Inapplicability of indemnification for accession on a plantation on State Forest Heritage landImprocedencia de indemnización por accesión de plantación en terreno del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado

**Sign Document** ***150001830419AG*** PROCEEDING:

ORDINARY PLAINTIFF:

JOSE AMADO JIMENEZ OBREGON DEFENDANT:

INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL VOTE No. 395-F-2018 AGRARIAN TRIBUNAL. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ.- At two hours and eleven minutes in the afternoon of the eleventh of May, two thousand eighteen.- ORDINARY PROCEEDING brought by [Name1] , of legal age, married, identification number CED1 ; against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (Inder), legal identification number CED2 - ; represented by its general judicial attorney Álvaro Chanto Ureña, of legal age, lawyer, resident of Pérez Zeledón, identification number CED3 . The PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA (PGR) intervenes in the proceeding as an interested party, represented by Heilyn Sáenz Calderón, of legal age, lawyer, resident of San José, identification number CED4 . Acting as the plaintiff's agrarian public defender is [Name2] , and as INDER's special judicial attorney, Marianela Quirós Mora, identification number CED5 . Processed before the Agrarian Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone, Corredores.-

WHEREAS:

1.- The plaintiff requests, in an ordinary proceeding valued at three million colones, that the following be declared: " 1) That it be declared that the undersigned carried out the planting of five hundred forty [Name3] trees on the land known as [Address1] , registered in the name of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural. 2) That it be affirmed that said plantings were carried out in plain view and with the consent of the Institute and with its due authorization. 3) That the 540 [Name3] trees planted on the land, [Address1] , be compensated for as an accession, this for the sum of three million one hundred ten thousand four hundred colones. 4) That the Institute be ordered to pay said accessions, within a period of one month, under penalty of issuing a seizure order on the budget assigned by law in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural. 5) That the defendant be ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs arising from this lawsuit" (folios 22 to 23 and back).- 2.- The defendant answered negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of standing to be sued (lack of standing ad causam), and necessary passive joinder (folios 30 to 38). The latter was resolved interlocutorily (folios 55 and 74).

3.- Judge Marisel Zamora Arias, of the Agrarian Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone, Corredores, in judgment 03 of January 10, 2018, resolved: “THEREFORE: In accordance with the foregoing, the ordinary agrarian lawsuit filed by Mr. [Name1] against INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL is DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. This matter is resolved without special condemnation for costs" (folder of associated documents, file 01/10/18 1:57:17 p.m.).- 4.- The plaintiff appeals, expressly indicating the reasons on which it is based (writings folder, file 01/18/18 9:00:10 a.m.).- 5.- In the substantiation of the proceeding, the legal requirements have been observed and there are no errors or omissions capable of producing the nullity of the judgment.- Drafted by Judge ALPIZAR RODRIGUEZ, and;

WHEREAS:

I.- The Tribunal shares the proven facts as they are supported by the evidence in the record, with the following clarifications and additions; except for the sixth, because it does not express a complete and understandable idea. To the first is added: It is also identified as [Address2] . To the fifth: The plaintiff began the plantation of [Name3] trees in the early nineties (official communication from IDA of May 18, 1995: folio 3; testimonial statements of [Name4] and [Name5] : folio 104). Add of the same nature: 6) The [Name3] plantation was cultivated in the early nineties (official communication from IDA of May 18, 1995: folio 3; appraisal by Inder of October 2014: folio 132; testimonial statements of [Name4] and [Name5] : folio 104). 7) In September, nineteen ninety-seven, the Sub-Regional Office of Piedras Blancas, IDA, authorized the plaintiff to maintain an existing [Name3] plantation on [Address3] , only for the period remaining until the cutting of the plantation. After that, he was informed the parcel would be adjudicated to third parties with whom the plaintiff had signed an agreement (see official communication 0SPB 558-P-1997: folio 2). 8) In October, two thousand fourteen, in the appraisal carried out on the [Name3] plantation existing on that date on the referred parcel, it was indicated that the crop had been planted more than eight years ago, according to the state of the plantation (see official communication 0SPB 558-P-1997: folio 2).

II.- In the first-instance judgment 03 of January 10, 2018, the lawsuit was declared without merit, without special condemnation for costs. The plaintiff appeals based on the following, which is summarized due to the reiterative nature of the claim. He alleges a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity of the law. He asserts that the appealed judgment infringes Article 34 of the Political Constitution. He emphasizes that the Constitutional Chamber, through its binding jurisprudence, when interpreting that norm, has indicated that retroactivity is not unrestrictedly prohibited. He cites jurisprudence indicating that this rule exists because relationships must be decided according to the rules in force when the bonds were formed. “What is prohibited is not retroactivity in itself, but rather detrimental retroactivity, because it causes irreparable harm against certainty. He adds that the cited constitutional provision states that no ‘law,’ understood as ‘norms,’ shall be given detrimental retroactive effect, which allows the conclusion that beneficial retroaction is permissible” (vote 259-91 of the Constitutional Chamber). Based on that norm, he claims that the law was erroneously applied. He explains that the lower court judge did not consider as proven a fundamental aspect for resolving the proceeding, which is the point where the [Name3] trees sought to be charged were planted, registered in the name of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (formerly IDA, now Inder), farm of Puntarenas, registration number [Placa1]. He says this was an uncontested fact in the lawsuit and the answer, and it is recorded in the registry certifications. He says this should have been taken into account to assess the indemnification for accession and apply Articles 505, 508, 509 of the Civil Code. He adds that in the third fact of the lawsuit, the current situation of that parcel, known as [Address4] , was explained. It was clarified that the land belonged to a single farm that he had always possessed, but due to a replanning carried out by the IDA, it was constituted as a separate farm. However, despite this segregation, he continued possessing the land with the consent and knowledge of that entity. This was demonstrated through the means of evidence provided, among them the official communication OSAP 558-B-97 from the Sub-regional Office of Piedras Blancas and the testimonial evidence. The official communication shows that the plaintiff was authorized to continue maintaining the plantation of 3 hectares of [Name3] trees located at [Address2] . He states that to cease possessing that land owned by the IDA, he initiated the administrative procedure to be compensated for that plantation. The regional office positively recommended the payment for those trees. But the Board of Directors of the IDA refused to do so, because the land was located within the Natural Heritage of the State. He emphasizes that the argument that indemnification for accession does not proceed because it is a land of that Heritage was used to reject the payment, according to proven fact two of the judgment. Based on the foregoing, he explains the infringement of the principle of non-retroactivity of the law, given that the land, at the time of planting the trees, was not affected by Decree 25153 of April 19, 1994, and furthermore, he maintains he planted in good faith, in plain view and with the consent of the IDA. He affirms that the plantation was made at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, as recorded in the official communication issued by the IDA of May 18, 1995, in which he was authorized to continue maintaining the plantation, which at that time was already five years old since planting. The witnesses, among them [Name4] , confirmed that they were cultivated in the early 90s. Additionally, he considers that the rules of the Ley Forestal 7575 of 1996, which was not in force at the time of planting, cannot be applied to the case. At that time, the governing forest law was Ley 4465 of 1969, from which the following aspects applicable to the case must be highlighted. Its Article 2 indicates that the primary objective of this law was to generate employment and increase the standard of living of the rural population settled in forest areas through their incorporation into silvicultural and industrial activities. Article 9 gave competence to the Dirección General Forestal to define areas for forest reserves, protective zones, wildlife refuges, and other use categories. It was from their definition that they became affected, as was the case of the IDA land where the claimed [Name3] trees were planted. Article 36 establishes the guidelines to follow for declaring that zone, through executive decrees. But the lower court judge applies a decree and a law that were not in force that year, which is not valid since a patrimonial right of accession had been acquired. He maintains that the IDA had knowledge of this entire situation and now seeks to enrich itself from the plaintiff's work and effort and not compensate for the accession protected by civil law. He requests that the judgment be revoked and that the accession be recognized for the [Name3] trees he planted in plain view and with the consent of the IDA, an acquired patrimonial right that was consolidated before the declaration as Natural Heritage of the State (writings folder: file 01/18/2018 09:00:10).

III.- REGARDING THE NATURAL HERITAGE OF THE STATE. The grievance refers basically to the claim that the right to be compensated for accession ([Name3] plantation) cannot be denied on land that forms part of the Natural Heritage of the State (PNE), cultivated before the encumbrance that converts it into public domain property. For this reason, it is necessary to refer to the creation and scope of that legal category. That Heritage is constituted by the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, the areas declared inalienable, the maritime-terrestrial zone (ZMT), the water resource protection zones, and the other lands registered in the name of the State and its institutions, except for those obtained by the National Banking System for credits in its favor (Articles 50, 89, 121-14 first paragraph of the Political Constitution; 1, 6, 13 to 18, 33 Ley Forestal; 7 Ley de Tierras y Colonización; 73 Ley de la ZMT; 2-a) of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 1 of the Ley de Biodiversidad). If they are covered with forest, they will automatically be incorporated into the PNE, and if they are registered lands, a limitation that must be recorded in the Public Property Registry will be constituted. For this, a specific declaration by the Public Administration is not required, because the legal encumbrance is immediate (First Chamber, vote 1675 of December 13, 2012). Therefore, Public Administration bodies cannot swap, cede, alienate, in any way, hand over, or lease rural lands owned or administered by them, without them having first been classified by MINAE, to determine if they are part of the PNE. Its administration is in charge of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE). The forest lands and forests that constitute the PNE are public domain property, which makes them unseizable, imprescriptible, and inalienable (Articles 261, 486 of the Civil Code and 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización). Their possession does not generate a right to acquire them by adverse possession, and the State's reivindicatory action to recover them is imprescriptible. Consequently, they cannot be registered in the Public Property Registry through possessory information, and their invasion or occupation are sanctioned (art. 14 Ley Forestal) (votes 192 of February 28, 2013, of the Agrarian Tribunal; 1991-2306 of November 6, 1991, and 9217 of August 25, 2004, of the First Chamber). But, from when does this encumbrance to the public domain exist?

IV.- ENCUMBRANCE TO THE NATURAL HERITAGE OF THE STATE. The Ley Forestal, 7575 of February 13, 1996, in force from April 16 of that year, was the one that introduced the concept of “natural heritage of the state” into the Costa Rican legal system (Articles 13 and 14). But before that, since the Ley Forestal 4465 of November 25, 1969, in force from that year, the concept of “forest heritage of the state” existed, which differentiated between public forest property and private forest property. Ley 4465, in its original text, permitted the Public Administration (Dirección General Forestal), or private persons with its authorization (concessions or permits) and according to technical forest management plans, to utilize the forest resource in national reserves and State farms, except in national parks and biological reserves (Articles 41, 46, and 58). Ley Forestal 4465 was reformed by Ley 7032 of May 2, 1986, Article 16, which required that any project carried out by the State or any of its institutions that implied the partial or total elimination of a forest, had to obtain the approval of the Dirección General Forestal (Articles 35, 41, and 55). Subsequently, Ley Forestal 7174 of June 28, 1990, was enacted, which kept the concepts of forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, national wildlife refuges, and biological reserves unchanged, as well as the possibility of direct forest utilization by the Dirección General Forestal or through concession, except in national parks and biological reserves (Articles 35, 41, and 55). It also required that State projects or those of its institutions implying the partial or total elimination of a forest had to have the approval of that Directorate (Article 16).

V.- The “Forest Heritage of the State” was regulated in Articles 4, 10-a), 32 to 42 of Ley 4465. Numeral 32 indicated: “The forest heritage of the State is constituted by all the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the farms registered in its name, and of those belonging to the municipalities, to the autonomous institutions, and to the other bodies of the Public Administration. This heritage will be administered by the Dirección General Forestal, which will register the lands in the Public Property Registry, when appropriate, through the Procuraduría General de la República, as individualized farms owned by the State.” Numeral 33 regulated the following: “The forest lands and forests that constitute the forest heritage of the State, detailed in the preceding article, shall be unseizable and inalienable; their possession by individuals shall not cause any right in their favor, and the State's reivindicatory action for these lands is imprescriptible. Consequently, they are not susceptible to registration in the Public Registry through possessory information; their invasion and occupation shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of this law.” Numeral 34 established: “No body of the Public Administration, with the exception of public law banks, may expropriate, swap, cede, or alienate, by any title, hand over, or lease rural lands owned or under its administration, without them having previously been classified by the Dirección General Forestal. If it considers them of forest suitability, they will automatically be incorporated into the forest heritage of the State. And 39 imposed: “The Executive Power, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, shall administer the national reserves. It must also transfer to the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario those lands that it requests, exclusively when they have been classified as of agricultural suitability.” Finally, regarding what is relevant to highlight from that regulation, 41 indicated: “The Dirección General Forestal may grant concessions for the utilization of forest products from lands and forests of the forest heritage of the State, which does not originate any real right over the property in favor of the concessionaire.” Therefore, it must be concluded that Ley 4465, reformed by Leyes 7032 and 7174, also regulated, since 1969, as a public domain area, the Forest Heritage of the State, by establishing in its numeral 33 that the lands included in it were encumbered. The current Ley Forestal simply reproduced with identical content the norms of Leyes Forestales 7174 (Articles 32 and 33) and 7032 (Articles 32 and 33), which had adopted the denomination “Forest Heritage of the State,” just as Ley 4465 had done (arts. 19 and 25).

VI.- According to the foregoing, the grievance that the rule of negative legal non-retroactivity was infringed is unfounded. The public domain status of the forested areas of state lands has existed since long before 1989, the year in which the appellant party affirms it cultivated the [Name3] plantation. His claim that it was uncontested that the plantation was cultivated on land registered in the name of the former IDA, originating from a segregation of a larger area, does not change the decision either, because the Forest Heritage of the State, before 1996, also included as public domain property all forested lands registered in the name of municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration. The lower court judge explained in the appealed judgment that she rejected the claim for compensation for accession based on the following: “No compensation of any kind can be recognized to the plaintiff for the value of the [Name3] plantation located at [Address5] La Gamba de Golfito, a settlement that is part of farm 75,791,000 owned by INDER, because ... based on the location recorded in the cadastral map number P 141748-1993, farm 6075791-000,..., it is located 5.74% within the limits of the Piedras Blancas National Park and furthermore, one hundred percent of its area is Natural Heritage of the State, category Forest and lands of forest suitability, and that within the lands that qualify as of forest suitability, there is a [Name3] plantation of more than fifteen years... In that the plaintiff seeks compensation for the value of a [Name3] plantation located on land that is part of the Piedras Blancas National Park, the compensation does not apply, since it is a public domain property, over which third parties cannot acquire rights. The possible possession that Mr. [Name1] may have exercised over that land does not grant him any right; public domain properties are impossible to acquire by prescription, are unseizable and inalienable, therefore he has no right whatsoever over the plantation incorporated into the land in question.” Although it is true, due to the way the judge explains her reasons, she seems to base her decision solely on the creation of the National Park in 1994, for the reasons this Tribunal clarifies, the claim that the current Ley 7575 was not applicable to the case is also not appropriate to vary what was decided. The public domain status of that zone cannot be based on that regulation, but rather on what has been regulated since 1969 in Ley 4465. In his grievance, the appellant only highlights the norms of that law that permitted forest utilization and cites principles that do not contradict the decision, since this conflict is not resolved based on them. As explained, Ley Forestal 4465 also established the public domain status of the forested areas existing on the lands of state institutions and those included in protected wild areas of any nature. Indeed, even though Ley 4465 permitted the exploitation of the forest resource in some protected wild areas (it excepted national parks and biological reserves), authorization from the Dirección General Forestal was required for this. It is clarified that his interpretation that these zones only became affected after the definition of the area of forest reserves, protective zones, wildlife refuges, and other use categories is erroneous. That only applied when privately owned lands were included within such categories. Not so when it concerned lands of public institutions, within which were those of the IDA. In such cases, the encumbrance to the public domain of the Forest Heritage of the State occurred automatically simply because they were forest lands, regardless of whether or not they were within a management category of a protected wild area. In that sense, numerals 35 and 37 of Ley Forestal 4465 established: 35."Article 35.- Within the forest heritage of the State, the following shall be constituted: a) Forest reserves:… b) Protective zones:… c) National parks:... The highest competent authority of the country is responsible for adopting adequate measures to prevent or eliminate, as soon as possible, the exploitation or occupation in the entire area, and to enforce the ecological, geomorphological, and aesthetic characteristics that have determined its establishment. The national parks and biological reserves shall be administered by the National Parks Service. ch) National wildlife refuges:... d) Biological reserves:…” 37.“When establishing forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, wildlife refuges, or biological reserves, the Executive Power, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, at the proposal of the Dirección General Forestal or the National Parks Service, is empowered to include within their limits, the private farms or parts of farms that are necessary for achieving the objectives indicated in this law, and to implement them in accordance with the respective management plan. In the case of national parks and biological reserves, the lands shall be acquired by purchase or by expropriation, or by both. In the case of forest reserves, protective zones, and wildlife refuges, the properties or parts of properties must also be purchased or expropriated, unless, at the request of the Dirección General Forestal, their owners agree to submit to the respective forest regime. Said submission to the forest regime shall be notified to the Public Property Registry for the corresponding annotation, which shall be maintained for the time established by the management plan” (the underlining is not from the original). Therefore, since the validity of Ley 4465, all those state forest lands formed part of the public domain. For this reason, the appellant party's theory that it was not until the validity of Decree 25153 of April 19, 1994, when the referred National Park was created, that the zone where he cultivated the [Name3] became affected, is not acceptable. Since before 1989, the land, due to its forest nature, formed part of the Forest Heritage of the State. His arguments that the lower court judge applied a decree and a law that were not in force in 1989 are therefore inconsistent, because the public domain encumbrance of that zone does not actually exist based on that.

VII.- The other stated grievance refers to the fact that the appellant considers he “acquired a patrimonial right of accession” because the IDA had knowledge of this entire situation (he did it in its plain view and with its consent) and now seeks to enrich itself from the work and not compensate for the accession protected by civil law, and it even granted him authorization to maintain it, as recorded in the official communication OSAP 558-B-97 from the Sub-regional Office of Piedras Blancas. Certainly, this Tribunal considers that the State's actions are reprehensible when it does not effectively exercise the effective protection of the public domain, especially when environmental assets are at stake. Historically, the state omission or deficiency in this regard is known, and the justifications may be valid or not, because they range from a lack of economic and human resources to a lack of viable policies and adequate planning. In this case, moreover, it is claimed that there was express knowledge of the situation occurring in the zone, since the plaintiff was even authorized to maintain a [Name3] plantation that should never have been cultivated in a sector of forest nature, encumbered to the Forest Heritage of the State. In this regard, it must be specified, in relation to that authorization, that it was not given with the breadth that the appellant party expresses. In the official communication 0SPB 558-P-1997 of September 29, 1997, the Sub-Regional Office of Piedras Blancas granted a temporary authorization to the plaintiff to maintain the [Name3] plantation and harvest it, with the warning that after that, the parcel would be handed over to third parties. The official communication states: "authorizes you to maintain the plantation of three hectares of [Name3] ... The authorization is given for the period remaining until the cutting of the [Name3] plantation, a period defined by a Forest Technician contracted by both parties, your Person and Mr. [Name6] ... After that period, the parcel will be adjudicated to the married couple comprised of [Name6] and [Name7] , according to the agreement signed between You, [Name6] and .... the Defensoría de los Habitantes" (folio 2). Although the parties do not explain what the origin of that agreement was and its scope, it is evident that there was a situation that related those third parties to the parcel where the referred plantation was located, and furthermore, that the IDA gave a temporary authorization for the [Name3] to be harvested, not for the plaintiff appellant to continue possessing the land or continue to benefit from what existed there. Nevertheless, this is not sufficient to grant a private person a patrimonial right like the one he claims. First, because the illegality of the occupation that the plaintiff exercised in the cited zone is not validated by the actions or what was authorized by the officials of the former IDA in the nineties. It must be kept in mind in this regard that, since before 1990, there were norms that granted competence solely to the Dirección General Forestal to grant permits or concessions for the utilization of the State Forest Heritage (Articles 34 and 41 of Ley 4465, transcribed above). Indeed, Article 41 of Ley 4465 provided: “The Dirección General Forestal may grant concessions for the utilization of forest products from lands and forests of the forest heritage of the State, which does not originate any real right over the property in favor of the concessionaire.” It is also not validated even if the referred temporary maintenance authorization existed, given that, aside from the IDA lacking the competence to grant permits for the utilization of the Forest Heritage of the State, it was a permit for him to harvest the [Name3], with temporary effects, issued in the context of a conflict in which the Defensoría de los Habitantes participated, as stated in the referred official communication. In third place, it must be emphasized that the accession regulated by civil law and claimed in the lawsuit and the cited appeal is not a real right in itself, but a way of acquiring real rights, specifically ownership (Article 484 of the Civil Code). Apart from the general rule that private real rights cannot be constituted over public domain property, due to their diverse legal nature, it is evident that the rules governing accession derived from cultivating on another's property could not be applicable to public domain property, since ownership over such property can in no way be acquired through that means.

VIII.- There is another issue raised in the appeal: the claim that the State would be unjustly enriched if it does not compensate for the plantation. Unjust enrichment occurs when one estate receives an increase at the expense of another, without there being a justifying cause for it. Although it is true that the legal system effectively promotes, as a universal principle, that this not be permitted, the rule is also not infringed by what was decided in this case. As explained, we are not facing a situation involving assets governed by the rules of individual private property (whether belonging to private persons or state institutions) (Article 261 of the Civil Code, second paragraph). The plaintiff and appellant seeks to be recognized compensation for what was cultivated in a public domain area. The rules to apply are therefore different, according to the provisions of numerals 261 of the Civil Code, first paragraph, 262, and 263, and in the Ley Forestal of 1969, whose regulation, in what is relevant, maintains the current law in force. That cultivation was not only done without permission granted by the competent state authority, but also, even though it is a plantation, it cannot be utilized by the State, that is, no economic benefit for the State will exist from its presence.

This is because it was done in an area not suitable for silviculture, given that it was land that formed part of the State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), which later even came to be partially included within a national park. Therefore, the argument that by not paying compensation the State will receive an undue benefit is also not acceptable. Nor is the argument by the plaintiff acceptable that the recognition INDER made of the situation when it gave him temporary authorization to harvest the melina created a right in his favor. That authorization, issued by a body legally incompetent as explained, is not sufficient to grant him a right against the State that could not have been configured at any time, since from the beginning of the melina plantation, the appellant remained in a situation of illegality and even of juridical impossibility of protection, by cultivating on public domain land (bien demanial) without state authorization and in an area that, by its nature, could not be used for silviculture.

IX.- In accordance with the foregoing, for the reasons indicated by this Court, the appealed ruling is confirmed in the appealed matter.

POR TANTO

In the appealed matter, the first instance judgment of January 10, 2018 is confirmed.

*2PIKN4MJB47A61* [Nombre8] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *C1SROQASZKI61* [Nombre9] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *JMJ3JOH5HX061* [Nombre10] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A The Forest Law, 7575 of February 13, 1996, effective as of April 16 of that year, was the one that introduced the concept of "natural heritage of the State" (patrimonio natural del Estado) into the Costa Rican legal system (articles 13 and 14). But before that, since the Forest Law 4465 of November 25, 1969, effective since that year, the concept of "***forest*** heritage of the State" (***patrimonio forestal*** del Estado) existed, which differentiated between public forest property and private forest property. Law 4465, in its original text, allowed the Public Administration (Dirección General Forestal) or private persons with its authorization (concessions or permits) and in accordance with technical forest management plans, to exploit the forest resource in national reserves and State-owned farms, except in national parks and biological reserves (articles 41, 46 and 58). Forest Law 4465 was amended by Law 7032 of May 2, 1986, article 16, which required that any project carried out by the State or any of its institutions that involved the partial or total elimination of a forest had to obtain the approval of the Dirección General Forestal (articles 35, 41 and 55). Later, the Forest Law 7174 of June 28, 1990 was enacted, which kept unaltered the concepts of forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, national wildlife refuges and biological reserves, and the possibility of direct forest exploitation by the Dirección General Forestal or through concession, except in national parks and biological reserves (articles 35, 41 and 55). It also required that State projects or those of its institutions that involved the partial or total elimination of forest had to have the approval of that Directorate (article 16).

**V.-** The "***Forest*** *Heritage of the State*" (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado) was regulated in articles 4, 10-a), 32 to 42 of Law 4465. Numeral 32 indicated: "The forest heritage of the State is constituted by all the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the farms registered in its name and those belonging to the municipalities, to the autonomous institutions and to the other organisms of the Public Administration. This heritage will be administered by the Dirección General Forestal, which will register the lands in the Public Property Registry, when appropriate, through the Procuraduría General de la República, as individualized farms owned by the State". 33 regulated the following: "The forest lands and forests that constitute the forest heritage of the State, detailed in the previous article, shall be unseizable and inalienable; their possession by private individuals shall not give rise to any right in their favor and the State's action for recovery of these lands is imprescriptible. Consequently, they are not susceptible to registration in the Public Registry by means of possessory information; their invasion and occupation will be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of this law". 34 established: "No organism of the Public Administration, with the exception of public law banks, may expropriate, swap, assign or transfer, by any title, hand over or give in lease, rural lands of its property or under its administration, without them having been previously classified by the Dirección General Forestal. If it considers them to be of forest aptitude, they will be automatically incorporated into the forest heritage of the State." And 39 imposed: "The Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, shall administer the national reserves. It shall also transfer to the Institute of Agrarian Development those lands that it requests, exclusively when they have been qualified as having agricultural and livestock aptitude". Finally, in what is important to highlight from that regulation, 41 indicated: "The Dirección General Forestal may grant concessions for the exploitation of forest products coming from lands and forests of the forest heritage of the State, which does not originate any real right over the property in favor of the concessionaire". Therefore, it must be concluded that Law 4465, amended by Laws 7032 and 7174, also regulated, since 1969, as a public domain area, the Forest Heritage of the State, by establishing in its numeral 33 that the lands comprised in such heritage were affected. The current Forest Law did was to reproduce with identical content, the norms of Forest Laws 7174 (articles 32 and 33) and 7032 (articles 32 and 33) that had adopted the denomination "*Forest Heritage of the State*" (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), just as Law 4465 did (arts. 19 and 25).

**VI.-** Based on the foregoing, the grievance that the rule of negative legal non-retroactivity was infringed is unfounded. The public domain status (demanialidad) of the forested areas of state lands has existed since long before 1989, the year in which the appellant party claims it cultivated the melina plantation. Nor does their claim change the ruling that it was not controverted that the plantation was cultivated on a land registered in the name of the former IDA, originating from a segregation from another larger one, because the Forest Heritage of the State, before 1996, also included as a public domain asset all forested lands registered in the name of municipalities, autonomous institutions and other organisms of the Public Administration. The lower court judge (A quo) explained in the contested judgment that she rejected the compensation claim for accession (accesión) based on the following: "*No compensation can be recognized to the plaintiff for the value of the [Nombre3] plantation located at [Dirección5] La Gamba de Golfito, settlement that is part of farm 75.791 000 property of INDER, because ... based on the location recorded in the cadastral plan number P 141748-1993, farm 6075791-000,..., it is located 5.74% within the limits of Piedras Blancas National Park and that, in addition, one hundred percent of its area is Natural Heritage of the State, Forest category and lands of forest aptitude, and that within the lands that qualify as having forest aptitude there is a [Nombre3] plantation of more than fifteen years... When the plaintiff claims compensation for the value of a [Nombre3] plantation located on a land that is part of Piedras Blancas National Park, compensation does not apply, since it is a public domain asset, over which third parties cannot acquire rights. The possible possession that Mr. [Nombre1] may have exercised over that land does not grant him any right; public domain assets are impossible to acquire by prescription, they are unseizable and inalienable, therefore he has no right whatsoever over the plantation incorporated into the land in question*." Although it is true that the way the judge explains her reasons seems to be based only on the creation of the National Park in 1994, for the reasons this Court clarifies, the claim that the current Law 7575 was not applicable to the case is also not appropriate to vary the ruling. It is not based on that regulation that the public domain status of that zone can be substantiated, but on what was regulated since 1969 in Law 4465. In their grievance, the appellant highlights only the norms of that law that permitted forest exploitation and cites principles that do not contradict the ruling, for it is not based on them that this conflict is resolved. As explained, Forest Law 4465 also established the public domain status of the forested areas existing on the lands of state institutions and those comprised in protected wilderness areas of any nature. Even though Law 4465 allowed the exploitation of the forest resource in some protected wilderness areas (excepting national parks and biological reserves), authorization from the Dirección General Forestal was required for this. It is clarified that their interpretation that these zones were only affected as from the definition of the area of forest reserves, protective zones, wildlife refuges and other use categories is erroneous. That only applied when privately owned lands were comprised within such categories. Not so when it involved lands of public institutions, among which were those of the IDA. In such cases, the affectation to the public domain of the Forest Heritage of the State occurred automatically by the mere fact of being forest lands, regardless of whether or not they were within a management category of a protected wilderness area. In that sense, numerals 35 and 37 of Forest Law 4465 established: 35." Article 35.- Within the forest heritage of the State, the following will be constituted: a) Forest reserves:… b) Protective zones:… c) National parks:... It is up to the highest competent authority of the country to adopt adequate measures to prevent or eliminate, as soon as possible, exploitation or occupation in the entire area, and to enforce the ecological, geomorphological and aesthetic characteristics that have determined its establishment. National parks and biological reserves will be administered by the Servicio de Parques Nacionales. ch) National wildlife refuges:... d) Biological reserves:…". 37."When establishing forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, wildlife refuges or biological reserves, the Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, upon proposal of the Dirección General Forestal or the Servicio de Parques Nacionales, **is empowered to include within its limits, the private farms or parts of private farms that are necessary for the achievement of the objectives** indicated in this law, and to implement them in accordance with the respective management plan. When it comes to national parks and biological reserves, the lands will be acquired by purchase or by expropriation, or both. In the case of forest reserves, protective zones and wildlife refuges, the properties or parts of properties must also be purchased or expropriated, unless, at the request of the Dirección General Forestal, their owners agree to submit to the respective forest regime. Said subjection to the forest regime will be notified to the Public Property Registry for the corresponding annotation, which will be maintained for the time established by the management plan" (the underlining is not from the original). Therefore, since the validity of Law 4465, all those state forest lands formed part of the public domain. For this reason, the appellant party's theory that it is only until the validity of Decree 25153 of April 19, 1994, when the referred National Park was created, that the area where they cultivated melina is affected, is not acceptable. Since before 1989, the land, due to its forest nature, formed part of the Forest Heritage of the State. Their arguments that the trial judge applied a decree and a law that were not in force in 1989 are therefore inconsistent, because it is not based on that that the public domain affectation of that zone actually exists.

**VII.-** The other grievance stated refers to the appellant's consideration that they "*acquired a patrimonial right of accession (accesión)*" because the IDA had knowledge of this entire situation (it was done in its full view and with its acquiescence) and now intends to enrich itself from the work and not compensate the accession protected in civil regulations, and even granted them authorization for maintenance, as stated in official letter OSAP 558-B-97 of the Sub-regional Office of Piedras Blancas. This Court certainly considers that the State's actions are reprehensible when it does not effectively exercise the effective protection of the public domain, especially when environmental assets are at stake. Historically, the state omission or deficiency in this regard is known, and the justifications may be valid or not, because they range from a lack of economic and human resources to a lack of viable policies and adequate planning. In this case, furthermore, it is claimed that there was express knowledge of the situation occurring in the zone, since the plaintiff was even authorized to perform maintenance on a [Nombre3] plantation that should never have been cultivated in a sector of forest nature, affected to the Forest Heritage of the State. In this regard, it must be specified, in relation to that authorization, that it was not given with the breadth that the appellant party states. In official letter 0SPB 558-P-1997 of September 29, 1997, the Sub-Regional Office of Piedras Blancas gave a temporary authorization to the plaintiff to perform maintenance on the [Nombre3] plantation and harvest it, with the warning that after that the plot would be handed over to third parties. The official letter says: "*authorizes you to perform maintenance on the three-hectare plantation of [Nombre3] ... The authorization is given for the period pending for the harvesting of the melina plantation, a period defined by a Forestry Technician contracted by both parties, your Person and Mr. [Nombre6] ... After that period, the plot will be awarded to the marriage composed of [Nombre6] and [Nombre7] , according to the agreement signed between You, [Nombre6] and .... the Defensoría de los Habitantes*" (folio 2). Although the parties do not explain what the origin of that agreement was and its scope, it is evident that there was a situation that related those third parties to the plot where the referred plantation was, and also that the IDA gave a temporary authorization for the melina to be harvested, not for the plaintiff appellant to continue in possession of the land or further exploit what existed on it. Nevertheless, this is not sufficient to grant a private person a patrimonial right like the one they claim. First, because the illegality of the occupation that the plaintiff exercised in the cited zone is not validated by the actions or what was authorized by the officials of the former IDA in the nineties. It must be borne in mind in this regard that since before 1990, there were norms that gave the competence solely to the Dirección General Forestal to grant permits or concessions for the exploitation of the state Forest Heritage (articles 34 and 41 of Law 4465, transcribed earlier). Indeed, article 41 of Law 4465 provided: "The Dirección General Forestal may grant concessions for the exploitation of forest products coming from lands and forests of the forest heritage of the State, **which does not originate any real right over the property in favor of the concessionaire**". Nor is it validated even if the referred temporary maintenance authorization existed, given that, apart from the IDA lacking the competence to grant exploitation permits for the Forest Heritage of the State, it was a permit for them to harvest the melina, with temporary effects, issued in the context of a conflict in which the Defensoría de los Habitantes participated, as stated in the referred official letter. Thirdly, it must be highlighted that the accession (accesión) regulated by civil regulations and claimed in the lawsuit and the cited appeal is not a real right itself, but a way of acquiring real rights, specifically ownership (article 484 of the Civil Code). Apart from the fact that, as a general rule, it is not possible to constitute private real rights over public domain assets, due to their different legal nature, it is evident that the rules governing accession derived from cultivating on another's property could not be applicable to public domain assets, since in no way can the right of ownership over such assets be acquired through that means.

**VIII.-** There is another issue raised in the appeal: the claim that the State would be unduly enriched if it does not compensate the plantation. Unjust enrichment occurs when one patrimony receives an increase at the expense of another, without a justificatory cause for it. Although the legal system effectively promotes, as a universal principle, that this not be permitted, the rule is not infringed either by what was ruled in this case. As explained, we are not facing a situation where assets governed by the rules of individual private property law (whether belonging to private persons or state institutions) are at stake (article 261 of the Civil Code, second paragraph). The plaintiff and appellant intends for compensation to be recognized for what was cultivated in a public domain area. The rules to apply are therefore different, in accordance with the provisions of numerals 261 of the Civil Code first paragraph, 262 and 263 and in the Forest Law of 1969, the regulation of which, in what is of interest, is maintained by the current Law in force. That cultivation was not only done without a permit granted by the competent state authority, but also, although it is a plantation, it cannot be exploited by the State, that is, no economic benefit will exist for it from its existence. This is because it was done in a zone not suitable for forestry, being a land that formed part of the Forest Heritage of the State, which later even partially became included within a national park. Therefore, the argument that by not providing compensation the State will receive an undue benefit is also not acceptable. Also not acceptable is what the plaintiff argued about how the recognition made by the IDA of the situation when it gave them temporary authorization to harvest the melina generated a right in their favor. That authorization, issued by a legally incompetent body according to what was explained, is not sufficient to grant them a right against the State that could not be configured at any time, because from the beginning of the melina plantation, the appellant remained in a situation of illegality and even of legal impossibility of protection, cultivating on a public domain asset without state authorization and in a zone that, due to its nature, could not be used for forestry.

**IX.-** In accordance with the foregoing, for the reasons indicated by this Court, the appealed judgment is confirmed regarding the appealed matters.

POR TANTO

In the appealed matter, the first-instance judgment of 10 January 2018 is affirmed.

     

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-aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline" /></p> | | <span style="font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:12pt">*C1SROQASZKI61*</span> [Nombre9] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A | &#xa0; | <span style="font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:12pt">*JMJ3JOH5HX061*</span> [Nombre10] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A | | &#xa0; | &#xa0; | &#xa0; | &#xa0; **III.- ON THE NATURAL HERITAGE OF THE STATE.** The grievance essentially refers to the fact that the right to be compensated for accession (accesión) (melina plantation) cannot be denied on land that forms part of the Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado, PNE), cultivated before the encumbrance (afectación) that converts it into public domain property (bien demanial). For this reason, it is necessary to refer to the creation and scope of that legal category. This Heritage is constituted by the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, the areas declared inalienable, the maritime terrestrial zone (zona marítima terrestre, ZMT), the water resource protection zones, and other lands registered in the name of the State and its institutions, except those obtained by the National Banking System for credits in its favor (articles 50, 89, 121-14 first paragraph of the Political Constitution; 1, 6, 13 to 18, 33 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal); 7 of the Land and Colonization Law; 73 of the ZMT Law; 2-a) of the Organic Environmental Law, 1 of the Biodiversity Law). If they are covered with forest, they will automatically be incorporated into the PNE, and if they are registered lands, a limitation will be constituted that must be registered in the Public Real Estate Registry. A specific declaration by the Public Administration is not required for this, because the legal encumbrance is immediate (First Chamber, vote 1675 of December 13, 2012). Therefore, Public Administration bodies cannot exchange, cede, alienate, in any way, deliver, or lease rural lands of their property or under their administration, without them first having been classified by MINAE, to determine if they are part of the PNE. Its administration is in charge of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE). The forest lands and forests that constitute the PNE are public domain properties, which makes them unseizable, imprescriptible, and inalienable (articles 261, 486 of the Civil Code and 11 of the Land and Colonization Law). Their possession does not generate a right to acquire them by adverse possession (usucapirles), and the State's action for recovery (acción reivindicatoria) to recover them is imprescriptible. Consequently, they cannot be registered in the Public Real Estate Registry through possessory information, and their invasion or occupation is sanctioned (Art. 14 Forestry Law) (votes 192 of February 28, 2013 of the Agrarian Court; 1991-2306 of November 6, 1991, and 9217 of August 25, 2004 of the First Chamber). But, from when does this encumbrance to the public domain exist? [...]

**IV.- ENCUMBRANCE TO THE NATURAL HERITAGE OF THE STATE.** The Forestry Law, 7575 of February 13, 1996, effective as of April 16 of that year, was the one that introduced the concept of "natural heritage of the State" into the Costa Rican legal system (articles 13 and 14). But before that, since the Forestry Law 4465 of November 25, 1969, effective from that year, the concept of "forest heritage of the State" (patrimonio forestal del Estado) existed, differentiating between public forest property and private forest property. Law 4465, in its original text, allowed the Public Administration (General Forestry Directorate) or private persons with its authorization (concessions or permits) and in accordance with technical forest management plans, to exploit the forest resource in the national reserves and State farms, except in national parks and biological reserves (articles 41, 46, and 58). Forestry Law 4465 was reformed by Law 7032 of May 2, 1986, article 16, which required that any project carried out by the State or one of its institutions that involved the partial or total elimination of a forest had to obtain the approval of the General Forestry Directorate (articles 35, 41, and 55). Subsequently, Forestry Law 7174 of June 28, 1990, was enacted, which kept the concepts of forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, national wildlife refuges, and biological reserves unaltered, and the possibility of direct forest exploitation by the General Forestry Directorate or through concession, except in national parks and biological reserves (articles 35, 41, and 55). It also required that State projects or its institutions' projects that involved the partial or total elimination of a forest had to have the approval of that Directorate (article 16). [...]

**V.-** The "Forest Heritage of the State" was regulated in articles 4, 10-a), 32 to 42 of Law 4465. Numeral 32 indicated: "The forest heritage of the State is constituted by all the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the farms registered in its name and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration. This heritage shall be administered by the General Forestry Directorate, which shall register the lands in the Public Property Registry, when appropriate, through the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, as individualized farms owned by the State." 33 regulated the following: "The forest lands and forests that constitute the forest heritage of the State, detailed in the previous article, shall be unseizable and inalienable; their possession by individuals shall not cause any right in their favor and the State's action for recovery for these lands is imprescriptible. Consequently, they are not susceptible to registration in the Public Registry through possessory information; their invasion and occupation shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of this law." 34 established: "No body of the Public Administration, with the exception of public-law banks, may expropriate, exchange, cede, or alienate, by any title, deliver, or lease rural lands of its property or under its administration, without them first having been classified by the General Forestry Directorate. If it considers them to be of forest aptitude, they will automatically be incorporated into the forest heritage of the State." And 39 imposed: "The Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, shall administer the national reserves. It must also transfer to the Institute of Agrarian Development those lands that it requests, exclusively when they have been classified as having agricultural aptitude." Finally, regarding what is relevant to highlight from that regulation, 41 indicated: "The General Forestry Directorate may grant concessions for the exploitation of forest products from lands and forests of the forest heritage of the State, which does not originate any real right over the property in favor of the concessionaire." Therefore, it must be concluded that Law 4465, reformed by Laws 7032 and 7174, also regulated, since 1969, the Forest Heritage of the State as a public domain area, by establishing in its numeral 33 that the lands comprised therein were encumbered. What the current Forestry Law did was to reproduce, with identical content, the norms of Forestry Laws 7174 (articles 32 and 33) and 7032 (articles 32 and 33) that had adopted the name "Forest Heritage of the State", as did Law 4465 (arts. 19 and 25). [...]

**VI.-** In accordance with the foregoing, the grievance that the rule against adverse legal non-retroactivity was infringed is unfounded. The public domain status of forested areas on State lands has existed since long before 1989, the year in which the appellant party claims the melina plantation was cultivated.

Nor does it change what was decided his claim that it was not disputed that the plantation was cultivated on land registered in the name of the former IDA, originating from a segregation of another larger property, because the State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), before 1996, also included as public domain property all forested lands registered in the name of municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration. The lower court explained in the appealed judgment that it rejected the claim for compensation by accession (accesión) based on the following: “No compensation whatsoever can be recognized to the plaintiff, for the value of the [Species1] plantation located at [Address1] in Gamba de Golfito, a settlement that is part of farm 75,791 000 owned by INDER, because … based on the location recorded in cadastral map number P 141748-1993, farm 6075791-000,…, it is 5.74% within the limits of Piedras Blancas National Park and also one hundred percent of its area is State Natural Heritage, category Forest and lands of forestry aptitude (terrenos de aptitud forestal), and within the lands that qualify as forestry aptitude there is a plantation of [Species1] more than fifteen years old... When the plaintiff claims compensation for the value of a [Species1] plantation located on land that is part of Piedras Blancas National Park, compensation is not applicable, as it is a public domain asset, over which third parties cannot acquire rights. The possible possession that Mr. [Name2] may have exercised over that land grants him no right; public domain assets are impossible to acquire by adverse possession (prescripción), they are unseizable and inalienable, therefore he has no right whatsoever over the plantation incorporated into the land in question.” While it is true that the way the judge explains her reasons seems to rely only on the creation of the National Park in 1994, for the reasons this Court clarifies, his claim that the current Law 7575 was not applicable to the case is also not grounds to vary what was decided. It is not based on that regulation that the public domain character of that zone can be founded, but on what has been regulated since 1969 in Law 4465. In his grievance, the appellant highlights only the norms of that law that allowed forestry use (aprovechamiento forestal) and cites principles that do not contradict what was decided, since this conflict is not resolved based on them. As explained, Forest Law 4465 also established the public domain character of forested areas existing on the lands of state institutions and those included in protected wild areas of any nature. Even though Law 4465 permitted the exploitation of the forestry resource in some protected wild areas (it excepted national parks and biological reserves), authorization from the General Forestry Directorate (Dirección General Forestal) was required for this. It is clarified that his interpretation is erroneous that only from the definition of the area of forest reserves, protective zones (zonas protectoras), wildlife refuges, and other use categories did those zones become affected. That was applicable only when privately owned lands were included within such categories. Not so when it involved lands of public institutions, among which were those of the IDA. In such cases, the affectation to the public domain of the State Forest Heritage occurred automatically by the mere fact of being forest lands, regardless of whether or not they were within a management category of a protected wild area. In that sense, articles 35 and 37 of Forest Law 4465 established: 35. “Article 35.- Within the State forest heritage the following shall be constituted: a) Forest reserves:… b) Protective zones:… c) National parks:... It is the responsibility of the highest competent authority of the country to adopt appropriate measures to prevent or eliminate, as soon as possible, the exploitation or occupation in the entire area, and to enforce the ecological, geomorphological, and aesthetic characteristics that determined its establishment. National parks and biological reserves shall be administered by the National Parks Service (Servicio de Parques Nacionales). ch) National wildlife refuges:... d) Biological reserves:…”. 37. “When establishing forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, wildlife refuges, or biological reserves, the Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, upon proposal of the General Forestry Directorate or the National Parks Service, is empowered to include within their limits the private farms or parts of farms that are necessary for the achievement of the objectives indicated in this law, and to implement them in accordance with the respective management plan. When dealing with national parks and biological reserves, the lands shall be acquired by purchase or expropriation, or both. In the case of forest reserves, protective zones, and wildlife refuges, the properties or parts of properties must also be purchased or expropriated, unless, at the requirement of the General Forestry Directorate, their owners accept to submit to the respective forestry regime. Said submission to the forestry regime shall be notified to the Public Property Registry for the corresponding annotation, which shall be maintained for the time established by the management plan” (the underlining is not from the original). [...] [...] Therefore, from the effective date of Law 4465, all those state forest lands formed part of the public domain. Hence, the appellant's theory that it is not until the effective date of Decree 25153 of April 19, 1994, when the referenced National Park was created, that the zone where he cultivated the melina is affected, is not accepted. Since before 1989, the land, due to its forest nature, formed part of the State Forest Heritage. His arguments that the trial judge applied a decree and a law that were not in force in 1989 are therefore inconsistent, because it is not based on those that the public domain affectation of that zone actually exists." He argues that the IDA had knowledge of this entire situation and now seeks to enrich itself from the work and effort of the plaintiff and not indemnify the accession (accesión) protected in civil law. He requests that the judgment be revoked and that accession be recognized for the [Nombre3] trees that he planted in plain sight and with the tolerance of the IDA, an acquired patrimonial right that was consolidated before the declaration of State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) *(case file: archive 18/01/2018 09:00:10).* **III.-** **REGARDING THE STATE NATURAL HERITAGE**. The grievance basically refers to the fact that the right to be indemnified for accession (planting of melina) cannot be denied on land that is part of the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado, PNE), cultivated before the legal designation (afectación) that turns it into a public domain asset. Therefore, it is necessary to refer to the creation and scope of this legal category. This Heritage is constituted by the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, the areas declared inalienable, the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítima terrestre, ZMT), the water resource protection zones, and the other lands registered in the name of the State and its institutions, except those acquired by the National Banking System for credits in its favor (articles 50, 89, 121-14 first paragraph of the Political Constitution; 1, 6, 13 to 18, 33 of the Ley Forestal; 7 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización; 73 of the Ley de la ZMT; 2-a) of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 1 of the Ley de Biodiversidad). If they are covered by forest, they will automatically be incorporated into the PNE, and if they are registered lands, a limitation will be established that must be registered in the Public Real Estate Registry (Registro Público Inmobiliario). A specific declaration by the Public Administration is not required for this because the legal designation is immediate (Sala Primera, Voto 1675 of December 13, 2012). For this reason, Public Administration bodies cannot exchange, assign, alienate in any way, deliver, or lease rural lands they own or administer without them first being classified by MINAE to determine if they are part of the PNE. Its administration is in charge of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE). The forest lands and forests that constitute the PNE are public domain assets, which makes them unattachable, imprescriptible, and inalienable (articles 261, 486 of the Civil Code and 11 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización). Possession of them does not generate a right to acquire them by adverse possession, and the State's action for recovery (acción reivindicatoria) to recover them is imprescriptible. Consequently, they cannot be registered in the Public Real Estate Registry through possessory information, and their invasion or occupation is sanctioned (Art. 14 Ley Forestal) (Votos 192 of February 28, 2013, of the Tribunal Agrario; 1991-2306 of November 6, 1991, and 9217 of August 25, 2004, of the Sala Primera). But, **from when does this designation as public domain exist**?

**IV.-** **DESIGNATION AS STATE NATURAL HERITAGE**. Ley Forestal, 7575 of February 13, 1996, in effect from April 16 of that year, was the one that introduced the concept of “state natural heritage” into the Costa Rican legal system (articles 13 and 14). But before that, since Ley Forestal 4465 of November 25, 1969, in effect from that year, the concept of “***state forest* heritage**” existed, which differentiated between public forest property and private forest property. Law 4465, in its original text, allowed the Public Administration (Dirección General Forestal) or private persons with its authorization (concessions or permits) and under technical forest management plans, to exploit the forest resource in national reserves and State farms, except in national parks and biological reserves (articles 41, 46, and 58). Ley Forestal 4465 was reformed by Law 7032 of May 2, 1986, article 16, which required that any project carried out by the State or one of its institutions that involved the partial or total elimination of a forest had to obtain the approval of the Dirección General Forestal (articles 35, 41, and 55). Subsequently, Ley Forestal 7174 of June 28, 1990, was enacted, which kept unchanged the concepts of forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, national wildlife refuges, and biological reserves, and the possibility of direct forest exploitation by the Dirección General Forestal or through concession, except in national parks and biological reserves (articles 35, 41, and 55). It also required that State projects or its institutions' projects involving the partial or total elimination of forest had to have the approval of that Directorate (article 16).

**V.-** The “***Forest* Heritage of the State**” was regulated in articles 4, 10-a), 32 to 42 of Law 4465. Numeral 32 indicated: “The state forest heritage is constituted by all the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the farms registered in its name, and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other Public Administration bodies. This heritage will be administered by the Dirección General Forestal, which will register the lands in the Public Property Registry, when appropriate, through the Procuraduría General de la República, as individualized farms owned by the State”. Article 33 regulated the following: “The forest lands and forests that constitute the state forest heritage, detailed in the previous article, shall be unattachable and inalienable; their possession by private parties shall not create any right in their favor, and the State's action for recovery for these lands is imprescriptible. Consequently, they are not susceptible to registration in the Public Registry through possessory information; their invasion and occupation shall be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of this law”. Article 34 established: “No body of the Public Administration, with the exception of public law banks, may expropriate, exchange, assign, or alienate, under any title, deliver, or lease rural lands of its property or under its administration, without them previously having been classified by the Dirección General Forestal. If this Directorate considers them to be of forest suitability, they shall automatically be incorporated into the state forest heritage.” And Article 39 imposed: “The Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, shall administer the national reserves. It shall also transfer to the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario those lands that it requests, exclusively when they have been classified as of agricultural suitability”. Finally, regarding what is relevant to highlight from that regulation, Article 41 indicated: “The Dirección General Forestal may grant concessions for the exploitation of forest products coming from lands and forests of the state forest heritage, which does not originate any real right over the property in favor of the concessionaire”. Therefore, it must be concluded that Law 4465, reformed by Laws 7032 and 7174, also regulated, since 1969, the State Forest Heritage as a public domain area, by establishing in its numeral 33 that the lands included in it were designated (afectados). The current Ley Forestal simply reproduced with identical content, the norms of the Leyes Forestales 7174 (articles 32 and 33) and 7032 (articles 32 and 33) which had adopted the denomination “*State Forest Heritage*”, just as Law 4465 did (arts. 19 and 25).

**VI.-** In accordance with the foregoing, the grievance that the rule against negative legal non-retroactivity was violated is unfounded. The public domain status (demanialidad) of the forested areas of state lands has existed since long before 1989, the year in which the appealing party claims they cultivated the melina plantation. Nor does their claim change the decision, that it was not controverted that the plantation was cultivated on land registered in the name of the former IDA, originating from a segregation from another larger property, because the State Forest Heritage, before 1996, also included as public domain assets all forested lands registered in the name of municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other Public Administration bodies. The A quo explained in the contested judgment that she rejected the indemnity claim for accession based on the following: “*No indemnity can be recognized to the plaintiff, for the value of the [Nombre3] plantation located in [Dirección5] La Gamba de Golfito, settlement that is part of farm 75.791 000 owned by INDER, because … based on the location recorded in cadastral map number P 141748-1993, farm 6075791-000,…, it is found 5.74% within the limits of Parque Nacional Piedras Blancas and also that one hundred percent of its area is State Natural Heritage, Forest category and lands of forest suitability, and that within the lands that qualify as forest suitability, there is a plantation of [Nombre3] more than fifteen years old... As the plaintiff seeks indemnification for the value of a [Nombre3] plantation located on land that is part of Parque Nacional Piedras Blancas, indemnification is not applicable, since it is a public domain asset, over which third parties cannot acquire rights. The possible possession that Mr. [Nombre1] may have exercised over that land does not grant him any right, public domain assets are impossible to acquire by prescription, they are unattachable and inalienable, therefore he has no right whatsoever over the plantation incorporated into the land in question*.” Although it is true that, due to the way the judge explains her reasons, she seems to base her decision only on the creation of the National Park in 1994, for the reasons clarified by this Tribunal, the claim that the current Law 7575 was not applicable to the case is also not appropriate to vary the decision. The public domain status of that zone cannot be based on that regulation, but on what was regulated since 1969 in Law 4465. In their grievance, the appellant highlights only the norms of that law that permitted forest exploitation and cites principles that do not contradict the decision, as it is not based on them that this conflict is resolved. As explained, Ley Forestal 4465 also established the public domain status of the forested areas existing on the lands of state institutions and those comprised within protected wild areas of any nature. Even though Law 4465 allowed the exploitation of the forest resource in some protected wild areas (excluding national parks and biological reserves), this required authorization from the Dirección General Forestal. It is clarified that their interpretation is erroneous, that it is only from the definition of the area of forest reserves, protective zones, wildlife refuges, and other use categories, that these zones became designated (afectadas). That proceeded only when privately owned lands were comprised within such categories. Not so when dealing with lands of public institutions, including those of the IDA. In such cases, the designation to the public domain of the State Forest Heritage occurred automatically by the mere fact of being forest lands, regardless of whether or not they were within a management category of a protected wild area. In that sense, numerals 35 and 37 of Ley Forestal 4465 established: 35.” Article 35.- Within the state forest heritage, the following shall be constituted: a) Forest reserves:… b) Protective zones:… c) National parks:... It corresponds to the highest competent authority of the country to adopt adequate measures to prevent or eliminate, as soon as possible, exploitation or occupation in the entire area, and to enforce the ecological, geomorphological, and aesthetic characteristics that have determined its establishment. National parks and biological reserves shall be administered by the Servicio de Parques Nacionales. ch) National wildlife refuges:... d) Biological reserves:…”. 37.“When establishing forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, wildlife refuges, or biological reserves, the Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Environment and Energy, at the proposal of the Dirección General Forestal or the Servicio de Parques Nacionales, **is empowered to include within their limits, the private farms or parts of farms that are necessary for the achievement of the objectives** stated in this law, and to implement them in accordance with the respective management plan. When dealing with national parks and biological reserves, the lands shall be acquired by purchase or expropriation, or both. In the case of forest reserves, protective zones, and wildlife refuges, the properties or parts of properties shall also be purchased or expropriated, unless, at the request of the Dirección General Forestal, their owners accept to submit to the respective forestry regime. Said submission to the forestry regime shall be notified to the Public Registry of Property for the corresponding annotation, which shall be maintained for the time established by the management plan” (underlining not in original). Therefore, since the entry into force of Law 4465, all those state forest lands formed part of the public domain. For this reason, the theory of the appealing party that it is only until the entry into force of Decreto 25153 of April 19, 1994, when the referred National Park was created, that the area where they cultivated the melina became designated, is not admissible. Since before 1989, the land, due to its forest nature, formed part of the State Forest Heritage. Their arguments are therefore inconsistent that the lower court judge applied a decree and a law that were not in force in 1989, because it is not based on that that the public domain designation of that zone actually exists.

**VII.-** The other grievance expressed refers to the appellant's consideration that they *“acquired a patrimonial right of accession”* because the IDA had knowledge of this entire situation (it occurred in their plain sight and with their tolerance) and now seeks to enrich itself from the work and not indemnify the accession protected in civil law, and even granted them authorization for maintenance, as recorded in official communication OSAP 558-B-97 from the Oficina Sub-regional de Piedras Blancas. This Tribunal certainly considers the State's action reprehensible when it does not effectively exercise the effective protection of the public domain, especially when environmental assets are at stake. Historically, the State's omission or deficiency in this regard is known, and the justifications may be valid or not, ranging from lack of economic and human resources to lack of viable policies and adequate planning. In this case, moreover, it is claimed that there was express knowledge of the situation occurring in the area, as the plaintiff was even authorized to provide maintenance to a plantation of [Nombre3] that should never have been cultivated in a sector of forest nature, designated (afectado) to the State Forest Heritage. In relation to that authorization, it must be clarified that it was not given with the breadth that the appealing party expresses. In official communication 0SPB 558-P-1997 of September 29, 1997, the Oficina Sub-Regional de Piedras Blancas gave a temporary authorization to the plaintiff to provide maintenance to the plantation of [Nombre3] and harvest it, with the warning that after that the parcel would be handed over to third parties. The communication states: “*authorizes you to provide maintenance to the three-hectare plantation of [Nombre3] ... The authorization is given for the remaining period for the cutting of the melina plantation, a period defined by a Forest Technician contracted by both parties, yourself and Mr. [Nombre6] ... After that period, the parcel will be awarded to the marriage composed of [Nombre6] and [Nombre7], according to the agreement signed between You, [Nombre6], and .... the Defensoría de los Habitantes*” *(folio 2).* Although the parties do not explain the origin of that agreement and its scope, it is evident that there existed a situation that related those third persons to the parcel where the referred plantation was, and also that the IDA gave a temporary authorization for the melina to be harvested, not for the plaintiff-appellant to continue in possession of the land or further exploit what existed on it. However, this is not sufficient to grant a private person a patrimonial right like the one claimed. First, because the illegality situation of the occupation exercised by the plaintiff in the cited area is not validated by the action or what was authorized by the officials of the former IDA in the 1990s. It must be kept in mind in this regard that, since before 1990, there were norms that granted competence solely to the Dirección General Forestal to grant permits or concessions for the exploitation of the state Forest Heritage (articles 34 and 41 of Law 4465, previously transcribed). In fact, article 41 of Law 4465 provided: “The Dirección General Forestal may grant concessions for the exploitation of forest products coming from lands and forests of the state forest heritage, **which does not originate any real right over the property in favor of the concessionaire**”. Nor is it validated even if the referred temporary maintenance authorization existed, given that apart from the IDA lacking competence to grant exploitation permits for the State Forest Heritage, it was a permit for harvesting the melina, with temporary effects, issued in the context of a conflict in which the Defensoría de los Habitantes participated, as expressed in the referred communication. Thirdly, it must be highlighted that the accession regulated by civil law and claimed in the lawsuit and cited appeal is not a real right in itself, but a way of acquiring real rights, specifically ownership (article 484 of the Civil Code). Apart from the fact that as a general rule, it is not possible to establish private real rights over public domain assets, due to their different legal nature, it is evident that the rules governing accession derived from cultivating on another's property could not be applicable to public domain assets, as the right of ownership over such can in no way be acquired through this means.

**VIII.-** There is another issue raised in the appeal: the claim that the State would be unjustly enriched if it does not indemnify the plantation. Unjust enrichment occurs when one estate receives an increase at the expense of another, without a justifying cause for it. Although it is true that the legal system effectively promotes, as a universal principle, that this not be allowed, the rule is also not violated by the decision in this case. As explained, this is not a situation involving assets governed by the rules of individual private property rights (whether of private persons or state institutions) (article 261 of the Civil Code, second paragraph). The plaintiff and appellant seeks recognition of indemnification for what was cultivated in a public domain area. The applicable rules are therefore different, according to the provisions of numerals 261 of the Civil Code first paragraph, 262, and 263, and in the Ley Forestal of 1969, whose relevant regulations are maintained by the current Law in force. This cultivation was not only done without permission granted by the competent state authority, but also, although it is a plantation, it cannot be exploited by the State, meaning there will be no economic benefit for it from its existence. This is because it was done in an area not suitable for silviculture, being land that formed part of the State Forest Heritage, which later even partially became included within a national park. Therefore, the argument that with the non-indemnification, the State will receive an undue benefit is also not acceptable. Nor is the argument made by the plaintiff acceptable that the recognition the IDA made of the situation when it gave him temporary authorization to harvest the melina generated a right in his favor. That authorization, issued by a legally incompetent body according to what has been explained, is not sufficient to grant him a right against the State that could never have been configured, because from the beginning of the melina plantation, the appellant remained in a situation of illegality and even legal impossibility of protection, by cultivating on a public domain asset without state authorization and in an area that, by its nature, could not be used for silviculture.

**IX.-** In accordance with the foregoing, for the reasons indicated by this Tribunal, the appealed judgment is confirmed on appeal.

POR TANTO

In the appealed matter, the first-instance judgment of January 10, 2018, is confirmed.

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VOTO N° 395-F-2018 TRIBUNAL AGRARIO. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ.- A las catorce horas y once minutos del once de mayo de dos mil dieciocho.- PROCESO ORDINARIO establecido por [Nombre1] , mayor, casado, cédula CED1 ; contra el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (Inder), cédula jurídica CED2 - ; representado por su apoderado general judicial Álvaro Chanto Ureña, mayor, abogado, vecino de Pérez Zeledón, cédula CED3 . Interviene en el proceso como parte interesada la PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA (PGR), representada por Heilyn Sáenz Calderón, mayor, abogada, vecina de San José, cédula CED4 . Actúa como defensor público agrario del actor, [Nombre2] , y como apoderada especial judicial del INDER, Marianela Quirós Mora, cédula CED5 . Tramitado ante el Juzgado Agrario del Segundo Circuito Judicial de la Zona Sur, Corredores.-

RESULTANDO:

1.- La parte actora pide, en proceso ordinario estimado en tres millones de colones, se declare lo siguiente: " 1) Se declare que el suscrito realizó la siembra de quinientos cuarenta árboles de [Nombre3] sobre el terreno conocido como la [Dirección1] , inscrita nombre del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural. 2) Se afirme que dichas siembras fueron realizadas a vista y paciencia del Instituto y con su debida autorización. 3) Se proceda a indemnizar por accesiones los 540 árboles de [Nombre3] sembradas en el terreno, [Dirección1] , esto por la suma de tres millones ciento diez mil cuatrocientos colones. 4) Se condene al Instituto a cancelar dichas accesiones, esto en el plazo de un mes, bajo pena de emitir orden de embargo en el presupuesto asignado por ley a favor del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural. 5) Se condene al demandado al pago de las costas procesales y personales con ocasión de este juicio" (folios 22 a 23 y vuelto).- 2.- La parte demandada contestó negativamente e interpuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de legitimación ad causam y litis consorcio pasivo necesario (folios 30 a 38). La última fue resuelta interlocutoriamente (folios 55 y 74).

3.- La Jueza Marisel Zamora Arias, del Juzgado Agrario del Segundo Circuito Judicial de la Zona Sur, Corredores, en sentencia 03 de 10 de enero de 2018, resolvió: “POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto, se DECLARA SIN LUGAR EN TODOS SUS EXTREMOS la demanda ordinaria agraria interpuesta por el señor [Nombre1] en contra de INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL. Se resuelve este asunto sin especial condenatoria en costas" (carpeta de documentos asociados, archivo 10/01/18 13:57:17 p.m.).- 4.- La parte actora apela con indicación expresa de las razones en que se apoya (carpeta de escritos, archivo 18/01/18 9:00:10 a.m.).- 5.- En la substanciación del proceso se han observado las prescripciones legales y no existen errores u omisiones capaces de producir la nulidad del fallo.- Redacta la jueza ALPIZAR RODRIGUEZ, y;

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- El Tribunal comparte los hechos probados por tener sustento en las pruebas constantes en autos, con las siguientes aclaraciones y adiciones; salvo el sexto por no expresa una idea completa y comprensible. Al primero se agrega: Se identifica también como [Dirección2] . Al quinto: El actor inició la plantación de árboles de [Nombre3] a principios de los noventa (oficio del IDA de 18 de mayo de 1995: folio 3; declaraciones testimoniales de [Nombre4] y [Nombre5] : folio 104). Agréguese de igual naturaleza: 6) La plantación de [Nombre3] se cultivó a principios de los noventa (oficio del IDA de 18 de mayo de 1995: folio 3; avalúo del Inder de octubre de 2014: folio 132; declaraciones testimoniales de [Nombre4] y [Nombre5] : folio 104). 7) En setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y siete, la Oficina Sub-Rgional de Piedras Blancas, IDA, autorizó al actora a dar mantenimiento a una plantación de [Nombre3] existente en la [Dirección3] , únicamente por el periodo pendiente para la corta de la plantación. Luego de ello, se le informó la parcelar sería adjudicada a terceras personas con las cuáles el actor había firmado un convenio (ver oficio 0SPB 558-P-1997: folio 2). 8) En octubre de dos mil catorce, en el avalúo realizado a la plantación de [Nombre3] existente en esa fecha en la parcela referida, se indicó que el cultivo tenía más de ocho años de sembrado, según el estado de la plantación (ver oficio 0SPB 558-P-1997: folio 2).

II.- En la sentencia de primera instancia 03 de 10 de enero de 2018, se declaró sin lugar la demanda sin especial condenatoria en costas. La parte actora apela con base en lo siguiente, que se resume por lo reiterado del reclamo. Alega existe violación al principio de retroactividad de la ley. Asegura, la sentencia impugnada infringe el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política. Resalta, la Sala Constitucional, a través de su jurisprudencia vinculante, al interpretar esa norma ha señalado que no se prohíbe irrestrictamente la retroactividad. Cita jurisprudencia en la que se indica que esta regla existe porque las relaciones se deben decidir conforme con las reglas vigentes cuando se dieron los vínculos. “Lo vedado no es entonces la retroactividad en sí misma, sino la retroactividad perjudicial, porque causa daño irreparable en razón de que va contra la certeza. Agrega la citada disposición constitucional que a ninguna “ley” entendida como “normas”, se le dará efecto retroactivo perjudicial, lo que permite concluir que si cabe la retroacción beneficiosa” (voto 259-91 de la Sala Constitucional). Con base en esa norma, se reclama que se aplicó erróneamente el derecho. Explica que la A quo no tuvo por demostrado un aspecto portante para resolver el proceso, cuál es el punto donde se sembraron los árboles de [Nombre3] que se cobran, está inscrita a nombre del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (antes IDA, ahora Inder), finca de Puntarenas, matrícula [Placa1]. Ese fue un hecho no controvertido en la demanda y la contestación y consta en las certificaciones registrales. Eso dice, debió ser tomado en cuenta para valorar la indemnización por accesión y aplicar los artículos 505, 508, 509 del Código Civil. Agrega, en el hecho tercero de la demanda se explicó la situación actual de esa parcela, conocida como [Dirección4] . Se aclaró, el terreno pertenecía a una sola finca que siempre había poseído, pero debido replanteamiento que realizó el IDA, se constituyó como finca aparte. Sin embargo, pese esa segregación, se continuó poseyendo el terreno avise paciencia de ese ente. Esto fue demostrado a través de los medios de prueba aportados, entre ellos el oficio OSAP 558-B-97 de la oficina Sub-regional de Piedras Blancas y la prueba testimonial. En el oficio consta que se autoriza la actora continuar dando mantenimiento a la plantación de 3 hectáreas de árboles de [Nombre3] ubicadas en la [Dirección2] . manifiesta, para no continuar ejerciendo posesión en ese terreno propiedad del IDA, se inició el procedimiento administrativo para que se le indemnizase esa plantación. La oficina regional recomendó positivamente el pago de esos árboles. Pero la Junta Directiva del IDA, rechazó hacerlo, por ubicarse el terreno dentro del Patrimonio Natural del Estado. Resalta, es argumento de que no procede la indemnización por accesión al ser un terreno de ese Patrimonio, se utilizó para rechazar el pago de los de acuerdo al hecho probado dos de la sentencia. Con base en lo indicado, se explica la afectación al principio de retroactividad de la ley, dado que el terreno al momento de la siembra de los árboles no estaba afectado por el Decreto 25153 19 de abril de 1994 y además sostiene sembró de buena fe, a vista y paciencia del IDA. Afirma, la plantación se hizo a finales de 1989 e inicios de 1990, según consta en el oficio emitido por el IDA de 18 de mayo de 1995, en el que se le autoriza a continuar dando mantenimiento a la plantación que en ese momento ya tenía cinco años de sembrada. Los testigos, entre ellos [Nombre4] , confirmaron que fueron cultivados a inicios de los 90. Adicionalmente, considera, no se pueden aplicar el caso las normas de la Ley Forestal 7575 de 1996, que no estaba vigente al momento de la siembra. En ese entonces la Ley forestal que regía era la 4465 de 1969, de la cual deben resaltar los siguientes aspectos aplicables al caso. En su artículo 2 se indica que el objetivo primordial de esta ley era generar empleo e incrementar el nivel de vida de la población rural radicada en áreas forestales mediante su incorporación actividades silviculturales e industriales. El artículo 9 daba competencia a la Dirección General Forestal para definir las áreas de reservas forestales, zonas protectoras, refugio de fauna silvestre y otras categorías de uso. A partir de su definición es que quedaban afectadas, como lo fue el caso del terreno del IDA en el que se sembraron los árboles de [Nombre3] reclamados. El artículo 36 establece las pautas a seguir para realizar la declaratoria de esa zona, a través de decretos ejecutivos. Pero la juzgadora de instancia aplica un decreto y una ley que no estaban vigentes ese año, lo cual no es válido ya que se había adquirido derecho patrimonial de accesión. Sostiene que el IDA tuvo conocimiento de toda esta situación y ahora pretenden enriquecerse del trabajo y esfuerzo del actor y no indemnizar la accesión tutelada en la normativa civil. Pide se revoque la sentencia y se reconozca la accesión por los árboles de [Nombre3] que sembró a vista y paciencia del IDA, derecho patrimonial adquirido que se consolidó antes de la declaratoria de Patrimonio Natural del Estado (carpeta de escritos: archivo 18/01/2018 09:00:10).

III.- SOBRE EL PATRIMONIO NATURAL DEL ESTADO. El agravio se refiere básicamente a que no se puede negar el derecho a ser indemnizado por accesión (plantación de melina), en un terreno que integra el Patrimonio Natural del Estado (PNE), cultivado antes de la afectación que lo convierte en bien demanial. Por ello resulte necesario referirse a la creación y alcances de esa categoría legal. Ese Patrimonio está constituido por los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, las áreas declaradas inalienables, la zona marítima terrestre (ZMT), las zonas de protección del recurso hídrico y las demás tierras inscritas a nombre del Estado y sus instituciones, salvo las que obtenga el Sistema Bancario Nacional por créditos a su favor (artículos 50, 89, 121-14 párrafo primero de la Constitución Política; 1, 6, 13 a 18, 33 Ley Forestal; 7 Ley de Tierras y Colonización; 73 Ley de la ZMT; 2-a) de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, 1 de la Ley de Biodiversidad). Si están cubiertos de bosque, automáticamente quedarán incorporados al PNE y si se trata de terrenos inscritos, se constituirá una limitación que debe registrarse en el Registro Público Inmobiliario. Para ello no se requiere una declaratoria específica de la Administración Pública, porque la afectación legal es inmediata (Sala Primera, voto 1675 de 13 de diciembre de 2012). Por ello, los organismos de la Administración Pública no pueden permutar, ceder, enajenar, de ninguna manera, entregar o dar en arrendamiento, terrenos rurales de su propiedad o bajo su administración, sin que antes hayan sido clasificados por el MINAE, para determinar si son parte del PNE. Su administración está a cargo del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE). Los terrenos forestales y bosques que constituyen el PNE son bienes demaniales, lo cual les hace inembargables, imprescriptibles e inalienables (artículos 261, 486 del Código Civil y 11 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización). Su posesión no genera derecho para usucapirles y la acción reivindicatoria del Estado para recuperarlos es imprescriptible. En consecuencia, no pueden inscribirse en el Registro Público Inmobiliario mediante información posesoria y su invasión u ocupación son sancionadas (art. 14 Ley Forestal) (votos 192 de 28 de febrero de 2013 del Tribunal Agrario; 1991-2306 de 6 de noviembre de 1991 y 9217 de 25 de agosto de 2004 de la Sala Primera). Pero, ¿a partir de cuando existe esa afectación al demanio público?

IV.- AFECTACIÓN AL PATRIMONIO NATURAL DEL ESTADO. La Ley Forestal, 7575 de 13 de febrero de 1996, vigente a partir del 16 abril de ese año, fue la que introdujo en el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense el concepto de “patrimonio natural del Estado” (artículos 13 y 14). Pero antes, desde la Ley Forestal 4465 de 25 de noviembre de 1969, vigente desde ese año, existía el concepto de “patrimonio forestal del Estado”, que diferenciaba entre propiedad forestal pública y propiedad forestal privada. La Ley 4465, en su texto original, permitía que la Administración Pública (Dirección General Forestal) o bien por personas privadas con su autorización (concesiones o permisos) y conforme a planes técnicos de manejo forestal, aprovecharan el recurso forestal en las reservas nacionales y fincas del Estado, excepto en parques nacionales y reservas biológicas (artículos 41, 46 y 58). La Ley Forestal 4465 fue reformada por la Ley 7032 de 2 de mayo de 1986, artículo 16, que exigió que todo proyecto que realizara el Estado o alguna de sus instituciones, e implicara la eliminación parcial o total de un bosque, debía obtener la aprobación de la Dirección General Forestal (artículos 35, 41 y 55). Luego se promulgó la Ley Forestal 7174 de 28 de junio de 1990, que mantuvo inalterados los conceptos de reservas forestales, zonas protectoras, parques nacionales, refugios nacionales de vida silvestre y reservas biológicas y la posibilidad de aprovechamiento forestal directo por parte de la Dirección General Forestal o mediante concesión, excepto en parques nacionales y reservas biológicas (artículos 35, 41 y 55). También exigió que los proyectos del Estado o sus instituciones que implicaran la eliminación parcial o total de bosque debían contar con la aprobación de esa Dirección (artículo 16).

V.- El “Patrimonio forestal del Estado” fue regulado en los artículos 4, 10-a), 32 a 42 de la Ley 4465. El numeral 32 indicaba: “El patrimonio forestal del Estado está constituido por todos los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, de las áreas declaradas inalienables, de las fincas inscritas a su nombre y de las pertenecientes a las municipalidades, a las instituciones autónomas y a los demás organismos de la Administración Pública. Este patrimonio será administrado por la Dirección General Forestal, la que inscribirá los terrenos en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, cuando sea procedente, por medio de la Procuraduría General de la República, como fincas individualizadas de propiedad del Estado”. El 33 reguló lo siguiente: “Los terrenos forestales y bosques que constituyen el patrimonio forestal del Estado, detallados en el artículo anterior, serán inembargables e inalienables; su posesión por los particulares no causará derecho alguno a su favor y la acción reivindicatoria del Estado por estos terrenos es imprescriptible. En consecuencia, no son susceptibles de inscripción en el Registro Público mediante información posesoria; su invasión y ocupación serán sancionadas conforme con lo dispuesto en esta ley”. El 34 estableció: “Ningún organismo de la Administración Pública, a excepción de los bancos de derecho público, podrá expropiar, permutar, ceder o enajenar, por cualquier título, entregar o dar en arrendamiento, terrenos rurales de su propiedad o bajo su administración, sin que previamente hayan sido clasificados por la Dirección General Forestal. Si esta los considerare de aptitud forestal, quedarán automáticamente incorporados al patrimonio forestal del Estado. Y el 39 imponía: “El Poder Ejecutivo, por medio del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, administrará las reservas nacionales. También deberá traspasar al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario aquellos terrenos que éste le solicite, exclusivamente cuando hayan sido calificados de aptitud agropecuaria”. Finalmente, en lo que interesa resaltar de esa normativa, el 41 indicó: “La Dirección General Forestal podrá otorgar concesiones para el aprovechamiento de productos forestales provenientes de terrenos y bosques del patrimonio forestal del Estado, lo cual no origina derecho real alguno sobre el inmueble a favor del concesionario”. Por ende, debe concluirse que la Ley 4465, reformada por las Leyes 7032 y 7174, también reguló, desde 1969, como área demanial, el Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, al establecerse en su numeral 33 que se afectaban los terrenos comprendidos en tal. La Ley Forestal actual, lo que hizo fue reproducir con idéntico contenido, las normas de las Leyes Forestales 7174 (artículos 32 y 33) y 7032 (artículos 32 y 33) que habían adoptado la denominación “Patrimonio Forestal del Estado”, tal y como lo hizo la Ley 4465 (arts. 19 y 25).

VI.- Conforme lo expuesto el agravio de que se infringió la regla de no retroactividad legal negativa resulta infundado. La demanialidad de las áreas boscosas de terrenos estatales existe desde mucho antes de 1989, año en que la parte apelante afirma hizo el cultivo de la plantación de melina. Tampoco cambia lo resuelto su reclamo de que no fue controvertido que la plantación se cultivó en un terreno inscrito a nombre del antes IDA, originado en una segregación de otro de mayor cabida, porque el Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, antes de 1996, también incluía como bien demanial todos los terrenos boscosos inscritos a nombre de municipalidades, instituciones autónomas y demás organismos de la Administración Pública. La A quo explicó en la sentencia impugnada que rechazaba el reclamo indemnizatorio por accesión con base en los siguiente: “No se puede reconocer indemnización alguna al señor actor, por concepto del valor de la plantación de [Nombre3] que se ubica en la [Dirección5] La Gamba de Golfito, asentamiento que es parte de la finca 75.791 000 propiedad del INDER, en razón de que … con base en la ubicación consignada en el plano catastrado numero P 141748-1993, finca 6075791-000,…, se encuentra en un 5.74% dentro de los límites del Parque Nacional Piedras Blancas y que además en un cien por ciento de su cabida es Patrimonio Natural del Estado, categoría Bosque y terrenos de aptitud forestal, y que dentro de los terrenos que califican como de aptitud forestal se encuentra una plantación de [Nombre3] de más de quince años... Al pretender el actor la indemnización del valor de una plantación de [Nombre3] ubicada en un terreno que es parte del Parque Nacional Piedras Blancas, no corresponde la indemnización, ya que se trata de un bien de dominio público, sobre el cual los terceros no pueden adquirir derechos. La posible posesión que haya ejercido el señor [Nombre1] sobre ese terreno no le otorga ningún derecho, los bienes de dominio público son imposibles de adquirir por prescripción, son inembargables e inalienables, por lo tanto no tiene derecho alguno sobre la plantación incorporada al terreno en cuestión”. Si bien es cierto por la forma como la juzgadora explica sus motivos parece solo fundamentarse en la creación del Parque Nacional en 1994, por las razones que aclara este Tribunal, no es tampoco procedente para variar lo resuelto el reclamo de que no era aplicable al caso la Ley vigente 7575. No es con base en esa normativa que se puede fundamentar la demanialidad de esa zona, sino en lo regulado desde 1969 en la Ley 4465. En su agravio, el apelante resalta solo las normas de esa ley que permitían el aprovechamiento forestal y cita principios que no contradicen lo resuelto, pues no es con fundamento en ellos que se resuelve este conflicto. Como se explicó, la Ley Forestal 4465 también estableció la demanialidad de las áreas boscosas existentes en los terrenos de instituciones estatales y de aquellas comprendidas en áreas silvestres protegidas de cualquier naturaleza. Incluso, aunque la Ley 4465 permitía la explotación del recurso forestal en algunas áreas silvestres protegidas (exceptuaba parques nacionales y reservas biológicas), para ello se requería autorización de la Dirección General Forestal. Se aclara que es errónea su interpretación de que solo a partir de la definición del área de reservas forestales, zonas protectoras, refugio de fauna silvestre y otras categorías de uso, es que quedaban afectadas esas zonas. Eso procedía solo cuando dentro de tales categorías quedaban comprendidos terrenos de dominio privado. No así cuando se trataba de terrenos de las instituciones públicas, dentro de los cuáles estaban los del IDA. En tales casos, la afectación al demanio público del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado se daba automáticamente por solo el hecho de ser terrenos forestales, sin importar si estaban o no dentro de una categoría de manejo de área silvestre protegida. En ese sentido, los numerales 35 y 37 de la Ley Forestal 4465 establecían: 35.” Artículo 35.- Dentro del patrimonio forestal del Estado se constituirán: a) Reservas forestales:… b) Zonas protectoras:… c) Parques nacionales:... Corresponde a la más alta autoridad competente del país adoptar medidas adecuadas para prevenir o eliminar, tan pronto como sea posible, la explotación u ocupación en toda el área, y para hacer respetar las características ecológicas, geomorfológicas y estéticas que han determinado su establecimiento. Los parques nacionales y reservas biológicas serán administrados por el Servicio de Parques Nacionales. ch) Refugios nacionales de vida silvestre:... d) Reservas biológicas:…”. 37.“Al establecer reservas forestales, zonas protectoras, parques nacionales, refugios de vida silvestre o reservas biológicas, el Poder Ejecutivo, por medio del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, a propuesta de la Dirección General Forestal o del Servicio de Parques Nacionales, queda facultado para incluir dentro de sus límites, las fincas o partes de fincas particulares que sean necesarias para el logro de los objetivos, señalados en esta ley, y para instrumentarlos de acuerdo con el respectivo plan de manejo. Cuando se trate de parques nacionales y de reservas biológicas, los terrenos serán adquiridos por compra o por expropiación, o por ambas. En el caso de reservas forestales, zonas protectoras y refugios de vida silvestre, los predios o partes de predios también se deberán comprar o expropiar, salvo que, a requerimiento de la Dirección General Forestal, sus propietarios acepten someterse al régimen forestal respectivo. Dicha sujeción al régimen forestal será notificada al Registro Público de la Propiedad para la anotación correspondiente, la cual se mantendrá durante el tiempo que establezca el plan de manejo” (lo subrayado no es del original). Por ende, desde la vigencia de la Ley 4465 todos esos terrenos forestales estatales formaron parte del dominio público. Por ello la teoría de la parte apelante de que es hasta la vigencia del Decreto 25153 de 19 de abril de 1994, cuando se creó el Parque Nacional referido, que se ve afectada la zona donde cultivó la melina, no es de recibo. Desde antes de 1989 el terreno, por su naturaleza forestal, formaba parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado. Son inconsistentes entonces sus argumentos de haber aplicado la juzgadora de instancia un decreto y una ley que no estaban vigentes en 1989, porque no es con base en ello que realmente existe la afectación demanial de esa zona.

VII.- El otro agravio expuesto se refiere a que el apelante considera “adquirió un derecho patrimonial de accesión” porque el IDA tuvo conocimiento de toda esta situación (lo hizo a su vista y paciencia) y ahora pretende enriquecerse del trabajo y no indemnizar la accesión tutelada en la normativa civil e incluso le concedió autorización para darle mantenimiento, según consta en el oficio OSAP 558-B-97 de la oficina Sub-regional de Piedras Blancas. Ciertamente considera este Tribunal que es reprochable el actuar del Estado cuando no ejerce en forma efectiva la tutela efectiva del dominio público, máxime si están de por medio bienes ambientales. Históricamente es conocida la omisión o deficiencia estatal al respeto y las justificaciones pueden ser válidas o no, porque van desde falta de recursos económicos y humanos hasta falta de políticas viables y planificación adecuada. En el caso además, se reclama que hubo conocimiento expreso de la situación que se daba en la zona, pues incluso se autorizó al actor a dar mantenimiento a una plantación de [Nombre3] que nunca debió haberse cultivado en un sector de naturaleza forestal, afectado al Patrimonio Forestal del Estado. Debe al respecto precisarse, en relación con esa autorización, que no se dio con la amplitud que la parte apelante expresa. En el oficio 0SPB 558-P-1997 de 29 de setiembre de 1997, la Oficina Sub-Rgional de Piedras Blancas, lo que dio fue una autorización temporal al actor para dar mantenimiento a la plantación de [Nombre3] y cosecharla, con la advertencia de que luego de eso la parcela sería entregada a terceras personas. El oficio dice: "lo autoriza a dar mantenimiento a la plantación de tres hectáreas de [Nombre3] ... La autorización se da por el periodo pendiente para la corta de la plantación de melina, periodo definido por un Técnido Forestal contratado por ambas partes, su Persona y el señor [Nombre6] ... Después de ese período, la parcela se adjudicará al matrimonio compuesto por [Nombre6] y [Nombre7] , de acuerdo al convenio suscrito entre Usted, [Nombre6] y .... la Defensoría de los Habitantes" (folio 2). Aunque las partes no explican cuál fue el origen de ese convenio y sus alcances, resulta evidente que existió una situación que relacionaba a esas terceras personas con la parcela donde estaba la plantación referida y además que el IDA dio una autorización temporal para que se cosechara la melina, no para que el actor apelante continuara en posesión del terreno ni usufructuara más lo existente en tal. No obstante, ello no es suficiente para conceder a una persona privada un derecho patrimonial como el que reclama. Primero porque la situación de ilegalidad de la ocupación que ejercía la persona actora en la zona citada, no se convalida por el actuar o lo autorizado por las personas funcionarias del antes IDA en la década de los noventa. Debe tenerse presente al respecto, que desde antes de 1990, existían normas que daban la competencia únicamente a la Dirección General Forestal para conceder permisos o concesiones para el aprovechamiento del Patrimonio Forestal estatal (artículos 34 y 41 de la Ley 4465, antes transcritos). Incluso, el artículo 41 de la Ley 4465 disponía: “La Dirección General Forestal podrá otorgar concesiones para el aprovechamiento de productos forestales provenientes de terrenos y bosques del patrimonio forestal del Estado, lo cual no origina derecho real alguno sobre el inmueble a favor del concesionario”. Tampoco se convalida aunque haya existido la autorización temporal de mantenimiento referida, dado que aparte de carecer el IDA de competencia para dar permisos de aprovechamiento del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, se trató de un permiso para que cosechara la melina, con efectos temporales, emitido en un contexto de un conflicto en el cual participó la Defensoría de los Habitantes, según se expresa en el oficio referido. En tercer lugar, debe resaltarse que la accesión que regula la normativa civil y que se reclama en la demanda y en el recurso citado, no es un derecho real en sí, sino una forma de adquirir derechos reales, específicamente el dominio (artículo 484 del Código Civil). Aparte de que por regla general no es posible constituir derechos reales privados sobre bienes de dominio público, por su diversa naturaleza jurídica, resulta evidente que las reglas que rigen la accesión derivada de cultivar en bien ajeno, no podría ser aplicables sobre bienes de dominio público, pues en forma alguna puede llegar a adquirirse el derecho de propiedad sobre tales a través de ese medio.

VIII.- Existe otro tema planteado en el recurso: el reclamo de que el Estado se vería enriquecido indebidamente si no indemniza la plantación. El enriquecimiento sin causa se presenta cuando un patrimonio recibe un aumento a costa de otro, sin que exista causa justificativa para ello. Si bien es cierto el ordenamiento jurídico promueve efectivamente, como principio universal, que no se permita ello, la regla no se infringe tampoco con lo resuelto en este caso. Como se explicó, no se está frente a una situación en la que estén de por medio bienes que se rijan por las reglas del derecho de propiedad privada individual (sean de personas privadas o de instituciones estatales) (artículo 261 del Código Civil párrafo segundo). La parte actora y apelante pretende se le reconozca indemnización por lo cultivado en un área demanial. Las reglas a aplicar son entonces diferentes, según lo dispuesto en los numerales 261 del Código Civil párrafo primero, 262 y 263 y en la Ley Forestal de 1969, cuya normativa en lo que interesa, mantiene la actual Ley vigente. Ese cultivo no solo se hizo sin permiso concedido por la autoridad estatal competente, sino que además, aunque se trata de una plantación, no puede ser aprovechado por el Estado, es decir, no existirá beneficio económico para tal con su existencia. Esto por haberse hecho en una zona no apta para la silvicultura, al ser un terreno que formaba parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, que luego incluso pasó a estar incluido parcialmente dentro de un parque nacional. Por ende, no es aceptable tampoco el argumento de que con la no indemnización el Estado recibirá un beneficio indebido. Tampoco es aceptable lo argumento por el actor sobre que por el reconocimiento que el IDA hizo de la situación cuando le dio la autorización temporal para cosechar la melina, se generó un derecho a su favor. Esa autorización, emitida por un órgano incompetente legalmente según lo explicado, no es suficiente para concederle un derecho frente al Estado que no se pudo configurar en ningún momento, pues desde el inicio de la plantación de melina, el apelante se mantuvo en una situación de ilegalidad e incluso de imposibilidad jurídica de tutela, al cultivar en un bien demanial sin autorización estatal y en una zona que, por su naturaleza, no podía ser utilizada para silvicultura.

IX.- De conformidad con lo expuesto, por las razones indicadas por este Tribunal, en lo apelado se confirma la sentencia recurrida.

POR TANTO

En lo apelado, se confirma la sentencia de primera instancia 10 de enero de 2018.

*2PIKN4MJB47A61* [Nombre8] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *C1SROQASZKI61* [Nombre9] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *JMJ3JOH5HX061* [Nombre10] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A