Municipal license and authorization for outdoor advertising on national roadsLicencia y autorización municipal para publicidad exterior en vías nacionales

V).- As to the merits, it must first be noted that "Tornillos Especiales de Centroamérica S.A." operates its business in a premises located in the center of the capital city, specifically on avenida 10, calles 18 and 20; therefore, it falls within the jurisdictional scope of the Municipalidad de San José, which has full constitutional and legal powers to regulate the exercise of its commercial activity, to require it to obtain a license, and to impose the payment of the business license tax (impuesto de patente).- Furthermore, it is evident that said company is subject, in matters of urban planning regulation, to the provisions duly approved by the local corporation, regulations that are mandatory and cannot be disregarded.- The San José Urban Master Plan (Plan Director Urbano de San José), published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta, No. 166 of June 5, 2005, includes the Outdoor Advertising Regulations (Reglamento de la Publicidad Exterior), whose purpose, pursuant to the provisions of Article 1, is to: "Regulate and control everything related to outdoor advertising, located on private property but with projection onto the public space of the Canton of San José, in order to achieve a better balance between the urban landscape and advertising messages". It is also established that to place, replace, or remodel advertisements, signs (rótulos, letreros), notices (avisos), billboards (vallas), and other typologies—which it refers to by the generic term of rótulos—it is mandatory to obtain a license from the Municipalidad de San José, and that if a supporting structural work (estructura constructiva) is required, a construction permit will be needed, according to the requirements regulated therein (Article 2).- Now then, as admitted in the appeal, the appellant placed some perforated sheets with digital prints on the windows of one of its commercial premises, sheets that certainly constitute a sign (rótulo), under the terms of the aforementioned Regulations, and those of Section V of the Urban Master Plan, which in the "Glossary," defines it as, "Any sign (letrero), writing, print, emblem, painting, drawing, or other means whose purpose is to draw attention to some product or activity that is offered or produced at the same site where the sign (rótulo) is located." Although the appellant has alleged in administrative proceedings that it is not an advertising print, that it does not have an explicit message, and that it was placed for the purpose of protecting products from inclement weather, such claims are unacceptable, since it is sufficient, as in the specific case, that it contains images related to the line of business, to consider it as such, without there being any evidence in the record capable of disproving this last circumstance. The fact is that it is a sign (rótulo) and as such, it is subject to obtaining a municipal license, in accordance with the regulatory plan (plan regulador) of the Central Canton of San José.- In this sense, the Tribunal understands that there is no commercial business, located within the territorial limits of said Municipality, that is excluded from the control that the latter can and must exercise over outdoor advertising that they intend to place in their premises.- It should be remembered that by constitutional and legal provision, these territorial entities have full competence to regulate everything related to the satisfaction of local interests and services, within which is undoubtedly found the search for a balance between architectural and urban works and advertising messages, as a means of communication, information, and identification in cities.- VI).- Now then, the sub examine presents a very particular situation, namely the fact that the appellant's premises is located on land adjacent to Avenida 10, which—as alleged—is a national road (vía nacional) and constitutes a crossing route (ruta de travesía) located in the urban quadrant of San José.- The appellant invokes this circumstance and relies on the Rights of Way and Outdoor Advertising Regulations (Reglamento de los Derechos de Vía y Publicidad Exterior), No. 29253-MOPT, to request that it be declared that the only entity with competence to regulate outdoor advertising for its client on that property is the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, and not the Municipality of San José.- This collegiate body disagrees with that assessment, for the following reasons: Certainly, national roads are under the administration of the cited Ministry, and only local roads are under the rule of the territorial corporations, as can be inferred from the various definitions given in Article 2 of Decree 29253-MOPT, which expresses itself in the following sense: "… Calles (City Streets): Urban public roads included within a quadrant, with the exception of highways that cross through it, subject to municipal jurisdiction. Calles locales (Local Streets): Public roads included within the quadrant of an urban area, and not classified as urban crossings on the national road network (red vial nacional). Calzada (Roadway): Surface of the road on which vehicles travel, composed of one or more traffic lanes. Does not include the shoulder (espaldón). Caminos no clasificados (Unclassified Roads): Public roads such as bridle paths, trails, footpaths, and tracks that provide access to very few users, who will bear the maintenance and improvement costs. The categories of neighborhood roads (caminos vecinales) and local streets are not included. Caminos vecinales (Neighborhood Roads): Public roads that provide direct access to farms or other rural economic units; they connect hamlets and towns with the national road network and are characterized by low traffic volumes and high proportions of short-distance local trips. Carreteras (Highways): Public land roads subject to the jurisdiction of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. (Decreto Ejecutivo 26213-M.O.P.T.). Carretera de acceso restringido (Restricted Access Highway): Are all those roads on which, by provision of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, and for reasons of capacity or safety, it is advisable to limit the access or exit of vehicles, and access or exit is only permitted at intersections. Likewise, entry to adjoining properties is permitted via frontage roads (vías marginales). Carretera de acceso semirestringido (Semi-Restricted Access Highway): Those highways whose operating conditions require control of the number, appropriate design, and adequate construction of accesses to ensure the smooth flow of vehicles, in order to minimize the risk of accidents. Carreteras primarias (Primary Highways): Network of trunk routes to serve corridors, characterized by relatively high traffic volumes and a high proportion of international, interprovincial, or long-distance trips. Carreteras secundarias (Secondary Highways): Routes connecting important cantonal capitals not served by primary highways, as well as other population, production, or tourism centers that generate a considerable number of interregional or intercantonal trips. Carreteras terciarias (Tertiary Highways): Routes that collect traffic from primary and secondary highways and constitute the main roads for trips within a region or between important districts. Derecho de vía (Right of Way): Strip of land, owned by the State, of public domain nature (naturaleza demanial), intended for the construction of road works for vehicular traffic, and other works related to safety, ornamentation, and pedestrian use, generally comprised between the boundaries separating it from the public or private lands adjacent to the road. Escampaderos (Bus Shelters): Structure designed by the Engineering Department of the Consejo de Transporte Público, located in the right of way of national highways for use by users of the paid public passenger transport service at authorized stops and duly signposted by the Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito, in which institutional and/or commercial information may be included. These structures are also known as casetas or parabuses. Red vial cantonal (Cantonal Road Network): Set of cantonal roads determined by the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad, based on the respective technical studies. Consisting of neighborhood roads, local streets, and unclassified roads, not included by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes within the national road network. Their administration corresponds to the municipalities. Red vial nacional (National Road Network): Set of national highways determined by the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad, based on the respective technical studies, and consisting of primary, secondary, and tertiary highways, whose administration is the competence of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. Terreno privado (Private Land): Property adjacent or not to rights of way, whose ownership and/or possession is lawfully exercised by an individual. Terreno público (Public Land): Property belonging to the State, not susceptible to appropriation by individuals in accordance with current laws. However, it may be leased to individuals when so requested and when meeting the requirements of the Law and current regulations. Vía Pública (Public Road): Road infrastructure of public domain and common use that, by provision of the administrative authority, is destined for the free transit of transport vehicles and persons, in accordance with the laws and planning regulations and that, in fact, is destined for that public use, subject to the provisions established in the Ley de Tránsito No. 7331." According to this regulation, furthermore, everything concerning the installation, replacement, construction, reconstruction, and exhibition of all types of advertisements, signs (rótulos), billboards (vallas), for buses (para buses), and in general any kind of outdoor advertising, on public or private land, corresponds to the latter, which will be the only competent authority in the matter (Article 1).- Numeral 10 requires authorization from that body, through a license to be issued by the Department of Road Inspection and Demolitions (Departamento de Inspección Vial y Demoliciones), according to expressly established requirements (Article 11).- VII).- As can be seen then, we are faced with an apparent concurrence of powers between the Municipalidad de San José and the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. The question lies in determining the points of intersection between the local regulations and those of the Executive Branch, whether there is antagonism between them, to the point that the competencies of one extinguish or limit those of the other, or vice versa, or if, on the contrary, it is possible to reconcile them, for the sake of better satisfying the public interest.- This last topic, by the way, has already been analyzed by the Sala Constitucional of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, which analyzed the constitutional validity of Decree No. 29253-M.O.P.T. That High Court, in its judgment No. 2003-02127 of thirteen hours and thirty-seven minutes on March 14, 2003, indicated:

II.- Subject of the action. The plaintiff challenges Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29253-M.O.P.T., which is the Rights of Way and Outdoor Advertising Regulations, as he believes its provisions create a conflict of competencies between the municipalities and the M.O.P.T., injure the principle of municipal autonomy by stripping municipalities of regulatory powers in matters of urban planning as established by the Ley de Planificación Urbana, the Ley de Construcciones, and the Outdoor Advertising Regulations for the Canton of Escazú, approved and implemented by the local government. Specifically, he challenges Articles 1, 3, and 4, and the rest of the provisions, due to their connection. Decree 29253-M.O.P.T. was promulgated based on Articles 11 and 14 of the Ley de Administración Vial, Article 2 subsection a) of the Law Creating the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, Article 125 in fine in relation to Article 206 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, and Articles 1, 2, and 19 of the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, all of which establish the competence of the M.O.P.T. to ensure the proper use of the rights of way of the national road network. Likewise, they assign competencies to the municipalities regarding the cantonal road network, according to the policies established by that Ministry.

III.- Municipal jurisdiction by subject matter. For the study of this action, it is necessary to analyze municipal autonomy and its jurisdiction in relation to local and national interests and services. The plaintiff alleges that the policies of the M.O.P.T. and the procedures for granting permits for the installation of signs (rótulos) do not coincide with municipal policies in that area and, far from contributing to improving the situation of urban development control projects set by the local government, produce negative consequences resulting from the lack of coordination that must exist between State entities. He also states that the M.O.P.T.'s policies regarding the construction of structures in rights of way, or the imposition of constructive regulations on private individuals, as well as the installation of signs (rótulos) on public and private land facing national highways, are in most cases contrary to municipal initiatives to order or standardize the harmonious growth of the city. He further points out that the Ley de Planificación Urbana and the Ley de Construcciones grant Municipalities the power to issue licenses for the installation of signs (rótulos) within their territory, which in his opinion includes the rights of way and the lands facing highways and roads that form part of the national road network.

The Chamber has referred in several judgments to the issue of municipal competence to regulate local interests and has analyzed how, since the enactment of the current Constitution (Carta Magna), Municipal Corporations are in charge of the administration of local interests, for which they have been granted autonomy, including budgetary autonomy, although subject to the Contraloría General de la República. Likewise, in application of Article 121 subsection 13), they have the power to impose taxes. In judgment 6469-97 of sixteen hours and twenty minutes on October 8, 1997, this Court indicated that the territorial decentralization of the municipal regime does not imply the elimination of the competencies constitutionally assigned to other State bodies, so there are local interests whose custody corresponds to the Municipalities and alongside them, others coexist whose constitutional and legal protection is attributed to other public entities. Likewise, there will be tasks that by their nature are municipal—local—and cannot be withdrawn from that sphere of competence to turn them into national services or interests, because doing so would imply dismantling the Municipality, or better yet, emptying it of constitutional content. Therefore, it is not possible to establish impassable limits of the local beforehand, but rather to unravel what corresponds or not to the communal government, it is necessary to conduct an examination in each specific case.

IV.- Analysis of Decree 29253-M.O.P.T. The plaintiff indicates that the challenged Decree allows the M.O.P.T. to authorize, control, and regulate the growth and urban development of public and private properties that border national highways, in accordance with the Ley General de Caminos Públicos, which in his opinion violates the principle of municipal autonomy. After analyzing the content of the challenged Regulations, it is concluded that it authorizes the M.O.P.T. to administer, supervise, and regulate, at the national level, the rights of way of the national road network, as well as the installation, replacement, construction, reconstruction, and exhibition of all types of advertisements, signs (rótulos), billboards (vallas), bus shelters (parabuses) on public or private land. Such public or private land is, according to the definition of the regulation itself, properties adjacent or not to a right of way. The Regulation regulates activities and tasks to be carried out on the rights of way that form part of the national road network, whose ownership corresponds to the State, but whose administration is granted to the M.O.P.T. This does not imply any interference with the constitutional competencies assigned to the Municipalities, which retain the power to administer the rights of way on the roads that form part of the cantonal road network. The principle of municipal autonomy is not injured, as this Court already indicated in judgment 5445-99, that Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution grant autonomy to municipal governments regarding "the administration of local interests and services in each canton": "X.- (...) The constitutional mandate must be understood as a reservation of material jurisdiction in favor of local governments and their regulation to define 'the local,' a sphere that can only be reduced by law—since it is a constitutional matter and a true right in favor of these institutions—in such a way that it leads to maintaining the integrity of local services and interests, in the terms indicated by this Court in judgment number 06469-97, cited above. A conflict cannot, then, be created by antagonism or protagonism between the matter that makes up the general purpose of 'local interests and services' and national or state public interests and services, intrinsically distinct from one another, but which in reality are called to coexist; and this is so, because both types of interest can be, eventually, intermingled and rather, it is frequent that, depending on the economic and organizational capacity of local governments, their own limitations lead to broadening the circle of those that appear as national or state, which makes it clear that the distinction should not be immutable, but gradual or variable; but in any case, as expressed by the jurisprudence cited above, it will ultimately be up to the judge to decide whether the criteria of distinction conform or not to the constitutional dimensioning. Once the material competence of the municipality in a given territorial circumscription is defined, it is clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that can be deemed national or state; therefore, it is essential to define the form of co-participation of powers that is inevitable, since the public capacity of the municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities is national; from which it follows that the municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent required by the circumstances." (Judgment No. 5445-99).

The Ley General de Caminos Públicos grants the M.O.P.T. the administration of the rights of way of the national road network and the municipalities the administration of the cantonal road network. Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the Organic Law of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, this entity is responsible for: "...a) Planning, building, and improving highways and roads. Maintaining highways and collaborating with the Municipalities in the conservation of neighborhood roads (caminos vecinales). Regulating and controlling the rights of way of existing or planned highways and roads. Regulating, controlling, and supervising traffic and transport on public roads." Such function is part of its work as rector in matters of roadways. For its part, Article 2 of the cited Law provides that this Ministry is responsible for regulating and controlling the rights of way on national highways.

The challenged Regulations establish that their objective is to grant the M.O.P.T. administration powers—in a broad sense—over the rights of way of the national road network and over land, public or private, or in rights of way under the care of the M.O.P.T. Its provisions do not violate Article 169 of the Constitution, which guarantees municipal autonomy, since none curtails the regulatory powers in matters of urban planning and construction that have been granted to the municipalities. The Regulation clearly determines which roads form part of the cantonal road network, following the distinction contained in that regard in the Ley de Caminos Públicos. Thus, it establishes that city streets (calles), local streets (calles locales), unclassified roads (caminos no clasificados), and neighborhood roads (caminos vecinales) are subject to municipal jurisdiction. In this way, both the Municipality and the M.O.P.T. have jurisdiction over public roads; when they concur in a given space, their execution requires coordination between the public and private institutions involved, so that the intended objectives and purposes are fulfilled.

Moreover, when the Regulation indicates that the M.O.P.T. will exercise its administration powers on "public or private land" and defines these as those properties "adjacent or not to the rights of way...", it is evident that it must be understood as referring to land located on or facing national highways or facing rights of way that form part of the national road network, not the cantonal road network, over which the only competent entity will be the corresponding Municipality. The M.O.P.T. is the rector entity in matters of roadways and the competent entity to issue the general road policies to be applied.

In relation to the scope of the M.O.P.T.'s powers in roadway matters, this Court ruled in judgment 5445-99, in which it stated: "Therefore, the regulation of the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the roads, of gas stations and public parking lots, the definition of road safety, its financing, payment of taxes, fines, and traffic rights, and matters concerning the ownership of motor vehicles (Article 1 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) are specific tasks derived from the general management of public roads, which by their nature are national, not local (municipal) matters, and consequently it is up to the Executive Branch to carry out their regulation; so that it is the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes that dictates and executes the management regarding concessions of paid public passenger transport, defines the location of bus stops, and the signaling of public roads, for example. However, in accordance with what was stated in Considering X of this judgment, this is a task that the MOPT must carry out in coordination with local functions, in the terms indicated in the challenged norm and in the provisions of the analyzed Article 5 of the repealed Código Municipal and Article 7 of the new legal body, so that when the management of public roads is issued, it must be done respecting the local legal order, which in this matter means that it must be done in accordance with the regulatory plans (planes reguladores) issued by the municipalities for their territorial jurisdiction where they exist, or in coordination with them to resolve what is most convenient, in jurisdictions where no regulatory plans exist. In view of the foregoing considerations, Article 2 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres does not violate municipal autonomy, and therefore the action must be dismissed on this point as well." In relation to road planning, in the same cited judgment, the Chamber stated: "...For its part, urban planning is closely related to the planning of public land roads that are destined for public service and use in general, a matter that by legal definition has been assigned to the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes; according to the definition of its own Creation Law, when it states what is relevant: 'The Ministerio de Obras Pública y Transportes has the purpose of: a) [...] Regulating and controlling the rights of way of existing or planned highways. Regulating, controlling, and supervising traffic and transport on public roads.' Therefore, the regulation of the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the roads, of gas stations and public parking lots, the definition of road safety, its financing, payment of taxes, fines, and traffic rights, and matters concerning the ownership of motor vehicles (Article 1 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) are specific tasks derived from the general management of public roads, which by their nature are national, not local (municipal) matters, and consequently it is up to the Executive Branch to carry out their regulation; so that it is the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes that dictates and executes the management regarding concessions of paid public passenger transport, defines the location of bus stops, and the signaling of public roads, for example. However, in accordance with what was stated in Considering X of this judgment, this is a task that the M.O.P.T. must carry out in coordination with local functions, in the terms indicated in the challenged norm and in the provisions of the analyzed Article 5 of the repealed Código Municipal and Article 7 of the new legal body, so that when the management of public roads is issued, it must be done respecting the local legal order, which in this matter means that it must be done in accordance with the regulatory plans (planes reguladores) issued by the municipalities for their territorial jurisdiction where they exist, or in coordination with them to resolve what is most convenient, in jurisdictions where no regulatory plans exist. In view of the foregoing considerations, Article 2 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres does not violate municipal autonomy…".

The notion of "coordination" then becomes a key element in inter-institutional relations. In Judgment No. 6706-93 of fifteen hours and twenty-one minutes on December 21, 1993, and in relation to the topic, this Court stated: "It becomes evident that it is not about removing competencies or powers from the municipalities, but rather about the due coordination that must exist with public offices, so that local interests and services do not conflict with national ones, as the maintenance of the national road network does not imply the administration or regulation thereof; for this reason, this provision is also not unconstitutional, in the terms challenged." The plaintiff alleges in the brief filing the action that there is no coordination whatsoever between the State entities. That, as such, is not a reason to challenge the Regulations. As noted in the previous considering, the fact that the Municipality is competent to regulate "the local" does not prevent it from, on certain occasions, having to coordinate actions and programs with other institutions and organs of the State, for the purpose of achieving the public aims that are foreseen. Such obligation also works in reverse: State institutions must coordinate with municipalities those tasks in which the interests of both entities concur in one way or another. In that sense, if there is no coordination between the Municipality and the M.O.P.T., that omission does not violate the Political Constitution nor is it a consequence of the challenged Decree; at most, it would constitute an infringement of an obligation held by state institutions and organs.

Institutions that regulate the same subject matter, albeit in different spheres, cannot ignore the concurrent powers (competencias concurrentes) of each, as doing so would be contrary to the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) according to which public officials are subject to the Constitution and the laws, and in general to the entire legal system, which obligates them to fulfill the functions, duties, and obligations that the system assigns to them. Municipal governments have the authority to administer local services and interests, which includes the roads that form part of the cantonal road network (red vial cantonal), clearly defined by the Public Roads Law (Ley de Caminos Públicos). Regarding coordination and its importance, in judgment number 5445-99 of 2:30 p.m. on July 14, 1999, the Chamber stated: “X.- REGARDING THE OBLIGATION OF COORDINATION WITH STATE INSTITUTIONS. Several of the provisions challenged in this unconstitutionality action -articles 5, 10, and 186 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), 2 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Roads (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres), 2 of the General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), 9 and 10 of the National Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Nacional), 26 and 27 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and 4, 10, 16, 17, and 18 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana)- refer to the obligation of coordination that must exist between local governments, decentralized institutions, and the Executive Branch, to carry out the functions entrusted to them, which must be analyzed based on the very nature of municipal autonomy. It is by virtue of the provisions of Article 170 of the Constitution that the municipalities (local corporate entities) enjoy functional, administrative, and financial autonomy in the administration of local interests and services (Article 169 of the Political Constitution), which has been repeatedly recognized in constitutional jurisprudence […]. And as has been indicated in that jurisprudence and in the concepts contained in the preceding recitals (considerandos), the sphere of competence and definition of powers entrusted to the municipalities are determined in the Fundamental Charter itself, insofar as they refer strictly to what is ‘local’. The constitutional mandate must be understood as a reservation of material competence in favor of local governments and their regulations to define ‘the local’, a sphere that can only be reduced by law -because it involves constitutional matter and a genuine right in favor of these institutions-, in such a way that it leads to maintaining the integrity of local services and interests, in the terms set forth by this Court in judgment number 06469-97, cited above. Therefore, a conflict cannot be created by antagonism or protagonism between the subject matter that constitutes the general purpose of ‘local interests and services’ and the ‘national’ or ‘state’ public interests and services, which are intrinsically distinct from one another, but which are actually called to coexist; and this is so, because both types of interest may be, eventually, intermingled, and indeed, it is common that, depending on the economic and organizational capacity of local governments, their own limitations lead to expanding the circle of those that appear as national or state, which shows that the distinction must not be immutable, but rather gradual or variable; but in any case, as expressed by the aforementioned jurisprudence, it will ultimately fall to the judge to decide whether the criteria for distinction conform or not to the constitutional dimensioning. Once the material competence of the municipality within a specific territorial circumscription is defined, it is clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that can be deemed national or state; for this reason, it is essential to define the form of shared participation (cooparticipación) of powers that is inevitable, since the public capacity of the municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities, national; hence, the municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional territory, to the extent circumstances require. That is, municipalities can share their powers with the Public Administration in general, a relationship that must develop in the terms defined by law (Article 5 of the former Municipal Code, Article 7 of the new Code), which establishes the obligation of ‘coordination’ between the municipalities and the public institutions that concur in the performance of their powers, to avoid duplication of efforts and contradictions, above all, because only voluntary coordination is compatible with municipal autonomy as it is its expression. In other terms, the municipality is called to enter into cooperative relations with other public entities, and vice versa, given the concurrent or coincident nature -in many cases- of interests surrounding a specific matter. In doctrine, coordination is defined based on the existence of several independent centers of action, each with its own tasks and decision-making powers, and possibly discrepant; despite this, there must be a community of ends by subject matter, but by concurrence, insofar as the receiving object of the final results of the activity and the acts of each is common.” V.- Conclusion. The rights-of-way (derechos de vía) that border highways and roads that form part of the national road network (red vial nacional) do not share the ‘local’ character indicated by Article 169 of the Political Constitution. Regarding the regulation of advertising –in general– on ‘public or private land’ as indicated by Article 1 of the challenged Decree, and in light of the definition established in Article 2 of the Regulations, it must be understood that the power of the MOPT falls upon those lands that face highways or roads that form part of the national road network only. The Tribunal considers that this is not part of the ‘local services and interests’ over which the Municipality has competence. In accordance with the foregoing, this Tribunal considers that Decree No. 29253-MOPT does not violate the principle of municipal autonomy, and therefore the action is unfounded and must be dismissed on the merits. Judge Vargas dissents and orders the action to proceed." The Tribunal determines, in accordance with the aforementioned ruling, that in the matter of outdoor advertising it is indeed possible to reconcile the powers that the MOPT –for the national road network– and the municipalities –for the cantonal road network– have in relation to public roads, particularly when a national road passes through an urban center. Not in vain, both entities –the national and the local ones– seek to satisfy identical objectives in this area –which in both cases reveal a profound public interest– and among which are guaranteeing and promoting the safety of drivers and users in general, maintaining the creative value of that outdoor advertising, preserving the landscape from visual blight, and in essence, achieving a better balance between the urban landscape and said advertising messages. Regarding this advertising, Costa Rican law grants preeminence to the Municipality, for the issuance of licenses and construction permits (permisos de construcción) –the latter, if necessary–, if the private property where the sign will be placed is adjacent to a cantonal road; on the other hand, it must be understood that if a specific business or private individual wishes to place a sign on private land bordering a national road, the powers are shared, that is, authorization from the Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de Obras Públicas) and the Municipality is required, without whose concurrence its placement will not be possible. It should be noted that in reality there is no insurmountable contradiction between Regulation 29253-MOPT and the San José Urban Master Plan (Plan Director Urbano de San José), as the appellant claims; rather, this collegiate body considers that this collision is only apparent and that it allows the interpretation just mentioned, which makes it possible to rule out any improper intrusion by one body into the competence of the other and vice versa; in fact, what happens in practice is that the Municipalities always require, in cases like the present, an authorization or approval (visto bueno) from the Ministry, prior to the granting of the license. The Outdoor Advertising Regulations (Reglamento de Publicidad Exterior) of the Municipality of San José, on the other hand, is absolutely clear when it provides in its numeral 2.4 subsection e), that a requirement to obtain the license is, "e) Approval (Visto bueno) of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), in cases of properties facing streets of the National Road Network (Red Vial Nacional)", which confirms the thesis set forth. VIII). In accordance with all of the foregoing, it should be noted, first, that the appellant does need to obtain a license from the Municipality of San José, to place the printed materials in the windows of its property, as required by the current Urban Master Plan. Furthermore, to obtain this latter license, it also requires authorization or approval from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, because its business is located on a private property adjacent to a national road. Tornillos Especiales de Centroamérica S.A. does not have the municipal license –in fact, it is being requested to initiate the process, and that is why this improper hierarchical appeal was resorted to– and also failed to demonstrate having authorization from the MOPT, by virtue of which the only possible conclusion is that the signs were placed outside the legal framework. Consequently, the decision by the Municipality is in accordance with the law and must be confirmed.” Specifically, it challenges Articles 1, 3, and 4 and the rest of the articles, by connection (conexidad).

Decree 29253-M.O.P.T. was enacted based on Articles 11 and 14 of the Road Administration Law (Ley de Administración Vial), Article 2, subsection a) of the Law Creating the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ley de Creación del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), Article 125 in fine in relation to Article 206 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres), and Articles 1, 2, and 19 of the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), all of which establish the competence of the M.O.P.T. to ensure the appropriate use of the rights-of-way (derechos de vía) of the national road network. Likewise, they assign competences to the municipalities regarding the cantonal road network, according to the policies established by that Ministry.

**III.- Municipal competence by reason of the matter.** For the study of this action, it is necessary to analyze municipal autonomy and its competence in relation to local and national interests and services. The petitioner (accionante) alleges that the policies of the M.O.P.T. and the procedures for granting permits for the installation of signs do not coincide with municipal policies on this matter and, far from contributing to improving the situation of urban development control projects established by the local government, negative consequences arise from the lack of coordination that must exist between State entities. He also states that the policies of the M.O.P.T. regarding the construction of structures in rights-of-way, or the imposition of construction regulations on individuals, as well as the installation of signs on public and private lands facing national highways, are in most cases contrary to municipal initiatives to order or standardize the harmonious growth of the city. He also points out that the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) and the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) grant the Municipalities the power to issue licenses for the installation of signs within their territory, which, in his opinion, includes the rights-of-way and lands facing highways and roads that are part of the national road network. This Chamber (La Sala) has referred in several rulings to the issue of municipal competence to regulate local interests and has analyzed how, since the enactment of the current Magna Carta, Municipal Corporations are in charge of the administration of local interests, for which they have been granted autonomy, including budgetary autonomy, although subject to the General Comptrollership of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). Likewise, in application of Article 121, subsection 13), they have the power to impose taxes. In ruling 6469-97 at sixteen hours twenty minutes on October eighth, nineteen ninety-seven, this Court indicated that the territorial decentralization of the municipal regime does not imply the elimination of the competences constitutionally assigned to other State bodies, so there exist local interests whose custody corresponds to the Municipalities and, alongside them, others coexist whose constitutional and legal protection is attributed to other public entities. Likewise, there will be tasks that by their nature are municipal -local- and cannot be removed from that sphere of competence to convert them into national services or interests, because doing so would imply dismantling the Municipality (Municipalidad), or better yet, emptying it of constitutional content. Therefore, it is not possible beforehand to establish the insurmountable limits of the local, but rather, to unravel what corresponds or not to the communal government, it is necessary to conduct an examination in each specific case.

**IV.- Analysis of Decree 29253-M.O.P.T.** The petitioner (accionante) points out that the challenged Decree allows the M.O.P.T. to authorize, control, and regulate the growth and urban development of public and private properties adjoining national highways, in accordance with the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), which in his opinion violates the principle of municipal autonomy. Having analyzed the content of the challenged Regulation, it is concluded that it authorizes the M.O.P.T. to administer, oversee, and regulate, at a national level, **the rights-of-way (derechos de vía) of the national road network**, as well as the installation, replacement, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, bus shelters (parabuses) on public or private lands. Such public or private lands are, as defined by the regulation itself, properties adjacent or not to a right-of-way. The Regulation regulates activities and tasks to be executed on the rights-of-way that are part of the national road network, whose ownership corresponds to the State, but whose administration is granted to the M.O.P.T. This does not imply any interference with the constitutional competences assigned to the Municipalities, which retain the power to administer the rights-of-way on the roads that are part of the cantonal road network. The principle of municipal autonomy is not harmed, since this Court already indicated in ruling 5445-99 that Articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) grant autonomy to municipal governments regarding "the administration of local interests and services in each canton": "X.- (...) The constitutional mandate must be understood as a reservation of material competence in favor of local governments and their regulations to define "**the local**," an area that can only be reduced by law—since it is a constitutional matter and a true right in favor of these institutions—such that it leads to the maintenance of the integrity of local services and interests, in the terms indicated by this Court in ruling number 06469-97, cited above (supra). Thus, a conflict cannot be created by antagonism or protagonism between the matter that integrates the general purpose of 'local interests and services' and 'national' or 'state' public interests and services, which are intrinsically distinct from one another, but are in reality destined to coexist; and this is so, because both types of interest may, eventually, be intermingled, and rather, it is frequent that, depending on the economic and organizational capacity of local governments, their own limitations lead to expanding the circle of those that appear as national or state, which shows that the distinction should not be immutable, but gradual or variable; but in any case, as expressed in the jurisprudence cited above, it will ultimately fall to the judge to decide whether the criteria of distinction conform or not to the constitutional dimensioning (dimensionamiento). Having defined the material competence of the municipality in a specific territorial circumscription, it is clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that may be considered national or state; for this reason, it is essential to define the form of co-participation (cooparticipación) of attributions that is inevitable, given that the public capacity of the municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities, national; from which it results that the municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent that circumstances demand it." (ruling (sentencia) No. 5445-99). The General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos) grants the M.O.P.T. the administration of the rights-of-way of the national road network and to the municipalities the administration of the cantonal road network. Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), the latter is responsible for: "...a) Planning, building, and improving highways and roads. Maintaining highways and collaborating with Municipalities in the conservation of local roads. Regulating and controlling the rights-of-way of existing or planned highways and roads. Regulating, controlling, and monitoring transit and transport on public roads." This function is part of its role as the governing body in matters of road transportation (vialidad). For its part, Article 2 of the cited Law provides that it corresponds to that Ministry to regulate and control the rights-of-way on national highways. The challenged Regulation establishes that its objective is to grant the M.O.P.T. administration powers—in a broad sense—over the rights-of-way of the national road network and over lands, public or private, or in rights-of-way under the care of the M.O.P.T. Its provisions do not violate Article 169 of the Constitution that guarantees municipal autonomy, since none curtails the regulatory powers that have been granted to the municipalities in matters of urban planning and construction. The Regulation clearly determines which roads form part of the cantonal road network, following the distinction contained in that regard in the Law of Public Roads (Ley de Caminos Públicos). Thus, it establishes that streets, local streets, unclassified roads, and local roads are subject to municipal jurisdiction. In this way, both the Municipality (Municipalidad) and the M.O.P.T. have competence over public roads; when concurring in a specific space, their execution requires coordination between the public and private institutions involved, so that the foreseen objectives and purposes are met. Furthermore, when the Regulation indicates that the M.O.P.T. will exercise its administration powers on "public or private lands" and defines these as those properties "adjacent or not to the rights-of-way...", it is clear that it must be understood as referring to lands located on or facing national highways or facing rights-of-way that are part of the national road network, not the cantonal road network, over which the sole competent authority will be the corresponding Municipality (Municipalidad). The M.O.P.T. is the governing entity in road transportation matters and the competent body to dictate the general road policies to be applied. Regarding the scope of the M.O.P.T.'s powers in road transportation matters, this Court ruled in ruling 5445-99, in which it stated: "Therefore, the regulation of the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the roads, of gas stations and public parking lots, the definition of road safety, its financing, payment of taxes, fines, and traffic fees, and matters relating to the ownership of motor vehicles (Article 1 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres)) are specific tasks deriving from the general management of public roads, which by their nature are national, not local (municipal) matters, and consequently it is the Executive Branch that is responsible for carrying out their regulation; such that it is the Ministry of Public Works and Transport that dictates and executes the regulations concerning concessions for remunerated public passenger transport, defines the location of bus stops, and the signage of public roads, for example. However, in accordance with what was stated in Considerando X of this ruling, this is a task that the M.O.P.T. must develop in coordination with local functions, in the terms indicated in the challenged norm and in the provisions of the analyzed Article 5 of the repealed Municipal Code and Article 7 of the new legal body, so that when the regulation of public roads is dictated, it must be done respecting the local legal order, which equates in this matter to doing so in accordance with the regulatory plans (planes reguladores) dictated by the municipalities for their territorial jurisdiction where they exist, or in coordination with them to resolve what is most convenient, in jurisdictions where regulatory plans do not exist. In view of the foregoing considerations, Article 2 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) does not violate municipal autonomy, and therefore the action must be declared without merit, also on this point." Regarding road management, in the same cited ruling, this Chamber (La Sala) stated: "...For its part, urban planning (ordenación urbanística) is closely related to the management of public land routes that are destined for public service and use in general, a matter that by legal definition has been assigned to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport; according to the definition of the very Law of its creation, when it states, relevantly: 'The Ministry of Public Works and Transport has the objective of: a) [...] Regulating and controlling the rights-of-way of existing or planned highways. Regulating, controlling, and monitoring transit and transport on public roads.' Therefore, the regulation of the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on the roads, of gas stations and public parking lots, the definition of road safety, its financing, payment of taxes, fines, and traffic fees, and matters relating to the ownership of motor vehicles (Article 1 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres)) are specific tasks deriving from the general management of public roads, which by their nature are national, not local (municipal) matters, and consequently it is the Executive Branch that is responsible for carrying out their regulation; such that it is the Ministry of Public Works and Transport that dictates and executes the regulations concerning concessions for remunerated public passenger transport, defines the location of bus stops, and the signage of public roads, for example. However, in accordance with what was stated in Considerando X of this ruling, this is a task that the M.O.P.T. must develop in coordination with local functions, in the terms indicated in the challenged norm and in the provisions of the analyzed Article 5 of the repealed Municipal Code and Article 7 of the new legal body, so that when the regulation of public roads is dictated, it must be done respecting the local legal order, which equates in this matter to doing so in accordance with the regulatory plans (planes reguladores) dictated by the municipalities for their territorial jurisdiction where they exist, or in coordination with them to resolve what is most convenient, in jurisdictions where regulatory plans do not exist. In view of the foregoing considerations, Article 2 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) does not violate municipal autonomy…" The notion of "coordination" thus becomes a key element in inter-institutional relations. In ruling No. 6706-93 at fifteen hours twenty-one minutes on December twenty-first, nineteen ninety-three and in relation to the topic, this Court stated: "It is evident that it is not about removing competences or attributions from the municipalities, but rather about the due coordination that must exist with public agencies, so that local interests and services do not conflict with national ones, insofar as the maintenance of the national road network does not imply their administration or regulation; for this reason, this provision is also not unconstitutional, in the challenged terms." The petitioner (accionante) alleges in the brief filing the action that no coordination whatsoever exists between State entities. That, as such, is not a reason to challenge the Regulation. As was stated in the preceding considerando, the fact that the Municipality (Municipalidad) is competent to regulate "the local" does not prevent it from, on certain occasions, having to coordinate actions and programs with other institutions and State bodies, for the purpose of achieving the public goals that are foreseen. Such obligation also works in reverse: State institutions must coordinate with the municipalities those tasks where the interests of both entities concur in one way or another. In that sense, if no coordination exists between the Municipality (Municipalidad) and the M.O.P.T., that omission does not violate the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), nor is it a consequence of the challenged Decree; at most, it would constitute an infraction of an obligation that State institutions and bodies have. Institutions that regulate the same matter, albeit in different spheres, cannot ignore each other's concurrent competences, as this would be contrary to the principle of legality (principio de legalidad) according to which public officials are subject to the Constitution (Constitución) and the laws, and in general to the entire legal order, which obliges them to comply with the functions, duties, and obligations that the legal system assigns them. Municipal governments have competence to administer local services and interests, which includes the roads that form part of the cantonal road network, clearly defined by the Law of Public Roads (Ley de Caminos Públicos). Regarding coordination and its importance, in ruling number 5445-99 at 14:30 hours on July 14, 1999, this Chamber (La Sala) stated: **"X.- ON THE OBLIGATION OF COORDINATION WITH STATE INSTITUTIONS.** Several of the provisions challenged in this unconstitutionality action—Articles 5, 10, and 186 of the Municipal Code, 2 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres), 2 of the General Law of Public Roads (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), 9 and 10 of the National Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Nacional), 26 and 27 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and 4, 10, 16, 17, and 18 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana)—refer to the obligation of coordination that must exist between local governments, decentralized institutions, and the Executive Branch, to carry out the functions entrusted to them, which must be analyzed based on the very nature of municipal autonomy. It is by virtue of the provisions of Article 170 of the Constitution that the municipalities (local corporate entities) enjoy functional, administrative, and financial autonomy in the administration of local interests and services (Article 169 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política)), which has been recognized in constitutional jurisprudence in a reiterated manner [...]. And as has been stated in that jurisprudence and in the concepts contained in the preceding considerandos (considerandos), the sphere of competence and definition of attributions that the municipalities are entrusted with is determined in the Fundamental Charter itself, insofar as they refer strictly to the '**local**.' The constitutional mandate must be understood as a reservation of material competence in favor of local governments and their regulations to define '**the local**,' an area that can only be reduced by law—since it is a constitutional matter and a true right in favor of these institutions—such that it leads to the maintenance of the integrity of local services and interests, in the terms indicated by this Court in ruling number 06469-97, cited above (supra). Thus, a conflict cannot be created by antagonism or protagonism between the matter that integrates the general purpose of 'local interests and services' and 'national' or 'state' public interests and services, which are intrinsically distinct from one another, but are in reality destined to coexist; and this is so, because both types of interest may, eventually, be intermingled, and rather, it is frequent that, depending on the economic and organizational capacity of local governments, their own limitations lead to expanding the circle of those that appear as national or state, which shows that the distinction should not be immutable, but gradual or variable; but in any case, as expressed in the jurisprudence cited above, it will ultimately fall to the judge to decide whether the criteria of distinction conform or not to the constitutional dimensioning (dimensionamiento). Having defined the material competence of the municipality in a specific territorial circumscription, it is clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that may be considered national or state; for this reason, it is essential to define the form of co-participation (cooparticipación) of attributions that is inevitable, given that the public capacity of the municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities, national; from which it results that the municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent that circumstances demand it. That is, municipalities can share their competences with the Public Administration (Administración Pública) in general, a relationship that must develop in the terms as defined in law (Article 5 of the former Municipal Code, Article 7 of the new Code), which establishes the obligation of '**coordination**' between the municipalities and the public institutions that concur in the performance of their competences, to avoid duplication of efforts and contradictions, above all, because only voluntary coordination is compatible with municipal autonomy, being its expression. In other terms, **the municipality is called to enter into cooperative relationships with other public entities, and vice versa,** given the concurrent or coincident nature—in many cases—of interests around a specific matter. In doctrine, coordination is defined based on the existence of several independent centers of action, each with its own tasks and decision-making powers, and potentially discrepant; despite this, there must be a community of goals per matter, but by concurrence, insofar as the object receiving the final results of the activity and acts of each one is common." **V.- Conclusion.** The rights-of-way (derechos de vía) that adjoin highways and roads forming part of the national road network do not participate in the "local" character indicated by Article 169 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). As for the regulation of advertising—in general—on "public or private lands" as indicated in Article 1 of the challenged Decree, and in light of the definition established in Article 2 of the Regulation, it must be understood that the power of the M.O.P.T. falls upon those lands facing highways or roads that form part of the national road network only. The Court considers that this does not form part of the "local services and interests" over which the Municipality (Municipalidad) has competence. In accordance with the foregoing, this Court considers that Decree No. 29253-MOPT does not violate the principle of municipal autonomy, therefore the action is without merit and must be rejected on the merits.

Magistrate Vargas dissents and orders that the action be given course.".- </i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:\r\n150%'>The Tribunal determines, in accordance with the referenced ruling, that in\r\nmatters of outdoor advertising it is indeed possible to reconcile the powers that the\r\nMOPT has in relation to public roads—for the national road network (red vial nacional)—and the municipalities—cantonal road network (red vial cantonal)—in particular\r\nwhen a national road passes through an urban center.- Not in vain, both entities\r\n—the national one and the local ones—seek to satisfy identical\r\nobjectives in this area—which in both cases reveal a profound public interest—among\r\nwhich are ensuring and promoting the safety of drivers and\r\nusers in general, maintaining the creative value of that outdoor advertising,\r\npreserving the landscape from social contamination, and in essence, achieving a better\r\nbalance between the urban landscape and said advertising messages.- With respect\r\nto that advertising, Costa Rican law grants preeminence to the Municipality, for\r\nthe issuance of licenses and construction permits—the latter if necessary—if the private property where the sign (rótulo) will be placed is adjacent to a cantonal road; however, it must be understood\r\nthat if a specific business or private individual wishes to place a sign on\r\nprivate land adjoining a national road, the powers are\r\nshared, that is, authorization is required from the Ministry of Public\r\nWorks and the Municipality, without whose concurrence its\r\nplacement will not be possible.- It should be noted that in reality there is no irreconcilable contradiction\r\nbetween Regulation 29253-MOPT and the Urban Master Plan (Plan Director Urbano) of San José, as the appellant alleges; rather, this collegiate body\r\nconsiders that this collision is only apparent and allows for the\r\ninterpretation just mentioned, which makes it possible to rule out\r\nany improper intrusion by one body into the powers of the other and\r\nvice versa; in fact, what happens in practice is that the Municipalities\r\nalways require, in cases like the present one, an authorization or approval (visto bueno) from the\r\nMinistry, prior to the granting of the license.- The Outdoor Advertising Regulation of the Municipality of San José, on the other hand, is absolutely\r\nclear when it provides in its section 2.4 subsection e), that a requirement to obtain\r\nthe license is, <i>"e) Approval (visto bueno) of the Ministry of Public Works and\r\nTransport (MOPT), in the cases of properties with frontage onto streets of the National Road Network (Red Vial Nacional)", </i>which\r\nconfirms the thesis set forth.-<span class=SpellE><b>VIII</b></span><b>).- </b>In\r\naccordance with all of the above, it is worth noting, first of all, that the\r\nappellant does need to obtain a license from the Municipality of San\r\nJosé, to place the printed materials on the windows of its property, as required\r\nby the current Urban Master Plan. Moreover, to obtain this\r\nlicense, it also requires authorization or approval from the Ministry of Public\r\nWorks and Transport, since its business is located on private property\r\nadjacent to a national road.- Tornillos Especiales de Centroamérica S.A. does\r\nnot have the municipal license—in fact, it is being asked to initiate the procedure\r\nand that is why this improper hierarchical appeal was filed—and it also did not demonstrate\r\nhaving authorization from the MOPT, by virtue of which it is only possible\r\nto conclude that the signs were placed outside the legal\r\nframework. Consequently, the decision made by the Municipality is\r\nin accordance with the law and must be confirmed.” <o:p></o:p></span></p> That High Court, in its judgment Nº2003-02127 of thirteen hours and thirty-seven minutes of March fourteenth, two thousand three, stated: II.- Object of the action. The plaintiff challenges Executive Decree N° 29253-M.O.P.T., which is the Regulation on Rights-of-Way and Outdoor Advertising (Reglamento de los Derechos de Vía y Publicidad Exterior), as he believes its provisions create a conflict of jurisdiction between the municipalities and the M.O.P.T., violate the principle of municipal autonomy by depriving municipalities of regulatory powers regarding urban planning (planificación urbana) as established by the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), and the Outdoor Advertising Regulation (Reglamento del Publicidad Exterior) for the Canton of Escazú, approved and implemented by the local government. Specifically, he challenges articles 1, 3, and 4, and the rest of the articles, by connection. Decree 29253-M.O.P.T. was enacted based on articles 11 and 14 of the Road Management Law (Ley de Administración Vial), article 2, subsection a) of the Law Creating the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ley de Creación del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), article 125 in fine in relation to article 206 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Roads (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres), and articles 1, 2, and 19 of the General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), all of which establish the M.O.P.T.'s jurisdiction to ensure the proper use of rights-of-way (derechos de vía) of the national road network. Likewise, they assign jurisdiction to the municipalities regarding the cantonal road network, according to the policies established by that Ministry. III.- Municipal jurisdiction by subject matter. For the study of this action, an analysis must be made of municipal autonomy and its jurisdiction in relation to local and national interests and services. The plaintiff alleges that M.O.P.T. policies and the procedures for granting permits for the installation of signs do not coincide with municipal policies on this matter and, far from contributing to improving the situation of the urban development control projects set by the local government, produce negative consequences resulting from the lack of coordination that should exist among state entities. He also states that M.O.P.T. policies regarding the construction of structures in rights-of-way (derechos de vía), or the imposition of construction regulations on individuals, as well as the installation of signs on public and private lands fronting national highways, are in most cases contrary to municipal initiatives to order or standardize the harmonious growth of the city. He further notes that the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) and the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) grant the Municipalities the power to issue licenses for the installation of signs within their territory, which in his view, includes rights-of-way (derechos de vía) and lands fronting highways and roads that are part of the national road network. This Chamber (La Sala) has referred in several judgments to the issue of municipal jurisdiction to regulate local interests and has analyzed how, since the enactment of the current Magna Carta, the Municipal Corporations are responsible for the administration of local interests, for which they have been granted autonomy, including budgetary, although subject to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). Likewise, in application of article 121, subsection 13), they have the power to impose taxes. In judgment 6469-97 of sixteen hours twenty minutes of October eight, nineteen ninety-seven, this Court indicated that the territorial decentralization of the municipal regime does not imply the elimination of powers constitutionally assigned to other State organs, so there are local interests whose custody corresponds to the Municipalities and alongside them, others coexist whose constitutional and legal protection is attributed to other public entities. Likewise, there will be tasks that by their nature are municipal—local—and cannot be removed from that sphere of jurisdiction to turn them into national services or interests, because doing so would imply dismantling the Municipality, or better still, emptying it of constitutional content. Therefore, it is not possible to establish beforehand the impassable limits of what is local; rather, to unravel what corresponds or not to communal government, an examination must be made in each specific case. IV.- Analysis of Decree 29253-M.O.P.T. The plaintiff points out that the challenged Decree allows the M.O.P.T. to authorize, control, and regulate the urban growth and development of public and private properties adjoining national highways, in accordance with the General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), which in his view violates the principle of municipal autonomy. Having analyzed the content of the challenged Regulation, it is concluded that it authorizes the M.O.P.T. to administer, supervise, and regulate, at the national level, the rights-of-way (derechos de vía) of the national road network, as well as the installation, replacement, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of advertisements, signs, billboards, bus shelters (parabuses) on public or private lands. Such public or private lands are, according to the regulation itself, properties adjacent or not to a right-of-way (derecho de vía). The Regulation regulates activities and works to be carried out on the rights-of-way (derechos de vía) that are part of the national road network, the ownership of which belongs to the State, but whose administration is granted to the M.O.P.T. This does not imply any interference with the constitutional powers assigned to the Municipalities, which retain the power to administer the rights-of-way (derechos de vía) over roads that are part of the cantonal road network. The principle of municipal autonomy is not harmed, as this Court already indicated in judgment 5445-99, that articles 169 and 170 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) grant autonomy to municipal governments regarding "the administration of local interests and services in each canton": "X.- (...) The constitutional mandate must be understood as a reservation of material jurisdiction in favor of local governments and their regulation to define 'the local' (lo local), an area that can only be reduced by law—as it is a constitutional matter and a true right in favor of these institutions—in such a way that it leads to maintaining the integrity of local services and interests, in the terms indicated by this Court in judgment number 06469-97, cited above. Therefore, a conflict cannot be created by antagonism or protagonism between the subject matter that constitutes the general purpose of 'local interests and services' and 'national' or 'state' public interests and services, intrinsically distinct from one another, but which in reality are meant to coexist; and this is so, because both types of interest can, eventually, be intermingled, and indeed, it is frequent that, depending on the economic and organizational capacity of local governments, their own limitations lead to expanding the sphere of those that appear as national or state, which shows that the distinction should not be immutable, but gradual or variable; but in any case, as expressed by the jurisprudence cited above, it will ultimately fall to the judge to decide whether the criteria for distinction conform or not to the constitutional dimensioning (dimensionamiento). Once the material jurisdiction of the municipality in a specific territorial circumscription is defined, it is clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that can be deemed national or state; therefore, it is essential to define the form of shared participation (cooparticipación) of attributions that is inevitable, since the public capacity of the municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities is national; from which it follows that municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent that circumstances require it." (judgment N° 5445-99). The General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos) grants the M.O.P.T. the administration of the rights-of-way (derechos de vía) of the national road network and to the municipalities the administration of the cantonal road network. Likewise, in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of the Organic Law of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), the following corresponds to it: "...a) Plan, build, and improve highways and roads. Maintain highways and collaborate with the Municipalities in the conservation of neighborhood roads. Regulate and control the rights-of-way (derechos de vía) of existing or projected highways and roads. Regulate, control, and monitor transit and transportation on public roads." Such function is part of its role as governing body in matters of road management (vialidad). For its part, article 2 of the aforementioned Law provides that said Ministry is responsible for regulating and controlling the rights-of-way (derechos de vía) on national highways. The challenged Regulation establishes that its purpose is to grant the M.O.P.T. broad administrative powers over the rights-of-way (derechos de vía) of the national road network and over lands, public or private, or on rights-of-way (derechos de vía) under the care of the M.O.P.T. Its provisions do not violate Constitutional article 169, which guarantees municipal autonomy, as none curtail the regulatory powers that, in matters of urban planning (planificación urbana) and construction, have been granted to the municipalities. The Regulation clearly determines which roads are part of the cantonal road network, following the distinction contained in that regard in the Public Roads Law (Ley de Caminos Públicos). Thus, it establishes that streets, local streets, unclassified roads, and neighborhood roads are subject to municipal jurisdiction. In this way, both the Municipality and the M.O.P.T. have jurisdiction over public roads; by concurring in a specific space, their execution requires coordination between the public and private institutions involved, so that the intended objectives and purposes are fulfilled. On the other hand, when the Regulation indicates that the M.O.P.T. will exercise its administrative powers on "public or private lands" and defines these as properties "adjacent or not to rights-of-way (derechos de vía)...", it is evident that it must be understood to refer to lands located on or fronting national highways or fronting rights-of-way (derechos de vía) that are part of the national road network, not of the cantonal road network, over which the only competent authority will be the corresponding Municipality. The M.O.P.T. is the governing entity in matters of road management (vialidad) and the one competent to dictate the general road policies to be applied. Regarding the scope of the M.O.P.T.'s powers in matters of road management (vialidad), this Court pronounced in judgment 5445-99, in which it indicated: "Therefore, the regulation of the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on roads, of gas stations and public parking lots, the definition of road safety, its financing, payment of taxes, fines, and transit fees, and matters regarding the ownership of motor vehicles (article 1 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Roads (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres)) are specific tasks deriving from the general ordering of public roads, which by their nature are national, not local (municipal) matters, and that consequently, the Executive Branch is responsible for carrying out their regulation; thus, it is the Ministry of Public Works and Transport that dictates and executes the ordering regarding concession of paid public transportation of persons, defines the location of bus stops, and the signaling of public roads, for example. However, in accordance with what is indicated in Considerando X of this judgment, this is a task that the MOPT must develop in coordination with local functions, in the terms indicated in the challenged norm and in the provisions of the analyzed article 5 of the repealed Municipal Code and article 7 of the new legal body, so that when the ordering of public roads is dictated, it must be done respecting the local legal order, which in this matter equates to being done in accordance with the regulatory plans (planes reguladores) issued by the municipalities for their territorial jurisdiction where they exist, or in coordination with them to resolve what is most appropriate, in jurisdictions where regulatory plans (planes reguladores) do not exist. In consideration of the foregoing, article 2 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Roads (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) does not violate municipal autonomy, and therefore the action must be dismissed, also on this point." In relation to road ordering, in the same cited judgment, the Chamber (la Sala) stated: "...For its part, urban ordering (ordenación urbanística) is closely related to the ordering of public land roads intended for public service and use in general, a matter that by legal definition has been assigned to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport; according to the definition of the Law of its creation itself, when it indicates, as relevant: 'The Ministry of Public Works and Transport has the purpose of: a) [...] Regulating and controlling the rights-of-way (derechos de vía) of existing or projected highways. Regulating, controlling, and monitoring transit and transportation on public roads.' Therefore, the regulation of the circulation of vehicles, persons, and livestock on roads, of gas stations and public parking lots, the definition of road safety, its financing, payment of taxes, fines, and transit fees, and matters regarding the ownership of motor vehicles (article 1 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Roads (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres)) are specific tasks deriving from the general ordering of public roads, which by their nature are national, not local (municipal) matters, and that consequently, the Executive Branch is responsible for carrying out their regulation; thus, it is the Ministry of Public Works and Transport that dictates and executes the ordering regarding concession of paid public transportation of persons, defines the location of bus stops, and the signaling of public roads, for example. However, in accordance with what is indicated in Considerando X of this judgment, this is a task that the M.O.P.T. must develop in coordination with local functions, in the terms indicated in the challenged norm and in the provisions of the analyzed article 5 of the repealed Municipal Code and article 7 of the new legal body, so that when the ordering of public roads is dictated, it must be done respecting the local legal order, which in this matter equates to being done in accordance with the regulatory plans (planes reguladores) issued by the municipalities for their territorial jurisdiction where they exist, or in coordination with them to resolve what is most appropriate, in jurisdictions where regulatory plans (planes reguladores) do not exist. In consideration of the foregoing, article 2 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Roads (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) does not violate municipal autonomy…”. The notion of "coordination" thus becomes a key element in inter-institutional relations. In judgment N° 6706-93 of fifteen hours twenty-one minutes of December twenty-first, nineteen ninety-three, and in relation to the issue, this Court stated: "It is evident that it is not a matter of removing powers or attributes from the municipalities, but rather of the proper coordination that must exist with public agencies, so that local interests and services do not conflict with national ones, insofar as the maintenance of the national road network does not imply their administration or regulation; for this reason, this provision is not unconstitutional either, in the challenged terms." The plaintiff alleges in the brief filing the action that there is no coordination whatsoever among State entities. This, as such, is not a reason to challenge the Regulation. As noted in the previous considering, the fact that the Municipality is competent to regulate "the local" (lo local) does not preclude that, on certain occasions, it must coordinate actions and programs with other institutions and organs of the State, in order to achieve the intended public purposes. This obligation also works in reverse: State institutions must coordinate with the municipalities those tasks in which the interests of both entities concur in one way or another. In that sense, if there is no coordination between the Municipality and the M.O.P.T., that omission does not violate the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) nor is it a consequence of the challenged Decree; at most, it would constitute a breach of an obligation that state institutions and organs have. Institutions that regulate the same subject matter, although in different spheres, cannot ignore each other's concurrent powers, as this would be contrary to the principle of legality according to which officials are subject to the Constitution and the laws, and in general to the entire legal system, which obliges them to fulfill the functions, duties, and obligations that the system assigns to them. Municipal governments have jurisdiction to administer local services and interests, which includes roads that are part of the cantonal road network, clearly defined by the Public Roads Law (Ley de Caminos Públicos). Regarding coordination and its importance, in judgment number 5445-99 of 14:30 hours of July 14, 1999, the Chamber (la Sala) stated: "X.- OF THE OBLIGATION OF COORDINATION WITH STATE INSTITUTIONS. Several of the provisions questioned in this unconstitutionality—articles 5, 10, and 186 of the Municipal Code, 2 of the Law on Transit on Public Land Roads (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres), 2 of the General Public Roads Law (Ley General de Caminos Públicos), 9 and 10 of the National Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Nacional), 26 and 27 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and 4, 10, 16, 17, and 18 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana)—refer to the obligation of coordination that must exist between local governments, decentralized institutions, and the Executive Branch, to carry out the functions entrusted to them, which must be analyzed based on the very nature of municipal autonomy. It is by virtue of the provisions of Constitutional article 170, that the municipalities (local corporate entities) enjoy functional, administrative, and financial autonomy in the administration of local interests and services (article 169 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política)), which has been recognized in constitutional jurisprudence repeatedly […]. And as has been indicated in that jurisprudence and in the concepts contained in the preceding considerandos, the sphere of jurisdiction and definition of attributions that the municipalities have been entrusted with are determined in the Fundamental Charter itself, insofar as they strictly refer to 'the local' (lo local). The constitutional mandate must be understood as a reservation of material jurisdiction in favor of local governments and their regulation to define 'the local' (lo local), an area that can only be reduced by law—as it is a constitutional matter and a true right in favor of these institutions—in such a way that it leads to maintaining the integrity of local services and interests, in the terms indicated by this Court in judgment number 06469-97, cited above. Therefore, a conflict cannot be created by antagonism or protagonism between the subject matter that constitutes the general purpose of 'local interests and services' and 'national' or 'state' public interests and services, intrinsically distinct from one another, but which in reality are meant to coexist; and this is so, because both types of interest can, eventually, be intermingled, and indeed, it is frequent that, depending on the economic and organizational capacity of local governments, their own limitations lead to expanding the sphere of those that appear as national or state, which shows that the distinction should not be immutable, but gradual or variable; but in any case, as expressed by the jurisprudence cited above, it will ultimately fall to the judge to decide whether the criteria for distinction conform or not to the constitutional dimensioning (dimensionamiento). Once the material jurisdiction of the municipality in a specific territorial circumscription is defined, it is clear that there will be tasks that by their nature are exclusively municipal, alongside others that can be deemed national or state; therefore, it is essential to define the form of shared participation (cooparticipación) of attributions that is inevitable, since the public capacity of the municipalities is local, and that of the State and other entities is national; from which it follows that municipal territory is simultaneously state and institutional, to the extent that circumstances require it. That is, municipalities can share their powers with the Public Administration (Administración Pública) in general, a relationship that must develop in terms as defined in law (article 5 of the previous Municipal Code, article 7 of the new Code), which establishes the obligation of 'coordination' between the municipalities and the public institutions that concur in the performance of their powers, to avoid duplications of efforts and contradictions, above all, because only voluntary coordination is compatible with municipal autonomy as it is its expression. In other terms, the municipality is called to enter into cooperative relations with other public entities, and vice versa, given the concurrent or coincident nature—in many cases—of interests regarding a specific matter. In doctrine, coordination is defined based on the existence of several independent centers of action, each with their own tasks and decision-making powers, and potentially conflicting ones; despite this, there must be a community of ends by subject matter, but by concurrence, insofar as the object receiving the final results of the activity and acts of each one is common." V.- Conclusion. The rights-of-way (derechos de vía) adjoining highways and roads that are part of the national road network do not partake of the "local" (local) character indicated by article 169 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). Regarding the regulation of advertising—in general—on "public or private lands" as indicated by article 1 of the challenged Decree, and in light of the definition established in article 2 of the Regulation, it must be understood that the M.O.P.T.'s power falls on those lands fronting highways or roads that are part of the national road network only. The Court considers that this is not part of the "local services and interests" over which the Municipality has jurisdiction. In accordance with the foregoing, this Court considers that Decree N° 29253-MOPT does not violate the principle of municipal autonomy, and therefore the action is without merit and must be dismissed on the merits.

Magistrate Vargas issues a dissenting vote and orders that the action be given course.".- </i><span style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height: 150%'>The Tribunal determines, in accordance with the aforementioned ruling, that in matters of outdoor advertising (publicidad exterior) it is indeed possible to reconcile the competencies that, in relation to public roads, are held by MOPT—for the national road network—and the municipalities—cantonal road network—, particularly when a national road traverses an urban center.- Not in vain, both entities—the national and the local ones—seek to satisfy identical objectives in this area—which in both cases reveal a profound public interest—and among which are guaranteeing and promoting the safety of drivers and users in general, maintaining the creative value of that outdoor advertising, preserving the landscape from social contamination, and in essence, achieving a better balance between the urban landscape and said advertising messages.- With respect to that advertising, Costa Rican law grants preeminence to the Municipality, for the issuance of licenses and construction permits—the latter if necessary—, if the private property (inmueble) where the sign will be placed is adjacent to a cantonal road; on the other hand, it must be understood that if a specific business or private individual wishes to place a sign on private land adjacent to a national road, the competencies are shared, that is, authorization is required from the Ministry of Public Works and the Municipality, without whose concurrence its placement will not be possible.- It should be noted that in reality there is no irreconcilable contradiction between Regulation 29253-MOPT and the San José Urban Master Plan (Plan Director Urbano de San José), as the appellant claims; rather, this collegiate body considers that this collision is only apparent and allows the interpretation just mentioned, which makes it possible to rule out any undue intrusion by one body into the competencies of the other and vice versa; in fact, what occurs in practice is that the Municipalities always require, in cases such as the present one, an authorization or approval (visto bueno) from the Ministry, prior to granting the license.- The Outdoor Advertising Regulation of the Municipality of San José, on the other hand, is absolutely clear when it provides in its section 2.4 subsection e), that a requirement to obtain the license is, <i>"e) Approval from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MOPT), in cases of properties with frontage onto streets of the National Road Network (Red Vial Nacional)", </i>which confirms the thesis set forth.- <span class=SpellE><b>VIII</b></span><b>).- </b>In accordance with all the foregoing, it is worth noting, in the first place, that the appellant does need to obtain a license from the Municipality of San José to place the printed materials on the windows of its property, as this is required by the current Urban Master Plan. Furthermore, to obtain this latter license, it also requires authorization or approval from the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, because its business is located on a private property adjacent to a national road.- Tornillos Especiales de Centroamérica S.A. does not have the municipal license—in fact, it is being requested to initiate the procedure, and that is why this improper hierarchical channel was resorted to—and it also did not demonstrate that it had authorization from MOPT, by reason of which the only possible conclusion is that the signs were placed outside the legal framework (ordenamiento jurídico). Consequently, the decision reached by the Municipality is lawful and must be upheld." <o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> </div> </body> </html>

“V).- En cuanto al fondo, debe señalarse en primer lugar, que "Tornillos Especiales de Centroamérica S.A.", desarrolla su negocio en un local ubicado en el Centro de la ciudad Capital, concretamente en avenida 10, calles 18 y 20, por ende, se encuentra dentro del ámbito competencial de la Municipalidad de San José, que tiene plenas potestades constitucionales y legales para regular el ejercicio de su actividad comercial, imponerle la obtención de licencia y el pago del impuesto de patente.- Además, resulta evidente que dicha compañía está sujeta, en materia de regulación urbanística, a las disposiciones debidamente aprobadas por la corporación local, normativa que resulta de acatamiento obligatorio y que no puede dejar de observarse.- El Plan Director Urbano de San José, publicado en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta, Nº 166 del cinco de junio del dos mil cinco, incluye el Reglamento de la Publicidad Exterior, cuyo propósito, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 1º, es el de: "Regular y controlar todo lo referente a la publicidad exterior, ubicada en propiedad privada pero con proyección al espacio público del Cantón de San José, con el fin de lograr un mejor equilibrio entre el paisaje urbano y los mensajes publicitarios". Igualmente se establece, que para colocar, sustituir o remodelar anuncios, rótulos, letreros, avisos, vallas y demás tipologías -a las que denomina con el término genérico de rótulos-, es obligatorio obtener licencia de la Municipalidad de San José, y que en caso de requerirse una estructura constructiva que los soporte, se necesitará permiso de construcción, según los requisitos que allí mismo se regulan (artículo 2).- Ahora bien, según se acepta en el recurso, la recurrente colocó unas láminas perforadas con impresiones digitales en las ventanas de un local comercial suyo, láminas que ciertamente constituyen un rótulo, en los términos del Reglamento antes citado, y en los de la Sección V del Plan Director Urbano, que en el "Glosario", define como tal, "Todo letrero, escritura, impreso, emblema, pintura, dibujo u otro medio cuyo propósito sea llamar la atención sobre algún producto o actividad que se ofrezca o se elabore en el mismo sitio donde el rótulo está ubicado". Aunque la recurrente ha alegado en sede administrativa que no se trata de un impreso publicitario, que no tiene un mensaje explícito y que se colocó con la finalidad de proteger los productos de las inclemencias del tiempo, tales afirmaciones no son de recibo, pues basta como en el caso concreto, con que contenga imágenes relacionadas con el giro del negocio, para considerarlo como tal, sin que en autos haya prueba capaz de desvirtuar esta última circunstancia. El caso es que sí se trata de un rótulo y como tal, está sujeto a la obtención de licencia municipal, de conformidad el plan regulador del Cantón Central de San José.- En este sentido, el Tribunal entiende que no hay ningún negocio comercial, ubicado dentro de los límites territoriales de dicha Municipalidad, que esté excluido del control que ésta última puede y debe ejercer sobre la publicidad exterior que pretendan colocar en sus locales.- Recuérdese que por disposición constitucional y legal, esos entes territoriales tienen plena competencia para regular todo lo relativo a la satisfacción de los intereses y servicios locales, dentro de los cuales se encuentra indudablemente, la búsqueda de un equilibrio entre la obra arquitectónica y urbana y los mensajes publicitarios, como medio de comunicación, información e identificación en las ciudades.- VI).- Ahora bien, el sub examine presenta una situación muy particular, y es el hecho de que el local de la recurrente se ubica en un terreno adyacente a la Avenida 10, la cual -como se alega-, es vía nacional y constituye una ruta de travesía ubicada en el cuadrante urbano de San José.- El recurrente invoca esa circunstancia y se ampara en el Reglamento de los Derechos de Vía y Publicidad Exterior, Nº 29253-MOPT, para solicitar que se declare que el único con competencia para regular en ese predio la publicidad exterior de su representada, es el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, no así la municipalidad josefina.- Este órgano colegiado disiente de esa apreciación, por las siguientes razones: Ciertamente, las vías nacionales están bajo la administración del Ministerio citado, y únicamente las locales están bajo el imperio de las corporaciones territoriales, tal y como se desprende de las diversas definiciones que da el artículo 2 del Decreto 29253-MOPT, que se expresa en el siguiente sentido: “… Calles: Vías públicas urbanas comprendidas dentro de un cuadrante, con excepción de las carreteras que lo atraviesan, sujetas a la jurisdicción municipal. Calles locales : Vías públicas incluidas dentro del cuadrante de un área urbana, y que no estén clasificadas como travesías urbanas en la red vial nacional. Calzada : Superficie de la vía sobre la que transitan los vehículos, compuesta por uno o varios carriles de circulación. No incluye el espaldón. Caminos no clasificados: Caminos públicos tales como los caminos de herradura, las sendas, las veredas y los trillos que proporcionen acceso a muy pocos usuarios, los cuales sufragarán los costos de mantenimiento y mejoramiento. No se incluyen las categorías de caminos vecinales y calles locales. Caminos vecinales: Caminos públicos que suministren el acceso directo a las fincas o a otras unidades económicas rurales; unen caseríos y poblados con la red vial nacional y se caracterizan por tener bajos volúmenes de tránsito y altas proporciones de viajes locales de corta distancia. Carreteras: Vías públicas terrestres sujetas a la jurisdicción del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. (Decreto Ejecutivo 26213-M.O.P.T.). Carretera de acceso restringido : Son todas aquellas vías en las cuales, por disposición del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, y por razones de capacidad o seguridad sea conveniente limitar el acceso o salida de vehículos, y únicamente se permite el acceso o salida de los mismos en las intersecciones. Asimismo, se permite el ingreso a las propiedades colindantes mediante las vías marginales . Carretera de acceso semirestringido: Son aquellas carreteras que por sus condiciones de operación requieren control del número, diseño apropiado y construcción adecuada de los accesos para asegurar el tránsito fluido de vehículos, con el fin de minimizar el riesgo de accidentes. Carreteras primarias : Red de rutas troncales para servir a corredores, caracterizadas por volúmenes de tránsito relativamente altos y con una alta proporción de viajes internacionales, interprovinciales o de larga distancia. Carreteras secundarias : Rutas que conectan cabeceras cantonales importantes, que no sean servidas por carreteras primarias, así como a otros centros de población, producción o turismo que generen una cantidad considerable de viajes interregionales o intercantonales. Carreteras terciarias: Rutas que recogen el tránsito de las carreteras primarias y secundarias y que constituyen las vías principales para los viajes dentro de una región o entre distritos importantes. Derecho de vía : Franja de terreno, propiedad del Estado, de naturaleza demanial, destinada para la construcción de obras viales para la circulación de vehículos, y otras obras relacionadas con la seguridad, el ornato y el uso peatonal, generalmente comprendida entre los linderos que la separan de los terrenos públicos o privados adyacentes a la vía. Escampaderos : Estructura de diseño autorizado por el Departamento de Ingeniería del Consejo de Transporte Público, ubicada en el derecho de vía de las carreteras nacionales para ser utilizadas por los usuarios del servicio público de transporte remunerado de personas en paradas autorizadas y debidamente señalizadas por la Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito, en la cual se puede incluir información institucional y/o comercial. Estas estructuras son también conocidas como casetas o parabuses. Red vial cantonal: Conjunto de carreteras nacionales determinadas por el Consejo Nacional de Vialidad, con sustento en los estudios técnicos respectivos. Constituida por los caminos vecinales, calles locales y caminos no clasificados, no incluidos por el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes dentro de la red vial nacional. Su administración corresponde a las municipalidades. Red vial nacional : Conjunto de carreteras nacionales determinadas por el Consejo Nacional de Vialidad, con sustento en los estudios técnicos respectivos, y constituidas por carreteras primarias, secundarias y terciarias, cuya administración es competencia del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. Terreno privado : Inmueble adyacente o no a los derechos de vía, cuya propiedad y/o posesión es lícitamente ejercida por un particular. Terreno público: Inmueble perteneciente al Estado, no susceptible de apropiación por particulares de acuerdo con las leyes vigentes. Sin embargo, podrá darse en arrendamiento a particulares cuando así se solicite y se cumpla con los requisitos de Ley y reglamentos vigentes. Vía Pública : Infraestructura vial de dominio público y de uso común que por disposición de la autoridad administrativa se destinare al libre tránsito de los vehículos de transporte y de las personas, de conformidad con las leyes y reglamento de planificación y que, de hecho, esté destinado a ese uso público, con sujeción a las disposiciones establecidas en la Ley de Tránsito No. 7331". De acuerdo con esa reglamentación, además, lo concerniente a la instalación, sustitución, construcción, reconstrucción y exhibición de todo tipo de anuncios, rótulos, vallas, para buses y en general cualquier clase de publicidad exterior, en terrenos públicos o privado corresponde a este último, quien será la única autoridad competente en la materia (artículo 1º).- El numeral 10 exige autorización de ese órgano, mediante una licencia que será requisitos expresamente establecidos (artículo 11).- s, o en los derechos de vía que están al cuidado del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes VII).- Como se advierte entonces, estamos ante una aparente concurrencia de atribuciones entre la Municipalidad de San José y el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. La cuestión, radica en determinar cuáles son los puntos de encuentro entre la normativa local y la del Poder Ejecutivo, si existe antagonismo entre ellas, al punto de que las competencias de una extingan o limiten las del otro, o viceversa, o si por el contrario, resulta posible conciliarlas, en aras de la mejor satisfacción del interés público.- Este último tema, por cierto, ya ha sido analizado por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, que analizó la validez constitucional del decreto Nº 29253-M.O.P.T. Ese Alto Tribunal, en su sentencia Nº2003-02127 de las trece horas con treinta y siete minutos del catorce de marzo del dos mil tres, indicó: II.- Objeto de la acción. El accionante impugna el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29253-M.O.P.T. que es Reglamento de los Derechos de Vía y Publicidad Exterior, pues estima que sus disposiciones crean un conflicto de competencias entre las municipalidades y el M.O.P.T., lesionan el principio de autonomía municipal pues le resta a las municipalidades potestades reguladoras en materia de planificación urbana tal y como lo establecen la Ley de Planificación Urbana, la Ley de Construcciones y el Reglamento del Publicidad Exterior para el Cantón de Escazú, aprobado y puesto en ejecución por el gobierno local. En concreto impugna los artículos 1°, 3° y 4° y el resto del articulado, por conexidad. El Decreto 29253-M.O.P.T. se promulgó con fundamento en los artículos 11 y 14 de la Ley de Administración Vial, artículo 2 inciso a) de la Ley de Creación del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, el artículo 125 in fine en relación con el artículo 206 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y los artículos 1, 2 y 19 de la Ley General de Caminos Públicos, todos los cuales establecen la competencia del M.O.P.T. para velar por el uso adecuado de los derechos de vía de la red vial nacional. Asimismo, asignan competencias a las municipalidades en cuanto a la red vial cantonal, según las políticas establecidas por ese Ministerio. III.- Competencia municipal en razón de la materia. Para el estudio de esta acción, es preciso hacer un análisis sobre la autonomía municipal y su competencia en relación con los intereses y servicios locales y nacionales. Alega el accionante que las políticas del M.O.P.T. y los procedimientos para la concesión de los permisos para la instalación de rótulos, no coinciden con las políticas municipales en esa materia y lejos de contribuir a mejorar la situación de los proyectos de control del desarrollo urbano fijados por el gobierno local, se producen consecuencias negativas producto de la falta de coordinación que debe existir entre los entes del Estado. Manifiesta también que las políticas del M.O.P.T. en cuanto a la construcción de estructuras en los derechos de vía, o la imposición de regulaciones constructivas a los particulares, así como la instalación de rótulos en terrenos públicos y privados que enfrentan carreteras nacionales, resultan en la mayoría de los casos contrarias a las iniciativas municipales de ordenar o uniformar el crecimiento armónico de la ciudad. Señala asimismo, que la Ley de Planificación Urbana y la Ley de Construcciones otorgan a las Municipalidades la potestad de otorgar licencias para la instalación de rótulos dentro de su territorio, lo que a su juicio, incluye los derechos de vía y los terrenos que enfrentan carreteras y caminos que forman parte de la red vial nacional. La Sala se ha referido en varias sentencias al tema de la competencia municipal para regular los intereses locales y ha analizado como, a partir de la promulgación de la actual Carta Magna, las Corporaciones Municipales tienen a su cargo la administración de los intereses locales, para lo cual se les ha otorgado autonomía, incluida la presupuestaria, aunque sujeta a la Contraloría General de la República. Asimismo, en aplicación del artículo 121 inciso 13), tienen potestad para imponer tributos. En la sentencia 6469-97 de las dieciséis horas veinte minutos del ocho de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y siete, este Tribunal indicó que la descentralización territorial del régimen municipal, no implica la eliminación de las competencias asignadas constitucionalmente a otros órganos del Estado, de manera que existen intereses locales cuya custodia corresponde a las Municipalidades y junto a ellos, coexisten otros cuya protección constitucional y legal es atribuida a otros entes públicos. Asimismo, habrá cometidos que por su naturaleza son municipales -locales- y no pueden ser substraídos de ese ámbito de competencia para convertirlos en servicios o intereses nacionales, porque hacerlo implicaría desarticular a la Municipalidad, o mejor aún, vaciarla de contenido constitucional. Por ello, no es posible de antemano establecer los límites infranqueables de lo local, sino que para desentrañar lo que corresponde o no al gobierno comunal, es preciso hacer un examen en cada caso concreto. IV.- Análisis del Decreto 29253-M.O.P.T. .Señala el accionante que el Decreto impugnado permite que sea el M.O.P.T. el que autorice, controle y regule el crecimiento y desarrollo urbano de los predios públicos y privados que colindan con carreteras nacionales, de conformidad con la Ley General de Caminos Públicos, lo que a su juicio viola el principio de autonomía municipal. Analizado el contenido del Reglamento impugnado se concluye que autoriza al M.O.P.T. a administrar, fiscalizar y regular, a nivel nacional los derechos de vía de la red vial nacional , así como la instalación, sustitución, construcción, reconstrucción y exhibición de todos tipo de anuncios, rótulos, vallas, parabuses en terrenos públicos o privados. Tales terrenos públicos o privados son, según define el mismo reglamento, inmuebles adyacentes o no a un derecho de vía. El Reglamento regula actividades y labores a ejecutar sobre los derechos de vía que forman parte de la red vial nacional, cuya titularidad corresponde al Estado, pero cuya administración se otorga al M.O.P.T. Ello no supone ninguna interferencia con las competencias constitucionales asignadas a las Municipalidades, que conservan la potestad de administrar los derechos de vía sobre los caminos que forman parte de la red vial cantonal. No se lesiona el principio de autonomía municipal, pues ya este Tribunal indicó en la sentencia 5445-99, que los artículos 169 y 170 de la Constitución Política otorgan autonomía a los gobiernos municipales en cuanto a “la administración de los intereses y servicios locales en cada cantón”: “X.- (...) Debe entenderse el mandato constitucional como una reserva de competencia material en favor de los gobiernos locales y de su reglamento para definir " lo local ", ámbito que sólo puede ser reducido por ley -por tratarse de materia constitucional y de un verdadero derecho a favor de estas instituciones-, de manera tal que conduzca al mantenimiento de la integridad de los servicios e intereses locales, en los términos señalados por este Tribunal en sentencia número 06469-97, supra citada. No puede, entonces, crearse un conflicto por antagonismo o protagonismo entre la materia que integra el fin general de "los intereses y servicios locales" de los intereses y servicios públicos "nacionales" o "estatales", intrínsecamente distintos unos de otros, pero que en realidad están llamados a coexistir; y ello es así, porque ambos tipos de interés pueden estar, eventualmente, entremezclados y más bien, es frecuente que, dependiendo de la capacidad económica y organizativa de los gobiernos locales, sus limitaciones propias conduzcan a ampliar el círculo de los que aparecen como nacionales o estatales, lo que hace ver que la distinción no debe ser inmutable, sino gradual o variable; pero en todo caso, como lo ha expresado la jurisprudencia antes citada, corresponderá en última instancia al juez decidir si los criterios de distinción se conforman o no con el dimensionamiento constitucional. Definida la competencia material de la municipalidad en una circunscripción territorial determinada, queda claro que habrá cometidos que por su naturaleza son exclusivamente municipales, a la par de otros que pueden ser reputados nacionales o estatales; por ello es esencial definir la forma de cooparticipación de atribuciones que resulta inevitable, puesto que la capacidad pública de las municipalidades es local, y la del Estado y los demás entes, nacional; de donde resulta que el territorio municipal es simultáneamente estatal e institucional, en la medida en que lo exijan las circunstancias.” (sentencia N° 5445-99). La Ley General de Caminos Públicos otorga al M.O.P.T. la administración de los derechos de vía de la red vial nacional y a las municipalidades la administración de la red vial cantonal. Asimismo, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 1° de la Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, le corresponde a este: “...a) Planificar, construir y mejorar las carreteras y caminos. Mantener las carreteras y colaborar con las Municipalidades en la conservación de los caminos vecinales. Regular y controlar los derechos de vía de las carreteras y caminos existentes o en proyecto. Regular, controlar y vigilar el tránsito y el transporte por los caminos públicos.” Tal función es parte de su labor como rector en materia de vialidad. Por su parte, el artículo 2° de la citada Ley dispone que le corresponde a ese Ministerio regular y controlar los derechos de vía sobre carreteras nacionales. El Reglamento impugnado establece que su objetivo es otorgar al M.O.P.T. potestades de administración –en sentido amplio-, sobre los derechos de vía de la red vial nacional y sobre terrenos, públicos o privados o en derechos de vía al cuidado del M.0.P.T. Sus disposiciones no violan el artículo 169 Constitucional que garantiza la autonomía municipal, pues ninguna cercena las potestades reguladoras que en materia de planificación urbana y de construcción, le han sido otorgadas a las municipalidades. El Reglamento determina claramente, cuales vías forman parte de la red vial cantonal, siguiendo la distinción que en ese sentido contiene la Ley de Caminos Públicos. Así, establece que las calles, las calles locales, los caminos no clasificados y los caminos vecinales están sujetas a la jurisdicción municipal. De esta forma, tanto la Municipalidad como el M.O.P.T. tienen competencia sobre vías públicas; al concurrir en un espacio determinado, su ejecución requiere coordinación entre las instituciones públicas y privadas involucradas, de manera que se cumplan los objetivos y fines previstos. Por otra parte, cuando el Reglamento indica que el M.O.P.T. ejercerá sus potestades de administración en “terrenos públicos o privados” y define estos como aquellos inmuebles “adyacentes o no a los derechos de vía...”, es evidente que deberá entenderse que se trata de terrenos ubicados o frente a carreteras nacionales o frente a derechos de vía que formen parte de la red vial nacional, no de la red vial cantonal, sobre la cual la única competente será la Municipalidad correspondiente. El M.O.P.T. es la entidad rectora en materia de vialidad y la competente para dictar las políticas viales generales a aplicar. En relación con los alcances de las potestades del M.O.P.T. en materia de vialidad, este Tribunal se pronunció en la sentencia 5445-99, en la cual indicó: “Por lo tanto, la regulación de la circulación de los vehículos, personas y semovientes en las vías, de las gasolineras y estacionamientos públicos, la definición de la seguridad vial, su financiamiento, pago de impuestos, multas y derechos de tránsito y lo referente a la propiedad de los vehículos automotores (artículo 1° de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) son tareas específicas que derivan de la ordenación general de las vías públicas, que por su naturaleza son temas nacionales, no locales (municipales), y que en consecuencia le corresponden al Poder Ejecutivo llevar a cabo su regulación; de manera que es el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes quien dicta y ejecuta la ordenación referente a las concesiones de transporte público remunerado de personas, define la ubicación de las paradas de buses, y la señalización de las vías públicas, por ejemplo. Sin embargo, de conformidad con lo señalado en el Considerado X de esta sentencia, ésta es una labor que el MOPT debe desarrollar en coordinación con las funciones locales, en los términos señalados en la norma impugnada y en lo dispuesto en el analizado artículo 5 del derogado Código Municipal y del artículo 7 del nuevo cuerpo legal, de manera que al dictarse la ordenación de las vías públicas debe hacerse respetándose el ordenamiento jurídico local, lo que equivale en esta materia, que debe hacerse conforme a los planes reguladores dictados por las municipalidades para su jurisdicción territorial en donde existan, o en coordinación con ellas para resolver lo que mejor convenga, en las jurisdicciones en las que no existan planes reguladores. En atención a las anteriores consideraciones, el artículo 2 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres no es violatorio de la autonomía municipal, por lo que debe declararse sin lugar la acción, también en este extremo.” En relación con el ordenamiento vial, en la misma sentencia citada, la Sala manifestó: “...Por su parte, la ordenación urbanística está muy relacionada con la ordenación de las vías públicas terrestres que están destinadas al servicio y uso público en general, materia que por definición legal ha sido asignada al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes; según definición de la propia Ley de su creación, cuando indica en lo que interesa: "El Ministerio de Obras Pública y Transportes tiene por objeto: a) [...] Regular y controlar los derechos de vía de las carreteras existentes o en proyecto. Regular, controlar y vigilar el tránsito y el transporte por los caminos públicos." Por lo tanto, la regulación de la circulación de los vehículos, personas y semovientes en las vías, de las gasolineras y estacionamientos públicos, la definición de la seguridad vial, su financiamiento, pago de impuestos, multas y derechos de tránsito y lo referente a la propiedad de los vehículos automotores (artículo 1° de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) son tareas específicas que derivan de la ordenación general de las vías públicas, que por su naturaleza son temas nacionales, no locales (municipales), y que en consecuencia le corresponden al Poder Ejecutivo llevar a cabo su regulación; de manera que es el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes quien dicta y ejecuta la ordenación referente a las concesiones de transporte público remunerado de personas, define la ubicación de las paradas de buses, y la señalización de las vías públicas, por ejemplo. Sin embargo, de conformidad con lo señalado en el Considerado X de esta sentencia, ésta es una labor que el M.O.P.T. debe desarrollar en coordinación con las funciones locales, en los términos señalados en la norma impugnada y en lo dispuesto en el analizado artículo 5 del derogado Código Municipal y del artículo 7 del nuevo cuerpo legal, de manera que al dictarse la ordenación de las vías públicas debe hacerse respetándose el ordenamiento jurídico local, lo que equivale en esta materia, que debe hacerse conforme a los planes reguladores dictados por las municipalidades para su jurisdicción territorial en donde existan, o en coordinación con ellas para resolver lo que mejor convenga, en las jurisdicciones en las que no existan planes reguladores. En atención a las anteriores consideraciones, el artículo 2 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres no es violatorio de la autonomía municipal…”. La noción de "coordinación" se convierte entonces, en un elemento clave en las relaciones interinstitucionales. En la sentencia N° 6706-93 de las quince horas veintiún minutos del veintiuno de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres y en relación con el tema, este Tribunal señaló: “Queda en evidencia que no se trata de quitarle competencias ni atribuciones a las municipalidades, sino más bien de la debida coordinación que debe existir con las dependencias públicas, a fin de que los intereses y servicios locales no se contrapongan con los nacionales, en tanto el mantenimiento de la red vial nacional no implica la administración ni la regulación de las mismas; por este motivo tampoco resulta inconstitucional, en los términos impugnados, esta disposición.” El accionante alega en el memorial de interposición de la acción que no existe coordinación alguna entre los entes del Estado. Ese como tal, no es un motivo para impugnar el Reglamento. Como se señaló en el considerando anterior, el hecho de que la Municipalidad sea competente para regular “lo local” no obsta para que, en determinadas ocasiones, deba coordinar acciones y programas con otras instituciones y órganos del Estado, con el objeto de alcanzar los fines públicos que están previstos. Tal obligación funciona también a la inversa: las instituciones del Estado deberán coordinar con las municipalidades aquellas labores en que de una u otra forma concurran los intereses de ambas entidades. En ese sentido, si no existe coordinación entre la Municipalidad y el M.O.P.T., esa omisión no viola la Constitución Política ni es tampoco consecuencia del Decreto impugnado; a lo sumo, constituiría una infracción a una obligación que tienen las instituciones y órganos estatales. Instituciones que regulan una misma materia, aunque en distintos ámbitos, no pueden ignorar las competencias concurrentes de cada una, pues ello sería contrario al principio de legalidad según el cual los funcionarios están sometidos a la Constitución y las leyes, y en general a todo el ordenamiento jurídico, lo que los obliga a cumplir con las funciones, deberes y obligaciones que el ordenamiento les asigna. Los gobiernos municipales tienen competencia para administrar los servicios e intereses locales, dentro de lo que se incluyen los caminos que forman parte de la red vial cantonal, definidos claramente por la Ley de Caminos Públicos. En relación con la coordinación y su importancia, en la sentencia número 5445-99 de las 14:30 horas del 14 de julio de 1999, la Sala manifestó: “X.- DE LA OBLIGACIÓN DE COORDINACIÓN CON LAS INSTITUCIONES ESTATALES. Varias de las disposiciones que se cuestionan en esta inconstitucionalidad -artículos 5, 10 y 186 del Código Municipal, 2 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, 2 de la Ley General de Caminos Públicos, 9 y 10 de la Ley de Planificación Nacional, 26 y 27 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 4, 10, 16, 17 y 18 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana-, se refieren a la obligación de coordinación que debe existir entre los gobiernos locales, las instituciones descentralizadas y el Poder Ejecutivo, para llevar a cabo las funciones que le han sido encomendadas, lo que debe ser analizado a partir de la naturaleza misma de la autonomía municipal. Es en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 170 constitucional, que las municipalidades (entes corporativos locales) gozan de autonomía funcional, administrativa y financiera en la administración de los intereses y servicios locales (artículo 169 de la Constitución Política), lo que ha sido reconocido en la jurisprudencia constitucional en forma reiterada[…]. Y como se ha señalado en esa jurisprudencia y en los conceptos contenidos en los anteriores considerandos, la esfera de competencia y definición de atribuciones que tienen encomendadas las municipalidades se determinan en la propia Carta Fundamental, en tanto se refieren estrictamente a lo " local ". Debe entenderse el mandato constitucional como una reserva de competencia material en favor de los gobiernos locales y de su reglamento para definir " lo local ", ámbito que sólo puede ser reducido por ley -por tratarse de materia constitucional y de un verdadero derecho a favor de estas instituciones-, de manera tal que conduzca al mantenimiento de la integridad de los servicios e intereses locales, en los términos señalados por este Tribunal en sentencia número 06469-97, supra citada. No puede, entonces, crearse un conflicto por antagonismo o protagonismo entre la materia que integra el fin general de "los intereses y servicios locales" de los intereses y servicios públicos "nacionales" o "estatales", intrínsecamente distintos unos de otros, pero que en realidad están llamados a coexistir; y ello es así, porque ambos tipos de interés pueden estar, eventualmente, entremezclados y más bien, es frecuente que, dependiendo de la capacidad económica y organizativa de los gobiernos locales, sus limitaciones propias conduzcan a ampliar el círculo de los que aparecen como nacionales o estatales, lo que hace ver que la distinción no debe ser inmutable, sino gradual o variable; pero en todo caso, como lo ha expresado la jurisprudencia antes citada, corresponderá en última instancia al juez decidir si los criterios de distinción se conforman o no con el dimensionamiento constitucional. Definida la competencia material de la municipalidad en una circunscripción territorial determinada, queda claro que habrá cometidos que por su naturaleza son exclusivamente municipales, a la par de otros que pueden ser reputados nacionales o estatales; por ello es esencial definir la forma de cooparticipación de atribuciones que resulta inevitable, puesto que la capacidad pública de las municipalidades es local, y la del Estado y los demás entes, nacional; de donde resulta que el territorio municipal es simultáneamente estatal e institucional, en la medida en que lo exijan las circunstancias. Es decir, las municipalidades pueden compartir sus competencias con la Administración Pública en general, relación que debe desenvolverse en los términos como está definida en la ley (artículo 5 del Código Municipal anterior, artículo 7 del nuevo Código), que establece la obligación de " coordinación " entre la municipalidades y las instituciones públicas que concurran en el desempeño de sus competencias, para evitar duplicaciones de esfuerzos y contradicciones, sobre todo, porque sólo la coordinación voluntaria es compatible con la autonomía municipal por ser su expresión. En otros términos, la municipalidad está llamada a entrar en relaciones de cooperación con otros entes públicos, y viceversa , dado el carácter concurrente o coincidente -en muchos casos-, de intereses en torno a un asunto concreto. En la doctrina, la coordinación es definida a partir de la existencia de varios centros independientes de acción, cada uno con cometidos y poderes de decisión propios, y eventualmente discrepantes; pese a ello, debe existir una comunidad de fines por materia, pero por concurrencia, en cuanto sea común el objeto receptor de los resultados finales de la actividad y de los actos de cada uno.” V.- Conclusión. Los derechos de vía que colindan con carreteras y caminos que forman parte de la red vial nacional, no participan del carácter “local” que indica el artículo 169 de la Constitución Política. En cuanto a la regulación de la publicidad –en general-, en “terrenos públicos o privados” según indica el artículo 1° del Decreto impugnado, y a la luz de la definición establecida en el artículo 2° del Reglamento, deberá entenderse que la potestad del M.O.P.T. recae sobre aquellos terrenos que enfrentan carreteras o caminos que forman parte de la red vial nacional solamente. El Tribunal estima que ello no forma parte de los “servicios e intereses locales” sobre los cuales tiene competencia la Municipalidad. De conformidad con lo expuesto, este Tribunal considera que el Decreto N° 29253-MOPT no viola el principio de autonomía municipal, por lo que la acción resulta improcedente y debe ser rechazada por el fondo. El Magistrado Vargas salva el voto y ordena dar curso a la acción".- El Tribunal determina, de conformidad con el referido fallo, que en materia de publicidad exterior sí es posible conciliar las competencias que en relación con las vías públicas tienen el MOPT -para la red vial nacional- y las municipalidades -red vial cantonal-, en particular cuando una vía nacional atraviesa un casco urbano.- No en vano, ambas entidades -la nacional y las locales-, pretenden satisfacer en esta temática idénticos objetivos -que en ambos casos revelan un profundo interés público- y entre los que se encuentran garantizar y promover la seguridad de los conductores y usuarios en general, mantener el valor creativo de esa publicidad exterior, preservar el paisaje de la contaminación social y en esencia, lograr un mejor equilibrio entre el paisaje urbano y dichos mensajes publicitarios.- En lo tocante a esa publicidad, el ordenamiento costarricense otorga preeminencia a la Municipalidad, para la emisión de licencias y permisos de construcción -estos últimos de ser necesarios-, si el inmueble privado donde se colocará el rótulo es adyacente a una vía cantonal; en cambio, debe entenderse que si un determinado negocio o persona particular desea colocar un rótulo en un terreno privado colindante con una vía nacional, las competencias son compartidas, es decir, se requiere autorización del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y de la Municipalidad, sin cuyo concurso no será posible su colocación.- Adviértase que en realidad no hay una contradicción insalvable entre el Reglamento 29253-MOPT y el Plan Director Urbano de San José, como alega el recurrente; antes bien, este órgano colegiado estima que esa colisión es tan sólo aparente y que permite la interpretación recién mencionada, que permite descartar cualquier intromisión indebida de un órgano en las competencias del otro y viceversa; de hecho, lo que ocurre en la práctica es que las Municipalidades siempre requieren en casos como el presente, una autorización o visto bueno del Ministerio, de previo al otorgamiento de la licencia.- El Reglamento de Publicidad Exterior de la Municipalidad de San José, por otra parte, es absolutamente claro cuando dispone en su numeral 2.4 inciso e), que es requisito para obtener la licencia, "e) Visto bueno del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (MOPT), en los casos de los predios con frente a las calles de la Red Vial Nacional", lo que confirma la tesis expuesta.-VIII).- En concordancia con todo lo expuesto, cabe señalar, en primer término, que la recurrente sí necesita obtener licencia de la Municipalidad de San José, para colocar los impresos en las ventanas de su inmueble, pues así lo exige el Plan Director Urbano vigente. Además, para la obtención de esta última, requiere también autorización o visto bueno del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, pues su negocio se ubica en una propiedad privada adyacente a una vía nacional.- Tornillos Especiales de Centroamérica S.A. no tiene la licencia municipal -de hecho se le está solicitando iniciar el trámite y es por ello que se acudió a esta vía jerárquica impropia- y tampoco demostró tener autorización del MOPT, en mérito de lo cual no cabe sino concluir que los rótulos se colocaron al margen del ordenamiento jurídico. Consecuentemente, lo decidido por la Municipalidad se ajusta a derecho y debe confirmarse.”