Fatal traffic accident on Route 110 not attributable to AyA, CONAVI or StateAccidente de tránsito fatal en Ruta 110 no atribuible a AyA, CONAVI o Estado

**II.** **REGARDING THE PROVEN FACTS:** Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following are considered as such: 1) That on the twenty-first of March, two thousand nine, Mr. Michael Obando Corea died as a consequence of a traffic accident that occurred in Alajuelita de San José, Ruta 110, fifty meters north of the Río Tiribí, on the public road in the San José-Alajuelita direction. The accident was due to the fact that Mr. Obando, who was driving the motorcycle with license plate M-190612 in the Alajuelita-San José direction, lost control of it, skidded and rolled along the pavement, and was run over by the Bus with license plate SJB-8191, which caused the injuries that led to his death (see folios 10 and 15 to 20 of the judicial file). 2) That at the time of the accident there were threads of water on the road (see folios 15 to 20 and 36 of the judicial file and the statements of witnesses Edgar Eduardo Madrigal Rojas and Ana Cecilia Guerrero Agüero). 3) That the accident was due to the lack of skill (impericia) of Mr. Obando Corea, understood as the lack of ability to have maintained control of the motorcycle (see the statement of expert Jorge Isaac Monge Campos, both in the expert report visible at folios 736 to 748 of the judicial file and in the statement given at the oral and public trial). 4) That with the amount of water observed in the photos at the time of the accident, hydroplaning (hidroplaneamiento) was not possible, this concept being understood as the circumstance that prevents a vehicle's tire or tires from losing contact with the running surface and causing loss of control (see the expert report and statement of expert Monge Campos and the statement of witness Benjamín Sandino González). 5) That the maximum speed at the accident site was forty kilometers per hour (see folio 360 of the file and the statement of witness Sandino González). 6) That at the accident site, drivers should drive defensively and not exceed speed limits (see the statement of expert Jorge Isaac Monge Campos, both in the expert report visible at folios 736 to 748 of the judicial file and in the statement given at the oral and public trial). 7) That Mr. Obando Corea was traveling at a speed between 40 and 50 kilometers per hour (statement of witness Madrigal Rojas). 8) That Mr. Obando lived in Concepción de Alajuelita and frequently passed by the accident site (see folio 53 of the file and testimonial statement of Mrs. Flor María Bermúdez Fallas). 9) That Mr. Obando appeared registered in the Drivers' registry of the Dirección General de Educación Vial, with a type A3 license since the twenty-third of February, two thousand nine (see folio 368 of the judicial file). 10) That the plaintiff Jiménez Bermúdez and the deceased Obando Corea were not cohabiting as a common-law partnership (pareja de hecho) (see folio 42 and 43 of the judicial file and statement of Mrs. Flor María Bermúdez Fallas at the oral and public trial).

**III.** **FACTS NOT PROVEN:** 1) That the water that ran over the asphalt at the accident in which Mr. Obando Corea lost his life, was the cause of the accident. 2) That a causal relationship existed between any material conduct of the co-defendant administrations and the death of Mr. Obando, and that as a consequence, a compensable damage had been produced.

**IV.** **OBJECT OF THE PROCEEDING:** The present proceeding is of an indemnity nature, as the plaintiffs seek to be compensated for the damages caused as a result of the accident in which Mr. Michael Obando Corea lost his life, considering that it originated from the water that was on Ruta 110 at the time of the accident, which caused the motorcycle driver to slip and lose control of the vehicle, a responsibility attributed to AyA for the presence of water on the road, as well as to CONAVI and the State for being responsible for road maintenance. It also argues that there is a right to road safety. The subjective moral damage of Mrs. Katherine Jiménez Bermúdez is derived from the dating relationship she maintained with the deceased and the marriage project they had, and that of her daughter from the loss of her father, which implies not only subjective moral damage but also material damage. For its part, AyA argues that the case is based on theories, but that certainty has not been reached regarding responsibility, since if it originates from the water existing on the road, there is no evidence that it was the institution's responsibility. It adds that Mr. Obando Corea traveled through the place every day and knew the street was wet, so it is possible he was coming at high speed and this circumstance was the cause of the accident. It rejects the material damage of the minor Obando Jiménez, as the expert's report is defective, and the moral damage of the child was not determined. Regarding Mrs. Jiménez Bermúdez, it considers that there is no standing (legitimación), an assessment shared by CONAVI, since it was not possible to demonstrate the family relationship that united them. The Council also notes that it was not possible to demonstrate that an action or omission generated damage, since Ruta 110 is maintained in optimal conditions, the stabilization works of a slope (talud) existing at the accident site began nine months after the accident, and that AyA intervened on the road and did not notify the Council so that it could determine if the asphalt layer had been left well. Regarding the water existing on the road, it is the responsibility of AyA and, in any case, the cause of the accident was the lack of skill (impericia) of Mr. Obando Corea, who should have driven according to the principles of avoidability and foreseeability. It deems that there is no responsibility of CONAVI. It requests that the moral damage of Mrs. Jiménez Bermúdez be rejected because there is no standing (legitimación), that the material damage of the minor be rejected due to the inconsistencies in the expert's report, and that in general terms, according to Article 317 of the Código Procesal Civil, the plaintiff party failed to demonstrate the damages. For its part, the State argues that the plaintiff party confuses the legal foundation of its claim, basing it on Article 1045 of the Código Civil, whereas the application of Articles 190 and following of the Ley General de la Administración Pública is appropriate. It also points out the lack of active standing (legitimación activa) of the plaintiff Jiménez Bermúdez. It raises the exceptions of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) and lack of right, which it bases on the fact that it has not been proven that the water existing on the roadway was the cause of the accident, and that furthermore, it cannot be attributed to the State, but rather to AyA. It points out that there was good lighting and good conditions, provided there was foresight. It argues there was fault of the victim, since Mr. Obando traveled daily and knew the road and its conditions, that the maximum speed at which he could drive was between 30 to 40 kilometers, and that one cannot travel at the permitted limit if conditions do not allow it, so that said gentleman coming in the descent lane obligated him to decelerate to drive defensively, to which it adds his little experience driving, which was about one month. It says that the party has not been able to prove its case theory, that there is no causal relationship (relación de causalidad), and objects to the damages sought, as well as the fact that the indexation request does not proceed, for being an obligation of value.

**V.** **REGARDING LAPSE (CADUCIDAD):** AyA raised the exception of lapse (caducidad), as it considered that the plaintiffs had one year to file the claim, according to the terms established in subsection 1) of Article 39 of the CPCA. In this regard, this Tribunal indicates that the present proceeding is of an indemnity nature and is not related to the challenge of a formal conduct of the Administration. The lapse (caducidad) of the action, which is what the cited article mentions, is precisely related to the formal acts of the administrations, for which, in general terms, one year is established to exercise the action before this instance, so it is not receivable. For this, there is the statute of limitations (prescripción), which refers to a right and is provided for in Article 41 of the same legal body, but since it was not raised by the co-defendants, the Court cannot examine it ex officio. Therefore, the exception of lapse (caducidad) must be rejected.

**VI.** **REGARDING THE EXCEPTION OF LACK OF ACTIVE STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN ACTIVA) RAISED AGAINST MRS. KATHERINE DAYANA JIMÉNEZ BERMÚDEZ IN THIS PROCEEDING:** The co-defendant parties raised the exception of lack of active standing (legitimación activa) of Mrs. Jiménez Bermúdez to file this proceeding, in summary, because at the time of Mr. Obando Corea's death, there was no factual cohabitation that supported her claims. The Costa Rican legal system recognizes a common-law partnership (unión de hecho) as having the same patrimonial effects as marriage, provided that the requirements established in Article 242 of the Código de Familia are met, that is, that it is public, notorious, and stable, for more than three years, and between a man and a woman with legal capacity to marry. For purposes of its recognition, numeral 243 establishes that the cohabitant or the heirs may request it from the Tribunal within the lapse (caducidad) period of two years from the break-up of the cohabitation. According to the statement of the plaintiff herself in the criminal summary 09-005407-042, as well as the statement of Mrs. Flor María Bermúdez Fallas, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff and the deceased Obando Corea maintained a dating relationship, that they had a daughter, but that they did not cohabit as a couple, since they lived in separate houses. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not promote the recognition of her union, which is an indispensable requirement for it to have patrimonial effects. This has been repeatedly recognized by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, when it states:

"The ordinal 242 of the Código de Familia establishes: 'The public, notorious, unique, and stable common-law partnership (unión de hecho), for more than three years, between a man and a woman who have legal capacity to marry, shall produce all the patrimonial effects proper to legally formalized marriage, upon ending for any cause.' On the other hand, canon 243 ejúsdem says: 'For the purposes indicated in the previous article, any of the cohabitants or their heirs may request from the Tribunal the recognition of the common-law partnership (unión de hecho). The action shall be processed via the abbreviated proceeding, regulated in the Código Procesal Civil, and shall lapse (caducará) in two years from the break-up of the cohabitation or the death of the de cujus.' From the analysis of the rules just transcribed, it follows that indeed, Article 243 of the Código de Familia establishes a lapse (caducidad) period to initiate the respective proceeding for the recognition of a common-law partnership (unión de hecho) that meets the requirements established in numeral 242 of the same legal body, namely: 'notorious, unique and stable, for more than three years, between a man and a woman who have legal capacity to marry.' The foregoing in order to recognize 'all the patrimonial effects proper to legally formalized marriage, upon ending for any cause.' By virtue of this, the established period is two years from the break-up of the cohabitation or the death of the de cujus. The analyzed requirements are necessary, precisely because of the particularity of the relationship, since in the absence of a legal bond, certain notorious and easily verifiable elements are essential for the judge. Marriage is a legal bond, which is registered in the Civil Registry; its proof can be given at any time by reviewing the records of that institution. A common-law partnership (unión de hecho), on the contrary, must be proven by other means, be it through witnesses, events, and circumstances that lead the trier of law to verify that said relationship indeed occurred. For this reason, it is essential that there be a prior judicial declaration, since the existence of a de facto bond between two people can only produce patrimonial effects through a judicial judgment that so orders. The cohabitant must undergo the recognition procedure for its validity; that would be the only way to support their standing (legitimación) as a result of that bond." (Judgment 415 of fourteen hours and twenty minutes of the ninth of April, two thousand thirteen).

Having failed, then, to prove a legal relationship that would allow her to appear in this venue to claim possible damages derived from the death of Mr. Obando Corea, the exception raised must be granted and the lack of active standing (legitimación activa) of the plaintiff Jiménez Bermúdez and the inadmissibility of the claim regarding her must be declared, so the analysis of the claims will be carried out only in relation to the minor Keytlin Obando Jiménez, on the grounds that she is the legitimate heir and can claim the compensation that would proceed according to law.

**VII. OF THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:** According to the constitutional principles established in Articles 9, 11, and 41 of the Constitución Política, as well as in the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), starting from Article 190, the liability of the Costa Rican State and more specifically of the public administrations is established as an objective regime, for all actions, both licit and illicit, that occur as a result of the exercise of the administrative function, both in formal activity and in its material or service providing expressions. For such purposes, three elements must be proven: the occurrence of an event, the existence of damage, and the causal link (nexo de causalidad) between the damage and the activity of the administration or administrations involved. Within the complexity of the organizational structure of the Public Administration in Costa Rica and according to what is established in Article 1 of the LGAP, as well as subsection 3 of Article 1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, there is a Central Administration, which is the larger entity, constituted by the constitutional bodies defined in Article 21 of the same law, the Poder Ejecutivo, the Poder Legislativo, and the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, when they perform administrative function, and other bodies of those same powers, such as the Contraloría General de la República and the Defensoría de los Habitantes. Likewise, there is a decentralized administration, which are all those entities that the legal system has endowed with legal personality, autonomy, and budget. Finally, within these entities, the phenomenon of deconcentration occurs, through which competencies are transferred from one body to another, due to specialization, and which in many cases, by decision of the legislator, have been endowed with instrumental legal personality. Having made the above introduction, given the claims of this proceeding, the specific competencies of the entities and bodies involved in this proceeding must be analyzed, starting with the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, which, according to its charter (Law 2726 of April 14, 1961, and its respective amendments), is an autonomous institution of the State, which, according to Article 2 of the cited norm, has, among others, the following competencies:

"a) To direct and oversee everything concerning providing the inhabitants of the republic with a service of potable water, collection and evacuation of black water and liquid industrial waste, and rainwater in urban areas; (...)

• e)To prepare all plans for public works related to the purposes of this law, as well as to approve all those for private works related to the aqueduct and sewer systems, as determined by the respective regulations; f) To exploit, use, govern, or oversee, as the case may be, all public domain water indispensable for the due compliance with the provisions of this law, in exercise of the rights that the State has over them, according to Law number 276 of August 27, 1942, for which purpose the Institute shall be considered the substitute body for the powers attributed in that law to the State, ministries, and municipalities; g) To directly administer and operate the aqueduct and sewer systems throughout the country, which shall be gradually assumed taking into account convenience and resource availability. The systems currently administered and operated by municipal corporations may continue under their charge, as long as they provide efficient service. Under no circumstances may it delegate the administration of the aqueduct and sanitary sewer systems of the Area Metropolitana. Nor may it delegate the administration of systems over which there is financial responsibility and while this corresponds directly to the Institute.

(...); i) To build, expand, and reform the aqueduct and sewer systems in those cases where it is necessary and the best satisfaction of national needs so advises; and j) To control the adequate investment of all resources that the State allocates for aqueduct and sanitary sewer works." As can be deduced from the law, AyA is in charge, not only of the administration, but also of the execution of the works of the aqueduct and sewer systems, which implies not only the construction, but also their maintenance and repair, so any damage occurring on the occasion of the foregoing falls within the scope of its responsibility. On the other hand, CONAVI was created by Law 7798 of April 30, 1998, as a body of maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, with instrumental and budgetary legal personality for the administration of the Fondo de la Red Nacional and to sign contracts and loans necessary for the fulfillment of its functions (Article 3 of the law). For the purposes of this analysis, within the competencies granted by law, in numeral 4 thereof, the following are found:

"a) To plan, program, administer, finance, execute, and control the conservation and construction of the national road network, in accordance with the programs prepared by the Dirección de Planificación of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes.

• b)To administer its assets." From the above, the body's responsibility regarding the construction and conservation of the national road network is clearly extracted. Finally, the State, specifically the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, has as its original competency related to the object of the proceeding, according to its organic law (Law 3155 of August 5, 1963, and its amendments), the following, as established in Article 2:

"a) To plan, build, and improve highways and roads. To maintain highways and collaborate with the Municipalities in the conservation of neighborhood roads. To regulate and control the rights of way of existing or projected highways and roads. To regulate, control, and oversee traffic and transport on public roads." There is, then, also a generic responsibility of the State regarding the maintenance of roads. There is another aspect that must also be analyzed, to determine the case theory of the co-defendants and that is the cause of exclusion of liability due to the fault of the victim, in that Mr. Obando Corea was obliged to drive according to the state of the road. The Ley de Tránsito sobre Vías Públicas Terrestres, Law 7331 of October 13, 1993, in force at the time the events occurred, establishes in its Article 80 the general conditions under which a vehicle must be driven on public land roads:

"Users of public roads must conduct themselves in a manner that does not obstruct circulation or endanger the safety of vehicles or other persons. Likewise, drivers shall avoid situations that impede the free flow of traffic, for which they shall apply defensive driving and maintain constant precaution and mutual consideration towards pedestrians and other drivers.

Drivers shall ensure the physical integrity and safety of themselves and their passengers as those responsible for the vehicle; therefore, they must use the seat belt and require all passengers in the vehicle to use it. The driver who does not use the seat belt or drives a vehicle in which any of the passengers does not use it, shall be sanctioned as established by this Law." On the other hand, speed limits are also regulated in the same law, as follows:

"The speed limits for vehicle circulation shall be set by the Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito, after a technical study, according to the type of road and its conditions. These limits, both minimum and maximum, are in effect from the placement of the signs or markings that indicate such speeds, which must be conveniently installed on the roads. Regarding speed, the following provisions apply:

• a)It is prohibited to travel at a speed higher than the maximum limit or lower than the established minimum, according to the limits set by the Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito; for this, the driver must take into account the road conditions and must do so under the rules indicated in the successive subsections.
• b)The maximum speed permitted on roads where there is no express regulation is sixty (60) kilometers per hour.
• c)In urban areas, the maximum permitted speed shall be forty (40) kilometers per hour. However, a driving speed on these sections that cannot exceed sixty (60) kilometers per hour is authorized, if the road conditions, the prevailing vehicular flow, and the low level of risk involved so permit. In non-urban areas, the maximum limit established for the section may only be exceeded by ten (10) kilometers per hour, only if the conditions indicated above are observed.

ch) When passing in front of the entrance and exit of educational establishments, hospitals, clinics, and places where sports, religious, social, cultural, or other public interest activities or spectacles are held, it is prohibited to travel at a speed greater than twenty-five (25) kilometers per hour, when activities are being carried out in those places.

• d)It is prohibited to travel on any stretch of road at less than the established minimum speed, in a way that limits or delays the free flow of the rest of the motor vehicles; except on occasions when, due to natural or artificial reasons, driving is difficult, or in the case of funeral processions.
• e)On highways, the minimum speed is established at forty (40) kilometers per hour and the maximum speed at one hundred (100) kilometers per hour.
• f)In areas designated as frequently traversed by cyclists, duly marked, the maximum permitted speed shall be forty (40) kilometers per hour. Highways may not be designated as zones frequently traversed by cyclists." The cited norms frame the parameters for drivers of any type of vehicle to travel on land roads.

**VII.** **ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE.** The discussion in this case revolves around whether there was any administrative conduct that generated liability of the entities and body involved regarding the death of Mr. Michael Obando Corea, which occurred on the twenty-first of March, two thousand nine, on national route 110, fifty meters north of the Río Tiribí, in the San José-Alajuelita direction. The death occurred when said gentleman was driving a motorcycle, in the Alajuelita-San José direction, lost control of it, ended up in the opposite lane, where the bus with license plate M-190612 was traveling, and was run over by the bus tires, which caused the injuries that led to his death at the accident site. The plaintiff party maintains that on the day of the mishap, there was water on the running surface and that this is what caused Mr. Obando to lose control of the vehicle he was driving. It attributes responsibility to AyA, since the water came from a pipe belonging to the Institute, as well as to CONAVI and the State for considering it is their responsibility to maintain national roads in optimal conditions for circulation. Both from the testimonial evidence and from the photographs of criminal summary 09-005407-042, in which the death of the deceased was investigated as culpable homicide, it is recorded that there was water on the roadway, so it must be determined if this was the cause of the accident. The criminal case was dismissed against the bus driver, in a resolution at ten hours on the twenty-ninth day of April, two thousand nine, as the criminal judge considered that the water leak existing on the road caused the motorcycle to skid and the fateful event to occur. The conclusion reached by the judge is basically due to the testimony of Edgar Eduardo Madrigal Rojas, who witnessed the event. This Tribunal considers that the conclusion reached by the criminal judge is not binding on it, since what was attempted to be determined was the responsibility of the bus driver in the commission of the crime of culpable homicide, and the evidence gathered was for that purpose, without sufficient technical evidence having been provided to reach that conclusion. Therefore, the matter must be analyzed with the evidence brought to the proceeding to determine not only the possible cause of the accident, but also the liability of the co-defendants, so that it is evaluated as a whole under the principles of sound criticism (sana crítica). Having made the previous observation, the presence of water at the accident site shall be examined first, which, as stated, is recorded in the photos visible at folios 17 and 18 of the file. Said water, according to the accident report, visible at folios 33 to 37 of the file and from the testimonial evidence, emanated from a hole in the roadway. What remains to be determined is if that was the cause of the mishap and, if so, to which of the co-defendants the liability corresponds. To this end, the testimony of Madrigal Rojas is dissected, who was an eyewitness to the accident and who was offered by the plaintiff in the present proceeding. Mr. Madrigal Rojas, as recorded in the criminal file, literally stated in the criminal case: "I arrived at the Alajuelita bridge going up at 30 mts I saw a young man on a motorcycle who was coming a little fast by not in excess, before the curve he braked and began to skid. On the street water was crying, the Coca Cola car perceived what was going to happen, it pulled over to the right towards the wall and braked, I also did the same." In the testimonial statement given on the day of the oral and public trial, this witness stated that the now deceased had slipped due to the water that was on the roadway.

He also indicated that Obando Corea was traveling at a normal speed, between forty and fifty kilometers per hour. In response to questions from the co-defendants regarding the change in version between the records, he clarified that his version in the criminal case file (expediente) was to benefit the bus driver. This statement must be contrasted with the documentary evidence existing in the case file, as well as with the expert report and other witness statements gathered. Firstly, the expert report prepared by Jorge Isaac Mora Campos must be reviewed; he determined, first of all, that the accident was caused by the driver's lack of skill (impericia), understood as the ability to maintain control of the motorcycle. Likewise, his report referred to hydroplaning, which consists of a quantity of water in a location preventing a vehicle's tire—in this case, a motorcycle—from making contact with the road, causing loss of control. In his opinion, based on the photos in the case file, the water was too little for this phenomenon to occur. Moreover, he referred to the fact that the location where the accident occurred, due to the road conditions, makes driving high-risk and that it is dangerous to take the curve at more than forty kilometers per hour, as it is a closed curve with a very small angle, and that the appropriate speed for transit is twenty-five kilometers per hour. On the other hand, witness Benjamín Sandino González concurred with the expert in that hydroplaning existed and that the maximum speed one could travel through the location is forty kilometers per hour. Having analyzed the foregoing evidence as a whole under the rules of sound rational criticism, this Court considers that the witness Madrigal Rojas is not credible regarding the cause of the accident—whether because of skidding or slipping—since regarding an event he witnessed, of which not much time has passed and which was also serious as it resulted in a person's death, he changed his version to favor one of the parties, at least concerning the criminal process. What is consistent, in both instances, is the speed at which Mr. Obando Corea was driving, since in the criminal process he said he was coming "rapidito" (rather fast) and in the present one that he was coming at a speed between forty and fifty kilometers per hour, an aspect to be revisited later. Similarly, the expert and the witness Sandino González agree that hydroplaning could not have occurred, as the amount of water was very little. Therefore, and despite the criminal case file indicating the street was slippery, there is no reliable proof that Mr. Obando Corea had slipped, as the eyewitness entered into contradictions, in addition to the fact that hydroplaning could not have occurred, that is, that the motorcycle's tires had lost contact with the road surface. The foregoing leads to consideration of the deceased's driving manner. It is an undisputed fact that Mr. Obando Corea lived in Alajuelita and frequently traveled through the accident location. It has also been established that at the time of his death, he had had his driver's license for approximately one month, and that the road conditions required drivers of any type of vehicle to travel at a maximum limit of forty kilometers per hour and that it was prudent to do so at an even lower speed, regardless of the existence of water at said location, which, according to the witness testimony of Ana Cecilia Guerrero Agüero, had been there for several days. As indicated previously, the cause of the accident was the driver's lack of skill (impericia) in not having been able to control the motorcycle when he took the curve. Taking into account that the only eyewitness was consistent that Mr. Obando Corea was traveling at a speed greater than forty kilometers per hour, this leads the Court to conclude that the cause of the accident was due more to the driver's recklessness, who was not driving defensively in accordance with Article 80 of the Traffic Law cited in the preceding recital (considerando), since the road conditions demanded extreme caution, especially when it is reasonable to presume that Mr. Obando Corea often passed through the location and knew the state and particular conditions of the street, in addition to his inexperience behind the wheel obligating him to greater care. Consequently, the co-defendants are correct in that the plaintiff could not demonstrate the existence of any administrative action that caused the oft-mentioned decease, since the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that the water running through the location was the cause of the accident. For this reason, it is also unnecessary to determine whether it came from any pipe or sewage system under the responsibility of AyA or some other institution, as well as whether there were omissions by the State and CONAVI regarding the powers granted by the legal system for the maintenance of public roads, as detailed in the preceding recital (considerando), or whether it was repaired after the accident. By virtue of the foregoing, one of the essential elements of administrative liability being absent, that is, the existence of a causal relationship between the death of Mr. Obando Corea and the action of the Public Administration, the compensation requested in favor of the minor Keylin Obando Jiménez is not applicable. In summary, there is no liability on the part of AyA, nor of MOPT or CONAVI; what existed was fault of the victim, as it was his lack of skill (impericia) that resulted in the fateful accident where unfortunately Mr. Obando Corea lost his life."

II. REGARDING THE PROVEN FACTS

Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following are taken as such: 1) That on March twenty-first, two thousand nine, Mr. Michael Obando Corea died as a result of a traffic accident occurring in Alajuelita de San José, Route 110, fifty meters north of the Tiribí River, on the public road in the San José-Alajuelita direction. The accident was due to the fact that Mr. Obando, who was driving motorcycle plates M-190612 in the Alajuelita-San José direction, lost control of it, skidded and rolled on the pavement, and was run over by bus plates SJB-8191, causing him the injuries that resulted in his death (see folios 10 and 15 to 20 of the judicial case file (expediente)). 2) That at the time of the accident, there were trickles of water on the road (see folios 15 to 20 and 36 of the judicial case file and statements of witnesses Edgar Eduardo Madrigal Rojas and Ana Cecilia Guerrero Agüero). 3) That the accident was due to the lack of skill (impericia) of Mr. Obando Corea, understood as the lack of ability to have maintained control of the motorcycle (see statement of expert Jorge Isaac Monge Campos both in the expert report visible at folios 736 a 748 of the judicial case file and in the statement given at the oral and public trial). 4) That with the amount of water observed in the photos at the time of the accident, it was not possible for hydroplaning to occur, this concept understood as the circumstance that prevents the tire or tires of a vehicle from losing contact with the road surface and losing control (see expert report and statement of expert Monge Campos and statement of witness Benjamín Sandino González). 5) That the maximum speed at the accident location was forty kilometers per hour (see folio 360 del expediente and statement del testigo Sandino González). 6) That at the accident location, drivers should drive defensively and not exceed speed limits (see statement del perito Jorge Isaac Monge Campos both in the expert report visible at folios 736 a 748 del expediente judicial como in the statement given at the oral and public trial). 7) That Mr. Obando Corea was traveling at a speed between 40 and 50 kilómetros per hour (statement of witness Madrigal Rojas). 8) That Mr. Obando lived in Concepción de Alajuelita and passed frequently through the accident site (see folio 53 of the case file and witness statement of Mrs. Flor María Bermúdez Fallas). 9) That Mr. Obando appeared registered in the Drivers Registry of la Dirección General de Educación Vial, with an A3 type license since February twenty-third, two thousand nine (see folio 368 of the judicial case file). 10) That the plaintiff Jiménez Bermúdez and the deceased Obando Corea did not cohabit as a common-law couple (see folios 42 and 43 of the judicial case file and statement of Mrs. Flor María Bermúdez Fallas at the oral and public trial).

III. UNPROVEN FACTS

• 1)That the water running on the asphalt accident in which Mr. Obando Corea lost his life was the cause del accidente. 2) That a causal relationship existed between any material conduct of the co-defendant administrations and the death of Mr. Obando, and that as a consequence, a reparable harm had been produced.

IV. OBJECT OF THE PROCESS

The present process is of an indemnity nature, as it is sought by the plaintiffs that they be compensated for the damages caused as a result of the accident in which Mr. Michael Obando Corea lost his life, considering that it originated from the water present on Route 110 at the time of the accident, which caused the motorcycle driver to slip and lose control of the vehicle, a responsibility they attribute to AyA for the presence of water on the road, as well as to CONAVI and the State for being responsible for road maintenance. It is also argued that there is a right to road safety. The subjective moral damages of Mrs. Katherine Jiménez Bermúdez are derived from the courtship she maintained with the deceased and the marriage project they had, and those of her daughter derive from the loss of her father, which implies not only subjective moral damages but also material ones. For its part, AyA argues that the case is based on theories, but certainty has not been reached regarding liability, since if it originates from the existing water on the road, there is no evidence that it was the institution's responsibility. It adds that Mr. Obando Corea traveled through the location every day and knew the street was wet, making it possible he was coming at high speed, and this circumstance was the cause del accidente. It rejects the material damages for the minor Obando Jiménez, as the expert report is defective, and the minor's moral damages were not determined. Regarding Mrs. Jiménez Bermúdez, it considers there is no standing, an assessment shared by CONAVI, as it was not possible to demonstrate the family relationship that bound them. The Council also notes that it was not demonstrated that an action or omission generated harm, as Route 110 is maintained in optimal conditions; the stabilization works on a slope existing at the accident location began nine months after the accident, and AyA intervened on the road and did not notify the Council so that it could determine if the asphalt layer had been left in good condition. Regarding the water on the road, it is the responsibility of AyA, and in any case, the cause del accidente was the lack of skill (impericia) del señor Obando Corea, who should have driven according to the principles of avoidability and foreseeability. It deems that there is no liability of CONAVI. It requests that the moral damages of Mrs. Jiménez Bermúdez be rejected because there is no standing, that the material damages for the minor be rejected due to inconsistencies in the expert report, and that in general terms, in accordance with Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the damages. For its part, the State argues that the plaintiff confuses the legal basis of her claim when she bases it on Article 1045 del Código Civil, as the application of Articles 190 and following of la Ley General de la Administración Pública applies. It also points out the lack of active standing of the plaintiff Jiménez Bermúdez. It alleges the defenses of lack of passive standing and lack of right, which it bases on the fact that it has not been proven that the water on the roadway was the cause del accidente, and furthermore, that it cannot be attributed to the State, but rather to AyA. It points out that there was good lighting and good conditions, provided there was foresight. It argues there was fault of the victim, as Mr. Obando traveled daily and knew the road and its conditions, that the maximum speed at which he could drive was between 30 a 40 kilómetros, and that one cannot travel at the permitted limit if conditions do not permit it, so that this man coming in the descent lane obliged him to decelerate to drive defensively, to which is added his limited driving experience of approximately one month. It states that the party has not been able to prove its theory del caso, that there is no causal relationship, and it objects to the claimed damages, as well as the indexation request not being applicable, as it deals with an obligation of value.

V. REGARDING THE EXPIRATION (LA CADUCIDAD)

AyA raised the defense of expiration (caducidad), as it considered that the plaintiffs had one year to file the lawsuit, according to subsection 1) del artículo 39 del CPCA. In this regard, this Court indicates that the present process is of an indemnity nature and is not related to the challenge of a formal act of la Administración. La caducidad of the action, which is what the cited article mentions, is related precisely to the formal acts of the administrations, for which, in general terms, one year is established to exercise the action before this instance; thus, it is not admissible. For this, there is the statute of limitations (prescripción), which refers to a right and is provided for in Article 41 del mismo body of law, but since it was not raised by the co-defendants, the Office cannot address it ex officio. For the foregoing reason, the defense of expiration (caducidad) must be rejected.

VI.REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF ACTIVE STANDING RAISED AGAINST MRS. KATHERINE DAYANA JIMÉNEZ BERMÚDEZ IN THE PRESENT PROCESS: The co-defendant parties raised the defense of lack of active standing of Mrs. Jiménez Bermúdez to file the present process, in summary, because at the time of Mr. Obando Corea's death, there was no common-law cohabitation supporting her claims. The Costa Rican legal system recognizes a common-law union (unión de hecho) as having the same patrimonial effects as marriage, provided the requirements established in Article 242 of the Family Code (Código de Familia) are met, that is, that it is public, notorious, and stable, for more than three years, and between a man and a woman with the legal capacity to marry. For its recognition, Article 243 establishes that the cohabitant or the heirs may request it from the Court within the expiration period of two years from the rupture of the cohabitation. According to the statement of the same plaintiff within criminal summary file 09-005407-042, as well as the statement of Mrs. Flor María Bermúdez Fallas, it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff and the deceased Obando Corea maintained a courtship, had a daughter together, but did not cohabit as a couple, as they lived in separate houses. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not promote the recognition of her union, which is an indispensable requirement for it to produce patrimonial effects. This has been repeatedly recognized by la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia when it states:

"The rule 242 of the Family Code establishes: ‘The public, notorious, unique, and stable common-law union (unión de hecho), for more than three years, between a man and a woman who possess the legal capacity to marry, shall produce all the patrimonial effects specific to legally formalized marriage, upon its termination for any cause’. On the other hand, canon 243 ejúsdem states: ‘Para the effects indicated in the preceding article, any of the cohabitants or their heirs may request from the Court the recognition of the common-law union (unión de hecho). The action shall be processed through the abbreviated procedure, regulated in the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), and shall expire in two years from the rupture of the cohabitation or the death of the causante’. From the analysis of the recently transcribed norms, it is deduced that indeed, Article 243 of the Family Code establishes an expiration period to establish the respective procedure for recognizing a common-law union (unión de hecho) that meets the requirements set forth in rule 242 of the same body of law, namely: 'notorious, unique, and stable, for more than three years, between a man and a woman who possess the legal capacity to marry'. The foregoing, in order to recognize 'all the patrimonial effects specific del matrimonio legally formalized, upon its termination for any cause'. By virtue of this, the established period is two years from the rupture of the cohabitation or the death del causante. The analyzed requirements are necessary precisely because of the particularity of the relationship, since in the absence of a legal bond, certain notorious and easily verifiable elements are indispensable for the judge. Matrimonio is a legal bond, which is registered in the Civil Registry; its proof can be provided at any time by consulting the records of that institution. Common-law union (unión de hecho), on the contrary, must be proven through other means, that is, by witnesses, events, and circumstances that lead the judge del derecho to verify that said relationship indeed occurred. For this reason, it is essential that a prior judicial declaration exists, since the existence of a de facto bond between two persons can only produce patrimonial effects through a judicial judgment that so orders.

The cohabitant must undergo the recognition procedure for its validity; that would be the only way to support her standing based on that bond." (Judgment 415 of fourteen hours and twenty minutes of April 9, two thousand thirteen).

Since she did not then prove a legal relationship that would allow her to come to this court to claim the possible damages arising from the death of Mr. Obando Corea, the objection filed must be upheld and the lack of active standing of the plaintiff Jiménez Bermúdez and the inadmissibility of the claim as far as she is concerned must be declared, meaning the analysis of the claims will be conducted solely in relation to the minor Keytlin Obando Jiménez, as she is the legitimate heir and may claim the compensation that may be appropriate under the law.

**VII. THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:** In accordance with the constitutional principles established in Articles 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution, as well as in the General Law of the Public Administration (LGAP), from Article 190 onward, the liability of the Costa Rican State and more specifically of the public administrations is established as a strict liability regime, for all actions, both lawful and unlawful, that occur as a result of the exercise of the administrative function, both in formal activity and in its material or service-provision expressions. For these purposes, three elements must be proven: the occurrence of an event, the existence of damage, and the causal link between the damage and the work of the administration or administrations involved. Within the complexity of the organizational structure of the Public Administration in Costa Rica and in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the LGAP, as well as subsection 3 of Article 1 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, there is a Central Administration, which is the larger entity, constituted by the constitutional bodies defined in Article 21 of the same law, the Executive Branch, the Legislative Branch, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, when they perform an administrative function, and other bodies of those same branches, such as the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Ombudsman's Office of the Inhabitants. Similarly, there is a decentralized administration, which comprises all those entities that the legal system has endowed with legal personality, autonomy, and a budget. Finally, within those entities, the phenomenon of deconcentration occurs, through which competencies are transferred from one body to another, based on specialty, and which in many cases, by decision of the legislator, has been endowed with instrumental legal personality. With the above introduction made, given the claims of this proceeding, the specific competencies of the entities and bodies involved in this process must be analyzed, beginning with the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, which, according to its enabling statute (Ley 2726 of April 14, 1961, and its respective amendments), is an autonomous institution of the State, which, according to Article 2 of the cited regulation, has, among others, the following competencies:

"a) To direct and oversee everything related to providing the inhabitants of the republic with a service of potable water, collection and evacuation of black water and liquid industrial waste, and stormwater in urban areas; (...)

• e)To prepare all plans for public works related to the purposes of this law, as well as to approve all those for private works related to water supply and sewerage systems, as determined by the respective regulations; f) To harness, use, govern, or monitor, as the case may be, all public-domain waters indispensable for the due fulfillment of the provisions of this law, in exercise of the rights that the State has over them, in accordance with Law number 276 of August 27, 1942, for which purpose the Institute shall be considered the substitute body for the powers attributed in that law to the State, ministries, and municipalities; g) To directly administer and operate the water supply and sewerage systems throughout the country, which shall be assumed taking into account convenience and availability of resources. Systems that are currently administered and operated by municipal corporations may remain under their charge, as long as they provide efficient service. Under no circumstances may the administration of the water supply and sanitary sewerage systems of the Metropolitan Area be delegated. Nor may the administration of systems for which financial responsibility exists and while this responsibility corresponds directly to the Institute be delegated.

(...); i) To build, expand, and reform water supply and sewerage systems in those cases where it is necessary and the better satisfaction of national needs so advises; and j) To control the proper investment of all resources that the State allocates for water supply and sanitary sewerage works." As can be seen from the law, AyA is in charge not only of the administration but also of the execution of the works of water supply and sewerage systems, which implies not only construction but also maintenance and repair, so any damage that occurs on account of the foregoing falls within the sphere of its responsibility. On the other hand, CONAVI was created by Law 7798 of April 30, 1998, as a body of maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, with instrumental and budgetary legal personality for the administration of the National Road Network Fund and to sign contracts and loans necessary for the fulfillment of its functions (Article 3 of the law). For the purposes of this analysis, among the competencies granted by law, in section 4 of the same are the following:

"a) To plan, program, administer, finance, execute, and control the conservation and construction of the national road network, in accordance with the programs prepared by the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport.

• b)To manage its assets." From the above, the responsibility of the body regarding the construction and conservation of the national road network is clearly extracted. Finally, the State, specifically the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, has the following original and related competency according to its organic law (Law 3155 of August 5, 1963, and its amendments), as established in Article 2:

" a) To plan, build, and improve highways and roads. To maintain highways and collaborate with the Municipalities in the conservation of local roads. To regulate and control the rights of way of existing or planned highways and roads. To regulate, control, and monitor traffic and transportation on public roads." Thus, there is also a generic responsibility of the State regarding the maintenance of roads. There is another aspect that must also be analyzed, to determine the theory of the case of the co-defendants, and that is the ground for exclusion of liability due to the fault of the victim, in which Mr. Obando Corea was obliged to drive given the state of the road. The Traffic Law on Public Land Roadways, Law 7331 of October 13, 1993, in force at the time the events occurred, establishes in its Article 80 the general conditions under which a vehicle must be driven on public land roadways:

"Users of public roads must conduct themselves in a manner that does not obstruct circulation or endanger the safety of vehicles or other persons. Likewise, drivers shall avoid situations that impede the free flow of traffic, for which they shall apply defensive driving and maintain constant caution and mutual consideration toward pedestrians and other drivers.

Drivers shall ensure the physical integrity and safety of their person and that of the passengers as those responsible for the vehicle; therefore, they shall use the seat belt and require that all passengers of the vehicle use it. The driver who does not use the seat belt or drives a vehicle in which any passenger does not use it shall be penalized as indicated in this Law." On the other hand, speed limits are also regulated in the same law, as follows:

"The speed limits for the circulation of vehicles shall be set by the General Directorate of Traffic Engineering, after a technical study, according to the type of road and its conditions. These limits, both minimum and maximum, are in effect from the placement of the signs or markings that indicate those speeds, which must be suitably installed on the roads. Regarding speed, the following provisions apply:

• a)Circulating at a speed higher than the established maximum limit or lower than the minimum is prohibited, in accordance with the limits set by the General Directorate of Traffic Engineering; for this purpose, the driver must take into account the road conditions and must do so under the rules indicated in the successive subsections.
• b)The maximum speed permitted on roads where there is no express regulation is sixty (60) kilometers per hour.
• c)In urban zones, the maximum speed permitted shall be forty (40) kilometers per hour. However, a driving speed that may not exceed sixty (60) kilometers per hour is authorized in those stretches, if the road conditions, the prevailing vehicular flow, and the low level of risk involved allow it. In non-urban zones, the maximum limit established for the stretch may only be exceeded by ten (10) kilometers per hour, only if the conditions indicated above are observed.

ch) When passing in front of the entrance and exit of educational centers, hospitals, clinics, and places where sports, religious, social, cultural, or other activities of public interest are held, circulating at a speed exceeding twenty-five (25) kilometers per hour is prohibited when activities are taking place at those locations.

• d)Circulating on any stretch of road at less than the established minimum speed, in a way that limits or delays the free flow of other vehicles, is prohibited; except on occasions when, due to natural or artificial reasons, driving is hindered, or in the case of funeral processions.
• e)On highways, the minimum speed is set at forty (40) kilometers per hour and the maximum speed at one hundred (100) kilometers per hour.
• f)In areas designated as frequent bicycle passage zones, duly signposted, the maximum speed permitted shall be forty (40) kilometers per hour. Highways may not be designated as frequent bicycle passage zones." The cited regulations frame the parameters for drivers of any type of vehicle to circulate on land roadways.

**VII. ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE.** The discussion in the present case revolves around whether there was any administrative conduct that generated liability on the part of the entities and bodies involved with respect to the death of Mr. Michael Obando Corea, which occurred on March 21, two thousand nine, on National Route 110, fifty meters north of the Tiribí River, in the San José-Alajuelita direction. The death occurred when said gentleman was driving a motorcycle, in the Alajuelita-San José direction, lost control of it, crossed into the opposite lane, along which bus license plate M-190612 was traveling, and was run over by the bus's tires, which caused the injuries that led to his death at the scene of the accident. The plaintiff maintains that on the day of the mishap, there was water on the road surface and that this is what caused Mr. Obando to lose control of the vehicle he was driving. She attributes liability to AyA, as the water came from a pipe belonging to the Institute, and also to CONAVI and the State, considering that it is their responsibility to maintain national roadways in optimal conditions for circulation. From both the testimonial evidence and the photographs of criminal summary case 09-005407-042, in which the death of the deceased was investigated as culpable homicide, it is clear that there was water on the roadway, so it must be determined whether this was the cause of the accident. The criminal case against the bus driver was dismissed, in a resolution of ten hours of April 29, two thousand nine, when the criminal judge considered that the water leak that existed on the road caused the motorcycle to skid and the tragic event to occur. The conclusion reached by the judge is basically due to the testimony of Edgar Eduardo Madrigal Rojas, who was an eyewitness to the event. This Court considers that the conclusion reached by the criminal judge does not bind it, since what was attempted to be determined was the bus driver's responsibility in the commission of the crime of culpable homicide, and the evidence gathered was for that purpose, without sufficient technical evidence having been provided to arrive at that conclusion. Therefore, the matter must be analyzed with the evidence brought to the process to determine not only the possible cause of the accident but also the liability of the co-defendants, so that it is assessed as a whole under the principles of sound criticism. Having made the previous observation, we proceed to examine, first, the presence of water at the accident site, which, as stated, is evident in the photos visible on folios 17 and 18 of the case file. Said water, according to the accident report, visible on folios 33 to 37 of the case file and according to the testimonial evidence, emanated from a hole in the roadway. What remains to be determined is if this was the cause of the mishap and, if so, to which of the co-defendants the liability would correspond. To do so, we proceed to dissect the testimony of Madrigal Rojas, who was an eyewitness to the accident and who was offered by the plaintiff in the present process. Mr. Madrigal Rojas, as recorded in the criminal case file, literally stated in the criminal case: "I arrived at the Alajuelita bridge going up and at 30 m I saw a young man on a motorcycle coming a little fast, though not excessively, before the curve he braked and started to skid. The road was weeping water, the Coca Cola car realized what was going to happen, pulled over to the right side toward the wall and braked, I also did the same." In the testimonial statement given on the day of the oral and public trial, this witness stated that the now-deceased had slipped on the water that was on the roadway. He also indicated that Obando Corea was traveling at a normal speed, between forty and fifty kilometers per hour. Faced with questions from the co-defendants about the change of version between the case file, he clarified that his version in the criminal case file was to benefit the bus driver. This statement must be contrasted with the documentary evidence existing in the case file, as well as with the expert report and other testimonial statements gathered. First, the expert report carried out by Jorge Isaac Mora Campos must be reviewed, who determined, first of all, that the accident was due to the driver's lack of skill, understood as the ability to maintain control of the motorcycle. Similarly, his report referred to hydroplaning, which consists of there being an amount of water at a location that prevents the tire of a vehicle, in this case a motorcycle, from making contact with the road and losing control. In his opinion, with the photos contained in the case file, the water is very little for that phenomenon to occur. Furthermore, he referred to the fact that the place where the accident occurred, due to the road conditions, driving is high-risk and that it is dangerous to take the curve at more than forty kilometers per hour, since it is closed with a very small angle, and that the appropriate speed to travel is twenty-five kilometers per hour. On the other hand, the witness Benjamín Sandino González agreed with the expert's statement, in that hydroplaning existed and that the maximum speed at which one could travel through the place is forty kilometers per hour. Analyzed as a whole, the previous evidence under the rules of rational sound criticism, this Court considers that the witness Madrigal Rojas does not deserve credibility regarding the cause of the accident, whether it was skidding or slipping, since regarding an event he witnessed, not much time has passed from it, and which was also serious since it resulted in a person's death, he changed his version to favor one of the parties, at least regarding the criminal process. What is uniform, in both cases, is the speed at which Mr. Obando Corea was driving, since in the criminal proceeding he said he was coming "rapidito" ("a little fast") and in this one, that he was traveling at a speed between forty and fifty kilometers per hour, an aspect which will be revisited later. Similarly, the expert report and the witness Sandino González agree that there could not have been hydroplaning, since the amount of water was very little. For this reason, and despite the fact that the criminal case file indicated that the road was slippery, there is no reliable proof that Mr. Obando Corea slipped, since the eyewitness incurred in contradictions, in addition to the fact that there could not have been hydroplaning, meaning that the motorcycle tires had lost contact with the road surface.

The foregoing leads to consideration of the manner of driving of the deceased. It is an incontrovertible fact that Mr. Obando Corea lived in Alajuelita and that he frequently traveled through the accident site. It has likewise been established that at the time of his death, he had had his driver's license for approximately one month, and that the road conditions required drivers of any type of vehicle to travel at a maximum speed limit of forty kilometers per hour and that it was prudent to do so at an even lower speed, this regardless of the existence of water at that location, which, according to the testimonial evidence of Ana Cecilia Guerrero Agüero, had been there for several days. As previously indicated, the cause of the accident was the driver's lack of skill (impericia) in not having been able to control the motorcycle when he made the curve. If one takes into account that the sole eyewitness was unequivocal in stating that Mr. Obando Corea was traveling at a speed greater than forty kilometers per hour, this leads the Court to conclude that the cause of the accident was due more to the imprudence of the driver, who was not driving defensively in accordance with the provisions of Article 80 of the Ley de Tránsito cited in the preceding recital (considerando), since the road conditions demanded extreme caution, especially when it is reasonable to presume that Mr. Obando Corea passed by the site often and knew the state and particular conditions of the street, in addition to the fact that his inexperience behind the wheel required him to exercise greater care. Consequently, the co-defendants are correct in that the plaintiff could not demonstrate the existence of any administrative action that caused the aforementioned death, since the evidence provided is insufficient to demonstrate that the water flowing over the area was the cause of the accident. For this reason, it is also unnecessary to determine whether said water came from a pipe or sewer for which AyA or another institution is responsible, nor whether there were omissions on the part of the State and CONAVI regarding the powers granted by law for the maintenance of public roads, as detailed in the preceding recital (considerando), nor whether it was repaired after the accident. By virtue of the foregoing, as one of the essential elements of administrative liability (responsabilidad administrativa) is missing, namely the existence of a causal link (relación de causalidad) between the death of Mr. Obando Corea and the action of the Public Administration (Administración Pública), the compensation requested on behalf of the minor Keylin Obando Jiménez is not appropriate. In summary, there is no liability on the part of AyA, MOPT, or CONAVI; what existed was fault on the part of the victim, since it was his lack of skill (impericia) that resulted in the fateful accident where unfortunately Mr. Obando Corea lost his life." For this, there is the statute of limitations (prescripción), which refers to a right and which is provided for in Article 41 of the same legal body, but since it was not raised by the co-defendants, the Court cannot address it ex officio. For the foregoing reason, the exception of expiration (caducidad) must be dismissed.

VI.OF THE EXCEPTION OF LACK OF STANDING TO SUE (LEGITIMACIÓN ACTIVA) RAISED AGAINST KATHERINE DAYANA JIMÉNEZ BERMÚDEZ IN THIS PROCEEDING: The co-defendant parties raised the exception of lack of standing to sue of Ms. Jiménez Bermúdez to file this proceeding, in summary, because at the time of the death of Mr. Obando Corea, no common-law marriage (unión de hecho) existed to support her claims. The Costa Rican legal system recognizes a common-law marriage as having the same property effects as marriage, provided the requirements established in Article 242 of the Family Code are met, namely, that it is public, notorious, and stable, for more than three years, and between a man and a woman with the legal capacity to marry. For the purposes of its recognition, Article 243 establishes that the cohabitant or their heirs may request it from the Court within the expiration period (plazo de caducidad) of two years from the rupture of the cohabitation. According to the statement of the plaintiff herself in criminal summary 09-005407-042, as well as the statement of Ms. Flor María Bermúdez Fallas, it has been proven that the plaintiff and the deceased Obando Corea maintained a dating relationship, that they had a daughter, but that they did not cohabit as a couple, since they lived in separate houses. In addition to this, the plaintiff did not seek the recognition of her union, which is an indispensable requirement for it to have property effects. This has been repeatedly recognized by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, when it states:

"Article 242 of the Family Code establishes: ‘A common-law marriage that is public, notorious, unique, and stable, for more than three years, between a man and a woman who have the legal capacity to marry, shall have all the property effects of a legally formalized marriage, upon its termination for any cause.’ On the other hand, Article 243 of the same body of law says: ‘For the purposes indicated in the previous article, either of the cohabitants or their heirs may request from the Court the recognition of the common-law marriage. The action shall be processed through the abbreviated proceeding, regulated in the Civil Procedure Code, and shall expire (caducará) in two years from the rupture of the cohabitation or the death of the de cujus.’ From the analysis of the rules just transcribed, it is clear that indeed, Article 243 of the Family Code establishes an recognition of a common-law marriage that meets the requirements established in Article 242 of the same legal body, namely: 'notorious, unique, and stable, for more than three years, between a man and a woman who have the legal capacity to marry.' The foregoing is for the purpose of recognizing 'all the property effects of a legally formalized marriage, upon its termination for any cause.' By virtue of this, the period established is two years from the rupture of the cohabitation or the death of the de cujus. The requirements analyzed are necessary, precisely because of the particularity of the relationship, since in the absence of a legal bond, certain notorious and easily verifiable elements are indispensable for the judge. Marriage is a legal bond, which is registered in the Civil Registry; its proof can be given at any time by consulting the records of that institution. A common-law marriage, on the contrary, must be accredited by other means, be it through witnesses, events, and circumstances that lead the judge of law to verify that this relationship indeed occurred. For this reason, it is essential that a prior judicial declaration exists, since the existence of a de facto bond between two persons can only have property effects through a judicial ruling that so provides. The cohabitant must undergo the recognition process for its validity; that would be the only way to support their standing based on that bond." (Judgment 415 of fourteen hours and twenty minutes on the ninth of April, two thousand thirteen).

Since no legal relationship was accredited that would allow Ms. Jiménez Bermúdez to come to this venue to claim the possible damages derived from the death of Mr. Obando Corea, the exception raised must be upheld and the lack of standing to sue of the plaintiff Jiménez Bermúdez and the inadmissibility of the complaint as far as she is concerned must be declared; therefore, the analysis of the claims will be conducted only in relation to the minor Keytlin Obando Jiménez, on the grounds of her being the legitimate heir and being able to claim the compensation that would proceed according to law.

VII. THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

In accordance with the constitutional principles established in Articles 9, 11, and 41 of the Political Constitution, as well as in the General Law of the Public Administration (LGAP), starting from Article 190, the liability of the Costa Rican State and more specifically of the public administrations is established as an objective regime, for all actions, both lawful and unlawful, that occur as a result of the exercise of the administrative function, both in formal activity and in its material or service expressions. For such purposes, three elements must be proven: the occurrence of an event, the existence of a damage (daño), and the causal link (nexo de causalidad) between the damage and the work of the administration or administrations involved. Within the complexity of the organizational structure of the Public Administration in Costa Rica and in accordance with what Article 1 of the LGAP establishes, as well as subsection 3 of Article 1 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, there is a Central Administration, which is the larger entity, constituted by the constitutional bodies defined in Article 21 of the same law, the Executive Branch, the Legislative Branch, and the Supreme Tribunal of Elections, when they perform an administrative function, and other bodies of those same branches, such as the Comptroller General of the Republic and the Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes). Likewise, there is a decentralized administration, which is all those entities that the legal system has endowed with legal personality, autonomy, and budget. Finally, within those entities occurs the phenomenon of deconcentration (desconcentración), through which competencies are transferred from one body to another, due to specialty, and which in many cases, by decision of the legislator, have been endowed with instrumental legal personality. Having made the foregoing introduction, given the claims of the present proceeding, the competencies of the entities and bodies involved in this proceeding must be analyzed, starting with the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados), which, according to its constituent law (Law 2726 of April 14, 1961, and its respective reforms), is an autonomous institution of the State, which, in accordance with Article 2 of the cited rule, has, among others, the following competencies:

"a) To direct and monitor everything related to providing the inhabitants of the republic with a service of potable water, collection and evacuation of black water and liquid industrial waste and stormwater in urban areas; (...)

• e)To prepare all the plans for public works related to the purposes of this law, as well as to approve all those for private works related to the aqueduct and sewer systems, as determined by the respective regulations; f) To use, exploit, govern, or supervise, as the case may be, all public domain waters indispensable for the due fulfillment of the provisions of this law, in exercise of the rights that the State has over them, pursuant to Law number 276 of August 27, 1942, for which purpose the Institute shall be considered the substitute body for the powers attributed in that law to the State, ministries, and municipalities; g) To directly administer and operate the aqueduct and sewer systems throughout the country, which shall be progressively assumed taking into account convenience and availability of resources. The systems that are currently administered and operated by the municipal corporations may continue under their charge, as long as they provide efficient service. Under no circumstances may it delegate the administration of the aqueduct and sanitary sewer systems of the Metropolitan Area. Nor may it delegate the administration of the systems over which there is financial responsibility and while this corresponds directly to the Institute.

(...); i) To build, expand, and reform the aqueduct and sewer systems in those cases where it is necessary and so advised for the better satisfaction of national needs; and j) To control the adequate investment of all the resources that the State allocates for aqueduct and sanitary sewer works." As is clear from the law, the AyA is responsible for not only the administration, but also the execution of the works of the aqueduct and sewer systems, which implies not only construction, but also their maintenance and repair; therefore, any damage that occurs on the occasion of the foregoing falls within the sphere of its responsibility. On the other hand, CONAVI was created by Law 7798 of April 30, 1998, as a body of maximum deconcentration, attached to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, with instrumental and budgetary legal personality for the administration of the National Road Network Fund (Fondo de la Red Nacional) and to enter into the contracts and loans necessary for the fulfillment of its functions (Article 3 of the law). For the purposes of this analysis, among the competencies granted by law, in Article 4 of the same are the following:

"a) To plan, program, administer, finance, execute, and control the conservation and construction of the national road network, in accordance with the programs prepared by the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport.

• b)To administer its patrimony." From the foregoing, the responsibility of the body regarding the construction and conservation of the national road network is clearly extracted. Finally, the State, specifically the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, has as its original competence, related to the object of this proceeding, according to its organic law (Law 3155 of August 5, 1963, and its reforms), the following, as established in Article 2:

"a) To plan, build, and improve highways and roads. To maintain highways and collaborate with the Municipalities in the conservation of local roads. To regulate and control the rights of way of existing or planned highways and roads. To regulate, control, and supervise traffic and transportation on public roads." There is, then, also a generic responsibility of the State regarding the maintenance of highways. There is another aspect that must also be analyzed, to determine the case theory of the co-defendants, which is the ground for exclusion of liability due to fault of the victim, regarding the duty Mr. Obando Corea had to drive according to the state of the road. The Traffic on Public Land Roads Law, Law 7331 of October 13, 1993, in force at the time the events occurred, establishes in its Article 80 the general conditions under which a vehicle must be driven on public land roads:

"Users of public roads must conduct themselves in a way that does not obstruct traffic or endanger the safety of vehicles or other persons. Likewise, drivers must avoid situations that impede the free flow of traffic, for which they shall apply defensive driving and maintain constant caution and mutual consideration towards pedestrians and other drivers.

Drivers must ensure the physical integrity and safety of their person and that of the passengers, as those responsible for the vehicle; therefore, they must use the seat belt and require that it be used by all passengers of the vehicle. The driver who does not use the seat belt or drives a vehicle in which any of the passengers does not use it shall be sanctioned as indicated in this Law." On the other hand, speed limits are also regulated in the same law, in the following manner:

"The speed limits for the circulation of vehicles shall be set by the General Directorate of Traffic Engineering, after a technical study, according to the type of road and its conditions. These limits, both minimum and maximum, are in effect from the placement of the signs or markings that indicate these speeds, which must be conveniently installed on the highways. Regarding speed, the following provisions apply:

• a)It is prohibited to drive at a speed greater than the maximum or less than the established minimum limit, in accordance with the limits set by the General Directorate of Traffic Engineering; for this, the driver must take into account the road conditions and must do so under the rules indicated in the subsequent subsections.
• b)The maximum permitted speed on roads where there is no express regulation is sixty (60) kilometers per hour.
• c)In urban areas, the maximum permitted speed shall be forty (40) kilometers per hour. However, a driving speed on those sections is authorized, which may not exceed sixty (60) kilometers per hour, if the road conditions, the prevailing vehicular flow, and the low level of risk involved so permit. In non-urban areas, the maximum limit established on the section may only be exceeded by ten (10) kilometers per hour, only if the conditions indicated above are observed.

ch) When passing in front of the entrance and exit of educational establishments, hospitals, clinics, and places where sports, religious, social, cultural, or other events of public interest are held, driving at a speed greater than twenty-five (25) kilometers per hour is prohibited when activities are being carried out in those places.

• d)Driving on any stretch of highway at less than the minimum established speed is prohibited, in a way that limits or delays the free flow of the rest of the vehicles; except on occasions when, for natural or artificial reasons, driving is difficult, or in the case of funeral processions.
• e)On highways, the minimum speed is established at forty (40) kilometers per hour and the maximum speed at one hundred (100) kilometers per hour.
• f)In areas designated as frequent cycling routes, duly signposted, the maximum permitted speed shall be forty (40) kilometers per hour. Highways may not be designated as a frequent cycling route." The cited rules frame the parameters for drivers of any type of vehicle to travel on land roads.

VII.OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE. The discussion in this case revolves around whether there was any administrative conduct that generated liability of the entities and body involved with respect to the death of Mr. Michael Obando Corea, which occurred on March 21, 2009, on National Route 110, fifty meters north of the Tiribí River, in the San José-Alajuelita direction. The death occurred when said gentleman was driving a motorcycle, in the Alajuelita-San José direction, lost control of it, went into the opposing lane, along which bus M-190612 was traveling, and was run over by the tires of the bus, which caused the injuries that led to his death at the accident site. The plaintiff party maintains that on the day of the mishap, there was water on the road surface and that this was what caused Mr. Obando to lose control of the vehicle he was driving. She attributes liability to the AyA, since the water came from a pipe belonging to the Institute, and also to CONAVI and the State, considering that the maintenance of national roads in optimal driving conditions is their responsibility. From both the testimonial evidence and the photographs from criminal summary 09-005407-042, in which the death of the deceased was investigated as negligent homicide (homicidio culposo), it is recorded that there was water on the roadway, so it must be determined if this was the cause of the accident. The criminal case was dismissed against the driver of the bus, in a resolution at ten o'clock on the twenty-ninth of April, two thousand nine, the criminal judge considering that the water leak existing on the highway caused the motorcycle to skid and the fatal event to occur. The conclusion reached by the judge is due basically to the testimony of Edgar Eduardo Madrigal Rojas, who was a witness of the event.

This Court considers that the conclusion reached by the criminal judge does not bind it, since what was sought to be determined was the liability of the bus driver in the commission of the crime of negligent homicide and the evidence gathered was for that purpose, without sufficient technical evidence having been provided to reach that conclusion. Therefore, the matter must be analyzed with the evidence brought to the proceeding to determine not only the possible cause of the accident, but also the liability of the co-defendants, so that it may be evaluated as a whole under the principles of sound criticism. Having made the foregoing observation, the Court proceeds to examine first the presence of water at the accident site, which, as stated, is recorded in the photos visible at folios 17 and 18 of the file. Said water, according to the accident report, visible at folio 33 a to 37 of the file and the testimonial evidence, emanated from a hole in the roadway. What remains to be determined is whether that was the cause of the mishap and, if so, which of the co-defendants would bear the liability. To do so, the testimony of Madrigal Rojas is parsed; he was an eyewitness to the accident and was offered by the plaintiff in this proceeding. Mr. Madrigal Rojas, as recorded in the criminal file, stated literally in the criminal case: "<i>I arrived at the bridge of Alajuelita, going up at 30 mts I saw a boy on a motorcycle coming <u>a little fast but not excessively,</u> before the curve he braked and began to skid. Water was weeping on the road, the Coca Cola car perceived what was going to happen, hugged (sic) to the right side towards the wall and braked, I did the same thing myself</i>." In the testimonial statement given on the day of the oral and public trial, this witness stated that the now deceased had slipped due to the water that was on the roadway. He also indicated that Obando Corea was coming at a normal speed, between forty and fifty kilometers per hour. To the questions by the co-defendants about the change of version between the file, he clarified that his version in the criminal file was to benefit the bus driver. This statement must be contrasted with the documentary evidence existing in the file, as well as with the expert report and other testimonial statements gathered. First, the expert report by Jorge Isaac Mora Campos must be reviewed, who determined first that the accident occurred due to the driver's lack of skill, understood as the ability to maintain control of the motorcycle. Likewise, his report referred to hydroplaning, which consists of there being an amount of water at a location that prevents a vehicle's tire, in this case a motorcycle, from making contact with the road and causing a loss of control. In his opinion, based on the photos in the file, the water is very little for that phenomenon to have occurred. Furthermore, he referred to the fact that the place where the accident occurred, due to road conditions, makes driving high-risk and that it is dangerous to take the curve at more than forty kilometers per hour, since it is tight with a very small angle, and that the appropriate speed to travel is twenty-five kilometers per hour. Moreover, witness Benjamín Sandino González coincided with what was expressed by the expert, in that hydroplaning occurred and that the maximum speed at which one could travel through the place is forty kilometers per hour. Having analyzed the foregoing evidence as a whole under the rules of rational sound criticism, this Court considers that witness Madrigal Rojas is not credible regarding the cause of the accident, whether he skidded or slipped, since of an event he witnessed, from which not much time has passed and which was also serious since it resulted in the death of a person, he changed his version to favor one of the parties, at least regarding the criminal proceeding. What is consistent, in both cases, is the speed at which Mr. Obando Corea was driving, since in the criminal court he said he was coming <i>"a little fast"</i> and in this proceeding that he was coming at a speed between forty and fifty kilometers per hour, an aspect to which the Court will return later. Likewise, the expert report and witness Sandino González coincide in that hydroplaning could not have occurred, since the amount of water was very little. Therefore, and despite the fact that the criminal file indicated that the street was slippery, there is no reliable evidence that Mr. Obando Corea had slipped, since the eyewitness incurred in contradictions, in addition to the fact that hydroplaning could not have occurred, i.e., that the motorcycle tires had lost contact with the road surface. The foregoing leads to considering the manner of driving of the deceased. It is an undisputed fact that Mr. Obando Corea lived in Alajuelita and that he often traveled through the accident site. It has likewise been established that at the time of his death he had had his driver's license for about a month, and that the road conditions required drivers of any type of vehicle to travel at a maximum limit of forty kilometers per hour and that it was prudent to do so at an even lower speed, regardless of the existence of water at said place, which, according to the testimonial evidence of Ana Cecilia Guerrero Agüero, had been there for several days. As previously indicated, the cause of the accident was the driver's lack of skill in not being able to control the motorcycle when he took the curve. If it is taken into account that the sole eyewitness was consistent that Mr. Obando Corea was traveling at a speed greater than forty kilometers per hour, this leads the Court to conclude that the cause of the accident was due more to the recklessness of the driver, who was not driving defensively in accordance with Article 80 of the Transit Law cited in the preceding considerando, since the road conditions demanded extreme caution, especially when it is reasonable to presume that Mr. Obando Corea passed through the place often and knew the state and particular conditions of the street, in addition to the fact that, due to his inexperience at the wheel, greater care was required of him. Consequently, the co-defendants are correct in that the plaintiff could not prove the existence of any administrative action that caused the oft-mentioned death, since the evidence provided is insufficient to prove that the water flowing through the place was the cause of the accident. Therefore, it is also unnecessary to determine whether it came from a pipe or sewer system under the responsibility of AyA or some other institution, as well as whether there were omissions by the State and CONAVI regarding the powers granted by the legal system for the maintenance of public roads, as detailed in the preceding considerando, as well as whether it was repaired after the accident. By virtue of the foregoing, since one of the elements inherent to administrative liability is lacking, i.e., the existence of a causal relationship between the death of Mr. Obando Corea and the action of the Public Administration, the compensation requested on behalf of the minor Keylin Obando Jiménez is inadmissible. In summary, there is no liability on the part of AyA, nor MOPT or CONAVI; what existed was the fault of the victim, since it was his lack of skill that resulted in the fateful accident where Mr. Obando Corea unfortunately lost his life.”</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-family: Cambria;color:#010101;mso-ansi-language:EN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><span lang=ES-PE style='mso-ansi-language:ES-PE'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> </div> </body> </html>

“II. SOBRE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS: De importancia para la resolución de este asunto, se tienen como tales los siguientes: 1) Que el día veintiuno de marzo de dos mil nueve falleció el señor Michael Obando Corea como consecuencia de un accidente de tránsito acaecido en Alajuelita de San José, Ruta 110, cincuenta metros norte del Río Tiribí, en la vía pública en el sentido San José. Alajuelita. El accidente se debió a que el señor Obando, quien iba conduciendo la motocicleta placas M-190612 en el sentido Alajuelita San José, perdió el control de la misma, derrapó y rodó por el pavimento y fue arrollado por el Bus placas SJB-8191 lo que le causó las lesiones que provocaron su deceso (ver folios 10 y 15 al 20 del expediente judicial). 2) Que al momento del accidente había hilos de agua sobre la vía (ver folios 15 al 20 y 36 del expediente judicial y declaraciones de los testigos Edgar Eduardo Madrigal Rojas y Ana Cecilia Guerrero Agüero). 3) Que el accidente se debió a la impericia del señor Obando Corea, entendida como la falta de habilidad para haber mantenido el control de la motocicleta (ver declaración del perito Jorge Isaac Monge Campos tanto en el informe pericial visible a los folios 736 a 748 del expediente judicial como en la declaración rendida en el juicio oral y público). 4) Que la cantidad de agua con la cantidad de agua que se observa en las fotos al momento del accidente, no era posible que se diera hidroplaneamiento, entendido este concepto como la circunstancia que impide que la llanta o llantas de un vehículo pierdan contacto con la superficie de rodamiento y se pierda el control (ver informe pericial y declaración del perito Monge Campos y declaración del testigo Benjamín Sandino González). 5) Que la velocidad máxima en el lugar del accidente era de cuarenta kilómetros por hora ( ver folio 360 del testigo Sandino González). 6) Que en el lugar del accidente los conductores deban de conducir a la defensiva y no exceder los límites de velocidad (ver declaración del perito Jorge Isaac Monge Campos tanto en el informe pericial visible a los folios 736 a 748 del expediente judicial como en la declaración rendida en el juicio oral y público). 7) Que el señor Obando Corea viajaba a una velocidad entre 40 y 50 kilómetros por hora (declaración del testigo Madrigal Rojas) 8) Que el señor Obando vivía en Concepción de Alajuelita y pasaba con frecuencia por el sitio del accidente (ver folio 53 del expediente y declaración testimonial de la señora Flor María Bermúdez Fallas). 9) Que el señor Obando aparecía inscrito en el registro de Conductores de la Dirección General de Educación Vial, con licencia tipo A3 desde el veintitrés de febrero de dos mil nueve (ver folio 368 del expediente judicial). 10) Que la actora Jiménez Bermúdez y el occiso Obando Corea, no convivían como pareja de hecho (ver folio 42 y 43 del expediente judicial y declaración de la señora Flor María Bermúdez Fallas en el juicio oral y público).

III. HECHOS NO PROBADOS

• 1)Que el agua que discurría sobre el asfal accidente en el que perdió la vida el señor Obando Corea, fuera la causa del accidente. 2) Que existiera una relación de causalidad entre alguna conducta material de las administraciones codemandadas y la muerte del señor Obando y que como consecuencia, hubiese producido un daño reparable.

IV. OBJETO DEL PROCESO

El presente proceso es de naturaleza indemnizatoria, ya que se pretende por parte de las actoras, que se les reparen los daños ocasionados a raíz del accidente en que perdió la vida el señor Michael Obando Corea, por considerar que el mismo se originó en el agua que había en la ruta 110 al momento del accidente, que causó que el conductor de la motocicleta resbalara y perdiera el control del vehículo, responsabilidad que endilga al AyA por la presencia del agua en la carretera, así como al CONAVI y al Estado por ser responsables en el mantenimiento de las carreteras. También argumenta que hay un derecho a la seguridad vial. El daño moral subjetivo de la señora Katherine Jiménez Bermúdez lo deriva de la relación de noviazgo que mantuvo con el occiso y el proyecto de matrimonio que tenían y el de su hija en la pérdida de su padre, que implica no solo un daño moral subjetivo, sino también material. Por su parte, el AyA argumenta que el caso se basa en teorías, pero que no se ha llegado a una certeza en cuanto a la responsabilidad, ya que si la misma se origina en el agua existente en la carretera, no hay evidencia de que fuera de resorte de la institución. Añade que el señor Obando Corea transitaba todos los días por el lugar y que sabía que la calle estaba mojada, por lo que es posible que viniera a alta velocidad y esta circunstancia fuera la causa del accidente. Rechaza el daño material de la menor Obando Jiménez, pues el peritaje es defectuoso y el daño moral de la niña, no se determinó. En cuanto a la señora Jiménez Bermúdez considera que no existe legitimación, apreciación que comparte el CONAVI, pues no se logró demostrar el parentesco que los unía. El Consejo también acota que no se logró demostrar que por acción u omisión se generara un daño, ya que la ruta 110 se mantiene en óptimas condiciones, los trabajos de estabilización de un talud que existe en el lugar del accidente se iniciaron nueve meses después del accidente y que el AyA intervino la carretera y no avisó al Consejo para que éste determinara si la capa asfáltica había quedado bien. En cuanto al agua existente en la carretera, es de responsabilidad del AyA y que en todo caso, la causa del accidente fue la impericia del señor Obando Corea, quien debió de haber manejado de acuerdo con los principios de evitabilidad y previsibilidad. Estima que no existe responsabilidad del CONAVI. Solicita que se rechace el daño moral de la señora Jiménez Bermúdez porque no existe legitimación, que el daño material de la menor por las inconsistencias del peritaje y que en términos generales, de acuerdo con el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil, la parte actora no logró demostrar los daños. Por su parte el Estado argumenta que la parte actora confunde la fundamentación jurídica de su demanda, cuando lo hace con base en el artículo 1045 del Código Civil ya que procede la aplicación de los artículos 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. También señala la falta de legitimación activa de la demandante Jiménez Bermúdez. Alega las excepciones de falta de legitimación pasiva y falta de derecho, las cuales fundamenta en que no ha sido acreditado que haya sido el agua existente en la calzada la causa del accidente y que además la misma no le puede ser imputada al Estado, sino al AyA. Señala que existía buena iluminación y buenas condiciones, siempre y cuando hubiera previsión. Aduce que hubo culpa de la víctima, pues el señor Obando viajaba a diario y conocía la vía y sus condiciones, que la velocidad máxima a la que podía conducir era de entre 30 a 40 kilómetros y que no puede viajarse al tope permitido si las condiciones no lo permiten, por lo que al venir dicho señor en el carril de descenso lo obligaba a desacelerar para manejar a la defensiva, a lo cual añade su poca experiencia de conducir, que era de alrededor de un mes. Dice que la parte no ha podido probar su teoría del caso, que no hay relación de causalidad y objeta los daños pretendidos, así como la solicitud de indexacción no procede, por tratarse de una obligación de valor.

V. DE LA CADUCIDAD

El AyA opuso la excepción de caducidad, pues consideró que las accionantes contaban con un año para interponer la demanda, al tenor de lo que que establece el inciso 1) del artículo 39 del CPCA. A este respecto, este Tribunal indica que el presente proceso es de naturaleza indemnizatoria y no está relacionado con la impugnación de una conducta formal de la Administración. La caducidad de la acción, que es la que menciona el artículo citado, está relacionada precisamente con los actos formales de las administraciones, para lo cual, en términos generales se establece un año para ejercer la acción ante esta instancia, por lo que no es de recibo. Para ello existe la prescripción, la cual está referida a un derecho y que está prevista en el artículo 41 del mismo cuerpo legal, pero al no haber sido interpuesta por los codemandados, no puede el Despacho entrar a conocerla de oficio. Por lo anterior, debe de rechazarse la excepción de caducidad.

VI.DE LA EXCEPCIÓN DE LEGITIMACIÓN ACTIVA INTERPUESTA EN CONTRA DE LA SEÑORA KATHERINE DAYANA JIMÉNEZ BERMÚDEZ EN EL PRESENTE PROCESO: Las partes codemandadas interpusieron la excepción de falta de legitimación activa de la señora Jiménez Bermúdez para interponer el presente proceso, en síntesis, porque no existía al momento de la muerte del señor Obando Corea, una convivencia de hecho que fundamente sus pretensiones. El ordenamiento jurídico costarricense reconoce a la unión de hecho los mismos efectos patrimoniales que el matrimonio, siempre y cuando se cumplan los requisitos establecidos en el artículo 242 del Código de Familia, es decir que sea de forma pública, notoria y estable, por más de tres años y entre un hombre y una mujer con aptitud legal para contraer matrimonio. Para efectos de su reconocimiento, el numeral 243 establece que el conviviente o los herederos podrán solicitarlo al Tribunal dentro del plazo de caducidad de dos años a partir de la ruptura de la convivencia. De acuerdo con la declaración de la misma actora dentro la sumaria penal 09-005407-042, así como de la declaración de la señora Flor María Bermúdez Fallas, ha quedado demostrado que la accionante y el occiso Obando Corea mantenían una relación de noviazgo, que procrearon una niña, pero que no convivían como pareja, ya que vivían en casas aparte. Además de ello, la actora no promovió el reconocimiento de su unión, lo cual es un requisito indispensable para que la misma surtiera efectos patrimoniales. Así lo ha reconocido la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en forma reiterada, cuando indica:

"El ordinal 242 del Código de Familia establece: “La unión de hecho pública, notoria, única y estable, por más de tres años, entre un hombre y una mujer que posean aptitud legal para contraer matrimonio, surtirá todos los efectos patrimoniales propios del matrimonio formalizado legalmente, al finalizar por cualquier causa”. Por otro parte, el canon 243 ejúsdem dice: “Para los efectos indicados en el artículo anterior, cualquiera de los convivientes o sus herederos podrá solicitar al Tribunal el reconocimiento de la unión de hecho. La acción se tramitará por la vía del proceso abreviado, regulada en el Código Procesal Civil, y caducará en dos años a partir de la ruptura de la convivencia o de la muerte del causante”. Del análisis de las normas recién transcritas, se desprende que efectivamente, el artículo 243 del Código de Familia establece un plazo de caducidad para establecer el respectivo procedimiento para que se reconozca una unión de hecho que cumpla los requisitos establecidos en el numeral 242 del mismo cuerpo legal, a saber: "notoria, única y estable, por más de tres años, entre un hombre y una mujer que posean aptitud legal para contraer matrimonio". Lo anterior a efecto de reconocerle "todos los efectos patrimoniales propios del matrimonio formalizado legalmente, al finalizar por cualquier causa". En virtud de ello, el plazo establecido es de dos años a partir de la ruptura de la convivencia o de la muerte del causante. Los requisitos analizados son necesarios, precisamente por la particularidad de la relación, puesto que al no existir un vínculo legal, son indispensables ciertos elementos notorios y fácilmente constatables para el juez. El matrimonio, es un vínculo jurídico, que se inscribe en el Registro Civil, su prueba se puede dar en cualquier momento con vista en los registros de esa institución. La unión de hecho por el contrario, debe acreditarse mediante otros medios, sea por testigos, eventos y circunstancias que conduzcan al juzgador del derecho a constatar que efectivamente esa relación se dio. Por tal motivo, es imprescindible que exista declaratoria judicial previa, ya que la existencia de un vínculo de hecho entre dos personas solo puede ser surtir efectos patrimoniales mediante sentencia judicial que así lo disponga. El conviviente debe someterse al trámite de reconocimiento para su validez, esa sería la única forma de sustentar su legitimación a raíz de ese vínculo." (Sentencia 415 de las catorce horas con veinte minutos del nueve de abril de dos mil trece).

Al no haber acreditado entonces una relación jurídica que le permitiera acudir a esta sede a reclamar los posibles daños derivados de la muerte del señor Obando Corea, debe de acogerse la excepción interpuesta y declarar la falta de legitimación activa de la demandante Jiménez Bermúdez y la inadmisibilidad de la demanda en lo que a ella concierne, por lo que se hará el análisis de las pretensiones únicamente en relación con la menor Keytlin Obando Jiménez, en razón de ser la heredera legítima y puede reclamar la indemnización que procediera conforme a derecho.

VII. DEL RÉGIMEN DE RESPONSABILIDAD DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA

De acuerdo con los principios constitucionales establecidos en los artículos 9, 11 y 41 de la Constitución Política, así como en la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), a partir del artículo 190, se establece la responsabilidad del Estado costarricense y más concretamente de las administraciones públicas como un régimen objetivo, por todas las actuaciones, tanto lícitas como ilícitas que ocurran a raíz del ejercicio de la función administrativa, tanto en actividad formal como en sus expresiones materiales o prestacionales. A tales efectos han de comprobarse tres elementos: la ocurrencia de un hecho, la existencia de un daño y el nexo de causalidad entre el daño y el quehacer de la administración o administraciones involucradas. Dentro de la complejidad de la estructura organizativa de la Administración Pública en Costa Rica y de acuerdo con lo que establece el artículo 1 de la LGAP, así como el inciso 3 del artículo 1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, hay una Administración Central, que es el ente mayor, constituido por los órganos constitucionales definidos en el artículo 21 de la misma ley, el Poder Ejecutivo, el Poder Legislativo y el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, cuando realicen función administrativa y otros órganos de esos mismos poderes, tales como la Contraloría General de la República y la Defensoría de los Habitantes. De igual forma, existe una administración descentralizada, que son todos aquellos entes a los que el ordenamiento jurídico los ha dotado con personalidad jurídica, con autonomía y presupuesto. Finalmente, dentro de esos entes ocurre el fenómeno de la desconcentración, por medio del cual se transfieren competencias de un órgano a otro, en razón de la especialidad y que en muchos casos, por decisión del legislador, se les ha dotado de personalidad jurídica instrumental. Hecha la anterior introducción, dada las pretensiones del presente proceso, deben de analizarse las competencias propias de los entes y órganos que intervienen en el presente proceso, comenzando con el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, el cual de acuerdo con su ley constitutiva (Ley 2726 del 14 de abril de 1961 y sus respectivas reformas), es una institución autónoma del Estado, la cual, de acuerdo con el artículo 2 de la citada norma, tiene, entre otras las siguientes competencias:

"a) Dirigir y vigilar todo lo concerniente para proveer a los habitantes de la república de un servicio de agua potable, recolección y evacuación de aguas negras y residuos industriales líquidos y de aguas pluviales en las áreas urbanas; (...)

• e)Elaborar todos los planos de las obras públicas relacionadas con los fines de esta ley, así como aprobar todos los de las obras privadas que se relacionen con los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados, según lo determinen los reglamentos respectivos; f) Aprovechar, utilizar, gobernar o vigilar, según sea el caso, todas las aguas de dominio público indispensables para el debido cumplimiento de las disposiciones de esta ley, en ejercicio de los derechos que el Estado tiene sobre ellas, conforme a la ley número 276 de 27 de agosto de 1942, a cuyo efecto el Instituto se considerará el órgano sustitutivo de las potestades atribuidas en esa ley al Estado, ministerios y municipalidades; g) Administrar y operar directamente los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados en todo el país, los cuales se irán asumiendo tomando en cuenta la conveniencia y disponibilidad de recursos. Los sistemas que actualmente están administrados y operados por las corporaciones municipales podrán seguir a cargo de éstas, mientras suministren un servicio eficiente. Bajo ningún concepto podrá delegar la administración de los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillado sanitario del Area Metropolitana. Tampoco podrá delegar la administración de los sistemas sobre los cuales exista responsabilidad financiera y mientras ésta corresponda directamente al Instituto.

(...); i) Construir, ampliar y reformar los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados en aquellos casos en que sea necesario y así lo aconseje la mejor satisfacción de las necesidades nacionales; y j) Controlar la adecuada inversión de todos los recursos que el Estado asigne para obras de acueductos y alcantarillado sanitario." Tal y como se desprende de la ley, el AyA tiene a su cargo, no solo la administración, sino también las ejecución de las obras de los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados, lo cual implica no solo la construcción, sino también su mantenimiento y reparación, por lo que cae dentro de la esfera de su responsabilidad, cualquier daño que ocurra con ocasión de lo anterior. Por otra parte, el CONAVI fue creado mediante la Ley 7798 del 30 de abril de 1998, como un órgano de desconcentración máxima, adscrito al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, con personalidad jurídica instrumental y presupuestaria para la administración del Fondo de la Red Nacional y suscribir contratos y empréstitos necesarios para el cumplimiento de sus funciones (artículo 3 de la ley). Para efectos del presente análisis, dentro de las competencias otorgadas por ley, en el numeral 4 de la misma se encuentran las siguientes:

"a) Planear, programar, administrar, financiar, ejecutar y controlar la conservación y la construcción de la red vial nacional, en concordancia con los programas que elabore la Dirección de Planificación del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes.

• b)Administrar su patrimonio." De lo anterior se extrae con claridad, la responsabilidad del órgano en lo relativo a la construcción y conservación de la red vial nacional. Finalmente el Estado, concretamente el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, tiene como competencia originaria y relacionada con el objeto del proceso, de acuerdo con su ley orgánica (Ley 3155 del 5 de agosto de 1963 y sus reformas), la siguiente, según lo establece el artículo 2:

" a) Planificar, construir y mejorar las carreteras y caminos. Mantener las carreteras y colaborar con las Municipalidades en la conservación de los caminos vecinales. Regular y controlar los derechos de vía de las carreteras y caminos existentes o en proyecto. Regular, controlar y vigilar el tránsito y el transporte por los caminos públicos." Hay entonces también una responsabilidad genérica del Estado en cuanto al mantenimiento de las carreteras. Existe otro aspecto que debe de analizarse también, para determinar la teoría del caso de las codemandadas y que es la causal de exclusión de responsabilidad por culpa de la víctima, en que estaba obligado a conducir el señor Obando Corea por el estado de la carretera. La Ley de Tránsito sobre Vías Públicas Terrestres, Ley 7331 del trece de octubre de 1993, vigente al momento en que ocurrieron los hechos, establece en su artículo 80, las condiciones generales en las que debe de conducirse un vehículo en las vías públicas terrestres:

"Los usuarios de las vías públicas deberán conducirse de manera que no obstruyan la circulación ni pongan en peligro la seguridad de los vehículos o de las demás personas. Asimismo, los conductores deberán evitar las situaciones que impidan la libre circulación del tránsito, por lo cual aplicarán el manejo defensivo y mantendrán una constante precaución y consideración mutua hacia los peatones y los demás conductores.

Los conductores deberán velar por la integridad física y la seguridad de su persona y la de los pasajeros como responsables del vehículo; por ello, deberán utilizar el cinturón de seguridad y exigir que lo usen todos los pasajeros del vehículo. El conductor que no utilice el cinturón de seguridad o conduzca un vehículo en el cual alguno de los pasajeros no lo use, será sancionado conforme lo señala esta Ley." Por otra parte, los límites de velocidad también están regulados en la misma ley, de la siguiente forma:

"Los límites de velocidad para la circulación de los vehículos serán fijados por la Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito, previo estudio técnico, de acuerdo con el tipo de la vía y sus condiciones. Esos límites, tanto en el mínimocomo en el máximo, rigen desde la colocación de los rótulos o las demarcaciones que indiquen esas velocidades, los cuales deben estar instalados, convenientemente, en las carreteras. En cuanto a la velocidad, rigen las siguientes disposiciones:

• a)Se prohíbe circular a una velocidad superior al límite máximo o inferior a la mínima establecida, de acuerdo con los límites fijados por la Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito; para ello, el conductor deberá tomar en cuenta las condiciones de la vía y deberá hacerlo bajo las reglas indicadas en los incisos sucesivos.
• b)La velocidad máxima permitida en las vías en donde no existe regulación expresa, es de sesenta (60) kilómetros por hora.
• c)En las zonas urbanas, la velocidad máxima permitida será de cuarenta (40) kilómetros por hora. No obstante, se autoriza una velocidad de conducción en esos tramos, que no podrá superar los sesenta (60) kilómetros por hora, si las condiciones de la vía, el flujo vehicular imperante y el nivel bajo de riesgo involucrado lo permiten. En zonas no urbanas, el límite máximo que se encuentre establecido en el tramo, solamente podrá ser superado en diez (10) kilómetros por hora, únicamente si se observan las condiciones antes indicadas.

ch) Al pasar frente a la entrada y salida de los planteles educativos, los hospitales, las clínicas y los lugares donde se lleven a cabo actividades o espectáculos deportivos, religiosos, sociales, culturales u otros de interés público, se prohíbe circular a una velocidad superior a veinticinco (25) kilómetros por hora, cuando se estén desarrollando actividades en esos lugares.

• d)Se prohíbe circular en cualquier tramo de carretera a menos de la velocidad mínima establecida, de manera que limite o retrase la libre circulación del resto de automotores; salvo en las ocasiones en que, por razones naturales o artificiales, se dificulte la conducción, o en el caso de cortejos fúnebres.
• e)En las autopistas, la velocidad mínima se establece en cuarenta (40) kilómetros por hora y, la velocidad máxima, en cien (100) kilómetros por hora.
• f)En las zonas designadas como de paso frecuente de ciclistas, debidamente señalizadas, la velocidad máxima permitida será de cuarenta (40) kilómetros por hora. Las autopistas no podrán ser designadas como zona de paso frecuente de ciclistas." Las normas citadas enmarcan los parámetros para que los conductores de cualquier tipo de vehículo circulen por las vías terrestres.

VII.DEL ANÁLISIS DEL CASO CONCRETO. La discusión en el presente caso gira en torno a si existió alguna conducta administrativa que generara responsabilidad de los entes y órgano involucrados con respecto a la muerte del señor Michael Obando Corea acaecida el día veintiuno de marzo de dos mil nueve, en la ruta nacional 110, cincuenta metros norte del Río Tiribí, en el sentido San José-Alajuelita. El deceso se produjo cuando dicho señor venía conduciendo una motocicleta, en el sentido Alajuelita-San José, perdió el control de la misma, fue a dar al carril contrario, por el que venía circulando el bus placas M-190612 y fue arrollado por las llantas del autobús, las que causaron las lesiones que provocaron su fallecimiento en el mismo lugar del accidente. La parte actora sostiene que el día del percance, había agua sobre la superficie de rodamiento y que esto fue lo que provocó que el señor Obando perdiera el control del vehículo que conducía. Atribuye la responsabilidad al AyA, pues el agua provenía de una tubería propia del Instituto, a la vez que al CONAVI y al Estado por considerar que es su responsabilidad el mantenimiento de las vías nacionales en condiciones óptimas para la circulación. Tanto de la prueba testimonial, como de las fotografías de la sumaria penal 09-005407-042, en la que se investigó la muerte del occiso como homicidio culposo, consta que había agua sobre la calzada, por lo que debe de determinarse si esta fue la causante del accidente. La causa penal fue desestimada en contra del conductor del autobús, en resolución de las diez horas del veintinueve de abril de dos mil nueve, al considerar el juez penal que la fuga de agua que existía en la carretera hizo que la moto derrapara y ocurriera el evento fatídico. La conclusión a la que llega el juzgador se debe básicamente al testimonio de Edgar Eduardo Madrigal Rojas, quien fue testigo del hecho. Este Tribunal considera que la conclusión a la que llega el juez penal no lo vincula, ya que lo que se trató de determinar fue la responsabilidad del conductor del autobús en la comisión del delito de homicidio culposo y las pruebas recabadas fueron con ese fin, sin que además se haya aportado prueba técnica suficiente para arribar a esa conclusión. Por ello, el asunto ha de analizarse con la prueba traída al proceso para determinar no solo la posible causa del accidente, sino también la responsabilidad de los codemandados, para que la misma sea valorada en su conjunto bajo los principios de la sana crítica. Hecha la anterior observación se entra a examinar en primer lugar la presencia de agua en el lugar del accidente, la cual, como se dijo, consta en las fotos visibles a los folios 17 y 18 del expediente. Dicha agua, de acuerdo con el parte del accidente, visible al folio 33 a 37 del expediente y con la prueba testimonial, emanaba de un hoyo en la calzada. Lo que queda por determinar si esa fue la causa del percance y de ser así, a cual de los codemandados correspondería la responsabilidad. Para ello, se procede a desmenuzar el testimonio de Madrigal Rojas, quien fue testigo presencial del accidente y quien fue ofrecido por la accionante en el presente proceso. El señor Madrigal Rojas, según consta en el expediente penal, manifestó literalmente en la causa penal: "Llegué al puente de Alajuelita subiendo a 30 mts vi un muchacho en una moto que venía alguito rápido por no en exceso, antes de la curva frenó y empezó a derrapar. En la calle lloraba agua, el carro de la Coca Cola percibió lo que iba pasar, se ahorrilló (sic) a mano derecho hacia el paredón y frenó yo también realicé lo mismo." En la declaración testimonial realizada el día del juicio oral y público, este testigo manifestó que el ahora occiso había resbalado por el agua que había en la calzada. También indicó que Obando Corea venía a una velocidad normal, entre cuarenta a cincuenta kilómetros por hora. Ante las preguntas de los codemandados acerca del cambio de versión entre el expediente, aclaró que su versión en el expediente penal fue para beneficiar al conductor del autobús. Esta declaración ha de contrastarse con la prueba documental existente en el expediente, así como con la pericia y demás declaraciones testimoniales recabadas. En primer lugar ha de revisarse la pericia realizada por Jorge Isaac Mora Campos, quien determinó en primer lugar, que el accidente se dio por impericia del conductor, entendida esta como la habilidad de mantenerse en el control de la motocicleta. De igual forma su informe hizo referencia al hidroplaneamiento que consiste en que existiendo en un lugar una cantidad de agua que impida que la llanta de un vehículo, en este caso una motocicleta, haga contacto con la carretera y se pierda el control. En su opinión, con las fotos que constan en el expediente, el agua es muy poca para que se diera ese fenómeno. Por otra parte hizo referencia a que el lugar en donde se produjo el accidente, por las condiciones de la carretera, la conducción es de alto riesgo y que es peligroso tomar la curva a más de cuarenta kilómetros por hora, pues es esta es cerrada con un ángulo muy pequeño y que la velocidad adecuada para transitar es de veinticinco kilómetros por hora. Por otra parte, el testigo Benjamín Sandino González coincidió con lo expresado con el perito, en cuanto a que existió hidroplaneamiento y que la velocidad máxima a la que se podía transitar por el lugar, es de cuarenta kilómetros por hora. Analizada en su conjunto la anterior prueba bajo las reglas de la sana crítica racional, considera este Tribunal que el testigo Madrigal Rojas, no le merece fe respecto de la causa del accidente, sea porque haya derrapado o sea porque se haya resbalado, ya que de un hecho que presenció, del cual no ha transcurrido mucho tiempo y que además fue de gravedad ya que se produjo la muerte de una persona, varió su versión para favorecer a una de las partes, por lo menos en cuanto al proceso penal. Lo que si es uniforme, en ambos casos, es la velocidad a la que venía conduciendo el señor Obando Corea, ya que sede penal dijo que venía "rapidito" y en el presente que venía a una velocidad entre cuarenta y cincuenta kilómetros por hora, aspecto sobre el cual se volverá más adelante. De igual forma, la pericia y el testigo Sandino González coinciden en que no pudo haber hidroplaneamiento, pues la cantidad de agua era muy poca. Por ello y pese a que en el expediente penal se indicara que la calle estaba resbalosa, no existe una prueba fehaciente de que el señor Obando Corea se hubiera resbalado, pues el testigo presencial incurrió en contradicciones, además de que no pudo haber hidroplaneamiento, sea, que las llantas de la moto hubieran perdido contacto con la superficie de rodamiento. Lo anterior lleva a considerar la forma de conducción del occiso. Es un hecho incontrovertido que el señor Obando Corea vivía en Alajuelita y que transitaba a menudo por el lugar del accidente. Igualmente ha quedado establecido que al momento de su fallecimiento tenía alrededor de un mes de haber obtenido su licencia de conducir, así como que las condiciones de la carretera obligaban a que los conductores de cualquier tipo de vehículo transitaran a una límite máximo de cuarenta kilómetros por hora y que fuera prudente hacerlo a una velocidad aún menor, lo anterior con independencia de la existencia del agua en dicho lugar, la cual, de acuerdo con la prueba testimonial de Ana Cecilia Guerrero Agüero, tenía varios días de estar allí. Como se indicó anteriormente, la causa del accidente fue la impericia del conductor al no haber podido controlar la moticicleta cuando hizo la curva. Si se toma en cuenta que el único testigo presencial fue conteste en que el señor Obando Corea venía circulando a una velocidad mayor a los cuarenta kilómetros por hora, hace concluir al Tribunal que la causa del accidente se debió más a la imprudencia del conductor, quien no conducía a la defensiva de acuerdo con lo que establece el artículo 80 de la Ley de Tránsito citado en el anterior considerando, ya que las condiciones de la carretera demandaban precaución extrema, máxime cuando es dable presumir que el señor Obando Corea pasaba a menudo por el lugar y conocía del estado y las condiciones particulares de la calle, además de que por su inexperiencia al volante, se le obligaba a un mayor cuidado. En consecuencia llevan razón los codemandados en cuanto a que la parte actora no pudo demostrar la existencia de alguna actuación administrativa que provocara el deceso tantas veces mencionado, ya que la prueba aportada resulta insuficiente para demostrar que el agua que discurría por el lugar fuera la causante del accidente. Por ello también resulta innecesario determinar si la misma provenía de alguna tubería o alcantarillado responsabilidad del AyA o de alguna otra institución, así como si existieron omisiones de parte del Estado y del CONAVI de las competencias otorgadas por el ordenamiento para la manutención de las vías públicas, según lo detallado en el considerando anterior, así como si la misma fue reparada con posterioridad al accidente. En virtud de lo anterior, al faltar uno de los presupuestos propios de la responsabilidad administrativa, sea la existencia de la relación de causalidad entre la muerte del señor Obando Corea y la actuación de la Administración Pública, no procede la indemnización solicitada en favor de la menor Keylin Obando Jiménez. En síntesis, no hay responsabilidad del AyA, ni del MOPT o el CONAVI, lo que existió fue culpa de la víctima ya que fue su impericia la que tuvo como consecuencia el fatídico accidente donde desgraciadamente el señor Obando Corea perdió la vida.”