Inapplicability of Administrative Silence in Immigration MattersImprocedencia del silencio positivo en materia migratoria

“IV.- On the immigration policy of the Costa Rican State. From the very outset, it must be noted that immigration policy is part of a Nation's sovereignty and includes the regulation of the entry and stay, whether temporary or permanent, of foreigners in its territory, with the possibility of exceptions and limitations to their rights by law. In our case, the exercise of this sovereign power derives from Articles 6 and 19 of the Political Constitution and from various international instruments, among which the Convention on the Condition of Foreigners ratified by Costa Rica by Law No. 40, of December 20, 1932; the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live; Convention 149 on Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, with the possibility of exceptions and limitations to their rights by law, stand out. Under this reasoning, foreigners seeking to enter our country must comply with the requirements demanded for that purpose by the domestic legal system and submit to the legal norms of our country that determine the legality or otherwise of their stay in the country and its consequences. Likewise, it involves the exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with the prevailing legal framework, the power to decide on the stay of a foreigner in the national territory being exclusively vested in the Executive Branch, when it finds that it is harmful, or compromises public order or tranquility, or when special circumstances so advise. The Administration has a series of legal means to make that power effective, which are regulated, among others, in the Immigration Law, such as, for example, the requirements and conditions for granting visas or residencies. All these means allow control to be exercised over foreign residents and grant, in effect, a wide margin of discretion to execute their immigration policies. But the exercise of these powers, purely legal, however discretionary they may be, cannot be unrestricted or, even less, ignore the limits that the legal system itself imposes, nor the elementary principles of justice, logic and convenience (articles 15, 16 and 17 of the General Law of Public Administration), which form part of the legal system. From that standpoint, the General Law on Immigration and Foreigners, No. 8764 of August 19, 2009, published in La Gaceta No. 170 of September 1, 2009, establishes that legal framework "... regulates the control of migrant persons and promotes their integration into society, based on the principles of respect for human life, cultural and personal diversity, solidarity, gender equity, as well as the human rights guaranteed in the Political Constitution, the treaties and international conventions duly subscribed, ratified and in force in the country." -Article 3-. For these purposes, that regulatory body confers the power on the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería to determine the conditions for the entry of non-resident persons into the country, being authorized to establish the criteria for the classification of restricted visa, consular visa and visa-free entry. For this Tribunal, it is clear that immigration policy concerns a matter of great national relevance, forming a substantial part of public order and national security. This is effectively derived from numeral 6, subsection 3, of the cited Law No. 8764, in that it indicates, as a purpose of immigration regulation, the due control of the entry, stay and departure of foreign persons from the country, in accordance with national development and public security policies. This social impact (in various areas, as it includes economic matters, health, housing, public order, security, among others), imbues this subject with a marked public interest. Such is the case with the effect of migrations in the area of employment levels in domestic work, a subject which, by way of mere reference, is addressed in ordinal 7 of the aforementioned Law, in its subsection 1), which indicates as a guideline of immigration policy: "The search for complementarity between the national workforce and the migrant workforce, in such a way that there is no displacement of national labor by the incorporation of immigrant workers." This is also evidenced by the various grounds that allow the impediment of entry into the country, even for persons who already possess an entry visa, a matter regulated in ordinal 61 ibidem. Likewise, that marked interest is denoted in mandate 63 ejusdem which indicates that for current duly substantiated reasons of public safety and health, the Executive Branch may impose entry restrictions on a specific foreign person or foreign group. In any case, the public relevance of the matter is expressed clearly in canon 2 of Law No. 8764. Article 12 of the cited law confers on the Dirección General de Migración the authority to execute immigration policy, with a wide range of powers, some of which are listed in Article 13 of that legal source.

V.- On the objections related to the declaration of lack of jurisdiction. Within a first axis of objection, the plaintiff corporation criticizes that the Dirección de Migración declared itself incompetent to hear the request for a restricted entry visa formulated on behalf of 49 Chinese citizens, but then denies the request for positive administrative silence (silencio positivo). In its judgment, the foregoing constitutes a nullity that must be declared. For the purposes of a correct approach to the claim made, it is necessary to analyze two elementary references in this regard: on one hand, what was petitioned by the plaintiff entity and on the other, what was resolved by the respondent Administration. In the document submitted on September 2, 2010 - visible at folios 59-66 of the judicial file -, the authorization of 49 work visas is requested for citizens of Chinese nationality who will remain in Costa Rica. In that request, it is indicated that all these workers were already in Costa Rica, working for the company AFECC, builder of the new National Stadium, specifying - point f of the document -, these workers are under the specialized restricted visa regime, having entered the country by virtue of the International Convention signed between the Government of the People's Republic of China and Costa Rica for the construction and donation of the National Stadium, so it would be a new issuance of visas with a different company. Based on the foregoing, by resolution No. CVRR-0573-2010 of 6:15 p.m. on October 14, 2010, the analysis of said request is entered into. Specifically, the immigration Administration understood that what was requested was the granting of entry visas for 49 foreign persons who were already working in the country. Based on that understanding, it stated that in accordance with numeral 49 of Law No. 8764, the jurisdiction of the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio is limited to the granting of restricted visas and refugee status for persons who so request it before the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería. This aspect is clarified in the third whereas clause (Considerando III) of the cited public action. Once this is done, in that same section it materially states: "... the company C.C.A. S.A. requests the Comisión de Visas Restringidas to grant 'work visas', indicating that the foreign persons are in Costa Rica working... this Comisión de Visas Restringidas cannot proceed to assess the applicant's claim since the entry visas have already been granted and the foreign persons whose entry is sought are already in the country. Likewise, the Commission is not legally authorized to authorize work permits or 'work visas'..." For such reasons, that public body declared itself incompetent to hear the request made. On the other hand, regarding the request for positive administrative silence made on October 14, 2010, it denies the positive administrative silence, referring for these purposes to ordinal 200 of Law No. 8764 and 55 of circular DGVS-675-2008 of September 1, 2008, indicating that the deadlines given by those norms for resolving have not expired. According to this account, this Tribunal does not observe any deficiency in what was done. Although reading the operative part of the act may generate some degree of confusion, since it declares a lack of jurisdiction to hear a specific procedure, and then orders the rejection of a request for positive administrative silence, such doubt dissipates when the act is understood in an integrated and unitary manner. Indeed, reading and analyzing the questioned act allows the doubts that support the claims resolved in this section to be dispelled. If the contested act is carefully analyzed, it is clear that the immigration Administration refers to two different factual scenarios. On one hand, it indicates that it cannot proceed to assess the applicant's claim since the entry visas have already been granted and the foreign persons whose entry is sought are already in the country. This section refers to the specific petition for granting restricted visas, a matter in which, under the protection of ordinal 49 of Law No. 8764, the Comisión de Visas Restringidas is indeed competent. However, immediately following, it indicates that it is not competent to resolve requests for work visas. On this matter, the act in question states: "Likewise, the Commission is not legally authorized to authorize work permits or 'work visas'... since Article 49 of the Law limits the Commission's action to determining the granting of restricted visas and refugee status. (...)" It is this Tribunal's criterion that these are different scenarios that are resolved within the same act, but which in no way imply the contradiction and pathological defect expressed by the plaintiff. Even within the strictly grammatical analysis of what was resolved, this collegiate body understands that the declaration of lack of jurisdiction refers only to the requests for work visas, not to the request for restricted visas. On the contrary, this Chamber understands that these are two different issues, whose resolution criteria are distinct. On one hand, regarding the entry visas, the cause for rejection is that they had already been granted and the persons for whose benefit they were requested were already within the country. This criterion is not challenged in this proceeding, the plaintiff not making any objection regarding this pronouncement. While regarding the work visas, the argumentative basis of the aforementioned Commission was its lack of jurisdiction to hear such matters. On the other hand, in a third aspect, within the fourth whereas clause of the cited act, the Commission undertook to resolve the request for a declaration of positive administrative silence, which was, ultimately, denied. For the foregoing, it is reiterated, the criterion was that the deadline provided in numeral 200 of Law No. 8764 and that set in circular DGVS-675-2008 of December 1, 2008, numeral 55, had not elapsed considering the filing date of the procedure. The validity of what was resolved in this regard will be elaborated upon infra. Specifically, from the analysis of that administrative act, this Chamber concludes that the declaration of lack of jurisdiction concerned solely the request for work visas, not the portion regarding restricted visas, which was resolved in light of another type of considerations that have not been challenged. Even if the "Por tanto" of the objected act is carefully analyzed, it is observed that on this matter it states: "... the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio DECLARES ITSELF INCOMPETENT to hear the request for work visas requested on September 2, 2010..."; that is, the act explicitly refers that the declaration of lack of jurisdiction is issued regarding the work visas. From this plane, in accordance with ordinals 59, 60, 129 of Law No. 6227/78 and canon 49 of Law No. 8764, the lack of jurisdiction declared by the administrative body itself - Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio - regarding said requests does not imply the impossibility, due to lack of jurisdiction, of ruling on the part of the request on which it is indeed competent and which concerns it in the exercise of its powers. On the requests for restricted visas in particular and the petition for declaration of a deemed act, that body was fully competent to rule, so the alleged defect is not configured, and therefore, its rejection proceeds.

VI.- On the application of positive administrative silence to the specific case. In a second axis of challenge, the plaintiff criticizes that the criticized act is invalid, since in this case, the elements that permit the application of the figure of positive administrative silence have been configured. The foregoing, it states - in essence - since the visa is defined as an authorization or permit to enter a given country, positive administrative silence is appropriate or applicable in cases where the Administration, without any reason and outside the deadline established by law, does not resolve the request for a permit or permission to enter, when all legal requirements for that purpose are met. It notes that, in this matter, the General Law of Public Administration is applicable as supplementary law, whose precept 330 establishes that when a request is submitted for the granting of a permit or authorization, the Administration is obliged to resolve within a period of one month, or otherwise, positive administrative silence operates. It affirms that its request was filed on September 2, 2010, and more than a month elapsed without receiving a response from the Administration, whereby the deemed act was configured. It highlights that immigration matters are not within the exception scenarios set by case law for the application of positive administrative silence, as there is no interest in protecting interests related to life, health, and environmental matters in general. Regarding such allegations, it is pertinent to state what is set out below. The public interest that it is called upon to protect constitutes the finalistic or teleological element that justifies the conferral of sovereign powers (potestades de imperio) to specific Public Administrations in the particular context of their action frameworks. Such public interest constitutes the ultimate purpose of the service-providing axis of such administrative units and the ultimate purpose of their actions, an interest that prevails even over the interest that a Public Administration itself may have (arts. 113, 131 LGAP). For this reason, and being the legitimizing basis of the powers conferred upon it, the competences and powers must be exercised for such satisfaction. This is indeed inferred from ordinal 66.1 of Law No. 6227/78, in that it indicates that sovereign powers and their exercise, public duties and compliance are inalienable, non-transferable and imprescriptible. Now, in multiple scenarios, those powers are exercised within the framework of an administrative procedure, which may be initiated ex officio or at the request of a party. In this latter case (request of an interested party), the due exercise of public powers entails the duty to issue an express act within the time margins imposed by the legal system for each type of request. Thus it is established, in principle, in canon 134 LGAP. However, it is common that, once that period has expired, the Administration does not issue a response on what was petitioned, in which case the legal-procedural consequence of that inertia must be distinguished and specified. On one hand, numeral 139 of the cited Law No. 6227/78 indicates that the silence of the Administration cannot reflect its will, unless a law provides otherwise. That is to say, the Administration's lack of response, although it can be considered a pathology or abnormal functioning (due to negligence) of the exercise of public power, has different effects, depending on the scenario to be analyzed. Thus, the public legal system establishes two figures that seek to regulate the incidences of public inertia, namely, negative administrative silence (silencio negativo) and positive administrative silence. Negative administrative silence, in simple terms, constitutes a deemed denial of the administrative petition, if, within the period granted to the Administration to resolve, it has not pronounced itself. It is a presumption of rejection of what was petitioned, whose purpose is to open the power of the administrated party to exercise its recourse rights against the same administration, or, to go directly to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction to seek protection of its legal situation. Negative administrative silence is not a rejection of the request, but a conjecture that enables the mentioned challenge, that is, it does not mean that the request has been effectively rejected, as there is no manifest public will, but only the possibility of bypassing that instance and continuing in the administrative procedure. It can be said that, when the exhaustion of the administrative channel was mandatory in all matters (prior to ruling 3669-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber and article 31.1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code), negative administrative silence was a burden for the administrated party, as it required them to exercise the recourse paths to obtain a reviewable act and then seek judicial protection. However, at present, as a power, it constitutes a possibility to activate the course of the procedure or to bring a legal action in court. Thus, subsection 3 of ordinal 261 of the General Law previously cited establishes, in the following sense: "3. If at the end of the indicated terms an express resolution has not been communicated, the claim or petition of the administrated party shall be deemed rejected in view of the Administration's silence, whether for the filing of the applicable administrative appeals or the contentious-administrative action, as the case may be, the latter in the terms and with the effects indicated by the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code." More simply, administrative inertia implies the rejection of the request - of the appeal - for purposes of advancing in the procedure, but this does not imply that, from the material-legal plane, the petition has been denied. Even numeral 329.3 of the LGAP establishes with complete clarity that the act issued outside the deadline shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless a rule provides otherwise. This implies the Administration's duty to rule on the request that has been presented to it, even when the deadline for issuing its response has expired and negative administrative silence can be understood as having occurred, its competence to resolve not decaying due to this circumstance. Unlike positive administrative silence, negative silence is not an act, but a conjecture of deemed rejection for the purposes indicated supra. On the other hand, in specific cases, apart from what has been stated, public inertia in issuing the formal response entails, as a legal effect, the so-called positive administrative silence. In these cases, the administration's silence is understood as favorable to the petitioner, their request being understood as resolved in terms favorable to how it was made. From that perspective, ordinal 330 of Law No. 6227/78 indicates: "The Administration's silence shall be understood as positive when it is expressly so established or when it involves authorizations or approvals that must be granted in the exercise of oversight and protection functions./ 2. Silence shall also be understood as positive when it involves requests for permits, licenses and authorizations." However, for this to occur, several elements must concur, as not in every request that involves a permit, license or authorization can the applicability of positive administrative silence be discussed. Indeed, a superficial reading of the second subsection of ordinal 330 LGAP could lead to the mistaken understanding that in any petition for authorization, license or permit, the figure of positive administrative silence applies or operates. This position is not shared by this Tribunal. Such an understanding implies, as a practical effect, that regardless of what was requested, the public omission would lead to a sort of administrative consent for the exercise of the acts supporting the interested party's petition. This, regardless of whether what was requested has a major impact on public order, public health and public safety. Authorization can be defined as the removal of a legal obstacle for the exercise of a due conduct. For its part, a permit consists of the administrative enablement for the development of a conduct, initially prohibited. Whereas a license consists of an authorization of a regulated content. From that plane, it is necessary to analyze in each case when the private (or public) petition is regulated by the figure of positive administrative silence or when it is subject to negative administrative silence. Otherwise, the existence of negative administrative silence would not make sense, except for the appeal phase, since with the exception of administrative claims, in multiple requests submitted to the knowledge of the administration, ultimately, the granting of a permit, a license or an authorization is sought. One can think of the case of a request for a permit to operate the activity of paid public transport of persons (art. 25 of Law No. 3503), which meets the requirements of that legislation and, once the deadline for resolution has expired, there is no public act. In such a case, it would be clearly unviable to think of a positive administrative silence. On the contrary, the Administration's silence in that case would not be the one provided for in ordinal 330 LGAP, but the effect indicated in article 261, subsections 1 and 3, of that same legal body. Hence, expressly, in the Ley Forestal, No. 7575, canon 4 clearly indicates the inadmissibility of positive administrative silence in environmental matters. The same effect occurs with public domain assets (bienes demaniales), by derivation of the legal regime applicable to the public domain (art. 262 Civil Code), a treatment that, in procedural terms, can be seen, among others, in precepts 34.2 of Law No. 8508 (CPCA). As can be seen, numeral 330 LGAP itself establishes that positive administrative silence applies when expressly established by law. This is the case, by way of mere reference, of the duty of processing in matters of administrative contracting - art. 16 of Law No. 7494 -, and in that same field, the omission of a response to the objection appeal - art. 83 ibidem -. In such expressly regulated cases, the legal system establishes a deadline different from that set by canon 261 LGAP, which usually matches the one-month period regulated by mandate 330 of Law No. 6227/78. However, in the normal course of situations, the deadline to resolve petitions is 2 months regulated in the aforementioned precept 261 LGAP and the effects of the silence are negative or denying. Consequently, this Tribunal does not share the position that every authorization, permit or license implies, in all cases, the application of the figure of positive administrative silence. For this, it is necessary to analyze in each case the convergence of a series of factors. On one hand, if there is express regulation that establishes the applicability of positive administrative silence. On the other, if there is no such explicit development, whether the administrated party's petition deals with a matter in which that figure is susceptible to application. In such cases - and only in those -, silence shall apply when it is accredited: a) that the request was submitted fulfilling all the requirements established by the legal system for that particular case; and b) that once the deadline set by the legal system for the Administration to resolve the procedure has expired, no express act has been issued. For these purposes, the Law for the Protection of Citizens from the Excess of Administrative Requirements and Procedures, No. 8220 of March 4, 2002, published in La Gaceta No. 49 of March 11, 2002, establishes the procedure for having positive administrative silence accredited. In that sense, numeral 7 indicates in its exact wording: "Procedure for applying positive administrative silence When dealing with requests for the granting of permits, licenses or authorizations, once the resolution deadline granted to the Administration by the legal system has expired, without it having pronounced itself, they shall be deemed approved. For the application of positive administrative silence, it will suffice for the administrated party to submit to the Administration a sworn statement, duly authenticated, attesting that all the necessary requirements for the granting of the permits, licenses or authorizations have been complied with and that the Administration did not resolve within the corresponding deadline. / These requirements shall be solely those expressly stipulated in the laws, executive decrees or regulations, in accordance with the provisions of article 4 of this law. / The Administration, within the three business days following receipt of the sworn statement, must issue a document stating that the deadline for the application of positive administrative silence elapsed and the request was not resolved in time. If the Administration does not issue this document within the indicated period, the application of positive administrative silence shall be deemed accepted and the administrated party may continue with the procedures to obtain the corresponding permit, license or authorization, except in cases where, by constitutional provision, positive administrative silence is inapplicable. / In fulfilling this procedure, the Administration must coordinate internally to inform the procedure simplification officer, in accordance with articles 8 and 11 of this law. / No institution may disregard or reject the application of positive administrative silence, which operates by operation of law (de pleno derecho). / When applicable, the Administration shall apply the nullity procedure in administrative venue regulated in article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration or shall initiate a judicial lesividad proceeding to demonstrate that the corresponding requirements were not met." (Thus amended by article 1 of Law No. 8990 of September 27, 2011) It should be noted that this wording was not the one in force at the time the plaintiff submitted the request for positive administrative silence, nor the one in force at the time of issuing the act or filing the lawsuit, therefore, the matter must be resolved with the text in force at that time. Said norm stated before the amendment made by Law No. 8990: "When dealing with requests for the granting of permits, licenses or authorizations, once the resolution deadline granted to the Administration by the legal system has expired, without it having pronounced itself, they shall be deemed approved. Once this situation occurs, the interested party may: a) Submit a note to the Administration stating that the request was submitted completely and that the Administration did not resolve it in time.

The Administration must issue, on the following business day, a note declaring that, in fact, the time period elapsed and the application was not approved, and therefore tacit approval (silencio positivo) applied; or b) Appear before a notary public so that he certifies, by means of a notarial certificate (acta notarial), that the application was filed in complete form and that the Administration did not resolve it in time." As can be seen, the procedure set forth in Law No. 8220 aims to have the concurrence of the indicated assumptions taken as proven. When tacit approval (silencio positivo) occurs, as has been stated, the so-called presumed administrative act (acto administrativo presunto) arises, and therefore, the suppression of that act requires and demands resorting to the forms of extinction of public conduct, that is, nullity under Article 173 of the LGAP, a lesivity proceeding (proceso de lesividad), or the revocation of conduct, under penalty of violating the principle of intangibility of one's own acts, enshrined in precept 34 of the Magna Carta. Likewise, that declaration of the occurrence of tacit approval (silencio positivo) may be raised in this contentious-administrative venue, under the protection of numerals 42 and 122 of the CPCA.

VII.- Impropriety of tacit approval (silencio positivo) in immigration matters and in the specific case. Now, having set forth these generalities regarding tacit approval (silencio positivo), it is the criterion of this Court that there is no invalidity in the actions taken by the respondent Administration. Certainly, numeral 46 of Law No. 8764 (Ley General de Migración y Extranjería) defines a visa as "... an authorization to enter the national territory issued by the director general or the consular agent, when authorized by the former, or when so permitted by the general directives for the granting of entry visas. The granting of diplomatic and official visas is excepted from this regime. In exceptional cases, the Migration director may grant visas, without the general directives for entry and stay visas for non-residents being binding for those purposes; in this case, he must duly support and reason his decision." Nevertheless, the mere reference to the concept of authorization, license, or permit does not imply, per se, the application of numeral 330.2 of the LGAP,—as has been indicated—since for that to occur, on one hand, it is necessary to analyze whether in that specific case of a public petition, the figure operates or whether, on the contrary, the claim or petition must be understood as denied in light of ordinal 261.3 of the LGAP, for which purpose, among other things, the relevance of the regulated matter must be analyzed, as well as the consideration of whether public inaction violates the exercise of a right conferred by the legal system. In the case of immigration matters, it must be insisted, this is a field of special relevance for the public interest, in which public order and the topic of public safety are linked. This matter also involves the component of national sovereignty, which is exercised and represented through the rules and decisions issued in the context of this type of immigration relations, a topic in which, according to the constitutional text, the application of the figure of tacit approval (silencio positivo) could not be sustained, as it would be a sort of presumed waiver of the exercise of said national sovereignty powers. As has been indicated, ordinals 2 and 3 of Law No. 8764 declare this matter to be of public interest, an aspect that is emphasized throughout the context of the cited legal framework, as it confers powers upon the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería to issue directives regulating the topic of granting visas and the stay of non-resident persons (Art. 47), as well as the regulation applicable to permanent residents (Art. 77) or temporary residents (Art. 79-86), non-residents (Arts. 87-92), or persons with special migratory statuses provided for in ordinal 94 of the aforementioned Law No. 8764. The power of rejection, understood as the action by which the immigration authority denies a foreign person entry into the national territory and orders their immediate transfer to the country of origin or provenance, or to a third country that admits them (Art. 64 ejusdem), denotes the relevance of said matter. This becomes clearer with the provisions of canon 67 ibidem, which states: "The granting of the intended migratory category shall be conditioned upon the requirements of public safety and the economic and social development of the country, in addition to the requirements determined by the Regulation of this Law." The foregoing demonstrates the marked and undeniable public interest underlying immigration matters, as it is not a simple analysis of formal requirements, but rather the authorization of entry through the granting of a visa in any of the indicated migratory conditions depends on the technical analysis of the Immigration Administration and not merely on the satisfaction of formal requirements. Its granting considers not only the personal conditions of the migrant, but also public safety aspects and the social and economic environment, in terms of convenience for the country. Thus, by way of example, the determination to grant visas for the temporary exercise of certain employment positions can be analyzed in light of the social conditions of labor occupation in that particular area, which constitutes an analysis of the domestic social incidence of the migrant phenomenon, whether temporary or permanent. Ergo, it is not a simple authorization as the promoting party seems to suggest, a thesis this Chamber does not share. On the contrary, if Article 55 of Law No. 8764 is analyzed, the visa "... implies a mere expectation of right, it does not imply unconditional admission of the foreign person to the country nor the authorization of the intended stay (...)" and as has been stated, it is a subjective stage conditioned upon social security factors, an assessment in which, of course, public action must not be arbitrary, but measured and reasoned. Therefore, it is not an application for authorization that can be understood as encompassed within the terms of ordinal 330 of the LGAP. This is not a criterion of distinction where the law does not make one (ubi lex non distingui nec non distinguere debemus)—as could be alleged—, but rather the interpretation and consideration that this Court carries out regarding the figure analyzed. Therefore, it is not a matter in which, in principle, the figure of tacit approval (silencio positivo) (or presumed act (acto presunto)) can be understood as applicable. Unlike what the plaintiff stated, it is not that this sensitive matter is not included within the exception assumptions for the pertinence of the presumed act (acto presunto), but rather, what is relevant is that given its public relevance, the occurrence of tacit approval (silencio positivo) must be interpreted restrictively, and in the absence of regulation that particularly establishes the application of that institute in this subject area, in this specific case, its application is not considered correct. Now, that single element would give rise to the rejection of the objection under examination. However, in the particular case, in response to the request for a declaration of tacit approval (silencio positivo) filed on October 14, 2010, regarding the visa conferral proceeding for 49 Chinese workers, in act CVRR-0573-2010, the fourth whereas clause (considerando) stated that the application for tacit approval (silencio positivo) was not appropriate, since the Comisión de Visas Restringidas was within the period established by law to resolve. For this purpose, it referred to numeral 200 of the Ley General de Migración y Extranjería and to circular DGVS-675-2008 of September 1, 2008, Article 55 which establishes a period of 60 days to resolve visa applications. (See folios 82-83 of the judicial file). The plaintiff states that the period to resolve the visa application filed on September 2, 2010, is the 1-month period indicated in ordinal 330 and 331 of Law No. 6227/78. This criterion is not shared by this Court. Indeed, even considering that tacit approval (silencio positivo) operates in this matter—which this collegiate body does not share—its appropriateness would be subject to the expiration of the period that the legal system grants to the competent Administration to resolve. In the specific case of immigration matters, numeral 189 of Law No. 8764 states: "The administrative procedures relating to immigration matters shall be governed by the provisions of this Law and its Regulation; additionally, supplementarily, by the Ley general de la Administración Pública, No. 6227, of May 2, 1978; Law No. 8220, Protección al ciudadano del exceso de requisitos y trámites administrativos, of March 4, 2002, and the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo, No. 8508, of April 28, 2006." As can be seen, the criterion for integration of Law No. 6227/78 and No. 8508 is by supplementarity (supletoriedad), not by direct remission. That is, one must first resort to the procedural rules set forth in the Ley de Migración, which are special for regulating the matter, and then, only in cases of topics not addressed in its articles, resort to the other legal sources of integration expressly indicated. This links with the criteria for integration of the public legal system provided for in mandate 9 of the LGAP. Thus, regarding the period to resolve immigration proceedings, ordinal 200 of Law No. 8764 states with complete clarity, regarding residence applications, that they must be resolved within the "... maximum period of three months to resolve, from the moment all requirements have been fulfilled. In the case of petitions to opt for legal migratory status, this period shall run from the receipt of documentation at the central offices of the Dirección General." In this way, given the special regulation, it is evident to this Court that the applicable legal period to be taken as a reference to determine the validity of what was resolved and of circular DGSV-675-2008 itself (also questioned), is three months, and not the one-month period established by ordinal 330 and 331 of the LGAP. With all, in light of the foregoing, even considering that the applicable period is that of the LGAP, it is the criterion of this collegiate body, for the reasons already explained, the period would not be the monthly one indicated therein, but the two-month period of precept 261 of that same Law. However, it is reiterated, this application must be resolved according to the period mandated by canon 200 of Law No. 8764, as it is a special period. With all, regarding visas, numeral 47 ibidem confers competence upon the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería to issue directives. In this vein, canon 55 of that circular establishes a period of sixty days to resolve visa applications. Thus, since the proceeding was filed on September 2, 2010, at the time of filing the application for the application of tacit approval (silencio positivo), that is, October 14, 2010, the established period had not elapsed, either under numeral 200 of Law No. 8764, or under numeral 55 of circular 675-2008. That period had also not expired at the time of issuing resolution No. CVRR-0573-2010 in which the declaration of tacit approval (silencio positivo) is denied. Consequently, the temporal element alleged by the plaintiff is not present, for which reason his grievance must be rejected, as it is insisted, even considering the figure of tacit approval (silencio positivo) appropriate in this matter (which is not shared), the period applicable to the case had not expired, consequently, the silence (silencio) cannot be considered to have occurred, as the Administration still had time to resolve the petitions formulated. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the requirements of circular DG-1084-2008 of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería were met, or whether the notarial certificate (acta notarial) was drawn up by the professional M. for the purposes of Article 7 of Law No. 8220, since, as has been indicated, tacit approval (silencio positivo) could not be considered to have occurred, and furthermore, it is inappropriate and impertinent in this case. Therefore, the rejection of the nullity ground presented must be ordered.

VIII.- Regarding the analysis of circulars on periods in immigration proceedings. In another vein, the plaintiff challenges the validity of circulars DG-3309-2009 and DGVS-675-2008, applied in the issuance of act No. CVRR-0573-2010. As grounds for nullity, it is alleged that regulations were issued that disregard the one-month period imposed in this type of matters by canon 331 of Law No. 6227/78. He indicates that the hierarchy of sources of Administrative Law is harmed, and also that circulars can only have internal effects within the Administration itself, without being able to modify legal or regulatory provisions, nor can they impose requirements, conditions, procedures, or burdens not indicated by law. On the subject of the framework of action and limits of the circulars that the Immigration Legislation enables in favor of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, the Sala Primera, in judgment No. 116-F-S1-2010 of nine o'clock on January twenty-second, two thousand ten, stated: "It cannot be lost sight of that a circular consists of an internal act through which instructions can be given regarding the manner of proceeding by officials, in this case, in the assessment of visa applications. Because it is a guideline directed at officials, and insofar as the effects attributed to it are consistent with the indicated particularity, and therefore applied when they assess the proceedings of private individuals, without being granted external effects, a violation of the principle of legal reserve (reserva legal) is not observed. Of course, due to this situation, it cannot be given the effects proper to a legal norm. Even though it may have effects on third parties in a reflexive manner, these must occur by virtue of preparatory acts within the proceeding, which must be in accordance with the legal system and never by virtue of the direct application of a directive on the legal sphere of the interested parties. In this understanding, as long as the content of the legal text is not exceeded, this Chamber does not observe a violation of the principle of legality." This analysis is conducted regarding the same circular now being challenged, albeit from the perspective of the validity of numeral 83, regarding the topic of economic solvency, the precedent is applicable for the purposes of specifying the scope and limits of this type of circulars. In light of that analysis then, it must be discerned whether that circular regulates matters not addressed by law that could affect third parties outside the Administration, such that it could be considered an external matter. As has been indicated, in the subject of procedure for resolving visa applications, numeral 200 of Law No. 8764 establishes a period of three months to resolve the various applications that the Administration must hear on that matter. It is clear that in the event of a potential divergence between the law and the circular, undoubtedly the law prevails due to the greater legal force and endurance inherent to it. From that perspective, although resolution CVRR-0573-2010 alludes to the cited circular, the basis for rejection is also supported by the period established by ordinal 200 of the Ley de Migración, so there would be no nullity whatsoever on that particular matter. On the other hand, that circular in ordinal 55 indicates: "Once the documentation is received by the Dirección General, it shall submit it to study and shall communicate the pertinent resolution to the consulate, having a maximum period of sixty days to resolve and issue the final resolution on applications filed." That circular was issued on August 28, 2008, whereas Law No. 8764 was published on August 19, 2009, and entered into force six months later (transitory II). Ergo, it is evident that the Law prevails. However, it is reiterated, the simple reference to the application of the circular does not cause its nullity. For this, it must be said, it is the criterion of this Court, the period regulated in that numeral 55 of the aforementioned circular does not antagonize the one regulated by mandate 200 of the Law, which establishes a period of 3 months for the resolution of residence application proceedings. With all, even applying the remission established by ordinal 189 of Law No. 8764, regarding the supplementary application of the procedural rules of the LGAP, numeral 261 of that regulatory body establishes that the proceeding must be concluded by a final act within the period of two months. If it is understood that the cited circular establishes a period of 60 days to resolve, without specifying whether they are business days (días hábiles) or calendar days (días naturales), so that in accordance with Article 256.1 of Law No. 6227/78, they must be understood as calendar days, the period in both regulated instruments is similar. From that perspective, as has been stated, the circular in question does not violate the legal situation of the plaintiff; first, because the act being challenged does not resolve based exclusively on that circular, but also refers to Article 200 of Law No. 8764, a norm that regulates the time the Administration has to resolve residence applications, without it being possible to understand that on this particular, the monthly period established by ordinal 331 of the LGAP applies; second, the 60-day period of the circular coincides with the one established by canon 261 of the LGAP; third, even considering that it conflicts with the period in Law No. 8764, it is clear that the one in the law prevails, due to its superior hierarchy and later issuance, yet, it is insisted, the rejection of the petition for tacit approval (silencio positivo) is not based, as the plaintiff states, solely on the temporal criterion of the circular. Hence, the defect of disregarding hierarchically superior norms, as the petitioner accuses, has not been incurred, but rather the opposite. Regarding circular DG-3309-2009, although it is mentioned in the operative part of the act, in the specific analysis of the issue of the petition for tacit approval (silencio positivo) it is not referred to at all, so it bears no relation to the debated issue. In addition to that, the plaintiff does not specify the reasons why such a circular would be invalid. He limits himself to making and presenting doctrinal citations and generic normative references to the topic of the elements of the act, the concept of invalidity, the nature of circulars, the powers of the administrative superior (jerarca administrativo) to issue them, yet, it is not indicated how those norms and sources lead to demonstrating the pathology of the circular in question. His statements in this regard are theoretical reflections on the regime of composition of the public act and the consequences of its defects, yet, outside of the topic of the period which in theory, in his judgment, is applicable in this case, a matter already resolved, he offers no allegation whatsoever. Therefore, in keeping with what has been set forth, it is necessary to order the rejection of the claim regarding this particular.

IX.- On the revocation of public acts. In a brief dated May 5, 2011, visible at folios 557-559 of the judicial file, the plaintiff firm expands its claim, regarding the facts and claims, challenging the nullity of act CVRR-022-2010 of July 8, 2010, of the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio, as well as the payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) derived from that act, which at the preliminary hearing it specified as the transfer and stay expenses of 40 Chinese citizens to Beijing. In this sense, it states that on February 8, 2010, it applied for a restricted entry visa in favor of one hundred Chinese citizens to work on the real estate project in San José, as a result of which, the Department of Labor Migrations of the National Employment Directorate issued a recommendation that led to the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio authorizing 100 visas during session 006-2010. It criticizes that by administrative resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010, the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería authorized the first 40 visas for Chinese citizens linked to the Torres del Lago Project. It says, by resolution CVRR-022-2010 of July 8, 2010, the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio ordered the revocation of the act granting the petition for 100 visas, without the prior opinion of the Contraloría General de la República and without decreeing compensation for damages (daños y perjuicios). On this point, it is worth noting what is set forth below. A fundamental point in this grievance is the institute of revocation of public acts. Revocation is constituted as a tool for suppression of public conduct, in principle, of favorable content, a case in which it has pragmatic utility, and eventually of unfavorable conduct, as will be indicated later. However, such suppression is not legitimized based on the invalidity of the Administration's actions, but on the unsuitability (inconveniencia) of the administrative act, in terms of consonance with the protected public interest, either due to the appearance of new facts that incorporate a supervening inopportuneness or unsuitability, or due to a variation in the criterion regarding the same facts that gave rise to the act. In this lies the difference with nullity (invalidity), because although both nullity and revocation are forms of suppression of public conduct, in the first case the cause for elimination is a substantial non-conformity with the legal system (Arts. 128 and 158 of the LGAP), whereas in revocation, the cause lies in the unsuitability of maintaining the effects of a given public act for the protection and satisfaction of public interests. That is, the basis for revocation is not the pathology of the act, but its unsuitability. Hence, in accordance with the provisions of ordinal 152 of Law No. 6227/78, it only proceeds for reasons of opportunity, advisability, or merit,—with the legal exceptions—, and can only take place when there is a serious divergence between the effects of the act and the public interest, despite the time elapsed, the rights created, or the nature and other circumstances of the legal relationship sought to be terminated. A fundamental aspect is that given this base characteristic, the originating cause for revocation can be configured by the appearance of new factual circumstances, not existing or not known at the time of issuing the original act, as well as a different assessment of the same factual circumstances that gave rise to the act, or of the affected public interest. With all, the revocation power (potestad revocatoria) must be exercised within the period of 4 years, according to precept 156 of the LGAP. It is worth highlighting that such public power can only fall upon acts of a discretionary content, being unfeasible in cases of acts of a regulated content, which highlights the discretionary and optional nature of the figure of revocation. This is established by ordinal 156.1 of that same legal body. Now, revocation can fall on acts of favorable or unfavorable content. In this latter case (exceptional), canon 156 ejusdem indicates that the act unfavorable to the administered party may be revoked even if it has already become final. As for favorable acts, the revocation process must distinguish whether that favorable effect derives from a subjective right or constitutes a precarious title (título precario), a distinction that holds special relevance in order to establish whether the procedure to revoke the act requires additional requirements or not. In this vein, mandate 154 of Law No. 6227/78 states: "Permits for the use of public domain, and other acts that expressly and validly recognize a right for an administered party under a precarious title, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or advisability without liability on the part of the Administration; but the revocation must not be untimely or arbitrary and a prudent period for fulfillment of the revocation act must be given in all cases." The norm refers to two clearly differentiated factual situations, on one hand, permits for the use of public domain property, and on the other, acts that confer an ephemeral and precarious right. In such hypotheses, revocation may be agreed upon without liability for the Administration, with the reservation that such decision not be arbitrary or untimely. On the other hand, when such conditioning assumptions are not present, and the favorable effect is characteristic of a right, the procedure to follow is that developed by ordinal 155 of the cited Ley General which literally states: "1. The revocation of an act declaratory of subjective rights must be done by the superior (jerarca) of the respective entity, with a prior favorable opinion of the Contraloría General de la República. 2. Simultaneously, it must contain the recognition and, if possible, the calculation of the full compensation for the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused, under penalty of absolute nullity. 3. In any case, the damages (daños y perjuicios) must be liquidated by the Administration within the month following the request or appeal of the administered party containing the liquidation sought by him." In this scenario, the validity of the act ordering the revocation of another is subject to compliance with substantial and procedural requirements, it being the case that a revocation agreed upon contrary to those rigorosities—when pertinent—will inevitably lead to the nullity of the revocatory act. On one hand, the competence to order the revocation rests with the maximum superior (jerarca máximo) of the entity that issued the act to be suppressed. Second, given that what is affected by the cessation of the act's effects is a subjective right—in the context of norm 155 analyzed—, the compensation for the damages (daños y perjuicios) that such determination may produce is necessary, a topic that, in order according to what is regulated by the norm in question, must have a mandatory and binding opinion from the Contraloría General de la República and, moreover, contain the recognition (as a right) and, if possible, the calculation of the economic reparation for the damages and eventual losses caused. The absence of that criterion or of the aforementioned compensation leads to the invalidity of the revocatory act. From what has been stated, it is clear that the requirement of this procedure, which requires favorable opinions from other public bodies and the weighing of compensation rights, only applies when the act to be revoked has granted subjective rights, not when it is a precarious title (título precario), since in such scenarios, the decision can be issued without liability for the Administration. It must be analyzed in each case, therefore, when that element conditions the revocation power (potestad revocatoria) or when that procedure, even in the lawful exercise of public powers, leads to administrative liability. Finally, it must be indicated that revocation produces effects from the moment it is ordered and onward into the future, and therefore, it does not extinguish the act from its original date, and consequently, all effects produced are maintained even after its revocation.

X.- On revocation in the specific case. As a complement to the above, it should be noted that even in cases where revocation can be ordered without liability for the Administration, it cannot be arbitrary or untimely, since in such cases an abuse of power or, as the case may be, a deviation of power could be configured. Now, in the case at hand, the analysis of the charges formulated requires establishing a recount of what occurred. After analyzing the case file, it is found that on February 8, 2010, the plaintiff entity filed before the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería an application for the granting of visas for a total of 100 Chinese workers for the construction of the Real Estate development called Condominio R.T.L.

(Folios 228-233 of the administrative file.) In the course of that proceeding, through technical report DML-DNE-013-2010 of the Department of Labor Migrations of the National Employment Directorate (folios 165-167 of the administrative file), a recommendation is issued on said petition, as a result of which, by agreement adopted in session 006-2010 of April 21, 2010, the Restricted Visas and Refuge Commission (Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio) determined to authorize the granting of the 100 work visas alluded to, for meeting the necessary requirements, having the approval of permits from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Municipality of San José, the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Technology -at that date-, and the General Directorate of Traffic Engineering. Through resolution DGVR 1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010, the General Directorate of Migration and Immigration (Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería) proceeds to communicate the authorization of entry visas for 40 Chinese citizens. (folio 173 front and back of the administrative file). However, by official communication DMT-724-2010 from the Minister of Labor and Social Security, dated June 1, 2010, the temporary suspension of the entry permit to Costa Rica for the workers referred to in report DML-DNE-0013-2010 of January 13, 2010, is requested, until the criteria set forth in said report are reviewed. (Folio 168 back of the administrative file). In that vein, by official communication DMT-795-2010 of June 24, 2010, the Minister of Labor and Social Security sends to the Restricted Visas Commission a technical recommendation report concerning the request for restricted entry visas in favor of Chinese citizens filed by the company C.C.A. S.A., in which she recommends that the Commission not grant any entry permit to the country, as long as the labor and economic conditions in the construction sector persist in the country. (Folios 143 back-147 of the administrative file). As a consequence, through resolution DGVR 1337-2010RVJ at 15:30 hours on June 2, 2010, the General Directorate of Migration and Immigration ordered the temporary suspension of the notification of resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010. (Folios 163-164 of the administrative file). Ultimately, by resolution No. CVRR-0022-2010 at 12:15 hours on July 8, 2010, the Restricted Visas and Refuge Commission ordered: "...TO REVOKE the authorization of the restricted visas granted to one hundred citizens of Chinese nationality in session No. 6 of April 21, 2010, and consequently administrative resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010, and to accept in its entirety Technical Report DMT-795-2010 signed by the Minister of Labor and Social Security, Sandra Piszk F. The actions of the General Directorate of Migration and Immigration, which in administrative resolution DGVR-1337-2010RVJ temporarily suspended the procedure, are ENDORSED in their entirety. (...)" (Folios 122 back-124 of the administrative file). Having thoroughly analyzed the argument of the plaintiff entity, it is the opinion of this Tribunal that the absence of a pronouncement by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría Genera de la República) and the estimation of eventual damages (daños y perjuicios) do not constitute the nullity of the challenged act, since the revoked decision does not affect subjective rights. On this matter, it is necessary to specify that the content and regulatory framework of the immigration figure of the entry visa allows us to establish that it constitutes a mere expectation of a right, which implies an immigration status that is not opposable to immigration authorities under any circumstance regarding the right to remain in the country, since, aside from its ownership, it is conditioned upon various requirements for continued stay. This is clarified by section 55 of Ley No. 8764, which states on this point: "The visa implies a mere expectation of a right; it does not presuppose the unconditional admission of the foreign person into the country nor the authorization for the intended stay; it shall be subject to a guarantee deposit, in the cases that apply according to this Law and its Regulations, as well as to the immigration control that the competent official performs to verify compliance with all the legal and regulatory requirements demanded for entry." The social implications of immigration matters, as detailed above, allow for an analysis of convenience and opportunity regarding the incidence that the migratory phenomenon has or will have in various fields of national activity, among these, the scope of employment supply and occupation levels, as can be inferred from mandates 5, 6, and 7 of Ley No. 8764. Specifically, it is worth reiterating that subsection one of Article 7 cited establishes as a purpose of the power in immigration matters "The search for complementarity between the national workforce and the migrant workforce, in such a way that there is no displacement of the national workforce due to the incorporation of immigrant workers." From this standpoint, given the social incidence of visa granting, it is certainly a title that confers a right, but one of a precarious nature, in view of the very dynamics of immigration matters. On the other hand, from a pragmatic standpoint, in this specific case, this Tribunal does not consider that the revocation of the cited act was untimely or arbitrary. While there was a technical recommendation report for the granting of the 100 visas, the truth of the matter is that later, the head of the Labor and Social Security Ministry issued an opinion on that same process, weighing a series of diverse—new—analyses and situations that led to determining the inadvisability of maintaining the effects of that authorization. In that sense, as has been noted, in official communication DMT-795-2010 of June 24, 2010, the Minister of Labor and Social Security sent to the Restricted Visas Commission a technical recommendation report on the abovementioned procedure, in which it is indicated that, given the existence of unemployment in the construction sector and the existence of qualified workforce in the country that can carry out the proposed project, she recommends that the Commission not grant any entry permit to the country, as long as the labor and economic conditions in the construction sector persist in the country. (Folios 143 back-147 of the administrative file). As can be observed, this is not only a factual and evaluative element distinct from the one considered for issuing the first act—the one revoked—but also an element of technical, factual, and legal justification that supports the decision finally adopted regarding the advisability of maintaining the effects of the act authorizing the granting of 100 visas to citizens of Chinese nationality in session No. 6 of April 21, 2010, of the Restricted Visas Commission and administrative resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010. From that perspective, in the judgment of this collegiate body, that reasoning demonstrates that the revocation, in accordance with section 154 of the LGAP, has not been untimely or arbitrary but rather is well-founded, as ordered by precept 136 of the same law. As has been noted, the procedure or requirements established in canon 155 of the same body of law are not, therefore, applicable; ergo, the omission of the aspects indicated in that rule for this specific case does not cause any nullity, as they are unnecessary. Consequently, there is no nullity that must be declared in this regard. Furthermore, as a derivation of the foregoing, the petition for damages (daños y perjuicios) is improper. These items are requested in the lawsuit as a consequence of the supposed harm caused by the issuance of a null revocatory act. It is a point petitioned in an accessory manner or conditioned upon the annulment claim. Subsequently then, having established that the questioned conducts do not suffer from or evidence the degrees of invalidity and pathology accused, there is no criterion of imputation or basis to configure a framework of public liability as a derivation of those conducts. It is not, therefore, a matter of damages that should be recognized by this Tribunal, coupled with the aspect that they have not been accredited in any way, for which reason the rejection of the amendment to the complaint is also appropriate.

XI.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses opposed. The representation of the State opposed the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of passive standing. The defense of lack of passive standing must be rejected. The action is brought against the Public Administration, the author of the questioned conducts, in accordance with section 12.1 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). The same occurs with the defense of lack of interest, as the current nature of this conflict is evident to this Tribunal insofar as it seeks the permissibility for the entry of operators and workers of Chinese nationality, as well as the eventual damages that the public conducts have generated. As for the defense of lack of right, it must be accepted with respect to all of the claims formulated, given that, on one hand, the validity of the questioned conducts has been proven, as well as the impropriety of the positive silence (silencio positivo) in this case, and the irrelevance of the indemnity claim formulated. Consequently, the rejection of the complaint in all its terms must be ordered." To the above, it is reiterated, the criterion was that the time limit provided in numeral 200 of Law No. 8764 and that set in circular DGVS-675-2008 of December 1, 2008, numeral 55, had not expired considering the date the application was filed. The validity of what was resolved on this point will be elaborated upon below. Specifically, from the analysis of that administrative act, this Chamber concludes that the declaration of lack of jurisdiction pertained solely to the petition for work visas, not to the matter of restricted visas, which was resolved based on other types of considerations that have not been challenged. Even if the operative part of the challenged act is carefully analyzed, it is observed that on this topic it states: "... *the Commission on Restricted Visas and Refuge DECLARES ITSELF TO LACK JURISDICTION to hear the application for work visas filed on September 2, 2010...*"; that is, the act explicitly refers that the declaration of lack of jurisdiction is issued regarding work visas. From this standpoint, in accordance with articles 59, 60, 129 of Law No. 6227/78 and article 49 of Law No. 8764, the lack of jurisdiction declared by the administrative body itself—the Commission on Restricted Visas and Refuge—regarding said applications does not imply the impossibility, due to lack of jurisdiction, to rule on the part of the petition over which it does have jurisdiction and which concerns it in the exercise of its powers. Regarding the restricted visa applications specifically and the petition for a declaration of a presumed act, that instance was fully competent to rule, so the alleged defect is not configured, and therefore, its rejection is proper.

**VI.- On the application of positive silence (silencio positivo) to the specific case.** In a second line of challenge, the plaintiff censures that the criticized act is invalid, since in this case, the elements allowing the application of the positive silence (silencio positivo) figure have been configured. The foregoing, she argues—essentially—since a visa is defined as an authorization or permit to enter a specific country, positive silence (silencio positivo) is proper or applicable in cases where the Administration (la Administración), without any reason and outside the time limit established by law, does not resolve the application for the process or entry permit, when all the legal requirements for this purpose are met. She points out that, in this matter, the General Law of the Public Administration (la Ley General de la Administración Pública) is applicable as supplementary law, in whose precept 330 it is established that when an application is filed for the granting of a permit or authorization, the Administration (la Administración) is obliged to resolve within a one-month time limit, or otherwise, positive silence (silencio positivo) operates. She affirms that her petition was filed on September 2, 2010, and more than one month elapsed without receiving a response from the Administration (la Administración), so a presumed act was configured. She emphasizes that immigration matters are not among the exceptional cases established by case law for the application of positive silence (silencio positivo) because there is no interest in protecting interests related to life, health, and environmental matters in general. Regarding these allegations, the following must be stated. The public interest that it is called upon to protect constitutes the finalist or teleological element that justifies the conferral of authority powers to certain Public Administrations within the particular context of their spheres of action. Such public interest constitutes the ultimate purpose of the service-providing axis of such administrative units and the ultimate purpose of their actions, an interest that prevails even over the interest that a Public Administration may have (articles 113, 131 LGAP). For this reason, and as it is the legitimizing basis of the powers conferred upon them, the competencies and powers must be exercised for such satisfaction. This is indeed inferred from article 66.1 of Law No. 6227/78, as it indicates that authority powers and their exercise, public duties, and compliance are irrevocable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible. Now, in many cases, these powers are exercised within the framework of an administrative procedure, which may arise ex officio or upon petition of a party. In the latter case (petition of an interested party), the due exercise of public powers entails the duty to issue an express act within the time limits imposed by the legal system for each type of petition. This is established, in principle, in article 134 LGAP. However, it is common that once this time limit expires, the Administration (la Administración) does not issue a response to what was requested, in which case the legal-procedural consequence of this inaction must be distinguished and specified. On one hand, numeral 139 of the cited Law No. 6227/78 indicates that the silence of the Administration (la Administración) cannot reflect its will, unless a law provides otherwise. That is to say, the lack of response from the Administration (la Administración), although it may be considered a pathology or abnormal functioning (due to negligence) of the exercise of public power, has different effects, depending on the case to be analyzed. In this way, the public legal system establishes two figures intended to regulate the effects of public inaction, namely, negative silence (silencio negativo) and positive silence (silencio positivo). Negative silence (silencio negativo), in simple terms, constitutes a fictional denial of the administrative request, if the Administration (la Administración) has not ruled within the time limit granted to it to resolve. It is a presumption of rejection of what was requested, the purpose of which is to open the right of the administered party to exercise their appeal rights before the same administration, or to directly go to the administrative contentious jurisdiction to seek protection of their legal situation. Negative silence (silencio negativo) is not a rejection of the petition, but a conjecture that enables the aforementioned challenge, that is, it does not mean that the petition has been effectively rejected, since there is no manifest public will, but only the possibility of bypassing that stage and continuing in the administrative procedure. It can be said that when exhaustion of administrative remedies was mandatory in all matters (prior to ruling 3669-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber (la Sala Constitucional) and article 31.1 of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo)), negative silence (silencio negativo) was a burden for the administered party, as it required them to pursue the appeals to obtain a reviewable act and then seek jurisdictional protection. However, currently, as a right, it constitutes a possibility to accelerate the course of the procedure or to file a judicial claim. This is established by subsection 3 of article 261 of the General Law (la Ley General) previously cited, as follows: "*3. If at the end of the indicated terms an express resolution has not been communicated, the claim or petition of the administered party shall be deemed rejected in light of the silence of the Administration (la Administración), either for filing the appropriate administrative appeals or the contentious action in its case, the latter under the terms and with the effects indicated by the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo).*" More simply, administrative inaction implies the rejection of the petition—of the appeal—for purposes of advancing the procedure, but this does not imply that, from the substantive-legal standpoint, the request has been denied. Even numeral 329.3 of the LGAP (la LGAP) establishes very clearly that an act issued after the time limit shall be valid for all legal purposes, unless a rule to the contrary applies. This entails the duty of the Administration (la Administración) to rule on the petition that has been presented to it, even when the time limit for issuing its conduct has expired and negative silence (silencio negativo) may be deemed to have occurred, as its competence to resolve does not lapse due to this circumstance. Unlike positive silence (silencio positivo), negative silence (silencio negativo) is not an act, but a fictional conjecture of rejection for the purposes indicated above. On the other hand, in certain cases, aside from the foregoing, public inaction in issuing a formal ruling leads, as a legal effect, to so-called positive silence (silencio positivo). In these cases, the silence of the administration is understood as favorable to the applicant, so that their petition is deemed resolved favorably as it was submitted. From that perspective, article 330 of Law No. 6227/78 states: "*The silence of the Administration (la Administración) shall be understood as positive when it is expressly so established or when it concerns authorizations or approvals that must be granted in the exercise of supervision and protection functions. / 2. Silence shall also be understood as positive when it concerns requests for permits, licenses, and authorizations.*" However, for this to occur, several elements must concur, because not every request that entails a permit, license, or authorization gives rise to positive silence (silencio positivo). Indeed, a superficial reading of the second paragraph of article 330 LGAP could lead to the misconception that in any request for an authorization, license, or permit, the figure of positive silence (silencio positivo) applies or operates. This position is not shared by this Court. The understanding in the stated terms implies, as a practical effect, that regardless of what is requested, the public omission would lead to a kind of administrative acquiescence for the exercise of the acts supporting the interested party's petition. This, regardless of whether what is requested has a major impact on public order, health, and public safety. An authorization can be defined as the removal of a legal obstacle for the exercise of a required conduct. In turn, a permit consists of the administrative enablement for the development of a conduct that is, in principle, prohibited. While a license consists of an authorization with regulated content. From that perspective, it is necessary to analyze in each case whether the private (or public) petition is governed by the figure of positive silence (silencio positivo) or whether it is subject to negative silence (silencio negativo). Otherwise, the existence of negative silence (silencio negativo) would not make sense, except for the appeal phase, because with the exception of administrative claims, in many proceedings submitted to the administration, what is ultimately sought is the granting of a permit, a license, or an authorization. One might consider the case of a request for a permit to operate the paid public passenger transportation activity (article 25 of Law No. 3503), which meets the requirements of that legislation, and once the time limit to resolve has expired, there is no public act. In such a case, it would be completely unfeasible to think of positive silence (silencio positivo). On the contrary, the silence of the Administration (la Administración) in that case would not be that provided for in article 330 LGAP, but rather the effect indicated in article 261, subsections 1 and 3, of that same legal body. Hence, expressly, in the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), No. 7575, article 4 clearly states the inapplicability of positive silence (silencio positivo) in environmental matters. The same effect occurs with public domain assets, by derivation from the legal regime applicable to the public domain (article 262 Civil Code), a treatment that in procedural terms can be seen, among others, in precepts 34.2 of Law No. 8508 (CPCA). As can be seen, article 330 LGAP itself establishes that positive silence (silencio positivo) is proper when it is expressly established by law. This is the case, for example only, of the duty to process in matters of administrative contracting—article 16 of Law No. 7494—and in that same field, the omission of a response to the objection appeal—article 83 ibid.—. In such cases, expressly regulated, the legal system establishes a time limit different from that set by article 261 LGAP, which usually matches the one-month period regulated by mandate 330 of Law No. 6227/78. However, in normal situations, the time limit to resolve petitions is 2 months, regulated in the aforementioned precept 261 LGAP, and the effects of the silence are negative or denials. Consequently, this Court does not share the position that every authorization, permit, or license implies, in all cases, the application of the figure of positive silence (silencio positivo). For this purpose, it is necessary to analyze in each case the convergence of a series of factors. On one hand, whether there is an express regulation establishing the pertinence of positive silence (silencio positivo). On the other hand, if there is no such explicit development, whether the petition of the administered party deals with a matter in which that figure is possible of application. In such cases—and only in those—silence will apply when it is proven: a) that the petition was submitted fulfilling all the requirements set by the legal system for that particular case; and b) that once the time limit set by the legal system for the Administration (la Administración) to resolve the proceeding has expired, no express act has been issued. For these purposes, the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excessive Requirements and Administrative Procedures, No. 8220, of March 4, 2002, published in La Gaceta No. 49 of March 11, 2002, establishes the procedure for having positive silence (silencio positivo) accredited. In this sense, numeral 7 literally states: "*Procedure for applying positive silence (silencio positivo)* *When it concerns requests for the granting of permits, licenses, or authorizations, once the time limit for resolution granted to the Administration (la Administración) by the legal system has expired without it having ruled, they shall be deemed approved. For the application of positive silence (silencio positivo), it shall be sufficient for the administered party to submit to the Administration (la Administración) a sworn statement, duly authenticated, certifying that all the necessary requirements for the granting of the permits, licenses, or authorizations have been met and that the Administration (la Administración) did not resolve within the corresponding time limit. / These requirements shall be solely those expressly stipulated in laws, executive decrees, or regulations, in accordance with the provisions of article 4 of this law. / The Administration (la Administración), within the three business days following receipt of the sworn statement, must issue a document stating that the time limit for the application of positive silence (silencio positivo) elapsed and the request was not resolved in time. If the Administration (la Administración) does not issue this document within the indicated time limit, the application of positive silence (silencio positivo) shall be deemed accepted and the administered party may continue with the procedures to obtain the corresponding permit, license, or authorization, except in cases where positive silence (silencio positivo) is not proper by constitutional provision. / In compliance with this procedure, the Administration (la Administración) shall coordinate internally to inform the simplification of procedures officer, in accordance with articles 8 and 11 of this law. / No institution may disregard or reject the application of positive silence (silencio positivo), which operates by operation of law. / When applicable, the Administration (la Administración) shall apply the administrative nullity procedure regulated in article 173 of the General Law of the Public Administration (la Ley General de la Administración Pública) or shall initiate a judicial proceeding for injury to demonstrate that the corresponding requirements were not met.*" (Thus amended by article 1 of law No. 8990 of September 27, 2011) It should be noted that this wording was not the one in force at the time the plaintiff filed the request for positive silence (silencio positivo), nor the one in force at the time the act was issued or the lawsuit filed, so the issue must be resolved with the text in force at that time. That rule stated, before the reform made by Law No. 8990: "*When it concerns requests for the granting of permits, licenses, or authorizations, once the time limit for resolution granted to the Administration (la Administración) by the legal system has expired without it having ruled, they shall be deemed approved. Once this situation occurs, the interested party may: a) Submit a note to the Administration (la Administración) stating that the application was submitted in complete form and that the Administration (la Administración) did not resolve it in time. The Administration (la Administración) must issue, on the following business day, a note declaring that, effectively, the time limit elapsed and the application was not approved, and therefore positive silence (silencio positivo) applied, or b) Appear before a notary public to certify, by means of a notarial act, that the application was submitted in complete form and that the Administration (la Administración) did not resolve it in time."* As observed, the procedure provided in Law No. 8220 aims to have the concurrence of the indicated conditions deemed proven. When positive silence (silencio positivo) occurs, as stated, the so-called presumed administrative act arises, so the elimination of that act requires resorting to the forms of extinction of public conduct, that is, nullity under article 173 LGAP, proceedings for injury, or the revocation of conduct, under penalty of infringing the principle of intangibility of one's own acts, enshrined in precept 34 of the Magna Carta. Likewise, that declaration of the occurrence of positive silence (silencio positivo) can be filed in this administrative contentious venue, under the protection of numeral 42 and 122 of the CPCA.

VII.- Inapplicability of positive silence (silencio positivo) in immigration matters and in the specific case. Now, having set forth these generalities on positive silence (silencio positivo), it is the criterion of this Court that there is no invalidity in the actions of the defendant Administration (la Administración). Certainly, numeral 46 of Law No. 8764 (General Law of Migration and Aliens) defines a visa as "*... an authorization to enter the national territory issued by the director general or the consular agent, when authorized by the former, or when permitted by the general directives for granting entry visas. The granting of diplomatic and official visas is excepted from the present regime. In exceptional cases, the director of Migration may grant visas, with the general directives on entry and stay visas for non-residents not being binding for these purposes; in this case, they must duly justify and provide reasons for their decision.*" However, the mere reference to the figure of an authorization, license, or permit does not imply, per se, the application of article 330.2 of the LGAP (la LGAP),—as has been indicated—because for this purpose, on one hand, it is necessary to analyze whether in that specific case of a public petition, the figure operates or if, on the contrary, the claim or petition must be deemed denied in light of article 261.3 LGAP, for which purpose it is necessary to analyze, among other things, the relevance of the regulated matter, as well as weighing whether the public inaction violates the exercise of a right conferred by the legal system. In the case of immigration matters, it must be insisted, this is a field of special relevance for the public interest, involving public order and the topic of public safety. This matter also involves the component of national sovereignty, which is exercised and represented through the rules and decisions issued in the context of this type of migratory relations, a topic in which, according to the constitutional text, the application of the figure of positive silence (silencio positivo) could not be sustained, as it would constitute a sort of presumed renunciation of the exercise of such national sovereignty powers. As has been indicated, articles 2 and 3 of Law No. 8764 declare this matter to be of public interest, an aspect that is emphasized throughout the context of the cited legal framework, as it confers powers upon the Directorate General of Migration and Aliens (la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería) to issue directives regulating the issue of granting visas and the stay of non-resident persons (article 47), as well as the regulation applicable to permanent residents (article 77) or temporary residents (articles 79-86), non-residents (articles 87-92), or persons with special migratory statuses provided for in article 94 of the aforementioned Law No. 8764. The power of rejection, understood as the action through which the immigration authority denies a foreign person entry to the national territory and orders their immediate transfer to the country of origin or provenance, or to a third country that admits them (article 64 ejusdem), denotes the relevance of said matter. This becomes clearer with the provisions of article 67 ibidem, which states: "*The granting of the intended migratory category shall be conditioned upon the requirements of public safety and the economic and social development of the country, in addition to the requirements determined by the Regulations of this Law.*" The foregoing evidences the marked and undeniable public interest underlying immigration matters, as it is not a simple analysis of formal requirements, but rather the authorization of entry through the granting of a visa under any of the indicated migratory conditions depends on the technical analysis of the Immigration Administration (la Administración Migratoria) and not solely on satisfying formal requirements. Its granting weighs not only the personal conditions of the migrant, but also aspects of public safety and the social and economic environment, in terms of convenience for the country.

Thus, by way of example, the determination of granting visas for the temporary exercise of certain employment positions can be analyzed in light of the social conditions of labor occupation in that particular area, which constitutes an analysis of the domestic social incidence of the migrant phenomenon, whether temporary or permanent. Ergo, it is not a simple authorization as the moving party seems to imply, a thesis this Chamber does not share. On the contrary, if one analyzes Article 55 of Law No. 8764, the visa "... implies a mere expectation of a right, does not entail the unconditional admission of the foreign person to the country nor the authorization of the intended stay (...)" and, as has been stated, it is a subjective stage conditioned upon social security factors, an assessment in which, of course, public action must not be arbitrary, but measured and reasoned. Therefore, it is not an authorization request that can be understood as encompassed within the terms of Article 330 LGAP. It is not a matter of a criterion of distinction where the law does not make one (ubi lex non distingui nec non distinguere debemus)—as could be alleged—but rather of the interpretation and weighing that this Court conducts regarding the figure analyzed. Thus, it is not a matter in which, as a matter of principle, the figure of positive silence (presumed act, acto presunto) can be understood as applicable. Unlike what was stated by the plaintiff, it is not that this sensitive matter is not included among the exceptions to the pertinence of the presumed act, but rather, the relevant point is that, given its public importance, the occurrence of positive silence must be interpreted restrictively, and lacking a regulation that specifically establishes the application of that institute in this topic, in this specific case, its application is not deemed correct. Now then, that element alone would give rise to the rejection of the complaint under examination. However, in the particular case, in response to the request for a declaration of positive silence filed on October 14, 2010, regarding the visa conferral process for 49 Chinese workers, in act CVRR-0573-2010, the fourth Considerando stated that the request for positive silence was not proper, since the Restricted Visas Commission was within the legally established period to resolve. For this, it referred to Article 200 of the General Law of Migration and Alienship and to circular DGVS-675-2008 of September 1, 2008, Article 55 which sets a period of 60 days to resolve visa applications. (See folios 82-83 of the judicial case file). The plaintiff points out that the period to resolve the visa application filed on September 2, 2010, is the 1-month period indicated in Articles 330 and 331 of Law No. 6227/78. This criterion is not shared by this Court. Indeed, even considering that positive silence operates in this matter—which this collegiate body does not share—its propriety would be contingent upon the expiry of the period that the legal system grants to the competent Administration to resolve. In the specific case of immigration matters, Article 189 of Law No. 8764 states: "The administrative procedures related to immigration matters shall be governed by the provisions of this Law and its Regulation; additionally, supplementarily, by the General Law of the Public Administration, No. 6227, of May 2, 1978; Law No. 8220, Protection of the Citizen from Excessive Administrative Requirements and Procedures, of March 4, 2002, and the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, No. 8508, of April 28, 2006." As observed, the integration criterion of Law No. 6227/78 and No. 8508 is by supplementarity, not by direct referral. That is, one must first turn to the procedural rules established in the Migration Law, special for regulating the matter, and then, only in the case of topics not addressed in its articles, turn to the other expressly indicated legal sources of integration. This aligns with the criteria of integration of the public legal system established in Article 9 of the LGAP. Thus, regarding the period to resolve immigration petitions, Article 200 of Law No. 8764 states very clearly, regarding residency applications, that they must be resolved within the "... maximum period of three months to resolve, from the moment all requirements have been met. When it concerns petitions to opt for legal migratory status, this period shall run from the receipt of the documentation at the central offices of the Directorate General." In this manner, in the face of the special regulation, it is evident to this Court that the applicable legal period to be taken as a reference for determining the validity of what was resolved and of circular DGSV-675-2008 itself (also questioned) is three months, not the one-month period established by Article 330 and 331 LGAP. With everything, in light of the foregoing, even considering that the applicable period is that of the LGAP, it is the criterion of this collegiate body, for the reasons already explained, that the period would not be the monthly one indicated there, but rather the bi-monthly one from Article 261 of that same Law. However, it is reiterated, this request must be resolved according to the period ordered by Article 200 of Law No. 8764, as it is a special period. With everything, in visa matters, Article 47 ibidem confers competence to the Directorate General of Migration and Alienship to issue directives. In this line, Article 55 of that circular establishes a period of sixty days to resolve visa applications. In this way, given that the petition was filed on September 2, 2010, at the time of filing the application for positive silence, that is, October 14, 2010, the set period had not elapsed, whether under Article 200 of Law No. 8764, or under Article 55 of circular 675-2008. That period had also not expired at the time of issuing resolution No. CVRR-0573-2010 in which the declaration of positive silence was denied. Consequently, the temporal element alleged by the plaintiff is not present, in view of which, his complaint must be rejected, because it is insisted, even considering the figure of positive silence as proper in this matter (which is not shared), the applicable period in the case had not expired, consequently, the silence cannot be deemed to have occurred, given that the Administration still had time to resolve the formulated petitions. Therefore, it is irrelevant that the requirements of circular DG-1084-2008 of the Directorate General of Migration and Alienship were met, or that the notarial record was drawn up by the professional M. for the effects of Article 7 of Law No. 8220, because as has been noted, positive silence could not be deemed to have occurred, and furthermore, it is inappropriate and impertinent in this case. Therefore, the rejection of the ground for nullity presented must be ordered.

**VIII.- On the analysis of the circulars regarding periods in the immigration process.** In another order of things, the plaintiff challenges the validity of circulars DG-3309-2009 and DGVS-675-2008, applied in the issuance of act No. CVRR-0573-2010. As a ground for nullity, it is alleged that regulations were enacted that disregard the one-month period imposed in this type of matter by Article 331 of Law No. 6227/78. It states that the hierarchy of sources of Administrative Law is violated, while circulars can only have internal effects within the Administration itself, without being able to modify legal or regulatory provisions, nor can they impose requirements, conditions, procedures, or burdens not indicated by law. On the topic of the scope and limits of the circulars that the Migration Legislation enables in favor of the Directorate General of Migration and Alienship, the First Chamber, in ruling No. 116-F-S1-2010 of the ninth hour of January twenty-second, two thousand ten, stated: "It must not be lost from sight that a circular consists of an internal act through which instructions can be issued regarding the manner of proceeding by public officials, in this case, in the assessment of visa applications. Because it is a guideline directed at officials, and insofar as the effects attributed to it are consistent with the indicated particularity, and therefore applied at the moment these assess the petitions of individuals, without granting it external effects, no violation of the principle of legal reserve is appreciated. Of course, due to this situation, it cannot be given the effects proper to a legal norm. Even though it may have effects on third parties in a reflexive manner, these must occur by virtue of preparatory acts within the procedure, which must be consistent with the legal system and never by virtue of the direct application of a directive on the legal sphere of the interested parties. In this understanding, as long as the content of the legal text is not exceeded, this Chamber does not appreciate a violation of the principle of legality." This analysis is conducted regarding the same circular now being questioned, even if from the perspective of the validity of Article 83, for the topic of economic solvency; the precedent is applicable for the purposes of specifying the scope and limits of that type of circular. In light of that analysis then, it must be determined whether that circular regulates topics not addressed by the law that could affect third parties foreign to the Administration, in a way that it could be considered an external matter. As has been noted, in the procedural topic for resolving visa applications, Article 200 of Law No. 8764 establishes a period of three months to resolve the various applications that in that matter the Administration must hear. It is clear that before the eventual divergence between the law and the circular, without a doubt the law prevails due to the greater legal force and resilience that are proper to it. From that standpoint, even though resolution CVRR-0573-2010 alludes to the cited circular, the criterion for rejection is also based on the period set by Article 200 of the Migration Law, so there would be no nullity whatsoever on that particular. On the other hand, that circular in Article 55 indicates: "Once the documentation is received at the Directorate General, it shall subject it to study and communicate the pertinent resolution to the consulate, having a maximum period of sixty days to resolve and issue the final resolution on filed applications." That circular was issued on August 28, 2008, while Law No. 8764 was published on August 19, 2009, and came into effect six months later (Transitory II). Ergo, it is evident that the Law prevails. However, it is insisted, the mere reference to the application of the circular does not cause its nullity. For this, it must be said, it is the criterion of this Court, the period regulated in that Article 55 of the aforementioned circular does not antagonize the one regulated by Article 200 of the Law, which sets a period of 3 months for the resolution of residency application procedures. With everything, even applying the referral established in Article 189 of Law No. 8764, regarding the supplementary application of the procedural rules of the LGAP, Article 261 of that normative body establishes that the procedure must be concluded by final act within a period of two months. If one understands that the cited circular sets a period of 60 days to resolve, without specifying whether they are business days or calendar days, and therefore, in accordance with Article 256.1 of Law No. 6227/78, they must be understood as calendar days, the period in both regulated instruments is similar. From that standpoint, as has been said, the circular in question does not violate the legal situation of the plaintiff; first, because the act it challenges does not resolve based exclusively on that circular, but also refers to Article 200 of Law No. 8764, a norm that regulates the time the Administration has to resolve residency applications, without it being understood that on this particular, the monthly period established by Article 331 of the LGAP applies; second, the 60-day period of the circular coincides with the one set by Article 261 LGAP; third, even considering that it clashes with the period of Law No. 8764, it is clear that the law's period prevails, due to its superior hierarchy and later issuance, however, it is insisted, the rejection of the petition for positive silence is not based, as the plaintiff states, solely on the temporal criterion of the circular. Hence, the defect of misapplication of hierarchically superior norms, as the petitioner accuses, was not incurred, but rather the contrary. Regarding circular DG-3309-2009, even though it is mentioned in the operative part of the act, in the specific analysis of the issue of the positive silence petition, it is not referred to at all, so it bears no relation to the debated issue. Furthermore, the plaintiff does not specify the reasons why such a circular would be invalid. It limits itself to making and presenting doctrinal citations and generic normative references to the topic of the elements of the act, the concept of invalidity, the nature of circulars, the powers of the administrative head to issue them, however, it does not indicate how those norms and sources lead to demonstrating the pathology of the circular in question. Its statements in this sense are theoretical reflections on the regime of composition of the public act and the consequences of its defects, however, outside the topic of the period which in theory, in its judgment, is applicable in this case, a matter already resolved, it offers no allegation whatsoever. Therefore, in line with the foregoing, it is necessary to order the rejection of the claim regarding this particular.

**IX.- On the revocation of public acts.** In a document dated May 5, 2011, visible at folios 557-559 of the judicial case file, the plaintiff firm expands its claim, regarding the facts and claims, challenging the nullity of act CVRR-022-2010 of July 8, 2010, of the Restricted Visas and Refuge Commission, as well as the payment of damages and losses derived from that act, which in the preliminary hearing it specified as the travel and stay expenses of 40 Chinese citizens to Beijing. In this sense, it points out that on February 8, 2010, it requested a restricted entry visa for one hundred Chinese citizens to work on the real estate project in San José, as a result of which, the Department of Labor Migrations of the National Directorate of Employment rendered a recommendation that led to the Restricted Visas and Refuge Commission authorizing 100 visas during session 006-2010. It criticizes that through administrative resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010, the Directorate General of Migration and Alienship authorized the first 40 visas for Chinese citizens linked to the Torres del Lago Project. It states that by resolution CVRR-022-2010 of July 8, 2010, the Restricted Visas and Refuge Commission ordered the revocation of the act that granted the petition for 100 visas, without the prior opinion of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and without decreeing the compensation for damages and losses. On this particular, it is worth noting what follows. A fundamental point in this complaint is the institute of the revocation of public acts. Revocation is constituted as a tool for the suppression of public conduct, as a matter of principle, of favorable content, a case in which it has pragmatic utility, and eventually for unfavorable ones, as will be indicated further on. But such suppression does not have as a legitimizing basis the invalidity of what was done by the Administration, but rather the unsuitability of the administrative act, in terms of consonance with the protected public interest, whether due to the appearance of new facts that incorporate a supervening inopportuneness or unsuitability, or due to a variation in the criterion of the same facts that gave rise to the act. In this lies the difference with nullity (invalidity), because even though both nullity and revocation are forms of suppression of public conduct, in the first case the cause for elimination is a substantial nonconformity with the legal system (arts. 128 and 158 LGAP), while in revocation, the cause lies in the unsuitability of maintaining the effects of a certain public act for the protection and satisfaction of public interests. That is, the basis of revocation is not the pathology of the act, but its unsuitability. Hence, in line with the provisions of Article 152 of Law No. 6227/78, it only proceeds for reasons of opportunity, convenience, or merit—with legal exceptions—and can only take place when there is a serious divergence between the effects of the act and the public interest, despite the time elapsed, the rights created, or the nature and other circumstances of the legal relationship it is intended to end. A fundamental aspect is that, given that basic characteristic, the original cause for revocation can be constituted by the appearance of new factual circumstances, not existing or not known at the time the original act was issued, as well as a different assessment of the same factual circumstances that gave rise to the act, or of the affected public interest. With everything, the revocation power must be exercised within a period of 4 years, as established by Article 156 of the LGAP. It should be noted that such public power can only fall on acts of discretionary content, being unviable in cases of acts of regulated content, which highlights the discretionary and optional nature of the figure of revocation. This is established by Article 156.1 of that same legal body. Now then, revocation can fall on acts of favorable or unfavorable content. In this latter case (exceptional), Article 156 ejusdem indicates that the act unfavorable to the administered party may be revoked even if it has already become final. Regarding favorable acts, the revocation procedure must determine whether that favorable effect derives from a subjective right or constitutes a precarious title, a distinction that holds special relevance in establishing whether the procedure to revoke the act requires additional requirements or not. In this line, Article 154 of Law No. 6227/78 states: "Permits for the use of the public domain, and other acts that expressly and validly recognize a right of an administered party under a precarious title, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability of the Administration; but the revocation must not be untimely or arbitrary and a reasonable period must be given in all cases for compliance with the revocation act." The norm refers to two clearly differentiated factual scenarios: on one hand, permits for the use of dominical goods, and on the other, acts that confer an ephemeral and precarious right. In such hypotheses, revocation may be agreed upon without liability for the Administration, provided that such decision is not arbitrary or untimely. For its part, when such conditioning premises are not present, and the favorable effect is proper to a right, the procedure to follow is that developed by Article 155 of the cited General Law which literally states: "1. The revocation of an act declaratory of subjective rights must be carried out by the head of the respective entity, after a favorable opinion from the Comptroller General of the Republic. 2. Simultaneously, it must contain the recognition and, if possible, the calculation of the full compensation for the damages and losses caused, under penalty of absolute nullity. 3. In any case, the damages and losses must be settled by the Administration within the month following the request or recourse of the administered party that contains the settlement sought by the latter." In this scenario, the validity of the act that orders the revocation of another is subject to compliance with substantial and procedural requirements, meaning that a revocation agreed upon against these strictures—when they are pertinent—will inevitably lead to the nullity of the revocatory act. On one hand, the competence to order the revocation resides in the highest-ranking head of the entity that issued the act to be suppressed. Second, given that what is affected by the cessation of the act's effects is a subjective right—in the context of the analyzed norm 155—the compensation for damages and losses that such a determination may cause is necessary, a matter which, in accordance with what is regulated by the norm in question, must have a mandatory and binding opinion from the Comptroller General of the Republic and also contain the recognition (as a right) and, if possible, the calculation of the economic reparation for the damages and eventual losses caused. The absence of that criterion or of the aforementioned compensation leads to the invalidity of the revocatory act.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the requirement of this procedure which necessitates favorable opinions from other public bodies and the weighing of indemnification rights only applies when the act to be revoked has granted subjective rights, but not when it involves a precarious title, since in such scenarios, the decision can be issued without liability for the Administration. It must therefore be analyzed in each case when this element conditions the revocation power or when this proceeding, even in the lawful exercise of public powers, leads to administrative liability. Finally, it must be noted that revocation produces effects from the moment it is issued and forward into the future, thus it does not extinguish the act from its original date, and consequently, all effects produced remain even after its revocation.

X.- On the revocation in the specific case. As a complement to the foregoing, it should be noted that even in cases where revocation can be ordered without liability for the Administration, it cannot be arbitrary or abrupt, as in such cases an abuse of power or, depending on the case, a misuse of power could be configured. Now, in the instant case, the analysis of the charges formulated requires establishing a recount of what occurred. After the analysis of the case file, it is noted that on February 8, 2010, the plaintiff entity filed before the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería a request for the granting of visas for a total of 100 Chinese workers for the construction of the real estate development called Condominio R.T.L. (Folios 228-233 of the administrative file.) In processing this matter, through technical report DML-DNE-013-2010 from the Department of Labor Migration of the Dirección Nacional de Empleo (folios 165-167 of the administrative file), a recommendation on said petition is issued, and as a result, by agreement adopted in session 006-2010 of April 21, 2010, the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio decided to authorize the granting of the 100 work visas in question, as they met the necessary requirements, having approval of permits from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Municipality of San José, the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Technology -at that date-, and the Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito. Through resolution DGVR 1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010, the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería proceeded to communicate the authorization of the entry visa for 40 Chinese citizens (folio 173 front and back of the administrative file). However, by official letter DMT-724-2010 from the Minister of Labor and Social Security, dated June 1, 2010, the temporary suspension of the entry permit to Costa Rica for the workers referred to in report DML-DNE-0013-2010 of January 13, 2010, is requested, until the criteria set forth in said report are reviewed (Folio 168 back of the administrative file). In this vein, by official letter DMT-795-2010 of June 24, 2010, the Minister of Labor and Social Security sends to the Comisión de Visas Restringidas a technical recommendation report concerning the restricted entry visa request in favor of Chinese citizens filed by the company C.C.A. S.A., in which she recommends that the Commission not grant any entry permit to the country, as long as the labor and economic conditions in the construction sector persist in the country (Folios 143 back-147 of the administrative file). Consequently, through resolution DGVR 1337-2010RVJ at 3:30 p.m. on June 2, 2010, the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería ordered the temporary suspension of the notification of resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010 (Folios 163-164 of the administrative file). Ultimately, by resolution No. CVRR-0022-2010 at 12:15 p.m. on July 8, 2010, the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio ordered: "...REVOKE the authorization of the restricted visas granted to one hundred citizens of Chinese nationality in session No. 6 of April 21, 2010, and consequently administrative resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010, and accept in all its aspects Technical Report DMT-795-2010 signed by the Minister of Labor and Social Security, Sandra Piszk F. The actions of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, which in administrative resolution DGVR-1337-2010RVJ temporarily suspended the procedure, are ENDORSED in all their aspects. (...)" (Folios 122 back-124 of the administrative file). Having thoroughly analyzed the allegation of the plaintiff entity, it is the opinion of this Tribunal that the absence of a pronouncement from the Contraloría General de la República and the estimation of eventual damages does not constitute the nullity of the challenged act, because the revoked decision does not affect subjective rights. On this point, it is worth clarifying that the content and regulatory framework of the immigration figure of the entry visa allows one to establish that it constitutes a mere expectation of a right, implying an immigration status that is not enforceable against the immigration authorities in any scenario regarding the right to remain in the country, since, regardless of its ownership, it is conditioned upon various requirements for permanence. This is clarified by section 55 of Law No. 8764, which states on this matter: "The visa implies a mere expectation of a right; it does not entail the unconditional admission of the foreign person to the country nor the authorization for the intended permanence; it shall be subject to a guarantee deposit, in the cases applicable under this Law and its Regulation, as well as to the immigration control that the competent official performs to verify compliance with all the legal and regulatory requirements demanded for entry." The social implications of immigration matters, as detailed above, allow for an analysis of convenience and opportunity regarding the impact that the immigration phenomenon has or will have on various fields of national activity, among them, the realm of employment supply and occupation levels, as can be inferred from mandates 5, 6, and 7 of Law No. 8764. Specifically, it bears reiterating that subsection one of Article 7 establishes as a purpose of the power in immigration matters: "The pursuit of complementarity between the national workforce and the migrant workforce, in such a way that there is no displacement of the national workforce due to the incorporation of immigrant workers." From this perspective, given the social impact of granting visas, it is certainly a title that confers a right, but of a precarious nature, in view of the very dynamics of immigration matters. On the other hand, from a pragmatic standpoint, in this case, this Tribunal does not deem that the revocation of the cited act was abrupt or arbitrary. While a technical recommendation report existed for granting the 100 visas, the truth is that subsequently, the head of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security rendered an opinion on the same proceeding, weighing a series of diverse—novel—analyses and situations that led to determining the inadvisability of maintaining the effects of that authorization. In that sense, as has been noted, in official letter DMT-795-2010 of June 24, 2010, the Minister of Labor and Social Security sends to the Comisión de Visas Restringidas a technical recommendation report on the aforementioned proceeding, indicating that since there is unemployment in the construction sector and a qualified workforce exists in the country capable of carrying out the proposed project, she recommends that the Commission not grant any entry permit to the country, as long as the labor and economic conditions in the construction sector persist in the country (Folios 143 back-147 of the administrative file). As can be observed, this is not only a factual and evaluative element different from the one considered when issuing the first—revoked—act, but also a technical, factual, and legal element of justification that supports the decision finally adopted regarding the advisability of maintaining the effects of the act authorizing the granting of 100 visas to citizens of Chinese nationality in session No. 6 of April 21, 2010, of the Comisión de Visas Restringidas and administrative resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010. From this viewpoint, in the judgment of this collegiate body, this motivation demonstrates that the revocation, in accordance with section 154 of the LGAP, has not been abrupt or arbitrary, but rather is duly motivated, as ordered by provision 136 of the same law. As has been noted, the procedure or requirements set forth in canon 155 of the same law are therefore not applicable; ergo, the omission of the aspects indicated in that rule for the specific case does not cause any nullity, as they are unnecessary. Consequently, there is no nullity that must be declared in this respect. On the other hand, as a derivation of the foregoing, the request for damages is inadmissible. These items are requested in the lawsuit as a consequence of the alleged impacts caused by the issuance of a null revocation act. This is an aspect requested in an accessory manner or conditioned upon the annulment claim. Thus, having established that the questioned conducts do not suffer from or demonstrate the degrees of invalidity and pathology alleged against them, there exists no criterion of imputation or basis to configure a framework of public liability as a derivation of those conducts. Therefore, these are not damages that must be recognized by this Tribunal, in addition to the fact that they have not been proven in any way, wherefore the rejection of the expansion of the lawsuit also proceeds.

XI.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses raised. The representation of the State raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of passive standing. The defense of lack of passive standing must be rejected. The action is brought against the Public Administration responsible for the questioned conducts, in accordance with section 12.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. The same applies to the defense of lack of interest, as the current nature of this conflict is evident to this Tribunal insofar as it seeks permission for the entry of operators and workers of Chinese nationality, as well as the eventual damages that the public conducts have generated. As for the defense of lack of right, it must be upheld with regard to all the claims formulated, having been proven, on one hand, the validity of the questioned conducts, the inapplicability of positive silence in this case, and the irrelevance of the indemnification claim formulated.

Consequently, the claim must be dismissed in its entirety.” **IV.- On the immigration policy of the Costa Rican State.** From the very outset, it must be noted that immigration policy is part of a Nation's sovereignty and includes the regulation of the entry and stay, whether temporary or permanent, of foreigners in its territory, with the possibility of exceptions and limitations to their rights by law. In our case, the exercise of this sovereign power derives from Articles 6 and 19 of the Constitución Política and from various international instruments, among which the Convention on the Status of Foreigners ratified by Costa Rica under Law No. 40 of December 20, 1932; the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live; Convention 149 on Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Treatment of Migrant Workers, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, with the possibility of exceptions and limitations to their rights by law, stand out. Under this principle, foreigners seeking to enter our country must comply with the requirements demanded for that purpose by the domestic legal system and submit to the legal rules of our country that determine the legality or not of their stay in the country and its consequences. Likewise, it involves the exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with the applicable legal framework and it is exclusively the authority of the Executive Branch to decide on the permanence of a foreigner in the national territory, when it finds that it is harmful, or compromises public tranquility or order, or when special circumstances so advise. For this purpose, the Administration has a series of legal means to make that power effective, which are regulated, among others, in the Immigration Law, such as, for example, the requirements and conditions for the granting of visas or residencies. All these means allow exercising control over foreign residents and grant, in effect, a wide margin of discretion to execute its immigration policies. But the exercise of these purely legal powers, however discretionary they may be, cannot be unrestricted or, even less, disregard the limits that the legal system itself imposes on it, nor the elementary principles of justice, logic, and convenience (Articles 15, 16, and 17 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), which form part of the legal system. From that standpoint, the Ley General de Migración y Extranjería, No. 8764 of August 19, 2009, published in La Gaceta No. 170 of September 1, 2009, establishes that legal framework "*... regulates the control of migrant persons and promotes their integration into society, based on the principles of respect for human life, cultural and personal diversity, solidarity, gender equity, as well as the human rights guaranteed in the Constitución Política, treaties, and international conventions duly signed, ratified, and in force in the country.*" -Article 3-. For these purposes, that normative body confers the power on the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería to determine the conditions for the entry of non-resident persons into the country, being enabled to establish the criteria for the classification of restricted visas, consular visas, and visa-free entry. For this Tribunal, it is clear that immigration policy deals with a matter of great national relevance, forming a substantial part of public order and national security. This indeed follows from Article 6, subsection 3 of the aforementioned Law No. 8764 insofar as it indicates that the purpose of immigration regulation is the due control of the entry, stay, and exit of foreign persons to the country, in accordance with national development and public security policies. This social impact (in various areas, as it includes economic matters, health, housing, public order, security, among others), imbues this topic with a marked public interest. Such is the case of the effect of migration on employment levels in domestic work, a topic which, by way of simple reference, is addressed by Article 7 of the previously mentioned Law, in its subsection 1) when it indicates as an orientation of immigration policy: "*The search for complementarity between national and migrant labor, in such a way that there is no displacement of national labor by the incorporation of immigrant workers.*" This is also evidenced in the various grounds that permit the impediment of entry into the country, even for persons who already possess an entry visa, a matter regulated in Article 61 ibidem. Likewise, this marked interest is denoted in Article 63 ejusdem, which indicates that for current duly substantiated public safety and health reasons, the Executive Branch may impose entry restrictions on a specific foreign person or foreign group. In any case, the public relevance of the matter is clearly expressed in Article 2 of Law No. 8764. Article 12 of the cited law confers on the Dirección General de Migración the authority to execute immigration policy, with a wide range of powers, some of which are listed in Article 13 of that legal source.

**V.- On the objections related to the declaration of lack of competence.** Within a first line of objection, the plaintiff company reproaches that the Dirección de Migración declared itself incompetent to hear the request for a restricted entry visa filed on behalf of 49 Chinese citizens, but then rejects the petition for positive silence (silencio positivo). In its view, the foregoing constitutes a nullity that must be declared. For the purposes of a correct approach to the claim made, it is necessary to analyze two elementary references in this regard: on one hand, what was requested by the plaintiff entity, and on the other, what was resolved by the defendant Administration. In the filing presented on September 2, 2010—visible at folios 59-66 of the judicial file—the authorization of 49 work visas is requested for citizens of Chinese nationality who will remain in Costa Rica. In that filing, it is indicated that all those workers were already in Costa Rica, working for the company AFECC, constructor of the new Estadio Nacional, specifying—point f of the filing—that these workers are under the regime of specialized restricted visas, having entered the country by virtue of the International Agreement signed between the Government of the República Popular de China and Costa Rica for the construction and donation of the Estadio Nacional, such that this would involve a new delivery of visas with a different company.

Based on the foregoing, through resolution No. CVRR-0573-2010 at 6:15 p.m. on October 14, 2010, the analysis of said petition was commenced. Specifically, the Immigration Administration understood that what was requested was the granting of entry visas for 49 foreign persons who were already working in the country. Based on that understanding, it stated that in accordance with numeral 49 of Law No. 8764, the competence of the Restricted Visas and Refuge Commission is limited to the granting of restricted visas and refugee status to persons who so request before the General Directorate of Migration and Immigration. This aspect is clarified in the third recital (considerando) of the cited public action. Following that, in that same section, it points out in essence: "<i>... the company C.C.A. S.A. requests from the Restricted Visas Commission the granting of 'work visas', indicating that the foreign persons are in Costa Rica working... this Restricted Visas Commission cannot evaluate the applicant's claim since the entry visas have already been granted and the foreign persons whose entry is sought are already in the country. Likewise, the Commission is not legally empowered to authorize work permits or 'work visas'...</i>" For these reasons, that public body declared itself incompetent to hear the petition filed. On the other hand, regarding the petition for positive silence (silencio positivo) filed on October 14, 2010, it denies the positive silence, referring for the effects to ordinal 200 of Law No. 8764 and 55 of circular DGVS-675-2008 of September 1, 2008, indicating that the deadlines given by those rules for resolving had not expired. According to this account, this Tribunal does not observe any deficiency in the proceedings. Although the reading of the operative part of the act may generate some degree of confusion, as it declares an incompetence to hear a specific procedure, and then orders the rejection of a petition for positive silence, such doubt is dispelled when the act is understood in an integrated and unitary manner. Indeed, the reading and analysis of the challenged act allow for the dissipation of the doubts that support the claims resolved in this section. If the appealed act is carefully analyzed, it is clear that the Immigration Administration refers to two different factual scenarios. On one hand, it states that it cannot evaluate the applicant's claim since the entry visas have already been granted and the foreign persons whose entry is sought are already in the country. This section refers to the specific petition for the granting of restricted visas, a matter in which, pursuant to ordinal 49 of Law No. 8764, the Restricted Visas Commission is indeed competent. However, immediately following, it indicates that it is not competent to resolve petitions for work visas. On this topic, the act in question states: "<i>Likewise, the Commission is not legally empowered to authorize work permits or 'work visas'... since Article 49 of the Law limits the Commission's action to the determination of the granting of restricted visas and refugee status. (...)</i>" It is the criterion of this Tribunal that these are diverse scenarios that are resolved within the same act, but that in no way imply the antinomy and pathology expressed by the petitioner. Even within a strictly grammatical analysis of what was resolved, this collegiate body understands that the declaration of incompetence refers only to the requests for work visas, not to the petition for restricted visas. On the contrary, this chamber understands that these are two different topics, whose resolution criteria are distinct. On one part, regarding the entry visas, the cause for rejection is that they had already been granted and the persons for whom they were required were already within the country. This criterion is not challenged in this process, as the petitioner formulates no objection regarding this pronouncement. Meanwhile, regarding the work visas, the argumentative basis of the referred Commission was its incompetence to hear such matters. On the other hand, in a third aspect, within the fourth recital (considerando) of the cited act, the Commission addressed the resolution of the petition for a declaration of positive silence, which was, ultimately, denied. For the foregoing, it is reiterated, the criterion was that the timeframe provided in numeral 200 of Law No. 8764 and that set in circular DGVS-675-2008 of December 1, 2008, numeral 55, had not expired considering the date of submission of the procedure. The validity of what was resolved on this point will be explored further below. Specifically, from the analysis of that administrative act, this Chamber concludes that the declaration of incompetence concerned only the petition for work visas, not the matter of restricted visas, which was resolved in light of other types of considerations that have not been challenged. Even if the operative part (por tanto) of the challenged act is carefully analyzed, it is observed that on this topic it states: "<i>... the Restricted Visas and Refuge Commission DECLARES ITSELF INCOMPETENT to hear the request for work visas filed on September 2, 2010...</i>"; that is to say, the act explicitly refers that the declaration of incompetence is issued regarding the work visas. From this perspective, in accordance with ordinals 59, 60, 129 of Law No. 6227/78 and canon 49 of Law No. 8764, the incompetence declared by the administrative body itself—the Restricted Visas and Refuge Commission—regarding said requests, does not imply an impossibility due to incompetence to rule on the part of the procedure on which it is competent and which concerns it in the exercise of its powers. Regarding the requests for restricted visas in particular and the petition for a declaration of a presumed act, that body was fully competent to rule, so the alleged defect is not configured, and therefore, its rejection is appropriate.

**VI.- On the application of positive silence to the specific case.** In a second axis of challenge, the petitioner criticizes that the criticized act is invalid, since in this case, the elements that allow for the application of the figure of positive silence have been configured. The foregoing, it says—in essence—given that the visa is defined as an authorization or permission to enter a specific country, positive silence is appropriate or applicable in cases where the Administration, without any reason and outside the legal timeframe, does not resolve the request for the procedure or entry permit, when all legal requirements for the effect are met. It points out that in this matter, the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) is applicable supplementarily, in whose precept 330 it is established that when a request is filed for the granting of a permit or authorization, the Administration is obliged to resolve within a period of one month, or otherwise, positive silence operates. It affirms that its procedure was filed on September 2, 2010 and more than one month passed without receiving a response from the Administration, thereby configuring the presumed act. It highlights that immigration matters are not within the exception scenarios set by jurisprudence for the application of positive silence because the interest of protecting interests related to life, health, and environmental matters in general does not exist. Regarding such allegations, the following must be stated. The public interest that it is called upon to protect constitutes the finalistic or teleological element that justifies the conferral of powers of authority (potestades de imperio) to certain Public Administrations in the specific context of their action frameworks. Such public interest constitutes the ultimate purpose of the service-providing axis of such administrative units and the ultimate purpose of their actions, an interest that prevails over the mere interest that a Public Administration may have (arts. 113, 131 LGAP). For this reason, and being the legitimizing basis of the powers conferred upon it, the competencies and powers must be exercised for such satisfaction. This is indeed inferred from ordinal 66.1 of Law No. 6227/78 insofar as it states that the powers of authority and their exercise, the public duties and compliance are non-waivable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible. Now then, in multiple scenarios, these powers are exercised within the framework of an administrative procedure, which can be initiated ex officio or at the request of a party. In this latter case (procedure initiated by an interested party), the due exercise of public powers implies the duty to issue an express act within the time margins imposed by the legal system for each type of procedure. This is established, in principle, in canon 134 LGAP. However, it is usual that after that timeframe has expired, the Administration does not issue a response on the petition, in which case, the juridical-procedural consequence of that inertia must be discriminated and specified. On one hand, numeral 139 of the cited Law No. 6227/78 indicates that the silence of the Administration cannot reflect its will, unless a law provides otherwise. That is, the lack of response from the Administration, although it can be considered a pathology or abnormal functioning (due to negligence) of the exercise of public power, has diverse effects, depending on the scenario to be analyzed. In this way, the public legal system establishes two figures that aim to regulate the incidences of public inertia, namely, negative silence (silencio negativo) and positive silence. Negative silence, in simple terms, constitutes a fictional denial of the administrative petition, if within the timeframe granted to the Administration to resolve, it has not pronounced. It is a presumption of rejection of the petition, whose purpose is to open the right of the administered party to exercise their appeal rights before the same administration, or else, to go directly to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction to seek the protection of their legal situation. Negative silence is not a rejection of the procedure, but a conjecture that enables the referred appeal exercise, that is, it does not imply that the procedure has been effectively rejected, as there is no explicit public will, but only the possibility to skip that instance and continue in the administrative procedure. It can be said, when the exhaustion of administrative remedies was imperative in all matters (prior to ruling 3669-2006 of the Constitutional Chamber and Article 31.1 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code), negative silence was a burden for the administered party, since it required them to pursue the appeal paths to obtain a reviewable act and then seek jurisdictional protection. However, at present, as a faculty, it constitutes a possibility to advance the course of the procedure or to institute a judicial cause. This is established in subsection 3 of ordinal 261 of the previously cited General Law, in the following sense: "<i>3. If at the end of the indicated terms an express resolution has not been communicated, the claim or petition of the administered party will be understood as rejected in view of the silence of the Administration, either for the filing of the appropriate administrative remedies or for the contentious action in its case, the latter in the terms and with the effects indicated by the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code.</i>". More simply, administrative inertia implies the rejection of the procedure—of the appeal—for the purposes of advancing the procedure, but this does not imply that from a material-juridical standpoint, the petition has been denied. Even numeral 329.3 of the LGAP establishes with complete clarity that the act issued outside the timeframe will be valid for all legal effects, unless a rule provides otherwise. This implies the duty of the Administration to rule on the procedure that has been presented to it, even when the timeframe to issue its conduct has expired and negative silence can be understood to have occurred, as its competence to resolve does not decline due to this circumstance. Unlike positive silence, negative silence is not an act, but a fictional conjecture of rejection for the effects indicated above. On the other hand, in certain cases, aside from the aforementioned, public inertia in the issuance of formal conduct leads, as a legal effect, to what is known as positive silence. In these cases, the silence of the administration is understood as favorable to the petitioner, its procedure being understood as resolved in terms favorable to how it was proposed. From that perspective, ordinal 330 of Law No. 6227/78 indicates: "<i>The silence of the Administration shall be understood as positive when it is expressly so established or when it concerns authorizations or approvals that must be granted in the exercise of oversight and guardianship functions. / 2. Silence shall also be understood as positive when it concerns requests for permits, licenses, and authorizations</i>." However, for this to occur, several elements must concur, as not every request that implies a permit, license, or authorization could involve the applicability of positive silence. Indeed, a superficial reading of the second subsection of ordinal 330 LGAP could lead to the mistaken understanding that in any petition for authorization, license, or permit, the figure of positive silence applies or operates. This position is not shared by this Tribunal. The understanding in those terms implies, as a practical effect, that regardless of what was requested, the public omission would lead to a sort of administrative consent for the exercise of the acts that underpin the interested party's petition. This regardless of whether the request has a major impact on public order, health, and public safety. Authorization can be defined as the removal of a legal obstacle for the exercise of a due conduct. For its part, a permit consists of administrative enabling for the development of conduct, in principle prohibited. Whereas a license consists of an authorization of regulated content. From this standpoint, it is necessary to analyze in each case when the private (or public) petition is regulated by the figure of positive silence or, alternatively, when it is subject to negative silence. Otherwise, the existence of negative silence would lack logic, except for the appeal phase, because with the exception of administrative claims, in multiple procedures submitted to the administration's knowledge, the ultimate goal is the granting of a permit, a license, or an authorization. One can think of the case of a permit request for the exploitation of the activity of paid public transport of persons (art. 25 of Law No. 3503), which meets the requirements of that legislation, and once the timeframe for resolution has expired, there is no public act. In such a case, thinking of a positive silence would be totally unfeasible. On the contrary, the silence of the Administration in that case would not be the one provided for in ordinal 330 LGAP, but the effect indicated in Article 261 subsections 1 and 3 of that same legal body. Hence, expressly, in the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal), No. 7575, canon 4 clearly indicates the inappropriateness of positive silence in environmental matters. The same effect occurs in public domain assets, by derivation of the legal regime applicable to the public domain (art. 262 Civil Code), a treatment that in procedural terms can be seen, among others, in precepts 34.2 of Law No. 8508 (CPCA). As can be seen, numeral 330 LGAP itself establishes that positive silence applies when it is expressly established by law. This is the case, by way of simple reference, of the duty of processing in matters of administrative contracting—art. 16 of Law No. 7494—and in that same field, the omission of a response to the objection appeal—art. 83 ibidem. In such cases, expressly regulated, the legal system establishes a different timeframe from that set by canon 261 LGAP, which usually matches the one-month period regulated by mandate 330 of Law No. 6227/78. However, in the normal course of situations, the timeframe to resolve petitions is 2 months, regulated in the aforementioned precept 261 LGAP, and the effects of the silence are negative or denying. Consequently, this Tribunal does not share the position that every authorization, permit, or license involves, in all cases, the application of the figure of positive silence. For this, it is necessary to analyze in each case the convergence of a series of factors. On one hand, if there is an express regulation that establishes the pertinence of positive silence. On the other, if there is no such explicit development, whether the petition of the administered party concerns a matter in which the application of that figure is feasible. In such cases—and only in those—silence will apply when it is proven: a) that the procedure was filed complying with all the requirements established by the legal system for that particular case; and b) that once the timeframe established by the legal system for the Administration to resolve the procedure has expired, no express act has been issued. For these effects, the Law for the Protection of the Citizen from the Excess of Administrative Requirements and Procedures, No. 8220 of March 4, 2002, published in La Gaceta No. 49 of March 11, 2002, establishes the procedure for having positive silence accredited. In that sense, numeral 7 indicates in its literal text: "<b><i>Procedure to apply positive silence</i></b><i> When it concerns requests for the granting of permits, licenses, or authorizations, once the resolution timeframe granted by the legal system to the Administration has expired, without it having pronounced, they shall be considered approved. For the application of positive silence, it will suffice for the administered party to present to the Administration a sworn statement (declaración jurada), duly authenticated, stating that they have complied with all the necessary requirements for the granting of the permits, licenses, or authorizations and that the Administration did not resolve within the corresponding timeframe. / These requirements shall only be those expressly stipulated in laws, executive decrees, or regulations, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of this law. / The Administration, within the three business days following the receipt of the sworn statement, must issue a document stating that the timeframe for the application of positive silence has elapsed and the request was not resolved in time. If the Administration does not issue this document within the indicated timeframe, the application of positive silence shall be considered accepted and the administered party may continue with the procedures to obtain the corresponding permit, license, or authorization, except in cases where positive silence is not applicable by constitutional provision. / In compliance with this procedure, the Administration must coordinate internally to inform the procedure-simplification official, in accordance with Articles 8 and 11 of this law. / No institution may ignore or reject the application of positive silence which operates by operation of law. / When appropriate, the Administration shall apply the annulment procedure in administrative venue regulated in Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration or shall initiate a judicial process of harmfulness (lesividad) to demonstrate that the corresponding requirements were not fulfilled." (As reformed by Article 1 of Law No. 8990 of September 27, 2011)</i> It should be noted that this wording was not in force at the time the petitioner filed the request for positive silence, nor at the time the act was issued or the lawsuit filed, so the matter must be resolved with the text in force at that moment. Such rule stated before the reform made by Law No. 8990: "<i>When it concerns requests for the granting of permits, licenses, or authorizations, once the resolution timeframe granted by the legal system to the Administration has expired, without it having pronounced, they shall be considered approved. Once this situation occurs, the interested party may: a) Present a note to the Administration stating that the request was filed in complete form and that the Administration did not resolve it in time.</i> The Administration must issue, on the following business day, a note declaring that, effectively, the time period elapsed and the application was not approved, and therefore tacit approval (silencio positivo) applied, or b) Appear before a notary public to certify, by means of a notarial certificate (acta notarial), that the application was submitted in complete form and that the Administration did not resolve it in time. As can be observed, the procedure provided in Law No. 8220 tends to have the concurrence of the indicated assumptions accredited. When tacit approval occurs, as has been said, the so-called presumed administrative act (acto administrativo presunto) arises, so the elimination of that act demands and requires resorting to the forms of extinction of public conduct, that is, nullity under Article 173 LGAP, a lesivity proceeding (proceso de lesividad), or the revocation of conduct, under penalty of harming the principle of intangibility of one's own acts (principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios), enshrined in precept 34 of the Magna Carta. Likewise, that declaration of the occurrence of tacit approval can be raised in this contentious-administrative venue, under the protection of numerals 42 and 122 of the CPCA.

VII.- Impropriety of tacit approval in immigration matters and in the specific case. Having set forth these generalities on tacit approval, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that there is no invalidity in the actions of the respondent Administration. Certainly, numeral 46 of Law No. 8764 (General Law on Migration and Foreign Nationals) defines a visa as "... an authorization to enter the national territory issued by the director general or the consular agent, when authorized by the former, or when permitted by the general guidelines for granting entry visas. The granting of diplomatic and official visas is exempted from the present regime. In exceptional cases, the director of Migration may grant visas, without the general guidelines for entry and stay visas for non-residents being binding for those purposes; in this case, they must duly substantiate and reason their decision." However, the mere reference to the figure of authorization, license, or permit does not imply, per se, the application of numeral 330.2 of the LGAP - as has been noted - since for that, on one hand, an analysis is necessary of whether in that specific case of a public petition, the figure operates or if, on the contrary, the claim or petition must be understood as denied in light of ordinal 261.3 LGAP, for which purpose, an analysis must be made, among other things, of the relevance of the regulated matter, as well as the weighing of whether the public inertia violates the exercise of a right conferred by the legal system. In the case of immigration matters, it must be insisted, this is a field of special relevance to the public interest, in which public order and the topic of public security are linked. This matter also involves the component of national sovereignty, which is exercised and represented through the norms and decisions issued in the context of this type of migratory relations, a topic in which, according to the constitutional text, the application of the figure of tacit approval could not be sustained, as it would be a kind of presumed waiver of the exercise of these powers of national sovereignty. As has been noted, ordinals 2 and 3 of Law No. 8764 declare this matter to be of public interest, an aspect that is emphasized throughout the context of the cited legal framework, as it confers powers on the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería to issue guidelines regulating the granting of visas and the stay of non-resident persons (art. 47), as well as the regulation applicable to permanent residents (art. 77) or temporary ones (art. 79-86), non-residents (arts. 87-92), or persons with special migratory statuses provided for in ordinal 94 of the aforementioned Law No. 8764. The power of rejection, understood as the action by which the immigration authority denies a foreign person entry into the national territory and orders their immediate transfer to the country of origin or provenance, or to a third country that admits them (art. 64 ejusdem), denotes the relevance of said matter. This gains greater clarity with the provisions of canon 67 ibidem, which states: "The granting of the intended migratory category shall be conditioned upon the prerequisites of public security and the economic and social development of the country, in addition to the requirements determined by the Regulations of this Law." The foregoing evidences the marked and undeniable public interest underlying immigration matters, for it is not a simple analysis of formal requirements, but rather the authorization of entry through the granting of a visa in any of the indicated migratory conditions hinges upon the technical analysis of the Immigration Administration and not solely upon the satisfaction of formal requirements. Its granting weighs not only the personal conditions of the migrant, but also aspects of public security and the social and economic environment, in terms of convenience for the country. Thus, as an example, the determination of granting visas for the temporary exercise of certain employment positions can be analyzed in light of the social conditions of labor occupation in that specific area, which constitutes an analysis of the domestic social impact of the migratory phenomenon, whether temporary or permanent. Ergo, it is not a simple authorization as the petitioner seems to suggest, a thesis that this Chamber does not share. On the contrary, if one analyzes Article 55 of Law No. 8764, the visa "... implies a mere expectation of right, it does not entail the unconditional admission of the foreign person to the country nor the authorization of the intended stay (...)" and as has been said, it is a subjective stage conditioned upon social security factors, a valuation in which, of course, public action must not be arbitrary, but measured and reasoned. Therefore, it is not an authorization application that can be understood as included within the terms of ordinal 330 LGAP. It is not a criterion of distinction where the law does not make one (ubi lex non distingui nec non distinguere debemus) - as could be alleged - but rather a matter of the interpretation and weighing that this Tribunal carries out regarding the figure analyzed. Thus, it is not a matter in which, in principle, the figure of tacit approval (or presumed act) can be understood as applicable. Unlike what the plaintiff stated, it is not that this sensitive matter is not included within the exception scenarios for the pertinence of the presumed act, but rather, what is relevant is that, given its public relevance, the occurrence of tacit approval must be interpreted restrictively, and since there is no regulation that particularly establishes the application of this institute in this topic, in this specific case, its application is not deemed correct. Now, this element alone would give rise to the rejection of the complaint under examination. However, in the particular case, before the petition for declaration of tacit approval filed on October 14, 2010, regarding the procedure for granting a visa for 49 Chinese workers, in act CVRR-0573-2010, in the fourth considerando, it was noted that the application for tacit approval was not appropriate, since the Comisión de Visas Restringidas was within the deadline set by law to resolve. For this, it referred to numeral 200 of the General Law on Migration and Foreign Nationals and to circular DGVS-675-2008 of September 1, 2008, Article 55, which sets a 60-day deadline to resolve visa applications. (See folios 82-83 of the judicial file). The plaintiff indicates that the deadline to resolve the visa application filed on September 2, 2010, is the 1-month period indicated in ordinal 330 and 331 of Law No. 6227/78. This criterion is not shared by this Tribunal. Indeed, even if considering that tacit approval operates in this matter - which this collegiate body does not share - its applicability would be subject to the expiration of the deadline that the legal system grants to the competent Administration to resolve. In the specific case of immigration matters, numeral 189 of Law No. 8764 states: "The administrative procedures relating to immigration matters shall be governed by the provisions of this Law and its Regulations; in addition, supplementarily, by the General Law of Public Administration, No. 6227, of May 2, 1978; Law No. 8220, Protection of the citizen from the excess of administrative requirements and procedures, of March 4, 2002, and the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, No. 8508, of April 28, 2006." As can be observed, the integration criterion of Law No. 6227/78 and Law No. 8508 is due to supplementarity (supletoriedad), not by direct reference. That is, one must first resort to the procedural rules provided in the Migration Law, which are special for regulating the matter, and then, only in the case of topics not addressed in its articles, resort to the other expressly indicated legal sources of integration. This meshes with the integration criteria of the public legal system provided for in mandate 9 of the LGAP. Thus, regarding the deadline to resolve immigration petitions, ordinal 200 of Law No. 8764 states with complete clarity, regarding residency applications, that they must be resolved within the "... maximum period of three months to resolve, from the moment all requirements have been fulfilled. When it concerns petitions to opt for a legal migratory condition, this period shall run from the receipt of the documentation at the central offices of the Dirección General." In this way, given the special regulation, it is evident to this Tribunal that the legal period applicable that must be taken as a reference to determine the validity of what was resolved, and of the DGSV-675-2008 circular itself (also questioned), is three months, and not the one-month period established by ordinal 330 and 331 LGAP. All told, in light of the foregoing, even if considering that the applicable period is that of the LGAP, it is the criterion of this collegiate body, for the reasons already explained, that the period would not be the monthly one indicated therein, but the bi-monthly one of precept 261 of that same Law. However, it is reiterated, the present application must be resolved according to the period ordered by canon 200 of Law No. 8764, as it is a special period. With all, regarding visas, numeral 47 ibidem confers competence on the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería to issue guidelines. In this line, canon 55 of that circular establishes a period of sixty days to resolve visa applications. In this way, given that the petition was filed on September 2, 2010, at the moment of filing the application for the application of tacit approval, that is, October 14, 2010, the set period had not elapsed, either by numeral 200 of Law No. 8764, or by numeral 55 of circular 675-2008. That period had also not expired at the moment of issuing resolution No. CVRR-0573-2010, in which the declaration of tacit approval was denied. Consequently, the temporal element alleged by the plaintiff is not present, before which, their grievance must be rejected, for it is insisted, even if considering the figure of tacit approval applicable in this matter (which is not shared), the period applicable to the case had not expired; consequently, the tacit approval cannot be deemed to have occurred, as the Administration still had time to resolve the petitions filed. Therefore, it is irrelevant that the requirements of circular DG-1084-2008 of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería were met, or that the notarial certificate (acta notarial) was drawn up by the professional M. for the purposes of Article 7 of Law No. 8220, because as has been noted, the tacit approval could not be deemed to have occurred, and moreover, it is inappropriate and impertinent in this case. Therefore, the rejection of the ground for nullity presented must be ordered.

VIII.- Regarding the analysis of the circulars on deadlines in the immigration procedure. In another order of things, the plaintiff objects to the validity of circulars DG-3309-2009 and DGVS-675-2008, applied in the issuance of act No. CVRR-0573-2010. As a ground for nullity, it is alleged that they established regulations that disregard the one-month period that canon 331 of Law No. 6227/78 imposes in this type of matter. It indicates that the hierarchy of sources of Administrative Law is harmed, while circulars can only have effects internal to the Administration itself, and cannot modify legal or regulatory provisions, nor can they impose requirements, conditions, procedures, or burdens not indicated by law. On the topic of the scope of action and limits of the circulars that the Immigration Legislation enables for the benefit of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, the Sala Primera, in ruling No. 116-F-S1-2010 at nine o'clock on January twenty-second, two thousand ten, stated: "It must not be lost sight of that the circular consists of an internal act through which instructions can be given regarding the manner of proceeding by officials, in this case, in the assessment of visa applications. Because it is a guideline directed at officials, and as long as the effects attributed to it are consistent with the indicated particularity, and therefore applied at the moment when they assess the petitions of individuals, without granting them external effects, a violation of the principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva legal) is not perceived. Of course, due to this situation, it cannot be given the effects typical of a legal norm. Even when it may have reflex effects on third parties, these must occur by virtue of preparatory acts within the procedure, which must be in accordance with the legal system and never by virtue of the direct application of a guideline over the legal sphere of the interested parties. In this understanding, as long as the content of the legal text is not exceeded, this Chamber does not perceive a violation of the principle of legality." This analysis is carried out with respect to the same circular now being questioned, albeit from the perspective of the validity of numeral 83 for the issue of economic solvency; the precedent is applicable for the purposes of specifying the scope and limits of that type of circular. In light of that analysis then, it must be discriminated whether that circular regulates topics not addressed by the law that could affect third parties outside the Administration, so that it could be considered an external matter. As has been noted, in the topic of the procedure for resolving visa applications, numeral 200 of Law No. 8764 establishes a three-month period to resolve the various applications that the Administration must hear in that matter. It is clear that in the face of an eventual divergence between the law and the circular, the law undoubtedly prevails due to the greater legal force and resilience that are characteristic of it. From that standpoint, although resolution CVRR-0573-2010 alludes to the cited circular, the criterion for rejection is also based on the period set by ordinal 200 of the Migration Law, so there would be no nullity on that particular point. Furthermore, that circular in ordinal 55 indicates: "Once the documentation is received at the Dirección General, it shall subject it to study and communicate the pertinent resolution to the consulate, having a maximum period of sixty days to resolve and issue the final resolution on the applications submitted." That circular was issued on August 28, 2008, whereas Law No. 8764 was published on August 19, 2009, and came into force six months later (Transitorio II). Ergo, it is evident that the Law prevails. However, it is insisted, the mere reference to the application of the circular does not produce its nullity. For this purpose, it must be said, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that the period regulated in that numeral 55 of the aforementioned circular does not conflict with that regulated by mandate 200 of the Law, which sets a 3-month period for the resolution of procedures for residency applications. With all this, even applying the referral established by ordinal 189 of Law No. 8764, regarding the supplementary application of the procedural rules of the LGAP, numeral 261 of that normative body sets that the procedure must be concluded by a final act within a two-month period. If it is understood that the cited circular sets a 60-day period to resolve, without specifying whether they are business days or calendar days, and therefore, in accordance with Article 256.1 of Law No. 6227/78, they must be understood as calendar days, the period in both instruments regulated is similar. From that standpoint, as has been said, the circular in question does not violate the legal situation of the plaintiff; first, because the act questioned does not resolve based exclusively on that circular, but also refers to Article 200 of Law No. 8764, a norm that regulates the time the Administration has to resolve residency applications, without it being understood that on this point the monthly period that ordinal 331 of the LGAP establishes applies; second, the 60-day period of the circular coincides with that set by canon 261 LGAP; third, even if considering that it clashes with the period of Law No. 8764, it is clear that that of the law prevails, due to its superior hierarchy and later issuance, however, it is insisted, the rejection of the petition for tacit approval is not based, as the plaintiff states, solely on the temporal criterion of the circular. Hence, there has been no incurrence in the vice of non-application of hierarchically superior norms as the petitioner claims, but rather the contrary. Regarding circular DG-3309-2009, although it is mentioned in the operative part of the act, in the concrete analysis of the issue of the tacit approval petition, it is not referred to at all, so it bears no relation to the debated topic. In addition to this, the plaintiff does not specify the reasons why such a circular would be invalid. They limit themselves to making and presenting doctrinal citations and generic normative references to the topic of the elements of the act, the concept of invalidity, the nature of circulars, the powers of the administrative head to issue them; however, they do not indicate how those norms and sources lead to evidencing the pathology of the circular in question. Their submissions in this sense are theoretical reflections on the composition regime of the public act and the consequences of its vices; however, outside of the topic of the period that, in theory, in their judgment, is applicable in this case—a matter already resolved—they offer no allegation whatsoever. Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, it is necessary to order the rejection of the claim in this regard.

IX.- On the revocation of public acts. In a writing dated May 5, 2011, visible at folios 557-559 of the judicial file, the plaintiff firm expands its claim, in terms of the facts and petitions, objecting to the nullity of act CVRR-022-2010 of July 8, 2010, of the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio, as well as the payment of damages derived from that act, which in the preliminary hearing it specified as the transfer and stay expenses for 40 Chinese citizens in Beijing. In this sense, it indicates that on February 8, 2010, it requested a restricted entry visa for one hundred Chinese citizens to work on the real estate project in San José, as a result of which, the Department of Labor Migration of the Dirección Nacional de Empleo issued a recommendation that led to the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio authorizing 100 visas through session 006-2010. It criticizes that, by administrative resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010, the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería authorized the first 40 visas for Chinese citizens linked to the Torres del Lago Project. It says that, by resolution CVRR-022-2010 of July 8, 2010, the Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio ordered the revocation of the act that had accepted the petition for 100 visas, without the prior opinion of the Contraloría General de la República and without decreeing the compensation for damages. On this point, the following can be noted. A fundamental point in this grievance is the institute of the revocation of public acts. Revocation is constituted as a tool for the suppression of public conduct, in principle, of a favorable nature, a situation in which it has pragmatic utility, and eventually, of unfavorable ones, as will be indicated below.

But such suppression does not have as its legitimizing basis the invalidity of what was done by the Administration, but rather the inconvenience of the administrative act, in terms of consonance with the protected public interest, whether due to the appearance of new facts that incorporate a supervening inopportuneness or inconvenience, or due to a variation in the criteria regarding the same facts that gave rise to the act. Herein lies the difference with nullity (invalidity), since although both nullity and revocation are forms of suppression of public conduct, in the first case the cause of elimination is a substantial non-conformity with the legal system (Articles 128 and 158 LGAP), whereas in revocation, the cause lies in the inconvenience of maintaining the effects of a certain public act for the protection and satisfaction of public interests. That is, the basis of revocation is not the pathology of the act, but its inconvenience. Hence, in accordance with the provisions of article 152 of Law No. 6227/78, it only proceeds for reasons of opportunity, convenience, or merit—with the exceptions provided by law—and may take place only when there is a serious divergence between the effects of the act and the public interest, despite the time elapsed, the rights created, or the nature and other circumstances of the legal relationship that is intended to be terminated. A fundamental aspect is that, given this base characteristic, the originating cause of revocation may be configured by the appearance of new factual circumstances, not existing or not known at the time the original act was issued, as well as a different assessment of the same factual circumstances that gave rise to the act, or of the affected public interest. Nevertheless, the power of revocation must be exercised within a period of 4 years, as established by precept 156 of the LGAP. It should be noted that such public power can only fall upon acts of discretionary content, being unfeasible in cases of acts of regulated content, which highlights the discretionary and optional nature of the figure of revocation. Thus it is established by article 156.1 of that same legal body. Now, revocation may fall upon acts of favorable or unfavorable content. In this latter case (exceptional), canon 156 of the same law indicates that an act unfavorable to the administered party may be revoked even if it has already become final. Regarding favorable acts, the revocation procedure must discriminate whether that favorable effect derives from a subjective right or constitutes a precarious title, a distinction that holds special relevance in order to establish whether the procedure to revoke the act requires additional requirements or not. Along these lines, mandate 154 of Law No. 6227/78 states: “*Permits for the use of the public domain, and other acts that recognize an administered party a right expressly and validly under a precarious title, may be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience without liability of the Administration; but the revocation must not be untimely or arbitrary and must in all cases provide a prudential period for compliance with the revocation act.*” The norm refers to two clearly differentiated factual assumptions: on the one hand, permits for the use of public domain property, and on the other, acts that confer an ephemeral and precarious right. In such hypotheses, revocation may be ordered without liability for the Administration, with the reservation that such decision must not be arbitrary or untimely. For its part, when such conditioning assumptions are not present, and the favorable effect is inherent to a right, the procedure to be followed is that developed by article 155 of the cited General Law which literally states: “*1. The revocation of an act declaratory of subjective rights must be carried out by the highest authority of the respective entity, with the prior favorable opinion of the Comptroller General of the Republic. 2. Simultaneously, it must contain the recognition and, if possible, the calculation of the complete compensation for the damages and losses caused, under penalty of absolute nullity. 3. In any case, the damages and losses must be liquidated by the Administration within the month following the request or recourse of the administered party containing the liquidation sought by the latter.*” In this assumption, the validity of the act ordering the revocation of another is subject to compliance with substantial and procedural requirements, and revocation ordered in contravention of those rigors—when applicable—will inevitably lead to the nullity of the revocatory act. On the one hand, the competence to order the revocation lies with the highest authority of the entity that issued the act to be suppressed. Second, given that what is affected by the cessation of effects of the act is a subjective right—in the context of the analyzed norm 155—it is necessary to provide compensation for the damages and losses that such determination may produce, a matter that, in order of what is regulated by the norm in question, must have a mandatory and binding opinion of the Comptroller General of the Republic and, additionally, contain the recognition (as a right) and, if possible, the calculation of the economic reparation for the damages and eventual losses caused. The absence of that criterion or of the alluded compensation leads to the invalidity of the revocatory act. From the foregoing, it is clear that the requirement of this procedure requiring favorable opinions from other public bodies and the weighing of compensation rights only applies when the act to be revoked has granted subjective rights, not when it involves a precarious title, since in such scenarios, the decision can be issued without liability for the Administration. It must be analyzed in each case, therefore, when that element conditions the power of revocation or when that proceeding, even in lawful exercise of public powers, leads to administrative liability. Finally, it must be indicated that revocation produces effects from the moment it is issued and towards the future, and therefore does not extinguish the act from its original date and, consequently, all the effects produced remain even after its revocation.

X.- On the revocation in the specific case. As a complement to the foregoing, it should be noted that even in cases where revocation can be ordered without liability for the Administration, it cannot be arbitrary or untimely, since in such cases an abuse of power or, depending on the case, a deviation of power could be configured. Now, in the present case, the analysis of the charges formulated requires establishing a recount of what occurred. After analysis of the records, it is established that on February 8, 2010, the petitioning entity submitted to the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners a request for the granting of visas to a total of 100 Chinese workers for the construction of the real estate development called Condominio R.T.L. (Folios 228-233 of the administrative file.) Cognizant of that procedure, through technical report DML-DNE-013-2010 of the Department of Labor Migrations of the National Directorate of Employment (folios 165-167 of the administrative file), a recommendation on said request is issued, as a result of which, by agreement adopted in session 006-2010 of April 21, 2010, the Commission on Restricted Visas and Refuge determined to authorize the granting of the 100 work visas alluded to, for complying with the necessary requirements, having the approval of permits from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Municipality of San José, Ministry of Environment, Energy and Technology—on that date—, General Directorate of Traffic Engineering. Through resolution DGVR 1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010, the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners proceeds to communicate the authorization of entry visa for 40 Chinese citizens. (folio 173 front and back of the administrative file). However, by official communication DMT-724-2010 of the Minister of Labor and Social Security, dated June 1, 2010, the temporary suspension of the permit for entry to Costa Rica of the workers referred to in report DML-DNE-0013-2010 of January 13, 2010, is requested, until the criteria set forth in said report are reviewed. (Folio 168 back of the administrative file). In that vein, by official communication DMT-795-2010 of June 24, 2010, the Minister of Labor and Social Security sends to the Commission on Restricted Visas a technical recommendation report regarding the request for restricted entry visas in favor of Chinese citizens submitted by the company C.C.A. S.A., in which she recommends that the Commission not grant any entry permit to the country, as long as the labor and economic conditions in the construction sector persist in the country. (Folios 143 back-147 of the administrative file). As a consequence, through resolution DGVR 1337-2010RVJ at 3:30 p.m. on June 2, 2010, the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners ordered the temporary suspension of the notification of resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010. (Folios 163-164 of the administrative file). Ultimately, by resolution No. CVRR-0022-2010 at 12:15 p.m. on July 8, 2010, the Commission on Restricted Visas and Refuge ordered: “*...REVOKE the authorization of the restricted visas granted to one hundred citizens of Chinese nationality in session No. 6 of April 21, 2010, and consequently administrative resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010, and accept in all its aspects Technical Report DMT-795-2010 signed by the Minister of Labor and Social Security, Sandra Piszk F. The actions of the General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners that in administrative resolution DGVR-1337-2010RVJ temporarily suspended the procedure are ENDORSED in all their aspects. (...)*” (Folios 122 back-124 of the administrative file). Having thoroughly analyzed the allegation of the petitioning entity, it is the criterion of this Tribunal that the absence of a pronouncement from the Comptroller General of the Republic and the estimation of eventual damages and losses does not entail the nullity of the challenged act, since the revoked decision does not affect subjective rights. On this matter, it is worth specifying, the content and normative regulation of the migratory figure of the entry visa allows for establishing that it involves an expectation of right that supposes a migratory status that is not enforceable against the migratory authorities in any case regarding the right of permanence in the country, since regardless of its ownership, it is conditioned upon various permanence requirements. Thus, article 55 of Law No. 8764 clarifies, stating on that point: “*The visa implies a mere expectation of right; it does not entail the unconditional admission of the foreign person to the country nor the authorization of the intended permanence; it shall be subject to a guarantee deposit, in cases where applicable according to this Law and its Regulation, as well as to the migratory control that the competent official carries out to verify compliance with all the legal and regulatory requirements demanded for entry.*” The social implications of the migratory matter, as detailed above, allow for an analysis of convenience and opportunity regarding the incidence that the migratory phenomenon has or will have in various fields of national activity, including the scope of employment supply and occupation levels, as can be inferred from mandates 5, 6, and 7 of Law No. 8764. Specifically, it should be reiterated that the first paragraph of the cited Article 7 establishes as the purpose of the power in migratory matters “*The search for complementarity between the national workforce and the migrant workforce, in such a way that there is no displacement of the national workforce by the incorporation of immigrant workers.*” From this plane, given the social incidence that the granting of visas has, it is certainly a title that confers a right, but of a precarious nature, in view of the very dynamic of the migratory matter. On the other hand, from the pragmatic order, in the present case, this Tribunal does not consider that the revocation of the cited act was untimely or arbitrary. While there was a technical recommendation report for the granting of the 100 visas, the truth of the matter is that subsequently, the highest authority of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security rendered an opinion on that same proceeding, weighing a series of diverse—novel—analyses and situations, which led to determining the inconvenience of maintaining the effects of that authorization. In that sense, as has been indicated, in official communication DMT-795-2010 of June 24, 2010, the Minister of Labor and Social Security sends to the Commission on Restricted Visas a technical recommendation report on the proceeding in question, in which it is indicated that, given the existence of unemployment in the construction sector and the existence of qualified labor in the country that can carry out the proposed project, she recommends that the Commission not grant any entry permit to the country, as long as the labor and economic conditions in the construction sector persist in the country. (Folios 143 back-147 of the administrative file) As can be observed, it is not only a factual and weighting element different from that taken into account to issue the first act—revoked—but rather an element of technical, factual, and legal justification that supports the decision finally adopted regarding the convenience of maintaining the effects of the act authorizing the granting of 100 visas to citizens of Chinese nationality in session No. 6 of April 21, 2010, of the Commission on Restricted Visas and administrative resolution DGVR-1189-2010JFS of May 18, 2010. From that perspective, in the judgment of this collegiate body, that motivation demonstrates that the revocation, in accordance with article 154 of the LGAP, has not been untimely or arbitrary, but is rather motivated, as ordered by precept 136 of the same law. As has been indicated, the procedure or requirements provided in canon 155 of the same law are not applicable, ergo, the omission of the aspects indicated in that norm for the specific case does not cause any nullity, being unnecessary. Consequently, there is no nullity that must be declared in this regard. On the other hand, as a derivation of the foregoing, the claim for damages and losses is improper. These items are requested in the lawsuit as a consequence of the supposed effects produced by the issuance of a null revocatory act. It is a matter petitioned in an accessory or conditional manner to the annulment claim. Therefore, having established that the questioned conduct does not suffer from or evidence the degrees of invalidity and pathology alleged, there is no criterion of imputation or basis to configure a framework of public liability as a derivation of that conduct. Thus, these are not damages and losses that must be recognized by this Tribunal, coupled with the aspect that they have not been in any way proven, in light of which, the rejection of the expansion of the lawsuit also proceeds.

XI.- Corollary. Analysis of the defenses raised. The representation of the State raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of passive standing. The defense of lack of passive standing must be rejected. The action is brought against the Public Administration that authored the questioned conduct, in accordance with article 12.1 of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure. The same occurs with the defense of lack of interest, the current nature of the present conflict being evident to this Tribunal insofar as it seeks the permissibility for the entry of workers and laborers of Chinese nationality, as well as the eventual damages and losses that the public conduct has generated. As for the defense of lack of right, it must be upheld with respect to the totality of the claims formulated, given that it has been proven, on the one hand, the validity of the questioned conduct, the impropriety of the positive silence in this case, as well as the impertinence of the indemnification claim formulated. Consequently, the rejection of the lawsuit in all its aspects must be ordered.”

“IV.- Sobre la política migratoria del Estado costarricense. De pleno inicio, debe señalarse que la política migratoria es parte de la soberanía de una Nación e incluye la regulación del ingreso y permanencia, temporal o definitiva, de los extranjeros en su territorio, con la posibilidad de excepciones y limitaciones a sus derechos por vía legal. En nuestro caso, el ejercicio de esa potestad soberana deriva de los artículos 6 y 19 de la Constitución Política y de diversos instrumentos internacionales entre los que destacan la Convención sobre la Condición de los extranjeros ratificada por Costa Rica por Ley No. 40, de 20 de diciembre de 1932; la Declaración de Derechos Humanos de los Individuos que no son nacionales del país en que viven; el Convenio 149 de las Migraciones en Condiciones Abusivas y la Promoción de Igualdad de Trato de los Trabajadores Migrantes y el Protocolo contra el Tráfico Ilícito de los Migrantes por Tierra, Mar y Agua, con la posibilidad de excepciones y limitaciones a sus derechos por vía legal. Bajo esta tesitura, los extranjeros que pretendan ingresar a nuestro país deberán cumplir con los requisitos que al efecto exige el ordenamiento jurídico interno y someterse a las normas jurídicas de nuestro país que determinan la legalidad o no de su permanencia en el país y sus consecuencias. Asimismo, se trata del ejercicio de una potestad discrecional conforme al bloque de legalidad vigente y que compete exclusivamente al Poder Ejecutivo la potestad de decidir sobre la permanencia de un extranjero en el territorio nacional, cuando encuentre que es nociva, o compromete la tranquilidad o el orden público, o bien cuando circunstancias especiales así lo aconsejen. Cuenta para ello la Administración con una serie de medios jurídicos para hacer efectiva esa potestad y que se regulan entre otros, en la Ley de Migración, como lo son por ejemplo, los requisitos y condiciones para el otorgamiento de visas o residencias. Todos esos medios permiten ejercer el control sobre los residentes extranjeros y otorgan, en efecto, un amplio margen de discrecionalidad para ejecutar sus políticas migratorias. Pero el ejercicio de estas potestades, puramente legales, aún por muy discrecionales que fueran, no puede ser irrestricto o menos aún, desconocer los límites que el propio ordenamiento jurídico le impone, ni los principios elementales de justicia, lógica y conveniencia (artículos 15, 16 y 17 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), que forman parte del ordenamiento jurídico. Desde ese plano, la Ley General de Migración y Extranjería, No. 8764 del 19 de agosto del 2009, publicada en La Gaceta No. 170 del 01 de setiembre del 2009, establece, ese marco legal "... regula el control de las personas migrantes y se fomenta la integración de estas a la sociedad, con base en los principios de respeto a la vida humana, a la diversidad cultural y de las personas, a la solidaridad, la equidad de género, así como a los derechos humanos garantizados en la Constitución Política, los tratados y los convenios internacionales debidamente suscritos, ratificados y vigentes en el país." -artículo 3-. Para los efectos, ese cuerpo normativo confiere la potestad a la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería para determinar las condiciones para el ingreso de personas no residentes al país, estando habilitada para establecer los criterios para la clasificación de visa restringida, visa consular e ingreso sin visa. Para este Tribunal, es claro que la política migratoria trata de una materia de gran relevancia nacional, siendo que forma parte sustancial del orden público y la seguridad nacional. Así en efecto se desprende del numeral 6 inciso 3 de la citada Ley No. 8764 en cuanto señala como finalidad de la regulación migratoria el debido control del ingreso, la permanencia y el egreso de personas extranjeras al país, en concordancia con las políticas de desarrollo nacional y seguridad pública. Esta incidencia social (en diversos ámbitos, pues incluye materia económica, salud, vivienda, orden público, seguridad, entre otros), impregna de un marcado interés público a esta temática. Es el caso del efecto de las migraciones en el ámbito de los niveles de ocupación en empleo doméstico, tema que a modo de simple referencia, aborda el ordinal 7 de la Ley de previa mención, en su inciso 1) en cuanto señala como orientación de la política migratoria: "La búsqueda de la complementariedad entre la mano de obra nacional y la migrante, en forma tal que no exista un desplazamiento de la mano de obra nacional por la incorporación de trabajadores inmigrantes.". Esto se pone en evidencia además, en las diversas causales que permiten el impedimento de ingreso al país, incluso a personas que ya poseen visa de ingreso, tema regulado en el ordinal 61 ibídem. Asimismo se denota ese marcado interés en el mandato 63 ejusdem que señala que por razones actuales de seguridad y salud públicas, debidamente fundamentadas, el Poder Ejecutivo podrá imponer restricciones de ingreso a determinada persona extranjera o grupo extranjero. En todo caso, la relevancia pública de la materia se expresa de manera diáfana en el canon 2 de la Ley No. 8764. El artículo 12 de la citada ley confiere a la Dirección General de Migración la autoridad para ejecutar la política migratoria, con una amplia gama de competencias, algunas de las cuales se enumeran en el artículo 13 de esa fuente legal.

V.- Sobre los reproches relacionados con la declaratoria de incompetencia. Dentro de un primer eje de reproche, la sociedad actora recrimina, la Dirección de Migración se declaró incompetente para conocer la solicitud de visa de ingreso restringido formulada a favor de 49 ciudadanos chinos, pero luego rechaza la petición de silencio positivo. A su juicio, lo anterior supone nulidad que debe ser declarada. Para los efectos de un correcto abordaje del reclamo formulado, es menester analizar dos referentes elementales en este sentido: por un lado, lo peticionado por la entidad accionante y por otro, lo resuelto por la Administración accionada. En el escrito presentado en fecha 02 de septiembre del 2010 -visible a folios 59-66 del legajo judicial-, se requiere la autorización de 49 visas de trabajo para ciudadanos de nacionalidad china que permanecerán en Costa Rica. En esa gestión, se indica que todos esos trabajadores ya se encontraban en Costa Rica, laborando para la empresa AFECC, constructora del nuevo Estadio Nacional, precisando -punto f del escrito-, esos trabajadores se encuentran bajo el régimen de visas restringidas especializadas, ingresados al país en virtud del Convenio Internacional suscrito entre el Gobierno de la República Popular de China y Costa Rica para la construcción y donación del Estadio Nacional, por lo que se trataría de una nueva entrega de visas con una empresa diversa. A partir de lo anterior, mediante la resolución No. CVRR-0573-2010 de las 18 horas 15 minutos del 14 de octubre del 2010, se ingresa al análisis de dicha petición. En concreto, la Administración migratoria entendió que lo solicitado era el otorgamiento de visas de ingreso para 49 personas extranjeras que ya se encontraban laborando en el país. Partiendo de esa comprensión, expresó que a tono con el numeral 49 de la Ley No. 8764, la competencia de la Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio, se circunscribe al otorgamiento de visas restringidas y la condición de refugio de personas que así lo soliciten ante la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería. Tal aspecto se aclara en el considerando tercero de la citada actuación pública. Una vez ello, en ese mismo aparte señala en lo medular: "... la empresa C.C.A. S.A. solicita a la Comisión de Visas Restringidas el otorgamiento de "visas de trabajo", indicando que las personas extranjeras se encuentran en Costa Rica laborando... esta Comisión de Visas Restringidas no puede entrar a valorar la pretensión del solicitante toda vez que las visas de ingreso ya fueron otorgadas y las personas extranjeras cuyo ingreso se pretende ya se encuentran en el país. Asimismo, la Comisión no está facultada legalmente para autorizar permisos de trabajo o "visas de trabajo"..." Por tales motivos esa instancia pública se declaró incompetente para conocer de la solicitud planteada. Por otro lado, en cuanto a la petición de silencio positivo planteada el 14 de octubre del 2010 deniega el silencio positivo, remitiendo para los efectos al ordinal 200 de la Ley No. 8764 y el 55 de la circular DGVS-675-2008 del 01 de septiembre del 2008, indicando que los plazos dados por esas normas para resolver no se encuentran vencidos. Conforme a este recuento, no observa este Tribunal deficiencia en lo actuado. Si bien la lectura de la parte dispositiva del acto puede generar algún grado de confusión, pues declara una incompetencia para conocer de un determinado trámite, y luego dispone el rechazo de una solicitud de silencio positivo, tal duda se disipa cuando se comprende el acto de manera integrada y unitaria. En efecto, la lectura y análisis del acto cuestionado permite disipar las dudas que sustentan los reclamos que en este aparte se resuelven. Si se analiza de manera cuidadosa el acto impugnado, es claro que la Administración migratoria se refiere a dos supuestos de hecho diferentes. Por un lado, señala que no puede entrar a valorar la pretensión del solicitante toda vez que las visas de ingreso ya fueron otorgadas y las personas extranjeras cuyo ingreso se pretende ya se encuentran en el país. Se refiere este aparte a la petición concreta de otorgamiento de visas restringidas, materia en la cual, al amparo del ordinal 49 de la Ley No. 8764, la Comisión de Visas Restringidas sí resulta competente. No obstante, tema seguido, indica que no es competente para resolver peticiones de visas de trabajo. Sobre este tema, el acto en cuestión señala: "Asimismo, la Comisión no está facultada legalmente para autorizar permisos de trabajo o "visas de trabajo"... ya que el artículo 49 de la Ley limita la actuación de la Comisión a la determinación del otorgamiento de visas restringidas y de la condición de refugio. (...)" Es criterio de este Tribunal, se trata de supuestos diversos que son resueltos dentro del mismo acto, pero que en modo alguno supone la antinomia y patología que expresa la accionante. Incluso dentro del análisis estrictamente gramatical de lo resuelto, entiende este órgano colegiado, la declaratoria de incompetencia se refiere solamente a las solicitudes de visa de trabajo, no así a la petición de visas restringidas. Por el contrario, entiende esta cámara, se trata de dos temas diferentes, cuyos criterios de resolución son distintos. De una parte, entratándose de las visas de ingreso, la causa del rechazo es que ya habían sido otorgadas y las personas a cuyo favor se requerían, ya se encontraban dentro del país. Este criterio no se cuestiona en este proceso, siendo que el accionante no formula reproche alguno respecto de este pronunciamiento. En tanto que sobre las visas de trabajo, la base argumentativa de la Comisión aludida fue su incompetencia para conocer tales cuestiones. Por otra parte, en un tercer aspecto, dentro del considerando cuarto del acto citado, la Comisión se abocó a resolver la petición de declaratoria de silencio positivo, la cual, en definitiva, fue denegada. Para lo anterior, se reitera, el criterio fue que el plazo previsto en el numeral 200 de la Ley No. 8764 y el fijado en la circular DGVS-675-2008 del 01 de diciembre del 2008, numeral 55, no había fenecido considerando la fecha de presentación del trámite. Sobre la validez de lo resuelto en este extremo se ahondará infra. En concreto, del análisis de ese acto administrativo, concluye esta Cámara, la declaratoria de incompetencia versó únicamente sobre la petición de las visas de trabajo, no así sobre el extremo de visas restringidas, el que fue resuelto a la luz de otro tipo de consideraciones que no han sido cuestionadas. Incluso, si se analiza con detenimiento el por tanto del acto reprochado, se observa que sobre este tema se señala: "... la Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio SE DECLARA INCOMPETENTE para conocer la solicitud de visas de trabajo solicitadas en fecha 02 de setiembre del 2010..."; es decir, el acto refiere de manera explícita, la declaratoria de incompetencia se emite respecto de las visas de trabajo. Desde este plano, a tono con los ordinales 59, 60, 129 de la Ley No. 6227/78 y el canon 49 de la Ley No. 8764, la incompetencia declarada por el mismo órgano administrativo -Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio- respecto de las solicitudes dichas, no supone la imposibilidad por incompetencia para pronunciarse sobre el extremo de la gestión sobre el cual sí es competente y le atañe en el ejercicio de sus potestades. Sobre las solicitudes de visas restringidas en particular y la petición de declaratoria de acto presunto, esa instancia era plenamente competente para pronunciarse, por lo que no se configura el vicio que se acusa, ante lo cual, procede su rechazo.

VI.- Sobre la aplicación del silencio positivo al caso concreto. En un segundo eje de cuestionamiento, la actora censura, el acto criticado es inválido, ya que en este caso, se han configurado los elementos que permiten la aplicación de la figura del silencio positivo. Lo anterior, dice -en lo esencial- siendo que la visa es definida como una autorización o permiso de ingreso a un país determinado, procede o es aplicable el silencio positivo en los casos en que la Administración, sin motivo alguno y fuera del plazo establecido por ley no resuelva la solicitud de gestión o permiso de ingreso, cuando se cumplan con todos los requisitos legales para el efecto. Señala, en esta materia resulta aplicable de materia supletoria la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en cuyo precepto 330 se establece que cuando se presente una solicitud para el otorgamiento de un permiso o autorización, la Administración está obligada a resolver dentro del plazo de un mes, o de lo contrario, opera el silencio positivo. Afirma, su gestión fue presentada en fecha 02 de septiembre del 2010 y transcurrió más de un mes sin recibir respuesta de la Administración, por lo que se configuró el acto presunto. Destaca, la materia migratoria no está dentro de los supuestos de excepción fijados por la jurisprudencia para la aplicación del silencio positivo por cuanto no se da el interés de tutelar intereses relacionados con la vida, la salud, y en general la materia ambiental. Sobre tales alegaciones cabe señalar lo que de seguido se expone. El interés público que está llamada a tutelar, constituye el elemento finalista o teleológico que justifica el conferimiento de potestades de imperio a determinadas Administraciones Públicas en el contexto particular de sus marcos de acción. Tal interés público constituye el fin último del eje prestacional de tales unidades administrativas y el fin último de sus actuaciones, interés que prevalece sobre el mismo interés que pueda tener una Administración Pública (arts. 113, 131 LGAP). Por tal motivo, y siendo la base legitimante de las potestades que le son conferidas, las competencias y potestades han de ser ejercitadas para tal satisfacción. Así en efecto se colige del ordinal 66.1 de la Ley No. 6227/78 en cuanto señala que las potestades de imperio y su ejercicio, los deberes públicos y cumplimiento son irrenunciables, intransmisibles e imprescriptibles. Ahora bien, en múltiples supuestos, esas potestades se ejercen en el marco de un procedimiento administrativo, que puede gestarse de oficio o a gestión de parte. En esta último caso (gestión de parte interesada), el debido ejercicio de los poderes públicos supone el deber de emitir acto expreso dentro de los márgenes temporales que imponga el ordenamiento jurídico en cada tipo de gestión. Así se establece, en tesis de principio, en el canon 134 LGAP. Con todo, es usual que vencido ese plazo, la Administración no emite respuesta sobre lo peticionado, ante lo cual, debe discriminarse y precisarse la consecuencia jurídico-procedimental de esa inercia. Por un lado, el numeral 139 de la citada Ley No. 6227/78 indica que el silencio de la Administración no puede reflejar su voluntad, salvo ley que disponga lo contrario. Es decir, la falta de respuesta de la Administración, si bien puede considerarse una patología o funcionamiento anormal (por desidia) del ejercicio del poder público, tiene efectos diversos, según se trate del supuesto a analizar. De este modo, el ordenamiento jurídico público fija dos figuras que pretenden regular las incidencias de la inercia pública, a saber, el silencio negativo y el silencio positivo. El silencio negativo, en términos simples, constituye una denegación ficta de la petición administrativa, si dentro del plazo conferido a la Administración para resolver, no se ha pronunciado. Se trata de una presunción de rechazo de lo peticionado, cuya finalidad es abrir la facultad del administrado de ejercer sus derechos recursivos frente a la misma administración, o bien, acudir directamente a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa para buscar la tutela de su situación jurídica. El silencio negativo no es un rechazo de la gestión, sino una conjetura que posibilita el ejercicio impugnaticio referido, es decir, no supone que la gestión ha sido efectivamente rechazada, pues no hay voluntad pública manifiesta, sino solo la posibilidad de saltar esa instancia y continuar en el procedimiento administrativo. Puede decirse, cuando el agotamiento de la vía administrativa era imperativo en todas las materias (previo al fallo 3669-2006 de la Sala Constitucional y el artículo 31.1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), el silencio negativo era una carga para el administrado, pues le exigía ejercer las sendas recursivas para obtener un acto preleable y luego acudir a la tutela jurisdiccional. Empero, en la actualidad, en tanto facultad, se constituye en una posibilidad para accionar el curso del procedimiento o bien, instaurar una causa judicial. Así lo establece el inciso 3 del ordinal 261 de la Ley General de previa cita, en el siguiente sentido: "3. Si al cabo de los términos indicados no se ha comunicado una resolución expresa, se entenderá rechazado el reclamo o petición del administrado en vista del silencio de la Administración, sea para la interposición de los recursos administrativos procedentes o de la acción contenciosa en su caso, esto último en los términos y con los efectos señalados por la Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo.". Más simple, la inercia administrativa supone el rechazo de la gestión - del recurso- para efectos de avanzar en el procedimiento, pero ello no implica que desde el plano material-jurídico, la petición ha sido denegada. Incluso, el numeral 329.3 de la LGAP establece con toda claridad que el acto dictado fuera de plazo será válido para todo efecto legal, salvo regla en contrario. Esto supone el deber de la Administración de pronunciarse sobre la gestión que le ha sido presentada, aún cuando ha fenecido el plazo para emitir su conducta y pueda entenderse ocurrido el silencio negativo, siendo que su competencia para resolver no decae por esta circunstancia. A diferencia del silencio positivo, el negativo no es un acto, sino una conjetura de rechazo ficta para los efectos señalados ut supra. Por otro lado, en determinados casos, al margen de lo señalado, la inercia pública en la emisión de la conducta formal lleva, como efecto jurídico, al denominado silencio positivo. En estos casos, el silencio de la administración se entiende como favorable al petente, siendo que su gestión se entiende por resuelta en términos favorables a como ha sido planteada. Desde esa óptica, el ordinal 330 de la Ley No. 6227/78 indica: "El silencio de la Administración se entenderá positivo cuando así se establezca acordarse en el ejercicio de funciones de fiscalización y tutela./ 2. También se entenderá positivo el silencio cuando se trate de solicitudes de permisos, licencias y autorizaciones." Empero, para que ello ocurra han de concurrir varios elementos, pues no en toda solicitud que suponga un permiso, licencia o autorización podría hablarse de la procedencia de un silencio positivo. En efecto, la lectura superficial del inciso segundo del ordinal 330 LGAP podría llevar al equívoco de entender que en cualquier petición de autorización, licencia o permiso, aplica u opera la figura del silencio positivo. Esta postura no es compartida por este Tribunal. La comprensión en los términos dichos supone, como efecto práctico, que al margen de lo pedido, la omisión pública llevaría a una suerte de anuencia administrativa para el ejercicio de los actos que sustentan la petición del interesado. Ello al margen que lo pedido tenga una gran incidencia en el orden público, la salud y la seguridad pública. La autorización puede definirse como la remoción de un obstáculo legal para el ejercicio de una conducta debida. Por su lado, el permiso consiste en la habilitación administrativa para el desarrollo de una conducta, en principio vedada. En tanto que la licencia consiste en una autorización de contenido reglado. Desde ese plano, es menester analizar en cada caso, cuando la petición privada (o pública) se regula por la figura del silencio positivo o bien, cuando está afecta al silencio negativo. De otro modo, no tendría lógica la existencia del silencio negativo, salvo para la fase recursiva, pues a excepción de los reclamos administrativos, en múltiples gestiones que se someten a conocimiento de la administración, a fin de cuentas, se busca el otorgamiento de un permiso, de una licencia o de una autorización. Puede pensarse en el caso de una solicitud de permiso para explotación de la actividad del transporte público remunerado de personas (art. 25 de la Ley No. 3503), que reúna los requisitos de esa legislación y vencido el plazo para resolver, no exista acto público. En tal caso, sería inviable a todas luces pensar en un silencio positivo. Por el contrario, el silencio de la Administración en ese caso no sería el previsto en el ordinal 330 LGAP, sino el efecto señalado en el artículo 261 incisos 1 y 3 de ese mismo cuerpo legal. De ahí que de manera expresa, en la Ley Forestal, No. 7575, el canon 4 señale de manera diáfana la improcedencia del silencio positivo en materia ambiental. Igual efecto se produce en los bienes demaniales, por derivación del régimen jurídico aplicable al dominio público (art. 262 Código Civil), tratamiento que en términos procesales puede verse, entre otros, en los preceptos 34.2 de la Ley No. 8508 (CPCA). Como puede verse, el mismo numeral 330 LGAP establece que procede el silencio positivo cuando se establezca de manera expresa por ley. Es el caso, a modo de simple referencia, del deber de tramitación en materia de contratación administrativa -art. 16 de la Ley No. 7494-, y en ese mismo campo, la omisión de respuesta del recurso de objeción -art. 83 ibídem-. En tales casos, expresamente regulados, el ordenamiento jurídico establece un plazo diverso al fijado por el canon 261 LGAP, que usualmente empata con el lapso de un mes regulado por el mandato 330 de la Ley No. 6227/78. Empero, en la normalidad de las situaciones, el plazo para resolver las peticiones es de 2 meses regulado en el mencionado precepto 261 LGAP y los efectos del silencio son negativos o denegatorios. En consecuencia, no comparte este Tribunal la posición que toda autorización, permiso o licencia supone, en todos los casos, la aplicación de la figura del silencio positivo. Para ello es necesario analizar en cada caso la convergencia de una serie de factores. De un lado, si existe regulación expresa que fije la pertinencia del silencio positivo. Por otro, de no haber ese desarrollo explícito, si la petición del administrado, trata de una materia en la que es de pasible aplicación esa figura. En tales casos -y solo en esos-, el silencio aplicará cuando se acredite: a) que la gestión fue presentada cumpliendo la totalidad de requisitos fijados por el ordenamiento jurídico para ese caso en particular; y b) que vencido el plazo fijado por el ordenamiento jurídico para que la Administración resuelva el trámite, no haya recaído acto expreso. Para los efectos, la Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos, No. 8220 del 04 de marzo del 2002, publicada en La Gaceta No. 49 del 11 de marzo del 2002, establece el procedimiento para tener por acreditado el silencio positivo. En ese sentido, el numeral 7 indica en su tenor literal: "Procedimiento para aplicar el silencio positivo Cuando se trate de solicitudes para el otorgamiento de permisos, licencias o autorizaciones, vencido el plazo de resolución otorgado por el ordenamiento jurídico a la Administración, sin que esta se haya pronunciado, se tendrán por aprobadas. Para la aplicación del silencio positivo bastará con que el administrado presente a la Administración una declaración jurada, debidamente autenticada, haciendo constar que ha cumplido con todos los requisitos necesarios para el otorgamiento de los permisos, las licencias o las autorizaciones y que la Administración no resolvió dentro del plazo correspondiente. / Estos requisitos serán únicamente los estipulados expresamente en las leyes, los decretos ejecutivos o los reglamentos, de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 4 de la presente ley. / La Administración, dentro de los tres días hábiles siguientes a la recepción de la declaración jurada, deberá emitir un documento donde conste que transcurrió el plazo para la aplicación del silencio positivo y la solicitud no fue resuelta en tiempo. Si la Administración no emite este documento dentro del plazo señalado, se tendrá por aceptada la aplicación del silencio positivo y el administrado podrá continuar con los trámites para obtener el permiso, la licencia o la autorización correspondientes, salvo en los casos en que por disposición constitucional no proceda el silencio positivo. / En el cumplimiento de este procedimiento, la Administración deberá coordinar a lo interno para informar al oficial de simplificación de trámites, de conformidad con los artículos 8 y 11 de esta ley. / Ninguna institución podrá desconocer o rechazar la aplicación del silencio positivo que, opera de pleno derecho. / Cuando sea procedente, la Administración aplicará el procedimiento de nulidad en sede administrativa regulado en el artículo 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública o iniciará un proceso judicial de lesividad para demostrar que los requisitos correspondientes no fueron cumplidos." (Así reformado por el artículo 1° de la ley N° 8990 del 27 de setiembre del 2011) Cabe destacar, esta redacción no era la vigente al momento en que el accionante presentó la solicitud del silencio positivo, ni la vigente al momento de dictarse el acto o formular la demanda, por lo que, el tema ha de ser resuelto con el texto vigente a ese momento. Tal norma señalaba antes de la reforma realizada por la Ley No. 8990: "Cuando se trate de solicitudes para el otorgamiento de permisos, licencias o autorizaciones, vencido el plazo de resolución otorgado por el ordenamiento jurídico a la Administración, sin que esta se haya pronunciado, se tendrán por aprobadas. Producida esta situación, el interesado podrá: a) Presentar una nota a la Administración donde conste que la solicitud fue presentada en forma completa y que la Administración no la resolvió en tiempo. La Administración deberá emitir, al día hábil siguiente, una nota que declare que, efectivamente, el plazo transcurrió y la solicitud no fue aprobada, por lo que aplicó el silencio positivo o bien b) Acudir ante un notario público para que certifique, mediante acta notarial, que la solicitud fue presentada en forma completa y que la Administración no la resolvió en tiempo." Como se observa, el procedimiento previsto en la Ley No. 8220 propende a tener por acreditada la concurrencia de los supuestos señalados. Cuando ocurra el silencio positivo, como se ha dicho, surge el denominado acto administrativo presunto, por lo que, la supresión de ese acto exige y requiere acudir a las formas de extinción de las conductas públicas, sea, nulidad del artículo 173 LGAP, proceso de lesividad o bien la revocación de conductas, so pena de lesionar el principio de intangibilidad de los actos propios, consagrado en el precepto 34 de la Carta Magna. De igual modo, esa declaración de ocurrencia del silencio positivo puede plantearse en esta sede contencioso administrativa, al amparo del numeral 42 y 122 del CPCA.

VII.- Improcedencia del silencio positivo en materia migratoria y en el caso concreto. Ahora bien, expuestas dichas generalidades sobre el silencio positivo, es criterio de este Tribunal, no existe invalidez en lo actuado por la Administración demandada. Ciertamente, el numeral 46 de la Ley No. 8764 (Ley General de Migración y Extranjería) define la visa como "... una autorización de ingreso al territorio nacional extendida por el director general o el agente consular, cuando lo autorice el primero, o cuando así lo permitan las directrices generales para el otorgamiento de visas de ingreso. Del presente régimen se exceptúa el otorgamiento de visas diplomáticas y oficiales. En casos excepcionales, el director de Migración podrá conceder visas, sin que para esos efectos sean vinculantes las directrices generales de visas de ingreso y permanencia para no residentes; en este caso, deberá fundamentar y razonar debidamente su decisión." No obstante, la sola referencia a la figura de la autorización, licencia o permiso, no implica, per se, la aplicación del numeral 330.2 de la LGAP, -como se ha señalado- pues para ello, por un lado, es menester el análisis de si en ese caso concreto de petición pública, opera la figura o si por el contrario, debe entenderse por denegado el reclamo o petición a la luz del ordinal 261.3 LGAP, a efectos de lo cual, ha de analizarse, entre otras cosas, la relevancia de la materia regulada, así como la ponderación de si la inercia pública conculca el ejercicio de un derecho conferido por el ordenamiento jurídico. En el caso de la materia migratoria, se ha de insistir, se trata de un campo de especial relevancia para el interés público, en el que se vincula el orden público y el tópico de la seguridad pública. Esta materia involucra además el componente de la soberanía nacional, que se ejercita y representa mediante las normas y decisiones que se emiten en el contexto de este tipo de relaciones migratorias, tópico en el cual, acorde al texto constitucional no podría sostenerse la aplicación de la figura del silencio positivo, en tanto sería una suerte de renuncia presunta al ejercicio de dichas potestades de soberanía nacional. Como se ha señalado, los ordinales 2 y 3 de la Ley No. 8764 declaran de interés público esta materia, aspecto que se remarca en todo el contexto del citado marco legal, en tanto confiere potestades a la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería para dictar directrices que regulen el tema del otorgamiento de visas y permanencia de personas no residentes (art. 47), así como de la regulación aplicable a residentes permanentes (art. 77) o temporales (art. 79-86), no residentes (arts. 87-92) o personas con estatus migratorios especiales previstos en el ordinal 94 de la mencionada Ley No. 8764. La potestad de rechazo, entendida como la acción mediante la cual la autoridad migratoria niega a una persona extranjera su ingreso al territorio nacional y ordena su traslado inmediato al país de origen o procedencia, o a un tercer país que la admita (art. 64 ejusdem), denota la relevancia de dicha materia. Ello adquiere mayor claridad con lo dispuesto en el canon 67 ibídem en cuanto señala: "El otorgamiento de la categoría migratoria pretendida estará condicionado a los presupuestos de seguridad pública y al desarrollo económico y social del país, además de los requisitos que determine el Reglamento de la presente Ley." Lo anterior evidencia el marcado e innegable interés público que subyace en la materia migratoria, pues no se trata de un simple análisis de requisitos formales, sino que la autorización de ingreso mediante el otorgamiento de visa en cualesquiera de las condiciones migratorias señaladas, pende del análisis técnico de la Administración Migratoria y no solo de la satisfacción de exigencias de forma. Su otorgamiento pondera no solo condiciones personales del migrante, sino además, aspectos de seguridad pública y entorno social y económico, en términos de conveniencia para el país. Así, a manera de ejemplo, la determinación del otorgamiento de visas para el ejercicio temporal de determinados puestos de empleo, puede analizarse a la luz de las condiciones sociales de ocupación laboral en esa área en particular, lo que configura un análisis de incidencia social doméstica del fenómeno migrante, sea temporal o permanente. Ergo, no se trata de una simple autorización como parece hacer ver la parte promovente, tesis que esta Cámara no comparte. Por el contrario, si se analiza el artículo 55 de la Ley No. 8764, la visa "... implica una mera expectativa de derecho, no supone la admisión incondicional de la persona extranjera al país ni la autorización de permanencia pretendida (...)" y como se ha dicho, es un estadio subjetivo condicionado a factores de seguridad social, valoración en las que desde luego, el proceder público no ha de ser arbitrario, sino mesurado y motivado. Por ende, no es una solicitud de autorización que pueda entenderse comprendida dentro de los términos del ordinal 330 LGAP. No se trata de un criterio de distinción donde la ley no lo hace (ubi lex non distingui nec non distinguere debemus)-como podría alegarse-, sino de la interpretación y ponderación que este Tribunal realiza respecto de la figura analizada. Entonces, no se trata de una materia en la que, en tesis de principio, pueda entenderse aplicable la figura del silencio positivo (o acto presunto). A diferencia de lo expuesto por la actora, no se trata de que esta materia sensible no esté incluida dentro de los supuestos de excepción de pertinencia del acto presunto, sino más bien, lo relevante es que dada su relevancia pública, la ocurrencia del silencio positivo ha de interpretarse de manera restrictiva, y no existiendo regulación que establezca particularmente la aplicación de ese instituto en esta tópica, en este caso concreto, no se estima correcta su aplicación. Ahora bien, ese solo elemento daría pie al rechazo del reproche bajo examen. Sin embargo, en el caso particular, ante la gestión de declaratoria de silencio positivo presentada el 14 de octubre del 2010 respecto del trámite de conferimiento de visa para 49 trabajadores chinos, en el acto CVRR-0573-2010, en el considerando cuarto se señaló que no era procedente la solicitud de silencio positivo, ya que la Comisión de Visas Restringidas se encontraba dentro del plazo fijado por ley para resolver. Para ello, se remitió al numeral 200 de la Ley General de Migración y Extranjería y a la circular DGVS-675-2008 del 01 de setiembre del 2008, artículo 55 que fija un plazo de 60 días para resolver las solicitudes de visa. (Ver folios 82-83 del legajo judicial). La accionante señala que el plazo para resolver la solicitud de visas presentada en fecha 02 de septiembre del 2010, es el de 1 mes señalado en el ordinal 330 y 331 de la Ley No. 6227/78. Este criterio no es compartido por este Tribunal. En efecto, aún de considerar que en esta materia opera el silencio positivo -lo que no comparte este cuerpo colegiado-, su procedencia estaría supeditada al fenecimiento del plazo que el ordenamiento jurídico otorga a la Administración competente para resolver. En el caso concreto de la materia migratoria, el numeral 189 de la Ley No. 8764 señala: "Los procedimientos administrativos relativos a materia migratoria se regirán por las disposiciones de la presente Ley y su Reglamento; además, supletoriamente, por la Ley general de la Administración Pública, No. 6227, de 2 de mayo de 1978; la Ley N.º 8220, Protección al ciudadano del exceso de requisitos y trámites administrativos, de 4 de marzo de 2002, y el Código Procesal Contencioso- Administrativo, N.º 8508, de 28 de abril de 2006." Como se observa, el criterio de integración de la Ley No. 6227/78 y la No. 8508 es por supletoriedad, no así por remisión directa. Es decir, primero ha de acudirse a las reglas procedimentales previstas en la Ley de Migración, especiales para regular la materia, y luego, solo en caso de temas no tratados en su articulado, acudir a las otras fuentes legales de integración expresamente señaladas. Ello engarza con los criterios de integración del ordenamiento jurídico público previstos en el mandato 9 de la LGAP. Así, en cuanto al plazo para resolver las gestiones migratorias, el ordinal 200 de la Ley No. 8764 señala con toda claridad, respecto de las solicitudes de residencia, que deben ser resueltas en el "... plazo máximo de tres meses para resolver, a partir del momento en que se hayan cumplido todos los requisitos. Cuando se trate de peticiones para optar por la condición migratoria legal, este plazo correrá a partir del recibo de la documentación, en las oficinas centrales de la Dirección General." De ese modo, ante la regulación especial, es evidente para este Tribunal, el plazo legal aplicable que ha de tenerse como referente para determinar la validez de lo resuelto y de la misma circular DGSV-675-2008 (también cuestionada), es de tres meses, no así el del mes que establece el ordinal 330 y 331 LGAP. Con todo, a la luz de lo expuesto, aún de considerar que el plazo aplicable es el de la LGAP, es criterio de este cuerpo colegiado, por las razones ya explicitadas, el plazo no sería el mensual que allí se indica, sino el bimensual del precepto 261 de esa misma Ley. Sin embargo, se reitera, la presente solicitud se ha de resolver conforme al plazo ordenado por el canon 200 de la Ley No. 8764, por ser un plazo especial. Con todo, en materia de visas, el numeral 47 ibídem confiere competencia a la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería para emitir directrices. En esta línea, el canon 55 de esa circular establece un plazo de sesenta días para resolver las solicitudes de visas. De ese modo, siendo que la gestión fue planteada el 02 de septiembre del 2010, al momento de presentar la solicitud de aplicación del silencio positivo, sea, 14 de octubre del 2010, no había transcurrido el plazo fijado, bien por el numeral 200 de la Ley No. 8764, o por el numeral 55 de la circular 675-2008. Ese plazo tampoco había expirado al momento de dictar la resolución No. CVRR-0573-2010 en la que se deniega la declaración del silencio positivo. En consecuencia, no se presenta el elemento temporal que aduce el accionante, ante lo cual, su agravio ha de ser rechazado, pues se insiste, aún de considerar procedente la figura del silencio positivo en esta materia (lo que no se comparte), el plazo aplicable al caso no se encontraba fenecido, en consecuencia, no se puede tener por ocurrido el silencio, siendo que la Administración contaba aún con plazo para resolver las peticiones formuladas. Por ello, es irrelevante que se reunieran los requisitos de la circular DG-1084-2008 de la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, o bien, que se hubiera levantado el acta notarial por el profesional M. para los efectos del artículo 7 de la Ley No. 8220, pues como se ha señalado, el silencio positivo no podía tenerse por ocurrido, además que resulta inapropiado e impertinente en este caso. Por ende, debe disponer el rechazo del motivo de nulidad que se presenta.

VIII.- Sobre el análisis de las circulares sobre plazos en el trámite migratorio. En otro orden de cosas, la accionante reprocha la validez de las circulares DG-3309-2009 y DGVS-675-2008, aplicadas en el dictado del acto No. CVRR-0573-2010. Como causal de nulidad se alega haber dispuesto regulaciones que desconocen el plazo de un mes que impone en este tipo de cuestiones el canon 331 de la Ley No. 6227/78. Indica, se lesiona la jerarquía de las fuentes del Derecho Administrativo, a la vez que las circulares solo pueden tener efectos internos a la misma Administración, sin que puedan modificar disposiciones legales o reglamentarias, así como tampoco pueden imponer requisitos, condiciones, trámites o cargas que no indique la ley. Sobre el tema del marco de acción y límites de las circulares que la Legislación Migratoria posibilita a favor de la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, la Sala Primera, en el fallo No. 116-F-S1-2010 de las nueve horas del veintidós de enero de dos mil diez señaló: "No puede perderse de vista que la circular consiste en un acto interno mediante el cual se puede girar instrucciones respecto a la forma de proceder por parte de los funcionarios, en este caso, en la valoración de las solicitudes de visas. Por tratarse de un lineamiento dirigido a los funcionarios, y en tanto los efectos que se le imputen sean consecuentes con la particularidad indicada, y por ende aplicadas al momento en que estos valoran las gestiones de los particulares, sin que se le otorguen efectos externos, no se aprecia un quebranto del principio de reserva legal. Claro está, por esta situación, no se le pueden dar los efectos propios de una norma jurídica. Aún y cuando pueda tener efectos sobre terceros de manera refleja, estos se deben dar en virtud de actos preparatorios dentro del procedimiento, los cuales deben ser acordes con el ordenamiento jurídico y nunca en virtud de la aplicación directa de una directriz sobre la esfera jurídica de los interesados. En esta inteligencia, en tanto no se extralimite el contenido del texto legal, no aprecia esta Sala un quebranto del principio de legalidad." Este análisis se realiza respecto de la misma circular que ahora se cuestiona, si bien desde la óptica de la validez del numeral 83, para el tema de la solvencia económica, el precedente resulta de aplicación para los efectos de precisar los alcances y límites de ese tipo de circulares. A la luz de ese análisis entonces, debe discriminarse si esa circular regula temas no tratados por la ley que puedan afectar a terceros ajenos a la Administración, de modo que pueda considerarse un tema externo. Conforme se ha señalado, en la temática de procedimiento para resolver solicitudes de visa, el numeral 200 de la Ley No. 8764 establece un plazo de tres meses para resolver las diversas solicitudes que en esa materia deba conocer la Administración. Es claro que ante la eventual divergencia entre la ley y la circular, sin duda alguna prevalece la ley por la mayor potencia y resistencia jurídicas que le son propias. Desde ese plano, si bien la resolución CVRR-0573-2010 alude a la citada circular, el criterio de rechazo se sustenta además en el plazo fijado por el ordinal 200 de la Ley de Migración, por lo que no habría nulidad alguna sobre ese particular. Por otro lado, esa circular en el ordinal 55 indica: "Recibida la documentación en la Dirección General, ésta la someterá a estudio y comunicará la resolución pertinente al consulado, teniendo un plazo máximo de sesenta días para resolver y emitir la resolución final en solicitudes planteadas." Esa circular fue emitida el 28 de agosto del 2008, en tanto que la Ley No. 8764 se publicó el 19 de agosto del 2009 y entró en vigencia seis meses después (transitorio II). Ergo, es evidente que prevalece la Ley. Sin embargo, se insiste, la simple referencia de la aplicación de la circular no produce su nulidad. Para ello, debe decirse, es criterio de este Tribunal, el plazo regulado en ese numeral 55 de la aludida circular, no antagoniza con el regulado por el mandato 200 de la Ley, que fija un lapso de 3 meses para la resolución de los trámites de solicitudes de residencia. Con todo, aún aplicando la remisión que establece el ordinal 189 de la Ley No. 8764, en cuanto a la aplicación supletoria de las reglas procedimentales de la LGAP, el numeral 261 de ese cuerpo normativo fija que el procedimiento ha de concluirse por acto final dentro del plazo de dos meses. Si se entiende que la citada circular fija un plazo de 60 días para resolver, sin precisar si son días hábiles o naturales, por lo que de conformidad con el artículo 256.1 de la Ley No. 6227/78, deben entenderse naturales, el plazo en ambos instrumentos regulados es similar. Desde ese plano, como se ha dicho, la circular en cuestión no vulnera la situación jurídica de la accionante; primero, porque el acto que cuestiona no resuelve con fundamento exclusivo de esa circular, sino que además refiere al artículo 200 de la Ley No. 8764, norma que regula el tiempo con que cuenta la Administración para resolver las solicitudes de residencia, sin que pueda entenderse que sobre ese particular, aplica el plazo mensual que estatuye el ordinal 331 de la LGAP; segundo, el plazo de 60 días de la circular, coincide con el fijado por el canon 261 LGAP; tercero, aún de considerar que se confronta con el lapso de la Ley No. 8764, es claro que prevalece el de la ley, por su superior jerarquía y posterior emisión, empero, se insiste, el rechazo de la petición de silencio positivo no se sustenta, como que no se haya incurrido en el vicio de desaplicación de normas jerárquicamente superiores como acusa la petente, sino por el contrario. En cuanto a la circular DG-3309-2009, si bien se menciona en la parte dispositiva del acto, en el análisis concreto del tema de la petición de silencio positivo no es referida en lo absoluto, por lo que no guarda relación con el tema debatido. Además de ello, el accionante no concreta las razones por las cuales tal circular sería inválida. Se limita a realizar y presentar citas doctrinarias y referencias normativas genéricas al tema de los elementos del acto, concepto de invalidez, naturaleza de las circulares, potestades del jerarca administrativo para emitirlas, empero, no se indica como esas normas y fuentes llevan a evidenciar la patología de la circular en cuestión. Sus deposiciones en este sentido son reflexiones teoréticas sobre el régimen de composición del acto público y las consecuencias de sus vicios, sin embargo, fuera del tema del plazo que en teoría, a su juicio, resulta aplicable en este caso, asunto ya resuelto, no ofrece alegación alguna. Por ende, a tono con lo expuesto, es menester disponer el rechazo de la demanda en cuanto a este particular.

IX.- Sobre la revocación de los actos públicos. En escrito de fecha 05 de mayo del 2011, visible a folios 557-559 del expediente judicial, la firma accionante amplia su demanda, en cuanto a los hechos y pretensiones, reprochando la nulidad del acto CVRR-022-2010 del 08 de julio del 2010 de la Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio, así como el pago de daños y perjuicios derivados de ese acto, los que en audiencia preliminar concretó en los gastos de traslado y estadía de 40 ciudadanos chinos a Beijing. En este sentido señala, el 08 de febrero del 2010 solicitó visa de ingreso restringido a favor de cien ciudadanos chinos para laborar en el proyecto inmobiliario en San José, producto de lo cual, el Departamento de Migraciones Laborales de la Dirección Nacional de Empleo rindió recomendación que llevó a que mediante la sesión 006-2010, la Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio autorizó 100 visas. Critica, mediante resolución administrativa DGVR-1189-2010JFS del 18 de mayo del 2010, la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería autorizó las primeras 40 visas de ciudadanos chinos ligados al Proyecto Torres del Lago. Dice, por resolución CVRR-022-2010 del 08 de julio del 2010, la Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio ordenó la revocación del acto que acogió la petición de 100 visas, sin el dictamen previo de la Contraloría General de la República y sin decretar la indemnización de daños y perjuicios. Sobre el particular cabe señalar lo que de seguido se establece. Punto fundamental en este agravio constituye el instituto de la revocación de los actos públicos. La revocación se constituye como una herramienta de supresión de las conductas públicas, en tesis de principio, de contenido favorable, supuesto en el que tiene utilidad pragmática, y eventualmente de las desfavorables, como adelante se indicará. Más tal supresión no tiene como base legitimante la invalidez de lo actuado por la Administración, sino la inconveniencia del acto administrativo, en términos de consonancia con el interés público tutelado, sea por la aparición de nuevos hechos que incorporen una inoportunidad o inconveniencia sobrevenida, o bien, por la variación de criterio de los mismos hechos que dieron motivo al acto. En ello estriba la diferencia con la nulidad (invalidez), pues si bien tanto la nulidad como la revocación son formas de supresión de conductas públicas, en el primer caso la causa de eliminación es una disconformidad sustancial con el ordenamiento jurídico (arts. 128 y 158 LGAP), en tanto que en la revocación, la causa estriba en la inconveniencia de mantener los efectos de determinado acto público para la tutela y satisfacción de intereses públicos. Es decir, la base de la revocación no es la patología del acto, sino su inconveniencia. De ahí que a tono con lo preceptuado por el ordinal 152 de la Ley No. 6227/78, solo proceda por razones de oportunidad, conveniencia o mérito, -con las salvedades de ley-, y pueda tener lugar únicamente cuando haya divergencia grave entre los efectos del acto y el interés público, pese al tiempo transcurrido, a los derechos creados o a la naturaleza y demás circunstancias de la relación jurídica a que se intenta poner fin. Aspecto fundamental es que dada esa característica de base, la causa originaria de la revocación puede configurarse por la aparición de nuevas circunstancias de hecho, no existentes o no conocidas al momento de dictarse el acto originario, así como una valoración diversa de las mismas circunstancias de hecho que dieron origen al acto, o del interés público afectado. Con todo, la potestad revocatoria debe ejercitarse dentro del plazo de 4 años, según lo estatuye el precepto 156 de la LGAP. Cabe destacar, tal poder público solo puede recaer sobre actos de contenido discrecional, siendo inviable en los casos de actos de contenido reglado, lo que pone en evidencia el carácter discrecional y facultativo de la figura de la revocación. Así lo establece el ordinal 156.1 de ese mismo cuerpo legal. Ahora bien, la revocación puede recaer sobre actos de contenido favorable o desfavorable. En este último caso (excepcional), el canon 156 ejusdem señala que el acto desfavorable al administrado podrá ser revocado aún si ya ha adquirido firmeza. En cuanto a los actos favorables, el trámite de revocación ha de discriminar si ese efecto favorable se deriva de un derecho subjetivo o se constituye en un título precario, distinción que guarda especial relevancia de cara a establecer si el procedimiento para revocar el acto requiere de exigencias adicionales o no. En esta línea, el mandato 154 de la Ley No. 6227/78 señala: "Los permisos de uso del dominio público, y los demás actos que reconozcan a un administrado un derecho expresa y válidamente a título precario, podrán ser revocados por razones de oportunidad o conveniencia sin responsabilidad de la Administración; pero la revocación no deberá ser intempestiva ni arbitraria y deberá darse en todos los casos un plazo prudencial para el cumplimiento del acto de revocación." La norma refiere a dos supuestos de hecho claramente diferenciados, por un lado, los permisos de uso de bienes dominicales, y por otro, los actos que confieran un derecho efímero y precario. En tales hipótesis, la revocación se podrá acordar sin responsabilidad para la Administración, a reserva que esa decisión no sea arbitraria o intempestiva. Por su parte, cuando no se estén presentes tales presupuestos condicionantes, y el efecto favorable sea propio de un derecho, el trámite a seguir es el desarrollado por el ordinal 155 de la citada Ley General que señala de manera literal: "1. La revocación de un acto declaratorio de derechos subjetivos deberá hacerse por el jerarca del ente respectivo, previo dictamen favorable de la Contraloría General de la República. 2. Simultáneamente deberá contener el reconocimiento y si es posible el cálculo de la indemnización completa de los daños y perjuicios causados, so pena de nulidad absoluta. 3. En todo caso los daños y perjuicios deberán ser liquidados por la Administración dentro del mes posterior a la solicitud o recurso del administrado que contenga la liquidación pretendida por éste." En este supuesto, la validez del acto que dispone la revocación de otro se encuentra sujeta al cumplimiento de requisitos sustanciales y procedimentales, siendo que la revocación acordada a contrapelo de esas rigurosidades -cuando sean pertinente-, llevará irremisiblemente a la nulidad del acto revocatorio. Por una parte, la competencia para disponer la revocación radica en el jerarca máximo del ente que dictó el acto a suprimir. Segundo, dado que lo que se afecta con la cesación de efectos del acto es un derecho subjetivo -en el contexto de la norma 155 analizada- , es menester la indemnización de los daños y perjuicios que tal determinación pueda producir, tema que en orden a lo regulado por la norma en cuestión, ha de contar con un dictamen obligatorio y vinculante de la Contraloría General de la República y además, contener el reconocimiento (como derecho) y de ser posible el cálculo de la reparación económica por los daños y eventuales perjuicios ocasionados. La ausencia de ese criterio o de la indemnización aludida, lleva a la invalidez del acto revocatorio. De lo indicado es claro que la exigencia de este procedimiento que requiere de dictámenes favorables de otros órganos públicos y ponderación de derechos indemnizatorios, solo aplica cuando el acto a revocar haya otorgado derechos subjetivos, no así cuando se trate de un título precario, pues en tales escenarios, la decisión se puede emitir sin responsabilidad para la Administración. Ha de analizarse en cada caso por ende cuando ese elemento condiciona la potestad revocatoria o bien, cuando ese proceder, aún en ejercicio lícito de los poderes públicos, lleva a una responsabilidad administrativa. Por último, debe indicarse que, la revocación, produce efectos desde que se dicta y hacia el futuro, por lo que no extingue el acto desde la fecha original de éste y, por ende, todos los efectos producidos se mantienen aún después de su revocatoria.

X.- Sobre la revocación en el caso concreto. Como complemento de lo expuesto, cabe señalar, aún en los casos en que la revocación se puede disponer sin responsabilidad para la Administración, esta no puede ser arbitraria ni intempestiva, pues en tales casos podría configurarse un abuso de poder o bien, según sea el caso, una desviación de poder. Ahora bien, en la especie, el análisis de los cargos formulados exige establecer un recuento de lo acaecido. Luego del análisis de los autos se tiene que en fecha 08 de febrero del 2010, la entidad accionante presentó ante la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, solicitud para el otorgamiento de visas a un total de 100 trabajadores chinos para la construcción del desarrollo Inmobiliario denominado Condominio R.T.L. (Folios 228-233 del legajo administrativo.) Conociendo de ese trámite, mediante el informe técnico DML-DNE-013-2010 del Departamento de Migraciones Laborales de la Dirección Nacional de Empleo (folios 165-167 del legajo administrativo), se emite recomendación sobre dicha petición, producto de lo cual, por acuerdo adoptado en la sesión 006-2010 del 21 de abril del 2010, la Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio determinó autorizar el otorgamiento de las 100 visas de trabajo aludidas, por cumplir con los requisitos necesarios contando con la aprobación de permisos del Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Municipalidad de San José, Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y Tecnología -en esa fecha-, Dirección General de Ingeniería de Tránsito. Mediante la resolución DGVR 1189-2010JFS del 18 de mayo del 2010, la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería procede a comunicar la autorización de visa de ingreso de 40 ciudadanos chinos. (folio 173 frente y vuelto del administrativo). Empero, por oficio DMT-724-2010 de la Ministra de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, de fecha 01 de junio del 2010, se solicita la suspensión temporal del permiso de ingreso a Costa Rica de los trabajadores a los que se hace referencia en el informe DML-DNE-0013-2010 del 13 de enero del 2010, hasta tanto se revisen los criterios expuestos en dicho informe. (Folio 168 vuelto del administrativo). En esa línea, por oficio DMT-795-2010 del 24 de junio del 2010, la Ministra de Trabajo y Seguridad Social remite a la Comisión de Visas Restringidas informe técnico de recomendación relativo a la solicitud de visas de ingreso restringido en favor de ciudadanos chinos presentada por la empresa C.C.A. S.A., en el que recomienda a la Comisión no otorgar ningún permiso de ingreso al país, en tanto las condiciones laborales y económicas en el sector de la construcción se mantenga en el país. (Folios 143 vuelto-147 del administrativo) Como consecuencia, mediante la resolución DGVR 1337-2010RVJ de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 02 de junio del 2010, la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería dispuso suspender temporalmente la notificación de la resolución DGVR-1189-2010JFS del 18 de mayo del 2010. (Folios 163-164 del administrativo) En definitiva, por resolución No. CVRR-0022-2010 de las 12 horas 15 minutos del 08 de julio del 2010, la Comisión de Visas Restringidas y Refugio dispuso: "...REVOCAR la autorización de las visas restringidas otorgadas a cien ciudadanos de nacionalidad china en sesión No. 6 del 21 de abril del 2010 y en consecuencia la resolución administrativa DGVR-1189-2010JFS del 18 de mayo del 2010 y acoger en todos sus extremos el Informe Técnico DMT-795-2010 suscrito por la señora Ministra de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Sandra Piszk F. Se AVALA en todos sus extremos las actuaciones de la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería que en resolución administrativa DGVR-1337-2010RVJ suspendió temporalmente el procedimiento. (...)" (Folios 122 vuelto-124 del expediente administrativo). Analizado a fondo el alegato de la entidad accionante, es criterio de este Tribunal, la ausencia de pronunciamiento de la Contraloría Genera de la República y la estimación de eventuales daños y perjuicios, no supone la nulidad del acto cuestionado, pues la decisión revocada no afecta derechos subjetivos. Sobre esto merece precisarse, el contenido y regulación normativa de la figura migratoria de la visa de ingreso, permite establecer que se trata de una a las autoridades migratorias en cualquier supuesto en cuanto al derecho de permanencia en el país, pues al margen de su titularidad, se encuentra condicionada a requisitos varios de permanencia. Así lo aclara el ordinal 55 de la Ley No. 8764 en cuanto señala sobre ese particular: "La visa implica una mera extranjera al país ni la autorización de permanencia pretendida; estará supeditada a un depósito de garantía, en los casos que corresponda según la presente Ley y su Reglamento, así como al control migratorio que el funcionario competente realice para verificar el cumplimiento de todos los requisitos legales y reglamentarios exigidos para el ingreso." Las implicaciones sociales de la materia migratoria, según se ha detallado arriba, permiten un análisis de conveniencia y oportunidad respecto de la incidencia que el fenómeno migratorio tiene o tendrá en diversos campos del quehacer nacional, dentro de estos, el ámbito de la oferta de empleo y los niveles de ocupación, según se puede desprender de los mandatos 5, 6 y 7 de la Ley No. 8764. En concreto, cabe reiterar, en el inciso primero del artículo 7 señalado, se fija como finalidad de la potestad en menesteres migratorios "La búsqueda de la complementariedad entre la mano de obra nacional y la migrante, en forma tal que no exista un desplazamiento de la mano de obra nacional por la incorporación de trabajadores inmigrantes." Desde este plano, dada la incidencia social que tiene el otorgamiento de las visas, ciertamente se trata de un título que confiere un derecho, pero de orden precario, en atención a la dinámica misma de la materia migratoria. Por otro lado, desde el orden pragmático, en la especie, no estima este Tribunal que la revocación del citado acto haya sido intempestiva o arbitraria. Si bien existía un informe técnico de recomendación para el otorgamiento de las 100 visas, lo cierto del caso es que luego, la jerarca de la cartera de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, rindió un criterio sobre esa misma gestión, ponderando una serie de análisis y situaciones diversas -novedosas-, que llevaron a determinar la inconveniencia de mantener los efectos de aquella autorización. En ese sentido, como se ha señalado, en el oficio DMT-795-2010 del 24 de junio del 2010, la Ministra de Trabajo y Seguridad Social remite a la Comisión de Visas Restringidas informe técnico de recomendación sobre el trámite de marras, en el que se indica que al existir desempleo en el sector de la construcción y existiendo mano de obra calificada en el país que puede llevar a cabo el proyecto propuesto, recomienda a la Comisión no otorgar ningún permiso de ingreso al país, en tanto las condiciones laborales y económicas en el sector de la construcción se mantenga en el país. (Folios 143 vuelto-147 del administrativo) Como se observa no solamente se trata de un elemento fáctico y de ponderación diverso al tenido en cuenta para emitir el primer acto -revocado-, sino de un elemento de justificación técnica, fáctica y jurídica que sustentan la decisión finalmente adoptada en cuanto a la conveniencia de mantener los efectos del acto de autorización del otorgamiento de 100 visas a ciudadanos de nacionalidad china en sesión No. 6 del 21 de abril del 2010 de la Comisión de Visas Restringidas y la resolución administrativa DGVR-1189-2010JFS del 18 de mayo del 2010. Desde esa óptica, a juicio de este cuerpo colegiado, esa motivación evidencia que la revocación, a tono con el ordinal 154 de la LGAP, no ha sido intempestiva o arbitraria, sino que se encuentra motivada, según lo ordena el precepto 136 ejusdem. Como se ha señalado, no resulta entonces aplicable el procedimiento o requisitos previstos en el canon 155 ibídem, ergo, no causa nulidad alguna la omisión de los aspectos señalados en esa norma para el caso en concreto, al ser innecesarios. En consecuencia, no existe nulidad que deba ser declarada en este sentido. Por otra parte, como derivación de lo expuesto, resulta improcedente el pedimento de daños y perjuicios. Estas partidas se solicitan en la demanda como consecuencia de las supuestas afectaciones que se produjeron por la emisión de un acto revocatoria nulo. Se trata de un extremo que se peticiona de manera accesoria o condicionada a la pretensión anulatoria. Luego entonces, al haberse establecido, las conductas cuestionadas no padecen o evidencian los grados de invalidez y patología recriminadas, no existe criterio de imputación o base para configurar un marco de responsabilidad pública como derivación de esas conductas. No se trata entonces de daños y perjuicios que deban ser reconocidos por este Tribunal, aunado al aspecto que no han resultado en modo alguno acreditados, ante lo cual, procede también el rechazo de la ampliación de la demanda.

XI.- Corolario. Análisis de las defensas opuestas. La representación del Estado opuso las defensas de defensas de falta de derecho, falta de interés actual, legitimación pasiva. La de falta de legitimación pasiva debe ser rechazada. La acción se cursa contra la Administración Pública autora de las conductas cuestionadas, a tono con el ordinal 12.1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Lo mismo ocurre con la defensa de falta de interés, siendo evidente para este Tribunal la actualidad del presente conflicto en tanto pretende la permisibilidad para el ingreso de operarios y trabajadores de nacionalidad china, así como los eventuales daños y perjuicios que las conductas públicas han generado. En cuanto a la defensa de falta de derecho, debe acogerse respecto de la totalidad de las pretensiones formuladas, al haberse acreditado por un lado la validez de las conductas cuestionadas, la improcedencia del silencio positivo en este caso, así como la impertinencia de la pretensión indemnizatoria formulada. En consecuencia, debe disponerse el rechazo de la demanda en todos sus extremos.”