Strict liability for damages from agricultural burning and firesResponsabilidad objetiva por daños de quemas e incendios en predios agrarios

**VOTE Nº 0817-F-10** **AGRARIAN TRIBUNAL OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSE.** Goicoechea, at sixteen hours on the thirtieth of August of the year two thousand ten.- **ORDINARY PROCEEDING** filed by [Nombre1] , of legal age, married, domestic duties, resident of Palmares, with identity card number CED1 - - , and [Nombre2] , of legal age, married, farmer, resident of Palmares, with identity card number CED2 - - , against MARSUPE SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA, with legal identity number CED3 - - ; and in a personal capacity against the unlimited general attorney-in-fact [Nombre3] , of legal age, married, resident of Puntarenas, identity card number CED4 - - . Appearing are attorney Albino Solórzano Vega, of unknown qualifications, as legal counsel for the plaintiffs, and attorney Guillermo Segura Amador, of unknown qualifications, as legal counsel for the defendant.- **WHEREAS:** **1.-** The plaintiffs file this ordinary complaint requesting that the judgment declare: "... a) That both the defendant [Nombre3] and the co-defendant MARSUPE S.R.L. ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY OBLIGATED TO PAY US ALL DAMAGES AND LOSSES ARISING FROM THE FIRE THEY NEGLIGENTLY CAUSED ON OUR FARM. b) That consequently, the co-defendants must pay the co-plaintiffs the following sums in colones: 1) Payment for two hundred hectares of pasture, at fifty thousand colones per hectare, for a total of ten million colones. 2). Payment for a minimum of fifty trees destroyed by the fire, for a total of one million eight hundred seventy-five colones. 3). Payment for the fence posts burned on the perimeter of our farm and in the paddocks, for a total of two million colones. 4). Payment and replacement of the damaged fencing wire, for a total of five hundred thousand colones. 5) Loss of weight of two hundred animals, for a value of seven million five hundred thousand colones. 6) Payment for cattle feed, as stated in fact VIII of the complaint, for two hundred ninety-one thousand four hundred colones. 7) Payment for pasturing the animals for three months for five hundred forty thousand colones and the additional sum of three hundred fifty thousand colones for the transport of the animals. 8) Payment and transport of wooden posts from Liberia, nine hundred thousand colones and one hundred twenty thousand colones respectively. Cost of labor to install said posts and wires, for a value of two hundred fifty-nine thousand two hundred colones. Furthermore, the judgment must definitively order the payment of interest on the declared sum from the occurrence of the illicit act and both costs of this proceeding..." (folios 56 and 57) .- **2.-** The defendant party answered the complaint negatively and raised the following defenses: lack of right, lack of active and passive standing, lack of current interest, and statute of limitations. (see folios 65 to 69).- **3.-** Attorney Mario Zamora Mata, first instance judge, in a judgment issued at nine hours on the eleventh of August of two thousand five, resolved: "... THEREFORE: In accordance with the foregoing and cited articles, the present ordinary proceeding filed by [Nombre1] and [Nombre2] against MARSUPE SRL AND [Nombre3] is GRANTED; the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, lack of active and passive standing, and statute of limitations are denied as to what is granted; the defense of lack of right is upheld as to what is denied. The following is declared in the judgment: 1) Regarding compensation for the payment of two hundred hectares of pasture, this item is denied, since, as recorded in the judicial inspection, the grass regrew and is currently in use; according to what the plaintiff himself stated in his complaint and what was requested, it is inferred that the cattle were off the farm for a period of three months and after that time they were brought back to the farm to date; it must be considered that the defendants' action was negligent and not intentional, and that what is being penalized is for non-contractual liability; likewise, it must be considered that the grass that was burned grew back naturally; it has not been proven in the record that it had to be fertilized or transplanted for it to grow back. 2). Regarding the destroyed trees, although it is true that the quantity was not duly proven in the record, it is reasonable to recognize that given the extent of the fire, the quantity claimed by the plaintiff is logical and consistent; in that sense, the amount of fifty trees is approved at a sum of twenty thousand colones each, for a total of one million colones. 3). Regarding the item for burned fence posts, it is approved in the amount of one thousand five hundred posts at a price of twenty thousand colones each, for a total of nine hundred thousand colones, post transport in the sum of one hundred twenty thousand colones. 4) Labor for installing posts: This item is approved in the sum of two hundred fifty-nine thousand two hundred colones. 5). The sum of one hundred fourteen thousand colones is approved for the purchase of barbed wire, staples, etc. 6). The sum of two hundred forty-five thousand colones is approved for the purchase of seven hundred sacks of chicken manure, given that the cattle needed extra food, even if taken to another farm, since they were removed from their natural and stable habitat and the conditions would not be the same. 7) The following sums are approved for the concepts to be stated: THE SUM OF THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND COLONES FOR THE TRANSPORT OF THE ANIMALS TO AND FROM ANOTHER FARM and to the plaintiff's farm, the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND COLONES, for the rental of pastures on another farm for a period of three months. 8). The item regarding the loss of weight of the animals is denied, since it was not proven that they lost weight, and second, because the animals were taken to graze elsewhere and were given the extra food that had to be purchased; for this reason, the items for payment of pastures and the purchase of chicken manure being granted, this item is not appropriate. Interest is approved on the sum granted, starting from the moment this judgment becomes final, at the rate established for six-month term deposits of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. The total being THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY COLONES. X. costs: This judge considers that the defendants cannot be considered as good-faith litigants, and consequently, they are ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of the proceeding. (Article 1045 of the Civil Code and 1, 153, 155, 221, 290 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure)..." (see folios 328 to 344).- **4.-** The plaintiffs and defendants filed an appeal (recurso de apelación), stating the reasons why they refute the lower court's thesis. (folios 364 and 367).- **5.-** In the processing of the proceeding, the legal prescriptions have been observed, and no errors or omissions capable of causing its nullity are noted in the judgment.- Judge ULATE CHACÓN drafts, and, **WHEREAS:** **I.-** Legal Representative: Attorney Albino Solórzano Vega is acknowledged as the attorney for the plaintiffs and indicated fax number 2453-16-89 for receiving notifications, of which the Processing Judge must take note.

**II.-** The Tribunal shares the statement of facts held as proven, as it conforms to the case record.

**III.-** Likewise, the provisions regarding the unproven facts are shared, due to a lack of evidentiary support for the parties' assertions on those points.

**IV.-** The plaintiffs' attorney appealed, alleging the following grievances: 1.- The value of the pastures that were burned is not recognized, whose disappearance caused a series of expenses that had to be incurred, and the judgment proceeds, as if it were sufficient, to only compensate for the concomitant damages and losses, without considering the depletion that had to be recovered; this must be recognized, as it was estimated in the complaint at 10 million colones, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1045 of the Civil Code; the expert opinion (dictamen pericial), he argues, estimated the cost of one hectare of improved pasture at 71,000 colones. 2.- He also disagrees that the number of burned posts was reduced to 1,500, when the report establishes 3,000 posts, and that the value of each one was reduced to 600 colones, when the expert appraised them at 800; therefore, the judgment should be corrected, because it does not explain the reason for departing from the expert value (folios 4 and 7 of said report). 3.- He disagrees with the setting of interest from the finality of the judgment, because it is declaratory and not constitutive, and should be recognized from the filing of the complaint. 4.- He also disagrees that a previous estimated sum provided to the OIJ was taken into consideration for the judgment, when all the consequences of the fire had not yet been assessed; the judge considered a limitation of 5 million, when the damages were far greater.

**V.-** The defendant party Marsupe Sociedad Anónima also appealed the judgment: 1.- It argues that there is an erroneous interpretation of the substantive law, given that there is no adequate causation between the conduct and the damage, this being one of the elements of subjective liability; it is not enough to prove fault (culpa), but it is necessary to demonstrate the causal relationship between fault and damage or loss (Article 704 of the Civil Code); the apparent damage suffered by the plaintiff, it argues, is not a direct and immediate consequence of the conduct attributed to its represented party, but rather indirect damages, and therefore non-compensable, as the claims are seen to be excessively onerous for the party obligated to satisfy them, which instead generates unjust enrichment; the plaintiff has not proven the fault of Marsupe S.A., much less the causal relationship. 2.- It alleges a lack of active and passive standing; the conduct is outside the application of Article 1045, because no civil joint and several liability (solidaridad civil) is pointed out on the part of its represented party; the damages and losses are not a consequence of the fault attributed in the contraventional judgment to [Nombre3] , as the attorney-in-fact of Marsupe, but rather in a personal capacity; the civil action is improper and illegal, because there are no elements of culpability against it as a criterion of imputation from the contraventional judgment; nor is there civil liability, because the 1941 Penal Code excludes the liability of legal entities in which their normal activity should not presume risk-generating conduct, i.e., it is not a matter of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva); in this case, it argues, the elements of subjective liability (culpability and causation) are not present, nor the risk for strict liability. Joint and several non-contractual liability is established in Article 1046, when two or more actors concur in producing a damage; in this case, it claims that proof of the fault of Marsupe S.A. is missing, whether in a direct or indirect subjective form (in eligendo or in vigilando), and Article 1048 does not provide for indirect liability for unlawful acts of the administrators of commercial companies; on the contrary, the Civil Code includes behaviors committed with malicious intent (intentional) by the manager or administrator that breaks the relationship, meaning that liability does not fall on the employer; furthermore, it argues, the principal is not responsible for conduct carried out outside the assigned service. 3.- Finally, it claims a lack of reasoning in the judgment by condemning Marsupe S.A. jointly and severally, because it is stated that the fire that generated the alleged damages was caused by the defendants, which finds no support in reality, much less that the participation of its represented party was demonstrated, when the contraventional judgment does not say so. The direct participant in the generating cause is Mrs. [Nombre3] . The judgment states that it is "well done" to have sued its represented party for the claim of damages, given that it is the owner of the property and Mrs. [Nombre3] was the manager, but it does not justify the necessary and sufficient legal reasons or grounds for attributing that liability to its company. The omission in the judgment, it argues, causes a serious defect that annuls it; the Judge should rather have exempted it from liability, nor does it explain whether Mrs. [Nombre3] acted under express orders of the Company, or under her own decision.

**VI.-** Agrarian Jurisprudence has been prolific in establishing strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) for agro-environmental damages, and particularly for the case of burns, for which reason the Tribunal will proceed, first, to analyze that topic:

"**IV.-** Our legal system contains several provisions that expressly and directly refer to burns and forest fires and the liability arising from them. We thus have: a) Law of Dividing Fences and Burns, N° 121 of October 26, 1909: Its Article 5 prohibits making burns in the fields. It only authorizes them when it involves clearing (desmontes) to enable land for agricultural purposes: To do so, one must: 1) Request permission from the local political authority, 2) Have guarantees and precautions to avoid greater destruction than intended or harm to third parties, 3) Personally notify or by summons from the authority all adjoining landowners or interested parties of the day and time of the burn, at least two days in advance, 4) Leave a minimum distance of [Dirección1] on springs (nacientes) originating in the hills, and [Dirección2] meters on springs on flat land. Regarding liability, it expressly states that, in any case, whoever makes burns must pay the damages and losses caused as a result of the fire. The proprietor, possessor, or lessee who at the time of the fire was preparing for that purpose is presumed the author of the burn. B) The current Forest Law (Ley Forestal), N° 7575 of February 13, 1996, in its Chapter IV on “Forest Protection” prohibits conducting burns on forest lands and adjacent areas without having obtained permission from the State Forest Administration. It refers to the Penal Code to sanction anyone who conducts a burn without permission (Article 35). Likewise, Articles 59 and 60 respectively sanction causing a forest fire intentionally or negligently, with penalties of one to three years in the first case and three months to two years in the second. C) Regulation to the Forest Law, Decreto Ejecutivo N° 25721-MINAE of October 17, 1996: Establishes that the Forest Administration official must visit the site prior to granting a burn permit (Article 34). D) Law of Use, Management and Conservation of Soils, N° 7779 of April 30, 1998: Requires that, to conduct burns on agricultural lands, the indications of the MAG be followed in accordance with the permit issued for those effects, according to the Regulation of burns in force, as well as the provisions of the Organic Law of the Environment and the Penal Code (article 24). E) Regulation to Use, Management and Conservation of Soils, Decreto N° 29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT of August 8, 2000: In its Chapter X titled “On Agrarian Burns”, it provides that the MAG, in coordination with the MINAE and the Ministry of Security, will issue the fundamental principles through which the practice of agrarian burns may be authorized. Its Article 86 expressly requires prior permission from the MAG to conduct burns on lands with agricultural vocation, which must grant a hearing to the respective MINAE conservation area, so that it issues its opinion on the repercussions for the biota and ecosystems. It even indicates that positive silence does not apply regarding the MINAE's opinion. Regarding forest lands, protective zones, national parks, wildlife refuges, it prohibits conducting burns (Article 88). F) Decreto N° 17015-MAG, of May 2, 1986: Created the National Commission for Forest Incidents. Said Commission, according to Decreto N° 19434-MIRENEM of December 11, 1990, has the authority to recommend national policies and prepare forest fire prevention and fighting programs. G) Decreto N° 21859-MIRENEM of December 7, 1992: Established the Committee against Fires Guanacaste as a coordination, support, and follow-up body for the Forest Fire Program of the Región Huetar Norte. H) Decreto N° 23850-MAG-SP of November 4, 1994, Regulation for controlled burns for agricultural and livestock purposes: It establishes the minimum requirements to carry out burns and fires, especially on lands of agricultural or livestock use. A burn is defined as an intentionally provoked fire, regulated by a pre-established plan, in which all preventive measures are taken to avoid damage to natural resources and the properties of neighbors. Fires are those that, naturally or artificially, affect forests, forest lands, agricultural lands, or lands for livestock use (Article 1). To carry out burns on agricultural and livestock lands, written authorization from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock is required. The official, in addition to the already approved measures based on a visit that must be made prior to the permit, must indicate any additional measures deemed necessary if the permit is granted (Articles 2 and 3). Article 6 establishes the following minimum requirements: 1) Determine, by means of firebreaks (rondas corta fuegos) (an area with a width double the height of the combustible material as indicated by the same Decreto), the area to be burned and the combustible materials used; 2) open and sweep a firebreak around the perimeter of the area to be burned, which cannot be less than one meter wide; 3) have sufficient water and tools to extinguish the fire in case of emergency. Additionally, one may: 4) give prior notice to the Police Directorate of the place regarding the date and time of the burn; 5) have the assistance of at least one person; 6) conduct the burn against the wind and against the slope after 16:00 hours and before 7:00 hours, avoiding doing it on windy days; 7) verify that the fire is completely extinguished before leaving. But regardless of whether or not the respective permit is obtained, the Decreto clearly establishes in its Article 7 that: “The person who conducts a burn, whether with or without a permit, shall be civilly liable for the damages and losses that may be caused, in accordance with Articles 41 and 50 of our Political Constitution and the rules on non-contractual civil liability that govern our legal system…”. I) Finally, “the general provisions contained in Articles '1045 et seq. of the Civil Code, on non-contractual civil liability, are of supplemental application to this matter' (see judgment of the First Chamber N° 112 of 15:50 hours on October 11, 1995). In the criminal sphere, the current Penal Code sanctions with a fine of 3 to 30 days whoever contravenes the provisions aimed at preventing fires or preventing their spread (subsection 1 of Article 407) and whoever infringes the rules on burning weeds, stubble, or other products of the land (subsection 2). VII. Modern doctrine, for its part, has supported the objectification of liability, by including risk, apart from fault (culpa) and intent (dolo), among the factors of imputability and legal attribution of damage. It has even been proposed to include as other objective factors: guarantee, equity, abuse of right, and excess of normal tolerance between neighbors. The damage is then seen not from the act of the author but from the position of the injured party, to ensure that every unjustly caused damage is repaired. From another point of view, fault has been separated from the unlawfulness of the act, giving a more important role to the latter. 'Once the equivalence between the unlawfulness of the act and fault was broken, the conduct acquired an autonomous physiognomy detached from the subjective profile of the agent's will, to become a simple means, cause, or criterion of connection between a subject held responsible and a certain harmful event to be compensated.' (Franzoni (Massimo), Dangerous Activity, in Liability for Damages in the Third Millennium, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.120). Thus, the Theory of Risk is mentioned, which does not displace fault but complements it, and is summarized as the duty of whoever creates a risk to compensate for the damage caused to a third party. 'Risk is a cause of imputability when, due to the performance of certain causes and determined activities, qualified as dangerous, damage occurs. The damage in these circumstances must be compensated, not because the agent incurred intent or fault, but because the legal order must protect the community from the development of dangerous activities, so that whoever carries them out incurs liability if damage is caused by virtue of such performance… Liability derived from risk does not depend on the intent or fault of the agent but originates in the mere occurrence of the damage resulting from the dangerous activity. This consideration brings with it a special evidentiary regime, according to which, by the mere exercise of the unsafe activity, the fault of the agent is presumed, exempting the victim from the task of proving improper conduct. It is up to the agent to rebut the presumption…' (Cubides Camacho Jorge, Imputable harmful act in On Damage, Editora Jurídica, 1st Ed, Colombia, 2001, p.260). For other authors, 'the causal relationship is an element of the illicit act and of the contractual breach that directly links the damage with the anti-juridical act, and indirectly with the element of subjective imputation or objective attribution. It is the binding factor that integrates the damage and the fault, or as the case may be the risk, into the unity of the act that is the source of the obligation to compensate' (see Bustamante Alcina (José), The Profile of Civil Liability at the End of the 20th Century, in Liability for Damages in the Third Millennium, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.24 to 26). VIII. Precisely, conducting burns – regardless of their purpose – is an undeniably risky activity. Therefore, in accordance with the cited doctrine, The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has clearly indicated: 'VII.- Burns can entail, for whoever produces them, civil and criminal liabilities. Civil liability is regulated in the Law of Burns and Dividing Fences by establishing the obligation, of whoever makes burns, to pay the damages and losses caused as a consequence of the fire (Article 5, paragraph 4). The proprietor, possessor, or lessee of the land who at the time of the fire was preparing for that purpose is presumed the author of the burn… VIII.- The Constitutional Chamber, through Voto N° 3459 of 14 hours 42 minutes on July 20, 1993, established the repeal of Article 5, fifth paragraph, of the Law of Burns and Dividing Fences regarding criminal liability… The same Constitutional Chamber (Voto N° 439-I-95 of 14:36 hours on August 22, 1995) clarified the mentioned judgment N° 3459-93 in the sense that Article 5, paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Law of Dividing Fences and Burns is repealed only regarding the criminal aspects it contains… IX.- The regulations on burns and fires follow the criterion of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Fault (culpa) is presumed in whoever created the conditions for the damage by having assumed the risk of harming third parties with the burn or fire. The damages and losses caused are at their charge. The injured party is exempt from proving fault. The burden of proof regarding the absence of fault corresponds to whoever burned or set the fire. It is an iuris tantum presumption. Force majeure, the fault of the victim, or the act of a third party would be exempting circumstances from liability. X. Whoever, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of damage, accepts the effects of the contingency, assumes the risk. Liability is based on creating the risk for the damage. The subject, upon initiating the activity, through their things, increases, enhances, or multiplies the possibilities of danger. Even if it may be a lawful conduct, whoever assumed the risk must always compensate the damage. There is even greater reason to impute liability if the act arises from unlawful conduct. The injured party cannot assume damages from conduct not promoted by themselves, unless they placed themselves in conditions to suffer the damage. Whoever burns or sets a fire, even with the authorization of the corresponding authority, cannot be exempted from liability. This is so because, although the Law of Burns and Dividing Fences N° 121 of October 26, 1909, establishes the guidelines for authorizing burns in agrarian estates and establishes a series of obligations for whoever requests authorization, this does not break the presumption of culpability. The requirements for authorizing burns aim to ensure minimum risk. It is a precautionary measure, but it is not an exemption from liability. Therefore, compliance with the indispensable requirements for authorization cannot harm the neighbors if the incident occurs. In this way, the damages to the property, crops, or even the persons of the neighbors must be compensated by whoever created the risk conditions with the fire or burn. XI. The activity of setting fires or burning, in itself, is directed against Nature. It is a recourse of primitive agriculture where fire tends to replace human labor. Instead of using human or mechanical means to promote agrarian activity, a destructive element is used to, on the ashes of what was destroyed, begin the cultivation of plants or the raising of animals. These types of actions are incompatible with current values. It threatens security by risking the property of neighbors, their goods, and persons. It also threatens the values of environmental protection. The economic and social function of property also entails an ecological function: agriculture must develop in harmony, and not in antagonism, with Nature. For the preservation of the environment, social solidarity requires devising new mechanisms to prevent damage and threatening events. This is the philosophy of the reform of Article 50 of the Political Constitution. The Law of Burns and Dividing Fences and the entire problem of liability derived from that activity must be analyzed along these lines' (see judgment N° 112 of 15 hours 50 minutes on October 11, 1995. In the same sense, N° 113 of 16 hours on October 11, 1995). VII. The Chamber also clarified in the cited judgments that the obligation to compensate the damages and losses caused by burns and the fact that the presumption of liability falls on whoever prepared the land for that purpose cannot be limited to the case of clearing (desmontes). 'Although it is true that Article 5 of the Law of Dividing Fences and Burns establishes the general prohibition of making burns in the fields, authorizing them in the case of clearing to enable land for agricultural purposes (first paragraph), this does not negate the possibility of carrying out said activity under other conditions and for other purposes, as current reality demonstrates. That is why the same Law establishes, in the fourth paragraph of Article 5, a generic liability when it states: 'In any case, whoever makes burns must pay the damages and losses…'. This fits perfectly with the generic principle of not harming others. In this case, the damages and losses are at the charge of the defendant because she assumed the risk of harming her neighbors with the burn. By initiating her activity, preparing the land to be burned, she increased the possibilities of danger. It was an unlawful conduct as she did not have authorization from the corresponding administrative authorities, as corroborated in the proven facts. She did not take the minimum precautions required by law to prevent greater than normally produced damages. Although she took some precautionary measures – making firebreaks (rondas) – this is not sufficient to exempt her from her liability to compensate the damages and losses caused to the plaintiff. The only way to free herself from that liability was to demonstrate the existence of fault on the part of the victim, an act of God, or the act of a third party, which she did not do. Even though the Law of Burns and Dividing Fences is from 1909, its interpretation must be carried out in accordance with Articles 10 of the Civil Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Modern interpretation (systematic, material, and evolutionary) requires adapting the content of the rule to the historical circumstances and the social and economic reality in which it is to be applied." To this end, the principles and values contained in the Constitution must be taken into account, as well as those in special agrarian laws." (see judgment No. 112-95 cited). VIII. According to what has been explained, it is possible to carry out burns on lands with agricultural vocation as long as the requirements established in our legal system are met, among them taking sufficient precautionary measures to be able to control the fire, requesting prior permission from the respective public entities, especially the office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería) that is relevant, and notifying the owners or managers of the neighboring properties. This last requirement is of utmost importance, because even if all possible measures are taken, natural phenomena such as wind, air currents, and others, can cause the fire to spread to other areas outside those originally intended to be burned. The notification of adjacent landowners seeks precisely to minimize or prevent the fire from spreading, and a greater damage from occurring, given that it enables better surveillance by the neighbors on their own lands, and allows them to be prepared to fight it if necessary. However, even in the case where all possible precautions have been taken and permission has been obtained, whoever originates or causes a burn that produces damage to third parties is responsible for such. The foregoing is so because it involves a risky activity. The liability is of a strict liability (objetiva) type as already explained." (Agrarian Court (Tribunal Agrario), No. 815-F-03 of December 16, 2003).- VII.- Appeal of the co-defendant Marsupe Sociedad Anónima: The co-defendant company, Marsupe S.A., challenged the ruling, alleging three fundamental grounds: the lack of a causal link (relación causal) between the conduct and the damage, the lack of active and passive standing (legitimación) because no joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) exists, and finally, nullity for lack of reasoning of the ruling. The appellant is not correct in any of the three grievances, and these will be resolved in the reverse order of how they were filed in the appeal, as this is the logical order for their analysis. 1.- Regarding the invoked "lack of reasoning of the ruling", concerning the joint and several liability (condena solidaria) of Marsupe S.A., it considers that this finds no basis in reality, because the participation of its represented party was not demonstrated, and the contraventional judgment does not say so, nor is it justified on necessary and sufficient legal grounds, which renders the judgment null. These assertions are not exact. The lower court (a-quo), in the first place, considered it proven in fact 10, that the fire occurred on the farm of the defendant Marsupe, and that the burn was ordered by Mrs. [Name3] Arias Jiménez and later spread to the plaintiffs' properties. This fact, supported by the statements of [Name4], [Name5], [Name6], [Name7], [Name8], and [Name9], has not been disproved by the appellant, and contrary to what she affirmed, in the contraventional judgment of May 3, 2001, the Judge concluded the following: "...they failed in their duty of care and did not maintain due precaution because without specifying a date but last year, they caused a fire on the farm of Marsupe, without requesting permission from the respective authorities and even though they took some precautions these were not sufficient and the fire spread to at least three neighboring farms..." (folio 23). Regarding the liability of the company, the lower court (a-quo) does provide grounds to attribute it by clearly indicating that "...the same is the owner of the farm where the fire started and Mrs. [Name3] Arias Jiménez is the Manager of said company, that being the reason why she appears in civil proceedings as stated in the case file...This way of carrying out burns without requesting permission from the corresponding authorities and without notifying the adjacent landowners; without a doubt falls within one of the modalities of fault such as negligence and recklessness...." (see judgment at folios 338-339). Furthermore, the judgment cites the rules and doctrine on tort liability (responsabilidad extracontractual), particularly Article 1045 et seq. of the Civil Code (considering clauses IV, IV bis and VII). As observed, the ruling was indeed reasoned, and therefore there is no ground for nullity. 2.- Regarding the tort-based joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria extracontractual) and the invoked lack of active and passive standing (legitimación), the appellants are also not correct. There are a great number of rules that establish the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) of companies, when it concerns strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Article 103 of the Criminal Procedure Code in relation to Article 106, provides for the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) of legal persons whose managers, administrators, or legal representatives are found responsible for punishable acts. The same rule is contained in Articles 135 and 137 subsection 3, of the 1941 Criminal Code, which indicates as jointly and severally liable (responsables solidarios) "The natural or legal persons owning establishments in which a punishable act is committed due to the infringement of police laws or regulations by the administrators, dependents, or servants of the establishment." Such rules are also related to Articles 1046 and 1048 of the Civil Code, third paragraph, regarding objective joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria objetiva). Both are even interpreted also in relation to the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences (Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias), Article 5, and the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), from which the exact opposite of what the appellant indicated is deduced, in the sense that both natural and legal persons are jointly and severally liable (solidariamente) for the agrarian damage caused. Article 57 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) provides that: "...when it concerns legal persons, civil liability shall extend to their legal representatives. Likewise, both natural and legal persons shall be civilly liable for the ecological damage caused, in accordance with what is established in Article 1045 of the Civil Code", being that in this case there is sufficient evidence to consider proven the link between the company Marsupe S.A. and [Name3], who was known as its representative. 3.- Regarding the causal link (relación de causalidad) between the conduct and the damage, it is more than demonstrated, even though in these cases of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), it is not required to prove fault, as what matters is that a risky activity existed, and then the production of the damage itself. See, as previously indicated, that in the same criminal judgment it was clearly established that the burn was carried out by a laborer, by order of the representative, on the farm of Marsupe S.A., and the fire later spread through the neighboring lands affecting at least three adjacent farms (see folios 22 and 23), which logically produced a great amount of damage, as is accredited in fact six, not disproved by the appellant, and which are recorded both in the OIJ report and in the photographic sequence added to the case file (folios 2 to 10), even four years later there still existed signs of the burns caused on the plaintiffs' farm (see judicial inspection record at folio 148 and expert report photographs at folios 290 and 291). The same testimonial evidence attests to this causal link (relación de causalidad): "...I worked on a farm that is in the middle of the two, of Mr. [Name2] and of Mrs. [Name3], and we were there around eleven in the morning and we started to see smoke on [Name3]'s farm. Then it was not just smoke but the lady's farm was engulfed in flames. That was in summer and sparks were coming everywhere, whirlwinds of fire because of the wind, the wind carried the sparks to the farm where I was and to that of Mr. [Name10] from the sparks, what happened was a great fire that devastated Mr. [Name2]'s farm, with land, pastures, fences, and trees..." (statement of [Name7], at folio 140). In summary, the defendant-appellant party is not correct in any of its grievances, so the estimatory judgment regarding the active and passive standing (legitimación activa y pasiva) of the plaintiffs and the defendant must be confirmed.

VIII.- Secondly, the matter related to damages (daños y perjuicios) will be analyzed. The jurisprudence has defined these concepts as follows: "IV.- Damage (daño) constitutes one of the prerequisites of tort liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual), since the duty to compensate is only configured if a harmful illegal act has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, capable of being protected by the legal system. Damage (daño), in a legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (injured party (damnificado)), which causes the deprivation of a legal right, regarding which its conservation was objectively expectable had the harmful event not occurred. Under this viewpoint, there is no civil liability if there is no damage (daño), just as there is no damage (daño) if there is no injured party (damnificado). On the other hand, only damage (daño) that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable, this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In sum, damage (daño) constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the illegal act with the one after it. On many occasions, the expressions 'damages (daños)' and 'losses (perjuicios)' are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to specify and distinguish both concepts. Damage (daño) constitutes the loss caused to the injured party (damnificado) (damnum emergens), while loss (perjuicio) is made up of the frustrated or lost profit or utility (lucro cesans), which was reasonably and probably expectable if the illegal act had not occurred. V. Not any damage (daño) imposes the obligation to compensate. For it to be compensable, the following characteristics must basically converge: A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical, it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. Damage (daño) does not lose this character if its quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to assess or prove; nor should certainty be confused with current existence, as reparation of certain but future damage (daño) is admissible; future damage (daño) should not be confused with loss of profit (lucro cesante) or loss (perjuicio). Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage (daño), it constitutes an extreme of unique subjective concern to the injured party (damnificado), but the law cannot deal with claims based on insignificant damage (daño), derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of compensation. Thus, there can be a direct injured party (damnificado) and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the harmful act and the second will be the victim's successors. C) It must be caused by a third party and subsisting; that is, it must not have been repaired. D) There must be a causal link (relación de causalidad) between the illegal act and the damage (daño). VI. Among the classes of damage (daños), material damage (daño material) and corporal damage (daño corporal) are found in the first place, the first being that which affects the things or material goods that make up the person's patrimony, while the second impacts bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage (daño material o patrimonial), the specific ones of corporal damage (daño corporal) and material damage (daño material). The second seems to be the most apt expression, since corporal damage (daño corporal) often affects the patrimonial interests of the injured party (damnificado) (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage (daño) has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (losses (perjuicios)), etc..." (First Chamber of the Court (Sala Primera de la Corte), No. 112 of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992 and No. 714 of 4:20 p.m. on September 18, 2002) – The underlining is not from the original-.

IX.- Regarding the proof of damages (daños y perjuicios), the principle of the burden of proof governs, enshrined in Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, and for enforcement cases in agrarian matters, in Article 62 subsection c) of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law (Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria). In this regard, national jurisprudence has established the following: "In matters of damages (daños y perjuicios), a subject on which there is long experience, the evidentiary element plays a very important role. He who alleges them must prove them, likewise he who denies them, except in the case of subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) which judges are allowed to assess according to the rules of experience, logic, and science, without being subject to any other evidentiary criterion. In the modern procedural system, the roman aphorism judex secundum allegata et probata partium decidere debet still has full force. This means the limitation of judges to be able to issue their judgments according to everything the parties allege and prove. The simple allegation of a fact is not enough for its condemnation because it is the party who is obliged to offer the evidence in time, obtain its admission from the judge, present it to be presented, and finally, within the process of evidentiary assessment, a task par excellence of the judge, attribute to those evidentiary elements the necessary value to accredit the formulated fact. This concerns the well-known principle of the burden of proof. It consists of the obligation of anyone who alleges a fact or a claim to proceed to legally prove what is alleged. This differs greatly from the mere act of accrediting the allegation or the evidence itself in the case file, because evidence for cassation purposes is only that to which the judgment gives that rank after a severe assessment process. And the principle not only has an important connotation in the affirmative aspect but also in the negative one, because he who alleges the non-existence, modification, or extinction of a fact or a claim must also prove it. To the principle of the burden of proof, in a democratic and non-inquisitorial regime, many other principles are linked, among which the principle of freedom of evidence stands out. According to that principle, all parties must have broad faculties to offer all lawful means of evidence, especially legitimately obtained, that is, all means duly authorized by the legal system and brought to the case file following the procedures also outlined by the procedural system, where the parties must have the right to question their own evidence and that of the opposing party, with the object of demonstrating or denying the facts, affirming or contradicting the claims." (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), No. 554 of 3:10 p.m. on August 4, 2000 – the bold is not from the original). For the granting of damages (daños y perjuicios), the Jurisprudence has required demonstrating the causal link (nexo causal) between the abstract condemnation imposed and what is claimed in the enforcement proceeding (First Chamber (Sala Primera), No. 830 of 11:45 a.m. on September 22, 2004, and No. 674 of 11:30 a.m. on August 18, 2004). On the other hand, the Jurisprudence has established that damages (daños y perjuicios) derived from an illegal act or conduct are value debts, and not monetary ones, which is why the amount should not become a reason to deny them, as long as they are proven (In this regard, First Chamber (Sala Primera), Vote No. 226 of March 31, 2004).

X.- Appeal of the plaintiff party: Regarding the damages (daños), the plaintiff party claims that the value of the paddocks was not recognized, which they claimed at 10 million colones, given that the expert report estimated the cost of one hectare of improved pasture at 71,000 colones; furthermore, they do not agree that the number of burned posts was reduced to 1,500, when the expert established that there are 3,000 posts at a value of 800 colones, and it is not explained why the lower court (a-quo) departed from the expert value. 1.- Regarding the first claim, the lower court (a-quo) rejected the item for the loss of pasture, considering that the grass grew back and is currently in use, and furthermore, the cattle were off the farm for a period of three months and then the cattle were moved back to the farm, the grass having grown back naturally. The Court agrees with the decision made by the lower court (a-quo), since the burning of the pastureland in no way caused its disappearance; on the contrary, it was a temporary matter of around three months, a fact for which the plaintiffs were recognized payment for feed (poultry litter), the transport of the animals to another farm, and the rental of pastures, which serves to repair the damage (daño) caused by the temporary loss of pasture, since evidently it grew back months after being devastated by the fire. 2.- Regarding the posts, the lower court (a-quo) considered it fair to recognize a quantity of one thousand five hundred posts, for a total of nine hundred thousand colones. The number of recognized posts corresponds to an approximate estimate of the paddocks that were damaged, at the time they occurred and the replacement date, since there was no certainty of the total amount of burned posts, and an approximate value is made, given that according to the report of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), 15 paddocks (out of a total of twenty) were devastated, and there were also some parts more damaged than others (folios 3, 4, and 5), but without absolute certainty of how many posts were actually damaged. Regarding the value or estimate, it must be taken into account that Article 123 of the 1941 Criminal Procedure Code, related to the rules for the reparation of damage (daño) in this type of events, indicates that "...shall be obligated to satisfy its value according to expert estimation referenced to the date of the infraction. If such estimation is not possible to be made because the thing has been destroyed or has disappeared, the judges shall fix the respective value, adhering to the data of the trial.". Thus, in this case too there is discretion of the judge to be able to establish the "quantum" of the compensation (indemnización), and for this the lower court (a-quo) took into consideration the amount that the plaintiffs initially claimed, in criminal proceedings, which was the sum of five million colones. By reason of the foregoing, the Court considers that the appellant is not correct in the grievances raised regarding the compensation (indemnización) for paddocks and wooden posts. 3.- Regarding the interest. The appellants claim they do not agree with the fixing of interest as from the finality of the judgment. It must be indicated that we are here facing a claim for objective patrimonial liability (responsabilidad patrimonial objetiva), for which liability had to be established first, to later establish the value of the damages (daños y perjuicios). Article 706 of the Civil Code establishes that "If the obligation is to pay a sum of money, the damages (daños y perjuicios) always and only consist in the payment of interest on the sum owed, counted from the maturity of the term.". In this case, the fixing of the value is acquired with the finality of the ruling, and therefore it is from that point that it is possible to collect the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused. 4.- Finally, regarding the use of the value estimated by the plaintiffs, in the contraventional case, and which appears in the OIJ report, it is evident that the lower court (a-quo), like this Court, considers that it is the amount that best fits the moment of the production of the damage (daño) and the replacement date that the plaintiffs had to make, thus it is applicable the provisions of Articles 123 and 124 of the 1941 Criminal Code. While it is true there is an expert report by [Name11], note that it conducts the valuation in the month of November 2004 at the "current cost" (folio 275), and not as of the date of the infraction, which is what Article 123 authorizes. That is why the defendant party challenged that valuation when it alleged the following: "...The expert, fortunately, determines what according to him is the CURRENT cost TO ESTABLISH, meaning sow new grass, however, on the one hand, the current price is not the same as 4 years ago...The same consideration must be made when the value of the damaged fences is determined..." (folio 302). As indicated in the previous considering clause, there was no certainty of the quantity of posts damaged, and in any case their price was fixed at the time of replacement.- XI.- By reason of all of the foregoing, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, in what was the object of appeal.

POR TANTO:

In what was the object of appeal, the appealed judgment is CONFIRMED.

ENRIQUE ULATE CHACÓN ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA CARLOS PICADO VARGAS Nº EXPN1 Ordinario de Actor [Name1] and another Contra Marsupe SRL.

li.+++ Payment for the burned fence posts on the perimeter of our farm and on that of the pastures (apartos), for a total of two million colones. 4). Payment and replacement of the damaged fencing wire, for a total of five hundred thousand colones. 5) Weight loss of two hundred animals, valued at seven million five hundred thousand colones. 6) Payment for cattle feed, as stated in fact VIII of the lawsuit, for two hundred ninety-one thousand four hundred colones. 7) Payment for pasturing (potreraje) for the animals for three months for five hundred forty thousand colones and the additional sum of three hundred fifty thousand colones for the transfer of the animals. 8) Payment and transport of wooden posts from Liberia, nine hundred thousand colones and one hundred twenty thousand colones respectively. Labor cost to install said posts and wires, valued at two hundred fifty-nine thousand two hundred colones. Furthermore, the judgment must definitively order that interest be paid on the declared sum from the occurrence of the unlawful act and both sets of costs of this proceeding... (folios 56 and 57)." **2.-** The defendant answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the following exceptions: lack of right, lack of active and passive standing (legitimación activa y pasiva), lack of current interest, and statute of limitations (prescripción). (see folios 65 to 69).- **3.-** Attorney Mario Zamora Mata, trial court judge, in a judgment at nine o'clock on August eleventh, two thousand five, resolved: "... POR TANTO: In accordance with the foregoing and cited articles, the present ordinary proceeding filed by [Name1] and [Name2] against MARSUPE SRL AND [Name3] is declared WITH MERIT, the exceptions of lack of right, lack of current interest, lack of active and passive standing, and statute of limitations are rejected regarding what is granted, the exception of lack of right regarding what is denied is accepted. The following is declared in the judgment: 1) Regarding compensation for the payment of two hundred hectares of pasture (potrero), the same item is rejected, since as stated in the judicial inspection (reconocimiento judicial), the grass grew back and is currently in use, according to what the same plaintiff stated in his lawsuit and to what was requested, it is evident that the cattle were off the farm for a period of three months and after that time they were brought back to their farm to date, it must be considered that the defendants' action was negligent (culposa) and not intentional (dolosa) and that what is penalized is for tort liability (responsabilidad extracontractual), likewise it must be taken into account that the grass that burned grew back naturally, it is not demonstrated in the record that it had to be fertilized or transplanted for it to grow again. 2). Regarding the destroyed trees, although it is true the quantity was not duly demonstrated in the record, it is possible to recognize that given the extent of the fire, the quantity demanded by the plaintiff is logical and consistent, in that sense it is approved in the amount of fifty trees at a sum of twenty thousand colones each, for a total of one million colones. 3). Regarding the item for burned fence posts, it is approved in the amount of one thousand five hundred posts at a price of six hundred colones each, for a total of nine hundred thousand colones, transport of the posts in the sum of one hundred twenty thousand colones. 4) Labor for installing posts: Said item is approved in the sum of two hundred fifty-nine thousand two hundred colones. 5). The sum of one hundred fourteen thousand colones is approved for the purchase of barbed wire, staples, etc. 6). The sum of two hundred forty-five thousand colones is approved for the purchase of seven hundred sacks of chicken manure, by virtue of the fact that the cattle needed extra food, even if on another farm, since they were removed from their natural and stable habitat and the conditions would not be the same. 7) The following sums are approved for the items that will be stated: THE SUM OF THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND COLONES FOR TRANSPORT OF THE ANIMALS TO AND FROM ANOTHER FARM and to the plaintiff’s farm, the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND COLONES, for the rental of pasturelands on another farm for a period of three months. 8). The item regarding the weight loss of the animals is rejected, since it was not demonstrated that they had lost weight and second because the animals were taken to graze in another place and were given the extra food that had to be purchased, which is why, with the items for payment of pastureland rental and purchase of chicken manure being granted, said item is not admissible. Interest is approved on the granted sum and from the moment this judgment becomes final, at the rate established for six-month term deposits of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Being a total of THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY COLONES. Regarding costs: This judge considers that the defendants cannot be considered as litigants in good faith and consequently they are condemned to pay the procedural and personal costs of the proceedings. (Article 1045 of the Civil Code and 1, 153, 155, 221, 290 and following of the Code of Civil Procedure)...". (see folios 328 to 344).- **4.-** The plaintiffs and defendants filed an appeal indicating the reasons for which they refute the trial court's thesis. (folios 364 and 367).- **5.-** In the processing of the proceeding, legal requirements have been observed, and no errors or omissions capable of producing its nullity are noted in the judgment.- Judge ULATE CHACÓN writes, and, **CONSIDERANDO:** **I.-** Legal Representative: Attorney Albino Solórzano Vega is recognized as representing the plaintiffs and he indicated fax number 2453-16-89 to receive notifications, of which the Processing Judge must take note.

**II.-** The Tribunal shares the statement of facts considered as proven, as it is consistent with the case record.

**III.-** Likewise, what is ordered regarding the unproven facts is shared, due to the lack of evidentiary support for the parties' statements on those points.

**IV.-** The plaintiffs' attorney appealed, alleging the following grievances: **1.-** The value of the pastures (potreros) that were burned is not recognized, whose disappearance caused him a series of expenses he had to make, and it is proceeded, as if it were enough, to indemnify only the concomitant damages, without considering the loss that had to be recovered; this must be recognized, which was estimated in the lawsuit at 10 million colones, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1045 of the Civil Code; the expert opinion (dictamen pericial), he argues, estimated the cost of one hectare of improved pasture at 71,000 colones. **2.-** He also disagrees that the number of burned posts was reduced to 1,500, when the report establishes 3,000 posts, and that the value of each one was reduced to 600 colones, when the expert gave them a value of 800, therefore the judgment must be corrected, because it does not explain the reason why it departed from the expert’s valuation (folios 4 and 7 of said report). **3.-** He disagrees with the setting of interest from the finality of the judgment, because it is declaratory and not constitutive, and it should be recognized from the filing of the lawsuit. **4.-** He also disagrees that an estimated sum made before the OIJ was taken into consideration for the decision, when all the consequences of the fire had not yet been able to be assessed, as the judge considered a limitation to 5 million, while the damages were much greater.

**V.-** The defendant **Marsupe Sociedad Anónima**, also appealed the judgment: **1.-** It argues that there is an erroneous interpretation of the substantive law, given that *adequate causation between the conduct and the damage does not exist*, this being one of the elements of subjective liability, it is not enough to prove fault (culpa), but it is necessary to demonstrate the causal relationship between fault and damage or harm (Article 704 of the Civil Code); the apparent damage suffered by the plaintiff, it argues, is not a direct and immediate consequence of the conduct attributed to its representative, but rather indirect damages, and therefore non-compensable, since the claims, as can be seen, are far too onerous regarding the party obligated to satisfy them, which rather generates unjust enrichment, as the plaintiff has not proven the fault of Marsupe S.A. and even less the causal relationship; **2.-** It alleges that there is *lack of active and passive standing, as the conduct falls outside the application of Article 1045, because no civil joint liability (solidaridad civil) on the part of its representative is indicated*, the damages are not a consequence of the fault attributed in the minor offense judgment to [Name3], as the representative of Marsupe, but rather personally, the civil action being improper and illegal, because no elements of culpability exist against it as a criterion of imputation from the minor offense judgment; nor is there civil liability, because the Penal Code of 1941 excludes the liability of legal entities in which their normal activity should not presume risk-generating conduct, that is, it is not a case of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva); in this case, it argues, the elements of subjective liability (culpability and causation) are not configured, nor the risk of strict liability. Joint tort liability (responsabilidad solidaria extracontractual) is provided for in Article 1046, when two or more actors concur in the production of a damage, and in this case, proof of the fault of Marsupe S.A. is missing, in a direct or indirect subjective form (in eligendo or in vigilando), and Article 1048 does not provide for indirect liability for unlawful acts of administrators of commercial companies, on the contrary, the civil code includes behaviors committed with bad intention (doloso) by the manager or administrator that breaks the relationship, and that liability does not fall on the employer; furthermore, it argues, the principal is not liable for conduct carried out outside the assigned service. **3.-** Finally, it claims *lack of reasoning in the judgment when it jointly and severally condemns Marsupe S.A.*, because it is affirmed that the fire generating the alleged damages was caused by the defendants, which finds no basis in reality, much less that the participation of its representative was demonstrated, when the minor offense judgment does not say so. The person who directly participated in the causing event is Mrs. [Name3]. The judgment affirms that "it is well done" that its representative was sued for the claim for damages, given that it is the owner of the property and Mrs. [Name3] was the manager, but it does not justify the necessary and sufficient legal reasons or grounds for attributing that liability to its company.

The omission of the ruling, it argues, causes a serious defect that annuls it, given that the Judge should instead have exempted it from liability, nor does it explain whether Mrs. [Nombre3] acted under express orders of the Company, or under her own decision.

**VI.-** Agrarian case law has been prolific in establishing strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) for agro-environmental damages, and particularly in the case of burns, which is why the Tribunal will proceed, first of all, to analyze that topic: " **IV.-** Our legal system contains several provisions that expressly and directly refer to burns and forest fires and the liability arising from them. Thus we have: a) **Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas, No. 121 of October 26, 1909:** Its article 5 prohibits making burns in the fields. It only authorizes them when it involves clearing to prepare land for agricultural purposes: To do so, one must: 1) Request permission from the local political authority, 2) Have guarantees and precautions to avoid greater destruction than intended or harm to third parties, 3) Personally notify or by means of an official notice from the authority all adjoining landowners or interested parties of the day and time of the burn, at least two days in advance, 4) Leave a minimum distance of [Dirección1] around springs (nacientes) originating in the hills, and [Dirección2] meters around springs on flat lands. Regarding liability, it expressly states that, in any case, whoever makes burns must pay the damages and losses caused by the fire. The owner, possessor, or lessee who at the time of the fire was prepared for that purpose is presumed to be the author of the burn. B) **The current Ley Forestal, No. 7575 of February 13, 1996,** in its Chapter IV on “Forest Protection” prohibits making burns on forest lands and lands adjacent to them, without having obtained permission from the State Forest Administration. It refers to the Criminal Code to sanction anyone who makes a burn without permission (article 35). Likewise, numerals 59 and 60 respectively sanction causing a forest fire intentionally or negligently, with penalties of one to three years in the first case and three months to two years in the second. C) **Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, Decreto N°25721-MINAE of October 17, 1996:** It establishes that the official of the Forest Administration must visit the site prior to granting a burn permit (article 34). D) **Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, No. 7779 of April 30, 1998:** It requires that, to conduct burns on agricultural lands, the instructions of the MAG be followed according to the permit issued for those effects, pursuant to the current Reglamento de quemas, as well as the provisions of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and the Criminal Code (article 24). E) **Reglamento al Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, Decreto N°29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT of August 8, 2000:** In its Chapter X titled “De las quemas agrarias”, it provides that the MAG in coordination with MINAE and the Ministry of Security will issue the fundamental principles by which the practice of agricultural burns may be authorized. Its article 86 expressly requires prior permission from the MAG to make burns on lands with agricultural vocation, which must grant a hearing to the respective conservation area of MINAE, so that it may issue its opinion on the repercussions on biota and ecosystems. It even indicates that positive silence does not operate with respect to the MINAE's opinion. As for forest lands, protected zones, national parks, wildlife refuges, it prohibits making burns (article 88). F) **Decreto N°17015-MAG, of May 2, 1986:** Created the National Commission for Forest Fires. Said Commission, according to Decreto N° 19434-MIRENEM of December 11, 1990, has the power to recommend national policies and prepare forest fire prevention and fighting programs. G) **Decreto N°21859-MIRENEN of December 7, 1992:** Established the Comité contra Incendios Guanacaste as an instance of coordination, support, and follow-up of the Forest Fire Program of the Huetar Norte Region. H) **Decreto N°23850-MAG-SP of November 4, 1994, Reglamento para quemas controladas con fines agrícolas y pecuarios:** It establishes the minimum requirements to be able to carry out burns and fires, especially on lands for agricultural or livestock use. It defines a burn as a fire provoked intentionally, regulated by a pre-established plan, in which all preventive measures are taken to avoid damages to natural resources and the properties of adjoining landowners. Fires are those that, naturally or artificially, affect forests, forest lands, agricultural lands, or lands for livestock use (article 1). To carry out burns on agricultural and livestock lands, written authorization from the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería must be obtained. The official, in addition to the measures already taken and approved according to a visit that must be made prior to the permit, must indicate any additional measures deemed necessary if it is granted (articles 2 and 3). Numeral 6 establishes the following as minimum requirements: 1) Determine through firebreaks (rondas corta fuegos) (an area with a width double the height of the combustible material as indicated by the same Decree), the area to be burned and the combustible materials used; 2) open and sweep a firebreak on the perimeter of the area to be burned, which cannot be less than one meter wide; 3) have sufficient water and tools to extinguish the fire in case of emergency. Additionally, one may: 4) give prior notice to the Police Directorate of the place regarding the date and time of the burn: 5) have the assistance of at least one person; 6) make the burn against the wind and against the slope after 16:00 and before 07:00, avoiding doing it on a windy day: 7) verify before withdrawing that the fire is completely extinguished. But regardless of whether or not one has the respective permit, the Decree clearly establishes in its article 7 that: “The person who carries out a burn, whether with or without a permit, will be civilly liable for the damages and losses that may be caused, in accordance with articles 41 and 50 of our Political Constitution and the rules on tort liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual) that govern our legal system...”. I) Finally “the general provisions contained in numerals **“1045 and following of the Civil Code,** on tort liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual), are of supplementary application for this matter” (see judgment of the First Chamber No. 112 of 15:50 of October 11, 1995). In the criminal sphere, the current Criminal Code sanctions with a fine of 3 to 30 days anyone who contravenes the provisions aimed at preventing fires or preventing their spread (subsection 1 of Article 407) and anyone who infringes the rules on burning weeds, stubble, or other products of the land (subsection 2). **VII.** Modern doctrine, for its part, has supported the objectification of liability, by including within the factors of imputability and legal attribution of damage, apart from fault and intent, risk. It has even been proposed to include as other objective factors: guarantee, equity, abuse of right, and excess of normal tolerance between neighbors. Damage is then seen not from the viewpoint of the author's act but from the position of the injured party, to ensure that every unjustly caused damage is repaired. From another point of view, fault has been separated from the wrongfulness of the act, giving the latter a more important role. “Once the equivalence between the wrongfulness of the act and fault was broken, the conduct acquired an autonomous physiognomy detached from the subjective profile of the agent's will, to become a simple means, cause, or criterion of connection between a subject held liable and a certain harmful event to be compensated.” (Franzoni (Massimo), The Dangerous Activity, in *Liability for Damages in the Third Millennium*, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.120). Thus, the Theory of Risk is discussed, which does not displace fault but complements it, and is summarized as the duty of one who creates a risk to indemnify the damage they cause to a third party. “Risk is a cause of imputability when, due to the performance of certain causes and determined activities, qualified as dangerous, damage is produced. The damage in these circumstances must be compensated, not because its agent incurred in intent or fault, but because the legal order must protect the community from the development of dangerous activities, so that whoever carries them out incurs liability if damage is caused by virtue of such performance... Liability derived from risk does not depend on the intent or fault of the agent but originates in the mere occurrence of the damage consequent to the dangerous activity. This consideration brings with it a special evidentiary regime, according to which, by the mere exercise of the unsafe activity, the fault of the agent is presumed, exonerating the victim from the task of demonstrating improper conduct. It falls to the agent to rebut the presumption...” (Cubides Camacho Jorge, Imputable Harmful Act in *Of Damage*, Editora Jurídica, 1st Ed, Colombia, 2001, p.260). For other authors, “the causal relationship is an element of the illicit act and the contractual breach that links the damage directly with the unlawful fact, and indirectly with the element of subjective imputation or objective attribution. It is the binding factor that causes the damage and the fault, or as the case may be the risk, to integrate into the unity of the act that is the source of the obligation to indemnify” (see Bustamante Alcina (José), The Profile of Civil Liability at the End of the 20th Century in *Liability for Damages in the Third Millennium*, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.24 to 26). **VIII.** Precisely, the act of burning – regardless of its purpose – is an undeniably risky activity. Therefore, in accordance with the cited doctrine, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has clearly indicated: “VII.- Burns can entail, for whoever produces them, civil and criminal liabilities. Civil liability is regulated in the Ley de quemas y Cercas divisorias by establishing the obligation, for whoever makes burns, to pay the damages and losses caused as a consequence of the fire (article 5, paragraph 4). The owner, possessor, or lessee of the land is presumed to be the author of the burn if at the time of the fire it was prepared for that purpose... VIII.- The Constitutional Chamber, by means of Voto N°3459 of 14:42 on July 20, 1993, established the repeal of article 5, fifth paragraph, of the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias regarding criminal liability... The same Constitutional Chamber (Voto N°439-I-95 of 14:36 on August 22, 1995) clarified the mentioned judgment No. 3459-93 to the effect that article 5, paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas is repealed only with respect to the criminal aspects it contains... IX.- The regulations on burns and fires follow the criterion of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Fault is presumed in whoever created the conditions for the damage by having assumed the risk of harming third parties with the burn or fire. The damages and losses caused are at their expense. The injured party is exempt from proving fault. The burden of proof regarding the absence of fault falls on whoever burned or set the fire. It is an iuris tantum presumption. Force majeure, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party would be exemptions from liability. X. Whoever, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of damage, accepts the effects of the contingency, assumes the risk. Liability is based on creating the risk for the damage. The subject, upon initiating the activity, by means of their things, increases, potentiates, or multiplies the possibilities of dangerousness. Even when it may involve lawful conduct, whoever assumed the risk must always compensate the damage. There is greater reason to impute liability if the act arises from unlawful conduct. The injured party cannot assume damages for conduct not driven by themself, unless they placed themself in conditions to suffer the damage. Whoever burns or sets a fire, even with the authorization of the corresponding authority, cannot be exempted from liability.

This is so because, although Law No. 121 on Burns and Boundary Fences (Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias) of October 26, 1909, establishes the guidelines for authorizing burns on agricultural properties and sets forth a series of obligations regarding the person requesting the authorization, this does not break the presumption of guilt. The requirements for authorizing burns tend to ensure minimum risk. It is a precautionary measure but not an exemption from liability. Thus, compliance with the essential requirements for authorization cannot harm neighbors if the disaster occurs. In this way, damages to the property, crops, or to the persons themselves, of the neighbors must be compensated by the one who created the risk conditions with the fire or burn. XI. The activity of igniting or burning is, in itself, directed against Nature. It is a recourse of primitive agriculture where fire tends to substitute for human labor. Instead of using human or mechanical means to promote agricultural activity, a destructive element is used, so that upon the ashes of what was destroyed, the cultivation of plants or the raising of animals can begin. These types of actions are incompatible with current values. It attacks security in that it risks the property of adjoining landowners, their goods, and persons. It equally attacks the values of environmental protection. The economic and social function of property also entails an ecological function: agriculture must develop in harmony, and not in antagonism, with Nature. For the preservation of the environment, social solidarity demands the devising of new mechanisms to prevent damage and threatening acts. This is the philosophy of the reform to Article 50 of the Political Constitution. The Law on Burns and Boundary Fences (Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias) and the entire problem of liability derived from that activity must be analyzed along these lines" (see judgment No. 112 of 15:50 hours on October 11, 1995. In the same sense, No. 113 of 16:00 hours on October 11, 1995). VII. The Chamber also clarified, in the cited judgments, that the obligation to compensate for damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by burns and the location of the presumption of liability on whoever prepared the land for that purpose cannot be limited to the case of land clearings (desmontes). "Although it is true that Article 5 of the Law on Fences and Burns (Ley de Cercas y Quemas Divisorias) establishes a general prohibition against burning fields, authorizing them when it involves land clearings (desmontes) to enable land for agricultural purposes (first paragraph), this does not negate the possibility of carrying out said activity under other conditions and for other purposes, as current reality demonstrates. That is why the same Law establishes, in the fourth paragraph of numeral 5, a generic liability when it states: 'In all cases, the one who conducts burns must pay the damages (daños y perjuicios)...'. This fits perfectly within the generic principle of not causing harm to others. In this case, the damages (daños y perjuicios) are the responsibility of the defendant because she assumed the risk of harming her adjoining neighbors with the burn. By initiating her activity, preparing the land to be burned, she increased the possibilities of danger. It was an unlawful conduct since she did not have authorization from the corresponding administrative authorities, as corroborated in the proven facts. She did not take the minimum precautions, required by law, to prevent damages greater than those normally produced. Although she took some precautionary measures – making firebreaks (rondas) – this is not sufficient to exempt her from her liability to compensate the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to the plaintiff. The only way to be released from said liability was by demonstrating the existence of fault on the part of the victim, a fortuitous event (caso fortuito), or an act of a third party, which she did not do. Even though the Law on Burns and Boundary Fences (Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias) is from 1909, its interpretation must be verified in accordance with Articles 10 of the Civil Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Modern interpretation (systematic, material, and evolutionary) requires adapting the content of the norm to the historical circumstances and the social and economic reality in which it is to be applied. For this, the principles and values contained in the Constitution, as well as in special agrarian laws, must be taken into account." (see judgment No. 112-95 cited). VIII. According to what has been explained, it is possible to conduct burns on lands suitable for agricultural and livestock use (vocación agropecuaria) provided the requirements established in our legal system are met, among them taking sufficient precautionary measures to be able to control the fire, requesting prior permission from the respective public entities, especially the office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock that is applicable, and notifying the owners or managers of the neighboring properties. This last requirement is of the utmost importance, because even if all possible measures are taken, natural phenomena such as wind, air currents, and others can cause the fire to spread to other areas outside of those originally intended to be burned. Notifying the adjoining neighbors precisely seeks to minimize or prevent the fire from spreading, and greater damage from occurring, since it enables better surveillance by the neighbors on their own properties and allows them to be prepared to fight it if necessary. Now, even in the case of having taken all possible precautions and having a permit, whoever originates or causes a burn that produces damage to third parties is liable for such damages. The foregoing is so because it is a risky activity. The liability is of an objective type, as already explained." (Agrarian Court, No. 815-F-03 of December 16, 2003).- VII.- Appeal of the co-defendant Marsupe Sociedad Anónima: The co-defendant company, Marsupe S.A., challenged the ruling, alleging three fundamental reasons: the lack of a causal relationship between the conduct and the damage, the lack of standing to sue and to be sued because there is no joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria), and finally, the nullity for lack of reasoning in the ruling. The appellant is not correct in any of the three grievances, and these will be resolved in the reverse order as they were raised in the appeal, this being the logical order for their analysis. 1.- Regarding the invoked "lack of reasoning in the ruling", on the joint and several (solidaria) condemnation of Marsupe S.A., it considers that this finds no basis in reality, because the participation of its represented party was not demonstrated, and the misdemeanor judgment does not say so, nor is it justified on necessary and sufficient legal grounds, which renders the judgment null and void. These statements are not accurate. The lower court (a-quo), first, held it as proven in fact 10 that the fire occurred on the farm of the defendant Marsupe, that the burn was ordered by Mrs. [Nombre3] Arias Jiménez, and that it later spread to the properties of the plaintiffs. This fact, supported by the statements of [Nombre4], [Nombre5], [Nombre6], [Nombre7], [Nombre8], and [Nombre9], has not been disproved by the appellant, and contrary to what she affirmed, in the misdemeanor judgment of May 3, 2001, the Judge concluded the following: "... they failed in their duty of care and did not maintain due caution because, without specifying a date but last year, they caused a fire on the farm of Marsupe, without requesting permission from the respective authorities and even though they took some precautions, these were not sufficient and the fire spread to at least three neighboring farms..." (page 23). Regarding the liability of the company, the lower court (a-quo) does provide grounds for attributing it by clearly indicating that "... it is the owner of the farm where the fire started and Mrs. [Nombre3] Arias Jiménez is the Manager of said company, that being the reason why she comes to the civil courts as it is recorded in the case file... This way of conducting burns without requesting permission from the corresponding authorities and without notifying the adjoining neighbors undoubtedly falls within one of the modalities of fault which is negligence and imprudence...." (see judgment on pages 338-339). Furthermore, the judgment cites the norms and doctrine on tort liability (responsabilidad extracontractual), particularly Article 1045 and following of the Civil Code (recitals IV, IV bis, and VII). As observed, the ruling was reasoned, and therefore there is no cause for nullity. 2.- Regarding the joint and several tort liability (responsabilidad solidaria extracontractual) and the invoked lack of standing to sue and to be sued, the appellants are also not correct. There are a great many norms that establish the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) of companies when objective liability is involved. Article 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in relation to 106, provides for the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) of legal entities whose managers, administrators, or legal representatives are found liable for the punishable acts. The same norm is contained in Articles 135 and 137, subsection 3, of the 1941 Penal Code, which identifies as jointly and severally liable (solidarios): "The natural or legal persons owning establishments in which a punishable act is committed by reason of the infringement of police laws or regulations by the administrators, dependents, or servants of the establishment." Such norms are also related to Articles 1046 and 1048 of the Civil Code, third paragraph, regarding objective joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria objetiva). Both are even interpreted also in relation to the Law on Burns and Boundary Fences (Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias), Article 5, and the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), from which exactly the opposite of what was indicated by the appellant is derived, meaning that both natural and legal persons are jointly and severally (solidariamente) liable for the agrarian damage caused. Article 57 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) provides: "... when it involves legal entities, civil liability shall extend to their legal representatives. Likewise, both natural and legal persons shall be civilly liable for the ecological damage caused, in accordance with what is established in Article 1045 of the Civil Code", given that in this case there is sufficient evidence to hold as proven the link between the company Marsupe S.A. and [Nombre3], who was known as its representative. 3.- Regarding the causal relationship between the conduct and the damage, it is more than demonstrated, even though in these cases of objective liability, fault does not need to be demonstrated, for what matters is that a risky activity exists, and then the production of the damage itself. See, as previously indicated, that the same criminal judgment clearly established that the burn was carried out by a laborer, by order of the representative, on the farm of Marsupe S.A., and then the fire spread through the adjoining lands affecting at least three neighboring farms (see pages 22 and 23), which logically produced a great amount of damage, as is accredited in the sixth fact, not disproved by the appellant, and which is found both in the OIJ report and in the photographic sequence added to the case file (pages 2 to 10); even four years later, there were still signs of the burns produced on the plaintiffs' farm (see judicial inspection record on page 148 and expert examination photographs on pages 290 and 291). The testimonial evidence itself attests to this causal relationship: "... I worked on a farm that is between the two, of Mr. [Nombre2] and of Mrs. [Nombre3], and we were there at about eleven in the morning and we started to see smoke on the farm of [Nombre3]. Later it wasn't just smoke but the lady's farm was engulfed in flames. That was in the dry season and sparks were flying everywhere, whirlwinds of fire due to the wind that was blowing, the wind carried the sparks to the farm where I was and to that of Mr. [Nombre10] from the sparks, what happened was a great fire that devastated the farm of Mr. [Nombre2], with land, pastures, fences, and trees..." (statement of [Nombre7], on page 140). In summary, the defendant, appellant, is not correct in any of her grievances, so the judgment ruling in favor of the plaintiff shall be confirmed regarding the standing to sue of the plaintiffs and standing to be sued of the defendant.

VIII.- Secondly, the matter of damages (daños y perjuicios) will be analyzed. The jurisprudence has defined these concepts as follows: "IV.- Damage (daño) constitutes one of the presuppositions of tort liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual), since the duty to compensate is only configured if there has been a damaging unlawful act (hecho ilícito) that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system. Damage (daño), in a legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (the injured party - damnificado), which causes the privation of a legal right, regarding which its conservation was objectively expected had the damaging event not occurred. Under this theory, there is no civil liability if there is no damage (daño), just as there is no damage (daño) if there is no injured party (damnificado). On the other hand, only damage (daño) that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable, this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In sum, damage (daño) constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from confronting the situation prior to the unlawful act (hecho ilícito) with the one after it. On many occasions, the expressions 'damages' (daños) and 'prejudices' (perjuicios) are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to specify and distinguish both concepts. Damage (daño) constitutes the loss caused to the injured party (damnum emergens), while prejudice (perjuicio) is made up of the frustrated gain or profit, or that left unperceived (lucro cesans), which was reasonably and probably expected if the unlawful act (hecho ilícito) had not occurred. V. Not just any damage (daño) imposes the obligation to compensate. For it to be compensable, the following characteristics must basically converge: A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical, it cannot be based on supposed or conjecturable realizations. The damage (daño) does not lose this character if its quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to assess or prove; nor should certainty be confused with currency, for the repair of certain but future damage (daño) is admissible; future damage (daño futuro) should not be confused with lost profit (lucro cesante) or prejudice (perjuicio). Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage (daño), it constitutes an extreme of sole subjective incumbency of the injured party (damnificado), however the law cannot deal with claims based on insignificant damages (daños), derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of compensation. Thus there can be a direct injured party (damnificado directo) and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the damaging act and the second will be the successors of the victim. C) It must be caused by a third party and subsisting; that is, it has not been repaired. D) There must be a causal relationship between the unlawful act (hecho ilícito) and the damage (daño). VI. Among the classes of damages (daños), in the first term are material damage (daño material) and bodily harm (daño corporal), the first being that which affects the things or material goods that make up the person's estate, while the second impacts bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage (daño material o patrimonial), the specific ones of bodily harm (daño corporal) and material damage (daño material), strictly speaking, are usually included. The second appears to be the most felicitous expression, for bodily harm (daño corporal) usually affects the patrimonial interests of the injured party (damnificado) (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), lost profits (ganancias frustradas) if the damage has incapacitated him to perform his usual occupations (prejudices - perjuicios), etc. ..." (First Chamber of the Supreme Court, No. 112 of 14:15 hours on July 15, 1992, and No. 714 of 16:20 hours on September 18, 2002) – The underlining is not from the original-.

IX.- Regarding the proof of damages (daños y perjuicios), the principle of the burden of proof (carga probatoria) enshrined in Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs, and for cases of enforcement in agrarian matters, in Article 62, subsection c) of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law (Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria).

In this regard, national case law has established the following: "In matters of damages, a subject on which there is lengthy experience, the evidentiary element plays a very important role. Whoever alleges them must prove them, and likewise whoever denies them, except in the case of subjective moral damage, which judges are permitted to assess according to the rules of experience, logic, and science, without being subject to any other evidentiary criterion. In the modern procedural system, the Roman aphorism judex secundum allegata et probata partium decidere debet remains fully valid. This means that judges are limited to issuing their rulings based on everything the parties allege and prove. The mere allegation of a fact is not sufficient for a conviction because it is the party who is obligated to offer evidence in a timely manner, obtain its admission from the court, present it for consideration, and finally, within the process of evidentiary assessment, a task par excellence of the court, attribute to those evidentiary elements the necessary value to prove the alleged fact. This is the well-known principle of the burden of proof. It consists of the obligation of anyone who alleges a fact or a claim to proceed to legally prove what is alleged. This differs greatly from the mere act of placing the allegation or the evidence itself in the case file, because evidence for purposes of cassation is only that to which the judgment assigns that rank after a rigorous assessment process. And the principle has not only an important connotation in the affirmative aspect but also in the negative, because whoever alleges the non-existence, modification, or extinction of a fact or a claim must also prove it. The principle of the burden of proof, in a democratic and non-inquisitorial regime, is linked to many other principles, among which the principle of evidentiary freedom stands out. According to that principle, all parties shall have broad powers to offer all lawful means of proof, above all those legitimately obtained, that is, all means duly authorized by the legal system and brought into the case file following the procedures also established by the procedural system, where the parties must have the right to question their own evidence and that of the opposing party, for the purpose of demonstrating or negating the facts, affirming or contradicting the claims." (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, No. 554 of 3:10 p.m. on August 4, 2000 – the bold lettering is not from the original). For the awarding of damages, case law has required demonstrating the causal link between the conviction imposed in the abstract and what is claimed in the execution phase (Sala Primera, No. 830 of 11:45 a.m. on September 22, 2004, and No. 674 of 11:30 a.m. on August 18, 2004). Furthermore, case law has established that damages derived from an illegal act or conduct are debts of value, and not monetary debts, which is why the amount should not become a reason to deny them, provided they are proven (In this regard, Sala Primera, Voto No. 226 of March 31, 2004).

X.- Appeal of the plaintiff party: Regarding the damages, the plaintiff party complains that they were not awarded the value of the grazing paddocks (potreros), which they claimed at 10 million colones, considering that the expert appraisal estimated the cost of one hectare of improved pasture at 71,000 colones; furthermore, they disagree that the number of burned posts was reduced to 1,500, when the expert states that there are 3,000 posts with a value of 800 colones, and they do not understand why the lower court departed from the expert valuation. 1.- As for the first complaint, the lower court rejected the item for the loss of pasture, considering that the grass grew back and is currently in use, and furthermore, the livestock was off the farm for a period of three months and then the livestock was moved back to the farm, with the grass regrowing naturally. The Court agrees with the decision made by the lower court, since the burning of the pastures in no way caused their disappearance; on the contrary, it was a temporary matter, lasting about three months, a fact for which the plaintiffs were awarded payment for feed (chicken manure), the transport of the animals to another farm, and the rental of pastures, which serves to repair the damage caused by the temporary loss of the pasture, since it evidently grew back months after being razed by the fire. 2.- Regarding the posts, the lower court considered it fair to award a quantity of one thousand five hundred posts, for a total of nine hundred thousand colones. The quantity of posts awarded corresponds to an approximate estimate of the fenced enclosures (repastos) that were damaged, at the time they occurred and the date of replacement, since there was no certainty as to the total number of burned posts, and an approximate value was made, given that according to the report of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, 15 cattle pens (apartos) were razed (out of twenty in total), and there were also some parts more damaged than others (folios 3, 4, and 5), but without absolute certainty as to how many posts were actually damaged. Regarding the value or estimate, it must be taken into account that Article 123 of the 1941 Code of Criminal Procedure, related to the rules for the reparation of damage in this type of event, states that "...he shall be obligated to pay its value according to an expert appraisal referred to the date of the infraction. If such an estimate is not possible because the thing was destroyed or has disappeared, the judges shall fix the respective value, adhering to the data in the trial.". In such a way that also in this case the court has discretion to establish the "quantum" of the compensation, and for this, the lower court took into consideration the amount that the plaintiffs initially claimed in the criminal forum, which was the sum of five million colones. For the reasons set forth, the Court considers that the appellant is not correct in the grievances raised regarding the compensation for fenced enclosures (repastos) and wooden posts. 3.- Regarding interest. The appellants complain that they do not agree with the setting of interest starting from the finality of the judgment; it must be noted that here we are faced with a claim for strict liability (responsabilidad patrimonial objetiva), so liability had to be determined first, in order to then establish the value of the damages. Article 706 of the Civil Code establishes that "If the obligation is to pay a sum of money, the damages consist always and solely of the payment of interest on the sum owed, counted from the maturity of the obligation." In this case, the determination of the value is acquired with the finality of the ruling, and therefore it is from that point onward that it is possible to collect the damages caused. 4.- Finally, regarding the use of the value estimated by the plaintiffs, in the contravention case, and which appears in the OIJ report, it is evident that the lower court, like this Court, considers that it is the amount that best conforms to the moment of the production of the damage and the date of the replacement that the plaintiffs had to make, and therefore the provisions of Articles 123 and 124 of the 1941 Criminal Code are applicable. Although it is true there is an expert appraisal by [Name11], note that it performs the valuation in the month of November 2004 at the "current cost" (folio 275), and not at the date of the infraction, which is what Article 123 authorizes. For this reason, the defendant party challenged that valuation when it alleged the following: "...The expert, happily, determines what according to him is the CURRENT cost to ESTABLISH, understood as planting new pasture, however, on the one hand, the current price is not the same as 4 years ago... The same consideration must be made when he determines the value of the damaged fences..." (folio 302).

As indicated in the preceding recital (considerando), there was no certainty as to the number of posts, damaged ones, and in any case their price was set at the time of replacement.- XI.- In light of all the foregoing, the appealed judgment must be confirmed, in respect of that which was the subject of the appeal.

POR TANTO:

In respect of that which was the subject of the appeal, the appealed judgment is CONFIRMED.

ENRIQUE ULATE CHACÓN ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA CARLOS PICADO VARGAS Nº EXPN1 Ordinario de Actor [Nombre1] y otro Contra Marsupe SRL. li.+++ B) <span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">The current Forest Law (Ley Forestal), No. 7575 of February 13, 1996,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> in its Chapter IV on “Forest Protection,” prohibits conducting burns on forest lands and lands adjacent to them without having obtained a permit from the State Forest Administration (Administración Forestal del Estado).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> It refers to the Penal Code to sanction anyone who conducts a burn without a permit (Article 35).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Likewise, sections 59 and 60 respectively penalize causing a forest fire intentionally or negligently, with penalties of one to three years in the first case and three months to two years in the second.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> C) </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Regulation to the Forest Law (Reglamento a la Ley Forestal), Decree No. 25721-MINAE of October 17, 1996:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Establishes that an official of the Forest Administration must visit the site prior to granting a burn permit (Article 34).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> D)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Law on the Use, Management, and Conservation of Soils (Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos), No. 7779 of April 30, 1998:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Requires that, to conduct burns on agricultural lands, the instructions of the MAG be followed in accordance with the permit issued for those purposes, pursuant to the current burns regulation (Reglamento de quemas), as well as the provisions of the Organic Law of the Environment and the Penal Code (Article 24).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> E)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Regulation on the Use, Management, and Conservation of Soils (Reglamento al Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos), Decree No. 29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT of August 8, 2000:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> In its Chapter X entitled “On Agricultural Burns (De las quemas agrarias),” it provides that the MAG, in coordination with MINAE and the Ministry of Security, will issue the fundamental principles through which the practice of agricultural burns may be authorized.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Its Article 86 expressly requires prior permission from the MAG to conduct burns on lands of agricultural vocation, which must grant a hearing to the respective conservation area (área de conservación) of MINAE so that it may issue its opinion on the repercussions to the biota and ecosystems.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> It even indicates that positive silence does not apply regarding the opinion of MINAE.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> As for forest lands, protected zones (zonas protectoras), national parks, and wildlife refuges, it prohibits conducting burns (Article 88).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> F)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Decree No. 17015-MAG of May 2, 1986:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Created the National Commission for Forest Fires (Comisión Nacional para los Incendios Forestales). Said Commission, according to Decree No. 19434-MIRENEM of December 11, 1990, has the authority to recommend national policies and prepare forest fire prevention and combat programs.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> G)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Decree No. 21859-MIRENEN of December 7, 1992:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Established the Guanacaste Fire Committee (Comité contra Incendios Guanacaste) as an instance for coordination, support, and follow-up of the Forest Fire Program of the Huetar Norte Region.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> H)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Decree No. 23850-MAG-SP of November 4, 1994, Regulation for Controlled Burns for Agricultural and Livestock Purposes (Reglamento para quemas controladas con fines agrícolas y pecuarios):</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Establishes the minimum requirements for conducting burns and fires, especially on lands of agricultural or livestock use.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> A burn (quema) is defined as intentionally provoked fire, regulated by a pre-established plan, in which all preventive measures are taken to avoid damage to natural resources and the properties of neighbors.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Fires (incendios) are those that, naturally or artificially, affect forests, forest lands, agricultural lands, or lands of livestock use (Article 1).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> To conduct burns on agricultural and livestock lands, written authorization from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería) is required.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> The official, in addition to the measures already taken and approved according to a visit that must be made prior to the permit, must indicate any additional measures deemed necessary if granted (Articles 2 and 3). Section 6 establishes the following as minimum requirements:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> 1)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Determine, by means of firebreaks (rondas corta fuegos) (an area with a width double the height of the combustible material, as indicated in the same Decree), the area to be burned and the combustible materials used; 2)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> open and sweep a firebreak on the perimeter of the area to be burned, which cannot be less than one meter wide;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> 3)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> have sufficient water and tools to extinguish the fire in case of emergency.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Additionally, one may:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> 4)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> give prior notice to the Police Directorate of the place regarding the date and time of the burn:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> 5)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> have the assistance of at least one person;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> 6)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> conduct the burn against the wind and against the slope after 4:00 p.m. and before 7:00 a.m., avoiding doing it on windy days:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> 7) verify before leaving that the fire is completely extinguished.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> But regardless of whether or not one has the respective permit, the Decree clearly establishes in its Article 7 that:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> “The person who conducts a burn, whether with or without a permit, shall be civilly liable for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) that may be caused, in accordance with Articles 41 and 50 of our Political Constitution and the rules on tort liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual) that govern our legal system...”.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> I)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Finally, “the general provisions contained in sections </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">“1045 and following of the Civil Code,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> on tort liability, are supplementary applicable to this matter”</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> (see judgment of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) No. 112 of 3:50 p.m. on October 11, 1995). In the criminal sphere, the current Penal Code sanctions with a fine of 3 to 30 days anyone who contravenes provisions aimed at preventing fires or avoiding their spread (subsection 1 of Article 407) and anyone who infringes the rules on burning weeds, stubble, or other products of the land (subsection 2).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">VII.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Modern doctrine, for its part, has supported the objectification of liability, by including risk among the factors of imputability and legal attribution of damage, apart from fault (culpa) and intent (dolo).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> It has even been proposed to include other objective factors such as:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> guarantee, equity, abuse of right, and excess of normal tolerance between neighbors.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Damage is thus seen not from the act of the author but from the position of the injured party, to ensure that every unjustly caused damage is repaired. From another point of view, fault has been separated from the unlawfulness of the act, giving the latter a more important role.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> “Once the equivalence between the unlawfulness of the act and fault was broken, conduct acquired an autonomous physiognomy detached from the subjective profile of the agent’s will, to become a simple means, cause, or criterion of connection between a subject held responsible and a certain damaging event to be compensated.”</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> (Franzoni (Massimo), La Actividad peligrosa, in </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.120).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Thus, the Theory of Risk is discussed, which does not displace fault but rather complements it, and is summarized as the duty of whoever creates a risk to indemnify the damage caused to a third party.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> “Risk is a cause of imputability when, due to the realization of certain causes and determined activities, classified as dangerous, damage occurs. The damage in these circumstances must be compensated, not because its agent incurred intent or fault, but because the legal order must protect the community from the development of dangerous activities, so that whoever carries them out incurs liability if damage is occasioned by virtue of such realization... Liability derived from risk does not depend on the intent or fault of the agent but originates in the mere occurrence of damage consequent to the dangerous activity.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> This consideration brings with it a special evidentiary regime, according to which, by the mere exercise of the unsafe activity, the fault of the agent is presumed, exonerating the victim from the task of demonstrating improper conduct. It is up to the agent to rebut the presumption...” ([Nombre1]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">, Hecho imputable dañoso in </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Del daño, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">Editora Jurídica, 1st Ed., Colombia, 2001, p.260).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> For other authors, “the causal relationship is an element of the unlawful act and of contractual breach that links the damage directly with the unlawful fact, and indirectly with the element of subjective imputation or objective attribution.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> It is the binding factor</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> that makes the damage and the fault, or as the case may be </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">the risk,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> integrate into the unity of the act that is the source of the obligation to indemnify” (see [Nombre2]</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">(), El perfil de la responsabilidad civil al finalizar el siglo XX in </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.24 to 26). </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold\">VIII. </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">Precisely, conducting burns —regardless of their purpose— is an undeniably risky activity.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> Therefore, in accordance with the cited doctrine, The First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) has clearly indicated: “VII.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> Burns can entail, for whoever produces them, civil and criminal liabilities.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> Civil liability is regulated in the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences (Ley de quemas y Cercas divisorias) by establishing the obligation for whoever conducts burnings to pay for the damages and losses occasioned as a consequence of the fire (Article 5, paragraph 4).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> The owner, possessor, or lessee of the land that, at the time of the fire, was prepared for that purpose, is presumed to be the author of the burning...</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> VIII.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), through Vote No. 3459 of 2:42 p.m. on July 20, 1993, established the repeal of Article 5, paragraph five, of the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences regarding criminal liability... The same Constitutional Chamber (Vote No. 439-I-95 of 2:36 p.m. on August 22, 1995) clarified the aforementioned judgment No. 3459-93 in the sense that Article 5, paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Law on Dividing Fences and Burns is repealed only with respect to the criminal aspects it contains...</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> IX.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">The regulations on burns and fires follow the criterion of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">Fault is presumed in whoever created the conditions of the damage for having assumed the risk of harming third parties with the burn or fire.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> The damages and losses occasioned are at their charge. The injured party is exempt from proving fault.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> The burden of proof regarding the absence of fault corresponds to whoever burned or set fire.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> It is an iuris tantum presumption. Exemptions from liability would be force majeure, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> X.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> Whoever foresees the eventuality or possibility of damage and accepts the effects of the contingency assumes the risk. Liability is based on creating the risk for the damage.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> The subject, upon initiating the activity, through their things, increases, potentiates, or multiplies the possibilities of danger.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> Even when it may be a lawful conduct, whoever assumed the risk must always indemnify the damage. There is greater reason to impute liability if the act originates from an unlawful conduct.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> The injured party cannot assume damages from conduct not driven by themselves, unless they placed themselves in conditions to suffer the damage. Whoever burns or sets fire, even with the authorization of the corresponding authority, cannot be exempted from liability. This is so because, although the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences No. 121 of October 26, 1909, establishes guidelines for authorizing burns on agricultural estates and establishes a series of obligations regarding whoever requests the authorization, this does not break the presumption of culpability.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> The requirements for authorizing burns tend to ensure minimum risk.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> It is a precautionary measure but not an exemption from liability.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> Therefore, compliance with the indispensable requirements for authorization cannot harm the neighbors if the accident occurs. In this way, damages to the property,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> crops, or the persons themselves of the neighbors must be indemnified by whoever created the risk conditions with the fire or burn.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> XI.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> The activity of setting fire or burning, in itself, is directed against Nature.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> It is a recourse of primitive agriculture where fire tends to substitute the labor of man. Instead of using human or mechanical means to promote agricultural activity, a destructive element is used to, on the ashes of what was destroyed, initiate the cultivation of plants or the raising of animals. These types of actions are incompatible with current values. It threatens security insofar as it risks the property of neighbors, their goods, and persons.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> It also threatens the values of environmental protection.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> The economic and social function of property also entails an ecological function:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> agriculture must develop in harmony, and not in antagonism, with Nature.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> For the preservation of the environment, social solidarity demands devising new mechanisms to prevent damage and threatening acts. This is the philosophy of the reform to Article 50 of the Political Constitution.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic\"> On these guidelines, the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences and the whole problematic of liability derived from that activity must be analyzed” (see judgment No. 112 of 3:50 p.m. on October 11, 1995. In the same sense, No. 113 of 4:00 p.m. on October 11, 1995).</span> **VII.** The Chamber also clarified in the cited rulings that the obligation to compensate for the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by burns and the fact that the presumption of responsibility falls on whoever prepared the land for that purpose cannot be limited to the case of land clearing (desmontes). "While it is true that Article 5 of the Ley de Cercas y Quemas Divisorias establishes the general prohibition against making burns in the fields, authorizing them in the case of land clearing (desmontes) to prepare land for agricultural purposes (first paragraph), this does not negate the possibility of carrying out such activity under other conditions and for other purposes, as current reality demonstrates. Therefore, the same Law establishes, in the fourth paragraph of numeral 5, a generic liability when it states: 'In any case, whoever makes burns must pay the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios)...'. This fits perfectly within the generic principle of not harming others. In this case, the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) are the responsibility of the defendant because she assumed the risk of harming her neighbors with the burn. By initiating her activity, preparing the land to be burned, she increased the possibilities of danger. This was an unlawful conduct since she did not have authorization from the corresponding administrative authorities, as corroborated in the proven facts. She did not take the minimum precautions, required by law, to prevent damages greater than those normally produced. Although she took some precautionary measures –making firebreaks (rondas)– this is not sufficient to exempt her from her responsibility to compensate for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused to the plaintiff. The only way to be released from such responsibility was to demonstrate the existence of fault by the victim, an act of God (caso fortuito), or an act of a third party, which she did not do. Even though the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias dates from 1909, its interpretation must be verified in accordance with Articles 10 of the Civil Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Modern interpretation (systematic, material, and evolutionary) requires adapting the content of the norm to the historical circumstances and the social and economic reality in which it will be applied. To do so, the principles and values contained in the Constitution, as well as in special laws on agrarian matters, must be taken into account." (see ruling No. 112-95 cited).

**VIII.** In accordance with what has been explained, it is possible to conduct burns on lands with agricultural vocation (vocación agropecuaria) as long as the requirements established in our legal system are met, including taking sufficient precautionary measures to be able to control the fire, requesting prior permission from the respective public entities, especially the pertinent office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and notifying the owners or managers of the neighboring properties. This last requirement is of utmost importance, because even if all possible measures are taken, natural phenomena such as wind, air currents, and others can cause the fire to spread to other areas beyond those originally intended to be burned. By notifying the adjoining landowners, the aim is precisely to minimize or prevent the fire from spreading and causing greater damage, since it enables better vigilance by the neighbors on their own lands, and allows them to be prepared to fight it if necessary. Now, even in the case that all possible precautions have been taken and permission has been obtained, whoever originates or causes a burn that produces damage to third parties is responsible for such. The foregoing is so because it is a risky activity. The liability is strict (objetivo) as already explained." (Agrarian Tribunal, No. 815-F-03 of December 16, 2003).- [...]

**VIII.-** Secondly, issues relating to damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) will be analyzed. Case law has defined these concepts as follows: "IV. Damage constitutes one of the prerequisites for extracontractual civil liability, since the duty to compensate is only configured if a harmful unlawful act has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, capable of being protected by the legal system. Damage, in a legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (aggrieved party), which causes the deprivation of a legal good, regarding which its conservation was objectively expected had the harmful event not occurred. Under this theory, there is no civil liability if no damage is mediated, just as there is no damage if there is no aggrieved party. On the other hand, only damage that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable, this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In sum, damage constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation before the unlawful act with that after it. On many occasions, the expressions 'damages' and 'losses' are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to specify and distinguish both concepts. **Damage constitutes the loss inflicted on the aggrieved party (damnum emergens), while loss is made up of the frustrated or forgone profit or utility (lucro cessans), which was reasonably and probably expected had the unlawful act not occurred.** V. Not any damage imposes the obligation to compensate. To be compensable, the following characteristics must basically converge: A) **It must be certain; real and effective**, and not merely eventual or hypothetical; it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. The damage does not lose this character if its quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to assess or prove; nor should certainty be confused with actuality, since the repair of certain but future damage is admissible; future damage should not be confused with loss of profit or loss (perjuicio). Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes a matter of sole subjective concern for the aggrieved party; however, the law cannot deal with claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) **There must be an injury to an interest that is legally relevant and deserving of compensation.** Thus, there can be a direct aggrieved party and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the harmful act and the second will be the victim's successors. C) **It must be caused by a third party and subsisting**; that is, it must not have been repaired. D) **There must be a causal relationship** between the unlawful act and the damage. VI. Within the classes of damage, material damage and bodily harm are found in the first place, the former being that which affects the things or material goods that make up a person's patrimony, while the latter affects bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific ones of bodily harm and material damage, in a strict sense, are usually encompassed. The latter seems to be the most felicitous expression, since bodily harm often affects the aggrieved party's patrimonial interests (payment for medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (losses (perjuicios)), etc…" (First Chamber of the Court, No. 112 of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992, and No. 714 of 4:20 p.m. on September 18, 2002) – The underlining is not from the original.

**IX.-** Regarding the proof of damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), the principle of the burden of proof (carga probatoria) enshrined in Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code applies, and for cases of execution in agrarian matters, in Article 62, subsection c) of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. In this regard, national case law has established the following: "**In matters of damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), a topic on which there is long experience, the evidentiary element plays a very important role.** Whoever alleges them must prove them, likewise whoever denies them, except in the case of subjective moral damage which judges are allowed to assess according to the rules of experience, logic, and science, without being subject to any other evidentiary criterion. In the modern procedural system, the Roman aphorism *judex secundum allegata et probata partium decidere debet* still has full force. This signifies the limitation of judges to be able to issue their rulings based on everything the parties allege and prove. **The mere allegation of a fact is not enough for a judgment against it because it is the party who is obliged to offer the evidence in time, obtain its admission from the judge, present it to be evaluated, and finally, within the evidentiary assessment process, a task par excellence of the judge, attribute to those evidentiary elements the necessary value to accredit the formulated fact.** This is the well-known principle of the burden of proof. It consists of the obligation of anyone who alleges a fact or a claim to proceed to legally prove what is alleged. This differs greatly from the mere act of accrediting the allegation or the evidence itself in the file, because evidence for cassation purposes is only that which the ruling gives that status after a rigorous assessment process. And the principle not only has an important connotation in the affirmative aspect but also in the negative one, since whoever alleges the non-existence, modification, or extinction of a fact or a claim must also prove it. To the principle of the burden of proof, in a democratic and non-inquisitorial regime, many other principles are linked, among which the principle of evidentiary freedom stands out. According to that principle, all parties must have broad powers to offer all lawful means of proof, especially those obtained legitimately; that is, all means duly authorized by the legal system and brought to the file following the procedures also established by the procedural system, where the parties must have the right to question their own evidence and that of the opposing party, with the aim of demonstrating or denying facts, affirming or contradicting claims." (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 554 of 3:10 p.m. on August 4, 2000 – the bold text is not from the original). For the awarding of damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), case law has required demonstrating the causal link between the abstract judgment imposed and what is claimed in the execution (First Chamber, No. 830 of 11:45 on September 22, 2004, and No. 674 of 11:30 a.m. on August 18, 2004). Moreover, case law has established that the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) derived from an unlawful act or conduct are value debts, and not monetary ones, which is why the amount should not become a reason to deny them, as long as they are proven (In this regard, First Chamber, Voto No. 226 of March 31, 2004)." (folios 56 y 57)." **2.-** The defendant party answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the following exceptions: lack of right, lack of active and passive standing (legitimación activa y pasiva), lack of current interest, and prescription. (see folios 65 a 69).- **3.-** Attorney Mario Zamora Mata, judge of first instance, in a judgment at nine o'clock on August eleventh, two thousand five, resolved: "... POR TANTO: In accordance with the foregoing and cited articles, the present ordinary proceeding filed by [Nombre1] and [Nombre2] against MARSUPE SRL AND [Nombre3] IS DECLARED WITH MERIT, the exceptions of lack of right, lack of current interest, lack of active and passive standing, and prescription are rejected with respect to what is granted, the exception of lack of right is upheld with respect to what is denied. It is declared in judgment as follows: 1) Regarding the compensation for the payment of two hundred hectares of pastureland, this item is rejected, since as recorded in the judicial inspection, the grass grew back and is currently in use; according to what was stated by the plaintiff himself in his lawsuit and to what was requested, it follows that the cattle were off the farm for a period of three months and after that time were brought back to his farm to date; it must be considered that the action of the defendants was negligent and not willful and that what is punished arises from non-contractual liability (responsabilidad extracontractual); likewise, it must be taken into account that the grass that was burned grew back naturally; it is not demonstrated in the case file that it had to be fertilized or replanted for it to grow back. 2). Regarding the destroyed trees, although it is true that the quantity was not duly demonstrated in the case file, it is permissible to recognize that given the extent of the fire, the quantity claimed by the plaintiff is logical and consistent; in that regard, it is approved in the amount of fifty trees at a sum of twenty thousand colones each, for a total of one million colones. 3). Regarding the item of burned fence posts, it is approved in the amount of one thousand five hundred posts at a price of twenty thousand colones each, for a total of nine hundred thousand colones, transportation of the posts in the sum of one hundred twenty thousand colones. 4) Labor for installing posts: This item is approved in the sum of two hundred fifty-nine thousand two hundred colones. 5). The sum of one hundred fourteen thousand colones is approved for the purchase of barbed wire, staples, etc. 6). The sum of two hundred forty-five thousand colones is approved for the purchase of seven hundred sacks of chicken manure (pollinaza), this by virtue of the fact that the cattle needed extra food, even if on another farm, since they were removed from their normal and stable habitat and the conditions would not be the same. 7) The following sums are approved for the concepts to be stated: THE SUM OF THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND COLONES FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF THE ANIMALS TO AND FROM ANOTHER FARM and back to the plaintiff's, the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND COLONES, for the rental of pastures on another farm for a period of three months. 8). The item regarding the weight loss of the animals is rejected, since it was not demonstrated that they lost weight, and second, the animals were taken to graze in another place and were given the extra food that had to be purchased, which is why, as the items for payment of pasture rentals and purchase of chicken manure are being granted, this item is not appropriate. Interest is approved on the sum granted and as of the moment this judgment becomes final, at the rate established for six-month time deposits of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Being a total of THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY COLONES. X. costs: This judge considers that the defendants cannot be considered as litigants in good faith, and consequently they are ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of the process. (Article 1045 of the Civil Code and 1, 153, 155, 221, 290 and following of the Code of Civil Procedure)..." (see folios 328 a 344).- **4.-** The plaintiffs and defendants filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) indicating the reasons why they refute the lower court's thesis. (folios 364 and 367).- **5.-** In the substantiation of the process, the legal prescriptions have been observed, and the existence of errors or omissions in the judgment capable of producing its nullity is not noted.- Drafted by Judge ULATE CHACÓN, and,

CONSIDERANDO:

**I.-** Legal Representative: Attorney Albino Solórzano Vega is acknowledged as appearing as the attorney for the plaintiffs and indicated fax number 2453-16-89 to receive notifications, of which the Processing Judge must take note.

**II.-** This Court shares the list of facts held as proven, as it is in accordance with the case file.

**III.-** Likewise, what is ordered regarding the unproven facts is shared, due to a lack of evidentiary support for the parties' assertions on those points.

**IV.-** The legal representative of the plaintiffs appealed, alleging the following grievances: **1.-** The value of the pasturelands that were burned is not recognized, the disappearance of which caused him a series of expenses he had to incur, and the judgment proceeds, as if it were sufficient, to compensate only the concomitant damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), without considering the depletion that had to be recovered; this must be recognized, which was estimated in the lawsuit at 10 million colones, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1045 of the Civil Code; the expert report, he alleges, estimated the cost of one hectare of improved pasture at 71,000 colones. **2.-** He also does not agree that the number of burned posts was reduced to 1,500, when the report establishes 3,000 posts, and that the value of each one was reduced to 600 colones, when the expert appraised them at a value of 800, for which reason the judgment must be corrected, because it does not explain the reason why it departed from the expert value (folios 4 and 7 of said report). **3.-** He does not agree with the fixing of interest as of the finality of the judgment, because it is declaratory and not constitutive, and should be recognized from the filing of the lawsuit. **4.-** He also does not agree that an estimate sum made before the OIJ was taken into consideration to resolve, when all the consequences of the fire had not yet been able to be assessed, the judge having taken into account a limitation to 5 million, when the damages were far greater.

**V.-** The defendant party, Marsupe Sociedad Anónima, also appealed the judgment: **1.-** Alleges that there is an erroneous interpretation of substantive law, given that there is no adequate causation (causalidad adecuada) between the conduct and the damage, this being one of the elements of subjective liability (responsabilidad subjetiva); proving fault is not enough, it is necessary to demonstrate the causal relationship between fault and damage or loss (Article 704 of the Civil Code); the apparent damage suffered by the plaintiff, he alleges, is not a direct and immediate consequence of the conduct attributed to his represented party, but rather indirect damages, and therefore not compensable, since as can be seen, the claims are too costly with respect to the party obliged to satisfy them, which rather generates unjust enrichment, given that the plaintiff has not proven the fault of Marsupe S.A., much less the relationship of causation; **2.-** Accuses that there is lack of active and passive standing, the conduct being outside the application of Article 1045, because no civil joint and several liability (solidaridad civil) on the part of his represented party is indicated; the damages and losses are not a consequence of the fault attributed in the contravention judgment to [Nombre3], as legal representative of Marsupe, but rather personally, the civil action being improper and illegal, because against it there exist no elements of guilt as a criterion of imputation of the contravention judgment; nor to civil liability, because the Criminal Code of 1941 excludes the liability of legal persons (personas jurídicas) in which their normal activity should not presume conduct generating risk, that is, it is not a matter of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva); in this case, he alleges, the elements of subjective liability (guilt and causation) are not configured, nor the risk of strict liability. Non-contractual joint and several liability is set forth in Article 1046, when two or more authors concur in the production of a damage, proof of the fault of Marsupe S.A. being missed in this case, in a direct or indirect subjective form (in eligendo or in vigilando), and Article 1048 does not foresee indirect liability for illicit acts of the administrators of commercial companies; on the contrary, the civil code includes the behaviors committed with bad intention (willful misconduct) of the manager or administrator that breaks the relationship, liability not falling on the employer; in addition, he alleges, the principal does not answer for conduct carried out outside the entrusted service. **3.-** Finally, he claims a lack of reasoning (falta de fundamentación) of the judgment when it jointly and severally condemns Marsupe S.A., because it is affirmed that the fire generating the alleged damages was caused by the defendants, which finds no basis in reality, much less that the participation of his represented party was demonstrated, when the contravention judgment does not say it. The person who directly participates in the generating cause is Mrs. [Nombre3]. The judgment affirms that "it is well done" that his represented party was sued for the claim of damages, given that it is the owner of the property and Mrs. [Nombre3] was the manager, but it does not justify the necessary and sufficient legal reasons or grounds for the attribution of that responsibility to his company. The omission of the judgment, he alleges, causes a serious defect that annuls it, the judge rather being required to exempt it from liability; nor does it explain if Mrs. [Nombre3] acted under express orders of the Company, or under her own decision.

**VI.-** Agricultural Jurisprudence (Jurisprudencia Agraria) has been prolific in establishing strict liability for agricultural-environmental damages (daños agroambientales), and in particular for cases of burns, therefore this Court will proceed, first of all, to analyze that topic: " **IV.-** Our legal system contains several provisions that expressly and directly refer to burns and forest fires and the liability that originates from them. We thus have: a) Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas, No. 121 of October 26, 1909: Its Article 5 prohibits carrying out burnings (quemazones) in the fields. It only authorizes them when it involves clearing to enable land for agricultural purposes: For this, it is required: 1) To request permission from the local political authority, 2) To have guarantees and precautions to avoid greater destruction than that intended or harm to third parties, 3) To notify personally or by certificate from the authority all adjoining landowners or interested parties of the day and time of the burn, at least two days in advance, 4) To leave a minimum distance of [Dirección1] from springs (manantiales) originating in the hills, and [Dirección2] meters from springs on flat terrain. In matters of liability, it expressly indicates that, in any case, whoever carries out burnings must pay for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) that are caused by the fire. The owner, possessor, or tenant who at the time of the fire was prepared for that purpose is presumed to be the author of the burning.

• B)**The current Forestry Law, No. 7575 of February 13, 1996,** in its Chapter IV on “Forestry Protection,” prohibits conducting burns on forest lands and lands adjacent to them, without having obtained the permit from the State Forestry Administration (Administración Forestal del Estado). It refers to the Criminal Code to sanction anyone who conducts a burn without a permit (Article 35). Likewise, sections 59 and 60 respectively sanction causing a forest fire willfully or negligently, with penalties of one to three years in the first case and three months to two years in the second.
• C)**Regulation to the Forestry Law, Decree No. 25721-MINAE of October 17, 1996:** It establishes that the official of the Forestry Administration must visit the site prior to granting a burn permit (Article 34).
• D)**Law on the Use, Management, and Conservation of Soils, No. 7779 of April 30, 1998:** It requires that, for conducting burns on agricultural lands, the instructions of the MAG be followed in accordance with the permit issued for those purposes, according to the current Burn Regulation, as well as the provisions of the Organic Environmental Law and the Criminal Code (Article 24).
• E)**Regulation on the Use, Management, and Conservation of Soils, Decree No. 29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT of August 8, 2000:** In its Chapter X, titled “On Agricultural Burns,” it provides that the MAG, in coordination with MINAE and the Ministry of Security, will issue the fundamental principles through which the practice of agricultural burns may be authorized. Its Article 86 expressly requires prior permission from the MAG to conduct burns on lands with Agricultural vocation, which must grant a hearing to the respective conservation area of MINAE, so that it may issue its opinion on the repercussions to the biota and ecosystems. It even indicates that positive silence does not operate regarding MINAE's opinion. Regarding forest lands, protective zones, national parks, and wildlife refuges, it prohibits conducting burns (Article 88).
• F)**Decree No. 17015-MAG, of May 2, 1986:** It created the National Commission for Forest Fires. Said Commission, according to Decree No. 19434-MIRENEM of December 11, 1990, has the authority to recommend national policies and prepare programs for the prevention and combating of forest fires.
• G)**Decree No. 21859-MIRENEN of December 7, 1992:** It established the Guanacaste Fire Committee as an instance for coordination, support, and monitoring of the Forest Fire Program of the Huetar Norte Region.
• H)**Decree No. 23850-MAG-SP of November 4, 1994, Regulation for Controlled Burns for Agricultural and Livestock Purposes:** It establishes the minimum requirements to be able to carry out burns and fires, especially on lands of agricultural or livestock use. A burn is defined as an intentionally set fire, regulated by a pre-established plan, in which all preventive measures are assumed to avoid damage to natural resources and the properties of neighbors. Fires are those that, naturally or artificially, affect forests, forest lands, agricultural lands, or lands under livestock use (Article 1). To conduct burns on agricultural and livestock lands, there must be written authorization from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. The official, in addition to the measures already taken and approved by virtue of a visit that must be made prior to the permit, must indicate any additional measures deemed necessary if granting it (Articles 2 and 3). Section 6 establishes the following as minimum requirements: 1) Determine, by means of firebreaks (an area with a width twice the height of the combustible material as indicated by the same Decree), the area to be burned and the combustible materials used; 2) open and sweep a firebreak on the perimeter of the area to be burned, which cannot be less than one meter wide; 3) have sufficient water and tools to extinguish the fire in case of emergency. Additionally, one may: 4) give prior notice to the Police Department of the location about the date and time of the burn; 5) have the assistance of at least one person; 6) conduct the burn against the wind and against the slope after 4 p.m. and before 7 a.m., avoiding doing it on a windy day; 7) verify before leaving that the fire is completely extinguished. But regardless of whether or not the respective permit is held, the Decree clearly establishes in its Article 7 that: “The person who conducts a burn, whether with or without a permit, will be civilly responsible for the damages that may be caused, in accordance with Articles 41 and 50 of our Political Constitution and the rules on non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual) that govern our legal system...”.
• I)Finally, “the general provisions contained in sections **1045 and following of the Civil Code,** on non-contractual civil liability, are of supplementary application for this matter” (see judgment of the First Chamber No. 112 at 3:50 p.m. on October 11, 1995). In the criminal sphere, the current Criminal Code sanctions, with fines of 3 to 30 days, anyone who violates provisions aimed at preventing fires or avoiding their spread (subsection 1 of Article 407) and anyone who infringes the rules on the burning of weeds, stubble, or other products of the land (subsection 2).

**VII.** Modern doctrine, for its part, has supported the objectification of liability, by including within the factors of imputability and legal attribution of damage, apart from fault and willful misconduct, the risk. It has even been proposed to include as other objective factors: guarantee, equity, abuse of right, and excess of normal tolerance between neighbors. The damage is seen, then, not from the act of the author but from the position of the injured party, to ensure that every unjustly caused damage is repaired. From another point of view, fault has been separated from the unlawfulness of the act, giving a more important role to the latter. “Once the equivalence between the unlawfulness of the act and fault was broken, the conduct acquired an autonomous physiognomy detached from the subjective profile of the agent's will, to become a simple means, cause, or criterion of connection between a subject held responsible and a certain harmful event to be compensated.” (Franzoni (Massimo), La Actividad peligrosa, in *Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio,* Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.120). Thus, the Theory of Risk is discussed, which does not displace fault but complements it, and is summarized as the duty of one who creates a risk to indemnify the damage caused to a third party. “Risk is a cause of imputability when, due to the performance of certain causes and certain activities, classified as dangerous, damage is produced. The damage in these circumstances must be compensated, not because its agent has incurred in willful misconduct or fault, but because the legal order must protect the community from the development of dangerous activities, in such a way that whoever performs them incurs liability if damage is caused by virtue of such performance... Liability derived from risk does not depend on the willful misconduct or fault of the agent but originates in the mere occurrence of the damage consequent to the dangerous activity. This consideration brings with it a special evidentiary regime, according to which, by the mere exercise of the unsafe activity, the fault of the agent is presumed, exonerating the victim from the task of demonstrating improper conduct. It is up to the agent to rebut the presumption…” (Cubides Camacho Jorge, Hecho imputable dañoso in *Del daño,* Editora Jurídica, 1st Ed, Colombia, 2001, p.260). For other authors, “the causal relationship is an element of the unlawful act and of the contractual breach that links the damage directly with the anti-juridical fact, and indirectly with the element of subjective imputation or objective attribution. It is the binding factor that makes the damage and the fault, or in its case the risk, integrate into the unity of the act that is the source of the obligation to indemnify” (see Bustamante Alcina (José), El perfil de la responsabilidad civil al finalizar el siglo XX in *Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio,* Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.24 to 26).

**VIII.** Precisely, conducting burns—regardless of their purpose—is an undeniably risky activity. Therefore, in accordance with the cited doctrine, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has clearly indicated: “VII.- Burns can entail, for whoever produces them, civil and criminal liabilities. Civil liability is regulated in the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences by establishing the obligation, of whoever conducts burnings, to pay the damages caused as a consequence of the fire (Article 5, paragraph 4). The owner, possessor, or lessee of the land that, at the time of the fire, was prepared for that purpose, is presumed the author of the burning... VIII.- The Constitutional Chamber, through Opinion No. 3459 at 2:42 p.m. on July 20, 1993, established the derogation of Article 5, fifth paragraph, of the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences regarding criminal liability... The same Constitutional Chamber (Opinion No. 439-I-95 at 2:36 p.m. on August 22, 1995) clarified the aforementioned judgment No. 3459-93 in the sense that Article 5, paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Law on Dividing Fences and Burns is repealed only with respect to the criminal aspects it contains... IX.- The regulations on burns and fires follow the criterion of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Fault is presumed in whoever created the conditions for the damage by having assumed the risk of harming third parties with the burn or fire. The damages caused are at their charge. The injured party is exempt from proving fault. The burden of proof regarding the absence of fault falls on whoever burned or set the fire. It is a iuris tantum presumption. Force majeure, the fault of the victim, or the act of a third party would be exemptions from liability. X.- He assumes the risk who, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of damage, accepts the effects of the contingency. Liability is based on creating the risk for the damage. The subject, upon initiating the activity, through his things, increases, enhances, or multiplies the possibilities of danger. Even when it may involve lawful conduct, whoever assumed the risk must always indemnify the damage. There is greater reason to attribute liability if the act stems from unlawful conduct. The injured party cannot assume damages for conduct not driven by himself, unless he placed himself in conditions to suffer the damage. He who burns or sets a fire, even with the authorization of the corresponding authority, cannot be exempted from liability. This is so because although the Law on Burns and Dividing Fences No. 121 of October 26, 1909 establishes the guidelines for authorizing burns on agricultural estates, and establishes a series of obligations regarding the person requesting authorization, this does not break the presumption of culpability. The requirements for authorizing burns tend to ensure minimum risk. It is a precautionary measure but not an exemption from liability. Therefore, compliance with the indispensable requirements for authorization cannot harm the neighbors if the disaster occurs. In this way, damages to the property, crops, or to the persons themselves of the neighbors must be indemnified by whoever created the conditions of risk with the fire or burn. XI.- The activity of setting a fire or burning is, in itself, directed against Nature. It is a recourse of primitive agriculture where fire tends to substitute the work of man. Instead of using human or mechanical means to promote agricultural activity, a destructive element is resorted to, in order to, on the ashes of what was destroyed, begin the cultivation of plants or the raising of animals. This type of actions is incompatible with current values. It attacks security insofar as it risks the property of neighbors, their goods, and persons. It also attacks the values of environmental protection. The economic and social function of property also entails an ecological function: agriculture must develop in harmony, and not in antagonism, with Nature. For the preservation of the environment, social solidarity demands devising new mechanisms to prevent damage and threatening acts. This is the philosophy of the reform to Article 50 of the Political Constitution. The Law on Burns and Dividing Fences and the entire problem of liability derived from that activity must be analyzed along those lines” (see judgment No. 112 at 3:50 p.m. on October 11, 1995. In the same vein, No. 113 at 4:00 p.m. on October 11, 1995).

VII.The Chamber also clarified in the cited rulings that the obligation to compensate for the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by burns and the presumption of responsibility falling on whoever prepared the land for that purpose cannot be limited to the case of clearings (desmontes). “While it is true that Article 5 of the Ley de Cercas y Quemas Divisorias establishes a general prohibition on setting fires in fields, authorizing them in the case of clearings to prepare land for agricultural purposes (first paragraph), this does not undermine the possibility of carrying out said activity under other conditions and for other purposes, as current reality demonstrates. That is why the same Law establishes, in the fourth paragraph of numeral 5, a generic responsibility when it states: ‘In any case, whoever sets fires must pay for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios)…’. This fits perfectly within the generic principle of not harming others. In this case, the damages and losses are the responsibility of the defendant because she assumed the risk of harming her adjoining landowners with the burn. By initiating her activity, preparing the land to be burned, she increased the potential for danger. It was an unlawful act since she did not have authorization from the corresponding administrative authorities, as corroborated in the proven facts. She did not take the minimum precautions required by law to prevent greater damages than those normally produced. Although she took some precautionary measures—making firebreaks (rondas)—that is not sufficient to exempt her from her responsibility to compensate the plaintiff for the damages and losses caused. The only way to be released from said responsibility was by demonstrating the existence of fault by the victim, a fortuitous event, or the act of a third party, which she did not do. Even though the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias is from 1909, its interpretation must be carried out in accordance with Articles 10 of the Civil Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. The modern interpretation (systematic, material, and evolutionary) requires adapting the content of the rule to the historical circumstances and the social and economic reality in which it is to be applied. For this, the principles and values contained in the Constitution must be taken into account, as well as those in special agrarian laws.” (see ruling No. 112-95 cited). VIII. In accordance with what has been explained, it is possible to set burns on lands of agricultural and livestock vocation (vocación agropecuaria) provided that the requirements established in our legal system are met, among them taking sufficient precautionary measures to control the fire, requesting prior permission from the respective public entities, especially the appropriate office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and notifying the owners or managers of the neighboring properties. This last requirement is of utmost importance, because even if all possible measures are taken, natural phenomena such as wind, air currents, and others can cause the fire to spread to other areas beyond those originally intended to be burned. Notifying adjoining landowners seeks precisely to minimize or prevent the fire from spreading and causing greater damage, since it allows for better vigilance by the neighbors on their own land, and allows them to be prepared to fight it if necessary. However, even in the case of having taken all possible precautions and having a permit, whoever originates or causes a burn that produces damages to third parties is responsible for them. The foregoing is so because it involves a risky activity. The responsibility is of an objective type as already explained.” (Tribunal Agrario, No. 815-F-03 of December 16, 2003).-

VII.- Appeal of the co-defendant Marsupe Sociedad Anónima: The co-defendant company, Marsupe S.A., challenged the ruling, alleging three fundamental reasons: the lack of a causal relationship between the conduct and the damage, the lack of active and passive standing (legimación activa y pasiva) because no joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) exists, and finally, nullity due to a lack of reasoning in the ruling. The appellant is not correct in any of the three grievances, which will be resolved in reverse order of how they were presented in the appeal, as this is the logical order for their analysis. 1.- Regarding the invoked "lack of reasoning in the ruling" concerning the joint and several liability of Marsupe S.A., they consider that this finds no basis in reality, because the participation of their client was not demonstrated, and the contraventional judgment does not say so, nor is it justified with necessary and sufficient legal grounds, which renders the judgment null and void. These statements are not accurate. The lower court, first, held as proven in fact 10 that the fire occurred on the farm of the defendant Marsupe, and that the burn was ordered by Mrs. [Nombre3] Arias Jiménez and later spread to the plaintiffs' properties. This fact, supported by the statements of [Nombre4], [Nombre5], [Nombre6], [Nombre7], [Nombre8], and [Nombre9], has not been disproved by the appellant, and contrary to what she asserted, in the contraventional judgment of May 3, 2001, the Judge concluded the following: "...they failed in their duty of care and did not exercise due caution because, without specifying a date but last year, they caused a fire on Marsupe's farm, without requesting permission from the respective authorities and even though they took some precautions, these were not sufficient and the fire passed to at least three neighboring farms..." (folio 23). Regarding the company's responsibility, the lower court does provide grounds for attributing it by clearly indicating that "...it is the owner of the farm where the fire started and Mrs. [Nombre3] Arias Jiménez is the Manager of said company, this being the reason she appears in the civil proceedings as recorded in the file... This way of setting burns without requesting permission from the corresponding authorities and without notifying the adjoining landowners undoubtedly falls within one of the modalities of fault, which is negligence and imprudence...." (see ruling on folios 338-339). Furthermore, the ruling cites the rules and doctrine regarding extracontractual liability (responsabilidad extracontractual), particularly Article 1045 and following of the Civil Code (Considering IV, IV bis, and VII). As observed, the ruling was indeed reasoned, and therefore there is no ground for nullity. 2.- Regarding the joint and several extracontractual liability and the invoked lack of active and passive standing, the appellants are also not correct. There are a great number of rules establishing the joint and several liability of companies when dealing with strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Article 103 of the Criminal Procedural Code, in relation to Article 106, provides for the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) of legal entities whose managers, administrators, or legal representatives are found responsible for punishable acts. The same rule is contained in Articles 135 and 137, subsection 3, of the 1941 Criminal Code, which identifies as jointly and severally liable "Natural or legal persons who own establishments where a punishable act is committed due to the violation of police laws or regulations by the administrators, employees, or servants of the establishment." Such rules are also related to Articles 1046 and 1048 of the Civil Code, third paragraph, as far as objective joint and several liability is concerned. Both are also interpreted in relation to the Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias, Article 5, and the Ley Forestal, from which exactly the opposite of what the appellant indicated can be inferred, in the sense that both natural and legal persons are jointly and severally liable for the agrarian damage caused. Article 57 of the Ley Forestal provides: "...when dealing with legal persons, civil liability shall extend to their legal representatives. Likewise, both natural and legal persons shall be civilly liable for the ecological damage caused, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1045 of the Civil Code," considering that in this case there is sufficient evidence to accredit the link between the company Marsupe S.A. and [Nombre3], who was known as its representative. 3.- Regarding the causal relationship between the conduct and the damage, it is more than demonstrated, even though in these cases of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), it is not necessary to prove fault, since what matters is that a risky activity exists, and then the production of the damage itself. See, as previously indicated, that the criminal judgment itself clearly established that the burn was carried out by a laborer, on the order of the representative, on Marsupe S.A.'s farm, and then the fire spread through the adjoining lands affecting at least three neighboring farms (see folios 22 and 23), which logically produced a large amount of damage, as is accredited in the sixth fact, not disproved by the appellant, and which is recorded both in the OIJ report and in the photographic sequence added to the records (folios 2 to 10); even four years later there were still signs of the burns produced on the plaintiffs' farm (see judicial inspection record on folio 148 and expert appraisal photographs on folios 290 and 291). The same testimonial evidence attests to this causal relationship: "...I was working on a farm that is between the two, Don [Nombre2]'s and Doña [Nombre3]'s, and we were there around eleven in the morning and we began to see smoke on [Nombre3]'s farm. Later it wasn't just smoke but the lady's farm was engulfed in flames. It was summertime and sparks were coming from everywhere, fire whirls from the wind that was blowing, the wind carried the sparks to the farm where I was and to Don [Nombre10]'s farm from the sparks; what happened was a great fire that razed Don [Nombre2]'s farm, its land, pastures, fences, and trees..." (declaration of [Nombre7], on folio 140). In summary, the defendant-appellant party is not correct in any of her grievances, therefore the judgment upholding the claim regarding the active and passive standing of the plaintiffs and the defendant must be confirmed.

VIII.- Secondly, the matter of damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) will be analyzed. The jurisprudence has defined these concepts as follows: “IV.- Damage constitutes one of the assumptions of extracontractual civil liability, because the duty to compensate is only configured if there has been a harmful unlawful act that injures a legally relevant interest, capable of being protected by the legal system. Damage, in the legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (the victim, damnificado), which causes the deprivation of a legal good, the conservation of which was objectively expected had the harmful event not occurred. Under that consideration, there is no civil liability if there is no damage, just as there is no damage if there is no victim. On the other hand, only damage that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable, this being a matter of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In short, damage constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the unlawful act with the one after it. Often the expressions 'damages' (daños) and 'losses' (perjuicios) are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to specify and distinguish both concepts. Damage (daño) constitutes the loss inflicted on the victim (damnum emergens), while loss (perjuicio) is comprised of the frustrated or lost profit or utility (lucro cesans), which was reasonably and probably expected if the unlawful act had not occurred. V. Not any damage imposes the obligation to compensate. For it to be compensable, the following characteristics must, basically, converge: A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely possible or hypothetical; it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. Damage does not lose this character if its quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to assess or prove; nor should certainty be confused with current-ness, since the repair of certain but future damage is admissible; future damage should not be confused with lost profit (lucro cesante) or loss (perjuicio). Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes a matter of sole subjective concern to the victim, however, the law cannot deal with claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest deserving of compensation. Thus, there can be a direct victim and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the harmful event, and the second will be the victim's successors. C) It must be caused by a third party and be subsisting; that is, it has not been repaired. D) There must be a causal relationship between the unlawful act and the damage. VI. Among the classes of damage, material and bodily damage are found first, the first being that which impacts the things or material goods comprising the person's patrimony, while the second affects bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific ones of bodily damage and material damage, strictly speaking, are usually encompassed. The second seems to be the most felicitous expression, because bodily damage often affects the victim's patrimonial interests (payment for medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage incapacitated him from performing his usual occupations (losses [perjuicios]), etc…” (First Chamber of the Supreme Court, No. 112 of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992, and No. 714 of 4:20 p.m. on September 18, 2002) – The underlining is not from the original.

IX.- Regarding the proof of damages and losses (daños y perjuicios), the principle of the burden of proof (carga probatoria) governs, enshrined in Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, and for execution cases in agrarian matters, in Article 62, subsection c) of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. In this regard, national jurisprudence has established the following: "In matters of damages and losses, a topic on which there is extensive experience, the evidentiary element plays a very important role. Whoever alleges them must prove them, equally whoever denies them, except in the case of subjective moral damage which judges are permitted to assess according to the rules of experience, logic, and science, without being subject to any other evidentiary criterion. In the modern procedural system, the Roman aphorism judex secundum allegata et probata partium decidere debet is still fully valid. This means the limitation of judges to issue their rulings only on everything the parties allege and prove. The simple allegation of a fact is not sufficient for condemnation because it is the party who is obligated to offer the evidence in time, obtain its admission from the judge, present it to be produced, and finally, within the process of evidentiary assessment, the judge's task par excellence, attribute to those evidentiary elements the necessary value to accredit the formulated fact. This is the well-known principle of the burden of proof. It consists of the obligation of anyone who alleges a fact or a claim to proceed to legally prove what is alleged. This differs greatly from the mere fact of accrediting the allegation or the evidence itself in the case file, because evidence for cassation purposes is only that which the judgment gives that rank after a rigorous assessment process. And the principle not only has an important connotation in the affirmative aspect but also in the negative one, since whoever alleges the non-existence, modification, or extinction of a fact or claim must also prove it. Linked to the principle of the burden of proof, in a democratic and non-inquisitorial regime, are many other principles, among which the principle of freedom of proof stands out. According to that principle, all parties must have broad powers to offer all lawful means of evidence, especially those legitimately obtained, that is, all means duly authorized by the legal system and brought to the case file following the procedures also established by the procedural system, where the parties must have the right to question their own evidence and the opposing party's, with the aim of demonstrating or denying the facts, and affirming or contradicting the claims." (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 554 of 3:10 p.m. on August 4, 2000 – the bold is not from the original). The Jurisprudence has required, for the granting of damages and losses, demonstrating the causal link between the abstract condemnation imposed and what is claimed in the execution (First Chamber, No. 830 of 11:45 a.m. on September 22, 2004, and No. 674 of 11:30 a.m. on August 18, 2004). On the other hand, the Jurisprudence has established that the damages and losses derived from an unlawful act or conduct are value debts, and not monetary ones, which is why the amount should not become a reason to deny them, provided they are proven (In this regard, First Chamber, Voto No.

226 of March 31, 2004).

**X.**- **Appeal (Recurso) of the plaintiff party**:

Regarding damages, the plaintiff party claims that the value of the paddocks (potreros) was not recognized, which they claimed at 10 million colones, given that the expert opinion estimated the cost of one hectare of improved pasture at 71,000 colones. Furthermore, they do not agree that the number of burned posts was reduced to 1,500, when the expert states that there are 3,000 posts with a value of 800 colones, and they do not understand why the lower court departed from the expert valuation.

**1.**- Regarding the first claim, the lower court rejected the item for the loss of pasture, considering that the grass grew back and is currently in use, and furthermore, the cattle were off the farm for a period of three months and then the cattle were moved back to the farm, as the grass grew back naturally.

The Court agrees with the decision taken by the lower court, since the burning of the grasslands in no way caused their disappearance; on the contrary, it was a temporary matter of about three months, a fact for which the plaintiffs were recognized for the payment of feed (pollinaza), the transportation of the animals to another farm, and the rental of pasture, which serves to repair the damage caused by the temporary loss of pasture, since it evidently grew back months after it was razed by the fire. **2.**- Regarding the posts, the lower court considered it fair to recognize a quantity of one thousand five hundred posts, for a total of nine hundred thousand colones. The number of recognized posts responds to an approximate estimate of the enclosures (repastos) that were damaged, at the time they occurred and the date of replacement, since there was no certainty of the total number of burned posts, and an approximate value is made, because according to the report of the Judicial Investigation Organization (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), 15 enclosures (apartos) were razed (out of twenty total), and there were also some parts more damaged than others (folios 3, 4, and 5), but without absolute certainty of how many posts were truly damaged.

Regarding the value or estimation, it must be considered that Article 123 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1941, related to the rules for the repair of damage in such events, indicates that "…*is obligated to satisfy its value according to expert estimation referred* *to the date of the infraction*. *If such estimation is not possible because the thing has been destroyed or has disappeared, the judges shall fix the respective value, adhering to the data of the trial.*". Thus, in this case, there is also discretion on the part of the judge to be able to establish the "quantum" of the compensation, and for this, the lower court took into consideration the amount that the plaintiffs first claimed in the criminal venue, which was the sum of five million colones.

For the reasons stated, the Court considers that the appellant is not correct in the grievances raised regarding the compensation for enclosures (repastos) and wooden posts. **3.-** Regarding interest. The appellants claim that they do not agree with the setting of interest from the finality (firmeza) of the judgment. It must be indicated that we are here faced with a claim of objective patrimonial liability, so the liability had to be established first, and then the value of damages and losses.

Article 706 of the Civil Code establishes that "*If the obligation is to pay a sum of money, the damages and losses always and exclusively consist of the payment of interest on the sum due, counted from the expiration of the term.*". In this case, the determination of the value is acquired with the finality of the ruling, and therefore it is from that point that it is possible to collect the damages and losses caused. **4.**- Finally, regarding the use of the value estimated by the plaintiffs in the contravention case, which appears in the OIJ report, it is evident that the lower court, like this Court, considers that it is the amount that best fits the moment of the occurrence of the damage and the date of the replacement that the plaintiffs had to make, and therefore the provisions of Articles 123 and 124 of the Penal Code of 1941 are applicable.

While it is true there is an expert appraisal by [Name11], see that it performs the valuation in the month of November 2004 at the "current cost" (folio 275), and not at the date of the infraction, which is what Article 123 authorizes.

For this reason, the defendant party challenged that valuation when they alleged the following:

"*...The expert, happily, determines what according to him is the CURRENT cost to ESTABLISH, meaning to sow new pasture, however, on one hand, the current price is not the same as 4 years ago...The same consideration must be made when he determines the value of the damaged fences...*" (folio 302). As stated in the preceding whereas clause, there was no certainty of the number of damaged posts and in any case, their price was fixed at the time of replacement.- **XI.-** Based on all of the foregoing, the appealed judgment must be confirmed in what was the object of the appeal.

**POR TANTO:** In what was the object of the appeal, the appealed judgment is CONFIRMED.

**ENRIQUE ULATE CHACÓN** **ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA** **CARLOS PICADO VARGAS** Nº EXPN1 Ordinario de Actor [Nombre1] and another Contra Marsupe SRL. li.+++

VOTO Nº 0817-F-10 TRIBUNAL AGRARIO DEL SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSE. Goicoechea, a las dieciséis horas del treinta de agosto del dos mil diez.- PROCESO ORDINARIO de [Nombre1] , mayor, casada, oficios domésticos, vecina de Palmares, con cédula de identidad número CED1 - - , y [Nombre2] , mayor, casado, agricultor, vecino de Palmares, con cédula de identidad número CED2 - - , contra MARSUPE SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA, con cédula jurídica número CED3 - - ; y en su carácter personal contra la apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma [Nombre3] , mayor, casada, vecina de Puntarenas, cédula de identidad número CED4 - - . Intervienen el licenciado Albino Solórzano Vega de calidades desconocidas como abogado director de los actores, y licenciado Guillermo Segura Amador de calidades ignoradas como abogado director de la demandada.-

RESULTANDO:

1.- La parte actora formula la presente demanda ordinaria donde solicita que en sentencia se declare: "... a) Que tanto la demandada [Nombre3] , como la codemandada MARSUPE S.R.L. ESTAN OBLIGADAS A PAGARNOS SOLIDARIAMENTE TODOS LOS DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS PROVENIENTES DEL INCENDIO QUE CAUSARON CULPOSAMENTE EN NUESTRA FINCA. b) Que por consecuencia, los codemandados deberán pagarnos a los codemantes las siguientes sumas de colones: 1) Pago de doscientas hectáreas de potrero, a cincuenta mil colones por hectárea, lo que da un total de diez millones de colones. 2). Pago de un mínimo de cincuenta árboles destruidos por el fuego, por un total de un millón ochocientos setenta y cinco colones. 3). Pago de los postes de cerca quemados en el perímetro de nuestra finca y en el de los apartos, por un total de dos millones de colones. 4). Pago y reposición del alambre de cercar dañado, por el total de quinientos mil colones. 5) Pérdida de peso de doscientos animales, por un valor de siete millones quinientos mil colones. 6) Pago de alimento para ganado, contenido en el hecho VIII de la demanda por doscientos noventa y un mil cuatrocientos colones. 7) Pago de potreraje para los animales por tres meses por quinientos cuarenta mil colones y la suma adicional de trescientos cincuenta mil colones por el traslado de los animales. 8) Pago y traslado de postes de madera desde Liberia novecientos mil colones y ciento veinte mil colones respectivamente. Costo de mano de obra para poner dichos postes y los alambres, por un valor de doscientos cincuenta y nueve mil doscientos colones. Además deberá la sentencia ordenar en definitiva que se paguen intereses sobre la suma declarada desde la ocurrencia del ilíticito y ambas costas de este juicio... (folios 56 y 57)" .

2.- La parte accionada contestó negativamente la demanda y opuso las siguientes excepciones: falta de derecho, de legitimación activa y pasiva, falta de interés actual y de prescripción. (ver folios 65 a 69).- 3.- El licenciado Mario Zamora Mata juez de primera instancia en sentencia de las nueve horas del once de agosto del dos mil cinco, resolvió: "... POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo antes expuesto y artículos citados se declara CON LUGAR el presente proceso ordinario establecido por [Nombre1] y [Nombre2] contra MARSUPE SRL Y [Nombre3] , se rechazan las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de interés actual, falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y prescripción en cuanto a lo concedido, se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho en cuanto a lo denegado. Declarándose en sentencia lo siguiente: 1) En cuanto a la indemnización por concepto de pago de doscientas hectáreas de potrero, el mismo rubro se rechaza, ya que tal y como consta en el reconocimiento judicial, el zacate volvió a nacer y en la actualidad se encuentra en uso, de acuerdo a lo dicho por el mismo actor en su demanda y a lo solicitado, se desprende que el ganado estuvo fuera de la finca por espacio de tres y luego de ese tiempo se trajo de nuevo a su finca hasta la fecha, se debe considerar que la acción de los demandados fue culposa y no dolosa y que lo que se castiga es por la responsabilidad extracontractual, asimismo se debe tomar en cuenta que el zacate que se quemó volvió a nacer de forma natural, no esta demostrado en autos que se tuviera que abonar o transplantar para que naciera de nuevo. 2). En cuanto a los árboles destruidos, si bien es cierto no quedó debidamente demostrado en autos la cantidad, si es dable reconocer que por la extensión del incendio si es lógica y congruente la cantidad demandada por el actor, en ese sentido se aprueba en la cantidad de cincuenta árboles a una suma de veinte mil colones cada uno, para un total de un millón de colones. 3). En cuanto a la partida de postes de cerca quemados se aprueba en la cantidad de mil quinientos postes a un precio de veinte mil colones cada uno, para un total de novecientos mil colones, transporte de los postes en la suma de ciento veinte mil colones. 4) Mano de Obra por instalar postes: Dicha partida se aprueba en la suma de doscientos cincuenta y nueve mil doscientos colones. 5). Se aprueba la suma de ciento catorce mil colones por concepto de compra de alambre de púa, grapas, etc. 6). Se aprueba la suma de doscientos cuarenta y cinco mil colones por concepto de compra de setecientos sacos de pollinaza, ello en virtud de que el ganado necesitaba alimento extra, aunque fuera a otra finca ya que fue sacado de su habitad natural y estable y las condiciones no serían las mismas. 7) Se aprueban las siguientes sumas por los conceptos que se dirán: LA SUMA DE TRESCIENTOS CINCUENTA MIL COLONES POR CONCEPTO DE TRANSPORTE DE LOS ANIMALES DE IDA Y REGRESO A OTRA FINCA y a la del actor, la suma de QUINIENTOS CUARENTA MIL COLONES, por concepto de alquiler de pastizales en otra finca por espacio de tres meses. 8). Se rechaza el rubro en cuanto a la pérdida de peso de los animales, ya que no se demostró que los mismos hayan perdido peso y segundo que los animales se llevaron a pastar a otro lugar y se les dió el alimento extra que hubo que comprar, razón por la cual el estarse concediendo los rubros por concepto de pago de pastizales y la compra de gallinaza, dicha partida no es procedente. Se aprueban los intereses por la suma concedida y a partir del momento en que esta sentencia se encuentre en firme, al tipo establecido para los depósitos a plazo de seis meses del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Siendo un total de TRES MILLONES CUATROCIENTOS NOVENTA Y OCHO MIL DOSCIENTOS VEINTE COLONES. X. costas: Considera este juzgador que los demandados no pueden ser considerados como litigantes de buena fe y en consecuencia se les condena al pago de las costas procesales y personales del proceso. (Artículo 1045 del Código Civil y 1, 153, 155, 221, 290 y siguientes del Código Procesal Civil)...". (ver folios 328 a 344).- 4.- Los actores y demandados formularon recurso de apelación indicando los motivos por los cuales refutan la tesis del juzgado de instancia. (folios 364 y 367).- 5.- En la substanciación del proceso se han observado las prescripciones legales, y no se nota la existencia de errores u omisiones en el fallo capaces de producir su nulidad.- Redacta el Juez ULATE CHACÓN, y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- Representante Legal: Se tiene por apersonado al Licenciado Albino Solórzano Vega como abogado de los actores y señaló el número de fax 2453-16-89 para recibir notificaciones de lo cual deberá tomar nota la Jueza Tramitadora.

II.- El Tribunal comparte la relación de hechos tenidos por acreditados, por ser conforme a los autos.

III.- De igual modo se comparte lo dispuesto en cuanto a los hechos indemostrados, por faltar respaldo probatorio de las afirmaciones de las partes en esos extremos.

IV.- El apoderado de los actores apeló aduciendo los siguientes agravios: 1.- No se reconoce el valor de los potreros que se quemaron, cuya desaparición le provocaron una serie de gastos que tuvo que hacer, y se procede, como si fuera suficiente, a indemnizar solo los daños y perjuicios concomitantes, sin considerar la merma que tuvo que recuperarse; ello deberá reconocerse lo cual fue estimado en la demanda en 10 millones de colones, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 1045 del Código Civil; el dictamen pericial, aduce, estimó el costo de una hectárea de pasto mejorado en 71.000 colones. 2.- Tampoco está de acuerdo en que se haya reducido el número de postes quemados a 1.500, cuando el informe establece 3.000 postes, y que el valor de cada uno se haya reducido a 600 colones, si el perito les dio un valor de 800, por lo que deberá corregirse el fallo, porque no explica el motivo por el cual se apartó del valor pericial (folios 4 y 7 de dicho informe). 3.- No está de acuerdo en la fijación de intereses a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia, porque la misma es declarativa y no constitutiva, debiendo reconocerse desde la presentación de la demanda. 4.- Tampoco está de acuerdo que se haya tomado en consideración para resolver una suma estimativa realizada ante el OIJ, cuando no se había podido valorar todas las consecuencias del incendio, siendo que el juez tomó en cuenta una limitación a 5 millones, siendo que los daños fueron muy superiores.

V.- La parte demandada Marsupe Sociedad Anónima, también recurrió el fallo: 1.- Aduce que existe una errónea interpretación de la ley sustantiva, dado que no existe la causalidad adecuada entre la conducta y el daño, siendo uno de los elementos de la responsabildad subjetiva, no bastando probar la culpa, sino que es necesario demostrar la relación causal entre culpa y daño o perjucio (artículo 704 del Código Civil); el aparente daño sufrido por la actora, aduce, no es consecuencia directa e inmediata de la conducta atribuida a su representada, sino más bien daños indirectos, y por ende no indemnizables, pues como se ve las pretensiones resultan demasiado onerosas respecto a la parte obligada a satisfacerlos, lo que más bien genera enriquecimiento injusto, siendo que el actor no ha probado la culpa de Marsupe S.A. y menos la relación de causalidad; 2.- Acusa que hay falta de legitmación activa y pasiva, siendo que la conducta está fuera de la aplicación del artículo 1045, porque no se señala alguna solidaridad civil por parte de su representada, los daños y perjuicios, no son consecuencia de la falta atribuida en el fallo contravencional a [Nombre3] , como apoderada de Marsupe, sino en forma personal, siendo impropia e ilegal la acción civil, porque en su contra no existe elementos de culpabilidad como criterio de imputación del fallo contravencional; tampoco a responsabilidad civil, porque el Código Penal de 1941 excluye la responsabilidad de personas jurídicas en las cuales su actividad normal no debe presumir una conducta generadora de riesto, es decir, no se trata de una responsabilidad objetiva; en este caso, aduce, no se configuran los elementos de la responsabilidad subjetiva (culpabilidad y causalidad), y tampoco el riesgo de la responsabilidad objetiva. La responsabilidad solidaria extracontractual está dada en el artículo 1046, cuando concurren dos o más autores en la producción de un daño, siendo que en este caso se hecha de menos la prueba de la culpa de Marsupe S.A., en forma subjetiva directa o indirecta (in eligendo o in vigilando), y del 1048 no queda prevista la responsabilidad indirecta por hechos ilícitos de los administradores de sociedades mercantiles, por el contrario el código civil incluye los comportamientos cometidos con mala intención (doloso) del gerente o administrador que rompe la relación, siendo que la responsabilidad no recae sobre el patrono; además, aduce, el comitente no responde de las conductas realizadas fuera del servicio encomendado. 3.- Finalmente, reclama falta de fundamentación del fallo en cuando condena solidariamente a Marsupe S.A., porque se afirma que el incendio generador de los supuestos daños fue ocasionado por los demandados, lo cual no encuentra asidero en la realidad, menos que se demostrara la participación de su representada, cuando la sentencia contravencional no lo dice. Quien participa directamente en la causa generadora lo es la señora [Nombre3] . En el fallo se afirma que "está bien hecho" que se haya demandado a su representada para el reclamo de los daños, dado que es la propietaria del inmueble y la señora [Nombre3] era la gerente, pero no se justifica las razones o motivos jurídicos necesarios y suficientes para la atribución de esa responsabilidad a su empresa. La omisión del fallo, aduce, provoca un vicio grave que lo anula, siendo que el Juzgador más bien debió eximirla de responsabilidad, tampoco explica si la señora [Nombre3] actuó bajo ordenes expresas de la Sociedad, o bajo su propia decisión.

VI.- La Jurisprudencia Agraria ha sido prolifera en el establecimiento de la responsabilidad objetiva por daños agroambientales, y en particular ara el caso de las quemas, por lo que el Tribunal procederá, en primer lugar a analizar ese tema:

" IV.- Nuestro ordenamiento jurídico contiene varias disposiciones que en forma expresa y directa se refieren a las quemas e incendios forestales y la responsabilidad que se origina por ellos. Tenemos así: a) Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas,N°121 de 26 de octubre de 1909: Su artículo 5 prohibe hacer quemazones en los campos. Únicamente las autoriza cuando se trate de desmontes para habilitar terrenos con fines agrícolas: Para ello se debe: 1) Solicitar permiso a la autoridad política local, 2) Tener garantías y precauciones para evitar mayor destrucción a la que se pretende o perjuicio a terceros,3) Notificar personalmente o por cédula de la autoridad a todos los colindantes o interesados el día y hora de la quema, por lo menos con dos días de antelación, 4) Dejar una distancia mínima de [Dirección1] sobre los manantiales nacidos en los cerros, y de [Dirección2] metros sobre los manantiales en terrenos planos. En materia de responsabilidad, expresamente indica que ,en todo caso ,el que hiciere quemazones debe pagar los daños y perjuicios que a causa del fuego se ocasionen. Se presume autor de la quemazón el propietario, poseedor o arrendatario que en la época del fuego estaba preparado para ese objeto. B) La Ley Forestal vigente, N°7575 de 13 de febrero de 1996, en su capítulo IV sobre “Protección Forestal” prohibe la realización de quemas en terrenos forestales y aledaños a ellos, sin haberse obtenido el permiso de la Administración Forestal del Estado. Remite al Código Penal para sancionar a quien realice una quema sin permiso (artículo 35). Asimismo, los numerales 59 y 60 respectivamente sancionan el causar dolosa o culposamente un incendio forestal, con penas de uno a tres años en el primer caso y de tres meses a dos años en el segundo. C) Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, Decreto N°25721-MINAE de 17 de octubre de 1996: Establece que el funcionario de la Administración Forestal debe visitar el lugar previo a otorgar un permiso de quema (artículo 34). D) Ley de Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, N°7779 de 30 de abril de 1998: Exige se sigan, para practicar quemas en terrenos agrícolas, las indicaciones del MAG conforme al permiso extendido para esos efectos, según el Reglamento de quemas vigentes, así como lo dispuesto en la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y el Código Penal (artículo 24). E) Reglamento al Uso, Manejo y Conservación de Suelos, Decreto N°29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT de 8 de agosto del 2000: En su capítulo X titulado “De las quemas agrarias”, dispone será el MAG en coordinación con el MINAE y el Ministerio de Seguridad quien emitirá los principios fundamentales mediante los cuales podrá autorizarse la práctica de quemas agrarias. Su artículo 86 expresamente exige el permiso previo del MAG para hacer quemas en terrenos de vocación Agrícola, el cual debe conferir audiencia al área de conservación del MINAE respectiva, para que emita su criterio sobre las repercusiones a la biota y los ecosistemas. Indica incluso no opera el silencio positivo en cuanto al criterio del MINAE. En cuanto a los terrenos forestales, zonas protectoras, parques nacionales, refugios de vida silvestre, prohibe la realización de quemas (artículo 88). F) Decreto N°17015-MAG,del2 de mayo de 1986: Creó la comisión Nacional para los Incendios Forestales. Dicha Comisión, según el Decreto N° 19434-MIRENEM de 11 de diciembre de 1990, tiene como atribuciones recomendar las políticas nacionales y preparar los programas de prevención y combate de incendios forestales. G) Decreto N°21859-MIRENEN del 7 de diciembre de 1992: Estableció el Comité contra Incendios Guanacaste como una instancia de coordinación, apoyo y seguimiento del Programa de Incendios Forestales de la Región Huetar Norte. H) Decreto N°23850-MAG-SP del 4 de noviembre de 1994, Reglamento para quemas controladas con fines agrícolas y pecuarios: En él se establecen los requisitos mínimos para poder efectuar quemas e incendios, especialmente en terrenos de uso agrícola o pecuario. Se define quema al fuego provocado intencionalmente, regulado por un plan preestablecido, en el cual se asumen todas las medidas preventivas para evitar daños a los recursos naturales y a las propiedades de los colindantes. Son incendios los que, natural o artificialmente, afecten bosques, terrenos forestales, terrenos agrícolas o de uso pecuario (artículo 1). Para efectuar quemas en terrenos agrícolas y pecuarios debe contarse con una autorización escrita del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería. El funcionario además de las medidas ya tomadas aprobadas según visita que debe hacer previo al permiso, debe indicar si lo concede las adicionales que considere necesario (artículos 2 y 3). El numeral 6° establece como requisitos mínimos los siguientes: 1) Determinar mediante rondas corta fuegos (área con un ancho del doble al alto del material combustible según lo indica el mismo Decreto), el área a quemar y los materiales combustibles utilizados; 2) abrir y barrer una ronda corta fuego en el perímetro del área a quemar, la cual no puede ser menos de un metro de ancho; 3) tener agua suficiente y herramientas para apagar el fuego en caso de emergencia. Adicionalmente se puede: 4) dar aviso previo a la Dirección Policial del lugar sobre la fecha y hora de la quema: 5) contar con la asistencia de al menos una persona; 6) hacer la quema contra viento y contra pendiente después de las 16 y antes de la 7 horas, evitando hacerla el día de viento: 7) verificar antes de retirarse el fuego quede completamente apagado. Pero independientemente se cuente o no con el permiso respectivo, el Decreto claramente establece en su artículo 7° que: “La persona que realice una quema, ya sea con o sin permiso, será civilmente responsable de los daños y perjuicios que pudieren ocasionarse ,de acuerdo con los artículos 41 y 50 de nuestra Constitución Política y las reglas sobre responsabilidad civil extracontractual que rigen nuestro ordenamiento jurídico..”. I) Finalmente “las disposiciones generales contenidas en los numerales “1045 y siguientes del Código Civil, sobre responsabilidad civil extracontractual, son de aplicación supletoria para esta materia” (ver sentencia de la Sala Primera N°112 de las 15:50 horas del 11 de octubre de1995). En el ámbito penal, el Código Penal vigente sanciona con 3 a 30 días multa quien contraviniere las disposiciones encaminadas a prevenir incendios o evitar su propagación (inciso 1° del Artículo 407) y a quien infringiere las reglas sobre quema de malezas, rastrojos u otros productos de la tierra (inciso 2°). VII. La doctrina moderna por su parte, ha apoyado la objetivación de la responsabilidad, al comprender dentro de los factores de imputabilidad y atribución legal del daño, aparte de la culpa y el dolo, el riesgo. Incluso se ha propuesto incluir como otros factores objetivos: garantía, equidad, abuso del derecho y exceso de la normal tolerancia entre vecinos. Se ve el daño entonces no desde el hecho del autor sino desde la posición del perjudicado, para procurar que todo daño causado en forma injusta sea reparado. Desde otro punto de vista, se ha separado la culpa de la ilicitud del hecho, dándole un rol más importante a éste. “Una vez rota la equiparación entre la ilicitud del hecho y la culpa, la conducta adquirió una fisonomía autónoma desligada del perfil subjetivo de la voluntad del agente, para constituirse en un simple medio, causa o criterio de conexión entre un sujeto tenido por responsable y un cierto evento dañoso a resarcir”. (Franzoni (Massimo), La Actividad peligrosa, en Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires,1997, p.120). Se habla así de la Teoría del riesgo, la cual no desplaza la culpa sino que la complementa, y se resume como el deber de quien crea un riesgo de indemnizar el daño que provoque a un tercero. “El riesgo es causa de imputabilidad cuando debido a la realización de ciertas causas y determinadas actividades, calificadas como peligrosas, se produce un daño. El daño en estas circunstancias debe resarcirse, no porque su agente haya incurrido en dolo o culpa, sino porque el orden jurídico debe proteger a la comunidad por el desarrollo de actividades peligrosas, de forma que quien las realiza incurre en responsabilidad si se ocasiona un daño en virtud de tal realización… La responsabilidad derivada del riesgo no depende del dolo o la culpa del agente sino que se origina en la mera ocurrencia del daño consecuente de la actividad peligrosa. Esta consideración trae consigo un régimen especial de la prueba, según la cual, por el solo ejercicio de la actividad insegura se presume la culpa del agente, exonerándose la víctima de la tarea de demostrar una conducta indebida. Al agente le corresponde desvirtuar la presunción…” (Cubides Camacho Jorge, Hecho imputable dañoso en Del daño, Editora Jurídica, 1° Ed,Colombia,2001, p.260). Para otros autores, “la relación causal es un elemento del acto ilícito y del incumplimiento contractual que vincula el daño directamente con el hecho antijurídico, e indirectamente con el elemento de imputación subjetiva o atribución objetiva. Es el factor aglutinante que hace que el daño y la culpa, o en su caso el riesgo, se integren en la unidad del acto que es fuente de la obligación de indemnizar” (ver Bustamante Alcina (José), El perfil de la responsabilidad civil al finalizar el siglo XX en Responsabilidad por daños en el tercer milenio, Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.24 a 26). VIII. Precisamente, la realización de quemas –independientemente de su fin- es una actividad innegablemente riesgosa. Por ello, en concordancia con la doctrina citada, La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha claramente indicado: “VII.- Las quemas pueden acarrear, para quien las produce, responsabilidades de tipo civil y penal. La responsabilidad civil está regulada en la Ley de quemas y Cercas divisorias al establecer la obligación, de quien hiciere quemazones, de pagar los daños y perjuicios ocasionados como consecuencia del fuego (artículo 5 párrafo 4). Se presume autor de la quemazón al propietario, poseedor o arrendatario del terreno que en la época del fuego estaba preparado para ese objeto… VIII.- La Sala Constitucional, mediante Voto N°3459 de las de las 14 horas 42minutos del 20 de julio de 1993, estableció la derogatoria del artículo 5°,párrafo quinto, de la Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias sobre las responsabilidad penal… La misma Sala Constitucional (Voto N°439-I-95 de las 14:36 horas del 22 de agosto de 1995) aclaró la mencionada sentencia N°3459-93 en el sentido de que el artículo 5°, párrafos 5°y 6,de la Ley de Cercas Divisorias y Quemas está derogado únicamente en cuanto a los aspectos penales que contiene… IX.- La normativa de quemas e incendios siguen el criterio de la responsabilidad objetiva. La culpa se presume en quien creó las condiciones del daño por haber asumido el riesgo de perjudicar a terceros con la quema o incendio. Los daños y perjuicios ocasionados son a su cargo. El damnificado está exento de probar la culpa. La carga de la prueba sobre la ausencia de culpa corresponde a quien quemó o incendió. Es una presunción iuris tantum. Sería eximente de responsabilidad la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima o el hecho de un tercero. X. Asume el riesgo quien previendo la eventualidad o posibilidad del daño acepta los efectos de la contingencia. La responsabilidad se funda en crear el riesgo para el daño. El sujeto al iniciar la actividad, por medio de sus cosas, aumenta, potencia o multiplica las posibilidades de peligrosidad. Aún cuando pueda tratarse de una conducta lícita, siempre debe indemnizar el daño quien asumió el riesgo. Hay mayor razón para imputar la responsabilidad si el hecho proviene de una conducta ilícita. No puede el damnificado asumir daños sobre conductas no impulsadas por él mismo, salvo si se puso en condiciones para sufrir el daño. Quien quema o incendia, aún con la autorización de la autoridad correspondiente, no puede ser eximido de responsabilidad. Esto es así porque si bien la Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias N° 121 del 26decotubre de 1909 establece las pautas para autorizar las quemas en fundos agrarios, y establece una serie de obligaciones respecto de quien solicita la autorización, ello no rompe la presunción de culpabilidad. Los requisitos para autorizar las quemas tienden a asegurar el mínimo riesgo. Se trata de una medida precautoria pero no es una eximente de responsabilidad. Entonces el cumplimiento de los requisitos indispensables para la autorización no pueden perjudicar a los vecinos si el siniestro ocurre. En esta forma los daños en los bienes, cosechas, o en las personas mismas, de los vecinos deben ser indemnizados por quien creo las condiciones del riesgo con el incendio o quema. XI. La actividad de incendiar o quemar en si misma, va dirigida contra la Naturaleza. En un recurso de una agricultura primitiva donde el fuego tiende a sustituir el trabajo del hombre. En vez de utilizar medios humanos o mecánicos para impulsar la actividad agraria se recurre a un elemento destructivo para, sobre las cenizas de lo destruido, iniciar el cultivo de vegetales o la cría de animales. Este tipo de acciones resultan incompatibles con los valores actuales. Atenta contra la seguridad en cuanto arriesga la propiedad de los colindantes, sus bienes y personas. Igualmente atenta contra los valores de protección al medio ambiente. La función económica y social de la propiedad entraña también una función ecológica: la agricultura debe desarrollarse en armonía, y no en antagonismo, con la Naturaleza. Para la preservación del medio ambiente la solidaridad social exige idear nuevos mecanismos para prevenir el daño y los hechos amenazantes. Este es la filosofía de la reforma al artículo 50 de la Constitución Política. Sobre esos lineamientos debe ser analizada la Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias y toda la problemática de la responsabilidad derivada de esa actividad” (ver sentencia N° 112 de las 15horas 50 minutos del11 de octubre de 1995.En igual sentido la N° 113 de las 16 horas del 11 de octubre de 1995). VII. Aclaró asimismo la Sala en las sentencias citadas, la obligación de indemnizar los daños y perjuicios ocasionados por las quemas y el recaer la presunción de responsabilidad sobre quien preparó el terreno para ese fin, no se pueden limitar al caso de los desmontes. “Si bien es cierto el artículo 5 de la Ley de Cercas y Quemas Divisorias establece la prohibición general de hacer quemazones en los campos, autorizándolos cuando se trate de desmontes para habilitar terrenos confines agrícolas (párrafo primero),ello no enerva la posibilidad de efectuar dicha actividad bajo otras condiciones y para otros fines, como lo demuestra la realidad actual. Por eso la misma Ley establece, en el párrafo cuarto del numeral 5°, una responsabilidad genérica cuando indica: “En todo caso, el que hiciere quemazones debe pagar los daños y perjuicios…”. Lo cual enmarca perfectamente en el principio genérico de no hacer daño a los demás. En este caso, los daños y perjuicios son a cargo de la demandada porque asumió el riesgo de perjudicar a sus colindantes con la quema. Al iniciar su actividad, preparando el terreno para ser quemado, aumentó las posibilidades de peligrosidad. Se trató de una conducta ilícita pues no contaba con autorización de las autoridades administrativas correspondientes, según se corrobora en los hechos probados. No tomó las previsiones mínimas, requeridas por ley, para prevenir daños mayores de los normalmente producidos. Aunque tomó algunas medidas precautorias –hechura de rondas- ello no es suficiente para eximirla de su responsabilidad de indemnizar los daños y perjuicios causados a la demandante. La única forma de liberarse de dicha responsabilidad era demostrando la existencia de culpa de la víctima, caso fortuito o hecho de un tercero, lo cual no hizo. Aún cuando la Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias es de 1909 su interpretación debe verificarse en consonancia con los artículos 10 del Código Civil y 5 de la Ley Orgánica del poder Judicial. La interpretación moderna (sistemática, material y evolutiva) exige adecuar el contenido de la norma a las circunstancias históricas y la realidad social y económica en la cual va a ser aplicada. Para ello debe tomarse en cuenta los principios y valores contenidos en la Constitución, así como en las leyes especiales en materia agraria “. (ver sentencia N° 112-95 citada). VIII. De acuerdo con lo explicado, es posible hacer quemas en terrenos de vocación agropecuaria siempre y cuando se cumplan los requisitos establecidos en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, entre ellos tomar las medidas de precaución suficientes para poder controlar el fuego, solicitar permiso previo ante los entes públicos respectivos, especialmente la oficina del Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería que sea del caso, y notificar a los dueños o encargados de los previos vecinos. Este último requisito es de suma importancia, porque aunque se tomen todas las medidas posibles, fenómenos naturales como lo es el viento, las corrientes de aire y otros, pueden ocasionar el fuego se extienda a otras zonas fuera de las que originalmente se pretendía quemar. Con la notificación de los colindantes se procura minimizar o evitar precisamente, propagarse el fuego, se produzca un daño mayor, dado que se posibilita una mejor vigilancia por parte de los vecinos en sus propios terrenos, y se les permite estar preparados para combatirlo si fuese necesario. Ahora bien, aún en el caso de haberse tomado todas las previsiones posibles y de contarse con permiso, quien origina o cause una quema que produzca daños a terceros, es responsable de tales. Lo anterior es así por tratarse de una actividad riesgosa. La responsabilidad es de tipo objetivo como ya se explicó." (Tribunal Agrario, No. 815-F-03 del 16 de diciembre del 2003).- VII.- Recurso de la co-demanda Marsupe Sociedad Anónima: La empresa co-demandada, Marsupe S.A. impugnó el fallo, aduciendo tres motivos fundamentales: la falta de relación causal entre la conducta y el daño, la falta de legimación activa y pasiva por no existir responsabilidad solidaria, y finalmente, la nulidad por falta de fundamentación del fallo. En ninguno de los tres agravios lleva razón la recurrente, y los cuales se resolverán a la inversa de como fueron interpuestos en el recurso, al ser el orden lógico para su análisis. 1.- En cuanto a la invocada "falta de fundamentación del fallo", sobre la condena solidaria de Marsupe S.A., considera que ello no encuentra asidero en la realidad, porque no se demostró la participación de su representada, y la sentencia contravencional no lo dice, y tampoco se justifica en motivos jurídicos necesarios y suficientes lo que vuelve en nula la sentencia. Dichas afirmaciones no son exactas. El a-quo, en primer lugar, tuvo por acreditado en el hecho 10, que el incendio ocurrió en la finca de la demandada Marsupe, y que la quema la ordenó hacer la señora [Nombre3] Arias Jiménez y luego se extendió a las propiedades de los actores. Tal hecho, sustentado en las declaraciones de [Nombre4] , [Nombre5] , [Nombre6] , [Nombre7] , [Nombre8] y [Nombre9] , no ha sido desvirtuada por la apelante, y contrario a lo afirmado por ella, en la sentencia contravencional del 3 de mayo del 2001, el Juez concluyó lo siguiente: "...faltaron al deber de cuidado y no guardaron la debida precausión por cuanto sin precisar fecha pero el año pasado, provocaron un incendio en la finca de Marsupe, sin pedir permiso a las autoridades respectivas y aun cuando tomaron algunas precauciones estas no fueron suficientes y el fuego se pasó al menos a tres fincas vecinas..." (folio 23). En cuanto a la responsabilidad de la empresa, el a-quo sí da fundamentos para atribuir la misma al indicar claramente que "..la misma es propietaria de la finca en que se inicio el fuego y la señora [Nombre3] Arias Jiménez es Gerente de dicha sociedad, siendo esa la razón por la que acude a la vía civil tal y como consta en autos...Esta forma de hacer quemas sin solicitar permiso a las autoridades correspondientes y sin avisarle a los colindantes; sin lugar a dudas enmarca dentro de una de las modalidades de la culpa como es la negligencia y la imprudencia...."(ver sentencia a folios 338-339). Además, en la sentencia se citan las normas y doctrina en materia de responsabilidad extracontractual, en particular el 1045 y siguientes del Código Civil (considerandos IV, IV bis y VII). Como se observa el fallo sí se fundamentó, y por ende no hay motivo de nulidad. 2.- En cuanto a la Responsabilidad solidaria extracontractual y la invocada falta de legitimación activa y pasiva, tampoco lleva razón los recurrentes. Existen gran cantidad de normas que establecen las responsabilidad solidaria de las empresas, cuando de responsabilidad objetiva se trata. El artículo 103 del Código Procesal Penal en relación con el 106, disponen la responsabilidad solidaria de las personas jurídicas cuyos gerentes, administradores o personeros legales, resulten reponsables de los hechos punibles. La misma norma está contenida en los artículos 135 y 137 inciso 3, del Código Penal de 1941, señala como responsables solidarios "Las personas naturales o jurídicas dueñas de establecimientos en que se cometiere un hecho punible con motivo de la infracción de leyes o reglamentos de policía por parte de los administradores, dependientes o criados del establecimiento". Tales normas también se relacionan con los artículos 1046 y 1048 del Código Cviil, párrafo tercero, en cuanto a la responsabilidad solidaria objetiva se refieren. Ambas incluso interpretadas también en relación con la Ley de Quemas y Cercas Divisorias, artículo 5 y la Ley Forestal, de los cuales se desprende todo lo contrario de lo indicado por el recurrente, en el sentido de que tanto las personas físicas como las jurídicas son responsables, solidariamente, del daño agrario causado. El artículo 57 de la Ley Forestal que dispone: "...cuando se trate de personas jurídicas, la responsabilidad civil se extenderá a sus representantes legales. Asimismo, tanto las personas físicas como jurídicas serán responsables, civilmente, por el daño ecológico causado, de acuerdo con lo que establece el artículo 1045 del Código Civil", siendo que en este caso existe suficiente prueba para tener por acreditada la vinculación de la empresa Marsupe S.A., con [Nombre3] , a quien se conocía como su representante. 3.- En cuanto a la relación de causalidad, entre la conducta y el daño, está más que demostrada, aún cuando en estos casos, de responsabildad objetiva, no se requiera demostrar la culpa, pues lo que interesa es que exista una actividad riesgosa, y luego la producción del daño en sí. Véase, como se indicó anteriormente, que en la misma sentencia penal se estableció claramente que la quema la hizo, un peón, por orden de la representante, en la finca de Marsupe S.A., y luego el fuego se propagó por los terrenos colindantes afectando al menos a tres fincas vecinas (ver folios 22 y 23), lo cual lógicamente produjo una gran cantidad de daños, conforme está acreditado en el hecho sexto, no desvirtuado por quien recurre, y que constan tanto en el informe del OIJ como en la secuencia fotográfica agregadas a los autos (folios 2 a 10), incluso, cuatro años después todavía existían indicios de las quemas producidas en la finca de los actores (ver acta de reconocimiento judicial a folio 148 y fotografías de peritaje a folios 290 y 291). La misma prueba testimonial da fe de esta relación de causalidad: "...Yo trabajaba en una finca que está en medio de los dos, de don [Nombre2] y de doña [Nombre3], y estábamos ahí como a las once de la mañana y empezamos a ver humo en la finca de [Nombre3]. Después no fue sólo humo sino que la finca de la señora estaba envuelta en llamas. Eso fue en verano y se venían chispas por todas partes, remolinos de fuego por el viento que hacía, el viento se llevó las chispas a la finca en la que yo estaba ya la de don [Nombre10] de las chispas, lo que sucedió fue un gran incendio que arrazó con la finca de don [Nombre2], con terreno, pastos, cercas y árboles..." (declaración de [Nombre7] , a folio 140). En síntesis, no lleva razón la parte demandada, recurrente, en ninguno de sus agravios, por lo que deberá confirmarse la sentencia estimatoria en cuanto a la legitimación activa y pasiva de los actores y de la demandada.

VIII.- En segundo lugar, se analizará lo relativo a los daños y perjuicios. La jurisprudencia ha definido dichos conceptos así: “IV.- El daño constituye uno de los presupuestos de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, por cuanto el deber de resarcir solamente se configura si ha mediado un hecho ilícito dañoso que lesione un interés jurídicamente relevante, susceptible de ser tutelado por el ordenamiento jurídico. El daño, en sentido jurídico constituye todo menoscabo, pérdida o detrimento de la esfera jurídica patrimonial o extrapatrimonial de la persona (damnificado), el cual provoca la privación de un bien jurídico, respecto del cual era objetivamente esperable su conservación de no haber acaecido el hecho dañoso. Bajo esa tesitura no hay responsabilidad civil si no media daño, así como no existe daño si no hay damnificado. Por otra parte, solo es daño indemnizable el que se llega a probar (realidad o existencia), siendo ello una cuestión de hecho reservada al prudente arbitrio del juzgador. En suma, el daño constituye la brecha perjudicial para la víctima, resultante de confrontar la situación anterior al hecho ilícito con la posterior al mismo. En muchas ocasiones se utilizan indiscriminadamente las expresiones “daños” y “perjuicios”. Es menester precisar y distinguir ambos conceptos. El daño constituye la pérdida irrogada al damnificado (damnum emergens), en tanto el perjuicio está conformado por la ganancia o utilidad frustrada o dejada de percibir (lucro cesans), la cual era razonable y probablemente esperable si no se hubiese producido el hecho ilícito. V. No cualquier daño impone la obligación de resarcir. Para que sea indemnizable han de confluir, básicamente, las siguientes características: A) Debe ser cierto; real y efectivo, y no meramente eventual o hipotético, no puede estar fundado en realizaciones supuestas o conjeturables. El daño no pierde ese carácter si su cuantificación resulta incierta, indeterminada o de difícil apreciación o prueba; tampoco debe confundirse la certeza con la actualidad, pues es admisible la reparación del daño cierto pero futuro; no cabe confundir el daño futuro con el lucro cesante o perjuicio. En lo relativo a la magnitud o monto (seriedad) del daño, constituye un extremo de incumbencia subjetiva única del damnificado, empero el derecho no puede ocuparse de pretensiones fundadas en daños insignificantes, derivadas de una excesiva susceptibilidad. B) Debe mediar lesión a un interés jurídicamente relevante y merecedor de indemnización. Así puede haber un damnificado directo y otro indirecto: el primero es la víctima del hecho dañoso y el segundo serán los sucesores de la víctima. C) Debe ser causado por un tercero y subsistente; esto es, que no haya sido reparado. D) Debe mediar una relación de causalidad entre el hecho ilícito y el daño. VI. Dentro de las clases de daños, se encuentra en primer término el daño material y el corporal, siendo el primero el que incide sobre las cosas o bienes materiales que conforman el patrimonio de la persona, en tanto el segundo repercute sobre la integridad corporal y física. En doctrina, bajo la denominación genérica de daño material o patrimonial, suelen comprenderse las específicas de daño corporal y de daño material, en sentido estricto. La segunda parece ser la expresión más feliz, pues el daño corporal suele afectar intereses patrimoniales del damnificado (pago de tratamiento médico, gastos de hospitalización, medicamentos, etc.), ganancias frustradas si el daño lo ha incapacitado para realizar sus ocupaciones habituales (perjuicios), etc …” (Sala Primera de la Corte, No. 112 de las 14:15 horas del 15 de julio de 1992 y No. 714 de 16:20 horas del 18 de setiembre del 2002) – Lo subrayado no es del original-.

IX.- En cuanto a la prueba de los daños y perjuicios, rige el principio de la carga probatoria consagrado en el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil, y para los casos de ejecución en materia agraria, en el artículo 62 inciso c) de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. Al respecto, la jurisprudencia nacional ha establecido lo siguiente: "En materia de daños y perjuicios, tema sobre el cual existe una larga experiencia, el elemento probatorio juega un papel muy importante. Quien los alegue debe probarlos, igualmente quien los niegue, salvo el caso del daño moral subjetivo al cual es consentido a los jueces valorarlo según las reglas de la experiencia, la lógica y la ciencia, sin sujeción a ningún otro criterio probatorio. En el sistema procesal moderno aún tiene plena vigencia el aforismo romano judex secundum allegata et probata partium decidere debet. Esto significa la limitación de los jueces a poder dictar sus sentencias a todo cuanto las partes aleguen y prueben. La simple alegación de un hecho no basta para su condena porque es la parte quien está en la obligación de ofrecer las pruebas en tiempo, lograr del juzgador su admisión, presentarlas para ser evacuadas, y finalmente, dentro del proceso de valoración probatoria, tarea por excelencia del juzgador, atribuirle a esos elementos probatorios el valor necesario para acreditar el hecho formulado. Se trata del conocido principio de la carga de la prueba. Consiste en la obligación de todo quien alegue un hecho o una pretensión en proceder a probar legalmente lo alegado. Esto difiere mucho del mero hecho de acreditar en el expediente el alegato o la misma prueba, porque prueba para efectos de la casación es sólo aquélla a la cual la sentencia le da ese rango después de un severo proceso de valoración. Y el principio no sólo tiene una importante connotación en el aspecto afirmativo sino también en el negativo, pues quien alegue la inexistencia, modificación o extinción de un hecho o de una pretensión también deberá probarlo. Al principio de la carga de la prueba, en un régimen democrático y no inquisitorio, se vinculan muchos otros principios, dentro de los cuales sobresale el de la libertad probatoria. Según ese principio todas las partes deberán tener amplias facultades para ofrecer todos los medios lícitos de prueba, sobre todo obtenidos legítimamente, esto es todos los medios debidamente autorizados por el ordenamiento jurídico y llevados al expediente siguiendo los procedimientos también pautados por el sistema procesal, donde las partes deben tener el derecho de preguntar a la propia prueba y a la contraria, con el objeto de demostrar o negar los hechos, afirmar o contradecir las pretensiones." (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, No. 554 de 15:10 horas del 4 de agosto del 2000 – la negrita no es del original). Para el otorgamiento de los daños y perjuicios, la Jurisprudencia ha exigido demostrar el nexo causal entre la condena en abstracto impuesta y lo que se reclama en la ejecución (Sala Primera, No. 830 de 11:45 del 22 de setiembre, 2004, y No. 674 de 11:30 horas del 18 de agosto del 2004). Por otra parte, la Jurisprudencia ha establecido, que los daños y perjuicios derivados de un hecho o conducta ilícita, son deudas de valor, y no dinerarias, motivo por el cual la cuantía no debe convertirse en motivo para denegarlos, siempre y cuando resulten probados (Al respecto, Sala Primera,Voto No. 226 del 31 de marzo del 2004).

X.- Recurso de la parte actora: En cuanto a los daños, la parte actora reclama que no se le hayan reconocido el valor de los potreros, lo cual reclamó en 10 millones de colones, siendo que el dictamen pericial estimó el costo de una hectárea de pasto mejorado en 71.000 colones, además, no está de acuerdo que se hayan reducido la cantidad de postes quemados a 1.500, si el perito establece que son 3000 postes con un valor de 800 colones, y no se explica porqué se apartó el a-quo del valor pericial. 1.- En cuanto al primer reclamo, el a-quo rechazó el rubro de la pérdida de los pastos, considerando que el zacate volvió a nacer y en la actualidad está en uso, y además, el ganado estuvo fuera de la finca por espacio de tres meses y luego se trasladó de nuevo el ganado a la finca, siendo que el zacate volvió a crecer en forma natural. El Tribunal está de acuerdo con la decisión tomada por el a-quo, toda vez que la quema de los pastizales en modo alguno provocó su desaparición, por el contrario, fue una cuestión temporal, de alrededor de tres meses, hecho por el cual se reconoció a los actores el pago de alimento (pollinaza), el transporte de los animales a otra finca, y el alquiler de los pastos, lo cual viene a reparar el daño causado por la pérdida temporal del pasto, pues evidentemente el mismo creció meses después de que fue arrazado por el fuego. 2.- En cuanto a los postes, el a-quo consideró justo reconocer una cantidad de mil quinientos postes, por un total de novecientos mil colones. La cantidad de postes reconocidos obedecen a una estimación aproximada de los repastos que resultaron dañados, en la época en que ocurrieron y la fecha de reposición, toda vez que no se tuvo certeza de la cantidad total de postes quemados, y se hace un valor aproximativo, por cuanto según el informe del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, fueron arrazados 15 apartos (de veinte en total), y además habían unas partes más dañadas que otras (folios 3, 4 y 5), pero sin tenerse certeza absoluta de cuántos postes realmente resultaron dañados. En cuanto al valor o estimación, debe tomarse en cuenta que el artículo 123 del Código Procesal Penal de 1941, relacionado con las normas para la reparación del daño en este tipo de eventos, indica que "...estará obligado a satisfacer su valor conforme a estimación pericial referida a la fecha de la infracción. Si tal estimación no fuese posible hacerla por haber sido destriuida o haber desaparecido la cosa, los jueces fijarán el valor respectivo, ateniéndose a los datos del juicio.". De manera tal que también en este caso existe discrecionalidad del juzgador para poder establecer el "quantum" de la indemnización, y para ello tomó en consideración el a-quo, el monto que en un primer momento reclamaron los actores, en sede penal, que fue la suma de cinco millones de colones. En razón de lo expuesto, considera el Tribunal que no lleva razón el recurrente en los agravios planteados en cuanto a la indemnización por repastos y postes de madera. 3.- Sobre los intereses. Reclaman los recurrentes que no están de acuerdo en la fijación de intereses a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia, debe indicarse que nos encontramos aquí frente a una demanda de responsabilidad patrimonial objetiva, por lo que debía fijarse, en primer lugar la responsabilidad, para luego establecer el valor de los daños y perjuicios. El artículo 706 del Código Civil establece que "Si la obligación es de pagar una suma de dinero, los daños y perjuicios consisten siempre y únicamente en el pago de intereses sobre la suma debida, contados desde el vencimiento del plazo.". En este caso la fijación del valor se adquiere con la firmeza del fallo, y por ende es a partir de ahí que es posible cobrar los daños y perjuicios ocasionados. 4.- Finalmente, en cuanto a la utlización del valor estimado por los actores, en la causa contravencional, y que aparece en el informe del OIJ, es evidente que el a-quo, al igual que este Tribunal, considera que es el monto que más se ajusta al momento de la producción del daño y la fecha de la reposición que tuvieron que hacer los actores, por lo que resulta aplicable lo dispuesto en los artículos 123 y 124 del Código Penal de 1941. Si bien es cierto existe un peritaje de [Nombre11] , véase que el mismo realiza la valoración en el mes de noviembre del 2004 al "costo actual" (folio 275), y no a la fecha de la infracción que es lo que autoriza el artículo 123. Por ello la parte demandada impugnó esa valoración cuando alegó lo siguiente: "...El perito, felizmente, determina lo que según él es el costo ACTUAL para ESTABLECER, entiéndase sembrar pasto nuevo, sin embargo, por un lado, el precio actual no es el mismo que hace 4 años...Igual consideración debe hacerse cuando determina el valor de las cercas dañadas..." (folio 302). Como se indicó en el considerando anterior no se tuvo certeza de la cantidad de postes, dañados y en todo caso su precio se fijó al tiempo de la reposición.- XI.- En razón de todo lo anteriormente expuesto, deberá confirmarse, en lo que fue objeto de apelación, la sentencia recurrida.

POR TANTO:

En lo que fue objeto de apelación, se CONFIRMA la sentencia recurrida.

ENRIQUE ULATE CHACÓN ANTONIO DARCIA CARRANZA CARLOS PICADO VARGAS Nº EXPN1 Ordinario de Actor [Nombre1] y otro Contra Marsupe SRL.

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