Private student transport not exempt from vehicle restriction exceptionsImprocedencia de incluir transporte privado de estudiantes en excepciones a restricción vehicular

IV.- REGARDING THE SUPERVENING REPEAL OF EXECUTIVE DECREE # 35379-MOPT AND ITS EFFECTS ON WHAT IS SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF. The representative of the State raises the defense of lack of current interest, given that Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT, the object of challenge in this proceeding, was repealed as of May second, two thousand eleven, by Executive Decree number 36547-MOPT, for which reason, he deems that the proceeding lacks interest, as it concerns a rule that is no longer in force, especially since the plaintiff did not proceed to adjust the claim, in order to challenge the provisions of Executive Decree number 36547-MOPT. In this regard, this Tribunal considers that while it is true that the plaintiff did not adjust the claims during the preliminary hearing held at fourteen hours and seven minutes on March ninth, two thousand twelve, and consequently, maintained – among others – the claims aimed at including private student transporters within the exception scenarios to the vehicular restriction provided for in Article 6 of Executive Decree 35379-MOPT and, subsidiarily, partially annulling said rule (see folios 93 to 95 of the judicial file and digital backup of the preliminary hearing), despite the fact that Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT had been repealed as of May second, two thousand eleven, upon the entry into force of Executive Decree number 36547-MOPT, published in Supplement 26 of the Official Gazette La Gaceta number 82 of April 29, two thousand eleven (see the digital version of Executive Decree number 36547-MOPT on the website: www.pgr.go.cr/scij); it is also true that the lawsuit was filed on August thirty-first, two thousand nine (folio 1 of the judicial file), that is, one month and eleven days after Executive Decree 35379-MOPT was published and entered into force, namely: July 20, 2009 (see the digital version of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT on the website: www.pgr.go.cr/scij). However, it was not until January twentieth, two thousand twelve, that by means of a ruling issued at eleven hours zero minutes, the Processing Judge gave notice of the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff company (folios 67 and 68 of the judicial file), at which time Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT had already been repealed by Executive Decree number 36547-MOPT, since May second, two thousand eleven. Now, given that pursuant to the provisions of Articles 10 subsection 2; 37 subsections 1 and 2; 39.1.b of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, it is possible to directly challenge – in principle – a regulatory provision, within one year following the day of the single or last publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, by those who claim to hold some legitimate, individual or collective interest, or some subjective right regarding that regulatory rule; this Tribunal considers that in the specific case, the content of the questioned rule must be analyzed, even though it is currently repealed, not only because as of August 31, 2009, the plaintiff company was within the timeframe to directly challenge that regulatory rule, without requiring individual application acts, but also, because it claims to hold, regarding what Article 6 of Executive Decree 35379-MOPT provided, an alleged subjective right, insofar as it carries out the private activity of paid transportation of persons – specifically students – in motor vehicles, microbús modality (see folios 37, 63 back of the judicial file and conclusions of the plaintiff's representative in the preliminary hearing, which are recorded in digital backup), which was not included in the exception scenarios of the rules regulating the vehicular restriction through the License Plate/Hour Scheme in the Center of San José, despite the fact that, according to its statement, it constitutes an activity not prohibited by the legal system, which, moreover, would contribute to the achievement of the objectives pursued by the vehicular restriction, such as: reducing traffic congestion and fuel consumption. In this sense, this Tribunal considers that it must be established whether Article 6 of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT – specifically insofar as it excluded private student transportation via microbús from the exception scenarios of the rules regulating the vehicular restriction – was contrary or not to the legal system, and therefore, to the subjective right that the plaintiff company claims to hold, an extreme which, in turn, is decisive for establishing whether or not it should be restored in the enjoyment of the legal situation it claims was violated, pursuant to the provisions of subsections a) and d) of Article 122 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. This is even more so when the content of the challenged rule is reproduced in numeral 6 of Executive Decree number 36547-MOPT, which is currently in force; and that the supervening repeal of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT occurred, in part, due to the delay that this Tribunal incurred in the initial processing of this declaratory proceeding, despite the lawsuit having been filed one month and eleven days after the entry into force of the challenged rule. Based on these considerations, this Tribunal rejects the defense of lack of current interest, filed by the representation of the State, and will proceed to analyze the challenged regulations, in order to determine the appropriateness or not of the claims raised by the plaintiff.

V.- REGARDING THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE SPECIAL PAID TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS – SPECIFICALLY STUDENTS – IN MOTOR VEHICLES, MICROBÚS MODALITY. The plaintiff alleges that the private student transportation activity it carries out in the microbús modality does not constitute an activity prohibited by the legal system, and therefore, pursuant to the provisions of Article 28 of the Political Constitution, it is outside the scope of the law, and therefore, they do not require a permit from the Transportation Council to carry it out. In that sense, we must start from the fact that it is established that the plaintiff company named Transportes Privados Caritas Felices CR, S.A., carries out the activity of special paid transportation of persons – specifically students – in motor vehicles, microbús modality, on a stable basis (see folios 37, 63 back of the judicial file and conclusions of the plaintiff's representative in the preliminary hearing, which are recorded in digital backup). By reason of the foregoing and contrary to what the representative of the plaintiff company maintains, the legitimate exercise of its activity is not only regulated in Articles 1, 3, and 25 of the Law Regulating Paid Transportation of Persons by Motor Vehicles (Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas por Vehículos Automotores, Law 3503); 5 subsection f of the Law Regulating Public Services (Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, Law 7593); 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Regulation for the Operation of Special Paid Motor Transportation Services for Persons (Reglamento para la Explotación de Servicios Especiales de Transporte Automotor Remunerado de Personas, Executive Decree number 15203); but is also conditioned on compliance with the requirements established for that purpose in said regulations. The foregoing statement finds support in that, as has been demonstrated, the activity carried out by the plaintiff company does not consist of the simple free and private transfer of students to educational centers, which – for example – parents or guardians of these students carry out daily; but on the contrary, it is a paid activity, which implies the operation of a special transportation service for persons (students, workers, or tourism), by means of collective transport vehicles, in their autobús, buseta, or microbús modalities, which are provided on an occasional basis – for a single service – or on a stable basis (for several services) and which are characterized by not having a fixed itinerary and which are contracted by time, by trip, or by both forms. Said activity has been classified by the legislator, since May 20, 1965 – the date of entry into force of Law 3503 – as "... a public service regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport ..." (Article 1), delegated to private parties and for whose operation the granting of a permit from the Public Transport Council is required (Articles 3 and 25 of Law 3503). So much so that, through Executive Decree number 15203 (Regulation for the Operation of Special Paid Motor Transportation Services for Persons), which entered into force as of February 22, nineteen eighty-four, the Executive Branch developed the terms of what is provided in numerals 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503, in the sense that: "... Article 1. —This Regulation is issued to regulate the operation of special paid transportation services for persons, in collective vehicles within the national territory referred to in Law No. 3503 of May 10, 1965, in its articles 3 and 25 and any other that may substitute it in the future. // Article 2. —Special services are those provided within the operation of paid motor transportation, with collective transport vehicles, without having a fixed itinerary and which are contracted by trip, by time, or in both forms. // Article 3. —For the purposes of this Regulation, special services are classified as occasional and stable: a) Occasional: occasional special services are those provided for only one service within the national territory. b) Stable: stable special services are those provided for several services, such as excursions of any kind, within the national territory. Likewise, the transportation of students (at any educational level), to and/or from educational centers; as well as that of laborers, agricultural workers, and workers in general. For the provision of such services, the transporter must sign a contract with the educational institutions or the companies, as the case may be, whose stipulations may not be agreed in contravention of this Regulation. // Article 4.— For the operation of special services, a permit authorized by the Public Transport Council* shall be required. Said permit may cover one or several vehicles, according to the transportation needs and, in any case, after prior study and recommendation from the Department of Administration of Concessions* and Permits of the Public Transport Council* ..." (the underlining is not from the original). At this point, it is worth highlighting that the classification as a public service, given to the activity of paid transportation of persons in collective motor vehicles – specifically in this case, stable or occasional special services for students, workers, or tourism – also finds support in Law 7593 – which entered into force on September fifth, 1996 – in whose Article 5 it is established: "... In the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; in addition, it shall ensure compliance with the standards of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, according to Article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are: (...) f) Any means of public paid transportation of persons, except by air ...". Lastly, in paragraph 2 of subsection l) of Article 1 of the Law Regulating the Public Service of Paid Transportation of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Modality (Law 7969), added by Article 3 of Law 8955, it is reaffirmed that "... Permits for the paid transportation of persons by means of microbuses, busetas, and autobuses shall be governed by the provisions of Law No. 3503, Law Regulating Paid Transportation of Persons in Motor Vehicles, of May 10, 1965, and its reforms, or any other that substitutes it in the future." Consequently, the paid transportation of students by means of collective motor vehicles – microbús modality – is a special public service of a stable nature, whose provision by a private law subject requires a permit granted by the Public Transport Council, a deconcentrated body which is also responsible for supervising its provision, not only by virtue of the provisions of numerals 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503, but also, based on the best interest of the minor (Principle II of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child; Articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 5 of the Code on Childhood and Adolescence). This is because the State and society in general are obliged to provide minors with special care and attention, in order to achieve their adequate physical, intellectual, and emotional development, which implies the adoption of special provisions aimed at ensuring the protection of the minor's rights and interests, their access to public services, and the adoption of special measures to safeguard their life, health, and safety, in this case, of a traffic-related nature. Finally, it is necessary to highlight that this has been the criterion maintained by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which has considered: "... As the Executive Director of the Public Transport Council of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport points out, the public transport service, called "special," is conceptualized as a "public service." The constituent does not list all services of a public nature, leaving to the ordinary legislator the competence to establish which services should be defined in that way, attending, of course, to the political model imposed by the Political Constitution, which is that of a social democratic rule of law. Article 3 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services defines public service as: '...that which, due to its importance for the sustainable development of the country, is classified as such by the Legislative Assembly, in order to subject it to the regulations of this law.' For its part, Article 12 of the General Law of Public Administration refers in its first paragraph that a public service shall be considered authorized when the subject and the purpose thereof have been indicated. Specifically, the Law Regulating Paid Transportation of Persons in Motor Vehicles, number 3503 of May tenth, nineteen sixty-five and its reforms, refers: 'Article 1.- The paid transportation of persons in collective motor vehicles, except automobiles for taxi service regulated in another law, which is carried out on streets, highways, and roads within the national territory, is a public service (the highlighting is not from the original) regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The provision is delegated to private parties who are expressly authorized, in accordance with the rules established herein.' From that category that the legislator attributes to the paid transportation of persons in collective motor vehicles, it must be inferred that the "special" service, in its modalities of workers, students, and tourists, is a public service and therefore, to be provided by private parties, an authorization must be held, be it called a permit or concession, as appropriate ..." (ruling number 2005-00846 of eleven hours twenty-five minutes of January twenty-eighth, two thousand five, and in a similar sense, ruling number 2005-2236 of fourteen hours forty-eight minutes of March second, two thousand five). By reason of all the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that since the entry into force on May 20, 1965, of the Law Regulating Paid Transportation of Persons by Motor Vehicles (Law 3503), the activity of paid transportation of students by means of collective motor vehicles – microbús modality – is classified by the legislator as a special public service of a stable nature, whose provision by a private law subject requires a permit granted by the Public Transport Council, which was subsequently ratified by the provisions of subsection f) of Article 5 of the Law Regulating Public Services (Law 7593).

VI.- REGARDING THE ALLEGED DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF. In the first instance, it should be clarified that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, when resolving through ruling number 2009-10251 of eleven hours twenty-seven minutes of June twenty-sixth, two thousand nine, the amparo appeal number 09-007129-0007-CO filed by the plaintiff, in which it raised arguments similar to those that constitute the object of this proceeding, considered: "... In this case, the appellant claims that despite what this Tribunal considered in ruling 2004-08880 of 15:49 of August 18, 2008, in the sense that an authorization from the Public Transport Council is not required to provide a student transportation service, traffic officers do not exempt his company's units from the vehicular restriction, which seriously affects him as the respective traffic tickets are applied. In this regard, the Chamber considers that it is not up to this Tribunal to indicate whether the activity carried out by the appellant is authorized or not, since the topic constitutes a matter alien to being discussed in this jurisdiction as it concerns an aspect of mere legality which must be ventilated in the corresponding administrative channels if applicable ..." (the underlining is not from the original - see digital file of the ruling, on the website: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/scij). Said decision is based on the provisions of Article 13 in fine of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, according to which, the jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, except for itself. By reason of the foregoing, this Jurisdiction is empowered – pursuant to the provisions of Articles 49 of the Political Constitution, 1 and 2 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code – to establish whether the activity of special paid transportation of persons – specifically students – in motor vehicles, microbús modality, on a stable basis, carried out by the plaintiff company, requires or not, for its legitimate operation, a permit from the Public Transport Council, and based on the foregoing, whether the provisions of numeral 6 of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT are discriminatory or not to its detriment. Based on the foregoing, and contrary to what the plaintiff company affirms, this Tribunal considers that the exceptions provided in Article 6 of the challenged Executive Decree, regarding the non-application of the rules regulating the vehicular restriction, specifically to "... vehicles of the regular public transport services (autobús, buseta, microbús) or special ones (transport of workers, tourism or transport of students authorized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport) in the paid transportation of persons regulated through Law No. 3503 that have public service plates ...", are not discriminatory, given that in the specific case, there is no valid parameter of equality between the activity carried out by the plaintiff company and that regulated by Laws 3503, 7593, and Executive Decree number 15203. In this regard, it should be noted that the plaintiff is not dedicated to the free and private transfer of students to educational centers, an activity that, for example, some parents or guardians of these students carry out daily. On the contrary, the plaintiff – as its own legal representative acknowledges – carries out a paid activity, which implies the operation of a special transportation service for persons (students, workers, or tourism), by means of collective transport vehicles, in their autobús, buseta, or microbús modalities, which are provided on an occasional basis – for a single service – or on a stable basis (for several services) and which are characterized by not having a fixed itinerary and which are contracted by time, by trip, or by both forms. Said activity is regulated by Articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; 5 subsection f) of Law 7593; 1 to 4 of Executive Decree number 15203, which classify it as a special public service of a stable nature, whose provision by a private law subject requires a permit granted by the Public Transport Council, a deconcentrated body which is also responsible for supervising its provision, not only by virtue of the provisions of numerals 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503, but also, based on the best interest of the minor (Principle II of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child; Articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 5 of the Code on Childhood and Adolescence). This is because, since the entry into force on May 20, 1965, of the Law Regulating Paid Transportation of Persons by Motor Vehicles (Law 3503), the activity of paid transportation of students by means of collective motor vehicles – microbús modality – is classified by the legislator as a special public service, whose provision by a private law subject – it is insisted – requires a permit granted by the Public Transport Council, which was subsequently ratified by the provisions of subsection f) of Article 5 of the Law Regulating Public Services (Law 7593). In that regard, the plaintiff company cannot validly claim that it is in the same condition as the factual assumption contained in the challenged rule and that therefore, it has the right to be included in the exception scenarios related to the non-application of the vehicular restriction, not only because the activity it carries out constitutes a public service that transcended the private sphere since the entry into force of Law 3503, given the need to guarantee its efficiency, continuity, adaptability, and equal treatment of users; but also, because in application of the principle of the best interest of the minor, the State, through the Public Transport Council, must supervise the provision of the special paid student transportation service by means of collective motor vehicles, microbús modality. To maintain the contrary would imply rather causing an inequality in the reverse sense, which would be substantially contrary to the legal system due to the singular non-application of the provisions of Articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; 5 subsection f) of Law 7593; 1 to 4 of Executive Decree number 15203, because in essence it would imply authorizing the protected company to circulate without the restrictions established for that purpose in Articles 38 bis of the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes and Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT, in contravention of the provisions of the rules governing the operation of the activity of special paid transportation of persons – specifically students – in motor vehicles, microbús modality, on a stable basis; especially considering that it has not been established that the motor vehicles, microbús modality, used by the plaintiff company to carry out the activity of special paid transportation of persons – specifically students – meet the requirements provided in Articles 1, 3, 25 of Law number 3503; 6 of Executive Decrees number 35379-MOPT and 36547-MOPT, namely: the permit issued by the Public Transport Council and the public service plate (see point a of recital II of this judgment). By reason of the foregoing, even though Article 6 of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT provides for the possibility that "... The Vice-Ministerial Office, attending to reasons of public interest and based on the principles of discretion, reasonableness, proportionality, rationality, and necessity, via administrative resolution, shall determine the granting of the exception to the restriction for vehicular circulation in those other cases it deems pertinent, upon prior submission of the request ..."; the truth is that this is not applicable to the specific case, as the plaintiff company carries out the activity of special paid transportation of persons – specifically students – in motor vehicles, microbús modality, on a stable basis, which is classified as a public service pursuant to the provisions of Laws 3503; 7593; and Executive Decree number 15203, and requires for its legitimate operation by a private law subject the granting of a permit from the Public Transport Council. In summary, the existence of equality in illegality cannot be validly alleged. For all the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that the exceptions provided in Article 6 of the challenged Executive Decree, regarding the non-application of the rules regulating the vehicular restriction, specifically to "... vehicles of the regular public transport services (autobús, buseta, microbús) or special ones (transport of workers, tourism or transport of students authorized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport) in the paid transportation of persons regulated through Law No. 3503 that have public service plates ...", are not discriminatory; and consequently, the main claim aimed at including the protected company in the exceptions provided in Article 6 of Executive Decree 35379-MOPT, regarding the non-application of the rules regulating the vehicular restriction, is inappropriate, as it is substantially contrary to the provisions of Articles 11 and 33 of the Political Constitution; 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration; 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; 5 subsection f) of Law 7593; 1 to 4 of Executive Decree number 15203.

VII.- REGARDING THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON VEHICULAR CIRCULATION AND THEIR NON-APPLICATION TO MEANS OF PUBLIC PAID TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS. It should be noted that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 38 bis of the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes, the Executive Branch may impose restrictions on vehicular circulation, for reasons of opportunity, convenience, public interest, regional or national, duly substantiated. In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, when dismissing the unconstitutionality action number 09-14039-0007-CO, filed against Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT which is questioned here, considered that: "... In the first place, decree number 35379-MOPT has specific support in Article 38 bis of the Law of Transit so that it complies with the formal conditions of the principle of legal reserve.

In this regard, said Decree merely develops the legislative authorization to decree restrictions on vehicular circulation, so that, regarding its substance, it also adheres to the material scope established in the legal norm. Furthermore, both with respect to freedom of movement and freedom of commerce, the provisions contained in the challenged Decree do not present any characteristic that would lead this Tribunal to understand that they constitute an excessive and disproportionate exercise of state powers, given that—as indicated—the restriction operates such that circulation is only limited one day between Monday and Friday, within a limited zone and within a specific time slot. Added to this is the fact that the measure contained in the Decree is temporary in nature and will be reviewed as soon as March of two thousand ten, and it must also be taken into account that authorities are obligated to provide updated information through studies that serve to validate or correct the scope of such limitations, from all of which it can be concluded that the restrictions are reasonable and proportional to the needs they seek to satisfy…" (judgment number 2010-06283 of fourteen hours thirty minutes on April seventh, two thousand ten—underlining is not from the original). Now, it is necessary to clarify that the legitimate exercise of that power derives from the fact that public roads are public domain assets (bienes de maniales) over which the State exercises especially detailed regulation, such that persons who must travel on them are subject to a regime of special subjection (sujeción especial) that obligates them to submit to the existing regulation in this matter, in order to protect superior public interests, such as road safety, environmental protection, public health, fluidity in vehicular circulation, among others. It is for this reason that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered that the freedom of transit and movement recognized and protected by Constitutional Law “does not protect the means of transport but rather the freedom of every inhabitant of the Republic to move freely from one place to another within the national territory” (judgment number 2002-09506 of fifteen hours thirty-two minutes on October first, two thousand two—underlining is not from the original). On the other hand, it is worth noting that, contrary to what the plaintiff asserts, Decreto Ejecutivo 35739-MOPT was indeed based on technical criteria for reestablishing the vehicular restriction via the License Plate/Hour Scheme (Esquema Hora/Placa) in San José’s city center (Centro de San José), as is evident from considerando 18 of the challenged Decreto Ejecutivo, which stated: "... 18.—That, in this sense, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), through the General Directorate of Traffic Engineering (Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito), has undertaken the required technical studies regarding the vehicular situation in the City of San José, taking into account the effects generated during the prior vehicular restriction and the chaotic situation in vehicular traffic generated after its disapplication, through the technical report entitled “Assessment of the Impact Produced by Eliminating the Vehicular Restriction by License Plate Number in San José” (official communication No. DGIT-0626-2009 of July 9, 2009), carried out in real time and with real data in a study area that included the following road corridors (...) said technical report concluding, regarding what is relevant, the following: “1. After eliminating the restriction on vehicle circulation according to license plate number, travel time in the analyzed corridors increased by 16%. Calle 0 and Avenida 8 were the most affected corridors with approximately a 35% increase in travel times. 2. The increase in time equates to an annual amount of nearly five hundred thousand dollars (the cost of time is calculated using the base salary of a Generalist Clerk of the Civil Service, for which the delay time is converted to hours and multiplied by the hourly wage of the said clerk). 3. Vehicular movement during peak hours decreased, demonstrating greater congestion on the roads. 4. Total vehicular demand increased by up to 19% at specific points.” In general, it was demonstrated that vehicular movement was negative, which is explained by the impossibility of movement that vehicles experienced during those analysis times. Likewise, the average travel times for crossing the central metropolitan area of San José (in which the vehicular restriction measure operated) have been affected by an increase in vehicular influx and circulation; an increase that has been set at a percentage increase in travel times of 16%, which amounts—in effective time—to an average increase of 17.5 minutes. An increase that justifies and leads to the technical recommendation to reimplement the vehicular restriction measure, based on the real situation referenced in this section. Carrying out cyclical monitoring of the operability of the aforementioned measure and its effects...". Finally, specifically regarding the exception cases provided for in Article 6 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 35379-MOPT, to which the rules regulating the vehicular restriction via the License Plate/Hour Scheme in San José’s city center do not apply, it should be noted that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the provision of public services, by both public law and private law entities, is characterized by their continuity, efficiency, and adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equal treatment of recipients, users, or beneficiaries. By virtue of the foregoing, and in order to ensure the continuity and efficiency in the provision of public services of paid passenger transport (transporte renumerado de personas) in its various modalities—including those regulated by Law 3503—the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo), in Article 6 of the challenged Decreto Ejecutivo, excluded the following cases from the vehicular restriction: "...police vehicles, vehicles intended for traffic control, ambulances, vehicles belonging to the fire department, public service taxi vehicles according to Law No. 7969, vehicles of regular public transport services (bus, buseta, microbús) or special services (worker transport, tourism, or student transport authorized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport) within the paid passenger transport regulated by Law No. 3503 that have public service license plates...". At this point, it is necessary to emphasize that even though Article 6 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 35379-MOPT provides for the possibility that "...The Vice-Minister’s Office, attending to reasons of public interest and based on the principles of discretion (discrecionalidad), reasonableness (razonabilidad), proportionality (proporcionabilidad), rationality (racionabilidad), and necessity, via administrative resolution, shall determine the granting of an exception to the restriction for vehicular circulation in other cases it deems pertinent, upon prior submission of the application..."; it is also true that this is not applicable to the specific case, because the plaintiff company develops the activity of special paid transport of persons—specifically students—in motor vehicles, microbús modality, on a stable basis, which is classified as a public service in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; subsection f) of Article 5 of Law 7593; 1 through 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 15203, and requires, for its legitimate exploitation, the granting of a permit by the Public Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte Público). For all the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that Article 6 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 35379-MOPT is not substantially contrary to the legal system, specifically to the provisions of Articles 4, 16, and 136 of the General Law of Public Administration; 38 bis of the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres); 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; subsection f) of Article 5 of Law 7593; 1 through 4 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 15203; therefore, the subsidiary claim seeking a declaration of absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) thereof is without merit.” "IV.- REGARDING THE SUPERVENING DEROGATION (DEROGATORIA SOBREVENIDA) OF DECRETO EJECUTIVO # 35379-MOPT AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS. The State’s representative raises the defense of lack of present interest (falta de interés actual), given that Decreto Ejecutivo number 35379-MOPT, the object of challenge in this proceeding, was derogated as of May second, two thousand eleven, by Decreto Ejecutivo number 36547-MOPT, for which reason he considers that the proceeding lacks interest, as it concerns a norm that is no longer in force, especially since the plaintiff did not adjust its claim to challenge the provisions of Decreto Ejecutivo number 36547-MOPT. In this sense, this Tribunal considers that while it is true the plaintiff did not adjust its claims during the preliminary hearing held at fourteen hours seven minutes on March ninth, two thousand twelve, and consequently maintained –among others– the claims seeking the inclusion of private student transporters within the exception cases to the vehicular restriction provided for in Article 6 of Decreto Ejecutivo 35379-MOPT, and subsidiarily, the partial annulment of said norm (see folios 93 to 95 of the judicial file and digital recording of the preliminary hearing), despite the fact that Decreto Ejecutivo number 35379-MOPT had been derogated since May second, two thousand eleven, upon entry into force of Decreto Ejecutivo number 36547-MOPT, published in Supplement (Alcance) 26 of the Official Gazette (Diario Oficial) La Gaceta number 82 of April 29, two thousand eleven (see the digital version of Decreto Ejecutivo number 36547-MOPT at the website: www.pgr.go.cr/scij); it is also true that the lawsuit was filed on August thirty-first, two thousand nine (folio 1 of the judicial file), that is, one month and eleven days after Decreto Ejecutivo 35379-MOPT was published and entered into force, namely: July 20, 2009 (see the digital version of Decreto Ejecutivo number 35379-MOPT at the website: www.pgr.go.cr/scij). However, it was not until January twentieth, two thousand twelve, that, by resolution issued at eleven hours zero minutes, the Processing Judge (Juez Tramitador) ordered service of process of the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff company (folios 67 and 68 of the judicial file), at which time Decreto Ejecutivo number 35379-MOPT had already been derogated by Decreto Ejecutivo number 36547-MOPT since May second, two thousand eleven. Now, given that, in accordance with Articles 10(2); 37(1) and (2); 39.1.b of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), it is possible—in principle—to directly challenge a regulatory provision (disposición reglamentaria) within one year following the date of the sole or last publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, by those who claim to hold some legitimate interest (interés legítimo), individual or collective, or some subjective right (derecho subjetivo) regarding that regulatory norm; this Tribunal considers that, in the specific case, the content of the questioned norm must be analyzed, even though it is currently derogated, not only because, as of August 31, 2009, the plaintiff company was within the time limit to directly challenge that regulatory norm, without requiring individual acts of application, but also because it claims to hold a presumed subjective right with respect to what Article 6 of Decreto Ejecutivo 35379-MOPT provided, insofar as it develops the private activity of paid passenger transport—specifically students—in motor vehicles, microbús modality (see folios 37, 63 verso of the judicial file and the conclusions of the plaintiff’s representative at the preliminary hearing, contained in the digital recording), which was not among the exception cases to the rules regulating vehicular restriction via the License Plate/Hour Scheme in San José’s city center, despite the fact that, according to its statement, it constitutes an activity not prohibited by the legal system, which furthermore would contribute to achieving the objectives pursued by the vehicular restriction, such as: reducing road congestion and fuel consumption. In this sense, this Tribunal considers that it must be established whether Article 6 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 35379-MOPT –specifically insofar as it excluded private student transport via microbús from the exception cases to the rules regulating vehicular restriction– was or was not contrary to the legal system, and therefore, to the subjective right the plaintiff company claims to hold, an extreme which, in turn, is determinative for establishing whether or not it should be restored to the enjoyment of the legal situation it alleges was violated, in accordance with subsections a) and d) of Article 122 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code. Furthermore, when the content of the challenged norm is reproduced in numeral 6 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 36547-MOPT, which is currently in force; and the supervening derogation of Decreto Ejecutivo number 35379-MOPT occurred, in part, due to the delay that this Tribunal incurred during the initial processing of this proceeding, despite the fact that the lawsuit was filed one month and eleven days after the entry into force of the challenged norm. Based on these considerations, this Tribunal rejects the defense of lack of present interest raised by the State’s representation and will proceed to analyze the challenged regulations in order to determine the merit or lack thereof of the claims made by the plaintiff." "V.- REGARDING THE LEGAL NATURE (NATURALEZA JURÍDICA) OF SPECIAL PAID TRANSPORT OF PERSONS—SPECIFICALLY STUDENTS—IN MOTOR VEHICLES, MICROBÚS MODALITY. The plaintiff alleges that the private transport activity for students it undertakes in the microbús modality does not constitute an activity prohibited by the legal system, and therefore, in accordance with Article 28 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), it lies outside the purview of the law, such that they do not require a permit from the Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte) to carry it out. In this sense, we must begin from the fact that it is considered proven that the plaintiff company named Transportes Privados Caritas Felices CR, S.A., develops the activity of special paid transport of persons—specifically students—in motor vehicles, microbús modality, on a stable basis (see folios 37, 63 verso of the judicial file and the conclusions of the plaintiff’s representative at the preliminary hearing, contained in the digital recording). By reason of the foregoing, and contrary to what the plaintiff company’s representative maintains, the legitimate exercise of its activity is not only regulated in Articles 1, 3, and 25 of the Regulatory Law for Paid Transport of Persons by Motor Vehicles (Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas por Vehículos Automotores, Law 3503); subsection f) of Article 5 of the Regulatory Law for Public Services (Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, Law 7593); 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Regulation for the Exploitation of Special Services of Paid Automotive Transport of Persons (Reglamento para la Explotación e Servicios Especiales de Transporte Automotor Remunerado de Personas, Decreto Ejecutivo number 15203); but it is also conditioned upon compliance with the requirements set forth for this purpose in said regulations. The foregoing assertion is supported by the fact that, as has been demonstrated, the activity carried out by the plaintiff company does not consist of the simple, free, private transport of students to educational centers, which—for example—parents or guardians of said students perform daily; but rather, on the contrary, it is a paid activity (actividad remunerada), which implies the exploitation of a special service for transporting persons (students, workers, or tourism), through collective transport vehicles, in their modalities of autobús, buseta, or microbús, which is provided occasionally—for a single service—or on a stable basis (for several services) and which is characterized by not having a fixed itinerary and which are contracted by time, by trip, or by both forms. Said activity has been classified by the legislator, since May 20, 1965—the date of entry into force of Law 3503—, as "...a public service regulated, controlled, and monitored by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport..." (Article 1), delegated to private parties and for whose exploitation the granting of a permit from the Public Transport Council is required (Articles 3 and 25 of Law 3503). So much so, that through Decreto Ejecutivo number 15203 (Regulation for the Exploitation of Special Services of Paid Automotive Transport of Persons), which entered into force on February 22, nineteen eighty-four, the Executive Branch developed the terms of the provisions in numerals 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503, in the sense that: "...Article 1.— This Regulation is issued to regulate the exploitation of special services of paid transport of persons, in collective vehicles within the national territory referred to by Law No. 3503 of May 10, 1965, in its Articles 3 and 25 and any other that may substitute it in the future. // Article 2.— Special services are those provided within the exploitation of paid automotive transport, with collective transport vehicles, without having a fixed itinerary and which are contracted by trip, by time, or in both forms. // Article 3.— For the purposes of this Regulation, special services are classified as occasional and stable: a) Occasional: occasional special services are those provided for a single service within the national territory. b) Stable: stable special services are those provided for several services, such as excursions of any kind, within the national territory. Likewise, student transport (at any educational level), to and/or from educational centers shall also be considered stable; as well as transport of laborers, agricultural workers, and workers in general. For the provision of such services, the transporter must sign a contract with the educational institutions or companies, as applicable, whose stipulations may not be agreed upon in contravention of this Regulation. // Article 4.— For the exploitation of special services, a permit authorized by the Public Transport Council will be required*.

Said permit may cover one or several vehicles, according to the needs of the transport and, in any case, following a study and recommendation of the Department of Concession and Permit Administration* of the Public Transport Council*..." (the underline is not from the original). In this regard, it should be highlighted that the classification as a public service, given to the activity of paid transport of persons in collective motor vehicles —specifically in this case, stable or occasional special services for students, workers, or tourism—, also finds support in Law 7593 —which entered into force on September five, one thousand nine hundred ninety-six— in whose article 5 it is established: "... In the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority (Autoridad Reguladora) shall set prices and rates; furthermore, it shall ensure compliance with the norms of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, according to article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are: (...) f) Any means of public paid transport of persons, except air..." Finally, in the 2nd paragraph of subsection l) of article 1 of the Regulatory Law of the Public Service of Paid Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Taxi Mode (Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi) (Law 7969), added by article 3 of Law 8955, it is reaffirmed that "...The permits for the paid transport of persons by minibuses (microbuses), midibuses (busetas), and buses, shall be governed by the provisions of Law No. 3503, Regulatory Law of Paid Transport of Persons in Motor Vehicles (Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores), of May 10, 1965, and its amendments, or any other that replaces it in the future.” Consequently, the paid transport of students by collective motor vehicles —minibus (microbús) mode— is a stable special public service, whose provision by a private law subject requires a permit granted by the Public Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte Público), a deconcentrated body that is also responsible for supervising its provision, not only by virtue of the provisions of numerals 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503, but also, based on the best interests of the minor (Principle II of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child; articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia)). This is because the State and society in general are obliged to provide minors with special care and attention, in order to achieve their adequate physical, intellectual, and emotional development, which implies the adoption of special provisions tending to ensure the protection of the rights and interests of the minor, their access to public services, and the adoption of special measures to safeguard their life, health, and safety, in this case, of a road nature. Finally, it is necessary to highlight that this has been the criterion maintained by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), which has considered: "...Just as the Executive Director of the Public Transport Council of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) points out, the public transport service, called “especiales” (special services), is conceptualized as a “public service”. The constituent does not list all services of a public nature, leaving to the ordinary legislator the competence to establish which services must be defined in that way, attending, of course, to the political model imposed by the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), which is that of a social democratic rule-of-law regime. Article 3 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) defines public service as: “…that which, due to its importance for the sustainable development of the country, is classified as such by the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), in order to subject it to the regulations of this law.” For its part, article 12 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de Administración Pública) refers in its first paragraph that a public service shall be considered authorized when the subject and the purpose of the same have been indicated. Already specifically, the Regulatory Law of Paid Transport of Persons in Motor Vehicles, number 3503 of May 10, one thousand nine hundred sixty-five and its amendments, refers: “Article 1.- The paid transport of persons in collective motor vehicles, except taxi service automobiles regulated in another law, which is carried out on streets, highways, and roads within the national territory, is a public service (the highlighting is not from the original) regulated, controlled, and supervised by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The provision is delegated to individuals whom it expressly authorizes, in accordance with the norms established herein.” Starting from that category that the legislator attributes to the paid transport of persons in collective motor vehicles, it must be inferred that the “especiales” (special) service, in its modalities for workers, students, and tourists, is a public service and therefore, to be provided by individuals, an authorization must be held, be it called a permit or concession, as appropriate..." (judgment number 2005-00846 at eleven hours and twenty-five minutes of January twenty-eight, two thousand five, and in a similar sense, judgment number 2005-2236 at fourteen hours and forty-eight minutes of March two, two thousand five). By reason of all the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that since the entry into force on May 20, 1965, of the Regulatory Law of Paid Transport of Persons by Motor Vehicles (Law 3503), the activity of paid transport of students by collective motor vehicles —minibus (microbús) mode— is classified by the legislator as a stable special public service, whose provision by a private law subject requires a permit granted by the Public Transport Council, which was subsequently ratified by the provisions of subsection f) of article 5 of the Regulatory Law of Public Services (Law 7593).

**VI.- REGARDING THE PRESUMED DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF.** In the first instance, it should be clarified that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, when resolving through judgment number 2009-10251 at eleven hours and twenty-seven minutes of June twenty-six, two thousand nine, the amparo remedy number 09-007129-0007-CO filed by the plaintiff, in which it raised allegations similar to those that constitute the object of this process, considered: "...In this case the appellant claims that despite what was considered by this Tribunal in judgment 2004-08880 at 15:49 of August 18, 2008, in the sense that to provide a student transport service an authorization from the Public Transport Council is not required, the traffic officers do not exempt his company's units from the vehicular restriction, which seriously affects him as the respective traffic tickets are applied. In this regard, the Chamber considers that it is not the responsibility of this Tribunal to indicate whether the activity developed by the appellant is authorized or not, since the issue constitutes a matter foreign to being discussed in this jurisdiction as it deals with an aspect of mere legality which must be aired in the corresponding administrative channels if that were the case..." (-the underline is not from the original- see digital file of the judgment, on the website: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/scij). Said decision is based on the provisions of article 13 in fine of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), according to which, the jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, except for itself. By reason of the foregoing, this Jurisdiction is empowered —in accordance with the provisions of articles 49 of the Political Constitution, 1 and 2 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo)—, to establish whether the activity developed by the plaintiff company of special paid transport of persons —specifically students— in motor vehicles, minibus (microbús) mode, on a stable basis, requires or not for its legitimate exploitation a permit from the Public Transport Council, and based on the above, whether the provision in numeral 6 of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT is discriminatory to its detriment or not. Based on the above, and contrary to what the plaintiff company affirms, this Tribunal considers that the exceptions provided for in article 6 of the challenged Executive Decree, regarding the non-application of the norms that regulate the vehicular restriction, specifically to "...the vehicles of the regular public transport services (autobús, buseta, microbús) or special (transport of workers, tourism, or transport of students authorized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport) in the paid transport of persons regulated by Law No. 3503 that have a public service plate...", are not discriminatory, since in this specific case, there is no valid parameter of equality between the activity carried out by the plaintiff company and that regulated by Laws 3503, 7593, and the provisions of Executive Decree number 15203. In that sense, it is worth noting that the plaintiff is not dedicated to the free and private transfer of students to educational centers, an activity that, for example, some parents or those in charge of said students carry out daily. On the contrary, the plaintiff —as its own legal representative acknowledges— develops a paid activity, which implies the exploitation of a special transport service for persons (students, workers, or tourism), by means of collective transport vehicles, in their bus (autobús), midibus (buseta), or minibus (microbús) modes, which it provides occasionally —for a single service— or on a stable basis (for several services) and which is characterized by not having a fixed itinerary and which are contracted by time, by trip, or by both forms. Said activity is regulated by articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; 5 subsection f) of Law 7593; 1 to 4 of Executive Decree number 15203, which classify it as a stable special public service, whose provision by a private law subject requires a permit granted by the Public Transport Council, a deconcentrated body that is also responsible for supervising its provision, not only by virtue of the provisions of numerals 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503, but also, based on the best interests of the minor (Principle II of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child; articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code). This is because, since the entry into force on May 20, 1965, of the Regulatory Law of Paid Transport of Persons by Motor Vehicles (Law 3503), the activity of paid transport of students by collective motor vehicles —minibus (microbús) mode— is classified by the legislator as a special public service, whose provision by a private law subject —it must be insisted— requires a permit granted by the Public Transport Council, which was subsequently ratified by the provisions of subsection f) of article 5 of the Regulatory Law of Public Services (Law 7593). In that respect, the plaintiff company cannot validly claim that it is in the same condition as the factual presupposition contained in the challenged norm and that therefore, it has the right to be included in the exception scenarios related to the non-application of the vehicular restriction, not only because the activity it develops constitutes a public service that transcended the private sphere since the entry into force of Law 3503, given the need to guarantee its efficiency, continuity, adaptability, and equality of treatment of users; but also, because in application of the principle of the best interests of the minor, the State, through the Public Transport Council, must supervise the provision of the special service of paid transport of students by means of collective motor vehicles, minibus (microbús) mode. To maintain the contrary, would rather imply provoking an inequality in the opposite direction, which would be substantially contrary to the legal system due to singular disapplication of the provisions of articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; 5 subsection f) of Law 7593; 1 to 4 of Executive Decree number 15203, since in essence it would imply authorizing the protected company to circulate without the restrictions provided for such purpose in articles 38 bis of the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) and Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT, in contravention of the provisions of the norms that govern the exploitation of the activity of special paid transport of persons —specifically students— in motor vehicles, minibus (microbús) mode, on a stable basis; even more so when it has not been accredited that the motor vehicles in minibus (microbús) mode used by the plaintiff company to develop the activity of special paid transport of persons —specifically students—, meet the requirements set forth in articles 1, 3, 25 of Law number 3503; 6 of the Executive Decrees number 35379-MOPT and 36547-MOPT, namely: the permit issued by the Public Transport Council and the public service plate (see point a of recital II of this judgment). By reason of the foregoing, even though article 6 of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT foresees the possibility that "...The Vice-Ministerial Office, attending to reasons of public interest and based on the principles of discretion, reasonableness, proportionality, rationality, and necessity, via administrative resolution, shall determine the granting of the exception to the restriction for vehicular circulation in those other cases it deems pertinent, upon prior presentation of the request..."; the truth is that this is not applicable to the specific case, because the plaintiff company develops the activity of special paid transport of persons —specifically students— in motor vehicles, minibus (microbús) mode, on a stable basis, which is cataloged as a public service in accordance with the provisions of Laws 3503; 7593; and Executive Decree number 15203, and requires for its legitimate exploitation by a private law subject, the granting of a permit by the Public Transport Council. In summary, the existence of equality in illegality cannot be validly alleged. For all the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that the exceptions provided for in article 6 of the challenged Executive Decree, regarding the non-application of the norms that regulate the vehicular restriction, specifically to "...the vehicles of the regular public transport services (autobús, buseta, microbús) or special (transport of workers, tourism, or transport of students authorized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport) in the paid transport of persons regulated by Law No. 3503 that have a public service plate...", are not discriminatory; and consequently, that the main claim tending to include the protected company in the exceptions provided for in article 6 of Executive Decree 35379-MOPT, regarding the non-application of the norms that regulate the vehicular restriction, is improper, since it is substantially contrary to the provisions of articles 11 and 33 of the Political Constitution; 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration; 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; 5 subsection f) of Law 7593; 1 to 4 of Executive Decree number 15203.

**VII.- REGARDING THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON VEHICULAR CIRCULATION AND THEIR NON-APPLICATION TO PUBLIC PAID TRANSPORT MEANS FOR PERSONS.** It should be indicated that, in accordance with the provisions of article 38 bis of the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes, the Executive Branch may carry out restrictions on vehicular circulation, for duly substantiated reasons of opportunity, convenience, public, regional, or national interest. In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, when declaring without merit the unconstitutionality action number 09-14039-0007-CO, filed against Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT challenged herein, considered that: "...In the first place, Decree number 35379-MOPT has specific support in article 38 bis of the Law of Transit, so it meets the formal conditions of the principle of statutory reserve. In this sense, said Decree develops the legislative authorization to decree restrictions on vehicular circulation, so that in terms of substance, it also adheres to the material scope established in the legal norm. On the other hand, both regarding the freedom of movement and regarding the freedom of commerce, the provisions contained in the challenged Decree do not present any characteristic that makes this Tribunal understand that they are an excessive and disproportionate exercise of state competences, given that –as indicated– the restriction operates so that circulation is only limited one day between Monday and Friday, within a limited zone and within a determined time slot.- To this is added that the measure contained in the Decree has a temporary nature and will be reviewed as soon as March of two thousand ten, and it should also be taken into account that for the authorities the obligation is established to provide updated information through studies that serve to validate or correct the scope of such limitations, from all of which it can be concluded that the restrictions have the character of reasonable and proportionate to the needs they seek to satisfy..." (judgment number 2010-06283 at fourteen hours and thirty minutes of April seven of two thousand ten -the underline is not from the original-).

Now, it is necessary to clarify that the legitimate exercise of this power derives from the fact that <b>public roads are public domain assets over which the State exercises a particularly detailed regulation, such that persons who must travel on them are subject to a special regime of subjection that obliges them to submit to the existing regulation in this matter</b>, <b>in order to protect higher-ranking public interests,</b> such as road safety, environmental protection, public health, fluidity of vehicular circulation, among others. It is for this reason that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered that <u>the freedom of transit and movement recognized and protected by the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución) Law <i>"does not protect the means of transport but rather the freedom of every inhabitant of the Republic (República) to move freely from one side of the national territory to the other"</i></u> (judgment number 2002-09506 of fifteen hours thirty-two minutes of October first, two thousand two - the underlining is not from the original). On the other hand, it should be noted that contrary to what the plaintiff claims, <b>Executive Decree 35739-MOPT was indeed based on technical criteria to re-establish the driving restriction (restricción vehicular) through the License Plate/Hour Scheme (Esquema Hora/Placa) in Downtown San José (Centro de San José)</b>, as is evident from recital (considerando) 18 of the challenged Executive Decree, which stated: </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>&quot;...18.—That, in that sense, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), through the General Directorate of Traffic Engineering (Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito), <u>has undertaken to carry out the rigorous technical studies regarding the vehicular situation in the City of San José, taking into account the effects generated during the previous driving restriction and the chaotic situation in vehicular traffic generated after its disapplication, through the technical report called “Evaluation of the Impact Produced by Eliminating the Driving Restriction by License Plate Number in San José” (Evaluación del Impacto Producido por Eliminar la Restricción Vehicular por Número de Placa en San José) (official communication No. DGIT-0626-2009 of July 9, 2009),</u></span></i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'> <i>carried out in real time and with real data in a study area that included the following road corridors (...) the said technical report concluding, in relevant part, the following:</i></span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>“1. After eliminating the restriction of vehicle circulation according to the license plate number, <u>the travel time on the analyzed corridors increased by 16%. Calle 0 and Avenida 8 were the most affected corridors with nearly a 35% increase in travel times,</u></span></i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'> <i>2. The increase in time equates to an annual amount of nearly five hundred thousand dollars (the cost of time is calculated using the base salary of a Generalist Clerk of the Civil Service, for which the delay time is converted to hours and multiplied by the hourly salary of the said clerk), 3. Vehicular movement per peak hour decreased, demonstrating greater congestion on the roads. 4. The total vehicular demand increased by up to 19% at specific points”. In general, it was demonstrated that the vehicular movement was negative, which is explained by the impossibility of movement presented by the vehicles during those analysis times. Likewise, the average travel times for crossing the central metropolitan area of San José (in which the driving restriction measure operated) have been affected by an increase in vehicular influx and circulation; <u>an increase that has been set at a percentage increase in travel times of 16%, which amounts –in effective time– to an average increase of 17.5 minutes. An increase that justifies and leads to the technical recommendation to re-implement the driving restriction measure, based on the reality situation referred to in this section</u>. Carrying out a cyclical control over the operability of the aforementioned measure and its effects...&quot;.</i></span><i><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span></i><span lang=EN style='color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Finally, specifically regarding the <b>exemption cases (supuestos de excepción) provided for in Article 6 of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT,</b> to which the rules regulating the driving restriction </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'>through the License Plate/Hour Scheme in Downtown San José do not apply,<span style='color:#010101'> it should be noted that in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the provision of public services, both by public and private law entities, is characterized by its continuity, efficiency, and adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equal treatment of the recipients, users, or beneficiaries. By virtue of the foregoing, and in order to ensure the <b>continuity and efficiency in the provision of public services of remunerated passenger transport in its different modalities - including those regulated by Law 3503 -, it is that the Executive Branch, in Article 6 of the challenged Executive Decree, excluded</b> the following cases from the driving restriction: </span></span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>&quot;...police vehicles, vehicles destined for traffic control, </span></i><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>a</span></i><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>mbulances, vehicles belonging to the fire department, public service vehicles taxis according to Law N° 7969, vehicles of regular public transport services (bus, buseta, microbús) or special services (transportation of workers, tourism, or student transportation authorized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport) in the remunerated passenger transport regulated by Law Nº 3503 that have public service license plates...&quot; . </span></i><span lang=EN style='color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>At this point, it is necessary to highlight that even though Article 6 of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT provides for the possibility that </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>&quot;...The Vice-Ministerial Office, attending to reasons of public interest and based on the principles of discretion, reasonableness, proportionality, rationality, and necessity, via administrative resolution, <u>will determine the granting of the exception to the restriction for vehicular circulation in those other cases it deems pertinent, upon prior submission of the request.</u></span></i><span lang=EN style='color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>..&quot;; it is also true that this is not applicable to the specific case, since the plaintiff company develops the activity of special remunerated passenger transport –specifically of students– in motor vehicles, microbús modality, on a stable basis, which is classified as a public service in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; 5 subsection f) of Law 7593; 1 to 4 of Executive Decree number 15203, and requires for its legitimate operation the granting of a permit by the Public Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte Público). <u>For all the foregoing, this Court considers that Article 6 of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT is not substantially contrary to the legal system, specifically to the provisions of Articles 4, 16, and 136 of the General Law of Public Administration; 38 bis of the Traffic on Public Land Roads Law (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres); 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; 5 subsection f) of Law 7593; 1 to 4 of Executive Decree number 15203, therefore, the subsidiary claim seeking a declaration of absolute nullity of the same is inadmissible</u>.”</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><span lang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> </div> </body> </html> Now, given that pursuant to the provisions of Articles 10, subsection 2; 37, subsections 1 and 2; 39.1.b of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code, it is possible to directly challenge – in principle – a regulatory provision, within one year following the day of its sole or last publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, by those who claim to hold, with respect to that regulatory norm, some legitimate interest, individual or collective, or some subjective right; this Tribunal considers that in this specific case, the content of the challenged norm must be analyzed, even though it is currently repealed, not only because as of August 31, 2009, the plaintiff company was within the time limit to directly challenge that regulatory norm, without requiring individual application acts, but also because it claims to hold, regarding what Article 6 of Executive Decree 35379-MOPT provided, an alleged subjective right, insofar as it carries out the private activity of remunerated transport of persons – specifically students – in automotive vehicles, microbus modality (see folios 37, 63 verso of the judicial file and conclusions of the representative of the plaintiff party in the preliminary hearing, which are recorded on digital backup), which was not included in the exception scenarios of the norms regulating the vehicular restriction by means of the License Plate Restriction Scheme (Esquema Hora/Placa) in the Center of San José, despite its assertion that it constitutes an activity not prohibited by the legal system, which, furthermore, would contribute to achieving the objectives pursued by the vehicular restriction, such as: reducing traffic congestion and fuel consumption. In this regard, this Tribunal deems that it must be established whether Article 6 of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT – specifically insofar as it excluded private student transport by microbus from the exception scenarios of the norms regulating the vehicular restriction – was or was not contrary to the legal system, and therefore, to the subjective right that the plaintiff company claims to hold, a point which, in turn, is decisive for establishing whether or not it should be restored to the enjoyment of the legal situation it alleges was violated, in accordance with the provisions of subsections a) and d) of Article 122 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code. Furthermore, when the content of the challenged norm is reproduced in numeral 6 of Executive Decree number 36547-MOPT, which is currently in force; and that the supervening repeal of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT occurred, in part, due to the delay that this Tribunal incurred in the initial processing of this proceeding, despite the lawsuit having been filed one month and eleven days after the entry into force of the challenged norm. Based on these considerations, this Tribunal rejects the exception of lack of current interest, filed by the representation of the State and will proceed to analyze the challenged regulations, in order to determine the appropriateness or not of the claims raised by the plaintiff party.

VI.- REGARDING THE LEGAL NATURE OF SPECIAL REMUNERATED TRANSPORT OF PERSONS – SPECIFICALLY STUDENTS – IN AUTOMOTIVE VEHICLES, MICROBUS MODALITY. The plaintiff party alleges that the private student transport activity it carries out in the microbus modality does not constitute an activity prohibited by the legal system, and therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 of the Political Constitution, it is outside the scope of the law, and thus, they do not require a permit from the Transport Council to carry it out. In that sense, we must start from the fact that it is accredited that the plaintiff company named Transportes Privados Caritas Felices CR, S.A., stably carries out the activity of special remunerated transport of persons – specifically students – in automotive vehicles, microbus modality (see folios 37, 63 verso of the judicial file and conclusions of the representative of the plaintiff party in the preliminary hearing, which are recorded on digital backup). By reason of the foregoing and contrary to what the representative of the plaintiff company maintains, the legitimate exercise of its activity is not only regulated in Articles 1, 3, and 25 of the Regulatory Law for the Remunerated Transport of Persons by Automotive Vehicles (Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas por Vehículos Automotores, Law 3503); 5, subsection f of the Regulatory Law for Public Services (Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, Law 7593); 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Regulation for the Operation of Special Services of Remunerated Automotive Transport of Persons (Reglamento para la Explotación de Servicios Especiales de Transporte Automotor Remunerado de Personas, Executive Decree number 15203); but it is also conditioned upon compliance with the requirements provided for that purpose in said regulations. The foregoing statement finds support in the fact that, as has been proven, the activity carried out by the petitioner company does not consist of the simple, free, and private transfer of students to educational centers, which – for example – is carried out daily by the parents or guardians of such students; but on the contrary, it is a remunerated activity, which implies the operation of a special service of transport of persons (students, workers, or tourism), by means of collective transport vehicles, in their modalities of autobus, buseta, or microbus, which is provided occasionally – for a single service – or stably (for several services) and which is characterized by not having a fixed itinerary and which are contracted by time, by trip, or by both forms. Said activity has been categorized by the legislator, since May 20, 1965 – the date of entry into force of Law 3503 –, as "...a regulated public service, controlled and monitored by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport..." (Article 1), delegated to private parties and for whose operation the granting of a permit from the Public Transport Council is required (Articles 3 and 25 of Law 3503). So much so, that by means of Executive Decree number 15203 (Regulation for the Operation of Special Services of Remunerated Automotive Transport of Persons), which entered into force on February 22, nineteen eighty-four, the Executive Branch developed the terms of the provisions in numerals 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503, in the sense that: "...Article 1.—This Regulation is issued to regulate the operation of special services of remunerated transport of persons, in collective vehicles within the national territory referred to in law No. 3503 of May 10, 1965, in its articles 3 and 25 and any other that may replace it in the future. // Article 2.—Special services are those provided within the operation of remunerated automotive transport, with collective transport vehicles, without having a fixed itinerary and which are contracted by trip, by time, or in both forms. // Article 3.—For the purposes of this Regulation, special services are classified as occasional and stable: a) Occasional: occasional special services are those provided for a single service within the national territory. b) Stable: stable special services are those provided for several services, such as excursions of any kind, within the national territory. Likewise, this includes the transport of students (at any educational level), to and/or from educational centers; as well as that of workers, agricultural laborers, and workers in general. For the provision of such services, the transporter must sign a contract with the educational institutions or companies, as the case may be, whose stipulations may not be agreed upon in contravention of this Regulation. // Article 4.—For the operation of special services, a permit authorized by the Public Transport Council will be required*. Said permit may cover one or several vehicles, according to the transport needs and, in any case, after a prior study and recommendation of the Department of Administration of Concessions* and Permits of the Public Transport Council*..." (the underlining is not original). At this point, it is worth highlighting that the classification as a public service, given to the activity of remunerated transport of persons in collective automotive vehicles – specifically in this case, stable or occasional special services for students, workers, or tourism –, also finds support in Law 7593 – which entered into force on September 5, 1996 – in whose Article 5 it is established: "... In the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority will set prices and rates; furthermore, it will ensure compliance with the norms of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, according to Article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are: (...) f) Any means of public remunerated transport of persons, except air..." . Finally, in the 2nd paragraph of subsection l) of Article 1 of the Regulatory Law for the Public Service of Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles in the Modality of Taxi (Law 7969), added by Article 3 of Law 8955, it is reaffirmed that "...The permits for the remunerated transport of persons by microbuses, busetas, and autobuses, shall be governed by the provisions of Law No. 3503 , Regulatory Law for the Remunerated Transport of Persons in Automotive Vehicles, of May 10, 1965, and its reforms, or any other that may replace it in the future.” In consequence, the remunerated transport of students by collective automotive vehicles – microbus modality – is a stable special public service, whose provision by a private legal entity requires a permit issued by the Public Transport Council, a deconcentrated body which is also responsible for supervising its provision, not only by virtue of the provisions in numerals 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503, but also, based on the best interests of the child (Principle II of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child; Articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and 5 of the Code of Childhood and Adolescence). This is because the State and society in general are obligated to provide children with special care and attention, in order to achieve their adequate physical, intellectual, and emotional development, which implies the adoption of special provisions tending to ensure the protection of the rights and interests of the child, their access to public services, and the adoption of special measures to safeguard their life, health, and safety, in this case, of a road-related nature. Finally, it is necessary to highlight that this has been the criterion sustained by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which has considered: "...As indicated by the Executive Director of the Public Transport Council of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the public transport service, called 'speciales', is conceptualized as a 'public service' . The constituent does not list all services of a public nature, leaving the ordinary legislator the competence to establish which services should be defined that way, attending, of course, to the political model imposed by the Political Constitution, which is that of a social democratic rule of law. Article 3 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services defines public service as: …that which due to its importance for the sustainable development of the country is qualified as such by the Legislative Assembly, with the aim of subjecting it to the regulations of this law.” For its part, Article 12 of the General Law of Public Administration refers in its first paragraph that a public service will be considered authorized when the subject and the purpose thereof have been indicated. Specifically, the Regulatory Law for Remunerated Transport of Persons in Automotive Vehicles, number 3503 of May 10, nineteen sixty-five and its reforms, states: “Article 1.- The remunerated transport of persons in collective automotive vehicles , except automobiles in the taxi service regulated in another law, which is carried out on streets, highways, and roads within the national territory, is a public service (the highlighting is not original) regulated, controlled, and monitored by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. The provision is delegated to private parties whom it expressly authorizes, in accordance with the norms established herein.” From that category attributed by the legislator to the remunerated transport of persons in collective automotive vehicles, it must be inferred that the 'speciales' service, in its modalities of workers, students, and tourists, is a public service and therefore, to be provided by private parties, an authorization must be held, be it called a permit or concession, as applicable..." (judgment number 2005-00846 of eleven hours twenty-five minutes of January 28, two thousand five, and in a similar sense, judgment number 2005-2236 of fourteen hours forty-eight minutes of March 2, two thousand five). By reason of everything stated, this Tribunal considers that since the entry into force on May 20, 1965, of the Regulatory Law for the Remunerated Transport of Persons by Automotive Vehicles (Law 3503), the activity of remunerated transport of students by collective automotive vehicles – microbus modality – is qualified by the legislator as a stable special public service, whose provision by a private legal entity requires a permit issued by the Public Transport Council, which was subsequently ratified by the provisions of subsection f) of Article 5 of the Regulatory Law for Public Services (Law 7593).

VI.- REGARDING THE PRESUMED DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF PARTY. In the first instance, it should be clarified that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, when resolving through judgment number 2009-10251 of eleven hours twenty-seven minutes of June 26, two thousand nine, the amparo appeal number 09-007129-0007-CO filed by the plaintiff party, in which it raised arguments similar to those that constitute the object of this proceeding, considered: "...In this case the appellant claims that despite what was considered by this Tribunal in judgment 2004-08880 of 15:49 of August 18, 2008, in the sense that an authorization from the Public Transport Council is not required to provide a student transport service, the traffic officers do not exempt his company's units from the vehicular restriction, which seriously affects him as the respective traffic tickets are applied. In this regard, the Chamber considers that it is not the responsibility of this Tribunal to indicate whether the activity carried out by the appellant is authorized or not, since the issue constitutes a matter unrelated to being discussed in this jurisdiction as it involves an aspect of mere legality which must be aired in the corresponding administrative channels, if applicable..." (-the underlining is not original- see digital archive of the judgment, on the website: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/scij). Said decision is based on the provisions of Article 13 in fine of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, according to which the jurisprudence and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction are binding erga omnes, except for itself. By reason of the foregoing, this Jurisdiction is empowered – in accordance with the provisions of Articles 49 of the Political Constitution, 1 and 2 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code – to establish whether the activity carried out by the petitioner company of stable special remunerated transport of persons – specifically students – in automotive vehicles, microbus modality, does or does not require a permit from the Public Transport Council for its legitimate operation, and based on the above, whether the provisions of numeral 6 of Executive Decree number 35379-MOPT are or are not discriminatory to its detriment. Based on the above, and contrary to what the plaintiff company asserts, this Tribunal considers that the exceptions provided for in Article 6 of the challenged Executive Decree, regarding the non-application of the norms regulating the vehicular restriction, specifically to "...the vehicles of regular public transport services (autobus, buseta, microbus) or special ones (transport of workers, tourism, or transport of students authorized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport) in the remunerated transport of persons regulated by Law No. 3503 that have a public service plate...", are not discriminatory, given that in the specific case, there is no valid parameter of equality between the activity carried out by the plaintiff company and that which is regulated by Laws 3503, 7593, and Executive Decree number 15203. In that sense, it should be noted that the plaintiff is not dedicated to the free and private transfer of students to educational centers, an activity that, for example, is carried out daily by some parents or the guardians of such students. On the contrary, the petitioner – just as its own legal representative acknowledges – carries out a remunerated activity, which implies the operation of a special service of transport of persons (students, workers, or tourism), by means of collective transport vehicles, in their modalities of autobus, buseta, or microbus, which it provides occasionally – for a single service – or stably (for several services) and which is characterized by not having a fixed itinerary and which are contracted by time, by trip, or by both forms.

That activity is regulated by Articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; Article 5(f) of Law 7593; and 1 to 4 of Executive Decree No. 15203, which classify it as a special public service of a stable nature, whose provision by a private-law entity requires a permit granted by the Public Transport Council (Consejo de Transporte Público), a deconcentrated body also responsible for overseeing its provision, not only by virtue of the provisions in Articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503, but also based on the best interests of the child (Principle II of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child; Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 5 of the Childhood and Adolescence Code (Código de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia)). This is because, since the entry into force on May 20, 1965, of the Regulatory Law for the Remunerated Transport of Persons by Motor Vehicles (Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas por Vehículos Automotores, Law 3503), the activity of remunerated transport of students by collective motor vehicles—microbus mode (modalidad microbús)—has been classified by the legislator as a special public service, whose provision by a private-law entity—it is reiterated—requires a permit granted by the Public Transport Council, which was subsequently ratified by the provisions of Article 5(f) of the Regulatory Law for Public Services (Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, Law 7593). In this regard, the plaintiff company cannot validly claim that it is in the same condition as the factual assumption contained in the challenged norm and that therefore, it has the right to be included in the exception scenarios related to the non-application of the vehicular restriction, not only because the activity it carries out constitutes a public service that transcended the private sphere since the entry into force of Law 3503, given the need to guarantee its efficiency, continuity, adaptability, and equal treatment of users; but also because, in application of the principle of the best interests of the child, the State, through the Public Transport Council, must oversee the provision of the special service of remunerated transport of students by collective motor vehicles, microbus mode. To maintain the contrary would imply, rather, creating an inequality in reverse, which would be substantially contrary to the legal system due to the singular non-application of the provisions in Articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; Article 5(f) of Law 7593; and 1 to 4 of Executive Decree No. 15203, as in essence it would imply authorizing the protected company to circulate without the restrictions provided for such purpose in Article 38 bis of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes and Executive Decree No. 35379-MOPT, in contravention of the provisions of the rules governing the exploitation of the activity of special remunerated transport of persons—specifically students—in motor vehicles, microbus mode, on a stable basis; even more so given that it has not been proven that the motor vehicles, microbus mode, used by the plaintiff company to carry out the activity of special remunerated transport of persons—specifically students—meet the requirements set forth in Articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law No. 3503; and Article 6 of Executive Decrees No. 35379-MOPT and 36547-MOPT, namely: the permit issued by the Public Transport Council and the public service license plate (placa de servicio público) (see point a of Considerando II of this judgment). By reason of the foregoing, even though Article 6 of Executive Decree No. 35379-MOPT provides for the possibility that "...The Vice-Ministerial Office, considering reasons of public interest and based on the principles of discretion, reasonableness, proportionality, rationality, and necessity, via administrative resolution, will determine the granting of the exception to the restriction on vehicular circulation in those other cases it deems pertinent, upon prior submission of the request..."; the truth is that this is not applicable to the specific case, because the plaintiff company engages in the activity of special remunerated transport of persons—specifically students—in motor vehicles, microbus mode, on a stable basis, which is categorized as a public service in accordance with the provisions of Laws 3503 and 7593, and Executive Decree No. 15203, and requires for its legitimate exploitation by a private-law entity the granting of a permit by the Public Transport Council. In summary, the existence of equality in illegality cannot be validly alleged. For all the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that the exceptions provided in Article 6 of the challenged Executive Decree, regarding the non-application of the rules regulating the vehicular restriction, specifically to "...vehicles of regular public transport services (autobús, buseta, microbús) or special ones (transport of workers, tourism, or transport of students authorized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport) in the remunerated transport of persons regulated by Law No. 3503 that have a public service license plate...", are not discriminatory; and consequently, the main claim seeking that the protected company be included in the exceptions provided in Article 6 of Executive Decree 35379-MOPT regarding the non-application of the rules regulating the vehicular restriction is inadmissible, since it is substantially contrary to the provisions of Articles 11 and 33 of the Political Constitution; 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública); 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; Article 5(f) of Law 7593; and 1 to 4 of Executive Decree No. 15203.

VII.- REGARDING THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON VEHICULAR CIRCULATION AND THEIR NON-APPLICATION TO MEANS OF REMUNERATED PUBLIC TRANSPORT OF PERSONS. It should be noted that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 38 bis of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes, the Executive Branch may impose restrictions on vehicular circulation for duly substantiated reasons of opportunity, convenience, public interest, regional or national interest. In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, when declaring the unconstitutionality action No. 09-14039-0007-CO unfounded, filed against Executive Decree No. 35379-MOPT which is questioned here, held that: "...First, decree No. 35379-MOPT has specific support in Article 38 bis of the Transit Law, such that it meets the formal conditions of the principle of legal reservation. In this sense, said Decree merely develops the legislative authorization to decree restrictions on vehicular circulation, so regarding the merits, it also adheres to the material scope established in the legal norm. Furthermore, both regarding the freedom of circulation and the freedom of commerce, the provisions contained in the challenged Decree do not present any characteristic that makes this Tribunal understand them to be an excessive and disproportionate exercise of state competencies, given that—as indicated—the restriction operates so that circulation is only limited one day between Monday and Friday, within a limited zone and within a determined time slot.- Added to this is that the measure contained in the Decree has a temporary nature and will be reviewed as soon as March two thousand ten, and it must also be taken into account that the authorities are established with the obligation to provide updated information through studies that serve to validate or correct the scope of such limitations, from all of which it can be concluded that the restrictions have the character of being reasonable and proportionate to the needs they seek to satisfy..." (judgment No. 2010-06283 of fourteen hours thirty minutes on April seven, two thousand ten—the underlining is not from the original—). However, it is necessary to clarify that the legitimate exercise of that power derives from the fact that public roads are domain assets over which the State exercises particularly detailed regulation, so that persons who must travel on them are subject to a special subjection regime that obliges them to submit to the existing regulation on this matter, in order to protect superior public interests, such as road safety, environmental protection, public health, fluidity in vehicular circulation, among others. It is for this reason that the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered that the freedom of transit and movement that the Law of the Constitution recognizes and protects "does not protect the means of transport but rather the freedom of every inhabitant of the Republic to move freely from one side of the national territory to the other" (judgment No. 2002-09506 of fifteen hours and thirty-two minutes on October one, two thousand two—the underlining is not from the original—). On the other hand, it should be noted that contrary to what the plaintiff party asserts, Executive Decree 35739-MOPT was supported by technical criteria for re-establishing the vehicular restriction through the License Plate/Hour Scheme (Esquema Hora/Placa) in Downtown San José (Centro de San José), as can be deduced from Considerando 18 of the challenged Executive Decree, in which it was stated: "...18.—That, in that sense, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, through the General Directorate of Traffic Engineering (Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito), has undertaken to carry out the rigorous technical studies regarding the vehicular situation in the City of San José, taking into account the effects generated during the previous vehicular restriction and the chaotic situation in vehicular transit generated after its non-application, through the technical report called “Evaluation of the Impact Produced by Eliminating the Vehicular Restriction by License Plate Number in San José” (official communication No. DGIT-0626-2009 of July 9, 2009), carried out in real time and with real data in a study area that included the following road corridors (...) said technical report concluding, in what is relevant, the following: “1. After eliminating the restriction on the circulation of vehicles according to the license plate number, the travel time on the analyzed corridors increased by 16%. Calle 0 and Avenida 8 were the most affected corridors with nearly a 35% increase in travel times, 2. The increase in time is equivalent to an annual amount close to five hundred thousand dollars (the cost of time is calculated using the base salary of a Generalist Clerk of the Civil Service, for which the delay time is converted to hours and multiplied by the hourly wage of the cited clerk), 3. The vehicular movement per peak hour decreased, demonstrating greater congestion on the roads. 4. Total vehicular demand increased by up to 19% at specific points”. In general, it was demonstrated that the vehicular movement was negative, which is explained by the impossibility of movement that the vehicles presented during those analysis times. Likewise, the average travel times for crossing the central metropolitan area of San José (in which the vehicular restriction measure operated) have been affected by an increase in vehicular influx and circulation; an increase that has been set at a percentage increase in travel times of 16%, which amounts—in effective time—to an average increase of 17.5 minutes. An increase that justifies and leads to the technical recommendation to re-implement the vehicular restriction measure, which is based on the reality situation referred to in this section. Carrying out a cyclical control over the operability of the aforementioned measure and its effects...". Finally, specifically regarding the exception scenarios provided in Article 6 of Executive Decree No. 35379-MOPT, to which the rules regulating the vehicular restriction through the License Plate/Hour Scheme in Downtown San José are not applied, it should be noted that in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration, the provision of public services both by public-law and private-law entities is characterized by its continuity, efficiency, and adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equal treatment to the recipients, users, or beneficiaries. By virtue of the foregoing and in order to ensure the continuity and efficiency in the provision of public remunerated transport services of persons in their different modes—which includes those regulated by Law 3503—, the Executive Branch in Article 6 of the challenged Executive Decree excluded from the vehicular restriction the following scenarios: "...police vehicles, vehicles intended for traffic control, ambulances, vehicles belonging to the fire department, public service taxi vehicles according to Law No. 7969, vehicles of regular public transport services (autobús, buseta, microbús) or special ones (transport of workers, tourism, or transport of students authorized by the Ministry of Public Works and Transport) in the remunerated transport of persons regulated by Law No. 3503 that have a public service license plate...". At this point, it is necessary to highlight that even though Article 6 of Executive Decree No. 35379-MOPT provides for the possibility that "...The Vice-Ministerial Office, considering reasons of public interest and based on the principles of discretion, reasonableness, proportionality, rationality, and necessity, via administrative resolution, will determine the granting of the exception to the restriction on vehicular circulation in those other cases it deems pertinent, upon prior submission of the request..."; it is also true that this is not applicable to the specific case, because the plaintiff company engages in the activity of special remunerated transport of persons—specifically students—in motor vehicles, microbus mode, on a stable basis, which is categorized as a public service in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; Article 5(f) of Law 7593; and 1 to 4 of Executive Decree No. 15203, and requires for its legitimate exploitation the granting of a permit by the Public Transport Council. For all the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that Article 6 of Executive Decree No. 35379-MOPT is not substantially contrary to the legal system, specifically to the provisions of Articles 4, 16, and 136 of the General Law of Public Administration; Article 38 bis of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes; Articles 1, 3, and 25 of Law 3503; Article 5(f) of Law 7593; and 1 to 4 of Executive Decree No. 15203, and therefore, the subsidiary claim seeking a declaration of its absolute nullity is inadmissible.”

“IVo.- SOBRE LA DEROGATORIA SOBREVENIDA DEL DECRETO EJECUTIVO # 35379-MOPT Y SUS EFECTOS EN LO PRETENDIDO POR LA PARTE ACTORA. El representante del Estado plantea la excepción de falta de interés actual, toda vez que el Decreto Ejecutivo número 35379-MOPT, objeto de impugnación en este proceso, fue derogado desde el dos de mayo del dos mil once, por el Decreto Ejecutivo número 36547-MOPT, razón por la cual, estima que el proceso carece de interés, pues versa sobre una norma que no se encuentra vigente, más aún que la parte actora, no procedió a ajustar la pretensión, a efecto de impugnar lo dispuesto en el Decreto Ejecutivo número 36547-MOPT. En ese sentido, este Tribunal considera que si bien es cierto, la parte actora no ajustó las pretensiones durante la audiencia preliminar celebrada a las catorce horas siete minutos del nueve de marzo del dos mil doce y en consecuencia, mantuvo – entre otras- las pretensiones tendentes a que se incluya a los transportistas privados de estudiantes dentro de los supuestos de excepción a la restricción vehicular previstos en el artículo 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo 35379-MOPT y de manera subsidiaria, se anule parcialmente dicha norma (ver folios 93 a 95 expediente judicial y respaldo digital de la audiencia preliminar), a pesar de que el Decreto Ejecutivo número 35379-MOPT había sido derogado desde el dos de mayo del dos mil once, al entrar en vigencia el Decreto Ejecutivo número 36547-MOPT, publicado en el Alcance 26 del Diario Oficial La Gaceta número 82 del 29 de abril del dos mil once (ver la versión digital del Decreto Ejecutivo número 36547-MOPT en la página web: www.pgr.go.cr/scij); también lo es, que la demanda fue presentada el treinta y uno de agosto del dos mil nueve (folio 1 del expediente judicial), o sea, un mes y once días después de que el Decreto Ejecutivo 35379-MOPT, fuera publicado y entrara en vigencia, a saber: 20 de julio del 2009 (ver la versión digital del Decreto Ejecutivo número 35379-MOPT en la página web: www.pgr.go.cr/scij ). Sin embargo, no es sino hasta el veinte de enero del dos mil doce, que mediante resolución dictada a las once horas cero minutos, que el Juez Tramitador dio traslado de la demanda interpuesta por la empresa demandante (folios 67 y 68 del expediente judicial), momento para el cual, el Decreto Ejecutivo número 35379-MOPT, ya había sido derogado por el Decreto Ejecutivo número 36547-MOPT, desde el dos de mayo del dos mil once. Ahora bien, dado que conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 10 inciso 2; 37 incisos 1 y 2; 39.1.b del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, es posible impugnar –en principio- de manera directa una disposición reglamentaria, dentro del año siguiente al día de la única o última publicación en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, por parte de quienes aleguen ostentar respecto de esa norma reglamentaria algún interés legítimo, individual o colectivo, o algún derecho subjetivo; este Tribunal considera que en el caso concreto, debe analizarse el contenido de la norma cuestionada, aún y cuando actualmente se encuentre derogada, no sólo porque al 31 de agosto del 2009, la empresa actora se encontraba en tiempo para impugnar de manera directa esa norma reglamentaria, sin que requiriera actos de aplicación individual, sino también, porque alega ostentar respecto a lo que disponía el artículo 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo 35379-MOPT, un presunto derecho subjetivo, en el tanto desarrolla la actividad privada de transporte remunerado de personas -específicamente de estudiantes- en vehículos automotores, modalidad microbús (ver folios 37, 63 vuelto del expediente judicial y conclusiones del representante de la parte actora en la audiencia preliminar, que constan en respaldo digital), la cual, no se encontraba en los supuestos de excepción de las normas que regulan la restricción vehicular mediante el Esquema Hora/Placa en el Centro de San José, a pesar de que según su dicho, constituye una actividad no prohibida por el ordenamiento jurídico, que además, coadyuvaría en la consecución de los objetivos que persigue la restricción vehicular, como lo son: reducir el congestionamiento vial y el consumo de combustible. En ese sentido, estima este Tribunal que debe establecerse si el artículo 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 35379-MOPT –específicamente en cuanto excluía de los supuestos de excepción de las normas que regulan la restricción vehicular, a los transportes privados de estudiantes mediante microbús-, resultaba o no contrario al ordenamiento jurídico, y por ende, al derecho subjetivo que la empresa actora alega ostentar, extremo que a su vez, es determinante para establecer si debe o no restituírsele en el goce de la situación jurídica que aduce le fue conculcada, conforme a lo dispuesto en los incisos a) y d) del artículo 122 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Más aún, cuando el contenido de la norma impugnada, se reproduce en el numeral 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 36547-MOPT, que actualmente se encuentra vigente; y que la derogatoria sobrevenida del Decreto Ejecutivo número 35379 -MOPT, acaeció en parte, por la dilación en que este Tribunal incurrió en el trámite inicial de este proceso de conocimiento, a pesar de que la demanda fue interpuesta un mes y once días después de la entrada en vigencia de la norma impugnada. Con base en estas consideraciones, este Tribunal rechaza la excepción de falta de interés actual, interpuesta por la representación del Estado y procederá a analizar la normativa impugnada, a fin de determinar la procedencia o no de las pretensiones planteadas por la parte actora.

Vo.- EN CUANTO A LA NATURALEZA JURÍDICA DEL TRANSPORTE ESPECIAL REMUNERADO DE PERSONAS -ESPECÍFICAMENTE DE ESTUDIANTES- EN VEHÍCULOS AUTOMOTORES, MODALIDAD MICROBÚS . La parte actora alega que la actividad de transporte privado de estudiantes que desarrolla en la modalidad de microbús, no constituye una actividad prohibida por el ordenamiento jurídico, por lo que, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 28 de la Constitución Política, se encuentra fuera de la acción de la ley, por lo que, no requieren de un permiso del Consejo de Transporte para llevarla a cabo. En ese sentido, debemos partir que se tiene por acreditado, que la empresa actora denominada Transportes Privados Caritas Felices CR, S.A., desarrolla la actividad de transporte especial remunerado de personas -específicamente de estudiantes- en vehículos automotores, modalidad microbús , de manera estable (ver folios 37, 63 vuelto del expediente judicial y conclusiones del representante de la parte actora en la audiencia preliminar, que constan en respaldo digital). En razón de lo anterior y contrario a lo que sostiene el representante de la empresa demandante, el ejercicio legítimo de su actividad no sólo se encuentra regulado en los artículos 1, 3 y 25 de la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas por Vehículos Automotores (Ley 3503); 5 inciso f de la Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (Ley 7593); 1, 2, 3 y 4 del Reglamento para la Remunerado de Personas (Decreto Ejecutivo número 15203); sino que además, está condicionado al cumplimiento de los requisitos previstos al efecto en dicha normativa. Lo anterior afirmación encuentra sustento, en que tal y como se tiene por demostrado, la actividad que realiza la empresa accionante, no consiste en el simple traslado gratuito y privado de estudiantes a los centros de enseñanza, que -por ejemplo- realizan diariamente los padres de familia o encargados de dichos alumnos; sino que por el contrario, se trata de una actividad remunerada, que implica la explotación de un servicio especial de transporte de personas (estudiantes, trabajadores o turismo), mediante vehículos de transporte colectivo, en sus modalidades de autobús, buseta o microbús, que se presta de forma ocasional -para un sólo servicio- o de manera estable (para varios servicios) y que se caracteriza por no tener un itinerario fijo y los cuales se contratan por tiempo, por viaje o por ambas formas. Dicha actividad está catalogada por el legislador, desde el 20 de mayo de 1965 -fecha de entrada en vigencia de la Ley 3503-, como "...un servicio público regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes..." (artículo 1), delegado en particulares y para cuya explotación se requiere del otorgamiento de un permiso del Consejo de Transporte Público (artículos 3 y 25 de la Ley 3503). Tan es así, que mediante Decreto Ejecutivo número 15203 (Reglamento para la Explotación de Servicios Especiales de Transporte Automotor Remunerado de Personas), que entró en vigencia a partir del 22 de febrero de mil novecientos ochenta y cuatro, el Poder Ejecutivo desarrolló los términos de lo dispuesto en los numerales 1, 3 y 25 de la Ley 3503, en el sentido de que: "...Artículo 1º. —El presente Reglamento se dicta para regular la explotación de servicios especiales de transporte remunerado de personas, en vehículos colectivos dentro del territorio nacional a que se refiere la ley Nº 3503 del 10 de mayo de 1965, en sus artículos 3º y 25 y cualquier otro que en el futuro la sustituya. // Artículo 2º. —Son servicios especiales, los que se prestan dentro de la explotación del transporte automotor remunerado, con vehículos de transporte colectivo, sin tener itinerario fijo y los cuales se contratan por viaje, por tiempo o en ambas formas. // Artículo 3º. —Para los efectos de este Reglamento, los servicios especiales se clasifican en ocasionales y estables: a) Ocasionales: son servicios especiales ocasionales, los que se prestan para solo un servicio dentro del territorio nacional. b) Estables: son servicios especiales estables, aquellos que se prestan para varios servicios, como las excursiones de cualquier índole, dentro del territorio nacional. I gualmente lo será el transporte de estudiantes (en cualquier nivel de enseñanza), hacia y/o desde los centros educativos; así como el de obreros, peones agrícolas y trabajadores en general. Para la prestación de tales servicios, el transportista deberá suscribir un contrato con las instituciones educativas o las empresas en su caso, cuyas estipulaciones no podrán pactarse en contravención a este Reglamento. // Artículo 4º.— Para la explotación de servicios especiales, se requerirá de permiso autorizado por el Consejo de Transporte Público*. Dicho permiso podrá amparar a uno o varios vehículos, de acuerdo con las necesidades del transporte y, en todo caso, previo estudio y recomendación del Departamento de Administración de Concesiones* y Permisos del Consejo de Transporte Público*..." (el subrayado no es del original) . En este punto, cabe resaltar, que la calificación de servicio público, dada a la actividad de transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos -específicamente en este caso, los servicios especiales estables u ocasionales de estudiantes, trabajadores o turismo-, también encuentra sustento, en la Ley 7593 -que entró en vigencia el cinco de setiembre de 1996- en cuyo artículo 5 se establece: "... En los servicios públicos definidos en este artículo, la Autoridad Reguladora fijará precios y tarifas; además, velará por el cumplimiento de las normas de calidad, cantidad, confiabilidad, continuidad, oportunidad y prestación óptima, según el artículo 25 de esta ley. Los servicios públicos antes mencionados son: (...) f) Cualquier medio de transporte público remunerado de personas, salvo el aéreo...". Por último, en el párrafo 2º del inciso l) del artículo 1 de la Ley Reguladora del Servicio Público de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos en la Modalidad de Taxi (Ley 7969), adicionado por el artículo 3 de la Ley 8955, se reafirma que "...Los permisos para el transporte remunerado de personas mediante microbuses, busetas y autobuses, se regirán por lo dispuesto en la Ley N.º 3503 , Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, de 10 de mayo de 1965, y sus reformas, o cualquier otra que la sustituya en el futuro.” En consecuencia, e l transporte remunerado de estudiantes mediante vehículos automotores colectivos -modalidad microbús- es un servicio público especial de carácter estable , cuya prestación por parte de un sujeto de derecho privado, requiere de un permiso otorgado por el Consejo de Transporte Público, órgano desconcentrado al que también le compete fiscalizar la prestación del mismo, no sólo en virtud de lo dispuesto en los numerales 1, 3 y 25 de la Ley 3503, sino también, con base en el interés superior del menor (Principio II de la Declaración de los Derechos del Niño; artículos 3 de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño y 5 del Código de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia). Ello por cuanto, el Estado y la sociedad en general están obligados a procurar a los menores , cuidados y atenciones especiales, a fin de lograr su adecuado desarrollo físico, intelectual y emocional, lo cual implica la adopción de disposiciones especiales que tiendan a asegurar la tutela de los derechos e intereses del menor, su acceso a los servicios públicos y la adopción de medidas especiales para resguardar su vida, salud y seguridad, en este caso, de carácter vial. Por último, es menester resaltar que éste ha sido el criterio sostenido por la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, la cual, ha considerado: "...Tal y como señala el Director Ejecutivo del Consejo de Transporte Público del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, el servicio de transporte público, denominado “especiales”, es conceptualizado como un “servicio público” . El constituyente no enlista todos los servicios de naturaleza pública, dejando al legislador ordinario la competencia para establecer cuáles servicios deben definirse de esa forma, atendiendo, claro está, al modelo político impuesto por la Constitución Política, cual es el de un régimen democrático social de derecho. El artículo 3 de la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos define como servicio público: “…el que por su importancia para el desarrollo sostenible del país sea calificado como tal por la Asamblea Legislativa, con el fin de sujetarlo a las regulaciones de esta ley.” Por su parte, el artículo 12 de la Ley General de Administración Pública refiere en su párrafo primero que se considerará autorizado un servicio público cuando se haya indicado el sujeto y el fin del mismo. Ya específicamente, la Ley Reguladora de Transporte Remunerado de Personas en Vehículos Automotores, número 3503 del diez de mayo de mil novecientos sesenta y cinco y sus reformas, refiere: “Artículo 1.- El transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos, excepto los automóviles de servicio de taxi regulado en otra ley, que se lleva a cabo por calles, carreteras y caminos dentro del territorio nacional, es un servicio público (el resaltado no es del original) regulado, controlado y vigilado por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. La prestación es delegada en particulares a quienes autoriza expresamente, de acuerdo con las normas aquí establecidas.” A partir de esa categoría que atribuye el legislador al transporte remunerado de personas en vehículos automotores colectivos, debe inferirse que el servicio de “especiales”, en sus modalidades de trabajadores, estudiantes y turistas, es un servicio público y por ello, para ser prestado por particulares, debe contarse con una autorización, llámese permiso o concesión, según corresponda..." (sentencia número 2005-00846 de las once horas veinticinco minutos del veintiocho de enero del dos mil cinco y en sentido similar, la sentencia número 2005-2236 de las catorce horas cuarenta y ocho minutos del dos de marzo del dos mil cinco). En razón de todo lo expuesto, este Tribunal considera que desde la entrada en vigencia el 20 de mayo de 1965, de la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas por Vehículos Automotores (Ley 3503), la actividad de transporte remunerado de estudiantes mediante vehículos automotores colectivos -modalidad microbús-, está calificada por el legislador como un servicio público especial de carácter estable, cuya prestación por parte de un sujeto de derecho privado, requiere de un permiso otorgado por el Consejo de Transporte Público, lo que con posterioridad, fue ratificado por lo dispuesto en el inciso f) del artículo 5 de la Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (Ley 7593).

VIo.- EN CUANTO AL PRESUNTO TRATO DISCRIMINATORIO QUE PLANTEA LA PARTE ACTORA. En primera instancia, cabe aclarar que la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, al resolver mediante sentencia número 2009-10251 de las once horas veintisiete minutos del veintiséis de junio del dos mil nueve, el recurso de amparo número 09-007129-0007-CO interpuesto por la parte demandante, en el cual, planteó alegatos similares a los que constituyen el objeto de este proceso, consideró: "...En este caso el recurrente reclama que a pesar de lo considerado por este Tribunal en sentencia 2004-08880 de las 15:49 del 18 de agosto del 2008, en el sentido de que para brindar un servicio de transporte de estudiantes no se requiere de una autorización del Consejo de Transporte Público, los oficiales de tránsito no eximen las unidades de su empresa de la restricción vehicular lo cual le afecta gravemente pues se le aplican las respectivas boletas de infracción. Al respecto la Sala considera que no le corresponde a este Tribunal indicar si la actividad desarrollada por el recurrente se encuentra autorizada o no ya que el tema constituye un asunto ajeno a ser discutido en esta jurisdicción al tratarse sobre un aspecto de mera legalidad el cual debe ser ventilado en las vías administrativas correspondientes si fuera el caso..." (-el subrayado no es del original- ver archivo digital de la sentencia, en la página web: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/scij). Dicha decisión tiene como fundamento lo dispuesto en el artículo 13 in fine de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, conforme a la cual, la jurisprudencia y los precedentes de la jurisdicción constitucional son vinculantes erga omnes, salvo para sí misma. En razón de lo anterior, esta Jurisdicción se encuentra facultada -conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 49 de la Constitución Política, 1 y 2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo-, para establecer si la actividad que desarrolla la empresa accionante de transporte especial remunerado de personas -específicamente de estudiantes- en vehículos automotores, modalidad microbús, de manera estable, requiere o no para su explotación legítima de un permiso del Consejo de Transporte Público, y a partir de lo anterior, si lo dispuesto en el numeral 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 35379-MOPT, resulta o no discriminatorio en su perjuicio. Con base en lo anterior, y contrario a lo que afirma la empresa actora, este Tribunal considera que las excepciones previstas en el artículo 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo impugnado, respecto a la no aplicación de las normas que regulan la restricción vehicular, específicamente a "...los vehículos de los servicios regulares de transporte público (autobús, buseta, microbús) o especiales (transporte de trabajadores, turismo o transporte de estudiantes autorizados por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) en el transporte remunerado de personas regulados mediante Ley Nº 3503 que cuenten con placa de servicio público ...", no resultan discriminatorias, toda vez que en el caso concreto, no existe parámetro de igualdad válido, entre la actividad que realiza la empresa demandante y la que regulan las Leyes 3503, 7593 y el del Decreto Ejecutivo número 15203. En ese sentido, cabe indicar que la actora no se dedica al traslado gratuito y privado de estudiantes a los centros de enseñanza, actividad que por ejemplo, realizan diariamente algunos padres de familia o los encargados de dichos alumnos. Por el contrario, la accionante -tal y como su propio representante legal reconoce- desarrolla una actividad remunerada, que implica la explotación de un servicio especial de transporte de personas (estudiantes, trabajadores o turismo), mediante vehículos de transporte colectivo, en sus modalidades de autobús, buseta o microbús, que presta de forma ocasional -para un sólo servicio- o de manera estable (para varios servicios) y que se caracteriza por no tener un itinerario fijo y los cuales se contratan por tiempo, por viaje o por ambas formas. Dicha actividad se encuentra regulada por los artículos 1, 3 y 25 de la Ley 3503; 5 inciso f) de la Ley 7593; 1 a 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 15203, las cuales, la califican como un servicio público especial de carácter estable, cuya prestación por parte de un sujeto de derecho privado, requiere de un permiso otorgado por el Consejo de Transporte Público, órgano desconcentrado al que también le compete fiscalizar la prestación del mismo, no sólo en virtud de lo dispuesto en los numerales 1, 3 y 25 de la Ley 3503, sino también, con base en el interés superior del menor (Principio II de la Declaración de los Derechos del Niño; artículos 3 de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño y 5 del Código de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia). Ello por cuanto, desde la entrada en vigencia el 20 de mayo de 1965, de la Ley Reguladora del Transporte Remunerado de Personas por Vehículos Automotores (Ley 3503), la actividad de transporte remunerado de estudiantes mediante vehículos automotores colectivos -modalidad microbús-, está calificada por el legislador como un servicio público especial, cuya prestación por parte de un sujeto de derecho privado, -se insiste- requiere de un permiso otorgado por el Consejo de Transporte Público, lo que con posterioridad fue ratificado por lo dispuesto en el inciso f) del artículo 5 de la Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (Ley 7593). En ese tanto, la empresa demandante no puede alegar de manera válida que se encuentra en la misma condición del supuesto de hecho contenido en la norma impugnada y que por ende, tiene derecho a que se le incluya en los supuestos de excepción relacionados con la no aplicación de la restricción vehicular, no sólo porque la actividad que desarrolla constituye un servicio público que trascendió el ámbito privado desde la entrada en vigencia de la Ley 3503, dada la necesidad de garantizar su eficiencia, continuidad, adaptabilidad y igualdad de trato de los usuarios; sino también, porque en aplicación del principio del interés superior del menor, el Estado a través del Consejo de Transporte Público, debe fiscalizar la prestación del servicio especial de transporte remunerado de estudiantes por medio de vehículos automotores colectivos, modalidad microbús. Sostener lo contrario, implicaría más bien provocar una desigualdad en sentido inverso, que resultaría sustancialmente contraria al ordenamiento jurídico por desaplicación singular de lo dispuesto en los artículos 1, 3 y 25 de la Ley 3503; 5 inciso f) de la Ley 7593; 1 a 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 15203, pues en el fondo implicaría autorizar a la empresa amparada a circular sin las restricciones previstas para tal efecto en los artículos 38 bis de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y el Decreto Ejecutivo número 35379-MOPT, en contravención a lo dispuesto en las normas que rigen la -específicamente de estudiantes- en vehículos automotores, modalidad microbús, de manera estable; más aún que no se ha tenido por acreditado que los vehículos automotores modalidad microbús que utiliza la empresa actora, para desarrollar la actividad de transporte especial remunerado de personas -específicamente de estudiantes-, cuenten con los requisitos previstos en los artículos 1, 3, 25 de la Ley número 3503; 6 de los Decretos Ejecutivos número 35379-MOPT y 36547-MOPT, a saber: el permiso extendido por el Consejo de Transporte Público y la placa de servicio público (ver punto a del considerando II de esta sentencia). En razón de lo anterior, aún y cuando el artículo 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo número35379-MOPT, prevee la posibilidad de que "... El Despacho Viceministerial atendiendo razones de interés público y con base en los principios de discrecionalidad, razonabilidad, proporcionabilidad, racionabilidad y necesidad, vía resolución administrativa, determinará el otorgamiento de la excepción a la restricción para la circulación vehicular en aquellos otros casos que considere pertinentes, previa presentación de la solicitud..."; lo cierto es, que ello no resulta aplicable al caso concreto, pues la empresa actora desarrolla la actividad de transporte especial remunerado de personas -específicamente de estudiantes- en vehículos automotores, modalidad microbús, de manera estable, la cual, está catalogada como servicio público conforme a lo dispuesto en las Leyes 3503; 7593; y el Decreto Ejecutivo número 15203, y requiere para su explotación legítima por parte de un sujeto de derecho privado, del otorgamiento de un permiso por parte del Consejo de Transporte Público. En síntesis, no alegarse válidamente la existencia de igualdad en la ilegalidad. Por todo lo expuesto, este Tribunal estima que las excepciones previstas en el artículo 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo impugnado, respecto a la no aplicación de las normas que regulan la restricción vehicular, específicamente a "... los vehículos de los servicios regulares de transporte público (autobús, buseta, microbús) o especiales (transporte de trabajadores, turismo o transporte de estudiantes autorizados por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) en el transporte remunerado de personas regulados mediante Ley Nº 3503 que cuenten con placa de servicio público..." , no resultan discriminatorias; y en consecuencia, que resulta improcedente la pretensión principal tendente a que se incluya a la empresa amparada en las excepciones previstas en el artículo 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo 35379-MOPT, respecto a la no aplicación de las normas que regulan la restricción vehicular, ya que es sustancialmente contraria a lo dispuesto en los artículos 11 y 33 de la Constitución Política; 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 1, 3 y 25 de la Ley 3503; 5 inciso f) de la Ley 7593; 1 a 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 15203.

VIIo.- RESPECTO A LA POTESTAD DEL PODER EJECUTIVO DE IMPONER RESTRICCIONES A LA CIRCULACIÓN VEHICULAR Y SU NO APLICACIÓN A LOS MEDIOS DE TRANSPORTE PÚBLICO REMUNERADO DE PERSONAS. Cabe indicar, que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 38 bis de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, el Poder Ejecutivo podrá realizar restricciones a la circulación vehicular, por razones de oportunidad, de conveniencia, de interés público, regional o nacional debidamente fundamentadas. En ese sentido, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, al declarar sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad número 09-14039-0007-CO, interpuesta contra el Decreto Ejecutivo número 35379-MOPT que aquí se cuestiona, estimó que: "...En primer lugar, el decreto número 35379-MOPT, tiene sustento específico en el artículo 38 bis de la Ley de Tránsito de modo que cumple con las condiciones formales del principio de reserva de ley. En este sentido, dicho Decreto lo que hace es desarrollar la autorización legislativa para decretar restricciones a la circulación vehicular, de modo que en cuanto al fondo, también se apega al ámbito material establecido en la norma legal. Por otra parte, tanto respecto de la libertad de circulación como respecto de la libertad de comercio, las disposiciones contenidas en el Decreto impugnado no presentan ninguna característica que haga entender a este Tribunal que son un ejercicio excesivo y desproporcionado de las competencias estatales, dado que –como se indicó- la restricción opera para de modo que solamente se limita la circulación un día entre lunes y viernes, dentro de una zona limitada y dentro de una franja horaria determinada.- A esto se agrega que la medida recogida en el Decreto tiene una naturaleza temporal y será revisada tan pronto como en marzo del dos mil diez y también debe tomarse en cuenta que para las autoridades se establece la obligación de proveer información actualizada a través de estudios que sirvan para validar o corregir el alcance de tales limitaciones, de todo lo cual puede concluirse que las restricciones tienen el carácter de razonables y proporcionadas a las necesidades que buscan satisfacerse..." (sentencia número 2010-06283 de las catorce horas treinta minutos del siete de abril de dos mil diez -el subrayado no es del original-). Ahora bien, es menester aclarar que el ejercicio legítimo de esa potestad, deriva de que las vías públicas son bienes de maniales sobre los que el Estado ejerce una regulación especialmente detallada, de modo que las personas que deban desplazarse por ellas, se encuentran sometidas a un régimen de sujeción especial que las obliga a someterse a la regulación existente en esta materia , a fin de tutelar intereses públicos de rango superior, como la seguridad vial, la protección del medio ambiente, la salud pública, fluidez en la circulación vehicular, entre otros. Es por ello, que la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ha considerado que la libertad de tránsito y de movimiento que reconoce y tutela el Derecho de la Constitución “no protege el medio de transporte sino la libertad de todo habitante de la República de trasladarse libremente de un lado a otro del territorio nacional” (sentencia número 2002-09506 de las quince horas con treinta y dos minutos del primero de octubre del dos mil dos -el subrayado no es del original-). Por otra parte, cabe indicar que contrario a lo que afirma la parte actora, el Decreto Ejecutivo 35739-MOPT, sí se sustentaba en criterios técnicos para reestablecer la restricción vehicular mediante el Esquema Hora/Placa en el Centro de San José, tal y como se desprende del considerando 18 el Decreto Ejecutivo impugnado, en el cual, se indicó: "... 18.—Que, en ese sentido, el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes por medio de la Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito se ha abocado a efectuar los estudios técnicos de rigor respecto a la situación vehicular en la Ciudad de San José, tomando en cuenta los efectos generados durante la restricción vehicular anterior y la situación caótica en el tránsito vehicular generada con posterioridad a su desaplicación mediante el informe técnico denominado “Evaluación del Impacto Producido por Eliminar la Restricción Vehicular por Número de Placa en San José” (oficio N° DGIT-0626-2009 del 9 julio de 2009), realizado en tiempo real y con datos reales en un área de estudio que incluyó los siguientes corredores viales (...) concluyendo dicho informe técnico en lo que interesa, lo siguiente: “1. Luego de la eliminación de restringir la circulación de vehículos de acuerdo con el número de placa se aumento en un 16% el tiempo de recorrido en los corredores analizados. La Calle 0 y la Avenida 8 fueron los corredores más afectados con cerca de 35% de incremento en los tiempos de recorrido, 2. El aumento en tiempo equivale a un monto anual cercano a los quinientos mil dólares (el costo del tiempo se hace utilizando el salario base de un Oficinista Generalista del Servicio Civil, para lo cual, el tiempo de las demoras se pasa a horas y se multiplica por el salario por hora del citado oficinista), 3. El movimiento vehicular por hora pico disminuyó, demostrando un mayor congestionamiento en las vías. 4. La demanda vehicular total aumentó hasta en un 19% en puntos determinados”. En general, quedó demostrado que el movimiento vehicular fue negativo lo que se explica por la imposibilidad de movimiento que presentaron los vehículos en esos tiempos de análisis. Asimismo los tiempos de viaje en promedio para el cruce del área metropolitana central de San José (en la cual operaba la medida de restricción vehicular) se han visto afectados por un incremento en la afluencia y circulación vehicular; incremento que se ha fijado en un porcentaje de aumento en los tiempos de viaje del 16%, lo cual importa –en tiempo efectivo- un promedio de incremento de 17,5 minutos. Aumento que justifica y lleva a la recomendación técnica de reimplementar la medida de restricción vehicular, fundamentada ésta en la situación de realidad referida en este apartado. Llevándose un control cíclico sobre la operatividad de la medida aludida y de sus efectos...". Por último, específicamente respecto a los supuestos de excepción previstos en el artículo 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 35379-MOPT, a los que no se aplican las normas que regulan la restricción vehicular mediante el Esquema Hora/Placa en el Centro de San José, cabe indicar que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, la prestación de los servicios públicos tanto por parte de sujetos de derecho público como de derecho privado, se caracteriza por su continuidad, eficiencia y adaptación a toda cambio en el régimen legal o en la necesidad social que satisfacen y la igualdad de trato a los destinatarios, usuarios o beneficiarios. En virtud de lo anterior y a fin de asegurar la continuidad y eficiencia en la prestación de los servicios públicos de transporte renumerado de personas en sus distintas modalidades -en los que se incluye los regulados por la ley 3503-, es que el Poder Ejecutivo en el artículo 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo impugnado, excluyó de la restricción vehicular, los siguientes supuestos: "...los vehículos policiales, los vehículos destinados al control del tráfico, l as ambulancias, los vehículos pertenecientes al cuerpo de bomberos, los vehículos de servicio público taxis según Ley N° 7969, los vehículos de los servicios regulares de transporte público (autobús, buseta, microbús) o especiales (transporte de trabajadores, turismo o transporte de estudiantes autorizados por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes) en el transporte remunerado de personas regulados mediante Ley Nº 3503 que cuenten con placa de servicio público..." . En este punto, es menester resaltar que aún y cuando el artículo 6 del Decreto Ejecutivo número35379-MOPT, prevee la posibilidad de que "...El Despacho Viceministerial atendiendo razones de interés público y con base en los principios de discrecionalidad, razonabilidad, proporcionabilidad, racionabilidad y necesidad, vía resolución administrativa, determinará el otorgamiento de la excepción a la restricción para la circulación vehicular en aquellos otros casos que considere pertinentes, previa presentación de la solicitud..."; también lo es, que ello no es aplicable al caso concreto, pues la empresa actora desarrolla la actividad de transporte especial remunerado de personas -específicamente de estudiantes- en vehículos automotores, modalidad microbús, de manera estable, la cual, está catalogada como servicio público conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 1, 3 y 25 de la Ley 3503; 5 inciso f) de la Ley 7593; 1 a 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 15203, y requiere para su explotación legítima, el otorgamiento de un permiso por parte del Consejo de Transporte Público. Por todo lo número 35379-MOPT, no resulta sustancialmente contrario al ordenamiento jurídico, específicamente a lo dispuesto en los artículos 4, 16 y 136 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; 38 bis de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres; 1, 3 y 25 de la Ley 3503; 5 inciso f) de la Ley 7593; 1 a 4 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 15203, por lo que, la pretensión subsidiaria tendente a que se declare la nulidad absoluta del mismo, resulta improcedente.”