Annulment for lack of party definition and evidentiary omission in marriage non-existence proceedingNulidad por indefinición de partes y omisión probatoria en proceso de inexistencia de matrimonio

“II. After a meticulous analysis of what the case file shows, this Tribunal concludes that the proceeding has not been approached appropriately, as not only does it seem there is no clarity regarding the object pursued by it, but there has also been confusion about legally relevant aspects, such as determining who must bear the status of defendant and what are the rules pertaining to evidentiary matters. Consequently, it is necessary to rewind the proceeding to the moment when these defects occurred and, for this purpose, it is essential to annul both the judgment and the procedural pieces that will be indicated below.

III.The Associate State Attorneys who have contested the first-instance judgment—one filing the appeal and the other appearing before this second instance to assert the rights he considers violated—are correct when they state that in this case, from the beginning, it was clear that the object of the proceeding was the declaration of non-existence of the marriage performed between Mr. [Nombre 005] and Ms. [Nombre 001]. The statement of facts was extremely clear in indicating that the marriage of Mr. [Nombre 005] and Ms. [Nombre 001] is registered in the Marriage Section of the Civil Registry under citation [Valor 001], a registration indicating that the marriage was celebrated on December ninth, two thousand one, but that it was performed despite the fact that Ms. [Nombre 001] did not give consent to marry Mr. [Nombre 005]. It was also stated that because she had not given this consent to marry, Ms. [Nombre 001] herself asked the authorities of the Civil Registry to annul the registration of the marriage where she appears married to Mr. [Nombre 005] because “I have never been married to that person and, furthermore, I do not know who he is” and she also asked that “the birth record of my children be corrected ... since he is not the biological father of my children.”

Along with the complaint, documentary evidence was submitted, which was formally offered (f.36). The documents provided were:

1. The official letter signed by Licenciado Óscar Fernando Mena Carvajal, Secretary General of the Civil Registry, in which he requests the Procuraduría General de la República to “take the actions within its competence for the nullity or non-existence of the marriage between Ms. [Nombre 001] (sic) and [Nombre 005], as well as the correction of the surnames of the minors [Nombre 006] ..., [Nombre 012] ... and [Nombre 007].” (fs. 1 to 5); 2. The declaration given by Ms. [Nombre 001] on November first, two thousand thirteen, before Licenciada Ligia Gamboa Martínez, Acting Head of the Heredia Regional Office of the Civil Registry (f.6); 3. Two birth certifications for Ms. [Nombre 001] (fs. 7 and 19); 4. A certification stating that Mr. [Nombre 005] is not a holder of a Costa Rican identity card (f.8); 5. An official letter indicating that in the Options and Naturalizations Section of the Civil Department of the Civil Registry there is no record of a naturalization proceeding for Mr. [Nombre 005] (f.9); 6. A copy of the registration entry of the marriage of Mr. [Nombre 005] to Ms. [Nombre 001] (f.11); 7. The birth certifications of the young lady [Nombre 006], the girl [Nombre 012], and the boy [Nombre 007] (fs.12 to 14); 8. A copy of the Certificate of Declaration of Civil Marriage issued by Notary Rocío Córdoba Cambronero (f.15); 9. A copy of the attested copy of the public deed of the marriage celebration of Mr. [Nombre 005] and Ms. [Nombre 001], which was executed before the same Notary (fs. 17 and 18); 10. A copy of a certification issued on November twenty-third, two thousand one, indicating that no registered marriage appeared for Ms. [Nombre 001] (f.20); 11. A copy of a certification of the birth record of [Nombre 005], issued by the Civil Registrar of Persons of Masaya, Nicaragua (f.21); 12. A copy of the first page of the Nicaraguan passport of Mr. [Nombre 005] (f.23); 13. A copy of the document control list submitted by Notary Rocío Córdoba with the application for registration of civil marriage (f.25); 14. Copies of official letters in which the Civil Registry warns Notary Rocío Córdoba Cambronero to make clarifications regarding the application for registration of the marriage of Mr. [Nombre 005] and Ms. [Nombre 001] (fs. 26 and 2).

In the claim, it was clearly requested that the judgment declare the non-existence of that marriage; and, as a consequence of the foregoing, that the “marriage registration citation number [Valor 001]” be annulled. Furthermore, it was requested that “the birth citations of the minors [Nombre 006], citation [Valor 005], [Nombre 012], citation [Valor 002], and [Nombre 007], citation [Valor 003] be annulled” and that “the defendants” be ordered to pay costs and interest thereon. (fs. 32 to 36) It could be considered that the complaint brief presents elements that generate some doubt. Thus, for example, the Procuraduría General de la República did not state precisely against whom the complaint was directed, since what Ms. State Attorney Licenciada Marcela Ramírez Jara indicated was that she was appearing before the Juzgado Primero de Familia “to request the non-existence of the marriage performed between [Nombre 001] and [Nombre 005].” (f.32) It was not until the legal basis section that some reference was made to whom she considered as “defendants,” when in point B, she entered the title: “Of the non-existence of the marriage celebrated between the defendants” (f.35) and there is also some insinuation when in the prayer for relief she requested that “the defendants” be ordered to pay costs and interest thereon. (f.35) There is also some confusion in the formulation of the claim in the complaint, when it was said that the declaration of non-existence of the marriage was requested because there was “a defect in the consent of one of the contracting parties” (f.35), since in the same complaint, in the legal basis identified with the letter A), “Of the regulation of Marriage in Costa Rica,” the State’s representative cited a judgment of this Tribunal in which it was indicated that “[...] if the ‘contracting parties’ do not appear before the authorized official to celebrate the marriage; or if only one of them appears and it is not established that the other had granted a special power of attorney for such purposes, there is simply no manifestation of will and, as a logical consequence, there is no marriage. It is not that the will is vitiated, it is that there is none. [...]” (f. 34. Emphasis supplied)

IV.The Juzgado of first instance admitted the complaint in the terms in which it was presented, having Mr. [Nombre 005] and Ms. [Nombre 001] as co-defendants; and in the end, in the judgment, the claims formulated were denied. The Lady Judge indicated, on one hand, that “the State’s representative makes a large number of requests that are contradictory to each other. The foregoing, because although she requests the declaration of non-existence of the marriage, due to the lack of consent on the part of the Costa Rican contracting party, because this contracting party said in her sworn statement that she did not consent to marry, that she does not know said gentleman, nor has she cohabited with him. Also, in the claim, the plaintiff alleges that a defect of consent was configured, and this is something different, since a defect occurs when consent exists, but it is vitiated.”; and, on the other hand, she pointed out that she did not have suitable evidence to make a favorable decision, by stating that “the mere statement in the administrative venue by Ms. [Nombre 001] is documentary evidence, which is insufficient to prove the non-existence of the marriage, since she was not even called to testify before the judicial authority, in order to carry out the adversarial process and so that the defendant's representative also has the possibility to cross-examine and clarify the doubts that arise concerning the alleged non-existence of the marriage. ... Nor did the undersigned judge have the possibility to cross-examine the Costa Rican contracting party and be able to comprehensively assess any element of conviction regarding this allegedly non-existent marriage.” Additionally, when referring to the legal basis invoked in the complaint, the Lady Judge stated that Articles 19 and 64 of the Family Code cannot be applied because norms cannot be given retroactive effect, indicating that these two articles were introduced in a reform introduced by Ley 8781, of November 11, 2009, and in this case, the marriage was celebrated on December 9, 2001. She mentioned the concept of “simulated marriage” and referred to the “nullity of marriage heard here.”

The first thing this Tribunal asks itself is: why has Ms. [Nombre 001] been held as a defendant? There is no doubt in affirming that procedural capacity is a procedural prerequisite —reviewable at the beginning of the proceeding— and that standing is a material prerequisite —analyzable in the judgment—; but it is clear that in every complaint there must be coherence, such that it is imperative that there be a logical relationship between those who appear as parties, the facts set forth, the evidence offered, the Law invoked, and the claim formulated. When that coherence does not exist, it is necessary for the judicial authority —exercising the powers of instruction and direction granted by Article 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure— to make the necessary preventive measures so that, from the beginning, what is pursued with the proceeding is clearly defined.

In this particular case, it is not possible to determine the reason why the Procuraduría General de la República apparently included Ms. [Nombre 001] as a defendant, if the State’s own representative affirmed that Ms. [Nombre 001] did not give her consent to marry Mr. [Nombre 005] and that she even asked the authorities of the Civil Registry to annul the marriage registration —because she never married and does not even know Mr. [Nombre 005]— and to correct the birth registration records of her daughters and son —because Mr. [Nombre 005] is not their father—. With this statement of facts, it gives the impression —at least preliminarily— that Ms. [Nombre 001], instead of appearing as a defendant, could have been constituted as an active co-litigant —pursuant to Article 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure—, or at least as an adhesive intervenor, as contemplated by Article 112 of the same regulatory body.

As stated in the preceding Considerando, the Procuraduría General de la República did not indicate with precision against whom the complaint was directed, although it did make some insinuation in the Legal Basis identified with the letter B) and in the request that “the defendants” be ordered to pay costs and interest thereon. But in the circumstances noted, the Juzgado of first instance could have warned the State’s representation that, based on the statement of facts it had made, it should indicate whether it was actually directing the complaint against Ms. [Nombre 001] and, if so, that it should indicate the reason. In this way, if the Procuraduría maintained its decision to consider her as a defendant, the analysis of the passive standing would have to be done in the judgment; but if it excluded her as a defendant, the Juzgado could well have ordered that the filing of this complaint be communicated to Ms. [Nombre 001], as she is a directly interested party, and that she thus express whether she wished to constitute herself as co-plaintiff or as an adhesive intervenor, or whether —informed of the filing of the complaint and of what is claimed therein— she did not wish to appear in the proceeding at all.

Secondly, the Tribunal considers that if the Juzgado considered that the claim formulated in the complaint was contradictory —as was stated in the judgment—, what it should have done, in application of the provisions contained in Articles 124 and 290 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was to prevent the clarification of the claim at the beginning of the proceeding, before admitting the complaint, so that the state representation would indicate precisely whether what it was requesting was the declaration of non-existence of the marriage because Ms. [Nombre 001] did not it was requesting was the declaration of nullity of the marriage, due to the existence of a defect of consent; or whether it was petitioning both pronouncements, and in this latter case, whether it requested both as principal claims (declaration of non-existence of marriage due to absence of consent of the alleged contracting party and declaration of nullity of marriage due to a defect of will of the contracting party) or whether it requested one as principal (declaration of non-existence due to absence of consent of the contracting party) and the other as subsidiary (declaration of nullity of marriage due to a defect of will of the contracting party). However, as indicated in preceding lines, the Juzgado admitted the complaint in the terms it was presented.

To relate it to what will be said later, it is necessary to expressly state that the State’s representation did not set forth facts in the complaint affirming the existence of a simulated marriage, in the terms established in Article 12 bis of the Family Code, nor did it request that its nullity be decreed for that reason, pursuant to Article 14 bis. It is true that the State’s representative made a mention of the figure of simulated marriage when she referred to the opposition made by the procedural guardian of the defendant [Nombre 005] when answering the complaint, but it is evident that the Procuraduría never expanded either the facts or the claim to request that the nullity of the marriage be decreed on the grounds of simulation. We will return to this in Considerando VIII.

Thirdly, the Tribunal observes an inadequate handling regarding the evidentiary issue, basically because the Juzgado of first instance never issued a resolution indicating whether it admitted or rejected the documentary evidence offered by the plaintiff when presenting the complaint; but mainly because it failed to order sua sponte evidence aimed at the investigation of the truth. In this regard, it is not only necessary to know the legal treatment of evidence in family procedural matters, but also to remember that in topics where there is public interest, the judicial authorities must order, even sua sponte, the evacuation of those pieces of evidence that are necessary to make a decision, without this being interpretable as a breach of the duty of impartiality that distinguishes jurisdictional activity.

V.At this point in the 21st century, there is no longer any doubt in affirming that there is no single type of family, as held by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case Atala Riffo vs. Chile, when it indicated that “the concept of family life is not reduced solely to marriage but must encompass other de facto family ties where the parties have life in common outside of marriage.” (Paragraph 142). However, it is unquestionable that marriage, as a legal institution, has always been a way to found a family. Article 52 of the Political Constitution provides that “marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses.” On the other hand, the State also has the constitutional duty to protect the family. So stipulates Article 51 of the Political Constitution when it indicates that “The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State.”

Now, the right to found a family and the right to enter into marriage are fundamental rights of natural persons, as they are human rights positivized in various international instruments, as can be verified below:

Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Article 16.

1. Men and women of full age, have the right, without any restriction due to race, nationality or religion, to marry and found a family; and are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

2. Only with the free and full consent of the future spouses may marriage be entered into.

American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Article VI. Every person has the right to establish a family, a fundamental element of society, and to receive protection for it.

American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José) Article 17. Protection of the Family [...]

2. The right of men and women to enter into marriage and to found a family is recognized if they are of the age and conditions required for it by domestic laws, insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of non-discrimination established in this Convention.

3. No marriage may be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

4. The States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure the equality of rights and the adequate equivalence of responsibilities of the spouses regarding marriage, during marriage, and at its dissolution. In case of dissolution, provisions shall be adopted that ensure the necessary protection of the children, solely on the basis of their own best interests.

[...]

Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) Article 15. Right to the Establishment and Protection of the Family [...]

2. Every person has the right to establish a family, which shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the corresponding domestic legislation.

[...]

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 23.

[...]

2. The right of men and women to enter into marriage and to found a family is recognized if they have the age for it.

3. No marriage may be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate measures to ensure the equality of rights and responsibilities of both spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In case of dissolution, provisions shall be adopted that ensure the necessary protection to the children.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Article 10. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:

1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the future spouses.

[...]

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Article 16 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and, in particular, shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:

• a)The same right to enter into marriage; b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent; c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution.

[...]

Making a comprehensive interpretation of all these norms, it is possible to conclude that natural persons have the fundamental right to enter into marriage, if they have the age and the conditions that each State contemplates; and also that the State has the duty to protect the legal institution of marriage, as it is a form of founding a family. (Of course, without this implying that only marriage should be protected, since as stated before, there is no single type of family, but rather this is a dynamic concept and, as such, evolves.) The national author Rubén Hernández Valle has explained it by saying that “there exists a fundamental right of persons to enter into marriage, which derives from Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 17.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights. This freedom implies —as the Constitutional Chamber has underscored— that, ‘on one hand, the State may not in any way prevent or unreasonably hinder the marriage of persons and, on the other, that it is not possible to impose the matrimonial form as the only way of constituting a family.’ (Voto 3693-94) (HERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Rubén. (2015) Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica. Commented and with jurisprudence citations. Editorial Juricentro, San José. p. 266) The protection of the legal institute of marriage is not only carried out through a negative obligation, such as that the State must not prevent or UNREASONABLY hinder the fundamental right that citizens have to enter into it, but it must also be done by complying with the positive obligation to zealously pursue and sanction persons who seek to circumvent the institution. Although marriage is entered into by two natural persons, subjects of private law; there is an unquestionable public interest in ensuring that marriage is entered into only between persons who can enjoy the right to marry TO found a family, and that it is performed following the formalities established to that effect.

This implacable pursuit that must be carried out to combat the antisocial and antijuridical use of the institute of marriage can take place in various ways and in different scenarios. Thus, for example, it corresponds to the criminal authorities to punish with imprisonment or a fine those who commit crimes related to marriage, including —as the case may be— not only the contracting parties themselves, but also their representatives, the officiants, and the witnesses (Arts. 176 to 181 bis of the Penal Code); it corresponds to the authorities hearing disciplinary proceedings for the exercise of the Notary Public profession to sanction the Notaries who intentionally participate in the celebration of a simulated marriage; and, in the family venue, there is no single way to prevent or combat the illegitimate celebration of marriages. The differences are clear and it is necessary to know them because the approach and the consequences are also very diverse.

VI.The first thing that must be clear is the difference between a non-existent marriage, an ineffective marriage, a simulated marriage, a legally impossible marriage, and, should it be celebrated, one vitiated by absolute nullity, a marriage vitiated by relative nullity, and a prohibited marriage.

Non-existent marriage. The necessary condition for a marriage to EXIST is the clear and express manifestation of the consent of the contracting parties. So provide the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Pact of San José, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and our Family Code also contemplates it in its Article 13, by indicating that “For a marriage to exist, the consent of the contracting parties must be manifested in a legal and Interpreted conversely, as allowed by Article 12 of the Civil Code, from this norm it is deduced that if one of the contracting parties did not make that manifestation of will —or if neither of them did— then the marriage DOES NOT EXIST and, as it does not exist, it produces no personal, social, or patrimonial effects. As explained by Doctor Marisa Herrera referring to Argentine legislation, but whose concepts are applicable, mutatis mutandi, in our country, “the indispensable and fundamental requirements for the existence of a marriage, post-reform of law 26,618 and which the CCyCN maintains, are two: 1) The full and free consent of both contracting parties and 2) the intervention of a competent authority. The absence of any of these requirements results in the non-existence of the bond. [...] Matrimonial consent is the verbal, written, or by any unequivocal means, declaration through which the contracting parties express their will to mutually constitute themselves as spouses. The declaration of the contracting parties presupposes, as a general principle, that the consent given is informed and free. Being an intuito personae right, the intended spouses must appear in person at the celebration of the matrimonial act and unequivocally express their will regarding the legal act they wish to be perfected.” (HERRERA, Marisa. (2015) Manual of Family Law. Abeledo Perrot. Buenos Aires, Argentina. p.121. Emphasis supplied.) In this way, if the marriage is celebrated despite the fact that one of the contracting parties DOES NOT express their will to marry —or neither of them expresses it—, and it is also registered, then that registration must be annulled, but not the marriage. The marriage is declared non-existent and the annulment of the registration is ordered.

Ineffective marriage. Our law allows marriage to be celebrated with the officiant, one of the contracting parties, and the special attorney-in-fact of the other contracting party present. The Family Code provides that if the marriage is celebrated, but at the moment of celebration the power of attorney had already been legally revoked, then “there shall be no” marriage. “There shall be no marriage” in legal technical language means that the marriage is ineffective, and consequently, it also produces no personal, social, or patrimonial effects. If such were the situation, the marriage was validly celebrated because it was performed as authorized by the Law, but upon verifying that the power of attorney was legitimately revoked, it is declared ineffective and the annulment of the registration is ordered. (Art. 30 of the Family Code) Legally impossible marriage, and should it be celebrated, marriage vitiated by absolute nullity. This contemplates those exceptional situations that the legislator has considered reasonable to prevent its celebration.

When the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) states that the State cannot "unreasonably impede or obstruct the marriage of persons," it is implicitly recognizing that the State does have the right to make objections that are reasonable in a given historical, social, and cultural moment. In other words, a person may marry whomever they wish, provided the State has not expressly prohibited it. These are the cases contemplated in Article 14 of the Family Code (Código de Familia). They are situations so clearly defined that to prevent their celebration—or to decree their nullity, should they be celebrated—it is sufficient to verify that they are present. These situations are the following:

a. The person who is bound by a previous marriage; b. Between ascendants and descendants by consanguinity or affinity. The impediment does not disappear with the dissolution of the marriage that gave rise to the kinship by affinity.

c. Between consanguineous siblings.

d. Between the adopter and the adoptee and their descendants; the adoptive children of the same person; the adoptee and the children of the adopter; the adoptee and the former spouse of the adopter; and, the adopter and the former spouse of the adoptee; e. Between the perpetrator, co-perpetrator, instigator, or accomplice to the crime of homicide of one of the spouses and the surviving spouse; f. Between persons of the same sex; and, g. The person under fifteen years of age.

Thus, if the marriage is celebrated, despite being legally impossible, its nullity shall then be decreed. This is an absolute nullity (nulidad de carácter absoluto), meaning the marriage cannot be validated under any circumstance. The discussion in a process established for this purpose does not concern the spouses' knowledge of the grounds for impediment, but rather the verification thereof. These are cases where there is no time limit to request nullity and where the standing (legitimación) is so broad that it can even be decreed ex officio (de oficio). (Article 64) Voidable marriage (Matrimonio anulable). In these cases, the marriages are validly celebrated, but during the act of celebration—or, exceptionally, shortly after its celebration—a reason arises for which it could be annulled, at the request of a party with standing and provided that the action is taken within the time period contemplated by the law itself, because otherwise, without any need for ratification, the marriage is validated. The causes of relative nullity are NOT situations of mere verification, but are susceptible to being contested, and therefore, for the marriage to be annulled, it is necessary that the conduct invoked is effectively demonstrated. One of these cases is when consent was indeed given, but it was vitiated. (Arts. 15, 18 and 65 of the Family Code) Prohibited marriage (Matrimonio prohibido). Since marriage is a solemn act, there is another situation in which the person who celebrated the marriage is sanctioned for not having complied with the formalities required by the State, but nothing happens to the marriage, precisely because the State must defend it as the legal institution that it is. These are the cases contemplated in Article 16 of the Family Code. The consequence regarding the marriage as such is set forth in Article 17, when it clearly states that "the marriage celebrated despite the prohibitions of the preceding article is valid." Simulated marriage (Matrimonio simulado). Finally, on a date no longer so recent, through Law 8781 (Ley 8781)—in force since November 17, 2009—the figure of the simulated marriage was expressly introduced into our legislation. This Law introduced reforms to the Family Code—to which articles 12 bis and 14 bis were added, a new Article 19 (because the previous one had been repealed by Law 8571 (Ley 8571)) and a second paragraph to Article 64—; to the Penal Code (Código Penal)—to which article 181 bis was added, to introduce the crime of "Simulated Marriage" which is different from the "Simulation of Marriage" contemplated in article 178—; to the Notarial Code (Código Notarial)—to which a subsection d) was added to article 145, to include the celebration of simulated marriages with the fraudulent concurrence of the Notary as grounds for the sanction of suspension from the practice of Notarial law—; and, to the General Law of Migration and Foreigners (Ley General de Migración y Extranjería)—to which article 73 bis was added, to introduce the possibility of granting migratory status to persons cohabiting in a common-law marriage (unión de hecho)—. The main purpose of the reform, clearly acknowledged in the statement of legislative intent (exposición de motivos) when it was still a bill, was to combat marriages celebrated between a foreign person and a Costa Rican person, without the purpose of founding a family, but rather with the intention of obtaining migratory advantages by abusing this legal institution. The reform was made not only to prevent individuals who seek to abuse marriage to irregularly obtain these migratory conditions from succeeding; but also to combat the criminal organizations dedicated to human trafficking and the dark business of obtaining benefits through fraud against the law, in which, unfortunately, Notaries Public often intervene—fraudulently or culpably. However, the legislator did not define simulated marriage in Article 12 bis of the Family Code with the clarity shown when typifying it as a crime in Article 181 bis of the Penal Code, but rather simply defined it as "the marital union that, complying with the formalities of law, does not have as its object the fulfillment of the essential purposes provided for in this Code." Let it be clear, however, that the marriage vitiated by absolute nullity due to simulation is not that which is celebrated between a foreign person and a Costa Rican person. That, clearly, would be an unconstitutional and unconventional provision, for being xenophobic. But the marriage celebrated to obtain migratory advantages or advantages of some other nature, and not to fulfill the essential purpose of founding a family, is indeed simulated. Consequently, for the nullity of the marriage due to simulation to be decreed, it is essential that it be alleged and subsequently demonstrated, with lawful evidence, that the purpose for which it was entered into was fraudulent. A distinction must be made, however, that when the contracting parties marry with the intention of founding a family, but additionally deem it necessary to stipulate a condition—for example, "we are getting married but we do not want children. If at any time either of us wishes to procreate, we will annul the marriage."—, the CONDITION is null, but the marriage is valid. That is what Article 12 of the Family Code refers to.

Now, by being placed in Article 14 bis, the legislator provided that "the simulated marriage shall be null," and in this case, the nullity is of an absolute character, and therefore it is not validatable by any subjective circumstance ("I did not know it was illegal to marry solely to obtain migratory or other advantages") nor by the mere passage of time, and, furthermore, it can be decreed even ex officio. The reform to Article 64, when a second paragraph was introduced, is solely to include the Director of the Civil Registry (Registro Civil) and the Director of Migration and Foreigners (Migración y Extranjería), under the representation of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), as persons authorized to seek the nullity of the marriage. This may be convenient, but it was not necessary by virtue of the fact that in absolute nullity, the standing is extremely broad, to the point that it can even be decreed ex officio.

The reform also brought something interesting: When a marriage is annulled—whether due to a defect of absolute nullity or a defect of relative nullity—some effects cease, but others remain. For example, upon decreeing the nullity of the marriage, the "spouses" return to their prior civil status, but the children they may have procreated retain the status of marital children (Arts. 69 and 82 of the Family Code). Other effects that remain are the patrimonial ones, and therefore, if there were marriage settlements (capitulaciones), these are respected, and if the patrimonial effects of the marriage must be liquidated through the default legal regime, the right of each spouse always arises to participate in half the net value of the community property (bienes gananciales) verified in the patrimony of the other. (Art. 41) This means that part of the responsibility of the adjudicator who annuls a marriage is to indicate which effects are extinguished and which remain.

Now, with the reform introduced through Law 8781, upon issuing the new Article 19 (which has no relation to the one that had been repealed by Law 8571), the legislator provided that "the simulated marriage shall not create any class of rights or obligations for the contracting parties." and expressly, because that was the motivation for the reforms, stipulated that "when its nullity is declared, the judge in a declaratory judgment (sentencia declarativa) shall order the cancellation of the registry inscription, as well as the migratory status and the naturalizations granted, all as a consequence of the simulated marriage." From a comprehensive analysis of all this legislation, it is possible to observe that the simulated marriage presents nuances that relate it to the non-existence (inexistencia) and ineffectiveness (ineficacia) of marriage, nuances that relate it to legally impossible marriages, and nuances that relate it to the relative nullity of marriages.

Thus, as with the non-existence and ineffectiveness of marriages, when the marriage is simulated, the inscription is annulled and no personal, social, or patrimonial effect is produced. As with marriages vitiated by absolute nullity or relative nullity, in the case of simulation the marriage is annulled and its inscription is annulled. As with non-existent, ineffective, and legally impossible marriages—and therefore, vitiated by absolute nullity should they be celebrated—the simulated marriage cannot be validated by subjective aspects of the spouses or by the passage of time, and the standing is so broad that it can even be decreed ex officio. And, as with marriages vitiated by relative nullity, it is feasible that in the simulated marriage the facts may be contested, and that for the nullity action to succeed, they must be demonstrated.

VII.Non-existent marriages, ineffective marriages, simulated marriages, and those vitiated by absolute nullity have in common that standing is extremely broad, to the point that non-existence, ineffectiveness, and nullity—due to simulation or because the marriage was legally impossible—can be decreed even in an ex officio manner.

The fact that it can be decreed even ex officio does not mean that the State, through the Courts of Justice and much less through administrative authorities, can make the declaration of non-existence, ineffectiveness, or nullity, dispensing with due process (debido proceso) and rendering the right of defense (derecho de defensa) nugatory. Any of these actions must be made known to those who appear as spouses, so that they have the opportunity to express what they deem pertinent, and, when required, to offer the corresponding evidence.

Now, the ex officio nature does not refer exclusively to the final decision adopted in a judgment (sentencia); rather, it encompasses all the activity that the adjudicator must carry out from the beginning of the process, making the necessary warnings so that before the claim (demanda) is served, there is clarity as to what is being sought in a specific process, and continuing through the evidentiary activity, in which they are required to take initiative and order the production of evidence necessary to issue the final ruling. As previously explained, marriage is entered into by natural persons, subjects of private law, but its celebration is of public interest (interés público). This public interest brings with it the requirement that the State, through the Courts of Justice, truly enforce the provision contained in Article 316 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), insofar as it indicates that at the beginning of the evidentiary phase, "the judge shall order the receipt of the evidence offered that is admissible, and that which ex officio they consider necessary." For this reason, the Tribunal considers unacceptable, in cases where public interest is at stake, the argument given by the Judge of first instance to the effect that there was insufficient evidence to issue an estimatory judgment. She stated that the declaration made by Ms. [Name 001] before the administrative authorities was not sufficient to decree the non-existence of the marriage, because the version she gave on that occasion could not be subjected to cross-examination. If such was the difficulty, the obligation was to order the evidence ex officio. But the problem is broader, since the judgment indicated that this documentary evidence was insufficient, yet it turns out that this evidentiary element was never legitimately incorporated into the process, as there is no resolution where it was admitted. In the resolution of fourteen hours seven minutes on June fifth, two thousand fifteen, it was indicated that it was not appropriate to summon the parties to conciliation and that "as there is no testimonial evidence to produce, once this order is final, the judgment on the merits shall be issued." (f.73) As can be seen, the resolution did not issue a pronouncement on the documentary evidence that was offered in the claim. The admission or rejection of evidence requires an intellectual task by the adjudicator, as they must analyze whether the evidence is pertinent and lawful and whether it was offered in a timely manner. By not having been admitted or rejected, the parties were prevented from contesting the decision. This brings us to the scenario of the legal treatment of evidence in family procedural matters.

Basically—because this topic is evidently very broad—it must be mentioned that in this family procedural matter, the limitations established in the civil procedural legislation for evaluating evidence do not apply. (Article 8 of the Family Code) But more importantly, the limitations not only do not exist at the end, when the evidence must be evaluated, but this extends to the moment of the production of evidence, to the moment of admission of evidence, and even to the moment when it must be qualified whether an element is evidence or not. This is so because for the Judge to evaluate the evidence, they first had to produce it, and before that they had to admit it, and to admit it, they had to have defined whether what was offered was, or was not, an evidentiary element. This breadth is known in doctrine as the principle of favor probatione, which, in the words of the Argentine proceduralist Jorge Luis Kielmanovich, "presupposes that in cases of doubt regarding the production, admission, conduciveness, or efficacy of the evidence, a broad criterion in favor of it shall be adopted, such that the opening of the case to evidence should be preferred over a declaration of pure law." In this way, as this author points out, in this matter one can consider "a lesser demand for precision in the testimonies rendered, in the admissibility of 'hearsay' or 'ex auditu' or indirect testimony; in the acceptance of less suitable evidence, e.g., testimonial evidence instead of expert evidence to establish, for example, the authenticity of a document in the absence of other undisputed ones and the absence or death of a grantor, etcetera." (KIELMANOVICH, Jorge Luis. (2008) Los principios del proceso de familia. In the joint work "Derecho Procesal de Familia. Tras las premisas de su teoría general." Editorial Jurídica Continental. San José. pp. 17 and 18). As the scholar Marisa Herrera also points out, commenting on Argentine legislation but with her concepts applicable, mutatis mutandi, in our country, "just as a constitutional/conventional family law has been built regarding substantive law, procedural law or procedures have also had to be humanized. In this way, and rightly so, it is understood that access to justice is a human right and that it must be especially protected when vulnerable persons are involved [...] In evidentiary matters, art. 710 specifies the principles relating to evidence in family proceedings. They are: 1) freedom, 2) breadth, 3) flexibility, and 4) dynamic burden of proof. [...]" (HERRERA MARISA. Op.cit. pp.49 y 50) The fact that there is evidentiary breadth in family procedural law does not mean that all types of evidence are admissible, since the Judge has the duty to guarantee that only lawful evidence is admitted, which in turn is pertinent and is offered and admitted at the times established by the Law.

The concept of lawful evidence (prueba lícita) encompasses not only that the evidentiary element as such is not violative of fundamental rights (for example, a statement under oath that refers to the commission of a crime by the declarant or a relative thereof up to the third degree by consanguinity or affinity, if the declarant was not previously warned of their constitutional right to abstain from testifying), but also that its procurement was not produced in violation of fundamental rights (for example, when the content of an electronic mail obtained after overcoming the will and privacy of the account holder through violence is offered as documentary evidence). Furthermore, it is very important to bear in mind that evidence obtained from other evidence that is illicit in itself or from other evidence obtained illicitly is spurious, which is known as the theory of the fruits of the poisonous tree.

The concept of pertinence refers to the evidence being offered or ordered ex officio for the verification of facts that are relevant and directly related to the claim (pretensión). For example, in a divorce proceeding where only the ground of de facto separation is invoked, it is not pertinent to receive the statement of a witness offered to refer to the fact that one of the spouses has violated the duty of fidelity.

Finally, the concept of timeliness (oportunidad) is related to the principle of procedural fairness (lealtad procesal), according to which there must be sufficient transparency for the parties to know, before their production, what evidence was offered, what was admitted, what was ordered ex officio, and what was rejected.

A case like the present one allows exemplifying the importance of what has just been stated: The Office of the Attorney General offered as documentary evidence—among others—the declaration given by Ms. [Name 001] before the Acting Head of the Local Office of Heredia of the Civil Registry. The Court of first instance did not indicate whether it admitted or rejected the evidence, thereby evading the obligation to examine its pertinence and lawfulness, and at the same time, prevented the parties from being able to exercise the corresponding remedies. However, that evidence was evaluated in the judgment, concluding that it was not "sufficient" because it had not been possible to subject it to cross-examination. The first thing that must be defined is whether the evidence is admitted or rejected. And if admitted, the appropriate course is to analyze it in the judgment, together with the other evidence that has been ordered received, at the request of a party or ex officio.

VIII.As can be seen, there was confusion in determining the object of this process. The claim filed by Prosecutor Marcela Ramírez Jara contains a clear claim for a declaration of non-existence of the marriage (f.35), but, without the facts or the claim having been expanded, the same Prosecutor introduced the concept of "simulated marriage" when she responded to the hearing granted to her to refer to the opposition that had been expressed by the guardian ad litem (curadora procesal) of the defendant [Name 005]. (ff. 68 and 69) Later, when the judgment was appealed, Prosecutor Esteban Alvarado Quesada stated that this had been a clerical error (error material). (f.83) However, upon appearing before this instance, another Prosecutor, Guillermo Fernández Lizano, expressed that the marriage is indeed simulated, for being non-existent. (f.124)

The Tribunal considers it necessary to clarify that the claim is for the non-existence of the marriage to be declared. It is not for relative nullity to be declared due to some vitiation of consent having occurred, nor is it for the nullity of the marriage to be declared due to simulation. As previously stated, neither the facts nor the claim were expanded, and therefore the factual framework and the claim were limited to what was set forth and what was requested in the claim.

It is also necessary for the Office of the Attorney General to clarify whether the claim was filed against Ms. [Name 001], since she was rather the person who requested the Civil Registry to process the annulment of the marriage inscription and the correction of the birth records of her daughters and son. Under such circumstances, it would seem that Ms. [Name 001]—who is not a legal professional—could be constituted as an active co-plaintiff (litis consorte activa) or as an adhering intervenor. This may end up having significant impact, because, eventually, Ms. [Name 001] could testify as a witness or as a party. If the Attorney General's Office considers that she must be maintained as a defendant, it will please indicate the corresponding reasons so that the judgment can adequately analyze the issue of passive standing (legitimación pasiva).

It is also required that the judicial authority of first instance, in exercise of the responsibility it has in discovering the truth of the facts because a matter of public interest is being elucidated, order ex officio the evidence it deems pertinent and also expressly rule on the documents offered by the plaintiff in the claim, indicating which it admits and/or which it rejects. The observation is made, respectfully, that the judgment mentioned that the declaration made by Ms. [Name 001] in the administrative venue could not be subjected to cross-examination, so eventually that evidence which the Judge missed could be ordered ex officio; and, as what was set forth in the claim is that Ms. [Name 001] did not express her consent to marry, perhaps it is pertinent to order a graphoscopic (handwriting) examination of the signature that might be stamped on the public deed (escritura pública).

For the reasons set forth in detail, the decision of this Tribunal is to annul the judgment and, in addition, all proceedings and resolutions from the order issued at thirteen hours fourteen minutes on August twenty-sixth, two thousand fourteen, in which Ms. [Name 001] was included in the procedural position of defendant. The decreed nullity does not include the service of the claim against Mr. [Name 005], nor the appointment of Ms. Karla Vanessa López Silva as his guardian ad litem, nor the acceptance and corresponding answer to the claim presented by said guardian ad litem. These documents remain in force in application of the principle of conservation of procedural acts.” The statement of facts was extremely clear in indicating that the marriage of Mr. [Name 005] and Mrs. [Name 001] is registered in the Marriages Section of the Civil Registry under citation [Value 001], an entry which indicates that the marriage was celebrated on December ninth, two thousand one, but that it was carried out despite the fact that Mrs. [Name 001] did not give her consent to marry Mr. [Name 005]. It was also stated that because she did not give this consent to marry, Mrs. [Name 001] herself asked the authorities of the Civil Registry to annul <u>the entry</u> of the marriage where she appears married to Mr. [Name 005] because "I have never been married to that person and furthermore I do not know who he is" and she also asked that "the birth record of my children be corrected ... since he is not the biological father of my children." Along with the complaint, documentary evidence was presented, which was formally offered (f.36). The documents provided were:

1. The official letter signed by Licenciado Óscar Fernando Mena Carvajal, Secretary General of the Civil Registry, in which he requests the Procuraduría General de la República to "manage what is within its competence for the nullity or non-existence of the marriage between Mrs. [Name 001] (sic) and [Name 005], as well as the correction of the surnames of the minors [Name 006]..., [Name 012]... and [Name 007]." (fs. 1 a 5); 2. The declaration given by Mrs. [Name 001] on November first, two thousand thirteen, before Licenciada Ligia Gamboa Martínez, Acting Head of the Regional Office of Heredia of the Civil Registry (f.6); 3. Two birth certificates of Mrs. [Name 001]. (fs. 7 and 19); 4. A certification stating that Mr. [Name 005] is not a holder of a Costa Rican identity card (f.8); 5. An official letter indicating that in the Options and Naturalizations Section of the Civil Department of the Civil Registry, there is no naturalization process for Mr. [Name 005] (f.9) 6. A copy of the registration entry for the marriage of Mr. [Name 005] to Mrs. [Name 001] (f.11), 7. The birth certificates of the young lady [Name 006], the girl [Name 012], and the boy [Name 007] (fs.12 to 14); 8. A copy of the Civil Marriage Declaration Certificate issued by the Notary Rocío Córdoba Cambronero (f.15); 9. A copy of the certified copy of the public deed of the celebration of the marriage of Mr. [Name 005] and Mrs. [Name 001], which was executed before the same Notary (fs. 17 and 18) 10. A copy of a certification issued on November twenty-third, two thousand one, stating that no registered marriage appeared for Mrs. [Name 001]. (f.20) 11. A copy of a certification of the birth record of [Name 005], issued by the Civil Registry of Persons of Masaya, Nicaragua. (f.21) 12. A copy of the first page of the Nicaraguan passport of Mr. [Name 005]. (f.23) 13. A copy of the document control list presented by the Notary Rocío Córdoba along with the application for registration of civil marriage. (f.25) 14. Copies of official letters in which the Civil Registry warns the Notary Rocío Córdoba Cambronero to make clarifications regarding the application for registration of the marriage of Mr. [Name 005] and Mrs. [Name 001]. (fs. 26 and 2) In the claim, it was clearly requested that the judgment declare the non-existence of that marriage; and, as a consequence of the foregoing, that "the marriage registration entry number [Value 001]" be annulled. Furthermore, it was requested that the "birth entries of the minors [Name 006], entries [Value 005], [Name 012], entries [Value 002], and [Name 007], entries [Value 003]" be annulled and that "the defendants" be ordered to pay costs and interest thereon. (fs. 32 a 36) It could be considered that the complaint brief presents elements that generate some doubt. Thus, for example, the Procuraduría General de la República did not state with precision against whom the complaint was directed, since what the Prosecutor, Licenciada Marcela Ramírez Jara, indicated was that she was appearing before the First Family Court "to request the non-existence of the marriage performed between [Name 001] and [Name 005]." (f.32) It was not until the section on legal grounds that any reference was made to whom she considered as "defendants," when in point B, she set out the title: "Of the non-existence of the marriage celebrated between the defendants" (f.35) and there is also some insinuation when in the prayer for relief she requested that "the defendants" be ordered to pay costs and interest thereon. (f.35) There is also some confusion in the formulation of the complaint's claim, when it was said that the declaration of non-existence of the marriage was requested because there existed "a defect in the consent of one of the contracting parties." (f.35), since in the same complaint, in the legal ground identified with letter A), "Of the regulation of Marriage in Costa Rica," the representative of the State cited a judgment of this Tribunal in which it was indicated that *"[...] if the 'contracting parties' do not appear before the official authorized to celebrate the marriage; or, if only one of them appears and it does not state that the other had granted a special power of attorney for such purposes, simply <u>there is no</u> manifestation of will and, as a logical consequence, there is no marriage. It is <b>not that the will is vitiated, it is that there is none.</b> [...]"* (f. 34. The emphasis is supplied) **IV.** The trial court processed the complaint in the terms in which it was presented, having Mr. [Name 005] and Mrs. [Name 001] as co-defendants; and in the end, in the judgment, the claims formulated were not granted. The Judge indicated, on one hand, that *"the representative of the State makes a large number of requests that are contradictory among themselves. The foregoing, because although she requests the declaration of non-existence of the marriage, due to the absence of consent on the part of the Costa Rican contracting party, because this contracting party stated in her sworn declaration that she had not consented to marry, that she does not know said gentleman, nor has she cohabited with him. Also in the claim, the plaintiff argues that a defect of consent was configured, and this is something different, since a defect occurs when the consent exists, but is vitiated."*; and, on the other, she pointed out that she did not have suitable evidence to make a favorable decision, by stating that *"the sole declaration in the administrative venue of Mrs. [Name 001] is documentary evidence, which is insufficient to prove the non-existence of the marriage, since she is not even called to testify before the judicial authority, in order to conduct the adversarial process and so that the representative of the defendant also has the possibility to cross-examine and clarify the doubts that arise regarding the alleged non-existence of the marriage. ... The undersigned judge also did not have the possibility to cross-examine the Costa Rican contracting party and be able to fully evaluate any element of conviction regarding this allegedly non-existent marriage."* Additionally, when referring to the legal grounds invoked in the complaint, the Judge stated that Articles 19 and 64 of the Family Code cannot be applied because the rules cannot be given retroactive effect, indicating that these two articles were introduced in a reform introduced by Law 8781, of November 11, 2009, and in this case, the marriage was celebrated on December 9, 2001. She mentioned the concept of "simulated marriage" and referred to the "nullity of marriage that is being heard here." The first question this Tribunal asks is: why has Mrs. [Name 001] been considered a defendant? There is no doubt to affirm that procedural capacity is a procedural prerequisite—reviewable at the beginning of the process—and that standing (legitimación) is a substantive prerequisite—analyzable in the judgment—; but it is clear that in every complaint there must be coherence, such that it is imperative that a logical relationship exists between those who appear as parties, with the facts that are set forth, with the evidence that is offered, with the law that is invoked, and with the claim that is formulated. When that coherence does not exist, it is necessary that the judicial authority—exercising the powers of instruction and direction conferred by Article 97 of the Civil Procedure Code—make the warnings that it must make so that, from the beginning, it is clearly defined what is being pursued with the process.

In this particular case, it is impossible to determine the reason why the Procuraduría General de la República apparently included Mrs. [Name 001] as a defendant, if the representative of the State herself affirmed that Mrs. [Name 001] did not give her consent to marry Mr. [Name 005] and that she even asked the authorities of the Civil Registry both to annul the entry of the marriage—because she never married and does not even know Mr. [Name 005]—and to correct the birth registration records of her daughters and son—because Mr. [Name 005] is not their father. With this statement of facts, it gives the impression—at least preliminarily—that Mrs. [Name 001], instead of appearing as a defendant, could have been constituted as an active litis consort (litis consorte activa)—pursuant to Article 107 of the Civil Procedure Code—, or at least as an adhering intervener, as contemplated by Article 112 of the same normative body.

As stated in the preceding Considerando, the Procuraduría General de la República did not indicate with precision against whom the complaint was directed, although it did make some insinuation in the Legal Ground identified with the letter B) and in the petition to order "the defendants" to pay costs and interest on the same. But in the circumstances noted, the trial court could have warned the representation of the State that, based on the statement of facts it had made, it should indicate whether it was indeed directing the complaint against Mrs. [Name 001] and, if so, to state the reason. In this way, if the Procuraduría maintained its decision to consider her as a defendant, the analysis of passive standing would have to be done in the judgment; but if it excluded her as a defendant, the Court could have ordered that the filing of this complaint be communicated to Mrs. [Name 001], because she is a direct interested party, and so she could express whether she wished to be constituted as a co-plaintiff or as an adhering intervener, or if—aware of the filing of the complaint and of what is claimed in it—she did not wish to participate in the process at all.

Secondly, the Tribunal considers that if the Court considered that the claim formulated in the complaint was contradictory—as it came to be said in the judgment—, what it should have done, in application of the provisions contained in Articles 124 and 290 of the Civil Procedure Code, was to warn for clarification of the claim at the beginning of the process, before processing the complaint, so that the state representation could indicate with precision whether what it requested was the declaration of non-existence of the marriage because Mrs. [Name 001] did not express her will to contract marriage with Mr. [Name 005]; whether what it requested was that the nullity of the marriage be declared, due to the existence of a defect of consent; or whether it petitioned for both pronouncements, and in this last case, whether it requested both as principal claims (declaration of non-existence of marriage due to absence of consent of the alleged contracting party and declaration of nullity of marriage due to defect of will of the contracting party) or whether it requested one as principal (declaration of non-existence due to absence of consent of the contracting party) and the other as subsidiary (declaration of nullity of marriage due to defect of will of the contracting party). However, as indicated in the preceding lines, the Court processed the complaint in the terms in which it was presented.

To relate it to what will be said later, it is necessary to expressly state that the representation of the State did not set forth facts <u>in the complaint</u> asserting the presence of a simulated marriage, under the terms established in Article 12 bis of the Family Code, nor did it request that its nullity be decreed for that reason, pursuant to Article 14 bis. It is true that the representative of the State made a mention of the figure of *simulated marriage* when she referred to the opposition made by the guardian ad litem of the defendant [Name 005] when answering the complaint, but it is evident that the Procuraduría never expanded either the facts or the claim to request that the nullity of the marriage be decreed, on the grounds of simulation. We will return to this in Considerando VIII.

Thirdly, the Tribunal observes inadequate treatment regarding the evidentiary matter, basically because the trial court never issued a resolution indicating whether it admitted or rejected the documentary evidence offered by the plaintiff when filing the complaint; but mainly because it failed to order, on its own motion, evidence aimed at the investigation of the truth. In this regard, it is not only necessary to know the legal treatment of evidence in family procedural matters, but also to remember that in topics where there is a public interest, judicial authorities must order, even ex officio, the taking of whatever evidence is necessary to make a decision, without this being able to be interpreted as a breach of the duty of impartiality that distinguishes jurisdictional activity.

**V.** At this point in the 21st century, there is no longer any doubt to affirm that there is no single type of family, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held in the case Atala Riffo vs. Chile, when it indicated that *"the concept of family life is not reduced solely to marriage but must encompass other de facto family ties where the parties live together outside marriage."* (Paragraph 142). However, it is unquestionable that marriage, as a legal institution, has always been a way to found a family. Article 52 of the Political Constitution provides that *"marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses."* On the other hand, the State also has the constitutional duty to protect the family. This is stipulated in Article 51 of the Political Constitution when it indicates that *"The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to special protection by the State."* Now, the *right to found a family* and the *right to marry* are fundamental rights of natural persons, as they are human rights positivized in various international instruments, as can be verified below:

***Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*** ***Article 16.*** **1.** *Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.* **2.** *Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.* ***American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man*** ***Article VI.*** *Every person has the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection therefor.* ***American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José)*** ***Article 17. Protection of the Family*** *[...]* *2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to raise a family shall be recognized, if they meet the conditions required by domestic laws, insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of non-discrimination established in this Convention.* *3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.* *4. The States Parties shall take appropriate steps to ensure the equality of rights and the adequate balancing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, during marriage, and in the event of its dissolution. In case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children on the sole basis of their own best interests and convenience.* *[...]* ***Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador)*** ***Article 15. Right to the Constitution and Protection of the Family*** *[...]* **2.** *Every person has the right to establish a family, which shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the pertinent domestic legislation.* *[...]* ***International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*** ***Article 23.*** *[...]* *2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.* *3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses.* *4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.* ***International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*** ***Article 10.*** *The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that:* **1.** *The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.* *[...]* ***Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women*** ***Article 16*** *1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:* *a) The same right to enter into marriage;* *b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent;* *c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution.* *[...]* By making a comprehensive interpretation of all these rules, it is possible to conclude that natural persons have the fundamental right to marry, if they meet the age and the conditions contemplated by each State; and also that the State has the duty to protect the legal institution of marriage, as this is a way to found a family. (Of course, without this implying that only marriage should be protected, since as previously stated, there is no single type of *family*, but rather this is a dynamic concept and, as such, evolves.) The national author Rubén Hernández Valle has explained this by saying that *"there exists a fundamental right of persons to marry, which derives from Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 17.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights."* This freedom implies—as Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has emphasized—that, "on one hand, the State cannot in any way unreasonably impede or obstruct the marriage of persons and, on the other, that it is not possible to impose the matrimonial form as the only way of constituting a family." (Voto 3693-94) (HERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Rubén. (2015) Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica. Comentada y con citas de jurisprudencia. Editorial Juricentro, San José. p. 266) The protection of the legal institution of marriage is carried out not only through a negative obligation, such as the State not unreasonably impeding or obstructing the fundamental right of citizens to enter into it, but it must also be done by fulfilling the positive obligation to diligently pursue and sanction persons who seek to circumvent the institution. Although marriage is entered into by two natural persons, subjects of private law, there is an unquestionable public interest in ensuring that marriage is celebrated only between persons who can enjoy the right to marry TO found a family, and that it is carried out following the formalities established for that purpose.

This relentless pursuit that must occur to combat the antisocial and unlawful use of the institution of marriage can take various forms and occur in different settings. Thus, for example, it is the responsibility of criminal authorities to sanction with imprisonment or a fine those who commit crimes related to marriage, including—depending on the case—not only the contracting parties themselves, but also their representatives, the officiants, and the witnesses. (Arts. 176 a 181 bis of the Penal Code); it is the responsibility of the authorities hearing disciplinary proceedings for the practice of Notarial Law to sanction Notaries who willfully participate in the celebration of a simulated marriage; and, in family court, there is no single way to prevent or combat the illegitimate celebration of marriages. The differences are clear and it is necessary to know them because the approach and the consequences are also very diverse.

**VI.** The first thing that must be clear is the difference between a non-existent marriage (matrimonio inexistente), an ineffective marriage (matrimonio ineficaz), a simulated marriage (matrimonio simulado), a legally impossible marriage (matrimonio legalmente imposible) and, should it be celebrated, one vitiated by absolute nullity, a marriage vitiated by relative nullity, and a prohibited marriage (matrimonio prohibido).

*Non-existent marriage.* The necessary condition for a marriage to EXIST is the clear and express manifestation of the consent of the contracting parties. This is provided for by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Pact of San José, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and it is also contemplated in our Family Code in its article 13, by indicating that *"For a marriage to **exist** the consent of the contracting parties must be manifested in a legal and express manner."* Interpreted in the opposite sense, as permitted by article 12 of the Civil Code, it is deduced from this rule that if one of the contracting parties did not make that manifestation of will—or if neither of them did—then the marriage DOES NOT EXIST and, since it does not exist, it produces no personal, social, or patrimonial effect. As explained by Doctora Marisa Herrera, referring to Argentine legislation, but with her concepts being applicable, *mutatis mutandi*, in our country, *"the indispensable and fundamental requirements for the existence of a marriage, post-reform of law 26.618 and which the CCyCN maintains, are two: 1) The full and free consent of both contracting parties and 2) the intervention of a competent authority. **The absence of any of these requirements results in the non-existence of the bond.** [...] Matrimonial consent is the verbal, written, or by any unequivocal means declaration, through which the contracting parties express their will to mutually constitute themselves as spouses. The declaration of the contracting parties presupposes, as a general principle, that the consent given is informed and free. Being an intuitu personae right, the intended spouses must appear in person at the celebration of the matrimonial act and unequivocally manifest their will regarding the legal act they wish to be perfected."* (HERRERA, Marisa. (2015) Manual de Derecho de las Familias. Abeledo Perrot. Buenos Aires, Argentina. p.121. The emphasis is supplied.) Thus, if the marriage is celebrated even though one of the contracting parties does NOT express their will to marry—or neither of them does—and it is also registered, then that registration must be annulled, but not the marriage. The marriage is declared non-existent and the annulment of the registration is ordered.

*Ineffective marriage.* Our law allows marriage to be celebrated with the officiant, one of the contracting parties, and the very special proxy of the other contracting party present. The Family Code provides that if the marriage is celebrated, but at the time of its celebration the power of attorney had already been legally revoked, then "there shall be no" marriage. "There being no marriage" in technical legal language means that the marriage is ineffective, and consequently, it also produces no personal, social, or patrimonial effects. If such is the situation, the marriage was validly celebrated because it was done in accordance with what the Law authorizes, but upon verification that the power of attorney was legitimately revoked, it is declared ineffective and the annulment of the registration is ordered. (Art. 30 of the Family Code) *Legally impossible marriage, and should it be celebrated, marriage vitiated by absolute nullity.* This contemplates those exceptional situations that the legislator has considered reasonable to prevent their celebration. When the Constitutional Chamber says that the State cannot "unreasonably impede or obstruct the marriage of persons," it is implicitly recognizing that the State does have the right to make objections that are reasonable at a given historical, social, and cultural moment. In other words, a person may marry whomever they wish, as long as the State has not expressly prohibited it. These are the cases contemplated in article 14 of the Family Code. They are situations so clearly defined that to prevent their celebration—or to decree their nullity, should they be celebrated—it is sufficient to verify that they are present. These situations are the following:

a. Of a person who is bound by a prior marriage; b. Between ascendants and descendants by consanguinity or affinity. The impediment does not disappear with the dissolution of the marriage that gave rise to the relationship by affinity.

c. Between consanguineous siblings.

d. Between the adopter and the adoptee and their descendants; the adoptive children of the same person; the adoptee and the children of the adopter; the adoptee and the former spouse of the adopter; and, the adopter and the former spouse of the adoptee; e. Between the perpetrator, co-perpetrator, instigator, or accomplice of the crime of homicide of one of the spouses and the surviving spouse; f. Between persons of the same sex; and, g. Of a person under fifteen years of age.

Thus, if the marriage is celebrated, despite being legally impossible, then its nullity shall be decreed. This is a nullity of an absolute nature, so the marriage cannot be convalidated under any circumstance. The discussion in a proceeding established for this purpose does not revolve around the *knowledge* that the spouses may have of the reason for the impediment, but rather the *verification* of it. These are cases where there is no time limit to request nullity and where standing is so broad that it can even be decreed ex officio. (Article 64) * Voidable marriage (Matrimonio anulable).* In these cases, marriages are validly celebrated, but at the act of their celebration—or, exceptionally, shortly after their celebration—some reason arises for which it could be annulled, at the request of a proper party and provided that the action is taken within the time period contemplated by the law itself, because otherwise, without any need for ratification, the marriage is convalidated. The causes of relative nullity are NOT situations of mere verification, but are susceptible to being challenged and, therefore, for the marriage to be annulled, it is necessary that the conduct invoked is effectively demonstrated. One of these cases is when consent was indeed given, but it is vitiated. (Arts. 15, 18 and 65 of the Family Code) *Prohibited marriage.* Since marriage is a solemn act, there is another situation where the person who celebrated the marriage is sanctioned for not having complied with the formalities required by the State, but nothing happens to the marriage, precisely because the State must defend it as the legal institution that it is. These are the cases contemplated in article 16 of the Family Code. The consequence regarding the marriage as such is provided in article 17, when it states very clearly that "the marriage celebrated despite the prohibitions of the preceding article is valid." *Simulated marriage.* Finally, on a date no longer so recent, through Law 8781—in force since November 17, 2009—the figure of *simulated marriage* was expressly introduced into our legislation. This Law introduced reforms to the Family Code—to which articles 12 bis and 14 bis, a new article 19 (because the previous one had been repealed by Law 8571), and a second paragraph to article 64 were added—; to the Penal Code—to which article 181 bis was added, to introduce the crime of "Simulated Marriage" which is different from "Simulation of Marriage" contemplated in article 178—; to the Notarial Code—to which a subsection d) was added to article 145, to include the celebration of simulated marriages with the willful participation of the Notary as grounds for a sanction of suspension from the practice of Notarial Law—; and, to the General Law of Migration and Foreigners—to which article 73 bis was added, to introduce the possibility of granting migratory status to persons living in a common-law marriage (unión de hecho)—. The main purpose of the reform, clearly acknowledged in the statement of legislative intent when it was still a bill, was to combat marriages celebrated between a foreign person and a Costa Rican person, without the purpose of founding a family existing, but rather with the intention of obtaining migratory advantages by abusing this legal institution. The reform was carried out not only to prevent individuals who intend to abuse marriage to irregularly obtain these migratory conditions from achieving it; but also to combat criminal organizations dedicated to human trafficking and the dark business of obtaining benefits through fraud against the law, in which, unfortunately, Notaries Public often intervene—willfully or culpably—. However, the legislator did not define simulated marriage in article 12 bis of the Family Code with the clarity it did show when criminalizing it as an offense in article 181 bis of the Penal Code, but rather defined it simply as "the marital union that, complying with the formalities of law, does not have as its object the fulfillment of the essential purposes provided for in this Code." Let it be clear, however, that the marriage vitiated by absolute nullity due to simulation is not that which is celebrated between a foreign person and a Costa Rican person. That, clearly, would be an unconstitutional and unconventional provision due to being xenophobic. But a marriage is simulated if it was entered into to obtain migratory advantages or those of some other nature and not to fulfill the essential purpose of founding a family. Consequently, for the nullity of a marriage due to simulation to be decreed, it is essential that it be alleged and then demonstrated, with lawful evidence, that the purpose for which it was contracted was fraudulent. It must be distinguished, however, that when the contracting parties marry with the intention of founding a family, but additionally deem it necessary to stipulate a condition—for example, "we marry but we do not want children. If at some point either of us wishes to procreate, we will annul the marriage."—, the CONDITION is null, but the marriage is valid. This is what article 12 of the Family Code refers to.

Now, by being placed in article 14 bis, the legislator provided that "the simulated marriage shall be null," and in this case, the nullity is of an absolute nature, so it is not convalidatable by any subjective circumstance ("I did not know it was illegal to marry solely to obtain migratory advantages or those of another type") nor by the simple passage of time and, furthermore, it can be decreed even ex officio. The reform to article 64, when a second paragraph was introduced, is solely to include the Director of the Civil Registry and the Director of Migration and Foreigners, under the representation of the Procuraduría General de la República, as persons authorized to petition for the nullity of the marriage. This is perhaps convenient, but it was not necessary by virtue of the fact that in absolute nullity, standing is extremely broad, to the point that it can even be decreed ex officio.

The reform also brought something interesting: When a marriage is annulled—whether due to a defect of absolute nullity or a defect of relative nullity—there are some effects that cease, but there are others that are maintained. For example, upon decreeing the nullity of the marriage, the "spouses" return to their previous civil status, but the children they may have procreated retain the status of marital children (Arts. 69 and 82 of the Family Code). Other effects that are maintained are the patrimonial ones, and therefore, if there were marriage contracts (capitulaciones), these are respected, and if the patrimonial effects of the marriage must be liquidated through the default legal regime, the right of each spouse to participate in half of the net value of the community property (bienes gananciales) verified in the estate of the other always arises. (Art.41) What this means is that part of the responsibility of the adjudicating person who annuls a marriage is to indicate which effects are extinguished and which are maintained.

Now, with the reform introduced through Law 8781, upon issuing the new article 19 (which has no relation to the one that had been repealed by Law 8571), the legislator provided that *"the simulated marriage shall not convalidate any type of rights or obligations for the contracting parties."* and expressly, because that was the motivation for the reforms, stipulated that *"when its nullity is declared, the judge in declaratory judgment shall order the cancellation of the registry inscription, as well as the migratory status and naturalizations granted, all as a consequence of the simulated marriage."* From a comprehensive analysis of all these regulations, it is possible to appreciate that the *simulated marriage* presents nuances that relate it to the non-existence and ineffectiveness of marriage, nuances that relate it to legally impossible marriages, and nuances that relate it to the relative nullity of marriages.

Thus, as with the non-existence and ineffectiveness of marriages, when the marriage is simulated, the registration is annulled and no personal, social, or patrimonial effect is produced. As with marriages vitiated by absolute nullity or by relative nullity, in the case of simulation, the marriage is annulled and its registration is annulled. As with non-existent, ineffective, and legally impossible marriages—and therefore, vitiated by absolute nullity should they be celebrated—the simulated marriage cannot be convalidated by subjective aspects of the spouses or by the passage of time, and standing is so broad that it can even be decreed ex officio. And, as with marriages vitiated by relative nullity, it is feasible that in a simulated marriage the facts become controversial, and for the nullity action to succeed, it is necessary that these be demonstrated.

**VII.** Non-existent marriages, ineffective ones, simulated ones, and those vitiated by absolute nullity have in common that legal standing to act is extremely broad, to the point that non-existence, ineffectiveness, and nullity—due to simulation or because the marriage was legally impossible—can be decreed even ex officio.

The fact that it can be decreed even ex officio does not mean that the State, through the Courts of Justice and much less through administrative authorities, can make the declaration of non-existence, ineffectiveness, or nullity, dispensing with due process and rendering the right of defense illusory. Any of these actions must be brought to the attention of those who appear as spouses, so that they have the opportunity to express what they deem pertinent, and, when required, to offer the corresponding evidence.

Now, acting ex officio does not refer exclusively to the final decision adopted in a judgment; rather, it encompasses all the activity that the adjudicating person must carry out from the beginning of the process, making the necessary preventive measures so that before the claim is served for response, clarity exists as to what is sought in a specific process, and extending through the evidentiary phase, in which they are required to take initiative and order the taking of evidence necessary to issue the final ruling. As explained before, marriage is contracted by natural persons, subjects of private law, but its celebration is of public interest. This public interest brings with it that requirement that the State, through the Courts of Justice, make truly effective the provision contained in article 316 of the Civil Procedure Code, insofar as it indicates that at the beginning of the evidentiary phase, *"the judge shall order the taking of the offered evidence that is admissible, **and that which ex officio they consider necessary.**"* For this reason, the Court deems unacceptable, in cases where public interest is at stake, the argument given by the first instance Judge to the effect that there was insufficient evidence to issue a favorable judgment. She stated that the declaration made by Ms. [Name 001] before the administrative authorities was not *sufficient* to decree the non-existence of the marriage, because the version she gave on that occasion could not be subjected to cross-examination. If such was the difficulty, the obligation was to order the evidence ex officio. But the problem is broader, since the judgment indicated that this documentary evidence was insufficient, yet it turns out that this evidentiary element was never legitimately incorporated into the proceedings, as there is no resolution where it was admitted. In the resolution of two hundred-seven minutes past fourteen hours on June five, two thousand fifteen, it was indicated that it was not appropriate to summon the parties to conciliation and that "since there is no testimonial evidence to take, once this order is final, the judgment on the merits shall be issued." (f.73) As can be seen, the resolution did not issue a pronouncement on the documentary evidence that was offered in the claim. The admission or rejection of evidence requires an intellectual effort by the adjudicating person, as they must analyze whether the evidence is pertinent and lawful and whether it was offered timely. By not having been admitted or rejected, the parties were prevented from contesting the decision. This leads us to the scenario of the legal treatment of evidence in family procedural matters.

Basically—because evidently this topic is very broad—it must be mentioned that in this family procedural matter, the limitations established in civil procedural legislation for evaluating evidence do not apply. (Article 8 of the Family Code) But more important is the fact that the limitations not only do not exist at the end, when the evidence must be evaluated, but that this extends to the moment of taking evidence, to the moment of admitting evidence, and even to the moment when it must be qualified whether an element constitutes evidence or not. This is so because for the Judge to evaluate the evidence, they first had to take it, and before that they had to admit it, and to admit it, they had to have defined whether what was offered was, or was not, an evidentiary element. This breadth is known in doctrine as the *principle of favor probatione*, which, in the words of the Argentine proceduralist Jorge Luis Kielmanovich, *"implies that in cases of doubt regarding the production, admission, conduciveness, or efficacy of the evidence, a broad criterion in favor of it shall be adopted, so that the opening of the case for evidence should be preferred over a declaration of pure law."* Thus, as this author points out, in this matter one can consider *"a lesser requirement of precision in depositions rendered, in the admissibility of 'hearsay,' 'ex auditu,' or indirect testimony; in the acceptance of less suitable evidence, e.g., testimonial instead of expert evidence to establish, for example, the authenticity of a document in the absence of other unquestioned documents and the absence or death of a grantor, etc."* (KIELMANOVICH, Jorge Luis. (2008) Los principios del proceso de familia. In the joint work "Derecho Procesal de Familia. Tras las premisas de su teoría general." Editorial Jurídica Continental. San José. pp. 17 and 18). As also noted by the scholar Marisa Herrera, commenting on Argentine legislation but with her concepts being applicable, *mutatis mutandi,* in our country, *"just as a constitutional/conventional family law has been built regarding substantive law, procedural law or procedures have also had to become humanized. In this way, and rightly so, it is understood that access to justice is a human right and that this must be especially protected when it concerns vulnerable persons [...] In evidentiary matters, art.710 specifies what the principles relating to evidence in family proceedings are. They are: 1) freedom, 2) breadth, 3) flexibility, and 4) dynamic burden of proof. [...]"* (HERRERA MARISA. Op.cit. pp.49 y 50) The fact that there is broad evidentiary availability in family procedural law does not mean that any type of evidence is admissible, since the Adjudicator has the duty to guarantee that only lawful evidence is admitted, which in turn is pertinent and is offered and admitted at the times established by the Law.

The concept of *lawful evidence* encompasses not only that the evidentiary element as such does not result in a violation of fundamental rights (for example, a sworn statement referring to the commission of a crime by the declarant or by a relative up to the third degree by consanguinity or affinity, if the declarant was not previously warned about their constitutional right to abstain from declaring), but also that its procurement was not produced through a violation of fundamental rights (for example, when the content of an email obtained after overcoming the will and privacy of the account holder by means of violence is offered as documentary evidence).

Furthermore, it is very important to bear in mind that evidence obtained from other evidence that is itself unlawful, or from other evidence obtained unlawfully, is spurious, which is known as the <i>fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.</i> The concept of <i>relevance (pertinencia)</i> refers to the evidence being offered or ordered by the court on its own motion (de oficio) to verify facts that are relevant and directly related to the claim. For example, in a divorce proceeding where only the ground of de facto separation is invoked, it is not relevant to receive the testimony of a witness offered to refer to the fact that one of the spouses has violated the duty of fidelity.

Finally, the concept of <i>timeliness (oportunidad)</i> is related to the principle of <i>procedural good faith (lealtad procesal)</i>, according to which there must be sufficient transparency so that the parties know, before their presentation, which evidence was offered, which was admitted, which was ordered by the court on its own motion, and which was rejected.

A case such as the present one serves to exemplify the importance of what has just been stated: The Procuraduría General de la República offered as documentary evidence - among others - the statement given by Mrs. [Name 001] before the Acting Head (Jefa a.i.) of the Local Office of Heredia of the Civil Registry. The first-instance court did not indicate whether it admitted or rejected the evidence, thereby evading the obligation to examine its relevance and lawfulness, and at the same time, the parties were prevented from exercising the corresponding remedies. However, that evidence was weighed in the judgment, concluding that it was not "sufficient" because it had not been possible to subject it to cross-examination. The first thing that must be defined is whether the evidence is admitted or rejected. And if it is admitted, the proper course is to analyze it in the judgment, together with the other evidence that has been ordered to be received, at the request of a party or on the court’s own motion.

**VIII.** As can be seen, there was confusion in determining the object of this proceeding. The complaint filed by Procuradora Marcela Ramírez Jara contains a clear claim for a declaration of non-existence of the marriage (f.35), but, without the facts or the claim having been expanded, the same Procuradora introduced the concept of "simulated marriage" when she responded to the hearing granted to her to refer to the opposition expressed by the procedural guardian (curadora procesal) of the defendant [Name 005]. (fs. 68 and 69) Later, when the judgment was appealed, Procurador Esteban Alvarado Quesada stated that this had been a material error. (f.83) However, upon appearing in this instance, another Procurador, Licenciado Guillermo Fernández Lizano, expressed that the marriage is indeed simulated, being non-existent. (f.124) The Court deems it necessary to clarify that the complaint is for a declaration of non-existence of the marriage. It is not for a declaration of relative nullity due to a defect in consent, nor for a declaration of nullity of the marriage due to simulation. As stated before, neither the facts nor the claim were expanded, and therefore the factual framework and the claim remained limited to what was set forth and requested in the complaint.

It is also necessary that the Procuraduría General de la República clarify whether the complaint was filed against Mrs. [Name 001], since she was rather the person who requested the Civil Registry to process the annulment of the marriage registration and the correction of the birth records of her daughters and son. In such circumstances, it <u>would seem</u> that Mrs. [Name 001] - who is not a legal professional - could be constituted as an active co-litigant (litis consorte activa) or as an adhering intervener (interventora adhesiva). This could have important implications because, eventually, Mrs. [Name 001] could give a statement as a witness or as a party. If the Procuraduría considers that she must remain as a defendant, it shall indicate the corresponding reasons so that the judgment can adequately analyze the issue of passive standing (legitimación pasiva).

It is also required that the first-instance judicial authority, in exercising its responsibility in discovering the truth of the facts as a matter of public interest is being elucidated, order on its own motion the evidence it deems relevant and also rule expressly on the documents offered by the plaintiff in the complaint, indicating which it admits and/or which it rejects. The observation is respectfully made that the judgment mentioned that the statement given by Mrs. [Name 001] in administrative proceedings could not be subjected to cross-examination, and therefore, that evidence which the Judge (Juzgadora) missed could eventually be ordered on the court's own motion; and, since what was stated in the complaint is that Mrs. [Name 001] did not express her consent to marry, it may be relevant to order a graphoscopic examination of the signature that may be stamped on the public deed.

For the reasons set forth in detail, this Court's decision is to annul the judgment and, in addition, all actions taken and decisions rendered as of the resolution issued at thirteen hours fourteen minutes on August twenty-sixth, two thousand fourteen, in which Mrs. [Name 001] was included in the procedural position of defendant. The declared nullity does not include the service of process of the complaint upon Mr. [Name 005], nor the appointment of Licenciada Karla Vanessa López Silva as his procedural guardian, nor the acceptance and corresponding response to the complaint filed by said procedural guardian. These pieces remain in force in application of the principle of preservation of procedural acts.” The statement of facts was extremely clear in indicating that the marriage between Mr. [Name 005] and Mrs. [Name 001] is registered in the Civil Registry's Marriage Section under entry [Value 001], an entry stating that the marriage was celebrated on December ninth, two thousand one, but that it took place despite the fact that Mrs. [Name 001] did not give her consent to marry Mr. [Name 005]. It was also set forth that, by not having given this consent to marry, Mrs. [Name 001] herself asked the Civil Registry authorities to annul the entry of the marriage where she appears married to Mr. [Name 005] because "I have never been married to that person and, besides, I do not know who he is," and she also asked that "the birth record of my children be corrected ... since he is not the biological father of my children." Along with the complaint, documentary evidence was submitted, which was formally offered (p. 36). The documents provided were:

1. The official letter signed by Licenciado Óscar Fernando Mena Carvajal, Secretary General of the Civil Registry, in which he requests the Procuraduría General de la República to "take the actions within its competence for the annulment or declaration of non-existence of the marriage between Mrs. [Name 001] (sic) and [Name 005], as well as the correction of the surnames of the minors [Name 006], [Name 012] ... and [Name 007]." (pp. 1 a 5); 2. The statement made by Mrs. [Name 001] on November first, two thousand thirteen, before Licenciada Ligia Gamboa Martínez, Acting Head of the Regional Office of Heredia of the Civil Registry (p. 6); 3. Two birth certificates of Mrs. [Name 001] (pp. 7 and 19); 4. A certification stating that Mr. [Name 005] is not a bearer of a Costa Rican identity card (p. 8); 5. An official letter indicating that in the Options and Naturalizations Section of the Civil Department of the Civil Registry, there is no record of a naturalization procedure for Mr. [Name 005] (p. 9); 6. A copy of the marriage registration entry between Mr. [Name 005] and Mrs. [Name 001] (p. 11); 7. The birth certificates of Miss [Name 006], the female child [Name 012], and the male child [Name 007] (pp. 12 to 14); 8. A copy of the Certificate of Declaration of Civil Marriage issued by Notaria Rocío Córdoba Cambronero (p. 15); 9. A copy of the testimonial copy of the public deed of the celebration of the marriage between Mr. [Name 005] and Mrs. [Name 001], which was executed before the same Notary (pp. 17 and 18); 10. A copy of a certification issued on November twenty-third, two thousand one, indicating that no registered marriage appeared for Mrs. [Name 001] (p. 20); 11. A copy of a certification of the birth record of [Name 005], issued by the Civil Status Registrar of Persons of Masaya, Nicaragua (p. 21); 12. A copy of the first page of the Nicaraguan passport of Mr. [Name 005] (p. 23); 13. A copy of the control of documents submitted by Notaria Rocío Córdoba along with the application for civil marriage registration (p. 25); 14. Copies of official letters in which the Civil Registry warns Notaria Rocío Córdoba Cambronero to make clarifications regarding the application for registration of the marriage of Mr. [Name 005] and Mrs. [Name 001] (pp. 26 and 2).

In the claim for relief, it was clearly requested that the judgment declare the non-existence of that marriage; and, as a consequence of the foregoing, that "the marriage registration entry number [Value 001]" be annulled. Additionally, it was requested that "the birth entries of the minors [Name 006], entries [Value 005], [Name 012], entries [Value 002], and [Name 007], entries [Value 003] be annulled" and that "the defendants" be ordered to pay the legal costs and interest thereon. (pp. 32 a 36) It could be considered that the complaint document presents elements that generate some doubt. Thus, for example, the Procuraduría General de la República did not precisely state against whom the complaint was directed, since what Mrs. Procuradora Licenciada Marcela Ramírez Jara indicated was that she was appearing before the First Family Court "to request the non-existence of the marriage performed between [Name 001] and [Name 005]." (p. 32) It was not until the legal grounds section that some reference was made to whom it considered as "defendants," when in point B, it noted the title: "On the non-existence of the marriage celebrated between the defendants" (p. 35), and there is also some hint when, in the prayer for relief, it requested that "the defendants" be ordered to pay legal costs and interest thereon. (p. 35) There is also some confusion in the formulation of the complaint's claim for relief, when it was stated that the declaration of the marriage's non-existence was requested because there was "a defect in the consent (vicio en el consentimiento) of one of the contracting parties." (p. 35), since in the same complaint, in the legal ground identified with the letter A), "On the regulation of Marriage in Costa Rica," the State's representative cited a judgment of this Tribunal indicating that "[...] if the 'contracting parties' do not appear before the official authorized to celebrate the marriage; or, if only one of them appears and there is no record that the other had granted a special power of attorney for such purposes, there simply is no manifestation of will and, as a logical consequence, there is no marriage. It is not that the will is defective, it is that there is none. [...]" (p. 34. Emphasis supplied.)

**IV.** The lower court processed the complaint in the terms it was presented, having Mr. [Name 005] and Mrs. [Name 001] as co-defendants; and in the end, in the judgment, the claims formulated were not upheld. The Judge indicated, on one hand, that "the State's representative makes a great number of requests that are contradictory among themselves. The foregoing, because although she requests the declaration of non-existence of the marriage, due to the lack of consent on the part of the Costa Rican contracting party, because this contracting party stated in her sworn statement that she did not consent to marry, that she does not know said gentleman, nor has she cohabited with him. Also, in the claim for relief, the plaintiff argues that a defect of consent (vicio de consentimiento) was configured, and this is something different, since a defect exists when consent exists, but it is defective."; and, on the other hand, pointed out that she did not have suitable evidence to make a granting decision, stating that "the sole statement in an administrative venue by Mrs. [Name 001] is documentary evidence that is insufficient to prove the non-existence of the marriage, since she is not even called to confess before the judicial authority, in order to conduct a contradictory proceeding and so that the representative of the defendant also has the possibility to cross-examine and elucidate the doubts that arise regarding the alleged non-existence of the marriage. ... Nor did the undersigned judge have the possibility to cross-examine the Costa Rican contracting party and to be able to fully assess any element of conviction regarding this alleged non-existent marriage." Additionally, when referring to the legal grounds invoked in the complaint, the Judge stated that Articles 19 and 64 of the Family Code cannot be applied because laws cannot be given retroactive effect, indicating that these two articles were introduced in a reform brought in by Ley 8781, of November 11, 2009, and in this case, the marriage was celebrated on December 9, 2001. She mentioned the concept of "simulated marriage" and referred to the "annulment of marriage that is being heard here." The first thing this Tribunal asks itself is: why has Mrs. [Name 001] been considered a defendant? There is no doubt in affirming that procedural capacity is a procedural prerequisite – reviewable at the beginning of the process – and that standing to sue (legitimación) is a substantive prerequisite – analyzable in the judgment –; but it is clear that in every complaint there must be coherence, such that it is imperative that a logical relationship exists between those who appear as parties, the facts set forth, the evidence offered, the Law invoked, and the claim for relief formulated. When such coherence does not exist, it is necessary for the judicial authority – exercising the powers of instruction and direction conferred by Article 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure – to make the necessary warnings so that, from the beginning, it is clearly defined what is being sought through the proceeding.

In this particular case, it is not possible to determine the reason why the Procuraduría General de la República apparently included Mrs. [Name 001] as a defendant, if the State's own representative affirmed that Mrs. [Name 001] did not give her consent to marry Mr. [Name 005] and that she even asked the Civil Registry authorities both to annul the marriage registration – because she never married and does not even know Mr. [Name 005] – and to correct the birth registration records of her daughters and son – because Mr. [Name 005] is not their father. With this statement of facts, it gives the impression – at least preliminarily – that Mrs. [Name 001], instead of appearing as a defendant, could have been constituted as an active co-litigant (litis consorte activa) – pursuant to Article 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure –, or at least as an adhering intervener (interventora adhesiva), as contemplated in Article 112 of the same regulatory body.

As stated in the previous Considerando, the Procuraduría General de la República did not precisely indicate against whom the complaint was directed, although it did make some hint in the Legal Ground identified with the letter B) and in the request to order "the defendants" to pay legal costs and interest thereon. But under the circumstances noted, the lower court could have warned the State's representation that, based on the statement of facts it had made, it should indicate whether it was indeed directing the complaint against Mrs. [Name 001] and, if so, to please state the reason. In this way, if the Procuraduría maintained its decision to consider her a defendant, the analysis of passive standing would have to be done in the judgment; but if it excluded her as a defendant, the Court could well have ordered that Mrs. [Name 001] be notified of the filing of this complaint, as she is a directly interested party, and that she thus express whether she wished to be constituted as a co-plaintiff or as an adhering intervener, or whether – informed of the filing of the complaint and what is sought therein – she did not wish to appear in the proceeding at all.

Secondly, the Tribunal considers that if the Court considered the claim for relief formulated in the complaint to be contradictory – as came to be stated in the judgment –, what it should have done, in application of the provisions contained in Articles 124 and 290 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was to order a clarification of the claim for relief at the beginning of the proceeding, before processing the complaint, so that the State's representation would indicate with precision whether what it was requesting was the declaration of non-existence of the marriage because Mrs. [Name 001] did not express her will to enter into marriage with Mr. [Name 005]; whether what it was requesting was that the annulment of the marriage be declared, due to the existence of a defect of consent; or whether it was petitioning for both pronouncements, and in this last case, whether it requested both as principal claims (declaration of non-existence of marriage due to absence of consent of the alleged contracting party and declaration of annulment of marriage due to defect of will of the contracting party) or whether it requested one as principal (declaration of non-existence due to absence of consent of the contracting party) and the other as subsidiary (declaration of annulment of marriage due to defect of will of the contracting party). However, as indicated in the preceding lines, the Court processed the complaint in the terms it was presented.

To relate it to what will be said later, it is necessary to expressly state that the State's representation did not set forth facts in the complaint affirming the presence of a simulated marriage, in the terms established in Article 12 bis of the Family Code, nor did it request that its annulment be decreed for that reason, pursuant to Article 14 bis. It is true that the State's representative made a mention of the figure of simulated marriage when referring to the opposition made by the special court-appointed representative for defendant [Name 005] when answering the complaint, but it is evident that the Procuraduría never expanded either the facts or the claim for relief to seek the annulment of the marriage on grounds of simulation. We will return to this in Considerando VIII.

Thirdly, the Tribunal observes inadequate treatment regarding the evidentiary matter, basically because the lower court never issued a resolution indicating whether it admitted or rejected the documentary evidence offered by the plaintiff when filing the complaint; but mainly because it failed to order, on its own motion, evidence aimed at ascertaining the truth. On this particular point, it is not only necessary to understand the legal treatment of evidence in family procedural matters but also to remember that in topics where public interest exists, judicial authorities must order, even on their own motion, the taking of those pieces of evidence that are necessary to make a decision, without this being able to be interpreted as a breach of the duty of impartiality that distinguishes jurisdictional activity.

**V.** At this point in the 21st century, there is no longer any doubt in affirming that there is no single type of family, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held in the Atala Riffo vs. Chile case, when it indicated that "the concept of family life is not reduced solely to marriage but must encompass other de facto family ties where the parties live a life in common outside of marriage." (Paragraph 142). However, it is unquestionable that marriage, as a legal institution, has always been a way to found a family. Article 52 of the Constitución Política provides that "marriage is the essential basis of the family and rests on the equality of rights of the spouses." On the other hand, the State also has the constitutional duty to protect the family. This is stipulated in Article 51 of the Constitución Política when it indicates that "The family, as a natural element and foundation of society, has the right to the special protection of the State." Now, the right to found a family and the right to enter into marriage are fundamental rights of natural persons, as they are human rights positivized in different international instruments, as can be verified below:

**Universal Declaration of Human Rights.** **Article 16.** **1.** Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. **2.** Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

**American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man** **Article VI.** Every person has the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection for it.

**American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José)** **Article 17. Protection of the Family** [...] 2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to raise a family shall be recognized, if they meet the conditions required by domestic laws, insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of non-discrimination established in this Convention. 3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 4. The States Parties shall take appropriate steps to ensure the equality of rights and the adequate balancing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, during marriage, and in the event of its dissolution. In case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children solely on the basis of their own best interests. [...]

**Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (Protocol of San Salvador)** **Article 15. Right to the Formation and Protection of the Family** [...] 2. Every person has the right to establish a family, which shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the corresponding domestic legislation. [...]

**International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights** **Article 23.** [...] 2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized. 3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.

**International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights** **Article 10.** The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that: **1.** The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses. [...]

**Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women** **Article 16** 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: a) The same right to enter into marriage; b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent; c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution. [...]

Making a comprehensive interpretation of all these norms, it is possible to conclude that natural persons have the fundamental right to enter into marriage, if they have the age and the conditions that each State contemplates; and also that the State has the duty to protect the legal institution of marriage, as it is a way to found a family. (Of course, without this implying that only marriage must be protected, since, as previously stated, there is no single type of family, rather it is a dynamic concept and, as such, evolves.) The national author Rubén Hernández Valle has explained this by saying that "a fundamental right of persons to enter into marriage exists, deriving from Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 17.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights." This freedom implies—as underscored by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)—that, "on the one hand, the State cannot in any way unreasonably impede or obstruct the marriage of persons and, on the other, that it is not possible to impose the marital form as the only way of constituting a family." (Voto 3693-94) (HERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Rubén. (2015) Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica. Comentada y con citas de jurisprudencia. Editorial Juricentro, San José. p. 266) The protection of the legal institution of marriage is achieved not only through a negative obligation, such as the State not UNREASONABLY impeding or obstructing the fundamental right of citizens to marry, but also by fulfilling the positive obligation to diligently pursue and sanction persons who seek to circumvent the institution. Although marriage is entered into by two natural persons, subjects of private law, there is an unquestionable public interest in ensuring that marriage is celebrated only between persons who can enjoy the right to marry TO found a family, and that it is performed following the formalities established for that purpose.

This relentless pursuit that must occur to combat the antisocial and antijuridical use of the institution of marriage can take various forms and occur in different settings. Thus, for example, it falls to criminal authorities to sanction with imprisonment or a fine those who commit crimes related to marriage, including—as the case may be—not only the contracting parties themselves, but also their representatives, the officiants, and the witnesses. (Arts. 176 a 181 bis of the Penal Code); it falls to the authorities hearing disciplinary proceedings for the practice of Notarial Law to sanction Notaries who willfully participate in the celebration of a simulated marriage (matrimonio simulado); and, in family court, there is not a single way to prevent or combat the illegitimate celebration of marriages. The differences are clear and it is necessary to know them because the approach and consequences are also very diverse.

**VI.** The first thing that must be clear is the difference between a non-existent marriage (matrimonio inexistente), an ineffective marriage (matrimonio ineficaz), a simulated marriage, a legally impossible marriage (matrimonio legalmente imposible), and, if celebrated, one vitiated by absolute nullity, a marriage vitiated by relative nullity, and a prohibited marriage (matrimonio prohibido).

*Non-existent marriage.* The necessary condition for a marriage to EXIST is the clear and express manifestation of the consent of the contracting parties. This is provided for by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Pact of San José, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and it is also contemplated by our Family Code in its article 13, when it indicates that "For a marriage to *exist* the consent of the contracting parties must be manifested in a legal and express manner." Interpreted in the opposite sense, as permitted by article 12 of the Civil Code, this norm implies that if one of the contracting parties did not make that manifestation of will—or if neither of them did—then the marriage DOES NOT EXIST and, since it does not exist, it produces no personal, social, or patrimonial effects. As explained by Doctora Marisa Herrera referring to Argentine legislation, but with concepts applicable, *mutatis mutandi*, in our country, "the indispensable and fundamental requirements for the existence of a marriage, after the reform of Law 26.618 and maintained by the CCyCN, are two: 1) The full and free consent of both contracting parties and 2) the intervention of a competent authority. **The absence of any of these requirements leads to the non-existence of the bond.** [...] Marital consent is the verbal, written, or unambiguous declaration by any means, through which the contracting parties express their will to constitute each other reciprocally as spouses. The declaration of the contracting parties presupposes, as a general principle, that the consent given is informed and free. Being a *intuito personae* right, the intended spouses must appear in person at the celebration of the marital act and manifest unequivocally their will in relation to the juridical act they wish to be perfected." (HERRERA, Marisa. (2015) *Manual de Derecho de las Familias.* Abeledo Perrot. Buenos Aires, Argentina. p.121. The emphasis is added.) In this way, if the marriage is celebrated even though one of the contracting parties DOES NOT express their will to marry—or neither of them does—and it is also registered, then that registration must be annulled, but not the marriage. The marriage is declared non-existent and the annulment of the registration is ordered.

*Ineffective marriage.* Our law permits marriage to be celebrated with the officiant, one of the contracting parties, and the special power-of-attorney holder (apoderado especialísimo) of the other contracting party present. The Family Code provides that if the marriage is celebrated, but at the time of celebration the power of attorney had already been legally revoked, then "there shall be no" marriage. "There being no marriage" in technical juridical language means that the marriage is ineffective, and consequently, it also produces no personal, social, or patrimonial effects. If that were the situation, the marriage was celebrated validly because it was done as authorized by the Law, but upon verifying that the power of attorney was legitimately revoked, it is declared ineffective and the annulment of the registration is ordered. (Art. 30 of the Family Code) *Legally impossible marriage*, *and if celebrated, marriage vitiated by absolute nullity.* This contemplates those exceptional situations that the legislator has considered reasonable to prevent their celebration. When the Constitutional Chamber says that the State cannot "unreasonably impede or obstruct the marriage of persons," it is implicitly recognizing that the State does have the right to make objections that are reasonable at a given historical, social, and cultural moment. In other words, a person can marry whomever they wish, as long as the State has not expressly prevented it. These are the cases contemplated in article 14 of the Family Code. They are situations so clearly defined that to prevent their celebration—or to decree their nullity, if celebrated—it is sufficient to verify that they are present. These situations are the following:

a. A person who is bound by a prior marriage; b. Between ascendants and descendants by consanguinity or affinity. The impediment does not disappear with the dissolution of the marriage that gave rise to the relationship by affinity. c. Between consanguineous siblings. d. Between the adopter and the adoptee and their descendants; the adoptive children of the same person; the adoptee and the children of the adopter; the adoptee and the former spouse of the adopter; and, the adopter and the former spouse of the adoptee; e. Between the perpetrator, co-perpetrator, instigator, or accomplice of the crime of homicide of one of the spouses and the surviving spouse; f. Between persons of the same sex; and, g. A person under fifteen years of age.

Thus, if the marriage is celebrated, despite being legally impossible, then its nullity shall be decreed. This is a nullity of an absolute character, so the marriage cannot be validated under any circumstances. The discussion in a process established for this purpose does not concern the *knowledge* the spouses may have of the grounds for impediment, but rather the *verification* of the same. These are cases where there is no time limit for requesting nullity and where standing (legitimación) is so broad that it can even be decreed ex officio. (Article 64) *Voidable marriage.* In these cases, marriages are celebrated validly, but at the moment of their celebration—or, exceptionally, shortly after their celebration—some reason arises for which it could be annulled, at the request of a party with standing (legitimación) and provided that the action is taken within the time period contemplated by the law itself, because otherwise, without need for any ratification, the marriage is validated. The causes of relative nullity are NOT situations of mere verification, but are susceptible to being disputed and, therefore, for the marriage to be annulled, it is necessary that the conduct invoked be effectively demonstrated. One of these cases is when consent was indeed given, but it is vitiated. (Arts. 15, 18 and 65 of the Family Code) *Prohibited marriage.* Since marriage is a solemn act, there is another situation in which the person who celebrated the marriage is sanctioned for not having complied with the formalities required by the State, but nothing happens to the marriage, precisely because the State must defend it as the juridical institution it is. These are the cases contemplated in article 16 of the Family Code. The consequence regarding the marriage as such is set forth in article 17, when it clearly states that "a marriage celebrated despite the prohibitions of the preceding article is valid." *Simulated marriage.* Lastly, on a date not so recent, through Law 8781—in force since November 17, 2009—the figure of *simulated marriage* was expressly introduced into our legislation. This Law introduced reforms to the Family Code—to which articles 12 bis and 14 bis, a new article 19 (because the previous one had been repealed by Law 8571), and a second paragraph to article 64 were added—; to the Penal Code—to which article 181 bis was added, to introduce the crime of "Simulated Marriage" which is different from "Simulation of Marriage" contemplated in article 178—; to the Notarial Code—to which a subsection d) was added to article 145, to include the celebration of simulated marriages with the willful participation of the Notary as grounds for the sanction of suspension from the practice of Notarial Law—; and, to the General Law of Migration and Aliens (Ley General de Migración y Extranjería)—to which article 73 bis was added, to introduce the possibility of granting migratory status to persons cohabiting in a common-law union (unión de hecho)—. The main purpose of the reform, clearly recognized in the statement of legislative intent when it was still a bill, was to combat marriages celebrated between a foreign person and a Costa Rican person, without the purpose of founding a family existing, and with the intention of obtaining migratory advantages by abusing this juridical institution. The reform was made not only to prevent persons who individually intend to abuse marriage to obtain these migratory conditions irregularly from succeeding; but also to combat criminal organizations dedicated to human trafficking and the dark business of obtaining benefits through fraud against the law, in which, unfortunately, Notaries Public often intervene—willfully or culpably. However, the legislator did not define simulated marriage in article 12 bis of the Family Code with the clarity shown when typifying it as a crime in article 181 bis of the Penal Code; instead, it defined it simply as "the marital union that, complying with the formalities of law, does not have the purpose of fulfilling the essential ends provided for in this Code." Let it be clear, though, that a marriage vitiated by absolute nullity due to simulation is not one celebrated between a foreign person and a Costa Rican person. That, clearly, would be an unconstitutional and unconventional provision due to being xenophobic. But a marriage is simulated if it was made to obtain migratory advantages or advantages of some other nature and not to fulfill the essential end of founding a family. Consequently, for the nullity of the marriage due to simulation to proceed, it is indispensable that it be alleged and then demonstrated, with lawful evidence, that the purpose for which it was contracted was fraudulent. It must be distinguished, however, that when the contracting parties marry with the intention of founding a family, but additionally deem it necessary to state a condition—for example, "we are marrying but we do not want children. If at some point either one wishes to procreate, we will annul the marriage."—, the CONDITION is null, but the marriage is valid. That is what article 12 of the Family Code refers to.

Now then, by being placed in article 14 bis, the legislator provided that "the simulated marriage shall be null," and in this case, the nullity is of an absolute character, so it is not validatable by any subjective circumstance ("I didn't know it was illegal to marry solely to obtain migratory or other advantages") nor by the simple passage of time, and, furthermore, it can be decreed even ex officio. The reform to article 64, when a second paragraph was introduced, is solely to include the Director of the Civil Registry and the Director of Migration and Aliens (Migración y Extranjería), under the representation of the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República), as persons authorized to seek the nullity of the marriage. This is perhaps convenient, but it was not necessary by virtue of the fact that in absolute nullity, standing (legitimación) is extremely broad, to the point that it can even be decreed ex officio.

The reform also brought something interesting: When a marriage is annulled—whether due to a defect of absolute nullity or a defect of relative nullity—, some effects end, but others are maintained. For example, upon decreeing the nullity of the marriage, the "spouses" return to their prior marital status, but the children they may have procreated retain the status of marital children (Arts. 69 and 82 of the Family Code). Other effects that are maintained are the patrimonial ones, and therefore, if there were marital agreements (capitulaciones), these are respected, and if the patrimonial effects of the marriage must be liquidated through the default legal regime, the right of each spouse to participate in half of the net value of the community property (bienes gananciales) verified in the other's estate always arises. (Art. 41) This means that part of the responsibility of the adjudicator who annuls a marriage is to indicate which effects are extinguished and which are maintained.

Now then, with the reform introduced through Law 8781, upon issuing the new article 19 (which has no relation to the one that had been repealed by Law 8571), the legislator provided that "the simulated marriage shall not validate any class of rights or obligations for the contracting parties." and expressly, because that was the motivation for the reforms, stipulated that "when its nullity is declared, the judge in a declaratory judgment (sentencia declarativa) shall order the cancellation of the registry registration, as well as the migratory status and the naturalizations granted, all as a consequence of the simulated marriage." From a comprehensive analysis of all these norms, it is possible to appreciate that the *simulated marriage* presents nuances that relate it to the non-existence and the ineffectiveness of marriage, nuances that relate it to legally impossible marriages, and nuances that relate it to the relative nullity of marriages.

Thus, as with the non-existence and the ineffectiveness of marriages, when the marriage is simulated, the registration is annulled and no personal, social, or patrimonial effect is produced. As with marriages vitiated by absolute nullity or by relative nullity, in the case of simulation, the marriage is annulled and its registration is annulled. As with non-existent, ineffective, and legally impossible marriages—and thus, vitiated by absolute nullity if celebrated—, the simulated marriage cannot be validated by the subjective aspects of the spouses nor by the passage of time, and standing (legitimación) is so broad that it can even be decreed ex officio. And, as with marriages vitiated by relative nullity, it is feasible that in a simulated marriage the facts become disputed, and that for the nullity action to succeed, it is necessary for these to be demonstrated.

**VII.** Non-existent marriages, ineffective ones, simulated ones, and those vitiated by absolute nullity have in common that standing (legitimación activa) is extremely broad, to the point that non-existence, ineffectiveness, and nullity—due to simulation or because the marriage was legally impossible—can be decreed even ex officio.

The fact that it can be decreed even ex officio does not mean that the State, through the Courts of Justice and much less through administrative authorities, can make the declaration of non-existence, ineffectiveness, or nullity dispensing with due process (debido proceso) and rendering the right of defense nugatory. Any of these actions must be brought to the knowledge of those who appear as spouses, so that they have the opportunity to express what they deem pertinent, and, when required, to offer the corresponding evidence.

Now then, the ex officio nature does not refer exclusively to the final decision adopted in a judgment (sentencia); rather, it encompasses all the activity that the adjudicator must carry out from the beginning of the process, making the necessary warnings so that before the complaint is transferred, there is clarity about what is sought in a specific process, and continuing through the evidentiary activity, in which it is required that they have initiative and order the taking of the evidence necessary to issue the final ruling. As explained before, marriage is entered into by natural persons, subjects of private law, but its celebration is of public interest. This public interest brings with it that requirement that the State, through the Courts of Justice, make truly effective the provision contained in article 316 of the Civil Procedure Code, insofar as it indicates that at the beginning of the evidentiary phase, "the judge shall order the receipt of the offered evidence that is appropriate, *and that which they consider necessary ex officio.*" For this reason, the Tribunal deems unacceptable, in cases where public interest is at stake, the argument given by the lady Judge of first instance in the sense that there was insufficient evidence to issue an estimatory judgment. She stated that the declaration made by Ms. [Name 001] before the administrative authorities was not *sufficient* to decree the non-existence of the marriage, because the version she gave on that occasion could not be subjected to cross-examination (contradictorio). If that was the difficulty, the obligation was to order the evidence ex officio. But the problem is broader, since the judgment indicated that that documentary evidence was insufficient, but it turns out that that evidentiary element was never legitimately incorporated into the process, as there is no resolution (resolución) where it was admitted. In the resolution of fourteen hours and seven minutes of June 5, 2015, it was indicated that it was not appropriate to summon the parties to conciliation and that "since there is no testimonial evidence to take, once this order is final, issue the decision on the merits." (f.73) As can be appreciated, in the resolution no ruling was issued on the documentary evidence that was offered in the complaint. The admission or rejection of evidence requires an intellective task by the adjudicator, as they must analyze whether the evidence is pertinent and lawful and whether it was offered timely. By not having been admitted or rejected, the parties were prevented from being able to challenge the decision. This leads us to the scenario of the juridical treatment of evidence in family procedural law.

Basically—because evidently this topic is very broad—it must be mentioned that in this family procedural law, the limitations established in civil procedural legislation for evaluating evidence do not apply. (Article 8 of the Family Code) But what is more important is the fact that the limitations not only do not exist at the end, when the evidence must be evaluated, but that this extends to the moment of taking evidence, to the moment of admitting evidence, and even to the moment when it must be qualified whether an element is evidence or not. This is so because for the Judge to evaluate the evidence, they first had to take it, and before that they had to admit it, and to admit it, they had to have defined whether what was offered was, or was not, an evidentiary element. This breadth is known in doctrine as the *principle of favor probatione*, which, in the words of the Argentine proceduralist Jorge Luis Kielmanovich, "means that in cases of doubt regarding the production, admission, conduciveness, or efficacy of evidence, a broad criterion in favor of it must be adopted, such that the opening of the case for evidence must be preferred over a declaration of pure law." In this way, as this author points out, in this field one can consider "a lesser demand for precision in the testimonies rendered, in the admissibility of 'hearsay' testimony, 'ex auditu' or indirect testimony; in the acceptance of less suitable evidence, e.g., testimonial evidence, instead of expert evidence to establish, for example, the authenticity of a document in the absence of other indubitable ones and the absence or death of a grantor, etcetera." (KIELMANOVICH, Jorge Luis. (2008) *Los principios del proceso de familia.* In the joint work "Derecho Procesal de Familia. Tras las premisas de su teoría general." Editorial Jurídica Continental. San José. pp. 17 and 18)*.* As also noted by the scholar Marisa Herrera, commenting on Argentine legislation but with concepts applicable, *mutatis mutandi,* in our country, "just as a constitutional/conventional family law has been built regarding substantive law, procedural law or procedures have also had to be humanized. In this way, and rightly so, it is understood that access to justice is a human right and that it must be especially protected when dealing with vulnerable persons [...] In evidentiary matters, art. 710 makes explicit what the principles relating to evidence in family proceedings are. They are: 1) freedom, 2) breadth, 3) flexibility, and 4) dynamic burden of proof. [...]" (HERRERA MARISA. Op.cit. pp.49 and 50) The fact that evidentiary breadth exists in family procedural law does not mean that all types of evidence are admissible, since the Judge has the duty to guarantee that only lawful evidence is admitted, which in turn is pertinent and is offered and admitted at the moments provided for by the Law.

The concept of *lawful evidence* encompasses not only that the evidentiary element as such does not violate fundamental rights (for example, a sworn statement that refers to the commission of a crime by the declarant or a relative up to the third degree by consanguinity or affinity, if the declarant was not previously warned about their constitutional right to abstain from testifying), but also that its obtainment was not produced by violating fundamental rights (for example, when the content of an electronic mail obtained after overcoming the will and privacy of the account holder through violence is offered as documentary evidence).

Furthermore, it is very important to bear in mind that evidence obtained from other evidence that is itself unlawful or from other evidence obtained unlawfully is tainted, which is known as the <i>fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.</i> </span><o:p></o:p></p> <p><span style='font-family:Arial'>The concept of <i>relevance (pertinencia)</i> refers to evidence being offered or ordered by the court on its own motion (ordenada de oficio) to prove facts that are material and directly related to the claim. For example, in a divorce proceeding where only the ground of de facto separation is invoked, it is not relevant to hear the testimony of a witness offered to refer to the fact that one of the spouses has violated the duty of fidelity.</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p><span style='font-family:Arial'>Finally, the concept of <i>timeliness (oportunidad)</i> relates to the principle of <i>procedural fairness (lealtad procesal)</i>, according to which there must be sufficient transparency so that the parties know, before they are presented (evacuación), which evidence was offered, which was admitted, which was ordered on the court's own motion (ordenadas de oficio), and which was rejected.</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p><span style='font-family:Arial'>A case such as this one exemplifies the importance of what has just been set forth: The Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) offered as documentary evidence -among other things- the statement given by Mrs. [Name 001] before the Acting Head (Jefa a.i.) of the Local Office (Oficina Local) of Heredia of the Civil Registry (Registro Civil). The trial court (Juzgado de primera instancia) did not indicate whether it admitted or rejected the evidence, thereby evading the obligation to examine its relevance (pertinencia) and its lawfulness, and at the same time, the parties were prevented from exercising the corresponding remedies. However, that evidence was weighed in the judgment, concluding that it was not "sufficient" because it had not been possible to subject it to cross-examination (contradictorio). The first thing that must be defined is whether the evidence is admitted or rejected. And if it is admitted, the proper course is to analyze it in the judgment, together with the other evidence that has been ordered to be received, at the request of a party or on the court's own motion (de oficio).</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> <p><b><span style='font-family:Arial'>VIII.</span></b><span style='font-family: Arial'> As can be seen, there was confusion in determining the object of this proceeding. The claim (demanda) filed by Attorney (Procuradora) Marcela Ramírez Jara contains a clear claim (pretensión) for a declaration of non-existence of the marriage (f.35), but, without the facts or the claim (pretensión) having been expanded, the same Attorney introduced the concept of "simulated marriage" when she responded during the hearing granted for her to address the opposition raised by the defendant's guardian ad litem (curadora procesal) [Name 005]. (fs. 68 and 69) Later, when the judgment was appealed, Attorney (Procurador) Esteban Alvarado Quesada stated that this had been a material error. (f.83) However, upon appearing before this instance, another Attorney (Procurador), Licenciado Guillermo Fernández Lizano, stated that the marriage is indeed simulated, because it is non-existent. (f.124)</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p><span style='font-family:Arial'>The Court (Tribunal) deems it necessary to clarify that the claim (demanda) is for the declaration of the non-existence of the marriage. It is not for the declaration of relative nullity due to some defect of consent (vicio de consentimiento), nor is it for the declaration of nullity of the marriage due to simulation. As stated before, neither the facts nor the claim (pretensión) were expanded, and therefore the factual framework and the claim were limited to what was set forth and what was requested in the claim (demanda).</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p><span style='font-family:Arial'>It is also necessary for the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) to clarify whether the claim (demanda) was filed against Mrs. [Name 001], given that she was, rather, the person who requested that the Civil Registry process the annulment of the marriage registration and the correction of the birth records of her daughters and son. In such a circumstance, <u>it would appear</u> that Mrs. [Name 001] -who is not a legal professional- could be joined as an active co-party (litis consorte activa) or as an intervening adhering party (interventora adhesiva). This may have significant implications, because, potentially, Mrs. [Name 001] could testify as a witness or as a party. If the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría) considers that she must remain as a defendant, it will please state the corresponding reasons so that the judgment can adequately analyze the issue of passive legal standing (legitimación pasiva).</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p><span style='font-family:Arial'>It is also required that the trial court authority, in exercise of its responsibility in discovering the truth of the facts because a matter of public interest is being determined, order on its own motion (ordene de oficio) the evidence it deems relevant and also rule expressly on the documents offered by the plaintiff in the claim (demanda), indicating which ones it admits and/or which ones it rejects. The observation is respectfully made that the judgment mentioned that the statement given by Mrs. [Name 001] in the administrative venue could not be subjected to cross-examination (contradictorio), so that eventually this evidence, whose absence the Trial Judge (Juzgadora) noted, could be ordered on the court's own motion (de oficio); and, since what was stated in the claim (demanda) is that Mrs. [Name 001] did not express her consent to marry, it might perhaps be relevant to order a forensic handwriting examination (examen grafoscópico) of the signature that may appear on the public deed.</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p><span style='font-family:Arial'>For the reasons explained in detail, the decision of this Court is to annul the judgment and, furthermore, everything done and decided from the resolution issued at one fourteen p.m. on August twenty-six, two thousand fourteen, in which Mrs. [Name 001] was included in the procedural position of defendant. The declared nullity does not include the transfer of the claim (traslado de la demanda) against Mr. [Name 005], nor the appointment of Licenciada Karla Vanessa López Silva as his guardian ad litem (curadora procesal), nor the acceptance and corresponding response to the claim (contestación de demanda) filed by the said guardian ad litem. These pieces remain valid in application of the principle of preservation of procedural acts (principio de conservación de los actos procesales).”</span><o:p></o:p></p> <p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p> </div> </body> </html>

“II. Luego de un minucioso análisis de lo que muestran los autos, este Tribunal llega a la conclusión de que el proceso no ha sido abordado adecuadamente, pues no solo parece que no existe claridad sobre el objeto que con él se persigue, sino que también ha habido confusión sobre aspectos jurídicamente relevantes, tales como determinar quién o quiénes deben ostentar la condición de parte demandada y cuáles son las reglas atinentes a las cuestiones probatorias. En consecuencia, resulta necesario retrotraer el proceso al momento en que se produjeron estos vicios y para ello resulta indispensable anular tanto la sentencia cuanto las piezas que más adelante se dirá.

III.Los señores Procuradores Adjuntos que han combatido la sentencia de primera instancia -uno estableciendo el recurso de apelación y el otro apersonándose a esta segunda instancia para hacer valer los derechos que considera lesionados- llevan razón razón cuando afirman que en este caso, desde el principio estaba claro que el objeto del proceso era la declaratoria de inexistencia del matrimonio realizado entre el señor [Nombre 005] y la señora [Nombre 001]. La exposición de hechos fue sumamente clara en indicar que el matrimonio del señor [Nombre 005] y la señora [Nombre 001] se encuentra inscrito en la Sección de Matrimonios del Registro Civil bajo las citas [Valor 001], inscripción en la que se indica que el matrimonio se celebró el nueve de diciembre de dos mil uno, pero que se llevó a cabo a pesar de que doña [Nombre 001] no dio consentimiento para casarse con don [Nombre 005]. También se expuso que por no haber dado este consentimiento para casarse, doña [Nombre 001] misma le pidió a las autoridades del Registro Civil que anularan la inscripción del matrimonio donde aparece casada con el señor [Nombre 005] porque "nunca he estado casada con esa persona y además no conozco quién es" y también le pidió que "se corrija el asiento de nacimiento de mis hijos ... ya que él no es el padre biológico de mis hijos".

Junto con la demanda se presentó prueba documental, la cual fue formalmente ofrecida (f.36). Los documentos aportados fueron:

1. El oficio suscrito por el Licenciado Óscar Fernando Mena Carvajal, Secretario General del Registro Civil, en el cual le solicita a la Procuraduría General de la República que "gestione lo de su competencia para la nulidad o inexistencia del matrimonio entre la señora [Nombre 001] (sic) y [Nombre 005], así también la corrección de los apellidos de los menores [Nombre 006] ..., [Nombre 012] ... y [Nombre 007]." (fs. 1 a 5); 2. La declaración que rindió la señora [Nombre 001] el día primero de noviembre de dos mil trece ante la Licenciada Ligia Gamboa Martínez, Jefa a.i. de la Oficina Regional de Heredia del Registro Civil (f.6); 3. Dos certificaciones de nacimiento de la señora [Nombre 001]. (fs. 7 y 19); 4. Una certificación que señala que el señor [Nombre 005] no es portador de cédula de identidad costarricense (f.8); 5. Un oficio en el que se indica que en la Sección de Opciones y Naturalizaciones del Departamento Civil del Registro Civil no aparece trámite de naturalización del señor [Nombre 005] (f.9) 6. Una copia del asiento de inscripción del matrimonio del señor [Nombre 005] con la señora [Nombre 001] (f.11), 7. Las certificaciones de nacimiento de la señorita [Nombre 006], de la niña [Nombre 012] y del niño [Nombre 007] (fs.12 a 14); 8. Una copia del Certificado de Declaración de Matrimonio Civil expedido por la Notaria Rocío Córdoba Cambronero (f.15); 9. Una copia del testimonio de escritura pública de la celebración del matrimonio del señor [Nombre 005] y la señora [Nombre 001], la cual se otorgó ante la misma Notaria (fs. 17 y 18) 10. Una copia de certificación expedida el veintitrés de noviembre de dos mil uno, en la que se indica que no aparecía matrimonio inscrito de la señora [Nombre 001]. (f.20) 11. Copia de una certificación del asiento de nacimiento de [Nombre 005], expedida por el Registrador del Estado Civil de las Personas de Masaya, Nicaragua. (f.21) 12. Copia de la primera plana del pasaporte nicaragüense del señor [Nombre 005]. (f.23) 13. Copia del control de documentos presentados por la Notaria Rocío Córdoba junto la solicitud de inscripción de matrimonio civil. (f.25) 14. Copias de oficios en los que el Registro Civil le previene a la Notaria Rocío Córdoba Cambronero que realice aclaraciones relativas a la solicitud de inscripción del matrimonio del señor [Nombre 005] y la señora [Nombre 001]. (fs. 26 y 2) En la pretensión, se pidió con claridad que en sentencia se declare la inexistencia de ese matrimonio; y, como consecuencia de lo anterior, que se anule "la cita de inscripción matrimonial número [Valor 001]." Además se pidió que se "anule las citas de nacimiento de los menores [Nombre 006], citas [Valor 005], [Nombre 012], citas [Valor 002], y [Nombre 007], citas [Valor 003]" y que se condene "a los demandados" al pago de las costas e intereses sobre éstas. (fs. 32 a 36) Podría considerarse que el escrito de demanda presenta elementos que generan alguna duda. Así, por ejemplo, la Procuraduría General de la República no consignó con precisión contra quién dirigió la demanda, pues lo que indicó la señora Procuradora Licenciada Marcela Ramírez Jara fue que se presentaba ante el Juzgado Primero de Familia "a solicitar la inexistencia del matrimonio realizado entre [Nombre 001] y [Nombre 005]." (f.32) No fue sino hasta el apartado del fundamento jurídico que se hizo alguna referencia a quiénes consideraba como "demandados", cuando en el punto B, consignó el título: "De la inexistencia del matrimonio celebrado entre los demandados" (f.35) y también hay alguna insinuación cuando en la petitoria solicitó que se condenara "a los demandados" al pago de las costas e intereses sobre éstas. (f.35) También hay alguna confusión en la formulación de la pretensión de la demanda, cuando se dijo que se pedía la declaratoria de inexistencia del matrimonio porque existía "un vicio en el consentimiento de uno de los contrayentes." (f.35), pues en la misma demanda, en el fundamento jurídico que se identificó con la letra A), "De la regulación del Matrimonio en Costa Rica", la representante del Estado citó una sentencia de este Tribunal en la que se indicó que "[...] si los "contrayentes" no comparecen ante el funcionario autorizado para celebrar el matrimonio; o bien, si solo comparece uno de ellos y no consta que el otro hubiera otorgado un poder especialísimo para tales efectos, simplemente no existe manifestación de voluntad y, por lógica consecuencia, no existe matrimonio. No es que la voluntad esté viciada, es que no la hay. [...]" (f. 34. El destacado es suplido)

IV.El Juzgado de primera instancia dio curso a la demanda en los términos que fue presentada, teniendo como codemandados al señor [Nombre 005] y a la señora [Nombre 001]; y al final, en la sentencia, no se hizo lugar a las pretensiones formuladas. La señora Jueza indicó, por un lado, que "la representante del Estado realiza una gran cantidad de peticiones que resultan contradictorias entre sí. Lo anterior, porque si bien pide la declaratoria de inexistencia del matrimonio, por no haber consentimiento de parte de la contrayente costarricense, debido a que esta contrayente dijo en su declaración jurada, no haber consentido para casarse, que no conoce a dicho señor, ni ha convivido con él. También en la pretensión la accionante, aduce que se configuró un vicio de consentimiento, y esto es algo distinto, pues se da un vicio cuando el consentimiento existe, pero es viciado."; y, por el otro, señaló que no contaba con pruebas idóneas para tomar una decisión estimatoria, al consignar que "la sola declaración en sede administrativa de la señora [Nombre 001], es prueba documental, que resulta insuficiente para acreditar la inexistencia del matrimonio, pues ni siquiera se le llama a confesar ante la autoridad judicial, a efecto de realizar el contradictorio y que la representante del demandado también tenga la posibilidad de repreguntar y dilucidar las dudas que surgen en torno a la presunta inexistencia del matrimonio. ... Tampoco la suscrita juzgadora tuvo la posibilidad de repreguntar a la contrayente costarricense y poder valorar integralmente, algún elemento de convicción en torno a este presunto matrimonio inexistente." Adicionalmente, al referirse al fundamento de derecho que se invocó en la demanda, la señora Jueza expuso que no se puede aplicar los artículos 19 y 64 del Código de Familia porque no se puede dar efecto retroactivo a las normas, indicando que estos dos artículos fueron introducidos en una reforma que se introdujo por Ley 8781, del 11 de noviembre de 2009, y en este caso, el matrimonio se celebró el 9 de diciembre de 2001. Hizo mención al concepto de "matrimonio simulado" y se refirió a la "nulidad de matrimonio que aquí se conoce".

Lo primero que se pregunta este Tribunal es: ¿por qué se ha tenido como demandada a la señora [Nombre 001]? No hay ninguna duda para afirmar que la capacidad procesal es un presupuesto procesal -revisable al inicio del proceso- y que la legitimación es un presupuesto material -analizable en la sentencia-; pero es claro que en toda demanda debe existir coherencia, de manera tal que resulta imperativo que exista una relación lógica entre quienes figuran como partes, con los hechos que se pretensión que se formula. Cuando no existe esa coherencia, es necesario que la autoridad judicial -ejerciendo los poderes de instrucción y ordenación que le confiere el artículo 97 del Código Procesal Civil- haga las prevenciones que tenga que hacer para que, desde el principio, quede claramente definido qué es lo que se persigue con el proceso.

En este caso en particular no se logra determinar el motivo por el que la Procuraduría General de la República aparentemente incluyó como demandada a doña [Nombre 001], si la propia representante del Estado afirmó que la señora [Nombre 001] no dio su consentimiento para casarse con don [Nombre 005] y que incluso le pidió a las autoridades del Registro Civil tanto que anularan la inscripción del matrimonio -porque nunca se casó y ni siquiera conoce al señor [Nombre 005]- como que corrigieran los asientos de inscripción de nacimiento de sus hijas e hijo -porque don [Nombre 005] no es su padre-. Con esta exposición de hechos, da la impresión -al menos preliminarmente- de que doña [Nombre 001], en lugar de figurar como demandada, podría haberse constituido como litis consorte activa -conforme al artículo 107 del Código Procesal Civil-, o al menos como interventora adhesiva, según lo contempla el artículo 112 del mismo cuerpo normativo.

Tal como se expuso en el Considerando anterior, la Procuraduría General de la República no indicó con precisión contra quién dirigía la demanda, aunque sí hizo alguna insinuación en el Fundamento de Derecho que identificó con la letra B) y en la petición para que se condenara en costas e intereses sobre las mismas "a los demandados". Pero en las circunstancias apuntadas, el Juzgado de primera instancia pudo haberle prevenido a la representación del Estado que, con base en la exposición de hechos que había hecho, indicara si efectivamente estaba dirigiendo la demanda en contra de la señora [Nombre 001] y, en caso afirmativo, que se sirviera indicar el motivo. De esta forma, si la Procuraduría mantenía su decisión de considerarla como demandada, el análisis de la legitimación pasiva habría que hacerla en la sentencia; pero si la excluía como demandada, el Juzgado bien pudo disponer que se le comunicara la presentación de esta demanda a la señora [Nombre 001], por ser ella una interesada directa, y que así expresara si deseaba constituirse como coactora o como interventora adhesiva, o si -enterada de la presentación de la demanda y de lo que en ella se pretende- del todo no deseaba figurar en el proceso.

En segundo lugar, el Tribunal estima que si el Juzgado consideró que la pretensión formulada en la demanda era contradictoria -como se llegó a decir en la sentencia-, lo que debió haber hecho, en aplicación de las disposiciones contenidas en los artículos 124 y 290 del Código Procesal Civil, era prevenir la aclaración de la pretensión al inicio del proceso, antes de darle curso a la demanda, para que la representación estatal indicara con precisión si lo que pedía era la declaratoria de inexistencia del matrimonio porque la señora [Nombre 001] no que pedía era que se declarara la nulidad del matrimonio, por existir un vicio de consentimiento; o si peticionaba ambos pronunciamientos, y en este último caso, si pedía ambos como pretensiones principales (declaratoria de inexistencia de matrimonio por ausencia de consentimiento de la supuesta contrayente y declaratoria de nulidad de matrimonio por vicio de voluntad de la contrayente) o si pedía una como principal (declaratoria de inexistencia por ausencia de consentimiento de la contrayente) y la otra como subsidiaria (declaratoria de nulidad de matrimonio por vicio de voluntad de la contrayente). Sin embargo, tal como se indicó en líneas precedentes, el Juzgado dio curso a la demanda en los términos que fue presentada.

Para relacionarlo con lo que se dirá más adelante, es necesario consignar expresamente que la representación del Estado no expuso hechos en la demanda en los que se afirmara estar en presencia de un matrimonio simulado, en los términos establecidos en el artículo 12 bis del Código de Familia, ni pidió que se decretara su nulidad por ese motivo, conforme al artículo14 bis. Es cierto que la representante del Estado hizo una mención sobre la figura del matrimonio simulado cuando se refirió a la oposición que hizo la curadora procesal del demandado [Nombre 005] al contestar la demanda, pero es evidente que la Procuraduría nunca amplió ni los hechos ni la pretensión para que se decretara la nulidad del matrimonio, por causa de simulación. Sobre esto volveremos en el Considerando VIII.

En tercer lugar, el Tribunal observa un tratamiento inadecuado con relación al tema probatorio, básicamente porque el Juzgado de primera instancia nunca emitió resolución en la que indicara si admitía o si rechazaba la prueba documental que ofreció la parte actora al presentar la demanda; pero principalmente porque fue omiso en ordenar oficiosamente pruebas tendientes a la averiguación de la verdad. Sobre este particular no solo es preciso conocer el tratamiento jurídico de la prueba en materia procesal familiar, sino también recordar que en los tópicos donde existe interés público, las autoridades judiciales deben disponer, incluso de oficio, la evacuación de aquellas pruebas que resulten necesarias para tomar una decisión, sin que ello se pueda interpretar como una falta al deber de imparcialidad que distingue a la actividad jurisdiccional.

V.A estas alturas del siglo XXI ya no hay duda para afirmar no existe un único tipo de familia, tal como sostuvo la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en el caso Atala Riffo vs. Chile, cuando indicó que "el concepto de vida familiar no está reducido únicamente al matrimonio sino que debe abarcar otros lazos familiares de hecho donde las partes tienen vida en común por fuera del matrimonio." (Párrafo 142). Sin embargo, es incuestionable que el matrimonio, como institución jurídica, siempre ha sido una forma de fundar familia. El artículo 52 de la Constitución Política dispone que "el matrimonio es la base esencial de la familia y descansa en la igualdad de los derechos de los cónyuges." Por otro lado, el Estado también tiene el deber constitucional de proteger a la familia. Así lo estipula el artículo 51 de la Constitución Política cuando indica que "La familia, como elemento natural y fundamento de la sociedad, tiene derecho a la protección especial del Estado."

Ahora bien, el derecho a fundar familia y el derecho a contraer matrimonio son derechos fundamentales de las personas físicas, pues son derechos humanos positivizados en distintos instrumentos internacionales, tal como se puede verificar a continuación:

Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos.

Artículo 16.

1. Los hombres y las mujeres, a partir de la edad núbil, tienen derecho, sin restricción alguna por motivos de raza, nacionalidad o religión, a casarse y fundar una familia; y disfrutarán de iguales derechos en cuanto al matrimonio, durante el matrimonio y en caso de disolución del matrimonio.

2. Sólo mediante el libre y pleno consentimiento de los futuros esposos podrá contraerse el matrimonio.

Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre Artículo VI. Toda persona tiene derecho a constituir familia, elemento fundamental de la sociedad, y a recibir protección para ella.

Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José) Artículo 17. Protección a la Familia [...]

2. Se reconoce el derecho del hombre y la mujer a contraer matrimonio y a fundar una familia si tienen la edad y las condiciones requeridas para ello por las leyes internas, en la medida en que éstas no afecten al principio de no discriminación establecido en esta Convención.

3. El matrimonio no puede celebrarse sin el libre y pleno consentimiento de los contrayentes.

4. Los Estados Partes deben tomar medidas apropiadas para asegurar la igualdad de derechos y la adecuada equivalencia de responsabilidades de los cónyuges en cuanto al matrimonio, durante el matrimonio y en caso de disolución del mismo. En caso de disolución, se adoptarán disposiciones que aseguren la protección necesaria de los hijos, sobre la base única del interés y conveniencia de ellos.

[...]

Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en Materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales. (Protocolo de San Salvador) Artículo 15. Derecho a la Constitución y Protección de la Familia [...]

2. Toda persona tiene derecho a constituir familia, el que ejercerá de acuerdo con las disposiciones de la correspondiente legislación interna.

[...]

Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos Artículo 23.

[...]

2. Se reconoce el derecho del hombre y de la mujer a contraer matrimonio y a fundar una familia si tienen edad para ello.

3. El matrimonio no podrá celebrarse sin el libre y pleno consentimiento de los contrayentes.

4. Los Estados Partes en el presente Pacto tomarán las medidas apropiadas para asegurar la igualdad de derechos y de responsabilidades de ambos esposos en cuanto al matrimonio, durante el matrimonio y en caso de disolución del mismo. En caso de disolución, se adoptarán disposiciones que aseguren la protección necesaria a los hijos.

Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales Artículo 10. Los Estados Partes en el presente Pacto reconocen que:

1. Se debe conceder a la familia, que es el elemento natural y fundamental de la sociedad, la más amplia protección y asistencia posibles, especialmente para su constitución y mientras sea responsable del cuidado y la educación de los hijos a su cargo. El matrimonio debe contraerse con el libre consentimiento de los futuros cónyuges.

[...]

Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer Artículo 16 1. Los Estados Partes adoptarán todas las medidas adecuadas para eliminar la discriminación contra la mujer en todos los asuntos relacionados con el matrimonio y las relaciones familiares y, en particular, asegurarán en condiciones de igualdad entre hombres y mujeres:

• a)El mismo derecho para contraer matrimonio; b) El mismo derecho para elegir libremente cónyuge y contraer matrimonio sólo por su libre albedrío y su pleno consentimiento; c) Los mismos derechos y responsabilidades durante el matrimonio y con ocasión de su disolución.

[...]

Haciendo una interpretación integral de todas estas normas, es posible concluir que las personas físicas tienen el derecho fundamental a contraer matrimonio, si cuentan con la edad y con las condiciones que cada Estado contempla; y también que el Estado tiene el deber de proteger la institución jurídica del matrimonio, por ser esta una forma de fundar familia. (Claro está, sin que ello implique que solo se debe proteger al matrimonio, pues como antes se dijo, no existe un único tipo de familia, sino que este es un concepto dinámico y, como tal, evoluciona.) El autor nacional Rubén Hernández Valle lo ha explicado al decir que "existe un derecho fundamental de las personas a contraer matrimonio, que deriva del artículo 16 de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y 17.2 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Esta libertad implica -como ha subrayado la Sala Constitucional- que, "por una parte, el Estado no puede en forma alguna impedirlo u obstaculizar, de modo irrazonable, el matrimonio de las personas y, por otra, que no es posible que se imponga como única forma de constitución de una familia, la matrimonial." (Voto 3693-94) (HERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Rubén. (2015) Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica. Comentada y con citas de jurisprudencia. Editorial Juricentro, San José. p. 266) La protección al instituto jurídico del matrimonio no solo se realiza a través de una obligación negativa, como lo es que el Estado no impida ni obstaculice de modo IRRAZONABLE el derecho fundamental que tienen los ciudadanos a contraerlo, sino que también se debe hacer cumpliendo con la obligación positiva de perseguir con ahínco y de sancionar a las personas que buscan burlar la institución. Aunque el matrimonio lo contraen dos personas físicas, sujetas de derecho privado; existe un incuestionable interés público en que el matrimonio se celebre solamente entre personas que pueden disfrutar del derecho a casarse PARA fundar una familia, y que este se realice siguiendo las formalidades que están establecidas al efecto.

Esta persecución implacable que debe darse para combatir el uso antisocial y antijurídico del instituto del matrimonio se puede dar de diversas formas y en distintos escenarios. Así, por ejemplo, corresponde a las autoridades penales sancionar con prisión o con multa a quienes cometen delitos relacionados con el matrimonio, incluyendo -según sea el caso- no solo a los propios contrayentes, sino también a sus representantes, a los celebrantes y a los testigos. (Arts. 176 a 181 bis del Código Penal); a las autoridades que conocen de los procesos disciplinarios por el ejercicio de Notariado, les corresponde sancionar a los Notarios que participan dolosamente en la celebración de un matrimonio simulado; y, en sede familiar, no existe una única forma para impedir o combatir la celebración ilegítima de matrimonios. Las diferencias son claras y es necesario conocerlas porque el abordaje y las consecuencias son también muy diversas.

VI.Lo primero que debe estar claro es la diferencia que existe entre un matrimonio inexistente, un matrimonio ineficaz, un matrimonio simulado, un matrimonio legalmente imposible y, en caso de que se celebre, viciado de nulidad absoluta, un matrimonio viciado de nulidad relativa y un matrimonio prohibido.

Matrimonio inexistente. La condición necesaria para que el matrimonio EXISTA, es la manifestación clara y expresa del consentimiento de los contrayentes. Así lo disponen la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, el Pacto de San José, el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales y la Convención para Eliminar Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra las Mujeres, y también lo contempla nuestro Código de Familia en su artículo 13, al indicar que "Para que exista matrimonio el consentimiento de los contrayentes debe manifestarse de modo legal y Interpretada en sentido contrario, tal como permite el artículo 12 del Código Civil, de esta norma se deduce que si alguno de los contrayentes no hizo esa manifestación de voluntad -o si ninguno de ellos la hizo-, entonces el matrimonio NO EXISTE y, como no existe, no produce ningún efecto personal, ni social, ni patrimonial. Tal como explica la Doctora Marisa Herrera refiriéndose a la legislación argentina, pero aplicables sus conceptos, mutatis mutandi, en nuestro país, "los requisitos indispensables y fundamentales para la existencia de un matrimonio, post reforma de la ley 26.618 y que el CCyCN mantiene, son dos: 1) El consentimiento pleno y libre de ambos contrayentes y 2) la intervención de autoridad competente. La ausencia de alguno de estos requisitos acarrea la inexistencia del vínculo. [...] El consentimiento matrimonial es la declaración verbal, escrita o por cualquier medio inequívoco, mediante la cual los contrayentes expresan su voluntad de constituirse recíprocamente en cónyuges. La declaración de los contrayentes presupone, como principio general, que el consentimiento prestado es informado y libre. Tratándose de un derecho intuito personae , los pretensos cónyuges deben comparecer en persona a la celebración del acto matrimonial y manifestar de manera inequívoca su voluntad con relación al acto jurídico que desean se perfeccione." (HERRERA, Marisa. (2015) Manual de Derecho de las Familias. Abeledo Perrot. Buenos Aires, Argentina. p.121. El destacado es suplido.) De esta forma, si el matrimonio se celebra a pesar de que uno de los contrayentes NO inscribe, entonces se debe anular esa inscripción, pero no el matrimonio. El matrimonio se declara inexistente y se ordena la anulación de la inscripción.

Matrimonio ineficaz. Nuestra ley permite que el matrimonio se celebre estando presentes el celebrante, uno de los contrayentes y el apoderado especialísimo del otro contrayente. El Código de Familia dispone que si el matrimonio se celebra, pero al momento de celebrarse ya estaba legalmente revocado el poder, entonces "no habrá" matrimonio. "No haber matrimonio" en lenguaje técnico jurídico significa que el matrimonio es ineficaz, y en consecuencia, tampoco produce efectos personales, ni sociales, ni patrimoniales. Si tal fuera la situación, el matrimonio fue celebrado válidamente porque se hizo conforme autoriza la Ley, pero al comprobarse que el poder estaba legítimamente revocado, se declara ineficaz y se ordena la anulación de la inscripción. (Art. 30 del Código de Familia) Matrimonio legalmente imposible, y en caso de que se celebre, matrimonio viciado de nulidad absoluta. Aquí se contempla aquellas situaciones de excepción que el legislador ha considerado razonables para impedir su celebración. Cuando la Sala Constitucional dice que el Estado no puede "impedir ni obstaculizar de modo irrazonable el matrimonio de las personas", está reconociendo implícitamente que el Estado sí tiene derecho a hacer objeciones que sean razonables en un determinado momento histórico, social y cultural. Dicho de otra forma, una persona puede contraer matrimonio con quien quiera, siempre y cuando el Estado no se lo haya impedido expresamente. Estos son los casos contemplados en el artículo 14 del Código de Familia. Son situaciones tan claramente definidas que para impedir su celebración -o para decretar su nulidad, en caso de que se celebre-, basta constatar que se presentan. Estas situaciones son las siguientes:

a. De la persona que está ligada por un matrimonio anterior; b. Entre ascendientes y descendientes por consanguinidad o afinidad. El impedimento no desaparece con la disolución del matrimonio que dio origen al parentesco por afinidad.

c. Entre hermanos consanguíneos.

d. Entre el adoptante y el adoptado y sus descendientes; los hijos adoptivos de la misma persona; el adoptado y los hijos del adoptante; el adoptado y el excónyuge del adoptante; y, el adoptante y el excónyuge del adoptado; e. Entre el autor, coautor, instigador o cómplice del delito de homicidio de uno de los cónyuges y el cónyuge sobreviviente; f. Entre personas de un mismo sexo; y, g. De la persona menor de quince años.

Así, si el matrimonio se celebra, a pesar de ser legalmente imposible, entonces se decretará su nulidad. Esta es una nulidad de carácter absoluto, por lo que el matrimonio no se puede convalidar bajo ninguna circunstancia. La discusión en un proceso que se establezca con este fin no pasa por el conocimiento que tengan los cónyuges del motivo de impedimento, sino por la comprobación del mismo. Estos son casos donde no existe límite de tiempo para solicitar la nulidad y donde la legitimación es tan amplia, que incluso se puede decretar de oficio. (Artículo 64) Matrimonio anulable. En estos casos, los matrimonios se celebran válidamente, pero en el acto de su celebración -o, excepcionalmente, poco tiempo después de su celebración- surge algún motivo por el que podría ser anulado, a petición de parte legitimada y siempre que la gestión se realice en el tiempo que la misma ley contempla, porque de lo contrario, sin necesidad de ratificación alguna, el matrimonio se convalida. Las causas de nulidad relativa NO son situaciones de mera constatación, sino que son susceptibles de ser controvertidas y, por ello, para que el matrimonio se anule, es necesario que la conducta que se invoca sea efectivamente demostrada. Uno de estos casos es cuando el consentimiento sí se dio, pero se encuentra viciado. (Arts. 15, 18 y 65 del Código de Familia) Matrimonio prohibido. Como el matrimonio es un acto solemne, existe otra situación que en la que se sanciona a la persona que celebró el matrimonio por no haber cumplido con las formalidades que exige el Estado, pero al matrimonio no le pasa nada, precisamente porque el Estado debe defenderlo como instituto jurídico que es. Estos son los casos que están contemplados en el artículo 16 del Código de Familia. La consecuencia respecto al matrimonio como tal está dispuesta en el artículo 17, cuando señala con toda claridad que "el matrimonio celebrado a pesar de las prohibiciones del artículo anterior es válido." Matrimonio simulado. Por último, en fecha ya no tan reciente, mediante Ley 8781 -vigente desde el 17 de noviembre de 2009- se introdujo en nuestra legislación expresamente la figura del matrimonio simulado. En esta Ley se introdujeron reformas al Código de Familia -al cual se le adicionó los artículos 12 bis y 14 bis, un nuevo artículo 19 (porque el anterior había sido derogado mediante Ley 8571) y un segundo párrafo al artículo 64-; al Código Penal -al cual se le adicionó el artículo 181 bis, para introducir el delito de "Matrimonio Simulado" que es diferente al de "Simulación de Matrimonio" que contempla el artículo 178-; al Código Notarial -al que se le adicionó un inciso d) al artículo 145, para incluir la celebración de matrimonios simulados con el concurso doloso del Notario como motivo de sanción de suspensión en el ejercicio del Notariado-; y, a la Ley General de Migración y Extranjería -a la que se le adicionó el artículo 73 bis, para introducir la posibilidad de conceder estatus migratorio a personas que convivan en unión de hecho-. El principal propósito de la reforma, claramente reconocido en la exposición de motivos cuando todavía era un proyecto de ley, fue combatir los matrimonios que se celebran entre una persona extranjera y una persona costarricense, sin que exista el propósito de fundar familia, y sí la intención de obtener ventajas migratorias abusando de este instituto jurídico. La reforma se hizo no solo para impedir que las personas que individualmente pretenden abusar del matrimonio para obtener irregularmente estas condiciones migratorias, puedan lograrlo; sino también para combatir a las organizaciones criminales que se dedican a la trata de personas y al oscuro negocio de obtener beneficios a través del fraude a la ley, en las cuales, lamentablemente, muchas veces intervienen -dolosa o culpablemente- Notarios Públicos. Sin embargo, el legislador no definió el matrimonio simulado en el artículo 12 bis del Código de Familia con la claridad que sí mostró al tipificarlo como delito en el articulo 181 bis del Código Penal, sino que lo definió simplemente como "la unión marital que, cumpliendo las formalidades de ley, no tenga por objeto cumplir los fines esenciales previstos en este Código". Quede claro, eso sí, que el matrimonio viciado de nulidad absoluta por simulación no es aquel que se celebra entre una persona extranjera y una persona costarricense. Eso, claramente, sería una disposición inconstitucional e inconvencional por xenofóbica. Pero sí es simulado el matrimonio que se hizo para obtener ventajas migratorias o de alguna otra naturaleza y no para cumplir con el fin esencial de fundar una familia. En consecuencia, para que proceda decretar la nulidad del matrimonio por simulación, es indispensable que alegue y luego se demuestre, con prueba lícita, que el propósito por el que se contrajo fue fraudulento. Hay que distinguir, eso sí, que cuando los contrayentes se casan con la intención de fundar familia, pero adicionalmente estiman necesario consignar una condición -por ejemplo, "nos casamos pero no queremos hijos. Si en algún momento alguno desea procrear, anulamos el matrimonio."-, la CONDICIÓN es nula, pero el matrimonio es válido. A eso se refiere el artículo 12 del Código de Familia.

Ahora bien, al ser colocado en el artículo 14 bis, el legislador dispuso que "el matrimonio simulado será nulo", y en este caso, la nulidad es de carácter absoluto, por lo que no es convalidable por ninguna circunstancia de carácter subjetivo ("yo no sabía que era ilegal casarse únicamente para obtener ventajas migratorias o de otro tipo") ni por el simple transcurso del tiempo y, además, se puede decretar incluso de oficio. La reforma al artículo 64, cuando se introdujo un párrafo segundo, es únicamente para incluir al Director del Registro Civil y al Director de MIgración y Extranjería, bajo la representación de la Procuraduría General de la República, como personas autorizadas a gestionar la nulidad del matrimonio. Esto quizás es conveniente, pero no era necesario en virtud de que en la nulidad absoluta la legitimación es amplísima, al punto que incluso se puede decretar de oficio.

La reforma también trajo algo interesante: Cuando un matrimonio se anula -ya sea por un vicio de nulidad absoluta o por un vicio de nulidad relativa-, hay algunos efectos que se acaban, pero hay otros que se mantienen. Por ejemplo, al decretarse la nulidad del matrimonio los "esposos" vuelven a su estado civil anterior, pero los hijos que hubieren procreado conservan la condición de hijos matrimoniales (Arts. 69 y 82 del Código de Familia). Otros efectos que se mantienen son los patrimoniales, y por ello, si había capitulaciones, estas se respetan, y si hay que liquidar los efectos patrimoniales del matrimonio por medio del régimen supletorio legal, siempre surge el derecho de cada cónyuge a participar en la mitad del valor neto de los bienes gananciales constatados en el patrimonio del otro. (Art.41) Con esto se quiere decir que parte de la responsabilidad de la persona juzgadora que anula un matrimonio es indicar cuáles efectos se extinguen y cuáles se mantienen.

Ahora bien, con la reforma que se introdujo mediante Ley 8781, al emitirse el nuevo artículo 19 (que no tiene ninguna relación con el que se había derogado por la Ley 8571), el legislador dispuso que "el matrimonio simulado no convalidará ninguna clase de derechos u obligaciones a los contrayentes." y en forma expresa, por haber sido esa la motivación de las reformas, estipuló que "cuando se declare su nulidad, el juez en sentencia declarativa ordenará la cancelación de la inscripción registral, así como el estatus migratorio y las naturalizaciones otorgadas, todo a consecuencia del matrimonio simulado." De un análisis integral de toda esta normativa, es posible apreciar que el matrimonio simulado presenta matices que lo relacionan con la inexistencia y la ineficacia del matrimonio, matices que lo relacionan con los matrimonios legalmente imposibles, y matices que lo relacionan con la nulidad relativa de matrimonios.

Así, al igual que con la inexistencia y con la ineficacia de matrimonios, cuando el matrimonio es simulado, se anula la inscripción y no se produce ningún efecto personal, ni social, ni patrimonial. Al igual que con los matrimonios viciados por nulidad absoluta o por nulidad relativa, en caso de simulación se anula el matrimonio y se anula su inscripción. Al igual que con los matrimonios inexistentes, ineficaces y legalmente imposibles -y por ende, viciados de nulidad absoluta en caso de que se celebren-, el matrimonio simulado no se puede convalidar por aspectos subjetivos de los esposos ni por el paso del tiempo y la legitimación es tan amplia que incluso se puede decretar de oficio. Y, al igual que con los matrimonios viciados con nulidad relativa, es factible que en el matrimonio simulado los hechos resulten controvertidos, y que para que la gestión de nulidad prospere, sea necesario que estos sean demostrados.

VII.Los matrimonios inexistentes, los ineficaces, los simulados y los que se encuentran viciados de nulidad absoluta tienen en común que la legitimación activa es amplísima, al punto que la inexistencia, la ineficacia y la nulidad -por simulación o porque el matrimonio era legalmente imposible- se puede decretar incluso de forma oficiosa.

El hecho de que se pueda decretar incluso de oficio no significa que el Estado, a través de los Tribunales de Justicia y mucho menos a través de las autoridades administrativas, puedan hacer la declaratoria de inexistencia, de ineficacia, o de nulidad prescindiendo del debido proceso y haciendo nugatorio el derecho de defensa. Cualquiera de estas gestiones debe ser puesta en conocimiento de quienes figuran como esposos, para que ellos tengan la oportunidad de expresar lo que estimen pertinente, y, cuando así se requiera, de ofrecer la prueba que corresponda.

Ahora bien, la oficiosidad no se refiere exclusivamente a la decisión final que se adopta en una sentencia; sino que abarca toda la actividad que debe desarrollar la persona juzgadora desde el inicio del proceso, haciendo las prevenciones necesarias para que antes de dársele traslado a la demanda, se tenga claridad de qué es lo que se pretende en un determinado proceso, y pasando por la actividad probatoria, en la cual le resulta exigible que tenga iniciativa y ordene la evacuación de las pruebas que sean necesarias para emitir el pronunciamiento final. Como antes se explicó, el matrimonio lo contraen personas físicas, sujetas de derecho privado, pero su celebración es de interés público. Este interés público trae consigo esa exigencia de que el Estado, a través de los Tribunales de Justicia, haga realmente efectiva la disposición contenida en el artículo 316 del Código Procesal Civil, en cuanto indica que al inicio de la fase probatoria, "el juez ordenará recibir las pruebas ofrecidas que san procedentes, y las que de oficio considere necesarias." Por esta razón, el Tribunal estima inaceptable, en casos donde está de por medio el interés público, el argumento dado por la señora Jueza de primera instancia en el sentido de que no había pruebas suficientes para emitir una sentencia estimatoria. Ella manifestó que la declaración rendida por la señora [Nombre 001] ante las autoridades administrativas no era suficiente para decretar la inexistencia del matrimonio, porque la versión que dio en aquella ocasión no se pudo someter al contradictorio. Si tal era la dificultad, la obligación era ordenar la prueba oficiosamente. Pero el problema es más amplio, ya que en la sentencia se indicó que esa prueba documental era insuficiente, pero resulta que ese elemento probatorio nunca fue incorporado legítimamente al proceso, pues no existe resolución en donde se hubiera admitido. En la resolución de las catorce horas siete minutos del cinco de junio de dos mil quince, se indicó que no era procedente convocar a las partes a conciliación y que "al no haber prueba testimonial que evacuar, firme el presente auto, díctese la resolución de fondo." (f.73) Como se aprecia, en la resolución no se emitió pronunciamiento sobre la prueba documental que fue ofrecida en la demanda. La admisión o el rechazo de pruebas requiere una labor intelectiva de la persona juzgadora, pues debe analizar si la prueba es pertinente y lícita y si fue ofrecida oportunamente. Al no haber sido admitida ni rechazada, se impidió que las partes pudieran combatir la decisión. Esto nos lleva al escenario del tratamiento jurídico de la prueba en materia procesal familiar.

Básicamente -porque evidentemente este tema es muy amplio- hay que mencionar que en esta materia procesal familiar no rigen las limitaciones establecidas en la legislación procesal civil para valorar las pruebas. (Artículo 8 del Código de Familia) Pero más importante resulta el hecho de que las limitaciones no solo no existen al final, cuando la prueba se debe valorar, sino que esto se extiende al momento de evacuación de las pruebas, al momento de admisión de las pruebas y hasta al momento en que debe calificarse si un elemento es prueba o no es prueba. Esto es así porque para que el Juez o la Jueza valore la prueba, primero la tuvo que evacuar, y antes la tuvo que admitir, y para admitirla, tuvo que haber definido si lo ofrecido era, o no era, un elemento probatorio. A esta amplitud se la conoce en doctrina como el principio del favor probatione, el cual, en palabras del procesalista argentino Jorge Luis Kielmanovich, "supone que en casos de duda en torno a la producción, admisión, conducencia o eficacia de la prueba habrá de estarse por un criterio amplio en favor de ella, de suerte que debe preferirse la apertura a prueba de la causa antes que una declaración de puro derecho." De esta forma, tal como señala este autor, en esta materia se puede considerar "una menor exigencia de precisión en los testimonios rendidos, en la admisibilidad del testimonio "de oídas", "ex auditu" o indirecto; en la aceptación de pruebas menos idóneas, v.gr. la testimonial, en lugar de la pericial para establecer, por ejemplo, la autenticidad de un documento a falta de otros indubitados y ausencia o fallecimiento de un otorgante, etcétera." (KIELMANOVICH, Jorge Luis. (2008) Los principios del proceso de familia. En obra conjunta "Derecho Procesal de Familia. Tras las premisas de su teoría general." Editorial Jurídica Continental. San José. pp. 17 y 18). Como también apunta la tratadista Marisa Herrera, comentando la legislación argentina pero aplicables sus conceptos, mutatis mutandi, en nuestro país, "así como se ha edificado un derecho constitucional/convencional de familia en lo relativo al derecho de fondo, el derecho procesal o los procedimientos también han debido humanizarse. De este modo, y con acierto, se entiende que el acceso a la justicia es un derecho humano y que éste debe ser protegido especialmente cuando se trata de personas vulnerables [...] En materia probatoria, el art.710 familia. Ellos son: 1) libertad, 2) amplitud, 3) flexibilidad y 4) carga dinámica de la prueba. [...]" (HERRERA MARISA. Op.cit. pp.49 y 50) El hecho de que exista amplitud probatoria en el derecho procesal de familia no significa que sea admisible todo tipo de pruebas, ya que el Juzgador o la Juzgadora tiene el deber de garantizar que solo se admita prueba lícita, que a su vez resulte pertinente y que sea ofrecida y admitida en los momentos que están dispuestos por la Ley.

El concepto de prueba lícita abarca no solo que el elemento probatorio como tal no resulte violatorio de derechos fundamentales (por ejemplo, la declaración bajo juramento que se refiera a la comisión de un delito por parte de quien declara o de un familiar suyo hasta el tercer grado por consanguinidad o afinidad, si antes no se advirtió al declarante acerca de su derecho constitucional a abstenerse de declarar), sino también que su obtención no se haya producido con violación de derechos fundamentales (por ejemplo, cuando se ofrece como prueba documental el contenido de un correo electrónico obtenido luego de vencer la voluntad y la intimidad del titular de la cuenta por medio de la violencia). Además, es muy importante tener presente que resulta espuria la prueba que se obtenga a partir de otra prueba ilícita en sí misma o de otra prueba obtenida de forma ilícita, lo cual se conoce como la teoría de los frutos del árbol envenenado.

El concepto de pertinencia se refiere a que la prueba sea ofrecida u ordenada de oficio para la comprobación de hechos relevantes y directamente relacionados con la pretensión. Por ejemplo, en un proceso de divorcio en el que se invoca únicamente la causal de separación de hecho, no es pertinente recibir la declaración de un testigo que se ofreció para referirse al hecho de que alguno de los cónyuges ha violado el deber de fidelidad.

Finalmente, el concepto de oportunidad tiene relación con el principio de lealtad procesal, según el cual, debe existir transaparencia suficiente para que las partes conozcan, antes de su evacuación, cuáles fueron las pruebas que se ofrecieron, las que se admitieron, las que se ordenaron de oficio y las que se rechazaron.

Un caso como el presente permite ejemplificar la trascendencia de lo que recién se ha expuesto: La Procuraduría General de la República ofreció como prueba documental -entre otros- la declaración que rindió la señora [Nombre 001] ante la Jefa a.i. de la Oficina Local de Heredia del Registro Civil. El Juzgado de primera instancia no indicó si admitió o si rechazó la prueba, con lo cual evadió la obligación de examinar su pertinencia y su licitud, y al mismo tiempo, se impidió a las partes que pudieran ejercer los recursos correspondientes. Sin embargo, esa prueba fue valorada en la sentencia, concluyéndose que no era "suficiente" porque no había sido posible someterla al contradictorio. Lo primero que tiene que definirse es si la prueba se admite o si se rechaza. Y si se admite, lo procedente es analizarla en la sentencia, en conjunto con las demás pruebas que se haya ordenado recibir, a petición de parte o de oficio.

VIII.Como se aprecia, hubo confusión en determinar cuál es el objeto de este proceso. La demanda formulada por la Procuradora Marcela Ramírez Jara contiene una clara pretensión de declaratoria de inexistencia del matrimonio (f.35), pero, sin que los hechos ni la pretensión hubieran sido ampliados, la misma Procuradora introdujo el concepto de "matrimonio simulado" cuando contestó la audiencia que se le concedió para referirse a la oposición que había manifestado la curadora procesal del demandado [Nombre 005]. (fs. 68 y 69) Luego, cuando la sentencia se apeló, el Procurador Esteban Alvarado Quesada manifestó que eso había sido un error material. (f.83) Sin embargo, al apersonarse en esta instancia, otro Procurador, el Licenciado Guillermo Fernández Lizano, expresó que el matrimonio sí es simulado, por ser inexistente. (f.124)

El Tribunal estima necesario precisar que la demanda es para que se declare la inexistencia del matrimonio. No es para que se declare la nulidad relativa por haberse producido algún vicio de consentimiento, ni es para que se declare la nulidad del matrimonio, por simulación. Como antes se dijo, ni los hechos ni la pretensión fueron ampliados y por eso el marco fáctico y la pretensión quedó limitada a lo que se expuso y a lo que se pidió en la demanda.

Es necesario también que la Procuraduría General de la República aclare si la demanda se presentó en contra de la señora [Nombre 001], pues ella más bien fue la persona que le solicitó al Registro Civil que tramitara la anulación de la inscripción del matrimonio y la corrección de los asientos de nacimiento de sus hijas e hijo. En tal circunstancia, pareciera que doña [Nombre 001] -quien no es profesional en Derecho- podría constituirse como litis consorte activa o como interventora adhesiva. Esto puede llegar a tener incidencia importante, porque, eventualmente, la señora [Nombre 001] podría rendir declaración como testiga o como parte. Si la Procuraduría estima que debe mantenerse como demandada, se servirá indicar los motivos correspondientes para que la sentencia se pueda analizar adecuadamente el tema de la legitimación pasiva.

También se requiere que la autoridad judicial de primera instancia, en ejercicio de la responsabilidad que tiene en el descubrimiento de la verdad de los hechos por estarse dilucidando un tema de interés público, ordene de oficio las pruebas que estime pertinentes y que además se pronuncie, expresamente, sobre les documentos que ofreció la parte actora en la demanda, indicando cuáles admite y/o cuáles rechaza. Se hace la observación, respetuosamente, de que en la sentencia se hizo mención a que la declaración que rindió la señora [Nombre 001] en sede administrativa no se pudo someter al contradictorio, por lo que eventualmente esa prueba que echó de menos la Juzgadora podría ordenarse de oficio; y, como lo que se expuso en demanda es que doña [Nombre 001] no expresó su consentimiento para casarse, quizás sea pertinente ordenar un examen grafoscópico de la firma que pueda estar estampada en la escritura pública.

Por las razones expuestas con detalle, la decisión de este Tribunal es anular la sentencia y, además, todo lo actuado y resuelto a partir de la resolución dictada a las trece horas catorce minutos del veintiséis de agosto de dos mil catorce, en la cual se incluyó a la señora [Nombre 001] en la posición procesal de demandada. La nulidad decretada no incluye el traslado de la demanda contra el señor [Nombre 005], ni el nombramiento de la Licenciada Karla Vanessa López Silva como su curadora procesal, ni la aceptación y la correspondiente contestación de demanda que presentó la referida curadora procesal. Estas piezas se mantienen vigentes en aplicación del principio de conservación de los actos procesales.”