Prescription of Local Taxes — Business License Tax and Biodiversity StampPrescripción de tributos locales — impuesto de patentes y timbre de biodiversidad

IV.- Synopsis of what occurred. From the list of proven facts, it is established that by official letter DGT-PF-452-2016 dated May 28, 2016, the Tax Management Department (Departamento de Gestión Tributaria) of the Municipality of San José (Municipalidad de San José) notified the plaintiff of the failure to file sworn tax returns for the commercial patent tax (impuesto de patente comercial) for the years 2009-2010-2011-2012-2013-2014, granting a period of 10 business days to submit documentation. After several requests for an extension for that submission, it was definitively filed on July 5, 2016. Subsequently, through official letter DGT-PF-797-2016 of September 2, 2016, the Tax Management Department determined the existence of a tax debt by estimating that the taxable base used for the calculation of the patent tax corresponding to the fiscal periods 2009-2010-2011-2012-2013 and 2014 was not updated by the taxpayer (contribuyente), and therefore there was an unpaid difference of ¢22,619,703.96 for the concept of commercial patent and ¢392,768.83 for the 2% biodiversity stamp (timbre de biodiversidad), for a total of ¢23,012,472.79, plus respective interest. In a motion for revocation (recurso de revocatoria), the plaintiff requested the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the taxes, fines, and interest for the 2009 and 2010 periods in accordance with numeral 73 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), as well as the statute of limitations of the taxes, interest, and fines for the 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 periods of the biodiversity stamp, in accordance with ordinals 51 and 55 of the CNPT [...]

V.- Regarding the ruling on the statute of limitations. Applicable regime. A first aspect that necessarily must be addressed refers to the statute of limitations regime applicable to the tax relations under dispute. In that regard, in the challenge of September 26, 2016, the company requested the statute of limitations of the taxes, fines, and interest for the 2009 and 2010 periods in accordance with numeral 73 of the Municipal Code. Likewise, the statute of limitations of the taxes, interest, and fines for the 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 periods of the biodiversity stamp, in accordance with ordinals 51 and 55 of the CNPT. This requires analyzing the statute of limitations regime applicable to each of those taxes. As a general guideline, it must be noted that, in accordance with the provisions of canon 40 of the CNPT, the material obligation to pay taxes must be satisfied within the deadlines set by the respective law creating the specific tax burden. In the absence thereof, that same rule states: "... When the tax law does not set a deadline for paying the tax, it must be paid within the fifteen business days following the date on which the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation occurs." It likewise specifies that for other payments for taxes resulting from determinative resolutions (resoluciones determinativas) of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), the payment must be made within the period of thirty business days following the date on which the taxpayer (sujeto pasivo) has been (validly) notified of their obligation. In any case, regarding interest, that same rule specifies that they must be calculated from the date on which the tax should have been paid, on the understanding that in cases where the determinative resolution or those addressing appeal measures filed against that final determinative act have been issued outside the due legal period, the calculation of interest is suspended during the period by which its issuance was exceeded. That is to say, both the payment of the principal and its interest is imposed from the moment the law so indicates, or in its absence, fifteen business days following the material configuration of the taxable event. Under that understanding, it is at that moment that the enforceability of said material duty of the taxpayer is established. Now then, the very Legal System (Ordenamiento Jurídico) imposes the prescriptibility of tax obligations, an aspect that must be regulated by law in each specific case, in the absence of which, one must resort to the generic rules imposed by the CNPT. This latter normative source, it is insisted, applicable as a general rule, save for a special rule setting a different period for the exercise of determinative powers regarding a specific tax, indicated, in its original version, that the right (power) of the Tax Administration to determine the obligation was barred by the statute of limitations within a period of three years, with the same period operating to demand payment of the tax and its financial returns. In cases of taxpayers or responsible parties not registered with the Tax Authority (Fisco), or those who, being registered, had failed to file sworn tax returns (declaraciones juradas), that period was extended to five years. That rule was later reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 7900 of August 3, 1999, moving to the following wording:

"Article 51.- Statute of Limitations Terms The action of the Tax Administration to determine the obligation prescribes at three years. The same term applies to demanding payment of the tax and its interest.

The term indicated above is extended to five years for taxpayers or responsible parties not registered with the Tax Administration or those who are registered but have filed returns classified as fraudulent or have not filed the sworn tax returns. The provisions contained in this article must be applied to each tax separately." As can be observed, it maintained the three- and five-year terms, but expanded the previous version in the assumptions that gave rise to the application of the aggravated period, to impose that treatment on the failure to register, inaction in filing returns, as well as the filing of returns that are classified as fraudulent. Subsequently, with the issuance of Law No. 9069 of September 10, 2012, that rule is reformed, and it moves, in its current version, to a prescriptive period of four years, which is extended to ten years in the same cases of failure to register, lack of declaration, or declaration classified as fraudulent. The current version of that precept reads:

"Article 51.- Statute of Limitations Terms The action of the Tax Administration to determine the obligation prescribes at four years. The same term applies to demanding payment of the tax and its interest.

The term indicated above is extended to ten years for taxpayers or responsible parties not registered with the Tax Administration, or those who are registered but have filed declarations classified as fraudulent, or have not filed the sworn tax returns.

The provisions contained in this article must be applied to each tax separately." On the other hand, prior to the reform made by Article 16 of Law No. 9416 of December 14, 2016, the calculation of that statute of limitations period ran from January first of the year following the one in which the tax was to be paid, according to the prior regulation of Article 52 ejusdem. With said reform, at present, the start of that calculation (dies a quo) is from the first day of the month following the date on which the tax must be paid. As can be observed, that prescriptive treatment operates both for the principal obligation (tax) and for its interest. Furthermore, it is clear that this time regime applies both to the power to determine tax obligations and to demanding payment of those obligations from the taxpayer. For these purposes, it is necessary to point out that determination, as a power, consists of the act that declares the existence and amount of a tax credit or its non-existence. Indeed, precept 121 of the CNPT so imposes. Now then, in the case of municipal taxes, the former numeral 73 of the Municipal Code regulated that those obligations prescribe in five years. It is worth highlighting that as of the issuance of Law No. 9542 "Law for the Strengthening of the Municipal Police" (Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Policía Municipal), of April 23, 2018, that numbering was shifted, such that to date, that mandate 73 became ordinal 82, maintaining the same wording. Ergo, the subject of the statute of limitations of municipal tax relations, having a rule that imposes a special period, is governed by that ordinance, which is imposed, by the criterion of specialty, over the periods established by ordinal 51 of the CNPT. From this angle of analysis, it is clear that the Municipal Code sets a single applicable period as a limit on the exercise of the powers of determination and demand of tax obligations, without specifying or distinguishing conduct of the taxpayer, as the CNPT indeed regulates. Given this, two alternatives arise that are debated in this dispute; on the one hand, starting from the impossibility of integrating numeral 82 of the Municipal Code with any other statute of limitations rule, understanding that it is a special rule that makes no distinction regarding the taxpayer's conduct in order to establish separate statute of limitations treatments, or, opting for normative integration by understanding that the municipal rule contains a gap regarding the negligent and irregular conduct of the taxpayer regarding the duty to declare and register. It is on this last particular aspect that the dilemma must be centered. The first position would give equal treatment to the various assumptions concerning the tax behavior of the taxpayer, without making any difference. The second, for its part, would have as a categorical value of interpretation the safeguarding of the due fulfillment of those formal duties, as a platform for the due exercise of tax oversight powers. However, the regulatory specificity makes it unfeasible to extend to the local regime the various assumptions of the aggravated statute of limitations regime regulated by the CNPT, given that in light of that special rule, a partial complementation with that general regulation is not appropriate. Thus, specifically, in taxes whose statute of limitations regime is governed by the rules of Article 51 of the CNPT, the power to determine the tax obligation, as well as to demand compliance with formal and material duties, terminates in four years, except in the cases where that rule establishes the applicability of the broadened ten-year regime. Whereas for local taxes, save for a rule to the contrary, the applicable rules are those established by ordinal 82 (formerly 73) of the Municipal Code, a hypothesis in which a single five-year prescriptive period applies, without there being a special period for other assumptions. Regarding the starting point for local taxes, the regulations of the Municipal Code do not specify the starting point of the prescriptive calculation, reason for which, in that matter, given that gap, in accordance with ordinals 7 and 9 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the supplementary application, by affinity of matter, of the CNPT is feasible. Such regulatory integration and complementation would be equally feasible in matters of the fiscal power of the Municipalities, in what is not expressly regulated by special law, provided that it does not involve components of the tax obligation that are subject to the legal reserve imposed, as a maxim, by ordinal 5 in relation to 61 of the CNPT. The foregoing implies that due to not having its own rule, in local taxes, the statute of limitations runs from the first day of the month following the date on which the tax should have been duly satisfied. With that preamble, we enter into the examination of the taxes under debate.

VI.- Patent tax of San José.

In this case, the statute of limitations of the fiscal periods 2009 and 2010 of the patent tax of San José is debated, given that in light of the request filed at the administrative stage, the Municipality (Ayuntamiento) denied that grievance, estimating that as it involved tax relations in which the duty to declare had been omitted, the extended ten-year statute of limitations rule regulated by ordinal 51 of the CNPT was applicable. Regarding that debate, a first aspect that must be clear is that the substantial content of the tax applicable to the periods in question is not debated in any way. Hence, any analysis of the regulation of the various elements of the alluded tax is futile. Nevertheless, it is worth specifying that Law No. 5694 of June 9, 1975 regulates matters related to the patent tax for the exercise of a for-profit activity (actividad lucrativa) in the Central Canton of San José (Cantón Central de San José). Ordinal 1 of that law establishes the taxable event of the tax, while assigning that local entity the competence to set said fiscal charge. From the review of that legal framework, it does not appear that it contains a special rule regulating matters concerning the statute of limitations of that type of local tax, therefore, the criteria of normative complementation that must be applied lead to the conclusion that, given the municipal nature of the tax in question, the statute of limitations rule to be integrated is that of the regulation closest by specialty of the matter. It being a tax matter, but also local, it is ordinal 82 (formerly 73) of the Municipal Code, the rule that regulates that aspect, without the CNPT regulation possibly being imposed. In that context, the statute of limitations that operates with respect to those taxes is five years.

Now then, it is necessary to establish the moment at which the tax obligation arises, which is determining for the calculation of the statute of limitations. On that question, mandate 7 of the cited Law No. 5694 states in its first paragraph:

"ARTICLE 7.- Each year, no later than January 15, the persons referred to in Article one of this law shall file, before the Municipality of San José, a sworn tax return indicating the amount of sales or gross income and the quarterly tax that must be paid for the concept of patent, in accordance with Article 14 of this law. (...)" For the purposes of determining the tax in question, ordinal 10 ibidem establishes that in the event of omission of declaration by the patent holder (patentado), the previous year's classification shall apply, unless the need to reclassify the respective patent is established. Likewise, canon 10 of that legal source confers authorization to the local entity to verify the accuracy of the data provided before the Directorate General of Taxation (Dirección General de Tributación), so that, if an alteration of the data provided by the patent holder is determined, and with it, an incorrect categorization, the Municipality is empowered to carry out the corresponding reclassification. The foregoing is explained by the circumstance that the tax rate is imposed based on the categorization regulated by precept 17 of that law, and on the basis of the criteria or factors that numeral 5 of that rule indicates for the imposition. For its part, that precept clarifies that the tax must be paid quarterly, according to the assessment made based on the information provided for each period. The foregoing implies that the Municipality, as manager of the tax under examination, constitutes a Tax Administration, in accordance with what is defined by numeral 99 of the CNPT, a rule that defines that term as the "... administrative body responsible for managing and overseeing taxes, whether it is the Tax Authority or other public entities that are active subjects (sujetos activos), pursuant to Articles 11 and 14 of this Code." It is notorious that, to the extent that the local entity is the creditor of the patent tax, the Municipality of San José is the sole competent entity to carry out the actions of oversight, determination, collection, and in general, management of that tax. Now then, according to that regulatory synopsis, although patent returns must be filed no later than January 15 of each year, the fact of the case is that the payment of the tax is quarterly. Thus, it is from the first day of the month following the date on which each payment should have been made, that the five-year statute of limitations period established by numeral 82 of the Municipal Code runs, that is, the five-year statute of limitations period for carrying out tax determinations for that concept.

VII.- [...] Indeed, the reform to numeral 51 of the CNPT that provided for the extension of the period in light of omissions of declaration, registration, or fraudulent declaration, from five years to ten years, occurred with the issuance of Law No. 9069 of September 10, 2012. That is to say, that aggravated treatment would only pertain to taxes or tax relations in which the tax obligation was considered configured as of the entry into force of such precept. In this way, given that the periods for which the declaration of statute of limitations is requested correspond to 2009 and 2010, the rule imposed by the reform of Law No. 9069 is not applicable to these. Hence, the supplementary application carried out by the local entity retroactively applies that regulation, to the detriment of ordinal 34 of the Magna Carta (Carta Magna). Thus, even assuming the applicability of the debated supplementary application, the regime in force at the date of the events regulated those declaration omissions with a statute of limitations of five years, precisely the same period established by canon 82 of the Municipal Code, formerly 73 at that date. Therefore, being the same time framework, the same result would be obtained, by the application of either one rule or the other, and in that sense, the release from the obligations claimed by the plaintiff and the corresponding nullity of the act that ordered the rejection of the statute of limitations for those periods would be appropriate.

VIII.- On the subject of the biodiversity stamp. Regarding this point, the plaintiff argues that regarding the taxes not collected for the biodiversity stamp, the Administration did not state its position, leaving her defenseless (indefensión). In that case, the three-year statute of limitations applies because it was the rule in force at the time and the most favorable one. She reproaches that by not answering the request for the statute of limitations of the biodiversity stamp tax, as well as not answering the request for interest, they leave her in a state of defenselessness. Regarding those allegations, it should be noted that in official letter DGT-PF-797-2016 of September 2, 2016, the Tax Management Department determined a debt of ¢392,768.83 for the 2% biodiversity stamp, due to the omissions of declaration of the patent tax for the periods 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. For those effects, at folios 159 and 160 of the administrative file, it presents a detail of that calculation. In the motion of September 26, 2016, the applicant alleges the statute of limitations for the 2009 to 2012 periods of the biodiversity stamp, in accordance with Article 51 of the CNPT, which for those periods set a three-year period. In resolution DGT-013-2-2017 of February 13, 2017, regarding the motion for revocation, a formal analysis is made, after which, the court enters into the merits of the matter, recounting the allegations of the appellant, pointing out that the first refers to the statute of limitations of the patent tax and the second, that related to the biodiversity stamp. Then, it enters into the analysis of those first and second points and concludes on their impropriety by estimating the ten-year statute of limitations provided for in ordinal 51 of the CNPT to be applicable. This is recorded on the reverse of folio 177 of the administrative file. The foregoing allows this Court (Tribunal) to establish that, contrary to what the claimant company asserts, that act does not incur the alleged defect related to the failure to rule on the request to declare the 2009 to 2012 periods of the Biodiversity Stamp (Timbre de Biodiversidad) barred by the statute of limitations, given that by estimating that in light of the credited omission of declaration, the aggravated statute of limitations indicated supra operated, such a matter was improper. The same occurs in official letter 156-CAJ-2016 of February 28, 2017, from the Commission on Legal Affairs (Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos), an act which, in the first considerando (considerando primero), point 2, points out the allegation of that preclusion and which, again, is dismissed in the third considerando (considerando tercero). This is recorded at folios 188 and 189 of the administrative file. As has been noted, this position was adopted by the Municipal Council of San José (Concejo Municipal de San José) through agreement 25, Article IV of ordinary session No. 049 of April 4, 2017, an act that therefore gives the same treatment to that issue. From that viewpoint, the defenselessness alleged is not produced since the inconsistency alleged by the plaintiff does not exist, given that, contrary to what she asserts, those conducts were manifested expressly with respect to the entirety of her allegations. In those terms, the rejection of said charge must be ordered. It is worth highlighting that this alleged omission of resolution is the only defect alleged regarding the subject of the cited fiscal instrument, so that, in order to canon 119 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), this analysis must be limited to that matter." The same term applies for demanding payment of the tax and its interest.

The aforementioned term is extended to five years for taxpayers or responsible parties not registered with the Tax Administration, or for those who are registered but have filed declarations classified as fraudulent or have not filed sworn declarations. The provisions contained in this article must be applied to each tax separately." As can be seen, it maintained the three- and five-year periods, but expanded the previous version regarding the circumstances giving rise to the application of the aggravated period, to impose that treatment in cases of omission of registration, failure to file declarations, as well as filing declarations that are classified as fraudulent. Subsequently, with the issuance of Law No. 9069 of September 10, 2012, that rule is reformed and shifts, in its current version, to a statute of limitations period of four years, which is extended to ten years in the same cases of omission of registration, lack of declaration, or declaration classified as fraudulent. The current version of that precept reads:

"**Article 51.- Statute of Limitations Terms** The action of the Tax Administration to determine the obligation prescribes in four years. The same term applies for demanding payment of the tax and its interest.

The aforementioned term is extended to ten years for taxpayers or responsible parties not registered with the Tax Administration, or for those who are registered but have filed declarations classified as fraudulent, or have not filed sworn declarations.

The provisions contained in this article must be applied to each tax separately." On the other hand, prior to the reform carried out by Article 16 of Law No. 9416 of December 14, 2016, the computation of that statute of limitations period ran from January first of the year following that in which the tax was due, according to the prior regulation of Article 52 *ejusdem*. With said reform, currently, the start of that computation (*dies a quo*), is from the first day of the month following the date on which the tax must be paid. As can be observed, that prescriptive treatment operates both for the principal obligation (tax) and for its interest. Moreover, it is clear that this temporality regime applies both to the power to determine tax obligations, as well as to demand payment of those obligations from the taxpayer. For these purposes, it is necessary to point out that determination, as a power, consists of the act that declares the existence and amount of a tax credit or its non-existence. This is indeed mandated by precept 121 of the CNPT. Now, in the case of municipal taxes, the former numeral 73 of the Municipal Code regulated that those obligations prescribe in five years. It should be noted that as of the issuance of Law No. 9542 "Law on Strengthening the Municipal Police," of April 23, 2018, that numbering was shifted, such that to date, that mandate 73 became ordinal 82, maintaining the same wording. Ergo, the issue of the statute of limitations of municipal tax relationships, having a rule that imposes a special period, is governed by that ordinance, which applies, by the criterion of speciality, over the periods established by ordinal 51 of the CNPT. From that angle of analysis, it is clear that the Municipal Code sets a single applicable period as a limitation on the exercise of the determinative powers and the power to demand tax obligations, without specifying or distinguishing behaviors of the taxpayer, as the CNPT indeed regulates. In view of this, two alternatives arise that are debated in this dispute; on the one hand, starting from the impossibility of integrating numeral 82 of the Municipal Code with any other statute of limitations rule, understanding that it is a special rule that does not distinguish regarding the taxpayer's conduct in order to establish separate statute of limitations treatments, or alternatively, opting for normative integration, understanding that the municipal rule contains a gap concerning the taxpayer's omissive and irregular conduct regarding the duty to declare and register. It is on this last aspect in particular that the dilemma must be focused. The first position would give equal treatment to the various assumptions concerning the taxpayer's fiscal behavior, without making any distinction. The second, for its part, would have as a categorical interpretive value the safeguarding of the proper fulfillment of those formal duties, as a platform for the proper exercise of tax oversight powers. However, the regulatory specificity makes it unviable to extend to the local regime the various assumptions of the aggravated statute of limitations regime regulated by the CNPT, given that in the face of this special rule, a partial complementation with that general regulation is not appropriate. Thus, specifically, in taxes whose statute of limitations regime is governed by the rules of Article 51 of the CNPT, the power to determine the tax obligation, as well as to demand compliance with formal and material duties, expires in four years, except in cases where that rule sets the applicability of the extended ten-year regime. Whereas for local taxes, unless a rule provides otherwise, the applicable rules are those established by ordinal 82 (formerly 73) of the Municipal Code, a hypothesis in which a single five-year statute of limitations period applies, without there being a special period for other assumptions. Regarding the starting point for local taxes, the regulations of the Municipal Code do not specify the starting point of the prescriptive computation, which is why, in that matter, given this gap, in accordance with ordinals 7 and 9 of the General Law of Public Administration, the supplementary application, by affinity of the matter, of the CNPT is feasible. Such normative integration and complementation would be equally feasible in matters of the fiscal power of the Municipalities, in matters not expressly regulated by special law, provided that they are not components of the tax obligation that are subject to the legal reserve imposed, as a maxim, by ordinal 5 in relation to 61 of the CNPT. The foregoing implies that, due to lacking its own rule, in local taxes, the statute of limitations runs from the first day of the month following the date on which the tax should have been duly satisfied. With that preamble, we proceed to the examination of the taxes under debate.

**VI.- San José business license tax.** In the instant case, the statute of limitations for fiscal periods 2009 and 2010 of the San José business license tax is debated, given that in response to the petition filed at the administrative level, the City Council denied that grievance, considering that since it involved tax relationships in which the duty to declare had been omitted, the extended statute of limitations rule of ten years regulated by ordinal 51 of the CNPT was applicable. Regarding that debate, a first aspect that must be clear is that the substantial content of the tax applicable to the periods in question is not debated in any way. Hence, any analysis of the regulation of the various elements of the referred tax is futile. Nonetheless, it is worth specifying that Law No. 5694 of June 9, 1975 regulates matters relating to the business license tax for the exercise of lucrative activity in the Central Canton of San José. Ordinal 1 of that law sets the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax, while assigning to that local entity the competence to set said tax burden. From the review of that legal framework, it does not appear that it contains a special rule regulating what corresponds to the statute of limitations of that type of local tax; therefore, the criteria of normative complementation that must be applied lead to the conclusion that, given the municipal nature of the tax in question, the statute of limitations rule to be integrated is that of the regulation closest by speciality of the matter. Being a tax matter, but also local, ordinal 82 (formerly 73) of the Municipal Code is the rule regulating that aspect, without the regulation of the CNPT being able to be imposed. In that context, the statute of limitations operating with respect to those taxes is five years.

Now, it is necessary to establish the moment when the tax obligation arises, which is decisive for computing the statute of limitations. On that question, mandate 7 of the aforementioned Law No. 5694 states in its first paragraph:

"ARTICLE 7.- Each year, no later than January 15, the persons referred to in Article One of this law shall submit, to the Municipality of San José, a sworn declaration indicating the amount of gross sales or income and the quarterly tax they must pay for business license fees, in accordance with Article 14 of this law. (...)" For the purpose of determining the tax in question, ordinal 10 *ibídem* establishes that in the event of the licensee's omission of declaration, the previous year's classification shall be applied, unless the need to reclassify the respective business license is established. Likewise, canon 10 of that legal source grants authorization to the local entity to verify the accuracy of the data provided with the Dirección General de Tributación, so that, if an alteration of the data provided by the licensee is determined, and with it, an incorrect categorization, the Municipality is empowered to carry out the corresponding reclassification. This is explained by the circumstance that the tax rate is imposed based on the categorization regulated by precept 17 of that law, and based on the criteria or factors for the imposition indicated by numeral 5 of that rule. For its part, that precept clarifies that the tax must be paid quarterly, according to the assessment made based on the information provided for each period. The foregoing implies that the Municipality, as manager of the tax under examination, constitutes a Tax Administration, in accordance with what is defined by numeral 99 of the CNPT, a rule that defines that term as "... the administrative body responsible for managing and overseeing taxes, whether it is the treasury or other public entities that are active subjects, in accordance with Articles 11 and 14 of this Code." It is notorious that, to the extent that the local entity is the creditor of the business license tax, the Municipality of San José is the sole competent authority to carry out the actions of oversight, determination, collection, and in general, management of that tax. Now, according to said regulatory synopsis, although the business license declarations must be filed no later than January 15 of each year, the truth of the matter is that the payment of the tax is quarterly. Thus, it is from the first day of the month following the date on which each payment should have been made, that the five-year statute of limitations period established by numeral 82 of the Municipal Code runs, that is, the five-year statute of limitations period for making tax determinations for that concept.

VII.- [...] In effect, the reform to numeral 51 of the CNPT that ordered the extension of the period in the face of omissions of declaration, registration, or fraudulent declaration, from five years to ten years, was with the issuance of Law No. 9069 of September 10, 2012. That is to say, that aggravated treatment would only pertain to taxes or tax relationships in which the tax obligation was deemed configured as of the entry into force of such precept. Thus, since the periods over which the declaration of statute of limitations is requested correspond to 2009 and 2010, the rule imposed by the reform of Law No. 9069 is not applicable to them. Hence, the supplementary application made by the local entity applies that regulation retroactively, to the detriment of ordinal 34 of the Magna Carta. Thus, even assuming the appropriateness of the debated supplementary application, the regime in force at the date of the facts regulated those omissions of declaration with a five-year statute of limitations, exactly the same period established by canon 82 of the Municipal Code, formerly 73 at that data. Therefore, being the same temporality framework, the same result would be obtained by the application of one rule or the other, and in that sense, the release from the obligations claimed by the petitioner and the corresponding annulment of the act that ordered the rejection of the statute of limitations for those periods would be applicable.

**VIII.- On the issue of the biodiversity stamp.** Regarding this point, the plaintiff argues that concerning the taxes not collected on the biodiversity stamp, the Administration did not express itself, leaving her defenseless. In that case, the three-year statute of limitations applies because it is the rule in force at the time and the most favorable. She reproaches that by not answering the petition for the statute of limitations of the biodiversity stamp tax, as well as not answering the petition for interest, she is left in a state of defenselessness. **Regarding those allegations, it should be noted** that in official communication DGT-PF-797-2016 of September 2, 2016, the Tax Management Department ordered a debt of ¢392,768.83 for the 2% biodiversity stamp, due to omissions in the declaration of the business license tax for periods 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. For these purposes, at folios 159 and 160 of the administrative file, it presents a detail of that calculation. In an appeal of September 26, 2016, the petitioner alleges the statute of limitations for periods 2009 to 2012 of the biodiversity stamp, according to Article 51 of the CNPT, which for those periods established a three-year period. In resolution DGT-013-2-2017 of February 13, 2017, regarding the appeal for revocation, a procedural analysis is made, after which, it addresses the merits of the matter, recounting the arguments of the appellant, pointing out that the first refers to the statute of limitations for the business license tax and the second, that relating to the biodiversity stamp. Then, it proceeds to the analysis of those first and second points and concludes on their inadmissibility, considering the ten-year statute of limitations provided in ordinal 51 of the CNPT to be applicable. This is recorded at folio 177 verso of the administrative file. This allows this Court to establish that, unlike what the claimant company argues, that act does not incur the alleged defect related to the omission of a ruling on the petition to declare periods 2009 to 2012 of the Biodiversity Stamp prescribed, given that, considering that due to the accredited omission of declaration, the aggravated statute of limitations indicated *ut supra* operated, such a matter was inadmissible. The same occurs in official communication 156-CAJ-2016 of February 28, 2017, from the Legal Affairs Commission, an act that, in the first Whereas Clause, point 2, points out the allegation of that preclusion and that, again, is dismissed in the third Whereas Clause. This is recorded at folios 188 and 189 of the administrative file. As has been pointed out, this position was endorsed by the Municipal Council of San José through agreement 25, Article IV of ordinary session No. 049 of April 4, 2017, an act that therefore gives the same treatment to that issue. From that standpoint, the alleged defenselessness does not occur, since the incongruence accused by the petitioner does not exist, given that, unlike what she argues, those conducts were expressed expressly regarding the totality of her allegations. In those terms, the rejection of said charge must be ordered.

It is worth noting that this alleged omission of a resolution is the only defect claimed regarding the matter of the aforementioned tax species, and therefore, in accordance with canon 119 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, this analysis must be limited to that question." **IV.- Synopsis of what occurred.** From the list of proven facts, it is established that by official letter DGT-PF-452-2016 dated May 28, 2016, the Tax Management Department (Departamento de Gestión Tributaria) of the Municipality of San José (Municipalidad de San José) warned the plaintiff about the failure to comply with the sworn declarations (presentaciones juradas) of the commercial license tax (impuesto de patente comercial) for the years 2009-2010-2011-2012-2013-2014, granting a period of 10 business days to provide documentation. After several requests for an extension for that submission, it was finally presented on July 5, 2016. Subsequently, through official letter DGT-PF-797-2016 of September 2, 2016, the Tax Management Department determined the existence of a tax debt upon estimating that the taxable base (base imponible) used for the calculation of the license tax (impuesto de patentes) corresponding to the fiscal periods 2009-2010-2011-2012-2013 and 2014 was not updated by the taxpayer (contribuyente), and therefore there was an unpaid difference of ¢22,619,703.96 for the commercial license concept and ¢392,768.83 for the 2% biodiversity stamp (timbre de biodiversidad), for a total of ¢23,012,472.79, plus their respective interest. In a revocation appeal, the plaintiff requested the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the taxes, fines, and interest for the periods 2009 and 2010 according to numeral 73 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), as well as the statute of limitations of the taxes, interest, and fines for the periods 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 of the biodiversity stamp, according to ordinals 51 and 55 of the CNPT [...]

**V.- Regarding the ruling on the statute of limitations. Applicable regime.** A first aspect that necessarily must be addressed refers to the statute of limitations regime applicable to the fiscal relationships under dispute. In that order, in the challenge of September 26, 2016, the company requested the statute of limitations of the taxes, fines, and interest for the periods 2009 and 2010 according to numeral 73 of the Municipal Code. Likewise, the statute of limitations of the taxes, interest, and fines for the periods 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 of the biodiversity stamp, according to ordinals 51 and 55 of the CNPT. This requires analyzing the statute of limitations regime applicable to each of those taxes. As a general guideline, it must be indicated that, in accordance with the provisions of canon 40 of the CNPT, the material obligation to pay taxes must be satisfied within the time limits set by the respective law creating the specific tax burden. Failing that, that same rule states: "*... When the tax law does not set a deadline for paying the tax, it must be paid within* *fifteen business days following the date on which the taxable event (hecho generador) of the* *tax obligation occurs.*". Similarly, it specifies that for other payments for taxes resulting from determinative resolutions of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), payment must be made within the period of thirty business days following the date on which the taxable person (sujeto pasivo) has been (validly) notified of their obligation. In any case, regarding interest, that same rule specifies that it must be calculated from the date on which the tax should have been paid, on the understanding that in cases where the determinative resolution or those addressing appealing measures filed against that final determinative act were issued outside the legal due term, the computation of interest is suspended during the period that exceeded its issuance. That is to say, both the payment of the principal and its interest are imposed from the moment the law indicates, or failing that, fifteen business days following the material configuration of the taxable event. Under that understanding, it is at that moment that the enforceability of said material duty of the taxable person is established. Now, the same Legal System imposes the statute of limitations of tax obligations, an aspect that must be regulated by law in each specific case, failing which, one must resort to the generic rules imposed by the CNPT. This last normative source, it is insisted, applicable as a general rule, unless a special rule sets a different time limit for the exercise of determinative powers regarding a specific tax, indicated, in its original version, that the right (power) of the Tax Administration to determine the obligation was subject to a statute of limitations within a period of three years, with the same period operating to demand payment of the tax and its financial returns. In the cases of taxpayers or responsible parties not registered with the Tax Authority (Fisco) or those who, being registered, had omitted the filing of sworn declarations (declaraciones juradas), that period was extended to five years. That rule was later reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 7900 of August 3, 1999, changing to the following wording:

"*Article 51.- Limitation periods. The action of the Tax Administration to determine the obligation prescribes in three years. The same term applies to demand payment of the tax and its interest.* *The aforementioned term is extended to five years for taxpayers or responsible parties not registered with the Tax Administration or for those who are registered but have filed declarations qualified as fraudulent or have not filed sworn declarations. The provisions contained in this article must be applied to each tax separately.*" As observed, it maintained the three- and five-year periods, but expanded the previous version in the assumptions that gave rise to the application of the aggravated period, to impose that treatment in the omission of registration, inertia in filing declarations, as well as the filing of declarations that are classified as fraudulent. Subsequently, with the issuance of Law No. 9069 of September 10, 2012, that rule is reformed and moves, in its current version, to a prescriptive period of four years, which is extended to ten years in the same cases of omission of registration, lack of declaration, or declaration classified as fraudulent. The current version of that precept states:

"***Article 51.- Limitation periods*** *The action of the Tax Administration to determine the obligation prescribes in four years. The same term applies to demand payment of the tax and its interest.* *The aforementioned term is extended to ten years for taxpayers or responsible parties not registered with the Tax Administration, or for those who are registered but have filed declarations qualified as fraudulent, or have not filed sworn declarations.* *The provisions contained in this article must be applied to each tax separately.*" On the other hand, prior to the reform made by Article 16 of Law No. 9416 of December 14, 2016, the computation of that prescription period ran from the first of January of the year following that in which the tax was to be paid, according to the previous regulation of Article 52 of the same legal body. With said reform, currently, the start of that computation (*dies a quo*), is from the first day of the month following the date on which the tax must be paid. As can be observed, that statute of limitations treatment operates both for the principal obligation (tax) and for its interest. On the other hand, it is clear that this regime of temporality applies both to the power to determine tax obligations and to demand that the tax obligor pay those obligations. For these purposes, it is necessary to point out that determination, as a power, consists of the act that declares the existence and amount of a tax credit or its non-existence. Indeed, precept 121 of the CNPT so imposes it. Now, in the case of municipal taxes, the previous numeral 73 of the Municipal Code regulated that those obligations prescribe in five years. It is worth noting that from the issuance of Law No. 9542 "Law for the Strengthening of the Municipal Police" (Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Policía Municipal), of April 23, 2018, that numbering was shifted, such that as of the current date, that mandate 73 became ordinal 82, maintaining the same wording. Ergo, the issue of the statute of limitations of municipal fiscal relations, having a rule that imposes a special term, is governed by that ordinance, which imposes itself, by criterion of specialty, over the terms established by ordinal 51 of the CNPT. From that angle of analysis, it is clear that the Municipal Code sets a single applicable period as a limitation on the exercise of the determinative powers and the demanding of tax obligations, without specifying or distinguishing conduct of the taxable person, as the CNPT indeed regulates. In light of this, two alternatives arise that are debated in this dispute; on the one hand, starting from the impossibility of integrating numeral 82 of the Municipal Code with any other statute of limitations rule, understanding that it is a special rule that makes no distinction regarding the conduct of the taxable person in order to establish separate statute of limitations treatments, or, opting for normative integration understanding that the municipal rule contains a gap regarding the omissive and irregular conduct of the taxable person regarding the duty of declaration and registration. It is on this last aspect in particular that the dilemma must focus. The first position would give equal treatment to the various assumptions concerning the tax behavior of the tax obligor, without making any difference. The second, for its part, would have as a categorical value of interpretation the safeguarding of the due fulfillment of those formal duties, as a platform for the due exercise of tax audit powers (potestades de fiscalización tributaria). However, the regulatory specificity makes it unfeasible to extend to the local regime the various assumptions of the aggravated statute of limitations regime regulated by the CNPT, given that in view of that special rule, a partial complementation with that general regulation is not appropriate. Thus, specifically, in taxes whose statute of limitations regime is governed by the rules of Article 51 of the CNPT, the power to determine the tax obligation, as well as to demand compliance with the formal and material duties, expires in four years, except in the cases where that rule sets the applicability of the extended ten-year regime. Whereas for local taxes, unless a rule states otherwise, the applicable rules are those established by ordinal 82 (formerly 73) of the Municipal Code, a hypothesis in which a single five-year statute of limitations period applies, without there being a special period for other assumptions. As for the starting point for local taxes, the regulations of the Municipal Code do not specify the starting point of the prescriptive computation, which is why, in that matter, given said gap, in accordance with ordinals 7 and 9 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the supplementary application, by affinity of the matter, of the CNPT is feasible. Such normative integration and complementation would be equally feasible in matters of the fiscal power of the Municipalities, in what was not expressly regulated by special law, provided that it does not involve components of the tax obligation that are subject to the legal reservation imposed, as a maxim, by ordinal 5 in relation to 61 of the CNPT. The foregoing implies that, by not having its own rule, for local taxes, the statute of limitations runs from the first day of the month following the date on which the tax should have been duly satisfied. With that preamble, we proceed to the examination of the taxes under debate.

**VI.- San José license tax.** In the case, the statute of limitations is debated for the fiscal periods 2009 and 2010 of the San José license tax (impuesto de patentes de San José), given that before the request formulated at the administrative level, the City Council (Ayuntamiento) denied that grievance, considering that in the case of fiscal relations in which the duty to declare had been omitted, the extended ten-year statute of limitations rule regulated by ordinal 51 of the CNPT was applicable. On this debate, a first aspect that must be clear is that the substantial content of the tax applicable to the periods in question is not being debated in any way. Hence, any analysis of the regulation of the various elements of the aforementioned tax is futile. Even so, it is worth specifying that Law No. 5694 of June 9, 1975 regulates matters relating to the license tax (impuesto de patente) for the exercise of for-profit activity in the Central Canton of San José (Cantón Central de San José). Ordinal 1 of that law sets the taxable event of the tax, while assigning that local entity the competence to set said fiscal burden. From the review of that legal framework, it is not apparent that it contains a special rule regulating that corresponding to the statute of limitations of that type of local tax, and therefore, the criteria of normative complementation that must be applied lead to the conclusion that, attending to the municipal nature of the tax in question, the statute of limitations rule to be integrated is that of the closest regulation by specialty of the matter. Being a tax matter, but also local, it is ordinal 82 (formerly 73) of the Municipal Code, the rule that regulates that aspect, without the regulation of the CNPT being able to be imposed. In that context, the statute of limitations that operates with respect to those taxes is five years.

Now, it is necessary to establish the moment in which the tax obligation arises, which is decisive for the computation of the statute of limitations. On this question, mandate 7 of the aforementioned Law No.

5694 states in its first paragraph:

" ARTICLE 7º.- Each year, no later than January 15, the persons referred to in article one of this law shall submit, to the Municipality of San José, a sworn declaration indicating the amount of gross sales or income and the quarterly tax to be paid for the patent (patente) concept, pursuant to article 14 of this law. (...) " For purposes of determining the tax in question, ordinal 10 ibídem establishes that in the event of the patent holder's omission of declaration, the previous year's classification shall be applied, unless it is established that the respective patent (patente) needs to be reclassified. Likewise, canon 10 of that legal source authorizes the local entity to verify the accuracy of the data provided with the Dirección General de Tributación, such that, if an alteration of the data provided by the patent holder is determined, and with it, an incorrect categorization, the Municipality is empowered to carry out the corresponding reclassification. The foregoing is explained by the circumstance that the tax rate is imposed based on the categorization regulated by precept 17 of that law, and on the basis of the criteria or factors that numeral 5 of that norm indicates for the imposition. For its part, that precept clarifies that the tax must be paid quarterly, according to the assessment made based on the information provided for each period. The foregoing implies that the Municipality, as manager of the tax under examination, constitutes a Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), in accordance with what is defined by numeral 99 of the CNPT, a norm that defines that term as the "... administrative body responsible for managing and supervising tributes, whether it is the treasury or other public entities that are active subjects, in accordance with articles 11 and 14 of this Code." It is notorious that, insofar as the local entity is the creditor of the patent tax (tributo de patentes), it is the Municipality of San José that is solely competent to carry out the actions of supervision, determination, collection, and, in general, management of that tax. Now then, according to said regulatory synopsis, although patent (patentes) declarations must be submitted no later than January 15 of each year, the truth of the matter is that the payment of the tribute is quarterly. Thus, it is from the first day of the month following the date on which each payment should have been made, that the five-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period established by numeral 82 of the Código Municipal runs, that is, the five-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period to carry out tax determinations for that concept.

VII.- [...] In effect, the reform to numeral 51 of the CNPT that ordered the extension of the period, in the face of omissions of declaration, registration, or fraudulent declaration, from five years to ten years, was with the issuance of Ley No. 9069 of September 10, 2012. That is, that aggravated treatment would only be applicable to tributes or tax relationships in which the tax obligation was considered configured as of the entry into force of such precept. Therefore, given that the periods for which the declaration of statute of limitations (prescripción) is petitioned correspond to 2009 and 2010, the rule imposed by the reform of Ley No. 9069 is not applicable to them. Hence, the supplementary application made by the local entity applies that regulation retroactively, to the detriment of ordinal 34 of the Carta Magna. Thus, even considering the appropriateness of the debated supplementary application, the regime in force at the date of the facts regulated those omissions of declaration with a five-year statute of limitations (prescripción), exactly the same period that canon 82 of the Código Municipal, formerly 73 at that time, stipulates. Therefore, the time frame being the same, the same result would be obtained by the application of one norm or another, and in that sense, the release from obligations claimed by the plaintiff and the corresponding nullity of the act that ordered the rejection of the statute of limitations (prescripción) for those periods would be appropriate.

VIII.- On the subject of the biodiversity stamp (timbre de biodiversidad). Regarding this point, the plaintiff alleges that with respect to the tributes not collected for the biodiversity stamp (timbre de biodiversidad), the Administration did not express itself, leaving her defenseless. In this case, the three-year statute of limitations (prescripción) applies because it is the norm in force at the time and the most favorable. She reproaches that by not answering the petition for the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the biodiversity stamp (timbre de biodiversidad) tax, as well as not answering the petition regarding interest, she is left defenseless. Regarding these allegations, it should be noted that in official communication DGT-PF-797-2016 of September 2, 2016, from the Departamento de Gestión Tributaria, it ordered a debt of ¢392,768.83 for the 2% biodiversity stamp (timbre de biodiversidad), due to omissions of declaration of the patent tax (impuesto de patentes) for the periods 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. For these purposes, on folios 159 and 160 of the administrative file, it presents details of that calculation. In a recourse of September 26, 2016, the petitioner alleges the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the periods 2009 to 2012 for the biodiversity stamp (timbre de biodiversidad), according to article 51 of the CNPT, which for those periods set a three-year period. In resolution DGT-013-2-2017 of February 13, 2017, as far as the appeal for revocation is concerned, a formal analysis is made, after which, the substance of the matter is addressed, recounting the appellant's arguments, noting that the first refers to the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the patent tax (impuesto de patentes) and the second, to what concerns the biodiversity stamp (timbre de biodiversidad). Then, it proceeds to the analysis of those first and second points and concludes on their inadmissibility by deeming applicable the ten-year statute of limitations (prescripción) provided for in ordinal 51 of the CNPT. This is recorded on the reverse of folio 177 of the administrative file. The foregoing allows this Tribunal to establish that, contrary to what the claiming company states, that act does not incur the imputed defect relating to the omission of a pronouncement regarding the petition to declare the periods 2009 to 2012 of the Biodiversity Stamp (Timbre de Biodiversidad) expired, since, by estimating that in the face of the accredited omission of declaration, the aggravated statute of limitations (prescripción) indicated ut supra operated, such a matter was inadmissible. The same occurs in official communication 156-CAJ-2016 of February 28, 2017, from the Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos, an act that, in the first considerando, point 2, points out the allegation of that preclusion and that, again, is declined in the third considerando. This is recorded on folios 188 and 189 of the administrative file. As has been noted, this position was adopted by the Concejo Municipal de San José through agreement 25, article IV of ordinary session No. 049 of April 4, 2017, an act that therefore, makes the same treatment on that subject. From that standpoint, the defenselessness alleged does not occur, since the incongruity accused by the plaintiff does not exist, because, contrary to what she states, those conducts were expressed expressly with respect to the totality of her allegations. In those terms, the rejection of said charge must be ordered. It is worth highlighting that this supposed omission of resolution is the only defect alleged regarding the subject of the cited tax species, so, in order with canon 119 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, this analysis must be limited to said matter.

"IV.- Sinopsis de lo acontecido. Del elenco de hechos probados se tiene que por oficio DGT-PF-452-2016 de fecha 28 de mayo del 2016, el Departamento de Gestión Tributaria de la Municipalidad de San José, advirtió a la actora sobre el incumplimiento de las presentaciones juradas del impuesto de patente comercial en los años 2009-2010-2011-2012-2013-2014, otorgando un plazo de 10 días hábiles para aportar documentación. Luego de varias solicitudes de prórroga para ese aporte, en definitiva, fue presentada el 05 de julio del 2016. De seguido, mediante el oficio DGT-PF-797-2016 del 02 de septiembre del 2016, el Departamento de Gestión Tributaria dispuso la existencia de una deuda fiscal al estimar que la base imponible utilizada para el cálculo del impuesto de patentes correspondiente a los períodos fiscales 2009-2010-2011-2012-2013 y 2014, no fue actualizada por la contribuyente, por lo que había una diferencia no cancelada por ¢22.619.703.96 por concepto de patente comercial y ¢392.768.83 del 2% del timbre de biodiversidad para un total de ¢23.012.472.79, más sus respectivos intereses. En recurso de revocatoria, la accionante solicitó la prescripción de los tributos, multas e intereses de los períodos 2009 y 2010 acorde al numeral 73 del Código Municipal, así como de los tributos, intereses y multas de los períodos 2009, 2010, 2011 y 2012 del timbre de biodiversidad, acorde a los ordinales 51 y 55 del CNPT [...]

V.- Sobre lo resuelto en torno a la prescripción. Régimen aplicable. Un primer aspecto de necesario abordaje se refiere al régimen de prescripción aplicable a las relaciones fiscales objeto de controversia. En ese orden, en impugnación del 26 de septiembre del 2016, la empresa solicitó la prescripción de los tributos, multas e intereses de los períodos 2009 y 2010 acorde al numeral 73 del Código Municipal. De igual manera, la prescripción de los tributos, intereses y multas de los períodos 2009, 2010, 2011 y 2012 del timbre de biodiversidad, acorde a los ordinales 51 y 55 del CNPT. Ello exige analizar el régimen de prescripción aplicable a cada uno de esos tributos. Como pauta general, debe indicarse que, de conformidad con lo estatuido por el canon 40 del CNPT, la obligación material de pago de los tributos, debe ser satisfecho dentro de los plazos que fije la ley respectiva de creación de la carga fiscal concreta. En su defecto, esa misma norma señala: "... Cuando la ley tributaria no fije plazo para pagar el tributo debe pagarse dentro de los quince días hábiles siguientes a la fecha en que ocurra el hecho generador de la obligación tributaria.". De igual manera precisa que los demás pagos por concepto de tributos resultantes de resoluciones determinativas de la Administración Tributaria, el pago debe concretarse dentro del plazo de treinta días hábiles siguientes a la fecha en que el sujeto pasivo ha sido notificado (válidamente) de su obligación. En todo caso, en cuanto a los intereses, esa misma norma precisa que han de calcularse desde la fecha en que el tributo debió haber sido pagado, en el entendido de que en los casos en que la resolución determinativa o las que atiendan medidas recursivas formuladas contra ese acto final determinativo, que hayan sido dictadas fuera del plazo legal debido, el cómputo de intereses se suspende durante el lapso que haya excedido en su emisión. Es decir que tanto el pago del principal como de sus intereses, se impone desde el momento en que la ley lo indique, o en su defecto, quince días hábiles siguientes a la configuración material del hecho generador. Bajo esa comprensión, es en ese momento que se establece la exigibilidad de dicho deber material del sujeto pasivo. Ahora bien, el mismo Ordenamiento Jurídico impone la prescriptibilidad de las obligaciones fiscales, aspecto que debe regularse por ley en cada caso concreto, en cuyo defecto, ha de acudirse a las reglas genéricas que impone el CNPT. Esta última fuente normativa, se insiste, aplicable como regla general, salvo norma especial que fije un plazo diverso para el ejercicio de las potestades determinativas respecto de determinado tributo, señalaba, en su versión original, que el derecho (potestad) de la Administración Tributaria para determinar la obligación, prescribía en el plazo de tres años, operando igual lapso para exigir el pago del tributo y sus réditos financieros. En los casos de contribuyentes o responsables no registrados ante el Fisco o bien, los que estando registrados, hubieren omitido la presentación de las declaraciones juradas, ese plazo se extendía a cinco años. Esa norma fue luego reformada por el artículo 1 de la Ley No. 7900 del 03 de agosto de 1999, pasando a la siguiente redacción:

"Artículo 51.- Términos de prescripción La acción de la Administración Tributaria para determinar la obligación prescribe a los tres años. Igual término rige para exigir el pago del tributo y sus intereses.

El término antes indicado se extiende a cinco años para los contribuyentes o responsables no registrados ante la Administración Tributaria o a los que estén registrados pero hayan presentado declaraciones calificadas como fraudulentas o no hayan presentado las declaraciones juradas. Las disposiciones contenidas en este artículo deben aplicarse a cada tributo por separado." Como se observa, mantuvo los plazos de tres y cinco años, pero ampliando la versión anterior en los supuestos que daban cabida a la aplicación del plazo agravado, para imponer ese tratamiento en la omisión de registro, inercia en la presentación de declaraciones, así como de presentación de declaraciones que sean calificadas como fradulentas. Posteriormente, con la emisión de la Ley No. 9069 del 10 de septiembre del 2012, esa norma es reformada y se pasa, en su versión actual, a un plazo prescriptivo de cuatro años, que se amplia a diez años en los mismos casos de omisión de registro, falta de declaración o declaración calificada como fraudulenta. Reza la versión actual de ese precepto:

"Artículo 51.- Términos de prescripción La acción de la Administración Tributaria para determinar la obligación prescribe a los cuatro años. Igual término rige para exigir el pago del tributo y sus intereses.

El término antes indicado se extiende a diez años para los contribuyentes o responsables no registrados ante la Administración Tributaria , o a los que estén registrados pero hayan presentado declaraciones calificadas como fraudulentas, o no hayan presentado las declaraciones juradas.

Las disposiciones contenidas en este artículo deben aplicarse a cada tributo por separado." Por otro lado, de previo a la reforma realizada por el artículo 16 de la Ley No. 9416 del 14 de diciembre del 2016, el cómputo de ese plazo de prescripción corría desde el primero de enero del año siguiente a aquel en que el tributo debía pagarse, acorde a la regulación previa del artículo 52 ejusdem. Con dicha reforma, en la actualidad, el inicio de ese cómputo (dies a quo), es a partir del primer día del mes siguiente a la fecha en que el tributo debe pagarse. Como puede observarse, ese tratamiento prescriptivo opera tanto para la obligación principal (tributo), como para sus intereses. Por otro lado, es claro que ese régimen de temporalidad aplica tanto para la potestad de determinar las obligaciones fiscales, así como para exigir al obligado tributario el pago de esas obligaciones. Para esos efectos, es necesario señalar que la determinación, como potestad, consiste en el acto que declara la existencia y cuantía de un crédito tributario o su inexistencia. Así en efecto lo impone el precepto 121 del CNPT. Ahora bien, tratándose de tributos municipales, el anterior numeral 73 del Código Municipal, regulaba que esas obligaciones prescriben en cinco años. Cabe destacar que a partir de la emisión de la Ley No. 9542 "Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Policía Municipal", del 23 de abril del 2018, esa numeración fue corrida, de suerte que a la fecha, ese mandato 73 pasó a ser el ordinal 82, manteniendo la misma redacción. Ergo, la temática de la prescripción de las relaciones fiscales municipales, al contar con norma que impone un plazo especial, se rige por esa ordenanza, la que se impone, por criterio de especialidad, a los plazos que estatuye el ordinal 51 del CNPT. Desde esa arista de análisis, resulta claro que el Código Municipal fija un solo plazo aplicable como limitante en el ejercicio de las potestades determinativas y de exigencia de obligaciones fiscales, sin precisar o distinguir conductas del sujeto pasivo, como en efecto lo regula el CNPT. Ante ello, surgen dos alternativas que se debaten en esta contienda; por un lado, partir de la imposibilidad de integrar el numeral 82 del Código Municipal con alguna otra norma de prescripción, al entender que se trata de norma especial que no hace distinción sobre la conducta del sujeto pasivo de cara a establecer tratamientos separados de prescripción, o bien, optar por la integración normativa al entender que la norma municipal contiene una laguna en cuanto las conductas omisivas e irregulares del sujeto pasivo en cuanto al deber de declaración y registro se refiere. Es sobre este último aspecto en particular que debe centrarse el dilema. La primer postura daría un trato paritario a los diversos supuestos atinentes al comportamiento fiscal del obligado tributario, sin hacer diferencia alguna. La segunda, por su parte, tendría como valor categórico de interpretación el resguardo del debido cumplimiento de esos deberes formales, como plataforma de un ejercicio debido de las potestades de fiscalización tributaria. Sin embargo, la especificidad regulatoria hace inviable extender al régimen local los diversos supuestos del régimen agravado de prescripción que regula el CNPT, dado que ante esa norma especial, no corresponde una complementación parcial con aquella normativa general. Así, en concreto, en los tributos cuyo régimen de prescripción se rigen por las reglas del artículo 51 del CNPT, la potestad de determinar la obligación tributaria, así como de exigir el cumplimiento de los deberes formales y materiales, fenece en cuatro años, salvo los casos en que de esa norma fija la procedencia del régimen ensanchado de diez años. En tanto que los tributos locales, salvo norma en contrario, las reglas aplicables son las establecidas por el ordinal 82 (anterior 73) del Código Municipal, hipótesis en la cual, aplica un solo plazo prescriptivo de cinco años, sin que exista un plazo especial para otros supuestos. En cuanto al punto de inicio de los tributos locales, las regulaciones del Código Municipal no precisan el punto de inicio del cómputo prescriptivo, razón por la cual, en esa materia, ante dicha laguna, de conformidad con los ordinales 7 y 9 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, es factible la aplicación supletoria, por afinidad de la materia, del CNPT. Tal integración y complementación normativa sería igualmente factible en las cuestiones de la potestad fiscal de las Municipalidades, en lo que no fuera expresamente regulado por ley especial, siempre que no se trate de componentes de la obligación tributaria que se encuentran sujetos a la reserva de ley que impone, como máxima, el ordinal 5 en relación al 61 del CNPT. Lo anterior supone que por no contar con regla propia, en los tributos locales, la prescripción corre desde el primer día del mes siguiente a la fecha en que el tributo debió haber sido satisfecho de manera debida. Con ese preámbulo, se ingresa al examen de los tributos objeto de debate.

VI.- Impuesto de patentes de San José.

En la especie, se debate la prescripción de los períodos fiscales 2009 y 2010 del impuesto de patentes de San José, siendo que ante la gestión formulada en sede administrativa, el Ayuntamiento denegó ese agravio, estimando que al tratarse de relaciones fiscales en las cuales se había omitido el deber de declarar, resultaba aplicable la regla de prescripción ampliada de diez años que regula el ordinal 51 del CNPT. Sobre ese debate, un primer aspecto que debe quedar claro, es que no se debate en modo alguno el contenido sustancial del tributo aplicable a los períodos en cuestión. De ahí que cualquier análisis a las regulación de los diversos elementos del tributo aludido, resulta fútil. Con todo, vale precisar que la Ley No. 5694 del 09 de junio de 1975 regula lo relativo al impuesto de patente por el ejercicio de actividad lucrativa en el Cantón Central de San José. El ordinal 1 de esa ley fija el hecho generador del tributo, en tanto que asigna a ese ente local la competencia para fijar dicha carga fiscal. De la revisión de ese marco legal no se desprende que contenga una norma especial que regule lo correspondiente a la prescripción de ese tipo de impuesto local, por lo cual, los criterios de complementación normativa que han de ser aplicados, llevan a que atendiendo a la naturaleza municipal del impuesto de marras, la regla de prescripción a integrar, sea la de la regulación más próxima por especialidad de la materia. Tratándose de materia tributaria, pero además local, es el ordinal 82 (anterior 73) del Código Municipal, la norma que regula ese aspecto, sin que pueda imponerse la regulación del CNPT. En ese contexto, la prescripción que opera respecto de esos tributos es de cinco años.

Ahora bien, resulta necesario establecer el momento en que surge la obligación impositiva, lo que es determinante para el cómputo de la prescripción. Sobre esa cuestión, el mandato 7 de la citada Ley No. 5694 señala en su párrafo primero:

"ARTICULO 7º.- Cada año, a más tardar el 15 de enero, las personas a que se refiere el artículo primero de esta ley presentarán, ante la Municipalidad de San José, una declaración jurada que indique el monto de las ventas o los ingresos brutos y el impuesto trimestral que deba pagar por concepto de patente, conforme al artículo 14 de esta ley. (...)" A efectos de determinar el impuesto de marras, el ordinal 10 ibídem establece que ante la omisión de declaración del patentado, se aplicará la calificación del año anterior, salvo que se establezca la necesidad de recalificar la patente respectiva. De igual manera, el canon 10 de esa fuente legal confiere autorización al ente local para verificar ante la Dirección General de Tributación, la exactitud de los datos suministrados, de modo que, si se determina alteración de datos suministrados por el patentado, y con ello, una categorización incorrecta, la Municipalidad se encuentra facultada para realizar la recalificación correspondiente. Lo anterior se explica en la circunstancia de que la tarifa del impuesto se impone con sustento en la categorización que regula el precepto 17 de esa ley, y sobre la base de los criterios o factores que para la imposición señala el numeral 5 de esa norma. Por su parte, ese precepto aclara que el impuesto debe pagarse de manera trimestral, acorde a la tasación realizada con sustento en la información aportada para cada período. Lo anterior implica que la Municipalidad en tanto gestora del impuesto bajo examen, se constituye en una Administración Tributaria, de conformidad con lo definido por el numeral 99 del CNPT, norma que define por tal término al "... órgano administrativo encargado de gestionar y fiscalizar los tributos, se trate del fisco o de otros entes públicos que sean sujetos activos, conforme a los artículos 11 y 14 del presente Código." Es notorio que, en la medida en que el ente local es el acreedor del tributo de patentes, es la Municipalidad de San José la única competente de realizar las acciones de fiscalización, determinación, recaudación y en general, gestión de ese impuesto. Ahora bien, acorde a dicha sinopsis regulatoria, si bien las declaraciones de patentes deben ser presentadas a más tardar el 15 de enero de cada año, lo cierto del caso es que el pago del tributo es trimestral. Así, es desde el primer día del mes siguiente a la fecha en que cada pago debió haber sido realizado, que corre el plazo de prescripción de cinco años que fija el numeral 82 del Código Municipal, sea, el plazo de prescripción de cinco años, para realizar determinaciones fiscales por ese concepto.

VII.- [...] En efecto, la reforma al numeral 51 del CNPT que dispuso la ampliación del plazo frente a las omisiones de declaración, registro o declaración fraudulenta, de cinco años a diez años, fue con la emisión de la Ley No. 9069 del 10 de septiembre del 2012. Es decir, ese tratamiento agravado solamente sería atinente a los tributos o relaciones fiscales en las cuales la obligación tributaria se tuviera por configurada a partir de la entrada en vigencia de tal precepto. De esa manera, siendo que los períodos sobre los cuales se peticiona la declaratoria de prescripción corresponden a 2009 y 2010, a estos no les resulta aplicable la regla impuesta por la reforma de la Ley No. 9069. De ahí que la aplicación supletoria realizada por el ente local, aplica de manera retroactiva esa normativa, en detrimento del ordinal 34 de la Carta Magna. Así, aún estimando la procedencia de la aplicación supletoria debatida, el régimen vigente para la fecha de los hechos, regulaba esas omisiones de declaración con una prescripción de cinco años, justamente el mismo plazo que estatuye el canon 82 del Código Municipal, anterior 73 a esa data. Por ende, siendo el mismo marco de temporalidad, igual resultado se obtendría, por la aplicación de una u otra norma y en ese sentido, cabría la liberación de las obligaciones reclamada por la accionante y la correspondiente nulidad del acto que dispuso el rechazo de prescripción de esos períodos.

VIII.- Sobre el tema del timbre de biodiversidad. En cuanto a este punto, la actora aduce sobre los tributos dejados de percibir sobre el timbre de biodiversidad, la Administración no se expresó, dejándole en indefensión. En ese caso se aplica la prescripción de tres años por ser la norma vigente al momento y la más favorable. Reprocha que al no contestar la petición de prescripción del tributo de timbre de biodiversidad, así como no contestar la petición de intereses, le dejan en estado de indefensión. Sobre esas alegaciones cabe señalar que en el oficio DGT-PF-797-2016 del 02 de septiembre del 2016 del Departamento de Gestión Tributaria dispuso una deuda de ¢392.768.83 del 2% del timbre de biodiversidad, por las omisiones de declaración del impuesto de patentes de los períodos 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 y 2014. Para esos efectos, a folios 159 y 160 del legajo administrativo presenta detalle de ese cálculo. En recurso del 26 de septiembre del 2016, la promovente alega prescripción de los períodos 2009 a 2012 del timbre de biodiversidad, acorde al artículo 51 del CNPT, que para esos períodos fijaba un plazo de tres años. En la resolución DGT-013-2-2017 del 13 de febrero del 2017, en cuanto al recurso de revocatoria se refiere, se hace un análisis de forma, posterior a lo cual, se ingresa al fondo del asunto, haciendo un recuento de los alegatos de la recurrente, señalando que el primero se refiere a la prescripción del impuesto de patentes y el segundo, lo relativo al timbre de biodiversidad. Luego, ingresa al análisis de esos puntos primero y segundo y concluye sobre su improcedencia al estimar aplicable la prescripción decenal prevista en el ordinal 51 del CNPT. Así consta a folio 177 vuelto del administrativo. Lo anterior permite a este Tribunal establecer que, a diferencia de lo que expone la empresa reclamante, ese acto no incurre en el vicio endilgado relativo a la omisión de pronunciamiento en torno a la petición de declarar prescritos los períodos 2009 a 2012 del Timbre de Biodiversidad, siendo que al estimar que ante la omisión de declaración acreditada, operaba la prescripción agravada señalada ut supra, tal cuestión era improcedente. Lo mismo ocurre en el oficio 156-CAJ-2016 del 28 de febrero del 2017, de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos, acto que, en el considerando primero, punto 2, señala la alegación de esa preclusión y que, nuevamente, es declinada en el considerando tercero. Así consta a folios 188 y 189 del expediente administrativo. Como se ha señalado, esta postura fue prohijada por el Concejo Municipal de San José mediante el acuerdo 25, artículo IV de la sesión ordinaria No. 049 del 04 de abril del 2017, acto que por ende, hace igual tratamiento sobre ese tema. Desde ese plano, no se produce la indefensión que se alega ya que no existe la incongruencia acusada por la accionante, por cuanto a diferencia de lo que expone, esas conductas se manifestaron de manera expresa en cuanto a la totalidad de sus alegaciones. En esos términos, debe disponerse el rechazo de dicho cargo. Vale destacar que esa supuesta omisión de resolución es el único vicio que se aduce en cuanto al tema de la citada especie fiscal, por lo que en orden al canon 119 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, debe limitarse este análisis a dicha cuestión".