INCOFER Cannot Subject Public Freight Transport to Suspensive Conditions, Nor Shift Its Legal Duties to the ContractorINCOFER no puede supeditar el transporte público de carga a condiciones suspensivas, ni descargar sus deberes legales en el contratista

“IV. ON THE MERITS OF THE PROCEEDINGS.- Having analyzed the arguments of the parties, this Tribunal has arrived at the following considerations regarding the subject matter of this proceeding: a.- REGARDING THE OMISSION OF INTERNAL APPROVAL ALLEGED BY THE PLAINTIFF: In this regard, this Tribunal considers that the defendant is correct in its arguments, since, as established by the Administrative Procurement Act (LCA), the activity in question is part of its ordinary management, which is exempt from the controls characteristic of administrative procurement procedures. In this sense, Article 2 of the LCA establishes: “Exceptions. The following activities are excluded from the competitive procedures established in this law: a) The ordinary activity of the Administration, understood as the direct supply to the user or final recipient of the services or the provisions established, legally or by regulation, within its purposes.” (Highlighting is not from the original) Said exception has in turn been specified through interpretation by the Constitutional Chamber in its judgment number 6754-98 of September 22, 1998, in which it explained that “…it refers to the activity or service that constitutes the ultimate or final provision of the Administration carried out for the user or final recipient, an activity or service that must be previously defined by law, and whose development may be carried out through autonomous or service regulations, but not executive ones (…) it is important to repeat that one will be in the presence of ordinary activity when the object of the contract constitutes the ultimate purpose of the Administration in question, an activity that, in addition, must be in close relationship with the user; that is, it cannot be just any activity, even if it constitutes a public purpose in itself, as noted in the definition given in the preceding Considering of this judgment. Likewise, the definition of ordinary activity in subsection 76.2.1. is incomplete, since not every public service is ordinary activity but, only, that referring to the ultimate purpose of the Administration that provides it in close relationship with the users and, furthermore, that this public service must be assigned by formal law.” (Highlighting is not from the original) Collecting the basic ideas in this constitutional vote, the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Act provides in Article 128: “The ordinary activity of each entity shall be developed within the respective legal and regulatory framework, without being subject to the procedures established in the Administrative Procurement Act and this Regulation. For these effects, it is understood as ordinary activity, only that which the Public Administration carries out within the scope of its competence, through an activity or service that constitutes the ultimate or final provision for users and whose frequency, traffic, and dynamism, justify or impose a departure from the usual competitive procedures…” (Highlighting is not from the original) Thus, in the case of the Costa Rican Railway Institute, its Organic Law, Number 7001 of September 19, 1985, provided that it would be constituted as an autonomous institution among whose main objectives would be the administration of the railroad transport system for passenger and freight service (Art. 3.a), as well as the administration of services in general of the national railroad to the Atlantic (Art. 3.b), all of which implies the duty to transport and deliver goods and other property to the users of its services, (Art. 4.ch) in the most efficient manner possible (Art. 4.e). In this regard, and for the purposes of this case under review, this Law also establishes that “For the application of this law, merchandise is any product, article, manufactured good, livestock and, in general, any movable property, without any exception” (Art. 41). In this manner, and in attention precisely to the first and third clauses of the contract in question, by indicating that its object is: “…consists of the transportation of bunker by railroad, with INCOFER committing to provide said service to THE CONTRACTOR, which will be carried out on the railway route between the Recope facility in Limón and the locality of Leesville (…). The contracted transport service will initially be for a maximum quantity of ten railroad tank cars, which represents the transportation of approximately three hundred thousand liters of bunker per train.” It is clear to the Tribunal that, indeed, the contractual activity embodied in said document forms part of the ordinary activity of the defendant Administration and for that reason, is therefore excluded from the approval procedure characteristic of administrative procurement. All of this, likewise, is complemented by what is provided in Article 9 of the Regulation to the Organic Law of INCOFER, Executive Decree number 18245-MOPT of June 23, 1988, when it indicates: “The Institute shall carry out the transportation of goods and passengers subject to common legislation and taking into account the general freight tariff and other services.” (Highlighting is not from the original) Likewise, it is possible to conclude that the infractions of the norms contained in Articles 1, 3, 4, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 30 of the Organic Law of INCOFER, alleged by the plaintiff company, are not at any time related to issues proper to the activity or service that constitutes the ultimate or final provision for which the defendant entity is responsible, but rather to aspects related to the internal organization of the institute, the formulation and proposal of tariffs, as well as the procurement procedures of the latter which, because they do not correspond to its ordinary activity, are subject to the administrative procurement procedures, among others, but which have no relationship with the object of this proceeding.- b.- REGARDING THE FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE PROJECT LUGRASA NOTES BY INCOFER: Given the facts deemed proven, it is detailed that, except for the case of the last note dated November 12, 2009, all the requests were in some way addressed promptly by the defendant entity, where even some of them, on the contrary, were rather not addressed by the plaintiff. In any case, note that this last request was a reiteration of requests that, in any event, had already been addressed by the defendant. Now then, it should be borne in mind that many of the requests filed have no meaning from the point of view of the type of material activity that the public company ordinarily deploys, which, governed more properly by the contractual sphere or at most by the public service sphere – as will be detailed later - did not require requests for “resolution and prompt disposition,” but on the contrary, actions of a very different type from those attempted by the plaintiff, which cannot benefit, in that sense, from its own error to establish contractual responsibilities where none lie. It is worth saying, furthermore, that in any case, the allegation of the failure to address said notes, by itself, cannot give rise to compensation at the contractual level, as the plaintiff has mistakenly understood; rather, it is necessary in that sense to prove a breach of the legal obligatory situations or the dissatisfaction of subjective rights and legitimate interests arising from the contract, in order to give rise to this type of claims. c.- IN RELATION TO THE LACK OF PERMITS BY INCOFER, AS A REASON FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: On this point, whose discussion was confusingly addressed by the plaintiff, it must be recognized that no clause was provided in the contract that expressly subjected INCOFER to the fulfillment of an obligation in that sense, but in this regard, neither was there any that established that obligation for Project Lugrasa in its condition as contractor, since as has been duly demonstrated, it was the plaintiff company that assumed said obligation as its own, by processing on behalf of the defendant, without having the direct legitimacy to do so, the “bunker transport authorizations.” If examined in detail, it can be observed how through notes dated April 28, May 4, and May 10, all from 2006, the representative of Project Lugrasa directly carried out the procedures for the authorization of the entry of INCOFER’s tank cars into the RECOPE facility in Moín, substituting for the carrier; however, as of the response obtained in official communication DDC-0382-06 of May 15, 2006, the processing that the plaintiff arrogated to itself was cast into doubt, since from that moment the director of the Fuel Distribution Directorate of RECOPE is the carrier, process the corresponding permits with the General Directorate of Transportation and Marketing of Fuels of MINAE…” (Highlighting is not from the original) such that, everything subsequently carried out by the plaintiff was executed knowing the impropriety of its actions, since it would be the responsibility of its counterparty to meet the requirement of RECOPE, if that requirement were even applicable, as we shall see later. Now then, despite this circumstance, if the rest of the communications held between Project Lugrasa and the officials of both the Ministry of Environment and Energy and the Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery are examined, it is possible to conclude that it was through the acts of the plaintiff company that INCOFER was placed, through the —improper— intermediation of the plaintiff, in the impossibility of satisfying the environmental and safety requirements (but not the freight transport service, as is insisted, we will see later) necessary to carry forward the contracted service. Thus, through official communication number DGTCC-558-06 of May 29, 2006, the General Director of the General Directorate of Transportation and Marketing of Fuels of MINAE, denied the plaintiff’s request for authorization considering himself lacking jurisdiction, because —according to that body's interpretation— the Regulation for the Transportation and Hauling of Petroleum Derivatives, Executive Decree number 24813-MAE, in force at that time, did not establish the scenario of transportation by railways as a modality subject to control, so that it proceeded to send the Contractor company back again to RECOPE and INCOFER itself. Even, note that subsequently, on October 10, 2006, the Director of Fuel Distribution denied the plaintiff company’s request to authorize the entry of the tank cars again, considering that they could not overlook the powers of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, deeming that he was “…legally unable to continue with the corresponding procedures, until such time as the cited executive decree is amended…” Likewise, it must be taken into account that in light of these circumstances, INCOFER attempted to process through official communication P.E. 679-2008 of November 7, 2008, the amendment of the decree just as indicated by the officials to whom the contractor had resorted, without it being evident to this Chamber whether the missive received a response or not from the Vice Minister of Environment and Energy. Faced with this panorama, this Tribunal is in a position to determine the following: first, to allege, as the plaintiff does, that the failure to complete procedures leads to an alleged contractual breach of contract, is not applicable as such, since it involves a legal requirement rather than an obligation incorporated, derived from, or implicit in the contract; in second place, that the non-fulfillment of this requirement is not attributable to an active or omissive behavior deployed by INCOFER, since it was Project Lugrasa who, despite it not being its obligation, nor holding legitimacy, nor any representation, assumed on another's behalf the actions aimed at obtaining the respective authorizations, in such a way that this Office finds no way to assign any responsibility to the defendant Institute for the acts that, without its authorization, were carried out on its behalf before third parties by the Contractor; and in third place, that it has been demonstrated that the failure to obtain the authorizations is not imputable to the defendant, but rather to a lack of coordination and a conflict of administrative powers among third-party Administrations, since on one hand RECOPE refers to MINAE for obtaining the authorizations, and on the other, the latter in turn refers back to RECOPE and even to other entities, encompassing INCOFER and the State (Ministry of Health), for the same purposes, but without any legal or technical basis whatsoever. It is worth noting for now, that this last point will be elaborated upon later, specifically when analyzing the counterclaim. In summary, since a contractual obligation properly speaking is not involved, and even, given the concurrence on one hand of the fault of the victim and on the other, an act of a third party, it is not possible to assert here the contractual liability of the Costa Rican Railway Institute.

III.REGARDING THE DEFENSES.- The defendant has raised in its defense the defenses of lack of passive and active standing, as well as lack of standing, which must be understood as incorporating the defense of unfulfilled contract or *non adimpleti contractus*, as will be stated below. a.- LACK OF PASSIVE AND ACTIVE STANDING: In this case, these are openly improper, since both procedural subjects constitute, in turn, the only parties to the contract for bunker transportation, whose breach is being alleged. That is to say, there is no other person here who could allege contractual liability in their favor or against them, other than the same two legal entities that participate in this process; thus, Project Lugrasa LG del Este Sociedad Anónima has standing in accordance with subsections 1.a and 4 of Article 10 of the CPCA to claim a possible contractual breach from the Costa Rican Railway Institute, which in turn is subject to said action, as provided in Article 12.1 of the CPCA. Thus, with both substantive defenses being improper, they must be rejected, as is hereby ordered.- b.- LACK OF STANDING: Although the defendant has separately formulated the defenses of lack of standing and the *non adimpleti contractus* defense in its response to the complaint, from a reading of both defenses, it is evident that they involve the same argument, as per the provisions of the First Chamber, which in judgment number 540-2003 at 11:00 hours on September 3, 2003, provided: “The analysis of the appealed ruling leads to the conclusion that the defense of unfulfilled contract is, in effect, one of lack of standing, since through this defense, the party invoking it attempts to negate the existence of a right claimed by the opposing party.” This Tribunal therefore considers it appropriate to analyze them in a single section and not in the manner in which they have been presented by the defendant Institute. Now then, regarding the topic of this type of defense, it is possible to review extensive jurisprudence of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, from which the following rulings can be cited: number 365 at 14:20 hours on December 26, 1990, 80 at 15:30 hours on November 30, 1993, 089-F-98 at 14:50 hours on September 23, 1998, 468-F-00 at 10:00 hours on June 16, 2000, 469-F-00 at 10:05 hours on June 16, 2000, 489-F-00 at 15:15 hours on June 28, 2000, 490-F-00 at 15:20 hours on June 28, 2000, 865-F-2000 at 15:35 hours on November 16, 2000, 566-F-01 at 16:15 hours on July 27, 2001, 266-F-03 at 11:00 hours on May 14, 2003, 314-F-03 at 11:25 hours on June 4, 2003, 562-F-03 at 10:40 hours on September 10, 2003, 655-F-04 at 15:30 hours on August 10, 2004, 522-F-2005 at 16:25 hours on July 20, 2005, 589-F-S1-2008 at 11:05 hours on August 29, 2008, and 1134-F-S1-2012 at 14:15 hours on September 4, 2012. Likewise, the rulings of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Section V, number 210-2011 at 15:35 hours on September 9, 2011, and of the Second Civil Court, First Section, number 150 at 14:15 hours on April 30, 2010, can be consulted. All these rulings, which in turn mostly cite the opinions of renowned national jurists, point out that based on Article 692 of the Civil Code, any person who is a party to a bilateral contract and who is at the same time —despite being in a state of contractual regularity— accused by its counterparty of breach of its obligations, has the right to except itself, refuse, deny, or withhold performance, if it proves that the party making the claim is currently in a situation of breach. This defense, called in Latin as “…*Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus* (…) is a defense available to the contracting party from whom the performance of an obligation is demanded, without the other party having performed the correlative obligation incumbent upon it.” (Judgment 365 of December 26, 1990) “It is the consequence provided by the legal system for violating an obligatory bond with normative force for the parties.” (Judgment 80 of November 30, 1993) In this regard, the article in question of the Civil Code states: “In bilateral contracts, the resolutory condition for lack of performance is always implicit. In this case, the party that has performed may demand the performance of the agreement or request its resolution with damages.” This norm is not of a procedural nature and, therefore, does not establish a concrete manner in which it must be alleged in a judicial process; hence, it can be treated both as an action: “…these are actions granted to the performing party by reason of the breach of the other party, precisely because contracts have the force of law between the parties…” (Judgment 562-F-03 of September 10, 2003) or as a defense: “…it is not, technically, a judicial defense, it is a de facto defense that can be invoked by the performing party during the execution of the contract, in the face of the breach by the other party (…) On the occasion of a trial, the correct course would be to raise a defense \"... that signifies the absence of a right to demand forced execution or resolution, on the part of one who is in default with respect to their contractual obligations…” (Judgment 089-F-98 of September 23, 1998) Thus, said article can be alleged in a different manner, depending precisely on who —in their capacity as the performing party— claims the occurrence of this condition in their favor. In other words, the plaintiff can request the forced execution of the agreement or its resolution together with the corresponding compensation, while the defendant can argue the absence of that right on the part of the plaintiff, and vice versa, in those cases where, as in the present one, there is a counterclaim from the defendant; however, in both hypotheses, the parties' theory of the case must necessarily manage to prove at least two factual scenarios: a) That the party alleging it has carried out the constitutive conduct of its obligation, or at a minimum, deployed the preparatory acts to execute its own obligations, in accordance with the terms of the contract, and b) that the counterparty has omitted or failed in the execution of its obligations. The foregoing is important to keep in mind, since, despite the jurisprudence cited indicating that: “This is, in short, a breach authorized by the breach of the correlative obligation, whose basis is found in a protection that the legal system gives to the non-breaching party to avoid further damages.” (Judgment 365 of December 26, 1990); it would be contrary to Law —in particular due to the principle of good faith— to ignore that the parties are called upon to ensure that the contract fulfills its function, displaying its efficacy, in such a way that even though this defense justifies the breach of one of the parties, the latter —if it has not yet performed— must at least prove that it has undertaken a minimum diligence aimed at the execution of its commitments, carrying out some or all of the necessary acts to fulfill the pact (*pacta sunt servanda*), even if those acts by themselves do not entail the complete satisfaction of the obligations, hence the First Chamber has provided: “It is clear then, that the only requirement to raise said defense is the performance of the party raising it, and it is sustained by the breach of the other party.” (Judgment 655-F-04 of August 10, 2004)

IV.CONT.- In this sense, in the concrete case, the party raising this defense argues, in summary, that the plaintiff company failed to fulfill the obligation to install the pumping system and the conditioning of the fuel arrival point according to the thirteenth clause, whose transport it deems was the sole obligation of INCOFER according to the eighth clause, so that by preventing INCOFER from performing, it was empowered to raise the defense of unfulfilled contract. In this regard, consideration must be taken of what the clauses in question express, which indicate: “EIGHTH: The parties agree and are clear that the liability of INCOFER in the service it will provide shall be limited to the transport service by train, once loaded and in motion (…) THIRTEENTH: This contract shall have a term of FIVE YEARS counted from this date, however, the obligations arising from this contract shall commence once the pumping system for the bunker is installed by the CONTRACTOR and the conditioning of the tank cars or cisterns for the transport of the bunker is completed by INCOFER. The five-year term may be extended for equal periods, through agreements signed by the parties, one month prior to the expiration date of the contract in force.” Thus, in view of the defendant's argument regarding the supposed limitation of liability to the matter of transport, there is actually no such limitation, as that is precisely the very object of the public service of merchandise transport, for whose illustration we can resort —*mutatis mutandis*— to the terms in which it is defined by the Commercial Code: “Through the transport contract, the carrier obligates itself to transport people, things, or news from one place to another in exchange for a price.” (Art. 323) Which in turn must be understood, in accordance with Articles 333 and 335 ibidem, to imply the obligation to deliver the goods by the consignor and their receipt by the carrier, as well as the obligation of the carrier to deliver these at the agreed point to the appropriate party according to what was agreed upon. In this manner, the presence of the eighth clause by itself —unlike what was alleged by the defendant Institute— does not inhibit the discussion regarding the scope of the responsibilities derived from the public service of freight transport, since what it does is reiterate the purpose and content of a service of this nature, so that what is truly important lies around the possible breach of the thirteenth clause. It is worth warning, however, that the mention of this regulation does not transform or ignore that, despite this contractual activity being excluded from the Administrative Procurement Act —for constituting the ordinary activity of the Entity— there is in the midst a *publicatio* that has turned this into a public service and, therefore, it is only subject suppletorily to Private Law. Now then, once a careful reading of the same is carried out, the literal text of the contract reveals what in appearance constitute two suspensive conditions, one corresponding to each party: the installation of the pumping system for the bunker by Project Lugrasa and the conditioning of the tank cars or cisterns for the transport of the bunker by INCOFER. In this way, we must establish, as stated previously, if any of the parties has not breached its obligations, which would grant it the right to demand contractual resolution and the corresponding compensation from the opposing party. In this sense, this Tribunal finds that Project Lugrasa has not managed to demonstrate here the performance of its obligations, so it is not entitled to claim that the contractual liability of INCOFER be declared and, consequently, the requested compensation for damages be awarded, just as has been alleged by said Institute as part of its defense of unfulfilled contract. On this aspect, the plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that would allow this Office to verify that a pumping system was installed for the fuel that was to be the object of transport and, therefore, the purpose of the contract. As has been insisted, if the function of the contract is to deploy its effects and if these depended on the suspensive condition agreed upon in the thirteenth clause, the minimum diligence expected from the plaintiff company was to have processed with INCOFER the respective coordination to install said pumping system; however, there is no element of proof that so verifies it. In this sense, regarding the note dated October 29, 2008, in which the plaintiff company informed INCOFER that they already had “…the advisory services of the company Ingenieria Genesis, and the quotation for the equipment necessary to carry out, on our part, all our commitments, and we already have the quotation for the systems that currently have a cost of (…), and include all necessary components,” note that the party is only reporting —midway through the contract term— that it has obtained a quotation for equipment and a supposed advisory service, but not whether these have been acquired effectively, nor does it even prove what those equipment are, whether they meet the corresponding technical and legal requirements, who is the supplier of the same, what relationship they have with the mentioned advisory company, and most importantly, how these quotations permit or do not permit the performance of its obligation. Observe that the party does not provide here purchase or service contracts that document this situation, it is solely their word; consequently, there is no way to consider the minimum due diligence for executing the contract as proven.

Nor has it even demonstrated whether said system was already installed prior to the contract, at some point along the railway line or at the Leesville station, as it has confusingly alleged throughout the proceeding, for example, as it asserts in the first and tenth facts of the complaint, when it claims that “…Since the mid-1990s, my client, built on the premises of the defendant entity INCOFER, in Leesville de Roxana de Pococí, the pipeline network that encompasses the damages, to drain bunker spills to a catchment tank, a booth with three suction and expulsion pumps, and the other necessary installations, to transport, and transfer, bunker fuel, obtained the authorizations from the Servicio Nacional de Electricidad, the entity then in charge of authorizing said handling, from the then, Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas, now Ministerio del Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones, from the Ministerio de Salud and from the Municipalidad de Pococí, to carry out said transport and transfer…” and later that “…despite my client complying with everything, INCOFER, breaching the granted contract, for factors we again do not know and they refuse to explain, refuses to begin the execution and takes none of the internal administrative actions necessary for its implementation, also neglecting the route to be used and the equipment that was contractually required for its due fulfillment…” In this regard, it has also not been demonstrated to this Court that said installations and equipment, if they exist, would have been maintained at the Leesville station or any other point along the railway line, or that these would have been the subject of contracting with third parties for their commissioning. Under these circumstances, the necessary fulfillment to bring an action on the part of Proyecto Lugrasa cannot be credited; on the contrary and as observed in the proven facts, the party seemed to have focused on the non-compliance of its counterparty, conduct whose good faith is to a certain degree dubious, since it resorted to this despite full knowledge of its impropriety, as well as insisting on steps that, as was noted in considerando IV, were inconducive to the execution of the contract. Regarding the defendant's fulfillment of its obligations, this will be delved into when analyzing the counterclaim, it being sufficient for the moment to indicate, as was done above, that the non-satisfaction of the legal requirements on the part of INCOFER, since it is not attributable to the latter, entitles it to oppose the lack of right of action (falta de derecho), basing such opposition on the state of non-compliance of the plaintiff company. Thus, and in accordance with the exception of lack of right of action (falta de derecho) raised by the defendant, sustained in turn by the defense of non-performance of contract (contrato no cumplido), this Court concludes that since the plaintiff company lacks any right to claim non-compliance and the consequent compensation, the proper course is to dismiss the action.

B.- ON THE COUNTERCLAIM

VII.PLEADINGS OF THE PARTIES.- By means of the counterclaim filed here in this proceeding, the Instituto Nacional de Ferrocarriles seeks a declaration that its counterparty breached the transport contract repeatedly mentioned herein and, consequently, a declaration of the termination (resolución) of this agreement, with the consequent compensation. As observed in both the complaint and the conclusions rendered during the oral trial, INCOFER essentially considers that the counterclaim defendant breached its obligations, since it did not obtain the necessary permits for the hauling of the bunker fuel that was to be transported, as well as for the pumping system and other installations necessary to unload the fuel, all due to causes solely attributable to the company Proyecto Lugrasa LUGRASA LG DEL ESTE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA. In this way, having prevented the counterclaimant Institute from performing, the counterclaim defendant company must compensate it for the income lost due to the non-transport of fuel. For its part, the representation of Proyecto Lugrasa LG del Este S.A. considers the pleadings of the counterclaimant Institute to be improper, since in its view, it was INCOFER who, by failing to supply the means and prevent the loss of the assets committed to satisfy the purpose of the contract, as well as by omitting the respective internal procedures and legal requirements, breached the contract and, therefore, is the one called to assume contractual liability, hence it raises the exception of lack of right of action (falta de derecho) and non-performance of contract (contrato no cumplido).

VIII.ON THE MERITS OF THE PROCEEDING.- Regarding this counterclaim, it is observed that it is built upon a single argument, entirely coincident with the lack of right of action (falta de derecho) raised by INCOFER as a defense in the answer: the non-compliance of Proyecto Lugrasa and its own compliance, as a starting point for declaring the contractual termination (resolución) and compensation for damages. Regarding this claim, one must analyze, first, the requirements for the applicability of contractual liability based on Article 692 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), and second, matters concerning the damages claimed by INCOFER. a.- REGARDING THE TERMINATION (RESOLUCIÓN) FOR NON-COMPLIANCE: As has been noted thus far in this judgment, it is indeed possible to assert a state of contractual non-compliance on the part of Proyecto Lugrasa, insofar as it did not carry out the installation of the pumping system to which it had committed itself as a condition precedent (condición suspensiva) in the thirteenth clause of the bunker transport contract that it signed with INCOFER; however, likewise, the non-satisfaction of a series of legal requirements has been demonstrated, which, although they are not the product of faults directly attributable to INCOFER, render unsustainable any right of the latter to claim contractual termination (resolución) pursuant to Article 692 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). Let us see; according to said provision, when it tells us that in bilateral contracts the resolutory condition for lack of performance is implicit, what this implies is that upon the occurrence of the future and uncertain event consisting of the failure to perform its obligations (non-compliance), the contract remains in a state of relative invalidity, subject to the will of the compliant party to enforce the contract, or else, to terminate (resolver) it, with the concomitant contractual liability borne by the non-compliant party, all of this, additionally, according to the seriousness of the non-compliance (see judgment of the Sala Primera number 566-F-01 of 4:15 p.m. on July 27, 2001, cited previously). This is so, because in the first place, the norm, as both a starting point and an endpoint for any interpretation, expressly indicates that we are facing a scenario of a resolutory condition, implicit in every bilateral contract, and in this sense, we will understand as a condition that future and uncertain event upon which, legally, the emergence or extinction of an obligation depends (See in this sense judgments of the Sala Primera number 608-F-2004 of 9:10 a.m. on July 23, 2004, 92 of 3:15 p.m. on June 10, 1992, 989-F-2002 of 4:20 p.m. on December 18, 2002, and 455-F-2007 of 2:00 p.m. on July 2, 2007). In this regard, the Tribunal Segundo Civil, Sección Primera, states in its judgment number 244 of 2:10 p.m. on June 25, 2001: “IV.- As is well known, for contracts to be valid and effective they must have the essential elements typical of each family of contracts, and that in each particular case the so-called “accidental elements” may or may not be present, which, if present, also become essential, because they are determinative of the will of the contracting parties. Such is the case of the condition, understood as the future and uncertain event on which the effectiveness of the bond depends, and of the term or period, which is nothing more than the future but certain event, although perhaps indeterminate in its date, that the parties considered essential to carry forward the negotiation. That is, from contracts in general a series of effects arises from the binding force with which they bind the parties, such as the obligation of execution, the irrevocability of performance, and the execution in good faith which entails the duties of loyalty and cooperation, and such effects are expected to be maintained, at least, during the term of effectiveness of the business, because the term is also an extremely important element in the willingness to negotiate. (…) V.- On the other hand, it is also common knowledge that contracts, by virtue of their binding force, constrain the parties to the performance of that to which they obligated themselves, unless the non-compliance is the product of force majeure (fuerza mayor), fortuitous event (caso fortuito), or the non-compliance of the other party (Article 702 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)). That, in the absence of any of these three exemptions from liability, the non-compliance must be seen as a fault attributable to the one who failed in its duties and that, by having incurred in it, brings about the duty to indemnify the damages directly caused to the other party, as deduced from Articles 693, 702, and 704 of the Code cited.” (Highlighting is not from the original) Thus, making use of these ideas, we can clearly establish two aspects of utmost importance for resolving this counterclaim: i.- that every condition constitutes an aspect of the contract's effectiveness and is therefore also covered by a duty of good faith and loyalty, as they respond to the very meaning of the contract; ii.- that the emergence of the future and uncertain event constituting non-compliance must be analyzed in light of the contract itself, as this is the source that binds or constrains the parties. Bearing this in mind, it is powerfully striking how the Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, first, conditions the provision of a public service, that is, subjects it to a future and uncertain event, contrary to the legal duty under its charge, and second, that despite it being a duty of INCOFER to verify that the client has the legal permits, in this case it omits doing so. We can thus affirm that there is a serious confusion on the part of the counterclaimant regarding the scope of the legal concession it holds for the provision of the public service of freight rail transport, in relation to the legal duties incumbent upon it in its condition as provider of said service and the obligations and rights it may agree with private parties as part of its ordinary activity, all of which leads it to erroneously interpret that legal situations favoring it (effectiveness) have arisen from the contract in question, when that is not the case, as we shall see below.

IX.CONT.- The Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, in accordance with what was set forth in section a.- of Considerando IV, constitutes a public entity which, as a necessary consequence of the administration of the railway transport system (competence and purpose), provides passenger and freight services, the latter implying the duty to transport and deliver merchandise and other goods in the most efficient manner possible to users who request its services, from a point where it receives said goods from the sender, to another where it will deliver them to the person indicated by the latter, provided both points are located along a railway line or track. This is reinforced by what is provided even prior to the enactment of the Ley Orgánica del INCOFER, in the Ley General de Ferrocarriles, Law No. 5066 of August 30, 1972, which in its Chapter I regarding “Fundamental Principles,” provides as relevant: “Article 1.- Rail transport is a public service whose provision is the exclusive faculty of the State, which may supply it through private concessionaires. Article 2.- Every railway is subject to the laws of the Republic, especially to this law, to the concession, to the regulations, and to the general principles of public law, in that order. (…) Article 7.- For the effects of this law, railway is understood as the track, the fixed and rolling stock, the branches or extensions, the sidings, the terminals, the intermediate stations, and all those buildings, installations, docks, and other annexes that directly or indirectly form part of the same operation.” (Highlighting is not from the original) These norms, which clearly establish the public service of rail transport, are also linked with the provision contained in Article 5 of the Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, Law No. 7593 of August 9, 1996, which subsequently –even with respect to the Ley Orgánica del INCOFER– also establishes and specifies said public service character: “In the public services defined in this article, the Autoridad Reguladora shall set prices and rates; moreover, it shall ensure compliance with the norms of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, opportunity, and optimal provision, according to Article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are: (…) h) Freight rail transport.” (Highlighting is not from the original) Thus, it is clear to the Court that the provision of the freight rail transport service constitutes a public service, notwithstanding that Article 9 of the Reglamento a la Ley Orgánica del INCOFER refers this entity to civil and commercial legislation for the definition of the scopes and contents of the service, hence it is subject to the norms that regulate this type of material administrative conduct, leaving norms outside Administrative Law a supplementary source character, according to the provisions of Articles 9, 12, and 13 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. In this way, various provisions are observed in the Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos that allow for foreseeing the principal guarantees that must characterize the provision of public services by the entities providing them, which encompasses in the case under study, the defendant Institute: “Article 6.- Obligations of the Autoridad Reguladora. The following obligations correspond to the Autoridad Reguladora: (…) b) Carry out technical inspections of the properties, plants, and equipment destined to provide the public service, when it deems it convenient to verify the quality, reliability, continuity, costs, prices, and rates of the public service. (…) Article 14.- Obligations of the providers. The obligations of the providers are: (…) b) Maintain installations and equipment in good condition, in such a way that they do not constitute a danger to people or properties, and do not cause interruption of the service. (…) h) Admit, without discrimination, access to the service for those who request it within their field. i) Be prepared to ensure, in the short term, the provision of the service in the face of an increase in demand. j) Provide the service under adequate conditions and with the regularity and safety that its nature, the concession, or the permit indicate. k) Provide the service to its clients under conditions of equality and charge them a fair and reasonable price for the service provided.” (Highlighting is not from the original) Likewise, these norms must be understood in conjunction with the provision of numeral 4 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, when it establishes that: “The activity of public entities must be subject in its entirety to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equality in the treatment of the recipients, users, or beneficiaries.” (Highlighting is not from the original) Also, constitutional jurisprudence concerning the so-called fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services must be taken into account, regarding which it is worth noting what was stated by the Sala Constitucional in its judgment 2009-01650 of 11:41 a.m. on February 6, 2009: “The jurisprudence of this Chamber has established: ‘(…) that the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) enshrines an innominate or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered to the proper functioning of public services, (…) There are already numerous rulings in which it has stated that this fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes upon public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their competencies and the provision of public services in an efficient and effective manner and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. In this line of thought, in judgment number 2004-07532 of 5:03 p.m. on July 13, 2004, the following is literally read: (…) Continuity implies that the provision of services must not be interrupted, (…) Any action –by action or omission– of officials or their lack of foresight in the rational organization of resources that tends to interrupt a public service is openly unlawful. Regularity implies that the public service must be provided or carried out subject to certain pre-established rules, norms, or conditions. Continuity must not be confused with regularity; the first concept implies it must function without interruptions and the second with adherence to the norms that make up the legal system. Adaptation to any change in the legal regime or to the needs imposed by the socioeconomic context means that administrative entities and bodies must have the capacity for foresight and, above all, for programming or planning to face the new demands and challenges imposed, whether by the increase in the volume of demand for the public service or by technological changes. No public entity, body, or official can adduce reasons of budgetary or financial lack, absence of equipment, lack of technological renovation thereof, excess or saturation of demand for the public service to cease providing it continuously and regularly. Equality or universality in access demands that all inhabitants have the right to demand, receive, and use the public service under equal conditions and in accordance with the norms that govern them; consequently, all those who are in the same situation can demand identical advantages. One of the guiding principles of public service that is not enunciated in Article 4 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública is that of its mandatory nature, since it would be useless to affirm they must be continuous, regular, uniform, and general if the provider entity does not have the obligation to provide it. The public administration providing the public service cannot choose its clientele or users; it must provide it to anyone who requires it.’ (The bold highlighting is not from the original) (2007-14214). It has also been the criterion of the Chamber that all public services provided by public administrations are governed by the aforementioned principles, which must be observed and respected, without any exception, by the public officials in charge of their management and provision, given that it is an imperative emanating from the direct and immediate normative effectiveness of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política).” (Highlighting is not from the original) From the relationship of the cited articles, the constitutional jurisprudence transcribed as relevant, and as previously stated, it is evidenced that INCOFER is necessarily subject, when providing the public service of freight rail transport, to providing it in a continuous, mandatory –without gratuity– and egalitarian, efficient and effective, prompt manner, adaptable according to the needs of the service and in accordance with the technical and legal parameters that characterize the service. As a consequence, INCOFER could not validly condition the service, disregarding the legal duty under its charge, upon a condition precedent (condición suspensiva) under its charge, such as: “…the conditioning of the tank cars or cisterns for the transport of bunker fuel…,” because this implies treating the public service as if it were a future and uncertain event, when on the contrary it must be treated as a legal duty of the Administration, current and certain, so that at the moment it is requested, without any discrimination, INCOFER must provide the service, requiring for this –obviously– the corresponding tariff counter-payment as established by the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos.

X.Now, on the matter of fuel transport, it must also be clear that, first, INCOFER could not discharge its responsibility onto the user, as it did by omission, since knowing the incorrectness of Proyecto Lugrasa's proceeding when managing the authorizations before RECOPE and the MINAE, it remained silent in this regard; secondly, that it was not until November 7, 2008 (approximately halfway through the contract term), when by official letters P.E. 688-2008 and P.E. 679-2008, the Executive President of INCOFER informed the plaintiff company of the absence of compliance with the technical and legal requirements relating to the fuel unloading point, as well as to the Deputy Minister of the Environment and Energy regarding the lack of regulatory inclusion of fuel transport by rail, to which –incidentally– it did not give the necessary follow-up that would have been expected from the standpoint of good faith and contractual loyalty, but moreover –and even more importantly–, what its own organic law establishes as a duty and an attribution: “To execute, in the most efficient manner possible, the transport of cargo and passengers” (Art. 4.ch. Highlighting is not from the original). Likewise, and thirdly, in light of the foregoing and what will be stated, the Institute’s lack of knowledge regarding the regularity with which the fuel transport service must be provided has been patent to this Court, starting with the scope of numeral 9 in relation to numeral 5 of the Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, which state, as relevant: “In the public services defined in this article, the Autoridad Reguladora shall set (…). The aforementioned public services are: (…) d) Supply of hydrocarbon-derived fuels, which includes: 1) (…) 2) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined for the final consumer. (…) h) Freight rail transport. (...) The authorization to provide the public service shall be granted by the entities cited below: (…) Subsection d.2): Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía. (…) Subsection h): Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. (…) Article 9.- To be a provider of the public services referred to in this law, the respective concession or permit from the competent public entity in the matter must be obtained, according to the provisions of Article 5 of this law. Excepted from this obligation are the public institutions and companies that, by legal mandate, provide any of these services. However, all providers shall be subject to this law and its regulations.” (Highlighting is not from the original) This being so, and as has been seen until now, INCOFER is one of those public companies that, by being charged by legal mandate with providing the freight rail transport service, is excepted from a permit or concession for the development of the service, and in relation to cargo, this can perfectly encompass fuels, since there is no norm that restricts it; in fact, on the contrary, Article 1 of the Reglamento para el Servicio de Transporte de Carga por Ferrocarril, adopted by the defendant Institute and in force since October 16, 2003 (a date prior to the transport contract in question), allows one to understand that it encompasses any type of merchandise: “Persons able to contract the freight rail transport service shall be all those natural and legal persons legally empowered, who have the need to transport their raw materials, semi-finished, or finished products using the freight train as a means of transport, in those places where there is an enabled railway track, and who wish to contract this service, in adherence to the provisions of the present regulation.” (Highlighting is not from the original). This norm is consistent with what is provided in numerals 3, 4, and 41 of the Ley Orgánica del INCOFER, already cited previously. Therefore, consequently, since the Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles is exempt from obtaining authorizations or concessions from either the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía or the Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes for the provision of this type of service, the regulatory modification required by RECOPE and requested of the MINAE by INCOFER's own Executive President was therefore unnecessary. However, of a very different nature is the question of the control and oversight that the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía refused to carry out in relation to the safety aspect of transport, not only of the tank cars, but also, and according to Article 7 of the Ley General de Ferrocarriles (transcribed above), of the entire infrastructure of a railway, since both the regulation for Transport and Hauling of Petroleum Derivatives (Transporte y Acarreo de Derivados de Petróleo), executive decree number 24813-MAE, in force at that time, and its later version currently in force, executive decree number 36627-MINAET, Reglamento para la regulación del transporte de combustible, have granted said Ministry broad competencies to supervise these matters, independently of the issue of authorization for the fuel transport service which, it is reiterated, was not required by INCOFER. In this regard, it suffices to cite by way of illustration, in relation to decree 24813-MAE, the following numerals: “Article 1.- The application of this regulation corresponds to the Dirección General de Transporte y Comercialización de Combustibles of the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía (DGTCC). For this purpose, the DGTCC must coordinate and direct the policies issued by the Executive Branch, in relation to the transport and commercialization of fuels in the country, being empowered to execute those policies, which among others shall contemplate: a) the pursuit of efficiency and efficacy in the transport of fuels by means of tanker trucks and their dispensing. b) the control of safety and hygiene aspects. (…) Article 3.- Due to the interest they hold for the safety of the inhabitants of the Republic and for the economic life of the country, the transport services for all petroleum derivative products, whether produced nationally or imported, are declared of public interest. (…) Article 6.- The following shall correspond to the Dirección General: a) To regulate, inspect, and control matters related to the transport of fuels, both clean product, dirty, and other hydrocarbons…” (Highlighting is not from the original).

XI.Thus, as outlined in considerando VIII, this Court has found that INCOFER, availing itself of questionable good faith and omitting its legal duties, proceeded to incorporate an ineffective condition into the bunker fuel transport contract, originally burdened its counterparty with the fulfillment of its own legal duties, and once the time came to enforce them, due to its own lack of expertise did not undertake actions to challenge the active and omissive conduct of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, as was expected according to the principles of good faith and loyalty in the execution of contracts.

All of the foregoing leads this Court to conclude that the appropriate course is to deny the action brought by the Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, since under the stated circumstances, it lacks a sound legal basis to support its claim, and furthermore, on the contrary, to grant it could be seen as endorsing an unfortunate legal interpretation by INCOFER regarding the scope of the concession that the Law granted it." "IV. ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE.- Having analyzed the arguments of the parties, this Court has come to consider the following in relation to the subject matter of this case: a.- *REGARDING THE ABSENCE OF INTERNAL APPROVAL (REFERENDO INTERNO) ALLEGED BY THE PLAINTIFF*: In this regard, this Court finds that the defendant is correct in its arguments, since, as established by the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa, LCA), the activity in question is part of its ordinary operations, which are exempt from the controls characteristic of administrative procurement procedures. In this sense, Article 2 of the LCA states: *“Exceptions. The following activities are excluded from the competitive bidding procedures established in this law: a) The ordinary activity of the Administration, understood as the direct supply to the final user or recipient of the services or provisions legally or regulatorily established within its purposes.”* (Highlighting is not from the original) This exception has in turn been clarified through the interpretation of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in its judgment number 6754-98 of September 22, 1998, in which it explained that “…*it concerns the activity or service that constitutes the ultimate or final provision of the Administration carried out before the final user or recipient, an activity or service that must be previously defined in the law, and whose development may be done through autonomous or service regulations, but not executive ones* (…) *it is important to reiterate that one is in the presence of ordinary activity when the purpose of the contract constitutes the ultimate purpose of the Administration in question, an activity that, moreover, must be in close relation to the user*; that is, it cannot be just any activity, even if it constitutes a public purpose in itself, as noted in the definition given in the preceding Consideration of this judgment. Likewise, the definition of ordinary activity in sub-section 76.2.1. is incomplete, since not every public service constitutes ordinary activity, but only *that referring to the ultimate purpose of the Administration that provides it in close relation to users and, additionally, that said public service must be assigned by formal law*.” (Highlighting is not from the original) Gathering the basic ideas from this constitutional decision, the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law provides in Article 128: “*The ordinary activity of each entity shall be developed within the respective legal and regulatory framework, without being subject to the procedures established in the Administrative Procurement Law and this Regulation. For these purposes, ordinary activity is understood to mean only that which the Public Administration carries out within the scope of its competence, through an activity or service that constitutes the ultimate or final provision before users and whose frequency, volume, and dynamism justify or require departing from the usual competitive bidding procedures*…” * * (Highlighting is not from the original) This being the case, in the matter of the Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, its Organic Law, Number 7001 of September 19, 1985, established that it would be constituted as an autonomous institution whose main objectives would include the administration of the railway transport system for passenger and freight service (Art. 3.a), as well as the administration of services in general of the national railway to the Atlantic (Art. 3.b), all of which implies the duty to transport and deliver merchandise and other goods to the users of its services, (Art. 4.ch) in the most efficient manner possible (Art. 4.e). In this regard, and as relevant for the purposes of the case under review, this Law further establishes that *“For the application of this law, merchandise is any product, article, manufacture, livestock, and, in general, all movable property, without any exception whatsoever”* (Art. 41) Thus, and in precise attention to the first and third clauses of the contract in question, by indicating that its purpose is: *“…to transport bunker fuel by railway, with INCOFER undertaking to provide said service to THE CONTRACTOR, which shall be carried out on the railway route between the RECOPE plant in Limón and the locality of Leesville* (…) *The contracted transportation service shall initially be for a maximum quantity of ten railway tank cars, which represents the transport of approximately three hundred thousand liters of bunker fuel per train.”* It is clear to the Court that, indeed, the contractual activity set forth in said document forms part of the ordinary activity of the defendant Administration and is therefore excluded from the approval (refrendo) procedure characteristic of administrative procurement. All of this is also complemented by the provisions of Article 9 of the Regulation to the Organic Law of INCOFER, Executive Decree number 18245-MOPT of June 23, 1988, when it indicates: “*The Institute shall carry out the transport of merchandise and passengers subject to ordinary legislation and taking into account the general tariff for freight and other services.”* (Highlighting is not from the original) Likewise, it is possible to conclude that the infractions of the rules contained in numerals 1, 3, 4, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 30 of the Organic Law of INCOFER, alleged by the plaintiff company, do not refer at any time to issues inherent to the activity or service that constitutes the ultimate or final provision by the defendant entity, but rather to aspects related to the internal organization of the institute, the formulation and proposal of tariffs, as well as its procurement procedures which, because they do not correspond to its ordinary activity, are indeed subject to administrative procurement procedures, among others, but which are unrelated to the subject matter of this case.- b.- *REGARDING THE FAILURE TO RESPOND BY INCOFER TO THE NOTES FROM PROYECTO LUGRASA*: In view of the facts deemed proven, it is detailed that, except for the case of the last note dated November 12, 2009, all the proceedings were in some manner promptly addressed by the defendant entity, where in some cases, on the contrary, they were rather disregarded by the plaintiff party. In any case, it is noted that this last proceeding was a reiteration of requests that had already been addressed by the defendant party anyway. Now, it must be kept in mind that many of the filed proceedings made no sense from the perspective of the type of material activity that the public company was deploying ordinarily, which, governed more properly by the contractual realm or at most by that of the public service –as will be detailed later– did not require proceedings of "resolution and prompt dispatch," but rather actions of a very different kind from those attempted by the plaintiff, who cannot benefit, in this sense, from its own error to establish contractual liability where it is not applicable. It is also worth stating, moreover, that in any case, the allegation of failure to respond to said notes, by itself, cannot give rise to indemnification at a contractual level, as the plaintiff has mistakenly understood, but rather it is necessary in that sense to prove a breach of the obligatory legal situations or the dissatisfaction of subjective rights and legitimate interests arising from the contract in order to give rise to this type of claim. c.- *IN RELATION TO THE LACK OF PERMITS ON THE PART OF INCOFER, AS A REASON FOR BREACH*: On this point, the discussion of which was addressed in a confusing manner by the plaintiff party, it must be recognized that no clause was stipulated in the contract that expressly obligated INCOFER to fulfill an obligation in that sense, but in this regard, neither was there any clause establishing that obligation for Proyecto Lugrasa in its condition as contractor, since, as has been duly demonstrated, it was the plaintiff company that assumed said obligation as its own, by processing, on behalf of the defendant, without having direct standing to do so, the "authorizations for the transport of bunker fuel." If one examines in detail, it can be observed how through the notes dated April 28, May 4, and May 10, all from 2006, the representative of Proyecto Lugrasa directly carried out the procedures for authorizing the entry of INCOFER's tank cars to the RECOPE plant in Moín, in substitution of the carrier; however, based on the response obtained in official communication DDC-0382-06 of May 15, 2006, the processing that the plaintiff arrogated to itself was called into question, since from that moment on the director of RECOPE's Fuel Distribution Directorate expressly informed it that “…*it is necessary for INCOFER, which in this case is the carrier, to process the corresponding permits with the General Directorate of Transport and Commercialization of Fuels of MINAE…*” (Highlighting is not from the original) in such a way that everything acted upon subsequently by the plaintiff was executed in full knowledge of the impropriety of its proceedings, since it would be the responsibility of its counterpart to fulfill RECOPE's requirement, if indeed that requirement were applicable, as we shall see later. * *Now, despite this circumstance, if the rest of the communications held between Proyecto Lugrasa and the officials of both the Ministry of Environment and Energy and the Refinería Costarricense de Petróleo are examined, it is possible to conclude that it was through the acts of the plaintiff company that INCOFER was placed, through the –improper– intermediation of the plaintiff, in the impossibility of satisfying the environmental and safety requirements (but not the freight transport service, as is insisted, we will see later) necessary to carry forward the contracted service. Thus, through official communication number DGTCC-558-06 of May 29, 2006, the General Director of the General Directorate of Transport and Commercialization of Fuels of MINAE denied the plaintiff company's authorization request, considering himself incompetent, on the grounds that -as said body interpreted- the Regulation for the Transport and Carriage of Petroleum Derivatives, Executive Decree number 24813-MAE, in force at that moment, did not establish the scenario of railway transport as a modality subject to control, and consequently proceeded to refer the Contractor company back to RECOPE and INCOFER itself. Indeed, it is further noted that later, on October 10, 2006, the Director of Fuel Distribution, denied the plaintiff company's request once again to authorize the entry of the tank cars, considering that they could not overlook the competencies of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, deeming that he was “…*legally unable to continue with the corresponding procedures until the cited executive decree is modified…*” Likewise, it must be taken into account that under these circumstances, INCOFER attempted to process, through official communication P.E. 679-2008 of November 7, 2008, the modification of the decree as indicated by the officials to whom the contractor had turned, without it being evident to this Chamber whether the missive received a response from the Vice Minister of Environment and Energy. In light of this panorama, this Court is in a position to determine the following: first, to argue, as the plaintiff party does, that the failure of procedures leads to an alleged contractual breach is not applicable as such, since it involves a legal requirement rather than an obligation incorporated, derived, or implied in the contract; secondly, that the non-satisfaction of this requirement is not attributable to any active or omissive behavior deployed by INCOFER, since it was Proyecto Lugrasa who, despite it not being its obligation, nor having standing, nor any representation, assumed in someone else's name the actions directed at obtaining the respective authorizations, such that this Office finds no way to hold the defendant Institute responsible for the acts that, without its authorization, were carried out in its name before third parties by the Contractor; and thirdly, it has been shown that the failure to obtain the authorizations is not imputable to the defendant, but rather to a lack of coordination and a conflict of administrative competencies among third-party Administrations, since on one hand RECOPE refers to MINAE for obtaining the authorizations and on the other, the latter in turn refers again to RECOPE and even to other entities, including INCOFER and the State (Ministry of Health), for the same purposes, but without any legal or technical basis. It is worth noting for now that this last point will be delved into further later, specifically when analyzing the counterclaim. In summary, since a proper contractual obligation is not at stake, and furthermore, as both the fault of the victim and an act of a third party concur, it is not possible to assert the contractual liability of the Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles here.

III.REGARDING THE DEFENSES (EXCEPCIONES).- The defendant party has raised in its defense the defenses of lack of passive and active standing (legitimación pasiva y activa), as well as lack of right (falta de derecho), which must be understood as incorporating the defense of non-performance of contract or *exceptio non adimpleti contractus*, as will be stated below. a.- *LACK OF PASSIVE AND ACTIVE STANDING: * In this case, these are openly unfounded, as both procedural subjects constitute, in turn, the sole parties to the bunker fuel transport contract whose breach is being alleged. That is, there is no other person here who could assert contractual liability in their favor or against them, other than the same two legal entities participating in this process; in this manner, Proyecto Lugrasa LG del Este Sociedad Anónima, has standing according to sub-sections 1.a and 4 of Article 10 CPCA to claim a possible contractual breach against the Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, which in turn is susceptible to such action, as stipulated in 12.1 CPCA. This being the case, both substantive defenses being unfounded, they must be rejected, as is hereby ordered.- b.- *LACK OF RIGHT:* Although the defendant party has separately formulated the defenses of lack of right and the defense of *non adimpleti contractus* in its response to the complaint *, * from a reading of both defenses, it is evident that they are the same argument, as also emerges from the ruling of the First Chamber (Sala Primera), which in judgment number 540-2003 of 11:00 a.m. on September 3, 2003, stated: *“An analysis of the appealed ruling leads to the conclusion that the defense of non-performance of contract is, indeed, one of lack of right, since through this defense, the party invoking it attempts to disprove the non-existence of a right claimed by the opposing party.”*, this Court then comes to consider that the appropriate course is to analyze them in a single section rather than in the manner presented by the defendant Institute. Now, on the subject of this type of defense or exception, it is possible to review extensive jurisprudence from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, from which the following rulings may be cited: number 365 at 2:20 p.m. on December 26, 1990, 80 at 3:30 p.m. on November 30, 1993, 089-F-98 at 2:50 p.m. on September 23, 1998, 468-F-00 at 10:00 a.m. on June 16, 2000, 469-F-00 at 10:05 a.m. on June 16, 2000, 489-F-00 at 3:15 p.m. on June 28, 2000, 490-F-00 at 3:20 p.m. on June 28, 2000, 865-F-2000 at 3:35 p.m. on November 16, 2000, 566-F-01 at 4:15 p.m. on July 27, 2001, 266-F-03 at 11:00 a.m. on May 14, 2003, 314-F-03 at 11:25 a.m. on June 4, 2003, 562-F-03 at 10:40 a.m. on September 10, 2003, 655-F-04 at 3:30 p.m. on August 10, 2004, 522-F-2005 at 4:25 p.m. on July 20, 2005, 589-F-S1-2008 at 11:05 a.m. on August 29, 2008, and 1134-F-S1-2012 at 2:15 p.m. on September 4, 2012. The following judgments may also be consulted: from the Contentious-Administrative and Civil-Treasury Court, Section V, number 210-2011 at 3:35 p.m. on September 9, 2011, and from the Second Civil Court, First Section, number 150 at 2:15 p.m. on April 30, 2010. All these judgments, which in turn mostly cite the opinions of renowned national jurists, indicate that based on Article 692 of the Civil Code, any person who is a party to a bilateral contract and who, at the same time—despite being in a state of contractual regularity—is accused by its counterpart of breaching its obligations, has the right to raise a defense, to refuse, to deny, or to withhold performance, if it proves that the party making the claim is currently in a state of breach. This defense, termed in Latin as *“…Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus* (…) *is a defense available to the contracting party who is demanded to perform an obligation, without the other party having fulfilled the correlative obligation incumbent upon it.”* (Judgment 365 of December 26, 1990) *“It is the consequence provided for by the legal order for transgressing a binding obligation with normative force for the parties.”* (Judgment 80 of November 30, 1993) In this regard, the article in question of the Civil Code indicates: *“In bilateral contracts, the resolutory condition for lack of performance is always implicit.*

In this case, the party that has performed may demand performance of the agreement or request its resolution with damages." This rule is not procedural in nature and therefore does not establish a specific manner in which it must be raised in a judicial proceeding; hence, it can be treated either as a cause of action: "…these are actions granted to the performing party by reason of the other party's non-performance, precisely because contracts have the force of law between the parties…" (Sentencia 562-F-03 of September 10, 2003) or as a defense: "…it is not, technically, a defense of a judicial nature; it is a de facto defense that can be invoked by the performing party during the execution of the contract, in the face of the other party's non-performance (…) On the occasion of a trial, the correct course would be to oppose an exception '... that signified the absence of right to demand specific performance or resolution, by the party who is in default regarding its contractual obligations…' " (Sentencia 089-F-98 of September 23, 1998). Thus, this provision can be raised in different ways, depending precisely on who—in their capacity as the performing party—claims the occurrence of this condition in their favor. In other words, the plaintiff can request the specific performance of the agreement or its resolution together with the corresponding compensation, while, for its part, the defendant can argue the absence of that right on the part of the plaintiff, and vice versa, in those cases like the present one where there is a counterclaim by the defendant; however, in both hypotheses, the parties' theory of the case must necessarily succeed in proving at least two factual assumptions: a) That whoever raises it has performed the conduct constituting their obligation, or at the very least, taken the preparatory steps to execute their own obligations, according to the terms of the contract, and b) that the counterparty has omitted or failed in the execution of its obligations. The foregoing is important to keep in mind, since, despite the cited case law stating: "It is, then, a case of non-performance authorized by the non-performance of the correlative obligation, whose basis is found in a protection afforded by the legal system to the non-defaulting party to prevent them from suffering greater damages." (Sentencia 365 of December 26, 1990); it would be contrary to Law—in particular due to the principle of good faith—to ignore that the parties are called upon to ensure that the contract fulfills its function, deploying its efficacy, such that even though this exception justifies the non-performance by one of the parties, that party—if it has not yet performed—must prove, at the very least, that it has undertaken a minimum diligence aimed at the execution of its commitments, carrying out some or all of the necessary acts to fulfill the pact (pacta sunt servanda), even if those acts by themselves do not constitute the full satisfaction of the obligations. Hence, the First Chamber (la Sala Primera) has held: "It is clear, then, that the sole requirement for opposing said exception is the performance by the party raising it, and it is sustained by the other party's non-performance." (Sentencia 655-F-04 of August 10, 2004)

IV.CONT.- In this sense, in the specific case, the party opposing this defense argues, in summary, that the plaintiff company did not fulfill the obligation to install the pumping system and the conditioning of the fuel delivery point according to clause thirteen, the transport of which it considers was the sole obligation of INCOFER according to clause eight, so that by preventing the latter from performing, it was empowered to oppose the defense of non-performance of the contract. In this regard, the wording of the clauses in question must be considered, which state: "EIGHTH: The parties agree and are clear that INCOFER's responsibility in the service it will provide shall be limited to the rail transport service, once loaded and in motion (…) THIRTEENTH: This contract shall have a term of FIVE YEARS counted from this date; however, the obligations arising from this contract shall commence once the pumping system for the bunker fuel is installed by the CONTRACTOR and the conditioning of the tank cars or cisterns for the transport of the bunker fuel by INCOFER. The five-year term may be extended for equal periods, through agreements signed by the parties, one month prior to the expiration date of the contract in force." Thus, in view of the defendant's allegation regarding the supposed limitation of responsibility to the matter of transport, there is really no such limitation, since that is precisely the very object of the public merchandise transport service, for whose illustration we can resort—mutatis mutandis—to the terms in which it is defined by the Commerce Code (Código de Comercio): "By the contract of transport, the carrier obligates itself to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another in exchange for a price." (Art. 323). Which in turn must be understood, according to provisions 333 and 335 ibidem, to imply the obligation of the consignor to deliver the merchandise and its reception by the carrier, as well as the carrier's obligation to deliver these at the agreed point to whoever is entitled according to what was agreed. In this manner, the presence of the eighth clause on its own—contrary to what is alleged by the defendant Institute—does not preclude discussion regarding the scope of responsibilities derived from the public freight transport service, since what it does is reiterate the purpose and content of a service of this nature. Therefore, what is really important revolves around the possible non-performance of the thirteenth clause. It is worth noting, however, that the mention of this regulation neither transforms nor ignores that, despite this contractual activity being excluded from the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa)—as it constitutes the Entity's ordinary activity—a publicatio is involved that has turned it into a public service and, therefore, it is only supplementarily subject to Private Law. Now then, having carefully read it, the literal text of the contract allows us to see what appear to be two conditions of a suspensive nature, one corresponding to each party: the installation of the pumping system for the bunker fuel by Proyecto Lugrasa and the conditioning of the tank cars or cisterns for the transport of the bunker fuel by INCOFER. In this way, we must establish, as previously stated, whether any of the parties has not fulfilled its obligations, which would recognize its right to demand contractual resolution and the corresponding compensation from the opposing party. In this regard, this Tribunal finds that Proyecto Lugrasa has not managed to demonstrate here the fulfillment of its obligations; therefore, it has no right to claim the contractual liability of INCOFER and consequently, the requested compensation for damages, as has been alleged by said Institute as part of its defense of non-performance of the contract. On this aspect, the plaintiff party has failed to provide any evidence that would allow this Court to verify that a pumping system was installed for the fuel that was to be the object of transport and, therefore, the purpose of the contract. As has been insisted, if the function of the contract is to deploy its effects and if these were pending the suspensive condition agreed upon in the thirteenth clause, the minimum diligence expected from the plaintiff company was to have managed the respective coordination with INCOFER to install said pumping system; however, there is no evidence whatsoever to verify this. In this sense, regarding the note dated October 29, 2008, in which the plaintiff company informed INCOFER that they already had "…the advisory services of the company Ingenieria Genesis, and the quotation for the necessary equipment to carry out, on our part, all our commitments, and we already have the quotation for the systems that currently have a cost of (…), and include all the necessary components," note that the party is only informing—halfway through the contract term—that it has obtained a quotation for equipment and a supposed advisory service, but not whether they have been effectively acquired, nor does it even accredit what those equipments are, whether they meet the corresponding technical and legal requirements, who the supplier is, what relationship it has with the mentioned advisory firm, and, most importantly, how these quotations allow or do not allow the fulfillment of its obligation. Observe that the party does not provide here purchase or service contracts documenting this situation; it is solely its word, so there is no way to consider the minimum diligence due for executing the contract as proven. Nor has it demonstrated, even, whether said system was already installed prior to the contract, at some point along the railway line or at the Leesville station, as it has confusingly alleged throughout the proceeding, for example, as argued in the first and tenth facts of the complaint, by claiming that "…Since the mid-1990s, my represented party built, at the facilities of the defendant entity INCOFER, in Leesville of Roxana de Pococí, the pipeline network that comprises the damages, to drain bunker fuel spills into a catchment tank, a cabin with three suction and expulsion pumps, and the other necessary facilities, to transport and transfer, bunker fuel, obtained the authorizations from the National Electricity Service (Servicio Nacional de Electricidad), the entity then in charge of authorizing said handling, from the then Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines (Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas), now the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (Ministerio del Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones), from the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud) and the Municipality of Pococí (la Municipalidad de Pococí), to carry out said transport and transfer…" and then that "…despite my represented party complying in full, INCOFER, failing to perform the granted contract, due to factors we again are unaware of and they refuse to explain, refuses to commence execution and takes none of the internal administrative actions necessary for its implementation, also neglecting the route to be used and the equipment contractually required for its due performance…" In this regard, it has also not been proven to this Tribunal that said facilities and equipment, if they existed, had been maintained at the Leesville station or any other point of the railway line, or that these had been the object of contracting with third parties for their start-up. Under these circumstances, the necessary performance for Proyecto Lugrasa to bring action cannot be accredited; on the contrary, and as observed in the proven facts, the party seems to have focused on the non-performance of its counterparty, a behavior whose good faith is, to a certain degree, doubtful, since it resorted to this despite full knowledge of its impropriety, as well as insisting on proceedings which, as noted in Considerando IV, were inconducive to the execution of the contract. Regarding the defendant's performance of its obligations, this will be delved into when analyzing the counterclaim, it being sufficient for the moment to indicate, as stated above, that the non-satisfaction of the legal requirements by INCOFER, being not attributable to it, empowers it to oppose the lack of right, basing this on the state of non-performance of the plaintiff company. This being the case, and in accordance with the exception of lack of right raised by the defendant, sustained in turn by the defense of non-performance of the contract, this Tribunal concludes that, as the plaintiff company lacks any right to claim non-performance and the consequent compensation, the proper course is to dismiss the action.

B.- REGARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM (LA RECONVENCIÓN)

VII.PARTY ARGUMENTS.- Through the counterclaim raised here in this proceeding, the National Railways Institute (Instituto Nacional de Ferrocarriles) seeks a declaration of its counterparty's non-performance of the transport contract repeatedly mentioned herein, and consequently, the resolution of this agreement, with the resulting compensation. As observed both in the counterclaim and in the conclusions presented during the oral trial, INCOFER basically considers that the counterclaim defendant failed to perform its obligations, since it did not obtain the necessary permits for the hauling of the bunker fuel to be transported, as well as for the pumping system and other facilities necessary to unload the fuel, all due to causes attributable solely to the company Proyecto Lugrasa LUGRASA LG DEL ESTE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA. Thus, by preventing the counterclaimant Institute from performing, the counterclaim defendant company must compensate it for the income not received due to the non-transport of fuel. For its part, the representation of Proyecto Lugrasa LG del Este S.A. considers the allegations of the counterclaimant Institute to be improper, since in its view, it was INCOFER who, by failing to provide the means and prevent the loss of the assets committed to satisfying the purpose of the contract, as well as omitting the respective internal procedures and legal requirements, has failed to perform the contract and, therefore, is the party called upon to assume contractual liability; hence, it raises the exception of lack of right and non-performance of the contract.

VIII.ON THE MERITS OF THE PROCEEDING.- Regarding this counterclaim, it is observed that it is built upon the basis of a single argument, entirely coincident with the lack of right raised by INCOFER, as a defense, in its answer: the non-performance by Proyecto Lugrasa and its own performance, as a starting point for the contractual resolution and compensation for damages to be declared. Regarding this allegation, it is necessary to analyze, first, matters relating to the requirements for the applicability of contractual liability based on Article 692 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), and second, matters concerning the damages alleged by INCOFER. a.- REGARDING RESOLUTION FOR NON-PERFORMANCE (RESOLUCIÓN POR INCUMPLIMIENTO): As has been pointed out so far in this judgment, it is indeed possible to assert a state of contractual non-performance on the part of Proyecto Lugrasa, insofar as it did not carry out the installation of the pumping system to which it had committed itself as a suspensive condition in the thirteenth clause of the bunker fuel transport contract that it signed with INCOFER. However, likewise, the non-satisfaction of a series of legal requirements has been evidenced, which, although not the product of faults directly attributable to INCOFER, render any right of the latter to claim contractual resolution according to Article 692 of the Civil Code unsustainable. Let us see; according to said provision, when we are told that in bilateral contracts the resolutory condition for lack of performance is implicit, this implies that upon the occurrence of the future and uncertain event consisting of the failure to execute one's obligations (non-performance), the contract remains in a state of relative ineffectiveness, subject to the will of the performing party to compel the forced execution of the contract, or else, to resolve it, with the concomitant contractual liability on the part of the defaulting party, all this, moreover, according to the gravity of the non-performance (see judgment of the First Chamber (la Sala Primera) number 566-F-01 of 4:15 p.m. on July 27, 2001, cited above). This is so because, in the first place, the rule, as both the starting point and the destination for any interpretation, expressly indicates that we are facing a case of a resolutory condition, implicit in every bilateral contract and, in this sense, we will understand a condition as that future and uncertain event on which, legally, the birth or extinction of an obligation depends (See in this sense judgments of the First Chamber (la Sala Primera) number 608-F-2004 of 9:10 a.m. on July 23, 2004, 92 of 3:15 p.m. on June 10, 1992, 989-F-2002 of 4:20 p.m. on December 18, 2002, and 455-F-2007 of 2:00 p.m. on July 2, 2007). In this regard, the Second Civil Tribunal, First Section (Tribunal Segundo Civil, Sección Primera), in its judgment number 244 of 2:10 p.m. on June 25, 2001, states: "IV.- As is well known, for contracts to be valid and effective, they must have the essential elements specific to each family of them, and in each particular case, the so-called 'accidental elements' may or may not be present, which, if present, also become essential, because they are decisive for the will of the contracting parties. Such is the case of the condition, understood as the future and uncertain event on which the effectiveness of the bond depends, and of the term or period, which is nothing more than the future but certain event, although perhaps undetermined in its date, that the parties considered essential to carry forward the negotiation. That is, from contracts in general, a series of effects proper to the obligatory force with which they bind the parties ensues, such as the obligation of execution, the irrevocability of performance, and the execution in good faith that entails the duties of loyalty and cooperation, and such effects are expected to be maintained, at least, during the period of validity of the business, because the term is also a very important element in the will to negotiate. (…) V.- On the other hand, it is also common knowledge that contracts, by virtue of their obligatory force, constrain the parties to the execution of that to which they obligated themselves, unless the non-performance is the product of force majeure, fortuitous event, or the non-performance of the other party (Article 702 of the Civil Code). That, none of these three eximating circumstances of liability being present, non-performance must be seen as a fault attributable to whoever failed in their duties and that, for having incurred in it, brings the duty to compensate the damages directly caused to the other party, as is derived from Articles 693, 702, and 704 of the Code cited." (Emphasis is not from the original). Using these ideas, we can clearly establish two aspects of the utmost importance for resolving this counterclaim: i.- that every condition constitutes an aspect of the contract's effectiveness and, hence, is also covered by a duty of good faith and loyalty, since they respond to the very sense of the contract; ii.- that the emergence of the future and uncertain event constituting non-performance must be analyzed in light of the contract itself, as it is the source that binds or constrains the parties. Bearing this in mind, it is strikingly noteworthy how the Costa Rican Railways Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles), first, conditions the provision of a public service, that is, subjects it to a future and uncertain event, contrary to the legal duty incumbent upon it, and second, that despite it being a duty of INCOFER to verify that the client has the required legal permits, in this case, it omits to do so. We can thus affirm that there is a serious confusion on the part of the counterclaimant regarding the scope of the legal concession it holds for the provision of the public rail freight transport service, in relation to the legal duties incumbent upon it in its condition as provider of said service and the obligations and rights that it can agree upon with private parties as part of its ordinary activity, all of which leads it to erroneously interpret that legal situations that favor it (effectiveness) have arisen from the contract in question, when that is not the case, as we will see below.

IX.CONT.- The Costa Rican Railways Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles), in accordance with what was set forth in section a.- of Considerando IV, constitutes a public entity that, as a necessary consequence of the administration of the railway transport system (competence and purpose), provides passenger and freight service, the latter implying the duty to transport and deliver merchandise and other goods in the most efficient manner possible to users requesting its services, from a point where it receives said goods from the consignor, to another where it will deliver them to whomever the consignor has indicated, provided both points are located along a railway line or track. This is reinforced, even in a manner prior to the enactment of the Organic Law (Ley Orgánica) of INCOFER, by the General Railways Law (Ley General de Ferrocarriles), Law number 5066 of August 30, 1972, which in its Chapter I regarding "Fundamental Principles," provides, in what is of interest: "Article 1.- Rail transport is a public service whose provision is the exclusive power of the State, which may supply it through private concessionaires.

Article 2.- <u>All railways are subject to the laws of the Republic</u>, especially to this law, to the concession, to the regulations, and to the general principles of public law, in that order. (…) Article 7.- For the purposes of this law, railway is understood to mean the track, the fixed and rolling stock, the branches or extensions, the sidings, the terminals, the intermediate stations, and all those buildings, installations, docks, and other appurtenances that directly or indirectly form part of the same operation.” (Highlighting not in original) These provisions, which clearly establish the public service of rail transport, are also linked to the provision contained in Article 5 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos), Law number 7593 of August 9, 1996, which subsequently—even in respect of the Organic Law of INCOFER (Ley Orgánica del INCOFER)—also establish and specify said public service character: “ In the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; in addition, it shall ensure compliance with standards of quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, timeliness, and optimal provision, according to Article 25 of this law. <u>The aforementioned public services are</u>: (…) h) <u>Rail freight transport</u>.” (Highlighting not in original) Thus, it is clear to the Tribunal that the provision of rail freight transport service constitutes a public service, notwithstanding that Article 9 of the Regulation to the Organic Law of INCOFER refers this entity to civil and commercial legislation for the definition of the scope and content of the service, hence it becomes subject to the rules governing this type of material administrative conduct, leaving rules outside Administrative Law with a supplementary source character, as provided in Articles 9, 12, and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Consequently, various provisions are observed in the Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services that allow for foreseeing the principal guarantees that must characterize the provision of public services by the entities providing them, which encompasses, in the case under study, the defendant Institute: “Article 6.- Obligations of the Regulatory Authority. The Regulatory Authority has the following obligations: (…) b) Carry out technical inspections of the properties, plants, and equipment intended to provide the public service, when it deems convenient to verify the <u>quality, reliability, continuity,</u> costs, prices, and rates of the public service. (…) Article 14.- Obligations of providers. <u>The obligations </u>of providers are: (…) b) <u>Maintain installations and equipment in good condition</u>, so that they do not constitute a danger to persons or property, and do not cause interruption of the service. (…) h) <u>Admit, without discrimination, access to the service to those who request it within its field</u>. i) Be <u>prepared to ensure, in the short term, the provision of the service in the face of increased demand. j) Provide the service under adequate conditions and with the regularity and security that its nature</u>, the concession, or the permit indicate. k) <u>Provide the service to its clients under conditions of equality</u> and charge them a fair and reasonable price for the service provided.” (Highlighting not in original) Likewise, these rules must be understood in conjunction with the provision of numeral 4 of the General Law of Public Administration, as it establishes that: “<i>The activity of public entities shall be subject in its entirety to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its <u>continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change</u> in the legal regime or <u>in the social need it satisfies, and equality in the treatment of recipients, users, or beneficiaries</u>.</i>” (Highlighting not in original) In addition, the constitutional jurisprudence regarding the so-called fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services must be taken into account, regarding which it is worth reviewing what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in its judgment 2009-01650 of 11:41 hours on February 6, 2009: “<i>The jurisprudence of this Chamber has established: “(…) that the Political Constitution recognizes an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered to the proper functioning of public services, </i>(…)<i> There are already numerous rulings in which it has stated that this fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their competencies and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when this constitutional guarantee is violated. In this line of thought, in judgment number 2004-07532 of 17:03 hours on July 13, 2004, the following is read, textually: </i>(…)<i> <u>Continuity</u></i><u> <i>implies that the provision of services must not be interrupted</i></u><i>, </i>(…) <i>Any action—by action or omission—by officials or lack of foresight on their part in the rational organization of resources that tends to interrupt a public service is openly unlawful. <u>Regularity</u></i><u> </u> <i><u>implies that the public service must be provided or performed subject to certain pre-established rules, norms, or conditions.</u></i> <i>Continuity should not be confused with regularity; the first concept <u>implies that it must function without interruptions</u> and the second, in accordance with the rules that make up the legal system. <u>Adaptation</u></i> <u> <i>to any change in the legal regime or to the needs imposed by the socioeconomic context means that administrative entities and bodies must have foresight capacity and, above all, programming or planning capacity to face new demands and challenges imposed, whether by the increase in the volume of public service demand or by technological changes</i></u><i>. No public entity, body, or official can allege reasons of budgetary or financial shortage, absence of equipment, lack of technological renewal thereof, excess or saturation of demand in the public service to stop providing it continuously and regularly. <u>Equality or universality</u></i><u> <i>in access demands that all inhabitants have the right to demand, receive, and use the public service under equal conditions and in accordance with the rules governing them</i></u><i>, consequently, all those who are in the same situation can demand identical advantages. One of the guiding principles of public service that is not stated in Article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration is its</i> <i><u>obligatory nature</u></i> <i>, since it would be useless to affirm that they must be continuous, regular, uniform, and general if the provider has no obligation to provide it. <u>The public administration providing the public service cannot choose its clientele or users; it must provide it to anyone who requires it</u>.” (The bold highlighting is not in the original) (2007-14214).</i> <i>It has also been the criterion of the Chamber that</i> <i><u>all public services provided by public administrations are governed by the aforementioned principles, which must be observed and respected, without any exception, by the public officials in charge of their management and provision</u>, taking into account that this is an imperative emanating from the direct and immediate normative effectiveness of the Political Constitution.”</i> (Highlighting not in original) From the relationship of the cited articles, the transcribed constitutional jurisprudence in its relevant parts, and in accordance with what was previously stated, it is evidenced that INCOFER is necessarily subject, when providing the public service of rail freight transport, to providing it continuously, obligatorily—without gratuity—and equally, efficiently and effectively, promptly, adaptably according to the needs of the service, and in accordance with the technical and legal parameters that characterize the service. As a consequence, INCOFER could not validly make the service contingent, disregarding the legal duty on its part, upon a suspensive condition on its part, such as: “…<i>the conditioning of tank cars or cisterns for the transport of bunker…</i>”, because this implies treating the public service as if it were a future and uncertain event, when, on the contrary, it must be treated as a current and certain legal duty of the Administration, such that at the moment it is requested, without any discrimination, INCOFER must provide the service, obviously requiring for this purpose the corresponding tariff consideration as established by the Regulatory Authority of Public Services.

X.Now, on the topic of fuel transport, it must also be clear that, first, INCOFER could not discharge its responsibility onto the user, as it did by omission, since knowing the incorrectness of Proyecto Lugrasa’s conduct when processing authorizations before RECOPE and MINAE, it remained silent on the matter; second, that it was not until November 7, 2008 (approximately at the midpoint of the contract term), when through official communications P.E. 688-2008 and P.E. 679-2008, the Executive President of INCOFER informed the plaintiff company about the absence of compliance with the technical and legal requirements relating to the fuel unloading point, and informed the Vice Minister of Environment and Energy regarding the lack of regulatory inclusion of rail fuel transport, to which—incidentally—it did not give the necessary follow-up that would have been expected from the standpoint of good faith and contractual loyalty, but also—and even more importantly—what its own organic law establishes as a duty and an attribution: <i>“Execute, <u>in the most efficient manner possible,</u> the transport of cargo and passengers”</i> (Art. 4.ch. Highlighting not in original) Likewise, and third, in light of the foregoing and what will be said, the Institute’s ignorance regarding the regularity with which the fuel transport service must be provided has become evident to this Tribunal, starting with the scope of numeral 9 in relation to Article 5 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, which state in relevant part: “<i>In the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set </i>(…)<i>. <u>The aforementioned public services are</u>: </i>(…) <i>d) Supply of fuels derived from hydrocarbons, within which are included: 1) </i>(…)<i> 2) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined for the final consumer. </i>(…) <i> h) Rail freight transport. </i>(...)<i> The authorization to provide the public service will be granted by the entities cited below: </i>(…)<i> Subsection d.2): Ministry of Environment and Energy. </i>(…)<i> Subsection h): Ministry of Public Works and Transport. </i>(…) <i>Article 9.- To be a provider of the public services referred to in this law, the respective concession or permit must be obtained from the competent public entity in the matter, as provided in Article 5 of this law.<u> Exempted from this obligation are public institutions and companies that, by legal mandate, provide any of these services. </u>However, all providers will be subject to this law and its regulations.” </i>(Highlighting not in original) This being so, and as has been seen so far, INCOFER is one of those public companies that, by being legally mandated to provide the rail freight transport service, is exempted from a permit or concession for the development of the service, and in relation to cargo, this can perfectly encompass fuels, since there is no rule that restricts it; in fact, on the contrary, Article 1 of the Regulation for the Rail Freight Transport Service (Reglamento para el Servicio de Transporte de Carga por Ferrocarril), adopted by the defendant Institute and in force since October 16, 2003 (a date prior to the transport contract in question), allows for the understanding that it encompasses any type of merchandise: “<i>Contractors for the rail freight transport service may be all legally empowered natural and legal persons who have the need to transport <u>their raw material, semi-finished, or finished products using the freight train as a means of transport</u>, in those places where there is an enabled railway line, and who wish to contract this service, in compliance with the provisions of this regulation.” </i>(Highlighting not in original) This rule is consistent with the provisions of numerals 3, 4, and 41 of the Organic Law of INCOFER, already cited above. Therefore, consequently, as the Costa Rican Institute of Railways (Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles) is exempt from obtaining authorizations or concessions from either the Ministry of Environment and Energy or the Ministry of Public Works and Transport for the provision of this type of service, the regulatory modification required by RECOPE and requested from MINAE by the very Executive President of INCOFER was therefore unnecessary. However, of a very different type is the question of the control and supervision that the Ministry of Environment and Energy refused to carry out in relation to the safety topic in transport, not only of the tank cars, but also, and according to Article 7 of the General Railway Law (Ley General de Ferrocarriles) (transcribed above), of all the infrastructure belonging to a railway, since both the Regulation for Transport and Haulage of Petroleum Derivatives, executive decree number 24813-MAE, in force at that time, and its subsequent and currently in-force version, executive decree number 36627-MINAET, Regulation for the regulation of fuel transport (Reglamento para la regulación del transporte de combustible), have granted said Ministry broad powers to supervise these matters, independently of the authorization issue for the fuel transport service which, it is insisted, was not required by INCOFER. In this regard, it is worth citing only by way of illustration, in relation to decree 24813-MAE, the following numerals: “<i>Article 1.- <u>The General Directorate of Transport and Commercialization of Fuels of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (DGTCC) is responsible for the application of this regulation</u>. For this purpose, the DGTCC must coordinate and direct the policies issued by the Executive Branch regarding the transport and commercialization of fuels in the country, <u>being empowered to execute those policies, which will contemplate, among others</u>: a) the pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness in the transport of fuels by means of tankers and their dispensing. b) <u>the control of safety and hygiene aspects</u>.</i> (…) <i>Article 3.- Due to the interest it holds for the safety of the inhabitants of the Republic and for the economic life of the country, <u>the transport services of all petroleum-derived products</u>, nationally produced or imported, <u>are declared of public interest</u>. </i>(…) <i>Article 6.- It shall be the responsibility of the General Directorate: <u>a) To regulate, supervise, and control matters relating to the transport of fuels</u>, both clean products, dirty products, and other hydrocarbons…” </i>(Highlighting not in original)

XI.Thus, as was outlined in recital VIII (Considerando VIII), this Tribunal has found that INCOFER, availing itself of questionable good faith and omitting its legal duties, proceeded to incorporate an ineffective condition into the bunker transport contract, originally burdened its counterpart with the fulfillment of its own legal duties, and once the time came to enforce them, through its own lack of skill, did not undertake actions to challenge the active and omissive conduct of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, as was reasonably expected according to the principles of good faith and loyalty in the execution of contracts.

All of the foregoing leads this Tribunal to conclude that the proper course is to deny the action brought by the Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, given that under the circumstances described, it lacks a sound legal basis to support its claim, and furthermore, on the contrary, granting it could be fostering an **unfortunate legal interpretation by INCOFER regarding the scope of the concession that the Law granted it.**" All of this is also complemented by the provisions of Article 9 of the Regulation to the Organic Law of INCOFER, Executive Decree number 18245-MOPT of June 23, 1988, when it states: “<i>The Institute shall carry out <u>the transport of goods and passengers in accordance with common legislation</u> and taking into account the general freight and other services rate.</i>” (Highlighting is not from the original) Likewise, it is possible to conclude that the infractions of the rules contained in numerals 1, 3, 4, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 30 of the Organic Law of INCOFER, alleged by the plaintiff company, are not referred to at any time to issues specific to the activity or service that constitutes the ultimate or final provision by the defendant entity, but to aspects related to the internal organization of the institute, the formulation and proposal of rates, as well as its contracting procedures which, because they do not correspond to its ordinary activity, are subject to administrative contracting procedures, among others, but which are not related to the object of this proceeding.- b.- <i>REGARDING THE FAILURE TO ATTEND TO THE PROJECT LUGRASA NOTES BY INCOFER</i>: Given the facts held as proven, it is detailed that, except for the case of the last note dated November 12, 2009, all the procedures were in some way punctually attended to by the defendant entity, where some of them, on the contrary, were rather disregarded by the plaintiff party. In any case, note that this last procedure was a reiteration of requests that had already been attended to by the defendant party. Now, it must be taken into account that many of the procedures filed make no sense from the point of view of the type of material activity that the public company has been ordinarily deploying, which, governed more properly by the contractual sphere or at most by public service –as will be detailed later- did not require procedures of "resolution and prompt dispatch," but on the contrary, actions of a type very different from those attempted by the plaintiff party, which cannot benefit, in that sense, from its own error to establish contractual responsibilities where they are not applicable. It is also worth saying that, in any case, the claim of failure to attend to said notes, by itself, cannot give rise to compensation at a contractual level, as the plaintiff has mistakenly understood, but rather it is necessary in that sense to prove a breach of obligatory legal situations or the dissatisfaction of subjective rights and legitimate interests arising from the contract, to give rise to this type of claims. c.- <i>IN RELATION TO THE LACK OF PERMITS BY INCOFER, AS GROUNDS FOR BREACH</i>: On this point, the discussion of which was addressed in a confused manner by the plaintiff party, it must be recognized that no clause was provided for in the contract that expressly subjected INCOFER to the fulfillment of an obligation in that sense, but regarding this, neither was any clause that established that obligation for Proyecto Lugrasa in its capacity as contractor, since as has been duly demonstrated, it was the plaintiff company that assumed said obligation as its own, by managing on behalf of the defendant, without having direct standing to do so, the "bunker transport authorizations." If one examines closely, it can be observed how through the notes dated April 28, May 4, and May 10, all of 2006, the representative of Proyecto Lugrasa directly carried out the procedures for authorizing the entry of INCOFER's tank cars into the RECOPE plant in Moín, in substitution of the carrier; however, following the response obtained in official letter DDC-0382-06 of May 15, 2006, the processing that the plaintiff arrogated to itself was called into question, since from that moment the director of the Fuel Distribution Directorate of RECOPE, expressly informs him that “…<i>it is necessary that INCOFER <u>which in this case is the carrier, processes the corresponding permits</u> at the General Directorate of Transport and Fuel Commercialization of MINAE…”</i> (Highlighting is not from the original) in such a way that, everything subsequently acted upon by the plaintiff was carried out knowing the impropriety of its procedures, since it would be the responsibility of its counterparty to comply with RECOPE's requirement, if this were even applicable, as we will see later.<i> </i>Now, notwithstanding this circumstance, if one examines the rest of the communications held between Proyecto Lugrasa and the officials of both the Ministry of Environment and Energy and the Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery, it is possible to conclude that it was through the acts of the plaintiff company that INCOFER was placed, through the –improper- intermediation of the plaintiff, in the impossibility of satisfying the environmental and safety requirements (but not the cargo transport service, as insisted, we will see later) necessary to carry out the contracted service. Thus, through official letter number DGTCC-558-06 of May 29, 2006, the Director General of the General Directorate of Transport and Fuel Commercialization of MINAE, denied the plaintiff company the authorization procedure considering himself incompetent, on the grounds that -according to said body's interpretation- the Regulation for the Transport and Carriage of Petroleum Derivatives, Executive Decree number 24813-MAE, in force at that time, did not establish the case of transport by rail as a modality subject to control, such that it proceeded to refer the Contractor company back to RECOPE and INCOFER itself. Even, note that subsequently, on October 10, 2006, the Director of Fuel Distribution, once again denied the plaintiff company the procedure to authorize the entry of the tank cars, considering that they could not overlook the powers of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, estimating that it was “…<i>legally unable to continue with the corresponding procedures, until such time as the aforementioned executive decree is modified…”</i> Likewise, it must be taken into account that in light of these circumstances, INCOFER attempted to manage through official letter P.E. 679-2008 of November 7, 2008, the modification of the decree as the officials to whom the contractor had turned had indicated, without it being evident to this Chamber whether the missive received a response or not from the Vice Minister of Environment and Energy. Given this panorama, this Tribunal is in a position to determine the following: first, to argue, as the plaintiff party does, that the failure to complete procedures leads to an alleged contractual breach, is not appropriate as such, since it is a requirement of a legal order rather than an incorporated, derived, or implicit obligation in the contract; secondly, that the non-satisfaction of this requirement is not attributable to any behavior, active or omissive, deployed by INCOFER, since it was Proyecto Lugrasa who, despite it not constituting its obligation, nor possessing standing, nor any representation, assumed on behalf of another the actions directed at obtaining the respective authorizations, in such a way that this Court finds no way to attribute any responsibility to the defendant Institute for the acts that, without its authorization, were carried out on its behalf before third parties by the Contractor; and thirdly, that it has been shown that the failure to obtain the authorizations is not attributable to the defendant, but to a lack of coordination and a conflict of administrative competencies by third-party Administrations, since on one hand RECOPE refers to MINAE for the obtaining of the authorizations, and on the other, the latter in turn refers back to RECOPE and even to other entities, encompassing INCOFER and the State (Ministry of Health), for the same purposes, but without any legal or technical basis. It is worth noting for now, that this last point will be delved into further later, specifically when analyzing the counterclaim. In summary, as there is no contractual obligation per se involved, and even, with the concurrence on one hand of the victim's fault and on the other, an act of a third party, it is not possible to assert here the contractual liability of the Costa Rican Institute of Railways. <o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p style='margin-left:29.0pt;text-indent:-29.0pt;mso-text-indent-alt:-18.0pt; line-height:150%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1;tab-stops:list 36.0pt'><![if !supportLists]><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-fareast-font-family:"Trebuchet MS"; mso-bidi-font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language:EN'><span style='font-decoration: Normal'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>III.<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span></b><![endif]><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS"; color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN'>REGARDING THE EXCEPTIONS.- </span></span></b><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language:EN'>The defendant party has opposed in its defense the exceptions of lack of passive and active standing, as well as lack of Right, which should be understood to incorporate the exception of unfulfilled contract or <i>non adimpleti contractus</i>, as will be stated next. a.- <i>LACK OF PASSIVE AND ACTIVE STANDING: </i>In this case, these are openly improper, since both procedural subjects constitute, in turn, the only parties to the bunker transport contract, the breach of which is being alleged. That is, there is no other person here who could allege contractual liability in their favor or against them, other than the same two legal persons who participate in this proceeding; in this way, Proyecto Lugrasa LG del Este Sociedad Anónima, has standing pursuant to subsections 1.a and 4 of Article 10 CPCA to claim a possible contractual breach against the Costa Rican Institute of Railways, who in turn is subject to said action, as provided by 12.1 CPCA. Thus, with both substantive defenses being improper, they must be rejected, as is hereby ordered.- b.- <i>LACK OF RIGHT:</i> While the defendant party has separately formulated the exceptions of lack of Right and the <i>non adimpleti contractus </i>exception in its response to the lawsuit<i>, </i>from the reading of both defenses, it is clear that it is the same argument, as from the provisions of the First Chamber, which in judgment number 540-2003 of 11:00 hours on September 3, 2003, stated: <i>“The analysis of the appealed ruling leads to the conclusion that the exception of unfulfilled contract is, in effect, a lack of right, since through that defense, the party invoking it attempts to distort the non-existence of a right claimed by the opposing party.”</i>, this Tribunal then comes to consider that the appropriate course is to analyze them in a single section and not in the manner presented by the defendant Institute.&nbsp;Now, regarding the topic of this type of defense or exception, it is possible to review an extensive case law of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, from which the following rulings can be cited: number 365 of 14:20 hours on December 26, 1990, 80 of 15:30 hours on November 30, 1993, 089-F-98 of 14:50 hours on September 23, 1998, 468-F-00 of 10:00 hours on June 16, 2000, 469-F-00 of 10:05 hours on June 16, 2000, 489-F-00 of 15:15 hours on June 28, 2000, 490-F-00 of 15:20 hours on June 28, 2000, 865-F-2000 of 15:35 hours on November 16, 2000, 566-F-01 of 16:15 hours on July 27, 2001, 266-F-03 of 11:00 hours on May 14, 2003, 314-F-03 of 11:25 hours on June 4, 2003, 562-F-03 of 10:40 hours on September 10, 2003, 655-F-04 of 15:30 hours on August 10, 2004, 522-F-2005 of 16:25 hours on July 20, 2005, 589-F-S1-2008 of 11:05 hours on August 29, 2008 and 1134-F-S1-2012 of 14:15 hours on September 4, 2012. Also, the judgments of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Litigation Tribunal, Section V, number 210-2011 of 15:35 hours on September 9, 2011, and of the Second Civil Tribunal, First Section, number 150 of 14:15 hours on April 30, 2010, can be consulted. All these judgments, which in turn mostly cite the opinions of distinguished national jurists, point out that based on Article 692 of the Civil Code, any person who is a party to a bilateral contract and who at the same time -despite being in a state of contractual regularity-, is accused by their counterparty of breach of their obligations, has the right to except themselves, refuse, deny, or withhold performance, if they prove that the party demanding from them is currently in a situation of breach. This defense called in Latin<i> “…Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus </i>(…)<i> is a defense available to the contracting party from whom compliance with an obligation is demanded, without the other party having fulfilled the correlative obligation incumbent upon them.” </i>(Judgment 365 of December 26, 1990)&nbsp; “<i>It is the consequence provided for by the legal system for transgressing an obligatory bond with normative force for the parties.”</i></span></b><b><span lang=EN style='font-size: 10.0pt;line-height:150%;font-family:Verdana;mso-ansi-language:EN'> </span></b><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language:EN'>(Judgment 80 of November 30, 1993) In this regard, the article in question of the Civil Code states: “<i>In bilateral contracts, the resolutory condition for lack of performance is always implied. In this case, the party that has performed may demand performance of the agreement or request its resolution with damages and lost profits.”</i> This rule is not of a procedural nature and therefore, does not establish a specific way in which it must be alleged in a judicial proceeding, hence it can be treated both as an action: “…<i>these are actions granted to the performing party by reason of the breach of the other party, precisely because contracts have the force of law between the parties…” </i>(Judgment 562-F-03 of September 10, 2003) or as a defense: <i>“…it is not, technically, a judicial defense; it is a de facto defense that can be invoked by the performing party during the execution of the contract, in the face of the breach by the other party </i>(…)<i> On the occasion of a trial, the correct course would be to oppose an exception &quot;... that signified the absence of right to demand forced execution or resolution, by one who is in default regarding their contractual obligations…” </i>(Judgment 089-F-98 of September 23, 1998) It is thus, that said numeral can then be alleged in a different way, depending precisely on who –in their capacity as performing party- claims the occurrence of this condition for their benefit. In other words, the plaintiff can request the forced execution of the agreement or its resolution together with the corresponding compensation, while for their part, the defendant can argue the absence of that right on the part of the plaintiff, and vice versa, in those cases where, like the present one, there is a counterclaim by the defendant; however, in both hypotheses the theory of the case of the parties must necessarily manage to prove at least two factual assumptions: a) That the person alleging it has carried out the conduct constituting their obligation, or at a minimum, deployed the preparatory acts to execute their own obligations, according to the terms of the contract, and b) that the counterparty has omitted or failed in the execution of their obligations. The foregoing is important to keep in mind, since, although the cited case law indicates that: “<i>It is, therefore, a breach authorized by the breach of the correlative obligation, the basis of which is found in a protection given by the legal system to the non-breaching party to avoid them greater damages.” </i>(Judgment 365 of December 26, 1990); it would be contrary to Law -in particular due to the principle of good faith- to ignore that the parties are called upon to ensure that the contract fulfills its function, deploying its effectiveness, in such a way that even though this exception justifies the breach by one of the parties, the latter –if they have not yet performed- must at least prove that they have undertaken minimal diligence aimed at the execution of their commitments, carrying out some or all of the necessary acts to comply with the agreement (<i>pacta sunt servanda</i>), even if by themselves those acts do not entail the total satisfaction of the obligations, hence the First Chamber has stated: “<i>It is clear then, that the only requirement to oppose said exception is the performance by the party who interposes it, and it is sustained by the breach of the other party.” </i>(Judgment 655-F-04 of August 10, 2004) <o:p></o:p></span></b></p> <p style='margin-left:29.0pt;text-indent:-29.0pt;mso-text-indent-alt:-18.0pt; line-height:150%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1;tab-stops:list 36.0pt'><![if !supportLists]><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-fareast-font-family:"Trebuchet MS"; mso-bidi-font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language:EN'><span style='font-decoration: Normal'><span style='mso-list:Ignore'>IV.<span style='font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></span></b><![endif]><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS"; color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN'>CONT.-</span></span></b><b><span lang=EN style='font-family:"Trebuchet MS";mso-ansi-language:EN'> In this sense, in the specific case, the party opposing this defense argues, in synthesis, that the plaintiff company did not comply with the obligation to install the pumping system and the conditioning of the fuel arrival point according to clause thirteenth, whose transport it estimates was the only obligation of INCOFER according to clause eighth, so that by preventing the latter from fulfilling, it was empowered to oppose the defense of unfulfilled contract. In this regard, one must take into account what the clauses in question express, which indicate: <i>“EIGHTH: The parties agree and are clear that INCOFER's responsibility in the service it will provide will be limited to the train transport service, once loaded and in motion </i>(…)<i> THIRTEENTH: This contract shall be effective for FIVE YEARS counted from this date, however the obligations arising from this contract shall commence once the bunker pumping system is installed by the CONTRACTOR and the tank or cistern cars are conditioned for bunker transport by INCOFER. The five-year term may be extended for equal periods, by agreements signed by the parties, with one month's notice prior to the expiry date of the current contract.” </i>Thus, in view of the defendant's argument in relation to the alleged limitation of responsibility to the issue of transport, in reality there is none, since precisely that is the very object of the public service of freight transport, for whose illustration we can resort –<i>mutatis mutandis</i>-, to the terms in which it is defined by the Commercial Code: “ <i>By the transport contract, the carrier is obliged to transport persons, goods, or news from one place to another in exchange for a price.” </i>(Art. 323) Which in turn is to be understood, pursuant to numerals 333 and 335 ibid., to imply the obligation to deliver the merchandise by the sender and its receipt by the carrier, as well as the obligation of the carrier to deliver these at the agreed point to whomever it may correspond according to what was agreed. In this manner, the presence of clause eighth by itself –unlike what was alleged by the defendant Institute- does not inhibit the discussion regarding the scope of the responsibilities derived from the public cargo transport service, since what it does is reiterate the purpose and content of a service of this nature, so that what is truly important revolves around the possible breach of clause thirteenth. It is worth warning, however, that the mention of this regulation does not transform, nor does it ignore that, despite this contractual activity being excluded from the Ley de Contratación Administrativa -because it constitutes the ordinary activity of the Entity-, there is a <i>publicatio</i> involved that has turned this into a public service and therefore, it is only supplementary subject to Private Law. Now then, once a careful reading of the same has been carried out, the literal wording of the contractual text lets us see what apparently constitute two conditions of a suspensive nature, corresponding one to each party: the <i>installation of the bunker pumping system&nbsp;</i> by Proyecto Lugrasa and <i>the conditioning of the tank or cistern cars for bunker transport </i>for INCOFER. In this way, we must establish, just as was said previously, if any of the parties has not breached their obligations, which would recognize their right to demand the contractual resolution and the corresponding compensation to be borne by the other party. In this sense, this Tribunal finds that Proyecto Lugrasa has not managed to demonstrate here the fulfillment of its obligations, and therefore it has no right to claim that INCOFER's contractual liability be declared and, consequently, the compensation for damages and lost profits requested, just as has been alleged by said Institute as part of its defense of unfulfilled contract. On this aspect, the plaintiff party has failed to provide any evidence that would allow this Court to verify that a pumping system for the fuel that was to be the object of transport was installed, and for that reason, subject of the contract. As has been insisted, if the function of the contract is to deploy its effects and if these depended on the suspensive condition agreed in clause thirteenth, the minimum diligence expected from the plaintiff company was to have managed with INCOFER the respective coordination to install said pumping system; however, there is no element of proof that verifies this. In this sense, in relation to the note dated October 29, 2008, in which the plaintiff company communicated to INCOFER that they already had <i>“…the advisory services of the company Ingenieria Genesis, and the quotation for the necessary equipment to fulfill, on our part, all our commitments, and we already have the quotation for the systems which currently have a cost of </i>(…)<i>, and include all the necessary components </i>”, note that the party is only informing –halfway through the contract term- that it has obtained a quotation for equipment and an alleged advisory service, but not whether they have been effectively acquired, nor does it even prove what those pieces of equipment are, whether they meet the corresponding technical and legal requirements, who the supplier of the same is, what relationship it has with the aforementioned advisory company, and most importantly, how these quotations allow or not the fulfillment of its obligation. See that the party does not provide here purchase or service contracts that document this situation, it is only its word, and therefore there is no way to consider the minimum diligence due to execute the contract as having been proven. Nor has it demonstrated, even, whether said system was already installed prior to the contract, at some point on the railway line or at the Leesville station, as it has confusingly alleged throughout the process, for example, as it argues in the first and tenth facts of the lawsuit, by asserting that <i>“…Since the mid-1990s, my represented party built in the facilities of the defendant entity INCOFER, in Leesville de Roxana de Pococí, the pipeline network that includes the damages, to evacuate bunker spills into a catchment tank, a cabin with three suction and expulsion pumps, and the other necessary facilities, to transport, and decant, bunker fuel, obtained the authorizations from the Servicio Nacional de Electricidad, the entity then in charge of authorizing said handling, from the then, Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines, now Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications, from the Ministry of Health and from the Municipality of Pococí, to carry out said transport and decanting…”</i> and then that <i>“…despite my represented party complying in everything, INCOFER, breaching the contract granted, for factors that we again do not know and they refuse to explain, refuses to begin execution and does not take any of the necessary internal administrative actions for its implementation, also neglecting the route to be used and the equipment contractually required for its due compliance…”</i> In this regard, it has also not been demonstrated for this Tribunal that said facilities and equipment, if they existed, had been maintained at the Leesville station or any other point on the railway line, or that these had been the object of contracting with third parties for their commissioning. Under these circumstances, the performance necessary for Proyecto Lugrasa to bring an action cannot be proven; on the contrary, and as observed in the proven facts, the party appears to have focused on the breach of its counterparty, a behavior whose good faith is to some degree doubtful, since it resorted to this in spite of full knowledge of its impropriety, as well as insisting on procedures that, as was pointed out in Considerando IV, were inconducive to the execution of the contract.

Regarding the defendant's compliance with its obligations, this will be explored further when analyzing the counterclaim, it being sufficient for the moment to indicate, as was done above, that the failure to satisfy the legal requirements by INCOFER, not being attributable to it, empowers it to raise the lack of right (falta de derecho), based on the state of non-compliance of the plaintiff company. Thus, and in accordance with the defense of lack of right raised by the defendant, supported in turn by the defense of non-performance of contract (contrato no cumplido), this Court concludes that, since the plaintiff company lacks any right to claim non-compliance and the consequent compensation, the proper course is to dismiss the action.

B.- REGARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM (LA RECONVENCIÓN)

VII.PARTIES' ARGUMENTS.- Through the counterclaim filed in this proceeding, the Instituto Nacional de Ferrocarriles seeks a declaration that its counterpart breached the transportation contract repeatedly mentioned herein and, consequently, that the resolution (resolución) of this agreement be declared, with the corresponding compensation. As observed both in the claim and in the conclusions presented during the oral trial, INCOFER essentially contends that the counterclaim defendant breached its obligations, since it did not obtain the necessary permits for the hauling of the bunker fuel to be transported, as well as for the pumping system and other facilities necessary to unload the fuel, all due to causes attributable solely to the company Proyecto Lugrasa LUGRASA LG DEL ESTE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA. In this way, by preventing the counterclaiming Institute from performing, the counterclaim defendant company must compensate it for the lost income from the non-transportation of fuel. For its part, the representation of Proyecto Lugrasa LG del Este S.A. considers the arguments of the counterclaiming Institute to be unfounded, since in its view, it was INCOFER that, by failing to provide the means and prevent the loss of the assets committed to satisfy the purpose of the contract, as well as by omitting the respective internal procedures and legal requirements, breached the contract and, therefore, is the one called upon to assume contractual liability, hence it raises the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) and non-performance of contract (contrato no cumplido).

VIII.ON THE MERITS OF THE PROCEEDING.- Regarding this counterclaim, it is observed that it is built upon a single argument, entirely coincident with the lack of right raised by INCOFER as a defense in its response: the non-compliance of Proyecto Lugrasa and its own compliance, as the starting point for the contractual resolution (resolución contractual) and compensation for damages to be declared. Regarding this argument, we must analyze, first, the requirements for the admissibility of contractual liability based on Article 692 of the Civil Code, and second, matters concerning the damages alleged by INCOFER. a.- *REGARDING RESOLUTION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE (LA RESOLUCIÓN POR INCUMPLIMIENTO):* As has been demonstrated thus far in this judgment, it is indeed possible to assert a state of contractual non-compliance by Proyecto Lugrasa, insofar as it did not carry out the installation of the pumping system to which it had committed as a condition precedent (condición suspensiva) in the thirteenth clause of the bunker fuel transportation contract it signed with INCOFER. However, it has also become evident the failure to satisfy a series of legal requirements, which, although not the product of faults directly attributable to INCOFER, render any right of the latter to claim contractual resolution (resolución contractual) under Article 692 of the Civil Code unsupportable. Let us see; according to that provision, when we are told that in bilateral contracts the condition subsequent (condición resolutoria) for non-performance is implicit, this means that upon the occurrence of the future and uncertain event consisting of the failure to perform its obligations (non-compliance), the contract is left in a state of relative ineffectiveness, subject to the will of the complying party to either enforce the contract or resolve it, with the concomitant contractual liability borne by the non-compliant party, all, furthermore, according to the seriousness of the non-compliance (see judgment of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) number 566-F-01 of 16:15 on July 27, 2001, cited above). This is so because, firstly, the rule, as both the starting and ending point for any interpretation, expressly indicates that we are facing a case of a condition subsequent (condición resolutoria), implicit in every bilateral contract, and in this sense, we will understand a condition as that future and uncertain event upon which, legally, the creation or extinction of an obligation depends (See in this sense judgments of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) number 608-F-2004 of 09:10 on July 23, 2004, 92 of 15:15 on June 10, 1992, 989-F-2002 of 16:20 on December 18, 2002, and 455-F-2007 of 14:00 on July 2, 2007). In this regard, the Second Civil Court, First Section, in its judgment number 244 of 14:10 on June 25, 2001, states: "*IV.- As is well known, for contracts to be valid and effective, they must have the essential elements specific to each family of contracts, and in each particular case, the so-called "accidental elements" may or may not be present, which, if present, also become essential because they determine the will of the contracting parties. Such is the case of the condition, understood as the future and uncertain event upon which the effectiveness of the bond depends, and the term or period, which is nothing more than the future but certain event, although perhaps undetermined in its date, which the parties considered essential to carry forward the negotiation. That is, from contracts in general, a series of effects arise from the binding force with which they tie the parties, such as the obligation of performance, the irrevocability of fulfillment, and the execution in good faith, which entails duties of loyalty and cooperation, and such effects are expected to be maintained, at least, during the term of the business, because the term is also a very important element in the will to negotiate.* (...) *V.- On the other hand, it is also common knowledge that contracts, by virtue of their binding force, constrain the parties to perform what they obligated themselves to, unless the non-compliance is the product of force majeure, fortuitous event, or the non-compliance of the other party (Article 702 of the Civil Code). That, if none of these three exonerations from liability occur, the non-compliance must be seen as a fault attributable to the party who failed in its duties and that, by having incurred in it, entails the duty to compensate the damages directly caused to the other party, as derived from Articles 693, 702, and 704 of the cited Code.*" (Highlighting is not from the original). Thus, drawing upon these ideas, we can clearly establish two aspects of utmost importance for resolving this counterclaim: i.- that every condition constitutes an aspect of the contract's effectiveness and is therefore also covered by a duty of good faith and loyalty, as they respond to the very meaning of the contract; ii.- that the occurrence of the future and uncertain event constituting the non-compliance must be analyzed in light of the contract itself, as this is the source that binds or constrains the parties. Bearing this in mind, what powerfully draws attention is how the Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, first, conditions the provision of a public service, that is, subjects it to a future and uncertain event, contrary to the legal duty it bears, and second, that despite it being a duty of INCOFER to verify that the client has the required legal permits, in this case, it omits doing so. Thus, we can affirm that there is serious confusion on the part of the counterclaimant regarding the scope of the legal concession it holds for providing the public service of rail freight transport, in relation to the legal duties incumbent upon it as the provider of said service and the obligations and rights it may agree upon with private parties as part of its ordinary activity, all of which leads it to erroneously interpret that legal situations favoring it (effectiveness) have arisen from the contract in question, when this is not the case, as we shall see next.

IX.CONT.- The Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, in accordance with what was set forth in section a.- of Considerando IV, constitutes a public entity that, as a necessary consequence of the administration of the railway transport system (competence and purpose), provides passenger and freight services, the latter implying the duty to transport and deliver merchandise and other goods in the most efficient manner possible to users requesting its services, from a point where it receives said goods from the consignor, to another where it will deliver them to the person indicated by the consignor, provided both points are located along a railway line or track. This is reinforced by what is provided, even prior to the enactment of the Organic Law of INCOFER (Ley Orgánica del INCOFER), in the General Railway Law (Ley General de Ferrocarriles), Law number 5066 of August 30, 1972, which in its Chapter I regarding "Fundamental Principles," provides, in what is of interest: "*Article 1.- Rail transport is a public service whose provision is the exclusive faculty of the State, which may supply it through private concessionaires. Article 2.- Every railway is subject to the laws of the Republic, especially this one, the concession, the regulations, and the general principles of public law, in that order.* (...) *Article 7.- For the purposes of this law, a railway is understood to be the track, fixed and rolling stock, branches or extensions, sidings, terminals, intermediate stations, and all those buildings, installations, docks, and other annexes that directly or indirectly form part of the same exploitation.*" (Highlighting is not from the original). These norms, which clearly establish the public service of railway transport, also link with the provision contained in Article 5 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos), Law number 7593 of August 9, 1996, which subsequently – even regarding the Organic Law of INCOFER – also establishes and specifies said public service character: "*In the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set prices and rates; furthermore, it shall ensure compliance with quality, quantity, reliability, continuity, opportunity, and optimal provision standards, according to Article 25 of this law. The aforementioned public services are:* (...) *h) Rail freight transport.*" (Highlighting is not from the original). Given this, it is clear to the Court that the provision of the rail freight transport service constitutes a public service, even though Article 9 of the Regulations to the Organic Law of INCOFER refers this entity to civil and commercial legislation for defining the scopes and contents of the service, hence it remains subject to the norms regulating this type of material administrative conduct, leaving norms outside Administrative Law a supplementary source character, according to the provisions of Articles 9, 12, and 13 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). In this way, different provisions in the Law of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services can be observed that allow for the anticipation of the main guarantees that must characterize the provision of public services by the entities providing them, which in the case under study, encompasses the defendant Institute: "*Article 6.- Obligations of the Regulatory Authority. The following obligations correspond to the Regulatory Authority:* (...) *b) Carry out technical inspections of the properties, plants, and equipment destined to provide the public service, when deemed convenient to verify the quality, reliability, continuity, costs, prices, and rates of the public service.* (...) *Article 14.- Obligations of the providers. The following are obligations of the providers:* (...) *b) Maintain facilities and equipment in good condition, so that they do not constitute a danger to persons or properties, and do not cause interruption of the service.* (...) *h) Admit, without discrimination, access to the service to those who request it within its scope. i) Be prepared to ensure, in the short term, the provision of the service in the face of increased demand. j) Provide the service in adequate conditions and with the regularity and safety that its nature, the concession, or the permit indicate. k) Provide the service to its clients under conditions of equality and charge them a fair and reasonable price for the service rendered.*" (Highlighting is not from the original). Likewise, these norms must be understood in conjunction with what is provided by Article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration, which establishes: "*The activity of public entities must be subject in its entirety to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equality in the treatment of the recipients, users, or beneficiaries.*" (Highlighting is not from the original). Thus also, constitutional jurisprudence regarding the so-called fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services must be taken into account, on which it is worth noting what was stated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in its judgment 2009-01650 of 11:41 on February 6, 2009: "*The jurisprudence of this Chamber has established: "(...) that the Political Constitution enshrines an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered to the proper functioning of public services,* (...) *There are already numerous rulings in which it has been stated that this fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes upon public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages caused when this constitutional guarantee is violated. In this line of thought, judgment number 2004-07532 of 17:03 on July 13, 2004 reads, textually, as follows:* (...) *Continuity means that the provision of services must not be interrupted*, (...) *Any action –by action or omission– by officials or their lack of foresight in the rational organization of resources that tends to interrupt a public service is openly unlawful. Regularity implies that the public service must be provided or carried out subject to certain pre-established rules, norms, or conditions.* *Continuity should not be confused with regularity, the first concept means it must function without interruptions and the second, in accordance with the norms that make up the legal order. Adaptation to any change in the legal regime or to the needs imposed by the socio-economic context means that administrative entities and bodies must have the capacity for foresight and, above all, for programming or planning to face new demands and challenges imposed, whether by the increase in the volume of demand for the public service or by technological changes.* *No entity, body, or public official may cite reasons of budgetary or financial shortage, absence of equipment, lack of technological renewal thereof, excess or saturation of demand in the public service to fail to provide it continuously and regularly. Equality or universality in access demands that all inhabitants have the right to demand, receive, and use the public service under equal conditions and in accordance with the norms that govern them*, consequently, all those who are in the same situation may demand identical advantages. One of the guiding principles of public service that is not enunciated in Article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration is its mandatory nature, since it would be of no use to affirm that they must be continuous, regular, uniform, and general if the providing entity does not have the obligation to provide it. *The public administration providing the public service may not choose its clientele or users; it must provide it to anyone who requires it.*" (The bolding is not from the original) (2007-14214).* *It has also been the criterion of the Chamber that all public services provided by public administrations are governed by the aforementioned principles, which must be observed and respected, without any exception, by the public officials in charge of their management and provision, given that it is an imperative emanating from the direct and immediate normative effectiveness of the Political Constitution."* (Highlighting is not from the original). From the relationship of the cited articles, the transcribed relevant constitutional jurisprudence, and in accordance with what was stated previously, it is evident that INCOFER is necessarily subject, when providing the public rail freight transport service, to providing it in a continuous, mandatory –without being free– and equal, efficient and effective, prompt manner, adaptable to the needs of the service and in accordance with the technical and legal parameters that characterize the service. Consequently, INCOFER could not validly make the service subject to a condition precedent (condición suspensiva) under its responsibility, such as: "...*the conditioning of the tank cars or cisterns for bunker fuel transport...*", because this implies treating the public service as if it were a future and uncertain event, when, on the contrary, it must be treated as a current and certain legal duty of the Administration, so that at the moment it is requested, without any discrimination, INCOFER must provide the service, requiring for this –obviously– the corresponding tariff consideration as established by the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos).

X.Now, on the topic of fuel transportation, it must also be clearly understood that, first, INCOFER could not discharge its responsibility onto the user, as it did by omission, since, knowing the incorrectness of Proyecto Lugrasa's conduct when processing the authorizations before RECOPE and MINAE, it remained silent on the matter; secondly, that it was not until November 7, 2008 (approximately halfway through the contract term), when through official letters P.E. 688-2008 and P.E. 679-2008, the Executive President of INCOFER informed the plaintiff company of the absence of compliance with the technical and legal requirements relating to the fuel unloading point, as well as informed the Vice-Minister of Environment and Energy regarding the lack of regulatory inclusion of rail fuel transportation, to which –incidentally– it did not give the necessary follow-up that would have been expected from the point of view of good faith and contractual loyalty, but moreover –and even more importantly– what its very organic law establishes as a duty and an attribution: "*Execute, in the most efficient manner possible, the transport of freight and passengers*" (Art. 4.ch. Highlighting is not from the original). Likewise, and thirdly, in light of the foregoing and what will be said, the Institute's ignorance regarding the regularity with which it must provide the fuel transportation service has become patent to this Court, beginning with the scope of Article 9 in relation to Article 5 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services, which state what is of interest: "*In the public services defined in this article, the Regulatory Authority shall set* (...). *The aforementioned public services are:* (...) *d) Supply of fuels derived from hydrocarbons, within which are included: 1)* (...) *2) petroleum derivatives, asphalts, gas, and naphthas destined for the final consumer.* (...) *h) Rail freight transport.* (...) *The authorization to provide the public service shall be granted by the entities cited below:* (...) *Subsection d.2): Ministry of Environment and Energy.* (...) *Subsection h): Ministry of Public Works and Transport.* (...) *Article 9.- To be a provider of the public services referred to in this law, the respective concession or permit from the competent public entity on the matter must be obtained, as provided in Article 5 of this law. Excepted from this obligation are the public institutions and companies that, by legal mandate, provide any of these services.*

However, all providers shall be subject to this law and its regulations.” (Highlighting not in original) That being the case and as has been seen up to now, INCOFER is one of those public enterprises that, being legally mandated to provide the rail freight transport service, is exempt from a permit or concession to develop the service, and in relation to the cargo, it can perfectly well include fuels, since there is no rule that so restricts it; in fact, on the contrary, Article 1 of the Reglamento para el Servicio de Transporte de Carga por Ferrocarril, adopted by the respondent Institute and in force since October 16, 2003 (a date prior to the transport contract in question), allows it to be understood that it covers any type of merchandise: “Contractors of the freight train transport service may be all those natural and legal persons legally authorized, who have the need to transport their raw material, semi-finished or finished products using the freight train as a means of transport, in those places where there is an enabled railway line, and who wish to contract this service, in compliance with the provisions of these regulations.” (Highlighting not in original) This rule is consistent with the provisions of numerals 3, 4, and 41 of the Organic Law of INCOFER, already cited above. Consequently, since the Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles was exempt from obtaining authorizations or concessions from either the Ministry of Environment and Energy or the Ministry of Public Works and Transport for the provision of this type of service, the regulatory amendment required by RECOPE and requested from MINAE by the same Executive President of INCOFER was therefore unnecessary. However, and of a very different nature, is the question of the control and oversight that the Ministry of Environment and Energy refused to carry out in relation to the issue of safety in transport, not only of the tank cars, but also, according to Article 7 of the General Railways Law (transcribed above), of all the infrastructure pertaining to a railway, since both the Reglamento de Transporte y Acarreo de Derivados de Petróleo, executive decree number 24813-MAE, in force at that time, and its later and currently in-force version, executive decree number 36627-MINAET, Reglamento para la regulación del transporte de combustible, have granted said Ministry broad powers to supervise these matters, regardless of the issue of authorization for the fuel transport service which, it is reiterated, was not required by INCOFER. In this regard, it is worth citing only by way of illustration, in relation to decree 24813-MAE, the following numerals: “Article 1.- The General Directorate of Transport and Fuel Commercialization of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (DGTCC) is responsible for the application of these regulations. For this purpose, the DGTCC must coordinate and direct the policies issued by the Executive Branch, regarding the transport and commercialization of fuels in the country, being empowered to execute those policies, which among others shall contemplate: a) the pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness in the transport of fuels by means of tankers and their dispensing. b) the control of safety and hygiene aspects. (…) Article 3.- Due to the interest it holds for the safety of the inhabitants of the Republic and for the economic life of the country, the transport services of all petroleum-derived products, produced nationally or imported, are declared of public interest. (…) Article 6.- It shall correspond to the General Directorate: a) To regulate, supervise, and control matters relating to the transport of fuels, both clean product, dirty product, and other hydrocarbons…” (Highlighting not in original)

XI.Thus, as recounted in considerando VIII, this Tribunal has found that INCOFER, availing itself of questionable good faith and omitting its legal duties, proceeded to incorporate an ineffective condition into the bunker transport contract, originally made its counterpart bear the burden of fulfilling its own legal duties, and once the time came to enforce them, due to its own lack of skill did not undertake actions to challenge the active and omissive conduct of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, as was to be expected according to the principles of good faith and loyalty in the execution of contracts. All of the foregoing leads this Tribunal to conclude that the appropriate course is to deny the action brought by the Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles since, under said circumstances, it lacks a good legal right to support its claim, and even, on the contrary, granting it could be fostering an

“IV. SOBRE EL FONDO DEL PROCESO.- Analizados los argumentos de las partes, este Tribunal ha llegado a considerar lo siguiente en relación con el objeto de este proceso: a.- RESPECTO DE LA OMISIÓN DE REFRENDO INTERNO ALEGADO POR EL ACTOR: Al respecto, estima este Tribunal que lleva razón el demandado en sus alegatos, ya que conforme lo establece la Ley de Contratación Administrativa (LCA) la actividad en cuestión es parte de su gestión ordinaria, la cual queda exenta de los controles característicos de los procedimientos de contratación administrativa. En este sentido, el numeral 2 LCA establece: “Excepciones. Se excluyen de los procedimientos de concursos establecidos en esta ley las siguientes actividades: a) La actividad ordinaria de la Administración, entendida como el suministro directo al usuario o destinatario final, de los servicios o las prestaciones establecidas, legal o reglamentariamente, dentro de sus fines.” (Resaltado no es del original) Dicha salvedad ha sido a su vez precisada mediante interpretación de la Sala Constitucional en su sentencia número 6754-98 del 22 de setiembre de 1998, en la que explicó que “…se trata de la actividad o servicio que constituye la prestación última o final de la Administración que realiza frente al usuario o destinatario final, actividad o servicio que deben estar definidos previamente en la ley, y cuyo desarrollo puede hacerse mediante reglamento autónomo o de servicio, pero no ejecutivo (…) es importante repetir que se estará en presencia de actividad ordinaria cuando el objeto del contrato constituya el fin último de la Administración de que se trate, actividad que además, debe estar en estrecha relación con el usuario; es decir, no puede ser cualquier actividad, aunque la misma constituya un fin público en si misma, según se anotó en la definición dada en el Considerando anterior de esta sentencia. Asimismo, la definición de actividad ordinaria del acápite 76.2.1. es incompleta, puesto que no todo servicio público es actividad ordinaria sino, únicamente, el referido al fin último de la Administración que lo presta en estrecha relación con los usuarios y además, de que ese servicio público debe ser asignado por ley formal.” (Resaltado no es del original) Recogiendo las ideas básicas en este voto constitucional, el Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa dispone en el artículo 128: “La actividad ordinaria de cada entidad se desarrollará dentro del marco legal y reglamentario respectivo, sin sujeción a los procedimientos establecidos en la Ley de Contratación Administrativa y el presente Reglamento. Para esos efectos, se entiende como actividad ordinaria, sólo la que realiza la Administración Pública dentro del ámbito de su competencia, por medio de una actividad o servicio que constituye la prestación última o final de frente a usuarios y cuya frecuencia, tráfico y dinamismo, justifican o imponen apartarse de los procedimientos usuales de concurso…” (Resaltado no es del original) Así las cosas, en tratándose del Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, su Ley Orgánica, Número 7001 del 19 de setiembre de 1985, dispuso que éste se constituiría como una institución autónoma entre cuyos objetivos principales estarían la administración del sistema de transporte ferroviario para el servicio de pasajeros y de carga (Art. 3.a), así como la administración de servicios en general del ferrocarril nacional al Atlántico (Art. 3.b), todo lo cual implica el deber de transportar y entregar las mercancías y otros bienes a los usuarios de sus servicios, (Art. 4.ch) en la forma más eficiente posible (Art. 4.e). Al respecto y en lo que interesa para efectos del caso bajo examen, ésta Ley establece además que “Para la aplicación de la presente ley, mercancía es todo producto, artículo, manufactura, semoviente y, en general, todo bien mueble, sin excepción alguna” (Art. 41) De este modo y en atención precisamente a las cláusulas primera y tercera del contrato en cuestión, al indicar que el objeto de éste: “…consiste en el transporte de bunker por ferrocarril, comprometiéndose INCOFER a prestar dicho servicio a EL CONTRATISTA, el cual se efectuará en el trayecto ferroviario comprendido entre el plantel de Recope en Limón y la localidad de Leesville (…) El servicio de transporte contratado será inicialmente por la cantidad máxima de diez carros cisterna ferroviarios, lo cual representa el transporte de aproximadamente trescientos mil litros de bunker por tren.” Queda claro al Tribunal que, efectivamente, la actividad contractual plasmada en dicho documento forma parte de la actividad ordinaria de la Administración demandada y por ello, excluida entonces del trámite de refrendo característico de la contratación administrativa. Todo esto, asimismo, se complementa con lo dispuesto por el artículo 9 del Reglamento a la Ley Orgánica del INCOFER, decreto ejecutivo número 18245-MOPT del 23 de junio de 1988, cuando indica: “El Instituto realizará el transporte de mercancías y pasajeros con sujeción a la legislación común y tomando en cuenta la tarifa general de fletes y otros servicios.” (Resaltado no es del original) Asimismo, es posible concluir que las infracciones a las normas contenidas en los numerales 1, 3, 4, 14, 16, 17, 19 y 30 de la Ley Orgánica del INCOFER, alegadas por la sociedad demandante, no están referidas en momento alguno a cuestiones propias de la actividad o servicio que constituye la prestación última o final a cargo del ente demandado, sino a aspectos relacionados con la organización interna del instituto, la formulación y propuesta de tarifas, así como de los procedimientos de contratación de éste que, por no corresponder a su actividad ordinaria sí están sujetos a los procedimientos de contratación administrativa, entre otros, pero que no tienen relación con el objeto de este proceso.- b.- RESPECTO DE LA INATENCIÓN DE LAS NOTAS DE PROYECTO LUGRASA POR PARTE DE INCOFER: Vistos los hechos tenidos por demostrados, se detalla que, salvado el caso de la última nota fechada 12 de noviembre de 2009, todas las gestiones fueron de alguna manera atendidas puntualmente por el ente demandado, en donde inclusive algunas de ellas, por el contrario, fueron más bien desatendidas por la parte accionante. En todo caso, nótese que ésta última gestión se trató de una reiteración de solicitudes que ya de todos modos habían sido atendidas por la parte demandada. Ahora bien, téngase en cuenta que las gestiones interpuestas muchas de ellas no tienen sentido desde el punto de vista del tipo de actividad material que la empresa pública viene desplegando ordinariamente, la cual, regida más propiamente por el ámbito contractual o a lo sumo del servicio público –como se detallará más adelante- no requería de gestiones de “resolución y pronto despacho”, sino por el contrario de acciones de tipo muy distinto a las intentadas por la parte actora, que no puede beneficiarse, en ese sentido, de su propio error para sentar responsabilidades contractuales donde no procede. Valga decir además, que en todo caso, el alegato de la inatención de dichas notas, por sí solo, no puede dar lugar a una indemnización a nivel contractual, como lo ha entendido equivocadamente la accionante, sino que es necesario en ese sentido acreditar un incumplimiento de las situaciones jurídicas obligacionales o la insatisfacción de los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos surgidos del contrato, para dar lugar a este tipo de reclamos. c.- EN RELACIÓN CON LA FALTA DE PERMISOS DE PARTE DE INCOFER, COMO MOTIVO DE INCUMPLIMIENTO: Sobre este punto, cuya discusión fue abordada de manera confusa por la parte actora, se ha de reconocer que no se previó en el contrato cláusula alguna que sujetara al respecto, tampoco alguna que estableciera esa obligación a Proyecto Lugrasa en su condición de contratista, ya que como ha quedado debidamente demostrado, fue la sociedad actora quien asumió como propia dicha obligación, al gestionar a favor del demandado, sin contar con la legitimación directa para ello, las “autorizaciones de transporte del búnker”. Si se detalla, se puede observar como mediante las notas fechadas 28 de abril, 04 y 10 de mayo, todas de 2006, el representante de Proyecto Lugrasa llevó a cabo directamente las gestiones para la autorización de la entrada de los vagones cisterna del INCOFER al plantel de RECOPE en Moín, en sustitución del transportista; sin embargo, a partir de la respuesta obtenida en oficio DDC-0382-06 del 15 de mayo de 2006, la tramitación que se arrogó la actora quedó entredicho, pues a partir de ese momento el director de la Dirección de Distribución de Combustibles de RECOPE, es el transportista, tramite los permisos correspondientes en la Dirección General de Transporte y comercialización de Combustibles del MINAE…” (Resaltado no es del original) de modo tal que, todo lo actuado con posterioridad por parte de la accionante se ejecutó a sabiendas de lo improcedente de sus gestiones, ya que sería responsabilidad de su contraparte cumplir con el requerimiento de RECOPE, si es que acaso fuera éste procedente, tal y como veremos más adelante. Ahora bien, no obstante esta circunstancia, si se examina del resto de comunicaciones sostenidas entre Proyecto Lugrasa y los funcionarios tanto del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, como de la Refinería Costarricense de Petróleo, es posible concluir que fue por los actos de la sociedad actora que se colocó al INCOFER, a través de la intermediación –improcedente- de la actora, en la imposibilidad de satisfacer los requerimientos ambientales y de seguridad (no así del servicio de transporte de carga, como se insiste, lo veremos luego) necesarios para llevar adelante el servicio contratado. Así, mediante oficio número DGTCC-558-06 de 29 de mayo de 2006, el Director General de la Dirección General de Transporte y Comercialización de Combustibles del MINAE, denegó a la sociedad actora la gestión de autorización por considerarse incompetente, en razón de que -según interpretó dicho órgano- el reglamento de Transporte y Acarreo de Derivados de Petróleo, decreto ejecutivo número 24813-MAE, vigente en aquel momento, no establecía el supuesto del transporte por vías férreas como una modalidad sujeta a control, de manera tal que procedió a remitir a la sociedad Contratista nuevamente ante RECOPE y el mismo INCOFER. Inclusive, nótese que con posterioridad, el día 10 de octubre de 2006, el Director de Distribución de Combustibles, denegó otra vez a la sociedad actora la gestión para autorizar el ingreso de los vagones cisterna, por considerar que no podían pasar por alto las competencias del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, estimando que se encontraba “…imposibilitado legalmente para seguir con los trámites correspondientes, hasta tanto no se modifique el decreto ejecutivo citado…” Asimismo, debe tenerse en cuenta que ante estas circunstancias, INCOFER intentó gestionar por oficio P.E. 679-2008 del 07 de noviembre de 2008, la modificación del decreto tal y como lo había indicado los funcionarios a los cuales había recurrido la contratista, sin que conste a esta Cámara si la misiva tuvo respuesta o no de parte del Viceministro de Ambiente y Energía. Ante este panorama, este Tribunal está en posición de determinar lo siguiente: primero, aducir como lo hace la parte actora, que el incumplimiento de trámites conlleve a un supuesto incumplimiento contractual, no resulta procedente tal cual, puesto que se trata de un requerimiento de orden legal más que una obligación incorporada, derivada o implícita en el contrato; en segundo término, que la no satisfacción de este requerimiento, no es atribuible a un comportamiento, activo u omisivo, desplegado de parte de INCOFER, ya que fue Proyecto Lugrasa quien a pesar de no constituir su obligación, ni ostentar legitimación, ni representación alguna, asumió en nombre ajeno las acciones dirigidas a la obtención de las autorizaciones respectivas, de modo tal que no encuentra este Despacho manera de endilgarle responsabilidad alguna al Instituto demandado por los actos que sin su autorización fueron llevados a cabo a su nombre ante terceros por parte de la Contratista; y en tercer término, que ha queda evidenciado que la no obtención de las autorizaciones, no resulta imputable al demandado, sino a una descoordinación y a un conflicto de competencias administrativas por parte de terceras Administraciones, pues por un lado RECOPE remite a MINAE para la obtención de las autorizaciones y por otra, ésta a su vez remite nuevamente a RECOPE e incluso a otras entidades, abarcando al INCOFER y al Estado (Ministerio de Salud), para los mismos efectos, pero sin fundamento jurídico, ni técnico alguno. Valga anotar por ahora, que sobre éste último punto se ahondará más adelante, específicamente a la hora de analizar la reconvención. En síntesis, al no estar de por medio una obligación contractual propiamente dicha, e inclusive, al concurrir por un lado la culpa de la víctima y por otro, un hecho de tercero, no es posible aseverar aquí la responsabilidad contractual del Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles.

III.RESPECTO DE LAS EXCEPCIONES.- La parte demandada ha opuesto en su defensa las excepciones de falta de legitimación pasiva y activa, así como de falta de Derecho, la cual debe entenderse que incorpora la excepción de contrato no cumplido o non adiplendi contractus, tal y como se dirá seguidamente. a.- FALTA DE LEGITIMACIÓN PASIVA Y ACTIVA: En este caso, las mismas resultan abiertamente improcedentes, ya que ambos sujetos procesales constituyen a su vez las únicas partes del contrato de transporte de búnker, cuyo incumplimiento se viene alegando. Es decir, no hay ninguna otra persona aquí que pudiera alegar la responsabilidad contractual en su favor o en su contra, más que las mismas dos personas jurídicas que intervienen en este proceso; de este modo Proyecto Lugrasa LG del Este Sociedad Anónima, está legitimada conforme los incisos 1.a y 4 del artículo 10 CPCA para reclamar un posible incumplimiento contractual al Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, quien a su vez es pasible de dicha acción, según lo dispone 12.1 CPCA. Así las cosas, resultando improcedentes ambas defensas de fondo, han de ser rechazadas, como en efecto se ordena.- b.- FALTA DE DERECHO: Si bien la parte demandada, ha formulado de manera separada las excepciones de falta de Derecho y la excepción non adimpleti contractus en su contestación de la demanda , de la lectura de ambas defensas, se desprende que se trata del mismo alegato, como de lo dispuesto por la Sala Primera, que en sentencia número 540-2003 de las 11:00 horas del 03 de setiembre de 2003 dispuso: “El análisis del fallo recurrido lleva a concluir que la excepción de contrato no cumplido es, en efecto, de falta de derecho, ya que por medio de esa defensa, quien la invoca, intenta desvirtuar la inexistencia de un derecho pretendido por la parte contraria.”, este Tribunal llega a considerar, entonces, que lo procedente es analizarlas en un solo acápite y no de la forma que ha sido expuesto por el Instituto demandado. Ahora bien, sobre el tema de este tipo de defensa o excepción, es posible revisar una extensa jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, de la cual pueden citarse los siguientes fallos: número 365 de las 14:20 horas del 26 de diciembre de 1990, 80 de las 15:30 horas del 30 de noviembre de 1993, 089-F-98 de las 14:50 horas del 23 de setiembre de 1998, 468-F-00 de las 10 horas del 16 de junio de 2000, 469-F-00 de las 10:05 horas del 16 de junio de 2000, 489-F-00 de las 15:15 horas del 28 de junio de 2000, 490-F-00 de las 15:20 horas del 28 de junio de 2000, 865-F-2000 de las 15:35 horas del 16 de noviembre de 2000, 566-F-01 de las 16:15 horas del 27 de julio de 2001, 266-F-03 de las 11:00 horas del 14 de mayo de 2003, 314-F-03 de las 11:25 horas del 4 de junio del 2003, 562-F-03 de las 10:40 horas del 10 de setiembre de 2003, 655-F-04 de las 15:30 horas del 10 de agosto de 2004, 522-F-2005 de las 16:25 horas del 20 de julio del 2005, 589-F-S1-2008 de las 11:05 horas del 29 de agosto de 2008 y 1134-F-S1-2012 de las 14:15 horas del 04 de setiembre de 2012. Así también pueden ser consultadas, las sentencias del Tribunal de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección V, número 210-2011 de las 15:35 horas del 09 de setiembre de 2011 y del Tribunal Segundo Civil, Sección Primera, la número 150 de las 14:15 horas del 30 de abril de 2010. Todas estas sentencias, que a su vez citan en su mayoría las opiniones de connotados juristas nacionales, lo que apuntan es que con base en el artículo 692 del Código Civil, toda persona quien sea parte de un contrato bilateral y que al mismo tiempo -no obstante encontrarse en un estado de regularidad contractual-, le sea imputada por su contraparte el incumplimiento de sus obligaciones, le asiste el derecho de exceptuarse, rehusarse, negarse o retenerse a cumplir, si acredita que quien le reclama se haya actualmente en una situación de incumplimiento. Esta defensa denominada en latín como “…Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus (…) es una defensa que asiste al contratante al cual se le exige el cumplimiento de una obligación, sin que la otra parte haya cumplido la obligación correlativa que le incumbe.” (Sentencia 365 del 26 de diciembre de 1990) “Es la consecuencia prevista por el ordenamiento jurídico por transgredir un vínculo obligacional con fuerza normativa para las partes.” (Sentencia 80 del 30 de noviembre de 1993) Al respecto, el artículo en cuestión del Código Civil, señala: “En los contratos bilaterales va siempre implícita la condición resolutoria por falta de cumplimiento. En este caso la parte que ha cumplido puede exigir el cumplimiento del convenio o pedir se resuelva con daños y perjuicios.” Esta norma no es de carácter procesal y por tanto, no establece una manera concreta en que deba ser alegada en un proceso judicial, de allí que se le pueda tratar tanto como una acción: “…se trata de acciones otorgadas a la parte cumpliente en razón del incumplimiento de la otra parte, precisamente por que los contratos tienen fuerza de ley entre las partes…” (Sentencia 562-F-03 del 10 de setiembre de 2003) o como una defensa: “…no es, técnicamente, una defensa de carácter judicial, es una defensa de hecho que puede ser invocada por la parte cumpliente durante la ejecución del contrato, ante el incumplimiento de la otra (…) Con ocasión de un juicio, lo correcto sería oponer una excepción "... que significara la ausencia de derecho para pedir la ejecución forzosa o la resolución, de quien se encuentra en mora respecto de sus obligaciones contractuales…” (Sentencia 089-F-98 del 23 de setiembre de 1998) Es así como, dicho numeral entonces puede ser alegado de modo distinto, dependiendo precisamente de quien –en su calidad de parte cumpliente- reclame el acaecimiento de esta condición en su beneficio. En otras palabras, el demandante puede solicitar la ejecución forzosa del convenio o su resolución en conjunto con la indemnización correspondiente, mientras que por su parte, el accionado puede argumentar la ausencia de ese derecho por parte del actor, y viceversa, en aquellos casos que como el presente exista una reconvención del demandado; sin embargo, en ambas hipótesis la teoría del caso de las partes tiene que pasar, necesariamente, por lograr acreditar al menos dos supuestos fácticos: a) Que quien lo alegue, haya realizado la conducta constitutiva de su obligación, o cuando mínimo, desplegado los actos preparatorios para ejecutar, sus propias obligaciones, conforme los términos del contrato, y b) que la contraparte haya omitido o fallado en la ejecución de sus obligaciones. Lo anterior es importante tenerlo en cuenta, ya que, no obstante la jurisprudencia citada señala que: “Se trata pues de un incumplimiento autorizado por el incumplimiento de la obligación correlativa, cuyo fundamento se encuentra en una protección que da el ordenamiento jurídico a la parte no incumplidora para evitarle mayores daños.” (Sentencia 365 del 26 de diciembre de 1990); resultaría contrario a Derecho -en particular por el principio de buena fe-, desconocer que las partes están llamadas a procurar que el contrato cumpla su función, desplegando su eficacia, de manera tal que a pesar de que ésta excepción justifica el incumplimiento de una de las partes, ésta –si aún no ha cumplido- debe acreditar al menos, que ha emprendido una diligencia mínima encaminada a la ejecución de sus compromisos, llevando a cabo algunos o todos los actos necesarios para cumplir con el pacto (pacta sunt servanda), aunque por si mismos esos actos no comporten la satisfacción total de las obligaciones, de allí que la Sala Primera haya dispuesto: “Es claro entonces, que el único requisito para oponer dicha excepción, es el cumplimiento de quien la interpone, y se sustenta en el incumplimiento de la otra parte.” (Sentencia 655-F-04 del 10 de agosto de 2004)

IV.CONT.- En este sentido, en el caso concreto, la parte que opone esta defensa argumenta, en síntesis, que la sociedad actora no cumplió con la obligación de instalar el sistema de bombeo y del acondicionamiento del punto de llegada del combustible según la cláusula décimo tercera, cuyo transporte estima que era la única obligación del INCOFER de acuerdo con la cláusula octava, de manera que al impedir a éste el cumplimiento se le facultó para oponer la defensa de contrato no cumplido. Al respecto, se debe tomar en consideración lo que expresan las cláusulas en cuestión, las cuales indican: “OCTAVA: Las partes convienen y están claras que la responsabilidad de INCOFER en el servicio que prestará, estará limitada al servicio de transporte por tren, una vez cargado y en movimiento (…) DÉCIMA TERCERA: El presente contrato tendrá una vigencia de CINCO AÑOS contado a partir de esta fecha, no obstante las obligaciones provenientes de este contrato iniciarán una vez instalado el sistema de bombeo para el bunker por parte del CONTRATISTA y el acondicionaiento de los carros tanque o cisterna para el transporte del bunker por parte de INCOFER. El plazo de cinco años, puede ser prorrogado por iguales periodos, mediante acuerdos firmados por las partes, con un mes de anticipación a la fecha de vencimiento del contrato vigente.” Así, en vista del alegato del demandado en relación con la supuesta limitación de responsabilidad al tema del transporte, en realidad no hay tal, pues precisamente ese es el objeto mismo del servicio público transporte de mercancías, para cuya ilustración podemos recurrir –mutatis mutandis-, a los términos en que es definido por el Código de Comercio: “ Por el contrato de transporte el porteador se obliga a transportar personas, cosas o noticias de un lugar a otro a cambio de un precio.” (Art. 323) Lo cual a su vez se ha entender, conforme los numerales 333 y 335 ibídem, que implican la obligación de entregar las mercancías por parte del remitente y su recepción por parte del transportista, así como la obligación del porteador de entregar éstas en el punto convenido a quien corresponda según lo que se haya pactado. De esta manera, la presencia de la cláusula octava por sí sola –a diferencia de lo alegado por el Instituto demandado- no inhibe la discusión en cuanto a los alcances de las responsabilidades derivadas del servicio público de transporte de carga, ya que lo que hace es reiterar el propósito y el contenido de un servicio de esta naturaleza, de modo que lo realmente importante radica en torno al posible incumplimiento de la cláusula décimo tercera. Valga advertir eso sí, que la mención de esta normativa no transforma, ni ignora que, a pesar de estar excluida esta actividad contractual, de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa -por constituir actividad ordinaria del Ente-, hay de por medio una publicatio que ha tornado ésta en un servicio público y por tanto, sólo esta sujeta supletoriamente al Derecho Privado. Ahora bien, una vez realizada una lectura cuidadosa de la misma, la literalidad del texto contractual nos deja ver lo que en apariencia constituyen dos condiciones de tipo suspensivo, correspondiéndole una a cada parte: la instalación del sistema de bombeo para el bunker por parte de Proyecto Lugrasa y el acondicionamiento de los carros tanque o cisterna para el transporte del bunker para el INCOFER. De esta manera, debemos establecer, tal y como se dijo anteriormente, si alguna de las partes no ha incumplido con sus obligaciones, lo cual le reconozca el derecho a exigir la resolución contractual y la correspondiente indemnización a cargo de la contraria. En este sentido, encuentra este Tribunal que Proyecto Lugrasa, no ha logrado demostrar aquí el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones, con lo cual no le asiste derecho para pretender que se declare la responsabilidad contractual de INCOFER y consecuentemente, la indemnización de daños y perjuicios solicitada, tal y como ha sido alegado por parte de dicho Instituto como parte de su defensa de contrato no cumplido. Sobre este aspecto, la parte actora ha fallado en aportar prueba alguna que permitiera a este Despacho comprobar que se instalara un sistema de bombeo para el combustible que debía ser objeto de transporte y por ello, motivo del contrato. Como se ha insistido, si la función del contrato es desplegar sus efectos y si estos pendían de la condición suspensiva pactada en la cláusula décimo tercera, la diligencia mínima esperable de parte de la sociedad actora, era haber gestionado ante el INCOFER la coordinación respectiva para instalar dicho sistema de bombeo, sin embargo, no hay ningún elemento de prueba que así lo verifique. En este sentido, en relación con la nota fechada 29 de octubre de 2008, en la que la sociedad actora comunicó a INCOFER que ya contaban con “…la asesoría de la empresa Ingenieria Genesis, y con la cotización de los equipos necesarios para realizar de nuestra parte, todos nuestros compromisos, y ya tenemos la cotización de los sistemas que en la actualidad tienen un costo de (…), e incluyen todos los componentes necesarios ”, nótese que la parte sólo está informando -a la mitad del plazo del contrato- que ha obtenido una cotización de equipos y una supuesta asesoría, pero no si se han adquirido efectivamente, ni siquiera acredita cuáles son esos equipos, si estos cumplen con los requerimientos técnicos y legales correspondientes, quién es el proveedor de los mismos, qué relación tiene con la mencionada empresa asesora y lo más importante, cómo estas cotizaciones permiten o no el cumplimiento de su obligación. Véase que la parte no aporta aquí contratos de compra o servicios que documenten esta situación, es únicamente su dicho, con lo cual no hay manera de tener por acreditada la mínima diligencia debida para ejecutar el contrato. Tampoco ha demostrado, inclusive, si es que dicho sistema ya se encontraba instalado de previo al contrato, en algún punto de la vía férrea o de la estación de Leesville, tal y como lo ha alegado confusamente a lo largo del proceso, por ejemplo, como lo aduce en los hechos primero y décimo de la demanda, al achacar que “…Desde mediados de la década de 1.990, mi representada, construyó en las instalaciones de la entidad demandada INCOFER, en Leesville de Roxana de Pococí, la red de oleoducto que comprende los daños, para desalojar derrames de bunker a un tanque de captación, una cabina con tres bombas de succión y expulsión, y las demás instalaciones necesarias, para transportar, y trasegar, combustible bunker, obtuvo las autorizaciones del Servicio Nacional de Electricidad, entidad encargada entonces de autorizar dicho manejo, del entonces, Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas, ahora Ministerio del Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones, del Ministerio de Salud y de la Municipalidad de Pococí, para efectuar dicho transporte y trasiego…” y luego que “…a pesar de cumplir en todo mi representada, el INCOFER, incumpliendo el contrato otorgado, por factores que nuevamente desconocemos y se niegan a explicar, se niega a iniciar la ejecución y no toma ninguna de las acciones administrativas internar necesarias para su implementación, descuidando además la vía a utilizar y el equipo que se requería contractualmente para su debido cumplimiento…” Al respecto, tampoco ha quedado demostrado para este Tribunal que dichas instalaciones y equipo, de existir, se hubieran mantenido en la estación de Leesville o cualquier otro punto de la línea férrea, o que éstas hubieran sido objeto de contratación con terceros para su puesta en operación. Bajo estas circunstancias, no se puede acreditar el cumplimiento necesario para accionar por parte de Proyecto Lugrasa, por el contrario y según se observa en los hechos probados, la parte pareciera haberse centrado en el incumplimiento de su contraparte, comportamiento cuya buena fe es hasta cierto grado dudoso, pues se avocó a esto a pesar del pleno conocimiento de su improcedencia, así como en insistir en las gestiones que, como se hizo ver en el considerando IV, resultaban inconducentes para la ejecución del contrato. En relación con el cumplimiento del demandado respecto de sus obligaciones, se ahondará al respecto a la hora de analizar la reconvención, bastando por el momento con indicar tal y como se hizo arriba, que la no satisfacción de los requerimientos legales por parte de INCOFER, al no resultar imputable a éste, le facultan para oponer la falta de derecho, basándose para ello en el estado de incumplimiento de la sociedad actora. Así las cosas y de conformidad con la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta por el demandado, sustentada a su vez en la defensa de contrato no cumplido, concluye este Tribunal, que al carecer la sociedad actora de derecho alguno para reclamar el incumplimiento y la consecuente indemnización, lo procedente es desestimar la acción.

B.- SOBRE LA RECONVENCIÓN

VII.ALEGATOS DE LAS PARTES.- Mediante la contrademanda aquí planteada proceso, el Instituto Nacional de Ferrocarriles pretende que se declare el incumplimiento de su contraparte en el contrato de transporte aquí mencionado reiteradamente y en consecuencia se declare la resolución de éste convenio, con la consecuente indemnización. Según se observa tanto en la demanda, como en las conclusiones vertidas durante el juicio oral, el INCOFER estima básicamente que la parte reconvenida incumplió sus obligaciones, ya que no obtuvo los permisos necesarios para el acarreo del búnker que se debía transportar, así como para el sistema de bombeo y otras instalaciones necesarias para descargar el combustible, todo debido a causas imputables únicamente a la empresa Proyecto Lugrasa LUGRASA LG DEL ESTE SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA. De este modo, el impedirle el cumplimiento al Instituto contrademandante, la sociedad reconvenida debe indemnizarle los ingresos dejados de percibir por el no transporte de combustible. Por su parte, la representación de Proyecto Lugrasa LG del Este S.A., estima como improcedentes los alegatos del Instituto contrademandante, ya que en su criterio, fue el INCOFER quien, al fallar en suplir los medios y evitar la pérdida de los bienes comprometidos para satisfacer la finalidad del contrato, así como en omitir los trámites internos y requisitos legales respectivos, ha incumplido el contrato y por tanto, es quien está llamado a asumir la responsabilidad contractual, de allí que deje opuesta la excepción de falta de derecho y de contrato no cumplido.

VIII.SOBRE EL FONDO DEL PROCESO.- Respecto de esta reconvención, se observa que la misma se construye sobre la base de un solo argumento, coincidente en un todo con la falta de derecho opuesta por el INCOFER, como defensa, en la contestación: el incumplimiento de Proyecto Lugrasa y su propio cumplimiento, como punto de partida para que se declare la resolución contractual y la indemnización de los daños y perjuicios. Sobre este alegato, debe analizarse, primero, lo relativo a los requerimientos para la procedencia de la responsabilidad contractual fundada en el artículo 692 del Código Civil, y segundo, lo concerniente a los daños y perjuicios alegados por el INCOFER. a.- RESPECTO DE LA RESOLUCIÓN POR INCUMPLIMIENTO: Tal y como se ha hecho ver hasta ahora en la presente sentencia, efectivamente, es posible aseverar un estado de incumplimiento contractual de parte de Proyecto Lugrasa, en tanto no llevó a cabo la instalación del sistema de bombeo a la que se había comprometido a manera de condición suspensiva en la cláusula décimo tercera del contrato de transporte de búnker que ésta suscribió con el INCOFER, sin embargo, asimismo, ha quedado evidenciado la insatisfacción de una serie de requerimientos legales, los cuales si bien no son producto de faltas achacables directamente al INCOFER, tornan insustentable derecho alguno de éste para reclamar la resolución contractual conforme el artículo 692 del Código Civil. Veamos; según dicho numeral, cuando se nos dice que en los contratos bilaterales va implícita la condición resolutoria por falta de cumplimiento, esto lo que implica es que a partir del acaecimiento del hecho futuro e incierto consistente en la falta de ejecución de sus obligaciones (incumplimiento), el contrato queda en un estado de ineficacia relativa, sujeta a la voluntad de la parte cumpliente de hacer ejecutar forzosamente el contrato, o bien, de resolver el mismo, con la concomitante responsabilidad contractual a cargo del incumpliente, todo además, de acuerdo a la gravedad del incumplimiento (ver sentencia de la Sala Primera número 566-F-01 de las 16:15 horas del 27 de julio de 2001, citada anteriormente). Esto es así, porque en primer lugar, la norma en tanto punto de partida y llegada para cualquier interpretación, señala expresamente que estamos frente a un supuesto de una condición resolutoria, implícita en todo contrato bilateral y en este sentido, entenderemos como condición aquel hecho futuro e incierto del cual, jurídicamente, dependa el nacimiento o la extinción de una obligación (Ver en este sentido sentencias de la Sala Primera número 608-F-2004 de las 09:10 horas del 23 de julio del 2004, 92 de las 15:15 horas del 10 de junio de 1992, 989-F-2002 de las 16:20 horas del 18 de diciembre del 2002 y 455-F-2007 de las 14:00 horas del 02 de julio de 2007) Al respecto, expone el Tribunal Segundo Civil, Sección Primera, en su sentencia número 244 de las 14:10 horas del 25 de junio del 2001: “IV.- Como es bien sabido, para que los contratos sean válidos y eficaces deben contar con los elementos esenciales propios de cada familia de ellos, y que en cada caso particular pueden darse o no los llamados "elementos accidentales" que, si están presentes, se tornan esenciales también, porque son determinantes de la voluntad de los contratantes. Tal es el caso de la condición, entendida como el hecho futuro e incierto de que depende la eficacia del vínculo, y del término o plazo, que no es más que el hecho futuro pero cierto, aunque tal vez indeterminado en su fecha, que las partes consideraron esencial para llevar adelante la negociación. O sea, de los contratos en general sobreviene una serie de efectos propios de la fuerza obligatoria con que vinculan a las partes, como la obligación de ejecución, la irrevocabilidad del cumplimiento y la ejecución de buena fe que conlleva los deberes de lealtad y cooperación, y tales efectos es de esperar que se mantengan, por lo menos, durante el plazo de vigencia del negocio, porque el plazo es también elemento importantísimo en la voluntad de negociar. (…) V.- Por otra parte, también es del conocimiento general que los contratos, en virtud de su fuerza obligatoria, constriñen a las partes a la ejecución de aquello a que se obligaron, salvo que el incumplimiento sea producto de la fuerza mayor, del caso fortuito o del incumplimiento de la otra parte (artículo 702 del Código Civil). Que, no dándose ninguno de estas tres eximentes de responsabilidad, el incumplimiento tiene que verse como una falta imputable a quien faltó a sus deberes y que, por haber incurrido en él, acarrea el deber de indemnizar los daños y perjuicios directamente causados a la otra parte, como se desprende de los artículos 693, 702 y 704 del Código de cita.” (Resaltado no es del original) Valiéndonos así de estas ideas, podemos establecer, claramente, dos aspectos de suma trascendencia para dar solución a esta contrademanda: i.- que toda condición constituye un aspecto de eficacia del contrato y de allí cubierta también por un deber de buena fe y lealtad, pues responden al sentido mismo del contrato; ii.- que el surgimiento del hecho futuro e incierto constitutivo del incumplimiento, debe ser analizado a la luz del contrato mismo, por ser éste la fuente que vincula o constriñe a las partes. Teniendo esto en cuenta, llama poderosamente la atención, como el Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, primero, condiciona la prestación de un servicio público, esto es, lo somete a un hecho futuro e incierto, contrario al deber legal a su cargo, y segundo, que no obstante constituir un deber del INCOFER el verificar que el cliente cuente con los permisos de ley, en este caso lo omite. Podemos así afirmar, que hay una seria confusión de parte del reconventor respecto del alcance de la concesión legal que ostenta para la prestación del servicio público de transporte de carga por ferrocarril, en relación con los deberes legales que le competen en su condición de prestador de dicho servicio y las obligaciones y derechos que puede llegar convenir con los particulares como parte de su actividad ordinaria, todo lo cual le lleva a interpretar erróneamente que del contrato en cuestión han surgido situaciones jurídicas que le favorecen (eficacia), cuando no es así, según veremos seguidamente.

IX.CONT.- El Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles, de conformidad con lo que se expuso en el apartado a.- del Considerando IV, constituye un ente público que, como consecuencia necesaria de la administración del sistema de transporte ferroviario (competencia y finalidad), presta el servicio de pasajeros y de carga, implicando esto último el deber de transportar y entregar mercancías y otros bienes en la forma más eficiente posible a los usuarios que soliciten sus servicios, de un punto donde recibe del remitente dichos bienes, a otro donde los entregará a quien haya indicado éste, siempre que ambos puntos se localicen a lo largo de una línea o vía férrea. Esto se ve reforzado, por lo dispuesto incluso de manera previa a la promulgación de la Ley Orgánica del INCOFER, en la Ley General de Ferrocarriles, Ley número 5066 del 30 de agosto de 1972, que en su capítulo I relativo a “Principios Fundamentales”, dispone en lo que resulta de interés: “Artículo 1º.- El transporte por ferrocarriles es un servicio público cuya prestación es facultad exclusiva del Estado, el cual podrá suministrarlo a través de concesionarios particulares. Artículo 2º.- Todo ferrocarril está sujeto a las leyes de la República, especialmente a la presente, a la concesión, a los reglamentos y a los principios generales de derecho público, en su orden. (…) Artículo 7º.- Para los efectos de la presente ley se entiende por ferrocarril la vía, el material fijo y rodante, los ramales o extensiones, los apartaderos, las terminales, las estaciones intermedias y todas aquellas edificaciones, instalaciones, muelles y otras anexidades que de manera directa o indirecta formen parte de una misma explotación.” (Resaltado no es del original) Estas normas, que claramente establecen el servicio público de transporte por ferrocarril, se engarzan asimismo con la disposición contenida en el artículo 5 de la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, Ley número 7593 del 09 de agosto de 1996, que con posterioridad –aún respecto de la Ley Orgánica del INCOFER-, también establecen y precisan dicho carácter de servicio público: “ En los servicios públicos definidos en este artículo, la Autoridad Reguladora fijará precios y tarifas; además, velará por el cumplimiento de las normas de calidad, cantidad, confiabilidad, continuidad, oportunidad y prestación óptima, según el artículo 25 de esta ley. Los servicios públicos antes mencionados son : (…) h) Transporte de carga por ferrocarril.” (Resaltado no es del original) Así las cosas, queda claro para el Tribunal que la prestación del servicio de transporte de carga por ferrocarril constituye un servicio público, no obstante, que el artículo 9 del Reglamento a la Ley Orgánica del INCOFER remita a esta entidad a la legislación civil y mercantil para la definición de los alcances y contenidos del servicio, de allí que éste quede sujeto a las normas que regulan este tipo de conducta administrativa material, dejando a las normas ajenas al Derecho Administrativo un carácter de fuente supletoria, según lo dispuesto en los artículos 9, 12 y 13 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. De esta manera, se observa en la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos distintos numerales que permiten prever las principales garantías que han de caracterizar la prestación de los servicios públicos por parte de los entes prestadores de los mismos, lo cual abarca en el caso bajo estudio, al Instituto demandado: “Artículo 6.- Obligaciones de la Autoridad Reguladora. Corresponden a la Autoridad Reguladora las siguientes obligaciones: (…) b) Realizar inspecciones técnicas de las propiedades, plantas y equipos destinados a prestar el servicio público, cuando lo estime conveniente para verificar la calidad, confiabilidad, continuidad, los costos, precios y las tarifas del servicio público. (…) Artículo 14.- Obligaciones de los prestadores. Son obligaciones de los prestadores: (…) b) Mantener instalaciones y equipos en buen estado, de manera que no constituyan peligro para personas ni propiedades, y no causen interrupción del servicio. (…) h) Admitir, sin discriminación, el acceso al servicio a quienes lo soliciten dentro de su campo. i) Estar preparados para asegurar, en el corto plazo, la prestación del servicio ante el incremento de la demanda. j) Brindar el servicio en condiciones adecuadas y con la regularidad y seguridad que su naturaleza, la concesión o el permiso indiquen. k) Prestar el servicio a sus clientes en condiciones de igualdad y cobrarles un precio justo y razonable por el servicio prestado.” (Resaltado no es del original) Asimismo, estas normas deben entenderse en conjunto con lo dispuesto por el numeral 4 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, al establecer ésta que: “La actividad de los entes públicos deberá estar sujeta en su conjunto a los principios fundamentales del servicio público, para asegurar su continuidad, su eficiencia, su adaptación a todo cambio en el régimen legal o en la necesidad social que satisfacen y la igualdad en el trato de los destinatarios, usuarios o beneficiarios.” (Resaltado no es del original) Así también, se ha de tomar en cuenta la jurisprudencia constitucional relativa al así llamado, derecho fundamental al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, sobre el cual valga reseñar lo dicho por Sala Constitucional en su sentencia 2009-01650 de las 11:41 horas del 06 de febrero del 2009: “La jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha establecido: “(…) que la Constitución Política recoge un derecho fundamental innominado o atípico, que es el de los administrados al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, (…) Son ya numerosos los fallos en los que ha dicho que este derecho fundamental al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos le impone a los entes públicos actuar en el ejercicio de sus competencias y la prestación de los servicios públicos de forma eficiente y eficaz y, desde luego, la obligación correlativa de reparar los daños y perjuicios causados cuando se vulnere esa garantía constitucional. En esta línea de pensamiento, en la sentencia número 2004-07532 de las 17:03 horas del 13 de julio de 2004 se lee, textualmente lo siguiente: (…) La continuidad supone que la prestación de los servicios no se debe interrumpir, (…) Cualquier actuación –por acción u omisión- de los funcionarios o imprevisión de éstos en la organización racional de los recursos que propenda a interrumpir un servicio público es abiertamente antijurídica. La regularidad implica que el servicio público debe prestarse o realizarse con sujeción a ciertas reglas, normas o condiciones preestablecidas. No debe confundirse la continuidad con la regularidad, el primer concepto supone que debe funcionar sin interrupciones y el segundo con apego a las normas que integran el ordenamiento jurídico. La adaptación a todo cambio en el régimen legal o a las necesidades impuestas por el contexto socioeconómico significa que los entes y órganos administrativos deben tener capacidad de previsión y, sobre todo, de programación o planificación para hacerle frente a las nuevas exigencias y retos impuestos, ya sea por el aumento en el volumen de la demanda del servicio público o bien por los cambios tecnológicos. Ningún ente, órgano o funcionario público pueden aducir razones de carencia presupuestaria o financiera, ausencia de equipos, falta de renovación tecnológica de éstos, exceso o saturación de la demanda en el servicio público para dejar de prestarlo de forma continua y regular. La igualdad o universalidad en el acceso demanda que todos los habitantes tienen derecho a exigir, recibir y usar el servicio público en igualdad de condiciones y de conformidad con las normas que los rigen, consecuentemente, todos los que se encuentran en una misma situación pueden exigir idénticas ventajas. Uno de los principios rectores del servicio público que no se encuentra enunciado en el artículo 4° de la Ley General de la Administración Pública lo constituye el de su obligatoriedad , puesto que, de nada serviría afirmar que deben ser continuos, regulares, uniformes y generales si el sujeto prestador no tiene la obligación de prestarlo. La administración pública prestadora del servicio público no puede escoger su clientela o usuarios, debe brindárselo a cualquiera que se lo requiera.” (El resaltado en negritas no es del original) (2007-14214). También ha sido criterio de la Sala que todos los servicios públicos prestados por las administraciones públicas están regidos por los principios antes señalados, que deben ser observados y respetados, sin excepción alguna, por los funcionarios públicos encargados de su gestión y prestación, habida cuenta que se trata de un imperativo que emana de la eficacia normativa directa e inmediata de la Constitución Política.” (Resaltado no es del original) De la relación de los artículos citados, la jurisprudencia constitucional trascrita en lo conducente y conforme lo dicho anteriormente, queda evidenciado que el INCOFER está sujeto necesariamente a la hora de prestar el servicio público de transporte de carga por ferrocarril, a la prestación de éste de manera continua, obligatoria –sin gratuidad- e igualitaria, eficiente y efectiva, pronta, adaptable conforme las necesidades del servicio y acorde con los parámetros técnicos y legales que caracterizan al servicio. Como consecuencia, el INCOFER no podía válidamente supeditar el servicio, desconociendo el deber legal a su cargo, a una condición suspensiva bajo su cargo, como sería: “…el acondicionamiento de los carros tanque o cisterna para el transporte del bunker…”, porque implica dar tratamiento al servicio público como si fuera un hecho futuro e incierto, cuando por el contrario se ha de tratar como un deber legal de la Administración, actual y cierto, de manera que en el momento en que se solicite, sin discriminación alguna, el INCOFER debe prestar el servicio, requiriendo para ello –obviamente- la contraprestación tarifaria correspondiente conforme lo establezca la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos.

X.Ahora, sobre el tema del transporte de combustible, debe tenerse claro además que, primero, no podía el INCOFER descargar la responsabilidad en el usuario, como lo hizo por omisión, pues a sabiendas de lo incorrecto del proceder de Proyecto Lugrasa a la hora de tramitar las autorizaciones ante RECOPE y el MINAE, mantuvo silencio al respecto; en segundo lugar, que no fue sino hasta 07 de noviembre de 2008 (aproximadamente a la mitad del plazo del contrato), cuando por oficios P.E. 688-2008 y P.E. 679-2008, el Presidente Ejecutivo del INCOFER comunicó a la sociedad actora sobre la ausencia de cumplimientos de los requerimientos técnicos y legales relativos al punto de descarga del combustible, así como al Viceministro de Ambiente y Energía relativo a la falta de inclusión reglamentaria del transporte de combustible por ferrocarril, a lo cual –dicho sea de paso- no dio el seguimiento necesario que hubiera sido esperable desde el punto de vista de la buena fe y lealtad contractual, pero además -e inclusive más importante aún-, lo que su misma ley orgánica le establece como un deber y una atribución: “Ejecutar, en la forma más eficiente posible, el transporte de carga y de pasajeros” (Art. 4.ch. Resaltado no es del original) Asimismo, y en tercer lugar, a la luz de lo anterior y lo que se dirá, ha quedado patente para este Tribunal el desconocimiento del Instituto en relación con la regularidad que ha de prestar el servicio de transporte de combustible, empezando por el alcance del numeral 9 en relación con el 5 de la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, que dicen en lo que interesan: “En los servicios públicos definidos en este artículo, la Autoridad Reguladora fijará (…) . Los servicios públicos antes mencionados son: (…) d) Suministro de combustibles derivados de hidrocarburos, dentro de los que se incluyen: 1) (…) 2) los derivados del petróleo, asfaltos, gas y naftas destinados al consumidor final. (…) h) Transporte de carga por ferrocarril. (...) La autorización para prestar el servicio público será otorgada por los entes citados a continuación: (…) Inciso d.2): Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía. (…) Inciso h): Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes. (…) Artículo 9.- Para ser prestador de los servicios públicos, a que se refiere esta ley, deberá obtenerse la respectiva concesión o el permiso del ente público competente en la materia, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 5 de esta ley. Se exceptúan de esta obligación las instituciones y empresas públicas que, por mandato legal, prestan cualquiera de estos servicios. Sin embargo, todos los prestadores estarán sometidos a esta ley y sus reglamentos.” (Resaltado no es del original) Siendo así y como se ha visto hasta ahora, el INCOFER es una de esas empresas públicas que al encontrarse por mandato legal prestando el servicio de transporte de carga por ferrocarril está exceptuada de un permiso o concesión para el desarrollo del servicio, y en relación con la carga, perfectamente puede ésta abarcar combustibles, ya que no hay norma así que lo restrinja, de hecho, por el contrario, el artículo 1 del Reglamento para el Servicio de Transporte de Carga por Ferrocarril, adoptado por el Instituto demandado y vigente desde el 16 de octubre de 2003 (fecha anterior al contrato de transporte en cuestión), permite entender que abarca cualquier tipo de mercancía: “Podrán ser contratantes del servicio de transporte de carga por tren, todas aquellas personas físicas y jurídicas legalmente facultadas, que les surja la necesidad de transportar su materia prima, productos semiterminados o terminados utilizando el tren de carga como medio de transporte, en aquellos lugares donde exista vía férrea habilitada, y que quieran contratar este servicio, con apego a las disposiciones del presente reglamento.” (Resaltado no es del original) En consistencia esta norma con lo dispuesto en los numerales 3, 4 y 41 de la Ley Orgánica del INCOFER, ya citado antes. Por lo que en consecuencia, al encontrarse el Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles exento de la obtención de las autorizaciones o concesiones por parte, sea del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, o sea del Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes, para la prestación de este tipo de servicio, resultaba por ello innecesaria la modificación reglamentaria requerida por RECOPE y solicitada al MINAE por parte del mismo Presidente Ejecutivo del INCOFER. Sin embargo, y de muy distinto tipo, es la cuestión del control y fiscalización que el Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía denegó llevar a cabo en relación con la temática de seguridad en el transporte, no sólo de los vagones cisterna, sino además y según el artículo 7 de la Ley General de Ferrocarriles (transcrito arriba) de toda la infraestructura propia de un ferrocarril, ya que tanto el reglamento de Transporte y Acarreo de Derivados de Petróleo, decreto ejecutivo número 24813-MAE, vigente en aquel momento, como su versión posterior y actualmente vigente, el decreto ejecutivo número 36627-MINAET, Reglamento para la regulación del transporte de combustible, le han concedido a dicho Ministerio amplias competencias para supervisar estas cuestiones, independientemente del tema de la autorización para el servicio de transporte de combustible que, se insiste, no era requerida por INCOFER. Al respecto, valga sólo citar a manera de ilustración, en relación con el decreto 24813-MAE, los siguientes numerales: “Artículo 1º.- Corresponde a la Dirección General de Transporte y Comercialización de Combustibles del Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía (DGTCC) la aplicación del presente reglamento. Para este efecto la DGTCC deberá coordinar y dirigir las políticas emitidas por el Poder Ejecutivo, en lo relativo al transporte y la comercialización de combustibles en el país, quedando facultada para ejecutar esas políticas, que entre otras contemplarán: a) la búsqueda de la eficiencia y eficacia en el transporte de los combustibles por medio de cisternas y su expendio. b) el control de los aspectos de seguridad e higiene. (…) Artículo 3º.- Por el interés que tiene para la seguridad de los habitantes de la República y para la vida económica del país, se declaran de interés público los servicios de transporte de todos los productos derivados de petróleo, producidos nacionalmente o importados. (…) Artículo 6º.- Corresponderá a la Dirección General: a) Regular, fiscalizar y controlar lo relativo al transporte de los combustibles, tanto de producto limpio, sucio como de otros hidrocarburos…” (Resaltado no es del original)

XI.Así las cosas, tal y como se reseño en el considerando VIII, este Tribunal ha encontrado que el INCOFER, valiéndose de una cuestionable buena fe y omitiendo sus deberes legales, procedió a incorporar una condición ineficaz al contrato de transporte de búnker, hizo recargar originalmente en su contraparte el cumplimiento de sus propios deberes legales y una vez llegado el momento para hacerlos cumplir, por impericia propia no emprendió acciones para impugnar las conductas activas y omisivas del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, como era dable de esperar según los principios de la buena fe y lealtad en la ejecución de los contratos. Todo lo anterior, lleva a concluir a este Tribunal que lo procedente, es denegar la acción incoada por el Instituto Costarricense de Ferrocarriles puesto que en las circunstancias dichas, la misma carece de buen derecho que sustente su reclamo, e inclusive, por el contrario, de acceder a ella podría estarse prohijando una desafortunada interpretación jurídica del INCOFER, sobre el alcance de la concesión que la Ley le otorgó.”