← Environmental Law Center← Centro de Derecho Ambiental
28/04/2004
OutcomeResultado
The Agrarian Court revoked the first-instance ruling and rejected the possessory information proceeding for failure to prove qualified ten-year possession prior to the 1994 creation of the Nicoya Peninsula Protected Zone, as the property forms part of the State's Forest Heritage.El Tribunal Agrario revocó la sentencia de primera instancia y rechazó las diligencias de información posesoria por no demostrarse posesión decenal calificada anterior a la creación de la Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya en 1994, al tratarse de un bien del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado.
SummaryResumen
The Agrarian Court revokes the approval of a possessory information proceeding regarding a 9,562.14 m² property within the Nicoya Peninsula Protected Zone, established in April 1994. The applicant was required to prove qualified ten-year possession—quiet, public, peaceful and uninterrupted—prior to that date, but the evidence was insufficient and contradictory. Testimonies conflicted on the mode of acquisition (original vs. derived from a third party), the time of possession (since 1971, 1982 or before 1950), the possessory acts (fences, crops vs. natural conservation) and the property boundaries. The court emphasizes that for state-protected areas, usucapion requires ad usucapionem possession ten years before the public domain designation, per Article 7 of the Informaciones Posesorias Law and Constitutional Chamber jurisprudence. It also criticizes the undue admission of multiple expansions of witness evidence and the uncleared existence of an easement on the survey. The court concludes the legal requirements were not met and rejects the proceeding.El Tribunal Agrario revoca la aprobación de una información posesoria sobre un terreno de 9,562.14 m² dentro de la Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, creada en abril de 1994. El promovente debió demostrar posesión decenal calificada —quieta, pública, pacífica e ininterrumpida— anterior a esa fecha, pero la prueba resultó insuficiente y contradictoria. Testimonios discreparon sobre el modo de adquisición (originario vs. derivado de un tercero), el tiempo de posesión (desde 1971, 1982 o desde antes de 1950), los actos posesorios (cercas, cultivos vs. conservación natural) y la delimitación del inmueble. El tribunal subraya que en zonas protegidas estatales, para usucapir se requiere posesión ad usucapionem diez años antes de la afectación al dominio público, según el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias y jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional. Además, critica la admisión indebida de múltiples ampliaciones de prueba testimonial y la existencia no aclarada de una servidumbre de paso en el plano. Concluye que no se acreditaron los presupuestos legales y rechaza las diligencias.
Key excerptExtracto clave
“In accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Informaciones Posesorias Law, applicable to the case because the property to be titled is located within the Protected Zone…, in order to register said property in the Public Registry, the applicant must prove to have been in possession of the property for at least ten years before the effective date of the Decree that created said Reserve, as well as having protected the forest resource” (vote No. 170-03, 4:24 p.m., March 31, 2003. See also vote No. 755-03). The Constitutional Chamber, in Vote No. 4587, 3:45 p.m., August 5, 1997, analyzing the constitutionality of said Article 7, ruled that in order to title lands located in the protected areas indicated therein, the interested party must prove possession ten years before the effective date of the respective Decree. On that occasion, the Chamber basically stated: "… given the nature of the property sought to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion must elapse before the property’s designation as public domain. In other words, the declaration of a protected wild area prevents possession after the designation from counting, and impedes the completion of usucapion requirements if, by that time, the right has not been acquired—that is, ten years of possession suitable for usucapion under the conditions established by law have not elapsed… In the present case, having conscientiously evaluated the evidence without strict adherence to common law rules (Article 54 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law), the Court reaches the unavoidable conclusion that this proceeding must be rejected because it encompasses property that forms part of the State’s Forest Heritage, as the applicant did not prove to have acquired and consolidated a property right over it prior to the creation of the protected zone in question.”“De acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, de aplicación al caso por encontrarse el inmueble a titular dentro de la Zona Protectora …, para poder inscribir dicho bien en el Registro Público, es preciso el gestionante demuestre haber estado en posesión del inmueble por lo menos diez años antes de la vigencia del Decreto que creó la citada Reserva, así como haber protegido el recurso forestal” (voto Nº170-03 de las 16:24 horas del 31 de marzo del 2003. Ver también al respecto el voto Nº755-03 citado). La Sala Constitucional en Voto N° 4587 de las 15:45 horas del 5 de agosto de 1997, en el cual analizó la constitucionalidad del artículo 7 citado, dispuso para poder titular los terrenos ubicados en las zonas protegidas que ahí se señalan, debía el interesado demostrar la posesión diez años antes de la vigencia del Decreto respectivo. Básicamente dijo la Sala en esa oportunidad: "… dada la naturaleza del bien que se pretende titular (cosa pública), el plazo de posesión apta para la usucapión debe transcurrir antes de que se produzca la afectación del bien al dominio público. Es decir, la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida evita que cuente la posesión posterior a la afectación, e impide concretar los requisitos de la usucapión si a ese momento no se ha adquirido el derecho, o sea, no han transcurrido los diez años de posesión apta para usucapir con las condiciones que establece la ley… En el caso, valorada la prueba a conciencia y sin sujeción estricta a las normas de derecho común (artículo 54 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), el Tribunal llega a la ineludible conclusión de que esta diligencia debe ser rechazada por comprender un bien que forma parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, al no haber sido demostrado por el titulante haber adquirido y consolidado un derecho de propiedad sobre el mismo con anterioridad a la creación de la zona protegida de marras.”
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"“dada la naturaleza del bien que se pretende titular (cosa pública), el plazo de posesión apta para la usucapión debe transcurrir antes de que se produzca la afectación del bien al dominio público.”"
"“given the nature of the property sought to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion must elapse before the property’s designation as public domain.”"
Considerando IX, citando voto Sala Constitucional N°4587-97
"“dada la naturaleza del bien que se pretende titular (cosa pública), el plazo de posesión apta para la usucapión debe transcurrir antes de que se produzca la afectación del bien al dominio público.”"
Considerando IX, citando voto Sala Constitucional N°4587-97
"“la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida evita que cuente la posesión posterior a la afectación, e impide concretar los requisitos de la usucapión si a ese momento no se ha adquirido el derecho, o sea, no han transcurrido los diez años de posesión apta para usucapir.”"
"“the declaration of a protected wild area prevents possession after the designation from counting, and impedes the completion of usucapion requirements if, by that time, the right has not been acquired—that is, ten years of possession suitable for usucapion have not elapsed.”"
Considerando IX, citando voto Sala Constitucional N°4587-97
"“la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida evita que cuente la posesión posterior a la afectación, e impide concretar los requisitos de la usucapión si a ese momento no se ha adquirido el derecho, o sea, no han transcurrido los diez años de posesión apta para usucapir.”"
Considerando IX, citando voto Sala Constitucional N°4587-97
"“El Tribunal llega a la ineludible conclusión de que esta diligencia debe ser rechazada por comprender un bien que forma parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado.”"
"“The Court reaches the unavoidable conclusion that this proceeding must be rejected because it encompasses property that forms part of the State’s Forest Heritage.”"
Considerando IX
"“El Tribunal llega a la ineludible conclusión de que esta diligencia debe ser rechazada por comprender un bien que forma parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado.”"
Considerando IX
Full documentDocumento completo
VII.The appellant's grievances two, four, and five are interrelated, as they challenge what was held to be proven by the lower court, and highlight the contradictions between what was stated by the petitioner and what was said by the witnesses regarding the mode of acquisition, possessory acts exercised, and delimitation of the land. In this regard, and in accordance with what will be explained in the following recitals, the Procuraduría is correct, with the clarification that only what is on record in this proceeding and the evidence actually received or submitted therein is taken into account to analyze the grievances, and not the reference to testimonies rendered in other matters, much less if they were not added to the case file as documentary evidence. According to what has been held as proven in this instance, the land to be titled is located within the Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, established in April 1994.
Consequently, the petitioner had to clearly and compellingly demonstrate having exercised at least ten years of possession prior to 1994. The foregoing was not duly accredited. In this regard, aside from what will be said about the form and number of witnesses received, the following points must be highlighted. The statements made in this type of proceeding by the petitioner have the character of a sworn declaration, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 3, final paragraph, of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 15 of the same law set forth the requirements that must be met when filing the proceeding, both procedural and substantive. In this sense, the Court has explained that an "…Información Posesoria is a non-contentious judicial procedure for the formalization of a registrable title over a property right that has been acquired through usucapion (usucapión), by complying with the corresponding legal requirements.
It is required to demonstrate possession as an owner (posesión a título de dueño), in a quiet, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted manner (Articles 1 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and 856 of the Civil Code). The title applicant, apart from lacking a registered or registrable title in the Public Registry, must expressly state that the property has not been previously registered in the Public Registry. For reasons of public interest, and to avoid double registry inscription over the same property, or to protect third parties with better rights than the title applicant, the Law requires that certain subjects be notified. It also established an opposition procedure within the Información Posesoria, in case any of the interested parties feels harmed by the titling (Article 8). The Ley de Informaciones Posesorias orders the Judge to consider adjoining landowners as parties and therefore to notify them personally from the start of the proceedings, because the titling could encompass part of the lands belonging to them.
It is also ordered to notify co-owners or condominium owners (condueños o condóminos). Likewise, to protect the interests of the State, it is ordered to consider the Procuraduría General de la República and the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario as parties, for the protection of property subject to public domain and state Agrarian Property (Article 5). Finally, the Law mandates that all interested parties, who may have a legitimate interest in the proceeding, be summoned through the publication of an Edict in the Boletín Judicial. (See numeral 5 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) (see decision Nº755 of 9:45 a.m. on November 13, 2003). The existence of well-marked boundaries (fences, lanes, etc.) is also required. The following documents must be submitted: livestock brand if the property is dedicated to livestock; the title applicant's identity card or respective identification document; the cadastral map (plano catastrado); an updated certification from the Public Registry clarifying whether other properties have been titled by the petitioner and their size; an updated certification from the Ministerio del Ambiente de Energía regarding whether or not the land is included within any protected area.
The legislation in force on soils requires demonstrating the use of the land according to its suitability (soil study). The judge is also obligated, to ensure the protection of water resources for public utility purposes, if springs (nacientes) or water sources exist, to request the respective report from the competent entity (Articles 50 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, subsection 14 of numeral 121 of the Constitución Política, 1, 3, and 17 of the Ley de Aguas N°276 of August 27, 1942, 33 of the current Ley Forestal Nº7575 of February 5, 1996, and Decreto Ejecutivo N°26237-MINAE of June 19, 1997). VIII.- Apart from what has been indicated, the initial brief must contain each of the data required in Article 1 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias: Name and qualifications of the petitioner; nature, location, size, and boundaries of the land; names and addresses of adjoining landowners (if they are legal entities, their updated legal status must be proven); an indication of whether there are co-owners and liens (among them, easements (servidumbres), usufructs, etc.), and if so, specifying who and which ones (also proving the constitution of the latter); time of possession; description of possessory acts; extent of crops, forested or pasture areas; existence of constructions and improvements made; number of livestock if the property is a livestock farm; cause and date of acquisition; name and surnames of the person who transferred it, in the case of a derivative mode, as well as their domicile; estimation of the property's value and the proceedings; indication of three neighboring witnesses from the same canton where the property is located, when necessary in accordance with what is indicated in numerals 4 and 6 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias.
It must also necessarily be declared that: the property is not already registered in the Public Registry, there is no registrable title of ownership, and there is no intention to evade the consequences of a succession proceeding. If the ten-year possession is not held at the time of initiating the proceeding, the petitioner may add that of their transferors, but besides clarifying this in the brief, they must provide the public document recording the transfer of their right. The documentary evidence and the rest of the evidence that must be submitted come to ratify or prove precisely what was stated in the brief. Therefore, it is not appropriate to refer to the content of the documentary evidence accompanying the initial brief. Regarding the required testimonial evidence, a minimum of three witnesses, the legislator imposed the requirement of being residents of the canton where the property is located.
This was with the aim of ensuring that those appearing to testify were truly knowledgeable about the situation. In other words, it is presumed that local residents are the ones who can best attest to the owners of lands near their own and what happens on them, by frequenting or living in the same place. All these requirements and the pertinent evidence to corroborate what was declared in the initial memorial are clearly specified in the cited regulations. Ignorance in this regard cannot therefore be alleged, much less if one has professional legal advice, as happened in this case. The omission concerning them, or the offering of non-pertinent evidence, is solely the responsibility of the petitioner, which the judge cannot assume or try to remedy. IX.- In addition to the mentioned requirements, in cases where the land is included within a protected zone, a more qualified requirement regarding the exercise and time of possession must be met.
"…In accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, applicable to this case because the property to be titled is located within the Zona Protectora…, to be able to register said property in the Public Registry, it is necessary for the petitioner to demonstrate having been in possession of the property at least ten years before the effective date of the Decree that created the cited Reserve, as well as having protected the forest resource (recurso forestal)" (decision Nº170-03 of 4:24 p.m. on March 31, 2003. See also in this regard the cited decision Nº755-03). The foregoing is required for the protection of the State's forest heritage (patrimonio forestal del Estado) and biodiversity, without affecting the rights that private subjects may have effectively consolidated through the passage of time (see in this regard decision Nº497 of 3:20 p.m. on July 30, 2003, of the Court).
In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in Decision N° 4587 of 3:45 p.m. on August 5, 1997, in which it analyzed the constitutionality of the cited Article 7, ordered that to title lands located in the protected zones indicated therein, the interested party had to demonstrate possession ten years before the effective date of the respective Decree. Basically, the Chamber stated on that occasion: "…given the nature of the property intended to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion (usucapión) must elapse before the property's allocation to the public domain occurs. That is, the declaration of a protected wilderness area prevents possession subsequent to the allocation from counting, and impedes the fulfillment of the usucapion requirements if the right has not been acquired at that moment, that is, if the ten years of possession suitable for usucapion have not elapsed under the conditions established by law… it is important to synthesize the basic elements that, at the doctrinal and jurisprudential level, are handled with these issues, and which oblige the judge – in relation to the contested norm- to determine in each case the specific type of possessory act that has been exercised on the land – which becomes part of the protected wilderness area – intended to be titled.
The foregoing is so that the judge has a broader criterion – not limited to the date the law or executive decree defining the boundaries of a specific wilderness area came into force – to establish with greater precision the moment when said properties became inalienable and imprescriptible, for the purposes of determining whether possession ad usucapionem was exercised over them during the ten years prior to their acquiring that condition. This broader perspective favors the protection of the Nation's environmental heritage (patrimonio ambiental de la Nación), determines that when one intends to title – through the procedure of informaciones posesorias – a land located within a protected wilderness area, the discussion is not reduced to the simple calculation of the time since one entered the property in relation to the date on which the declaration of a protected wilderness area occurred, since –on one hand, the elements that each specific type of possession entails must be considered for the purposes of accrediting possession ad usucapionem during the period established in Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, and –on the other hand- the possible existence of norms that long ago declared those lands inalienable, even before their specific allocation to the public domain…".
In the case, having assessed the evidence conscientiously and without strict subjection to the norms of common law (Article 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), the Court reaches the unavoidable conclusion that this proceeding must be rejected because it comprises property that forms part of the Forest Heritage of the State, as the title applicant has not demonstrated having acquired and consolidated a property right over it prior to the creation of the protected zone in question. This Court considers it unnecessary to analyze prior legislation to see if such lands were allocated to the public domain earlier by some other law, since according to the foregoing, there are sufficient grounds for the rejection of this proceeding. The reasons of equity and law that support this conclusion will be given in the subsequent recitals. X.- Regarding the mode of acquisition, time of possession, and possessory acts, there is no coincidence among the witnesses, nor between them and what was stated by the title applicant in his initial brief.
Mr. [Nombre1] indicated he possessed the land since 1971 in an original form and that his possessory acts were the making of firebreaks (rondas), fences, planting of plantains, and fruit trees such as mango, coconut, avocado, and teak (folios 7 and 8). The first was not corroborated by any of the witnesses who testified at different opportunities: [Nombre2], [Nombre3], [Nombre4], [Nombre5], [Nombre6], [Nombre7], [Nombre8] and [Nombre9] (folios 26, 27, 28, 77, 78, 103, 104, 105). In fact, the last three cited, in an identical manner, indicated they knew the property since before 1950, and that it had always belonged to the [Nombre1] family (folios 103, 104, and 105). For their part, Messrs. [Nombre5] and [Nombre6] affirmed that the land Mr. [Nombre1] intends to title was acquired by him from [Nombre10], about twenty years ago according to the former, which corresponds approximately to the year 1982 (folio 77).
The petitioner, in a manner contradictory to his interests, since it is assumed he offers truthful witnesses, knowledgeable about the property's situation, whom he VOLUNTARILY chooses to prove his affirmations, submits the memorial dated April 19, 2002, visible at folio 88, with which he intends to "clarify" what was said by those two witnesses, alleging that Mr. [Nombre10] many years ago had adjacent properties to the one intended to be titled, but not that one, and reiterates that his mode of acquisition is original. The foregoing is not convincing nor acceptable, [Nombre11] in this case, in which, unjustifiably, different witnesses were allowed to testify on more than one occasion. If his justification were admitted, it would have to be taken as true that those witnesses did not testify about the property that is the object of this proceeding, or that they did not know it, and therefore, they should not have been offered as such.
But aside from this highly questionable conduct, and from the contradictions regarding the mode and date of acquisition, which prevent considering the exercise of ten-year possession in the manner required by law to have been effectively demonstrated by the title applicant, there are other discrepancies that equally disprove what was affirmed by him, and which lead to the rejection of this petition. XI.- Regarding the time of possession, [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] (folios 28 and 26) stated they knew the property for 10 and 12 years respectively (approximately 1991 and 1989, according to the date of the declaration). Besides these witnesses not being useful to demonstrate possession prior to those dates, which was necessary given the special situation of the property as it forms part of a protected zone, it is striking that despite affirming they knew the property for so many years, they did not know who its adjoining landowners were. [Nombre4], [Nombre6], [Nombre5] (folios 27, 78, 77) stated they knew the property for about 30 years (which corresponds to 1971 and 1972 respectively, according to their declaration dates).
However, like the first ones cited, Mrs. [Nombre4] did not know who the adjoining landowners were, nor did she refer to how [Nombre1] came to be the owner of the land. [Nombre5] also did not know about the adjoining properties or the size of the land. But furthermore, along with [Nombre6], they affirmed the property was acquired from [Nombre10]. The former said this was about 20 years ago, giving an approximate date of 1982. The latter did not mention the acquisition date (folios 77 and 78). This contradicts not only the mode of acquisition affirmed by Mr. [Nombre1] but also the time he declared he possessed the land. This is even more questionable, if one takes into account that, given the creation date of the protected zone in question, he should have demonstrated possession of the property for at least ten years prior to 1994, in the manner legally required. [Nombre7], [Nombre8] and [Nombre9] (folios 103, 104, and 105), declared they knew the property since before 1950, which was formerly part of another.
They affirmed it has always belonged to the [Nombre1] family. The foregoing contradicts not only what was affirmed by previous witnesses but also the title applicant's own statement, who affirms under oath to have been the owner of the property since 1971 and to have acquired it in an original form. XII.- Regarding the possessory acts, the first witnesses received in March 2001 stated: [Nombre2] and [Nombre4] they consisted of the property having been fenced on all its boundaries. The latter added that the land was "very clean" (folios 77 and 27); [Nombre3] said they had been the cleaning of the land for the purpose of building a house (folio 26). The second group of witnesses was received in February 2002, and they affirmed knowing the land but as part of a larger one. Specifically regarding the possessory acts, with the clarification of knowing the land as part of another, they stated: [Nombre5], the property has been dedicated to agriculture (folio 77). [Nombre6], it being a land dedicated mostly to fruit trees, having made and repaired fences, cleaning of firebreaks (rondas), and general care (folio 78).
The third group of witnesses, who likewise know the land as part of another, was received in June 2002, and they declared: [Nombre7] and [Nombre8] say the property has been dedicated to conservation or natural regeneration and the possessory acts have been the general care that a property of that nature requires (folios 103 and 105). [Nombre9], unlike all the cited witnesses, affirms some parts of the property have been dedicated to livestock, and others to agriculture, but mostly to conservation or natural regeneration, and the possessory acts are the general care that a property of such nature requires (folio 104). Apart from the evident inconsistencies among what was affirmed by the witnesses themselves, in the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) carried out on June 20, 2001, it derives from what was recorded therein that the land has broken topography, no fences existed but there were lanes, and there were no constructions, livestock, or crops.
It was recorded as being dedicated to natural conservation. Added to the above, the map (plano) that is the subject of the proceedings indicates the land is dedicated to "trees" (folio 1), which is also corroborated by indicating the nature of the property in the initial brief (folio 7). Consequently, given so many contradictions, it is in no way possible to be clear about what the possessory acts have been and what the land subject to titling has been dedicated to, and therefore this aspect cannot be considered demonstrated in the manner required by law, much less if one takes as a basis that the title applicant affirmed they were fences, firebreaks, and planting of plantains and fruit trees, and according to his three latest witnesses, supposedly provided to "clarify or prove" what the previous ones could not say, the land "has always been dedicated to conservation and the possessory acts have been those required by a property of such nature".
XIII.-- Regarding the delimitation of the property, this Court takes into account that it formed part of a material unit, to which several of the witnesses received refer. However, when the petitioner decides to propose its registration in parts, specifically in this case a land measuring 9562.14 square meters, he is obligated to delimit it clearly. Likewise, the witnesses he offers must know it in that form, and be able to explain what they know about it, because otherwise it could not be accepted, nor would there be certainty, about whether what was declared refers to the land subject to titling. In this sense, of the first witnesses who testified in the case file: [Nombre2] and [Nombre4], indicated the land was fenced on all four sides. [Nombre2] even specified that the erection of the fences were, for him, the possessory acts exercised. [Nombre3] did not refer to how the land was delimited, and also did not know its adjoining properties (folio 26). [Nombre5] says that because the property is very broken he has never been interested in knowing them.
He adds: "The property is dedicated to agriculture. This property was formerly a single farm but it has been subdivided (loteando), I do not know for what intention. I do not know if it has firebreaks or fences since these are fences that are very difficult to walk" (folio 77). [Nombre6] (folio 78), affirmed the "lot belongs to a large farm of approximately eighty-something hectares, whose boundaries on the west side are with [Dirección1], on the east with [Dirección2], on the north with a gringo whose name I do not know, and on the south I do not remember whose it is". Apart from the problems implied by knowing the lot as part of another land for the purposes of its location, this witness is not useful then to demonstrate the specific and current boundaries of the one intended to be titled, since it is inferred from his statement that he refers to the land as a whole and not to the part that was intended to be titled.
The last three witnesses, [Nombre7], [Nombre8] and [Nombre9], do not refer to the adjoining properties of the land (folios 103 to 105).- But in addition to the foregoing, the title applicant in his initial memorial affirms having carried out, as acts of possession, the making of fences (folio 8). That affirmation and what was indicated by the first witnesses cited above, is disproven by what was observed in the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) carried out in June 2001, since it was clearly indicated that the property was not fenced, with lanes existing as delimitation (see record at folio 51). XIV.- What has been analyzed is sufficient to consider the basic premises for granting the present petition as not demonstrated. But independently of this, it is important to indicate the following regarding the remaining grievances. What was alleged in the third grievance regarding the lower court's argument that the area is easy to become overgrown (enmontar) and therefore after one harvest it quickly returns to natural regeneration not being true, is inadmissible, aside from this being a situation that must be analyzed and demonstrated in each specific case, depending on the type of vegetation and natural conditions of the specific zone.
But, in this matter, even if it were true that it could be an area of easy regeneration, this does not change the conclusion reached by the Court regarding the non-fulfillment of the necessary requirements to approve this titling. XV.- Regarding the sixth grievance, it must be said that the Court cannot limit the powers of the lower court judge in a general manner, [Nombre11] if numeral 11 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias provides: "The judge may, when he deems it convenient, order all those proceedings he considers necessary to verify the truthfulness of the facts to which the Información refers. He shall reject it if he comes to verify that it is intended to improperly title national wastelands (baldíos nacionales) or lands belonging to any State institution, as well as forest reserves, national parks, or biological reserves." However, on this occasion, given what occurred and was demonstrated in the case file, the Procurador is correct in claiming that the extension of testimonial evidence was improperly admitted, not only on one, but on two occasions.
The foregoing because in March 2001, the first three witnesses offered by the title applicant were received, as required by Article 6 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. On that first occasion, the Court must emphasize that the evidence was received by a commissioned Judge, which is not an admissible practice in agrarian matters, due to its purposes, which promote respect, except for qualified exceptions, of the principle of immediacy. [Nombre11] in cases like the present one, where the protection of a protected zone is at stake, and the commissioned action is the evacuation of fundamental evidence for the substance of what is called to be resolved, such as testimonial evidence. After this, it is recorded that the Procuraduría appeared, which reminded that the ten-year exercise of possession must be demonstrated prior to the effective date of the decree that created the protected zone in question.
Unacceptably, the lower court uses as an argument to justify the extension of testimonial evidence the fact that said entity appeared after those first statements. Regardless of what was alleged by the Procurador, the Judge by principle knows the law and is obligated to ensure compliance with said requirement. The title applicant also had to, from the moment he offered testimonial evidence, corroborate that the witnesses knew the land for sufficient time to be able to prove the facts affirmed by him. If an error or ignorance on his part or his legal advisor's part does not accredit them in the proper form at the opportune time, it is a burden that must only be imputed against him under his responsibility. It is not for the judge to remedy that situation, unless, without violating his functions and in protection of the party's rights and with respect for the current legal system, he considers, on a well-founded basis, that it is strictly necessary to receive some additional evidence.
After that, a judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) is carried out, in which this Court cannot fail to point out that a record was drawn up with a quite limited description of the land (see folio 51). In a memorial dated December 7, 2001, the title applicant requests to be allowed to offer two other witnesses, because Messrs. Ricardo Azofeifa and José Pérez had known the property for a short time, to which the lower court Judge agrees. Thus, in February 2002, the statements of [Nombre6] and [Nombre5] were received (folios 77 and 78). Due to contradictions between what was declared by them and what was affirmed by the title applicant, the latter presents two memorials. In the first, he attempts to "clarify" what was said by them regarding the mode of acquisition of the property being derivative, which contradicts what was affirmed by the title applicant. In the second, the title applicant's legal representative requests that three more witnesses be received, "…in order to demonstrate that the lands my represented party intends to title have always been in his and or his family's hands and that the transmission from parents to children has occurred verbally; likewise that the possession exercised has been for much more than ten (sic) years prior to the publication of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización…".
Despite the fact that this statement changes what was initially affirmed by the promoter, and despite five testimonies having already been admitted, the lower court judge agrees to receive them in June 2002 (folios 99). These, apart from affirming they knew the property since 1950, do not provide much information about the land, and even make the evidence received in its entirety even more contradictory. The Court clarifies that this grievance is admitted in this specific case, since, as already explained, it is the lower court Judge's power to determine the number of witnesses needed to rule, and regarding what is established in cited Article 6 on the number of witnesses, its extension is not illegal, as long as it is strictly necessary and it is corroborated that the effective fulfillment of the purposes of current legislation is not altered thereby. What is unacceptable is to allow the petitioner to "correct" or alter, at his convenience, what he has affirmed or what has been progressively demonstrated, as the process elapses. [Nombre11] if the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias is clear regarding requirements, and there is a great number of pronouncements by the Courts that have resolved and explained how each of them are interpreted and must be complied with.
In the case, in view of the affirmations of the first two witnesses received, [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] (folios 28 and 26), about knowing the land for barely 10 or 12 years, it can be understood that the reception of two more witnesses was ordered, who are supposed to have had knowledge of the same for many more years prior, and moreover, logically, to be sufficiently informed to be able to inform the judge about all the details that he might require regarding the time of possession, acts exercised, delimitation, and other fundamental data. Even if the judge were to omit asking a question of special interest to corroborate what was reported by the title applicant, the latter and his legal advisor may be present at the statement and request that the pertinent questions the judge failed to ask be put to the declarant. But after the second witnesses, unjustifiably in light of what was alleged, as explained, three more were received.
XVI.- The seventh grievance is rejected because there is no demonstration that the property intended to be titled in expediente (record) Nº00-100077-417AG of the Juzgado Agrario of Nicoya overlaps with the one that is the object of the present proceeding. In the report requested from the Catastro Nacional, it is even indicated that the map P-54225-1963 cited in the respective report from the Juzgado of Nicoya does not overlap with the map P-589856-1999. Neither do the rest of the maps referring to the informaciones posesorias that the petitioner is processing, according to what was indicated by the Catastro Nacional, overlap documentarily (folios 159 to 162). In this regard, it clearly indicates that the portion described in map P-590611-99, which corresponds to this matter, does not overlap with the cited 1963 map. Therefore, the Procuraduría's allegations in this regard are inadmissible.
XVII.- Finally, the Court must also note that, in the recitals of the contested judgment, rather than analyzing the evidence and compliance with the procedural and substantive prerequisites required to grant the proceeding, the Procuraduría's position is contested, considering that it engages in an "inconvenient" practice of changing the "rules of the game". Also, there is a contradiction between what was affirmed in the initial brief about no liens (cargas reales) existing on the property and what was recorded on the base map of the proceedings, where the existence of a right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso) is marked, which evidently serves as access to the same.
This is not only a discrepancy that should have been noticed by the lower court (a quo), so that if pertinent, it would order the demonstration of its constitution in due form and clarify which was the servient tenement, whether or not it was registered, the dimensions of the easement (servidumbre) (width and length) and its purpose. But furthermore, in this case, given that the property forms part of a protected area, if the applicant had not consolidated their right according to the foregoing, the constitution of an encumbrance such as the one cited was improper. In this regard, it should be remembered that state protected wilderness areas form part of the natural heritage of the State (articles 32, 34, 37, 38, 46 of the Organic Environmental Law, 13 and 14 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal); 58 of the Biodiversity Law, Constitutional Chamber vote No. 2988 of 11:57 a.m. on April 23, 1999 and No. 755-03 cited from the Agrarian Tribunal).
The latter, for its part, is composed of the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, areas declared inalienable, properties registered in the name of the State, properties of the municipalities, autonomous institutions and other bodies of the Public Administration, except for properties that guarantee credit operations of the National Banking System and form part of its heritage (articles 13 and 15 Forest Law (Ley Forestal)). The forest lands and forests comprised within the natural heritage of the State are unseizable, inalienable and imprescriptible, in accordance with numerals 14 and 15 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal), and may not be mortgaged nor be susceptible to encumbrance under the terms of Civil Law (see in this regard votes No. 1092 of 4:09 p.m. on February 7, 2001 and No. 421 of 3:20 p.m. on January 16, 2001. In the same sense, No. 2988 of 11:57 a.m. on April 23, 1999, all from the Constitutional Chamber).
XVIII.- By reason of all the foregoing, the appealed resolution must be revoked, insofar as it approved the present possessive information proceedings. In its place, in accordance with the provisions of articles 1, 7 and 11 of the Law of Possessory Information (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) and other cited regulations, the possessive information proceedings established by [Name1] are rejected.
"VII.- Los agravios dos, cuatro y cinco de la parte apelante se relacionan entre sí, pues combaten lo tenido por demostrado por el a quo, y resaltan las contradicciones entre lo afirmado por el promovente y lo dicho por los testigos en cuanto a modo de adquisición, actos posesorios ejercidos y delimitación del terreno. Al respecto, y de acuerdo con lo que se explicará en los considerandos siguientes, lleva razón la Procuraduría, aclarándose se toma en cuenta únicamente para analizar los agravios, lo que conste en este proceso y la prueba efectivamente recibida o aportada en él, no así la referencia a los testimonios rendidos en otros asuntos, mucho menos si no fueron agregados a los autos como prueba documental. Según lo tenido por probado en esta instancia, el terreno a titular se encuentra ubicado dentro de la Zona Protectora Península de Nicoya, establecida en abril de 1994. Por consiguiente, debió el promovente demostrar en forma clara y contundente, haber ejercido una posesión decenal al menos anterior a 1994.
Lo anterior no fue debidamente acreditado. Al respecto, aparte de lo que se dirá sobre la forma y cantidad de testigos recibidos, deben resaltarse los siguiente puntos. Las declaraciones hechas en este tipo de proceso por los gestionante, tienen el carácter de declaración jurada, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 3 párrafo final de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias. Los artículos 1, 2, 4, 5 6, 7, 9 y 15 de la misma disponen los requisitos que deben cumplirse al plantearse el proceso, como de trámite y de fondo. En ese sentido, el Tribunal ha explicado, la “…Información Posesoria es un trámite de actividad judicial no contenciosa para la formalización de un título registrable sobre un derecho de propiedad que se ha llegado a adquirir por la usucapión, cumpliendo para ello con los requisitos legales correspondientes. Se exige demostrar la posesión a título de dueño, en forma quieta, pública, pacífica e ininterrumpida (artículos 1 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias y 856 del Código Civil).
El titulante, aparte de carecer de título inscrito o inscribible en el Registro Público, debe manifestar expresamente que la finca no ha sido inscrita en el Registro Público anteriormente. Por razones de interés público, y para evitar una doble inscripción registral sobre un mismo bien, o bien, para tutelar a terceros de mejor derecho que el titulante, la Ley exige notificar a ciertos sujetos. También estableció un trámite de oposición dentro de la Información Posesoria, en caso de que alguno de los interesados se sienta perjudicado por la titulación (artículo 8). La Ley de Informaciones Posesorias ordena al Juez tener como partes y por tanto notificarles personalmente desde el inicio de las diligencias, a los colindantes, ello por cuanto la titulación podría abarcar parte de las tierras que les pertenecen. También se ordena notificar a los condueños o condóminos. Igualmente, en resguardo de los intereses del Estado, se ordena tener como parte a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, para el resguardo de la propiedad sujeta al dominio público, y de la Propiedad Agraria estatal (artículo 5).
Finalmente, la Ley manda a citar a todos los interesados, mediante la publicación de un Edicto en el Boletín Judicial, que puedan tener un interés legítimo en el proceso.(Ver numeral 5 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) ( ver voto Nº755 de las 9:45 horas del 13 de noviembre del 2003). Se exige también la existencia de linderos bien señalados (cercas, carriles, etc.). Deben aportarse los siguientes documentos: marca de ganado si la finca se dedica a ganadería; cédula de identidad o documento de identificación respectivo del titulante; el plano catastrado; certificación actualizada del Registro Público que aclare si se han titulado otras fincas por el promovente y cual es su medida; certificación actualizada del Ministerio del Ambiente de Energía sobre si está o no comprendido el terreno dentro de alguna área protegida. La legislación vigente sobre suelos exige se demuestre el uso del terreno conforme a su aptitud (estudio de suelo).
También está obligado el juez, para velar por la protección del recurso hídrico con fines de utilidad pública, de existir nacientes o fuentes de agua, a solicitar el informe respectivo del ente competente para ello (artículos 50 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, inciso 14 del numeral 121 de la Constitución Política, 1, 3 y 17 de la Ley de Aguas N°276 de 27 de agosto de 1942, 33 de la Ley Forestal vigente Nº7575 de 5 de febrero de 1996 y Decreto Ejecutivo N°26237-MINAE de 19 de junio de 1997). VIII.- Aparte de lo indicado, el escrito inicial debe contener cada uno de los datos requeridos en el artículo 1º de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias: Nombre y calidades del promovente; naturaleza, situación, medida y linderos del terreno; nombres y dirección de los colindantes (si son personas jurídicas debe acreditarse su personería actualizada); indicación de sí existen condueños y cargas reales (entre ellas, servidumbres, usufructos, etc.), de haberlos especificar quiénes y cuáles (probar además la constitución de las últimas); tiempo de posesión; descripción de los actos posesorios; extensión de cultivos, zonas boscosas o de pasto; existencia de construcciones y mejoras realizadas; cantidad de apartos de ser ganadera la finca; causa y fecha de adquisición; nombre y apellidos de la persona que transmitió, en caso de tratarse de un modo derivado, así como su domicilio; estimación del inmueble y las diligencias; indicación de tres testigos vecinos del mismo cantón donde se ubique el inmueble, cuando sea necesario de acuerdo con lo indicado en el numerales 4 y 6 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias.
Debe además necesariamente declararse que: la finca no se encuentra ya inscrita en el Registro Público, se carece de título de dominio inscribible y no se pretende evadir las consecuencias de un juicio sucesorio. De no tenerse la posesión decenal al momento de iniciar la diligencia, puede el promovente sumar la de sus transmitentes, pero además de aclarar eso en el escrito, debe aportar el documento público en el cual conste el traspaso de su derecho. La documental y el resto de la prueba que se debe aportar, vienen a ratificar o probar precisamente lo informado en el escrito. Por ello no resulta procedente se remita al contenido de la documental que acompañe al escrito inicial. En cuanto a la prueba testimonial exigida, en un mínimo de tres, el legislador impuso el requisito de ser vecinos del cantón donde se ubica el inmueble. Ello con el fin de permitir fuesen realmente personas conocedoras de la situación las que se presentaran a declarar.
En otras palabras, se presume los vecinos de la zona son quienes mejor pueden dar fe de los dueños de los terrenos cercanos a los suyos y que sucede en ellos, por frecuentar o vivir en el mismo lugar. Todos estos requisitos y la prueba pertinente para corroborar lo declarado en el memorial inicial están claramente especificados en la normativa citada. No puede entonces alegarse desconocimiento al respecto, mucho menos si se cuenta con asesoría legal profesional, como sucedió en el caso. La omisión en cuanto a ellos, o el ofrecimiento de prueba no pertinente, es responsabilidad únicamente del promovente, que el juzgador no puede asumir ni intentar solventar. IX.- Además de los requisitos mencionados, en los casos en los cuales el terreno esté comprendido dentro de una zona protegida, debe cumplirse con un requisito más calificado en cuanto al ejercicio y tiempo de la posesión. “…De acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, de aplicación al caso por encontrarse el inmueble a titular dentro de la Zona Protectora …, para poder inscribir dicho bien en el Registro Público, es preciso el gestionante demuestre haber estado en posesión del inmueble por lo menos diez años antes de la vigencia del Decreto que creó la citada Reserva, así como haber protegido el recurso forestal”(voto Nº170-03 de las 16:24 horas del 31 de marzo del 2003.
Ver también al respecto el voto Nº755-03 citado). Lo anterior se exige en protección del patrimonio forestal del Estado y la biodiversidad, sin afectarse por ello los derechos que efectivamente los sujetos privados hubiesen consolidado por el transcurso del tiempo (ver al respecto el voto Nº497 de las 15:20 horas del 30 de julio del 2003 del Tribunal). En ese sentido, la Sala Constitucional en Voto N° 4587 de las 15:45 horas del 5 de agosto de 1997, en el cual analizó la constitucionalidad del artículo 7 citado, dispuso para poder titular los terrenos ubicados en las zonas protegidas que ahí se señalan, debía el interesado demostrar la posesión diez años antes de la vigencia del Decreto respectivo. Básicamente dijo la Sala en esa oportunidad: "… dada la naturaleza del bien que se pretende titular (cosa pública), el plazo de posesión apta para la usucapión debe transcurrir antes de que se produzca la afectación del bien al dominio público.
Es decir, la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida evita que cuente la posesión posterior a la afectación, e impide concretar los requisitos de la usucapión si a ese momento no se ha adquirido el derecho, o sea, no han transcurrido los diez años de posesión apta para usucapir con las condiciones que establece la ley… resulta importante sintetizar los elementos básicos que a nivel de doctrina y jurisprudencia se maejan con estos temas, y que obligan al juez – en relación con la norma impugnada- a determinar en cada caso el tipo específico de acto posesorio que se ha ejercido en el fundo – que entra a formar parte del área silvestre protegida- que se pretende titular. Lo anterior con el objeto de que el juez tenga un criterio más amplio – que no se limite a la fecha de entrada en vigencia de la ley o el decreto ejecutivo que defina los límites de un área silvestre determinada- para establecer con mayor precisión el momento en que dichos bienes se convirtieron en inalienables e imprescriptibles, a los efectos de determinar si sobre ellos se ejerció la posesión ad usucapionem durante diez años anteriores a que adquirieron esa condición.
Esta perspectiva de mayor amplitud favorece la protección del patrimonio ambiental de la Nación, determina que cuando se pretenda titular – mediante el procedimiento de informaciones posesorias- un terreno ubicado dentro de un área silvestre protegida, la discusión no se reduzca al simple cálculo del tiempo que tiene de haber ingresado a un inmueble en relación con la fecha en que se haya producido la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida, ya que -por un lado deberá contemplarse a los efectos de acreditar la posesión ad usucapionem durante el plazo establecido en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, los elementos que cada tipo específico de posesión contempla, y –por otro lado- la posible existencia de normas que de antaño declaraban inalienables esos terrenos, aún antes de su afectación específica al dominio público… ". En el caso, valorada la prueba a conciencia y sin sujeción estricta a las normas de derecho común (artículo 54 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria), el Tribunal llega a la ineludible conclusión de que esta diligencia debe ser rechazada por comprender un bien que forma parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, al no haber sido demostrado por el titulante haber adquirido y consolidado un derecho de propiedad sobre el mismo con anterioridad a la creación de la zona protegida de marras.
Considera este Tribunal innecesario entrar a analizar la legislación anterior para ver si tales terrenos fueron afectados al dominio publico anteriormente por alguna otra ley, pues conforme a lo expuesto existen motivos suficientes para el rechazo de estas diligencias. En los considerandos posteriores se darán las razones de equidad y derecho que fundamentan dicha conclusión. X.- Respecto del modo de adquisición, tiempo de posesión y actos posesorios, no existe coincidencia entre los testigos, y entre estos y lo dicho por el titulante en su escrito inicial. Indicó el señor [Nombre1] poseer el terreno desde 1971 en forma originaria y ser sus actos posesorios la hechura de rondas, cercas, siembra de plátanos, árboles frutales como mango, coco, aguacate y teca (folios 7 y 8). Lo primero no fue corroborado por ninguno de los testigos que declararon en diferentes oportunidades: [Nombre2] , [Nombre3] , [Nombre4] , [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] , [Nombre7] , [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] (folios 26, 27, 28, 77, 78, 103, 104, 105).
De hecho, los tres últimos citados, en forma idéntica indicaron, conocer la finca desde antes de 1950, y haber sido siempre de la familia [Nombre1] (folios 103, 104, y 105). Por su parte, los señores [Nombre5] y [Nombre6] afirmaron el terreno que el señor [Nombre1] pretende titular lo adquirió éste de [Nombre10] , hacía como veinte años según el primero, lo cual corresponde aproximadamente al año de 1982 (folio 77). El promovente, en forma contradictoria a sus intereses, por cuanto se supone que ofrece testigos veraces, conocedores de la situación de la finca, que VOLUNTARIAMENTE elige con el fin de probar sus afirmaciones, aporta el memorial en fecha 19 de abril del 2002, visible a folio 88, con el cual pretende “aclarar” lo dicho por esos dos testigos, aduciendo el señor [Nombre10] hace muchos años tuvo fincas aledañas a la que se pretende titular, pero no esa, y reitera su modo de adquisición es originario.
Lo anterior no es convincente ni aceptable, [Nombre11] en este caso, en el cual en forma injustificada se aceptó en más de una oportunidad declararan diferentes testigos. De ser admitida su justificación, tendría que tenerse por cierto esos testigos no declararon entonces sobre la finca objeto del proceso, o bien no la conocían, y por ende, no debieron ser ofrecidos como tal. Pero aparte de este proceder tan cuestionable, y de las contradicciones en cuanto al modo y fecha de adquisición, que impiden tener por efectivamente demostrada el ejercicio de la posesión decenal en la forma requerida por la ley, por parte del titulante, existen otras discordancias que igualmente desvirtúan lo afirmado por él, y que conllevan el rechazo de esta gestión. XI.- En cuanto al tiempo de posesión, [Nombre2] y [Nombre3] (folios 28 y
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