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Res. 00096-2018 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección V · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección V · 22/11/2018
OutcomeResultado
The prescription and nullity of the dismissal are rejected; an indemnity of ₡2,000,000 is awarded for subjective moral damages plus statutory interest from the date the judgment becomes final; objective moral damages and automatic indexation are denied.Se rechaza la prescripción y la nulidad del despido; se concede indemnización de ₡2.000.000 por daño moral subjetivo, más intereses legales a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia, y se desestima el daño moral objetivo y la indexación automática.
SummaryResumen
The ruling analyzes the claim of a Public Force Officer dismissed for sexual harassment, who alleged prescription of the disciplinary action, violation of due process, and lack of reasoning. The Administrative Appeals Court finds that the claim was not time-barred, applying the two-year statute of limitations under Article 83 of the General Police Law, which is interrupted by the initiation of proceedings, and rejects interpretations that would extend that period to eight years. On the merits, while acknowledging the importance of anti‑harassment legislation and evidentiary difficulties, the court stresses that this cannot leave the accused defenseless. It holds that the dismissal decision properly weighed the circumstantial evidence and did not breach due process, therefore dismissing most claims. It awards only subjective moral damages of two million colones plus interest from the date the judgment becomes final; objective moral damages are denied for lack of proof, and indexation is conditional on showing that interest does not cover inflation.La sentencia analiza la demanda de un Oficial de la Fuerza Pública despedido por acoso sexual, quien alega prescripción de la acción disciplinaria, violación al debido proceso y falta de motivación. El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo determina que la acción no estaba prescrita, aplicando el plazo de dos años del artículo 83 de la Ley General de Policía, el cual se interrumpe al iniciar el procedimiento, y rechaza las interpretaciones que extienden ese plazo a ocho años. Sobre el fondo, aunque reconoce la importancia de la normativa contra el hostigamiento sexual y la dificultad probatoria, subraya que ello no puede colocar en indefensión al imputado. En este caso, estima que el acto de despido sí valoró adecuadamente la prueba indiciaria y no lesionó el debido proceso, por lo que declara sin lugar la mayoría de las pretensiones. Únicamente concede indemnización por daño moral subjetivo, calculada en dos millones de colones, más intereses desde la firmeza de la sentencia; rechaza el daño moral objetivo por falta de prueba y condiciona la indexación a que se demuestre que los intereses no cubren la inflación.
Key excerptExtracto clave
In that sense, while it is true that due to the special circumstances in which the different manifestations of sexual harassment can occur, obtaining direct evidence is difficult, and therefore the statement of the complainant must be assessed together with the existing circumstantial evidence, in accordance with the rules of sound criticism, logic, experience, reasonableness, and proportionality, as well as the special principles governing this area (confidentiality, in dubio pro víctima, freedom, equality and non‑discrimination on grounds of gender, human life, and the right to decent work); it is also true that this does not imply placing the person accused of the alleged misconduct in a state of defenselessness, evading the effective protection of minimum procedural guarantees such as the reasoning of the administrative act, compliance with the deadlines for the employer to exercise the disciplinary sanctioning power, the assessment of existing evidence according to the rules of rational sound criticism, among others. As for the judgments No. 100-F-TC-2018 and 119-F-TC-2018 issued by the Civil and Administrative Court of Cassation, referred to by the State’s representative during the conclusions of the oral and public trial, it should be noted that they are dissimilar precedents, as they calculate the two-year prescription period established in Article 83 of the General Police Law, taking into account or not the different phases into which the disciplinary procedure before the MSP is divided, to the extent that according to judgment No. 100-F-TC-2018, the procedure would last eight years, given that each time any of the four stages provided for in the General Police Law is interrupted, the two-year period would start to run again; unlike what was considered in judgment 119-F-TC-2018. … In light of the foregoing, this Court upholds the criterion set forth in judgment 28-2018-V … regarding the applicable prescription period and how it is calculated in disciplinary sanctioning proceedings governed by the General Police Law that are not related to breaches against the Public Treasury or the internal control framework.En ese sentido, si bien es cierto, por las especiales circunstancias en que pueden presentarse las diferentes manifestaciones del hostigamiento o acoso sexual, se dificulta la obtención de prueba directa, por lo que, el dicho del o de la denunciante deberá valorarse junto con la prueba indiciaria existente, conforme a las reglas de la sana crítica, la lógica, la experiencia, la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, así como, los principios especiales que rigen en esta materia (confidencialidad, in dubio pro víctima, libertad, igualdad y no discriminación por razón de género, vida humana y derecho a un trabajo digno); también lo es, que ello no implica colocar en estado de indefensión a la persona a quién se le imputa la presunta comisión de esa falta, obviando la tutela efectiva de garantías mínimas procesales, como la motivación del acto administrativo, la observancia de los plazos para ejercer la potestad disciplinario sancionatoria por el patrono, la valoración de la prueba existente de acuerdo a las reglas de la sana crítica racional, entre otros. En cuanto a las sentencias número 100-F-TC-2018 y 119-F-TC-2018 dictadas por el Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil, a que hizo referencia la representante del Estado en la fase de conclusiones del juicio oral y público, cabe resaltar que se trata de antecedentes disímiles, dado que computan el plazo de prescripción de dos años previsto en el numeral 83 de la Ley General de Policía, tomando en cuenta o no las diferentes fases en que se divide el procedimiento disciplinario ante el MSP, al punto de que conforme a la sentencia número 100-F-TC-2018, el procedimiento tendría una duración de ocho años, dado que cada vez que se interrumpe alguna de las cuatro etapas que lo comprenden conforme a lo dispuesto en la Ley General de Policía, el plazo de dos años volvería a iniciar su cómputo; a diferencia de lo considerado en la sentencia 119-F-TC-2018. … En razón de lo anterior, este Tribunal mantiene el criterio vertido en sentencia 28-2018-V … relativo al plazo de prescripción aplicable y a la forma de computar el mismo, en los casos de procedimientos disciplinarios sancionatorios, regulados por la Ley General de Policía, que no estén relacionados con faltas a la Hacienda Pública y/o al ordenamiento de control interno.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"la gravedad de la falta imputada no puede justificar la violación de garantías procesales fundamentales, relacionadas íntimamente con el ejercicio en tiempo y forma de la potestad disciplinario-sancionatoria"
"the seriousness of the alleged misconduct cannot justify the violation of fundamental procedural guarantees, intimately related to the timely and proper exercise of the disciplinary sanctioning power"
Considerando IVo, apartado f)
"la gravedad de la falta imputada no puede justificar la violación de garantías procesales fundamentales, relacionadas íntimamente con el ejercicio en tiempo y forma de la potestad disciplinario-sancionatoria"
Considerando IVo, apartado f)
"no implica colocar en estado de indefensión a la persona a quién se le imputa la presunta comisión de esa falta, obviando la tutela efectiva de garantías mínimas procesales"
"it does not imply placing the person accused of the alleged misconduct in a state of defenselessness, evading the effective protection of minimum procedural guarantees"
Considerando VIIo
"no implica colocar en estado de indefensión a la persona a quién se le imputa la presunta comisión de esa falta, obviando la tutela efectiva de garantías mínimas procesales"
Considerando VIIo
"el daño moral subjetivo es “in re ipsa”, lo cual significa que es clara la naturaleza de la lesión en las circunstancias que se ocasionó, es posible concluir directamente y tenerse acreditado que el sufrimiento, dolor, angustia y desesperación en efecto se dio"
"subjective moral damage is “in re ipsa,” meaning the nature of the injury is clear from the circumstances in which it occurred; it is possible to directly conclude and hold as proven that suffering, pain, anguish, and despair indeed took place"
Considerando XIo, citando voto 112-1992 de Sala Primera
"el daño moral subjetivo es “in re ipsa”, lo cual significa que es clara la naturaleza de la lesión en las circunstancias que se ocasionó, es posible concluir directamente y tenerse acreditado que el sufrimiento, dolor, angustia y desesperación en efecto se dio"
Considerando XIo, citando voto 112-1992 de Sala Primera
Full documentDocumento completo
In the first instance, it should be noted that Article 83 of the Ley General de Policía establishes that: "Minor offenses shall be time-barred in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated." Based on the special rule cited above, this Tribunal considers the following:
VII.ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF MOTIVATION (MOTIVACIÓN), ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE (VALORACIÓN DE LA PRUEBA), REASONABLENESS, AND PROPORTIONALITY OF THE FINAL ACT OF DISMISSAL ISSUED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. In the first instance, this Tribunal deems it necessary to highlight the importance of the existence of proceedings for alleged sexual harassment (hostigamiento o acoso sexual) in a patriarchal society like Costa Rica's, with deep-rooted prejudices regarding relationships between women and men, or between persons of the same gender in the workplace and their gender roles, a situation that obliges legal operators to redouble respect for technical-legal standards regarding the use of presumptions ("iuris tantum" and "iure et iure"), and the rigor with which the procedural rules of circumstantial evidence (prueba indiciaria) must be applied, since the contrary would put Justice and Legal Certainty at risk in the specific case, and by default, would be to the detriment of the very important purposes pursued by this legislation, based on the principles contained in the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women.
In that sense, while it is true that, due to the special circumstances in which the different manifestations of sexual harassment may occur, obtaining direct evidence is difficult, and therefore, the statement of the complainant must be assessed together with the existing circumstantial evidence, according to the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica), logic, experience, reasonableness, and proportionality, as well as the special principles governing this matter (confidentiality, in dubio pro víctima, freedom, equality and non-discrimination based on gender, human life, and the right to dignified work); it is also true that this does not imply placing the person charged with the alleged commission of that offense in a state of defenselessness, bypassing the effective protection of minimum procedural guarantees, such as the motivation of the administrative act, observance of the time limits for exercising the disciplinary-sanctioning power by the employer, the assessment of the existing evidence according to the rules of rational sound judgment, among others.
To hold otherwise would imply a flagrant violation of due process, since if the purpose of the disciplinary proceeding is the search for truth, it would be illegitimate for the victim's statement to be given full credibility per se, without first assessing that testimony together with the other existing evidentiary elements—regardless of whether they constitute direct or circumstantial evidence—, in order to establish whether in each specific case, the offense of sexual abuse (abuso sexual) typified in Ley 7476 was proven or not, and therefore, whether there are grounds to apply the respective sanction, which in any case, will be proportional to the seriousness of the proven act. Under these parameters, we shall proceed to analyze whether in the specific case, the final act ratifying the recommendations for dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal) against the appellant for alleged sexual abuse, suffers or not from an absolute nullity defect, for being substantially contrary to the legal system.
X. [...] On the other hand, given the petition raised by the plaintiff, regarding the recognition of legal interest on the amount determined for this item, it is necessary to clarify that the jurisprudential line of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia in this matter consists of: "... it is evident, regarding such items in value obligations, it is possible to grant them from the judgment where the amount due was established until its effective payment..." (Judgment No. 000293-F-S1-2016 issued at 09:45 hours on April 7, 2016, issued by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Consequently, in accordance with the foregoing, the recognition of legal interest on the sum established in this judgment for subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) in favor of the plaintiff proceeds, from its finality and until its effective payment, and not from the moment the damage occurred.
Regarding objective moral damage, the plaintiff bases this part of his claim by arguing that his image and honorability as a person and member of the Fuerza Pública was affected in different areas—family, work, and before the general public opinion—, therefore, he estimates the injury in the amount of twenty-five million colones. When dealing with the issue of moral damage, it must be clear that subjective and objective moral damage, while sharing their non-pecuniary nature, have important differences regarding their effects or incidence, and consequently, also differ regarding the handling of evidence. Thus, when we are faced with subjective moral damage, it relates to an injury to the inner sphere of individuals, without repercussions on their assets, or on the social consideration the subject has externally. The opposite occurs with objective moral damage, which does generate economic consequences.
In this sense, "VIII.- Moral damage (also called in doctrine incorporeal, non-pecuniary, affective, etc.) occurs when the sphere of non-pecuniary interest of the individual is injured, however, as its violation can generate pecuniary consequences, it is appropriate to distinguish between 'pure' subjective moral damage, or affective, and objective or 'objectified' moral damage. Subjective moral damage occurs when a non-pecuniary right has been injured, without impacting the assets, normally involving an unjust disturbance of the individual's emotional conditions (displeasure, discouragement, despair, loss of satisfaction in living, etc., e.g., injury to honor, dignity, privacy, the so-called loss of enjoyment of life, grief over the death of a family member or loved one, etc.). Objective moral damage injures a non-pecuniary right with repercussions on the assets, that is, it generates economically assessable consequences (e.g., the case of the professional who, due to the attributed act, loses their clientele in whole or in part).
This distinction serves to separate the damage suffered by the individual in their social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual sphere (grief for the death of a relative), one refers to the social part and the other to the affective part of the non-pecuniary sphere... Objective moral damage, contrary to the previous one, requires the corresponding demonstration. As stated in the preceding section, it refers to the injury of a non-pecuniary right that generates economically assessable consequences. That is, it is that suffered by the person in their social context, and not in the individual sphere. Hence, it is necessary to demonstrate how the damage occurred, and indispensable to prove, in addition to the causal link, its existence, corresponding, under the protection of numeral 317 of the Código Procesal Civil, to the person claiming it, to provide sufficient evidence to support it (...) Thus, as has been explained, subjective moral damage is 'in re ipsa', which means that the nature of the injury in the circumstances in which it was caused is clear, it is possible to conclude directly and have it proven that the suffering, pain, anguish, and despair indeed occurred, for example if a serious injury is suffered.
But there must always be a causal link between the generating event and the damage claimed. It is different with objective damage, which does require evidence to support it..." (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, No. 112-1992, of fourteen hours on July 15, 1992). In the matter under examination, the Tribunal considers that the plaintiff did not carry out evidentiary activity aimed at proving the alleged objective moral damage, given that the witness [Name 011] did not make statements about this point, but rather about the subjective moral damage (see the digital backup of the witness statement given by [Name 011] at the trial hearing, which is recorded in the associated documents folder of the virtual file). Consequently, the Tribunal considers that there is an absolute omission of his evidentiary duty, which would provide the Tribunal with at least an indication of the existence and magnitude of the alleged damage, a burden that corresponded to the plaintiff, as clearly established in Article 41.1 of the Código Procesal Civil, applicable in this case, since the conditions established for this purpose by numeral 220 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo are met. Therefore, the rejection of this part of the claim is declared.
Finally, regarding the claim for indexation to be applied to the amounts the State is ordered to pay in this judgment, it is necessary to emphasize that in pronouncement No. 378-F-S1-2018 of 14:05 hours on April 26, 2018, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia considered:
"...V.- Of importance for the resolution of the objection, it is appropriate to make the following clarifications regarding indexation and interest. Money is a unit of measurement of the economic value of goods and services. It constitutes a monetary unit of payment and, to that extent, it is subject to changes generated by economic factors, such as inflation or devaluation. Thus, for example, whoever receives a loan today to return the money within two years, received an amount that can be exchanged for other goods and services at their current prices. If, as a consequence of inflation, prices rose, it means that after two years, the debtor would deliver the same number of monetary units, but with a lower economic value than that lent, because the capacity and disposal power with that amount will be less than it had at the time the loan was granted. The classic theory of nominalism, in which 'one colon equals one colon, a dollar is always equal to a dollar,' that is, a monetary unit is always equal to itself, does not generate equivalence in the obligations affected by said economic phenomena.
With that theory, monetary units are legally presumed stable, which is not typical in the current era. A debt today will not have the same value over time, precisely because money is dependent on market economic changes. It cannot be overlooked that the nominal payment of an obligation does not necessarily take into account monetary depreciation, which translates, concretely, into the loss of real exchange value or purchasing power of money, as a consequence of the increase in inflation or the general level of prices. In this context, if the quantum of the obligation is not readjusted, the creditor is exposed to being paid a nominal sum that does not correspond to the real value of the obligation. To solve this problem, in several precedents of this Chamber, it has been held that interest serves to compensate for the opportunity cost that had to be borne by the person who did not receive the money owed during the period of non-compliance, and, for its part, indexation functions as a mechanism to readjust the loss of currency value due to inflation.
Thus, it has been said that both items are not mutually exclusive, since the updating of a sum of money does not except the recognition of damages. Likewise, a distinction has been made between legal and net interest, to recognize the latter item in sums that have been indexed. (See, among others, decisions No. 1315 of 10 hours 56 minutes on December 7, 2016, No. 835 of 9 hours 25 minutes on August 11, 2016, No. 1282 of 9 hours 5 minutes on October 11, 2012, No. 902 of 9 hours 55 minutes on July 31, 2012, No. 1384 of 8 hours 55 minutes on November 10, 2011, No. 1053 of 13 hours 55 minutes on October 8, 2011, No. 557 of 10 hours 10 minutes on May 6, 2010 and No. 1053 of 13 hours 55 minutes on October 8, 2009). However, after deep and conscientious reflection, the conviction is reached that the payment of interest (legal or conventional) constitutes a compensatory and indexing measure at the same time, insofar as it adjusts the mismatches in the value of money over time, as well as the effects due to its unavailability.
The legislator regulated two ways of calculating interest in the absence of an agreement between the parties: Article 1163 of the Civil Code for civil obligations and Article 497 of the Commercial Code for commercial ones. In the former, the interest will be equal to that paid by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month term certificates of deposit for the currency in question. In the latter, it will be calculated based on the basic passive rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica for operations in national currency and at the prime rate for operations in American dollars. In both cases, the parameter for its calculation is governed by the yield that financial entities provide to their savers. The objective of this type of rate is to counteract the effects of inflation on the saved money, in such a way that the deposited sum is compensated and updated and, in turn, provides a yield to the saver.
In summary, it is a composite rate: it covers indexation and utility at the same time. The same applies to conventional interest, insofar as the agreed rate is higher than the aforementioned legal ones. In this way, whenever there is a monetary obligation with interest payment, it is not possible to index the sum, since their joint payment would imply solving monetary devaluation twice. In that sense, the interest rate, comprised of the cost of money and inflation, is aimed at compensating the creditor for the damage, represented by the depreciation of the currency (loss of its real value), and the loss, consisting of the profit foregone by not having lucrative disposal of the capital. This thesis had previously been upheld by this Adjudicating Body (see, among others, rulings No. 313 of 15 hours 30 minutes on April 17, 2002, as well as No. 49 of 15 hours on May 19, 1995). In such decisions, it was indicated that 'the default in the payment of an obligation of this nature (referring to monetary obligations) generates the recognition in favor of the creditor of interest as a civil fruit that is no longer received due to the lack of availability of the capital, that is, the interest rate constitutes an important means aimed at seeking the least possible damage to the assets of the one who has been deprived of what belongs to them, since, one of its basic components, apart from the utility for the use of the capital, is the inflation rate [...]'.
According to the above, the interest rate configures a monetary correction mechanism of the debt, since the inflationary component is immersed in its calculation. With this, the loss caused by currency depreciation is compensated or indexed. With the entry into force of the CPCA, by the normative provision inserted in Article 123, it was established that when an order is made to fulfill a monetary obligation, directly or by equivalent, a pronouncement must be included on the updating of said sum, in order to compensate for the variation in purchasing power occurring during the period between the date of enforceability of the obligation and its extinction by effective payment. For the purpose of updating purchasing power, the legislator set as a parameter for its calculation the consumer price index, issued by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos. This indicator measures the variation in prices of the Costa Rican basic basket in a specific period of time; that is, inflation is quantified with it.
The cited numeral 123 aims to compensate the creditor for inflationary impacts, which is why it requires the Judge to pronounce on the updating of the granted sum. However, as explained supra, when a monetary obligation entails the payment of interest, as a rule it can be indicated that such covers that required update, insofar as these, by configuring the price of money, become the remuneration or consideration of it, which is why the interest rate (whether set by the parties themselves or by Law) covers that inflationary component, in addition to the opportunity cost and unavailability of money. Nevertheless, such rule admits exceptions, such as when hyperinflationary processes or cycles occur, where legal or conventional interest has not been able to foresee that unexpected process. This is not the case. VI.- In the sub judice, the appellant claims that there was an error in the contested judgment, because only legal interest was granted and the conferred sum was not indexed, even though numeral 123 of the CPCA orders it and it was also expressly requested in the claim.
As explained in the preceding considerando, this type of interest covers a percentage for inflation and another for pure return or benefit. In this way, such interest compensates for the unavailability of the money for the time the party has not had access to it and, in addition, the deflationary effect that sum has suffered, that is, it is brought to present value. In this case, the Tribunal granted legal interest on the granted amount, thereby covering not only compensation for the unavailability of the principal amount, but also updating its value, thus fulfilling the normative provision of the cited canon 123. In other words, the indexation was immersed within the granted legal interest, because the inflationary index is a component of it. Thus, granting interest and indexation jointly, as the appellant intends, is inappropriate because he would receive in his favor the calculation of the inflationary item in duplicate, which entails an undue economic advantage. Therefore, the objection must be rejected..." (the highlighting is not from the original).
Based on the provisions of the judgment partially transcribed above, this collegiate body considers that the indexation both on the sum of two million colones (¢2,000,000.00) for subjective moral damage, and on the amounts determined in the judgment execution phase of this Tribunal for lost wages (salarios caídos)—if that is appropriate in view of the documents visible on folios 149 to 151 and 155 of the judicial file—will proceed if the plaintiff demonstrates in the same judgment execution stage that the interest is not sufficient to cover inflation or the loss of purchasing power of the money.
In summary, the gravity of the alleged misconduct cannot justify the violation of fundamental procedural guarantees, closely related to the timely and proper exercise of disciplinary-sanctioning authority; g) Regarding judgments number 100-F-TC-2018 and 119-F-TC-2018 issued by the Tribunal de Casación de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil, to which the State's representative referred during the conclusions phase of the oral and public trial, it should be noted that these are dissimilar precedents, given that they compute the two-year statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) provided in numeral 83 of the Ley General de Policía, taking into account or not the different phases into which the disciplinary procedure before the MSP is divided, to the point that according to judgment number 100-F-TC-2018, the procedure would have a duration of eight years, given that each time any of the four stages comprising it is interrupted, as provided in the Ley General de Policía, the two-year period would begin its computation anew; unlike what was considered in judgment 119-F-TC-2018.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be highlighted that both introduce—as is indicated, in application of the principle of self-integration of the administrative legal system—a characteristic element of procedures processed for alleged misconduct against the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) and/or the internal control system, which is the provision in paragraph 2 of numeral 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, relating to the statute of limitations being interrupted with continued effects. This is despite the fact that article 83 of the Ley General de Policía does not contemplate that form of computing the indicated statute of limitations, given that due to its nature, it is not applicable to disciplinary misconduct not related to the two aforementioned scenarios (Public Treasury or Internal Control), as is the case here. Due to the foregoing, this Court maintains the criterion expressed in judgment 28-2018-V of 08:00 hours on April 2, 2018, regarding the applicable statute of limitations and the manner of computing it, in cases of disciplinary sanctioning procedures, regulated by the Ley General de Policía, which are not related to misconduct against the Public Treasury and/or the internal control system. [...]
VIIo.- ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF MOTIVATION, ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE, REASONABLENESS, AND PROPORTIONALITY OF THE FINAL DISMISSAL ACT ISSUED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. In the first instance, this Court deems it necessary to highlight the importance of the existence of procedures for alleged harassment or sexual harassment (hostigamiento o acoso sexual) in a patriarchal society such as Costa Rican, with deep prejudices regarding relationships between women and men, or between people of the same gender in the workplace and their gender roles, a situation that obliges legal practitioners to redouble respect for technical-legal standards regarding the use of presumptions (“iuris tantum” and “iure et iure”) and the rigor with which the procedural rules of circumstantial evidence must be applied, because otherwise Justice and Legal Certainty would be at risk in the specific case, and by default, it would be detrimental to the very important purposes pursued by this legislation, based on the principles contained in the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women.
In that sense, although it is true that, due to the special circumstances in which the different manifestations of harassment or sexual harassment can occur, obtaining direct evidence is difficult, and therefore, the statement of the complainant must be assessed together with the existing circumstantial evidence, in accordance with the rules of sound criticism, logic, experience, reasonableness, and proportionality, as well as the special principles governing this matter (confidentiality, in dubio pro víctima, freedom, equality and non-discrimination based on gender, human life, and the right to dignified work); it is also true that this does not imply placing the person accused of the alleged commission of that misconduct in a state of defenselessness, obviating the effective protection of minimum procedural guarantees, such as the motivation of the administrative act, observance of the deadlines for the employer to exercise disciplinary-sanctioning authority, assessment of existing evidence according to the rules of rational sound criticism, among others.
To argue otherwise would imply a flagrant violation of due process (debido proceso), since if the purpose of the disciplinary procedure is the search for truth, it would be illegitimate for the victim's statement to be given full credibility per se, without first assessing that testimony together with the other existing evidentiary elements—regardless of whether they constitute direct or circumstantial evidence—in order to establish whether, in each specific case, the sexual abuse misconduct typified in Law 7476 was demonstrated or not, and therefore, whether or not there is grounds to apply the respective sanction, which in any case, will be proportional to the gravity of the proven act. Under these parameters, we will proceed to analyze whether in the specific case, the final act ratifying the recommendations for dismissal without employer liability against the appellant for alleged sexual abuse, suffers or not from a defect of absolute nullity, for being substantially contrary to the legal system.- [...]
Xo.- [...] On the other hand, given the petition raised by the plaintiff, regarding the recognition of legal interest on the amount determined for this item, it is necessary to clarify that the jurisprudential line of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia in this matter is that: “… it is evident, regarding these items in the case of obligations of value, it is possible to grant them as of the judgment where the amount due was established and until its effective payment…” (Judgment number 000293-F-S1-2016 issued at 09:45 hours on April 7, 2016, issued by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia). Consequently, in accordance with the foregoing, the recognition of legal interest on the sum established in this judgment for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) in favor of the plaintiff is appropriate, from its finality and until its effective payment, and not from the moment the damage occurred.
XIo.- ON THE CLAIM FOR INDEMNIFICATION FOR OBJECTIVE MORAL DAMAGES (DAÑO MORAL OBJETIVO). Regarding objective moral damages, the plaintiff bases this part of their claim, arguing that their image and honorability as a person and member of the Fuerza Pública, were affected in different spheres—family, work, and before public opinion in general—therefore, they estimate the injury in the amount of twenty-five million colones. When dealing with the issue of moral damages, it must be clear that the subjective and objective types, although they share their non-proprietary nature, have important differences in terms of their effects or incidence, and consequently, also differ in the handling of evidence. Thus, when we face a subjective moral damage, this relates to an injury to the inner sphere of the person, without repercussions on their property, or on the social consideration that the subject has externally.
The opposite occurs with objective moral damage, which does generate economic consequences. In this sense, “VIII.- Moral damage (also called in doctrine incorporal, extra-proprietary, of affection, etc.) occurs when the sphere of extra-proprietary interest of the individual is injured, however, as its violation can generate proprietary consequences, it is appropriate to distinguish between 'pure' subjective moral damage, or damage of affection, and objective or 'objectified' moral damage. Subjective moral damage occurs when an extra-proprietary right has been injured, without repercussions on property, normally supposing an unjust disturbance of the individual's mental conditions (disgust, discouragement, despair, loss of satisfaction with life, etc., e.g., the offense against honor, dignity, intimacy, the so-called loss of enjoyment of life, affliction due to the death of a relative or loved one, etc.).
Objective moral damage injures an extra-proprietary right with repercussions on property, that is, it generates economically valuable consequences (e.g., the case of the professional who, due to the attributed act, loses their clientele in whole or in part). This distinction serves to delineate the damage suffered by the individual in their social consideration (good name, honor, honesty, etc.) from that suffered in the individual field (affliction due to the death of a relative), thus one refers to the social part and the other to the affective part of property… Objective moral damage, contrary to the former, requires corresponding demonstration. As stated in the preceding section, it refers to the injury of an extra-proprietary right that generates economically valuable consequences. That is, it is what is suffered by the person in their social context, and not in the individual field.
Hence, it is necessary to demonstrate how the damage occurred, and it is essential to prove, in addition to the causation, its existence, corresponding, under the protection of numeral 317 of the Código Procesal Civil, to the one who requests it, to provide sufficient evidence to support it (...) Consequently, as has been stated, subjective moral damage is “in re ipsa”, which means that the nature of the injury in the circumstances in which it was caused is clear, allowing to directly conclude and take as proven that the suffering, pain, anguish, and despair did indeed occur, for example, if a serious injury is suffered. But there must always be a causal link between the generating act and the claimed damage. The opposite occurs with the objective type, which does require supporting evidence…”. (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia No. 112-1992, of fourteen hours on July 15, 1992).
In the matter under review, the Court considers that the plaintiff did not carry out evidentiary activity aimed at proving the alleged objective moral damages, given that the witness [Nombre 011], did not make statements regarding this point, but regarding the subjective moral damages (see digital recording of the testimonial statement given by [Nombre 011] at the trial hearing, which is contained in the associated documents folder of the virtual case file). Consequently, the Court considers that there is an absolute omission of their evidentiary duty, which provides the Court with at least an indication of the existence and magnitude of the alleged damage, a burden that corresponded to the plaintiff, as is clearly established in article 41.1 of the Código Procesal Civil, applicable in this case, upon fulfillment of the prerequisites established for this purpose by numeral 220 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Therefore, the rejection of this part of the claim is declared.
XIIo.- ON INDEXATION (INDEXACIÓN). Finally, regarding the claim for indexation to be applied to the amounts that the State is ordered to pay in this judgment, it is necessary to highlight that in ruling number No. 378-F-S1-2018 of 14:05 hours on April 26, 2018, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia considered: “…V.- Of importance for the resolution of the objection, it is appropriate to make the following precisions regarding indexation and interest. Money is a unit of measurement of the economic value of goods and services. It constitutes a monetary unit of payment and, to that extent, is subject to changes generated by economic factors, such as inflation or devaluation. Thus, for example, whoever receives a loan today to return the money within two years, received an amount that can be exchanged for other goods and services at their current prices. If as a consequence of inflation, prices rose, it means that in two years the debtor would deliver the same number of monetary units, but with an economic value lower than the one lent, because the capacity and power of disposition with such amount will be less than it was at the time of granting the loan.
The classic theory of nominalism, in which 'one colón equals one colón, one dollar is always equal to one dollar', that is, one monetary unit is always equal to itself, does not generate equivalence in the obligations affected by such economic phenomena. With that theory, monetary units are legally presumed stable, which is not typical in modern times. A debt today will not have the same value in a while, precisely because money is dependent on the economic changes of the market. It cannot be overlooked that the nominal payment of an obligation does not necessarily take into account monetary depreciation, which translates concretely into the loss of the real exchange value or purchasing power of money, as a consequence of increased inflation or the general price level. In this context, if the quantum of the obligation is not readjusted, the creditor risks being paid a nominal sum that does not correspond to the real value of the obligation.
To solve that problem, in several precedents of this Chamber, it has been held that interest serves to compensate the opportunity cost that had to be borne by whoever did not receive the money owed during the period of non-compliance and, for its part, indexation serves as a mechanism to readjust the loss of the currency's value due to inflation. Thus, it has been said that both items are not mutually exclusive, since the updating of a sum of money does not except the recognition of damages. Likewise, a distinction has been made between legal and net interest, to recognize this latter item in sums that have been indexed. (See, among others, rulings No. 1315 of 10 hours 56 minutes on December 7, 2016, No. 835 of 9 hours 25 minutes on August 11, 2016, No. 1282 of 9 hours 5 minutes on October 11, 2012, No. 902 of 9 hours 55 minutes on July 31, 2012, No. 1384 of 8 hours 55 minutes on November 10, 2011, No. 1053 of 13 hours 55 minutes on October 8, 2011, No. 557 of 10 hours 10 minutes on May 6, 2010, and No. 1053 of 13 hours 55 minutes on October 8, 2009).
However, after a deep and thoughtful reflection, one arrives at the conviction that the payment of interest (legal or conventional) constitutes a compensatory and indexation measure at the same time, insofar as it adjusts the mismatches in the value of money due to the passage of time, as well as the effects of the unavailability thereof. The legislator regulated two ways of calculating interest in the absence of an agreement between parties: Article 1163 of the Código Civil for civil obligations, and 497 of the Código de Comercio for commercial ones. In the first, the interest shall be equal to that paid by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month certificates of deposit for the currency in question. In the second, it shall be calculated based on the basic passive rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica for operations in national currency and the prime rate for operations in US dollars.
In both cases, the parameter for its calculation is governed by the yield that financial entities provide to their savers. The objective of these types of rates is to counteract the effects of inflation on saved money, in such a way that the deposited sum is compensated and updated and, at the same time, provides a return to the saver. In summary, it is a composite rate: it covers indexation and profit at the same time. The same fate applies to conventional ones, as long as the agreed rate is higher than the referred legal ones. In this way, whenever there is a monetary obligation with payment of interest, it is not possible to index the sum, because their joint payment would imply solving the monetary devaluation twice over. In that sense, the interest rate, composed of the cost of money and inflation, is aimed at compensating the creditor for the damage, represented by the depreciation of the currency (loss of its real value), and the loss, consisting of the gain forgone by not lucratively disposing of the capital.
This thesis had been previously held by this Deciding Body (see, among others, rulings No. 313 of 15 hours 30 minutes on April 17, 2002, as well as No. 49 of 15 hours on May 19, 1995). In such rulings, it was indicated that 'default in the payment of an obligation of this nature (referring to monetary obligations) generates the recognition in favor of the creditor of interest as a civil fruit that they cease to receive due to the lack of availability of the capital, that is, the interest rate constitutes an important means aimed at seeking the least possible damage to the patrimony of the person who has been deprived of what belongs to them, since one of its basic components, apart from the profit for the use of capital, is the inflation rate […]'. According to the foregoing, the interest rate constitutes a mechanism for monetary correction of the debt, since the inflationary component is found immersed in its calculation.
This compensates for or indexes the loss caused by the depreciation of the currency. With the entry into force of the CPCA, through the normative provision inserted in article 123, it was established that when a party is ordered to fulfill a monetary obligation, directly or by equivalent, a pronouncement must be included on the updating of said sum, in order to compensate for the variation in purchasing power that occurred during the period between the enforceability date of the obligation and its extinction by effective payment. To update the purchasing power, the legislator set as a parameter for its calculation the consumer price index, issued by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos. This indicator measures the variation in prices of the Costa Rican basic basket in a specific period of time (sic); that is, this quantifies inflation. The cited numeral 123 aims to compensate the creditor for inflationary impacts, which is why it imposes on the Judge a pronouncement on the updating of the granted sum.
Now then, as explained supra, when a monetary obligation carries with it the payment of interest, as a rule it can be indicated that this covers that required updating, insofar as these, by constituting the price of money, become the retribution or consideration thereof, which is why the interest rate (whether set by the parties themselves or by Law) covers that inflationary component, in addition to the opportunity cost and unavailability of money. However, this rule admits exceptions, such as when hyperinflationary processes or cycles occur, where legal or conventional interest could not have foreseen that unexpected process. This is not the case. VI.- In the subjudice, the appellant indicates that there was an error in the challenged judgment, because only legal interest was granted and the granted sum was not indexed, even though numeral 123 of the CPCA orders it and it was also expressly requested in the claim.
As explained in the preceding consideration, this type of interest covers a percentage for inflation and another for yield or pure profit. In this way, such interest compensates for the unavailability of money during the time the party has not had access to it and, in addition, the deflationary effect that sum has suffered, that is, it is brought to present value. In this case, the Court granted legal interest on the amount awarded, so it covered not only indemnification for the unavailability of the principal amount, but also the updating of its value, thus complying with the normative provision of the cited canon 123. In other words, the indexation was immersed within the legal interest granted, because the inflation index is a component thereof. Thus, granting interest and indexation jointly, as the appellant intends, is inappropriate because they would receive the calculation of the inflationary item in their favor in duplicate, which entails an undue economic advantage.
Therefore, the objection must be rejected…” (highlighting is not from the original). Based on the provisions of the judgment partially transcribed above, this collegiate body considers that indexation, both on the sum of two million colones (¢2,000,000.00) for subjective moral damages, and on the amounts determined in the judgment execution phase of this Court for back pay (salarios caídos)—if appropriate in view of the documents visible at folios 149 to 151 and 155 of the judicial case file—will proceed if the plaintiff demonstrates in the same judgment execution stage, that the interest is not sufficient to cover inflation or the loss of purchasing power of money.-" ", "html_plano": "\"IVo.- RESPECTO AL ALEGATO DE QUE LA ACCIÓN SANCIONADORA DEL MINISTERIO DE SEGURIDAD PÚBLICA SE ENCUENTRA PRESCRITA. En primera instancia, cabe indicar que el artículo 83 de la Ley General de Policía establece que: \"Las faltas leves prescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La prescripción se interrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario.\". A partir de la norma especial antes citada, este Tribunal considera lo siguiente:
VI.In the case at hand, the appellant argues that there was an error in the challenged judgment, because only legal interest was granted and the awarded sum was not indexed, even though Article 123 of the CPCA mandates it and it was also expressly requested in the complaint. As explained in the preceding recital, this type of interest covers a percentage for inflation and another for yield or pure profit. Thus, such interest compensates for the unavailability of the money for the time that the party has not had access to it and, in addition, for the deflationary effect that sum has suffered, that is, it is brought to present value. In this case, the Court granted legal interest on the awarded amount, thereby covering not only compensation for the unavailability of the principal amount, but also the updating of its value, thus complying with the normative provision of the cited Article 123. In other words, the indexation was embedded within the legal interest granted, since the inflation index is a component thereof.
Therefore, granting interest and indexation jointly, as the appellant intends, is improper because he would receive the calculation of the inflation component in duplicate, which entails an undue economic advantage. For the foregoing reason, the objection must be dismissed…” (the highlighting is not from the original). \nBased on the provisions of the judgment partially transcribed above, this collegiate body considers that indexation both on the sum of two million colones (¢2,000,000.00) for subjective moral damages, and on the amounts determined in the judgment execution phase of this Court for back pay—should that be appropriate in view of the documents visible at folios 149 to 151 and 155 of the judicial file—will proceed if the plaintiff demonstrates in that same judgment execution stage that the interest is insufficient to cover inflation or the loss of the money's purchasing power.
"IVo.- RESPECTO AL ALEGATO DE QUE LA ACCIÓN SANCIONADORA DEL MINISTERIO DE SEGURIDAD PÚBLICA SE ENCUENTRA PRESCRITA. En primera instancia, cabe indicar que el artículo 83 de la Ley General de Policía establece que: "Las faltas leves prescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La prescripción se interrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario.". A partir de la norma especial antes citada, este Tribunal considera lo siguiente:
Document not found. Documento no encontrado.