Annulment of disciplinary proceeding due to unreasonable delayNulidad de procedimiento disciplinario por dilación irrazonable

V.- THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: From its origins, Administrative Sanctioning Law was part of Criminal Law, which meant that an administrative procedure could not be distinguished in its own right. However, thanks to the degree of development achieved by Administrative Law, especially through jurisprudential interpretation, it is now possible to speak of an administrative sanctioning procedure, which is governed by principles and precepts of its own. It is essential to understand that at any stage of the procedure, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the individual must be respected, such that they are not harmed by arbitrary actions of the Administration. Therefore, care must be taken to ensure that any administrative procedure that may culminate in the imposition of some type of sanction is carried out objectively, with the purpose of determining the real truth of the facts under investigation. Understanding the true meaning of the principles of the procedure is fundamental to guarantee its development in accordance with the Law. Within the Administration, Sanctioning Law has the purpose of maintaining the order of the system and repressing, through coercive means, those conducts contrary to the policies of the state entity. The sanctioning power granted to the Administration is that by virtue of which sanctions can be imposed on those who fail to observe the actions or omissions imposed on them by the administrative regulatory framework, or that which is applicable by the Public Administration in each case. The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its actions, while on the other hand it imposes itself as a frame of reference that allows the administered party to compare the public conduct, in order to establish a control to ensure that its actions have been manifested in accordance with the rules that guide that conduct. It seeks, therefore, to become a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As indicated in Article 214 of the General Law of Public Administration, its purpose is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the case under analysis. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the better fulfillment of the Administration's goals and the protection of the individual's rights, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the aforementioned Law. It is for this reason that canon 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure in strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the adversarial principle, in order to establish the aforementioned real truth (among which can be seen those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the aforementioned General Law). This acquires even greater relevance in so-called control or sanctioning procedures, because in those cases, the final decision can impose a repressive framework in the legal sphere of a person. The same Legal System provides for the substantiality of these minimum guarantees, considering invalid the procedure that does not satisfy these minimum matters. This is derived from Article 223 of the referenced Law, in that it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities will cause nullity of the procedure. From this standpoint, this Tribunal has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred upon this jurisdiction by numeral 49 of the Magna Carta, means that the Administration, in the course of these procedures (of a sanctioning nature in this case), satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that in its core, the due process that must be insurmountable in this proceeding has been protected. Now then, by virtue of what has been indicated, it is important to analyze the matter of the functions specific to the directing body and the decision-making body of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the decision-making body, that is, to whom the legal competence has been conferred to issue the act that exhausts administrative remedies. However, in the interest of administrative efficiency, the instructional competences are delegable to a body in charge of carrying out the instruction of the procedure, which has come to be called the "directing or investigating body." In principle, the designation of the latter corresponds to the decision-making body, for which its validity is subject to it falling upon an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. However, it is feasible that in certain cases, the same law establishes the administrative unit that constitutes the directing body of the proceeding. Exceptionally, it has been permitted that persons who are not regular officials be constituted as the directing body of the procedure; however, in that specific function, it must be understood that they perform a public function, with the inherent obligations. Regarding its competences, the representation of the investigating administration within the procedure corresponds to that directing body, as is clearly derived from numeral 282 clause 3 of the General Law of Public Administration. It is a body with powers of instruction and ordering of the procedure (Art. 227 LGAP), in charge of carrying out all the preparatory stages and then, forwarding the case file to the decision-making body, together with a non-binding opinion -unless a rule states otherwise- (Art. 330 LGAP). Although it can render recommendations, they certainly would not be binding, so its determinations with a view to adopting a final decision are considered procedural acts. Therefore, it is responsible for issuing the opening act, giving procedural impetus, all the investigative work of the procedure, directing the hearing, resolving preliminary issues, resolving the appeal for reconsideration filed against procedural acts, rendering a report to the decision-making body at the time of forwarding the case file for the issuance of the final act. Within its competences, Articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the referenced General Law, can be seen. For its part, the decision-making body is the competent superior who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act that resolves the procedure.

VI.- THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE DISCIPLINARY POWER. The analysis of the validity of what was resolved by the Administration in the specific case has as its starting point determining whether there is an applicable statute of limitations (prescripción) in the disciplinary administrative procedure initiated against the defendant. The plaintiff presents an argument by virtue of which he indicates that the sanction was drafted and issued extemporaneously on July 22, 2009, an argument that he had been maintaining since the course of the administrative procedure without making a greater analysis of what was stated, since he even refers to the fact that the procedure began on March 19, 2009, with note PPCN-128-07 subscribed by Sergeant Mariano Céspedes Anchía, when the truth is that indeed that proceeding begins with that note, but its date of issuance is March 19, 2007 (folio 04 of the administrative file). He bases his claim on numeral 77 of the General Police Law and requests the nullity of everything acted upon and resolved within the administrative file number 752-IP-2007. For its part, the State, in summary, says that since it involves a two-year statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción), it is interrupted with the commencement of the disciplinary procedure; therefore, although the computation of the statute of limitations (prescripción) began with the complaint on April 11, 2007, that period was interrupted with the notification to the plaintiff of the opening order on October 27, 2007, since this is the first act that interrupts the statute of limitations (prescripción) and from which the period runs until the Personnel Council is in a position to decide, that is, July 22, 2009, hence the two-year period of the General Police Law has not elapsed. On the subject of the statute of limitations (prescripción), it is necessary to mention that the liberation supposes the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inaction on the part of the holder of a right in its exercise, b) lapse of the time established by the legal system, and; c) allegation or exception of the passive subject of the legal relationship to assert the statute of limitations (prescripción). This means that there is no liberating effect if, despite the concurrence of prerequisites a and b, the articulation is not formulated. Hence, the statute of limitations (prescripción) responds to a petition principle and, unlike expiration (in procedural terms), cannot be considered on its own motion. The foregoing, regarding the disciplinary power, implies that the holder of the right is the administrative superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly established by the applicable regulations, upon the expiration of which, his power to require the recognition of the loss of the hierarchical power emerges. Now then, from that perspective, the corrective power of the superior regarding the officials who depend on him, for a matter of legal certainty, is subject to a prescriptive period. Generically, that period is regulated by mandate 603 of the Labor Code, which establishes a one-month period for the exercise of that repressive power. However, it is a rule that gives way to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that extreme. For example, in matters of public finance, the applicable period is that regulated and specified by Law No. 8292 (Art. 43), 8422 (Art. 44), and 8131 (Art. 112), a matter that is therefore subject to this particular regime. It is a normative system that constitutes a sectoral legal framework containing specific rules, which, as special laws, prevail over general regulations. In its core, these rules refer to the regime provided in precept 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428. The same occurs with the General Police Law, No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, published in Supplement No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 103 of May 30, 1994, in whose numeral 83 a particular statute of limitations regime (régimen de prescripción) is established, namely: "Minor offenses will prescribe in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations (prescripción) shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure begins." There is no controversy in this case regarding the applicable regime, it being clear that the position of public force officer held by the plaintiff means that such legal framework is what regulates and specifies the employment relationships he maintains with the Ministry of Public Security. Hence, it is evident that in the case at hand, the applicable statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción), will be that of one month or two years established in the aforementioned ordinal 83 of Law No. 7410. Now then, in the context of said rule, the expiration of the period granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the causes of interruption established by Article 876 of the Civil Code. It should be specified that the causes of interruption -which cause the prescriptive period to begin anew- can only produce that effect to the extent that they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if they occurred, if it is after the expiration of the period, the mere allegation of the barring effect of the statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) entails the loss of the exercise of the right precluded due to inaction in its exercise. Now then, the same alluded rule (Art. 83 Law No. 7410) establishes a specific case of interruption, which is precisely the opening of the procedure. It should be understood that the interruption does not occur with that simple opening resolution, but with the communication thereof, which has instructed the disciplinary cause, in accordance with ordinals 140, 239, 240, 243 of the LGAP. In accordance with the provisions of the indicated rule, the statute of limitations period (plazo de prescripción) for disciplining the offense is not computed from the moment the superior receives the report of the directing body of the procedure, but from the moment in which he is in an objective possibility of knowing the cause of the alleged offense. In these cases where a complaint has been filed regarding alleged irregular acts of a specific official, that period runs from that same date, because it is at that moment that the Administration becomes aware of the factual cause that constitutes the basis of the disciplinary action. The contrary would render the cited period futile to the extent that, regardless of when the hypothetical offense was brought to the knowledge of the body -or entity-, the period would run until that circumstance is communicated to the superior, which can lead to ignoring the administrative inaction in the due and diligent attention of these matters. By way of example, there could eventually be a case of an unprocessed complaint that was filed more than two years before the superior became aware of it. In such a case, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that it could not be maintained that the prescriptive period has not started, because it has been the Administration itself, with its indolence and abnormal functioning, that has propitiated that expiration of the disciplinary power. Now, in the case under analysis, the complaint that motivated the administrative procedure was filed by official letter number PPCN-128-07 dated March 19, 2007, which means that it is from that moment that the two years applicable in this matter must be computed. As has been taken as accredited, through the act at 09 hours on October 17, 2007, issued within the administrative file number 752-IP-2007, the Legal Disciplinary Department, Police Inspection Section, acting as the directing body of the disciplinary procedure, communicates to the plaintiff the opening order of the administrative procedure initiated against him. This act was personally notified on October 27, 2007. In accordance with what is indicated by numeral 83 of Law No. 7410, the communication of that opening order interrupts the statute of limitations (prescripción), which in this case has occurred, since at the time of its notification, the two years for the expiration of the corrective power had not passed. It is necessary to mention that the opening of the procedure leads to the interruption of the statute of limitations (prescripción), however, during the time in which the procedure is processed, the multiple acts issued during its course have an equally interruptive effect on the alluded period, provided they are acts that seek the effective prosecution of the case and not mere dilatory actions to evade the periods that must be applicable to the procedure. Thus, for example, the act that is clearly issued to evade the consequences of procedural indolence, whether due to being unnecessary, arbitrary, or repetitive, would not produce the alluded effect, a matter that must be analyzed in each specific case. However, if the process falls into inaction or abandonment attributable to the Administration for a period exceeding six months, and upon express request of the charged official, the expiration of that procedure is ordered, this in accordance with numeral 340.3 of the LGAP, in which case the interruption is considered as not having occurred. From that standpoint, this Tribunal does not observe that at the time of the opening of the procedure, a statute of limitations (prescripción) of the exercise of the right to sanction disciplinary offenses by the superior of the Ministry of Security had occurred. Even so, it is necessary to enter into the analysis of the temporal element with respect to the processing of that procedure.

VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE PROCEDURE

In the case under analysis, the plaintiff addresses the issue of the statute of limitations (prescripción) in a very general manner, simply mentioning that the disciplinary procedure began on March 19, 2009 (although it is clear he refers to March 19, 2007, because he refers to official letter number PPCN-128-07 which was issued precisely on March 19, 2007), and given that the procedure began from that moment, he argues that the sanction was issued extemporaneously by the Personnel Council on July 22, 2009. In view of such a scenario, it is necessary to also analyze the issue of the statute of limitations of the procedure (prescripción del procedimiento) for having taken a period exceeding the two months stipulated by numeral 261 of the LGAP. The principle of prompt and complete justice supposes, in the case of administrative procedures, that they must be resolved, in principle, by final act, within reasonable and proportionate periods, avoiding subjecting the recipient to unjustifiably long procedures. It constitutes, therefore, an expression of the maxim of legal certainty, to the extent that it requires the definition of the case within a reasonable timeframe. The complexity or not of the procedure could not justify arbitrarily long procedures, because that would mean admitting an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and at its own discretion, the power to resolve the conflict, to the evident detriment of the aforementioned certainty and in clear violation of due process. In that sense, numeral 261.1 of the LGAP states: "The administrative procedure must be concluded, by final act, within two months following its commencement or, as the case may be, following the filing of the lawsuit or petition of the administered party, unless otherwise provided in this law." That same period is established by numeral 32 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code. Both rules indicate, in essence, that once the indicated periods have elapsed without the Administration issuing a final act, the recipient may consider the petition rejected, by means of negative silence (silencio negativo), in order to file administrative appeals or, alternatively, seek jurisdictional protection. Clearly, the figure of negative silence currently holds a guarantee-oriented approach for the recipient and not an administrative privilege as was previously handled. It constitutes the possibility of understanding the claim as rejected in order to be able to resort to other instances and not be subject to the Administration issuing a formal act. It was precisely the "act-centric" vision of administrative justice, evidenced in the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies that prevailed until the issuance of ruling 3669-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber and numeral 31.1 of the CPCA, which required the issuance of a formal act to access jurisdictional protection, for which purpose, the tacit rejection sought precisely to resort to higher levels to issue that formal conduct -it must be remembered that the previous model had a preeminently objective tendency-. Nowadays, with the merely optional notion of exhaustion of administrative remedies, silence constitutes a guarantee for the individual, enabling him to seek other legal means to seek the protection of his legal situation, no longer as a prerequisite to have an appealable act, but to eliminate administrative inaction in the definition of his legal relationship. However, the analysis of that figure means that such a denial effect is only viable within procedures initiated at the request of a party, given that what has not been requested cannot be understood as denied, so in cases initiated ex officio, the basic prerequisite, which is the petition or claim, is not present. This is established by clause 3 of the aforementioned precept 261 insofar as it indicates: "...the claim or petition of the administered party shall be deemed rejected in view of the Administration's silence..." Ergo, it is not a figure that can be considered pragmatic in ex officio procedures. Now, the violation of the periods established by the legal system for the exercise of a competence may well involve a pathology in the act, due to infringement of the subjective element of competence. It must be remembered that in light of precept 255 of the LGAP, legal periods bind both the Administration and the administered parties. From that postulate it follows, then, that competences subject to a time limit can result in null acts (doctrine of numeral 60.1 LGAP). However, the correct understanding of that last statement must lead to the following. Powers of imperium are imprescriptible (Art. 66.1 ibidem), an aspect that justifies what is stated by numeral 329.3 of the cited Law No. 6227 in that an act issued outside the time limit will be valid for all legal effects, unless expressly stated otherwise by law. A clear example of those exceptions is positive silence (i.e., deemed act -Art. 330 ejusdem in relation to 139-), in which case, correctly declared or having occurred, the maxim of the intangibility of one's own acts operates, which implies the impossibility for the Administration to disregard that effect, under penalty of absolute nullity for infringement of constitutional precept 34. In this example of positive silence, it is precisely due to a temporal factor that the competence to issue the act is lost, not to seek the forms of suppression of the deemed act. Having said this, it is worth clarifying: despite its wording in imperative language, the two-month period established by canon 261.2 of the LGAP is not peremptory, but merely directory, which follows from what has been stated regarding the duty of the Administration to exercise its competences and the initial validity of "extemporaneous" acts. Such a position can also be seen in ruling No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. This applies both to procedures initiated ex officio and those at the request of a party. In the latter, despite the exercise of the power of the effects of negative silence, the Administration may well issue the act, which would broaden the debate at the appeal stage, whether administrative or jurisdictional. From this standpoint, neither the investigative power of the procedure nor the procedure itself are expired if the period in question has been exceeded. Although the structure of the ordinary procedure would lead one to presume that the period in question should always be respected, it is clear that the complexity of a matter and the vicissitudes inherent in the course may lead to longer periods. The decisive factor, then, lies in the procedure showing signs of activity and not unjustified delays, in accordance with the principle of celerity and procedural impetus -numerals 222 and 225 LGAP-, in such a way that its duration is not the product of arbitrary conduct or inaction. Such inaction is sanctioned with figures such as expiration (caducidad), which is regulated in Article 340 of the aforementioned General Law, a rule that was reformed by numeral 200 clause 10 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code. Said rule indicates: "1) When the procedure is paralyzed for more than six months by virtue of a cause exclusively attributable to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration who initiated it, ex officio or by complaint, expiration (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it is the case provided in the final paragraph of Article 339 of this Code (it refers to the same LGAP and not to the CPCA). 2) Expiration (caducidad) of the procedure initiated at the request of a party shall not proceed when the interested party has ceased action because positive or negative silence has occurred, or when the file is ready for the issuance of the final act. 3) The expiration (caducidad) of the administrative procedure does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the procedures are considered as not having been pursued, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations (prescripción)." The analysis of the nature of this figure allows concluding that it is a legal fact within the procedure that is justified as a means of avoiding the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interests of legal certainty, as well as in the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity.

VII.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE.- Notwithstanding the foregoing, the directory nature -not peremptory- of the aforementioned period does not speak to the validity of acts issued within procedures whose delay exceeds the normal threshold of reasonableness. An unreasonable duration of the procedure can lead to the nullity of what has been acted upon due to an injury to the principle of prompt and complete justice (which this Tribunal must protect). In this line, what is stated in precedents numbers 2007-3140 and 2007-6758, both of the Constitutional Chamber, can be observed. In the first, it was forcefully stated: "Now then, from the moment an administrative procedure begins, until the issuance of the final act, a reasonable and proportionate period must elapse, taking into account the actions of the parties, the complexity of the matter, and the legal periods established for each case, in such a way that the Administration can have a prudential period, but without incurring undue delays that hinder the procedure… this Tribunal considers that the time used by the respondent from the moment the procedure began, to date, far from being justifiable, is excessive, unreasonable, and to the detriment of the fundamental rights of the petitioner, due to the unjustified delay incurred by the respondent administration." Not every procedure that takes more than two months implies the nullity of what has been acted upon, but only to the extent that the period is unreasonable, which must be weighed in each case, considering the processing and complexity of what has been acted upon. In this case, from the analysis of the factual picture set forth in the list of proven facts, it is observed that the procedure had internal stages very distanced from each other that reveal times of unjustified inactivity which, it is appreciated, are an expression of serious abandonment, whose comprehensive and unitary understanding within the context of a procedure of this disciplinary nature, leads this Tribunal to consider that such treatment undoubtedly constitutes a breach of the principle of celerity and concentration. A simple review and recount of what happened reveals that what the Administration has acted upon in this case violates the constitutional maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice, protected by ordinal 41 of the Political Constitution, and contravenes the principles of immediacy, ex officio procedural impetus, celerity, which must prevail in these procedures. Indeed, the procedure has as its genesis a complaint filed against the plaintiff through report PPCN-128-07 of March 19, 2007, in which Sergeant Mariano Céspedes Anchía relates that the plaintiff, during working hours when he should have been patrolling in the sector of Barrio el Progreso number 5, was in another area together with another colleague, in a soda called M y M sitting on a chair without having the respective permission to leave the sector. (folios 1 to 5 of the administrative file).

However, it was not until October 17, 2007, that an administrative proceeding was initiated against the plaintiff Enrique Roa Sequeira and another, for the alleged "Abandonment of Service and assigned area" (folios 22 and 23 of the administrative file), an act that was communicated to the plaintiff on October 27, 2007, according to the proof of notification visible at folio 23 of the administrative file. At this point, a delay of approximately seven months between both dates is evident, without it having been proven in this proceeding or the reasons for such tardiness being justified, which reveals, in that first stage, a neglect of the duty to conduct proceedings promptly. Now, with said opening communicated, on March 27, 2008, the oral and private hearing (comparecencia oral y privada) is held, which had initially been scheduled for November 21, 2007, without the accused appearing (folio 28 of the administrative file). That by resolution 1059-IP-09-DDL of 8:55 a.m. on June 25, 2009, the Conducting Body of the Proceeding (Órgano Director del Procedimiento) -Legal Disciplinary Department, Police Inspection Section- deems the misconduct attributed to the plaintiff Roa Sequeira and his colleague Zúñiga Chávez to be duly proven, ordering that the Personnel Council be recommended the sanction of Suspension of the officials for a period of eight days without pay for having abandoned the service and the assigned area on March 19, 2007, at 7:30 a.m., under warning of a more severe sanction if they commit another misconduct. (folios 50 to 55 of the administrative file). This act is issued approximately 15 months after the oral and private hearing was held. In this line, numeral 319 of the LGAP establishes in its first paragraph: "1. Once the hearing (comparecencia) of the matter is concluded, it shall be ready for the issuance of the final act (acto final), which the competent body must do within a period of fifteen days, counted from the date of the hearing, unless it wishes to introduce new facts or complete the evidence, in which case it must consult the superior." Certainly, as established by subsection three of that mandate, such period is understood without prejudice to the periods set by ordinal 261 of that same legal body, which establishes that the proceeding must be concluded by a final act within a period of two months. It is clear, again, that it is an ordering period, given that there is no procedural sanction for its non-compliance according to what is set forth by ordinal 329.3 of the LGAP, however, it is reiterated, this aspect does not imply an open letter for the Administration to disregard the principle of efficiency and, to the detriment of legal certainty and security, to delay without justifiable cause the culmination of the administrative proceeding. Now, once the report of the conducting body was rendered, by official letter number 1059-IP-09-DDL of June 25, 2009, the Personnel Council of the Ministry of Public Security, through an agreement taken in ordinary session 707 held on July 22, 2009, Article VI, Agreement Forty, analyzes resolution 1059-IP-09-DDL and agrees: "ARTICLE VI: Agreement Forty (...) To accept the recommendation of the Legal Disciplinary Department, of the Police Inspection Section, to: SUSPEND FROM THEIR DUTIES FOR A PERIOD OF EIGHT DAYS WITHOUT PAY THE OFFICIALS EDUARDO ENRIQUE ROA SEQUEIRA, IDENTITY CARD NUMBER 6-101-542, AND MIGUEL ANGEL ZUÑIGA CHAVEZ, IDENTITY CARD NUMBER 9-088-234, FOR: 'HAVING ABANDONED THE SERVICE AND THE ASSIGNED AREA, BEING SURPRISED AT THE SODA M Y M LOCATED IN A SECTOR THAT WAS NOT THEIR ASSIGNED AREA, SITTING ON A CHAIR NEXT TO A TABLE, THE FOREGOING WITHOUT HAVING REQUESTED THE CORRESPONDING PERMISSION FOR SUCH PURPOSES, AN EVENT THAT OCCURRED AT APPROXIMATELY 5:30 P.M. ON MARCH 19, 2007, AND THEY ARE WARNED, THAT IN CASE OF COMMITTING ANOTHER MISCONDUCT, THEY MAY BE SANCTIONED MORE DRASTICALLY. THE FOREGOING AS IT SO CORRESPONDS. 2) The Human Resources Directorate is instructed to proceed to communicate the respective agreement to the employee and to indicate to him that the disciplinary sanction being ordered will be executed once it has become final. 3) Likewise, I inform you that against the present resolution, a REVOCATORIA AND APELACIÓN appeal may be filed, within the third day from the receipt hereof, in accordance with articles 344 and 346 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and it must be filed with the LEGAL DISCIPLINARY DEPARTMENT. AGREEMENT FIRM BY UNANIMOUS VOTE." (folio 56 of the administrative file). This act is communicated to the plaintiff by official letter number 5665-2009-DRH-SEC of August 6, 2009, and is notified to him on August 28, 2009, together with resolutions 1059-IP-09-DDL, official letter 1936-2009-C.P, and official letter number 5665-09-DRH-SEC (folios 58 and 59 of the administrative file). The plaintiff challenged that decision in a writ filed on September 4, 2009, filing a revocation appeal (recurso de revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio) against resolution 1059-IP-09-DDL of June 25, 2009 (folio 62 of the administrative file), a recourse measure that is resolved by resolution No. 1803-2009-DDL-SIP at three fifty-eight in the afternoon on October two, two thousand nine (folios 71 to 77 of the administrative file) and in which the Personnel Council is recommended to reject the revocation appeal, as well as the statute of limitations objection (excepción de prescripción) filed, to confirm the appealed act, and to forward the proceedings to the Minister for him to rule on the appeal filed in the alternative by the plaintiff. The Personnel Council, through ordinary session 712 of October 14, 2009, orders in article VIII, in the sixth agreement, to confirm the appealed act and forward the subsidiary appeal to the Hierarchical Superior for his consideration (folio 78 administrative file); this act, together with resolution 1803-2009-DDL-SIP, is notified to the plaintiff by official letter 7186-2009-DRH-SEC, which are notified on November 16, 2009. The appeal (recurso de apelación) filed is rejected by resolution of the Office of the Minister number 2010-2210-D.M at nine o'clock in the morning on June thirtieth, two thousand ten, being notified to the plaintiff on September 21, 2011 (folio 95 of the administrative file) by official letter number 6107-2011-DRH-SEC of August 23, 2011, in which he is also informed that "his immediate supervisor has 3 months to apply said suspension and must inform this Directorate of the days on which it will be fulfilled." (folio 95 of the administrative file). The Sanction imposed as of December 1, 2011, had not been applied to the plaintiff, as can be deduced from official letter number DPC-3315-11-2011 of December 1, 2011 (folio 41 of the main file).- The above detail of what occurred during the course of this proceeding reveals an unreasonable period in its processing, without any justification having been presented that would allow sustaining such delay. Nor can this Court deduce it from the substantive analysis it has conducted of the case file, since the events that occurred are simple in terms of their analysis. Ultimately, this Court considers that such aspect vitiates the proceeding due to an infringement of the principles of procedural impulse, celerity, concentration, and prompt and complete administrative justice. Therefore, a deficiency arises that grounds the invalidity of what was acted. The contrary would lead to condoning proceedings with unreasonable periods without any legal consequence, which, of course, this Court does not tolerate. Consider the length of the periods to issue the resolution after the oral hearing, which amounts to an unjustified time of approximately 15 months; likewise, after the filing of the appeals by the plaintiff (September 4, 2009), the matter is definitively resolved 9 months later, that is, on June 30, 2010 (resolution of the Office of the Minister), and the notification of this resolution is only carried out on September 21, 2011 (that is, the communication act was carried out 15 months after the final and definitive act was issued). While numeral 329.3, previously referenced, indicates that the final act issued out of time is valid, save for legal exceptions, it is clear that this in no way constitutes a sort of permissive, uncontrollable open letter that justifies extremely drawn-out proceedings, with an unreasonable violation of time limits to the detriment of due process, concentration, celerity, procedural unity, and legal certainty, all constituent elements of the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. As has been indicated, such deficiency shows a substantial non-conformity with the legal system (numerals 128, 158 and 223, all of the LGAP) regarding the proceeding conducted, from a comprehensive plane. Such aspect demands the nullity of what was acted. In sum, due to the unjustified delay present in the proceeding under examination, a cause of absolute, insurmountable nullity converges, which leads, without more, to the suppression of that proceeding. At this level, it is appropriate to point out that given such intervals, an unsustainable delay of the proceeding supervenes; that tardiness and lapses during which the file remained inactive, in its comprehensive understanding, violates the efficiency of administrative procedures and prompt and complete administrative justice, which supposes, in accordance with everything stated, a severe pathology in the proceeding, for omissions that violate legal security and certainty, as well as the rights of the individual before this type of proceeding. This is not a denial of the existence of internal corrective powers within the framework of employment relationships, but rather the establishment of limits inherent to the exercise of public power, which the legal system itself imposes, from the plane of temporality for the legitimate exercise of its competencies. Thus, this invalidity undermines the fulfillment of the public purpose that has been imposed in proceedings of this nature, which is the timely correction of the alleged misconduct of officials, but with due respect for their rights within the procedures. Consequently, the nullity of said proceeding must be ordered, and therefore, of the resolutions issued therein. This Court has so held, among others, in ruling No. 199-2011-VI of 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011. By virtue of what is ordered in this ruling, it is omitted as unnecessary to analyze the rest of the plaintiff's allegations.- VII.- THE DECLARED NULLITIES: For such reasons, the nullity of the administrative proceeding initiated against the plaintiff, file 752-IP-2007, must be ordered. Now, in accordance with numeral 164.2 of the LGAP, the nullity of the proceeding supposes, by a criterion of connexity, the invalidity of the acts that depend on it. This implies the nullity of the following acts: a) act of 08:55 a.m. on June 25, 2009, in which the conducting body of the proceeding -Legal Disciplinary Department, Police Inspection Section-, renders report No. 1059-IP-09-DDL that issues a recommendation regarding the disciplinary cause brought against the plaintiff; b) The agreement taken in ordinary session 707, held on July 22, 2009, article VI, agreement forty, in which the Personnel Council of the Ministry of Public Security accepts the recommendation made by the Legal Disciplinary Department of the Police Inspection Section contained in report 1059-IP-09-DDL.- c) Official letter No. 1936-2009-C.P of July 23, 2009, in which the agreement taken in ordinary session 707, held on July 22, 2009, cited in the preceding subsection, is communicated to the Human Resources Directorate.- d) Official letter 5665-2009-DRH-SEC in which the plaintiff is notified of the Fortieth Agreement of session 707 of July 22, 2009, of the Personnel Council, in which the recommendation of report 1059-IP-09-DDL is accepted to suspend him for eight days without pay. e) Resolution No. 1803-2009-DDL-SIP at three fifty-eight in the afternoon on October two, two thousand nine, in which the Legal Disciplinary Department orders to recommend the rejection of the revocation appeal, the confirmation of the sanction, and that the matter be elevated to the Office of the Minister for the resolution of the appeal.-; f) The agreement taken in ordinary session 721, held on October 14, 2009, article VIII, sixth agreement, in which the Personnel Council of the Ministry of Public Security accepts the recommendation made by the Legal Disciplinary Department of the Police Inspection Section contained in report 1803-2009-DDL-SIP.- g) Official letter No. 2796-2009-C.P of October 15, 2009, in which the agreement taken in ordinary session 721, held on October 14, 2009, cited in the preceding subsection, is communicated to the Human Resources Directorate.- h) Official letter 7816-2009-DRH-SEC of October 23, 2009, in which the plaintiff is notified of what was agreed by the Personnel Council in session 721 of October 14, 2009, in which the revocation appeal filed is rejected in all its extremes and the appeal is forwarded to the superior. i) Resolution number 2010-2210 at nine o'clock in the morning on June 30, 2010, in which the Minister rejects the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed and orders: "I.- TO DECLARE UNFOUNDED the subsidiary appeal and the statute of limitations objection (excepción de prescripción) filed by Mr. Enrique Roa Sequeira, identity card number six - one hundred one- five hundred forty-two. II.- To confirm what was ordered in the resolution and official letters brought on appeal, that is, the eight-day suspension without pay imposed on the employee Roa Sequeira. III. To order the Department of Salaries and Compensations to deduct from the stipend of Mr. Roa Sequeira the amount corresponding to eight days without pay, in the event that it has not already been deducted. IV. To forward the respective file to the Human Resources Directorate so that all ordered proceedings may be carried out. V. Finally, send the administrative file in question to the Legal Disciplinary Department, Police Inspection Section, for its custody. The foregoing based on the legal provisions cited above and the reasons of fact and law indicated." j) Official letter 6107-2011-DRH-SEC of August 23, 2011, in which the plaintiff is notified of what was resolved by the Minister through resolution 2010-2210 of June 30, 2010, confirming the sanction imposed and indicating to him that "his immediate supervisor has 3 months to apply said suspension and must inform this Directorate of the days on which it will be fulfilled." The plaintiff submits an argument by virtue of which he indicates that the sanction was drafted and issued extemporaneously on July 22, 2009, an argument he had been maintaining since the course of the administrative procedure without undertaking a greater analysis of what was stated, since he even refers to the procedure having begun on March 19, 2009, with note PPCN-128-07 signed by Sergeant Mariano Céspedes Anchía, when the truth is that indeed the proceeding began with that note, but its date of issuance is March 19, 2007 (folio 04 of the administrative file). He bases his claim on numeral 77 of the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía) and requests the nullity of all actions taken and resolved within administrative file number 752-IP-2007. For its part, the State, in summary, says that since this involves a two-year statute of limitations (prescripción), it is interrupted by the commencement of the disciplinary procedure; therefore, although the computation of the statute of limitations began with the complaint on April 11, 2007, that period was interrupted with the notification of the opening order (auto de apertura) to the plaintiff on October 27, 2007, as this is the first act that interrupts the statute of limitations and from which the period runs until the Personnel Board (Consejo de Personal) is in a position to decide, that is, July 22, 2009; hence, the two-year period of the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía) has not elapsed.-- On the subject of the statute of limitations (prescripción), it is necessary to mention that the release presupposes the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inertia of the holder of a right in its exercise, b) lapse of the time established by the legal system, and; c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship to assert the statute of limitations. This means that there is no releasing effect if, despite the concurrence of elements a and b, the pleading is not formulated. Hence, the statute of limitations (prescripción) follows a rogatory principle and, unlike expiration (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. The foregoing, regarding disciplinary authority, implies that the holder of the right is the administrative superior and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective authority only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which, his power to require recognition of the loss of hierarchical authority emerges. Now, from that perspective, the corrective authority of the superior regarding the officials who depend on him, for reasons of legal certainty, is subject to a prescriptive period. Generically, that period is regulated by mandate 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which sets a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive authority. However, this is a rule that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that point. For example, in matters of public finance, the applicable period is that regulated and specified by Law No. 8292 (art. 43), 8422 (art. 44), and 8131 (art. 112), a matter that is therefore subject to this particular regime. It is a regulatory system that is constituted as a sectoral framework containing specific rules, which, being special, prevail over the general regulations. At its core, these rules refer to the regime provided for in precept 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptrollership of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428. The same occurs with the General Police Law (Ley General de Policía), No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, published in Alcance No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 103 of May 30, 1994, in whose numeral 83 a particular statute of limitations regime is set, namely: "Minor offenses shall prescribe in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary procedure is initiated." There is no controversy whatsoever in this case regarding the applicable regime, it being clear that the position of public force officer held by the plaintiff means that such legal framework is what regulates and specifies the employment relationships he maintains with the Ministry of Public Security (Ministerio de Seguridad Pública). Hence, it is evident that in this case, the applicable statute of limitations period will be that of one month or two years set in the aforementioned ordinal 83 of Law No. 7410. Now, in the context of said norm, the expiration of the period granted to exercise the corrective authority is subject to the grounds for interruption set by article 876 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). It must be specified that the grounds for interruption—which cause the prescriptive period to start anew—can only produce that effect insofar as they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if they occurred, if it is after the period has expired, the mere allegation of negative statute of limitations (prescripción negativa) entails the loss of the exercise of the right foreclosed by inertia in its exercise. Now, the same aforementioned norm (art. 83 Law No. 7410), establishes a specific case of interruption, which is precisely the opening of the procedure. It must be understood that the interruption is not produced by that simple opening resolution, but by the notification thereof that deems the disciplinary cause initiated, in accordance with ordinals 140, 239, 240, 243 of the LGAP. In accordance with the provisions of the indicated norm, the statute of limitations period for disciplining the offense is not computed from the moment the superior receives the report from the directing body of the procedure, but from the moment he is in an objective position to know the cause of the alleged offense. In these cases where a complaint has been filed regarding alleged irregular acts of a specific official, that period runs from that same date, since it is at that moment that the factual cause constituting the basis of the disciplinary action is brought to the attention of the Administration. The contrary would render the cited period nugatory insofar as, regardless of when the hypothetical offense was brought to the attention of the public body—or entity—the period would run until that circumstance is communicated to the superior, which could lead to ignoring the administrative inertia in the due and diligent attention to those matters. By way of example, a case could potentially arise of an unprocessed complaint that was filed more than two years before the superior learns of it. In such a case, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that it could not be maintained that the prescriptive period has not begun, because it has been the Administration itself, with its indolence and abnormal functioning, that has brought about that expiration of the disciplinary authority. Now, in the case under analysis, the complaint that motivated the administrative procedure was filed through official letter number PPCN-128-07 dated March 19, 2007, so it is from that moment on that the two years applicable in this matter must be computed. As has been duly accredited, through the act of 09 hours on October 17, 2007, issued within administrative file number 752-IP-2007, the Legal Disciplinary Department, Police Inspection Section (Departamento Disciplinario Legal, Sección de Inspección Policial), acting as the directing body of the disciplinary procedure, communicated to the plaintiff the opening order (auto de apertura) of the administrative procedure initiated against him. This act was personally notified on October 27, 2007. According to what is indicated by numeral 83 of Law No. 7410, the notification of that opening order interrupts the statute of limitations (prescripción), which in this case has occurred, because at the time of its notification, the two years for the expiration of the corrective authority had not passed. It is necessary to mention that the opening of the procedure leads to the interruption of the statute of limitations, however, during the time the procedure is processed, the multiple acts that are issued during its course have an equally interruptive effect on the aforementioned period, provided they are acts that seek the effective continuation of the cause and not mere dilatory actions to circumvent the periods that should be applicable to the procedure. Thus, v.gr., an act that is clearly issued to circumvent the consequences of procedural indolence, whether due to being unnecessary, arbitrary, or repetitive, would not produce the aforementioned effect, a matter that must be analyzed in each specific case. However, if the process enters into inertia or abandonment attributable to the Administration for a period exceeding six months, and upon the express request of the accused official, the expiration (caducidad) of that procedure is ordered, this in accordance with numeral 340.3 of the LGAP, in which case the interruption is deemed not to have occurred. From that perspective, this Tribunal does not observe that at the time of the opening of the procedure, a statute of limitations (prescripción) of the exercise of the right to sanction disciplinary offenses by the superior of the Ministry of Security had occurred. Nevertheless, it is necessary to enter into the analysis of the temporal element regarding the processing of that procedure.-

VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF THE PROCEDURE

In the case under analysis, the plaintiff addresses the issue of the statute of limitations (prescripción) in a very general manner, simply mentioning that the disciplinary procedure began on March 19, 2009 (although it is clear he refers to March 19, 2007, because he refers to official letter number PPCN-128-07 which was issued precisely on March 19, 2007), and since the procedure began from that moment, he argues that the sanction was issued extemporaneously by the Personnel Board (Consejo de Personal) on July 22, 2009. Given such a scenario, it is also necessary to analyze the issue of the statute of limitations of the procedure (prescripción del procedimiento) for having taken a period exceeding the two months stipulated by numeral 261 of the LGAP. The principle of prompt and complete justice presupposes, in the case of administrative procedures, that they must be resolved, in principle, by a final act, within reasonable and proportional timeframes, avoiding subjecting the recipient to unduly long procedures. It therefore constitutes an expression of the maxim of legal certainty, to the extent that it requires the definition of the cause within a reasonable timeframe. The complexity or not of the procedure could not justify arbitrarily long procedures, as this would imply admitting an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and under its own discretion, the power to resolve the conflict, to the evident detriment of the aforementioned certainty and in clear injury to due process. In that sense, numeral 261.1 of the LGAP states: "The administrative procedure must be concluded, by a final act, within two months after its initiation or, where applicable, after the filing of the lawsuit or petition of the administered party, unless otherwise provided in this law." The same period is set by numeral 32 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Both rules state, at their core, that once the indicated periods have expired without the Administration issuing a final act, the recipient may deem the petition rejected, through negative silence, in order to file administrative appeals or resort to judicial protection. Clearly, the figure of negative silence currently holds a guarantee-oriented purpose for the recipient and not an administrative privilege as was previously handled. It constitutes the possibility of understanding the claim as rejected in order to be able to resort to other instances and not be held subject to the Administration issuing a formal act. It was precisely the "act-centric" vision of administrative justice, evidenced in the mandatory exhaustion of the administrative remedy that prevailed until the issuance of ruling 3669-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and numeral 31.1 of the CPCA, which required the issuance of a formal act to access judicial protection, for which purpose, tacit rejection sought precisely to go to higher scales to issue that formal conduct—it should be remembered that the previous model had a predominantly objective tendency—. Nowadays, with the only optional notion of exhaustion of the administrative remedy, silence implies a guarantee for the individual, enabling him to resort to other legal means to seek the protection of his legal situation, no longer as a prerequisite to have a preleable act, but to suppress administrative inertia in the definition of his legal relationship. However, the analysis of that figure presupposes that such a denial effect is only viable within procedures initiated at the request of a party, given that one cannot understand as denied what has not been requested; therefore, in causes initiated ex officio, the basic premise, which is the petition or claim, is not present. Thus establishes subsection 3 of the cited precept 261 when it states: "...the claim or petition of the administered party shall be deemed rejected in view of the silence of the Administration..." Ergo, it is not a figure that can be considered pragmatic in ex officio procedures. Now, the violation of the periods set by the legal system for the exercise of a competence may well come to incorporate a pathology in the act, due to infringement of the subjective element of competence. It must be remembered that in light of precept 255 of the LGAP, legal periods bind both the Administration and the administered parties. From such a postulate, it follows then that competences subject to a period can lead to null acts (doctrine of numeral 60.1 LGAP). However, the correct understanding of that last statement must lead to the following. Powers of authority are imprescriptible (art. 66.1 ibidem), an aspect that justifies what is stated by numeral 329.3 of the cited Law No. 6227 in that the act issued outside the period will be valid for all legal effects, unless expressly stated otherwise by law. A clear example of those exceptions is positive silence (that is, presumed act -art. 330 ejusdem in relation to 139-), in which case, correctly declared or having occurred, the maxim of intangibility of one's own acts operates, which implies the impossibility of the Administration to disregard that effect, under penalty of absolute nullity for infringement of constitutional precept 34. In this example of positive silence, it is precisely due to a temporal factor that the competence to issue the act is lost, not the competence to seek the ways of suppressing the presumed act. This said, it is worth clarifying, despite its drafting in imperative language, the two-month period set by canon 261.2 of the LGAP is not peremptory, but only directory, which follows from what has been stated regarding the duty of the Administration to exercise its competences and the initial validity of "extemporaneous" acts. Such position can also be seen in ruling No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia). This applies both to procedures initiated ex officio and those at the request of a party. In the latter, despite the exercise of the power of the effects of negative silence, the Administration may well issue the act, which would broaden the debate in appeal venues, whether administrative or jurisdictional. From this perspective, neither the investigative power of the procedure nor the procedure itself are expired if the period in question has been exceeded. Although the structure of the ordinary procedure would lead one to presume that the period in question must always be respected, it is clear that the complexity of a matter and the vicissitudes inherent in the course itself, lead to longer periods. The determining factor, then, lies in the procedure showing signs of activity and not unjustified delays, in accordance with the principle of celerity and procedural impetus -numerals 222 and 225 LGAP-, such that its duration is not the product of arbitrary conduct or inertia. Such inertia is sanctioned with figures such as expiration (caducidad), which is regulated in article 340 of the cited General Law, a norm that was reformed by numeral 200, subsection 10 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Said norm indicates: "1) When the procedure is halted for more than six months by virtue of a cause, exclusively attributable to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, ex officio or by complaint, expiration (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it involves the case provided for in the final paragraph of article 339 of this Code (it refers to the LGAP itself and not to the CPCA). 2) Expiration of the procedure initiated at the request of a party shall not proceed, when the interested party has ceased to manage because positive or negative silence has occurred, or when the file is ready for the final act to be issued. 3) The expiration of the administrative procedure does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the procedures are deemed not to have been pursued, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations (prescripción)." The analysis of the nature of this figure allows concluding that it is a legal fact within the procedure that is justified as a means of avoiding the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interests of legal certainty, as well as in the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity.

VII.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE.- Despite the foregoing, the directory nature—not peremptory—of the aforementioned period does not speak to the validity of acts issued within procedures whose delay exceeds the normal threshold of reasonableness. An unreasonable duration of the procedure can lead to the nullity of the actions taken due to an injury to the principle of prompt and complete justice (which this Tribunal must protect). In this line, what was stated in precedents numbers 2007-3140 and 2007-6758, both from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), can be observed. In the first, it was forcefully stated: "Now, from the moment an administrative procedure begins, until the issuance of the final act, a reasonable and proportional period must elapse, taking into account the actions of the parties, the complexity of the matter, and the legal periods established for each case, in such a way that the Administration may have a prudential period, but without incurring undue delays that hinder the procedure… this Tribunal considers that the time taken by the respondent from the moment the procedure began, to date, far from being justifiable, is excessive, unreasonable, and to the detriment of the fundamental rights of the protected party, due to the unjustified delay in which the respondent administration has incurred.” Not every procedure that takes more than two months implies the nullity of the actions taken, but only to the extent that the period is unreasonable, which must be weighed in each case, considering the processing and complexity of the actions taken. In this cause, from the analysis of the factual picture set forth in the list of proven facts, it is observed that the procedure had internal stages very distanced from one another that reveal periods of unjustified inactivity which appear to be the expression of a serious abandonment. Its comprehensive and unitary understanding within the context of a procedure of this disciplinary nature, leads this Tribunal to consider that such treatment entails, without any doubt, a breach of the principle of celerity and concentration. A simple review and recount of what occurred shows that the actions taken by the Administration in this case violate the constitutional maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice, protected by ordinal 41 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), and contravene the principles of immediacy, ex officio procedural impetus, and celerity that must prevail in these procedures. Indeed, the procedure originates from a complaint filed against the plaintiff through report PPCN-128-07 of March 19, 2007, in which Sergeant Mariano Céspedes Anchía relates that the plaintiff, during working hours when he was supposed to be on his patrol in the area of Barrio el Progreso number 5, was in another area with another colleague, in a soda shop called M y M sitting in a chair without having the respective permission to leave his sector. (folios 1 to 5 of the administrative file). However, it was not until October 17, 2007, that an administrative procedure was initiated against the plaintiff Enrique Roa Sequeira and another, for the alleged "Abandonment of Service and the assigned area (folios 22 and 23 of the administrative file), an act that was communicated to the plaintiff on October 27, 2007, according to the notification record visible on folio 23 of the administrative file. At this point, a delay of approximately seven months between both dates is evidenced, without the reasons for this delay having been accredited or justified in this process, which reveals, in that first stage, a neglect of the duty to promptly process procedures. Now, once the cited opening was communicated, on March 27, 2008, the oral and private hearing was held, which had initially been scheduled for November 21, 2007, without the accused appearing (folio 28 of the administrative file). That through resolution 1059-IP-09-DDL of 8 hours and 55 minutes on June 25, 2009, the Directing Body of the Procedure -Legal Disciplinary Department, Police Inspection section- deems the offense attributed to the plaintiff Roa Sequeira and his colleague Zúñiga Chávez duly accredited, ordering to recommend to the Personnel Board the sanction of Suspension of the officials for a period of eight days without pay for having abandoned the service and the assigned area on March 19, 2007, at 7:30 hours, with the warning of a more severe sanction if they commit another offense. (folios 50 to 55 of the administrative file). This act is issued approximately 15 months after the holding of the oral and private hearing. In this line, numeral 319 of the LGAP establishes in its first paragraph: " 1. Once the hearing is finished, the matter shall be ready for the final act to be issued, which the competent body must do within the period of fifteen days, counted from the date of the hearing, unless it wishes to introduce new facts or complete the evidence, in which case it must consult the superior." Certainly, as established in the third subsection of that mandate, such period is understood to be referred to without prejudice to the periods set by ordinal 261 of that same body of law, which provides that the procedure must be concluded by a final act within the period of two months. It is clear, again, that it is a directory period, since there is no procedural sanction for its non-compliance according to what is set forth in ordinal 329.3 of the LGAP; however, it is insisted, such an aspect does not imply an open letter for the Administration to ignore the principle of efficiency and, to the detriment of certainty and legal certainty, delay the culmination of the administrative procedure without justifiable cause. Now, once the report of the directing body was issued, through official letter number 1059-IP-09-DDL of June 25, 2009.

The Personnel Council of the Ministry of Public Security, by agreement reached in ordinary session 707 held on 22 July 2009, Article VI, Fortieth Agreement, analyzes Resolution 1059-IP-09-DDL and agrees: " **ARTICLE VI:** Fortieth Agreement (...) To accept the recommendation of the Legal Disciplinary Department, of the Police Inspection Section, to: SUSPEND FROM THEIR FUNCTIONS FOR A PERIOD OF EIGHT DAYS WITHOUT PAY THE OFFICIALS EDUARDO ENRIQUE ROA SEQUEIRA, IDENTITY CARD NUMBER 6-101-542 AND MIGUEL ANGEL ZUÑIGA CHAVEZ, IDENTITY CARD NUMBER 9-088-234 FOR: "HAVING ABANDONED THE SERVICE AND THE ASSIGNED AREA BY BEING FOUND AT THE M AND M SODA LOCATED IN A SECTOR THAT DID NOT CORRESPOND TO THEM, SEATED ON A CHAIR NEXT TO A TABLE, THE FOREGOING WITHOUT HAVING REQUESTED THE CORRESPONDING PERMISSION FOR THAT PURPOSE, AN EVENT THAT OCCURRED AT APPROXIMATELY 17:30 HOURS ON 19 MARCH 2007, AND THEY ARE WARNED THAT IN THE EVENT OF COMMITTING ANOTHER FAULT, THEY MAY BE SANCTIONED MORE DRASTICALLY. THE FOREGOING AS IT CORRESPONDS. 2) The Human Resources Directorate is instructed to proceed to communicate the respective agreement to the employee and to indicate that the disciplinary sanction ordered will be executed once it has become final. 3) I also inform you that against this resolution, an appeal for REVOCATION AND APPEAL is available, within the third day from the receipt of this document, in accordance with articles 344 and 346 of the General Law of Public Administration, which must be filed with the LEGAL DISCIPLINARY DEPARTMENT. AGREEMENT FINALIZED UNANIMOUSLY." (folio 56 of the administrative file). This act is communicated to the plaintiff by official letter number 5665-2009-DRH-SEC of 6 August 2009, and is notified on 28 August 2009 together with Resolutions 1059-IP-09-DDL, official letter 1936-2009-C.P, and official letter number 5665-09-DRH-SEC (folios 58 and 59 of the administrative file). The plaintiff challenged that decision in a document filed on 04 September 2009, filing an appeal for revocation with a subsidiary appeal against Resolution 1059-IP-09-DDL of 25 June 2009 (folio 62 of the administrative file), a recourse measure that is resolved through Resolution No. 1803-2009-DDL-SIP at fifteen hours fifty-eight minutes on two October two thousand nine (folios 71 to 77 of the administrative file) and in which it is recommended that the Personnel Council reject the appeal for revocation, as well as the exception of prescription formulated, confirm the appealed act, and refer the proceedings to the Minister so that he may rule on the appeal filed subsidiarily by the plaintiff. The Personnel Council, during ordinary session 712 of 14 October 2009, orders in article VIII in the sixth agreement to confirm the appealed act and refer the subsidiary appeal to the Hierarchical Superior for his consideration (folio 78 administrative file), this act together with Resolution 1803-2009-DDL-SIP is notified to the plaintiff via official letter 7186-2009-DRH-SEC, which are notified on 16 November 2009. The appeal filed is rejected by resolution of the Office of the Minister number 2010-2210-D.M at nine o'clock on thirty June two thousand ten, being notified to the plaintiff on 21 September 2011 (folio 95 of the administrative file) via official letter number 6107-2011-DRH-SEC of 23 August 2011, in which he is also informed that "your immediate superior has 3 months to apply said suspension and must inform this Directorate of the days on which it will be served." (folio 95 of the administrative file). The Sanction imposed as of 01 December 2011 had not been applied to the plaintiff as shown by official letter number DPC-3315-11-2011 of 01 December 2011 (folio 41 of the principal). The foregoing detail of what occurred during the course of this procedure reveals an unreasonable period in its processing, without any justification having been presented that would allow such delay to be sustained. Nor does this Court manage to infer it from the substantive analysis it has conducted of the records, since the events that occurred are simple in terms of their analysis. In conclusion, this Court considers that this aspect vitiates the procedure due to an infringement of the principles of procedural impetus, celerity, concentration, and prompt and complete administrative justice. Therefore, a deficiency arises that provides the basis for the invalidity of what has been carried out. The opposite would lead to condoning procedures with unreasonable timeframes without any legal consequence, which, of course, this Court does not tolerate. Consider the lengthy periods for issuing the resolution after the oral hearing, which constitutes an unjustified time of approximately 15 months; likewise, after the filing of appeals by the plaintiff (04 September 2009), the matter is definitively resolved 9 months later, that is, on 30 June 2010 (resolution of the Office of the Minister), with the notification of this resolution being carried out only on 21 September 2011 (that is, the act of communication was carried out 15 months after the final and definitive act was issued). Although section 329.3 of the aforementioned reference indicates that the final act issued out of time is valid, except for legal exceptions, it is clear that this in no way constitutes a sort of open, permissive, uncontrollable license that justifies extremely drawn-out procedures, with an unreasonable violation of deadlines to the detriment of due process, concentration, celerity, procedural unity, and legal certainty, all constituent elements of the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. As has been noted, such a deficiency shows a substantial disagreement with the legal order (sections 128, 158, and 223, all of LGAP) regarding the procedure carried out, from a comprehensive standpoint. This aspect demands the nullity of what has been carried out. In sum, due to the unjustified delay present in the procedure under examination, a cause of absolute, insurmountable nullity converges, which leads, without further ado, to the suppression of that procedure. At this level, it is appropriate to point out that given such intervals, an untenable delay of the procedure occurs; this tardiness and the periods in which the file remained inactive, in its comprehensive understanding, violates the efficiency of administrative procedures and prompt and complete administrative justice, which supposes, in light of all of the above, a severe pathology in the procedure, due to omissions that violate security and legal certainty, as well as the rights of the individual in this type of procedure. It is not a denial of the existence of internal corrective powers within the framework of employment relationships, but rather the establishment of limits inherent to the exercise of public power, which the legal order itself imposes, from the standpoint of temporality for the legitimate exercise of its competencies. Thus, this invalidity violates the fulfillment of the public purpose that has been imposed in procedures of this nature, that is, the timely correction of the alleged faults of officials, but with due respect for their rights within the procedures. Consequently, the nullity of said procedure must be ordered, and therefore, of the resolutions issued therein. This Court has so held, among others, in ruling No. 199-2011-VI at 16 hours 20 minutes on 12 September 2011. In virtue of what is provided in this ruling, it is unnecessary to analyze the rest of the plaintiff's arguments.- **VII.- THE DECREED NULLITIES:** For such reasons, the nullity of the administrative procedure initiated against the plaintiff, case file 752-IP-2007, must be ordered. Now then, in accordance with section 164.2 of the LGAP, the nullity of the procedure entails, by a criterion of connectedness, the invalidity of the acts that depend on it. This implies the nullity of the following acts: **a)** the act at 08 hours 55 minutes on 25 June 2009, in which the directing body of the procedure –Legal Disciplinary Department, Police Inspection Section– renders report No. 1059-IP-09-DDL, which issues a recommendation regarding the disciplinary case against the plaintiff; **b)** The agreement reached in ordinary session 707, held on 22 July 2009, article VI, fortieth agreement, in which the Personnel Council of the Ministry of Public Security accepts the recommendation made by the Legal Disciplinary Department of the Police Inspection Section contained in report 1059-IP-09-DDL.- **c)** Official letter No. 1936-2009-C.P of 23 July 2009 in which the agreement reached in ordinary session 707, held on 22 July 2009, cited in the previous subparagraph, is communicated to the Human Resources Directorate.- **d)** Official letter 5665-2009-DRH-SEC in which the plaintiff is notified of the Fortieth Agreement of session 707 of 22 July 2009 of the Personnel Council in which the recommendation of report 1059-IP-09-DDL to suspend him for eight days without pay is accepted. **e)** Resolution No. 1803-2009-DDL-SIP at fifteen hours fifty-eight minutes on two October two thousand nine in which the Legal Disciplinary Department orders that the rejection of the revocation appeal, the confirmation of the sanction, and the elevation of the matter to the Office of the Minister for the resolution of the appeal be recommended.-; **f)** The agreement reached in ordinary session **721, held on 14 October 2009** article VIII sixth agreement in which the Personnel Council of the Ministry of Public Security accepts the recommendation made by the Legal Disciplinary Department of the Police Inspection Section contained in report 1803-2009-DDL-SIP.- **g)** Official letter No. 2796-2009-C.P of 15 October 2009 in which the agreement reached in ordinary session 721, held on 14 October 2009, cited in the previous subparagraph, is communicated to the Human Resources Directorate.- **h)** Official letter 7816-2009-DRH-SEC of 23 October 2009 in which the plaintiff is notified of what was agreed by the Personnel Council in session 721 of 14 October 2009, in which the filed revocation is rejected in all its aspects and the appeal is referred to the superior. **i)** Resolution number 2010-2210 at nine hours on 30 June 2010 in which the Minister rejects the appeal filed and orders: "*1.-TO DECLARE WITHOUT MERIT the subsidiary appeal and the exception of prescription filed by Mr. Enrique Roa Sequeira, identity card number six-one hundred one-five hundred forty-two. II.- To confirm what was ordered in the resolution and official letters appealed, that is, the suspension for eight days without pay imposed on the employee Roa Sequeira. III. To order the Remuneration and Compensation Department to deduct from the stipend of Mr. Roa Sequeira the amount corresponding to eight days without pay in the event that it has not already been deducted. IV. To remit the respective case file to the Human Resources Directorate so that all ordered proceedings are carried out. V. Finally, send the administrative case file in question to the Legal Disciplinary Department, Police Inspection Section for its custody.*" The foregoing is based on the legal regulations cited above and the reasons of fact and law indicated." **j)** Official letter 6107-2011-DRH-SEC of August 23, 2011, in which the plaintiff is notified of the decision of the Mr. Minister through resolution 2010-2210 of June 30, 2010, the imposed sanction is confirmed, and it is indicated that "your immediate superior has 3 months to apply said suspension and must inform this Directorate of the days on which it will be served." **V.- THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE:** Since its origins, Administrative Sanctioning Law was part of Criminal Law, which is why an administrative procedure by itself could not be distinguished. However, thanks to the degree of development achieved by Administrative Law, especially through jurisprudential interpretation, it is currently possible to speak of an administrative sanctioning procedure, which is governed by its own principles and precepts. It is essential to understand that at any stage of the procedure, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the person must be respected, so that these are not harmed by arbitrary actions of the Administration. For this reason, care must be taken so that any administrative procedure that may culminate in the imposition of some type of sanction is carried out objectively, with the purpose of determining the real truth of the investigated facts. Understanding the true meaning of the principles of the procedure is fundamental to guarantee its development in accordance with the Law. Within the Administration, Sanctioning Law has the purpose of maintaining the order of the system and repressing, by coercive means, those conducts contrary to the policies of the state entity. The sanctioning power given to the Administration is that by virtue of which sanctions can be imposed on those who fail to observe the actions or omissions imposed on them by the administrative regulatory system, or that which is applicable by the Public Administration in each case. The administrative procedure constitutes an important formal element of public conduct. It serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it establishes the path that the Administration must follow to adopt a specific decision, guiding its actions, while on the other hand, it imposes itself as a reference framework that allows the administered party to establish a comparison of public conduct, in order to set a control that its actions have been manifested in accordance with the norms that guide that conduct. It therefore seeks to become a mechanism for the protection of subjective rights and legitimate interests against public power, as well as to guarantee the legality, timeliness, and appropriateness of the administrative decision and the correct functioning of the public function. As indicated in Article 214 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, its object is to establish the real truth of the facts that serve as the basis for the case under analysis. This formal element is imperative to achieve a balance between the better fulfillment of the Administration's goals and the protection of the rights of the individual, as expressed in Article 225.1 of the cited Law; it is for this reason that canon 216.1 ibidem requires the Administration to adopt its decisions within the procedure with strict adherence to the legal system. In its course, the procedure aims to establish the basic formalities that allow the administered party the full exercise of the right of defense and the right to be heard, in order to establish the aforementioned real truth (among which can be seen those established in canons 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, among others, all of the cited Ley General). This acquires even greater relevance in the so-called control or sanctioning procedures, since in those cases, the final decision may impose a repressive framework on the legal sphere of a person. The same legal system provides for the substantial nature of these minimum guarantees, considering invalid the procedure that does not satisfy these minimum aspects. This follows from Article 223 of the referenced Law, insofar as it indicates that the omission of substantial formalities will cause the nullity of the procedure. From this perspective, this Tribunal has already indicated that the control of the administrative function conferred on this jurisdiction by numeral 49 of the Magna Carta, implies that the Administration, in the course of those procedures (of a sanctioning nature in this case), *satisfies the minimum guarantees established by the applicable regulations, and that substantively, the due process that must be impassable in that conduct has been protected*. Now, by virtue of the foregoing, it is important to analyze the issue of the functions that are proper to the directing body and the deciding body of the procedure. The competence to issue the final act within a procedure corresponds to the deciding body, that is, to whom the legal competence to issue the act that exhausts the administrative route has been conferred. However, for the sake of administrative efficiency, the powers of investigation or formal preparation (instrucción) are delegable to a body in charge of carrying out the formal preparation of the procedure, which has come to be called the "directing or instructing body." In principle, the designation of the latter corresponds to the deciding body, for which its validity is subject to it falling upon an assigned official, regularly designated and in possession of the position. However, it is feasible that in certain cases, the law itself establishes the administrative unit that constitutes the directing body of the proceeding. Exceptionally, it has been allowed that individuals who are not regular officials be constituted as the directing body of the procedure; however, in that specific function, it must be understood that they perform a public function, with the inherent obligations. Regarding its competencies, the representation of the instructing administration within the procedure corresponds to that directing body, as is clearly inferred from numeral 282, subsection 3 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. It is a body with powers of both the formal preparation (instrucción) and the procedural management (ordenación) of the procedure (Art. 227 LGAP), in charge of carrying out all the preparatory stages and then submitting the case file to the deciding body, together with a non-binding opinion—unless a rule states otherwise—(Art. 330 LGAP). While it can render recommendations, they certainly would not be binding, so its determinations for the adoption of a final decision are considered procedural acts (actos de trámite).

Therefore, it is responsible for issuing the opening act, providing procedural impetus, all the investigatory work of the proceeding, directing the hearing, resolving preliminary issues, resolving the appeal for revocation filed against procedural acts, and rendering a report to the decision-making body when remitting the case file for the issuance of the final act. Within its competencies can be seen Articles 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, all of the referenced General Law. For its part, the decision-making body is the competent superior who meets the necessary conditions to issue the final act that resolves the proceeding.

VI.- THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (LA PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE DISCIPLINARY POWER. The analysis of the validity of what was resolved by the Administration in the specific case has as its starting point determining whether an applicable statute of limitations exists in the disciplinary administrative proceeding brought against the defendant. The plaintiff presents an argument by virtue of which he indicates that the sanction was drafted and issued untimely on July 22, 2009, an argument he had been sustaining since the course of the administrative proceeding without making a greater analysis of what was stated, since he even makes reference to the proceeding having begun on March 19, 2009, with official communication PPCN-128-07 signed by Sergeant Mariano Céspedes Anchía, when the truth is that the proceeding indeed began with that communication, but its issuance date is March 19, 2007 (folio 04 of the administrative file). He bases his claim on Article 77 of the General Police Law and requests the nullity of everything done and resolved within administrative file number 752-IP-2007. For its part, the State, in summary, says that since it concerns a two-year statute of limitations period, the same is interrupted by the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding, so that, even though the computation of the statute of limitations began with the complaint on April 11, 2007, that period was interrupted by the notification of the opening order (auto de apertura) to the plaintiff on October 27, 2007, as this is the first act that interrupts the statute of limitations and from which the period runs until the Personnel Council is in a position to decide, that is, July 22, 2009, hence the two-year period of the General Police Law has not elapsed.-- On the subject of the statute of limitations, it is necessary to mention that the release (liberatoria) presupposes the concurrence of three fundamental elements: a) inaction of the holder of a right in its exercise, b) lapse of the time established by the legal system, and; c) allegation or exception by the passive subject of the legal relationship to assert the statute of limitations. This means that there is no releasing effect if, despite the concurrence of presuppositions a and b, the articulation is not formulated. Hence, the statute of limitations answers to a rogatory principle and, unlike expiration (caducidad) (in procedural terms), cannot be considered ex officio. The foregoing regarding the disciplinary power implies that the holder of the right is the administrative superior, and the passive subject is the public official, who, to that extent, is subject to the internal corrective power only for the period expressly set by the applicable regulations, after which, his power to request recognition of the loss of hierarchical power emerges. Now, from that perspective, the corrective power of the superior regarding the officials who depend on him, for reasons of legal certainty, is subject to a prescriptive period. Generically, that period is regulated by Article 603 of the Labor Code, which sets a period of one month for the exercise of that repressive power. However, it is a norm that yields to particular and special regulations, which incorporate diverse rules regarding that extreme. For example, in matters of public finance, the applicable period is the one regulated and specified by Law No. 8292 (art. 43), 8422 (art. 44), and 8131 (art. 112), a matter that is therefore subject to this particular regime. It is a normative system that constitutes a sectorial order containing concrete rules, which, as special, prevail over the general norm. In essence, these norms remit to the regime provided for in Article 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptrollership of the Republic, No. 7428. The same occurs with the General Police Law, No. 7410 of May 26, 1994, published in Supplement No. 16 to La Gaceta No. 103 of May 30, 1994, in whose Article 83 a particular statute of limitations regime is set, namely: "Minor offenses shall prescribe in one month and serious ones, in two years. The statute of limitations shall be interrupted when the disciplinary proceeding is initiated." There is no controversy whatsoever in this case regarding the applicable regime, it being clear that the position of public force officer held by the plaintiff means that such legal framework is the one that regulates and specifies the employment relations he maintains with the Ministry of Public Security. Hence, it is evident that in the specific case, the applicable statute of limitations period will be that of one month or two years set in the aforementioned Article 83 of Law No. 7410. Now, in the context of said norm, the expiration of the period granted to exercise the corrective power is subject to the causes of interruption set by Article 876 of the Civil Code. It should be specified that the causes of interruption—which cause the prescriptive period to start anew—can only produce that effect insofar as they occur before the expiration of the period to be interrupted, because even if they occur, if the period has expired, the simple allegation of negative statute of limitations entails the loss of the exercise of the right precluded by inaction in its exercise. Now, the same norm alluded to (art. 83 Law No. 7410) establishes a specific assumption of interruption, which is precisely the opening of the proceeding. It must be understood that the interruption does not occur with that simple opening resolution, but with the communication thereof which establishes that the disciplinary case has been investigated, in accordance with Articles 140, 239, 240, 243 of the LGAP. In accordance with the provisions of the indicated norm, the statute of limitations period for disciplining the offense is not computed from the moment the superior receives the report from the directing body of the proceeding, but from the moment he is in an objective possibility of knowing the cause of the alleged offense. In these cases where a complaint has been formulated about alleged irregular acts of a specific official, that period runs from that same date, since it is at that moment that the factual cause constituting the support of the disciplinary action is brought to the knowledge of the Administration. The contrary would render the cited period nugatory to the extent that, regardless of when the hypothetical offense was brought to the knowledge of the public body—or entity—the period would run until that circumstance is communicated to the superior, which could lead to ignoring administrative inaction in the due and diligent attention to those matters. By way of example, a case could eventually arise of an unprocessed complaint that was filed more than two years before the superior becomes aware of it. In such a case, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that it could not be sustained that the prescriptive period has not commenced, because it has been the Administration itself which, with its indolence and abnormal functioning, has propitiated that expiration of the disciplinary power. Now, in the case under analysis, the complaint that motivated the administrative proceeding was filed by official communication number PPCN-128-07 dated March 19, 2007, so it is from that instant that the two years applicable in this matter must be computed. As has been credited, through the act of 09 hours on October 17, 2007, issued within administrative file number 752-IP-2007, the Disciplinary Legal Department, Police Inspection Section, acting as the directing body of the disciplinary proceeding, communicates to the plaintiff the opening order (auto de apertura) of the administrative proceeding brought against him. This act was notified personally on October 27, 2007. As indicated by Article 83 of Law No. 7410, the communication of that opening order interrupts the statute of limitations, which in this case has occurred, because at the moment of its notification, the two years for the expiration of the corrective power had not passed. It is necessary to mention that the opening of the proceeding leads to the interruption of the statute of limitations, however, during the time the proceeding is processed, the multiple acts issued during its course have an equally interrupting effect on the alluded period, provided they are acts that seek the effective prosecution of the case and not mere dilatory actions to circumvent the periods that must be applicable to the proceeding. Thus, for example, the act that is clearly issued to circumvent the consequences of procedural indolence, whether unnecessary, arbitrary, or repetitive, would not produce the alluded effect, a matter that must be analyzed in each specific case. However, if the proceeding enters into inaction or abandonment attributable to the Administration for a period exceeding six months, and upon express request of the charged official, the expiration (caducidad) of that proceeding is ordered, this in accordance with Article 340.3 of the LGAP, in which case the interruption is considered not to have occurred. From that perspective, this Tribunal does not observe that a statute of limitations on the exercise of the right to sanction disciplinary offenses by the superior of the Ministry of Security occurred at the time of the opening of the proceeding. Even so, it is necessary to enter into the analysis of the temporal element regarding the processing of that proceeding.-

VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF THE PROCEDURE

In the case under analysis, the plaintiff addresses the subject of the statute of limitations in a very general way, simply mentioning that the disciplinary proceeding began on March 19, 2009 (although it is clear that he refers to March 19, 2007, as he references official communication number PPCN-128-07 which was issued precisely on March 19, 2007), and since the proceeding began from that moment, he argues that the sanction was issued untimely by the Personnel Council on July 22, 2009. Faced with such a panorama, it is also necessary to analyze the issue of the statute of limitations of the procedure for having taken a period exceeding the two months stipulated by Article 261 of the LGAP. The principle of prompt and fulfilled justice presupposes, in the case of administrative proceedings, that they must be resolved, in principle, by a final act, within reasonable and proportional periods, avoiding subjecting the recipient to unfoundedly long proceedings. It therefore constitutes an expression of the maxim of legal certainty, to the extent that it demands the definition of the case within a reasonable timeframe. The complexity or not of the proceeding could not justify arbitrarily long proceedings, as this would mean admitting an uncontrollable power of the Administration to exercise, at any time and at its own discretion, the power to resolve the conflict, to the evident detriment of the aforementioned certainty and in clear violation of due process. In that sense, Article 261.1 of the LGAP states: "The administrative proceeding must be concluded, by a final act, within two months after its initiation or, as applicable, after the filing of the lawsuit or petition of the administered party, unless otherwise provided in this law." That same period is set by Article 32 of the Administrative Contentious Procedural Code. Both norms state, in essence, that once the indicated periods have elapsed without the Administration issuing a final act, the recipient may consider the petition rejected, through negative silence (silencio negativo), in order to file administrative appeals or else, resort to jurisdictional protection. Clearly, the figure of negative silence currently has a guarantee-oriented orientation for the recipient, and not an administrative privilege as was previously handled. It constitutes the possibility of considering the claim rejected in order to be able to resort to other instances and not be subject to the Administration issuing a formal act. It was precisely the "act-centric" vision of administrative justice, evidenced in the mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies that prevailed until the issuance of ruling 3669-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) and Article 31.1 of the CPCA, which demanded the issuance of a formal act to access jurisdictional protection, for which purpose, the tacit rejection sought precisely to resort to higher scales to issue that formal conduct—it must be remembered that the previous model had a preeminently objective tendency—. Nowadays, with the merely optional notion of exhausting administrative remedies, silence represents a guarantee for the individual, enabling him to resort to other legal means to seek the protection of his legal situation, no longer as a prerequisite to have a pleadable act, but to suppress administrative inaction in the definition of his legal relationship. However, the analysis of that figure presupposes that such a denying effect is only viable within proceedings initiated at the request of a party, given that what has not been requested cannot be understood as denied, so, in cases brought ex officio, the base presupposition, which is the petition or claim, is not present. This is established by subsection 3 of the cited Article 261 as it states: "...the claim or petition of the administered party shall be understood as rejected in view of the silence of the Administration..." Ergo, it is not a figure that can be considered pragmatic in ex officio proceedings. Now, the violation of the periods set by the legal system for the exercise of a competence may well incorporate a pathology in the act, due to an infringement of the subjective element of competence. It must be remembered that in light of Article 255 of the LGAP, legal periods bind both the Administration and the administered parties. From such a postulate, it follows then that competencies subject to a term can lead to null acts (doctrine of Article 60.1 LGAP). However, the correct understanding of that last statement must lead to the following. The powers of authority are imprescriptible (art. 66.1 ibidem), an aspect that justifies what is stated by Article 329.3 of the cited Law No. 6227 in that the act issued outside the period shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless expressly stated otherwise by law. A clear example of these exceptions is positive silence (that is, a presumed act -art. 330 ejusdem in relation to 139-), a case in which, correctly declared or occurred, the maxim of intangibility of one's own acts operates, which implies the impossibility for the Administration to disregard that effect, under penalty of absolute nullity for infringement of Article 34 of the Constitution. In this example of positive silence, it is precisely due to a temporal factor that the competence to issue the act is lost, but not to seek the forms of suppression of the presumed act. This said, it is worth clarifying that, despite its wording in imperative language, the two-month period set by Article 261.2 of the LGAP is not peremptory, but only directory, which follows from the foregoing regarding the duty of the Administration to exercise its competencies and the initial validity of "extemporaneous" acts. Such a position can also be seen in ruling No. 34-F-S1-2011 of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice. This applies both to proceedings brought ex officio and those at the request of a party. In the latter, despite the exercise of the power of the effects of negative silence, the Administration may well issue the act, which would broaden the debate in appellate proceedings, whether administrative or jurisdictional. From this perspective, neither the investigative power of the proceeding nor the proceeding itself are extinguished if the period in question has been exceeded. While the structure of the ordinary proceeding would suggest that the period in question must always be respected, it is clear that the complexity of a matter and the vicissitudes inherent to the course may lead to longer periods. The determining factor, then, lies in the proceeding showing signs of activity and not unjustified delays, in accordance with the principle of celerity and procedural momentum – Articles 222 and 225 LGAP –, such that its duration is not the product of arbitrary conduct or inaction. Such inaction is penalized with figures such as the expiration (caducidad) regulated in Article 340 of the cited General Law, a norm that was reformed by Article 200, subsection 10 of the Administrative Contentious Procedural Code. Said norm indicates: "1) When the proceeding is paralyzed for more than six months by virtue of a cause, attributable exclusively to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, ex officio or by complaint, expiration (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it concerns the case provided in the final paragraph of Article 339 of this Code (refers to the LGAP itself and not the CPCA). 2) The expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding initiated at the request of a party shall not proceed, when the interested party has ceased to act because positive or negative silence has occurred, or when the file is ready for the issuance of the final act. 3) The expiration (caducidad) of the administrative proceeding does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the proceedings are considered not followed, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations." The analysis of the nature of this figure allows us to conclude that it is a legal fact within the proceeding that is justified as a means of preventing the excessive prolongation of proceedings, in the interest of legal certainty, as well as in the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity.

VII.- ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC CASE.- Notwithstanding the foregoing, the directory—not peremptory—nature of the alluded period does not speak to the validity of acts issued within proceedings whose delay exceeds the normal threshold of reasonableness. An unreasonable duration of the proceeding can lead to the nullity of what has been done due to a violation of the principle of prompt and fulfilled justice (which this Tribunal must safeguard). In this line, what was stated in precedents numbers 2007-3140 and 2007-6758, both of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), can be observed. In the first, it was forcefully stated: "Now, from the moment an administrative proceeding begins, until the issuance of the final act, a reasonable and proportional period must elapse, taking into account the actions of the parties, the complexity of the matter, and the legal periods established for each case, in such a way that the Administration can have a prudential period, but without incurring undue delays that hinder the proceeding… this Tribunal considers that the time used by the respondent from the moment the proceeding began, to date, far from being justifiable, is excessive, unreasonable, and to the detriment of the fundamental rights of the protected party, due to the unjustified delay that the respondent administration has incurred.” Not every proceeding that takes more than two months implies the nullity of what has been done, but only to the extent that the period is unreasonable, which must be weighed in each case, considering the processing and complexity of the actions. In this case, from the analysis of the factual picture presented in the list of proven facts, it is observed that the proceeding had internal stages that were very distant from one another, revealing periods of unjustified inactivity that, it is appreciated, are an expression of a serious abandonment. Its comprehensive and unitary understanding within the context of a proceeding of this disciplinary nature leads this Tribunal to consider that such treatment undoubtedly represents a breach of the principle of celerity and concentration. A simple review and recount of what happened reveals that the actions of the Administration in this case violate the constitutional maxim of prompt and fulfilled administrative justice, protected by Article 41 of the Political Constitution, and contravene the principles of immediacy, ex officio procedural momentum, and celerity, which must prevail in these proceedings. Indeed, the proceeding has its genesis in a complaint filed against the plaintiff through report PPCN-128-07 of March 19, 2007, in which Sergeant Mariano Céspedes Anchía relates that the plaintiff, during working hours when he should have been patrolling in the Barrio el Progreso number 5 sector, was in another area with another colleague, in a soda shop called M y M, sitting on a chair without having the respective permission to leave the sector. (folios 1 to 5 of the administrative file). However, it was not until October 17, 2007, that an administrative proceeding was initiated against the plaintiff Enrique Roa Sequeira and another, for the alleged "Abandonment of Service and of the assigned area (folios 22 and 23 of the administrative file), an act that was communicated to the plaintiff on October 27, 2007, according to the notification record visible on folio 23 of the administrative file. At this point, a delay of approximately seven months between both dates is evidenced, without the reasons for that delay having been credited or justified in this process, which reveals, in that first stage, a neglect of the duty to investigate proceedings promptly. Now, once the cited opening was communicated, on March 27, 2008, the oral and private hearing was held, which initially had been scheduled for November 21, 2007, without the accused appearing (folio 28 of the administrative file). That by resolution 1059-IP-09-DDL of 8 hours and 55 minutes on June 25, 2009, the Directing Body of the Proceeding—Legal Disciplinary Department, Police Inspection Section—considered the offense attributed to the plaintiff Roa Sequeira and his colleague Zúñiga Chávez duly credited, recommending to the Personnel Council the sanction of Suspension of the officials for a period of eight days without pay for having abandoned the service and the assigned area on March 19, 2007, at 7:30 hours, with a warning of a more severe sanction if they commit another offense. (folios 50 to 55 of the administrative file). This act is issued approximately 15 months after the holding of the oral and private hearing. In this line, Article 319 of the LGAP establishes in its first paragraph: "1. Once the hearing of the matter is concluded, it shall be ready for the issuance of the final act, which the competent body must do within the period of fifteen days, counted from the date of the hearing, unless it wishes to introduce new facts or complete the evidence, in which case it must consult the superior." Certainly, as established by the third subsection of that mandate, such period is understood without prejudice to the periods set by Article 261 of that same legal body, which stipulates that the proceeding must be concluded by a final act within a period of two months.

It is clear, again, that this is a procedural deadline (plazo ordenatorio), given that there is no procedural sanction for its non-compliance pursuant to the provisions of Article 329.3 of the LGAP; however, it is reiterated, this aspect does not imply an open letter for the Administration to disregard the principle of efficiency and, to the detriment of legal certainty and security (certeza y seguridad jurídica), to delay the conclusion of the administrative procedure without justifiable cause. Now, once the report of the directing body was rendered, by official letter number 1059-IP-09-DDL of June 25, 2009, the Consejo de Personal of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, by agreement taken in ordinary session 707 held on July 22, 2009, Article VI, Forty-second Agreement, analyzes resolution 1059-IP-09-DDL and agrees: "ARTICLE VI: Forty-second Agreement (...) Accept the recommendation of the Departamento Disciplinario Legal, of the Sección de Inspección Policial to: THE OFFICIALS EDUARDO ENRIQUE ROA SEQUEIRA, IDENTITY CARD NUMBER 6-101-542 AND MIGUEL ANGEL ZUÑIGA CHAVEZ IDENTITY CARD NUMBER 9-088-234 ARE SUSPENDED FROM THEIR DUTIES FOR A PERIOD OF EIGHT DAYS WITHOUT PAY FOR: "HAVING ABANDONED THE SERVICE AND THE ASSIGNED AREA UPON BEING FOUND AT LA SODA M Y M LOCATED IN A SECTOR THAT DID NOT CORRESPOND TO THEM, SITTING IN A CHAIR NEXT TO A TABLE, THE FOREGOING WITHOUT HAVING REQUESTED THE CORRESPONDING PERMISSION FOR THAT PURPOSE, AN EVENT THAT OCCURRED AT APPROXIMATELY 5:30 P.M. ON MARCH 19, 2007, AND THEY ARE WARNED THAT IN THE EVENT OF COMMITTING ANOTHER FAULT, THEY MAY BE SANCTIONED MORE DRASTICALLY. THE FOREGOING AS CORRESPONDS. 2) The Dirección de Recursos Humanos is instructed to proceed to communicate the respective agreement to the employee and to indicate to him that the disciplinary sanction ordered shall be executed once it has become final. 3) Likewise, I inform you that against this resolution, an appeal for REVOCATORIA Y APELACIÓN is available, within the third day from the receipt of this, in accordance with Articles 344 and 346 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which must be filed in the DEPARTAMENTO DISCIPLINARIO LEGAL. AGREEMENT FIRM BY UNANIMITY." (folio 56 of the administrative file). This act is communicated to the plaintiff by official letter number 5665-2009-DRH-SEC of August 6, 2009, and is notified to him on August 28, 2009, together with resolutions 1059-IP-09-DDL, official letter 1936-2009-C.P, and official letter number 5665-09-DRH-SEC (folios 58 and 59 of the administrative file). The plaintiff challenged that decision in a brief filed on September 4, 2009, filing an appeal for revocatoria with apelación in subsidy against resolution 1059-IP-09-DDL of June 25, 2009 (folio 62 of the administrative file), a recourse measure that is resolved by resolution No. 1803-2009-DDL-SIP of three fifty-eight in the afternoon of October second, two thousand nine (folios 71 to 77 of the administrative file) and in which it is recommended to the Consejo de Personal to reject the appeal for revocatoria, as well as the statute of limitations exception (excepción de prescripción) filed, to confirm the appealed act, and to refer the proceedings to the Señor Ministro so that he may rule on the apelación filed subsidiarily by the plaintiff. The Consejo de Personal, by ordinary session 712 of October 14, 2009, orders in Article VIII, sixth agreement, to confirm the appealed act and to refer the apelación in subsidy to the Hierarchical Superior for his consideration (folio 78 administrative file); this act, together with resolution 1803-2009-DDL-SIP, is notified to the plaintiff by official letter 7186-2009-DRH-SEC, which are notified on November 16, 2009. The appeal for apelación filed is rejected by resolution of the Despacho del Señor Ministro number 2010-2210-D.M of nine o'clock on June thirtieth, two thousand ten, being notified to the plaintiff on September 21, 2011 (folio 95 of the administrative file) by official letter number 6107-2011-DRH-SEC of August 23, 2011, in which he is also told that "su jefe inmediato has 3 months to apply said suspension and must communicate to this Dirección the days on which it will be fulfilled." (folio 95 of the administrative file). The Sanction imposed as of December 1, 2011, had not been applied to the plaintiff, as is evident from official letter number DPC-3315-11-2011 of December 1, 2011 (folio 41 of the principal file). The foregoing detail of what occurred during the course of this procedure reveals an unreasonable timeframe in its processing, without any justification having been presented that would allow such delay to be sustained. Nor can this Tribunal infer it from the substantive analysis it has conducted of the case file, as the events that occurred are simple in terms of their analysis. In short, this Tribunal considers that this aspect vitiates the procedure for violation of the principles of procedural impetus, celerity, concentration, and prompt and complete administrative justice. Thus, a deficiency arises that provides a basis for the invalidity of the proceedings. The contrary would lead to condoning procedures with unreasonable timeframes without any legal consequence, which, of course, this Tribunal does not tolerate. Consider the length of time to issue the resolution after the oral hearing, which amounts to an unjustified time of approximately 15 months; similarly, after the filing of the appeals by the plaintiff (September 4, 2009), the matter is finally resolved 9 months later, that is, on June 30, 2010 (resolution of the Despacho del señor Ministro), whereas notification of this resolution is not effected until September 21, 2011 (meaning the act of communication occurred 15 months after the final and definitive act was issued). While the aforementioned Article 329.3 indicates that the final act rendered out of time is valid, save for legal exceptions, it is clear that this by no means represents a sort of open, permissive, uncontrollable letter that justifies extremely prolonged procedures, with unreasonable violation of deadlines to the detriment of due process, concentration, celerity, procedural unity, legal certainty, all constitutive elements of the maxim of prompt and complete administrative justice. As has been noted, such a flaw shows a substantial nonconformity with the legal system (Articles 128, 158, and 223, all of the LGAP) regarding the procedure carried out, from a comprehensive standpoint. This aspect necessitates the nullity of the proceedings. In sum, due to the unjustified delay present in the procedure under examination, a cause for absolute, insurmountable nullity converges, which leads, without more, to the suppression of that procedure. It is worth noting at this level that faced with such intervals, an indefensible delay of the procedure supervenes; that tardiness and the lapses in which the file remained inactive, in their comprehensive understanding, violate the efficiency of administrative procedures and prompt and complete administrative justice, which entails, in light of all the foregoing, a severe pathology in the procedure, due to omissions that violate security and legal certainty, as well as the rights of the individual in this type of procedure. This is not a denial of the existence of internal corrective powers within the framework of employment relationships, but rather the establishment of limits inherent to the exercise of public power, which the legal system itself imposes, from the standpoint of temporality for the legitimate exercise of its competencies. Thus, this invalidity violates the fulfillment of the public purpose that has been imposed in procedures of this nature, which is the timely correction of alleged faults by officials, but with due respect for their rights within the procedures. Consequently, the nullity of said procedure and, therefore, of the resolutions issued therein, must be ordered. This Tribunal has so held, among others, in ruling No. 199-2011-VI of 4:20 p.m. on September 12, 2011. By virtue of what is ordered in this ruling, it is unnecessary to proceed to analyze the remainder of the plaintiff's allegations.- VII.- THE DECREED NULLITIES: For such reasons, the nullity of the administrative procedure brought against the plaintiff, file 752-IP-2007, must be ordered. Now, in accordance with Article 164.2 of the LGAP, the nullity of the procedure entails, by the criterion of conexity, the invalidity of the acts that depend upon it. This implies the nullity of the following acts: a) the act of 8:55 a.m. on June 25, 2009, in which the directing body of the procedure -Departamento Disciplinario Legal, Sección de Inspección Policial-, renders report No. 1059-IP-09-DDL which issues a recommendation regarding the disciplinary cause pursued against the plaintiff; b) The agreement taken in ordinary session 707, held on July 22, 2009, Article VI, Forty-second Agreement, in which the Consejo de Personal of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública accepts the recommendation made by the Departamento Disciplinario legal of the Sección de Inspección Policial contained in report 1059-IP-09-DDL.- c) Official letter No. 1936-2009-C.P of July 23, 2009, in which the agreement taken in ordinary session 707, held on July 22, 2009, cited in the previous section, is communicated to the Dirección de Recursos humanos.- d) Official letter 5665-2009-DRH-SEC in which the Forty-second Agreement of session 707 of July 22, 2009, of the Consejo de Personal, in which the recommendation of report 1059-IP-09-DDL to suspend him for eight days without pay is accepted, is communicated to the plaintiff. e) Resolution No. 1803-2009-DDL-SIP of three fifty-eight in the afternoon of October second, two thousand nine, in which the Departamento Disciplinario Legal orders to recommend the rejection of the appeal for revocatoria, the confirmation of the sanction, and that the matter be elevated to the Despacho del Señor Ministro for the resolution of the appeal for apelación.-; f) The agreement taken in ordinary session 721, held on October 14, 2009, Article VIII, sixth agreement, in which the Consejo de Personal of the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública accepts the recommendation made by the Departamento Disciplinario legal of the Sección de Inspección Policial contained in report 1803-2009-DDL-SIP.- g) Official letter No. 2796-2009-C.P of October 15, 2009, in which the agreement taken in ordinary session 721, held on October 14, 2009, cited in the previous section, is communicated to the Dirección de Recursos humanos.- h) Official letter 7816-2009-DRH-SEC of October 23, 2009, in which what was agreed by the Consejo de Personal in session 721 of October 14, 2009, in which the revocatoria filed is rejected in all its aspects and the apelación is referred to the superior, is communicated to the plaintiff. i) Resolution number 2010-2210 of nine o'clock on June 30, 2010, in which the Señor Ministro rejects the appeal for apelación filed and orders: "I.- DECLARE WITHOUT MERIT the appeal for apelación in subsidy and the statute of limitations exception filed by Mr. Enrique Roa Sequeira, identity card number six - one hundred one- five hundred forty-two. II.- Confirm what was ordered in the resolution and official letters under appeal, that is, the suspension for eight days without pay imposed on employee Roa Sequeira. III. Order the Departamento de Remuneraciones y Compensaciones to deduct from Mr. Roa Sequeira's salary the amount corresponding to eight days without pay in the event that it has not already been deducted. IV. Refer the respective file to the Dirección de Recursos Humanos so that all ordered proceedings are carried out. V. Finally, send the administrative file in question to the Departamento Disciplinario legal, Sección de Inspección Policial for its custody. The foregoing based on the legal regulations cited above and the reasons of fact and law indicated." j) Official letter 6107-2011-DRH-SEC of August 23, 2011, in which what was resolved by the Señor Ministro by resolution 2010-2210 of June 30, 2010, confirming the imposed sanction, is communicated to the plaintiff, and indicates that "su jefe inmediato has 3 months to apply said suspension and must communicate to this Dirección the days on which it will be fulfilled."

¨ V.- EL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO: Desde sus orígenes, el Derecho Administrativo Sancionador formó parte del Derecho Penal, por lo cual no se lograba distinguir un procedimiento administrativo por sí mismo. Sin embargo, gracias al grado de desarrollo alcanzado por el Derecho Administrativo, especialmente a través de la interpretación jurisprudencial, en la actualidad resulta posible hablar de un procedimiento administrativo sancionador, el cual se rige por principios y preceptos que le son propios. Es fundamental comprender que en cualquier etapa del procedimiento se deberán respetar los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos de la persona, de forma tal que estos no resulten lesionados por actuaciones arbitrarias de la Administración. Por ello, se debe velar por que todo procedimiento administrativo que pueda culminar con la imposición de algún tipo de sanción, se efectúe de forma objetiva, teniendo como finalidad determinar la verdad real de los hechos investigados. Comprender el verdadero significado de los principios del procedimiento, es fundamental para garantizar su desarrollo ajustado a Derecho. Dentro de la Administración, el Derecho Sancionador tiene como finalidad mantener el orden del sistema y reprimir por medios coactivos, aquellas conductas contrarias a las políticas del ente estatal. El poder sancionador dado a la Administración es aquel en virtud del cual pueden imponerse sanciones a quienes incurran en la inobservancia de las acciones u omisiones que le son impuestas por el ordenamiento normativo administrativo, o el que sea aplicable por la Administración Pública en cada caso. El procedimiento administrativo constituye un importante elemento formal de la conducta pública. Cumple una doble finalidad. Por un lado, establece el camino que ha de seguir la Administración para adoptar una determinada decisión, orientando su proceder, mientras que por otro se impone como un marco de referencia que permite al administrado, establecer un cotejo del proceder público, a fin de fijar un control de que sus actuaciones se hayan manifestado acorde a las normas que orientan ese proceder. Busca por ende, constituirse en un mecanismo de tutela de derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos frente al poder público, así como garantizar la legalidad, oportunidad y conveniencia de la decisión administrativa y el correcto funcionamiento de la función pública. Conforme lo señala el artículo 214 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, su objeto es establecer la verdad real de los hechos que sirven de motivo al caso bajo análisis.- Este elemento formal resulta imperativo para lograr un equilibrio entre el mejor cumplimiento de los fines de la Administración y la tutela de los derechos del particular, tal y como se expresa en el artículo 225.1 de la citada Ley, es por ello que el canon 216.1 ibídem, exige a la Administración adoptar sus decisiones dentro del procedimiento con estricto apego al ordenamiento jurídico. En su curso, el procedimiento pretende establecer las formalidades básicas que permitan al administrado el ejercicio pleno del derecho de defensa y el contradictorio, para llegar a establecer la referida verdad real (dentro de las cuales pueden verse las estatuidas en los cánones 217, 218, 219, 297, 317, entre otros, todos de la citada Ley General). Ello adquiere aún mayor relevancia en los denominados procedimientos de control o sancionatorios, pues en esos casos, la decisión final puede imponer un marco represivo en la esfera jurídica de una persona. El mismo Ordenamiento dispone la sustancialidad de estas garantías mínimas, considerando inválido el procedimiento que no satisfaga esas cuestiones mínimas. Así se desprende del artículo 223 de la Ley de referencia, en cuanto señala que la omisión de formalidades sustanciales causará nulidad del procedimiento. Desde este plano, este Tribunal ya ha señalado que el control de la función administrativa que confiere a esta jurisdicción el numeral 49 de la Carta Magna, supone que la Administración en el curso de esos procedimientos (de corte sancionatorio para este caso), satisfacen las garantías mínimas fijadas por la normativa aplicable, y que en lo medular, se ha tutelado el debido proceso que ha de ser infranqueable en ese proceder. Ahora bien, en virtud de lo indicado, es importante analizar el tema de las funciones que le son propias al órgano director y al órgano decisor del procedimiento. La competencia para emitir el acto final dentro de un procedimiento corresponde al órgano decisor, es decir a quien se le ha conferido la competencia legal para emitir el acto que causa estado. Empero, en aras de la eficiencia administrativa, las competencias de instrucción son delegables en un órgano encargado de llevar a cabo la instrucción del procedimiento, el que se ha tendido en denominar "órgano director o instructor". En principio, la designación de este último corresponde al órgano decisor, para lo cual, su validez se encuentra sujeta a que recaiga en un funcionario adscrito, designado regularmente y en posesión del cargo. Sin embargo, es factible que en determinados supuestos, la misma ley establezca la unidad administrativa que se constituye en órgano director del trámite. Excepcionalmente se ha permitido que se constituya como órgano director del procedimiento a personas que no son funcionarios regulares, sin embargo, en esa función específica, debe entenderse que cumplen una función pública, con las obligaciones inherentes. En cuanto a sus competencias, la representación de la administración instructora dentro del procedimiento corresponde a ese órgano director, según se desprende con toda claridad del numeral 282 inciso 3 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Se trata de un órgano con potestades de instrucción y ordenación del procedimiento (art. 227 LGAP), encargada de llevar todas las etapas preparatorias para luego, remitir los autos al órgano decisor, junto con un dictamen no vinculante -salvo norma en contrario- (art. 330 LGAP). Si bien puede rendir recomendaciones, ciertamente no serían vinculantes, por lo que sus determinaciones de cara a la adopción de una decisión final se consideran actos de trámite. Por ende, le corresponde dictar el acto de apertura, dar impulso procesal, toda la labor de instrucción del procedimiento, dirigir la comparecencia, resolver cuestiones previas, resolver el recurso de revocatoria que se interponga contra los actos de trámite, rendir un informe al órgano decisor al momento de remitir el expediente para el dictado del acto final. Dentro de sus competencias pueden verse los artículos 221, 227, 230, 248, 249, 267, 282, 300, 301, 304, 314, 315, 316, 318, 323, 326, 333, 349, 352, todos de la Ley General de referencia. Por su parte, el órgano decisor es el jerarca competente que reúne las condiciones necesarias para dictar el acto final que resuelve el procedimiento.

VI.- LA PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA. El análisis de validez de lo resuelto por la Administración en el caso concreto tiene como punto de partida determinar si existe una prescripción aplicable en el procedimiento administrativo disciplinario instaurado contra el demandado. El demandante presenta un alegato en virtud del cual indica que la sanción se redacta y dicta extemporáneamente el 22 de julio de 2009, alegato que venía sosteniendo desde el curso del procedimiento administrativo sin hacer un mayor análisis de lo expuesto, ya que incluso hace referencia a que el procedimiento inició el 19 de marzo de 2009 con la nota PPCN-128-07 suscrita por el Sargento Mariano Céspedes Anchía, cuando lo cierto es que efectivamente con esa nota inicia el trámite, pero la fecha de emisión de la misma es el 19 de marzo de 2007 (folio 04 del expediente administrativo), fundamenta su pretensión en el numeral 77 de la Ley General de Policía y pide la nulidad de todo lo actuado y resuelto dentro del expediente administrativo número 752-IP-2007. Por su parte el Estado en resumen, dice que al tratarse de un plazo de prescripción de dos años, el mismo se interrumpe con el inicio del procedimiento disciplinario por lo que, si bien el cómputo de la prescripción se inició con la denuncia el 11 de abril de 2007, ese plazo se interrumpió con la notificación del auto de apertura al actor el 27 de octubre de 2007, por ser éste el primer acto que interrumpe la prescripción y desde el cual corre el plazo hasta cuando el Consejo de Personal está en posición de decidir, es decir el 22 de julio de 2009 de ahí que el plazo de dos años de la Ley General de Policía no ha transcurrido.- Sobre el tema de la prescripción es preciso hacer mención a que la liberatoria supone la concurrencia de tres elementos fundamentales: a) inercia del titular de un derecho en su ejercicio, b) transcurso del tiempo establecido por el ordenamiento jurídico y; c) alegación o excepción del sujeto pasivo de la relación jurídica de hacer valer la prescripción. Ello supone que no existe efecto liberatorio si pese a concurrir los presupuestos a y b, la articulación no se formula. De ahí que la prescripción atienda a un principio rogatorio y a diferencia de la caducidad (en términos procesales), no pueda ser considerada de oficio. Lo anteriormente derecho es el jerarca administrativo y el sujeto pasivo el funcionario público, quien en esa medida, se encuentra sujeto a la potestad correctiva interna solo por el plazo que expresamente fije la normativa aplicable, vencido el cual, emerge su facultad de requerir el reconocimiento de la pérdida de la potestad jerárquica. Ahora bien, desde esa perspectiva, la potestad correctiva del jerarca respecto de los funcionarios que de él dependen, por un tema de seguridad jurídica, se encuentra sujeta a plazo prescriptivo. De manera genérica, ese plazo se regula por el mandato 603 del Código de Trabajo, el cual fija un plazo de un mes para el ejercicio de esa potestad represiva. Sin embargo, se trata de una norma que cede frente a regulaciones particulares y especiales, que incorporan reglas diversas en cuanto a ese extremo. Por ejemplo, en materia de hacienda pública, el plazo aplicable resulta el regulado y precisado por la Ley No. 8292 (art. 43), 8422 (art. 44) y 8131 (art. 112), materia que por ende está afecta a éste régimen particular. Se trata de un sistema normativo que se constituye como un ordenamiento sectorial que contiene reglas concretas, que en tanto especiales, prevalecen sobre la normativa general. En lo medular, estas normas remiten al régimen previsto en el precepto 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428. Ocurre lo mismo con la Ley General de Policía, No. 7410 del 26 de mayo de 1994, publicada en el Alcance No. 16 a La Gaceta No. 103 del 30 de Mayo de 1994, en cuyo numeral 83 se fija un régimen de prescripción particular, a saber: "Las faltas leves prescribirán en un mes y las graves, a los dos años. La prescripción se interrumpirá cuando se inicie el procedimiento disciplinario." No existe controversia alguna en esta causa respecto del régimen aplicable, siendo claro que el puesto de oficial de la fuerza pública que desempeña el accionante hace que tal marco legal sea el que regule y precise las relaciones funcionariales que mantiene con el Ministerio de Seguridad Pública. De ahí que resulte evidente que en la especie, el plazo de prescripción aplicable, será el de un mes o de dos años fijado en el precitado ordinal 83 de la Ley No. 7410. Ahora bien, en el contexto de dicha norma, el fenecimiento del plazo conferido para ejercer la potestad correctiva se encuentra sujeto a las causales de interrupción que fija el artículo 876 del Código Civil. Cabe precisar, las causales de interrupción -que hacen que el plazo prescriptivo inicie de nuevo- solo pueden producir ese efecto en la medida en que ocurran antes del vencimiento del plazo a interrumpir, pues aún ocurridas, si lo es vencido el plazo, la simple alegación de prescripción negativa conlleva la pérdida del ejercicio del derecho precluido por inercia en su ejercicio. Ahora bien, la misma norma aludida (art. 83 Ley No. 7410), establece un supuesto específico de interrupción, que es justamente la apertura del procedimiento. Debe entenderse que la interrupción no se produce con esa simple resolución de apertura, sino con la comunicación de la misma que tiene por instruida la causa disciplinaria, de conformidad con los ordinales 140, 239, 240, 243 de la LGAP. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en la norma señalada, el plazo de prescripción para disciplinar la falta no se computa desde el momento en que el jerarca recibe el informe del órgano director del procedimiento, sino desde el momento en que se encuentre en posibilidad objetiva de conocer la causa de la supuesta falta. En estos casos en que se ha formulado una denuncia sobre supuestos actos irregulares de un determinado funcionario, ese lapso corre desde esa misma fecha, pues es en ese momento que se pone en conocimiento de la Administración la causa fáctica que constituye el sustento de la acción disciplinaria. Lo contrario haría nugatorio el citado plazo en la medida en que al margen de cuando fue puesta a conocimiento del órgano -o ente- público la hipotética falta, el plazo correría hasta que se comunique al jerarca de esa circunstancia, lo que puede llevar a desconocer la inercia administrativa en la debida y diligente atención de esos asuntos. A manera de ejemplo, podría eventualmente darse un caso de denuncia no tramitada que fuera presentada más de dos años antes de que el jerarca la conozca. En tal caso, es criterio de este Tribunal, que no podría sostenerse que el plazo prescriptivo no ha iniciado, porque ha sido la misma Administración quien con su indolencia y funcionamiento anormal, ha propiciado ese fenecimiento de la potestad disciplinaria. Ahora, en el caso que se analiza, la denuncia que motivó el procedimiento administrativo fue presentada mediante oficio número PPCN-128-07 fechado 19 de marzo de 2007, por lo que es a partir de ese instante que deben computarse los dos años que aplican en esta materia. Según se ha tenido por acreditado, mediante el acto de las 09 horas del 17 de octubre de 2007, dictado dentro del expediente administrativo número 752-IP-2007, el Departamento Disciplinario Legal, Sección de Inspección Policial, fungiendo como órgano director del procedimiento disciplinario, comunica al actor auto de apertura del procedimiento administrativo instaurado en su contra. Este acto fue notificado de manera personal el 27 de octubre de 2007. Conforme a lo indicado por el numeral 83 de la Ley No. 7410, la comunicación de ese auto de apertura interrumpe la prescripción, lo que en este caso ha sucedido, pues al momento de su notificación, no habían pasado los dos años para la expiración de la potestad correctiva. Es preciso mencionar que la apertura del procedimiento lleva a la interrupción de la prescripción, sin embargo durante el tiempo en que el procedimiento se tramita, los múltiples actos que se emiten durante su curso, tienen un efecto igualmente interruptor en el plazo aludido, siempre que sean actos que busquen la efectiva prosecución de la causa y no meras gestiones dilatorias para burlar los plazos que deben ser aplicables al procedimiento. Así, v.gr., no produciría el efecto aludido el acto que con claridad se emite para burlar las consecuencias de la indolencia procedimental, sea por innecesarios, arbitrarios o reiterativos, tema que deberá analizarse en cada caso concreto. Sin embargo, si el proceso ingresa en inercia o abandono atribuible a la Administración por un plazo superior a seis meses, y ante petición expresa del funcionario encausado, se dispone la caducidad de ese procedimiento, esto acorde con el numeral 340.3 de la LGAP, en cuyo caso la interrupción se tiene por no ocurrida. Desde ese plano, no observa este Tribunal que al momento de la apertura del procedimiento se haya producido una prescripción del ejercicio del derecho de sancionar faltas disciplinarias por parte del jerarca del Ministerio de Seguridad. Con todo, es menester ingresar al análisis del elemento temporal en lo que respecta a la tramitación de ese procedimiento.-

VI. PRESCRIPCIÓN DEL PROCEDIMIENTO

En el caso bajo análisis, el actor aborda de manera muy general el tema de la prescripción, haciendo simplemente mención a que el procedimiento disciplinario inició el 19 de marzo de 2009 (aunque es claro que se refiere al 19 de marzo de 2007 pues hace referencia al oficio número PPCN-128-07 que se emitió precisamente el 19 de marzo de 2007), y siendo que a partir de ese momento inició el procedimiento, aduce que la sanción se dictó extemporáneamente por parte del Consejo de Personal el 22 de julio de 2009 . Ante tal panorama resulta necesario además analizar el tema de la prescripción del procedimiento por haber tardado un plazo superior a los dos meses que estipula el numeral 261 de la LGAP. El principio de justicia pronta y cumplida supone, para el caso de los procedimientos administrativos, que deben ser resueltos, en tesis de principio, por acto final, dentro de plazos razonables y proporcionales, evitando someter al destinatario a procedimientos infundadamente largos. Constituye por ende una expresión de la máxima de seguridad jurídica, en la medida en que exige la definición de la causa dentro de un espacio temporal razonable. La complejidad o no del procedimiento no podría justificar procedimientos arbitrariamente largos, pues ello supondría admitir un poder incontrolable de la Administración para ejercitar, en cualquier tiempo y bajo su propio arbitrio, la potestad de resolver el conflicto, en detrimento evidente de la aludida certeza y en clara lesión del debido proceso. En ese sentido, el numeral 261.1 de la LGAP señala: "El procedimiento administrativo deberá concluirse, por acto final, dentro de los dos meses posteriores a su iniciación o, en su caso, posteriores a la presentación de la demanda o petición del administrado, salvo disposición en contrario de esta ley." Ese mismo plazo fija el numeral 32 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Ambas normas señalan, en lo medular, que vencidos los plazos señalados sin que la Administración emita acto final, el destinatario podrá tener por rechazada la petición, mediante silencio negativo, a fin de interponer los recursos administrativos o bien, acudir a la tutela jurisdiccional. Claramente la figura del silencio negativo en la actualidad ostenta una orientación garantista para el destinatario y no un privilegio administrativo como anteriormente se manejaba. Constituye la posibilidad de entender por rechazado el reclamo para poder acudir a otras instancias y no encontrarse sujeto a que la Administración emita un acto formal. Era precisamente la visión "acto-céntrica" de la justicia administrativa, evidenciada en el agotamiento preceptivo de la vía administrativa que imperaba hasta la emisión del fallo 3669-2006 de la Sala Constitucional y el numeral 31.1 del CPCA, la que exigía la emisión de un acto formal para acceder a la tutela jurisdiccional, para lo cual, el rechazo tácito buscaba precisamente acudir a escalas superiores para emitir esa conducta formal -debe recordarse que el anterior modelo tenía una tendencia preeminentemente objetiva-. Hoy en día, con la noción solo facultativa del agotamiento de la vía administrativa, el silencio supone una garantía para el particular, que le posibilita acudir a otros medios jurídicos para buscar la tutela de su situación jurídica, ya no como presupuesto para contar con un acto preleable, sino para suprimir la inercia administrativa en la definición de su relación jurídica. No obstante, el análisis de esa figura supone que tal efecto denegatorio solo es viable dentro de los procedimientos iniciados a gestión de parte, siendo que no se puede entender negado lo que no ha sido pedido, entonces, en las causas instauradas ex officio, no se encuentra presente el presupuesto de base, tal cual es la petición o reclamo. Así lo establece el inciso 3 del citado precepto 261 en cuanto señala: "...se entenderá rechazado el reclamo o petición del administrado en vista del silencio de la Administración..." Ergo, no es una figura que pueda tenerse por pragmática en procedimientos de oficio. Ahora, la lesión de los plazos fijados por el ordenamiento para el ejercicio de una competencia, bien puede llegar a incorporar una patología en el acto, por infracción al elemento subjetivo competencia. Debe recordarse que a la luz del precepto 255 de la LGAP, los plazos legales vinculan tanto a la Administración como a los administrados. De tal postulado se desprende entonces que las competencias sujetas a plazo pueden desembocar en actos nulos (doctrina del numeral 60.1 LGAP). No obstante, la correcta comprensión de esa última afirmación debe llevar a lo siguiente. Las potestades de imperio son imprescriptibles (art. 66.1 ibídem), aspecto que justifica lo enunciado por el numeral 329.3 de la citada Ley No. 6227 en cuanto a que el acto dictado fuera de plazo será válido para todo efecto legal, salvo mención expresa de ley. Constituye ejemplo claro de esas excepciones el silencio positivo (sea, acto presunto -art. 330 ejusdem en relación al 139-), caso en el cual, correctamente declarado o acaecido, opera la máxima de intangibilidad de actos propios, lo que implica la imposibilidad de la Administración de desconocer ese efecto, so pena de nulidad absoluta por infracción del precepto 34 constitucional. En este ejemplo de silencio positivo, es precisamente por un factor temporal que se pierde la competencia para emitir el acto, que no para buscar las formas de supresión del acto presunto. Dicho esto vale aclarar, pese a su redacción en lenguaje imperativo, el plazo bimensual que fija el canon 261.2 de LGAP no es perentorio, sino solo ordenatorio, lo que se desprende de lo expuesto en cuanto al deber de la Administración de ejercitar sus competencias y la validez inicial de los actos "extemporáneos". Tal postura puede verse además en el fallo No. 34-F-S1-2011 de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Esto aplica tanto para los procedimientos instaurados de oficio como los de gestión de parte. En estos últimos, pese al ejercicio de la facultad de los efectos del silencio negativo, bien puede la Administración dictar el acto, el cual, ampliaría el debate en sede recursiva, sea administrativa o jurisdiccional. Desde este plano, ni la potestad instructora del procedimiento ni el procedimiento en si, se encuentran fenecidos si el plazo en cuestión ha sido superado. Si bien la estructura del procedimiento ordinario haría presumir que el plazo de marras debe ser siempre respetado, es claro que la complejidad de un asunto y las vicisitudes propias del curso, lleven a plazos superiores. Lo determinante entonces estriba en que el procedimiento muestre señales de actividad y no dilaciones injustificadas, acorde al principio de celeridad e impulso procesal -numerales 222 y 225 LGAP-, de manera tal que su duración no sea producto de un proceder o inercia arbitraria. Tal inercia, es sancionada con figuras como la caducidad que se encuentra regulada en el artículo 340 de la citada Ley General, norma que fue reformada por el numeral 200 inciso 10 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Dicha norma indica: "1) Cuando el procedimiento se paralice por más de seis meses en virtud de causa, imputable exclusivamente al interesado que lo haya promovido o a la Administración que lo haya iniciado, de oficio o por denuncia, se producirá la caducidad y se ordenará su archivo, a menos que se trate del caso previsto en el párrafo final del artículo 339 de este Código (se refiere a la misma LGAP y no al CPCA). 2) No procederá la caducidad del procedimiento iniciado a gestión de parte, cuando el interesado haya dejado de gestionar por haberse operado el silencio positivo o negativo, o cuando el expediente se encuentre listo para dictar el acto final. 3) La caducidad del procedimiento administrativo no extingue el derecho de las partes; pero los procedimientos se tienen por no seguidos, para los efectos de interrumpir la prescripción." El análisis de la naturaleza de esta figura permite concluir que se trata de un hecho jurídico dentro del procedimiento que se justifica como un medio de evitar la prolongación excesiva de los procedimientos, en aras de la seguridad jurídica, así como en la necesidad de garantizar la continuidad y eficiencia de la actividad administrativa.

VII.- ANÁLISIS DEL CASO CONCRETO.- No obstante lo expuesto, la naturaleza ordenatoria -que no perentoria- del plazo aludido, no habla de la validez de actos dictados dentro de procedimientos cuya dilación superan el umbral normal de razonabilidad. Una duración irrazonable del procedimiento puede llevar a la nulidad de lo actuado por una lesión al principio de justicia pronta y cumplida (que este Tribunal debe tutelar). En esta línea puede observarse lo dicho en los precedentes números 2007-3140 y 2007-6758, ambos de la Sala Constitucional. En el primero, de manera contundente se señaló: "Ahora bien, desde el momento en que inicia un procedimiento administrativo, hasta la emisión del acto final, debe mediar un plazo razonable y proporcionado, tomando en cuenta la actuación de las partes, la complejidad del asunto y los plazos legales establecidos para cada caso, de tal forma, que la Administración pueda contar con un plazo prudencial, pero sin incurrir en dilaciones indebidas que entraben el procedimiento… estima este Tribunal, que el tiempo utilizado por el recurrido desde el momento en que se inició el procedimiento, a la fecha, lejos de ser justificable resulta excesivo, irrazonable y en perjuicio de los derechos fundamentales del amparado, por el retardo injustificado en el que ha incurrido la administración recurrida.” No todo procedimiento que tarde más de dos meses implica la nulidad de lo actuado, sino solo en la medida que el plazo sea irrazonable, lo que ha de ser ponderado en cada caso, atendiendo a la tramitación y complejidad de lo actuado. En esta causa, del análisis del cuadro fáctico expuesto en el elenco de hechos probados, se observa que el procedimiento tuvo etapas internas muy distanciadas unas de otras que ponen en evidencia tiempos de inactividad injustificada que se aprecia, son expresión de un abandono grave, cuya comprensión integral y unitaria dentro del contexto de un procedimiento de esta naturaleza disciplinaria, lleva a este Tribunal a considerar que ese tratamiento supone, sin duda alguna un quebranto del principio de celeridad y concentración. Un simple repaso y recuento de lo acontecido pone en evidencia que lo actuado por la Administración en este caso, atenta contra la máxima constitucional de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida, tutelada por el ordinal 41 de la Constitución Política, y contraviene los principios de inmediación, impulso procesal de oficio, celeridad, que han de imperar en estos procedimientos. En efecto, el procedimiento tiene como génesis una denuncia presentada contra el accionante a través del informe PPCN-128-07 del 19 de marzo de 2007, en el que el Sargento Mariano Céspedes Anchía relata que el actor en horas laborales en que debía estar haciendo su recorrido en el sector de Barrio el Progreso número 5, se encontraba en otra área junto con otro compañero, en una soda denominada M y M sentado en una silla sin que tuviera el permiso respectivo para salir del sector. (folios 1 a 5 del expediente administrativo) . No obstante, no fue sino hasta el 17 de octubre de 2007 que se inicia procedimiento administrativo, contra el actor Enrique Roa Sequeira y otro, por el supuesto de "Abandono de Servicio y del área asignada (folios 22 y 23 del de octubre de 2007 según constancia de notificación visible a folio 23 del expediente administrativo. En este punto se evidencia una dilación de aproximadamente siete meses entre ambas fechas sin que se haya acreditado en este proceso o se justifique las razones de esa tardanza, lo que pone en evidencia, en esa primera etapa, un descuido frente al deber de instruir con prontitud los procedimientos. Ahora, comunicada la citada apertura, en fecha 27 de marzo de 2008 se celebra la comparecencia oral y privada, la cual inicialmente se había señalado para el 21 de noviembre de 2007 sin que se presentaran los inculpados ( folio 28 del expediente administrativo). Que mediante resolución 1059-IP-09-DDL de las 8 horas y 55 minutos del 25 de junio de 2009, el Órgano Director del Procedimiento -Departamento Disciplinario Legal, sección de Inspección Policial- tiene por debidamente acreditada la falta atribuida al actor Roa Sequeira y a su compañero Zúñiga Chávez, disponiendo recomendar al Consejo de Personal la sanción de Suspensión de los funcionarios por un período de ocho días sin goce de salario por haber abandonado el servicio y el área asignada el día 19 de marzo de 2007 a las 7:30 horas, bajo apercibimiento de una sanción más severa si incurren en otra falta. (folios 50 a 55 del expediente administrativo). Este acto se emite aproximadamente 15 meses posteriores a la celebración de la audiencia oral y privada. En esta línea, el numeral 319 de la LGAP establece en su párrafo primero: " 1. Terminada la comparecencia del asunto quedará listo para dictar el acto final, lo cual deberá hacer el órgano competente dentro del plazo de quince días, contado a partir de la fecha de la comparecencia, salvo que quiera introducir nuevos hechos o completar la prueba en cuyo caso deberá consultar al superior." Ciertamente, tal y como lo establece el inciso tercero de ese mandato, tal plazo se entiende referido sin perjuicio de los plazos fijados por el ordinal 261 de ese mismo cuerpo legal, que estatuye que el procedimiento ha de concluirse por acto final dentro del plazo de dos meses. Es claro, de nuevo, que se trata de un plazo ordenatorio, siendo que no existe sanción procesal por su incumplimiento en orden a lo expuesto por el ordinal 329.3 de la LGAP, sin embargo, se insiste, tal aspecto no implica una carta abierta para que la Administración desconozca el principio de eficiencia y en perjuicio de la certeza y seguridad jurídica, dilate sin causa justificante la culminación del procedimiento administrativo. Ahora, una vez rendido el informe del órgano director, por oficio número 1059-IP-09-DDL del 25 de junio de 2009. el Consejo de Personal del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública mediante acuerdo tomado en la sesión ordinaria 707 celebrada el 22 de julio de 2009 Artículo VI acuerdo Cuadragésimo pone analiza la resolución 1059-IP-09-DDL y acuerda: " ARTICULO VI: Acuerdo Cuadragésimo (...) Aceptar la recomendación del Departamento Disciplinario Legal, de la Sección de Inspección Policial de: SE SUSPENDA DE SUS FUNCIONES POR UN PERIODO DE OCHO DIAS SIN GOCE DE SALARIO A LOS FUNCIONARIOS EDUARDO ENRIQUE ROA SEQUEIRA, CÉDULA DE IDENTIDAD NÚMERO 6-101-542 Y MIGUEL ANGEL ZUÑIGA CHAVEZ CÉDULA DE IDENTIDAD NÚMERO 9-088-234 POR: "HABER ABANDONADO EL SERVICIO Y EL ÁREA ASIGNADA AL SER SORPRENDIDOS EN LA SODA M Y M UBICADA EN UN SECTOR QUE NO LES CORRESPONDÍA, SENTADOS EN UNA SILLA CONTIGUO A UNA MESA, LO ANTERIOR SIN HABER SOLICITADO EL CORRESPONDIENTE PERMISO PARA DICHO EFECTO, HECHO OCURRIDO A LAS 17:30 HORAS APROXIMADAS DEL 19 DE MARZO DEL 2007, Y SE LES APERCIBA, QUE EN CASO DE COMETER OTRA FALTA, PODRÁN SER SANCIONADOS DE FORMA MÁS DRÁSTICA. LO ANTERIOR POR ASI CORRESPONDER. 2) Se instruye a la Dirección de Recursos Humanos para que proceda a comunicar el respectivo acuerdo al servidor e indicarle que la sanción disciplinaria que se ordena se ejecutará una vez que la misma haya adquirido firmeza. 3) Asimismo le comunico que contra la presente resolución cabe recurso de REVOCATORIA Y APELACIÓN, dentro el tercer día a partir del recibo de la presente, de conformidad con los artículos 344 y 346 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, el mismo debe presentarse en el DEPARTAMENTO DISCIPLINARIO LEGAL. ACUERDO FIRME POR UNANIMIDAD." (folio 56 del expediente administrativo). Este acto se le comunica al actor mediante oficio número 5665-2009-DRH-SEC del 6 de agosto de 2009, y se le notifica el día 28 de agosto de 2009 conjuntamente con las resoluciones 1059-IP-09-DDL, el oficio 1936-2009-C.P y el oficio número 5665-09-DRH-SEC (folios 58 y 59 del expediente administrativo). El actor cuestionó esa decisión en escrito presentado el 04 de setiembre de 2009 interponiendo recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra la resolución 1059-IP-09-DDL del 25 de junio de 2009 (folio 62 del expediente administrativo), medida recursiva que se resuelve mediante la resolución No. 1803-2009-DDL-SIP de las quince horas cincuenta y ocho minutos del dos de octubre de dos mil nueve (folios 71 a 77 del expediente administrativo) y en la que se recomienda al Consejo de Personal rechazar el recurso de revocatoria, así como la excepción de prescripción formulada, confirmar el acto recurrido y remitir las diligencias al señor Ministro para que se pronuncie sobre la apelación formulada subsidiariamente por el actor. El Consejo de Personal mediante sesión ordinaria 712 del 14 de octubre de 2009, dispone en el artículo VIII en el acuerdo sexto confirmar el acto recurrido y remitir la apelación en subsidio al Superior Jerárquico para lo de su cargo (folio 78 expediente administrativo), este acto conjuntamente con la resolución 1803-2009-DDL-SIP, es notificado al actor mediante oficio 7186-2009-DRH-SEC, los cuales se notifican el día 16 de noviembre de 2009. El recurso de apelación interpuesto es rechazado mediante resolución del Despacho del Señor Ministro número 2010-2210-D.M de las nueve horas del treinta de junio de dos mil diez siendo notificada al actor el día 21 de setiembre de 2011 (folio 95 del expediente administrativo) mediante oficio número 6107-2011-DRH-SEC del 23 de agosto de 2011, en el cual además se le indica que "su jefe inmediato tiene 3 meses para aplicar dicha suspensión y debe comunicar a esta Dirección los días en que se cumplirá." (folio 95 del expediente administrativo). La Sanción impuesta al 01 de diciembre de 2011 no se había aplicado al actor según se desprende del oficio número DPC-3315-11-2011 del 01 de diciembre de 2011 (folio 41 del principal).- El anterior detalle de lo acontecido durante el curso de este procedimiento pone en evidencia un plazo irrazonable en la tramitación del mismo, sin que se haya presentado justificación alguna que permita sostener tal dilación. Tampoco logra este Tribunal desprenderlo del análisis de fondo que ha realizado de los autos, pues los hechos acontecidos resultan sencillos en cuanto a su análisis. En definitiva, estima este Tribunal que tal aspecto vicia el procedimiento por infracción a los principios de impulso procesal, celeridad, concentración y justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida. Por ende, se presenta una deficiencia que da base a la invalidez de lo actuado. Lo contrario llevaría a cohonestar procedimientos con plazos irrazonables sin consecuencia jurídica alguna, lo que desde luego, no tolera este Tribunal. Tómese en cuenta la extensión de los plazos para dictar la resolución luego de la comparecencia oral, que resulta un tiempo injustificado de aproximadamente 15 meses, de igual manera, luego de la interposición de los recursos por parte del actor (04 de setiembre de 2009), el asunto se resuelve en definitiva 9 meses después, es decir el 30 de junio de 2010 (resolución del Despacho del señor Ministro), siendo que la notificación de esta resolución se efectúa hasta el día 21 de setiembre de 2011 (es decir el acto de comunicación se realizó 15 meses después de emitido el acto final y definitivo) Si bien el numeral 329.3 de referencia previa, señala que el acto final recaído fuera de plazo, es válido, salvo excepciones de ley, es claro que ello no supone en modo alguno una suerte de carta abierta, permisiva, incontrolable que justifique procedimientos en extremo dilatados, con vulneración irrazonable de plazos en mengua del debido proceso, concentración, celeridad, unidad procedimental, certeza jurídica, todos elementos constituyentes de la máxima de justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida. Como se ha señalado, tal falencia muestra una disconformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico (numerales 128, 158 y 223, todos de LGAP) en cuanto al procedimiento llevado, desde el plano integral. Tal aspecto exige, la nulidad de lo actuado. En suma, por la dilación injustificada que se presenta en el procedimiento bajo examen converge una causal de nulidad absoluta, insalvable que desemboca, sin más, en la supresión de ese procedimiento. Cabe en este plano señalar que ante tales intervalos sobreviene una dilación no amparable del procedimiento, esa tardanza y lapsos en que el expediente se mantuvo inactivo, en su comprensión integral atenta contra la eficiencia de los procedimientos administrativos y la justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida, lo que supone, en orden a todo lo contra la seguridad y la certeza jurídica, así como contra los derechos del particular ante este tipo de procedimientos. No se trata de una negación de la existencia de potestades correctivas internas en el marco de las relaciones funcionariales, sino del establecimiento de límites propios del ejercicio del poder público, que el mismo ordenamiento jurídico impone, desde el plano de la temporalidad para el ejercicio legítimo de sus competencias. Así las cosas, esa invalidez atenta contra el cumplimiento del fin público que ha sido impuesto en los procedimientos de esta índole, cual es, la corrección oportuna de las supuestas faltas de los funcionarios, pero con el debido respeto de sus derechos dentro de los procedimientos. En consecuencia, debe disponerse la nulidad de dicho procedimiento y por ende de las resoluciones en él emitidas. Así lo ha sostenido este Tribunal, entre otras, en el fallo No. 199-2011-VI de las 16 horas 20 minutos del 12 de septiembre del 2011. Se omite por innecesario, en virtud de lo dispuesto en este fallo, entrar a analizar el resto de alegatos del actor.- VII.- LAS NULIDADES DECRETADAS: Por tales razones, se debe disponer la nulidad del procedimiento administrativo instaurado contra el demandante, expediente 752-IP-2007. Ahora bien, de conformidad con el numeral 164.2 de la LGAP, la nulidad del procedimiento supone, por criterio de conexidad, la invalidez de los actos que dependan de aquel. Ello implica, la nulidad de lo siguientes actos: a) acto de las 08 horas 55 minutos del 25 de junio de 2009 , en el que el órgano director del procedimiento -Departamento Disciplinario Legal, Sección de Inspección Policial-, rinde el informe No. 1059-IP-09-DDL que emite rinde recomendación respecto de la causa disciplinaria seguida contra el demandante; b) El acuerdo tomado en sesión ordinaria 707, celebrada el 22 de julio de 2009 artículo VI acuerdo cuadragésimo en el cual el Consejo de Personal del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública acepta la recomendación realizada por el Departamento Disciplinario legal de la Sección de Inspección Policial contenido en el informe 1059-IP-09-DDL.- c) El oficio No. 1936-2009-C.P del 23 de julio de 2009 en el cual se comunica a la Dirección de Recursos humanos el acuerdo tomado en sesión ordinaria 707, celebrada el 22 de julio de 2009 citado en el aparte anterior.- d) El oficio 5665-2009-DRH-SEC en el cual se comunica al actor el acuerdo Cuadragésimo de la sesión 707 del 22 de julio de 2009 del Consejo de Personal en la que se acoge la recomendación del informe 1059-IP-09-DDL de suspenderlo por ocho días sin goce de salario. e) Resolución No. 1803-2009-DDL-SIP de las quince horas cincuenta y ocho minutos del dos de octubre de dos mil nueve en la cual el Departamento Disciplinario Legal dispone recomendar el rechazo del recurso de revocatoria, la confirmación de la sanción, y que se eleve el asunto al Despacho del Señor Ministro para la resolución del recurso de apelación.-; f) El acuerdo tomado en sesión ordinaria 721, celebrada el 14 de octubre de 2009 artículo VIII acuerdo sexto en el cual el Consejo de Personal del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública acepta la recomendación realizada por el Departamento Disciplinario legal de la Sección de Inspección Policial contenido en el informe 1803-2009-DDL-SIP.- g) El oficio No. 2796-2009-C.P del 15 de octubre de 2009 en el cual se comunica a la Dirección de Recursos humanos el acuerdo tomado en sesión ordinaria 721, celebrada el 14 de octubre de 2009 citado en el aparte anterior.- h) Oficio 7816-2009-DRH-SEC del 23 de octubre de 2009 en el cual se le comunica al actor lo acordado por el Consejo de Personal en la sesión 721 del 14 de octubre de 2009 en que se rechaza en todos sus extremos la revocatoria interpuesta y remite la apelación al superior. i) Resolución número 2010-2210 de las nueve horas del 30 de junio de 2010 en la cual el Señor Ministro rechaza el recurso de apelación interpuesto y se dispone: "1.-DECLARAR SIN LUGAR el recurso de apelación en subsidio y la excepción de prescripción interpuestos por el señor Enrique Roa Sequeira, cédula de identidad número seis - ciento uno- quinientos cuarenta y dos. II.- Confirmar lo dispuesto en la resolución y oficios venidos en alzada, sea la suspensión por ocho días sin goce de salario impuesta al servidor Roa Sequeira. III. Ordenar, al Departamento de Remuneraciones y Compensaciones deducir del estipendio del señor Roa Sequeira el monto correspondiente a ocho días sin goce de salario en el caso de que el mismo no haya sido deducido. IV. Remitir el respectivo expediente a la Dirección de Recursos Humanos para que se realicen todas las diligencias ordenadas. V. Finalmente envíese el Sección de Inspección Policial para la custodia del mismo. Lo anterior con fundamento en la normativa legal supra citada y las razones de hecho y derecho señaladas." j) Oficio 6107-2011-DRH-SEC del 23 de agosto de 2011, en el cual se le comunica al actor lo resuelto por el Señor Ministro mediante resolución 2010-2210 del 30 de junio de 2010 se confirma la sanción impuesta y le indica que "su jefe inmediato tiene 3 meses para aplicar dicha suspensión y debe comunicar a esta Dirección los días en que se cumplirá." ¨