes whose skill, responsibility, and effort factors were substantially equal to those of the officials of the superintendencies (which originated the distortions and where the plaintiff was assigned), in order to eliminate the existing differences by assigning the same salary category, which meant moving the lawyers who were assigned in categories 13 and 14 of the Regular Salary Scale to 16, which was the one held by SUGEF legal advisors, which translated into the recognition or equalization of categories for the rest of the bank's lawyers who performed the same duties and met the same requirements, so that all would have category 16. Thus, if the position occupied by the plaintiff in the class "Legal Advisor," category 16, of the General Superintendency of Financial Entities, was one of those taken as a reference point for the application of the position homologation, it was illogical for that category, with responsibilities and functions identical to those homologated, to have been recognized with a superior category, because this would have perpetuated the unconstitutional (Article 57 of the Political Constitution) and illegal (Article 167 of the Labor Code) inequalities that existed at that time on the salary scale of the issuing entity, which moreover could not be done, because it was stated in relation to said position that "Due to the fact that in the technical-operative section of the Regular Salary Scale, no position classes with conditions similar to the aforementioned position classes were found, the homologation process does not extend to said section." This being the case, it is appropriate to confirm the challenged judgment insofar as it declared that part of the lawsuit without merit.

VIII.- Article 54 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica No. 1552 of April 23, 1953, and its amendments, established: "The Central Bank of Costa Rica may only compute in its assets and debit balances the following: / ... / 8th.- The balances of accounts originating from the normal movement of expenses, losses, and results, and others coming from operations authorized by this law. Within the item indicated in numeral 8, the Central Bank shall include a sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total of its employees' salaries for the maintenance of the guarantee fund and retirement fund (fondo de garantías y jubilaciones) for these employees. This sum shall belong to them in the proportion corresponding to their salary, and must be delivered to them under the conditions determined in the retirement regulation, if they leave the service before having attained the right to a disability pension. This Bank contribution shall be unique for all types of social benefits. The institution's regulations may establish additional sums with which employees must contribute to the strengthening of the fund, so that they may obtain an adequate pension, according to their salary, age, and time of service. The system thus created is complementary to that established by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), and does not affect the obligations of its beneficiaries to the Fund. The sums corresponding to employees who leave the service before having attained the right to a disability pension are declared unseizable. The Central Bank may invest the reserve for legal benefits in the discount of obligations held in its favor by the mentioned fund. In the Administrative Board of the Bank's Guarantee and Retirement Fund, representation shall be given to the employees, who shall elect two of its members." That norm was repealed by Article 170 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica No. 7558 of November 3, 1995. The plaintiff's objections to continue being recognized the equivalent contribution of 10% of salary for the maintenance of the Guarantee and Retirement Fund, which she considers a right incorporated into her employment contract for having joined SUGEF before such contribution was eliminated by the repeal ordered in Law No. 7558 of November 13, 1995, are not admissible, because said contribution does not constitute a vested right or consolidated legal situation for those servants who, as of November 1995, were part of the supplementary pension regime regulated by Article 54 of Law No. 1552, amended by Law No. 7107 of November 4, 1988, which established the contribution that the Central Bank had been making based on that repealed norm. That percentage never constituted an integral part of the salary of the Central Bank and its dependencies' officials—even though it was calculated as a percentage of the total of the employees' salaries and belonged to them by legal provision, in the proportion corresponding to their salary—nor a vested right that must continue to be paid, because the cause for that transfer of money from the Central Bank's assets to the Guarantee Fund had a legal cause of a different nature and was duly authorized by the legal system, which is not the case now. The vested right of those who worked at the Central Bank before the enactment of Law No. 7558, regarding the contributions that institution made when it was authorized by the legal system, translates into the certainty of not having to reimburse their employer for what it contributed to the Guarantee Fund. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber has established: "In this case, the constitutional guarantee of the non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of removing the asset or the right already acquired from the person's patrimony, or of causing that, if the factual prerequisite had occurred prior to the legal amendment, the (beneficial, it is understood) consequence that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation no longer arises. Now then, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a 'right to the immutability of the legal system,' that is, that the rules never change. Therefore, the constitutional precept does not mean that, once the rule connecting the act with the effect comes into legal existence, it cannot be modified or even suppressed by a subsequent norm..." (Voto No. 2765 at 15:03 hours on May 20, 1997). It was also stated in that vote that: "1. The protection of vested rights means, in this case, that despite the elimination of the norms, all amounts received until then as allowance must be considered irrecoverable. To the extent that they had definitively entered the assets of the interested parties prior to the legal amendment, it would be absurd—and unconstitutional—to pretend that they must be returned, or anything similar…". Hence, in the plaintiff's case, as in that of the other Central Bank officials, the only vested right that can be claimed regarding that contribution is in relation to those effectively delivered by the bank to the Guarantee and Retirement Fund up to the moment of the repeal of the norm that gave it support, which are the property, in the proportional part, of each of them, and not that the issuing entity continues granting said benefit. Consequently, the plaintiff has no right for the Central Bank to continue making the contribution she claims; therefore, what was decided on this specific point by the judges of the preceding instances must be confirmed.

IX.- Finally, the plaintiff is correct in feeling aggrieved by the prudential assessment made of the personal costs, but not by the claim that these be set as a percentage. Since the litigation at hand is a matter of inestimable amount and taking into account the work carried out, the economic importance of the process, and the economic position of the parties (Article 495 of the Labor Code), the prudential assessment made of the personal costs must be modified, to instead establish them in the sum of one million colones.

X.- In accordance with the foregoing considerations, it is appropriate to partially reverse the challenged judgment insofar as it granted the action regarding the prohibition issue, to uphold the exception of lack of right with respect thereto and dismiss on that specific point the claim of the lawsuit. The assessment of the personal costs must be modified to establish them in the prudential sum of one million colones. In all other respects, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, establishing that from the amount corresponding to the plaintiff, the sums paid for notice (preaviso), severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), and other indemnities received by the plaintiff (Annex 12 of the administrative file) must be deducted, as well as any other item or items she may have received as salary after that settlement. Social security contributions must also be deducted from the amounts to be paid for that concept, to the extent legally applicable.

THEREFORE:

The challenged judgment is partially reversed insofar as it granted the action regarding the prohibition issue. Instead, the exception of lack of right is upheld with respect thereto, and on that specific point the claim of the lawsuit is dismissed. The assessment of the personal costs is modified to establish them in the prudential sum of three million colones. In all other respects, the appealed judgment is confirmed, establishing that from the amount corresponding to the plaintiff, the sums paid for notice, severance pay, and other indemnities already received by the plaintiff must be deducted, as well as any other item or items she may have received as salary after that settlement. Social security contributions must also be deducted from the amounts to be paid for that concept, to the extent legally applicable.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Zarela María Villanueva Monge Julia Varela Araya Rolando Vega Robert Eva María Camacho Vargas CERTIFICATION:

In accordance with Article 154, final paragraph, of the Civil Procedure Code, it is noted that Judge Eva María Camacho Vargas concurred with her vote in the issuance of this judgment, but does not sign as she is unable to do so, being on vacation. San José, January 12, 2010.

José Celso Fernández Delgado Acting Clerk [Nombre4].

2 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675, and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Electronic Mail: [...]. and [...]

• 8)Payment of the unpaid difference corresponding to 6.49%, given that the Board of Directors of the BCCR approved a general salary increase of 11.49% to the base for cost-of-living adjustment for all employees of the Banco Central de Costa Rica and its decentralized bodies, effective as of July 1, 1995. That the Bank must make the salary recognition of 6.49%, to be calculated on the base salary, from July 1, 1995, and its future salary incorporation. Payment of legal interest, as it became due and until its effective payment. Payment of the existing differences due to the non-incorporation into the base salary of the 6.49%, in relation to each and every one of the bonuses or components that make up my salary, from July 1, 1995, and as they became due. 9) Payment of the equivalent of 65% of the salary for the concept of prohibition (prohibición), from April 17, 2000, to the date of its effective payment, including legal interest, and the corresponding salary adjustments be made. 10) Plus the readjustment in the calculation of the severance pay (cesantía) that the salary recognitions may favor me. 11) That the Banco Central de Costa Rica and, jointly and severally, Ing. [Nombre2], in his capacity as Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, be ordered to pay back wages and interest as damages, plus both procedural and personal costs.

2.- The defendant [Nombre2], in his personal capacity, as Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras and as general proxy (apoderado generalísimo) of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, answered the action in the terms indicated in the brief dated March 19, 2001, and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of passive standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), the generic defense of sine actione agit, and what he termed lack of cause. For his part, the co-defendant [Nombre3] answered the litis out of time.

3.- The judge, Lic. Pedro Ubau Hernández, by judgment at ten hours and two minutes on December 19, 2005, ordered: In accordance with the stated grounds, legal citations, and cited case law, the present ordinary lawsuit filed by [Nombre1] against BANCO CENTRAL DE COSTA RICA, [Nombre2], and [Nombre3] is declared WITHOUT MERIT in all its aspects. The defenses of lack of right, lack of passive standing to be sued, lack of cause, and the generic defense of sine actione agit are upheld. This matter is resolved without special condemnation in costs in accordance with articles 222 of the Código Procesal Civil in relation to article 452 of the Código de Trabajo. The parties are advised that this judgment admits the appeal (recurso de apelación), which must state, verbally or in writing, the factual or legal grounds on which the appealing party bases its disagreement; under the warning of declaring the appeal unhearable (article 500 and 501, subsections c) and d); votes of the Sala Constitucional numbers 5798, at 16:21 hours, of August 11, 1998, and 1306 at 16:27 hours of February 23, 1999, and vote of the Sala Segunda number 386, at 14:20 hours, of December 10, 1999) (circular of the Secretaría General de la Corte Suprema de Justicia No. 79-2001).

4.- The plaintiff appealed and the Tribunal de Trabajo, Sección Cuarta, of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, composed of Lic. Óscar Ugalde Miranda, Lic. Álvaro Moya Arias, and Lic. Nelson Rodríguez Jiménez, by judgment at eighteen hours and fifty-five minutes on November 17, 2006, resolved: It is declared that in the processing of this matter, no omission is observed that could have caused nullity or defenselessness. The appealed judgment is revoked and the Banco Central de Costa Rica is ordered to reinstate the appellant [Nombre1] to the position she held at the time of the dismissal of which she was the object, and must pay her the wages she stopped receiving from June 23, 2000, with interest from the due date of each sum and until effective payment. The quantum of these aspects shall be determined in execution of judgment. The defenses of lack of right, lack of passive standing to be sued, lack of cause, and the generic defense of sine actione agit are rejected. Both costs are to be borne by the defendant bank, setting the personal costs at the prudential sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones.

5.- The Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and the plaintiff filed appeals before this Chamber in briefs dated February 21 and July 4, both of 2007, which are based on the grounds that will be stated in the considering part.

6.- The procedures prescribed by law have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Aguirre Gómez; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- The plaintiff filed the lawsuit seeking a declaration that the dismissal of which she was the object is null, as well as: “1) That this ordinary labor lawsuit be admitted. 2) That since the dismissal of the undersigned was a ‘covert’ dismissal, as the alleged cause does not exist, the restructuring process not complying with the postulates and legal budgets, THE UNDERSIGNED BE REINSTATED TO HER POSITION AND IN FULL ENJOYMENT OF HER LABOR RIGHTS. 3) That failing this, since the Banco Central, with its arbitrary attitude that threatens every right and labor guarantee of the undersigned, has caused me damages of irreparable consideration, not only economically, but socially, occupationally, and morally, preventing me, without any justification, from my right to work that I efficiently performed for 23 years, the undersigned be paid, as damages, the back wages from the moment of the undersigned's cessation and their corresponding interest, until the moment the resolution approving my claims becomes final and is implemented. 4) In the alternative, in the event the main petition is declared without merit, that the present request be admitted to pay the complementary amounts corresponding to the failure to recognize the year worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, plus the corresponding interest at the date of payment. 5) That the sums over-withheld be returned to me, due to the incorrect application by the Banco Central de Costa Rica of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, and the corresponding legal interest, from the date these withholdings began and for the entire time the law was misapplied, plus the corresponding interest at the date of their effective payment. 5) That the salary adjustment, carried out at the Banco Central de Costa Rica via homologation (homologación), and legal interest be made to me. 6) That I be recognized the equivalent of the contribution of 10% of the salary for the Fondo de Garantías, which I had been enjoying for having started working at the Banco Central before the month of November 1995, and its legal interest, having been eliminated with retroactive effect to my detriment, as provided in the Ley del Banco Central de Costa Rica (Ley 7558), that is, from November 1995 to the date of resolution of this request, plus legal interest. 7) That the proportional part to which I am entitled of the reserve for eventual lawsuits of ¢125 million colones agreed upon by the Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco Central de Costa Rica be returned to me, for not being in accordance with law, and the respective legal interest. 8) Payment of the unpaid difference corresponding to 6.49%, given that the Board of Directors of the BCCR approved a general salary increase of 11.49% to the base for cost-of-living adjustment for all employees of the Banco Central de Costa Rica and its decentralized entities, effective as of July 1, 1995. That the Bank must make the salary recognition of 6.49%, to be calculated on the base salary, from July 1, 1995, and its future salary incorporation. Payment of legal interest, as it became due and until its effective payment. Payment of the existing differences due to the non-incorporation into the base salary of the 6.49%, in relation to each and every one of the bonuses or components that make up my salary, from July 1, 1995, and as they became due. 9) Payment of the equivalent of 65% of the salary for the concept of prohibition (prohibición), from April 17, 2000, to the date of its effective payment, including legal interest, and the corresponding salary adjustments be made. 10) Plus the readjustment in the calculation of the severance pay (cesantía) that the salary recognitions may favor me. 11) That the Banco Central de Costa Rica and, jointly and severally, Ing. [Nombre2], in his capacity as Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, be ordered to pay back wages and interest as damages, plus both procedural and personal costs.” As she stated, she worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal from June 23, 1976, to April 31, 1977, when she resigned, and for the Banco Central de Costa Rica from the following May 1 to June 23, 2000, the date she was terminated due to administrative restructuring. She indicated having received her legal severance benefits under protest on July 27, 2000, calculated based on the time served at the bank but not the time worked at other Public Sector institutions (folios 1 to 33). Bernardo Alfaro Araya answered the complaint negatively, in his personal capacity and as general proxy (apoderado generalísimo) of the Banco Central de Costa Rica for the matters of the Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, raising the defenses of lack of right, lack of passive standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), lack of cause, and the generic sine actione agit. Eduardo Lizano Fait in his personal capacity and as general proxy (apoderado generalísimo) of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, answered the complaint negatively out of time (folios 42 to 70 and 121 to 161). The trial court upheld the defenses raised, declared the lawsuit without merit in all its aspects, and resolved the matter without special condemnation in costs (folios 399 to 409). The plaintiff appealed the decision and the Tribunal revoked the appealed judgment, denied the defenses raised, and ordered the Banco Central de Costa Rica to reinstate the plaintiff to the position she held at the time of dismissal, with the wages she stopped receiving from June 23, 2000, to pay her the prohibition (prohibición) allowance she stopped receiving from April 17, 2000, until it is applied to the salary, as well as interest from the due date of each sum until effective payment, whose quantum shall be determined in execution of judgment, with costs to be borne by the defendant bank, setting the personal costs at the prudential sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones (folios 416 to 448, 580 to 593, and 614 to 618).

II.- The Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and the plaintiff are dissatisfied with the decision of the ad-quem; the former because the ruling of the a-quo was revoked and the Banco Central de Costa Rica was ordered to reinstate the plaintiff to the position she held when she was dismissed, to pay her what she stopped receiving from June 23, 2000, as well as the prohibition (prohibición) allowance she stopped receiving from April 17, 2000, until it is applied to the salary, with interest from the due date of each sum until effective payment and both procedural costs. It reproaches that it was deemed that the plaintiff was dismissed illegitimately, since her termination was the product of an administrative reorganization or restructuring carried out by Sugef, supported by real needs and technical studies that gave backing and solidity to the decision, approved by the Consejo Nacional de la Supervisión del Sistema Financiero and by the Board of Directors of the Banco Central de Costa Rica. It accuses the Tribunal of making an inadequate assessment of the evidence submitted to the record, by questioning the validity and legality of the restructuring process that it has endorsed in identical cases. It considers irrelevant that the Tribunal concluded “that the plaintiff was dismissed without an immediate suppression of her position and that another professional was appointed in her place, therefore it is clearly established that the restructuring was used as an excuse or pretext to dismiss the plaintiff.” It points out that constitutional precept 192 establishes that the dismissal of an administrative official is justified by: a) forced reduction of services, b) lack of funds, and c) to achieve a better reorganization, therefore the Tribunal made an erroneous assessment of the evidence by indicating that the dismissal was illegitimate because the suppression of the plaintiff's position occurred until some months after the dismissal—given that another professional was hired to occupy a position similar to the one she held—when forced reduction is not the only assumption contemplated by article 192 of the Constitution to justify removal in case of restructuring, and the process approved for the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras was based not only on a forced reduction of services, but also on a series of technical studies that instituted the ideal profile of the organization and each position to achieve greater efficiency and adaptation to the needs of the Financial System. It indicates that after applying all the procedures approved for the restructuring, the plaintiff did not prove to be suitable to occupy the position she had been performing, because despite meeting the academic requirements she did not meet the capacity and suitability required for the new structure; hence, if she was not fit to occupy the position she should perform in the new structure, it was illogical to have to wait a prolonged time to fill the position she left vacant again, so just as in other positions that were in that situation, the necessary procedures were carried out to fill them with those who met the required profiles within the Banco Central and its decentralized bodies, through personnel recruitment assessing the suitability, merit, and capacity of the offerors, which is why about three months after the plaintiff's dismissal, professionals were hired to be incorporated into functional areas of the Superintendencia, including the legal professional for the Department of Legal Advisory. It qualifies the reasoning of the ad-quem as erroneous in deeming the dismissal illegal and arbitrary, and especially erroneous the consideration of that Tribunal in estimating that “the restructuring process was used as a pretext to dismiss the plaintiff” and hire a new person, especially since approximately 75 people left the institution through voluntary mobility or dismissal as a result of said process. It reiterates that the termination in question was not based on a suppression of positions, but was due to the fact that once the suitability tests of the officials were carried out, the plaintiff proved not suitable for the position she had been occupying by not fitting the profile required for the new structure. It denies that the dismissal was illegal because there was no reduction of positions or because a new person was subsequently appointed to a similar position in the Legal Directorate of the Superintendencia, because in restructuring processes in which the aim, based on technical studies, is to improve the organization's performance, the official who does not meet the new defined profile for the position they held can be dismissed, so it cannot be affirmed that if a person is dismissed for not meeting said profile, it is a covert dismissal or discriminatory action, but rather a situation where the servant does not meet the profile required for better performance in the organization, which makes it possible to dispense with their services with the respective payment of all their labor rights. It points out that the Tribunal incurred an error in the appreciation of the facts and evidence adduced to the file, by considering that the restructuring process that served as the basis for the dismissal did not contemplate the Legal Advisory area, when the process approved by the competent bodies comprised all administrative areas of the Superintendencia, including Legal Advisory. It alleges that the restructuring implied a change in the requirements for the Legal Advisory officials, which was evaluated through technical tests carried out for that purpose by prestigious and experienced companies hired for that end. It argues that the results of the tests applied to the plaintiff were not satisfactory, so as her suitability for the position according to the new structure was not verified, based on the comprehensive evaluation of criteria such as academic record, previous experience, immediate supervisor evaluation (forced ranking), and interviews, her services were dispensed with, so the plaintiff's dismissal cannot be considered unjustified. It maintains that the reasoning regarding the payment of the prohibition (prohibición) is incorrect, since for the officials of the Auditoría General de Bancos, now Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, the benefit originally established in Ley 5867 of December 15, 1975, was granted to them based on budget laws 6982 of December 19, 1984, article 14; 7015 of November 22, 1985, article 101; and 7018 of December 20, 1985, article 14, subsection 17), and not based on article 8 of session 4621-92 held by the Board of Directors of the Banco Central on December 9, 1992, which referred to article 27 of the parties' agreement—regulations annulled by votes numbers 1962-92 and 3285-92 of the Sala Constitucional. It points out that those budget regulations annulled by the Sala Constitucional through vote 4647 of June 16, 1999, did not give economic content to the payment for prohibition (prohibición) as the Tribunal erroneously understood, but rather reformed Ley 5867, extending the recognition of that regime to the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos (now Sugef). It accuses that in the present matter there was no administrative act that could be the object of a process of absolute, evident, and manifest nullity (article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) or of lesivity (lesividad) (articles 10 and 35 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), since such processes are conceived for the nullity of administrative acts declaring rights or producing legal effects, and the prohibition (prohibición) regime that covered the plaintiff as an official of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras was established by the budget regulations declared unconstitutional by vote 4647-99; therefore, one cannot speak of the annulment of any administrative act, since the regime had legislative, not administrative, support, hence the elimination of the prohibition (prohibición) regime in that dependency of the Banco Central was not something capricious and arbitrary as the Tribunal erroneously qualifies it. It notes that the prohibition (prohibición) is a technical requirement and condition inherent to the position, which imposes on its holder the duty not to practice their profession or trade for the benefit of third parties—which in certain cases provided for by law confers the correlative right to payment of an economic compensation for such limitation—and given the public interest on which the prohibition (prohibición) is founded, the State has the power to change such a situation, before which those interested cannot claim vested rights to the permanence of the previous legal situation, that is, there can be no vested right to the immutability of the regime. It alludes that upon being obligated to eliminate the payment for prohibition (prohibición), the issuing entity arranged to compensate for the loss of that allowance by decreeing an increase in base salaries and modifying the salary scales in six categories, in order to maintain a competitive position in the institution's remunerations. It refers that the economic compensation for prohibition (prohibición) enjoyed by the servants of SUGEF ceased in execution of the judgments or votes of the Sala Constitucional Nos. 4647 at 16:20 hours on June 16, 1999, and No. 6327 at 10:03 hours on August 13, 1999, which declared unconstitutional and annulled the budget regulations that had given legal support to the regime, an annulment that is retroactive to its entry into force without prejudice to the rights acquired in good faith under its protection. For this party, such rights comprise the payments definitively entered into the holder's estate, so only those effectively received during the validity of the annulled budget regulations can be considered as vested rights, that is, upon the regulations on which the payment of the prohibition (prohibición) was based being declared unconstitutional, the vested rights consist of not having to repay what was paid for such concept, since after said declaration the immediate cessation of the payment of compensation for prohibition (prohibición) that had been made based on the cited regulations was appropriate, without being able to allege any vested right whatsoever to continue earning that benefit in the terms in which it had been done before the declaration of nullity, as it would constitute a breach of the principle of legality, there being no legal norm justifying its payment. It affirms that the plaintiff and the ad-quem are mistaken in estimating that the prohibition (prohibición) was suppressed arbitrarily and illegally and that there was a defect due to lack of due process. With these arguments, it seeks the reversal of the appealed judgment and the confirmation of the first-instance judgment in its entirety. The plaintiff is dissatisfied because she was denied what she terms as a typical salary increase or adjustment carried out by the Banco Central de Costa Rica via homologation (homologación) of position classes, discriminating against the category 16 position she occupied in the Legal Advisory of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, despite its application being general in nature, for which reason, in her understanding, the Board of Directors' agreement that did not homologate the referred position with a higher category is illegal. She also recriminates the denial of the recognition of the contribution on the part of the bank of 10% of the salary for the maintenance of the Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones, which was eliminated by the repeal ordered in Ley No. 7558 of November 13, 1995, which meant for her the suppression of a right that is incorporated into her employment contract.

It challenges the setting of the amount of two hundred fifty thousand colones for personal costs, arguing it does not conform to the complexity of the proceeding, to what was granted, or to the economic position of the parties, pointing out that an item ranging between 15% and 25% of the estimated amount should be established for this concept. It alleges a violation of Article 495 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) due to lack of application or erroneous interpretation, and therefore requests that the setting be made on a percentage basis. Based on these arguments, it seeks the reversal of the appealed judgment regarding the matters appealed and that, instead, the requested claims be granted in the terms originally sought, while maintaining what was resolved regarding what was granted (folios 626 to 647, 677 to 709, and 664 to 675).

III.- The dismissal of the plaintiff was justified by a process of organizational and human resource restructuring of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero in session no. 124-99, article 6, of November 9, 1999, and by the Junta Directiva of the Banco Central de Costa Rica in session no. 5014-99, article 5, of November 12, 1999 (complaint, answer, and evidence no. 6 of the administrative file). As a fundamental principle of the public employment regime, constitutional provision 192 instituted the so-called "right to employment stability" (derecho a la estabilidad en el empleo), which has been conceived as the right of the public servant to keep their position and to lose it only in the event of incurring one of the grounds for dismissal established by labor legislation or when a forced reduction of services is necessary due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the service. Regarding bank employees, Article 41, subsection 6) of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional expressly recognizes the minimum benefits contemplated in the labor and civil service laws of the Republic, which results in the application in their favor of the rights contemplated by the Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Article 43 of that statute establishes the removal of servants covered by that regulation only when they incur the grounds contemplated in Article 81 of the Código de Trabajo and Article 41, subsection d), of that law, or in acts that imply a serious infraction of said regulation, its regulations, or the respective internal work regulations. Said law also contemplates the possibility of removal in those cases where a forced reduction of services is necessary due to an absolute lack of funds; or to achieve a more efficient and economical reorganization thereof, provided that reorganization affects at least 60% of the employees of the respective unit. On the other hand, the "Convenio de Partes suscrito entre el Banco Central de Costa Rica y sus Trabajadores" in 1988, in its *article 24*, provides: "*INAMOVILIDAD. All Bank employees covered by an indefinite-term employment contract are irremovable as provided by article 188 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, a concept that must be interpreted as the guarantee of bank employees not to be arbitrarily dismissed...". It is worth highlighting the provisions of the Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República, No. 7107 of November 4, 1988, published in La Gaceta No. 222 of November 22, 1988, transitory annex 3 of the articles of the Sistema Bancario Nacional, article 188, which states: "*Each State bank shall have a roster in which the banking career of its officials is guaranteed, as well as their irremovability and their promotions in such a way that the right to ascend in said institutions from the lowest scale to being able to occupy the highest positions is ensured, based on merit. Any modification carried out by banks to adapt their regular rosters to the prevailing conditions at the time shall not affect in any way employees who previously joined…*" (emphasis not in original). From the foregoing, it follows that since employment stability is a constitutional guarantee for the bank official, the specific cases of reorganization of services in which that right is curtailed must be assessed with absolute objectivity and in adherence to legality. The legal procedures established for this purpose must be respected, as well as the rights of the directly or indirectly involved servants, so that both the new proposed organizational forms, the criteria for determining which positions are maintained within the body or entity and their conditions, as well as the proposal regarding the officials to be removed or transferred, are matters that must be handled with full transparency and objectivity; otherwise, a dangerous loophole for arbitrariness would be opened, allowing the will of the hierarch—or those in charge of executing the changes—to dictate these aspects, even without any substantiation or using improper mechanisms or discriminatory criteria. In this matter, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has recognized the constitutionality of restructuring processes in the Public Administration, in the following terms: "*Right to work and stability in employment. In a public employment relationship, the projection of the right to work protected by Article 56 of the Constitution includes, as one of its postulates in favor of the worker, that of stability in the position. Indeed, it cannot be ignored that this is what allows the servant to access a series of social and economic benefits that enable their academic and professional advancement, providing them with the necessary security for their personal development and for the family unit that depends on them, which truly gives effect to the sense of the right to work as an individual guarantee and an obligation to society, using the expression of the constitutional text. That is why servants can only be removed by way of exception, due to a justified cause for dismissal, or in the case of a forced reduction of services, one of the cases being precisely the restructuring processes to which an institution may be subjected, the latter also being in line with the principles derived from Article 192 of the Political Constitution. Now, submitting to a legitimate modernization process that guarantees the optimum use of public funds and the highest efficiency in the provision of services entrusted to an institution is, of course, a legitimate reason to execute organizational changes that, in most cases, inevitably lead to the elimination of certain positions. But precisely because it is an exception to the constitutional guarantee of stability for the worker, its application by the Administration must be executed with absolute objectivity, transparency, and seriousness, hence the requirement for qualified technical studies that can validate decision-making based on a coherent and effective model. Under this line of thought, this Chamber admits that if the new structure cannot accommodate the relocation of an official because the substantive functions they were performing disappear due to being eliminated in response to efficiency and modernization criteria, their cessation is legitimate in accordance with the commented constitutional provision*". (Emphasis not in original) (Constitutional Chamber vote (voto) No. 4951-2000 of 4:37 p.m. on June 27, 2000). On the same topic, that Chamber also indicated: "*As the Chamber has indicated in reiterated pronouncements, Article 192 of the Political Constitution empowers the Public Administration to order the restructuring of the various departments that comprise it, in order to achieve better performance and organization thereof, for which it may order not only the elimination and reclassification of positions, but also the transfer of officials. The authorization provided by the legal system to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is dispensable in the current structure and, moreover, impossible to integrate into the new institutional organization. So the State may exercise its power to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for organizational reasons, provided that this is based on the real need—duly verified—to improve the public service and respects the procedure established for that purpose. In any case, and to ensure effective protection of the rights of the governed, the constitutional jurisdiction of freedom is empowered to review whether the restructuring mechanism is used to conceal dismissals carried out for reasons other than purely organizational ones. This is aimed at preventing the need for State reorganization and modernization from serving to exempt the Administration from its elementary obligation to always act in respect of the rights and freedoms that the Social State of Law recognizes to individuals*". (Underlining is the drafter's) (Constitutional Chamber votes (votos) Nos. 1846, at 2:57 p.m. on February 29; 2496, at 5:39 p.m. on March 21; 4951, at 4:37 p.m. on June 27; and 5783, at 4:01 p.m. on July 11, all of the year 2000). The foregoing establishes the scope to be given to the concept of "reorganization" (reorganización) or "restructuring" with which the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras dismissed the plaintiff. Reorganizations or restructurings, authorized by the constituent power as an exception to the general principle of employment stability (estabilidad en el empleo) of public officials, refer to a transformation in the organizational structure of the entity, which motivates the elimination or change of unnecessary positions to achieve a more efficient and economical reorganization of services. It constitutes an objective cause for dismissal, distinct from those causes established in the Código de Trabajo, which address faults committed by the worker or the inability to perform their functions, for which the employer can validly dismiss them. In no way could it be interpreted that, under the pretext of a reorganization to achieve that objective, one could examine the skills or performance of the servant in their position, given that this would mean applying a subjective cause for dismissal, not contemplated in the constitutional provision, within the concept of reorganization. In several amparo appeals (recursos de amparo) filed by officials of the defendant Bank, in relation to the restructuring process under study, the Constitutional Chamber ruled in these terms: "*On the other hand, having analyzed the account of facts set forth in Considerando II, it is observed that the restructuring process of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras is based on technical studies carried out by specialized consulting firms in the field, and its purpose is to guarantee the efficiency of the public service and the better use of public resources. Moreover, the decision to execute a modernization plan was communicated in advance to the affected public officials, so they could adopt the measures they deemed pertinent. Finally, the restructuring process was duly and timely approved by the competent bodies for that purpose, namely, the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero and the Junta Directiva of the Banco Central de Costa Rica. Consequently, it is also not observed that the threat of dismissal of the protected parties comes from an untimely or arbitrary action by the Administration*" (vote (voto) No. 2000-1846, at 2:57 p.m. on February 29, 2000). In votes (votos) 3136, at 10:52 a.m. on April 14; 4362, at 12:21 p.m. on May 19; and 11357, at 10:08 a.m. on December 20, all of the year 2000, the Constitutional Chamber dismissed various amparo appeals in which the plaintiff appeared as appellant, and in the last one, it stated: "*In a considerable number of amparo appeals, the Constitutional Chamber has had the opportunity to rule on the restructuring procedure in the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, its correctness from a formal point of view, and to declare that in itself, this process does not violate the fundamental rights of public servants. Obviously, in that form of resolution, no prejudgment is made, as it was not appropriate, on the individual impacts that may occur with the application of the reforming parameters that have been approved. It should be remembered that this restructuring is substantiated in and intimately linked to the precedents of the one carried out in the Banco Central de Costa Rica, which this Chamber somehow endorsed. Since this is the basis from which the individual application of the review mechanisms for pre-existing personnel is conducted, to declare whether or not they conform to the principles and values that inform the restructuring, such as, for example, whether the involved persons satisfactorily meet the approved profile and whether or not they obtain the minimum qualifications required based on the application of objective and substantially equal criteria for all servants, these mechanisms turn out to be aspects of legality that cannot be examined through the constitutional review process. This Court reaches this conclusion, but not without first warning that, exceptionally, gross errors and evident arbitrariness that lead to pathological cases of deviation of power would apply to this general rule. However, in the present matter, the Chamber does not find that the facts lead to such a classification. Indeed, what the protected party alleges is the manner in which she was evaluated and graded, which, as stated in the appeal, 'is the result of comparing real profiles with the ideal ones of the project, based on the evaluations, among other aspects, of intellectual aptitudes, critical thinking, logical-abstract reasoning, verbal reasoning, personality factors, dominance, rational control, self-confidence, sociability, reliability, training, experience, foreign languages (English)'. If the result, in the case of the appellant, was an insufficient grade to place herself in the intended category, whether the evaluation or qualification was correct or incorrect, whether the application of the objective criteria on which the evaluation is based was done with or without scientific foundation, these are aspects of ordinary legality that this Chamber cannot proceed to review… and this Tribunal is not here to control the application of legislation to a specific case, as has been stated, except for deviation of power that could result in the infringement of fundamental rights, which is not observed in the specific case*". Thus, in the case of the plaintiff, it cannot be considered that the validity of the procedure for her dismissal was endorsed by the Constitutional Chamber. This judicial office, like that Chamber, has recognized the legality of restructuring processes in the Public Administration, which the Constitutional Chamber declared regarding the restructuring carried out in the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and which this Court endorses, as the plaintiff's objections are not tenable when she pointed out that the tests applied in the restructuring process did not meet minimum reliability parameters and argued that accumulated experience, technical skill, academic level, and performance were not assessed, because such statements have not been proven; rather, from the documentary evidence on record, it appears that factors such as those indicated by the plaintiff were indeed considered (see evidence numbers 17, 26, and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file). For its part, the Colegio Profesional de Psicólogos de Costa Rica, whose intervention was requested by the union (folios 185 to 187), stated that it had found no anomaly in the actions of the professionals in charge of developing the process (folios 170 and 171), and the defendant, regarding the tests or exams applied, acknowledged—in its amparo appeal No. 99-009337-0007-CO—that these were adapted to the national environment (evidence number 39 of the administrative file). From the submitted documentary evidence numbers 26, 32, 33 and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file, it appears that the plaintiff had access to the results of the tests conducted and was in a position to discuss them, with the assistance of a professional in the field (see also evidence numbers 35, 36 and annexes 23 and 24 of the cited file). Likewise, from the documentary evidence numbered as proof 16A through 16F, it is evident that communication was indeed maintained with the employees regarding the process and that work experience was assessed. Information was also provided on the elements evaluated and on the interpretation of the tests (documentary evidence labeled as evidence number 23 and annexes 20 to 22 of the cited file). Furthermore, from the evidence identified with number 15 of the administrative file, it is apparent that the workers were duly informed that the process could conclude in dismissals with employer liability. Moreover, the record shows that all personnel in the occupational structure of SUGEF, including the Legal Advisory Department, were subject to the organizational and human resource restructuring plan of that unit, and therefore subjected to the academic, psychological, and behavioral evaluation tests, as well as intellectual aptitude, personality, and work style tests to which all personnel, including the plaintiff, were subjected—an evaluation which determined whether or not they met the new profiles and requirements for the various positions. However, what is relevant in the sub lite matter to resolve this issue is to analyze the legality of the specific dismissal of the worker.

IV.- In the case before us, the plaintiff's cessation was justified, as stated, by the existence of the restructuring process taking place in the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. Said restructuring had the following **main objectives**: "*Introduce the necessary adjustments to the organizational scheme in accordance with the requirements of the risk-based supervision approach. / Establish an organization that allows a clear assignment of responsibilities, the specialization of functions, and a capacity for timely response to the needs and evolution of the Sistema Financiero Nacional. / Integrate the supervision processes through adequate supervision, coordination, and communication between the different areas of SUGEF. / Seek the rational use of human and financial resources assigned to the oversight of entities...*" (annex 13 of the administrative file). From the note sent to the plaintiff, the reasons that motivated her dismissal are drawn. In that communication, she was told:

"*In my capacity as administrative head of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, it is my responsibility to implement the approved restructuring, whose first stage consisted of an evaluation of the competency skills of each official, for each of the positions, given that each one requires different degrees of critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work/management style, and personality factors. / The second stage consisted of the evaluation of personnel through a forced ranking. The immediate superiors of each official were asked to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of their personnel, taking into account both their technical skills and their competency skills. In this way, initiative, written communication, time management, planning, programming and control, problem solving, decision making, and technical skill were assessed. / The third stage consisted of the evaluation of the personnel of this entity, through different instruments to assess the compliance by said officials with the new requirements established regarding academic training and professional experience. / Based on these evaluations and their results, I have had to make decisions regarding your permanence in this organization. In accordance with the evaluations carried out, you meet the academic requirements to hold the position of Profesional en Gestión Bancaria 3, in the Dirección General de Asesoría Jurídica, however, the competency evaluations indicate that your skills do not match the competencies required to perform said position.*" Likewise, comparing her profile with other positions in the new structure, her relocation within this entity was not possible" (Anexo 11 and evidence No. 4 of the administrative file). (The bold and underline are the writer's).

It is observed from the transcribed documentation that the worker was dismissed after the following points were evaluated: 1) her skills in the position in aspects such as critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work style/direction, and personality factors; 2) the evaluation performed by her superior regarding abilities such as initiative, written communication, time management, planning, problem-solving, decision-making, etc.; and lastly, 3) compliance with the new requirements established regarding academic training and professional experience. The plaintiff was informed that she met the academic requirements established for the position of Banking Management Professional 3; however, she was dismissed because, according to the other evaluations conducted, she lacked the skills required to perform in that position. The foregoing means that the termination of her position did not correspond to an objective restructuring as a result of which her position disappeared, but rather to an examination of her aptitudes and skills, from which it is inferred that the failure to meet the new established standards motivated her termination. Such a procedure is not authorized by the constitution, since resolving in that manner is a veiled way through which the plaintiff was dismissed due to her personal conditions, thereby allowing a subjective cause for dismissal not authorized by law or the Constitution, making the dismissal of the claimant arbitrary and illegal, using the restructuring process as an excuse or pretext to terminate her and appoint another professional in her place. If, by principle, the servants of the Public Administration are protected by job stability, it is not possible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, the requirements and personal conditions with which the servant accessed their position are modified, because this would open a dangerous loophole for arbitrariness and insecurity. In this sense, it must be mentioned that Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute, when referring to dismissal due to reorganization, states that when dispensing with servants, criteria such as efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitudes, and other conditions resulting from the service rating will be considered, which is understood for the case in which certain positions of a same category being eliminated are retained. But the case under study is different, because what occurred here was a reassessment of the aptitudes and skills with which the plaintiff was admitted and appointed to her position; a reassessment carried out with different standards from those with which she was initially hired, and which, upon not being met, motivated her termination. It must be clear that the right to stability of public officials can only be eliminated by the causes expressly stated in the law, as no public entity is permitted to carry out reorganization processes that conclude with dismissals, departing from constitutional and legal regulations. Only that contemplated in the constitutional norm and developed in subsections a) and b) of Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute can be classified as restructuring, and not any other process. So-called modernization processes or reviews of personnel structures can be called by many different names, such as job requalification, reengineering, restructuring, transitional strategies, organizational rearchitecture, structural redesign, organizational flattening, job reversal, structural reinvention. All such measures aimed at reducing costs, invoking efficiency, must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and can in no way become a mechanism to review appointment acts that were legally performed many years earlier. The legal system allows public entities to impose new requirements for positions, demand new profiles, and, based on that, hire suitable personnel to fill them, without prejudice to the rights of those who occupy those positions. In the cited votes of the Constitutional Chamber, issued by that Chamber on the occasion of amparo appeals filed by officials of SUGEF against that institution, it is noted that the plaintiff also appealed through that channel the restructuring process that ultimately culminated in her dismissal. However, such amparo actions were rejected, among other reasons, for the following:

"In the specific case, apart from the foregoing considerations, it cannot be ignored that the restructuring process in SUGEF is just being executed, the completion of which was agreed for June 30, 2000 (regardless of in which session this agreement was issued), and that it is not proven in the record that the protected party is among the persons who are going to be dismissed, since there is also the institutional commitment that, prior to making that type of decision, relocation in another position will be sought within the same Body, in the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or in any of the other Maximum Deconcentration Bodies of the issuing entity. Likewise, the Chamber understands, because the informant expressly stated so, that the tests carried out so far will constitute nothing more than another additional element to consider alongside academic training, professional experience, and knowledge of the English language, such that the fact of not having been 'qualified' in accordance with them is not decisive for a dismissal decision against her, according to the Superintendent General of Financial Entities has indicated under oath—with consequences including criminal liability as contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction in case of stating inaccuracies or falsehoods to this Court. In this context, the Chamber considers that at this moment the filing of this amparo is premature, given that there is no certain and imminent threat pending to the detriment of the protected party of being dismissed without respect for her fundamental rights, (…) Far from it, the tests that have been applied to all SUGEF personnel will constitute an objective parameter to be used by the head to make subsequent decisions regarding the personnel who will definitively remain in that Body, jointly with others such as the academic and professional record of each servant and the evaluation of the immediate supervisor..." (vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1856-00, at 3:07 p.m. on February 29, cited by No. 3136, at 10:52 a.m. on April 14, both of 2000).

In accordance with the reasons set forth, addressing the specific grievances raised by the appellant, it could well be said that the ad-quem incurred an erroneous and inadequate assessment of the evidence by questioning, in general terms, the validity and legality of the restructuring process, but not so in pointing out that the plaintiff's dismissal was illegitimate due to being arbitrary and illegal, since, as stated, she was removed after examining her personal conditions and determining that she did not meet the requirements of the position, according to a new profile established by the employer itself, in order to appoint another lawyer in her place. Consequently, we deem null the dismissal to which the plaintiff was subjected, and being in the presence of a null dismissal, the effects of that declaration must be retroactive to the moment or date of said act, so that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. Consequently, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, specifying that from the amount that may be due to the plaintiff, the sums paid for advance notice, severance pay, and other indemnities received by her (Anexo 12 of the administrative file) must be deducted, as well as any other item that, by way of salary, she may have received after that settlement. Regarding the amounts to be paid for such concept, the deduction of social security contributions must also be made.

V.- The prohibition is not an employer's liberality but rather a condition legally imposed on a specific position by reason of the nature of the functions that compose it, which requires a transparent, impartial, and objective exercise, far from any conflict of interest; it is an ethical requirement and a condition inherent to the position that imposes a specific legal situation on its holder, from which the duty arises for the official appointed to the position not to exercise their profession or trade for the benefit of third parties, with the correlative right to the payment of an economic compensation for said limitation. It is an incompatibility between the exercise of the public function and that of the private profession due to the potential conflict of interests between the two. In the specific case, the prohibition was paid to the plaintiff based on the following budgetary provisions:

"Article 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic for 1985, No. 6982 of December 19, 1984. Add a paragraph to Article 1 of Law 5867 that reads: 'The benefits and prohibitions indicated in this article include the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos.'- 'Article 101 of the Extraordinary Budget Law, No. 7015 of November 22, 1985.- The technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos shall receive the economic benefits of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, and its amendments, subject to the prohibitions of said law.' 'Article 14 of the Budget Law for 1986, No. 7018 of December 20, 1985.- 1. ... 17. The prohibitions and benefits contained in Article 1 of Law No. 5867 of December 15, 1975, are applicable to the Auditing Departments of the National Banking System.'" (The bold is not in the original).

The payment of said economic compensation ceased with the votes of the Constitutional Chamber No. 4647 at 4:20 p.m. on June 16, 1999, and 6327 at 10:03 a.m. on August 13, 1999, which declared unconstitutional and annulled the cited provisions retroactively to their entry into force, without prejudice to the good faith rights acquired under their protection, and not based on Article 8 of Session No. 4621 of December 9, 1992, which referred to Article 27 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement—a provision that had also been annulled by votes No. 1962-92 and 3285-92 of the Constitutional Chamber—without any other valid and effective legal provision existing to support it, as ordered by the principle of legality that must be observed in public service. From the foregoing, it is inferred that the representative of SUGEF is correct in indicating that the budgetary provisions annulled through Vote 4647 of June 16, 1999, did not give economic content to the prohibition payment, as the court erroneously understood; on the contrary, they gave legal support to the regime, since the matter they regulated was not budgetary but rather a matter belonging to ordinary legislation with which Law 5867 was amended, extending the recognition of the prohibition to the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos (today SUGEF). He is also correct in pointing out that, since the provisions supporting the prohibition payment in that entity were declared unconstitutional and therefore null, his client did not need to resort to the process of Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration or Articles 10 and 35 of the Regulating Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction to eliminate said benefit, because such provisions are designed for the nullity of administrative acts declaratory of rights or that produce legal effects, and the prohibition regime that covered the plaintiff was established by the provisions declared unconstitutional by Vote 4647-99, so one cannot speak of the annulment of any administrative act, since the regime had legislative, not administrative, support; therefore, the contested ruling erred in considering that the prohibition was eliminated in an arbitrary and illegal manner due to a lack of due process.

VI.- The payment of the prohibition depends on whether the position held is under that regime and whether the official or servant meets the requirements provided in the regulations that impose it. In this specific case, the legal basis for the prohibition payment, as stated, was provided for in the cited atypical provisions, which for that reason were annulled. The indemnity for the prohibition was granted to the plaintiff subject to the validity of said provisions, so independently of whether the bank's administration revoked the benefit in execution of the aforementioned votes of unconstitutionality, the truth is that said indemnity was granted conditioned on the position in question continuing to be subject to said regime, which is sufficient to consider that this benefit did not constitute an acquired right, because it was contingent upon the position remaining under the prohibition regime. According to what was resolved by Constitutional Votes No. 4647-99 and 6327-99, which declared null the provisions on which the prohibition was based, without prejudice to rights acquired under their validity, undoubtedly the right to payments received for that concept while the prohibition regime existed was consolidated, which must be considered non-refundable insofar as they definitively entered the plaintiff's patrimony prior to the extinction of those regulations, but it does not constitute a right to demand that the regime must continue to exist. It is clear that the cited budgetary provisions supported the granting of the prohibition benefit in the Auditoría General de Bancos (today SUGEF), and that as of Vote 4647-99, those provisions became void with the unconstitutionality declared therein, so if the Constitutional Chamber dimensioned the effects of its declaration of nullity, stating that it was retroactive to the date of validity of the annulled provisions, without prejudice to good faith acquired rights, it is as of that date that the administration of the defendant bank was left without the necessary legal basis to continue applying the economic benefit of the prohibition questioned here, regarding the positions of officials of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. Hence, the ad-quem court erred in considering that the plaintiff continued to have a legal basis to maintain the prohibition benefit, since, as stated, the budgetary provisions on which her prohibition regime was based were found unconstitutional in light of the cited Votes 4647-99 and 6327-99, so the only acquired right the plaintiff has is that corresponding to the monies she received while the regime existed and the servant fell within the factual assumptions that said regime established. Consequently, it cannot be considered that the mere fact that the plaintiff received the prohibition payment determined the existence of an acquired right to that benefit for the rest of her working life with SUGEF. We are not in the presence of a right that has been incorporated into the employment contract, but rather a benefit that, in order to be received, must have its respective legal basis, so there cannot be a right to remain under the regime beyond the change that occurs in the legal system, whether by repeal through a later law or annulment through a judgment in the constitutional arena. In other words, there is no right to the immutability of the regime. Consequently, as the objections of the appellant are admissible in this petitioned third instance, the contested judgment must be reversed insofar as it upheld the action regarding the end of the prohibition, and in its place, that specific point of the claims of the lawsuit is dismissed.

VII.- The objections of the plaintiff are not admissible insofar as the claimed end of homologation is concerned, that it involved a salary adjustment of general application not recognized for the position she held, given that it is recorded in the file that in Session No. 4975-98 of October 21, 1998, official communication [Placa1] of the 19th of that same month and year was heard, in which it is noted that some classes of positions at the Banco Central present differences in their classification and valuation when compared with their similar ones in the deconcentrated bodies, since even though they had substantially identical characteristics in terms of factors of skill, effort, and responsibility, the salary category was different (lower at the Banco Central in relation to its deconcentrated bodies). Therefore, the Board of Directors of the bank, based on the power it has to dictate its salary regime and other remunerations for its officials, as well as its own policy on job classification and valuation (Article 28, subsections t) and m) of the Organic Law of the Banco Central), taking into account principles such as equity, reasonableness, and equality, in Article 10 of Session No. 4980-98, of December 9, 1998, based on what was stated by the administration in memorandum [Placa2] of November 17, 1998, regarding the necessary homologation of the classes of positions existing in the Banco Central and its dependencies, agreed, among other things: "1.- Approve the homologation of the classes of professional positions located in categories 13 and 14, and of the classes of positions relating to Section Chiefs or Area Executives, currently in category 16, so that they are located in categories 15, 16, and 18, respectively, of the Current Regular Salary Scale, an action that will take effect on July 1, 1999, according to the date of approval of its budgetary content by the Contraloría General de la República. / 2.- …The foregoing seeks to correct the distortions currently present in matters of job classification and valuation, so that classes of positions whose characteristics are substantially equal in terms of factors of skill (Academic preparation, experience, and specific knowledge); effort and responsibility (decision-making, fund management, significance of the decision, supervision exercised), are assigned to the same salary category" (official communications [Placa1] and [Placa2] from pages 373 to 388 and evidence No. 40 of the administrative file). That is, the Banco Central decided to apply the homologation to positions that, despite having the same tasks and meeting the same requirements demanded of their counterparts located in the Legal Advisory Department of SUGEF, received different salary remunerations, resulting from dissimilar categories. In the plaintiff's case, through administrative resolution SUGEF-02-98 of July 13, 1998, provided as evidence in Anexo 30 of the administrative file, it was determined that the lawyers of SUGEF would be reclassified to category 16, when that type of professionals at the Banco Central continued with a category 13 or 14; this caused one of the distortions that were intended to be corrected with the job homologation process, when it was decided to equate the classes of positions whose factors of skill, responsibility, and effort were substantially equal to those of the officials of the superintendencies (which originated the distortions and where the plaintiff was assigned), in order to eliminate the existing differences by assigning the same salary category, which meant moving the lawyers who were assigned in categories 13 and 14 of the Regular Salary Scale to 16, which was the one held by the legal advisors of SUGEF, which translated into the recognition or equalization of categories for the rest of the bank's lawyers who performed the same tasks and met the same requirements, so that everyone would have category 16. Thus, if the position held by the plaintiff in the class "Asesor Jurídico," category 16, of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, was one of those taken as a reference point for the application of the job homologation, it was illogical for that category, with responsibilities and functions identical to the homologated ones, to have been recognized a higher category, because this would have perpetuated the unconstitutional inequalities (Article 57 of the Political Constitution) and illegal inequalities (Article 167 of the Labor Code) that were occurring at that time in the salary scale of the issuing entity, which furthermore could not be done, since it was stated regarding that position that "Because no classes of positions with conditions similar to the aforementioned classes of positions were found in the technical-operative section of the Regular Salary Scale, the homologation process does not extend to that section." Thus, the proper course is to confirm the contested judgment insofar as it declared that end of the lawsuit to be without merit.

**VIII.-** Article 54 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica No. 1552 of April 23, 1953, and its amendments, established: “*The Central Bank of Costa Rica may only record in its assets and debit balances the following: / … / 8°.- The balances of accounts originating from the normal movement of expenses, losses, and results, and others arising from operations authorized by this law. Within the item indicated in numeral 8, the Central Bank shall include a sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total salaries of its employees for the maintenance of the guarantee and retirement fund for these employees. This sum shall belong to them in the proportion corresponding to their salary, and must be delivered to them under the conditions determined in the retirement regulations, if they leave the service before having attained the right to a disability pension. This contribution from the Bank shall be the sole contribution for all types of social benefits. The institution's regulations may establish the additional sums with which employees must contribute to the strengthening of the fund, so that they may obtain an adequate pension, according to their salary, age, and time of service. The system thus created is complementary to that established by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and does not affect the obligations of its beneficiaries to the Caja. The sums corresponding to employees who leave the service before having attained the right to a disability pension are declared unseizable. The Central Bank may invest the reserve for legal benefits in the discount of obligations held in favor of the aforementioned fund. Employees shall be represented on the Administrative Board of the Bank's Guarantee and Retirement Fund, and they shall elect two of its members*”. This rule was repealed by Article 170 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica No. 7558 of November 3, 1995. The plaintiff's objections to continue being recognized the equivalent of the 10% salary contribution for the maintenance of the Guarantee and Retirement Fund, which she considers a right incorporated into her employment contract because she joined SUGEF before such contribution was eliminated by the repeal ordered in Law No. 7558 of November 13, 1995, are unavailing, because said contribution does not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) or consolidated legal situation of the employees who, as of November 1995, were part of the complementary pension regime regulated by Article 54 of Law No. 1552, amended by No. 7107 of November 4, 1988, which established the contribution that the Central Bank had been making based on that repealed rule. That percentage never formed an integral part of the salary of the Central Bank officials and its dependencies—even though it was calculated as a percentage of the total salaries of the employees and belonged to them by legal provision, in the proportion corresponding to their salary—nor a vested right that must continue to be paid, because the cause for that transfer of money from the Central Bank's patrimony to the Guarantee Fund had a legal cause of a different nature and was duly authorized by the legal system, which is not the case now. The vested right of those who worked at the Central Bank before the enactment of Law No. 7558, regarding the contributions that institution made when it was authorized by the legal system, translates into the certainty of not having to reimburse their employer for what it contributed to the Guarantee Fund. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has established: “*In this case, the constitutional guarantee of non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of removing the already acquired good or right from the person's patrimony, or of causing that, if the factual premise had been met prior to the legal reform, the (beneficial, it is understood) consequence that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation no longer arises. Now, specifically regarding the latter, it has also been understood that no one has a \"right to the immutability of the legal system\", that is, that the rules will never change. Therefore, the constitutional precept does not consist of the rule that connects the fact with the effect, once born into legal life, cannot be modified or even suppressed by a subsequent norm…*” (ruling [voto] No. 2765 of 3:03 p.m. on May 20, 1997). It was also stated in said ruling that: “*1. The protection of vested rights means, in this case, that despite the elimination of the norms, all amounts received until then as assistance must be considered non-recoverable. To the extent that they had definitively entered the interested parties' patrimony prior to the legal reform, it would be absurd—and unconstitutional—to pretend that they must be returned, or something similar…*”. Hence, in the case of the plaintiff, as with the other Central Bank officials, the only vested right that can be claimed regarding that contribution is with respect to those effectively delivered by the bank to the Guarantee and Retirement Fund up to the moment of the repeal of the rule that supported it, which are the proportional property of each of them, and not that the issuing entity continue granting said benefit. Consequently, the plaintiff has no right for the Central Bank to continue making the contribution she claims; therefore, the decision on this specific point by the lower instance judges must be confirmed.

**IX.-** Finally, the plaintiff is right in feeling aggrieved by the equitable fixing of personal costs, but not with the claim that these be set on a percentage basis. Because the dispute at hand is a matter of inestimable value and considering the work performed, the economic importance of the process, and the economic standing of the parties (Article 495 of the Labor Code [Código de Trabajo]), the equitable fixing of personal costs must be modified, to instead establish them in the sum of one million colones.

**X.-** In accordance with the preceding considerations, it is appropriate to partially overturn the appealed judgment regarding the estimation of the action concerning the prohibition claim, to uphold the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) on that matter and to dismiss that specific point of the lawsuit's claim. The fixing of personal costs must be modified to establish them in the equitable sum of one million colones. In all other respects, the appealed sentence must be confirmed, establishing that the sums paid for advance notice (preaviso), severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), and other indemnities received by the plaintiff (Annex 12 of the administrative file), as well as any other item or items received as salary after that settlement, must be deducted from the amount that corresponds to the plaintiff. Social charges must also be deducted from the amounts to be paid for said concept, to the extent legally applicable.

**POR TANTO:** The appealed judgment is partially overturned regarding the estimation of the action concerning the prohibition claim. In its place, the defense of lack of right is upheld on that matter and that specific point of the lawsuit's claim is dismissed. The fixing of personal costs is modified to establish them in the equitable sum of three million colones. In all other respects, the appealed sentence is confirmed, establishing that the sums paid for advance notice, severance pay, and other indemnities already received by the plaintiff, as well as any other item or items received as salary after that settlement, must be deducted from the amount that corresponds to the plaintiff. Social charges must also be deducted from the amounts to be paid for said concept, to the extent legally applicable.

***Orlando Aguirre Gómez*** ***Zarela María Villanueva Monge*** ***Julia Varela Araya*** ***Rolando Vega Robert*** ***Eva María Camacho Vargas*** **CONSTANCIA:** In accordance with Article 154, final paragraph, of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), it is hereby noted that Judge Eva María Camacho Vargas participated with her vote in the issuance of this judgment, but does not sign because she is unable to do so, as she is on vacation. San José, January 12, 2010.

**José Celso Fernández Delgado** **Acting Secretary (Secretario a.í.)** ***[Name4].-*** 2 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Electronic Mail: [...]

**III.-** The dismissal of the plaintiff was justified in a process of organizational and human resource restructuring of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero in session no. 124-99, article 6, of November 9, 1999, and by the Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica in session no. 5014-99, article 5, of November 12, 1999 (lawsuit, statement of defense, and evidence no. 6 of the administrative file). As a fundamental principle of the public employment regime, constitutional provision 192 instituted the so-called *"right to stability in employment"*, which has been conceived as the right of the public servant to keep their position and to lose it only in the event of incurring one of the grounds for dismissal established by labor legislation or when a forced reduction of services is necessary due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the service. Regarding banking employees, article 41, subsection 6) of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional expressly recognizes for them the minimum benefits contemplated in the labor and civil service laws of the Republic, which results in the application in their favor of the rights contemplated by the Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Article 43 of that statute establishes the removal of servants protected by that regulation only when they incur the grounds contemplated in article 81 of the Código de Trabajo and 41, subsection d), of that law, or in acts that imply a serious infraction of said regulation, its regulations, or the respective internal labor regulations. Said law also contemplates the possibility of removal in those cases where a forced reduction of services is necessary due to an absolute lack of funds; or to achieve a more efficient and economical reorganization of the same, provided that reorganization affects at least 60% of the employees of the respective unit. Furthermore, the “Convenio de Partes suscrito entre el Banco Central de Costa Rica y sus Trabajadores” in the year 1988, in its *article 24* provides: “*LIFETIME TENURE. All Bank employees covered by an indefinite-term employment contract have lifetime tenure as provided in article 188 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, a concept that must be interpreted as the guarantee of banking employees not to be arbitrarily dismissed...*”. It is worth highlighting the provisions of the Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República no. 7107 of November 4, 1988, published in La Gaceta no. 222 of November 22, 1988, transitory annex 3 of the articles of the Sistema Bancario Nacional, article 188, which states: “*<span style="text-decoration:underline;">Each State bank must have a roster guaranteeing the banking career to its officials, as well as their lifetime tenure and promotions in such a way as to ensure their right to rise within these institutions from the lowest scale to potentially occupying the highest positions, based on merit</span>. Any modification carried out by banks to adapt their regular rosters to the prevailing conditions at the time will not in any way affect employees who joined previously…*” (highlighting is not from the original). From the foregoing, it follows that since labor stability is a constitutional guarantee for the banking official, specific cases of service reorganization in which that right is curtailed must be assessed with absolute objectivity and adherence to legality. The established legal procedures for this purpose must be respected, as well as the rights of the servants directly or indirectly involved, so that both the proposed new organizational forms, the criteria for determining which positions are maintained within the body or entity and their conditions, as well as the proposal regarding the officials to be removed or transferred, are matters that must be handled with full transparency and objectivity; otherwise, a dangerous loophole for arbitrariness would be opened, allowing the will of the head of the institution—or those in charge of implementing the changes—to decide these aspects, even without any substantiation or using improper mechanisms or discriminatory criteria. On this matter, the Sala Constitucional has recognized the constitutionality of restructuring processes in the Public Administration, in the following terms: “***Right to work and stability in employment**. In a public employment relationship, the projection of the right to work protected by article 56 of the Constitution contains, as one of its postulates in favor of the worker, that of stability in the position. Indeed, it cannot be denied that this is what allows the servant to access a series of social and economic benefits that enable their academic and professional advancement, providing them with the necessary security for their personal development and that of the family unit that depends on them, which truly effectuates the meaning of the right to work as an individual guarantee and obligation to society, in the expression used by the constitutional text. It is for this reason that servants can only be removed by way of exception, due to a justified ground for dismissal, or in the case of a forced reduction of services, one of these cases being precisely the restructuring processes to which an institution may be subjected, the latter also being in line with the principles derived from article 192 of the Constitución Política. Now then, subjection to a legitimate modernization process, which guarantees the optimal use of public funds and the highest efficiency in the provision of the services entrusted to an institution, is, of course, a legitimate reason to execute organizational changes that, in most cases, inevitably entail the suppression of certain positions. **But precisely because it is an exception to the constitutional guarantee of stability for the worker, its application by the administration must be executed with absolute objectivity, transparency, and seriousness, and hence the requirement for qualified technical studies that can validate decision-making, based on a coherent and effective model. Under this line of thought, this Chamber admits that if the new structure cannot accommodate the relocation of an official, since the substantive functions they had been performing disappear, as they are suppressed based on efficiency and modernization criteria, their termination is legitimate in accordance with the aforementioned constitutional provision**.*” (Highlighting is not from the original) (ruling of the Sala Constitucional no. 4951-2000 of 16:37 on June 27, 2000). On the same subject, that Chamber also indicated: “*As the Chamber has indicated in repeated pronouncements, article 192 of the Constitución Política empowers the Public Administration to order the restructuring of the various units that comprise it, in order to achieve better performance and organization thereof, for which purpose it may order not only the elimination and reclassification of positions, but also the transfer of officials. <span style="text-decoration:underline;">The authorization provided by the legal system to dispense with the services of a public official due to restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is dispensable in the current structure and, moreover, impossible to integrate into the new institutional organization. Thus, the State may exercise its power to forcibly transfer or dismiss its officials for reasons of reorganization, provided that this is based on the real—duly verified—need to improve the public service and respects the procedure established for that purpose. In any case, and to ensure the effective protection of the rights of the administered, the constitutional jurisdiction of liberty is legitimized to review whether the figure of restructuring is used to conceal dismissals carried out for reasons other than purely organizational ones. This with the objective of preventing the need for reorganization and modernization of the State from serving to exempt the Administration from its elementary obligation to always act in respect of the rights and freedoms that the Social State of Law recognizes to individuals</span>*.” (The underlining is by the drafter) (rulings of the Sala Constitucional nos. 1846, of 14:57 on February 29; 2496, of 17:39 on March 21; 4951, of 16:37 on June 27; and 5783, of 16:01 on July 11, all of the year 2000). The foregoing establishes the scope to be given to the concept of “reorganization” or “restructuring,” with which the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras dismissed the plaintiff. The reorganizations or restructurings, authorized by the constituent power as an exception to the general principle of stability in the employment of public officials, refer to a transformation in the organizational structure of the entity, which motivates the elimination or change of unnecessary positions to achieve a more efficient and economical reorganization of the services. It constitutes an objective ground for dismissal distinct from those grounds established in the Código de Trabajo, which address the faults committed by the worker or the incapacity for the execution of their duties, for which the employer can validly dismiss them. In no way could it be interpreted that, under the pretext of a reorganization to achieve that objective, the skills or performance of the servant in their position can be examined, given that this would mean applying a subjective ground for dismissal, not contemplated in the constitutional norm, within the concept of reorganization. In several amparo appeals filed by officials of the defendant Bank, in relation to the restructuring process under study, the Sala Constitucional ruled in these terms: “*On the other hand, having analyzed the account of facts set forth in considerando II, it is observed that the **restructuring process** of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras is based on technical studies carried out by consulting firms specialized in the matter, and its purpose is to guarantee the efficiency of the public service and the best use of public resources. Furthermore, the decision to execute a modernization plan was communicated in advance to the affected public officials, so that they could adopt the measures they deemed pertinent. Finally, the restructuring process was duly and timely approved by the competent bodies for that purpose, namely, the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero and the Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica. Consequently, it is also not observed that the threat of dismissal of the protected parties comes from an untimely or arbitrary action on the part of the Administration*” (ruling no. 2000-1846, of 14:57 on February 29, 2000). In rulings 3136, of 10:52 on April 14; 4362, of 12:21 on May 19; and 11357, of 10:08 on December 20, all of the year 2000, the Sala Constitucional declared without merit respective amparo appeals in which the plaintiff appeared as appellant, and in the last one it stated: “*In a considerable number of amparo cases, the Sala Constitucional has had the opportunity to rule on the restructuring procedure at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, its correctness from a formal point of view, and to declare that in itself that process does not violate the fundamental rights of public servants. Obviously, in that form of resolution, no prejudgment is made, as was not appropriate, regarding the individual impacts that may occur with the application of the reforming parameters that have been approved. It should be remembered that this restructuring is based on and intimately linked with the precedents of the one carried out at the Banco Central de Costa Rica, which this Chamber in some way endorsed. This being the basis from which the individual application of the mechanisms for reviewing pre-existing personnel is carried out, in order to declare whether or not they conform to the principles and values that inform the restructuring, such as, for example, whether the persons involved satisfactorily meet the approved profile and whether or not they obtain the minimum qualifications required through the application of objective and substantially equal criteria for all servants, these mechanisms turn out to be aspects of legality that cannot be examined through constitutional review. This is the conclusion reached by the Chamber, not without first warning that this general rule would apply, by exception, to gross errors and evident arbitrariness leading to pathological cases of deviation of power. However, in the present matter, the Chamber does not find that the facts lead to such a qualification.*” Indeed, what the amparo petitioner alleges is the manner in which she was evaluated and scored, which according to what is stated in the appeal, "is the result of the confrontation of real profiles with the ideal profiles for the project, based on evaluations of, among other aspects, intellectual aptitudes, critical thinking, logical-abstract reasoning, verbal reasoning, personality factors, dominance, rational control, self-confidence, sociability, trustworthiness, training, experience, foreign languages (English)." If the result, in the case of the appellant, was an insufficient score to place her in the category sought, if the evaluation or scoring was correct or incorrect, if the application of the objective criteria on which the evaluation is based was done with a scientific foundation or not, these are matters of ordinary legality that this Chamber cannot review... and this Court is not here to control the application of legislation to a specific case, as has been stated, except for abuse of power (desviación de poder) that might result in the infringement of fundamental rights, which is not evident in the specific case.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">"</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> Thus, in the plaintiff's case, it cannot be considered that the validity of her dismissal procedure was endorsed by the Constitutional Chamber. This judicial office, like that Chamber, has recognized the legality of restructuring processes in the Public Administration, which the Constitutional Chamber declared regarding the restructuring carried out at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and is endorsed by this Chamber, because the plaintiff's objections—in which she pointed out that the tests applied in the restructuring process did not meet minimum reliability parameters and claimed that accumulated experience, technical skill, academic level, and performance were not assessed—are not admissible, since such assertions have not been proven; rather, from the documentary evidence in the record, it can be inferred that factors such as those indicated by the plaintiff were indeed taken into account (see pieces of evidence numbered 17, 26 and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file). Furthermore, the Colegio Profesional de Psicólogos de Costa Rica, whose intervention was requested by the union (folios 185 to 187), stated that it had not found any anomaly in the conduct of the professionals responsible for carrying out the process (folios 170 and 171), and the respondent, regarding the tests or assessments applied, acknowledged—in its amparo appeal no. 99-009337-0007-CO—that these were adapted to the national context (piece of evidence number 39 of the administrative file). From the submitted documentary evidence numbers 26, 32, 33, and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file, it is clear that the plaintiff had access to the results of the tests performed and was able to discuss them, with the assistance of a professional in the field (see also pieces of evidence numbers 35, 36 and annexes 23 and 24 of the cited file). Likewise, from the documentary evidence numbered as proof 16A through 16F, it can be extracted that communication was maintained with employees regarding the process and that work experience was evaluated. Information was also provided on the elements evaluated and on the interpretation of the tests (documentary evidence labeled as proof number 23 and annexes 20 to 22 of the cited file). Then, from the evidence identified as number 15 of the administrative file, it can be inferred that the workers were duly informed that the process could conclude in dismissals with employer liability. Furthermore, it is recorded in the file that all the personnel in the occupational structure of SUGEF, including the Legal Advisory Office, were subject to the organizational and human resources restructuring plan of that unit, and therefore subjected to the academic, psychological, and behavioral evaluation tests, as well as those on intellectual aptitude, personality, and work style to which all personnel, including the plaintiff, were submitted, an evaluation by which it was determined whether they met the new profiles and requirements for the different positions. However, what is relevant in the sub lite issue to resolve this matter is to analyze the legality of the specific dismissal of the worker.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">IV.-</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> In the case at hand, the plaintiff's termination was justified, as stated, by the restructuring process taking place at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. Said restructuring had the following </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold">main objectives</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">:</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">"</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Introduce the necessary adjustments to the organizational scheme in accordance with the requirements of the risk-based supervision approach. / Establish an organization that allows a clear assignment of responsibilities, the specialization of functions, and a capacity for timely response to the needs and evolution of the National Financial System. / Integrate supervision processes through adequate supervision, coordination, and communication between the different areas of SUGEF. / Seek the rational use of human and financial resources destined for the oversight of entities...</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" (annex 13 of the administrative file). The reasons motivating her dismissal are clear from the communication sent to the plaintiff. In that communication, she was informed:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">"</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">In my capacity as the administrative head of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, it is my responsibility to implement</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> the approved restructuring, which, as a first stage, consisted of an </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">evaluation of the competency skills of each official, for each of the positions</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">, given that each position requires different degrees of critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work/leadership style, and personality factors. / The second stage consisted of </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the evaluation of the personnel through a forced ranking. The immediate superiors of each official were asked to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of their staff, considering both their technical skills and their competency skills.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> In this way, initiative, written communication, time management, planning, scheduling and control, problem-solving, decision-making, and technical skill were assessed. / The third stage consisted of the </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">evaluation of this entity's personnel, through different instruments that allowed assessing said officials' compliance with the new requirements established regarding academic training and professional experience.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> / Based on these evaluations and their results, I have had to make decisions regarding your permanence in this organization. In accordance with the evaluations carried out</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">, you meet the academic requirements to hold the position </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">of Profesional en Gestión Bancaria 3,</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> of the Dirección General de Asesoría Jurídica, </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">however, </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the competency evaluations indicate that your skills do not match the competencies required to perform said position. </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">Likewise, comparing your profile with other positions in the new structure, your relocation within this entity was not possible</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">" </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">(annex 11 and proof no. 4 of the administrative file)</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">(Bolding and underlining by the writer).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:195%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">It is observed from the transcribed documentation that the worker was terminated after the following points were assessed:</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> 1) her skills in the position in aspects such as critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work/leadership style, and personality factors; 2) the evaluation carried out by her superior regarding abilities such as initiative, written communication, time management, planning, problem-solving, decision-making, etc., and finally, 3) compliance with the new requirements established regarding academic training and professional experience. The plaintiff was informed that she met the academic requirements established for the position of Profesional en Gestión Bancaria 3; however, she was dismissed because, according to the other evaluations carried out, she lacked the skills required to perform in that position. The foregoing means that the termination of her position did not correspond to an objective restructuring as a result of which her job position (plaza) disappeared, but rather to an examination of her aptitudes and skills from which it is inferred that the failure to meet the newly established standards motivated her termination. Such a procedure is not authorized by the drafters of the Constitution, since resolving in that manner is a veiled way by which the plaintiff was dismissed due to her personal conditions, thereby permitting a subjective ground for dismissal not authorized by law or by the Constitution, rendering the dismissal of the claimant arbitrary and illegal, using the restructuring process as an excuse or pretext to terminate her and appoint another professional in her place.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">If, in principle, Public Administration servants are protected by employment stability, it is not possible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, the requirements and personal conditions with which the servant obtained their position are modified, because that would open a dangerous loophole to arbitrariness and insecurity.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">In this regard, it must be mentioned that Article 47 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil, when referring to dismissal due to reorganization, indicates that when dispensing with the services of servants, criteria such as efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitudes, and other conditions resulting from the service rating will be considered, which is understood to apply in the event that certain positions of a same eliminated category are retained.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> However, the case under study is different, because what operated in this instance was a re-evaluation of the aptitudes and skills with which the plaintiff was admitted and appointed to her position; a re-evaluation carried out under different standards from those under which she was initially hired and which, upon not being met, motivated her termination. It must be clear that the right to stability of public officials can only be eliminated for the grounds expressly indicated in the law, since no public entity is allowed to carry out reorganization processes that conclude in dismissals, deviating from constitutional and legal norms.</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">Only what is contemplated in the constitutional norm and developed in subsections a) and b) of Article 47 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil can be classified as restructuring (reestructuración), and not just any other process. What are called modernization processes or reviews of personnel structures can be named in many different ways, be it labor recalification, reengineering, </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">restructuring</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">, transitional strategies, organizational re-architecture, structural redesign, organizational flattening, labor reversal, structural reinvention. All these measures tending to reduce costs, invoking efficiency, must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and the law, and cannot in any way become a mechanism to review appointment acts that were carried out legally many years before. The legal system allows public entities to impose new requirements for positions, demand new profiles, and, based on that, hire suitable personnel to fill them, without prejudice to the rights of those who occupy those positions. In the cited votes of the Constitutional Chamber, issued by that Chamber on the occasion of amparo appeals filed by SUGEF officials against that institution, it is noted that the plaintiff also appealed through that avenue the restructuring process that finally culminated in her dismissal. However, those amparo actions were rejected, among others, for the following reasons:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">"</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">In the specific case, apart from the foregoing considerations, it cannot be overlooked </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">that the restructuring process at SUGEF is only just being executed</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">, whose completion was agreed upon for June 30, 2000 (regardless of in which session this agreement was issued), and that it is not proven in the record that </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the amparo petitioner is among the persons to be dismissed, as there is also the institutional commitment that prior to making such a decision, relocation to another position</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> within the same Organ, in the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or in any of the other Órganos de Desconcentración Máxima of the issuing entity, will be sought. Likewise, the Chamber understands, because the informant expressly stated so, that </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the tests carried out so far will constitute only another additional element to consider along with academic training, professional experience, and knowledge of the English language, in such a way that the fact of not having turned out "qualified" in accordance with them is not decisive for a dismissal decision against her</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">, as indicated under oath—with the consequences, even of a criminal nature, that the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional contemplates in case of affirming inaccuracies or falsehoods to this Court—by the Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras. In this context, the Chamber considers that at this time, the filing of this amparo </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">is premature</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic">, given that </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">there is no certain and imminent threat pending against the petitioner of being dismissed without respect for her fundamental rights,</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'; font-style:italic"> (…) Far from it, the tests that have been applied to all SUGEF personnel will constitute an objective parameter to be used by the head to make subsequent decisions regarding the personnel who will definitively remain in that Organ, jointly with others such as the academic and professional record of each servant and the evaluation by the immediate superior...</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">"</span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">(vote of the Constitutional Chamber no. 1856-00, of 15:07 hours on February 29, cited by no. 3136, of 10:52 hours on April 14, both of 2000).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:200%"><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'"> </span><span style="font-family:'Bookman Old Style'">In accordance with the reasons set forth, in attention to the specific grievances raised by the appellant, it could well be said that the ad-quem incurred in an erroneous and inadequate evaluation of the evidence by questioning in general terms the validity and legality of the restructuring process, but not so by pointing out that the dismissal of the plaintiff was illegitimate because it was arbitrary and illegal, since, as stated, she was removed after examining her personal conditions and determining that she did not meet the requirements of the position, according to a new profile established by the employer itself, to appoint another female lawyer in her place. Consequently, we deem the dismissal to which the plaintiff was subject to be null and void, and being in the presence of a null dismissal, the effects of this declaration must be retroacted to the moment or date of said act, so that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. In conclusion, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, specifying that the sums paid for advance notice (preaviso), severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), and other indemnities received by her (annex 12 of the administrative file), as well as any other item that, by way of salary, she has received after that settlement, must be deducted from the amount corresponding to the plaintiff.</span></p> **Exp: 00-009288-0166-LA** **Res: 2009-001257** **SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA**. San José, at nine hours forty minutes on the fourth of December of two thousand nine.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by **[Name1]**, against **BANCO CENTRAL DE COSTA RICA**, represented by its general attorney-in-fact Roy González Rojas, Master in Business Administration, **EDUARDO LIZANO FAIT**, graduate in Economic Sciences, **[Name2]**, civil engineer, and **SUPERINTENDENCIA GENERAL DE ENTIDADES FINANCIERAS**, represented by its superintendent Francisco Lay Solano. Acting as special judicial attorneys; for the plaintiff, graduate Luis Ricardo Bogantes Villegas, resident of Alajuela; and for the defendant [Name2], graduate Karoll Molina Chaves. All of legal age, married, lawyers, and residents of San José, with the exceptions noted.

**RESULTANDO:** **1.-** The plaintiff, in a pleading dated December twenty-second of two thousand, brought this action so that in judgment: 1) That this ordinary labor claim be granted. 2) That since my dismissal was a "disguised" dismissal, as the alleged cause does not exist, the restructuring process not complying with the postulates and legal requirements, **THE PLAINTIFF BE REINSTATED IN HER POSITION AND IN FULL ENJOYMENT OF HER LABOR RIGHTS**. 3) That failing that, since the Banco Central, with its arbitrary attitude, violating all of my labor rights and guarantees, has caused me damages of irreparable consideration, not only in the economic aspect, but also social, labor, and moral, unjustifiably depriving me of my right to work which I efficiently performed for 23 years, the plaintiff be paid for damages, the back wages from the moment of my cessation and their corresponding interest, until the resolution upholding my claims becomes final and is implemented. 4) In the alternative, should the main petition be declared without merit, that this request be granted for the payment of the complementary amounts corresponding to the non-recognition of the year worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, plus the corresponding interest as of the payment date. 5) That the sums withheld in excess be returned to me, due to the incorrect application by the Banco Central de Costa Rica of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta), and the corresponding legal interest, from the date these withholdings began and throughout the entire time the law was misapplied, plus the corresponding interest as of the date of its effective payment. 5) (sic) That the salary adjustment made at the Banco Central de Costa Rica, via job reclassification (homologación), and the legal interest, be paid to me. 6) That the equivalent of the 10% salary contribution for the Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantías), which I had been enjoying for having started working at the Banco Central before the month of November 1995, and its legal interest, be recognized to me, given that it was eliminated with retroactive effect to my detriment, as provided in the Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica (Ley 7558), that is, from November 1995 to the date of resolution of this request, plus legal interest. 7) That the proportional part to which I am entitled of the reserve for eventual lawsuits of 125 million colons, agreed upon by the Administrative Board of the Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco Central de Costa Rica, be returned to me, for not being in accordance with the law, and the respective legal interest. 8) That the unpaid difference corresponding to 6.49% be paid to me, as the Board of Directors of the BCCR approved a general salary increase of 11.49% to the base cost-of-living adjustment for all employees of the Banco Central de Costa Rica and its deconcentrated entities, effective July 1, 1995. That the Bank must make the salary recognition of 6.49%, to be calculated on the base salary, from July 1, 1995, and its incorporation into the salary going forward. That the legal interest be paid to me, as it became due and until its effective payment. That the existing differences be paid for the non-incorporation into the base salary of the 6.49%, in relation to each and every one of the supplements or components that make up my salary, from July 1, 1995, and as they became due.

• 9)That the equivalent of 65% of my salary be paid to me as compensation for the prohibition (prohibición), from April 17, 2000, until the date of its effective payment, including statutory interest, and that the corresponding salary adjustments be made. 10) Plus the readjustment in the calculation of the severance pay (cesantía) that the salary recognitions may favor me. 11) That the Banco Central de Costa Rica and jointly and severally, Mr. [Nombre2], in his capacity as Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, be ordered to pay back wages and interest as damages, plus both procedural and personal costs.

2.- The defendant [Nombre2], in his personal capacity, as Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, and as general attorney-in-fact (apoderado generalísimo) of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, answered the action in the terms indicated in his brief dated March nineteenth, two thousand one, and raised the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), the generic defense of sine actione agit, and the one he termed lack of cause (falta de causa). The co-defendant [Nombre3] answered the lawsuit untimely.

3.- The judge, Pedro Ubau Hernández, by judgment rendered at ten hours and two minutes on December nineteenth, two thousand five, ordered: In accordance with the stated grounds, legal citations, and cited jurisprudence, the present ordinary lawsuit filed by [Nombre1] against BANCO CENTRAL DE COSTA RICA, [Nombre2], AND [Nombre3] is declared WITHOUT MERIT in all its claims. The defenses of lack of right, lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causan pasiva), lack of cause, and the generic defense of sine actione agit are upheld. This matter is resolved without special condemnation as to costs, in accordance with article 222 of the Civil Procedure Code in relation to article 452 of the Labor Code. The parties are advised that this judgment admits the remedy of appeal (recurso de apelación), which must state, verbally or in writing, the factual or legal grounds on which the appealing party bases its disagreement, under the warning that the remedy will be declared unworthy of consideration (article 500 and 501, subsections c) and d); decisions of the Sala Constitucional numbers 5798, of 16:21 hours of August 11, 1998, and 1306 of 16:27 hours of February 23, 1999, and decision of the Sala Segunda number 386, of 14:20 hours of December 10, 1999) (circular of the Secretaría General de la Corte Suprema de Justicia no. 79-2001).

4.- The plaintiff appealed, and the Tribunal de Trabajo, Sección Cuarta, of the Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, comprised of Óscar Ugalde Miranda, Álvaro Moya Arias, and Nelson Rodríguez Jiménez, by judgment rendered at eighteen hours and fifty-five minutes on November seventeenth, two thousand six, resolved: It is declared that, in the processing of this matter, no omission is observed that could have caused nullity or defenselessness. The appealed judgment is reversed, and the Banco Central de Costa Rica is ordered to reinstate the appellant [Nombre1] to the position she held at the time of the dismissal she was subjected to, and must pay her the wages she ceased to receive from June twenty-third, two thousand, with interest from the time each sum became due until its effective payment. The quantum of these items shall be determined in the execution of judgment (ejecución de sentencia). The defenses of lack of right, lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), lack of cause, and the generic defense of sine actione agit are rejected. Both costs are charged to the defendant bank, with the personal costs set at the prudential sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones.

5.- The Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and the plaintiff filed appeals before this Chamber in briefs dated February twenty-first and July fourth, both of two thousand seven, which are based on the grounds that will be stated in the recitals section (parte considerativa).

6.- The procedures have observed the legal prescriptions.

Drafted by Judge Aguirre Gómez; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- The plaintiff filed the lawsuit to have the dismissal she was subjected to declared null, as well as for: "1) That this ordinary labor lawsuit be granted. 2) That since my dismissal was a 'disguised' dismissal, because the alleged grounds do not exist, as the restructuring process does not comply with the postulates and legal budgets, I BE REINSTATED TO MY POSITION AND IN FULL ENJOYMENT OF MY LABOR RIGHTS. 3) That failing that, since the Banco Central, with its arbitrary and violating attitude toward all my labor rights and guarantees, has caused me irreparable damages, not only economically but socially, labor-wise, and morally, unjustifiably preventing my right to work that I performed efficiently for 23 years, I be paid for damages, the back wages from the moment of my cessation and their corresponding interest, until the resolution approving my claims becomes final and is implemented. 4) In the alternative, should the main petition be declared without merit, this request be granted for the payment of the supplementary amounts corresponding to the year I worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, which was not recognized, plus the corresponding interest as of the date of payment. 5) That the sums withheld in excess be returned to me, due to the incorrect application by the Banco Central de Costa Rica of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta), and the corresponding statutory interest, from the date these withholdings began and throughout the time the law was misapplied, plus the corresponding interest to the date of their effective payment. 5) That the salary adjustment, implemented at Banco Central de Costa Rica via pay scale alignment (homologación), be applied to me, plus statutory interest. 6) That the equivalent of the 10% salary contribution for the Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantías) be recognized to me, which I had been enjoying for having started working at Banco Central before November 1995, and its statutory interest, having been eliminated with retroactive effect to my detriment, as provided in the Organic Law of the Banco Central de Costa Rica (Ley 7558), that is, from November 1995 to the date of resolution of this request, plus statutory interest. 7) That the proportional part of the reserve for potential lawsuits of 125 million colones, agreed upon by the Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco Central de Costa Rica, to which I am entitled, be returned to me for not being in accordance with the law, plus the respective statutory interest. 8) That the unpaid difference corresponding to 6.49% be paid to me, upon the BCCR's Junta Directiva having approved a general salary increase of 11.49% to the base for an increase in the cost of living for all employees of the Banco Central de Costa Rica and its decentralized bodies, effective as of July 1, 1995. That the Bank must make the 6.49% salary recognition, which will be calculated on the base salary, from July 1, 1995, and its incorporation into the salary going forward. That I be paid the legal interest, as each amount became due and up to its effective payment. That the existing differences be paid for the non-incorporation of the 6.49% into the base salary, in relation to each and every one of the bonuses or components that make up my salary, from July first, 1995, and as they became due. 9) That the equivalent of 65% of my salary be paid to me as compensation for the prohibition, from April 17, 2000, until the date of its effective payment, including statutory interest, and that the corresponding salary adjustments be made. 10) Plus the readjustment in the calculation of the severance pay that the salary recognitions may favor me. 11) That the Banco Central de Costa Rica and jointly and severally, Mr. [Nombre2], in his capacity as Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, be ordered to pay back wages and interest as damages, plus both procedural and personal costs". As she stated, she worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal from June 23, 1976, to April 31, 1977, when she resigned, and for the Banco Central de Costa Rica from the following May 1st to June 23, 2000, the date on which she was terminated due to administrative restructuring. She indicated having received her legal benefits under protest on July 27, 2000, calculated based on the time served at the bank but not the time worked at other Public Sector institutions (folios 1 to 33). Bernardo Alfaro Araya answered the lawsuit negatively, in his personal capacity and as general attorney-in-fact of the Banco Central de Costa Rica for the affairs of the Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, raising the defenses of lack of right, lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), lack of cause, and the generic sine actione agit. Eduardo Lizano Fait, in his personal capacity and as general attorney-in-fact of the Banco Central de Costa Rica, answered the lawsuit negatively in an untimely manner (folios 42 to 70 and 121 to 161). The trial court upheld the defenses raised, declared the lawsuit without merit in all its claims, and resolved the matter without special condemnation as to costs (folios 399 to 409). The plaintiff appealed the decision, and the tribunal reversed the appealed judgment, denied the defenses raised, and ordered the Banco Central de Costa Rica to reinstate the plaintiff to the position she held at the time of the dismissal, with the wages she ceased to receive from June 23, 2000, to pay her the prohibition component she ceased to receive from April 17, 2000, until it is applied to her salary, as well as interest from the time each sum became due until effective payment, the quantum of which will be determined in the execution of judgment, with costs charged to the defendant bank, setting the personal costs at the prudential sum of two hundred fifty thousand colones (folios 416 to 448, 580 to 593, and 614 to 618).

II.- The Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and the plaintiff disagree with the decision of the ad-quem; the first because the ruling of the a-quo was reversed and the Banco Central de Costa Rica was ordered to reinstate the plaintiff to the position she held when she was dismissed, to pay her what she ceased to receive from June 23, 2000, as well as the prohibition component she ceased to receive from April 17, 2000, until it is applied to her salary, with interest from the time each sum became due until effective payment, and both costs of the proceeding. It objects to the finding that the plaintiff was dismissed illegitimately, since her cessation was the product of an administrative reorganization or restructuring carried out by Sugef, supported by real needs and technical studies that gave backing and solidity to the decision, approved by the Consejo Nacional de la Supervisión del Sistema Financiero and by the Junta Directiva of the Banco Central de Costa Rica. It accuses the tribunal of making an inadequate assessment of the evidence in the case file, by questioning the validity and legality of the restructuring process it has endorsed in identical cases. It considers irrelevant that the tribunal concluded "that the plaintiff was dismissed without an immediate suppression of her position and that another professional was appointed in her place, therefore it is clearly established that the restructuring was used as an excuse or pretext to dismiss the plaintiff". It points out that Article 192 of the Constitution establishes that the dismissal of an administrative official is justified by: a) forced reduction of services, b) lack of funds, and c) to achieve a better reorganization, so the tribunal made an erroneous assessment of the evidence by stating that the dismissal was illegitimate, because the suppression of the plaintiff's position occurred only some months after the dismissal -another professional having been hired to occupy a position similar to the one she occupied-, when forced reduction is not the only circumstance contemplated by Article 192 of the Constitution to justify removal in the case of restructuring, and the process approved for the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras was not only based on a forced reduction of services, but also on a series of technical studies that established the ideal profile of the organization and each position to achieve greater efficiency and adaptation to the needs of the Financial System. It indicates that after applying all the procedures approved for the restructuring, the plaintiff was not found suitable to occupy the position she had been performing, because despite meeting the academic requirements, she did not meet the capacity and suitability required for the new structure, hence if she was not fit to occupy the position she was to perform in the new structure, it was illogical to have to wait a prolonged time to refill the position she left vacant, so just as with other positions that were in that situation, the necessary procedures were carried out to fill them with those who met the required profiles within the Banco Central and its decentralized bodies, through personnel recruitment evaluating the suitability, merit, and capacity of the applicants, for which reason approximately three months after the plaintiff's dismissal, professionals were hired to be incorporated into functional areas of the Superintendencia, including the legal professional for the Departamento de Asesoría Jurídica. It qualifies the reasoning of the ad-quem as erroneous for deeming the dismissal illegal and arbitrary, and above all for that tribunal's consideration being wrong in finding that "the restructuring process was used as a pretext to dismiss the plaintiff" and hire a new person, especially if approximately 75 people left the institution through voluntary mobility or dismissal as part of that process. It reiterates that the cessation in question was not based on a suppression of positions, but rather was due to the fact that once the suitability tests of the officials were conducted, the plaintiff was found not suitable for the position she had been occupying as she did not fit the required profile for the new structure. It denies that the dismissal was illegal because there was no reduction of positions or because a new person was subsequently appointed to a similar position in the Legal Directorate of the Superintendencia, because in restructuring processes where the aim, based on technical studies, is to improve the organization's performance, an official who does not meet the new profile defined for the position they had been occupying can be dismissed, and thus it cannot be affirmed that if a person is dismissed for not meeting said profile, it is a disguised dismissal or discriminatory action, but rather a situation where the servant does not meet the required profile for the best performance in the organization, which authorizes dispensing with their services with the respective payment of all their labor rights. It points out that the tribunal erred in the appreciation of the facts and evidence in the file, by considering that the restructuring process that served as the basis for the dismissal did not contemplate the Legal Counsel area (Asesoría Jurídica), when the process approved by the competent bodies included all administrative areas of the Superintendencia including the Legal Counsel area. It alleges that the restructuring implied a change in the requirements for the officials of the Legal Counsel area, which was evaluated through technical tests carried out for this purpose by prestigious and experienced companies hired for that end. It argues that the results of the tests applied to the plaintiff were not satisfactory, so as her suitability for the position was not proven according to the new structure, based on the comprehensive evaluation of criteria such as academic record, prior experience, the evaluation of the immediate supervisor (forced ranking), and interviews, her services were dispensed with, so the plaintiff's dismissal cannot be considered unjustified. It maintains that the reasoning regarding the payment of the prohibition is incorrect, because for the officials of the Auditoría General de Bancos, now the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, the benefit originally established in Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, was granted to them based on budget laws 6982 of December 19, 1984, article 14; 7015 of November 22, 1985, article 101; and 7018 of December 20, 1985, article 14, subsection 17), and not based on article 8 of session 4621-92 held by the Junta Directiva of the Banco Central on December 9, 1992, which referred to article 27 of the collective bargaining agreement - regulations annulled by decisions numbers 1962-92 and 3285-92 of the Sala Constitucional. It points out that those budget norms annulled by the Sala Constitucional through decision 4647 of June 16, 1999, did not give economic content to the payment for prohibition as the tribunal erroneously understood, but rather reformed Law 5867, extending the recognition of that regime to the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos (today Sugef). It accuses that in the present matter, there was no administrative act that could be subject to a process of evident and manifest absolute nullity (article 173 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) or of lesividad (articles 10 and 35 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), since such processes are designed for the nullification of administrative acts that declare rights or produce legal effects, and the prohibition regime that covered the plaintiff as an official of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras was established by budget norms declared unconstitutional by decision 4647-99, so one cannot speak of annulment of any administrative act, since the regime had legislative, not administrative, support, hence the elimination of the prohibition regime in that dependency of the Banco Central was not something arbitrary or capricious, as the tribunal erroneously qualifies it. It notes that the prohibition is a technical requirement and condition inherent to the position, imposing on its holder the duty not to practice their profession or trade for the benefit of third parties -which in certain cases provided by law, confers the correlative right to the payment of economic compensation for such limitation-, and given the public interest on which the prohibition is based, the State has the power to change such a situation, before which the interested parties cannot claim acquired rights to the permanence of the prior legal situation, in other words, there can be no acquired right to the immutability of the regime. It alludes that, being obliged to eliminate the payment for prohibition, the issuing entity arranged to compensate for the loss of that component by decreeing an increase in base salaries and modifying the salary scales into six categories, in order to maintain a competitive position in the institution's remunerations. It relates that the economic compensation for prohibition enjoyed by the servants of SUGEF ceased in execution of the judgments or decisions of the Sala Constitucional nos. 4647 of 16:20 hours of June 16, 1999, and no. 6327 of 10:03 hours of August 13, 1999, which declared unconstitutional and annulled the budget norms that had given legal support to the regime, an annulment that is retroactive to their entry into force without prejudice to the good faith rights acquired under their protection. For this party, such rights include the payments definitively entered into the holder's patrimonial sphere, so only payments effectively received during the validity of the annulled budget regulations can be considered as acquired rights, that is, upon the norms on which the payment of the prohibition was based being declared unconstitutional, the acquired rights consist of not having to return what was paid for that concept, since after said declaration it was appropriate to immediately cease the payment of the prohibition compensation that was being made based on the cited norms, without being able to claim any acquired right to continue receiving that benefit in the terms it had been received before the declaration of nullity, as it would constitute a breach of the principle of legality, as no legal norm exists to justify its payment. It affirms that the plaintiff and the ad-quem err in considering that the prohibition was suppressed arbitrarily and illegally and that a defect existed due to lack of due process. With these arguments it seeks the reversal of the contested judgment and that the first instance judgment be confirmed in its entirety. The plaintiff disagrees because she was denied what she calls a typical salary increase or adjustment carried out by the Banco Central de Costa Rica via pay scale alignment (homologación) of job classes, discriminating against the category 16 position she occupied in the Legal Counsel office (Asesoría Jurídica) of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, despite its application being of a general nature, for which reason, in her understanding, the agreement of the Junta Directiva that did not align the referenced position with a higher category is illegal. She also criticizes the denial of the recognition of the contribution by the bank of 10% of the salary for the maintenance of the Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones, which was eliminated by the derogation ordered in Law No. 7558 of November 13, 1995, which meant the suppression of a right incorporated into her employment contract. She objects to the setting of the amount of two hundred fifty thousand colones as personal costs, for not conforming to the complexity of the process, to what was granted, and to the economic standing of the parties, noting that an amount for this concept should be set that ranges between 15% and 25% of what was estimated. She alleges that article 495 of the Labor Code was violated due to lack of application or erroneous interpretation, for which reason she requests that the setting be done on a percentage basis.

Based on those arguments, it seeks the reversal of the challenged ruling in the appealed aspects and that, instead, the requested relief be granted in the terms originally sought, while maintaining what was resolved in what was granted (folios 626 to 647, 677 to 709, and 664 to 675).

III.- The plaintiff’s dismissal was justified by an organizational and human resources restructuring process of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero in session no. 124-99, article 6, of November 9, 1999, and by the Junta Directiva of the Banco Central de Costa Rica in session no. 5014-99, article 5, of November 12, 1999 (complaint, answer, and evidence no. 6 of the administrative file). As a fundamental principle of the public employment regime, Article 192 of the Constitution established the so-called “right to employment stability (derecho a la estabilidad en el empleo),” which has been conceived as the right of the public servant to keep their position and to lose it only in the event of incurring one of the grounds for dismissal established by labor legislation or when a forced reduction of services (reducción forzosa de servicios) is necessary due to lack of funds or to achieve a better organization of the service. Regarding bank employees, Article 41, subsection 6) of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional expressly recognizes for them the minimum benefits contemplated in the labor and civil service laws of the Republic, which results in the application in their favor of the rights contemplated by the Estatuto de Servicio Civil. Article 43 of that statute establishes the removal of employees covered by that regulation only when they incur the grounds contemplated in Article 81 of the Código de Trabajo and Article 41, subsection d), of that law, or in acts that imply a serious infraction of such regulation, its regulations, or the respective internal labor regulations. Said law also contemplates the possibility of removal in those cases in which a forced reduction of services is necessary due to an absolute lack of funds; or to achieve a more effective and economical reorganization of the same, provided that said reorganization affects at least 60% of the employees of the respective unit. Furthermore, the “Convenio de Partes suscrito entre el Banco Central de Costa Rica y sus Trabajadores” in the year 1988, in its Article 24, provides: “TENURE (INAMOVILIDAD). All employees of the Bank covered by an indefinite-term employment contract have tenure as provided in Article 188 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, a concept that must be interpreted as the guarantee of bank employees not to be arbitrarily dismissed...”. It is worth highlighting the provisions of the Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República No. 7107 of November 4, 1988, published in La Gaceta No. 222 of November 22, 1988, transitory annex 3 of the articles of the Sistema Bancario Nacional, Article 188, which states: “Each State bank must have a career ladder in which the banking career is guaranteed to its officials, as well as their tenure (inamovilidad) and their promotions in such a way as to ensure their right to ascend in said institutions from the lowest scale to be able to occupy the highest positions, based on merits. Any modification carried out by the banks to adapt their regular career ladders to the prevailing conditions at the time shall not affect in any way the employees who entered previously…” (the emphasis is not from the original). It follows from the foregoing that, since employment stability is a constitutional guarantee for the bank official, the specific cases of service reorganization in which that right is curtailed must be assessed with absolute objectivity and in compliance with legality. The legal procedures established for this purpose must be respected, as well as the rights of the employees directly or indirectly involved, so that both the proposed new organizational forms, the criteria for determining which positions are maintained within the body or entity and their conditions, and the proposal regarding the officials who are to be removed or transferred, are matters that must be handled with full transparency and objectivity, since otherwise, a dangerous loophole for arbitrariness would be opened, so that it is the will of the head official—or of those in charge of executing the changes—that decides these aspects, even without any substantiation or by using improper mechanisms or discriminatory criteria. In this matter, the Sala Constitucional has recognized the constitutionality of restructuring processes in the Public Administration, in the following terms: “Right to work and employment stability. In a public employment relationship, the projection of the right to work protected by Article 56 of the Constitution contains as one of its postulates in favor of the worker that of stability in the position. Indeed, it cannot be ignored that this is what allows the employee to access a series of social and economic benefits that enable their academic and labor advancement, providing them with the necessary security for their personal development and that of the family nucleus that depends on them, which truly effectivizes the meaning of the right to work as an individual guarantee and obligation towards society, in the expression used by the constitutional text. It is for this reason that employees can only be removed by way of exception, upon a justified cause for dismissal, or in the case of a forced reduction of services, one of the cases being precisely the restructuring processes to which an institution may be subjected, the latter also being consistent with the principles derived from Article 192 of the Constitución Política. Now then, subjection to a legitimate modernization process, which guarantees the optimal use of public funds and the highest efficiency in the provision of the services entrusted to an institution, is, of course, a legitimate reason to execute organizational changes that, in most cases, irremediably entail the suppression of certain positions. But precisely because it is an exception to the constitutional guarantee of stability for the worker, its application by the administration must be executed with absolute objectivity, transparency, and seriousness, and hence the requirement for qualified technical studies that can validate decision-making, based on a coherent and effective model. Under this order of ideas, this Chamber admits that if the new structure cannot accommodate the reassignment (reubicación) of an official, since the substantive functions they had been performing disappear, being suppressed in light of efficiency and modernization criteria, their termination adhered to the commented constitutional provision is legitimate.” (The emphasis is not from the original) (vote of the Sala Constitucional No. 4951-2000 at 4:37 p.m. on June 27, 2000). On the same topic, that Chamber also indicated: “As the Chamber has indicated in reiterated pronouncements, Article 192 of the Constitución Política empowers the Public Administration to order the restructuring of the various units that compose it, in order to achieve a better performance and organization of the same, for which purpose it may order not only the elimination and reclassification of positions, but also the transfer of the officials. The authorization that the legal system provides to dispense with the services of a public official for reasons of restructuring necessarily implies that the position, considered in itself, is dispensable within the current structure and also impossible to integrate into the new institutional organization. Thus, the State may put into practice its power to transfer or forcibly dismiss its officials for reasons of reorganization, provided that this is based on the real need—duly verified—to improve the public service and respects the procedure established for this purpose. In any case, and to make effective the protection of the rights of the administered parties, the constitutional jurisdiction of freedom is legitimized to review whether the figure of restructuring is used to conceal dismissals carried out for reasons other than purely organizational ones. This with the objective of preventing the need for reorganization and modernization of the State from serving to exempt the Administration from its elemental obligation to always act in respect of the rights and freedoms that the Social State of Law recognizes to individuals.” (The underlining is by the drafter) (votes of the Sala Constitucional Nos. 1846, at 2:57 p.m. on February 29; 2496, at 5:39 p.m. on March 21; 4951, at 4:37 p.m. on June 27, and 5783, at 4:01 p.m. on July 11, all of the year 2000). The foregoing establishes the scope that must be given to the concept of “reorganization (reorganización)” or “restructuring (reestructuración),” with which the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras dismissed the plaintiff. Reorganizations or restructurings, authorized by the constituent power, as an exception to the general principle of employment stability for public officials, refer to a transformation in the organizational structure of the entity, which motivates the elimination or change of unnecessary positions to achieve a more effective and economical reorganization of the services. It constitutes an objective ground for dismissal distinct from those grounds established in the Código de Trabajo, which address the faults committed by the worker or the incapacity to perform their functions, for which the employer may validly dismiss them. In no way could it be interpreted that, under the pretext of a reorganization to achieve that objective, the skills or performance of the employee in their position could be examined, given that this would mean applying a subjective ground for dismissal, not contemplated in the constitutional norm, within the concept of reorganization. In several amparo appeals filed by officials of the defendant Bank, in relation to the restructuring process under study, the Sala Constitucional ruled in these terms: “On the other hand, having analyzed the recital of facts set forth in Considerando II, it is observed that the restructuring process of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras is based on technical studies carried out by consulting firms specialized in the matter, and has the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency of the public service and the best use of public resources. Furthermore, the decision to execute a modernization plan was communicated in advance to the affected public officials, so that they could adopt the measures they deemed pertinent. Finally, the restructuring process was duly and timely approved by the competent bodies for this purpose, namely, the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero and the Junta Directiva of the Banco Central de Costa Rica. Consequently, it is also not observed that the threat of dismissal of the petitioners comes from an untimely or arbitrary action on the part of the Administration.” (vote No. 2000-1846, at 2:57 p.m. on February 29, 2000). In votes 3136, at 10:52 a.m. on April 14; 4362, at 12:21 p.m. on May 19, and 11357, at 10:08 a.m. on December 20, all of the year 2000, the Sala Constitucional dismissed respective amparo appeals in which the plaintiff appeared as an appellant, and in the last one it stated: “In a considerable number of amparos, the Sala Constitucional has had the opportunity to rule on the restructuring procedure in the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, its correctness from a formal point of view, and to declare that in itself that process does not violate the fundamental rights of public employees. Obviously, that way of resolving does not prejudge, as it was not appropriate, the individual impacts that may occur with the application of the reforming parameters that have been approved. It should be recalled that this restructuring is fundamentally and intimately linked to the precedents of the one carried out at Banco Central de Costa Rica, which this Chamber in some way endorsed. This being the basis from which the individual application of the reviewing mechanisms of the pre-existing personnel is carried out, to declare whether or not they conform to the principles and values that inform the restructuring, such as, for example, whether the involved persons satisfactorily meet the approved profile and whether or not they obtain the minimum required qualifications from the application of objective and substantially equal criteria for all employees, those mechanisms turn out to be aspects of legality that cannot be examined through the constitutionality review process. This is the conclusion reached by the Chamber, not without first warning that this general rule would apply, by exception, to gross errors and evident arbitrariness leading to pathological cases of abuse of power. However, in the present case, the Chamber does not find that the facts lead to such a qualification. Indeed, what the petitioner alleges is the way she was evaluated and rated, which, as stated in the appeal, 'is the result of the confrontation of real profiles with the ideal ones of the project, based on the evaluations, among other aspects, of intellectual aptitudes, critical thinking, logical-abstract reasoning, verbal reasoning, personality factors, dominance, rational control, self-confidence, sociability, reliability, training, experience, foreign languages (English).' If the result, in the appellant's case, was an insufficient rating to place her in the intended category, if the evaluation or rating was correct or incorrect, if the application of the objective criteria on which the evaluation is based was carried out with a scientific basis or not, these are aspects of ordinary legality that this Chamber cannot review… and this Tribunal is not here to control the application of legislation to a specific case, as has been stated, except for abuse of power that could result in the infringement of fundamental rights, which is not observed in this specific case.” Thus, in the plaintiff's case it cannot be considered that the validity of her dismissal procedure was endorsed by the Sala Constitucional. This judicial office, just like that Chamber, has recognized the legality within the Public Administration of restructuring processes, which the Constitutional Chamber declared regarding the restructuring carried out in the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras and this Chamber endorses, since the plaintiff's objections are not admissible when she pointed out that the tests applied in the restructuring process did not meet minimum reliability standards and alleged that accumulated experience, technical skill, academic level, and performance were not assessed, because such statements have not been proven; rather, from the documentary evidence in the file it appears that factors such as those indicated by the plaintiff were indeed taken into account (see evidence nos. 17, 26 and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file). For its part, the Colegio Profesional de Psicólogos de Costa Rica, whose intervention the union requested (folios 185 to 187), stated that it had not found any anomaly in the performance of the professionals responsible for developing the process (folios 170 and 171), and the defendant, regarding the tests or evaluations applied, acknowledged—in its amparo appeal No. 99-009337-0007-CO—that these were adapted to the national context (evidence no. 39 of the administrative file). From the documentary evidence provided, numbers 26, 32, 33 and annexes 19 and 20 of the administrative file, it appears that the plaintiff had access to the results of the tests performed and was able to discuss them, with the assistance of a professional in the field (see also evidence nos. 35, 36 and annexes 23 and 24 of the cited file). Likewise, from the documentary evidence numbered as evidence 16A to 16F, it is extracted that communication was maintained with the employees regarding the process and that work experience was assessed. Information was also provided on the elements evaluated and on the interpretation of the tests (documentary evidence labeled as evidence no. 23 and annexes 20 to 22 of the cited file). Then, from the evidence identified as number 15 of the administrative file, it is extracted that the workers were duly informed that the process could conclude in dismissals with employer responsibility. Furthermore, it is recorded in the file that all the personnel of the occupational structure of SUGEF, including the Legal Counsel, were subject to the organizational and human resources restructuring plan of that unit, and therefore subjected to the academic, psychological, and behavioral evaluation tests, as well as intellectual aptitude, personality, and work style tests to which all the personnel were subjected, including the plaintiff, an evaluation with which it was determined whether the new profiles and requirements for the different positions were met or not. However, what is relevant in this sub lite matter to resolve this issue is to analyze the legality of the worker's specific dismissal.

IV.- In the case at hand, the plaintiff's termination was justified, as stated, by the existence of the restructuring process taking place at the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. Said restructuring had the following main objectives: “To introduce the necessary adjustments to the organizational scheme in accordance with the requirements of the risk-based supervision approach. / To establish an organization that allows for a clear assignment of responsibilities, the specialization of functions, and a capacity for timely response to the needs and evolution of the Sistema Financiero Nacional. / To integrate supervision processes through adequate supervision coordination and communication among the different areas of SUGEF. / To seek the rational use of human and financial resources destined for the oversight of the entities…” (annex 13 of the administrative file). From the note sent to the plaintiff, the reasons that motivated her dismissal are evident. In that communication, she was informed:

“In my capacity as administrative head of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, it is my responsibility to implement the approved restructuring, which as a first stage consisted of an evaluation of the competency skills of each official, for each of the positions, given that each one requires different degrees of critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work/leadership style, and personality factors. / The second stage consisted of the evaluation of the personnel through a forced ranking. The immediate superiors of each of the officials were asked to carry out an integral evaluation of their personnel, in which both their technical skills and their competency skills were taken into account. In this way, initiative, written communication, time management, planning, programming and control, problem solving, decision making, and technical skill were assessed. / The third stage consisted of the evaluation of the personnel of this entity, through different instruments that would allow assessing the compliance by said officials with the new requirements established in relation to academic training and professional experience. / Based on these evaluations and their results, I have had to make decisions regarding your permanence in this organization. In accordance with the evaluations carried out, you meet the academic requirements to occupy the position of Professional in Banking Management 3, of the Dirección General de Asesoría Jurídica, however, the competency evaluations indicate that your skills do not fit the competencies required to perform said position.

Likewise, comparing her profile with other positions in the new structure, her relocation within this entity was not possible" (Anexo 11 and prueba n° 4 of the expediente administrativo). (Bolding and underlining are by the editor).

It is observed from the transcribed documentation that the worker was terminated after the following points were assessed: 1) her skills in the position in aspects such as critical thinking, logical reasoning, verbal reasoning, work style/direction, and personality factors; 2) the evaluation carried out by her superior in relation to abilities such as initiative, written communication, time management, planning, problem-solving, decision-making, etc., and lastly, 3) compliance with the new requirements established regarding academic training and professional experience. The plaintiff was informed that she met the academic requirements established for the position of Banking Management Professional 3; however, she was dismissed because, according to the other evaluations carried out, she lacks the skills required to perform in that position. The foregoing means that the termination of her position did not correspond to an objective restructuring as a result of which her job disappeared, but rather to an examination of her aptitudes and skills from which it is inferred that failure to comply with the new established standards motivated her termination. Such a procedure is not authorized by the constituent power, because resolving in this manner is a veiled way by which the plaintiff was dismissed based on her personal conditions, thereby allowing a subjective cause for dismissal not authorized by law or the Political Constitution, making the dismissal of the claimant arbitrary and illegal, using the restructuring process as an excuse or pretext to terminate her and appoint another professional in her place. If, in principle, the employees of the Public Administration are protected by employment stability, it is not possible to admit that, under the pretext of a reorganization process, the requirements and personal conditions with which the employee accessed her position are modified, because this would open a dangerous loophole for arbitrariness and insecurity. In this regard, it should be mentioned that Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute, when referring to dismissal due to reorganization, indicates that when dispensing with employees, criteria such as efficiency, seniority, character, conduct, aptitudes, and other conditions resulting from the evaluation of services will be considered, which is understood to apply in the event that certain positions of the same category being eliminated are retained. But the case under study is different, because what occurred in this instance was a re-evaluation of the aptitudes and skills with which the plaintiff was admitted and appointed to her position; a re-evaluation carried out with standards different from those under which she was initially hired, and which, upon not being met, motivated her termination. It must be clear that the right to stability of public officials can only be eliminated for the causes expressly indicated in the law, as no public entity is permitted to carry out reorganization processes that conclude in dismissals, departing from constitutional and legal regulations. Only what is contemplated in the constitutional norm and developed in subsections a) and b) of Article 47 of the Civil Service Statute can be classified as restructuring, and not any other process. The so-called modernization processes or reviews of personnel structures can be called by many different names, be it labor re-qualification, reengineering, restructuring, transitional strategies, organizational re-architecture, structural redesign, organizational flattening, labor reversion, structural reinvention. All those measures tending to reduce costs, invoking efficiency, must be carried out in accordance with the Political Constitution and the law, and cannot in any way become a mechanism to review appointment acts that were legally carried out many years before. The legal system allows public entities to impose new requirements on positions, demand new profiles, and based on that, hire suitable personnel to fill them, without prejudice to the rights of those who hold those positions. In the cited votes of the Constitutional Chamber, issued by that Chamber on the occasion of amparo actions filed by officials of SUGEF against that institution, it is noted that the plaintiff also resorted to that avenue regarding the restructuring process that ultimately culminated in her dismissal. However, such amparo actions were rejected, among other reasons for the following reasons:

“In the specific case, apart from the foregoing considerations, it cannot be overlooked that the restructuring process at SUGEF is just being executed, whose completion was agreed for June 30, 2000 (regardless of in which session this agreement was issued), and that it is not proven in the case file that the petitioner is one of the persons to be dismissed, as there also exists the institutional commitment that prior to taking such a type of decision, relocation in another position will be sought within the same Body, in the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or in any of the other Bodies of Maximum Deconcentration of the issuing entity. Likewise, the Chamber understands, because the reporting party expressly stated so, that the tests carried out to date will not constitute more than an additional element to consider alongside academic training, professional experience, and knowledge of the English language, in such a way that the fact of not having been 'qualified' in accordance with them is not determinative for the purpose of a dismissal decision against her, as the General Superintendent of Financial Entities has indicated under oath -with the consequences even of a criminal nature contemplated by the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction in the event of affirming inaccuracies or falsehoods to this Tribunal-. In this context, the Chamber considers that at this time the presentation of this amparo is premature, considering that no certain and imminent threat of being dismissed without respect for her fundamental rights hangs over the petitioner, (…) Far from it, the tests that have been applied to all SUGEF personnel will constitute an objective parameter to be used by the head to make subsequent decisions in relation to the personnel who will definitively remain in that Body, jointly with others such as the academic and professional record of each employee and the evaluation of the immediate supervisor...” (vote of the Constitutional Chamber No. 1856-00, at 15:07 hours on February 29, cited by No. 3136, at 10:52 hours on April 14, both of 2000).

In accordance with the reasons set forth, in attention to the specific grievances raised by the appellant, it could well be said that the lower court incurred in an erroneous and inadequate assessment of the evidence by questioning in general terms the validity and legality of the restructuring process, but not in pointing out that the plaintiff's dismissal was illegitimate because it was arbitrary and illegal, since, as stated, she was removed after examining her personal conditions and determining that she did not meet the requirements of the position, according to a new profile established by the employer itself, in order to appoint another lawyer in her place. Consequently, we deem the dismissal of the plaintiff to be null and void, and being in the presence of a null dismissal, the effects of that declaration must be retroacted to the moment or date of said act, so that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. Consequently, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, specifying that from the amount that corresponds to the plaintiff, the sums paid for notice (preaviso), severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), and other indemnities received by her must be deducted (Anexo 12 of the expediente administrativo), as well as any other item for salary she may have received after that settlement. Regarding the amounts to be paid for this concept, the social charges must also be deducted.

V.- The prohibition (prohibición) is not an employer's liberality but a condition legally imposed on a specific position due to the nature of the functions that comprise it, which requires a transparent, impartial, and objective exercise, far from any conflict of interest; it is an ethical requirement and a condition inherent to the position that imposes on its holder a specific legal situation, from which arises for the official appointed to the position the duty not to exercise their profession or trade for the benefit of third parties, with the correlative right to the payment of economic compensation for said limitation. It is an incompatibility between the exercise of the public function and that of the private profession due to the potential clash of interests between both. In the specific case, the plaintiff was paid the prohibition (prohibición) based on the following budgetary norms:

“Article 14 of the Ordinary and Extraordinary Budget Law of the Republic for 1985, number 6982 of December 19, 1984. Add a paragraph to Article 1 of Law 5867 that reads:

"The benefits and prohibitions indicated in this article include the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos".- "Article 101 Extraordinary Budget Law, number 7015 of November 22, 1985.- The technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos will receive the economic benefits of Law 5867 of December 15, 1975, and its amendments, subject to the prohibitions of said law." "Article 14 Budget Law for 1986 number 7018 of December 20, 1985.- 1. ...

17. The prohibitions and benefits contained in Article 1 of Law No. 5867 December 15, 1975, are applicable to the Audit Offices of the National Banking System.” (Bold text is not in the original).

The payment of said economic compensation ceased with the votes of the Constitutional Chamber Nos. 4647 at 16:20 hours on June 16, 1999, and 6327 at 10:03 hours on August 13, 1999, which declared the cited norms unconstitutional and annulled them retroactively to their entry into force without prejudice to the rights acquired in good faith under their protection, and not based on Article 8 of session No. 4621 of December 9, 1992, which referred to Article 27 of the Agreement of the Parties -a provision that had also been annulled by votes numbers 1962-92 and 3285-92 of the Constitutional Chamber-, without there being any other valid and effective legal provision to support it, as ordered by the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) that must be observed in the public function. From the foregoing, it is inferred that the representative of SUGEF is correct in indicating that the budgetary norms annulled by vote 4647 of June 16, 1999, did not give economic content to the payment for prohibition (prohibición), as the court erroneously understood; on the contrary, they gave legal support to the regime, since the matter they regulated was not budgetary but rather a matter pertaining to ordinary legislation which reformed Law 5867, extending the recognition of the prohibition to the technical personnel of the Auditoría General de Bancos (now SUGEF). He is also correct in pointing out that, having declared unconstitutional and therefore null the norms that supported the payment of the prohibition (prohibición) in that entity, his represented entity did not need to resort to the process of Article 173 of the General Public Administration Law or of Articles 10 and 35 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction to eliminate such benefit, because such norms are designed for the nullity of administrative acts that declare rights or produce legal effects, and the prohibition regime that covered the plaintiff was established by the norms declared unconstitutional by vote 4647-99, so there can be no talk of annulment of any administrative act, since the regime had legislative support, not administrative; thus, the contested ruling erred in considering that the prohibition was suppressed arbitrarily and illegally due to lack of due process.

VI.- The payment of the prohibition (prohibición) depends on the occupied position being under that regime and on the official or employee meeting the conditions established by the regulations that impose it. In the specific case, the legal support for the payment of the prohibition, as stated, was provided for in the cited atypical norms which for that reason were annulled. The indemnity for prohibition (prohibición) was granted to the plaintiff subject to the validity of said provisions, so regardless of whether the bank's administration had revoked the benefit in execution of the aforementioned votes of unconstitutionality, the truth is that this indemnity was granted conditional on the position in question continuing to be subject to said regime, which is sufficient to consider that this benefit did not constitute an acquired right, being contingent upon the position remaining under the prohibition (prohibición) regime. In accordance with what was resolved by constitutional votes Nos. 4647-99 and 6327-99, which declared the norms on which the prohibition (prohibición) was based null and void without prejudice to the rights acquired under the protection of their validity, undoubtedly the right to the payments received for that concept while the prohibition regime existed was consolidated, which must be considered non-recoverable to the extent that they definitively entered into the plaintiff's patrimony prior to the extinction of that regulation, but it does not constitute a right to demand that the regime must continue to exist. It is clear that the cited budgetary norms supported the granting of the prohibition benefit in the Auditoría General de Bancos (now SUGEF), and that as of vote 4647-99, said norms ceased to exist with the unconstitutionality declared therein; therefore, if the Constitutional Chamber scoped the effects of its declaration of nullity by indicating that it was retroactive to the effective date of the annulled norms, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith, it is from that date that the administration of the defendant bank was left without the legal basis necessary to continue applying the economic benefit of the prohibition (prohibición) questioned here, regarding the positions of officials of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. Hence, the lower court was mistaken in considering that the plaintiff continued to have a legal basis to maintain the benefit of the prohibition (prohibición), because, as stated, the budgetary norms on which her prohibition regime was based were found unconstitutional in light of the cited votes 4647-99 and 6327-99, so the only acquired right that the plaintiff has is that corresponding to the funds she received while the regime existed and the employee fit within the factual conditions that said regime established. Consequently, it cannot be considered that the mere fact that the plaintiff received payment for prohibition (prohibición) determined the existence of an acquired right to that benefit for the rest of her working life with SUGEF. We are not in the presence of a right that has been incorporated into the employment contract, but rather facing a benefit that, in order to be received, must have its respective legal basis, so there can be no right to remain in the regime beyond the change that occurs in the legal system, whether by a repeal through a subsequent law or an annulment by judgment in the constitutional venue. In other words, there is no right to the immutability of the regime. Consequently, as the appellant's objections are admissible in this third requested instance, the contested judgment must be revoked to the extent it upheld the action as far as the prohibition (prohibición) point is concerned, and in its place, dismiss that specific point of the lawsuit's claims.

VII.- The plaintiff's objections that the claimed homologation (homologación) point involved a salary adjustment of general application not recognized for the position she held are not admissible, since it is recorded in the case file that in session No. 4975-98 of October 21, 1998, official communication [Placa1] of the 19th of that same month and year was considered, in which it is noted that some job classes at the Banco Central present differences in their classification and valuation when compared with their similar counterparts in the deconcentrated organs, since even though they had substantially identical characteristics in terms of skill, effort, and responsibility factors, the salary category was different (lower at the Banco Central in relation to its deconcentrated organs). Therefore, the Board of Directors of the bank, based on the power it holds to dictate its salary regime and other remunerations for its officials, as well as its own policy on job classification and valuation (Article 28, subsections t) and m) of the Organic Law of the Banco Central), taking into account principles such as equity, reasonableness, and equality, in Article 10 of session No. 4980-98, of December 9, 1998, based on what was stated by the administration in memorandum [Placa2] of November 17, 1998, regarding the necessary homologation of job classes existing at the Banco Central and its dependencies, agreed, among other things, “1.- To approve the homologation of the professional job classes located in categories 13 and 14, and the job classes related to Section Heads or Area Executives, currently in category 16, so that they are placed in categories 15, 16, and 18, respectively, of the Regular Salary Scale in Force, an action that will take effect on July 1, 1999, according to the approval date of its budgetary content by the Contraloría General de la República. / 2.- …The foregoing seeks to correct the distortions currently present in the area of job classification and valuation, so that job classes whose characteristics are substantially equal in terms of factors of skill (Academic preparation, experience, and specific knowledge); effort and responsibility (decision-making, handling of funds, significance of the decision, supervision exercised), are assigned to the same salary category” (official communications [Placa1] and [Placa2] from folios 373 to 388 and prueba n° 40 of the expediente administrativo), meaning that the Banco Central decided to apply the homologation to positions that, despite having the same tasks and meeting the same requirements demanded of their counterparts located in the Legal Advisory Office of SUGEF, received different salary retributions, a product of dissimilar categories. In the case of the plaintiff, through administrative resolution SUGEF-02-98 dated July 13, 1998, submitted as evidence in Anexo 30 of the expediente administrativo, it was determined that SUGEF lawyers would be reclassified to a category 16, when that type of professional at the Banco Central continued with a category 13 or 14, which caused one of the distortions that were intended to be corrected with the job homologation process (homologación de puestos), when it was decided to equate the job classes whose skill, responsibility, and effort factors were substantially equal to those of the officials of the superintendencies (which originated the distortions and where the plaintiff was assigned), in order to eliminate the existing differences by assigning the same salary category, which meant moving the lawyers who were assigned in categories 13 and 14 of the Regular Salary Scale to category 16, which was the category held by the legal advisors of SUGEF, translating into the recognition or equalization of categories for the rest of the bank's lawyers who performed the same tasks and met the same requirements, in such a way that all would have category 16. So, if the position held by the plaintiff in the class "Legal Advisor," category 16, of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, was one of those taken as a reference point for the application of the job homologation, it was illogical for that category, with responsibilities and functions identical to those homologated, to have been recognized as a superior category, because this would have perpetuated the unconstitutional (Article 57 of the Political Constitution) and illegal (Article 167 of the Labor Code) inequalities that existed at that time in the salary scale of the issuing entity, which moreover could not be done, since it was noted regarding that position that “Because no job classes with conditions similar to the aforementioned job classes were found in the technical-operative section of the Regular Salary Scale, the homologation process does not extend to that section.” Thus, the appropriate course is to confirm the contested ruling to the extent it declared that point of the lawsuit without merit.

**VIII.-** Article 54 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica No. 1552 of April 23, 1953, and its amendments, established: “*The Central Bank of Costa Rica may only record in its assets and debit balances the following: / … / 8°.- The balances of accounts originating from the normal movement of expenses, losses, and results, and others from operations authorized by this law. Within the item indicated in numeral 8, the Central Bank shall include a sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total salaries of its employees for the maintenance of the guarantee and retirement fund for these employees. This sum shall belong to them in the proportion corresponding to their salary, and must be delivered to them under the conditions determined in the retirement regulations, if they leave the service before having attained the right to a disability pension. That Bank contribution shall be unique for all types of social benefits. The institution's regulations may establish additional sums with which employees must contribute to the strengthening of the fund, so that they may obtain an adequate pension, in accordance with their salary, age, and time of service. The system thus created is complementary to that established by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, and does not affect the obligations of its beneficiaries to the Caja. The sums corresponding to employees who leave the service before having attained the right to a disability pension are declared unseizable. The Central Bank may invest the reserve for legal benefits in the discount of obligations held in its favor by the aforementioned fund. On the Administrative Board of the Bank's Guarantee and Retirement Fund, representation shall be given to the employees, who shall elect two of its members*”. That norm was repealed by Article 170 of the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica No. 7558 of November 3, 1995. The objections of the plaintiff to continue being recognized the equivalent of the 10% salary contribution for the maintenance of the Guarantee and Retirement Fund, which she considers a right incorporated into her employment contract by having joined SUGEF before such contribution was eliminated by the repeal ordered in Law No. 7558 of November 13, 1995, are not admissible, because said contribution does not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) or consolidated legal situation of the employees who, as of November 1995, were part of the complementary pension regime regulated by Article 54 of Law No. 1552, amended by No. 7107 of November 4, 1988, which established the contribution that the Central Bank had been making based on that repealed norm. That percentage never constituted an integral part of the salary of the Central Bank officials and its dependencies—even though it was calculated as a percentage of the total salaries of the employees and belonged to them by legal provision, in the proportion corresponding to their salary—, nor a vested right that must continue to be paid, since the cause for that transfer of money from the Central Bank's assets to the Guarantee Fund had a legal cause of a different nature and was duly authorized by the legal system, which is not the case now. The vested right of those who worked at the Central Bank before the enactment of Law No. 7558, regarding the contributions that institution made when it was authorized by the legal system, translates into the certainty of not having to reimburse their employer for what it contributed to the Guarantee Fund. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has established: “*In this case, the constitutional guarantee of non-retroactivity of the law translates into the certainty that a change in the legal system cannot have the consequence of removing an already acquired good or right from the person's assets, or of causing that, if the factual prerequisite had occurred prior to the legal reform, the (beneficial, it is understood) consequence that the interested party expected from the consolidated legal situation no longer arises. Now, specifically on this last point, it has also been understood that no one has a "right to the immutability of the legal system," that is, that the rules never change. Therefore, the constitutional precept does not consist of the rule connecting the fact with the effect cannot, once born into legal life, be modified or even suppressed by a later norm…*” (vote No. 2765 of 3:03 p.m. on May 20, 1997). It was also indicated in said vote that: “*1. The protection of vested rights means, in this case, that despite the elimination of the norms, all amounts received until then for assistance must be considered non-recoverable. To the extent that they had definitively entered the interested parties' assets prior to the legal reform, it would be absurd—and unconstitutional—to pretend that they must be returned, or something similar…*”. Hence, in the case of the plaintiff, as with the other Central Bank officials, the only vested right that can be claimed regarding that contribution is with respect to those effectively delivered by the bank to the Guarantee and Retirement Fund up to the moment of the repeal of the norm that supported it, which are the property in the proportional part of each of them, and not that the issuing entity continue granting said benefit. Consequently, the plaintiff does not have the right for the Central Bank to continue making the contribution she claims, therefore, what was resolved on this specific point by the judges of the preceding instances must be confirmed.

**IX.-** Finally, the plaintiff is correct in feeling aggrieved by the equitable determination (fijación prudencial) made of the personal costs, but not with the claim that these be fixed on a percentage basis. Because the litigation at hand involves an unquantifiable amount and considering the work performed, the economic importance of the process, and the economic position of the parties (Article 495 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)), the equitable determination made of the personal costs must be modified, and instead established in the sum of one million colones.

**X.-** In accordance with the preceding considerations, it is appropriate to partially revoke the appealed judgment insofar as it granted the action with respect to the prohibition point, to uphold the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho) in that regard and dismiss the claim of the lawsuit on that specific point. The determination of personal costs must be modified to establish them in the equitable sum of one million colones. In all other respects, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, establishing that from the amount that corresponds to the plaintiff, the sums paid for notice (preaviso), severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), and other indemnities received by the plaintiff must be deducted (Annex 12 of the administrative file), as well as any other item or items received as salary subsequent to that settlement. On the amounts to be paid for that concept, the deduction of social charges (cargas sociales) must also be made, to the extent legally applicable.

**POR TANTO:** The appealed judgment is partially revoked insofar as it granted the action with respect to the prohibition point. In its place, the exception of lack of right is upheld in that regard, and the claim of the lawsuit is dismissed on that specific point. The determination of personal costs is modified to establish them in the equitable sum of three million colones. In all other respects, the appealed judgment is confirmed, establishing that from the amount that corresponds to the plaintiff, the sums paid for notice, severance pay, and other indemnities already received by the plaintiff must be deducted, as well as any other item or items received as salary subsequent to that settlement. On the amounts to be paid for that concept, the deduction of social charges must also be made, to the extent legally applicable.

***Orlando Aguirre Gómez*** ***Zarela María Villanueva Monge*** ***Julia Varela Araya*** ***Rolando Vega Robert*** ***Eva María Camacho Vargas*** **CONSTANCIA:** In accordance with Article 154, final paragraph, of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), it is recorded that Magistrate Eva María Camacho Vargas participated with her vote in the issuance of this judgment, but does not sign because she is unable to do so, being on vacation. San José, January 12, 2010.

**José Celso Fernández Delgado** **Interim Clerk (Secretario a.í.)** *[Name4].-* 2

*000092880166LA* *000092880166LA* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2009-001257 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas cuarenta minutos del cuatro de diciembre de dos mil nueve.

Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, por [Nombre1] , contra el BANCO CENTRAL DE COSTA RICA, representado por su apoderado generalísimo Roy González Rojas, máster en Administración de Negocios, EDUARDO LIZANO FAIT, licenciado en Ciencias Económicas, [Nombre2] ingeniero civil y SUPERINTENDENCIA GENERAL DE ENTIDADES FINANCIERAS, representada por su superintendente Francisco Lay Solano. Actúan como apoderados especiales judiciales; de la actora, el licenciado Luis Ricardo Bogantes Villegas, vecino de Alajuela; y del demandado [Nombre2] , la licenciada Karoll Molina Chaves. Todos mayores, casados, abogados y vecinos de San José, con las excepciones indicadas.

RESULTANDO:

1.- La actora, en escrito fechado veintidós de diciembre de dos mil, promovió la presente acción para que en sentencia: 1) Que se acoja esta demanda ordinaria de trabajo. 2) Que toda vez que el despido de la suscrita fue un despido “encubierto”, ya que la causal alegada no existe, al no cumplir el proceso de reestructuración con los postulados y los presupuestos de ley, se REINSTALE A LA SUSCRITA EN SU PUESTO Y EN PLENO USO DE SUS DERECHOS LABORALES. 3) Que en su defecto, toda vez que el Banco Central, con su actitud arbitraria y atentatoria de todo derecho y garantía laboral de la suscrita, me ha causado daños y perjuicios de irreparable consideración, no solo en el aspecto económico, sino social, laboral, y moral impidiéndome, sin justificación alguna mi derecho al trabajo que durante 23 años realicé en forma eficiente, se paguen a la suscrita por concepto de daños y perjuicios, los salarios caídos desde el momento de cese de la suscrita y sus correspondientes intereses, hasta el momento en que quede firme y se implemente la resolución que apruebe mis pretensiones. 4) Subsidiariamente, ante una eventual declaratoria sin lugar la petitoria principal, se acoja la presente solicitud de que se paguen los montos complementarios que corresponden al no habérseme reconocido el año laborado para el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, más los intereses correspondientes a la fecha de pago. 5) Que se me devuelvan las sumas retenidas de más, por la no correcta aplicación del Banco Central de Costa Rica, de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, y los correspondientes intereses de ley, desde la fecha en que se iniciaron estas retenciones y durante todo el tiempo que fue mal aplicada la ley, más los correspondientes intereses a la fecha de su efectivo pago. 5) (sic) Que se me realice el ajuste salarial, realizado en el Banco Central de Costa Rica, vía homologación y los intereses de ley. 6) Que se me reconozca el equivalente al aporte del 10% del salario por concepto del Fondo de Garantías, el cual venía gozando por haber ingresado a trabajar al Banco Central antes del mes de noviembre de 1995, y sus intereses de ley, al haber sido eliminado con efecto retroactivo en perjuicio, lo dispuesto en la Ley del Banco Central de Costa Rica (Ley 7558), sea desde noviembre de 1995 a la fecha de resolución de esta solicitud, más los intereses de ley. 7) Que se me devuelva la parte proporcional a que tengo derecho de la reserva para eventuales juicios de ¢125 millones de colones acordada por la Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco Central de Costa Rica, por no ajustarse a derecho, y los respectivos intereses de ley. 8) Se me cancele la diferencia no pagada correspondiente al 6.49% al haberse aprobado por la Junta Directiva del BCCR, un incremento salarial general de un 11.49% a la base por aumento del costo de la vida a todos los empleados del Banco Central de Costa Rica y sus entes desconcentrados con vigencia a partir del 1 de julio de 1995. Que el Banco debe hacer el reconocimiento salarial del 6.49%, que se calculará sobre el salario base, desde el 1 de julio de 1995 y su incorporación salarial al futuro. Se me paguen los intereses legales, conforme se fue haciendo exigible y hasta su efectivo pago. Se paguen las diferencias existentes por la no incorporación al salario base del 6.49%, en relación a todos y cada uno de los pluses o componentes que integran mi salario, a partir del primero de julio de 1995 y conforme se fueron haciendo exigibles. 9) Se me cancele el equivalente al 65% del salario por concepto de prohibición, a partir del 17 de abril de 2000 a la fecha de su efectivo pago, incluidos los intereses de ley y se realicen los ajustes salariales correspondientes. 10) Más el reajuste en el cálculo de la cesantía que los reconocimientos salariales me favorezcan. 11) Que se condene al Banco Central de Costa Rica y solidariamente al Ing [Nombre2] , en su calidad de Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, al pago de salarios caídos e intereses en concepto de daños y perjuicios más ambas costas procesales y personales.

2.- El demandado [Nombre2] , en su condición personal, en calidad de Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras y como apoderado generalísimo del Banco Central de Costa Rica, contestó la acción en los términos que indicó en el memorial de fecha diecinueve de marzo del dos mil uno y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva, la genérica de sine actione agit y la que denominó como falta de causa. Por su parte el codemandado [Nombre3] contestó la litis en forma extemporánea.

3.- El juez, licenciado Pedro Ubau Hernández, por sentencia de las diez horas dos minutos del diecinueve de diciembre de dos mil cinco, dispuso: De conformidad con los fundamentos expuestos, citas de derecho y jurisprudencia citada se declara SIN LUGAR en todos sus extremos, la presente demanda ordinaria incoada por [Nombre1] , contra BANCO CENTRAL DE COSTA RICA, [Nombre2] , Y [Nombre3] . Se acogen las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación ad causan pasiva, falta de causa y la genérica de sine actione agit. Se resuelve este asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas de conformidad con los artículos 222 del Código Procesal Civil en relación con el artículo 452 del Código de Trabajo. Se advierte a las partes que, esta sentencia admite el recurso de apelación, el cual deberá exponer, en forma verbal o escrita, los motivos de hecho o de derecho en que la parte recurrente apoya su inconformidad; bajo el apercibimiento de declarar inatendible el recurso (artículo 500 y 501 inciso c) y d); votos de la Sala Constitucional números 5798, de las 16:21 horas, del 11 de agosto de 1998 y 1306 de las 16:27 horas del 23 de febrero de 1999 y voto de la Sala Segunda número 386, de las 14:20 horas, del 10 de diciembre de 1999) (circular de la Secretaría General de la Corte Suprema de Justicia n° 79-2001).

4.- La parte actora apeló y el Tribunal de Trabajo, Sección Cuarta, del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, integrado por los licenciados Óscar Ugalde Miranda, Álvaro Moya Arias y Nelson Rodríguez Jiménez, por sentencia de las dieciocho horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del diecisiete de noviembre de dos mil seis, resolvió: Se declara, que en la tramitación de este asunto, no se advierte omisión alguna, que haya podido causar nulidad o indefensión. Se revoca la sentencia recurrida y se condena al Banco Central de Costa Rica a reinstalar a la recurrente [Nombre1] en el puesto que tenía al momento del despido de que fue objeto, debiendo cancelarle los salarios que dejó de percibir desde el veintitrés de junio del año dos mil, con intereses desde la exigibilidad de cada suma y hasta el efectivo pago. El quantum de esos extremos deberán ser determinados en ejecución de sentencia. Se rechazan las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva, falta de causa y la genérica de sine actione agit. Son ambas costas a cargo del banco demandado, fijándose las personales en la suma prudencial de doscientos cincuenta mil colones.

5.- La Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras y la parte actora formularon recursos para ante esta Sala en memoriales de data veintiuno de febrero y cuatro de julio ambos del dos mil siete, los cuales se fundamentan en los motivos que se dirán en la parte considerativa.

6.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Aguirre Gómez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- La demandante interpuso la litis para que se declare nulo el despido de que fue objeto, así como para: “1) Que se acoja esta demanda ordinaria de trabajo. 2) Que toda vez que el despido de la suscrita fue un despido “encubierto”, ya que la causal alegada no existe, al no cumplir el proceso de reestructuración con los postulados y los presupuestos de ley, se REINSTALE A LA SUSCRITA EN SU PUESTO Y EN PLENO USO DE SUS DERECHOS LABORALES. 3) Que en su defecto, toda vez que el Banco Central, con su actitud arbitraria y atentatoria de todo derecho y garantía laboral de la suscrita, me ha causado daños y perjuicios de irreparable consideración, no solo en el aspecto económico, sino social, laboral, y moral impidiéndome, sin justificación alguna mi derecho al trabajo que durante 23 años realicé en forma eficiente, se paguen a la suscrita por concepto de daños y perjuicios, los salarios caídos desde el momento de cese de la suscrita y sus correspondientes intereses, hasta el momento en que quede firme y se implemente la resolución que apruebe mis pretensiones. 4) Subsidiariamente, ante una eventual declaratoria sin lugar la petitoria principal, se acoja la presente solicitud de que se paguen los montos complementarios que corresponden al no habérseme reconocido el año laborado para el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, más los intereses correspondientes a la fecha de pago. 5) Que se me devuelvan las sumas retenidas de más, por la no correcta aplicación del Banco Central de Costa Rica, de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, y los correspondientes intereses de ley, desde la fecha en que se iniciaron estas retenciones y durante todo el tiempo que fue mal aplicada la ley, más los correspondientes intereses a la fecha de su efectivo pago. 5) Que se me realice el ajuste salarial, realizado en el Banco Central de Costa Rica, vía homologación y los intereses de ley. 6) Que se me reconozca el equivalente al aporte del 10% del salario por concepto del Fondo de Garantías, el cual venía gozando por haber ingresado a trabajar al Banco Central antes del mes de noviembre de 1995, y sus intereses de ley, al haber sido eliminado con efecto retroactivo en perjuicio, lo dispuesto en la Ley del Banco Central de Costa Rica (Ley 7558), sea desde noviembre de 1995 a la fecha de resolución de esta solicitud, más los intereses de ley. 7) Que se me devuelva la parte proporcional a que tengo derecho de la reserva para eventuales juicios de ¢ 125 millones de colones acordada por la Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones de los Empleados del Banco Central de Costa Rica, por no ajustarse a derecho, y los respectivos intereses de ley. 8) Se me cancele la diferencia no pagada correspondiente al 6.49% al haberse aprobado por la Junta Directiva del BCCR, un incremento salarial general de un 11.49% a la base por aumento del costo de la vida a todos los empleados del Banco Central de Costa Rica y sus entes desconcentrados con vigencia a partir del 1 de julio de 1995. Que el Banco debe hacer el reconocimiento salarial del 6.49%, que se calculará sobre el salario base, desde el 1 de julio de 1995 y su incorporación salarial al futuro. Se me paguen los intereses legales, conforme se fue haciendo exigible y hasta su efectivo pago. Se paguen las diferencias existentes por la no incorporación al salario base del 6.49%, en relación a todos y cada uno de los pluses o componentes que integran mi salario, a partir del primero de julio de 1995 y conforme se fueron haciendo exigibles. 9) Se me cancele el equivalente al 65% del salario por concepto de prohibición, a partir del 17 de abril de 2000 a la fecha de su efectivo pago, incluidos los intereses de ley y se realicen los ajustes salariales correspondientes. 10) Más el reajuste en el cálculo de la cesantía que los reconocimientos salariales me favorezcan. 11) Que se condene al Banco Central de Costa Rica y solidariamente al Ing. [Nombre2] , en su calidad de Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, al pago de salarios caídos e intereses en concepto de daños y perjuicios más ambas costas procesales y personales”. Según indicó, laboró para el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal del 23 de junio de 1976 al 31 de abril de 1977 cuando renunció, y para el Banco Central de Costa Rica del 1° de mayo siguiente al 23 de junio de 2000, fecha en que se le cesó por motivos de reestructuración administrativa. Señaló haber recibido bajo protesta sus prestaciones legales el 27 de julio de 2000, calculadas sobre el tiempo servido en el banco pero no el laborado en otras instituciones del Sector Público (folios 1 a 33). Bernardo Alfaro Araya contestó la demanda negativamente, en su condición personal y como apoderado generalísimo del Banco Central de Costa Rica para los asuntos de la Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras, oponiendo las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva, falta de causa y la genérica sine actione agit. Eduardo Lizano Fait en su condición personal y como apoderado generalísimo del Banco Central de Costa Rica, contestó la demanda negativamente en forma extemporánea (folios 42 a 70 y 121 a 161). El juzgado acogió las defensas opuestas, declaró en todos sus extremos sin lugar la demanda y resolvió el asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas (folios 399 a 409). La actora apeló lo resuelto y el tribunal revocó la sentencia recurrida, denegó las defensas opuestas y condenó al Banco Central de Costa Rica a reinstalar a la actora en el puesto que tenía al momento del despido, con los salarios que dejó de percibir desde el 23 de junio de 2000, a pagarle el rubro de prohibición que dejó de recibir desde el 17 de abril de 2000 hasta que se aplique el mismo en el salario, así como los intereses desde la exigibilidad de cada suma hasta el efectivo pago, cuyo quantum se determinará en ejecución de sentencia, con las costas a cargo del banco demandado, fijando las personales en la suma prudencial de doscientos cincuenta mil colones (folios 416 a 448, 580 a 593 y 614 a 618).

II.- La Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras y la parte actora, se muestran disconformes con lo resuelto por el ad-quem; la primera porque se revocó el fallo del a-quo y se condenó al Banco Central de Costa Rica a reinstalar a la demandante al puesto que tenía cuando fue despedida, a cancelarle lo que dejó de percibir desde el 23 de junio de 2000, así como el rubro de prohibición que dejó de recibir desde el 17 de abril de 2000, hasta que se aplique en el salario, con los intereses desde la exigibilidad de cada suma hasta el efectivo pago y ambas costas del proceso. Reprocha que se haya estimado que la actora fue despedida en forma ilegítima, pues su cesación fue el producto de una reorganización o reestructuración administrativa realizada por la Sugef, apoyada en necesidades reales y en estudios técnicos que le dieron respaldo y solidez a la decisión, aprobada por el Consejo Nacional de la Supervisión del Sistema Financiero y por la Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica. Acusa que el tribunal efectuó una inadecuada valoración de la prueba aportada a los autos, al cuestionar la validez y legalidad del proceso de reestructuración que en casos idénticos ha avalado. Considera irrelevante que el tribunal concluyera “que la actora fue despedida sin que mediara una supresión inmediata de su plaza y que en su lugar se nombró a otro profesional, por lo que le queda claramente establecido que se utilizó la reestructuración como excusa o pretexto para despedir a la actora”. Señala que el ordinal 192 Constitucional establece que el despido de un funcionario administrativo se justifica por: a) reducción forzosa de servicios, b) falta de fondos y c) conseguir una mejor reorganización, por lo que el tribunal efectuó una errónea valoración de la prueba al señalar que el despido fue ilegítimo, porque la supresión de la plaza de la actora se dio hasta unos meses después del despido -al haber sido contratada otra profesional para ocupar una plaza similar a la que ella ocupaba-, cuando la reducción forzosa no es el único supuesto que contempla el artículo 192 constitucional para justificar la remoción en caso de reestructuración, y el proceso aprobado a la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras no solo se fundamentó en una reducción forzosa de servicios, sino también en una serie de estudios técnicos que instituyeron el perfil ideal de la organización y de cada uno de los puestos para lograr una mayor eficiencia y adaptación a las necesidades del Sistema Financiero. Indica que después de aplicarse todos los procedimientos aprobados para la reestructuración, la actora no resultó idónea para ocupar el puesto que venía desempeñando, porque pese a cumplir con los requerimientos académicos no cumplía con la capacidad e idoneidad requeridas para la nueva estructura, de ahí que si no era apta para ocupar el puesto que debía desempeñar en la nueva estructura, resultaba ilógico que se tuviera que esperar un tiempo prolongado para volver a ocupar el puesto que dejó vacante, por lo que al igual que en otros puestos que se encontraban en esa situación, se realizaron los trámites necesarios para llenarlos con quienes cumplieran los perfiles requeridos dentro del Banco Central y sus órganos desconcentrados, mediante reclutamiento de personal valorando la idoneidad, el mérito y la capacidad de los oferentes, por lo cual unos tres meses después del despido de la actora se contrataron profesionales para ser incorporados en áreas funcionales de la Superintendencia, incluyendo la profesional en derecho para el Departamento de Asesoría Jurídica. Califica de erróneo el razonamiento del ad-quem al reputar de ilegal y arbitrario el despido y sobre todo errada la consideración de ese tribunal, al estimar que “el proceso de reestructuración fue utilizado como pretexto para despedir a la actora” y contratar a una nueva persona, máxime si con dicho proceso salieron de la institución por movilidad voluntaria o despido, aproximadamente 75 personas. Reitera que la cesación que nos ocupa no se fundamentó en una supresión de plazas, sino que se debió a que una vez realizadas las pruebas de idoneidad de los funcionarios, la actora resultó no idónea para el puesto que venía ocupando al no ajustarse al perfil requerido para la nueva estructura. Niega que el despido resultara ilegal por no haber existido reducción de plazas o porque se nombrara con posterioridad a una nueva persona en una plaza similar en la Dirección Legal de la Superintendencia, porque en procesos de reestructuración en los que se pretende con base en estudios técnicos mejorar el desempeño de la organización, se puede despedir al funcionario que no cumpla con el nuevo perfil definido para el puesto que venía ocupando, por lo que no se puede afirmar que si una persona es despedida por no cumplir con dicho perfil, se trate de un despido encubierto o de una actuación discriminatoria, sino mas bien de una situación en que el servidor no cumple con el perfil requerido para el mejor desempeño en la organización, lo que faculta a prescindir de sus servicios con el respectivo pago de todos sus derechos laborales. Señala que el tribunal incurrió en error en la apreciación de los hechos y prueba allegada al expediente, al considerar que el proceso de reestructuración que sirvió de base para el despido no contemplaba el área de Asesoría Jurídica, cuando el proceso aprobado por los órganos competentes comprendió todas las áreas administrativas de la Superintendencia incluida la Asesoría Jurídica. Alega que la reestructuración implicó un cambio en los requerimientos de los funcionarios de la Asesoría Jurídica, lo que se evaluó mediante pruebas técnicas realizadas al efecto por empresas de prestigio y de reconocida experiencia contratadas para ese fin. Arguye que los resultados de las pruebas aplicadas a la actora no fueron satisfactorias, por lo que al no comprobarse su idoneidad para el cargo según la nueva estructura, con base en la evaluación integral de criterios como el récord académico, experiencia previa, la evaluación del jefe inmediato (ranking forzado) y entrevistas, se prescindió de sus servicios, por lo que el despido de la actora no se puede tener como injustificado. Sostiene que el razonamiento en relación con el pago de la prohibición es incorrecto, por cuanto para los funcionarios de la Auditoría General de Bancos actual Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, el beneficio originalmente establecido en la Ley 5867 del 15 de diciembre de 1975, les fue concedido con sustento en las leyes presupuestarias 6982 del 19 de diciembre de 1984, artículo 14; 7015 de 22 de noviembre de 1985, artículo 101 y 7018 de 20 de diciembre de 1985, artículo 14, inciso 17), y no con base en el artículo 8 de la sesión 4621-92 celebrada por la Junta Directiva del Banco Central el 9 de diciembre de 1992, que remitía al artículo 27 del convenio de partes -normativa anulada por los votos números 1962-92 y 3285-92 de la Sala Constitucional-. Señala que esas normas presupuestarias anuladas por la Sala Constitucional mediante voto 4647 del 16 de junio de 1999, no le daban contenido económico al pago por prohibición como erróneamente lo entendió el tribunal, sino que reformaron la Ley 5867, extendiendo el reconocimiento de ese régimen al personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos (hoy Sugef). Acusa que en el presente asunto no existió acto administrativo que pudiera ser objeto de un proceso de nulidad absoluta evidente y manifiesta (artículo 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) o de lesividad (artículo 10 y 35 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), pues tales procesos están concebidos para la nulidad de actos administrativos declaratorios de derechos o que producen efectos jurídicos y el régimen de prohibición que cobijó a la actora como funcionaria de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, fue establecido por las normas presupuestarias declaradas inconstitucionales por el voto 4647-99, por lo cual no puede hablarse de anulación de acto administrativo alguno, ya que el régimen tenía sustento legislativo no administrativo, de ahí que la eliminación del régimen de prohibición en esa dependencia del Banco Central no fue algo antojadizo y arbitrario como erróneamente lo califica el tribunal. Apunta que la prohibición es una exigencia técnica y condición propia del puesto, que impone a su titular el deber de no ejercer su profesión u oficio a favor de terceras personas -lo que en ciertas ocasiones previstas por ley, confiere el derecho correlativo al pago de una compensación económica por tal limitación-, y dado el interés público en que se fundamenta la prohibición, el Estado tiene la potestad de cambiar tal situación, ante lo cual los interesados no pueden alegar derechos adquiridos a la permanencia de la situación jurídica anterior, o sea, que no puede existir un derecho adquirido a la inmutabilidad del régimen. Alude que al verse obligado el ente emisor a eliminar el pago por prohibición dispuso compensar la pérdida de ese rubro, decretando un aumento de los salarios básicos y modificando las escalas salariales en seis categorías, para así mantener una posición competitiva en las remuneraciones de la institución. Refiere que la compensación económica por prohibición disfrutada por los servidores de la SUGEF cesó en ejecución de las sentencias o votos de la Sala Constitucional n°s 4647 de las 16:20 horas del 16 de junio de 1999 y n° 6327 de las 10:03 horas del 13 de agosto de 1999, que declararon inconstitucionales y anularon las normas presupuestarias que habían dado sustento legal al régimen, anulación que es retroactiva a su entrada en vigencia sin perjuicio de los derechos de buena fe adquiridos a su amparo. Para esa parte, tales derechos comprenden los pagos ingresados definitivamente en la esfera patrimonial del titular, por lo que solo pueden considerarse como derechos adquiridos los efectivamente recibidos durante la vigencia de la normativa presupuestaria anulada, o sea, que al declararse inconstitucionales las normas en que se fundamentaba el pago de la prohibición, los derechos adquiridos consisten en no tener que repetir lo pagado por tal concepto, ya que después de dicha declaratoria lo procedente era el cese inmediato del pago de la compensación por prohibición que se venía haciendo con base en las citadas normas, sin que se pudiese alegar derecho adquirido alguno a seguir devengando ese beneficio en los términos que se venía haciendo antes de la declaratoria de nulidad, por cuanto constituiría un quebranto del principio de legalidad, por no existir norma jurídica que justifique su pago. Afirma que la actora y el ad-quem incurren en error al estimar que la prohibición fue suprimida en forma arbitraria e ilegal y que existió un vicio por falta de un debido proceso. Con esos argumentos pretende la revocatoria del fallo impugnado y que se confirme la sentencia de primera instancia en su totalidad. La parte actora se muestra disconforme porque se le denegó lo que ella denomina como un típico aumento o ajuste salarial realizado por el Banco Central de Costa Rica vía homologación de las clases de puestos, discriminando el puesto categoría 16 por ella ocupado en la Asesoría Jurídica de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, pese a ser su aplicación de carácter general, por lo cual, según su entender, el acuerdo de la Junta Directiva que no homologó el puesto referido con una categoría superior es ilegal. Recrimina también la denegatoria del reconocimiento del aporte por parte del banco del 10% del salario para el mantenimiento del Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones, que fuera eliminado por la derogatoria dispuesta en la Ley n° 7558 del 13 de noviembre de 1995, lo que le significó la supresión de un derecho que se encuentra incorporado a su contrato de trabajo. Reprocha la fijación del monto de doscientos cincuenta mil colones por costas personales, por no ajustarse a la complejidad del proceso, a lo concedido y a la posición económica de las partes, señalando que debe establecerse por tal concepto un rubro que oscile entre un 15% y un 25% de lo estimado. Alega haberse vulnerado el artículo 495 del Código de Trabajo por falta de aplicación o errónea interpretación, por lo que solicita se proceda hacer la fijación de manera porcentual. Con base en esos argumentos pretende la revocatoria del fallo impugnado en lo recurrido y que en su lugar, se concedan los extremos petitorios en los términos originalmente solicitados, manteniendo lo resuelto en lo concedido (folios 626 a 647, 677 a 709 y 664 a 675).

III.- El despido de la demandante fue justificado en un proceso de reestructuración organizacional y del recurso humano de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, aprobado por el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero en la sesión n° 124-99, artículo 6, del 9 de noviembre de 1999 y por la Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica en sesión n° 5014-99, artículo 5, del 12 de noviembre de 1999 (demanda, contestación y prueba n° 6 del expediente administrativo). Como principio fundamental del régimen de empleo público, el numeral 192 constitucional instituyó el denominado “derecho a la estabilidad en el empleo”, el cual ha sido concebido como el derecho del servidor público a conservar su puesto y de perderlo sólo en caso de incurrir en alguna de las causales de despido establecidas por la legislación de trabajo o cuando resulte necesaria una reducción forzosa de servicios por falta de fondos o para lograr una mejor organización del servicio. Respecto de los servidores bancarios, el artículo 41, inciso 6) de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, expresamente les reconoce, los beneficios mínimos contemplados en las leyes de trabajo y de servicio civil de la República, lo que redunda en la aplicación en su favor de los derechos contemplados por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil. El artículo 43 de ese estatuto, establece la remoción de los servidores amparados por esa normativa, únicamente cuando incurrieren en las causales contempladas en el artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo y 41, inciso d), de esa ley, o en actos que impliquen infracción grave de tal normativa, de sus reglamentos, o de los reglamentos interiores de trabajo respectivos. También contempla dicha ley, la posibilidad de remoción en aquellos casos en que resulte necesaria la reducción forzosa de servicios por falta absoluta de fondos; o para conseguir una más eficaz y económica reorganización de los mismos, siempre que esa reorganización afecte por lo menos al 60% de los empleados de la respectiva dependencia. Por otra parte, el “Convenio de Partes suscrito entre el Banco Central de Costa Rica y sus Trabajadores” en el año 1988, en su artículo 24 dispone: “INAMOVILIDAD. Todos los empleados del Banco amparados por contrato de trabajo por tiempo indefinido son inamovibles según lo dispone el artículo 188 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, concepto que debe interpretarse como la garantía de los empleados bancarios a no ser despedidos arbitrariamente...”. Cabe destacar lo dispuesto en la Ley de Modernización del Sistema Financiero de la República n° 7107 de 4 de noviembre de 1988, publicada en La Gaceta n° 222 del 22 de noviembre de 1988, transitorio anexo 3 de los artículos del Sistema Bancario Nacional, artículo 188, que expresa: “Cada banco del Estado deberá tener un escalafón en el que se les garantice la carrera bancaria a sus funcionarios, así como su inamovilidad y sus ascensos en forma tal que se les asegura el derecho de ascender en dichas instituciones desde la escala inferior hasta poder ocupar las posiciones más elevadas, con base en méritos. Cualquier modificación que lleven a cabo los bancos adecuar sus escalafones regulares a las condiciones imperantes en el momento, no afectará en forma alguna a los empleados que ingresaron con anterioridad…” (lo destacado no es del original). De lo anterior resulta que al ser la estabilidad laboral, una garantía constitucional para el funcionario bancario, los casos específicos de reorganización de servicios en los que se cercene ese derecho, deben ser valorados con absoluta objetividad y apegados a la legalidad. Los procedimientos legales establecidos al efecto deben respetarse y también los derechos de los servidores directa o indirectamente involucrados, de manera que tanto las nuevas formas organizativas propuestas, los criterios para determinar cuáles plazas se mantienen dentro del órgano o entidad y sus condiciones, así como la propuesta sobre los funcionarios que habrán de ser removidos o trasladados, son asuntos que deben manejarse con plena transparencia y objetividad, pues de lo contrario, se estaría abriendo un peligroso portillo a la arbitrariedad, para que sea la voluntad del jerarca -o de los encargados de ejecutar los cambios- la que disponga esos aspectos, aún sin ninguna fundamentación o utilizando mecanismos indebidos o criterios discriminatorios. En esta materia, la Sala Constitucional ha reconocido la constitucionalidad de los procesos de reestructuración en la Administración Pública, en los siguientes términos: “Derecho al trabajo y estabilidad en el empleo. En una relación de empleo público, la proyección del derecho al trabajo protegido por el artículo 56 constitucional contiene como uno de sus postulados a favor del trabajador el de la estabilidad en el puesto. En efecto, no puede desconocerse que ello es lo que permite al servidor acceder a una serie de beneficios sociales y económicos que posibilitan su superación académica y laboral, proporcionándole la seguridad necesaria para su desarrollo personal y del núcleo familiar que de él depende, lo que efectiviza realmente el sentido del derecho al trabajo como garantía individual y obligación con la sociedad, en la expresión utilizada por el texto constitucional. Es por ello que los servidores sólo pueden ser removidos por vía de excepción, ante una causal de despido justificado, o en el caso de reducción forzosa de servicios, siendo uno de los casos precisamente los procesos de reestructuración a que puede someterse una institución, encontrándose esto último, además, en consonancia con los principios que se derivan del artículo 192 de la Constitución Política. Ahora bien, el sometimiento a un proceso legítimo de modernización, que garantice la óptima utilización de los fondos públicos y la más alta eficiencia en la prestación de los servicios encomendados a una institución, es, desde luego, un motivo legítimo para ejecutar cambios organizacionales que, en la mayoría de los casos, irremediablemente conllevan la supresión de determinadas plazas. Pero justamente por ser una excepción a la garantía constitucional de estabilidad para el trabajador, su aplicación por parte de la administración debe ser ejecutada con absoluta objetividad, transparencia y seriedad, y de ahí la exigencia de estudios técnicos calificados que puedan validar la toma de decisiones, con base en un modelo coherente y efectivo. Bajo este orden de ideas, esta Sala admite que si la nueva estructura no puede dar cabida a la reubicación de un funcionario, toda vez que las funciones sustantivas que venía desempeñando desaparecen, por suprimirse en atención a criterios de eficiencia y modernización, es legítimo su cese con apego a la disposición constitucional comentada”. (Lo destacado no es del original) (voto de la Sala Constitucional n° 4951-2000 de las 16:37 horas del 27 de junio de 2000). Sobre el mismo tema esa Sala también indicó: “Como lo ha indicado la Sala en reiterados pronunciamientos, el artículo 192 de la Constitución Política faculta a la Administración Pública para disponer la reestructuración de las diversas dependencias que la componen, con el fin de alcanzar un mejor desempeño y organización de las mismas, para lo cual podrá ordenar no sólo la eliminación y recalificación de plazas, sino el traslado de los funcionarios. La autorización que brinda el ordenamiento para prescindir de los servicios de un funcionario público por motivo de reestructuración implica necesariamente que el puesto, considerado en sí mismo, sea dispensable en la estructura vigente y además de imposible integración en la nueva organización institucional. De manera que el Estado podrá poner en práctica su facultad de trasladar o despedir forzosamente a sus funcionarios por razones de reorganización, siempre y cuando ésta se fundamente en la necesidad real -debidamente comprobada- de mejorar el servicio público y respete el procedimiento establecido a tal efecto. En todo caso, y para hacer efectiva la tutela de los derechos de los administrados, la jurisdicción constitucional de libertad está legitimada para revisar si la figura de la reestructuración es utilizada para encubrir despidos que se realizan por motivos ajenos a los meramente organizacionales. Esto con el objetivo de evitar que la necesidad de reorganización y modernización del Estado sirva para eximir a la Administración de su elemental obligación de actuar siempre en respeto de los derechos y libertades que el Estado Social de Derecho reconoce a los individuos”. (El subrayado es del redactor) (votos de la Sala Constitucional n°s 1846, de las 14:57 horas del 29 de febrero; 2496, de las 17:39 horas del 21 de marzo; 4951, de las 16:37 horas del 27 de junio y 5783, de las 16:01 horas del 11 de julio todas del año 2000). Lo anterior establece el alcance que ha de dársele al concepto de “reorganización” o “reestructuración”, con que la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras despidió a la actora. Las reorganizaciones o reestructuraciones, autorizadas por el constituyente, como excepción al principio general de la estabilidad en el empleo de los funcionarios públicos, refieren a una transformación en la estructura organizacional de la entidad, que motiva la eliminación o el cambio de plazas innecesarias para conseguir una más eficaz y económica reorganización de los servicios. Constituye una causal objetiva de despido distinta de aquellas causales establecidas en el Código de Trabajo, que atiende a las faltas cometidas por el trabajador o la incapacidad para la ejecución de sus funciones, por las cuales el patrono puede válidamente despedirlo. En modo alguno se podría interpretar que, so pretexto de una reorganización para alcanzar ese objetivo, se pueda examinar las habilidades o el desempeño del servidor en su puesto, dado que ello significaría aplicar una causal subjetiva de despido, no contemplada en la norma constitucional, dentro del concepto de reorganización. En varios recursos de amparo interpuestos por funcionarios del Banco demandado, en relación con el proceso de reestructuración objeto de estudio, la Sala Constitucional se pronunció en estos términos: “Por otra parte, analizada la relación de hechos consignada en el considerando II, se observa que el proceso de reestructuración de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras se fundamenta en estudios técnicos realizados por empresas consultoras especializadas en la materia, y tiene como finalidad garantizar la eficiencia del servicio público y la mejor utilización de los recursos públicos. Además, la decisión de ejecutar un plan de modernización fue comunicada con antelación a los funcionarios públicos afectados, a fin de que adoptaran las medidas que estimaran pertinentes. Finalmente, el proceso de reestructuración fue debida y oportunamente aprobado por las instancias competentes a tal efecto, a saber, el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero y la Junta Directiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica. En consecuencia, tampoco se observa que la amenaza de despido de los amparados provenga de una actuación intempestiva o arbitraria de parte de la Administración” (voto n° 2000-1846, de las 14:57 horas del 29 de febrero de 2000). En los votos 3136, de las 10:52 horas del 14 de abril; 4362, de las 12:21 horas del 19 de mayo y 11357, de las 10:08 horas del 20 de diciembre, todos del año 2000, la Sala Constitucional declaró sin lugar sendos recursos de amparo en los que la actora figuraba como recurrente, y en el último de ellos señaló: “En considerable cantidad de amparos, la Sala Constitucional ha tenido la oportunidad de pronunciarse sobre el procedimiento de reestructuración en la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, su corrección desde el punto de vista formal y declarar que en sí mismo ese proceso no viola los derechos fundamentales de los servidores públicos. Obviamente, en esa forma de resolver no se prejuzga, como no era procedente, sobre los impactos individuales que se puedan dar con la aplicación de los parámetros reformadores que han sido aprobados. Recuérdese que esta reestructuración está fundamentada e íntimamente ligada con los precedentes de la efectuada en el Banco Central de Costa Rica, que de alguna manera esta Sala avaló. Siendo esta la base a partir de la cual se procede a la aplicación individual de los mecanismos revisores del personal preexistente, para declarar si se conforman o no con los principios y valores que informan la reestructuración, como por ejemplo, si las personas involucradas llenan a satisfacción el perfil aprobado y si obtienen o no las calificaciones mínimas exigidas a partir de la aplicación de criterios objetivos y sustancialmente iguales para todos los servidores, esos mecanismos resultan ser aspectos de legalidad que no pueden ser examinados en la vía del control de constitucionalidad. Esta conclusión es a la que llega la Sala no sin antes advertir que a esta regla general se aplicaría, por excepción, los errores gruesos y la arbitrariedad evidente que conduzcan a casos patológicos de desviación de poder. Sin embargo, en el presente asunto no encuentra la Sala que los hechos conduzcan a tal calificación. En efecto, lo que la amparada alega es la forma como se la evaluó y calificó, lo que según se afirma en el recurso, "es el resultado de la confrontación de perfiles reales con los ideales del proyecto, a partir de las evaluaciones, entre otros aspectos, de las aptitudes intelectuales, del pensamiento crítico, del razonamiento lógico-abstracto, del razonamiento verbal, de los factores de personalidad, dominio, control racional, confianza en sí, sociabilidad, confiabilidad, formación, experiencia, idiomas extranjeros (inglés)". Si el resultado, en el caso de la recurrente, fue una calificación insuficiente para ubicarse en la categoría pretendida, si la evaluación o calificación fue correcta o incorrecta, si la aplicación de los criterios objetivos en los que se funda la evaluación se hizo con fundamento científico o no, son aspectos de legalidad ordinaria que esta Sala no puede entrar a revisar… y este Tribunal no está para controlar la aplicación de la legislación a un caso concreto, como ha quedado dicho, salvo la desviación de poder que pudiera resultar en la infracción de derechos fundamentales, que no se advierte en el caso concreto”. De modo que en el caso de la actora no se puede considerar, que la validez del procedimiento de su despido haya sido avalado por la Sala Constitucional. Este despacho judicial al igual que aquella Sala ha reconocido la legalidad en la Administración Pública de los procesos de reestructuración, lo que la Constitucional declaró respecto de la reestructuración llevada a cabo en la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras y avala esta Sala, por no ser atendibles los reparos de la actora en cuanto señaló que las pruebas aplicadas en el proceso de reestructuración no cumplían parámetros mínimos de confiabilidad y acusó que no se valoró la experiencia acumulada, la habilidad técnica, el nivel académico ni el desempeño, por cuanto tales afirmaciones no han sido acreditadas, más bien, de la documental constante en autos se desprende que sí se tuvieron en cuenta factores como los indicados por la actora (véanse las pruebas números 17, 26 y anexos 19 y 20 del expediente administrativo). Por su parte, el Colegio Profesional de Psicólogos de Costa Rica, cuya intervención solicitó el sindicato (folios 185 a 187) manifestó que no había encontrado anomalía alguna en la actuación de las profesionales encargadas de desarrollar el proceso (folios 170 y 171), y la accionada en cuanto a los test o pruebas aplicadas reconoció -en su recurso de amparo n° 99-009337-0007-CO-, que estas fueron adaptadas al medio nacional (prueba número 39 del expediente administrativo). De la documental aportada números 26, 32, 33 y anexos 19 y 20 del expediente administrativo, se desprende que la actora tuvo acceso al resultado de las pruebas realizadas y estuvo en la posibilidad de discutirlas, con auxilio de un profesional en la materia (véase también pruebas números 35, 36 y anexos 23 y 24 del citado expediente). De igual forma, de la documental numerada como prueba del 16A al 16F se extrae que sí se mantuvo comunicación con los empleados en relación con el proceso y que la experiencia laboral fue valorada. También se dio información de los elementos evaluados y sobre la interpretación de las pruebas (documental rotulada como prueba número 23 y anexos 20 a 22 del expediente citado). Luego, de la prueba identificada con el número 15 del expediente administrativo, se extrae que los trabajadores fueron debidamente informados de que el proceso podía concluir en despidos con responsabilidad patronal. Además, consta en autos que todo el personal de la estructura ocupacional de la SUGEF incluida la Asesoría Jurídica, estuvo sujeto al plan de reestructuración organizacional y de recurso humano de esa dependencia, y por ende sumido en las pruebas de evaluación académica, sicológica y conductual, así como de aptitud intelectual, de personalidad y de estilo de trabajo a que fue sometido todo el personal incluida la demandante, evaluación con la cual se determinaba si se cumplía o no con los nuevos perfiles y requisitos para los distintos puestos. Sin embargo, lo que compete en el sublite para resolver este asunto, es analizar la legalidad del despido concreto de la trabajadora.

IV.- En el caso que nos ocupa, la cesación de la demandante se justificó como se dijo, en la existencia del proceso de reestructuración que se daba en la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. Dicha reestructuración tuvo como objetivos principales los siguientes: “Introducir los ajustes necesarios al esquema organizacional conforme a los requerimientos del enfoque de supervisión basado en riesgos. / Establecer una organización que permita una asignación clara de responsabilidades, la especialización de las funciones y una capacidad de respuesta oportuna frente a las necesidades y la evolución del Sistema Financiero Nacional. / Integrar los procesos de supervisión mediante una adecuada supervisión coordinación y comunicación entre las diferentes áreas de la SUGEF. / Procurar el uso racional de los recursos humanos y financieros destinados a la fiscalización de las entidades...” (anexo 13 del expediente administrativo). De la nota remitida a la actora, se desprenden las razones que motivaron su despido. En esa comunicación se le indicó:

“En mi condición de jerarca administrativo de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras me corresponde implementar la restructuración aprobada, la cual como primera etapa consistió en una evaluación de las habilidades competenciales de cada funcionario, para cada uno de los puestos, en razón de que cada uno de los mismos requiere distintos grados de pensamiento crítico, razonamiento lógico, razonamiento verbal, estilo de trabajo/dirección y factores de personalidad. / La segunda etapa consistió en la evaluación del personal a través de un ranking forzado. Se solicitó a los superiores inmediatos de cada uno de los funcionarios que realizaran una evaluación integral de su personal, en la que tomaran en cuenta tanto sus destrezas técnicas como sus habilidades competenciales. De esta forma se valoró la iniciativa, comunicación escrita, manejo del tiempo, planificación, programación y control, solución de problemas, toma de decisiones y destreza técnica. / La tercera etapa consistió en la evaluación del personal de esta entidad, a través de diferentes instrumentos que permitieran valorar el cumplimiento por parte de dichos funcionarios de los nuevos requisitos establecidos en relación con la formación académica y experiencia profesional. / A partir de estas evaluaciones y de sus resultados, he debido tomar decisiones en relación con su permanencia en esta organización. De conformidad con las evaluaciones llevadas a cabo, usted cuenta con los requisitos académicos para desempeñar el cargo de Profesional en Gestión Bancaria 3, de la Dirección General de Asesoría Jurídica, no obstante, las evaluaciones de competencia indican que sus habilidades no se ajustan a las competencias requeridas para desempeñar dicho cargo. Asimismo, confrontando su perfil con otros puestos de la nueva estructura, no fue posible su reubicación a lo interno de esta entidad” (anexo 11 y prueba n° 4 del expediente administrativo). (La negrilla y subrayado son del redactor).

Se observa de la documentación trascrita que la trabajadora fue cesada, luego de que le fueron valorados los siguientes puntos: 1) sus habilidades en el puesto en aspectos tales como pensamiento crítico, razonamiento lógico, razonamiento verbal, estilo de trabajo/dirección y factores de personalidad; 2) la evaluación que realizara su superior en relación con capacidades tales como iniciativa, comunicación escrita, manejo del tiempo, planificación, solución de problemas, toma de decisiones, etc. y por último, 3) el cumplimiento de los nuevos requisitos establecidos en relación con la formación académica y experiencia profesional. A la actora se le comunicó que cumplía con los requisitos académicos establecidos para el cargo de Profesional en Gestión Bancaria 3; sin embargo, se le despidió porque de acuerdo con las otras evaluaciones realizadas carece de las habilidades requeridas para desempeñarse en ese puesto. Lo anterior significa, que la cesación en su cargo no correspondió a una reestructuración objetiva producto de la cual, su plaza desapareciera, sino a un examen de sus aptitudes y habilidades del que se infiere que el incumplimiento de los nuevos estándares establecidos, motivaron su cese. Tal proceder no está autorizado por el constituyente, pues el resolver de esa forma, es una manera velada por medio de la cual la actora fue despedida en razón de sus condiciones personales, permitiéndose por ese medio, una causal subjetiva de despido no autorizada por la ley ni por la Constitución, con lo que resultó arbitrario e ilegal el despidió de la reclamante, utilizándose el proceso de reestructuración como una excusa o pretexto para cesarla y nombrar en su lugar a otra profesional. Si por principio, los servidores de la Administración Pública están amparados por la estabilidad en el empleo, no es posible admitir que, so pretexto de un proceso de reorganización, se modifiquen los requisitos y condiciones personales con las que el servidor accedió a su puesto, porque por ese medio se abriría un peligroso portillo a la arbitrariedad y a la inseguridad. En este sentido se debe mencionar que el artículo 47 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, al referirse al despido por reorganización, señala que al prescindir de los servidores, se atenderán criterios tales como eficiencia, antigüedad, carácter, conducta, aptitudes y demás condiciones que resulten de la calificación de los servicios, lo cual se entiende, para el supuesto en que se conserven ciertas plazas de una misma categoría que se elimina. Mas el caso en estudio es diferente, porque lo que operó en la especie fue una revaloración de las aptitudes y habilidades con las cuales la actora fue admitida y nombrada en su cargo; revaloración que se realizó con cánones distintos a aquellos con los que fue inicialmente contratada y los que, al no cumplir, motivaron su cesación. Debe quedar claro que el derecho a la estabilidad de los funcionarios públicos, sólo puede ser eliminado, por las causales expresamente señaladas en la ley, pues no le está permitido a ninguna entidad pública realizar procesos de reorganización que concluyan con despidos, apartándose de la normativa constitucional y legal. Como reestructuración solo puede calificarse la contemplada en la norma constitucional y desarrollada en los incisos a) y b) del artículo 47 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, y no cualquier otro proceso. Los llamados procesos de modernización o las revisiones de las estructuras de personal, pueden denominarse de muy diversas maneras, llámense recalificación laboral, reingeniería, reestructuración, estrategias transicionales, rearquitectura organizacional, rediseño estructural, aplanamiento orgánico, reversión laboral, reinvención estructural. Todas esas medidas que tiendan a reducir costos, invocando eficiencia, deben realizarse conforme a la Constitución y a la ley, y no pueden de ningún modo convertirse en un mecanismo para revisar actos de nombramiento que se han realizado de manera legal muchos años antes. El ordenamiento jurídico permite que las entidades públicas impongan nuevos requisitos a los puestos, exijan nuevos perfiles y con base en ello, contraten al personal idóneo para ocuparlos, sin perjuicio de los derechos de quienes ocupen esos puestos. En los votos de la Sala Constitucional citados, dictados por esa Sala con ocasión de recursos de amparo interpuestos por funcionarios de la SUGEF, contra esa institución, se advierte que la actora también recurrió en esa vía, el proceso de reestructuración que finalmente culminó con su despido. Sin embargo, tales acciones de amparo fueron rechazadas, entre otras por las siguientes razones:

“En el caso concreto, aparte de las anteriores consideraciones, no puede obviarse que apenas se está ejecutando el proceso de reestructuración en la SUGEF, cuya finalización fue acordada para el 30 de junio del 2000 (independientemente en cuál sesión se emitió este acuerdo), y que no se acredita en autos que la amparada sea de las personas que van a ser destituidas, pues existe además el compromiso institucional de que previo a tomar ese tipo de decisión se procurará la reubicación en otro puesto dentro del mismo Órgano, en el Banco Central de Costa Rica, o en cualquiera de los otros Órganos de Desconcentración Máxima del ente emisor. Asimismo, entiende Sala por haberlo manifestado así expresamente el informante, que las pruebas hasta el momento realizadas no se constituirán más que en otro elemento adicional a considerar junto a la formación académica, la experiencia profesional y el conocimiento del idioma inglés, de forma tal que el hecho de no haber resultado "calificado" de conformidad con las mismas, no es determinante a efecto de una decisión de despido en su contra, según ha indicado bajo juramento -con las consecuencias hasta de índole penal que contempla la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional en caso de afirmar inexactitudes o falsedades a este Tribunal- el Superintendente General de Entidades Financieras. En esta tesitura, estima la Sala que en estos momentos la presentación de este amparo resulta prematura, habida cuenta que no pende en perjuicio de la amparada ninguna amenaza cierta e inminente de ser despedida sin respeto de sus derechos fundamentales, (…) Lejos de ello, las pruebas que se les ha estado aplicando a todo el personal de la SUGEF se constituirán en un parámetro objetivo a ser utilizado por el jerarca a fin de tomar decisiones ulteriores en relación con el personal que definitivamente permanecerá en ese Órgano, conjuntamente con otros como el récord académico y profesional de cada servidor y la evaluación del jefe inmediato...” (voto de la Sala Constitucional n° 1856-00, de las 15:07 horas del 29 de febrero, citado por el n° 3136, de las 10:52 horas del 14 de abril ambos de 2000).

De conformidad con las razones expuestas, en atención a los concretos agravios planteados por la recurrente, bien podría decirse que el ad-quem incurrió en una errónea e inadecuada valoración de la prueba al cuestionar en términos generales la validez y legalidad del proceso de reestructuración, mas no así al señalar que el despido de la demandante fue ilegítimo por arbitrario e ilegal, pues como se dijo se le removió después de examinar sus condiciones personales y determinarse que no cumplía con los requisitos del puesto, según un nuevo perfil establecido por el propio empleador, para nombrar en su lugar a otra abogada. Consecuentemente, estimamos nulo el despido del que fue objeto la actora y al estar en presencia de un despido nulo, los efectos de esa declaratoria deben retrotraerse al momento o fecha de dicho acto, de manera que las cosas deben volver al estado en que se encontraban antes de su emisión. En consecuencia, se debe confirmar la sentencia recurrida, puntualizando que al monto que sea en corresponderle a la demandante se le deberán rebajar las sumas canceladas por preaviso, auxilio de cesantía y demás indemnizaciones recibidas por ella (anexo 12 del expediente administrativo), así como cualesquier otro rubro que por concepto de salario haya recibido con posterioridad a esa liquidación. Sobre los montos a pagar por tal concepto deberá también hacerse el rebajo de las cargas sociales.

V.- La prohibición no es una liberalidad patronal sino una condición impuesta legalmente a un puesto determinado en razón de la naturaleza de las funciones que lo componen, el cual requiere de un ejercicio transparente, imparcial y objetivo, lejos de todo conflicto de intereses; es una exigencia ética y condición propia del puesto que impone a su titular una situación jurídica determinada, de la cual deviene para el funcionario nombrado en el puesto el deber de no ejercer su profesión u oficio a favor de terceras personas, con el derecho correlativo al pago de una compensación económica por dicha limitación. Se trata de una incompatibilidad entre el ejercicio de la función pública y el de la profesión privada por el eventual choque de intereses entre ambas. En el caso concreto, a la demandante se le pagó prohibición con sustento en las siguientes normas presupuestarias:

“Artículo 14 Ley de Presupuesto Ordinario y Extraordinario de la República para 1985, número 6982 de 19 diciembre 1984. Agréguese un párrafo al artículo 1 de la Ley 5867 que diga:

"Los beneficios y prohibiciones que se indican en este artículo, incluyen al personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos".- "Artículo 101 Ley de Presupuesto Extraordinario, número 7015 del 22 noviembre 1985.- El personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos recibirá los beneficios económicos de la Ley 5867 de 15 de diciembre de 1975 y sus reformas sujeto a las prohibiciones de dicha ley." "Artículo 14 Ley de Presupuesto para 1986 número 7018 de 20 de diciembre de 1985.- 1. ...

17. Las prohibiciones y beneficios contenidos en el artículo 1 de la Ley No. 5867 15 de diciembre de 1975, son aplicables a las Auditorías del Sistema Bancario Nacional.” (La negrita no está en el original).

El pago de dicha compensación económica cesó con los votos de la Sala Constitucional n°s. 4647 de las 16:20 horas del 16 de junio de 1999 y 6327 de las 10:03 horas del 13 de agosto de 1999, que declararon inconstitucionales y anularon las citadas normas en forma retroactiva a la entrada en vigencia de las mismas sin perjuicio de los derechos de buena fe adquiridos a su amparo, y no con fundamento en el artículo 8 de la sesión n° 4621 del 9 de diciembre de 1992, que remitía al artículo 27 del Convenio de Partes -disposición que también había sido anulada por los votos números 1962-92 y 3285-92 de la Sala Constitucional-, sin que existiera alguna otra disposición legal válida y eficaz que le diera sustento, según lo ordena el principio de legalidad que debe observarse en la función pública. De lo anterior se infiere, que el representante de la SUGEF lleva razón al indicar que las normas presupuestarias anuladas mediante voto 4647 del 16 de junio de 1999, no le daban contenido económico al pago por prohibición como erróneamente lo entendió el tribunal, por el contrario, le dieron sustento jurídico al régimen, ya que la materia que regulaban no era presupuestaria sino materia propia de la legislación ordinaria con la cual se reformó la Ley 5867 extendiendo el reconocimiento de la prohibición al personal técnico de la Auditoría General de Bancos (hoy Sugef). También lleva razón al señalar que al haberse declarado inconstitucionales y por ende nulas las normas que sustentaban el pago de la prohibición en esa entidad, su representada para eliminar tal beneficio no necesitaba recurrir al proceso del artículo 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública o del artículo 10 y 35 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, porque tales normas están concebidas para la nulidad de actos administrativos declaratorios de derechos o que producen efectos jurídicos y el régimen de prohibición que cobijó a la actora, fue establecido por las normas declaradas inconstitucionales por el voto 4647-99, por lo que no puede hablarse de anulación de acto administrativo alguno, ya que el régimen tenía sustento legislativo no administrativo, por ende, el fallo impugnado incurrió en error al estimar que la prohibición se suprimió en forma arbitraria e ilegal por falta de un debido proceso.

VI.- El pago de la prohibición depende de que el puesto que se ocupe esté bajo ese régimen y que el funcionario o servidor cumpla los presupuestos que prevé la normativa que la impone. En el caso concreto el sustento jurídico del pago de la prohibición, como se dijo, estaba prevista en las citadas normas atípicas que por tal razón fueron anuladas. La indemnización por prohibición se otorgó a la accionante sujeta a la vigencia de dichas disposiciones, por lo que con independencia de que la administración del banco hubiera revocado el beneficio en ejecución de los votos de inconstitucionalidad aludidos, lo cierto es que esa indemnización se otorgó condicionada a que el puesto en cuestión siguiera estando sujeto a dicho régimen, lo que resulta suficiente para estimar que ese beneficio no constituyó un derecho adquirido, por estar supeditado a que el puesto se mantuviera bajo el régimen de prohibición. Al tenor de lo resuelto por los votos constitucionales n°s 4647-99 y 6327-99, que declararon nulas las normas en las que se sustentaba la prohibición sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos al amparo de su vigencia, a no dudarlo se consolidó el derecho a los pagos recibidos por ese concepto mientras existió el régimen de prohibición, los cuales deben considerarse irrepetibles en la medida en que ingresaron definitivamente en el patrimonio de la demandante con anterioridad a la extinción de esa normativa, pero no constituye un derecho a exigir que el régimen deba seguir existiendo. Queda claro que las citadas normas presupuestarias sustentaron el otorgamiento del beneficio de prohibición en la Auditoría General de Bancos (hoy Sugef), y que a partir del voto 4647-99 dichas normas quedaron insubsistentes con la inconstitucionalidad ahí declarada, por lo que si la Sala Constitucional dimensionó los efectos de su declaratoria de nulidad señalando que era retroactiva a la fecha de vigencia de las normas anuladas, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe, es a partir de esa data que la administración del banco demandado se quedó sin el fundamento jurídico necesario para seguir aplicando el beneficio económico de la prohibición que aquí se cuestiona, respecto de los puestos de funcionarios de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras. De ahí que se equivocó el tribunal ad-quem al estimar que la actora seguía contando con fundamento jurídico para mantener el beneficio de la prohibición, pues como se dijo, las normas presupuestarias en que se sustentaba su régimen de prohibición resultaron inconstitucionales a la luz de los votos 4647-99 y 6327-99 citados, por lo que el único derecho adquirido que tiene la actora es el correspondiente a los dineros que recibió mientras el régimen existió y la servidora se enmarcó en los presupuestos de hecho que dicho régimen establecía. Por consiguiente, no se puede considerar que el solo hecho de haber recibido la actora el pago por prohibición, haya determinado la existencia de un derecho adquirido a ese beneficio por el resto de su vida laboral con la SUGEF. No estamos en presencia de un derecho que se haya incorporado al contrato de trabajo, sino ante un beneficio que para poder percibirlo debe tener su respectivo fundamento jurídico, de modo que no puede existir derecho a permanecer en el régimen más allá del cambio que opere en el ordenamiento jurídico, sea por una derogatoria mediante ley posterior o una anulación por sentencia en la vía constitucional. En otras palabras no existe un derecho a la inmutabilidad del régimen. En consecuencia, al resultar atendibles en esta tercera instancia rogada los reparos del recurrente, se debe revocar la sentencia impugnada en cuanto estimó la acción en lo que al extremo de la prohibición se refiere, para en su lugar, desestimar ese punto concreto de las pretensiones de la demanda.

VII.- No son atendibles los reparos de la demandante en cuanto a que el extremo de la homologación reclamado, se haya tratado de un ajuste salarial de aplicación general no reconocido al puesto por ella ocupado, por cuanto consta en autos que en sesión n° 4975-98 del 21 de octubre de 1998, se conoció oficio [Placa1] del 19 de ese mismo mes y año, en el cual se advierte que algunas clases de puestos del Banco Central presentan diferencias en su clasificación y valoración al comparárseles con sus similares en los órganos desconcentrados, pues aún y cuando tenían características sustancialmente idénticas en cuanto a factores de habilidad, esfuerzo y responsabilidad, la categoría de sueldo era diferente (menor en el Banco Central en relación con sus órganos desconcentrados). Por lo anterior, la Junta Directiva del banco con sustento en la potestad que tiene de dictar su régimen de salarios y otras remuneraciones de sus funcionarios, así como su propia política en materia de clasificación y valoración de puestos (artículo 28, incisos t) y m) de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central), tomando en cuenta principios como el de equidad, razonabilidad e igualdad, en el artículo 10 de la sesión n° 4980-98, del 9 de diciembre de 1998, con base en lo manifestado por la administración en memorando [Placa2] del 17 de noviembre de 1998, respecto a la necesaria homologación de las clases de puestos existentes en el Banco Central y sus dependencias, acordó entre otras cosas “1.- Aprobar la homologación de las clases de puestos profesionales ubicadas en las categorías 13 y 14, y de las clases de puestos relativas a Jefaturas de Sección o Ejecutivos de Area, Actualmente en categoría 16, de manera que sean ubicadas en las categorías 15, 16 y 18, respectivamente, de la Escala Regular de Salarios Vigente, acción que cobrará vigencia el 1° de julio de 1999, según la fecha de aprobación de su contenido presupuestario por parte de la Contraloría General de la Republica. / 2.- …Lo anterior procura corregir las distorsiones presentes en la actualidad en materia de clasificación y valoración de puestos, de modo que las clases de puestos cuyas características sean sustancialmente iguales en cuanto a factores de habilidad (Preparación académica, experiencia y conocimientos específicos); esfuerzo y responsabilidad (toma de decisiones, manejo de fondos, trascendencia de la decisión, supervisión ejercida), sean asignadas a una misma categoría de sueldo” (oficios [Placa1] y [Placa2] de folios 373 a 388 y prueba n° 40 del expediente administrativo) o sea que el Banco Central decidió aplicar la homologación a los puestos que a pesar de tener las mismas labores y cumplir con los mismos requisitos exigidos a sus homónimos ubicados en la Asesoría Jurídica de la Sugef, recibían retribuciones salariales diferentes, producto de categorías disímiles. En el caso de la demandante, mediante resolución administrativa SUGEF-02-98 del 13 de julio de 1998, aportada como prueba en el anexo 30 del expediente administrativo, se determinó que los abogados de la Sugef serían reclasificados a una categoría 16, cuando ese tipo de profesionales en el Banco Central continuaban con una categoría 13 o 14, ello provocó una de las distorsiones que se pretendían corregir con el proceso de homologación de puestos, cuando se decidió equiparar las clases de puestos cuyos factores de habilidad, responsabilidad y esfuerzo fueran sustancialmente iguales a los de los funcionarios de las superintendencias (que originaron las distorsiones y en donde estaba asignada la actora), con el fin de eliminar las diferencias existentes mediante la asignación de la misma categoría de sueldo, lo que significó pasar a los abogados que se hallaban asignados en las categorías 13 y 14 de la Escala Salarial Regular a la 16, que era la ostentada por los asesores jurídicos de la SUGEF, lo que se tradujo en el reconocimiento o equiparación de categorías al resto de los abogados del banco que efectuaban las mismas labores y cumplían con los mismos requisitos, de forma tal que todos tuvieran la categoría 16. De manera que si el puesto ocupado por la actora en la clase “Asesor Jurídico”, categoría 16, de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, fue uno de los tomados como punto de referencia para la aplicación de la homologación de puestos, resultaba ilógico que a esa categoría con responsabilidades y funciones idénticas a las homologadas se le hubiese reconocido una categoría superior, porque con ello se hubieran perpetuado las desigualdades inconstitucionales (artículo 57 de la Constitución Política) e ilegales (artículo 167 del Código de Trabajo) que se presentaban en ese momento en la escala salarial del ente emisor, lo que por demás no podía hacerse, por cuanto se señaló en relación con dicha plaza que “Debido a que en el tramo técnico-operativo de la Escala Salarial Regular no se hallaron clases de puestos con condiciones similares a las clases de puestos antes señalados, el proceso de homologación no se extiende a dicho tramo”. Así las cosas, lo procedente es confirmar el fallo impugnado en cuanto declaró sin lugar ese extremo de la demanda.

VIII.- El artículo 54 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica n° 1552 del 23 de abril de 1953 y sus reformas establecía: “El Banco Central de Costa Rica sólo podrá computar en su activo y saldos deudores lo siguiente: / … / 8°.- Los saldos de las cuentas originadas por el movimiento normal de gastos, pérdidas y resultados, y los demás provenientes de operaciones autorizadas por esta ley. Dentro del rubro indicado en el numeral 8, el Banco Central incluirá una suma equivalente al diez por ciento (10%) del total de los sueldos de sus empleados para el mantenimiento del fondo de garantías y jubilaciones de estos empleados. Esta suma les pertenecerá a éstos en la proporción correspondiente a su sueldo, y deberá serles entregada bajo las condiciones que se determinen en el reglamento de jubilaciones, si dejaren el servicio antes de haber alcanzado el derecho a una pensión por invalidez. Ese aporte del Banco será único para toda clase de beneficios sociales. En el reglamento de la institución podrán establecerse las sumas adicionales con las que los empleados deberán contribuir para el fortalecimiento del fondo, a fin de que ellos puedan obtener una pensión adecuada, de acuerdo con su sueldo, su edad y el tiempo de servicio. El sistema que así se crea es complementario del establecido por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, y no afecta las obligaciones de sus beneficiarios para con la Caja. Se declaran inembargables las sumas que les correspondan a los empleados que dejaren el servicio antes de haber alcanzado el derecho a una pensión por invalidez. El Banco Central podrá invertir la reserva para prestaciones legales en el descuento de obligaciones que tenga a su favor el mencionado fondo. En la Junta Administrativa del Fondo de Garantía y Jubilaciones del Banco se dará representación a los empleados, quienes elegirán a dos de sus miembros”. Esa norma fue derogada por el artículo 170 de la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica n° 7558 del 3 de noviembre de 1995. Los reparos de la parte actora para que se le continúe reconociendo el equivalente al aporte del 10% del salario para el mantenimiento del Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones, que considera un derecho incorporado a su contrato de trabajo por haber ingresado a la SUGEF antes de que tal aporte fuera eliminado por la derogatoria dispuesta en la Ley n° 7558 del 13 de noviembre de 1995, no son atendibles, por cuanto dicho aporte no constituye un derecho adquirido o situación jurídica consolidada de los servidores que a noviembre de 1995 formaban parte del régimen complementario de pensiones regulado por el artículo 54 de la Ley n° 1552, reformada por la n° 7107 del 4 de noviembre de 1988, que instauró el aporte que el Banco Central venía realizando con fundamento en esa norma derogada. Ese porcentaje nunca constituyó parte integrante del salario de los funcionarios del Banco Central y sus dependencias -aun y cuando el mismo se calculara en un porcentaje del total de los sueldos de los empleados y les perteneciera a estos por disposición legal, en la proporción correspondiente a su sueldo-, ni un derecho adquirido que deba seguírsele girando, pues la causa de ese traslado de dinero del patrimonio del Banco Central al Fondo de Garantías tenía una causa jurídica de naturaleza distinta y estaba debidamente autorizado por el ordenamiento, lo que no sucede ahora. El derecho adquirido de quienes laboraban en el Banco Central antes de la promulgación de la Ley n° 7558, respecto a los aportes que esa institución hacía cuando estaba autorizada por el ordenamiento, se traduce en la certidumbre de no tener que repetir a su empleador lo aportado por este al Fondo de Garantías. Al respecto la Sala Constitucional ha establecido: “En este caso, la garantía constitucional de la irretroactividad de la ley se traduce en la certidumbre de que un cambio en el ordenamiento no puede tener la consecuencia de sustraer el bien o el derecho ya adquirido del patrimonio de la persona, o de provocar que si se había dado el presupuesto fáctico con anterioridad a la reforma legal, ya no surja la consecuencia (provechosa, se entiende) que el interesado esperaba de la situación jurídica consolidada. Ahora bien, específicamente en punto a ésta última, se ha entendido también que nadie tiene un "derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento", es decir, a que las reglas nunca cambien. Por eso, el precepto constitucional no consiste en que, una vez nacida a la vida jurídica, la regla que conecta el hecho con el efecto no pueda ser modificada o incluso suprimida por una norma posterior…” (voto n° 2765 de las 15:03 horas del 20 de mayo de 1997). También se indicó en dicho voto que: “1. La protección de los derechos adquiridos significa, en este caso, que no obstante la eliminación de las normas, todos los montos recibidos hasta entonces por concepto de auxilio, deben estimarse irrepetibles. En la medida en que habían ingresado definitivamente al patrimonio de los interesados con anterioridad a la reforma legal, resultaría absurdo -e inconstitucional- pretender que deban ser devueltos, o cosa semejante…”. De ahí que en el caso de la demandante, al igual que en el de los demás funcionarios del Banco Central, el único derecho adquirido que se puede alegar respecto de aquel aporte, es en cuanto a los efectivamente entregados por el banco al Fondo de Garantías y Jubilaciones hasta el momento de la derogatoria de la norma que le daba sustento, los cuales son propiedad en la parte proporcional de cada uno de ellos y no así a que el ente emisor continúe otorgando dicho beneficio. En consecuencia, la parte actora no tiene derecho a que el Banco Central continúe haciendo el aporte que reclama, por ello, se ha de confirmar lo resuelto sobre ese punto concreto por los juzgadores de las instancias precedentes.

IX.- Por último, lleva razón la accionante al sentirse agraviada con la fijación prudencial que se hiciera de las costas personales, no así con la pretensión de que estas sean fijadas en forma porcentual. Por tratarse la litis que nos ocupa de un asunto de cuantía inestimable y atendiendo la labor realizada, la importancia económica del proceso y la posición económica de las partes (artículo 495 del Código de Trabajo), se debe modificar la fijación prudencial que se hiciera de las costas personales, para en su lugar establecerlas en la suma de un millón de colones.

X.- De acuerdo con las consideraciones precedentes, procede revocar parcialmente el fallo impugnado en cuanto estimó la acción en lo que al extremo de prohibición se refiere, para acoger a su respecto la excepción de falta de derecho y desestimar en ese punto concreto la pretensión de la demanda. Se debe modificar la fijación de las costas personales para establecerlas en la suma prudencial de un millón de colones. En todo lo demás se ha de confirmar la sentencia recurrida, estableciendo que al monto que sea en corresponderle a la demandante se le deberán rebajar las sumas canceladas por preaviso, auxilio de cesantía y demás indemnizaciones recibidas por la actora (anexo 12 del expediente administrativo), así como cualesquier otro rubro o rubros que por concepto de salario haya recibido con posterioridad a esa liquidación. Sobre los montos a pagar por tal concepto deberá también hacerse el rebajo de las cargas sociales, en lo que sea legalmente procedente.

POR TANTO:

Se revoca parcialmente la sentencia impugnada en cuanto estimó la acción en lo que al extremo de prohibición se refiere. En su lugar se acoge a su respecto la excepción de falta de derecho y se desestima en ese punto concreto la pretensión de la demanda. Se modifica la fijación de las costas personales para establecerlas en la suma prudencial de tres millones de colones. En todo lo demás se confirma la sentencia recurrida, estableciéndose que al monto que sea en corresponderle a la demandante se le deberán rebajar las sumas canceladas por preaviso, auxilio de cesantía y demás indemnizaciones ya recibidas por la actora, así como cualesquier otro u otros rubros que por concepto de salario haya recibido con posterioridad a esa liquidación. Sobre los montos a pagar por tal concepto deberá también hacerse el rebajo de las cargas sociales, en lo que sea legalmente procedente.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Zarela María Villanueva Monge Julia Varela Araya Rolando Vega Robert Eva María Camacho Vargas CONSTANCIA:

De conformidad con el artículo 154, párrafo final, del Código Procesal Civil, se hace constar, que la Magistrada Eva María Camacho Vargas concurrió con su voto al dictado de esta sentencia, pero no firma por estar imposibilitada para hacerlo, por encontrarse de vacaciones. San José, 12 de enero de 2010.

José Celso Fernández Delgado Secretario a.í.

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