Enforceability of open mortgage without registered installment clausesExigibilidad de hipoteca abierta sin cláusulas de tracto sucesivo inscritas

Document PJEDITOR  Res. 000016-F-TC-2025 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY COURT OF CASSATION. San José, at nine hours and five minutes on the sixth of February, two thousand twenty-five.

In the ordinary proceeding, filed by HOTEL POSADA CLARO DE LUNA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, legal identification number 3-101-280320, represented by its unlimited general agent, Mr. Johnny Guzmán Zamora, bearer of identity card 2-384-205; against BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA, legal identification number 4-000-001021, represented by its unlimited general agent, Mr. Juan Carlos Corrales Salas, identity card 1-481-093; Attorney Gerardo José Bouzid Jiménez, special judicial representative of the plaintiff, filed an appeal in cassation challenging judgment number 08-2022-VII, issued at 08 hours 40 minutes on February 3, 2022, by the Seventh Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, composed of the judges Alinne Solano Ramírez, Francisco Hidalgo Rueda, and Gustavo Irías Obando.

Reporting Judge Jorge Leiva Poveda

CONSIDERING

I.The lawsuit was filed on May 24, 2018. In summary, the plaintiff argued that, in public deed no. 89-4, executed before notary public Karla Fuentes Marín at 10 hours on April 30, 2009, an open-ended mortgage in the first degree was constituted in favor of the defendant entity, for a term of three hundred sixty months, maturing on April 30, 2039. However, the plaintiff argued that the mortgage, in its registration, lacked the description of all the elements required by the legal system for its early execution, such as the payment schedules, the amount of the installments, their periodicity, the specific interest rate of the credit, and the grounds for early maturity. According to its account, the bank attempted to supplement the mortgage with a promissory note, an instrument of a different nature that does not have registration. In that sense, it was highlighted, for example, that the mortgage constitution established that the term of the guaranteed credits would be defined in the respective contract (eleventh fact) and that early maturity could occur upon non-payment of any credit, under the “respective documents.” It considers such a thing improper. Among other reasons, because the mortgage has a different enforcement path than the promissory note, which is collected through a payment order process. Part of its thesis was also that, according to canon 41 of the Code of Commerce, it is not possible to “implicate” a commercial contract with a civil one that requires specific formalities for its validity; much less, to attempt to enforce them jointly (image 22 of the initial brief). It stated that it did not understand that both the promissory note it signed on April 30, 2009 – no. 198200 – and the aforementioned mortgage were guarantees for the same bank loan; instead, it considered it to be paperwork. It also highlighted that linking a promissory note to a mortgage in this way denatures the former as an unconditional guarantee of payment, which is improper. From that perspective, it said that, within the promissory note, it was indicated that the credit would be guaranteed with the already mentioned open-ended mortgage, such that the negotiable instrument lost all its value as an enforcement instrument (executive title) (image 25 of the digital file of 05/24/2018). The plaintiff corporation also argued that its representation had understood that when commercial contracts arose and were signed, they replaced the mortgage guarantee. In this regard, it stated that the difference in the term of the mortgage and the promissory note generated uncertainty about this. It alleged that it is not proper to execute two or more guarantees, as the financial institution intended, in the collection venue; that is, in the bankruptcy protective proceeding processed under file 11-100148-0297-CI, in which it attempted to demand payment of the debt contained in the mortgage loan. Along these lines, the plaintiff argued that, because it lacked the necessary information for this, the mortgage that was attempted to be executed became unenforceable. The claims raised are the following: "1. I request that this lawsuit be admitted and due process be served on the defendant party. 2. I request that it be declared that Mortgage No 88-4 signed before notary Karla Fuentes Marín at 10 hours on April 30, 2009, has its contractual maturity until April 30, 2039, and that its payment must be made at that time. 3. I request that the Lack of Enforceability be declared regarding the mortgage document signed in deed No. 89-4, signed before the notary Karla Fuentes Marín, signed at 10 hours on April 30, 2009, in which a mortgage credit was constituted that is being settled irregularly and does not contain any clause regarding payment in successive installments. 4. I request that it be declared with retroactive effect that the debt maturity arose with the mortgage credit contract of April 30, 2009, and that it be declared that all payments made by my represented party to BNCR must be returned to the debtor because the term of the sole credit document matures until April 30, 2039. 5. I request that all default interest accrued from April 30, 2009, onwards be declared totally extinguished and also prescribed. 6. That the defendant be ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding. 7. That the cancellation of the mortgage entry visible under citations 2009-111188-01-0001-001 be ordered and that said credit document be considered canceled because it was replaced by the commercial contracts which were signed, executed, and adhered to on dates subsequent to the central contract. Failing the above, we request that the aforementioned contract be judicially modified, ordering registration and modifying the following clauses therein: THIRD: ORDINARY INTEREST – MODIFICATION OF ORDINARY INTEREST – FOURTH: DEFAULT INTEREST – THIRTEENTH: EARLY MATURITY, so that they become completely null".

The defendant entity opposed the lawsuit and raised the defenses of “prescription or expiration” and lack of right. At the preliminary hearing held on October 2, 2018, the parties presented their conclusions, as the matter was of pure law, given that there was no evidence to be presented at trial.

In the challenged judgment, the defense of “prescription or expiration” was rejected, and the defense of lack of right was upheld. Consequently, the lawsuit was declared without merit in all its aspects. Costs were imposed on the plaintiff. Disagreeing, its representative files an appeal in cassation.

II.Brief consideration on the structure of the cassation judgment. In this resolution, the antecedent arguments of the parties, as well as their grievances, are succinctly summarized, so that their main aspects are pointed out, without prejudice to the complete reading that has been made of the accessory arguments, as well as the various reasonings that develop the central ideas of the presentation – e.g., argumentative reiterations, detailed narratives of procedural events, personal opinions, doctrinal and jurisprudential citations, among other similar drafting elements, all of which can be consulted in detail in the corresponding brief -; all this, in order to promote a better reading and attention to the grievances, under the protection and in observance of what is ordered in canon 61.2 of the Civil Procedure Code, which provides that: “Second instance and cassation judgments shall include a brief summary of the aspects debated in the challenged resolution and of the arguments of the appellants.” Said mandate is of supplementary application in the contentious-administrative process, in terms of the structure of the judgment, according to canon 220 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code.

III.Grievances. Before alluding to the stated grievances, it must be noted that the appeal is repetitive. The text contains the following sections: “1. The resolution of defenses resolves the merits of the lawsuit's claims…” (image 3); “2. A defense was resolved without giving a hearing to the counterparty so they could argue what is pertinent…” (image 3); “3. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO UPHOLD THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF RIGHT”; “On the Lack of Right of the Judgment” (image 5); “Considering V on applicable regulations”; “4. The appellate court has violated due process by advancing an opinion…” (folio 11); “5. The decision is not reasoned” (image 11). However, in line with the previously mentioned note, the reproaches that are inferred from its reading are set forth below, avoiding unnecessary reiterations. From the outset, it must be noted that clarity, order, and precision are a burden that must be observed by anyone filing an appeal, such that, although the Chamber, shedding unnecessary formalities, proceeds with the analysis of the grievances, it does so to the extent reasonably permitted by the wording. Thus, the criticisms consist of the following topics. Claims of a procedural nature. a. The judgment is not reasoned regarding the upholding of the defense of lack of right, such that the reason for it is not understood. (image 11). b. There is a violation of due process, since the Court advanced an opinion. The appellant disagrees that the a quo, instead of limiting itself to resolving the preliminary defenses, addressed the merits of the claims. It considers that such action is premature, since only the preliminary hearing has taken place, so only an interlocutory ruling should have been issued (images 3 and 11). c. Helplessness was caused, as the plaintiff was not granted a hearing on the defenses raised; specifically, on what was alleged by the defendant on August 22, 2018.

IV.None of the procedural grievances are admissible. Regarding the lack of reasoning on the upholding of the defense of lack of right, this is entirely incorrect. Cassation jurisprudence has repeatedly stated that this anomaly occurs when the jurisdictional body omits to state the reasons that motivate its decision, or when those it states are seriously contradictory or incomprehensible, which ends up producing the same effect, that is, the impossibility for the parties – and the legal community, in general – to understand the resolution. This harms the justice of the specific case, as it prevents the party harmed by the decision from being able to appeal it, by not knowing its basis. Likewise, the defect in question is harmful beyond the limits of the particular conflict, as it removes from the judgment the clarity required so that the transparency and publicity of the jurisdictional function can be subject to legitimate mechanisms of popular and institutional control. In this way, the adequate substantiation of decisions stands as a guarantee of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, contemplated in canon 11 of the Political Constitution, projected, at the legal level, in canon 11 of the General Law of Public Administration. On this subject, consult, among many others, resolutions of the First Chamber no. 484 at 10 hours 30 minutes of August 12, 2003; 195 at 09 hours 10 minutes of March 8, 2018; 316-F-S1-2021 at 11 hours 55 minutes of February 11, 2021; 1750-F-S1-2021 at 13 hours 58 minutes of October 12, 2021. Now, it must also be mentioned that the right is one of the necessary material prerequisites for the issuance of any favorable judgment. In short, it consists of the legal system backing the legal situation that is sought to be protected in the lawsuit; whether its judicial declaration or constitution is sought. Generally, the plaintiff themself – whether personally or by representation – must hold the title to the legal situation that is the subject of the proceeding; although there are exceptional circumstances where this is not the case, as occurs, for example, in the derivative action, where a creditor exercises the action to safeguard a right of their debtor, which benefits them indirectly, to be able to satisfy their credit. (numeral 715 of the Civil Code). Now, in addition to the right, standing (legitimación) – in its active and passive forms – as well as the current interest, must be reviewed, necessarily, ex officio. This means that if the Court detects that any of its prerequisites are not present in the specific case, it is not appropriate to grant the lawsuit. Consult, in this regard, among many others, Chamber decisions no. 1424-F-S1-2022 at 11 hours 40 minutes of August 18, 2022, 592-F-S1-2023 at 10 hours 32 minutes of April 20, 2023, and 236-F-S1-2023 at 09 hours 25 minutes of February 23, 2023. In that order of ideas, if the Court develops various reasons throughout the ruling to justify why, in its opinion, the legal system does not uphold the claims raised – for reasons that do not correspond to a lack of standing or interest, which warrant their own explanation – it is evident that it thereby justifies the lack of right; especially if, when rejecting said defense, it makes an explicit reference to the reasons contained in the pronouncement to justify the rejection of the lawsuit. That is precisely what has occurred in this case. In this sense, in Considering VIII of the ruling, one reads in this regard: “Regarding the lack of right, by virtue of what has been explained by the Court in the previous sections, the cited defense must be upheld, due to the total impropriety of the lawsuit.” Thus, what must be paid attention to is the justification the a quo gave for dismissing the lawsuit. The answer is found in Considering VII. In summary, the reasoning that led the judges to deny the claims consists of the following points. 1) In the act of constituting the open-ended mortgage, both parties agreed that the failure to pay any of the commercial loans guaranteed by the mortgage, according to the conditions established in each of them, would give rise to the early maturity of the guarantee. It transcribed clauses of the contract to conclude that it indeed contained clear and exact stipulations on the enforceability of the mortgage in case of non-payment. 2) In the mortgage deed, an express connection was established between the mortgage and a commercial loan granted to the defendant at that time, which contained the corresponding conditions, known to the parties. In this sense, it highlighted that the aforementioned public instrument established that: "...for each operation constituted under this Open-Ended Mortgage, reimbursement will be made according to the form agreed with the client, depending on the activity to be financed." From that statement, it inferred that the parties voluntarily referred the provisions related to the payment of the credit to the stipulations contained in the contracts that arose and were backed by said open-ended guarantee. 3) Ordinal 414 allows the constitution of a mortgage for an open credit, which is supplemented by the clauses of each loan. 4) The contracts signed by the parties, related to credit operation no. 57-15-30485326, establish a clearly detailed schedule of the sums to be paid each month, which is supplemented by the other mortgage clauses of the loan. 5) The plaintiff itself, in its claims, acknowledges that the mortgage is a central guarantee contract that was extended by others that are dependent on the principal line of credit and are supported by the same guarantee. 6) Regarding the request that the interest be declared prescribed, it was indicated that this is not appropriate since there is no evidence that a final resolution has been issued in the bankruptcy protective proceeding filed by the plaintiff, processed under file 11-100148-0297-CI. Thus, it is the Court's criterion that, according to numeral 723 of Law no. 7130 – applicable to that bankruptcy proceeding – no statute of limitations runs while said judicial matter is pending. As is clear, the judgment does then contain multiple reasons why the claim for lack of right was not considered appropriate. Therefore, any lack of reasoning in this regard is dismissed. Next, there was no advancement of opinion whatsoever due to the fact that the resolution contains a ruling on the merits of the matter. The appellant believes that it could only refer to preliminary defenses. It is mistaken. The challenged resolution is none other than the judgment. At the preliminary hearing, held on October 2, 2018, the matter was declared of pure law (minute 20:30 of the audio of the preliminary hearing, dated 10/02/2018, at 14:35:52 hours), as there was no evidence to be presented at trial; such that both parties had the opportunity to present conclusions, as they effectively did. The plaintiff did not make any claim when that decision was made. Moreover, it was the plaintiff itself – see minute 20 of the audio – that considered the matter to be of pure law and dispensed with the testimonial and confessional evidence it had offered. Therefore, the appropriate course, given the nature of the matter, recognized by the plaintiff's representative, was the issuance of the judgment. In this, naturally, the corresponding defenses had to be resolved, as well as the merits of the lawsuit (98, second paragraph, 119 and 121 of the CPCA). Thus, there was no advancement whatsoever. What happened is that the holding of a trial was unnecessary, so the court proceeded as ordered by the Code of Procedure, in ordinal 98 ibidem, to which the very party now appealing agreed. The litigants, moreover, were able to present their conclusions prior to the ruling, so there is no helplessness whatsoever. At minute 21:28 of the trial audio, the plaintiff began its closing arguments, without any inconvenience, which lasted for over fourteen minutes (until time 35:44). Therefore, the impropriety of this argument is clear. Finally, regarding the claim that no hearing was granted on the substantive defenses; this is also not admissible. The record contains the resolution of 14 hours 18 minutes of August 24, 2018, in which it was expressly stated: "...the answer to this lawsuit is deemed filed in a timely manner, and the defenses of LACK OF RIGHT, VICTIM'S FAULT, PRESCRIPTION, and EXPIRATION are deemed raised. Regarding the opposition filed, a hearing is granted for THREE BUSINESS DAYS to the plaintiff, who, when referring to it, may offer its counter-evidence (article 70 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code)." The notification certificate to the plaintiff had a positive result and is associated with the electronic file on 09/04/2019 at 16:30:08 hours. Therefore, it is not true that no hearing was granted on the opposing defenses. Furthermore, at the hearing, as already indicated, the plaintiff had full opportunity to address the merits of the matter and the counterparty's defense thesis. Thus, it is clear that the procedural arguments are notoriously unaddressable and inconsistent with what is evident from the record.

V.Substantive reasons. As previously anticipated, the drafting of the appeal is repetitive and, furthermore, lacks the desired clarity and conciseness. Nonetheless, the arguments presented will be summarized below in a concrete manner, avoiding, as much as possible, reiterations and unnecessary digressions, which in no way contribute to an adequate reading of the disagreement, nor of what is resolved here. For a detailed reading of the text, consult the appeal brief. In summary, the appellant considers that the open-ended mortgage that the party making the claim attempted to enforce becomes unenforceable early because the registered instrument lacks the necessary elements for this, such as the “successive installment” and early maturity clauses, interest rates, terms, and payment amounts. It invokes the provisions of canon 409 of the Civil Code, according to which every mortgage and its details must be registered in the corresponding Registry. It also appeals to mandate 465, second paragraph, ibidem. It highlights that this precept establishes the need for the respective entry to indicate, in addition to the general circumstances, the amount of the credit, its terms and conditions, the interest rate, and the date from which they run. It considers it improper for the registered mortgage to be supplemented, for purposes of its early maturity, with the clauses of other contracts that lack registration. In its understanding, this is a custom contrary to Law. It argues that the proper procedure was the signing of addenda to the mortgage, which should have been equally registered, and not to confer mortgage rank on commercial loan contracts, which infringes mandate 166 of the Civil Procedure Code. It reasons that, if proceeding in the manner it considers correct, the corresponding credits would be covered by the preferential guarantee, without having to resort to other guarantee contracts. It considers, moreover, that the Court undertook the analysis of issues that diverge from what has been discussed; for example, by giving general explanations about mortgages, without giving an exact answer to what was submitted for its consideration. It considers that there is no regulatory support that allows integrating a mortgage guarantee with commercial instruments such as a promissory note. It maintains that canon 414, mentioned in the ruling, does not allow it, nor does cardinal 70 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System. Among other norms, it also invokes articles 10, subsection 1, 36, 42, and 43 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, to support the merit of the lawsuit. It states that the conflict is of a civil and not commercial nature, insofar as the non-compliance with legal formalities has been claimed, so it is not appropriate to allude to the restrictive, broad, or intermediate theories of the open instrument. It also reasons that establishing the scope of article 70 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System in relation to ordinal 414 of the Civil Code was not part of the debate either. It disagrees with the ruling's approach regarding the first of those mandates. It argues that a mortgage is executed as an enforcement instrument with preferential rank, whereas the commercial contract is not. It maintains that, through that venue, only a pledge (prenda), mortgage, or mortgage certificates that are duly registered can be enforced. It also highlights that cardinal 64 of the cited banking law contemplates the power of banks to operate and regulate mortgages that guarantee open credits, in accordance with the provisions of canon 414 of the Civil Code. However, it notes: “Note, First Chamber, that the norm specifies that what is being submitted to the framework of action is not the 414 of civil law, but rather the non-compliance with 409 and 465, and also note, Honorable First Chamber, that 414 does not gift or condone any kind of exemption for the open instrument from having to in turn adhere to the requirements of every mortgage under the two main articles of the subject matter.” It considers that the provisions of numeral 414 ejúsdem are subject to the requirements set forth in canons 409 and 465, second paragraph, of that same regulatory body. It refutes that the mortgage instrument contains express clauses regarding early maturity and execution. It believes there are no precise, determined stipulations “dated in time.”

VI.Reference has already been made above to the criterion of the a quo. For what is now of interest, it is important to bear in mind that, for the judges who compose it, the open-ended mortgage under debate does not lack the elements necessary for its early execution, because the parties signing the aforementioned real guarantee contract established that it would be executable in the event of non-compliance with the payments of the guaranteed obligations, under the terms established in them. Thus, the fact that the guaranteed credit had a detailed description of the installments, amounts, and other credit conditions allowed the operability of the guarantee. However, the appellant disagrees with that position, as it believes that each and every element of the guaranteed credit must be registered in order for them to be covered by the aforementioned backing lien. This body has already had the opportunity to address this very issue. As has been done on other occasions, it is essential, first, to refer to the institute of the open-ended mortgage, understood as a special type of real guarantee right. In that order of ideas, its legal regulation is found in canon 414 of the Civil Code, a norm located in Book II (“Of Property and the Extent and Modifications of Property”), Title VI (“Of Mortgage and Pledge”), Chapter I (“Of Mortgage”), of that regulatory body. Its text is as follows: “A mortgage constituted for an open credit with a sum limit guarantees the amounts delivered at any time and for diverse purposes, provided they do not exceed the pre-set sum. Any payment made by the debtor will automatically create availability to be used in the manner agreed upon by the parties.” Now, as can be seen, it is a particular type of mortgage, because, in this case, the guarantee can back a plurality of “amounts delivered at any time and for diverse purposes.” It is clear that the norm refers to the mortgage backing of various credits, even those subsequent to the constitution of the lien. Otherwise, the open-ended guarantee would have no reason to exist, as it would be totally subject to a particular operation and not to an indeterminate amount of financings, as provided by law, which can be granted, even for diverse purposes. Now, the reading of that mandate must be carried out with attention to the hermeneutical parameters of canon 10 of the Civil Code. This establishes that: “Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose.” In that sense, given the plaintiff's arguments, it is necessary to determine if it is consistent with the purpose - ratio legis - of the regulation of the open-ended mortgage, as well as with the social reality in which it is used, to understand that both the interest rate and the payment modality of the guaranteed credits must be determined from the moment the open-ended mortgage is constituted, or else registered at the time each of those financial operations intended to be backed by the lien opened on the guaranteeing property arises. To answer this question, the institute in question must be associated with its use in the national banking sphere. To this effect, article 64 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (or LOSBN hereinafter), expressly contemplates "...the power of each bank to operate and regulate mortgages that guarantee open credits, in accordance with the provisions of article 414 of the Civil Code.” This precept is mentioned in the appeal. However, it is clear that the appellant does not give it its correct dimension, by relating it to canons 409 and 465 of the same code. The mandate under analysis contemplates the use of this instrument as a financial tool that can be used by the banks that make up the National Banking System, such as the Banco Nacional. It cannot be ignored that financial entities handle various lines of credit, each with its own conditions and purposes, which is a notorious fact in an economic context like the current one, where a multiplicity of banking organizations offers different financing options for the highly varied purposes that economic agents may pursue in the market.

Thus, for example, bank customers have access to financial products for the purchase and construction of real estate, acquisition of vehicles and other movable goods, development of agricultural, industrial, commercial, tourism or any other type of business projects (whether the borrowers are micro, small, medium or large enterprises), consolidation of other loans, discretionary use, among many other options. Consequently and logically, there are multiple factors that, with regard to each of the offered lines, are considered by the financial institution to determine the applicable interest rates, the term of the financing, the form of payment, as well as the periodicity and amount of the payments to principal and interest. Article 130 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, establishes the following: “The payment of the principal, interest, commissions and other charges of the loans granted by the Mortgage Departments, shall be agreed upon in fixed periodic installments, payable in periods of no less than one month nor more than one year, which shall include said payments proportionally according to the mathematical tables that the departments shall calculate for these purposes. In the judgment of the Board of Directors of each bank, the installments shall be charged in advance or for periods in arrears. The debtor shall have the right to pay all or part of his debt in advance, but the departments shall not be obliged to return interest, commissions or other charges that have been paid in advance”. It should be noted, in accordance with the transcribed regulation, the different mortgage loans have their own conditions. In addition, Article 128 of this same regulatory body contemplates the power of the Banco Central to fix, when it deems it necessary: “(...) 1) The maximum interest rates, commission and other charges that they may charge to their debtors”. Likewise, the interest rates that banks recognize to their investors are also variable over time (e.g., numerals 497 of the Código de Comercio and 1163 of the Código Civil). Thus, it is evident that the interpretation of the financial system's regulations cannot be carried out without taking into account the inherent dynamism of the market and credit relations. Therefore, this Court finds no reason in the plaintiff's arguments, insofar as they intend for the open-end mortgage (hipoteca abierta) to be conceived as a rigid and inflexible instrument, which must be modified, at the registry level, each time it is used as security for a different loan, despite the fact that it has been established as a tool that allows the financing of various fundings and for equally varied purposes, by the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. In line with the criterion expressed by the lower court (a quo), then, this Chamber considers that these elements must be determined in the documents that constitute the guaranteed transactions, as happened in this case. Otherwise, it is reiterated, the open-end mortgage would truly lack the utility it possesses; because it would be limited to a single transaction, which would have to have fixed, from the start, unique conditions enforceable throughout the entire term. That is, the mortgage would not be open-end, but ordinary. Nor does it make sense to require new registrations as the amounts guaranteed by the mortgage are being granted. It should be noted, the registration of the encumbrance satisfies the registry publicity that is required, so that the existence of the lien and the existing relationship between the bank and its client can be of public knowledge and known to interested third parties. What the appellant proposes would be exactly the same as, each time a new loan is granted, an ordinary mortgage is modified. Evidently, the logic of the open-end mortgage facilitates the economic and legal relationship that the bank establishes with its clientele, allowing the latter to have access to new loans, without having to grant a new guarantee, since it is sufficient, for these purposes, to associate the loan to the one that was already constituted and consented to for such purpose. Let it be remembered that registry publicity is indispensable for a legal act to have effect against third parties; but not so between the parties (numeral 455 of the Código Civil). In such manner, if the bank and the consumer agree to associate one of their transactions to an open-end guarantee, there is no obstacle whatsoever for it to be used. Nor are the interests of third parties harmed, because the registry publicity warns them, precisely, that there is a preferential encumbrance, which is liable up to a determined amount, in the constituting deed. In this case, for seven hundred thousand dollars (proven fact one). In this order of ideas, whoever had an interest in acquiring any right over the property, knows of the existence of a guarantee of this type. For this same reason, the argument put forward by the plaintiff is also unacceptable, in saying that custom has been given a value superior to the law, because the practice of backing, with the same open-end mortgage, loans that are documented in separate instruments, in which their various specific conditions are set, in aspects such as interest rates, amount and frequency of partial payments, is, in no way, contrary to the law. On the contrary, the customary banking practice (práctica consuetudinaria bancaria) constitutes a legitimate source of commercial and banking law, which complements the commented regulation. The foregoing, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Código de Comercio, which provides the following in this regard: “Commercial customs shall serve not only to supplement the silence of the law, but also as a rule for appreciating the meaning of commercial words or technical terms used in commercial acts or contracts”. It is worth noting that, although the appellant tries to disregard the relationship of this matter with the norms of the Código de Comercio, it is evident that they are mistaken. Banking activity is, above all, commercial. In fact, Article 4 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, refers to the “commercial banks of the State”. Thus, it is impossible to dissociate, as the appellant wants, the norms, principles and sources of Commercial Law, from the operation of the open-end mortgage, even when this is regulated in the Código Civil. What the appellant seeks is to make a merely formalistic thesis prevail, regarding the registration of the mortgage, totally independent from the context of its application, which is contrary to the exegetical and hermeneutical parameters contained in cardinal 10 ibidem. Incidentally, the Código de Comercio itself allows the application of the regulations of the Código Civil, insofar as it is necessary to respond to questions that the Commercial Code does not expressly regulate (numeral 2 ibidem), as is the use of the mortgage to guarantee commercial transactions, coupled with the express provision of ordinal 64 of the LOSBN. Finally, it must be said, it is not true that the contract for the constitution of the mortgage guarantee lacks regulations referring to aspects such as the interest rate, payment conditions, and acceleration (vencimiento anticipado). What occurs is that these are adjusted, precisely, to the nature of the open-end mortgage because, although they contain a schedule in this regard, it does not definitively determine the conditions of each transaction, but rather provides that, in each case, they must be defined, in the corresponding documents. In this regard, it is opportune to transcribe some of the contractual stipulations. According to the second proven fact, not refuted, in the contract it reads, in what is of interest now, the following: “B) REPAYMENT: The debtor accepts that for each transaction constituted under this Open-End Mortgage, the repayment will be made according to the form agreed with the client, depending on the activity to be financed and the Investment plan, whether monthly, bimonthly, quarterly, semi-annual or annual, likewise the term. The amortizations create immediate availability to be used again, in the manner agreed between the parties. The non-payment of the loans guaranteed with this open-end mortgage or of the interest in the originally agreed form of one or several transactions shall render the mortgage guarantee that covers the Open-End Mortgage due and enforceable. THE DEBTOR has been informed and warned and consequently accepts, that the disbursements of this loan shall be made in accordance with the availability of funds of the Creditor (...) C) INVESTMENT PLAN: OPENING OF OPEN-END MORTGAGE. All activities and investment plans established in the credit regulations of the Banco Nacional may be financed, to meet the applicant's need for resources as agreed in each loan guaranteed with this open-end mortgage. D) DISBURSEMENT OF THE LOAN: The disbursement shall be for each derived transaction in accordance with the activity to be financed, the investment plan and in accordance with the usual practice of the Bank. (...) INTEREST RATE: The debtor accepts that the ordinary interest shall be those that govern for each type of loan, in force at the date of formalization for the activity being financed and according to the type of currency. It shall be revised and adjustable monthly, payable in advance or in the manner stipulated by the credit product. (...) G) DEFAULT INTEREST: The debtor recognizes default interest at the same rate as the ordinary interest of each derived loan, plus two percentage points, calculated on the amount of the delayed payment, in accordance with the provisions of article seventy of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional. (...) L) GUARANTEE: (...) that as a guarantee of payment of the loans that are approved and formalized for each case, their ordinary and default interest at the indicated rates, maintenance costs, expenses for insurance policies, expenses corresponding to the collection management, costs of the eventual legal proceedings, and all other expenses incurred by the creditor for the collection of the Loan and the fulfillment of all obligations deriving from any transaction granted under this loan, a FIRST-DEGREE OPEN-END MORTGAGE is constituted in favor of BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA during the agreed term over the following properties of the Partido de Puntarenas: I) folio real registration number SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY-THREE-ZERO ZERO ZERO (...) With a legal liability to be registered of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. II) Folio Real registration number ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO-ZERO ZERO ZERO (...) With a legal liability to be registered of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. I (…) Q) ACCELERATION: In addition to the situations mentioned in this deed, the Creditor may deem the entire debt due and immediately enforceable; which the debtor accepts expressly and irrevocably; in the cases: (...) d) If the debtor stops paying a loan or the interest or any sum that must be paid under the respective documents (...) the Creditor, upon its sole statement, may deem the obligation due and enforceable executively and demand its total and immediate cancellation in accordance with the provisions of articles four hundred twenty of the Código de Comercio and seventy of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, by the means it deems convenient, without the need for demands or other prior requirements. T) OTHER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS: (...) b) For each sub-loan derived from the Loan, a commercial contract must be executed with the credit conditions of the product in force at the time of formalization, such as, the amount of the sub-loan, term, form of payment, form of delivery, investment plan, interest, commissions, among others, commercial contracts that will be deemed incorporated into this mortgage document for all legal purposes. c) The debtor undertakes to unconditionally comply with all the clauses and terms specified for each loan and in case of breach of any of them, the totality of the transactions covered by this open-end mortgage shall be deemed due and the total cancellation of the same shall be demanded. d) The lack of payment of any installment of one or all of the loans covered by this open-end mortgage or of the interest, commissions or any other amounts that the debtor must pay shall render the entirety of the Loan enforceable by the creditor. e) This Open-End Loan is granted under the modality of Open-End Mortgage, it being the case that the debtor may make use of it by adjusting to the respective investment project approved in each case at the sole discretion of the creditor institutions\". It is noted, it is evident that the mortgage title does have clear stipulations, in accordance with its nature, regarding interest, payment conditions and grounds for acceleration. The scheduling was totally clear. It would be, in each transaction linked to the mortgage, that these particular characteristics would be set. For this purpose, it was established, with total clarity, that the respective commercial contracts had to be executed, which would be considered incorporated into the open-end mortgage. It is also noted that the parties agreed that, upon the debtor's breach, the creditor could accelerate the term and demand the total cancellation of the loan, “in accordance with the provisions of articles four hundred twenty of the Código de Comercio and seventy of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional”. These latter precepts, precisely, contemplate the acceleration of this type of obligations (payable in installments) before the non-payment of one or more loan installments, in the commercial and financial spheres. Therefore, any lack of provision or illegitimacy is also ruled out, concerning the acceleration of the mortgage in the event of non-payment of the guaranteed transactions.

VII.It is also necessary to respond to what the appellant stated, by arguing that the mortgage has a privileged means of execution, which unregistered commercial contracts do not enjoy. They are also not correct in this regard. It is worth recognizing that numeral 166 of the Código Procesal Civil establishes the admissibility of the mortgage and pledge execution process, in the following terms: “Common and certificate mortgages, as well as duly registered pledges, constitute executory titles with waiver of procedures to enforce the privilege over the encumbered property or, where appropriate, over the insurance sum, as well as to enforce all personal guarantees, which shall be understood as limited to the uncovered balance”. On the other hand, the payment order procedure (proceso monitorio) is the legally provided means for the collection of a negotiable instrument such as a promissory note, insofar as it contains a monetary, liquid and enforceable obligation, supported by documentation. Article 110.1 of the Código Procesal Civil so regulates it. Now, Article 68 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, provides for the existence of “principal or additional” guarantees. Consequently, there is no legal impediment whatsoever for the same transaction to have guarantees of a different nature, such as a promissory note and a mortgage. Therefore, once the non-compliance with the obligation guaranteed with a real guarantee is verified, there is no reason to disregard its enforceability, through the corresponding legal means. From this perspective, the fact that, on the occasion of the loans backed by the mortgage, a document identified as “promissory note” is also signed, in no way distorts the relationship of the obligation with the open-end mortgage, nor does it prevent its operation, as long as the consumer has freely and informedly consented to the backing of their debt with the real guarantee in question. All in accordance with the fundamental right to information and security of consumers of financial products, established in numeral 46 of the Carta Magna, as well as in Article 32, subsection c, of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor. Eventually, it could be discussed whether the so-called promissory note, as such, contains or not an unconditional, pure and simple promise of payment, or not, in the terms of Articles 799 and 800 of the Código de Comercio. However, what is relevant, for this litigation, is that both parties agreed to the granting of a credit transaction backed by the open-end mortgage, with its specific conditions duly established, in accordance with its nature, as already explained, which the plaintiff has not been able to refute in this litigation. From that point of view, there is no plausible reason to decree that the open-end mortgage consented to by the plaintiff does not mature until the year 2039. Nor is there any defect in what the parties agreed, nor is a violation of the regulations invoked in the appeal perceived, because it is clear that what was agreed is fully consistent with the nature of the open-end mortgage, for which clear and explicit stipulations were established in the act constituting the guarantee, the content and scope of which the plaintiff and debtor cannot now disregard. By doing so, it is clear, they assume a position contrary to the duties of contractual good faith. At bottom, what is perceived is an attempt to evade the legal consequences of a contractual breach, which constitutes an abusive position that the legal operator cannot endorse (canons 20 and 22 of the Código Civil). In the identical sense, consult judgment of the Sala Primera de la Corte no. 948-F-S1-2022 of 08 hours 12 minutes of May 5, 2022.

VIII.By virtue of the reasons set forth, the rejection of the formulated appeal on cassation (recurso de casación) is warranted. As the appellant party, in the judgment of this Chamber, lacks sufficient cause to appeal, they are ordered to bear the costs of the appeal (canon 150.3 of the CPCA), which shall be settled in the sentence execution phase, in order to guarantee the right of defense of the executed party, granting them the respective hearing on the settlement presented (articles 41 and 153 of the Constitución Política).

POR TANTO

The appeal filed is declared without merit, with its costs to be borne by the plaintiff party. DRUDIN.

 LUIS GUILLERMO RIVAS LOAICIGA - MAGISTRADO/A  CARLOS GUILLERMO ZAMORA CAMPOS - MAGISTRADO/A  JORGE LEIVA POVEDA - MAGISTRADO/A San José, at nine hours and five minutes on the sixth of February, two thousand twenty-five.

In the ordinary proceeding, filed by **HOTEL POSADA CLARO DE LUNA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA**, legal entity identification number 3-101-280320, represented by its general attorney-in-fact without limit of sum, Mr. Johnny Guzmán Zamora, holder of identity card 2-384-205; against **BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA**, legal entity identification number 4-000-001021, represented by its general attorney-in-fact without limit of sum, Mr. Juan Carlos Corrales Salas, identity card 1-481-093; Licenciado Gerardo José Bouzid Jiménez, special judicial attorney for the plaintiff, filed a cassation appeal challenging judgment number 08-2022-VII, issued at 08 hours 40 minutes on February 3, 2022, by the Seventh Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, composed of the judges Alinne Solano Ramírez, Francisco Hidalgo Rueda, and Gustavo Irías Obando.

**Reporting Magistrate Jorge Leiva Poveda** **CONSIDERANDO** **I.** The complaint was filed on May 24, 2018. In summary, the plaintiff alleged that, in public deed no. 89-4, granted before notary public Karla Fuentes Marín at 10 hours on April 30, 2009, a first-degree open mortgage (hipoteca abierta) was constituted in favor of the defendant entity, for a term of three hundred sixty months, maturing on April 30, 2039. Now, the plaintiff alleged that the mortgage's registration did not contain the description of all the elements established by the legal system for its early execution (ejecución anticipada), such as the payment tracts, the amount of the installments, their periodicity, the specific interest rate for the credit, and the grounds for acceleration (causales de vencimiento anticipado). According to its account, the bank attempted to supplement the mortgage with a promissory note (pagaré), which is of a different nature and lacks registration. In that sense, it was highlighted, for example, that in the constitution of the mortgage it was established that the term of the guaranteed credits would be defined in the respective contract (eleventh fact) and that acceleration could occur upon non-payment of any credit, under the "respective documents." It considers such a thing to be improper. Among other reasons, because the mortgage has a different enforcement route from the promissory note (pagaré), which is collected through a payment order proceeding (proceso monitorio). Also part of its thesis was that, pursuant to canon 41 of the Commercial Code, it is not possible to "imply" a commercial contract with a civil one that requires specific formalities for its validity; and even less so, to attempt to enforce them jointly (image 22 of the initial pleading). It stated that it did not understand that both the promissory note (pagaré) it signed on April 30, 2009 – no. 198200 – and the aforementioned mortgage, were security for the same bank loan; instead, it considered it to be paperwork. It also highlighted that linking a promissory note (pagaré) to a mortgage in this way distorts the former's nature as an unconditional guarantee of payment, which is improper. From that perspective, it said that within the promissory note (pagaré), it was indicated that the credit would be guaranteed by the already-mentioned open mortgage (hipoteca abierta), such that the negotiable instrument (título valor) lost all its value as an enforcement title (título ejecutivo) (image 25 of the digital file dated 05/24/2018). The plaintiff company also argued that its representation had understood that when commercial contracts arose and were signed, they replaced the mortgage guarantee (garantía hipotecaria). In this regard, it stated that the difference in the term between the mortgage and the promissory note (pagaré) generated uncertainty in this respect. It alleged that it is not permissible to enforce two or more guarantees, as the financial entity sought in the collection venue; that is, in the preventive arrangement proceeding (proceso de convenio preventivo) processed under case file 11-100148-0297-CI, in which it attempted to demand payment of the debt contained in the mortgage credit. Along those lines, the plaintiff alleged that, because it lacked the information necessary for this, the mortgage that was attempted to be executed became unenforceable. The claims raised are as follows: *"1. I request that the present complaint be admitted and the due transfer be given to the defendant party. 2. I request that it be declared that mortgage No. 88-4 signed before notary Karla Fuentes Marín, signed at 10 hours on April 30, 2009, has its contractual maturity until April 30, 2039, and that payment thereof must be made at that time. 3. I request that the Lack of Enforceability be declared regarding the mortgage document signed in deed No. 89-4, signed before notary Karla Fuentes Marín, signed at 10 hours on April 30, 2009, in which a mortgage credit was constituted that is being settled irregularly and that contains no clause referring to payment in successive tracts. 4. I request that it be declared with retroactive effect that the maturity of the debt arose with the mortgage credit contract of April 30, 2009, and that it be declared that all payments made by my represented party to BNCR must be returned to the debtor on the basis that the term of the sole credit document matures until April 30, 2039. 5. I request that all default interest (intereses moratorios) accrued from April 30, 2009, onward be declared completely extinguished and also prescribed. 6. That the defendant be ordered to pay the costs of both parties in this proceeding. 7. The cancellation of the mortgage entry visible under citations 2009-111188-01-0001-001 be ordered and that said credit document be deemed cancelled on the basis that it was substituted by the commercial contracts which were signed, subscribed, and adhered to on dates subsequent to the main contract. Failing the above, we request that the cited contract be judicially ordered modified, providing for registration and modifying therein the following clauses: THIRD: CURRENT INTEREST (INTERESES CORRIENTES) – MODIFICATION OF CURRENT INTEREST (INTERESES CORRIENTES) – FOURTH: DEFAULT INTEREST (INTERESES MORATORIOS) – THIRTEENTH: ACCELERATION (VENCIMIENTO ANTICIPADO), so that they become completely null"*. The defendant entity opposed the complaint and raised the defenses of "prescription or expiration (prescripción o caducidad)" and lack of right. At the preliminary hearing held on October 2, 2018, the parties rendered their conclusions, as the matter was one of pure law, in that there was no evidence to be taken at trial. In the appealed judgment, the exception of "prescription or expiration (prescripción o caducidad)" was rejected, and the defense of lack of right was upheld. Consequently, the complaint was declared without merit in all its aspects.

Costs were imposed on the plaintiff. Disagreeing, its representation files a cassation appeal.

II.Brief consideration on the structure of the cassation judgment. In this resolution, the parties' preceding arguments, as well as their grievances, are succinctly summarized, in such a way that their main aspects are pointed out, without prejudice to the complete reading that has been made of the accessory arguments, as well as the diverse reasonings that develop the central ideas of the presentation – e.g., argumentative reiterations, meticulous accounts of procedural events, personal opinions, doctrinal and jurisprudential citations, among other similar drafting elements, all of which can be consulted in detail in the corresponding brief –; all, in order to promote a better reading and attention to the grievances, under the protection and in observance of what is ordered in canon 61.2 of the Código Procesal Civil, by providing that: “The second instance and cassation judgments shall include a brief summary of the aspects debated in the appealed resolution and of the appellants' arguments”. Said mandate is of supplementary application in the contentious-administrative process, regarding the structure of the judgment, in accordance with canon 220 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

III.Grievances. Before alluding to the grievances set forth, it must be noted that the appeal is repetitive. The text contains the following sections: "1. The resolution of exceptions resolves the merits of the claims of the complaint…” (image 3); "2. An exception was resolved without giving a hearing to the opposing party so that it could plead what is pertinent…” (image 3); "3. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO GRANT THE LACK OF RIGHT EXCEPTION”; "Of the Lack of Right of the Judgment” (image 5); "Considering V on applicable regulations”; "4. The appellate court has violated due process by advancing an opinion…” (folio 11); "5. The decision is not motivated” (image 11). However, in line with the warning previously made, the reproaches gleaned from a reading are set forth below, avoiding unnecessary reiterations. From now on, it must be noted that clarity, order, and precision is a burden that whoever files a challenge must observe, so that, although this Chamber, shedding unnecessary formalisms, proceeds to the analysis of the objections, it does so to the extent that the drafting reasonably allows it. Thus, the censures consist of the following topics. Claims of a procedural nature. a. The judgment is not motivated, with respect to the granting of the lack of right exception, such that the reason for it is not understood. (image 11). b. There is a violation of due process, since the Court advanced an opinion. The appellant disagrees that the a quo, instead of limiting itself to the resolution of the preliminary exceptions, referred to the merits of the claims. It considers that such a procedure is precipitous, since only the preliminary hearing has elapsed, so that a pronouncement should only have been issued on interlocutory issues (images 3 and 11). c. Defenselessness (indefensión) was caused, as the plaintiff was not granted a hearing on the exceptions raised; specifically, on what was argued by the defendant on August 22, 2018.

IV.None of the objections on procedural form are admissible. Regarding the lack of motivation, concerning the granting of the lack of right, this is totally misguided. Cassation jurisprudence has already repeatedly pointed out that such anomaly occurs when the jurisdictional body omits to express the reasons that motivate its decision, or when those it indicates are seriously contradictory or incomprehensible, which ends up producing the same effect, that is, the impossibility for the parties – and the legal community, in general – to understand the resolution. This harms the justice of the specific case, as it prevents the party harmed by the decision from being able to appeal it, by not knowing its foundations. Likewise, the defect in question is harmful beyond the limits of the particular conflict, as it removes from the judgment the clarity required, so that the transparency and publicity of the jurisdictional function can be subject to legitimate popular and institutional control mechanisms. In this way, the adequate grounds for decisions stand as a guarantee of the principle of the prohibition of arbitrariness, contemplated in canon 11 of the Constitución Política, projected, at the legal level, in canon 11 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. On the subject, consult, among many others, the resolutions of the Sala Primera no. 484 of 10 hours 30 minutes of August 12, 2003; 195 of 09 hours 10 minutes of March 8, 2018; 316-F-S1-2021 of 11 hours 55 minutes of February 11, 2021; 1750-F-S1-2021 of 13 hours 58 minutes of October 12, 2021. Now, it must also be mentioned that the right is one of the necessary material preconditions for issuing any ruling upholding a claim. In short, it consists of the legal system supporting the legal situation sought to be protected in the complaint; whether its judicial declaration or constitution is sought. Generally, it will be the person filing the complaint – whether personally, or through representation – who must hold ownership of the legal situation subject to the process; although there are exceptional circumstances in which this is not the case, as occurs, for example, in the oblique action, where a creditor exercises the action in protection of a right of its debtor, which benefits it mediately, in order to satisfy its credit. (numeral 715 of the Código Civil). Now, in addition to the right, standing (legitimación) – in its active and passive modalities – as well as the current interest, must necessarily be reviewed ex officio. This means that, if the Court detects that any of these preconditions are not present in the specific case, it is not appropriate to uphold the complaint. Consult, in this regard, among many others, the votes of the Chamber no. 1424-F-S1-2022 of 11 hours 40 minutes of August 18, 2022, 592-F-S1-2023 of 10 hours 32 minutes of April 20, 2023, and 236-F-S1-2023 of 09 hours 25 minutes of February 23, 2023. In this order of ideas, if the Court develops various reasons, throughout the judgment, to justify what grounds, in its opinion, the legal system does not uphold the claims raised – for reasons not corresponding to a lack of standing or interest, which warrant their own explanation – it is evident that it thus justifies the lack of right; especially if, upon rejecting said defense, it makes an explicit reference to the reasons contained in the pronouncement, to justify the rejection of the complaint. This is precisely what has occurred in the instant case. In that sense, in considering VIII of the judgment, it reads in this regard: “Regarding the lack of right, by virtue of what has been explained by the Court in the previous sections, the cited exception must be granted, due to the total inadmissibility of the complaint”. Thus, what must be paid attention to is the justification that the a quo gave for rejecting the complaint.

The answer is found in Considerando VII. In sum, the reasoning that led the judges to deny the claims consists of the following points. 1) In the act constituting the open mortgage, both parties agreed that the failure to pay each of the commercial loans guaranteed by the mortgage, in accordance with the conditions set forth in each one, would give rise to the early maturity of the guarantee. It transcribed clauses of the contract to conclude that it did contain clear and precise stipulations regarding the enforceability of the mortgage in case of default. 2) In the mortgage deed, an express linkage of the mortgage was established with a commercial loan granted to the defendant at that time, which contained the corresponding conditions, known to the parties. In that regard, it highlighted that the aforementioned public instrument established that: "…for each operation constituted under this Open Mortgage, repayment shall be made according to the form agreed with the client, depending on the activity to be financed". From that statement, it inferred that the parties voluntarily referred the provisions related to the payment of the credit to the stipulations contained in the contracts that would arise and be backed by said open guarantee. 3) Article 414 enables the constitution of a mortgage for an open credit, which is complemented by the clauses of each loan. 4) The contracts signed by the parties, related to credit operation no. 57-15-30485326, establish a clearly detailed table of the sums to be paid each month, which is complemented by the other clauses of the loan mortgage. 5) The plaintiff itself, in its claims, acknowledges that the mortgage is a central guarantee contract that was extended by others that depend on the principal credit opening agreement and are supported by the same guarantee. 6) Regarding the request to declare the interest prescribed, it was indicated that this is not appropriate since there is no record of a final resolution having been issued in the preventive arrangement (convenio preventivo) proceeding instituted by the plaintiff, processed under file number 11-100148-0297-CI. Thus, it is the Court's criterion that, pursuant to article 723 of Law No. 7130 – applicable to that insolvency proceeding – no statute of limitations period runs while said judicial matter is pending. As is clear, the judgment does contain, then, multiple reasons why the claim was considered admissible and not the exception of lack of right. Therefore, any lack of reasoning in this regard is dismissed. Next, there is no advance of any criterion, due to the fact that the ruling contains a pronouncement on the merits of the matter. The appellant considers that it could only refer to the preliminary exceptions. It is mistaken. The challenged ruling is none other than the judgment. At the preliminary hearing, held on October 2, 2018, the matter was declared purely a matter of law (minute 20:30 of the audio of the preliminary hearing, dated 02/10/2018, at 14:35:52 hours), as there was no evidence to be presented at trial; thus, both parties had the opportunity to present conclusions, as they indeed did. The plaintiff did not raise any objection when that decision was made. Moreover, it was the plaintiff itself – see minute 20 of the audio – that considered the matter to be purely a matter of law and dispensed with the testimonial and confession evidence it had offered. Therefore, what was appropriate, given the nature of the matter, recognized by the plaintiff's representative, was the issuance of the judgment. In this, naturally, the corresponding exceptions had to be resolved, as well as the admissibility of the claim on the merits (98, second paragraph, 119 and 121 of the CPCA). Thus, there was no advance whatsoever. What happened was that holding a trial was unnecessary, so the court proceeded as ordered by the Code of Procedure, in article 98 ibidem, with which the same party now appealing agreed. The litigants, moreover, were able to present their conclusions prior to the ruling, so there is no defenselessness whatsoever. At minute 21:28 of the trial audio, the plaintiff began its closing arguments without any problem, which lasted for more than fourteen minutes (up to time 35:44). Therefore, the inadmissibility of this argument is clear. Finally, regarding the claim that no hearing was granted on the merits-based exceptions; this is also unacceptable. The record contains the resolution issued at 14 hours 18 minutes on August 24, 2018, in which it was expressly stated: "…the present claim is deemed answered in time and form, and the exceptions of LACK OF RIGHT, VICTIM'S FAULT, PRESCRIPTION and LAPSE are deemed filed. Regarding the opposition filed, a hearing is granted for THREE WORKING DAYS to the plaintiff, who when referring to it may offer its counter-evidence (article 70 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code)". The notification record to the plaintiff had a positive result and is recorded as associated with the electronic file on 04/09/2019 at 16:30:08. Therefore, it is not true that no hearing was granted on the exceptions raised. Furthermore, at the hearing, as already indicated, the plaintiff had full opportunity to address the merits of the matter and the counterparty's defense theory. Thus, it is clear that the procedural arguments are notoriously untenable and inconsistent with what is evident from the record.

**V. Substantive reasons.** As already anticipated, the drafting of the appeal is repetitive and, furthermore, lacks the desired clarity and conciseness. Nevertheless, the arguments presented will be summarized below, in a concrete manner, avoiding, as far as possible, unnecessary reiterations and digressions, which in no way contribute to an adequate reading of the disagreement, nor of what is resolved here. For a detailed reading of the text, consult the appeal brief. In sum, the appellant considers that the open mortgage that the plaintiff has sought to execute becomes unenforceable in advance, because the registered title does not contain the necessary elements for this, such as the "successive tract" and early maturity clauses, interest rates, terms, and payment amounts. It invokes the provisions of article 409 of the Civil Code, according to which every mortgage and its details must be registered in the corresponding Registry. It also appeals to provision 465, second paragraph, ibidem. It highlights that this precept establishes the need for the respective entry to indicate, in addition to the general circumstances, the amount of the credit, its terms and conditions, the interest rate, and the date from which it runs. It deems it inadmissible for the registered mortgage to be complemented, for purposes of its early maturity, with the clauses of other contracts that are not registered. According to its understanding, this is a custom contrary to the Law. It argues that the appropriate course would have been the signing of addenda to the mortgage, which should also be registered, and not granting mortgage rank to commercial loan contracts, which infringes provision 166 of the Civil Procedural Code. It reasons that, if proceeding in the manner it considers correct, the corresponding credits would be covered by the preferential guarantee, without having to resort to other guarantee contracts. It considers, moreover, that the Court engaged in the analysis of issues that diverge from what has been discussed; for example, by making general explanations about the mortgage, without giving an exact answer to what was submitted to its knowledge. It considers that there is no normative support that allows integrating a mortgage guarantee with commercial instruments such as a promissory note. It maintains that article 414, mentioned in the judgment, does not permit it, nor does article 70 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System. Among other norms, it also invokes articles 10, subsection 1, 36, 42, and 43 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, to support the admissibility of the claim.

It argues that the conflict is civil in nature and not commercial, insofar as the claim concerns the breach of legal formalities, and therefore it is not appropriate to refer to the restrictive, broad, or intermediate theories of the open-ended title (título abierto). It also reasons that the debate did not include establishing the scope of Article 70 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional), in relation to Article 414 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). It disagrees with the approach of the decision, with respect to the first of those mandates. It argues that a mortgage is executed as an enforcement title (título de ejecución) with preferential rank, whereas a commercial contract is not. It maintains that, through that avenue, only a duly registered pledge, mortgage, or mortgage certificates (cédulas hipotecarias) may be executed. It further highlights that Article 64 of the cited banking law contemplates the power of banks to operate and regulate mortgages that secure open credits (créditos abiertos), in accordance with the provisions of Article 414 of the Civil Code. However, it notes: “Let the First Chamber (Sala Primera) note that the norm specifies that what is being submitted to the framework for action is not Article 414 of civil law, but the breach of Articles 409 and 465, and let the Honorable First Chamber also note that Article 414 does not gift or waive for the open-ended title any kind of exemption from having in turn to comply with the requirements of every mortgage in the two main articles on the subject.” It considers that the provisions of Article 414 are, in turn, subject to the requirements set forth in Articles 409 and 465, second paragraph, of that same normative body. It refutes that the mortgage title contains express clauses regarding acceleration (vencimiento anticipado) and enforcement. It deems that there are no precise, determined stipulations “fixed in time.”

VI.Reference has already been made to the criterion of the lower court (a quo). For present purposes, it should be borne in mind that, for the judges composing it, the open mortgage (hipoteca abierta) under debate does not lack the necessary elements for its acceleration, since the subscribing parties to the referenced real guarantee contract established that it would be enforceable, in the event of non-payment of the secured obligations, under the terms established therein. Thus, the fact that the secured credit contained a detailed description of the installments, amounts, and other credit conditions allowed the operability of the guarantee. However, the appellant disagrees with that position, as it deems that each and every element of the secured credit must be registered in order to be covered by the referenced backup lien. This body has already had occasion to address the same issue raised. As has been done on other occasions, it is essential, first of all, to make a reference to the institution of the open mortgage, understood as a special type of real security right (derecho real de garantía) of guarantee. In that order of ideas, its legal regulation is found in Article 414 of the Civil Code, a norm located in Book II (“Of Property and the Extent and Modifications of Property” [“De los Bienes y de la Extensión y Modificaciones de la Propiedad”]), Title VI (“Of Mortgage and Pledge” [“De la Hipoteca y de la Prenda”]), Chapter I (“Of Mortgage” [“De la Hipoteca”]), of that normative body. Its text is as follows: “A mortgage constituted for an open credit with a sum limitation guarantees the amounts delivered at any time and for various purposes, provided they do not exceed the preset sum. Any payment made by the debtor will automatically create availability to be used in the manner agreed by the parties.” Now, as can be seen, it is a particular kind of mortgage, since, in this case, the guarantee can secure a plurality of “amounts delivered at any time and for various purposes.” It is clear that the norm refers to the mortgage backing of various credits, even those subsequent to the constitution of the lien. Otherwise, the open guarantee would have no reason to exist, as it would be entirely tied to a particular transaction and not to an indeterminate number of financings, as provided by law, which may be granted even for diverse purposes. Now, the reading of that mandate must be carried out with attention to the hermeneutical parameters of Article 10 of the Civil Code. This establishes that: “Norms shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, historical and legislative antecedents, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, attending fundamentally to their spirit and purpose.” In that sense, in view of the plaintiff’s arguments, it is necessary to determine whether it is in accordance with the purpose – ratio legis – of the regulation of the open mortgage, as well as with the social reality in which it is used, to understand that both the interest rate and the payment method of the secured credits must be determined from the moment the open mortgage is constituted, or else registered at the moment each of those financial operations that are intended to be secured by the lien opened on the guarantor property arises. To answer such a question, the institution in question must be associated with its use in the national banking sphere. To that effect, Article 64 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (or LOSBN hereinafter) expressly contemplates “…the power of each bank to operate and regulate mortgages that secure open credits, in accordance with the provisions of Article 414 of the Civil Code.” This precept is mentioned in the appeal. However, it is clear that the appellant does not give it its correct dimension, by relating it to Articles 409 and 465 of the same code. The mandate under analysis contemplates the use of that instrument as a financial tool that can be used by the banks that make up the National Banking System, such as the Banco Nacional. It cannot be overlooked that financial entities manage various credit lines, each with its own conditions and purposes, which constitutes a notorious fact in an economic context like the current one, where a multiplicity of banking organizations offer different financing options for the highly varied purposes that economic agents may pursue in the market. Thus, for example, bank clients have access to financial products for the purchase and construction of real estate, acquisition of vehicles and other movable goods, development of agricultural, industrial, commercial, tourism business projects or of any other kind (whether the borrowers are micro, small, medium, or large companies), consolidation (refundición) of other credits, discretionary use, among many other options.

Consequently and logically, there are multiple factors that, with respect to each of the lines offered, are considered by the financial institution to determine the applicable interest rates, the term of the financing, the form of payment, as well as the frequency and amount of the payments toward principal and interest. Article 130 of the *Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional* provides the following: *"Payment of the principal, interest, commissions, and other charges of the loans granted by the Mortgage Departments shall be agreed upon in fixed periodic installments, payable in periods of no less than one month nor more than one year, which shall comprise said payments proportionally in accordance with the mathematical tables that the departments shall calculate for such purposes. In the judgment of the Board of Directors of each bank, the installments shall be collected in advance or in arrears. The debtor shall have the right to prepay all or part of his debt, but the departments shall not be obligated to refund interest, commissions, or other charges that may have been paid in advance."* Note, in accordance with the transcribed rules, the different mortgage loans have their own conditions. Furthermore, Article 128 of that same body of law contemplates the authority of the Central Bank to set, when it deems it necessary: *"(…) 1) The maximum rates of interest, commission, and other charges they may collect from their debtors."* Similarly, the interest rates that banks pay to their investors are equally variable over time (e.g., Articles 497 of the Commercial Code (*Código de Comercio*) and 1163 of the Civil Code (*Código Civil*)). Thus, it is evident that the interpretation of the regulations of the financial system cannot be carried out without taking into account the inherent dynamism of the market and credit relations. Therefore, the Court finds no reason whatsoever in the plaintiff's arguments, in that it seeks for the open-end mortgage to be conceived as a rigid and inflexible institution, which must be modified at the registry level each time it is used as collateral for a different loan, despite the fact that it has been established as a tool that allows the financing of various loans and for equally varied purposes by the banks of the National Banking System (*Sistema Bancario Nacional*). In line with the criteria set forth by the lower court (*a quo*), then, the Chamber considers that those elements must be determined in the documents that constitute the secured transactions, as happened in this specific case. Otherwise, it is insisted, the open-end mortgage would really lack its utility; because it would be limited to a single transaction, which would have to have unique, fixed conditions that are required from the outset for the entire term. That is to say, the mortgage would not be open-end but rather a conventional one. Nor does it make sense to require new registrations as the amounts that the mortgage guarantees are granted. It should be noted, the registration of the encumbrance satisfies the public registry notice that is required, so that the existence of the encumbrance and the relationship between the bank and its client may be of public and interested third-party knowledge. What the appellant proposes would be exactly the same as if, every time a new loan is granted, a conventional mortgage were modified. Evidently, the logic of the open-end mortgage facilitates the economic and legal relationship that the bank establishes with its clientele, allowing the latter to have access to new loans, without having to grant new collateral, since for those purposes it suffices to associate the loan to the one that was already constituted and consented to for that purpose. It should be recalled that registry publicity is essential for a legal act to have effects against third parties; but not between the parties (Article 455 of the Civil Code). Thus, if a bank and a consumer agree to associate any of their transactions with an open-end collateral, there is no obstacle whatsoever for it to be used. Nor are the interests of third parties harmed, because the registry publicity warns them, precisely, that a preferential encumbrance exists, which responds up to a certain amount, in the constitutive deed. In this case, for seven hundred thousand dollars (first proven fact). Along those lines, whoever might have an interest in acquiring any right over the property knows of the existence of a collateral of that nature.

For that same reason, neither is the argument put forward by the plaintiff that custom has been given a value superior to law receivable, since the practice of backing, with the same open-end mortgage, loans that are embodied in separate documents, in which their various specific conditions are set, in aspects such as interest rates, the amount and frequency of partial payments, is, in no way, contrary to law. On the contrary, customary banking practice constitutes a legitimate source of commercial and banking law, which complements the regulation discussed. The foregoing, pursuant to the provisions of Article 4 of the Commercial Code, which provides the following in this regard: *"Commercial customs shall serve not only to fill the silence of the law, but also as a rule for assessing the meaning of words or technical terms of commerce used in commercial acts or contracts."* It is worth noting that, although the appellant attempts to disavow the relationship of this matter with the rules of the Commercial Code, it is evident that he is mistaken. Banking activity is, first and foremost, commercial. In fact, Article 4 of the *Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional* refers to the *"commercial banks of the State."* In this manner, it is impossible to dissociate, as the appellant would like, the norms, principles, and sources of Commercial Law from the operation of the open-end mortgage, even when it is regulated in the Civil Code. What the appellant seeks is to make a purely formalistic thesis prevail, regarding the registration of the mortgage, completely independent of the context of its application, which is contrary to the exegetical and hermeneutical parameters contained in Article 10 of that same Code. Incidentally, the Commercial Code itself allows the application of the regulations of the Civil Code, insofar as it is necessary to provide answers to questions not expressly regulated by the Commercial Code (Article 2 ibidem), such as the use of the mortgage to guarantee commercial transactions, coupled with the express provision of Article 64 of the LOSBN. Finally, it must be said, it is not true that the contract establishing the mortgage collateral lacks regulations regarding aspects such as the interest rate, payment conditions, and early maturity. What happens is that these are adjusted, precisely, to the nature of the open-end mortgage since, although they contain a program in this regard, this does not definitively determine the conditions of each transaction, but rather provides that, in each case, they must be defined in the corresponding documents. In this respect, it is appropriate to transcribe some of the contractual stipulations. According to the second proven fact, not refuted, the contract reads, in what is now relevant, as follows: *"B) REPAYMENT: The debtor accepts that for each transaction established under this Open-End Mortgage, repayment shall be made according to the form agreed with the client, depending on the activity to be financed and the Investment Plan, whether monthly, bimonthly, quarterly, semiannually, or annually, as well as the term. The amortizations create immediate availability to be used again, in the manner agreed upon by the parties. Failure to pay the loans guaranteed by this open-end mortgage or the interest in the originally agreed upon form of one or more transactions shall render the mortgage collateral that covers the Open-End Mortgage matured and due. THE DEBTOR has been informed and warned and therefore accepts that the disbursements of this loan shall be made according to the availability of funds of the Creditor (...) C) INVESTMENT PLAN: SET UP OF OPEN-END MORTGAGE."* All investment activities and plans established in the credit regulations of Banco Nacional may be financed to meet the applicant's need for resources as agreed in each loan guaranteed by this open mortgage. D) DISBURSEMENT OF THE LOAN: The disbursement shall be for each derived operation in accordance with the activity to be financed, the investment plan, and according to the Bank's usual practice. (...) INTEREST RATE: The debtor agrees that the ordinary interest shall be that prevailing for each type of loan, in effect at the date of formalization for the activity being financed and according to the type of currency. It shall be reviewed and adjustable monthly, payable in advance or in the manner stipulated by the credit product. (...) G) DEFAULT INTEREST: The debtor acknowledges default interest at the same rate as the ordinary interest of each derived credit, plus two percentage points, calculated on the amount of the delayed payment, in accordance with the provisions of article seventy of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional). (...) L) GUARANTEE: (...) that as guarantee for the payment of the loans approved and formalized for each case, their ordinary and default interest at the indicated rates, care costs, expenses for policies, costs corresponding to collection management, both cost awards of any eventual enforcement, and all other expenses incurred by the creditor for the collection of the Credit (sic) and the fulfillment of all obligations deriving from any operation granted under this credit, a FIRST-DEGREE OPEN MORTGAGE is constituted in favor of BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA during the agreed term over the following properties of the District of Puntarenas (Partido de Puntarenas): I) registered real estate folio number SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY-THREE- ZERO ZERO ZERO (...) With a legal liability to be registered of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. II) Registered Real Estate Folio number ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO- ZERO ZERO ZERO (...) With a legal liability to be registered of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. I (...) Q) EARLY MATURITY: In addition to the situations mentioned in this deed, the Creditor may deem the entire debt matured and immediately demandable; which the debtor accepts expressly and irrevocably; in the following cases: (...) d) If the debtor fails to pay a credit or interest or any sum owed under the respective documents (...) the Creditor, by its own declaration, may deem the obligation matured and enforceable by means of enforcement proceedings and demand its total and immediate cancellation in accordance with the provisions of articles four hundred twenty of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) and seventy of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional), through the means it deems convenient, without the need for notices or other prior requirements. T) OTHER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS: (...) b) For each sub-loan derived from the Credit, a commercial contract must be executed with the credit conditions of the product in effect at the time of formalization, such as the sub-loan amount, term, form of payment, form of delivery, investment plan, interest, commissions, among others, which commercial contracts shall be deemed incorporated into this mortgage document for all legal purposes. c) The debtor undertakes to unconditionally comply with all clauses and terms specified for each loan, and in the event of breach of any of them, the totality of the operations covered by this open mortgage shall be deemed matured and their total cancellation shall be demanded. d) Failure to pay any installment of one or all of the loans covered by this open mortgage, or interest, commissions, or any other amounts owed by the debtor, shall make the totality of the Credit demandable by the creditor. e) This Open Credit is granted under the modality of Open Mortgage, it being the case that the debtor may make use of it by adhering to the respective investment project approved in each case, at the sole discretion of the creditor institutions". Note, it is evident that the mortgage title does indeed contain clear stipulations, consistent with its nature, regarding interest, payment conditions, and grounds for early maturity (vencimiento anticipado). The structuring was entirely clear. Those particular characteristics were to be set, for each operation linked to the mortgage. For that purpose, it was established, with total clarity, that the respective commercial contracts must be executed, which would be deemed incorporated into the open mortgage. Note, further, that the parties agreed that, upon the debtor's default, the creditor could accelerate the maturity of the term and demand the total cancellation of the credit, "in accordance with the provisions of articles four hundred twenty of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) and seventy of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional)". These latter precepts, precisely, contemplate the early maturity of this type of obligation (payable in installments) upon the non-payment of one or more credit installments, in both commercial and financial spheres. Therefore, any lack of provision or illegitimacy concerning the early maturity of the mortgage in the event of non-payment of the guaranteed operations is equally dismissed.

VII.It is also necessary to respond to what was presented by the appellant, in arguing that the mortgage has a privileged enforcement procedure, which unregistered commercial contracts do not enjoy. He is also incorrect in that regard. It must be recognized that article 166 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) establishes the admissibility of the mortgage and pledge enforcement process, in the following terms: "Common and certificate mortgages, as well as duly registered pledges, constitute enforcement titles with waiver of procedures to enforce the privilege over the encumbered property or, as applicable, over the insurance sum, as well as to enforce all personal guarantees, which shall be understood to be limited to the outstanding balance". On the other hand, the order for payment procedure (proceso monitorio) is the legally provided mechanism for the collection of a negotiable instrument such as a promissory note (pagaré), insofar as it contains a monetary, liquid, and demandable obligation, supported by documentation. This is regulated by article 110.1 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). Now then, article 68 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional) provides for the existence of "principal or additional" guarantees. Consequently, there is no legal impediment whatsoever for a single operation to have guarantees of a different nature, such as a promissory note (pagaré) and a mortgage.

Therefore, having verified the breach of the obligation secured by a real guarantee, there is no reason whatsoever to disregard the enforceability of the latter, through the corresponding legal channel. From that perspective, the fact that, on the occasion of the credits backed by the mortgage, a document identified as a "promissory note (pagaré)" is also signed, in no way distorts the relationship of the obligation with the open mortgage, nor does it impede the operability of the latter, as long as the consumer has freely and in an informed manner consented to the backing of their debt with the real guarantee in question. All in accordance with the fundamental right to information and security of consumers of financial products, established in numeral 46 of the Carta Magna, as well as in article 32, subsection c, of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor. Eventually, it could be discussed whether the so-called promissory note (pagaré), as such, contains or not an unconditional, pure, and simple promise of payment, or not, under the terms of articles 799 and 800 of the Código de Comercio. However, what is relevant for this litigation is that both parties agreed on the granting of a credit operation backed by the open mortgage, with its specific conditions duly established, in accordance with its nature, as already explained, which the plaintiff has not managed to refute in this litigation. From this point of view, there is no plausible reason to decree that the open mortgage consented to by the plaintiff does not mature until the year 2039. Nor is there any defect in what the parties agreed upon, nor is a violation of the regulations invoked in the appeal observed, since it is clear that what was agreed fully corresponds to the nature of the open mortgage, for which clear and explicit stipulations were established in the constitutive act of the guarantee, the content and scope of which the plaintiff and debtor cannot now disavow. In doing so, it is clear, they assume a position contrary to the duties of contractual good faith. At bottom, what is perceived is an attempt to evade the legal consequences of a contractual breach, which constitutes an abusive posture that the legal operator cannot endorse (canons 20 and 22 of the Código Civil). In an identical sense, consult the judgment of the Sala Primera de la Corte no. 948-F-S1-2022 at 08 hours 12 minutes on May 5, 2022.

VIII. By virtue of the reasons set forth, the rejection of the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed is required

In the opinion of this Chamber, as the cassation appellant lacks sufficient grounds to appeal, the costs of the appeal are imposed (canon 150.3 of the CPCA), which shall be settled in the sentence enforcement phase, in order to guarantee the right of defense of the enforced party, granting them the respective hearing on the settlement presented (Articles 41 and 153 of the Constitución Política).

THEREFORE

The appeal filed is declared without merit, with costs charged to the plaintiff. DRUDIN.

Cassation case law has repeatedly indicated that this anomaly occurs when the jurisdictional body omits stating the reasons that motivate its decision, or when those it does state are seriously contradictory or incomprehensible, which ends up producing the same effect, that is, the impossibility for the parties – and the legal community, in general – to understand the resolution. This harms the justice of the specific case, as it prevents the party harmed by the decision from being able to appeal it, by being unaware of its bases. Likewise, the defect in question is harmful beyond the limits of the particular conflict, since it removes from the judgment the clarity required so that the transparency and publicity of the jurisdictional function can be subject to the legitimate mechanisms of popular and institutional oversight. Thus, the adequate reasoning of decisions stands as a guarantee of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad), contemplated in canon 11 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), projected, at the legal level, in canon 11 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). On this subject, consult, among many others, the resolutions of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) no. 484 of 10 hours 30 minutes of August 12, 2003; 195 of 09 hours 10 minutes of March 8, 2018; 316-F-S1-2021 of 11 hours 55 minutes of February 11, 2021; 1750-F-S1-2021 of 13 hours 58 minutes of October 12, 2021. Now, it must also be mentioned that the right is one of the material prerequisites necessary for the issuance of any favorable judgment. In short, it consists of the legal system supporting the legal situation sought to be protected in the claim; whether its declaration or judicial constitution is pursued. Generally, it will be the same person bringing the claim – whether personally, or by representation – who must hold title to the legal situation that is the object of the proceeding; although there are exceptional circumstances in which this is not so, as occurs, for example, in the oblique action (acción oblicua), where a creditor exercises the action in protection of a right of their debtor, which benefits them indirectly, in order to satisfy their credit. (numeral 715 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)). Now, in addition to the right, standing (legitimación) – in its active and passive modalities – as well as the current interest, must necessarily be reviewed ex officio. This means that, if the Court detects that any of these prerequisites does not concur in the specific case, it is not appropriate to uphold the claim. Consult, in this regard, among many others, the votes of the Chamber (Sala) no. 1424-F-S1-2022 of 11 hours 40 minutes of August 18, 2022, 592-F-S1-2023 of 10 hours 32 minutes of April 20, 2023 and 236-F-S1-2023 of 09 hours 25 minutes of February 23, 2023.

In this line of reasoning, if the Court develops various reasons throughout the ruling to justify why, in its opinion, the legal system does not prohibit the claims raised – for reasons that do not correspond to a lack of standing or interest, which warrant their own explanation – it is evident that the lack of right is thus justified; even more so if, in rejecting that defense, it makes an explicit reference to the reasons contained in the ruling, to justify the rejection of the claim." In that vein, its legal regulation is found in canon 414 of the Civil Code, a provision located in Book II (`De los Bienes y de la Extensión y Modificaciones de la Propiedad`), Title VI (`De la Hipoteca y de la Prenda`), Chapter I (`De la Hipoteca`), of that normative body. Its text is as follows: “Constituida hipoteca por un crédito abierto con limitación de suma, garantiza las cantidades entregadas en cualquier tiempo y para diversos fines, siempre que no excedan de la suma prefijada. Cualquier pago que efectúe el deudor, automáticamente creará disponibilidad para ser utilizada de la forma que lo convengan las partes”. Now, as can be seen, this is a particular kind of mortgage, since, in this case, the guarantee can back a plurality of “cantidades entregadas en cualquier tiempo y para diversos fines”. It is clear that the provision refers to the mortgage backing of various credits, even those subsequent to the creation of the lien (gravamen). Otherwise, the open guarantee would have no reason to exist, as it would be entirely tied to one particular transaction and not to an indeterminate number of financings, as provided by the law, which may be granted for diverse purposes. Now, the reading of that mandate must be carried out with attention to the hermeneutical parameters of canon 10 of the Civil Code. This establishes that: “Las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas”. In that sense, in light of the plaintiff's arguments, it is necessary to determine if it is consistent with the purpose - ratio legis - of the regulation of the open mortgage, as well as with the social reality in which it is used, to understand that both the interest rate and the payment method of the guaranteed credits must be determined from the moment the open mortgage is constituted, or else, registered at the moment each of those financial transactions intended to be backed by the lien opened on the guarantor property arises. To answer that question, the institute in question must be linked to its use in the national banking sphere. To that effect, Article 64 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional (or LOSBN hereinafter), expressly contemplates “…la potestad de cada banco para operar y reglamentar las hipotecas que garanticen créditos abiertos, conforme a lo estipulado en el artículo 414 del Código Civil”.

This precept is mentioned in the appeal. However, it is clear that the appellant does not give it its correct dimension, by relating it to canons 409 and 465 of the same code. The mandate under analysis contemplates the use of that instrument as a financial tool that may be utilized by the banks that make up the National Banking System (Sistema Bancario Nacional), such as Banco Nacional. It cannot be overlooked that financial entities handle diverse lines of credit, each with its own conditions and purposes, which constitutes a notorious fact in an economic context like the current one, where a multiplicity of banking organizations offer different financing options for the highly varied purposes that economic agents can pursue in the market. Thus, for example, bank customers have access to financial products for the purchase and construction of real estate, acquisition of vehicles and other movable goods, development of agricultural, industrial, commercial, tourism, or any other type of business projects (whether the borrowers are micro, small, medium, or large enterprises), refinancing of other credits, discretionary use, among many other options. Consequently and logically, there are multiple factors that, with respect to each of the lines offered, are considered by the financial entity to determine the applicable interest rates, the term of the financing, the form of payment, as well as the periodicity and amount of the principal and interest installments. Article 130 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional) establishes the following: “The payment of principal, interest, commissions, and other charges on credits granted by the Mortgage Departments shall be agreed upon in fixed periodic installments, payable in periods of no less than one month nor more than one year, which shall comprise such payments in a proportional form according to the mathematical tables that the departments shall calculate for those purposes. At the discretion of the Board of Directors of each bank, the installments shall be collected in advance or for expired periods. The debtor shall have the right to prepay all or part of his debt, but the departments shall not be obligated to return interest, commissions, or other charges that may have been paid in advance.” Note, according to the transcribed regulation, the different mortgage credits have their own conditions. Furthermore, Article 128 of that same legal body contemplates the authority of the Central Bank (Banco Central) to set, when it deems it necessary: “(...) 1) The maximum rates of interest, commission, and other charges that they may collect from their debtors.” In the same way, the interest rates that banks recognize to their investors are, equally, variable over time (e.g., numerals 497 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) and 1163 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)). Such being the case, it is evident that the interpretation of the financial system regulations cannot be carried out without taking into account the dynamism inherent in the market and credit relations.

Therefore, the Court finds no reason in the plaintiff's arguments, insofar as it seeks to have the open-ended mortgage (hipoteca abierta) conceived as a rigid and inflexible institution, which must be modified, at the registry level, each time it is used as security for a different credit, even though it has been established as a tool that allows the financing of various loans and for equally varied purposes, by the banks of the National Banking System (Sistema Bancario Nacional). In line with the criterion expressed by the lower court (a quo), then, the Chamber considers that those elements must be determined in the documents that constitute the secured transactions, as occurred in the present case. Otherwise, it is insisted, the open-ended mortgage would really lack the utility it has; since it would be limited to a single transaction, which would have to have, from the outset, fixed and only conditions enforceable throughout the entire term. That is, the mortgage would not be open-ended, but rather an ordinary mortgage (hipoteca común). Nor does it make sense to require new registrations as the amounts guaranteed by the mortgage are disbursed. Note that the registration of the encumbrance satisfies the registry publicity that is required, so that the existence of the lien and the relationship between the bank and its client can be known to the public and interested third parties. What the appellant proposes would be exactly the same as if, each time a new credit is granted, an ordinary mortgage were modified. Evidently, the logic of the open-ended mortgage facilitates the economic and legal relationship that the bank establishes with its clientele, allowing the latter to have access to new loans, without having to grant a new guarantee, since for those purposes it is sufficient to associate the credit with the one that was already constituted and consented to for that purpose. Recall that registry publicity is essential for a legal act to have effects against third parties; but not so between the parties (section 455 of the Civil Code). Thus, if bank and consumer agree to associate any of their transactions with an open-ended guarantee, there is no obstacle whatsoever for it to be used. Nor are the interests of third parties harmed, since the registry publicity warns them, precisely, that a preferential encumbrance exists, which responds up to a specific amount, in the constitutive deed. In this case, for seven hundred thousand dollars (first proven fact). In that vein, anyone who had an interest in acquiring any right over the property knows of the existence of a guarantee of that nature. For that same reason, the argument put forth by the plaintiff is also not admissible, in saying that custom has been given a value superior to law, because the practice of backing, with the same open-ended mortgage, credits that are embodied in separate documents, in which their diverse specific conditions are set, in aspects such as interest rates, amount, and frequency of partial payments, is in no way contrary to the law. On the contrary, customary banking practice constitutes a legitimate source of commercial and banking law, which complements the regulation in question. The foregoing, pursuant to the provisions of Article 4 of the Commercial Code, which provides the following in this regard: "Commercial customs shall serve not only to supplement the silence of the law, but also as a rule for appreciating the meaning of the technical words or terms of commerce used in commercial acts or contracts." It is worth noting that, although the appellant attempts to deny the connection between this matter and the rules of the Código de Comercio, they are clearly mistaken. Banking activity is, above all, commercial. In fact, Article 4 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional refers to the “state commercial banks.” Thus, it is impossible to dissociate, as the appellant wishes, the rules, principles, and sources of Commercial Law from the operation of the open mortgage (hipoteca abierta), even though the latter is regulated in the Código Civil. What the appellant seeks is to make a purely formalistic thesis prevail, regarding the registration of the mortgage, completely independent of the context of its application, which is contrary to the exegetical and hermeneutical parameters contained in numeral 10 of the same body of law. Incidentally, the Código de Comercio itself allows the application of the regulations of the Código Civil, insofar as necessary to answer questions not expressly regulated by the Código Mercantil (numeral 2 ibidem), such as the use of the mortgage to guarantee commercial operations, coupled with the express provision of ordinal 64 of the LOSBN. Finally, it must be said, it is not true that the contract establishing the mortgage guarantee (garantía hipotecaria) lacks regulations regarding aspects such as the interest rate, payment conditions, and acceleration. What happens is that these are adjusted, precisely, to the nature of the open mortgage because, although they contain scheduling in that regard, this does not definitively determine the conditions of each operation, but rather provides that, in each case, they must be defined in the corresponding documents. In this regard, it is appropriate to transcribe some of the contractual stipulations. According to the second proven fact, not contested, the contract reads, as relevant here, as follows: “B) REPAYMENT: The debtor accepts that for each operation established under the protection of this Open Mortgage, repayment will be carried out according to the form agreed with the client, depending on the activity to be financed and the Investment Plan, whether monthly, bimonthly, quarterly, semiannually, or annually, and likewise the term. The amortizations create immediate availability to be used again, in the manner agreed between the parties. The non-payment of the loans guaranteed by this open mortgage or of the interest in the originally agreed form of one or more operations shall accelerate and make payable the mortgage guarantee covering the Open Mortgage. THE DEBTOR has been informed and warned and therefore accepts, that the disbursements of this credit will be made according to the availability of funds of the Creditor (...) C) INVESTMENT PLAN: OPEN MORTGAGE GRANTING. All activities and investment plans established in the credit regulations of Banco Nacional may be financed, to meet the need for resources of the applicant as agreed in each loan guaranteed by this open mortgage. D) LOAN DISBURSEMENT: The disbursement for each derived operation will be according to the activity to be financed, the investment plan, and in accordance with the Bank's usual practice. (...) INTEREST RATE: The debtor accepts that the ordinary interest will be that which governs for each type of loan, in force on the date of formalization for the activity being financed and according to the type of currency. It will be reviewed and adjustable monthly, payable in advance or in the manner stipulated by the credit product.

• G)DEFAULT INTEREST: The debtor acknowledges default interest (intereses moratorios) at the same rate as the ordinary interest (intereses corrientes) of each derived credit, plus two percentage points, calculated on the amount of the delayed payment, in accordance with the provisions of article seventy of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional. (...) L) GUARANTEE: (...) that as a guarantee of payment of the loans approved and formalized for each case, their ordinary interest (intereses corrientes) and default interest (intereses moratorios) at the indicated rates, maintenance costs, expenses for insurance policies, expenses corresponding to the collection management, both sets of costs of the eventual execution and all other expenses incurred by the creditor for the collection of the Credit and the fulfillment of all obligations arising from any operation granted under this credit, a FIRST-DEGREE OPEN MORTGAGE is constituted in favor of BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA during the agreed term over the following properties of the Partido de Puntarenas: I) real property registration number SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY-THREE - ZERO ZERO ZERO (...) With a legal liability to be registered of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. II) Real Property Registration number ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO - ZERO ZERO ZERO (...) With a legal liability to be registered of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. I (...) Q) ACCELERATION: In addition to the situations mentioned in this deed, the Creditor may deem the entirety of the debt due and payable early; which the debtor accepts expressly and irrevocably; in the cases: (...) d) If the debtor ceases to pay a credit or the interest or any sum that must be paid under the respective documents (...) the Creditor, by its own statement, may deem the obligation due and executable and demand its total and immediate cancellation in accordance with the provisions established in articles four hundred twenty of the Código de Comercio and seventy of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, through the means it deems convenient, without the need for demands or other prior requirements. T) OTHER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS: (...) b) For each sub-loan derived from the Credit, a commercial contract must be executed with the credit conditions of the product in effect at the time of formalization, such as the sub-loan amount, term, form of payment, form of disbursement, investment plan, interest, commissions, among others, commercial contracts that shall be deemed incorporated into this mortgage document for all legal purposes. c) The debtor undertakes to unconditionally comply with all clauses and terms specified for each sub-loan and in the event of breach of any of them, the entirety of the operations covered by this open mortgage shall be deemed due and their total cancellation shall be demanded. d) The failure to pay any installment of one or all of the loans covered by this open mortgage or of the interest, commissions, or any other amounts that the debtor must pay shall make the entirety of the Credit demandable by the creditor. e) This Open Credit is granted under the Open Mortgage modality, it being the case that the debtor may make use of it by adjusting to the respective investment project approved in each case at the sole discretion of the creditor institutions." It is evident that the open mortgage lien (título hipotecario) does contain clear stipulations, consistent with its nature, regarding interest, payment conditions, and grounds for acceleration. The schedule was entirely clear. In each operation linked to the mortgage, those particular characteristics would be established. For this purpose, it was established, with complete clarity, that the respective commercial contracts should be executed, which would be deemed incorporated into the open mortgage. Note, furthermore, that the parties agreed that, in the event of the debtor's default, the creditor could accelerate the maturity of the term and demand payment of the entire loan, "in accordance with the provisions of articles four hundred twenty of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) and seventy of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional)". These latter precepts, precisely, contemplate the acceleration of this type of obligation (payable in installments) upon non-payment of one or more installments of the loan, in the commercial and financial spheres. Therefore, any lack of provision or illegitimacy concerning the acceleration of the mortgage in the event of non-payment of the guaranteed operations is also dismissed.

VII.It is also necessary to address the appellant's argument that the mortgage has a privileged enforcement procedure (vía privilegiada de ejecución), which unregistered commercial contracts do not enjoy. There is no merit in this argument. It should be recognized that numeral 166 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) establishes the admissibility of mortgage and pledge enforcement proceedings, in the following terms: "Common and mortgage certificate (cédula) mortgages, as well as duly registered pledges, constitute enforcement titles with a waiver of procedures to enforce the privilege over the encumbered property or, where applicable, over the insurance sum, as well as to enforce all personal guarantees, which shall be understood as limited to the deficiency balance". On the other hand, the payment order proceeding (proceso monitorio) is the legally provided avenue for collecting a negotiable instrument (título valor) such as a promissory note (pagaré), insofar as it contains a monetary obligation that is liquid and payable, supported by documentation. Article 110.1 of the Civil Procedure Code regulates it thus. Now, Article 68 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System provides for the existence of "primary or additional" guarantees.

Consequently, there is no legal impediment whatsoever for a single transaction to be secured by guarantees of a different nature, such as a promissory note and a mortgage. Therefore, once the breach of the obligation secured by a real guarantee (garantía real) is verified, there is no reason whatsoever to deny its enforceability through the corresponding legal channel. From that perspective, the fact that, on the occasion of the credits backed by the mortgage, a document identified as a “promissory note (pagaré)” is also subscribed, in no way distorts the relationship of the obligation with the open mortgage (hipoteca abierta), nor does it impede the operability of the latter, as long as the consumer has freely and informedly consented to the backing of their debt with the real guarantee in question. All in accordance with the fundamental right to information and safety of consumers of financial products, established in article 46 of the Carta Magna, as well as in article 32, subsection c, of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor. Eventually, it could be discussed whether the so-called promissory note, as such, contains or not an unconditional, pure, and simple promise of payment, or not, in the terms of articles 799 and 800 of the Código de Comercio. However, what is relevant, for this litigation, is that both parties agreed on the granting of a credit transaction backed by the open mortgage, with its specific conditions duly established, in accordance with its nature, as already explained, which the plaintiff has not managed to refute in this litigation. From that point of view, there is no plausible reason whatsoever to decree that the open mortgage consented to by the claimant does not mature until the year 2039. Nor is there any defect in what the parties agreed upon, nor is a violation of the regulations invoked in the appeal observed, since it is clear that what was agreed is in full correspondence with the nature of the open mortgage, for which clear and explicit stipulations were established in the constitutive act of the guarantee, whose content and scope the plaintiff and debtor cannot now disavow. By doing so, it is clear, they assume a position contrary to the duties of contractual good faith. In essence, what is perceived is an attempt to evade the legal consequences of a contractual breach, which constitutes an abusive position that the operator of the law cannot endorse (canons 20 and 22 of the Código Civil). In an identical sense, consult the judgment of the Sala Primera de la Corte no. 948-F-S1-2022 of 08 hours 12 minutes of May 5, 2022.

San José, at nine hours five minutes on the sixth of February two thousand twenty-five.

In the ordinary proceeding filed by **HOTEL POSADA CLARO DE LUNA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA,** legal entity identification number 3-101-280320, represented by its generalissimo agent without sum limit, Mr. Johnny Guzmán Zamora, holder of identity card 2-384-205; against **BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA,** legal entity identification number 4-000-001021, represented by its general agent without sum limit, Mr. Juan Carlos Corrales Salas, identity card 1-481-093; Licenciado Gerardo José Bouzid Jiménez, special judicial agent of the plaintiff, filed a cassation appeal challenging judgment number 08-2022-VII, issued at 08 hours 40 minutes on February 03, 2022, by the Seventh Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, composed of the judges Alinne Solano Ramírez, Francisco Hidalgo Rueda and Gustavo Irías Obando.

**Magistrado ponente Jorge Leiva Poveda** **CONSIDERANDO** **I.** The complaint was filed on May 24, 2018. In summary, the plaintiff alleged that, in public deed no. 89-4, executed before notary public Karla Fuentes Marín at 10 hours on April 30, 2009, an open-ended first-degree mortgage was constituted in favor of the defendant entity, for a term of three hundred sixty months, maturing on April 30, 2039. Now, the plaintiff alleged that the mortgage did not contain, in its registration, the description of all the elements established by the legal system for its early enforcement, such as the payment installments, the amount of the quotas, their periodicity, the specific interest rate for the loan, and the grounds for acceleration. According to its account, the bank tried to supplement the mortgage with a promissory note (pagaré), which is of a different nature and does not have a registration. In that sense, it was highlighted, for example, that in the constitution of the mortgage it was established that the term of the guaranteed loans would be defined in the respective contract (eleventh fact) and that acceleration could occur upon default of any loan, under the protection of the "respective documents." It considers such a thing is improper. Among other reasons, because the mortgage has an enforcement avenue different from the promissory note (pagaré), which is collected via a payment order proceeding. It was also part of its thesis that, pursuant to canon 41 of the Commercial Code, it is not possible to "imply" a commercial contract with a civil one that requires specific formalities for its validity; and even less, to attempt to enforce them jointly (image 22 of the initial brief). It stated that it did not understand that both the promissory note (pagaré) it signed on April 30, 2009 – no. 198200 – and the aforementioned mortgage were security for the same bank loan; instead, it believed it was paperwork. It also highlighted that linking a promissory note (pagaré) to a mortgage, in that manner, distorts the nature of the former as an unconditional guarantee of payment, which is improper. From that perspective, it said that, within the promissory note (pagaré), it was indicated that the loan would be guaranteed with the already mentioned open-ended mortgage, so that the negotiable instrument lost all its value as an enforceable title (imagen 25 of the digital file of 24/05/2018). The plaintiff company also maintained that its representation had understood that when commercial contracts arose and were signed, they replaced the mortgage guarantee. In this regard, it stated that the difference in term between the mortgage and the promissory note (pagaré) generated uncertainty in this respect. It alleged that it is not proper to enforce two or more guarantees, as the financial entity intended, in the collection venue; that is, in the preventive arrangement proceeding processed under file 11-100148-0297-CI, in which it attempted to demand payment of the debt contained in the mortgage loan. In this line of thought, the plaintiff alleged that, because it lacked the necessary information for it, the mortgage that was attempted to be enforced became unenforceable. The claims filed are the following: *"1. I request that the present complaint be admitted and the due notice be given to the defendant. 2. I request that it be declared that Mortgage No. 88-4 signed before notary Karla Fuentes Marín, executed at 10 hours on April 30, 2009, has its contractual maturity until April 30, 2039, and that payment thereof must be made at that time. 3. I request the declaration of Lack of Enforceability of the mortgage document executed in deed No. 89-4, signed before notary Karla Fuentes Marín, executed at 10 hours on April 30, 2009, in which a mortgage loan was constituted that is being irregularly liquidated and which does not contain any clause regarding payment in successive installments. 4. I request that it be declared with retroactive effect that the maturity of the debt arose with the mortgage loan contract of April 30, 2009, and that it be declared that all payments made by my represented party to the BNCR must be returned to the debtor because the term of the sole loan document does not mature until April 30, 2039. 5. I request that all default interest accrued from April 30, 2009, onwards be declared totally extinguished and also time-barred. 6. That the defendant be ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding. 7. That the cancellation of the mortgage entry visible under citations 2009-111188-01-0001-001 be ordered and that said loan document be considered canceled because it was replaced by the commercial contracts which were signed, executed, and adhered to on dates subsequent to the main contract. In default of the foregoing, we request that the court order the modification of said contract, providing for the registration thereof and modifying therein the following clauses: THIRD: CURRENT INTEREST – MODIFICATION OF CURRENT INTEREST – FOURTH: DEFAULT INTEREST – THIRTEENTH: ACCELERATION, so that they become completely null"*. The defendant entity opposed the complaint and raised the defenses of "prescripción o caducidad" and lack of right. In the preliminary hearing held on October 02, 2018, the parties presented their conclusions, as the matter was one of pure law, insofar as there was no evidence to be presented at trial. In the challenged judgment, the exception of "prescripción o caducidad" was rejected, and that of lack of right was sustained. Consequently, the complaint was declared without merit in all its aspects.

Costs were imposed on the plaintiff. Disagreeing, its representative files an appeal in cassation.

II.Brief consideration regarding the structure of the cassation judgment. In this decision, the preceding arguments of the parties, as well as their grievances, are succinctly summarized, in such a way that their main aspects are pointed out, without prejudice to the full reading that has been made of the accessory arguments, as well as the various reasonings that develop the central ideas of the presentation – v.g., argumentative reiterations, detailed accounts of procedural events, personal opinions, doctrinal and jurisprudential citations, among other similar elements of the writing, all of which can be consulted in detail in the corresponding brief -; all, in order to foster a better reading and attention to the grievances, under the protection and in observance of what is ordered in canon 61.2 of the Código Procesal Civil, by providing that: “Second instance and cassation judgments shall include a brief summary of the aspects debated in the challenged decision and of the arguments of the appellants”. Said mandate is of supplementary application in the contentious-administrative process, regarding the structure of the judgment, pursuant to canon 220 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

III.Grievances. Before alluding to the grievances set forth, it must be noted that the appeal is reiterative. The text contains the following sections: “1. The decision on the exceptions resolves the merits of the claims of the lawsuit…” (image 3); “2. An exception was resolved without giving an audience to the opposing party to argue what is pertinent…” (image 3); “3. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO DECLARE WITH MERIT THE EXCEPTION OF LACK OF RIGHT”; “Of the Lack of Right of the Judgment” (image 5); “Considering V on applicable regulations”; “4. The appellate court has violated due process by advancing a criterion…” (folio 11); “5. The decision is not reasoned”” (image 11). However, in line with the previous warning, the reproaches that are inferred from its reading are set forth below, avoiding unnecessary reiterations. From the outset, it must be warned that clarity, order, and precision are a burden that whoever formulates an appeal must observe, such that, although this Chamber, dispensing with unnecessary formalisms, proceeds to analyze the objections, it does so to the extent that the writing reasonably permits. Thus, the censures consist of the following topics. Claims of a procedural nature. a. The judgment is not reasoned, regarding the granting of the exception of lack of right, such that the reason for it is not understood. (image 11). b. There is a violation of due process, since the Court advanced a criterion. The appellant disagrees that the a quo, instead of limiting itself to the resolution of the preliminary exceptions, referred to the merits of the claims. It considers that such proceeding is precipitous, since only the preliminary hearing has elapsed, so that a pronouncement should only be issued on interlocutory questions (images 3 and 11). c. Defenselessness was caused, since no audience was granted to the plaintiff regarding the exceptions raised; specifically, regarding what was alleged by the defendant on August 22, 2018.

IV.None of the procedural objections are admissible. As for the lack of reasoning, regarding the granting of the lack of right, this is entirely misguided. Cassation jurisprudence has already repeatedly indicated that said anomaly occurs when the jurisdictional body omits to express the reasons motivating its decision, or when those it points out are seriously contradictory or incomprehensible, which ends up producing the same effect, that is, the impossibility for the parties – and the legal community, in general - to understand the resolution. This harms the justice of the specific case, as it prevents the party harmed by the decision from being able to appeal it, by being unaware of its bases. Likewise, the defect in question is harmful beyond the limits of the particular conflict, as it removes from the judgment the clarity that is required, so that the transparency and publicity of the jurisdictional function can be subject to the legitimate mechanisms of popular and institutional oversight. In this way, the adequate substantiation of decisions stands as a guarantee of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, contemplated in canon 11 of the Constitución Política, projected, at the legal level, in canon 11 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. On the subject, see, among many others, the resolutions of the Sala Primera no. 484 of 10 hours 30 minutes of August 12, 2003; 195 of 09 hours 10 minutes of March 08, 2018; 316-F-S1-2021 of 11 hours 55 minutes of February 11, 2021; 1750-F-S1-2021 of 13 hours 58 minutes of October 12, 2021. Now then, it must also be mentioned that the right is one of the material prerequisites necessary for the issuance of any favorable judgment. In sum, it consists of the legal system supporting the legal situation sought to be protected in the lawsuit; whether its judicial declaration or constitution is pursued. Generally, it will be the same person bringing the lawsuit – whether personally, or by representation – who must hold title to the legal situation that is the object of the process; although there are exceptional circumstances in which this is not so, as occurs, for example, in the oblique action, where a creditor exercises the action in protection of a right of their debtor, which benefits them indirectly, in order to satisfy their credit. (numeral 715 of the Código Civil). Now then, in addition to the right, standing (legitimación) – in its active and passive modalities – as well as current interest, must be necessarily reviewed ex officio. This means that, if the Court detects that any of these prerequisites does not concur in the specific case, it is not proper to grant the lawsuit. See, in this regard, among many others, the votes of this Chamber no. 1424-F-S1-2022 of 11 hours 40 minutes of August 18, 2022, 592-F-S1-2023 of 10 hours 32 minutes of April 20, 2023 and 236-F-S1-2023 of 09 hours 25 minutes of February 23, 2023. In that order of ideas, if the Court develops various reasons, throughout the ruling, to justify why, in its opinion, the legal system does not protect the claims raised – for reasons that do not correspond to a lack of standing (legitimación) or interest, which merit their own explanation – it is evident that it thus justifies the lack of right; especially if, when rejecting said defense, it makes an explicit reference to the reasons contained in the pronouncement, to justify the rejection of the lawsuit. This is precisely what has occurred in this case. In that sense, in considering VIII of the ruling, one reads regarding the matter: “Regarding the lack of right, by virtue of what has been explained by the Court in the previous sections, the cited exception must be declared with merit, due to the total impropriety of the lawsuit”. Thus, attention must be paid to the justification that the a quo gave for rejecting the lawsuit.

The answer is found in considering VII. In sum, the reasoning that led the judges to deny the claims consists of the following points. 1) In the act of constituting the open-ended mortgage (hipoteca abierta), both parties agreed that the failure to pay each of the commercial loans guaranteed by the mortgage, according to the conditions established in each one, would give rise to the early maturity of the guarantee. It transcribed clauses of the contract to conclude that it did contain clear and exact stipulations on the enforceability of the mortgage in the event of non-payment. 2) In the mortgage deed, an express link was established between the mortgage and a commercial loan that was granted to the defendant at that time, which contained the corresponding conditions, known to the parties. In that sense, it highlighted that the referenced public instrument established that: "...for each operation constituted under this Open-Ended Mortgage, the repayment will be made according to the form agreed with the client, depending on the activity to be financed". From that statement, it inferred that the parties voluntarily referred the provisions related to the payment of the credit to the stipulations contained in the contracts that arose and were backed by said open-ended guarantee. 3) Article 414 enables the constitution of a mortgage for an open credit, which is complemented by the clauses of each loan. 4) The contracts signed by the parties, related to credit operation no. 57-15-30485326, establish a clearly detailed table of the sums to be paid each month, which is complemented by the other clauses of the loan's mortgage. 5) The plaintiff itself, in its claims, acknowledges that the mortgage is a central guarantee contract that was extended by others that depend on the principal credit opening agreement and are supported by the same guarantee. 6) Regarding the request to declare the interest time-barred (prescritos), it was indicated that this is not appropriate since it does not appear that a final resolution has been issued in the preventive arrangement process (proceso de convenio preventivo) initiated by the plaintiff, processed under case file 11-100148-0297-CI. Thus, it is the Court's criterion that, in accordance with article 723 of Law No. 7130 – applicable to that insolvency proceeding – no statute of limitations period runs while said judicial matter is pending. As is clear, the judgment does contain, then, multiple reasons why the claim was considered appropriate and not the objection (excepción) of lack of right. Therefore, any lack of reasoning in this regard is dismissed. Then, there is no advance of any criterion, by the fact that the resolution contains a pronouncement on the merits of the matter. The appellant considers that it could only refer to preliminary objections (excepciones previas). He is mistaken. The contested resolution is none other than the judgment. At the preliminary hearing, held on October 2, 2018, the matter was declared to be purely of law (minute 20:30 of the audio of the preliminary hearing, dated 10/02/2018, at 14:35:52 hours), as there was no evidence to be heard at trial; so both parties had the opportunity to render conclusions, as they effectively did. The plaintiff formulated no complaint when that decision was taken. Moreover, it was the plaintiff itself – see minute 20 of the audio – that considered the matter to be purely of law and dispensed with the testimonial and confession evidence it had offered. Therefore, the appropriate course, given the nature of the matter, recognized by the plaintiff's representative, was the issuance of the judgment. In this, naturally, the corresponding objections had to be resolved, as well as the appropriateness of the claim, on the merits (98, second paragraph, 119 and 121 of the CPCA). Thus, there was no advance whatsoever. What happened is that holding a trial was unnecessary, so the court proceeded just as the Code of Procedure orders, in article 98 ibidem, to which the same party now appealing agreed. The litigants, moreover, were able to present their closing arguments, prior to the ruling, so there is no defenselessness whatsoever. At minute 21:28 of the trial audio, the plaintiff began its closing arguments, without any inconvenience, which extended for more than fourteen minutes (until time 35:44). Therefore, the inadmissibility of this argument is clear. Finally, regarding the fact that no hearing was granted on the substantive objections (excepciones de fondo); this is also not acceptable. The record includes the resolution of 14 hours 18 minutes on August 24, 2018, in which it was expressly stated: "...the present claim is deemed answered in time and form, and the objections of LACK OF RIGHT, FAULT OF THE VICTIM, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS and CADUCITY are deemed filed. Regarding the opposition formulated, a hearing is granted for THREE BUSINESS DAYS to the plaintiff, who upon referring to it may offer its counter-evidence (article 70 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code)". The notification record to the plaintiff was positive and is associated with the electronic file on day 09/04/2019 at 16:30:08 hours. Therefore, it is not true that no hearing was granted on the objections raised. Furthermore, in the hearing, as already indicated, the plaintiff had a full opportunity to refer to the merits of the matter and to the counterpart's defense theory. Thus, it is clear that the procedural arguments are notoriously inadmissible and inconsistent with what is deduced from the record.

**V. Substantive reasons.** As previously mentioned, the drafting of the appeal is repetitive and, furthermore, lacks the desired clarity and conciseness. However, the arguments presented will be summarized below, in a concrete manner, avoiding, as far as possible, unnecessary reiterations and digressions, which in no way contribute to an adequate reading of the disagreement, nor of what is resolved here. For a detailed reading of the text, consult the appeal brief. In sum, the cassation appellant considers that the open-ended mortgage that the plaintiff has sought to enforce becomes unenforceable, in an accelerated manner, because the registered title does not contain the necessary elements for this, such as the "successive tract" (tracto sucesivo) clauses and early maturity, interest rates, payment terms, and amounts. He invokes the provisions of article 409 of the Civil Code, according to which every mortgage and its details must be registered in the corresponding Registry. He also appeals to article 465, second paragraph, ibidem. He highlights that this precept establishes the need for the respective entry to indicate, in addition to the general circumstances, the amount of the credit, its terms and conditions, the interest rate, and the date from which it runs. He considers it improper for the registered mortgage to be supplemented, for purposes of its early maturity, with the clauses of other contracts that do not have registration. According to his understanding, this is a custom contrary to Law. He argues that the appropriate course was the signing of addenda to the mortgage, which should be equally registered, and not to give mortgage status to commercial loan contracts, which infringes article 166 of the Civil Procedure Code. He reasons that, if proceeding in the manner he considers correct, the corresponding credits would be covered by the preferential guarantee, without having to resort to other guarantee contracts. He considers, moreover, that the Court focused on the analysis of issues that diverge from what has been discussed; for example, by providing general explanations about the mortgage, without giving an exact response to what was submitted for its consideration. He considers that there is no normative support that allows integrating a mortgage guarantee with commercial instruments like a promissory note (pagaré). He maintains that article 414, mentioned in the ruling, does not allow it, nor does cardinal 70 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System. Among other norms, he also invokes articles 10, subsection 1, 36, 42, and 43 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code, to support the appropriateness of the claim.

It states that the conflict is civil, not commercial, in nature, insofar as the breach of legal formalities has been claimed, and therefore it is inappropriate to allude to the restrictive, broad, or intermediate theories of the open-ended title (título abierto). It also reasons that establishing the scope of article 70 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System, in relation to article 414 of the Civil Code, was not part of the debate either. It disagrees with the approach of the ruling with respect to the first of those provisions. It argues that the mortgage is executed as an enforcement title (título de ejecución) with preferential rank, whereas the commercial contract is not. It maintains that, through that avenue, only the pledge, mortgage, or mortgage certificates (cédulas hipotecarias) that are duly registered can be enforced. It further highlights that article 64 of the aforementioned banking law contemplates the power of banks to operate and regulate mortgages that secure open credits, in accordance with the provisions of article 414 of the Civil Code. However, it notes: “Let the First Chamber note that the rule specifies that what is being submitted to the framework of action is neither article 414 of civil law, but the breach of articles 409 and 465, and let the Honorable First Chamber also note that article 414 does not grant or condone any kind of exemption for the open-ended title (título abierto) from having to, in turn, comply with the requirements of any mortgage in the two main articles on the matter.” It considers that the provisions of article 414 eiusdem are subject to the requirements set forth in articles 409 and 465, second paragraph, of that same body of law. It refutes that the mortgage title (título hipotecario) contains express clauses regarding early termination and enforcement. It deems that there are no precise, specific stipulations that are “dated in time.”

VI.Reference has already been made to the opinion of the a quo. For present purposes, it should be noted that, for the judges composing it, the open mortgage under debate does not lack the necessary elements for its early enforcement, since the subscribing parties to the aforementioned real guarantee contract established that it would be enforceable, in the event of non-payment of the secured obligations, under the terms established therein. Thus, the fact that the secured credit contained a detailed description of the installments, amounts, and other credit conditions allowed the operability of the guarantee. However, the appellant disagrees with that position, as it deems that each and every element of the secured credit must be registered in order to be covered by the aforementioned underlying encumbrance. This body has already had the opportunity to address the same issue raised here. As has been done on other occasions, it is essential, first of all, to reference the legal institution of the open mortgage, understood as a special type of real right of guarantee. In that vein, its legal regulation is found in article 414 of the Civil Code, a provision located in Book II (“Of Property and the Extent and Modifications of Ownership”), Title VI (“Of Mortgage and Pledge”), Chapter I (“Of Mortgage”), of that body of law. Its text is as follows: “A mortgage constituted for an open credit with a sum limitation secures the amounts delivered at any time and for various purposes, provided they do not exceed the pre-set sum. Any payment made by the debtor will automatically create availability to be used in the manner agreed upon by the parties.” Now, as can be seen, this is a particular sort of mortgage, since, in this case, the guarantee can secure a plurality of “amounts delivered at any time and for various purposes.” It is clear that the rule refers to the mortgage backing of various credits, even those subsequent to the constitution of the encumbrance. Otherwise, the open guarantee would have no reason to exist, as it would be entirely tied to a particular operation and not to an indeterminate number of financings, as the law provides, which can be granted even for diverse purposes. Now, the reading of that mandate must be carried out with attention to the hermeneutical parameters of article 10 of the Civil Code. This establishes that: “Rules shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative antecedents, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, fundamentally attending to their spirit and purpose.” In that sense, in light of the plaintiff’s arguments, it is necessary to determine whether it is consistent with the purpose — ratio legis — of the open mortgage regulation, as well as with the social reality in which it is used, to understand that both the interest rate and the payment method of the secured credits must be determined from the moment the open mortgage is constituted, or else registered at the moment each of those financial operations arises that are intended to be secured by the encumbrance opened on the guaranteeing property. To answer that question, the institution in question must be associated with its use in the national banking sphere. To that effect, article 64 of the Organic Law of the National Banking System (or LOSBN hereinafter), expressly contemplates “…the power of each bank to operate and regulate mortgages that secure open credits, in accordance with the provisions of article 414 of the Civil Code.” This precept is mentioned in the appeal. However, it is clear that the appellant does not give it its correct dimension, by relating it to articles 409 and 465 of the same code. The mandate under analysis contemplates the use of that instrument as a financial tool that can be used by the banks comprising the National Banking System, as is the case with the Banco Nacional. It cannot be overlooked that financial entities manage various lines of credit, each with its own conditions and purposes, which constitutes a notorious fact in an economic context like the current one, where a multiplicity of banking organizations offers different financing options for the widely varied purposes that economic agents can pursue in the market. Thus, for example, bank customers have access to financial products for the purchase and construction of real estate, acquisition of vehicles and other movable goods, development of agricultural, industrial, commercial, tourism, or any other type of business projects (whether the borrowers are micro, small, medium, or large enterprises), consolidation of other credits, discretionary use, among many other options.

Consequently and logically, the factors that, for each of the lines offered, the financial entity considers to determine the applicable interest rates, the financing term, the form of payment, as well as the frequency and amount of principal and interest payments, are multiple. Article 130 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional establishes the following: "The payment of principal, interest, commissions, and other charges for credits granted by the Mortgage Departments shall be agreed upon in fixed periodic installments, payable in periods of no less than one month nor more than one year, which shall comprise said payments proportionally according to the mathematical tables that the departments shall calculate for these purposes. At the discretion of the Board of Directors of each bank, the installments shall be collected in advance or in arrears. The debtor shall have the right to pay all or part of his debt in advance, but the departments shall not be obligated to refund interest, commissions, or other charges that have been paid in advance." Note, according to the transcribed regulation, that different mortgage credits have their own conditions. Furthermore, Article 128 of that same regulatory body contemplates the power of the Banco Central to set, when it deems it necessary: "(...) 1) The maximum rates of interest, commission, and other charges they may levy on their debtors." Similarly, the interest rates that banks pay to their investors are also variable over time (e.g., articles 497 of the Código de Comercio and 1163 of the Código Civil). This being the case, it is evident that the interpretation of the financial system's regulations cannot be carried out without taking into account the inherent dynamism of the market and of credit relationships. Therefore, this Court finds no reason whatsoever in the plaintiff's arguments, insofar as she intends for the open mortgage (hipoteca abierta) to be conceived as a rigid and inflexible instrument that must be modified at the registry level every time it is used as security for a different credit, despite the fact that it has been established as a tool allowing the financing of various loans for equally varied purposes by the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. In line with the criterion expressed by the lower court, then, this Chamber considers that those elements must be determined in the documents that constitute the guaranteed operations, as happened in the instant case. Otherwise, it is reiterated, the open mortgage would truly lack the utility it possesses; because it would be limited to a single operation, which would have to have, from the outset, fixed, unique conditions enforceable throughout the entire term. That is, the mortgage would not be open (abierta), but ordinary (común). It also makes no sense to require new registrations as the amounts guaranteed by the mortgage are disbursed. Note that the registration of the encumbrance (gravamen) satisfies the required public registry notice (publicidad registral), so that the existence of the affectation and the relationship between the bank and its client may be of public knowledge and known to interested third parties. What the appellant proposes would be exactly the same as modifying an ordinary mortgage every time a new credit is granted. Evidently, the logic of the open mortgage facilitates the economic and legal relationship that the bank establishes with its clientele, allowing the latter access to new loans without having to grant a new security (garantía), since for these purposes it is sufficient to associate the credit with the one already established and consented to for such an end. It should be remembered that public registry notice is essential for a legal act to have effect vis-à-vis third parties; but not so between the parties (article 455 of the Código Civil). Thus, if bank and consumer agree to associate any of their operations with an open guarantee (garantía abierta), there is no obstacle whatsoever to its use being made. Nor are the interests of third parties harmed, since public registry notice precisely warns them that a preferential encumbrance exists, which is liable for up to a determined amount, in the constitutive deed. In this case, for seven hundred thousand dollars (first proven fact). In that vein, anyone with an interest in acquiring any right over the property knows of the existence of a security of that nature. For that same reason, the argument put forward by the plaintiff is not acceptable either, in saying that custom has been granted a value superior to the law, since the practice of backing, with a single open mortgage, credits that are embodied in separate documents, in which their diverse specific conditions are set, in aspects such as interest rates, amount and frequency of partial payments, is in no way contrary to the law. On the contrary, customary banking practice constitutes a legitimate source of commercial and banking law, which complements the regulation mentioned. The foregoing, pursuant to the provisions of article 4 of the Código de Comercio, in which the following provision on the matter is set forth: "Commercial customs shall serve not only to supply the silence of the law, but also as a rule for appreciating the meaning of the words or technical terms of commerce used in commercial acts or contracts." It is worth noting that, although the appellant attempts to disavow the relationship of this matter with the norms of the Código de Comercio, it is evident that he is mistaken. Banking activity is, above all, commercial. In fact, article 4 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional refers to the "commercial banks of the State." Thus, it is impossible to dissociate, as the appellant wishes, the norms, principles, and sources of Commercial Law from the operability of the open mortgage, even when the latter is regulated in the Código Civil. What the appellant seeks is to make a merely formalistic thesis prevail, regarding the registration of the mortgage, completely independent of the context of its application, which is contrary to the exegetical and hermeneutical parameters contained in article 10 of the same code. Incidentally, the Código de Comercio itself allows the application of the regulations of the Código Civil, insofar as is necessary to provide an answer to questions not expressly regulated by the Commercial Code (article 2 ibidem), such as the use of the mortgage to guarantee commercial operations, coupled with the express provision of article 64 of the LOSBN. Finally, it must be said, it is not true that the contract establishing the mortgage security does not have regulations regarding aspects such as the interest rate, conditions of payment, and early maturity (vencimiento anticipado). What happens is that these are adjusted, precisely, to the nature of the open mortgage because, although they contain a schedule in this regard, it does not definitively determine the conditions of each operation, but rather provides that, in each case, they must be defined in the corresponding documents. In this regard, it is appropriate to transcribe some of the contractual stipulations. According to the second proven fact, uncontradicted, the following is read in the contract, in what is now of interest: "B) REPAYMENT: The debtor accepts that for each operation that is established under this Open Mortgage, the repayment shall be made according to the form agreed with the client, based on the activity to be financed and the Investment Plan, whether monthly, bimonthly, quarterly, semiannually, or annually, likewise the term. Amortizations create immediate availability to be used again, in the manner agreed between the parties. The non-payment of the loans guaranteed with this open mortgage or of the interest in the originally agreed form of one or more operations shall render the mortgage security covering the Open Mortgage due and payable. THE DEBTOR has been informed and warned and consequently accepts that the disbursements of this credit shall be made according to the availability of funds of the Creditor (...) C) INVESTMENT PLAN: OPENING OF OPEN MORTGAGE." All investment activities and plans established in the credit regulations of Banco Nacional may be financed, to meet the resource needs of the applicant as agreed in each loan guaranteed by this open mortgage. D) DISBURSEMENT OF THE LOAN: The disbursement shall be for each derived operation according to the activity to be financed, the investment plan, and in accordance with the Bank's usual practice. (...) INTEREST RATE: The debtor accepts that the ordinary interest shall be that which governs for each type of loan, in effect at the date of formalization for the activity being financed and according to the currency type. It shall be reviewed and adjustable monthly, payable in advance or in the manner stipulated by the credit product. (...) G) DEFAULT INTEREST: The debtor acknowledges default interest at the same rate as the ordinary interest of each derived credit, plus two percentage points, calculated on the amount of the late payment, in accordance with the provisions of article seventy of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional. (...) L) GUARANTEE: (...) that as a guarantee of payment of the loans approved and formalized in each case, their ordinary and default interest at the indicated rates, maintenance expenses, expenses for insurance policies, expenses corresponding to collection management, both sets of costs of the eventual enforcement, and all other expenses incurred by the creditor for the collection of the Credit (sic) and the fulfillment of all obligations arising from any operation granted under this credit, a FIRST-DEGREE OPEN MORTGAGE is constituted in favor of BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA for the agreed term over the following properties of the Partido de Puntarenas: I) real property folio number SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY-THREE - ZERO ZERO ZERO (...) With a legal liability to be registered of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. II) Real Property Folio number ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO - ZERO ZERO ZERO (...) With a legal liability to be registered of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. I (…) Q) EARLY MATURITY: In addition to the situations mentioned in this deed, the Creditor may declare the entire debt due and payable early; which the debtor expressly and irrevocably accepts; in the following cases: (...) d) If the debtor fails to pay a credit or the interest or any sum that must be paid under the respective documents (...) the Creditor, by its own statement, may declare the obligation due and enforceable by way of execution and demand its total and immediate cancellation in accordance with the provisions of articles four hundred twenty of the Código de Comercio and seventy of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, through the means it deems convenient, without the need for demands or other prior requirements. T) OTHER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS: (...) b) For each sub-loan derived from the Credit, a commercial contract must be executed with the credit conditions of the product in effect at the time of formalization, such as the amount of the sub-loan, term, form of payment, form of delivery, investment plan, interest, commissions, among others, commercial contracts that shall be deemed incorporated into this mortgage document for all legal purposes. c) The debtor undertakes to unconditionally comply with all clauses and terms specified for each loan and in the event of breach of any of them, the entirety of the operations covered by this open mortgage shall be deemed due and the total cancellation of the same shall be demanded. d) The failure to pay any installment of one or all of the loans covered by this open mortgage or the interest, commissions, or any other amounts that the debtor must pay shall make the entirety of the Credit payable by the creditor. e) This Revolving Credit is granted under the Open Mortgage modality, it being the case that the debtor may make use of the same by conforming to the respective investment plan approved in each case at the sole discretion of the creditor institutions." Note, it is evident that the mortgage title does contain clear stipulations, consistent with its nature, regarding interest, payment conditions, and grounds for early maturity. The scheduling was entirely clear. It would be, in each operation linked to the mortgage, that those particular characteristics would be set. To this end, it was established, with total clarity, that the respective commercial contracts must be executed, which would be deemed incorporated into the open mortgage. Note, furthermore, that the parties agreed that, upon the debtor's default, the creditor could declare the term early due and demand the total cancellation of the credit, "in accordance with the provisions of articles four hundred twenty of the Código de Comercio and seventy of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional." These latter precepts, precisely, contemplate the early maturity of this type of obligations (payable in installments) upon the non-payment of one or more installments of the credit, in the commercial and financial spheres. Therefore, any lack of foresight or illegitimacy is equally discarded, concerning the early maturity of the mortgage in the event of non-payment of the guaranteed operations.

VII.It is also necessary to respond to what was stated by the appellant, in arguing that the mortgage has a privileged enforcement procedure, which unregistered commercial contracts do not enjoy. He is also wrong in this regard. It must be recognized that numeral 166 of the Código Procesal Civil establishes the appropriateness of the mortgage and pledge enforcement process, in the following terms: "Common and certificate mortgages, as well as pledges duly registered, constitute enforcement titles with waiver of procedures to enforce the privilege over the encumbered property or, as applicable, over the insurance sum, as well as to enforce all personal guarantees, which shall be understood as limited to the outstanding balance." On the other hand, the order for payment procedure (proceso monitorio) is the legally provided means for collecting a negotiable instrument such as a promissory note (pagaré), insofar as it contains a monetary, liquid, and enforceable obligation, supported by documentation. So regulates article 110.1 of the Código Procesal Civil. Now then, article 68 of the Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional provides for the existence of "principal or additional" guarantees. Consequently, there is no legal impediment whatsoever for the same operation to have guarantees of a different nature, such as a promissory note (pagaré) and a mortgage.

Therefore, having verified the breach of the obligation secured by a real guarantee, there is no reason whatsoever to disregard the enforceability of the latter, through the corresponding legal channel. From that perspective, the fact that, on the occasion of the credits backed by the mortgage, a document identified as a "promissory note (pagaré)" is also signed, in no way distorts the relationship of the obligation with the open mortgage, nor does it impede the operability of the latter, as long as the consumer has freely and in an informed manner consented to the backing of their debt with the real guarantee in question. All in accordance with the fundamental right to information and security of consumers of financial products, established in numeral 46 of the Carta Magna, as well as in article 32, subsection c, of the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor. Eventually, it could be discussed whether the so-called promissory note (pagaré), as such, contains or not an unconditional, pure, and simple promise of payment, or not, under the terms of articles 799 and 800 of the Código de Comercio. However, what is relevant for this litigation is that both parties agreed on the granting of a credit operation backed by the open mortgage, with its specific conditions duly established, in accordance with its nature, as already explained, which the plaintiff has not managed to refute in this litigation. From this point of view, there is no plausible reason to decree that the open mortgage consented to by the plaintiff does not mature until the year 2039. Nor is there any defect in what the parties agreed upon, nor is a violation of the regulations invoked in the appeal observed, since it is clear that what was agreed fully corresponds to the nature of the open mortgage, for which clear and explicit stipulations were established in the constitutive act of the guarantee, the content and scope of which the plaintiff and debtor cannot now disavow. In doing so, it is clear, they assume a position contrary to the duties of contractual good faith. At bottom, what is perceived is an attempt to evade the legal consequences of a contractual breach, which constitutes an abusive posture that the legal operator cannot endorse (canons 20 and 22 of the Código Civil). In an identical sense, consult the judgment of the Sala Primera de la Corte no. 948-F-S1-2022 at 08 hours 12 minutes on May 5, 2022.

VIII. By virtue of the reasons set forth, the rejection of the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed is required

Since, in this Chamber’s judgment, the cassation appellant lacks sufficient grounds to appeal, the appellant is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal (canon 150.3 of the CPCA), which shall be liquidated during the judgment enforcement phase, in order to guarantee the right of defense of the party against whom enforcement is sought, by granting the respective hearing on the liquidation that is submitted (articles 41 and 153 of the Political Constitution).

THEREFORE

The appeal is dismissed, with costs to be borne by the plaintiff. DRUDIN.

Telephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email [email protected]

Documento PJEDITOR  Res. 000016-F-TC-2025 TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, a las nueve horas cinco minutos del seis de febrero del dos mil veinticinco.

En el proceso de conocimiento, formulado por HOTEL POSADA CLARO DE LUNA SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, cédula de persona jurídica 3-101-280320, representada por su apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma, el señor Johnny Guzmán Zamora, portador de la cédula de identidad 2-384-205; en contra del BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA, cédula de persona jurídica 4-000-001021, representado por su apoderado general sin límite de suma, el señor Juan Carlos Corrales Salas, cédula 1-481-093; el Licenciado Gerardo José Bouzid Jiménez, apoderado especial judicial de la parte actora, interpuso recurso de casación impugnando la sentencia número 08-2022-VII, emitida a las 08 horas 40 minutos del 03 de febrero de 2022, por la Sección Sétima del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, integrada por las personas juzgadoras Alinne Solano Ramírez, Francisco Hidalgo Rueda y Gustavo Irías Obando.

Magistrado ponente Jorge Leiva Poveda

CONSIDERANDO

I.La demanda fue presentada el 24 de mayo de 2018. En resumen, la parte actora alegó que, en la escritura pública no. 89-4, otorgada ante la notaria pública Karla Fuentes Marín a las 10 horas del 30 de abril de 2009, se constituyó una hipoteca abierta en primer grado, en favor de la entidad demandada, por un plazo de trescientos sesenta meses, con vencimiento al 30 de abril de 2039. Ahora bien, la parte actora alegó que la hipoteca no contaba en su inscripción, con la descripción de todos los elementos que establece el ordenamiento jurídico para su ejecución anticipada, como lo son los tractos del pago, el monto de las cuotas, su periodicidad, la tasa de interés específica del crédito y las causales de vencimiento anticipado. Conforme a su relato, el banco intentó integrar la hipoteca, con un pagaré, mismo que es de naturaleza diversa y no goza de inscripción. En ese sentido, se resaltó, por ejemplo, que, en la constitución de la hipoteca se estableció que el plazo de los créditos garantizados sería definido en el contrato respectivo (hecho décimo primero) y que el vencimiento anticipado podía darse ante el impago de algún crédito, al amparo de los “respectivos documentos”. Considera que tal cosa es improcedente. Entre otras razones, por tener la hipoteca una vía de ejecución diversa al pagaré, el que se cobra por medio de un proceso monitorio. También fue parte de su tesis que, conforme al canon 41 del Código de Comercio, no es posible “implicar” un contrato mercantil con uno civil que requiere de solemnidades específicas para su validez; y menos, pretender ejecutarlos conjuntamente (imagen 22 del libelo inicial). Refirió que no entendió que, tanto el pagaré que suscribió el 30 de abril de 2009 – no. 198200 -, como la hipoteca aludida, eran garantía del mismo préstamo bancario; en cambio, estimó que se trataba de papeleo. Resaltó, además, que ligar un pagaré a una hipoteca, de esa manera, desnaturaliza el primero, como garantía incondicional de pago, lo que es improcedente. Desde esa óptica, dijo que, dentro del pagaré, se indicó que el crédito quedaría garantizado con la hipoteca abierta ya aludida, de modo tal que el título valor perdió todo su valor como título ejecutivo (imagen 25 del archivo digital del 24/05/2018). También sostuvo la sociedad actora, que su representación había comprendido que cuando surgían y se firmaban los contratos mercantiles, estos sustituían la garantía hipotecaria. Al respecto, manifestó que, la diferencia del plazo de la hipoteca y el pagaré generaba incerteza al respecto. Alegó que no es procedente ejecutar dos o más garantías, como lo pretendió la entidad financiera, en la sede cobratoria; sea, en el proceso de convenio preventivo tramitado bajo el expediente 11-100148-0297-CI, en el que intentó exigir el pago de la deuda contenida en el crédito hipotecario. En ese orden de ideas, la parte actora alegó que, por no contar con la información necesaria para ello, la hipoteca que se intentó ejecutar devino en inexigible. Las pretensiones planteadas son las siguientes: "1. Solicito que se admita la presente demanda y se confiera el debido traslado a la parte accionada. 2. Solicito se declare que la hipoteca No 88-4 suscrita ante la notaria Karla Fuentes Marín suscrita a las 10 horas del 30 de abril del año 2009, tiene su vencimiento contractual hasta el 30 de abril del año 2039 y que el pago de la misma deberá realizarse en dicho momento. 3. Solicito se declare la Falta de Exigibilidad del documento hipotecario suscrito en la escritura No 89-4, suscrita ante la notaria Karla Fuentes Marín, suscrita a las 10 horas del 30 de abril del año 2009, en la cual se constituyó un crédito hipotecario que está siendo liquidado de forma irregular y que no contiene ninguna cláusula referente al pago en tractos sucesivos. 4. Solicito que se declare en efecto retroactivo que el vencimiento de la deuda nació con el contrato de crédito hipotecario del 30 de abril del 2009 y que se declare que todos los pagos realizados por mi representada al BNCR deben de ser devueltos al deudor en razón de que el plazo del único documento de crédito vence hasta el 30 de abril del año 2039. 5. Solicito que se declaren totalmente extintos y además prescritos todos los intereses moratorios corridos desde el 30 de abril del 2009 en adelante. 6. Que se condene al demandado al pago de ambas costas de este proceso. 7. Se ordene la cancelación del asiento hipotecario visible bajo las citas 2009-111188-01-0001-001 y se tenga por cancelado dicho documento de crédito en razón de que fue sustituido por los contratos mercantiles los cuales fueron firmados suscritos y adheridos en fechas posteriores al contrato central. En defecto de lo anterior solicitamos que judicialmente se ordene modificar el citado contrato, disponiéndose registralmente y modificando en el mismo las siguientes cláusulas: TERCERO: INTERESES CORRIENTES – MODIFICACIÓN DE LOS INTERESES CORRIENTES – CUARTO: INTERESES MORATORIOS – DÉCIMO TERCERO_ VENCIMIENTO ANTICIPADO, de modo que queden completamente nulas". La entidad accionada se opuso a la demanda y opuso las defensas de “prescripción o caducidad” y falta de derecho. En la audiencia preliminar celebrada el 02 de octubre de 2018, las partes rindieron sus conclusiones, por ser el asunto de puro derecho, en el tanto no había prueba por evacuar en juicio. En la sentencia impugnada, se rechazó la excepción de “prescripción o caducidad” y se acogió la de falta de derecho. En consecuencia, se declaró la demanda sin lugar, en todos sus extremos. Las costas fueron impuestas a la parte actora. Disconforme, su representación, formula recurso de casación.

II.Breve consideración sobre la estructura de la sentencia de casación. En esta resolución, los alegatos antecedentes de las partes, así como sus agravios, son resumidos sucintamente, de manera tal que se señalan sus aspectos principales, sin perjuicio de la lectura íntegra que se ha hecho de los alegatos accesorios, así como de los diversos razonamientos que desarrollan las ideas centrales de la exposición – v.g., reiteraciones argumentativas, relatos minuciosos de eventos procesales, opiniones personales, citas doctrinarias y jurisprudenciales, entre otros elementos similares de la redacción, todo lo cual puede ser consultado con detalle en el libelo correspondiente -; todo, en aras de propiciar una mejor lectura y atención de los agravios, al amparo y en observancia de lo ordenado en el canon 61.2 del Código Procesal Civil, al disponer que: “Las sentencias de segunda instancia y casación incluirán un breve resumen de los aspectos debatidos en la resolución impugnada y de los alegatos de los recurrentes”. Dicho mandato es de aplicación supletoria en el proceso contencioso, en lo que a la estructura de la sentencia se refiere, conforme al canon 220 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

III.Agravios. Antes de hacer alusión a los agravios expuestos, debe advertirse que el recurso es reiterativo. El texto contiene los siguientes apartados: “1. La resolución de excepciones resuelve el fondo de las pretensiones de la demanda…” (imagen 3); “2. Se resolvió una excepción sin dar audiencia a la contraparte para que alegue lo pertinente…” (imagen 3); “3. NO EXISTEN MOTIVOS PARA DECLARAR CON LUGAR LA EXCEPCIÓN DE FALTA DE DERECHO”; “De la Falta de Derecho de la Sentencia” (imagen 5); “Considerando V sobre normativa aplicable”; “4. El tribunal de alzada ha violentado el debido proceso al adelantar criterio…” (folio 11); “5. La decisión no está motivada”” (imagen 11). Sin embargo, en línea con la advertencia realizada anteriormente, se exponen, de seguido, los reproches que se coligen de su lectura, evitándose reiteraciones innecesarias. Desde ya, debe advertirse que la claridad, orden y precisión es una carga que debe observar quien formule una impugnación, de modo tal que, si bien la Sala, en desprendimiento de formalismos innecesarios, accede al análisis de los reparos, esto lo hace en la medida que lo permita, razonablemente, la redacción. Así las cosas, las censuras consisten en los siguientes temas. Reclamos de índole procesal. a. La sentencia no está motivada, con respecto al acogimiento de la excepción de falta de derecho, de modo tal que no se entiende el porqué de ello. (imagen 11). b. Hay una violación al debido proceso, toda vez que el Tribunal adelantó criterio. Se muestra disconforme el recurrente con que, el a quo, en lugar de limitarse a la resolución de las excepciones previas, se refiriera al fondo de las pretensiones. Considera que dicho proceder es precipitado, por cuanto únicamente ha transcurrido la audiencia preliminar, de manera que solo debía emitirse pronunciamiento sobre cuestiones interlocutorias (imágenes 3 y 11). c. Se causó indefensión, pues no se otorgó audiencia a la parte actora sobre las excepciones opuestas; concretamente, sobre lo alegado por el demandado el 22 de agosto de 2018.

IV.Ninguno de los reparos por la forma es de recibo. En cuanto a la falta de motivación, sobre el acogimiento de la falta de derecho, ello es totalmente desacertado. Ya la jurisprudencia casacional ha señalado, reiteradamente, que dicha anomalía acontece cuando el órgano jurisdiccional omite expresar las razones que motivan su decisión, o bien, cuando las que señala, son gravemente contradictorias o incomprensibles, lo que termina produciendo el mismo efecto, sea, la imposibilidad de que las partes – y la comunidad jurídica, en general - comprendan la resolución. Esto perjudica la justicia del caso concreto, pues obsta a que la parte perjudicada con la decisión pueda recurrirla, al desconocer sus basamentos. Asimismo, el vicio en cuestión, resulta lesivo más allá de los límites del conflicto en particular, pues sustrae a la sentencia de la claridad que se requiere, a efectos de que la transparencia y publicidad de la función jurisdiccional, puedan ser objeto de los legítimos mecanismos de contralor popular e institucional. De tal manera, la adecuada fundamentación de las decisiones, se erige como una garantía del principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, contemplado en el canon 11 de la Constitución Política, proyectado, a nivel legal, en el canon 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Sobre el tema, consúltese, entre muchas otras, las resoluciones de la Sala Primera no. 484 de las 10 horas 30 minutos del 12 de agosto de 2003; 195 de las 09 horas 10 minutos del 08 de marzo de 2018; 316-F-S1-2021 de las 11 horas 55 minutos del 11 de febrero de 2021; 1750-F-S1-2021 de las 13 horas 58 minutos del 12 de octubre de 2021. Ahora bien, debe mencionarse, también, que el derecho es uno de los presupuestos materiales necesarios para el dictado de toda sentencia estimatoria. En suma, consiste en que el ordenamiento jurídico respalde la situación jurídica que se busca tutelar en la demanda; ya sea que se persiga su declaración o constitución judicial. Por lo general, será la misma persona promovente de la demanda – sea personalmente, o por representación -, quien debe ostentar la titularidad de la situación jurídica objeto del proceso; aunque hay circunstancias excepcionales, en la que ello no es así, como ocurre, por ejemplo, en la acción oblicua, donde un acreedor ejerce la acción en resguardo de un derecho de su deudor, lo que le beneficia mediatamente, para poder satisfacer su crédito. (numeral 715 del Código Civil). Ahora bien, además del derecho, la legitimación – en sus modalidades activa y pasiva -, así como el interés actual, deben ser revisados, necesariamente, de oficio. Ello quiere decir que, de detectar el Tribunal que, cualquiera de sus presupuestos, no concurre en el caso concreto, no es procedente estimar la demanda. Consúltese, al respecto, entre muchos otros, los votos de la Sala no. 1424-F-S1-2022 de las 11 horas 40 minutos del 18 de agosto de 2022, 592-F-S1-2023 de las 10 horas 32 minutos del 20 de abril de 2023 y 236-F-S1-2023 de las 09 horas 25 minutos del 23 de febrero de 2023. En ese orden de ideas, si el Tribunal desarrolla diversas razones, a lo largo del fallo, para justificar por qué motivo, en su criterio, el ordenamiento jurídico no prohíja las pretensiones planteadas – por motivos que no correspondan a una falta de legitimación o interés, los que ameritan de su propia explicación -, es evidente que así justifica la falta de derecho; máxime si, al rechazar dicha defensa, hace una referencia explicita a las razones que contiene el pronunciamiento, para justificar el rechazo de la demanda. Ello es, precisamente, lo que ha ocurrido en la especie. En ese sentido, en el considerando VIII del fallo, se lee al respecto: “En lo que toca a la falta de derecho, en virtud de lo que ha sido explicado por el Tribunal en los apartes previos, la citada excepción ha de declararse con lugar, debido a la improcedencia total de la demanda”. Así las cosas, a lo que se debe prestar atención es a la justificación que dio el a quo para rechazar la demanda. La respuesta, se encuentra en el considerando VII. En suma, la motivación que llevó a las personas juzgadoras a denegar las pretensiones, consiste en los siguientes puntos. 1) En el acto de constitución de la hipoteca abierta, ambas partes acordaron que el incumplimiento del pago de cada uno de los préstamos mercantiles que se garantizaran con la hipoteca, conforme a las condiciones establecidas en cada uno de ellos, daría lugar al vencimiento anticipado de la garantía. Transcribió cláusulas del contrato para concluir que el mismo sí contenía estipulaciones claras y exactas sobre la exigibilidad de la hipoteca, en caso de impago. 2) En la escritura hipotecaria, se estableció una vinculación expresa de la hipoteca con un préstamo mercantil que se le otorgó a la demandada, en aquel momento, el que contenía las condiciones correspondientes, conocidas por las partes. En ese sentido, destacó que en el instrumento público aludido se estableció que: "…para cada operación que se constituya al amparo de la presente Hipoteca Abierta, el reintegro se realizará de acuerdo a la forma pactada con el cliente, en función de la actividad a financiar". A partir de esa manifestación, coligió que las partes remitieron, voluntariamente, las disposiciones relacionadas al pago del crédito, a las estipulaciones contenidas en los contratos que surgieran y tuviesen respaldo en dicha garantía abierta. 3) El ordinal 414 habilita la constitución de una hipoteca por un crédito abierto, el que se complementa con las cláusulas de cada préstamo. 4) Los contratos que suscribieron las partes, relacionados con la operación crediticia no. 57-15-30485326, establecen un cuadro claramente detallado de las sumas a pagar cada mes, lo que se complementa con las demás cláusulas de la hipoteca del préstamo. 5) La misma parte actora, en sus pretensiones, reconoce que la hipoteca es un contrato central de garantía que se vio extendido por otros que penden del principal de apertura de crédito y que se sustentan en la misma garantía. 6) En lo que respecta a la solicitud de que se declararan prescritos los intereses, se indicó que ello no es procedente puesto que no consta que se haya dictado resolución final en el proceso de convenio preventivo instaurado por la actora, tramitado bajo el expediente 11-100148-0297-CI. De tal manera, es criterio del Tribunal que, conforme al numeral 723 de la Ley no. 7130 – aplicable a ese proceso concursal -, no corre plazo de prescripción alguno, mientras dicho asunto judicial se encuentre en trámite. Como es claro, la sentencia sí contiene, entonces, múltiples razones por las cuales se consideró procedente la demanda y no la excepción de falta de derecho. Por ende, se descarta cualquier falta de motivación al respecto. Luego, no hay anticipó de criterio alguno, por el hecho de que la resolución contenga pronunciamiento sobre el fondo del asunto. El recurrente estima que la misma únicamente podía referirse a las excepciones previas. Se equivoca. La resolución impugnada no es otra que la sentencia. En la audiencia preliminar, celebrada el 02 de octubre de 2018, el asunto fue declarado de puro derecho (minuto 20:30 del audio de la audiencia preliminar, de fecha 02/10/2018, a las 14:35:52 horas), pues no había prueba por evacuar en juicio; de modo tal que ambas partes tuvieron oportunidad de rendir conclusiones, como efectivamente lo hicieron. La parte actora no formuló reclamo alguno cuando se tomó esa decisión. Es más, fue la misma parte actora – ver minuto 20 del audio -, la que consideró que el asunto es de pleno derecho y prescindió de la prueba testimonial y confesional que había ofrecido. Por ende, lo procedente, dada la naturaleza del asunto, reconocida por el representante de la demandante, era el dictado de la sentencia. En esta, naturalmente, debían resolverse las excepciones que correspondiera, así como la procedencia de la demanda, por el fondo (98, inciso segundo, 119 y 121 del CPCA). Así, no hubo anticipo alguno. Lo que ocurre es que fue innecesaria la celebración de un juicio, de manera que se procedió tal y como lo ordena el Código de Rito, en el ordinal 98 ibidem, en lo que estuvo de acuerdo la misma parte que ahora recurre. Las personas litigantes, por lo demás, pudieron emitir sus conclusiones, de previo al fallo, de modo que no hay indefensión alguna. A minuto 21:28 del audio del juicio, la parte actora inició sus alegatos de cierre, sin ningún inconveniente, mismos que se extendieron durante más de catorce minutos (hasta el tiempo 35:44). Por ende, es clara la improcedencia de este alegato. Finalmente, en lo que respecta a que no se otorgó audiencia sobre las excepciones de fondo; ello tampoco es de recibo. En autos consta la resolución de las 14 horas 18 minutos del 24 de agosto de 2018, en la que, expresamente, se indicó: “…se tiene por contestada en tiempo y forma la presente demanda, y por interpuesta las excepciones de FALTA DE DERECHO, CULPA DE LA VICTIMA, PRESCRIPCIÓN y CADUCIDAD. De la oposición formulada, se confiere audiencia por TRES DÍAS HÁBILES a la parte actora, quien al referirse a ella puede ofrecer su contraprueba (artículo 70 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo)”. El acta de notificación a la parte actora, tuvo resultado positivo y consta asociada al expediente electrónico el día 04/09/2019 a las 16:30:08 horas. Por ende, no es cierto que no se otorgó audiencia sobre las excepciones opuestas. Además, en audiencia, como ya se indicó, la parte demandante tuvo plena oportunidad de referirse al fondo del asunto y a la tesis de defensa de la contraparte. Así, es claro que los alegatos por la forma son notoriamente inatendibles e inconsistentes con lo que se desprende de los autos.

V.Razones sustantivas. Como ya se anticipó, la redacción del recurso es reiterativa y, además, carece de la claridad y concisión deseada. No obstante, los argumentos expuestos serán resumidos de seguido, de manera concreta, evitándose, hasta donde sea posible, reiteraciones y divagaciones innecesarias, que en nada contribuyen a una adecuada lectura de la disconformidad, ni de lo que aquí se resuelve. Para una lectura detallada del texto, consúltese el libelo recursivo. En suma, el casacionista considera que la hipoteca abierta que ha pretendido ejecutar la parte actora, deviene en inexigible, de manera anticipada, por cuanto no contiene, el título inscrito, de los elementos necesarios para ello, como lo son las cláusulas de “tracto sucesivo” y de vencimiento anticipado, tasas de interés, plazos y montos de los pagos. Invoca lo dispuesto en el canon 409 del Código Civil, conforme al cual toda hipoteca y sus pormenores deben estar inscritos en el Registro correspondiente. También apela al mandato 465, inciso segundo, ibidem. Destaca que este precepto establece la necesidad de que el asiento respectivo indique, además de las circunstancias generales, el monto del crédito, sus plazos y condiciones, la tasa de interés y la fecha desde la cual corren. Estima improcedente que la hipoteca inscrita se complemente, para efectos de su vencimiento anticipado, con las cláusulas de otros contratos que no gozan de inscripción. Según su entender, se trata de una costumbre contraria a Derecho. Aduce, lo procedente era la suscripción de adendas a la hipoteca, las que debían ser igualmente inscritas y no dar rango de hipoteca a contratos mercantiles de préstamo, lo que infringe el mandato 166 del Código Procesal Civil. Razona que, en caso de que se proceda de la manera que considera correcta, los créditos correspondientes quedarían cubiertos por la garantía preferente, sin tener que acudirse a otros contratos de garantía. Considera, por lo demás, que el Tribunal se abocó al análisis de cuestiones que divergen de lo que se ha discutido; por ejemplo, al realizar explicaciones generales sobre la hipoteca, sin dar respuesta exacta a lo que fue sometido a su conocimiento. Considera que no hay respaldo normativo que permita integrar una garantía hipotecaria, con instrumentos mercantiles como un pagaré. Sostiene que el canon 414, mencionado en el fallo, no lo permite, ni tampoco el cardinal 70 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional. Entre otras normas, invoca, además, los artículos 10, inciso 1, 36, 42 y 43 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, para sustentar la procedencia de la demanda. Refiere que el conflicto es de naturaleza civil y no mercantil, en el tanto se ha reclamado el incumplimiento de formalidades jurídicas, por lo que no es procedente hacer alusión a las teorías restrictivas, amplia o intermedia del título abierto. También razona que tampoco formó parte del debate, establecer los alcances del artículo 70 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, con relación al ordinal 414 del Código Civil. Discrepa del enfoque del fallo, con respecto al primero de esos mandatos. Argumenta que la hipoteca se ejecuta como un título de ejecución con rango preferente, mientras que el contrato mercantil no. Mantiene que, por dicha vía, únicamente pueden ejecutarse la prenda, hipoteca o cédulas hipotecarias, que estén debidamente inscritas. Resalta, además, que el cardinal 64 de la citada ley bancaria, contempla la potestad de los bancos para operar y reglamentar las hipotecas que garanticen créditos abiertos, conforme a lo estipulado en el canon 414 del Código Civil. Sin embargo, acota: “Note la Sala Primera que la norma especifica que se está sometiendo al marco de acción no es ni el 414 del derecho civil, sino el incumplimiento del 409 y del 465 y note también la Honorable Sala Primera que el 414 no le regala ni le condona al título abierto ninguna clase de exención para no tener a su vez que acogerse a los requisitos de toda hipoteca en los dos articulados principales de la materia”. Considera que lo dispuesto en el numeral 414 ejúsdem queda sujeto a las exigencias previstas en los cánones 409 y 465, inciso segundo, de ese mismo cuerpo normativo. Refuta que el título hipotecario contenga cláusulas expresas en lo referente al vencimiento anticipado y ejecución. Estima que no hay estipulaciones precisas, determinadas y “fechadas en el tiempo”.

VI.Ya antes se hizo referencia al criterio del a quo. En lo que ahora interesa, cabe tener en cuenta que, para las personas juzgadoras que lo integran, la hipoteca abierta objeto de debate no carece de los elementos necesarios para su ejecución anticipada, pues las partes suscriptoras del contrato de garantía real aludido, establecieron que la misma sería ejecutable, en caso de que se incumplieran los pagos de las obligaciones garantizadas, en los términos que se establecieran en estos. Así, el hecho de que el crédito garantizado contara con una detallada descripción de las cuotas, montos y demás condiciones crediticias, permitía la operatividad de la garantía. No obstante, el recurrente discrepa de esa postura, pues estima que todos y cada uno de los elementos del crédito garantizado deben estar inscritos, para que queden cubiertos por el gravamen de respaldo en mención. Ya este órgano ha tenido oportunidad de referirse sobre el mismo tema traído a colación. Tal como se ha hecho en otras ocasiones, resulta imprescindible, en primer término, realizar una referencia al instituto de la hipoteca abierta, entendida esta como un tipo especial de derecho real de garantía. En ese orden de ideas, su regulación legal se encuentra en el canon 414 del Código Civil, norma que se ubica en el Libro II (“De los Bienes y de la Extensión y Modificaciones de la Propiedad”), Título VI (“De la Hipoteca y de la Prenda”), Capítulo I (“De la Hipoteca”), de ese cuerpo normativo. Su texto es el siguiente: “Constituida hipoteca por un crédito abierto con limitación de suma, garantiza las cantidades entregadas en cualquier tiempo y para diversos fines, siempre que no excedan de la suma prefijada. Cualquier pago que efectúe el deudor, automáticamente creará disponibilidad para ser utilizada de la forma que lo convengan las partes”. Ahora bien, como se ve, se trata de una suerte particular de hipoteca, pues, en este caso, la garantía puede respaldar una pluralidad de “cantidades entregadas en cualquier tiempo y para diversos fines”. Es diáfano que la norma se refiere al respaldo hipotecario de diversos créditos, incluso posteriores a la constitución del gravamen. De lo contrario, la garantía abierta no tendría razón de ser, pues quedaría totalmente sujeta a una operación en particular y no a una cantidad indeterminada de financiamientos, como lo prevé la ley, los cuales pueden ser concedidos, incluso, para fines diversos. Ahora bien, la lectura de ese mandato debe realizarse con atención a los parámetros hermenéuticos del canon 10 del Código Civil. Este, establece que: “Las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas”. En ese sentido, de cara a los planteamientos de la parte actora, resulta necesario determinar si es acorde con la finalidad - ratio legis - de la regulación de la hipoteca abierta, así como con la realidad social en la que esta es utilizada, entender que tanto la tasa de interés, como la modalidad de pago de los créditos garantizados, deben determinarse desde que se constituye la hipoteca abierta, o bien, inscribirse en el momento en que surge cada una de esas operaciones financieras que se pretenden respaldar con el gravamen aperturado sobre la finca garante. Para dar respuesta a tal interrogante, debe asociarse el instituto en cuestión a su utilización en el ámbito bancario nacional. Al efecto, el artículo 64 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional (o LOSBN en adelante), contempla, expresamente, “…la potestad de cada banco para operar y reglamentar las hipotecas que garanticen créditos abiertos, conforme a lo estipulado en el artículo 414 del Código Civil”. Este precepto es mencionado en el recurso. Sin embargo, es claro que el recurrente no le da su dimensión correcta, al relacionarlo a los cánones 409 y 465 del mismo código. El mandato bajo análisis, contempla la utilización de ese instrumento como una herramienta financiera que puede ser utilizada por los bancos que integran el Sistema Bancario Nacional, como lo es el Banco Nacional. No puede dejar de considerarse que las entidades financieras manejan diversas líneas de crédito, cada una de ellas con sus propias condiciones y finalidades, lo que constituye un hecho notorio en un contexto económico como el actual, donde una multiplicidad de organizaciones bancarias ofrece diferentes opciones de financiamiento para los muy variados propósitos que los agentes económicos pueden perseguir en el mercado. Así, por ejemplo, la clientela bancaria tiene acceso a productos financieros para compra y construcción de bienes inmobiliarios, adquisición de vehículos y otros bienes muebles, desarrollo de proyectos empresariales agrícolas, industriales, comerciales, turísticos o de cualquier otro giro (sean las prestatarias, micro, pequeñas, medianas o grandes empresas), refundición de otros créditos, uso discrecional, entre muchas otras opciones. Consecuente y lógicamente, son múltiples los factores que, de cara a cada una de las líneas ofertadas, son consideradas por la entidad financiera para determinar las tasas de interés aplicables, el plazo del financiamiento, la forma de pago, así como la periodicidad y monto de los abonos a capital e intereses. El artículo 130 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, establece lo siguiente: “El pago del principal, intereses, comisiones y otras cargas de los créditos concedidos por los Departamentos Hipotecarios, se pactará por cuotas fijas periódicas, pagaderas en períodos no inferiores a un mes ni mayores de un año, que comprenderán dichos pagos en forma proporcional conforme a las tablas matemáticas que para esos efectos calcularán los departamentos. A juicio de la Junta Directiva de cada banco, las cuotas se cobrarán por anticipado o bien por períodos vencidos. El deudor tendrá derecho a pagar anticipadamente el todo o parte de su deuda, pero los departamentos no estarán obligados a devolverle intereses, comisiones ni otras cargas que hubieren sido pagadas por anticipado”. Nótese, conforme a la normativa transcrita, los diferentes créditos hipotecarios cuentan con sus propias condiciones. Además, el artículo 128 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo contempla la potestad del Banco Central para fijar, cuando lo considere necesario: “(…) 1) Las tasas máximas de interés, comisión y otras cargas que pueden cobrar a sus deudores”. Del mismo modo, las tasas de interés que los bancos reconocen a sus inversionistas son, igualmente, variables en el tiempo (v.g., numerales 497 del Código de Comercio y 1163 del Código Civil). Así las cosas, es evidente que la interpretación de las regulaciones del sistema financiero, no puede llevarse a cabo sin tomar en cuenta el dinamismo propio del mercado y de las relaciones crediticias. Por ende, no encuentra el Tribunal razón alguna en los argumentos de la actora, en el tanto pretende que la hipoteca abierta sea concebida como un instituto rígido e inflexible, que deba ser modificada, a nivel registral, cada vez que sea utilizada como garantía de un crédito diverso, a pesar de que la misma ha sido estatuida como una herramienta que permite el financiamiento de diversos financiamientos y para fines igualmente variados, por parte de los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional. En línea con el criterio expuesto por el a quo, entonces, considera la Sala que esos elementos deben determinarse en los documentos que constituyan las operaciones garantizadas, como aconteció en la especie. De lo contrario, se insiste, la hipoteca abierta carecería, realmente, de la utilidad que tiene; pues quedaría limitada a una única operación, la que debería tener fijas, de una vez, condiciones únicas exigibles en todo el plazo. Es decir, la hipoteca no sería abierta, sino común. Tampoco tiene sentido exigir nuevas inscripciones conforme se vayan otorgando las cantidades que garantiza la hipoteca. Adviértase, la inscripción del gravamen satisface la publicidad registral que se requiere, a efectos de que la existencia de la afectación y de la relación existente entre el banco y su cliente, pueda ser de conocimiento público y de terceros interesados. Lo que propone el recurrente sería exactamente igual a que, cada vez que se otorgue un nuevo crédito, se modificara una hipoteca común. Evidentemente, la lógica de la hipoteca abierta facilita la relación económica y jurídica que establece el banco con su clientela, permitiendo a esta tener acceso a nuevos préstamos, sin tener que otorgar una nueva garantía, pues basta, a esos efectos, asociar el crédito a la que fue ya constituida y consentida para tal fin. Recuérdese que la publicidad registral es imprescindible para que un acto jurídico surta efectos frente a terceros; mas no así entre las partes (numeral 455 del Código Civil). De tal manera, si banco y consumidor acuerdan asociar alguna de sus operaciones a una garantía abierta, no hay óbice alguno para que esta sea utilizada. Tampoco se lesionan los intereses de terceros, pues la publicidad registral les avisa, precisamente, que existe un gravamen preferente, el que responde hasta por un monto determinado, en la escritura constitutiva. En este caso, por setecientos mil dólares (hecho probado primero). En ese orden de ideas, quien tuviese interés en adquirir algún derecho sobre el bien, sabe de la existencia de una garantía de esa índole. Por esa misma razón, no resulta tampoco de recibo el argumento expuesto por el actor, al decir que se ha concedido a la costumbre un valor superior a la ley, pues la práctica de respaldar, con una misma hipoteca abierta, créditos que se plasmen en documentos aparte, en los que se fijan sus diversas condiciones específicas, en aspectos tales como las tasas de interés, monto y frecuencia de los pagos parciales, no es, en modo alguno, contraria a la ley. Por el contrario, la práctica consuetudinaria bancaria constituye una fuente legítima del derecho mercantil y bancario, que complementa la regulación comentada. Lo anterior, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 del Código de Comercio, en el que se dispone lo siguiente al respecto: “Las costumbres mercantiles servirán no sólo para suplir el silencio de la ley, sino también como regla para apreciar el sentido de las palabras o términos técnicos del comercio usados en los actos o contratos mercantiles”. Vale acotar que, aunque el recurrente intenta desconocer la relación de este asunto con las normas del Código de Comercio, es evidente que se equivoca. La actividad bancaria es, ante todo, mercantil. De hecho, el artículo 4 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, se refiere a los “bancos comerciales del Estado”. De tal manera, resulta imposible disociar, como lo quiere el recurrente, las normas, principios y fuentes del Derecho Mercantil, con la operatividad de la hipoteca abierta, aún y cuando esta se regula en el Código Civil. Lo que busca el casacionista es que se haga prevalecer una tesis meramente formalista, sobre la inscripción de la hipoteca, con total independencia del contexto de su aplicación, lo que es contrario a los parámetros exegéticos y hermenéuticos contenidos en el cardinal 10 ibídem. Dicho sea de paso, el propio Código de Comercio permite la aplicación de las regulaciones del Código Civil, en el tanto sea necesario para dar respuesta a las cuestiones que no regule expresamente el Código Mercantil (numeral 2 ibidem), como lo es la utilización de la hipoteca para garantizar operaciones mercantiles, aunado a la previsión expresa del ordinal 64 de la LOSBN. Finalmente, debe decirse, no es cierto que el contrato de constitución de la garantía hipotecaria no cuente con regulaciones referentes a aspectos tales como la tasa de interés, condiciones del pago y vencimiento anticipado. Lo que ocurre es que estas se ajustan, precisamente, a la naturaleza de la hipoteca abierta pues, si bien contienen una programación al respecto, esta no determina, definitivamente, las condiciones de cada operación, sino que prevé que, en cada caso, deberán definirse, en los documentos correspondientes. Al respecto, resulta oportuno transcribir algunas de las estipulaciones contractuales. Conforme al hecho probado segundo, no desmentido, en el contrato se lee, en lo que ahora interesa, lo siguiente: “B) REINTEGRO: El deudor acepta que para cada operación que se constituya a amparo de la presente Hipoteca Abierta, el reintegro se realizará de acuerdo a la forma pactada con el cliente, en función de la actividad a financiar y el plan de Inversión, ya sea mensual, bimestral, trimestral, semestral o anual, de igual manera el plazo. Las amortizaciones crean disponibilidad inmediata para ser nuevamente utilizado, en la forma convenida entre las partes. El no pago de los préstamos garantizados con esta hipoteca abierta o de los intereses en la forma originalmente pactada de una o varias operaciones darán por vencida y exigible la garantía hipotecaria que cubre la Hipoteca Abierta. EL DEUDOR ha sido informado y advertido y por consiguiente acepta, que los desembolsos de este crédito se realizarán conforme a la disponibilidad de fondos del Acreedor (...) C) PLAN DE INVERSIÓN: APERTURA DE HIPOTECA ABIERTA. Se podrán financiar todas las actividades y planes de inversión establecidos en la normativa crediticia del Banco Nacional, para solventar la necesidad de recursos del solicitante según se pacta en cada préstamo garantizado con esta hipoteca abierta. D) DESEMBOLSO DEL PRÉSTAMO: El desembolso será para cada operación derivada de acuerdo con la actividad a financiar, el plan de inversión y conforme a la práctica usual del Banco. (...) TASA DE INTERÉS: El deudor acepta que los intereses corrientes serán los que rijan para cada tipo de préstamo, vigente a la fecha de formalización para la actividad que se está financiando y de acuerdo con el tipo de moneda. Será revisada y ajustable mensualmente, pagadera en forma anticipada o en la forma que lo estipule el producto crediticio. (...) G) INTERESES MORATORIOS: El deudor reconoce intereses moratorios al mismo tipo de los intereses corrientes de cada crédito derivado, más dos puntos porcentuales, calculados sobre el monto del abono retrasado, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo setenta de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional.(...) L) GARANTÍA: (...) que en garantía de pago de los préstamos que se aprueben y formalicen para cada caso, sus intereses corrientes y moratorios a los tipos indicados, gastos de cuido, gastos por concepto de pólizas, gastos correspondientes a la gestión cobratoria, ambas costas de la eventual ejecución y todos los otros gastos en los que incurra el acreedor para el cobro del Crédito (sic) y el cumplimiento de todas las obligaciones que se deriven de cualquier operación otorgada al amparo de este crédito se constituye a favor del BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA HIPOTECA ABIERTA DE PRIMER GRADO durante el plazo convenido sobre los siguientes inmuebles del Partido de Puntarenas: I) matrícula de folio real número SETENTA Y CINCO MIL NOVECIENTOS NOVENTA Y TRES- CERO CERO CERO (...) Con una responsabilidad legal a inscribir de TRESCIENTOS MIL DÓLARES. II) Matrícula de Folio Real número CIENTO CINCUENTA Y CUATRO MIL TRESCIENTOS SETENTA Y DOS- CERO CERO CERO (...) Con una responsabilidad legal a inscribir de CUATROCIENTOS MIL DÓLARES. I (…) Q) VENCIMIENTO ANTICIPADO: Además de las situaciones que se mencionan en esta escritura, el Acreedor podrá tener por vencida y exigible anticipadamente la totalidad de la deuda; lo cual el deudor acepta de manera expresa e irrevocable; en los casos: (...) d) Si el deudor deja de pagar un crédito o los intereses o cualquier suma que debiere pagar al amparo de los respectivos documentos (...) el Acreedor con su solo dicho, podrá tener por vencida y exigible ejecutivamente la obligación y exigir su total e inmediata cancelación de conformidad con lo establecido en los artículos cuatrocientos veinte del Código de Comercio y setenta de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, por la vía que considere conveniente, sin que sean necesarios requerimientos ni otros requisitos previos. T) OTRAS OBLIGACIONES GENERALES: (...) b) Para cada subpréstamo derivado del Crédito, se deberá realizar un contrato mercantil con las condiciones crediticias del producto vigente al momento de la formalización, como son, el monto del subpréstamo, plazo, forma de pago, forma de entrega, plan de inversión intereses, comisiones, entre otros, contratos mercantiles que se tendrán por incorporados al presente documento hipotecario para todos los efectos legales. c) El deudor se compromete a cumplir incondicionalmente todas las cláusulas y términos especificados para cada préstamo y en caso de incumplimiento de cualquiera de ellas, se dará por vencida la totalidad de las operaciones amparadas con esta hipoteca abierta y se exigirá la cancelación total de las mismas. d) La falta de pago de cualquier cuota de uno de todos los préstamos amparados en esta hipoteca abierta o de los intereses, comisiones o cualquiera otros montos que deban cancelar el deudor hará exigible la totalidad del Crédito por parte del acreedor. e) Este Crédito Abierto se otorga bajo la modalidad de Hipoteca Abierta, siendo el caso que el deudor podrá hacer uso del mismo ajustándose al respectivo proyecto de inversión aprobado en cada caso a simple criterio de las instituciones acreedoras". Nótese, es evidente que el título hipotecario sí cuenta con estipulaciones claras, acordes a su naturaleza, sobre los intereses, condiciones de los pagos y causales de vencimiento anticipado. La programación fue totalmente clara. Sería, en cada operación ligada a la hipoteca, que se fijarían esas características particulares. Para ello, se estableció, con total claridad, que deberían otorgarse los contratos mercantiles respectivos, mismos que se tendrían por incorporados a la hipoteca abierta. Nótese, además, que las partes acordaron que, ante el incumplimiento del deudor, el acreedor podría dar por vencido anticipadamente el plazo y exigir la cancelación total del crédito, “de conformidad con lo establecido en los artículos cuatrocientos veinte del Código de Comercio y setenta de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional”. Estos últimos preceptos, precisamente, contemplan el vencimiento anticipado de este tipo de obligaciones (pagaderas a tractos) ante el impago de una o más cuotas del crédito, en los ámbitos mercantil y financiero. Por ende, se descarta, igualmente, cualquier falta de previsión o ilegitimidad, en lo concerniente al vencimiento anticipado de la hipoteca en caso de impago de las operaciones garantizadas.

VII.También es menester dar respuesta a lo expuesto por el casacionista, al argüir que la hipoteca tiene una vía privilegiada de ejecución, de la que no gozan los contratos mercantiles no inscritos. Tampoco lleva razón en ello. Cabe reconocer que el numeral 166 del Código Procesal Civil, establece la procedencia del proceso de ejecución hipotecaria y prendaria, en los siguientes términos: “Las hipotecas comunes y de cédula, así como la prenda debidamente inscritas, constituyen títulos de ejecución con renuncia de trámites para hacer efectivo el privilegio sobre lo gravado o, en su caso, sobre la suma del seguro, así como para hacer efectivas todas las garantías personales, las cuales se entenderán limitadas al saldo en descubierto”. Por otra parte, el proceso monitorio es la vía prevista legalmente para el cobro de un título valor como lo es un pagaré, en el tanto contiene una obligación dineraria, líquida y exigible, respaldada documentalmente. Así lo regula el artículo 110.1 del Código Procesal Civil. Ahora bien, el artículo 68 de la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, prevé la existencia de garantías “principales o adicionales”. Consecuentemente, no hay impedimento legal alguno para que una misma operación cuente con garantías de diferente naturaleza, como lo es un pagaré y una hipoteca. Por ende, verificado el incumplimiento de la obligación garantizada con garantía real, no hay razón alguna para desconocer la exigibilidad de esta, por la vía legal correspondiente. Desde esa óptica, el hecho de que, con ocasión de los créditos respaldados por la hipoteca, se suscriba, además, un documento identificado como “pagaré”, en nada desvirtúa la relación de la obligación con la hipoteca abierta, ni impide la operatividad de esta, mientras la persona consumidora haya consentido libremente y de manera informada, del respaldo de su deuda, con la garantía real de interés. Todo de conformidad con el derecho fundamental de información y seguridad de las personas consumidoras de productos financieros, establecido en el numeral 46 de la Carta Magna, así como en el artículo 32, inciso c, de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor. Eventualmente, podría discutirse si el denominado pagaré, como tal, contiene o no una promesa incondicional, pura y simple de pago, o no, en los términos de los artículos 799 y 800 del Código de Comercio. Empero, lo que es relevante, para esta lite, es que ambas partes hayan convenido en el otorgamiento de una operación crediticia respaldada por la hipoteca abierta, con sus condiciones específicas debidamente establecidas, de conformidad con su naturaleza, según ya se explicó, lo que no ha conseguido la parte actora desmentir en esta lite. Desde ese punto de vista, no hay ninguna razón plausible para decretar que la hipoteca abierta consentida por el accionante no vence sino hasta el año 2039. Tampoco hay vicio alguno en lo que acordaron las partes, ni se advierte una violación a la normativa invocada en el recurso, pues es claro que lo acordado guarda plena correspondencia con la naturaleza de la hipoteca abierta, para lo cual se establecieron estipulaciones claras y explícitas en el acto constitutivo de la garantía, cuyo contenido y alcances no puede desconocer ahora la parte actora y deudora. Al hacerlo, es claro, asume una postura contraria a los deberes de buena fe contractual. En el fondo, lo que se percibe es un intento de evadir las consecuencias legales de un incumplimiento contractual, lo que constituye una postura abusiva que el operador del Derecho no puede prohijar (cánones 20 y 22 del Código Civil). En idéntico sentido, consúltese la sentencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte no. 948-F-S1-2022 de las 08 horas 12 minutos del 05 de mayo de 2022.

VIII.En mérito de las razones expuestas, se impone el rechazo del recurso de casación formulado. Al no asistirle a la parte casacionista, a juicio de esta Cámara, motivo suficiente para recurrir, se le impone el reconocimiento de las costas del recurso (canon 150.3 del CPCA), las cuales deberán liquidarse en la fase de ejecución de sentencia, a fin de garantizar el derecho de defensa de la parte ejecutada, dándole la audiencia respectiva de la liquidación que se presente (artículos 41 y 153 de la Constitución Política).

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso interpuesto, con sus costas a cargo de la parte actora. DRUDIN.

 LUIS GUILLERMO RIVAS LOAICIGA - MAGISTRADO/A  CARLOS GUILLERMO ZAMORA CAMPOS - MAGISTRADO/A  JORGE LEIVA POVEDA - MAGISTRADO/A