No indemnification to municipality for ARESEP opposition in water tariff settingImprocedencia de indemnización a municipalidad por oposición de ARESEP en fijación tarifaria de acueducto

**IV) ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE:** This jurisdictional body finds that the core issue in the present matter lies in whether the defendant Regulatory Authority of Public Services must return, with interest, the payments made to it by the Municipality of San Carlos for tariff regulation fees, on the grounds that these constitute undue payments, and whether ARESEP is liable, due to its opposition to the tariff setting for the water service that the plaintiff intended to carry out, for the payment of forty-four million seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred forty-eight colones, plus legal interest, an amount the plaintiff Municipality estimates it failed to receive due to said opposition. By reason of what is stated here, this judgment will analyze four aspects considered basic for the correct resolution of this dispute: the liability of the Public Administration, the binding nature of the opinions issued by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the concept and consequences of undue payment, and the retroactive effects of the upholding judgments issued by the Constitutional Chamber in matters of unconstitutionality actions.

IV.1)- ON THE STRICT LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND EXEMPTING CAUSES OF LIABILITY: Within the regime of so-called non-contractual civil liability, two types are distinguished: subjective liability, established in Article 1045 of the Civil Code, and strict liability, governed by section 9 of the Political Constitution, Article 1048 of the Civil Code, and section 190 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration. This latter Article provides that the Administration (constituted by the State and other public entities, as stated in Article 1 of that same regulatory body) shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except in cases of force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. As can be clearly noted, the cited norm introduces the concept of strict liability of the State. That is, the kind that does not take into account the examination of the official's conduct regarding the extremes of their culpability, basing liability on the mere verification of the damage and that it was produced by the activity of the Administration. As has been indicated by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice: "The fundamental concepts upon which the theory of strict liability of the Administration is based shall be the following: In the first place, we have the concept of compensable injury or damage. If the determination of the servant's specific conduct is disregarded to establish its possible illegality, it is clear that the guiding element for this principle is the guarantee of the patrimonies of individuals, which have been affected by administrative action. The injury or damage that serves as the foundation for the compensatory institute must be wrongful, that is, its holder must not have the objective duty to bear it, meaning there are no causes of justification that legitimize the production of the harm in the administered party's patrimonial sphere. Causes of justification which, it goes without saying, must be enshrined in the legal system itself, such that their application is a typical consequence of that regulatory set (e.g., collection of taxes, preservation of morality and good customs, Article 195 of the General Law). In addition, that damage must present the characteristics of being effective, economically assessable, and individualizable. In such a way that, by effective, we understand a damage that is certain, which implies it can be current or future (if verifiable through the rules of science or technique, or the elementary principles of justice, logic, or convenience - Article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration-) and not one that is eventual or merely possible; while its valuation in monetary terms allows, in some way, fixing with the greatest equity the amount subject to compensation. The latter is especially relevant in the case of moral damage, as we shall see later. Regarding the concept of individualizable, it indicates that it must be a concrete damage, directly related to the claimant's patrimony and that exceeds, moreover, those that can be considered common burdens of social life. In such a way that it may be a single person or a group of them that, however, does not reach the generality of the inhabitants or broad sectors of the population. The point is that everyone is in a legal condition that makes the affectation of their patrimonial spheres injurious to the Legal System. (See Judgment No. 112 of fourteen hours twenty-five minutes of November 25, 1994. Bold highlighting is by this Tribunal). Thus, strict liability occurs without needing to prove the intent or fault of the party causing the damage; the risk is enough to generate it. In this way, the party causing the injury must compensate it, whether intent or fault was involved or not, unless it proves some exonerating cause from those contemplated by section 190 of the General Law of Public Administration, cited above. Consequently, for its occurrence, three essential requirements are necessary: 1) Injury or existence of wrongful damage, which consists of wrongful patrimonial affectations, inasmuch as the party suffering them has no duty to bear them. 2) Conduct of the administration, whether omissive or active, formal or material, and 3) The causal link, that is, that a direct cause-and-effect relationship exists between the act imputed and the damage produced; evidently, without the presence of causes of justification that legitimize the injury produced. For in such a case, the causal link is broken upon the occurrence of an exempting situation such as force majeure, fault of the victim, and act of a third party. Force majeure is understood as an event of nature, extraneous, external, unforeseeable, and unavoidable (see Judgment No. 00319 of eleven hours of October 12, 2001, issued by the First Section of this Administrative Litigation Tribunal). The fault of the victim occurs when, by its own action or by its inexcusable carelessness, negligence, or imprudence, it causes the injury or places itself in a position conducive to it and assumes the risk with its harmful effects, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of the contingency. The act of a third party is the action or omission of a person unrelated to the relationship, without whose participation the harmful event would not have occurred. (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, resolution number 025-F-99 of 14:15 hours of January 22, 1999, number 589-F-99 of 14:20 hours of October 1, 1999, and number 252-F-01 of 16:15 hours of March 28, 2001). The regulation contained in the General Law of Public Administration concerning the cases in which compensation for the caused injury is applicable distinguishes two main aspects: First, the illicit or abnormal activity of the Administration (Articles 190, 191, and 192) presupposes a transgression of the Legal System, which in turn means that the claim for the suffered injury encompasses not only the damage as such but also the corresponding loss (in relation to Article 10.3 of the Regulatory Law of the Administrative Litigation Jurisdiction). Generally, illegality is related to the breach of norms of the Legal System applicable to the Administration, while abnormality focuses on an examination related to its material activity or service provision. Secondly, liability for lawful conduct and normal functioning presupposes a specific assessment of the injury caused by the actions of the Public Administration. In this case, the damage is qualified as "special," either because of the "small proportion of affected parties" or "because of the exceptional intensity of the injury." (Article 194 of the General Law). It shall be understood, in contradiction with the previous definition of abnormality, that in this case the adjustment made by the causative agent to the parameters of good functioning and compliance with regulatory and other provisions that affect its conduct have not managed to prevent the damage from being consummated and, furthermore, that such damage is so alien to the generality of results that it obliges its compensation. The foundation of this figure was explained in the Legislative Assembly by Doctor Ortiz Ortiz in the following terms: "This obeys the principle we explained yesterday of the so-called indemnification of public law, for lawful act or for normal functioning of the Administration. But it is clearly established here under what conditions that indemnification will be admitted, only when those affected by the normal functioning or the lawful act are very few or the injury inflicted is exceptionally serious. Extraordinary or abnormal in relation to the members of the rest of the community. (...) We say that when it involves very few, or a very intense grievance or damage, it will proceed to apply that indemnification. We must recognize that this has a certain margin of indeterminacy. How many are few and how many are many? That is something that will fundamentally remain with judicial appreciation. When the injury inflicted will be very intense or extraordinary or abnormal is something that will remain with the judge's appreciation. But in reality it is a risk, and we consider that all laws run it. The second paragraph simply affirms the following, when the doctrine of this type of liability upholds the following principle: When a good of the administered party is damaged by lawful act or normal functioning, the Administration must restore the owner to the previous state in relation to that good, not to the patrimonial state they would have had if the good had not suffered the damage because it is considered that this is not a responsibility that is a sanction, an illicit act, but rather an act of justice to compensate a citizen for the sacrifice made for the benefit of the community. Then, with the same spirit of solidarity, the citizen is imposed a loss of their damages, although limited, in the sense that they cannot charge for loss of profit. The doctrine usually formulates this rule saying: the damage to the injured good is compensated, the damage caused to the owner is not compensated. The damage to the injured good may be less than that caused to the owner. When the owner, as a consequence of the injury, has ceased to receive certain profits. In that case, it is not compensated. (...) In these cases, the State acts in an act of social solidarity and justice with the individual..."(QUIRÓS CORONADO, Roberto, General Law of Public Administration, concorded and annotated with the Legislative Debate and Constitutional Jurisprudence, San José, Costa Rica. Editorial Aselex S.A., 1996. Page. 295 ).

IV.2) ON THE BINDING NATURE OF THE OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC: The Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982) establishes in its Article 1, first paragraph that this is the "higher consultative, technical-legal body of the Public Administration, and the legal representative of the State in matters within its competence." The "consultative function" of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is materialized in the issuance of opinions and legal opinions for the different administrative authorities that make up the active Public Administration and that, by provision of law, are legitimized to request the criterion of this Consultative Body.

The ultimate goal pursued with the issuance of opinions and legal opinions is to help clarify for the administrative authority, through a technical legal criterion, the principles and modalities of its competences at the time of issuing an administrative act, as well as the scope of the various norms that make up the legal system. (See opinion C-278-2008 of August 12, 2008). Thus, it is established that by the will of the legislator, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic has been charged with providing technical-legal advice to the Public Administration, constituted by the State (higher entity) and other public entities (lesser entities), as established by Article 1 of the General Law of Public Administration.

Now then, when the Attorney General issues a criterion through an opinion, the same, besides constituting administrative jurisprudence, is of mandatory observance for the consulting Administration. Thus, Article 2 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic establishes that: "The opinions and pronouncements of the Office of the Attorney General constitute administrative jurisprudence, and are of mandatory observance for the Public Administration." From the reading of the cited section, it would be inferred that all opinions and pronouncements of the Attorney General are binding for the Public Administration, understood in the terms indicated above. However, the article under discussion was the object of an Unconstitutionality Action before the Full Court, when it was this body that exercised the functions of constitutionality controller. In Extraordinary Session No. 32 of thirteen hours thirty minutes of May 3, 1984, the Court interpreted the referred section, indicating that: "In accordance with all the foregoing, it is necessary to conclude that the mandatory nature of the opinion established in Article 2 is for the administration that requested it, not for the others, for which it constitutes administrative jurisprudence, and which is an unwritten source of the administrative legal system, and that as such a source it will have the rank determined by the General Law of Public Administration." Thus, then, only the consulting Administration is obliged to observe the opinion that the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic issues on the subject of consultation, unless a dispensation from it is obtained from the Government Council (when public interest is at stake), for which the consultant must first formally request reconsideration of the opinion before the same Office of the Attorney General, a proceeding that will be resolved by the Assembly of Attorneys. That is, if once reconsideration is formulated it is denied by the Attorney General, the consulting Administration may appeal to the Government Council to request the dispensation. (Article 6, Organic Law of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic).

IV.3) ON THE CONCEPT OF UNDUE PAYMENT: As its name indicates, to pay unduly is to make a payment that, due to the circumstances of the case, the person who believed themselves obligated to do so did not have to make. "When a person receives as payment a sum of money or any other benefit that is not owed to them, they are obliged to return the thing received, as there is no legitimate cause justifying the appropriation made of it." (MONTERO PIÑA, Fernando. Obligations. PREMIA EDITORES, First Edition, 1999. San José, Costa Rica. Page 162). As can be noted, in undue payment there is an absence of cause, which is why the person who receives what did not correspond to them is compelled to return only what was received if they acted in good faith, or what was received with all its fruits if they acted in bad faith. For this reason, it is said that "if undue payment occurs, the legal consequences consist in that the recipient acquires the obligation to reimburse the payer's patrimony with the content of what was unduly received..." (Op. cit. page 162).

Thus, undue payment generates unjust enrichment, which obliges the party experiencing it to return what was received and generates in the payer the right to reclaim what was paid (action for repetition, recourse, or in rem verso), that is, to recover what was unduly delivered. (See Voto 06886-2001 of sixteen hours seven minutes of July seventeen, two thousand one, and Voto 05973-2001 of fourteen hours forty-four minutes of July five, two thousand one, both by the Constitutional Chamber). The payer who exercises said action is the one who bears the burden of proof, that is, they must prove the undue payment made to extinguish an obligation that did not exist at the time said payment was made, or the mistake incurred in carrying out the fulfillment of that content of the benefit. (Op. cit., page 164).

IV.4) ON THE EFFECTS OF UPHOLDING JUDGMENTS IN UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTIONS: Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes that the declaration of unconstitutionality implies that the norm is contrary to the Political Constitution, with the consequences of such declaration extending backward in time (that is, retroactively) to the date the act or norm was issued, but respecting good faith acquired rights.

Pursuant to that same section, the constitutional annulment judgment in such cases must establish in space, time, or matter the retroactive consequences it has (ex tunc effect) and shall provide what is necessary to prevent said effect from causing serious harm or damage to security, justice, or social peace. Referring precisely to the topic of constitutional judgments, this Tribunal stated: "... Specifically, and regarding the value of the judgments of the Constitutional Chamber, the latter, in resolution No. 240-I-95 of 14:28 hours of May 10, 1995, expressed: '... From the principles deriving from Articles 10, 42, 48, 153, and 154 of the Political Constitution, developed by Articles 11, 12, and 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the judgments issued by the Chamber in the matters it hears lack appeals, have the character of formal and material res judicata, and also bind erga omnes, producing general effects. This means that in our system, the jurisdictional nature of constitutional decisions is clearly set forth, in their nature as judgments, as defined by the most qualified constitutional doctrine, and the effects proper and characteristic to them, derived from their authority as formal and material res judicata, are also clearly highlighted. Thus, constitutional judgments are subject to the general principles of procedural law, and therefore the effects of the judgment are definitive and immutable. ." (Judgment No. 00007 of ten hours thirty minutes of March 26, 2007, issued by Section IV of this Administrative Litigation Tribunal). Now then, in the case of upholding judgments in unconstitutionality actions, it has been said that under the protection of the provisions of Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the annulment of the norm or act contrary to the Constitution has retroactive effects that will be dimensioned by the Constitutional Chamber. Moreover, pursuant to Article 88 of said regulatory body, said annulment shall govern from the first time the operative part of the judgment is published in the Judicial Bulletin. Thus, it is true that judgments in such cases do not have ex nunc (forward or toward the future) effect and that the Chamber "is not authorized to dimension toward the future the annulling effects of the norm or act declared unconstitutional, in itself; but it is also true that a 'different situation is the future effect of constitutional jurisprudence, in its character as an unwritten normative source of the legal system.'" (PIZA ROCAFORT, Rodolfo and ORTEGA CÓRDOBA, Jorge. Constitutional Justice in Costa Rica. Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. Pages 174-175). Put another way, constitutional jurisprudence, in its character as an unwritten normative source of the Costa Rican legal system, has ex nunc effect, that is, toward the future.

**V) DETERMINATION IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE OF THE FOUR ASPECTS INDICATED IN THE PREVIOUS CONSIDERANDOS.** V.1.) On strict liability and the payment of the amounts the plaintiff Municipality failed to receive: The plaintiff seeks, among other points that will be analyzed in this judgment, that the judgment compel ARESEP to pay the Municipality of San Carlos the amounts it failed to receive due to the opposition exercised when the plaintiff sought to increase water service rates, amounts that total forty-four million seven hundred forty-three thousand four hundred forty-eight colones and forty-six céntimos. A sum on which it also seeks the recognition of the respective legal interest. It is therefore appropriate to establish whether the necessary requirements for said imputation concur in the case, namely injury or existence of wrongful damage, the conduct of the administration whether omissive or active, formal or material, and the causal link, as has been repeatedly established by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in its resolutions number 025-F-99 of 14:15 hours of January 22, 1999, 589-F-99 of 14:20 hours of October 1, 1999, and 252-F-01 of 16:15 hours of March 28, 2001.). Regarding the injury or compensable damage, in the filing brief, the complaint, and the Appeal Motion being analyzed here, the plaintiff indicates that such injury consists of "the amounts failed to be received due to the opposition exercised by ARESEP to the Municipality of San Carlos when it sought to increase water rates and which total forty-four million seven hundred forty-three thousand four hundred forty-eight colones and forty-six céntimos.", and it is necessary to analyze whether the alleged damage is susceptible to compensation under the terms of section 196 of the General Law of Public Administration and the cited jurisprudence. In this regard, it has rightly been said that not just any damage must be compensated, but only that which is certain, effective, assessable, and individualizable. In the present case, this Tribunal considers that the injury the plaintiff credits as compensable does not fit within the legal prerequisites necessary to be repaired, because although a conduct of the defendant Administration is credited in the record, consisting of opposition to the plaintiff Municipality setting new rates for the potable water supply service, the damage being liquidated is eventual, uncertain, and hypothetical, as it is based on supposed or conjectural realizations; because although the plaintiff Municipality had approved the proposed rates through its Municipal Council, it is true that a public hearing was convened for the citizens of the canton, who evidently had the right to oppose and to have their oppositions analyzed (f. 33 to 35 administrative file Volume I, proven facts five and six). In addition to the foregoing, nothing guaranteed that when exercising its control function over the determination mechanisms of the proposed rates, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic would approve them, and much less did any guarantee exist regarding the resounding success of the collection. Thus, there is no certainty, nor immediacy, that the plaintiff Municipality would effectively obtain the income it claims to have failed to receive due to the defendant's action, which does not allow crediting the effective materialization of such injury, whose existence depends on chance and the uncertain, which the judge is forbidden to compensate. Indeed, nothing guarantees, nor proves, that the plaintiff Municipality would effectively obtain the income it claims, much less when a series of steps within the procedural journey remained for the entry into force of the proposed tariff setting, such as resolving the eventual oppositions of users, obtaining the comptroller's approval, and carrying out effective collection for the service provided. Note that it was a mere expectation, not the affectation of a subjective right, which prevents its recognition. It has rightly been said that "damage constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial juridical sphere of the person (injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal right, regarding which its conservation was objectively expectable had the harmful event not occurred." (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice number 14-F-93 of sixteen hours of March 2, 1993) and in this case, there is no deprivation of a legal right because the rates had not been approved for their due implementation, that is, no subjective right had been obtained whose injury would generate the compensatory obligation claimed. Consequently, since damage "constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the illicit act with the one subsequent to it" (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice number 14-F-93 indicated above), this leads inevitably to the conclusion that the plaintiff's situation before the defendant's opposition to the new tariff setting, even when the Municipal Council had already approved it, did not imply the holding of a protectable and compensable legal right, in the terms expounded here. That is, they do not constitute income derived from the provision of the potable water supply service, so that, as subjective rights produce effects from the adoption of the act that generates them (doctrine of section 140 of the General Law of Public Administration), it is not possible to compensate what it would have earned before its declaration, as this would be equivalent to compensating an uncertain fact residing in the realm of expectations. Now then, it has been consistently held that the damage must be wrongful, that is, that its holder does not have the objective duty to bear it, meaning there are no causes of justification that legitimize the production of the harm in the administered party's patrimonial sphere. Causes of justification, which must be enshrined in the legal system itself, such that their application is a typical consequence of that regulatory set (e.g., collection of taxes, preservation of morality and good customs, Article 195 of the General Law of Public Administration).

In the case at hand, even though no compensable damage exists for the reasons outlined above, it is worth, even if briefly, bringing up that ARESEP acted in accordance with the opinions that the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic had been issuing on the subject matter of this process. In this sense, said regulatory authority and the plaintiff municipality itself received respective opinions addressed to them, which related to the subject. In the case of ARESEP, C-244-99 of December 15, 1999, and regarding the Municipality of San Carlos, C-007-2000 of January 24, 2000, where the Attorney General expressly concludes that it corresponded to ARESEP to set water service rates when the service is provided by the Municipalities. This being the conclusion of the higher consultative body of the Public Administration as indicated supra, and being of mandatory observance for the consulting entities what was stated by it, it is clear that at that time both entities had to conform to what was set forth in the referenced opinions.

ARESEP brought to the attention of the plaintiff Municipality the opinion of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría), indicating, as was appropriate, the legal basis for its opposition and the consequences for the municipal authorities if they did not respect ARESEP's powers and continued with their rate-setting procedure (proven fact number seven). Thus, within the legal scenario existing at that time, ARESEP's opposition, which the municipal entity resents, was in accordance with the Law. Now, as is evident from the case file (f. 41-46 of the main file, f. 101-107 of the main file), the claim of the plaintiff Municipality is based on the fact that through Voto 7728-2000 of fourteen hours and forty-five minutes of August thirtieth, two thousand, issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), by which Voto 5445-99 of fourteen hours and thirty minutes of July fourteenth, nineteen ninety-nine was supplemented, it was established that as long as the aqueduct service is being provided by the Municipalities, it is up to them, by reason of their constitutionally granted autonomy, to set the rates to be charged, leaving the final control of their determination in the hands of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). According to the plaintiff's thesis, what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber in the cited supplemental vote has retroactive effects and, therefore, everything done by ARESEP had been illegal. This thesis is not shared by this Court, since it has been set forth above (Considerando IV.4), that although estimatory rulings in actions of unconstitutionality have retroactive effects, it is also true, that with respect to the subject matter in question, the Constitutional Chamber did not declare unconstitutional either Article 5 of Law 7593 (Law Creating ARESEP) or the interpretation that the Attorney General's Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) had been making regarding it, in accordance with other regulations cited in its opinions. What the Constitutional Chamber did, as indicated supra, was a regulatory interpretation, which, for that reason, lacks the retroactive effect that the plaintiff party intends to give it and that the trial judge indicates. On the contrary, as it constitutes jurisprudence (a non-written source of the legal system), it has efficacy toward the future. (PIZA ROCAFORT, Rodolfo and ORTEGA CÓRDOBA, Jorge. La Justicia Constitucional en Costa Rica. Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. Pages 174-175). Contrary to what was stated by the trial judge, whose position is most respectable but not shared by this Court, the aforementioned Voto 7728-2000, when it refers to retroactive effects, clearly refers to the unconstitutionality it is declaring of Article 212 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito) and does not record such effects ex tunc for the interpretation it makes of Article 5 subsection c) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996. Thus, the Vote under comment expressly orders, regarding this point: "...likewise, the judgment is clarified to the effect that article 164 of the Municipal Code -Law number 7794- is not unconstitutional; but, on the other hand, subsection a) of article 212 of the Traffic Law for Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) is unconstitutional, an unconstitutionality that is declarative and retroactive to the date the annulled norm took effect, which is April twenty-second, nineteen ninety-three; and, that as an expression of municipal autonomy, it is up to local governments to set the rates for the potable water supply service in cases where said service is provided by the municipalities themselves..." (bold emphasis is from this Court). As can be seen, the Constitutional Chamber, in the operative part of its clarifying vote, separates each of its ideas with a semicolon. Thus, when it addresses the issue of setting aqueduct rates, it does so after the semicolon that separates it from the declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 212 of the Traffic Law for Public Land Routes, which has the effects stated therein (declarative and retroactive), precisely to avoid confusions like the one that has been generated here. In summary, there is no doubt whatsoever, not only because of said wording but also for the legal reasons stated herein, that the retroactive effect recorded by the Constitutional Chamber in the operative part of the cited Vote relates to the declaration of unconstitutionality stated therein and never to the interpretation of Article 5 subsection b) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996, which, as has been indicated, lacks that retroactive effect, and such interpretation must be applied toward the future and specifically from the publication in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) of the operative part of the judgment (Article 88 Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)), which occurred on September 22, 2000 (Bulletin No. 182). V.2.) Regarding the refund of payments made by the Municipality of San Carlos: The plaintiff also seeks, through the judgment, to compel ARESEP to refund to the Municipality of San Carlos the amounts paid since the entry into force of Law 7794, for the following fees: -Solid Waste and Road Cleaning Concept which is one hundred one thousand three hundred seventy-five colones with fifty céntimos. -Storm Sewer Concept which is one hundred one thousand thirty-seven net colones. -Municipal Aqueduct Regulation two million seven hundred eighty-three thousand four hundred seventeen colones with seventy céntimos. It also requests the recognition of statutory interest on such sums. Throughout its argument regarding the reason for said refund, it states that in its view what has occurred is a undue payment (pago indebido) and that, therefore, the requested refund together with the requested interest is appropriate.

To determine the existence of an undue payment, the issue of cause (causa) must be analyzed, understood as the reason why the payment is made. In the case at hand, it is the opinion of this Court, as has been expressed throughout this judgment, that ARESEP, until September 22, 2000, the date on which the operative part of Voto 7728-2000—which in turn clarified Voto 5445-1999—was published in the Judicial Bulletin, was, according to the legal scenario prevailing at that time, the entity competent to set the rates to be charged for the aqueduct concept. The plaintiff Municipality considers that by virtue of the retroactive effects it claims the clarifying vote, cited so many times, has with respect to the interpretation of Article 5 subsection b) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996, from the entry into force of the Municipal Code (Law 7794) the payments made to ARESEP for fees for rate-setting (fijaciones tarifarias) lacked legal basis, and therefore constitute undue payments and their refund with interest is appropriate. Such a position cannot be endorsed by this Court. As indicated above, the interpretation made by the Constitutional Chamber of Article 5 subsection b) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996 does not have retroactive effects. To this must be added the fact that the plaintiff Municipality paid ARESEP for a rate-setting service that the latter provided. To be clearer, it has been taken as established that in accordance with the non-retroactivity of the Chamber's interpretation indicated supra and the legal scenario in which both ARESEP and the plaintiff Municipality found themselves, the regulatory authority had no choice but to do what it did, in defense of what, up to that moment in Costa Rica, was considered its legitimate competence. However, if for a moment, hypothetically, the plaintiff's thesis regarding the lack of legal basis for the payment as of the entry into force of the Municipal Code (Law 7794) were to be endorsed, it is a fact that ARESEP provided the service for which the fees were paid, and that service provided was useful to the municipal entity which, feeling satisfied with it, promptly paid what was due. From this perspective, ordering the refund of the fees paid plus interest (which only applies when bad faith has existed) would be equivalent to allowing the plaintiff entity, having obtained a benefit from the service provided by ARESEP, which clearly has a cost, not to pay for it despite having received it. This being the case, from any perspective one looks at it, one cannot speak of an undue payment in this case, given that, as indicated supra, this occurs "when a person receives as a payment a sum of money or any other benefit that is not owed to them..." (MONTERO PIÑA, Fernando. Obligaciones. PREMIA EDITORES, First Edition, 1999. San José, Costa Rica. Page 162) and in the case under analysis, the sums paid to ARESEP were owed by the plaintiff Municipality, and according to the legal scenario prevailing at that time, it is not feasible to affirm that ARESEP had acted illegally by receiving them. " IV.2) ON THE BINDING NATURE OF THE OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA: The Organic Law of the Procuraduría General de la República (Law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982) establishes in its Article 1, first paragraph, that it is the "órgano superior consultivo, técnico-jurídico, de la Administración Pública, y el representante legal del Estado en las materias propias de su competencia." The “advisory function” of the Procuraduría General de la República is materialized in the issuance of opinions and legal opinions for the different administrative authorities that compose the active Public Administration and that, by legal provision, are legitimized to request the criterion of this Advisory Body.

The ultimate goal pursued, with the issuance of opinions and legal opinions, is to help clarify for the administrative authority, through a technical-legal criterion, the principles and modalities of their competencies at the time of issuing an administrative act, as well as the scope of the various norms that make up the legal system. (See opinion C-278-2008 of August 12, 2008). Thus, it is held that by the will of the legislator, the Procuraduría General de la República has been entrusted with providing technical-legal advice to the Public Administration, constituted by the State (senior entity) and the other public entities (junior entities), as established by Article 1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.

Now, when the Procuraduría externalizes a criterion through an opinion, the same, besides constituting administrative jurisprudence, is of obligatory compliance for the consulting Administration. Thus, Article 2 of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de República establishes that: "Los dictámenes y pronunciamientos de la Procuraduría General constituyen jurisprudencia administrativa, y son de acatamiento obligatorio para la Administración Pública." From the reading of the cited numeral, it would appear that all opinions and pronouncements of the Procuraduría are binding for the Public Administration, understood in the terms outlined above. However, the commented article was the object of an Unconstitutionality Action before the Corte Plena, when it was the one exercising the functions of constitutional controller. In Extraordinary Session No. 32 at thirteen hours and thirty minutes on May 3, 1984, the Court interpreted the referred numeral indicating that: "De acuerdo con todo lo anterior necesario es concluir que la obligatoriedad del dictamen que establece el artículo 2º lo es para la administración que lo solicitó, no así en cuanto a las demás, para las que constituye jurisprudencia administrativa, y que es fuente no escrita del ordenamiento jurídico administrativo, y que como tal fuente tendrá el rango que determina la Ley General de la Administración Pública." Therefore, only the consulting Administration is obligated to comply with the opinion that the Procuraduría General de la República issues on the consulted topic, unless a dispensation from it is obtained from the Consejo de Gobierno (when public interest is at stake), for which, the consultant must previously, formally request reconsideration of the opinion before the same Procuraduría, a procedure that will be resolved by the Asamblea de Procuradores. That is, if once the reconsideration is formulated, it is denied by the Procuraduría, the consulting Administration may resort to the Consejo de Gobierno to request the dispensation of comment. (Article 6, Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República).

IV.3) ON THE FIGURE OF UNDUE PAYMENT: As its name indicates, paying unduly is making a payment that, due to circumstances of the case, the person who believed themselves obligated to do so had no reason to make. "Cuando una persona recibe en calidad de pago una suma de dinero o cualquier otra prestación que no se le debe, está obligada a devolver la cosa recibida, pues falta causa legitima que justifique la apropiación que de ella se hiciere." (MONTERO PIÑA, Fernando. Obligaciones. PREMIA EDITORES, First Edition, 1999. San José, Costa Rica. Page 162). As can be noted, in undue payment there is an absence of cause, which is why whoever receives what did not correspond to them is compelled to return only what was received if there was good faith, or what was received with all its fruits if they have acted in bad faith. For this reason, it is said, "si se produce el pago indebido, las consecuencias jurídicas consisten en que el receptor adquiere la obligación de reintegrar al patrimonio del pagador el contenido de lo recibido indebidamente..." (Op. cit. page 162).

Thus, undue payment generates unjust enrichment, which obliges the one who experiences it to return what was received and generates in the payer, the right to repeat what was paid (acción de repetición, de regreso or in rem verso), that is, to recover what was unduly delivered. (See Voto No. 06886-2001 of sixteen hours seven minutes of July seventeenth, two thousand one, and Voto No. 05973-2001 of fourteen hours forty-four minutes of July fifth, two thousand one, both from the Sala Constitucional). The payer who exercises said action is the one who bears the burden of proof, that is, they have to demonstrate the undue payment made to extinguish an obligation that did not exist at the time said payment was made, or the mistake incurred in the fulfillment of that content of the provision. (Op. cit., page 164).

IV.4) ON THE EFFECTS OF ESTIMATORY JUDGMENTS IN UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTIONS: Article 91 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that the declaration of unconstitutionality implies that the norm is contrary to the Constitución Política, the consequences of such declaration extending backwards in time (that is, retroactively) to the date on which the act or norm was issued, but respecting rights acquired in good faith.

In accordance with that same numeral, the constitutional judgment of annulment in such cases must establish in space, time, or matter, the retroactive consequences it has (ex tunc efficacy) and shall provide what is necessary to prevent said effect from causing serious prejudice or damage to security, justice, or social peace. Referring precisely to the issue of constitutional judgments, this Tribunal stated: "... En concreto y por lo que concierne al valor de las sentencias de la Sala Constitucional, ésta en resolución Nº 240-I-95 de 14.28 horas de 10 de mayo de 1995, expresó: " ... De los principios que se derivan de los artículos 10. 42. 48, 153 y 154 de la Constitución Política, desarrollados por los artículos 11, 12 y 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, las sentencias que dicta la Sala en los asuntos que conoce, carecen de recursos, tienen el carácter de cosa juzgada formal y material y además, vinculan, erga omnes produciendo efectos generales. Esto quiere decir, que en nuestro sistema queda claramente expuesto el carácter jurisdiccional de las decisiones constitucionales, en su naturaleza de sentencia, como lo define la más calificada doctrina constitucionalista, y queda destacado, también con nitidez, los efectos que le son propios y característicos derivados de su autoridad de cosa juzgada formal y material. Así las cosas, a las sentencias constitucionales le son aplicables los principios generales del derecho procesal y por ello los efectos de la sentencia son definitivos e inmutables. ." (Judgment No. 00007 of ten hours thirty minutes, of March 26, 2007, issued by the Sección IV of this Contentious Administrative Tribunal). Now, in the case of estimatory judgments on unconstitutionality actions, it has been said that under the protection of the provisions of Article 91 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the annulment of the norm or act contrary to the Constitution has retroactive effects that will be dimensioned by the Sala Constitucional. Furthermore, according to Article 88 of said normative body, said annulment will take effect from the first time the operative part of the judgment is published in the Judicial Gazette. So, the truth is that judgments in such cases do not have ex nunc efficacy (for or towards the future) and that the Sala "no está autorizada para dimensionar hacia el futuro los efectos anulatorios de la norma o acto declarados inconstitucionales, en sí"; but it is also true that "distinta es el efecto futuro de la jurisprudencia constitucional, en su carácter de fuente normativa no escrita del ordenamiento." (PIZA ROCAFORT, Rodolfo and ORTEGA CÓRDOBA, Jorge. La Justicia Constitucional en Costa Rica. Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. Pages 174-175). In other words, constitutional jurisprudence, in its character as an unwritten normative source of the Costa Rican legal system, has ex nunc efficacy, that is, towards the future.

• V)DETERMINATION IN THE PRESENT LITIGATION OF THE FOUR ASPECTS POINTED OUT IN THE PREVIOUS CONSIDERANDOS. V.1.) On the strict liability and the payment of amounts foregone by the plaintiff Municipalidad: The plaintiff claims among other points that will be analyzed in this ruling, that the judgment compels the ARESEP to pay the Municipalidad de San Carlos the amounts foregone due to the opposition executed when the plaintiff intended to increase the aqueduct rates, which amount to a sum of forty-four million seven hundred forty-three thousand four hundred forty-eight colones with forty-six cents. A sum on which it also claims the recognition of the respective legal interest. It is then appropriate to establish whether the necessary requirements for said imputation concur in the case, namely injury or existence of an wrongful damage, the conduct of the administration by omission or action, formal or material, and the causal link, as has been repeatedly established by the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia in its resolutions number 025-F-99 of 14:15 hours of January 22, 1999, 589-F-99 of 14:20 hours of October 1, 1999, and 252-F-01 of 16:15 hours of March 28, 2001. Regarding the injury or compensable damage, in the filing brief, in the complaint, and in the Appeal Brief analyzed here, the plaintiff indicates that such injury consists of "los montos dejados de percibir por la oposición ejecutada por la ARESEP a la Municipalidad de San Carlos cuando se pretendió aumentar las tarifas del agua y que ascienden a un monto de cuarenta y cuatro millones setecientos cuarenta y tres mil cuatrocientos cuarenta y ocho colones con cuarenta y seis céntimos.", and it must be analyzed whether the claimed damage is susceptible to compensation according to numeral 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and the cited jurisprudence. In this regard, it has been rightly said that not any damage should be compensated, but only that which is certain, effective, evaluable, and individualizable. In the present case, this Tribunal considers that the injury the plaintiff accredits as compensable does not fit within the legal requirements necessary to be repaired, because although a conduct by the defendant Administration is accredited in the case file, consisting of the opposition to the plaintiff Municipalidad setting new rates for the potable water supply service, the damage being claimed is eventual, uncertain, and hypothetical, being based on supposed or conjectural realizations; because although the plaintiff Municipalidad had approved the proposed rates through its Municipal Council, it is true that a public hearing was convened for the citizens of the canton, who evidently had the right to oppose and to have their oppositions analyzed (f. 33 to 35 administrative file Volume I, facts five and six held as proven). Added to the above, nothing guaranteed that when exercising its control function over the determination mechanisms of the proposed rates, the Contraloría General de la República was going to approve them, and much less was there a guarantee regarding the resounding success of the collection. Thus, there is no certainty, nor immediacy, that the plaintiff Municipalidad was effectively going to obtain the income it claims to have foregone due to the defendant's action, which does not allow for accrediting the effective materialization of such injury, which depends on chance and uncertainty, which is forbidden for the judge to compensate. In effect, nothing guarantees, nor proves, that the plaintiff Municipalidad was effectively going to obtain the income it claims, even less when for the entry into force of the proposed rate fixing, a series of steps remained within the procedural iter, such as resolving any user oppositions, obtaining the comptroller's approval, and carrying out an effective collection for the service provided. Note that it was a mere expectation, not the affectation of a subjective right, which prevents its recognition. It has been rightly said that "el daño constituye todo menoscabo, pérdida o detrimento de la esfera jurídica patrimonial o extrapatrimonial de la persona (damnificado), el cual provoca la privación de un bien jurídico, respecto del cual era objetivamente esperable su conservación de no haber acaecido el hecho dañoso." (Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia number 14-F-93 of sixteen hours of March 2, 1993) and in this case, there is no deprivation of a legal right because the rates had not been approved for their due implementation, that is, no subjective right had been obtained, which as a result of its injury generated the compensatory obligation claimed. Consequently, as the damage "constituye la brecha perjudicial para la víctima, resultante de confrontar la situación anterior al hecho ilícito con la posterior al mismo" (Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia number 14-F-93 supra indicated), this leads inevitably to the conclusion that the plaintiff's situation before the defendant's opposition to the new rate fixing, even though the Municipal Council had already approved it, did not imply the holding of a protectable and compensable legal right, under the terms described herein. That is, they do not constitute income derived from the provision of the potable water supply service, so as subjective rights produce effects from the adoption of the act that generates them (doctrine of numeral 140 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), it is not possible to compensate what would have been earned before its declaration, as this would amount to rewarding an uncertain fact that lies in the realm of expectations.

Now, it has been argued that the damage must be wrongful, that is, its holder must not have the objective duty to endure it, meaning there are no causes of justification that legitimize the production of the harm in the administered party's patrimonial sphere. Causes of justification must be collected in the legal system itself, so that their application is a typical consequence of that set of norms (e.g.: tax collection, preservation of morals and good customs, Article 195 of the Ley General de la Aministración Pública).

In the present case, even though there is no compensable damage for the reasons outlined above, it is worth, even briefly, bringing up that the ARESEP acted in accordance with the opinions that the Procuraduría General de República had been issuing on the subject matter of this process. In this sense, said regulatory authority and the plaintiff municipality itself receive respective opinions directed to them, which related to the topic. In the case of the ARESEP, C-244-99 of December 15, 1999, and regarding the Municipalidad de San Carlos, C-007-2000 of January 24, 2000, where the Procuraduría expressly concludes that the ARESEP was responsible for fixing the aqueduct rates, when the service is provided by the Municipalities. This being the conclusion of the superior advisory body of the Public Administration as indicated supra, and what was stated by it being of obligatory compliance for the consulting entities, it is clear that at that moment both entities had to adhere to what was stated in the referred opinions. The ARESEP made known to the plaintiff Municipalidad the criterion of the Procuraduría, pointing out as appropriate the legal basis for its opposition and the consequences for the municipal authorities if they did not respect the competencies of the ARESEP and continued with their rate-fixing procedure (proven fact number seven). So then, within the legal scenario existing at those moments, the opposition of ARESEP that the municipal entity resents, was in accordance with the Law. Now, as can be deduced from the file (f. 41-46 of the principal, f.

(…101-107 of the main claim), the plaintiff Municipality’s claim is based on the argument that, through Vote 7728-2000 of fourteen hours forty-five minutes of August thirtieth, two thousand, issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), which added to Vote 5445-99 of fourteen hours thirty minutes of July fourteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, it was established that as long as the aqueduct service is being provided by the Municipalities, it is for them, by reason of constitutionally granted autonomy, to set the rates they are to charge, leaving the final control over their determination in the hands of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). According to the plaintiff’s thesis, what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in the cited clarifying vote has retroactive effects, and therefore everything carried out by ARESEP had been illegal. This Tribunal does not share this thesis, as it has been set out above (Considerando IV.4) that while it is true that favorable judgments in unconstitutionality actions have retroactive effects, it is also true that, regarding this matter, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) did not declare unconstitutional either Article 5 of Law 7593 (Law Creating ARESEP) or the interpretation that the Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República) had been making of it in accordance with other regulations cited in its opinions. What was done by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), as indicated supra, was a normative interpretation, which, by reason of that, lacks the retroactive effect that the plaintiff seeks to give it and that the trial judge indicates. On the contrary, as it constitutes jurisprudence (an unwritten source of law), it has effect towards the future. (PIZA ROCAFORT, Rodolfo and ORTEGA CÓRDOBA, Jorge. La Justicia Constitucional en Costa Rica. Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. Pages 174-175). Contrary to what was stated by the trial judge, whose position is highly respectable but not shared by this Tribunal, Vote 7728-2000 cited above, when it refers to retroactive effects, clearly refers to the unconstitutionality it is declaring of Article 212 of the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito), but it does not record such ex tunc effects for the interpretation it makes of Article 5 subsection c) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996. Thus, the Vote under comment expressly provides, regarding this point of interest: "...likewise, the judgment is clarified in the sense that article 164 of the Municipal Code -Law number 7794- is not unconstitutional; but by contrast, subsection a) of article 212 of the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres) is unconstitutional, an unconstitutionality that is declaratory and retroactive to the effective date of the annulled norm, which is April twenty-second, nineteen ninety-three; and, that as an expression of municipal autonomy, it is for local governments to set the rates for the potable water supply service in cases where this service is provided by the municipalities themselves..." (emphasis in bold is by this Tribunal). As can be seen, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in the operative part of its clarifying vote, separates each of its ideas with a semicolon. Thus, when it addresses the issue of setting aqueduct rates, it does so after the semicolon that separates it from the declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 212 of the Law of Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres), which has the effects indicated there (declaratory and retroactive), precisely to avoid confusions such as the one generated here. In summary, there is no doubt whatsoever, not only because of said wording but also for the legal reasons indicated here, that the retroactive effect recorded by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in the operative part of the cited Vote refers to the declaration of unconstitutionality indicated there and never to the interpretation of Article 5 subsection b) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996, which, as has been indicated, lacks that retroactive effect, and that interpretation must be applied towards the future and specifically from the publication in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) of the operative part of the judgment (Article 88 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction), which occurred on September 22, 2000 (Bulletin No. 182).

V.2.) Regarding the refund of payments made by the Municipality of San Carlos: The plaintiff also seeks that the judgment compel ARESEP to refund to the Municipality of San Carlos the amounts paid since Law 7794 took effect, for the following fees: - Solid Waste and Road Cleaning concept, which is one hundred one thousand three hundred seventy-five colones with fifty cents. - Storm Sewer concept, which is one hundred one thousand thirty-seven net colones. - Municipal Aqueduct Regulation, two million seven hundred eighty-three thousand four hundred seventeen colones with seventy cents. It also requests the recognition of statutory interest on such sums. Throughout its argument, regarding the reason for said refund, it states that in its opinion what has occurred is an undue payment, and therefore the requested refund along with the requested interest is proper.

To determine the existence of an undue payment, the issue of cause, understood as the reason why the payment is made, must be analyzed. In the present case, it is this Tribunal’s opinion, as stated throughout this judgment, that ARESEP, until September 22, 2000, the date on which the operative part of Vote 7728-2000 – which in turn clarified Vote 5445-1999 – was published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), was, in accordance with the prevailing legal scenario at that time, the competent entity to set the rates that were to be charged for the aqueduct concept. The plaintiff Municipality considers that, by virtue of the retroactive effects it claims the clarifying vote so often cited has regarding the interpretation of Article 5 subsection b) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996, as of the entry into force of the Municipal Code (Law 7794), the payments made to ARESEP for the concept of fees for rate-setting lacked legal basis, and therefore constitute undue payments and their refund with interest is proper. Such a position cannot be endorsed by this Tribunal. As indicated above, the interpretation of Article 5 subsection b) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996 made by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) does not have retroactive effects. To this must be added the fact that the plaintiff Municipality paid ARESEP for a rate-setting service that it provided to it. To be clearer, it has been taken as settled that, in accordance with the non-retroactivity of the Chamber’s (Sala) interpretation indicated supra and the legal scenario in which both ARESEP and the plaintiff Municipality found themselves, the regulatory authority had no choice but to do what it did, in defense of what up to that moment in Costa Rica was considered its legitimate competence. Notwithstanding, if for a moment the plaintiff’s thesis regarding the lack of legal basis for the payment as of the entry into force of the Municipal Code (Law 7794) were hypothetically endorsed, it is nonetheless true that ARESEP provided the service for which the fees were paid, and that service provided was useful to the municipal entity which, feeling satisfied with it, timely paid what was owed. From this perspective, ordering the refund of the fees paid plus interest (which only applies when there has been bad faith) would be equivalent to allowing the plaintiff entity, having obtained a benefit from the service provided by ARESEP – which evidently has a cost – not to pay for it despite having received it. Thus, from whatever perspective it is viewed, one cannot speak in this case of undue payment, given that this, as indicated supra, occurs "when a person receives as payment a sum of money or any other benefit that is not owed to them..." (MONTERO PIÑA, Fernando. Obligaciones. PREMIA EDITORES, First Edition, 1999. San José, Costa Rica. Page 162) and in the case under analysis, the sums paid to ARESEP were owed by the plaintiff Municipality and, in accordance with the legal scenario prevailing at that time, it is not possible to affirm that ARESEP had acted illegally in receiving it." IV) ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE: This jurisdictional body finds that the core issue in the present matter lies in whether the sued Regulatory Authority of Public Services must refund, with interest, the payments made to it by the Municipality of San Carlos for regulatory fees (cánones por regulación tarifaria), on the grounds that these constitute undue payments (pagos indebidos), and whether the ARESEP, due to its opposition to the tariff setting (fijación tarifaria) of the aqueduct service that the plaintiff intended to implement, is liable for the payment of forty-four million seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred forty-eight colones, plus legal interest, an amount the plaintiff Municipality estimates it failed to receive due to the cited opposition. By reason of what is stated here, this judgment will analyze four aspects considered basic for the correct resolution of this dispute: the liability of the Public Administration, the binding nature of the opinions issued by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), the concept and consequences of undue payment, and the retroactive effects of the upholding judgments issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in matters of unconstitutionality actions.

IV.1)- ON THE OBJECTIVE LIABILITY (RESPONSABILIDAD OBJETIVA) OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND EXEMPTING CAUSES OF LIABILITY: Within the regime of so-called extracontractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual), two types are distinguished: the subjective type established in Article 1045 of the Civil Code and the objective type, governed by numeral 9 of the Political Constitution, Article 1048 of the Civil Code, and numeral 190 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). This last Article provides that the Administration (constituted by the State and other public entities, as stated in Article 1 of that same normative body) shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. As can be clearly noted, the cited norm introduces the concept of objective liability of the State. That is, that which does not take into account an examination of the official's conduct regarding the extremes of their culpability, basing liability on the mere verification of the damage and that the same was produced by the activity of the Administration. As has been indicated by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice: "The fundamental concepts upon which the theory of objective liability of the Administration rests shall be the following: In the first term, we have the concept of compensable injury or damage (lesión resarcible o daño). If the determination of the specific conduct of the server is disregarded to establish its possible illegality, it is clear that the guiding element for this principle is the guarantee of the patrimonies of individuals, which have been affected by administrative action. The injury or damage that serves as the basis for the compensatory institute must be unlawful (antijurídico), that is, its holder must not have the objective duty to bear it, meaning there must be no causes of justification that legitimize the production of the harm in the administered party's patrimonial sphere. Causes of justification which, it goes without saying, must be contained in the legal system itself, such that their application is a typical consequence of that normative set (e.g., tax collection, preservation of morals and good customs, Article 195 of the General Law). Furthermore, that damage must present the characteristics of being effective, economically assessable (evaluable económicamente), and individualizable (individualizable). Such that, by effective, we understand a damage that is certain, which implies that it may be current or future (if this is ascertainable through the rules of science or technique, or the elementary principles of justice, logic or convenience - Article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration) and not one that is eventual or simply possible; while its appraisal in monetary terms allows, in some way, to fix with the greatest equity the amount to which the compensation is subject. The latter is especially relevant in the case of moral damage, as we shall see further on. Regarding the concept of individualizable, it indicates that the damage must be concrete, have a direct relationship with the claimant's patrimony, and exceed, moreover, those that can be considered common burdens of social life. Such that it may affect a single person or a group of persons that, however, does not reach the generality of the inhabitants or broad sectors of the population. It requires that all be in a legal condition that makes the affectation of their patrimonial spheres injurious to the Legal System." (See Judgment No. 112 of fourteen hours twenty-five minutes on November 25, 1994. Emphasis in bold is by this Court). Thus, objective liability arises without the need to prove intent or fault (dolo o culpa) of the party causing the damage; the risk itself is sufficient to generate it. In this way, the party causing the injury must compensate for it, whether or not there was intent or fault, unless they demonstrate some exempting cause (causal exonerativa) from those contemplated by numeral 190 of the General Law of Public Administration, cited supra. Consequently, for its occurrence, three essential requirements are needed: 1) Injury or existence of an unlawful damage (daño antijurídico), which consists of unlawful patrimonial affectations, insofar as the person who suffers them does not have the duty to bear them. 2) Conduct of the administration, whether passive (omisiva) or active, formal or material, and 3) The causal nexus (nexo causal), that is, that a direct cause-and-effect relationship exists between the attributed act and the damage produced; evidently, without the presence of causes of justification that legitimize the injury produced. For in such a case, the causal nexus is broken upon the occurrence of an exempting situation such as force majeure, fault of the victim, and act of a third party. Force majeure is understood as a natural event, extraneous, external, unforeseeable, and inevitable (see Judgment No. 00319 of eleven hours on October 12, 2001, issued by the First Section of this Contentious Court). Fault of the victim occurs when, by their own actions or through their inexcusable carelessness, negligence, or imprudence, the injury is provoked, or they place themselves in a position conducive to it and assume the risk with its harmful effects, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of the contingency. The act of a third party is the action or omission of a person foreign to the relationship, without whose participation the injurious event would not have occurred. (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, resolution number 025-F-99 of 14:15 hours on January 22, 1999, number 589-F-99 of 14:20 hours on October 1, 1999, and number 252-F-01 of 16:15 hours on March 28, 2001). The regulation contained in the General Law of the Administration pertaining to the cases in which compensation for the caused injury is appropriate, distinguishes two main aspects: In the first term, the illicit or abnormal activity of the Administration (Articles 190, 191, and 192) presupposes a transgression of the Legal System, which in turn means that the claim for the suffered injury includes not only the damage as such, but also the corresponding loss (perjuicio) (in relation to Article 10.3 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction). Generally, illegality is related to the breach of norms of the Legal System applicable to the Administration, while abnormality focuses on an examination related to the material activity or service provision thereof. In the second term, liability for lawful conduct and normal functioning presupposes a specific valuation of the injury caused by the action of the Public Administration. In this case, the damage is qualified as "special" (especial), either by the "small proportion of affected persons" or by "the exceptional intensity of the injury." (Article 194 of the General Law). It should be understood, by contradiction with the previous definition of abnormality, that in this case the adjustment made by the causing agent to the parameters of good functioning and compliance with normative and other provisions that affect their conduct, has not managed to prevent the damage from being consummated and, furthermore, that such damage is so foreign to the generality of results that it obliges compensation thereof. The basis for this figure was explained in the Legislative Assembly by Dr. Ortiz in the following terms: "This obeys the principle we explained yesterday of the so-called public law indemnity, for a lawful act or for normal functioning of the Administration. But it is clearly established here under what conditions that indemnity will be admitted, only when those affected by the normal functioning or the lawful act are very few, or the injury inflicted is exceptionally serious. Extraordinary or abnormal in relation to the members of the rest of the community. (...) We say that when it concerns very few, or a very intense grievance or damage, it will be appropriate to apply that indemnity. We must recognize that this has a certain margin of indeterminacy. How many are few and how many are many? It is something that will remain fundamentally subject to judicial appreciation. When the injury inflicted is very intense or extraordinary or abnormal, is something that will remain subject to the judge's appreciation. But in reality, it is a risk, and we consider that all laws run it.

The second paragraph simply states the following, when the doctrine of this type of liability holds the following principle: When an asset of the administered party is damaged by a lawful act or normal functioning, the Administration must restore the owner to the prior state with respect to that asset, not to the patrimonial state it would have had if the asset had not suffered the damage, because it is considered that this is a liability that is a sanction, an unlawful act, but rather an act of justice to compensate a citizen for the sacrifice made for the benefit of the community. Therefore, with the same spirit of solidarity, a loss of their damages is imposed on the citizen, even if limited, in the sense that they cannot claim lost profits (lucro cesante). The doctrine usually formulates this rule by saying: the damage to the injured asset is compensated, the damage caused to the owner is not compensated. It may be that the damage to the injured asset is less than that caused to the owner, when the owner, as a consequence of the injury, has ceased to receive certain earnings. In that case, it is not compensated. (...) In these cases, the State acts in an act of social solidarity and justice with the individual..." (QUIRÓS CORONADO, Roberto, Ley General de la Administración Pública, concordada y anotada con el Debate Legislativo y la Jurisprudencia Constitucional, San José, Costa Rica. Editorial Aselex S.A., 1996. Page 295). IV.2) ON THE BINDING NATURE OF THE OPINIONS (DICTÁMENES) ISSUED BY THE PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA: The Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República (Law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982) establishes in its Article 1, first paragraph, that it is the "higher consultative, technical-legal body of the Public Administration, and the legal representative of the State in matters within its competence." The "consultative function" of the Procuraduría General de la República materializes in the issuance of opinions (dictámenes) and legal opinions for the different administrative authorities that comprise the active Public Administration and that, by provision of law, are authorized to request the criteria of this Consultative Body.

The ultimate goal pursued with the issuance of opinions (dictámenes) and legal opinions is to help clarify for the administrative authority, through a technical-legal criterion, the principles and modalities of its competencies when issuing an administrative act, as well as the scope of the various norms that make up the legal system. (See opinion C-278-2008 of August 12, 2008). Thus, it is understood that by the will of the legislator, the Procuraduría General de la República has been entrusted with providing technical-legal advice to the Public Administration, constituted by the State (higher entity) and the other public entities (lower entities), as established by Article 1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.

Now, when the Procuraduría expresses a criterion through an opinion (dictamen), the same, besides constituting administrative jurisprudence (jurisprudencia administrativa), is of mandatory compliance (acatamiento obligatorio) for the consulting Administration. Thus, Article 2 of the Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de República establishes that: "The opinions (dictámenes) and pronouncements of the Procuraduría General constitute administrative jurisprudence, and are of mandatory compliance for the Public Administration." From the reading of the cited numeral, it would follow that all opinions (dictámenes) and pronouncements of the Procuraduría are binding on the Public Administration, understood in the terms indicated above. However, the article under comment was the subject of an Acción de Inconstitucionalidad before la Corte Plena, when it was the one exercising the functions of constitutional controller. In Extraordinary Session No. 32 at thirteen thirty hours on May 3, 1984, the Court interpreted the referred numeral stating: "In accordance with all the foregoing, it is necessary to conclude that the mandatory nature of the opinion (dictamen) established by Article 2 is for the administration that requested it, not with respect to the others, for which it constitutes administrative jurisprudence, and which is an unwritten source of the administrative legal system, and as such a source it will have the rank determined by the Ley General de la Administración Pública." Thus, only the consulting Administration is obliged to comply with the opinion (dictamen) issued on the consulted topic by the Procuraduría General de la República, unless a dispensation from it is obtained from the Consejo de Gobierno (when public interest is at stake), for which the consultant must first formally request reconsideration of the opinion (dictamen) before the Procuraduría itself, a procedure that will be resolved by the Assembly of Procuradores. That is, if once the reconsideration is filed, it is denied by the Procuraduría, the consulting Administration may resort to the Consejo de Gobierno to request the dispensation under comment. (Article 6, Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República). IV.3) ON THE CONCEPT OF UNDUE PAYMENT (PAGO INDEBIDO): As its name indicates, undue payment (pagar indebidamente) is making a payment that, due to the circumstances of the case, the person who believed they were obligated did not have to make. "When a person receives as payment a sum of money or any other benefit that is not owed to them, they are obligated to return the thing received, as there is a lack of legitimate cause to justify the appropriation made of it." (MONTERO PIÑA, Fernando. Obligaciones. PREMIA EDITORES, Primera Edición, 1999. San José, Costa Rica. Page 162). As can be noted, in undue payment (pago indebido) there is an absence of cause, reason for which, whoever receives what was not due to them, is compelled to return only what was received if there was good faith, or what was received with all its fruits if they acted in bad faith. For this reason, it is said that "if undue payment (pago indebido) occurs, the legal consequences consist of the receiver acquiring the obligation to reimburse the payer's patrimony for the content of what was unduly received..." (Op. cit. page 162).

Thus, undue payment (pago indebido) generates unjust enrichment, which obligates the one who experiences it to return what was received and generates in the payer the right to repeat what was paid (acción de repetición, de regreso, or in rem verso), that is, to recover what was unduly delivered. (See Voto No. 06886-2001 at sixteen hours seven minutes on July seventeen, two thousand one, and Voto No. 05973-2001 at fourteen hours forty-four minutes on July five, two thousand one, both from la Sala Constitucional). It is the payer who exercises said action who bears the burden of proof, that is, they must demonstrate the undue payment (pago indebido) made to extinguish an obligation that did not exist at the time of making said payment, or the mistake incurred in fulfilling that content of the provision. (Op. cit., page 164). IV.4) ON THE EFFECTS OF ESTIMATORY JUDGMENTS IN INCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTIONS (ACCIONES DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD): Article 91 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional establishes that the declaration of unconstitutionality implies that the norm is contrary to the Constitución Política, the consequences of such declaration extending backwards in time (that is, retroactively) to the date on which the act or norm was issued, but respecting rights acquired in good faith.

In accordance with that same numeral, the constitutional judgment of annulment in such cases must establish in space, time, or matter, the retroactive consequences it has (ex tunc effect) and will provide what is necessary to prevent said effect from causing serious prejudice or damage to social security, justice, or peace. Referring precisely to the topic of constitutional judgments, this Tribunal stated: "... Specifically and concerning the value of the judgments of la Sala Constitucional, this body in resolution Nº 240-I-95 at 14:28 hours on May 10, 1995, expressed: ' ... From the principles derived from Articles 10, 42, 48, 153 and 154 of the Constitución Política, developed by Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the judgments issued by la Sala in the matters it hears lack appeals, have the character of formal and material res judicata (cosa juzgada formal y material), and also bind erga omnes producing general effects. This means that in our system, the jurisdictional character of constitutional decisions, in their nature as judgment (sentencia), as defined by the most qualified constitutionalist doctrine, is clearly exposed, and the effects that are proper and characteristic of them, derived from their authority as formal and material res judicata, are also clearly highlighted. Thus, the general principles of procedural law are applicable to constitutional judgments, and therefore, the effects of the judgment are definitive and immutable.' " (Judgment No. 00007 at ten hours thirty minutes, on March 26, 2007, issued by la Sección IV of this Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). Now, in the case of estimatory judgments in matters of unconstitutionality actions (acciones de inconstitucionalidad), it has been said that under the provisions of Article 91 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the annulment of the norm or act contrary to the Constitution has retroactive effects that will be dimensioned by la Sala Constitucional. Furthermore, according to Article 88 of said normative body, said annulment will take effect from the first time the operative part of the judgment is published in the Boletín Judicial. Thus, it is true that judgments in such cases do not have ex nunc efficacy (forward or towards the future) and that la Sala "is not authorized to dimension into the future the annulling effects of the norm or act declared unconstitutional, in itself"; but it is also true that a "different situation is the future effect of constitutional jurisprudence, in its character as an unwritten normative source of the legal system." (PIZA ROCAFORT, Rodolfo and ORTEGA CÓRDOBA, Jorge. La Justicia Constitucional en Costa Rica. Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. Pages 174-175). In other words, constitutional jurisprudence, in its character as an unwritten normative source of the Costa Rican legal system, has ex nunc efficacy, that is, towards the future. V) DETERMINATION IN THE PRESENT LITIGATION OF THE FOUR ASPECTS INDICATED IN THE PREVIOUS CONSIDERANDOS. V.1.) On strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) and the payment of amounts left uncollected by the plaintiff Municipalidad: the plaintiff intends, among other points that will be analyzed in this ruling, that the judgment compel la ARESEP to pay the Municipalidad de San Carlos the amounts left uncollected due to the opposition executed when the plaintiff attempted to increase water supply rates, which amount to forty-four million seven hundred forty-three thousand four hundred forty-eight colones with forty-six céntimos. An amount on which it also seeks recognition of the respective legal interest. It is then appropriate to establish whether the necessary requirements for said imputation are present in this case, namely injury or existence of an unlawful damage (daño antijurídico), the omissive or active conduct of the administration, formal or material, and the causal link, as has been repeatedly established by la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia in its resolutions number 025-F-99 at 14:15 hours on January 22, 1999, 589-F-99 at 14:20 hours on October 1, 1999, and 252-F-01 at 16:15 hours on March 28, 2001. Regarding the injury or compensable damage (daño resarcible), in the filing brief, the complaint, and the Appeal (Recurso de Apelación) analyzed here, the plaintiff indicates that such injury consists of "the amounts left uncollected due to the opposition executed by la ARESEP against the Municipalidad de San Carlos when it was attempted to increase water rates, which amount to forty-four million seven hundred forty-three thousand four hundred forty-eight colones with forty-six céntimos." It must be analyzed whether the claimed damage is susceptible to compensation under the terms of numeral 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and the cited jurisprudence. In this regard, it has been well stated that not just any damage must be compensated, but only that which is certain, effective, evaluable, and individualizable (individualizable). In the present case, this Tribunal considers that the injury the plaintiff credits as compensable (indemnizable) does not fit within the legal prerequisites necessary to be repaired, because although the conduct of the defendant Administration is credited in the case file, consisting of the opposition to the plaintiff Municipalidad setting new rates for the drinking water supply service, the damage being liquidated is eventual, uncertain, and hypothetical, as it is based on supposed or conjectural realizations; because although the plaintiff Municipalidad had approved the proposed rates through its Municipal Council, it is true that a public hearing was convened for the citizens of the canton, who evidently had the right to oppose and to have their oppositions analyzed (f. 33 to 35 administrative file, Volume I, facts five and six deemed proven). In addition to the above, nothing guaranteed that when exercising its control function over the mechanisms for determining the proposed rates, the Contraloría General de la República was going to approve them, and much less was there a guarantee regarding the resounding success of the collection. Thus, there is no certainty, nor immediacy, that the plaintiff Municipalidad was effectively going to obtain the income it claims to have left uncollected due to the defendant's action, which does not allow crediting the effective materialization of such injury, these depending on chance and uncertainty, which the judge is prohibited from compensating. Indeed, nothing guarantees, nor proves, that the plaintiff Municipalidad was effectively going to obtain the income it claims, much less when, for the entry into force of the proposed rate fixation, a series of steps remained within the procedural iter, such as resolving the eventual oppositions from users, obtaining the comptroller's approval (venia contralora), and carrying out effective collection for the service provided. Note that it was a mere expectation, not the affectation of a subjective right, which prevents its recognition. It has been well stated that "damage constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal asset, with respect to which its conservation was objectively expectable had the harmful event not occurred." (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, number 14-F-93 at sixteen hours on March 2, 1993) and in this case, there is no deprivation of a legal asset because the rates had not been approved for their proper implementation, that is, no subjective right had been obtained, which as a result of its injury would generate the compensation obligation being claimed. Consequently, since damage "constitutes the prejudicial gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the unlawful act with the situation after it" (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, number 14-F-93 supra indicated), this leads irremediably to the conclusion that the plaintiff's situation prior to the defendant's opposition to the new rate fixation, even though it had already been approved by the Municipal Council, did not imply the possession of a protectable (tutelable) and compensable (indemnizable) legal asset, under the terms set forth herein. That is, they do not constitute income derived from the provision of the drinking water supply service, therefore, as subjective rights produce effects from the adoption of the act that generates them (doctrine of numeral 140 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), it is not possible to compensate what would have been earned before its declaration, as this would be equivalent to rewarding an uncertain fact that lies in the realm of expectations. Now, it has been maintained that the damage must be unlawful (antijurídico), that is, its holder must not have an objective duty to bear it, meaning that there are no causes of justification that legitimize the production of the harm in the administered party's patrimonial sphere. Causes of justification that must be contained in the legal system itself, such that their application is a typical consequence of that normative set (e.g.: tax collection, preservation of morality and good customs, Article 195 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública).

In the case at hand, even though there is no compensable damage (daño resarcible) for the reasons outlined above, it is worth, even briefly, bringing up that la ARESEP acted in accordance with the opinions (dictámenes) on the subject matter of this process that the Procuraduría General de República had been issuing. In this sense, said regulatory authority and the plaintiff municipality itself received respective opinions (dictámenes) directed to them, which were related to the topic. In the case of la ARESEP, C-244-99 of December 15, 1999, and regarding the Municipalidad de San Carlos, C-007-2000 of January 24, 2000, where the Procuraduría expressly concludes that the fixation of aqueduct rates corresponded to la ARESEP, when Municipalities provide the service. This being the conclusion of the higher consultative body of the Public Administration as indicated supra, and being of mandatory compliance (acatamiento obligatorio) for the consulting entities what is stated by it, it is clear that at that moment both entities had to adjust to what was recorded in the referred opinions (dictámenes).

ARESEP informed the plaintiff Municipality of the legal opinion of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría), noting, as appropriate, the legal basis for its opposition and the consequences for municipal authorities if they failed to respect the competencies of ARESEP and continued with their rate-setting (fijación tarifaria) procedure (proven fact number seven). Thus, within the legal scenario existing at that time, ARESEP's opposition, which the municipal entity resents, was in accordance with the law. Now, as is evident from the case file (folios 41-46 of the principal, folios 101-107 of the principal), the claim of the plaintiff Municipality is based on the fact that, through Ruling 7728-2000 of fourteen hours and forty-five minutes on August thirtieth, two thousand, issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), through which Ruling 5445-99 of fourteen hours and thirty minutes on July fourteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, was supplemented, it was established that as long as the water service (acueducto) is being provided by the Municipalities, it is up to them, by reason of their constitutionally granted autonomy, to set the rates they are to charge, leaving final control over their determination in the hands of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República). According to the plaintiff's thesis, what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber in the cited supplementary ruling has retroactive effects and therefore everything carried out by ARESEP had been illegal. This thesis is not shared by this Court, because it has been set forth earlier (Considering IV.4) that although favorable rulings in unconstitutionality actions have retroactive effects, it is also true that, with respect to the topic mentioned, the Constitutional Chamber did not declare unconstitutional either Article 5 of Law 7593 (Ley de Creación de la ARESEP) or the interpretation thereof that the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic had been making in accordance with other regulations cited in its opinions. What was done by the Constitutional Chamber, as indicated above, was a normative interpretation, which, by reason thereof, lacks the retroactive effect that the plaintiff party seeks to give it and that the judge of the lower court indicates. On the contrary, by constituting jurisprudence (an unwritten source of the legal order), it has efficacy towards the future. (PIZA ROCAFORT, Rodolfo and ORTEGA CÓRDOBA, Jorge. La Justicia Constitucional en Costa Rica. Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. Pages 174-175). Contrary to what was stated by the judge of the lower court, whose position is highly respectable but not shared by this Court, the aforementioned Ruling 7728-2000, when it refers to retroactive effects, clearly refers to the declaration of unconstitutionality it is making regarding Article 212 of the Ley de Tránsito and does not record such ex tunc effects for the interpretation it makes of Article 5, subsection c) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996. Thus, the Ruling in question expressly provides, regarding what is relevant at this point: "...likewise, the judgment is clarified to the effect that Article 164 of the Código Municipal -Law number 7794- is not unconstitutional; but, by contrast, subsection a) of Article 212 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres is unconstitutional, a declaration of unconstitutionality that is declaratory and retroactive to the effective date of the annulled norm, specifically April twenty-second, nineteen ninety-three; and, that as an expression of municipal autonomy, it is the responsibility of local governments to set the rates for the potable water supply service in cases where such service is provided by the municipalities themselves..." (emphasis in bold is added by this Court). As can be seen, the Constitutional Chamber, in the operative part of its clarifying ruling, separates each of its ideas with a semicolon. Thus, when it addresses the issue of setting water service rates, it does so after the semicolon that separates it from the declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 212 of the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, which has the effects indicated therein (declaratory and retroactive), precisely to avoid confusions such as the one that has been generated here. In summary, there is no doubt, not only because of the cited wording but also because of the legal reasons set forth herein, that the retroactive effect recorded by the Constitutional Chamber in the operative part of the cited Ruling refers to the declaration of unconstitutionality indicated therein and never to the interpretation of Article 5, subsection b) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996, which, as has been indicated, lacks that retroactive effect, with that interpretation to be applied forward and specifically as of the publication in the Judicial Gazette (Boletín Judicial) of the operative part of the judgment (Article 88 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), which occurred on September 22, 2000 (Bulletin No. 182).

**V.2.) Regarding the refund of payments made by the Municipality of San Carlos:** The plaintiff equally seeks that, in the judgment, ARESEP be ordered to return to the Municipality of San Carlos the amounts paid since the entry into force of Law 7794, for the following fees: -Concepto de Desechos Sólidos y Limpieza de Vías, which is one hundred one thousand three hundred seventy-five colones and fifty céntimos. -Concepto de Alcantarillado Pluvial, which is one hundred one thousand thirty-seven colones netos. -Regulación del Acueducto Municipal, two million seven hundred eighty-three thousand four hundred seventeen colones and seventy céntimos. It also requests the recognition of legal interest on such sums. Throughout its argument regarding the reason for said refund, it states that, in its view, what has occurred is an undue payment (pago indebido) and that, therefore, the requested refund along with the requested interest is applicable.

To determine the existence of an undue payment, the issue of cause must be analyzed, understood as the reason for which the payment is made. In the case at hand, it is the opinion of this Court, as has been stated throughout this judgment, that ARESEP, until September 22, 2000, the date on which the operative part of Ruling 7728-2000, which in turn clarified Ruling 5445-1999, was published in the Judicial Gazette, was, in accordance with the legal scenario prevailing at that time, the competent entity to set the rates to be charged for the water service. The plaintiff Municipality considers that, by virtue of the retroactive effects it claims the clarifying Ruling cited numerous times has with respect to the interpretation of Article 5, subsection b) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996, from the entry into force of the Código Municipal (Law 7794), the payments made to ARESEP for fees for rate-setting (fijaciones tarifarias) lacked legal basis, and therefore they constitute undue payments and their refund with interest is applicable. Such a position cannot be endorsed by this Court. As indicated above, the interpretation made by the Constitutional Chamber of Article 5, subsection b) of Law 7593 of March 28, 1996, does not have retroactive effects. To this must be added the fact that the plaintiff Municipality paid ARESEP for a rate-setting service that the latter provided to it. To be clearer, it has been assumed that, in accordance with the non-retroactivity of the interpretation of the Chamber indicated above and the legal scenario in which both ARESEP and the plaintiff Municipality found themselves, the regulatory authority had no choice but to do what it did, in defense of what, up to that moment in Costa Rica, was considered its legitimate competence. However, if, hypothetically for a moment, the plaintiff's thesis were endorsed regarding the lack of legal basis for the payment as of the entry into force of the Código Municipal (Law 7794), the truth is that ARESEP provided the service for which the fees were paid, and that service was useful to the municipal entity which, feeling satisfied with it, timely paid what was due. From this perspective, ordering the refund of the fees paid plus interest (which is only applicable when bad faith has existed) would be equivalent to allowing the plaintiff entity, having obtained a benefit from the service provided by ARESEP, the same service that evidently has a cost, not to pay for it despite having received it. Thus, from whatever perspective it is viewed, one cannot in this case speak of an undue payment, given that it, according to what was indicated above, occurs "when a person receives, as a payment, a sum of money or any other performance that is not owed to them..." (MONTERO PIÑA, Fernando. Obligaciones. PREMIA EDITORES, First Edition, 1999. San José, Costa Rica. Page 162) and, in the case under analysis, the sums paid to ARESEP were owed by the plaintiff Municipality and, in accordance with the legal scenario prevailing at that time, it is not possible to assert that ARESEP had acted illegally in receiving them.

“IV) SOBRE EL FONDO DEL ASUNTO: Éste órgano jurisdiccional encuentra que la cuestión medular en el presente asunto, radica en si debe la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos aquí demandada, devolver con intereses, los pagos que le hiciera la Municipalidad de San Carlos por concepto de cánones por regulación tarifaria, en razón de constituir los mismos, pagos indebidos y si por su oposición a la fijación tarifaria del servicio de acueducto que pretendía realizar la actora, es responsable la ARESEP del pago de cuarenta y cuatro millones setecientos cuarenta y tres mil ochocientos cuarenta y ocho colones, más intereses legales, suma que estima la Municipalidad accionante dejó de percibir por la citada oposición. En razón de lo aquí manifestado, en el presente fallo se hará un análisis de cuatro aspectos considerados básicos para la correcta solución de esta litis: la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública, el carácter vinculante de los dictámenes emitidos por la Procuraduría General de la República, concepto y consecuencias del pago indebido y los efectos retroactivos de las sentencias estimatorias que en materia de acciones de inconstitucionalidad dicta la Sala Constitucional.

IV.1)- SOBRE LA RESPONSABILIDAD OBJETIVA DE LA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA Y CAUSALES EXIMENTES DE RESPONSABILIDAD: Dentro del régimen de la llamada responsabilidad civil extracontractual, se distinguen dos tipos, la subjetiva establecida en el Artículo 1045 del Código Civil y la objetiva, normada en el numeral 9 de la Constitución Política, el Artículo 1048 del Código Civil y el numeral 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Este último Artículo dispone, que la Adminstración (constituida por el Estado y los demás entes públicos, según reza el Artículo 1 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo) responderá por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero. Como puede notarse claramente, la citada norma introduce el concepto de responsabilidad objetiva del Estado. Es decir, aquella que no toma en cuenta el examen de la actuación del funcionario en cuanto a los extremos de su culpabilidad, haciendo descansar la responsabilidad en la mera constatación del daño y en que el mismo, se haya producido por la actividad de la Administración. Tal y como lo ha señalado la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia: "Los conceptos fundamentales en los cuales se asienta la teoría de la responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración serán los siguientes: En primer término, tenemos el concepto de lesión resarcible o daño. Si se deja de tomar en cuenta la determinación de la específica conducta del servidor para establecer la posible ilicitud de ella, es claro que el elemento que servirá de guía para este principio lo es la garantía de los patrimonios de los particulares, que han sido afectados por la actuación administrativa. La lesión o daño que sirve de fundamento al instituto indemnizatorio ha de ser, antijurídico, es decir, que su titular no tenga el deber objetivo de soportarlo, o sea que no existan causas de justificación que legitimen la producción del perjuicio en la esfera patrimonial del administrado. Causas de justificación que, por demás está decirlo, deberán estar recogidas en el propio ordenamiento jurídico, de tal suerte que su aplicación sea una consecuencia típica de ese conjunto normativo (v.g., cobro de impuestos, preservación de la moral y las buenas costumbres, artículo 195 de la Ley General). Además, ese daño deberá presentar las características de ser efectivo, evaluable económicamente e individualizable. De tal suerte que, por efectivo, entendamos un daño que sea cierto, lo que implica que puede ser actual o futuro (si ello es constatable a través de las reglas de la ciencia o de la técnica, o de los principios elementales de la justicia, lógica o conveniencia - artículo 16 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública-) y no uno que sea eventual o simplemente posible; mientras que su tasación en términos monetarios permita, de algún modo, fijar con la mayor equidad el monto a que se sujeta el resarcimiento. Esto último es especialmente relevante en tratándose de daño moral, como veremos más adelante. En lo que se refiere al concepto de individualizable, se trata de indicar que ha de tratarse de un daño concreto, que tenga relación directa con el patrimonio del reclamante y que exceda, además, de los que pueden considerarse cargas comunes de la vida social. De tal suerte que pueda ser una única persona o bien un grupo de ellas que, sin embargo, no alcanza la generalidad de los habitantes o de amplios sectores de la población. Se trata de que todos estén en una condición jurídica que torne en lesivo del Ordenamiento, la afectación de sus esferas patrimoniales. (Ver Sentencia No. 112 de las catorce horas veinticinco minutos del 25 de Noviembre de 1994. Destacado en negrita es de este Tribunal). Así, la responsabilidad objetiva se produce, sin que sea necesario demostrar el dolo o la culpa del causante del daño; basta el riesgo para generarla. De esta forma, el causante de la lesión debe resarcirlo, haya habido o no dolo o culpa, salvo que demuestre alguna causal exonerativa de las contempladas por el numeral 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, supra citado. En consecuencia, para su acaecimiento se requiere de tres requisitos esenciales: 1) Lesión o existencia de un daño antijurídico, el cual consiste en las afectaciones patrimoniales antijurídicas, por cuanto quien los padece no tiene el deber de soportarlos. 2) Conducta de la administración omisiva o activa, formal o material, y 3) El nexo causal, es decir, que exista relación directa de causa a efecto entre el hecho que se imputa y el daño producido; evidentemente, sin la presencia de causas de justificación que legitimen la lesión producida. Pues en tal caso, se rompe el nexo de causalidad al acontecer una situación eximente como la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima y el hecho de un tercero. Por fuerza mayor se entiende, un hecho de la naturaleza, extraño, exterior, imprevisible e inevitable (ver Sentencia No. 00319 de las once horas del 12 de Octubre del 2001, emitida por la Sección Primera de este Tribunal Contencioso). La culpa de la víctima acontece, cuando por su propio accionar o por su descuido, negligencia o imprudencia inexcusable, se provoca la lesión o se coloca en una posición propicia para ello y asume el riesgo con sus efectos nocivos, previendo la eventualidad o posibilidad de la contingencia. El hecho de un tercero, es la acción u omisión de una persona ajena a la relación, sin cuya participación no se hubiera producido el hecho lesivo. (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, resolución número 025- F-99 de las 14:15 horas del 22 de Enero de 1999, número 589-F-99 de las 14.20 horas del 1 de octubre de 1999 y la número 252-F-01 de las 16:15 horas del 28 de marzo del 2001). La regulación contenida en la Ley General de la Administración atinente a los supuestos en que cabe indemnización de la lesión causada, distingue dos vertientes principales: En primer término, la actividad ilícita o anormal de la Administración (artículos 190, 191 y 192) supone una transgresión del Ordenamiento Jurídico, lo cual a su vez genera que el reclamo por la lesión sufrida comprenda no sólo el daño como tal, sino, además, el perjuicio correspondiente (en relación con el artículo 10.3 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa). Generalmente, se relaciona la ilicitud con el incumplimiento de normas del Ordenamiento Jurídico aplicables a la Administración, mientras que la anormalidad, se enfoca en un examen relacionado con la actividad material o de prestación de servicios de aquella. En segundo término, la responsabilidad por conducta lícita y funcionamiento normal, supone una específica valoración de la lesión que causa el actuar de la Administración Pública. En este supuesto, el daño es calificado de "especial", ya sea por la "pequeña proporción de afectados" o bien "por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión." (Artículo 194 de la Ley General). Deberá entenderse, por contradicción con la anterior definición de anormalidad, que en este caso el ajuste que haya hecho el agente causante, a los parámetros de buen funcionamiento y cumplimiento de las disposiciones normativas y de otra índole que incidan en su conducta, no han logrado impedir que el daño se consuma y, además, que tal daño es tan ajeno a la generalidad de resultados que obliga a la indemnización del mismo. El fundamento de esta figura, fue Asamblea Legislativa por el Doctor Ortiz Ortiz en los siguientes términos: "Esto obedece al principio que explicábamos ayer de la llamada indemnización de derecho público, por acto lícito o por funcionamiento normal de la Administración. Pero se establece aquí claramente en qué condiciones se va a admitir esa indemnización, únicamente cuando los afectados por el funcionamiento normal o el acto lícito sean muy pocos o la lesión que haya inferido sea excepcionalmente grave. Extraordinaria o anormal en relación con los miembros del resto de la colectividad. (...) Nosotros decimos que cuando se trata de muy poco, o de un agravio o daño muy intenso, procederá a aplicar esa indemnización. Tenemos que reconocer que esto tiene cierto margen de indeterminación. ¿Cuántos son pocos y cuántos son muchos? Es algo que quedará fundamentalmente a la apreciación judicial. Cuándo será muy intensa la lesión inferida o extraordinaria o anormal es algo que quedará a la apreciación del juez. Pero en realidad es un riesgo, y consideramos, que todas las leyes lo corren. El segundo párrafo, simplemente afirma lo siguiente, cuando la doctrina de este tipo de responsabilidad sostiene el siguiente principio: Cuando se daña por acto lícito o funcionamiento normal un bien del administrado, la Administración debe restituir al dueño al estado anterior en relación con ese bien, no al estado patrimonial que hubiera tenido si el bien no hubiera sufrido el daño porque se considera que se trata de una responsabilidad que es una sanción, un acto ilícito, sino de un acto de justicia para reparar a un ciudadano el sacrificio que hizo en beneficio de la colectividad. Entonces con el mismo espíritu de solidaridad se le impone al ciudadano una pérdida de sus perjuicios aunque sea limitada, en el sentido de que le lucro cesante no lo puede cobrar. La doctrina suele formular esta regla diciendo: se indemniza el daño al bien lesionado, no se indemniza el daño causado al dueño. Puede ser que el daño al bien lesionado sea menor que el causado al dueño. Cuando el dueño a consecuencia de la lesión ha dejado de percibir ciertas ganancias. En ese caso, no se indemniza. (...) En estos casos, el Estado actúa en un acto de solidaridad social y de justicia con el particular..."(QUIRÓS CORONADO, Roberto, Ley General de la Administración Pública, concordada y anotada con el Debate Legislativo y la Jurisprudencia Constitucional, San José, Costa Rica. Editorial Aselex S.A., 1996. Página. 295 ). IV.2) SOBRE LA NATURALEZA VINCULANTE DE LOS DICTÁMENES EMITIDOS POR LA PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA: La L ey Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República ( Ley No. 6815 del 27 de Septiembre de 1982) establece en su Artículo 1, párrafo primero que esta es el "órgano superior consultivo, técnico-jurídico, de la Administración Pública, y el representante legal del Estado en las materias propias de su competencia." La “función consultiva” de la Procuraduría General de la República, se materializa en la emisión de dictámenes y opiniones jurídicas para las diferentes autoridades administrativas que componen la Administración Pública activa y que, por disposición de ley, se encuentran legitimadas para solicitar el criterio de este Órgano Consultivo.

El fin último que se persigue, con la emisión de dictámenes y opiniones jurídicas, es el de ayudar a esclarecer a la autoridad administrativa, mediante un criterio técnico jurídico, los principios y modalidades de sus competencias al momento de emitir un acto administrativo, así como sobre el alcance de las diversas normas que integran el ordenamiento jurídico. (Ver dictamen C-278- 2008 del 12 de Agosto del 2008). Así las cosas, se tiene que por voluntad del legislador se le ha encargado a la Procuraduría General de la República, el brindar asesoría técnico-jurídica a la Administración Pública, constituida esta por el Estado (ente mayor) y los demás entes públicos (entes menores), según lo establece el Artículo 1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.

Ahora bien, cuando la Procuraduría externa un criterio a través de un dictamen, el mismo, además de constituir jurisprudencia administrativa, es de actamiento obligatorio para la Adminstración consultante. Así, el Artículo 2 de la Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de República establece que: "Los dictámenes y pronunciamientos de la Procuraduría General constituyen jurisprudencia administrativa, y son de acatamiento obligatorio para la Administración Pública. " De la lectura del citado numeral, se desprendería que todos los dictámenes y pronunciamientos de la Procuraduría son vinculantes para la Administración Pública, entendida en los términos líneas atrás señalados. No obstante, el artículo de comentario fue objeto de una Acción de Inconstitucionalidad ante la Corte Plena, cuando era ésta quien ejercía las funciones de contralor de constitucionalidad. En Sesión Extraordinaria No. 32 de las trece horas con treinta minutos del 3 de Mayo de 1984, la Corte interpretó el referido numeral indicando que: "De acuerdo con todo lo anterior necesario es concluir que la obligatoriedad del dictamen que establece el artículo 2º lo es para la administración que lo solicitó, no así en cuanto a las demás, para las que constituye jurisprudencia administrativa, y que es fuente no escrita del ordenamiento jurídico administrativo, y que como tal fuente tendrá el rango que determina la Ley General de la Administración Pública." Así entonces, sólo la Administración consultante queda obligada al acatamiento del dictamen que sobre el tema de consulta emita la Procuraduría General de la República, a menos que se obtenga la dispensa del mismo por parte del Consejo de Gobierno (cuando esté en juego el interés público), para lo cual, el consultante deberá previamente, gestionar formal reconsideración del dictamen ante la misma Procuraduría, gestión que será resuelta por la Asamblea de Procuradores. Es decir, si una vez formulada la reconsideración la misma es denegada por la Procuraduría, la Administración consultante podrá acudir ante el Consejo de Gobierno a solicitar la dispensa de comentario. (Artículo 6, Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República). IV.3) SOBRE LA FIGURA DEL PAGO INDEBIDO: Como su nombre lo indica, pagar indebidamente es efectuar un pago que por circunstancias del caso no tenía por qué realizar quien se creía obligado a hacerlo. "Cuando una persona recibe en calidad de pago una suma de dinero o cualquier otra prestación que no se le debe, está obligada a devolver la cosa recibida, pues falta causa legitima que justifique la apropiación que de ella se hiciere." (MONTERO PIÑA, Fernando. Obligaciones. PREMIA EDITORES, Primera Edición, 1999. San José, Costa Rica. Página 162). Como puede notarse, en el pago indebido hay ausencia de causa, razón por la cual, quien recibe lo que no le correspondía, se ve compelido a devolver sólo lo recibido si hubo buena fe o lo recibido con todo y frutos si ha actuado de mala fe. Por ello se dice, que "si se produce el pago indebido, las consecuencias jurídicas consisten en que el receptor adquiere la obligación de reintegrar al patrimonio del pagador el contenido de lo recibido indebidamente..." (Op. cit. página 162).

Así las cosas, el pago indebido genera un enriquecimiento injusto, que obliga a quien lo experimenta a la devolución de lo recibido y genera en el pagador, el derecho a repetir lo pagado (acción de repetición, de regreso o in rem verso), es decir, a recuperar lo indebidamente entregado. (Ver Voto No. 06886-2001 de las dieciséis horas siete minutos del diecisiete de Julio del dos mil uno y Voto No. 05973-2001 de las catorce horas cuarenta y cuatro minutos del cinco de Julio del dos mil uno, ambos de la Sala Constitucional). Al pagador que ejercita la acción dicha, es a quien le corresponde la carga de la prueba, es decir, tiene que demostrar el pago indebido que se hizo para extinguir una obligación que no existía al momento de hacerse dicho pago o la equivocación en que se incurrió en la realización del cumplimiento de ese contenido de la prestación. (Op. cit., página 164). IV.4) SOBRE LOS EFECTOS DE LAS SENTENCIAS ESTIMATORIAS EN ACCIONES DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD: El Artículo 91 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional, establece que la declaración de inconstitucionalidad implica que la norma es contraria a la Constitución Política, extendiéndose las consecuencias de tal declaratoria, hacia atrás en el tiempo (es decir, retroactivamente) a la fecha en que se emitió el acto o norma, pero respetando los derechos adquiridos de buena fe.

Conforme a ese mismo numeral, la sentencia constitucional de anulación en tales casos, deberá establecer en el espacio, el tiempo o la materia, las consecuencias retroactivas que tiene (eficacia ex tunc) y dispondrá lo necesario para evitar que dicho efecto, cause graves perjuicios o daños en la seguridad, la justicia o la paz sociales. Refiriéndose precisamente al tema de las sentencias constitucionales, este Tribunal manifestó: "... En concreto y por lo que concierne al valor de las sentencias de la Sala Constitucional, ésta en resolución Nº 240-I-95 de 14.28 horas de 10 de mayo de 1995, expresó: " ... De los principios que se derivan de los artículos 10. 42. 48, 153 y 154 de la Constitución Política, desarrollados por los artículos 11, 12 y 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, las sentencias que dicta la Sala en los asuntos que conoce, carecen de recursos, tienen el carácter de cosa juzgada formal y material y además, vinculan, erga omnes produciendo efectos generales. Esto quiere decir, que en nuestro sistema queda claramente expuesto el carácter jurisdiccional de las decisiones constitucionales, en su naturaleza de sentencia, como lo define la más calificada doctrina constitucionalista, y queda destacado, también con nitidez, los efectos que le son propios y característicos derivados de su autoridad de cosa juzgada formal y material. Así las cosas, a las sentencias constitucionales le son aplicables los principios generales del derecho procesal y por ello los efectos de la sentencia son definitivos e inmutables. ." (Sentencia No. 00007 de la diez horas treinta minutos, del 26 de Marzo del 2007, emitida por la Sección IV del este Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). Ahora bien, tratándose de sentencias estimatorias en materia de acciones de inconstitucionalidad, se ha dicho que al amparo de lo dispuesto por el Artículo 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la anulación de la norma o acto contrario a la Constitución, tiene efectos retroactivos que serán dimensionados por la Sala Constitucional. Además, conforme al Artículo 88 de dicho cuerpo normativo, la anulación dicha regirá desde la primera vez que se publique en el Boletín Judicial, la parte dispositiva de la sentencia. Así las cosas, es lo cierto que las sentencias en tales casos, no tienen eficacia ex nunc (pro o hacia futuro) y que la Sala "no está autorizada para dimensionar hacia el futuro los efectos anulatorios de la norma o acto declarados inconstitucionales, en sí; pero también lo es, que situación "distinta es el efecto futuro de la jurisprudencia constitucional, en su carácter de fuente normativa no escrita del ordenamiento." (PIZA ROCAFORT, Rodolfo y ORTEGA CÓRDOBA, Jorge. La Justicia Constitucional en Costa Rica. Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. Páginas 174-175). Dicho de otra forma, la jurisprudencia constitucional, en su carácter de fuente normativa no escrita del ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, tiene eficacia ex nunc, sea, hacia futuro. V) DETERMINACIÓN EN LA PRESENTE LITIS DE LOS CUATRO ASPECTOS SEÑALADOS LOS CONSIDERANDOS ANTERIORES. V.1.) Sobre la responsabilidad objetiva y el pago de los montos dejados de percibir por la Municipalidad actora: pretende la actora dentro de otros puntos que se analizarán en este fallo, que en sentencia se obligue a la ARESEP, a pagar a la Municipalidad de San Carlos los montos dejados de percibir por la oposición ejecutada, cuando la actora pretendió aumentar las tarifas de acueducto y que ascienden a un monto de cuarenta y cuatro millones setecientos cuarenta y tres mil cuatrocientos cuarenta y ocho colones con cuarenta y seis céntimos. Suma sobre la cual pretende además, el reconocimiento de los intereses legales respectivos. Procede entonces establecer, si concurren en la especie los requisitos necesarios de dicha imputación, a saber lesión o existencia de un daño antijurídico, la conducta de la administración omisiva o activa, formal o material, y el nexo causal, tal y como lo ha establecido en forma reiterada la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en sus resoluciones número 025- F-99 de las 14:15 horas del 22 de enero de 1999, 589-F-99 de las 14.20 horas del 1 de octubre de 1999, y la 252-F-01 de las 16:15 horas del 28 de marzo del 2001.). Respecto a la lesión o daño resarcible, en el escrito de interposición, en la demanda y en el Recurso de Apelación que aquí se analiza, indica el actor que tal lesión consiste en "los montos dejados de percibir por la oposición ejecutada por la ARESEP a la Municipalidad de San Carlos cuando se pretendió aumentar las tarifas del agua y que ascienden a un monto de cuarenta y cuatro millones setecientos cuarenta y tres mil cuatrocientos cuarenta y ocho colones con cuarenta y seis céntimos.", debiendo analizarse si el daño pretendido es susceptible de indemnización al tenor del numeral 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y de la jurisprudencia citada. Al respecto, bien se ha dicho que no cualquier daño debe resarcirse, sino únicamente aquel que sea cierto, efectivo, evaluable e individualizable. En la presente causa, estima este Tribunal que la lesión que acredita el actor como indemnizable, no encuadra dentro de los presupuestos legales necesarios para ser reparado, debido a que si bien en autos se acredita una conducta de la Administración demandada, consistente en la oposición a que la Municipalidad actora fijara nuevas tarifas para el servicio de suministro de agua potable, el daño que se liquida es eventual, incierto e hipotético, por estar fundado en realizaciones supuestas o conjeturables; pues si bien la Municipalidad actora había aprobado a través de su Concejo Municipal las tarifas propuestas, es lo cierto que se convocó a una audiencia pública a los ciudadanos del cantón, a quienes evidentemente les asistía el derecho a oponerse y a que sus oposiciones fueran analizadas (f. 33 a 35 expediente administrativo Tomo I, hechos quinto y sexto tenidos como probados). Aunado a lo anterior, nada garantizaba que al momento de ejercer su labor de control sobre los mecanismos de determinación de la tarifas propuestas, la Contraloría General de la República fuera a aprobarlas y mucho menos existía una garantía en cuanto al éxito rotundo de la recaudación. Así las cosas, no hay certeza, ni inmediatez, de que efectivamente la Municipalidad actora, fuera a obtener los ingresos que aduce haber dejado de percibir por la actuación de la demandada, lo que no permite acreditar la materialización efectiva de tal lesión, las cuales dependen del acaso y lo incierto, lo que está vedado al juzgador indemnizar. En efecto, nada garantiza, ni prueba, que efectivamente la Municipalidad actora, fuera a obtener los ingresos que reclama, mucho menos cuando para la entrada en vigencia de la fijación tarifaria propuesta, restaban una serie de pasos dentro del iter procedimental, como el resolver las eventuales oposiciones de los usuarios, obtener la venia contralora y realizar una efectiva recaudación por el servicio brindado. Nótese que se trataba de una mera expectativa, no la afectación de un derecho subjetivo, lo que impide su reconocimiento. Bien se ha dicho que "el daño constituye todo menoscabo, pérdida o detrimento de la esfera jurídica patrimonial o extrapatrimonial de la persona (damnificado), el cual provoca la privación de un bien jurídico, respecto del cual era objetivamente esperable su conservación de no haber acaecido el hecho dañoso." (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia número 14-F-93 de las diceciséis horas del 2 de Marzo de 1993) y en este caso, no hay privación de un bien jurídico porque no se tenían aprobadas las tarifas para su debida implementación, es decir, no se había obtenido derecho subjetivo alguno, que producto de su lesión generara la obligación indemnizatoria que se reclama. En consecuencia, como el daño "constituye la brecha perjudicial para la víctima, resultante de confrontar la situación anterior al hecho ilícito con la posterior al mismo" (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia número 14-F-93 supra indicada), ello conlleva a concluir irremediablemente, que la situación anterior de la actora antes de la oposición de la demandada a la nueva fijación tarifaria, aún cuando ya la había aprobado el Concejo Municipal, no implicaba la tenencia de un bien jurídico tutelable e indemnizable, en los términos aquí expuestos. Es decir, no constituyen ingresos derivados de la prestación del servicio de suministro de agua potable, por lo que al producir los derechos subjetivos efectos a partir de la adopción del acto que los genera (doctrina del numeral 140 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), es que no resulta posible indemnizar lo que hubiera ganado antes de su declaratoria, pues ello equivaldría a retribuir un hecho incierto que radica en el ámbito de las expectativas. Ahora bien, se ha venido sosteniendo que el daño debe ser antijurídico, es decir, que su titular no tenga el deber objetivo de soportarlo, o sea, que no existan causas de justificación que legitimen la producción del perjuicio en la esfera patrimonial del administrado. Causas de justificación, que deberán estar recogidas en el propio ordenamiento jurídico, de tal suerte que su aplicación, sea una consecuencia típica de ese conjunto normativo (ej: cobro de impuestos, preservación de la moral y las buenas costumbres, Artículo 195 der la Ley General de la Aministración Pública).

En el caso de marras, aún y cuando no existe daño resarcible por las razones esbozadas líneas atrás, merece aunque sea someramente, traer a colación que la ARESEP actuó ajustándose a los dictámenes que sobre el tema objeto de este proceso había venido emitiendo la Procuraduría General de República. En tal sentido, dicha autoridad reguladora y la misma municipalidad actora, reciben sendos dictámenes a ellas dirigidas, que se relacionaban con el tema. En el caso de la ARESEP el C-244-99 del 15 de Diciembre de 1999 y en cuanto a la Municipalidad de San Carlos el C-007-2000 del 24 de Enero del 2000, donde expresamente concluye la Procuraduría que correspondía a la ARESEP la fijación de las tarifas de acueductos, cuando el servicio lo prestan las Municipalidades. Siendo esta, la conclusión del órgano superior consultivo de la Administración Pública como se indicó supra y siendo para las entidades consultantes de actamiento obligatorio lo por ella manifestado, resulta claro que a ese momento ambas entidades debían ajustarse a lo consignado en los referidos dictámenes. La ARESEP puso en conocimiento de la Municipalidad actora el criterio de la Procuraduría, señalando como correspondía el sustento jurídico de su oposición y las consecuencias para las autoridades municipales, sino respetaban las competencias de la ARESEP y continuaban con su procedimiento de fijación tarifaria (hecho probado número siete). Así entonces, dentro del escenario jurídico tenido en esos momentos, la oposición de ARESEP que resiente la entidad municipal, se encontraba ajustada a Derecho. Ahora bien, tal y como se desprende de los autos (f. 41-46 del principal, f. 101-107 del principal), el reclamo de la Municipalidad actora estriba en que mediante el Voto 7728-2000 de las catorce horas con cuarenta y cinco minutos del treinta de Agosto del dos mil, emitido por la Sala Constiticional, mediante el cual se adicionó el Voto 5445-99 de las catorce horas treinta minutos del catorce de Julio de mil novecientos noventa y nueve, se estableció que en el tanto el sevicio de acueducto estén siendo prestado por las Municipalidades, corresponde a estas, en razón de la autonomía constitucionalmente otorgada, fijar la tarifas que han de cobrar, dejando en manos de la Contraloría General de la República, el control final de la determinación de las mismas. Conforme a la tesis de la actora, lo manifestado por la Sala Constitucional en el citado voto de adición, tiene efectos retroactivos y por ende todo lo actuado por la ARESEP había sido ilegal. Tesis esta que no comparte este Tribunal, por cuanto se ha bien las setencias estimatorias en acciones de inconstitucionalidad tiene efectos retroactivos, también es lo cierto, que con respecto al tema dicho, la Sala Constitucional no declaró inconstitucional, ni el Artículo 5 de la Ley 7593 (Ley de Creación de la ARESEP) ni la interpretación que respecto al mismo había venido haciendo la Produraduría General de la República en concordancia con otra normativa citada en sus dictámenes. Lo realizado por la Sala Constitucional, tal y como se indicó supra, fue una interpretación normativa, que en razón de ello, carece del efecto retroactivo que pretende darle la parte actora y señala el juzgador de instancia. Por el contrario, al constituir jurisprudencia (fuente no escrita del ordenamiento) tiene eficacia hacia futuro. (PIZA ROCAFORT, Rodolfo y ORTEGA CÓRDOBA, Jorge. La Justicia Constitucional en Costa Rica. Editorial Investigaciones Jurídicas S.A. Páginas 174-175). Contrario a lo manifestado por el juzgador de instancia, cuya posición es de sumo respetable mas no compartida por este Tribunal, el Voto 7728-2000 antes citado, cuando hace refrencia a los efectos retroactivos, se refiere claramente a la inconstitucionalidad que está declarando del Artículo 212 de la Ley de Tránsito más no consigna tales fectos ex tunc para la interpretación que realiza del Artículo 5 inciso c) de la Ley 7593 del 28 de Marzo de 1996. Así, en forma expresa dispone el Voto de comentario en lo que a este punto interesa: "...igualmente se aclara la sentencia en el sentido de que el artículo 164 del Código Municipal -Ley número 7794- no es inconstitucional; pero en cambio sí lo es el inciso a) del artículo 212 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, inconstitucionalidad que es declarativa y retroactiva a la fecha de vigencia de la norma que se anula, sea el veintidós de abril de mil novecientos noventa y tres; y, que como expresión de la autonomía municipal, corresponde a los gobiernos locales la fijación de las tarifas del servicio de suministro de agua potable en los casos en que dicho servicio sea prestado por las propias municipalidades..." (destacado en negrita es de este Tribunal). Como puede apreciarse, la Sala Constitucional en la parte dispositiva de su voto aclaratorio, separa cada una de sus ideas con un punto y coma. Así, cuando aborda el tema de la fijación de tarifas de acueductos lo hace despúes del punto y coma que separa el mismo de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad del Artículo 212 de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, la cual tiene los efectos allí señalados (declarativos y retroactivos), ello precisamente para evitar confusiones como la que aquí se ha generado. En síntesis, no cabe duda alguna, no sólo por la redacción dicha sino por las razones jurídicas aquí señaladas, que el efecto retroactivo que consigna la Sala Constititucional en la parte dispositiva del Voto citado, es respecto de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad allí señalada y nunca de la interpretación del Artículo 5 inciso b) de la Ley 7593 del 28 de Marzo de 1996, la cual como se ha indicado carece de ese efecto retroactivo, debiendo aplicarse esa interpretación hacia futuro y específicamente a partir de la publicación en el Boletín Judicial de la parte dispositiva de la sentencia (Artículo 88 Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), lo cual ocurrió el 22 de Setiembre del 2000 (Boletín No. 182). V.2.) Sobre la devolución de los pagos realizados por la Municipalidad de San Carlos: Igualmente pretende la actora, que en sentencia se obligue a la ARESEP, a devolver a la Municipalidad de San Carlos los montos cancelados desde la vigencia de la Ley 7794, por los siguientes cánones: -Concepto de Desechos Sólidos y Limpieza de Vías que son ciento un mil trescientos setenta y cinco colones con cincuenta céntimos. -Concepto de Alcantarillado Pluvial que son ciento un mil treinta y siete colones netos. -Regulación del Acueducto Municipal dos millones setecientos ochenta y tres mil cuatrocientos diecisiete colones con setenta céntimos. Solicita además, el reconocimiento de los intereses de ley sobre tales sumas. A lo largo de su argumentación, respecto al porqué de dicha devolución, expone que en su criterio lo que se ha presentado es un pago indebido y que por ello, procede la devolución solicitada junto con los intereses pedidos.

Para determinar la existencia de un pago indebido, debe analizarse el tema de la causa, entendida como la razón por la cual se realiza el pago. En el caso de marras, es criterio de este Tribunal según se ha manifestado a lo largo de la presente sentencia, que la ARESEP hasta el día 22 de Setiembre del 2000, fecha en la que se publicó en el Boletín Judicial la parte dispositiva del Voto 7728-2000 que aclaró a su vez el Voto 5445-1999, era conforme al escenario jurídico imperante en ese momento, la entidad competente para fijar las tarifas que debían cobrarse por concepto acueducto. La Municipalidad actora, considera que en virtud de los efectos retroactivos que dice tener el Voto aclaratorio tantas veces citado con respecto a la interpretación del Artículo 5 inciso b) de la Ley 7593 del 28 de Marzo de 1996, a partir de la entrada en vigencia del Código Municipal (Ley 7794) los pagos realizados a la ARESEP por concepto de cánones por las fijaciones tarifarias, carecía de sustento jurídico, por lo que constituyen pagos indebidos y procede su devolución con intereses. Tal postura no puede ser avalada por este Tribunal. Tal y como se indicó líneas atrás, la interpretación realizada por la Sala Constitucional del Artículo 5 inciso b) de la Ley 7593 del 28 de Marzo de 1996 no tiene efectos retroactivos. A ello debe aunársele el hecho de que la Municipalidad actora pagó a la ARESEP por un servicio de fijación tarifaria que esta le brindó. Para ser más claros, se ha tenido por sentado que conforme a la irretroactividad de la interpretación de la Sala señalada supra y el escenario jurídico en el que se encontraba tanto la ARESEP como la Municipalidad actora, la autoridad reguladora no tenía más, que hacer lo que hizo, en defensa de lo que hasta ese momento en Costa Rica se tenía como su legítima competencia. No obstante, si por un momento en forma hipotética se avalara la tesis de la actora en cuanto a la carencia de sustento jurídico del pago a partir de la entrada en vigencia del Código Municipal (Ley 7794), es lo cierto que ARESEP brindó el servicio por el cual se pagaron los cánones y ese servicio brindado le fue útil a la entidad municipal que sintiéndose conforme con el mismo, canceló oportunamente lo que correspondía. Desde esta óptica, ordenar la devolución de los cánones pagados más los intereses (los cuales proceden sólo cuando ha existido mala fe), equivaldría a permitir que la entidad actora habiendo obtenido un beneficio por el servicio brindado por ARESEP, mismo que evidentemente tiene un costo, no pague por él a pesar de haberlo recibido. Así las cosas, desde cualquier óptica que se aprecie, no se puede en la especie hablar de pago indebido, toda vez que este según se indicó supra este se da "cuando una persona recibe en calidad de pago una suma de dinero o cualquier otra prestación que no se le debe..." (MONTERO PIÑA, Fernando. Obligaciones. PREMIA EDITORES, Primera Edición, 1999. San José, Costa Rica. Página 162) y en el caso bajo análisis, las sumas pagadas a ARESEP eran debidas por la Municipalidad actora y conforme al escenario jurídico imperante en ese momento, no es dable afirmar que ARESEP hubiese actuado ilegalmente al recibirlo. “