Teacher's pay supplements and health reassignmentRecargo salarial y reubicación por salud docente

Document Review  Supreme Court of Justice SECOND CHAMBER Res: 2025-000194 SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eighteen hours ten minutes on the thirty-first of January of two thousand twenty-five.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Nombre 001], widow, educator and resident of Puntarenas, against the STATE, represented by its deputy procurator, attorney Marianella Barrantes Zamora, resident of Heredia. Appearing as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is attorney Cristian Ceciliano Mora, resident of San José. All of legal age, married and attorneys, with the indicated exception.

Drafted by Magistrate Fallas Carvajal; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- BACKGROUND: The special judicial attorney for the plaintiff initiated this action so that, in judgment, the State be ordered to immediately restore the payment of the additional amounts for extension of the I and II cycle workday and for the Learning Assessment Committee/Technical Advisory Committee, which she received prior to the relocation and as long as she maintains said condition; as well as to pay all salary differences owed from the date these were illegally suppressed from the plaintiff, from February 1, 2020, including differences that may arise for Christmas bonus, vacation pay, and school salary; interest and both costs. The state representative answered the complaint negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. The trial judge, Msc. Bertha M. Jiménez Alvarado, by judgment no. 2024-824 of sixteen hours fifty-three minutes on May tenth, two thousand twenty-four, of the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, First Section, declared the complaint with merit and ordered the plaintiff be restored the payment corresponding to the alternate schedule additional amount or extension of the I and II cycle workday and the additional amount for the Learning Assessment Committee/Technical Advisory Committee; which the plaintiff held at the time of being relocated due to health problems and as long as said condition persists; likewise, it granted what was owed for the proportional extremes of Christmas bonus and school salary originating from said suppression. It ordered that social charges and income tax be deducted from these extremes where applicable. It granted payment of interest, indexation and costs, setting personal costs at 15% of the total award.

II.- OBJECTIONS: The state representative disagrees with the ruling. She alleges improper interpretation and application of article 254 of the Labor Code and numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); as well as violation of the principle of legality. She maintains that article 254 of the Labor Code does not apply to the case of the plaintiff here, since the plaintiff did not demonstrate with documentary evidence that she was disabled due to a work risk, or that the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) caused her any salary harm when relocating her temporarily for health reasons. On the contrary, as is evident from the evidence brought to the record by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría), it is proven that she was relocated not by application of numeral 22 bis of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil); but rather by a medical recommendation, and she was not disabled by illness, nor by work risk, in order for the cited numeral 254 to apply. She affirms that there is no evidence of the alleged harm against the plaintiff, especially since the additional amount for duties constitutes a temporary supplementary salary (sobresueldo) that responds to the needs of educational centers, for reasons of opportunity or convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. Likewise, she considers that an erroneous interpretation of article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), (hereinafter ESC), is made, since although it is mentioned that if the servant at the time of being disabled by illness or maternity is earning a supplementary salary (sobresueldo), they will have the right to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time; the truth of the matter is that from the documentary evidence in the record, it is not apparent that Mrs. [Nombre 002] was disabled by illness or had a leave, on the contrary, it was a treating health professional who recommended a temporary relocation for health reasons. She argues that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, and therefore can only proceed according to what is duly authorized by the legal system (numerals 11 of the Political Constitution, and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration). She adduces violation of article 15 of the Public Administration Salaries Law, as well as omission of the criteria of the Legal Directorate of the MEP. She insists that the additional amounts are temporary, not permanent, and violation of the principle of equity, as well as the principle of budgetary legality. She maintains that, by personnel action no. 201902-MP-4103173, she was assigned the additional amount for extension of the I and II cycle workday and for the Learning Assessment Committee/Technical Advisory Committee for the entire 2019 school year, which was kept intact until the expiration date, that is, January 31, 2020. Hence, once that recognition period ended, it is impossible both legally (violation of the principle of legality) and materially for the ministerial portfolio to recognize an additional amount that has not been assigned, nor has it been worked for by the plaintiff, since as indicated she did not perform teaching duties per se due to her health condition. She highlights what is provided in numerals 118 subsection j) of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and numeral 13 of Decreto Ejecutivo no. 12915-E-P, that salary bonuses are granted when the servant carries out additional duties to those ordinarily performed in their position, on a temporary basis and whose assignment is duly justified. On the other hand, she alleges insufficient grounds in the judgment to grant payment of salary differences, specifically those related to Christmas bonus, vacation pay, annual increases, incentive for extension of the school year, didactic incentive, professional career and school salary; given that these are related to the granting of the principal claim, therefore, if the principal claim is not admissible, with much more reason the payment of those adjustments is not admissible, which is why she requests the appeal be declared with merit. She argues inadmissibility regarding the payment of interest and indexation jointly. Regarding the granting of indexation, she believes it must be rejected. She affirms that legal interest already contains an indexation component in its formula. Hence, it is not legally viable to grant legal interest and indexation, and for the latter to proceed it would be necessary to grant simple interest, not legal interest. Finally, she alleges improper application of numeral 563 of the Labor Code. She proposes that the State should be exempted from paying costs for having litigated in good faith. Thus, she requests that the cassation appeal be admitted in such a way that the appealed judgment be modified in relation to the points indicated.

III.- CASE ANALYSIS: There is no objection regarding the fact that the plaintiff was relocated for health reasons as of March 15, 2019. It is also accredited that before being relocated to administrative duties, the plaintiff's salary included the additional amount for the Learning Assessment Committee/Technical Advisory Committee and an additional amount for extension of the I and II Cycle workday, as can be seen from official letter DRHDPRH-ULIC-1813-2019 and personnel action no. 201903-MP-4117407 with an effective date until January 31, 2020 (image 7 of the full view of the electronic court record). Now, in this case, it is a matter of defining whether the payment of this supplementary salary (sobresueldo) corresponds to a teaching official who, for health reasons, has had to be relocated to an administrative position. The disability and relocation in these cases originate from an illness of the official that prevents them from remaining in active teaching service, based on the grounds provided by article 254 of the Labor Code. This article, as part of Title Four of that regulatory body, called "ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS DURING THE EXERCISE OF WORK," establishes the obligation of the employer to reinstate the worker who has suffered a risk, but who is able to continue working, into their position. It also provides for the employer's duty to provide a different position according to their possibilities when, by medical recommendation, they cannot return to perform the duties they had been performing. It literally states in its second paragraph: "If in accordance with medical opinion, the worker could not normally perform the work they were doing when the risk occurred, but could perform a different one in the same company, the employer will be obliged to provide it, as long as that is feasible, for which purpose they may carry out the necessary personnel movements," the same article that served as support for the Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Educación) to grant the work relocation for health reasons to the plaintiff. This regulation has a direct relationship with the Special Leave Regulation Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública) (Decreto Ejecutivo number 19113 of July 28, 1989), where article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the norms and procedures that the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) must follow to grant leave to its servants, due to the diminishment of their faculties or aptitudes for work, survivors of work risks or illness. For its part, numeral 2 establishes: "The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those servants who, due to the diminishment suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, could not perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the duties and attributions corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular servants." This regulation distinguishes between permanent leave and partial leave, declaring that the latter is available to those servants for whom the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) or the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability or a partial or permanent disability and recommend a change of duties. Article 8 specifically deals with the case of granting special leave in the following terms: "In accordance with the provisions of article 5 above, the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) shall grant a special leave to those servants found in the following circumstances:/a) That according to their ailment, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) recommends in the final treatment assessment a change of duties./ b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the work risk that occurred, the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) determines a minor or partial permanent disability and recommends their reincorporation to service with a change of duties." Article 17 says: "The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Education Code (Código de Educación) on the matter." So that this regulation complements and does not contradict the provisions of numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), which reads: "a) If the servant, at the time of being disabled by illness or maternity, is earning additional salary for zonaje, for alternate schedule (horario alterno), or any supplementary salary (sobresueldo), they shall have the right to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time./ b) Leaves due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right that servants have to receive the corresponding salary increases./c) For all legal effects, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall be, consequently, the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other extremes, that may correspond." The regulatory norm develops this express provision, contemplating indistinctly the right to compensation, both for the case of permanent leave and special leave. This Chamber has so resolved on previous occasions where this same issue has been discussed. In judgment number 57 of 9:50 hours, of January 21, 2011, it was explained: "IV.- ...The representative of the State insists that numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) is not applicable to the plaintiff, because that norm is only provided for persons who are permanently disabled and that her situation must be governed by the provisions of article 166, according to which, 'When leave is granted to the teacher due to duly verified illness, half of the salary prior to the enjoyment of the leave shall be paid in their favor for a period not exceeding 6 months. In exceptional cases, an extension of this benefit may be authorized for up to two more quarters, if the ill teacher proves their inability to work, with the testimony of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social)'. However, the Chamber has had the opportunity to hear matters identical to the present one and has concluded that the cited article 174 does not exclude personnel who enjoy a special leave, for being partially disabled. The cited numeral 166 does not establish that its application is only possible for cases of special leaves. For its part, article 174 also does not exclude partially disabled workers enjoying that type of leave. The norms make no distinction between special and permanent leaves, coupled with the fact that they also do not contemplate any differentiation between these leaves and disability due to illness, aside from the fact that all have as their basis, precisely, the loss of health due to a disabling illness. See that subsection a) of this latter norm indicates that 'If the servant, at the time of being disabled by illness or maternity, is earning additional salary for zonaje, for alternate schedule (horario alterno), or any supplementary salary (sobresueldo), shall have the right to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time...'. Furthermore, from numeral 173 idem it follows that the legislator's intention was to protect the integrity of the salary of teaching staff during the period of disability. No other thing can be deduced from what is indicated in the final paragraph of subsection a), according to which, '...when it is verified that the disability extends to a period greater than four days, their salary shall not suffer deduction', as well as from what is stipulated in subsection b, where it is noted that 'if the servant is protected by Social Security, the Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Educación) shall recognize the salary difference up to 100% (one hundred percent) of the same; if not, the payment of the salary shall be borne by the Ministry of Education (Ministerio de Educación)'. None of those norms refer to absolute disability or exclude from their application persons who enjoy special leave. It is clear that this leave is granted to servants suffering from a permanent minor or partial disability and require a change of duties, according to what is established in numeral 5 of the Regulation of special leaves for servants of the Ministry of Public Education (Reglamento de licencias especiales para los servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública) (Decreto Ejecutivo no. 19113, effective as of July 28, 1989). In numeral 2 of that regulation, it is also established that: 'The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those servants who, due to the diminishment suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, could not perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the duties and attributions corresponding to the position they had been performing as regular servants'. Now, regarding the remuneration that the beneficiaries of this type of leave must receive, the special regulation states that they are entitled to enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary, as stipulated in this regard in the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Education Code (Código de Educación). Expressly, article 17 of the Regulation prescribes: 'The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and the Education Code (Código de Educación) on the matter' (bold not in original). From the transcribed text, a clear reference to the norms of the cited Statute is noted and, therefore, the application of article 174 is valid; because, as indicated, in that norm no exclusion is made of this type of disability." Thus, the additional amounts in question should have been maintained despite the relocation, since she has the right to receive an aid identical to the salary she held at the time prior to the granting of the administrative relocation. Consequently, if at the time she was relocated the plaintiff was earning those additional amounts, her right is indisputable, in accordance with the special regulation previously cited, to have that supplementary salary (sobresueldo) included in her remuneration, as an administrative official, a granting that is independent of the requirements that the employer entity may have for those services. That is, in application of that provision (subsection c, article 174 idem), the defendant entity could not suppress the subsidy of a salary nature granted to the plaintiff that she received before being relocated. In addition to the above, it must be made clear that the current wording of numeral 174 does not give rise to eliminating supplementary salaries (sobresueldos), and therefore, undoubtedly, servants covered by a leave due to illness have the right to continue earning this type of bonus while that leave lasts (see the rulings of this Chamber, numbers 2001-591; 2004-965; 2005-304; 2005-395; 2006-1102; 2006-1108; 2007-91; 2008-62; 2008-96; 2008-442; 2008-634; 2010-537 and 2010-1510).

IV.- ON THE GRANTED SALARY DIFFERENCES: The State's representative challenges the granting of payment of salary differences for Christmas bonus, vacation pay, annual increases, incentive for extension of the school year, didactic incentive, professional career and school salary. As her sole argument, she points out that these are related to the granting of the principal claim, therefore, if the principal claim is not admissible, with much more reason the payment of those adjustments is not admissible, for which reason she requests they be dismissed. The Chamber recognizes that in labor matters the principles of simplicity and informality prevail, but in appellate matters this does not release the appellant from the obligation to argue, clearly and precisely, the reasons why they challenge the factual or legal basis of the appealed decision. The precise expression of the reasons warranting the revocation of the pronouncement is a necessary requirement to proceed with the study of the questions, as cassation being a means of control of the work done by the preceding instance, the inputs of the appellant are required for said analysis (article 590 of the Labor Code). In this way, as there is no further argument than that they are accessory extremes, and having verified that the principal was duly granted, there is no merit to vary what was resolved by the lower court on these adjustments. It is not omitted to indicate that the challenged judgment only granted the payment of salary differences for Christmas bonus and school salary, but not for the other accessory extremes mentioned by the appellant.

V.- INTEREST AND INDEXATION: Article 565 of the Labor Code, regarding interest, provides that the percentage shall be the one set in Law no. 3284 of April 30, 1964 (Commerce Code), whose canon 497 defines legal interest, which is the one applicable in the absence of an express agreement between the parties. That numeral reads: "Legal interest is that which is applied supplementarily in the absence of agreement, and is equal to the basic passive rate of the Central Bank of Costa Rica for operations in national currency and to the 'prime rate' for operations in US dollars." Without making any exclusion, the mentioned ordinal 565 -which is the applicable one in this matter- also expressly provides that every judgment condemning to pay a monetary obligation shall imply for the debtor the obligation to adjust the principal economic extremes, updating them to present value. So there is no infringement the trial judge could have incurred by ordering the recognition of legal interest jointly with the indexation of the recognized items, as the law so orders, regardless of the interpretation that other courts may have made in relation to this issue. For the Chamber, the norm is clear and does not admit the interpretation that the challenger tries to assert, under the shelter of what was resolved by other judicial offices, whose decision -furthermore- is not binding for this other Body. Therefore, even if the interest rate may include inflation, the truth is that both figures compensate for different factors. Indexation is provided to compensate for the loss of money value occurring through the passage of time in relation to inflation, while interest compensates for the opportunity cost of not having been able to dispose of the money in a timely manner. Consequently, it must be understood that indexation and legal interest are not mutually exclusive extremes, and being regulated by law, they do not imply double payment.

VI.- COSTS: Ordinal 562 of the Labor Code, in what is of interest, stipulates: "In every judgment […] the losing party shall be condemned […] to pay the personal and procedural costs caused. /If the judgment resolves the matter on the merits […] the personal costs may not be less than fifteen percent (15%) nor greater than twenty-five percent (25%) of the liquid amount of the award or acquittal, as the case may be…" The subsequent article 563, for its part, states: "Notwithstanding, the losing party may be exempted from the payment of personal costs and even from procedural costs, when: 1) It has litigated with evident good faith. /2) The claims have partially prospered. /3) When there has been reciprocal defeat. /The exoneration must always be reasoned… /It may not be considered good faith the party that denied evident claims that the result of the process indicates it should have accepted, did not attend the entire hearing, adduced bribed witnesses or false witnesses and documents, did not offer any evidence to justify its complaint or defenses, if they were based on disputed facts…" In accordance with these norms, the rule is to impose payment of these expenses on the party that was defeated. In the case under analysis, it is not considered to be in any of the exception scenarios, in order to exercise the power granted to judges to exempt the losing party from payment of costs, since the servant was forced to resort to judicial authorities in pursuit of the satisfaction of her rights and the State's theory of the case lacks legal basis. Consequently, there is no merit to vary what was resolved on this specific aspect.

VII.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: In light of the foregoing, the appeal must be declared without merit.

VIII.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATES VARELA ARAYA AND CHACÓN ARTAVIA: The undersigned depart from the majority opinion insofar as it confirms the recognition to the plaintiff of the payment for the additional amounts of the Learning Assessment Committee/Technical Advisory Committee and the additional amount for extension of the workday, from the moment she was relocated to administrative duties and as long as she remains in that condition. It has been duly accredited that, in 2019, the plaintiff was earning those additional amounts and that, due to health problems, she was relocated to administrative duties starting March 2019; reason why those ceased to be paid to her starting February first, 2020. Likewise, it is clear that the relocation was agreed based on article 254 of the Labor Code. We are not facing a disability per se. The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, and therefore can only proceed according to what is duly authorized in the legal system (numerals 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration), and that the servant is not within the factual assumptions provided in article 22 bis subsection a) of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil), as she is not disabled due to illness to be entitled to what is claimed. After a rethinking of the analysis on the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that the appellant is not right. Ordinals 118 of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of the Procedure Manual for Administering Teaching Personnel (Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente) stipulate the possibility of assigning certain additional amounts, which do not constitute a vested right and, consequently, the payment thereof must be suspended when the official, in the exercise of their usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto del Servicio Civil) establishes that: "a) If the servant, at the time of being disabled by illness or maternity, is earning additional salary for zonaje, for 'alternate schedule' (horario alterno), or any supplementary salary (sobresueldo), they shall have the right to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time. /b) Leaves due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right that servants have to receive the corresponding salary increases. (Thus amended by article 1 of Law No.5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal effects, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall be, consequently, the basis for calculating pensions and legal benefits, among other extremes, that may correspond. / (Thus the previous subsection added by article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)" (highlighting added). From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that the servant who is disabled by illness, or the female official on maternity leave, who was earning additional salary for supplementary salaries (sobresueldos), has the right to have these considered when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid. In the case at hand, the plaintiff was relocated to administrative duties and is not disabled nor enjoying such leave, so her situation does not fall under the factual assumption of the norm. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that, in accordance with the provisions of numerals 118, subsection j), of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and 13 of Decreto Ejecutivo no. 12915-E-P, these bonuses are granted when the servant carries out additional duties to those ordinarily performed in their position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether due to needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these supplementary salaries (sobresueldos) depends on circumstances warranting it and therefore they are assigned on a temporary basis, for each school year, according to the start and end dates regulated in ordinal 176 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); otherwise, the eventual service would be distorted and become an ordinary one. In line with the above, article 15 of the Public Administration Salaries Law prescribes that "the excess shall be maintained as an additional amount, therefore, of a temporary nature." Consequently, those additional amounts that depend on some particular condition to be granted are not configured as a vested right, which is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, permanently and independently of the service provided, as is sought in this case. There is vast jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in the sense that additional amounts for duties cannot be considered a vested right of the servant.

Thus, in judgment no. 3681, of 15:45 hours on March 22, 2011, it was stated: “It must be remembered that this Chamber has indicated that the performance of the worker that can be classified as a surcharge of duties (recargo de funciones) does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned that obliges the Administration to maintain them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such surcharges – because it responds to the need for service provision at a specific moment – has a temporary nature and is paid for a specific amount of work, and logically, its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly within its interest and competence (see in this regard judgment number 2003-09533 of twelve hours twenty-eight minutes of September fifth, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 of sixteen hours forty-seven minutes of May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the surcharge constitutes a ‘plus’ or wage benefit that depends on whether the functions are exercised or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party so that such an amount continues to be paid to them, or so that the surcharge or alternate schedule is maintained for them” (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions number 6390 of 15:14 hours of May 18, 2011 and 868 of 9:05 hours of January 18, 2013). Likewise, in vote no. 3306, of 12:48 hours of March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the assumptions under which a supplemental salary (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such a benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not being met (judgment No. 2006-010959 of 17:51 hours of July 26, 2006).” This same ruling referenced judgment no. 296, of 11:54 hours of January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly indicated: “The same can be said regarding the salary difference that the appellant claims to stop receiving on the occasion of the challenged act, since the remuneration for the cited surcharge constitutes a ‘plus’ or wage benefit, which depends on whether the functions are exercised or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a determined period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, so that such an amount continues to be paid to them, or so that the indicated surcharge is maintained for them, such that the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also unfounded…”. Finally, in resolution no. 10959, of 17:51 hours of July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: “This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that supplemental salaries that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right that is incorporated as such into the salary proper, since their granting depends on the objective conditions under which they were recognized. In other words, if the conditions under which a supplemental salary was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such a benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not being met.” In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for the surcharges of the Learning Evaluation Committee/Advisory Technician (Comité Evaluación del Aprendizajes/Técnico Asesor) and the surcharge for extension of the workday (ampliación de jornada laboral) constitute temporary supplemental salaries, attached to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final remuneration received by the official, are not a permanent substantial component, but rather additional, whose recognition depends on the official meeting the assumptions established in the legal system for their concession and on the needs that arise in each school term. It should be noted that the payment of these surcharges is appropriate by reason of the position and the functions performed by the server, so it may be denied when the original conditions of their granting disappear. Based on the norms brought up, the cited case law, and the principles of primacy of reality, reasonableness, and salary equality, it is considered that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of remuneration when the actual provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as the present case (a person reassigned to an administrative position), as there is no factual or legal basis to remunerate a service that is not being provided. Furthermore, forcing the State to pay a remuneration for a consideration that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. Added to this, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, with respect to those who are appointed to a teaching position and exercising the functions by surcharge of some type, since they are not in equal conditions and earn the same. Besides, the State would be paying double (to two officials) for the same surcharge for extension of the workday, when it has been necessary for the person who substitutes the one who has been reassigned for health reasons to assume it. As stated before, the surcharges in question do not constitute an acquired right, besides the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be regarded as a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching staff. Finally, it must be borne in mind that to be able to demand payment of the surcharge, it is necessarily required that a norm so authorizes it (principle of legality that governs in the public sector) and that the conditions and assumptions established by it are met; which is not the case here. By virtue of the above, the suppression of the surcharge in question, upon the plaintiff passing from the condition of teacher to performing administrative functions due to reassignment, is in accordance with law. Regarding costs, although the regulations on this item establish as a general rule the condemnation in those expenses to the losing party, those who subscribe this dissenting vote consider that, in the specific case, the party should be absolved from costs. Although it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff is not entitled to the right claimed, it is appreciated that she has litigated with evident good faith, under the belief that she has the right to maintain the payment of the claimed surcharge during her reassignment to administrative duties, and the undersigned have re-examined the matter of the correct interpretation of the norms governing the surcharge for any reason. This exoneration is ordered in application of articles 563 and 562 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Thus, the appropriate course is to partially grant the appeal filed, revoke what was resolved in the first-instance judgment, uphold the defense of lack of right, and dismiss the claim in all its aspects. It is appropriate to resolve without special condemnation in costs.

POR TANTO:

The appeal is dismissed. Magistrates Varela Araya and Chacón Artavia dissent, partially grant the appeal filed, revoke what was resolved in the first-instance judgment, uphold the defense of lack of right, and dismiss the claim in all its aspects. They resolve without special condemnation in costs.

Res: 2025-000194 MMONGEROD/RPC  JULIA VARELA ARAYA - MAGISTRADO/A  MARIA ANGELICA FALLAS CARVAJAL - MAGISTRADO/A  ROXANA CHACÓN ARTAVIA - MAGISTRADO/A  ANA ORFILIA BRICEÑO YOCK - MAGISTRADO/A  JORGE ENRIQUE OLASO ÁLVAREZ - MAGISTRADO/A 1 Res: 2025-000194 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at eighteen hours ten minutes on the thirty-first of January, two thousand twenty-five.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Name 001], widow, educator and resident of Puntarenas, against the STATE, represented by its deputy procurator, attorney Marianella Barrantes Zamora, resident of Heredia. Appearing as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is attorney Cristian Ceciliano Mora, resident of San José. All are of legal age, married, and attorneys, with the exception noted.

Drafted by Magistrate Fallas Carvajal; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- BACKGROUND: The special judicial attorney for the plaintiff filed this action so that the judgment would order the State to immediately restore the payment of the extended working hours I and II cycle and the Learning Assessment Committee/Advisory Technical Committee (Comité de Evaluación de los Aprendizajes/ Comité Técnico Asesor) surcharges, which she had before the relocation and as long as she maintains this condition; as well as to pay all salary differences owed from the date these were illegally suppressed for the plaintiff, from February 1, 2020, including differences that may be generated for year-end bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, and school salary; interest and costs of both instances. The state representative answered the complaint negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. The trial judge, M.Sc. Bertha M. Jiménez Alvarado, by judgment no. 2024-824 at sixteen hours and fifty-three minutes on May ten, two thousand twenty-four, from the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, First Section, ruled in favor of the complaint and ordered restoring to the plaintiff the payment corresponding to the alternate schedule or extended working hours I and II cycle surcharge and the Learning Assessment Committee/Advisory Technical Committee surcharge that the plaintiff held at the time of being relocated for health reasons and as long as this condition is maintained; likewise, granted what was owed for the proportional amounts of year-end bonus (aguinaldo) and school salary originating from said suppression. Ordered that social charges and income tax be deducted from these amounts if applicable. Granted the payment of interest, indexation (indexación), and costs, setting the personal costs at 15% of the total award.

II.- AGGRIEVANCES: The state representative expresses disagreement with the ruling. Alleges improper interpretation and application of article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); as well as violation of the principle of legality. She argues that article 254 of the Labor Code does not apply to the case of the claimant here, since the plaintiff did not demonstrate with documentary evidence that she was disabled by a work-related risk, or that the Ministry of Public Education (Ministerio de Educación Pública) caused her any salary prejudice by temporarily relocating her for health reasons. On the contrary, as is evident from the evidence brought to the case file by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría), it is proven that she was relocated not by the application of numeral 22 bis of the Regulation to the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil); but rather by a medical recommendation, and she was not incapacitated due to illness, nor by work-related risk, for the cited numeral 254 to apply. She affirms that there is no evidence of the supposed prejudice against the plaintiff, especially since the function surcharge constitutes a temporary supplementary salary that responds to the needs of educational centers, for reasons of opportunity or convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. Likewise, she considers that an erroneous interpretation is made of article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (hereinafter ESC), because although it mentions there that if the servant at the time of being incapacitated due to illness or maternity was receiving a supplementary salary, they will have the right to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were receiving at that time; the truth of the matter is that from the documentary evidence added to the file, it is not evident that Mrs. [Name 002] was incapacitated by illness or had a leave of absence; on the contrary, it was a treating health professional who recommended a temporary relocation for health reasons. She argues that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, so it can only proceed according to what is duly authorized by the legal system (numerals 11 of the Political Constitution, and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration). She alleges violation of article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law (Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública), as well as omission of the criteria of the Legal Directorate (Dirección Jurídica) of the MEP. She insists that the surcharges are temporary, not permanent, and a violation of the principle of equity, as well as the principle of budgetary legality. She argues that, by personnel action no. 201902-MP-4103173, she was assigned the extended working hours I and II cycle and Learning Assessment Committee/Advisory Technical Committee surcharge for the entire 2019 school year, which was kept intact until the expiration date, that is, January 31, 2020. Hence, once that period of recognition has ended, it is impossible both legally (violation of the principle of legality) and materially for the ministerial portfolio to be able to recognize a surcharge that has not been assigned, nor has it been worked by the plaintiff, since as has been indicated, she was not performing proper teaching functions due to her state of health. She highlights the provisions in numerals 118 subsection j) of the Education Code (Código de Educación) and numeral 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, that salary bonuses are granted when the employee performs additional functions to those they ordinarily perform in their position, on a temporary basis and whose assignment is duly justified. On the other hand, she alleges insufficient basis in the judgment to grant the payment of salary differences, specifically those related to year-end bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, annual increases, incentive for extended school year, teaching incentive, professional career, and school salary; given that these are related to the granting of the principal, therefore, if the principal claim is not admissible, with much more reason the payment of these adjustments is not admissible, which is why she requests that the appeal be granted. She argues that the joint payment of interest and indexation (indexación) is improper. Regarding the granting of indexation, she estimates it should be rejected. She affirms that legal interest already contains an indexation component in its formula. Hence, it is not legally viable to grant legal interest and indexation, since for the latter to be admissible it would be necessary to grant simple interest, not legal interest. Finally, she alleges improper application of numeral 563 of the Labor Code. She argues that the State should be exempted from the payment of costs for having litigated in good faith. Thus, she requests that the appeal for cassation be admitted in order to modify the appealed judgment regarding the points indicated.

III.- CASE ANALYSIS: There is no objection that the plaintiff was relocated for health reasons starting March 15, 2019. It is also accredited that before being relocated to administrative functions, the plaintiff's salary included the Learning Assessment Committee/Advisory Technical Committee surcharge and an extended working hours I and II Cycle surcharge, as can be seen from official communication DRHDPRH-ULIC-1813-2019 and personnel action no. 201903-MP-4117407 with effective date up to January 31, 2020 (image 7 of the complete view of the Court's electronic file). Now, in this case, the issue is to define whether the payment of this supplementary salary corresponds to a teaching official who, for health reasons, has had to be relocated to an administrative position. The incapacity and the relocation in these cases have their origin in an illness of the official that prevents them from remaining in active teaching service, based on the foundation given by article 254 of the Labor Code.

This article, as part of Title Four of that regulatory body, called "ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS DURING THE EXERCISE OF WORK," establishes the obligation of the employer to reinstate in their position a worker who has suffered a risk but is able to continue working. It also provides for the employer's duty to provide a different position in accordance with their abilities when, on medical recommendation, they cannot return to perform the functions they were performing. The second paragraph literally states: "If according to medical opinion, the worker is not able to perform normally the work they were doing when the risk occurred, but can perform a different one in the same company, the employer shall be obliged to provide it to them, provided this is feasible, for which purpose the employer may make the personnel moves that are necessary," the same article that served as support for the Ministerio de Educación to grant the job reassignment for health reasons to the plaintiff. This regulation is directly related to the Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública (Decreto Ejecutivo número 19113 of July 28, 1989), where its article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the rules and procedures that the Ministerio de Educación Pública must follow to grant leave (licencia) to its servants, due to the diminishment of their faculties or aptitudes for work, survivors of occupational risks or illness. For its part, numeral 2 establishes: "The leaves to which this regulation refers shall be granted to those servants who, due to the diminishment suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, cannot perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and attributions corresponding to the position they were performing as regular servants." That regulation distinguishes between permanent leave (licencia permanente) and partial leave (licencia parcial), declaring that those servants for whom the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability or a partial or permanent disability and recommend a change of functions are entitled to the latter. Article 8 specifically deals with the case of granting special leave (licencia especial) in the following terms: "In accordance with the provisions of article 5 above, the Ministerio de Educación Pública shall grant a special leave (licencia especial) to those servants who find themselves in the following circumstances:/a) That according to their ailment, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social recommends, in the final assessment of the treatment, their change of functions./ b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the occupational risk that occurred, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros determines a minor or partial permanent disability and recommends their incorporation into the service with a change of functions." Article 17 states: "The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil and the Código de Educación on the matter." Thus, this regulation complements and does not contradict what is provided by numeral 174 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil, which reads: "a) If the servant, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, were earning additional salary for zonaje, for alternating schedule, or any additional pay, they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that moment./ b) Leaves due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right that servants have to receive the corresponding salary increases./c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the allowances referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other aspects, that may correspond." The regulatory provisions develop this express provision, contemplating, without distinction, the right to compensation (indemnización), both for the case of permanent leave (licencia permanente) and special leave (licencia especial). This is how this Chamber has resolved it on previous occasions when this same issue has been discussed. In judgment number 57 of 9:50 a.m., on January 21, 2011, it was explained: "IV.- … The representative of the State insists that numeral 174 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil is not applicable to the plaintiff, because that norm is only provided for persons who are permanently disabled and that her situation must be governed by what is established in article 166, according to which, 'When leave is granted to the teacher due to duly proven illness, half of the salary prior to the enjoyment of the leave shall be paid in their favor and for a period not exceeding 6 months. In exceptional cases, an extension of this benefit may be authorized for up to two more quarters, if the ill teacher demonstrates their inability to work, with the testimony of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.' However, the Chamber has had the opportunity to hear matters identical to the present one and has concluded that the cited article 174 does not exclude personnel who enjoy a special leave (licencia especial), for being partially disabled. The cited numeral 166 does not establish that its application is only possible for cases of special leaves (licencias especiales). For its part, article 174 also does not exclude workers who are partially disabled and who enjoy a leave of that type. The norms make no distinction whatsoever between special leaves (licencias especiales) and permanent leaves (licencias permanentes), coupled with the fact that they also do not contemplate any differentiation between these leaves and disability due to illness, apart from the fact that all are based, precisely, on the loss of health due to a disabling illness. See that subsection a) of this last norm indicates that 'If the servant, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, were earning additional salary for zonaje, for alternating schedule, or any additional pay, they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that moment...'. Furthermore, from numeral 173 ibid it is inferred that the legislator's intention was to protect the integrity of the salary of educational personnel during the period of disability. Nothing else is deduced from what is indicated in the final paragraph of subsection a), according to which, '...when it is proven that the disability extends to a period longer than four days, their salary shall not suffer a deduction,' as well as from what is stipulated in subsection b, where it is noted that 'if the servant were protected by the Seguro Social, the Ministerio de Educación shall recognize the difference in salaries up to 100% (one hundred percent) thereof; if not, the payment of the salary shall be borne by the Ministerio de Educación.' None of those norms makes reference to an absolute disability or excludes persons who enjoy special leave (licencia especial) from its application. It is clear that this leave is granted to servants who suffer from a minor or partial permanent disability and require a change of functions, according to what is established in numeral 5 of the Reglamento de licencias especiales para los servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública (Decreto Ejecutivo N° 19113, effective as of July 28, 1989). In numeral 2 of that regulation, it is also established that: 'The leaves to which this regulation refers shall be granted to those servants who, due to the diminishment suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, cannot perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and attributions corresponding to the position they were performing as regular servants.' Now, regarding the remuneration that the beneficiaries of this type of leave must receive, the special regulation points out that they are entitled to enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary, according to what is stipulated on the matter in the Estatuto de Servicio Civil and in the Código de Educación." Thus, the surcharges (recargos) in question should have been maintained despite the reassignment (reubicación), as she has the right to receive an allowance identical to the salary she held at the time prior to the granting of the administrative reassignment. Consequently, if at the time of being reassigned the plaintiff was earning those surcharges, her right is indisputable, in accordance with the special regulations previously cited, for said additional pay to be included within her remuneration as an administrative official, a granting that is independent of the needs the employer entity may have for those services. That is, in application of that provision (subsection c, Article 174, Ibidem), the defendant entity could not suppress the subsidy of a salary nature granted to the plaintiff, which she received before being reassigned. In addition to the above, it must be made clear that the current wording of Article 174 does not give grounds to eliminate the additional pays, so that, without a doubt, the servants covered by a medical leave have the right to continue earning this type of bonuses while that leave lasts (see rulings from this Chamber, numbers 2001-591; 2004-965; 2005-304; 2005-395; 2006-1102; 2006-1108; 2007-91; 2008-62; 2008-96; 2008-442; 2008-634; 2010-537 and 2010-1510).

IV.- ON THE GRANTED SALARY DIFFERENCES: The State's representative challenges the granting of payment for salary differences on Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, annual raises, incentive for extension of the school year, didactic incentive, professional career, and school salary. As the sole argument, it points out that these are related to the granting of the principal; therefore, if the principal claim is not admissible, with even more reason the payment of those adjustments is not admissible, for which reason it requests that they be dismissed. The Chamber recognizes that in labor matters the principles of simplicity and informality prevail, but in appellate matters this does not release the appellant from the obligation to argue, in a clear and precise manner, the reasons for which it challenges the factual or legal basis of the appealed judgment. The precise expression of the reasons warranting the revocation of the pronouncement is a necessary requirement to proceed with the study of the challenges, since cassation (casación) being a means of control over the work performed by the previous instance, the appellant's inputs are required for said analysis (Article 590 of the Labor Code, Código de Trabajo). In this way, there being no greater argumentation than that these are accessory extremes, and it having been proven that the principal was duly granted, there is no merit to vary what the A quo resolved on these adjustments. We do not omit to indicate that the challenged judgment only granted the payment of salary differences on Christmas bonus and school salary, but not on the other accessory extremes mentioned by the appellant.

V.- INTERESTS AND INDEXATION (INDEXACIÓN): Article 565 of the Labor Code, regarding interests, provides that the percentage shall be that established in Law No. 3284 of April 30, 1964 (Commercial Code, Código de Comercio), whose canon 497 defines legal interest, which is applicable in the absence of an express agreement between the parties. That numeral states: "Legal interest is that which is applied supplementarily in the absence of an agreement, and is equal to the basic passive rate of the Central Bank of Costa Rica for operations in national currency and to the 'prime rate' for operations in United States dollars." Without making any exclusion, the mentioned ordinal 565—which is applicable in this matter—also expressly provides that every judgment ordering the payment of a monetary obligation shall imply for the debtor the obligation to adjust the principal economic extremes, updating them to present value. Thus, the trial judge could not have incurred in any violation by ordering the recognition of legal interest jointly with the indexation of the recognized items, since the law so orders it, regardless of the interpretation that other courts may have made regarding this topic. For the Chamber, the norm is clear and does not admit the interpretation that the challenger attempts to assert, under the shelter of what was resolved by other judicial offices, whose decision—furthermore—is not binding for this other Body. Then, even though the interest rate may contemplate that of inflation, the truth is that both figures compensate different factors. Indexation is provided to compensate for the loss of the value of money occurring over time in relation to inflation, while interests compensate for the opportunity cost, for not having been able to dispose of the money in a timely manner. Consequently, it must be understood that indexation and legal interests are not mutually exclusive extremes, and being regulated by law, they do not imply a double payment.

VI.- COSTS (COSTAS): Ordinal 562 of the Labor Code, in what is of interest, stipulates: "In every judgment [...] the losing party shall be condemned [...] to the payment of the personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales) caused. /If the judgment resolves the matter on the merits [...] the personal costs shall not be less than fifteen percent (15%) nor greater than twenty-five percent (25%) of the liquid amount of the condemnation or the absolution, as the case may be..." The following Article 563, for its part, indicates: "Notwithstanding, the losing party may be exempted from the payment of personal and even procedural costs, when: 1) The litigation was conducted with evident good faith. /2) The propositions have partially succeeded. /3) When there has been reciprocal defeat. /The exoneration must always be reasoned... /A party that denied evident claims which the outcome of the process indicates they should have accepted, did not attend the entire hearing, adduced bribed witnesses or false witnesses and documents, did not offer any evidence to justify their claim or defenses, if they were based on disputed facts... cannot be considered to be in good faith." In accordance with these norms, the rule is to impose the payment of these expenses on the losing party. In the case under analysis, it is not estimated to be in any of the exception scenarios, in effect to exercise the power granted to judges to exonerate the losing party from the payment of costs, as the worker was forced to resort to judicial courts in pursuit of the satisfaction of her rights and the State's theory of the case has no legal basis. Consequently, there is no merit to vary what was resolved on this specific aspect.

VII.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: In light of the foregoing, the appeal must be declared without merit.

VIII.- DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATES VARELA ARAYA AND CHACÓN ARTAVIA: The undersigned depart from the majority criterion insofar as it confirms the recognition to the plaintiff of the payment for the concept of surcharges of the Learning Assessment Committee/Technical Advisor (Comité Evaluación del Aprendizajes/Técnico Asesor) and surcharge for extension of the workday, from the moment she was reassigned to administrative tasks and while she remains in that condition. It has been duly accredited that, in the year 2019, the plaintiff earned those surcharges and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative functions as of March 2019; reason for which they stopped being paid to her as of February first, two thousand twenty. Likewise, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed based on Article 254 of the Labor Code.

We are not dealing with a disability proper. The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, and therefore may only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (articles 11 of the Political Constitution and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration), and the employee is not within the factual circumstances provided for in article 22 bis subsection a) of the Regulations of the Civil Service Statute, since she is not disabled by illness to be entitled to what is claimed. After a reconsideration of the analysis of the scope of the rules applicable to the specific case, we conclude that the appellant is not correct. Articles 118 of the Education Code and 13 of the Manual of Procedures for Managing Teaching Staff stipulate the possibility of assigning certain extra pay (recargos), which do not constitute a vested right and, consequently, payment thereof must be suspended when the civil servant, in the performance of his or her usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, article 174 of the Civil Service Statute establishes that: “a) If the civil servant, at the time of being disabled due to illness or maternity, was receiving additional salary for location allowance (zonaje), for an "alternate schedule", or any extra pay (sobresueldo), he or she shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary that he or she was receiving at that time. /b) Sick leave, whatever its duration, shall not interrupt the right of civil servants to receive the corresponding salary increases. (Thus amended by article 1 of Law No. 5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aid referred to in article 167 shall have the nature of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may correspond. / (Thus added the preceding subsection by article 1 of Law No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)” (emphasis added). From the text transcribed above, it can be clearly and expressly inferred that a civil servant who is disabled due to illness, or a female civil servant on maternity leave, who has been receiving additional salary for extra pay (sobresueldos), is entitled to have these included when setting the amount of the subsidy to be paid. In the case at hand, the claimant was reassigned to administrative functions and is neither disabled nor enjoying such leave, so her situation does not fall under the factual circumstances of the rule. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the provisions of articles 118, subsection j), of the Education Code and 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, these additional amounts (pluses) are granted when the civil servant performs temporary additional functions to those ordinarily performed in his or her position, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether due to the needs of educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient provision of the service. In other words, the granting of these extra pay (sobresueldos) depends on the circumstances so warranting it and is therefore assigned on a temporary basis, for each academic year, according to the start and end dates regulated in article 176 of the Civil Service Statute; otherwise, the temporary service would be distorted and would become a permanent one. In accordance with the foregoing, article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law prescribes that “the excess shall be maintained as extra pay (recargo), therefore, of a temporary nature.” Consequently, those extra pay (recargos) that depend on a particular condition to be granted do not configure a vested right, which is irrevocably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, on a permanent basis and regardless of the service provided, as is intended in this case. There is extensive jurisprudence from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in the sense that extra pay for additional duties (recargos de funciones) cannot be considered a vested right of the civil servant. Thus, in judgment No. 3681, of 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it was stated: “It should be recalled that this Chamber has indicated that the performance of the worker that can be classified as extra pay for additional duties (recargo de funciones) does not constitute a vested right for the worker to whom it is assigned and that obliges the Administration to maintain him or her in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such extra pay (recargos) -since it is due to the need to provide the service at a specific time- is temporary in nature and is paid for a quantity of specific tasks, and, logically, its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly within its interest and competence (see in this regard judgment number 2003-09533 of twelve hours twenty-eight minutes on September fifth, two thousand three and 2006-7717 of sixteen hours forty-seven minutes on May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, extra pay (recargo) constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit that depends on whether or not the functions are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specific period having the effect of creating a vested right in favor of the interested party for such item to continue being paid, or for the extra pay (recargo) or alternate schedule to be maintained" (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions numbers 6390 of 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011 and 868 of 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013). Likewise, in Voto No. 3306, of 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the assumptions under which an extra pay (sobresueldo) was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met (Judgment No. 2006-010959 of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006)”. In this same ruling, reference was made to judgment No. 296, of 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly stated: “The same applies with respect to the salary difference that the appellant claims to cease receiving as a result of the challenged act, since the remuneration for the cited extra pay (recargo) constitutes a ‘plus’ or salary benefit, which depends on whether or not the functions are performed, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specific period having the effect of creating a vested right in favor of the interested party, for said extra pay (recargo) to continue being paid, or for the indicated extra pay (recargo) to be maintained, so that the appeal, with respect to this last objection, is also unfounded…”. Finally, in resolution No. 10959, of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was pointed out: “This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that extra pay (sobresueldos) that depend on a condition to be granted do not constitute a vested right that is incorporated as such into the salary proper, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which they were recognized.” In other words, if the conditions under which a bonus (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is no longer met." In accordance with the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for the surcharges (recargos) of the Learning Assessment Committee/Technical Advisor and the workday extension surcharge constitute temporary bonuses, annexed to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final remuneration received by the employee, are not a permanent substantial component, but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on the employee meeting the assumptions established in the legal system for their granting and on the needs that arise in each school term. It should be noted that the payment of these surcharges proceeds by reason of the position and the functions performed by the employee, and therefore may be denied when the original conditions for their granting disappear. Based on the norms cited, the jurisprudence mentioned, and the principles of primacy of reality, reasonableness, and wage equality, it is considered that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of remuneration when the actual provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as in the case at hand (a person reassigned to an administrative position), since there is no factual or legal basis to remunerate a service that is not being provided. Furthermore, obliging the State to pay a remuneration for a service that is not being rendered is unreasonable and contrary to equity. In addition to this, an undue advantage would be given to reassigned persons, compared to those who are appointed to a teaching position and are performing functions with a surcharge of some type, since they are not in equal conditions yet earn the same. Besides the fact that the State would be paying double (to two employees) for the same workday extension surcharge, when it has been necessary for the person substituting the one who has been reassigned for health reasons to assume it. As previously stated, the surcharges in question do not constitute a vested right, besides the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be considered a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, it should be borne in mind that in order to demand payment of the surcharge, it is necessarily required that a norm so authorizes it (principle of legality that governs the public sector) and that the conditions and assumptions established by it are met; which is not the case here. By virtue of the foregoing, the suppression of the surcharge in question, upon the plaintiff moving from the condition of teacher to performing administrative functions due to reassignment, is in accordance with the law. Regarding costs, although the regulation on this item establishes as a general rule the imposition of those expenses on the losing party, those who sign this dissenting vote consider that, in the specific case, the party should be absolved from paying costs. Although it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff is not entitled to the right claimed, it is observed that she has litigated with evident good faith, under the belief that she is entitled to the right to maintain the payment of the surcharge claimed during her reassignment to administrative duties, and the undersigned have reconsidered the issue of the correct interpretation of the norms governing the surcharge for any reason. This exoneration is ordered in application of articles 563 and 562 of the Labor Code. Thus, the appropriate course is to partially uphold the appeal filed, revoke the ruling in the first-instance judgment, accept the defense of lack of right, and dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety. It is appropriate to rule without special condemnation for costs.

THEREFORE:

The appeal is dismissed. Judges Varela Araya and Chacón Artavia dissent, partially uphold the appeal filed, revoke the ruling in the first-instance judgment, accept the defense of lack of right, and dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety.

They resolve without special award of costs.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:6pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">Res:</span><span style="font-size:6pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub"> 2025-000194</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:9pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:6pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">MMONGEROD</span><span style="font-size:6pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">/RPC</span></p> Recital X). The petitioner’s main objection is directed against these very aspects. In response to the violation relating to the preservation of lifetime tenure of forest cover, the municipality indicates in the license that the forest management plan (plan de manejo forestal) is subject to the corresponding administrative procedure. There is no explanation whatsoever in the contested decision regarding the applicability of the regulatory plan (plan regulador) without proper deliberation before the authorized entity, accompanied by the necessary technical studies such as the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA), ignored by the municipal approval, yet such studies are necessary to ensure that the urban development (desarrollo urbanístico) is compatible with the preservation of forest cover (cobertura boscosa) and aquifers. As defended by the Comptroller General’s Office and the Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA), urban planning cannot take place without this type of study strictly. Furthermore, the feasibility granted for drinking water supply, being provisional as stated by the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (ICAA) and the Administrative Court for Public Utility Services of ASADA of Santa Eduviges, lacks the mandatory binding nature required for any subdivision (fraccionamiento) approval process, in direct violation of the Subdivision Regulations (Reglamento de Fraccionamiento). Along the same lines, the clearance from the National Roads Authority, under file No. 4574-2007 of December 11, 2007, only relates to access on National Route No. 239, but no consideration is given to the negative impact of high-density vehicular development on an area designated as a Forest Reserve, which serves as an aquifer recharge zone of the highest importance. The Comptroller’s Office also indicates that authorizations for projects adjacent to Protected Wild Areas are the exclusive competence of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE), through the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC), which has not been complied with here. As for the forest cover, the property is largely composed of forest of the very humid tropical type, a fragile ecosystem, verified by technical reports from MINAE. Its destruction or fragmentation through urbanization has enormous environmental consequences. The decision of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in Voto 4654-2003, establishes that the protection of the environment must prevail over economic development whenever the latter implies irreparable destruction. No economic interests, the Chamber has said, can prevail over the right to a healthy environment, and the state’s obligation to protect what is public domain is fundamental. What is stated in this ruling is directly violated in this case, given the evidence provided by the petitioner and the documentation of the municipality of Pérez Zeledón.

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JORGE ENRIQUE OLASO ÁLVAREZ - MAGISTRADO/A 1 **PAYMENT OF THE SUPPLEMENT (RECARGO) TO A TEACHING STAFF MEMBER REASSIGNED (REUBICADA) TO ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES DUE TO HEALTH PROBLEMS IS APPROPRIATE.** Based on Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil), in relation to the Regulation on Special Leaves of the MEP (Decreto Ejecutivo N.º 19113), it was concluded that the plaintiff should continue receiving the subsidy equivalent to her total salary, including the supplements (sobresueldos) she was receiving at the time of her reassignment (reubicación). The Chamber affirmed that the Administration could not eliminate these payments, as their nature was part of the ordinary salary while the medical condition that justified the reassignment (reubicación) persisted. Therefore, the lower court ruling was confirmed, ordering the payment of salary differences, including the year-end bonus (aguinaldo) and school salary (salario escolar), along with interest, indexation, and personal legal costs set at 15% of the total award. [194-25] **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATES VARELA ARAYA AND CHACÓN ARTAVIA.** They consider that the recognition of supplements (sobresueldos) for duties supplements (recargos) is not appropriate after the plaintiff's reassignment (reubicación), because these benefits are temporary in nature and are subject to the effective performance of specific additional duties. They argued that Article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) applies only when there is a formally accredited disability, which was not satisfied in this case, since the teacher was reassigned (reubicada) without being legally disabled. In the opinion of the magistrates, the payment of supplements (sobresueldos) must cease when the conditions that gave rise to them disappear. They cited constitutional case law establishing that supplements for duties (recargos por funciones) do not constitute an acquired right (derecho adquirido).

Res: 2025-000194 SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.

San José, at eighteen hours and ten minutes on the thirty-first of January of two thousand twenty-five.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, by [Nombre 001], widow, educator, and resident of Puntarenas, against the STATE, represented by its deputy procurator, attorney Marianella Barrantes Zamora, resident of Heredia. Appearing as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff is attorney Cristian Ceciliano Mora, resident of San José. All of legal age, married, and attorneys, with the exception noted.

Drafted by Judge Fallas Carvajal; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- BACKGROUND: The special judicial attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff filed this action so that, in judgment, the State be ordered to immediately restore the payment of the extended workday surcharges (recargos de ampliación de jornada laboral) for I and II Cycle and the Learning Assessment Committee/ Technical Advisory Committee (Comité de Evaluación de los Aprendizajes/ Comité Técnico Asesor) surcharge, which she had before the reassignment and while she maintains that condition; as well as to pay all salary differences owed from the date they were illegally suppressed for the plaintiff, from February 1, 2020, including differences that may arise for year-end bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, and school salary (salario escolar); interest and both costs. The state representative answered the complaint negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. The trial judge, M.Sc. Bertha M. Jiménez Alvarado, by judgment no. 2024-824 at sixteen hours and fifty-three minutes on May 10, two thousand twenty-four, of the Labor Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, First Section, declared the complaint with merit and ordered that the payment corresponding to the alternate schedule or extended workday surcharge for I and II Cycle and the Learning Assessment Committee/ Technical Advisory Committee surcharge be restored to the plaintiff; which the plaintiff held at the time of being reassigned for health reasons and while she maintains that condition; likewise, it granted what was owed for the proportional amounts of year-end bonus (aguinaldo) and school salary (salario escolar) originating from that suppression. It ordered that, from these amounts, social charges and income tax must be deducted if applicable. It granted the payment of interest, indexation (indexación), and costs, setting personal costs at 15% of the total award.

II.- GRIEVANCES: The state representative expresses disagreement with the decision. She alleges improper interpretation and application of article 254 of the Labor Code and of numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil); as well as violation of the principle of legality. She argues that article 254 of the Labor Code does not apply to the case of the plaintiff here, since the plaintiff did not demonstrate with documentary evidence that she was disabled due to a work-related risk, or that the Ministry of Public Education caused her any salary detriment by temporarily reassigning her for health reasons. On the contrary, as can be deduced from the evidence brought to the record by the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría), it is proven that she was reassigned not by application of numeral 22 bis of the Regulation of the Civil Service Statute (Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil); but rather by a medical recommendation, and she was not disabled due to illness, nor due to work-related risk, for the cited numeral 254 to apply. She affirms that there is no evidence of the alleged detriment against the plaintiff, especially since the functions surcharge constitutes a temporary supplemental salary (sobresueldo) that responds to the needs of educational centers, for reasons of opportunity or convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. Likewise, she considers that an erroneous interpretation is made of article 174 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil, hereinafter ESC), because although it is mentioned there that if the employee, at the time of becoming disabled due to illness or maternity, is earning a supplemental salary (sobresueldo), they will be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time; the fact of the matter is that from the documentary evidence filed in the case file it cannot be deduced that Mrs. [Nombre 002] was disabled due to illness or that she had a leave; on the contrary, it was a treating health professional who recommended a temporary reassignment for health reasons. She argues that the Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, therefore it can only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized by the legal system (numerals 11 of the Political Constitution, and 11 and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration). She alleges violation of article 15 of the Public Administration Salary Law, as well as omission of the criteria of the Legal Directorate (Dirección Jurídica) of the MEP. She insists that the surcharges are temporary, not permanent, and violation of the principle of equity, as well as the principle of budgetary legality. She maintains that, by personnel action no. 201902-MP-4103173, she was assigned the extended workday surcharge for I and II Cycle and the Learning Assessment Committee/Technical Advisory Committee for the entire 2019 school year, which was kept intact until its expiration date, that is, January 31, 2020. Hence, once that recognition period ended, it is impossible both legally (violation of the principle of legality) and materially for the ministerial portfolio to be able to recognize a surcharge that has not been assigned, nor has it been worked by the plaintiff, since, as has been indicated, she was not performing proper teaching functions due to her state of health. She highlights the provisions in numerals 118 subsection j) of the Education Code and numeral 13 of Executive Decree No. 12915-E-P, that salary bonuses (pluses salariales) are granted when the employee carries out additional functions to those ordinarily performed in their position, on a temporary basis and whose assignment is duly justified. On the other hand, she alleges insufficient grounds in the judgment to grant the payment of salary differences, specifically those related to year-end bonus (aguinaldo), vacations, annual increases, incentive for extension of the school year, didactic incentive, professional career, and school salary (salario escolar); since these are related to the granting of the principal claim, therefore, if the principal claim is not proper, with much more reason the payment of those readjustments is not proper, which is why she requests that the appeal be granted with merit. She claims the joint payment of interest and indexation (indexación) is improper. Regarding the granting of indexation (indexación), she considers that it must be rejected. She affirms that legal interest already contains an indexation component in its formula. Hence, it is not legally viable to grant legal interest and indexation (indexación), being that for the latter to proceed it would be necessary to grant simple interest, not legal interest. Lastly, she alleges improper application of numeral 563 of the Labor Code. She argues that the State must be exempted from the payment of costs for having litigated in good faith. This being the case, she asks that the appeal for cassation (recurso de casación) be admitted in such a way that the appealed judgment be modified in relation to the points indicated.

III.- CASE ANALYSIS: There is no objection that the plaintiff was reassigned for health reasons starting March 15, 2019. It is also accredited that before being reassigned to administrative functions, the plaintiff's salary included the Learning Assessment Committee/Technical Advisory Committee surcharge and a surcharge for extended workday I and II Cycle, as can be observed from official letter DRHDPRH-ULIC-1813-2019 and personnel action no. 201903-MP-4117407 with an effective date until January 31, 2020 (image 7 of the complete view of the Court's electronic file). Now, in this case, it is a matter of defining whether the payment of this supplemental salary (sobresueldo) is appropriate for a teaching official who, for health reasons, has had to be reassigned to an administrative position. The disability and the reassignment in these cases have their origin in an illness of the official that prevents them from remaining in active teaching service, this based on the grounds given by article 254 of the Labor Code.

This article, as part of Title Four of that regulatory body, called "ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF WORK," establishes the employer's obligation to reinstate the worker who has suffered a risk, but who is able to continue working. It also provides for the employer's duty to provide a different position according to their capabilities when, by medical recommendation, they cannot return to the functions they were performing. The second paragraph literally states: "If, according to medical opinion, the worker could not normally perform the work they were doing when the risk occurred, but could perform a different one in the same company, the employer shall be obliged to provide it, provided it is feasible, for which purpose they may make the necessary personnel moves," the same article that served as support for the Ministry of Education to grant the occupational relocation for health reasons to the plaintiff. This regulation is directly related to the Regulations for Special Leaves Ministry of Public Education (Executive Decree number 19113 of July 28, 1989), where its Article 1 mentions that this regulation aims to establish the rules and procedures that the Ministry of Public Education must follow to grant leave to its employees, due to the diminution of their faculties or aptitudes for work, survivors of work risks or illness. For its part, numeral 2 establishes: "The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the diminution suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, could not perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and attributions corresponding to the position they were performing as regular employees." That regulation distinguishes between permanent leave and partial leave, declaring that those employees for whom the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social or the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, in their final assessment, declare a minor permanent disability or a partial or permanent disability and recommend a change of functions are entitled to the latter. Article 8 specifically addresses the assumption of the granting of the special leave in the following terms: "In accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article 5, the Ministry of Public Education shall grant a special leave to those employees who find themselves in the following circumstances:/a) That in accordance with their condition, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in the final assessment of the treatment, recommends a change of functions./ b) That in the final assessment of the effects of the work risk that occurred, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros determines a minor or partial permanent disability and recommends their incorporation into the service with a change of functions." Article 17 states: "The beneficiaries of the leaves provided for in this regulation shall enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Statute and the Education Code on the matter." Thus, this regulation complements and does not contradict the provisions of numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute, which reads: "a) If the employee, at the time of being disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zone pay, for alternate schedule, or any supplementary salary, they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time./ b) Leaves due to illness, whatever their duration, shall not interrupt the right that employees have to receive the corresponding salary increases./c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy and the aids referred to in Article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other aspects, that might correspond." The regulatory provisions develop this express provision, indistinctly contemplating the right to compensation, both for the case of permanent leave and special leave. This Chamber has so decided on previous occasions where this same issue has been discussed. In judgment number 57 of 9:50 a.m., of January 21, 2011, it was explained: "IV.- …The State's representative insists that numeral 174 of the Civil Service Statute is not applicable to the plaintiff, since that rule is only provided for persons who are permanently disabled and that her situation must be governed by the provisions of Article 166, according to which, 'When leave is granted to the teacher due to duly verified illness, half of the salary prior to the enjoyment of the leave shall be paid in their favor and for a period of no more than 6 months. In exceptional cases, an extension of this benefit for up to two more quarters may be authorized, if the sick teacher demonstrates their inability to work, with the testimony of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.' However, the chamber has had the opportunity to hear cases identical to the present one and has concluded that the cited Article 174 does not exclude personnel who enjoy a special leave, due to being partially disabled. The cited numeral 166 does not establish that its application is possible only for cases of special leaves. For its part, Article 174 also does not exclude workers who are partially disabled and who enjoy such a leave. The rules make no distinction between special and permanent leaves, added to the fact that they also do not contemplate any differentiation between these leaves and disabilities due to illness, apart from the fact that all are based precisely on the loss of health due to a disabling illness. It is seen that subsection a) of this last rule indicates that 'If the employee, at the time of being disabled due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for zone pay, for alternate schedule, or any supplementary salary, they shall be entitled to a subsidy equivalent to the total salary they were earning at that time...' Furthermore, from numeral 173 idem, it follows that the legislator's intention was to protect the integrity of the salary of teaching personnel during the period of disability. Nothing else can be deduced from what is indicated in the final paragraph of subsection a), according to which, '...when it is proven that the disability extends to a period longer than four days, their salary shall not suffer a deduction,' as well as from what is stipulated in subsection b, where it is noted that 'if the employee were protected by the Social Security, the Ministry of Education shall recognize the difference in salaries up to completing 100% (one hundred percent) thereof; if not, the payment of the salary shall be borne by the Ministry of Education.' None of these rules refers to an absolute disability or excludes from their application persons who enjoy special leave. It is clear that this leave is granted to employees who suffer a minor or partial permanent disability and require a change of functions, according to what is established in numeral 5 of the Regulations for special leaves for employees of the Ministry of Public Education (Executive Decree No. 19113, in force as of July 28, 1989). In numeral 2 of that regulation, it is also established that: 'The leaves referred to in this regulation shall be granted to those employees who, due to the diminution suffered in their faculties or aptitudes, could not perform, without detriment to their health or the service, the functions and attributions corresponding to the position they were performing as regular employees.' Now then, regarding the remuneration that the beneficiaries of this type of leave must receive, the special regulation points out that they are entitled to enjoy a subsidy equivalent to the entirety of their salary, according to what is stipulated in this regard in the Civil Service Statute and in the Education Code.

Therefore, the additional pays (recargos) in question should have been maintained despite the reassignment (reubicación), as she has the right to receive aid identical to the salary she held at the time immediately prior to the granting of the administrative reassignment (reubicación administrativa). Consequently, if at the time the plaintiff was reassigned she was earning those additional pays (recargos), it is indisputable that she has the right, in accordance with the special legislation cited above, for said additional pay (sobresueldo) to be included in her remuneration as an administrative official, a granting that is independent of the employer entity's need for those services. That is, in application of that provision (subsection c, Article 174 ibid.), the defendant entity could not eliminate from the subsidy of a salary nature granted to the plaintiff and which she received before being reassigned. In addition to the foregoing, it must be made clear that the current wording of numeral 174 does not provide grounds for eliminating additional pays (sobresueldos); therefore, without a doubt, servants covered by a sick leave are entitled to continue earning this type of bonuses while that leave lasts (see decisions of this Chamber, numbers 2001-591; 2004-965; 2005-304; 2005-395; 2006-1102; 2006-1108; 2007-91; 2008-62; 2008-96; 2008-442; 2008-634; 2010-537 and 2010-1510).

**IV.- REGARDING THE SALARY DIFFERENCES GRANTED:** The State's representative challenges the granting of the payment of salary differences for Christmas bonus (aguinaldo), vacation, annual increases, incentive for extension of the school year (incentivo por ampliación del curso lectivo), didactic incentive (incentivo didáctico), professional career (carrera profesional), and school salary (salario escolar). As the sole argument, it points out that these are related to the granting of the principal claim, and therefore, if the principal claim is not admissible, with much greater reason the payment of these adjustments is not admissible, which is why it requests they be dismissed. The Chamber recognizes that in labor matters the principles of simplicity and informality prevail, but in appellate matters this does not release the appellant from the obligation to argue, clearly and precisely, the reasons for challenging the factual or legal basis of the appealed judgment. The precise expression of the reasons warranting the reversal of the ruling is a necessary requirement to proceed with the study of the challenges, since cassation (casación) being a means of controlling the work performed by the lower court, the appellant's inputs are required for said analysis (Article 590 of the Labor Code, Código de Trabajo). In this way, as there is no greater argument than that these are ancillary items, and it having been proven that the principal was duly granted, there is no merit to vary what was resolved by the lower court regarding these adjustments. It is not omitted to indicate that the contested judgment only granted the payment of salary differences for Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) and school salary (salario escolar), but not for the other ancillary items mentioned by the appellant.

**V.- INTERESTS AND INDEXATION (INDEXACIÓN):** Article 565 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), regarding interests, provides that the percentage shall be that established in Law No. 3284 of April 30, 1964 (Commercial Code, Código de Comercio), whose canon 497 defines the legal interest (interés legal), which is applicable in the absence of an express agreement between the parties. That numeral reads: "Legal interest (Interés legal) is that which is applied supplementally in the absence of agreement, and is equal to the basic passive rate (tasa básica pasiva) of the Central Bank of Costa Rica for operations in national currency and to the 'prime rate' for operations in US dollars." Without making any exclusion, the aforementioned ordinal 565—which is applicable in this matter—also expressly provides that every judgment ordering the payment of a monetary obligation shall imply for the debtor the obligation to adjust the principal economic items, updating them to present value. Therefore, the trial judge could not have incurred any infraction by ordering the recognition of legal interest (interés legal) jointly with the indexation (indexación) of the recognized items, since the law so orders, regardless of the interpretation that other courts may have made regarding this issue. For the Chamber, the norm is clear and does not admit the interpretation that the challenger seeks to assert, under the shelter of decisions rendered by other judicial offices, whose decision—moreover—is not binding on this other Body. Furthermore, even though the interest rate may contemplate the rate of inflation, the fact is that both figures compensate for different factors. Indexation (indexación) is provided to compensate for the loss of the value of money occurring over time in relation to inflation, while interests compensate for the opportunity cost of not having been able to dispose of the money in a timely manner. Consequently, it must be understood that indexation (indexación) and legal interests are not mutually exclusive items, and being regulated by law, they do not imply a double payment.

**VI.- COSTS (COSTAS):** Ordinal 562 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), in what is relevant, stipulates: "In every judgment […] the losing party shall be ordered […] to pay the personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales) incurred. /If the judgment resolves the matter on its merits […] the personal costs (personales) may not be less than fifteen percent (15%) nor more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the net amount of the award or the dismissal, as the case may be.…" The following Article 563, for its part, indicates: "Nonetheless, the losing party may be exempted from the payment of personal costs (costas personales) and even procedural costs (procesales), when: 1) Litigation has been with evident good faith (buena fe). /2) The claims have partially succeeded. /3) When there has been mutual defeat (vencimiento recíproco). /The exoneration must always be reasoned… /It may not be considered good faith (buena fe) for the party that denied evident claims that the outcome of the process indicates they should have accepted, did not attend the entirety of the hearing, adduced bribed witnesses or false witnesses and documents, did not offer any proof to justify their claim or defenses, if these were based on disputed facts…" In accordance with these norms, the rule is to impose the payment of these expenses on the party that was defeated. In the case under analysis, it is not considered that any of the exceptions apply, in order to exercise the power granted to judges to exonerate the losing party from the payment of costs (costas), insofar as the servant was forced to resort to the courts in pursuit of the satisfaction of her rights and the State's case theory lacks legal basis. Consequently, there is no merit to vary what was resolved on this specific aspect.

**VII.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** In light of the above, the appeal must be declared without merit.

**VIII.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGES VARELA ARAYA AND CHACÓN ARTAVIA:** The undersigned dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it confirms the recognition to the plaintiff of the payment for the additional pays (recargos) of the Learning Assessment Committee (Comité Evaluación del Aprendizajes)/Technical Advisor (Técnico Asesor) and the additional pay for extended work hours (recargo de ampliación de jornada laboral), from the moment she was reassigned to administrative duties and for as long as she remains in that condition. It has been duly accredited that, in 2019, the plaintiff was earning those additional pays (recargos) and that, due to health problems, she was reassigned to administrative functions as of March 2019; reason for which they ceased to be paid to her as of February first, 2020. Likewise, it is clear that the reassignment was agreed upon based on Article 254 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo).

We are not dealing with an incapacity properly speaking. The Public Administration is subject to the principle of legality, and therefore may only proceed in accordance with what is duly authorized in the legal system (Articles 11 of the Constitución Política and 11 and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), and the employee does not fall within the factual circumstances provided for in article 22 bis, subsection a) of the Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil, as she is not incapacitated by illness to be entitled to what is sought. After reconsidering the analysis of the scope of the regulations applicable to the specific case, we conclude that the appellant is not correct. Articles 118 of the Código de Educación and 13 of the Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente stipulate the possibility of assigning certain additional payments (recargos), which do not constitute an acquired right and, consequently, payment of these must be suspended when the employee, in the performance of her usual duties, ceases to meet the requirements demanded for their recognition. On the other hand, article 174 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil establishes that: “a) If the employee, at the time of becoming incapacitated due to illness or maternity, was earning additional salary for location-based pay (zonaje), for "alternate schedule" (horario alterno), or any extra pay (sobresueldo), she shall be entitled to a subsidy (subsidio) equivalent to the total salary she was earning at that time. /b) Sick leave, regardless of its duration, shall not interrupt the right of employees to receive the corresponding salary increases. (Thus amended by article 1 of Ley No.5659 of December 17, 1974). /c) For all legal purposes, both the subsidy (subsidio) and the aid referred to in article 167 shall have the character of salary, and shall consequently be the basis for the calculation of pensions and legal benefits, among other items, that may apply. / (Subsection added by article 1 of Ley No. 6110 of November 9, 1977)” (emphasis added). From the text transcribed above, it is clearly and expressly inferred that an employee who is incapacitated due to illness, or a female employee on maternity leave, who had been earning additional salary through extra pay (sobresueldos), is entitled to have these considered when setting the amount of the subsidy (subsidio) to be paid to her. In the case at hand, the petitioner was reassigned to administrative functions and is neither incapacitated nor enjoying that leave, so her situation is not subsumed under the factual condition of the rule. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 118, subsection j), of the Código de Educación and 13 of Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 12915-E-P, these pluses (pluses) are granted when the employee performs functions additional to those ordinarily carried out in her position, on a temporary basis, and whose assignment is duly justified, whether by the needs of the educational centers, for reasons of opportunity and convenience, or for the effective and efficient satisfaction of the service provided. In other words, the granting of these extra payments (sobresueldos) depends on the circumstances so warranting it, and they are therefore assigned on a temporary basis, for each school year, according to the start and end dates regulated in article 176 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil; otherwise, the temporary service would be distorted and would become an ordinary one. In line with the above, article 15 of the Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública prescribes that “the excess shall be maintained as an additional payment (recargo), therefore, of a temporary nature.” Consequently, those additional payments (recargos) that depend on some particular condition to be granted are not configured as an acquired right, which is irremediably incorporated into the total salary of the worker, permanently and regardless of the service provided, as is sought in this case. There is extensive jurisprudence from the Sala Constitucional to the effect that additional payments for functions (recargos de funciones) cannot be considered an acquired right of the employee. Thus, in judgment n.° 3681, of 3:45 p.m. on March 22, 2011, it was stated: “It must be remembered that this Chamber has indicated that the worker’s performance that can be classified as an additional payment (recargo) for functions does not constitute an acquired right for the worker to whom it is assigned, which would oblige the Administration to maintain them in that condition. Generally, the assignment of such additional payments (recargos) – because it responds to the need for service provision at a specific time – is temporary in nature and is paid for a specific amount of work, and, logically, its value must be determined by the appealed authority based on technical and objective criteria that are properly its interest and competence (see in this regard judgment number 2003-09533 of twelve hours twenty-eight minutes on September fifth, two thousand three, and 2006-7717 of sixteen hours forty-seven minutes on May thirtieth, two thousand six, among others). For this reason, the additional payment (recargo) constitutes a ‘plus’ (‘plus’) or salary benefit that depends on whether the functions are performed or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specific period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party for such item to continue being paid, or for the additional payment (recargo) or alternate schedule (horario alterno) to be maintained” (emphasis supplied; see also resolutions numbers 6390 of 3:14 p.m. on May 18, 2011, and 868 of 9:05 a.m. on January 18, 2013). Likewise, in Voto n.° 3306, of 12:48 p.m. on March 9, 2007, it was noted: “…if the assumptions under which an extra pay (sobresueldo) was granted change, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met (judgment N° 2006-010959 of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006).” In this same ruling, reference was made to judgment n.° 296, of 11:54 a.m. on January 13, 1995, in which it was expressly stated: “The same applies with regard to the salary difference that the appellant claims to no longer receive due to the challenged act, since the remuneration for the cited additional payment (recargo) constitutes a ‘plus’ (‘plus’) or salary benefit, which depends on whether the functions are performed or not, without the circumstance of having performed them for a specific period having the effect of constituting a subjective right in favor of the interested party, for such item to continue being paid, or for the indicated additional payment (recargo) to be maintained, so that the appeal, regarding this last objection, is also unfounded…”. Finally, in resolution n.° 10959, of 5:51 p.m. on July 26, 2006, it was noted: “This Chamber, on multiple occasions, has established that extra pays (sobresueldos) that depend on some condition to be granted do not constitute an acquired right that is incorporated as such into the salary itself, since their granting depends on the objective conditions for which they were recognized.” In other words, if the conditions under which a bonus (sobresueldo) was granted vary, and the person is no longer in the same circumstances, it is not arbitrary for the Administration to unilaterally revoke such benefit, since the condition under which it originated is not met. In light of the foregoing, it is evident that the sums received for the Learning Assessment Committee/Technical Advisor bonus (recargos de Comité Evaluación del Aprendizajes/Técnico Asesor) and the extended workday bonus (recargo de ampliación de jornada laboral) constitute temporary bonuses, attached to the salary structure, which, although they form part of the final remuneration received by the public employee, are not a permanent substantial component, but rather an additional one, whose recognition depends on the employee meeting the assumptions established in the legal system for its granting and on the needs that arise in each school term. It should be noted that the payment of these bonuses is appropriate based on the position and the functions performed by the public servant; therefore, it can be denied when the original conditions for granting it disappear. Based on the laws cited, the case law referenced, and the principles of the primacy of reality, reasonableness, and salary equality, it is considered that it is not feasible to maintain the payment of compensation when the actual provision of the service does not occur, for reasons such as the one at hand (a person reassigned to an administrative position), since there is no factual or legal basis to compensate a service that is not being provided. Furthermore, compelling the State to pay compensation for a consideration that is not being provided is unreasonable and contrary to equity. In addition, this would give an undue advantage to reassigned persons, compared to those who are appointed to a teaching position and performing the functions of a bonus (recargo) of any kind, since they are not in equal conditions and earn the same. Besides, the State would be paying double (to two officials) for the same extended workday bonus (recargo por ampliación de jornada), when it has been necessary for the person substituting the one who has been reassigned for health reasons to assume it. As stated before, the bonuses in question do not constitute an acquired right, in addition to the fact that, due to the exceptional nature of the matter, they cannot be deemed a right that is ordinarily (fixedly) incorporated into the employment contracts of teaching personnel. Finally, bear in mind that to demand payment of the bonus (recargo), a law must necessarily authorize it (principle of legality that governs in the public sector) and the conditions and assumptions established by it must be met; which does not occur in the present case. By virtue of the above, the suppression of the bonus in question, when the plaintiff moved from the condition of teacher to performing administrative functions due to reassignment, is in accordance with the law. Regarding costs, although the regulation on this item establishes as a general rule that the losing party shall be ordered to pay those expenses, the undersigned of this dissenting opinion consider that, in the specific case, the party should be absolved of costs. Although it has been demonstrated that the plaintiff is not entitled to the right claimed, it is noted that she has litigated in evident good faith, under the belief that she had the right to maintain the payment of the claimed bonus (recargo) during her reassignment to administrative duties, and the undersigned have reconsidered the matter of the correct interpretation of the rules governing the bonus for any reason. This exoneration is ordered in application of articles 563 and 562 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Thus, the appropriate course is to partially grant the appeal filed, reverse the ruling in the first-instance judgment, admit the defense of lack of right, and dismiss the claim in all its respects. It is appropriate to resolve with no special order as to costs.

THEREFORE:

The appeal is dismissed. Justices Varela Araya and Chacón Artavia dissent, partially grant the appeal filed, reverse the ruling in the first-instance judgment, admit the defense of lack of right, and dismiss the claim in all its respects.

They resolve without special award of costs.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:6pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">Res:</span><span style="font-size:6pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub"> 2025-000194</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:9pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:6pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">MMONGEROD</span><span style="font-size:6pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">/RPC</span></p> -av-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline" /><br><span style="font-family:'WASP 39 L'; 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font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"></span><br><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">0353HTVCJIW61</span><br><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">JORGE ENRIQUE OLASO ÁLVAREZ - MAGISTRADO/A</span></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><div style=\"-aw-headerfooter-type:footer-primary; clear:both\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"-aw-field-start:true\"></span><span style=\"-aw-field-code:'PAGE'\"></span><span style=\"-aw-field-separator:true\"></span><span style=\"font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">1</span><span style=\"-aw-field-end:true\"></span><span style=\"font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">EXP: 22-001773-1178-LA</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:1pt; text-align:center; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&nbsp;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:1pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; border-top:0.75pt solid #000000; background-color:#ffffff; -aw-border-top:0pt single\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces\">&nbsp;</span><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Tel</span><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">é</span><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">fonos: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406.</span> Facsimile: 2258-4165. Email: [email protected]

Revisión del Documento  Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2025-000194 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciocho horas diez minutos del treinta y uno de enero de dos mil veinticinco.

Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, por [Nombre 001], viuda, educadora y vecina de Puntarenas, contra el ESTADO, representado por su procuradora adjunta, la licenciada Marianella Barrantes Zamora, vecina de Heredia. Figura como apoderado especial judicial de la actora, el licenciado Cristian Ceciliano Mora, vecino de San José. Todos mayores, casados y abogados, con la excepción indicada.

Redacta la Magistrada Fallas Carvajal; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- ANTECEDENTES: El apoderado especial judicial de la actora promovió la presente acción para que en sentencia se condene al Estado a restituir de forma inmediata el pago de los recargos de ampliación de jornada laboral I y II ciclo y del Comité de Evaluación de los Aprendizajes/ Comité Técnico Asesor, con los que contaba antes de la reubicación y mientras mantenga dicha condición; así como pagar todas las diferencias salariales adeudadas desde la fecha en que estos se suprimieron en forma ilegal a la actora, desde el 1 de febrero del 2020, incluyendo diferencias que puedan generarse por aguinaldo, vacaciones y salario escolar; intereses y ambas costas. La representante estatal contestó la demanda negativamente y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho. La juzgadora de instancia, Msc. Bertha M. Jiménez Alvarado, mediante sentencia n.° 2024-824 de las dieciséis horas con cincuenta y tres minutos del diez de mayo del dos mil veinticuatro, del Juzgado de Trabajo del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José, Sección Primera, declaró con lugar la demanda y ordenó restituir a la parte actora el pago correspondiente al recargo de horario alterno o ampliación de jornada laboral I y II ciclo y el recargo del Comité de Evaluación de los Aprendizajes/ Comité Técnico Asesor; que la demandante ostentaba al momento de ser reubicada por problemas de salud y mientras se mantenga dicha condición; asimismo, concedió lo adeudado por concepto de los extremos proporcionales de aguinaldo y salario escolar originados por dicha supresión. Ordenó que, a estos extremos se le deben rebajar las cargas sociales y renta en caso de que correspondiera. Concedió el pago de intereses, indexación y costas, fijando las personales en un 15% sobre la condena total.

II.- AGRAVIOS: La representante del estado muestra inconformidad con lo resuelto. Alega indebida interpretación y aplicación del artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo y del numeral 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil; así como violación al principio de legalidad. Sostiene que, el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo no aplica para el caso de la aquí accionante, ya que no demostró la parte actora con prueba documental, que estuviera incapacitada por un riesgo laboral, o bien, que el Ministerio de Educación Pública le causó algún perjuicio salarial al reubicarla temporalmente por razones de salud. Al contrario, tal y como se desprende de la prueba traída a los autos por parte de la Procuraduría se tiene por probado que fue reubicada no por la aplicación del numeral 22 bis del Reglamento del Estatuto del Servicio Civil; sino más bien por una recomendación médica, y no fue incapacitada por enfermedad, ni por riesgo del trabajo, para que se aplique el numeral 254 de cita. Afirma que, no hay evidencia del supuesto perjuicio en contra de la actora, máxime que, el recargo de funciones constituye un sobresueldo temporal que responde a las necesidades de los centros educativos, por razones de oportunidad o conveniencia, o para la satisfacción efectiva y eficiente del servicio brindado. Asimismo, considera que se realiza una errónea interpretación del artículo 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, (en adelante ESC), pues si bien ahí se menciona que si el servidor al momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad estuviese devengando un sobresueldo tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengado; lo cierto del caso es que de la prueba documental que consta agregada al expediente no se desprende que la señora [Nombre 002] estuvo incapacitada por enfermedad o bien, que tuvo una licencia, por el contrario, fue un profesional de la salud tratante que recomendó una reubicación temporal por salud. Argumenta que, la Administración Pública está sujeta al principio de legalidad, por lo que solo puede proceder conforme a lo que esté debidamente autorizado por el ordenamiento jurídico (numerales 11 de la Constitución Política, y 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). Aduce violación al artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública, así como omisión de los criterios de la Dirección Jurídica del MEP. Insiste en que los recargos son temporales, no permanentes y violación al principio de equidad, así como al principio de legalidad presupuestaria. Sostiene que, por acción de personal n.° 201902-MP-4103173 se le asignó para todo el curso lectivo 2019 el recargo de ampliación de jornada laboral I y II ciclo y del Comité de Evaluación de los Aprendizajes/Comité Técnico Asesor, el cual se le mantuvo intacto hasta la fecha de vencimiento, es decir, el 31 de enero del 2020. De ahí que, una vez finalizado ese período de reconocimiento es imposible tanto legal (violación del principio de legalidad) como materialmente para la cartera ministerial poder reconocer un recargo que no ha sido asignado, ni ha sido laborado por la actora, por cuanto como se ha indicado esta no realizaba funciones propiamente docentes debido a su estado de salud. Resalta lo dispuesto en los numerales 118 inciso j) del Código de Educación y el numeral 13 del Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 12915-E-P, los pluses salariales se conceden cuando la persona servidora lleva a cabo funciones adicionales a las que realiza ordinariamente en su puesto, de manera temporal y cuya asignación se encuentra debidamente justificada. Por otro lado, alega fundamento insuficiente de la sentencia para otorgar el pago de diferencias salariales, propiamente las relacionadas con aguinaldo, vacaciones, aumentos anuales, incentivo por ampliación del curso lectivo, incentivo didáctico, carrera profesional y salario escolar; toda vez que, estas están relacionadas con el otorgamiento del principal, por lo tanto, si la pretensión principal no es procedente con mucha más razón no procede el pago de esos reajustes, razón por la cual solicita se declare con lugar el recurso. Aduce improcedencia sobre el pago de intereses e indexación de forma conjunta. Respecto al otorgamiento de la indexación, estima que debe ser rechazada. Afirma que, los intereses legales ya contienen en su fórmula un componente indexatorio. De ahí que, no es jurídicamente viable otorgar intereses legales e indexación, siendo que para que proceda esta última sería necesario otorgar un interés simple, no un interés legal. Por último, alega indebida aplicación del numeral 563 del Código de Trabajo. Plantea que, el Estado debe ser eximido en el pago de las costas por haber litigado de buena fe. Así las cosas, pide se admita el recurso de casación de tal manera que se modifique la sentencia recurrida en relación con los puntos señalados.

III.- ANÁLISIS DEL CASO: No existe objeción en cuanto a que la actora fue reubicada por razones de salud a partir del 15 de marzo del 2019. Queda también acreditado que antes de ser reubicada en funciones administrativas, el salario de la actora contemplaba el recargo de Comité Evaluación del Aprendizajes/Técnico Asesor y un recargo por ampliación de jornada laboral I y II Ciclo, tal y como puede observarse del oficio DRHDPRH-ULIC-1813-2019 y acción de personal n.° 201903-MP-4117407 con fecha de rige hasta el 31 de enero del 2020 (imagen 7 de la vista completa del expediente electrónico del Juzgado). Ahora bien, en este supuesto se trata de definir si corresponde el pago de este sobresueldo a una persona funcionaria docente quien, por razones de salud, ha debido ser reubicada en un cargo administrativo. La incapacidad y la reubicación en estos casos tienen su origen en una enfermedad del funcionario o la funcionaria que le impide mantenerse en el servicio activo de la docencia, esto con base en el fundamento dado por artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. Este artículo, como parte del Título Cuarto de ese cuerpo normativo, denominado "DE LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS TRABAJADORES DURANTE EL EJERCICIO DEL TRABAJO", establece la obligación de la parte empleadora de reponer en su puesto a la persona trabajadora que haya sufrido un riesgo, pero que esté en posibilidades de continuar laborando. También prevé el deber patronal de proporcionarle un puesto diferente de acuerdo con sus posibilidades cuando, por recomendación médica, no pueda regresar a ejercer las funciones que venía desempeñando. Señala literalmente en su párrafo segundo: “Si de conformidad con el criterio médico, el trabajador no pudiera desempeñar normalmente el trabajo que realizaba cuando le aconteció el riesgo, pero sí otro diferente en la misma empresa, el patrono estará obligado a proporcionárselo, siempre que ello sea factible, para lo cual podrá realizar los movimientos de personas que sean necesarios”, mismo artículo que sirvió de sustento al Ministerio de Educación para conceder la reubicación laboral por salud a la actora. Esta normativa tiene relación directa con el Reglamento de Licencias Especiales Ministerio de Educación Pública (Decreto Ejecutivo número 19113 del 28 de julio de 1989), donde en su artículo 1° menciona que esta reglamentación tiene por objeto establecer las normas y los procedimientos que deberá seguir el Ministerio de Educación Pública para conceder licencia a sus servidores o servidoras, con motivo de la disminución de sus facultades o aptitudes para el trabajo, sobrevivientes de riesgos del trabajo o enfermedad. Por su parte, el numeral 2 establece: “Las licencias a que se refiere la presente reglamentación se concederán a aquellos servidores que, por la disminución sufrida en sus facultades o aptitudes, no pudieren desempeñar, sin detrimento de su salud o del servicio, las funciones y atribuciones correspondientes al cargo que venían desempeñando en calidad de servidores regulares”. Esa normativa distingue entre licencia permanente y licencia parcial, declarando que tienen derecho a esta última aquellos servidores o servidoras respecto de los cuales la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social o el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, en su valoración final, declaren una incapacidad menor permanente o una incapacidad parcial o permanente y recomienden un cambio de funciones. El artículo 8 trata específicamente el supuesto de la concesión de la licencia especial en los siguientes términos: “De conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 5° anterior, el Ministerio de Educación Pública, concederá una licencia especial a aquellos servidores que encuentren en las siguientes circunstancias:/a) Que de acuerdo con su dolencia la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, recomiende en la valoración final del tratamiento su cambio de funciones./ b) Que en la valoración final de los efectos del riesgo de trabajo acaecido, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, determine una incapacidad menor o parcial permanente y recomiende su incorporación al servicio con cambio de funciones”. El artículo 17 dice: “Los beneficiarios de las licencias previstas en esta reglamentación gozarán de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario con arreglo a lo dispuesto por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Código de Educación sobre la materia”. De modo que esta normativa complementa y no contradice lo dispuesto por el numeral 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, que reza: “a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por horario alterno´, o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando./ b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes./c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder”. La normativa reglamentaria desarrolla esta expresa disposición, contemplando de manera indistinta el derecho a la indemnización, tanto para el caso de la licencia permanente como de la especial. Así lo ha resuelto esta Sala en ocasiones anteriores en las que se ha discutido este mismo tema. En la sentencia número 57 de 9:50 horas, del 21 de enero de 2011, se explicó: “IV.- …La representante del Estado insiste en que el numeral 174 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil no resulta aplicable a la actora, pues esa norma solo está prevista para las personas que se incapacitan de forma permanente y que su situación debe regirse por lo establecido en el artículo 166, según el cual, ´Cuando la licencia se conceda al maestro por razón de enfermedad debidamente comprobada, se girará a su favor y por un tiempo no mayor de 6 meses, la mitad del sueldo anterior al disfrute de la licencia. En casos excepcionales puede autorizarse una prórroga de este beneficio hasta por dos trimestres más, si el maestro enfermo demostrare su incapacidad para trabajar, con el testimonio de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social´. No obstante, la sala ha tenido la oportunidad de conocer asuntos iguales al presente y ha concluido que el citado artículo 174 no excluye al personal que disfruta de una licencia especial, por estar incapacitado de manera parcial. El numeral 166 citado no establece que su aplicación es dable solo para casos de licencias especiales. Por su parte, el artículo 174 tampoco excluye a los trabajadores incapacitados de manera parcial y que disfrutan de una licencia de ese tipo. Las normas no hacen distinción alguna entre licencias especiales y permanentes, aunado al hecho de que tampoco contemplan alguna diferenciación entre estas licencias y las incapacidades por enfermedad, aparte de que todas tienen como base, precisamente, la pérdida de la salud por una enfermedad incapacitante. Véase que el inciso a) de esta última norma señala que ´Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por horario alterno, o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando...´. Además, del numeral 173 ídem se desprende que la intención del legislador fue proteger la integridad del salario de las personas docentes durante el período de incapacidad. No otra cosa se deduce de lo indicado en el párrafo final del inciso a), según el cual, ´...cuando se comprobare que la incapacidad se extiende a un período mayor de los cuatro días, su salario no sufrirá deducción´, así como de lo estipulado en el inciso b, donde se apunta que ´si el servidor estuviese protegido por el Seguro Social, el Ministerio de Educación le reconocerá la diferencia de salarios hasta completar el 100% (ciento por ciento) del mismo; caso de no estarlo, el pago del salario correrá por cuenta del Ministerio de Educación´. Ninguna de esas normas hace referencia a una incapacidad absoluta o excluye de su aplicación a las personas que gozan de licencia especial. Está claro que esta licencia se otorga a las o los servidores que padecen una incapacidad menor o parcial permanentes y requieren un cambio de funciones, según lo que se establece en el numeral 5 del Reglamento de licencias especiales para los servidores del Ministerio de Educación Pública (Decreto Ejecutivo n° 19113, vigente a partir del 28 de julio de 1989). En el numeral 2 de esa normativa, también se establece que: ´Las licencias a que se refiere la presente reglamentación se concederán a aquellos servidores que, por la disminución sufrida en sus facultades o aptitudes, no pudieren desempeñar, sin detrimento de su salud o del servicio, las funciones y atribuciones correspondientes al cargo que venían desempeñando en calidad de servidores regulares´. Ahora bien, en cuanto a la remuneración que deben percibir las personas beneficiarias de este tipo de licencia, la normativa especial apunta que tienen derecho a gozar de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario, según lo estipulado al respecto en el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y en el Código de Educación. En forma expresa, el artículo 17 del Reglamento preceptúa: ´Los beneficiarios de las licencias previstas en esta reglamentación gozarán de un subsidio equivalente a la totalidad de su salario con arreglo a lo dispuesto por el Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el Código de Educación sobre la materia´ (la negrita no es del original). De lo transcrito se advierte la clara remisión a las normas del citado Estatuto y, entonces, resulta válida la aplicación del artículo 174; por cuanto, como se indicó, en esa norma no se hace exclusión alguna de este tipo de incapacidades”. De modo que, los recargos en cuestión debieron mantenerse a pesar de la reubicación, pues tiene derecho a recibir un auxilio idéntico al salario que ostentaba al momento previo al otorgamiento de la reubicación administrativa. En consecuencia, si al momento de ser reubicada la actora devengaba esos recargos, resulta indiscutible el derecho que tiene, conforme a la normativa especial anteriormente citada, a que dentro de su remuneración, como funcionaria administrativa, dicho sobresueldo le sea contemplado, otorgamiento que resulta independiente a los requerimientos que de esos servicios tenga el ente empleador. Es decir, en aplicación de esa disposición (inciso c, artículo 174 ídem), el ente demandado no podía suprimir del subsidio con naturaleza salarial concedido a la accionante y que percibía antes de ser reubicada. En adición a lo anterior, se debe dejar claro que la redacción actual del numeral 174 no da pie para eliminar los sobresueldos, por lo que, sin lugar a dudas, los servidores o servidoras acogidos a una licencia por enfermedad tienen derecho a continuar devengando este tipo de pluses mientras dure esa licencia (véanse los votos de esta Sala, números 2001-591; 2004-965; 2005-304; 2005-395; 2006-1102; 2006-1108; 2007-91; 2008-62; 2008-96; 2008-442; 2008-634; 2010-537 y 2010-1510).

IV.- SOBRE LAS DIFERENCIAS SALARIALES CONCEDIDAS: La representante del Estado impugna que se concediera el pago de diferencias salariales sobre aguinaldo, vacaciones, aumentos anuales, incentivo por ampliación del curso lectivo, incentivo didáctico, carrera profesional y salario escolar. Como único argumento, señala que estas están relacionadas con el otorgamiento del principal, por ende, si la pretensión principal no es procedente con mucha más razón no procede el pago de esos reajustes, razón por la cual solicita que sean desestimados. La Sala reconoce que en materia laboral priman los principios de sencillez e informalismo, pero en materia recursiva esto no libera a la parte recurrente de la obligación de argumentar, en forma clara y precisa, las razones por las cuales impugna el fundamento fáctico o jurídico del fallo recurrido. La expresión precisa de las razones que ameritan la revocatoria del pronunciamiento son un requisito necesario para proceder al estudio de los cuestionamientos, pues tratándose la casación de un medio de control de la labor realizada por la instancia precedente, se requieren los insumos del recurrente para dicho análisis (artículo 590 del Código de Trabajo). De esta manera, al no existir mayor argumentación que el que se trata de extremos accesorios, y habiéndose comprobado que el principal fue debidamente otorgado, no existe mérito para variar lo resuelto por la A quo sobre estos reajustes. No se omite indicar que, el fallo impugnado únicamente concedió el pago de diferencias salariales sobre aguinaldo y salario escolar, mas no sobre los otros extremos accesorios mencionados por el recurrente.

V.- INTERESES E INDEXACIÓN: El artículo 565 del Código de Trabajo, en cuanto a los intereses, dispone que el porcentaje será el fijado en la Ley n.° 3284 del 30 de abril de 1964 (Código de Comercio), cuyo canon 497 define el interés legal, que es el aplicable a falta de acuerdo expreso entre las partes. Ese numeral reza: “Interés legal es el que se aplica supletoriamente a falta de acuerdo, y es igual a la tasa básica pasiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica para operaciones en moneda nacional y a la tasa 'prime rate' para operaciones en dólares americanos”. Sin realizar ninguna exclusión, el ordinal 565 en mención -que es el aplicable en esta materia- también prevé expresamente que toda sentencia de condena a pagar una obligación dineraria implicará para el deudor la obligación de adecuar los extremos económicos principales, actualizándolos a valor presente. De modo que en ninguna infracción habría podido incurrir la juzgadora de instancia al ordenar el reconocimiento del interés legal conjuntamente con la indexación de los rubros reconocidos, pues la ley así lo ordena, independientemente de la interpretación que hayan podido hacer otros tribunales en relación con este tema. Para la Sala, la norma es clara y no admite la interpretación que intenta hacer valer el impugnante, al alero de lo resuelto por otros despachos judiciales, cuya decisión -por lo demás- no resulta vinculante para este otro Órgano. Luego, aun cuando la tasa de interés pueda contemplar la de la inflación, lo cierto es que ambas figuras compensan factores distintos. La indexación se prevé para compensar la pérdida del valor del dinero ocurrida por el transcurso del tiempo en relación con la inflación, mientras que los intereses compensan el costo de oportunidad, por no haber podido disponer del dinero en forma oportuna. En consecuencia, debe entenderse que la indexación y los intereses legales no son extremos excluyentes, y al estar regulados por ley, no implican un doble pago.

VI.- COSTAS: El ordinal 562 del Código de Trabajo, en lo que resulta de interés, estipula: “En toda sentencia […] se condenará al vencido […] al pago de las costas personales y procesales causadas. /Si la sentencia resuelve el asunto por el fondo […] las personales no podrán ser menores del quince por ciento (15%) ni mayores del veinticinco por ciento (25%) del importe líquido de la condenatoria o de la absolución, en su caso…” El artículo 563 siguiente, por su parte, señala: “No obstante, se podrá eximir al vencido del pago de las costas personales y aun de las procesales, cuando: 1) Se haya litigado con evidente buena fe. /2) Las proposiciones hayan prosperado parcialmente. /3) Cuando haya habido vencimiento recíproco. /La exoneración debe ser siempre razonada… /No podrá considerarse de buena fe a la parte que negó pretensiones evidentes que el resultado del proceso indique que debió aceptarlas, no asistió a la totalidad de la audiencia, adujo testigos sobornados o testigos y documentos falsos, no ofreció ninguna probanza para justificar su demanda o excepciones, si se fundaran en hechos disputados…” De conformidad con estas normas, la regla es imponer el pago de estos gastos a la parte que resultó vencida. En el caso bajo análisis, no se estima estar en ninguno de los supuestos de excepción, a efecto de ejercer la facultad concedida a los juzgadores de exonerar del pago de las costas a quien resultó perdidoso, en tanto la servidora se vio obligada a acudir a estrados judiciales en procura de la satisfacción de sus derechos y la teoría del caso del Estado no cuenta con asidero jurídico. En consecuencia, no existe mérito para variar lo resuelto sobre este aspecto en concreto.

VII.- CONSIDERACIONES FINALES: A la luz de lo expuesto, el recurso debe ser declarado sin lugar.

VIII.- VOTO SALVADO DE LAS MAGISTRADAS VARELA ARAYA Y CHACÓN ARTAVIA: Las suscritas se apartan del criterio de mayoría en cuanto confirma el reconocimiento a la parte actora del pago por concepto de los recargos de Comité Evaluación del Aprendizajes/Técnico Asesor y recargo de ampliación de jornada laboral, a partir del momento en que fue reubicada en labores administrativas y mientras se mantenga en esa condición. Ha quedado debidamente acreditado que, en el año 2019, la demandante devengaba esos recargos y que, debido a problemas de salud, fue reubicada en funciones administrativas a partir de marzo de 2019; razón por la cual aquellos se le dejaron de pagar a partir del primero de febrero del 2020. Asimismo, está claro que la reubicación se acordó con base en el artículo 254 del Código de Trabajo. No estamos ante una incapacidad propiamente dicha. La Administración Pública está sujeta al principio de legalidad, por lo que solo puede proceder conforme a lo que esté debidamente autorizado en el ordenamiento jurídico (numerales 11 de la Constitución Política y 11 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), y que la servidora no se encuentra dentro de los presupuestos de hecho previstos en el artículo 22 bis inciso a) del Reglamento de Estatuto del Servicio Civil, al no encontrarse incapacitada por enfermedad para ser acreedora a lo pretendido. Luego de un replanteamiento del análisis sobre los alcances de la normativa aplicable al caso concreto, concluimos que no lleva razón quien recurre. Los ordinales 118 del Código de Educación y 13 del Manual de Procedimientos para Administrar el Personal Docente estipulan la posibilidad de asignar ciertos recargos, los cuales no constituyen un derecho adquirido y, por consiguiente, el pago de estos debe suspenderse cuando la persona funcionaria, en el ejercicio de sus labores habituales, deja de cumplir los requisitos exigidos para su reconocimiento. Por otro lado, el artículo 174 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, establece que: “a) Si el servidor, en el momento de incapacitarse por enfermedad o maternidad, estuviese devengando salario adicional por zonaje, por "horario alterno", o cualquier sobresueldo, tendrá derecho a un subsidio equivalente al salario total que en dicho momento estuviese devengando. /b) Las licencias por enfermedad, cualquiera que sea su duración, no interrumpirán el derecho que tienen los servidores para recibir los aumentos de sueldos correspondientes. (Así reformado por el artículo 1º de la Ley No.5659 de 17 de diciembre de 1974). /c) Para todos los efectos legales, tanto el subsidio, como los auxilios a que se refiere el artículo 167, tendrán el carácter de salario, y serán, en consecuencia, la base para el cálculo de pensiones y prestaciones legales, entre otros extremos, que pudieran corresponder. / (Así adicionado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1º de la Ley No. 6110 de 9 de noviembre de 1977)” (el resaltado es agregado). Del texto antes trascrito se colige, en forma clara y expresa, que la persona servidora que se encuentre incapacitada por enfermedad, o la funcionaria en licencia por maternidad, que viniere devengando salario adicional por sobresueldos, tiene derecho a que estos se contemplen al momento de fijar el importe del subsidio a pagarle. En el caso que nos ocupa, la promovente fue reubicada en funciones administrativas y no está incapacitada ni disfrutando de aquella licencia, por lo que su situación no se subsume en el presupuesto de hecho de la norma. Además, hay que tener presente que, al tenor de lo dispuesto en los numerales 118, inciso j), del Código de Educación y 13 del Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 12915-E-P, estos pluses se conceden cuando la persona servidora lleva a cabo funciones adicionales a las que realiza ordinariamente en su puesto, de manera temporal, y cuya asignación se encuentra debidamente justificada, ya sea por necesidades de los centros educativos, por razones de oportunidad y conveniencia, o para la satisfacción efectiva y eficiente del servicio brindado. Dicho de otro modo, el otorgamiento de estos sobresueldos depende de que las circunstancias así lo ameriten y por ello se asignan con carácter temporal, para cada curso lectivo, según las fechas de inicio y fin normadas en el ordinal 176 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil; de lo contrario, se desnaturalizaría el servicio eventual y se convertiría en uno ordinario. En consonancia con lo anterior, el artículo 15 de la Ley de Salarios de la Administración Pública prescribe que “el exceso se mantendrá como un recargo, por ende, de carácter temporal”. Consecuentemente, aquellos recargos que dependan de alguna condición particular para ser concedidos no se configuran como un derecho adquirido, que se incorpora irremediablemente al salario total de la persona trabajadora, en forma permanente y con independencia del servicio que preste, como se pretende en este caso. Existe vasta jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional en el sentido de que los recargos de funciones no pueden considerarse como un derecho adquirido de la persona servidora. Así, en la sentencia n.° 3681, de las 15:45 horas del 22 de marzo de 2011, se externó: “Debe recordarse que esta Sala ha señalado que el desempeño del trabajador que pueda ser catalogado como un recargo de funciones, no constituye un derecho adquirido para el trabajador al que se le asigna y que obligue a la Administración a mantenerle en esa condición. Generalmente la asignación de tales recargos -por obedecer a la necesidad de prestación del servicio en un momento determinado-, tiene un carácter temporal y se paga por una cantidad de labores específicas, siendo que, lógicamente, su valor deberá ser determinado por la autoridad recurrida con fundamento en criterios técnicos y objetivos que son propiamente de su interés y de su competencia (ver en ese sentido sentencia número 2003-09533 de las doce horas veintiocho minutos del cinco de septiembre del dos mil tres y 2006-7717 de las dieciséis horas cuarenta y siete minutos del treinta de mayo del dos mil seis, entre otras). Por tal razón, el recargo constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial que depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo u horario alterno" (énfasis suplido; véanse también las resoluciones números 6390 de las 15:14 horas del 18 de mayo de 2011 y 868 de las 9:05 horas del 18 de enero de 2013). De igual manera, en el voto n.° 3306, de las 12:48 horas del 9 de marzo de 2007, se acotó: “…si los supuestos por los cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó (sentencia N° 2006-010959 de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006)”. En este mismo fallo se hizo referencia a la sentencia n.° 296, de las 11:54 horas del 13 de enero de 1995, en el cual expresamente se indicó: “De igual forma cabe pronunciarse en lo que toca a la diferencia salarial que dice el recurrente que deja de percibir con ocasión del acto cuestionado, toda vez que la retribución por el recargo citado constituye un ‘plus’ o beneficio salarial, el cual depende del hecho de que las funciones se ejerzan o no, sin que la circunstancia de haberlas realizado por un plazo determinado, tenga el efecto de constituir un derecho subjetivo a favor del interesado, para que se le siga pagando tal extremo, o para que se le mantenga el recargo señalado, de manera que el recurso, en cuanto a este último reparo es también improcedente…”. Por último, en la resolución n.° 10959, de las 17:51 horas del 26 de julio de 2006, se apuntó: “Esta Sala, en múltiples oportunidades, ha establecido que los sobresueldos que dependan de alguna condición para ser otorgados no constituyen un derecho adquirido que se incorpore como tal al salario propiamente dicho, toda vez que su otorgamiento depende de las condiciones objetivas por las cuales fue reconocido. En otras palabras, si las condiciones bajo las cuales fue otorgado un sobresueldo varían, y la persona ya no se encuentra en las mismas circunstancias, no resulta arbitrario que la Administración revoque en forma unilateral tal beneficio, toda vez que no se cumple la condición bajo la cual se originó”. Conforme a lo expuesto, resulta evidente que las sumas recibidas por los recargos de Comité Evaluación del Aprendizajes/Técnico Asesor y recargo de ampliación de jornada laboral, constituyen sobresueldos temporales, anexos a la estructura salarial, que si bien forman parte de la remuneración final que percibe la persona funcionaria, no son un componente sustancial permanente, sino adicional, cuyo reconocimiento depende de que aquella se encuentre en los presupuestos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para su concesión y de las necesidades que surjan en cada período lectivo. Cabe destacar que el pago de estos recargos procede en razón del puesto y de las funciones que realiza la persona servidora, por lo que puede denegarse cuando las condiciones originarias de su otorgamiento desaparezcan. Con base en las normas traídas a colación, la jurisprudencia citada y los principios de primacía de la realidad, razonabilidad e igualdad salarial, se considera que no es factible mantener el pago de retribuciones cuando no se da la prestación real del servicio, por motivos como el de autos (persona reubicada en un puesto administrativo), pues no existe sustento fáctico ni jurídico para retribuir un servicio que no se está prestando. Además, obligar al Estado a cancelar una remuneración por una contraprestación que no se está brindando resulta irrazonable y contrario a la equidad. Aunado a ello, se estaría dando una ventaja indebida a las personas reubicadas, con respecto a quienes se encuentran nombradas en una plaza de docente y ejerciendo las funciones por recargo de algún tipo, pues no se hallan en igualdad de condiciones y ganan igual. Amén de que el Estado estaría pagando doble (a dos funcionarios) por un mismo recargo por ampliación de jornada, cuando haya sido necesario que lo asuma la persona que sustituye a quien ha sido reubicada por razones de salud. Como se dijo antes, los recargos en cuestión no constituyen un derecho adquirido, amén de que, por lo excepcional del tema, no pueden ser reputados como un derecho que se incorpora de ordinario (fijo) a los contratos de trabajo de las personas docentes. Finalmente, téngase presente que para poder exigir el pago del recargo se requiere necesariamente que una norma así lo autorice (principio de legalidad que rige en el sector público) y cumplir con las condiciones y presupuestos por ella estatuidos; lo que no se da en la especie. En virtud de lo anterior, la supresión del recargo en cuestión, al pasar la actora de la condición de docente a cumplir funciones administrativas por reubicación, está ajustada a derecho. Respecto de las costas, aunque la normativa sobre este rubro establece como regla de principio la condenatoria en esos gastos a la parte vencida, quienes suscriben este voto salvado consideran que, en el caso concreto, se debe absolver en costas. Si bien se ha demostrado que a la parte actora no le corresponde el derecho que reclama, se aprecia que esta ha litigado con evidente buena fe, bajo la creencia de que le asiste el derecho a mantener el pago del recargo reclamado durante su reubicación en labores administrativas y, las suscritas se han replanteado el tema de la interpretación correcta de las normas que rigen el recargo por algún motivo. Esta exoneración se dispone en aplicación de los artículos 563 y 562 del Código de Trabajo. De esta manera, lo procedente es declarar parcialmente con lugar el recurso presentado, revocar lo resuelto en la sentencia de primera instancia, acoger la defensa de falta de derecho y desestimar la demanda en todos sus extremos. Corresponde resolver sin especial condena en costas.

POR TANTO:

Se declara sin lugar el recurso. Las magistradas Varela Araya y Chacón Artavia salvan el voto, declaran parcialmente con lugar el recurso presentado, revocan lo resuelto en la sentencia de primera instancia, acogen la defensa de falta de derecho y desestiman la demanda en todos sus extremos. Resuelven sin especial condena en costas.

Res: 2025-000194 MMONGEROD/RPC  JULIA VARELA ARAYA - MAGISTRADO/A  MARIA ANGELICA FALLAS CARVAJAL - MAGISTRADO/A  ROXANA CHACÓN ARTAVIA - MAGISTRADO/A  ANA ORFILIA BRICEÑO YOCK - MAGISTRADO/A  JORGE ENRIQUE OLASO ÁLVAREZ - MAGISTRADO/A 1