Municipal Authority over Billboards Facing National RoutesCompetencia municipal sobre vallas publicitarias frente a rutas nacionales

**Review of the Document** *140086451027CA* Case File: 14-008645-1027-CA Ruling: 000250-F-S1-2019 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours six minutes on March twenty, two thousand nineteen.

Ordinary proceeding initiated in the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A, Goicoechea. San José; by TOP MEDIA COSTA RICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, hereinafter TOP MEDIA (formerly COLITE COSTA RICA, S.A.), represented by its general agents with unlimited authority, Arturo Zarate Rocha and Michael Frank Donalson; against the MUNICIPALITY OF CURRIDABAT, represented by its Mayor, Edgar Eduardo Mora Altamirano, and its Vice-Mayor, Alicia Borja Rodriguez. Also appearing as special judicial agents for the plaintiff, Daniel Rojas Pochet and Federico Altamura Arce, whose credentials are not recorded in the case file; and for the defendant, María Isabel Corrales Madrigal and Floribeth Calderón Marín. The individuals are of legal age, with the noted exceptions, attorneys, and residents of San José.

**CONSIDERING** **I.-** Top Media Costa Rica S.A. (hereinafter Top Media) sued the Municipality of Curridabat. It stated that, by virtue of advertising contracts it held with the companies Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. and Vivicom S.A., it signed a lease agreement with Mr. SHU UN HSIAO TSAI, by which it leased four square meters of the San José property, registration number 200335-000, located in Curridabat (National Route no. 2, in front of Taco Bell Curridabat), for the purpose of placing a billboard (valla publicitaria). It asserted that it subsequently processed the corresponding permits for placement before the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, hereinafter MOPT), the competent body, since the location was in front of a national route. It emphasized that, on March 6, 2014, the MOPT's Department of Road Planning (Departamento de Previsión Vial), through official letter DPV-OF1181-14, provided the respective alignment (alineamiento), and on June 30, 2014, through official letter DGIT-ED-4820-2014, the MOPT's General Directorate of Traffic Engineering approved the placement of the billboard. It added that, on July 22, 2014, —having fulfilled the requirements—, the MOPT granted permit no. VP0001-01 054 Route 2, for the placement of a billboard structure. Likewise, it explained, the Municipality of Curridabat granted it a permit to build it through outdoor advertising permit no. 100-2014, issued by the Urban Development and Control Directorate of that municipal government. However, it clarified, on September 22, 2014, arbitrarily and suddenly, an inspector from that Municipality appeared at the work site, who, through order no. 5456, shut down (clausuró) the works and placed seals on them. It affirmed that this occurred without any prior notification, with the municipality arguing an alleged non-compliance with the Outdoor Advertising Regulation, and even threatening to detain the workers. It stated that, on September 29, 2014, it filed a motion for revocation with a subsidiary appeal, with no response at the time of filing the lawsuit. It outlined that, on October 13, 2014, Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. considered that the delay constituted a breach, warning that if the advertising placement was not installed by October 15, 2014, it would terminate the contract, without prejudice to resorting to judicial instances for a claim for damages. It stipulated that, on October 14 of that year, it filed a provisionalísima (urgent provisional) precautionary measure, which was granted, suspending the effects of the shutdown order. It added that this was also upheld on the merits in ruling no. 2762-2014 at 3:00 p.m. on October 22, 2014, by the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, suspending the effects of the shutdown order. It detailed that, on October 20, 2014, it received an email from the Marketing Manager of Pizza Hut (Comidas Centroamericanas S.A.), informing it of the decision to terminate the cited contract, despite the placement being on display, as a result of a threatening phone call he received from the Mayor of Curridabat. It revealed that, subsequently, after a second call, said Manager requested the immediate termination of the signed advertising contract. It noted that, on November 3, 2014, the contracting party Vivicom S.A. also requested the annulment of advertising contract no. C233792, given the uncertainty related to the cited permit. The plaintiff requests that the judgment declare: a) the absolute nullity of shutdown order no. 5456 issued by the Municipality of Curridabat; b) that said corporation must pay the damages (daños y perjuicios), interest, and indexation resulting from the shutdown order that caused the termination of the contracts signed with the companies Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., amounts to be liquidated during execution of judgment; c) that the defendant must pay its procedural costs. The sued corporation provided a negative defense. It raised the exceptions of lack of standing (legitimación) and lack of right. The Tribunal rejected the lack of standing and upheld the lack of right. It declared the lawsuit inadmissible. It imposed costs on the plaintiff, who, dissatisfied, files an appeal in cassation.

**Appeal on procedural grounds** **II.-** The appellant formulates a single charge of this nature. It alleges that the defect of lack of reasoning (motivación) has been incurred. This, it says, is due to the non-application in the judgment of rule 155 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC), which regulates the requirements that must be observed in drafting rulings. It points out that numeral 155 ibidem stipulates the content of the "resultandos," "considerandos," and the "por tanto," however, the Tribunal literally transcribes, in sections IV and V of the ruling, the submissions of both parties in their entirety, a matter that should be dealt with synthetically in the "resultandos." It says this situation creates a state of legal uncertainty and defenselessness, as there is a lack of clarity in those "essential elements." It outlines that, in sections IV and V, all the parties' submissions are transcribed literally, incurring a violation of the cited procedural rule due to non-application, which warrants the nullity of the ruling. It comments that the defect described in the drafting of the "resultandos" was carried over to what the judges wrote in section IX, called "Criterion of the Tribunal." It explains that said section suggests that the judges will resolve the merits of the matter, yet it does not do so, but rather confines itself, within the Legal Information System, to copying multiple norms without interruption, without resolving the dispute through a coherent and harmonious interpretation of them. It estimates that it does not know with certainty why the judgment makes literal quotations of multiple contradictory norms without explaining their differences or applying a method of interpretation. It says the appealed ruling does not reveal what it thinks about billboards and the competence of the entities, nor the reasons why it inclined towards one of the rules. It accuses a lack of reasoning, confusing drafting, and obscurity in what was resolved. It stipulates that no statement is made about the methodology used, nor does it provide a doctrinal exposition. It details that the judgment is devoid of a hermeneutical tool and lacking in rigor because it cites multiple contradictory precepts. It considers that it is unaware of the reasons why the judges decided on some rules, discarding others, in violation of due legal process. It states that, without explaining why, the Tribunal cites practically all the provisions of Decree 29253, which regulate the competence of the MOPT, but attributes these functions to the Municipality of Curridabat. It comments that, after citing various provisions, it makes its ruling depend on canon 74 of the Construction Law, attributing to the Territorial Corporation the functions established by Decree 29253. It adds that, although it informed the Tribunal that its claim is based on constitutional ruling no. 2127 of March 14, 2003, as well as on others from the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, the judgment decided to disapply them without any reason.

**III.-** Regarding the sole procedural charge, this Chamber (resolution no. 328-F-S1-2012 at 8:50 a.m. on March 8, 2012) has indicated that reasoning, in the terms of rule 137, subsection d) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (hereinafter CPCA), should not be understood as a mechanism to question the legal grounds of the judgment. It arises when there is no reasoning, either because it does not exist, or because its development is extremely confused or contradictory, such that it prevents clarity regarding the rationales that led to the decision adopted in the operative part of the ruling, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, in particular, due process and the right of defense. Thus, it is not a matter of determining whether the judge ruled on all the claims incorporated into the process (defect of incongruence), but rather, whether the grounds on which the corresponding decision was adopted were provided. Equally, it must be kept in mind that this is a procedural ground, concerning potential non-compliances with adjective provisions that regulate the procedural "iter" or the judgment, as well as the legal relationship that binds the parties and the judge within the framework of a judicial process, and from which rights and obligations derive. Consequently, this cause of action should not be confused with a mechanism to discuss the application of the law or the assessment of the evidence, for which the referenced Code establishes autonomous causes of action (cardinal 138), as otherwise the specific cassation ground would be denatured. Regarding the specific claim, the Tribunal cites and partially transcribes various provisions of the Construction Law, the Public Roads Law, the Urban Planning Law, as well as the Regulation of Rights of Way and Outdoor Advertising, Executive Decree 29253, of December 20, 2000. Subsequently, it refers that, for the installation of a billboard in front of a national route, a license for the commercial exercise of advertising and its registration is previously required, a matter that falls under the MOPT's purview. Likewise, it said, that Ministry is responsible for verifying the alignment or building line for reasons of road planning for the widening of public roads, the structural design permit and its registration, the approval of structural plans for the work, and the permit for the installation of that design. It based the foregoing on numerals 1 and 28 of Decree 29253. It added that this does not invade the factual assumption of ordinal 74 of the Construction Law, insofar as any construction, whether permanent or provisional, must be executed with a license from the corresponding Municipality. It revealed that what is provided for is the technical supervision and control of outdoor advertising, as well as of the commercial advertising activity of private parties, for purposes of safety, public health, comfort, and beauty, to prevent harm from being caused to neighboring properties, to ensure the proper use of rights of way, respect for public domain assets, road safety standards, the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, and the rights of private parties to the commercial exercise of advertising. It partially transcribed canon 52 of the same Decree, which establishes prohibitions regarding advertising signs. It continued by citing a list of factual elements, from which it highlighted that the application was returned for non-compliance with requirements, with the party being warned that, in addition to the note from the MOPT's Basic Studies Unit, it also had to present the permit for the placement of the billboard from the MOPT's Department of Road Inspection. Furthermore, it said, it was warned that the plan must clearly represent the location of the sign within the property. It explained that, in the plan in question, the responsible professional, without any objection, indicated by hand "Location Plan of billboard," graphically representing the location within the lot, an inscription on which the impression of the Municipal Government's stamp granting the construction permit appears. It stipulated that the permit was thus granted by the Municipality on August 26, 2014. It commented that the construction rights, from which the license takes effect, were paid in favor of the Municipality (and not the MOPT) on September 2, 2014. It considered that, in this way, although it concerns a property fronting a national route, this is not a permit to build a work on a national route, within the right of way, sidewalk (acera), shoulder (espaldón), and even less on the roadway (calzada). For that reason, it said, it rejects the quotations of resolutions and rulings invoked by the party, referring to land use (uso de suelo), telecommunications towers, and urban ornaments, because it does not consider there to be an identity of object and cause with the case under study. It added that it is also not true that what was granted by the MOPT was a construction permit, nor that what was granted by the Municipality was an outdoor advertising permit. For that reason, it explained, it rejects the argument of incongruence and harm to legitimate expectations, as well as that the MOPT was the competent body to approve or reject that construction permit. It also refutes that the Municipality incurred in abusive, arbitrary, disproportionate, and illegal conduct by purporting to exercise the MOPT's powers. It specified that this is because it concerns a municipal administrative procedure and a final and firm municipal administrative act, which is not part of the object, i.e., the claim for nullity, which renders that argument sterile. It also considered inadmissible the request for nullity on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction (incompetencia) of shutdown order no. 5456 of September 22, 2014, issued by the Inspections Department of the Territorial Corporation, following for this the principle that the accessory follows the fate of the principal, i.e., that it is an act issued and executed on the occasion of that municipal construction permit, which was not challenged nor argued as null due to lack of jurisdiction. It rejected that the works were shut down and seals placed for non-compliance with the Municipality's Outdoor Advertising Regulation, but rather it was due to irregular conduct, in particular, the execution of works not conforming to those approved by the Municipal Government. It also stated that the case file shows that this shutdown was carried out for the second time, hence it is not true that construction was being executed once all legal permits had been obtained. The foregoing, it stipulates, is inferred from the fact that already on May 13, 2014, the Municipal Inspection had indicated that the works were being shut down for lacking a municipal permit. Furthermore, it indicated, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that it was the Billboard that was being shut down and not the construction, nor that the works had not been paralyzed on the basis that they had already been completed, and even less that this was the product of municipal harassment, particularly from the Mayor. It assessed that the foregoing contradicts the order of 3:07 p.m. on October 14, 2014, which ordered the suspension of the effects of the shutdown act, authorizing the continuation of the suspended works. It concluded that, although it is a billboard, its structure requires excavation (excavación), removal of earth (remoción de tierra), foundation slab, column, angles, concrete, and a rebar framework. It said that this implies the use of water pumps and concrete mixers, for which reason it is a construction work, over which the territorial entity has competence to grant the license, as it did, as well as to supervise its compliance (numerales 74 and 81 of the Construction Law). From this perspective, it pointed out, the municipality has the power to supervise any construction work executed in that canton, including that necessary to install billboards. Thus, it noted, the content of notification no. 5456 is in accordance with the law, making its nullity on grounds of lack of jurisdiction inadmissible. For this Chamber, it is undeniable that the Tribunal did provide the reasons why it deemed the claim of nullity for lack of jurisdiction of the Municipality of Curridabat inadmissible. At its core, it considered that, from numerals 74 and 81 of the Construction Law, it is extracted that any construction carried out in the canton must have a municipal permit. In this way, the cited Municipal Government has sufficient authority to demand the construction license, and consequently, also to supervise the works and, in the event of non-compliance, issue a shutdown order. It elaborated a thesis to establish that billboards are constructions, and therefore must be authorized and supervised by the municipal government. Thus, the ruling did have the proper reasoning, making the allegation unaddressable.

**Appeal on the merits** **IV.-** In the sole grievance of this nature, the appellant in cassation alleges that numeral 1 of the old Construction Law no. 833 of 1949 (hereinafter LC) charged the municipalities with the "good living of the populations," both on "public roads" and on private land, without harming the powers that other laws grant in matters of "safety, comfort, and beauty" to "other administrative bodies." It specifies that this regulation opens a door for other laws to regulate the subject matter. It emphasizes that for "sociological" reasons, the said Law did not differentiate between cantonal and national jurisdiction over public roads, as the General Law of Public Roads no. 5060 (hereinafter LGCP) later did. It comments that, in accordance with cardinal 10 of the Civil Code, precepts must be interpreted in relation to the sociological context and the social reality they regulated at the time. Thus, it states, the LGCP attributes the administration of the national road network to the MOPT, and its cantonal counterpart to the municipal governments. It asserts that the LGCP also cleared up the uncertainty of canon 1 of the LC, deciding that the Executive Branch is responsible for establishing, via decree, the bases for the administration of the national road network which it attributes to the MOPT. It points out that numeral 2 of the LGCP states that the municipal governments are the owners of the streets in their jurisdiction, while the State is the owner of all existing ones, including the public roads to be built in the future. In its opinion, a special supremacy of the State, a greater entity, is thus established over the territorial corporations —a lesser entity— with respect to the national road network, which implies the exercise of authority or unilateral action by the Executive Branch through Decrees, in order to regulate the MOPT's competence over local governments. In its judgment, it is obvious that if provision 2 of the LGCP establishes an express competence of the State over the national road network, the legal and material effects of that norm are determined by Decree 29253, as it allows the Ministry to exercise a series of powers over said road system. Consequently, it affirms, this is an erroneous interpretation of the rights and powers of the MOPT and the Municipality of Curridabat, by the Tribunal, in asserting that shutdown order no. 5456 is lawful. It stresses that it not only misinterprets the meaning of the regulation being discussed but also changes the meaning they have, by extrapolating the provisions of Decree 29253, transferring the MOPT's powers to the Municipality of Curridabat. It claims this is because a formal law exists that authorizes the Executive Branch to administer the national road network. In that way, it adds, the rights and powers of the municipalities over that road, in excess of their competence, are also a threat to private initiative regarding billboards, a situation that materializes in shutdown order 5456, which is the object of this proceeding. It refers that the competence granted to the MOPT over the national road network originates from the LGCP and Regulation 29253 MOPT, a competence by subject matter (materia), territory, and degree, which can only be extinguished by another law, which does not currently exist. Thus, it highlights that a competence cannot be reformed by a normative interpretation. It mentions that the supremacy of the MOPT over national roads is also noted by rule 19 of the LGCP, when it indicates: "No constructions or buildings of any type may be built in front of existing or planned highways, without the prior authorization of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, nor in front of local roads and streets without the written approval of the corresponding Municipality. The Municipalities will coordinate the alignments in front of local roads with the Ministry, which shall be the one to establish the policy most convenient to the public interest." It stresses that the intersubjective conflict that exists on this point between the MOPT and the sued local government is apparent, because the distinct competence of each one is understood by differentiating between national and cantonal highway. It points out that this distinction is made by numeral 1 of the LGCP, by attributing the administration of the national road network to the MOPT and the cantonal network to the municipalities. It considers that, by not making this difference, the appealed ruling interprets the cited norm erroneously, attributing to the Municipality of Curridabat the administration of a national road network without considering what is stipulated in canons 1 and 2 of the LGCP and Decree 29253. It recalls that, regarding rule 19 of the cited Decree, an erroneous interpretation is also incurred, because, in harmony with the referenced norms, it should have been assessed that the MOPT is the supreme body on the matter and, in this capacity, it is responsible for establishing the policy most convenient to the public interest. Therefore, it considers the shutdown order issued by the Territorial Corporation against it to be illegal and null. It indicates that, if this is not an erroneous interpretation, it is a non-application of rule 19 of the LGCP, as well as of rules 35 and 42 of the LGCP. It expresses that, by not taking into account canons 19 and 35 of the LGCP, which differentiate between national and local roads, the judgment simply violated them by non-application. It outlines that the trial judges violated numeral 42 of the LGCP by non-application, because this norm stipulated that it repealed everything that opposed it and, in that sense, the LGCP, being subsequent to the LC, repealed the competence of the municipalities over national highways, as attributed in matters of billboards, in precepts 1, 2, 10, 29, and 74 of that regulation. The foregoing, it expresses, also determines the non-application of numeral 8 of the Civil Code, since it stipulates that a later law repeals the earlier one, just as determined by rule 42 of the LGCP. It stipulates that another direct violation committed by the appealed ruling is the non-application of Decree 29253 MOPT, which regulates outdoor advertising on national roads. It says that said Decree attributes to the MOPT the administration and supervision of billboards constructed on public and private lands. It comments that the MOPT is (Art. 1) the only competent authority in matters of billboards located on national highways, according to numerals 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 18, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 56, 57, and 63 of that Regulation, regulations that the Tribunal violates. Concomitantly, it details, it violated Transitory Provision XIII of the Traffic Law no. 9078, of October 4, 2012, which establishes that, until special legislation is enacted that regulates outdoor visual communication on private property fronting national and cantonal routes, the regulatory and supervisory bodies are determined, and Executive Decree 29253-MOPT is repealed, the MOPT shall be responsible for approving or denying the permits that are processed, within a maximum period of 30 calendar days from their application. It adds that the criterion issued by the MOPT shall prevail in all cases concerning the matter fronting national routes. It opines that the Regulation was the object of a constitutional challenge, processed in case file 01-10761-7-CO, resolved in ruling 2003-2127, in which it was indicated that the rights of way that adjoin highways and roads forming part of the national road network do not share the local character indicated by rule 169 of the Political Constitution. It assures that it is obvious that the constitutional ruling, by dismissing the action, declared the constitutionality of Regulation 29253 MOPT, with erga omnes effect (ordinals 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law and 8.1 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch). From this perspective, it continues, the judges violated the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality. It cites rulings from the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal in support of its thesis. It concludes that, from the foregoing norms, it is deduced that precepts 74 and 89 of the LC are not applicable to the case under examination.

**V.-** The Tribunal, at its core, indicated that for the installation of a billboard fronting a national route, a license for the commercial exercise of advertising and its registration is required, which falls under the MOPT's purview. Equally, it said, that entity is responsible for verifying the alignment or building line for reasons of road planning for the widening of public roads, the structural design permit and its registration, the approval of structural plans of the work, and the permit for the installation of that design. It based the foregoing on numerals 1 and 28 of Decree 29253. Nevertheless, it added, in accordance with ordinal 74 of the LC, any construction requires a Municipal license. It revealed that, although it concerns a property fronting a national route, this is not a permit to build works within the right of way, sidewalk, shoulder, or roadway. Thus, it rejected that the MOPT was the competent body to approve that construction permit. Furthermore, it objected that the works had been shut down and seals placed for non-compliance with the Municipality's Outdoor Advertising Regulation, but rather due to irregular construction conduct, in particular, the execution of works not conforming to those approved by the Municipal Government. It stated that the shut-down work is a construction, for which reason the Municipality has competence to grant the license, as well as to supervise its compliance (numerals 74 and 81 of the Construction Law). From this perspective, it pointed out, the municipality has the power to control any construction work executed in that canton, including that necessary to install billboards, and, where applicable, to proceed with the shutdown when circumstances warrant it.

**VI.-** For this Chamber, the current legislation (numeral 4 of the Law Creating the National Road Council No. 7798 of April 30, 1998, precept 2 of the LGCP, and canon 21 subsections 3 and 42 of the Urban Planning Law) distinguishes two types of road networks: the national network and the cantonal network. The national network is composed of primary, secondary, tertiary highways, and freeways. As its owner is the State, the law has stipulated that its administration corresponds to the MOPT. Its design, for its part, will correspond to the National Road Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad, hereinafter CONAVI). The Cantonal Network is composed of public roads not included in the national network. These can be local roads (vecinales), unclassified roads, and local streets, the maintenance of which clearly corresponds to the municipalities. As stipulated by Article 2 of the LGCP, the territorial corporations not only administer but are also owners of the cantonal road network. Its design will correspond to the local governments. (See, in this sense, this Chamber's rulings no. 674-2013 at 9:45 a.m. on June 4, 2013, and 1448-2014 at 10:00 a.m. on November 7, 2014, among others). Now then, in the present case, it is an uncontested fact that the billboard, the object of this proceeding, is located in front of a national route. According to precept 227 of Law 9078, Law of Traffic on Public Land Routes and Road Safety (hereinafter Traffic Law), the MOPT shall regulate the cases in which road signage will be installed, also being responsible for granting the respective alignment (alineamiento) in cases of advertising signs placed in front of national routes. In that direction, in accordance with canons 1, and 3 through 12 of Decree 29253-MOPT, "Regulation of Rights of Way and Outdoor Advertising," the installation, replacement, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of signs, labels, or billboards, on public or private land, or in the rights of way, on national routes, must be processed before the MOPT. Said Ministry is the only competent authority in matters of outdoor advertising, with the exception of the areas corresponding to the Municipalities, according to the distribution of powers established by Article 1 of the LGCP.

The cited regulation finds legislative reinforcement in the line established by Transitorio XIII of the Ley de Tránsito, which states: “Until such time as a special law is enacted regulating exterior visual communication on private property facing national and cantonal routes, the regulatory and supervisory bodies are determined, and Decreto Ejecutivo 29253-MOPT, entitled 'Reglamento de los derechos de vía y publicidad exterior,' is repealed, the MOPT shall be responsible for approving or denying the permits submitted (…). The criterion issued by the MOPT shall prevail in cases concerning this matter on national routes.” From the foregoing, it is clear that jurisdiction for advertising purposes and in matters of exterior visual communication on national routes has been conferred by the Legal System on the MOPT. This is drawn not only from the jurisdictional division between the cited Ministry and the Municipalities, regarding cantonal and national roads established by the LGCP and the Ley de Planificación Urbana, but also from the special determination made by the Ley de Tránsito, which not only authorizes the MOPT to issue Regulations on the matter but also maintains the validity of Decreto Ejecutivo 29253 until such time as special legislation regulating visual communication on terrestrial roads is enacted. Thus, even though article 74 of the Ley de Construcciones generally subjects construction works to local governments, it is unquestionable that, in the case of the installation, replacement, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of advertisements, signs, or billboards (vallas publicitarias), on public or private land, municipal jurisdiction is limited to cantonal routes. The foregoing because, on national routes, the cited legislation, by tacit repeal, reserves that jurisdiction exclusively to MOPT. To interpret that by virtue of that regulation (Ley de Construcciones of 1949), a residual jurisdiction is attributed to local governments in this area, through which the Municipality can intercede and close a work authorized by the MOPT, would imply emptying the copious legislation that attributes exclusive power in this discipline to the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. In accordance with the foregoing, the claim must be upheld.

VII.- The plaintiff requested that the defendant corporation be ordered to pay damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) resulting from the rescission (rescisión) of the contracts signed with the companies Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. caused by the closure order, plus interest, sums to be indexed (indexar) and liquidated in the execution of judgment (ejecución de sentencia). In the case at hand, it is shown that in June 2014, Top Media signed with SHU NU HSIAO TSAI, a lease agreement (contrato de arrendamiento) for an area of land for the placement of a billboard (valla publicitaria) for a period of five years (images 1 through 12 of the injunction (medida cautelar) file). Likewise, images 20 and 21 of the injunction file (11 and 12 of the main file) show respective invoices from Top Media, dated September 27 and October 1, both 2014, in the name of Vivicon Inmobiliaria S.A. and Centroamericana de Comidas S.A.; for the placement of advertising content (pauta publicitaria) in front of Taco Bell Curridabat. There is also a purchase order between Top Media and “Estructuras e Instalaciones Publicitarias S.A.”, for the manufacture of a new structure, to be located in the same place, whose delivery date is September 29, 2014 (Image 10 of the main file). Having assessed the above, on July 22, 2014, through official communication IVD-0750-2014, the Departamento de Inspección Vial of the MOPT granted permit for billboard structure number VP0001-01 054-14-RUTA 2. Likewise, on August 26, 2014, the Dirección de Desarrollo y Control Urbano of the Municipalidad de Curridabat, granted the plaintiff construction permit number 100-2014 (fact 11 deemed accredited). However, on September 22, 2014, through notification certificate number 5456, the Departamento de Inspecciones of the defendant Municipality notified the plaintiff of the closure of the works, arguing irregular conduct. Literally, the cited Territorial Corporation indicated that Top Media: “4. Executed works without a license that cause harm or damages to third parties. 5. Executed works not in accordance with those approved by the Municipality. Legal references. LC 58, 89 Section d. LPU 57, LC 89 subsection c. By virtue of the foregoing, the undersigned MUNICIPAL INSPECTOR proceeds to: Close and place seals. Second time. OBSERVATIONS: Closed for non-compliance with the Reglamento de Publicidad Exterior of the Municipality. -illegible- ...distance from center of street to sign is 15.50 mts. Disrespected ... the plans were not found on site." (Fact 12 deemed demonstrated). On September 29, Top Media filed before the Departamento de Inspecciones of the Municipality a revocation appeal (recurso de revocatoria) with a subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio), against the aforementioned action, and on October 14 following, it filed an injunction before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, which, as indicated supra, was granted that day (facts deemed proven 13 and 14). Indeed, in a decree at 15 hours 7 minutes on October 14, 2014, the Court granted a provisionalissima injunction (medida cautelar provisionalísima), leaving without effect the closure order under examination, authorizing the removal of seals and the continuation of works. Subsequently, in resolution 2762-2014-T, at 15 hours on October 22, 2014, the Court firmly granted the injunction requested by Top Media. Thus, it is clear that the works were stopped by order of the Municipalidad de Curridabat between September 22 and October 14, both 2014, the date when the Court authorized the continuation of the work. Now, in the file there is a note from the company Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., dated October 13, 2014, stating that on September 12, 2014, the plaintiff and Comidas Centromericanas signed a contract for the placement of an advertisement in front of Taco Bell in Curridabat. This missive adds that, according to what was agreed, the billboard was to be exhibited starting October 1, 2014; and that, by that date, the advertising content in question had not been placed, for which reason, in its opinion, Top Media had breached the contract. Thus, it indicates that if the advertisement of interest is not duly installed and displayed by October 15, 2014, it would irrevocably rescind (rescindir) the cited contract (note from folio 26 of the main file – image 30). According to emails from Comidas Centroamericanas dated October 18 and 19, 2014, in accordance with its desire to protect the brand and avoid conflicts with local governments, the situation with the local government obliges it not to proceed further with the matter of the billboard under examination, unless a document from the Mayor indicating his approval was presented to it (folios 27 to 31 of the file - images 31 to 34). Likewise, at folio 27 (image 31 of the main file), dated October 20, 2014, there is a communication from Comidas Centroamericanas in which it indicates to the plaintiff that the Mayor of Curridabat had just called to inform it that the billboard had been installed, for which reason, it formally requests Top Media to proceed to “take it down,” as it does not want to have problems with any local government. In response that same day, through the indicated medium (email at 10:58:27 am), Top Media indicates that indeed the billboard has already been dismantled, however, it clarifies, they had all the permits including that of the Municipality of Curridabat. Then, in a note dated November 3, 2014, Vivicon requests Top Media Costa Rica to “cancel contract no. C233792” corresponding to the billboard under study, the foregoing “due to the uncertainty related to the permit for said billboard, and the conflict this has generated with the municipality.” From the foregoing, this Chamber observes, it is clear that between September 22 and October 14, 2014, the Territorial Corporation of Curridabat illegitimately closed the construction works for the billboard under examination. Likewise, it is irrefutable, according to what is set forth in Considerando VI of this judgment, the Municipalidad de Curridabat lacked jurisdiction to close the construction work for the advertising content under analysis. Thus, it is clear that the conduct of the Municipality of Curridabat, —constituting a unlawful act (vía de hecho)—, namely, closure of the construction works for the placement of the billboard of interest, influenced the decision of Vivicom S.A. regarding rescinding the contract for the construction and placement of advertising content. Although it is not shown in this case that, indeed, the Municipal Mayor called the officials of Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., it is undeniable that the works were destined to be completed by October 15, 2014, which was impossible because they were unduly stopped between September 22 and October 14, 2014. Thus, the final decision of Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centromericanas S.A. was influenced by illegitimate acts of the territorial corporation, that is, by the illegitimate temporary closure of the construction of the advertising content, acts that evidently constitute the causal link (nexo causal) that prevented Top Media from completing the works on time, motivating the decision of Vivicon S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., to rescind the existing contracts with the plaintiff for the placement and display of billboards for Pizza Hut Restaurants. This insofar as, it is reiterated, the cited administrative actions prevented Top Media from completing its works within the contractually foreseen period, a situation that justified the rescission requested by Vivicon S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. As a consequence of the foregoing, the claim for damages and losses must be upheld, with the defendant Municipality having to indemnify the damages caused by the illegitimate temporary closure of the construction works of the billboard, specifically, those derived from the contractual rescission of the agreements under study, existing between the plaintiff and the companies Vivicon S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., which must be liquidated in the execution of judgment.

VIII.- By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal (recurso) filed by the plaintiff shall be granted. The judgment shall be reversed (casar). Deciding on the merits, the defense of lack of right shall be rejected. The lawsuit shall be granted. Closure order number 5456 issued by the Municipalidad de Curridabat shall be annulled. Said territorial corporation is ordered to pay the damages and losses that the closure order may have caused, whether due to the closure of the works themselves, or the contractual rescissions caused regarding the advertising contracts signed between the plaintiff and the companies Vivicon S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., sums to be indexed plus statutory interest, which must be liquidated in the execution of judgment. Costs are the responsibility of the defendant Municipality, in accordance with precept 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

POR TANTO

The cassation appeal (recurso de casación) is granted. The judgment is reversed. Deciding on the merits, the defense of lack of right is denied. The lawsuit is granted. Closure order number 5456 issued by the Municipalidad de Curridabat is annulled. Said territorial corporation is ordered to pay the damages and losses caused by the closure order of the construction works of the billboard under examination, in particular, the rescission of the existing contracts between the plaintiff and the companies Vivicon S.A. and Centroamericana de Comidas S.A., amounts to be liquidated in the execution of judgment, sums to be indexed plus interest. Costs are the responsibility of the defendant Municipality.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya William Molinari Vílchez Yazmín Aragón Cambronero Maribel Seing Murillo CGZAMORA/SSOLANOA The individuals are of legal age, with the exceptions noted, attorneys and residents of San José.

CONSIDERING

I.- Top Media Costa Rica S.A. (hereinafter Top Media) sued the Municipality of Curridabat. It stated that, by virtue of advertising contracts it held with the companies Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. and Vivicom S.A., it entered into a lease agreement with Mr. SHU UN HSIAO TSAI, whereby it leased four square meters of the San José property, registration number 200335-000, located in Curridabat (Ruta Nacional no. 2, in front of Taco Bell Curridabat) for the purpose of placing a billboard. It asserted that it subsequently processed the corresponding permits for placement before the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (hereinafter MOPT), the competent body, because it is located facing a national route. It emphasized that on March 6, 2014, the MOPT's Department of Road Prevision (Departamento de Previsión Vial), through official letter DPV-OF1181-14, provided the respective alignment, and on June 30, 2014, through official letter DGIT-ED-4820-2014, the MOPT's General Directorate of Traffic Engineering granted approval for the placement of the billboard. It added that on July 22, 2014—having fulfilled the requirements—the MOPT granted it permit no. VP0001-01 054 Route 2, for the placement of a structure for an advertising billboard. It also explained that the Municipality of Curridabat granted it a permit to build it through outdoor advertising permit (permiso de publicidad exterior) no. 100-2014 issued by that municipal government's Directorate of Development and Urban Control. However, it clarified that on September 22, 2014, arbitrarily and unexpectedly, an inspector from that Municipality appeared at the worksite and, through order no. 5456, shut it down and placed seals. It affirmed that this was done without any prior notification, with the municipality arguing a supposed non-compliance with the Outdoor Advertising Regulation (Reglamento de Publicidad Exterior), and even threatening to detain the workers. It stated that on September 29, 2014, it filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal, without a response at the time of filing the claim. It outlined that on October 13, 2014, Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. considered that the delay constituted a breach, warning that if the advertisement was not installed by October 15, 2014, it would terminate the contract, without prejudice to resorting to jurisdictional instances to claim damages. It stipulated that on October 14 of that year, it filed a provisional interim measure, which was granted, suspending the effects of the closure order. It added that this was also granted on the merits in judgment no. 2762-2014 at 3:00 p.m. on October 22, 2014, by the Administrative Court, suspending the effects of the closure order. It detailed that on October 20, 2014, it received an email from the Marketing Manager of Pizza Hut (Comidas Centroamericanas S.A.), informing it of the decision to terminate the cited contract, despite the advertisement being on display, as a result of a threatening call received from the Mayor of Curridabat. It revealed that subsequently, after a second call, the Manager requested the immediate termination of the signed advertising contract. It noted that on November 3, 2014, the contracting party Vivicom S.A. also requested the annulment of advertising contract no. C233792 due to the uncertainty related to the aforementioned permit. It requests that the judgment declare: a) the absolute nullity of closure order no. 5456 issued by the Municipality of Curridabat; b) said corporation must pay the damages, interest, and indexation resulting from the closure order that caused the termination of the contracts signed with the companies Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., amounts to be settled in the execution of judgment; c) the defendant must pay the costs of the proceeding. The defendant corporation answered negatively. It raised the defenses of lack of: standing and right. The Court rejected the lack of standing, upheld the defense of lack of right. It declared the claim inadmissible. It imposed costs on the plaintiff, who, dissatisfied, appears in cassation.

Appeal on procedural grounds II.- The appellant formulates a single charge of this nature. It alleges that the defect of lack of sufficient reasoning has been incurred. The foregoing, it says, due to the judgment's failure to apply mandate 155 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC), which regulates the requirements that must be observed in the drafting of rulings. It points out that numeral 155 ibidem sets out the content of the operative facts (resultandos), considering (considerandos), and the operative part (por tanto); however, the Court transcribes literally in sections IV and V of the judgment, the arguments of both parties in their entirety, a matter that should be dealt with synthetically in the operative facts (resultandos). It says this situation creates a state of legal uncertainty and defenselessness, as there is a lack of clarity in those "essential elements." It outlines that in sections IV and V, all the arguments of the parties are transcribed literally, incurring a violation of the cited procedural rule due to lack of application, which warrants the annulment of the ruling. It comments that the defect described in the drafting of the operative facts (resultandos) was transferred to what was written by the judges in section IX entitled "Court's Criterion." It explains that said section suggests that the judges will resolve the merits of the matter, however it does not do so, but rather encloses itself, within the Legal Information System, copying without interruption multiple rules, without resolving the dispute through a coherent and harmonious interpretation thereof. It opines that it does not know with certainty the reason why the judgment makes literal citations of multiple contradictory rules, without explaining their differences or applying a method of interpretation. It says the appealed ruling does not disclose what it thinks about billboards and the competence of the entities, nor the reasons why it leaned towards one of the rules. It alleges a lack of sufficient reasoning, confused wording, and obscurity in what was decided. It stipulates that no mention is made of the methodology used, nor does it provide a doctrinal exposition. It details that the judgment is devoid of a hermeneutical tool, and lacks rigor because it cites multiple contradictory precepts. It considers that it does not know the reasons why the judges decided on some rules while discarding others, in breach of due legal process. It specifies that, without explaining why, the Court cites practically all the provisions of Decree 29253 that regulate the competence of the MOPT, but attributes these functions to the Municipality of Curridabat. It comments that, after citing various provisions, it makes its ruling depend on canon 74 of the Construction Law, attributing to the Territorial Corporation the functions established by Decree 29253. It adds that, although it informed the Court that its claim is grounded in constitutional judgment no. 2127 of March 14, 2003, as well as in others from the Administrative Court, the judgment decided to disapply them without any reason.

III.- Regarding the single procedural charge, this Chamber (resolution no. 328-F-S1-2012 at 8 hours 50 minutes on March 8, 2012) has indicated that sufficient reasoning, in terms of rule 137, subsection d) of the Administrative Contentious Jurisdiction Code (hereinafter CPCA), should not be understood as a mechanism to question the legal foundations of the judgment. It arises when there is no reasoning, either because it does not exist, or because its development is extremely confusing or contradictory, such that it prevents clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative part of the ruling, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, particularly due process and the right of defense. Thus, it is not a matter of determining whether the court ruled on all the claims incorporated into the proceeding (defect of incongruity), but rather, whether it provided the grounds upon which it adopted the corresponding decision. Likewise, it must be kept in mind that this is a procedural ground, which concerns potential failures to comply with adjective provisions that regulate the procedural steps ("iter") or the judgment, as well as the legal relationship that binds the parties and the judge within the framework of a judicial proceeding, and from which rights and obligations derive. That being the case, this ground for cassation should not be confused with a mechanism for discussing the application of law or the weighing of evidence, for which the referenced Code establishes autonomous grounds (cardinal 138), since otherwise the specific ground for cassation would be distorted. Regarding the specific claim, the Court cites and partially transcribes various provisions of the Construction Law, the Public Roads Law, the Urban Planning Law, as well as the Regulations for Rights of Way and Outdoor Advertising (Reglamento de los Derechos de Vía y Publicidad Exterior), Executive Decree 29253, of December 20, 2000. Subsequently, it states that for the installation of a billboard facing a national route, a prior license for the commercial activity of advertising and its registration is required, which falls under the MOPT's authority. Likewise, it said, it falls to that Ministry to verify the alignment or building line for reasons of road prevision for the widening of public roads, the structural design permit and its registration, the approval of structural plans for the work, and the permit for the installation of that design. It based the foregoing on numerals 1 and 28 of Decree 29253. It added that the foregoing does not invade the operative fact of ordinal 74 of the Construction Law, insofar as any construction, whether permanent or provisional, must be carried out with a license from the corresponding Municipality. It revealed that what is provided is the supervision and technical control of outdoor advertising, as well as of the commercial advertising activity of private parties, for purposes of safety, health, comfort, and beauty, to prevent damages from being caused to neighboring properties, to ensure the proper use of rights of way, respect for public domain assets, road safety rules, the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, and that of private parties to the commercial activity of advertising. It partially transcribed canon 52 of the Decree ibidem, which establishes prohibitions regarding advertising signs. It continued by citing a list of factual elements, from which it highlighted that the application was returned for failure to meet requirements, warning the party that, in addition to the note from the MOPT's Basic Studies Unit, it must also submit the billboard placement permit from the MOPT's Department of Road Inspection. It also said it was warned that the plan had to clearly represent the location of the sign within the lot. It explained that in the plan in question, the responsible professional, without any objection, indicated by hand "Location plan for billboard," graphically representing the location within the lot, an inscription on which the impression of the Municipal Government's seal granting the building permit (permiso de construcción) appears. It stipulated that the permit was thus granted by the Municipality on August 26, 2014. It commented that the construction rights, upon which the license becomes effective, were paid in favor of the Municipality (and not the MOPT) on September 2, 2014. It considered that, in this way, although it is a property fronting a national route, this is not a permit to build a work on the national route, within the right of way, sidewalk, shoulder, much less on the roadway. For that reason, it said, it rejects the citations of resolutions and judgments invoked by the party referring to land use, telecommunications towers, and urban ornaments, as it does not consider there to be an identity of object and cause with the case under study. It added that it is also not true that what was granted by the MOPT was a building permit (permiso de construcción) nor that what was granted by the Municipality was an outdoor advertising permit (permiso de publicidad exterior). For that reason, it explained, it rejects the argument of incongruity and injury to legitimate expectations, as well as the argument that the MOPT was the competent body to approve or reject that building permit (permiso de construcción). It also refutes that the Municipality incurred in abusive, arbitrary, disproportionate, and illegal conduct by attempting to exercise the MOPT's competencies. It specified that this is because it concerns an administrative proceeding and a final and binding municipal administrative act that is not part of the object, that is, of the nullity claim, which renders that argument sterile. It also considered the nullity claim based on lack of competence against closure order no. 5456 of September 22, 2014, issued by the Territorial Corporation's Department of Inspections, to be inadmissible, following the principle that the accessory follows the fate of the principal, that is, that it concerns an act issued and executed on the occasion of that municipal building permit (permiso de construcción municipal), which was not challenged nor alleged null for lack of competence. It rejected that the action was to shut down the works and place seals due to non-compliance with the Municipality's Outdoor Advertising Regulation (Reglamento de Publicidad Exterior), but rather that it was due to irregular conduct, in particular, the execution of works not in conformity with those approved by the Municipal Government. It also stated that the case file shows that this shutdown was carried out for a second time, hence it was not true that the construction had been carried out once all legal permits were obtained. The foregoing, it stipulated, follows from the fact that on May 13, 2014, the Municipal Inspection had already indicated that the works were being shut down for lacking a municipal permit. Furthermore, it indicated that the plaintiff did not prove that the Billboard was being shut down and not the construction, nor that the works had not been halted on the basis that they were already completed, and even less so, that this was the product of municipal harassment, particularly by the Mayor. The foregoing, it assessed, contradicts the order at 15:07 on October 14, 2014, which ordered the suspension of the effects of the shutdown act, authorizing the continuation of the suspended works. It concluded that, although it is a billboard, its structure requires excavation, earth removal, a foundation slab, a column, angles, concrete, and rebar framework. It said this implies the use of water pumps and concrete mixers, therefore it is a construction work, over which the territorial entity has the competence to grant the license, as it did, as well as to oversee its compliance (numerals 74 and 81 of the Construction Law). From that perspective, it pointed out that the municipality has the power to oversee any construction work carried out in that canton, including that necessary to install billboards. Consequently, it noted that the content of notification no. 5456 is in accordance with law, making its nullity based on lack of competence inadmissible. For this Chamber, it is undeniable that the Court did provide the reasons why it deemed the nullity claim based on lack of competence of the Municipality of Curridabat inadmissible. Essentially, it considered that from numerals 74 and 81 of the Construction Law, it can be extracted that any construction carried out in the canton must have a municipal permit. Thus, the cited Municipal Government has sufficient power to require the building license (licencia de construcción), and consequently, also to oversee the works and, in case of non-compliance, issue a closure order. It developed a thesis to establish that billboards are constructions and therefore must be authorized and overseen by the municipal government. That being the case, the ruling did contain the due reasoning, and therefore, the claim is unavailing.

Appeal on the merits IV.- In the single grievance of this nature, the appellant alleges that numeral 1 of the old Construction Law no. 833 of 1949 (hereinafter LC) tasked the municipalities with the "good living of the populations," both on "public roads" and on private lands, without prejudicing the competencies that other laws grant in matters of "safety, comfort, and beauty," to "other administrative bodies." It specifies that this regulation opens a door for other laws to regulate the matter.

He emphasizes, for “sociological” reasons, that said Law did not differentiate between cantonal and national jurisdiction over public roads, as was later done by the General Law of Public Roads No. 5060 (hereinafter LGCP). He comments that, pursuant to cardinal 10 of the Civil Code, precepts must be interpreted in relation to the sociological context and the social reality they regulated at the time. Thus, he states, the LGCP attributes the administration of the national road network to the MOPT, and its cantonal counterpart to the municipalities. He also asserts that the LGCP cleared up the uncertainty of canon 1 of the LC, deciding that it corresponds to the Executive Branch to establish, via decree, the bases for the administration of the national road network that it attributes to the MOPT. He points out that numeral 2 of the LGCP states that the municipalities are the holders of the streets in their jurisdiction, while the State is the holder of all existing ones, including public roads built in the future. In his opinion, a special supremacy of the State—the higher entity—over the territorial corporations—the lower entity—is thus established, regarding the national road network, which implies the exercise of imperium or unilateral action by the Executive Branch through Decrees, in order to regulate the competence of the MOPT above local governments. In his view, it is obvious that if provision 2 of the LGCP provides for an express competence of the State over the national road network, the legal and material effects of that rule are determined by Decree 29253, inasmuch as it allows the Ministry to exercise a series of powers over said road system. Consequently, he affirms, there is an erroneous interpretation of the rights and powers of the MOPT and the Municipality of Curridabat on the part of the Court, by asserting that closure order No. 5456 is in accordance with the law. He stresses that it not only misinterprets the sense of the regulation in question, but also changes the meaning they have, by extrapolating the provisions of Decree 29253, transferring the powers of the MOPT to the Municipality of Curridabat. This, he claims, is because there is a formal law that authorizes the Executive Branch to administer the national road network. In that way, he adds, the rights and powers of the municipalities over that roadway, in excess of their competence, are also a threat to private initiative regarding billboards (vallas publicitarias), a situation that materializes in closure order 5456, the object of this proceeding. He notes that the competence granted to the MOPT over the national road network arises from the LGCP and Regulation 29253 MOPT, a competence by subject matter, territory, and degree that can only be extinguished by another law—which does not currently exist. Thus, he points out, a competence cannot be reformed by a normative interpretation. He mentions that the supremacy of the MOPT over national roads is also noted by mandate 19 of the LGCP, when it states: “No constructions or buildings of any type may be erected in front of existing or planned roads without the prior authorization of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, nor in front of neighborhood roads and streets without the written approval of the corresponding Municipality. Municipalities shall coordinate alignments in front of neighborhood roads with the Ministry, which shall be the one to establish the policy most convenient to the public interest.” He stresses that the inter-subjective conflict that exists on this point between the MOPT and the sued local government is only apparent, because the distinct competence of each is understood by differentiating between national and cantonal roadways. He points out that said distinction is made by numeral 1 of the LGCP, by attributing the administration of the national road network to the MOPT and the cantonal network to the municipalities. He considers that by failing to make this differentiation, the appealed judgment erroneously interprets the cited norm, attributing to the Municipality of Curridabat the administration of a national road network without considering the provisions of canons 1 and 2 of the LGCP and Decree 29253. He recalls that, regarding mandate 19 of the cited Decree, an erroneous interpretation is also made, because in harmony with the reference norms, it should have been assessed that the MOPT is the supreme body on the matter and, in this condition, it is its responsibility to establish the policy most convenient to the public interest. Therefore, he considers the closure order issued by the Territorial Corporation against it to be illegal and null. He indicates that if this is not an erroneous interpretation, it would be a lack of application of mandate 19 of the LGCP, as well as of mandates 35 and 42 of the LGCP. He expresses that by not taking canons 19 and 35 of the LGCP into account, which differentiate between national and neighborhood roads, the judgment simply violated them due to lack of application. He outlines that the lower court judges violated numeral 42 of the LGCP due to lack of application, because this norm provided that it repealed everything opposed to it, and in that sense, the LGCP, being subsequent to the LC, repealed the competence of the municipalities over national roadways, as appears attributed in matters of billboards, in precepts 1, 2, 10, 29, and 74 of that legislation. The foregoing, he expresses, also determines the lack of application of numeral 8 of the Civil Code, since it provides that a later law repeals the earlier one, just as mandate 42 of the LGCP determined. He stipulates that another direct violation committed by the appealed judgment is the lack of application of Decree 29253 MOPT, which regulates outdoor advertising on national roads. He says that said Decree attributes the administration and oversight of billboards built on public and private lands to the MOPT. He comments that the MOPT is (art. 1) the sole competent authority in matters of billboards located on national roadways, according to numerals 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 18, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 56, 57, and 63 of that Regulation, legislation that the Court breaches. Concomitantly, he details, it violated Transitory Provision XIII of the Traffic Law No. 9078, of October 4, 2012, which establishes that until special legislation is enacted that regulates outdoor visual communication on private property in front of national and cantonal routes, the regulatory and supervisory bodies are determined, and Executive Decree 29253-MOPT is not repealed, the MOPT shall be responsible for approving or denying the permits that are processed, within a maximum period of 30 calendar days from their request. He adds that the criteria issued by the MOPT shall prevail in all cases concerning the matter in front of national routes. He opines that the Regulation was the object of an unconstitutionality action, processed in expediente 01-10761-7-CO, resolved in judgment 2003-2127, in which it was indicated that the rights-of-way that border roadways and roads that form part of the national road network do not partake of the local character indicated by mandate 169 of the Political Constitution. He assures that it is obvious that the constitutional judgment, by declaring the action without merit, declared the constitutionality of Regulation 29253 MOPT, with erga omnes effectiveness (ordinals 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and 8.1 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch). From that perspective, he continues, the judges breached the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality. He cites judgments of the Administrative Contentious Court in support of his thesis. He concludes that from the foregoing norms, it is deduced that precepts 74 and 89 of the LC are not applicable to the case under review.

V.- The Court essentially indicated that for the installation of a billboard in front of a national route, a license for the commercial exercise of advertising and its registration is required, which is the responsibility of the MOPT. Likewise, it said, it corresponds to that entity to verify the alignment or building line for reasons of road planning for the widening of public roads, the structural design permit and its registration, the approval of structural plans for the work, and the permit for the installation of that design. It based the foregoing on numerals 1 and 28 of Decree 29253. However, it added, in accordance with ordinal 74 of the LC, all construction requires a Municipal license. It revealed that, although it involves a property with frontage on a national route, this is not a permit to build a work in the right-of-way, sidewalk, shoulder, or roadway. Thus, it rejected that the MOPT was the competent body to approve that construction permit. Furthermore, it objected that the works had been closed and seals placed, not for non-compliance with the Municipality’s External Advertising Regulation, but due to irregular construction practices, in particular, the execution of works not in conformity with those approved by the Municipal Government. It stated that the closed work is a construction, for which reason the Municipality has competence to grant the license, as well as to oversee its compliance (numerals 74 and 81 of the Construction Law). From that perspective, it pointed out that the municipality has the power to control all construction work executed in that canton, including that necessary to install billboards, and where appropriate, to proceed to closure when circumstances warrant it.

VI.- For this Chamber, the legislation in force (numeral 4 of the Law Creating the National Road Council No. 7798 of April 30, 1998, precept 2 of the LGCP, and canon 21 subsections 3 and 42 of the Urban Planning Law) demarcates two types of road networks: the national network and the cantonal network. The national network is composed of primary, secondary, and tertiary roadways and highways. As the State is its holder, the law has provided that its administration corresponds to the MOPT. Its design, for its part, shall correspond to the National Road Council (hereinafter CONAVI). The Cantonal Network is composed of public roads that are not included in the national network. These may be neighborhood roads, unclassified roads, and local streets, the maintenance of which clearly corresponds to the municipalities. As provided by Article 2 of the LGCP, the territorial corporations not only administer but are also the owners of the cantonal road network. Its design shall correspond to the local governments. (See, in that regard, the judgments of this Chamber No. 674-2013 of 9:45 a.m. on June 4, 2013, and 1448-2014 of 10:00 a.m. on November 7, 2014, among others). Now then, in this case, it is a non-contested fact that the billboard that is the object of this proceeding is located in front of a national route. According to precept 227 of Law 9078, Law of Transit on Land Public Roads and Road Safety (hereinafter Traffic Law), the MOPT shall regulate the cases in which road nomenclature shall be installed, also being responsible for granting the respective alignment in cases of advertising signs placed in front of national routes. In that direction, in accordance with canons 1, and 3 through 12 of Decree 29253-MOPT, “Regulation of Rights-of-Way and Outdoor Advertising”, the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and exhibition of all types of announcements, signs, or billboards, on public or private lands, or in the rights-of-way, on national routes, must be processed before the MOPT. Said Ministry is the sole competent authority in matters of outdoor advertising, with the exception of the areas that correspond to the Municipalities, according to the distribution of powers established by Article 1 of the LGCP. The cited regulation finds legislative reinforcement in the line provided by Transitory Provision XIII of the Traffic Law, which indicates: “Until such time as special legislation is enacted that regulates outdoor visual communication on private property in front of national and cantonal routes, the regulatory and supervisory bodies are determined, and Executive Decree 29253-MOPT, titled ‘Regulation of rights-of-way and outdoor advertising,’ is not repealed, the MOPT shall be responsible for approving or denying the permits that are processed (…). The criterion issued by the MOPT shall prevail in cases concerning the matter in front of national routes.” From the foregoing, it is clear that the competence for advertising purposes and in matters of outdoor visual communication on national routes has been conferred by the Legal System on the MOPT. This is drawn not only from the division of powers between the cited Ministry and the Municipal Governments regarding cantonal and national roads, provided by the LGCP and the Urban Planning Law, but also from the special determination made by the Traffic Law, which not only authorizes the MOPT to issue Regulations on the matter but also maintains the validity of Executive Decree 29253 until special legislation regulating visual communication on land roads is issued. In this way, even though numeral 74 of the Construction Law generally subjects construction works to local governments, it is unquestionable that, when dealing with the installation, substitution, construction, reconstruction, and exhibition of all types of announcements, signs, or billboards, on public or private lands, municipal competence is reduced to cantonal routes. The foregoing is because, on national routes, the cited legislation, by tacit derogation, reserves that competence exclusively for the MOPT. To interpret that by virtue of that legislation (Construction Law of 1949), a residual competence exists attributed to local governments on this subject, through which the Municipality can intervene and close a work authorized by the MOPT, would imply emptying of content the copious legislation that attributes exclusive power in that discipline to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport. In accordance with the foregoing, the claim must be upheld.

VII.- The plaintiff requested that the sued corporation be ordered to pay the damages and losses resulting from the rescission of the contracts entered into with the companies Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., which the closure order caused, plus interest, sums to be indexed and liquidated in the execution of the judgment. In the case, it is recorded that in June 2014, Top Media entered into a lease agreement with SHU NU HSIAO TSAI for a land area for the placement of a billboard for a period of five years (images 1 through 12 of the expediente for the interim measure). Likewise, there appear in images 20 and 21 of the expediente for the interim measure (11 and 12 of the main expediente), respective invoices from Top Media, dated September 27 and October 1, both of 2014, in the name of Vivicon Inmobiliaria S.A. and Centroamericana de Comidas S.A.; for the placement of advertising space in front of Taco Bell Curridabat. There also appears a purchase order between Top Media and “Estructuras e Instalaciones Publicitarias S.A.,” for the fabrication of a new structure, to be located in the same place, with a delivery date of September 29, 2014 (Image 10 of the main expediente). Having assessed the foregoing, on July 22, 2014, through official communication IVD-0750-2014, the Road Inspection Department of the MOPT granted the permit for billboard structure No. VP0001-01 054-14-RUTA 2. Likewise, on August 26, 2014, the Directorate of Development and Urban Control of the Municipality of Curridabat granted the plaintiff Construction Permit No. 100-2014 (fact 11 taken as accredited). However, on September 22, 2014, through notification form No. 5456, the Inspection Department of the sued Municipality notified the plaintiff of the closure of the works, arguing irregular practices. Literally, said Territorial Corporation indicated that Top Media: “4. Executed without a license works that cause harm or damage to third parties. 5. Executed works not in conformity with those approved by the Municipality. Legal references. LC 58, 89 Sub. d. LPU 57, LC 89 subsection c. By virtue of the foregoing, the undersigned MUNICIPAL INSPECTOR proceeds to: Close and place seals. Second time. OBSERVATIONS: Closed for non-compliance with the Municipality’s External Advertising Regulation. -illegible- ...setback from the center of the road to the sign is 15.50 m. Disregarded ... the plans were not found on site." (Fact 12 taken as proven). On September 29, Top Media filed a motion for revocation with subsidiary appeal before the Municipality’s Inspection Department against the referred action, and on October 14 next, it requested an interim measure before the Administrative Contentious Court, which, as indicated supra, was granted that day (facts taken as proven 13 and 14). In effect, in an order of 3:07 p.m. on October 14, 2014, the Court granted a provisionalísima interim measure, leaving the closure order under review without effect, authorizing the removal of seals and the continuation of the works. Subsequently, in resolution 2762-2014-T, of 3:00 p.m. on October 22, 2014, the Court firmly granted the interim measure requested by Top Media. Thus, it is clear that the works were halted by order of the Municipality of Curridabat between September 22 and October 14, both of 2014, the date when the Court authorized the continuation of the work. Now then, in the expediente, there is a note from the company Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., dated October 13, 2014, in which it is noted that on September 12, 2014, the plaintiff and Comidas Centroamericanas entered into a contract for the placement of an advertising announcement in front of Taco Bell in Curridabat. Said missive adds that, in accordance with what was agreed, the billboard was to be exhibited starting October 1, 2014; and that, as of that date, the advertising space in question had not been placed, for which reason, in its opinion, Top Media had breached the contract. In that way, it indicates that if the advertising of interest is not duly installed and exhibited by October 15, 2014, the cited contract shall be irrevocably rescinded (note from folio 26 of the main expediente – image 30). According to emails from Comidas Centroamericanas dated October 18 and 19, 2014, in accordance with its desire to protect the brand and avoid conflicts with local governments, the situation with the local government forces it not to proceed further with the billboard under review, unless a document from the Mayor indicating his approval were presented to it (folios 27 through 31 of the expediente – images 31 through 34). Likewise, at folio 27 (image 31 of the main expediente), dated October 20, 2014, there is a communication from Comidas Centroamericanas in which it indicates to the plaintiff that the Mayor of Curridabat has just called to inform it that the billboard was installed, for which reason, it formally requests Top Media to proceed to “take it down,” since it does not want to have problems with any local government. In a response that day, through the indicated medium (email at 10:58:27 a.m.), Top Media indicates that indeed the billboard has already been dismantled, however, it clarifies that they had all the permits, including that of the Municipality of Curridabat. Then, in a note dated November 3, 2014, Vivicon requests Top Media Costa Rica to “cancel contract No. C233792” corresponding to the billboard under study, the foregoing “due to the uncertainty related to the permit for said billboard, and the conflict this has generated with the municipality.” From the above, this Chamber observes, it is clear that between September 22 and October 14, 2014, the Territorial Corporation of Curridabat illegitimately closed the construction works of the advertising billboard under examination. It is equally irrefutable, according to what was set forth in Considerando VI of this judgment, that the Municipality of Curridabat lacked competence to close the construction work of the advertising signage under analysis. Thus, it is clear that the conduct of the Municipality of Curridabat—constituting a de facto action (vía de hecho), namely, the closure of the construction works for the placement of the advertising billboard in question—influenced Vivicom S.A.'s decision to rescind the contract for the construction and placement of advertising signage. Although the record does not show that the Municipal Mayor actually contacted the representatives of Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., it is undeniable that the works were destined to be completed on October 15, 2014, which proved impossible because they were unduly halted between September 22 and October 14, 2014. Thus, the final decision of Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. was influenced by illegitimate acts of the territorial corporation, that is, by the illegitimate temporary closure of the construction of the advertising signage, acts that evidently constitute the causal link that prevented Top Media from completing the works on time, motivating the decision of Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. to rescind the existing contracts with the plaintiff for the placement and display of advertising billboards for Pizza Hut Restaurants. This is so because, it is reiterated, the aforementioned administrative conduct prevented Top Media from completing its works within the contractually stipulated timeframe, a situation that justified the rescission requested by Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. As a consequence of the foregoing, the claim for damages (daños y perjuicios) must be granted, and the defendant Municipality must compensate the damages caused by the illegitimate temporary closure of the construction works of the advertising billboard, specifically, those derived from the contractual rescission of the agreements under study, existing between the plaintiff and the companies Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., which must be liquidated during the execution of judgment (ejecución de sentencia).

**VIII.-** By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal (recurso) filed by the plaintiff shall be granted. The judgment shall be reversed (casar la sentencia). Ruling on the merits (fallando por el fondo), the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) shall be rejected. The claim (demanda) shall be granted. Closure order no. 5456 issued by the Municipality of Curridabat shall be annulled. Said territorial corporation is ordered to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) that the closure order may have caused, whether for the closure of the works per se, or for the contractual rescissions caused with respect to the advertising contracts entered into between the plaintiff and the companies Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., sums to be indexed plus statutory interest, which must be liquidated during the execution of judgment (ejecución de sentencia). Costs (costas) are the responsibility of the defendant Municipality, pursuant to precept 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

**POR TANTO** The appeal of cassation (recurso de casación) is granted. The judgment is reversed (casar la sentencia). Ruling on the merits (fallando por el fondo), the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) is denied. The claim (demanda) is granted. Closure order no. 5456 issued by the Municipality of Curridabat is annulled. Said territorial corporation is ordered to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused by the closure order of the construction works of the advertising billboard under examination, particularly, the rescission of the existing contracts between the plaintiff and the companies Vivicom S.A. and Centroamericana de Comidas S.A., amounts to be liquidated during the execution of judgment (ejecución de sentencia), sums to be indexed plus interest. Costs (costas) are the responsibility of the defendant Municipality.

CGZAMORA/SSOLANOA Telephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email [email protected] See resolutions 674-2013 and 1448-2014 (voto 250-F-2019).

Distinction between the national network (administrated by the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes and designed by the Consejo Nacional de Viabilidad) and the cantonal network (its maintenance corresponds to the Municipalities). The advertising billboard (valla publicitaria) that is the subject of this proceeding is located facing a national route, therefore it is the responsibility of MOPT to approve or deny the permits processed for advertising purposes and in matters of exterior visual communication (articles 227 Ley 9078, 1 and 3 through 12 Decreto 29253, 1 Ley General de Caminos Públicos, transitory XIII Ley de Tránsito). Pursuant to precept 74 of the Ley de Construcciones, regarding the installation, replacement, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of advertisements, signs, or advertising billboards (vallas publicitarias), on public or private land, municipal jurisdiction is limited to cantonal routes (voto 250-F-2019).

In the case under study, the decision of two companies to rescind existing contracts with the plaintiff for the placement and display of advertising billboards (vallas publicitarias) was influenced by illegitimate acts of the municipality, due to the temporary closure of the construction of an advertising placement (pauta publicitaria), acts that evidently constitute the causal link (nexo causal) that prevented the plaintiff from completing the works on time.

Therefore, its claim for damages is appropriate, which must be calculated in the enforcement of judgment phase (voto 250-F-2019).

**Exp: 14-008645-1027-CA** **Res: 000250-F-S1-2019** **SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.** San José, at sixteen hours six minutes on March twenty, two thousand nineteen.

Ordinary proceeding established in the Administrative and Civil Treasury Litigation Court, Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A, Goicoechea, San José; by **TOP MEDIA COSTA RICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA**, hereinafter TOP MEDIA (formerly COLITE COSTA RICA, S.A.), represented by its general agents without sum limitation, Arturo Zarate Rocha and Michael Frank Donalson; against the **MUNICIPALIDAD DE CURRIDABAT**, represented by its Municipal Mayor, Edgar Eduardo Mora Altamirano, and its Vice-Mayor, Alicia Borja Rodriguez. Also appearing as special judicial agents for the plaintiff are Daniel Rojas Pochet and Federico Altamura Arce, whose qualifications are not on record; and for the defendant, María Isabel Corrales Madrigal and Floribeth Calderón Marín. The natural persons are of legal age, with the exceptions noted, lawyers, and residents of San José.

**CONSIDERANDO** **I.**- Top Media Costa Rica S.A. (hereinafter Top Media) sued the Municipalidad de Curridabat. It stated that, by virtue of advertising contracts it held with the companies Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. and Vivicom S.A., it entered into a lease agreement with Mr. SHU UN HSIAO TSAI, by which it leased four square meters of the property of San José, title number 200335-000, located in Curridabat (National Route No. 2, in front of Taco Bell Curridabat) for the purpose of placing an advertising billboard. It asserted that it subsequently processed the corresponding permits for the placement with the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (hereinafter MOPT), the competent body, as it was located on a national route. It emphasized that on March 6, 2014, the Department of Road Prevision of the MOPT, through official communication DPV-OF1181-14, provided it with the respective alignment, and on June 30, 2014, through official communication DGIT-ED-4820-2014, the General Directorate of Traffic Engineering of the MOPT granted approval for the placement of the billboard. It added that on July 22, 2014, - having fulfilled the requirements - the MOPT granted it permit no. VP0001-01 054 Route 2, for the placement of a structure for an advertising billboard. Likewise, it explained, the Municipalidad de Curridabat granted it permission to construct it through exterior advertising permit no. 100-2014 issued by the Directorate of Urban Development and Control of that municipality. However, it clarified, on September 22, 2014, an inspector of that Municipality appeared at the worksite in an arbitrary and sudden manner, who, through order no. 5456, shut down the works and placed seals. It assured that the foregoing was done without any prior notification, with the municipality arguing an alleged violation of the Reglamento de Publicidad Exterior, and even threatening to arrest the workers. It affirmed that on September 29, 2014, it filed a motion for reversal with a subsidiary appeal, which had received no response at the time the lawsuit was filed. It outlined that on October 13, 2014, Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. considered that, with the delay, it had incurred a breach, warning that if the advertising display was not installed by October 15, 2014, it would terminate the contract, without prejudice to resorting to jurisdictional courts for the claim of damages. It stipulated that on October 14 of that year, it filed an extremely precautionary measure, which was granted, suspending the effects of the closure order. It added that this measure was also upheld on the merits in judgment no. 2762-2014 at 15:00 hours on October 22, 2014, of the Administrative Litigation Court, suspending the effects of the closure order. It detailed that on October 20, 2014, it received an email from the Marketing Manager of Pizza Hut (Comidas Centroamericanas S.A.), informing it of his decision to terminate the aforementioned contract, despite the advertisement being on display, and that this was due to a threatening phone call he received from the Mayor of Curridabat. It revealed that later, following a second call, the Manager requested the immediate termination of the signed advertising contract. It noted that on November 3, 2014, the contracting party Vivicom S.A. also requested the annulment of advertising contract no. C233792 in light of the uncertainty related to the aforementioned permit. It requests that the judgment declare: a) the absolute nullity of closure order no. 5456 issued by the Municipalidad de Curridabat; b) said corporation must pay the damages, interest, and indexation resulting from the closure order that caused the termination of the contracts signed with the companies Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., amounts to be calculated in the enforcement of judgment phase; c) the defendant must pay the costs of the proceeding. The defendant corporation answered in the negative. It raised the defenses of lack of standing and lack of right. The Court rejected the lack of standing defense and upheld the lack of right defense. It declared the lawsuit inadmissible. It imposed costs on the plaintiff, who, disagreeing, appeals to cassation.

**Appeal on procedural grounds** **II.-** The appellant formulates a **single charge** of this nature. It accuses that the defect of lack of reasoning has been committed. The foregoing, it says, due to the judgment's non-application of mandate 155 of the Código Procesal Civil (hereinafter CPC), which regulates the requirements that must be observed in the drafting of rulings. It points out that number 155 ibidem provides the content of the recitals (resultandos), the reasoning (considerandos), and the operative part (por tanto); however, the Court transcribes verbatim, in points IV and V of the judgment, the allegations of both parties in their entirety, a matter that should be treated synthetically in the recitals (resultandos). It says this situation generates a state of legal uncertainty and defenselessness, as there is a lack of clarity in these "essential elements." It outlines that in points IV and V, all the parties' allegations are transcribed verbatim, incurring a violation of the cited procedural rule due to non-application, which warrants the annulment of the ruling. It comments that the defect narrated in the drafting of the recitals (resultandos) was transferred to what was written by the judges in point IX called "Criterion of the Court." It explains that this section suggests the judges will resolve the merits of the matter, yet they do not do so, but instead confine themselves, within the Legal Information system, to copying multiple norms without interruption, without resolving the dispute through a coherent and harmonious interpretation of them. It considers that it does not know with certainty why the judgment makes literal quotations of multiple contradictory norms, without explaining their differences or applying a method of interpretation. It says the appealed ruling does not reveal what it thinks about advertising billboards and the competence of the entities, nor the reasons why it leaned toward one set of rules.

It alleges lack of motivation (motivación), confusing wording, and obscurity of what was decided. It stipulates that no statement of the methodology used is made, nor is a doctrinal exposition provided. It details that the judgment is devoid of any hermeneutical tool and lacks rigor because it cites multiple contradictory precepts. It considers that the reasons why the judges decided on some rules while discarding others are unknown, in breach of due process of law (debido proceso legal). It points out, without explaining why, the Court cites practically all the provisions of Decree 29253 that regulate the competence of the MOPT, but attributes these functions to the Municipality of Curridabat. It remarks that, after citing various provisions, it makes its ruling depend on canon 74 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones), attributing to the Territorial Corporation the functions established by Decree 29253. It adds that, although it informed the Court that its claim was grounded in constitutional judgment no. 2127 of March 14, 2003, as well as others from the Administrative Litigation Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), the judgment decided to disregard them without any reason.

**III.**- Regarding the **sole** procedural ground, this Chamber (resolution no. 328-F-S1-2012 of 8:50 a.m. on March 8, 2012), has indicated that motivation (motivación), in the terms of norm 137, subsection d) of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, hereinafter CPCA), should not be understood as a mechanism to question the legal foundations of the judgment. It arises when there is no motivation, either because it does not exist, or because its development is extremely confusing or contradictory, thereby preventing clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative part of the ruling, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, particularly due process and the right of defense. Thus, it is not about determining whether the judge ruled on all the claims incorporated into the process (defect of incongruence), but rather whether the judge provided the grounds upon which the corresponding decision was adopted. Likewise, it must be kept in mind that this is a ground of a procedural nature, which pertains to potential breaches of adjective provisions that regulate the procedural "iter" or the judgment, as well as the legal relationship that binds the parties and the judge within the framework of a judicial process, and from which rights and obligations derive. Accordingly, this ground should not be confused with a mechanism to discuss the application of the law or the assessment of evidence, for which the referenced Code establishes autonomous grounds (cardinal 138), as otherwise the specific cassation ground would be perverted. Regarding the specific claim, the Court cites and partially transcribes various provisions of the Construction Law, the Public Roads Law (Ley de Caminos Públicos), the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), as well as the Regulation of Rights of Way and Outdoor Advertising (Reglamento de los Derechos de Vía y Publicidad Exterior), Executive Decree 29253, of December 20, 2000. Subsequently, it states that for the installation of a billboard (valla publicitaria) facing a national route, a prior license for the commercial exercise of advertising and its registration is required, which falls under the competence of the MOPT. Likewise, it said, that Ministry is responsible for verifying the alignment or building line for reasons of road foresight for the widening of public roads, the structural design permit and its registration, the approval of the structural plans for the work, and the permit for the installation of that design. It based the foregoing on articles 1 and 28 of Decree 29253. It added that the foregoing does not invade the operative facts of article 74 of the Construction Law, insofar as any construction, whether permanent or temporary, must be executed with a license from the corresponding Municipality. It revealed that what is ordered is the technical supervision and control of outdoor advertising, as well as of the commercial advertising activity of private parties, for purposes of safety, health, comfort, and beauty, to prevent harm from being caused to neighboring properties, ensure the proper use of rights of way, respect for public domain assets, road safety norms, the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, and the right of private parties to the commercial exercise of advertising. It partially transcribed canon 52 of the same Decree, which establishes prohibitions regarding advertising signs. It continued by citing a list of factual elements, from which it highlighted that the application was returned for non-compliance with requirements, with the party being warned that, in addition to the note from the Basic Studies Unit of the MOPT, they also had to present the permit for placing a billboard from the Road Inspection Department of the MOPT. Furthermore, it said that it was warned that the plan had to clearly represent the location of the sign within the property. It explained that, in the plan in question, the responsible professional, without any objection, indicated by hand "Planta de ubicación de valla publicitaria", graphically representing the location within the lot, an inscription on which the impression of the City Council's stamp granting the construction permit appears. It stipulated that the permit was thus granted by the Municipality on August 26, 2014. It remarked that the construction rights upon which the license becomes effective were paid in favor of the Municipality (and not the MOPT) on September 2, 2014. It considered that, in this way, although it concerns a property facing a national route, this is not a permit to build a work on the national route, in the right of way, sidewalk, shoulder, much less on the roadway. For that reason, it said, it rejects the citations of resolutions and judgments invoked by the party, referring to land use, telecommunications towers, and urban ornaments, because it does not consider there to be an identity of object and cause with the case under study. It added that it is also not true that what was granted by the MOPT was a construction permit or that what was granted by the Municipality was an outdoor advertising permit. For that reason, it explained, it rejects the argument of incongruence and harm to legitimate expectations (confianza legítima), as well as the argument that the MOPT was the competent authority to approve or reject that construction permit. It also refutes that the Municipality incurred in abusive, arbitrary, disproportionate, and illegal conduct by attempting to exercise MOPT competencies. It specified that this is because it concerns a municipal administrative procedure and final, firm municipal administrative act, which is not part of the object, that is, the claim for nullity, which renders that argument futile. It also considered the request for nullity due to lack of competence of closure order no. 5456 of September 22, 2014, issued by the Inspections Department of the Territorial Corporation, to be inadmissible, following for this the principle that the accessory follows the fate of the principal, that is, that it concerns an act issued and executed on the occasion of that municipal construction permit, which was not challenged or argued for nullity due to lack of competence. It rejected the claim that the works were closed and seals were placed for non-compliance with the Municipality's Outdoor Advertising Regulation, but rather that it was for irregular conduct, in particular, the execution of works not conforming to those approved by the City Council. It also stated that it is recorded in the case file that this closure was carried out for the second time, hence it was not true that construction work had proceeded once all legal permits were obtained. The foregoing, it stipulates, is inferred from the fact that on May 13, 2014, the Municipal Inspection had already indicated that works were being closed for lacking a municipal permit. Furthermore, it indicated that the plaintiff did not prove that the Billboard was being closed and not the construction, nor that the works had not been halted on the basis that they had already been completed, and even less that this was the product of municipal harassment, particularly by the Mayor. The foregoing, it assessed, is contradicted by the order of 3:07 p.m. on October 14, 2014, which ordered the suspension of the effects of the closure act, authorizing the continuation of the suspended works. It concluded that although it is a billboard, its structure requires excavation, earth removal, a foundation slab, column, angle irons, concrete, and a rebar frame. It said that this implies the use of water pumps and concrete mixers, for which reason it is a constructive work, over which the territorial entity has competence to grant the license, as it did, as well as to supervise its compliance (articles 74 and 81 of the Construction Law). From this perspective, it pointed out that the municipality has the power to supervise any constructive work executed in that canton, including that necessary to install billboards. Thus, it noted that the content of notification no. 5456 is lawful, making its nullity due to lack of competence inadmissible. For this Chamber, it is undeniable that the Court did provide the reasons why it deemed the claim for nullity due to lack of competence of the Municipality of Curridabat to be inadmissible. In essence, it considered that from articles 74 and 81 of the Construction Law, it is extracted that any construction carried out in the canton must have a municipal permit. In this way, the cited City Council has sufficient authority to require the construction license, consequently, also to supervise the works and, in case of non-compliance, issue a closure order. It developed a thesis to establish that billboards are constructions and therefore must be authorized and supervised by the city council. Accordingly, the ruling did have the due motivation, for which reason the allegation is unworkable.

**Appeal on the merits** **IV**.- In the **sole** grievance of this nature, the appellant for cassation claims that article 1 of the old Construction Law no. 833 of 1949 (hereinafter LC), entrusted the municipalities with the "good living of the populations", both on "public roads" and on private land, without harming the competencies that other laws granted regarding "safety, comfort, and beauty", to "other administrative bodies". It specifies that this regulation opens a door for other laws to regulate the matter. It emphasizes that for "sociological" reasons, said Law did not differentiate between cantonal and national jurisdiction over public roads, as would later be done by the General Public Roads Law no. 5060 (hereinafter LGCP). It remarks that, according to cardinal 10 of the Civil Code, precepts must be interpreted in relation to the sociological context and the social reality they regulated at the time. Thus, it states that the LGCP attributes the administration of the national road network to the MOPT, and its cantonal counterpart to the municipalities. It asserts that, furthermore, the LGCP cleared up the uncertainty of canon 1 of the LC, deciding that it corresponds to the Executive Branch to establish, via decree, the bases for the administration of the national road network which it attributes to the MOPT. It points out that article 2 of the LGCP states that city councils are the owners of the streets within their jurisdiction, while the State is the owner of all existing ones, including the public roads to be built in the future. In its opinion, a special supremacy of the State, the greater entity, is thus established over the territorial corporations—the lesser entity—regarding the national road network, which implies the exercise of imperium or unilateral action by the Executive Branch through Decrees, in order to regulate the competence of the MOPT above local governments. In its view, it is obvious that if provision 2 of the LGCP establishes an express competence of the State over the national road network, the legal and material effects of that norm are determined by Decree 29253, since it allows the Ministry to exercise a series of powers over said road system. Consequently, it affirms that there is an erroneous interpretation of the rights and powers of the MOPT and the Municipality of Curridabat by the Court, when asserting that closure order no. 5456 is lawful. It stresses that it not only poorly interprets the meaning of the regulation under discussion, but also changes the meaning they have by extrapolating the provisions of Decree 29253, transferring the powers of the MOPT to the Municipality of Curridabat. This, it claims, because there is a formal law that authorizes the Executive Branch to administer the national road network. Thus, it adds, the rights and powers of the municipalities over that road, in excess of their competence, are also a threat to private initiative regarding billboards, a situation that materialized in closure order 5456, the object of this process. It states that the competence granted to the MOPT over the national road network arises from the LGCP and MOPT Regulation 29253, a competence by subject matter, territory, and degree, which can only be extinguished by another law, currently nonexistent. Thus, it highlights that competence cannot be reformed by a normative interpretation. It mentions that the supremacy of the MOPT over national roads is also noted by mandate 19 of the LGCP, when it states: "No constructions or buildings of any type may be built facing existing or planned highways without the prior authorization of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes), nor facing neighborhood roads and streets without the written approval of the corresponding municipality. The Municipalities shall coordinate alignments facing neighborhood roads with the Ministry, which shall be the one to establish the policy most convenient to the public interest." It stresses that the intersubjective conflict that exists on this point between the MOPT and the defendant local government is apparent, because the distinct competence of one and the other is understood by differentiating between a national and a cantonal highway. It points out that said distinction is made by article 1 of the LGCP, by attributing to the MOPT the administration of the national road network and to the municipalities the cantonal road network. It considers that by not making this difference, the appealed judgment erroneously interprets the cited norm, attributing to the Municipality of Curridabat the administration of a national road network without considering the provisions of canons 1 and 2 of the LGCP and Decree 29253. It recalls that with respect to mandate 19 of the cited Decree, an erroneous interpretation is also incurred, because in harmony with the referenced norms, it should have been assessed that the MOPT is the supreme body in the matter and in this condition it is responsible for establishing the policy most convenient to the public interest. Therefore, it considers the closure order issued by the Territorial Corporation against it to be illegal and null. It indicates that if this is not a case of erroneous interpretation, then it would be a lack of application of mandate 19 of the LGCP, as well as of mandates 35 and 42 of the LGCP. It expresses that the judgment, by not taking into account canons 19 and 35 of the LGCP, which differentiate between national and neighborhood roads, simply violated them due to lack of application. It outlines that the trial judges violated article 42 of the LGCP due to lack of application, because this norm ordered that it repealed everything that opposed it, and in that sense, the LGCP, being later than the LC, repealed the competence of the municipalities over national highways, as attributed regarding billboards in precepts 1, 2, 10, 29, and 74 of that regulation. The foregoing, it expresses, also determines the lack of application of article 8 of the Civil Code, since it orders that a later law repeals the earlier one, just as determined by mandate 42 of the LGCP. It stipulates that another direct violation committed by the appealed judgment is the lack of application of MOPT Decree 29253, which regulates outdoor advertising on national roads. It says that said Decree attributes to the MOPT the administration and supervision of billboards built on public and private lands. It remarks that the MOPT is (art. 1) the only competent authority regarding billboards located on national highways, according to articles 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 18, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 56, 57, and 63 of that Regulation, a regulation which the Court violates. Concomitantly, it details that it violated Transitory XIII of the Traffic Law no. 9078, of October 4, 2012, which establishes that until special legislation is enacted to regulate outdoor visual communication on private property facing national and cantonal routes, the regulatory and supervisory bodies are determined, and Executive Decree 29253-MOPT is repealed, the MOPT shall be responsible for approving or denying the permits that are processed within a maximum period of 30 calendar days from their request. It adds that the opinion issued by the MOPT shall prevail in all cases concerning the matter facing national routes. It opines that the Regulation was the subject of an action of unconstitutionality, processed under file 01-10761-7-CO, resolved in judgment 2003-2127, in which it was indicated that the rights of way adjacent to highways and roads that form part of the national road network do not share the local character indicated by mandate 169 of the Political Constitution. It assures that it is obvious that the constitutional judgment, by dismissing the action, declared the constitutionality of MOPT Regulation 29253, with erga omnes effect (articles 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law and 8.1 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch). From that perspective, it continues, the judges violated the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality. It cites judgments from the Administrative Litigation Court in support of its thesis. It concludes that from the foregoing norms it is deduced that precepts 74 and 89 of the LC are not applicable to the case under examination.

**V.-** The Court essentially indicated that for the installation of a billboard facing a national route, a license for the commercial exercise of advertising and its registration is required, which falls under the competence of the MOPT. Likewise, it said that that entity is responsible for verifying the alignment or building line for reasons of road foresight for the widening of public roads, the structural design permit and its registration, the approval of the structural plans for the work, and the permit for the installation of that design. It based the foregoing on articles 1 and 28 of Decree 29253. However, it added that, according to article 74 of the LC, any construction requires a Municipal license. It revealed that although it concerns a property facing a national route, this is not a permit to build a work in the right of way, sidewalk, shoulder, or roadway. Thus, it rejected that the MOPT was the competent authority to approve that construction permit. Furthermore, it objected to the claim that the works had been closed and seals placed due to non-compliance with the Municipality's Outdoor Advertising Regulation, but rather for irregular constructive conduct, in particular, the execution of works not conforming to those approved by the City Council. It stated that the closed work is a construction, for which reason the Municipality has competence to grant the license, as well as to supervise its compliance (articles 74 and 81 of the Construction Law). From this perspective, it pointed out that the municipality has the power to control any constructive work executed in that canton, including that necessary to install billboards, and where appropriate, to proceed with the closure when the circumstances warrant it.

VI.- For this Chamber, the legislation in force (numeral 4 of the Law Creating the National Road Council No. 7798 of April 30, 1998, precept 2 of the LGCP, and canon 21 subsections 3 and 42 of the Urban Planning Law) delineates two types of road networks, the national network and the cantonal network. The national network is composed of primary, secondary, tertiary roads, and highways. As its owner is the State, the law has provided that its administration corresponds to the MOPT. Its design, in turn, corresponds to the National Road Council (hereinafter CONAVI). The Cantonal Network is composed of public roads not included in the national network. These may be local, unclassified roads, and local streets, whose maintenance clearly corresponds to the municipalities. As provided by Article 2 of the LGCP, the territorial corporations not only administer but are also owners of the cantonal road network. Its design shall correspond to the local governments. (See in this regard rulings of this Chamber no. 674-2013 of 9:45 a.m. on June 4, 2013, and 1448-2014 of 10:00 a.m. on November 7, 2014, among others). Now, in the present case, it is an undisputed fact that the billboard at issue in this proceeding is located in front of a national route. According to precept 227 of Law 9078, Law of Transit on Public Land Roads and Road Safety (hereinafter Transit Law), the MOPT shall regulate the cases in which road nomenclature will be installed, also being responsible for granting the respective alignment in the cases of advertising signs placed in front of national routes. In that direction, pursuant to canons 1, and 3 through 12 of Decree 29253-MOPT, "Regulation of Rights of Way and Outdoor Advertising," the installation, replacement, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of advertisements, signs, or billboards, on public or private land, or in rights-of-way, on national routes, must be processed before the MOPT. Said Ministry is the sole authority competent in matters of outdoor advertising, with the exception of areas corresponding to the Municipalities, according to the distribution of competencies established by Article 1 of the LGCP. The cited regulation finds legislative reinforcement in the line provided by Transitory XIII of the Transit Law, which states: "Until such time as special legislation is enacted regulating visual outdoor communication on private property in front of national and cantonal routes, the regulatory and supervisory bodies are determined, and Executive Decree 29253-MOPT called 'Regulation of rights of way and outdoor advertising' is repealed, the MOPT shall be responsible for approving or denying the permits processed (...). The criterion issued by the MOPT shall prevail in cases concerning the matter in front of national routes." From the foregoing it is clear that jurisdiction for advertising purposes and in matters of visual outdoor communication on national routes has been conferred by the Legal System to the MOPT. This is derived not only from the division of competencies between the cited Ministry and the Municipalities, regarding cantonal and national roads provided by the LGCP and the Urban Planning Law, but also from the special determination made by the Transit Law, which not only authorizes the MOPT to issue Regulations on the matter, but also maintains the validity of Executive Decree 29253 until special legislation regulating visual communication on land roads is enacted. Thus, even though numeral 74 of the Construction Law generally subjects construction works to local governments, it is unquestionable that, in the case of the installation, replacement, construction, reconstruction, and display of all types of advertisements, signs, or advertising billboards, on public or private land, municipal jurisdiction is reduced to cantonal routes. The foregoing because, on national routes, the cited legislation, by tacit derogation, reserves that jurisdiction exclusively to the MOPT. Interpreting that by virtue of that regulation (Construction Law of 1949), there is a residual jurisdiction attributed to local governments in this matter, through which the Municipality can intervene and close a work authorized by the MOPT, would imply emptying the abundant legislation that attributes exclusive authority in this discipline to the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation. In accordance with the above, the claim must be upheld.

VII.- The plaintiff requested that the defendant corporation be ordered to pay the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) resulting from the rescission of the contracts signed with the companies Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. caused by the closure order, plus interest, amounts to be indexed and liquidated in the execution of judgment. In the case file, it is recorded that in June 2014, Top Media signed a lease agreement for a land area with SHU NU HSIAO TSAI for the placement of a billboard for a period of five years (images 1 to 12 of the precautionary measure file). Also appearing at images 20 and 21 of the precautionary measure file (11 and 12 of the main file) are respective invoices from Top Media, dated September 27 and October 1, both of 2014, in the name of Vivicon Inmobiliaria S.A. and Centroamericana de Comidas S.A.; for the placement of advertising space in front of Taco Bell Curridabat. There is also a purchase order between Top Media and "Estructuras e Instalaciones Publicitarias S.A.," for the manufacture of a new structure, to be located in the same place, with a delivery date of September 29, 2014 (Image 10 of the main file). Having assessed the foregoing, on July 22, 2014, through official letter IVD-0750-2014, the MOPT Department of Road Inspection granted the permit for the billboard structure no. VP0001-01 054-14-RUTA 2. Likewise, on August 26, 2014, the Directorate of Urban Development and Control of the Municipality of Curridabat granted the plaintiff construction permit no. 100-2014 (fact 11 deemed accredited). However, on September 22, 2014, through notification certificate no. 5456, the Department of Inspections of the defendant Municipality notified the plaintiff of the closure of the works, arguing irregular conduct. Literally, said Territorial Corporation stated that Top Media: "4. Executed without a license works that cause harm or damage to third parties. 5. Executed works not in accordance with those approved by the Municipality. Legal references. LC 58, 89 Subsection d. LPU 57, LC 89 subsection c. By virtue of the foregoing, the undersigned MUNICIPAL INSPECTOR proceeds to: Close and place seals. Second time. OBSERVATIONS: Closed for non-compliance with the Municipality's Outdoor Advertising Regulation. -illegible- ... setback from the center of the street to the sign is 15.50 meters. Disregarded ... the plans were not found on site." (Fact 12 deemed demonstrated). On September 29, Top Media filed an appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal before the Department of Inspections of the Municipality against the referenced action, and on the following October 14, it requested a precautionary measure before the Administrative Litigation Court, which, as indicated supra, was granted that day (facts deemed proven 13 and 14). Indeed, in the order of 3:07 p.m. on October 14, 2014, the Court granted an extremely provisional precautionary measure, setting aside the closure order under review, authorizing the removal of seals and the continuation of the works. Subsequently, in resolution 2762-2014-T, of 3:00 p.m. on October 22, 2014, the Court firmly granted the precautionary measure requested by Top Media. Thus, it is clear that the works were stopped by order of the Municipality of Curridabat between September 22 and October 14, both of 2014, the date when the Court authorized the continuation of the work. Now, in the file, there is a note from the company Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., dated October 13, 2014, in which it is noted that on September 12, 2014, the plaintiff and Comidas Centromericanas signed a contract for the placement of an advertisement in front of Taco Bell in Curridabat. Said letter adds that, according to the agreement, the billboard was to be displayed starting October 1, 2014; and that, by that date, the advertising space in question had not been placed, for which reason, in its opinion, Top Media had breached the contract. In this way, it indicates that if the advertising of interest was not duly installed and displayed by October 15, 2014, it would proceed to irrevocably rescind the cited contract (note on file page 26 of the main file – image 30). According to emails from Comidas Centroamericanas dated October 18 and 19, 2014, in accordance with its desire to protect the brand and avoid conflicts with local governments, the situation with the local government forced it not to proceed with the billboard under review, unless it was presented with a document from the Mayor indicating his approval (file pages 27 to 31 of the file – images 31 to 34). Likewise, on file page 27 (image 31 of the main file), dated October 20, 2014, there is a communication from Comidas Centroamericanas in which it indicates to the plaintiff that the Mayor of Curridabat has just called to inform it that the billboard was installed, for which reason it formally requests Top Media to proceed to "take it down," as it does not want to have problems with any local government. In response that day, through the indicated medium (email at 10:58:27 am), Top Media indicates that indeed the billboard has already been dismantled; however, it clarifies, they had all the permits, including that of the Municipality of Curridabat. Then, in a note dated November 3, 2014, Vivicon requests Top Media Costa Rica "cancel contract no. C233792" corresponding to the billboard under review, the foregoing "due to the uncertainty related to the permit for said billboard, and the conflict that this has generated with the municipality." From the foregoing, this Chamber observes that it is clear that between September 22 and October 14, 2014, the Territorial Corporation of Curridabat illegitimately closed the construction works for the billboard under examination. It is equally irrefutable, according to what was stated in Considerando VI of this judgment, that the Municipality of Curridabat lacked jurisdiction to close the construction work for the advertising space under analysis. Thus, it is clear that the conduct of the Municipality of Curridabat—constituting a de facto act (vía de hecho)—namely, the closure of the construction works for placing the billboard of interest, influenced the decision of Vivicom S.A. regarding the rescission of the contract for the construction and placement of advertising space. Although it is not recorded in the case file that the Municipal Mayor indeed called the representatives of Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., it is undeniable that the works were destined to be completed by October 15, 2014, which was impossible as they were improperly stopped between September 22 and October 14, 2014. Thus, the final decision of Vivicom S.A. and Comidas Centromericanas S.A. was influenced by illegitimate acts of the territorial corporation, that is, by the illegitimate temporary closure of the construction of the advertising space, acts that evidently constitute the causal link that prevented Top Media from completing the works on time, prompting the decision of Vivicon S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. to rescind the existing contracts with the plaintiff for the placement and display of billboards for the Pizza Hut Restaurants. This because, it is reiterated, the cited administrative conducts prevented Top Media from completing its works within the contractually stipulated period, a situation that justified the rescission requested by Vivicon S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. As a consequence of the foregoing, the claim for damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) must be upheld, and the defendant Municipality must compensate for the damages caused by the illegitimate temporary closure of the billboard construction works, specifically, those derived from the contractual rescission of the agreements under review existing between the plaintiff and the companies Vivicon S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., which shall be liquidated in the execution of judgment.

VIII.- By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal filed by the plaintiff will be granted. The judgment will be quashed. Deciding on the merits, the defense of lack of right will be rejected. The lawsuit will be granted. Closure order no. 5456 issued by the Municipality of Curridabat will be annulled. Said territorial corporation is ordered to pay the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) that the closure order may have caused, whether due to the closure of the works themselves or due to the contractual rescissions caused with respect to the advertising contracts signed between the plaintiff and the companies Vivicon S.A. and Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., amounts to be indexed plus statutory interest, which must be liquidated in the execution of judgment. Costs are to be borne by the defendant Municipality, in accordance with precept 193 of the Administrative Litigation Procedural Code.

POR TANTO

The cassation appeal is granted. The judgment is quashed. Deciding on the merits, the defense of lack of right is denied. The lawsuit is granted. Closure order no. 5456 issued by the Municipality of Curridabat is annulled. Said territorial corporation is ordered to pay the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused by the closure order of the construction works of the billboard under examination, in particular, the rescission of the existing contracts between the plaintiff and the companies Vivicon S.A. and Centroamericana de Comidas S.A., amounts to be liquidated in the execution of judgment, sums to be indexed plus interest. Costs are to be borne by the defendant Municipality.

CGZAMORA/SSOLANOA

Revisión del Documento *140086451027CA* Res: 000250-F-S1-2019 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José a las dieciséis horas seis minutos del veinte de marzo de dos mil diecinueve.

Proceso de conocimiento establecido en el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A, Goicoechea. San José; por TOP MEDIA COSTA RICA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, en adelante TOP MEDIA (anteriormente COLITE COSTA RICA, S.A.) representada por sus apoderados generalísimos sin límites de suma, Arturo Zarate Rocha y Michael Frank Donalson; contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE CURRIDABAT, representada por su Alcalde Municipal, Edgar Eduardo Mora Altamirano y su Vicealcaldesa, Alicia Borja Rodriguez. Figuran además como apoderados especiales judiciales de la parte actora, Daniel Rojas Pochet y Federico Altamura Arce, cuyas calidades no constan en autos; y de la parte demandada María Isabel Corrales Madrigal y Floribeth Calderón Marín. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad, con las salvedades hechas, abogados y vecinos de San José.

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Top Media Costa Rica S.A. (en lo que sigue Top Media) demandó a la Municipalidad de Curridabat. Manifestó, en virtud de contratos de publicidad que mantenía con las empresas Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. y Vivicom S.A. suscribió un contrato de arrendamiento con el señor SHU UN HSIAO TSAI, mediante el cual arrendó cuatro metros cuadrados de la finca de San José matrícula no. 200335-000, ubicada en Curridabat (Ruta Nacional no. 2, frente a Taco Bell Curridabat) a efecto de colocar una valla publicitaria. Aseveró, posteriormente tramitó los permisos correspondientes para la colocación ante el Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes (en adelante MOPT), órgano competente, por localizarse frente a ruta nacional. Subrayó, el 6 de marzo de 2014, el Departamento de Previsión Vial del MOPT, mediante oficio DPV-OF1181-14, le entregó el alineamiento respectivo, y el 30 de junio de 2014, mediante oficio DGIT-ED-4820-2014, la Dirección General de Ingeniería del Tránsito del MOPT, otorgó visto bueno para la colocación de la valla. Agregó, el 22 de julio de 2014, -cumplidos los requisitos-, el MOPT le concedió el permiso no. VP0001-01 054 Ruta 2, para la colocación de una estructura para valla publicitaria. Asimismo, explicó, la Municipalidad de Curridabat le concedió permiso para construirla mediante permiso de publicidad exterior no. 100-2014 emitido por la Dirección de Desarrollo y Control Urbano de ese ayuntamiento. No obstante, aclaró, el 22 de setiembre de 2014, de manera arbitraria e intempestiva, se apersonó al lugar de las obras un inspector de esa Municipalidad, quien mediante orden no. 5456, las clausuró y colocó sellos. Aseguró, lo anterior sin haber mediado ninguna notificación, argumentando la municipalidad un supuesto incumplimiento del Reglamento de Publicidad Exterior, y, amenazando incluso con llevarse detenidos a los trabajadores. Afirmó, el 29 de setiembre de 2014, interpuso recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio, sin respuesta al momento de presentar la demanda. Esbozó, el 13 de octubre de 2014, Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. consideró, con el atraso había incurrido en un incumplimiento, advirtiendo que si al 15 de octubre de 2014, la pauta publicitaria no se encontraba instalada, daría por rescindido el contrato, sin perjuicio de acudir a instancias jurisdiccionales para el reclamo de daños. Estipuló, el 14 de octubre de ese año, interpuso medida cautelar provisionalísima, la cual fue declarada con lugar, suspendiéndose los efectos de la orden de clausura. Agregó, ésta fue también acogida por el fondo en sentencia no. 2762-2014 de las 15 horas del 22 de octubre de 2014 del Tribunal Contencioso, suspendiéndose los efectos de la orden de clausura. Detalló, el 20 de octubre de 2014 recibió correo electrónico del Gerente de Mercadeo de Pizza Hut (Comidas Centroamericanas S.A.), informándole su decisión de rescindir el contrato citado, a pesar de estar la pauta en exhibición, ello a raíz de una llamada amenazante que recibió de parte del Alcalde de Curridabat. Reveló, posteriormente, ante una segunda llamada, el señor Gerente solicitó la rescisión inmediata del contrato publicitario suscrito. Acotó, el 3 de noviembre de 2014, también la contratante Vivicom S.A., solicitó anular el contrato publicitario no. C233792 ante la incertidumbre relacionada con el permiso de cita. Solicita en sentencia se declare: a) la nulidad absoluta de la orden de clausura no. 5456 emitida por la Municipalidad de Curridabat; b) dicha corporación debe pagar los daños y perjuicios, intereses e indexación producto de la orden de clausura que provocó la rescisión de los contratos suscritos con las empresas Vivicom S.A. y Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., montos a liquidar en ejecución de sentencia; c) la accionada debe pagarle las costas del proceso. La corporación accionada contestó negativamente. Opuso las excepciones de falta de: legitimación y derecho. El Tribunal rechazó la falta de legitimación, acogió la de derecho. Declaró improcedente la demanda. Impuso las costas a la actora, quien inconforme acude a casación.

Recurso por razones procesales II.- La parte recurrente formula un único cargo de esta naturaleza. Acusa se ha incurrido en el vicio de falta de motivación. Lo anterior, dice, por falta de aplicación de la sentencia, del mandato 155 del Código Procesal Civil (en adelante CPC), el cual regula los requisitos que deben observarse en la redacción de los fallos. Señala, el numeral 155 ibídem dispone el contenido de los resultandos, considerandos y el por tanto, no obstante, el Tribunal transcribe literalmente en los puntos IV y V de la sentencia, los alegatos de una y otra parte en su totalidad, tema que corresponde tratar sintéticamente en los resultandos. Dice, esta situación genera un estado de inseguridad jurídica e indefensión, pues falta claridad en esos “elementos esenciales”. Esboza, en los puntos IV y V, se transcriben literalmente todos los alegatos de las partes, incurriendo en la violación de la citada norma procesal por falta de aplicación, lo que amerita la nulidad del fallo. Comenta, el defecto narrado en la redacción de los resultandos, se trasladó a lo escrito por los jueces en el punto IX denominado “Criterio del Tribunal”. Explica, dicho apartado hace suponer que los jueces resolverán el fondo del asunto, sin embargo no lo hace, sino que se encierra, en el sistema de Información Jurídica, copiando sin interrupción múltiples normas, sin solucionar el litigio a través de una interpretación coherente y armónica de aquellas. Estima, no sabe con certeza la razón por la cual la sentencia hace citas literales de múltiples normas contradictorias, sin explicar sus diferencias ni aplicar un método de interpretación. Dice, no da a conocer el fallo recurrido lo que piensa sobre las vallas publicitarias y la competencia de las entidades, ni las razones por las cuales se inclinó por una de las reglas. Acusa falta de motivación, confusa redacción y oscuridad de lo resuelto. Estipula, tampoco se hace manifestación de la metodología utilizada, ni aporta una exposición doctrinal. Detalla, la sentencia es ayuna de una herramienta hermenéutica, y carente de rigor pues cita múltiples preceptos contradictorios. Considera, desconoce las razones por las cuales, los jueces se decidieron por unas reglas desechando otras, en quebranto del debido proceso legal. Puntualiza, sin explicar porqué, el Tribunal cita prácticamente todas las disposiciones del Decreto 29253, que regulan la competencia del MOPT, pero atribuye estas funciones a la Municipalidad de Curridabat. Comenta, tras citar diversas disposiciones, hace depender su fallo del canon 74 de la Ley de Construcciones, atribuyendo a la Corporación Territorial, las funciones que establece el Decreto 29253. Agrega, aunque hizo saber al Tribunal que su pretensión tiene fundamento en la sentencia constitucional no. 2127 de 14 de marzo de 2003, así como en otras del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, mas la sentencia decidió desaplicarlas sin motivo alguno.

III.- Tocante al único cargo procesal, esta Cámara (resolución no. 328-F-S1-2012 de las 8 horas 50 minutos del 8 de marzo de 2012), ha indicado, la motivación, en los términos de la norma 137, inciso d) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (en adelante CPCA), no debe entenderse como un mecanismo para cuestionar los fundamentos jurídicos de la sentencia. Surge cuando no hay motivación, ya sea porque no existe, o bien, por cuanto su desarrollo resulta en extremo confuso o contradictorio, de modo que impide tener claridad en cuanto a los razonamientos que derivaron en la decisión adoptada en el dispositivo del fallo, lo que vulneraría los derechos procesales de las partes, en particular, el del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa. De esa manera, no se trata de determinar si el juzgador se pronunció sobre todas las pretensiones incorporadas al proceso (vicio de incongruencia), sino por el contrario, si brindó los fundamentos sobre los cuales adoptó la decisión correspondiente. De igual forma, debe tenerse presente, se trata de un motivo de índole procesal, lo cual atañe a eventuales incumplimientos de disposiciones adjetivas que regulan el “iter” procesal o la sentencia, así como la relación jurídica que vincula a las partes y al juez en el marco de un proceso judicial, y de la cual derivan derechos y obligaciones. Así las cosas, no debe confundirse esta causal con un mecanismo para entrar a discutir la aplicación del derecho o la valoración de la prueba, para lo cual el Código de referencia establece causales autónomas (cardinal 138), ya que de lo contrario se desnaturalizaría el motivo casacional específico. Sobre el reclamo en concreto, el Tribunal cita y transcribe parcialmente diversas disposiciones de la Ley de Construcciones, de la Ley de Caminos Públicos, de la Ley de Planificación Urbana, así como el Reglamento de los Derechos de Vía y Publicidad Exterior, Decreto Ejecutivo 29253, del 20 de diciembre de 2000. Posteriormente, refiere, para la instalación de una valla publicitaria frente a ruta nacional, se requiere de previo, una licencia para el ejercicio comercial de publicidad y su registro, lo cual compete al MOPT. Igualmente, dijo, corresponde a ese Ministerio verificar el alineamiento o línea de construcción por razones de previsión vial para el ensanche de las vías públicas, el permiso de diseño estructural y su registro, la aprobación de planos estructurales de la obra, y el permiso para la instalación de ese diseño. Fundó lo anterior en los numerales 1 y 28 del Decreto 29253. Agregó, lo anterior no invade el supuesto de hecho del ordinal 74 de la Ley de Construcciones, en cuanto a que toda construcción, sea permanente o provisional, debe ejecutarse con licencia de la Municipalidad correspondiente. Reveló, lo que se dispone es la supervisión y control de orden técnico de la publicidad exterior, así como de la actividad comercial de publicidad, de los particulares, con fines de seguridad, salubridad, comodidad y belleza, para impedir, se causen perjuicios a los predios vecinos, velar por el uso adecuado de los derechos de vía, el respeto de los bienes de dominio público, las normas de seguridad vial, el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado y de los particulares al ejercicio comercial de publicidad. Transcribió parcialmente el canon 52 del Decreto ibídem, el cual establece prohibiciones en materia de anuncios publicitarios. Continuó citando un elenco de elementos fácticos, de los cuales resaltó, la solicitud fue devuelta por incumplimiento de requisitos, previniéndose a la parte, que además de la nota de la Unidad de Estudios Básicos del MOPT, debía también presentar el permiso de colocación de valla publicitaria del Departamento de Inspección Vial del MOPT. Además dijo, se le previno que el plano debía representar claramente la ubicación del rótulo dentro del terreno. Explicó, en el plano en cuestión, el profesional responsable, sin objeción alguna, indicó a mano “Planta de ubicación de valla publicitaria”, representando gráficamente la localización dentro del lote, inscripción en la cual, aparece la impresión del sello del Ayuntamiento otorgando el permiso de construcción. Estipuló, así fue otorgado el permiso por la Municipalidad el 26 de agosto de 2014. Comentó, los derechos de construcción a partir de los cuales surte eficacia la licencia, fueron cancelados a favor de la Municipalidad (y no del MOPT), el 2 de setiembre de 2014. Consideró, de esa manera, si bien se trata de un inmueble con frente a ruta nacional, no se está ante un permiso para construir obra sobre ruta nacional, en el derecho de vía, acera, espaldón, y menos sobre la calzada. Por ese motivo, dijo, rechaza las citas de resoluciones y sentencias que invoca la parte, referentes al uso de suelo, torres de telecomunicación y ornamentos urbanos, por no considerar exista identidad de objeto y causa con el caso de estudio. Añadió, tampoco es cierto que lo otorgado por el MOPT fuera un permiso de construcción ni que lo concedido por la Municipalidad fuera un permiso de publicidad exterior. Por ese motivo explicó, rechaza el argumento de incongruencia y lesión a la confianza legítima, así como que fuera el MOPT el competente para aprobar o rechazar ese permiso de construcción. Refuta además que la Municipalidad haya incurrido en una actuación abusiva, arbitraria, desproporcional e ilegal al pretender ejercer competencias del MOPT. Especificó, ello por cuanto se trata de un procedimiento administrativo y acto administrativo municipal, final y firme, que no forma parte del objeto, esto es, de la pretensión de nulidad, lo cual torna estéril ese argumento. También consideró improcedente la solicitud de nulidad por incompetencia de la orden de clausura no. 5456 del 22 de setiembre de 2014, emitida por el Departamento de Inspecciones de la Corporación Territorial, siguiendo para ello el principio de que lo accesorio sigue la suerte del principal, esto es, que se trata de un acto dictado y ejecutado con ocasión de ese permiso de construcción municipal, no impugnado ni argüido de nulidad por incompetencia. Rechazó que se procediera a clausurar las obras y colocar sellos, por incumplimiento del Reglamento de Publicidad Exterior de la Municipalidad, sino que fue por conductas irregulares, en particular, la ejecución de obras no conformes a las aprobadas por el Ayuntamiento. Manifestó además, que consta en autos que esa clausura se hizo por segunda vez, de ahí que no fuera cierto que se había procedido a ejecutar la construcción una vez que se contó con todos los permisos de ley. Lo anterior, estipula, se desprende del hecho de que ya el 13 de mayo de 2014, la Inspección Municipal había indicado que se clausuraban las obras por no contar con permiso municipal. Además indicó, la actora no demostró que se estuviera clausurando la Valla Publicitaria y no la construcción, tampoco, que no se hubieran paralizado las obras sobre la base de que ya se habían hecho, y menos aún, que eso fuera producto de acoso municipal, particularmente del Alcalde. Lo anterior, valoró, se contradice con el auto de las 15 horas 07 minutos del 14 de octubre de 2014, que ordenó la suspensión de los efectos del acto de clausura, autorizando continuar con los trabajos suspendidos. Concluyó, si bien es una valla publicitaria, su estructura requiere excavación, remoción de tierra, placa de fundación, columna, angulares, concreto y una armadura de varilla. Dijo, ello implica el uso de bombas de agua y batidoras de concreto, por lo cual es una obra constructiva, sobre la cual el ente territorial tiene competencia para otorgar la licencia, como lo hizo, así como para fiscalizar su cumplimiento (numerales 74 y 81 de la Ley de Construcciones). Desde esa óptica, apuntó, el municipio tiene potestad para fiscalizar toda obra constructiva que se ejecute en ese cantón, incluida la necesaria para instalar vallas publicitarias. De tal suerte, acotó, el contenido de la notificación no. 5456, se encuentra ajustado a derecho, resultando improcedente su nulidad por incompetencia. Para esta Cámara, resulta innegable, el Tribunal si brindó las razones por las cuales estimó improcedente el reclamo de nulidad por incompetencia de la Municipalidad de Curridabat. En lo medular, consideró, de los numerales 74 y 81 de la Ley de Construcciones, se extrae, cualquier construcción que se realice en el cantón debe contar con un permiso municipal. De esa manera, el Ayuntamiento de cita, cuenta con facultad suficiente para exigir la licencia de construcción, consecuentemente, también para fiscalizar las obras y en caso de incumplimiento, dictar una orden de clausura. Elaboró tesis a fin de establecer que las vallas publicitarias son construcciones de ahí que deban ser autorizadas y fiscalizadas por el ayuntamiento. Así las cosas, el fallo si contó con la debida motivación, por lo cual, resulta inatendible el alegato.

Recurso por el fondo IV.- En el único agravio de esta naturaleza, la casacionista acusa, el numeral 1º de la vieja Ley de Construcciones no. 833 de 1949 (en adelante LC), encargó a las municipalidades el “buen vivir de las poblaciones”, tanto en las “vías públicas”, como en los terrenos privados, sin perjudicar las competencias que otras leyes otorgaran en materia de “seguridad, comodidad, y belleza”, “a otros órganos administrativos”. Precisa, esta normativa abre una puerta para que otras leyes regulen el tema. Enfatiza, por razones “sociológicas” dicha Ley no diferenció entre jurisdicción cantonal y nacional de las vías públicas, como lo hiciera posteriormente la Ley General de Caminos Públicos no. 5060 (en lo que sigue LGCP). Comenta, conforme al cardinal 10 del Código Civil, los preceptos deben interpretarse en relación con el contexto sociológico y la realidad social que en su momento regularon. Así, manifiesta, la LGCP atribuye la administración de la red vial nacional al MOPT, y de su similar cantonal a las municipalidades. Asevera, además la LGCP despejó la incertidumbre del canon 1º de la LC, decidiendo que corresponde al Poder Ejecutivo establecer vía decreto, las bases de la administración de la red vial nacional que atribuye al MOPT. Apunta, el numeral 2 de la LGCP, refiere que los ayuntamientos son los titulares de las calles de su jurisdicción, mientras el Estado lo es de todas las existentes, incluso los caminos públicos que se construyan en el futuro. En su opinión, se establece así una supremacía especial del Estado, ente mayor, sobre las corporaciones territoriales, -ente menor-, respecto de la red vial nacional, lo que implica el ejercicio de imperio o actuación unilateral del Poder Ejecutivo mediante Decretos, con el fin de regular la competencia del MOPT por encima de los gobiernos locales. En su criterio, es obvio que si la disposición 2 de la LGCP dispone una competencia expresa del Estado sobre la red vial nacional, los efectos jurídicos y materiales de esa norma quedan determinados por el Decreto 29253, por cuanto permite al Ministerio ejercer una serie de potestades sobre dicho sistema vial. En consecuencia, afirma, se está ante una interpretación errónea de derechos y potestades del MOPT y de la Municipalidad de Curridabat, por parte del Tribunal, al asegurar que la orden de clausura no. 5456 se ajusta a derecho. Recalca, no solo interpreta mal el sentido de la regulación de comentario, sino que cambia el sentido que tienen, al extrapolar las disposiciones del Decreto 29253, trasladando las potestades del MOPT a la Municipalidad de Curridabat. Ello, reclama, por cuanto existe una ley formal que autoriza al Poder Ejecutivo a administrar la red vial nacional. De esa suerte, añade, los derechos y potestades de las municipalidades sobre esa vía, en exceso de su competencia, son también una amenaza a la iniciativa privada en materia de vallas publicitarias, situación que se materializa en la orden de clausura 5456, objeto de este proceso. Refiere, la competencia otorgada al MOPT sobre la red vial nacional nace la de la LGCP y el Reglamento 29253 MOPT, competencia por materia, territorio y grado, que solo puede extinguir otra ley, hoy inexistente. Así, destaca, una competencia no puede ser reformada por una interpretación normativa. Menciona, la supremacía del MOPT sobre las vías nacionales, también la hace notar el mandato 19 de la LGCP, al indicar: “No podrán hacerse construcciones o edificaciones de ningún tipo frente a las carreteras existentes o en proyecto, sin la previa autorización del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, ni al frente de los caminos vecinales y calles sin la aprobación escrita de la Municipalidad correspondiente. Las Municipalidades coordinarán los alineamientos frente a los caminos vecinales con el Ministerio quien será el que establezca la política, más conveniente al interés público”. Recalca, el conflicto intersubjetivo que existe en este punto entre el MOPT y el gobierno local demandado es aparente, porque la distinta competencia de uno y otro, se comprende al diferenciar entre carretera nacional y cantonal. Apunta, dicha distinción la realiza el numeral 1º de la LGCP, al atribuir al MOPT la administración de la red vial nacional y a las municipalidades la cantonal. Considera, al no hacer esta diferencia, la sentencia recurrida interpreta en forma errónea la norma de cita, atribuyendo a la Municipalidad de Curridabat la administración de una red vial nacional sin considerar lo dispuesto en los cánones 1 y 2 de la LGCP y el Decreto 29253. Recuerda, en cuanto al mandato 19 del Decreto citado, también se incurre en interpretación equivocada, porque en armonía con las normas de referencia, debió valorarse que el MOPT es el órgano supremo en la materia y en esta condición le corresponde establecer la política más conveniente al interés público. Por lo tanto considera ilegal y nula la orden de clausura girada por la Corporación Territorial en su contra. Indica, de no estarse ante errónea interpretación, se estaría ante falta de aplicación del mandato 19 de la LGCP, así como de los mandatos 35 y 42 de la LGCP. Expresa, la sentencia al no tomar en cuenta los cánones 19 y 35 de la LGCP, que diferencia entre carreteras nacionales y vecinales, simplemente los violó por falta de aplicación. Esboza, los jueces de instancia violaron el numeral 42 de la LGCP por falta de aplicación, por cuanto esta norma dispuso que derogaba todo lo que se le oponía y en ese sentido, la LGCP, por ser posterior a la LC, derogó la competencia de las municipalidades sobre carreteras nacionales, como aparece atribuida en materia de vallas publicitarias, en los preceptos 1, 2, 10, 29 y 74 de esa normativa. Lo anterior, expresa, también determina la falta de aplicación del numeral 8 del Código Civil, toda vez que dispone que una ley posterior deroga la anterior, tal y como lo determinó el mandato 42 de la LGCP. Estipula, otra violación directa cometida por la sentencia recurrida es la falta de aplicación del Decreto 29253 MOPT, el cual reglamenta la publicidad exterior en las vías nacionales. Dice, dicho Decreto atribuye al MOPT la administración y fiscalización de las vallas publicitarias que se construyan en los terrenos públicos y privados. Comenta, el MOPT es (art 1º) la única autoridad competente en materia de vallas publicitarias ubicadas en las carreteras nacionales, según los numerales 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 18, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 56, 57, y 63 de ese Reglamento, normativa que quebranta el Tribunal. En forma concomitante, detalla, violó el transitorio XIII de la Ley de Tránsito no. 9078, de 4 de octubre de 2012, el cual establece, hasta tanto no se promulgue una legislación especial que regule la comunicación visual exterior en propiedad privada frente a las rutas nacionales y cantonales, se determinen los órganos reguladores y supervisores y no se derogue el Decreto Ejecutivo 29253-MOPT, el MOPT se encargará de aprobar o denegar los permisos que se tramiten, en un plazo máximo de 30 días naturales desde su solicitud. Agrega, el criterio emitido por el MOPT prevalecerá en todos los casos concernientes a la materia frente a las rutas nacionales. Opina, el Reglamento fue objeto de una acción de inconstitucionalidad, tramitada en expediente 01-10761-7-CO, resuelta en fallo 2003-2127, en el cual se indicó que los derechos de vía que colindan con carreteras y caminos que forman parte de la red vial nacional, no participan del carácter de local que indica el mandato 169 de la Constitución Política. Asegura, es obvio que la sentencia constitucional al declarar sin lugar la acción, declaró la constitucionalidad del Reglamento 29253 MOPT, con eficacia erga ommes (ordinales 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y 8.1 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). Desde esa óptica, prosigue, los juzgadores quebrantaron los principios de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, seguridad jurídica e igualdad. Cita sentencias del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo en apoyo de su tesis. Concluye, de las anteriores normas se deduce, los preceptos 74 y 89 de LC no son aplicables al caso de examen.

V.- El Tribunal en lo medular indicó para la instalación de una valla publicitaria frente a ruta nacional, se requiere una licencia para el ejercicio comercial de publicidad y su registro, lo cual compete al MOPT. Igualmente, dijo, corresponde a esa entidad verificar el alineamiento o línea de construcción por razones de previsión vial para el ensanche de las vías públicas, el permiso de diseño estructural y su registro, la aprobación de planos estructurales de la obra, y el permiso para la instalación de ese diseño. Fundó lo anterior en los numerales 1 y 28 del Decreto 29253. No obstante, agregó, conforme al ordinal 74 de la LC, toda construcción requiere licencia Municipal. Reveló, si bien se trata de un inmueble con frente a ruta nacional, no se está ante un permiso para construir obra en el derecho de vía, acera, espaldón, o calzada. Así, rechazó que fuera el MOPT el competente para aprobar ese permiso de construcción. Además, objetó que se hubiese procedido a clausurar las obras y colocar sellos, por incumplimiento del Reglamento de Publicidad Exterior de la Municipalidad, sino por conductas constructivas irregulares, en particular, la ejecución de obras no conformes a las aprobadas por el Ayuntamiento. Manifestó, la obra clausurada es una construcción, por lo cual la Municipalidad tiene competencia para otorgar la licencia, así como para fiscalizar su cumplimiento (numerales 74 y 81 de la Ley de Construcciones). Desde esa óptica, apuntó, el municipio tiene potestad para controlar toda obra constructiva que se ejecute en ese cantón, incluida la necesaria para instalar vallas publicitarias y en su caso, proceder a la clausura cuando las circunstancias lo ameriten.

VI.- Para esta Sala la legislación vigente, (numeral 4 de la Ley de Creación del Consejo Nacional de Vialidad No. 7798 del 30 de abril de 1998, el precepto 2 de la LGCP, y canon 21 incisos 3 y 42 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana), deslinda dos tipos de redes viales, la red nacional y la red cantonal. La red nacional está compuesta por las carreteras primarias, secundarias, terciarias y las autopistas. Como su titular es el Estado, la ley ha dispuesto que su administración corresponde al MOPT. El diseño por su parte, le corresponderá al Consejo Nacional de Vialidad, (en lo sucesivo CONAVI). La Red Cantonal está compuesta por los caminos públicos que no se encuentran incluidos en la red nacional. Estos pueden ser vecinales, no clasificados y calles locales, cuyo mantenimiento corresponde claramente a las municipalidades. Según lo dispone el artículo 2 de la LGCP, las corporaciones territoriales no solo administran sino que son también propietarias de la red vial cantonal. Su diseño le corresponderá a los gobiernos locales. (Ver en ese sentido los fallos de esta Sala no. 674-2013 de las 9 horas 45 minutos del 4 de junio de 2013 y 1448-2014 de las 10 horas del 7 de noviembre de 2014, entre otros). Ahora bien, en la especie es un hecho no controvertido, la valla publicitaria objeto del presente proceso está ubicada frente a una ruta nacional. Según el precepto 227 de la Ley 9078, Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres y Seguridad Vial, (en adelante Ley de Tránsito), el MOPT reglamentará los casos en que se instalará la nomenclatura vial, correspondiéndole también otorgar el alineamiento respectivo en los casos de rótulos publicitarios colocados frente a rutas nacionales. En esa dirección, conforme a los cánones 1º, y del 3 al 12 del Decreto 29253-MOPT, “Reglamento de los Derechos de Vía y Publicidad Exterior”, la instalación, sustitución, construcción, reconstrucción y exhibición de todo tipo de anuncios, rótulos o vallas, en terrenos públicos o privados, o en los derechos de vía, en rutas nacionales, deberán tramitarse ante el MOPT. Dicho Ministerio es la única autoridad competente en materia de publicidad exterior, con excepción de las áreas que corresponden a las Municipalidades, según la distribución de competencias establecida por el artículo 1° de la LGCP. La regulación de cita encuentra refuerzo legislativo en la línea dispuesta por el Transitorio XIII de la Ley de Tránsito, el cual indica: “Hasta tanto no se promulgue una legislación especial que regule la comunicación visual exterior en propiedad privada frente a las rutas nacionales y cantonales, se determinen los órganos reguladores y supervisores y no se derogue el Decreto Ejecutivo 29253-MOPT denominado "Reglamento de los derechos de vía y publicidad exterior", el MOPT se encargará de aprobar o denegar los permisos que se tramiten (…). El criterio emitido por el MOPT prevalecerá en los casos concernientes a la materia frente a las rutas nacionales.” De lo expuesto es claro, la competencia para fines publicitarios y en materia de comunicación visual exterior en rutas nacionales ha sido conferida por el Ordenamiento Jurídico al MOPT. Esto se extrae no solo de la división competencial entre el Ministerio de cita y los Ayuntamientos, respecto de vías cantonales y nacionales dispuesta por la LGCP y la Ley de Planificación Urbana, sino de la determinación especial que realiza la Ley de Tránsito, la cual no solo autoriza al MOPT a emitir Reglamentación sobre la materia, sino que mantiene la vigencia del Decreto Ejecutivo 29253 hasta tanto no se emita legislación especial que regule la comunicación visual en vías terrestres. De esa suerte, aún y cuando el numeral 74 de la Ley de Construcciones, sujeta en su generalidad las obras constructivas hacia los gobiernos locales, resulta incuestionable, tratándose de la instalación, sustitución, construcción, reconstrucción y exhibición de todo tipo de anuncios, rótulos o vallas publicitarias, en terrenos públicos o privados, la competencia municipal se reduce a las rutas cantonales. Lo anterior por cuanto, en las nacionales, la legislación de cita, por derogación tácita, reserva esa competencia exclusivamente al MOPT. Interpretar que en virtud de esa normativa (Ley de Construcciones de 1949), existe una competencia residual atribuida a los gobiernos locales en esta temática, a través de la cual, el Municipio puede irrumpir y clausurar una obra autorizada por el MOPT, implicaría vaciar de contenido la copiosa legislación que atribuye potestad exclusiva en esa disciplina, al Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. Acorde a lo expuesto, el cargo deberá ser acogido.

VII.- La accionante solicitó condenar a la corporación demandada al pago de los daños y perjuicios, producto de la rescisión de los contratos suscritos con las empresas Vivicom S.A. y Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. que causó la orden de clausura, mas intereses, sumas a indexar y liquidar en ejecución de sentencia. En la especie consta que en junio de 2014, Top Media suscribió con SHU NU HSIAO TSAI, un contrato de arrendamiento de un área de terreno para la colocación de una valla publicitaria por un periodo de cinco años (imágenes 1 al 12 del expediente de la medida cautelar). Igualmente aparecen a imágenes 20 y 21 del expediente de medida cautelar (11 y 12 de expediente principal), sendas facturas de Top Media, fechadas 27 de setiembre y 1º de octubre, ambas de 2014, a nombre de Vivicon Inmobiliaria S.A. y Centroamericana de Comidas S.A.; por la colocación de pauta publicitaria frente a Taco Bell Curridabat. También obra orden de compra entre Top Media y “Estructuras e Instalaciones Publicitarias S.A.”, por fabricación de estructura nueva, a ubicar en el mismo lugar, cuya fecha de entrega es el 29 de setiembre de 2014 (Imagen 10 del expediente principal). Valorado lo anterior, el 22 de julio de 2014, mediante oficio IVD-0750-2014, el Departamento de Inspección Vial del MOPT concedió el permiso para estructura de valla publicitaria no. VP0001-01 054-14-RUTA 2. Asimismo, el 26 de agosto de 2014, la Dirección de Desarrollo y Control Urbano de la Municipalidad de Curridabat, otorgó a la accionante el permiso de construcción no. 100-2014 (hecho 11 tenido por acreditado). No obstante, el 22 de setiembre de 2014, mediante cédula de notificación no. 5456, el Departamento de Inspecciones del Municipio accionado, notificó a la actora la clausura de las obras, argumentando conductas irregulares. En lo literal indicó dicha Corporación Territorial que Top Media: “4. Ejecutó sin licencia obras que causen perjuicio o daños a terceros. 5. Ejecutó obras no conforme a las aprobadas por la Municipalidad. Referencias legales. LC 58, 89 Inc. d. LPU 57, LC 89 inciso c. En virtud de lo anterior, el suscrito INSPECTOR MUNICIPAL procede a: Clausurar y colocar sellos. Segunda vez. OBSERVACIONES: Se clausura por incumplimiento al Reglamento de Publicidad Exterior de la Municipalidad. -ilegible- ...retiro de centro de calle a rótulo son 15,50 mts. Irrespetado ... los planos no se encontraron en el sitio." (Hecho 12 tenido por demostrado). El 29 de setiembre Top Media interpuso ante el Departamento de Inspecciones de la Municipalidad un recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio, en contra de la actuación referida y el 14 de octubre siguiente, gestionó medida cautelar ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, la cual como se indicara supra, fue acogida ese día (hechos tenidos por probados 13 y 14). En efecto, en auto de las 15 horas 7 minutos del 14 de octubre de 2014, el Tribunal otorgó medida cautelar provisionalísima, dejando sin efecto la orden de clausura de examen, autorizando la remoción de sellos y la continuación de las obras. Posteriormente, en resolución 2762-2014-T, de las 15 horas del 22 de octubre de 2014, el Tribunal otorgó en firme la medida cautelar solicitada por Top Media. Así es claro, las obras estuvieron detenidas por orden de la Municipalidad de Curridabat, entre el 22 de setiembre y el 14 de octubre, ambos de 2014, data cuando el Tribunal autorizó la continuación de las labores. Ahora bien, en el expediente obra nota de la empresa Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., fechada 13 de octubre de 2014, en la cual se hace ver que el 12 de setiembre de 2014, la actora y Comidas Centromericanas suscribieron un contrato para la colocación de un anuncio publicitario frente a Taco Bell de Curridabat. Agrega dicha misiva, que conforme a lo pactado, la valla debía exhibirse a partir del 1º de octubre de 2014; y que, a esa data la pauta en cuestión no había sido colocada, por lo cual, en su opinión, Top Media había incumplido el contrato. De esa manera, indica, que si la propaganda de interés no se encuentra debidamente instalada y exhibida el día 15 de octubre de 2014, se procedería a rescindir irrevocablemente el contrato citado (nota de folio 26 del expediente principal – imagen 30). Según correos electrónicos de Comidas Centroamericanas fechados el 18 y 19 de octubre de 2014, conforme a su deseo de proteger la marca y evitar conflictos con los gobiernos locales, la situación con el gobierno local le obliga a no seguir adelante con el tema de la valla de examen, a menos que le fuera presentado documento del Alcalde indicando su aprobación (folios 27 a 31 del expediente- imágenes 31 a 34). Asimismo, en el folio 27 (imagen 31 del expediente principal), fechada 20 de octubre de 2014, obra comunicado de Comidas Centroamericanas en el cual indica a la actora, que le acaba de llamar el señor Alcalde de Curridabat para informarle que la valla fue instalada, por lo cual, formalmente le solicita a Top Media, proceder a “bajarla”, pues no quiere tener problemas con ningún gobierno local. En respuesta de ese día, por el medio indicado, (correo electrónico de las 10:58:27 am) Top Media indica que efectivamente la valla ha sido ya desmantelada, sin embargo, aclara, contaban con todos los permisos incluyendo el del Municipio de Curridabat. Luego, en nota del 3 de noviembre de 2014 Vivicon solicita a Top Media Costa Rica “anular el contrato no. C233792” correspondiente a la valla en estudio, lo anterior “a causa de la incertidumbre relacionada con el permiso de dicha valla, y el conflicto que esto ha generado con la municipalidad”. De lo anterior, observa esta Cámara, es claro que entre el 22 de setiembre y el 14 de octubre de 2014, la Corporación Territorial de Curridabat clausuró en forma ilegítima las obras constructivas de la valla publicitaria objeto de examen. Igualmente resulta irrefutable, acorde a lo expuesto en el considerando VI de esta sentencia, la Municipalidad de Curridabat carecía de competencia a fin de clausurar las labores constructivas de la pauta publicitaria de análisis. Así es claro, la conducta del Municipio de Curridabat, -constitutiva de una vía de hecho-, a saber, clausura de las obras constructivas para la colocación de la valla publicitaria de interés, incidió en la decisión de Vivicom S.A. en torno a rescindir el contrato de construcción y colocación de pauta publicitaria. Si bien no consta en la especie, que en efecto, el Alcalde Municipal haya llamado a los personeros de Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., es indudable que las obras estaban destinadas a concluirse el 15 de octubre de 2014, lo cual resultó imposible pues estuvieron indebidamente detenidas entre el 22 de setiembre y el 14 de octubre de 2014. Así, la decisión final de Vivicom S.A. y Comidas Centromericanas S.A. se vió influenciada por actos ilegítimos de la corporación territorial, esto es, por el cierre temporal ilegítimo de la construcción de la pauta publicitaria, actos que evidentemente constituyen el nexo causal que impidió a Top Media la conclusión en tiempo de las obras, motivando la decisión de Vivicon S.A. y Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., en cuanto a rescindir los contratos existentes con la accionante para la colocación y exhibición de vallas publicitarias de los Restaurantes Pizza Hut. Ello en el tanto, se reitera, las conductas administrativas de cita, impidieron a Top Media, concluir sus obras en el plazo contractualmente previsto, situación que justificó la rescisión solicitada por Vivicon S.A. y Comidas Centroamericanas S.A. Consecuencia de lo anterior, el reclamo por daños y perjuicios deberá ser acogido, debiendo la Municipalidad demandada indemnizar los daños provocados por la clausura temporal ilegítima de las obras de construcción de la valla publicitaria, específicamente, los derivados de la rescisión contractual de los convenios de estudio, existentes entre la actora y las empresas Vivicon S.A. y Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., los cuales deberán liquidarse en ejecución de sentencia.

VIII.- En mérito de lo expuesto, se declarará con lugar el recurso interpuesto por la accionante. Se casará la sentencia. Fallando por el fondo, se rechazará la defensa de falta de derecho. De declarará con lugar la demanda. Se anulará la orden de clausura no. 5456 emitida por la Municipalidad de Curridabat. Se condena a dicha corporación territorial al pago de los daños y perjuicios que la orden de clausura hubiese provocado, sea por el cierre de las obras en sí, como por las rescisiones contractuales provocadas respecto de los contratos publicitarios suscritos entre la accionante y las empresas Vivicon S.A. y Comidas Centroamericanas S.A., sumas a indexar mas intereses de ley, que deberán ser liquidadas en ejecución de sentencia. Son las costas a cargo del Ayuntamiento demandado, conforme al precepto 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

POR TANTO

Se acoge el recurso de casación. Se casa la sentencia. Fallando por el fondo, se deniega la defensa de falta de derecho. Se declara con lugar la demanda. Se anula la orden de clausura no. 5456 emitida por la Municipalidad de Curridabat. Se condena a dicha corporación territorial al pago de los daños y perjuicios provocados por la orden de clausura de las obras de construcción de la valla publicitaria de examen, en particular, la rescisión de los contratos existentes entre la actora y las empresas Vivicon S.A. y Centroamericana de Comidas S.A., montos a liquidar en ejecución de sentencia, sumas a indexar mas intereses. Son las costas a cargo de la Municipalidad demandada.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya William Molinari Vílchez Yazmín Aragón Cambronero Maribel Seing Murillo CGZAMORA/SSOLANOA