Application of Article 71 of the LOCGR to an IDA Regional Director sanctioned for conflict of interestAplicación del artículo 71 de la LOCGR a Director Regional del IDA sancionado por conflicto de intereses

**III.-** Regarding the second section, it is necessary to note that the analysis will be limited to the arguments concerning the application of Article 71 of the LOCGR; given that the rest of the arguments presented there –referring to the interruption of the statute of limitations and the expiration of the procedure– are informal, as they fail to state what specific normative breach the Trial Court is accused of having incurred. As stated when resolving the admissibility of this appeal, for a grievance to proceed in cassation, mere subjective considerations against the judges' ruling are insufficient; on the contrary, it is the cassation appellant's duty, as an interested party, to carefully and precisely demonstrate the specific reasons why he deems his rights violated, properly identifying the legal norms he considers breached. Having clarified the foregoing, the appellant's challenge will be assessed insofar as he affirms that, from the moment the Administration became aware of the facts (in the year 2005), “it had one month to initiate the procedure,” yet it took three years to issue and notify the initial order, and therefore, he asserts, the one-month statute of limitations period had already amply elapsed. On this matter, the Trial Court stated: “[…] the plaintiff was appointed as Huetar Norte Regional Director of the Institute of Agrarian Development (Autonomous Institution) as of July 1, 1996, which evidently means his position entails the control and handling of public funds and assets (fact 2), holding a position at the time of the facts as a public official with handling of public funds and assets, so regarding the statute of limitations, numeral 603 of the Labor Code is not applicable, as the plaintiff intends, but rather numeral 71 of Law Number 7428, Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic.” The cassation appellant considers that the judges erroneously applied canon 71 of the LOCGR, since his represented party “does not have among his duties the administration, administrative management, or accounting of public funds, he simply confirmed a recommendation because it was ordered by the Board of Directors and the Presidency; thus, under these circumstances, he cannot be considered a public finance official, but rather a simple public official.” **IV.-** In order to proceed with the examination of the challenged point, it is necessary to bear in mind that the political formula of the Costa Rican constitutional system is one of responsibility and accountability, as derived from constitutional articles 9 and 11. Likewise, there is a series of international commitments, among which is the United Nations Convention against Corruption, approved by Law No. 8557 of November 29, 2006, whose Article 29 is important to bear in mind, as it obliges the establishment of broad statutes of limitations (prescripción) for initiating proceedings for offenses stipulated in that convention. Although said international agreement focuses on the sphere of criminal prosecution, it is not limited solely thereto. Canon 8 thereof urges countries to establish codes of conduct that seek integrity, honesty, and responsibility in the public function, for which it promotes adopting “disciplinary or other measures against public officials who violate the codes or standards established in accordance with this article.” Likewise, precept 30 of that international agreement clarifies that the act of criminalizing the offenses typified therein to combat corruption does not impair “the exercise of disciplinary powers by the competent bodies against public employees.” For its part, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, approved by Law No. 7670 of April 17, 1997, obliges the adoption of norms that allow ensuring the correct and honorable exercise of the public function, together with the necessary measures to prevent, detect, and sanction non-compliance, as stipulated in its Article III, which provides: “[…] The States Parties agree to consider the applicability of measures, within their own institutional systems, designed to create, maintain, and strengthen: // 1. Standards of conduct for the correct, honorable, and proper performance of public functions. These standards shall be aimed at preventing conflicts of interest and ensuring the preservation and proper use of resources assigned to public officials in the performance of their duties. They shall also establish measures and systems requiring public officials to inform the competent authorities of acts of corruption in the public function of which they are aware. Such measures shall help preserve confidence in the integrity of public officials and in public management. // 2. Mechanisms to enforce compliance with said standards of conduct. // […] // 9. Oversight bodies with a view to developing modern mechanisms for preventing, detecting, punishing, and eradicating corrupt practices.” It is in pursuit of objectives such as those described that, in the year 2002, the LGCI modified precept 71 of the LOCGR. In the past, the first paragraph of that norm provided: “The disciplinary liability (responsabilidad disciplinaria) of the Public Finance Servant shall prescribe in the period of two years, counted from the proven knowledge of the fault by the competent body, to initiate the respective sanctioning procedure. For these purposes, Article 603 of the Labor Code and any other legal provisions that oppose it are hereby reformed, with respect to public officials or public servants. // […].” That is, the one-month period stipulated in precept 603 of the Labor Code was extended to two years for those officials who fell within the concept of “Public Finance Servant.” The Constitutional Chamber had indicated that this was restricted “to one who is in charge of handling public funds. […] [That is,] directly related to the handling and disposal of public funds,” (judgment No. 6750-97 of 11 hours 12 minutes of October 17, 1997, reiterated in Nos. 6843-98 of 15 hours 45 minutes of September 24, 1998, and No. 7516-2001 of 14 hours 49 minutes of August 1, 2001). However, by virtue of the reform enacted in 2002, numeral 71 of the LOCGR came to institute the following: “Article 71.— Statute of limitations for disciplinary liability. The administrative liability (responsabilidad administrativa) of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight legal framework (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores), shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules: // a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. // b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious – understood as a fact that requires an investigation or an audit study to report its possible irregularity – the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is brought to the knowledge of the head or official competent to initiate the respective procedure. // The statute of limitations (prescripción) shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible person of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure. // When the author of the fault is the head, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. // Failure by the competent official to initiate the sanctioning procedure in a timely manner or allowing the liability of the offender to prescribe without justified cause shall be deemed a serious fault of that official.” In this way, a series of important changes were introduced. On the one hand, the statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción) was extended from 2 to 5 years; and it was recognized, in what is relevant here, that it would begin to be computed from the “irregular fact,” if it is notorious, or from the moment the investigation or audit is brought to the knowledge of the head, in the case of matters requiring it for the purpose of reporting about the possible irregularity. On the other hand, the scope of the norm was extended, which is of particular interest for the case under analysis here. The First Chamber, when rejecting a cassation appeal on its merits that dealt with this same topic, specified: “[…] With the reform undergone by Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the assessment criterion was changed to determine the applicable statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción), as it moved from a subjective regime to an objective one. That is, it is no longer necessary to carry out the assessment exercise of whether the servant is of the Public Finance (aspecto subjetivo). For it is sufficient to determine the violation of the control and oversight legal framework of the Public Finance (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública), which obeys an objective material criterion” (judgment No. 623-A-S1-2013 of 10 hours 25 minutes of May 16, 2013). Indeed, as has been stated, under the previous version, the norm was applicable only to those who could be categorized as a “Public Finance Servant” (condition of the subject); now it includes every public official –regardless of the position or post held–, insofar as what matters is that the conduct committed (the “irregular fact”) can be considered an infraction of the “superior control and oversight legal framework” (criterio objetivo). The latter is defined by Article 10 of the LOCGR, which stipulates: “Article 10.- Superior control and oversight legal framework.- The superior control and oversight legal framework of the Public Finance (ordenamiento de control y de fiscalización superiores de la Hacienda Pública) comprises the set of norms that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relations, procedures, liabilities (responsabilidades), and sanctions derived from that oversight or necessary for it. // This legal framework also comprises the norms that regulate oversight over foreign entities and bodies and private funds and activities, referred to in this Law, as its fundamental norm, within the constitutional framework.” Hence, the legal framework that makes up this system includes, among others, the aforementioned LOCGR and LGCI, as well as the General Law of Public Administration (hereinafter LGAP); the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, Law No. 8422 of October 6, 2004 (hereinafter Law Against Corruption); the Law of the Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, Law No. 8131 of September 18, 2001; the Administrative Procurement Law, Law No. 7494 of May 2, 1995, and other provisions that develop them. Furthermore, the First Chamber has considered that canon 71 of the LOCGR stands as a precept of a general nature, stipulating a statute of limitations period for the fault (prescripción de la falta) in oversight matters. So much so that, in the case of professional associations, it has been indicated: “[…] The statute of limitations for the fault (prescripción de la falta), […] is not expressly regulated either in the Regulation or in the Organic Law of the Federated College of Engineers and Architects. This normative omission obliges that said period must be set by means of integration of the legal system, which must be carried out taking into consideration the nature of the relationship that binds the professional association with its members and the power being exercised. […]. Thus, these associations exercise, on behalf of the State, an administrative function consisting of overseeing that their members carry out their activity in accordance with the ethical, moral, and professional parameters that are required, in attention to the marked public interest existing in the matter, originating, between both, a relationship of special subjection. By virtue of the foregoing, in the opinion of this Chamber, the underlying relationship between a professional association and its members presents a nature akin to that existing between the Administration and the public servants through which it acts, and over whom it exercises a surveillance and control function. Added to the above, the sanctioning power being analyzed is entirely compatible with that granted to the Administration in disciplinary matters on the occasion of the exercise of an oversight power, similar to the one analyzed here. For this reason, recourse must be had to the provisions of Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, which establishes a statute of limitations period for the fault (plazo de prescripción de la falta) of 5 years. The foregoing due to the fact that both the Internal Control Law (Law No. 8292) and the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (law no. 4822), by virtue of Articles 43 and 44, respectively, refer to this precept for the definition of the institute in question, and given the absence of another provision in the administrative legal order that regulates said aspect, it can be inferred that both circumstances grant said norm a general character for the purpose of analyzing the statute of limitations (prescripción) in oversight matters, and the consequent sanctioning possibility (without prejudice, of course, to a special regulation). […] // […] // […] In this sense, every fault must be subject to a statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción), and therefore, in those cases where the legal system does not fix it, it must be established supplementarily, without this causing any harm to the rights of the individual” (judgment No. 479-F-S1-2011 of 11 hours 40 minutes of April 7, 2011). In a similar vein, regarding the oversight powers of the Office of the General Superintendency of Securities, that same Court stated: “[…] The annulment of sanctioning administrative acts is sought, through which SUGEVAL, exercising a power of authority granted by the Law Regulating the Securities Market, corrects the improper action of the stock exchange firm and its agents. Given the absence within the cited normative framework of a precept establishing the statute of limitations (prescripción), it is appropriate to apply the LOCGR, as indicated above, resorting to the principles of completeness and coherence of the legal system, and to the mechanisms of integration to resolve said gap. […]. In this manner, based on integrative mechanisms of Law, this Collegiate Body concludes that the applicable period is that of five years indicated, because the genesis of this process corresponds to the deployment of a power of authority of the Administration, which is the application of the sanctioning procedure for non-compliance with duties, an administrative procedure immersed in a special Law, which due to the claimed gap must adjust to what is established in the LOCGR and specifically to canon 71, regarding the statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción)” (judgment No. 517-F-S1-2012 of 9 hours 35 minutes of May 3, 2012).

**V.-** In this litigation, it is proven that Mr. Quirós Conejo, in his capacity as Director of the Huetar Norte Regional Directorate, recommended and requested that parcels and farms of the Institute be awarded and titled in favor of two of his uncles and a cousin and three sisters of his wife. These facts came to the knowledge of the Board of Directors by virtue of report No. OSCQ-023-2006 of January 19, 2006, through which the Subregional Office of Ciudad Quesada reported about a number of lands that, in that Regional Directorate, had been awarded to officials of the same Institute or to their relatives. By virtue thereof, on January 30, 2006, the heads of that Institution ordered that the matter be referred “to the Labor Relations Unit, so that it may initiate the rigorous procedures.” Without the reasons why the immediate compliance with what was indicated by the Board of Directors did not proceed –immediately– being known here, it is established that it was not until January 12, 2009, that the administrative sanctioning procedure was initiated against the former Regional Director, which culminated in a sanction of 22 days of suspension without pay. Said official attacked in the jurisdictional venue what was resolved by the Institute, arguing, among other things, the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power. However, the Trial Court rejected that argument, as it considered that the 5 years referred to in numeral 71 of the LOCGR had not elapsed (considering that, by the time the facts were known by the heads, the reform that had operated on that norm was already in force). The decision of the judges finds antecedents in circumstances of a similar nature, in which the Second Chamber had already recognized that such statute of limitations (prescripción) should be governed as indicated in that canon, and not the one stipulated in the Labor Code. Thus, in the face of a lawsuit against the IDA –filed by another Regional Director, dismissed for irregularities committed in land titling processes–, said Chamber indicated: “Nor is the reproach regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning power of the Institute of Agrarian Development acceptable. Particularly due to the application by the lower court judges of Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, […]. This does not violate the principle of legal certainty nor the protective principle of the most favorable norm to the worker. If you look closely, what was done through Article 10 of the cited Regulation was nothing other than developing the principle established in Article 71 of the Law. Its purpose being that reprehensible conduct of public servants, responsible for public funds or assets, does not go unpunished simply due to the passage of fleeting periods. And, the Constitutional Chamber has already considered and resolved that the existence for public officials and servants of a public employment regime necessarily implies some consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, now not only distinct from those of (private) labor law, but often opposed to them. Note that these are norms that are not only later but also special, which makes them prevail, as the Ad quem expressed, over the cited Article 603” (Second Chamber, judgment No. 2003-00796 of 14 hours 55 minutes of December 18, 2003). Now, the cassation appellant insists that, in his view, the precept in question was not applicable to his represented party, since the position he held was not that of “a Public Finance Servant,” so the statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción) would be that of one month. In response, as already stated, it is clear that numeral 71 ibidem governs for every official who violates the superior control and oversight legal framework, regardless of the position he holds in the Public Administration (or in a private sector company, under the terms stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Law Against Corruption). In this regard, it is necessary to bear in mind that the duty of probity (deber de probidad) stands as one of the central bulwarks of the public function, through which all servants are required “to orient their management towards the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall manifest itself, fundamentally, in identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, in demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions adopted in fulfillment of their duties conform to impartiality and the specific objectives of the institution in which they serve and, finally, in administering public resources in accordance with the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, satisfactorily rendering accounts” (Article 3 of the Law Against Corruption). Although that legal description is of a date later than the facts attributed to Mr. Quirós Conejo, said precept reflects constitutional principles and norms that, from long ago, guide the correct exercise of the public function; in such a way that the actions of its servants conform to legality, their impartiality is guaranteed, equal treatment to users, planned, effective, and efficient attention and demonstrate rectitude and good faith. All this under a framework of measures that impose, among others, a regime of prohibitions, incompatibilities, disqualifications, and grounds for abstention and excuse, which have informed –for many years– the national legal system. For this reason, this Cassation Court shares the reasons set forth in the appealed judgment, insofar as it indicates that: “the public official must act with prudence, integrity, honesty, seriousness, morality, and rectitude both in the daily performance of his function and in the use and protection of the funds, assets, and resources entrusted to him by reason of his position and abide by his duties and prohibitions of an ethical and upright nature, which immediately leads us to the issue of conflict of interest. When, due to the circumstances, the public official must recuse himself from matters brought to his knowledge when his objectivity and actions may be at risk, without the duty of obedience being an absolute justification, […]. What obliges the official is his subjection to the fulfillment of ethical duties, and among these the regime of disqualifications that can be applied officially or at the request of a party, just as provided for in numerals 229, 230, and 237 of the General Law of Public Administration regarding abstention and recusal, a norm that refers in turn to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and the Civil Procedure Code in order to avoid a potential conflict of interest.” Indeed, the IDA was an institution whose ordinary activity included the trading of lands, so it could buy, sell, mortgage, lease, and acquire the goods and services necessary for rural exploitation, as well as carry out comprehensive development plans, peasant settlements, colonization programs, parcel out and award lands (as established in Articles 2 and 3 of the Law of Creation of the Institute of Agrarian Development, Law No. 6735 of March 29, 1982; currently repealed by the Law of Transformation of the Institute of Agrarian Development into the Institute of Rural Development, Law No. 9036 of May 11, 2012). It is under this framework of institutional powers that Mr. Salvador Quirós carried out his work, as Director of the Huetar Norte Regional Directorate. From that perspective, it is striking that the cassation appellant challenges the ruling under the argument that it incurred in “a non-existent analysis of the functions or duties of my client visible as we point out at folios 186 to 189 of the administrative file.” On the contrary, the certification issued by the Coordinator of the Human Resources Area of the IDA, at 10 hours and 40 minutes of February 27, 2008, visible in the folios referred to by the appellant, was assessed as proven fact no. 2 of the judgment. In that document, it is observed that the tasks of Mr. Quirós Conejo included, among other things: “- Awards, Controls, and follows up on leases, in border strips and parcels of the Institute, based on established regulations. // - Advises the Executive Presidency and Management on substantive activities of the Institution and land titling, either verbally or through the presentation of written reports for decision-making on matters of land investment, transfers of properties, mortgages, segregations, and others, for the fulfillment of institutional objectives. // […] // - Programs, in coordination with the Agrarian Planning department, the prioritization and processing of property titles. // […] // - Coordinates, supervises, and carries out periodic field inspections, to verify the existence of anomalies in the exploitation or occupation of the property (lot or parcel).” In light of what is indicated in said certification, it is clear that Mr. Quirós Conejo was responsible for awarding and controlling the Institute's lands in his respective Regional Directorate, as well as advising senior authorities on this matter. For this reason, by recommending and requesting that parcels and farms of the IDA be awarded and titled in favor of his own relatives and those of his wife, he incurred in a conflict of interest; rather, as recognized by the appealed ruling, his duty was to recuse himself from the knowledge of such matters and not –as he did– intercede so that his relatives, and those of his spouse, would be benefited with properties provided by the Institute. Such that, although he was sanctioned with only 22 days of suspension without pay, the Administration made clear that it was a serious fault. Even more so, on this point, the Trial Court highlighted: “This is indeed a serious breach of the duties of the then-plaintiff's position, which could well have allowed even a greater sanction in the judgment of this jurisdictional collegiate body, but the administration –in the handling of human resources– chose to mitigate the sanction.” Thus, it is an infraction of the superior control and oversight system. This is because, as mentioned, the duty of probity is inserted in the substantial base of the democratic regime, insofar as he who is a public servant must be upright, so that from his post he serves the citizenry and not himself. For this reason, the liability of public officials (responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos) constitutes one of the objective components of the Public Finance (cardinal 8 of the LOCGR), which is linked both to the constitutional principles of responsible government, accountability, probity, and suitability (precepts 9, 11, and 192 of the Political Constitution), and to those of effectiveness and efficiency (numerals 139.4, 140.8, and 191 ibidem). Thus, the norms to prevent conflicts of interest constitute necessary measures to “preserve confidence in the integrity of public officials and in public management,” as recognized in Article III of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, cited supra. In that sense, when the facts attributed to Mr. Quirós Conejo were committed, subsection ch) of canon 26 of the then-current Law on Illicit Enrichment of Public Servants, Law No. 6872 of June 17, 1983, already held –criminally– liable those who “consent, facilitate, or intervene in any way, through their influence, knowledge, or function, in the enrichment of a third party, whether a public official or not,” as the IDA referred to as part of the normative foundation to support the sanction. Likewise, as the appealed judgment rightly indicates, precepts 229, 230, and 237 already instituted the duty of abstention, in order to avoid said conflict of interest, as derived from the referral made by those provisions to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (hereinafter LOPJ) and the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC); by virtue of which, servants who hear matters involving the interest of their spouse, their uncles/aunts, or siblings-in-law, as the case may be, must abstain, recuse themselves, excuse themselves, or be challenged (numerals 25 of the LOPJ and 49 and 53 of the CPC). On the other hand, it should be recalled that “the higher the hierarchy of the official and the more technical his functions, in relation to the defect of the act, the greater his duty to be aware of it and to assess it properly,” as provided for in canon 213 of the LGAP.

In short, this case concerns a public servant who held the position of Regional Director of the IDA, subject to a duty of probity that required him to avoid any conflict of interest and to refrain from any action tending to benefit his relatives or those of his wife, with farms, properties, or other lands of that Institute. Hence, the applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) for administrative liability is that stipulated in Article 71 of the LOCGR, as resolved by the judgment under appeal, and not the one-month period stipulated in the Labor Code and sought by the appellant. For this reason, the alleged grievance must be rejected." "III.- Regarding the second section, it is necessary to note that the analysis will be limited to the arguments concerning the application of Article 71 of the LOCGR; since the rest of the arguments presented there—referring to the interruption of the statute of limitations (prescripción) and the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure—are informal, as they fail to state what regulatory breach the Trial Court is accused of having incurred. As stated when resolving the admissibility of this appeal, for a grievance to proceed in cassation, mere subjective considerations against what was decided by the judges are not enough; on the contrary, it is the duty of the appellant, as an interested party, to carefully and precisely demonstrate the specific reasons why they believe their rights were violated, properly identifying the legal norms they consider breached. With the foregoing clarified, the appellant's challenge will be assessed insofar as he claims that, from the time the Administration became aware of the facts (in the year 2005) “it had one month to initiate the procedure”, yet it took three years to issue and notify the initial order, therefore, he asserts, the one-month statute of limitations (prescripción) period had already amply elapsed. On this matter, the Trial Court stated: “[…] the plaintiff was appointed as Regional Director of Huetar Norte of the Institute of Agrarian Development (Autonomous Institution) as of July 1, 1996, which evidently means his position entails the control and management of public funds and assets (fact 2), holding a position at the time of the facts as a public official with management of public funds and assets, so regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción), numeral 603 of the Labor Code is not applicable, as the plaintiff intends, but rather numeral 71 of Law Number 7428, Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic”. The appellant believes that the judges erroneously applied canon 71 of the LOCGR, since his represented party “does not have among his attributions the administration, administrative or accounting management of public funds, he simply confirmed a recommendation because it was ordered by the Board of Directors and the Presidency, thus, it is not considerable [sic] an official of the public treasury (hacienda pública), but rather he is a simple public official.” IV.- In order to proceed with the examination of the objected point, it is necessary to bear in mind that the political formula of the Costa Rican constitutional system is one of responsibility and accountability, as derived from constitutional articles 9 and 11. Likewise, there is a series of international commitments, among which is the United Nations Convention against Corruption, approved by Law No. 8557 of November 29, 2006, of which it is important to keep in mind its article 29, as it requires establishing broad statutes of limitations (plazos de prescripción) to initiate proceedings for crimes stipulated in that convention. Although said international agreement focuses on the scope of criminal prosecution, it is not limited solely to that. Canon 8 ibidem urges countries to establish codes of conduct that seek integrity, honesty, and responsibility in public service, for which it promotes adopting “disciplinary or other measures against any public official who transgresses the codes or standards established in accordance with this article.” Likewise, precept 30 of that international agreement clarifies that the fact of criminalizing the offenses defined there to combat corruption does not impair “the exercise of disciplinary powers by the competent bodies against public employees.” For its part, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, approved by Law No. 7670 of April 17, 1997, requires adopting norms that ensure the correct and honorable exercise of public service, together with the necessary measures to prevent, detect, and sanction its breach, as stipulated in its Article III, which provides: “[…] The States Parties agree to consider the applicability of measures, within their own institutional systems, designed to create, maintain and strengthen: // 1.- Standards of conduct for the correct, honorable, and proper performance of public functions. These standards shall be aimed at preventing conflicts of interest and ensuring the preservation and proper use of resources assigned to public officials in the performance of their functions. They shall also establish measures and systems requiring public officials to inform the competent authorities of acts of corruption in public service of which they become aware. Such measures shall help to preserve confidence in the integrity of public officials and in public management. // 2.- Mechanisms to enforce the application of said standards of conduct. // […] // 9.- Oversight bodies, with a view to developing modern mechanisms for preventing, detecting, sanctioning, and eradicating corrupt practices”. It is in light of objectives such as those described that, in the year 2002, the LGCI modified precept 71 of the LOCGR. In the past, the first paragraph of said norm provided: “The disciplinary liability of the public treasury (Hacienda Pública) servant shall be prescribed within a period of two years, counted from the proven knowledge of the fault by the competent body to initiate the respective sanctioning procedure. For these purposes, article 603 of the Labor Code and any other legal provisions that oppose it are hereby reformed, with respect to public officials or public servants. // […].” That is, the one-month period stipulated in precept 603 of the Labor Code was extended to two years for those officials who fell within the concept of “public treasury (Hacienda Pública) servant.” The Constitutional Chamber had indicated that this was restricted “to the one who is in charge of managing public funds. […] [That is,] directly related to the management and disposal of public funds,” (ruling No. 6750-97 of 11 hours 12 minutes of October 17, 1997, reiterated in No. 6843-98 of 15 hours 45 minutes of September 24, 1998, and No. 7516-2001 of 14 hours 49 minutes of August 1, 2001). However, by virtue of the reform operated in the year 2002, numeral 71 of the LOCGR went on to establish the following: “Article 71.— Statute of limitations (Prescripción) of disciplinary liability. The administrative liability of the public official for violations provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight system (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores) shall be prescribed in accordance with the following rules: // a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. // b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as that act requiring an investigation or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—the liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is brought to the attention of the hierarch or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. // The statute of limitations (prescripción) shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure. // When the author of the fault is the hierarch, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the entity, company, or respective body. // It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure, to not initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the offender's liability to prescribe, without justified cause.” In this way, a series of important changes were introduced. On one hand, the statute of limitations (prescripción) period was extended from 2 to 5 years; and it was recognized, in what concerns us here, that it would begin to be calculated from the “irregular act,” if it is notorious, or else from the moment the investigation or audit is brought to the attention of the hierarch, when dealing with matters that require it for purposes of reporting the possible irregularity. On the other hand, the scope of the norm was extended, which is of particular interest for the case analyzed here. The First Chamber, when rejecting on the merits an appeal in cassation that dealt with this same topic, already specified: “[…] With the reform undergone by Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the assessment criterion was varied to determine the applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) period, moving from a subjective regime to an objective one. That is, it is no longer necessary to exercise the assessment of whether the servant is of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) (subjective aspect). Since it is sufficient to determine the transgression of the control and oversight system of the Public Treasury (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública), which obeys an objective material criterion” (ruling No. 623-A-S1-2013 of 10 hours 25 minutes of May 16, 2013). Indeed, as has been said, under the previous version, the norm was applicable only to those who could be classified as a “public treasury (Hacienda Pública) servant” (condition of the subject); now it includes every public official—regardless of the position or office they hold—, as what matters is that the conduct committed (the “irregular act”) can be considered a violation of the “superior control and oversight system (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superior)” (objective criterion). The latter is defined by Article 10 of the LOCGR, which stipulates: “Article 10.- Superior control and oversight system (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores).- The superior control and oversight system of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) comprises the set of norms that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relations, procedures, responsibilities, and sanctions derived from that oversight or necessary for it. // This system also comprises the norms that regulate the oversight of foreign entities and bodies and private funds and activities, to which this Law refers, as its fundamental norm, within the constitutional framework.” Hence, the legal framework that makes up this system includes, among others, the already cited LOCGR and LGCI, as well as the General Law of Public Administration (hereinafter LGAP); the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, Law No. 8422 of October 6, 2004 (hereinafter Law Against Corruption); the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, Law No. 8131 of September 18, 2001; the Law on Administrative Procurement, Law No. 7494 of May 2, 1995, and other provisions that develop them. Furthermore, the First Chamber has considered that canon 71 of the LOCGR stands as a precept of a general nature, stipulating a statute of limitations (prescripción) period for the fault, in matters of oversight (fiscalización). Such that, in the case of professional associations, it has been indicated: “[…] The statute of limitations (prescripción) of the fault, […] is not expressly regulated either in the Regulation or in the Organic Law of the Federated College of Engineers and Architects. This regulatory omission obliges that said period must be determined by integrating the legal system, which must be done taking into consideration the nature of the relationship that binds the professional association with its members and the power being exercised. […]. Thus, these associations exercise, on behalf of the State, an administrative function consisting of overseeing that their members carry out their activity according to the ethical, moral, and professional parameters that are required, in view of the marked public interest that exists in the matter, originating, between both, a relationship of special subjection. By virtue of the foregoing, in the opinion of this Chamber, the underlying relationship between a professional association and its members presents a nature akin to that existing between the Administration and the public servants through whom it acts, and over whom it exercises a function of surveillance and control. Added to the above, the sanctioning power being analyzed is completely compatible with that granted to the Administration in disciplinary matters on the occasion of exercising an oversight (fiscalización) power, similar to the one analyzed here. For this reason, one must resort to the provisions of Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, which establishes a statute of limitations (prescripción) period for the fault of 5 years. The foregoing is because, both the Internal Control Law (Law No. 8292) and the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Law No. 4822), by virtue of articles 43 and 44, respectively, refer to this precept for the definition of the institution in question, and given the absence of another provision in the administrative legal system that regulates said aspect, it can be inferred that both circumstances give said norm a general character for purposes of analyzing the prescripción in oversight (fiscalización) matters, and the consequent possibility of sanction (without prejudice, of course, to special regulation). […] // […] // […] In this sense, every fault must be subject to a statute of limitations (prescripción) period, so that, in those cases where the system does not set one, it must be established supplementarily, without causing any harm to the rights of the individual” (ruling No. 479-F-S1-2011 of 11 hours 40 minutes of April 7, 2011). In a similar vein, regarding the oversight (fiscalización) powers of the General Superintendency of Securities, that same Chamber stated: “[…] The annulment is sought of sanctioning administrative acts through which SUGEVAL, exercising an imperium power granted by the Securities Market Regulatory Law, corrects the improper performance of the stock exchange and its agents. Given the absence within the cited regulatory framework of a precept establishing the prescripción, it is appropriate to apply the LOCGR, as indicated above, resorting to the principles of plenitude and coherence of the legal system, and to the integration mechanisms to resolve said gap. […]. Thus, based on integrative mechanisms of Law, this Collegiate Body concludes that the applicable period is the indicated five-year period, since the genesis of this proceeding corresponds to the exercise of an imperium power of the Administration, which is the application of the sanctioning procedure for breach of duties, an administrative procedure immersed in a special Law, which due to the claimed gap must conform to what is established in the LOCGR and specifically to canon 71, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) period” (ruling No. 517-F-S1-2012 of 9 hours 35 minutes of May 3, 2012).

V.- In this litigation, it is proven that Mr. Quirós Conejo, in his capacity as Director of the Huetar Norte Regional Directorate, recommended and requested that parcels and farms of the Institute be adjudicated and titled in favor of two of his uncles and one cousin and three sisters of his wife. These facts came to the attention of the Board of Directors by virtue of report No. OSCQ-023-2006 of January 19, 2006, through which the Ciudad Quesada Subregional Office reported about a number of lands that, in that Regional Directorate, had been adjudicated to officials of the same Institute or their relatives. By virtue of this, on January 30, 2006, the hierarchs of that Institution ordered the matter to be referred “to the Labor Relations Unit, so that it may initiate the appropriate procedures.” Without the reasons being known here for why the instructions of the Board of Directors were not immediately proceeded with, it is established that it was not until January 12, 2009, that the administrative sanctioning procedure was initiated against the former Regional Director; which culminated with a sanction of 22 days of suspension without pay. Said official challenged the Institute's decision in the judicial venue, arguing, among other things, the prescription (prescripción) of the disciplinary power. However, the Trial Court rejected that argument, insofar as it deemed that the 5 years referred to in numeral 71 of the LOCGR had not elapsed (considering that, by the time the facts were known to the hierarchs, the reform that had operated on that norm was already in force). The decision of the judges finds antecedents in circumstances of a similar nature, in which the Second Chamber had already recognized that such prescription (prescripción) should be governed as indicated in that canon, and not the one stipulated in the Labor Code. Thus, in a lawsuit against the IDA—filed by another Regional Director, dismissed for irregularities committed in land titling processes—, said Chamber indicated: “Nor is the reproach regarding the prescription (prescripción) of the sanctioning power of the Institute of Agrarian Development admissible. In particular, because the trial judges applied Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, […].” This does not violate the principle of legal certainty nor the protection regarding the norm most favorable to the worker. If examined closely, what was done through Article 10 of the cited Regulation was nothing other than developing the principle established in Article 71 of the Law. Its purpose being that reprehensible conduct by public servants, responsible for public funds or assets, does not go unpunished merely due to the passage of fleeting deadlines. And, the Sala Constitucional has already considered and resolved that the existence, for public officials and servants, of a public employment regime necessarily implies consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, not only distinct from those of (private) labor law, but often contrary to them. It should be noted that these are norms that are not only subsequent but also special, which causes them to prevail, as the Ad quem stated, over the cited article 603” (Sala Segunda, judgment no. 2003-00796 of 14 hours 55 minutes on December 18, 2003). Now, the appellant insists that, in his opinion, the precept in question was not applicable to his client, as the position he held was not that of *“a servant of la Hacienda Pública”*, and therefore, the statute of limitations should be one month. In response to this, as already stated, it is clear that numeral 71 ibidem governs for any official who infringes the higher control and oversight system, regardless of the position they hold in la Administración Pública (or in a private sector company, under the terms stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 2 of la Ley Contra la Corrupción). In this regard, it is necessary to keep in mind that the duty of probity stands as one of the central bulwarks of public function, through which it is imposed on all servants *“to orient their management towards the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall be manifested, fundamentally, by identifying and addressing priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of la República; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred upon them by law; ensuring that the decisions they adopt in fulfillment of their attributions conform to impartiality and the objectives proper to the institution in which they serve and, finally, by administering public resources adhering to the principles of legality, efficacy, economy and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily”* (Article 3 of la Ley Contra la Corrupción). Although this legal description is dated after the acts attributed to Mr. Quirós Conejo, said precept reflects constitutional principles and norms that, since time immemorial, have guided the correct exercise of public function; such that the actions of its servants conform to legality, their impartiality is guaranteed, as well as equal treatment for users, planned, effective and efficient attention, and they demonstrate rectitude and good faith. All of this under a framework of measures that impose, among others, a regime of prohibitions, incompatibilities, impediments and grounds for abstention and excuse, which have informed – for many years – the national legal system. For this reason, this Court of Cassation shares the reasons set forth in the contested judgment, inasmuch as it states that: *“the public official must act with prudence, integrity, honesty, seriousness, morality and rectitude both in the daily performance of their function and in the use and protection of the funds, assets and resources entrusted to them by reason of their position and comply with their duties and prohibitions of an ethical and probative nature, which leads us immediately to the issue of conflict of interests. When by reason of circumstances the public official must withdraw from matters brought to their attention when their objectivity and actions may be at risk, without the duty of obedience being an absolute justification, […]. What obliges the official is subject to the fulfillment of ethical duties, and among these, the regime of impediments that may be applied ex officio or at the request of a party, as provided for in numerals 229, 230 and 237 of la Ley General de la Administración Pública regarding abstention and recusal, a norm that in turn refers to la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial and the Código Procesal Civil in order to avoid a potential conflict of interests.”* Indeed, the IDA was an institution whose ordinary activity included land transactions, so it could buy, sell, mortgage, lease and acquire the goods and services necessary for rural exploitation, as well as carry out integral development plans, peasant settlements, colonization programs, plot and adjudicate lands (as established by Articles 2 and 3 of the Ley de Creación del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, Law no. 6735 of March 29, 1982; currently repealed by la Ley de Transformación del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario en el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, Law no. 9036 of May 11, 2012). It is under this framework of institutional competencies that Mr. Salvador Quirós carried out his work, as Director of la Dirección Regional Huetar Norte. From this perspective, it is striking that the appellant contests the ruling under the argument that it incurred in *“a nonexistent analysis of my client's functions or attributions visible as we pointed out at folios 186 to 189 of the administrative file”*. On the contrary, the certificate issued by la Coordinadora of the Human Resources Area of the IDA, at 10 hours and 40 minutes on February 27, 2008, visible in the folios referred to by the appellant, was assessed as proven fact no. 2 of the judgment. In said document, it is observed that the tasks of Mr. Quirós Conejo included, among other things: *“- Adjudicates, Controls* [sic] *and follows up on leases, in border strips* [sic] *and parcels of the Institute, based on established regulations. // - Advises la Presidencia Ejecutiva and Management on substantive activities of la Institución and land titling, whether verbally or through the submission of written reports for decision-making regarding land investment, property transfers, mortgages, segregations and others, for the fulfillment of institutional objectives. // […] // - Programs, in coordination with the Agrarian Planning department* [sic]*, the prioritization and processing of property titles. // […] // - Coordinates, supervises and carries out periodic field inspections, to verify the existence of anomalies in the exploitation or occupation of the property (lot or parcel).”* In light of what is indicated in said certification, it is clear that Mr. Quirós Conejo was responsible for adjudicating and controlling the Institute's lands in his respective Dirección Regional, as well as advising the higher authorities on this matter. For this reason, by recommending and requesting that parcels and farms of the IDA be adjudicated and titled in favor of his own relatives and those of his wife, he incurred a conflict of interests; rather, as the contested ruling acknowledged, his duty was to withdraw from the knowledge of such matters and not – as he did – to intercede so that his relatives, and those of his spouse, would benefit from properties provided by the Institute. Of such nature that, although he was only sanctioned with 22 days of suspension without pay, la Administración made it clear that it was a serious offense. Even more so, on this point, the Tribunal highlighted: *“It is indeed a serious breach of the duties of the position held by the plaintiff, which could well have allowed even a more severe sanction at the discretion of this collegiate jurisdictional body, but the administration* [sic] *- in the management of the human resource - chose to mitigate the sanction.”* Therefore, this constitutes an infraction of the higher control and oversight system. This is because, as mentioned, the duty of probity is embedded in the substantial basis of the democratic regime, inasmuch as whoever is a public servant must be upright, so that from their post they serve the citizenry and not themselves. For this reason, the responsibility of public officials constitutes one of the objective components of la Hacienda Pública (cardinal 8 of la LOCGR), which is linked both to the constitutional principles of responsible government, accountability, probity and suitability (precepts 9, 11 and 192 of la Constitución Política), and to those of efficacy and efficiency (numerals 139.4, 140.8 and 191 ibidem). Thus, the norms to prevent conflicts of interests constitute necessary measures to *“preserve confidence in the integrity of public officials and in public management”*, as recognized by Article III of la Convención Interamericana Contra la Corrupción, cited *supra*. In this sense, when the acts attributed to Mr. Quirós Conejo were committed, subsection ch) of canon 26 of the then-current Ley sobre el Enriquecimiento Ilícito de los Servidores Públicos, Law no. 6872 of June 17, 1983, already held – criminally – responsible those who *“consent, facilitate or intervene in any way, through their influence, knowledge or function, in the enrichment of a third party, whether a public official or not”*, as the IDA referenced as part of the normative basis to support the sanction. Likewise, as the contested judgment rightly indicates, precepts 229, 230 and 237 already instituted the duty of abstention, in order to avoid this conflict of interests, as derived from the referral these provisions make to la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (hereinafter LOPJ) and to the Código Procesal Civil (hereinafter CPC); by virtue of which, servants who are aware of matters that interest their spouse, their uncles(a) or brothers/sisters-in-law, as the case may be, must abstain, disqualify themselves, excuse themselves or be recused (numerals 25 of la LOPJ and 49 and 53 of the CPC). On the other hand, it should be remembered that *“the higher the hierarchy of the official and the more technical their functions, in relation to the defect of the act, the greater their duty to know it and properly assess it”*, as provided in canon 213 of la LGAP. In short, this concerns a public servant who held the position of Regional Director of the IDA, subject to a duty of probity that imposed upon him the obligation to avoid all conflicts of interest and to withdraw from any action tending to benefit his relatives or those of his wife, with farms, properties or other lands of that Institute. Hence, the applicable statute of limitations for administrative responsibility is that stipulated in Article 71 of la LOCGR, as resolved by the judgment under appeal, and not the one-month period stipulated in the Labor Code and claimed by the appellant.

For that reason, the grievance invoked must be rejected.”</span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>\r\n\r\n</div>\r\n\r\n</body>\r\n\r\n</html>\r\n", "content": "Por <span class=GramE>tal</span>\r\nmotivo, el agravio que se invoca habrá de ser rechazado.”</span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>\r\n\r\n</div>\r\n\r\n</body>\r\n\r\n</html>\r\n", "links": [], "next_actions": [ "Full document text is in the 'content' field", "Structured metadata in 'metadata' (and 'api_hits' for the raw API response)" ], "api_hits": { "anno": "2014", "claseAsunto": "Proceso de conocimiento", "contenidosInteresOrden": "3", "descriptores": [ "Prescripción de la sanción administrativa disciplinaria", "Sanción administrativa disciplinaria", "Instituto de Desarrollo Rural", "Servidor público" ], "despacho": "Tribunal de Casación Contencioso 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del IDA por beneficiar a familiares en procesos de titulación de tierras" }, { "id": 1, "nombre": "Plazo de prescripción para aplicar sanción disciplinaria a servidor público" } ] }, { "id": 1, "nombre": "Prescripción de la sanción administrativa disciplinaria", "Subtemas": [ { "id": 1, "nombre": "Plazo para aplicar sanción disciplinaria al servidor de la Hacienda Pública" }, { "id": 2, "nombre": "Sanción a Director Regional del IDA por beneficiar a familiares en procesos de titulación de tierras" } ] } ], "tipoContenido": "Voto de mayoría", "tipoDocumento": "EXT", "tipoInformacion": "Resolución Judicial", "tipoResolucion": "De Fondo", "tipoTexto": "1", "previousdocs": [], "nextdocs": [], "html": "<html xmlns:v=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml\"\r\nxmlns:o=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office\"\r\nxmlns:w=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word\"\r\nxmlns:st1=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags\"\r\nxmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40\">\r\n\r\n<head>\r\n<meta 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style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'>- En relación al\r\nsegundo apartado, es preciso advertir que el análisis se limitará a los\r\nalegatos respecto de la aplicación del artículo 71 de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la LOCGR\" w:st=\"on\">la LOCGR</st1:PersonName>; toda vez que el resto\r\nde los argumentos allí expuestos –referentes a la interrupción de la prescripción\r\ny la caducidad del procedimiento– son informales, en tanto omiten exponer cuál\r\nes el quebranto normativo que, se recrimina, ha incurrido el Tribunal. Tal y\r\ncomo se expuso al resolver la admisibilidad del presente recurso, para que un\r\nagravio proceda en casación, no bastan meras consideraciones subjetivas en\r\ncontra de lo resuelto por los juzgadores; por el contrario, es deber del\r\ncasacionista, como parte interesada, evidenciar con cuidado y precisión los\r\nmotivos concretos por los que estima vulnerados sus derechos, identificando\r\nadecuadamente las normas jurídicas que considera violadas. Dejando claro lo\r\nanterior, se valorará el cuestionamiento del recurrente en cuanto afirma que,\r\ndesde que <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Administración\" w:st=\"on\">la\r\n Administración</st1:PersonName> tuvo conocimiento de los hechos (en el año\r\n2005)<i> “contaba con un mes para iniciar el procedimiento”</i>, sin embargo\r\ntardó tres años para dictar y notificar el auto inicial, por lo que, asegura,\r\nya había transcurrido sobradamente el plazo mensual de prescripción. Sobre el\r\nparticular, el Tribunal indicó: <i>“[…] el actor fue nombrado como Director\r\nRegional Huetar Norte del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (Institución\r\nAutónoma) desde el 1 de julio de 1996 lo que de forma evidente su cargo\r\nconlleva el control y manejo de fondos y bienes públicos (hecho 2) ocupando un\r\ncargo para el momento de los hechos de funcionario público con manejo de fondos\r\ny bienes públicos, por lo que en torno a la prescripción no resulta de\r\naplicación el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo, como lo pretende el actor,\r\nsino el numeral 71 de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley Número\" w:st=\"on\">la\r\n Ley Número</st1:PersonName> 7428, Ley Orgánica de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Contraloría General\" w:st=\"on\">la Contraloría General</st1:PersonName>\r\nde <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la República\" w:st=\"on\">la República</st1:PersonName>”</i>.\r\nEl casacionista estima que los juzgadores aplicaron erróneamente el canon 71 de\r\n<st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la LOCGR\" w:st=\"on\">la LOCGR</st1:PersonName>, toda\r\nvez que su representado <i>“no tiene entre sus atribuciones el administrar,\r\ngestionar administrativa o contablemente los fondos públicos, simplemente\r\nconfirmó una recomendación por haberlo ordenado <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Junta Directiva\" w:st=\"on\">la Junta Directiva</st1:PersonName> y <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Presidencia\" w:st=\"on\">la Presidencia</st1:PersonName>, así las\r\ncosas no es considerable </i>[sic]<i> un funcionario de la hacienda pública,\r\nsino que es un simple funcionario público”</i>.</span><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:200%'><b><span\r\nlang=EN style='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'>IV<span class=GramE>.<span\r\nstyle='font-weight:normal'>-</span></span></span></b><span lang=EN\r\nstyle='font-family:Tahoma;mso-ansi-language:EN'> Con el fin de proceder al\r\nexamen <st1:State w:st=\"on\">del</st1:State> punto objetado, es necesario tener\r\npresente que la fórmula política <st1:State w:st=\"on\"><st1:place w:st=\"on\">del</st1:place></st1:State>\r\nsistema constitucional costarricense es de responsabilidad y rendición de\r\ncuentas, según se deriva de los ordinales 9° y 11° constitucionales. Asimismo,\r\nexiste una serie de compromisos internacionales, entre los que se encuentra <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Convención\" w:st=\"on\">la Convención</st1:PersonName> de las\r\nNaciones Unidas contra <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Corrupción\" w:st=\"on\">la\r\n Corrupción</st1:PersonName>, aprobada mediante Ley no. 8557 del 29 de\r\nnoviembre de 2006, de la cual importa tener presente su artículo 29, en tanto\r\nobliga establecer plazos de prescripción amplios, para iniciar los procesos por\r\ndelitos estipulados en ese convenio. Si bien dicho acuerdo internacional se\r\nenfoca en el ámbito de la persecución penal, no se limita únicamente <span\r\nclass=GramE>a</span> ello. El canon 8 ibídem, insta a los países para que\r\nestablezcan códigos de conducta que procuren la integridad, honestidad y\r\nresponsabilidad en la función pública, para lo cual promueve adoptar <i>“medidas\r\ndisciplinarias o de otra índole contra todo funcionario público que transgreda\r\nlos códigos o <span class=GramE>normas</span> establecidos de conformidad con\r\nel presente artículo”</i>. Asimismo, el precepto 30 de <span class=GramE>ese</span>\r\nacuerdo internacional aclara que, el hecho de penalizar los delitos allí\r\ntipificados para combatir la corrupción, no menoscaba <i>“el ejercicio de\r\nfacultades disciplinarias por los organismos competentes contra empleados\r\npúblicos”</i>. Por su parte, <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Convención Interamericana\" w:st=\"on\">la Convención Interamericana</st1:PersonName>\r\ncontra <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Corrupción\" w:st=\"on\">la Corrupción</st1:PersonName>,\r\naprobada por Ley no. 7670 del 17 de abril de 1997, obliga adoptar normas que\r\npermitan asegurar el correcto y honorable ejercicio de la función pública,\r\nconjuntamente con las medidas necesarias para prevenir, detectar y sancionar su\r\nincumplimiento, según lo estipula su artículo III, donde se dispone: <i>“[…]\r\nLos Estados Partes convienen en considerar la aplicabilidad de medidas, dentro\r\nde sus propios sistemas institucionales, destinadas a crear, mantener y\r\nfortalecer: // 1.- Normas de conducta para el correcto, honorable y adecuado\r\ncumplimiento de las funciones públicas. Estas <span class=GramE>normas</span>\r\ndeberán estar orientadas a prevenir conflictos de intereses y asegurar la\r\npreservación y el uso adecuado de los recursos asignados a los funcionarios\r\npúblicos en el desempeño de sus funciones. <span class=GramE>Establecerán\r\ntambién las medidas y sistemas que exijan a los funcionarios públicos informar\r\na las autoridades competentes sobre los actos de corrupción en la función\r\npública de los que tengan conocimiento.</span> <span class=GramE>Tales medidas\r\nayudarán a preservar la confianza en la integridad de los funcionarios públicos\r\ny en la gestión pública.</span> // 2<span class=GramE>.-</span> Mecanismos para\r\nhacer efectivo el cumplimiento de dichas normas de conducta. // […] // 9.-\r\nÓrganos de control superior, con el fin de desarrollar mecanismos modernos para\r\nprevenir, detectar, sancionar y erradicar las prácticas corruptas”</i>. Es en\r\nfunción de objetivos <st1:City w:st=\"on\"><st1:place w:st=\"on\"><span\r\n class=GramE>como</span></st1:place></st1:City> los descritos que, en el año\r\n2002, <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la LGCI\" w:st=\"on\">la LGCI</st1:PersonName>\r\nmodificó el precepto 71 de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la LOCGR. En\" w:st=\"on\">la\r\n LOCGR. En</st1:PersonName> el pasado, el párrafo primero de dicha norma\r\ndisponía: <i>“La responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Hacienda Pública\" w:st=\"on\">la Hacienda Pública</st1:PersonName>\r\nprescribirá en el plazo de dos años, contados a partir del conocimiento\r\ncomprobado de la falta por parte del órgano competente, para iniciar el\r\nrespectivo procedimiento sancionatorio. Para estos efectos, quedan reformados,\r\nrespecto de los funcionarios o de los servidores públicos, el artículo 603 del\r\nCódigo de Trabajo y cualesquiera otras disposiciones jurídicas que se le\r\nopongan. // […].”</i> Es decir, el plazo de un mes, estipulado en el precepto\r\n603 del Código de Trabajo, se extendía a dos años, para aquellos funcionarios\r\nque cabían dentro del concepto de <i>“servidor de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Hacienda Pública\" w:st=\"on\">la Hacienda Pública</st1:PersonName>”</i>.\r\n<st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Sala Constitucional\" w:st=\"on\">La Sala\r\n Constitucional</st1:PersonName> había señalado que ello se restringía <i>“<span\r\nclass=GramE>a</span> aquel que tiene a su cargo el manejo de fondos públicos. </i>[…]\r\n[Sea,]<i> directamente relacionados con el manejo y disposición de los fondos públicos,”\r\n</i>(sentencia no. 6750-97 de las 11 horas 12 minutos del 17 de octubre de\r\n1997, reiterada en las no. 6843-98 de las 15 horas 45 minutos del 24 de\r\nseptiembre de 1998 y no. 7516-2001 de las 14 horas 49 minutos del 1° de agosto\r\nde 2001). Sin embargo, en virtud de la reforma operada en el año 2002, el\r\nnumeral 71 de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la LOCGR\" w:st=\"on\">la LOCGR</st1:PersonName>\r\npasó a instituir lo siguiente: <i>“Artículo 71.— Prescripción de la\r\nresponsabilidad disciplinaria.</i> <i>La responsabilidad administrativa del\r\nfuncionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el\r\nordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con\r\nlas siguientes reglas: // a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea\r\nnotorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del\r\nacaecimiento del hecho. // b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea\r\nnotorio –entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un\r\nestudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la\r\nresponsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que\r\nel informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en\r\nconocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al\r\nprocedimiento respectivo. // La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos\r\ncontinuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable <st1:State w:st=\"on\"><span\r\n class=GramE>del</span></st1:State> acto que acuerde el inicio <st1:State\r\nw:st=\"on\"><st1:place w:st=\"on\">del</st1:place></st1:State> procedimiento\r\nadministrativo. // Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo\r\nempezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio\r\ncon el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. // Se reputará <span\r\nclass=GramE>como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el\r\nprocedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este</span> oportunamente o\r\nel dejar que la responsabilidad del infractor prescriba, sin causa\r\njustificada.”</i> <span class=GramE>De esta forma, se introdujeron una serie de\r\ncambios importantes.</span> Por un lado, el plazo de prescripción se amplió de <st1:metricconverter\r\nProductID=\"2 a\" w:st=\"on\">2 a</st1:metricconverter> 5 años; y se reconoció, en\r\nlo que aquí interesa, que se empezaría a computar a partir del <i>“hecho\r\nirregular”</i>, en caso de que sea notorio, o bien desde el momento en que la\r\nindagación o auditoría se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca, cuando se trate de\r\nasuntos que la requieran para efectos de informar acerca de la posible\r\nirregularidad. Por otra parte, el alcance de la <span class=GramE>norma</span>\r\nse extendió, lo cual reviste particular interés para el caso que aquí se\r\nanaliza. Ya <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Sala Primera\" w:st=\"on\">la Sala\r\n Primera</st1:PersonName>, al rechazar por el fondo un recurso de casación que\r\nversaba sobre este mismo tema, precisó: <i>“</i>[…]<i> Con la reforma que\r\nsufrió el artículo 71 de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Ley Orgánica\" w:st=\"on\">la\r\n Ley Orgánica</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Contraloría General\" w:st=\"on\">la Contraloría General</st1:PersonName>\r\nde <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la República\" w:st=\"on\">la República</st1:PersonName>,\r\nse varió el criterio de valoración, para determinar el plazo de prescripción\r\naplicable, por cuanto se pasa de un régimen subjetivo a uno objetivo. <span\r\nclass=GramE>Es decir, ya no es necesario hacer el ejercicio de valoración de si\r\nel servidor es de <st1:PersonName ProductID=\"la Hacienda Pública\" w:st=\"on\">la\r\n Hacienda Pública</st1:PersonName> (aspecto subjetivo).</span> Pues basta con\r\ndeterminar la transgresión al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Hacienda Pública\" w:st=\"on\">la Hacienda Pública</st1:PersonName>,\r\nlo cual obedece a un criterio material objetivo”</i> (sentencia no. 623-A-S1-2013\r\nde las 10 horas 25 minutos del 16 de mayo de 2013). En efecto, según se ha\r\ndicho, conforme la versión anterior, la norma era aplicable únicamente a\r\naquellos que podían ser catalogados como <i>“servidor de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Hacienda Pública\" w:st=\"on\">la Hacienda Pública</st1:PersonName>”</i>\r\n(condición del sujeto); ahora incluye a todo funcionario público\r\n–independientemente del puesto o cargo que ejerza–, en tanto lo que interesa es\r\nque la conducta cometida (el <i>“hecho irregular”</i>) pueda ser considerada\r\ncomo una infracción del <i>“ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superior”</i>\r\n(criterio objetivo). Este último es definido por el artículo 10 de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la LOCGR\" w:st=\"on\">la LOCGR</st1:PersonName>, el cual estipula:<i>\r\n“Articulo 10<span class=GramE>.-</span> Ordenamiento de control y fiscalización\r\nsuperiores.- El ordenamiento de control y de fiscalización superiores de <st1:PersonName\r\nProductID=\"la Hacienda Pública\" w:st=\"on\">la Hacienda Pública</st1:PersonName>\r\ncomprende el conjunto de normas, que regulan la competencia, la estructura, la\r\nactividad, las relaciones, los procedimientos, las responsabilidades y las\r\nsanciones derivados de esa fiscalización o necesarios para esta.For that reason, the grievance invoked shall be rejected.

This system also comprises the norms that regulate oversight over foreign entities and bodies and private funds and activities, to which this Law refers, as its fundamental norm, within the constitutional framework." Hence, the legal framework that makes up this system includes, among others, the already cited LOCGR and LGCI, as well as the General Law of the Public Administration (hereinafter LGAP); the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Service, Law no. 8422 of 6 October 2004 (hereinafter Law against Corruption); the Law of Financial Administration of the Republic and Public Budgets, Law no. 8131 of 18 September 2001; the Law on Administrative Contracting, Law no. 7494 of 2 May 1995, and other provisions that develop them. Moreover, the First Chamber has considered that canon 71 of the LOCGR stands as a precept of a general nature, stipulating a statute of limitations (plazo de prescripción) for the fault, in matters of oversight. Thus, in the case of professional associations, it has been indicated: "[…] The statute of limitations of the fault, […] is not expressly regulated either in the Regulation or in the Organic Law of the Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos. This normative omission requires that said term be fixed by means of integration of the system, which must be done taking into consideration the nature of the relationship that binds the professional association (colegio profesional) to its members and of the power that is exercised. […]. Thus, these groups exercise, in the name of the State, an administrative function consisting of overseeing that their members carry out their activity according to the ethical, moral, and professional parameters that are required, in view of the marked public interest that exists in the matter, originating, between both, a special subjection relationship (relación de sujeción especial). By virtue of the foregoing, in the opinion of this Chamber, the underlying relationship between a professional association and its members presents a nature akin to that existing between the Administration and the public servants through which it acts, and over whom it exercises a supervisory and control function. In addition to the foregoing, the sanctioning power being analyzed is entirely compatible with that granted to the Administration in disciplinary matters on the occasion of the exercise of an oversight power, similar to the one analyzed here. Therefore, one must resort to the provisions of Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República, which establishes a statute of limitations of the fault of 5 years. The foregoing is due to the fact that both the Internal Control Law (Law no. 8292) and the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Law no. 4822), by virtue of Articles 43 and 44, respectively, refer to this precept for the definition of the institute in question, and given the absence of another provision in the administrative legal system that regulates said aspect, it can be inferred that both circumstances grant said norm a general character for purposes of analyzing the statute of limitations in matters of oversight, and the consequent possibility of sanction (without prejudice, of course, to a special regulation). […] // […] // […] In this sense, every fault must be subject to a statute of limitations, so that, in those cases where the system does not set it, it must be established in a supplementary manner, without causing any harm to the rights of the individual" (judgment no. 479-F-S1-2011 of 11 hours 40 minutes on 7 April 2011). In a similar vein, regarding the oversight powers of the Superintendencia General de Valores, that same Chamber stated: "[…] The nullification of sanctioning administrative acts is sought, through which SUGEVAL, exercising a power of authority (potestad de imperio) granted by the Securities Market Regulatory Law, corrects the improper conduct of the stock exchange post (puesto de bolsa) and its agents. Given the absence within the cited normative framework of a precept establishing the statute of limitations, it is appropriate to apply the LOCGR, as indicated above, resorting to the principles of completeness and coherence of the legal system, and to the mechanisms of integration to resolve said gap. […]. In this way, based on integrative mechanisms of Law, this Collegiate Body concludes that the applicable term is the five-year term indicated, because the genesis of this process corresponds to the deployment of a power of authority of the Administration, which is the application of the sanctioning procedure for non-compliance with duties, an administrative procedure immersed in a special Law, which, due to the claimed gap, must conform to what is established in the LOCGR and specifically to canon 71, regarding the statute of limitations" (judgment no. 517-F-S1-2012 of 9 hours 35 minutes on 3 May 2012).

**V.**- In this dispute (lite), it is proven that Mr. Quirós Conejo, in his capacity as Director of the Dirección Regional Huetar Norte, recommended and requested that plots and farms of the Institute be adjudicated and titled in favor of two of his uncles, one cousin, and three sisters of his wife. These facts came to the knowledge of the Board of Directors by virtue of report no. OSCQ-023-2006 of 19 January 2006, through which the Oficina Subregional de Ciudad Quesada reported about a number of lands that, in that Regional Directorate, had been adjudicated to officials of the same Institute or their relatives. By virtue of this, on 30 January 2006, the heads of that Institution ordered the matter to be referred "to the Unidad de Relaciones Laborales, so that it may initiate the rigorous procedures." Without the reasons being known here for which they did not proceed –immediately– to comply with what was indicated by the Board of Directors, it was not until 12 January 2009 that the sanctioning administrative proceeding was initiated against the former Regional Director; which culminated with a sanction of 22 days of suspension without pay. Said official challenged what was decided by the Institute in the jurisdictional venue, arguing, among other things, the statute of limitations of the disciplinary power. However, the Tribunal rejected that argument, as it considered that the 5 years referred to in numeral 71 of the LOCGR had not elapsed (considering that, when the facts became known to the authorities, the reform that had operated on that norm was already in force). The judges' decision finds precedents in circumstances of a similar nature, in which the Second Chamber had already recognized that such statute of limitations should be governed according to what is indicated in that canon, and not that stipulated in the Labor Code. Thus, before a lawsuit against the IDA –filed by another Regional Director, dismissed for irregularities committed in land titling processes–, said Chamber indicated: "Nor is the reproach regarding the statute of limitations of the sanctioning power of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario receivable. In particular, because the instance judges applied Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, […]. This does not violate the principle of legal certainty nor the protective principle of the most favorable norm for the worker. If looked at closely, what was done through Article 10 of the cited Regulation was nothing other than developing the principle established in Article 71 of the Law. Its purpose being that reprehensible conduct of public servants, responsible for public funds or assets, does not go unpunished by the mere passage of fleeting terms. And, the Constitutional Chamber has already considered and decided that the existence, regarding public officials and servants, of a public employment regime necessarily implies consequences derived from the nature of that relationship, with its own general principles, which are not only different from those of (private) labor law, but many times are opposed to them. It should be noted that these are not only later but special norms, which makes them prevail, as the Ad quem expressed, over the cited Article 603" (Second Chamber, judgment no. 2003-00796 of 14 hours 55 minutes on 18 December 2003). Now, the appellant insists that, in his opinion, the precept under comment was not applicable to his client, since the position he held was not that of "a servant of the Hacienda Pública", so the statute of limitations would be one month. In response to this, as already stated, it is clear that numeral 71 ibidem governs for any official who infringes the superior control and oversight system, regardless of the position he or she holds in the Public Administration (or in a private sector company, under the terms stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Law against Corruption). In that respect, it is necessary to keep in mind that the duty of probity stands as one of the central bastions of the public function, through which it is imposed on all servants to "orient their management towards the satisfaction of the public interest. This duty shall be manifested, fundamentally, by identifying and attending to priority collective needs, in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; likewise, by demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; ensuring that the decisions adopted in compliance with their attributions conform to impartiality and the proper objectives of the institution in which they serve and, finally, by administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily" (Article 3 of the Law against Corruption). Even though this legal description is dated after the facts imputed to Mr. Quirós Conejo, said precept reflects constitutional principles and norms that, for a long time, have guided the correct exercise of the public function; so that the actions of its servants conform to legality, their impartiality is guaranteed, equal treatment to users, planned, effective, and efficient service, and they demonstrate rectitude and good faith. All this under a framework of measures that impose, among others, a regime of prohibitions, incompatibilities, impediments, and reasons for abstention and excuse, which inform –for many years now– the national legal system. For that reason, this Court of Cassation shares the reasons set forth in the challenged judgment, insofar as it points out that: "the public official must act with prudence, integrity, honesty, seriousness, morality, and rectitude both in the daily performance of their function and in the use and protection of the funds, assets, and resources entrusted to them by reason of their position and comply with their duties and prohibitions of an ethical and upright nature, which immediately leads us to the issue of conflict of interest. When, by reason of the circumstances, the public official must step aside from the matters brought to their attention when their objectivity and actions may be at risk, without the duty of obedience being an absolute justification, […]. What obligates the official is subject to the fulfillment of ethical duties, and among these the regime of impediments that can be applied ex officio or at a party's request, as provided for in numerals 229, 230, and 237 of the General Law of the Public Administration regarding abstention and recusal, a norm that refers in turn to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and the Civil Procedure Code in order to prevent a potential conflict of interest." Indeed, the IDA was an institution whose ordinary activity included the trade of land (tráfico de tierras), so it could buy, sell, mortgage, lease, and acquire the goods and services necessary for rural exploitation, as well as carry out comprehensive development plans, peasant settlements (asentamientos campesinos), colonization programs, parcel out and adjudicate lands (as established by Articles 2 and 3 of the Law Creating the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, Law no. 6735 of 29 March 1982; currently repealed by the Law for the Transformation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario into the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, Law no. 9036 of 11 May 2012). It is under this framework of institutional competencies that Mr. Salvador Quirós performed his duties, as Director of the Dirección Regional Huetar Norte. From that perspective, it is striking that the appellant contests the ruling under the argument that it incurred in "a non-existent analysis of the functions or attributions of my client visible as we point out at folios 186 to 189 of the administrative file." On the contrary, the certification issued by the Coordinator of the Human Resources Area of the IDA, at 10 hours 40 minutes on 27 February 2008, visible in the folios referred to by the appellant, was assessed as proven fact no. 2 of the judgment. In said document, it is observed that the tasks of Mr. Quirós Conejo included, among other things: "- Adjudicates, Controls [sic] and follows up on leases, in border strips (fajas fronterizas) and plots of the Institute, based on the established regulations. // - Advises the Executive Presidency and Management on substantive activities of the Institution and land titling, either verbally or through the submission of written reports for decision-making regarding investment in lands, farm transfers, mortgages, segregations, and others, for the fulfillment of institutional objectives. // […] // - Programs, in coordination with the Agrarian Planning (Ordenamiento Agrario) [sic] department, the prioritization and processing of property titles. // […] // - Coordinates, supervises and carries out periodic inspections in the field, to verify the existence of anomalies in the exploitation or occupation of the property (lot or plot)." In light of what is indicated in said certification, it is clear that Mr. Quirós Conejo was responsible for adjudicating and controlling the Institute's lands in his respective Regional Directorate, as well as advising the superior authorities on this matter. For that reason, by recommending and requesting that plots and farms belonging to the IDA be adjudicated and titled in favor of his own relatives and those of his wife, he incurred in a conflict of interest; indeed, as the challenged ruling acknowledged, his duty was to recuse himself from the knowledge of such matters and not –as he did– to intercede so that his relatives, and those of his spouse, would benefit from properties provided by the Institute. So much so, that even though he was sanctioned with only 22 days of suspension without pay, the Administration made it clear that it was a serious fault. Moreover, on that particular point, the Tribunal highlighted: "This is indeed a serious breach of the duties of the position of the current plaintiff, which could well have justified even a greater sanction in the opinion of this jurisdictional collegiate body, but the administration [sic] -in the management of human resources- chose to mitigate the sanction." This being the case, it is an infraction of the superior control and oversight system. This is because, as mentioned, the duty of probity is inserted into the substantial basis of the democratic regime, insofar as he who is a public servant must be upright, so that from his post he serves the citizenry and not himself. For that reason, the responsibility of public officials constitutes one of the objective components of the Hacienda Pública (cardinal 8 of the LOCGR), which is linked both to the constitutional principles of responsible government, accountability, probity, and suitability (precepts 9, 11, and 192 of the Political Constitution), and to those of effectiveness and efficiency (numerals 139.4, 140.8, and 191 ibidem). Thus, the norms to prevent conflicts of interest constitute necessary measures to "preserve confidence in the integrity of public officials and in public management," as recognized by Article III of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, cited supra. In that sense, when the acts imputed to Mr. Quirós Conejo were committed, subparagraph ch) of canon 26 of the then-current Law on Illicit Enrichment of Public Servants, Law no. 6872 of 17 June 1983, already held –criminally– responsible those who "consent, facilitate, or intervene in any way, through their influence, knowledge, or function, in the enrichment of a third party, whether a public official or not," as the IDA referred to as part of the normative basis to support the sanction. Likewise, as the challenged judgment correctly indicates, precepts 229, 230, and 237 already instituted the duty of abstention, in order to avoid that conflict of interest, as derived from the referral those provisions make to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (hereinafter LOPJ) and to the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter CPC); by virtue of which servants who hear matters that interest their spouse, their uncles/aunts or brothers/sisters-in-law, as the case may be, must recuse themselves, disqualify themselves, excuse themselves, or be recused (numerals 25 of the LOPJ and 49 and 53 of the CPC). On the other hand, it must be remembered that "the higher the hierarchy of the official and the more technical his functions, in relation to the defect of the act, the greater his duty to know it and appreciate it properly," as prevented by canon 213 of the LGAP. In short, this concerns a public servant who held the position of Regional Director of the IDA, subject to a duty of probity that required him to avoid any conflict of interest and to step aside from any action tending to benefit his relatives or those of his wife, with farms, properties, or other lands of that Institute. Hence, the applicable statute of limitations for administrative responsibility is that stipulated in Article 71 of the LOCGR, as decided by the judgment being challenged, and not that of one month, stipulated in the Labor Code and sought by the appellant. For that reason, the grievance invoked must be rejected."

“III.- En relación al segundo apartado, es preciso advertir que el análisis se limitará a los alegatos respecto de la aplicación del artículo 71 de la LOCGR; toda vez que el resto de los argumentos allí expuestos –referentes a la interrupción de la prescripción y la caducidad del procedimiento– son informales, en tanto omiten exponer cuál es el quebranto normativo que, se recrimina, ha incurrido el Tribunal. Tal y como se expuso al resolver la admisibilidad del presente recurso, para que un agravio proceda en casación, no bastan meras consideraciones subjetivas en contra de lo resuelto por los juzgadores; por el contrario, es deber del casacionista, como parte interesada, evidenciar con cuidado y precisión los motivos concretos por los que estima vulnerados sus derechos, identificando adecuadamente las normas jurídicas que considera violadas. Dejando claro lo anterior, se valorará el cuestionamiento del recurrente en cuanto afirma que, desde que la Administración tuvo conocimiento de los hechos (en el año 2005) “contaba con un mes para iniciar el procedimiento”, sin embargo tardó tres años para dictar y notificar el auto inicial, por lo que, asegura, ya había transcurrido sobradamente el plazo mensual de prescripción. Sobre el particular, el Tribunal indicó: “[…] el actor fue nombrado como Director Regional Huetar Norte del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (Institución Autónoma) desde el 1 de julio de 1996 lo que de forma evidente su cargo conlleva el control y manejo de fondos y bienes públicos (hecho 2) ocupando un cargo para el momento de los hechos de funcionario público con manejo de fondos y bienes públicos, por lo que en torno a la prescripción no resulta de aplicación el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo, como lo pretende el actor, sino el numeral 71 de la Ley Número 7428, Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República”. El casacionista estima que los juzgadores aplicaron erróneamente el canon 71 de la LOCGR, toda vez que su representado “no tiene entre sus atribuciones el administrar, gestionar administrativa o contablemente los fondos públicos, simplemente confirmó una recomendación por haberlo ordenado la Junta Directiva y la Presidencia, así las cosas no es considerable [sic] un funcionario de la hacienda pública, sino que es un simple funcionario público”.

IV.- Con el fin de proceder al examen del punto objetado, es necesario tener presente que la fórmula política del sistema constitucional costarricense es de responsabilidad y rendición de cuentas, según se deriva de los ordinales 9° y 11° constitucionales. Asimismo, existe una serie de compromisos internacionales, entre los que se encuentra la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Corrupción, aprobada mediante Ley no. 8557 del 29 de noviembre de 2006, de la cual importa tener presente su artículo 29, en tanto obliga establecer plazos de prescripción amplios, para iniciar los procesos por delitos estipulados en ese convenio. Si bien dicho acuerdo internacional se enfoca en el ámbito de la persecución penal, no se limita únicamente a ello. El canon 8 ibídem, insta a los países para que establezcan códigos de conducta que procuren la integridad, honestidad y responsabilidad en la función pública, para lo cual promueve adoptar “medidas disciplinarias o de otra índole contra todo funcionario público que transgreda los códigos o normas establecidos de conformidad con el presente artículo”. Asimismo, el precepto 30 de ese acuerdo internacional aclara que, el hecho de penalizar los delitos allí tipificados para combatir la corrupción, no menoscaba “el ejercicio de facultades disciplinarias por los organismos competentes contra empleados públicos”. Por su parte, la Convención Interamericana contra la Corrupción, aprobada por Ley no. 7670 del 17 de abril de 1997, obliga adoptar normas que permitan asegurar el correcto y honorable ejercicio de la función pública, conjuntamente con las medidas necesarias para prevenir, detectar y sancionar su incumplimiento, según lo estipula su artículo III, donde se dispone: “[…] Los Estados Partes convienen en considerar la aplicabilidad de medidas, dentro de sus propios sistemas institucionales, destinadas a crear, mantener y fortalecer: // 1.- Normas de conducta para el correcto, honorable y adecuado cumplimiento de las funciones públicas. Estas normas deberán estar orientadas a prevenir conflictos de intereses y asegurar la preservación y el uso adecuado de los recursos asignados a los funcionarios públicos en el desempeño de sus funciones. Establecerán también las medidas y sistemas que exijan a los funcionarios públicos informar a las autoridades competentes sobre los actos de corrupción en la función pública de los que tengan conocimiento. Tales medidas ayudarán a preservar la confianza en la integridad de los funcionarios públicos y en la gestión pública. // 2.- Mecanismos para hacer efectivo el cumplimiento de dichas normas de conducta. // […] // 9.- Órganos de control superior, con el fin de desarrollar mecanismos modernos para prevenir, detectar, sancionar y erradicar las prácticas corruptas”. Es en función de objetivos como los descritos que, en el año 2002, la LGCI modificó el precepto 71 de la LOCGR. En el pasado, el párrafo primero de dicha norma disponía: “La responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor de la Hacienda Pública prescribirá en el plazo de dos años, contados a partir del conocimiento comprobado de la falta por parte del órgano competente, para iniciar el respectivo procedimiento sancionatorio. Para estos efectos, quedan reformados, respecto de los funcionarios o de los servidores públicos, el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo y cualesquiera otras disposiciones jurídicas que se le opongan. // […].” Es decir, el plazo de un mes, estipulado en el precepto 603 del Código de Trabajo, se extendía a dos años, para aquellos funcionarios que cabían dentro del concepto de “servidor de la Hacienda Pública”. La Sala Constitucional había señalado que ello se restringía “a aquel que tiene a su cargo el manejo de fondos públicos. […] [Sea,] directamente relacionados con el manejo y disposición de los fondos públicos,” (sentencia no. 6750-97 de las 11 horas 12 minutos del 17 de octubre de 1997, reiterada en las no. 6843-98 de las 15 horas 45 minutos del 24 de septiembre de 1998 y no. 7516-2001 de las 14 horas 49 minutos del 1° de agosto de 2001). Sin embargo, en virtud de la reforma operada en el año 2002, el numeral 71 de la LOCGR pasó a instituir lo siguiente: “Artículo 71.— Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: // a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. // b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio –entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo. // La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. // Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. // Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar que la responsabilidad del infractor prescriba, sin causa justificada.” De esta forma, se introdujeron una serie de cambios importantes. Por un lado, el plazo de prescripción se amplió de 2 a 5 años; y se reconoció, en lo que aquí interesa, que se empezaría a computar a partir del “hecho irregular”, en caso de que sea notorio, o bien desde el momento en que la indagación o auditoría se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca, cuando se trate de asuntos que la requieran para efectos de informar acerca de la posible irregularidad. Por otra parte, el alcance de la norma se extendió, lo cual reviste particular interés para el caso que aquí se analiza. Ya la Sala Primera, al rechazar por el fondo un recurso de casación que versaba sobre este mismo tema, precisó: “[…] Con la reforma que sufrió el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, se varió el criterio de valoración, para determinar el plazo de prescripción aplicable, por cuanto se pasa de un régimen subjetivo a uno objetivo. Es decir, ya no es necesario hacer el ejercicio de valoración de si el servidor es de la Hacienda Pública (aspecto subjetivo). Pues basta con determinar la transgresión al ordenamiento de control y fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública, lo cual obedece a un criterio material objetivo” (sentencia no. 623-A-S1-2013 de las 10 horas 25 minutos del 16 de mayo de 2013). En efecto, según se ha dicho, conforme la versión anterior, la norma era aplicable únicamente a aquellos que podían ser catalogados como “servidor de la Hacienda Pública” (condición del sujeto); ahora incluye a todo funcionario público –independientemente del puesto o cargo que ejerza–, en tanto lo que interesa es que la conducta cometida (el “hecho irregular”) pueda ser considerada como una infracción del “ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superior” (criterio objetivo). Este último es definido por el artículo 10 de la LOCGR, el cual estipula: “Articulo 10.- Ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores.- El ordenamiento de control y de fiscalización superiores de la Hacienda Pública comprende el conjunto de normas, que regulan la competencia, la estructura, la actividad, las relaciones, los procedimientos, las responsabilidades y las sanciones derivados de esa fiscalización o necesarios para esta. // Este ordenamiento comprende también las normas que regulan la fiscalización sobre entes y órganos extranjeros y fondos y actividades privados, a los que se refiere esta Ley, como su norma fundamental, dentro del marco constitucional.” De ahí que, el marco jurídico que conforma este sistema incluye, entre otras, las ya citadas LOCGR y LGCI, así como la Ley General de la Administración Pública (en lo sucesivo LGAP); la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, Ley no. 8422 del 6 de octubre de 2004 (en adelante Ley Contra la Corrupción); la Ley de la Administración Financiera de la República y Presupuestos Públicos, Ley no. 8131 del 18 de septiembre de 2001; la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, Ley no. 7494 del 2 de mayo de 1995, y demás disposiciones que las desarrollan. Más aún, la Sala Primera ha considerado que el canon 71 de la LOCGR se erige como precepto de carácter general, estipulando un plazo de prescripción de la falta, en materia de fiscalización. De tal suerte que, en el caso de los colegios profesionales, se ha indicado: “[…] La prescripción de la falta, […] no se encuentra regulada en forma expresa ni en el Reglamento ni en la Ley Orgánica del Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos. Esta omisión normativa obliga a que dicho plazo tenga que ser fijado mediante integración del ordenamiento, lo cual se debe realizar tomando en consideración la naturaleza de la relación que vincula al colegio profesional con sus agremiados y de la potestad que se ejerce. […]. Así, estas agrupaciones ejercen, en nombre del Estado, una función administrativa consistente en fiscalizar que sus agremiados desarrollen su actividad de acuerdo a los parámetros éticos, morales y profesionales que resultan exigibles, en atención al marcado interés público que existe en la materia, originando, entre ambos, una relación de sujeción especial. En virtud de lo anterior, en criterio de esta Sala, la relación subyacente entre un colegio profesional y sus agremiados presenta una naturaleza afín a la existente entre la Administración y los servidores públicos mediante la cual actúa, y respecto de los cuales ejerce una función de vigilancia y control. Aunado a lo anterior, la potestad sancionatoria que se analiza resulta en un todo compatible con aquella otorgada a la Administración en materia disciplinaria con ocasión del ejercicio de una potestad de fiscalización, similar a la que aquí se analiza. Por esto, se debe acudir a lo dispuesto en el artículo 71 de la Ley Órganica de la Contraloría General de la República, el cual establece un plazo de prescripción de la falta de 5 años. Lo anterior debido a que, tanto la de la Ley de Control Interno (Ley no. 8292) como la Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito (ley no. 4822), por virtud de los artículos 43 y 44, respectivamente, remiten a este precepto para la definición del instituto en cuestión, y ante la ausencia de otra disposición en el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo que regule dicho aspecto, se puede colegir que ambas circunstancias le otorgan a dicha norma un carácter general a efectos de analizar la prescripción en materia de fiscalización, y la consecuente posibilidad sancionatoria (sin perjuicio, claro está, de una regulación especial). […] // […] // […] En este sentido, toda falta debe estar sujeta a un plazo de prescripción, por lo que, en aquellos casos en que el ordenamiento no lo fija, debe establecerse en forma supletoria, sin que ello cause perjuicio alguno a los derechos del particular” (sentencia no. 479-F-S1-2011 de las 11 horas 40 minutos del 7 de abril de 2011). En similar sentido, respecto de las competencias de fiscalización de la Superintendencia General de Valores, esa misma Cámara señaló: “[…] Se pretende la anulación de actos administrativos sancionatorios a través de los cuales la SUGEVAL, ejerciendo una potestad de imperio otorgada por Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, corrige la actuación indebida del puesto de bolsa y de sus agentes. Ante la ausencia dentro del marco normativo de cita de un precepto que establezca la prescripción, procede aplicar la LOCGR, como se indicó líneas antes, acudiendo a los principios de plenitud y coherencia del ordenamiento jurídico, y a los mecanismos de integración para resolver dicha laguna. […]. De este modo, con base en mecanismos integrativos del Derecho, este órgano Colegiado concluye que el plazo aplicable es el de cinco años señalado, por corresponder la génesis de este proceso al despliegue de una potestad de imperio de la Administración, cual es la aplicación del procedimiento sancionatorio por el incumplimiento de deberes, procedimiento administrativo inmerso en una Ley especial, el cual por la laguna reclamada debe ajustarse a lo establecido en la LOCGR y en concreto al canon 71, respecto del plazo de prescripción” (sentencia no. 517-F-S1-2012 de las 9 horas 35 minutos del 3 de mayo de 2012).

V.- En esta lite, está comprobado que el señor Quirós Conejo, en calidad de Director de la Dirección Regional Huetar Norte, recomendó y solicitó que se adjudicaran y titularan parcelas y granjas del Instituto a favor de dos de sus tíos y un primo y tres hermanas de su esposa. Estos hechos llegaron a conocimiento de la Junta Directiva en virtud del informe no. OSCQ-023-2006 del 19 de enero de 2006, mediante el cual la Oficina Subregional de Ciudad Quesada informó acerca de una cantidad de terrenos que, en esa Dirección Regional, habían sido adjudicados a funcionarios del mismo Instituto o a sus familiares. En virtud de ello, el 30 de enero de 2006, los jerarcas de esa Institución ordenaron remitir el asunto “a la Unidad de Relaciones Labores, para que inicie los procedimientos de rigor”. Sin que se conozcan aquí las razones por las cuales no se procedió –de inmediato– a cumplir con lo indicado por la Junta Directiva, se tiene que fue hasta el 12 de enero de 2009 cuando se inició el procedimiento administrativo sancionatorio, en contra del que había sido Director Regional; el cual culminó con una sanción de 22 días de suspensión sin goce de salario. Dicho funcionario atacó en sede jurisdiccional lo resuelto por el Instituto, argumentando, entre otras cosas, la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria. Sin embargo, el Tribunal rechazó ese alegato, en tanto estimó que no habían transcurrido los 5 años a los que refiere el numeral 71 de la LOCGR (considerando que, para cuando los hechos fueron del conocimiento de los jerarcas, ya se encontraba vigente la reforma que había operado sobre esa norma). La decisión de los juzgadores encuentra antecedentes en circunstancias de similar naturaleza, en los que ya la Sala Segunda había reconocido que tal prescripción debía regirse conforme lo indicado en ese canon, y no la estipulada en el Código de Trabajo. Así, ante una demanda contra el IDA –interpuesta por otro Director Regional, despedido por irregularidades cometidas en procesos de titulación de tierras–, dicha Cámara indicó: “Tampoco es de recibo el reproche en cuanto a la prescripción de la potestad sancionadora del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. En particular por haberse aplicado por los juzgadores de instancia el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, […]. Con ello no se violenta el principio de seguridad jurídica ni el protector sobre la norma más favorable al trabajador. Si bien se mira, lo que se hizo mediante el artículo 10 del Reglamento citado no fue otra cosa que desarrollar el principio establecido en el artículo 71 de la Ley. Siendo su propósito el que no queden impunes conductas reprochables de los servidores públicos, responsables de fondos o bienes públicos, por el sólo transcurso de plazos fugaces. Y, ya la Sala Constitucional ha considerado y resuelto que la existencia respecto de los funcionarios y servidores públicos de un régimen de empleo público implica, necesariamente, unas consecuencias derivadas de la naturaleza de esa relación, con principios generales propios, ya no solamente distintos a los del derecho laboral (privado), sino muchas veces contrapuestos a éstos. Obsérvese que se trata de normas no solo posteriores sino especiales, lo que hace que prevalezcan, como expresó el Ad quem, sobre el citado artículo 603” (Sala Segunda, sentencia no. 2003-00796 de las 14 horas 55 minutos del 18 de diciembre de 2003). Ahora, el casacionista insiste en que, en su criterio, el precepto en comentario no resultaba aplicable a su representado, pues el cargo que ostentaba no era el de “un servidor de la Hacienda Pública”, por lo que el plazo de prescripción sería el de un mes. Ante ello, como ya se expuso, es claro que el numeral 71 ibídem rige para todo funcionario que infrinja el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superior, independientemente del puesto que ocupe en la Administración Pública (o bien en una empresa del sector privado, en los términos estipulados en el párrafo 2° del artículo 2 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción). En ese tanto, es preciso tener presente que el deber de probidad se erige como uno de los baluartes centrales de la función pública, mediante el cual se impone a todos los servidores “orientar su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público. Este deber se manifestará, fundamentalmente, al identificar y atender las necesidades colectivas prioritarias, de manera planificada, regular, eficiente, continua y en condiciones de igualdad para los habitantes de la República; asimismo, al demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley; asegurarse de que las decisiones que adopte en cumplimiento de sus atribuciones se ajustan a la imparcialidad y a los objetivos propios de la institución en la que se desempeña y, finalmente, al administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia, rindiendo cuentas satisfactoriamente” (artículo 3 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción). Si bien esa descripción legal es de fecha posterior a los hechos imputados al señor Quirós Conejo, dicho precepto refleja principios constitucionales y normas que, desde vieja data, guían el correcto ejercicio de la función pública; de tal manera que las actuaciones de sus servidores se ajusten a la legalidad, se garantice su imparcialidad, el trato igualitario a los usuarios, una atención, planificada, eficaz y eficiente y demuestren rectitud y buena fe. Todo ello bajo un marco de medidas que imponen, entre otras, un régimen de prohibiciones, incompatibilidades, impedimentos y razones de abstención y excusa, la cuales informan –desde hace muchos años– el ordenamiento jurídico patrio. Por tal motivo, este Tribunal de Casación comparte las razones expuestas en la sentencia impugnada, en tanto señala que: “el funcionario público debe actuar con prudencia, integridad, honradez, seriedad, moralidad y rectitud tanto en el desempeño diario de su función como en el uso y protección de los fondos, bienes y recursos que le fueron confiados en razón de su cargo y acatar sus deberes y prohibiciones de carácter ético y probo, lo que nos lleva de seguido al tema del conflicto de intereses. Cuando en razón de las circunstancias el funcionario público debe separarse de los asuntos puestos a su conocimiento cuando pueda verse en riego su objetividad y sus acciones, sin que pueda resultar una justificación absoluta el deber de obediencia, […]. Lo que obliga al funcionario se encuentra sujeto al cumplimiento de deberes éticos, y entre estos el régimen de impedimentos que pueden ser aplicados de manera oficiosa o a gestión de parte, tal y como lo prevén los numerales 229, 230 y 237 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública respecto a la abstención y recusación, norma que remite a su vez a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el Código Procesal Civil a fin de evitar un eventual conflicto de intereses.” En efecto, el IDA era una institución cuya actividad ordinaria comprendía el tráfico de tierras, por lo que podía comprar, vender, hipotecar, arrendar y adquirir los bienes y servicios necesarios para la explotación rural, así como efectuar planes de desarrollo integral, asentamientos campesinos, programas de colonización, parcelar y adjudicar terrenos (según lo establecían los artículos 2 y 3 de la Ley de Creación del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, Ley no. 6735 del 29 de marzo de 1982; actualmente derogados por la Ley de Transformación del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario en el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, Ley no. 9036 del 11 de mayo de 2012). Es bajo ese marco de competencias institucionales que el señor Salvador Quirós ejercía sus labores, como Director de la Dirección Regional Huetar Norte. Desde esa perspectiva, llama la atención que el casacionista combate el fallo bajo el argumento de que se incurrió en “un inexistente análisis de las funciones o atribuciones de mi cliente visibles como señalamos a folios 186 al 189 del expediente administrativo”. Por el contrario, la constancia emitida por la Coordinadora del Área de Recursos Humanos del IDA, a las 10 horas con 40 minutos del 27 de febrero de 2008, visible en los folios referidos por el recurrente, fue valorada como hecho probado no. 2 de la sentencia. En tal documento, se observa que las tareas del señor Quirós Conejo incluían, entre otras cosas: “- Adjudica, Controla [sic] y da seguimiento a los arrendamientos, en fajas [sic] fronterizas y parcelas del Instituto, con base en la reglamentación establecida. // - Asesora a la Presidencia Ejecutiva y Gerencia en actividades sustantivas de la Institución y titulación de tierras, ya sea en forma verbal o mediante la presentación de informes escritos para la toma de decisiones en materia de inversión en tierras, traspasos de fincas, hipotecas, segregaciones y otras, para el cumplimiento de los objetivos institucionales. // […] // - Programa, en coordinación con el departamento Ordenamiento agrario [sic], la priorización y tramitación de títulos de propiedad. // […] // - Coordina, supervisa y realiza inspecciones periódicas en el campo, para constatar la existencia de anomalías en la explotación u ocupación del precio (lote o parcela).” A la luz de lo indicado en dicha certificación, es claro que el señor Quirós Conejo era el responsable de adjudicar y controlar los terrenos del Instituto en su respectiva Dirección Regional, así como de asesorar a las autoridades superiores en esta materia. Por tal motivo, al recomendar y solicitar que se adjudicaran y titularan parcelas y granjas del IDA a favor de sus propios parientes y los de su esposa, incurrió en conflicto de intereses; antes bien, tal y como lo reconoció el fallo impugnado, su deber era apartarse del conocimiento de tales asuntos y no –como lo hizo– interceder para que sus familiares, y los de su conyugue, fueran beneficiados con inmuebles facilitados por el Instituto. De tal suerte que, aunque se le sancionó solamente con 22 días de suspensión sin goce de salario, la Administración dejó claro que se trataba de una falta grave. Mas aún, sobre ese particular, el Tribunal destacó: “Se trata en efecto de un incumplimiento grave a los deberes del cargo del hoy actor, que bien podría haber permitido incluso una sanción mayor a juicio de este órgano colegiado jurisdiccional, pero la administración [sic] -en el manejo del recurso humano- optó por atenuar la sanción.” Así las cosas, se trata de una infracción al sistema de control y fiscalización superior. Ello por cuanto, tal y como se mencionó, el deber de probidad se encuentra inserto en la base sustancial del régimen democrático, en tanto, quien es servidor público debe ser probo, para que desde su puesto sirva a la ciudadanía y no a sí mismo. Por tal motivo, la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos constituye uno de los componentes objetivos de la Hacienda Pública (cardinal 8 de la LOCGR), que se vincula tanto a los principios constitucionales de gobierno responsable, rendición de cuentas, probidad e idoneidad (preceptos 9, 11 y 192 de la Constitución Política), como a los de eficacia y eficiencia (numerales 139.4, 140.8 y 191 ibídem). Así, las normas para prevenir los conflictos de intereses, constituyen medidas necesarias para “preservar la confianza en la integridad de los funcionarios públicos y en la gestión pública”, tal y como lo reconoce el artículo III de la Convención Interamericana Contra la Corrupción, citado supra. En ese sentido, cuando se cometieron los hechos que se le imputan al señor Quirós Conejo, ya el inciso ch) del canon 26 de la entonces vigente Ley sobre el Enriquecimiento Ilícito de los Servidores Públicos, Ley no. 6872 del 17 de junio de 1983, responsabilizaba –penalmente– a quienes “consientan, faciliten o intervengan de cualquier modo, por su influencia, conocimiento o función, en el enriquecimiento de un tercero, funcionario público o no”, según lo refirió el IDA como parte del fundamento normativo para sustentar la sanción. Asimismo, como bien indica la sentencia impugnada, los preceptos 229, 230 y 237 ya instituían el deber de abstención, con el fin de evitar ese conflicto de intereses, según se deriva de la remisión que hacen esas disposiciones a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (en adelante LOPJ) y al Código Procesal Civil (en lo sucesivo CPC); en virtud de las cuales se deben abstener, inhibir, excusar o ser recusados, los servidores que conozcan de los asuntos que interesen a su cónyuge, su tíos(as) o cuñados(as), según sea el caso (numerales 25 de la LOPJ y 49 y 53 del CPC). Por otra parte, recuérdese que “cuanto mayor sea la jerarquía del funcionario y más técnicas sus funciones, en relación al vicio del acto, mayor es su deber de conocerlo y apreciarlo debidamente”, según lo previene el canon 213 de la LGAP. En fin, se trata aquí de un servidor público que ostentaba el cargo de Director Regional del IDA, sujeto a un deber de probidad que le imponía evitar todo conflicto de interés y apartarse de cualquier gestión tendente a beneficiar a sus familiares o los de sus esposa, con granjas, predios u otros terrenos de ese Instituto. De ahí que, el plazo de prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa aplicable es el estipulado en el artículo 71 de la LOCGR, tal y como lo resolvió la sentencia que se impugna, y no el de un mes, estipulado en el Código de Trabajo y pretendido por el casacionista. Por tal motivo, el agravio que se invoca habrá de ser rechazado.”