Strict liability for sugarcane field burning and damage to adjacent coffee plantationResponsabilidad objetiva por quema de cañal y daños a cafetal colindante

VOTE No. 815-F-03 VOTE No. 815-F-03 AGRARIAN TRIBUNAL OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSE. Goicoechea, at fourteen hours fifty minutes on December sixteenth, two thousand three.

ORDINARY proceeding processed before the AGRARIAN COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ALAJUELA, by AGRITEC SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, legal identification number CED1 - - , represented by [Name1] , of legal age, single, businesswoman, bearer of identity card number CED2 - - , and CAFENA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, legal identification number CED3 - - , represented by [Name2] , married, businessman, passport D CED4 , resident of San José, against AGRICOLA [Name3] LIMITADA, number three - one hundred two - one hundred eighteen seventy seventy-three, represented by [Name4] , of legal age, widow, businesswoman, bearer of identity card number CED5 - - , resident of [Name4] of Grecia, as manager with powers of a generalísima attorney-in-fact. Also intervening, in their capacity as special judicial attorneys-in-fact, are licensed attorney Ana Lorena Umaña Rojas, of legal age, married, lawyer, bearer of identity card number CED6 - - , resident of Grecia, and licensed attorney Fernando Morera Solano, of legal age, single, lawyer, bearer of identity card number CED7 - - , for the plaintiff and defendant, respectively.

WHEREAS:

1. The present proceeding, valued at exactly eight hundred thousand colones, seeks a judgment declaring: "1. That AGRICOLA [Name3] LTDA. be ordered to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to my clients by the described events, to be liquidated during the execution of the judgment, pursuant to expert appraisal, as a principal claim and not an accessory one, which consist of: - The value of the 152 damaged plants. - The value of their production over four years, considering an average harvest and an average price. - The interest my clients will cease to receive by not being able to collect, each year, the value of the crop from the plants, on a cumulative basis, until effective payment of the principal. - The cost of the seed, its planting, and care until the new plants reach the size of the damaged ones, including the labor and necessary inputs, over four years. 2. That AGRICOLA [Name3] LTDA. be ordered to pay both sets of costs of this proceeding.

2. The defendant company answered the complaint and raised the defenses of sine actione agit, lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of interest (falta de interés), and lack of standing (falta de legitimación ad causam), in its active and passive modes.

3. Licensed attorney Luis Rodrigo Campos Gamboa, Judge of First Instance, in a judgment at nine hours on April fifteenth, two thousand two, ordered: "THEREFORE: As has been set forth, I declare the ordinary agrarian complaint filed by CAFENA S.A. AND AGRITEC S.A. against the company AGRICOLA [Name3] LTDA. without merit in all its aspects and for the arguments put forward on the merits of this matter. Regarding the defenses of LACK OF RIGHT, LACK OF ACTIVE AND PASSIVE STANDING, AND LACK OF INTEREST, they are upheld. Costs are to be borne by the plaintiff. The requested security for costs (afianzamiento de costas) is rejected, by virtue of the fact that article 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure was declared Unconstitutional. Pp… " 4. The Tribunal hears this ruling by virtue of an appeal filed by the special judicial attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff. The legal requirements have been observed in the substantiation of the proceeding, and no defects or omissions are noted.

Judge Darcia Carranza writes; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- The Tribunal shares the facts deemed proven in the judgment rendered, as they are a faithful reflection of what occurred in the case file, with the exception of numbered point eight, since it is not proven that the fire originating on the farm of [Name5] was the one that burned the properties of Cafena S.A, Agritec S.A. and Agrícola [Name3] Limitada, and point five, as it is an evidentiary element for quantifying damages and not a fact per se. Likewise, numbered point six is not admitted, as it is not of interest for the resolution of this matter. Of that nature, the following are considered: 9) The laborers of the defendant, including its foreman by the name of [Name6], were, on February eleventh, nineteen ninety-seven, burning the cane field adjacent to the properties of the plaintiffs, (see testimonies of [Name7], [Name8], [Name9], [Name10], on pages 69, 70 verso, 78 verso, 79). 10) After noon on February eleventh, nineteen ninety-seven, [Name8] realized that part of the farms of Cafena S.A and Agritec S.A. were burning (see testimony of [Name8], [Name9], [Name10] pages 70 verso, 78 verso and 79). 11) The fire affected approximately one hundred to one hundred and three coffee bushes on the properties of the plaintiffs (see testimony of [Name11] on page 97, [Name12] 98 verso, [Name6] on page 99 verso). 12) The properties of Agrícola [Name3] Limitada, Cafena S.A., and Agritec S.A. are adjoining each other (see testimonial evidence from [Name12], [Name6], [Name10] on pages 62, 70 verso, 98 verso, 99 verso and expert report on page 23 and judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) on page 13).

II.- The fact deemed not proven in the judgment in question is not shared, as it is considered that there are precise, clear, and concordant indicia that the fire affecting the farms of Cafena S.A and Agritec S.A. started on the defendant's land, through the burning of a cane field carried out by its laborers. Of that nature, the following are considered: 1) The defendant does not demonstrate having had the respective permit to conduct burns, nor that it had notified the adjoining landowners that one would be conducted on the date pertaining to the events in litis. (there is no evidence to that effect).

III.- The plaintiff appeals, within the period established in article 59 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, the resolution at nine hours on April fifteenth, two thousand two, based on the following: 1) The judge criticizes the terms in which the complaint was drafted, in a way that is neither fair nor correct, as the corresponding brief, besides meeting all requirements, clearly indicates that there are properties of Cafena and Agritec S.A. adjoining those of the defendant, establishing their respective farm numbers, which in fact are grouped as a single productive unit. All the properties cited in the complaint are injured, since they are subdivided (fraccionados) into many lots for agricultural use, and for that reason, the two plaintiffs are managing the collection of their damages (daños y perjuicios). The witnesses for both parties clearly identify that the farm where the burn occurred belongs to the defendant, and the farms where the damaged coffee is located belong to the plaintiffs. On the other hand, it was established in point 3 of the complaint that the defendant company proceeded without a permit, without firebreaks (rondas), without taking safety measures, nor giving notice to the neighbors, so that the aspects of negligence and recklessness that later led to the citation of articles 1045 and 1048 of the Civil Code were indeed detailed. 2. According to the judgment, there is no proof that the fire started on the defendant's property. This, for the appellant, is not correct, as the application of the same principles of sound judgment (sana crítica) mentioned allows us to analyze the following: a. On February 11, 1997, laborers of the defendant company, under the supervision of its foreman (mandador), proceeded to burn a cane field belonging to Agrícola [Name3] Ltda., adjacent to the farms of the plaintiffs here, which in that part are planted with coffee. This core fact can be considered proven based on the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) conducted, and on the statements of [Name7] (page 69) and of all the witnesses, in addition to the photographs provided with the complaint and the response to the hearing on defenses, one of which shows the defendant's tractor, driven by one of its employees, working at the time of the fire. b. The witnesses clearly state that they saw the laborers of [Name3] "moving the fire from one side to another with wads of trash," an expression used by several declarants ([Name7], page 65 front, last line and verso; [Name8], on page 71, [Name9], on page 78, [Name10], page 79; [Name13], on page 94. The witness [Name8] emphatically points out on page 71 that THEY WERE BURNING AND NOT EXTINGUISHING, and states they had wads of lit leaves and were placing them from one side to another. [Name10] expresses the same, on page 79. c. Additionally, the declarants state that the person in charge was nearby ([Name7], page 65 verso) and even identify the defendant's foreman (mandador), as the man named [Name6], present at the site and a participant in the burn ([Name8], page 71 verso; [Name9], page 78 verso, [Name14] page 79). d. The ruling, according to the plaintiffs, deems it proven in point 6 that Cooperativa Victoria carried out plowing work on the same dates. However, it overlooks that the area was cleared using fire by the defendant's laborers to prepare it so that machinery from Cooperativa Victoria could do that work, as this company requires that lands be clear (Document on page 29, statement of [Name7] on pages 69 and 70; [Name8] page 71, [Name15], page 77, [Name9], page 78 verso, [Name10] on page 79 verso, [Name6] on page 100). The testimony of [Name15] stands out, who points out the Cooperativa's modus operandi, which must schedule the dispatch of the machines in advance, and indicates that on March 18, March 23, and April 24, 1997 (that is, after the date of the events that occurred on February 11, 1997), the Cooperativa performed plowing (arada), harrowing (rastrea), and furrowing (zurcada) on the property of Mrs. [Name4]. He further indicates that the only known method for clearing land where there has been sugarcane is by burning. e. The existence of the Burning Law (Ley de Quemas), which was violated, is considered fundamental. The defendant did not obtain any permit from the authorities to conduct the burn (it presented no evidence to that effect), nor did it create the so-called firebreaks (rondas), no safety measure was taken, nor was notice given to the neighbors, including my clients ([Name7] page 65, [Name8], page 71, [Name9], page 78 verso). f. It was proven that the employees of [Name3] Ltda. were burning the trash left after the sugarcane had been manually cut on the site. See statements of [Name7], page 70 verso; [Name8] page 71, [Name9], page 78. g. It was demonstrated that at [Address1] several cane field burns were conducted to clear lands, some of which were replanted with coffee ([Name8], pages 71 and 72; [Name9], page 78 verso; [Name10], page 79 verso; [Name13], page 94, [Name11], on page 98, [Name12], on page 99, who even mentions an Engineer from Cooperativa Victoria; [Name6], on page 99 verso, [Name6] on page 100). h. Faced with all this evidence, cited in detail, the judgment gives more credence to the deposition of a single witness, an employee of a sister of Mrs. [Name4], who said the fire started on the property of [Name5]. The appellant states that the defendant argues the burn was not carried out by its laborers and foreman, or that it was the product of the action of unscrupulous individuals; no evidence was provided to that effect, and rather, there is abundant evidence to the contrary, already mentioned above, which points to the clear action of its employees. The statement of Mr. [Name11], which is given so much importance in the judgment, is, rather, contradictory to [Name3]'s previous argumentation. This witness [Name11] refers to a fire on the property of [Name5], which has nothing to do with the events described here, and said that when he passed by Mrs. [Name4]'s farm, the fire was already over, therefore he contributes nothing nor contradicts what has already been indicated as proven. It is evident that the Judge did not take the foregoing into account, and it involved completely different historical and factual moments. Mr. [Name11] himself says he counted 103 completely unusable bushes, and the curious thing about it is what he stated regarding the fact that he conducted that count at the request of and in the company of the defendant's foreman (mandador), which reflects that the latter well knew her fault in the matter. For otherwise, what would the interest have been in counting the plants. i. It states that Agrícola [Name3] Ltda. had contracted with Cooperativa Victoria for a series of works on that land, which could only be done if it was completely clear, for which reason they proceeded to burn it. Such a burn was not accidental nor the work of third parties, and because most of the cane had already been cut, the trash and leaves were grouped in mounds. It was these mounds that were burned intentionally, and under those circumstances – unlike what occurs with standing cane – the fire does not run; however, the entire lot, from side to side, appears burned, which implies intentionality, to the extreme that parts of the planted coffee belonging to the same defendant were even damaged. Its laborers and foreman (mandador) were at the site from the start of the fire and were responsible for carrying it to all ends of the lot, in plain sight and with the patience of several people. The Judge took none of this into account, and for this reason, the appellant indicates, the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) were not applied. 10. Analyzing the defendant's evidence, we find that [Name12] mentions a firebreak (ronda) (which everyone else denied) but one made after the fact, which therefore does not relieve the defendant of responsibility. In any case, he is unaware of how the fire originated. [Name16] arrived around ten-thirty in the morning, therefore, he cannot account for what happened before (pages 206 to 209).

IV.- Our legal system contains several provisions that expressly and directly refer to agricultural burns and wildfires and the liability originating from them. We have, therefore: a) Law on Fences and Burning (Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas), No. 121 of October 26, 1909: Its Article 5 prohibits conducting burns in the countryside. It only authorizes them when it involves clearing land (desmontes) to make it suitable for agricultural purposes. To do so, one must: 1) Request a permit from the local political authority; 2) Have guarantees and precautions to avoid greater destruction than intended or harm to third parties; 3) Personally notify, or through a notice from the authority, all adjoining landowners or interested parties of the day and time of the burn, at least two days in advance; 4) Leave a minimum distance of 400 meters from springs (nacientes) originating in the hills, and 200 meters from springs (nacientes) on flat land. Regarding liability, it expressly indicates that, in any case, whoever conducts burns must pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by the fire. The owner, possessor, or lessee who, at the time of the fire, had prepared the land for that purpose, is presumed to be the author of the burn. B) The current Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, in its Chapter IV on "Forestry Protection," prohibits conducting burns on forest lands and lands adjacent to them, without having obtained a permit from the State Forestry Administration. It refers to the Penal Code to sanction anyone who conducts a burn without a permit (Article 35). Likewise, articles 59 and 60 respectively sanction causing a forest fire intentionally or negligently, with penalties of one to three years in the first case and three months to two years in the second. C) Regulations to the Forestry Law (Reglamento a la Ley Forestal), Decree No. 25721-MINAE of October 17, 1996: Establishes that the Forestry Administration official must visit the site prior to granting a burn permit (Article 34). D) Law on the Use, Management, and Conservation of Soils (Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos), No. 7779 of April 30, 1998: Requires that, for conducting burns on agricultural land, the instructions of the MAG be followed in accordance with the permit issued for those purposes, pursuant to the current Burning Regulations, as well as the provisions of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) and the Penal Code (Article 24). E) Regulations for the Use, Management, and Conservation of Soils (Reglamento al Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos), Decree No. 29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT of August 8, 2000: In its Chapter X titled "On Agricultural Burns" (De las quemas agrarias), it stipulates that the MAG, in coordination with MINAE and the Ministry of Security, will issue the fundamental principles under which the practice of agricultural burns may be authorized. Its Article 86 expressly requires prior permission from the MAG to conduct burns on land designated for agricultural use, which must grant a hearing to the respective conservation area of MINAE, so it can issue its opinion on the repercussions on the biota and ecosystems. It even indicates that tacit approval (silencio positivo) does not apply regarding MINAE's opinion. As for forest lands, buffer zones (zonas protectoras), national parks, and wildlife refuges, it prohibits conducting burns (Article 88). F) Decree No. 17015-MAG, of May 2, 1986: Created the National Commission for Forest Fires. Said Commission, according to Decree No. 19434-MIRENEM of December 11, 1990, has the authority to recommend national policies and prepare forest fire prevention and combat programs. G) Decree No. 21859-MIRENEN of December 7, 1992: Established the Guanacaste Fire Committee as a body for coordination, support, and monitoring of the Forest Fire Program of the Huetar Norte Region. H) Decree No. 23850-MAG-SP of November 4, 1994, Regulations for controlled burns for agricultural and livestock purposes: Establishes the minimum requirements for conducting burns and fires, especially on land for agricultural or livestock use. It defines a burn as a fire that is intentionally set, regulated by a pre-established plan, in which all preventive measures are taken to avoid damage to natural resources and the properties of adjoining landowners. Fires are those that, naturally or artificially, affect forests, forest lands, agricultural lands, or lands for livestock use (Article 1). To conduct burns on agricultural and livestock land, written authorization from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock must be obtained. The official, in addition to the measures already taken and approved according to the visit that must be conducted prior to the permit, must indicate, if granted, any additional measures deemed necessary (Articles 2 and 3). Article 6 establishes the following minimum requirements: 1) Determine, by means of firebreak rings (rondas corta fuegos) (an area with a width double the height of the combustible material, as indicated by the same Decree), the area to be burned and the combustible materials used; 2) create and sweep a firebreak ring (ronda corta fuego) along the perimeter of the area to be burned, which cannot be less than one meter wide; 3) have sufficient water and tools to extinguish the fire in case of emergency. Additionally, one may: 4) give prior notice to the Local Police Directorate regarding the date and time of the burn; 5) have the assistance of at least one person; 6) conduct the burn against the wind and against the slope after 1600 hours and before 0700 hours, avoiding doing it on windy days; 7) verify before leaving that the fire is completely out. But regardless of whether the respective permit is held or not, the Decree clearly establishes in its Article 7 that: "The person who conducts a burn, whether with or without a permit, shall be civilly liable for the damages (daños y perjuicios) that may be caused, in accordance with Articles 41 and 50 of our Political Constitution and the rules on non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual) that govern our legal system." I) Finally, "the general provisions contained in articles 1045 and following of the Civil Code, on non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual), are of supplementary application to this matter" (see judgment of the First Chamber No. 112 of 15:50 on October 11, 1995). In the criminal field, the current Penal Code punishes with a fine of 3 to 30 days whoever contravenes the provisions aimed at preventing fires or avoiding their spread (subsection 1 of Article 407), and whoever infringes the rules on the burning of weeds, stubble, or other products of the land (subsection 2).

V.Modern doctrine, for its part, has supported the objectification of liability, by including within the factors of imputability and legal attribution of damage, apart from fault (culpa) and malice (dolo), risk. It has even been proposed to include other objective factors such as: guarantee, equity, abuse of right, and excess of normal tolerance between neighbors. Damage is then seen not from the author's act but from the position of the injured party, to ensure that all unjustly caused damage is repaired. From another point of view, fault has been separated from the unlawfulness of the act, giving the latter a more important role. "Once the equivalence between the unlawfulness of the act and fault was broken, the conduct acquired an autonomous appearance detached from the subjective profile of the agent's will, to constitute a simple means, cause, or criterion of connection between a subject held liable and a certain damaging event to be compensated." (Franzoni (Massimo), La Actividad peligrosa, in Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.120). Thus, the Theory of Risk is discussed, which does not displace fault but complements it, and is summarized as the duty of whoever creates a risk to compensate for the damage they cause to a third party. "Risk is a cause of imputability when, due to the performance of certain causes and determined activities, classified as dangerous, damage occurs. The damage under these circumstances must be compensated, not because its agent incurred in malice (dolo) or fault (culpa), but because the legal order must protect the community from the development of dangerous activities, so that whoever carries them out incurs liability if damage is caused by virtue of such performance... Liability derived from risk does not depend on the malice (dolo) or fault (culpa) of the agent but originates in the mere occurrence of damage resulting from the dangerous activity. This consideration brings a special regime of evidence, according to which, by the mere exercise of the unsafe activity, the fault of the agent is presumed, exonerating the victim from the task of demonstrating improper conduct. The agent must rebut the presumption..." ([Name17], Hecho imputable dañoso in Del daño, Editora Jurídica, 1st Ed., Colombia, 2001, p.260). For other authors, "the causal relationship is an element of the unlawful act and contractual breach that directly links the damage with the unlawful act, and indirectly with the element of subjective imputation or objective attribution. It is the binding factor that makes damage and fault, or risk, as the case may be, integrate into the unity of the act that is the source of the compensation obligation" (see [Name18] (), El perfil de la responsabilidad civil al finalizar el siglo XX in Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.24 to 26).

VI.Precisely, the conducting of burns – regardless of their purpose – is an undeniably risky activity. Therefore, in accordance with the cited doctrine, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has clearly indicated: "VII.- Burns can entail, for whoever produces them, civil and criminal liabilities. Civil liability is regulated in the Law on Burning and Fences (Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias) by establishing the obligation, on whoever conducts burns, to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused as a consequence of the fire (Article 5, paragraph 4). The owner, possessor, or lessee of the land who, at the time of the fire, had prepared it for that purpose, is presumed to be the author of the burn... VIII.- The Constitutional Chamber, through Vote No. 3459 of 14 hours 42 minutes on July 20, 1993, established the repeal of Article 5, fifth paragraph, of the Law on Burning and Fences (Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias) regarding criminal liability... The same Constitutional Chamber (Vote No. 439-I-95 of 14:36 hours on August 22, 1995) clarified the mentioned judgment No. 3459-93 in the sense that Article 5, paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Law on Fences and Burning (Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas) is repealed only regarding the criminal aspects it contains... IX.- The regulations on burns and fires follow the criterion of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Fault is presumed in whoever created the conditions for the damage by having assumed the risk of harming third parties with the burn or fire. The damages (daños y perjuicios) caused are at their expense. The injured party is exempt from proving fault. The burden of proof regarding the absence of fault corresponds to whoever burned or ignited. It is an iuris tantum presumption. Force majeure, the fault of the victim, or the act of a third party would be grounds for exemption from liability. X. Whoever, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of damage, accepts the effects of the contingency, assumes the risk. Liability is based on creating the risk of damage. By starting the activity, through the use of their things, the subject increases, enhances, or multiplies the possibilities of danger. Even when it may involve lawful conduct, whoever assumed the risk must always compensate the damage. There is even greater reason to impute liability if the act originates from unlawful conduct. The injured party cannot assume damages for conduct not prompted by themselves, unless they placed themselves in conditions to suffer the damage. Whoever burns or ignites, even with the authorization of the corresponding authority, cannot be exempted from liability. This is so because, although the Law on Burning and Fences (Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias) No. 121 of October 26, 1909, establishes the guidelines for authorizing burns on agricultural land, and establishes a series of obligations regarding the person requesting the authorization, this does not break the presumption of culpability. The requirements for authorizing burns aim to ensure minimum risk. It is a precautionary measure, but it is not an exemption from liability. Therefore, compliance with the essential requirements for authorization cannot harm the neighbors if the disaster occurs. In this way, the damages to the goods, crops, or the persons themselves, of the neighbors must be compensated by whoever created the conditions of risk with the fire or burn. XI. The activity of burning or igniting, in itself, is directed against Nature. It is a recourse of primitive agriculture where fire tends to replace human labor. Instead of using human or mechanical means to promote agricultural activity, a destructive element is resorted to, in order to, upon the ashes of what was destroyed, begin the cultivation of plants or the raising of animals. These types of actions are incompatible with current values. It threatens safety insofar as it risks the property of adjoining landowners, their goods, and persons. It equally threatens the values of environmental protection. The economic and social function of property also entails an ecological function: agriculture must develop in harmony, and not in antagonism, with Nature. For the preservation of the environment, social solidarity demands the devising of new mechanisms to prevent damage and threatening acts. This is the philosophy of the reform of Article 50 of the Political Constitution. On these guidelines, the Law on Burning and Fences (Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias) and the entire problem of liability arising from that activity must be analyzed." (see judgment No. 112 of 15 hours 50 minutes on October 11, 1995. In the same sense, No. 113 at 16 hours on October 11, 1995).

VII.The Chamber also clarified in the cited judgments that the obligation to compensate the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by burns, and the fact that the presumption of liability falls upon whoever prepared the land for that purpose, cannot be limited to the case of clearing land (desmontes). "Although it is true that Article 5 of the Law on Fences and Burning (Ley de Cercas y Quemas Divisorias) establishes the general prohibition against conducting burns in the countryside, authorizing them when it involves clearing land (desmontes) to make it suitable for agricultural purposes (first paragraph), this does not undermine the possibility of carrying out said activity under other conditions and for other purposes, as current reality demonstrates. For that reason, the same Law establishes, in the fourth paragraph of article 5, a generic liability when it indicates: 'In any case, whoever conducts burns must pay the damages (daños y perjuicios)...'. Which fits perfectly within the generic principle of not causing harm to others. In this case, the damages are at the defendant's expense because it assumed the risk of harming its adjoining landowners with the burn. By initiating its activity, preparing the land to be burned, it increased the possibilities of danger. It was unlawful conduct because it did not have authorization from the corresponding administrative authorities, as corroborated in the proven facts."

It did not take the minimum precautions, required by law, to prevent greater damage than that normally produced. Although it took some precautionary measures—the creation of firebreaks (rondas)—this is not sufficient to exempt it from its responsibility to indemnify the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused to the plaintiff. The only way to free itself from said responsibility was to demonstrate the existence of fault by the victim, a fortuitous event (caso fortuito), or the act of a third party, which it did not do. Even though the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias dates from 1909, its interpretation must be verified in accordance with articles 10 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). The modern interpretation (systematic, material, and evolutionary) requires adapting the content of the rule to the historical circumstances and the social and economic reality in which it will be applied. To do this, the principles and values contained in the Constitution, as well as in special agrarian laws, must be taken into account." (see ruling N° 112-95 cited).

VIII.In accordance with what has been explained, it is possible to carry out burns on lands with agricultural vocation (vocación agropecuaria) as long as the requirements established in our legal system are met, among them, taking sufficient precautionary measures to control the fire, requesting prior permission from the respective public entities, especially the relevant office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería), and notifying the owners or managers of the neighboring properties. This last requirement is of utmost importance, because even if all possible measures are taken, natural phenomena such as wind, air currents, and others, can cause the fire to spread to other areas outside those originally intended to be burned. The notification of adjoining landowners seeks to minimize or prevent, precisely, the fire from spreading, producing greater damage, since it enables better vigilance by the neighbors on their own lands, and allows them to be prepared to fight it if necessary. That being said, even in the case of having taken all possible precautions and having permission, whoever originates or causes a burn that produces damages to third parties is responsible for them. The foregoing is so because it concerns a hazardous activity. The liability is of an objective type as already explained.

IX.- In the case at hand, testimonial evidence was produced and the deponents [Nombre7], [Nombre8], [Nombre9], [Nombre10] were unanimous in affirming that at six in the morning on February eleventh, nineteen ninety-seven, when they were going to work, they observed the laborers (peones) of Mrs. [Nombre4] burning a cane field (cañal) within her properties, who were passing the fire with clumps of trash (mechones de basura) from one side to the other within said planted field (see folios 69 to 72 and 78 to 79). They also declared that they were later notified the fire had spread to the properties of Cafena S.A. and Agritec S.A., and they proceeded to put out the fire and to throw logs onto the already burned part, to prevent it from spreading. In the present case, the trial court judge bases his reasoning on the declaration given by Mr. [Nombre11], to indicate the fire started on a farm owned by Mrs. [Nombre4]'s sister, named [Nombre5], and considers it unproven that the fire was started on the farm of the defendant company Agrícola [Nombre3] S.A.. For this reason, it is considered necessary to analyze such testimony. Said deponent stated: "…That was the eleventh or twelfth of February, nineteen ninety-seven, I was notified by a son of a brother of mine that in the property of [Nombre5] a cane field was burning. At that moment I did not have the means to go to the place, that is, I had no vehicle so I called a laborer and at about eight-fifteen at night a laborer arrived to notify me of the burning of the cane field. This laborer is [Nombre19] (sic) and I told him I had no driver, he came by car and offered to take me, when we arrived at the point where it was burning, after a while Mrs. [Nombre5]'s chapulinista arrived. Then we began to fight the fire… we applied counterfire (contrafuego) so both fires would go out and at about ten at night the fire was over. Our surprise was the next day, and we moved there at about five-thirty in the morning in the farm's pick up, and when we were passing by the farm of Mrs. [Nombre4] I observed that the cane part was totally burned and in what way it happened I could not say… The cane part of the adjoining boundary where we passed, the division is not seen and there was a bit of standing but burned cane… These events occurred in the month of February, Sunday the burn was at Mrs. [Nombre5]'s and Monday at [Nombre4]'s. On the farm of [Nombre4] and Mr. [Nombre13] there is an adjoining boundary, on this gentleman's adjoining boundary what there is is coffee… At noon we passed by the same place where the cane had been burned and there were cane cutters. At that moment the cane is usable and can be delivered. In that sector, burning cane was not customary… About fifteen or twenty days later the overseer (mandador) [Nombre6], from the farm of Mrs. [Nombre4], came to my house and asked me if I could go with him so that we could count (sic) on the adjoining boundary on the [Nombre13] side and count (sic) the coffee plants that were already inactive on this gentleman's farm. We walked there and we were counting and there were plants that were not really burned, it was a matter of pruning them and the plant served and we counted one hundred three plants that nothing could be done, it was a matter of removing the trunk and putting in another plant. That coffee was pruned, it was about five years old… The first ones that could be pruned they did not count…" (folio 94). From what was said by this witness, this Tribunal considers that the same conclusions reached by the lower court (a quo) cannot be reached, since he indicates that on the eleventh or twelfth of February nineteen eighty-seven at night, at about eight-thirty, he arrived to see the burn on the property of Mrs. [Nombre5] and was putting out the fire until it went out at about ten at night. He also indicated it was the next day that he saw the burning cane field of Mrs. [Nombre4]. Such deposition does not agree with the facts charged here, as it is indicated the coffee plantation (cafetal) was burned on February eleventh, nineteen ninety-seven, without specifying the exact time the fire spread from one property to another, but that at about twelve noon on February eleventh of the cited year, the coffee plantation on the lands of the plaintiff companies here had already been burned. Furthermore, from what was said by the witnesses [Nombre7], [Nombre8], [Nombre9], [Nombre10], that same day in the morning hours, the laborers of Mrs. [Nombre4] were lighting fire to the cane field adjoining the coffee plantation of the plaintiffs here. From the foregoing, from the deponent [Nombre11], the conclusion given by the lower court cannot be reached, in that the fire started on the farm of Mrs. [Nombre5] and relating it as he does with the burning of the cane field of Mrs. [Nombre4] and therefore with the damages caused to the coffee plantation of the plaintiffs. What is made clear is that the defendant, through its laborers, was the one who carried out the burning of a cane field on its lands contiguous to the properties of the plaintiffs here, by which damages were caused to the coffee plantation located on their lands, as stated by the witnesses [Nombre7], [Nombre8], [Nombre9], [Nombre10]; this occurred on February 11, 1997. In the report rendered by the expert [Nombre20], it is indicated that the distance between the coffee plants located on the lands of the plaintiffs and the burned cane field on the defendant's estate was less than four meters, on the properties of Agritec S.A., and from six to eight meters with respect to the properties of Cafena S.A. (folio 24), therefore this Tribunal considers, being such a short distance, the fire could easily spread from one property to another. Moreover, as indicated by the mentioned witnesses, there were no firebreaks (rondas corta fuego). All of this constitutes serious, precise, and concordant circumstantial evidence (indicios) that the fire passed from the defendant's farm to the neighboring properties of the plaintiff companies. On the other hand, the act of a third party as an exonerating cause of liability is not demonstrated, as interpreted by the lower court in the issued judgment, for the reason that there is no evidence in the record of such circumstances, especially after analyzing the testimony of Mr. Arley Bolaños, upon which the trial court judge bases his judgment and from which the conclusion he reached cannot be deduced, viewing the evidence as a whole.

X.- From what was said in the aforementioned expert report, it cannot really be determined how many coffee plants were damaged in the coffee plantations of Agritec S.A. and Cafena S.A. In that report, the quantity of burned coffee plants is not proven, but rather reference is made for its valuation to 81 plants on the farm of Cafena S.A. and 79 plants on the lands of Agritec S. A., according to what was stated in the complaint. Due to the foregoing, it is necessary to review the rest of the probative elements, to be able to determine the quantity of coffee plants damaged. The witness [Nombre11] indicated that some one hundred three coffee plants were burned, but without specifying exactly on the lands of which of the plaintiffs the damaged plants were counted (folio 97). The deponent [Nombre6] said: "some one hundred plants were burned between scorched (chasparreadas) and burned," without indicating either on which of the plaintiffs' lands it occurred (folio 99). In the same vein, Mr. Maynor Navarro Alvarado declared (folio 98 verso), referring to having observed some one hundred coffee plants burned. The same was said by [Nombre10] "As a result of that burn, some eighty coffee plants were burned on each side, I clarify from eighty to one hundred plants" (folio 79). From what was said by the witnesses [Nombre16] and [Nombre9], it can be determined that an average of between eighty and one hundred coffee plants were destroyed on the lands owned by Cafena S.A. (see folios 78 front and back). The judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) conducted is also not precise as to the quantity of coffee plants burned, stating "…On the farm of Cafena S.A., an area of coffee is observed whose plants are dry as a product of the same burn… From this sector of the farm we departed towards the north of the main road of the Agritec S.A. farm, on [Dirección2], and I observe in sectors coffee plants burned all along the fence…" (folio 13). From the foregoing, only the burning of some one hundred coffee plants has been demonstrated, and not one hundred fifty-two, as indicated by the plaintiffs in the complaint brief (folio 5), in which it was indicated that 79 plants were burned on the lands of Agritec S.A. and 81 on those of Cafena S.A.. For the reasons set forth above, the issued sentence must be reversed and in its place the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho) must be rejected, since the plaintiff party has proven damages were caused to its coffee plantations and therefore has the right to collect for them; the defenses of lack of passive and active standing (falta de legitimación pasiva y activa) must also be rejected because it is clear the plaintiffs have active standing to bring the present process by virtue of having their assets diminished, having caused damages to their crops, and they have demonstrated the fire started in the defendant's cane field, as its laborers set fire to it and it later spread to the crops of its adjoining landowners. For the same reasons, the defense of lack of interest (falta de interés) raised by the defendant is rejected. Based on the foregoing: 1) The damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused to one hundred coffee plants are approved to be liquidated in the execution of the sentence, distributed as follows: a) The value of the 81 plants located on the lands of Cafena and 19 plants located on the lands of Agritec S.A., b) The value of the production lost during a period of four years, which is the replacement time for the plantation while it reaches its fullness for harvesting. 2) The defendant Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada is ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this process.

POR TANTO:

The issued sentence is reversed. In its place, the defenses of lack of right, lack of passive and active standing, and lack of interest raised by the defendant are rejected. The complaint filed by Agritec S.A. and Cafena S.A. against Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada is partially granted, condemning it to pay the damages and losses caused, in the following manner: 1) The damages and losses caused to one hundred coffee plants are approved to be liquidated in the execution of the sentence, distributed as follows: a) The value of the 81 plants located on the lands of Cafena and 19 plants located on the lands of Agritec S.A., b) The value of the production lost during a period of four years, which is the replacement time for the plantation while it reaches its fullness for harvesting. 2) The defendant Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada is ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this process. 3) The rest of the claims are denied.

ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA CARLOS BOLAÑOS CÉSPEDES RUTH ALPÍZAR RODRÍGUEZ Ordinary Proceeding (Ordinario) Cafena S. A c/ Agrícola [Nombre3] Ltda.

rgr 11) The fire affected approximately one hundred to one hundred and three coffee plants on the plaintiffs' properties (see testimony of [Nombre11] at folio 97, [Nombre12] at folio 98 verso, [Nombre6] at folio 99 verso). 12) The properties of Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada, Cafena S.A., and Agritec S.A. are adjacent to each other (see testimonial evidence of [Nombre12], [Nombre6], [Nombre10] at folios 62, 70 verso, 98 verso, 99 verso and expert report at folio 23 and judicial inspection at folio 13) **II.-** We do not share the fact held as not proven in the judgment under appeal, considering that there are precise, clear, and concordant indications that the fire that affected the farms of Cafena S.A. and Agritec S.A. started on the defendant's land, through a burn of a cane field carried out by its peons. Of such nature, consider the following: 1) The defendant does not demonstrate having had the respective permit to conduct burns, nor that it had notified the adjacent landowners that one was going to be carried out on the date subject to the facts in litigation. (there is no evidence to that effect).

**III.-** The plaintiff appeals within the time limit contemplated in numeral 59 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, the resolution issued at nine o'clock on April fifteenth, two thousand two, based on the following: **1)** The judge criticizes the terms in which the complaint was drafted, in a manner that is neither fair nor correct because the corresponding brief, in addition to meeting all the requirements, clearly indicates that there are properties of Cafena and Agritec S.A. adjacent to those of the defendant, establishing their respective farm numbers, which are in fact grouped together as a single productive unit. All the estates cited in the complaint are harmed, as they are subdivided into many lots for agricultural use, and for that reason, the two plaintiffs are managing the collection of their damages. The witnesses of both parties clearly identify the farm where the burn occurred as belonging to the defendant, and the farms where the damaged coffee is located as belonging to the plaintiffs. Moreover, it was indeed established in fact 3 of the complaint that the defendant company proceeded without a permit, without firebreaks (rondas), without taking safety measures, and without notifying the neighbors, so the aspects of negligence and imprudence that later led to the citation of articles 1045 and 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) were detailed. **2.** According to the judgment, there is no proof that the fire started on the defendant's property. Such a thing, for the appellant, is not correct, because the application of the same principles of sound judgment (sana crítica) mentioned allows us to analyze the following: a. On February 11, 1997, peons of the defendant company, under the supervision of its foreman (mandador), proceeded to carry out the burn of a cane field owned by Agrícola [Nombre3] Ltda. Adjacent to the farms of the plaintiffs here, which in that part are cultivated with coffee. This core fact can be considered proven based on the judicial inspection conducted, and on the statements of [Nombre7] (folio 69) and of all the witnesses, in addition to the photographs provided with the complaint and the response to the hearing on exceptions, one of which allows observing the defendant's tractor, driven by one of its employees, engaged in tasks at the time of the fire. b. The witnesses clearly state having seen the peons of [Nombre3] "pass the fire from one side to the other with tufts of trash", an expression used by several declarants ([Nombre7], folio 65 front, last line and verso; [Nombre8], at folio 71, [Nombre9], at folio 78, [Nombre10], folio 79; [Nombre13], at folio 94. The witness [Nombre8] emphatically points out at folio 71 that THEY WERE BURNING AND NOT EXTINGUISHING, and asserts they had tufts of leaves lit and were placing them from one side to the other. [Nombre10] expresses the same, at folio 79. c. Furthermore, the declarants indicate that the person in charge was nearby ([Nombre7], folio 65 verso) and they even identify the defendant's foreman, as the gentleman named [Nombre6], present at the site and participant in the burn ([Nombre8], folio 71 verso; [Nombre9], folio 78 verso, [Nombre14] folio 79). d. The ruling, according to the plaintiffs, considers it proven in fact 6 that Cooperativa Victoria carried out plowing work on the same dates. However, it disregards that the area was cleared using fire by the defendant's peons, to prepare it so that machinery from Cooperativa Victoria could perform those jobs, since this company requires the land to be clean (Document at folio 29, statement of [Nombre7] at folio 69 and 70; [Nombre8] folio 71, [Nombre15], folio 77, [Nombre9], folio 78 verso, [Nombre10] at folio 79 verso, [Nombre6] at folio 100). Particularly noteworthy is the testimony of [Nombre15], who points out the modus operandi of the Cooperative, which must schedule the dispatch of machines in advance, and indicates that on March 18, March 23, and April 24, 1997 (that is, after the date of the events that occurred on February 11, 1997) the Cooperative carried out plowing (arada), harrowing (rastrea), and furrowing (zurcada) on the property of Mrs. [Nombre4]. Furthermore, he indicates that the only known method for clearing land where there has been sugarcane is through burning. e. It considers the existence of the Ley de Quemas fundamental, which was violated. The defendant did not obtain any permit from the authorities to carry out the burn (it presented no evidence to that effect), nor did it create the so-called firebreaks (rondas), no safety measure was taken, nor were the neighbors notified, including my clients ([Nombre7] folio 65, [Nombre8], folio 71, [Nombre9], Folio 78 verso). f. It was accredited that the employees of [Nombre3] Ltda. were burning the trash left after having manually cut the cane in the place. See statements of [Nombre7], folio 70 verso; [Nombre8] folio 71, [Nombre9], folio 78. g. It was demonstrated that in [Dirección1] several burns of cane fields were carried out to clear land, some of which were replanted with coffee ([Nombre8], folio 71 and 72; [Nombre9], folio 78 verso; [Nombre10], folio 79 verso; [Nombre13], folio 94, [Nombre11], at folio 98, [Nombre12], at folio 99, who even mentions an Engineer from Cooperativa Victoria; [Nombre6], at folio 99 verso, [Nombre6] at folio 100). h. In the face of all this evidence, cited in detail, the judgment gives more credit to the deposition of a single witness, an employee of a sister of Mrs. [Nombre4], who said the fire started on the property of [Nombre5]. It points out, the defendant argues, the burn was not carried out by its peons and foreman, or that it was the product of the action of unscrupulous individuals; no evidence was provided to that effect and rather there is abundant evidence to the contrary, already pointed out above, which leads to the clear action of its employees. The statement of Mr. [Nombre11], to which so much importance is given in the judgment, is rather contradictory to the previous argumentation of [Nombre3]. This witness [Nombre11] alludes to a fire on the property of [Nombre5], which has nothing to do with the facts described here, and said that when he passed by Mrs. [Nombre4]'s farm the fire was already consummated, therefore it contributes nothing nor contradicts what has already been indicated as demonstrated. It is evident that the Judge did not take the foregoing into account, and these were totally different historical and factual moments. The same Mr. [Nombre11] says he counted 103 plants that were completely unusable, and the curious thing about this is what he indicated regarding that said count was made at the request and in the company of the defendant's foreman, which reflects that the latter well knew its fault in the matter. For otherwise, what would have been the interest in counting the plants. i. It says, Agrícola [Nombre3] Ltda. had contracted a series of jobs on that land with Cooperativa Victoria, which could only be done if it was totally clean, for which reason they proceeded to burn it. Such a burn was not accidental nor the work of third parties, and because most of the cane had already been cut, the trash and leaves were grouped in mounds. It was these mounds that were burned intentionally (ex profeso), and in those circumstances – unlike what occurs with standing cane – the fire does not run; however, the entirety of the lot, from side to side, is observed burned, which implies intentionality, to the extreme that parts of planted coffee belonging to the same defendant were even damaged. Its peons and foreman were at the place from the start of the fire and were responsible for carrying it to all ends of the lot, in plain view and with the patience of several people. The Judge took none of this into account, therefore it indicates, the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica) were left unapplied. 10. Analyzing the defendant's evidence we find that [Nombre12] mentions a firebreak (ronda) (which everyone else denied) but made a posteriori, for which reason it does not absolve the defendant of liability. In any case, he is unaware of how the fire originated. [Nombre16] arrived at around ten-thirty in the morning, therefore, he cannot account for what happened before (folio 206 to 209).

**IV.-** Our legal system contains several provisions that expressly and directly refer to burns and forest fires and the liability arising from them. We thus have: a) **Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas, No. 121 of October 26, 1909:** Its article 5 prohibits making burns in the fields. It only authorizes them when dealing with clearing land (desmontes) to enable land for agricultural purposes: For this, one must: 1) Request a permit from the local political authority, 2) Have guarantees and precautions to avoid greater destruction than intended or harm to third parties, 3) Notify personally or by order of the authority to all adjacent landowners or interested parties the day and time of the burn, at least two days in advance, 4) Leave a minimum distance of 400 meters around springs (manantiales) originating in the hills, and 200 meters around springs on flat land. In terms of liability, it expressly indicates that, in any case, whoever carries out burns must pay the damages caused by the fire. The owner, possessor, or lessee who at the time of the fire was prepared for that purpose is presumed to be the author of the burn. B) **The current Ley Forestal, No. 7575 of February 13, 1996,** in its Chapter IV on “Forest Protection” prohibits carrying out burns on forest lands and those adjacent to them, without having obtained permission from the State Forest Administration. It refers to the Penal Code (Código Penal) to sanction anyone who carries out a burn without a permit (article 35). Likewise, numerals 59 and 60 respectively sanction causing a forest fire willfully (dolosa) or negligently (culposa), with penalties of one to three years in the first case and three months to two years in the second. C) **Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, Decreto N°25721-MINAE of October 17, 1996:** It establishes that the official of the Forest Administration must visit the place before granting a burn permit (article 34). D) **Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, No. 7779 of April 30, 1998:** It requires that, to practice burns on agricultural lands, the indications of the MAG be followed in accordance with the permit issued for those effects, according to the current Reglamento de quemas, as well as the provisions of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and the Penal Code (Código Penal) (article 24). E) **Reglamento al Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, Decreto N°29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT of August 8, 2000:** In its Chapter X titled “On Agrarian Burns (De las quemas agrarias)”, it provides that the MAG in coordination with MINAE and the Ministry of Security will issue the fundamental principles through which the practice of agrarian burns may be authorized. Its article 86 expressly requires prior permission from the MAG to carry out burns on land of agricultural vocation, which must grant a hearing to the respective conservation area (área de conservación) of MINAE, so that it can issue its criteria on the repercussions on the biota and ecosystems. It even indicates that positive silence does not operate regarding the MINAE's criteria. As for forest lands, protective zones, national parks, and wildlife refuges, it prohibits carrying out burns (article 88). F) **Decreto N°17015-MAG, of May 2, 1986:** It created the National Commission for Forest Fires (Comisión Nacional para los Incendios Forestales). Said Commission, according to Decreto N° 19434-MIRENEM of December 11, 1990, has as its attributions to recommend national policies and prepare programs for the prevention and combat of forest fires. G) **Decreto N°21859-MIRENEN of December 7, 1992:** It established the Comité contra Incendios Guanacaste as an instance for coordination, support, and follow-up of the Forest Fire Program of the Huetar Norte Region. H) **Decreto N°23850-MAG-SP of November 4, 1994, Reglamento para quemas controladas con fines agrícolas y pecuarios:** In it, the minimum requirements are established to be able to carry out burns and fires, especially on land for agricultural or livestock use. A burn (quema) is defined as fire caused intentionally, regulated by a pre-established plan, in which all preventive measures are assumed to avoid damage to natural resources and the properties of adjacent landowners. Fires (incendios) are those that, naturally or artificially, affect forests, forest lands, agricultural lands, or lands for livestock use (article 1). To carry out burns on agricultural and livestock lands, a written authorization from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería) must be obtained. The official, in addition to the measures already taken and approved according to a visit that must be made prior to the permit, must indicate, if granted, any additional measures deemed necessary (articles 2 and 3).

Item 6 establishes the following minimum requirements: 1) Determine, using firebreaks (firebreaks (*rondas corta fuegos*) with a width double the height of the combustible material, as indicated by the same Decree), the area to be burned and the combustible materials used; 2) open and sweep a firebreak (firebreak (*ronda corta fuego*)) around the perimeter of the area to be burned, which cannot be less than one meter wide; 3) have sufficient water and tools to extinguish the fire in case of emergency. Additionally, one may: 4) give prior notice to the local Police Department of the date and time of the burn; 5) have the assistance of at least one person; 6) conduct the burn against the wind and against the slope after 4 p.m. and before 7 a.m., avoiding doing it on windy days; 7) verify before leaving that the fire is completely extinguished. But regardless of whether or not the respective permit is held, the Decree clearly establishes in its Article 7 that: *“The person who conducts a burn, whether with or without a permit, shall be civilly liable for the damages (daños y perjuicios) that may be caused, in accordance with Articles 41 and 50 of our Political Constitution and the rules on non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual) that govern our legal system.”* I) Finally, *“the general provisions contained in numerals 1045 and following of the Civil Code, regarding non-contractual civil liability, are of supplementary application for this matter”* (see judgment of the First Chamber, No. 112 of 15:50 hours on October 11, 1995). In the criminal sphere, the current Criminal Code punishes with a fine of 3 to 30 days anyone who contravenes provisions aimed at preventing fires or avoiding their spread (subsection 1 of Article 407) and anyone who infringes the rules on burning weeds, stubble, or other products of the land (subsection 2).

V.Modern doctrine, for its part, has supported the objectification of liability, by including within the factors of imputability and legal attribution of damage, apart from fault (culpa) and intent (dolo), risk. It has even been proposed to include other objective factors: guarantee, equity, abuse of rights, and excess of normal tolerance among neighbors. Damage is thus seen not from the perspective of the author's act but from the position of the injured party, to ensure that any damage caused unjustly is repaired. From another point of view, fault has been separated from the unlawfulness of the act, giving the latter a more important role. “Once the equation between the unlawfulness of the act and fault was broken, the conduct acquired an autonomous physiognomy detached from the subjective profile of the agent's will, to become a simple means, cause, or criterion of connection between a subject held liable and a certain harmful event to be compensated.” (Franzoni (Massimo), La Actividad peligrosa, in Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p. 120). Thus, the Theory of Risk is discussed, which does not displace fault but complements it, and is summarized as the duty of one who creates a risk to indemnify the damage caused to a third party. “Risk is a cause of imputability when, due to the performance of certain causes and specific activities, classified as dangerous, damage is produced. The damage in these circumstances must be compensated, not because its agent incurred in intent or fault, but because the legal system must protect the community from the development of dangerous activities, so that whoever performs them incurs liability if damage is caused by virtue of such performance… Liability derived from risk does not depend on the agent's intent or fault but originates from the mere occurrence of damage consequent to the dangerous activity. This consideration brings with it a special evidentiary regime, according to which, by the mere exercise of the unsafe activity, the agent's fault is presumed, relieving the victim of the task of demonstrating improper conduct. It is up to the agent to rebut the presumption…” ([Nombre17], Hecho imputable dañoso in Del daño, Editora Jurídica, 1st Ed., Colombia, 2001, p. 260). For other authors, “the causal relationship is an element of the unlawful act and of contractual breach that links the damage directly with the anti-juridical fact, and indirectly with the element of subjective imputation or objective attribution. It is the binding factor that makes damage and fault, or in its case risk, integrate into the unit of the act that is the source of the obligation to indemnify” (see [Nombre18] (), El perfil de la responsabilidad civil al finalizar el siglo XX in Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, pp. 24 to 26).

VI.Precisely, conducting burns (quemas)—regardless of their purpose—is an undeniably risky activity. Therefore, in accordance with the cited doctrine, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has clearly indicated: *“VII.- Burns can entail, for those who produce them, civil and criminal liabilities. Civil liability is regulated in the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias by establishing the obligation, of whoever conducts burns (quemazones), to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused as a consequence of the fire (Article 5, paragraph 4). The owner, possessor, or lessee of the land that at the time of the fire was prepared for that purpose is presumed to be the author of the burn… VIII.- The Constitutional Chamber, by means of Voto N°3459 of 14 hours 42 minutes on July 20, 1993, established the repeal of Article 5, paragraph five, of the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias regarding criminal liability… The same Constitutional Chamber (Voto N°439-I-95 of 14:36 hours on August 22, 1995) clarified the aforementioned judgment No. 3459-93 in the sense that Article 5, paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas is repealed only regarding the criminal aspects it contains… IX.- The regulations on burns and fires follow the criterion of objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Fault is presumed in one who created the conditions for the damage by having assumed the risk of harming third parties with the burn or fire. The damages (daños y perjuicios) caused are at their charge. The injured party is exempt from proving fault. The burden of proof regarding the absence of fault corresponds to the one who burned or set fire. It is an iuris tantum presumption. Force majeure, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party would be exemptions from liability. X. One assumes the risk who, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of the damage, accepts the effects of the contingency. Liability is based on creating the risk for the damage. The subject, upon initiating the activity, by means of their things, increases, potentiates, or multiplies the possibilities of danger. Even when it may be a lawful conduct, the one who assumed the risk must always indemnify the damage. There is greater reason to impute liability if the act originates from unlawful conduct. The injured party cannot assume damages from conduct not driven by himself, unless he placed himself in conditions to suffer the damage. One who burns or sets fire, even with authorization from the corresponding authority, cannot be exempted from liability. This is so because although Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias No. 121 of October 26, 1909, establishes the guidelines for authorizing burns on agricultural estates and establishes a series of obligations regarding the person requesting authorization, this does not break the presumption of guilt. The requirements for authorizing burns tend to ensure minimal risk. It is a precautionary measure but not an exemption from liability. Therefore, compliance with the indispensable requirements for authorization cannot harm the neighbors if the disaster occurs. In this way, damages to property, crops, or to the persons themselves, of the neighbors must be indemnified by the one who created the conditions of the risk with the fire or burn. XI. The activity of setting fire or burning, in itself, is directed against Nature. It is a recourse of primitive agriculture where fire tends to substitute the work of man. Instead of using human or mechanical means to promote agricultural activity, a destructive element is used to, on the ashes of what was destroyed, begin the cultivation of plants or the raising of animals. These types of actions are incompatible with current values. It threatens security in that it risks the property of adjoining landowners, their goods, and persons. It also threatens environmental protection values. The economic and social function of property also entails an ecological function: agriculture must develop in harmony, and not in antagonism, with Nature. For the preservation of the environment, social solidarity demands devising new mechanisms to prevent damage and threatening acts. This is the philosophy of the reform to Article 50 of the Political Constitution. The Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias and the entire problem of liability derived from that activity must be analyzed along those lines”* (see judgment No. 112 of 15 hours 50 minutes on October 11, 1995. In the same sense, No. 113 of 16 hours on October 11, 1995).

VII.The Chamber also clarified, in the cited judgments, that the obligation to indemnify the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by burns and the presumption of liability falling upon the one who prepared the land for that purpose cannot be limited to the case of land clearings (desmontes). *“While it is true that Article 5 of the Ley de Cercas y Quemas Divisorias establishes the general prohibition of conducting burns (quemazones) in the fields, authorizing them in the case of land clearings to enable land for agricultural purposes (first paragraph), this does not vitiate the possibility of carrying out said activity under other conditions and for other purposes, as current reality demonstrates. Therefore, the same Law establishes, in the fourth paragraph of numeral 5, a generic liability when it indicates: ‘In any case, whoever conducts burns (quemazones) must pay the damages and perjuicios…’ This fits perfectly within the generic principle of not causing harm to others. In this case, the damages (daños y perjuicios) are the responsibility of the defendant because she assumed the risk of harming her adjoining landowners with the burn. By initiating her activity, preparing the land to be burned, she increased the possibilities of danger. It was unlawful conduct since she did not have authorization from the corresponding administrative authorities, as corroborated in the proven facts. She did not take the minimum precautions, required by law, to prevent greater damages than those normally produced. Although she took some precautionary measures—making firebreaks (rondas)—this is not sufficient to exempt her from her liability to indemnify the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to the plaintiff. The only way to free herself from said liability was to demonstrate the existence of fault of the victim, act of God (caso fortuito), or act of a third party, which she did not do. Even though the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias is from 1909, its interpretation must be carried out in accordance with Articles 10 of the Civil Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Modern interpretation (systematic, material, and evolutionary) demands adapting the content of the norm to the historical circumstances and the social and economic reality in which it will be applied. To do so, the principles and values contained in the Constitution must be taken into account, as well as special agrarian laws.”* (see cited judgment No. 112-95).

VIII.According to what has been explained, it is possible to conduct burns on lands with agricultural and livestock vocation (vocación agropecuaria) as long as the requirements established in our legal system are met, including taking sufficient precautionary measures to be able to control the fire, requesting prior permission from the respective public entities, especially the competent office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and notifying the owners or managers of neighboring properties. This last requirement is of utmost importance because even if all possible measures are taken, natural phenomena such as wind, air currents, and others, can cause the fire to spread to areas outside of those originally intended to be burned. Notifying adjoining landowners seeks precisely to minimize or prevent the fire from spreading and causing greater damage, as it enables better surveillance by the neighbors on their own lands and allows them to be prepared to combat it if necessary. Now, even in the case of having taken all possible precautions and having a permit, whoever originates or causes a burn that produces damages to third parties is responsible for them. The foregoing is so because it is a risky activity. The liability is of an objective type as already explained.

IX.- In the case at hand, testimonial evidence was presented and the deponents [Nombre7], [Nombre8], [Nombre9], [Nombre10] were unanimous in stating that at six in the morning on February 11, 1997, when they were going to work, they observed the peons of Mrs. [Nombre4] burning a cane field within her properties, moving the fire with clumps of trash from one side to another inside said plantation (see folios 69 to 72 and 78 to 79). They also declared that they were later informed the fire had spread to the properties of Cafena S.A. and Agritec S.A., proceeding to extinguish the fire and throw logs in the already burned part to prevent it from spreading. In the present case, the trial judge bases his finding on the statement given by Mr. [Nombre11], indicating that the fire started on a farm owned by Mrs. [Nombre4]'s sister, named [Nombre5], and holds as unproven that the fire was started on the farm of the defendant company Agrícola [Nombre3] S.A. For this reason, it is considered necessary to analyze such testimony. Said deponent stated: “…This was the eleventh or twelfth of February, nineteen ninety-seven. A son of a brother of mine informed me that in the property of [Nombre5] a cane field was being burned. At that moment I did not have the means to travel to the place, that is, I had no vehicle, so I called a peon, and around a quarter past eight at night a peon arrived to inform me about the burning of the cane field. This peon is [Nombre19] (sic) and I told him I had no driver; he came by car and offered to take me. When we arrived at the point where it was burning, after a while, the chapulinista of Mrs. [Nombre5] arrived. Then we began to fight the fire… we put in a backfire so the two fires would go out, and around ten at night the fire ended. Our surprise was the next day, and we went around half past five in the morning in the farm's pick-up truck, and as we were driving past the farm of Mrs. [Nombre4], I observed that the cane part was totally burned, and in what way it happened I could not say… The cane part of the boundary where we passed, the division is not visible, and there was a bit of cane standing but burned… These events occurred in the month of February, on Sunday the burn was at Mrs. [Nombre5]'s and on Monday at [Nombre4]'s place. On the farm of [Nombre4] and of Mr. [Nombre13] there is a boundary. On the boundary of this gentleman, what there is is coffee… At noon, we passed by the same place where the cane had been burned, and there were cane cutters. At that moment the cane is usable and can be delivered. In that sector it was not customary to burn cane… About fifteen or twenty days later, the foreman [Nombre6], from Mrs. [Nombre4]'s farm, came to my house and asked me if I could go with him so we could count on the boundary in [Nombre13]'s part and count the coffee plants that were already inactive on this gentleman's farm. We walked there and were counting, and there were plants that were not really burned, it was a matter of pruning them and the plant would serve, and we counted one hundred and three plants that nothing could be done for, it was a matter of taking out the trunk and putting in another plant. That coffee was from pruning, it was around five years old… The first ones that could be pruned, they did not count them…” (folio 94).

From the testimony of this witness, this Court considers that it cannot reach the same conclusions reached by the lower court (a quo), since he states that on the eleventh or twelfth of February, nineteen eighty-seven, at night around eight-thirty, he saw the burn on Mrs. [Nombre5]'s property and was putting out the fire until it went out at around ten o'clock at night. He also indicated that it was the next day that he saw Mrs. [Nombre4]'s cane field burned. Such a statement does not match the facts accused here, since it is indicated that the coffee plantation was burned on the eleventh of February, nineteen ninety-seven, without specifying the exact time the fire spread from one property to another, but that by around twelve noon on the eleventh of February of the cited year, the coffee plantation on the lands of the plaintiff companies here had already been burned. Furthermore, from what was said by the witnesses [Nombre7], [Nombre8], [Nombre9], [Nombre10], that same day in the morning hours, Mrs. [Nombre4]'s laborers were setting fire to the cane field adjacent to the coffee plantation of the plaintiffs here. From the foregoing, the deponent [Nombre11]'s statement does not allow one to reach the conclusion given by the lower court (a quo) that the fire started on the farm of Mrs. [Nombre5] and to relate it, as it does, to the burn of Mrs. [Nombre4]'s cane field and therefore to the damages caused to the plaintiffs' coffee plantation. What is clear, however, is that the defendant, through her laborers, was the one who carried out the burn of a cane field on her land adjacent to the properties of the plaintiffs here, which caused damages to the coffee plantation located on their lands, as stated by the witnesses [Nombre7], [Nombre8], [Nombre9], [Nombre10]; this on February 11, 1997. In the report rendered by the expert [Nombre20], it is indicated that the distance between the coffee plants located on the plaintiffs' lands and the burned cane field on the defendant's property was less than four meters, on the properties of Agritec S.A., and six to eight meters for the properties of Cafena S.A. (folio 24); therefore, this Court considers that with such a short distance, the fire could easily spread from one property to another. On the other hand, according to what the said witnesses indicated, there were no firebreaks. All of this constitutes serious, precise, and concordant indications that the fire spread from the defendant's farm to the neighboring properties of the plaintiff companies. Furthermore, the act of a third party as a circumstance exempting from liability is not demonstrated, as interpreted by the lower court (a quo) in the ruling issued, due to the absence in the record of evidence of such circumstances, especially after analyzing the testimony of Mr. Arley Bolaños, upon which the trial judge bases his ruling and from which the conclusion he reached cannot be drawn, considering the evidence as a whole.

**X.-** From what was stated in the aforementioned expert report, it is not possible to truly determine how many coffee plants were damaged in the coffee plantations of Agritec S.A. and Cafena S.A. That report does not prove the quantity of coffee plants burned; rather, for its valuation, it references 81 plants on the Cafena S.A. farm and 79 plants on the lands of Agritec S. A., as stated in the complaint. Due to the foregoing, it is necessary to review the rest of the evidentiary elements to determine the quantity of coffee plants damaged. The witness [Nombre11] indicated that about one hundred and three coffee plants were burned, but without specifying exactly on which of the plaintiffs' lands the damaged plants were counted (folio 97). The deponent [Nombre6] said: "about a hundred plants were burned, between scorched and burned," also without indicating on which of the plaintiffs' lands this occurred (folio 99). In that vein, Mr. Maynor Navarro Alvarado declared (folio 98 reverse), stating that he observed about one hundred burned coffee plants. The same was said by [Nombre10]: "As a result of that burn, about eighty coffee plants were burned on each side, I clarify, from eighty to one hundred plants" (folio 79). From what was said by the witnesses [Nombre16] and [Nombre9], it can be determined that an average of between eighty and one hundred coffee plants were destroyed on the lands owned by Cafena S.A. (see folios 78 front and reverse). The judicial inspection conducted is also not precise regarding the quantity of coffee plants burned, indicating: "...On the Cafena S.A. farm, an area of coffee is observed whose plants are dry as a result of the same burn... From this sector of the farm, we head north of the main road of the Agritec S.A. farm, in the [Dirección2], and I observe in sectors burned coffee plants all along the fence..." (folio 13). From the foregoing, only the burning of about one hundred coffee plants has been demonstrated, and not one hundred fifty-two, as indicated by the plaintiffs in the complaint brief (folio 5), in which it was indicated that 79 plants were burned on the lands of Agritec S.A. and 81 on those of Cafena S.A.. For the reasons stated above, the judgment rendered must be reversed and in its place the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho) must be rejected, because the plaintiff party has proven that damages were caused to their coffee plantations and therefore has the right to collect them; the defenses of lack of passive and active standing (falta de legitimación pasiva y activa) must also be rejected because it is clear that the plaintiffs have active standing to bring the present process by virtue of having suffered a diminution of their assets, as damages were caused to their crops, and they have demonstrated that the fire started in the defendant's cane field, when her laborers set fire to it, and then it spread to the crops of their neighbors. For the same reasons, the defense of lack of interest (falta de interés) raised by the defendant is rejected. Based on the foregoing: 1) The damages and injury caused to one hundred coffee plants are approved, to be liquidated in the enforcement of judgment stage, distributed as follows: a) The value of the 81 plants located on Cafena's lands and 19 plants located on Agritec S.A.'s lands, b) The value of the lost production for a period of four years, which is the replacement time for the plantation until it reaches its full harvesting capacity. 2) The defendant Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada is ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this process.

**POR TANTO:** The judgment rendered is reversed. In its place, the defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho), lack of passive and active standing (falta de legitimación pasiva y activa), and lack of interest (falta de interés) raised by the defendant are rejected. The lawsuit filed by Agritec S.A. and Cafena S.A. against Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada is partially upheld, ordering payment of the damages and injury caused, in the following manner: 1) The damages and injury caused to one hundred coffee plants are approved, to be liquidated in the enforcement of judgment stage, distributed as follows: a) The value of the 81 plants located on Cafena's lands and 19 plants located on Agritec S.A.'s lands, b) The value of the lost production for a period of four years, which is the replacement time for the plantation until it reaches its full harvesting capacity. 2) The defendant Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada is ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this process. 3) The rest of the claims are denied.

**ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA** **CARLOS BOLAÑOS CÉSPEDES** **RUTH ALPÍZAR RODRÍGUEZ** **Exp. No. EXPN1** **Ordinario** **Cafena S. A** **c/** **Agrícola [Nombre3] Ltda.** **IV.-** Our legal system contains several provisions that expressly and directly refer to agricultural burns and forest fires and the liability arising from them. We have the following: a) **Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas, No. 121 of October 26, 1909:** Its Article 5 prohibits conducting burns in the fields. It only authorizes them when it involves clearing (desmontes) to enable land for agricultural purposes: To do so, one must: 1) Request a permit from the local political authority, 2) Have guarantees and precautions to avoid greater destruction than what is intended or harm to third parties, 3) Personally notify, or have the authority notify by summons, all adjacent landowners (colindantes) or interested parties of the day and time of the burn, at least two days in advance, 4) Leave a minimum distance of [Dirección1] from springs (manantiales) originating in the hills, and of [Dirección2] from springs on flat terrain. Regarding liability, it expressly states that, in any case, whoever conducts burns must pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by the fire. The owner, possessor, or lessee who, at the time of the fire, was prepared for that purpose is presumed to be the author of the burn. B) **The current Ley Forestal, No. 7575 of February 13, 1996,** in its Chapter IV on “Forest Protection,” prohibits conducting burns on forest lands and lands adjacent to them without having obtained the permit from the State Forest Administration (Administración Forestal del Estado). It refers to the Código Penal to sanction anyone who conducts a burn without a permit (Article 35). Likewise, numerals 59 and 60 respectively sanction causing a forest fire intentionally or negligently, with penalties of one to three years in the first case and three months to two years in the second. C) **Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, Decreto N°25721-MINAE of October 17, 1996:** Establishes that the official of the Forest Administration must visit the site before granting a burn permit (Article 34). D) **Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, No. 7779 of April 30, 1998:** Requires that, to conduct burns on agricultural lands, the instructions of the MAG must be followed in accordance with the permit issued for those purposes, pursuant to the current Reglamento de quemas, as well as the provisions of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and the Código Penal (Article 24). E) **Reglamento al Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, Decreto N°29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT of August 8, 2000:** In its Chapter X titled “De las quemas agrarias,” it provides that the MAG, in coordination with MINAE and the Ministry of Security, will issue the fundamental principles through which the practice of agricultural burns may be authorized. Its Article 86 expressly requires prior permission from the MAG to conduct burns on lands with agricultural aptitude (vocación Agrícola), which must grant a hearing to the respective conservation area (área de conservación) of MINAE so it can issue its opinion on the repercussions for the biota and ecosystems. It even indicates that tacit consent (silencio positivo) does not apply regarding MINAE’s opinion. Regarding forest lands, protective zones (zonas protectoras), national parks (parques nacionales), and wildlife refuges (refugios de vida silvestre), it prohibits conducting burns (Article 88). F) **Decreto N°17015-MAG, of May 2, 1986:** Created the National Commission for Forest Fires (Comisión Nacional para los Incendios Forestales). Said Commission, according to Decreto N° 19434-MIRENEM of December 11, 1990, has the authority to recommend national policies and prepare programs for the prevention and combat of forest fires. G) **Decreto N°21859-MIRENEN of December 7, 1992:** Establishes the Committee against Fires of Guanacaste (Comité contra Incendios Guanacaste) as an instance for coordination, support, and monitoring of the Forest Fire Program of the Huetar Norte Region. H) **Decreto N°23850-MAG-SP of November 4, 1994, Reglamento para quemas controladas con fines agrícolas y pecuarios:** Establishes the minimum requirements to be able to conduct burns and fires, especially on lands of agricultural or livestock use. A burn (quema) is defined as an intentionally provoked fire, regulated by a pre-established plan, in which all preventive measures are taken to avoid damage to natural resources and the properties of adjacent landowners (colindantes). Fires (incendios) are those that, naturally or artificially, affect forests, forest lands, agricultural lands, or lands for livestock use (Article 1). To conduct burns on agricultural and livestock lands, one must have written authorization from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería). The official, in addition to the measures already taken and approved according to a visit that must be made prior to the permit, must indicate, if granting it, additional measures deemed necessary (Articles 2 and 3). Numeral 6° establishes the following minimum requirements: 1) Determine, by means of firebreaks (rondas corta fuegos) (area with a width double the height of the combustible material as indicated by the same Decreto), the area to be burned and the combustible materials used; 2) open and sweep a firebreak around the perimeter of the area to be burned, which cannot be less than one meter wide; 3) have sufficient water and tools to extinguish the fire in case of emergency. Additionally, one may: 4) give prior notice to the Police Directorate (Dirección Policial) of the place regarding the date and time of the burn: 5) have the assistance of at least one person; 6) conduct the burn against the wind and against the slope after 4 p.m. and before 7 a.m., avoiding doing it on windy days: 7) verify before leaving that the fire is completely extinguished. But regardless of whether or not one has the respective permit, the Decreto clearly establishes in its Article 7° that: *“The person who conducts a burn, whether with or without a permit, shall be civilly liable for the damages (daños y perjuicios) that may be caused, in accordance with Articles 41 and 50 of our Constitución Política and the rules on non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual) that govern our legal system...”* I) Finally, *“the general provisions contained in numerals 1045 and following of the Código Civil, on non-contractual civil liability, are of supplementary application for this matter”* (see judgment of the Sala Primera No. 112 of 3:50 p.m. on October 11, 1995). In the criminal sphere, the current Código Penal sanctions with a fine of 3 to 30 days anyone who contravenes provisions aimed at preventing fires or avoiding their spread (subsection 1° of Article 407) and anyone who infringes the rules on the burning of weeds, stubble, or other products of the land (subsection 2°).

**V.** Modern legal doctrine, for its part, has supported the objectification of liability, by including risk among the factors of imputability and legal attribution of damage, apart from fault (culpa) and intent (dolo). It has even been proposed to include other objective factors: guarantee, equity, abuse of rights, and exceeding the normal tolerance among neighbors. Damage is therefore viewed not from the perspective of the author's act but from the position of the injured party, to ensure that all damage caused unjustly is repaired.

From another point of view, fault (culpa) has been separated from the wrongfulness of the act, giving a more important role to the latter. "Once the equivalence between the wrongfulness of the act and fault (culpa) was broken, the conduct acquired an autonomous physiognomy detached from the subjective profile of the agent's will, to become a simple means, cause, or connection criterion between a subject held responsible and a certain harmful event to be compensated." (Franzoni (Massimo), La Actividad peligrosa, in Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.120). Thus speaks the Theory of Risk, which does not displace fault (culpa) but rather complements it, and is summarized as the duty of one who creates a risk to compensate the damage it causes to a third party. "Risk is a cause of imputability when damage occurs due to the performance of certain activities, classified as dangerous. The damage under these circumstances must be compensated, not because its agent incurred in willful misconduct (dolo) or fault (culpa), but because the legal order must protect the community from the development of dangerous activities, such that whoever performs them incurs liability if damage is occasioned by virtue of such performance... Liability derived from risk does not depend on the agent's willful misconduct (dolo) or fault (culpa) but originates from the mere occurrence of damage consequent to the dangerous activity. This consideration brings with it a special evidentiary regime, according to which, by the mere exercise of the unsafe activity, the agent's fault (culpa) is presumed, relieving the victim of the task of demonstrating wrongful conduct. It is the agent's responsibility to rebut the presumption..." (Cubides Camacho Jorge, Hecho imputable dañoso in Del daño, Editora Jurídica, 1st Ed., Colombia, 2001, p.260). For other authors, "the causal relationship is an element of the unlawful act and of the contractual breach that links the damage directly to the unlawful act, and indirectly to the element of subjective imputation or objective attribution. It is the binding factor that integrates the damage and the fault (culpa), or in its case risk, into the unity of the act that is the source of the obligation to compensate" (see Bustamante Alcina (José), El perfil de la responsabilidad civil al finalizar el siglo XX in Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.24 to 26). **VI.** Precisely, the execution of burns—regardless of their purpose—is an undeniably risky activity. Therefore, in accordance with the cited doctrine, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice has clearly indicated: "*VII.- Burns can entail, for whoever produces them, civil and criminal liabilities. Civil liability is regulated in the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias by establishing the obligation, for whoever makes burnings (quemazones), to pay the damages occasioned as a consequence of the fire (article 5 paragraph 4). The owner, possessor, or lessee of the land that at the time of the fire was prepared for that purpose is presumed to be the author of the burning (quemazón)... VIII.- The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), by means of Voto N°3459-93 at 14 hours 42 minutes on July 20, 1993, established the repeal of article 5, paragraph five, of the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias regarding criminal liability... The same Constitutional Chamber (Voto N°439-I-95 at 14:36 hours on August 22, 1995) clarified the aforementioned ruling N°3459-93 in the sense that article 5, paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas is repealed only with respect to the criminal aspects it contains... IX.- The regulations on burns and fires follow the criterion of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Fault (culpa) is presumed in whoever created the conditions for the damage by having assumed the risk of harming third parties with the burn or fire. The damages occasioned are at their charge. The injured party is exempt from proving fault (culpa). The burden of proof regarding the absence of fault (culpa) corresponds to whoever burned or set the fire. It is an iuris tantum presumption. Force majeure, the fault of the victim, or the act of a third party would be grounds for exoneration from liability. X. Whoever foresees the eventuality or possibility of damage and accepts the effects of the contingency assumes the risk. Liability is based on creating the risk of damage. The subject, upon initiating the activity, by means of their things, increases, potentiates, or multiplies the possibilities of danger. Even when it may be lawful conduct, whoever assumed the risk must always compensate the damage. There is even greater reason to impute liability if the act derives from unlawful conduct. The injured party cannot assume damages for conduct not driven by themself, unless they placed themself in conditions to suffer the damage. Whoever burns or sets fire, even with the authorization of the corresponding authority, cannot be exempted from liability. This is so because although the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias No. 121 of October 26, 1909 establishes the guidelines for authorizing burns on agricultural estates, and establishes a series of obligations regarding whoever requests the authorization, this does not break the presumption of culpability. The requirements for authorizing burns tend to ensure minimum risk. It is a precautionary measure but is not an exemption from liability. Therefore, compliance with the indispensable requirements for authorization cannot harm the neighbors if the incident occurs. In this way, the damages to the property, harvests, or to the persons themselves, of the neighbors must be compensated by whoever created the conditions of risk with the fire or burn. XI. The activity of setting fire or burning, in itself, is directed against Nature. It is a recourse of primitive agriculture where fire tends to substitute man's labor. Instead of using human or mechanical means to promote agricultural activity, a destructive element is resorted to in order to, upon the ashes of what was destroyed, initiate the cultivation of plants or the raising of animals. These types of actions are incompatible with current values. It threatens safety as it risks the property of adjacent landowners, their goods, and persons. Likewise, it threatens environmental protection values. The economic and social function of property also entails an ecological function: agriculture must be developed in harmony, and not in antagonism, with Nature. For the preservation of the environment, social solidarity requires devising new mechanisms to prevent damage and threatening acts. This is the philosophy of the reform to Article 50 of the Political Constitution. The Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias and the entire problem of liability derived from that activity must be analyzed along these lines*" (see ruling No. 112 at 15 hours 50 minutes on October 11, 1995. In the same sense, No. 113 at 16 hours on October 11, 1995). **VII.** The Chamber also clarified in the cited rulings, the obligation to compensate the damages caused by burns and the fact that the presumption of liability falls upon whoever prepared the land for that purpose, cannot be limited to the case of clearing (desmontes). "*While it is true that Article 5 of the Ley de Cercas y Quemas Divisorias establishes the general prohibition against making burnings (quemazones) in the fields, authorizing them when it comes to clearings (desmontes) to enable lands for agricultural purposes (first paragraph), this does not vitiate the possibility of carrying out said activity under other conditions and for other purposes, as demonstrated by current reality. That is why the same Law establishes, in the fourth paragraph of numeral 5, a generic liability when it states: 'In any event, whoever makes burnings (quemazones) must pay the damages...'. This fits perfectly within the generic principle of not harming others. In this case, the damages are at the charge of the defendant because it assumed the risk of harming its adjacent landowners with the burn. By initiating its activity, preparing the land to be burned, it increased the possibilities of danger. It involved unlawful conduct because it did not have authorization from the corresponding administrative authorities, as corroborated in the proven facts. It did not take the minimum precautions, required by law, to prevent damages greater than those normally produced. Although it took some precautionary measures—creation of firebreaks (rondas)—this is not sufficient to exempt it from its liability to compensate the damages caused to the plaintiff. The only way to be released from this liability was by demonstrating the existence of fault of the victim, fortuitous event, or act of a third party, which it did not do. Even though the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias dates from 1909, its interpretation must be verified in accordance with Articles 10 of the Civil Code and 5 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. The modern interpretation (systematic, material, and evolutionary) requires adapting the content of the norm to the historical circumstances and the social and economic reality in which it is to be applied. For this, the principles and values contained in the Constitution, as well as in special laws on agrarian matters, must be taken into account*" (see ruling No. 112-95 cited). **VIII**. According to what has been explained, it is possible to make burns on lands with agricultural and livestock vocation (vocación agropecuaria) as long as the requirements established in our legal system are met, among them taking sufficient precautionary measures to be able to control the fire, requesting prior permission from the respective public entities, especially the relevant office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería), and notifying the owners or managers of the adjacent properties. This last requirement is of utmost importance, because even if all possible measures are taken, natural phenomena such as wind, air currents, and others, can cause the fire to spread to other areas outside those originally intended to be burned. The notification to the adjacent landowners seeks precisely to minimize or prevent the fire from spreading and a greater damage from occurring, given that it enables better vigilance by the neighbors on their own properties, and allows them to be prepared to fight it if necessary. Now then, even in the case of having taken all possible precautions and having permission, whoever originates or causes a burn that produces damages to third parties is liable for such. The foregoing is thus because it involves a risky activity. The liability is of a strict liability (objetivo) type as already explained." Drafted by Judge Darcia Carranza; and, **CONSIDERANDO:** **I.-** The Tribunal shares the facts deemed proven in the judgment rendered, as they faithfully reflect what occurred in the case file, with the exception of number eight, since it is not proven that the fire originating on the property of [Nombre5] was the one that burned the properties of Cafena S.A., Agritec S.A., and Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada, and fact five, as it is an evidentiary element for quantifying damages and not a fact proper. Likewise, fact number six is not accepted, as it is not of interest for resolving this matter. Of that nature, consider the following: 9) The laborer (peones) of the defendant, including her foreman (capataz) named [Nombre6], were on the eleventh of February, 1997, burning the cane field (cañal) adjacent to the plaintiffs' properties (see testimonies of [Nombre7], [Nombre8], [Nombre9], [Nombre10], on folios 69, 70 vuelto, 78 vuelto, 79). 10) After noon on the eleventh of February, 1997, [Nombre8] realized that part of the farms of Cafena S.A. and Agritec S.A. were burning (see testimony of [Nombre8], [Nombre9], [Nombre10] on folios 70 vuelto, 78 vuelto, and 79). 11) The fire affected approximately one hundred to one hundred and three coffee plants (matas de café) on the plaintiffs' properties (see testimony of [Nombre11] on folio 97, [Nombre12] on folio 98 vuelto, [Nombre6] on folio 99 vuelto). 12) The properties of Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada, Cafena S.A., and Agritec S.A. are adjacent to each other (see witness evidence from [Nombre12], [Nombre6], [Nombre10] on folios 62, 70 vuelto, 98 vuelto, 99 vuelto, and expert report on folio 23 and judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) on folio 13).

**II.-** The fact deemed not proven in the judgment under review is not shared, as it is considered that there exist precise, clear, and concordant indicia (indicios) that the fire that affected the farms of Cafena S.A. and Agritec S.A. started on the defendant's land, through a burn (quema) carried out on a cane field (cañal) by her laborers (peones). Of that nature, consider the following: 1) The defendant did not demonstrate having obtained the respective permit to conduct burns (quemas), nor that she had notified the adjacent landowners (colindantes) that one was going to be carried out on the date of the events in litis. (There is no evidence whatsoever in that regard).

**III.-** The plaintiff party appeals, within the period contemplated in numeral 59 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, the resolution rendered at nine o'clock on the fifteenth of April, two thousand and two, based on the following: **1)** The judge criticizes the terms in which the complaint was drafted, in a manner that is neither fair nor correct, because the corresponding pleading, in addition to meeting all the requirements, clearly indicates that there are properties of Cafena and Agritec S.A. adjacent to those of the defendant, establishing their respective farm numbers, which in fact are grouped together as a single productive unit. All the parcels of land (fundos) cited in the complaint were harmed, as they are subdivided (fraccionados) into many lots for agricultural use, and for that reason, the two plaintiffs are pursuing the collection of their damages and losses (daños y perjuicios). The witnesses for both parties clearly identify that the farm where the burn (quema) occurred belongs to the defendant, and that the farms where the damaged coffee is located belong to the plaintiffs. On the other hand, it was established in fact 3 of the complaint that the defendant company proceeded without a permit, without firebreaks (rondas), without taking safety measures, and without notifying the neighbors, such that the aspects of negligence and imprudence that later led to the citation of articles 1045 and 1048 of the Civil Code were indeed detailed. **2.** According to the judgment, there is no proof that the fire started on the defendant's property. This, for the appellant party, is not correct, as the application of the same principles of sound criticism (sana crítica) mentioned allows us to analyze the following: a. On February 11, 1997, laborers (peones) of the defendant company, under the supervision of its foreman (mandador), proceeded to carry out the burn (quema) of a cane field (cañal) owned by Agrícola [Nombre3] Ltda., adjacent to the farms of the plaintiffs herein, which in that area are planted with coffee. This core fact can be considered proven based on the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) conducted, and on the statements of [Nombre7] (folio 69) and all the witnesses, in addition to the photographs provided with the complaint and the reply to the hearing on exceptions, one of which allows one to observe the defendant's tractor, driven by one of its employees, working at the time of the fire. b. The witnesses clearly state having seen [Nombre3]'s laborers (peones) "carrying the fire from one side to the other with clumps of trash" ("pasar el fuego de un lado a otro con mechones de basura"), a phrase used by several declarants ([Nombre7], folio 65 front, last line and verso; [Nombre8], on folio 71; [Nombre9], on folio 78; [Nombre10], folio 79; [Nombre13], on folio 94). The witness [Nombre8] emphatically points out on folio 71 that THEY WERE BURNING AND NOT EXTINGUISHING, and he affirms they had clumps of lit leaves and were placing them from one side to the other. [Nombre10] expresses the same on folio 79. c. Furthermore, the declarants indicate that the person in charge was nearby ([Nombre7], folio 65 verso) and they even identify the defendant's foreman (mandador), as the gentleman named [Nombre6], present at the site and participating in the burn (quema) ([Nombre8], folio 71 verso; [Nombre9], folio 78 verso; [Nombre14], folio 79). d. The ruling, according to the plaintiffs, deems it proven in fact 6 that Cooperativa Victoria carried out plowing work on the same dates. However, it ignores that the area was cleared using fire by the defendant's laborers (peones), to prepare it so that Cooperativa Victoria's machinery could perform that work, since this company requires that the land be clean (Document on folio 29, statement of [Nombre7] on folios 69 and 70; [Nombre8] folio 71; [Nombre15], folio 77; [Nombre9], folio 78 verso; [Nombre10] on folio 79 verso; [Nombre6] on folio 100). Particularly noteworthy is the testimony of [Nombre15], who points out the modus operandi of the Cooperative, which must schedule the dispatch of machines in advance, and indicates that on March 18, March 23, and April 24, 1997 (that is, after the date of the events that occurred on February 11, 1997), the Cooperative carried out plowing, harrowing, and furrowing on the property of Mrs. [Nombre4]. Furthermore, he indicates that the only known method for clearing land where there has been cane is by burning. e. It considers the existence of the Ley de Quemas to be core, which was violated. The defendant did not obtain any permit from the authorities to conduct the burn (quema) (she presented no evidence to this effect), nor did she construct the so-called firebreaks (rondas), no safety measure was taken, nor were the neighbors notified, including my clients ([Nombre7] folio 65; [Nombre8], folio 71; [Nombre9], folio 78 verso). f. It was accredited that the employees of [Nombre3] Ltda. were burning the trash left after having manually cut the cane on the site. See statements of [Nombre7], folio 70 verso; [Nombre8] folio 71; [Nombre9], folio 78. g. It was demonstrated that several burns (quemas) of cane fields (cañales) were carried out at [Dirección1] to clear land, some of which was replanted with coffee ([Nombre8], folios 71 and 72; [Nombre9], folio 78 verso; [Nombre10], folio 79 verso; [Nombre13], folio 94; [Nombre11], on folio 98; [Nombre12], on folio 99, who even mentions an Engineer from Cooperativa Victoria; [Nombre6], on folio 99 verso; [Nombre6] on folio 100). h. Against all this evidence, cited in detail, the judgment gives more credence to the deposition of a single witness, an employee of a sister of Mrs. [Nombre4], who stated the fire started on the property of [Nombre5]. It points out, the defendant argues, the burn (quema) was not carried out by her laborers (peones) and foreman (mandador), or that it was the result of the action of unscrupulous individuals; no evidence whatsoever was provided to that effect and, rather, there is abundant evidence to the contrary, already noted above, which points to the clear action of her employees. The statement of Mr. [Nombre11], to which so much importance is given in the judgment, is, rather, contradictory to the prior argument of [Nombre3]. This witness [Nombre11] refers to a fire on the property of [Nombre5], which has nothing to do with the events described here, and stated that when he passed by Mrs. [Nombre4]'s farm, the fire had already consumed everything; therefore, he contributes nothing and does not contradict what has already been indicated as proven. It is evident that the Judge did not take the foregoing into account, and it concerned entirely distinct historical and factual moments. The same Mr. [Nombre11] states he counted 103 completely unusable plants, and the curious thing about this is what he indicated, that he made that count at the request of and in the company of the defendant's foreman (mandador), which reflects that the latter was well aware of her fault in the matter. For otherwise, what would have been the interest in counting the plants? i. It says, Agrícola [Nombre3] Ltda. had contracted with Cooperativa Victoria for a series of works on that land, which could only be done if it was completely clean, for which reason they proceeded to burn it. This burn (quema) was neither accidental nor the work of third parties, and because most of the cane had already been cut, the trash and leaves were grouped in mounds. It was these mounds that were burned on purpose, and under those circumstances – unlike what occurs with standing cane – the fire does not run; however, the entirety of the lot, from side to side, is observed to be burned, which implies intentionality, to the extreme that even parts of planted coffee belonging to the same defendant were damaged. Her laborers (peones) and foreman (mandador) were on the site from the start of the fire and were in charge of bringing it to every end of the lot, in full view and tolerance of several people. The Judge took none of this into account; therefore, it indicates, the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) were not applied. 10. Analyzing the defendant's evidence, we find that [Nombre12] mentions a firebreak (ronda) (which everyone else denied) but one made after the fact, for which reason it does not relieve the defendant of liability. In any case, he is unaware of how the fire originated. [Nombre16] arrived around ten-thirty in the morning; therefore, he cannot account for what occurred before (folios 206 to 209).

**IV.-** Our legal system contains several provisions that expressly and directly refer to burns (quemas) and forest fires and the liability arising from them. We thus have: a) **Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas, N°121 of October 26, 1909:** Its article 5 prohibits making burns (quemazones) in the fields. It authorizes them only in the case of clearing (desmontes) to enable land for agricultural purposes. To do so, one must: 1) Request permission from the local political authority; 2) Have guarantees and precautions to prevent greater destruction than that intended or harm to third parties; 3) Personally notify or via a document issued by the authority all adjacent landowners (colindantes) or interested parties of the day and time of the burn (quema), at least two days in advance; 4) Leave a minimum distance of 400 meters from springs (manantiales) originating in the hills, and 200 meters from springs (manantiales) on flat land. Regarding liability, it expressly indicates that, in all cases, whoever makes burns (quemazones) must pay for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused by the fire. The owner, possessor, or lessee who, at the time of the fire, was prepared for that purpose is presumed to be the author of the burn (quemazón).

• B)**The current Forestry Law, N° 7575 of February 13, 1996,** in its chapter IV on "Forest Protection" prohibits conducting controlled burns (quemas) on forest lands and lands adjacent to them, without having obtained a permit from the State Forest Administration (Administración Forestal del Estado). It refers to the Penal Code to sanction anyone who conducts a burn without a permit (article 35). Likewise, numerals 59 and 60 respectively sanction causing a forest fire willfully or culpably, with penalties of one to three years in the first case and three months to two years in the second.
• C)**Regulation to the Forestry Law, Decree N° 25721-MINAE of October 17, 1996:** It establishes that the official of the Forest Administration must visit the site prior to granting a burn permit (article 34).
• D)**Law on the Use, Management and Conservation of Soils, N° 7779 of April 30, 1998:** It requires that the indications of the MAG be followed, in accordance with the permit issued for those purposes, to conduct controlled burns on agricultural lands, according to the current Regulations on burns, as well as the provisions of the Organic Law of the Environment and the Penal Code (article 24).
• E)**Regulation on the Use, Management and Conservation of Soils, Decree N° 29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT of August 8, 2000:** In its chapter X titled "On Agricultural Burns," it provides that the MAG, in coordination with MINAE and the Ministry of Security, will issue the fundamental principles by which the practice of agricultural burns may be authorized. Its article 86 expressly requires the prior permit of the MAG to conduct controlled burns on lands of agricultural vocation, which must grant a hearing to the respective conservation area (área de conservación) of MINAE, so that it may issue its opinion on the repercussions for the biota and the ecosystems. It even indicates that positive silence does not operate regarding MINAE's opinion. As for forest lands, protective zones (zonas protectoras), national parks, wildlife refuges, it prohibits conducting controlled burns (article 88).
• F)**Decree N° 17015-MAG, of May 2, 1986:** Created the National Commission for Forest Fires. Said Commission, according to Decree N° 19434-MIRENEM of December 11, 1990, has the attributions of recommending national policies and preparing prevention and combat programs for forest fires.
• G)**Decree N° 21859-MIRENEN of December 7, 1992:** Established the Guanacaste Fire Committee as an instance of coordination, support, and follow-up to the Forest Fire Program of the Huetar Norte Region.
• H)**Decree N° 23850-MAG-SP of November 4, 1994, Regulation for controlled burns with agricultural and livestock purposes:** It establishes the minimum requirements to be able to carry out controlled burns (quemas) and fires (incendios), especially on lands of agricultural or livestock use. A burn (quema) is defined as fire provoked intentionally, regulated by a pre-established plan, in which all preventive measures are assumed to avoid damage to natural resources and the properties of adjoining landowners. Fires (incendios) are those that, naturally or artificially, affect forests, forest lands, agricultural lands, or lands used for livestock (article 1). To conduct controlled burns on agricultural and livestock lands, a written authorization from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock must be obtained. The official, in addition to the measures already taken and approved according to a visit that must be made prior to the permit, must indicate, if granting it, the additional measures considered necessary (articles 2 and 3). Numeral 6° establishes the following minimum requirements: 1) Determine, by means of firebreaks (rondas corta fuegos) (an area with a width double the height of the combustible material as indicated by the same Decree), the area to be burned and the combustible materials used; 2) open and sweep a firebreak around the perimeter of the area to be burned, which cannot be less than one meter wide; 3) have sufficient water and tools to extinguish the fire in case of emergency. Additionally, one can: 4) give prior notice to the Police Directorate of the place about the date and time of the burn; 5) have the assistance of at least one person; 6) conduct the burn against the wind and against the slope after 4 p.m. and before 7 a.m., avoiding doing it on windy days; 7) verify before leaving that the fire is completely extinguished. But regardless of whether one has the respective permit or not, the Decree clearly establishes in its article 7° that: *"The person who conducts a controlled burn, whether with or without a permit, shall be civilly liable for the damages and losses that may be caused, in accordance with articles 41 and 50 of our Political Constitution and the rules on extracontractual civil liability that govern our legal system..".* I) Finally, *"the general provisions contained in numerals* ***"1045 and following of the Civil Code,*** *on extracontractual civil liability, are of supplementary application for this matter"* (see judgment of the First Chamber N° 112 of 3:50 p.m. on October 11, 1995). In the criminal sphere, the current Penal Code sanctions with a fine of 3 to 30 days anyone who contravenes the provisions aimed at preventing fires or avoiding their spread (subsection 1° of Article 407) and anyone who infringes the rules on the burning of weeds, stubble, or other products of the land (subsection 2°).

**V.** Modern doctrine, for its part, has supported the objectivization of liability, by understanding among the factors of imputability and legal attribution of damage, apart from fault (culpa) and willful misconduct (dolo), risk. It has even been proposed to include as other objective factors: guarantee, equity, abuse of rights, and excess of normal tolerance among neighbors. Damage is thus viewed not from the perspective of the actor's deed but from the position of the injured party, to ensure that every unjustly caused damage is compensated. From another point of view, fault has been separated from the unlawfulness of the act, giving a more important role to the latter. "Once the equivalence between the unlawfulness of the act and fault was broken, the conduct acquired an autonomous physiognomy detached from the subjective profile of the agent's will, to become a simple means, cause, or criterion of connection between a subject held responsible and a certain harmful event to be compensated." (Franzoni (Massimo), The Dangerous Activity, in *Liability for Damages in the Third Millennium*, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.120). Thus, there is discussion of the Theory of Risk, which does not displace fault but complements it, and is summarized as the duty of whoever creates a risk to indemnify the damage caused to a third party. "Risk is a cause of imputability when, due to the performance of certain causes and specific activities, qualified as dangerous, damage is produced. Damage in these circumstances must be compensated, not because its agent incurred in willful misconduct or fault, but because the legal order must protect the community from the development of dangerous activities, in such a way that whoever carries them out incurs liability if damage is caused by virtue of such execution… Liability derived from risk does not depend on the willful misconduct or fault of the agent but originates in the mere occurrence of the damage resulting from the dangerous activity. This consideration brings with it a special evidentiary regime, according to which, by the mere exercise of the unsafe activity, the fault of the agent is presumed, exonerating the victim from the task of demonstrating improper conduct. It is up to the agent to rebut the presumption…" ([Nombre17], Imputable Harmful Act in *On Damage*, Editora Jurídica, 1st Ed., Colombia, 2001, p.260). For other authors, "the causal link is an element of the unlawful act and of contractual breach that directly links the damage with the unlawful act, and indirectly with the element of subjective imputation or objective attribution. It is the binding factor that integrates the damage and the fault, or as the case may be the risk, into the unity of the act that is the source of the obligation to indemnify" (see [Nombre18], The Profile of Civil Liability at the End of the Twentieth Century in *Liability for Damages in the Third Millennium*, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.24 to 26).

**VI.** Precisely, the execution of controlled burns – regardless of their purpose – is an undeniably risky activity. For this reason, in accordance with the cited doctrine, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has clearly indicated: *"VII.- Controlled burns can entail, for whoever produces them, civil and criminal liabilities. Civil liability is regulated in the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences by establishing the obligation of whoever makes burns to pay for the damages and losses caused as a consequence of the fire (article 5 paragraph 4). The owner, possessor, or lessee of the land that at the time of the fire was prepared for that purpose is presumed to be the author of the burn… VIII.- The Constitutional Chamber, by means of Vote N° 3459 of 2:42 p.m. on July 20, 1993, established the repeal of article 5°, fifth paragraph, of the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences regarding criminal liability… The same Constitutional Chamber (Vote N° 439-I-95 of 2:36 p.m. on August 22, 1995) clarified the aforementioned judgment N° 3459-93 in the sense that article 5°, paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Law on Dividing Fences and Burns is repealed only regarding the criminal aspects it contains… IX.- The regulations on controlled burns and fires follow the criterion of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Fault is presumed in whoever created the conditions for the damage by having assumed the risk of harming third parties with the burn or fire. The damages and losses caused are at their charge. The injured party is exempt from proving fault. The burden of proof regarding the absence of fault corresponds to whoever burned or set the fire. It is an iuris tantum presumption. Exemptions from liability would be force majeure, the fault of the victim, or the act of a third party. X.- Whoever, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of damage, accepts the effects of the contingency, assumes the risk. The liability is based on creating the risk for the damage. The subject, upon initiating the activity, by means of their things, increases, strengthens, or multiplies the possibilities of danger. Even if it may be a lawful conduct, whoever assumed the risk must always indemnify the damage. There is greater reason to impute liability if the act stems from an unlawful conduct. The injured party cannot assume damages from conduct not promoted by themself, unless they placed themself in conditions to suffer the damage. Whoever burns or sets a fire, even with the authorization of the corresponding authority, cannot be exempted from liability. This is so because, although the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences N° 121 of October 26, 1909 establishes the guidelines for authorizing controlled burns on agrarians fund and establishes a series of obligations regarding who requests the authorization, this does not break the presumption of culpability. The requirements to authorize controlled burns tend to ensure minimal risk. It is a precautionary measure but not an exemption from liability. Therefore, compliance with the indispensable requirements for authorization cannot prejudice the neighbors if the disaster occurs. In this way, the damages to the goods, crops, or to the persons themselves of the neighbors must be compensated by whoever created the risk conditions with the fire or burn. XI.- The activity of setting fires or burning is, in itself, directed against Nature. It is a recourse of primitive agriculture where fire tends to substitute human labor. Instead of using human or mechanical means to promote agrarian activity, a destructive element is resorted to, upon the ashes of what was destroyed, to initiate the cultivation of plants or the raising of animals. These types of actions are incompatible with current values. It threatens security in that it risks the property of adjoining landowners, their goods, and persons. It equally threatens the values of environmental protection. The economic and social function of property also entails an ecological function: agriculture must develop in harmony, and not in antagonism, with Nature. For the preservation of the environment, social solidarity demands devising new mechanisms to prevent damage and threatening acts. This is the philosophy of the reform to article 50 of the Political Constitution. The Law on Burns and Dividing Fences and the entire problem of liability derived from that activity must be analyzed along these guidelines"* (see judgment N° 112 of 3:50 p.m. on October 11, 1995. In the same sense, N° 113 of 4:00 p.m. on October 11, 1995).

**VII.** The Chamber also clarified in the cited judgments that the obligation to indemnify the damages and losses caused by controlled burns and the fact that the presumption of liability falls on whoever prepared the land for that purpose cannot be limited to the case of land clearings (desmontes). *"Although it is true that article 5 of the Law on Dividing Fences and Burns establishes the general prohibition of conducting burns in the fields, authorizing them in the case of land clearings to enable lands for agricultural purposes (first paragraph), this does not invalidate the possibility of carrying out said activity under other conditions and for other purposes, as current reality demonstrates. For this reason, the same Law establishes, in the fourth paragraph of numeral 5°, a generic liability when it indicates: 'In any case, whoever makes burns must pay for the damages and losses…'. This fits perfectly within the generic principle of not harming others. In this case, the damages and losses are the responsibility of the defendant because she assumed the risk of harming her adjoining landowners with the burn. Upon initiating her activity, preparing the land to be burned, she increased the possibilities of danger. It was an unlawful conduct because she did not have authorization from the corresponding administrative authorities, as corroborated in the proven facts. She did not take the minimum precautions, required by law, to prevent greater damages than those normally produced. Although she took some precautionary measures –making firebreaks (rondas)– this is not sufficient to exempt her from her liability to indemnify the damages and losses caused to the plaintiff. The only way to free herself from said liability was by demonstrating the existence of fault on the part of the victim, a fortuitous event, or the act of a third party, which she did not do. Even though the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences is from 1909, its interpretation must be verified in accordance with articles 10 of the Civil Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Modern interpretation (systematic, material, and evolutionary) demands adapting the content of the norm to the historical circumstances and the social and economic reality in which it is to be applied."* To this end, the principles and values contained in the Constitution must be taken into account, as well as those in special laws on agrarian matters (see ruling No. 112-95 cited).

**VIII**. According to what has been explained, it is possible to conduct burns on lands of agricultural suitability (vocación agropecuaria) provided the requirements established in our legal system are met, among them taking sufficient precautionary measures to control the fire, requesting prior permission from the respective public entities, especially the relevant office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería), and notifying the owners or persons in charge of neighboring properties. This last requirement is of utmost importance, because even if all possible measures are taken, natural phenomena such as wind, air currents, and others can cause the fire to spread to areas other than those originally intended to be burned. Notifying the adjacent landowners seeks precisely to minimize or prevent the fire from spreading and causing greater damage, as it enables better vigilance by the neighbors on their own lands, and allows them to be prepared to fight it if necessary. That said, even in the event that all possible precautions were taken and a permit was obtained, the person who originates or causes a burn that produces damage to third parties is liable for such damages. The foregoing is so because it is a risky activity. The liability is of the strict liability type (responsabilidad objetiva) as already explained.

**IX**.- In the instant case, testimonial evidence was taken and the deponents [Nombre7], [Nombre8], [Nombre9], [Nombre10] were consistent in affirming that at six o'clock in the morning on February eleventh, nineteen ninety-seven, while they were on their way to work, they observed Mrs. [Nombre4]'s laborers burning a cane field (cañal) within her properties, who were passing the fire with trash torches from one side to another within said field (see folios 69 to 72 and 78 to 79). They also testified that later they were notified the fire had spread to the properties of Cafena S.A. and Agritec S.A., proceeding to put out the fire and to throw logs on the already burned part, to prevent it from spreading. In the present case, the lower court judge bases his reasoning on the statement given by Mr. [Nombre11], to indicate the fire started on a farm owned by Mrs. [Nombre4]'s sister, named [Nombre5], and finds it unproven that the fire was started on the farm of the defendant company Agrícola [Nombre3] S.A.. For this reason, it is considered necessary to analyze such testimony. Said deponent stated: “…That was February eleven or twelve, nineteen ninety-seven, I was notified by a son of a brother of mine that on the property of [Nombre5] a cane field was burning. At that moment I did not have the means to move to the site, that is, I did not have a vehicle, so I called a laborer and at about eight fifteen at night, a laborer arrived to notify me about the burning of the cane field. This laborer is [Nombre19] (sic) and I told him I had no driver, he came in a car and offered to take me, when we arrived at the point where it was burning, after a while Mrs. [Nombre5]'s chapulinista arrived. Then we began to fight the fire… we set a backfire (contrafuego) so the two fires would go out and at about ten o'clock at night the fire ended. Our surprise was the next day, and we moved out at about five thirty in the morning in the farm's pick up, and when we were passing by Mrs. [Nombre4]'s farm, I observed that the part of the cane was completely burned and in what way it happened I could not say… The part of the cane on the boundary where we passed, the division is not visible and there was some standing but burned cane… These events happened in the month of February, on Sunday the burn was at Mrs. [Nombre5]'s and on Monday on part of [Nombre4]'s. On the farm of [Nombre4] and of Mr. [Nombre13] there is a shared boundary, on the boundary of this (sic) sir what there is is coffee… At twelve noon we passed by the same place where the cane had been burned and there were cane cutters. At that moment the cane is usable and can be delivered. In that sector, burning cane was not customary… About fifteen or twenty days later the overseer (mandador) [Nombre6], from Mrs. [Nombre4]'s farm, came to my house and asked if I could go with him so that we could count (sic) on the boundary on [Nombre13]'s part and count (sic) the coffee plants that were already inactive on this sir's farm. We walked there and we were counting and there were plants that were not really burned, it was a matter of pruning them and the plant served and we counted one hundred three plants that nothing could be done for them, it was a matter of taking out the trunk and putting in another plant. That coffee was pruning coffee, it was about five years old… The first ones that could be pruned, they did not count them…” (folio 94). From what this witness stated, this Court considers that the same conclusions reached by the court below (a quo) cannot be arrived at, since he indicates that on February eleven or twelve, nineteen eighty-seven, at night at about eight thirty, he arrived to see the burn on Mrs. [Nombre5]'s property and was putting out the fire until it went out at about ten o'clock at night. He also indicated that it was the next day that he saw Mrs. [Nombre4]'s cane field burned. Such testimony does not concur with the facts accused here, since it is indicated the coffee plantation was burned on February eleventh, nineteen ninety-seven, without specifying the exact time the fire passed from one property to another, but that at about twelve noon on February eleventh of the cited year, the coffee plantation on the lands of the plaintiff companies here had already been burned. Furthermore, from what was stated by witnesses [Nombre7], [Nombre8], [Nombre9], [Nombre10], that same day in the morning hours, Mrs. [Nombre4]'s laborers were setting fire to the cane field adjacent to the coffee plantation of the plaintiffs here. From the foregoing, from the deponent [Nombre11], one cannot arrive at the conclusion given by the court below (a quo) that the fire started on Mrs. [Nombre5]'s farm and relate it, as it does, to the burning of Mrs. [Nombre4]'s cane field and therefore to the damages caused to the plaintiffs' coffee plantation. What is clear is that the defendant, through her laborers, was the one who carried out the burning of a cane field on her lands adjacent to the properties of the plaintiffs here, through which damages were caused to the coffee plantation located on the latter's lands, as witnesses [Nombre7], [Nombre8], [Nombre9], [Nombre10] stated; all on February 11, 1997. In the report rendered by the expert [Nombre20], it is indicated the distance between the coffee plants located on the plaintiffs' lands and the burned cane field on the defendant's property was less than four meters, on the properties of Agritec S.A., and six to eight meters regarding the properties of Cafena S.A.(folio 24), therefore this Court considers that at such a short distance, the fire could easily spread from one property to another. On the other hand, according to what said witnesses indicated, there were no firebreaks (rondas corta fuego). All of this constitutes serious, precise, and concordant indications (indicios) that the fire spread from the defendant's farm to the neighboring properties of the plaintiff companies. On the other hand, the fact of a third party as an exonerating cause of liability, as interpreted by the court below (a quo) in the issued judgment, is not demonstrated, by reason of there being no proof in the case file (autos) of such circumstances, especially after analyzing the testimony of Mr. Arley Bolaños, upon which the lower court judge bases his judgment and from which the conclusion he reached cannot be derived, viewing the evidence as a whole.

**X.-** From what was stated in the aforementioned expert report, it is not truly possible to determine how many coffee plants were damaged in the coffee plantations of Agritec S.A. and Cafena S.A. That report does not prove the quantity of burned coffee plants, but rather refers for its valuation to 81 plants on the farm of Cafena S.A. and 79 plants on the lands of Agritec S.A., according to what was stated in the complaint (demanda). Due to the foregoing, it is necessary to review the rest of the evidentiary elements, in order to determine the quantity of damaged coffee plants. The witness [Nombre11] indicated about one hundred three coffee plants were burned, but without specifying exactly on the lands of which of the plaintiffs the damaged plants were counted (folio 97). The deponent [Nombre6] said: “about one hundred plants were burned between scorched (chasparreadas) and burned,” without also indicating on which of the plaintiffs' lands this occurred (folio 99). In that regard, Mr. Maynor Navarro Alvarado testified (folio 98 verso), referring to having observed about one hundred burned coffee plants. [Nombre10] stated the same: “As a result of that burn, about eighty coffee plants were burned on each side, I clarify, from eighty to one hundred plants” (folio 79). From what was said by witnesses [Nombre16] and [Nombre9], it is possible to determine that an average of between eighty and one hundred coffee plants were destroyed on the lands owned by Cafena S.A. (see folios 78 front and back). The judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial) carried out is also not precise regarding the quantity of burned coffee plants, indicating “…On the farm of Cafena S.A., an area of coffee is observed whose plants are dry as a result of the same burn… From this sector of the farm we headed north of the main road of the farm of Agritec S.A., in [Dirección2], and I observe in sectors burned coffee plants all along the fence…” (folio 13). From the foregoing, only the burning of about one hundred coffee plants has been proven, and not one hundred fifty-two, as indicated by the plaintiffs in the complaint brief (folio 5), in which it was indicated that 79 plants were burned on lands of Agritec S.A. and 81 on those of Cafena S.A.. For the reasons stated above, the judgment issued must be reversed and, in its place, the defenses (excepciones) of lack of right (falta de derecho) must be rejected, because the plaintiff party has proven that damages were caused to its coffee plantations and therefore has the right to charge for them; the defenses of lack of passive and active standing (legitimación pasiva y activa) must also be rejected as it is clear the plaintiffs have active standing to bring the present process by virtue of their assets having been impaired, through damages caused to their crops, and they have proven the fire started in the defendant's cane field, when her laborers set fire to it and it later spread to the crops of her adjacent landowners. For the same reasons, the defense of lack of interest (falta de interés) raised by the defendant is rejected. Based on the foregoing: 1) The damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused to one hundred coffee plants are approved, to be liquidated in the execution of sentence (ejecución de sentencia), distributed as follows: a) The value of the 81 plants located on Cafena's lands and 19 plants located on lands of Agritec S.A., b) The value of the production lost (producción dejada de percibir) over a four-year period, which is the replacement time for the plantation while it reaches its full harvesting capacity. 2) The defendant Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada is ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) of this proceeding.

**POR TANTO:** The judgment issued is reversed. In its place, the defenses of lack of right, lack of passive and active standing, and lack of interest raised by the defendant are rejected. The complaint filed by Agritec S.A. and Cafena S.A. against Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada is partially granted, ordering payment of the damages and losses caused, in the following manner: 1) The damages and losses caused to one hundred coffee plants are approved, to be liquidated in the execution of sentence, distributed as follows: a) The value of the 81 plants located on Cafena's lands and 19 plants located on lands of Agritec S.A., b) The value of the production lost over a four-year period, which is the replacement time for the plantation while it reaches its full harvesting capacity. 2) The defendant Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada is ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this proceeding. 3) The rest of the claims are denied.

**ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA** **CARLOS BOLAÑOS CÉSPEDES** **RUTH ALPÍZAR RODRÍGUEZ** **Exp. No. EXPN1** **Ordinario** **Cafena S. A. c/ Agrícola [Nombre3] Ltda.** **rgr**

VOTO N° 815-F-03 VOTO N° 815-F-03 TRIBUNAL AGRARIO DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSE. Goicoechea, a las catorce horas cincuenta minutos del dieciséis de diciembre de dos mil tres.

Proceso ORDINARIO tramitado ante el JUZGADO AGRARIO DEL PRIMER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE ALAJUELA, por AGRITEC SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, cédula jurídica número CED1 - - , representada por [Nombre1] , mayor, soltera, empresaria, portadora de la cédula de identidad número CED2 - - , y CAFENA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, cédula jurídica número CED3 - - , representada por [Nombre2] , casado, empresario, pasaporte D CED4 , vecino de San José, contra AGRICOLA [Nombre3] LIMITADA, número tres - ciento dos - ciento dieciocho setecientos setenta y tres, representada por [Nombre4] , mayor, viuda, empresaria, portadora de la cédula de identidad número CED5 - - , vecina de [Nombre4] de Grecia, como gerente con facultades de apoderada generalísima. Intervienen además, en su condición de apoderados especiales judiciales de la licenciada Ana Lorena Umaña Rojas, mayor, casada, abogada, portadora de la cédula de identidad número CED6 - - , vecina de Grecia y el licenciado Fernando Morera Solano, mayor, soltero, abogado, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED7 - - , de la actora y demandado, por su orden.

RESULTANDO:

1. El presente proceso estimado en la suma de ochocientos mil colones exactos, es para que en sentencia se declare; "1. Se condene a AGRICOLA [Nombre3] LTDA. a pagar los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a mis representadas con los hechos descritos, que se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia, conforme al avalúo pericial, por ser pretensión principal y no accesoria, los cuales consisten en : - El valor de las 152 plantas dañadas. - El valor de su producción durante cuatro años, considerando una cosecha promedio y un precio promedio. - Los intereses que dejarán de percibir mis representadas al no poder percibir, cada año, el valor de la cosecha de las plantas, en forma acumulativa, y hasta el efectivo pago del principal.. - El costo de la semilla, su siembra y asistencia hasta que las nuevas plantas alcancen el tamaño de las dañadas, incluyendo la mano de obra e insumos necesarios, durante cuatro años. 2. Se condene al AGRICOLA [Nombre3] LTDA. a pagar ambas costas de este proceso.

2. La sociedad demandada contestó la demanda e interpuso las excepciones de sine actione agit, falta de derecho, falta de interés y falta de legitmación ad causam, en sus modalidades activa y pasiva.

3. El licenciado Luis Rodrigo Campos Gamboa, Juez de Primera instancia, en sentencia de las nueve horas del quince de abril del dos mil dos, dispuso: "POR TANTO: Conforme se ha expuesto, declaro sin lugar la demanda ordinaria agraria incoada por CAFENA S.A. Y AGRITEC S.A. contra la sociedad AGRICOLA [Nombre3] LTDA, en todos sus extremos y por los argumentos esgrimidos en el fondo del presente asunto. Sobre las EXCEPCIONES D E FALTA DE RECHO, FALTA DE LEGITIMACION ACTIVA Y PASIVA Y LA FALTA DE INTERES, se acogen las mismas. Son las costas a cargo de la parte actora. Se rechaza el afianzamiento de costas solicitado, lo anterior en virtud de que el ordinal 285 del Código Procesal Civil fue declarado Inconstitucional. Fs… " 4. De este fallo conoce el Tribunal en virtud de apelación interpuesta por la apodera especial judicial de la parte actora. En los procedimientos se ha observado las prescripciones legales en la substanciación del proceso y no se notan defectos u omisiones.

Redacta el juez Darcia Carranza; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- El Tribunal comparte los hechos tenidos por demostrados en la sentencia dictada al ser fiel reflejo de lo ocurrido en autos, con excepción del numerado ocho, ya que no queda demostrado el fuego originado en la finca de [Nombre5] sea el que quemó las propiedades de Cafena S.A, Agritec S.A. y Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada y el hecho cinco al ser un elemento probatorio de cuantificación de daños y no un hecho propiamente. Así mismo, el hecho numerado seis no se acoge al no ser de interés para la resolución de este asunto. De dicha naturaleza téngase los siguientes: 9) Los peones de la demandada incluso su capataz de nombre [Nombre6], estuvieron en fecha once de febrero de 1997, quemando el cañal contiguo a las propiedades de las actoras, (ver testimonios de [Nombre7] , [Nombre8] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] , a folios 69, 70 vuelto, 78 vuelto, 79). 10 Luego de mediodía del once de febrero de 1997, [Nombre8] , se dio cuenta se estaba quemando parte de las fincas de Cafena S.A y Agritec S.A. (ver testimonio de [Nombre8] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] folios 70 vuelto, 78 vuelto y 79 ). 11) El fuego afecto aproximadamente unas cien a ciento tres matas de café en propiedades de las actoras (ver testimonio de [Nombre11] a folio 97, [Nombre12] 98 vuelto, [Nombre6] a folio 99 vuelto). 12) Las propiedades de Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada, Cafena S.A. y Agritec S.A. son colindantes entre sí (ver prueba testimonial de [Nombre12] , [Nombre6] , [Nombre10] a folios 62, 70 vuelto, 98 vuelto, 99 vuelto e informe pericial a folio 23 y reconocimiento judicial a folio 13) II.- No se comparte el hecho tenido por no demostrado en la sentencia de marras, al considerarse existen indicios precisos claros y concordantes de que el fuego que afectó las fincas de Cafena S.A y Agritec S.A., se inició en terrenos de la demandada, mediante quema realizada de un cañal por parte de sus peones. De dicha naturaleza téngase los siguientes:1) La demandada no demuestra haber contado con el permiso respectivo para realizar quemas, ni que hubiera notificado a los colindantes se iba a hacer una en la fecha objeto de los hechos en litis. (no hay ninguna prueba en ese sentido).

III.- La parte actora apela dentro del plazo contemplado en el numeral 59 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria, la resolución de las nueve horas del quince de abril del dos mil dos con fundamento en lo siguiente: 1) El señor juez critica los términos en que se redactó la demanda, en forma que no es justa ni correcta pues el libelo correspondiente, además de reunir todos los requisitos, señala claramente que hay inmuebles de Cafena y Agritec S.A. colindantes con los de la demandada, estableciendo sus respectivos números de finca, las cuales de hecho están reunidas como una sola unidad productiva. Todos los fundos que se citan en la demanda son perjudicados, pues los mismos están fraccionados en muchos lotes de uso agrícola, y por ese motivo, las dos actoras están gestionando el cobro de sus daños y perjuicios. Los testigos de ambas partes identifican claramente es de la demandada la finca donde se dio la quema, y de las actoras las fincas donde está el café dañado. Por otra parte, sí se estableció en el hecho 3 de la demanda, que la sociedad demandada procedió sin permiso, sin rondas, sin tomar medidas de seguridad, ni dar aviso a los vecinos, de manera que sí se pormenorizaron los aspectos de negligencia e imprudencia que llevaron después a la cita de los artículos 1045 y 1048 del Código Civil. 2. De acuerdo con la sentencia, no existe prueba de que el fuego se iniciara en propiedad de la demandada. Tal cosa para la parte apelante no es correcta, pues la aplicación de los mismos principios de la sana crítica a que se hace mención nos permite analizar lo siguiente: a. El día 11 de febrero de 1997, peones de la sociedad demandada, bajo la supervisión de su mandador, procedieron a efectuar la quema de un cañal propiedad de Agrícola [Nombre3] Ltda. Contiguo a las fincas de las aquí actoras, que se encuentran en esa parte cultivadas de café. Este hecho medular puede tenerse por comprobado con base en el reconocimiento judicial realizado, y en las declaraciones de [Nombre7] (folio 69) y de todos los testigos, además de las fotografías aportadas con la demanda y la contestación a la audiencia sobre excepciones, una de las cuales permite observar el tractor de la demandada, conducido por uno de sus empleados, en labores al momento del incendio. b. Los testigos afirman con claridad haber visto a los peones de [Nombre3] “pasar el fuego de un lado a otro con mechones de basura”, expresión que es usada por varios declarantes ([Nombre7] , folio 65 frente última línea y vuelto; [Nombre8] , a folio 71, [Nombre9] , a folio 78, [Nombre10] , folio 79; [Nombre13] , a folio 94. El testigo [Nombre8] señala enfáticamente a folio 71 que ESTABAN QUEMANDO Y NO APAGANDO, y en asegura se tenían mechones de hojas prendidos y poniéndolos de un lado a otro. Igual se expresa [Nombre10] , a folio 79. c. Además, señalan los declarantes que el encargado estaba cerca de allí ([Nombre7] , folio 65 vuelto) e identifican incluso al mandador de la demandada, como el señor de nombre [Nombre6], presente en el sitio y partícipe de la quema ([Nombre8] , folio 71 vuelto; [Nombre9] , folio 78 vuelto, [Nombre14] folio 79). d. El fallo según las actoras tiene por probado en el hecho 6 que la Cooperativa Victoria realizó labores de arada en las mismas fechas. Sin embargo, desconoce que el área fue limpiada mediante fuego por peones de la demandada, para prepararla a fin de que maquinaria de la Cooperativa Victoria, realizara esos trabajos, ya que esta empresa exige que los terrenos estén limpios (Documento de folio 29, declaración de [Nombre7] a folio 69 y 70; [Nombre8] folio 71, [Nombre15] , folio 77, [Nombre9] , folio 78 vuelto, [Nombre10] a folio 79 vuelto, [Nombre6] a folio 100). Resalta en particular el testimonio de [Nombre15] , quien señala el modus operandi de la Cooperativa, la cual debe programar con anticipación el envío de las máquinas, e indica que los días 18 de marzo , 23 de marzo y 24 de abril de 1997 (es decir, después de la fecha de los hechos que ocurrieron el 11 de febrero de 1997) la Cooperativa realizó arada, rastrea y zurcada en propiedad de doña [Nombre4]. Además, indica que el único método conocido para limpiar terrenos donde ha habido caña es mediante la quema. e. Considera medular la existencia de la Ley de Quemas, la cual fue transgredida. La demandada no obtuvo permiso alguno de las autoridades para hacer la quema (ninguna prueba presentó al efecto), ni confeccionó las llamadas rondas, no se tomó medida de seguridad alguna, ni se avisó a los vecinos, en cuenta a mis representadas ([Nombre7] folio 65, [Nombre8] , folio 71, [Nombre9] , Folio 78 vuelto). f. Quedó acreditado, los empleados de [Nombre3] Ltda., estaban quemando la basura que quedó tras haber cortado manualmente la caña en el lugar. Ver declaraciones de [Nombre7] , folio 70 vuelto; [Nombre8] folio 71, [Nombre9] , folio 78. g. Se demostró, que en la [Dirección1] se hicieron varias quemas de cañales para limpiar terrenos, algunos de los cuales se resembraron con café ([Nombre8] , folio 71 y 72; [Nombre9] , folio 78 v7uelto; [Nombre10] , folio 79 vuelto; [Nombre13] , folio 94, [Nombre11] , a folio 98, [Nombre12] , a folio 99, que incluso menciona a un Ingeniero de la Cooperativa Victoria; [Nombre6] , a folio 99 vuelto, [Nombre6] a folio 100). h. Frente a todas estas pruebas, citadas en forma detallada, la sentencia da más crédito a la deposición de un solo testigo, empleado de una hermana de la señora [Nombre4], el cual dijo el fuego se inició en propiedad de [Nombre5] . Señala, la demandada argumenta, la quema no se efectuó por peones y mandador suyos, o que fue producto de la acción de sujetos inescrupulosos; ninguna prueba se aportó al efecto y más bien hay abundante prueba en contrario, ya señalada anteriormente, la cual conduce a la clara acción de los empleados de ella. El dicho del señor [Nombre11] , al cual se da tanta importancia en la sentencia, más bien, es contradictorio con la anterior argumentación de [Nombre3]. Este testigo [Nombre11] alude a un incendio en propiedad de [Nombre5] , el cual nada tiene que ver con los hechos aquí descritos, y dijo, que cuando pasó por finca de doña [Nombre4] el incendio ya estaba consumado, por ello nada aporta ni contradice a lo ya indicado como demostrado. Es evidente, el señor Juez no tuvo en cuenta lo anterior, y se trató de momentos históricos y fácticos totalmente distintos. El mismo señor [Nombre11] dice haber contado 103 matas totalmente inservibles, y lo curioso de ello, es lo indicado por él en cuanto a que dicho recuento lo hizo a solicitud y en compañía del mandador de la demandada, lo cual refleja, que bien sabía esta última su culpa en el asunto. Pues de lo contrario, cual hubiese sido el interés en contar las plantas. i. Dice, Agrícola [Nombre3] Ltda. había contratado con la Cooperativa Victoria una serie de trabajos en ese terreno, los cuales solo podían hacerse si el mismo estaba totalmente limpio, por lo cual procedieron a quemarlo. Tal quema no fue accidental ni obra de terceros, y porque la mayor parte de la caña ya había sido cortada, la basura y hojas estaban agrupadas en montículos. Fueron estos montículos los quemados ex profeso, y en esas circunstancias – a diferencia de lo que ocurre con la caña en pie.- el fuego no corre; sin embargo, la totalidad del lote, de lado a lado, se observa quemado, lo que implica una intencionalidad, al extremo de que incluso se dañaron partes de café sembrado perteneciente a la misma demandada. Sus peones y mandador estuvieron en el lugar desde el inicio del fuego y se encargaron de llevarlo a todos los extremos del lote, a vista y paciencia de varias personas. Nada de esto tomó en cuenta el señor Juez, por ello indica, se dejó de aplicar las reglas de la sana crítica. 10. Analizando la prueba de la demandada encontramos que [Nombre12] menciona una ronda (que todos los demás negaron) pero hecha a posteriori, por lo cual no releva de responsabilidad a la demandada. En todo caso ignora como se originó el incendio. [Nombre16] llegó como a las diez y media de la mañana, por ello, no puede dar cuenta de lo ocurrido antes, (folio 206 a 209).

IV.- Nuestro ordenamiento jurídico contiene varias disposiciones que en forma expresa y directa se refieren a las quemas e incendios forestales y la responsabilidad que se origina por ellos. Tenemos así: a) Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas,N°121 de 26 de octubre de 1909: Su artículo 5 prohibe hacer quemazones en los campos. Unicamente las autoriza cuando se trate de desmontes para habilitar terrenos con fines agrícolas: Para ello se debe: 1) Solicitar permiso a la autoridad política local, 2) Tener garantías y precauciones para evitar mayor destrucción ala que se pretende o perjuicio a terceros,3) Notificar personalmente o por cédula de la autoridad a todos los colindantes o interesados el día y hora de la quema, por lo menos con dos días de antelación, 4) Dejar una distancia mínima de 400 metros sobre los manantiales nacidos en los cerros, y de 200 metros sobre los manantiales en terrenos planos. En materia de responsabilidad, expresamente indica que ,en todo caso ,el que hiciere quemazones debe pagar los daños y perjuicios que a causa del fuego se ocasionen. Se presume autor de la quemazón el propietario, poseedor o arrendatario que en la época del fuego estaba preparado para ese objeto. B) La Ley Forestal vigente, N°7575 de 13 de febrero de 1996, en su capítulo IV sobre “Protección Forestal” prohibe la realización de quemas en terrenos forestales y aledaños a ellos, sin haberse obtenido el permiso de la Administración Forestal del Estado. Remite al Código Penal para sancionar a quien realice una quema sin permiso (artículo 35). Asimismo, los numerales 59 y 60 respectivamente sancionan el causar dolosa o culposamente un incendio forestal, con penas de uno a tres años en el primer caso y de tres meses a dos años en el segundo. C) Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, Decreto N°25721-MINAE de 17 de octubre de 1996: Establece que el funcionario de la Administración Forestal debe visitar el lugar previo a otorgar un permiso de quema (artículo 34). D) Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, N°7779 de 30 de abril de 1998: Exige se sigan, para practicar quemas en terrenos agrícolas, las indicaciones del MAG conforme al permiso extendido para esos efectos, según el Reglamento de quemas vigentes, así como lo dispuesto en la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y el Código Penal (artículo 24). E) Reglamento al Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, Decreto N°29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT de 8 de agosto del 2000: En su capítulo X titulado “De las quemas agrarias”, dispone será el MAG en coordinación con el MINAE y el Ministerio de Seguridad quien emitirá los principios fundamentales mediante los cuales podrá autorizarse la práctica de quemas agrarias. Su artículo 86 expresamente exige el permiso previo del MAG para hacer quemas en terrenos de vocación Agrícola, el cual debe conferir audiencia al área de conservación del MINAE respectiva, para que emita su criterio sobre las repercusiones a la biota y los ecosistemas. Indica incluso no opera el silencio positivo en cuanto al criterio del MINAE. En cuanto a los terrenos forestales, zonas protectoras, parques nacionales, refugios de vida silvestre, prohibe la realización de quemas (artículo 88). F) Decreto N°17015-MAG,del2 de mayo de 1986: Creó la comisión Nacional para los Incendios Forestales. Dicha Comisión, según el Decreto N° 19434-MIRENEM de 11 de diciembre de 1990, tiene como atribuciones recomendar las políticas nacionales y preparar los programas de prevención y combate de incendios forestales. G) Decreto N°21859-MIRENEN del 7 de diciembre de 1992: Estableció el Comité contra Incendios Guanacaste como una instancia de coordinación, apoyo y seguimiento del Programa de Incendios Forestales de la Región Huetar Norte. H) Decreto N°23850-MAG-SP del 4 de noviembre de 1994, Reglamento para quemas controladas con fines agrícolas y pecuarios: En él se establecen los requisitos mínimos para poder efectuar quemas e incendios, especialmente en terrenos de uso agrícola o pecuario. Se define quema al fuego provocado intencionalmente, regulado por un plan preestablecido, en el cual se asumen todas las medidas preventivas para evitar daños a los recursos naturales y a las propiedades de los colindantes. Son incendios los que, natural o artificialmente, afecten bosques, terrenos forestales, terrenos agrícolas o de uso pecuario (artículo 1). Para efectuar quemas en terrenos agrícolas y pecuarios debe contarse con una autorización escrita del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería. El funcionario además de las medidas ya tomadas aprobadas según visita que debe hacer previo al permiso, debe indicar si lo concede las adicionales que considere necesario (artículos 2 y 3). El numeral 6° establece como requisitos mínimos los siguientes: 1) Determinar mediante rondas corta fuegos (área con un ancho del doble al alto del material combustible según lo indica el mismo Decreto), el área a quemar y los materiales combustibles utilizados; 2) abrir y barrer una ronda corta fuego en el perímetro del área a quemar, la cual no puede ser menos de un metro de ancho; 3) tener agua suficiente y herramientas para apagar el fuego en caso de emergencia. Adicionalmente se puede: 4) dar aviso previo a la Dirección Policial del lugar sobre la fecha y hora de la quema: 5) contar con la asistencia de al menos una persona; 6) hacer la quema contra viento y contra pendiente después de las 16 y antes de la 7 horas, evitando hacerla el día de viento: 7) verificar antes de retirarse el fuego quede completamente apagado. Pero independientemente se cuente o no con el permiso respectivo, el Decreto claramente establece en su artículo 7° que: “La persona que realice una quema, ya sea con o sin permiso, será civilmente responsable de los daños y perjuicios que pudieren ocasionarse ,de acuerdo con los artículos 41 y 50 de nuestra Constitución Política y las reglas sobre responsabilidad civil extracontractual que rigen nuestro ordenamiento jurídico..”. I) Finalmente “las disposiciones generales contenidas en los numerales “1045 y siguientes del Código Civil, sobre responsabilidad civil extracontractual, son de aplicación supletoria para esta materia” (ver sentencia de la Sala Primera N°112 de las 15:50 horas del 11 de octubre de1995). En el ámbito penal, el Código Penal vigente sanciona con 3 a 30 días multa quien contraviniere las disposiciones encaminadas a prevenir incendios o evitar su propagación (inciso 1° del Artículo 407) y a quien infringiere las reglas sobre quema de malezas, rastrojos u otros productos de la tierra (inciso 2°).

V.La doctrina moderna por su parte, ha apoyado la objetivación de la responsabilidad, al comprender dentro de los factores de imputabilidad y atribución legal del daño, aparte de la culpa y el dolo, el riesgo. Incluso se ha propuesto incluir como otros factores objetivos: garantía, equidad, abuso del derecho y exceso de la normal tolerancia entre vecinos. Se ve el daño entonces no desde el hecho del autor sino desde la posición del perjudicado, para procurar que todo daño causado en forma injusta sea reparado. Desde otro punto de vista, se ha separado la culpa de la ilicitud del hecho, dándole un rol más importante a éste. “Una vez rota la equiparación entre la ilicitud del hecho y la culpa, la conducta adquirió una fisonomía autónoma desligada del perfil subjetivo de la voluntad del agente, para constituirse en un simple medio, causa o criterio de conexión entre un sujeto tenido por responsable y un cierto evento dañoso a resarcir”. (Franzoni (Massimo), La Actividad peligrosa, en Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires,1997, p.120). Se habla así de la Teoría del riesgo, la cual no desplaza la culpa sino que la complementa, y se resume como el deber de quien crea un riesgo de indemnizar el daño que provoque a un tercero. “El riesgo es causa de imputabilidad cuando debido a la realización de ciertas causas y determinadas actividades, calificadas como peligrosas, se produce un daño. El daño en estas circunstancias debe resarcirse, no porque su agente haya incurrido en dolo o culpa, sino porque el orden jurídico debe proteger a la comunidad por el desarrollo de actividades peligrosas, de forma que quien las realiza incurre en responsabilidad si se ocasiona un daño en virtud de tal realización… La responsabilidad derivada del riesgo no depende del dolo o la culpa del agente sino que se origina en la mera ocurrencia del daño consecuente de la actividad peligrosa. Esta consideración trae consigo un régimen especial de la prueba, según la cual, por el solo ejercicio de la actividad insegura se presume la culpa del agente, exonerándose la víctima de la tarea de demostrar una conducta indebida. Al agente le corresponde desvirtuar la presunción…” ([Nombre17] , Hecho imputable dañoso en Del daño, Editora Jurídica, 1° Ed,Colombia,2001, p.260). Para otros autores, “la relación causal es un elemento del acto ilícito y del incumplimiento contractual que vincula el daño directamente con el hecho antijurídico, e indirectamente con el elemento de imputación subjetiva o atribución objetiva. Es el factor aglutinante que hace que el daño y la culpa, o en su caso el riesgo, se integren en la unidad del acto que es fuente de la obligación de indemnizar” (ver [Nombre18] (), El perfil de la responsabilidad civil al finalizar el siglo XX en Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.24 a 26).

VI.Precisamente, la realización de quemas –independientemente de su fin- es una actividad innegablemente riesgosa. Por ello, en concordancia con la doctrina citada, La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha claramente indicado: “VII.- Las quemas pueden acarrear, para quien las produce, responsabilidades de tipo civil y penal. La responsabilidad civil está regulada en la Ley de quemas y Cercas divisorias al establecer la obligación, de quien hiciere quemazones, de pagar los daños y perjuicios ocasionados como consecuencia del fuego (artículo 5 párrafo 4). Se presume autor de la quemazón al propietario, poseedor o arrendatario del terreno que en la época del fuego estaba preparado para ese objeto… VIII.- La Sala Constitucional, mediante Voto N°3459 de las de las 14 horas 42minutos del 20 de julio de 1993, estableció la derogatoria del artículo 5°,párrafo quinto, de la Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias sobre las responsabilidad penal… La misma Sala Constitucional (Voto N°439-I-95 de las 14:36 horas del 22 de agosto de 1995) aclaró la mencionada sentencia N°3459-93 en el sentido de que el artículo 5°, párrafos 5°y 6,de la Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas está derogado únicamente en cuanto a los aspectos penales que contiene… IX.- La normativa de quemas e incendios siguen el criterio de la responsabilidad objetiva. La culpa se presume en quien creó las condiciones del daño por haber asumido el riesgo de perjudicar a terceros con la quema o incendio. Los daños y perjuicios ocasionados son a su cargo. El damnificado está exento de probar la culpa. La carga de la prueba sobre la ausencia de culpa corresponde a quien quemó o incendió. Es una presunción iuris tantum. Sería eximente de responsabilidad la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima o el hecho de un tercero. X. Asume el riesgo quien previendo la eventualidad o posibilidad del daño acepta los efectos de la contingencia. La responsabilidad se funda en crear el riesgo para el daño. El sujeto al iniciar la actividad, por medio de sus cosas, aumenta, potencia o multiplica las posibilidades de peligrosidad. Aún cuando pueda tratarse de una conducta lícita, siempre debe indemnizar el daño quien asumió el riesgo. Hay mayor razón para imputar la responsabilidad si el hecho proviene de una conducta ilícita. No puede el damnificado asumir daños sobre conductas no impulsadas por él mismo, salvo si se puso en condiciones para sufrir el daño. Quien quema o incendia, aún con la autorización de la autoridad correspondiente, no puede ser eximido de responsabilidad. Esto es así porque si bien la Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias N° 121 del 26decotubre de 1909 establece las pautas para autorizar las quemas en fundos agrarios, y establece una serie de obligaciones respecto de quien solicita la autorización, ello no rompe la presunción de culpabilidad. Los requisitos para autorizar las quemas tienden a asegurar el mínimo riesgo. Se trata de una medida precautoria pero no es una eximente de responsabilidad. Entonces el cumplimiento de los requisitos indispensables para la autorización no pueden perjudicar a los vecinos si el siniestro ocurre. En esta forma los daños en los bienes, cosechas, o en las personas mismas, de los vecinos deben ser indemnizados por quien creo las condiciones del riesgo con el incendio o quema. XI. La actividad de incendiar o quemar en si misma, va dirigida contra la Naturaleza. En un recurso de una agricultura primitiva donde el fuego tiende a sustituir el trabajo del hombre. En vez de utilizar medios humanos o mecánicos para impulsar la actividad agraria se recurre a un elemento destructivo para, sobre las cenizas de lo destruido, iniciar el cultivo de vegetales o la cría de animales. Este tipo de acciones resultan incompatibles con los valores actuales. Atenta contra la seguridad en cuanto arriesga la propiedad de los colindantes, sus bienes y personas. Igualmente atenta contra los valores de protección al medio ambiente. La función económica y social de la propiedad entraña también una función ecológica: la agricultura debe desarrollarse en armonía, y no en antagonismo, con la Naturaleza. Para la preservación del medio ambiente la solidaridad social exige idear nuevos mecanismos para prevenir el daño y los hechos amenazantes. Este es la filosofía de la reforma al artículo 50 de la Constitución Política. Sobre esos lineamientos debe ser analizada la Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias y toda la problemática de la responsabilidad derivada de esa actividad” (ver sentencia N° 112 de las 15horas 50 minutos del11 de octubre de 1995.En igual sentido la N° 113 de las 16 horas del 11deoctubre de 1995).

VII.Aclaró asimismo la Sala en las sentencias citadas, la obligación de indemnizar los daños y perjuicios ocasionados por las quemas y el recaer la presunción de responsabilidad sobre quien preparó el terreno para ese fin, no se pueden limitar al caso de los desmontes. “Si bien es cierto el artículo 5 de la Ley de Cercas y Quemas Divisorias establece la prohibición general de hacer quemazones en los campos, autorizándolos cuando se trate de desmontes para habilitar terrenos confines agrícolas (párrafo primero),ello no enerva la posibilidad de efectuar dicha actividad bajo otras condiciones y para otros fines, como lo demuestra la realidad actual. Por eso la misma Ley establece, en el párrafo cuarto del numeral 5°, una responsabilidad genérica cuando indica: “En todo caso, el que hiciere quemazones debe pagar los daños y perjuicios…”. Lo cual enmarca perfectamente en el principio genérico de no hacer daño a los demás. En este caso, los daños y perjuicios son a cargo de la demandada porque asumió el riesgo de perjudicar a sus colindantes con la quema. Al iniciar su actividad, preparando el terreno para ser quemado, aumentó las posibilidades de peligrosidad. Se trató de una conducta ilícita pues no contaba con autorización de las autoridades administrativas correspondientes, según se corrobora en los hechos probados. No tomó las previsiones mínimas, requeridas por ley, para prevenir daños mayores de los normalmente producidos. Aunque tomó algunas medidas precautorias –hechura de rondas- ello no es suficiente para eximirla de su responsabilidad de indemnizar los daños y perjuicios causados a la demandante. La única forma de liberarse de dicha responsabilidad era demostrando la existencia de culpa de la víctima, caso fortuito o hecho de un tercero, lo cual no hizo. Aún cuando la Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias es de 1909 su interpretación debe verificarse en consonancia con los artículos 10 del Código Civil y 5 de la Ley Orgánica del poder Judicial. La interpretación moderna (sistemática, material y evolutiva) exige adecuar el contenido de la norma a las circunstancias históricas y la realidad social y económica en la cual va a ser aplicada. Para ello debe tomarse en cuenta los principios y valores contenidos en la Constitución, así como en las leyes especiales en materia agraria “. (ver sentencia N° 112-95 citada).

VIII.De acuerdo con lo explicado, es posible hacer quemas en terrenos de vocación agropecuaria siempre y cuando se cumplan los requisitos establecidos en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, entre ellos tomar las medidas de precaución suficientes para poder controlar el fuego, solicitar permiso previo ante los entes públicos respectivos, especialmente la oficina del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería que sea del caso, y notificar a los dueños o encargados de los previos vecinos. Este último requisito es de suma importancia, porque aunque se tomen todas las medidas posibles, fenómenos naturales como lo es el viento, las corrientes de aire y otros, pueden ocasionar el fuego se extienda a otras zonas fuera de las que originalmente se pretendía quemar. Con la notificación de los colindantes se procura minimizar o evitar precisamente, propagarse el fuego, se produzca un daño mayor, dado que se posibilita una mejor vigilancia por parte de los vecinos en sus propios terrenos, y se les permite estar preparados para combatirlo si fuese necesario. Ahora bien, aún en el caso de haberse tomado todas las previsiones posibles y de contarse con permiso, quien origina o cause una quema que produzca daños a terceros, es responsable de tales. Lo anterior es así por tratarse de una actividad riesgosa. La responsabilidad es de tipo objetivo como ya se explicó.

IX.- En el caso de marras se evacuó prueba testimonial y los deponentes [Nombre7] , [Nombre8] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] fueron contestes en afirmar que a las seis de la mañana del once de febrero de 1997, cuando ellos iban hacia el trabajo observaron a los peones de doña [Nombre4] quemando un cañal dentro de propiedades de ella, los cuales pasaban el fuego con mechones de basura de un lado a otro dentro de dicho sembradío (véase folios 69 a 72 y 78 a 79). Declararon también luego fueron avisados el fuego se había pasado a las propiedades de Cafena S.A. Y Agritec S.A., procediendo a apagar el fuego y a tirar troncos en la parte ya quemada, para evitar se propagara. En el presente caso el juzgador de instancia se fundamenta en la declaración dada por el señor [Nombre11] , para indicar el fuego inició en una finca propiedad de la hermana de doña [Nombre4], llamada [Nombre5], y tiene por indemostrado, el fuego fue iniciado en la finca de la empresa demandada Agrícola [Nombre3] S.A.. Por esta razón se considera necesario analizar tal testimonio. Dicho deponente dijo: “…Eso fue once o doce de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y siete, a mí me avisó un hijo de un hermano mío de que en la propiedad de [Nombre5] se estaba quemando un cañal. En ese momento no tenía el medio para trasladarme al lugar, es decir no tenía vehículo por lo que llamé a un peón y llegó como a las ocho y cuarto de la noche un peón a avisarme de la quema del cañal. El peón este es [Nombre19] (sic) y le dije que no tenía chofer, el venía en carro y se ofreció llevarme, cuando llegamos al punto donde se estaba quemando, al rato llegó el chapulinista de doña [Nombre5]. Entonces comenzamos a luchar contra el fuego… le metimos contrafuego para los dos fuegos se apagaran y como a las diez de la noche se terminó el fuego. La sorpresa de nosotros fue al día siguiente, y nosotros nos trasladamos como al ser las cinco y media de la mañana en el pick up de la finca, y cuando íbamos pasando por la finca de doña [Nombre4] observé que la parte de la caña estaba totalmente quemada y en que forma sucedió no podría decirlo…La parte de la caña de la colindancia por donde nosotros pasamos no se ve la división y había un poco de caña parada pero quemada…Estos hechos sucedieron en el mes de febrero, el día domingo la quema fue donde doña [Nombre5] y el lunes en parte de [Nombre4]. En la finca de [Nombre4] y del señor [Nombre13] existe colindancia, en la colindancia del (sic) este señor lo que hay es café…Al ser las doce del día pasamos por el mismo lugar donde se había quemado la caña y habían cortadores de caña. En ese momento la caña es aprovechable y se puede entregar. Por ese sector no se acostumbraba quemar caña…Entre unos quince o veinte días después el mandador [Nombre6], de la finca de doña [Nombre4] pasó a mi casa y me dijo que si podía ir con él para que contaramos (sic) en la colindancia en la parte de [Nombre13] y contaramos (sic) las matas de café que ya estaban inactivas en la finca de este señor. Anduvimos ahí y estuvimos contando y habían matas que no estaban realmente quemadas, era cuestión de hacerle una poda y la mata servía y contamos ciento tres matas que no se podía hacerle nada, era cuestión de sacar el tronco y meterle otra mata. Ese café era de poda, andaba por los cinco años…Las primeras que se podían podar no las contaron…” (folio 94). De lo dicho por este testigo, considera este Tribunal no se puede llegar a las mismas conclusiones a las que llegó el a quo, pues este indica el día once o doce de febrero de mil novecientos ochenta y siete a noche a eso de las ocho y treinta llegó a ver la quema en la propiedad de doña [Nombre5] y estuvo apagando el fuego hasta que éste se apagó a eso de las diez de la noche. Indicó también, fue al otro día que el vio quemado el cañal de doña [Nombre4]. Tal deposición no concuerda con los hechos aquí acusados, pues se indica el cafetal se quemó en fecha once de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y siete sin precisar la hora exacta en que el fuego se pasó de una propiedad a otra, pero que a eso de las doce horas del día once de febrero del año citado, ya se había quemado el cafetal en los terrenos de las empresas aquí actoras. Además, de lo dicho por los testigos [Nombre7] , [Nombre8] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] , ese mismo día en horas de la mañana los peones de doña [Nombre4] estaban prendiendo fuego al cañal colindante con el cafetal de las aquí actoras. De lo expuesto el deponente [Nombre11] , no se puede llegar a la conclusión dada por el a quo en cuanto a que el incendio se inició en la finca de la señora [Nombre5] y relacionarlo como lo hace con la quema del cañal de la señora [Nombre4] y por ende con los daños ocasionados al cafetal de las actoras. Lo que si queda claro es la demandada, a través de sus peones fue quien realizó la quema de un cañal en sus terrenos contiguo a las propiedades de las aquí actoras, por el cual se provocaron daños al cafetal ubicado en los terrenos de éstas, según lo expusieron los testigos [Nombre7] , [Nombre8] , [Nombre9] , [Nombre10] ; ello en fecha 11 de febrero de 1997. En el informe rendido por el perito [Nombre20] se indica la distancia entre las plantas de café ubicadas en terrenos de las actoras y el cañal quemado en el fundo de la demandada, era menor a cuatro metros, en las propiedades de Agritec S.A. y de seis a ocho metros respecto de las propiedades de Cafena S.A.(folio 24), por ello considera este Tribunal al ser una distancia tan corta el fuego se podía pasar fácilmente de una propiedad a otra. Por otra parte, según lo indicaron los testigos dichos no habían rondas corta fuego. Todo ello son indicios graves, precisos y concordantes en cuanto a que el fuego pasó de la finca de la demandada a las propiedades vecinas de las empresas actoras. Por otra parte, no se demuestra el hecho de un tercero como causal eximente de la responsabilidad, según lo interpretó el a quo en el fallo dictado, ello en razón de no existir en autos prueba de tales circunstancias, máxime, después de analizarse el testimonio del señor Arley Bolaños, sobre el cual fundamenta su fallo el juzgador de instancia y del cual no se puede desprender la conclusión a la lque llegó éste, vista la prueba en su conjunto.

X.- De lo dicho en el informe pericial antes mencionado no se logra determinar realmente cuantas plantas de café resultaron dañadas en los cafetales de Agritec S.A. y Cafena S.A. En ese informe no se prueba la cantidad de plantas de café quemadas, sino se hacer referencia para su valoración a 81 plantas en la finca de Cafena S.A. y de 79 plantas en los terrenos de Agritec S. A., según lo dicho en la demanda. Debido a lo anterior, se hace necesario revisar el resto de los elementos probatorios, para poder determinar la cantidad de plantas de café dañadas. El testigo [Nombre11] , indicó se quemaron unas ciento tres matas de café, pero sin precisar exactamente en los terrenos de cual de las actoras se contabilizaron las plantas dañadas (folio 97). El deponente [Nombre6] dijo: “se quemaron unas cien matas entre chasparreadas y quemadas”, sin indicar tampoco en cual de los terrenos de las actoras se dio (folio 99). En dicho sentido declaró el señor Maynor Navarro Alvarado (folio 98 vuelto), refiriéndose a que observó unas cien matas de café quemadas. Lo mismo dijo [Nombre10] “A raíz de esa quema se quemaron unas ochenta matas de café a cada lado, aclaro de ocehanta a cien matas” (folio 79). De lo dicho por los testigos [Nombre16] y [Nombre9] se logra determinar se destruyeron un promedio entre ochenta y cien matas de café en los terrenos propiedad de Cafena S.A. (ver folios 78 frente y vuelto). El reconocimiento judicial practicado tampoco es preciso en cuanto a la cantidad de matas de café quemadas, al indicar “…En la finca de Cafena S.A. se observan un área de café cuyas matas están secas producto de la misma quema… De este sector de la finca partimos hacia el norte del camino principal de la finca de Agritec S.A., en el [Dirección2] , y observo en sectores matas de café quemadas a todo lo largo de la cerca…” (folio 13). De lo expuesto sólo se ha logrado demostrar la quema de unas cien matas de café, y no ciento cincuenta y dos, como lo indican las actoras en memorial de demanda (folio 5), en el cual se indicaba se quemaron 79 plantas en terrenos de Agritec S.A. y 81 en los de Cafena S.A.. Por las razones anteriormente expuestas se debe revocar la sentencia dictada y en su lugar rechazar las excepciones de falta de derecho, pues la parte actora ha comprobado se le causaron daños en sus plantaciones de café y por ello tiene el derecho a cobrar los mismos, las de falta de legitimación pasiva y activa también se deben rechazar pues es claro las actoras están legitimadas activamente para plantear el presente proceso en virtud de haber sido menoscabadas en sus activos, al habérseles causado daños a sus cultivos, y han demostrado el fuego inició en el cañal de la demandada, al haber sus peones prendido fuego al mismo y luego éste se pasó a los cultivos de sus colindantes. Por las mismas razones se rechaza la excepción de falta de interés planteada por la demandada. Partiendo de lo anterior: 1) Se aprueban los daños y perjuicios causados en cien plantas de café para ser liquidados en ejecución de sentencia, distribuidos de la siguiente forma: a) El valor de las 81 plantas ubicadas en terrenos de Cafena y 19 plantas ubicadas en terrenos de Agritec S.A., b) El valor de la producción dejada de percibir durante un periodo de cuatro años, el cual es el tiempo de reposición de la plantación mientras esta alcanza su plenitud para cosechar. 2) Se condena a la demandada Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada al pago de las costas procesales y personales de este proceso.

POR TANTO:

Se revoca la sentencia dictada. En su lugar se rechazan las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación pasiva y activa y falta de interés planteada por la demandada. Se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda incoada por Agritec S.A. y Cafena S.A. contra Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada condenándose a pagar los daños y perjuicios causados, en la siguiente forma: 1) Se aprueban los daños y perjuicios causados en cien plantas de café para ser liquidados en ejecución de sentencia, distribuidos de la siguiente forma: a) El valor de las 81 plantas ubicadas en terrenos de Cafena y 19 plantas ubicadas en terrenos de Agritec S.A., b) El valor de la producción dejada de percibir durante un periodo de cuatro años, el cual es el tiempo de reposición de la plantación mientras esta alcanza su plenitud para cosechar. 2) Se condena a la demandada Agrícola [Nombre3] Limitada al pago de las costas procesales y personales de este proceso. 3) Se deniega el resto de pretensiones.

ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA CARLOS BOLAÑOS CÉSPEDES RUTH ALPÍZAR RODRÍGUEZ Ordinario Cafena S. A c/ Agrícola [Nombre3] Ltda.

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