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Res. 00074-2013 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VII · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VII · 29/10/2013
OutcomeResultado
The claim is partially granted for the State's, INDER's, and CONAI's failure to comply with Article 5 of the Indigenous Law; the State is ordered to allocate the owed budget, INDER to demarcate the reserve, and CONAI to conduct censuses; direct compensation and other claims are denied.Se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda por omisión del Estado, INDER y CONAI en el cumplimiento del artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena; se ordena al Estado asignar el presupuesto adeudado, al INDER demarcar la reserva y a la CONAI realizar censos, rechazándose indemnizaciones directas y otras pretensiones.
SummaryResumen
The Integral Development Association of the Cabécar Indigenous Reserve of Talamanca sued the State, CONAI, and INDER (formerly IDA) for failing to comply with Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, which mandates the relocation, expropriation, and compensation of non-indigenous occupants in their territories, along with the corresponding budget allocation. The Court partially granted the claim: it declared the State in breach for not including the required funds in budgets, and ordered INDER to demarcate the reserve and CONAI to conduct population censuses. Premature claims for direct compensation were denied due to the lack of prior demarcation, and the Court found lack of standing to enforce a judgment from a separate proceeding. The ruling emphasizes the State's obligation to guarantee indigenous property rights under international law (ILO Conventions 107 and 169) and orders coordinated actions among the defendants and the indigenous community.La Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Cabécar de Talamanca demandó al Estado, la CONAI y el INDER (antes IDA) por omisión en el cumplimiento del artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena, que ordena la reubicación, expropiación e indemnización de ocupantes no indígenas en sus territorios, así como la dotación presupuestaria para ello. El Tribunal acogió parcialmente la demanda: declaró que el Estado incumplió al no incluir en los presupuestos los fondos exigidos por la ley, y condenó al INDER a demarcar la reserva y a la CONAI a realizar censos poblacionales. Rechazó pretensiones prematuras sobre indemnizaciones directas por falta de demarcación previa y declaró la falta de legitimación para ejecutar una sentencia de otro proceso. La sentencia subraya la obligación estatal de garantizar la propiedad indígena conforme al derecho internacional (Convenios 107 y 169 de la OIT) y ordena acciones coordinadas entre las entidades demandadas y la comunidad indígena.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Article 5 of the Indigenous Law is a programmatic norm that breaks down into two types of actions, feasible once the indigenous reserve is properly demarcated and its legal situation is known based on its registry and cadastral circumstances regarding third parties. Only once there is technical and material certainty of the limits of the indigenous territory's extension can any non-indigenous persons occupying or holding portions of land forming part of the reserve be identified; these are the persons referred to in the relevant article and who may be subject to compensation for the purposes of their eviction from those lands. By majority vote, the State is ordered to include in favor of the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs in the Draft National Budget Law of the Republic the one hundred million colones that should have been included for the budget periods 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982. The inclusion of these funds must be done in four installments, at current value, over four consecutive annual budget periods, the first of which must be made after the end of the budget period subsequent to the one in progress at the time this judgment becomes final. The Rural Development Institute is ordered to take any necessary action at its own expense to ensure that the Cabécar Indigenous Reserve is properly demarcated, which must commence no later than six months from the date this judgment becomes final.El artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena es una norma programática que se desdobla en dos tipos de acciones, realizables en la medida en que la reserva indígena se encuentre debidamente demarcada y claro está, que se conozca su situación jurídica a partir de sus circunstancias registrales y catastrales en función de terceros. Sólo una vez que se cuente con certeza técnica y material de los límites de la extensión material del territorio indígena es que resultaría posible identificar a cualesquiera no indígenas que se encuentren poseyendo o sean titulares de porciones de tierra que forma parte de la reserva, que son a quienes refiere el artículo de interés, deben ser posibles sujetos de indemnización a los efectos de su desalojo de esas tierras. Por mayoría se condena al Estado a incluir a favor de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas en el Proyecto de Ley de Presupuesto Nacional de la República, los cien millones de colones que debió incluir, en aquellos que correspondían a los períodos presupuestarios de mil novecientos setenta y nueve, mil novecientos ochenta, mil novecientos ochenta y uno y mil novecientos ochenta y dos. La inclusión de esos dineros en el proyecto respectivo deberá de realizarse en cuatro tractos, a valor actual, y en cuatro períodos presupuestarios anuales consecutivos, el primero de los cuales deberá realizarse hasta vencido el período presupuestario posterior a aquel que se encuentre corriendo al momento en que adquiera firmeza la presente sentencia. Se condena al Instituto de Desarrollo Rural a desplegar toda acción que resulte necesaria con cargo en su propio presupuesto, a fin de que se encuentre debidamente demarcada la reserva Indígena Nombre128202, lo que deberá iniciar dentro de un plazo no menor a seis meses contados a partir de la fecha en que adquiera firmeza la presente sentencia.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El Estado no solamente ha incumplido con lo dispuesto en el último párrafo del artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena, si no que además, se trata de un incumplimiento calificado y reforzado en el tiempo desde que el ordenamiento le impuso la específica obligación de dotar de contenido presupuestario a la CONAI."
"The State has not only failed to comply with the provisions of the last paragraph of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, but this is a qualified and reinforced non-compliance over time since the legal system imposed on it the specific obligation to provide budgetary content to CONAI."
Considerando XIII.1.2
"El Estado no solamente ha incumplido con lo dispuesto en el último párrafo del artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena, si no que además, se trata de un incumplimiento calificado y reforzado en el tiempo desde que el ordenamiento le impuso la específica obligación de dotar de contenido presupuestario a la CONAI."
Considerando XIII.1.2
"No podría decirse otra cosa entonces, que el contenido de estos cuerpos en materia de derechos humanos tiene un enorme valor interpretativo para todas las instancias encargadas de aplicar las normas que componen el bloque de legalidad, y en ese sentido también el derecho interno."
"It cannot be said otherwise, then, that the content of these bodies on human rights has enormous interpretative value for all instances responsible for applying the norms that make up the legality block, and in that sense also domestic law."
Considerando XIII.1.1
"No podría decirse otra cosa entonces, que el contenido de estos cuerpos en materia de derechos humanos tiene un enorme valor interpretativo para todas las instancias encargadas de aplicar las normas que componen el bloque de legalidad, y en ese sentido también el derecho interno."
Considerando XIII.1.1
"La conducta omisiva del hoy INDER relacionada, ha impedido materialmente a la CONAI la realización de censos poblacionales en las comunidades indígenas con el concurso de las propias comunidades indígenas por razones obvias, coadyuvando esa circunstancia con el incumplimiento de las obligaciones que el ordenamiento jurídico le impone respecto de estos grupos vulnerables de nuestra nación."
"The related omission of today's INDER has materially prevented CONAI from conducting population censuses in indigenous communities with the concurrence of the indigenous communities themselves for obvious reasons, contributing to the non-compliance with the obligations imposed by the legal system regarding these vulnerable groups of our nation."
Considerando XIII.2
"La conducta omisiva del hoy INDER relacionada, ha impedido materialmente a la CONAI la realización de censos poblacionales en las comunidades indígenas con el concurso de las propias comunidades indígenas por razones obvias, coadyuvando esa circunstancia con el incumplimiento de las obligaciones que el ordenamiento jurídico le impone respecto de estos grupos vulnerables de nuestra nación."
Considerando XIII.2
Full documentDocumento completo
PROCEEDINGS:
Judge Córdoba Ramírez writes the opinion (redacta) with the affirmative vote of Judge Fernández Brenes and in part of Judge Hess Araya, the latter who records in this ruling a dissenting vote (voto salvado) in the corresponding part.- WHEREAS (CONSIDERANDO)
I.On the evidence for better provision. Since by means of a brief filed with the court by the representative of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural on September fifth, two thousand thirteen, the admission of evidence for better provision (prueba para mejor resolver) was requested (folio 757) consisting of the text of judgment number 106-2013 of fourteen hours on August twenty-eighth, two thousand thirteen, issued by the First Section (Sección Primera) of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo in an ordinary process identified as the one processed under judicial file number 07-001117-0163-CA, through which, as it states, it seeks to have its content weighed to prove that regarding the part of the lawsuit directed against the aforementioned Institute (Instituto), it should not prosper. (Folios 720 to 756). On this matter, it should be noted that the possibility of this type of extemporaneous evidence being admitted by virtue of the provisions of Article 331 of the Código Procesal Civil, falls under the discretion of the Judge, and it is not acceptable to affirm that its rejection could cause defenselessness (indefensión) since it is supposed, by the principle of procedural preclusion (principio de preclusión procesal), that it is brought to the process outside the opportunities provided for the parties linked in the procedural legal relationship to provide evidentiary elements, therefore it is rejected.
It should additionally be noted that the evidence refers in particular to a jurisprudential precedent that is affirmed to have been issued in a judicial case different from this one, not constituting proof that is in any way directed at accounting for the real truth regarding any of the facts of interest concerning the resolution that on the merits should declare the better right in the present case, for which reason, furthermore, it becomes immaterial for that reason, therefore the request is rejected.-
II.Proven facts (Hechos probados). Of relevance for the resolution of the present process, the following are deemed:
III.Unproven facts (Hechos no probados): Of relevance for the issuance of this ruling, the following are deemed unproven facts:
IV.On the grievances (reproches) formulated by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's representative outlined in its lawsuit, argumentative structures in support of the present action according to which it indicated - now what follows expressed as a summary - that the Nombre128202 indigenous community was recognized as the holder of its territory according to the content of Executive Decree number 29448 of March twenty-first, two thousand one, which includes the area it identifies - it is confusingly added - as Nombre128202 and Nombre128203, forming the farm (finca) registered in the National Registry (Registro Nacional), of the Limón District (Partido de Limón), under real folio registration number (matrícula de folio real) Placa30242, which was subsequently divided, segregating from it farm number Placa30243 (it does not indicate to whom the segregated area belongs). Later, it affirms that the area of territory that belongs to it is described in the cadastral plan (plano catastrado) number Placa30244, but that this includes a farm, namely, the one registered under registration number Placa30245, regarding which no claim is to be understood as made in this case, since the propriety of this is being discussed in the judicial case it identified as the one being processed under judicial file number 10-000275-1028-CA.
It alleged that the plaintiff's lands are invaded in more than one thousand hectares, without the defendant institutions and the State having yet carried out the studies and procedures established in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, so that the expropriation, compensation, and/or eviction of the non-indigenous occupants who are within our territory may be concluded. Regarding the State, it alleged that it has not provided a budget to the corresponding institutions, nor have they made the necessary efforts to proceed in accordance with the studies of occupants, expropriations, and evictions within those territories.-
V.On the defense arguments formulated by the State's representative. The State's representative indicated - in what it answered the lawsuit only within the hearing granted to it within judicial file number 10-000274-2018-CA and in opposition to the lawsuit being declared with merit - that while it is correct that the indigenous reserve of interest was created through Executive Decree number 29448 of March twenty-first, two thousand one, it is not correct that it is invaded by non-indigenous persons, as there is no evidence attesting to this circumstance. Regarding the judicial process being processed under number 10-000275-1028-CA, it warns that it is an ordinary process within which the State has partially paid fees and interest to the registered owners of the farm, but that it has not been possible to take definitive possession of the property until the total amount owed is paid. It also indicated that there is a lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) in the present matter insofar as the action has been directed against the State, since the lawsuit in its core is against INDER and CONAI, which are entities with their own legal personality, and at the same time those designated by the legislator to carry out the studies and appraisals on the lands in the reserve of interest that are occupied by non-indigenous third parties.-
VI.On the defense arguments formulated by CONAI's representative. For its part, CONAI's representative indicated in defense of said organization that while it is true that the reserve of interest is the property or held by the Nombre128202 indigenous community, it is occupied by third parties who are not part of said group, even though for several years they have been urging the different governments to comply with what is established in the Indigenous Law.-
That its legal obligations toward communities such as the plaintiff are limited to carrying out coordination tasks as so defined by the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), once it was consulted on the pertinent matter in due course, and that it is not this entity, but rather the Institute of Rural Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Rural), which is responsible for the acquisition of real property owned by private individuals within indigenous reserves, an institute which, it cautions, has neither available budget nor technical resources to perform those tasks. In sum, it rejected that any responsibility in this matter be attributed to CONAI, since it has never failed to comply with its legal duties.-
VII.On the defense arguments made by the representative of INDER. In defense of INDER's institutional interests, its representative stated that, while it is true that under the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) the obligation to expropriate and compensate occupants of the reserves who are not indigenous, when applicable, falls to it, this is to be done in coordination with CONAI. That it is important to take into account that INDER has not been provided by the State with the necessary economic resources to fulfill that obligation, and therefore it has found it impossible to carry out the corresponding actions. It then refers to some initiatives or proposals that have been raised at the institutional level to solve this problem, such as a bill (proyecto de ley) it identified as the "Ley de Financiación para la Recuperación de Territorios Indígenas" which, it affirmed, was presented to the indigenous communities.
It does not indicate when this occurred or the fate that said bill has had. It also stated that they would have drafted a "Manual para la Adquisición y Traspaso de Tierras en Territorios indígenas al amparo del artículo cinco de la Ley Indígena 6172," which was first approved by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) in the year two thousand eight—one must understand, that of INDER—and later repealed by it in the year two thousand nine, thereby preventing its application. It indicates that no regulatory body exists governing the form and procedure to be followed, through which it must be determined which possessor or titleholder is non-indigenous within these areas in the reserves, and whether they are in good faith or not, as well as in which public authority the competence for such determination should be vested. It reinforces its assertions with the occasion of what it identifies as a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), according to which it was indicated to them that the determination of who holds superior right by reason of being the titleholder of areas presumably part of these reserves must be made in the judicial sphere in an ordinary proceeding, so the corresponding determination is the responsibility of a judge and not INDER.
Adding to the foregoing is the fact that it does not consider these functions to be the responsibility of INDER, since such activities do not form part of its ordinary functions, whereas, in its view, they fall to CONAI, jointly with the indigenous associations. It was added that another circumstance that has prevented them from proceeding accordingly is the financial aspect, given that even though Article 5 of the Indigenous Law provides that these tasks would be carried out with a budget of one hundred million colones, to be disbursed in installments of twenty-five million each in the years from one thousand nine hundred seventy-nine to one thousand nine hundred eighty-two, "The reality is that said provision was never implemented by the State; which has caused severe delays in the processing of said proceedings; because lacking the financial resources for the payment of compensation, it has been impossible to execute…." Still on this point, it noted that the law has not designed any alternative so that within the institutional budget, there exists a budget line for the payment of those lands, consequently lacking legal authorization to disburse funds for those purposes, despite the provisions of Law 2825, under penalty of incurring the cause for liability set forth in the Law on Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets (Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos) in its Article 110, subsection e).
Regarding the fact that the plaintiff related, as an omission by INDER and CONAI, the failure to carry out studies and procedures identifying non-indigenous persons in the reserves, in the terms referred to in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, it reiterated what was previously mentioned, with a bill and a Manual that the co-defendant institution attempted to put into force and operation. Regarding the judicial proceeding processed under judicial case file number 86-000826-0178-CA, it stated that it is a matter that has been decided with the character of res judicata (cosa juzgada material) and that with respect to new invaders who have encroached upon the lands that were the subject of discussion in said proceeding, it has been the plaintiff indigenous association itself that has shown passivity regarding these incursions in its reserve.-
VIII.On the position of the Association for Integral Development of the Indigenous Reserve of Nombre128203 de Talamanca (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Nombre128203 de Talamanca). In its answering brief to the complaint, the representative of the co-defendant indigenous association accepted the facts in their entirety; however, it cautions that it leaves the same subject to what emerges from the evidence contradicting the foregoing. It added, stating that it approves the claims made by the plaintiff, and that the Sibujú Norte territory indeed, first, does not belong to the indigenous community Nombre128203 and second, that it belongs to Nombre128202, so they do not oppose the recovery of that territory by those bringing the action.-
IX.On the subject matter of this proceeding (claims). This Tribunal considers it necessary, before entering into substantive considerations, to make a series of reflections that aid in specifying what the subject matter of this proceeding is. As is reflected in the record of this case in view of folios 691 to 693 of the main file, in connection with the electronic record of the single hearing (audiencia única), which was held again on June twenty-fourth, two thousand thirteen with the participation of the parties involved in the procedural legal relationship and jointly with the parties, particularly the plaintiff, the claims of the proceeding were determined as a single set thereof, so that for all purposes they are considered to be the following: "1. That it be declared that my principal is the registered owner, and the Nombre128202 people is the owner, of the Property (Finca) described in Executive Decree No. 29448-G of March 21, 2001 ('Reserva – Tenorio- Indígena Nombre128202 de Talamanca). 2.
That the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) and the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas) be ordered to carry out the studies and appraisals (avalúos) on the lands occupied by non-indigenous persons within that indigenous territory: a) Let them be ordered that the studies must determine which of those persons must be compensated and which are not entitled to this; b) Let them be ordered that the appraisals be carried out on the lands that must be compensated, taking into consideration the possible variations that could occur due to potential delays in the proceedings processed for compensation; c) Let them be ordered to commence the studies and appraisals no more than one month after the judgment becomes final (firmeza de la sentencia), and they must have concluded them no more than four months after that finality. 3.
That the State, the Institute of Agrarian Development, and the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs be ordered to immediately commence, once the cited studies and appraisals are carried out, the procedures for compensation (including possible expropriations) of the possessors or owners entitled to it, and to pay—no more than one month after the judgment so ordering—the corresponding compensation. 4. That it be ordered to place my principal in possession of each of the properties, parcels, or areas that make up our territory each time any of the current occupants are evicted or compensated as established by the Expropriations Law (Ley de Expropiaciones); 5. In the case of the Sibujú Norte Indigenous Reserve (which is indigenous territory Nombre128202 cited above), if placing my principal in possession requires payment of the compensation ordered in the proceeding being processed in (sic) the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Finance Court (Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), in case file 86-000826-0178-CA, let the State be ordered to proceed with its payment no more than one month after the judgment becomes final. 6.
That the defendants be ordered to jointly and severally pay both sets of costs (costas) of this action." With the above stated, the action is set forth so that the identity of the titleholder of dominion over a real property, identified as the Property described in Executive Decree No. 29448-G of March twenty-first, two thousand one, may be discussed at trial. This claim is of a merely declaratory nature insofar as can be observed. Subsequently, a series of petitionary points were made, all directed at condemning the defendant public authorities to do, that is, to carry out some conduct that, in the plaintiff's view, is imposed by the legal system, without it having been executed by the defendants to date, which speaks of a dual nature in the action: claims aimed at declaring that an illegitimate omission (conducta omisiva) has existed on the part of all the defendant Public Administrations, so that it may then be ordered to adopt in its place the conduct demanded by the legal system.
This concerns an accused omission constituted by the actions referred to in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, which, though required to be executed by the defendants, is directed at the defense of the property right of the indigenous community, in this case, Nombre128202. Finally, a claim was included that is linked to the possibility that prior to ordering that the plaintiff community be placed in possession of specific areas of its territory, the money that was ordered to be paid by the State pursuant to a judgment rendered with the character of res judicata in another plenary judicial proceeding distinct from the one at hand, must be paid. Thus, it is sought that in this case, the party that was unsuccessful in said judicial proceeding be ordered to execute that which it was condemned to do therein. In the terms that will be stated, and according to which, in the view of this Tribunal, there is no interest in addressing issues regarding which there is no conflict to be resolved—such as that related to the ownership of the Nombre128202 indigenous reserve—this action fundamentally proposes a complaint grounded in an omissive conduct inconsistent with the legal system, as emerges from the case theory set forth by the plaintiff. Otherwise, the last of the claims is autonomous and, as will be seen, fruitless.-
X.On the legal regime for the protection of indigenous territories and the identity of that belonging to the Nombre128202 indigenous community. It being essential for the purposes of the analysis to be conducted to resolve this matter, we proceed to address the legal regime for the protection of indigenous reserves, particularly regarding Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, as well as the regulation defining the location of the indigenous reserve owned by the plaintiffs.
It is noted that the Commission from its creation—and accordingly its general assembly—was composed, among others, pursuant to its Article 2, subsection a), of: “… the representatives of the following agencies and institutions: Office of the President of the Republic; University of Costa Rica; National University; Ministry of Public Education; Ministry of the Interior and Police; Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock; Ministry of Public Security; Joint Institute for Social Assistance; Institute of Lands and Colonization; National Water and Sewer Service; National Institute of Housing and Urbanism; National Institute of Apprenticeship; and National Electricity Service; (…)” . (The highlighting is not from the original). The foregoing demonstrates the necessary link that had to exist between the Central Government and, among other entities, the ITCO itself, at least until the issuance of Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice judgment number 3485-2003, at fourteen hours and seventeen minutes on May 2, 2003, a ruling whose content we do not analyze, it being sufficient to indicate that it deemed unconstitutional that the commission be composed of said public authorities.
It should be noted that the referenced institutions and Ministries formed part of the general assembly of CONAI, with the authority to set its general policy acting as components of said collegiate body, and to approve or reject its budget, both ordinary and extraordinary. The purpose of this organization, which is reiterated due to its relevance, was, among other things and as noted, to serve as an instrument of inter-institutional coordination, as well as to ensure respect for the rights of indigenous minorities by stimulating state action to guarantee the individual indigenous person property rights and their community, property rights over their territories, as provided in Article 4, subsection e) of said legal body. As for the assets of CONAI, at the date of its entry into operation, they were to be constituted by the annual subsidy previously provided in the General Ordinary Budget Law of the Republic to the former Board for the Protection of Aboriginal Races; the extraordinary contributions agreed upon by the State and autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions of the Republic; the assets belonging to the former Board; donations from private individuals, foreign states, international agencies and foundations, or any other entity; the use of indigenous names, symbols, and figures; and the proceeds from the rights granted for the commercial use of those indigenous names, symbols, and figures (Article 8, subsection a) of the CONAI Creation Law).
Still regarding budgetary matters, Article 9 of this law stipulated that the State and autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions of the Republic were authorized to provide assistance of any kind to CONAI, of course, for the achievement of its purposes. Furthermore, and always along these same lines, in its Article 28, the law at hand indicated that: “In order that the Executive Branch may be in a position to set, in the draft General Budget Law of the Republic, the subsidy it deems appropriate, no later than July 31 of each year, the Board of Directors shall submit to the Planning Office of the Office of the President of the Republic a reasoned estimate of its needs for the next fiscal period. It is understood that for the 1973 fiscal period, this provision does not apply. Likewise, the Institution’s budgets shall be submitted to the Comptroller General of the Republic for its approval and liquidation in accordance with the law.” (The highlighting is not from the original).
The Nombre128202 indigenous reserve was first described under the terms of Executive Decree number 5904 of March 11, 1976, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number seventy, of April 10, 1976 (1976). This regulatory instrument declared, among other things, the following: “ Whereas: (…)5°- That territories populated exclusively by indigenous people still exist, making the delimitation of said Reserves possible; (…) 10.- That it is the State’s duty to ensure the security of its citizens, and to prevent injustices and mistreatment, especially in the case of currently marginalized indigenous minorities ”. (The highlighting and underlining are not from the original). Moreover, its first article ordered that: “Its exact delimitation shall be carried out by the ITCO, in coordination with CONAI.” Thus, the entity then called the Institute of Lands and Colonization (now INDER) is reiterated as the body responsible for the territorial demarcation of the reserve so created, a task that was to begin two months after the Decree came into effect.
(Among these reserves, Talamanca had already been identified under the terms of the above-cited Executive Decree number 5904 of March 11, 1976). Additionally, pursuant to Articles 14 and 15 of the Decree under analysis, it was expressed by the Executive Branch that what was regulated thereby is of public interest, and that CONAI had the duty to prepare a census of Costa Rica’s indigenous population as soon as possible, which must also be kept permanently updated. Well then, the land owned by these communities having been recognized as indicated, just over a year later, the Indigenous Law was enacted, number 6172 of November 29, 1977 (1977), which, pursuant to its Article 11, repealed any prior law to the extent contrary to it. On this occasion, and without prejudice to what the legislator enacted on the occasion of the entry into force of the Lands and Colonization Law—however unsystematic its implied repeal may have been—it was stipulated, pursuant to Article 1 in relation to Article 2 of this subsequent legal body—now, in accordance with the provisions of International Labour Organization Convention 107 concerning the Protection of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples—that the indigenous reserves are the property of those communities and that they were all to be registered in the National Registry in their name, no longer in the name of ITCO.
Likewise, it was established that the boundaries of those territories once “recognized” by the State may not be altered to reduce their size except by a law of the Republic. Furthermore, it was noted that these communities would have full legal capacity to act and would not be considered state entities (Article 4 of the law refers to the Boards of Directors, administrators, and representatives of these communities). In addition, it is reiterated that these territories are inalienable and imprescriptible, non-transferable, and exclusive to the indigenous communities that inhabit them. Non-indigenous persons are not permitted to rent, lease, buy, or otherwise acquire lands or properties included within these reserves. Any transfer or negotiation of lands or improvements thereon within indigenous reserves between indigenous and non-indigenous persons is absolutely null and void, with the legal consequences of the case.
As a separate note, pursuant to the regulation to the Indigenous Law, Executive Decree number 8487, of April 26, 1978, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 89, of May 10, 1978, its Article 3 indicated that: “For the exercise of the rights and fulfillment of the obligations referred to in Article 2 of the Indigenous Law, the Indigenous Communities shall adopt the organization provided for in Law No. 3859 on the National Directorate of Community Development Associations and its Regulation.” Meanwhile, Article 10 of the same regulation indicated that: “To guarantee the rights regulated in Articles 3 and 5 of the Law, the President of the Integral Development Association shall appear, personally or through an agent or Delegate, as soon as possible after the infringement has occurred, bringing the certification where the Reserve’s registration appears, to initiate the corresponding legal action before the competent official.” Subsequently, pursuant to Executive Decree number 13568 of April 30, 1982, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 94 of May 17, 1982, its first article stipulated that the Integral Development Associations have the legal representation of the Indigenous Communities and act as their local government.
Reinforcing all of the foregoing, on November 3, 1992 (1992), Law number 7316 was enacted, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 234, of December 4, 1992, “Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,” of the International Labour Organization, pursuant to which the issue of indigenous property is specifically regulated. Article 2.1 of this instrument states as follows: “Governments shall have the responsibility for developing, with the participation of the peoples concerned, co-ordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee respect for their integrity.” For its part, subsection 2) of the same article indicates: “2. Such action shall include measures for: (a) ensuring that members of these peoples benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population; (b) promoting the full realisation of the social, economic and cultural rights of these peoples with respect for their social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions and their institutions; (c) assisting the members of the peoples concerned to eliminate socio-economic gaps that may exist between indigenous and other members of the national community, in a manner compatible with their aspirations and ways of life.” Other articles of the convention that are of interest are cited here.
Article 3 reads: “Article 3.- 1. Indigenous and tribal peoples shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental freedoms without hindrance or discrimination. The provisions of the Convention shall be applied without discrimination to male and female members of these peoples; 2. No form of force or coercion shall be used in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples concerned, including the rights contained in this Convention.” Its Article 4 states that the State shall: “1. Special measures shall be adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned. 2. Such special measures shall not be contrary to the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. 3. Enjoyment of the general rights of citizenship, without discrimination, shall not be prejudiced in any way as a consequence of such special measures.” Article 5 indicates that governments: “In applying the provisions of this Convention: (a) the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognised and protected, and due account shall be taken of the nature of the problems which face them both as groups and as individuals; (b) the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these peoples shall be respected; (c) policies aimed at mitigating the difficulties experienced by these peoples in facing new conditions of life and work shall be adopted, with the participation and co-operation of the peoples affected.” The issue of the property of these groups over the areas comprising their territories was specifically addressed in this convention.
In this regard, Article 13 reads: “1. In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention, governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship. 2. The use of the term lands in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use.” (The highlighting is not from the original). Article 14, subsection 2), reads: “2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.”
The same thing that currently occurs with the indigenous zones of the Atlantic region and Coto Brus, where legislation on the matter does not even exist; 10.- That it is the duty of the State to watch over the safety of its citizens, and to prevent injustices and mistreatment, especially in the case of currently marginalized indigenous minorities.” (The highlighting and underlining are not from the original). On this occasion, the Executive Branch not only recognizes and declares the circumstances in which these particular groups of the national population find themselves in relation to the exercise of their rights, but also determines, according to its first article, the extensions of land that would correspond to the Talamanca indigenous reserve and orders that: “Its exact delimitation shall be carried out by the ITCO, in coordination with the CONAI.” Thus, the entity then named the Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización) (today INDER) is reiterated in its designation as the body that would be in charge of the territorial demarcation of the reserve thus created, a task that was to begin two months after the Decree came into force.
(Among these reserves, that of Talamanca was already identified under the terms of the above-cited Executive Decree number 5904 of the eleventh of March of nineteen seventy-six). Said act of the Executive Branch also provided that any institution, public or private, could provide assistance to the ITCO for these purposes. A rule was also included in the cited Decree in its Article 4, which, contrary to what was regulated in the Law of Lands and Colonization, but in accordance with the provisions of Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization, provided as follows: “Declare the reserves mentioned in article 1 of this decree to be property of the indigenous communities. The State recognizes the existence and legal personality of these communities. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic shall register these Reserves in the Public Registry.” (The underlining is not from the original).
Article 6 of the same Decree reiterated the classification of these lands as inalienable, non-transferable, and exclusive for indigenous people, and in its Article 5 it indicated that: “The reserves shall be administered by the indigenous people in their traditional or modern community structures, under the coordination and advice of the CONAI.” Due to its relevance, keep in mind the text of Article 8 of this Executive Decree: “Article 8.- In the event that non-indigenous persons had acquired ownership or are in legal possession, or are precarious possessors of farms or lands located within the reserves, at the time this Decree enters into force, they shall be expropriated and compensated according to the procedures established in Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961, and its reforms…”. (The highlighting is not from the original). The rule to which this article of the Executive Decree refers is the Law of Lands and Colonization.
Furthermore, according to Articles 14 and 15 of the Decree under analysis, it was expressed by the Executive Branch that what was normed by this means is of public interest, as well as that the CONAI would have the duty to prepare a census of the indigenous population of Costa Rica as soon as possible, which should also be kept permanently updated. The rules of the Executive Decree under study were later modified on the occasion of the entry into force of Executive Decree number 6036, of the twenty-sixth of May of nineteen seventy-six (1976), published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number one hundred thirteen, of the twelfth of June of nineteen seventy-six, with which the limits of the Indigenous Reserves of Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella, and Talamanca were reformed, and the recognition of the Telire Reserve was carried out. In what is of interest, Article 13 of this new decree indicated: “Article 13.- In the expropriation process of lands located within the Reserves (Article 8 of Decree No. 5904-G), only works or investments that have truly been of utility or that represent some permanent economic activity shall be recognized as \"improvements\".
Abusive deforestation, leading to soil erosion, as well as hoarded lands and those abandoned for more than three (3) years at the time this decree enters into force, shall not be compensated.” (The highlighting is not from the original). Afterwards, by Executive Decree number 7268 of the ninth of August of nineteen seventy-seven (1977), published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number one hundred fifty-seven of the twentieth of August of the same year, the “recognition” of property over the indigenous territory and its delimitation was provided for in more legally adequate terms, in which the reserves of Sibujú Norte, Chase, and Alto Pacuare were identified, which, according to Article 3 of said instrument, all formed an integral part of the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve and would be registered in the Property Registry, despite constituting one unit, in separate farms. The referral to the Law of Lands and Colonization regarding expropriations, while it indicates nothing regarding the public authority responsible for carrying them out, leads one to think that although it was the exclusive obligation of the State, it would reside with the ITCO, in coordination with the CONAI.
Currently, the indigenous reserve Nombre128202 is described regarding its location – on the cartographic sheets of the National Geographic Institute – and limits, under the terms of the information contained in Executive Decree number 29448 dated the twenty-first of March of two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 93 of the sixteenth of May of two thousand one, but the corresponding tasks for determining its registry situation, nor its material demarcation, have not been carried out, despite the passage of decades since these tasks were and are an obligation of the State, jointly with the current INDER and the CONAI in what corresponds.
XI.Regarding the claim aimed at having it declared that the plaintiff association is the registered owner, and the Nombre128202 people the owner, of the Farm described in Executive Decree number 29448-G of the twenty-first of March of two thousand one. This petitionary point deserves separate consideration in the terms that will be stated. Regarding the claim aimed at having it declared that the plaintiff association is the registered owner, and the Nombre128202 people the owner of the Farm described in Executive Decree number 29448-G of the twenty-first of March of two thousand one, there is clearly a lack of current interest that makes this point unfounded, as is hereby ordered. On this matter, and given that none of the sued parties invoked such a defense as an exception, it must be noted that the jurisprudence emanating from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, within which, as an example, is judgment number 2008-000317 of nine hours ten minutes of the second of May of two thousand eight, has characterized this exception as one directed at the verification of a material prerequisite of the jurisdictional action.
Thus, for a lawsuit to succeed, regardless of other aspects, such as procedural capacity, competence, and compliance with the respective requirements in the complaint, it must also be reviewed ex officio whether material prerequisites such as right, standing, and of course, current interest, are present. If any of these prerequisites – or all – are not present, the lawsuit could not receive a positive response. In the case of a lack of current interest, it is an exception, a matter for analysis at the time the judgment is issued, which supposes that, regardless of the merits of what was raised, the claim is not susceptible to being accepted because there is a different, but legally relevant motive that imposes this. Current interest is closely related to the possibility that the ruling may act in reality, either innovating or preserving a determined legal situation, which is closely related to the object of the process, understood as the claims.
To say that there is a current interest in ruling on the substantive right is nothing other than speaking of the necessity to provide jurisdictional protection – in this case according to constitutional Article 49 – to the person who alleges being affected in their subjective rights and/or legitimate interests, regarding an administrative conduct before which they request the intervention of the respective jurisdictional body. The purpose of that intervention is to resolve the legal conflict of which one is a part (right of action) when the judgment proves useful for the holder of that subjective right or legitimate interest. The foregoing implies that the judge holds the duty to make a judgment of “utility” in view of the formulated claim and the factual circumstances under which the action is established (cause of action), comparing the effects of the requested jurisdictional resolution, precisely with the framework of utility that such a pronouncement would provide in favor of the plaintiff.
It is a projection analysis that weighs whether a positive judgment, or not, would produce any effect on the person who requested the protection of their legal situation. Thus, there is no current interest if, even by granting what is requested, the judgment does not have the virtue of causing such an effect on the plaintiff's legal situation, the ruling thus becoming sterile. (See also the related Judgment of the First Chamber, number 465-2009 of ten hours forty-five minutes of the seventh of May of two thousand nine). Hence, an exercise of objective control of legality for legality's sake lacks any relevant benefit or utility. (See doctrine derived from Article 10 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code). The foregoing stated in different terms, if one takes into account that the exercise of the action for the review of the legality of administrative conduct is subjective in nature, to the extent it supposes the existence of a person with standing by virtue of being the holder of a relevant interest in obtaining a pronouncement that benefits them in their legal sphere – without an objective review of legality for legality's sake being possible with respect to administrative acts, it is insisted – there is an absence of that current interest, when the effect of the judgment would in no way – for the purposes of an effects-oriented phenomenon – change the state of things.
In the case at hand, the representation of the plaintiff association must bear in mind that the judgment that could accept the claim under analysis, insofar as it is directed at declaring that it is the owner of the Nombre128202 Indigenous Reserve, becomes at all lights sterile and unnecessary, to the extent that according to the same factual framework it outlines in its action, nothing leads one to think that there is any conflict between it, and the sued public authorities, as well as in relation to the association that was joined to the litis, – even though the cause of action describes no fact at any level indicating otherwise – regarding the better right of dominion over the territories that make up said reserve, when quite to the contrary, it is a matter peacefully accepted between the parties, that according to the particular legal regime applicable to these particular assets, the location of the reserves is recognized by executive decree and that for the particular case, it has currently been done by the Executive Branch according to the cartographic sheets of the National Geographic Institute, in the terms of the information contained in Executive Decree number 29448 dated the twenty-first of March of two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 93 of the sixteenth of May of two thousand one.
On the other hand, if it is about the exclusive participation of the indigenous community Nombre128203, it is possible to say that it was according to the same Executive Decree number 29448 dated the twenty-first of March of two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 93 of the sixteenth of May of two thousand one, that any matter related to the former right it held was peacefully resolved between both communities, without any pronouncement then being required to innovate where the reality of things is that no act or conduct of that community has been, since then at least, affecting the better right of the plaintiff indigenous community, as will be seen.
XII.Regarding the lawsuit, in what, as a result of the same, the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Nombre128203 de Talamanca was joined to the litis. Needing to refer the parties to the content of what was expressed in the preceding considerando, in relation to what was indicated in section IX of this judgment, the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve is currently legally constituted according to Executive Decree number 29448 dated the twenty-first of March of two thousand one, an instrument through which the overlap that at some historical moment existed between the land areas comprising the indigenous reserve of the plaintiff party and that which formerly was recognized as property of the population of the Nombre128203 community was eliminated, just as can be extracted from the plaintiff party's own statements in its complaint briefs, according to which it is clear that it has never been its intention to sue that community – as there exists no property conflict whatsoever against it.
Thus, it has been accredited that through Executive Decree number 29448 dated the twenty-first of March of two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 93 of the sixteenth of May of two thousand one, the Executive Branch ordered, on the occasion that there was a partial overlap between the Nombre128202 reserve and what was called Sibujú Norte, given in its time to the Nombre128203 community, to merge both reserves into a single delimitation, with the areas decreed indigenous reserves being considered in turn to collectively constitute the Nombre128202 Indigenous Reserve. Apparently, the problem arises for strictly registry purposes, which are of no type of interest in the present case and which are a matter foreign to this one, where in no way does this circumstance constitute a cause of action formulated by the plaintiff party. That being so, there is equally a clear lack of interest in what the lawsuit was understood to be by the Sixth Section of this Court in its time, for which reason the lawsuit is consequently declared unfounded insofar as it was understood to be directed against the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre128203.
XIII.Regarding the merits or not of the claims numbered 2 through 4, related to an omission in which the sued public authorities would have incurred regarding compliance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law. What is claimed in this regard is the core object for the purposes of the action, as this Court has so understood. The plaintiff party, in what is of interest, has accused in this regard the non-observance of numeral 5 of the Indigenous Law, which provides: “Article 5º.- In the case of non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within the indigenous reserves, the ITCO shall relocate them to other similar lands, if they so desire; if it is not possible to relocate them or they do not accept the relocation, it must expropriate and compensate them according to the procedures established in the Expropriation Law. / The studies and procedures for expropriation and compensation shall be carried out by the ITCO in coordination with the CONAI. / If non-indigenous persons subsequently invade the reserves, the competent authorities must immediately proceed with their eviction, without any payment of compensation. / The expropriations and compensations shall be financed with the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash, which shall be appropriated through four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982.
The fund shall be administered by the CONAI, under the supervision of the Comptroller General of the Republic.” Thus, and therefore, the omission of compliance with said norm would correspond to the omission accused in the case. In support of its action, the plaintiff affirms that despite having been recognized as the holder of its territory, which according to its statement is described in cadastral map number L-118495-1993, these lands are invaded in more than a thousand hectares without the sued institutions having yet carried out the studies and procedures established in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, so that the expropriation, compensation, and/or eviction of the non-indigenous occupants found within its territory may be concluded. In what corresponds to the State, it accused that the State has not provided a budget to the corresponding institutions, nor have these made the necessary efforts to proceed in accordance with the studies of occupants, expropriations, and evictions within those territories (observe particularly the petitionary point identified as number 3).
Thus, as the claims of the lawsuit were adjusted, it is held that the plaintiff aspires to have the following ordered in judgment, based on an omission carried out in disconformity with the legal system: “…2. That the Institute of Agrarian Development and the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs be ordered to carry out the studies and appraisals on the lands occupied by non-indigenous persons within that indigenous territory: a) Let them be ordered that the studies must determine which of those persons must be compensated and which have no right to it; b) Let them be ordered that the appraisals be carried out on the lands that must be compensated, taking into consideration the possible variations that could occur due to eventual delays in the processes processed for compensation; c) Let them be ordered to begin the studies and appraisals no more than one month after the judgment becomes final, having to have concluded them no more than four months after that finality. 3.
That the State, the Institute of Agrarian Development, and the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs be ordered to immediately initiate, once the aforementioned studies and appraisals have been carried out, the procedures for compensations (including possible expropriations) of the possessors or owners who have a right thereto, and to pay – no more than one month after the judgment that so orders – the corresponding compensations. 4. That it be ordered to place my represented party in possession of each of the farms, parcels, or areas that make up our territory each time any of the current occupants is evicted or compensated according to the Expropriation Law…”. It is the criterion of this Court, that while it is imperative to declare the lawsuit admissible against the three sued public authorities, it cannot be in full accordance with the points of the lawsuit, just as they were formulated by the plaintiff, both situations which we proceed to reason below.
1.1.-) Regarding the principle of conventionality control. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted internationally on the thirtieth of April of nineteen eighty-two, today Law of the Republic number 7615 of the twenty-fourth of July of nineteen ninety-six, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 164 of the twenty-ninth of August of nineteen ninety-six, it was provided, in what is of interest to us: “Article 26.- \"Pacta Sunt Servanda\". Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” The foregoing implies the obligation of states to be consistent with the obligations they assume before the international community and, of course, in cases such as those contained in Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization in relation to Convention number 169, “Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries”, with indigenous communities, particularly regarding guarantees with respect to the exercise, which must be guaranteed as full, of fundamental rights. Of course, both Article 7, and the doctrine that the Constitutional Chamber has forged based on the scope it has given to numeral 48, both of the Political Constitution, are observable in this matter.
At another level, for the purposes of the operational aspects or application of these rules, Article 27 of this body of international law provides, in relation to domestic law and the observance of treaties, referring to the signatory States, that: “A party may not invoke the provisions of its domestic law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to Article 46.” This Article 46 referred to the effectiveness of the treaty once consented to (signed) by the respective delegation, which relates to Article 11, on the means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty, in that it provides that signature alone is sufficient. In view of this, the delegation of Costa Rica interpreted and expressed that the provision would apply in the case of the Costa Rican State with regard to secondary law, but not to the provisions of the Political Constitution. All of the foregoing is relevant on the occasion of the development of the principle of conventionality control and of what could also be called the principle of intangibility of treaties vis-à-vis the law.
Furthermore, the foregoing implies, under the umbrella of the aspiration of every legal system to provide certainty and security, the obligation to make direct application of the rules contained in international treaties already ratified and in force in the domestic legal order, and such rules may, of course, be invoked by their beneficiary, regardless of whether it is another State and in demand of loyalty to the commitments assumed within the framework of relations between the linked nations, without prejudice to the coverage that has also been habitually invoked under the principle regarding instruments of this type when they regulate human rights matters. The Constitutional Chamber has indicated the following in this regard: “II.- It is obvious that the petitioner starts from the provisions of Article seven of the Political Constitution in the sense that treaties and international conventions ‘shall have authority superior to the laws’ (…).
But it must be said that the international Human Rights instruments in force in the Republic, pursuant to the reform of Constitutional Article 48 (Law No. 7128, of August 18, 1989), upon being integrated into the legal system at the highest level, that is, at the constitutional level, complement it to the extent that they favor the individual.” Thus, in summary, the recognition of the validity of international norms as a direct source of domestic law is imposed, and in recognition of their placement in the hierarchy of sources. The principle of conventionality control is established in the aforementioned Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in relation to Articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, without prejudice to the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the latter of which, like many other declarations arising within the United Nations and the Organization of American States, are not subject to ratification by member or signatory States because it is unnecessary.
It could not be said otherwise, then, that the content of these bodies of law on human rights has enormous interpretive value for all instances responsible for applying the norms that make up the block of legality, and in that sense also domestic law. It is not superfluous to indicate, in what is relevant for the case before us, that as follows from Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which refers to the right to property, as for every other right recognized in that instrument, States are committed to ensuring the universal and effective respect for the rights and fundamental freedoms of man, which means that the State has the obligation not only to respect those rights and freedoms, but also the obligation to ensure them. This implies that it is the State as a whole—without its internal organization allowing it to claim that it has divested itself of its duties—that is required to adopt actions tending toward the effective realization of the objectives pursued by conventions of this type in the area of human rights, without domestic law serving as an excuse for failing to comply with what has been agreed.
Regarding the importance of keeping in mind what has been said up to this point in connection with the defense of the rights of a population group that is in a situation of vulnerability, as are the indigenous communities since time immemorial, the Constitutional Chamber, in its judgment No. 2253-96 of 3:39 p.m. on May 14, 1996, indicated: “... There are various legal instruments aimed at promoting that real equality among subjects; among them can be placed the particular situation of aboriginal peoples, who have traditionally been marginalized, for historical, social, economic, and cultural reasons. They suffer the consequences of a society that does not understand or respect their differences; and that, on occasion, tends to see them as beings incapable of directing their own lives and destinies. Given that situation, the international community felt the need to adopt measures in favor of indigenous peoples.
Thus, Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization -ILO-, called ‘Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,’ incorporated into our legal system through Law No. 7316 of November 3, 1992, established the special protection of indigenous peoples and their culture.” Conventionality control means that the Judicial Branch of each State and the bodies that make up its structure (and any authority that exercises materially jurisdictional functions, in particular the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction, pursuant to the provisions of constitutional Article 49) must apply, interpret, and/or resolve the matters within their competencies as legal operators, making the conventional control parameter prevail, thus making international law, in what it regulates regarding human rights, what it really is, namely, a guarantee of respect for human rights to the extent applicable.
Moreover, it is sufficient to indicate that according to our Civil Code in its Article 5, these international normative bodies are of direct application by the legal operator since they form part of the domestic positive law of the nation, from the moment their incorporation into the block of legality occurs by virtue of the approval of the Legislative Assembly and their full publication in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta,” and therefore, forming part of the block of legality, this is a control parameter of this jurisdiction. (Article 6 of the General Law on Public Administration).- 1.2.-) Regarding the omissive conduct in which the State has incurred. Having said all of the foregoing, the majority of the members of this Tribunal consider that the State has not only failed to comply with the provisions of the last paragraph of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, but also that it is a qualified and reinforced non-compliance over time since the legal system imposed on it the specific obligation to provide budgetary content to CONAI so that such resources would be made available in accordance with the procedures to be carried out by the now INDER, for the exclusive purpose of expropriating and indemnifying, when appropriate, non-indigenous persons who are occupying or are titleholders, in both cases in good faith, of the lands identified as part of the indigenous reserves.
In the present case, it has been proven at a first level and without prejudice to the fact that the reserve owned by the plaintiff indigenous community dates back decades, in its current dimensions, that the indigenous community represented here is the titleholder of the domain over the described reserve as of the adoption by the Executive Branch of Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta,” number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one, regardless of whether or not it is registered in the name of the plaintiff association representing the community Nombre128202 (which can be consulted on the Judicial Branch Website, accessing the Costa Rican Legal Information System), as well as that since its creation for the first time, pursuant to Executive Decree number 5904 of March eleventh, nineteen seventy-six, as the Executive Branch itself reported on that circumstance since then, there have been non-indigenous persons occupying areas of those that comprise its surface.
On this matter, of relevance were also the statements given at trial by the witness Nombre128204 , a geographer by profession and an official of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs with twenty-five years of experience that has related him, among others, to the plaintiff indigenous community, as well as Mr. Nombre128205 , a member of the indigenous community Nombre128202 , who indicated that he has lived in the indigenous territory of interest since his birth, at least fifty-four years ago. Both witnesses indicated that they know of the existence of non-indigenous persons who are occupying areas of the reserve in question, without there being any reason that would lead this Tribunal to consider that their statements lack credibility. Furthermore, and in any case, the existence of non-indigenous persons on these lands and under the conditions stated seems to follow from the very recognition of the Executive Branch and the legislator pursuant to the Indigenous Law itself, as well as particularly, what was expressed by the Executive Branch in Executive Decree number 5904 of March eleventh, nineteen seventy-six.
Of core relevance is the fact that, according to the evidence ordered by this judicial authority for better resolution, visible at folios 795 to 198 of the main file, which is a document signed by the person identified therein as Nombre128164 in her capacity as Director of the General Directorate of the National Budget of the Ministry of Finance, it is reported that at no historical moment since the entry into force of Indigenous Law number 6172 and pursuant to its Article 5, has the Executive Branch included in the General Budget of the Republic the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash that it should have allocated through four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning with the first with its inclusion in the National Budget Project of the Republic for 1979, to continue in the budgets of 1980, 1981, and 1982 respectively. It follows from this, according to the majority opinion of the members of this Tribunal, that for the purposes of the Indigenous Law, as well as those of the international conventions signed on the matter, the State illegitimately failed by omission to fulfill its duty to take effective actions—in this case, a specific and concrete one established by the indicated normative instruments—for the protection of indigenous property over the land.
This is an administrative conduct submitted, by virtue of the provisions of constitutional Article 49, to the legality control residing in this jurisdiction, which, furthermore, does not grant or confer any margin of discretion on the Administration obligated to act. At a second level, and despite the fact that this was in accordance with the understanding of the lawsuit filed against it, the State also did not take steps to prove that, since the entry into force of Indigenous Law number 6172, it has deployed, in what it is legally empowered to do, any act aimed at directing, coordinating, and/or monitoring, in an orderly and systematic manner, the tasks that, having been imposed on it by international and domestic law regarding the right of indigenous populations to the integrity of their territories, should have been carried out as appropriate, whether with the INDER or with CONAI or any other indirectly linked organization.
See the content of the provisions of Article 26, subsection b), in relation to Article 27, first subsection, both of the General Law on Public Administration, regarding the duty of whoever exercises the Presidency of the Republic, autonomously or, as the case may be, jointly with the Minister of the sector, to direct and coordinate the tasks of government and of the Central Public Administration in its entirety, as well as the same with the decentralized Public Administration, this, in what would also have been expected, could have been accredited at least with respect to the management, in what interests us, of what is now called the Rural Development Institute, as well as the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs in relation to the Nombre128202 Indigenous Reserve. Nor was any evidence brought to the process demonstrating that the State has undertaken or effectively, coordinately, and/or systematically procured efforts that could be understood as joint with the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs and the Rural Development Institute aimed at protecting and guaranteeing the Nombre128202 Indigenous Community regarding the integrity of the territories of which it is the titleholder.
(All the foregoing according to the court records due to the absence of evidentiary material indicating otherwise). These factual circumstances make the omission in which the State has incurred illegitimate insofar as it constitutes non-compliance with Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in relation to Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization and Convention number 169, “Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,” in what they regulate regarding the duties that the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica must fulfill, which must be associated with the provisions of Article 140, subsection 8) of the Political Constitution. With respect to the last paragraph of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, which provides that “…The expropriations and indemnifications shall be financed with the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash, which shall be allocated through four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982.
The fund shall be administered by CONAI, under the supervision of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic,” if the administration of the funds with which CONAI should have been provided by the Executive Branch was for the purpose of having the necessary resources to proceed with the expropriations and indemnifications whose processing corresponds to INDER, it being a prerequisite for this, nothing could be indemnified, unless it is done through channels other than those unconditionally provided by the legal system to the Executive Branch, which cannot be granted protection by the jurisdictional authority in this venue pursuant to constitutional Article 49. This leads to a declaration that the State has indeed incurred in an illegitimate omissive conduct, contrary to what is provided and ordered by the legal system. It should be noted that, without prejudice to the fact that a similar sum of money at the end of the 1970s might have served the purposes foreseen in the law, it is the duty of the Executive Branch to provide the resources required to comply with the cited regulations, and even in the event that this economic provision proves insufficient, this circumstance does not negate the original obligation, only endorsable to the State, to provide the resources necessary to fully comply with the provisions of the Indigenous Law and international law.
At the moment when there are no longer non-indigenous persons to indemnify in the reserves, it is clear to this Tribunal that the rule contained in the provision—a programmatic rule—will cease to be in force by virtue of the objective pursued by the same having already been fulfilled to that extent. In that eventual state of affairs, it could be affirmed that the exercise by the indigenous communities of the exclusive and exclusionary right of property of which they are titleholders has been effectively materialized, without prejudice to future vigilance regarding its integrity. As long as this is not the case, it would undoubtedly be a property right that is not full, as it is not being protected by the State, in open violation of the right that assists these communities. This being the case, it is reiterated, it is imposed to declare the lawsuit admissible in what was directed against the State, but, under the terms that will be set forth below.-
As a result, to date the Nombre128202 indigenous reserve is not demarcated, nor adequately registered in the name of said community in the registry, there is no certainty regarding the land areas on which the respective population censuses would have to be conducted, and it prevents compliance with the regulations governing the human rights of these populations regarding the effective and exclusive exercise of their right to property, all of the foregoing, despite the fact that since the year two thousand one, the Nombre128202 indigenous reserve has been described in terms of its location—on the cartographic sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN)—and limits, under the terms of the information contained in Executive Decree number 29448 dated the twenty-first of March, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 93 of the sixteenth of May, two thousand one.-
XIV.On the inadmissibility of the claim directed at ordering the payment of the indemnification ordered in another judicial proceeding. As indicated above, the representation of the Nombre128202 indigenous community requested that the judgment declare that: “In the case of the Reserva Indígena Sibujú Norte (which is Nombre128202 indigenous territory cited above), if placing my represented party in possession requires that the indemnification ordered in the proceeding before the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, in file 86-000826-0178-CA, be paid, order the state to proceed with its payment no more than one month after the judgment becomes final.” It suffices to indicate in this regard that there is clearly a lack of active legal standing in the party suing in this case, without prejudice to the potential standing that could potentially be recognized by the competent judicial authority in the execution phase of the judgment rendered in application of the rules of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, in the ordinary proceeding processed under judicial file number 86-000826-0178-CA, judgments of the Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda at eleven thirty hours on the twenty-fourth of December, nineteen ninety-two, in relation to number 276-94, at eight fifteen hours on the thirty-first of August, nineteen ninety-four, of the Sección Primera of the Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo.
(Folios 172 to 228 of the main file). In this sense, the plaintiff must be told that clearly, what was resolved in that proceeding has produced a state of res judicata, without it being possible, by imperative of the rules that inform procedural law, for a judgment of that nature to be executed in another case, which is clearly what is intended from what was requested. It must be indicated, however, that due to the dual nature of the right it supposes, it is tangentially being protected since the payment of an indemnification was ordered in that proceeding, it being clear that the right of the plaintiff indigenous community to demand from those authorities that were condemned to proceed with the respective payment is embedded there, but not in this case, in the opinion of this Court. That being the case, and given that standing is a procedural prerequisite susceptible to being analyzed ex officio, it is declared that there is a lack of active legal standing to accede to what was requested, and therefore, the inadmissibility of the complaint must be declared to that extent.-
XV.Corollary. In conclusion of everything set forth up to this point, having demonstrated the illegitimate omission in which, at various levels, the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas have incurred, the complaint shall succeed, however, in a manner different from that in which the claims were formulated, based on the relevant public interest that an adequate execution of the tasks assigned by the legal system to the institutions it linked with the protection of the rights of indigenous communities pursuant to Article 122, subsections c), d), g), and k) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, it is necessary to declare the complaint partially admissible, in the terms to be indicated in the operative part of this judgment.-
XVI.On the defenses raised. The representations of the State and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas raised the defense of lack of passive legal standing, while the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural raised the defenses of lack of right and material res judicata, the latter of which was resolved by rejection through the issuance of ruling number 33-2013, dictated within the single hearing held on the twenty-fourth of June, two thousand thirteen, at ten fifty-five hours, so that regarding what was thus resolved, the parties must abide by what was ordered at that time. Regarding the defense of lack of passive legal standing, its rejection is necessary for what was alleged in this case for the following reasons. Standing is a substantive prerequisite of every jurisdictional process and as such, its analysis is obligatory for Judges, even ex officio if the respective defense (of lack of active and/or passive standing) is not raised.
The institute addresses the "... specific material legal situation in which a subject, or plurality of subjects, finds themselves, in relation to what constitutes the litigious object of a given process; standing, ultimately, will indicate to us in each case who are the true holders of the material relationship that is intended to be elucidated in the scope of the process; who are the subjects whose procedural participation is necessary for the Judgment to be "effective"." (Nombre71661, Nombre71662;, Nombre136773;, Nombre149727 and Nombre71664, Nombre9069. Derecho Procesal Administrativo Costarricense. Editorial Juricentro. San José, Costa Rica. p.162.). It concerns the aptitude of the intervening subjects to be a party in a process of this nature; which derives or originates from the relationship existing between the sphere of interests and rights of the same in direct relation to the administrative conduct being challenged.
Thus, "... a subject is legitimized in a proceeding or in a given process by virtue of the prior affectation suffered in their interests or qualified rights" (Nombre137195, Nombre25610. El nuevo proceso contencioso administrativo. Collective Work. Poder Judicial. Escuela Judicial. San José. Costa Rica. p. 79.) If the intervening parties lack standing, it can be concluded that the development of the entire process will not serve to solve the specific intersubjective conflict raised in court, because that lack will determine the inexistence of the legal relationship between them. In this contentious-administrative jurisdiction, the "legal situations of every person" are protectable, as clarified by subsection 1) of the first numeral of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, in relation to the diverse manifestations of administrative conduct, so that to obtain effective and substantive judicial protection in a contentious process, one must be the holder of a subjective right or at least "a legitimate interest" (Article 49 of the Constitución Política) of the administered party, derived or originated in an administrative legal relationship.
On the other hand, standing splits into an active dimension, relating to whoever appears as plaintiff and precisely to the supposed ownership of the alleged subjective right or legitimate interest, which is conceived as the suitability to perform acts exercising the power of action that enables them to demand satisfaction of a specific provision or object; and a passive dimension, in relation to the defendant party, which manifests as the aptitude to bear the exercise of said power. Thus, a subjective right or legitimate interest confronts public powers or competencies. In the present case, in the majority opinion of this chamber, it is clear that there is standing to sue the State to the extent that among the omissions that were reproached, it is the legal system that designated it as the direct responsible party, while it was demonstrated that it breached said legal obligations. Regarding the now-called Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, the same occurs—now by unanimity of this Chamber—to the extent that the powers-duties that the legal system imposed on it in matters of identification of indigenous lands and the demarcation thereof have constituted, together with the inactivity of the State, the cause that to date Article 5 of the Ley Indígena has not been effectively applied.
Added to the foregoing, and given the substantive analysis that has been carried out in the terms of this judgment, resulting in the complaint being partially successful against the INDER, it is necessary to reject the defense of lack of right raised by it. Finally, it is stated ex officio that with respect to the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, duties were assigned to it that are directed at the protection of indigenous peoples, particularly those of coordination and liaison, which have not been exercised, even remotely, in an adequate and effective manner, both before the State and the INDER, and in relation to the indigenous communities themselves.-
XVII.On costs. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so, in such a way that, with no prerequisite existing that would justify exonerating from said condemnation under subsections a) and b) of said numeral, nor under Article 194 of the same legal body for the case of the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas— losers in this process—it is necessary to jointly and severally condemn them to pay both costs generated as a consequence of the processing of this case in favor of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de La Reserva Indígena Nombre128202. The processing of the process as far as it was instituted against the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Nombre128203, despite the plaintiff not having succeeded, was due to the order issued by this Court for it to be joined to the litis even though there was no cause in the complaint that spoke of any existing conflict between it and the plaintiff indigenous association, and therefore its participation, which was limited to answering the complaint, shall not generate costs against the plaintiff. Judge Hess Araya dissents regarding the condemnation against the State.-
POR TANTO
The evidence provided for a better resolution by the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is rejected. By majority, the defense of lack of passive legal standing raised by the representation of the State is rejected, and by unanimity, the one formulated by the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas is rejected. It is declared ex officio that there is a lack of active legal standing in the plaintiff association to demand in this case the execution of what was decided in the judicial proceeding processed before the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda in the proceeding processed under judicial file number 86-000826-0178-CA. It is declared ex officio that there is a lack of current interest, and to that extent, the complaint is inadmissible exclusively regarding what was brought by the Judicial Authority against the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Bribri de Talamanca.
The defense of lack of right raised by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is rejected. By majority, the complaint is declared partially admissible as far as it was instituted by the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre128202 against the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, and it must be understood denied for all purposes in everything not granted in this ruling, and therefore the following pronouncements are made: a.) By majority, the State is condemned to include, in favor of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, in the National Budget Bill of the Republic, the one hundred million colones that it should have included in those bills corresponding to the budget periods of nineteen seventy-nine, nineteen eighty, nineteen eighty-one, and nineteen eighty-two. The inclusion of these monies in the respective bill must be made in four installments, at present value, and over four consecutive annual budget periods, the first of which must be made by the end of the budget period following the one that is underway at the time this judgment becomes final.
(Consequently), by majority, the State is ordered to exercise coordinated, systematic, and effective work with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the Indigenous Community of Nombre128202, which guarantee the execution of the provisions of Article 5 of the Ley Indígena. At no time may the Presidency of the Republic—without prejudice to the constitutional powers of the Contraloría General de la República—disregard the proper use given to that fund in accordance with the Law. Judge Hess Araya dissents regarding this operative point; b.) By unanimity, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is condemned to deploy all necessary actions, charged to its own budget, so that the Indigenous Reserve of Nombre128202 is duly demarcated, which must begin within a period of no less than six months from the date on which this judgment becomes final. These tasks must be concluded at least six months after they begin.
The demarcation must include the surveying of plans and any other instrument of that nature, as well as the registry studies necessary for the subsequent effective registry inscription of the lands, allowing the identification of whether there are overlapping properties over the areas that comprise the indigenous reserve of interest. These tasks must be carried out with the coordination of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the collaboration of the plaintiff indigenous community, for which purpose said commission must interact with the indigenous authorities so that no obstacle is generated that hinders the performance of the ordered tasks; c.) By unanimity, the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas is condemned to deploy all necessary activity in direct, intense, and systematic coordination with the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre128202, and the authorities of the Indigenous Community of Nombre128202, so that, jointly with them, by conducting a population census, any non-indigenous person possessing areas of the surface of the indigenous reserve of interest is identified, this once the Nombre128202 indigenous reserve is demarcated and the respective registry and cadastral information is surveyed by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural.
The ordered census must be fully completed within a period of four months from the time the reserve has been demarcated and the registry and cadastral information of interest is available, and the determination of which titleholders or possessors of lands are in good faith or not must be carried out with the full participation of the authorities of the plaintiff indigenous community, the association that represents it, the CONAI, and the INDER. This ruling is issued without a special condemnation of costs exclusively regarding the part of the complaint that did not succeed against the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Bribri de Talamanca; d.) By majority, the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas are jointly and severally condemned to pay both costs. Judge Hess Araya dissents regarding the condemnation of costs against the State.- Notify.- Felipe Córdoba Ramírez Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Christian Hess Araya Dissenting vote of Judge Hess Araya:
I.I dissent only as far as the preceding ruling concludes that there has been an omission attributable to the State and, consequently, upholds the action against it, in the terms of point a) of the operative part; which I support as follows.
II.Article 5 in fine of the Ley Indígena stipulates: "The expropriations and indemnifications shall be financed with the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash, which shall be allocated in four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982."
The fund shall be administered by CONAI, under the supervision of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.” In the opinion of the undersigned, and diverging from the criterion of my fellow male and female Judges of the Tribunal (and even partially reconsidering what I subscribed to in judgment No. 198-2011-VI of the Sixth Section), the transcribed stipulations—despite being inserted into a norm whose remaining content does not possess that character—were established by the legislator with a purely temporary validity and, in fact, in proper legislative technique, should have appeared in the corresponding section at the end of the law, as is customary. Based on both their text and the application of the principle of annuality of the budget cycle, I consider that the validity of said provisions expired at the end of the 1982 fiscal year, without this Tribunal being empowered to re-establish their validity more than thirty years later, however noble the purpose that inspired their enactment.
All of the foregoing without prejudice to the fact that: a) the norm omits to indicate which is the source of financing that would cover the disbursement ordered therein, in violation of the principle of budget balance, a peripheral observation upon which I do not elaborate further because it is a matter for the Constitutional Jurisdiction and not for this Chamber; and, b) it is strange, in every sense, that the administration of the fund was entrusted to CONAI, when it was the ITCO (today INDER) that had to carry out and pay the expropriations. With the foregoing, I do not seek to disregard either the international commitments assumed by the Costa Rican State regarding the protection of indigenous cultures, or the responsibilities contained in the legislation on the matter. I limit myself to confirming a reality, which is that the cited rules were foreseen to be fulfilled within a precise period, which has amply expired, and that, consequently, this collegiate body cannot now compel their fulfillment.-
III.Additionally, in the dissenting vote that I also recorded regarding judgment No. 53-2013-VII of this Tribunal, I expressed the reasons for which I consider that the omission—attributed to the Executive Branch—of providing for certain specific budget items in the ordinary or extraordinary Budget projects of the Republic that it submits to the Legislative Assembly for its knowledge, does not constitute an administrative conduct whose oversight corresponds to this jurisdiction; as well as why I consider that it is not possible for this Tribunal to compel the Executive Branch to act to the contrary (and even less so by determining in how many tracts to do so), despite dealing with budget obligations of legal origin. Certainly, the money necessary to pay the required expropriations must come from somewhere and, therefore, to the extent that INDER cannot cover them from its own funds, it would have to manage the necessary budget transfers.
But this is very different from this Tribunal reaching the point of ordering the Executive Branch to proceed in that sense, assuming a competence that I believe it does not have. In any case, note that in the final extreme and in the event that this position is not shared, I am of the opinion that what was ordered in another very similar case (under case file No. 10-000275-1028-CA, resolved by the already cited judgment No. 198-2011-VI) would still be applicable to this case, wherein it was explained that it is not possible to attribute omissive conduct to the Executive Branch for not having budgeted and transferred the monies for the expropriations of non-indigenous persons, since this necessarily supposes that the IDA and CONAI must first have satisfied their obligations related to determining in which cases that procedure should be followed, in order to subsequently manage the necessary resources.-
IV.Finally, it should be added that based on the manner in which the procedural claims were established in this matter, only those numbered 3 and 5 contain requests related to the State: the first seeks that the latter initiate, together with the IDA (today IDER) and CONAI, “the cited studies and appraisals, the procedures for the indemnifications (including possible expropriations)”, duties that the law only assigns to those last two entities; while the second is clearly improper for the reasons expressed in this ruling and which I share. Consequently, to the extent that the operative part of the judgment “orders the State to exercise coordinated, systematic, and effective tasks with the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs and the Institute of Rural Development and the Indigenous Community Nombre128202, which guarantee the execution of the provisions of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law,” this norm is given a scope that it does not possess with respect to the State, wherefore I do not consider the referred mandate legally sustainable.-
V.For all of the foregoing, I uphold the objection of lack of passive legal standing raised by the State, with respect to which I declare the claim inadmissible, with the corresponding award of costs in its favor. In all other respects, I share the pronouncement that precedes.-
CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA (Folio 766 of the main file).-
Drafted by Judge Córdoba Ramírez with the affirmative vote of Judge Fernández Brenes and in part by Judge Hess Araya, the latter of whom records a dissenting vote in this ruling on the corresponding matter.-
CONSIDERANDO
I.Regarding the evidence for better provision. Whereas, through a brief submitted to the court by the representation of the Institute of Rural Development on September five, two thousand thirteen, the admission of evidence for better resolution was requested (folio 757), consisting of the text of judgment number 106-2013 of fourteen hours on August twenty-eight, two thousand thirteen, issued by the First Section of the Administrative Litigation Court in an ordinary proceeding identified as the one processed under judicial file number 07-001117-0163-CA, with which, as expressed, it intends for its content to be weighed to prove that regarding the claims against the mentioned Institute, the lawsuit should not succeed. (Folios 720 through 756). On this matter, it must be noted that the possibility for this type of untimely evidence to be admitted by virtue of the provisions of article 331 of the Civil Procedure Code is at the discretion of the Judge, and it is not acceptable to assert that its rejection can cause defenselessness, since, by principle of procedural preclusion, it is brought to the process outside the opportunities provided for the purpose of contributing evidentiary elements available to the parties linked in the procedural legal relationship; therefore, it is rejected.
Additionally, it must be noted that the evidence refers specifically to a jurisprudential precedent affirmed to have been issued in a judicial case different from this one, not constituting proof that is in any way aimed at giving an account of the material truth regarding any of the facts of interest concerning the ruling on the merits that must declare the better right in the present case; for this reason, it is also irrelevant, and therefore, the request is rejected.-
II.Proven Facts. The following are of relevance for the resolution of this proceeding:
III.Facts Not Proven: The following are considered facts not proven for the issuance of this ruling:
IV.Regarding the criticisms made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's representation outlined in its lawsuit argumentative structures supporting this action, indicating—by way of summary—that the indigenous community Nombre128202 was recognized as the titleholder of its territory pursuant to the content of Executive Decree number 29448 of March twenty-one, two thousand one, which includes the area it identifies—confusingly adds—as Nombre128202 and Nombre128203, forming the farm registered in the National Registry, from the Partido of Limón, under real folio registration number Placa30242, which was later divided, segregating from it farm number Placa30243 (it does not indicate to whom the segregated area belongs). Then, it asserts that the area of territory belonging to it is described in cadastral map number Placa30244, but that this map includes a farm, namely the one registered under registration number Placa30245, regarding which no claim shall be understood to be made in this case, since the same matter is being discussed in the judicial case it identified as the one being processed under judicial file number 10-000275-1028-CA.
It alleged that the plaintiff's lands are invaded over more than one thousand hectares, without the defendant institutions and the State having yet carried out the studies and procedures established in article 5 of the Indigenous Law, so that the expropriation (expropiación), indemnification (indemnización), and/or eviction of the non-indigenous occupants within our territory may be concluded. Concerning the State, it accused it of not having provided budget to the corresponding institutions, and those institutions of not having made the necessary efforts to proceed in accordance with the studies of occupants, expropriations, and evictions within those territories.-
V.Regarding the defense arguments made by the State's representation. The State's representation indicated—insofar as it only contested the lawsuit within the hearing granted to it in judicial file number 10-000274-2018-CA and in opposition to the lawsuit being granted—that while it is correct that Executive Decree number 29448 of March twenty-one, two thousand one created the indigenous reserve in question, it is not true that it is invaded by non-indigenous persons, in the absence of evidence demonstrating this circumstance. Regarding the judicial proceeding processed under number 10-000275-1028-CA, it notes that it is an ordinary proceeding in which the State has partially paid fees and interest to the registered owners of the farm, but it has not been possible to take definitive possession of the property until the total amount owed is paid. It also indicated that there is a lack of passive legal standing in this matter insofar as the action has been directed against the State, given that the core of the lawsuit is against INDER and CONAI, entities with their own legal personality, and at the same time, those designated by the legislator to carry out the studies and appraisals on the lands within the relevant reserve that are occupied by non-indigenous third parties.-
VI.Regarding the defense arguments made by CONAI's representation. For its part, CONAI's representation indicated in defense of that organization that, while it is true that the reserve in question is the property or vested right of the indigenous community Nombre128202 and is occupied by third parties who are not part of said group, despite having been urging different governments for several years to comply with the provisions of the Indigenous Law. That its legal obligations towards communities such as the plaintiff are limited to performing coordination tasks, as defined by the Procuraduría General de la República after being consulted on the matter in due course, and that it is not this entity, but rather the Institute of Rural Development, that is responsible for acquiring properties owned by private individuals within indigenous reserves, an Institute which, it warns, lacks an available budget and technical elements to perform these tasks. In summary, it rejected that CONAI be attributed any responsibility in this matter, as it has never breached its legal duties.-
VII.Regarding the defense arguments made by INDER’s representation. In defense of INDER's institutional interests, its representation indicated that, while it is true that Indigenous Law assigns it the obligation to expropriate and indemnify non-indigenous occupants of the reserves when appropriate, this is done in coordination with CONAI. That it is important to consider that INDER has not had the necessary economic resources from the State to fulfill this obligation, and has therefore found itself unable to execute what is required. It then refers to some initiatives or proposals raised at the institutional level to solve this problem, such as a bill it identified as "Ley de Financiación para la Recuperación de Territorios Indígenas," which it asserted was presented to the indigenous communities. It does not indicate when this occurred or what fate this bill has had. It also indicated that they would have created a "Manual para la Adquisición y Traspaso de Tierras en Territorios indígenas al amparo del artículo cinco de la Ley Indígena 6172," which was first approved by the Board of Directors in the year two thousand eight—understood to be that of INDER—and later repealed by it in the year two thousand nine, thus preventing its application.
It indicates that there is no regulatory body that governs the manner and procedure to be followed, through which a possessor or titleholder would be determined to be non-indigenous within those areas in the reserves, and whether they are in good faith or not, as well as which public authority would have the competence for such determination. It reinforces its assertions regarding a ruling it identifies from the Constitutional Chamber, which indicated to them that the determination of who has a better right on account of being the titleholder of areas presumably part of these reserves must be made in court through an ordinary proceeding, so the corresponding determination is the responsibility of a judge, not INDER. Added to this is that it does not consider these functions to correspond to INDER, as such activities are not part of its ordinary functions, but rather, in its view, are the responsibility of CONAI, in conjunction with the indigenous associations.
It was also added that another circumstance preventing them from proceeding accordingly is the financial aspect, given that despite article 5 of the Indigenous Law providing that these tasks would be carried out with a budget of one hundred million colones, to be delivered in installments of twenty-five million each in the years nineteen hundred seventy-nine to nineteen hundred eighty-two, *"The reality is that said provision was never implemented by the State; which has caused severe delays in the processing of said processes; due to lacking the financial resources for the payment of indemnifications, execution has become impossible…"* . Continuing on this point, it noted that the law has not designed any alternative for the institutional budget to include a specific allocation for the payment of these lands, consequently lacking legal authorization to disburse funds for these purposes, despite the provisions of Law 2825, under penalty of incurring the cause of liability provided in the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets in its article 110, subsection e).
Regarding the fact related by the plaintiff, such as the omission by INDER and CONAI to carry out studies and procedures to identify non-indigenous persons in the reserves, under the terms referred to in article 5 of the Indigenous Law, it reiterated what was related above, with a bill and a Manual that the co-defendant institution attempted to put into effect and operation. Regarding the judicial proceeding processed under judicial file number 86-000826-0178-CA, it indicated that this is a matter that has been adjudicated with the character of res judicata and that, concerning new encroachers who have entered the lands that were the subject of discussion in said proceeding, it has been the plaintiff indigenous association itself that has shown passivity in the face of these incursions into its reserve.-
VIII.Regarding the position of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Nombre128203 de Talamanca. In its statement of defense to the lawsuit, the representation of the co-defendant indigenous association accepted all the facts, notwithstanding that it leaves them subject to what emerges from the evidence in contradiction with the foregoing.-
He added, stating that he approves the claims made by the plaintiff, and that the Sibujú Norte territory indeed, first, does not belong to the indigenous community Nombre128203 and second, that it belongs to the Nombre128202, so they do not oppose the recovery of that territory by those bringing the action.
IX.On the object of the present proceeding (claims). This Court considers it necessary, before entering into considerations on the merits, to make a series of reflections that help to clarify what the object of the present proceeding is. As reflected in the record of the present case, in view of folios 691 to 693 of the main case file, in relation to the electronic record of the single hearing, which was held again on the twenty-fourth of June, two thousand thirteen, with the participation of the parties involved in the procedural legal relationship and in conjunction with the parties, particularly the plaintiff, a single list of claims for the proceeding was determined, so that for all purposes they shall be as follows: *"1. That it be declared that my represented party is the registered owner, and the Nombre128202 people are the proprietor, of the Property described in Executive Decree No. 29448-G of March 21, 2001 ("Reserva – Tenorio- Indígena Nombre128202 de Talamanca). 2.
That the Agricultural Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) and the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI) be ordered to carry out the studies and appraisals on the lands occupied by non-indigenous persons within that indigenous territory: a) Order them that the studies must determine which of those persons must be compensated and which have no right to such; b) Order them that the appraisals be carried out on the lands that must be compensated, taking into consideration the possible variations that could occur due to potential delays in the processes being processed for compensation; c) Order them to begin the studies and appraisals no more than one month after the judgment becomes final, and to have concluded them no more than four months after that finality. 3. That the State, the Agricultural Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario), and the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI) be ordered to immediately initiate, once the cited studies and appraisals have been carried out, the procedures for compensation (including possible expropriations) of the possessors or proprietors who have a right to it, and to pay -no more than one month after the judgment so ordering- the corresponding compensation. 4.
That my represented party be ordered to be placed in possession of each of the farms, parcels, or areas that make up our territory each time any of the current occupants are evicted or compensated in accordance with the provisions of the Expropriation Law (Ley de Expropiaciones); 5. In the case of the Indigenous Reserve Sibujú Norte (which is the aforementioned Nombre128202 indigenous territory), if placing my represented party in possession requires payment of the compensation ordered in the proceeding being processed in (sic) the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), under case file 86-000826-0178-CA, order the State to proceed with its payment no more than one month after the judgment becomes final. 6. That the defendants be ordered to jointly and severally pay the costs of this action."* That said, the action is formulated for trial to discuss the identity of the titleholder of a real property, identified as the Property described in Executive Decree No. 29448-G of March twenty-first, two thousand one.
This claim is of a purely declaratory nature as far as can be observed. Then, a series of petitionary points were formulated, all aimed at ordering the defendant public authorities to perform an action—that is, to deploy some conduct that, in the plaintiff's view, is imposed by the legal system but has not yet been executed by the defendants. This speaks to a split in the action: claims aimed at declaring an unlawful omission by all the defendant Public Administrations, and then ordering them to adopt the conduct demanded by the legal system instead. It concerns an alleged omission constituted by the actions referred to in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), which, while required to be executed by the defendants, is directed at defending the property right of the indigenous community, in this case, the Nombre128202. Finally, a claim was included linked to the possibility that, before ordering that the plaintiff community be placed in possession of specific areas of its territory, the State must pay the money it was ordered to pay in a judgment issued with the authority of material res judicata, within another plenary judicial proceeding distinct from the one at hand.
Thus, it seeks to order in the present case the party that lost in that judicial proceeding to execute that which it was ordered to do therein. In the terms that will be stated, and according to which, in this Court's view, there is no interest in addressing issues concerning which there is no conflict to resolve—such as that relating to the ownership of the Nombre128202 indigenous reserve—this action fundamentally proposes a claim based on an omission inconsistent with the legal system, as derived from the theory of the case presented by the plaintiff. Moreover, the last of the claims is autonomous and, as will be seen, sterile.
X.On the legal protection regime for indigenous territories and the identity of the one belonging to the Nombre128202 indigenous community. Being essential for the analysis to be carried out to resolve the present matter, we proceed to address the legal protection regime for indigenous reserves, particularly as regards Article 5 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), as well as the regulation defining the location of the indigenous reserve owned by the plaintiffs.
Well then, very much despite what the legal system at that time clearly regulated regarding the property rights of these communities in the terms stated, with the adoption and entry into force of the </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Ley de Tierras y Colonización</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> number 2825 of the fourteenth of May, nineteen sixty-one </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">(</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">1961</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">, published in the Colección de Leyes y Decretos of that year in its second semester, first volume, page three hundred ninety-four, which repealed the Ley de Terrenos Baldíos, it was provided, pursuant to its Article 75, in gross contravention of Convention No. 107 of the International Labour Organization, as follows, in relation to the entity that this normative body identified as the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización: “</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">The Institute, in agreement with the pertinent bodies, shall ensure the conditioning of indigenous communities or families, in accordance with the spirit of this law. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">It shall not be declared that the extensive zones where these communities live in isolation belong exclusively to them</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, but rather </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">an attempt shall be made to gather all these communities together, forming a single agrarian center</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, in the zone that the Institute </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">deems adequate</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> and for which purpose the area of land that is necessary shall be used”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">.
The norm refers</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> to the entity formerly known as ITCO (1961) later IDA, Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (1982) currently INDER Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (2012). The cited norm simply and categorically disregarded the property rights of indigenous communities enshrined in a norm of superior rank, potency, and endurance. Subsequently, and more than a decade later, while this unsystematic regulation was in force, the </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Ley de Creación de la</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">number 5251, of the eleventh of July, nineteen seventy-three </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">(</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">1973</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">, was promulgated, published in the Colección de Leyes y Decretos of the same year in its second semester, first volume, page sixty-five.
Having seen this normative body, if one bears in mind the commitment that resided in the State as of the entry into force of Convention No. 107 of the International Labour Organization in its Articles 2.1, 5, 11, and 13.2, this new domestic public organization linked to indigenous communities, pursuant to Article 4 of the aforementioned law, was designated by the legislator, for general purposes and in what is of interest, to: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">“…b) Serve as an</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">instrument of coordination</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">between the different public institutions obliged to execute works and provide services for the benefit of indigenous communities; (…) e) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Ensure respect for the rights of indigenous minorities, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">stimulating the action of the State</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">in order to guarantee the Indian </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">individual and collective property of the land</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; the timely use of credit; adequate marketing of production and efficient technical assistance; (…)”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">.
(The highlighting and underlining are not from the original). With everything and that, as will be seen below, these coordination tasks were not exclusively designated to CONAI, since ITCO was already linked to this function, albeit in a different form. On the other hand, the State's obligation to guarantee the property rights of these communities over the land was reiterated. Regarding these assigned coordination tasks, one cannot overlook Article 9 of the same legal body, which reads as follows: “</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">For the purposes of subsection b) of Article 8, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">the State is empowered</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, [and] the autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions of the country to </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">provide assistance of any kind</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> to the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">.
(The highlighting is not from the original). A separate point is that this law contemplated – again in an unsystematic manner – a single transitory provision, seemingly inspired by the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which read: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">“No later than within six months following the effective date of this law, the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización shall proceed to </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">initiate possessory information proceedings</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(levantar informaciones posesorias)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> for all the parcels occupied by the indigenous people in the different zones, in order to register them in the Property Registry immediately in the name of the occupants of said parcels.
Indians who are not occupying parcels must be registered in a census to resolve for them the problem of the lack of land as soon as possible. The Instituto de Tierras y Colonización must maintain a considerable reserve of lands suitable for cultivation, on which it shall grant leases; and which </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">shall be destined exclusively for future expansions of the indigenous communities</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">, (the highlighting is not from the original) which speaks – it is insisted – of a dispossession of the</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> ownership of those lands against what was established by international law.
On another note, in what could be considered to constitute some favorable aspect to indigenous interests, it was indicated that as of the promulgation of that law, it was that Institute that should have at least provided itself with sufficient lands to destine them exclusively to these communities, as well as that, as a logical and necessary consequence of that attribution-duty, it should have undertaken the pertinent tasks in order to determine and clearly define the limitation or boundary (deslinde) of the lands that would comprise those territories. One year after its entry into force, this transitory provision was reformed pursuant to Article 1 of Law number 5651 of the thirteenth of December, nineteen seventy-four (1974), in the following terms and with absolute disregard for the indigenous property guaranteed by Convention No. 107 of the International Labour Organization: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">“Transitory.- The indigenous reserves </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">registered in the name of the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> (ITCO) are declared inalienable, which shall be destined exclusively for the settlement of the indigenous communities, indispensable public services, and for the </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">use, habitation and usufruct</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> of the aborigines who lack lands of their own property, registered or not registered outside of these reserves.
Within these, the ITCO may grant leases to said aborigines, for a limited and non-transferable term, except to other aborigines who are in the same conditions. The National Banking System and the other institutions of the State, jointly with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas (CONAI), shall regulate special systems so that the members of the aboriginal communities may obtain credits for the adequate exploitation of the lands, to which this transitory refers”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">. It is insisted that ITCO then had to delimit and register, even if in its own name, the corresponding land areas. The foregoing entailed the complete disregard for indigenous property that the State would have committed to guarantee before the international community and those peoples. Turning again to the original text of Law number 5251 that creates the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, said organization, according to its first article, was endowed with its own legal personality and patrimony.
It is highlighted that the Commission from its creation – and in that respect its general assembly – was composed, among others according to its Article 2, subsection a), by: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">\"…</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> the representatives of the following dependencies and institutions: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Presidencia de la República</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; Universidad de Costa Rica; Universidad Nacional; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Ministerio de Educación Pública</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Ministerio de Salud</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Ministerio de Seguridad Pública</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social; Instituto de Tierras y Colonización; Servicio Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillado; Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo; Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje; and Servicio Nacional de Electricidad;</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">(…)”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">(The highlighting is not from the original).
The foregoing evidences the necessary link that must have existed between the Central Government and, among other entities, ITCO itself, this, until the issuance of judgment number 3485-2003 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, at fourteen hours seventeen minutes on the second of May, two thousand three, a ruling whose content we do not proceed to analyze, it being sufficient to indicate that it deemed it unconstitutional for the commission to be composed of said public authorities. It must be noted that the referred institutions and Ministries formed part of the general assembly of CONAI, with powers to set its general policy by acting as components of said collegiate body, as well as to approve or disapprove its budget, both ordinary and extraordinary. The purpose of this organization is reiterated for its relevance, it was, among other things and as noted, to serve as an instrument of inter-institutional coordination, as well as to ensure respect for the rights of indigenous minorities by stimulating State action in order to guarantee the indigenous person individual property and to their community, the property of their territories according to Article 4, subsection e) of said legal body.
As for the patrimony of CONAI, it would be found constituted as of the date of its start of operations, by the annual subsidy that had been given in the Ley de Presupuesto General Ordinario de la República to the former Junta de Protección a las Razas Aborígenes; the extraordinary contributions agreed upon by the State and autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions of the Republic; the assets belonging to the former Junta; donations from individuals, foreign States, international agencies and foundations or any other entity; the use of indigenous names, symbols and figures; and the amount of the rights granted for the commercial use of those indigenous names, symbols and figures, (Article 8, subsection a) of the Ley de Creación de la CONAI). Still in regard to budgetary matters, Article 9 of this law provided that the State and autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions of the Republic would be authorized to provide assistance of any kind to CONAI, of course, for the achievement of its purposes.
On another note and always along these same lines, in its Article 28, the law that concerns us indicated that: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">“</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">In order that the Executive Branch may be in a position to set, in the bill for the Presupuesto General de la República</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">, the subsidy it deems appropriate, no later than July 31st of each year, the Board of Directors shall send to the Oficina de Planificación de la Presidencia de la República a reasoned estimate of its needs for the next fiscal period. It is understood that this provision does not apply for the 1973 fiscal period. Likewise, the Institution’s budgets shall be submitted to the Contraloría General de la República for their approval and settlement in accordance with the law”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">.
(The highlighting is not from the original). The indigenous reserve Nombre128202</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; -aw-import:spaces\">  </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">, was described for the first time in the terms of </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Decreto Ejecutivo number 5904</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> of the</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">eleventh of March, nineteen seventy-six, published in the Diario Oficial “La Gaceta” number seventy, of the tenth of April, nineteen seventy-six </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">(1976)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">.
In this normative instrument, it was declared, among other things, as follows: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">“</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Considering: (…)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">5°- That there still exist territories populated exclusively by indigenous people</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">making it possible to delimit said Reserves</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">; (…) 10.- That it </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">is </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">the duty of the State</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">to watch over the security of its citizens, and to prevent injustices and mistreatment, especially in the case of </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">indigenous minorities currently marginalized</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">.
(The highlighting and underlining are not from the original). Furthermore, in its first article it was ordered that: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">“Its exact delimitation shall be carried out by ITCO, in coordination</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">with CONAI”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">. Thus, the entity then called Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, (today INDER) is reiterated in its designation as the organism that would have under its charge the </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">territorial demarcation of the thusly created reserve</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">, a task that should have begun two months after the Decree was put into effect.
(Among these reserves, that of Talamanca was already identified by the terms of the above-cited Decreto Ejecutivo number 5904 of the</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">eleventh of March, nineteen seventy-six). Additionally, pursuant to Articles 14 and 15 of the Decree under analysis, it was expressed by the Executive Branch that what was being regulated by this means is of</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">public interest, as well as that </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">CONAI would have the duty to prepare a census of the indigenous population of Costa Rica as soon as possible</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">, which must also be kept permanently updated.
Well then, the land owned by these communities being recognized in the manner indicated, just over a year later, the </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Ley Indígena</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">was promulgated</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">, number 6172 of the twenty-ninth of November, nineteen seventy-seven </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">(</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">1977</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">)</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">, which, pursuant to its Article 11, repealed any other previous law in what opposes it.
On this occasion and without prejudice to what the legislator promulgated on the occasion of putting into force the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, which would have been, in its unsystematic nature, considered repealed, it was provided, pursuant to the first article in relation to Article 2 of this supervening legal body – now, indeed, in accordance with the provisions of Convention 107 of the International Labour Organization on the Protection of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples – that the indigenous reserves are the property of those communities and that they should all be found registered in the National Registry in their name, no longer that of ITCO. Likewise, it was established that the limits of those territories, once “recognized” by the State, may not be varied to diminish their area except by a law of the Republic. In addition, it was noted that these communities would have full legal capacity to act and that they would not be considered state entities (Article 4 of the law speaks of the Directive Councils, administrators, and representatives of these communities).
Moreover, it is reiterated that these are inalienable and imprescriptible territories, non-transferable and exclusive to the indigenous communities that inhabit them, non-indigenous people not being permitted to rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or properties comprised within these reserves, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; text-decoration:underline\">any transfer or negotiation of lands or their improvements within the indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous people, being absolutely null with the legal consequences of the case</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">. As a separate note, according to the regulation to the Ley Indígena, Decreto Ejecutivo number 8487, of the twenty-sixth of April, nineteen seventy-eight, published in the Diario Oficial “La Gaceta” number 89, of the tenth of May, nineteen seventy-eight, in its Article 3, it was indicated that: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">“For the exercise of the rights and fulfillment of the obligations referred to in Article 2 of the Ley Indígena, the Indigenous Communities shall adopt the organization provided for in Law N</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super\">o</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\"> 3859 of the Dirección Nacional de Asociaciones de Desarrollo de la Comunidad and its Regulation.”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> Meanwhile, Article 10 of the same regulation indicated that: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">“To guarantee the rights regulated in Articles 3</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic\">and 5 of the Law, the President of the Comprehensive Development Association shall appear, personally or through their attorney-in-fact or Delegate, as soon as possible after the infringement has occurred, accompanying the certification showing the registration of the Reserve, to initiate, before the competent official, the corresponding legal action.”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> Subsequently, pursuant to Decreto Ejecutivo number 13568 of April 30, 1982, published in the Diario Oficial “La Gaceta” number 94 of the seventeenth of May, nineteen eighty-two, it was provided in its first article that the Comprehensive Development Associations have the legal representation of the Indigenous Communities and act as their local government.</span> In reinforcement of all the foregoing, on the third of November of nineteen ninety-two (<span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">1992</span>), Law number 7316 was enacted, published in Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 234, of the fourth of December of nineteen ninety-two, <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“</span> <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">”</span> of the International Labour Organization, pursuant to which the subject of indigenous property is specifically regulated.
In its article 2.1, this instrument reads as follows: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“Governments shall have the responsibility for developing, with the participation of the peoples concerned, co-ordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee respect for their integrity”</span>. For its part, subsection 2) of the same numeral indicates: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“2. Such action shall include measures for: (a) ensuring that members of these peoples benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population; (b) promoting the full realisation of the social, economic and cultural rights of these peoples with respect for their social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions and their institutions; (c) assisting the members of the peoples concerned to eliminate socio-economic gaps that may exist between indigenous and other members of the national community, in a manner compatible with their aspirations and ways of life”</span>.
Other numerals of the convention that are of interest, we proceed to cite; its article 3 says as follows: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“Article 3.- 1. Indigenous and tribal peoples shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental freedoms without hindrance or discrimination. The provisions of the Convention shall be applied without discrimination to male and female members of these peoples; 2. No form of force or coercion shall be used in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples concerned, including the rights contained in this Convention”</span>. Its numeral 4, which on the part of the State: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“1. Special measures shall be adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned. 2.
Such special measures shall not be contrary to the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. 3. Enjoyment of the general rights of citizenship, without discrimination, shall not be prejudiced in any way by such special measures”</span>. Article 5 indicates that governments: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“In applying the provisions of this Convention: (a) the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognised and protected, and due account shall be taken of the nature of the problems which face them both as groups and as individuals; (b) the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these peoples shall be respected; (c) policies aimed at mitigating the difficulties experienced by these peoples in facing new conditions of life and work shall be adopted, with the participation and co-operation of the peoples affected”.</span> The subject of the property of these groups over the areas that comprise their territories was specifically contemplated in this convention, and in this vein, its article 13 indicates as follows: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“1.
In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention, governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">their relationship with the lands or territories, or both</span> <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship. 2. The use of the term 'lands' in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use”</span>. (The highlighting is not from the original). Article 14, subsection 2), reads: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“2.
Governments shall take steps as necessary to</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, and to</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned”</span>.-
In this regulatory instrument, the following was declared regarding the situation these communities were considered to be experiencing and the circumstances that would have justified their protection at that point: *"Whereas: 1°- That the indigenous population of Costa Rica is seriously threatened in its existence by a continuous and arbitrary dispossession of their lands (despojo continuo y arbitrario de sus tierras) and that this phenomenon has alarmingly intensified in recent years, reaching acts of violence; 2°- That the dispossession was made possible by the fact that the indigenous people have no legal backing for ownership of the lands they have occupied since time immemorial (no tienen ningún respaldo legal de propiedad de las tierras que ellos ocupan desde tiempos inmemoriales); 3°- That furthermore, the indigenous people have demonstrated an inability to contain the invasion of their lands by themselves (han demostrado no poder contener por sí solos la invasión de sus tierras); 4°- That for the foregoing reasons, the indigenous people have been requesting (han venido solicitando) for a long time the creation or legalization of inalienable Reserves and the recognition of their right to the guarantee of land (el reconocimiento de su derecho a la garantía de la tierra); 5°- That territories populated exclusively by indigenous people still exist, making the delimitation of said Reserves possible; 6°- That the Culture and social organization of indigenous people are profoundly different from those of non-indigenous people, and therefore deserve to be supported; 7°- That the agricultural methods of indigenous people are less destructive to the forests than those of non-indigenous people, thus allowing better protection of watersheds, especially in areas of rugged topography; and that, furthermore, it is the State's obligation to ensure that lands with forestry vocation always remain with their forest cover (cobertura boscosa); 8°- That indigenous people are ruthlessly exploited and driven to alcoholism by the small grocery stores (pulperías) and bars (cantinas), respectively, established for that purpose in their territories by non-indigenous people; 9°- The development of the South Pacific zone had the disastrous consequence of the almost total spoliation of the indigenous people, due to a lack of adequate legislation and measures.
The same is currently happening with the indigenous zones of the Atlantic region and of Coto Brus where not even legislation on the matter exists; 10.- That it is the duty of the State (es deber del Estado) to watch over the security of its citizens, and to prevent injustices and mistreatment, especially in the case of currently marginalized indigenous minorities (minorías indígenas actualmente marginadas)"*. (The highlighting and underlining are not from the original). On this occasion, the Executive Branch not only recognizes and declares the circumstances in which these particular groups of the national population find themselves in relation to the exercise of their rights, but also determines, in accordance with its first article, the extensions of land that would correspond to the Talamanca indigenous reserve and orders that: *"Its exact delimitation shall be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI"*.
Thus, the then-named Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización) (today INDER) is reiterated its designation as the body that would be in charge of the territorial demarcation of the reserve thus created, a task that was to begin two months after the Decree came into force. (Among these reserves, that of Talamanca was already identified under the terms of the above-cited Executive Decree number 5904 of March eleventh, nineteen seventy-six). Said act of the Executive Branch also provided that any institution, public or private, could provide assistance to ITCO for these purposes. A rule was also included in the cited Decree in its Article 4, which, contrary to what was regulated in the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), but in accordance with the provisions of Convention number 107 of the International Labor Organization, ordered as follows: *"Declare the reserves mentioned in Article 1 of this decree as the property of the indigenous communities (propiedad de las comunidades indígenas).
The State recognizes the existence and legal personality of these communities. The Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) shall register these Reserves in the Public Registry."* (The underlining is not from the original). Article 6 of the same Decree again classified these lands as inalienable, non-transferable, and exclusive for indigenous people, and its Article 5 indicated that: *"The reserves shall be administered by the indigenous people in their traditional or modern community structures, under the coordination and advisement of CONAI (coordinación y asesoría de la CONAI)"*. Due to its relevance, note the text of Article 8 of this Executive Decree: *"Article 8.- In the event that non-indigenous persons have acquired ownership or are in legal possession, or are precarious possessors of farms or lands enclaved within the reserves, at the time this Decree comes into force, they shall be expropriated and compensated (expropiados e indemnizados) in accordance with the procedures established in Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961 and its amendments…"*.
(The highlighting is not from the original). The regulation referred to in this article of the Executive Decree is the Land and Colonization Law. Furthermore, in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of the Decree under analysis, the Executive Branch expressed that what was regulated in this manner is of public interest, as well as that CONAI would have the duty to prepare a census of the indigenous population of Costa Rica as soon as possible, which must also be permanently updated. The norms of the Executive Decree under study were later modified on the occasion of the entry into force of Executive Decree number 6036, of May twenty-sixth, nineteen seventy-six (1976), published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number one hundred thirteen, of June twelfth, nineteen seventy-six, which reformed the boundaries of the Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella, and Talamanca Indigenous Reserves, and proceeded with the recognition of the Telire Reserve.
Regarding what is of interest, Article 13 of this new decree indicated: *"Article 13.- In the expropriation process for lands enclaved in the Reserves (Article 8 of Decree No. 5904-G), only works or investments that have truly been useful or represent some permanent economic activity shall be recognized as 'improvements' (mejoras). Abusive deforestation, leading to soil erosion, as well as hoarded lands and those abandoned for more than three (3) years at the time this decree comes into force, shall not be compensated (indemnizados)."* (The highlighting is not from the original). Subsequently, by Executive Decree number 7268 of August ninth, nineteen seventy-seven (1977), published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number one hundred fifty-seven of August twentieth of the same year, it was provided, in more legally appropriate terms, the "recognition" of ownership over the indigenous territory and its delimitation, in which those of Sibujú Norte, Chase, and Alto Pacuare were identified, which, according to Article 3 of said instrument, all formed an integral part of the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve and would be registered in the Property Registry, despite constituting a unit, in separate properties.
The reference to the Land and Colonization Law regarding expropriations, while not indicating anything about the public authority that would be responsible for carrying them out, suggests that although it was the exclusive obligation of the State, it would reside with ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. Currently, the indigenous reserve Nombre128202 is described in terms of its location—on the cartographic sheets of the National Geographic Institute (IGN)—and boundaries, under the terms of the information contained in Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one, but the tasks corresponding to determining its registry situation, nor its physical demarcation, have not been carried out, despite the passage of decades since these tasks were and are an obligation of the State, in conjunction with what is now INDER and CONAI in this matter.-
XI.Regarding the claim seeking a declaration that the plaintiff association is the registered owner, and the people of Nombre128202 the owner, of the Property described in Executive Decree number 29448-G of March twenty-first, two thousand one. This petitionary claim deserves separate consideration in the terms to be stated. Regarding the claim seeking a declaration that the plaintiff association is the registered owner, and the people of Nombre128202 the owner of the Property described in Executive Decree number 29448-G of March twenty-first, two thousand one, there is clearly a lack of current interest that renders this claim inadmissible, as is hereby ordered. On this matter, and since none of the defendant parties invoked such a defense as an exception, it must be noted that the jurisprudence emanating from the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, within which, by way of example, is judgment number 2008-000317 of nine hours ten minutes on May second, two thousand eight, has characterized this exception as one directed at verifying a material prerequisite of the jurisdictional action.
Thus, for a lawsuit to succeed, independent of other aspects such as procedural capacity, jurisdiction, and compliance with the respective requirements in the complaint, a sua sponte (oficiosamente) review must also be conducted to determine whether material prerequisites such as the right, legal standing, and of course, the current interest, are present. If any—or all—of these prerequisites are absent, the lawsuit could not receive a positive response. In the case of lack of current interest, it is an exception, subject to analysis at the time of issuing the judgment, which supposes that regardless of the merits of the claim, the claim is not susceptible to being granted because there is a different but legally relevant reason that imposes this. The current interest is closely related to the possibility that the ruling may act upon reality, whether by innovating or preserving a determined legal situation, which is closely linked to the object of the process understood as the claims.
To say that there is a current interest in ruling on the substantive right is nothing other than speaking of the need to provide jurisdictional protection—in this case, in accordance with Article 49 of the Constitution—to the person who claims to be affected in their subjective rights and/or legitimate interests, regarding an administrative conduct for which they request the intervention of the respective jurisdictional body. The purpose of that intervention is to resolve the legal conflict of which one is a part (right of action) when the judgment proves useful for the holder of that subjective right or legitimate interest. This implies that the adjudicator has the duty to make a judgment of "utility" in view of the claim formulated and the factual circumstances under which the action is erected (grounds for the claim), comparing the effects of the requested jurisdictional resolution precisely with the framework of utility that such a pronouncement would provide in favor of the plaintiff.
It is a prospective analysis that weighs whether the favorable judgment would produce any effect on the person who requested the protection of their legal situation. Thus, there is no current interest if, even by granting the request, the judgment does not have the virtue of causing such an effect on the plaintiff's legal situation, thereby rendering the ruling sterile. (See also the related Judgment of the First Chamber, number 465-2009 of ten hours forty-five minutes on May seventh, two thousand nine). Hence, an exercise of objective control of legality for legality's sake lacks all relevant benefit or utility. (See doctrine derived from Article 10 of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure). Having stated the foregoing in different terms, if one considers that the exercise of the action to review the legality of administrative conduct is of a subjective nature, insofar as it presupposes the existence of a person with standing as a result of being the holder of a relevant interest to obtain a pronouncement that benefits them in their legal sphere—without a purely objective review of legality for legality's sake regarding administrative acts being possible, it is insisted—there is an absence of that current interest when the effect of the judgment would not alter, in any way—for the purposes of an effect-based phenomenon—the state of things.
For the case at hand, the representation of the plaintiff association must bear in mind that the judgment that could uphold the claim under analysis, insofar as it seeks to declare it the owner of the Nombre128202 Indigenous Reserve, is clearly sterile and unnecessary, given that, according to the very factual framework outlined in its action, nothing suggests the existence of any conflict between it and the defendant public authorities, as well as in relation to the association that was joined to the litigation—even though the grounds for the claim do not describe any fact whatsoever indicating the contrary—regarding the superior right of ownership over the territories that constitute said reserve. Quite the contrary, it is a settled issue between the parties that, under the specific legal regime applicable to these particular assets, it is by executive decree that the location of the reserves is recognized and that for this specific case, it has currently been done so by the Executive Branch according to the cartographic sheets of the IGN, under the terms of the information contained in Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one.
On the other hand, if it concerns the exclusive participation of the Nombre128203 indigenous community, it can be said that it was under the same Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one, that any matter related to the former right they held was peacefully resolved between both communities, without any pronouncement being required to innovate where the reality is that no act or conduct by that community has since been affecting the superior right of the plaintiff indigenous community, as will be seen.-
XII.Regarding the lawsuit, to the extent that the Comprehensive Development Association of the Nombre128203 Indigenous Reserve of Talamanca was joined to the litigation. The parties must refer to the content expressed in the preceding whereas clause, in relation to what was indicated in section IX of this judgment. The Talamanca Indigenous Reserve is currently legally constituted under Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, an instrument by which the overlap that at some historical moment existed between the land areas comprising the indigenous reserve of the plaintiff party and that which formerly was recognized as property of the population of the Nombre128203 community was eliminated, as can indeed be extracted from the plaintiff party's own statements in its complaint filings, according to which it is clear that it was never its intention to sue that community—as there is no property conflict against it.
Thus, it has been established as proven that through Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one, the Executive Branch ordered, on the occasion of a partial overlap existing between the reserve Nombre128202 and what was called Sibujú Norte, given in its time to the Nombre128203 community, to merge both reserves into a single delimitation, considering in turn the areas decreed as indigenous reserves, together constituting the Nombre128202 Indigenous Reserve. Apparently, the problem arises for strictly registry purposes, which are of no kind of interest in the present case and are a matter foreign to it, where at no level does this circumstance constitute a ground for the claim formulated by the plaintiff party. This being so, there is equally a clear lack of interest in what the lawsuit was understood to be by the Sixth Section (Sección Sexta) of this Court at the time, and consequently, the lawsuit is declared inadmissible insofar as it was understood to be directed against the Comprehensive Development Association of the Nombre128203 Indigenous Reserve.-
XIII.Regarding the admissibility or not of claims numbered 2 through 4, related to an omissive conduct in which the defendant public authorities allegedly incurred, regarding compliance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena). What is claimed in this regard is the core object of the action, as this Court has understood it. The plaintiff party, in what is relevant, has alleged the non-observance of numeral 5 of the Indigenous Law, which provides: *"Article 5.- In the case of non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within the indigenous reserves, ITCO must relocate them to other similar lands, should they so desire; if it is not possible to relocate them or if they do not accept the relocation, it must expropriate and compensate them in accordance with the procedures established in the Expropriation Law (Ley de Expropiaciones). / The studies and proceedings for expropriation and compensation (expropiación e indemnización) shall be carried out by ITCO in coordination with CONAI. / If there is subsequently an invasion of non-indigenous persons into the reserves, the competent authorities must immediately proceed with their eviction (desalojo), without payment of any compensation. / The expropriations and compensations shall be financed with a contribution of one hundred million colones in cash, to be allocated through four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982.
The fund shall be administered by CONAI, under the supervision of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República)."*. Thus, the failure to comply with this norm must correspond to the omission alleged in the case. In support of its action, the plaintiff claims that despite having been recognized as the holder of its territory, which according to its statement is described in cadastral map number L-118495-1993, these lands are invaded by more than one thousand hectares without the defendant institutions having yet carried out the studies and proceedings established in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, in order to conclude the expropriation, compensation, and/or eviction of the non-indigenous occupants found within its territory. Regarding the State, it alleged that the State has not provided a budget to the corresponding institutions, nor have these institutions made the necessary efforts to proceed in accordance with the studies of occupants, expropriations, and evictions within those territories (see particularly the petitionary claim identified as number 3).-
Thus, as the claims of the lawsuit were adjusted, the plaintiff aspires that, based on an omissive conduct adopted in discordance with the legal system, the judgment orders the following: "...2. Order the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas to carry out the studies and appraisals on the lands occupied by non-indigenous persons within this indigenous territory: a) Order them that the studies must determine which of these persons must be indemnified and which have no right to that; b) Order them that the appraisals be carried out on the lands that must be indemnified, considering the possible variations that could occur due to eventual delays in the processes being processed for the indemnification; c) Order them to begin the studies and appraisals no later than one month after the judgment becomes final, and to have concluded them no later than four months after that finality. 3.
Order the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas to immediately begin, once the cited studies and appraisals have been completed, the procedures for indemnifications (including possible expropriations) of the possessors or owners who are entitled to them, and to pay -no later than one month after the judgment ordering it- the corresponding indemnifications. 4. Order that my represented party be placed in possession of each one of the farms, parcels, or areas that make up our territory each time any of the current occupants is evicted or indemnified, as established by the Ley de Expropiaciones..." It is the opinion of this Court that, although it is necessary to declare the lawsuit admissible against the three sued public authorities, it cannot be in full accordance with the claims of the lawsuit, as they were formulated by the plaintiff, both situations which we proceed to reason out below.-
1.1.-) On the principle of conventionality control. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted internationally on April 30th, nineteen eighty-two, now Law of the Republic number 7615 of July 24th, nineteen ninety-six, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number 164 of August 29th, nineteen ninety-six, it was provided, in what is of interest to us: *"Article 26.- 'Pacta Sunt Servanda'. Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith"*. The foregoing implies the obligation of states to be consistent with the obligations they assume before the international community and, of course, in cases such as those covered in Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization in relation to Convention number 169, "concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries," with indigenous communities, particularly in matters of guarantees regarding the exercise, which must be guaranteed as full, of fundamental rights.
Of course, both article 7 and the doctrine that the Sala Constitucional has forged based on the scope it has given to numeral 48, both of the Constitución Política, are observable in this matter. On another level, for the purpose of the operational aspects or application of these rules, article 27 of this body of international law provides, in relation to domestic law and the observance of treaties, referring to the subscribing States, that: *"A party* *may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty* *This rule is without prejudice to article 46."* This article 46 referred to the effectiveness of the treaty once consented (signed) by the respective delegation, which relates to article 11, on the forms of manifestation of consent to be bound by a treaty, in providing that the signature of the same suffices. In view of this, the delegation of Costa Rica interpreted and expressed that the provision would apply in the case of the Costa Rican State with regard to secondary law, but not to the provisions of the Constitución Política.
All of the foregoing is relevant regarding the development of the principle of conventionality control and what could also be called the principle of intangibility of treaties before the law. From the foregoing, it also follows, under the coverage of the aspiration of every legal system to provide certainty and security, the obligation of direct application of the norms contained in international treaties already ratified and in force in the domestic order, being able, of course, to be legislation invoked by its beneficiary, independently of whether it is another State and in demand of loyalty to the commitments assumed within the framework of relations between the linked nations, without prejudice to the coverage that has also been customarily invoked for the principle in matters of instruments of this type when they regulate human rights matters. The Sala Constitucional in this regard has indicated as follows: *"II.- It is obvious that the petitioner starts from what is provided in article seven of the Constitución Política, in the sense that international treaties and conventions 'have authority superior to laws' (...).
But it must be said that the international Human Rights instruments in force in the Republic, according to the reform of article 48 of the Constitution (Law No. 7128, of August 18, 1989), upon integrating into the legal system at the highest level, that is, at the constitutional level, complement it in what favors the person."* Thus, in synthesis, the recognition of the validity of international norms as a direct source of domestic law is imposed, and in recognition of their location in the matter of the hierarchy of sources. The principle of conventionality control is rooted in the already mentioned article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in relation to articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, without prejudice to the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the latter of which, like many other declarations arising within the United Nations and the Organization of American States, are not subject to ratification by member or signatory States as it is unnecessary.
One could not say otherwise, then, than that the content of these bodies in matters of human rights has enormous interpretative value for all instances in charge of applying the norms that make up the block of legality, and in that sense, also domestic law. It is not superfluous to indicate, in what is relevant to the case at hand, that as follows from article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which refers to the right to property, as it is for every other right recognized in that instrument, the States are committed to securing the universal and *effective* respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of man, which means that the State has the obligation not only to respect those rights and freedoms, but also, the obligation to *ensure* them. This implies that it is the State as a whole, without its internal organization allowing it to claim it has divested itself of its duties, which is required to adopt actions tending toward the effective realization of the objectives pursued by conventions of this type in matters of human rights, without internal law serving as an excuse to fail to comply with what was agreed.
On the importance of bearing in mind what has been said at this point, in what is linked to the defense of the rights of a sector of the population that finds itself in a situation of vulnerability, such as indigenous communities from time immemorial, the Sala Constitucional, in its judgment N° 2253-96 of 3:39 p.m. on May 14, 1996, indicated: *"... There are various legal instruments aimed at promoting that real equality among subjects; among them can be located the particular situation of the aborigines, who have traditionally been marginalized, for historical, social, economic, and cultural reasons. They suffer the consequences of a society that neither understands nor respects their differences; and that, on occasions, tends to see them as beings incapable of directing their own lives and destinies. Faced with that situation, the international community felt the need to adopt measures in favor of indigenous people.
Thus, Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization -ILO-, called 'Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries', incorporated into our legal system through Law No. 7316 of November 3, 1992, established the special protection of indigenous people and their culture."* Conventionality control means that the Judicial Branch of each State and the bodies that make up its structure (and every authority that exercises materially jurisdictional functions, particularly the Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, based on what is provided in article 49 of the Constitution) must apply, interpret, and/or resolve the matters of their competences as legal operators, making the conventional parameter of control prevail, thus constituting international law, in what it regulates in human rights, as what it really is, namely, a guarantee of respect for human rights in the corresponding sphere.
For the rest, it suffices to indicate that according to our Civil Code in its article 5, these international normative bodies are of direct application by the legal operator, forming part of the positive domestic law of the nation, from the moment their incorporation into the block of legality occurs by virtue of the approval of the Asamblea Legislativa and their full publication in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta," so that forming part of the block of legality, this is a parameter of control for this jurisdiction. (Article 6 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública).- 1.2.-) On the omissive conduct in which the State has incurred. Having said all the foregoing, it is considered by the majority of the members of this Court, that the State has not only failed to comply with what is provided in the last paragraph of Article 5 of the Ley Indígena, but also that it involves a qualified and reinforced non-compliance over time, since the legal system imposed on it the specific obligation to endow CONAI with budgetary content so that such resources would be available according to the procedures to be carried out by today's INDER, exclusively for the purpose of expropriating and indemnifying, when appropriate, non-indigenous persons who are occupying or are titleholders, in both cases in good faith, of the lands identified as part of the indigenous reserves.
In the present case, it has been held as proven at a first level, and without prejudice to the fact that the reserve owned by the plaintiff indigenous community dates back decades, in its current dimensions, that the indigenous community here represented is the titleholder of the ownership over the reserve described, as of the adoption by the Executive Branch of Decreto Ejecutivo number 29448 dated March 21st, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta," number 93 of May 16th, two thousand one, independently of whether or not it is registered in the name of the plaintiff association representing the community Nombre128202 (which can be consulted on the Web Page of the Judicial Branch, accessing the Sistema Costarricense de Información Jurídica), as well as that since its creation for the first time, according to Decreto Ejecutivo number 5904 of March 11th, nineteen seventy-six, as the Executive Branch itself gave an account of that circumstance since then, there exist non-indigenous persons occupying areas of those that comprise its surface.
On this particular, of relevance were also the declarations that were rendered at trial by the witness Nombre128204, a geographer by profession and an official of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas with twenty-five years of experience that has related him, among others, to the plaintiff indigenous community, as well as Mr. Nombre128205, a member of the Nombre128202 indigenous community, who indicated that he has lived in the indigenous territory of interest since his birth, at least fifty-four years ago. Both witnesses indicated they are aware of the existence of non-indigenous persons who are occupying areas of the reserve in question, without there being any reason that induces this Court to consider that their statements lack credibility. In any case, the existence of non-indigenous persons on these lands and under the said conditions seems to stem from the very recognition of the Executive Branch and the legislator, according to the Ley Indígena itself, as well as particularly, what was expressed by the Executive Branch in Decreto Ejecutivo number 5904 of March 11th, nineteen seventy-six.
Of crucial relevance is the fact that according to the evidence ordered by this judicial authority for better resolution, visible on folios 795 to 198 of the main case file, being a document signed by the person who identifies herself therein as Nombre128164, in her capacity as Director of the Dirección General de Presupuesto Nacional of the Ministerio de Hacienda, it is reported that at no historical moment from the entry into force of the Ley Indígena number 6172 and according to its Article 5, has the Executive Branch included in the Presupuesto General de la República the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash that it should have deposited in four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first with its inclusion in the National Budget Project of the Republic for 1979, to continue in the budgets of 1980, 1981, and 1982 respectively. From this, it follows, according to the majority opinion of the members of this Court, that for the purposes of the Ley Indígena, as well as those of the international conventions signed on the matter, the State illegitimately failed, by omission, to comply with its duty to take effective actions —in this case, a specific and concrete one set by the indicated normative instruments— for the protection of indigenous property over the land.
This concerns an administrative conduct submitted by virtue of the provisions of Article 49 of the Constitution to the legality control residing in this jurisdiction, which, on the other hand, does not grant or confer any margin of discretion upon the Administration obligated to act. At a second level, and despite this being consistent with the understanding of the claim filed against it, the State also failed to prove that, since the entry into force of Indigenous Law No. 6172, it has deployed, within what it is legally enabled to do, any act aimed at directing, coordinating, and/or monitoring, in an orderly and systematic manner, the tasks that, having been imposed upon it by international and domestic law regarding the right of indigenous populations to the integrity of their territories, should have been exercised as appropriate, whether with INDER or with CONAI or any other indirectly linked organization.
See the content of the provisions of Article 26, subsection b), in relation to Article 27, first subsection, both of the General Law of Public Administration, regarding the duty of whoever holds the Presidency of the Republic, autonomously or, as the case may be, jointly with the relevant Minister, to direct and coordinate the tasks of the government and the centralized Public Administration as a whole, as well as the same with respect to the decentralized Public Administration, this, in what would have also been expected, could have been accredited at least regarding the management, in what concerns us, of what is now called the Rural Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Rural), as well as the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas) in relation to the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202 . Nor was any evidence brought to the process demonstrating that the State had effectively, coordinately, and/or systematically undertaken or procured efforts that could be understood as joint efforts with the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs and the Rural Development Institute aimed at protecting and guaranteeing to the Indigenous Community Nombre128202 the integrity of the territories of which it is the holder.
(All the foregoing according to the case file due to the non-existence of evidentiary material indicating the contrary). These factual circumstances render the omission in which the State has incurred illegitimate, as it constitutes non-compliance with Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in relation to Convention No. 107 of the International Labour Organization and Convention No. 169, "Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries," in what they regulate the duties that the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica must fulfill, which must be associated with the provisions of Article 140, subsection 8) of the Political Constitution. Regarding what corresponds with the last paragraph of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, which provides that *“…The expropriations and indemnifications shall be financed with the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash, which shall be deposited in four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, the first beginning in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982.
The fund shall be administered by CONAI, under the supervision of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic,”* if the administration of the funds with which CONAI was to be endowed by the Executive Branch was for the purpose of having the necessary resources to proceed with the expropriations and indemnifications whose processing corresponds to INDER, being the prerequisite for this, nothing could be indemnified unless it is done through channels other than those unconditionally provided by the legal system to the Executive Branch, which cannot be protected by the jurisdictional authority in this venue pursuant to Article 49 of the Constitution. This leads to a declaration that the State has indeed incurred in an illegitimate omission, contrary to what is provided and ordered by the legal system. It should be noted that, notwithstanding the estimation that a sum of money similar to that at the end of the seventies could serve the purposes provided for in the law, it is the duty of the Executive Branch to provide the resources required to comply with the cited regulations, and even in the face of the possibility that this economic provision proves insufficient, this circumstance does not vitiate the original obligation only attributable to the State, to provide the resources necessary to fully comply with the provisions of the Indigenous Law and international law.
At the moment when there are no non-indigenous persons to indemnify in the reserves, it is clear to this Court that the norm contained in the numeral —a norm of a programmatic nature— shall lose its validity having already fulfilled the purpose it pursues in that respect. In that eventual state of affairs, it could be affirmed that the exercise by the indigenous communities of the exclusive and exclusionary right of property of which they are the holders is effectively materialized, without prejudice to future vigilance regarding their integrity. As long as this is not the case, it would undoubtedly be a property right that is not full, as it is not being protected by the State, in flagrant violation of the right that assists these communities. This being so, it is reiterated, it is necessary to declare the claim admissible in what was directed against the State, but, in the terms to be set forth below.-
It is estimated that what is sought in ordering INDER to carry out studies and appraisals of the lands occupied by non-indigenous persons in the reserve of interest, as well as regarding indemnifications, becomes premature, given that the reserve itself is not even duly demarcated based on adequate technical information, nor is there any registry or cadastral information, nor are there updated population censuses in concert with the indigenous community Nombre128202 itself that defines in relation to which persons and properties action should be taken accordingly. As has been indicated in this judgment, the prerequisite that the legislature foresaw pursuant to Article 5 of the Ley Indígena for these purposes does not exist either. What pertains to the procedures for indemnification is premature for the same reasons, as is the assignment of deadlines for it. Consequently, the placing of the indigenous community in possession of the lands occupied by non-indigenous persons in its reserve is also premature.
Regarding the deadlines that the plaintiff petitions be provided for the Administration to deploy its activity, these are fleeting and out of step with the reality shown by simple experience. On the other hand, the execution of whatever must be ordered cannot depend exclusively on the good will and obedience of the public authorities, which in this case have historically proven to be illegitimately reluctant, or at least not capable or willing, to execute what is ordered by the legal system in the terms it dictates. Finally, it is considered by the majority of this Chamber that the budgetary capacity—it goes without saying that in this case it has not been proven that the State faces an impossibility to comply with the Ley Indígena in its Article 5—could not legally constitute immunity for the public authority from an express legal mandate, so the historical omission in respect thereof would correspond more than anything else to a deficiency in public management.
On the other hand, there is no legal principle whatsoever that allows for asserting that a governmental decision on how resources are to be allocated to fund public management according to the priorities it defines implies a disapplication of the principle of legality contained in Article 11 of both the Constitución Política and the Ley General de la Administración Pública, when the legislature has not given the Poder Ejecutivo any margin of discretion under the Ley Indígena in the last paragraph of its Article 5. The Poder Ejecutivo should have proceeded in accordance with the aforementioned law as of the year nineteen seventy-nine, so not having done so, neither at that time nor at any other previous time, despite the fact that said rule remains fully in force and so requires it, only leads to the conclusion that it has incurred in an illegitimate omissive conduct, furthermore, qualified and reinforced, because it pertains to a mandatory duty to act that has been maintained for decades even despite the claims and calls of the indigenous peoples themselves, but at the same time framed for the protection of the human rights that, recognized as belonging to these communities, correspond to those that should be guaranteed in the case of population groups traditionally considered vulnerable and neglected for decades, now once again by the public authorities.
Keeping proportions, and accepting that the following assessment is not of a legal nature, the absence of a guarantee of integrity of the communal property right over indigenous territories by the public authorities is, to these indigenous communities, from a sociocultural point of view, what the failure to find a guarantee over the integrity of its territory under the constitution against other nations would be for the Nation itself. Thus, the claim is partially admissible as the majority of this Court understands it, but, not being so in the terms petitioned, instead, the </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">State</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> must be condemned first, as is hereby done, to comply with the provisions of the currently valid Article 5 of the Ley Indígena in its last paragraph, in relation to International Labour Organization Convention No. 107, Law No. 2330 "Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" and "Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries", Law No. 7316, and consequently, it must include in favor of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas in the Draft Law of the National Budget of the Republic, the one hundred million colones that it should have included, in those projects corresponding to the budget periods of nineteen seventy-nine, nineteen eighty, nineteen eighty-one, and nineteen eighty-two.
The inclusion of those funds in the respective project must be carried out in four installments, at current value, and in four consecutive annual budget periods, the first of which must be carried out after the end of the budget period subsequent to the one ongoing at the time this judgment becomes final. The State is ordered to carry out coordinated, systematic, and effective work with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the Indigenous Community Nombre128202, to guarantee the execution of the provisions of Article 5 of the Ley Indígena. At no time may the Presidency of the Republic—without prejudice to the constitutional powers vested in the Contraloría General de la República—disregard the proper use given to that fund in accordance with the Law. The </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">Instituto de Desarrollo Rural</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> is condemned to deploy any necessary action charged to its own budget, so that the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202 is duly demarcated, which must begin within a period of no less than six months from the date this judgment becomes final.
Those tasks must be concluded at least six months after they have begun. The demarcation must include the surveying of maps and any other instrument of that nature, as well as registry studies, necessary for the effective subsequent registry inscription (inscripción registral) of the lands, allowing for the identification of whether there are properties superimposed on the areas comprising the indigenous reserve of interest. These tasks must be carried out with the coordination of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the collaboration of the plaintiff indigenous community, for which purpose, said commission must interact with the indigenous authorities so that no obstacle is generated that hinders the performance of the ordered tasks. The </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> is condemned to deploy any and all necessary activity in direct, intense, and systematic coordination with the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202, and the authorities of the Indigenous Community Nombre128202, so that in concert with them, by means of carrying out a population census, any non-indigenous person possessing areas of the surface of the indigenous reserve of interest is identified, this once the indigenous reserve Nombre128202 has been demarcated and the respective registry and cadastral information has been gathered by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural.
The ordered census must be completed in its entirety within a period of four months from when the reserve has been demarcated and the registry and cadastral information of interest is available, and the determination of which titleholders or possessors of lands are in good faith or not must be carried out with the full participation of the authorities of the plaintiff indigenous community, the association representing it, CONAI, and INDER.-
XIV.On the inadmissibility of the claim aimed at ordering the payment of the indemnification ordered in another judicial process. As has been indicated above, the representation of the indigenous community Nombre128202 requested that the judgment declare that: “*In the case of the Sibujú Norte Indigenous Reserve (which is indigenous territory Nombre128202 previously cited), if placing my represented party in possession requires payment of the indemnification ordered in the process being processed in (sic) the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, in expediente 86-000826-0178-CA, order the state to proceed with its payment no more than one month after the judgment becomes final*.” It suffices to indicate in this regard that there is clearly a lack of active standing (legitimación activa) on the part of the party suing in this present case, without prejudice to the possible standing that could potentially be recognized by the competent judicial authority, in the execution phase of the judgment issued applying the rules of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, in the ordinary process processed under judicial expediente number 86-000826-0178-CA, judgments of the Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda of eleven hours thirty minutes on December twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-two, in relation to number 276-94, of eight hours fifteen minutes on August thirty-first, nineteen ninety-four, of the Sección Primera of the Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo.
(Pages 172 to 228 of the main case file). In this sense, it must be indicated to the plaintiff that clearly, what was resolved in that process has the force of res judicata (produjo estado), and a judgment of that nature cannot, by imperative of the rules that inform procedural law, be executed in another case, which is clearly what is intended from what was petitioned. It must be noted, however, that due to the dual nature of the right it entails, it is tangentially being protected since the payment of an indemnification was ordered in that process; it is clear that the right of the plaintiff indigenous community to demand from those authorities that were condemned to proceed with the respective payment is encompassed there, but not in this present case, in the opinion of this Court. That being so, and given that standing is a procedural prerequisite that can be analyzed ex officio, it is declared that there is a lack of active standing to accede to what was petitioned, so in that respect the declaration of inadmissibility of the claim is mandatory.-
XV.Corollary. In conclusion of everything set forth up to this point, having demonstrated the illegitimate omissive conduct at various levels incurred by the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, the claim will succeed, however, in a manner different from that in which the claims were formulated, by reason of the relevant public interest in the proper execution of the tasks assigned by the legal system to the institutions linked to the protection of the rights of indigenous communities, pursuant to Article 122, subsections c), d), g), and k) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, it is mandatory to declare the claim partially admissible, in the terms to be indicated in the operative part of this judgment.-
XVI.On the defenses interposed. The representations of the State and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas interposed the defense of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva), while the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural interposed the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) and res judicata (cosa juzgada material), the latter of which was resolved by rejecting it upon issuance of ruling number 33-2013, issued during the single hearing held on June twenty-fourth, two thousand thirteen, at ten hours fifty-five minutes, so as to what was thus resolved, the parties must abide by what was ordered at that time. Regarding the defense of lack of passive standing, its rejection as it was alleged in this case is mandatory for the following reasons. Standing is a substantive prerequisite of every jurisdictional process and as such, its analysis is obligatory for the Judges even ex officio if the respective exception (lack of active and/or passive standing) is not raised.
The institute relates to the "... *specific material legal situation in which a subject, or plurality of subjects, finds themselves, in relation to what constitutes the litigious object of a given process; standing, in short, will indicate to us in each case who the true holders of the material relationship that is intended to be elucidated in the scope of the process are; who the subjects whose procedural participation is necessary for the Judgment to be "effective" are*." (Nombre71661, Nombre71662;, Nombre136773;, Nombre149727 and Nombre71664, Nombre9069. *Derecho Procesal Administrativo Costarricense*. Editorial Juricentro. San José, Costa Rica. p.162.). It concerns the aptitude of the intervening subjects to be a party in a process of this nature; which derives or originates from the relationship existing between their sphere of interests and rights in direct relation to the challenged administrative conduct.
Thus, "*a subject is granted standing in a procedure or in a given process by virtue of the prior impact suffered in their qualified interests or rights*" (Nombre137195, Nombre25610. *El nuevo proceso contencioso administrativo*. Collective Work. Poder Judicial. Escuela Judicial. San José. Costa Rica. p. 79.). If the intervening parties lack standing, it can be concluded that the development of the entire process will not serve to solve the specific intersubjective conflict raised before the judicial courts because that lack will determine the non-existence of the legal relationship between them. In this contentious-administrative jurisdiction, "*situaciones jurídicas* of every person" are tutelable, clarifies subsection 1) of the first numeral of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, in relation to the diverse manifestations of administrative conduct, so that to obtain effective judicial protection on the merits in a contentious process, it is required to be the holder of a subjective right or at least a "legitimate interest (interés legítimo)" (Article 49 of the Constitución Política) of the administered party, derived or originated from an administrative legal relationship.
Moreover, standing is divided into an active dimension, relating to who figures as plaintiffs and precisely, to the alleged ownership of the subjective right or legitimate interest alleged, which is conceived as the suitability to carry out acts of exercising the power of action that entitles them to demand the satisfaction of a determined provision or object; and a passive dimension, in relation to the defendant party, which manifests as the aptitude to bear the exercise of said power. Thus, a subjective right or legitimate interest is pitted against public powers or competences. In this present case, according to the majority opinion of this chamber, it is clear that standing exists to sue the State insofar as, among the omissive conducts that were reproached, it is the legal system that designated it as the direct responsible party, while it was proven that it incurred in non-compliance regarding said legal obligations.
The same occurs with respect to the party currently called the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural—now by unanimity of this Chamber—insofar as the powers-duties that the legal system imposed on it regarding the identification of indigenous lands, their demarcation, has constituted, together with the inactivity of the State, the cause that to date Article 5 of the Ley Indígena has not been applied effectively. Added to the foregoing and given the substantive analysis that has been carried out in the terms of this judgment, with the claim being partially successful against INDER, it is mandatory to reject the defense of lack of right interposed by it. Finally, ex officio, it is noted that with respect to the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, duties directed toward the protection of indigenous peoples, particularly those of coordination and liaison, were vested, which have not been exercised, even remotely adequately or effectively, both before the State and INDER, as well as in relation to the indigenous communities themselves.-
XVII.On costs. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so, such that, there being no grounds whatsoever justifying exemption from said condemnation under subsections a) and b) of said numeral, as well as under Article 194 of the same legal body in the case of the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, *—defeated in this process—*, it is mandatory to condemn them jointly and severally (solidaria) to the payment of both costs generated as a consequence of the processing of this present case, in favor of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202. The processing of the process insofar as it was filed against the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Indigenous Reserve of Nombre128203, despite the plaintiff party not having been successful, was due to the order issued by this Court for the dispute to be integrated despite there being no cause in the claim referring to any existing conflict between it and the plaintiff indigenous association, so its participation, which was limited to contesting the claim, shall not generate costs against the plaintiff party. Judge Hess Araya dissents regarding the condemnation against the State.-
POR TANTO
The evidence submitted for better resolution by the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is rejected. By majority, the defense of lack of passive standing interposed by the representation of the State is rejected, and by unanimity, the one formulated by the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas is rejected. It is declared ex officio that there is a lack of active standing in the plaintiff association to demand in this present case the execution of the ruling in the judicial process processed before the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda in the process processed under judicial expediente number 86-000826-0178-CA. It is declared ex officio that there is a lack of current interest and to that extent, the claim is inadmissible exclusively insofar as the Judicial Authority was considered filed against the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Bribri de Talamanca Indigenous Reserve.
The defense of lack of right interposed by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is rejected. By majority, the claim is declared partially admissible insofar as it was filed by the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202 against the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, it being understood for all intents and purposes as denied in all that is not granted in this ruling, therefore the following pronouncements are made: a.) By majority, the State is condemned to include in favor of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas in the Draft Law of the National Budget of the Republic, the one hundred million colones that it should have included, in those corresponding to the budget periods of nineteen seventy-nine, nineteen eighty, nineteen eighty-one, and nineteen eighty-two. The inclusion of those funds in the respective project must be carried out in four installments, at current value, and in four consecutive annual budget periods, the first of which must be carried out after the end of the budget period subsequent to the one ongoing at the time this judgment becomes final.
(Consequently), by majority, the State is ordered to carry out coordinated, systematic, and effective work with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the Indigenous Community Nombre128202, to guarantee the execution of the provisions of Article 5 of the Ley Indígena. At no time may the Presidency of the Republic—without prejudice to the constitutional powers vested in the Contraloría General de la República—disregard the proper use given to that fund in accordance with the Law. Judge Hess Araya dissents regarding this operative paragraph; b.) By unanimity, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is condemned to deploy any necessary action charged to its own budget, so that the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202 is duly demarcated, which must begin within a period of no less than six months from the date this judgment becomes final. Those tasks must be concluded at least six months after they have begun.
The demarcation must include the surveying of maps and any other instrument of that nature, as well as registry studies, necessary for the effective subsequent registry inscription of the lands, allowing for the identification of whether there are properties superimposed on the areas comprising the indigenous reserve of interest. These tasks must be carried out with the coordination of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the collaboration of the plaintiff indigenous community, for which purpose, said commission must interact with the indigenous authorities so that no obstacle is generated that hinders the performance of the ordered tasks; c.) By unanimity, the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas is condemned to deploy any and all necessary activity in direct, intense, and systematic coordination with the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202, and the authorities of the Indigenous Community Nombre128202, so that in concert with them, by means of carrying out a population census, any non-indigenous person possessing areas of the surface of the indigenous reserve of interest is identified, this once the indigenous reserve Nombre128202 has been demarcated and the respective registry and cadastral information has been gathered by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural.
The ordered census must be completed in its entirety within a period of four months from when the reserve has been demarcated and the registry and cadastral information of interest is available, and the determination of which titleholders or possessors of lands are in good faith or not must be carried out with the full participation of the authorities of the plaintiff indigenous community, the association representing it, CONAI, and INDER. This ruling is issued without special condemnation for costs exclusively with respect to the part of the claim that did not succeed against the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Bribri de Talamanca Indigenous Reserve; d.) By majority, the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas are jointly and severally condemned to pay both costs.
Judge Hess Araya dissents in part regarding the award of costs against the State.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">Notify</span><span style="font-family:Arial">.- </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">Felipe Córdoba Ramírez</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> Christian Hess Araya</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Dissenting vote of Judge Hess Araya:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">I.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> I dissent only insofar as the preceding ruling concludes that there was an act of omission attributable to the State and, consequently, upholds the claim against it, under the terms of item a) of the operative part; which I support as follows.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">II.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> Article 5 </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">in fine</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> of the Ley Indígena stipulates: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"The expropriations and indemnifications shall be financed with the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash, which shall be deposited through four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982.
The fund shall be administered by CONAI, under the supervision of the Contraloría General de la República."</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> In the opinion of the undersigned, and in divergence from the criterion of my fellow members of the Court (and even partially reconsidering what I subscribed to in ruling N° 198-2011-VI of Section Six), the transcribed stipulations – despite being inserted in a norm whose remaining content does not possess that character – were established by the legislature with a purely transitory validity and, in fact, under sound legislative technique should have appeared in the corresponding section at the end of the law, as is customary. Based on both their text and the application of the principle of the annuality of the budget cycle, I consider that the validity of said provisions expired at the end of the fiscal year 1982, without this Court being empowered to reestablish their validity more than thirty years later, however noble the purpose that inspired their enactment may be.
All of the foregoing without prejudice to: a) the norm omits to indicate the source of financing that would cover the outlay ordered therein, in violation of the principle of budgetary balance, a marginal reflection in which I do not delve deeper as it pertains to the Constitutional Jurisdiction and not to that of this Chamber; and b) it is strange, by all means, that the administration of the fund was entrusted to CONAI, when it was ITCO (now INDER) that was to carry out and pay for the expropriations. By this statement I do not intend to disregard either the international commitments assumed by the Costa Rican State in matters of protection of indigenous cultures, or the responsibilities contained in the relevant legislation. I confine myself to noting a reality, which is that the cited rules were foreseen to be fulfilled within a specific period, which has amply expired, and that, consequently, this collegiate body cannot now compel compliance.-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">III.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> Furthermore, in the dissenting vote that I also recorded for ruling N° 53-2013-VII of this Court, I expressed the reasons why I consider that the omission – attributed to the Executive Branch – to provide for certain budget items in the ordinary or extraordinary Budget bills of the Republic that it submits for the consideration of the Legislative Assembly, does not constitute an administrative conduct whose oversight falls to this jurisdiction; as well as why I consider that it is not possible for this Court to compel the Executive Branch to act otherwise (and even less so by determining in how many stages to do so), even though these are budget obligations of legal origin.
Certainly, the money necessary to pay for the required expropriations must come from somewhere and, therefore, to the extent that INDER cannot fund them from its own resources, it would have to arrange the necessary budget transfers. But that is very different from this Court going so far as to order the Executive Branch to proceed in that sense, assuming a power that I believe it does not have. In any event, it should be noted that ultimately and in the event that this position is not shared, I am of the opinion that what was ordered in another very similar case (under file N° 10-000275-1028-CA, resolved with the already cited ruling N° 198-2011-VI) would remain applicable to this case, where it was explained that it is not possible to attribute an omissive conduct to the Executive Branch for not having budgeted and disbursed the funds for the expropriations of non-indigenous individuals, since this necessarily presupposes that the IDA and CONAI have first fulfilled their obligations related to determining in which cases it was appropriate to proceed in that manner, in order to subsequently request the necessary resources.-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">IV.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> Finally, it should be added that based on the manner in which the procedural claims were formulated in this matter, only those numbered 3 and 5 contain petitions relative to the State: the first seeks that the latter initiate, together with the IDA (now INDER) and CONAI, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"the cited studies and appraisals, the procedures for indemnifications (including possible expropriations)"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">, duties which the law assigns only to those latter two entities; while the second is clearly inadmissible for the reasons stated in this ruling and which I share.
Consequently, to the extent that the operative part of the ruling </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">"orders the State to carry out coordinated, systematic, and effective work with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the Indigenous Community Nombre128202</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">  </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">, which guarantee the execution of the provisions of Article 5 of the Ley Indígena"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">, this norm is given a scope which it does not possess with respect to the State, and I therefore do not consider the referred mandate juridically sustainable.-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">V.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> For all the foregoing, I uphold the exception of lack of standing to be sued (falta de legitimación pasiva) raised by the State, against which I declare the complaint inadmissible, with the corresponding award of costs in its favor.
In all other respects, I concur with the preceding ruling.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\"> </span></p></div></body></html> [ ...
Specifically, the legal norms deemed violated are stipulated in the following provisions:
| norm_nom | bdt | art_subnum | tipo_norma | art_id | norm_anno | norm_num | norm_ver | norm_fecha | norm_id | art_num |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica | 1 | 0 | Political Constitution | 23834 | 1949 | 33323 | 07 Nov 1949 | 48113 | 50 | |
| Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries | 1 | 0 | Law | 14 | 1992 | 7316 | 60976 | 03 Nov 1992 | 55652 | 13 |
| Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries | 1 | 0 | Law | 15 | 1992 | 7316 | 60976 | 03 Nov 1992 | 55652 | 14 |
| Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties | 1 | 0 | Law | 184965 | 1996 | 7615 | 45069 | 24 Jul 1996 | 42751 | 26 |
| Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties | 1 | 0 | Law | 184966 | 1996 | 7615 | 45069 | 24 Jul 1996 | 42751 | 27 |
| Regulation to the Indigenous Law | 1 | 0 | Executive Decree | 4 | 1978 | 8487 | 61774 | 26 Apr 1978 | 56355 | 3 |
| Regulation to the Indigenous Law | 1 | 0 | Executive Decree | 11 | 1978 | 8487 | 61774 | 26 Apr 1978 | 56355 | 10 |
| Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure | 1 | 0 | Law | 2 | 2006 | 8508 | 81340 | 28 Apr 2006 | 57436 | 1 |
| Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure | 1 | 0 | Law | 11 | 2006 | 8508 | 81340 | 28 Apr 2006 | 57436 | 10 |
| Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure | 1 | 0 | Law | 123 | 2006 | 8508 | 81340 | 28 Apr 2006 | 57436 | 122 |
esResolucionEstructural: 0, esResolucionOral: 0, esResolucionRelevante: 0, fecha: 2013-10-29, tipoDocumento: EXT, padreSentenciasIgualSentido: sen-1-0034-624482, esCriterioUnificador: 0, tipoContenido: Majority vote, doctrina: Gimeno Sendra, Vicente; Saborío Valverde, Rodolfo; Garberí Llobregat, José and González-Cuellar Serrano, Nicolás.
Costa Rican Administrative Procedural Law. Editorial Juricentro. San José, Costa Rica. p.162Jiménez Meza, Manrique. The New Contentious-Administrative Process. Collective Work. Poder Judicial. Judicial School. San José. 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asunto, procedemos a abordar el\r\nrégimen jurídico de protección a las reservas indígenas, particularmente en lo\r\nque toca al artículo 5 de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley Indígena\" w:st=\"on\">la\r\n Ley Indígena</st1:PersonName>, así como a la regulación que define el\r\nemplazamiento de la reserva indígena propiedad de los accionantes.</span><span\r\nlang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p style='line-height:150%'><span class=GramE><b><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>1.-) Sobre la evolución normativa en la materia de territorios indígenas.</span></b></span><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>El primer antecedente legislativo en la materia -ya entrada <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Nación\" w:st=\"on\">la Nación</st1:PersonName> en su época\r\nRepublicana- se ubica en la otrora vigente <b><u>Ley Sobre Terrenos Baldíos</u></b>\r\nnúmero 13 del diez de enero de mil novecientos treinta y nueve <b>(<u>1939</u>)</b>,\r\npublicada en <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Colección\" w:st=\"on\">la Colección</st1:PersonName>\r\nde Leyes y Decretos de ese año, en su primer semestre, tomo segundo, página\r\ndiez, que en su artículo 8 rezaba como sigue y en lo conducente: <i>"... <b>se\r\ndeclara</b> <b>inalienable</b> y de <b>propiedad exclusiva de los indígenas</b>,\r\nuna zona prudencial <b>a juicio del Poder Ejecutivo</b> en los lugares <b>en\r\ndonde existan tribus de éstos</b>, a fin de conservar nuestra raza\r\nautóctona y de librarlos de futuras injusticias"</i>.
(El resaltado no es <st1:State\r\nw:st=\"on\"><st1:place w:st=\"on\"><span class=GramE>del</span></st1:place></st1:State>\r\noriginal). Este primer antecedente normativo <st1:City w:st=\"on\"><span\r\n class=GramE>como</span></st1:City> se puede observar, de entrada reconoció a\r\nesa data el derecho de propiedad exclusiva <st1:State w:st=\"on\">del</st1:State>\r\nque son titulares las comunidades indígenas, pero para entonces, en un tanto de\r\náreas territoriales a ser definidas <i>“a juicio <st1:State w:st=\"on\"><st1:place\r\n w:st=\"on\">del</st1:place></st1:State> Poder Ejecutivo”</i>, en la medida de\r\nque se trataría de los sitios en que estos grupos se encontrasen emplazados.\r\nDesde entonces, se observa al menos el carácter inalienable que le fue dado a\r\neste tipo de propiedad residenciada en un grupo minoritario, pero determinado\r\nde personas, unidas por lazos culturales particulares, lo que no fue otra cosa\r\nque un blindaje con el que se pretendió proteger su derecho de propiedad\r\ncomunitaria -aunque lo fuese hasta una vez materializado por un acto el Poder\r\nEjecutivo-, y esto, frente a posibles intentos ya de terceros, como de los\r\npropios grupos indígenas, de trasladar el dominio de esos bienes y por\r\nsupuesto, disponiendo la imposibilidad de que personas ajenas a estos grupos de\r\nla población nacional, pudiesen alegar derechos o titularidad sobre los mismos.\r\n<span class=GramE>Singular nota entonces, lo es que se trató desde sus inicios\r\nde bienes que se encontraron <i>"fuera <st1:State w:st=\"on\"><st1:place\r\n w:st=\"on\">del</st1:place></st1:State> comercio de los hombres"</i>.</span>\r\nLa norma sin embargo nada expresó sobre la posibilidad de que previo a la\r\nentrada en vigencia de la misma y luego de adoptados, en aplicación de ésta,\r\nactos posteriores que definiesen la identidad de esas áreas de territorio por\r\nparte del Poder Ejecutivo, existiesen terceros poseedores o titulares de buena\r\nfe sobre esas las mismas áreas de superficie, por lo que habría de suponerse,\r\nque el Poder Ejecutivo no constituiría reservas en terrenos, que no fuesen los\r\nposeídos exclusivamente por indígenas.
Pues bien, en ejercicio de la\r\ncompetencia referida por el legislador al Poder Ejecutivo como se ha informado,\r\nno fue si no hasta algunos años después de entrada en vigencia <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Ley Sobre\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley Sobre</st1:PersonName> Terrenos\r\nBaldíos relacionada, que se emitió el primer <b><u>Decreto Ejecutivo en la\r\nmateria, a saber, el número 45</u> </b>del tres de diciembre de mil novecientos\r\ncuarenta y cinco <b>(<u>1945</u>)</b>. Este decreto no obstante no se definió\r\nningun área específica como un territorio indígena a los propósitos definidos\r\npor la ley y pese al texto del artículo 8 de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Ley Sobre\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley Sobre</st1:PersonName> Terrenos\r\nBaldíos, en su artículo primero consignó lo siguiente: “<i>Declárense\r\ninalienables y de propiedad exclusiva de las tribus indígenas autóctonas, <b>los\r\nterrenos baldíos</b></i> <b><i>por ellas ocupados</i></b><i>; con excepción de\r\nlas fajas destinadas a Carretera Interamericana ". </i>(El resaltado\r\nno es <st1:State w:st=\"on\"><st1:place w:st=\"on\"><span class=GramE>del</span></st1:place></st1:State>\r\noriginal).
De esta forma, aunque el Poder Ejecutivo replicó lo que ya disponía\r\nla ley, fue más allá de ésta al establecer que las zonas en cuestión no habrían\r\nde corresponder con aquellas que a juicio <span class=GramE>del</span> Poder\r\nEjecutivo fuesen designadas para estos fines, “según su criterio”. En su lugar,\r\nse estableció que el Poder Ejecutivo habría de reconocer <st1:City w:st=\"on\"><span\r\n class=GramE>como</span></st1:City> tales todas esas áreas <st1:State w:st=\"on\"><st1:place\r\n w:st=\"on\">del</st1:place></st1:State> territorio de la nación, en tanto se\r\nencontrasen ocupadas por las comunidades indígenas. Sea en otros términos dicho\r\nlo anterior, que era la posesión efectiva ejercida sobre esos terrenos por las\r\ncomunidades indígenas, el criterio a partir del cual como variable, habría de\r\nhaberse definido la protección legal que por parte del poder central, debía de\r\ndarse a estas comunidades en garantía de su derecho de propiedad.
Con todo y\r\nello, la definición de qué áreas de la superficie de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Nación\" w:st=\"on\">la Nación</st1:PersonName> pertenecerían a\r\nestos grupos de personas, contó con una fórmula genérica e indeterminada a esa\r\nfecha, pues se trataría de los terrenos que ocupen estos grupos, <i>“en tanto\r\nterrenos baldíos<span class=GramE>”<span style='font-size:12.0pt;line-height:\r\n150%;font-style:normal'> </span><span style='font-style:normal'>,</span></span></i>\r\nlo que comprendió un contrasentido, si se trataba de terrenos previamente\r\nocupados por estas comunidades y sobre las que mediaba una propiedad\r\npreexistente, reconocible en tanto actos posesorios se ejerciesen en virtud de\r\nla misma. El mismo Decreto conformó también según su artículo primero, lo que\r\nsería la primera organización dirigida a realizar esfuerzos para materializar\r\nel mandato de ley anteriormente citado, en lo que se denominó como la <i>"Junta\r\nde Protección de las Razas Aborígenes de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Nación\"\r\nw:st=\"on\">la Nación</st1:PersonName>"</i>, asignándole a ésta la tarea de <b>delimitar\r\naquellas áreas de terreno</b>, que por primera vez se denominaron <i>“reservas\r\nindígenas”</i>.
Por su parte, el primer acto del Poder Ejecutivo efectivamente\r\ndirigido a la localización de un territorio indígena, se produjo en términos\r\njurídicos hasta algunos años después, con ocasión de la promulgación del <b><u>Decreto\r\nEjecutivo número 34</u></b></span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;\r\nmso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:\r\n150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>de quince de noviembre de mil\r\nnovecientos cincuenta y seis <b>(<u>1956</u>)</b>, que identificó tres reservas\r\ndistintas que no incluyeron a la de la aquí actora, a saber, la\r\n“Boruca-Térraba”, “Ujarrás-Salitre-Cabagra” y “China Kichá”. Por tratarse de <span\r\nclass=GramE>un</span> derecho de propiedad en el caso concreto el que se\r\nreconoció de esta manera, nos debe remitir ello a la disposición constitucional\r\nque lo relaciona <st1:City w:st=\"on\">como</st1:City> un derecho fundamental,\r\nsegún se extrae <st1:State w:st=\"on\"><st1:place w:st=\"on\">del</st1:place></st1:State>\r\nartículo 45 de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Carta Magna.\" w:st=\"on\">la Carta\r\n Magna.</st1:PersonName> La posterior consolidación de este derecho de\r\npropiedad, privativa en la medida que es exclusiva y excluyente, además de\r\ncomunitaria o colectiva, <b>“reconocido”</b></span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>jurídicamente -pues no podría afirmarse que se trató de un derecho <b>“constituido”</b></span><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>o creado a partir de la vigencia de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley\"\r\nw:st=\"on\">la Ley</st1:PersonName> de Terrenos Baldíos- se produjo frente a la\r\ncomunidad internacional al adoptarse como regulación interna el contenido del <b><u>Convenio\r\nnúmero 107 de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Organización Internacional\" w:st=\"on\">la\r\n Organización Internacional</st1:PersonName> del Trabajo</u></b>, en los\r\ntérminos de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley\" w:st=\"on\">la Ley</st1:PersonName>\r\nde <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la República\" w:st=\"on\">la República</st1:PersonName>\r\nnúmero 2330 de nueve de abril de mil novecientos cincuenta y nueve <b>(</b></span><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><b><u><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>1959</span></u></b><b><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:\r\n150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>)</span></b><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>, identificado como el <i>"Convenio Relativo a <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Protección\" w:st=\"on\">la Protección</st1:PersonName> e\r\nIntegración de las Poblaciones Indígenas y de otras Poblaciones Tribuales y\r\nSemitribales en los Países Independientes"</i>.
En su artículo 2.1 el\r\nconvenio de interés dispuso: <i>“Incumbirá principalmente</i></span><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><b><i><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:\r\nEN'>a los gobiernos</span></i></b><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;\r\nline-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> desarrollar <b>programas\r\ncoordinados y sistemáticos</b></span></i><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;\r\nmso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;\r\nline-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>con miras a la protección\r\nde las poblaciones en cuestión y a su integración progresiva en la vida de sus\r\nrespectivos países”</span></i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:\r\n150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>. (El resaltado no es <st1:State\r\nw:st=\"on\"><st1:place w:st=\"on\"><span class=GramE>del</span></st1:place></st1:State>\r\noriginal).
De esta forma, adherido que lo fue por su voluntad el Estado\r\ncostarricense al instrumento de cita y frente a la comunidad internacional, así\r\ncomo frente a estos grupos indígenas, se comprometió como tal a ejecutar esas\r\nacciones coordinadas y sistemáticas, dirigidas en lo que nos interesa a este\r\npunto, a proteger en los términos más generales a estas poblaciones de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Nación\" w:st=\"on\">la Nación</st1:PersonName>, minoritarias y\r\nvulnerables en aquel momento también, conforme lo que ya su ordenamiento\r\njurídico legal le imponía verbigracia de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley\"\r\nw:st=\"on\">la Ley</st1:PersonName> de Terrenos Baldíos y Decretos Ejecutivos\r\nantes citados.“X.- Regarding the legal regime for the protection of indigenous territories and the identity of the territory belonging to the Cabécar Indigenous Community of Talamanca.
As a rigorous result of what follows for the purposes of the analysis that must be carried out in order to resolve this matter, we proceed to address the legal regime for the protection of indigenous reserves, particularly as it relates to Article 5 of the Ley Indígena, as well as the regulation that defines the location of the indigenous reserve owned by the plaintiffs.”
This obligation must be related to what is set forth in article 5 of the same supra-legal normative body, which states: <i>“In applying the provisions of this Convention relating to the protection and integration of the populations in question, governments shall: a) Seek the collaboration of these populations and their representatives; (…)”</i>. (The highlighting is not from the original). Regarding what were at that time identified at the national legal level as indigenous reserves, article 11 of the cited convention indicated that in the bound States: <i>“The right of ownership, collective or individual, of the members of the populations concerned over the lands which these populations traditionally occupy shall be recognised”</i>. (The highlighting is not from the original). Thus it was established at the positive normative level, that governments—the State as a whole in our case—would have committed themselves since the year nineteen fifty-nine to deploy within the Nation, coordinated and systematic processes, among other things, to respond to the international community and the indigenous communities themselves in guarantee of their pre-existing right to property, including, for those purposes, the State itself being the one who had to “seek,” and not wait for the contrary to happen, the collaboration of the indigenous populations of interest and their representatives.
Moreover, it must be noted that these are supra-legal norms under the terms of article 7 of our Political Constitution, so that in accordance with the principle of hierarchy of norms, as well as the principle of conventionality control <b>(articles 1, 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Law of the Republic number 1615 of the twenty-fourth of July of nineteen ninety-six and 6.1.b) of the General Law of Public Administration)</b>, these would have to systematically inform the rest of the lower-ranking and lower-resistance regulations, as well as serve as a parameter for the legal operator when applying the legal system to the specific case, (articles 10, both of the General Law of Public Administration and of the Civil Code). Furthermore, according to abundant jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber, such as by way of example, its judgment number 1995-02313, of sixteen hours eighteen minutes on the ninth of May of nineteen ninety-five, it has been stated that as a derivation of article 48 of the Political Constitution, insofar as international legal instruments provide greater protection to fundamental rights, they shall be considered of equal rank to the Constitution, so that what is related in the cited convention, it can well be affirmed, also informs the adequate scope that for these particular cases, article 45 of our Political Constitution and the infra-constitutional legal system must be understood to have.
Due to its relevance, we consider pertinent the citation, as relevant, of article 13 of the International Labour Organization Convention under study, in what it indicates in its subsection 2 that: <i>“...Measures shall be adopted to prevent persons who are not members of the populations concerned from taking advantage of their customs or of their ignorance of the laws on the part of their members to obtain the ownership or use of the lands belonging to them”</i>. (The highlighting is not from the original). From that moment on, important features of this type of community property are that its legal regime is close to that of the public domain, although it is not, because it is property that, while community and therefore collective, exclusive and exclusionary, is at the same time vested in a vulnerable population group, which for that reason merits special protection from the State. Well then, despite what at those times the legal system clearly regulated regarding the right to property of these communities in the terms stated, with the adoption and entry into force of the <b><u>Land and Colonization Law</u></b> number 2825 of the fourteenth of May of nineteen sixty-one <b>(<u>1961</u>)</b>, published in the Collection of Laws and Decrees of that year in its second semester, volume one, page three hundred ninety-four, which repealed the Vacant Lands Law, it was provided in its article 75, in gross contravention of Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization, as follows, in relation to the entity that normative body identified as the Institute of Lands and Colonization: “<i>The Institute, in agreement with the pertinent organisms, shall ensure the conditioning of indigenous communities or families, in accordance with the spirit of this law. <b><u>It shall not be declared that the extensive zones where these communities live in isolation belong exclusively to them</u></b>, but an attempt <b>shall be made to gather all these communities, forming a single agrarian center</b>, in the zone that the Institute <b>deems adequate</b> and for which purpose the necessary area of land shall be used”</i>.
The norm refers to the formerly known as ITCO (1961) then IDA, Institute of Agrarian Development (1982) currently INDER Institute of Rural Development (2012). The cited norm simply flatly disregarded the right to property of indigenous communities enshrined in a norm of superior rank, potency, and resistance. Subsequently and more than a decade later, with this unsystematic regulation in force, <b><u>the Law for the Creation of the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs</u></b> number 5251, of the eleventh of July of nineteen seventy-three <b>(<u>1973</u>)</b>, was enacted, published in the Collection of Laws and Decrees of the same year in its second semester, volume one, page sixty-five. Viewing this normative body, if one bears in mind the commitment that was vested in the State from the entry into force of Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization in its articles 2.1, 5, 11 and 13.2, to this new internal public organization linked to indigenous communities pursuant to article 4 of the aforementioned law, the legislator assigned it, for general purposes and as relevant to: <i>“…b) Serve as an <b><u>instrument of coordination</u></b> among the different public institutions obligated to the execution of works and the provision of services for the benefit of indigenous communities; (…) e) <b>Ensure respect for the rights of indigenous minorities, <u>encouraging State action</u></b> in order to guarantee the indigenous person the <b>individual and collective ownership of the land</b>; the timely use of credit; adequate marketing of production and efficient technical assistance; (…)”</i>.
(The highlighting and underlining is not from the original). Nevertheless, as will be seen later, these coordination tasks were not designated exclusively to CONAI, since ITCO was already linked to this function, although in a different manner. On the other hand, the obligation of the State to guarantee the right to property of these communities over the land was reiterated. Regarding these assigned coordination tasks, article 9 of the same legal body cannot be overlooked, which reads as follows: “<i>For the purposes of subsection b) of article 8, <b><u>the State is empowered</u></b>, the autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions of the country to <b><u>provide aid of any kind</u></b> to the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs”</i>. (The highlighting is not from the original). A separate point is that this law contemplated—again in an unsystematic manner—a single transitory provision, apparently inspired by the Land and Colonization Law, which stated: <i>“No later than within the six months following the effective date of this law, the Institute of Lands and Colonization shall proceed to <b>conduct possessory information proceedings</b> for all parcels occupied by indigenous people in the different zones, in order to register them in the Property Registry immediately in the name of the occupants of said parcels.
Indigenous people who are not occupying parcels must be registered in a census to resolve the problem of lack of land as soon as possible. The Institute of Lands and Colonization must maintain a considerable reserve of land suitable for cultivation, in which it shall grant leases; and which <b>shall be destined exclusively for future expansions of indigenous communities</b>”</i>, (the highlighting is not from the original) which speaks—it is insisted—of a dispossession of the ownership of those lands against what was established by international law. On the other hand, in what could be considered to constitute some favorable aspect to indigenous interests, it was indicated that from the enactment of that law, it was that Institute that should have at least provided itself with sufficient land to destine it exclusively for these communities, as well as that, as a logical and necessary consequence of that attribution-duty, it should have undertaken the pertinent tasks in order to determine and clearly define the limitation or demarcation of the lands that would comprise those territories.
A year after its entry into force, this transitory provision was reformed pursuant to article 1 of Law number 5651 of the thirteenth of December of nineteen seventy-four (1974), in the following terms and with absolute disregard of the indigenous property guaranteed by Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization: <i>“Transitory.- The inalienable <b>indigenous reserves <u>registered in the name of the Institute of Lands and Colonization</u></b> (ITCO) are declared inalienable, which shall be destined exclusively for the settlement of indigenous communities, indispensable public services, and the <b>use, habitation and usufruct</b> of aborigines who lack lands of their property, registered or unregistered outside those reserves. In these, ITCO may grant leases to said aborigines, for a limited and non-transferable term, except to other aborigines who are in the same conditions.
The National Banking System and the other State institutions, jointly with the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs (CONAI), shall regulate special systems so that the members of the aboriginal communities may obtain credits for the adequate exploitation of the lands, referred to in this transitory provision”</i>. It is insisted that ITCO was then to delimit and register, even if in its own name, the corresponding land areas. The foregoing entailed the full disregard of indigenous property that the State had committed to guarantee before the international community and those peoples. Turning again to the original text of Law number 5251 that creates the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, said organization, according to its first article, was granted its own legal personality and patrimony. It is highlighted that the Commission since its creation—and therefore its general assembly—was composed among others, according to its article 2, subsection a), by: <b><i>"…</i></b><i> the representatives of the following dependencies and institutions: <b>Presidency of the Republic</b>; University of Costa Rica; National University; <b>Ministry of Public Education</b>; <b>Ministry of Governance and Police</b>; <b>Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports</b>; <b>Ministry of Health</b>; <b>Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock</b>; <b>Ministry of Public Security</b>; Joint Institute of Social Assistance; Institute of Lands and Colonization; National Service of Aqueducts and Sewerage; National Institute of Housing and Urbanism; National Learning Institute; and National Electricity Service;<b> </b>(…)”</i>.<b><i> </i></b>(The highlighting is not from the original).
The foregoing accounts for the necessary link that had to exist between the Central Power and, among other entities, ITCO itself, this, until the issuance of the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice number 3485-2003, of fourteen hours seventeen minutes on the second of May of two thousand three, a ruling whose content we do not analyze, it being sufficient to indicate that it deemed it unconstitutional for the commission to be composed of said public authorities. It must be noted that the referred institutions and Ministries formed part of CONAI’s general assembly, with powers to set its general policy acting as components of said collegiate body, as well as to approve or reject its budget, both ordinary and extraordinary. The purpose of this organization, reiterated due to its relevance, was among other things and as noted, to serve as an instrument of inter-institutional coordination, as well as to ensure respect for the rights of indigenous minorities by encouraging State action to guarantee the indigenous person individual ownership and their community, the ownership of its territories, as stated in article 4 subsection e) of said legal body.
Regarding the patrimony of CONAI, at the date of its entry into operation it was to be constituted by the annual subsidy that had been given in the Law of the Ordinary General Budget of the Republic to the former Board for the Protection of Aboriginal Races; the extraordinary contributions agreed upon by the State and autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions of the Republic; the assets belonging to the former Board; donations from individuals, foreign States, international agencies and foundations or any other entity; the use of indigenous names, symbols and figures; and the amount of the rights granted for the commercial use of those indigenous names, symbols and figures, (article 8, subsection a) of the Law for the Creation of CONAI). Still on budget-related matters, article 9 of this law provided that the State and autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions of the Republic would be authorized to provide aid of any kind to CONAI, of course, for the achievement of its purposes.
Moreover and continuing along this same line of thought, in its article 28, the law at hand indicated that: <i>“<b>In order for the Executive Branch to be in a position to set in the draft law of the General Budget of the Republic</b>, the subsidy it deems appropriate, no later than July 31 of each year, <b>the Board of Directors shall submit to the Planning Office of the Presidency of the Republic</b>, a reasoned estimate of its needs for the next fiscal period. It is understood that this provision does not apply for the 1973 fiscal period. Likewise, the budgets of the Institution shall be submitted to the Comptroller General of the Republic for their approval and settlement in accordance with the law”</i>. (The highlighting is not from the original). The Cabécar de Talamanca indigenous reserve was first described under the terms of <b><u>Executive Decree number 5904</u></b> of the eleventh of March of nineteen seventy-six, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number seventy, of the tenth of April of nineteen seventy-six <b>(1976)</b>.
In this normative instrument, among other things, the following was declared: <b><i>Considering</i></b><b><i>:</i></b><i> (…)</i><i>5°- That territories populated exclusively by indigenous people still exist, <b><u>making possible the delimitation of said Reserves</u></b>; (…) 10.- That <b>it is <u>the duty of the State</u></b> <b>to watch over the safety of its citizens, and to prevent injustices and mistreatment, especially in the case of <u>currently marginalized indigenous minorities</u></b>”</i>. (The highlighting and underlining is not from the original). Furthermore, in its first article it was ordered that: <i>“Its exact delimitation shall be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI”</i>. Thus, the then-called Institute of Lands and Colonization (today INDER) was reiterated its designation as the organism that would be in charge of the <b>territorial demarcation of the reserve thus created</b>, a task that was to begin two months after the Decree came into effect.
(Among these reserves, that of Talamanca was already identified under the terms of the above-cited Executive Decree number 5904 of the eleventh of March of nineteen seventy-six). In addition, pursuant to articles 14 and 15 of the Decree under analysis, the Executive Branch expressed that what was regulated by that means is of public interest, as well as that <b>CONAI would have the duty to prepare a census of the indigenous population of Costa Rica as soon as possible</b>, which should also be permanently updated. Well then, with the land owned by these communities recognized in the manner indicated, just a little over a year later, <b><u>the Indigenous Law</u></b>, number 6172 of the twenty-ninth of November of nineteen seventy-seven <b>(<u>1977</u>)</b>, was enacted, which according to its article 11 repealed all previous laws to the extent they oppose it. On this occasion and without prejudice to what the legislator enacted on the occasion of the entry into force of the Land and Colonization Law, in the unsystematic way that resulted from it being considered repealed, it was provided, according to the first article in relation to article 2 of this subsequent legal body—now indeed, in accordance with the provisions of International Labour Organization Convention 107 on the Protection of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples—that indigenous reserves are the property of these communities and that they were to be all registered in the National Registry in their name, no longer in that of ITCO.
Likewise, it was established that the limits of those territories, once “recognized” by the State, cannot be varied by diminishing their area except by law of the Republic. Furthermore, it was warned that these communities would have full legal capacity to act and that they would not be considered state-owned (article 4 of the law speaks of the Directing Councils, administrators and representatives of these communities). Additionally, it is reiterated that these are inalienable and imprescriptible territories, non-transferable and exclusive to the indigenous communities that inhabit them, it not being permitted for non-indigenous people to rent, lease, buy or in any other way acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves, <u>any transfer or negotiation of lands or improvements to them in indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous people, being absolutely null with the legal consequences of the case</u>.
As a separate note, pursuant to the regulation to the Indigenous Law, Executive Decree number 8487, of April twenty-sixth, nineteen seventy-eight, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 89, of May tenth, nineteen seventy-eight, its Article 3 stated that: <i>“For the exercise of the rights and fulfillment of the obligations referred to in Article 2 of the Indigenous Law, the Indigenous Communities shall adopt the organization provided for in Law No. 3859 of the National Directorate of Community Development Associations and its Regulation.”</i> Meanwhile, Article 10 of the same regulation stated that: <i>“To guarantee the rights regulated in Articles 3 and 5 of the Law, the President of the Integral Development Association shall appear, by himself or through his attorney-in-fact or Delegate, as soon as possible after the infringement has occurred, accompanying the certification showing the registration of the Reserve, to initiate, before the competent official, the corresponding legal action.”</i> Subsequently, pursuant to Executive Decree number 13568 of April 30, 1982, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 94 of May seventeenth, nineteen eighty-two, its first article provided that the Integral Development Associations have the legal representation of the Indigenous Communities and act as their local government.
In reinforcement of all the foregoing, on November third, nineteen ninety-two (<b><u>1992</u></b>) Law number 7316 was enacted, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 234, of December fourth, nineteen ninety-two, <span class=GramE><i>“</i><span style='font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%'> </span><b><i><u>Convention</u></i></b></span><b><i><u> 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries</u></i></b><i>”</i></span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>, of the International Labour Organization, which specifically regulates the issue of indigenous property. In its Article 2.1, this instrument reads as follows: <i>“Governments shall have the responsibility for developing, with the participation of the peoples concerned, co-ordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee respect for their integrity.”</i> For its part, subsection 2) of the same numeral indicates: <i>“2.
Such action shall include measures for: (a) ensuring that members of these peoples benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population; (b) promoting the full realisation of the social, economic and cultural rights of these peoples with respect for their social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions and their institutions; (c) assisting the members of the peoples concerned to eliminate socio-economic gaps that may exist between indigenous and other members of the national community, in a manner compatible with their aspirations and ways of life.”</i> Other numerals of the convention that are of interest, we proceed to cite, its Article 3 states: <i>“Article 3.- 1. Indigenous and tribal peoples shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental freedoms without hindrance or discrimination.
The provisions of this Convention shall be applied without discrimination to male and female members of these peoples. 2. No form of force or coercion shall be used in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples concerned, including the rights contained in this Convention.”</i> Its numeral 4, which on the part of the State: <i>“1. Special measures shall be adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned. 2. Such special measures shall not be contrary to the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. 3. Enjoyment of the general rights of citizenship, without discrimination, shall not be prejudiced in any way as a consequence of such special measures.”</i> Article 5 indicates that governments: <i>“In applying the provisions of this Convention: (a) the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognised and protected, and due account shall be taken of the nature of the problems which face them both as groups and as individuals; (b) the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these peoples shall be respected; (c) policies aimed at mitigating the difficulties experienced by these peoples in facing new conditions of life and work shall be adopted, with the participation and co-operation of the peoples affected.”</i> The issue of the property of these groups over the areas comprising their territories was specifically contemplated in this convention, and along these lines, its Article 13 indicates: <i>“1.
In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention, governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of <b>their relationship with the lands or territories, or both</b></i></span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>, as the case may be, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship. 2. The use of the term “lands” in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use.”</span></i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>. (The highlighting is not from the original). Article 14, subsection 2), reads: <i>“2.
Governments shall take steps as necessary to <b>identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy</b>, and to <b>guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession</b>. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.”</i>.-</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='line-height:150%'><span class=GramE><b><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>2.-) On the scope of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law.</span></b></span><b><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span></b><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>In what is most relevant for the purposes of this ruling, Article 5 of the Indigenous Law provided: <i>“In the case of non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within the indigenous reserves, <b>ITCO shall relocate them</b></i> <i>to other similar lands, if they so desire; if it is not possible to relocate them or they do not accept the relocation, <b>it shall expropriate them and indemnify them</b> in accordance with the procedures established in the Expropriations Law. / <b>The <u>studies and procedures for expropriation</u></b></i></span><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><b><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>and indemnification shall be carried out by ITCO in <u>coordination</u></span></i></b><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> <b><i>with CONAI<span style='font-weight:normal'>.</span> / If there is subsequently an invasion of non-indigenous persons into the reserves, the competent authorities shall immediately proceed to evict them, without payment of any indemnification whatsoever. / </span>The <u>expropriations and indemnifications</u> shall be financed with a contribution of one hundred million colones in cash</i></b><i>, which shall be deposited in four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, the first beginning in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982. <b>The fund shall be administered by CONAI</b></i></span><span class=GramE><span lang=EN style='font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>,</span></i></span><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'> under the supervision of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.”</span></i><span lang=EN style='font-size:11.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Arial;mso-ansi-language:EN'>.
It is deemed necessary to make the following considerations in the majority opinion of this Court. The law, regarding this article, seems to have recognized, or at least is expressed in such a way, that it assumes a fact taken as certain by the Legislator, namely, that upon its entry into force, there effectively existed non-indigenous persons, possessors or titleholders in good or bad faith, over areas within the territories of the indigenous reserves, in relation to which, to fulfill the commitments assumed by the State, particularly with the stipulations in Article 11 of Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization, their eviction had to be carried out. Thus, assuming that the reserve was duly delimited, it was defined according to the article under study and by logical deduction, that regarding these non-indigenous possessors, <b>first</b>, they must be identified as possessors of lands within the reserve.
For these purposes, with full clarity, this judicial authority understands that it is required that the Administration has a clear delimitation of the land areas that make up the indigenous reserve, exclusively according to the respective Executive Decree issued for that effect, which has so recognized it, and this, absolutely independent from the registry information derived from the National Registry, although, of course, the surveying of the corresponding plans and the registry inscription of the properties (fincas) in the name of the respective associations is a prerequisite for the subsequent determination of which non-indigenous person is located within the reserve, or of any eventual legal situations derived from the registry situation of the property. The delimitation of those lands corresponded, before the entry into force of the Indigenous Law, to INDER, in coordination with CONAI, just as it is now according to the current regulations, and of course, in coordination with the indigenous communities themselves and any other linked public authority, including the State itself, according to an adequate exercise of conventionality control in matters of human rights. <b>Second</b>, starting from the areas that comprise the reserve, once duly delimited, one would then have to proceed to carry out population censuses that allow the identification of the existence of non-indigenous persons within it (a task that corresponds to CONAI, in conjunction with the indigenous communities), whether those third parties exercise acts of possession or appear as titleholders at the registry level of some right over the territories (possible registry overlaps included), for which the registry and/or cadastral situation of the property is mandatory. <b>Third</b>, for the purposes of proceeding with material expulsion through a police action, administrative eviction, or, as the case may be, prior to eviction or placing in possession, the indemnification, if applicable through the expropriation process, of any non-indigenous person in the reserves, one would have to proceed with the prior determination of the variables that, according to Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, condition acting in one way or another, that is, depending on whether the exercise of acts or rights by third parties was carried out in good or bad faith.
The parameter for this, without a doubt, are the rules contained in the Civil Code, Articles 17 to 22, without prejudice to the regulations that have been systematically analyzed up to this point in this instrument, under which any act carried out after the validity of the Indigenous Law and, by virtue of what is provided therein at least, becomes, in principle and by provision of law, null and void, as it concerns properties (inmuebles) outside of commerce. Of course, the date of creation itself of each reserve is a parameter that must also be weighed, and despite the absence of demarcation, whether the non-indigenous person could have known that the property could be part of the indigenous territory. <b>Fourth</b>, in the case of possessors in bad faith, one must proceed with their expulsion (police act) or immediate eviction through the legal channels provided for this purpose (administrative eviction (desahucio)), for which purpose no indemnification whatsoever would be due.
In the case of persons who are registry titleholders of ownership or of some real right, who have a title and are in bad faith, one should proceed with the action provided for by the legal system for the removal from the legal realm of the corresponding title, to subsequently achieve the respective eviction. In the event that the title was granted in the exercise of some administrative power (titling by a public authority, among others), this would entail the action via the lesividad proceeding if applicable, without prejudice to what is provided in Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration or the direct action exercised by the titleholder of the affected right. For the scenario of non-indigenous persons, whether simple possessors or registry titleholders of ownership and/or some real right over the property, as long as they are acting in good faith, INDER must proceed to propose an alternative for their relocation to lands that would be as equivalent as possible to those thus affected by these third parties in the indigenous reserves.
The lands for relocation shall undoubtedly be among those available to the Rural Development Institute, both for its ordinary legal purposes and for these particular purposes, under the protection of the Indigenous Law, given that the provision of lands to be destined for the purposes of protecting indigenous communities has long been vested in the then ITCO, even prior to the entry into force of the Indigenous Law, as noted supra. Now, relocation only proceeds if it is voluntary on the part of the individual and if it is possible; otherwise, one must proceed with the expropriation procedure, the proceeding of which, subsequently and eventual judicial process, shall be in charge of the Rural Development Institute, using its own budget for this, except exclusively for the payment of indemnifications when applicable, which shall be charged to the funds to be administered by CONAI. INDER, for these purposes, must carry out the necessary procedures to comply with the preparatory acts of the respective administrative procedure and expropriation in the judicial venue, including the full identification of the property in question, its valuation, and the declaration of public interest, as the case may be, without prejudice to the assistance that other public entities and, of course, the Executive Branch itself may provide, which, in the opinion of the majority of the members of this Court, has never been understood by the legal order to be disconnected from these tasks in direct application of international law.
Thus, it shall be exclusively for the payment of indemnifications, then, that the funds directed to CONAI by the Executive Branch, according to the final paragraph of said numeral, must be used, so that, being in the sound administration of the Commission, it must keep them available for when it is appropriate to proceed with the indemnification in favor of the entitled party, in accordance with the requirement of INDER and when legally applicable, all within an adequate and efficient framework of coordination. In the manner stated, it is fair to say that the legislator utilized the entity called at that time the Institute of Lands and Colonization – one might suppose given the platform its organization had – later the Institute of Agrarian Development, today, the Rural Development Institute, in relation to which its legal duties are still in force to delimit the lands that make up the indigenous reserves pursuant to Executive Decree number 5904 of March eleventh, nineteen seventy-six, and to provide the lands that are necessary to relocate non-indigenous persons when appropriate – for which it must proceed using those lands it has available.
In the event of expropriation, one must take into account the particular interest that the declaration of public interest, which corresponds to an indispensable prior action, must pursue. The public interest in these cases, certainly according to Article 45 of the Constitution, responds to the deployment of state obligations imposed by the body of law and, to that extent, in protection of the public interest related to the protection of indigenous culture associated with the right of property, but it also attends to, and at the same time, a community or collective interest of a private nature, as it will pursue the integrity of the right of property, exclusive and exclusionary, vested in the indigenous communities through their representative organizations; therefore, it is not an institutional interest, but rather a means for the preservation of the right of property of particular and vulnerable groups of the population that have traditionally been at risk and subject to constant violations of their right of property, just as the legislator and the Executive Branch have expressly recognized.
As for the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs, this public organization is responsible, as stated, for carrying out population censuses within the indigenous reserves, of course, once they are clearly delimited by INDER, without prejudice to how it must proceed when there is no doubt about the areas of the reserve in question. In this sense, for this Court by majority, the administration of the funds with which CONAI should have been endowed by the Executive Branch in accordance with Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, and their being made available, exclusively for the purposes of paying the indemnifications whose processing is in charge of INDER, should serve as the budget to finance them. The foregoing assumes that a formal requirement by INDER to CONAI must prevail for these purposes when applicable, and as long as the money designated for that effect by the legislator from the Executive Branch subsists.
If it proves insufficient, the shortfall should be provided by the Executive Branch following the same legislative formula established and to the extent necessary. The possibility that the originally planned budget may not be sufficient imposes nothing other than saying that this circumstance does not vitiate the original obligation, solely attributable to the central government, to provide the resources necessary to give full compliance to what is provided in the Indigenous Law and international law. At the moment when there are no non-indigenous persons to indemnify in the reserves, it is clear to this Court that the norm contained in the cited numeral – a programmatic norm – shall lose its validity by virtue of the purpose pursued by it having already been fulfilled in that respect. In that eventual state of affairs, it should be possible to affirm that the effective exercise of the exclusive and exclusionary right of property, of which the indigenous communities are the titleholders, would have materialized, without prejudice to future vigilance over its integrity.
In this manner, it is presumed that for the fulfillment of these specific purposes, the State, CONAI, and INDER must carry out intense and systematic coordination tasks, in the exercise of obligations and competencies that are neither exclusive nor exclusionary, but rather joint, coordinated, and interdependent, and none of these authorities may neglect the active role imposed by the legal system that they must perform, from the legal, registry, and material delimitation of the reserves, the carrying out of population censuses and location of non-indigenous possessors or titleholders of some right over the properties of interest, having in each specific case to determine whether that right or possession is in good faith, to proceed, when appropriate, to simple indemnification and/or, as the case may be, to indemnification after the corresponding expropriation procedure and its subsequent expulsion or eviction from the property, as well as the placing of the land in effective possession of its titleholder.</span> It is noted that any of the involved administrations, by not fulfilling its role or legal duty, prevents or at least substantially affects the rest.-
XI.Regarding the claim aimed at declaring that the plaintiff association is the registered owner, and the Cabécar de Talamanca people the owner, of the Farm described in Decreto Ejecutivo number 29448-G of March twenty-first, two thousand one. A separate note deserves to be given to this petitionary aspect in the terms that will be stated. Regarding the claim aimed at declaring that the plaintiff association is the registered owner, and the Cabécar de Talamanca people the owner of the Farm described in Decreto Ejecutivo number 29448-G of March twenty-first, two thousand one, there is clearly a lack of current interest that renders said aspect inadmissible, as is indeed ordered. On this matter, and since none of the sued parties invoked such defense as an exception, it should be noted that the jurisprudence emanating from the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, within which, as an example, is ruling number 2008-000317 of nine hours ten minutes on May second, two thousand eight, has characterized this exception as one directed at the verification of a material prerequisite for the jurisdictional action.
Thus, for a lawsuit to prosper independently of other aspects, such as procedural capacity, competence, and compliance with the respective requirements in the complaint, it must also be reviewed ex officio whether material prerequisites such as right, standing (legitimación), and of course, current interest, are present. If any of these prerequisites -or all- are not present, the lawsuit could not find a positive response. In the case of the lack of current interest, it is an exception, a subject for analysis at the time of issuing the judgment, which implies that regardless of the merits of what was raised, the claim is not susceptible to being accepted due to the existence of a different but legally relevant reason that so requires. Current interest is closely related to the possibility that the ruling may act in reality, either innovating or preserving a specific legal situation, which is closely related to the object of the process, understood as the claims.
To say that there is a current interest in ruling on the substantive right is nothing other than speaking of the need to provide jurisdictional protection -in this case pursuant to article 49 of the Constitution-, to the person alleging their subjective rights and/or legitimate interests are being affected, regarding an administrative conduct against which they request the intervention of the respective jurisdictional body. The purpose of that intervention is to resolve the legal conflict of which one is a part (right to sue) when the ruling proves useful for the holder of that subjective right or legitimate interest. The foregoing implies that the judge has the duty to conduct a judgment of "utility" given the formulated claim and the factual circumstances under which the action is built (cause of action), comparing the effects of the requested jurisdictional resolution, precisely with the framework of utility that such pronouncement would provide in favor of the plaintiff.
It is a projection analysis that weighs whether the ruling, positive or not, would produce any effect on the person who requested the protection of their legal situation. Thus, there is no current interest if, even if the petition is granted, the ruling does not have the virtue of causing such an effect on the plaintiff's legal situation, the judgment thereby becoming sterile. (See also the related Sentencia of the Sala Primera, number 465-2009 of ten hours forty-five minutes on May seventh, two thousand nine). Hence, an exercise of objective legality control for legality's sake lacks all relevant profit or utility. (See doctrine derived from article 10 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Having said the foregoing in different terms, if one takes into account that the exercise of the action for review of the legality of administrative conduct is of a subjective nature, insofar as it presupposes the existence of a person with standing (legitimado) by virtue of being the holder of a relevant interest to obtain a ruling that benefits them in their legal sphere -without an objective review of legality for legality's sake regarding administrative acts being possible, it is insisted-, there is an absence of that current interest, when the effect of the ruling would not in any way -for the purposes of an effects-oriented phenomenon- change the state of things.
In the case at hand, the representation of the plaintiff association must bear in mind that the ruling that might uphold the claim under analysis, insofar as it seeks to declare that said association is the owner of the Cabécar de Talamanca Indigenous Reserve, becomes evidently sterile and unnecessary, to the extent that according to the very factual framework outlined in its action, nothing leads one to think that there is any conflict between it and the sued public authorities, as well as in relation to the association that was joined to the litis -despite the fact that in the cause of action, no fact is described at any level that indicates the contrary- over the better right of dominion over the territories that make up said reserve, when quite the contrary, it is a peaceful issue between the parties that, pursuant to the particular legal regime applicable to these particular assets, it is by executive decree that the location of the reserves is recognized and that for this particular case, it has been so currently by the Executive Branch according to the cartographic sheets of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional-, in the terms of the information comprised in Decreto Ejecutivo number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one.
On the other hand, if it is regarding the exclusive participation of the Bribrí de Talamanca indigenous community, it is plausible to say that it was under the same Decreto Ejecutivo number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one, that any matter related to the former right held by said community was peacefully resolved between both communities, without any ruling then being required to innovate where the reality of things is that no act or conduct of that community has since at least affected the better right of the plaintiff indigenous community, as will be seen.-
XII.Regarding the lawsuit, as it relates to the joinder to the litis of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Bribrí de Talamanca. The parties must refer to the content expressed in the preceding recital, in relation to what was indicated in section IX of this judgment, the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve is currently legally constituted pursuant to Decreto Ejecutivo number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, an instrument by which the overlap that at some historical moment existed between the land areas comprising the plaintiff's indigenous reserve and that which formerly was recognized as property to the population of the Bribrí de Talamanca community was eliminated, as can be inferred from the plaintiff's own statements in its complaint, according to which it is clear, it was never their intention to sue that community -as there is no property conflict whatsoever against it-.
Thus, it has been accredited that through Decreto Ejecutivo number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one, the Executive Branch ordered, on the occasion that there was a partial overlap between the Cabécar de Talamanca reserve and what was called Sibujú Norte, given in its time to the Bribrí de Talamanca community, to merge both reserves into a single delimitation, also considering the areas decreed indigenous reserves as coming to constitute, as a whole, the Cabécar de Talamanca Indigenous Reserve. Apparently, the problem arises for strictly registry purposes, which are of no type of interest in this case and are the subject of a matter unrelated to it, where at no level does this circumstance constitute a cause of action formulated by the plaintiff. That being so, there is equally a clear lack of interest in what the lawsuit was understood to mean by the Sección Sexta of this Tribunal at the time, therefore, consequently the lawsuit is declared inadmissible insofar as it was understood to be directed against the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Bribrí de Talamanca .-
XIII.On the admissibility or not of the claims numbered 2 through 4, related to an omission allegedly incurred by the sued public authorities, regarding compliance with the provisions of article 5 of the Ley Indígena. What is sought in this regard turns out to be the core object for the purposes of the action as this Tribunal has understood it. The plaintiff, as relevant, has accused in this regard the non-observance of numeral 5 of the Ley Indígena, which provides: *“Article 5.- In the case of non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within the indigenous reserves, ITCO must relocate them to other similar lands, if they so desire; if it is not possible to relocate them or they do not accept the relocation, it must expropriate and indemnify them in accordance with the procedures established in the Ley de Expropiaciones. / The studies and procedures for expropriation and indemnification shall be carried out by ITCO in coordination with CONAI. / If there is subsequently an invasion by non-indigenous persons into the reserves, the competent authorities must immediately proceed to evict them, without payment of any indemnification. / The expropriations and indemnifications shall be financed with the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash, which shall be allocated through four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982.
The fund shall be administered by CONAI, under the supervision of the Contraloría General de la República.”* So then, the omission of compliance with said provision would correspond to the omission accused in the case.
In support of her action, the plaintiff affirms that despite having been recognized as the titleholder of her territory, which according to her statement is described in cadastral map number L-118495-1993, those lands are invaded in more than one thousand hectares without the defendant institutions having yet carried out the studies and procedures established in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), in order to conclude with the expropriation, compensation, and/or eviction of the non-indigenous occupants who are within her territory. Regarding the State, she accused that it has not provided a budget to the corresponding institutions, nor have these made the necessary efforts to proceed in accordance with the studies of occupants, expropriations, and evictions within those territories (observe particularly the petitionary endpoint identified as number 3). Thus, as the claims of the lawsuit were adjusted, it is understood that the plaintiff aspires that, based on an omission adopted in non-conformity with the legal system, the judgment orders the following: “…*2.
Order the Agrarian Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) and the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI) to carry out the studies and appraisals of the lands occupied by non-indigenous persons within that indigenous territory: a) Order them that the studies must determine which of those persons must be compensated and which do not have a right to it; b) Order them that the appraisals be carried out on the lands that must be compensated, taking into consideration the possible variations that could occur due to eventual delays in the processes that are processed for compensation; c) Order them to begin the studies and appraisals no more than one month after the finality of the judgment, and must have concluded them no more than four months after that finality. 3. Order the State, the Agrarian Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario), and the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI) to immediately begin, once the cited studies and appraisals are completed, the procedures for the compensations (including possible expropriations) of the possessors or owners who have a right to it, and to pay -no more than one month after the judgment that so orders- the corresponding compensations. 4.
Order to place my represented party in possession of each one of the farms, parcels, or areas that make up our territory each time any of the current occupants is evicted or compensated as established in the Expropriations Law (Ley de Expropiaciones)…”. It is the criterion of this Tribunal that, while declaring the lawsuit admissible against the three defendant public authorities is warranted, it cannot be done in full conformity with the terms of the lawsuit, as formulated by the plaintiff, both situations which we proceed to reason below.-
1.1.-) On the principle of conventionality control. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted internationally on April thirtieth, nineteen eighty-two, now Law of the Republic (Ley de la República) number 7615 of July twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-six, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 164 of August twenty-ninth, nineteen ninety-six, it was provided, in what interests us: *“Article 26.- "Pacta Sunt Servanda". Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”* The foregoing entails the obligation of states to be consistent with the obligations they assume before the international community and, clearly, in cases such as those encompassed in Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization (Organización Internacional del Trabajo) in relation to Convention number 169, “concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries”, with the indigenous communities, particularly in matters of guarantees regarding the exercise, which must be guaranteed as full, of fundamental rights.
Of course, both Article 7 and the doctrine forged by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) based on the scope it has given to numeral 48, both of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), are observable in this matter. At another level, for the purpose of the operational or application aspects of these rules, Article 27 of this body of international law provides in relation to domestic law and the observance of treaties, referring to the signatory States, that: *“A party <u>may not invoke the provisions of its internal law</u> as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46.”* This Article 46 referred to the effectiveness of the treaty once consented to (signed) by the respective delegation, which is related to Article 11, on the means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty, in that it provides that signature is sufficient.
Given this, the delegation of Costa Rica interpreted and expressed that the provision would apply for the case of the Costa Rican State regarding secondary law, but not to the provisions of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). All of the foregoing is relevant on the occasion of the development of the principle of conventionality control and what could also be called, the principle of the intangibility of treaties in the face of law. From the above, it also follows, under the coverage of the aspiration of every legal system to provide certainty and security, the obligation to directly apply the norms contained in international treaties already ratified and in force in the domestic order, being able, of course, to be norms invoked by their beneficiary, independently of whether it concerns another State and in demand of loyalty to the commitments assumed within the framework of relations between the linked nations, without prejudice to the coverage that has also been customarily invoked for the principle in matters of instruments of this type when they regulate human rights matters.
The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in this regard has indicated as follows: *“II.- It is obvious that the petitioner starts from what Article seven of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) provides in the sense that international treaties and conventions "have an authority superior to the laws" (…). But it must be said that the international Human Rights instruments in force in the Republic, in accordance with the reform of Article 48 of the Constitution (Law No. 7128, of August 18, 1989), upon integrating into the legal system at the highest level, that is to say, at the constitutional level, complement it in whatever favors the person.”* Thus, it imposes in summary the recognition of the validity of international norms as a direct source of domestic law and in recognition of their location regarding the hierarchy of sources. The principle of conventionality control is based in the already mentioned Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in relation to Articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, without prejudice to the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the latter which, like multiple other declarations arising within the bosom of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, are not subject to ratification by the member or signatory States as unnecessary.
One could not say otherwise, then, than that the content of these bodies in the matter of human rights has enormous interpretive value for all instances charged with applying the norms that make up the block of legality, and in that sense, also domestic law. It is not superfluous to indicate, in what is relevant for the case before us, that as is inferred from Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which refers to the right to property, as it is for every other right recognized in that instrument, the States are committed to ensuring the universal and <u>effective</u> respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of man, which means that the State has the obligation not only to respect those rights and freedoms, but also, the obligation to <u>ensure them</u>. This implies that it is the State as a whole, without its internal organization allowing it to affirm that it has divested itself of its duties, which is demanded to adopt actions tending towards the effective realization of the objectives pursued by conventions of this type in the matter of human rights, without domestic law serving as an excuse to fail to comply with what was agreed.
On the importance of bearing in mind what has been said to this point in what is linked to the defense of the rights of a group of the population that is in a situation of vulnerability, such as indigenous communities from time immemorial, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in its judgment N° 2253-96 of 15:39 hours of May 14, 1996, indicated: *“... There exist various legal instruments tending to foster that real equality between subjects; among them can be located the particular situation of the aborigines, who traditionally have been marginalized, for historical, social, economic, and cultural reasons. They suffer the consequences of a society that neither comprehends nor respects their differences; and that on occasion, tends to see them as beings incapable of directing their own lives and destinies. Given that situation, the international community felt the need to adopt measures in favor of indigenous people.
Thus, Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization (Organización Internacional del Trabajo) -ILO-, named “Convention concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries”, incorporated into our legal system by means of Law Nº 7316 of November 3, 1992, established the special protection of indigenous people and their culture."* Conventionality control entails that the Judicial Branch of each State and the organs that make up its structure (and every authority that exercises materially jurisdictional functions, particularly the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), in function of what is provided in Article 49 of the Constitution) must apply, interpret, and/or resolve the matters proper to their competencies as legal operators, making the conventional parameter of control prevail, thus constituting international law in what it regulates regarding human rights, into what it really is, that is, a guarantee of respect for human rights in what corresponds.
Moreover, suffice it to indicate that according to our Civil Code in its Article 5, these normative bodies of an international nature are of direct application by the legal operator upon forming part of the positive domestic law of the nation, from the moment when their incorporation into the block of legality occurs by virtue of the approval of the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) and their integral publication in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta”, so that forming part of the block of legality, this is a parameter of control of this jurisdiction.
(Article 6 of the General Public Administration Law).- 1.2.-) Regarding the State's omission. Having stated all the foregoing, the majority of the members of this Court find that the State has not only failed to comply with the provisions of the last paragraph of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, but also that this is a qualified and reinforced non-compliance over time, ever since the legal system imposed on it the specific obligation to provide budgetary content to CONAI so that such resources could be used, in accordance with the procedures to be carried out by the current INDER, solely for the purpose of expropriating and compensating, when appropriate, non-indigenous persons who are occupying or are titleholders, in both cases in good faith, of the lands identified as part of the indigenous reserves. In the present case, it has been proven at a first level, and without prejudice to the fact that the reserve owned by the plaintiff indigenous community dates back decades in its current dimensions, that the indigenous community represented here holds title to the domain over the reserve described, starting from the adoption by the Executive Branch of Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta,” number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one, regardless of whether or not it is registered in the name of the plaintiff association representing the Cabécar community of Talamanca (which can be consulted on the Judiciary’s Web Page, by accessing the Costa Rican Legal Information System).
It has also been proven that since its first creation, per Executive Decree number 5904 of March eleventh, nineteen seventy-six, as the Executive Branch itself reported on that circumstance at the time, non-indigenous persons have occupied areas within its surface. On this particular point, of relevance were also the statements made at trial by the witness José Manuel Paniagua Vargas, a geographer by profession and an official of the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs with twenty-five years of experience that has linked him, among others, to the plaintiff indigenous community, as well as Mr. Hermógenes Morales Morales, a member of the Cabécar indigenous community of Talamanca, who stated he has lived in the indigenous territory of interest since his birth, at least fifty-four years ago. Both witnesses stated they know of the existence of non-indigenous persons who are occupying areas of the reserve in question, with no reason existing that would induce this Court to consider their statements lack credibility.
Subsequently, and in any case, the existence of non-indigenous persons on these lands and under the conditions described seems to stem from the Executive Branch’s own recognition and that of the legislature per the Indigenous Law itself, and particularly, what was expressed by the Executive Branch in Executive Decree number 5904 of March eleventh, nineteen seventy-six. Of central relevance is the fact that, according to the evidence ordered by this judicial authority for better judgment, visible on folios 795 to 198 of the main case file, which is a document signed by the person identified therein as Marjorie Morera González in her capacity as Director of the General Directorate of the National Budget of the Ministry of Finance, it is reported that at no point in history, from the entry into force of the Indigenous Law number 6172 and according to its Article 5, has the Executive Branch included in the General Budget of the Republic the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash that it should have allocated in four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first with its inclusion in the National Budget Project of the Republic for 1979, to continue in the budgets of 1980, 1981, and 1982 respectively.
It follows from this, according to the majority opinion of the members of this Court, that for the purposes of the Indigenous Law, as well as the international conventions signed on the matter, the State illegitimately failed, by omission, in its duty to take effective actions—in this case, a specific and concrete one set by the indicated normative instruments—for the protection of indigenous property over the land. This is an administrative conduct subjected, by virtue of the provisions of Article 49 of the Constitution, to the legality control vested in this jurisdiction, which, on the other hand, does not grant or confer any margin of discretion on the Administration obligated to act. At a second level, and despite this having been consistent with the understanding of the lawsuit filed against it, the State also failed to prove that, from the entry into force of the Indigenous Law number 6172, it deployed, within what is legally authorized, any act directed at guiding, coordinating, and/or monitoring, in an orderly and systematic manner, the tasks that, having been imposed by international and domestic law in the area of the right of indigenous populations to the integrity of their territories, should have been exercised where appropriate, whether with INDER, with CONAI, or any other indirectly linked organization.
See the content of the provisions in Article 26, subsection b), in relation to Article 27, first subsection, both of the General Public Administration Law, regarding the duty of whoever holds the Presidency of the Republic, autonomously or, where applicable, jointly with the relevant Minister, to direct and coordinate the tasks of the government and the central Public Administration as a whole, as well as the same regarding the decentralized Public Administration. This is what, furthermore, would have been expected to have been proven at least with respect to the management, in what concerns us, of the entity now called the Rural Development Institute, as well as the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs, in relation to the Cabécar Indigenous Reserve of Talamanca. Nor was any evidence brought to the proceedings that demonstrates that the State undertook or effectively, jointly, and/or systematically pursued efforts that could be understood as joint with the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs and the Rural Development Institute aimed at protecting and guaranteeing the Cabécar Indigenous Community of Talamanca regarding the integrity of the territories of which it is the titleholder.
(All the foregoing according to the case records due to the lack of evidentiary material indicating otherwise). These factual circumstances make the omission incurred by the State illegitimate, as it constitutes non-compliance with Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in relation to Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization and Convention number 169, “Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,” insofar as they regulate the duties that the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica must fulfill, which must be associated with the provisions of Article 140, subsection 8) of the Political Constitution. With respect to the last paragraph of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, which provides that “…The expropriations and compensations shall be financed with the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash, which shall be allocated in four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982.
The fund shall be administered by CONAI, under the supervision of the Comptroller General of the Republic”, if the administration of the funds with which CONAI was to be endowed by the Executive Branch was for the purpose of having the necessary resources to proceed with the expropriations and compensations whose processing corresponds to INDER, this being a prerequisite for such, nothing could ever be compensated unless it is through channels other than those unconditionally provided by the legal system to the Executive Branch, which cannot be upheld by the jurisdictional authority in this venue according to Article 49 of the Constitution. This leads to declaring that the State has indeed incurred in an illegal omission, contrary to what is provided and ordered by the legal system. It should be noted that, without prejudice to the assessment that a similar sum of money at the end of the 1970s could serve the purposes foreseen in the law, it is the duty of the Executive Branch to provide the resources required to comply with the cited regulations; thus, even given the possibility that this economic forecast may be insufficient, that circumstance does not vitiate the original obligation, solely attributable to the State, to provide the necessary resources for full compliance with the provisions of the Indigenous Law and international law.
The moment there are no non-indigenous persons to compensate in the reserves, it is clear to this Court that the norm contained in that article—a programmatic-type norm—shall lose its validity, having already fulfilled the purpose pursued by it to that extent. In that eventual state of affairs, one could affirm that the exercise by the indigenous communities of the exclusive and exclusionary property right of which they are titleholders is effectively realized, without prejudice to future vigilance over its integrity. As long as this is not the case, it would undoubtedly be a property right that is not fully realized, as it is not being protected by the State, in flagrant violation of the right vested in these communities. It being so, it is reiterated, the claim must be declared admissible in what was directed against the State, but under the terms to be stated below.-
On the contrary, such events only speak to the ineffectiveness of any effort made in this regard as sterile and insufficient, despite the fact that in its beginnings and up until the year two thousand three, by provision of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), it was composed of, among others, several Ministries of the Executive Branch according to its own law of creation, which reinforces how sterile its operation has been in this line of thought, if one considers that its General Assembly defined its institutional policy and budget. (See ruling of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) number 3485-2003 of fourteen hours seventeen minutes of the second of May of two thousand three). It is not accredited, as was to be expected, that its Board of Directors and General Assembly have undertaken efforts to ensure the institution was endowed with the budget referred to by the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) in the last paragraph of its article 5, for the specific case of the Cabécar de Talamanca Indigenous Reserve (Reserva Indígena), furthermore.
Note that not even an effort has been made to describe the tasks performed to date in what is relevant, using the resources it has indeed had; it has almost simply been affirmed that it cannot execute what corresponds due to lacking financing for the exercise of its functions. (See article 28 of the creation law of CONAI). Neither in the matter of delimitation or demarcation of the Cabécar de Talamanca indigenous reserve is it demonstrated that any coordination work has been carried out with INDER, nor with the Cadastral Regularization Program mentioned earlier, when that opportunity arose, this despite that regarding the administration of the reserves, it should have carried out the due coordination and advisory to the indigenous communities. The Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena) and compliance with its article 5 by both the State and INDER in what corresponds, supposes that CONAI has exercised its attributions-duties efficiently and with the necessary power to persuade, or at least warn the Executive Branch and INDER, of the state of non-compliance with the legal order in which they have been found to be incurring, even currently.
As a result, to date the Cabécar de Talamanca indigenous reserve is not demarcated, nor adequately inscribed in the name of said community in the registry, there is no certainty of the land areas in which the respective population censuses would have to be carried out on their part, and it prevents compliance with the regulations governing the matter of human rights of these populations regarding the effective and exclusive exercise of their right to property, all the foregoing, despite that since the year two thousand one, the Cabécar de Talamanca indigenous reserve is described regarding its location – in the cartographic sheets of the National Geographic Institute (IGN) – and limits, in the terms of the information comprised in Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 29448 dated twenty-first of March of two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 93 of the sixteenth of May of two thousand one.-
XIV.On the inadmissibility of the claim directed at ordering the payment of the compensation ordered in another judicial process. Just as has been indicated above, the representation of the Cabécar de Talamanca indigenous community requested that the judgment declare: “In the case of the Sibujú Norte Indigenous Reserve (Reserva Indígena) (which is Cabécar de Talamanca indigenous territory cited earlier), if the placement in possession of my represented party requires that the compensation ordered in the process being processed in (sic) the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), in file 86-000826-0178-CA, be paid, order the state to proceed to its payment no more than one month after the judgment becomes final.” It suffices to indicate in this regard, that there clearly exists a lack of active standing (legitimación activa) in whoever thus sues in the present cause, without prejudice to the possible standing (legitimación) that could potentially be recognized by the competent judicial authority, in the execution phase of the judgment rendered in application of the rules of the Regulatory Law of the Administrative-Contentious Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa), in an ordinary process processed under judicial file number 86-000826-0178-CA, judgments of the Second Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) of eleven hours thirty minutes of the twenty-fourth of December of nineteen hundred ninety-two, in relation to number 276-94, of eight hours fifteen minutes of the thirty-first of August of nineteen hundred ninety-four, of the First Section (Sección Primera) of the Superior Administrative-Contentious Court (Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo).
(Folios from 172 to 228 of the main file). In this sense, it must be indicated to whoever acts that clearly, what was resolved in that process produced res judicata (estado), without it being possible, by imperative of the rules that inform procedural law, for a judgment of that nature to be executed in another cause, which is clearly intended based on what was petitioned. It must be indicated, however, that due to the dual nature of the right it supposes, it is tangentially being protected, having ordered the payment of a compensation in that process, of course immersed is the right of the plaintiff indigenous community to demand that those authorities that were condemned proceed with the respective payment, but not in the present cause, this in the opinion of this Court. Being so, and given that standing (legitimación) is a procedural requirement susceptible to being analyzed ex officio, it is declared that there is a lack of active standing (legitimación activa) to access what was petitioned, therefore, to that extent, it is necessary to declare the inadmissibility of the claim.-
XV.Corollary. In conclusion of everything expounded up to this point, demonstrated the illegitimate omission conduct in which, at various levels, both the State, the Institute of Rural Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Rural), and the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas) have incurred, the claim shall succeed, however, in a different form from that in which the claims were formulated, due to the relevant public interest that an adequate execution of the tasks assigned by the legal order to the institutions it linked with the protection of the rights of indigenous communities in accordance with article 122, subsections c), d), g) and k) of the Administrative-Contentious Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), it is necessary to declare the claim partially admissible, in the terms to be indicated in the operative part of this judgment.-
XVI.On the exceptions filed. The representations of the State and the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas) filed the exception of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva), while the representation of the Institute of Rural Development filed those of lack of right and material res judicata (cosa juzgada material), the latter which was resolved in its rejection with the issuance of ruling number 33-2013, rendered within the single hearing held on the twenty-fourth of June of two thousand thirteen, at ten hours fifty-five minutes, therefore, regarding what was thus resolved, the parties must abide by what was ordered at that opportunity. Regarding the exception of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva), its rejection is necessary in what was alleged in this cause for the following reasons. Standing (legitimación) is a substantive requirement of every jurisdictional process and as such, its analysis is mandatory for the Judges even ex officio if the respective exception (of lack of active and/or passive standing) is not raised.
The institute attends to the "... specific material legal situation in which a subject, or plurality of subjects, finds themselves, in relation to what constitutes the litigious object of a specific process; standing (legitimación), definitively, will indicate to us in each case who are the true titleholders of the material relationship that it is intended to elucidate in the scope of the process; whose subjects whose procedural participation is necessary for the Judgment (Sentencia) to be "effective". (Gimeno Sendra, Vicente; Saborío Valverde, Rodolfo; Garberí Llobregat, José and González-Cuellar Serrano, Nicolás. Costa Rican Administrative Procedural Law (Derecho Procesal Administrativo Costarricense). Editorial Juricentro. San José, Costa Rica. p.162.). It is the aptitude of the intervening subjects to be a party in a process of this nature; that which derives or originates from the relationship existing between the sphere of interests and rights of the same in direct relationship with the impugned administrative conduct.
Thus, "...a subject is granted standing (legitimación) in a procedure or in a specific process by virtue of the prior impact suffered in their qualified interests or rights" (Jiménez Meza, Manrique. The New Administrative-Contentious Process (El nuevo proceso contencioso administrativo). Collective Work.
Judicial Branch. Judicial School. San José. Costa Rica. p. 79.) If the intervening parties lack standing, it can be concluded that the development of the entire proceeding will not serve to resolve the specific intersubjective conflict brought before the judicial court, because that lack will determine the nonexistence of the legal relationship between them. In this contentious-administrative jurisdiction, "the legal situations of every person" are tutelageable, clarifies subsection 1) of the first numeral of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, in relation to the various manifestations of administrative conduct, so in order to obtain effective and substantive judicial protection in a contentious proceeding, it is required to be the holder of a subjective right or at least "a legitimate interest" (Article 49 of the Political Constitution) of the administered party, derived from or originating in an administrative legal relationship.
On the other hand, standing is divided into an active dimension, relating to the person or persons who appear as plaintiffs and precisely, to the supposed ownership of the alleged subjective right or legitimate interest, which is conceived as the suitability to carry out acts of exercise of the power of action that empowers them to demand the satisfaction of a specific performance or object; and a passive dimension, in relation to the defendant, which manifests as the aptitude to bear the exercise of said power. Thus, a subjective right or legitimate interest confronts public powers or competences. In this case, according to the majority opinion of this chamber, it is clear that there is standing to sue the State to the extent that among the omission conducts that were reproached, the legal system was designated as the directly responsible party, while it was demonstrated that in relation to said legal obligations it incurred in non-compliance.
With respect to the entity now called the Rural Development Institute (INDER), the same occurs —now by unanimity of this Chamber— to the extent that the powers and duties that the legal system imposed on it regarding the identification of indigenous lands and their demarcation, have constituted, together with the State's inactivity, the cause for the fact that to date Article 5 of the Indigenous Law has not been effectively applied. In addition to the foregoing, and given the substantive analysis that has been carried out in the terms of this judgment, resulting in the partial grant of the claim against the INDER, it becomes necessary to reject the exception of lack of right interposed by it. Finally, on its motion, it is pointed out that with respect to the National Commission of Indigenous Affairs (CONAI), duties were assigned that are aimed at the protection of indigenous peoples, particularly those of coordination and liaison, which have not been exercised, even remotely, in an adequate and effective manner, both vis-à-vis the State and the INDER, as well as in relation to the indigenous communities themselves.—" </div> </body> </html> }, "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [] } ], "contenidosInteresOrden": "3", "despacho": "Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VII", "despachoOrden": "19", "enteSistematizador": "CENTRO DE INFORMACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIAL", "esCambioCriterio": "0", "esCriterioUnificador": "0", "esNotaSeparada": "0", "esProtegida": "0", "esResolucionClave": "0", "esResolucionEstructural": "0", "esResolucionOral": "0", "esResolucionRelevante": "0", "esVotoSalvado": "1", "expediente": "100002741028CA", "fecha": "2013-10-29", "formatoDocumento": "ESCRITO", "hora": "10:30", "id": "sen-1-0034-589847", "normasInternacionales": [ "Convenio sobre protección de pueblos indígenas y tribales, Convenio OIT N° 107", "Convenio sobre pueblos indígenas y tribales en países independientes, Convenio OIT N° 169" ], "numeroDocumento": "00074", "redactor": "Felipe Córdoba Ramírez", "sentenciasIgualSentido": "sen-1-0034-624482", "sentenciasRelacionadas": [ "sen-1-0034-1203699", "sen-1-0034-1203727", "sen-1-0034-660732", "sen-1-0034-712969", "sen-1-0034-746961", "sen-1-0034-897917", "sen-1-0034-905304", "sen-1-0034-916762", "sen-1-0034-993570", "sen-1-0034-996729" ], "sourceName": "Documentos", "subNumeroDocumento": "1", "tipoDocumento": "SNT", "tipoInformacion": "Resolución Judicial", "tipoResolucion": "De Fondo", "tipoTexto": "1", "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [], "html": "<html><head><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" /><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Style-Type\" content=\"text/css\" /><meta name=\"generator\" content=\"Aspose.Words for .NET 23.6.0\" /><title></title></head><body style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt\"><div><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">EXPEDIENTE: 10-000274-1028-CA</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">ASUNTO: PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">ACTOR: ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA CABECAR DE TALAMANCA</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">DEMANDADOS: EL ESTADO, LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS, EL INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, y la ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA BRIBRI DE TALAMANCA </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">Nº 74-2013-VII</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">TRIBUNAL PROCESAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN SÉPTIMA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, ANEXO A, Goicoechea,</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> a las diez horas treinta minutos del veintinueve de octubre del dos mil trece.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">RESULTANDO:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">1.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Que por escrito de demanda presentado a estrados judiciales el día veintitrés de marzo del dos mil diez, la representación de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre128202</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">  </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, accionó en contra del Estado, la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y para entonces el denominado Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, hoy Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, con ocasión de lo cual fue levantado el presente expediente judicial. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios del 160 al 166 y del 294 al 300, todos del expediente principal)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">2.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Que por escrito de demanda presentado a estrados judiciales el día ocho de septiembre del dos mil diez, la representación de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre128202</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">  </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, accionó en contra del Estado, la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y para entonces el denominado Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, hoy Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, con ocasión de lo cual fue levantado el expediente judicial identificado con el número 10-002957-1027-CA. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios del 373 al 379 y del 400 y 401, y 480 al 482, todos del expediente principal)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">3.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Que para el caso de ambos expedientes judiciales, fue ordenado por la autoridad judicial encargada para entonces de su tramitación, que al asunto le fuese dado el trámite preferente a que refiere el artículo 60 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios 168 y 169 del expediente judicial número 10-000274-1028-CA; y folios del 392 al 394 del expediente judicial número 10-002957-1027-CA)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">4.-</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\"> Que por auto número 35-2011-VI de las diez horas treinta minutos del quince de febrero del dos mil once, la autoridad judicial para entonces a cargo de la tramitación del expediente judicial identificado con el número 10-002957-2017-CA, ordenó la acumulación de dicho expediente con el presente, disponiéndose en consecuencia, que fuesen tramitados bajo el número 10-000274-2018-CA. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios del 460 al 462)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">5.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Que conferido el traslado de ley a la representación del Estado en ambos expedientes judiciales, previo a que fuesen acumulados, se pronunció ésta en oposición a la demanda en cada uno de ellos, en los términos de los escritos presentado a estrados judiciales el día nueve de junio del dos mil diez en el tramitado bajo el número 10-000274-1028-CA.
Además, conforme la resolución dictada únicamente dentro del proceso que se tramitó bajo el expediente judicial número 10-2957-1027-CA, a las quince horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintitrés de mayo del dos mil once, se dispuso declarar al Estado en de rebeldía con causa en no haber contestado en tiempo y que en ese entendido, se habrían de tener en esa causa los hechos por contestados afirmativamente. Por parte de la representación del Estado fue interpuesta solamente la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios del 244 al 249 y 470, del principal)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">6.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Que conferido el traslado de ley a la representación del INDER en ambos expedientes judiciales, previo a que fuesen acumulados, se pronunció ésta en oposición a la demanda en cada uno de ellos, en los términos de los escritos presentado a estrados judiciales el día diez de junio del dos mil diez, en el tramitado bajo el número 10-000274-1028-CA y el día catorce de diciembre del dos mil diez, en el expediente número 10-002957-027-CA.
Fue interpuesta la excepción de falta de integración de la litis consorcio pasivo necesaria (que fue resuelta interlocutoriamente en rechazo de la misma conforme el auto, hoy firme, número 2781-2010 de las catorce horas diez minutos del veintinueve de julio del dos mil diez, visible a folios del 304 al 306 del expediente judicial). Se interpusieron de su parte además las excepciones de falta de derecho y cosa juzgada, ésta última que fue también resuelta interlocutoriamente en rechazo de la misma, por resolución número 33-2013, dictada dentro de la audiencia única celebrada el día veinticuatro de junio del dos mil trece, al ser las</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> diez horas cincuenta cinco minutos. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios del 253 al 267, y del 423 al 441, todos del principal)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">7.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Que conferido el traslado de ley a la representación de la CONAI en ambos expedientes judiciales, previo a que fuesen acumulados, se pronunció ésta en oposición a la demanda en cada uno de ellos, en los términos de los escritos presentado a estrados judiciales el día dieciséis de junio del dos mil diez, en el tramitado bajo el número 10-000274-1028-CA y el día trece de diciembre del dos mil diez, en el expediente número 10-002957-1027-CA.
Fue interpuesta únicamente la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios del 270 al 273, del 285 al 287, del 420 al 422del principal)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">8.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Que en el presente asunto no fue celebrada audiencia de conciliación, habiendo sido renunciada esa posibilidad por parte del INDER. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folio 355, así como por la propia parte accionante, como se observa a folio 354, ambos del expediente principal)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">9.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">Que la audiencia única fue celebrada con la participación de las partes involucradas en la relación jurídica procesal en dos tantos.
La primera ocasión en fecha veintiséis de julio del dos mil diez (encontrándose para esa data la tramitación del asunto asignada a la Sección Sexta de este Tribunal). En ésta, fueron discutidos asuntos relacionados con el saneamiento del proceso, fueron determinadas las pretensiones del proceso como parte del ejercicio de aclaración y/o ajuste de las mismas, y por decisión de la autoridad judicial, le fue dado término a la audiencia, al haber ordenado la integración de la litis pasivo necesaria, para que se trajese a la que se identificó en ese momento como la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre128203 de Talamanca. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios 602 y 603 del expediente principal)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">10.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Que conferido el traslado de ley a la representación de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre128203</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces\">  </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">, se pronunció ésta en dirección a no tener ningún interés en el resultado de la causa, con fundamento en reconocer no ser propietaria de área alguna de territorio en la reserva indígena titularidad de la parte actora, desde que así se dispuso por Decreto Ejecutivo, por lo que se allanó a lo pretendido por la accionante en ese tanto -habría que entender-. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios 622 y 623 del principal)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">11.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Que la audiencia única fue nuevamente celebrada el día veinticuatro de junio del dos mil trece a cargo de la Sección Séptima, con la participación de las partes involucradas en la relación jurídica procesal, salvo para el caso de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Talamanca (Nombre42326), que no se apersonó en esa ocasión.
En dicha diligencia, fueron efectuadas nuevamente observaciones en relación con cuestiones de saneamiento, y en concurso con las partes, particularmente la actora, fueron determinadas como las pretensiones, un solo elenco de éstas para ambos procesos acumulados, para que a todos los efectos se tenga que lo son las que siguen: </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">“1. Se declare que mi representada es la propietaria registral, y el pueblo Nombre128202</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">   </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">es el dueño, de la Finca descrita en el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29448-G del 21 de Marzo de 2001 (“Reserva – Tenorio- Indígena Nombre128202 de Talamanca). 2. Se ordene al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y a la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas realizar los estudios y avalúos sobre los terrenos ocupados por personas no indígenas dentro de ese territorio indígena: a) Ordéneseles que los estudios deben determinar cuáles de esas personas tienen que ser indemnizadas y cuáles no tienen derecho a ello; b) Ordéneseles que los avalúos se realicen sobre los terrenos que deben ser indemnizados, tomando en consideración las posibles variaciones que podrían ocurrir por los eventuales retrasos en los procesos que se tramiten para la indemnización; c) Ordéneseles iniciar los estudios y avalúos no más de un mes posterior a la firmeza de la sentencia, debiendo haberlos concluido no más de cuatro meses después de esa firmeza. 3.
Se ordene al Estado, al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y a la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas iniciar de inmediato, una vez realizados los estudios y avalúos citados, los trámites para las indemnizaciones (incluidas las posibles expropiaciones) de los poseedores o propietarios que tengan derecho a ello, y cancelar -no más de un mes posterior a</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> la sentencia que así lo ordene- las indemnizaciones correspondientes 4. Se ordene poner a mi representada en posesión de cada una de las fincas, parcelas o áreas que componen nuestro territorio cada vez que se desaloje o indemnice a alguno de los actuales ocupantes conforme lo establece la Ley de Expropiaciones; 5. En el caso de la Reserva Indígena Sibujú Norte (que es territorio indígena Nombre128202</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces\">   </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">antes citado), si la puesta en posesión de mi representada requiere que se pague la indemnización ordenada en el proceso que se tramita en (sic) Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, en expediente 86-000826-0178-CA, ordénesele al estado (sic) proceder a su pago no más de un mes después de que quede firme la sentencia. 6.
Se condene a los demandados al pago solidario de ambas costas de esta acción”</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">. Por resolución número 33-2013 dictada dentro de la misma audiencia única, al ser las diez horas con cincuenta y cinco minutos, fueron rechazadas las defensas previas de cosa juzgada e integración de la litis consorcio pasivo necesaria (esta última defensa en relación con la que lo así resuelto, se encuentra firme desde el dictado por parte del Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, de auto número 486-2013 de las once horas veinte minutos del veintiuno de agosto del dos mil trece). Se determinaron los hechos controvertidos y de trascendencia para el proceso, se efectuó pronunciamiento sobre la admisibilidad o no de la totalidad de la prueba y encontrándose admitida la testimonial y testimonial pericial, fue evacuada la misma. Finalizada la fase de evacuación de la prueba, les fue otorgado a las partes un espacio de tiempo para que expresaren sus conclusiones, procediendo todas las presentes de conformidad. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios del 691 al 693 del expediente principal, en relación con el registro electrónico de la audiencia única)</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">12.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Que habiendo la representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural el día veintisiete de junio del dos mil trece, presentado recurso de apelación en contra de lo resuelto por auto número 33-2013, de las diez horas con cincuenta y cinco minutos en lo que rechazó la defensa de integración de la litis opuesta dentro de la audiencia única, esta Sección Séptima hizo remisión del expediente a los efectos que corresponden ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, con efectos suspensivos, dada la naturaleza de la gestión interpuesta a ese punto del trámite procesal siendo que ya se había dado término a la audiencia única, que comprendió el juicio oral y público. </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios del 708 al 711, en relación con el 702 y 703 del expediente principal)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold\">13.- </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">Que el recurso de apelación a que refiere el resultando anterior, fue resuelto en rechazo del mismo en audiencia oral celebrada por el Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda el día veintiuno de agosto del dos mil trece, conforme el auto identificado con el número 486-2013 de las once horas veintiún minutos del mismo día. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">(Folios del 717 al 718 del expediente principal)</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt\">.-</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">14.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> Que por escrito presentado a estrados judiciales por parte de la representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural el día cinco de septiembre del dos mil trece, formuló solicitud para que fuese admitida prueba que identificó como nueva, misma, respecto de la que fue otorgada la audiencia de rigor audiencia a las partes, por resolución dictada a las dieciséis horas veintisiete minutos del doce de septiembre del dos mil trece. </span></p></div></body></html> (Folios 720 to 757 of the main case file).-
Drafted by Judge Córdoba Ramírez with the affirmative vote of Judge Fernández Brenes and partially by Judge Hess Araya, the latter who appends a dissenting vote to the corresponding part of this ruling.-
CONSIDERING
I.Regarding the evidence for better provision. Given that through a writing submitted to the judicial court by the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural on September fifth, two thousand thirteen, the admission of evidence for a better decision was requested (folio 757), consisting of the text of judgment number 106-2013 of fourteen hours on August twenty-eighth, two thousand thirteen, rendered by the First Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo in an ordinary proceeding identified as that processed under judicial case file number 07-001117-0163-CA, by which, as it so states, it intends that its content be weighed to prove that as to the part of the lawsuit directed against the referenced Institute, the same should not proceed. (Folios 720 to 756). On this particular, it must be noted that the possibility for this type of extemporaneous evidence to be admitted by virtue of the provisions of Article 331 of the Civil Procedural Code is at the discretion of the Judge, it being unacceptable to affirm that its rejection may cause defenselessness, given that it is supposed, by the principle of procedural preclusion, to have been brought into the process outside the opportunities provided for bringing evidentiary elements available to the parties bound in the procedural legal relationship; therefore, the same is rejected.
It must additionally be noted that the evidence refers in particular to a jurisprudential precedent that is affirmed to have been rendered in a judicial cause different from this one, not constituting proof directed at any level to account for the real truth regarding any of the facts of interest concerning the resolution that must declare the better right on the merits in the present cause; therefore, it is also for this reason inadmissible; thus, the request is rejected.-
II.Proven facts. The following are relevant for the resolution of this proceeding:
III.Unproven facts: The following are held as unproven facts relevant for the issuance of this ruling:
IV.Regarding the reproaches formulated by the plaintiff party. The representation of the plaintiff party set forth in its lawsuit argumentative structures in support of the present action, according to which they indicated -as summarized below- that to the indigenous community Nombre128202, title over its territory was recognized in accordance with the content of Decreto Ejecutivo number 29448 of March twenty-first, two thousand one, which includes the area it identifies -it is added, in a confusing manner- as Nombre128202 and Nombre128203, forming the property registered in the National Registry, Partido de Limón, under registered folio number Placa30242, which was later divided, segregating from it property number Placa30243 (it does not indicate to whom the segregated area belongs). Subsequently, it affirms that the territory area belonging to it is described in cadastral plan number Placa30244, but that this includes a property, namely, that registered under entry number Placa30245, regarding which no claim shall be understood as effective in this cause, since the proper matter is being discussed in the judicial cause it identified as that being processed under judicial case file number 10-000275-1028-CA.
It accused that the plaintiff’s lands are invaded in more than one thousand hectares, without the defendant institutions and the State having yet undertaken the studies and procedures established in Article 5 of the Ley Indígena, so that the expropriation, compensation, and/or eviction of non-indigenous occupants found within our territory may be concluded. Regarding the State, it accused that it has not provided the corresponding institutions with a budget, nor have they made the necessary efforts to proceed in accordance with the studies of occupants, expropriations, and evictions within those territories.-
V.Regarding the defense arguments made by the representation of the State. The representation of the State indicated -in contesting the lawsuit solely within the audience granted within judicial case file number 10-000274-2018-CA and in opposition to the lawsuit being declared with merit- that although it is correct that the indigenous reserve of interest was created through Decreto Ejecutivo number 29448 of March twenty-first, two thousand one, it is not true that it is invaded by non-indigenous people, in the absence of evidence demonstrating this circumstance. Regarding the judicial proceeding processed under number 10-000275-1028-CA, it warns that it is an ordinary proceeding within which the State has partially paid fees and interest to the registered owners of the property, but that it has not been possible to take definitive possession of the property until the entire debt is paid. It also indicated that in the present matter, there is a lack of passive standing regarding the action filed against the State, given that the lawsuit’s core is against INDER and CONAI, which are entities with their own legal personality, and at the same time those designated by the legislator to carry out the studies and appraisals of the lands within the reserve of interest that are occupied by non-indigenous third parties.-
VI.Regarding the defense arguments made by the representation of CONAI. For its part, the representation of CONAI indicated in defense of said organization that although it is true that the reserve of interest is the property or belonging of the indigenous community Nombre128202, it is occupied by third parties who are not part of said group, despite having been urging different governments for several years to comply with the provisions of the Ley Indígena. That its legal obligations towards communities like the plaintiff are limited to carrying out coordination tasks as defined by the Procuraduría General de la República, once it was consulted on the matter in due time, and that it is not CONAI, but rather the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, which is responsible for acquiring real property owned by private individuals within indigenous reserves, an institute which, it warns, does not have an available budget or technical elements to carry out these tasks. In sum, it rejected that any responsibility in this matter be attributed to CONAI, since it has never failed to fulfill its legal duties.-
VII.Regarding the defense arguments made by the representation of INDER. In defense of the institutional interests of INDER, its representation indicated that although it is true that, according to the Ley Indígena, it is responsible for the obligation to expropriate and compensate non-indigenous occupants of the reserves when appropriate, this is to be done in coordination with CONAI. That it is important to take into account that INDER has not had the necessary financial resources from the State to fulfill this obligation, and has therefore found itself unable to execute what is required. It then refers to some initiatives or proposals that have been raised at the institutional level to solve this problem, such as a bill it identified as “Ley de Financiación para la Recuperación de Territorios Indígenas” which it affirmed was presented to the indigenous communities. It does not indicate when this occurred or the fate of such bill.
It also indicated that they would have drafted a “Manual para la Adquisición y Traspaso de Tierras en Territorios indígenas al amparo del artículo cinco de la Ley Indígena 6172”, which was first approved by the Board of Directors in the year two thousand eight -one must understand, that of INDER- and later repealed by it in the year two thousand nine, thus preventing its application. It indicates that there is no regulatory body governing the form and procedure to be followed for determining which possessor or titleholder is non-indigenous within those areas in the reserves, and whether they are in good faith or not, as well as in which public authority the competence for such determination should reside. It reinforces its statements on the occasion of what it identifies as a ruling by the Constitutional Chamber, according to which it was indicated that the determination of who has better right by virtue of being the titleholder of areas presumably part of these reserves must be made in the judicial venue through an ordinary proceeding; therefore, the corresponding determination corresponds to a judge and not to INDER.
Added to the foregoing is that it does not consider that these functions correspond to INDER, as such activities do not form part of its ordinary functions, whereas, in its view, they do correspond to CONAI, in conjunction with the indigenous associations. It was added that another circumstance that has prevented them from proceeding accordingly is the financial aspect, given that despite Article 5 of the Ley Indígena providing that these tasks would be carried out with a budget of one hundred million colones, to be transferred in installments of twenty-five million each in the years nineteen seventy-nine to nineteen eighty-two, *“The reality is that said provision was never executed by the State; which has caused severe delays in the processing of said procedures; due to lacking the financial resources for the payment of compensations, execution has become impossible...”*. Continuing on this point, it noted that the law has not designed any alternative for there to be a budget line within the institutional budget for the payment of those lands, consequently lacking legal authorization to disburse funds for these purposes, despite the provisions of Ley 2825, under penalty of incurring the cause of liability provided for in the Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos in its Article 110, subparagraph e).
Regarding the fact that the plaintiff party related as the omission by INDER and CONAI to carry out studies and procedures to identify non-indigenous people in the reserves, under the terms referred to in Article 5 of the Ley Indígena, it reiterated what was related previously, concerning a bill and a Manual that the co-defendant institution attempted to put into effect and operation. Regarding the judicial proceeding processed under judicial case file number 86-000826-0178-CA, it indicated that it is a matter that has been adjudicated with the character of material res judicata and that regarding new invaders who have encroached upon the lands that were the subject of discussion in that proceeding, it has been the same plaintiff indigenous association that has shown passivity in the face of these incursions into its reserve.-
VIII.Regarding the position of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Nombre128203 de Talamanca. In its answering brief to the lawsuit, the representation of the co-defendant indigenous association fully accepted the facts, notwithstanding it warns that it leaves them subject to whatever is derived from the evidence in contradiction to the foregoing.-
He added, stating that he approves the claims made by the plaintiff, and that the Sibujú Norte territory indeed, first, does not belong to the indigenous community Nombre128203 and second, that it belongs to the Nombre128202, so they do not oppose the recovery of that territory by those bringing the action.
IX.On the object of the present proceeding (claims). This Court considers it necessary, before entering into considerations on the merits, to make a series of reflections that help to clarify what the object of the present proceeding is. As reflected in the record of the present case, in view of folios 691 to 693 of the main case file, in relation to the electronic record of the single hearing, which was held again on the twenty-fourth of June, two thousand thirteen, with the participation of the parties involved in the procedural legal relationship and in conjunction with the parties, particularly the plaintiff, a single list of claims for the proceeding was determined, so that for all purposes they shall be as follows: *"1. That it be declared that my represented party is the registered owner, and the Nombre128202 people are the proprietor, of the Property described in Executive Decree No. 29448-G of March 21, 2001 ("Reserva – Tenorio- Indígena Nombre128202 de Talamanca). 2.
That the Agricultural Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) and the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI) be ordered to carry out the studies and appraisals on the lands occupied by non-indigenous persons within that indigenous territory: a) Order them that the studies must determine which of those persons must be compensated and which have no right to such; b) Order them that the appraisals be carried out on the lands that must be compensated, taking into consideration the possible variations that could occur due to potential delays in the processes being processed for compensation; c) Order them to begin the studies and appraisals no more than one month after the judgment becomes final, and to have concluded them no more than four months after that finality. 3. That the State, the Agricultural Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario), and the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, CONAI) be ordered to immediately initiate, once the cited studies and appraisals have been carried out, the procedures for compensation (including possible expropriations) of the possessors or proprietors who have a right to it, and to pay -no more than one month after the judgment so ordering- the corresponding compensation. 4.
That my represented party be ordered to be placed in possession of each of the farms, parcels, or areas that make up our territory each time any of the current occupants are evicted or compensated in accordance with the provisions of the Expropriation Law (Ley de Expropiaciones); 5. In the case of the Indigenous Reserve Sibujú Norte (which is the aforementioned Nombre128202 indigenous territory), if placing my represented party in possession requires payment of the compensation ordered in the proceeding being processed in (sic) the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), under case file 86-000826-0178-CA, order the State to proceed with its payment no more than one month after the judgment becomes final. 6. That the defendants be ordered to jointly and severally pay the costs of this action."* That said, the action is formulated for trial to discuss the identity of the titleholder of a real property, identified as the Property described in Executive Decree No. 29448-G of March twenty-first, two thousand one.
This claim is of a purely declaratory nature as far as can be observed. Then, a series of petitionary points were formulated, all aimed at ordering the defendant public authorities to perform an action—that is, to deploy some conduct that, in the plaintiff's view, is imposed by the legal system but has not yet been executed by the defendants. This speaks to a split in the action: claims aimed at declaring an unlawful omission by all the defendant Public Administrations, and then ordering them to adopt the conduct demanded by the legal system instead. It concerns an alleged omission constituted by the actions referred to in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), which, while required to be executed by the defendants, is directed at defending the property right of the indigenous community, in this case, the Nombre128202. Finally, a claim was included linked to the possibility that, before ordering that the plaintiff community be placed in possession of specific areas of its territory, the State must pay the money it was ordered to pay in a judgment issued with the authority of material res judicata, within another plenary judicial proceeding distinct from the one at hand.
Thus, it seeks to order in the present case the party that lost in that judicial proceeding to execute that which it was ordered to do therein. In the terms that will be stated, and according to which, in this Court's view, there is no interest in addressing issues concerning which there is no conflict to resolve—such as that relating to the ownership of the Nombre128202 indigenous reserve—this action fundamentally proposes a claim based on an omission inconsistent with the legal system, as derived from the theory of the case presented by the plaintiff. Moreover, the last of the claims is autonomous and, as will be seen, sterile.
X.On the legal protection regime for indigenous territories and the identity of the one belonging to the Nombre128202 indigenous community. Being essential for the analysis to be carried out to resolve the present matter, we proceed to address the legal protection regime for indigenous reserves, particularly as regards Article 5 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), as well as the regulation defining the location of the indigenous reserve owned by the plaintiffs.
Well, despite what the legal system at that time clearly regulated regarding the property rights of these communities in the stated terms, with the adoption and entry into force of Law No. 2825, the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), of May fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one (1961), published in the Collection of Laws and Decrees of that year in its second semester, first volume, page three hundred ninety-four, which repealed the Law on Uncultivated Lands (Ley de Terrenos Baldíos), it was provided in its Article 75, in gross contravention of Convention No. 107 of the International Labour Organization, as follows, regarding the entity that this regulatory body identified as the Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización): “The Institute, in agreement with the pertinent bodies, shall ensure the conditioning of indigenous communities or families, in accordance with the spirit of this law.
It shall not be declared that the extensive zones where these communities live in isolation belong exclusively to them, but an attempt shall be made to bring all these communities together, forming a single agrarian center, in the zone that the Institute deems appropriate and for which the necessary area of land shall be used.” The rule refers to what was formerly known as ITCO (1961), later IDA, the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, 1982), and currently INDER, the Institute of Rural Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, 2012). The cited rule simply and outrightly disregarded the property right of indigenous communities enshrined in a norm of superior rank, force, and endurance. Subsequently, and more than a decade later, with this unsystematic regulation in force, Law No. 5251, the Law Creating the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs (Ley de Creación de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas), was enacted on July eleventh, nineteen seventy-three (1973), published in the Collection of Laws and Decrees of the same year in its second semester, first volume, page sixty-five.
Looking at this regulatory body, bearing in mind the commitment that resided with the State from the entry into force of Convention No. 107 of the International Labour Organization in its articles 2.1, 5, 11, and 13.2, this new internal public organization linked to indigenous communities, according to Article 4 of the mentioned law, was designated by the legislator, for general purposes and in what is relevant, to: “…b) Serve as a coordination instrument (instrumento de coordinación) between the different public institutions obligated to execute works and provide services for the benefit of indigenous communities; (…) e) Ensure respect for the rights of indigenous minorities, stimulating the action of the State in order to guarantee the individual and collective ownership of land (propiedad individual y colectiva de la tierra) to the indigenous person; the timely use of credit; adequate marketing of production; and efficient technical assistance; (…)” (The bolding and underlining are not from the original).
Even so, as will be seen below, these coordination tasks were not designated exclusively to CONAI, since ITCO was already linked to this function, albeit in a different way. Furthermore, the State's obligation to guarantee the property rights of these communities over the land was reiterated. Regarding these assigned coordination tasks, Article 9 of the same legal body cannot be overlooked, which reads as follows: “For the purposes of subsection b) of Article 8, the State, autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions of the country are empowered to provide assistance of any kind to the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs” (The bolding is not from the original). A separate point is that this law contemplated – again in an unsystematic manner – a single transitional provision, apparently inspired by the Land and Colonization Law, which stated: “No later than six months following the effective date of this law, the Institute of Lands and Colonization shall proceed to undertake possessory information proceedings (informaciones posesorias) for all parcels occupied by indigenous people in the different zones, in order to register them immediately in the Property Registry (Registro de la Propiedad) in the name of the occupants of said parcels.
Indigenous persons who are not occupying parcels must be registered in a census to resolve the problem of lack of land as soon as possible. The Institute of Lands and Colonization must maintain a considerable reserve of land suitable for cultivation, which it shall lease; and which shall be destined exclusively for future expansions of indigenous communities” (the bolding is not from the original), which speaks – it is insisted – of a dispossession of the tenure of those lands contrary to what was established by international law. On the other hand, in what could be considered to constitute some aspect favorable to indigenous interests, it was indicated that from the enactment of that law, it was that Institute that would have had to provide at least sufficient land to be destined exclusively to these communities, as well as, as a logical and necessary consequence of that attribution-duty, to have undertaken the pertinent tasks to determine and clearly define the limitation or boundary (deslinde) of the lands that would comprise those territories.
One year after its entry into force, this transitional provision was reformed according to Article 1 of Law No. 5651 of December thirteenth, nineteen seventy-four (1974), in the following terms and with absolute disregard for indigenous property guaranteed by Convention No. 107 of the International Labour Organization: “Transitional Provision.- The indigenous reserves (reservas indígenas) registered in the name of the Institute of Lands and Colonization (ITCO) are declared inalienable, which shall be destined exclusively for the settlement of indigenous communities, indispensable public services, and for the use, habitation, and usufruct (uso, habitación y usufructo) of the aborigines who lack lands of their own property, registered or unregistered outside of those reserves. In these, ITCO may grant leases to said aborigines, for a limited and non-transferable term, except to other aborigines who are in the same conditions.
The National Banking System and other State institutions, jointly with the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs (CONAI), shall regulate special systems so that members of aboriginal communities may obtain credit for the adequate exploitation of the lands referred to in this transitional provision.” It is reiterated that ITCO had to then delimit and register, even if in its own name, the corresponding land areas. The foregoing entailed the full disregard of indigenous property that the State would have committed to guarantee before the international community and these peoples. Turning again to the original text of Law No. 5251 creating the National Commission on Indigenous Affairs, said organization, according to its first article, was endowed with its own legal personality and assets (personería jurídica y patrimonio propios). It is highlighted that the Commission, since its creation – and in that respect, its general assembly – was composed, among others, according to its Article 2, subsection a), by: "… the representatives of the following dependencies and institutions: Presidency of the Republic (Presidencia de la República); University of Costa Rica; National University; Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública); Ministry of Governance and Police (Ministerio de Gobernación y Policía); Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports (Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes); Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud); Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería); Ministry of Public Security (Ministerio de Seguridad Pública); Joint Institute of Social Assistance; Institute of Lands and Colonization; National Service of Aqueducts and Sewers; National Institute of Housing and Urbanism; National Institute of Apprenticeship; and National Electricity Service; (…)” (The bolding is not from the original).
The foregoing accounts for the necessary link that had to exist between the Central Government and, among other entities, the same ITCO, this, until the issuance of Constitutional Chamber judgment No. 3485-2003, at fourteen hours seventeen minutes on May two, two thousand three, a ruling whose content we do not analyze, it being sufficient to indicate that it deemed unconstitutional that the commission be composed of such public authorities. It must be noted that the institutions and Ministries referred to formed part of the general assembly of CONAI, with powers to set its general policy acting as components of said collegiate body, as well as to approve or disapprove its ordinary and extraordinary budget. The purpose of this organization is reiterated due to its relevance; it was, among other things and as noted, to serve as an instrument of inter-institutional coordination, as well as to ensure respect for the rights of indigenous minorities, stimulating the action of the State in order to guarantee the indigenous person individual property and, to their community, the property of their territories, as stated in Article 4, subsection e) of said legal body.
Regarding CONAI's assets, they were to be constituted, as of the date it began operations, by the annual subvention that had been given in the Ordinary General Budget Law of the Republic to the former Board for the Protection of Aboriginal Races; the extraordinary contributions agreed upon by the State and autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions of the Republic; the assets belonging to the former Board; donations from private individuals, foreign States, international agencies and foundations, or any other entity; the use of indigenous names, symbols, and figures; and the amount of the rights granted for the commercial use of those indigenous names, symbols, and figures (Article 8, subsection a) of the Law Creating CONAI). Still regarding budgetary matters, Article 9 of this law provided that the State and autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions of the Republic would be authorized to provide assistance of any kind to CONAI, naturally, for the achievement of its purposes.
On the other hand, and always along this same line of thought, in its Article 28, the law in question indicated that: “So that the Executive Branch may be in a position to set, in the General Budget Law of the Republic bill, the subvention it sees fit, no later than July 31 of each year, the Board of Directors shall submit to the Planning Office of the Presidency of the Republic a reasoned estimate of its needs for the next fiscal period. It is understood that this provision does not apply for the 1973 fiscal period. Likewise, the Institution's budgets shall be submitted to the Comptroller General of the Republic for approval and settlement according to the law.” (The bolding is not from the original). The indigenous reserve Nombre128202 was first described in the terms of Executive Decree No. 5904 (Decreto Ejecutivo número 5904) of March eleventh, nineteen seventy-six, published in the Official Journal “La Gaceta” number seventy, of April tenth, nineteen seventy-six (1976).
In this regulatory instrument, the following, among other things, was declared: “Considering: (…) 5°- That there still exist territories populated exclusively by indigenous people, making possible the delimitation (delimitación) of said Reserves; (…) 10.- That it is the duty of the State to watch over the safety of its citizens, and prevent injustices and mistreatment, especially in the case of currently marginalized indigenous minorities” (The bolding and underlining are not from the original). Furthermore, its first article ordered that: “Its exact delimitation shall be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI.” Thus, to the then-called Institute of Lands and Colonization (today INDER) its designation is reiterated as the body that would be in charge of the territorial demarcation (demarcación territorial) of the reserve so created, a task that was to begin two months after the Decree came into effect.
(Among these reserves, that of Talamanca was already identified with the terms of the above-cited Executive Decree No. 5904 of March eleventh, nineteen seventy-six). Additionally, according to Articles 14 and 15 of the Decree under analysis, it was expressed by the Executive Branch that what was regulated by that means is of public interest, as well as that CONAI would have the duty to prepare a census of the indigenous population of Costa Rica as soon as possible, which must also be permanently updated. Well, with the land owned by these communities recognized in the manner indicated, just over a year later, the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena), No. 6172 of November twenty-ninth, nineteen seventy-seven (1977), was enacted, which according to its Article 11 repealed any prior law to the extent it opposed it. On this occasion, and without prejudice to what the legislator enacted on the occasion of the entry into force of the Land and Colonization Law, which would have been, in its unsystematic nature, deemed repealed, it was provided, according to the first article in relation to Article 2 of this supervening legal body – now, indeed, in accordance with the provisions of International Labour Organization Convention 107 concerning the Protection of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples – that the indigenous reserves are the property of those communities and that they shall all be registered in the National Registry (Registro Nacional) in their name, no longer in that of ITCO.
Likewise, it was established that the boundaries of those territories, once “recognized” by the State, cannot be varied by decreasing their area except by a law of the Republic. Furthermore, it was noted that these communities would have full legal capacity to act and that they would not be considered state entities (Article 4 of the law speaks of the Boards of Directors, administrators, and representatives of these communities). In addition, it is reiterated that these are inalienable and imprescriptible territories, non-transferable and exclusive to the indigenous communities that inhabit them, it not being permitted for non-indigenous persons to rent, lease, buy, or in any other way acquire lands or farms comprised within these reserves, with any transfer or negotiation of lands or their improvements in the indigenous reserves, between indigenous and non-indigenous persons, being absolutely null, with the legal consequences of the case.
As a separate note, according to the regulation to the Indigenous Law, Executive Decree No. 8487, of April twenty-sixth, nineteen seventy-eight, published in the Official Journal “La Gaceta” number 89, of May tenth, nineteen seventy-eight, in its Article 3, it was indicated that: “For the exercise of the rights and fulfillment of the obligations referred to in Article 2 of the Indigenous Law, the Indigenous Communities shall adopt the organization provided for in Law No. 3859 of the National Directorate of Community Development Associations (Dirección Nacional de Asociaciones de Desarrollo de la Comunidad) and its Regulation.” Meanwhile, Article 10 of the same regulation indicated that: “To guarantee the rights regulated in Articles 3 and 5 of the Law, the President of the Comprehensive Development Association (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral) shall appear, by himself or through his attorney-in-fact or Delegate, as soon as possible after the infraction has occurred, accompanying the certification where the registration of the Reserve appears, to initiate, before the competent official, the corresponding legal action.” Subsequently, according to Executive Decree No. 13568 of April 30, 1982, published in the Official Journal “La Gaceta” number 94 of May seventeenth, nineteen eighty-two, it was provided in its first article that the Comprehensive Development Associations hold the legal representation of the Indigenous Communities and act as their local government.
In reinforcement of all the foregoing, on the third of November of nineteen ninety-two (<span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">1992</span>), Law number 7316 was enacted, published in Official Gazette “La Gaceta” number 234, of the fourth of December of nineteen ninety-two, <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“</span> <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">”</span> of the International Labour Organization, pursuant to which the subject of indigenous property is specifically regulated. In its article 2.1, this instrument reads as follows: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“Governments shall have the responsibility for developing, with the participation of the peoples concerned, co-ordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee respect for their integrity”</span>.
For its part, subsection 2) of the same numeral indicates: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“2. Such action shall include measures for: (a) ensuring that members of these peoples benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population; (b) promoting the full realisation of the social, economic and cultural rights of these peoples with respect for their social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions and their institutions; (c) assisting the members of the peoples concerned to eliminate socio-economic gaps that may exist between indigenous and other members of the national community, in a manner compatible with their aspirations and ways of life”</span>. Other numerals of the convention that are of interest, we proceed to cite; its article 3 says as follows: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“Article 3.- 1.
Indigenous and tribal peoples shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental freedoms without hindrance or discrimination. The provisions of the Convention shall be applied without discrimination to male and female members of these peoples; 2. No form of force or coercion shall be used in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples concerned, including the rights contained in this Convention”</span>. Its numeral 4, which on the part of the State: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“1. Special measures shall be adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned. 2. Such special measures shall not be contrary to the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. 3. Enjoyment of the general rights of citizenship, without discrimination, shall not be prejudiced in any way by such special measures”</span>.
Article 5 indicates that governments: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“In applying the provisions of this Convention: (a) the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognised and protected, and due account shall be taken of the nature of the problems which face them both as groups and as individuals; (b) the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these peoples shall be respected; (c) policies aimed at mitigating the difficulties experienced by these peoples in facing new conditions of life and work shall be adopted, with the participation and co-operation of the peoples affected”.</span> The subject of the property of these groups over the areas that comprise their territories was specifically contemplated in this convention, and in this vein, its article 13 indicates as follows: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“1.
In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention, governments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">their relationship with the lands or territories, or both</span> <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship. 2. The use of the term 'lands' in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use”</span>. (The highlighting is not from the original). Article 14, subsection 2), reads: <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">“2.
Governments shall take steps as necessary to</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">, and to</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; font-style:italic">. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned”</span>.-
In this regulatory instrument, the following was declared regarding the situation these communities were considered to be experiencing and the circumstances that would have justified their protection at that point: *"Whereas: 1°- That the indigenous population of Costa Rica is seriously threatened in its existence by a continuous and arbitrary dispossession of their lands (despojo continuo y arbitrario de sus tierras) and that this phenomenon has alarmingly intensified in recent years, reaching acts of violence; 2°- That the dispossession was made possible by the fact that the indigenous people have no legal backing for ownership of the lands they have occupied since time immemorial (no tienen ningún respaldo legal de propiedad de las tierras que ellos ocupan desde tiempos inmemoriales); 3°- That furthermore, the indigenous people have demonstrated an inability to contain the invasion of their lands by themselves (han demostrado no poder contener por sí solos la invasión de sus tierras); 4°- That for the foregoing reasons, the indigenous people have been requesting (han venido solicitando) for a long time the creation or legalization of inalienable Reserves and the recognition of their right to the guarantee of land (el reconocimiento de su derecho a la garantía de la tierra); 5°- That territories populated exclusively by indigenous people still exist, making the delimitation of said Reserves possible; 6°- That the Culture and social organization of indigenous people are profoundly different from those of non-indigenous people, and therefore deserve to be supported; 7°- That the agricultural methods of indigenous people are less destructive to the forests than those of non-indigenous people, thus allowing better protection of watersheds, especially in areas of rugged topography; and that, furthermore, it is the State's obligation to ensure that lands with forestry vocation always remain with their forest cover (cobertura boscosa); 8°- That indigenous people are ruthlessly exploited and driven to alcoholism by the small grocery stores (pulperías) and bars (cantinas), respectively, established for that purpose in their territories by non-indigenous people; 9°- The development of the South Pacific zone had the disastrous consequence of the almost total spoliation of the indigenous people, due to a lack of adequate legislation and measures.
The same is currently happening with the indigenous zones of the Atlantic region and of Coto Brus where not even legislation on the matter exists; 10.- That it is the duty of the State (es deber del Estado) to watch over the security of its citizens, and to prevent injustices and mistreatment, especially in the case of currently marginalized indigenous minorities (minorías indígenas actualmente marginadas)"*. (The highlighting and underlining are not from the original). On this occasion, the Executive Branch not only recognizes and declares the circumstances in which these particular groups of the national population find themselves in relation to the exercise of their rights, but also determines, in accordance with its first article, the extensions of land that would correspond to the Talamanca indigenous reserve and orders that: *"Its exact delimitation shall be carried out by ITCO, in coordination with CONAI"*.
Thus, the then-named Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización) (today INDER) is reiterated its designation as the body that would be in charge of the territorial demarcation of the reserve thus created, a task that was to begin two months after the Decree came into force. (Among these reserves, that of Talamanca was already identified under the terms of the above-cited Executive Decree number 5904 of March eleventh, nineteen seventy-six). Said act of the Executive Branch also provided that any institution, public or private, could provide assistance to ITCO for these purposes. A rule was also included in the cited Decree in its Article 4, which, contrary to what was regulated in the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), but in accordance with the provisions of Convention number 107 of the International Labor Organization, ordered as follows: *"Declare the reserves mentioned in Article 1 of this decree as the property of the indigenous communities (propiedad de las comunidades indígenas).
The State recognizes the existence and legal personality of these communities. The Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) shall register these Reserves in the Public Registry."* (The underlining is not from the original). Article 6 of the same Decree again classified these lands as inalienable, non-transferable, and exclusive for indigenous people, and its Article 5 indicated that: *"The reserves shall be administered by the indigenous people in their traditional or modern community structures, under the coordination and advisement of CONAI (coordinación y asesoría de la CONAI)"*. Due to its relevance, note the text of Article 8 of this Executive Decree: *"Article 8.- In the event that non-indigenous persons have acquired ownership or are in legal possession, or are precarious possessors of farms or lands enclaved within the reserves, at the time this Decree comes into force, they shall be expropriated and compensated (expropiados e indemnizados) in accordance with the procedures established in Law No. 2825 of October 14, 1961 and its amendments…"*.
(The highlighting is not from the original). The regulation referred to in this article of the Executive Decree is the Land and Colonization Law. Furthermore, in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of the Decree under analysis, the Executive Branch expressed that what was regulated in this manner is of public interest, as well as that CONAI would have the duty to prepare a census of the indigenous population of Costa Rica as soon as possible, which must also be permanently updated. The norms of the Executive Decree under study were later modified on the occasion of the entry into force of Executive Decree number 6036, of May twenty-sixth, nineteen seventy-six (1976), published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number one hundred thirteen, of June twelfth, nineteen seventy-six, which reformed the boundaries of the Chirripó, Guaymi de Coto Brus, La Estrella, and Talamanca Indigenous Reserves, and proceeded with the recognition of the Telire Reserve.
Regarding what is of interest, Article 13 of this new decree indicated: *"Article 13.- In the expropriation process for lands enclaved in the Reserves (Article 8 of Decree No. 5904-G), only works or investments that have truly been useful or represent some permanent economic activity shall be recognized as 'improvements' (mejoras). Abusive deforestation, leading to soil erosion, as well as hoarded lands and those abandoned for more than three (3) years at the time this decree comes into force, shall not be compensated (indemnizados)."* (The highlighting is not from the original). Subsequently, by Executive Decree number 7268 of August ninth, nineteen seventy-seven (1977), published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number one hundred fifty-seven of August twentieth of the same year, it was provided, in more legally appropriate terms, the "recognition" of ownership over the indigenous territory and its delimitation, in which those of Sibujú Norte, Chase, and Alto Pacuare were identified, which, according to Article 3 of said instrument, all formed an integral part of the Talamanca Indigenous Reserve and would be registered in the Property Registry, despite constituting a unit, in separate properties.
The reference to the Land and Colonization Law regarding expropriations, while not indicating anything about the public authority that would be responsible for carrying them out, suggests that although it was the exclusive obligation of the State, it would reside with ITCO, in coordination with CONAI. Currently, the indigenous reserve Nombre128202 is described in terms of its location—on the cartographic sheets of the National Geographic Institute (IGN)—and boundaries, under the terms of the information contained in Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one, but the tasks corresponding to determining its registry situation, nor its physical demarcation, have not been carried out, despite the passage of decades since these tasks were and are an obligation of the State, in conjunction with what is now INDER and CONAI in this matter.-
XI.Regarding the claim seeking a declaration that the plaintiff association is the registered owner, and the people of Nombre128202 the owner, of the Property described in Executive Decree number 29448-G of March twenty-first, two thousand one. This petitionary claim deserves separate consideration in the terms to be stated. Regarding the claim seeking a declaration that the plaintiff association is the registered owner, and the people of Nombre128202 the owner of the Property described in Executive Decree number 29448-G of March twenty-first, two thousand one, there is clearly a lack of current interest that renders this claim inadmissible, as is hereby ordered. On this matter, and since none of the defendant parties invoked such a defense as an exception, it must be noted that the jurisprudence emanating from the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, within which, by way of example, is judgment number 2008-000317 of nine hours ten minutes on May second, two thousand eight, has characterized this exception as one directed at verifying a material prerequisite of the jurisdictional action.
Thus, for a lawsuit to succeed, independent of other aspects such as procedural capacity, jurisdiction, and compliance with the respective requirements in the complaint, a sua sponte (oficiosamente) review must also be conducted to determine whether material prerequisites such as the right, legal standing, and of course, the current interest, are present. If any—or all—of these prerequisites are absent, the lawsuit could not receive a positive response. In the case of lack of current interest, it is an exception, subject to analysis at the time of issuing the judgment, which supposes that regardless of the merits of the claim, the claim is not susceptible to being granted because there is a different but legally relevant reason that imposes this. The current interest is closely related to the possibility that the ruling may act upon reality, whether by innovating or preserving a determined legal situation, which is closely linked to the object of the process understood as the claims.
To say that there is a current interest in ruling on the substantive right is nothing other than speaking of the need to provide jurisdictional protection—in this case, in accordance with Article 49 of the Constitution—to the person who claims to be affected in their subjective rights and/or legitimate interests, regarding an administrative conduct for which they request the intervention of the respective jurisdictional body. The purpose of that intervention is to resolve the legal conflict of which one is a part (right of action) when the judgment proves useful for the holder of that subjective right or legitimate interest. This implies that the adjudicator has the duty to make a judgment of "utility" in view of the claim formulated and the factual circumstances under which the action is erected (grounds for the claim), comparing the effects of the requested jurisdictional resolution precisely with the framework of utility that such a pronouncement would provide in favor of the plaintiff.
It is a prospective analysis that weighs whether the favorable judgment would produce any effect on the person who requested the protection of their legal situation. Thus, there is no current interest if, even by granting the request, the judgment does not have the virtue of causing such an effect on the plaintiff's legal situation, thereby rendering the ruling sterile. (See also the related Judgment of the First Chamber, number 465-2009 of ten hours forty-five minutes on May seventh, two thousand nine). Hence, an exercise of objective control of legality for legality's sake lacks all relevant benefit or utility. (See doctrine derived from Article 10 of the Code of Administrative Litigation Procedure). Having stated the foregoing in different terms, if one considers that the exercise of the action to review the legality of administrative conduct is of a subjective nature, insofar as it presupposes the existence of a person with standing as a result of being the holder of a relevant interest to obtain a pronouncement that benefits them in their legal sphere—without a purely objective review of legality for legality's sake regarding administrative acts being possible, it is insisted—there is an absence of that current interest when the effect of the judgment would not alter, in any way—for the purposes of an effect-based phenomenon—the state of things.
For the case at hand, the representation of the plaintiff association must bear in mind that the judgment that could uphold the claim under analysis, insofar as it seeks to declare it the owner of the Nombre128202 Indigenous Reserve, is clearly sterile and unnecessary, given that, according to the very factual framework outlined in its action, nothing suggests the existence of any conflict between it and the defendant public authorities, as well as in relation to the association that was joined to the litigation—even though the grounds for the claim do not describe any fact whatsoever indicating the contrary—regarding the superior right of ownership over the territories that constitute said reserve. Quite the contrary, it is a settled issue between the parties that, under the specific legal regime applicable to these particular assets, it is by executive decree that the location of the reserves is recognized and that for this specific case, it has currently been done so by the Executive Branch according to the cartographic sheets of the IGN, under the terms of the information contained in Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one.
On the other hand, if it concerns the exclusive participation of the Nombre128203 indigenous community, it can be said that it was under the same Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one, that any matter related to the former right they held was peacefully resolved between both communities, without any pronouncement being required to innovate where the reality is that no act or conduct by that community has since been affecting the superior right of the plaintiff indigenous community, as will be seen.-
XII.Regarding the lawsuit, to the extent that the Comprehensive Development Association of the Nombre128203 Indigenous Reserve of Talamanca was joined to the litigation. The parties must refer to the content expressed in the preceding whereas clause, in relation to what was indicated in section IX of this judgment. The Talamanca Indigenous Reserve is currently legally constituted under Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, an instrument by which the overlap that at some historical moment existed between the land areas comprising the indigenous reserve of the plaintiff party and that which formerly was recognized as property of the population of the Nombre128203 community was eliminated, as can indeed be extracted from the plaintiff party's own statements in its complaint filings, according to which it is clear that it was never its intention to sue that community—as there is no property conflict against it.
Thus, it has been established as proven that through Executive Decree number 29448 dated March twenty-first, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number 93 of May sixteenth, two thousand one, the Executive Branch ordered, on the occasion of a partial overlap existing between the reserve Nombre128202 and what was called Sibujú Norte, given in its time to the Nombre128203 community, to merge both reserves into a single delimitation, considering in turn the areas decreed as indigenous reserves, together constituting the Nombre128202 Indigenous Reserve. Apparently, the problem arises for strictly registry purposes, which are of no kind of interest in the present case and are a matter foreign to it, where at no level does this circumstance constitute a ground for the claim formulated by the plaintiff party. This being so, there is equally a clear lack of interest in what the lawsuit was understood to be by the Sixth Section (Sección Sexta) of this Court at the time, and consequently, the lawsuit is declared inadmissible insofar as it was understood to be directed against the Comprehensive Development Association of the Nombre128203 Indigenous Reserve.-
XIII.Regarding the admissibility or not of claims numbered 2 through 4, related to an omissive conduct in which the defendant public authorities allegedly incurred, regarding compliance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law (Ley Indígena). What is claimed in this regard is the core object of the action, as this Court has understood it. The plaintiff party, in what is relevant, has alleged the non-observance of numeral 5 of the Indigenous Law, which provides: *"Article 5.- In the case of non-indigenous persons who are owners or possessors in good faith within the indigenous reserves, ITCO must relocate them to other similar lands, should they so desire; if it is not possible to relocate them or if they do not accept the relocation, it must expropriate and compensate them in accordance with the procedures established in the Expropriation Law (Ley de Expropiaciones). / The studies and proceedings for expropriation and compensation (expropiación e indemnización) shall be carried out by ITCO in coordination with CONAI. / If there is subsequently an invasion of non-indigenous persons into the reserves, the competent authorities must immediately proceed with their eviction (desalojo), without payment of any compensation. / The expropriations and compensations shall be financed with a contribution of one hundred million colones in cash, to be allocated through four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982.
The fund shall be administered by CONAI, under the supervision of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República)."*. Thus, the failure to comply with this norm must correspond to the omission alleged in the case. In support of its action, the plaintiff claims that despite having been recognized as the holder of its territory, which according to its statement is described in cadastral map number L-118495-1993, these lands are invaded by more than one thousand hectares without the defendant institutions having yet carried out the studies and proceedings established in Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, in order to conclude the expropriation, compensation, and/or eviction of the non-indigenous occupants found within its territory. Regarding the State, it alleged that the State has not provided a budget to the corresponding institutions, nor have these institutions made the necessary efforts to proceed in accordance with the studies of occupants, expropriations, and evictions within those territories (see particularly the petitionary claim identified as number 3).-
Thus, as the claims of the lawsuit were adjusted, the plaintiff aspires that, based on an omissive conduct adopted in discordance with the legal system, the judgment orders the following: "...2. Order the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas to carry out the studies and appraisals on the lands occupied by non-indigenous persons within this indigenous territory: a) Order them that the studies must determine which of these persons must be indemnified and which have no right to that; b) Order them that the appraisals be carried out on the lands that must be indemnified, considering the possible variations that could occur due to eventual delays in the processes being processed for the indemnification; c) Order them to begin the studies and appraisals no later than one month after the judgment becomes final, and to have concluded them no later than four months after that finality. 3.
Order the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas to immediately begin, once the cited studies and appraisals have been completed, the procedures for indemnifications (including possible expropriations) of the possessors or owners who are entitled to them, and to pay -no later than one month after the judgment ordering it- the corresponding indemnifications. 4. Order that my represented party be placed in possession of each one of the farms, parcels, or areas that make up our territory each time any of the current occupants is evicted or indemnified, as established by the Ley de Expropiaciones..." It is the opinion of this Court that, although it is necessary to declare the lawsuit admissible against the three sued public authorities, it cannot be in full accordance with the claims of the lawsuit, as they were formulated by the plaintiff, both situations which we proceed to reason out below.-
1.1.-) On the principle of conventionality control. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted internationally on April 30th, nineteen eighty-two, now Law of the Republic number 7615 of July 24th, nineteen ninety-six, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta" number 164 of August 29th, nineteen ninety-six, it was provided, in what is of interest to us: *"Article 26.- 'Pacta Sunt Servanda'. Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith"*. The foregoing implies the obligation of states to be consistent with the obligations they assume before the international community and, of course, in cases such as those covered in Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization in relation to Convention number 169, "concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries," with indigenous communities, particularly in matters of guarantees regarding the exercise, which must be guaranteed as full, of fundamental rights.
Of course, both article 7 and the doctrine that the Sala Constitucional has forged based on the scope it has given to numeral 48, both of the Constitución Política, are observable in this matter. On another level, for the purpose of the operational aspects or application of these rules, article 27 of this body of international law provides, in relation to domestic law and the observance of treaties, referring to the subscribing States, that: *"A party* *may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty* *This rule is without prejudice to article 46."* This article 46 referred to the effectiveness of the treaty once consented (signed) by the respective delegation, which relates to article 11, on the forms of manifestation of consent to be bound by a treaty, in providing that the signature of the same suffices. In view of this, the delegation of Costa Rica interpreted and expressed that the provision would apply in the case of the Costa Rican State with regard to secondary law, but not to the provisions of the Constitución Política.
All of the foregoing is relevant regarding the development of the principle of conventionality control and what could also be called the principle of intangibility of treaties before the law. From the foregoing, it also follows, under the coverage of the aspiration of every legal system to provide certainty and security, the obligation of direct application of the norms contained in international treaties already ratified and in force in the domestic order, being able, of course, to be legislation invoked by its beneficiary, independently of whether it is another State and in demand of loyalty to the commitments assumed within the framework of relations between the linked nations, without prejudice to the coverage that has also been customarily invoked for the principle in matters of instruments of this type when they regulate human rights matters. The Sala Constitucional in this regard has indicated as follows: *"II.- It is obvious that the petitioner starts from what is provided in article seven of the Constitución Política, in the sense that international treaties and conventions 'have authority superior to laws' (...).
But it must be said that the international Human Rights instruments in force in the Republic, according to the reform of article 48 of the Constitution (Law No. 7128, of August 18, 1989), upon integrating into the legal system at the highest level, that is, at the constitutional level, complement it in what favors the person."* Thus, in synthesis, the recognition of the validity of international norms as a direct source of domestic law is imposed, and in recognition of their location in the matter of the hierarchy of sources. The principle of conventionality control is rooted in the already mentioned article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in relation to articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, without prejudice to the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the latter of which, like many other declarations arising within the United Nations and the Organization of American States, are not subject to ratification by member or signatory States as it is unnecessary.
One could not say otherwise, then, than that the content of these bodies in matters of human rights has enormous interpretative value for all instances in charge of applying the norms that make up the block of legality, and in that sense, also domestic law. It is not superfluous to indicate, in what is relevant to the case at hand, that as follows from article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which refers to the right to property, as it is for every other right recognized in that instrument, the States are committed to securing the universal and *effective* respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of man, which means that the State has the obligation not only to respect those rights and freedoms, but also, the obligation to *ensure* them. This implies that it is the State as a whole, without its internal organization allowing it to claim it has divested itself of its duties, which is required to adopt actions tending toward the effective realization of the objectives pursued by conventions of this type in matters of human rights, without internal law serving as an excuse to fail to comply with what was agreed.
On the importance of bearing in mind what has been said at this point, in what is linked to the defense of the rights of a sector of the population that finds itself in a situation of vulnerability, such as indigenous communities from time immemorial, the Sala Constitucional, in its judgment N° 2253-96 of 3:39 p.m. on May 14, 1996, indicated: *"... There are various legal instruments aimed at promoting that real equality among subjects; among them can be located the particular situation of the aborigines, who have traditionally been marginalized, for historical, social, economic, and cultural reasons. They suffer the consequences of a society that neither understands nor respects their differences; and that, on occasions, tends to see them as beings incapable of directing their own lives and destinies. Faced with that situation, the international community felt the need to adopt measures in favor of indigenous people.
Thus, Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization -ILO-, called 'Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries', incorporated into our legal system through Law No. 7316 of November 3, 1992, established the special protection of indigenous people and their culture."* Conventionality control means that the Judicial Branch of each State and the bodies that make up its structure (and every authority that exercises materially jurisdictional functions, particularly the Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, based on what is provided in article 49 of the Constitution) must apply, interpret, and/or resolve the matters of their competences as legal operators, making the conventional parameter of control prevail, thus constituting international law, in what it regulates in human rights, as what it really is, namely, a guarantee of respect for human rights in the corresponding sphere.
For the rest, it suffices to indicate that according to our Civil Code in its article 5, these international normative bodies are of direct application by the legal operator, forming part of the positive domestic law of the nation, from the moment their incorporation into the block of legality occurs by virtue of the approval of the Asamblea Legislativa and their full publication in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta," so that forming part of the block of legality, this is a parameter of control for this jurisdiction. (Article 6 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública).- 1.2.-) On the omissive conduct in which the State has incurred. Having said all the foregoing, it is considered by the majority of the members of this Court, that the State has not only failed to comply with what is provided in the last paragraph of Article 5 of the Ley Indígena, but also that it involves a qualified and reinforced non-compliance over time, since the legal system imposed on it the specific obligation to endow CONAI with budgetary content so that such resources would be available according to the procedures to be carried out by today's INDER, exclusively for the purpose of expropriating and indemnifying, when appropriate, non-indigenous persons who are occupying or are titleholders, in both cases in good faith, of the lands identified as part of the indigenous reserves.
In the present case, it has been held as proven at a first level, and without prejudice to the fact that the reserve owned by the plaintiff indigenous community dates back decades, in its current dimensions, that the indigenous community here represented is the titleholder of the ownership over the reserve described, as of the adoption by the Executive Branch of Decreto Ejecutivo number 29448 dated March 21st, two thousand one, published in the Official Gazette "La Gaceta," number 93 of May 16th, two thousand one, independently of whether or not it is registered in the name of the plaintiff association representing the community Nombre128202 (which can be consulted on the Web Page of the Judicial Branch, accessing the Sistema Costarricense de Información Jurídica), as well as that since its creation for the first time, according to Decreto Ejecutivo number 5904 of March 11th, nineteen seventy-six, as the Executive Branch itself gave an account of that circumstance since then, there exist non-indigenous persons occupying areas of those that comprise its surface.
On this particular, of relevance were also the declarations that were rendered at trial by the witness Nombre128204, a geographer by profession and an official of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas with twenty-five years of experience that has related him, among others, to the plaintiff indigenous community, as well as Mr. Nombre128205, a member of the Nombre128202 indigenous community, who indicated that he has lived in the indigenous territory of interest since his birth, at least fifty-four years ago. Both witnesses indicated they are aware of the existence of non-indigenous persons who are occupying areas of the reserve in question, without there being any reason that induces this Court to consider that their statements lack credibility. In any case, the existence of non-indigenous persons on these lands and under the said conditions seems to stem from the very recognition of the Executive Branch and the legislator, according to the Ley Indígena itself, as well as particularly, what was expressed by the Executive Branch in Decreto Ejecutivo number 5904 of March 11th, nineteen seventy-six.
Of crucial relevance is the fact that according to the evidence ordered by this judicial authority for better resolution, visible on folios 795 to 198 of the main case file, being a document signed by the person who identifies herself therein as Nombre128164, in her capacity as Director of the Dirección General de Presupuesto Nacional of the Ministerio de Hacienda, it is reported that at no historical moment from the entry into force of the Ley Indígena number 6172 and according to its Article 5, has the Executive Branch included in the Presupuesto General de la República the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash that it should have deposited in four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first with its inclusion in the National Budget Project of the Republic for 1979, to continue in the budgets of 1980, 1981, and 1982 respectively. From this, it follows, according to the majority opinion of the members of this Court, that for the purposes of the Ley Indígena, as well as those of the international conventions signed on the matter, the State illegitimately failed, by omission, to comply with its duty to take effective actions —in this case, a specific and concrete one set by the indicated normative instruments— for the protection of indigenous property over the land.
This concerns an administrative conduct submitted by virtue of the provisions of Article 49 of the Constitution to the legality control residing in this jurisdiction, which, on the other hand, does not grant or confer any margin of discretion upon the Administration obligated to act. At a second level, and despite this being consistent with the understanding of the claim filed against it, the State also failed to prove that, since the entry into force of Indigenous Law No. 6172, it has deployed, within what it is legally enabled to do, any act aimed at directing, coordinating, and/or monitoring, in an orderly and systematic manner, the tasks that, having been imposed upon it by international and domestic law regarding the right of indigenous populations to the integrity of their territories, should have been exercised as appropriate, whether with INDER or with CONAI or any other indirectly linked organization.
See the content of the provisions of Article 26, subsection b), in relation to Article 27, first subsection, both of the General Law of Public Administration, regarding the duty of whoever holds the Presidency of the Republic, autonomously or, as the case may be, jointly with the relevant Minister, to direct and coordinate the tasks of the government and the centralized Public Administration as a whole, as well as the same with respect to the decentralized Public Administration, this, in what would have also been expected, could have been accredited at least regarding the management, in what concerns us, of what is now called the Rural Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Rural), as well as the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs (Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas) in relation to the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202 . Nor was any evidence brought to the process demonstrating that the State had effectively, coordinately, and/or systematically undertaken or procured efforts that could be understood as joint efforts with the National Commission for Indigenous Affairs and the Rural Development Institute aimed at protecting and guaranteeing to the Indigenous Community Nombre128202 the integrity of the territories of which it is the holder.
(All the foregoing according to the case file due to the non-existence of evidentiary material indicating the contrary). These factual circumstances render the omission in which the State has incurred illegitimate, as it constitutes non-compliance with Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in relation to Convention No. 107 of the International Labour Organization and Convention No. 169, "Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries," in what they regulate the duties that the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica must fulfill, which must be associated with the provisions of Article 140, subsection 8) of the Political Constitution. Regarding what corresponds with the last paragraph of Article 5 of the Indigenous Law, which provides that *“…The expropriations and indemnifications shall be financed with the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash, which shall be deposited in four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, the first beginning in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982.
The fund shall be administered by CONAI, under the supervision of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic,”* if the administration of the funds with which CONAI was to be endowed by the Executive Branch was for the purpose of having the necessary resources to proceed with the expropriations and indemnifications whose processing corresponds to INDER, being the prerequisite for this, nothing could be indemnified unless it is done through channels other than those unconditionally provided by the legal system to the Executive Branch, which cannot be protected by the jurisdictional authority in this venue pursuant to Article 49 of the Constitution. This leads to a declaration that the State has indeed incurred in an illegitimate omission, contrary to what is provided and ordered by the legal system. It should be noted that, notwithstanding the estimation that a sum of money similar to that at the end of the seventies could serve the purposes provided for in the law, it is the duty of the Executive Branch to provide the resources required to comply with the cited regulations, and even in the face of the possibility that this economic provision proves insufficient, this circumstance does not vitiate the original obligation only attributable to the State, to provide the resources necessary to fully comply with the provisions of the Indigenous Law and international law.
At the moment when there are no non-indigenous persons to indemnify in the reserves, it is clear to this Court that the norm contained in the numeral —a norm of a programmatic nature— shall lose its validity having already fulfilled the purpose it pursues in that respect. In that eventual state of affairs, it could be affirmed that the exercise by the indigenous communities of the exclusive and exclusionary right of property of which they are the holders is effectively materialized, without prejudice to future vigilance regarding their integrity. As long as this is not the case, it would undoubtedly be a property right that is not full, as it is not being protected by the State, in flagrant violation of the right that assists these communities. This being so, it is reiterated, it is necessary to declare the claim admissible in what was directed against the State, but, in the terms to be set forth below.-
It is estimated that what is sought in ordering INDER to carry out studies and appraisals of the lands occupied by non-indigenous persons in the reserve of interest, as well as regarding indemnifications, becomes premature, given that the reserve itself is not even duly demarcated based on adequate technical information, nor is there any registry or cadastral information, nor are there updated population censuses in concert with the indigenous community Nombre128202 itself that defines in relation to which persons and properties action should be taken accordingly. As has been indicated in this judgment, the prerequisite that the legislature foresaw pursuant to Article 5 of the Ley Indígena for these purposes does not exist either. What pertains to the procedures for indemnification is premature for the same reasons, as is the assignment of deadlines for it. Consequently, the placing of the indigenous community in possession of the lands occupied by non-indigenous persons in its reserve is also premature.
Regarding the deadlines that the plaintiff petitions be provided for the Administration to deploy its activity, these are fleeting and out of step with the reality shown by simple experience. On the other hand, the execution of whatever must be ordered cannot depend exclusively on the good will and obedience of the public authorities, which in this case have historically proven to be illegitimately reluctant, or at least not capable or willing, to execute what is ordered by the legal system in the terms it dictates. Finally, it is considered by the majority of this Chamber that the budgetary capacity—it goes without saying that in this case it has not been proven that the State faces an impossibility to comply with the Ley Indígena in its Article 5—could not legally constitute immunity for the public authority from an express legal mandate, so the historical omission in respect thereof would correspond more than anything else to a deficiency in public management.
On the other hand, there is no legal principle whatsoever that allows for asserting that a governmental decision on how resources are to be allocated to fund public management according to the priorities it defines implies a disapplication of the principle of legality contained in Article 11 of both the Constitución Política and the Ley General de la Administración Pública, when the legislature has not given the Poder Ejecutivo any margin of discretion under the Ley Indígena in the last paragraph of its Article 5. The Poder Ejecutivo should have proceeded in accordance with the aforementioned law as of the year nineteen seventy-nine, so not having done so, neither at that time nor at any other previous time, despite the fact that said rule remains fully in force and so requires it, only leads to the conclusion that it has incurred in an illegitimate omissive conduct, furthermore, qualified and reinforced, because it pertains to a mandatory duty to act that has been maintained for decades even despite the claims and calls of the indigenous peoples themselves, but at the same time framed for the protection of the human rights that, recognized as belonging to these communities, correspond to those that should be guaranteed in the case of population groups traditionally considered vulnerable and neglected for decades, now once again by the public authorities.
Keeping proportions, and accepting that the following assessment is not of a legal nature, the absence of a guarantee of integrity of the communal property right over indigenous territories by the public authorities is, to these indigenous communities, from a sociocultural point of view, what the failure to find a guarantee over the integrity of its territory under the constitution against other nations would be for the Nation itself. Thus, the claim is partially admissible as the majority of this Court understands it, but, not being so in the terms petitioned, instead, the </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">State</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> must be condemned first, as is hereby done, to comply with the provisions of the currently valid Article 5 of the Ley Indígena in its last paragraph, in relation to International Labour Organization Convention No. 107, Law No. 2330 "Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" and "Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries", Law No. 7316, and consequently, it must include in favor of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas in the Draft Law of the National Budget of the Republic, the one hundred million colones that it should have included, in those projects corresponding to the budget periods of nineteen seventy-nine, nineteen eighty, nineteen eighty-one, and nineteen eighty-two.
The inclusion of those funds in the respective project must be carried out in four installments, at current value, and in four consecutive annual budget periods, the first of which must be carried out after the end of the budget period subsequent to the one ongoing at the time this judgment becomes final. The State is ordered to carry out coordinated, systematic, and effective work with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the Indigenous Community Nombre128202, to guarantee the execution of the provisions of Article 5 of the Ley Indígena. At no time may the Presidency of the Republic—without prejudice to the constitutional powers vested in the Contraloría General de la República—disregard the proper use given to that fund in accordance with the Law. The </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">Instituto de Desarrollo Rural</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> is condemned to deploy any necessary action charged to its own budget, so that the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202 is duly demarcated, which must begin within a period of no less than six months from the date this judgment becomes final.
Those tasks must be concluded at least six months after they have begun. The demarcation must include the surveying of maps and any other instrument of that nature, as well as registry studies, necessary for the effective subsequent registry inscription (inscripción registral) of the lands, allowing for the identification of whether there are properties superimposed on the areas comprising the indigenous reserve of interest. These tasks must be carried out with the coordination of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the collaboration of the plaintiff indigenous community, for which purpose, said commission must interact with the indigenous authorities so that no obstacle is generated that hinders the performance of the ordered tasks. The </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> is condemned to deploy any and all necessary activity in direct, intense, and systematic coordination with the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202, and the authorities of the Indigenous Community Nombre128202, so that in concert with them, by means of carrying out a population census, any non-indigenous person possessing areas of the surface of the indigenous reserve of interest is identified, this once the indigenous reserve Nombre128202 has been demarcated and the respective registry and cadastral information has been gathered by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural.
The ordered census must be completed in its entirety within a period of four months from when the reserve has been demarcated and the registry and cadastral information of interest is available, and the determination of which titleholders or possessors of lands are in good faith or not must be carried out with the full participation of the authorities of the plaintiff indigenous community, the association representing it, CONAI, and INDER.-
XIV.On the inadmissibility of the claim aimed at ordering the payment of the indemnification ordered in another judicial process. As has been indicated above, the representation of the indigenous community Nombre128202 requested that the judgment declare that: “*In the case of the Sibujú Norte Indigenous Reserve (which is indigenous territory Nombre128202 previously cited), if placing my represented party in possession requires payment of the indemnification ordered in the process being processed in (sic) the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, in expediente 86-000826-0178-CA, order the state to proceed with its payment no more than one month after the judgment becomes final*.” It suffices to indicate in this regard that there is clearly a lack of active standing (legitimación activa) on the part of the party suing in this present case, without prejudice to the possible standing that could potentially be recognized by the competent judicial authority, in the execution phase of the judgment issued applying the rules of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, in the ordinary process processed under judicial expediente number 86-000826-0178-CA, judgments of the Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda of eleven hours thirty minutes on December twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-two, in relation to number 276-94, of eight hours fifteen minutes on August thirty-first, nineteen ninety-four, of the Sección Primera of the Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo.
(Pages 172 to 228 of the main case file). In this sense, it must be indicated to the plaintiff that clearly, what was resolved in that process has the force of res judicata (produjo estado), and a judgment of that nature cannot, by imperative of the rules that inform procedural law, be executed in another case, which is clearly what is intended from what was petitioned. It must be noted, however, that due to the dual nature of the right it entails, it is tangentially being protected since the payment of an indemnification was ordered in that process; it is clear that the right of the plaintiff indigenous community to demand from those authorities that were condemned to proceed with the respective payment is encompassed there, but not in this present case, in the opinion of this Court. That being so, and given that standing is a procedural prerequisite that can be analyzed ex officio, it is declared that there is a lack of active standing to accede to what was petitioned, so in that respect the declaration of inadmissibility of the claim is mandatory.-
XV.Corollary. In conclusion of everything set forth up to this point, having demonstrated the illegitimate omissive conduct at various levels incurred by the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, the claim will succeed, however, in a manner different from that in which the claims were formulated, by reason of the relevant public interest in the proper execution of the tasks assigned by the legal system to the institutions linked to the protection of the rights of indigenous communities, pursuant to Article 122, subsections c), d), g), and k) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, it is mandatory to declare the claim partially admissible, in the terms to be indicated in the operative part of this judgment.-
XVI.On the defenses interposed. The representations of the State and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas interposed the defense of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva), while the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural interposed the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) and res judicata (cosa juzgada material), the latter of which was resolved by rejecting it upon issuance of ruling number 33-2013, issued during the single hearing held on June twenty-fourth, two thousand thirteen, at ten hours fifty-five minutes, so as to what was thus resolved, the parties must abide by what was ordered at that time. Regarding the defense of lack of passive standing, its rejection as it was alleged in this case is mandatory for the following reasons. Standing is a substantive prerequisite of every jurisdictional process and as such, its analysis is obligatory for the Judges even ex officio if the respective exception (lack of active and/or passive standing) is not raised.
The institute relates to the "... *specific material legal situation in which a subject, or plurality of subjects, finds themselves, in relation to what constitutes the litigious object of a given process; standing, in short, will indicate to us in each case who the true holders of the material relationship that is intended to be elucidated in the scope of the process are; who the subjects whose procedural participation is necessary for the Judgment to be "effective" are*." (Nombre71661, Nombre71662;, Nombre136773;, Nombre149727 and Nombre71664, Nombre9069. *Derecho Procesal Administrativo Costarricense*. Editorial Juricentro. San José, Costa Rica. p.162.). It concerns the aptitude of the intervening subjects to be a party in a process of this nature; which derives or originates from the relationship existing between their sphere of interests and rights in direct relation to the challenged administrative conduct.
Thus, "*a subject is granted standing in a procedure or in a given process by virtue of the prior impact suffered in their qualified interests or rights*" (Nombre137195, Nombre25610. *El nuevo proceso contencioso administrativo*. Collective Work. Poder Judicial. Escuela Judicial. San José. Costa Rica. p. 79.). If the intervening parties lack standing, it can be concluded that the development of the entire process will not serve to solve the specific intersubjective conflict raised before the judicial courts because that lack will determine the non-existence of the legal relationship between them. In this contentious-administrative jurisdiction, "*situaciones jurídicas* of every person" are tutelable, clarifies subsection 1) of the first numeral of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, in relation to the diverse manifestations of administrative conduct, so that to obtain effective judicial protection on the merits in a contentious process, it is required to be the holder of a subjective right or at least a "legitimate interest (interés legítimo)" (Article 49 of the Constitución Política) of the administered party, derived or originated from an administrative legal relationship.
Moreover, standing is divided into an active dimension, relating to who figures as plaintiffs and precisely, to the alleged ownership of the subjective right or legitimate interest alleged, which is conceived as the suitability to carry out acts of exercising the power of action that entitles them to demand the satisfaction of a determined provision or object; and a passive dimension, in relation to the defendant party, which manifests as the aptitude to bear the exercise of said power. Thus, a subjective right or legitimate interest is pitted against public powers or competences. In this present case, according to the majority opinion of this chamber, it is clear that standing exists to sue the State insofar as, among the omissive conducts that were reproached, it is the legal system that designated it as the direct responsible party, while it was proven that it incurred in non-compliance regarding said legal obligations.
The same occurs with respect to the party currently called the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural—now by unanimity of this Chamber—insofar as the powers-duties that the legal system imposed on it regarding the identification of indigenous lands, their demarcation, has constituted, together with the inactivity of the State, the cause that to date Article 5 of the Ley Indígena has not been applied effectively. Added to the foregoing and given the substantive analysis that has been carried out in the terms of this judgment, with the claim being partially successful against INDER, it is mandatory to reject the defense of lack of right interposed by it. Finally, ex officio, it is noted that with respect to the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, duties directed toward the protection of indigenous peoples, particularly those of coordination and liaison, were vested, which have not been exercised, even remotely adequately or effectively, both before the State and INDER, as well as in relation to the indigenous communities themselves.-
XVII.On costs. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so, such that, there being no grounds whatsoever justifying exemption from said condemnation under subsections a) and b) of said numeral, as well as under Article 194 of the same legal body in the case of the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, *—defeated in this process—*, it is mandatory to condemn them jointly and severally (solidaria) to the payment of both costs generated as a consequence of the processing of this present case, in favor of the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202. The processing of the process insofar as it was filed against the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Indigenous Reserve of Nombre128203, despite the plaintiff party not having been successful, was due to the order issued by this Court for the dispute to be integrated despite there being no cause in the claim referring to any existing conflict between it and the plaintiff indigenous association, so its participation, which was limited to contesting the claim, shall not generate costs against the plaintiff party. Judge Hess Araya dissents regarding the condemnation against the State.-
POR TANTO
The evidence submitted for better resolution by the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is rejected. By majority, the defense of lack of passive standing interposed by the representation of the State is rejected, and by unanimity, the one formulated by the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas is rejected. It is declared ex officio that there is a lack of active standing in the plaintiff association to demand in this present case the execution of the ruling in the judicial process processed before the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda in the process processed under judicial expediente number 86-000826-0178-CA. It is declared ex officio that there is a lack of current interest and to that extent, the claim is inadmissible exclusively insofar as the Judicial Authority was considered filed against the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Bribri de Talamanca Indigenous Reserve.
The defense of lack of right interposed by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is rejected. By majority, the claim is declared partially admissible insofar as it was filed by the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202 against the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, it being understood for all intents and purposes as denied in all that is not granted in this ruling, therefore the following pronouncements are made: a.) By majority, the State is condemned to include in favor of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas in the Draft Law of the National Budget of the Republic, the one hundred million colones that it should have included, in those corresponding to the budget periods of nineteen seventy-nine, nineteen eighty, nineteen eighty-one, and nineteen eighty-two. The inclusion of those funds in the respective project must be carried out in four installments, at current value, and in four consecutive annual budget periods, the first of which must be carried out after the end of the budget period subsequent to the one ongoing at the time this judgment becomes final.
(Consequently), by majority, the State is ordered to carry out coordinated, systematic, and effective work with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the Indigenous Community Nombre128202, to guarantee the execution of the provisions of Article 5 of the Ley Indígena. At no time may the Presidency of the Republic—without prejudice to the constitutional powers vested in the Contraloría General de la República—disregard the proper use given to that fund in accordance with the Law. Judge Hess Araya dissents regarding this operative paragraph; b.) By unanimity, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is condemned to deploy any necessary action charged to its own budget, so that the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202 is duly demarcated, which must begin within a period of no less than six months from the date this judgment becomes final. Those tasks must be concluded at least six months after they have begun.
The demarcation must include the surveying of maps and any other instrument of that nature, as well as registry studies, necessary for the effective subsequent registry inscription of the lands, allowing for the identification of whether there are properties superimposed on the areas comprising the indigenous reserve of interest. These tasks must be carried out with the coordination of the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the collaboration of the plaintiff indigenous community, for which purpose, said commission must interact with the indigenous authorities so that no obstacle is generated that hinders the performance of the ordered tasks; c.) By unanimity, the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas is condemned to deploy any and all necessary activity in direct, intense, and systematic coordination with the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Indigenous Reserve Nombre128202, and the authorities of the Indigenous Community Nombre128202, so that in concert with them, by means of carrying out a population census, any non-indigenous person possessing areas of the surface of the indigenous reserve of interest is identified, this once the indigenous reserve Nombre128202 has been demarcated and the respective registry and cadastral information has been gathered by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural.
The ordered census must be completed in its entirety within a period of four months from when the reserve has been demarcated and the registry and cadastral information of interest is available, and the determination of which titleholders or possessors of lands are in good faith or not must be carried out with the full participation of the authorities of the plaintiff indigenous community, the association representing it, CONAI, and INDER. This ruling is issued without special condemnation for costs exclusively with respect to the part of the claim that did not succeed against the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral of the Bribri de Talamanca Indigenous Reserve; d.) By majority, the State, the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, and the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas are jointly and severally condemned to pay both costs.
Judge Hess Araya dissents regarding the award of costs against the State.- Notify.- Felipe Córdoba Ramírez Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Christian Hess Araya Dissenting vote of Judge Hess Araya:
I.I dissent only insofar as the preceding ruling concludes that there has been an omission attributable to the State and, consequently, upholds the action against it, in the terms of point a) of the operative part; which I support as follows.
II.Article 5 *in fine* of the Ley Indígena stipulates: *“The expropriations and indemnifications shall be financed with the contribution of one hundred million colones in cash, which shall be deposited in four annual installments of twenty-five million colones each, beginning the first in the year 1979; said installments shall be included in the general budgets of the Republic for the years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982. The fund shall be administered by CONAI, under the supervision of the Contraloría General de la República.”* In the opinion of the undersigned, and in divergence from the criterion of my fellow members of the Tribunal (and even partially reconsidering what I subscribed to in judgment No. 198-2011-VI of the Sixth Section), the transcribed stipulations—despite being inserted in a norm whose remaining content does not possess that character—were established by the legislator with a purely transitory validity and, in fact, under good legislative technique should have appeared in the section corresponding to the end of the law, as is customary.
Based on both their text and the application of the principle of annuality of the budget cycle, I consider that the validity of these provisions precluded upon the end of the 1982 fiscal year, without this Tribunal being empowered to restore their validity more than thirty years later, however noble the purpose that inspired their enactment. This is without prejudice to the fact that: a) the norm omits to indicate the source of financing that would cover the expenditure therein set forth, in violation of the principle of budget balance, a marginal reflection into which I do not delve as it is proper to the Constitutional Jurisdiction and not that of this Chamber; and, b) it is strange, in every respect, that the administration of the fund was entrusted to CONAI, when it was the ITCO (today INDER) that was to carry out and pay for the expropriations. With the foregoing, I do not intend to disregard either the international commitments assumed by the Costa Rican State regarding the protection of native cultures, or the responsibilities contained in the legislation on the matter.
I merely note a reality, which is that the cited rules were foreseen to be fulfilled within a specific period, which has amply expired, and that, consequently, this collegiate body cannot now compel compliance.-
III.Moreover, in the dissenting vote I also set forth in judgment No. 53-2013-VII of this Tribunal, I expressed the reasons why I consider that the omission—attributed to the Executive Branch—of foreseeing certain items in the ordinary or extraordinary Budget bills of the Republic that it submits to the Legislative Assembly, does not constitute an administrative conduct whose oversight corresponds to this jurisdiction; as well as why I consider that it is not possible for this Tribunal to compel the Executive to act to the contrary (and even less so by determining in how many installments to do so), despite them being budget obligations of legal origin. Certainly, the money necessary to pay the required expropriations must come from somewhere and, therefore, to the extent that INDER does not manage to cover them from its own funds, it would have to manage the necessary budget transfers. But this is very different from this Tribunal going so far as to order the Executive Branch to proceed in that sense, assuming a competence that I believe it does not have.
In any event, note that as a last resort and in the event that this position is not shared, I opine that what was decided in another very similar case (under case file No. 10-000275-1028-CA, resolved by the already cited judgment No. 198-2011-VI) would continue to be applicable here, where it was explained that it is not possible to attribute omission to the Executive Branch for not having budgeted and disbursed the monies for the expropriations of non-indigenous persons, since this necessarily presupposes that the IDA and CONAI have first satisfied their obligations regarding determining in which cases it was necessary to proceed in that manner, in order to subsequently manage the necessary resources.-
IV.Finally, it should be added that based on the way the procedural claims were established in this matter, only those numbered 3 and 5 contain requests relative to the State: the first seeks that it initiate, together with the IDA (today INDER) and CONAI, *“the cited studies and appraisals, the procedures for indemnifications (including possible expropriations)”*, duties that the law only assigns to those last two entities; while the second is clearly inadmissible for the reasons expressed in the present ruling and which I share. Consequently, to the extent that the operative part of the judgment *“orders the State to carry out coordinated, systematic, and effective work with the Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas and the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the Indigenous Community Nombre128202, ensuring the execution of the provisions of Article 5 of the Ley Indígena”*, this norm is given a scope that it does not have regarding the State, wherefore I do not consider the said mandate legally sustainable.-
V.For all the reasons expressed, I uphold the defense of lack of passive standing raised by the State, regarding which I declare the claim inadmissible, with the corresponding award of costs in its favor. In all other respects, I share the preceding pronouncement.-
CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA
ASUNTO: PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR: ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA CABECAR DE TALAMANCA DEMANDADOS: EL ESTADO, LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS, EL INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, y la ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA BRIBRI DE TALAMANCA Nº 74-2013-VII TRIBUNAL PROCESAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN SÉPTIMA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ, ANEXO A, Goicoechea, a las diez horas treinta minutos del veintinueve de octubre del dos mil trece.- Procesos de conocimiento incoados por la ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA CABECAR DE TALAMANCA, cédula de persona jurídica número CED117090 , representada por su Presidente, Nombre149727 , quien es mayor de edad, soltero, agricultor, cédula de identidad número CED117091 , en contra del ESTADO, representado por el Procurador Adjunto, Bernardo Lara Flores, quien es mayor de edad, casado, abogado, vecino de San José, cédula de identidad número CED117092 ; la COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS INDÍGENAS, en adelante y a los efectos de la presente sentencia (CONAI) cédula de persona jurídica número CED117093 y CED117094 , representada por su Presidente, Nombre136655 , quien es mayor de edad, casado, agricultor, vecino de la Comunidad Indígena de Nairí Awari, cédula de identidad número CED117095 ; y el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, en adelante y a los efectos de la presente sentencia (INDER), cédula de persona jurídica número cuatro-cero cero cero-cuarenta y dos mil ciento cuarenta y tres-once, representado por su apoderado general judicial, señor Carlos Enrique García Anchía, quien es mayor de edad, abogado, vecino de San Ramón, cédula de identidad número CED115380 , y la ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LA RESERVA INDÍGENA BRIBRI DE TALAMANCA, cédula de persona jurídica número CED117096, representada por su Presidente, Nombre149728 , quien es mayor de edad, soltero, en unión de hecho, agricultor, cédula de identidad número CED117097 , .
Interviene como Abogado Director de la asociación accionante, el Licenciado Danilo Chaverri Barrantes, carné del Colegio de Abogados de la República de Costa Rica número CED117098 , y como apoderado especial judicial de la CONAI el Licenciado Mauricio Masís Murillo, cédula de identidad número CED117099- . En representación de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Talamanca (Bribrí) comparece como abogado Director el Licenciado Gerardo Mora Protti, carné del Colegio de Abogados número CED117089 .-
RESULTANDO:
Redacta el juez Córdoba Ramírez con el voto afirmativo de la jueza Fernández Brenes y en parte del juez Hess Araya, este último quien consigna en el presente fallo un voto salvado en lo correspondiente.-
CONSIDERANDO
I.Sobre la prueba para mejor proveer. Siendo que por escrito presentado a estrados judiciales por parte de la representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural el día cinco de septiembre del dos mil trece, se requirió la admisión de prueba para mejor resolver (folio 757) en lo que se encuentra constituida por el texto de la sentencia número 106-2013 de las catorce horas del veintiocho de agosto del dos mil trece, dictada por la Sección Primera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo en proceso ordinario identificado como el tramitado bajo el expediente judicial número 07-001117-0163-CA, con lo que según así lo expresa, pretende sea ponderado su contenido para probar que en lo que la demanda se dirigió en contra del Instituto referido, no debe prosperar la misma. (Folios del 720 al 756). Sobre el particular, debe tomarse nota de que la posibilidad de que este tipo de prueba de carácter extemporáneo sea admitida por virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 331 del Código Procesal Civil, responde al arbitrio del Juzgador, no siendo de recibo afirmar que su rechazo pueda causar indefensión al suponer por principio de preclusión procesal, que es traída al proceso fuera de las oportunidades previstas a los efectos de aportar elementos probatorios con que cuentan las partes vinculadas en la relación jurídica procesal, por lo que se rechaza la misma.
Debe tomarse nota en adición, de que la prueba refiere en particular a un antecedente jurisprudencial que se afirma ha sido dictado en causa judicial diversa a ésta, no constituyendo probanza que vaya en ningún nivel dirigida a dar cuenta de la verdad real respecto de alguno de los hechos de interés a propósito de la resolución que por el fondo haya de declarar el mejor derecho en la presente causa, por lo que además, deviene en razón de ello en inconducente, por lo que se rechaza la solicitud.-
II.Hechos probados. De relevancia para la resolución del presente proceso se tienen los siguientes:
III.Hechos no probados: De relevancia para el dictado del presente fallo se tienen como hechos no probados los siguientes:
IV.Sobre los reproches formulados por la parte accionante. La representación de la parte actora esbozó en su demanda, estructuras argumentativas en soporte de la presente acción conforme las cuales indicó -ahora lo que sigue expresado a manera de síntesis- que a la comunidad indígena Nombre128202 le fue reconocida la titularidad de su territorio conforme el contenido del Decreto Ejecutivo número 29448 del veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno, que incluye el área que identifica -de forma confusa se agrega-, como Nombre128202 y Nombre128203, conformando, la finca inscrita en el Registro Nacional, del Partido de Limón, matrícula de folio real número Placa30242, que luego fue dividida, segregándose de ésta, la finca número Placa30243 (no indica a quién pertenece el área segregada). Luego, afirma que el área de territorio que le pertenece, se encuentra descrita en el plano catastrado número Placa30244, pero que éste incluye una finca, a saber, la inscrita bajo la matrícula número Placa30245, respecto de la que no habrá de entenderse efectuada pretensión alguna en esta causa, pues lo propio se encuentra siendo discutido en la causa judicial que identificó, como la que se encuentra siendo tramitada bajo el expediente judicial número 10-000275-1028-CA.
Acusó que las tierras de la actora se encuentran invadidas en más de mil hectáreas, sin que las instituciones demandadas y el Estado, hayan efectuado aún los estudios y trámites que se establecen en el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena, a fin de que se concluya con la expropiación, indemnización y/o desalojo de los ocupantes no indígenas que se encuentran dentro de nuestro territorio. En lo que corresponde con el Estado, acusó que éste no ha dotado de presupuesto a las instituciones correspondientes, ni éstas han hecho las gestiones necesarias para que se proceda de conformidad con los estudios de ocupantes, expropiaciones y desalojos dentro de esos territorios.-
V.Sobre los alegatos de defensa formulados por la representación del Estado. Indicó la representación del Estado -en lo que contestó la demanda únicamente dentro de la audiencia que le fue conferida dentro del expediente judicial número 10-000274-2018-CA y en oposición a que la demanda sea declarada con lugar- que si bien es correcto que mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29448 del veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno se creó la reserva indígena de interés, no lo es que se encuentre ésta invadida por no indígenas, al no mediar prueba que dé cuenta de esa circunstancia. Sobre el proceso judicial que se tramita bajo el número 10-000275-1028-CA, advierte que se trata de un proceso ordinario dentro del que el Estado ha pagado parcialmente honorarios e intereses a los propietarios registrales de la finca, pero que no ha sido posible tomar posesión definitiva del inmueble hasta que no se cancele la totalidad de lo adeudado. Indicó además que media en el presente asunto una falta de legitimación pasiva en lo que la acción ha sido dirigida en contra del Estado, toda vez que la demanda en lo medular lo es en contra del INDER y la CONAI, que son entidades con personería jurídica propia, y a la vez las designadas por el legislador a fin de que realicen los estudios y avalúos sobre los terrenos que en la reserva de interés que se encuentren ocupados por terceros no indígenas.-
VI.Sobre los alegatos de defensa formulados por la representación del CONAI . Por su parte, la representación de la CONAI indicó en defensa de dicha organización, que si bien es cierto que la reserva de interés es propiedad o titularidad de la comunidad indígena Nombre128202 , se encuentra ocupada por terceros que no forman parte de la dicha agrupación, pese a que por varios años han estado instando a los distintos gobiernos con el objeto de que cumplan lo establecido en la Ley Indígena. Que sus obligaciones de ley para con las comunidades como la accionante, se limita a la realización de tareas de coordinación conforme así lo ha definido la Procuraduría General de la República, una vez que le fue consultado lo pertinente en su oportunidad, no siendo ésta, como sí el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, a quien corresponde la adquisición de los bienes inmuebles propiedad de particulares dentro de las reservas indígenas, instituto que advierte, no cuenta con presupuesto disponible ni elementos técnicos para realizar esas tareas. En suma, rechazó que se le endilgue a la CONAI responsabilidad alguna en este asunto, pues nunca ha incumplido sus deberes legales.-
VII.Sobre los alegatos de defensa formulados por la representación del INDER. En defensa de los intereses institucionales del INDER indicó su representación, que si bien es cierto le corresponde conforme la Ley Indígena la obligación de expropiar e indemnizar a los ocupantes de las reservas que no sean indígenas cuando ello proceda, esto lo es en coordinación con la CONAI. Que es importante tomar en cuenta que el INDER, no ha contado por parte del Estado con los recursos económicos necesarios a fin de dar cumplimiento a esa obligación, por lo que se ha encontrado en imposibilidad de ejecutar lo correspondiente. Refiere entonces a algunas iniciativas o propuestas que se ha planteado a nivel institucional para solucionar este problema, como lo fue un proyecto de ley que identificó como “Ley de Financiación para la Recuperación de Territorios Indígenas” que afirmó, fue presentado a las comunidades indígenas.
No indica en qué momento ello ocurrió o la suerte que ha tenido tal proyecto de ley. También indicó que habrían confeccionado un “Manual para la Adquisición y Traspaso de Tierras en Territorios indígenas al amparo del artículo cinco de la Ley Indígena 6172”, que primero fue aprobado por la Junta Directiva en el año dos mil ocho -habría que entender, la del INDER- y luego derogado por ésta en el año dos mil nueve, con lo que se impidió así hacer aplicación del mismo. Indica que no existe un cuerpo normativo que regule la forma y el procedimiento a seguir, mediante el que habría de determinarse qué poseedor o titular es no indígena dentro de esas áreas en las reservas, y si lo es de buena fe o no, así como en qué autoridad pública habría de residenciarse la competencia para tal determinación. Refuerza sus afirmaciones con ocasión del que identifica es un fallo de la Sala Constitucional, conforme el que se les indicó que la determinación de quién tenga mejor derecho con ocasión de ser titular de áreas presuntamente parte de estas reservas, debe hacerse en la vía judicial en un proceso ordinario, por lo que le compete a un juez y no al INDER la determinación correspondiente.
Se suma a lo anterior, el que no considera que estas funciones le correspondan al INDER, al no formar parte tales actividades de sus funciones ordinarias, como sí y en su criterio, a la CONAI, en concurso con las asociaciones indígenas. Se agregó que otra circunstancia que les ha impedido proceder de conformidad, lo es el aspecto financiero, dado que no obstante el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena prevé que estas tareas se realizarían con un presupuesto de cien millones de colones, a ser girados en tractos de veinticinco millones cada uno en los años de mil novecientos setenta y nueve a mil novecientos ochenta y dos, “La realidad es que dicha disposición nunca se efectuaron por parte del Estado; lo que ha provocado severos atrasos en la tramitación de dichos procesos; debido a carecer de los recursos financieros para el pago de las indemnizaciones que se ha hecho imposible ejecutar…”. Siempre sobre este punto, señaló que no se ha diseñado por la ley, alternativa alguna para que dentro del presupuesto institucional, exista alguna partida para el pago de esas tierras, no contando en consecuencia con autorización legal para girar fondos para esos propósitos, pese a lo dispuesto en la Ley 2825, so pena de incurrir en la causal de responsabilidad prevista en la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos en su artículo 110, inciso e).
Sobre el hecho que relacionó la parte actora, como la omisión por parte del INDER y la CONAI de realizar estudios y trámites que identifiquen a los no indígenas en las reservas, en los términos a que refiere el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena, reiteró lo relacionado atrás, con un proyecto de ley y un Manual que intentó poner en vigencia y operación la institución codemandada. Sobre el proceso judicial que fue tramitado bajo el expediente judicial número 86-000826-0178-CA, indicó que se trata de un asunto que se encuentra fallado con carácter de cosa juzgada material y que en lo que corresponde con nuevos invasores que han incursionado en las tierras que fueron objeto de discusión en dicho proceso, ha sido la misma asociación indígena actora la que ha mostrado pasividad ante estas incursiones, en su reserva.-
VIII.Sobre la posición de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Nombre128203 de Talamanca. En su escrito de contestación a la demanda, la representación de la asociación indígena codemandada aceptó los hechos en su totalidad, no obstante advierte que dejan los mismos sujetos a lo que se desprenda de la prueba en contradicción con lo anterior. Adicionó, manifestando que aprueba las pretensiones formuladas por la accionante, y que el territorio Sibujú Norte efectivamente, primero, no pertenece a la comunidad indígena Nombre128203 y segundo, que pertenece a la Nombre128202 por lo que no se oponen a la recuperación de ese territorio por parte de quienes accionan.-
IX.Sobre el objeto del presente proceso (pretensiones). Considera necesario este Tribunal, previo a entrar en consideraciones de fondo, efectuar una serie de reflexiones que coadyuven a precisar cuál es el objeto del presente proceso. Conforme es reflejo de lo actuado en la presente causa con vista en los folios del 691 al 693 del expediente principal, en relación con el registro electrónico de la audiencia única, que fue nuevamente celebrada el día veinticuatro de junio del dos mil trece con la participación de las partes involucradas en la relación jurídica procesal y en concurso con las partes, particularmente la actora, fueron determinadas como las pretensiones del proceso, un solo elenco de éstas, para que a todos los efectos se tenga que lo son las que siguen: “1. Se declare que mi representada es la propietaria registral, y el pueblo Nombre128202 es el dueño, de la Finca descrita en el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29448-G del 21 de Marzo de 2001 (“Reserva – Tenorio- Indígena Nombre128202 de Talamanca). 2.
Se ordene al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y a la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas realizar los estudios y avalúos sobre los terrenos ocupados por personas no indígenas dentro de ese territorio indígena: a) Ordéneseles que los estudios deben determinar cuáles de esas personas tienen que ser indemnizadas y cuáles no tienen derecho a ello; b) Ordéneseles que los avalúos se realicen sobre los terrenos que deben ser indemnizados, tomando en consideración las posibles variaciones que podrían ocurrir por los eventuales retrasos en los procesos que se tramiten para la indemnización; c) Ordéneseles iniciar los estudios y avalúos no más de un mes posterior a la firmeza de la sentencia, debiendo haberlos concluido no más de cuatro meses después de esa firmeza. 3. Se ordene al Estado, al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y a la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas iniciar de inmediato, una vez realizados los estudios y avalúos citados, los trámites para las indemnizaciones (incluidas las posibles expropiaciones) de los poseedores o propietarios que tengan derecho a ello, y cancelar -no más de un mes posterior a la sentencia que así lo ordene- las indemnizaciones correspondientes 4.
Se ordene poner a mi representada en posesión de cada una de las fincas, parcelas o áreas que componen nuestro territorio cada vez que se desaloje o indemnice a alguno de los actuales ocupantes conforme lo establece la Ley de Expropiaciones; 5. En el caso de la Reserva Indígena Sibujú Norte (que es territorio indígena Nombre128202 antes citado), si la puesta en posesión de mi representada requiere que se pague la indemnización ordenada en el proceso que se tramita en (sic) Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, en expediente 86-000826-0178-CA, ordénesele al estado proceder a su pago no más de un mes después de que quede firme la sentencia. 6. Se condene a los demandados al pago solidario de ambas costas de esta acción”. Dicho lo anterior, la acción se encuentra planteada para que sea discutida en juicio, la identidad del titular del dominio sobre un bien inmueble, que se identifica como la Finca descrita en el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 29448-G del veintiuno de marzo de dos mil uno.
Esta pretensión lo es de corte meramente declarativo hasta donde se logra observar. Luego, se formularon una serie de extremos petitorios, todos dirigidos a que se condene a las autoridades públicas demandadas a hacer, sea, a desplegar alguna conducta que se encuentra en criterio de la parte actora impuesta por el ordenamiento jurídico, sin que a la fecha haya sido ejecutada por los accionados, lo que habla de un desdoble en la acción, en pretensiones dirigidas a que se declare que ha existido una ilegítima conducta omisiva de parte de todas las Administraciones Públicas demandadas, para que luego se ordene adoptar en su lugar la conducta que demanda el ordenamiento jurídico. Se trata de una acusada omisión constituida por las acciones a que refiere el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena, que debiendo ser ejecutadas por las demandadas, se dirige a la defensa del derecho de propiedad de la comunidad indígena, en este caso, la Nombre128202 .
Finalmente, se incluyó una pretensión, que se vincula con la posibilidad de que previo a que proceda ordenar poner en posesión a la comunidad accionante de áreas específicas de su territorio, deba pagarse por parte del Estado el dinero al que fue condenado pagar conforme una sentencia dictada con carácter de cosa juzgada material, dentro del otro proceso judicial de corte plenario diverso al que nos ocupa. Así, pretende que se ordene en la presente causa a la parte que resultó vencida en dicho proceso judicial, ejecutar aquello a lo que fue condenada hacer en ella. En los términos que se dirán y conforme los cuales en criterio de este Tribunal, no existe interés alguno en abordar temas en relación con los que no existe conflicto alguno que resolver, como lo es el relacionado con la titularidad de la reserva indígena Nombre128202 , la presente acción propone en lo medular una demanda fundada en una conducta omisiva disconforme con el ordenamiento jurídico según así se desprende de la teoría del caso planteada por la parte actora. Por lo demás, la última de las pretensiones resulta autónoma y como se verá, estéril.-
X.Sobre el régimen jurídico de protección a los territorios indígenas y la identidad del perteneciente a la comunidad indígena Nombre128202 . Resultando de rigor lo que sigue a los efectos del análisis que habrá de efectuarse a fin de resolver el presente asunto, procedemos a abordar el régimen jurídico de protección a las reservas indígenas, particularmente en lo que toca al artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena, así como a la regulación que define el emplazamiento de la reserva indígena propiedad de los accionantes.
XI.Sobre la pretensión dirigida a que se declare que la asociación actora es la propietaria registral, y el pueblo Nombre128202 el dueño, de la Finca descrita en el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29448-G del veintiuno de Marzo de dos mil uno. Punto aparte merece darse a este extremo petitorio en los términos que se dirán. En torno a la pretensión dirigida a que se declare que la asociación actora es la propietaria registral, y el pueblo Nombre128202 el dueño de la Finca descrita en el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29448-G del veintiuno de marzo de dos mil uno, con claridad media una falta de interés actual que torna en improcedente dicho extremo, como en efecto se dispone. Sobre el particular y siendo que como excepción ninguna de las partes accionadas invocó tal defensa, debe tomarse nota de que la jurisprudencia emanada de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia dentro de la que como ejemplo, se encuentra la sentencia número 2008-000317 de las nueve horas diez minutos del dos de mayo de dos mil ocho, ha caracterizado esta excepción como una de las dirigidas a la verificación de un presupuesto material de la acción jurisdiccional.
Así, para que una demanda pueda prosperar con independencia de otros aspectos, como lo son la capacidad procesal, la competencia y el cumplimiento de los requisitos respectivos en el escrito de demanda, también debe revisarse oficiosamente si concurren presupuestos materiales como lo son el derecho, la legitimación y claro está, el interés actual. Si alguno de estos presupuestos -o todos- no se encuentran presentes, la demanda no podría encontrar respuesta positiva. Para el caso de la falta de interés actual, se trata de una excepción, resorte de análisis a la hora del dictado de la sentencia, que supone que con independencia del fondo de lo planteado, la pretensión no sea susceptible de ser acogida con causa en que existe un motivo diverso, pero jurídicamente relevante que así lo impone. El interés actual está relacionado estrechamente con la posibilidad de que el fallo actúe en la realidad, ya sea innovando o conservando una situación jurídica determinada, lo que se encuentra estrechamente relacionado con el objeto del proceso entendido como las pretensiones.
Decir que existe interés actual en pronunciarse sobre el derecho de fondo, no es otra cosa que hablar de la necesidad de proveer de tutela jurisdiccional -en este caso conforme el artículo 49 constitucional-, a la persona que alega estar siendo afectada en sus derechos subjetivos y/o intereses legítimos, respecto de una conducta administrativa frente a la que solicita la intervención del respectivo órgano jurisdiccional. La finalidad de esa intervención lo es resolver el conflicto jurídico del que se es parte (derecho de accionar) cuando la sentencia resulte de utilidad para el titular de ese derecho subjetivo o interés legítimo. Implica lo anterior que en el juzgador se encuentra residenciado el deber de efectuar un juicio de “utilidad” vista la pretensión formulada y las circunstancias fácticas bajo las que se erige la acción (causa de pedir) cotejando los efectos de la resolución jurisdiccional solicitada, justamente con el marco de la utilidad que tal pronunciamiento habría de proveer a favor de quien demanda.
Se trata de un análisis de proyección que pondera si la sentencia positiva o no, habría de producir algún efecto en quien solicitó la tutela de su situación jurídica. Así, no hay interés actual, si con todo y acceder a lo peticionado, la sentencia no tiene la virtud de ocasionar tal efecto en la situación jurídica del accionante, deviniendo en ese tanto estéril el fallo. (Puede verse también la Sentencia de la Sala Primera relacionada, número 465-2009 de las diez horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del siete de mayo de dos mil nueve). De ahí que un ejercicio de control objetivo de legalidad por la legalidad misma, carece de todo provecho o utilidad relevante. (Ver doctrina derivada del artículo 10 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Dicho lo anterior en términos diversos, si se toma en cuenta que el ejercicio de la acción de revisión de la legalidad de la conducta administrativa es de carácter subjetivo, en la medida que supone la existencia de una persona legitimada con ocasión de resultar titular de un interés relevante para obtener un pronunciamiento que le aproveche en su esfera jurídica -sin que sea posible una revisión objetiva de la legalidad por la legalidad misma respecto de los actos administrativos, se insiste-, media ausencia de ese interés actual, cuando el efecto de la sentencia en nada -a los propósitos de un fenómeno efectista-, habría de mutar el estado de las cosas.
Para el caso que nos ocupa, debe tener presente la representación de la asociación accionante, que la sentencia que pudiese acoger la pretensión en análisis en tanto se dirige declarar que es propietaria de la Reserva Indígena Nombre128202 deviene a todas luces en estéril e innecesaria, en la medida de que conforme el mismo cuadro fáctico que esboza en su acción, nada induce pensar que existe algún conflicto entre ésta, y las autoridades públicas accionadas, tanto como en relación con la asociación que fue integrada a la litis, -pese a que en la causa de pedir, en ningún nivel se describe hecho alguno que indique lo contrario- en torno al mejor derecho del dominio sobre los territorios que conforman dicha reserva, cuando muy al contrario, resulta un tema pacífico entre las partes, que conforme el particular régimen jurídico aplicable a estos particulares bienes, es por decreto ejecutivo que se reconoce la ubicación de las reservas y que para el caso particular, lo ha sido en la actualidad por parte del Poder Ejecutivo según las hojas cartográficas del Instituto Geográfico Nacional-, en los términos de la información comprendida en el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29448 de fecha veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno, publicado en el Diario Oficial “La Gaceta” número 93 del dieciséis de mayo del dos mil uno.
De otra parte, si lo es a propósito de la participación exclusivamente de la comunidad indígena Nombre128203 , es dable decir que fue conforme el mismo el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29448 de fecha veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno, publicado en el Diario Oficial “La Gaceta” número 93 del dieciséis de mayo del dos mil uno, que cualquier asunto relacionado con el otrora derecho que ostentaba quedó dilucidado de forma pacífica entre ambas comunidades, sin que se requiera entonces de pronunciamiento alguno que venga a innovar en donde la realidad de las cosas es que ningún acto o conducta de esa comunidad se encuentra desde entonces al menos afectando al mejor derecho de la comunidad indígena actora, como se verá.-
XII.Sobre la demanda, en lo que en función de la misma fue integrada a la litis la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Nombre128203 de Talamanca. Debiéndose remitir las partes al contenido de la expresado en el considerando anterior, en relación con lo indicado en el IX de la presente sentencia, la Reserva Indígena de Talamanca se encuentra conformada jurídicamente en la actualidad conforme el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29448 de fecha veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno, instrumento mediante el cual, fue eliminado el traslape que en algún momento histórico existió entre las áreas de terreno que comprenden la reserva indígena de la parte actora y la que otrora, fue reconocida como propiedad a la población de la comunidad Nombre128203 , tal y como así se logra extraer de las propias manifestaciones de la parte accionante en sus escritos de demanda, conforme los que es claro, nunca ha sido su intención demandar a esa comunidad -al no existir conflicto de propiedad alguna frente a ella-.
Así, se ha tenido por acreditado que mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo número 29448 de fecha veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno, publicado en el Diario Oficial “La Gaceta” número 93 del dieciséis de mayo del dos mil uno, el Poder eEjecutivo dispuso con ocasión de que existía un traslape parcial entre la reserva Nombre128202 y la que se denominó Sibujú Norte, dada en su oportunidad a la comunidad Nombre128203 , fusionar ambas reservas en una sola delimitación, considerándose a su vez las áreas decretadas reservas indígenas pasando a constituir en su conjunto la reserva Indígena Nombre128202 . Al parecer, el problema se suscita a propósitos estrictamente registrales, que no son de ningún tipo de interés en la presente causa y que son resorte de asunto ajeno a éste, en donde en ningún nivel constituye esta circunstancia causa de pedir formulada por la parte actora. Siendo así, media igualmente una clara falta de interés en lo que la demanda fue entendida por la Sección Sexta de este Tribunal en su oportunidad, por lo que en consecuencia se declara improcedente la demanda en tanto se entendió dirigida en contra de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre128203 .-
XIII.Sobre la procedencia o no de las pretensiones enumeradas de la 2 a la 4, relacionadas con una conducta omisiva en que habrían incurrido las autoridades públicas accionadas, en torno al cumplimiento con lo dispuesto en el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena. Lo pretendido en este tanto, resulta ser el objeto medular a los efectos de la acción conforme así lo ha comprendido este Tribunal. La parte actora en lo que interesa, ha acusado al respecto la inobservancia con el numeral 5 de la Ley Indígena que dispone: “Artículo 5º.- En el caso de personas no indígenas que sean propietarias o poseedoras de buena fe dentro de las reservas indígenas, el ITCO deberá reubicarlas en otras tierras similares, si ellas lo desearen; si no fuere posible reubicarlas o ellas no aceptaren la reubicación, deberá expropiarlas e indemnizarlas conforme los procedimientos establecidos en la Ley de Expropiaciones. / Los estudios y trámites de expropiación e indemnización serán efectuados por el ITCO en coordinación con la CONAI. / Si posteriormente hubiere invasión de personas no indígenas a las reservas, de inmediato las autoridades competentes deberán proceder a su desalojo, sin pago de indemnización alguna. / Las expropiaciones e indemnizaciones serán financiadas con el aporte de cien millones de colones en efectivo, que se consignarán mediante cuatro cuotas anuales de veinticinco millones de colones cada una, comenzando la primera en el año de 1979; dichas cuotas serán incluidas en los presupuestos generales de la República de los años 1979, 1980, 1981 y 1982.
El fondo será administrado por la CONAI, bajo la supervisión de la Contraloría General de la República.”. Así y entonces, la omisión de cumplimiento con dicha norma habría de corresponder con la omisión acusada en la causa. En soporte de su acción, la actora afirma que pese habérsele reconocido la titularidad de su territorio, que según su dicho se encuentra descrita en el plano catastrado número L-118495-1993, esas tierras se encuentran invadidas en más de mil hectáreas sin que las instituciones demandadas hayan efectuado aún los estudios y trámites que se establecen en el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena, a fin de que se concluya con la expropiación, indemnización y/o desalojo de los ocupantes no indígenas que se encuentran dentro de su territorio. En lo que corresponde con el Estado, acusó que éste no ha dotado de presupuesto a las instituciones correspondientes, ni éstas han hecho las gestiones necesarias para que se proceda de conformidad con los estudios de ocupantes, expropiaciones y desalojos dentro de esos territorios (obsérvese particularmente el extremo petitorio identificado como número 3).
Así, conforme fueron ajustadas las pretensiones de la demanda, se tiene que aspira la accionante a que con causa en una conducta omisiva adoptada en desajuste con el ordenamiento jurídico, en sentencia, se disponga lo siguiente: “…2. Se ordene al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y a la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas realizar los estudios y avalúos sobre los terrenos ocupados por personas no indígenas dentro de ese territorio indígena: a) Ordéneseles que los estudios deben determinar cuáles de esas personas tienen que ser indemnizadas y cuáles no tienen derecho a ello; b) Ordéneseles que los avalúos se realicen sobre los terrenos que deben ser indemnizados, tomando en consideración las posibles variaciones que podrían ocurrir por los eventuales retrasos en los procesos que se tramiten para la indemnización; c) Ordéneseles iniciar los estudios y avalúos no más de un mes posterior a la firmeza de la sentencia, debiendo haberlos concluido no más de cuatro meses después de esa firmeza. 3.
Se ordene al Estado, al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y a la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas iniciar de inmediato, una vez realizados los estudios y avalúos citados, los trámites para las indemnizaciones (incluidas las posibles expropiaciones) de los poseedores o propietarios que tengan derecho a ello, y cancelar -no más de un mes posterior a la sentencia que así lo ordene- las indemnizaciones correspondientes 4. Se ordene poner a mi representada en posesión de cada una de las fincas, parcelas o áreas que componen nuestro territorio cada vez que se desaloje o indemnice a alguno de los actuales ocupantes conforme lo establece la Ley de Expropiaciones…”. Es criterio de este Tribunal, que si bien se impone declarar procedente la demanda en contra de las tres autoridades públicas demandadas, no lo puede ser con ajuste pleno a los extremos de la demanda, tal cual fueron formulados por la actora, ambas situaciones que pasamos a razonar de seguido.-
1.1.-) Sobre el principio de control de la convencionalidad. Conforme la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, adoptado internacionalmente el treinta de abril de mil novecientos ochenta y dos, hoy ley de la República número 7615 del veinticuatro de julio de mil novecientos noventa y seis, publicado en el Diario Oficial “La Gaceta” número 164 del veintinueve de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y seis, se dispuso en lo que nos interesa: “Articulo 26.- "Pacta Sunt Servanda". Todo tratado en vigor obliga a las partes y debe ser cumplido por ellas de buena fe”. Lo anterior importa la obligación de los estados de ser consecuentes con las obligaciones que asumen frente a la comunidad internacional y claro está, en casos como los comprendidos en el Convenio número 107 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo en relación con el Convenio número 169, “Sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en Países Independientes”, con las comunidades indígenas, particularmente en materia de garantías respecto del ejercicio, que debe ser garantizado como pleno, de derechos fundamentales.
Por supuesto que son observables en esta materia tanto el artículo 7, como la doctrina que ha forjado la Sala Constitucional a partir de los alcances que ha dado al numeral 48, ambos de la Constitución Política. En otro nivel, a efecto de los aspectos operativos o de aplicación de estas reglas, el artículo 27 de este cuerpo normativo de derecho internacional dispone en relación con el derecho interno y la observancia de los tratados, refiriéndose a los Estado suscribientes, que: “Una parte no podrá invocar las disposiciones de su derecho interno como justificación del incumplimiento de un tratado . Esta norma se entenderá sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el artículo 46”. Este artículo 46, refería a la eficacia del tratado una vez consentido (firmado) por la delegación respectiva, lo que tiene relación con el artículo 11, sobre las formas de manifestación del consentimiento para obligarse por un tratado, en lo que dispone que basta con la firma del mismo.
Ante ello, la delegación de Costa Rica interpretó y expresó que la disposición aplicaría para el caso del Estado Costarricense en lo que se refiere al derecho secundario, no así a las disposiciones de la Constitución Política. Todo lo anterior es relevante con ocasión del desarrollo del principio de control de la convencionalidad y de lo que se podría denominar además, el principio de intangibilidad de los tratados frente a la ley. De lo anterior se desprende además, bajo la cobertura de la aspiración de todo ordenamiento jurídico de proveer certeza y seguridad, la obligación de hacer aplicación directa de las normas contenidas en tratados internacionales ya ratificados y vigentes en el orden interno, pudiendo claro está, ser normativa invocada por su beneficiario, independientemente de que se trate de otro Estado y en exigencia de lealtad a los compromisos asumidos en el marco de las relaciones entre las naciones vinculadas, sin perjuicio de la cobertura que también se ha solido invocar al principio en materia de instrumentos de este tipo cuando regulan materia de derechos humanos.
La Sala Constitucional al respecto ha indicado como sigue: “II.- Es obvio que el gestionante parte de lo que dispone el artículo siete de la Constitución Política en el sentido de que los tratados y convenios internacionales "estén con autoridad superior a las leyes" (…). Mas debe decirse que los instrumentos internacionales de Derechos Humanos vigentes en la República, conforme a la reforma del artículo 48 Constitucional (Ley No.7128, de 18 de agosto de 1989), al integrarse al ordenamiento jurídico al más alto nivel, valga decir, al nivel constitucional, lo complementan en lo que favorezcan a la persona”. Así, se impone en síntesis el reconocimiento de la validez de las normas internacionales como fuente directa del derecho interno y en reconocimiento de su ubicación en materia de la jerarquía de las fuentes. El principio de control de la convencionalidad se encuentra residenciado en el ya mencionado artículo 27 de la Convención de Viena sobre Derecho de los Tratados, en relación con el artículo 1.1 y 2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, sin perjuicio del contenido de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, esta última que al igual que múltiples otras declaraciones surgidas en el seno de las Naciones Unidas y la Organización de Estados Americanos, no son objeto de ratificación por los Estados miembros o signatarios por innecesario.
No podría decirse otra cosa entonces, que el contenido de estos cuerpos en materia de derechos humanos tiene un enorme valor interpretativo para todas las instancias encargadas de aplicar las normas que componen el bloque de legalidad, y en ese sentido también el derecho interno. No está demás indicar en lo relevante para el caso que nos ocupa, que como se desprende del artículo 17 de la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos que refiere al derecho de propiedad, como lo es para todo otro derecho reconocido en ese instrumento, los Estado encuentran comprometidos a asegurar el respeto universal y efectivo de los derechos y libertades fundamentales del hombre, lo que significa que el Estado tiene la obligación no sólo de respetar esos derechos y libertades, si no además, la obligación de asegurarlos. Esto lo que implica que es al Estado en su conjunto sin que su organización interna permita afirmar que se ha desprendido de sus deberes, a quien se le demanda la adopción de actuaciones que tiendan a la realización efectiva de los cometidos que persiguen los convenios de este tipo en materia de derechos humanos, sin que el derecho interno sirva de excusa para incumplir lo convenido.
Sobre la importancia de tener presente lo dicho a este punto en lo que se vincula con la defensa de los derechos de un grupo de la población que se encuentra en situación de vulnerabilidad como lo son las comunidades indígenas desde tiempos inmemoriales, la Sala Constitucional en su sentencia N° 2253-96 de las 15:39 horas de 14 de mayo de 1996, indicó: “... Existen diversos instrumentos jurídicos tendientes a fomentar esa igualdad real entre los sujetos; entre ellos puede ubicarse la situación particular de los aborígenes, quienes tradicionalmente han sido marginados, por razones históricas, sociales, económicas y culturales. Ellos sufren las consecuencias de una sociedad que no comprende ni respeta sus diferencias; y que en ocasiones, tiende a verlos como seres incapaces de dirigir sus propias vidas y destinos. Ante esa situación, la comunidad internacional sintió la necesidad de adoptar medidas a favor de los indígenas.
Así, el Convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo -OIT-, denominado “Convenio sobre pueblos indígenas y tribales en países independientes”, incorporado a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico mediante Ley Nº 7316 de 3 de noviembre de 1992, estableció la especial protección de los indígenas y de su cultura." El control de convencionalidad importa que el Poder Judicial de cada Estado y los órganos que componen su estructura (y toda autoridad que ejerza funciones materialmente jurisdiccionales, en particular la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, en función de lo dispuesto en el artículo 49 constitucional) deban aplicar, interpretar y/o resolver los asuntos propios de sus competencias como operadores jurídicos, haciendo prevalecer el parámetro convencional de control, constituyéndose así el derecho internacional en lo que regule derechos humanos, en lo que realmente es, sea, garantía del respeto a los derechos humanos en lo que corresponde.
Por lo demás, baste con indicar que según nuestro Código Civil en su artículo 5, estos cuerpos normativos de corte internacional son de aplicación directa por el operador jurídico al formar parte del derecho positivo interno de la nación, desde el momento en que su incorporación al bloque de legalidad se produce por virtud de la aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa y su publicación integral en el Diario Oficial “La Gaceta”, por lo que formando parte del bloque de legalidad, esto es parámetro de control de esta jurisdicción. (Artículo 6 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública).- 1.2.-) Sobre la conducta omisiva en que ha incurrido el Estado. Dicho todo lo anterior, se estima por la mayoría de los miembros de este Tribunal, que el Estado no solamente ha incumplido con lo dispuesto en el último párrafo del artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena, si no que además, se trata de un incumplimiento calificado y reforzado en el tiempo desde que el ordenamiento le impuso la específica obligación de dotar de contenido presupuestario a la CONAI a fin de que tales recursos se dispusieren conforme los trámites a efectuar por el hoy INDER, a efecto exclusivamente de expropiar e indemnizar cuando proceda a los no indígenas, que se encuentren ocupando o sean titulares, en ambos casos de buena fe de los terrenos identificados como parte de las reservas indígenas.
En la presente causa se ha tenido como probado en un primer nivel y sin perjuicio de que la reserva propiedad de la comunidad indígena actora data de décadas atrás, en sus actuales dimensiones, que la comunidad indígena aquí representada es titular del dominio sobre la reserva descrita a partir de la adopción por parte del Poder Ejecutivo, del Decreto Ejecutivo número 29448 de fecha veintiuno de marzo del dos mil uno, publicado en el Diario Oficial “La Gaceta”, número 93 del dieciséis de mayo del dos mil uno, con independencia de que se encuentre inscrita o no a nombre de la asociación accionante en representación de la comunidad Nombre128202 (lo que puede ser consultado en la Página Web del Poder Judicial, accediendo al Sistema Costarricense de Información Jurídica), tanto como que desde su creación por primera vez, conforme el Decreto Ejecutivo número 5904 del once de marzo de mil novecientos setenta y seis, según dio cuenta de esa circunstancia el propio Poder Ejecutivo desde entonces, existen personas no indígenas ocupando áreas, de aquellas que comprenden su superficie.
Sobre este particular, de relevancia lo fueron además las declaraciones que fueron rendidas en juicio por parte del testigo Nombre128204 , geógrafo de profesión y funcionario de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas con veinticinco años de experiencia que le ha relacionado entre otras, con la comunidad indígena accionante, así como el señor Nombre128205 , miembro de la comunidad indígena Nombre128202 , quien indicó vivir en el territorio indígena de interés desde su nacimiento, hace cincuenta y cuatro años al menos. Ambos testigos indicaron conocer de la existencia de no indígenas que se encuentran ocupando áreas de la reserva que nos ocupa, sin que exista motivo alguno que induzca a este Tribunal estimar que carezcan de credibilidad sus manifestaciones. Luego y de todos modos, la existencia de no indígenas en estas tierras y en las condiciones dichas, parece devenir del propio reconocimiento del Poder Ejecutivo y el legislador conforme la propia Ley Indígena, así como particularmente, lo expresado por el Poder Ejecutivo en el Decreto Ejecutivo número 5904 del once de marzo de mil novecientos setenta y seis.
Medular relevancia tiene el hecho de que conforme la prueba ordenada por esta autoridad judicial para mejor resolver, visible a folios del 795 al 198 del expediente principal, que es documento suscrito por quien en él se identifica como Nombre128164 en su condición de Directora de la Dirección General de Presupuesto Nacional del Ministerio de Hacienda, se da cuenta de que en ningún momento histórico a partir de la vigencia de la Ley Indígena número 6172 y conforme su artículo 5, el Poder Ejecutivo ha incluido en el Presupuesto General de la República, el aporte de cien millones de colones en efectivo que debió haber consignado mediante cuatro cuotas anuales de veinticinco millones de colones cada una, comenzando la primera con su inclusión en el Proyecto de Presupuesto Nacional de la República de 1979, para continuar en los presupuestos de 1980, 1981 y 1982 respectivamente. De ello se sigue según el criterio de mayoría de los integrantes de este Tribunal, que a los propósitos de la Ley Indígena, tanto como de los de los convenios internacionales suscritos en la materia, el Estado incumplió ilegítimamente por omisión, con su deber de tomar acciones efectivas -en este caso, una específica y concreta fijada por los instrumentos normativos indicados- para la protección de la propiedad indígena sobre la tierra.
Se trata de una conducta administrativa sometida por virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 49 constitucional al control de legalidad residenciado en esta jurisdicción, que por otro lado, no otorga o confiere margen de discrecionalidad en la Administración obligada a actuar. En un segundo nivel y pese a haber resultado ello acorde con la inteligencia de la demanda presentada en su contra, tampoco se ocupó el Estado de probar, que a partir de la vigencia de la Ley Indígena número 6172, haya desplegado en lo que jurídicamente se encuentra habilitado, acto alguno dirigido a dirigir, coordinar y/o vigilar, de forma ordenada y sistemática las tareas que habiéndole sido impuestas por el derecho internacional y el interno en materia del derecho de las poblaciones indígenas a la integridad de sus territorios, debían de ser ejercidas en lo conducente, ya con el INDER ya con la CONAI o cualquier otra organización indirectamente vinculada.
Véase el contenido de lo dispuesto en el artículo 26, inciso b), en relación con el 27, inciso primero, ambos de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en cuanto al deber de quien ejerza la Presidencia de la República, de forma autónoma o en su caso, conjunta con el Ministro del ramo, de dirigir y coordinar las tareas de gobierno y de la Administración Pública Central en su total conjunto, así como lo propio con la Administración Pública descentralizada, esto, en lo que se habría esperado además, hubiese podido acreditar al menos respecto de la gestión en lo que nos interesa del hoy denominado Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, tanto como de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas en relación con la Reserva Indígena Nombre128202 . Tampoco se trajo al proceso prueba alguna que de muestre de que el Estado haya emprendido o procurado de forma efectiva, coordinada y/o sistemática, esfuerzos que se pudiesen entender conjuntos con la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural dirigida a proteger y garantizar a la Comunidad Indígena Nombre128202 en cuanto a la integridad de los territorios de los que es su titular.
(Todo lo anterior conforme los autos por inexistencia de material probatorio que indique lo contrario). Estas circunstancias fácticas hacen de la omisión en que ha incurrido el Estado, en ilegítima en tanto importa incumplimiento con el artículo 26 de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, en relación con el Convenio número 107 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo y el Convenio número 169, “Sobre Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales en Países Independientes” en lo que regulan los deberes a los que debe dar cumplimiento el Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica, lo que debe asociarse a lo dispuesto en el artículo 140, inciso 8) de la Constitución Política. En lo que corresponde con el último párrafo del artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena que dispone que “…Las expropiaciones e indemnizaciones serán financiadas con el aporte de cien millones de colones en efectivo, que se consignarán mediante cuatro cuotas anuales de veinticinco millones de colones cada una, comenzando la primera en el año de 1979; dichas cuotas serán incluidas en los presupuestos generales de la República de los años 1979, 1980, 1981 y 1982.
El fondo será administrado por la CONAI, bajo la supervisión de la Contraloría General de la República”, si la administración de los fondos con que debió de ser dotada la CONAI por parte del Poder Ejecutivo, lo era a fin de contar con los recursos necesarios, a efecto de proceder con las expropiaciones e indemnizaciones cuya tramitación corresponde al INDER, siendo presupuesto para ello, nada habría de poder ser indemnizado, si no no lo es por otras vías que las dispuestas incondicionalmente por el ordenamiento jurídico al Poder Ejecutivo, lo que no puede ser amparado por la autoridad jurisdiccional en esta sede conforme el artículo 49 constitucional. Esto conlleva a declarar que efectivamente el Estado ha incurrido en una ilegitima conducta omisiva, contraria a lo dispuesto y ordenado por el ordenamiento jurídico. Nótese que sin perjuicio de que se haya estimado que una suma de dinero semejante a finales de los años setenta, podría servir para los propósitos previstos en la ley, es deber del Poder Ejecutivo proveer de los recursos que se requieran para dar cumplimiento a la normativa de cita, así inclusive, ante la posibilidad de que no resulte suficiente esa previsión económica, no enerva esa circunstancia la obligación originaria únicamente endosable al Estado, de dotar de los recursos que resulten necesarios para dar cabal cumplimiento a lo dispuesto en la Ley Indígena y el derecho internacional.
En el momento en que no existan no indígenas que indemnizar en las reservas, queda claro para este Tribunal que la norma comprendida en el numeral -norma de corte programático- habrá de perder vigencia en función de haberse ya cumplido el fin que persigue la misma en ese tanto. En ese eventual estado de las cosas, habría de poderse afirmar que se encuentra materializado de forma efectiva el ejercicio por parte de las comunidades indígenas del derecho exclusivo y excluyente de propiedad del que son titulares, sin perjuicio de la vigilancia futura en torno a su integridad. En tanto no lo sea, sin duda se trataría de un derecho de propiedad que no es pleno al no encontrarse siendo protegido por el Estado en franca violación del derecho que asiste a estas comunidades. Siendo así se reitera, se impone declarar procedente en lo que se dirigió en contra del estado, mas, en los términos que se dirán adelante.-
XIV.Sobre la improcedencia de la pretensión dirigida a que se ordene proceder al pago de la indemnización ordenada en otro proceso judicial. Tal y como se ha indicado líneas atrás, la representación de la comunidad indígena Nombre128202 , requirió que en sentencia se declare que: “En el caso de la Reserva Indígena Sibujú Norte (que es territorio indígena Nombre128202 antes citado), si la puesta en posesión de mi representada requiere que se pague la indemnización ordenada en el proceso que se tramita en (sic) Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, en expediente 86-000826-0178-CA, ordénesele al estado proceder a su pago no más de un mes después de que quede firme la sentencia”. Baste con indicar al respecto, que media con claridad una falta de legitimación activa en quien así demanda en la presente causa, sin perjuicio de la posible legitimación que potencialmente se le pudiese reconocer por la autoridad judicial competente, en la fase de ejecución de la sentencia dictada en aplicación de las reglas de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa, en proceso ordinario tramitado bajo el expediente judicial número 86-000826-0178-CA, sentencias del Juzgado Segundo de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda de las once horas treinta minutos del veinticuatro de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y dos, en relación con la número 276-94, de las ocho horas quince minutos del treinta y uno de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, de la Sección Primera del Tribunal Superior Contencioso Administrativo.
(Folios del 172 al 228 del expediente principal). En este sentido debe indicarse a quien acciona que con claridad, lo resuelto en aquel proceso produjo estado, sin que pueda por imperativo de las reglas que informan el derecho procesal, ser ejecutada una sentencia de esa índole, en otra causa, lo que es claro pretende a partir de lo peticionado. Debe indicarse no obstante, que por la naturaleza dual del derecho que supone, tangencialmente se encuentra siendo tutelado al haberse ordenado el pago de una indemnización en aquel proceso, claro está que inmerso se encuentra al derecho de la comunidad indígena actora de exigir por parte de aquellas autoridades que resultaron condenadas, proceder con el pago respectivo, más no en la presente causa, esto en criterio de este Tribunal. Siendo así, y dado que la legitimación es presupuesto procesal susceptible de ser analizado de oficio, se declara que media falta de legitimación activa para acceder a lo peticionado, por lo que en ese tanto se impone declarar la inadmisibilidad de la demanda.-
XV.Corolario. En conclusión de todo lo hasta este punto expuesto, demostrada la ilegítima conducta omisiva en que en diversos niveles han incurrido tanto el Estado, como el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, la demanda habrá de tener éxito, no obstante, de forma diversa a aquella en que fueron formuladas las pretensiones, con causa en el relevante interés público que reviste una adecuada ejecución de las tareas asignadas por el ordenamiento jurídico a las instituciones que vinculó con la protección de los derechos de las comunidades indígenas conforme el artículo 122, incisos c), d), g) y k) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, se impone declarar procedente la demanda de forma parcial, en los términos a indicar en la parte dispositiva de la presente sentencia.-
XVI.Sobre las excepciones interpuestas. Las representaciones del Estado y la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas interpusieron la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva, mientras que la representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, la de falta de derecho y cosa juzgada material, esta última que fue resuelta en rechazo de la misma con el dictado del auto número 33-2013, dictado dentro de la audiencia única celebrada el día veinticuatro de junio del dos mil trece, al ser las diez horas cincuenta cinco minutos, por lo que en cuanto a lo así resuelto, habrán de atenerse las partes a lo dispuesto en esa oportunidad. En cuanto a la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva se impone su rechazo en lo que fue alegada en esta causa por las siguientes razones. La legitimación es un presupuesto de fondo de todo proceso jurisdiccional y como tal, su análisis resulta obligado para los Juzgadores incluso de oficio si no se opone la respectiva excepción (de falta de legitimación activa y/o pasiva).
Atiende el instituto a la "... específica situación jurídica material en la que se encuentra un sujeto, o pluralidad de sujetos, en relación con lo que se constituye el objeto litigioso de un determinado proceso; la legitimación, en definitiva, nos va a indicar en cada caso quiénes son los verdaderos titulares de la relación material que se intenta dilucidar en el ámbito del proceso; quiénes los sujetos cuya participación procesal es necesaria para que la Sentencia resulte "eficaz"." (Nombre71661 , Nombre71662; , Nombre136773; , Nombre149727 y Nombre71664 , Nombre9069. Derecho Procesal Administrativo Costarricense . Editorial Juricentro. San José, Costa Rica. p.162.). Se trata de la aptitud de los sujetos intervinientes para ser parte en un proceso de esta naturaleza; la que deriva o se origina de la relación existente entre la esfera de intereses y derechos de los mismos en relación directa con la conducta administrativa impugnada.
Así, "...un sujeto queda legitimado en un procedimiento o en un determinado proceso por virtud de la afectación previa sufrida en sus intereses o derechos cualificados" (Nombre137195 , Nombre25610. El nuevo proceso contencioso administrativo. Obra Colectiva. Poder Judicial. Escuela Judicial. San José. Costa Rica. p. 79.) Si las partes intervinientes carecen de legitimación, se puede concluir que el desarrollo de todo el proceso no servirá para solucionar el conflicto intersubjetivo en concreto planteado en estrados judiciales, porque esa falta determinará la inexistencia de la relación jurídica entre éstas. En esta jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa son tulelables las "situaciones jurídicas de toda persona", clarifica el inciso 1) del numeral primero del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, en relación con las diversas manifestaciones de la conducta administrativa, de manera que para obtener una tutela judicial efectiva y de fondo en un proceso contencioso, se requiere ser titular de un derecho subjetivo o de al menos "un interés legítimo" (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política) del administrado, derivado u originado en una relación jurídico administrativa.
Por otro lado, la legitimación se desdobla en una dimensión activa, relativa a quien o quienes figuran como actores y cabalmente, a la supuesta titularidad del derecho subjetivo o interés legítimo alegado, que se concibe como la idoneidad para realizar actos de ejercicio del poder de acción que le faculta exigir la satisfacción de una determinada prestación u objeto; y pasiva, en relación a la parte demandada, que se manifiesta como la aptitud para soportar el ejercicio de dicho poder. Se enfrenta así, un derecho subjetivo o interés legítimo frente a potestades o competencias públicas. En la presente causa según criterio de mayoría de esta cámara es claro que existe legitimación para demandar al Estado en la medida que de entre las conductas omisivas que fueron reprochadas, es el ordenamiento jurídico al encargado de haberse designado domo directo responsable, al tiempo que fue demostrado que en relación con dichas obligaciones legales incurrió en incumplimiento.
Por parte del hoy denominado Instituto de Desarrollo Rural ocurre lo mismo, -ahora por unanimidad de esta Cámara- en la medida en que las potestades deberes que el ordenamiento jurídico le impuso en materia de identificación de los terrenos indígenas, la demarcación de los mismos, ha constituido en conjunto con la inactividad del Estado, causa de que a la fecha el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena no haya sido aplicado de manera efectiva. Sumado a lo anterior y dado el análisis de fondo que se ha realizado en los términos de la presente sentencia, resultando con lugar parcial la demanda en contra del INDER, se impone rechazar la excepción de falta de derecho interpuesta por esta. Finalmente, oficiosamente se pasa a indicar que en lo que respecta a la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, fueron residenciados deberes que se dirigen a la protección de los pueblos indígenas, particularmente los de coordinación y enlace, que no han sido ejercidos, siquiera cercanamente de forma adecuada y efectiva, tanto frente al Estado y el INDER, como en relación con las propias comunidades indígenas.-
XVII.Sobre las costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo, de forma tal, que no mediando presupuesto alguno que justifique exonerar de dicha condenatoria al amparo de los incisos a) y b) de dicho numeral, tanto como al amparo del artículo 194 del mismo cuerpo legal para el caso del Estado, el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, -vencidos en este proceso-, se impone condenarles de forma solidaria al pago de ambas costas generadas como consecuencia de la tramitación de la presente causa en favor de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de La Reserva Indígena Nombre128202 . La tramitación del proceso en lo que fue incoado en contra de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena de Nombre128203 , pese a no haber tenido éxito la parte actora, se debió a la orden dictada por este Tribunal para que fuese integrada la litis pese a no haber causa en la demanda que hablase de algún conflicto existente entre aquella y la asociación indígena accionante, por lo que su participación, que se limitó a la contestación de la demanda, no habrá de generar costas en contra de la parte actora. El Juez Hess Araya salva su voto en cuanto a la condenatoria en contra del Estado-
POR TANTO
Se rechaza la prueba aportada para mejor resolver por parte de la representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural. Por mayoría se rechaza la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva interpuesta por la representación del Estado y por unanimidad la formulada por la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas. Se declara oficiosamente que media falta de legitimación activa en la asociación accionante para demandar en la presente causa la ejecución de lo fallado en el proceso judicial tramitado ante el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda en proceso tramitado bajo el expediente judicial número 86-000826-0178-CA. Se declara oficiosamente que media una falta de interés actual y en ese tanto, es improcedente la demanda exclusivamente en lo que se tuvo por la Autoridad Judicial incoada en contra de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Bribri de Talamanca. Se rechaza la excepción de falta de derecho interpuesta por el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural.
Por mayoría se declara parcialmente procedente la demanda en lo que fue incoada por la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre128202 en contra del Estado, el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos indígenas, debiéndose para todos los efectos entender denegada en todo lo que no sea concedido en este fallo, por lo que se hacen los siguientes pronunciamientos: a.) Por mayoría se condena al Estado a incluir a favor de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas en el Proyecto de Ley de Presupuesto Nacional de la República, los cien millones de colones que debió incluir, en aquellos que correspondían a los períodos presupuestarios de mil novecientos setenta y nueve, mil novecientos ochenta, mil novecientos ochenta y uno y mil novecientos ochenta y dos. La inclusión de esos dineros en el proyecto respectivo deberá de realizarse en cuatro tractos, a valor actual, y en cuatro períodos presupuestarios anuales consecutivos, el primero de los cuales deberá realizarse hasta vencido el período presupuestario posterior a aquel que se encuentre corriendo al momento en que adquiera firmeza la presente sentencia.
(Consecuentemente), por mayoría se ordena al Estado ejercer labores coordinadas, sistemáticas y efectivas con la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y la Comunidad Indígena Nombre128202 , que garanticen la ejecución de lo dispuesto en el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena. En ningún momento la Presidencia de la República, -sin perjuicio de las facultades constitucionales que asisten a la Contraloría General de la República-, podrán desentenderse del adecuado uso que le sea dado a ese fondo conforme la Ley. El juez Hess Araya salva el voto con relación a este extremo resolutorio; b.) Por unanimidad, se condena al Instituto de Desarrollo Rural a desplegar toda acción que resulte necesaria con cargo en su propio presupuesto, a fin de que se encuentre debidamente demarcada la reserva Indígena Nombre128202 , lo que deberá iniciar dentro de un plazo no menor a seis meses contados a partir de la fecha en que adquiera firmeza la presente sentencia.
Esas tareas deberán encontrarse concluidas, al menos seis meses luego de iniciadas. La demarcación deberá incluir el levantamiento de planos y cualquiera otro instrumento de ese corte, así como los estudios registrales, necesario para la efectiva inscripción registral posterior de los terrenos, permitiendo identificar si existen propiedades superpuestas sobre las áreas que comprende la reserva indígena de interés. Estas tareas deberán efectuarse con la coordinación de la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y la colaboración de la comunidad indígena actora, para lo cual, dicha comisión deberá interactuar con las autoridades indígenas a efecto de que no se genere obstáculo alguno que entorpezca la realización de las tareas ordenadas; c.) Por unanimidad se condena a la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas a desplegar toda actividad necesaria en directa, intensa y sistemática coordinación con la Asociación de Desarrollo integral de la Reserva Indígena Nombre128202 , y las autoridades de la Comunidad Indígena Nombre128202 , para que en concurso con éstas, mediante el levantamiento de un censo poblacional sea identificada cualquier persona no indígena que posea áreas de la superficie de la reserva indígena de interés, esto una vez demarcada la reserva indígena Nombre128202 y levantada la información registral y catastral respectiva por parte del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural.
El censo ordenado deberá encontrarse efectuado en su totalidad dentro del plazo de cuatro meses a partir de que se haya demarcado la reserva y se cuente con la información registral y catastral de interés y la determinación de qué personas titulares o poseedoras de tierras lo son de buena fe o no, deberá realizarse con plena participación de las autoridades de la comunidad indígena actora, la asociación que le representa, la CONAI y el INDER. Se dicta el presente fallo sin especial condenatoria en costas exclusivamente en lo que la demanda no prosperó en contra de la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de la Reserva Indígena Bribri de Talamanca; d.) Por mayoría se condena solidariamente al pago de ambas costas al Estado, al Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y a la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas. El juez Hess Araya salva el voto en cuanto a la condena en costas del Estado.- Notifíquese.- Felipe Córdoba Ramírez Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Christian Hess Araya Voto salvado del juez Hess Araya:
I.Salvo mi voto únicamente en cuanto a que el fallo que precede concluye que ha existido una conducta omisiva atribuible al Estado y, consecuentemente, acoge la acción respecto de él, en los términos del punto a) de la parte dispositiva; lo cual sustento como sigue.
II.El artículo 5 in fine de la Ley Indígena estipula: “Las expropiaciones e indemnizaciones serán financiadas con el aporte de cien millones de colones en efectivo, que se consignarán mediante cuatro cuotas anuales de veinticinco millones de colones cada una, comenzando la primera en el año de 1979; dichas cuotas serán incluidas en los presupuestos generales de la República de los años 1979, 1980, 1981 y 1982. El fondo será administrado por la CONAI, bajo la supervisión de la Contraloría General de la República.” En opinión del suscrito y en divergencia con el criterio de mi compañero y compañera de Tribunal (e incluso reconsiderando parcialmente lo que suscribí en la sentencia N° 198-2011-VI de la Sección Sexta), las estipulaciones transcritas –a pesar de encontrarse insertas en una norma cuyo contenido restante no posee ese carácter– fueron establecidas por el legislador con una vigencia puramente transitoria y, de hecho, en buena técnica legislativa debieron figurar en el apartado correspondiente al final de la ley, según es costumbre.
A partir tanto de su texto, como de la aplicación del principio de anualidad del ciclo presupuestario, estimo que la vigencia de dichas disposiciones precluyó al finalizar el ejercicio económico de 1982, sin que este Tribunal esté habilitado para restablecer su vigencia más de treinta años después, por noble que sea el propósito que inspiró su promulgación. Todo ello sin perjuicio de que: a) la norma omite señalar cuál es la fuente de financiamiento que habría de cubrir la erogación allí dispuesta, en infracción del principio de equilibrio presupuestario, reflexión marginal en la que no ahondo por ser propia de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y no de la de esta Cámara; y, b) resulta extraño, de toda suerte, que la administración del fondo fuera confiada a la CONAI, cuando era el ITCO (hoy INDER) quién debía efectuar y pagar las expropiaciones. Con lo dicho no pretendo desconocer ni los compromisos internacionales asumidos por el Estado costarricense en materia de tutela de las culturas autóctonas, ni las responsabilidades contenidas en la legislación de la materia.
Me limito a constatar una realidad, cual es que las reglas citadas fueron previstas para ser cumplidas dentro de un período preciso, que expiró sobradamente y que, en consecuencia, este órgano colegiado no puede compeler ahora a cumplir.-
III.Por lo demás, en el voto salvado que también consigné a la sentencia N° 53-2013-VII de este Tribunal, expresé las razones por las que estimo que la omisión –atribuida al Poder Ejecutivo– de prever determinadas partidas en los proyectos de Presupuesto ordinario o extraordinario de la República que remite a conocimiento de la Asamblea Legislativa, no constituye una conducta administrativa cuya fiscalización corresponda a esta jurisdicción; así como por qué considero que para este Tribunal no es posible compeler al Ejecutivo a actuar en sentido contrario (y menos aun determinando en cuántos tractos hacerlo), a pesar de que se trate de obligaciones presupuestarias de origen legal. Ciertamente, el dinero necesario para pagar las expropiaciones requeridas tiene que provenir de alguna parte y, por ende, en la medida en que el INDER no logre sufragarlas de su propio peculio, tendría que gestionar las transferencias presupuestarias necesarias.
Pero ello es muy distinto a que este Tribunal llegue al punto de ordenarle al Poder Ejecutivo que proceda en ese sentido, asumiendo una competencia que creo que no tiene. De toda suerte, nótese que en último extremo y para el evento de que no se comparta esta tesitura, opino que seguiría resultando aplicable a este caso lo que se dispuso en otro muy similar (bajo expediente N° 10-000275-1028-CA, resuelto con la ya citada sentencia N° 198-2011-VI), en donde se explicó que no es posible achacarle conducta omisiva al Poder Ejecutivo por no haber presupuestado y girado los dineros para las expropiaciones de personas no indígenas, ya que ello necesariamente supone que el IDA y la CONAI hayan satisfecho primero sus obligaciones relativas a determinar en qué casos debía procederse de esa manera, a efecto de gestionar posteriormente los recursos necesarios.-
IV.Finalmente, cabe agregar que a partir de la manera en que quedaron fijadas las pretensiones procesales en este asunto, solamente las numeradas 3 y 5 contienen pedimentos relativos al Estado: el primero persigue que éste inicie, junto con el IDA (hoy IDER) y la CONAI, “los estudios y avalúos citados, los trámites para las indemnizaciones (incluidas las posibles expropiaciones)”, deberes que la ley solo asigna a esas últimas dos entidades; mientras que el segundo es claramente improcedente por las razones que expresa el presente fallo y que comparto. En consecuencia, en la medida en que en el dispositivo de la sentencia “se ordena al Estado ejercer labores coordinadas, sistemáticas y efectivas con la Comisión Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas y el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y la Comunidad Indígena Nombre128202 , que garanticen la ejecución de lo dispuesto en el artículo 5 de la Ley Indígena”, se da a esta norma un alcance que no posee respecto del Estado, de donde no estimo jurídicamente sustentable el referido mandato.-
V.Por todo lo expresado, acojo la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva opuesta por el Estado, respecto del cual declaro improcedente la demanda, con la correlativa condena en costas a su favor. En lo demás, comparto el pronunciamiento que precede.-
CHRISTIAN HESS ARAYA
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