Teacher surcharges do not constitute a vested right during health relocationRecargos docentes no constituyen derecho adquirido durante reubicación por salud

Review of the Document Supreme Court of Justice SECOND DIVISION Case File: 23-001034-1178-LA Ruling: 2025002697 SECOND DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours eighteen minutes on the twenty-ninth of August, two thousand twenty-five.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Name 001], educator, resident of Guanacaste, against the STATE, represented by its deputy solicitor, attorney Marianela Barrantes Zamora, resident of Heredia. The attorney Luis Adolfo Vetrani Arguedas, resident of San José, acts as special judicial representative of the plaintiff. All are of legal age, married, and attorneys, with the indicated exception.

Drafted by Judge Rodríguez Chaves; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- BACKGROUND: The plaintiff stated that she works for the Ministry of Public Education, that she is a permanent employee as a Secondary Education Science Teacher for Cycles III and IV, at the Liberia Laboratory Educational Center, under the Liberia Regional Education Directorate. That starting in 2018, she was granted a reassignment to administrative duties due to a health problem. She indicated that prior to the reassignment, she worked 40 permanent lessons and 8 interim ones. She claimed that due to the reassignment, as of February 1, 2019, the payment for the 8 interim lessons was reduced, and these have not been paid to her over the years. Therefore, she requested that the payment equivalent to the additional pay for 8 interim lessons be restored, from the moment it was eliminated until the day she retired. She requested salary differences in Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, annual increases, incentive for extending the school term, teaching incentive, and school salary. She requested legal interest, indexation, and costs for both parties (images 1 to 6 of the complete view of the file in PDF format). The state representation answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defense of lack of right (images 133 to 143). The Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, in judgment number 2025-000176 at 15:54 hours on January 27, 2025, issued by Judge Gabriela Salas Zamora, partially granted the lawsuit. It ordered the State to pay the plaintiff the salary differences for the additional pay of 8 interim lessons from their elimination on February 1, 2019, until her retirement (October 28, 2022). It recognized differences in Christmas bonuses, teaching incentive, and school salary. Regarding vacations, it granted recognition of the differences only if all or part of them were paid or compensated to her, but not if she enjoyed them. It recognized legal interest and indexation. It ruled without special condemnation for the payment of costs (images 328 to 336).

II.- GRIEVANCES: Both parties file a cassation appeal against the trial court's judgment. 1.- Appeal from the plaintiff: She appeals the exoneration from the payment of costs. She states that costs are governed by the provisions of articles 562 and 563 of the Labor Code, which establish as a general rule the condemnation for the payment of costs to the losing party, allowing the non-application thereof only exceptionally, and provided that the litigation has been conducted in good faith. She considers that the defeated party must be ordered to pay costs, since it forced the other party to resort to the judicial system, because, without just cause, it eliminated from the plaintiff's salary the amount corresponding to the item of 8 interim lessons as a Secondary Education teacher, which, as has been established, is recognized for teaching staff when they have been reassigned due to health reasons. She highlights that the defendant did not acquiesce to the lawsuit, but answered it negatively, acts that demonstrate the opposite of good faith; it even raised exceptions attempting to prevent the proceedings from continuing; therefore, the interpretation by the lower court judge (A-quo) is incorrect. Therefore, she requests that the ruling be revoked insofar as it exonerated the State from the payment of costs, and that it be ordered to pay them on a percentage basis (images 338 to 340). 2.- Appeal from the state representation: I.- Appeal on procedural grounds (por la forma): Insufficient reasoning. It claims that the judge based her considerations on specific regulations: numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute, since the grounds for resolving this case should have been limited to article 254 of the Labor Code. It indicates that the judge analyzes the case conceiving that the plaintiff's additional pay should be maintained despite her being reassigned for health reasons, regardless of whether she was subject to a sick leave; as the jurisprudence has reiterated, there is no distinction between reassignment and sick leave; for both, it is appropriate to retain the accessory salary components. Under these hypotheses, it resolved in favor of the plaintiff. It argued that the additional pay is maintained, even though it is subject to temporality and the execution of specific functions. It reiterates that this case, contrary to the conclusions reached by the judicial authority, should be guided by the parameters established in numeral 254 of the Labor Code, as there is a clear and defined differentiation in the jurisprudence regarding what is understood by sick leaves and leaves of absence (licencias), in contrast to what a health-related reassignment is. The former are governed by article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, while the other (reassignment) is covered by article 254 of the Labor Code. Furthermore, the former originate from reasons that allow the employment relationship to continue—but in a different nature—with the clarification that the incentives are maintained as long as the requirements for their granting are met. Leaves of absence and sick leaves retain their incentives and bonuses as long as the situation that gave rise to the interruption of their work continues. Therefore, it alleges that there is an erroneous application by the trial judge when she intends for the additional pay to be maintained in health-related reassignment scenarios. Because the regulation she appeals to is of unique application for sick leaves and leaves of absence, leaving reassignments aside. Hence, the additional pay in a reassignment corresponds to the execution of tasks within the time limit for which it was granted. Once the term to which it was conditioned has passed, if the employee no longer maintains the same characteristics of their employment relationship, it is not appropriate to extend it, since the elements that gave rise to said payment have been lost. It states that when a public servant receives items such as additional pay, these have an effective date. Upon exceeding the given term, the authority analyzes whether the factors that gave rise to them remain. If so, an extension of the incentive occurs; but when the requirements for the benefit do not persist, it expires. It points out that in the specific case, it was demonstrated that with the plaintiff's reassignment, she stopped executing the tasks and working hours for which the additional pay was paid. This meant that, once the effective period of the additional pay was completed, it was not extended further, as her employment relationship had changed. Thus, the plaintiff was subject to a lesson additional pay that was delimited to the execution of tasks, and it had an effective date until January 31, 2019. If after that date her work situation changed, extinguishing the causes that gave rise to said incentive, then there was no reason for it to be extended or granted again. It estimates that admitting the opposite would be acting against common sense and arbitrarily against the principle of legality. Inasmuch as, equating the recommendation for reassignment due to health reasons to a sick leave or a leave of absence under the terms of article 174 cited, corresponds to an extensive interpretation of the regulation not permitted by law, even to the detriment of the Public Treasury. It highlights that no additional pay is being frozen or eliminated; rather, in the specific case, it expired. It notes that there is no fundamental right to these items, much less that the State should continue to pay an amount of salary that does not correspond to the work actually performed by the servant, therefore it has been recognized that the additional pay does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned, nor does it oblige the Administration to maintain that condition for them. II.- Appeal on the merits (por el fondo): Incorrect application of the evidentiary regime. It states that when, on January 31, 2019, the plaintiff's additional pay for 8 interim lessons expired, it was no longer paid, because the period covering that item expired administratively, since the plaintiff no longer met the requirements necessary for it to be extended. It reiterates that additional pay corresponds to an established date, and once this period was completed, it was not appropriate to extend the bonuses, since the plaintiff did not meet the requirements necessary to continue in an employment relationship of that type, considering her health condition. It cites article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law and insists that additional pay cannot be granted definitively. III.- Accessory aspects granted in the judgment. It challenges the order to pay differences in Christmas bonus, vacations, and school salary. Regarding the Christmas bonus, it indicates that it was already duly paid in the corresponding period. Regarding the school salary, it states that it is not an item that the State or its institutions pay additionally as if it were an extraordinary amount or a liberality without legal backing, but rather one that the worker is entitled to receive on a deferred basis in January, which has been withheld from them but not paid out: this being so, it should not be granted or contemplated in a proceeding of this nature. IV.- Interest and indexation: It indicates that it is improper to grant interest and indexation jointly, as they are opposed to each other. From a deeper analysis of legal interest, its constitution implies an inflationary value, since the Passive Base Rate of the National Bank and the Central Bank of Costa Rica Rate is used as a reference for setting interest on loans and other types of financial instruments, which is periodically reviewed so that the interest adjusts to current inflation. So that money raising is not harmed by inflation, which causes a loss of the purchasing value of money, therefore the condemnation for indexation is improper.

III. APPEAL ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS (POR LA FORMA)

The state representation alleges lack of reasoning of the appealed judgment. The current article 587 of the Labor Code empowers this Division to hear the procedural defects provided for therein. Subsection 5) of the cited numeral 587 contemplates the lack of reasoning or insufficient reasoning of the judgment as a ground for cassation on procedural grounds. The duty to properly underpin judicial resolutions constitutes an obligation inherent to the fundamental rights of due process and defense. The materialization of the reasons that led the judge to adopt one decision or another is what allows the parties to exercise control over what was resolved, through the procedural mechanisms designed for this purpose. "The reasoning of the judgment is the intellective work of the judge used to justify the decision adopted regarding the matter submitted to their knowledge. To do this, the judicial operator must record the factual and legal reasons that serve to support their criteria, or otherwise their decision will be arbitrary. The foregoing is not a mere formal requirement of the judgment, but a requirement derived from the principle of due process, since through the reasoning of the decision, both plaintiff and defendant can make use of the ordinary remedies granted by legislation, in order to exercise control over the judicial power" (Second Division, judgment No. 181 at 9:45 hours on February 5, 2010). Hence, articles 421 and 560 of the Labor Code expressly establish the obligation to provide reasons for decisions. The latter precept provides that, in the whereas section of the ruling, "...the means of proof on which the conclusion is supported and the reasons that support it and the evaluation criteria used shall be indicated, for which purpose a record must be made of the analysis of the different evidentiary elements presented, through a detailed and exhaustive explanation of each of them... the reasons of fact, legal, doctrinal, and jurisprudential shall be given, the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the propositions shall be assessed... It is essential to cite the legal norms that serve as the basis for the conclusions on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the claims or exceptions proposed." Upon reviewing the appealed judgment, this Division notes that the judge did set out the legal and factual reasons on which she based her decision. Regardless of whether these reasons are correct or not (which must be determined in the analysis on the merits), it is clear that the trial judge did provide reasons for her verdict. Now, if one does not share what was ordered in the trial court judgment and its reasoning, including the assessment and pretermission of evidence, it is a question on the merits that, as such, will be analyzed later (numeral 588 of that normative body).

IV.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE: It has been duly proven that the plaintiff was earning additional pay (recargo) for 8 interim lessons and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative duties effective August 7, 2018; which is why payment for it was stopped on February 1, 2019. Likewise, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, grounded in article 254 of the Labor Code. We are not dealing with a sick leave per se. The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, therefore it can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (numerals 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration), and the employee is not within the factual circumstances provided for in article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute, as she is not on sick leave due to illness to be entitled to what is claimed. After a reexamination of the analysis of the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that the state representation is correct. Ordinals 118 of the Education Code and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Managing Teaching Staff stipulate the possibility of assigning certain additional pays (recargos), which do not constitute an acquired right and, consequently, their payment must be suspended when the public servant, in the exercise of their usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, article 174 of the Civil Service Statute establishes that: "a) If the servant, at the time of being placed on sick leave due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for location allowance (zonaje), for 'alternate schedule', or any additional pay (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. /b) Sick leaves due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right of servants to receive the corresponding salary increases. (Thus amended by article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall therefore be the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may be applicable. / (The preceding subsection added by article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)." From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that a public servant who is on sick leave due to illness, or the public servant on maternity leave, who was earning additional salary through additional pays (sobresueldos), has the right for these to be considered when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid to them. In the case at hand, the claimant was reassigned to administrative duties and is neither on sick leave nor enjoying that leave, so her situation does not fall under the factual circumstances of the rule. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that, according to the provisions of numerals 118, subsection j), of the Education Code and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, these bonuses are granted when the public servant performs additional functions to those ordinarily performed in their position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether due to the needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these additional pays (sobresueldos) depends on whether the circumstances so warrant, and therefore they are assigned on a temporary basis, for each academic term, according to the start and end dates regulated in ordinal 176 of the Civil Service Statute; otherwise, the temporary service would be denatured and become an ordinary one. In line with the foregoing, article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law prescribes that "the excess shall be maintained as additional pay (recargo), therefore, of a temporary nature." Consequently, those additional pays that depend on some particular condition to be granted are not configured as an acquired right, which is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, permanently and regardless of the service provided, as is intended in this case. There is vast jurisprudence from the Constitutional Division in the sense that additional pays for duties cannot be considered an acquired right of the public servant. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, at 15:45 hours on March 22, 2011, it was stated: "It must be remembered that this Division has indicated that the performance of the worker that can be classified as additional duties (recargo de funciones) does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned, nor does it oblige the Administration to maintain them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such additional pays—because they respond to the need to provide service at a specific time—has a temporary nature and is paid for a specific amount of work, and logically, its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly of its interest and competence (see in this sense judgment number 2003-09533 at twelve hours twenty-eight minutes on September five, two thousand three and 2006-7717 at sixteen hours forty-seven minutes on May thirty, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the additional pay constitutes a salary 'plus' or benefit that depends on whether or not the duties are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specific term having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party for such item to continue being paid, or for the additional pay or alternate schedule to be maintained for them" (see also resolutions numbers 6390 at 15:14 hours on May 18, 2011 and 868 at 9:05 hours on January 18, 2013). Similarly, in vote No. 3306, at 12:48 hours on March 9, 2007, it was noted: "...if the circumstances for which an additional pay (sobresueldo) was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is no longer met (judgment No. 2006-010959 at 17:51 hours on July 26, 2006)." In this same ruling, reference was made to judgment No. 296, at 11:54 hours on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly stated: "In the same way, it is appropriate to pronounce on the salary difference that the appellant claims to no longer receive due to the questioned act, since the compensation for the cited additional pay constitutes a salary 'plus' or benefit, which depends on whether or not the duties are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specific term having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, so that such item continues to be paid to them, or so that the indicated additional pay is maintained for them, so the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also improper…". Finally, in resolution No. 10959, at 17:51 hours on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: "This Division, on multiple occasions, has established that additional pays (sobresueldos) that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right that is incorporated as such into the salary itself, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which it was recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which an additional pay was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is no longer met." In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for the additional pay for 8 interim lessons constitute temporary additional pays (sobresueldos), annexed to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final remuneration received by the public servant, are not a permanent substantive component, but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on their being within the conditions established in the legal system for its granting and on the needs that arise in each academic period. It should be noted that the payment of these additional pays is appropriate by reason of the position and the duties performed by the public servant, so it can be denied when the original conditions for its granting disappear. Based on the norms cited, the jurisprudence mentioned, and the principles of primacy of reality, reasonableness, and salary equality, it is considered that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of compensation when the actual provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as those in this case (a person reassigned to an administrative position), as there is no factual or legal basis to compensate a service that is not being provided. Furthermore, obliging the State to pay compensation for a consideration that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. Added to this, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, with respect to those who are appointed to a teaching position and performing duties through some type of additional pay, as they are not in equal conditions and earn the same. Besides the fact that the State would be paying twice (to two public servants) for the same additional pay, when it has been necessary for it to be assumed by the person substituting the one who has been reassigned for health reasons. As previously stated, the additional pay for eight interim lessons, as occurs in the case under study, does not constitute an acquired right, besides the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, it cannot be considered a right that is ordinarily (fixed) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it should be kept in mind that in order to demand payment of the additional pay, it is necessarily required that a regulation so authorizes it (principle of legality that governs in the public sector) and to comply with the conditions and circumstances established by it; which does not occur in this case. By virtue of the foregoing, the elimination of the additional pay, when the plaintiff transitioned from the condition of a teacher to performing administrative duties due to reassignment, is in accordance with the law.

V.- ON COSTS: Although the legislation on costs establishes as a general rule the condemnation for these expenses to the losing party, it is considered that, in the specific case, it is appropriate to absolve regarding costs. While it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff is not entitled to the right she claims, it is appreciated that she has litigated with evident good faith, under the belief that she is entitled to maintain the payment of the additional pay during her reassignment to administrative duties and, furthermore, the issue of the correct interpretation of the rules governing additional pay for any reason to the ordinarily contracted academic load has been reexamined. This exoneration is ordered in application of ordinals 562 and 563 of the Labor Code. Due to the way the matter is resolved, addressing the other objections in the appeal is omitted.

VI.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: As a corollary to the foregoing, the appeal from the state representation must be granted and the one filed by the plaintiff declared without merit. The appealed judgment must be annulled, and the lawsuit declared without merit in all its aspects, admitting the exception of lack of right in this regard. Likewise, for the reasons previously stated, it is resolved without special condemnation for costs.

VII.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE OLASO ÁLVAREZ AND JUDGE MONTERO MORALES: The undersigned dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it denies the plaintiff payment of the additional pay. As indicated, there is no objection to the fact that, before being reassigned to administrative duties, the plaintiff worked as an educator, nor to the fact that this reassignment, for health reasons, became effective as of August 7, 2018. Likewise, it was taken as true that she had been granted the additional pay for duties of 8 interim lessons, which was eliminated on February 1, 2019. According to the defendant's criteria, these additional pays for duties are conceived only for those who work as teachers when there is an institutional need; therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to the payment of these additional pays (sobresueldos) since her position is now of an administrative nature. In this case, it is a matter of defining the correspondence of those rights to a teaching public servant who, for health reasons, has had to be reassigned to an administrative position. In these cases, sick leave and reassignment have their origin in an illness of the public servant that prevents them from remaining in active teaching service and which is based on article 254 of the Labor Code, as the appellant rightly points out. This article, as part of Title Four of that normative body called "ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS DURING THE EXERCISE OF WORK," establishes the obligation of the employer to reinstate the worker who has suffered a workplace risk but is able to continue working, and also provides for the employer's duty to provide them with a different position according to their possibilities, when by medical recommendation they cannot return to perform the duties they had been carrying out. It literally states in its second paragraph: "If, according to medical opinion, the worker cannot normally perform the work they were doing when the risk occurred, but can perform another different one in the same company, the employer shall be obliged to provide it, whenever feasible, for which purpose it may carry out the necessary movements of personnel." This article served as a basis for granting the work reassignment for health reasons to the plaintiff. This regulation is directly related to the Regulation for Special Leaves of Absence of the Ministry of Public Education (Executive Decree number 19113 of July 28, 1989), where its article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the rules and procedures that the Ministry of Public Education must follow to grant leave to its servants, due to the decrease in their faculties or aptitudes for work, survivors of workplace risks, or illness. In turn, numeral 2 establishes: "The leaves of absence referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those servants who, due to the decrease suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, cannot perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the duties and attributions corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular servants." This regulation distinguishes between permanent leave and partial leave, declaring that those servants for whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund or the National Insurance Institute, in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability or a partial or permanent disability and recommend a change of duties are entitled to the latter.

Article 8 deals specifically with the case of granting a special license in the following terms: "Pursuant to the provisions of Article 5 above, the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) shall grant a special license to those employees who find themselves in the following circumstances:/a) That according to their ailment, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) recommends a change of duties in the final treatment assessment./ b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the occupational hazard that occurred, the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) determines a minor or partial permanent disability and recommends their return to service with a change of duties." Article 17 reads: "The beneficiaries of the licenses provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to their full salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Education Code (Código de Educación) on the matter." Thus, this regulation complements and does not contradict the provisions of section 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which reads: "a) If the employee, at the time of being disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for location pay (zonaje), for an 'alternate schedule' (horario alterno), or any salary supplement (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time./ b) Sick leave, regardless of its duration, shall not interrupt the right of employees to receive the corresponding salary increases./c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the assistance referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other matters, that may correspond." The regulatory provision develops this express disposition, contemplating without distinction the right to compensation, both for the case of permanent leave and for special leave. This Chamber has so resolved on previous occasions in which this same topic has been discussed. In ruling number 57 of 9:50 a.m., of January 21, 2011, it was explained: "IV.- …The State's representative insists that section 174 of the Civil Service Statute is not applicable to the plaintiff, because that norm is only provided for persons who are permanently disabled and that her situation should be governed by the provisions of Article 166, according to which, 'When leave is granted to a teacher due to duly proven illness, half of the salary prior to taking the leave shall be remitted in their favor for a period of no more than 6 months. In exceptional cases, an extension of this benefit may be authorized for up to two additional quarters, if the sick teacher proves their inability to work with the testimony of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social)'." However, the Chamber has had the opportunity to hear matters identical to the present one and has concluded that the cited Article 174 does not exclude personnel who enjoy a special leave due to being partially disabled. The cited section 166 does not establish that its application is only possible for cases of special leaves. For its part, Article 174 also does not exclude workers who are partially disabled and who enjoy a leave of that type. The norms make no distinction between special and permanent leaves, coupled with the fact that they also do not contemplate any differentiation between these leaves and disability due to illness, apart from the fact that all are based precisely on the loss of health due to a disabling illness. Note that subsection a) of this latter norm indicates that 'If the employee, at the time of being disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for location pay (zonaje), for an alternate schedule (horario alterno), or any salary supplement, they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time...'.

Furthermore, from section 173 idem, it follows that the legislator's intention was to protect the integrity of the salary of teaching personnel during the period of disability. Nothing else can be deduced from what is indicated in the final paragraph of subsection a), according to which, "...when it is proven that the disability extends to a period longer than four days, their salary shall not suffer a deduction,' as well as from what is stipulated in subsection b, where it is noted that 'if the employee is protected by Social Security (Seguro Social), the Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Educación) shall recognize the difference in salaries up to completing 100% (one hundred percent) thereof; if not, the payment of the salary shall be borne by the Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Educación)." None of these norms refer to absolute disability or exclude persons who enjoy a special leave from their application. It is clear that this leave is granted to employees who suffer a permanent minor or partial disability and require a change of duties, according to what is established in section 5 of the Regulation on Special Licenses for Employees of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de licencias especiales para los servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública) (Executive Decree No. 19113 (Decreto Ejecutivo n° 19113), effective as of July 28, 1989). In section 2 of that regulation, it is also established that: "The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the diminishment suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, cannot perform, to the detriment of their health or the service, the functions and attributions corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular employees." Now then, regarding the remuneration that the beneficiaries of this type of leave must receive, the special regulation notes that they have the right to enjoy a subsidy equivalent to their full salary, according to what is stipulated on the matter in the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and in the Education Code (Código de Educación). Expressly, Article 17 of the Regulation prescribes: "The beneficiaries of the licenses provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to their full salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Education Code (Código de Educación) on the matter." From the foregoing, the clear referral to the norms of the cited Statute is noted, and therefore, the application of Article 174 is valid; because, as noted, in that norm no exclusion whatsoever is made of this type of disability. Consequently, if before the reassignment the plaintiff was earning the salary supplement (sobresueldo) of 8 interim lessons, the right she has, pursuant to that special regulation, for this to continue to be recognized within her remuneration as an administrative employee is indisputable, regardless of the requirements that the employing entity has for that service. That is, in application of that special provision, the defendant entity could not eliminate this subsidy of a salary nature granted to the plaintiff and received before being reassigned (subsection c, Article 174 idem).

In addition to the above, it must be made clear that the current wording of section 174 does not give grounds to eliminate salary supplements (sobresueldos), so that, without a doubt, employees who are on sick leave have the right to continue earning these types of bonuses (pluses) for the duration of that leave. In the sub-litem, the right to the benefit does not derive from the exercise of functions but from the application of the norm that expressly grants the benefit, by reason of their health condition (special leave). The norm contemplates the right to continue receiving, in those circumstances, "a subsidy equivalent to their full salary." Hence, it cannot be concluded, as is intended, that the nature of the additional payment (recargo) was distorted or that public funds are unjustifiably affected, since the existing norms are the ones that establish those legal consequences.

The appellant's statement that the recognition of additional payments (recargos) to the plaintiff is granted as an acquired right also lacks support. Note that the previous instance granted this right only while her reassigned condition persists. Then, what was decided is not contrary to the Constitutional Chamber's (Tribunal Constitucional) criterion either, in the sense that additional payments (recargos) are temporary in nature and do not constitute an acquired right, given that the case does not refer to the situation of an active employee in functions who requests or does not request the additional payment, but rather the issue is reduced to establishing the remuneration that an employee must receive who has not been able to continue performing their normal duties or the additional payments they had been exercising, due to an ailment (in a similar sense, see vote 1429 of this Chamber at 11:45 a.m. on September 8, 2017).

In vote number 57 at 9:50 a.m. of January 21, 2011, of this Office, it was considered: "Although it is true that teachers do not have an acquired right to the cited schedule or other conditions that may depend on different variables, the fact is that, in the specific case, it has not been demonstrated that it was a circumstance other than the enjoyment of special leave due to illness that was invoked to eliminate such bonuses (pluses) from the plaintiff's remuneration, with the argument that if she did not effectively perform the service, she had no right to the corresponding compensation. Thus, rather, in application of the principle of legality (Article 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 11 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), it is that the defendant entity could not eliminate from the subsidy of a salary nature granted to the plaintiff the bonuses (pluses) for alternate schedule (horario alterno) and additional payment (recargo) that she received before being disabled, since subsection a) of Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) clearly establishes that persons who are disabled due to illness or maternity shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning." In any case, in relation to the votes of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) cited in the appeal, it should be noted that this other body has already issued a pronouncement on the matter, in the sense that these are issued from a constitutional perspective and that the special regulation applicable to this type of matter is clear regarding the appropriateness of the intended right (see, among others, vote number 397 at 9:39 a.m., of March 24 and 537 at 10:22 a.m., of April 9, both of 2010 and, 711 at 9:55 a.m., of August 31, 2011). Hence, we consider that the grievance on this point is not receivable.

DIFFERENCES IN YEAR-END BONUS (AGUINALDO). The payment of these differences is appropriate, since salary supplements (sobresueldos) form part of the calculation of this right. Ordinal 2 of Law No. 1835 (Ley n.° 1835), Additional Salary for Public Servants (Sueldo adicional de servidores públicos), establishes in its second paragraph: "The additional salary referred to in this law shall be calculated based on the average of the ordinary and extraordinary salaries earned during the period indicated in the first paragraph." Then, since the additional payment (recargo) of two interim lessons is being granted, the corresponding adjustments must be made to the amounts paid to the plaintiff for this concept, so this grievance cannot prosper.

DIFFERENCES IN SCHOOL SALARY (SALARIO ESCOLAR): The State representative's argument is that it is not appropriate to grant differences in the school salary, since this item is formed through a withholding from the salary increase, which is later paid in deferred form in the month of January. The topic related to the legal nature of the school salary has been widely debated. On some occasions, it was considered a deferred payment withholding, as the appellant points out, and this Chamber maintained the criterion that it constituted an additional salary component. However, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in a recent ruling addressed the analysis of the topic and concluded that the school salary is comprised of a withholding from the salary increase, whose payment is deferred to be granted in the month of January of each year. In that sense, in vote No. 9188 (voto n.° 9188), at 9:50 a.m. on May 21, 2020, it established: "Now then, from the previously expounded, it follows that the school salary arises from the adjustments in the cost-of-living increases that were decreed in 1994, and which, based on the salary policy agreement of that year, were paid gradually, with a percentage of these being paid cumulatively in the month of January […] Thus, in summary, the school salary arises as a percentage of the workers' salary increase that would be paid by employers in accumulated and deferred form during the month of January of each year and which, therefore, is within the employee's patrimony. The foregoing implies that it is not an extraordinary payment, as is the case with the year-end bonus (aguinaldo), but rather forms part of the worker's salary." Having determined the above, the Chamber observes that, for the purposes of the decision, the nature noted in the appeal has no impact. The calculation of the school salary is made taking into account the same components used to determine the amount applicable for the year-end bonus (aguinaldo). To that extent, it means that what corresponds for the salary supplements (sobresueldos) in question should have been added for its calculation. Since this was not paid, it also could not have been included when calculating what would have corresponded for school salary. Consequently, the recognition of the additional payments (recargos) in court generates a difference in the amounts the plaintiff has received for school salary.

DIFFERENCES IN VACATIONS: The appeal cannot be accepted regarding the claim to pay differences in vacations. While the Trial Court ordered payment of these, the fact is that it also specified that this imposition was made "provided that they have been compensated." Then, what was resolved is in accordance with the law, since the continued recognition of the differences in salary would encompass the periods in which the plaintiff was on vacation, so no harm is caused to the State (ordinal 589 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)).

ON INTERESTS AND INDEXATION: The State representation reproaches that it was condemned to pay both interest and indexation. This Chamber, on repeated occasions, has resolved on the appropriateness of the condemnation to recognize indexation together with legal interest. Thus, in ruling No. 993 (sentencia n.° 993), at 11:30 a.m. on September 14, 2016, it was indicated: "The Chamber has held: 'The parties to legal-patrimonial relations, when the obligation has arisen from agreement or contract, can resort to mechanisms for protecting the creditor that are not prohibited by law, in attention to eventual devaluations or loss of the purchasing value of the national currency, as is usually done by resorting to currencies stronger and more stable than the colón, such as the United States dollar. But, in the case of obligations such as those granted in the judgment under review (unpaid wages and differences in year-end bonus), as there is no monetary updating mechanism, the prolonged breach by the debtor party causes an economic displacement towards the debtor itself and an impoverishment for the creditor. As such enrichment must be considered illicit, as it violates the most elementary principles of justice and equity, the provisions of Article 10 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) must be taken into account, which establishes that norms must be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative antecedents and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose, and to recognize the possibility of compensating for the loss of the real value of money and with a better study of the matter give to the cited section 706 a different application, reducing the obstacle effect it has been given, understanding that monetary updating does not properly constitute compensation but rather a mechanism for paying what is truly owed, what is fairly due, at the moment of non-compliance, which in that understanding is not prohibited. It must be taken into account that the employment contract obliges both to what is expressed therein, as well as to the consequences that derive from its content according to good faith, equity, usage, custom, or the law (Article 19 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). In the same sense, section 1023 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) provides: "1) Contracts oblige both to what is expressed in them, as well as to the consequences that equity, usage, or the law give rise to from the obligation, according to its nature…"), which demands from the parties transparent conduct in the different phases of the legal relationship and its strict adjustment, in the exercise of their rights, to fair criteria. Thus, to the damages that the delay (mora) incurred by the debtor party in fulfilling the obligation causes, making effective and timely enjoyment by its creditor impossible (Article 702 idem), must be added the inflationary problem that over time produces currency depreciation, reducing the real content of the principal obligation, which gives rise to the need to index to eliminate the illicit enrichment produced in favor of the debtor. The general principles of law –which permeate and irradiate the totality of the legal system-, impose, in addition to the integral reparation of damage, the inescapable equilibrium that must mediate in the counterpart obligations, the prohibition of abuse of right and unjust enrichment, in such a way that fulfillment must always adjust to reality. Furthermore, Article 41 of the Constitution demands restoring the injured state of affairs to its previous situation, which must be done in the context and present value. This, because a different solution would nullify that constitutional right (effective judicial protection, Articles 41 and 49), as well as that of property (Article 45), since an insufficient payment would be admitted, signifying an unjust enrichment for the debtor, as stated' (resolution No. 267 (resolución n° 267) at 10:45 a.m. on March 30, 2012). In this way, the failure to apply the figure of indexation in cases such as the one we are dealing with, in the face of culpable delay in fulfilling labor obligations by the employer, would mean privileging the stronger party to the relationship, allowing them to benefit, through inflation, from their tardiness, thereby violating the protective principle that inspires labor law and which is contained in Article 17 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Therefore, what was resolved by the ad quem in relation to this point must also be ratified" (vote number 102 at 10:25 a.m., of January 30, 2013), a criterion that is fully shared, and moreover, there is no element in the sub-judice that allows changing it." Added to this, based on section 565 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), previously transcribed, in labor matters, by legal imperative, every judgment that condemns to pay a monetary obligation shall imply for the debtor, unless an express agreement or provision to the contrary, the payment of interest and indexation.

ON COSTS: In the appeal filed by the plaintiff's party, it requests that the State be condemned to pay both costs. Article 562 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), the general rule provides for the condemnation to costs of the losing party. Although the following section indicates the circumstances in which exoneration from this item is appropriate. In the sub-litem, it is not observed that there is good faith in the procedural action of the defendant, given that there are numerous pronouncements from this Chamber on the topic debated. The defendant's refusal to correct the plaintiff's situation forced her to resort to court, with evident expenditure of her time and payment of fees to a legal professional to attend to her position in the trial. For these reasons, we accept the appeal of the plaintiff and condemn the State to pay both costs, setting the personal costs at 20% of the condemnation.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The appeal of the State representation is accepted, and the appeal filed by the plaintiff is declared without merit. The appealed judgment is annulled, and the lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects, admitting the defense of lack of right in its regard. It is resolved without a special ruling on costs. Judge Olaso Álvarez and Judge Montero Morales dismiss the appeal filed by the State and accept the one filed by the plaintiff. They annul the appealed ruling insofar as it resolved without a special ruling on costs, and in its place condemn the defendant to pay these emoluments, setting the personal costs at twenty percent of the condemnation.

Res: 2025002697 NROSITO Julia Varela Araya Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Ana Patricia Montero Morales Rafael Antonio Ortega Telleria Eddy Rodriguez Chaves Digitally Signed Document -- Verification code --  1 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2258-4165.

Email: [email protected] Res: 2025002697 SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.

San José, at fifteen hours and eighteen minutes on the twenty-ninth of August, two thousand twenty-five.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court (Juzgado de Trabajo) of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Name 001], educator, resident of Guanacaste, against the STATE (ESTADO), represented by its deputy procuradora, Lic. Marianela Barrantes Zamora, resident of Heredia. Appearing as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is Lic. Luis Adolfo Vetrani Arguedas, resident of San José. All are of legal age, married, and lawyers, with the exception noted.

Drafted by Judge Rodríguez Chaves; and,

CONSIDERING:

**I.- BACKGROUND:** The plaintiff stated that she works for the Ministry of Public Education, that she is a permanent employee as a Secondary Education Science Teacher III and IV Cycle, at the Liberia Laboratory Educational Center, under the Liberia Regional Education Directorate. That starting in 2018, she was granted a reassignment (reubicación) to administrative functions due to her health problem. She indicated that prior to the reassignment, she worked 40 permanent teaching periods (lecciones en propiedad) and 8 temporary ones (lecciones interinas). She claimed that due to the reassignment, starting February 1, 2019, the payment for the 8 temporary teaching periods was reduced, and they have not been paid to her over the years. Therefore, she requested that the payment equivalent to the overload of 8 temporary teaching periods be restored, from the moment it was eliminated until the day she retired. She requested salary differences in Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), vacation pay, annual increases, incentive for extension of the school year, didactic incentive (incentivo didáctico), and school salary (salario escolar). She requested legal interest, indexation (indexación), and costs of both instances (images 1 to 6 of the complete view of the case file in PDF format). The State's representation answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defense of lack of right (images 133 to 143). The Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, in judgment number 2025-000176 at 15:54 hours on January 27, 2025, issued by Judge Gabriela Salas Zamora, partially granted the lawsuit. It ordered the State to pay the plaintiff the salary differences for the overload of 8 temporary teaching periods from their elimination on February 1, 2019, until her retirement (October 28, 2022). It granted differences in Christmas bonuses, didactic incentive, and school salary. Regarding vacation pay, it granted recognition of the differences only if all or part of them were paid or compensated, but not if she enjoyed them. It granted legal interest and indexation. It resolved without a special order for the payment of costs (images 328 to 336).

**II.- GRIEVANCES:** Against the trial court's judgment, both parties filed a cassation appeal (recurso de casación). **1.-** **Appeal of the plaintiff:** She appeals the exoneration from the payment of costs. She submits that costs are governed by the provisions of articles 562 and 563 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which establish as a general rule the imposition of costs on the losing party, only allowing exceptionally for their non-application, and provided that the litigation was conducted in good faith. She considers that the losing party must be ordered to pay costs, given that it forced the other party to resort to the courts, since, without just cause, it eliminated from the plaintiff's salary the amount corresponding to the item of 8 temporary teaching periods as a Secondary Education teacher, which, as has been established, is recognized for teaching personnel when they have been reassigned for health reasons. She stresses that the defendant did not acquiesce to the lawsuit, but rather answered it negatively, acts that demonstrate the exact opposite of good faith; it even raised exceptions that attempted to prevent the proceeding from continuing, therefore, the lower court judge's interpretation is not correct. For this reason, she asks that the judgment be reversed insofar as it exonerated the State from the payment of costs and that it be ordered to pay them on a percentage basis (images 338 to 340). **2.-** **Appeal of the State's representation:** **I.- Appeal on procedural grounds (Recurso por la forma): Insufficient reasoning.** It claims that the judge based her considerations on specific regulations: article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), since the grounds for resolving this case should have been limited to article 254 of the Labor Code. It indicates that the judge analyzes the case by conceiving that the plaintiff's overloads must be maintained even though she was reassigned due to health, regardless of whether she was the subject of a disability; as case law has reiterated that there is no distinction between reassignment and disability, for both it is appropriate to retain the accessory salary components. Under these hypotheses, she resolved in favor of the plaintiff. She argued that the bonus pay is maintained, even though it is subject to temporality and the performance of specific functions. It reiterates that this case, contrary to the conclusions reached by the judicial authority, in the specific case must be guided by the parameters established in article 254 of the Labor Code, because there is a clear and defined differentiation in case law regarding what is understood by disabilities and leaves, in contrast to what a reassignment for health reasons is. The former are governed by article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, while the other (reassignment) is covered by article 254 of the Labor Code. Furthermore, the former originate from reasons that allow the employment relationship to continue—but in a different nature—with the clarification that incentives are maintained as long as the requirements for their granting are met. Leaves and disabilities retain their incentives and bonuses as long as the situation that gave rise to the interruption of their work continues. Therefore, it alleges that there is an erroneous application by the trial court judge when she intends for the bonus pays to be maintained in scenarios of reassignment for health reasons, since the regulation to which she appeals is for sole application to disabilities and leaves, excluding reassignments. Hence, the overload in a reassignment corresponds to the performance of work within the temporary limit for which it was granted. Once the term to which it was conditioned has passed, if the employee no longer maintains the same characteristics of their employment relationship, it is not appropriate to extend it, given that the elements that gave rise to said payment have been lost. It submits that when a public servant receives items such as overloads, these have an effective date. Upon exceeding the given term, the authority analyzes whether the factors that gave rise to them are maintained. If they are, an extension of the incentive is granted; but when the benefit requirements do not subsist, it expires. It points out that in the specific case, it was demonstrated that with the plaintiff's reassignment, she stopped performing the work and the hours for which the overload is paid. This meant that, once the overload's validity period had elapsed, it was not extended further, since her employment relationship had changed. Thus, the plaintiff was subject to an overload of teaching periods that was delimited to the performance of work, and it had an effective date until January 31, 2019. If after that date her employment situation changed, extinguishing the reasons that originated said incentive, then the same had no reason to be extended or granted again. It believes that admitting the contrary would be acting against common sense, arbitrarily against the principle of legality. Insofar as equating the recommendation of reassignment for health reasons to a disability or a leave under the terms of article 174 cited, corresponds to an extensive interpretation of the regulations not permitted by law, to the detriment even of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). It highlights that no overload is being frozen or eliminated, but rather, in the specific case, it expired. It notes that there is no fundamental right to them, and even less so that the State should continue paying a salary amount that does not correspond to what was actually worked by the public servant, as it has been recognized that the overload does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned, nor does it oblige the Administration to maintain said condition for them. **II.- Appeal on the merits (Recurso por el fondo): Incorrect application of the rules of evidence.** It submits that when the plaintiff's overload of 8 temporary teaching periods expired on January 31, 2019, payment was not continued, because administratively, the period covering said item ended, given that the plaintiff no longer met the necessary requirements for them to be prolonged. It reiterates that overloads correspond to an established date, and once this period concluded, it was not appropriate to extend the bonuses, since the plaintiff did not meet the necessary requirements to continue in an employment relationship of that type, taking into account her health condition. It cites article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) and insists that overloads cannot be granted definitively. **III.- Accessory aspects granted in the judgment.** It challenges the order to pay differences in the Christmas bonus, vacation pay, and school salary. Regarding the Christmas bonus, it indicates that it has already been duly paid in the corresponding period. Regarding the school salary, it submits that it is not an item that the State or its institutions pay additionally as if it were an extraordinary amount or a gratuity without legal backing, but rather one that the worker is entitled to receive in a deferred manner in the month of January, which has been withheld from her, but not liquidated; this being so, it should not be granted or contemplated in a proceeding of this nature. **IV.- Interest and indexation:** It indicates that it is improper to grant interest and indexation jointly, since they are contradictory to each other. From a deeper analysis of legal interest, the constitution of the same contains an implicit inflationary value, because the Passive Base Rate of Banco Nacional and that of Banco Central de Costa Rica are used as a reference means for setting interest rates on loans and other types of financial instruments, which is periodically reviewed so that the interest adjusts to current inflation. So that the raising of money is not harmed by the inflation that causes a loss of the purchasing power of money, making the imposition of indexation improper.

**III. APPEAL ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS:** The State's representation alleges a lack of reasoning in the appealed judgment. Current article 587 of the Labor Code empowers the Chamber to hear the procedural defects provided for therein. Subsection 5) of said article 587 contemplates the lack of reasoning or insufficient reasoning in the judgment as a grounds for cassation on procedural grounds. The duty to properly underpin judicial decisions constitutes an obligation consubstantial to the fundamental rights of due process and defense. The materialization of the reasons that led the adjudicator to adopt one decision or another is what allows the parties to exercise control over what was decided, through the procedural mechanisms conceived for this purpose. "The reasoning of the judgment is the intellectual labor of the judge used to justify the decision adopted regarding the matter submitted to their knowledge. For this, the legal operator must state the factual and legal reasons that serve to support their judgment, otherwise their decision will be arbitrary. The foregoing is not a mere formal requirement of the judgment, but a requirement derived from the principle of due process, since through the reasoning of the decision, both plaintiff and defendant may make use of the ordinary remedies granted by legislation, in order to exercise control over judicial power" (Second Chamber, judgment No. 181 at 9:45 hours on February 5, 2010). Hence, articles 421 and 560 of the Labor Code expressly mandate the obligation to reason decisions. This latter precept prescribes that, in the considering section of the decision, there shall be indicated "...the evidence on which the conclusion is supported and the reasons that uphold it and the assessment criteria employed, for which purpose a record must be made of the analysis of the various evidentiary elements produced, by means of a detailed and exhaustive explanation of each one of them... the factual, legal, doctrinal, and jurisprudential reasons shall be given, the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the propositions shall be weighted... It is essential to cite the legal norms that serve as the basis for the conclusions on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the claims or exceptions raised." Having reviewed the judgment under appeal, the Chamber notes that the adjudicator did set forth the legal and factual reasons on which they based their decision.

Irrespective of whether these grounds are correct or not (which must be determined in the substantive analysis), it is clear that the lower-court judge did provide reasons for her verdict. Now, whether one disagrees with the provisions of the lower-court judgment and its basis, including the assessment and omission of evidence, is a substantive issue which, as such, will be analyzed further below (section 588 of that body of law).

**IV.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE:** It has been duly proven that the plaintiff was earning a supplement (recargo) for 8 interim lessons and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative duties as of August 7, 2018; that supplement (recargo) therefore ceased to be paid to her on February 1, 2019. Likewise, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, pursuant to Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not dealing with a disability proper (incapacidad propiamente dicha). The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, meaning it can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (sections 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), and the employee does not fall within the factual circumstances provided for in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil), as she is not disabled by illness to be entitled to what is claimed. After reconsidering the analysis of the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that the State's representation is correct. Sections 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) stipulate the possibility of assigning certain supplements (recargos), which do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido), and, consequently, payment thereof must be suspended when the employee, in the performance of her usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements for their recognition. Furthermore, Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) establishes that: “*a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled by illness or maternity, was earning an additional salary for location allowance, for \"alternate schedule\", or any supplemental salary (sobresueldo), they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. /b) Sick leave, regardless of its duration, shall not interrupt the right of employees to receive the corresponding salary increases. (Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may apply. / (The previous subsection was thus added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)*”. From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that an employee who is disabled by illness, or a female employee on maternity leave, who was earning an additional salary through supplemental salaries (sobresueldos), is entitled to have these considered when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid to them. In the case at hand, the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative duties and is neither disabled nor enjoying such leave; therefore, her situation is not subsumed under the factual premise of the rule. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that, according to the provisions of sections 118, subsection j), of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, these bonuses (pluses) are granted when the employee performs additional functions beyond those ordinarily performed in their position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether due to the needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these supplemental salaries (sobresueldos) depends on the circumstances warranting it, and therefore they are assigned on a temporary basis, for each school year, according to the start and end dates regulated in section 176 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); otherwise, the eventual service would be distorted and would become an ordinary one. In line with the above, Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) prescribes that “*the excess shall be maintained as a supplement (recargo), therefore, of a temporary nature*”. Consequently, those supplements (recargos) that depend on some particular condition to be granted do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido), which is irremediably incorporated into the worker's total salary, permanently and regardless of the service provided, as is being claimed in this case. There is extensive jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) to the effect that function supplements (recargos de funciones) cannot be considered a vested right (derecho adquirido) of the employee. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, issued at 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it stated: “*It should be recalled that this Chamber has indicated that an employee's performance that can be classified as a function supplement (recargo de funciones) does not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) for the worker to whom it is assigned, nor does it oblige the Administration to maintain them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such supplements (recargos) - as it arises from the need to provide a service at a particular time - has a temporary nature and is paid for a specific amount of work; logically, its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly within its interest and competence (see in that sense judgment number 2003-09533 at twelve hours twenty-eight minutes of September fifth, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 at sixteen hours forty-seven minutes of May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the supplement (recargo) constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit that depends on whether the functions are exercised or not, and the circumstance of having performed them for a specific period does not have the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party to continue being paid that item, or to have the supplement (recargo) or alternate schedule maintained*" (see also resolutions numbers 6390 at 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011, and 868 at 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013). Likewise, in vote No. 3306, issued at 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…*if the assumptions under which a supplemental salary (sobresueldo) was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met (judgment No. 2006-010959 at 17:51 hours of July 26, 2006)*”. This same ruling referred to judgment No. 296, issued at 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, which expressly stated: “*Similarly, a ruling must be made regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to cease receiving as a result of the challenged act, since the compensation for the cited supplement (recargo) constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit, which depends on whether the functions are exercised or not, and the circumstance of having performed them for a specific period does not have the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, to continue being paid that item, or to have the indicated supplement (recargo) maintained, meaning the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also inadmissible…*”. Finally, in resolution No. 10959, issued at 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: “*This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that supplemental salaries (sobresueldos) that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido) that is incorporated as such into the salary properly speaking, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which they were recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which a supplemental salary (sobresueldo) was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met*”. According to the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received as a supplement (recargo) for 8 interim lessons constitute temporary supplemental salaries (sobresueldos), ancillary to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final remuneration received by the employee, are not a permanent substantial component but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on the employee meeting the assumptions established in the legal system for its granting and on the needs that arise in each academic period. It should be noted that the payment of these supplements (recargos) is appropriate based on the position and the functions performed by the employee, and thus may be denied when the original conditions for its granting disappear. Based on the norms cited, the jurisprudence mentioned, and the principles of the primacy of reality (primacía de la realidad), reasonableness, and salary equality, it is considered that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of compensation when the actual provision of the service is not taking place, for reasons such as those in this case (a person reassigned to an administrative post), as there is no factual or legal basis to compensate a service that is not being provided. Furthermore, obliging the State to pay compensation for a consideration that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. Added to this, it would give an undue advantage to reassigned individuals over those who are appointed to a teaching position and are performing the functions for some type of supplement (recargo), since they are not in equal conditions but earn the same. Not to mention that the State would be paying double (to two employees) for the same supplement (recargo), when it has been necessary for the person substituting the one reassigned for health reasons to take it on. As stated previously, the supplement (recargo) of eight interim lessons, as in the case under study, does not constitute a vested right (derecho adquirido), besides the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be deemed a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it must be kept in mind that to demand payment of the supplement (recargo), it is necessarily required that a norm authorize it (principle of legality governing the public sector) and that the conditions and assumptions established by it be met; which is not the case here. By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the supplement (recargo), when the plaintiff moved from the condition of teacher to performing administrative functions due to reassignment, is in accordance with the law.

**V.- ON COSTS (COSTAS):** Although the regulations on costs (costas) establish as a general rule the award of these expenses to the losing party, it is considered that, in this specific case, there should be no award of costs (absolver en costas). While it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff is not entitled to the right she claims, it is observed that she has litigated with evident good faith, under the belief that she is entitled to maintain the payment of the supplement (recargo) during her reassignment to administrative duties, and, additionally, the issue of the correct interpretation of the norms governing the supplement (recargo) for some reason over the ordinarily contracted academic load has been reconsidered. This exemption is ordered in application of sections 562 and 563 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Given the manner in which this is resolved, there is no need to address the other objections of the appeal.

**VI.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** As a corollary of the foregoing, the appeal of the State's representation must be upheld, and the appeal filed by the plaintiff must be dismissed. The appealed judgment must be annulled and the lawsuit dismissed in its entirety, upholding the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) against it. Likewise, for the reasons stated above, it is resolved without a special award of costs (sin especial condenatoria en costas).

**VII.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE OLASO ÁLVAREZ AND MAGISTRATE MONTERO MORALES:** The undersigned dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it denies the plaintiff payment of the supplement (recargo). As indicated, there is no objection regarding the fact that, before being reassigned to administrative duties, the plaintiff worked as an educator, nor regarding the fact that this reassignment, for health reasons, became effective on August 7, 2018. Likewise, it was deemed true that she had been granted the function supplement (recargo de funciones) of 8 interim lessons, which was suppressed on February 1, 2019. According to the defendant's criterion, these function supplements (recargos de funciones) are conceived solely for those who work as teachers when there is an institutional need; therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to the payment of these supplemental salaries (sobresueldos) since her position is now administrative in nature. In this case, it is a matter of defining the applicability of those rights to a teaching employee who, for health reasons, has had to be reassigned to an administrative position. Disability and reassignment, in these cases, originate from an illness of the employee that prevents them from remaining in active teaching service and are based on Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), as the appellant rightly points out. This article, as part of Title Four of that body of law entitled "ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF WORK", establishes the employer's obligation to reinstate to their post a worker who has suffered a risk but is able to continue working, and also provides for the employer's duty to provide them with a different one according to their possibilities, when, by medical recommendation, they cannot return to perform the functions they had been carrying out. Its second paragraph literally states: “*If, according to medical opinion, the worker could not normally perform the work they were doing when the risk occurred, but could perform a different one in the same company, the employer shall be obliged to provide it, provided this is feasible, for which purpose they may carry out the necessary personnel movements.*”. This article served as the basis for granting the work reassignment for health reasons to the plaintiff. This regulation is directly related to the Regulation for Special Leaves (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales) of the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) (Executive Decree number 19113 of July 28, 1989), where its Article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the rules and procedures that the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) must follow to grant leave to its employees, due to the diminishment of their faculties or aptitudes for work, survivors of work-related risks or illness. For its part, section 2 establishes: “*The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the diminishment suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, could not perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and powers corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular employees*”. That regulation distinguishes between permanent leave and partial leave, stating that the latter is available to those employees for whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) or the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability (incapacidad menor permanente) or a partial or permanent disability (incapacidad parcial o permanente) and recommend a change of functions.

Article 8 specifically addresses the case of granting the special license (licencia especial) in the following terms: “In accordance with the provisions of Article 5 above, the Ministry of Public Education shall grant a special license to those employees who find themselves in the following circumstances:/a) That according to their ailment, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund recommends in the final treatment assessment a change of functions./ b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the work-related risk that occurred, the National Insurance Institute determines a minor or partial permanent disability and recommends their return to service with a change of functions.” Article 17 states: “The beneficiaries of the licenses provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equal to the totality of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter.” Thus, this regulation complements and does not contradict the provisions of section 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which reads: “a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zonaje, for ‘horario alterno’, or any sobresueldo, they shall be entitled to a subsidy equal to the total salary they were earning at that time./ b) Sick leave (licencias por enfermedad), regardless of its duration, shall not interrupt the right of employees to receive the corresponding salary increases./c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other matters, that might correspond.” The regulatory provisions develop this express provision, contemplating indistinctly the right to compensation, both for the case of permanent license and special license. This Chamber has so resolved on previous occasions in which this same topic has been discussed. In judgment number 57 of 9:50 a.m., of January 21, 2011, it was explained: “IV.- …The State’s representative insists that section 174 of the Civil Service Statute is not applicable to the plaintiff, since that rule is only provided for persons who are permanently disabled (incapacitan de forma permanente) and that her situation must be governed by the provisions of Article 166, according to which, ‘When the license is granted to the teacher due to duly proven illness, half of the salary prior to the enjoyment of the license shall be paid in their favor and for a period not exceeding 6 months. In exceptional cases, an extension of this benefit may be authorized for up to two more quarters, if the sick teacher proves their inability to work, with the testimony of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund.’ However, this Chamber has had the opportunity to hear matters identical to the present one and has concluded that the cited Article 174 does not exclude personnel enjoying a special license, for being partially disabled. The cited section 166 does not establish that its application is only applicable for cases of special licenses. For its part, Article 174 also does not exclude workers who are partially disabled and who enjoy such a license. The rules make no distinction whatsoever between special and permanent licenses, coupled with the fact that they also do not contemplate any differentiation between these licenses and disabilities due to illness, apart from the fact that all are based, precisely, on the loss of health due to a disabling illness. Note that subsection a) of this last rule indicates that ‘If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zonaje, for horario alterno, or any sobresueldo, they shall be entitled to a subsidy equal to the total salary they were earning at that time...’. Furthermore, from section 173 idem it follows that the legislator’s intention was to protect the integrity of the salary of teaching personnel during the period of disability. Nothing else is deduced from what is indicated in the final paragraph of subsection a), according to which, ‘…when it is proven that the disability extends for a period greater than four days, their salary shall not suffer a deduction’, as well as from what is stipulated in subsection b, where it is noted that ‘if the employee were protected by Social Security, the Ministry of Education shall recognize the difference in salaries up to 100% (one hundred percent) of the same; if not, the salary payment shall be borne by the Ministry of Education’. None of these rules refers to an absolute disability or excludes from its application persons who enjoy a special license. It is clear that this license is granted to employees who suffer a minor or partial permanent disability and require a change of functions, according to what is established in section 5 of the Regulation for Special Licenses for Employees of the Ministry of Public Education (Executive Decree No. 19113, effective as of July 28, 1989). In section 2 of that regulation, it is also established that: “The licenses referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the diminishment suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, cannot perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and attributions corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular employees.” Now, regarding the remuneration that the beneficiaries of this type of license must receive, the special regulation indicates that they have the right to enjoy a subsidy equal to the totality of their salary, according to what is stipulated in this regard in the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code. Expressly, Article 17 of the Regulation prescribes: “The beneficiaries of the licenses provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equal to the totality of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter.” From the transcribed text, a clear referral to the rules of the cited Statute is noted and, therefore, the application of Article 174 is valid; because, as indicated, in that rule no exclusion whatsoever of this type of disability is made. Consequently, if before the reassignment (reubicación) the plaintiff was earning the sobresueldo of 8 interim lessons, the right she has is indisputable, in accordance with that special regulation, that within her remuneration, as an administrative official, this continue to be recognized, regardless of the requirements that the employing entity has for that service. That is, in application of that special provision, the defendant entity could not suppress this subsidy with a salary nature granted to the plaintiff and received before being reassigned (subsection c, Article 174 idem). In addition to the above, it must be made clear that the current wording of section 174 does not give grounds to eliminate sobresueldos, so, without a doubt, employees covered by a sick leave have the right to continue earning this type of pluses while that license lasts. In the sub lite, the right to the benefit does not derive from the exercise of functions but from the application of the regulation that expressly grants the benefit, by reason of their health condition (special license). The rule contemplates the right to continue receiving, in those circumstances, “a subsidy equal to the totality of their salary.” Hence, it cannot be concluded, as is intended, that the nature of the surcharge was distorted or that public funds are unjustifiably affected, since it is the existing rules that establish these legal consequences. The appellant's assertion that the recognition of the surcharges to the plaintiff is granted as an acquired right is also unfounded. Note that the lower instance granted this right only while her reassigned condition persists. Furthermore, what was decided is not contrary to the Constitutional Chamber’s criterion, in the sense that surcharges have a temporary nature and do not constitute an acquired right, given that the case does not refer to the situation of an active employee in service who demands or not the surcharge, but the issue is reduced to establishing the remuneration that must be received by an official who has been unable to continue performing her normal duties nor the surcharges she had been exercising, due to a condition (in a similar sense, see ruling of this Chamber 1429 of 11:45 a.m. on September 8, 2017). In vote number 57 of 9:50 a.m. on January 21, 2011, of this Office, it was considered: “While it is true that teachers do not have an acquired right to the cited schedule or other conditions that may depend on different variables, the truth is that, in the specific case, it has not been demonstrated that it was a circumstance other than the enjoyment of the special sick leave that was invoked to eliminate such pluses from the plaintiff’s remuneration, with the argument that if she did not effectively perform the service, she was not entitled to the corresponding compensation. Thus, rather in application of the principle of legality (Article 11 of the Political Constitution and Article 11 of the General Law of Public Administration), the defendant entity could not suppress from the subsidy with salary nature granted to the plaintiff the pluses for horario alterno and surcharge that she received before being disabled, since subsection a) of Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute clearly establishes that persons who are disabled due to illness or maternity shall be entitled to a subsidy equal to the total salary they were earning.” In any case, in relation to the votes of the Constitutional Chamber cited in the appeal, it must be noted that this other body has already issued a pronouncement in this regard, in the sense that these are issued from the constitutional perspective and that the special regulation applicable to this type of matter is clear regarding the appropriateness of the right sought (see among others, vote number 397 of 9:39 a.m., on March 24 and 537 of 10:22 a.m., on April 9, both of 2010 and, 711 of 9:55 a.m., on August 31, 2011). Hence, we consider that the grievance on this point is inadmissible.

DIFFERENCES IN AGUINALDO. The payment of these differences is appropriate, since sobresueldos form part of the calculation of this right. Section 2 of Law No. 1835, Additional Salary for Public Servants, establishes in its second paragraph: “The additional salary referred to in this law shall be calculated based on the average of the ordinary and extraordinary salaries earned during the period indicated in the first paragraph.” Then, since the surcharge of two interim lessons is being granted, the corresponding adjustments must be made in the amounts paid for this concept to the plaintiff, so this grievance cannot prosper.

DIFFERENCES IN SALARIO ESCOLAR: The State’s representative's argument is that it is not appropriate to grant differences in the salario escolar, since this item is formed through a retention of the salary increase, which is then paid in a deferred manner in the month of January. The issue related to the legal nature of the salario escolar has been widely debated. On some occasions it was considered a deferred payment retention, as the appellant points out, and this Chamber maintained the criterion that it constituted one more salary component. However, the Constitutional Chamber, in a recent judgment addressed the analysis of the topic and concluded that the salario escolar is formed by a retention of the salary increase, the payment of which is deferred to grant it in the month of January of each year. In that sense, in vote No. 9188, of 9:50 a.m. on May 21, 2020, it established: “Now then, from the foregoing it follows that the salario escolar arises from the adjustments in the increases decreed for the cost of living in the year 1994, and that based on the salary policy agreement of that year, were paid gradually, paying a percentage of these in a cumulative manner in the month of January […] Thus, in summary, the salario escolar arises as a percentage of the workers' salary increase that would be paid by employers in an accumulated and deferred manner during the month of January of each year and which, therefore, is within the employee's patrimony. The foregoing implies that it is not an extraordinary payment, as is the case with the aguinaldo, but rather forms part of the worker's salary.” Having determined the above, the Chamber observes that, for the purposes of the decision, the nature noted in the appeal has no incidence. The calculation of the salario escolar is made taking into account the same components used to determine the amount due for aguinaldo. To that extent, it means that the amount corresponding for the sobresueldos in question should have been added for its calculation. As this was not paid, it could not have been included when calculating what would have corresponded for salario escolar either. Consequently, the recognition of the surcharges at the judicial venue generates a difference in the amounts that the plaintiff has received for salario escolar.

DIFFERENCES IN VACATION PAY: The appeal cannot be upheld regarding the claimed order to pay differences in vacation pay. Although the Trial Court ordered the payment of these, the truth is that it also specified that this imposition was made “provided they have been compensated.” Then, what was resolved conforms to law, since the running recognition of the differences in salary would cover the periods in which the plaintiff was on vacation, thus no harm is caused to the State (section 589 of the Labor Code).

REGARDING INTERESTS AND INDEXATION: The State representation reproaches that a ruling was made to pay both interests and indexation. This Chamber, on repeated occasions, has resolved on the appropriateness of the ruling to recognize indexation together with legal interests. Thus, in judgment No. 993, of 11:30 a.m. on September 14, 2016, it was indicated: “The Chamber has held: ‘The parties to legal-patrimonial relationships, when the obligation has arisen from the agreement or covenant, may resort to mechanisms for creditor protection that are not prohibited by law, in consideration of eventual devaluations or loss of the purchasing value of the national currency, as is usually done by resorting to currencies stronger and more stable than the colón, such as the United States dollar. But, in the case of obligations such as those granted in the judgment being heard (back salaries and differences in aguinaldo), in the absence of a monetary updating mechanism, the prolonged breach by the debtor party entails an economic displacement towards the debtor itself and an impoverishment for the creditor.

As such enrichment must be considered unlawful, since it violates the most elementary principles of justice and equity, the provisions of Article 10 of the Civil Code must be taken into account, which establishes that norms must be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to the spirit and purpose thereof, and recognizing the possibility of compensating the loss of the real value of money and, with a better study of the issue, giving the cited numeral 706 a different application, removing the obstacle effect that has been given to it, understood that monetary updating (actualización monetaria) does not properly constitute compensation but rather a mechanism for paying what is truly owed, what is justly due, at the time of non-performance, which in this understanding is not prohibited. It must be taken into account that the employment contract obligates both to what is expressed in it, as well as to the consequences derived from its content according to good faith, equity, use, custom, or the law (Article 19 of the Labor Code). In the same vein, numeral 1023 of the Civil Code provides: "1) Contracts obligate both to what is expressed in them, as well as to the consequences that equity, use, or the law give rise to from the obligation, according to the nature thereof..."), which requires transparent conduct from the parties in the different phases of the legal relationship and its strict adjustment, in the exercise of their rights, to fair criteria. Thus, to the damages and losses caused by the delay (mora) incurred by the debtor party in fulfilling the obligation, preventing effective and timely enjoyment by the creditor (Article 702 idem), the inflationary problem that over time produces the depreciation of the currency must be added, reducing the real content of the principal obligation, which gives rise to the need to index (indexar) in order to eliminate the unlawful enrichment produced in favor of the debtor. The general principles of law – which permeate and radiate throughout the entire legal system – impose, besides the full reparation of the damage, the unavoidable balance that must mediate in counter-prestations, the prohibition of abuse of right and of unjust enrichment, so that fulfillment must always adjust to reality. On the other hand, Article 41 of the Constitution requires restoring the injured state of affairs to its previous situation, which must be done in the current context and present value. This, because a different solution would nullify that constitutional right (effective judicial protection, Articles 41 and 49), as well as that of property (Article 45), since an insufficient payment would be admitted, signifying an unjust enrichment for the debtor, as stated’ (Resolution No. 267 of 10:45 hours of March 30, 2012). In this way, the non-application of the figure of indexation (indexación) in cases such as the one at hand, faced with culpable delay in the fulfillment of labor obligations by the employer, would mean privileging the stronger party in the relationship, allowing them to benefit, from inflation, from their delay, thereby violating the protective principle that inspires labor law and which is contained in Article 17 of the Labor Code. Therefore, it must also be ratified what was resolved by the ad quem in relation to this point” (Voto No. 102 of 10:25 hours, of January 30, 2013), a criterion that is fully shared and, in addition, there is no element in the sub-judice that allows it to be varied.” Added to this, based on numeral 565 of the Labor Code, previously transcribed, in labor matters, by legal imperative, any judgment that orders the payment of a monetary obligation will imply for the debtor, unless otherwise agreed or expressly provided, the payment of interest and indexation (indexación). ON COSTS: In the appeal filed by the plaintiff, she requests that the State be ordered to pay both costs. Article 562 of the Labor Code, the general rule provides for the condemnation of the losing party to pay costs. Although in the following numeral the assumptions under which exoneration in this matter proceeds are indicated. In the sub-litem, it is not observed that there is good faith in the procedural conduct of the defendant, given that there are numerous pronouncements of this Chamber on the debated topic. The refusal of the defendant to correct the plaintiff’s situation forced her to resort to the judicial instance, with evident expense of her time and payment of fees to a legal professional who attended to her position in trial. For these reasons, we grant the plaintiff’s appeal and condemn the State to pay both costs, establishing the personal costs at 20% of the award.

**POR TANTO:** The appeal of the State representation is granted and the one filed by the plaintiff is declared without merit. The appealed judgment is annulled and the lawsuit is declared without merit in all its terms, admitting the defense of lack of right in its regard. It is resolved without special condemnation for costs. Magistrate Olaso Álvarez and Magistrate Montero Morales dismiss the appeal filed by the State and grant the one filed by the plaintiff. They annul the appealed ruling insofar as it resolved without special condemnation for costs, and in its place condemn the defendant to pay these emoluments, establishing the personal costs at twenty percent of the award.

</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">Res: </span><span style="font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">2025002697</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub">NROSITO</span><span style="font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:100%; border-collapse:collapse" class="mce-item-table"><tbody><tr><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img 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style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">Julia Varela Araya</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img 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<br/><br/>| Ana Patricia Montero Morales | Rafael Antonio Ortega Telleria | | Eddy Rodriguez Chaves | | --- | --- | --- | --- | |  |  | |  | <br/><br/> Documento Firmado Digitalmente<br/> -- Código verificador --<br/> [WASP39_FONT_CHARACTERS] **"IV.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE:** It has been duly accredited that the plaintiff was earning a surcharge (recargo) for 8 interim lessons and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative duties as of August 7, 2018; for which reason the former ceased to be paid to her on February 1, 2019. Likewise, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, pursuant to Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not dealing with a disability leave (incapacidad) per se. The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, meaning it can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (Articles 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), and the employee does not fall within the factual assumptions provided for in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil), as she is not on disability leave due to illness to be entitled to what is claimed. After a reconsideration of the analysis regarding the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that the State's representation is correct. [...]"** **"VII.- DISSENTING OPINION OF MAGISTRATE OLASO ÁLVAREZ AND MAGISTRATE MONTERO MORALES:** [...] Consequently, if before the reassignment the plaintiff was earning the surcharge (sobresueldo) of 8 interim lessons, her right, under that special regulation, for it to continue to be recognized within her remuneration as an administrative employee is indisputable, regardless of the requirements for that service that the employing entity may have. In other words, in application of this special provision, the defendant entity could not eliminate this subsidy of a salary nature (subsidio con naturaleza salarial) granted to the plaintiff and received before being reassigned (subsection c, Article 174 ibid). In addition to the foregoing, it must be made clear that the current wording of Article 174 does not provide grounds for eliminating surcharges (sobresueldos), and therefore, without a doubt, employees (servidores or servidoras) covered by a disability leave have the right to continue earning this type of bonuses while that leave lasts." Res: 2025002697 **SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE**.

San José, at fifteen hours eighteen minutes on the twenty-ninth of August two thousand twenty-five.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by **[Name 001]**, educator, resident of Guanacaste, against the **STATE**, represented by its deputy procuradora, Licenciada Marianela Barrantes Zamora, resident of Heredia. Acting as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is Licenciado Luis Adolfo Vetrani Arguedas, resident of San José. All are of legal age, married, and attorneys, with the noted exception.

**Drafted by Judge Rodríguez Chaves; and,** **CONSIDERING:** **I.- BACKGROUND:** The plaintiff stated she works for the Ministry of Public Education, that she holds a permanent position as a Third and Fourth Cycle Secondary Education Science Teacher, at the Liberia Laboratory Educational Center, under the Liberia Regional Directorate of Education. That starting in 2018, she was granted a reassignment to administrative duties due to a health problem. She indicated that prior to the reassignment, she worked 40 permanent teaching periods (lecciones) and 8 temporary ones. She claimed that due to the reassignment, as of February 1, 2019, the payment for the 8 temporary teaching periods (lecciones) was discontinued, and these have not been paid to her over the years. Therefore, she requested that the payment equivalent to the overload of 8 temporary teaching periods (lecciones) be restored, from the moment it was discontinued until the day she retired. She requested salary differences in Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, annual increases, incentive for extension of the school year, didactic incentive, and school salary. She requested legal interest, indexation, and both costs (*images 1 to 6 of the complete view of the case file in PDF format*). The state representation answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defense of lack of right (*images 133 to 143*). The Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, in judgment number 2025-000176 at 15:54 hours on January 27, 2025, issued by Judge Gabriela Salas Zamora, partially granted the lawsuit. It ordered the State to pay the plaintiff the salary differences for the overload of 8 temporary teaching periods (lecciones) from their discontinuation on February 1, 2019, until her retirement (October 28, 2022). It recognized differences in Christmas bonuses (aguinaldos), didactic incentive, and school salary. Regarding vacations, it granted recognition of the differences only if all or part of them were paid or compensated to her, but not if she took them. It recognized legal interest and indexation. It resolved without special order as to the payment of costs (*images 328 to 336*).

**II.- GROUNDS FOR APPEAL:** Both parties file a cassation appeal against the trial court's judgment. **1.-** **Appeal of the plaintiff:** Appealing the exoneration from the payment of costs. She states that costs are governed by the provisions of articles 562 and 563 of the Labor Code, which establish as a general rule the order to pay costs against the losing party, allowing the non-application thereof only exceptionally, and provided the litigation was in good faith. She considers that the losing party must be ordered to pay costs, given that it forced the other party to resort to the judicial process, since, without just cause, it discontinued from the plaintiff's salary the amount corresponding to the item for 8 temporary teaching periods (lecciones) as a Secondary Education teacher, which, as has been established, is recognized for teaching staff when they have been reassigned for health reasons. She emphasizes that the defendant did not acquiesce to the lawsuit, but rather answered it negatively, acts which demonstrate the complete opposite of good faith; it even raised exceptions intended to prevent the proceeding from continuing, therefore, the A-quo's interpretation is incorrect. Thus, she requests that the judgment be revoked insofar as it exonerated the State from the payment of costs and that it be ordered to pay them on a percentage basis (*images 338 to 340*). **2.-** **Appeal of the state representation:** **I.- Procedural appeal: Insufficient grounds.** Claims that the judge based her considerations on a particular regulation: Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, since the grounds for resolving this case should have been limited to Article 254 of the Labor Code. Indicates that the judge analyzed the case, conceiving that the plaintiff must maintain her overloads even though she was reassigned for health reasons, regardless of whether she was subject to a medical leave; as jurisprudence has reiterated that there is no distinction between reassignment and medical leave, for both it is appropriate to preserve the accessory salary components. Under these hypotheses, she ruled in favor of the plaintiff. She argued that the additional salary (sobresueldo) is maintained, even though it is subject to temporality and the performance of specific functions. Reiterates that in this case, contrary to the conclusions reached by the judicial authority, in the specific case the parameters established in Article 254 of the Labor Code must be followed, the foregoing because there is a clear and defined differentiation in jurisprudence regarding what is understood as incapacities and leaves, in contrast to what a health-related reassignment is. The former are governed by Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute, while the other (reassignment) is covered by Article 254 of the Labor Code. Furthermore, the former originate from reasons that allow the employment relationship to continue—but in another capacity—with the clarification that the incentives are maintained as long as the requirements for their granting are met. Leaves and incapacities preserve their incentives and bonuses as long as the situation that gave rise to the interruption of their duties continues. Therefore, it alleges there is an erroneous application by the first-instance judge when she intends that additional salaries (sobresueldos) be maintained in scenarios of health-related reassignment. Since the regulation she invokes applies only to incapacities and leaves, leaving out reassignments. Hence, the overload in a reassignment corresponds to the performance of duties within the time limit for which it was granted. Once the deadline upon which it was conditioned has passed, if the employee no longer maintains the same characteristics of their employment relationship, it is not appropriate to extend it, given that the elements that gave rise to said payment have been lost. It states that when a server receives items such as overloads, these have an effective date. Upon exceeding the given term, the authority analyzes whether the factors that gave rise to them remain. If so, an extension of the incentive is granted; but when the requirements for the benefit do not persist, it expires. Notes that in this specific case, it was demonstrated that with the plaintiff's reassignment, she ceased to perform the duties and workdays for which the overload is paid. This meant that, once the effective period of the overload was completed, it was not extended further, since her employment relationship had changed. Thus, the plaintiff was subject to an overload of teaching periods (lecciones) that was delimited to the performance of duties, and it had an effective date up to January 31, 2019. If after that date her employment situation changed, extinguishing the reasons that gave rise to said incentive, then there was no reason for it to be extended or granted again. Considers that if the contrary is admitted, one would be acting against the consensus, arbitrarily against the principle of legality. Because equating the recommendation for reassignment for health reasons to an incapacity or leave under the terms of cited Article 174 constitutes an extensive interpretation of the regulation not permitted by law, even to the detriment of the Public Treasury. Highlights that no overload is being frozen or discontinued, but rather that in the specific case it expired. Notes that there is no fundamental right to them, and even less that the State should continue paying a salary amount that does not correspond to what was actually worked by the server, so it has been recognized that the overload does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned, nor does it oblige the Administration to maintain that condition for them. **II.- Appeal on the merits: Incorrect application of the evidentiary rules.** States that when the plaintiff's overload of 8 temporary teaching periods (lecciones) expired on January 31, 2019, payment was not continued, because the period covering said item administratively ended, by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff no longer met the necessary requirements for them to be prolonged. Reiterates that overloads correspond to an established date, and once this period was completed, it was not appropriate to prolong the bonuses, since the plaintiff did not meet the necessary requirements to continue in an employment relationship of that type; taking into account her health condition. Cites Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law and insists that overloads cannot be granted permanently. **III.- Accessory items granted in the judgment.** Challenges the order to pay differences in Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, and school salary. Regarding the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), indicates that it was already duly paid in the corresponding period. Regarding school salary, states that it is not an item that the State or its institutions pay additionally as if it were an extraordinary amount or a gratuity without legal backing, but rather one that the worker is entitled to receive on a deferred basis in January, which has been withheld from the worker, but not liquidated: this being so, it should not be granted or contemplated in a proceeding of this nature. **IV.- Interest and indexation:** Indicates that it is improper to grant interest and indexation jointly, as they are contradictory to each other. From a deeper analysis of legal interest, its constitution implicitly brings an inflationary value, insofar as the Passive Base Rate of the National Bank and that of the Central Bank of Costa Rica are used as a reference means for setting interest on loans and other types of financial instruments, which is periodically reviewed so that the interest adjusts to current inflation. So that the collection of money is not harmed by the inflation that causes a loss of the purchasing value of money, therefore the order of indexation is improper.

**III. PROCEDURAL APPEAL:** The state representation alleges a lack of sufficient grounds for the appealed judgment. Current Article 587 of the Labor Code empowers this Chamber to hear the procedural defects provided for therein. Subsection 5) of the aforementioned Article 587 contemplates the lack of grounds or insufficient grounds for the judgment as a ground for cassation on procedural form. The duty to properly ground judicial resolutions constitutes an obligation inherent to the fundamental rights of due process and defense. The materialization of the reasons that led the judge to adopt one or another decision is what allows the parties to exercise control over what was resolved, through the procedural mechanisms conceived for that purpose. "The grounding of the judgment is the intellectual work of the judge employed to justify the decision adopted with respect to the matter submitted to their knowledge. To do this, the legal operator must state the factual and legal reasons that serve to support their criterion, otherwise their decision will be arbitrary. The foregoing is not merely a formal requirement of the judgment, but a requirement derived from the principle of due process, since through the reasoning of the ruling, both plaintiff and defendant may make use of the ordinary remedies granted to them by legislation, in order to exercise control over jurisdictional power" (Chamber II, judgment No. 181 at 9:45 a.m. on February 5, 2010). Hence, Articles 421 and 560 of the Labor Code expressly establish the obligation to provide reasons for decisions. This latter provision states that, in the considering section of the ruling, there shall be indicated "...the means of proof on which the conclusion is based and the reasons that support it and the valuation criteria employed, for which purpose a record shall be left of the analysis of the different evidentiary elements presented, through a detailed and exhaustive explanation of each one of them... the factual, legal, doctrinal, and jurisprudential reasons shall be given, the merits or lack of merits of the propositions shall be sufficiently reasoned... It is essential to cite the legal rules that serve as the basis for the conclusions on the merits or lack of merits of the claims or exceptions proposed." Having reviewed the judgment appealed, this Chamber notes that the judge did set out the legal and factual reasons on which the decision was based.

Regardless of whether these reasons prove to be correct or not (which must be determined in the analysis on the merits), it is clear that the trial judge did provide reasons for her verdict. Now, if one disagrees with the ruling of the lower court and its reasoning, including the assessment and pretermission of evidence, that is a question on the merits which, as such, will be analyzed further on (section 588 of that normative body).

**IV.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE:** It has been duly established that the plaintiff was receiving a supplement for 8 interim lessons and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative duties effective August 7, 2018; for which reason the supplement ceased to be paid to her on February 1, 2019. Likewise, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon based on a medical recommendation, grounded in Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). We are not dealing with a disability properly speaking. The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, and therefore may only act in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (sections 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)), and the employee does not fall within the factual circumstances provided for in Article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil), as she is not disabled by illness so as to be entitled to what is claimed. After a reexamination of the analysis regarding the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that the State's representation is correct. Sections 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedures Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) stipulate the possibility of assigning certain supplements, which do not constitute an acquired right, and, consequently, the payment thereof must be suspended when the employee, in the exercise of her usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) establishes that: "*a) If the employee, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zonage, for \"alternate schedule\", or any extra pay (sobresueldo), she shall have the right to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary she was earning at that time. /b) Sick leave, whatever its duration, shall not interrupt the right that employees have to receive the corresponding salary increases. (Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aid referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall, consequently, be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may be applicable. / (The preceding subsection was thus added by Article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)*". From the text transcribed above, it is inferred, in a clear and express manner, that an employee who is disabled due to illness, or a female employee on maternity leave, who was earning additional salary through extra pay, has the right for such extra pay to be taken into account when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid to her. In the case before us, the plaintiff was reassigned to administrative duties and is neither disabled nor enjoying such leave; therefore, her situation does not fall under the factual premise of the rule. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that, pursuant to the provisions of sections 118, subsection j), of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, these bonuses are granted when the employee performs additional duties to those she ordinarily carries out in her position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether due to the needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these extra pays depends on the circumstances warranting it, and for this reason they are assigned on a temporary basis, for each school term, according to the start and end dates regulated in section 176 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); otherwise, the temporary service would be distorted and would become an ordinary one. In accordance with the foregoing, Article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública) prescribes that "*the excess shall be maintained as a supplement, therefore, of a temporary nature*". Consequently, those supplements that depend on a particular condition to be granted do not become an acquired right, which is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, on a permanent basis and regardless of the service she provides, as is claimed in this case. There is vast jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) to the effect that function supplements cannot be considered an acquired right of the employee. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, of 15:45 hours on March 22, 2011, it stated: "*It should be recalled that this Chamber has indicated that the performance of a worker that can be classified as a function supplement does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned, obligating the Administration to keep her in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such supplements—because it responds to the need for service provision at a given time—has a temporary character and is paid for a specific amount of work, it being logical that its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly of its interest and competence (see in that regard judgment number 2003-09533 of twelve hours twenty-eight minutes on September five, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 of sixteen hours forty-seven minutes on May thirty, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the supplement constitutes a 'bonus' or salary benefit that depends on whether the functions are exercised or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party so that such item continues to be paid to her, or so that the supplement or alternate schedule is maintained for her*" (see also resolutions numbers 6390 of 15:14 hours on May 18, 2011, and 868 of 9:05 hours on January 18, 2013). Similarly, in vote No. 3306, of 12:48 hours on March 9, 2007, it noted: "*…if the assumptions under which an extra pay was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is no longer met (Judgment No. 2006-010959 of 17:51 hours on July 26, 2006)*". This same ruling referred to judgment No. 296, of 11:54 hours on January 13, 1995, which expressly stated: "*It is equally appropriate to pronounce on the matter of the salary difference that the appellant claims to stop receiving as a result of the questioned act, since the compensation for the cited supplement constitutes a 'bonus' or salary benefit, which depends on whether the functions are exercised or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party so that such item continues to be paid to her, or so that the indicated supplement is maintained for her, so that the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also inadmissible…*". Finally, in resolution No. 10959, of 17:51 hours on July 26, 2006, it noted: "*This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that extra pays that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right that is incorporated as such into the salary proper, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which it was recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which an extra pay was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is no longer met*". In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for the supplement of 8 interim lessons constitute temporary extra pays, attached to the salary structure, which although they form part of the final remuneration received by the employee, are not a permanent substantial component, but rather an additional one, the recognition of which depends on her meeting the prerequisites established in the legal system for its granting and on the needs that arise in each school term. It is worth noting that the payment of these supplements applies based on the position and the functions performed by the employee, and may therefore be denied when the original conditions of their granting disappear. Based on the cited regulations, the cited jurisprudence, and the principles of primacy of reality, reasonableness, and salary equality, it is considered that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of compensation when the actual provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as those in the case at hand (a person reassigned to an administrative position), since there is no factual or legal basis to pay for a service that is not being rendered. Furthermore, obligating the State to pay a remuneration for a counterpart performance that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. In addition to this, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, as compared to those who are appointed to a teaching position and are performing functions through a supplement of some type, since they are not in equal conditions yet earn the same. Aside from the fact that the State would be paying twice (to two employees) for the same supplement, when it has been necessary for the person substituting the one who has been reassigned for health reasons to take it on. As previously stated, the supplement of eight interim lessons, as in the case under study, does not constitute an acquired right, aside from the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be deemed a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it must be kept in mind that to be able to demand payment of the supplement, a regulation must necessarily authorize it (principle of legality governing the public sector) and the conditions and prerequisites established by it must be met; which does not occur in this specific case. By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the supplement, when the plaintiff moved from the condition of teacher to performing administrative duties due to reassignment, is in accordance with the law.

**V.- ON COSTS:** Although the regulation on costs establishes as a general rule the condemnation in such expenses to the losing party, it is considered that, in the specific case, the party must be absolved from paying costs. While it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff is not entitled to the right she claims, it is appreciated that she has litigated with evident good faith, under the belief that she has the right to maintain payment of the supplement during her reassignment to administrative tasks, and furthermore, the matter of the correct interpretation of the rules governing the supplement for any additional reason to the ordinarily contracted academic load has been reexamined. This exoneration is ordered in application of sections 562 and 563 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Due to the manner in which it is resolved, reference to the other objections of the appeal is omitted.

**VI.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** As a corollary of the foregoing, the appeal of the State's representation must be granted, and the one filed by the plaintiff must be declared without merit. The appealed judgment must be annulled, and the lawsuit must be declared without merit in all its aspects, admitting regarding it the defense of lack of right. Likewise, for the reasons previously indicated, it is resolved without special condemnation in costs.

**VII.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE OLASO ÁLVAREZ AND MAGISTRATE MONTERO MORALES:** The undersigned depart from the majority criterion insofar as it denies the plaintiff payment of the supplement. As indicated, there is no objection to the fact that, before being reassigned to administrative duties, the plaintiff worked as an educator, nor to the fact that this reassignment, for health reasons, became effective as of August 7, 2018. Likewise, it was taken as true that she had been granted the function supplement of 8 interim lessons, which was suppressed on February 1, 2019. According to the defendant's criterion, these function supplements are conceived solely for those who work as teachers when an institutional need exists; therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to payment of these extra pays since her position is now administrative in nature. In this scenario, it is a matter of defining the correspondence of those rights to a teaching official who, for health reasons, has had to be reassigned to an administrative position. Disability and reassignment, in these cases, originate from an illness of the official that prevents her from remaining in active teaching service and is grounded in Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), as the appellant rightly points out. This article, as part of Title Four of that normative body named "ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS DURING THE EXERCISE OF WORK", establishes the obligation of the employer to reinstate the worker who has suffered a risk but is in a position to continue working, and also provides for the employer's duty to provide her with a different position according to her possibilities, when, by medical recommendation, she cannot return to perform the functions she was carrying out. It literally states in its second paragraph: "*If, in accordance with medical opinion, the worker could not normally perform the work she was doing when the risk occurred to her, but could perform another different job in the same company, the employer shall be obligated to provide it to her, provided it is feasible, for which purpose the employer may make the personnel movements that are necessary.*" This article served as the basis for granting the plaintiff the labor reassignment for health reasons. This regulation is directly related to the Special Leave Regulation of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública) (Executive Decree number 19113 of July 28, 1989), where in its Article 1, it mentions that this regulation aims to establish the norms and procedures that the Ministry of Public Education must follow to grant leave to its employees, due to the decrease in their faculties or aptitudes for work, survivors of work risks, or illness. For its part, section 2 establishes: "*The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the decrease suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, could not perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and duties corresponding to the position they were performing as regular employees.*" That regulation distinguishes between permanent leave and partial leave, declaring that the latter shall be available to those employees for whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) or the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability or a partial or permanent disability and recommend a change of functions.

Article 8 specifically addresses the case of granting special leave in the following terms: *"In accordance with the provisions of Article 5 above, the Ministry of Public Education shall grant a special leave to those employees who find themselves in the following circumstances: / a) That according to their ailment, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund recommends in the final treatment assessment a change of duties. / b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the work-related accident that occurred, the National Insurance Institute determines a partial or minor permanent disability and recommends their return to service with a change of duties."* Article 17 states: *"The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in these regulations shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter."* Thus, these regulations complement and do not contradict the provisions of section 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which reads: *"a) If, at the time of being disabled due to illness or maternity, the employee was earning additional salary for a zone differential, for an 'alternate schedule,' or any supplemental pay (sobresueldo), they shall have the right to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. / b) Leaves due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the employees' right to receive corresponding salary increases. / c) For all legal purposes, the subsidy as well as the assistance referred to in Article 167 shall have the nature of salary, and shall therefore be the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may apply."* The regulatory provisions develop this express provision, indistinctly contemplating the right to compensation for both permanent and special leave. This Section has so resolved on previous occasions in which this same issue has been discussed. In judgment number 57 of 9:50 a.m., January 21, 2011, it was explained: *"IV. ... The State's representative insists that section 174 of the Civil Service Statute is not applicable to the plaintiff, since that rule is only provided for persons who are permanently disabled and that her situation must be governed by what is established in Article 166, according to which, 'When leave is granted to a teacher for a duly proven illness, half the salary prior to the enjoyment of the leave shall be paid in their favor and for a period of no more than 6 months. In exceptional cases, an extension of this benefit may be authorized for up to two additional quarters, if the ill teacher demonstrates their inability to work, with testimony from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund.' However, the Section has had the opportunity to hear cases identical to the present one and has concluded that the cited article 174 does not exclude personnel who enjoy special leave for being partially disabled. The cited section 166 does not establish that its application is only possible for cases of special leave. For its part, Article 174 also does not exclude workers who are partially disabled and enjoy such leave. The norms make no distinction whatsoever between special and permanent leaves, coupled with the fact that they also do not contemplate any differentiation between these leaves and disabilities due to illness, apart from the fact that all are based precisely on the loss of health due to a disabling illness. See that subsection a) of this last rule states that 'If, at the time of being disabled due to illness or maternity, the employee was earning additional salary for a zone differential, for an alternate schedule, or any supplemental pay (sobresueldo), they shall have the right to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time...' Furthermore, from section 173 thereof it is inferred that the legislator's intention was to protect the integrity of the salary of teaching personnel during the disability period. Nothing else can be deduced from what is indicated in the final paragraph of subsection a), according to which, '...when it is proven that the disability extends for a period longer than four days, their salary shall not suffer a deduction,' as well as from what is stipulated in subsection b, where it is noted that 'if the employee were protected by Social Security, the Ministry of Education will recognize the salary difference to complete 100% (one hundred percent) of the same; if not, the payment of the salary shall be borne by the Ministry of Education.' None of these rules refers to an absolute disability or excludes from their application persons who enjoy special leave. It is clear that this leave is granted to those employees who suffer a partial or minor permanent disability and require a change of duties, as established in section 5 of the Regulation on special leaves for employees of the Ministry of Public Education (Executive Decree No. 19113, effective as of July 28, 1989). Section 2 of these regulations also establishes that: 'The leaves referred to in these regulations shall be granted to those employees who, due to the decrease suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, could not perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the duties and responsibilities corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular employees.' Now, regarding the remuneration that the beneficiaries of this type of leave must receive, the special regulations indicate that they have the right to enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary, according to what is stipulated in that regard in the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code. Expressly, Article 17 of the Regulation mandates: 'The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in these regulations shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter.' From the transcribed text, a clear referral to the norms of the cited Statute is evident, and therefore, the application of Article 174 is valid; since, as indicated, no exclusion whatsoever of this type of disability is made in that rule. Consequently, if before her reassignment the plaintiff was earning the supplemental pay (sobresueldo) for 8 interim lessons, her right, in accordance with that special regulation, to have this continue to be recognized within her remuneration as an administrative official is indisputable, regardless of the requirements for that service that the employing entity may have. That is to say, in application of that special provision, the defendant entity could not suppress this subsidy with a salary nature granted to the plaintiff received before she was reassigned (subsection c, Article 174 thereof). In addition to the foregoing, it must be made clear that the current wording of section 174 does not give grounds to eliminate supplemental pay (sobresueldos), so undoubtedly, employees who are granted leave due to illness have the right to continue earning these types of bonuses for the duration of that leave. In the sub litem, the right to the benefit does not derive from the performance of duties but from the application of the regulation that expressly grants the benefit, due to their health condition (special leave). The rule contemplates the right to continue receiving, in those circumstances, 'a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary.' Hence, one cannot conclude, as is intended, that the nature of the additional assignment (recargo) was distorted or that public funds are unjustifiably affected, since the existing norms are what establish these legal consequences. The appellant's statement that the recognition of the additional assignments (recargos) to the plaintiff is granted as a vested right also lacks support. Note that the previous instance granted this right only while her reassigned condition is maintained. Therefore, what was decided is also not contrary to the Constitutional Court's criterion that additional assignments (recargos) are temporary in nature and do not constitute a vested right, given that the case does not refer to the situation of an active employee in service who demands or does not demand the additional assignment (recargo), but rather the issue is limited to establishing the remuneration that a working person who has been unable to continue performing their normal duties or the additional assignments (recargos) they had been carrying out, due to an ailment (in a similar sense, see vote 1429 of this Section, 11:45 a.m., September 8, 2017). In vote number 57 of 9:50 a.m., January 21, 2011, of this Office, it was considered: "While it is true that teachers do not have a vested right to the cited schedule or other conditions that may depend on different variables, the truth is that, in the specific case, it has not been demonstrated that a different circumstance from that of the enjoyment of special leave for illness was invoked to eliminate such bonuses from the plaintiff's remuneration, with the argument that if she did not effectively perform the service, she had no right to the corresponding compensation. This being the case, rather in application of the principle of legality (Article 11 of the Political Constitution and Article 11 of the General Law of Public Administration), the defendant entity could not suppress from the subsidy with a salary nature granted to the plaintiff the bonuses for alternate schedule and additional assignment (recargo) she was receiving before being disabled, since subsection a) of Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute clearly establishes that persons who become disabled due to illness or maternity shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning."* In any case, regarding the votes of the Constitutional Chamber cited in the appeal, it must be noted that this other body has already issued a pronouncement on the matter, to the effect that these are issued from a constitutional perspective and that the special regulations applicable to this type of matter are clear regarding the appropriateness of the intended right (see, among others, vote number 397 of 9:39 a.m., March 24, and 537 of 10:22 a.m., April 9, both of 2010 and 711 of 9:55 a.m., August 31, 2011). Hence, we consider that the grievance on this particular point is not admissible.

**CHRISTMAS BONUS DIFFERENCES.** The payment of these differences is appropriate, since supplemental pay (sobresueldos) form part of the calculation of this right. Section 2 of Law No. 1835, Additional Salary for Public Employees, establishes in its second paragraph: *"The additional salary referred to in this law shall be calculated based on the average of the ordinary and extraordinary salaries earned during the period indicated in the first paragraph."* Therefore, since the additional assignment (recargo) of two interim lessons is being granted, the corresponding adjustments must be made to the amounts paid to the plaintiff for this concept, so this grievance cannot prosper.

**SCHOOL SALARY DIFFERENCES:** The State representative's argument is that it is inappropriate to grant differences in the school salary (salario escolar), since this item is formed through a retention of the salary increase, which is then paid in a deferred manner in the month of January. The issue related to the legal nature of the school salary (salario escolar) has been widely debated. On some occasions, it was considered a retention of deferred payment, as the appellant points out, and this Section maintained the criterion that it constituted one more salary component. However, the Constitutional Chamber, in a recent judgment, addressed the analysis of the issue and concluded that the school salary (salario escolar) is made up of a retention of the salary increase, the payment of which is deferred and awarded in the month of January each year. In that regard, in vote No. 9188, of 9:50 a.m., May 21, 2020, it established: *"Now, from the foregoing it is clear that the school salary (salario escolar) arises from the adjustments to the cost-of-living increases that were decreed in 1994, and that based on the salary policy agreement of that year, were gradually offset, paying a percentage of these cumulatively in the month of January [...] Thus, in summary, the school salary (salario escolar) arises as a percentage of the workers' salary increase that would be paid by employers in an accumulated and deferred manner during the month of January each year and which, therefore, is part of the employee's assets. The foregoing implies that it is not an extraordinary payment, as is the case of the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), but rather forms part of the worker's salary."* Having determined the foregoing, the Section observes that, for the purposes of the decision, the nature noted in the appeal has no impact. The calculation of the school salary (salario escolar) is made taking into account the same components used to determine the applicable amount for the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo). To that extent, it means that the amount corresponding to the aforementioned supplemental pay (sobresueldos) should have been added for its calculation. Since this was not paid, it also could not have been included when calculating what would have been due for the school salary (salario escolar). Consequently, the recognition of the additional assignments (recargos) in a court proceeding generates a difference in the amounts the plaintiff has received for school salary (salario escolar).

**VACATION DIFFERENCES:** The appeal cannot be accepted regarding the claim against the order to pay vacation differences. Although the Court ordered the payment of these, the truth is that it also specified that this imposition was made *"provided they have been compensated."* Therefore, the decision is in accordance with the law, since the ongoing recognition of the salary differences would encompass the periods in which the plaintiff was on vacation, meaning no harm is caused to the State (section 589 of the Labor Code).

**ON INTEREST AND INDEXATION (INDEXACIÓN):** The State representation reproaches the order to pay both interest and indexation (indexación). This Section, on repeated occasions, has resolved on the appropriateness of the order to recognize indexation (indexación) together with legal interest. Thus, in judgment No. 993, of 11:30 a.m., September 14, 2016, it was indicated: *"The Section has held: 'Parties in legal-economic relationships, when the obligation has arisen from agreement or contract, may resort to creditor protection mechanisms not prohibited by law, in consideration of possible devaluations or loss of purchasing power of the national currency, as is often done by resorting to currencies stronger and more stable than the colón, such as the United States dollar. But, in the case of obligations such as those granted in the judgment under review (past-due salaries and Christmas bonus differences), in the absence of a monetary updating mechanism, the prolonged non-compliance of the debtor party leads to an economic shift towards the debtor themselves and an impoverishment for the creditor."* As such enrichment must be considered unlawful, since it violates the most elementary principles of justice and equity, account must be taken of the provisions of article 10 of the Civil Code, which establishes that norms must be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to the spirit and purpose thereof, and to recognize the possibility of compensating for the loss of the real value of money and, with a better study of the question, to give the aforementioned numeral 706 a different application, removing the obstacle effect that has been attributed to it, it being understood that monetary updating (actualización monetaria) does not properly constitute an indemnification (indemnización) but rather a mechanism for paying what is truly owed, what is justly due, at the moment of non-performance, which, in that understanding, is not prohibited. It must be taken into account that the employment contract binds both to what is expressed in it and to the consequences that derive from its content according to good faith, equity, usage, custom, or the law (article 19 of the Labor Code). In the same sense, numeral 1023 of the Civil Code provides: "1) Contracts bind both to what is expressed in them, and to the consequences that equity, usage, or the law give rise to from the obligation, according to the nature thereof..."), which requires of the parties transparent conduct in the different phases of the legal relationship and their strict adjustment, in the exercise of their rights, to just criteria. Thus, to the damages and losses caused by the delay (mora) incurred by the debtor party in the fulfillment of the obligation, making effective and timely enjoyment impossible for the creditor (article 702 idem), must be added the inflationary problem that over time produces the depreciation of the currency, reducing the real content of the principal obligation, which gives rise to the need to index (indexar) in order to eliminate the unlawful enrichment (enriquecimiento ilícito) produced in favor of the debtor. The general principles of law –which permeate and irradiate the entirety of the legal system– impose, in addition to the full reparation of the damage, the unavoidable balance that must mediate in the counter-prestations, the prohibition of abuse of right and of unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento injusto), such that performance must always conform to reality. Moreover, article 41 of the Constitution requires restoring the injured state of things to its previous situation, which must be done in the present context and value. This, because a different solution would render nugatory that constitutional right (effective judicial protection, articles 41 and 49), as well as that of property (article 45), since an insufficient payment would be admitted, signifying an unjust enrichment for the debtor, as stated' (resolution No. 267 of 10:45 a.m. on March 30, 2012). In this manner, the non-application of the figure of indexation (indexación) in cases such as the one before us, in the face of culpable delay in the fulfillment of labor obligations by the employer, would mean privileging the stronger party to the relationship, allowing them to benefit, through inflation, from their delay, thereby violating the protective principle that inspires labor law and which is contained in article 17 of the Labor Code. For this reason, what was decided by the ad quem regarding this point must also be confirmed" (vote number 102 of 10:25 a.m., on January 30, 2013), a criterion that is fully shared and, furthermore, there is no element in the sub judice that would allow it to be varied." In addition to this, based on numeral 565 of the Labor Code, transcribed above, in labor matters, by legal imperative, any judgment that orders the payment of a monetary obligation will imply for the debtor, unless otherwise agreed or expressly provided, the payment of interest and indexation (indexación). ON COSTS: In the appeal filed by the plaintiff, she requests that the State be ordered to pay both costs. Article 562 of the Labor Code, the general rule provides for the award of costs against the losing party. Although the following numeral indicates the assumptions under which exoneration in this item proceeds. In the sub litem, it is not noted that there is good faith in the procedural conduct of the defendant, given that there are numerous pronouncements of this Chamber on the debated issue. The defendant's refusal to correct the plaintiff's situation forced her to resort to the judicial instance, with an evident expenditure of her time and payment of fees to a legal professional who handled her position in court. For these reasons, we grant the plaintiff's appeal and order the State to pay both costs, setting the personal costs at 20% of the condemnation.

**POR TANTO:** The appeal of the State representation is granted, and the appeal filed by the plaintiff is declared without merit. The appealed judgment is annulled, and the lawsuit is declared without merit in all its extremes, admitting in its respect the defense of lack of right. It is resolved without special award of costs. Magistrate Olaso Álvarez and Magistrate Montero Morales dismiss the appeal filed by the State and grant the appeal filed by the plaintiff. They annul the appealed ruling insofar as it resolved without special award of costs, and in its place order the defendant to pay these emoluments, setting the personal costs at twenty percent of the condemnation.

<p style="">Res: 2025002697</p><p style="">NROSITO </p><p style=""> </p><p style=""> </p>

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width="162" height="74" alt="" style="-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline"></p><p style="">Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez</p> | | <p style=""><img src="

| Rafael Antonio Ortega Telleria | 2-0508-0021 | <img 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Revisión del Documento  Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2025002697 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas dieciocho minutos del veintinueve de agosto de dos mil veinticinco .

Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, por [Nombre 001], educadora, vecina de Guanacaste, contra el ESTADO, representado por su procuradora adjunta, la licenciada Marianela Barrantes Zamora, vecina de Heredia. Figura como apoderado especial judicial de la actora, el licenciado Luis Adolfo Vetrani Arguedas, vecino de San José. Todos mayores, casados y abogados, con la excepción indicada.

Redacta el Magistrado Rodríguez Chaves; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- ANTECEDENTES: Expuso la parte actora labora para el Ministerio de Educación Pública, que es funcionaria en propiedad como Profesora de Enseñanza Media Ciencias III y IV Ciclo, en el Centro Educativo Laboratorio de Liberia, de la Dirección Regional de Educación de Liberia. Que a partir del año 2018, se le otorgó una reubicación en funciones administrativas debido a su problema de salud. Indicó que previo a la reubicación, laboraba 40 lecciones en propiedad y 8 interinas. Reclamó que debido a la reubicación, a partir del 1° de febrero de 2019, se le rebajó el pago de las 8 lecciones interinas, las cuales no se le han pagado en el transcurso de los años. Por ello, pidió que se le restituya el pago equivalente al recargo de 8 lecciones interinas, desde el momento en que se suprimió y hasta el día en que se pensionó. Pidió las diferencias salariales en aguinaldo, vacaciones, aumentos anuales, incentivo por ampliación del curso lectivo, incentivo didáctico y salario escolar. Requirió intereses legales, indexación y ambas costas (imágenes 1 a 6 de la vista completa del expediente en formato PDF). La representación estatal contestó negativamente la demanda e interpuso la defensa de falta de derecho (imágenes 133 a 143). El Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, en sentencia número 2025-000176 de las 15:54 horas del 27 de enero de 2025, dictada por la Jueza Gabriela Salas Zamora, declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda. Condenó al Estado a pagarle a la actora las diferencias salariales de recargo de 8 lecciones interinas desde su supresión el 1° de febrero de 2019 y hasta su jubilación (28 de octubre de 2022). Reconoció diferencias en aguinaldos, incentivo didáctico y salario escolar. En cuanto a las vacaciones, otorgó el reconocimiento de las diferencias sólo si todas o parte de ellas le fueron pagadas o compensadas, no así si las disfrutó. Reconoció intereses legales e indexación. Resolvió sin especial condena al pago de costas (imágenes 328 a 336).

II.- AGRAVIOS: Contra la sentencia del Juzgado, ambas partes presentan recurso de casación. 1.- Recurso de la parte actora: Recurre la exoneración del pago de costas. Expone que las costas se rigen por lo dispuesto en el artículo 562 y 563 del Código de Trabajo que establecen como regla general de la condenatoria en el pago de las costas a la parte que pierde el proceso, permitiendo solo en forma excepcional la no aplicación de ello, y siempre y cuando se haya litigado de buena fe. Considera que debe condenarse al vencido al pago de las costas, toda vez que obligó a la otra parte a acudir a la vía jurisdiccional, ya que, sin justa causa, suprimió del salario de la actora, lo correspondiente al rubro de 8 lecciones interinas como docente de Educación Media que como se ha venido estableciendo, al personal docente, se le reconoce, cuando se ha reubicado por salud. Destaca que el demandado no se allanó a la demanda, sino que contestó negativamente la misma, actos que demuestran todo lo contrario a la buena fe, incluso opuso excepciones que intentaban que el proceso no continuara, por ende, no es correcta la interpretación de la A-quo. Por ello, pide que se revoque el fallo en cuando exoneró al Estado del pago de costas y se le condena a su pago de forma porcentual (imágenes 338 a 340). 2.- Recurso de la representación estatal: I.- Recurso por la forma: Fundamento insuficiente. Reclama que la jueza haya basado sus consideraciones en una normativa particular: el numeral 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, ya que los fundamentos para resolver este caso, debían limitarse al artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. Indica que la juzgadora analiza el caso concibiendo que a la accionante se le debe mantener sus recargos con todo y que haya sido reubicada por salud, indistintamente si fue objeto de una incapacidad; ya que la jurisprudencia ha reiterado que no hay distinción entre reubicación e incapacidad, para ambas corresponde conservar los componentes salariales accesorios. Bajo estas hipótesis resolvió en favor de la demandante. Adujo que el sobresueldo se mantiene, aunque este sujeto a temporalidad y ejecución de funciones específicas. Reitera que este caso Contrario a las conclusiones a las que arriba la autoridad juridicial, en el caso concreto corresponde guiarse por los parámetros establecidos en el numeral 254 del Código de Trabajo, lo anterior porque existe una diferenciación clara y definida en la jurisprudencia respecto a lo que se entiende por incapacidades y licencias, en contraste con lo que es una reubicación por salud. Las primeras se rigen por el 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, mientras que la otra (reubicación) se ampara en el 254 del Código de Trabajo. Además, las primeras se originan en motivos que permiten seguir ejecutando la relación laboral -pero en otra naturaleza-, con la aclaración de que los incentivos se mantienen en el tanto se cumpla con los requerimientos para su otorgamiento. Las licencias e incapacidades conservan sus incentivos y pluses en el tanto se prolongue la situación que dio pie a la interrupción de sus labores. Por ende, alega que hay una errónea aplicación de la jueza de primera instancia cuando pretende que los sobresueldos se mantengan en escenarios de reubicación por salud. Ya que la normativa a la que apela es de aplicación única para incapacidades y licencias, dejando por fuera las reubicaciones. De ahí que el recargo en una reubicación responde a la ejecución de labores dentro del límite temporal para el que fue otorgado. Pasado el plazo al que se condicionó, si el funcionario ya no mantiene las mismas características de su relación laboral, no corresponde prorrogárselo, toda vez que se han perdido los elementos que dieron origen a dicho pago. Expone que cuando un servidor percibe rubros tipo recargos, estos tienen una fecha de vigencia. Al superarse el término dado, la autoridad analiza si los factores que dieron pie a estos se mantienen. En caso de que sí, se da una prolongación del incentivo; pero cuando no subsisten los requisitos del beneficio, este expira. Señala que en el caso concreto, se demostró que con la reubicación de la parte actora esta dejó de ejecutar labores y jornadas por que se le paga el recargo. Lo que implicó que, cumplido el plazo de vigencia del recargo, no se le prorrogara más, ya que su relación laboral había variado. Así, la parte actora fue sujeta de un recargo de lecciones que se delimitó a la ejecución de labores, y el mismo tuvo fecha de rige hasta el 31 de enero de 2019. Si posterior a dicha fecha su situación laboral varío, extinguiendo los motivos que originan dicho incentivo, entonces el mismo no tenía por qué prorrogarse u otorgarse nuevamente. Estima que de admitirse lo contrario, se estaría actuando a contrario censo, arbitrariamente en contra del principio de legalidad. Por cuanto, equiparar la recomendación de reubicación por motivos de salud a una incapacidad o una licencia en los términos del artículo 174 de cita, corresponde a una interpretación extensiva de la normativa no permitida por ley, en perjuicio incluso de la Hacienda Pública. Resalta que no se está congelando ni suprimiendo ningún recargo, sino que en el caso concreto éste expiro. Acota que no existe un derecho fundamental a los mismos y menos aún a que el Estado continúe cancelando un monto de salario que no corresponde al efectivamente laborado por el servidor, por lo que se ha reconocido que el recargo no constituye un derecho adquirido para el trabajador al que se le asigna, ni tampoco obliga a la Administración a mantenerle dicha condición. II.- Recurso por el fondo: Incorrecta aplicación del régimen probatorio. Expone que cuando el 31 de enero de 2019, venció el recargo de 8 lecciones interinas de la actora, no se le continuo pagando, por cuanto administrativamente feneció el período que cubría dicho extremo, en virtud de que la parte demandante ya no cumplía con los requerimientos necesarios para que los mismos se prolongaran. Reitera que los recargos responden a una fecha establecida, y cumplido este período no correspondía prolongar los pluses, ya que la accionante no cumplía con los requerimientos necesarios para continuar en una relación laboral de ese tipo; tomando en cuenta su condición de salud. Cita el artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública e insiste que los recargos no pueden ser otorgados de forma definitiva. III.- Aspectos accesorios concedidos en sentencia. Impugna la condena al pago de las diferencias en aguinaldo, vacaciones y salario escolar. Sobre el aguinaldo, indica que ya fue debidamente pagado en el periodo correspondiente. En cuanto al salario escolar, expone que no es un rubro que el Estado o sus instituciones paguen en forma adicional como si fuera un monto extraordinario o una liberalidad sin respaldo legal, sino uno que le corresponde recibir al trabajador en forma diferida en el mes de enero, el cual se le ha retenido, pero no liquidado: siendo así no debe otorgarse o contemplarse en un proceso de esta naturaleza. IV.- Intereses e indexación: Indica que hay una improcedencia para otorgar intereses e indexación de forma conjunta, ya que son contrapuestos entre sí. De un análisis más profundo de los intereses legales la constitución de los mismos trae implícito un valor inflacionario, esto por cuanto la Tasa Básica Pasiva del Banco Nacional y la del Banco Central de Costa Rica se usa como medio de referencia para la fijación en los intereses de préstamos y otro tipo de instrumentos financieros, que periódicamente es revisada a fin de que el interés se ajuste a la inflación actual. De modo que no sea perjudicado la captación de dinero por la inflación que ocasiona una pérdida del valor adquisitivo del dinero, por lo que resulta improcedente la condena de indexación.

III. RECURSO POR LA FORMA

La representación estatal alega falta de fundamentación del fallo recurrido. El actual artículo 587 del Código de Trabajo faculta a la Sala para conocer los vicios de orden procesal que ahí se prevén. El inciso 5) del citado numeral 587 contempla la falta de fundamento o fundamento insuficiente de la sentencia como supuesto de casación por la forma. El deber de cimentar debidamente las resoluciones judiciales constituye una obligación consustancial a los derechos fundamentales del debido proceso y de defensa. La materialización de las razones que condujeron a la persona juzgadora a adoptar una u otra decisión es lo que permite a las partes ejercer control sobre lo resuelto, mediante los mecanismos procesales concebidos para ello. “La fundamentación de la sentencia es la labor intelectiva del juzgador empleada para justificar la decisión que adopta con respecto al asunto que es sometido a su conocimiento. Para ello el operador del derecho, debe hacer constar los motivos fácticos y jurídicos que le sirven para sustentar su criterio, pues de lo contrario su decisión será arbitraria. Lo anterior no es mero requisito de forma de la sentencia, sino una exigencia derivada del principio del debido proceso, ya que por medio de la motivación del fallo, tanto actor como demandado podrán hacer uso de los recursos ordinarios que les otorga la legislación, con el fin de realizar el control del poder jurisdiccional” (Sala Segunda, sentencia n.°181 de las 9:45 horas del 5 de febrero de 2010). De ahí que los artículos 421 y 560 del Código de Trabajo estatuyen expresamente la obligación de razonar las decisiones. Este último preceptúa que, en el acápite considerativo del fallo, se indicarán “…los medios de prueba en que se apoya la conclusión y las razones que la amparan y los criterios de valoración empleados, para cuyo efecto deberá dejarse constancia del análisis de los distintos elementos probatorios evacuados, mediante una explicación detallada y exhaustiva de cada uno de ellos…se darán las razones de hecho, jurídicas, doctrinales y jurisprudenciales, se bastanteará la procedencia o improcedencia de las proposiciones... Es indispensable citar las normas jurídicas que sirven de base a las conclusiones sobre la procedencia o improcedencia de las pretensiones o excepciones propuestas”. Revisada la sentencia venida en alzada, la Sala advierte que el juzgador sí expuso las razones jurídicas y de hecho en las cuales sustentó su decisión. Con independencia de que estos motivos resulten acertados o no (lo que debe determinarse en el análisis por el fondo), está claro que la juzgadora de instancia sí motivó su veredicto. Ahora bien, si no se comparte lo dispuesto en la sentencia de instancia y su fundamento, incluida la valoración y preterición de prueba, es una cuestión de fondo que, como tal, se analizará más adelante (numeral 588 de ese cuerpo normativo).

IV.- ANÁLISIS DEL CASO CONCRETO: Ha quedado debidamente acreditado que la demandante devengaba un recargo por 8 lecciones interinas y que, debido a problemas de salud, fue reubicada en funciones administrativas a partir del 7 de agosto de 2018; razón por la cual aquel se le dejó de pagar el 1 de febrero de 2019. Asimismo, está claro que la reubicación se acordó ante una recomendación médica, basada en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. No estamos ante una incapacidad propiamente dicha. La Administración Pública está sujeta al principio de legalidad, por lo que solo puede proceder conforme a lo que esté debidamente autorizado en el ordenamiento jurídico (numerales 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), y que la servidora no se encuentra dentro de los presupuestos de hecho previstos en el artículo 22 bis inciso a) del Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil, al no encontrarse incapacitada por enfermedad para ser acreedora a lo pretendido. Luego de un replanteamiento del análisis sobre los alcances de la normativa aplicable al caso concreto, concluimos que lleva razón la representación estatal. Los ordinales 118 del Código de Educación y 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente estipulan la posibilidad de asignar ciertos recargos, los cuales no constituyen un derecho adquirido y, por consiguiente, el pago de estos debe suspenderse cuando la persona funcionaria, en el ejercicio de sus labores habituales, deja de cumplir los requisitos exigidos para su reconocimiento. Por otro lado, el artículo 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil , establece que: “a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por "horario alterno", o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando. /b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes. (Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la Ley No.5659 de 17 de diciembre de 1974). /c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder. / (Así adicionado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1º de la Ley No. 6110 de 9 de noviembre de 1977)”. Del texto antes trascrito se colige, en forma clara y expresa, que la persona servidora que se encuentre incapacitada por enfermedad, o la funcionaria en licencia por maternidad, que viniere devengando salario adicional por sobresueldos, tiene derecho a que estos se contemplen al momento de fijar el importe del subsidio a pagarle. En el caso que nos ocupa, la promovente fue reubicada en funciones administrativas y no está incapacitada ni disfrutando de aquella licencia, por lo que su situación no se subsume en el presupuesto de hecho de la norma. Además, hay que tener presente que, al tenor de lo dispuesto en los numerales 118, inciso j), del Código de Educación y 13 del Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 12915-E-P, estos pluses se conceden cuando la persona servidora lleva a cabo funciones adicionales a las que realiza ordinariamente en su puesto, de manera temporal, y cuya asignación se encuentra debidamente justificada, ya sea por necesidades de los centros educativos, por razones de oportunidad y conveniencia, o para la satisfacción efectiva y eficiente del servicio brindado. Dicho de otro modo, el otorgamiento de estos sobresueldos depende de que las circunstancias así lo ameriten y por ello se asignan con carácter temporal, para cada curso lectivo, según las fechas de inicio y fin normadas en el ordinal 176 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil; de lo contrario, se desnaturalizaría el servicio eventual y se convertiría en uno ordinario. En consonancia con lo anterior, el artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública prescribe que “el exceso se mantendrá como un recargo, por ende, de carácter temporal”. Consecuentemente, aquellos recargos que dependan de alguna condición particular para ser concedidos no se configuran como un derecho adquirido, que se incorpora irremediablemente al salario total de la persona trabajadora, en forma permanente y con independencia del servicio que preste, como se pretende en este caso. Existe vasta jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en el sentido de que los recargos de funciones no pueden considerarse como un derecho adquirido de la persona servidora. Así, en la sentencia n.° 3681, de las 15:45 horas del 22 de marzo de 2011, se externó: “Debe recordarse que esta Sala ha señalado que el desempeño del trabajador que pueda ser catalogado como un recargo de funciones, no constituye un derecho adquirido para el trabajador al que se le asigna y que obligue a la Administración a mantenerle en esa condición. Generalmente la asignación de tales recargos -por obedecer a la necesidad de prestación del servicio en un momento determinado-, tiene un carácter temporal y se paga por una cantidad de labores específicas, siendo que, lógicamente, su valor deberá ser determinado por la autoridad recurrida con fundamento en criterios técnicos y objetivos que son propiamente de su interés y de su competencia (ver en ese sentido sentencia número 2003-09533 de las doce horas veintiocho minutos del cinco de septiembre del dos mil tres y 2006-7717 de las dieciséis horas cuarenta y siete minutos del treinta de mayo del dos mil seis, entre otras). Por tal razón, el recargo constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial que depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo u horario alterno" (véanse también las resoluciones números 6390 de las 15:14 horas del 18 de mayo de 2011 y 868 de las 9:05 horas del 18 de enero de 2013). De igual manera, en el voto n.° 3306, de las 12:48 horas del 9 de marzo de 2007, se acotó: “…si los supuestos por los cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó (sentencia N° 2006-010959 de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006)”. En este mismo fallo se hizo referencia a la sentencia n.° 296, de las 11:54 horas del 13 de enero de 1995, en el cual expresamente se indicó: “De igual forma cabe pronunciarse en lo que toca a la diferencia salarial que dice el recurrente que deja de percibir con ocasión del acto cuestionado, toda vez que la retribución por el recargo citado constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial, el cual depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado, para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo señalado, de manera que el recurso, en cuanto a este último reparo es también improcedente…”. Por último, en la resolución n.° 10959, de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006, se apuntó: “Esta Sala, en múltiples oportunidades, ha establecido que los sobresueldos que dependan de alguna condición para ser otorgados no constituyen un derecho adquirido que se incorpore como tal al salario propiamente dicho, toda vez que su otorgamiento depende de las condiciones objetivas por las cuales fue reconocido. En otras palabras, si las condiciones bajo las cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó”. Conforme a lo expuesto, resulta evidente que las sumas recibidas por recargo 8 lecciones interinas, constituyen sobresueldos temporales, anexos a la estructura salarial, que si bien forman parte de la remuneración final que percibe la persona funcionaria, no son un componente sustancial permanente, sino adicional, cuyo reconocimiento depende de que aquella se encuentre en los presupuestos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para su concesión y de las necesidades que surjan en cada periodo lectivo. Cabe destacar que el pago de estos recargos procede en razón del puesto y de las funciones que realiza la persona servidora, por lo que puede denegarse cuando las condiciones originarias de su otorgamiento desaparezcan. Con base en las normas traídas a colación, la jurisprudencia citada y los principios de primacía de la realidad, razonabilidad e igualdad salarial, se considera que no es factible mantener el pago de retribuciones cuando no se da la prestación real del servicio, por motivos como el de autos (persona reubicada en un puesto administrativo), pues no existe sustento fáctico ni jurídico para retribuir un servicio que no se está prestando. Además, obligar al Estado a cancelar una remuneración por una contraprestación que no se está brindando resulta irrazonable y contrario a la equidad. Aunado a ello, se estaría dando una ventaja indebida a las personas reubicadas, con respecto a quienes se encuentran nombradas en una plaza de docente y ejerciendo las funciones por recargo de algún tipo, pues no se hallan en igualdad de condiciones y ganan igual. Amén de que el Estado estaría pagando doble (a dos funcionarios) por un mismo recargo, cuando haya sido necesario que lo asuma la persona que sustituye a quien ha sido reubicada por razones de salud. Como se dijo antes, el recargo de ocho lecciones interinas, como ocurre en el caso de estudio, no constituye un derecho adquirido, amén de que, por lo excepcional del tema, no pueden ser reputados como un derecho que se incorpora de ordinario (fijo) a los contratos de trabajo de las personas docentes. Finalmente, téngase presente que para poder exigir el pago del recargo se requiere necesariamente que una norma así lo autorice (principio de legalidad que rige en el sector público) y cumplir con las condiciones y presupuestos por ella estatuidos; lo que no se da en la especie. En virtud de lo anterior, la supresión del recargo, al pasar la actora de la condición de docente a cumplir funciones administrativas por reubicación, está ajustada a derecho.

V.- SOBRE LAS COSTAS: Aunque la normativa sobre costas establece como regla de principio la condenatoria en esos gastos a la parte vencida, se considera que, en el caso concreto, se debe absolver en costas. Si bien se ha demostrado que a la parte actora no le corresponde el derecho que reclama, se aprecia que esta ha litigado con evidente buena fe, bajo la creencia de que le asiste el derecho a mantener el pago del recargo durante su reubicación en labores administrativas y, además, se ha replanteado el tema de la interpretación correcta de las normas que rigen el recargo por algún motivo a la carga académica contratada de ordinario. Esta exoneración se dispone en aplicación de los ordinales 562 y 563 del Código de Trabajo. Por la forma en que se resuelve, se omite referirse a los demás reproches del recurso.

VI.- CONSIDERACIONES FINALES: Como corolario de lo expuesto, se debe acoger el recurso de la representación estatal y declarar sin lugar el interpuesto por la parte actora. Se debe anular la sentencia recurrida y declarar sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos, admitiendo a su respecto la excepción de falta de derecho. Asimismo, por las razones anteriormente señaladas, se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas.

VII.- VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO OLASO ÁLVAREZ Y LA MAGISTRADA MONTERO MORALES: Los suscritos nos apartamos del criterio de mayoría en cuanto deniega a la parte actora el pago del recargo. Como se indicó, ninguna objeción existe en cuanto a que, antes de ser reubicada en funciones administrativas, la actora se desempeñaba como educadora, ni tampoco en cuanto a que esa reubicación, por motivos de salud, se hizo efectiva a partir del 7 de agosto de 2018. Asimismo, se tuvo por cierto que tenía concedido el recargo de funciones de 8 lecciones interinas, el cual le fue suprimido el 1 de febrero de 2019. Según criterio del demandado, estos recargos de funciones están concebidos únicamente para quienes se desempeñan como docentes cuando existe una necesidad institucional, por ello, a la actora no le asiste el derecho al pago de estos sobresueldos ya que su puesto es ahora, de naturaleza administrativa. En este supuesto se trata de definir la correspondencia de esos derechos a una funcionaria docente quien, por razones de salud, ha debido ser reubicada en un cargo administrativo. La incapacidad y la reubicación, en estos casos, tienen su origen en una enfermedad del funcionario o la funcionaria que le impide mantenerse en el servicio activo de la docencia y que tiene fundamento en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo, como bien lo señala la parte recurrente. Este artículo, como parte del Título Cuarto de ese cuerpo normativo denominado "DE LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS TRABAJADORES DURANTE EL EJERCICIO DEL TRABAJO", establece la obligación de la parte empleadora de reponer en su puesto a la persona trabajadora que haya sufrido un riesgo pero que esté en posibilidades de continuar laborando, y también prevé el deber patronal de proporcionarle uno diferente de acuerdo con sus posibilidades, cuando por recomendación médica no pueda regresar a ejercer las funciones que venía desempeñando. Señala literalmente en su párrafo segundo: “Si de conformidad con el criterio médico, el trabajador no pudiera desempeñar normalmente el trabajo que realizaba cuando le aconteció el riesgo, pero sí otro diferente en la misma empresa, el patrono estará obligado a proporcionárselo, siempre que ello sea factible, para lo cual podrá realizar los movimientos de personas que sean necesarios.”. Ese artículo sirvió de sustento para conceder la reubicación laboral por salud a la actora. Esta normativa tiene relación directa con el Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública (Decreto Ejecutivo número 19113 del 28 de julio de 1989), donde en su artículo 1° menciona que esta reglamentación tiene por objeto establecer las normas y los procedimientos que deberá seguir el Ministerio de Educación Pública para conceder licencia a sus servidores o servidoras, con motivo de la disminución de sus facultades o aptitudes para el trabajo, sobrevivientes de riesgos del trabajo o enfermedad. Por su parte, el numeral 2 establece: “Las licencias a que se refiere la presente reglamentación se concederán a aquellos servidores que, por la disminución sufrida en sus facultades o aptitudes, no pudieren desempeñar, sin detrimento de su salud o del servicio, las funciones y atribuciones correspondientes al cargo que venían desempeñando en calidad de servidores regulares”. Esa normativa distingue entre licencia permanente y licencia parcial, declarando que tienen derecho a esta última aquellos servidores o servidoras respecto de los cuales la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social o el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, en su valoración final, declaren una incapacidad menor permanente o una incapacidad parcial o permanente y recomienden un cambio de funciones. El artículo 8 trata, específicamente, el supuesto de la concesión de la licencia especial en los siguientes términos: “De conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 5° anterior, el Ministerio de Educación Pública, concederá una licencia especial a aquellos servidores que encuentren en las siguientes circunstancias:/a) Que de acuerdo con su dolencia la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, recomiende en la valoración final del tratamiento su cambio de funciones./ b) Que en la valoración final de los efectos del riesgo de trabajo acaecido, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, determine una incapacidad menor o parcial permanente y recomiende su incorporación al servicio con cambio de funciones”. El artículo 17 dice: “Los beneficiarios de las licencias previstas en esta reglamentación gozarán de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario con arreglo a lo dispuesto por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Código de Educación sobre la materia”. De modo que esta normativa complementa y no contradice lo dispuesto por el numeral 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, que reza: “a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por ´horario alterno´, o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando./ b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes./c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder”. La normativa reglamentaria desarrolla esta expresa disposición, contemplando de manera indistinta el derecho a la indemnización, tanto para el caso de la licencia permanente como de la especial. Así lo ha resuelto esta Sala en ocasiones anteriores en las que se ha discutido este mismo tema. En la sentencia número 57 de 9:50 horas, del 21 de enero de 2011, se explicó: “IV.- …La representante del Estado insiste en que el numeral 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil no resulta aplicable a la actora, pues esa norma solo está prevista para las personas que se incapacitan de forma permanente y que su situación debe regirse por lo establecido en el artículo 166, según el cual, ´Cuando la licencia se conceda al maestro por razón de enfermedad debidamente comprobada, se girará a su favor y por un tiempo no mayor de 6 meses, la mitad del sueldo anterior al disfrute de la licencia. En casos excepcionales puede autorizarse una prórroga de este beneficio hasta por dos trimestres más, si el maestro enfermo demostrare su incapacidad para trabajar, con el testimonio de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social”. No obstante, la Sala ha tenido la oportunidad de conocer asuntos iguales al presente y ha concluido que el citado artículo 174 no excluye al personal que disfruta de una licencia especial, por estar incapacitado de manera parcial. El numeral 166 citado no establece que su aplicación es dable solo para casos de licencias especiales. Por su parte, el artículo 174 tampoco excluye a los trabajadores incapacitados de manera parcial y que disfrutan de una licencia de ese tipo. Las normas no hacen distinción alguna entre licencias especiales y permanentes, aunado al hecho de que tampoco contemplan alguna diferenciación entre estas licencias y las incapacidades por enfermedad, aparte de que todas tienen como base, precisamente, la pérdida de la salud por una enfermedad incapacitante. Véase que el inciso a) de esta última norma señala que ´Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por horario alterno, o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando...´. Además, del numeral 173 ídem se desprende que la intención del legislador fue proteger la integridad del salario de las personas docentes durante el período de incapacidad. No otra cosa se deduce de lo indicado en el párrafo final del inciso a), según el cual, “...cuando se comprobare que la incapacidad se extiende a un período mayor de los cuatro días, su salario no sufrirá deducción´, así como de lo estipulado en el inciso b, donde se apunta que ´si el servidor estuviese protegido por el Seguro Social, el Ministerio de Educación le reconocerá la diferencia de salarios hasta completar el 100% (ciento por ciento) del mismo; caso de no estarlo, el pago del salario correrá por cuenta del Ministerio de Educación”. Ninguna de esas normas hace referencia a una incapacidad absoluta o excluye de su aplicación a las personas que gozan de licencia especial. Está claro que esta licencia se otorga a las o los servidores que padecen una incapacidad menor o parcial permanentes y requieren un cambio de funciones, según lo que se establece en el numeral 5 del Reglamento de licencias especiales para los servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública (Decreto Ejecutivo n° 19113, vigente a partir del 28 de julio de 1989). En el numeral 2 de esa normativa, también se establece que: “Las licencias a que se refiere la presente reglamentación se concederán a aquellos servidores que, por la disminución sufrida en sus facultades o aptitudes, no pudieren desempeñar, sin detrimento de su salud o del servicio, las funciones y atribuciones correspondientes al cargo que venían desempeñando en calidad de servidores regulares”. Ahora bien, en cuanto a la remuneración que deben percibir las personas beneficiarias de este tipo de licencia, la normativa especial apunta que tienen derecho a gozar de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario, según lo estipulado al respecto en el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y en el Código de Educación. En forma expresa, el artículo 17 del Reglamento preceptúa: “Los beneficiarios de las licencias previstas en esta reglamentación gozarán de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario con arreglo a lo dispuesto por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Código de Educación sobre la materia”. De lo transcrito se advierte la clara remisión a las normas del citado Estatuto y, entonces, resulta válida la aplicación del artículo 174; por cuanto, como se indicó, en esa norma no se hace exclusión alguna de este tipo de incapacidades. En consecuencia, si antes de la reubicación la actora devengaba el sobresueldo de 8 lecciones interinas, resulta indiscutible el derecho que tiene, conforme a esa normativa especial a que dentro de su remuneración, como funcionaria administrativa, este le siga siendo reconocido, independientemente de los requerimientos que de ese servicio tenga el ente empleador. Es decir, en aplicación de esa disposición especial, el ente demandado no podía suprimir este subsidio con naturaleza salarial concedido a la actora percibido antes de ser reubicada (inciso c, artículo 174 ídem). En adición a lo anterior, se debe dejar claro que la redacción actual del numeral 174 no da pie para eliminar los sobresueldos, por lo que, sin lugar a dudas, los servidores o las servidoras acogidos o acogidas a una licencia por enfermedad tienen derecho a continuar devengando este tipo de pluses mientras dure esa licencia. En el sublitem, el derecho al beneficio no deriva del ejercicio de las funciones sino de la aplicación de la normativa que expresamente le otorga el beneficio, en razón de su condición de salud (licencia especial). La norma contempla el derecho a que se siga percibiendo, en esas circunstancias, “un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario”. De ahí que no pueda concluirse, como se pretende, que se desvirtuó la naturaleza del recargo o que se afectan los fondos públicos de manera injustificada, puesto que las normas existentes son las que establecen esas consecuencias jurídicas. También carece de sustento la afirmación del recurrente en cuanto a que el reconocimiento de los recargos a la actora se concede como un derecho adquirido. Nótese que la anterior instancia otorgó este derecho únicamente mientras se mantenga su condición de reubicada. Luego, lo decidido tampoco resulta contrapuesto al criterio del Tribunal Constitucional, en el sentido de que los recargos tienen naturaleza temporal y no constituyen un derecho adquirido, dado que el caso no se refiere a la situación de una persona servidora activa en funciones que demande o no el recargo, sino que el tema se reduce a establecer la remuneración que debe percibir una persona funcionaria que no ha podido seguir efectuando sus labores normales ni los recargos que venía ejerciendo, en razón de un padecimiento (en sentido similar puede verse el voto de esta Sala 1429 de las 11:45 horas del 8 de setiembre de 2017). En el voto número 57 de las 9:50 horas del 21 de enero de 2011 de este Despacho se consideró: “Si bien es cierto que las y los docentes no tienen un derecho adquirido al citado horario u otras condiciones que pueden depender de distintas variables, lo cierto es que, en el caso concreto, no ha quedado demostrado que fuera otra circunstancia diferente a la del disfrute de la licencia especial por enfermedad la que se invocó para eliminar tales pluses de la remuneración de la accionante, con el argumento de que si no realizaba en forma efectiva la prestación, no tenía derecho a la retribución correspondiente. Así las cosas, más bien en aplicación del principio de legalidad (artículo 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) es que el ente demandado no podía suprimir del subsidio con naturaleza salarial concedido a la actora los pluses por horario alterno y recargo que percibía antes de ser incapacitada, ya que el inciso a) del artículo 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil claramente establece que las personas que resulten incapacitadas por enfermedad o maternidad tendrán derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que estuviere devengando”. En todo caso, en relación con los votos de la Sala Constitucional citados en el recurso, debe apuntarse que ya este otro órgano ha emitido pronunciamiento al respecto, en el sentido que éstos se dictan desde la perspectiva constitucional y que la normativa especial aplicable a este tipo de asuntos es clara en cuanto a la procedencia del derecho pretendido (ver entre otros, el voto número 397 de las 9:39 horas, del 24 de marzo y 537 de las 10:22 horas, del 9 de abril, ambas de 2010 y, 711 de las 9:55 horas, del 31 de agosto de 2011). De ahí que consideramos que el agravio sobre el particular no sea de recibo. DIFERENCIAS EN AGUINALDO. El pago de estas diferencias resulta procedente, puesto que los sobresueldos forman parte del cálculo de este derecho. El ordinal 2 de la Ley n.° 1835, Sueldo adicional de servidores públicos, establece en su segundo párrafo: “El sueldo adicional a que se refiere esta ley, será calculado con base en el promedio de los sueldos ordinarios y extraordinarios devengados durante el período indicado en el párrafo primero”. Luego, al estarse concediendo el recargo de dos lecciones interinas debe realizarse los ajustes correspondientes en las cantidades pagadas por este concepto a la actora, de modo que este agravio no puede prosperar. DIFERENCIAS EN SALARIO ESCOLAR: El alegato del representante del Estado es que no procede otorgar diferencias en el salario escolar, por cuanto este rubro se conforma por medio de una retención del aumento salarial, que después se paga en forma diferida en el mes de enero. El tema relacionado con la naturaleza jurídica del salario escolar ha sido ampliamente debatido. En algunas ocasiones se le consideró como una retención de pago diferido, como lo apunta el recurrente, y esta Sala mantuvo el criterio de que constituyó un componente salarial más. Sin embargo, la Sala Constitucional, en una reciente sentencia abordó el análisis del tema y concluyó que el salario escolar está conformado por una retención del aumento salarial, cuyo pago se difiere para otorgarlo en el mes de enero de cada año. En ese sentido, en el voto n.° 9188, de las 9:50 horas del 21 de mayo de 2020, estableció: “Ahora bien, de lo expuesto anteriormente se desprende que el salario escolar surge a partir de los ajustes en los aumentos que por concepto de costo de vida fueron decretados en el año 1994, y que con base en el acuerdo de política salarial de ese año, fueron cancelados en forma gradual, pagándose un porcentaje de estos en forma acumulativa en el mes de enero […] Así, en resumen, el salario escolar surge como un porcentaje del aumento salarial de los trabajadores que sería pagado por los patronos en forma acumulada y diferida durante el mes de enero de cada año y que, por lo tanto, se encuentra dentro patrimonio del empleado. Lo anterior, implica que no se trata de un pago extraordinario, como es el caso del aguinaldo, sino que forma parte del salario del trabajador.” Determinado lo anterior, la Sala observa que, para los efectos de la decisión, la naturaleza advertida en el recurso no tiene ninguna incidencia. El cálculo del salario escolar se hace tomando en cuenta los mismos componentes que se usan para determinar el monto que procede por aguinaldo. En ese tanto, significa que lo correspondiente por los sobresueldos en cuestión debió sumarse para su cálculo. Como este no se pagó, tampoco pudo haber sido incluido al momento de calcular lo que hubiera correspondido por salario escolar. En consecuencia, el reconocimiento de los recargos en sede judicial genera una diferencia en los montos que la accionante ha percibido por salario escolar. DIFERENCIAS EN VACACIONES: El recurso tampoco puede acogerse en cuanto se reclama la condena a pagar diferencias en vacaciones. Si bien el Juzgado ordenó el pago de estas, lo cierto es que también precisó que esta imposición se hacía “siempre y cuando hayan sido compensadas”. Luego, lo resuelto se ajusta a derecho, toda vez que el reconocimiento corrido de las diferencias en el salario abarcaría los períodos en los que el demandante haya estado de vacaciones, por lo que ningún perjuicio se causa al Estado (ordinal 589 del Código de Trabajo). SOBRE LOS INTERESES Y LA INDEXACIÓN: Reprocha la representación estatal que se haya condenado tanto al pago de intereses como de indexación. Esta Sala, en repetidas oportunidades, ha resuelto sobre la procedencia de la condena a reconocer la indexación juntamente con los intereses legales. Así, en la sentencia n.° 993, de las 11:30 horas del 14 de setiembre de 2016, se indicó: “La Sala ha sostenido: ‘Las partes de las relaciones jurídico-patrimoniales, cuando la obligación ha surgido del acuerdo o convenio, pueden recurrir a mecanismos de tutela del acreedor que no estén prohibidas por las leyes, en atención a las eventuales devaluaciones o pérdida del valor adquisitivo de la moneda nacional, como suele hacerse recurriendo a monedas más fuertes y estables que el colón, como el dólar de los Estados Unidos. Mas, en el caso de obligaciones como las concedidas en la sentencia que se conoce (salarios caídos y diferencias en aguinaldo), al no existir un mecanismo de actualización monetaria, el incumplimiento prolongado de la parte deudora, acarrea un desplazamiento económico hacia el propio deudor y un empobrecimiento para el acreedor. Como tal enriquecimiento debe considerarse ilícito, pues violenta los más elementales principios de justicia y equidad, debe tomarse en cuenta lo dispuesto en el artículo 10 del Código Civil que establece que las normas deben interpretarse según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas, y reconocer la posibilidad de compensar la pérdida del valor real del dinero y con un mejor estudio de la cuestión darle al citado numeral 706 una aplicación diferente, restándole el efecto obstáculo que se le ha venido dando, entendido que la actualización monetaria no constituye propiamente una indemnización sino un mecanismo de pago de lo verdaderamente adeudado, lo justamente debido, al momento del incumplimiento, lo cual en esa inteligencia, no resulta prohibido. Ha de tomarse en cuenta, que el contrato de trabajo obliga tanto a lo que en él se expresa, como a las consecuencias que se deriven de su contenido según la buena fe, la equidad, el uso, la costumbre o la ley (artículo 19 del Código de Trabajo. En igual sentido, en el numeral 1023 del Código Civil se dispone: “1) Los contratos obligan tanto a lo que se expresa en ellos, como a las consecuencias que la equidad, el uso o la ley hacen nacer de la obligación, según la naturaleza de ésta…”), lo cual exige de las partes una conducta transparente en las diferentes fases de la relación jurídica y su ajuste estricto, en el ejercicio de sus derechos a criterios justos. Así, a los daños y perjuicios que ocasiona el retraso (mora) en que incurre la parte deudora en el cumplimiento de la obligación, imposibilitando el disfrute efectivo y a tiempo por parte de su acreedor (artículo 702 ídem), debe sumarse el problema inflacionario que con el tiempo produce la depreciación de la moneda, reduciendo el contenido real de la obligación principal, lo cual hace nacer la necesidad de indexar para eliminar el enriquecimiento ilícito producido a favor del deudor. Los principios generales del derecho –que permean e irradian la totalidad del ordenamiento jurídico-, imponen además de la íntegra reparación del daño, el ineludible equilibrio que debe mediar en las contraprestaciones, la prohibición del abuso del derecho y del enriquecimiento injusto, de manera tal que el cumplimiento debe ajustarse siempre a la realidad. Por otra parte, el artículo 41 constitucional exige restituir el estado de cosas lesionado a su situación anterior, lo que debe hacerse en el contexto y valor presente. Esto, por cuanto una solución distinta haría nugatorio ese derecho constitucional (tutela judicial efectiva, artículos 41 y 49), lo mismo que el de propiedad (artículo 45), toda vez que se admitiría un pago insuficiente, significando un enriquecimiento injusto para el deudor, según se dijo’ (resolución n° 267 de las 10:45 horas del 30 de marzo de 2012). De esta manera, la no aplicación de la figura de la indexación ante casos como el que nos ocupa, frente a la dilación culpable en el cumplimiento de las obligaciones laborales por parte del empleador, significaría privilegiar a la parte más fuerte de la relación, permitiéndole beneficiarse, a partir de la inflación, de su morosidad, con lo cual se violenta el principio protector que inspira el derecho de trabajo y que se recoge en el artículo 17 del Código de Trabajo. Por ello, también debe ratificarse lo resuelto por el ad quem en relación con este punto” (voto número 102 de las 10:25 horas, del 30 de enero de 2013), criterio que se comparte plenamente y, además, no existe en el subjúdice ningún elemento que permita variarlo”. Aunado a ello, con base en el numeral 565 del Código de Trabajo, antes transcrito, en materia laboral, por imperativo legal, toda sentencia que condene a pagar una obligación dineraria implicará para el deudor, salvo pacto o disposición expresa en contrario, el pago de intereses e indexación. SOBRE LAS COSTAS: En el recurso interpuesto por la parte actora, solicita que se condene al Estado al pago de ambas costas. El artículo 562 del Código de Trabajo, la regla general dispone la condenatoria en costas al vencido. Aunque en el numeral siguiente se indican los supuestos en los que procede la exoneración en este rubro. En el sublitem no se advierte que exista buena fe en el actuar procesal del demandado, dado que existen numerosos pronunciamientos de esta Sala sobre el tema debatido. La negativa del accionado a corregir la situación de la actora la obligó a recurrir a la instancia judicial, con evidente gasto de su tiempo y de pago de honorarios de un profesional en derecho que atendiera su posición en juicio. Por estas razones, acogemos el recurso de la parte actora y condenamos al Estado al pago de ambas costas, estableciendo las personales en el 20% de la condena

POR TANTO:

Se acoge el recurso de la representación estatal y se declara sin lugar el interpuesto por la parte actora. Se anula la sentencia recurrida y se declara sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos, admitiendo a su respecto la excepción de falta de derecho. Se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas. El magistrado Olaso Álvarez y la magistrada Montero Morales desestiman el recurso planteado por el Estado y acogen el interpuesto por la parte actora. Anulan el fallo recurrido en cuanto resolvió sin especial condena en costas, y en su lugar condenan a la accionada al pago de estos emolumentos, estableciendo las personales en el veinte por ciento de la condena.

Res: 2025002697 NROSITO Julia Varela Araya Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Ana Patricia Montero Morales Rafael Antonio Ortega Telleria Eddy Rodriguez Chaves Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador --  1