Employer Continuity Between Banco de Costa Rica and BCR Pension OperatorContinuidad patronal entre Banco de Costa Rica y BCR Operadora de Pensiones

V.- Having reviewed the grievances filed by the plaintiff, and after this matter has been studied and discussed, it is the opinion of the members of this Tribunal that the Special Judicial Representative of the plaintiff is partially correct, and the judgment must be revoked, for the following reasons: Regarding the first grievance, we see two curious things in the appellant's argument; on one hand, she wants the plaintiff's employment continuity (continuidad laboral) to be recognized because when he ceased to be an employee of the Banco de Costa Rica and, after receiving his legal severance benefits to his satisfaction, he immediately continued working under new conditions which she now cites as: “it was later that he realized and was made aware that he continued to be a bank employee and that he should request the salary differences…” and as the second point of her two grievances, she indicates that she does not agree with the cost order against her since there was no bad faith in the plaintiff's actions. Quite a mess that we will try to resolve below.

REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN): The legal representative of the Banco de Costa Rica alleges in the answer to the complaint that the plaintiff's right to bring action is time-barred (prescrito); the trial judge accepts it, and the plaintiff appeals in this instance, indicating that the judge is incorrect in appreciating it in his decision. In labor law, the legal institution of negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) establishes that, in general, obligations are extinguished by the mere passage of the time provided for by the legal system, when the person who holds the enforceable right does not exercise it within the legally established period. The scholar [Name1] states that “All rights, and consequently all actions for their exercise derived from the employment contract, decline over time. It does not matter if they are non-waivable rights or rights over which one cannot validly dispose; non-waivability and imprescriptibility are different legal institutions; (...) but once the statute of limitations (prescripción) –or expiration (caducidad)– has occurred, the right has already been extinguished (...) And the prohibition of waiver refers to the express declaratory act or conduct of exercising 'the right to waive the right', not to the mere inaction that is the basis of the statute of limitations (prescripción). (...)” ([Name1] , . Derecho del Trabajo. Madrid: Civitas Ediciones, S.L., 2002, p. 520). The statute of limitations (prescripción) finds its basis in the need for society to establish clear rules for legal transactions, so that they develop within a framework of certainty and security for all participating agents, without leaving issues or matters pending for eternity (see [Name2] , [Name3]. . and [Name4] , . (1999). Derecho del Trabajo. Madrid: Editorial Centro de Estudios Ramón Areces, S.A., (7th Ed., p. 367 et seq.). In our positive law, Title Ten of the Labor Code regulates matters concerning the statute of limitations (prescripción) of workers' labor rights. As relevant, Article 602 regulates the statute of limitations period for claiming rights arising from employment contracts, setting it at one year (amended by Article 1 of Law n° 8520, of June 20, 2006), and Article 604, added by Article 2 of said law, provides the causes for interruption of the statute of limitations (prescripción) in labor matters.

In the case at hand, the appellant party argues that the statute of limitations (prescripción) on the claim did not apply by virtue of the fact that the employment relationship that the plaintiff maintained with the Banco de Costa Rica between January 1974 and October 28, 2004, did not end, although it is true that the record contains proof of the payment of severance benefits to the plaintiff and also shows that as of October 29, 2004, a new contract began with BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s.a; and she emphasizes that the bank and the company, despite belonging to the same financial conglomerate, are independent and therefore it is the same employer. In short, in her opinion, since there is employer continuity (continuidad patronal), the right claimed – derived from the first employment relationship – did not expire (prescribió). Now, both to determine whether the fatal term of the statute of limitations (prescripción) actually elapsed, and to elucidate whether it is correct to revoke the ruling regarding the supposed rights claimed, it is necessary to point out that it is impossible for a worker to receive severance benefits, start a new employment relationship under other conditions, then come and request employment continuity (continuidad laboral) and its rights without returning the benefits paid; that would be taking advantage of one's own fraud. However, the rights of employment continuity (continuidad laboral) cannot be granted without restitution of the unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía) that was paid to him in 2004; even so, it is necessary to verify whether employer continuity (continuidad patronal) existed. That is, whether the Banco de Costa Rica and BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias S. A. are, in reality, the same employer. To do this, the legal nature of the mentioned financial entity and that of the company must be analyzed.

The Political Constitution establishes in its canon 188: “The autonomous institutions of the State enjoy administrative independence and are subject to the law in matters of government. Their directors are responsible for their management.” Likewise, in the following Article (189) it is provided: “The following are autonomous institutions: 1) The State Banks; 2) The State insurance institutions; 3) Those established by this Constitution, and the new bodies that the Legislative Assembly may create by a vote of no less than two-thirds of its total members.” (Emphasis supplied by the drafter). For its part, the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional stipulates in Article 2: “The State banks listed in the preceding article are autonomous institutions under public law, with their own legal personality and independence in administrative matters. They are subject to the law in matters of government and must act in close collaboration with the Executive Branch, coordinating their efforts and activities. Decisions on the functions placed under their competence may only emanate from their respective boards of directors. In accordance with the foregoing, each bank shall have its own responsibility in the execution of its functions, which imposes on the members of the Board of Directors the obligation to act according to their criteria in the direction and administration of the bank, within the provisions of the Constitution, the pertinent laws and regulations, and technical principles, as well as the obligation to be accountable for their management, in a total and inescapable manner, in accordance with Articles 27 and 28 of this law.” Among the State banks referred to in this article is the Banco de Costa Rica. In light of the stated rules, it is inferred that these entities are part of the state sector, as they have been designated as autonomous institutions.

On the other hand, and in relation to BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s,a, it is noted that it was created under the protection of Article 55 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, No. 7732 of December 17, 1997. That canon provides the following: “Article 55.- Incorporation of companies. The Instituto Nacional de Seguros and each of the public banks are hereby authorized to incorporate respective companies, under the terms indicated in the preceding article, for the sole purpose of operating their own brokerage house (puesto de bolsa) and exclusively carrying out the activities indicated in Article 56. Likewise, they are authorized for each to incorporate an investment fund management company (sociedad administradora de fondos de inversión) and a pension operator (operadora de pensiones), under the terms established in this law and in Law No. 7523 of July 7, 1995, as applicable. In such cases, the brokerage houses, the investment fund management companies, and the pension operators must keep their operations and accounting totally independent from the institution to which they belong. This provision shall also apply to private brokerage houses, in relation to their partners and other companies belonging to the same economic interest group. The State and public institutions and companies may acquire securities, make their investments, or place their issuances through any brokerage house, without prejudice to the applicable provisions on administrative contracting.” As can be seen, the transcribed norm authorizes public banks and the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to incorporate corporations (sociedades anónimas) in three cases: to operate a brokerage house, to operate complementary pension plans, and to manage investment funds. The purpose sought by the aforementioned norm is, precisely, to allow the creation of independent legal entities, so that public entities can separate part of their assets, as well as the respective accounting, in order to maintain transparent management of resources, which is indispensable in the markets open to competition in which such companies participate.

Regarding the nature of public enterprises, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has stated: “Through the public enterprise, the Public Administration, central or decentralized, intervenes, directly or indirectly, in a market or economic sector, developing an industrial, commercial, or agricultural activity for the purpose of satisfying public ends. The basis for public initiative or intervention in the economy or the market finds its foothold in Article 50 of the Political Constitution, which establishes that 'The State shall seek the greatest well-being for all the inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth,' and in the principles of solidarity and social justice. The public enterprise, in addition to sharing the elements of any enterprise, such as the professional, habitual, and continuous development of a line of business, is characterized because the entrepreneur (owner or proprietor of an enterprise) is a Public Administration –central or decentralized–, which maintains command control, and pursues a profit motive as an instrument to satisfy certain public interests or ends. Consequently, the public enterprise has a subjective element, which is the participation of a public entity, and an objective element, which is the development of a business activity for the achievement of public ends. As for the reasons justifying the public enterprise, doctrine has offered several, such as market failures or imperfections of the competitive system, the lack of industrial or commercial enterprises of a certain magnitude and stability, the existence of natural monopolies, the production of public goods and services, the need to redistribute income, the existence of strategic sectors, etc.” (Judgment No. 1556 of 3:35 p.m. on February 7, 2007, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional).) (Emphasis supplied by the drafter).

From the foregoing, it is corroborated that BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. constitutes a public enterprise, meaning it is characterized by the provision of services in concurrence with other private parties and whose ownership –that of the public entity– is state-owned, this because it is attached to the founding entity through the ownership of shares. This also finds constitutional basis, insofar as Article 189 establishes that all insurance entities belonging to the State, from an organizational point of view, shall be autonomous institutions. It cannot be overlooked that, although the public enterprise under study is classified as “a corporation (sociedad anónima),” under no concept could it be fully equated to the figure of private law since, as the Constitutional Body points out, it does not cease to be an instrument that the legislator has made available to the autonomous entity for the achievement of its ends (see in this sense decision No. 6513-2002 of July 3, 2002, of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda)). In light of the considerations made, and pursuant to the jurisprudence of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) of the Supreme Court of Justice, it is clearly concluded that employer continuity (continuidad patronal) existed in the case under study. That is, despite the fact that the plaintiff was first hired by the Banco de Costa Rica and subsequently through the insurance broker, the employer has never ceased to be the Banco de Costa Rica, the entity for which the plaintiff currently works. Consequently, it is irrefutable that the fatal term of the statute of limitations (prescripción) invoked by the appellant did not occur; the trial judge erred in declaring it.

REGARDING THE MERITS OF WHAT WAS REQUESTED IN THIS PROCESS: The first point of the claim in the complaint is granted, as the plaintiff requested: recognition of the continuous employment relationship from January four, nineteen seventy-four, until the date the judgment becomes final. Now, within the case file, there is no evidence that would lead to the granting of salary differences, since there is an absence of proof in that regard, and in a certain way, the appellant refutes this, so points 2 to 6 must be denied. Despite what has been said, this appellate tribunal cannot overlook the fact that there was a payment of severance pay (Cesantía) by the Banco de Costa Rica to the plaintiff in 2004, since it is evident in this process that the plaintiff worked for the Banco de Costa Rica starting January 4, 1974; it is also evident that his position was restructured, and for that reason, he was dismissed and began working at BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s.a., the latter being a corporation. For this reason, he was terminated from the Banco de Costa Rica, and the sum of ¢28,363,338.40 was paid to him for severance (cesantía) as compensation for the elimination of the position he occupied, minus some deductions that he himself authorized. He was subsequently hired by BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s.a, but he never returned the amount paid for unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía). Said requirement should have been made based on Article 586, subsection b) of the Labor Code.

Consequently, it is worth noting that the Labor Code, in its Title VIII, contains special provisions for the servants of the State and its Institutions. In this regard, canon 585 defines who holds the status of a worker of the State or its Institutions, and 586 determines the rights of those public employees, establishing that they would be beneficiaries of the benefits contained in Articles 28, 29, and 31 of that normative body. In that sense, Article 585 stipulates: “A worker of the State or its Institutions is any person who provides to the former or the latter a material, intellectual, or mixed service, by virtue of an appointment issued by a competent authority or official, or by the fact of appearing on budget lists or payroll payments. Any of these latter circumstances substitutes, for all legal effects, the written employment contract.” Further on, the following Article provides, as relevant: “(…) b) Servants who benefit from this article may not occupy remunerated positions in any State agency during a period equal to that represented by the sum received as unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía). If within that period they should accept one, they shall be obliged to reimburse the Public Treasury the sums received for that concept, deducting those representing the salaries they would have earned during the term they remained unemployed (…)”.

Now, it is necessary to specify the scope of that norm, that is, to establish who its addressees are. According to Article 1 of the General Law of Public Administration, it is constituted by the State and the other public entities, each with its own legal personality and capacity under public and private law; in such a way that, in their actions, their bodies and entities can shed their sovereign powers and exercise a non-public activity, as if they were a private party, without this implying that they no longer belong to its formation. Now, in Articles 111 and following, it is indicated who are public officials, and Article 112 establishes that those who work for State enterprises shall be considered public officials for all purposes, even though they do not strictly exercise a public function, nor one governed by Public Law. In such a way that, regardless of the activity performed by them, they belong to the Public Administration.

In this line of thought, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has ruled on this matter in other similar cases and considers that the addressees of canon 586 of the Labor Code are public servants, in a broad sense and without any distinction, that is, those of the State and its Institutions, since the norm makes no exception in this regard. It would not be feasible to interpret restrictively a norm that pursues the protection of public funds and that prevents vices or abuses that could arise from the instantaneous re-entry into public service. In other words, it does not matter whether it is the central or decentralized administration, but rather, according to Article 189 of the Magna Carta and Article 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, the Banco de Costa Rica is part of the state sector, as it has been designated an autonomous institution. For its part, BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s.a. constitutes a public enterprise whose shareholding ownership falls on that financial entity and cannot be seen as an independent corporation since, as explained above, it was created as an instrument available to the bank for the achievement of its ends. Consequently, based on the state nature of the entity for which they work, the employees of state banks are workers of the State, and therefore, Article 586, subsection b) of the Labor Code is applicable to them (a circumstance within which the plaintiff finds himself). Moreover, the appellant cites judgment No. 2014-15882 of 9:20 a.m. on September 26, 2014, of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), where the case of the workers of the company BCR Valores S.A. is analyzed. In that pronouncement, it is explained that those officials, by not participating in the public management of the Administration, are governed by ordinary labor law, meaning the regulations of the Civil Service Statute are not applicable to them, but rather those of the Labor Code.

In light of the reasoning given, the undersigned judges consider that the appellant is correct in alleging continuity, and for that reason, the decision regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) must be revoked. In this regard, consider what was decided by the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) in decision 671 of June 26, 2015.

The foundation for public initiative or intervention in the economy or the market is grounded in Article 50 of the Constitution, which establishes that "The State shall strive for the greatest well-being for all the inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth," and in the principles of solidarity and social justice. The public enterprise, besides sharing the elements of any enterprise, such as the development of a business activity in a professional, habitual, and continuous manner, is characterized because the entrepreneur (the owner of an enterprise) is a Public Administration—central or decentralized—which maintains control and pursues a profit-making purpose as an instrument to satisfy certain public interests or goals. Consequently, the public enterprise has a subjective element, which is the participation of a public entity, and an objective one, which is the development of a business activity for the achievement of public purposes. As for the reasons justifying the public enterprise, legal doctrine has offered several, such as market failures or imperfections in the competitive system, the lack of industrial or commercial enterprises of a certain magnitude and stability, the existence of natural monopolies, the production of public goods and services, the need to redistribute income, the existence of strategic sectors, etc." (Judgment No. 1556 of 3:35 p.m. on February 7, 2007, of the Sala Constitucional.) (Emphasis supplied by the undersigned).

From the foregoing, it is corroborated that BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. constitutes a public enterprise, that is, one characterized by the provision of services in competition with private entities and whose ownership—that of the public entity—is of the State, given that it is attached to the founding entity by virtue of share ownership. This, moreover, has constitutional support, to the extent that Article 189 establishes that all insurance entities belonging to the State, from an organizational standpoint, shall be autonomous institutions. It cannot be overlooked that, although the public enterprise under study is classified as "a sociedad anónima (sociedad anónima)," it can under no concept be fully equated to the figure of private law because, as the Constitutional Body points out, it remains an instrument that the legislator has made available to the autonomous entity for the achievement of its ends (see in this regard resolution No. 6513-2002 of July 3, 2002, of the Sala Segunda). In light of the considerations made, and in accordance with the case law of the Sala Segunda of the Supreme Court of Justice, it is concluded that clearly there was employer continuity in the case under study. That is, despite the fact that the claimant was first hired by the Banco de Costa Rica and subsequently through the insurance broker, the employer has never ceased to be the Banco de Costa Rica, the entity for which the plaintiff currently works. Consequently, it is irrefutable that the statutory limitation period invoked by the appellant did not occur; the trial judge erred in declaring it.

REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CLAIMS IN THIS PROCEEDING: The first point of the petition in the lawsuit is granted because the plaintiff requested: recognition of the continuous employment relationship from January fourth, nineteen seventy-four, until the date of the finality of the judgment. Now, within the case file, there is no evidence whatsoever that would lead to the granting of salary differences, since there is an absence of proof in that regard and, in a certain way, the appellant refutes this, so points 2 through 6 must be denied. Despite this, this appeals court cannot disregard the fact that there was a payment of severance pay (Cesantía) by the Banco de Costa Rica to the plaintiff in 2004, since it is recorded in this process that the plaintiff worked for the Banco de Costa Rica as of January 4, 1974; it is also recorded that his position was restructured and, for that reason, he is terminated and begins working at BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s.a., the latter as a sociedad anónima. For that reason, his employment with the Banco de Costa Rica is terminated, and he was paid the sum for severance pay of ¢28,363,338.40 as compensation for the elimination of the position he held, minus some deductions that he himself authorized. Subsequently, he was hired by BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s.a., but he never returned what was paid for severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía). This requirement should have been made based on Article 586, subsection b), of the Labor Code. Consequently, it is worth noting that the Labor Code, in its Title VIII, contains special provisions for servants of the State and its institutions. In this regard, Article 585 defines who holds the condition of worker of the State or its Institutions, and Article 586 determines the rights of those public officials, establishing that they shall be recipients of the benefits contained in Articles 28, 29, and 31 of that regulatory body. In that sense, Article 585 stipulates: “Worker of the State or its Institutions is any person who provides to the former or the latter a material, intellectual, or combined service, by virtue of an appointment issued by a competent authority or official, or by the fact of appearing on budget lists or payroll payments. Any of these latter circumstances shall substitute, for all legal purposes, the written employment contract.” Further on, the following Article stipulates, as relevant: "(…) b) Servants who avail themselves of the benefits of this article may not hold remunerated positions in any dependency of the State for a period equal to that represented by the sum received as severance assistance. If within that period they should come to accept one, they shall be obligated to reimburse the Public Treasury the sums received for that concept, deducting those representing the salaries they would have earned during the term they remained unemployed (…)." Now then, it is necessary to specify the scope of that norm, that is, to establish who its recipients are. In accordance with Article 1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, it is constituted by the State and the other public entities, each with its own legal personality and capacity under public and private law; such that, in their actions, their bodies and entities may divest themselves of their sovereign powers and exercise a non-public activity, as if they were a private party, without this implying that they cease to belong to the makeup of the former. Now, in Articles 111 and following, it indicates who are public officials, and Article 112 establishes that those who perform work for State enterprises shall be considered public officials for all purposes, despite the fact that they do not exercise a public function strictly speaking, nor one adhering to Public Law. Such that, regardless of the activity performed by them, they belong to the Public Administration. In that line of reasoning, the Sala Constitucional, in other similar cases, has ruled on the matter and considers that the recipients of Article 586 of the Labor Code are public servants, in a broad sense and without any distinction, that is, those of the State and of its Institutions, since the norm makes no exception in this regard. It would not be feasible to interpret restrictively a norm that pursues the protection of public funds and that prevents vices or abuses that could arise with instantaneous re-entry into public service. In other words, it does not matter whether it concerns the central or decentralized administration, but rather that, under Article 189 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, the Banco de Costa Rica is part of the state sector, insofar as it has been designated as an autonomous institution. For its part, BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s.a. constitutes a public enterprise whose shareholding ownership falls upon that financial entity and cannot be seen as an independent sociedad anónima (sociedad anónima) since, as explained above, it was created as an instrument at the bank's disposal for the achievement of its ends. Consequently, based on the state nature of the entity for which they work, employees of state banks are workers of the State and, therefore, Article 586, subsection b), of the Labor Code is applicable to them (a circumstance within which the claimant finds himself). More abundantly, the appellant cites judgment No. 2014-15882 of 9:20 a.m. on September 26, 2014, of the Sala Constitucional, where the case of workers of the entity BCR Valores S.A. is analyzed. That pronouncement explains that those officials, by not participating in the public management of the Administration, are governed by ordinary labor law, that is, the regulations of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil are not applicable to them, but rather those of the Labor Code. In light of the reasoning provided, the undersigned female judges consider that the appellant is right in alleging continuity, and for that reason, the ruling regarding the statute of limitations must be revoked. In this regard, take into account the resolution issued by the Sala Segunda in resolution 671 of June 26, 2015.

In such cases, the brokerage houses (puestos de bolsa), the investment fund management companies, and the pension operators must keep their operations and accounting completely independent from the institution to which they belong. This provision shall also apply to private brokerage houses, in relation to their partners and to other companies belonging to the same economic interest group. The State and public institutions and enterprises may acquire securities, make their investments, or place their issues through any brokerage house, without prejudice to the applicable provisions on administrative procurement." As can be seen, the transcribed provision authorizes public banks and the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to form corporations (sociedades anónimas) in three scenarios: to operate a brokerage house, to operate supplementary pension plans, and to manage investment funds. The purpose sought by the aforementioned provision is precisely to allow the creation of independent legal entities, so that public entities can separate part of their assets, as well as the respective accounting, in order to maintain transparent resource management, which is indispensable in the competitive markets in which such companies participate.

Regarding the nature of public enterprises, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has stated: "Through the public enterprise (Empresa pública), the Public Administration, whether centralized or decentralized, intervenes, directly or indirectly, in a market or economic sector by developing an industrial, commercial, or agricultural activity with the purpose of satisfying public purposes. The basis for public initiative or intervention in the economy or the market finds support in Article 50 of the Political Constitution, which establishes that 'The State shall seek the greatest well-being for all the inhabitants of the country, organizing and stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth,' and in the principles of solidarity and social justice. The public enterprise, in addition to sharing the elements of any enterprise, such as engaging in a line of business professionally, habitually, and continuously, is characterized by the fact that the entrepreneur (the titular owner of an enterprise) is a Public Administration—central or decentralized—which maintains command and control and pursues a profit motive as an instrument to satisfy certain public interests or purposes. Consequently, the public enterprise has a subjective element, which is the participation of a public entity, and an objective element, which is the development of a business activity for the achievement of public purposes. As to the reasons that justify the public enterprise, doctrine has offered several, such as market failures or imperfections in the competitive system, the lack of industrial or commercial enterprises of a certain size and stability, the existence of natural monopolies, the production of public goods and services, the need to redistribute income, the existence of strategic sectors, etc." (Judgment No. 1556 of 3:35 p.m. on February 7, 2007, of the Constitutional Chamber.) (Emphasis supplied by the drafter).

From the foregoing, it is corroborated that BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. constitutes a public enterprise, that is, it is characterized by the provision of services in competition with other private parties and whose ownership—that of the public entity—is state-owned, this because it is attached to the founding entity through the ownership of shares. This also finds constitutional support, to the extent that Article 189 establishes that all insurance entities belonging to the State, from an organizational standpoint, shall be autonomous institutions. It cannot be overlooked that, although the public enterprise under study is classified as "a corporation," under no concept could it be fully equated to the private law figure since, as the Constitutional Body points out, it remains an instrument that the legislator has made available to the autonomous entity for the achievement of its purposes (see in this regard Resolution No. 6513-2002 of July 3, 2002, of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda)).

In light of the considerations made, and pursuant to the jurisprudence of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, it is clearly concluded that there was employer continuity (continuidad patronal) in the case under study. That is, despite the fact that the plaintiff was hired first by the Banco de Costa Rica and subsequently through the insurance broker, the employer has never ceased to be the Banco de Costa Rica, the entity for which the plaintiff currently works. Consequently, it is irrefutable that the fatal statute of limitations (prescripción) period invoked by the appellant did not occur; the lower court judge erred in declaring it.

ON THE PROPRIETY OF WHAT WAS REQUESTED IN THIS PROCEEDING: The first point of the petition of the complaint is granted because the plaintiff requested: recognition of the continuous employment relationship from January fourth, nineteen seventy-four, until the date the judgment becomes final. Now, within the case file, there is no evidence whatsoever that would lead to the granting of salary differences, since there is an absence of evidence in that regard, and in a certain way, the appellant refutes this, so points 2 through 6 must be denied.

Despite what has been said, this appellate court cannot ignore that there was a severance pay (Cesantía) payment by the Banco de Costa Rica to the plaintiff in 2004, since in this proceeding it is on record that the plaintiff worked for the Banco de Costa Rica starting January 4, 1974; it is also on record that his position was restructured and, for that reason, he was laid off and began working at BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias S.A., this being a corporation. For that reason, he was laid off from the Banco de Costa Rica, and the sum of ¢28,363,338.40 was paid to him as severance pay for indemnification due to the suppression of the position he held, minus certain deductions that he himself authorized. He was subsequently hired by BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias S.A., but he never returned what was paid as severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía). Said requirement should have been made based on Article 586, subsection b) of the Labor Code. Consequently, it is worth noting that the Labor Code, in its Title VIII, provides special provisions for servants of the State and its Institutions. In this regard, Article 585 defines who holds the status of worker of the State or its Institutions, and Article 586 determines the rights of those public officials, establishing that they would be recipients of the benefits contained in Articles 28, 29, and 31 of that normative body. In that sense, Article 585 stipulates: "A worker of the State or its Institutions is any person who provides a material, intellectual, or both types of service to the former or the latter, by virtue of an appointment issued by a competent authority or official, or by the fact of appearing on budget lists or on payroll payments. Any of these latter circumstances substitutes, for all legal purposes, the written employment contract." Further on, the following article provides, as pertinent: "(…) b) The servants who avail themselves of the benefits of this article may not hold remunerated positions in any State agency for a period equal to that represented by the sum received as severance assistance. If within that period they should accept one, they shall be obligated to reimburse the Public Treasury for the sums received for that concept, deducting those representing the wages they would have earned during the term they remained unemployed (…)." Now then, it is necessary to specify the scope of that provision, that is, to establish who its recipients are. According to Article 1 of the General Law of Public Administration, it is constituted by the State and the other public entities, each with its own legal personality and capacity under public and private law; in such a way that, in their actions, their bodies and entities may divest themselves of their sovereign powers and engage in a non-public activity, as if they were a private party, without this implying that they cease to belong to the composition of the former. Now, Articles 111 and following indicate who public officials are, and Article 112 establishes that those who perform work for State enterprises shall be considered public officials for all purposes, even though they do not strictly exercise a public function nor one governed by Public Law. In such a way that, regardless of the activity performed by them, they belong to the Public Administration.

In that line of thought, the Constitutional Chamber, in other similar cases, has ruled on this matter and considers that the recipients of Article 586 of the Labor Code are public servants, in a broad sense and without any distinction whatsoever, that is, those of the State and its Institutions, since the provision makes no exception whatsoever in this regard. It would not be feasible to interpret restrictively a provision that seeks the protection of public funds and prevents vices or abuses that could arise from instantaneous re-entry into public service. In other words, it does not matter whether it concerns the central or decentralized administration, but rather, pursuant to Article 189 of the Magna Carta and Article 2 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System, the Banco de Costa Rica is part of the state sector, insofar as it has been designated an autonomous institution. For its part, BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias S.A. constitutes a public enterprise whose shareholding ownership lies with that financial entity and cannot be seen as an independent corporation since, as explained above, it was created as an instrument available to the bank for the achievement of its purposes. Consequently, based on the state nature of the entity for which they work, the employees of state banks are workers of the State, and therefore Article 586, subsection b) of the Labor Code is applicable to them (a circumstance within which the plaintiff finds himself). To further support this, the appellant cites Judgment No. 2014-15882 of 9:20 a.m. on September 26, 2014, of the Constitutional Chamber, which analyzes the case of the workers of the company BCR Valores S.A. In that ruling, it is explained that since those officials do not participate in the public management of the Administration, they are governed by ordinary labor law, that is, the regulations of the Civil Service Statute are not applicable to them, but rather those of the Labor Code.

In light of the reasoning carried out, the undersigned judges consider that the appellant is right to claim continuity, and for that reason, what was decided regarding the statute of limitations must be revoked. In this regard, take into account what was decided by the Second Chamber in Resolution 671 of June 26, 2015."

"V.- Vistos los agravios formulados por la parte actora y, una vez que ha sido estudiado y discutido este asunto, es criterio de las integrantes de este Tribunal, que lleva razón parcialmente la Apoderada Especial Judicial de la parte actora y debe revocarse la sentencia, por los siguientes razonamientos: En cuanto al primer agravio, vemos dos cosas curiosas en la argumentación de la apelante, quiere por un lado que se le reconozca continuidad laboral al actor porque cuando dejó de ser funcionario del Banco de Costa Rica y luego de recibir a conformidad con las prestaciones legales, continuó de forma inmediata laborando bajo nuevas condiciones que ahora cita de que: “fue posteriormente cuando cae en cuenta que se le hace saber que continuaba siendo empleado bancario y que debía solicitar las diferencias salariales,…” y como segundo punto de sus dos agravios señala que no esta conforme con su condenatoria en costas pues no hubo mala fe en el actuar del actor. Menudo embrollo que se tratará de resolver a continuación. EN CUANTO A LA PRESCRIPCIÓN: El apoderado del Banco de Costa Rica alega en la contestación de la demanda que el derecho de la parte actora para accionar se encuentra prescrito, el juez de instancia lo acepta y la parte actora apela en esta instancia indicando que no lleva razón el juez al apreciarla en su resolución. En materia laboral, el instituto jurídico de la prescripción negativa establece que, en general, las obligaciones se extinguen con sólo el transcurso del tiempo previsto por el ordenamiento jurídico, cuando quien tiene a su haber el derecho exigible, no lo ejerce dentro del plazo legalmente establecido. El tratadista [Nombre1] expresa que “Todos los derechos, y consiguientemente todas las acciones para su ejercicio derivados del contrato de trabajo, decaen en el transcurso del tiempo. No importa que se trate de derechos irrenunciables o sobre los que no pueda válidamente disponer; irrenunciabilidad e imprescriptibilidad son institutos jurídicos diferentes; (...) pero ocurrida la prescripción –o la caducidad-, el derecho se ha extinguido ya (...) Y es que la prohibición de renuncia se refiere al acto o conducta expreso declaratorio de que se ejercita “el derecho a renunciar al derecho”, no a la mera inacción que está en la base de la prescripción. (...)” ([Nombre1] , . Derecho del Trabajo. Madrid: Civitas Ediciones, S.L., 2002, p. 520). La prescripción encuentra su fundamento, en la necesidad de que la sociedad establezca reglas claras para los negocios jurídicos, de manera que se desarrollen en un marco de certeza y seguridad para todos los agentes participantes, sin dejar temas o asuntos pendientes hacia la eternidad (puede verse a [Nombre2] , [Nombre3]. . y [Nombre4] , . (1999). Derecho del Trabajo. Madrid: Editorial Centro de Estudios Ramón Areces, S.A., (7ª. Ed., p. 367 s.s.). En nuestro derecho positivo, el Título Décimo del Código de Trabajo, regula lo referente a la prescripción de los derechos laborales de los trabajadores. En lo que interesa, el ordinal 602 regula el plazo de prescripción para el reclamo de los derechos provenientes de los contratos de trabajo, el que fija en un año (reformado por artículo 1° de la Ley n° 8520, del 20 de junio del 2006) y el 604 adicionado mediante el artículo 2 de la citada ley, dispone las causas de interrupción de la prescripción en materia laboral. En el caso que nos ocupa, la parte recurrente argumenta que no operó la prescripción del reclamo en virtud de que el vínculo laboral que mantuvo el actor con el Banco de Costa Rica entre el de enero de 1974 y el 28 de octubre de 2004, no finalizó aunque es cierto que en autos consta el pago de prestaciones al actor y también consta que a partir del 29 de octubre de 2004 inició una nueva contratación con BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s.a; y enfatiza en que el banco y la sociedad a pesar de pertenecer a un mismo conglomerado financiero son independientes y por ende se trata del mismo patrono. En pocas palabras, en su criterio, al tener continuidad patronal el derecho pretendido -y que deriva de la primera relación laboral- no prescribió. Ahora bien, tanto para determinar si efectivamente transcurrió o no el término fatal de la prescripción, como para dilucidar si es correcto revocar el fallo en cuanto a los supuestos derechos pretendidos, es menester indicar que es imposible para un trabajador percibir prestaciones, iniciar una nueva relación laboral bajo otras condiciones, venir a solicitar la continuidad laboral y sus derechos y no devolver lo pagado por prestaciones, eso sería aprovecharse de su propio dolo. No obstante, no pueden otorgarse los derechos de una continuidad laboral sin restitución del auxilio de cesantía que le fue cancelado en 2004, aún así, es necesario comprobar si existió continuidad patronal. Es decir, si el Banco de Costa Rica y BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias S. A., son en realidad un mismo empleador. Para ello debe analizarse la naturaleza jurídica de la entidad financiera mencionada y la de la sociedad. La Constitución Política establece en su canon 188: “Las instituciones autónomas del Estado gozan de independencia administrativa y están sujetas a la ley en materia de gobierno. Sus directores responden por su gestión”. Asimismo, en el numeral siguiente (189) se dispone: “Son instituciones autónomas: 1) Los Bancos del Estado; 2) Las instituciones aseguradoras del Estado; 3) Las que esta Constitución establece, y los nuevos organismos que creare la Asamblea Legislativa por votación no menor de los dos tercios del total de sus miembros”. (Énfasis suplido por la redactora). Por su parte la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional estipula en el ordinal 2: “Los bancos del Estado enumerados en el artículo anterior son instituciones autónomas de derecho público, con personería jurídica propia e independencia en materia de administración. Están sujetos a la ley en materia de gobierno y deben actuar en estrecha colaboración con el Poder Ejecutivo, coordinando sus esfuerzos y actividades. Las decisiones sobre las funciones puestas bajo su competencia sólo podrán emanar de sus respectivas juntas directivas. De acuerdo con lo anterior, cada banco tendrá responsabilidad propia en la ejecución de sus funciones, lo cual impone a los miembros de la Junta Directiva la obligación de actuar conforme con su criterio en la dirección y administración del banco, dentro de las disposiciones de la Constitución, de las leyes y reglamentos pertinentes y de los principios de la técnica, así como la obligación de responder por su gestión, en forma total e ineludible, de acuerdo con los artículos 27 y 28 de esta ley. ”. Dentro de los bancos del Estado a los que alude este artículo, se encuentra el Banco de Costa Rica. Al tenor de las normas expuestas se infiere que esos entes son parte del sector estatal, en el tanto se han designado como instituciones autónomas. Por otro lado y en relación con BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s,a, se tiene que ésta fue creada al amparo del artículo 55 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, Nº 7732 del 17 de diciembre de 1997. Ese canon dispone lo siguiente: “Artículo 55.- Constitución de sociedades. El Instituto Nacional de Seguros y cada uno de los bancos públicos quedarán autorizados para constituir sendas sociedades, en los términos indicados en el artículo anterior, con el fin único de operar su propio puesto de bolsa y realizar, exclusivamente, las actividades indicadas en el artículo 56. Asimismo, se autorizan para que cada uno constituya una sociedad administradora de fondos de inversión y una operadora de pensiones, en los términos establecidos en esta ley y en la Ley No. 7523 de 7 julio de 1995, según corresponda. En tales casos, los puestos, las sociedades administradoras de fondos de inversión y las operadoras de pensiones, deberán mantener sus operaciones y su contabilidad totalmente independientes de la institución a la que pertenezcan. Esta disposición se aplicará igualmente a los puestos de bolsa privados, en relación con sus socios y con otras sociedades pertenecientes al mismo grupo de interés económico. El Estado y las instituciones y empresas públicas podrán adquirir títulos, efectuar sus inversiones o colocar sus emisiones, por medio de cualquier puesto de bolsa, sin perjuicio de las disposiciones aplicables en materia de contratación administrativa.” Como se puede apreciar, la norma transcrita autoriza a los bancos públicos y al Instituto Nacional de Seguros para constituir sociedades anónimas en tres supuestos: para operar un puesto de bolsa, para operar planes de pensión complementaria y para administrar fondos de inversión. El objeto que persigue la norma aludida es, precisamente, la de permitir la creación de personas jurídicas independientes, con la finalidad de que los entes públicos puedan separar parte de su patrimonio, así como la contabilidad respectiva, a efecto de mantener una gestión transparente de recursos, indispensable en los mercados abiertos a la competencia en los que participan tales sociedades. Sobre la naturaleza de las empresas públicas, la Sala Constitucional ha manifestado: “Mediante la Empresa pública, la Administración Pública, central o descentralizada, interviene, de forma directa o indirecta, en un sector del mercado o de la economía desarrollando una actividad industrial, mercantil o agropecuaria con el propósito de satisfacer fines públicos. El fundamento de la iniciativa o intervención pública en la economía o el mercado, encuentra asidero en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política al establecer que “El Estado procurará el mayor bienestar a todos los habitantes del país, organizando y estimulando la producción y el más adecuado reparto de la riqueza” y en los principios de solidaridad y justicia social. La Empresa pública, además de compartir los elementos de toda empresa, como lo son el desarrollo de un giro de forma profesional, habitual y continua, se caracteriza porque el empresario (titular o dueño de una empresa) es una Administración Pública –central o descentralizada-, la cual mantiene el control de mando, y persigue un fin de lucro como un instrumento para satisfacer determinados intereses o fines públicos. Consecuentemente, la Empresa pública tiene un elemento subjetivo que es la participación de un ente público y otro objetivo que es el desarrollo de una actividad empresarial para el logro de fines públicos. En cuanto a las razones que justifican la empresa pública, la doctrina ha ofrecido varias, tales como los fallos del mercado o imperfecciones del sistema competitivo, la carencia de empresas industriales o comerciales de cierta magnitud y estabilidad, la existencia de monopolios naturales, la producción de bienes y servicios públicos, la necesidad de redistribuir los ingresos, la existencia de sectores estratégicos, etc”. (Sentencia nº 1556 de las 15:35 horas del 7 de febrero de 2007 de la Sala Constitucional.) (Énfasis suplido por la redactora). De lo expuesto se corrobora que BCR Corredora de Seguros S.A. constituye una empresa pública, es decir, que se caracteriza por la prestación de servicios en concurrencia con otros particulares y cuya titularidad -la del ente público- es estatal, esto por cuanto se encuentra adscrita al ente fundador por la titularidad de las acciones. Esto además encuentra asidero constitucional, en la medida en que el numeral 189 establece que todas las entidades aseguradoras que pertenezcan al Estado, desde el punto de vista organizacional, serán instituciones autónomas. No puede soslayarse que, a pesar de que la empresa pública bajo estudio es catalogada como “una sociedad anónima”, bajo ningún concepto podría equiparársele plenamente a la figura del derecho privado puesto que, tal y como lo apunta el Órgano Constitucional, no deja de ser un instrumento que el legislador a puesto a disposición del ente autónomo para la consecución de sus fines (ver en este sentido la resolución nº 6513-2002 del 3 de julio de 2002 de la Sala Segunda). A la luz de las consideraciones realizadas, y conforme a la jurisprudencia de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, se concluye que claramente que existió una continuidad patronal en el caso bajo estudio. Es decir, a pesar de que la parte accionante fue contratada primero por el Banco de Costa Rica y posteriormente a través de la corredora de seguros, el empleador nunca ha dejado de ser el Banco de Costa Rica, entidad para la cual labora actualmente el actor. Consecuentemente resulta irrebatible que no acaeció el plazo fatal de la prescripción que invoca el recurrente, apreció mal el juez de instancia al declararlo. SOBRE LA PROCEDENCIA DE LO PETICIONADO EN ESTE PROCESO: El punto primero de la petitoria de la demanda sí se concede pues el actor solicitó: reconocimiento de la relación laboral continua desde el cuatro de enero de mil novecientos setenta y cuatro hasta la fecha de la firmeza de la sentencia. Ahora dentro del expediente no existe prueba alguna que conlleve el otorgamiento de diferencias salariales, puesto que hay ausencia de prueba en ese sentido y de cierta manera así lo refuta la apelante, por lo que los puntos 2 a 6 deben denegarse. Pese a lo dicho, no puede obviar este tribunal de apelaciones que hubo un pago de Cesantía por parte del Banco de Costa Rica al actor en el 2004 ya que en este proceso consta que la parte actora laboró para el Banco de Costa Rica a partir del 04 de enero de 1974, consta además que su puesto fue reestructurado y por ello se le cesa y empieza a laborar en BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s.a., esta como sociedad anónima. Por ese motivo le cesa del Banco de Costa Rica y le fue cancelada la suma por cesantía de ¢28.363.338.40 por indemnización de la supresión de la plaza que ocupaba, menos unos rebajos que el mismo autorizó. Posteriormente es contratado por BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s.a, pero nunca devolvió lo pagado por auxilio de cesantía. Dicho requerimiento se debió realizar con sustento en el artículo 586 inciso b) del Código de Trabajo. Consecuentemente cabe acotar que el Código de Trabajo, en su Título VIII, contempla disposiciones especiales para los servidores del Estado y sus instituciones. Al respecto el canon 585 define quién ostenta la condición de trabajador del Estado o de sus Instituciones, y el 586 determina los derechos de esos funcionarios públicos, estableciendo que estos serían destinatarios de los beneficios contenidos en los artículos 28, 29 y 31 de ese cuerpo normativo. En ese sentido, el ordinal 585 estipula: “Trabajador del Estado o de sus Instituciones, es toda persona que preste a aquél o a éstas un servicio material; intelectual o de ambos géneros, en virtud del nombramiento que le fuere expedido por autoridad o funcionario competente, o por el hecho de figurar en las listas de presupuestos o en los pagos por planillas. Cualquiera de estas últimas circunstancias sustituye, para todos los efectos legales, al contrato escrito de trabajo”. Más adelante el numeral siguiente dispone en lo que interesa: “(…) b) Los servidores que se acojan a los beneficios de este artículo no podrán ocupar cargos remunerados en ninguna dependencia del Estado, durante un tiempo igual al representado por la suma recibida en calidad de auxilio de cesantía. Si dentro de ese lapso llegaren a aceptarlo, quedarán obligados a reintegrar al Tesoro Público las sumas percibidas por ese concepto, deduciendo aquellas que representen los salarios que habrían devengado durante el término que permanecieron cesantes (…)”. Ahora bien, es necesario precisar el alcance de esa norma, o sea establecer quiénes son sus destinatarios. De conformidad con el numeral 1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública está constituida por el Estado y los demás entes públicos cada uno con personería jurídica propia y capacidad de derecho público y privado; de tal manera que, en su actuar pueden sus órganos y entes despojarse de sus potestades de imperio y ejercer una actividad no pública, como si fuese un particular, sin que ello implique que no continúe perteneciendo a la conformación de aquella. Ahora bien, en los numerales 111 y siguientes se indica quienes son funcionarios públicos, y en el artículo 112 se establece que aquellos que prestan labores a las empresas del Estado, serán considerados como funcionarios públicos para todos los efectos, pese a que ellos no ejercen una función pública de manera estricta, ni apegada al Derecho Público. De tal manera que, con independencia de la gestión realizada, por ellos, pertenecen a la Administración Pública. En ese orden de ideas, la Sala Constitucional en otros casos similares se ha pronunciado al respecto y estima que los destinatarios del canon 586 del Código de Trabajo son los servidores públicos, en sentido amplio y sin distingo alguno, es decir aquellos del Estado y de sus Instituciones toda vez que la norma no hace salvedad alguna al respecto. No sería factible interpretar restrictivamente una norma que persigue la tutela de fondos públicos y que previene vicios o abusos que podrían suscitarse con el reingreso instantáneo al servicio público. En otras palabras, no importa si se trata de la administración central o descentralizada, sino que, al tenor del artículo 189 de la Carta Magna y del 2 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, el Banco de Costa Rica es parte del sector estatal, en el tanto se ha designado como institución autónoma. Por su parte, BCR Pensión Operadora de Planes de Pensiones Complementarias s.a. constituye una empresa pública cuya titularidad accionaria recae en esa entidad financiera y no puede verse como una sociedad anónima independiente toda vez que, como se explicara líneas arriba, fue creada como un instrumento a disposición del banco para la consecución de sus fines. Consecuentemente, partiendo de la naturaleza estatal del ente para el que laboran, los empleados de los bancos estatales son trabajadores del Estado y por ende les resulta aplicable el ordinal 586, inciso b) del Código de Trabajo (circunstancia dentro de la cual se encuentra el accionante). A mayor abundamiento, el recurrente cita la sentencia nº 2014-15882 de las 9:20 horas del 26 de septiembre de 2014 de la Sala Constitucional donde se analiza el caso de los trabajadores de la sociedad BCR Valores S.A. En ese pronunciamiento se explica que esos funcionarios al no participar de la gestión pública de la Administración se encuentran regidos por el derecho laboral común, es decir no les son aplicables las regulaciones del Estatuto del Servicio Civil sino las del Código de Trabajo. A la luz de los razonamientos efectuados, las suscritas juezas consideran que le asiste razón al recurrente de alegar continuidad y por ese motivo debe revocarse lo resuelto en cuanto a la prescripción. Al respecto tómese en cuenta lo resuelto por la Sala segunda en la resolución 671 del 26 de junio de 2015."