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Res. 16342-2010 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 29/09/2010
OutcomeResultado
The Constitutional Chamber denies the amparo, upholding the Comptroller General's jurisdiction to continue the administrative proceeding against the Mayor of San José.La Sala Constitucional declara sin lugar el recurso de amparo, confirmando la competencia de la Contraloría General de la República para continuar el procedimiento administrativo contra el Alcalde de San José.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber hears a writ of amparo filed by the Mayor of San José against the Comptroller General (CGR) in connection with a public finances administrative proceeding (DAGJ-71-2009) over alleged irregularities in a cadastral update contract. The petitioner argues that, under Article 259 of the Electoral Code, only the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) may initiate proceedings against mayors, that the CGR's actions violate municipal autonomy, and that the procedure's design—where the same body investigates and decides—breaches due process. The Chamber dismisses the amparo: it holds that the question of whether the CGR or the TSE holds jurisdiction is beyond the amparo's scope, as the CGR is not a manifestly incompetent body; it reiterates the constitutionality of Articles 68 and 73 of the Comptroller Organic Law and confirms that municipal autonomy does not preclude the CGR's oversight. The procedural objections lack the severity required for an amparo since they do not cause defenselessness.La Sala Constitucional conoce un recurso de amparo del Alcalde de San José contra la Contraloría General de la República, en el marco de un procedimiento administrativo de hacienda pública (DAGJ-71-2009) por presuntas irregularidades en la ejecución de un contrato de actualización catastral. El recurrente argumenta que, según el artículo 259 del Código Electoral, solo el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones puede iniciar procedimientos contra alcaldes, que la actuación contralora vulnera la autonomía municipal y que el diseño del procedimiento –donde un mismo órgano instruye y decide– viola el debido proceso. La Sala desestima el amparo: señala que la cuestión de si la competencia corresponde a la Contraloría o al TSE es ajena al amparo, pues no se trata de un órgano manifiestamente incompetente; además, reitera la constitucionalidad de los artículos 68 y 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría y confirma que la autonomía municipal no impide la fiscalización contralora. Las objeciones procedimentales no alcanzan la gravedad requerida para un amparo, ya que no generan indefensión.
Key excerptExtracto clave
The arguments raised by the petitioner do not directly relate to the protection of fundamental rights—the exclusive object of the amparo writ—since although it is considered that he faces a disciplinary proceeding in which respect for the due process principle is central, not every alleged irregularity in this type of proceeding implies a constitutional violation of due process. (...) Thus, determining whether the Comptroller General or the Supreme Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction to initiate the proceeding, and whether its continuation violates municipal autonomy, are matters beyond the Chamber's competence in amparo (Ruling #2006-10777 of July 26, 2006). The first scenario described does not involve the intervention of a manifestly incompetent body, for the constitutionality of Articles 68 and 73 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General has been upheld in repeated precedents, even regarding decentralized entities (...).Los argumentos que plantea el actor no se relacionan de forma directa con la protección de los derechos fundamentales –objeto exclusivo del recurso de amparo–, pues aunque se toma en consideración que enfrenta un procedimiento de índole sancionatorio, en cuyo desarrollo es central el respeto del principio del debido proceso, no toda aducida irregularidad en este tipo de procedimiento implica violación constitucional del debido proceso. (...) De este modo, establecer si competía a la Contraloría General de la República o al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones iniciar el procedimiento, así como si con su prosecución se violenta la autonomía municipal, son extremos ajenos al ámbito competencial de la Sala en amparo (resolución #2006-10777 de las 14:49 horas del 26 de julio de 2006). No se trata, el primer supuesto descrito, de la intervención de un órgano manifiestamente incompetente para actuar, pues en repetidos pronunciamientos se ha sustentado la constitucionalidad de los artículos 68 y 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, aún frente a entes descentralizados (...).
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Que la Constitución confiera a esos entes autonomía política y administrativa no libera a sus jerarcas del respeto del deber de probidad y del cumplimiento de las normas de protección de la hacienda pública, cuya infracción corresponde verificar a la Contraloría General accionada."
"That the Constitution grants those entities political and administrative autonomy does not release their heads from the duty of probity and compliance with the rules protecting public funds, whose violation it is for the defendant Comptroller General to verify."
Considerando V
"Que la Constitución confiera a esos entes autonomía política y administrativa no libera a sus jerarcas del respeto del deber de probidad y del cumplimiento de las normas de protección de la hacienda pública, cuya infracción corresponde verificar a la Contraloría General accionada."
Considerando V
"El desdoblamiento reclamado no constituye un elemento básico del principio en cuestión, ni implica desventaja para el actor en el ejercicio de su derecho de defensa."
"The claimed separation of functions does not constitute a basic element of the principle at issue, nor does it imply a disadvantage for the petitioner in the exercise of his right of defense."
Considerando VI
"El desdoblamiento reclamado no constituye un elemento básico del principio en cuestión, ni implica desventaja para el actor en el ejercicio de su derecho de defensa."
Considerando VI
Full documentDocumento completo
Res. No. 2010-016342 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours and six minutes of the twenty-ninth of September of two thousand ten.
Amparo action filed by Johnny Araya Monge, of legal age, Mayor of San José, bearer of identity card number 1-476-724, against the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic.
Considering:
1.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 18:55 hours on August 3, 2010, the petitioner states that the respondent comptroller body is pursuing ordinary sanctioning procedure DAGJ-71-2009 against him and other persons. He considers that the Office of the Comptroller cannot pursue sanctioning procedures against municipal officials, as it contradicts local autonomy. That according to Article 259 of the Electoral Code, it falls to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to make an initial assessment of the matter and then, if deemed pertinent, to refer the case to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The Office of the Comptroller cannot act ex officio. Disqualification from holding public office cannot be imposed on him, since the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's sole jurisdiction is to cancel credentials. Finally, he alleges that, given the confusion of regulatory rules, the Office of the Comptroller intends a single body to be both instructor and decision-maker at the same time, but he maintains that the hearing and the draft final act will be handled by one of its members, that is, one member will be the only one with immediacy, that member will form an opinion, draft the final act, and vote on it in the collegiate body. It is an unnecessarily complicated system, adopted by the Office of the Comptroller, which implies that the member acting individually advances an opinion and only harms those under investigation. He alleges the violation of Articles 11, 39, and 41 of the Political Constitution.
2.- Rocío Aguilar Montoya, in her capacity as Comptroller General of the Republic, reports under oath (folio 34) that at the end of 2000, the Municipality of San José conducted an international public bidding procedure for the updating of the cadastre of the central canton, known as the Fiscal Geographic Information System, a tender awarded to the Consorcio Estudios y Proyectos de Ingeniería Urbana S.A. de C.V. and Argeomática S.A. de C.V., composed of foreign companies, with which the municipal corporation formalized the respective contract. The Office of the Comptroller was made aware of apparently irregular events that occurred during the execution of the contract, and therefore, by resolution at 14:00 hours on February 11, 2010, expanded by resolution at 9:30 hours on July 5, 2010, the Legal Division of the comptroller body opened an administrative public treasury (hacienda pública) procedure against the petitioner. It was initiated and is processed based on the power established in Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. It analyzes the eventual administrative and civil liability of the petitioner. If the imputed facts were proven, for failure of the legal duties of internal control, for having allegedly authorized payments to the contractor exceeding what his powers as Mayor permitted, sanctions ranging from a written warning to dismissal or cancellation of his credential could be imposed. The foregoing, based on Articles 110 of the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets; 2, 12, and 41 of the General Law of Internal Control; 17 a) 18 d) and 24 e) of the Municipal Code; 3, 4, and 38 d) of the Law Against Corruption; and 73 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. A sanction of two to eight years, prohibiting him from entering or re-entering public treasury (Hacienda Pública) positions that are not by popular election, could also be imposed, based on Article 72 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller. Regarding patrimonial liability, he was imputed as civilly and jointly and severally liable for the sum of 822,968,103.99 colones. This, based on Articles 94 of the Law on Administrative Contracting, 108, 110, 114, and 116 of the Law of the Financial Administration, and 210 of the General Law of Public Administration, for allegedly not having taken the necessary actions to prevent the Municipality of San José from receiving a partial, incomplete, and defective delivery of the Fiscal Geographic Information System, even though the Internal Audit brought the situation to his attention in a timely manner. In ruling #5445-99 of the Constitutional Chamber, it was noted the impropriety of the Office of the Comptroller acting as the directing body of an administrative procedure for disciplinary liability of municipal officials belonging to the municipal administrative career, as it would invade municipal autonomy and be detrimental to the disciplinary powers of the Mayor. In resolution #6326-2000, the Chamber clarified that this did not prevent actions relating to municipal leaders, much less those of popular election, from being taken. Recognizing the jurisdiction of the Office of the Comptroller to investigate violations of the control and oversight regulations for public funds, through the special procedure of Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller, does not violate due process or municipal autonomy. The pronouncements of the Chamber #7343-2006 and #10777-2006 were adopted in the same sense. The argument that with Article 259 of the Municipal Code the Office of the Comptroller has lost the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings, like the one against the petitioner, is also not valid. The rule refers to the specific scenario of the direct referral to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of the eventual discussion of the cancellation of an official's credentials. The cancellation or annulment of credentials is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The rule does not in any way prevent the Comptroller from initiating a procedure, based on Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller, nor does it condition its intervention on the referral of the case by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner forgets the functional independence conferred on the Office of the Comptroller by Article 183 of the Political Constitution. The Chamber has established the constitutionality of the cited Article 68 (rulings #4835-2001, #7044-2002, #13140-2003, and #3904-2004). The informant clarifies that a distinction must be made between the disqualification from holding public office (Article 72 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic) and the cancellation of credentials. The latter could only be applied by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, which the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic could recommend. Disqualification does not imply the loss of the credential and is not enforceable against elective positions, so its imposition does not mandate the intervention of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Regarding the arguments related to the composition of the decision-making body, the Regulation of Administrative Procedures of the Office of the Comptroller establishes the designation of a procedure-directing body as optional. The practice of a single body for instruction and decision has been reiterated, endorsed by the Chamber in ruling #6379-2002. The Organic Regulation of the Office of the Comptroller established the collegiate processing of the opening and the final act of administrative procedures. The entire collegiate body attends the hearing. The merging of the instruction and decision-making tasks seeks to ensure the principle of immediacy of evidence and full knowledge of the file and its incidents. All decisions are adopted, signed, and validated by all members of the collegiate body. No arbitrariness has been incurred, nor any violation of due process, and therefore it is requested that the filed action be dismissed.
3.- In the brief on folio 52, the petitioner stated that the purpose of the contract was an update of the Municipality's cadastre, not a fiscal geographic information system. No software was contracted. The Office of the Comptroller General decided to initiate the procedure without the Supreme Electoral Tribunal having requested it. It seeks to impose sanctions beyond what the Tribunal can order and to hold him economically liable for the contract, as if it had yielded no result. Vote 6326 is from 2000. The Electoral Code is from 2009, its Article 259 clearly stating "When the cancellation is urged," that is, when the Tribunal has exercised the initiative as the deciding body. Only the Tribunal can assess whether there is merit to go to a formal procedure. The Office of the Comptroller lost its initiative and its recommendations their binding character. The matter reduces to that of the proprietorship of the sanctioning power over Mayors, by Constitution and by law.
4.- By memorial of September 29, 2010 (folio 55), José Joaquín Porras Contreras, Deputy for the Partido Accesibilidad sin Exclusión, requested to be admitted as a passive co-adjuvant in this process.
5.- In the proceedings followed, legal prescriptions have been observed.
Drafted by Magistrate Armijo Sancho; and,
Considering:
I.- Object of the action. The petitioner considers that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic could not initiate ex officio the procedure pursued under file DJ-71-2009, by virtue of the provisions of Article 259 of the Electoral Code; that it violates municipal autonomy to seek to impose disciplinary and civil liability on him, as well as the sanction of disqualification from holding public office; and that the fact that only one of the members of the decision-making body holds the oral hearing and prepares the base report for the final resolution of the procedure contradicts due process. The co-adjuvancy of José Joaquín Porras Contreras is admitted, on the understanding that its sole purpose and role is to collaborate with its arguments in the process.
II.- Proven facts. Of importance for the decision of this matter, the following facts are deemed duly demonstrated, either because they have been accredited or because the respondent has omitted to refer to them as provided in the initial order:
III.- On the merits. The arguments raised by the petitioner do not relate directly to the protection of fundamental rights –the exclusive object of the amparo action–, for although it is taken into consideration that he faces a procedure of a sanctioning nature, in the development of which respect for the principle of due process is central, not every alleged irregularity in this type of procedure implies a constitutional violation of due process. The basic constitutive elements of the principle, in the administrative realm, are established in ruling #15-90 of 16:45 hours on January 5, 1990, and in repeated subsequent pronouncements, as follows:
"(...) the right of defense guaranteed by Article 39 of the Political Constitution and consequently the principle of due process, contained in Article 41 of our Fundamental Charter, or as it is usually called in doctrine, the principle of 'bilateralism of the hearing' or of 'due legal process' or 'principle of contradiction' (...) has been synthesized thus: a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure; b) the right to be heard, and the opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce the evidence they deem pertinent; c) the opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to the information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; ch) the right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and the reasons on which it is based; and e) the right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued." "... the right of defense protected in Article 39 ibidem governs not only for jurisdictional proceedings, but also for any administrative procedure carried out by the public administration; and that the petitioner must necessarily be given the right to be assisted by a lawyer, if they so choose, in order to exercise their defense. (...)"
On the other hand, this Tribunal has repeatedly indicated –when specifying its scope of jurisdiction– that in matters of due process, amparo is admissible only against evidently arbitrary acts that directly violate fundamental rights, that is, serious, gross, and clear violations of the right of defense, since this venue was not created to correct all procedural defects, but only to remedy infringements of the essential elements of due process that place the administered party in an evident state of defenselessness. Thus, not every violation of procedural rules becomes, per se, a violation of constitutional relevance, remediable in this venue. On the contrary, amparo only proceeds, due to the summary nature that characterizes it, in the face of serious violations that directly and effectively violate or threaten to violate the right of defense or due process (cf. rulings #98-2109 of 17:24 hours on March 25, 1998, #2001-1545 of 9:31 hours on February 23, and #2001-10198 of 15:29 hours on October 10, the latter two of 2001).
IV.- Therefore, establishing whether it fell to the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic or the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to initiate the procedure, as well as whether its continuation violates municipal autonomy, are aspects outside the jurisdictional scope of the Chamber in amparo proceedings (resolution #2006-10777 of 14:49 hours on July 26, 2006). The first described scenario does not involve the intervention of a body manifestly incompetent to act, since in repeated pronouncements the constitutionality of Articles 68 and 73 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic has been upheld, even against decentralized entities (rulings #2001-4835 of 14:46 hours on June 6, 2001; #2002-7044 of 15:07 hours on June 16, 2002; #2003-13140 of 14:37 hours on November 12, 2003; #2004-3904 of 15:11 hours on April 21, 2004). Article 259 of the Electoral Code of 2009 does not patently withdraw any jurisdiction from the Office of the Comptroller, as recognized by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal itself in the recent resolution #6061-M-2010 of 12:15 hours on September 13, 2010, in which the cancellation of the credentials of the Municipal Mayor of the Central Canton of Alajuela is decreed, based on a procedure initiated by the Office of the Comptroller, ex officio, in March 2010, to verify whether the legal framework governing municipal and public treasury matters had been transgressed. The Tribunal considered the prescriptions of Article 259 of the Electoral Code satisfied in that case and without objection (Considerando III of the resolution).
V.- On the other hand, the constitutional compatibility of the sanctioning powers of the Office of the Comptroller with municipal autonomy was established in the already cited pronouncement #2004-3904 of 15:11 hours on April 21, 2004. That the Constitution confers political and administrative autonomy on these entities does not exempt their leaders from respecting the duty of probity and compliance with the rules for the protection of the public treasury (hacienda pública), the violation of which the respondent Office of the Comptroller General is responsible for verifying. The allegations of violation of due process due to the material incompetence of the Office of the Comptroller must, therefore, be dismissed, and this aspect of the amparo must be denied.
VI.- Finally, the petitioner complains against procedural guidelines that also do not entail disregard for the essence of the constitutional principle of due process, such as the instruction of the procedure executed directly by the person who will issue its final act, and the holding of the oral hearing and preparation of the base report for the final resolution of the procedure by just one of the members of the decision-making body. The claimed splitting does not constitute a basic element of the principle in question, nor does it imply a disadvantage for the petitioner in the exercise of his right of defense. It is for practical reasons, and not for impartiality, that instruction and decision may fall to different bodies, but if the decision-maker can immediately take over the processing of the procedure, no defenselessness is caused to the investigated party. Regarding the holding of the hearing in a single-member manner, the allegation lacks support, since the General Comptroller, in her report, indicates that it is the decision-making body as a collegiate body that participates in that procedural act. And with respect to the preparation of a final report by one of the members of the decision-making body and its subsequent submission to the collegiate body for approval, even if it constituted a procedural defect, it lacks the gravity and relevance defined above for it to be heard in an amparo proceeding. The action, consequently, must be declared without merit.
Therefore:
The action is declared without merit.
Ana Virginia Calzada M. President Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.
Res. Nº 2010-016342 **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours and six minutes on the twenty-ninth of September, two thousand ten.** An amparo action filed by Johnny Araya Monge, of legal age, Mayor of San José, holder of identity card number 1-476-724, against the Comptroller General of the Republic.
**Whereas:** **1.-** By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 18:55 hours on August 3, 2010, the petitioner states that the respondent comptroller body is pursuing ordinary sanctioning procedure DAGJ-71-2009 against him and other persons. He considers that the Comptroller General cannot pursue sanctioning procedures against municipal officials, as this contradicts local autonomy. That according to Article 259 of the Electoral Code, it is the Supreme Electoral Tribunal that must make an initial assessment of the matter and then, if deemed pertinent, refer the case to the Comptroller General of the Republic. The Comptroller General cannot act ex officio. Disqualification from holding public office cannot be imposed on him, since the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's only competence is to cancel credentials. Finally, he alleges that, given the confusion of regulatory norms, the Comptroller General intends for a single body to be both investigator and decision-maker at the same time, but he maintains that the hearing and the draft final act will be handled by one of its members, meaning one member will be the only one with immediacy; that member will form an opinion, draft the final act, and vote on it in the collegiate body. It is an unnecessarily complicated system, adopted by the Comptroller General, which implies that the member acting individually advances an opinion and only harms the investigated parties. He alleges the violation of Articles 11, 39, and 41 of the Political Constitution.
**2.-** Rocío Aguilar Montoya, in her capacity as Comptroller General of the Republic, reports under oath (folio 34) that, at the end of the year 2000, the Municipality of San José carried out an international public bidding procedure for the updating of the cadastre (catastro) of the central canton, known as the Fiscal Geographic Information System, a tender that was awarded to the Consortium Estudios y Proyectos de Ingeniería Urbana S.A. de C.V. and Argeomática S.A. de C.V., composed of foreign companies, with which the municipal corporation formalized the respective contract. The Comptroller General was made aware of facts, apparently irregular, that occurred during the execution of the contract, and therefore, by resolution at 14:00 hours on February 11, 2010, extended by resolution at 9:30 hours on July 5, 2010, the Legal Division of the comptroller body opened a public treasury administrative procedure against the petitioner. It was initiated and is processed based on the power established in Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic. In it, the possible administrative and civil liability of the petitioner is analyzed. If the imputed facts were proven, for failure in the legal duties of internal control, for allegedly having authorized payments to the contractor exceeding what his powers as Mayor allowed, sanctions could be imposed ranging from a written reprimand to dismissal or cancellation of his credentials. The foregoing, based on Articles 110 of the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, 2, 12, and 41 of the General Law of Internal Control; 17 a) 18 d) and 24 e) of the Municipal Code; 3, 4, and 38 d) of the Law against Corruption; and 73 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic. A sanction of two to eight years could also be imposed, which would prohibit his entry or re-entry to positions in the Public Treasury that are not by popular election, based on Article 72 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General. Regarding patrimonial liability, he was charged as civilly and jointly and severally liable for the sum of 822,968,103.99 colones. This, based on Articles 94 of the Administrative Contracting Law, 108, 110, 114, and 116 of the Law of the Financial Administration, and 210 of the General Law of Public Administration, for allegedly not having taken the necessary actions to prevent the Municipality of San José from receiving a partial, incomplete, and defective delivery of the Fiscal Geographic Information System, even though the Internal Audit informed him of the situation in a timely manner. In ruling #5445-99 of the Constitutional Chamber, the impropriety of the Comptroller General acting as the directing body in an administrative procedure for disciplinary liability of municipal officials belonging to the municipal administrative career was warned, as it would invade municipal autonomy and would be to the detriment of the disciplinary powers of the Mayor. In resolution #6326-2000, the Chamber clarified that this did not prevent taking actions related to municipal leaders, much less those by popular election. Recognizing the competence of the Comptroller General to investigate violations of the control and oversight regulations of public funds, through the special procedure of Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General, does not violate due process or municipal autonomy. In the same sense, the Chamber's pronouncements #7343-2006 and #10777-2006 were adopted. Nor is the argument valid that with Article 259 of the Municipal Code, the Comptroller General lost the competence to initiate procedures, such as the one being followed against the petitioner. The norm refers to the specific case of direct referral to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for the eventual discussion of the cancellation of an official's credentials. The cancellation or annulment of credentials is the exclusive competence of the Tribunal. The norm in no way prevents the Comptroller General from initiating a procedure based on Article 68 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General, nor does it subject its intervention to the referral of a case by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner overlooks the functional independence that Article 183 of the Political Constitution confers upon the Comptroller General. The Chamber has established the constitutionality of the cited Article 68 (rulings #4835-2001, #7044-2002, #13140-2003, and #3904-2004). The informant clarifies that a distinction must be made between disqualification from holding public office (Article 72 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic) and the cancellation of credentials. The latter could only be applied by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and the Comptroller General of the Republic could recommend it. Disqualification does not imply loss of credentials and is not opposable to elective positions, so its imposition does not require the intervention of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Regarding the arguments related to the composition of the decision-making body, the Regulation of Administrative Procedures of the Comptroller General establishes the designation of a directing body for the procedure as optional. The practice of a single body for investigation and decision has been reiterated, endorsed by the Chamber in ruling #6379-2002. The Organic Regulation of the Comptroller General established the collegiate processing of the opening and the final act of administrative procedures. The entire collegiate body attends the hearing. The fusion of the investigation and decision-making tasks seeks to ensure the principle of immediacy of evidence and full knowledge of the file and its incidents. All decisions are adopted, signed, and validated by all members of the collegiate body. No arbitrariness has been incurred, nor any violation of due process, for which reason it is requested that the filed action be dismissed.
**3.-** In a brief at folio 52, the petitioner stated that the purpose of the contract was an update of the Municipality's cadastre (catastro), not a fiscal geographic information system. No software was contracted. The Comptroller General decided to initiate the procedure without the Supreme Electoral Tribunal requiring it. It seeks to impose sanctions beyond what the Tribunal can order and to hold him economically responsible for the contract, as if it had yielded no results. Ruling 6326 is from 2000. The Electoral Code is from 2009, its Article 259 clearly stating "When the cancellation is requested," that is, when the Tribunal has exercised the initiative as the decision-making body. Only the Tribunal can assess whether there is merit to proceed to a formal procedure. The Comptroller General lost its initiative and its recommendations their mandatory nature. The matter reduces to the ownership of the sanctioning power over Mayors, by Constitution and by law.
**4.-** By a memorial of September 29, 2010 (folio 55), José Joaquín Porras Contreras, Congressman for the Partido Accesibilidad sin Exclusión, requested to be considered a passive coadjuvant in this process.
**5.-** In the proceedings followed, the legal prescriptions have been observed.
Drafted by Magistrate **Armijo Sancho**; and, **Considering:** **I.- Purpose of the action.** The petitioner considers that the Comptroller General of the Republic could not initiate ex officio the procedure being followed under file DJ-71-2009, by virtue of the provisions of Article 259 of the Electoral Code; that seeking to impose disciplinary and civil liability on him, as well as the sanction of disqualification from the exercise of public office, violates municipal autonomy; and that having only one of the members of the decision-making body hold the oral hearing and prepare the base report for the final resolution of the procedure contradicts due process. The coadjuvancy of José Joaquín Porras Contreras is admitted, under the understanding that his sole purpose and role is to collaborate with his arguments in the process.
**II.- Proven facts.** Of importance for the decision of this matter, the following facts are deemed duly demonstrated, either because they have been accredited or because the respondent has omitted to refer to them as provided in the initial order:
**III.- On the merits.** The arguments raised by the petitioner do not relate directly to the protection of fundamental rights – the exclusive purpose of the amparo action – since although it is taken into consideration that he faces a procedure of a sanctioning nature, in whose development respect for the principle of due process is central, not every alleged irregularity in this type of procedure implies a constitutional violation of due process. The basic constitutive elements of the principle, in the administrative sphere, are established in ruling #15-90 of 16:45 hours on January 5, 1990, and in repeated subsequent pronouncements, as follows:
"(...) the right of defense guaranteed by Article 39 of the Political Constitution and consequently the principle of due process, contained in Article 41 of our Fundamental Charter, or as it is often called in doctrine, the principle of 'bilateral hearing' of 'legal due process' or 'principle of contradiction' (...) has been synthesized as follows: a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present the arguments and produce the evidence deemed pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; ch) the administered party's right to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and of the grounds on which it is based; and e) the interested party's right to appeal the decision issued." "..."
the right to a defense safeguarded in Article 39 ibidem, governs not only judicial proceedings, but also any administrative proceeding carried out by the public administration; and that the petitioner must necessarily be given, if he so wishes, the right to be assisted by a lawyer, in order to exercise his defense. (...)" On the other hand, this Court has indicated on repeated occasions—when specifying its scope of jurisdiction—that in matters of due process, the amparo remedy is appropriate only against acts that are evidently arbitrary and that directly violate fundamental rights, that is, serious, crude, and clear violations of the right to a defense, since this venue was not created to correct all procedural defects, but only to remedy infringements of the essential elements of due process that place the individual under administration in an evident state of defenselessness. Thus, not every violation of procedural rules becomes, per se, a violation of constitutional relevance, actionable in this venue. On the contrary, the amparo remedy is appropriate only, due to its summary nature, in the face of serious violations that directly and effectively violate or threaten to violate the right to defense or due process (cf. rulings #98-2109 of 17:24 hours on March 25, 1998, #2001-1545 of 9:31 hours on February 23, and #2001-10198 of 15:29 hours on October 10, the latter two from 2001).
**IV.-** Thus, establishing whether it was the responsibility of the Contraloría General de la República or the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to initiate the proceeding, as well as whether its continuation violates municipal autonomy, are matters outside the jurisdictional scope of this Chamber in amparo proceedings (resolution #2006-10777 of 14:49 hours on July 26, 2006). The first scenario described does not involve the intervention of a manifestly incompetent body to act, since in repeated pronouncements the constitutionality of Articles 68 and 73 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República has been upheld, even against decentralized entities (rulings #2001-4835 of 14:46 hours on June 6, 2001; #2002-7044 of 15:07 hours on June 16, 2002; #2003-13140 of 14:37 hours on November 12, 2003; #2004-3904 of 15:11 hours on April 21, 2004). Article 259 of the 2009 Código Electoral does not clearly remove any jurisdiction from the Contraloría, as was recognized by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones itself, in the recent resolution #6061-M-2010 of 12:15 hours on September 13, 2010, in which the cancellation of the credentials of the Municipal Mayor of the Central Canton of Alajuela was decreed, based on a proceeding initiated by the Contraloría, on its own motion, in March 2010, to verify whether the legal framework governing municipal and public finance matters had been violated. The Court considered the prescriptions of Article 259 of the Código Electoral to have been fulfilled, in that case and without objection (Considerando III of the resolution).
**V.-** Furthermore, the constitutional compatibility of the Contraloría's sanctioning powers with municipal autonomy was established in the aforementioned pronouncement #2004-3904 of 15:11 hours on April 21, 2004. That the Constitution grants these entities political and administrative autonomy does not free their leaders from respect for the duty of probity and compliance with the rules for the protection of public finances, the violation of which is the responsibility of the respondent Contraloría General to verify. The allegations of violation of due process due to the Contraloría's material incompetence must, therefore, be discarded, and this aspect of the amparo petition dismissed.
**VI.-** Finally, the petitioner complains against procedural guidelines that likewise do not entail disregard for the essence of the constitutional principle of due process, such as the conduct of the proceeding carried out directly by the person who will issue its final act, and the holding of the oral hearing and preparation of the base report for the final resolution of the proceeding by only one of the members of the deciding body. The split functions claimed do not constitute a basic element of the principle in question, nor do they imply a disadvantage for the petitioner in the exercise of his right to defense. It is for practical reasons, and not for impartiality, that instruction and decision may be assigned to different bodies, but if the decision-maker can immediately assume the handling of the proceeding, no defenselessness is caused to the investigated party. Regarding the holding of the hearing by a single person, the allegation lacks support, since the Contralora General indicates, in her report, that it is the deciding body as a whole that participates in that procedural act. And with respect to the preparation of a final report by one of the members of the deciding body and its subsequent submission to the full body for approval, even if it constitutes a procedural defect, it lacks the seriousness and relevance defined above, for purposes of being heard through the amparo proceeding. The appeal, consequently, must be declared without merit.
**Por tanto:** The appeal is declared without merit.
Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.
**III.- On the merits.** The arguments raised by the plaintiff do not relate directly to the protection of fundamental rights—the exclusive purpose of the amparo appeal—since, although it is taken into consideration that he faces a proceeding of a sanctioning nature, in the development of which respect for the principle of due process (principio del debido proceso) is central, not every alleged irregularity in this type of proceeding implies a constitutional violation of due process.
The basic constituent elements of the principle, in the administrative venue, are established in judgment #15-90 of 4:45 p.m. on January 5, 1990, and in repeated subsequent pronouncements, as follows:
*(...) the right of defense guaranteed by Article 39 of the Political Constitution and consequently the principle of due process, contained in Article 41 of our Fundamental Charter, or as it is often called in doctrine, the principle of 'bilateral hearing' of 'due process of law' or 'adversarial principle' (...) has been synthesized as follows: a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the proceeding; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce evidence deemed pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare its allegations, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; d) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; e) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and of the grounds on which it is based; and f) right of the interested party to appeal the decision rendered." "...the right of defense protected in Article 39 ibidem, not only governs jurisdictional proceedings, but also any administrative proceeding conducted by the public administration; and the petitioner must necessarily be given, if he so wishes, the right to be assisted by a lawyer, so that he may exercise his defense. (...)"* On the other hand, this Court has indicated on repeated occasions—when specifying its scope of competence—that in matters of due process, the amparo (amparo) is only appropriate against evidently arbitrary acts that directly violate fundamental rights, that is, grave, gross, and clear violations of the right of defense, since this venue was not created to correct all procedural defects, but only to remedy infringements upon the essential elements of due process that place the administered party in an evident state of defenselessness. Thus, not every infraction of procedural rules becomes, per se, a violation of constitutional relevance, actionable in this venue. On the contrary, the amparo (amparo) only proceeds, due to the summary nature that characterizes it, in the face of grave violations that violate or threaten to violate, directly and effectively, the right of defense or due process (cf. judgments #98-2109 of 5:24 p.m. on March 25, 1998, #2001-1545 of 9:31 a.m. on February 23, and #2001-10198 of 3:29 p.m. on October 10, the last two from 2001).
**IV.-** Thus, establishing whether it was incumbent upon the Contraloría General de la República or the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones to initiate the proceeding, as well as whether its continuation violates municipal autonomy, are matters outside the scope of competence of this Chamber in amparo (amparo) (resolution #2006-10777 of 2:49 p.m. on July 26, 2006). The first described scenario does not involve the intervention of a manifestly incompetent body to act, given that in repeated pronouncements the constitutionality of articles 68 and 73 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República has been upheld, even regarding decentralized entities (judgments #2001-4835 of 2:46 p.m. on June 6, 2001; #2002-7044 of 3:07 p.m. on June 16, 2002; #2003-13140 of 2:37 p.m. on November 12, 2003; #2004-3904 of 3:11 p.m. on April 21, 2004). Article 259 of the 2009 Electoral Code does not clearly remove any competence from the Contraloría, as was recognized by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones itself, in the recent resolution #6061-M-2010 of 12:15 p.m. on September 13, 2010, in which the cancellation of the credentials of the Municipal Mayor of the Central Canton of Alajuela is decreed, arising from a proceeding initiated by the Contraloría, ex officio, in March 2010, to verify whether the legal framework governing municipal matters and public finances had been transgressed. The Tribunal considered the prescriptions of Article 259 of the Electoral Code to have been fulfilled, in that case and without objection (Considerando III of the resolution).
**V.-** On the other hand, the constitutional compatibility of the sanctioning powers of the Contraloría with municipal autonomy was established in the aforementioned pronouncement #2004-3904 of 3:11 p.m. on April 21, 2004. That the Constitution confers political and administrative autonomy on these entities does not release their leaders from respecting the duty of probity and complying with the rules for the protection of public finances, the infraction of which it is incumbent upon the respondent Contraloría General to verify. The allegations of violation of due process due to material incompetence of the Contraloría must, therefore, be discarded, and this ground of the amparo (amparo) dismissed.
**VI.-** Finally, the petitioner objects to procedural guidelines that also do not entail disregard for the essence of the constitutional principle of due process, such as the instruction of the proceeding carried out directly by the person who will issue its final act, and the holding of the oral hearing and preparation of the base report for the final resolution of the proceeding by only one of the members of the decision-making body. The requested separation does not constitute a basic element of the principle in question, nor does it imply a disadvantage for the petitioner in the exercise of his right of defense. It is for practical reasons, and not for reasons of impartiality, that instruction and decision may fall to different bodies, but if the decision-maker can immediately assume the processing of the proceeding, no defenselessness is caused to the investigated party. Regarding the holding of the hearing by a single person, the allegation lacks support, since the Contralora General indicates, in her report, that it is the decision-making body as a panel that participates in that procedural act. And concerning the preparation of a final report by one of the members of the decision-making body and its subsequent submission to the panel for approval, even if it constituted a procedural defect, it lacks the gravity and relevance defined above, for the purposes of being heard in amparo (amparo) proceedings. The appeal, consequently, must be declared without merit." The joinder (coadyuvancia) of José Joaquín Porras Contreras is admitted, on the understanding that his sole purpose and role is to collaborate with his arguments in the proceeding.
**II.- Proven facts.** For the decision of this matter, the following facts are deemed duly demonstrated, either because they have been accredited or because the respondent omitted to refer to them as provided in the initial order:
**III.- On the merits.** The arguments raised by the plaintiff do not relate directly to the protection of fundamental rights—the exclusive object of the amparo remedy (recurso de amparo)—because, although it is taken into consideration that he faces a proceeding of a sanctioning nature, in whose development respect for the principle of due process is central, not every alleged irregularity in this type of proceeding implies a constitutional violation of due process. The basic constitutive elements of the principle, in the administrative sphere, are established in judgment #15-90 at 4:45 p.m. on January 5, 1990, and in repeated subsequent pronouncements, as follows:
“(...) the right of defense guaranteed by article 39 of the Political Constitution and consequently the principle of due process, contained in article 41 of our Fundamental Charter, or as it is usually called in doctrine, the principle of the 'bilateral nature of the hearing' of 'legal due process' or the 'adversarial principle' (...) has been synthesized as follows: a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the proceeding; b) the right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce the evidence he deems pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare his allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; ch) the right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision rendered by the administration and the grounds on which it is based; and e) the right of the interested party to appeal the decision rendered." "...the right of defense safeguarded in article 39 ibidem governs not only for jurisdictional proceedings, but also for any administrative proceeding carried out by the public administration; and that the claimant must necessarily be given, if he so wishes, the right to be assisted by a lawyer, in order to exercise his defense. (...)”
Furthermore, this Tribunal has indicated on repeated occasions—in defining its scope of competence—that in matters of due process, amparo is only appropriate against clearly arbitrary acts that directly violate fundamental rights, that is, serious, crude, and clear violations of the right of defense, since this venue has not been created to correct all procedural defects, but only to remedy infringements of the essential elements of due process that place the administered party in an evident state of defenselessness (indefensión). Thus, not every infringement of procedural norms becomes, per se, a violation of constitutional relevance, remediable in this venue. On the contrary, amparo only proceeds, due to the summary nature that characterizes it, in the face of serious violations that violate or threaten to violate, directly and effectively, the right of defense or due process (cf. judgments #98-2109 at 5:24 p.m. on March 25, 1998, #2001-1545 at 9:31 a.m. on February 23, and #2001-10198 at 3:29 p.m. on October 10, the last two from 2001).
**IV.-** Thus, establishing whether the Comptroller General of the Republic or the Supreme Electoral Tribunal had the competence to initiate the proceeding, as well as whether its continuation violates municipal autonomy, are matters foreign to the jurisdictional scope of this Chamber in amparo (resolution #2006-10777 at 2:49 p.m. on July 26, 2006). The first described scenario does not involve the intervention of a manifestly incompetent body to act, since in repeated pronouncements the constitutionality of articles 68 and 73 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic has been upheld, even in relation to decentralized entities (judgments #2001-4835 at 2:46 p.m. on June 6, 2001; #2002-7044 at 3:07 p.m. on June 16, 2002; #2003-13140 at 2:37 p.m. on November 12, 2003; #2004-3904 at 3:11 p.m. on April 21, 2004). Article 259 of the Electoral Code of 2009 does not clearly withdraw any competence from the Comptroller's Office, as was recognized by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal itself, in the recent resolution #6061-M-2010 at 12:15 p.m. on September 13, 2010, in which the cancellation of the credentials of the Municipal Mayor of the Central Canton of Alajuela was ordered, based on a proceeding initiated by the Comptroller's Office, ex officio, in March 2010, to verify whether the legal order governing municipal and public finance matters had been transgressed. The Tribunal considered the prescriptions of article 259 of the Electoral Code to have been complied with, in that case and without objection (Considerando III of the resolution).
**V.-** On the other hand, the constitutional compatibility of the Comptroller's Office's sanctioning powers with municipal autonomy was established in the already cited pronouncement #2004-3904 at 3:11 p.m. on April 21, 2004. The fact that the Constitution grants these entities political and administrative autonomy does not release their heads from respect for the duty of probity and compliance with the norms protecting public finance, whose infringement it is the responsibility of the respondent Comptroller General's Office to verify. The allegations of violation of due process due to material incompetence of the Comptroller's Office must, therefore, be discarded, and this aspect of the amparo dismissed.
**VI.-** Finally, the petitioner complains about procedural rules that also do not entail a disregard of the essence of the constitutional principle of due process, such as the instruction of the proceeding carried out directly by whoever will issue its final act, and the holding of the oral hearing and preparation of the base report for the final resolution of the proceeding by only one of the members of the deciding body. The claimed separation (desdoblamiento) does not constitute a basic element of the principle in question, nor does it imply a disadvantage for the plaintiff in the exercise of his right of defense. It is for practical reasons, and not those of impartiality, that instruction and decision may fall to different bodies, but if the decision-maker can immediately take on the processing of the proceeding, no defenselessness is caused to the investigated party. Regarding the holding of the hearing in a single-person format, the allegation lacks support, since the Comptroller General indicates, in her report, that it is the deciding body as a collegial panel that participates in that procedural act. And as far as concerns the preparation of a final report by one of the members of the deciding body and its subsequent submission to the collegial panel for approval, even if it constituted a procedural defect, it lacks the gravity and relevance defined above to be cognizable in amparo proceedings. The remedy (recurso), consequently, must be declared without merit.
***Therefore:*** The remedy is declared without merit.- Ana Virginia Calzada M. President Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.
Rosa María Abdelnour G. José Paulino Hernández G.
Res. Nº 2010-016342 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciséis horas y seis minutos del veintinueve de setiembre del dos mil diez.
Recurso de amparo interpuesto por Johnny Araya Monge, mayor, Alcalde de San José, portador de la cédula de identidad número 1-476-724, contra la Contraloría General de la República.
Resultando:
1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 18:55 horas del 3 de agosto del 2010, el recurrente manifiesta que, en su contra y de otras personas, el órgano contralor recurrido sigue el procedimiento sancionatorio ordinario DAGJ-71-2009. Considera que la Contraloría no puede seguir procedimientos sancionatorios contra funcionarios municipales, pues contradice la autonomía local. Que de acuerdo con el artículo 259 del Código Electoral corresponde al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones hacer una valoración inicial del asunto y luego, de considerarlo pertinente, remitir el caso a la Contraloría General de la República. La Contraloría no puede actuar de oficio. No puede imponérsele inhabilitación para ejercer cargos públicos, pues el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones para lo único que tiene competencia es para cancelar credenciales. Por último alega que, ante la confusión de normas reglamentarias, la Contraloría pretende que, un solo órgano, sea instructor y decisor a la vez, pero sostiene que la comparecencia y el proyecto de acto final será manejado por uno de sus miembros, o sea, un miembro será el único que tendrá inmediatez, ese se formará criterio, redactará el acto final y lo votará en el colegio. Es un sistema innecesariamente complicado, que adoptó la Contraloría, que implica que el miembro que actúa individualmente adelanta criterio y solo perjudica a los investigados. Aduce la infracción de los artículos 11, 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política.
2.- Informa bajo juramento Rocío Aguilar Montoya, en su calidad de Contralora General de la República (folio 34), que, a finales del año 2000, la Municipalidad de San José llevó a cabo un procedimiento de licitación pública internacional, para la actualización del catastro del cantón central, conocido como Sistema de Información Geográfica Fiscal, concurso que fue adjudicado al Consorcio Estudios y Proyectos de Ingeniería Urbana S.A. de C.V. y Argeomática S.A. de C.V., integrado por empresas extranjeras, con el cual la corporación municipal formalizó el respectivo contrato. La Contraloría fue puesta en conocimiento de hechos, en apariencia irregulares, acaecidos durante la ejecución del contrato, por lo que, mediante resolución de las 14:00 horas del 11 de febrero de 2010, ampliada por resolución de las 9:30 horas del 5 de julio de 2010, la División Jurídica del órgano contralor abrió un procedimiento administrativo de hacienda pública contra el recurrente. Se inició y se tramita con base en la potestad establecida en el artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. En él se analiza la eventual responsabilidad administrativa y civil del actor. Si se demostraran los hechos imputados, por falta a los deberes legales de control interno, por haber autorizado presuntamente pagos al contratista superiores a los que sus facultades de Alcalde lo permitían, podría imponérsele sanciones que van desde una amonestación escrita hasta la destitución o cancelación de su credencial. Lo anterior, con base en los artículos 110 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, 2, 12 y 41 de la Ley General de Control Interno; 17 a) 18 d) y 24 e) del Código Municipal; 3, 4 y 38 d) de la Ley contra la Corrupción; y 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República. También podría imponérsele una sanción de dos a ocho años, que le prohibiría el ingreso o reingreso a cargos de la Hacienda Pública que no sean de elección popular, con fundamento en el artículo 72 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría. En cuanto a la responsabilidad patrimonial, se le imputó como civil y solidariamente responsable por la suma de 822.968.103,99 colones. Esto, a partir de los artículos 94 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, 108, 110, 114 y 116 de la Ley de la Administración Financiera y 210 de la Ley General de la Administración, por no haber tomado, presuntamente, las acciones necesarias para evitar que la Municipalidad de San José recibiera una entrega parcial, inconclusa y defectuosa del Sistema de Información Geográfica Fiscal, aún cuando la Auditoría Interna lo puso en conocimiento de la situación oportunamente. En la sentencia #5445-99 de la Sala Constitucional se advirtió de la improcedencia que la Contraloría fungiera como órgano director de un procedimiento administrativo por responsabilidad disciplinaria de los funcionarios municipales que pertenecen a la carrera administrativa municipal, pues se invadiría la autonomía municipal e iría en demérito de las potestades disciplinarias del Alcalde. En resolución #6326-2000 aclaró la Sala que ello no impedía que se tomara acciones relacionadas con los jerarcas municipales, mucho menos los de elección popular. No viola el debido proceso ni la autonomía municipal reconocer la competencia de la Contraloría para investigar las infracciones al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización de los fondos públicos, mediante el procedimiento especial del artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría. En el mismo sentido se adoptaron los pronunciamientos de la Sala #7343-2006 y #10777-2006. Tampoco es válido el argumento que con el artículo 259 del Código Municipal la Contraloría haya perdido la competencia de iniciar procedimientos, como el que se sigue contra el recurrente. La norma se refiere al supuesto concreto de la remisión directa al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones de la eventual discusión de la cancelación de credenciales de un funcionario. Es competencia exclusiva del Tribunal la anulación o cancelación de las credenciales. La norma no impide, de forma alguna, que la Controlaría inicie un procedimiento, con base en el artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría, ni supedita su intervención a la remisión de caso, por parte del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Olvida el actor la independencia funcional que confiere a la Contraloría el artículo 183 de la Constitución Política. La Sala ha establecido la constitucionalidad del artículo 68 citado (sentencias #4835-2001, #7044-2002, #13140-2003 y #3904-2004). Precisa la informante que debe diferenciarse entre la inhabilitación para ejercer cargos públicos (artículo 72 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) y la cancelación de credenciales. Esta última podría aplicarse, solo por parte del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, pudiendo recomendarlo la Contraloría General de la República. La inhabilitación no implica pérdida de la credencial y no es oponible a cargos electivos, por lo que su imposición no obliga a la intervención del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones. Sobre los argumentos relacionados con la conformación del órgano decisor, el Reglamento de Procedimientos Administrativos de la Contraloría establece como facultativa la designación de un órgano director de procedimiento. Se ha reiterado la práctica de un mismo órgano para la instrucción y decisión, avalada por la Sala en sentencia #6379-2002. El Reglamento Orgánico de la Contraloría estableció la tramitación colegiada de la apertura y el acto final de los procedimientos administrativos. Todo el órgano colegiado asiste a la comparecencia. La fusión de las labores de instrucción y decisión procura asegurar el principio de inmediación de la prueba y el pleno conocimiento del expediente y sus incidencias. Todas las decisiones son adoptadas, firmadas y validadas por todos los miembros del colegio. No se ha incurrido en arbitrariedad alguna, ni en infracción del debido proceso, por lo que se solicita desestimar el recurso planteado.
3.- En escrito de folio 52 manifestó el actor que el objeto del contrato fue una actualización del catastro de la Municipalidad, no un sistema de información geográfica fiscal. No se contrató un software. La Contraloría General decidió iniciar el procedimiento sin que el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones se lo requiriera. Pretende imponer sanciones más allá de lo que el Tribunal puede disponer y responsabilizar económicamente por el contrato, como si este no hubiere dado ningún fruto. El voto 6326 es del 2000. El Código Electoral es de 2009, señalando claramente su artículo 259 “Cuando se inste la cancelación”, es decir cuando el Tribunal haya ejercido la iniciativa como órgano decidor. Solo el Tribunal puede valorar si hay mérito para ir a un procedimiento formal. La Contraloría perdió su iniciativa y sus recomendaciones el carácter obligatorio. El asunto se reduce al de la titularidad de la potestad sancionatoria de los Alcaldes, por Constitución y por ley.
4.- Mediante memorial del 29 de setiembre de 2010 (folio 55) José Joaquín Porras Contreras, Diputado por el Partido Accesibilidad sin Exclusión, pidió se le tuviera como coadyuvante pasivo en este proceso.
5.- En los procedimientos seguidos se ha observado las prescripciones legales.
Redacta el Magistrado Armijo Sancho; y,
Considerando:
I.- Objeto del recurso. Estima el actor que la Contraloría General de la República no podía iniciar de oficio el procedimiento que se sigue bajo el Electoral; que viola la autonomía municipal pretender imponerle responsabilidad disciplinaria y civil, así como la sanción de inhabilitación para el ejercicio de cargos públicos; y que contradice el debido proceso que solo uno de los miembros del órgano decisor celebre la audiencia oral y prepare el informe base para la resolución final del procedimiento. Se admite la coadyuvancia de José Joaquín Porras Contreras, bajo el entendido que su solo propósito y rol es el de colaborar con sus argumentos en el proceso.
II.- Hechos probados. De importancia para la decisión de este asunto, se estiman como debidamente demostrados los siguientes hechos, sea porque así han sido acreditados o bien porque el recurrido haya omitido referirse a ellos según lo prevenido en el auto inicial:
III.- Sobre el fondo. Los argumentos que plantea el actor no se relacionan de forma directa con la protección de los derechos fundamentales –objeto exclusivo del recurso de amparo–, pues aunque se toma en consideración que enfrenta un procedimiento de índole sancionatorio, en cuyo desarrollo es central el respeto del principio del debido proceso, no toda aducida irregularidad en este tipo de procedimiento implica violación constitucional del debido proceso. Los elementos básicos constitutivos del principio, en sede administrativa, se establecen en la sentencia #15-90 de las 16:45 horas del 5 de enero de 1990 y en repetidos pronunciamientos subsecuentes, como sigue:
“(...) el derecho de defensa garantizado por el artículo 39 de la Constitución Política y por consiguiente el principio del debido proceso, contenido en el artículo 41 de nuestra Carta Fundamental, o como suele llamársele en doctrina, principio de 'bilateralidad de la audiencia' del 'debido proceso legal' o 'principio de contradicción' (...) se ha sintetizado así: a) Notificación al interesado del carácter y fines del procedimiento; b) derecho de ser oído, y oportunidad del interesado para presentar los argumentos y producir las pruebas que entienda pertinentes; c) oportunidad para el administrado de preparar su alegación, lo que incluye necesariamente el acceso a la información y a los antecedentes administrativos, vinculados con la cuestión de que se trate; ch) derecho del administrado de hacerse representar y asesorar por abogados, técnicos y otras personas calificadas; d) notificación adecuada de la decisión que dicta la administración y de los motivos en que ella se funde y e) derecho del interesado de recurrir la decisión dictada." "... el derecho de defensa resguardado en el artículo 39 ibídem, no sólo rige para los procedimientos jurisdiccionales, sino también para cualquier procedimiento administrativo llevado a cabo por la administración pública; y que necesariamente debe dársele al accionante si a bien lo tiene, el derecho de ser asistido por un abogado, con el fin de que ejercite su defensa. (...)"
De otra parte, este Tribunal ha indicado en reiteradas ocasiones -al precisar su ámbito de competencia- que en materia de debido proceso el amparo procede solo contra actos evidentemente arbitrarios que conculquen en forma directa derechos fundamentales, es decir, violaciones graves, burdas y claras al derecho de defensa, ya que esta sede no ha sido creada para corregir todos los vicios procedimentales, sino sólo para enmendar las infracciones a los elementos esenciales del debido proceso que colocan al administrado en un evidente estado de indefensión. De esta manera, no toda infracción a las normas de procedimiento se convierte, per se, en una violación de relevancia constitucional, amparable en esta sede. Por el contrario, el amparo tan sólo procede, debido a la sumariedad que lo caracteriza, ante violaciones graves que conculquen o amenacen conculcar, de forma directa y efectiva el derecho de defensa o el debido proceso (cfr. las sentencias #98-2109 de las 17:24 horas del 25 de marzo de 1998, #2001-1545 de las 9:31 horas del 23 de febrero y #2001-10198 de las 15:29 horas del 10 de octubre, últimas dos del 2001).
IV.- De este modo, establecer si competía a la Contraloría General de la República o al Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones iniciar el procedimiento, así como si con su prosecución se violenta la autonomía municipal, son extremos ajenos al ámbito competencial de la Sala en amparo (resolución #2006-10777 de las 14:49 horas del 26 de julio de 2006). No se trata, el primer supuesto descrito, de la intervención de un órgano manifiestamente incompetente para actuar, pues en repetidos pronunciamientos se ha sustentado la constitucionalidad de los artículos 68 y 73 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, aún frente a entes descentralizados (sentencias #2001-4835 de las 14:46 horas del 6 de junio de 2001; #2002-7044 las 15:07 horas del 16 de junio de 2002; #2003-13140 de las 14:37 horas del 12 de noviembre de 2003; #2004-3904 de las 15:11 horas del 21 de abril de 2004). El artículo 259 del Código Electoral de 2009 no retira competencia alguna de forma palmaria a la Contraloría, tal y como lo reconoció el propio Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, en la reciente resolución #6061-M-2010 de las 12:15 horas del 13 de setiembre de 2010, en la cual se decreta la cancelación de las credenciales de la Alcaldesa Municipal del Cantón Central de Alajuela, a partir de un procedimiento iniciado por la Contraloría, oficiosamente, en marzo de 2010, para verificar si se había transgredido el ordenamiento jurídico que rige la materia municipal y de hacienda pública. Tuvo el Tribunal por cumplidas, en ese caso y sin objeción, las prescripciones del artículo 259 del Código Electoral (considerando III de la resolución).
V.- Por otra parte, la compatibilidad constitucional de las competencias sancionatorias de la Contraloría con la autonomía municipal quedó establecida en el ya citado pronunciamiento #2004-3904 de las 15:11 horas del 21 de abril de 2004. Que la Constitución confiera a esos entes autonomía política y administrativa no libera a sus jerarcas del respeto del deber de probidad y del cumplimiento de las normas de protección de la hacienda pública, cuya infracción corresponde verificar a la Contraloría General accionada. Los alegatos de violación al debido proceso por incompetencia material de la Contraloría deben, por ende, descartarse y desestimarse este extremo del amparo.
VI.- Por último, reclama el recurrente contra pautas procedimentales que tampoco aparejan desconocimiento de la esencia del principio constitucional del debido proceso, como es la instrucción del procedimiento ejecutada directamente por quien emitirá su acto final, y la celebración de la audiencia oral y preparación del informe base para la resolución final del procedimiento por parte de uno solo de los integrantes del órgano decisor. El desdoblamiento reclamado no constituye un elemento básico del principio en cuestión, ni implica desventaja para el actor en el ejercicio de su derecho de defensa. Es por razones prácticas, y no de imparcialidad, que puede recaer en órganos distintos instrucción y decisión, pero si el decisor puede inmediatamente asumir el trámite del procedimiento, no se causa indefensión al investigado. Sobre la celebración de la audiencia en forma unipersonal, el alegato carece de sustento, pues indica la Contralora General, en su informe, que es el órgano decisor como colegio quien participa de ese acto procesal. Y en lo que concierne a la preparación de un informe final por uno de los integrantes del órgano decisor y su posterior sometimiento al colegio para su aprobación, de constituir un vicio de procedimiento, carece de la gravedad y relevancia arriba definidos, a efectos de ser conocido en vía de amparo. El recurso, en consecuencia, debe declararse sin lugar.
Por tanto:
Se declara sin lugar el recurso.- Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V.
Rosa María Abdelnour G. José Paulino Hernández G.
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