Denial of exit permit for pledged vehicle based on internal bank policies and validity of registry regulationsDenegación de permiso de salida del país de vehículo prendado por políticas internas bancarias y validez del reglamento registral

**File:** 13-004752-1027-CA **PLAINTIFF:** TRANSPORTES TURÍSTICOS MIRAVISTA MJS S.A.

**DEFENDANTS:** STATE, ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD OF THE NATIONAL REGISTRY, PUBLIC TRANSPORT COUNCIL, BANCO CITIBANK DE COSTA RICA S.A.

CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. SECTION FIVE. Second Judicial Circuit of San José. Goicoechea, at ten hours fifty-five minutes on the twenty-seventh of May of the year two thousand nineteen.- Judgment No. 47-2019-V Ordinary proceeding filed by Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A., legal identification number CED91053, represented by Nombre115172, of legal age, tourism operator, identity card number CED91054 and Nombre115173, of legal age, single, resident of San Rafael de Heredia, identity card number CED91055. Grants special judicial power of attorney to Nombre115174, Bar Association ID 13,415, against: the State, represented by Omar Rivera Mesén, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of San Pedro de Montes de Oca, identity card No. CED557; the National Registry represented by Dagoberto Sibaja Morales, of legal age, married once, attorney, resident of San José, identity card CED2890, in his capacity as general judicial representative without limit of sum, grants special judicial power of attorney to Nombre20087, of legal age, married once, Attorney, resident of San Ramón de Alajuela, bearer of identity card number CED32415; Nombre115175, of legal age, single, Attorney, resident of Rohrmoser, bearer of identity card number CED91056; Nombre115176, of legal age, married, Attorney, resident of Dirección4252, , bearer of identity card number CED91050-; Nombre1846, of legal age, divorced, Attorney, resident of San Ramón de Alajuela, bearer of identity card number CED665; and, Nombre115177, of legal age, single, Attorney, resident of Heredia, bearer of identity card number CED32416; the Public Transport Council represented by Juan Manuel Delgado Naranjo, of legal age, married, Business Administrator with Emphasis in Human Resources, in his capacity as Executive Director, bearer of identity card CED91051- and Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., represented by its special judicial attorneys, Rolando Laclé Zúñiga, of legal age, attorney, divorced, resident of San José, identity card number CED29048 and José Pablo Valverde Marín, of legal age, married, Attorney, resident of Alajuela, bearer of identity card number CED31787.

**Whereas** 1.- That on July 18, 2013, the plaintiff asserted the following claim: "a. That the nullity of articles 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the 'Reglamento Organización Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble' No. 26883-J, published in La Gaceta No. 91 of May 13, 1998, be declared. b. That a judicial order be issued to the Public Registry, so that it does not process the permit for vehicles to leave the country, as long as no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly supports it. c. That a judicial order be issued to the MOPT, so that it does not process the permit for vehicles to leave the country, as long as no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly supports it. d. That Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. be ordered to pay the damages caused, under strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), for establishing institutional abusive banking practices in its capacity as pledgee (acreedor prendario), for the requirement to leave the country of a tourism minibus, which undermined the debtor's ability to pay by establishing obstacles to the main source of income, against Article 46 and 140 of constitutional rank, the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer and against Law 8220, for the sum of $500,000 as principal (cost of the tourism unit, lost profits for four years and moral, psychological and patrimonial damage), for impeding the development of the constitutional right of Freedom of Enterprise, for leaving the debtor without occupation, for damaging his name before SUGEF and preventing him from other market financial options, for harming him as a banking consumer, for damaging the company morally, plus other aspects that will be pointed out later; plus existing legal interest until settlement of judgment of this proceeding. e. Order to pay personal and procedural costs of the parties" (folio 127 of the judicial file). At the preliminary hearing of February 10, 2015, the claim was expanded as follows: "14:10 The claims are at folio 127 of the complaint, the Judge proceeds to read them. The plaintiff indicates that an expansion was made regarding the claim for damages against the State, the claim stated at folio 527 for the sum of $138,000.00. The State's representation asks which of the two plaintiffs is the one requesting the subjective moral damage. The plaintiff's representation indicates that it is Mr. Nombre115172" (minutes of the preliminary hearing visible at folio 607 of the judicial file and audiovisual support, contained in the virtual file).

2.- That on October 30, 2013, by resolution at 8:27 a.m., the Judge of the procedural stage granted the due transfer to the defendants (folio 16 of the judicial file).

3.- That on September 26, 2013, the plaintiff Nombre115178 clarified that he also appeared as a plaintiff, so that he would not be considered the representative of the plaintiff company, but rather as another plaintiff, being the most offended party as a banking consumer in this proceeding (folio 145 of the judicial file).

4.- That on January 8, 2014, the defendant Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. answered the complaint negatively, and filed the defenses of expiration (caducidad), lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of right, lack of current interest, lack of cause and lack of standing to sue (legitimación activa) and lack of standing to be sued (legitimación pasiva). That same day, the Public Transport Council answered the complaint negatively and filed the defenses of lack of standing to be sued and lack of right. (folios 180 and 273 of the judicial file).

5.- That on January 10, 2014, the Administrative Board of the National Registry answered the complaint negatively, and filed the defenses of expiration (caducidad), lack of right, lack of standing to sue and lack of current interest (folio 46 of the judicial file).

6.- That on January 15, 2014, the State answered the complaint negatively and filed the defenses of expiration (caducidad) against claim No. 1, lack of right and lack of standing to sue (folio 447 of the judicial file).

7.- That on May 27, 2014, during the hearing on defenses and counter-evidence, the plaintiff expanded its claim in the following terms: "Being this the opportune procedural moment, as the preliminary hearing has not yet been held, and in relation to the damages caused by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A., this section of the complaint is clarified and expanded in the sense that the cause that originates them had not been specified, what they consist of and their prudential estimation in accordance with numerals 58 and 95 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code AND 290 SUBSECTION S of the Civil Procedure Code, we proceed to clarify and expand on this point, to avoid greater delays in more advanced stages of the proceeding. The reasons that originate the indemnification for damages, as well as what they consist of, in the present proceeding are: 1) The general provisions of the Regulation being challenged. 2) The individual application of the challenged regulatory provisions that affected the plaintiffs. 3) The existence of the Requirement of the Pledgee's Permission for a tourism minibus to leave the country.

• 4)The refusal of Banco City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. to grant the permission to leave the country for the minibus, at a time when the pledge loan transaction was up to date, as well as its respective insurance policies before the INS, which did not put the capital invested by the banking entity at risk, especially since extraterritoriality insurance is paid to leave the country. To which they simply argued "Internal Banking Policies" to the detriment of the fourth-generation constitutional rights of the banking consumer. 5) The application made by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. of Extracontractual Internal Banking Policies not informed to the debtor at the time of the Credit Contracting for Granting of the Loan. 6) The application of banking policies not informed to the debtor at the formalization of the loan caused serious damages to the plaintiffs. 7) The unjustified delay by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. in providing a timely response to the Banking consumer, upon the latter's request to be able to take the minibus out of the country, which caused the loss of the tourism minibus due to affecting the debtor's payment capacity and it had to be given to the Bank as Dation in Payment (Dación de Pago). 8) The failure of the defendant banking entity to observe the economic situation the country was experiencing at the time of the request made by the banking debtor and the unreasonable failure to observe state policies regarding debt restructuring and payment arrangements for banking debtors in the national tourism sector due to the international crisis that was a Public and Notorious Fact. 9) The loss of the movable property, which was at that time the main profit-generating asset of the company. 10) The loss of active clients at that time that contracted the tourism minibus. 11) The loss of the merchant image of the affected debtor as well as the image of the transport company. 12) The losses suffered by the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and by the undersigned debtor, important economic losses since Banco City Bank de Costa Rica prevented the plaintiffs in this case from generating profits, from increasing their assets, the losses even for the debtor of the assets he had prior to the credit contracting with the banking entity, loss of rating before SUGEF as a debtor. 13) The impossibility for the plaintiffs of having an open credit in any other financial entity, since after a dation in payment, no other financial entity would grant a pledge loan to the plaintiffs. 14) The impossibility of business growth, which was fully available at the time of the loan with City Bank de Costa Rica and afterwards was not. 15) The subjective and psychological moral damage caused to the banking debtor. 16) The objective moral damage caused to the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. 17) The Strict Liability incurred by the State for the challenged Regulation and by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. for the damages caused in its loan service relationship with the debtor and for the application of the Consumer Protection Law. The present complaint was estimated against Banco City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. in THE SUM OF $500,000 (five hundred thousand dollars) legal tender of the United States of America, plus legal interest until settlement of judgment, legal indexation of the losses suffered, which will be indicated later, as they are not fully defined at this moment, which are broken down as follows: Current Value of the Movable Property or similar: $170,000 (one hundred seventy thousand US dollars). Damages Suffered Lost Profits: $48,000 annual profits, at $4,000 (four thousand dollars) per month, gives us a total of $192,000 (one hundred ninety-two thousand dollars) in four years. $138,000 for subjective moral damage to the debtor, objective moral damage to the company, psychological damage to the debtor, loss of asset situation existing before the contract with the BANK. The present complaint is expanded for damages against the State for the sum of $138,000 caused to the plaintiffs by the State, in application of the Challenged Regulation." (folio 524 of the judicial file).

8.- That on October 17, 2014, by resolution, the Judge of the procedural stage rejected the defense of lack of jurisdiction filed by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. (resolution contained in the virtual desktop).

9.- That on February 10, 2015, the preliminary hearing was held. At that stage, the claims were expanded in the terms indicated in whereas clause No. 1 of this judgment. At the same time, the State filed the exception of expiration (caducidad) in relation to claim No. 1 of the complaint. The Public Transport Council and Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. adhered to the exception of expiration (caducidad) presented by the State. The Administrative Board of the National Registry adhered to the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) filed by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. The Judge of the procedural stage transferred the resolution of the defenses of expiration (caducidad) and statute of limitations (prescripción) to the Trial Court (minutes visible at folio 607 of the judicial file and audiovisual support).

10.- That on April 8, 2015, the matter was assigned to Section Five of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (folio 738 of the judicial file).

11.- That on April 16, 2015, Section Five of the Contentious Tribunal scheduled the day of November 24, 2015, to hold the oral and public trial (folio 557 of the judicial file).

12.- That on November 24, 2015, the Tribunal composed of judges Gustavo Irías Obando, Francisco Hidalgo Rueda and Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo, suspended the holding of the oral and public trial, considering that the unconstitutionality action under files 14-12592-007-CO and 15-4280-007-CO of the Constitutional Chamber had to be resolved (trial minutes and audiovisual support).

13.- That on November 6, 2017, Section Five of the Contentious Tribunal scheduled the oral and public trial to be held on May 6, 2019 (resolution contained in the virtual desktop).

14.- That on May 6, 2019, the oral and public trial was held (trial minutes and audiovisual support).

15.- In the proceedings before this Tribunal, no nullities have been observed that must be remedied or that generate defenselessness, and the judgment is issued within the term established in Article 111 subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code.

Drafted by Judge Nombre31590, with the affirmative vote of Judge Nombre113674 and Judge Nombre114124; and, **Considering** I.- Proven facts: 1) That on October 3, 2008, according to public deed of Notary Erick Fabricio Jiménez Masís, Importaciones Zuzu S.A., sold to Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A., the vehicle brand Marco Polo, year 2008, with plates to be assigned with the Heredia code. In that same act, plaintiff Nombre115172 and Banco Cuscatlán appeared, which granted him a commercial loan for the sum of $64,489.80, for a term of 72 months. The guarantee granted was of a first-degree pledge nature (garantía prendaria en primer grado), over the aforementioned vehicle (folio 67 of the judicial file). 2) That on September 18, 2009, the plaintiff Nombre115172 submitted to the collections manager of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., a request to take the Marcopolo minibus plate Placa21537 out of the country, in the following terms: "FIRST: That I have a pledge loan operation with you, number Identificacion617. SECOND: That for various reasons, in the course of the loan I have had certain normal delays, considering the economic crisis that has affected our country in the last year, in addition to the fact that from the beginning of the loan, we began working more than a month after signing the contract with the former Cuscatlán, who did not issue the payment check to the company MARCOPOLO until the Pledge on the movable property was registered, reason for which the property was delivered to us only when the Pledge was registered and the first payment installment for me was already being collected by the Bank. THIRD: That despite all that, as of today we are completely up to date with the credit operation, in fact you can verify the payment status, where we have paid up to three installments together. The above indicates our intention to be up to date with the credit operation. FOURTH: That the week before last, the permit was requested for the Marcopolo Minibus, year 2008, Plate number Placa21537, to leave the country, and it was denied us because we have had delays in the loan. FIFTH: That we need authorization to leave the country since the Investment Plan for the Acquisition of the Tourism Minibus, as you can verify in the loan file, was for National and International Excursions and if we are not allowed to take the Minibus out of the country we cannot work and therefore, we will not be able to pay the Bank for it. SIXTH: I understand that within the Bank's policies, it is to protect the Movable Property; however, this loan, as stated above, is completely up to date and it is required that it leaves the country so that it can work and produce as the active asset it is, in fact we need the permit to pay UNISERSE the corresponding extraterritoriality insurance. SEVENTH: Therefore, it is unreasonable and illogical that we are not allowed to work, especially since the extraterritoriality insurance will be paid and the operation is up to date, otherwise, the Bank is not allowing us to develop the Investment Plan that justified the granting of the loan. For all the foregoing, I thank you in advance for the collaboration you can provide, as I need to work on excursions to Panama and Nicaragua and require the authorization of the Pledgee (Acreedor Prendario)." (folio 42 of the judicial file). 3) That on November 2, 2009, Sara Gómez Méndez, in her capacity as Head of Insurance of the defendant Bank, addressed a note to the plaintiff in the following terms: "Receive a cordial greeting from us, and at the same time we indicate that according to the request for permission to leave the country for the vehicle Marco Polo, plate Placa21537 registered in the Public Property Registry in the name of Transportes Turísticos Miravista S.A., with legal identification number CED91052; where Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. is the pledgee (acreedor prendario) according to the lien (gravamen) registered with the Registry in Volume 2008, Entry 00312179, Sequence 002 and where you are the debtor of operation CED91057, you are informed of the following: 'In application of the bank's internal policies and studies carried out on your operation, the permit to leave the country was temporarily denied until the credit does not register delays greater than 30 days in the last six months' This denial is not permanent and at any time you may have our authorization as long as you comply with the above. For any inquiries, we remain at your disposal at telephones 2299-0206 Franklin Guzmán or 2299-0411 Sara Gómez." (folio 44 of the judicial file). 4) That on November 3, 2010, before notary Gabriela Valverde Mena, in deed number seventy-four, the plaintiff company and Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. appeared, for the purpose of extinguishing the obligation the latter had with the Bank, a dation in payment (dación en pago) was carried out, with a movable property, which was the minibus plate Placa21537, said agreement was recorded in the following terms: "THEY SAY: The first appearing party: That in payment of the amount of sixty-six thousand six hundred fifty dollars and seventy-seven cents, which is the balance of operation number one one zero nine nine zero four zero four six zero three, for which my represented party is a guarantor, and owed by Mr. Nombre115172 to Banco Cuscatlán de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, now named Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S. A., guaranteed by the pledge contract (contrato de prenda) registered in the Public Registry of Movable Property, of the respective section, volume two thousand eight, entry three hundred twelve thousand one hundred seventy-nine, sequence zero two, secured by the vehicle plate Placa21538, which is described as follows: Brand: Marco Polo, Style: W nine, Category: Minibus, Capacity: Twenty-nine persons, Year: Two thousand eight, Chassis: nine three PB four zero B three P seven C zero two zero four four six. Motor: Brand: MWM, Number: Placa21539, Displacement: four thousand three hundred C. C., Fuel: Diesel, transfers it free of liens (gravámenes) and judicial annotations, estimating the dation in payment in the aforementioned amount. The second appearing party: That its represented party accepts the dation in payment and requests that Registry to register said vehicle in the name of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima; and, as a consequence of the same, totally cancels the aforementioned pledge registration entry, leaving the cited vehicle free of this lien (gravamen) and extinguishing the liability of the former debtor." (folio 50 of the judicial file). 5) That in this case neither the State, nor the Administrative Board of the National Registry, nor the Public Transport Council carried out any active conduct or administrative act aimed at denying the permit for minibus HB 2467 to leave the country, in application of the Reglamento Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble No. 26883-J, published in La Gaceta No. 91 of May 13, 1998. (Confessional statement of Nombre115172 in oral and public trial, audiovisual support of the trial) II.- Unproven facts: 1) That with the denial of the minibus to leave the country, issued by the defendant Bank by note of November 2, 2009, the plaintiff lost the movable property, its image, faced difficulty in generating profits, was impeded from growing its business, had the inconvenience of requesting credit with other financial entities and the moral damage it alleges (no proof). 2) That after November 2, 2009, the plaintiff had once again requested the permit to leave the country (no proof).

III.- Arguments of the plaintiff: By way of summary, the plaintiff explains that it acquired a minibus for tourism transportation. It notes that the buying debtor was Nombre115172 and the Minibus was registered in the name of the Company owned by the debtor, Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. It indicates that to acquire said minibus, it obtained a pledge loan (crédito prendario) under the SME (PYMES) modality with Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., formerly called Banco Cuscatlán, through credit operation number 120990404603 and for the sum of $64,489.80 over a term of 6 years, at an interest rate of 8.6% per year, with an investment plan intended for national and international tourism. The cost of the minibus was $85,090, of which it gave a down payment of $20,510.2. It adds that the loan acquisition was carried out solely and exclusively for the purchase of the minibus for land tourism passenger transportation, mainly for conducting international tours to Nicaragua and Panama. It accuses that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that requires the procedure and the requirements for the permit for motor vehicles to leave the country, requested by the MOPT, specifically the Public Transport Council and the National Registry, without considering the permits that financial entities must grant in case there are motor vehicles given as pledge guarantee (garantía prendaria). It also maintains that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that establishes as a requirement for the permit for a minibus dedicated to international tourism to leave the country, the authorization of a judge in case there is a traffic collision. It adds that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that establishes as a requirement for the permit for a minibus dedicated to international tourism to leave the country, authorization from the pledgee (acreedor prendario). It also mentions that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that establishes as a requirement for the permit for a minibus dedicated to international tourism to leave the country, the acquisition of extraterritoriality insurance. On the other hand, it mentions that, in early 2009, with the fall of tourism worldwide, it fell behind in the payment of three monthly installments of the bank loan. It points out that between April 6, 2009, and May 8 of the same year, still without income due to the indicated crisis, it obtained a personal loan from a private individual, to pay Citibank the sum of $5,252, to bring the pledge loan (crédito prendario) up to date with the banking entity and thus be able to obtain the permit to leave the country from the bank as pledgee, being clear that by the principle of reasonableness, balance of the consumer relationship, justice and equity between the parties, the banking entity, with the operation being up to date, would have no reasons to deny the permit to leave the country. It reproaches that this was not the case, but rather that it was not until a month and a half later that it received a response in which they denied the exit from the country for the vehicle given as guarantee. It indicates that Citibank responded negatively to its request for a permit for the tourism minibus to leave the country, stating the following: "In application of the bank's internal policies and studies carried out on your operation, the permit to leave the country was temporarily denied until the credit does not register delays greater than 30 days in the last 6 months." It questions that the supposed internal policies of the bank were never informed to it in the pre-contractual stage, nor before signing the pledge guarantee (garantía prendaria) with the bank. It considers that this lack of prior, simple and clear information by the provider of financial services leaves the debtor clients and banking consumers in a situation of total legal unprotectedness of their legitimate interests and subjective rights. It considers that the refusal of the defendant Bank, based on the mentioned policies, undermined its possibility of paying the loan by not being able to obtain profits.

IV.- Arguments of the defendant parties: By way of summary, Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. explains that it was not Mr. Nombre115172 who acquired the real property in question, but that it was the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. It maintains that the foregoing is relevant, since the credit relationship was with the natural person and not with the legal entity, thus, it notes, the relationship with the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. stems solely from the consent of said company in the pledge lien (gravamen prendario) that was at the time granted over the movable property under study. It affirms that the supposed tourism activity was carried out by the company and not by the debtor. It argues that the power to grant permits for motor vehicles to leave the country derives directly from Article 140 subsections 3 and 18 of the Political Constitution, as well as Articles 2 subsection f 3 and 4 of Law 3155 (Law for the Creation of the Ministry of Transport, comprehensively reformed by Law 4786). It maintains that the requirements that the plaintiff reproaches derive from different laws, which it omits to refer to. It argues that the obligation of the Executive Branch to plan, regulate, control and supervise transportation does have a legal origin, and for its part, the attributions to regulate said activity via decree or regulation as an administrative act of general scope, have a constitutional origin. It defends the fact that the debtor was expressly told that the denial of the authorization for the vehicle to leave was not permanent, and that it responded to a criterion under which what our represented party requests is that there be no delay in payments of more than 30 days over a period of 6 months, an altogether reasonable and proportional measure, aimed at measuring the debtor's payment behavior taking into consideration the history of delays the account presented at the time and therefore the risk of possible execution of the guarantee held regarding the loan granted. It points out that the requirements the plaintiff reproaches come both from subsection e) of Article 95 of the Decreto Ejecutivo 26883-J, Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble, and from Article 20 of the Decreto Ejecutivo 16821-J (Reglamento del Registro Público de la Propiedad de Vehículos Automotores), which in turn were enacted based on Articles 140 subsections 3 and 18 of the Political Constitution, Article 28 second paragraph subsection b) of the General Law of Public Administration and Articles 236 and 551 of the Commercial Code. It adds that Mr. Nombre115172 was not located, from the credit perspective, in Group 1, but in Group 2 of debtors, in which the parameter of "Payment Capacity" is not used, but rather only the evaluation parameters of "Delinquency" and "Historical Payment Behavior." It considers that freedom of commerce or freedom of work has not been violated, as the denial was temporary.

For its part, the Public Transportation Council states that the assertion in the filing that there is no express rule issued by the Legislative Assembly requiring the processing of permits for the exit from the country of motor vehicles providing public transportation services is false; in this regard, it must be noted that the current regulations governing public transportation service in its different modalities are regulated by Ley 3503 and Ley 7969. The Administrative Board of the National Registry maintains that the Organizational Regulation of the Public Registry of Movable Property was created by Decreto Ejecutivo número 26883-J, in accordance with article 28, second paragraph, subsection b) of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and articles 236 and 551 of the Código de Comercio, Ley número 3284 of April 30. It maintains that this Regulation contains no nullity whatsoever in the articles being discussed in this proceeding, as they are authorized by higher-ranking legal norms. At the same time, it states that no active or omissive conduct related to the requested damages has been proven. Finally, the State indicates that the pledge contract finds full regulation in articles 530 and following of the Código de Comercio and has the purpose of guaranteeing obligations subject to the rules provided in said articles. The assets affected by a pledge will guarantee the creditor, with special privilege, the amount of the transaction and the interest, commissions, and expenses, and both court costs, under the terms indicated in the contract. It maintains that, in the particular case of pledges where a motor vehicle is offered as collateral, it must be constituted in a public deed. The debtor will retain, in the name of the pledge creditor, possession of the pledged item and will assume the obligations and responsibilities of a depositary; furthermore, they will be liable for any damages suffered by the items that do not arise from a fortuitous event, force majeure, or the very nature of the objects, in accordance with article 537. On the other hand, it argues that the pledge constitution contract must contain the information required by section 554 of the Código de Comercio and be registered in the Pledge Registry. Finally, in pledge obligations payable in successive installments, failure to pay one of them will make the entire obligation due and payable, unless otherwise agreed, in accordance with canon 580. It argues that, by the very nature of the pledge contract, which is constituted over movable property, the only way to guarantee the credit is to the extent that the asset given as collateral remains in the country. Hence, the challenged regulatory norm, insofar as it requires the authorization of the pledge creditor for the Public Registry to authorize the exit from the country of a vehicle given as pledge collateral, finds full basis, I repeat, in the very nature of the pledge contract. Therefore, the plaintiff company is not correct in alleging that the challenged Regulation, insofar as it regulates the procedure to issue an exit permit for a vehicle given in pledge, exceeds regulatory power because, I repeat, it finds its basis in the very nature of the pledge contract, duly regulated in sections 530 and following of the Código de Comercio, Ley N. o 3284 of April 30, 1964.

V.-Object of the proceeding: We are facing a full jurisdiction proceeding, through which the plaintiff claims not only the nullity of an administrative conduct, but also the patrimonial liability of the involved administrations, as well as that of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. VI.-Regarding the defense of expiration: In the answer to the complaint, Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., in relation to this defense, maintains that the action is expired regarding claims a, b, and c, in accordance with article 39, subsection 1 of the CPCA. It argues that Decreto Ejecutivo 26883-J was published in La Gaceta n.° 91 of May 13, 1998. If this period is not considered for the expiration count, it notes that the singular application of the mentioned decree occurred in 2009 and the complaint was not filed until 2013. In its answer to the complaint, regarding the defense of expiration, the Administrative Board of the Public Registry maintained, based on a judgment of Section VI of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativa, number 52-2012-VI, that, while it is true that as long as regulatory norms remain in force, the possibility of challenging them cannot expire, however, the plaintiff must demonstrate a legitimate interest. It accuses in that sense that, at the date of filing the complaint, it does not possess the immovable property, since it was transferred by a dation in payment to the banking entity Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. Finally, the State raised the defense in its answer to the complaint and maintained that in accordance with the provisions of article 64, subsection 2, in relation to section 66, subsection k) and 39 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the possibility of challenging articles 94 to 99 of the Organizational Regulation of the Public Registry of Movable Property, Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 26833-J, published in La Gaceta 91 of May 13, 1998, has expired. This is because section 39, subsection b) of the CPCA, provides that the maximum period to sue for the nullity of a Regulation, such as the one before us, is one year, counted from the day after its sole or last publication. At the preliminary hearing of February 10, 2015, Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. and the Public Transportation Council joined the expiration defense presented by the State. On the other hand, at the exceptions hearing, the plaintiff maintained that, regarding what the defendant Bank presented, what is provided in article 39 of the CPCA is not applicable to the specific case, but rather canon 40, given that, according to its criterion, these are acts that produce effects at this moment. With matters thus presented, the period begins to run from the date on which Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. denied the exit permit for the minibus from the country, which is the moment when the Regulation caused it a negative effect, in relation to article 37, subsection 3) of the same mentioned Code. For its part, regarding the defense of expiration alleged by the State, it affirms that canon 66, subsection 1 k, nor 39, both of the CPCA, do not apply, given that in the case under examination, it states that 40 of the CPCA applies. It argues, furthermore, that it is empowered to challenge the specific act and all antecedent rules, including the general provision that was not challenged in a timely manner, in accordance with section 10, subsection 2 of the CPCA. Regarding the argument of the Administrative Board of the National Registry, it maintains that the cited judgment of the Sixth Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo actually supports it, given that it recognizes that regulatory norms maintain their force over time and the possibility of challenging them exists while they remain in force, therefore, the possibility of challenging does not expire. The foregoing must be reconciled with article 37, subsection c) of the CPCA. Criterion of the Tribunal: In accordance with what has been proven in the file, this Collegiate Body is clear that Decreto Ejecutivo 26.883-J challenged in this venue dates from 1998 and, in turn, that the individual application act of the challenged norm occurred on November 2, 2009, and also that the complaint was filed on June 18, 2013; the truth is that the questioned norms maintained their force over time at the moment the complaint was filed as well as up to today. Thus, regulatory norms, by their very nature, produce their effects continuously while they are in force, which is why this possibility cannot expire as long as they are in force and the plaintiff can demonstrate that they have, at least, a legitimate interest for such purposes, in accordance with the provisions of article 10, subsection 2 ibidem (see judgments number 262-2011-VI, at fourteen hours fifty minutes of December first, two thousand eleven, and number 52-2012-VI at seven hours thirty minutes of March twenty-second, two thousand twelve, both issued by the Sixth Section of this Tribunal). At this point, it should be remembered that in accordance with the provisions of section 40 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, it is possible to challenge administrative acts of general scope with normative effects, as long as their continued effects persist over time, so the maximum period to file the proceeding will be one year from the day after the cessation of those effects. In addition to the foregoing, it should be remembered that in cases of self-executing norms -as in this case-, an individual application act is not required to challenge them, because they are immediately binding upon their mere enactment, without the need for other norms or acts that develop them or make them applicable to the affected party. For the Tribunal, the plaintiff holds a legitimate interest, as it is engaged in the activity of tourist transportation. Based on the foregoing, the defense of expiration must be rejected.

VII.-Regarding the defense of statute of limitations. The defendant Bank in the present case maintains that the claim for damages filed against it arises from the pledge contract, by which the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. granted the vehicle with license plate Placa21537 as a real guarantee for payment of the debt acquired by the actor Nombre115172, with whom it maintained the credit relationship. It maintains that this is a commercial contract governed by section 531 of the Código de Comercio. It adds that the denial of the permit occurred on November 2, 2009, so the statute of limitations period of canon 984 of the Código de Comercio operated. It considers that the statute of limitations period elapsed, since the judgment was notified to the defendant Bank on November 8, 2013. On the other hand, the plaintiff maintains that the damage claimed arose with the dation in payment. It considers that the 4 years of article 984 of the Código de Comercio have not elapsed, as the complaint was filed on July 18, 2013. Finally, it maintains that, if one starts from the fact that what is sought is indemnification for damages against the State, for lawful conduct, the 10-year statute of limitations period of article 868 of the Código Civil applies. Criterion of the Tribunal: Adjusted to the evidence in the file, as already indicated in the previous resultando, Decreto Ejecutivo 26883-J challenged in this venue dates from 1998 and, in turn, the individual application act of the challenged norm occurred on November 2, 2009, and the complaint was filed on June 18, 2013, makes it possible to see that the cause of action is not time-barred for demanding liability. As will be developed later, two different types of liability are requested, with regard to private law legal entities and public law entities. For the first case, as indicated by the defendant Bank, canon 984 of the Código de Comercio applies, which provides a 4-year statute of limitations period for any right and its corresponding action derived from the Código de Comercio, Ley n.° 3284 and its reforms. However, contrary to what the defendant financial entity maintains, said period was interrupted at the moment the complaint was filed on June 18, 2013. If one considers that the event to which the alleged impairments claimed in this venue are sought to be linked occurred on November 2, 2009, with the rejection of the request for a permit to take the minibus out of the country, by the date of filing the complaint, the 4-year period had not elapsed, being interrupted by the filing of the complaint. Based on the foregoing, the defense of statute of limitations filed by the Bank must be rejected. On the other hand, regarding entities governed by Public Law, the liability requested is governed by the provisions of articles 190 and following of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Specifically, canon 198 provides a 4-year period to claim objective liability from the Administration, and not article 868 of the Código Civil, as the plaintiff maintains. Said numeral, insofar as it is relevant, provides: “Article 198.-The right to claim indemnification from the Administration shall prescribe in four years, counted from the event giving rise to the liability (…)” With matters thus presented, the event giving rise to the liability to claim damages occurred on November 2, 2009, due to the denial of the exit permit for the plaintiff's vehicle. Thus, said period was interrupted at the moment the complaint was filed on June 18, 2013. If one considers that the event to which the alleged impairments claimed in this venue are sought to be linked occurred on November 2, 2009, with the rejection of the request for a permit to take the minibus out of the country, by the date of filing the complaint, the 4-year period of canon 198 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública had not elapsed, being interrupted by the filing of the complaint. Based on the foregoing, the defense of statute of limitations must be rejected.

VIII.-Regarding the lack of passive legitimation of the Public Transportation Council: Among the substantive prerequisites to be analyzed in the judgment by the Tribunal, even ex officio, is the legitimación ad causam, both active and passive, understood as the capacity to be a party in a specific proceeding; legitimación ad causam is not a procedural but a substantive matter, it is the relationship between the legal situation presented by the actor and the legitimate interest being debated, being a prerequisite for a favorable decision on the claim. "Every contentious jurisdictional proceeding includes what some procedural law experts have called a 'procedural legal relationship'; the subjects involved act exercising the right of action and the right of defense. The plaintiff and defendant become parties, by the mere fact of exercising those rights, without this necessarily implying that there exists between them the substantive legal relationship being ventilated in the proceeding. This last aspect is precisely what legitimación ad causam refers to. It is formed insofar as there is a connection between the parties and that substantive legal situation, such that it requires identity between who sues and the holder of the subjective interest claimed (active) and between the defendant and the obligor to the required performance (passive). Thus, it is said that there is active legitimation when the possibility exists to effectively grant the claim with respect to the plaintiff, and passive when that ruling can be effective with respect to the defendant." (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, n.° 775-F-03 at 14:25 hours on November 20, 2003). The determination of this procedural standing is intimately linked to the claim asserted in the action, such that only whoever is in a specific relationship with it can be a party in the respective proceeding. In the specific case, the Public Transportation Council has alleged the defense of lack of passive legitimation. For the Tribunal, the substantive procedural legal relationship mentioned above does not exist between the plaintiff in this proceeding and the Public Transportation Council. The foregoing, in the first place, by virtue of the fact that the CTP did not issue active or omissive conduct aimed at denying the exit permit for the minibus, because as Nombre115172 explained in their confessional testimony, once the exit permit was rejected by the defendant Bank, they did not continue with the procedure before said public entity or any of the other defendants. On the other hand, the norm challenged here is that of the Organizational Regulation of the Public Registry of Property, Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 28.883-J. Which in this case does not concern the Public Transportation Council. Based on the foregoing, there is no reason for it to appear as a defendant, and the defense of lack of passive legitimation raised by the CTP must be accepted, and consequently, the complaint against it must be declared inadmissible.

IX.-Regarding the specific case: As transcribed in resultandos n.° 1 and n.° 7, and as stated in resultando n.° 9, as well as in considerando V, all of this judgment, this full jurisdiction proceeding raises several claims against different entities, some of Public Law and another of Private Law. As a consequence of the foregoing, given the diverse legal nature of the defendant parties, we are faced with different legal regimes applicable to each of them. To resolve this case in an orderly manner, each claim will be analyzed separately, and each of their arguments will be resolved. A) Annulment claim: Nullity of articles 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99 of the Organizational Regulation of the Public Registry of Movable Property n.° 26883-J, published in La Gaceta n.° 91 of May 13, 1998: The plaintiff comes to this venue to reproach, in a first, very broad line of argument, the administrative procedures before the MOPT and the Property Registry to be able to take a motor vehicle out of the country, which they list and describe as bureaucratic and unnecessary. Within this list of procedures, they highlight the one that must be carried out before the Public Registry, of presenting the authorization of the pledge creditor, duly authenticated. At the same time, they list three decrees from the MOPT, from which the requirements for the exit of motor vehicles from the country derive. On the other hand, they refer to the requirements established by the Public Registry, based on the Organizational Regulation of the Public Registry of Movable Property, n.° 26883-J, published in La Gaceta n.° 91 of May 13, 1998. Notwithstanding how broad their dissertations, arguments, and reproaches may be, given the way the claim was outlined, the object of this proceeding is aimed at determining, according to the present annulment claim, whether canons 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99 of the indicated Regulation suffer from any type of defect that merits a decree of their invalidity. The fundamental reason that the plaintiff reproaches in this proceeding, as generating the defect of invalidity, consists of the non-existence of a legal basis supporting the exit requirements for motor vehicles provided in the Regulation it challenges. It misses the existence of a legal norm, emanating from the Legislative Assembly, that provides as a requirement for the exit from the country of a minibus, dedicated to international tourism, the authorization of the pledge creditor. It also reproaches the non-existence of a legal normative premise that authorizes a Judge, in the event of a traffic collision, to require their authorization. At the same time, it considers the existence of extraterritoriality insurance for the exit of a minibus from the country to be abusive. It states that the regulatory norm in question is contrary to the provisions of the Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos, n.° 8220, as well as the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, n.° 7472. The defendant Bank maintains that, contrary to what the plaintiff states, the power to grant exit permits from the country for motor vehicles derives directly from article 140, subsections 3 and 18 of the Constitución Política, as well as articles 2, subsection f, 3, and 4 of Ley 3155 (Ley de Creación del Ministerio de Transportes, comprehensively amended by Ley 4786). That is, what is stated in the fact does not come from a whim of the administration, but from a legislative mandate to "plan, regulate, control, and monitor" any mode of transportation using the powers given to the Executive Branch by the Constituent to sanction, regulate, and execute laws. Likewise, articles 236 and 551 of the Código de Comercio support the exit requirement granted by the National Registry, which corresponds to a protection of the interests of the pledge creditor, who could see the guarantee they hold in the credit diverted or lost. The Public Transportation Council maintains that in this regard, Ley 7969, article 7, and Ley 3503, article 3, establish the powers the Public Transportation Council has to regulate matters concerning the Public Transportation service provided. The Administrative Board of the National Registry maintains that the Regulation in question has support in sections 11 and 12 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Finally, the State notes that the Pledge Contract finds full regulation in articles 530 and following of the Código de Comercio and has the purpose of guaranteeing obligations subject to the rules provided in said articles. At the same time, it maintains that the assets affected by a pledge will guarantee the creditor, with special privilege, the amount of the transaction and the Interest, commissions, and expenses, and both court costs, under the terms indicated in the contract, according to canon Article 540 of the same normative body. It adds that in the particular case of pledges where a motor vehicle is offered as collateral, it must be constituted in a public deed. The debtor will retain, in the name of the pledge creditor, possession of the pledged item and will assume the obligations and responsibilities of a depositary; furthermore, they will be liable for any damages suffered by the items that do not arise from a fortuitous event, force majeure, or the very nature of the objects, in accordance with article 537. In turn, it maintains that the pledge constitution contract must contain the information required by section 554 of the Código de Comercio and be registered in the Pledge Registry. Finally, in pledge obligations payable in successive installments, failure to pay one of them will make the entire obligation due and payable, unless otherwise agreed, as stated in article 580. Thus, by the very nature of the pledge contract, which is constituted over movable property, the only way to guarantee the credit is to the extent that the asset given as collateral remains in the country. Hence, the challenged regulatory norm, insofar as it requires the authorization of the pledge creditor for the Public Registry to authorize the exit from the country of a vehicle given as pledge collateral, finds full basis in the very nature of the pledge contract. Therefore, the plaintiff is not correct in alleging that the challenged Regulation, which regulates the procedure to issue an exit permit from the country for a vehicle given in pledge, exceeds regulatory power because, as it reiterates, it finds its basis in the very nature of the pledge contract, duly regulated in sections 530 and following of the Código de Comercio, Ley n.° 3284 of April 30, 1964. Criterion of the Tribunal: It is necessary to keep in mind that Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 26.883, called the Organizational Regulation of the Public Registry of Movable Property, as stated in its heading, was born in accordance with the provisions of articles 140, subsections 3) and 18) of the Constitución Política, article 28, second paragraph, subsection b) of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and articles 236 and 551 of the Código de Comercio, Ley n.° 3284 of April 30, 1964. Considering in turn, that Title II, Book One of the Código de Comercio provided for the creation of a Movable Property Registry in the city of San José, to act jointly with the Pledge Registry and that article 2 of the Ley de Creación del Registro Nacional, n.° 5695 of May 28, 1975, and its reforms, attached the Movable Property Registry to this Institution, which also included matters relating to vehicles. In turn, that Decreto Ejecutivo No 23178-J-MOPT of May 5, 1994, attached the National Vessel Registry to the Public Registry of Movable Property of the National Registry and that the Public Registry of Motor Vehicle Property, the General Pledge Registry, and the National Vessel Registry have operated under independent Regulations, making it necessary to stipulate a single legal regime for the entire Public Registry of Movable Property and; finally, that the General Pledge Registry had been operating under Decreto Ejecutivo n° 34 of December 10, 1969, and the Public Registry of Motor Vehicle Property has operated under Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 16821-J of December 16, 1985, but it was necessary to enact a new regulation that would codify the norms on the registry of movable property, while also standardizing the procedures of the entire Public Registry of Movable Property. Based on the foregoing, article 1 provides that the Public Registry of Movable Property is attached to the National Registry according to Ley n.° 5695 of May 28, 1975, and its Reforms and has under its competence the registration and publication of rights relating to the constitution, declaration, modification, and extinction of movable property and the pledge encumbrances affecting it, as well as the adjudication and issuance of registration certificates for registrable assets and their exit permits from the national territory, all in accordance with the law. Following the corresponding order in Title Three of that Decreto Ejecutivo, the registration and permits relating to movable assets are regulated. Chapter One regulates the exit permits for vehicles, from sections 94 to 98, which are precisely those being challenged in this jurisdictional venue. Article 94 provides the following: "Article 94.—Exclusive competence. The Registry shall grant exit permits from the country for motor vehicles." For its part, canon 95 indicates: "Article 95.—Requirements of the permit Without prejudice to other conditions that, in the interest of legal certainty, the Directorate may provide, requests for an exit permit from the country must be submitted in writing, typewritten, and meet the following requirements: a) Authorization of the registered owner for the granting of the exit, the characteristics of the vehicle, the exit date, and the destination. If the owner does not personally process the exit before the Registry, in which case presentation of their identity card will suffice, said request must be authenticated by a Notary Public. b) If the vehicle belongs to a legal entity, the request must be signed by the person with legal representation, which must be demonstrated with a certification valid as of the date of the request. c) Having satisfied the fees and other fiscal requirements. d) In the event of judicial encumbrances, they must be canceled or, failing that, authorization from the corresponding authority must be provided. e) In the event of pledge encumbrances, authorization from the pledge creditor must be provided. f) In the case of buses destined for the collective transport of persons, a certificate of being up to date with the extraterritoriality policy from the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, the authorization note from the Dirección General de Transporte Automotor of the MOPT, and a note from the Sección de Egresos e Ingresos of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo regarding the payment of taxes must also be provided. g) In the case of vehicles destined for tourism service, the authorization note from the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo and the extraterritoriality policy from the INS must additionally be provided. h) In the case of taxis destined for the collective transport of persons, in addition to the previous general requirements, the extraterritoriality policy from the INS and an authorization note from the taxi office of the MOPT will be required. i) In the case of vehicles belonging to Public Institutions and Branches of Government, the authorization of the head of the entity, duly letterheaded and stamped, will be additionally requested. j) In the case of vehicles in the name of International Missions or Organizations and the Diplomatic Corps, a request from the representative of the Organization or Ambassador and a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs certifying the legal standing of the applicant must be provided. k) In the case of vehicles owned by pensionado rentista residents, the note from the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo certifying that the owner is up to date in complying with the obligations required by this legal status will be additionally required." On the other hand, article 96 provides the following: "Article 96.—Authorization of the permit. Once the request is accepted, it will be compared with the Registry information and verified whether it meets the general requirements. If no defect is found, the exit permit will be granted, leaving the related documents microfilmed." Then, section 97 provides: "Article 97.—Validity of the permit The exit permit must be used within fifteen days after its issuance, in the case of private vehicles, and within four months after its issuance, in the case of heavy cargo vehicles." Finally, canon 98 states: "Article 98.—Issuance of permits through the external network of the registry." The Registry, through the Department of Informatics of the National Registry, via the Services Decentralization Program, may coordinate with the Municipalities of the Country or other institutions, so that vehicle exit permits can be issued in those Dependencies for the classes deemed convenient, in accordance with Executive Decree No. 26515-J of December 18, 1997." Having reviewed and analyzed this challenged regulatory body, the Tribunal finds that the plaintiff is not correct in considering that there are no legal norms of statutory rank supporting the regulatory development by the Executive Decree being challenged. On one front, there are constitutional provisions that gave it support, from which the powers of the Executive Branch to issue the regulatory norm in question derive. On the other hand, there is the Law Creating the National Registry, as well as the Commercial Code. The regulation of vehicle exit permits turns out to be an extension, within the framework of the regulatory power of the Executive Branch, of canons 236, 530, 537, 540, 551, 554, and 580 of the Commercial Code. Note that Article 236 creates the Registry of Movable Property based in the city of San José, which will act jointly with the Registry of Pledges (Registro de Prendas). Chapter VIII, belonging to Title I, of Book II, Commercial Code, regulates the pledge contract from Articles 530 to 581. Article 537 stands out, which provides the following: "Article 537.- Pledges in which automotive vehicles, vessels, or aircraft are offered as guarantee must be constituted in public deed. Those constituted in relation to other movable property of a different nature may be granted in a public or private document or in official contract forms. In these last two cases, the debtor's signature duly authenticated by a notary public will be required. The debtor shall retain, on behalf of the pledgee creditor, possession of the pledged item and shall assume the obligations and responsibilities of a depositary; furthermore, shall be liable for damages suffered by the items that do not arise from fortuitous event, force majeure, or the very nature of the objects. As proof of the deposit, the document or certificate proving the constitution of the pledge or the certification from the Pledge Registry shall serve." In the Tribunal's judgment, the requirements established in the questioned articles of the Executive Decree in question, such as those the plaintiff reproaches, consisting of the creditor's permission and the insurance policy (póliza), are not contrary to the aforementioned laws and rather have the purpose of ensuring the rights of the pledgee creditor and the guarantee, so that they are not affected. On the other hand, in the judgment of this collegiate body, the alleged violation of canons: 1, 8, 9, and 10 of Law No. 8220, called the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excessive Requirements and Administrative Procedures, does not exist. The foregoing because, as previously stated, the challenged articles are consistent with the provisions of the Commercial Code, which regulates the pledge contract, with the aim of safeguarding the rights of pledgee creditors and the creation of a movable property registry that organizes this entire situation. On the other hand, the requirements set forth in the challenged articles, in the Tribunal's judgment, are not contrary to reasonableness, proportionality, logic, or good faith, as no procedure is observed that is excessive or unnecessary, and which has any purpose other than providing legal certainty to the pledgee creditor; as well as to users of the service through the extraterritoriality insurance policy (póliza de extraterritorialidad). For which reason the petition for annulment of the aforementioned norms must be rejected.

• B)First ordering claim: That a judicial order be issued to the Public Registry, so that it does not carry out the procedure for the exit permit from the country for vehicles, as long as there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that supports it and C) Second ordering claim: That a judicial order be issued to MOPT, so that it does not carry out the procedure for the exit permit from the country for vehicles, as long as there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that supports it. For the Tribunal, it is impossible to grant these two claims to order the Administrative Board of the National Registry or MOPT to do what is requested. The foregoing, in accordance with what has been set forth in point A) above, of this judgment, given that, as was stated, there are constitutional and legal norms that support the regulations concerning the exit permits from the country for vehicles. In another vein, neither is it found that the questioned regulations violate the provisions of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excessive Requirements and Administrative Procedures, No. 8220. Thus, the alleged invalidity is not found, nor any reason aimed at decreeing the annulment of Articles 94 through 98 of the challenged Executive Decree; therefore, it is also not possible to grant the ordering claims directed at MOPT or the Administrative Board of the National Registry.
• D)First claim for damages based on strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) against Banco Citibank: The plaintiff seeks a ruling ordering payment of damages caused, based on strict liability, for establishing abusive institutional banking practices in its capacity as pledgee creditor, for the requirement of exiting the country for a tourist minibus (buseta de turismo), which impaired the debtor's payment capacity by establishing obstacles to the main source of income, in violation of constitutional Articles 46 and 140, the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, and Law 8220, for the sum of $500,000 for principal (cost of the tourist unit, loss of profit for four years, and moral, psychological, and property damage), for impeding the development of the constitutional right of Freedom of Enterprise, for leaving the debtor unemployed, for tarnishing his name before SUGEF and preventing him from other financial market options, for harming him as a banking consumer, for morally damaging the company; plus existing legal interest until settlement of judgment in this proceeding. The defendant Bank maintains that the denial it carried out, for November 29, 2009, was due to a policy aimed at safeguarding its interest within the framework of the pledge contract. Court's Criterion: Regarding the duty to inform the consumer adequately, timely, clearly, truthfully, and sufficiently, it must be borne in mind that the last paragraph of Article 46 of the Political Constitution; subsections c) and d) of Article 32 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense; 41 and 43 of the Regulation to that Law, establish that the consumer must receive adequate, clear, truthful, timely, and sufficient information on all elements that directly affect his or her consumption decision; therefore, it is essential that the person intending to sign a contract such as the one before us must sufficiently and timely know its conditions, limitations, scope, and consequences, allowing him or her to determine whether or not to sign it. In that sense, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: "... it is notorious that the consumer is at the end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of the consumer goods they need to acquire for their personal satisfaction, and their participation in that process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but rather in the constant celebration of contracts on a personal basis. Therefore, their relationship in that commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the suppliers of goods and services, so that prior to expressing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary elements of judgment, allowing them to express it with complete freedom, and this implies thorough knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included therein, in a harmonious blend, are several constitutional principles, such as state concern for the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating individuals the free disposal of their assets with the assistance of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health when it is involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relations between the interested parties, the alignment of international commercial practices with the internal system, and finally, the greater protection of the inhabitant's functioning in the means of subsistence..." (judgment number 1996-04463 of nine hours forty-five minutes of August thirty, nineteen ninety-six. See in similar sense, judgment number 1992-01441 of fifteen hours forty-five minutes of June two, nineteen ninety-two). In the case under examination, for this Tribunal, the defendant Bank's conduct is doubtful, in its denial of the exit permit from the country, by alleging as grounds for rejection the existence of some supposed "internal policies," which the plaintiff was unaware of. It is contrary to this duty of information, that surprisingly in situations like what happened in the present case, denials of exit permits from the country are justified by a policy that the plaintiff became aware of only at the moment he requested the permit. What would have been appropriate in this specific case, was that, safeguarding the right to information in consumer matters, with due advance notice, prior to signing the pledge contract, the defendant bank would inform the plaintiff about all banking policies associated with vehicle exit permits. Such information was relevant to his consumption decision. Notwithstanding the foregoing, along the lines that for this Collegiate Body the defendant Bank violated its duty to adequately inform the plaintiff, the truth is that the Tribunal does not find a link or causal nexus between this omission and the damages claimed. It has not been adequately proven that, due to the lack of information reproached and the denial of the exit of the minibus from the country, the plaintiff lost the movable property, that his image was affected, that difficulties arose for him to generate profits, nor the alleged impediment to business growth, nor the inconvenience of applying for credit with other financial institutions, nor the moral damage he alleges. The existence of a causal nexus between these alleged damages and the Bank's conduct of denying the exit permit based on an "Internal Policy," whose timely disclosure has not been proven either, failing in its duty of information, has not been proven in the present case. For the foregoing, the defense of lack of right must be upheld, and consequently, the lawsuit for strict liability against the bank declared without merit.
• E)Second claim for damages against the State and the Administrative Board of the National Registry: At folio 527 of the judicial file, the plaintiff expanded his claim, adjusted and clarified in a preliminary hearing against the State, for the sum of $138,000 for damages. Regarding moral damage, the claimant is Mr. Nombre115172. The plaintiff's theory of the case for claiming strict liability under canon 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration is based on the issuance of Executive Decree 28.883-J, which is the Regulation of Organization of the Public Registry, to which he attributes invalidity in Articles 94 through 99. Prior to ruling, it must be borne in mind, as has been proven in this venue, that neither the State nor the Administrative Board of the National Registry carried out any active or omissive conduct aimed at denying the exit permit, since as Nombre115172 explained in his confession statement, once the defendant Bank rejected the permit, he did not present his request to the rest of the defendants. The plaintiff's daughter in her witness statement also confirmed this aspect. With things thus presented, the strict liability attributed to them, in the plaintiff's theory of the case, arises from the issuance of the Executive Decree in question. For the Tribunal, it is impossible to grant this claim, by virtue of the fact that the scheme of strict liability of the Administration is not met, lacking the necessary elements to demand any compensation from the Administration. First, since the alleged invalidity does not exist, as explained in point A) of this considering clause numbered IX, we are not facing any liability imputation criteria, such as illicit or abnormal operation. Regarding the imputation criteria of licit and normal operation, they do not apply in this case either, given that the existence of an exceptional injury and a small proportion of affected parties has not been proven, as required by canon 194 of the General Law of Public Administration. A series of damages suffered by the company are alleged, already mentioned in point D) above, however, a causal nexus between these and the issuance of the Executive Decree by the State is not found either. For the foregoing, the defense of lack of right must be upheld, and therefore the lawsuit against the State and the Administrative Board of the National Registry declared without merit, as the alleged strict liability cannot be determined.

X.-Regarding the claims for damages. In accordance with what was set forth in the preceding considering clause, numbered IX, of this judgment, it is impossible to grant the claims for damages sought by the plaintiff against Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, and the Administrative Board of the National Registry.

XI.-Regarding the defenses. The defense of lack of jurisdiction was resolved by the Processing Judge, as explained in the resultando numbered 8 of this judgment. The defense of expiration must be rejected in accordance with what is set forth in considering clause VI of this judgment. The defense of statute of limitations must be rejected based on what is set forth in considering clause VII of this judgment. Regarding the defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) raised by the Public Transport Council, it must be upheld, in accordance with what was set forth in considering clause VIII of this resolution, consequently, the lawsuit filed against it must be declared inadmissible. As for the defenses of lack of active and passive standing raised by the defendant Bank, they must be rejected, by virtue of the existence of a substantive legal relationship, based on the contractual relationship (pledge contract), as well as the request for the exit permit from the country and the dación en pago of the minibus, legal situations that link them in such a way that the plaintiffs can appear as the active party and the defendant Bank as the passive party in this jurisdictional proceeding. Likewise, regarding the defense of lack of active standing raised by the Administrative Board of the National Registry, the procedural legal relationship alluded to above exists, from the moment the Executive Decree in question is challenged, this being a Regulation of Organization of the Public Registry, coupled with the liability sought to be attributed to them. For this reason, as in the previous case, the plaintiff has sufficient standing to appear in this venue against the State and the Administrative Board of the National Registry. For the foregoing, said defense must be rejected. The defenses of lack of current Interest and lack of cause raised by the Bank must be rejected. The first by virtue of the fact that the interest persists, since the alleged damages supposedly derive from conduct carried out by the bank, according to the plaintiff's theory of the case, for which reason their admission or rejection must be analyzed on the merits of the judgment. The second must be rejected by virtue of the fact that it is not a defense that is itemized or listed in the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. Finally, the defense of lack of right must be upheld in the terms set forth in considering clause VIII of this judgment.

XII.- Regarding costs. In accordance with Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the fact of being so. Dispensation from this judgment is only viable when there is, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is issued based on evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason whatsoever to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulations and break the postulate of judgment against the loser, for which reason Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and Nombre115172 must bear the costs of the defendants.

THEREFORE.

I.-The following defenses are rejected: a) defense of expiration raised by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the Administrative Board of the National Registry, and the State. b) defense of statute of limitations raised by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. and the State. c) defense of lack of active and passive standing raised by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, and the Administrative Board of the National Registry. d) defense of lack of interest and lack of cause, raised by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. e) defense of lack of current interest raised by the Administrative Board of the National Registry. II.-The following defenses are upheld: a) lack of passive standing raised by the Public Transport Council, consequently, the lawsuit against it is declared inadmissible. b) lack of right raised by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, and the Administrative Board of the National Registry, consequently, the lawsuit filed by Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and Nombre115172 must be declared without merit. Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and Nombre115172 are ordered to pay costs in favor of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, the Administrative Board of the National Registry, and the Public Transport Council.

That a judicial order be issued to the Public Registry (Registro Público) to not process the permit for the exit of the vehicles from the country, as long as no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly exists to support it. c. That a judicial order be issued to the MOPT to not process the permit for the exit of the vehicles from the country, as long as no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly exists to support it. d. That Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. be ordered to pay damages and losses caused, on the basis of strict liability, for establishing institutional abusive banking practices in its capacity as a pledgee, for the exit-from-the-country requirement for a tourist minibus, which undermined the debtor's payment capacity by creating obstacles to its main source of income, in violation of articles 46 and 140 of constitutional rank, the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer, and against Law 8220, for the sum of $500,000 as principal (cost of the tourism unit, loss of profits for four years, and moral, psychological, and patrimonial damages), for impeding the exercise of the constitutional right of Freedom of Enterprise, for leaving the debtor out of work, for staining his name before SUGEF and preventing him from other market financial options, for harming him as a banking consumer, for damaging the company morally, plus other aspects that will be pointed out later; plus existing legal interest until the settlement of the judgment of this proceeding. e. An award of personal and procedural costs against the parties" (folio 127 of the judicial file). At the preliminary hearing of February 10, 2015, the claim was expanded as follows: "14:10 The claims are found at folio 127 of the statement of claim, the Judge proceeds to read them. The plaintiff indicates that an expansion was made regarding the claim for damages and losses against the State, the claim appearing at folio 527 for the sum of $138,000.00. The State's representation inquires which of the two plaintiffs is requesting the subjective moral damages. The plaintiff's representation indicates that it is Mr. Nombre115172" (minutes of the preliminary hearing visible at folio 607 of the judicial file and audiovisual support, contained in the virtual file).

**2.-** That on **October 30, 2013**, by resolution at 8:27 a.m., the Judge of the procedural stage granted the mandatory transfer to the defendants (folio 16 of the judicial file).

**3.-** That on **September 26, 2013**, the plaintiff Nombre115178 clarified that he also appeared as a plaintiff, so that he would no longer be considered as the representative of the plaintiff company, but as another plaintiff, being the most aggrieved as a banking consumer in this proceeding (folio 145 of the judicial file).

**4.-** That on **January 8, 2014**, the defendant Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. answered the complaint negatively and raised the defenses of **lapse (caducidad)**, **lack of subject-matter jurisdiction**, **statute of limitations (prescripción)**, **lack of right, lack of current interest, lack of cause, lack of standing to sue, and lack of standing to be sued**. That same day, the **Consejo de Transporte Público** answered the complaint negatively and raised the defenses of **lack of standing to be sued** and **lack of right**. (folios 180 and 273 of the judicial file).

**5.-** That on **January 10, 2014**, the **Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional** answered the complaint negatively and raised the defenses of **lapse (caducidad)**, **lack of right**, **lack of standing to sue, and lack of current interest** (folio 46 of the judicial file).

**6.-** That on **January 15, 2014**, the **State** answered the complaint negatively and raised the defenses of **lapse (caducidad)** against claim no. 1, **lack of right**, and **lack of standing to sue** (folio 447 of the judicial file).

**7.-** That on **May 27, 2014**, when addressing the hearing for defenses and counter-evidence, the plaintiff expanded its claim in the following terms: "This being the opportune procedural moment, as the preliminary hearing has not yet been held (sic), and in relation to the damages and losses caused by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A., this section of the complaint is clarified and expanded in the sense that the reason giving rise to them, what they consist of, and their prudential estimation in accordance with numerals 58 and 95 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and 290, subsection S, of the Código de Procedimientos Civiles, is now being concretized; we proceed to clarify and expand this point, to avoid greater delays in more advanced stages of the proceeding. The reasons giving rise to the indemnification for damages and losses, as well as what they consist of, in the present proceeding are: 1) The general provisions of the Regulation being challenged. 2) The individual application of the challenged regulatory provisions that affected the plaintiffs. 3) The existence of the Requirement for the Pledgee's Permission for a tourist minibus to exit the country.

• 4)The refusal of Banco City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. to grant the exit-from-the-country permit for the minibus, at a time when the pledge loan operation was current, as well as its respective insurance policies with INS, which did not put the capital invested by the banking entity at risk, especially since extraterritoriality insurance is paid to leave the country. To which they simply argued "Internal Banking Policies" to the detriment of the banking consumer's fourth-generation constitutional rights. 5) The application by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. of Extracontractual Internal Banking Policies not disclosed to the debtor at the time of the Credit Contracting for the Loan Granting. 6) The application of banking policies not disclosed to the debtor in the formalization of the loan caused serious damages and losses to the plaintiffs. 7) The unjustified delay by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. in providing a timely response to the Banking Consumer, in the face of his request to be able to take the minibus out of the country, which caused the loss of the tourist minibus by affecting the debtor's payment capacity, and it had to be given to the Bank as a Deed in Lieu of Payment (Dación de Pago). 8) The disregard by the defendant banking entity of the economic situation the country was experiencing at the time of the request made by the banking debtor, and the unreasonable disregard of state policies regarding debt restructuring and payment arrangements for banking debtors in the national tourism sector due to the international crisis, which was a Public and Notorious Fact. 9) The loss of the movable good, which was at that time the company's main profit-producing asset. 10) The loss of active clients at that time who were contracting the tourist minibus. 11) The loss of the affected debtor's merchant image, as well as the image of the transport company. 12) The losses suffered by the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and by the undersigned debtor, significant economic losses since Banco City Bank de Costa Rica prevented the plaintiffs in this case from generating profits, increasing their assets, and even caused losses to the debtor for the assets he had prior to the credit contracting with the banking entity, and loss of rating before SUGEF as a debtor. 13) The impossibility for the plaintiffs to have an open loan in any other financial entity, since after a deed in lieu of payment, no other financial entity would grant a pledge loan to the plaintiffs. 14) The impossibility of business growth, which was fully available at the time of the loan with City Bank de Costa Rica and afterwards was not. 15) The subjective moral and psychological damages caused to the banking debtor. 16) The objective moral damages caused to the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. 17) The Strict Liability (Responsabilidad Objetiva) incurred by the State for the challenged Regulation and by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. for the damages caused in its loan service relationship to the debtor and for the application of the Consumer Protection Law. The present complaint was estimated against Banco City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. in THE SUM OF $500,000 (five hundred thousand dollars), legal tender of the United States of America, plus legal interest until settlement of judgment, legal indexation of the losses suffered, which will be indicated later, since they are not totally defined at this moment, which are broken down as follows: Current Value of the Movable Good or similar: $170,000 (one hundred seventy thousand American dollars).

**Damages Suffered** Lost Profits (Lucro Cesante): **$48,000** annually in earnings, at $4,000 (four thousand dollars) per month, gives us a total of **$192,000** (one hundred ninety-two thousand dollars) over four years. **$138,000** for subjective non-material damage (daño moral subjetivo) to the debtor, objective non-material damage (daño moral objetivo) to the company, psychological damage (daño psicológico) to the debtor, loss of the asset situation (pérdida de situación patrimonial) existing before the contract with the BANK. This lawsuit is expanded for damages against the State for the sum of **$138,000** caused to the plaintiffs by the State, in application of the Challenged Regulation." (folio 524 of the judicial file).

**8.-** That on **October 17, 2014**, by means of a resolution, the Judge of the procedural stage rejected the defense of lack of jurisdiction filed by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. (resolution that appears in the virtual desktop).

**9.-** That on **February 10, 2015**, the preliminary hearing was held. At that stage, the claims were expanded in the terms indicated in resultando No. 1 of this judgment. At the same time, the State filed the exception of expiration (caducidad) in relation to claim No. 1 of the lawsuit. The Consejo de Transporte Público and Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. joined the exception of expiration (caducidad) filed by the State. The Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional joined the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) filed by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. The Judge of the procedural stage deferred the resolution of the defenses of expiration (caducidad) and statute of limitations (prescripción) to the Trial Court (minute visible on folio 607 of the judicial file and audiovisual record).

**10.-** That on **April 8, 2015**, the matter was assigned to the Fifth Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (folio 738 of the judicial file).

**11.-** That on **April 16, 2015**, the Fifth Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal set **November 24, 2015**, as the date to hold the oral and public trial (folio 557 of the judicial file).

**12.-** That on **November 24, 2015**, the Tribunal composed of judges Gustavo Irías Obando, Francisco Hidalgo Rueda, and Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo, suspended the holding of the oral and public trial, considering that the unconstitutionality action under case files 14-12592-007-CO and 15-4280-007-CO of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) had to be resolved (trial minute and audiovisual record).

**13.-** That on **November 6, 2017**, the Fifth Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal scheduled the oral and public trial to be held on **May 6, 2019** (resolution that appears in the virtual desktop).

**14.-** That on **May 6, 2019**, the oral and public trial was held (oral and public trial minute and audiovisual record).

**15.-** In the proceedings before this Tribunal, no nullities that must be corrected or that cause defenselessness have been observed, and the judgment is issued within the period established in Article 111, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

**Drafted by Judge Nombre31590, with the affirmative vote of Judge Nombre113674 and Judge Nombre114124; and,** **Considering** **I.- Proven Facts**: **1)** That on **October 3, 2008**, according to public deed of Notary **Erick Fabricio Jiménez Masís**, Importaciones Zuzu S.A. sold to Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A., the vehicle make Marco Polo, year 2008, with plates to be assigned with the Heredia code. In that same act, the plaintiff Nombre115172 appeared and Banco Cuscatlán, which granted him a commercial loan for the sum of $64,489.80, for a term of 72 months. The guarantee granted was a first-degree chattel mortgage (prenda) on the aforementioned vehicle (folio 67 of the judicial file). **2)** That on **September 18, 2009**, the plaintiff Nombre115172 submitted to the collections manager of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. a request to take the Marcopolo minibus with license plate Placa21537 out of the country, in the following terms: "FIRST: That I have a chattel mortgage (prendario) credit operation with you, number Identificacion617. SECOND: That for various reasons, during the course of the credit I have had certain normal delays, considering the economic crisis that has affected our country in the last year, in addition to the fact that from the beginning of the credit, we started working more than a month after signing the contract with the former Cuscatlán, who did not issue the payment check to the MARCOPOLO company until the Chattel Mortgage (Prenda) on the movable property was registered, which is why the property was not delivered to us until the Chattel Mortgage (Prenda) was registered and the first payment installment for me was already due to the Bank. THIRD: That despite all that, as of today we are completely up to date with the credit operation, in fact you can verify the payment status, where we have paid up to three installments at once. The foregoing indicates our intention to be up to date with the credit operation. FOURTH: That the week before last, permission was requested to take the Marcopolo Minibus, year 2008, License Plate number Placa21537, out of the country, and it was denied to us because we have had delays in the credit. FIFTH: That we need authorization to leave the country since the Investment Plan for the Acquisition of the Tour Minibus, as you can verify in the credit file, was for National and International Excursions and if we are not allowed to take the Minibus out of the country we cannot work and therefore, we will not be able to pay the Bank. SIXTH: I understand that among the Bank's policies is taking care of the Movable Property; however, this credit, as stated above, is completely up to date and it is required for it to work and produce as the active asset it is, to leave the country, in fact we need the permit to pay UNISERSE the corresponding extraterritoriality coverage. SEVENTH: Therefore, it is unreasonable and illogical that we are not allowed to work, especially since the extraterritoriality insurance will be paid and the operation is up to date; otherwise, the Bank is not allowing us to develop the Investment Plan that justified granting the credit." For all of the foregoing, I thank you in advance for any cooperation you can provide me, as I need to work on tours to Panama and Nicaragua and require the authorization of the Pledge Creditor (Acreedor Prendario)." (folio 42 of the judicial file). 3) That on November 2, 2009, Sara Gómez Méndez, in her capacity as Insurance Manager of the defendant Bank, sent a note to the plaintiff in the following terms: "Receive a cordial greeting from us, and at the same time we inform you that in accordance with the request for permission for the vehicle Marco Polo, license plate Placa21537, to leave the country, registered in the Public Registry of Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad) under the name of Transportes Turísticos Miravista S.A., with corporate ID number CED91052; where Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. is the pledge creditor (acreedor prendario) according to the lien (gravamen) recorded before the Registry in Volume 2008, Entry 00312179, Sequence 002 and where you are the debtor of operation CED91057, the following is communicated: 'In application of the bank's internal policies and studies carried out on your operation, the exit permit was temporarily denied until the loan does not register delays greater than 30 days in the last six months.' This denial is not permanent and at any time you may have our authorization, provided you comply with the above. For any inquiry, we are at your disposal at telephone numbers 2299-0206 Franklin Guzmán or at 2299-0411 Sara Gómez." (folio 44 of the judicial file). 4) That on November 3, 2010, before notary public Gabriela Valverde Mena, in deed number seventy-four, the plaintiff corporation and Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. appeared, for the purpose of extinguishing the obligation that the latter had with the Bank, carrying out a dation in payment (dación en pago), with a movable asset, which was the minibus (buseta) with license plate Placa21537, said agreement being recorded in the following terms: "THEY STATE: The first appearing party: That in payment of the amount of sixty-six thousand six hundred fifty dollars and seventy-seven cents, which is the outstanding balance of operation number one one zero nine nine zero four zero four six zero three, for which my represented party is a guarantor, and owed by Mr. Nombre115172 to Banco Cuscatlán de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, now named Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.

A., secured by the pledge contract (contrato de prenda) registered in the Movable Property Section (Registro Público de la Propiedad de Bienes Muebles) of the respective section, volume two thousand eight, entry three hundred twelve thousand one hundred seventy-nine, sequence zero two, guaranteed with the vehicle plate Placa21538, which is described as follows: Make: Marco Polo, style: W nine, category: Minibus (Buseta), capacity: Twenty-nine persons, year: Two thousand eight, chassis: nine three PB four zero B three P seven C zero two zero four four six. Engine: Make: MWM, number: Placa21539, displacement: four thousand three hundred C. C., fuel: Diesel, he transfers it free of liens and judicial annotations, estimating the dación de pago in the previously cited amount. The second appearing party: That his represented party accepts the dación de pago and requests that Registry to register said vehicle in the name of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima; and, as a consequence of the same, totally cancels the mentioned pledge registration entry, leaving the cited vehicle free of this lien and the liability of the former debtor extinguished." (folio 50 of the judicial file). 5) That in the present case, neither the State, nor the Administrative Board of the National Registry (Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional), nor the Public Transportation Council (Consejo de Transporte Público) carried out an active conduct or administrative act aimed at denying the exit permit for the minibus HB 2467, in application of the Regulation for the Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property No. 26883-J, published in Gazette No. 91 of May 13, 1998. (Confessional declaration of Nombre115172 in oral and public trial, audiovisual record of the trial) II.-Unproven facts: 1) That with the denial of the minibus's exit from the country, carried out by the defendant Bank by means of a note of November two, two thousand nine, the plaintiff party lost the movable property, its image, the difficulty of generating profits, the impediment to business growth, the inconvenience of requesting credit with other financial entities, and the moral damages he alleges (there is no evidence). 2) That after November two, two thousand nine, the plaintiff party had again processed the exit permit from the country (there is no evidence).

III.-Arguments of the plaintiff party: By way of summary, the plaintiff party explains that he acquired a minibus for tourism transportation. He points out that the purchasing debtor was Nombre115172 and the Minibus was registered in the name of the Company owned by the debtor, Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. He indicates that for the acquisition of said minibus, he obtained a pledge credit under the PYME modality with Citibank de Costa Rica S.A, formerly called Banco Cuscatlán, through credit operation number 120990404603 and for the sum of $64,489.80 for a term of 6 years, at an interest rate of 8.6% per year, with an investment plan intended for national and international tourism. The cost of the minibus was $85,090, of which he gave a down payment of $20,510.2. He adds that the acquisition of the credit was made solely and exclusively for the purchase of the minibus for land tourism transportation of people, mainly for conducting international tours to Nicaragua and Panama. He accuses that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that requires the procedure and requirements for the exit permit from the country for motor vehicles requested by the MOPT, specifically the Public Transportation Council and the National Registry, without taking into account the permits that financial entities must give in the event that there are motor vehicles given as a pledge guarantee. He also maintains that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that establishes as a requirement for the exit permit from the country for a minibus dedicated to international tourism, the authorization of a judge in the event of a traffic collision. He adds that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that establishes as a requirement for the exit permit from the country for a minibus dedicated to international tourism, authorization from the pledge creditor. He also mentions that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that establishes as a requirement for the exit permit from the country for a minibus dedicated to international tourism, the acquisition of extraterritoriality insurance. On the other hand, he mentions that, at the beginning of 2009, with the fall of tourism worldwide, he fell behind in the payment of three monthly installments of the bank loan. He specifies that between April 6, 2009, and May 8 of the same year, even without having income due to the indicated crisis, he obtained a personal loan with a private individual to pay Citibank the sum of $5,252, to bring the pledge credit up to date with the banking entity and thus be able to obtain the exit permit from the country from the bank as the pledge creditor, being clear that by the principle of reasonableness, balance of the consumer relationship, justice, and equity between the parties, the banking entity, the operation being up to date, would have no reasons to deny him the exit permit from the country. He reproaches that it was not so, but rather he obtained a response a month and a half later in which they denied the exit from the country of the vehicle given as a guarantee. He indicates that Citibank responded negatively to his request for an exit permit from the country for the tourism minibus, stating the following: "In application of the bank's internal policies and studies carried out on your operation, the exit permit from the country was temporarily denied until the credit does not register delays greater than 30 days in the last 6 months." He questions that the bank's alleged internal policies were never informed to him in the pre-contractual stage, nor before the signing of the pledge guarantee with the bank. He considers that this lack of prior, simple, and clear information by the provider of financial services leaves debtor clients and banking consumers in a state of total legal vulnerability regarding their legitimate interests and subjective rights. He considers that the refusal of the defendant Bank, based on the mentioned policies, violated his possibility of paying the credit by preventing him from obtaining profits.

IV.-Arguments of the defendant parties: By way of summary, Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. explains that it was not Mr. Nombre115172 who acquired the movable property in question, but rather it was the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. He maintains that the foregoing is relevant, since the credit relationship was with the natural person and not with the legal entity, thus, as he points out, the relationship with the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. is solely as a result of said company's consent to the pledge lien that was at the time granted over the movable property under study. He affirms that the supposed tourism activity was carried out by the company and not by the debtor. He argues that the power to grant exit permits from the country to motor vehicles derives directly from Article 140 subsections 3 and 18 of the Political Constitution, as well as Articles 2 subsection f 3 and 4 of Law 3155 (Law Creating the Ministry of Transportation, integrally reformed by Law 4786). He maintains that the requirements the plaintiff party reproaches derive from different laws, which he omits to reference. He adduces that the obligation of the Executive Branch to plan, regulate, control, and monitor transportation does have a legal origin, and for its part, the attributions to regulate said activity via decree or regulation as an administrative act of general scope have a constitutional origin. He defends the fact that the debtor was expressly informed that the denial of the authorization for the vehicle's exit was not permanent, and that it responded to a criterion under which what our represented party requests is that there be no delays in payments for more than 30 days over a 6-month period, a measure that is clearly reasonable and proportional, which tends to measure the debtor's payment behavior taking into consideration the history of delays that the account presented at the time and therefore the risk of possible execution of the guarantee held with respect to the granted credit. He points out that the requirements the plaintiff party reproaches come from both subsection e) of Article 95 of Executive Decree 26883-J, Regulation for the Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property, and from Article 20 of Executive Decree 16821-J (Regulation of the Public Registry of Motor Vehicle Property), which were in turn enacted based on Articles 140 subsections 3 and 18 of the Political Constitution, Article 28 second paragraph subsection b) of the General Law of Public Administration, and Articles 236 and 551 of the Commercial Code.

He adds that Mr. Nombre115172</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, was not placed, from the credit perspective, in Group 1, but rather in Group 2 of debtors, in which the "Payment Capacity" (Capacidad de Pago) parameter is not used, but only the evaluation parameters of "Delinquency" (Morosidad) and "Historical Payment Behavior" (Comportamiento de Pago Histórico). He considers that freedom of commerce or freedom to work has not been violated, since the denial was temporary in nature. For its part, the Public Transportation Council (Consejo de Transporte Público) points out that the assertion in the line of argument that there is no express rule issued by the Legislative Assembly requiring the permit process for the exit from the country of motor vehicles providing public transportation services is false; in this regard, it must be indicated that the current regulations governing public transportation service in its different modalities are regulated by Ley 3503 and Ley 7969. The Administrative Board of the National Registry (Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional) maintains that the Regulation of Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property (Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble) was created through Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 26883-J, this in accordance with Article 28, second paragraph, subsection b) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Articles 236 and 551 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio), Law (Ley) number 3284 of April 30. It maintains that this Regulation does not contain any nullity in the articles discussed in this proceeding, since they are authorized by higher-ranking legal regulations. At the same time, it states that no active or omissive conduct related to the damages claimed is accredited. Finally, the State (el Estado) indicates that the pledge contract (contrato de prenda) is fully regulated in Articles 530 and following of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) and its purpose is to guarantee obligations subject to the rules set forth in said articles. The assets affected by a pledge (prenda) shall guarantee the creditor, with special privilege, the amount of the transaction and the interest, commissions, and costs, and costs of both parties, in the terms indicated by the contract. It maintains that, in the particular case of pledges (prendas) in which a motor vehicle is offered as collateral, it must be constituted by public deed (escritura pública). The debtor shall retain, in the name of the pledge creditor (acreedor pignoraticio), possession of the pledged item and shall assume the obligations and responsibilities of a depositary; furthermore, the debtor shall be liable for damages suffered by the items that do not arise from a fortuitous event, force majeure, or the very nature of the objects, in accordance with Article 537. On the other hand, it argues that the contract for the constitution of a pledge (prenda) must contain the information required by numeral 554 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) and be registered in the Pledge Registry (Registro de Prendas). Finally, regarding pledge obligations (obligaciones prendarias) payable in successive installments, failure to pay one of them makes the entire obligation due and payable, unless otherwise agreed, in accordance with canon 580. It argues that, due to the very nature of the pledge contract (contrato de prenda), which is constituted on movable assets (bienes muebles), the only way to guarantee the credit is insofar as the asset given as collateral remains in the country. Hence, the challenged regulatory norm, in requiring the authorization of the pledge creditor (acreedor prendario) for the Public Registry to authorize the exit from the country of a vehicle given as pledge collateral (garantía prendaria), is fully grounded, I repeat, in the very nature of the pledge contract (contrato prendario). Hence, the plaintiff company is incorrect in alleging that the challenged Regulation, in regulating the procedure for issuing an exit permit for a vehicle given in pledge (prenda), exceeds the regulatory power, since, I repeat, it is grounded in the very nature of the pledge contract (contrato de prenda), duly regulated in numerals 530 and following of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio), Law (Ley) No. 3284 of April 30, 1964.

**V.-Object of the proceeding:** We are facing a plenary jurisdiction proceeding, through which the plaintiff not only claims the nullity of an administrative conduct, but also the patrimonial liability of the involved administrations, as well as that of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A.

**VI.-Regarding the defense of expiration (caducidad):** In its answer to the complaint, **Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A.**, regarding this defense, maintains that the action is expired (caduca) in relation to claims a, b, and c, in accordance with Article 39, subsection 1 of the CPCA. It argues that Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 26883-J was published in La Gaceta No. 91 on May 13, 1998. If this period is not considered for the expiration count, it points out that the individual application of the mentioned decree occurred in 2009 and the complaint was not filed until 2013. In its answer to the complaint, regarding the defense of expiration (caducidad), **the Administrative Board of the Public Registry (la Junta Administrativa de Registro Público)** maintained, based on a ruling from Section VI of the Administrative Contentious Tribunal, number 52-2012-VI, that, although to the extent that regulatory norms remain in force, the possibility of challenging them cannot expire (caduque), however, the plaintiff must demonstrate a legitimate interest (interés legítimo). In that sense, it states that as of the date of filing of the complaint, it does not possess the real estate (bien inmueble), since it was transferred by a dation in payment (dación en pago) to the banking entity Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. Finally, the **State (Estado)** raised the defense in its answer to the complaint and maintained that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 64, subsection 2, in relation to numeral 66, subsection k) and 39 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), the possibility of challenging Articles 94 through 99 of the Regulation of Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property (Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble), Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 26833-J, published in La Gaceta 91 of May 13, 1998, is expired (caduca). The foregoing by virtue of the fact that numeral 39, subsection b) of the CPCA, provides that the maximum period to claim the nullity of a Regulation, such as the one at hand, is one year, counted from the day following the sole or last publication. In the preliminary hearing of February 10, 2015, Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. and the Public Transportation Council (Consejo de Transporte Público) joined the defense of expiration (caducidad) presented by the State. On the other hand, in the exceptions hearing, the **plaintiff** maintained that, in relation to what the defendant Bank stated, the provisions of Article 39 of the CPCA are not applicable to the specific case, but rather canon 40, given that, in its opinion, these are acts producing effects at this moment. As the matter is thus framed, the period begins to run from the date on which Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. denied the exit permit for the minibus, which is the moment in which the Regulation caused it a negative effect, in relation to Article 37, subsection 3) of the same mentioned Code. For its part, regarding the defense of expiration (caducidad) alleged by the State, it affirms that canon 66, subsection 1 k, nor 39, both of the CPCA, apply, given that in the case under examination, as it states, Article 40 of the CPCA applies. It also argues that it is empowered to challenge the specific act and all antecedent norms, including the general provision that was not challenged in a timely and proper manner, in accordance with numeral 10, subsection 2 of the CPCA. Regarding the argument of the Administrative Board of the National Registry (Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional), it maintains that the cited ruling of the Sixth Section of the Administrative Contentious Tribunal, rather, supports its position, given that it recognizes that regulatory norms maintain their validity over time and the possibility of challenging them exists while they remain in force, therefore, the possibility of challenge does not expire. The foregoing must be concorded with Article 37, subsection c) of the CPCA.

**Criterion of the Tribunal (Criterio del Tribunal)** : In accordance with what has been accredited in the case file, this Collegiate Body is clear that the Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 26.883-J challenged in this venue dates from the year **1998** and, in turn, that the individual act of application of the challenged norm occurred on **November 2, 2009**; it is also clear that the complaint was filed on **June 18, 2013**; the fact is that the questioned norms have maintained their validity over time at the moment the complaint was filed as well as to date. In this way, regulatory norms, by their very nature, produce their effects continuously while they are in force, which is why that possibility cannot expire while they are in effect and the plaintiff can demonstrate that it has, at least, legitimate interest (interés legítimo) for such purposes, in accordance with the provisions of Article 10, subsection 2 ibidem *(see rulings number 262-2011-VI, of fourteen hours fifty minutes on December first, two thousand eleven, and number 52-2012-VI of seven hours thirty minutes on March twenty-second, two thousand twelve, both issued by the Sixth Section of this Tribunal).* At this point, it is worth recalling that, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 40 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), it is possible to challenge administrative acts of general scope with normative effects, as long as their continuous effects subsist over time, therefore, the maximum period to file the proceeding shall be one year from the day following the cessation of those effects. Added to the foregoing, it is worth recalling that in cases of automatically applicable norms—as in this case—no individual act of application is required to challenge them, given that they become immediately binding upon their sole promulgation, without the need for other norms or acts that develop them or make them applicable to the aggrieved party. For the Tribunal, the plaintiff holds a legitimate interest (interés legítimo), as it is dedicated to the activity of transporting tourists. For the foregoing, the defense of expiration (caducidad) must be rejected.

**VII.-Regarding the defense of prescription (prescripción).** The defendant **Bank** in the present case maintains that the indemnification claim filed against it originates from the pledge contract (contrato de prenda), through which the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. granted vehicle license plate Placa21537 as a real guarantee (garantía real) for payment of the debt acquired by the plaintiff Nombre115172</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, with whom it held the credit relationship. It maintains that it is a commercial contract (contrato mercantil) governed by numeral 531 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio). It adds that the denial of the permit occurred on November 2, 2009, so the prescription period (plazo de prescripción) of canon 984 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) has run. It considers that the prescription period (plazo de prescripción) elapsed, given that the ruling was notified to the defendant Bank on November 8, 2013. On the other hand, the plaintiff maintains that the damage claimed arises with the dation in payment (dación en pago). It considers that the 4 years of Article 984 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) have not elapsed, since the complaint was filed on July 18, 2013. Finally, it maintains that, if one starts from the fact that what is sought is compensation for damages against the State, for lawful conduct, the 10-year prescription period (plazo de prescripción) of Article 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) applies.

**Criterion of the Tribunal (Criterio del Tribunal):** Adjusted to the evidence in the case file, as already indicated in the previous recital, the fact that the Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) 26883-J challenged in this venue dates from the year **1998** and, in turn, that the individual act of application of the challenged norm occurred on **November 2, 2009**, also that the complaint was filed on **June 18, 2013**, allows us to see that the cause is not prescribed (prescrita) for claiming liability. As will be developed further below, two different types of liability are requested, due to private law legal entities and public law entities. For the first case, as the defendant Bank indicates, canon 984 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) applies, which provides a 4-year prescription period (plazo de prescripción) for all rights and their corresponding action derived from the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio), Law (Ley) No. 3284 and its reforms. However, contrary to what the defendant financial entity maintains, said period **was interrupted at the moment in which the complaint was filed** on **June 18, 2013.** If one takes into account that the event to which the alleged impairments in this venue are intended to be linked occurred on **November 2, 2009**, with the rejection of the permit request to take the minibus out of the country, on the date of filing the complaint, the 4-year period had not elapsed, being interrupted by the filing of the complaint. For the foregoing, the defense of prescription (prescripción) raised by the Bank must be rejected. On the other hand, regarding the entities governed by Public Law, the liability requested is governed by the provisions of Articles 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). Specifically, canon 198 provides a 4-year period to claim objective liability from the Administration and not Article 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), as the plaintiff maintains. Said numeral, regarding what is of interest, provides: *"Article 198.-The right to claim compensation from the Administration shall prescribe (prescribirá) in four years, counted from the event giving rise to the liability (...)"* With matters thus framed, the event giving rise to the liability to claim damages occurred on **November 2, 2009**, due to the denial of the exit permit for the plaintiff's vehicle. In this way, said period **was interrupted at the moment in which the complaint was filed** on **June 18, 2013.** If one takes into account that the event to which the alleged impairments in this venue are intended to be linked occurred on **November 2, 2009**, with the rejection of the permit request to take the minibus out of the country, on the date of filing the complaint, the 4-year period of canon 198 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) had not elapsed, being interrupted by the filing of the complaint. For the foregoing, the defense of prescription (prescripción) must be rejected.

**VIII.-Regarding the lack of passive legitimation (legitimación pasiva) of the Public Transportation Council (Consejo de Transporte Público):** Among the substantive prerequisites to be analyzed in the ruling by the Tribunal, even ex officio, is legitimation *ad causam* both active and passive, understood as the aptitude to be a party in a determined proceeding; legitimation *ad causam* is not a matter of form but of substance, it is the relationship between the legal situation set forth by the plaintiff and the debated legitimate interest (interés legítimo), being a prerequisite for a decision granting the claim. *"Every contentious jurisdictional proceeding includes what some procedural experts have called a 'procedural legal relationship'; the subjects intervening in it do so exercising the right of action and the right of defense. Plaintiff and defendant become parties by the mere fact of exercising those rights, without this implying, necessarily, that the material legal relationship ventilated in the proceeding exists between them. Legitimation ad causam refers precisely to this latter aspect. It is formed insofar as there is a link between the parties and that material legal situation, so that it requires the identity between the person who claims and the holder of the subjective interest claimed (active) and between the defendant and the one obliged to the required performance (passive). Thus, it is said, there is active legitimation when the possibility of effectively upholding the claim exists with respect to the plaintiff, and passive when that pronouncement can be effective in relation to the defendant."* (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 775-F-03 of 14:25 hours on November 20, 2003). The determination of this procedural suitability is intimately linked to the claim deduced in the action, so that only whoever is in a certain relationship with it can be a party in the respective proceeding. In the specific case, the Public Transportation Council (Consejo de Transporte Público) has alleged the defense of lack of passive legitimation (legitimación pasiva). For the Tribunal, the aforementioned material procedural legal relationship does not exist between the plaintiff in this proceeding and the Public Transportation Council (Consejo de Transporte Público). The foregoing, primarily, by virtue of the fact that the CTP did not issue any active or omissive conduct aimed at denying the exit permit for the minibus, since, as Nombre115172</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> explained in his confession (declaración confesional), once the exit permit was rejected by the defendant Bank, he did not continue with the process before said public entity or any of the other defendants. On the other hand, the regulation challenged here is that of the Regulation of Organization of the Public Registry of Property (Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad), Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) No. 28.883-J. Which in this case does not concern the Public Transportation Council (Consejo de Transporte Público). For the foregoing, there is no reason whatsoever for it to appear as a defendant and the defense of lack of passive legitimation (legitimación pasiva) raised by the CTP must be granted, and consequently, the complaint against it must be declared inadmissible.

**IX.-Regarding the specific case:** As transcribed in recitals (resultandos) No. 1 and No. 7, and as stated in recital (resultando) No. 9, as well as in considerando V, all of the present ruling, this plenary jurisdiction proceeding raises several claims against different entities, some governed by Public Law and another by Private Law. As a consequence of the foregoing, given the diverse legal nature of the defendant parties, we are faced with different legal regimes applicable to each. To resolve this case in an orderly manner, each claim will be analyzed separately and each of its arguments will be resolved.

**A)** **Annulment claim: Nullity of Articles 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the Regulation of Organization Public Registry of Movable Property (Reglamento de Organización Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble) No. 26883-J, published in La Gaceta No. 91 of May 13, 1998**: The plaintiff comes to this venue to reproach, in a first, very broad line of argument, the administrative procedures before the MOPT and the Property Registry (Registro de la Propiedad) to be able to take a motor vehicle out of the country, which it lists and qualifies as bureaucratic and unnecessary. Within this count of procedures, it highlights the one that must be carried out before the Public Registry, of presenting the duly authenticated authorization of the pledge creditor (acreedor prendario). At the same time, it lists three decrees of the MOPT, from which the requirements for the exit of motor vehicles from the country derive. On the other hand, it refers to the requirements established by the Public Registry, based on the Regulation of Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property (Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble), No. 26883-J, published in La Gaceta No. 91 of May 13, 1998. Notwithstanding how broad its dissertations, arguments, and reproaches are, given the way in which the claim was outlined, the object of this proceeding is aimed at determining, according to this annulment claim, whether canons 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the indicated Regulation suffer from some type of pathology that merits decreeing their invalidity. The fundamental reason that the **plaintiff** reproaches in this proceeding, as the generator of the pathology of invalidity, consists of the nonexistence of a legal basis that supports the exit requirements provided for motor vehicles in the Regulation it challenges. It misses the existence of a legal norm, issued by the Legislative Assembly, that provides as a requirement for the exit from the country of a minibus, dedicated to international tourism, the authorization of the pledge creditor (acreedor prendario). It also reproaches the nonexistence of a legal normative assumption authorizing a Judge, in case a traffic collision exists, to require their authorization. At the same time, it considers that the existence of extraterritoriality insurance due to the exit of a minibus from the country is abusive. It states that the regulatory norm in question is contrary to the provisions of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from the Excess of Administrative Requirements and Procedures (Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos), No. 8220, as well as the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor), No. 7472.

The defendant **Bank** maintains that, contrary to what the plaintiff states, the authority to grant exit permits for motor vehicles to leave the country derives directly from Article 140, subsections 3 and 18, of the Political Constitution, as well as Articles 2, subsection f, 3, and 4 of Law 3155 (Law Creating the Ministry of Transport, comprehensively reformed by Law 4786). That is, the statement in the fact does not stem from a whim of the administration, but rather from a legislative mandate to "plan, regulate, control, and supervise" any mode of transport, using the powers granted to the Executive Branch by the Constitution's framers to sanction, regulate, and execute the laws. Similarly, Articles 236 and 551 of the Commercial Code provide the basis for the exit requirement granted by the National Registry, which corresponds to a protection of the interests of the pledgee creditor, who could see its guarantee in the credit diverted or lost. The **Public Transport Council** maintains that, in this regard, Law 7969, Article 7, and Law 3503, Article 3, establish the powers that the Public Transport Council has to regulate matters concerning the Public Transport service provided. The **Administrative Board of the National Registry** maintains that the Regulation in question is grounded in numerals 11 and 12 of the General Law of Public Administration. Finally, the **State** indicates that the Pledge Agreement finds full regulation in Articles 530 and following of the Commercial Code and its purpose is to guarantee obligations subject to the rules set forth in the referenced articles. At the same time, it maintains that goods affected by a pledge shall guarantee to the creditor, with special privilege, the amount of the transaction and the Interest, commissions, and expenses, and both sets of costs, under the terms indicated in the contract, in accordance with the provision of Article 540 of the same regulatory body. It adds that in the particular case of pledges in which a motor vehicle is offered as guarantee, it must be constituted by public deed. The debtor shall retain, in the name of the pledgee creditor, the possession of the pledged thing and shall assume the obligations and responsibilities of a depositary; furthermore, he shall be liable for damages suffered by the things that do not arise from a fortuitous event, force majeure, or the very nature of the objects, in accordance with Article 537. In turn, it maintains that the pledge constitution agreement must contain the information required by numeral 554 of the Commercial Code and be recorded in the Pledge Registry. Finally, in pledge obligations payable in successive installments, failure to pay one of them shall make the entire obligation due and payable, unless otherwise agreed, as stated in Article 580. Thus, by the very nature of the pledge agreement, which is constituted on movable property, the only way to guarantee the credit is insofar as the good given as guarantee remains in the country. Hence, the challenged regulatory provision, insofar as it requires the authorization of the pledgee creditor for the Public Registry to authorize the departure from the country of a vehicle given as a pledge guarantee, finds full basis in the very nature of the pledge contract. Hence, the plaintiff is not correct in alleging that the challenged Regulation, which regulates the procedure for issuing an exit permit for a pledged vehicle, exceeds the regulatory power because, as reiterated, it finds basis in the very nature of the pledge contract, duly regulated in numerals 530 and following of the Commercial Code, Law No. 3284 of April 30, 1964. **Court's Opinion**: It is necessary to bear in mind that Executive Decree No. 26.883, called the Regulation for the Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property, as stated in its heading, is born in accordance with the provisions of Articles 140, subsections 3) and 18) of the Political Constitution, Article 28, second paragraph, subsection b) of the General Law of Public Administration, and Articles 236 and 551 of the Commercial Code, Law No. 3284 of April 30, 1964. Considering at the same time, that Title II, First Book of the Commercial Code provided for the creation of a Registry of Movable Property in the city of San José, to act jointly with the Pledge Registry, and that Article 2 of the Law Creating the National Registry, No. 5695 of May 28, 1975, and its reforms, attached the Registry of Movable Property to this Institution, which also included matters relating to vehicles. At the same time, that Executive Decree No. 23178-J-MOPT of May 5, 1994, attached the National Registry of Vessels to the Public Registry of Movable Property of the National Registry and that the Public Registry of Motor Vehicle Property, the General Pledge Registry, and the National Registry of Vessels have operated under independent Regulations, making it necessary to stipulate a single legal regime for the entire Public Registry of Movable Property; and finally, that the General Pledge Registry had been operating under Executive Decree No. 34 of December 10, 1969, and the Public Registry of Motor Vehicle Property has operated under Executive Decree No. 16821-J of December 16, 1985, but it was necessary to promulgate a new regulation that codified the rules on the registration of movable property, while also standardizing the procedures of the entire Public Registry of Movable Property. Based on the foregoing, Article 1 provides that the Public Registry of Movable Property is attached to the National Registry under Law No. 5695 of May 28, 1975, and its Reforms and has under its competence the registration and publication of rights referring to the constitution, declaration, modification, and extinction of movable property and the pledge encumbrances (gravámenes prendarios) affecting it, as well as the adjudication and delivery of the registration certificates (matrículas) of registrable goods and their permits to leave the national territory, all in accordance with the law. Following the corresponding order in the Third Title of that Executive Decree, the registration and permits relating to movable property are regulated. The First Chapter regulates the exit permits for vehicles, from numerals 94 to 98, which are precisely the ones challenged in this jurisdictional venue. Article 94 provides the following: *"Article 94.—**Exclusive competence.** The Registry shall grant the permits for motor vehicles to leave the country."* For its part, provision 95 indicates: *"Article 95.—**Permit requirements.** Without prejudice to other conditions that the Directorate may provide in the interest of legal certainty, requests for exit permits to leave the country must be submitted in writing, typed, and meet the following requirements: a) Authorization of the registral owner for the granting of the exit, the characteristics of the vehicle, the date of exit, and the destination. If the owner does not personally process the exit before the Registry, in which case the presentation of his identity card will suffice, said request must be authenticated by a Notary Public. b) If the vehicle belongs to a legal entity, the request must be signed by the person who has the legal representation, which must be demonstrated with a certification current on the date of the request. c) Having satisfied the corresponding fees and other tax requirements. d) In the event of recorded judicial encumbrances (gravámenes judiciales), these must be canceled or, failing that, authorization from the corresponding authority must be provided. e) In the event of recorded pledge encumbrances (gravámenes prendarios), authorization from the pledgee creditor must be provided. f) In the case of buses intended for the collective transport of persons, a certification of being up to date with the extraterritoriality policy (póliza de extraterritorialidad) before the National Insurance Institute must also be provided, along with the authorization note from the General Directorate of Motor Transport of MOPT and a note from the Departures and Arrivals Section of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute regarding the cancellation of taxes. g) In the case of vehicles intended for tourism services, the authorization note from the Costa Rican Tourism Institute and the extraterritoriality policy (póliza de extraterritorialidad) from INS must additionally be provided. h) In the case of taxis intended for the collective transport of persons, in addition to the foregoing general requirements, the extraterritoriality policy (póliza de extraterritorialidad) from INS and an authorization note from the MOPT taxi office will be required. i) In the case of vehicles belonging to Public Institutions and Branches of Government, the authorization of the head of the entity, duly on letterhead and sealed, will additionally be requested. j) In the case of vehicles in the name of International Missions or Organizations and the Diplomatic Corps, a request from the representative of the Organization or Ambassador and a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs certifying the legal capacity of the applicant must be provided. k) In the case of vehicles owned by pensioners and rentiers, the note from the Costa Rican Tourism Institute certifying that the owner is up to date in fulfilling the obligations that this legal status demands will additionally be required."* On the other hand, Article 96 provides the following: *"Article 96.—**Authorization of the permit.** Once the request is admitted, it shall be compared with the Registry information and verified whether it meets the general requirements. If no defect is found, the exit permit shall be granted, leaving the related documents microfilmed."* Then numeral 97 provides: *"Article 97.—**Validity of the permit.** The exit permit must be used within fifteen days after its issuance, in the case of private vehicles, and within four months after its issuance, in the case of heavy cargo vehicles."* Finally, provision 98 states: *"Article 98.—**Issuance of permits through the registry's external network.** The Registry, through the Department of Informatics of the National Registry, through the Service Decentralization Program, may coordinate with the Municipalities of the Country or other institutions, so that exit permits for vehicles in the classes deemed convenient can be issued in those Dependencies, in accordance with the provisions of Executive Decree No. 26515-J of December 18, 1997."* Having reviewed and analyzed this challenged regulatory body, the Court finds that the plaintiff is not correct in considering that there are no legal-rank norms that support the regulatory development by the Executive Decree being challenged. On a first line, there are the constitutional-rank provisions that gave it support, from which the powers of the Executive Branch to issue the regulatory norm in question derive. On the other hand, there is the Law Creating the National Registry, as well as the Commercial Code. The regulation of vehicle exit permits turns out to be an extension, within the framework of the regulatory power of the Executive Branch, of provisions 236, 530, 537, 540, 551, 554, and 580 of the Commercial Code. Note that Article 236 creates the Registry of Movable Property based in the city of San José, which shall act jointly with the Pledge Registry. Chapter VIII, belonging to Title I, of Book II, of the Commercial Code, regulates the pledge contract from Articles 530 to 581. Numeral 537 stands out, providing the following: *"Article 537.- Pledges in which motor vehicles, vessels, or aircraft are offered as guarantee must be constituted by public deed. Those constituted in relation to other movable property of a different nature may be granted in public or private document or in official contract forms. In these last two cases, the debtor's signature duly authenticated by a notary public will be required. The debtor shall retain, in the name of the pledgee creditor, the possession of the pledged thing and shall assume the obligations and responsibilities of a depositary; furthermore, he shall be liable for damages suffered by the things that do not arise from a fortuitous event, force majeure, or the very nature of the objects. The document or certificate accrediting the constitution of the pledge or the certification of the Pledge Registry shall serve as proof of the deposit."* In the Court's opinion, the requirements established in the questioned numerals of the Executive Decree in question, such as those the plaintiff objects to, which consist of the creditor's permission and the insurance policy, are not contrary to the laws cited above, and their purpose is rather to ensure the rights of the pledgee creditor and the guarantee, so that they are not affected. On the other hand, in this collegiate body's judgment, the alleged violation of provisions: 1, 8, 9, and 10 of Law No. 8220, called the Law for the Protection of the Citizen from Excessive Administrative Requirements and Procedures, does not exist. The foregoing by virtue of the fact that, as was set forth previously, the challenged articles are in accordance with the provisions of the Commercial Code, which regulates the pledge contract, in order to safeguard the rights of pledgee creditors and the creation of a registry of movable property that organizes this entire situation. Furthermore, the requirements set forth in the challenged numerals, in the Court's opinion, are not contrary to reasonableness, proportionality, logic, or good faith, insofar as no procedure is observed that is excessive or unnecessary, and that has any purpose other than providing legal certainty to the pledgee creditor; as well as to the users of the service through the extraterritoriality policy (póliza de extraterritorialidad). For this reason, the petition for annulment (nulidad) of the aforementioned norms must be rejected. **B) First order-seeking claim: That a judicial order be issued to the Public Registry, so that it does not carry out the permit procedure for vehicles to leave the country, as long as there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that supports it and C) Second order-seeking claim: That a judicial order be issued to MOPT, so that it does not carry out the permit procedure for vehicles to leave the country, as long as there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that supports it.** For the Court, it is impossible to grant these two claims to order the Administrative Board of the National Registry or MOPT as requested. The foregoing, in accordance with what has been set forth in point A) above, of this ruling, given that, as was set forth, there exist norms of a constitutional and legal nature that support the regulations concerning exit permits for vehicles to leave the country. In another vein, neither is it found that the questioned regulations transgress the provisions of the Law for the Protection of the Citizen from Excessive Administrative Requirements and Procedures, No. 8220. Therefore, the alleged invalidity is not found, nor any reason aimed at decreeing the annulment (nulidad) of Articles 94 to 98 of the Executive Decree being questioned; consequently, it is also not possible to accede to the order-seeking claims directed at MOPT or the Administrative Board of the National Registry.

**D) First claim for damages based on strict liability against Banco Citibank:** The plaintiff seeks an order for the payment of damages caused, based on strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), for establishing abusive institutional banking practices in its capacity as a pledgee, regarding the requirement for a tour bus (buseta de turismo) to leave the country, which undermined the debtor's payment capacity by establishing obstacles to their main source of income, contrary to Articles 46 and 140 of the Constitution, the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, and Law 8220, for the sum of $500,000 for principal (cost of the tour vehicle, lost profits (lucro cesante) for four years, and moral damages (daño moral), psychological harm, and property damage), for impeding the development of the constitutional right to Freedom of Enterprise, for rendering the debtor unemployed, for tarnishing his name before SUGEF and preventing him from other financial market options, for harming him as a banking consumer, for morally damaging the company; plus existing legal interest until the settlement of the judgment in this process. The defendant **Banco** maintains that the denial it issued, so that on November 29, 2009, was due to a policy aimed at safeguarding its interest within the framework of the pledge contract. ***Criterion of the Court***: Regarding the duty to provide adequate, timely, clear, truthful, and sufficient information to the consumer, it must be borne in mind that the last paragraph of Article 46 of the Political Constitution; subsections c) and d) of Article 32 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense; and Articles 41 and 43 of the Regulation to that Law, establish that *the consumer must receive adequate, clear, truthful, timely, and sufficient information on all elements that directly affect their consumption decision*, so it is essential that the person intending to sign a contract such as the one at hand must know sufficiently and timely its conditions, limitations, scope, and consequences, allowing them to determine whether or not to sign it. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: *“...it is notorious that the consumer is at the end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and marketing of consumer goods they need to acquire for their personal satisfaction, and their participation in that process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but rather to the constant execution of contracts on a personal basis.* *For this reason, their relationship in that commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the providers of goods and services, so that prior to expressing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary elements of judgment that allow them to express it freely, and this implies thorough knowledge of the goods and services offered.* *Included in what has been expressed, in a harmonious mixture, are several constitutional principles, such as the state’s concern for the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating individuals' free disposition of their assets with the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health which is involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relations between the interested parties, the homologation of international commercial practices to the internal system, and finally, the greater protection of the inhabitant's functioning in their means of subsistence...”* (Judgment No. 1996-04463 of nine forty-five hours on August thirty, nineteen ninety-six. See in a similar sense, Judgment No. 1992-01441 of fifteen forty-five hours on June two, nineteen ninety-two). In the case under review, for this Court, the conduct of the defendant Bank in its denial of the departure permit is dubious, when alleging as grounds for rejection the existence of supposed “internal policies” that the plaintiff was unaware of. It is contrary to this duty to provide information that, surprisingly in situations such as that which occurred in the case at hand, denials of departure permits are justified on a policy that the plaintiff only became aware of at the moment they requested the permit. The appropriate course of action in the specific case would have been, in safeguarding the right to information in consumer matters, that with due notice, prior to the signing of the pledge contract, the defendant bank had informed the plaintiff of all banking policies associated with vehicle departure permits. Such information was relevant to their consumption decision. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and in line with the fact that for this Collegiate Body the defendant Bank violated its duty to adequately inform the plaintiff, the truth is that the Court does not find a link or causal nexus (nexo causal) between this omissive conduct and the damages sought to be compensated. It has not been adequately proven that, due to the lack of information reproached and the denial of the microbus's departure from the country, the plaintiff lost the movable property, that their image was affected, that they experienced difficulties generating profits, nor the alleged impediment to growing commercially, as well as the difficulty in applying for credit with other financial institutions and the moral damages (daño moral) claimed. The existence of a causal nexus (nexo causal) has not been proven in the case at hand between these alleged damages and the Bank's conduct in denying the departure permit based on an *"Internal Policy,"* whose timely disclosure has also not been proven, failing in its duty to provide information. Therefore, the defense of lack of right must be upheld and consequently, the claim for strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) against the bank is dismissed. **E) Second claim for damages against the State and the Administrative Board of the National Registry**: On folio 527 of the judicial file, the plaintiff expanded their claim, adjusted and clarified in the preliminary hearing, against the State, for the sum of $138,000 for damages. With respect to the moral damages (daño moral), the claimant is Mr. Nombre115172. The plaintiff's theory of the case for seeking strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) under Canon 190 and subsequent articles of the General Law of Public Administration is based on the issuance of Executive Decree No. 28883-J, which is the Regulation for the Organization of the Public Registry, to which they attribute invalidity in Articles 94 through 99. Before resolving, it must be kept in mind, as is proven in this venue, that neither the State nor the Administrative Board of the National Registry carried out any active or omissive conduct aimed at denying the departure permit, because as Mr. Nombre115172 explained in his confessional statement, once the defendant Bank rejected his permit, he did not present his application to the rest of the defendants. The plaintiff's daughter in her witness statement also confirmed this aspect. With matters thus posed, the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) attributed to them, in the plaintiff's theory of the case, arises from the issuance of the Executive Decree in question. It is impossible for the Court to grant this claim, due to the fact that the scheme of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of the Administration is not met, lacking the necessary elements to demand any compensation from the Administration. Firstly, since the alleged invalidity does not exist, as explained in point A) of this recital numbered IX, we are not before the criteria for attributing liability, such as illicit or abnormal functioning. With respect to the criteria for attributing liability based on licit and normal functioning, they also do not apply in this case, since the existence of an exceptional injury and a small proportion of affected persons has not been proven, as required by Canon 194 of the General Law of Public Administration. A series of damages suffered by the company are alleged, already mentioned in point D) above; however, a causal nexus (nexo causal) between these and the issuance of the Executive Decree by the State is also not found. For the foregoing reasons, the defense of lack of right must be upheld and therefore the claim against the State and the Administrative Board of the National Registry is dismissed, as the alleged strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) cannot be determined.

**X.- On the compensatory claims**. In accordance with what was stated in the preceding recital, numbered IX, of this judgment, it is impossible to grant the claims for damages sought by the plaintiff against Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, and the Administrative Board of the National Registry.

**XI.- On the defenses**. The defense of lack of jurisdiction was resolved by the Case Management Judge, as explained in finding of fact number **8** of this judgment. The defense of **lapse (caducidad)** must be rejected in accordance with what is stated in recital **VI** of this judgment. The defense of **statute of limitations (prescripción)** must be rejected based on what is stated in recital **VII** of this judgment. Regarding the defense of **lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva)** filed by the Public Transportation Council, it must be upheld, in accordance with what is stated in recital **VIII** of this resolution, and consequently, the claim filed against it must be declared inadmissible. As for the defenses of **lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva)** filed by the defendant Bank, they must be rejected, because a legal relationship of a material nature exists, by virtue of the contractual relationship (pledge contract), as well as the processing of the departure permit and the dation in payment (dación en pago) of the microbus, legal situations that link them in such a way that the plaintiffs can appear as the active party and the defendant Bank as the passive party in this jurisdictional process. Likewise, regarding the defense of **lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa)** filed by the Administrative Board of the National Registry, the procedural legal relationship alluded to previously exists, from the moment the Executive Decree in question is challenged, this being a Regulation for the Organization of the Public Registry, coupled with the liability sought to be attributed to them. For this reason, as in the previous case, the plaintiff has sufficient standing to appear in this venue against the State and the Administrative Board of the National Registry. Therefore, said defense must be rejected. The defenses of **lack of current interest and lack of cause** filed by the Bank must be rejected. The first, by virtue of the fact that the interest persists, since the alleged damages supposedly derive from a conduct carried out by the bank, according to the plaintiff's theory of the case, which is why their admission or rejection must be analyzed on the merits of the judgment. The second must be rejected because it is not a defense that is enumerated or listed in the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure. Finally, the defense of **lack of right** must be upheld in the terms set forth in recital VIII of this judgment.

**XII.- On costs**. In accordance with Article 193 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the very fact of being so. Exemption from this ruling is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the present case (en la especie), this collegiate body finds no reason whatsoever to apply the exceptions established in the applicable regulations and to break the principle of ruling the vanquished to pay costs, which is why **Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and Nombre115172** must bear the defendants' costs.

**THEREFORE.** **I.-** The following defenses are **rejected**: **a)** **defense of lapse (caducidad)** filed by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the Administrative Board of the National Registry, and the State. **b)** **defense of statute of limitations (prescripción)** filed by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. and the State. **c)** defense of lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva) filed by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, and the Administrative Board of the National Registry. **d)** defense of **lack of interest** and **lack of cause**, filed by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. **e)** **defense of lack of current interest** filed by the Administrative Board of the National Registry. **II.-** The following defenses are upheld: **a)** lack of **passive standing (legitimación pasiva)** filed by the Public Transportation Council, consequently, the claim is **declared inadmissible** against it. **b)** **lack of right** filed by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, and the Administrative Board of the National Registry, consequently, the claim filed by **Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and Nombre115172** must be **dismissed**. **Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and Nombre115172** are ordered to pay costs in favor of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, the Administrative Board of the National Registry, and the Public Transportation Council.

Nombre31590 Nombre113674 Nombre114124

1 "IX.- Regarding the specific case: As transcribed in findings of fact (resultandos) no. 1 and no. 7, and as set forth in finding of fact no. 9, as well as in recital (considerando) V, all of this judgment, this plenary jurisdiction proceeding raises several claims against different entities, some of Public Law and another of Private Law.

As a consequence of the foregoing, given the diverse legal nature of the defendant parties, we are faced with distinct legal regimes applicable to each of them. To resolve this case in an orderly fashion, each of the claims will be analyzed separately and each of their arguments will be resolved. **A) Annulment claim: Nullity of articles 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the Reglamento de Organización Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble n.° 26883-J, published in La Gaceta n.° 91 of May 13, 1998:** The plaintiff comes to this venue to reproach, in a first, very broad line of argument, the administrative procedures before the MOPT and the Registro de la Propiedad, necessary to take a motor vehicle out of the country, which they enumerate and describe as bureaucratic and unnecessary. Within this list of procedures, they highlight the one that must be carried out before the Registro Público, of presenting the duly authenticated authorization of the pledge creditor. At the same time, they list three decrees from the MOPT, from which the requirements for motor vehicles leaving the country derive. On the other hand, they refer to the requirements established by the Registro Público, based on the Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble, n.° 26883-J, published in La Gaceta n.° 91 of May 13, 1998. Notwithstanding the breadth of their dissertations, arguments, and reproaches, given the manner in which the claim was outlined, the object of this proceeding is aimed at determining, in accordance with this annulment claim, whether canons 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the indicated Reglamento suffer from some type of pathology that warrants decreeing their invalidity. The fundamental reason that the **plaintiff** reproaches in this proceeding, as the generator of the pathology of invalidity, consists of the nonexistence of a legal basis that supports the country exit requirements set forth for motor vehicles in the Reglamento being challenged. It misses the existence of a legal norm, emanating from the Asamblea Legislativa, that provides as a requirement for a minibus, dedicated to international tourism, to leave the country, the authorization of the pledge creditor. It also reproaches the nonexistence of a legal normative assumption that authorizes a Judge, in the case of a traffic collision, to require their authorization. At the same time, it considers that the existence of extraterritoriality insurance upon the departure of a minibus from the country is abusive. It states that the regulatory provisions in question are contrary to the provisions of the Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos, n.° 8220, as well as the Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, n.° 7472. The defendant **Banco** maintains that contrary to what the plaintiff states, the power to grant permits for motor vehicles to leave the country derives directly from Article 140, subsections 3 and 18 of the Constitución Política, as well as Articles 2, subsection f, 3 and 4 of Ley 3155 (Ley de Creación del Ministerio de Transportes, comprehensively reformed by Ley 4786). That is, what is stated in the fact does not derive from a whim of the administration, but from a legislative mandate to "plan, regulate, control and monitor" any mode of transport making use of the powers given to the Poder Ejecutivo by the Constituent to sanction, regulate and execute laws. Similarly, Articles 236 and 551 of the Código de Comercio provide support for the exit requirement granted by the Registro Nacional, which corresponds to a protection of the interests of the pledge creditor, who could see the guarantee held on the credit diverted or lost. The **Consejo de Transporte Público** maintains that in this regard, Ley 7969 Article 7 and Ley 3503 Article 3 establish the powers that the Consejo de Transporte Público has to regulate matters related to the public transport service provided. The **Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional** maintains that the Reglamento in question is supported by numerals 11 and 12 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Finally, the **Estado** points out that the pledge contract finds full regulation in Articles 530 and following of the Código de Comercio and its purpose is to guarantee obligations subject to the rules set forth in the referred articles. At the same time, it maintains that goods affected by a pledge will guarantee the creditor, with special privilege, the amount of the transaction and the interest, commissions and expenses, and both legal costs, in the terms indicated by the contract, in accordance with canon Article 540 of the same regulatory body. It adds that in the particular case of pledges in which a motor vehicle is offered as collateral, it must be constituted via public deed. The debtor shall retain, in the name of the pledge creditor, possession of the pledged item and shall assume the obligations and responsibilities of a depositary; furthermore, they will be liable for damages suffered by the items that do not arise from a fortuitous event, force majeure, or the very nature of the objects, in accordance with Article 537. In turn, it maintains that the pledge constitution contract must contain the information required by numeral 554 of the Código de Comercio and be registered in the Registro de Prendas. Finally, in pledge obligations payable in successive installments, failure to pay one of them will render the entire obligation matured and enforceable, unless otherwise agreed, as Article 580 states. Thus, by the very nature of the pledge contract, which is constituted over personal property (bienes muebles), the only way to guarantee the credit is insofar as the good given as collateral remains in the country. Hence, the impugned regulatory provisions, insofar as they require the pledge creditor's authorization for the Registro Público to authorize a vehicle given in pledge guarantee to leave the country, find full foundation in the very nature of the pledge contract. Hence, the plaintiff is incorrect in alleging that the impugned Reglamento, which regulates the procedure to issue a departure permit for a country exit of a vehicle given in pledge, exceeds regulatory authority because, as reiterated, it finds its basis in the very nature of the pledge contract, duly regulated in numerals 530 and following of the Código de Comercio, Ley n.° 3284 of April 30, 1964. **Criterion of the Tribunal**: It is necessary to bear in mind that Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 26.883, called Reglamento Organización Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble, as stated in its heading, is born in accordance with the provisions of Articles 140, subsections 3) and 18) of the Constitución Política, Article 28, second paragraph, subsection b) of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and Articles 236 and 551 of the Código de Comercio, Ley n.° 3284 of April 30, 1964.

Considering, in turn, that Title II, Book One of the Commercial Code provided for the creation of a Registry of Movable Property (Registro de Bienes Muebles) in the city of San José, to act jointly with the Pledge Registry (Registro de Prendas), and that Article 2 of the Law of Creation of the National Registry (Ley de Creación del Registro Nacional), No. 5695 of May 28, 1975, and its amendments, assigned the Registry of Movable Property to this Institution, which also included matters relating to vehicles. In turn, that Executive Decree No. 23178-J-MOPT of May 5, 1994, assigned the National Registry of Vessels (Registro Nacional de Buques) to the Public Registry of Movable Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble) of the National Registry, and that the Public Registry of Automotive Vehicle Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad de Vehículos Automotores), the General Pledge Registry, and the National Registry of Vessels have operated under independent Regulations, making it necessary to stipulate a single legal regime for the entire Public Registry of Movable Property; and, finally, that the General Pledge Registry had been operating under Executive Decree No. 34 of December 10, 1969, and the Public Registry of Automotive Vehicle Property has operated under Executive Decree No. 16821-J of December 16, 1985, but it was necessary to promulgate a new regulation that would codify the rules on the registration of movable property (registro de bienes muebles), while also standardizing the procedures of the entire Public Registry of Movable Property. Based on the foregoing, Article 1 provides that the Public Registry of Movable Property is assigned to the National Registry pursuant to Law No. 5695 of May 28, 1975, and its Amendments, and has under its competence the registration and publication of rights referring to the constitution, declaration, modification, and extinction of movable property and the lien encumbrances (gravámenes prendarios) that affect it, as well as the adjudication and delivery of the registrations of registrable goods and their permits to leave the national territory, all in accordance with the law.

Following the corresponding order in Title Three of that Executive Decree, the registration and permits relating to movable property are regulated. Chapter One regulates the exit permits for vehicles, from numerals 94 to 98, which are precisely those challenged in this jurisdictional venue. Article 94 provides the following: "*Article 94.—**Exclusive Competence.** The Registry shall grant the permits for the exit from the country of automotive vehicles.*" For its part, canon 95 indicates: "*Article 95.—**Requirements of the permit.** Without prejudice to other conditions that for the sake of legal certainty the Directorate may provide, petitions for an exit permit from the country must be submitted in typewritten form and meet the following requirements: a) Authorization of the registered owner for the granting of the exit, the vehicle's characteristics, the date of exit, and the destination. If the owner does not personally process the exit before the Registry, in which case the presentation of their identity card shall suffice, said application must be authenticated by a Notary Public. b) If the vehicle belongs to a legal entity, the application must be signed by the person who holds the legal representation, which must be demonstrated with a certification valid as of the date of the application. c) Having satisfied the fees and other fiscal requirements. d) In the event of judicial encumbrances (gravámenes judiciales), they must be canceled or, failing that, authorization from the corresponding authority must be provided. e) In the event of lien encumbrances, authorization from the pledge creditor must be provided. f) In the case of buses destined for the collective transport of persons, proof of being up to date with the extraterritoriality policy before the National Insurance Institute (INS), the authorization note from the General Directorate of Automotive Transport of MOPT, and a note from the Departures and Arrivals Section of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT) relating to the cancellation of taxes must also be provided. g) In the case of vehicles destined for tourism service, the authorization note from the Costa Rican Tourism Institute and the extraterritoriality policy from the INS must additionally be provided. h) In the case of taxis destined for the collective transport of persons, in addition to the previous general requirements, the extraterritoriality policy from the INS and an authorization note from the taxi office of MOPT shall be required. i) In the case of vehicles belonging to Public Institutions and Branches of Government, the authorization of the head of the entity, duly letterheaded and sealed, shall additionally be requested. j) In the case of vehicles in the name of International Missions or Organizations and the Diplomatic Corps, an application from the representative of the Organization or the Ambassador and a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs certifying the legal capacity of the applicant must be provided. k) In the case of vehicles owned by retired rentiers, the note from the Costa Rican Tourism Institute certifying that the owner is up to date in the fulfillment of the obligations that this legal status requires shall additionally be demanded.*" On the other hand, Article 96 provides the following: "*Article 96.—**Authorization of the permit.** Once the application is admitted, it shall be compared with the Registry's information, and compliance with the general requirements shall be verified. If no defect is found, the exit permit shall be granted, leaving the related documents microfilmed.*" Then numeral 97 provides: "*Article 97.—**Validity of the permit.** The exit permit must be used within fifteen days following its issuance, in the case of private vehicles, and within four months following its issuance, in the case of heavy cargo vehicles.*" Finally, canon 98 states: "*Article 98.—**Issuance of permits through the Registry's external network.** The Registry, through the IT Department of the National Registry, via the Service Decentralization Program, may coordinate with the Municipalities of the Country or other institutions, so that exit permits for vehicles in the classes deemed convenient may be issued at those Dependencies, in accordance with the provisions of Executive Decree No. 26515-J of December 18, 1997.*" Having reviewed and analyzed this challenged regulatory body, for the Tribunal, the plaintiff is not correct in considering that there are no legal norms of statutory rank that support the regulatory development by the Executive Decree being challenged. On one front are the constitutional provisions that gave it support, from which the powers of the Executive Branch to issue the regulatory norm in question derive. On the other hand, there is the Law of Creation of the National Registry, as well as the Commercial Code. The regulation of vehicle exit permits turns out to be an extension, within the framework of the Executive Branch's regulatory power, of canons 236, 530, 537, 540, 551, 554, and 580 of the Commercial Code. Note that Article 236 creates the Movable Property Registry based in the city of San José, which shall act jointly with the Pledge Registry. Chapter VIII, belonging to Title I, of Book II, Commercial Code, regulates the pledge contract from Articles 530 to 581. Highlighted is numeral 537, which provides the following: "*Article 537.- Pledges in which automotive vehicles, vessels, or aircraft are offered as collateral must be constituted in a public deed. Those constituted in relation to other movable property of a different nature may be granted in a public or private document or in official contract forms. In these last two cases, the debtor's duly authenticated signature by a notary public will be required. The debtor shall retain, in the name of the pledge creditor, possession of the pledged thing and shall assume the obligations and responsibilities of a depositary; furthermore, they shall be liable for damages suffered by the things that do not arise from a fortuitous event, force majeure, or the very nature of the objects. The document or certificate attesting to the constitution of the pledge or the certification from the Pledge Registry shall serve as proof of the deposit.*" In the Tribunal's judgment, the requirements established in the questioned numerals of the Executive Decree in question, such as those the plaintiff reproaches, consisting of the creditor's permission and the policy, are not contrary to the aforementioned laws and have, rather, the purpose of securing the rights of the pledge creditor and the collateral, so that they are not affected. On the other hand, in the judgment of this collegiate body, there is no violation alleged of canons: 1, 8, 9, and 10 of Law No. 8220, called the Law for the Protection of the Citizen from the Excess of Requirements and Administrative Procedures (Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos). The foregoing is because, as was previously stated, the challenged articles are consistent with the provisions of the Commercial Code, which regulates the pledge contract, for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of pledge creditors and the creation of a registry of movable property that governs this entire situation. On the other hand, the requirements set forth in the challenged numerals, in the Tribunal's judgment, are not contrary to reasonableness, proportionality, logic, or good faith, insofar as no procedure is observed that is excessive or unnecessary, and that has any purpose other than that of providing legal certainty to the pledge creditor, as well as to the users of the service through the extraterritoriality policy. For which reason, the petition for nullity of the aforementioned norms must be rejected.

**B) First injunctive claim: That a judicial order be issued to the Public Registry, so that it does not process the vehicle exit permit from the country, as long as there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that supports it** and **C) Second injunctive claim: That a judicial order be issued to the MOPT, so that it does not process the vehicle exit permit from the country, as long as there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that supports it.** For the Court, it is impossible to grant these two claims to order the Administrative Board of the National Registry or the MOPT as requested. The foregoing, in accordance with what has been set forth in point A) above, of this judgment, given that, as was stated, there are norms of a constitutional and legal nature that support the regulations concerning vehicle exit permits from the country. Furthermore, it is also not found that the questioned regulations violate the provisions of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excessive Requirements and Administrative Procedures, No. 8220. Therefore, the alleged invalidity is not found, nor any reason aimed at decreeing the nullity of Articles 94 to 98 of the Executive Decree under challenge; hence, it is also not possible to grant the injunctive claims directed at the MOPT or the Administrative Board of the National Registry. ***D) First claim for damages based on strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) against Banco Citibank:*** The plaintiff seeks an order for the payment of damages caused, based on strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), for establishing abusive institutional banking practices as a pledgee creditor, regarding the requirement for the exit from the country of a tourism minibus, which violated the debtor's payment capacity by establishing obstacles to the main source of income, contrary to Articles 46 and 140 of constitutional rank, the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer, and Law 8220, for the sum of $500,000 for principal (cost of the tourism unit, lost profits for four years, and moral, psychological, and patrimonial damages), for impeding the development of the constitutional right to Freedom of Enterprise, for leaving the debtor unemployed, for tarnishing his name before SUGEF and preventing him from other financial options in the market, for prejudicing him as a banking consumer, for damaging the company morally; plus existing legal interest until settlement of judgment of the present process. The defendant **Banco** maintains that the denial it carried out on November 29, 2009, was due to a policy aimed at safeguarding its interest within the framework of the pledge contract. ***Criteria of the Court***: Regarding the duty to inform the consumer adequately, timely, clearly, truthfully, and sufficiently, it must be borne in mind that the last paragraph of Article 46 of the Political Constitution; subsections c) and d) of Article 32 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer; 41 and 43 of the Regulation to that Law, establish that *the consumer must receive adequate, clear, truthful, timely, and sufficient information regarding all elements that directly affect their consumption decision*. Therefore, it is essential that the person intending to sign a contract such as the one before us, must sufficiently and timely know its conditions, limitations, scope, and consequences, enabling them to determine whether or not to sign it. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: *“... it is notorious that the consumer is at the end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of the consumer goods they require to acquire for their personal satisfaction, and their participation in that process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but to the constant celebration of contracts in a personal capacity. For this reason, their relationship in that commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the providers of goods and services, so that prior to expressing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary elements of judgment that allow them to express it with complete freedom, and this implies full knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included in the foregoing, in a harmonious mix, are several constitutional principles, such as state concern in favor of the broadest sectors of the population when they act as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating individuals the free disposition of their assets with the aid of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health as involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relations among the interested parties, the homologation of international commercial practices to the internal system, and finally, the greater protection of the inhabitant's functioning in the means of subsistence...”* (Judgment number 1996-04463 of nine hours forty-five minutes of August thirtieth, nineteen ninety-six. See in a similar sense, judgment number 1992-01441 of fifteen hours forty-five minutes of June second, nineteen ninety-two). In the case under examination, for this Court, the conduct of the defendant Bank is doubtful, in its denial of the country exit permit, by alleging as grounds for the rejection, the existence of supposed “internal policies,” which the plaintiff was unaware of. It is contrary to this duty of information that, surprisingly in situations such as what occurred in the instant case, denials of country exit permits are justified by a policy that the plaintiff only became aware of at the moment he requested the permit. The appropriate course of action in the specific case would have been that, in protection of the right to information in consumer matters, with due advance notice, prior to the signing of the pledge contract, the defendant bank would have informed the plaintiff about all banking policies associated with vehicle exit permits. Such information was relevant to their consumption decision. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the line that for this Collegiate Body the defendant Bank violated its duty to adequately inform the plaintiff, the truth is that the Court does not find a link or causal nexus between this omission and the damages claimed. It has not been adequately proven that, due to the reproached lack of information and the denial of the minibus's exit from the country, the plaintiff lost the movable asset, that its image was affected, that it faced difficulties in generating profits, as well as the alleged impediment to growing its business, the difficulty of applying for credit with other financial entities, and the moral damages it claims. The existence of a causal nexus between these alleged damages and the Bank's conduct in denying the exit permit based on an *"Internal Policy,"* whose timely disclosure has not been proven either, failing in its duty of information, has not been proven in the instant case. Therefore, the defense of lack of right must be upheld and consequently, the lawsuit for strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) against the bank declared without merit.[...]" Grants special judicial power of attorney to Nombre115174, Bar Association card number 13,415, against: the State, represented by Omar Rivera Mesén, of legal age, married, attorney, resident of San Pedro de Montes de Oca, with identity card number CED557; the National Registry represented by Dagoberto Sibaja Morales, of legal age, married once, attorney, resident of San José, identity card CED2890, in his capacity as general judicial attorney-in-fact without limit of sum, grants special judicial power of attorney to Nombre20087, of legal age, married once, Attorney, resident of San Ramón de Alajuela, bearer of identity card number CED32415; Nombre115175, of legal age, single, Attorney, resident of Rohrmoser, bearer of identity card number CED91056; Nombre115176, of legal age, married, Attorney, resident of Dirección4252, bearer of identity card number CED91050-; Nombre1846, of legal age, divorced, Attorney, resident of San Ramón de Alajuela, bearer of identity card number CED665; and, Nombre115177, of legal age, single, Attorney, resident of Heredia, bearer of identity card number CED32416; the Public Transportation Council represented by Juan Manuel Delgado Naranjo, of legal age, married, Business Administrator with Emphasis in Human Resources, in his capacity as Executive Director, bearer of identity card CED91051- and Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., represented by its special judicial attorneys-in-fact, Rolando Laclé Zúñiga, of legal age, attorney, divorced, resident of San José, identity card number CED29048 and José Pablo Valverde Marín, of legal age, married, Attorney, resident of Alajuela, bearer of identity card number CED31787.

Whereas

1.- That on July 18, 2013, the claimant set forth the following claim: "a. That the nullity of articles 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 and 99 of the 'Rules of Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property' No. 26883-J, published in Gazette No. 91 of May 13, 1998, be declared. b. That a judicial order be issued to the Public Registry, so that it does not process the permit for the exit of vehicles from the country, as long as there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that supports it. c. That a judicial order be issued to the MOPT, so that it does not process the permit for the exit of vehicles from the country, as long as there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that supports it. d. That Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. be condemned to pay the damages caused, under strict liability, for establishing institutional abusive banking practices as a pledge creditor, for the requirement for the exit from the country of a tourist minibus, which violated the debtor's payment capacity by establishing obstacles to the principal source of income, against Article 46 and 140 of constitutional rank, the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Defense of the Consumer and against Law 8220, for the sum of $500,000 in concept of principal (cost of the tourism unit, lost profits for four years and moral, psychological and patrimonial damages), for impeding the development of the constitutional right of Freedom of Enterprise, for leaving the debtor unemployed, for staining his name before SUGEF and preventing him from other financial options in the market, for harming him as a banking consumer, for damaging the company morally, plus other aspects that will be pointed out later; plus existing legal interest until settlement of judgment of the present process. e. Condemnation in personal and procedural costs of the parties" (folio 127 of the judicial file). At the preliminary hearing of February 10, 2015, the claim was expanded as follows: "14:10 The claims are at folio 127 of the complaint brief, the Judge proceeds to read them. The plaintiff indicates that an expansion was made regarding the claim for damages against the State, the claim that appears at folio 527 for the sum of $138,000.00. The State's representation asks which of the two plaintiffs is the one requesting subjective moral damages. The plaintiff's representation indicates that it is Mr. Nombre115172" (minute of the preliminary hearing visible at folio 607 of the judicial file and audiovisual medium, which appears in the virtual file).

2.- That on October 30, 2013, by means of a resolution at 8:27 a.m., the Judge of the procedural stage granted the mandatory transfer to the defendants (folio 16 of the judicial file).

3.- That on September 26, 2013, the plaintiff Nombre115178, clarified that he also figured as a plaintiff, so that he would proceed not to be considered as the representative of the plaintiff company, but as another plaintiff, being the most offended as a banking consumer in this process (folio 145 of the judicial file).

4.- That on January 8, 2014, the defendant Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., answered the complaint negatively, and interposed the defenses of expiration (caducidad), lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae, statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of right, lack of current interest, lack of cause and lack of active standing (legitimación activa) and lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva). On that same day, the Public Transportation Council answered the complaint negatively and interposed the defenses of lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) and lack of right. (folios 180 and 273 of the judicial file).

5.- That on January 10, 2014, the Administrative Board of the National Registry answered the complaint negatively, and interposed the defenses of expiration (caducidad), lack of right, lack of active standing (legitimación activa) and lack of current interest (folio 46 of the judicial file).

6.- That on January 15, 2014, the State answered the complaint negatively and interposed the defenses of expiration (caducidad) against claim no. 1, lack of right and lack of active standing (legitimación activa) (folio 447 of the judicial file).

7.- That on May 27, 2014, upon attending the hearing for defenses and counter-evidence, the plaintiff expanded its claim in the following terms: "Being this the opportune procedural moment, since the preliminary hearing has not yet been held (sic), and in relation to the damages caused by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A., this section of the complaint is clarified and expanded in the sense that the motive that originates them, what they consist of, and their prudent estimation in accordance with numerals 58 and 95 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code and 290 SUBSECTION S of the Code of Civil Procedures, we proceed to clarify and expand this point, to avoid greater delays in more advanced stages of the process. The motives that originate the indemnification for damages, as well as what they consist of, in the present process are: 1) The general provisions of the Regulations that are being challenged. 2) The individual application of the challenged regulatory provisions that affected the plaintiffs. 3) The existence of the Pledge Creditor's Permit Requirement for a tourist minibus to leave the country.

• 4)The refusal of Banco City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. to grant the exit permit from the country for the minibus, at a time when the pledge credit operation was up to date, as well as its respective insurance policies with INS, which did not put the capital invested by the banking entity at risk, especially since extraterritoriality insurance is paid to leave the country. To which they simply argued "Internal Banking Policies" to the detriment of the fourth-generation constitutional rights of the banking consumer. 5) The application by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. of Extracontractual Internal Banking Policies not informed to the debtor at the time of the Credit Contracting for the Granting of Credit. 6) The application of banking policies not informed to the debtor in the formalization of the credit caused serious damages to the plaintiffs. 7) The unjustified delay by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. in giving a timely response to the Banking Consumer, before the latter's request to be able to take the minibus out of the country, which caused the loss of the tourist minibus due to the affectation of the debtor's payment capacity and it had to be given to the Bank as Dación de Pago. 8) The failure of the defendant banking entity to observe the economic situation the country was experiencing at the time of the request made by the banking debtor and the unreasonable failure to observe state policies regarding debt readjustment and payment arrangements for banking debtors in the national tourism sector due to the international crisis, which was a Public and Notorious Fact. 9) The loss of the movable property, which was at that time the principal income-producing asset of the company.
• 10)The loss of active clients at that time who were contracting the tourism minibus. 11) The loss of the affected debtor's commercial image as well as the image of the transportation company. 12) The losses suffered by the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and by the undersigned debtor, significant economic losses since Banco City Bank de Costa Rica prevented the plaintiffs in this case from generating profits, from increasing their assets, and caused losses even to the debtor's assets held prior to the credit agreement with the banking entity, and loss of credit rating as a debtor before SUGEF. 13) The impossibility for the plaintiffs to have open credit with any other financial entity, since after a dación en pago (deed in lieu of foreclosure), no other financial entity would grant a secured loan to the plaintiffs. 14) The impossibility of business growth, which was fully available at the time of the credit with City Bank de Costa Rica and not afterwards. 15) The subjective moral and psychological damage caused to the bank debtor. 16) The objective moral damage caused to the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. 17) The strict liability incurred by the State due to the challenged regulation and by City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. for the damages caused in its credit service relationship to the debtor and for the application of the Consumer Protection Law. This lawsuit was valued against Banco City Bank de Costa Rica S.A. in the SUM OF $500,000 (five hundred thousand dollars) in the legal tender currency of the United States of America, plus legal interest until settlement of judgment, legal indexation of the losses suffered, which will be indicated later, as they are not fully defined at this moment, which are broken down as follows: Current Value of the Movable Asset or similar: $170,000 (one hundred seventy thousand American dollars). Damages Suffered for Lost Profits (Lucro Cesante): $48,000 annually in earnings, at $4,000 (four thousand dollars) per month, gives a total of $192,000 (one hundred ninety-two thousand dollars) over four years. $138,000 for subjective moral damage to the debtor, objective moral damage to the company, psychological damage to the debtor, loss of the asset situation existing before the contract with the BANK. This lawsuit is hereby expanded for damages against the State for the sum of $138,000 caused to the plaintiffs by the State, in application of the Challenged Regulation." (folio 524 of the judicial file).

**8.-** That on **October 17, 2014**, by means of a resolution, the Judge of the procedural stage rejected the defense of lack of jurisdiction filed by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. (resolution found in the virtual desktop).

**9.-** That on **February 10, 2015**, the preliminary hearing was held. At that stage, the claims were expanded in the terms indicated in Resultando no. 1 of this judgment. At the same time, the State filed the exception of expiration (caducidad) in relation to claim no. 1 of the lawsuit. The Consejo de Transporte Público and Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. joined the exception of expiration presented by the State. The Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional joined the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) filed by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. The Judge of the procedural stage referred the resolution of the defenses of expiration and statute of limitations to the Trial Court (minute visible at folio 607 of the judicial file and audiovisual record).

**10.-** That on **April 8, 2015**, the matter was transferred to the Fifth Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo (folio 738 of the judicial file).

**11.-** That on **April 16, 2015**, the Fifth Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo scheduled the day of November 24, 2015, to conduct the oral and public trial (folio 557 of the judicial file).

**12.-** That on **November 24, 2015**, the Court composed of judges Gustavo Irías Obando, Francisco Hidalgo Rueda, and Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo suspended the holding of the oral and public trial, considering that the unconstitutionality action under files 14-12592-007-CO and 15-4280-007-CO of the Sala Constitucional had to be resolved (trial minute and audiovisual record).

**13.-** That on **November 6, 2017**, the Fifth Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo scheduled the oral and public trial to be held on May 6, 2019 (resolution found in the virtual desktop).

**14.-** That on **May 6, 2019**, the oral and public trial was held (trial minute and public and audiovisual record).

**15.-** In the proceedings before this Court, no nullities have been observed that must be corrected or that cause defenselessness, and the judgment is issued within the term established in Article 111, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

**Drafted by Judge Nombre31590, with the affirmative vote of Judge Nombre113674 and Judge Nombre114124; and,** **Considering** **I.- Proven facts**: **1)** That on **October 3, 2008**, according to public deed of Notary Public **Erick Fabricio Jiménez Masís**, Importaciones Zuzu S.A. sold to Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A., the vehicle brand Marco Polo, year 2008, with plates to be assigned with the Heredia code. In that same act, plaintiff Nombre115172 and Banco Cuscatlán appeared, with the latter granting the former a commercial loan for the sum of $64,489.80, for a term of 72 months. The guarantee granted was a first-degree pledge (prenda) on the aforementioned vehicle (folio 67 of the judicial file). **2)** That on **September 18, 2009**, the plaintiff Nombre115172 presented to the collections officer of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., a request to take the Marcopolo bus plate Placa21537 out of the country, in the following terms: "FIRST: That I have a secured credit operation with you, number Identificacion617. SECOND: That for various reasons, during the course of the credit I have had certain normal delays, considering the economic crisis that has affected our country in the last year, in addition to the fact that from the beginning of the credit, we started working more than a month after the signing of the contract with the former Cuscatlán, who did not issue the settlement check to the company MARCOPOLO until the pledge on the movable asset was registered, which is why the asset was not delivered to us until the Pledge was registered and the first payment installment, for me, was already up for collection with the Bank. THIRD: That despite all this, as of today we are completely up to date with the credit operation, in fact you can verify the payment status, where we have paid up to three installments together. The foregoing indicates our intention to be up to date with the credit operation. FOURTH: That the week before last, permission was requested for the departure from the country of the Marcopolo Bus, year 2008, Plate number Placa21537, and it was denied to us because we have had delays in the credit. FIFTH: That we need authorization to leave the country since the Investment Plan for the Acquisition of the Tourism Bus, as you can verify in the credit file, was for National and International Excursions and if we are not allowed to take the Bus out of the country we cannot work and, therefore, we will not be able to pay the Bank. SIXTH: I understand that within the Bank's policies is the care of the Movable Asset; however, this credit, as stated above, is completely up to date and it is required for it to work and produce, as the active asset it is, that it leaves the country; in fact, we need the permit to pay UNISERSE the corresponding extraterritoriality coverage." SEVENTH: In light of the foregoing, it is unreasonable and illogical that we are not permitted to work, especially since the extraterritoriality insurance is going to be paid and the operation is up to date; otherwise, the Bank is not letting us develop the Investment Plan that justified the granting of the credit. For all the foregoing, I thank you in advance for the assistance you can provide me, as I need to work on excursions to Panama and Nicaragua and I require the authorization of the Pledge Creditor." (folio 42 of the judicial file). 3) That on November 2, 2009, Sara Gómez Méndez, in her capacity as Insurance Manager of the defendant Bank, addressed a note to the plaintiff in the following terms: "Receive a cordial greeting from our part, and at the same time we indicate to you that in accordance with the request for permission for the Marco Polo vehicle, license plate Placa21537, registered in the Public Registry of Property in the name of Transportes Turísticos Miravista S.A., with legal ID CED91052; where Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. is the pledge creditor according to the lien registered in Volume 2008, Entry 00312179, Sequence 002 and where you are the debtor of operation CED91057, you are hereby informed of the following: 'In application of the bank's internal policies and studies conducted on your operation, the permission for the vehicle to leave the country was temporarily denied until the credit does not register arrears greater than 30 days in the last six months.' This denial is not permanent and at any time you can have our authorization by complying with the above. For any questions, we are at your disposal at telephone numbers 2299-0206 Franklin Guzmán or 2299-0411 Sara Gómez." (folio 44 of the judicial file). 4) That on November 3, 2010, before notary Gabriela Valverde Mena, in deed number seventy-four, the plaintiff company and Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. appeared for the purpose of extinguishing the obligation the latter had with the Bank; a dación en pago was carried out with a chattel, which was the buseta with license plate Placa21537. Said agreement was recorded in the following terms: "THEY STATE: The first appearing party: That in payment of the amount of sixty-six thousand six hundred fifty dollars and seventy-seven cents, which is the balance of operation number one one zero nine nine zero four zero four six zero three, for which my represented party is a guarantor, and which Mr. Nombre115172 owes to Banco Cuscatlán de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, now named Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.

A., secured by the chattel mortgage (prenda) contract registered in the Public Registry of Movable Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad de Bienes Muebles), of the respective section, volume two thousand eight, entry three hundred twelve thousand one hundred seventy-nine, sequence zero two, secured by the vehicle plate Placa21538 , which is described as follows: Make: Marco Polo, style: W nine, category: Minibus, capacity: Twenty-nine persons, year: Two thousand eight, chassis: nine three PB four zero B three P seven C zero two zero four four six. Engine: Make: MWM, number: Placa21539 , displacement (cilindrada): four thousand three hundred C. C., fuel: Diesel, he transfers it free of liens and judicial annotations, estimating the dation in payment (dación de pago) in the aforementioned amount. The second appearing party: That his represented party accepts the dation in payment and requests that Registry to register said vehicle in the name of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima; and, as a consequence thereof, totally cancels the aforementioned chattel mortgage registration entry, leaving said vehicle free of this lien and the responsibility of the former debtor extinguished." (folio 50 of the judicial file). 5) That in the present case, neither the State, nor the Administrative Board of the National Registry, nor the Public Transport Council carried out an active conduct or administrative act aimed at denying him the exit permit for the minibus HB 2467, in application of the Regulation for the Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property No. 26883-J (Reglamento Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble n.° 26883-J), published in Gazette No. 91 of May 13, 1998. (Confessional statement of Nombre115172 in oral and public trial, audiovisual support of the trial) II.-Unproven facts: 1) That with the denial of the minibus's exit from the country, carried out by the defendant Bank through a note of November two, two thousand nine, the plaintiff lost the movable property, his image, the difficulty of generating profits, the impediment to business growth, the inconvenience of applying for credit with other financial entities, and the moral damages he alleges (no evidence). 2) That after November two, two thousand nine, the plaintiff had once again managed the exit permit from the country (no evidence).

III.-Arguments of the plaintiff: By way of summary, the plaintiff explains that he acquired a minibus for tourism transportation. He points out that the debtor buyer was Nombre115172 and the Minibus was registered in the name of the Company owned by the debtor, Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. He indicates that for the acquisition of said minibus, he obtained a chattel mortgage loan under the SMEs modality with Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., formerly called Banco Cuscatlán, through credit operation number 120990404603 and for the sum of $64,489.80 for a term of 6 years, at an annual interest rate of 8.6%, with an investment plan aimed at national and international tourism. The cost of the minibus was $85,090, of which he paid a down payment of $20,510.2. He adds that the acquisition of the credit was carried out solely and exclusively for the purchase of the minibus for land tourism transportation of persons, mainly for conducting international tours to Nicaragua and Panama. He accuses that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly requiring the procedure and requirements for the exit permit from the country for motor vehicles requested by the MOPT, specifically the Public Transport Council and the National Registry, without taking into account the permits that financial entities must grant in the event of motor vehicles given as chattel mortgage. He also maintains that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly establishing as a requirement for the exit permit from the country for a minibus dedicated to international tourism, the authorization of a judge in the event of a traffic collision. He adds that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly establishing as a requirement for the exit permit from the country for a minibus dedicated to international tourism, authorization from the chattel mortgage creditor. He also mentions that there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly establishing as a requirement for the exit permit from the country for a minibus dedicated to international tourism, the acquisition of extraterritoriality insurance. On the other hand, he mentions that, at the beginning of 2009, with the worldwide decline in tourism, he fell behind in the payment of three monthly installments of the bank loan. He points out that between April 6, 2009, and May 8 of the same year, even without having income due to the aforementioned crisis, he obtained a personal loan from a private individual to pay Citibank the sum of $5,252, to bring the chattel mortgage credit up to date with the banking entity and thus be able to obtain the exit permit from the country from the bank as the chattel mortgage creditor, being clear that by the principle of reasonableness, balance of the consumer relationship, justice, and equity between the parties, the banking entity, with the operation being up to date, would have no reason to deny him the exit permit from the country. He reproaches that this was not the case, but rather that he obtained a response only a month and a half later, in which they denied the exit from the country of the vehicle given as collateral. He indicates that Citibank responded negatively to his request for an exit permit from the country for the tourism minibus, stating the following: "In application of the bank's internal policies and studies carried out on your operation, the exit permit from the country was temporarily denied until the credit does not register delays greater than 30 days in the last 6 months." He questions that the bank's supposed internal policies were never informed to him in the pre-contractual stage, nor before the signing of the chattel mortgage with the bank. He considers that this lack of prior, simple, and clear information from the financial services provider leaves debtor clients and bank consumers in a state of total legal vulnerability regarding their legitimate interests and subjective rights. He considers that the denial by the defendant Bank, based on the mentioned policies, undermined his ability to pay the credit by being unable to generate profits.

IV.-Arguments of the defendant parties: By way of summary, Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. explains that it was not Mr. Nombre115172 who acquired the real estate in question, but rather the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. He maintains that the foregoing is relevant, as the credit relationship was with the natural person and not with the legal entity; thus, as he points out, the relationship with the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. is solely by reason of said company's consent to the chattel mortgage lien that was granted at the time on the movable property under study. He affirms that the supposed tourism activity was carried out by the company and not by the debtor. He argues that the power to grant exit permits from the country for motor vehicles derives directly from Article 140, sections 3 and 18, of the Political Constitution, as well as Articles 2, subsections f, 3, and 4 of Law 3155 (Law Creating the Ministry of Transportation, comprehensively reformed by Law 4786). He maintains that the requirements that the plaintiff reproaches derive from various laws, which he omits to reference. He argues that the obligation of the Executive Branch to plan, regulate, control, and monitor transportation does have a legal origin, and for its part, the attributions to regulate said activity via decree or regulation as an administrative act of general scope have a constitutional origin. He defends the fact that the debtor was expressly told that the denial of the vehicle's exit authorization was not permanent, and that it responded to a criterion under which what our represented party requested was that there be no payment delays for more than 30 days in a period of 6 months, a measure that is by all lights reasonable and proportional, which tends to measure the debtor's payment behavior taking into consideration the history of delays that the account presented at the time and therefore the risk of possible execution of the collateral held regarding the granted credit. He points out that the requirements that the plaintiff reproaches come from both subsection e) of Article 95 of Executive Decree 26883-J, Regulation for the Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property, and from Article 20 of Executive Decree 16821-J (Regulation of the Public Registry of Motor Vehicle Property), which in turn were promulgated based on Articles 140 sections 3 and 18 of the Political Constitution, Article 28, second paragraph, subsection b) of the General Public Administration Law, and Articles 236 and 551 of the Commercial Code.

He adds that Mr. Nombre115172</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, was not, from the credit standpoint, placed in Group 1, but rather in Group 2 of debtors, in which the "Payment Capacity" parameter is not used, but only the evaluation parameters of "Delinquency" and "Historical Payment Behavior." He considers that neither the freedom of commerce nor the freedom to work has been violated, since the denial was temporary in nature. For its part, the Public Transportation Council (Consejo de Transporte Público) indicates that the assertion that there is no express rule issued by the Legislative Assembly requiring the processing of permits for motor vehicles providing public transportation services to leave the country is false; in this regard, it must be noted that the current regulations governing public transportation service in its different modalities are regulated by Law 3503 (Ley 3503) and Law 7969 (Ley 7969). The </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Administrative Board of the National Registry (Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> maintains that the Regulations for the Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property (Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble) were created by Executive Decree number 26883-J (Decreto Ejecutivo número 26883-J), in accordance with Article 28, second paragraph, subsection b) of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Articles 236 and 551 of the Commerce Code (Código de Comercio), Law number 3284 of April 30. It maintains that this Regulation contains no nullity whatsoever in the articles being discussed in this proceeding, as they are authorized by higher-ranking legal regulations. At the same time, it states that no active or omissive conduct related to the damages claimed has been proven. Finally, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">the State (el Estado)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> indicates that the pledge contract (contrato de prenda) is fully regulated in Articles 530 and following of the Commerce Code and has the purpose of guaranteeing obligations subject to the rules set forth in the referenced articles. The assets affected by the pledge shall guarantee the creditor, with special privilege, the amount of the transaction and the interest, commissions, and expenses, and both sets of costs, in the terms indicated in the contract. It maintains that, in the particular case of pledges in which a motor vehicle is offered as collateral, it must be constituted in a public deed (escritura pública). The debtor shall retain, in the name of the pledgee creditor (acreedor pignoraticio), possession of the pledged item and shall assume the obligations and responsibilities of a depositary; furthermore, it shall be liable for any damages suffered by the items that do not arise from a fortuitous event, force majeure, or the very nature of the objects, in accordance with Article 537. On the other hand, it argues that the contract for the constitution of a pledge must contain the information required by numeral 554 of the Commerce Code and be registered in the Pledge Registry (Registro de Prendas). Finally, in pledge obligations payable in successive installments, the failure to pay one of them shall cause the entire obligation to become due and payable, unless otherwise agreed, in accordance with canon 580. It argues that, due to the very nature of the pledge contract, which is constituted over movable property (bienes muebles), the only way to guarantee the credit is insofar and as long as the asset given as collateral remains in the country. Hence, the challenged regulatory provision, insofar as it requires the authorization of the pledgee creditor for the Public Registry to authorize the exit from the country of a vehicle given as pledge collateral, finds full basis, I repeat, in the very nature of the pledge contract. Hence, the plaintiff company is incorrect in alleging that the challenged Regulation, insofar as it regulates the procedure for issuing a permit for a vehicle given in pledge to leave the country, exceeds the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) because, I repeat, it finds its basis in the very nature of the pledge contract, duly regulated in numerals 530 and following of the Commerce Code, Law No. 3284 of April 30, 1964.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">V.-Object of the proceeding:</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> We are faced with a plenary jurisdiction proceeding (proceso de plena jurisdicción), through which the plaintiff claims not only the nullity of an administrative conduct, but also the pecuniary liability (responsabilidad patrimonial) of the administrations involved, as well as that of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\"> VI.-Regarding the defense of time-bar (caducidad): </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">In its statement of defense, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A.</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, in relation to this defense, maintains that</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> the action is time-barred (caduca) in relation to claims a, b, and c, in accordance with Article 39, subsection 1 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA). It argues that Executive Decree 26883-J was published in La Gaceta No. 91 of May 13, 1998. If this term is not considered for calculating the time-bar, it points out that the singular application of the mentioned decree occurred in 2009 and the lawsuit was not filed until 2013. In its statement of defense, regarding the defense of time-bar, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">the Administrative Board of the Public Registry (la Junta Administrativa de Registro Público)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> maintained, based on a judgment of Section VI of the Contentious Administrative Court, number 52-2012-VI, that, although to the extent that regulatory provisions remain in force, the possibility of challenging them cannot be time-barred, however, the plaintiff must prove a legitimate interest (interés legítimo). It alleges in this sense, that as of the date the lawsuit was filed, it does not possess the real property, as it was transferred by a dation in payment (dación en pago) to the banking entity Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. Finally, the </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">State </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">raised the defense in the statement of defense and maintained that i</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">n accordance with the provisions of Article 64, subsection 2, in relation to numeral 66, subsection k) and 39 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, the possibility of challenging Articles 94 to 99 of the Regulations for the Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property, Executive Decree No. 26833-J, published in La Gaceta 91 of May 13, 1998, is time-barred. The foregoing by virtue of the fact that numeral 39, subsect</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#252525\">i</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">on b) of the CPCA provides that the maximum period to sue for the nullity of a Regulation, such as the one at hand, is one year, counted from the day following the sole or last publication. At the preliminary hearing of February 10, 2015, Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. and the Public Transportation Council adhered to the defense of time-bar presented by the State. On the other hand, at the exceptions hearing, the </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">plaintiff </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">maintained that, in relation to what the defendant Bank stated, what is provided in Article 39 of the CPCA is not applicable to the specific case, but rather canon 40, given that, in its opinion, these are acts that produce effects at this moment. With matters thus framed, the period begins to run from the date on which Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. denied the permit for the minibus to leave the country, which is the moment when the Regulation caused a negative effect, in relation to Article 37, subsection 3) of the same Code mentioned. For its part, regarding the defense of time-bar alleged by the State, it affirms that canon 66, subsection 1 k, nor 39, both of the CPCA, apply, given that in the case under examination, according to its statement, Article 40 of the CPCA applies. It also argues that it is empowered to challenge the concrete act and all antecedent norms, including the general provision that was not challenged in time and form, in accordance with numeral 10, subsection 2 of the CPCA. Regarding the argument of the Administrative Board of the National Registry, it maintains that the cited judgment of the Sixth Section of the Contentious Administrative Court rather supports its position, given that it recognizes that regulatory provisions maintain their validity over time and there is the possibility of challenging them as long as they remain in force, therefore the possibility of challenge does not time-bar. The foregoing must be reconciled with Article 37, subsection c) of the CPCA. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#0a0a0a\">Criterion of the Court</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">: In accordance with what has been proven in the case file, it is clear to this Collegiate Body that Executive Decree 26.883-J challenged in this venue dates from </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">1998</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\"> and, in turn, that the act of individual application of the norm being challenged occurred on </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">November 2, 2009</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">, and also that the lawsuit was filed on </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">June 18, 2013</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">; what is certain is that the questioned norms have maintained their continuous validity over time at the time the lawsuit was filed as well as today. Consequently, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">regulatory provisions, by their very nature, produce their effects continuously while they are in force, for which reason, that possibility cannot be time-barred while they are in effect and the plaintiff can prove that it has, at least, a legitimate interest for such purposes, in accordance with the provisions of Article 10, subsection 2 ibidem </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">(see judgments number 262-2011-VI, of fourteen hours fifty minutes of December first, two thousand eleven, and number 52-2012-VI of seven hours thirty minutes of March twenty-second, two thousand twelve, both issued by the Sixth Section of this Court).</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">On this point, it is worth recalling that, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 40 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, it is possible to challenge administrative acts of general scope with regulatory effects, as long as their continued effects subsist over time, therefore, the maximum period to file the proceeding shall be one year from the day following the cessation of those effects.</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">In addition to the foregoing, it is worth recalling that in cases of automatically applicable norms—as in this case—an individual application act is not required to challenge them, by virtue of the fact that they are immediately obligatory upon their sole enactment, without the need for other norms or acts that develop them or make them applicable to the injured party. For the Court, the plaintiff holds a legitimate interest, since it is engaged in the activity of tourist transportation. For the foregoing reasons, the defense of time-bar must be rejected.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">VII.-</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Regarding the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción)</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">. The defendant </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">Bank</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> in the present case maintains that the damages claim (pretensión indemnizatoria) brought against it derives from the pledge contract, through which the company Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. granted vehicle license plate Placa21537 as a real guarantee (garantía real) for payment of the debt acquired by the actor Nombre115172</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, with whom it maintained the credit relationship. It maintains that it is a commercial contract governed by numeral 531 of the Commerce Code. It adds that the denial of the permit occurred on November 2, 2009, therefore the statute of limitations period of canon 984 of the Commerce Code has lapsed. It considers that the statute of limitations period elapsed by virtue of the judgment being notified to the defendant Bank on November 8, 2013. On the other hand, the plaintiff maintains that the damage claimed arose with the dation in payment. It considers that the 4 years of Article 984 of the Commerce Code have not elapsed, as the lawsuit was filed on July 18, 2013. Finally, it maintains that, if one starts from the fact that what is claimed is compensation for damages against the State for licit conduct, the 10-year statute of limitations period of Article 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) applies. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Criterion of the Court</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">In accordance with the evidence in the case file, as already indicated in the previous recital, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">Executive Decree 26883-J challenged in this venue dates from </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">1998</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\"> and, in turn, that the act of individual application of the norm being challenged occurred on </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">November 2, 2009</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">, and also that the lawsuit was filed on </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">June 18, 2013, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">which allows it to be seen that the cause of action is not time-barred for claiming liability. As will be developed further below, two different types of liability are being claimed, based on private law legal entities and public law entities. For the first case, as indicated by the defendant Bank, canon 984 of the Commerce Code applies, which provides a 4-year statute of limitations period for any right and its corresponding action derived from the Commerce Code, Law No. 3284 and its amendments. However, contrary to what the defendant financial entity maintains, said period </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline; color:#0a0a0a\">was interrupted at the time the lawsuit was filed</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\"> on </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">June 18, 2013. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">Taking into account that the event to which the alleged detriments in this venue are sought to be linked occurred on </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">November 2, 2009</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">, with the rejection of the application for a permit to take the minibus out of the country, the 4-year period had not elapsed as of the date the lawsuit was filed, having been interrupted by the filing of the lawsuit. For the foregoing reasons, the defense of statute of limitations raised by the Bank must be rejected. On the other hand, as regards entities governed by Public Law, the liability sought is governed by the provisions of Articles 190 and following of the General Public Administration Law. Specifically, canon 198 provides a 4-year period to claim objective liability from the Administration, and not Article </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">868 of the Civil Code, as maintained by the plaintiff</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">. Said numeral, in what is pertinent, provides:</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic; color:#0a0a0a\">“Article 198.-The right to claim compensation from the Administration shall prescribe in four years, counted from the event giving rise to the liability (…)”</span><span> </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">With matters thus framed, the event giving rise to the liability for claiming damages occurred on </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">November 2, 2009, </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">due to the denial of the permit for the plaintiff's vehicle to leave. In this way, said period </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; text-decoration:underline; color:#0a0a0a\">was interrupted at the time the lawsuit was filed</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\"> on </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">June 18, 2013. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">Taking into account that the event to which the alleged detriments in this venue are sought to be linked occurred on </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold; color:#0a0a0a\">November 2, 2009</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; color:#0a0a0a\">, with the rejection of the application for a permit to take the minibus out of the country, the 4-year period of canon 198 of the General Public Administration Law had not elapsed as of the date the lawsuit was filed, having been interrupted by the filing of the lawsuit. For the foregoing reasons, the defense of statute of limitations must be rejected.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.1pt; margin-bottom:5.1pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-weight:bold\">VIII.-Regarding the lack of standing to be sued (falta de legitimación pasiva) on the part of the Public Transportation Council: </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">Among the substantive prerequisites to be analyzed by the Court in its judgment, even acting on its own motion, is standing </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">ad causam</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">, both active and passive, understood as the aptitude to be a party in a specific proceeding; standing </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">ad causam</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> is not a matter of form but of substance, it is the relationship between the legal situation presented by the plaintiff and the debated legitimate interest, being a prerequisite for a favorable decision on the claim. </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-style:italic\">"Every contentious jurisdictional proceeding comprises what some proceduralists have called a 'procedural legal relationship'; the subjects who intervene in it do so exercising the right of action and the right of defense. Plaintiff and defendant become parties by the mere fact of exercising those rights, without this necessarily implying that the material legal relationship being ventilated in the proceeding exists between them. This latter is precisely what standing ad causam refers to. It is formed insofar as there exists a link between the parties and that material legal situation, so that it requires identity between he who sues and the holder of the claimed subjective interest (active) and between the defendant and the person obligated to the required performance (passive). Thus, it is said, there is active standing when there is the possibility of effectively upholding the claim with respect to the plaintiff and passive standing when that pronouncement can be effective in relation to the defendant." </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\">(First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 775-F-03 of 14:25 hours of November 20, 2003). The determination of this procedural suitability is intimately linked to the claim brought in the action, so that only he who is in a specific relationship with it can be a party in the respective proceeding. In the specific case, the Public Transportation Council has alleged the defense of lack of standing to be sued. For the Court, the aforementioned material procedural legal relationship does not exist between the plaintiff in this proceeding and the Public Transportation Council. The foregoing, in the first place, by virtue of the fact that the CTP did not issue any active or omissive conduct aimed at denying the permit for the minibus to leave, since, as Nombre115172</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma\"> explained in his examination under oath (declaración confesional), once the exit permit was rejected by the defendant Bank, he did not continue with the procedure before said public entity or any of the other defendants. On the other hand, the regulation challenged here is that of the Regulations for the Organization of the Public Registry of Property, Executive Decree No. 28.883-J, which in this case does not concern the Public Transportation Council. For the foregoing reasons, there is no reason whatsoever for it to appear as a defendant party, and the defense of lack of standing to be sued raised by the CTP must be upheld, and consequently, the claim against it must be declared inadmissible.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.1pt; margin-bottom:5.1pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:13.5pt\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">IX.-Regarding the specific case: </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt\">As transcribed in recitals No. 1 and No. 7, and as stated in recital No. 9, as well as in recital V, all of this judgment, this plenary jurisdiction proceeding raises several claims against different entities, some governed by Public Law and another by Private Law. As a consequence of the foregoing, given the diverse legal nature of the defendant parties, we are faced with different legal regimes applicable to each of them. In order to resolve this case in an orderly manner, each claim will be analyzed separately, and each of its arguments will be resolved. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold\">A) </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Annulment claim: Nullity of </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#080808\">Articles 94</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#212121\">, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#080808\">95, 96</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#212121\">, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#080808\">97, 98 and 99 of the </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline\">Regulations for the </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#080808\">Organization of the Public Registry of Mov</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#212121\">a</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#080808\">ble Property No. 26883-J</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#323232\">, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#080808\">published in La Gaceta No. 91 of May 13,</span><span> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#080808\">1998</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; color:#080808\">: The plaintiff comes to this venue to reproach, in a first, very broad line of argument, the administrative procedures before the MOPT and the Property Registry required to take a motor vehicle out of the country, which it lists and describes as bureaucratic and unnecessary. Within this enumeration of procedures, it highlights the one that must be carried out before the Public Registry, consisting of presenting the authorization of the pledgee creditor, duly authenticated. At the same time, it lists three MOPT decrees from which the requirements for motor vehicles to leave the country are derived. On the other hand, it refers to the requirements established by the Public Registry, based on the Regulations for the Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property, No. 26883-J, published in La Gaceta No. 91 of May 13, 1998. Notwithstanding how broad its dissertations, arguments, and reproaches are, given the manner in which the claim was outlined, the object of this proceeding is aimed at determining, in accordance with the present annulment claim, whether canons 94</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; color:#212121\">, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; color:#080808\">95, 96</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; color:#212121\">, </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; color:#080808\">97, 98 and 99 of the indicated </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt\">Regulation </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; color:#080808\">suffer from some type of pathology that warrants decreeing their invalidity. The fundamental reason that the </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; color:#080808\">plaintiff</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Tahoma; font-size:12pt; color:#080808\"> reproaches in this proceeding, as the generator of the pathology of invalidity, consists of the nonexistence of a legal basis that supports the exit requirements for motor vehicles set forth in the Regulation it challenges. It misses the existence of a legal norm, issued by the Legislative Assembly, that establishes the authorization of the pledgee creditor as a requirement for a minibus dedicated to international tourism to leave the country. It also reproaches the nonexistence of a legal normative assumption authorizing a Judge, in the event of a traffic collision, to require his or her authorization. At the same time, it considers that the existence of extraterritoriality insurance for the departure of a minibus from the country is abusive. It states that the regulatory provision in question is contrary to the provisions of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excessive Requirements and Administrative Procedures (Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos), No. 8220, as well as the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor), No. 7472.</span> The defendant **Bank** contends that, contrary to what the plaintiff claims, the authority to grant permits for the exit of motor vehicles from the country derives directly from Article 140, subsections 3 and 18, of the Political Constitution, as well as Articles 2(f), 3, and 4 of Law 3155 (Law Creating the Ministry of Transport, comprehensively reformed by Law 4786). That is, what is stated in the fact does not arise from a whim of the administration, but from a legislative mandate to "plan, regulate, control, and monitor" any mode of transport, making use of the powers given to the Executive Branch by the Constituent Assembly to sanction, regulate, and execute the laws. Similarly, Articles 236 and 551 of the Commercial Code provide support for the exit requirement granted by the National Registry, which corresponds to a protection of the interests of the secured creditor (acreedor prendario), who could see the guarantee they hold in the credit diverted or lost. The **Public Transport Council** maintains that, in this regard, Law 7969, Article 7, and Law 3503, Article 3, establish the powers that the Public Transport Council has to regulate matters relating to the Public Transport service provided. The **Administrative Board of the National Registry** maintains that the Regulation in question is supported by numerals 11 and 12 of the General Law of Public Administration. Finally, the **State** points out that the Pledge Contract finds full regulation in Article 530 et seq. of the Commercial Code and its purpose is to guarantee obligations subject to the rules set forth in the referred articles. At the same time, it maintains that the goods affected by a pledge shall guarantee the creditor, with special privilege, the amount of the operation and the interest, commissions, and expenses, and both costs, in the terms indicated by the contract, in accordance with the canon Article 540 of the same normative body. It adds that in the particular case of pledges where a motor vehicle is offered as guarantee, it must be constituted by public deed. The debtor shall retain, in the name of the pledgee creditor (acreedor pignoraticio), the possession of the pledged thing and shall assume the obligations and responsibilities of a depositary; in addition, they shall be liable for the damages suffered by the things that do not arise from a fortuitous event, force majeure, or the very nature of the objects, in accordance with Article 537. In turn, it maintains that the contract for the constitution of a pledge must contain the information required by numeral 554 of the Commercial Code and must be registered in the Pledge Registry. Finally, in pledge obligations payable in successive installments, the failure to pay one of them shall make the entire obligation due and payable, unless otherwise agreed, as stated in Article 580. Thus, by the very nature of the pledge contract, which is constituted over movable goods, the only way to guarantee the credit is insofar as the good given as guarantee remains in the country. Hence, the challenged regulatory norm, insofar as it requires the authorization of the pledgee creditor for the Public Registry to authorize the exit from the country of a vehicle given as a pledge guarantee, finds full basis in the very nature of the pledge contract. Hence, the plaintiff is not correct in alleging that the challenged Regulation, which regulates the procedure for issuing an exit permit from the country for a vehicle given in pledge, exceeds the regulatory power, since, as reiterated, it finds basis in the very nature of the pledge contract, duly regulated in numerals 530 et seq. of the Commercial Code, Law No. 3284 of April 30, 1964. **Opinion of the Tribunal**: It is necessary to bear in mind that Executive Decree No. 26.883, called the Regulation for the Organization of the Public Registry of Movable Property, as stated in its heading, was born in accordance with the provisions of Articles 140, subsections 3) and 18), of the Political Constitution, Article 28, second paragraph, subsection b), of the General Law of Public Administration, and Articles 236 and 551 of the Commercial Code, Law No. 3284 of April 30, 1964. Considering, in turn, that Title II, Book One of the Commercial Code provided for the creation of a Registry of Movable Goods in the city of San José, to act jointly with the Pledge Registry, and that Article 2 of the Law Creating the National Registry, No. 5695 of May 28, 1975, and its reforms, assigned the Registry of Movable Goods to this Institution, which also included matters relating to vehicles. In turn, that Executive Decree No. 23178-J-MOPT of May 5, 1994, assigned the National Registry of Vessels to the Public Registry of Movable Property of the National Registry, and that the Public Registry of Motor Vehicle Property, the General Pledge Registry, and the National Registry of Vessels have operated under independent Regulations, it being necessary to stipulate a single legal regime for the entire Public Registry of Movable Property; and finally, that the General Pledge Registry had been operating under Executive Decree No. 34 of December 10, 1969, and the Public Registry of Motor Vehicle Property has operated under Executive Decree No. 16821-J of December 16, 1985, but it was necessary to promulgate a new regulation that codified the rules on the registration of movable goods, while standardizing the procedures of the entire Public Registry of Movable Property. Based on the foregoing, Article 1 provides that the Public Registry of Movable Property is attached to the National Registry according to Law No. 5695 of May 28, 1975, and its Reforms, and has under its competence the registration and publication of rights referring to the constitution, declaration, modification, and extinction of movable property and the pledge liens (gravámenes prendarios) that affect it, as well as the adjudication and delivery of the registrations of registrable goods and their permits to exit the national territory, all in accordance with the law. Following the corresponding order in Title Three of that Executive Decree, the registration and permits relating to movable goods are regulated. Chapter One regulates the exit permits for vehicles, from numerals 94 to 98, which are precisely those challenged in this jurisdictional venue. Article 94 provides the following: *"Article 94.—**Exclusive competence.** The Registry shall grant the permits for the exit from the country of motor vehicles."* For its part, canon 95 indicates: *"Article 95.—**Permit Requirements** Without prejudice to other conditions that, in the interest of legal certainty, the Directorate may provide, the requests for permits to exit the country must be submitted in writing, typed, and meet the following requirements: a) Authorization of the registered owner for the granting of the exit, the characteristics of the vehicle, the date of exit, and the destination. If the owner does not personally process the exit before the Registry, in which case the presentation of their identity card will suffice, said request must be authenticated by a Notary Public. b) If the vehicle belongs to a legal entity, the request must be signed by the person who has the legal representation, who must demonstrate this with a certification valid as of the date of the request. c) Having satisfied the fees and other fiscal requirements. d) If there are judicial liens, they must be canceled or, failing that, authorization from the corresponding authority must be provided. e) If there are pledge liens (gravámenes prendarios), authorization from the pledgee creditor (acreedor pignoraticio) must be provided. f) In the case of buses destined for the collective transport of persons, a certificate of being up to date with the extraterritoriality policy before the National Insurance Institute, the authorization note from the General Directorate of Motor Transport of the MOPT, and a note from the Departures and Arrivals Section of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute relating to the cancellation of taxes must also be provided. g) In the case of vehicles destined for tourism service, the authorization note from the Costa Rican Tourism Institute and the extraterritoriality policy from the INS must additionally be provided. h) In the case of taxis destined for the collective transport of persons, in addition to the previous general requirements, the extraterritoriality policy from the INS and an authorization note from the taxi office of the MOPT shall be required. i) In the case of vehicles belonging to Public Institutions and Branches of the State, the authorization of the head of the entity, duly letterheaded and sealed, shall additionally be requested. j) In the case of vehicles in the name of International Missions or Organizations and the Diplomatic Corps, a request from the representative of the Organization or the Ambassador and a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs certifying the legal capacity of the applicant must be provided. k) In the case of vehicles owned by pensioners/annuitants, the note from the Costa Rican Tourism Institute certifying that the owner is current in fulfilling the obligations required by this legal status shall additionally be required."* On the other hand, Article 96 provides the following: *"Article 96.—**Authorization of the permit.** Once the application is admitted, it shall be compared with the Registry information and it shall be verified whether it meets the general requirements. If no defect is found, the exit permit shall be granted, leaving the related documents microfilmed."* Numeral 97 then provides: *"Article 97.—**Validity of the permit** The exit permit must be used within fifteen days following its issuance, in the case of private vehicles, and within four months following its issuance, in the case of heavy cargo vehicles."* Finally, canon 98 states: *"Article 98.—**Issuance of permits through the external network of the registry.** The Registry, through the Information Technology Department of the National Registry, through the Service Decentralization Program, may coordinate with the Municipalities of the Country or other institutions, so that exit permits for vehicles can be issued in those Offices for the classes deemed convenient, in accordance with Executive Decree No. 26515-J of December 18, 1997."* Having reviewed and analyzed this challenged normative body, for the Tribunal, the plaintiff is not correct in considering that there are no legal norms of statutory rank that support the normative development by the Executive Decree being challenged. In the first line are the constitutional provisions that provided its support, from which the powers of the Executive Branch to issue the regulatory norm in question derive. On the other hand, there is the Law Creating the National Registry, as well as the Commercial Code. The regulation of vehicle exit permits turns out to be an extension, within the framework of the regulatory power of the Executive Branch, of canons 236, 530, 537, 540, 551, 554, and 580 of the Commercial Code. Note that Article 236 creates the Registry of Movables based in the city of San José, which shall act jointly with the Pledge Registry. Chapter VIII, belonging to Title I of Book II of the Commercial Code, regulates the pledge contract from Articles 530 to 581. Numeral 537 stands out, providing the following: *"Article 537.- Pledges in which motor vehicles, vessels, or aircraft are offered as guarantee must be constituted by public deed. Those constituted in relation to other movable goods of a different nature may be granted in a public or private document or in official contract forms. In these last two cases, the signature of the debtor duly authenticated by a notary public shall be required. The debtor shall retain, in the name of the pledgee creditor, the possession of the pledged thing and shall assume the obligations and responsibilities of a depositary; in addition, they shall be liable for the damages suffered by the things that do not arise from a fortuitous event, force majeure, or the very nature of the objects. The document or certificate accrediting the constitution of the pledge or the certification from the Pledge Registry shall serve as proof of the deposit."* In the Tribunal's judgment, the requirements established in the questioned numerals of the Executive Decree in question, such as those reproached by the plaintiff, consisting of the creditor's permit and the policy, are not contrary to the laws cited above and rather have the purpose of ensuring the rights of the pledgee creditor and the guarantee, so that they are not affected. On the other hand, in the judgment of this collegiate body, there is no violation, as alleged, of canons: 1, 8, 9, and 10 of Law No. 8220, called the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excess Requirements and Administrative Procedures. The foregoing is by virtue of the fact that, as previously stated, the challenged articles are consistent with the provisions of the Commercial Code, which regulates the pledge contract, with the purpose of safeguarding the rights of pledgee creditors and the creation of a movable property registry that organizes this entire situation. On the other hand, the requirements set forth in the challenged numerals, in the Tribunal's judgment, are not contrary to reasonableness, proportionality, logic, or good faith, insofar as no procedure is observed that is excessive or unnecessary, or that has any purpose other than providing legal certainty to the pledgee creditor, as well as to the service users through the extraterritoriality policy. Reason for which the request for nullity of the aforementioned norms must be rejected. **B) First ordering petition: That a judicial order be issued to the Public Registry so that it does not process the permit for the exit from the country of vehicles, as long as there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that supports it, and C) Second ordering petition: That a judicial order be issued to the MOPT so that it does not process the permit for the exit from the country of vehicles, as long as there is no legal norm emanating from the Legislative Assembly that supports it.** For the Tribunal, it is impossible to grant these two petitions to order the Administrative Board of the National Registry or the MOPT to do what is requested. The foregoing, in accordance with what has been set out in point A) above, of this judgment, given that, as was set out, there are norms of a constitutional and legal nature that support the regulations referring to permits for the exit of vehicles from the country. In another order of things, it is also not found that the challenged regulations violate the provisions of the Law for the Protection of Citizens from Excess Requirements and Administrative Procedures, No. 8220. With which the alleged invalidity is not found, nor any reason whatsoever aimed at decreeing the nullity of Articles 94 to 98 of the Executive Decree being questioned; therefore, it is not possible to accede to the ordering petitions directed at the MOPT or the Administrative Board of the National Registry.

• D)First claim for damages based on strict liability against Banco Citibank: The plaintiff seeks a ruling for the payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) caused, based on strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), for establishing institutional abusive banking practices as a pledgee creditor, regarding the requirement for a tourist minibus to leave the country, which undermined the debtor's payment capacity by creating obstacles to its main source of income, against Articles 46 and 140 of the Constitution, the Law on Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense, and Law 8220, for the sum of $500,000 for principal (cost of the tourist unit, lost profits (lucro cesante) for four years, and moral, psychological, and patrimonial damages), for impeding the development of the constitutional right of Freedom of Enterprise, for leaving the debtor unemployed, for tarnishing his name before SUGEF and preventing him from other financial market options, for harming him as a banking consumer, for morally damaging the company; plus existing legal interest until the settlement of judgment. of this process. The defendant Bank maintains that the denial it carried out, so that on November 29, 2009, was due to a policy aimed at safeguarding its interest within the framework of the pledge contract. Criteria of the Office: In relation to the duty to adequately, timely, clearly, truthfully, and sufficiently inform the consumer, it must be borne in mind that the last paragraph of Article 46 of the Political Constitution; subsections c) and d) of Article 32 of the Law on Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense; 41 and 43 of the Regulation to that Law, establish that the consumer must receive adequate, clear, truthful, timely, and sufficient information on all elements that directly affect their consumption decision; therefore, it is essential that the person intending to sign a contract such as the one at hand must sufficiently and timely know its conditions, limitations, scope, and consequences, allowing them to determine whether or not to sign it. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: “... it is notorious that the consumer is at the end of the chain formed by the production, distribution, and commercialization of consumer goods they need to acquire for personal satisfaction, and their participation in that process does not respond to technical or professional reasons, but rather in the constant celebration of contracts on a personal basis. Therefore, their relationship in that commercial sequence is one of inferiority and requires special protection against the suppliers of goods and services, for the purpose that, prior to expressing their contractual consent, they have all the necessary elements of judgment that allow them to express it with full freedom, and this implies full knowledge of the goods and services offered. Included in the foregoing, in a harmonious mix, are various constitutional principles, such as state concern in favor of the broadest sectors of the population when acting as consumers, the reaffirmation of individual freedom by facilitating private parties the free disposal of their assets with the aid of the greatest possible knowledge of the good or service to be acquired, the protection of health as involved, the ordering and systematization of reciprocal relations between interested parties, the homologation of international commercial practices into the internal system, and ultimately, the greater protection of the inhabitant's functioning in their means of subsistence...” (judgment number 1996-04463 of nine hours forty-five minutes on August thirtieth, nineteen ninety-six. See in a similar sense, judgment number 1992-01441 of fifteen hours forty-five minutes on June second, nineteen ninety-two). In the case under review, for this Court, the conduct of the defendant Bank is dubious, in its denial of the exit permit, by alleging as grounds for the rejection the existence of supposed “internal policies” unknown to the plaintiff. It is contrary to this duty to inform that, unexpectedly in situations such as what happened in the present case, denials of exit permits be justified by a policy that the plaintiff only learned of at the time he requested the permit. What would have been appropriate in the specific case would have been for the defendant bank, in safeguarding the right to information in consumer matters, to have informed the plaintiff with due advance notice, prior to signing the pledge contract, about all banking policies associated with vehicle exit permits. Such information was relevant to his consumption decision. Notwithstanding the above, in the line that for this Collegiate Body the defendant Bank breached its duty to adequately inform the plaintiff, the truth is that the Court does not find a link or causal nexus (nexo causal) between this omissive conduct and the damages claimed. It has not been adequately proven that, due to the reproached lack of information and the denial of the minibus's exit from the country, the plaintiff lost the movable asset, that his image was affected, that he encountered difficulties in generating profits, nor the alleged impediment to business growth, as well as the difficulty in applying for credit with other financial entities and the moral damages he alleges. The existence of a causal nexus between these alleged damages and the Bank's conduct of denying the exit permit based on an "Internal Policy," whose timely disclosure has not been credited either, has not been proven in the present case, failing in its duty to inform. For the foregoing reasons, the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) must be upheld, and consequently, the claim for strict liability against the bank must be declared without merit. E) Second claim for damages against the State and the Administrative Board of the National Registry: At folio 527 of the judicial file, the plaintiff expanded its claim, adjusted, and clarified in the preliminary hearing against the State, for the sum of $138,000 for damages. Regarding moral damages, the claimant is Mr. Nombre115172. The case theory of the plaintiff to claim strict liability under canon 190 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration is based on the issuance of Decreto Ejecutivo 28.883-J, which is the Regulation for the Organization of the Public Registry, to which it attributes invalidity in Articles 94 to 99. Before deciding, it must be borne in mind, as proven in this venue, that neither the State nor the Administrative Board of the National Registry carried out an active or omissive conduct aimed at denying the exit permit, since, as Nombre115172 explained in his confessional statement, once the defendant Bank rejected the permit, he did not present his petition before the rest of the defendants. The plaintiff's daughter in her testimonial statement also confirmed this aspect. Thus, as matters stand, the strict liability attributed to them, in the case theory of the plaintiff, arises from the issuance of the Executive Decree in question. For the Court, it is impossible to grant this claim, by virtue of the fact that the scheme of strict liability of the Administration is not met, lacking the necessary elements for any compensation to be demanded from the Administration. First, since the alleged invalidity does not exist, as explained in point A) of this Considerando with the number IX, we are not faced with the criteria for attributing liability, such as illicit or abnormal functioning. Regarding the criteria for attributing lawful and normal functioning, they also do not apply in this case, given that the existence of an exceptional injury and a small proportion of affected parties has not been proven, as required by canon 194 of the General Law of Public Administration. A series of damages suffered by the company are alleged, already mentioned in point D) above; however, a causal nexus is also not found between these and the issuance of the Executive Decree by the State. Therefore, the defense of lack of right must be upheld, and consequently, the claim against the State and the Administrative Board of the National Registry must be declared without merit, as the alleged strict liability cannot be determined.

X.- Regarding the compensation items. In accordance with what is set forth in the previous Considerando, numbered IX, of this judgment, it is impossible to grant the claims for damages sought by the plaintiff against Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, and the Administrative Board of the National Registry.

XI.- Regarding the defenses. The defense of lack of jurisdiction was resolved by the Procedural Judge, as explained in the Resultando numbered 8 of this judgment. The defense of expiration (caducidad) must be rejected in accordance with what is set forth in Considerando VI of this judgment. The defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) must be rejected based on what is set forth in Considerando VII of this judgment. Regarding the defense of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) raised by the Public Transport Council, it must be upheld, in accordance with what is set forth in Considerando VIII of this resolution; consequently, the claim filed against it must be declared inadmissible. Regarding the defenses of lack of active and passive standing raised by the defendant Bank, they must be rejected, by virtue of the existence of a material legal relationship, by virtue of the contractual relationship (pledge contract), as well as the petition for the exit permit and the dation in payment (dación en pago) of the minibus, legal situations that bind them in such a way that the plaintiffs can appear as the active party and the defendant Bank as the passive party in this jurisdictional process. Likewise, regarding the defense of lack of active standing raised by the Administrative Board of the National Registry, the procedural legal relationship previously alluded to exists, from the moment the Executive Decree in question is challenged, this being a Regulation for the Organization of the Public Registry, coupled with the liability sought to be imputed to them. For this reason, as in the previous case, the plaintiff has sufficient standing to proceed in this venue against the State and the Administrative Board of the National Registry. For the foregoing, said defense must be rejected. The defenses of lack of current interest and lack of cause raised by the Bank must be rejected. The first by virtue of the fact that the interest persists, as the alleged damages supposedly derive from conduct carried out by the bank, according to the case theory of the plaintiff, for which reason their admission or rejection must be analyzed on the merits of the judgment. The second must be rejected by virtue of the fact that it is not a defense enumerated or listed in the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. Finally, the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) must be upheld in the terms set forth in Considerando VIII of this judgment.

XII.- Regarding costs. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the fact of being so. Dispensation from this condemnation is only viable when, in the Court's opinion, there is sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In the species, this collegiate body finds no reason whatsoever to apply the exceptions set by the applicable regulations and break the postulate of condemning the vanquished, for which reason Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and Nombre115172 must bear the costs of the defendants.

POR TANTO.

I.- The following defenses are rejected: a) defense of expiration (caducidad) raised by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the Administrative Board of the National Registry, and the State. b) defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) raised by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. and the State. c) defense of lack of active and passive standing raised by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, and the Administrative Board of the National Registry. d) defense of lack of interest and lack of cause, raised by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. e) defense of lack of current interest raised by the Administrative Board of the National Registry. II.- The following defenses are upheld: a) lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) raised by the Public Transport Council; consequently, the claim against it is declared inadmissible. b) lack of right (falta de derecho) raised by Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, and the Administrative Board of the National Registry; consequently, the claim filed by Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and Nombre115172 must be declared without merit. Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. and Nombre115172 are condemned to pay costs in favor of Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., the State, the Administrative Board of the National Registry, and the Public Transport Council.

Nombre31590 Nombre113674 Nombre114124

1

Firmar Documento ACTOR: TRANSPORTES TURÍSTICOS MIRAVISTA MJS S.A.

DEMANDADO: ESTADO, JUNTA ADMINISTRATIVA DEL REGISTRO NACIONAL, CONSEJO DE TRANSPORTE PÚBLICO, BANCO CITIBANK DE COSTA RICA S.A.

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN QUINTA. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José. Goicoechea, a las diez horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del veintisiete de mayo del año dos mil diecinueve.- Sentencia n.° 47-2019-V Proceso de conocimiento interpuesto por Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A., cédula jurídica CED91053, representada por Nombre115172 , mayor, operador de turismo, cédula de identidad número CED91054 y Nombre115173 , mayor, soltera, vecina de San Rafael de Heredia, cédula de identidad número CED91055. Otorga poder especial judicial a Nombre115174 , carné del Colegio de Abogados 13.415, contra: el Estado, representado por Omar Rivera Mesén, mayor, casado, abogado, vecino de San Pedro de Montes de Oca, con cédula de identidad n.° CED557; el Registro Nacional representado por Dagoberto Sibaja Morales, mayor, casado una vez, abogado, vecino de San José, cédula de identidad CED2890, en su condición de apoderado general judicial sin límite de suma, otorga poder especial judicial a Nombre20087 , mayor, casado una vez, Abogado, vecino de San Ramón de Alajuela, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED32415; Nombre115175 , mayor, soltero, Abogado, vecino de Rohrmoser, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED91056; Nombre115176 , mayor, casado, Abogado, vecino de Dirección4252, , portador de la cédula de identidad número CED91050- ; Nombre1846 , mayor, divorciada, Abogada, vecina de San Ramón de Alajuela, portadora de la cédula de identidad número CED665; y, Nombre115177 , mayor, soltera, Abogada, vecina de Heredia, portadora de la cédula de identidad número CED32416; el Consejo de Transporte Público representado por Juan Manuel Delgado Naranjo, mayor, casado, Administrador de Empresas con Énfasis en Recursos Humanos, en su condición de Director Ejecutivo, portador de la cédula de identidad CED91051- y el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., representado por sus apoderados especiales judiciales, Rolando Laclé Zúñiga, mayor, abogado, divorciado, vecino de San José, cédula de identidad número CED29048 y José Pablo Valverde Marín, mayor de edad, casado, Abogado, vecino de Alajuela, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED31787.

Resultando

1.- Que el 18 de julio del 2013, la parte accionante esgrimió la siguiente pretensión: " a. Que se declare la nulidad de los articulas 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 y 99 del "Reglamento Organización Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble" No 26883-J, publicado en la Gaceta No 91 del 13 de mayo de 1998. b. Que se emita orden judicial al Registro Público, para que no realice el trámite de permiso de salida del país de los vehículos, mientras no exista norma jurídica emanada de la Asamblea Legislativa que lo ampare. c. Que se emita orden judicial al MOPT, para que no realice el trámite de permiso de salida del país de los vehículos, mientras no exista norma jurídica emanada de la Asamblea Legislativa que lo ampare. d. Que se condene al Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A, al pago de daños y perjuicios causados, por responsabilidad objetiva, por establecer prácticas abusivas bancarias institucionales en calidad de acreedor prendario, para el requisito de salida del país de una buseta de turismo, que vulneraron la capacidad de pago del deudor por establecer obstáculos en la principal fuente de ingresos, en contra el artículo 46 y 140 de rango constitucional, la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor y contra la Ley 8220, por la suma $500 000 por concepto de capital (costo de la unidad de turismo, lucro cesante por cuatro años y daño moral, psicológico y patrimonial), por impedir el desarrollo del derecho constitucional de la Libertad de Empresa, por dejar cesante al deudor, por manchar su nombre ante la SUGEF e impedirle otras opciones financieras del mercado, por perjudicarlo como consumidor bancario, por dañar a la empresa moralmente, más otros aspectos que se señalaran más adelante; más los intereses legales existentes hasta liquidación de sentencia. del presente proceso. e. Condenatoria en costas personales y procesales de las partes” (folio 127 del expediente judicial). En audiencia preliminar del 10 de febrero del 2015, se amplió la pretensión de la siguiente forma: “14:10 Las pretensiones se encuentran a folio 127 del escrito de demanda, el señor Juez procede a leerlas. La parte actora indica que se realizó una ampliación en cuanto a la pretensión de los daños y perjuicios contra el Estado, la pretensión que consta a folio 527 por la suma de $138.000,00. La representación del Estado consulta cuál de las dos partes actoras es el que solicita el daño moral subjetivo. La representación actora indica que es el señor Nombre115172 ” (minuta de la audiencia preliminar visible a folio 607 del expediente judicial y soporte audiovisual, que consta en expediente virtual).

2.-Que el 30 de octubre del 2013, mediante resolución de las 8:27 horas, el Juez de la etapa de trámite concedió el traslado de rigor a los demandados (folio 16 del expediente judicial).

3.- Que el 26 de setiembre del 2013, el actor Nombre115178 , aclaró que él también figuraba como parte accionante, para que se procediera a no tenerlo como representante de la sociedad accionante, sino como otra parte actora, siendo el mayor ofendido como consumidor bancario en este proceso (folio 145 del expediente judicial).

4.- Que el 8 de enero del 2014, el demandado Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., contestó la demanda en forma negativa, e interpuso las defensas de caducidad, falta de competencia por la materia, prescripción, falta de derecho, falta de Interés actual, falta de causa y falta de legitimación activa y falta de legitimación pasiva. Ese mismo día, el Consejo de Transporte Público contestó la demanda en forma negativa e interpuso las defensas de falta de legitimación pasiva y falta de derecho. (folios 180 y 273 del expediente judicial).

5.- Que el 10 de enero del 2014, la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional contestó la demanda en forma negativa, e interpuso las defensas de caducidad, falta de derecho, falta de legitimación activa y falta de interés actual (folio 46 del expediente judicial).

6.-Que el 15 de enero del 2014, el Estado contestó la demanda en forma negativa e interpuso las defensas caducidad en contra de la pretensión n.° 1, falta de derecho y falta de legitimación activa (folio 447 del expediente judicial).

7.-Que el 27 de mayo del 2014, al atender la audiencia de defensas y contra prueba, la parte actora amplio su pretensión en los siguientes términos: "Siendo este momento procesal oportuno, por no haberse aún celebrado la audiencia preeliminar (sic), y con relación a los daños y perjuicios causados por parte de City Bank de Costa Rica S.A se aclara y amplía este acápite de la demanda en el sentido de no haberse concretado el motivo que los origina, en qué consisten y su estimación prudencial de conformidad con los numeral 58 y 95 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo Y 290 INCISO S del Código de Procedimientos Civiles, se procede a aclarar y ampliar este punto, para evitar atrasos mayores en etapas más avanzadas del proceso. Los motivos que originan la indemnización de daños y perjuicios, así como en qué consisten los mismos, en el presente proceso son: 1) Las disposiciones generales del Reglamento que se impugna. 2) La aplicación individual de las disposiciones reglamentaria impugnadas que afectaron a los actores. 3) La existencia del Requisito de Permiso del Acreedor Prendario para que una microbús de turismo salga del país.

• 4)La negativa del Banco City Bank de Costa Rica S.A, de dar el permiso de salida del país a la microbús, momento en que se encontraba al día la operación de crédito prendario, así como sus respectivos seguros ante el INS, lo que no ponía en riesgo el capital invertido por la entidad bancaria, máxime que se pagan los seguros de extraterritorialidad para salir del país. A lo que argumentaron simplemente "Políticas Internas Bancarias" en perjuicio de los derechos constitucionales de cuarta generación del consumidor bancario. 5) La aplicación que realizó City Bank de Costa Rica S.A de Políticas Internas Bancaria Extracontractuales no informadas al deudor al momento de la Contratación Crediticia de Otorgamiento del Crédito. 6) La aplicación de políticas bancarias no informadas al deudor en la formalización del crédito ocasionó graves daños y perjuicios a los actores. 7) El atraso injustificado por parte de City Bank de Costa Rica S.A de dar una respuesta oportuna al consumidor Bancario, ante la solicitud de éste para poder sacar la microbús del país, lo que provocó la pérdida de la buseta de turismo por afectación a la capacidad de pago del deudor y hubo que darla al Banco en Dación de Pago. 8) La inobservancia de la entidad bancaria demandada de la situación económica que vivía el país al momento de la solicitud realizada por el deudor bancario y la inobservancia irrazonable de las políticas estatales en materia de readecuación de deudas y arreglos de pago a los deudores bancarios del sector de turismo nacional por la crisis internacional que fue un Hecho Público y Notorio. 9) La pérdida del bien mueble, que era en ese momento el principal activo productor de utilidades de la empresa. 10)La pérdida de clientes activos en ese momento que contrataban la microbús de turismo. 11) La pérdida de la imagen de comerciante del deudor afectado así como la imagen de la empresa de transportes. 12) Las pérdidas sufridas por la empresa Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A y por el suscrito deudor, pérdidas económicas importantes ya que el Banco City Bank de Costa Rica, impidió a los actores de la presente causa, la no generación de utilidades, el no aumento de sus activos, las pérdidas incluso para el deudor del patrimonio que tenía anterior a la contratación crediticia con la entidad bancaria, pérdida de calificación ante la SUGEF como deudor. 13) La imposibilidad para los actores de tener un crédito abierto en cualquier otra entidad financiera, ya que después de una dación en pago, ninguna otra entidad financiera le otorgaría un crédito prendario a los actores. 14)La imposibilidad de crecimiento empresarial, que se encontraba plenamente disponible al momento del crédito con City Bank de Costa Rica y después no. 15)El daño moral subjetivo y psicológico causado al deudor bancario. 16)EI daño moral objetivo causado a la empresa Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. 17) La Responsabilidad Objetiva en que incurrió el Estado por el Reglamento impugnado y la de City Bank de Costa Rica S.A por los daños causados en su relación de servicio de crédito al deudor y por la aplicación de la Ley de Protección al Consumidor. La presente demanda se estimó contra el Banco City Bank de Costa Rica S.A en LA SUMA DE $500 000 (quinientos mil dólares) moneda de curso legal de los Estados Unidos de América, más los intereses legales hasta liquidación de sentencia, indexación legal de las pérdidas sufridas, que se indicarán más adelante, por no estar totalmente definidas en este momento, los cuales se desglosan de la siguiente manera: Valor Actual del Bien Mueble o similar: $170 000 (ciento setenta mil dólares americanos). Perjuicios Sufridos Lucro Cesante: $48 000 anuales de ganancias, a $4000 (cuatro mil dólares) por mes, nos da un total de $192 000 (ciento noventa y dos mil dólares) en cuatro años. $138 000 por daño moral subjetivo al deudor, daño moral objetivo a la empresa, daño psicológico al deudor, pérdida de situación patrimonial existente antes del contrato con el BANCO. Se amplía la presente demanda por concepto de daños y perjuicios contra el Estado por la suma de $138 000 ocasionados a los actores por parte del Estado, en aplicación del Reglamento Impugnado." (folio 524 del expediente judicial).

8.-Que el 17 de octubre del 2014, mediante resolución el Juez de la etapa de trámite rechazó la defensa de incompetencia interpuesta por el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. (resolución que consta en el escritorio virtual).

9.-Que el 10 de febrero del 2015, se llevó a cabo la audiencia preliminar. En dicha etapa se ampliaron las pretensiones en los términos que se indican en el resultando n.° 1 de la presente sentencia. A la vez, el Estado interpuso la excepción de caducidad en relación a la pretensión n.° 1 de la demanda. El Consejo de Transporte Público y el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., se adhirieron a la excepción de caducidad que presentó el Estado. La Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional se adhirió a la defensa de prescripción interpuesta por el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. El Juez de la etapa de trámite trasladó la resolución de las defensas de caducidad y prescripción al Tribunal de Juicio (minuta visible a folio 607 del expediente judicial y soporte audiovisual).

10.- Que el 8 de abril del 2015, el asunto fue turnado a la Sección Quinta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo (folio 738 del expediente judicial).

11.-Que el 16 de abril del 2015, la Sección Quinta del Tribunal Contencioso señaló el día 24 de noviembre del año 2015 para llevar a cabo el juicio oral y público (folio 557 del expediente judicial).

12.-Que el 24 de noviembre del 2015, el Tribunal integrado por los jueces Gustavo Irías Obando, Francisco Hidalgo Rueda y Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo, suspendieron la celebración del juicio oral y público, al considerar que debía ser resuelta la acción de inconstitucionalidad bajo los expedientes 14-12592-007-CO y 15-4280-007-CO de la Sala Constitucional (minuta del juicio y soporte audiovisual).

13.-Que el 6 de noviembre de 2017, la Sección Quinta del Tribunal Contencioso señaló para celebrar el juicio oral y público para celebrarse el 6 de mayo del 2019 (resolución que consta en escritorio virtual).

14.-Que el 6 de mayo del 2019, se celebró el juicio oral y público (minuta del juicio y público y soporte audiovisual).

15.-En los procedimientos ante este Tribunal no se han observado nulidades que deban ser subsanadas o que generen indefensión y la sentencia se dicta dentro del plazo establecido en el artículo 111 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

Redacta el juez Nombre31590 , con el voto afirmativo de la jueza Nombre113674 y el juez Nombre114124 ; y,

Considerando

I.-Hechos probados: 1) Que el 3 de octubre del 2008, según escritura pública del Notario Erick Fabricio Jiménez Masís, Importaciones Zuzu S.A., le vendió a Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A., el vehículo marca Marco Polo, año 2008, con placas por asignar con el código de Heredia. En ese mismo acto comparecieron el actor Nombre115172 y el Banco Cuscatlán, que le concedió un préstamo mercantil por la suma de $64.489,80, por un plazo de 72 meses. La garantía otorgada fue de naturaleza prendaria en primer grado, sobre el vehículo antes mencionado (folio 67 del expediente judicial). 2) Que el 18 de setiembre del 2009, el actor Nombre115172 , presentó ante la encargada de cobros del Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., una solicitud para sacar del país la buseta Marcopolo placa Placa21537, en los siguientes términos: "PRIMERO: Que poseo una operación de crédito prendario con ustedes, la número Identificacion617 SEGUNDO: Que por diversas razones, en el transcurso del crédito he tenido ciertos atrasos normales, si tomamos en cuenta la crisis económica que ha afectado a nuestro país en el último año, además de que desde el inicio del crédito, comenzamos a trabajar más de un mes después de la firma del contrato con el antiguo Cuscatlán, quien no giraba el cheque de cancelación a la empresa MARCOPOLO, hasta que la Prenda del bien mueble no estuviera inscrita, razón por la cual se nos hizo entrega del bien hasta que la Prenda quedó inscrita y ya la primera cuota de pago para mi persona, se encontraba al cobro con el Banco. TERCERO: Que a pesar de todo eso, al día de hoy nos encontramos totalmente al día con la operación crediticia, de hecho pueden verificar el estado de pagos, donde hemos pagado hasta tres cuotas juntas. Lo anterior indica nuestra intención de estar al día con la operación crediticia. CUARTO: Que la semana antepasada se solicitó el permiso de salida del país de la Buseta Marcopolo, año 2008, Placa número Placa21537, y se nos denegó porque hemos tenido atrasos en el crédito. QUINTO: Que necesitamos autorización para salir del país ya que el Plan de Inversión de la Adquisición de la Buseta de Turismo, como pueden verificarlo en el expediente del crédito, fue para Excursiones Nacionales e Internacionales y si no se nos permite sacar la Buseta del país no podemos trabajar y por ende, no podremos pagarla al Banco. SEXTO: Entiendo que dentro de las políticas del Banco, esté el cuidar el Bien Mueble; sin embargo, este crédito como se manifestó líneas arriba se encuentra totalmente al día y se requiere para que trabaje y produzca como bien activo que es, que salga del país, de hecho ocupamos el permiso para pagar a UNISERSE la extraterritorialidad correspondiente. SÉTIMO: Por lo anterior, resulta irrazonable e ilógico que no se nos permita trabajar, máxime que se va a pagar el seguro de extraterritorialidad y la operación está al día, de lo contrario, el Banco no nos está dejando desarrollar el Plan de Inversión que justificó el otorgamiento del crédito. Por todo lo expuesto, agradezco de antemano la colaboración que puedan brindarme, ya que necesito trabajar en excursiones a Panamá y Nicaragua y requiero la autorización del Acreedor Prendario." (folio 42 del expediente judicial). 3) Que el 2 de noviembre del 2009, Sara Gómez Méndez, en su condición de Jefe de Seguros del Banco accionado le dirigió nota al actor en los siguientes términos: "Reciba un cordial saludo de nuestra parte, y a la vez le indicamos que de acuerdo a la solicitud de permiso de salida del país del vehículo Marco Polo, placa Placa21537 inscrito en el Registro Público de la Propiedad a nombre de Transportes Turísticos Miravista S.A., con cédula jurídica CED91052 ; donde el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. es acreedor prendario de acuerdo al gravamen inscrito ante el Registro en el Tomo 2008, Asiento 00312179, Secuencia 002 y donde usted es deudor de la operación CED91057 se le informa lo siguiente: "En aplicación a las políticas internas del banco y estudios realizados a su operación el permiso de salida del país fue denegado temporalmente hasta que el crédito no registre atrasos mayores a 30 días en los últimos seis meses" Esta negación no es permanente y en cualquier momento puede disponer de nuestra autorización siempre cumpliendo con lo indicado anteriormente. Cualquier consulta nos encontramos a su disposición en los teléfonos 2299-0206 Franklin Guzmán o al 2299-0411 Sara Gómez." (folio 44 del expediente judicial). 4) Que el 3 de noviembre del 2010, ante la notaria Gabriela Valverde Mena, en la escritura número setenta y cuatro, compareció la sociedad accionante y el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., a efectos de extinguir la obligación que tenía la última con el Banco, llevó a cabo una dación en pago, con un bien mueble, que era la buseta placa Placa21537, dicho acuerdo quedó consignado en los siguientes términos: "DICEN: El primer compareciente: Que en pago de la cantidad de sesenta y seis mil seiscientos cincuenta dólares con setenta y siete centavos, que es el saldo de la operación número uno uno cero nueve nueve cero cuatro cero cuatro seis cero tres, de la cual mi representada es garante, y en deber el señor Nombre115172 a Banco Cuscatlán de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, hoy denominado Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S. A., garantizado con el contrato de prenda inscrito en el Registro Público de la Propiedad de Bienes Muebles, de la respectiva sección, tomo dos mil ocho, asiento trescientos doce mil ciento setenta y nueve, secuencia cero dos, garantizado con el vehículo placa Placa21538 , que se describe así: Marca: Marco Polo, estilo: W nueve, categoría: Buseta, capacidad: Veintinueve personas, año: Dos mil ocho, chasis: nueve tres PB cuatro cero B tres P siete C cero dos cero cuatro cuatro seis. Motor: Marca: MWM, número: Placa21539 , cilindrada: cuatro mil trescientos C. C., combustible: Diesel, le traspasa libre de gravámenes y anotaciones judiciales, estimando la dación de pago en la cantidad antes citada. El segundo compareciente: Que su representada acepta la dación en pago y solicita a ese Registro se inscriba dicho vehículo a nombre de Banco Citibank de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima; y, como consecuencia de la misma cancela totalmente el mencionado asiento de inscripción prendaria, dejando libre de este gravamen al citado vehículo y extinguida la responsabilidad del ex deudor." (folio 50 del expediente judicial). 5) Que en la presente causa ni el Estado, ni la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional, ni el Consejo de Transporte Público llevaron a cabo una conducta activa o acto administrativo dirigido a denegarle el permiso de salida de la microbús HB 2467, en aplicación del Reglamento Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble n.° 26883-J, publicado en la Gaceta No 91 del 13 de mayo de 1998. (Declaración confesional de Nombre115172 en juicio oral y público, soporte audiovisual del juicio) II.-Hechos no probados: 1) Que con la denegatoria de salida del país de la microbús, realizada por el Banco demandado mediante nota de dos de noviembre del dos mil nueve, la parte actora perdiera el bien mueble, su imagen, la dificultad de generar utilidades, el impedimento de crecer empresarialmente, el inconveniente de solicitar crédito con otras entidades financieras y el daño moral que alega (no hay prueba). 2) Que con posterioridad al dos de noviembre del dos mil nueve, la parte actora hubiese gestionado nuevamente el permiso de salida del país (no hay prueba).

III.-Argumentos de la parte actora: A modo de síntesis, explica la parte actora que adquirió una buseta para el transporte de turismo. Señala que el deudor comprador fue Nombre115172 y la Buseta se inscribió registralmente a nombre de la Empresa propiedad del deudor, Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. Indica que para la adquisición de dicha buseta obtuvo un crédito prendario bajo la modalidad de PYMES con Citibank de Costa Rica S.A, antiguamente llamado Banco Cuscatlán, mediante la operación crediticia número 120990404603 y por la suma de $64.489,80 a un plazo de 6 años, a una tasa de interés del 8.6% anual, con un plan de inversión destinado al turismo nacional e internacional. El costo de la buseta fue de $85.090, de los cuales dio una prima $20.510,2. Añade que la adquisición del crédito, fue realizado única y exclusivamente para la compra de la buseta de transporte de turismo terrestre de personas, principalmente para la realización de tours internacionales hacia Nicaragua y en Panamá. Acusa que no existe una norma jurídica emanada de la Asamblea Legislativa, que exija el trámite y los requisitos para el permiso de salida del país, de los vehículos automotores que piden el MOPT, específicamente el Consejo de Transporte Público y el Registro Nacional, sin tomar en cuenta los permisos que tienen que dar las entidades financieras en caso de que haya automotores dados en garantía prendaria. Sostiene, además, que no existe norma jurídica emanada de la Asamblea Legislativa que establezca como requisito para el permiso de salida del país de una buseta dedicada al turismo internacional, la autorización de un juez en caso de que haya colisión de tránsito. Agrega que no existe norma jurídica emanada de la Asamblea Legislativa que establezca como requisito para el permiso de salida del país de una buseta dedicada al turismo internacional, autorización del acreedor prendario. Menciona también que no existe norma jurídica emanada de la Asamblea Legislativa que establezca como requisito para el permiso de salida del país de una buseta dedicada al turismo internacional, la adquisición del seguro de extraterritorialidad. Por otra parte, menciona que, a inicios del 2009, con la caída del turismo a nivel mundial, se atrasó en el pago de tres cuotas mensuales del crédito bancario. Puntualiza que entre el 6 de abril del año 2009 y el 8 de mayo del mismo año, aún sin tener ingresos por la crisis señalada, obtuvo un préstamo personal con un particular, para cancelar a Citibank la suma de $5.252, para poner al día el crédito prendario con la entidad bancaria y así poder obtener el permiso de salida del país, por parte del banco como acreedor prendario, teniendo claro que por el principio de razonabilidad, equilibrio de la relación de consumo, la justicia y equidad entre las partes la entidad bancaria al estar al día la operación no tendría motivos para denegarle el permiso de salida del país. Reprocha que no fue así, sino que más bien hasta mes y medio después obtuvo respuesta en la que le denegaron la salida del país del vehículo dado en garantía. Indica que Citibank, respondió de forma negativa su solicitud de permiso de salida del país para la buseta de turismo, manifestando lo siguiente: "En aplicación a las políticas internas del banco y estudios realizados a su operación el permiso de salida del país fue denegado temporalmente hasta que el crédito no registre atrasos mayores a 30 días en los últimos 6. meses. " Cuestiona las supuestas políticas internas del banco nunca le fueron informadas en la etapa precontractual, ni antes de la firma de la garantía prendaria con el banco. Considera que esa falta de información previa, sencilla y clara por parte del proveedor de los servicios financieros, deja a los deudores clientes y consumidores bancarios en una total desprotección jurídica de sus intereses legítimos y derechos subjetivos. Considera que la negativa del Banco accionado, basado en las políticas mencionadas vulneró su posibilidad de pagar el crédito al no poder obtener ganancias.

IV.-Argumentos de las partes demandadas: A modo de síntesis, explica el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. que no fue el señor Nombre115172 el que adquirió el bien inmueble en cuestión, si no que fue la sociedad Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. Sostiene que lo anterior resulta relevante, pues la relación crediticia fue con la persona física y no con la jurídica, de ese modo, según apunta, la relación con la empresa Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. es únicamente a raíz del consentimiento de dicha compañía en el gravamen prendario que en su momento se otorgó sobre el bien mueble objeto de estudio. Afirma que la supuesta actividad turística la desarrollaba la empresa y no el deudor. Arguye que la facultad de otorgar permisos de salida del país a los vehículos automotores deviene directamente del artículo 140 incisos 3 y 18 de la Constitución Política, así como los artículos 2 inciso f 3 y 4 de la Ley 3155 (Ley de Creación del Ministerio de Transportes, reformada integralmente por la Ley 4786). Sostiene que los requisitos que reprocha la parte actora devienen de distintas leyes, a las cuales omite hacer referencia. Aduce que la obligación del Poder Ejecutivo de planificar, regular, controlar y vigilar el transporte sí tiene un origen legal, y por su parte, las atribuciones de regular dicha actividad vía decreto o reglamento como acto administrativo de alcance general, tienen un origen constitucional. Defiende el hecho de que en forma expresa al deudor se le indicó que la denegación de la autorización de salida del vehículo no era permanente, y que la misma respondía a un criterio bajo el cual lo que solicita nuestra representada es que no hubiese atraso en los pagos por más de 30 días en un periodo de 6 meses, una medida a todas luces razonable y proporcional, que tiende a medir el comportamiento de pagos del deudor tomando en consideración el historial de atrasos que presentó la cuenta en su momento y por ende el riesgo de posible ejecución de la garantía que se tiene respecto al crédito otorgado. Señala que los requisitos que reprocha la parte actora, provienen tanto del inciso e) del artículo 95 del Decreto Ejecutivo 26883-J, Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble, como del artículo 20 del Decreto Ejecutivo 16821-J (Reglamento del Registro Público de la Propiedad de Vehículos Automotores, que a su vez se promulgaron con base en los artículos 140 incisos 3 y 18 de la Constitución Política, el artículo 28 párrafo segundo inciso b) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y los artículos 236 y 551 del Código de Comercio. Añade que el señor Nombre115172 , no se encontraba ubicado desde la óptica crediticia en el Grupo 1, sino en el Grupo 2 de deudores, en el cual no se hace uso del parámetro de Capacidad de Pago" sino únicamente de los parámetros de evaluación de "Morosidad" y "Comportamiento de Pago Histórico" Considera que no ha sido violentada la libertad de comercio o la de trabajo, pues la denegatoria era de carácter temporal. Por su parte, el Consejo de Transporte Público señala que resulta falsa la afirmación en la línea de que no exista norma expresa emanada por la Asamblea Legislativa que exija el trámite de permisos para la salida del país de los automotores que brindan servicios de transporte público, al respecto debe indicarse que la normativa vigente que regula el servicio público de transporte en sus diferentes modalidades, se encuentra regulado por la Ley 3503 y la Ley 7969. La Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional sostiene que el Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble, se creó mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo número 26883-J, esto de conformidad con el artículo 28, párrafo segundo, inciso b) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y los artículos 236 y 551 del Código de Comercio, Ley número 3284 de 30 de abril. Sostiene que este Reglamento, no contiene nulidad alguna en los artículos que se discuten en este proceso, ya que los mismos se encuentran autorizados mediante normativa legal de rango superior. A la vez manifiesta que no se acredita ninguna conducta activa u omisiva que tenga relación con los daños que pide. Finalmente, el Estado indica que el contrato de prenda encuentra plena regulación en los artículos 530 y siguientes del Código de Comercio y tiene por objeto garantizar obligaciones con sujeción a las reglas que disponen los referidos artículos. Los bienes afectados por prenda garantizarán al acreedor, con privilegio especial, el importe de la operación y los intereses, comisiones y gastos, y ambas costas, en los términos que indique el contrato. Sostiene que, en el caso particular, de las prendas en las que ofrezca como garantía un vehículo automotor, debe ser constituida en escritura pública. El deudor conservará, en nombre del acreedor pignoraticio, la posesión de la cosa empeñada y asumirá las obligaciones y responsabilidades de un depositario; además, responderá por los daños que sufran las cosas y no provengan de un caso fortuito, fuerza mayor ni de la naturaleza misma de los objetos, de acuerdo con el artículo 537. Por otro lado, arguye que el contrato de constitución de prenda deberá contener la información que requiere el numeral 554 del Código de Comercio e inscribirse en el Registro de Prendas. Finalmente, en las obligaciones prendarias, pagaderas por tractos sucesivos, la falta de pago de uno de ellos hará vencida y exigible toda la obligación, salvo pacto en contrario, acorde con el canon 580. Argumenta que, por la naturaleza misma del contrato de prenda, que se constituye sobre bienes muebles, la única manera de garantizar el crédito lo es en el tanto y el cuanto el bien dado en garantía se mantenga en el país. De ahí que la normativa reglamentaria impugnada, en cuanto exige la autorización del acreedor prendario para que el Registro Público autorice la salida del país de un vehículo dado en garantía prendaria, encuentra pleno fundamento, repito, en la naturaleza misma del contrato prendarlo. De ahí que no lleve razón la empresa actora en cuanto alega que el Reglamento impugnado, en cuanto regula el procedimiento para expedir un permiso de salida del país de un vehículo dado en prenda, excede la potestad reglamentaria pues, repito, encuentra fundamento en la propia naturaleza del contrato de prenda, debidamente regulado en los numerales 530 y siguientes del Código de Comercio, Ley N. o 3284 del 30 de abril de 1964.

V.-Objeto del proceso: Nos encontramos frente a un proceso de plena jurisdicción, mediante el cual la parte actora reclama no solo la nulidad de una conducta administrativa, sino la responsabilidad patrimonial de las administraciones involucradas, así como la del Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. VI.-Sobre la defensa de caducidad: En la contestación de la demanda, el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., en relación con esta defensa sostiene que se encuentra caduca la acción en relación con las pretensiones a, b y c, de conformidad con el artículo 39 inciso 1 del CPCA. Argumenta que el Decreto Ejecutivo 26883-J, fue publicado en La Gaceta n.° 91 del 13 de mayo de 1998. Si no se considera este plazo para hacer el conteo de la caducidad señala que la aplicación singular del decreto mencionado se dio en el año 2009 y la demanda fue presentada hasta el año 2013. En su contestación de demanda, sobre la defensa de caducidad, la Junta Administrativa de Registro Público, sostuvo, con fundamento en una sentencia de la Sección VI del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativa, número 52-2012-VI, que, si bien en la medida en la que las normas reglamentarias se encuentren vigentes, no es posible que caduque la posibilidad de impugnarlas, sin embargo, la parte accionante debe acreditar un interés legítimo. Acusa en ese sentido, que a la fecha de la interposición de la demanda, no posee el bien inmueble, ya que fue traspasado por una dación en pago a la entidad bancaria Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. Finalmente, el Estado interpuso la defensa en la contestación de la demanda y sostuvo que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 64, inciso 2, en relación con el numeral 66, inciso k) y 39 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, se encuentra caduca la posibilidad de impugnar los artículos 94 a 99 del Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble, Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 26833-J, publicado en La Gaceta 91 del 13 de mayo de 1998. Lo anterior en virtud de que, el numeral 39, inciso b) del CPCA, dispone que el plazo máximo para demandar la nulidad de un Reglamento, cómo el que nos ocupa, es de un año, contado a partir del día siguiente a la única o última publicación. En la audiencia preliminar del 10 de febrero del 2015, el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. y el Consejo de Transporte Público se adhirieron a la defensa de caducidad que presentó el Estado. Por otro lado, en la audiencia de excepciones la parte actora sostuvo que en relación con lo que expuso el Banco accionado, para el caso concreto no es aplicable lo que dispone el artículo 39 del CPCA, sino el canon 40, dado que, según su criterio, se trata de actos que producen efectos en este momento. Así planteadas las cosas, el plazo empieza a correr a partir de la fecha en que el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., negó el permiso de salida del país del microbús, que es el momento en el que el Reglamento le causó un efecto negativo, en relación con el artículo 37 inciso 3) del mismo Código mencionado. Por su parte, en lo que respecta a la defensa de caducidad alegada por el Estado, afirma que no aplica el canon 66 inciso 1 k, ni el 39 ambos del CPCA, dado que en el caso bajo examen según manifiesta aplica el 40 del CPCA. Aduce, además, que se encuentra facultado para impugnar el acto concreto y todas las normas antecedentes, incluyendo la disposición general que no haya sido impugnada en tiempo y forma, de conformidad con el numeral 10 inciso 2 del CPCA. En cuanto al argumento de la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional, sostiene que más bien la sentencia citada de la Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo le da la razón, dado que reconoce que las normas reglamentarias mantienen su vigencia en el tiempo y existe la posibilidad de impugnarlas mientras se encuentren vigentes, por lo que no caduca la posibilidad de impugnar. Lo anterior se debe concordar con el artículo 37 inciso c) del CPCA. Criterio del Tribunal: Acorde con lo que ha sido acreditado en autos, tiene claridad este Órgano Colegiado que, el Decreto Ejecutivo 26.883-J impugnado en esta sede, data del año 1998 y, a su vez, que el acto de aplicación individual de la norma que se impugna se produjo el día 2 de noviembre del 2009, también que la demanda fue presentada el día 18 de junio del 2013; lo cierto, es que las normas cuestionadas han mantenido su vigencia en el tiempo en el momento en que fue interpuesta la demanda así como al día de hoy. De ese modo, las normas reglamentarias, por su propia naturaleza, surten sus efectos de manera continua mientras estén en vigencia, motivo por el cual, esa posibilidad no puede caducar mientras ellas estén en vigor y la parte accionante pueda acreditar que cuenta, al menos, con interés legítimo para tales efectos, conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 10 inciso 2 ibidem (ver las sentencias número 262-2011-VI, de las catorce horas cincuenta minutos del primero de diciembre del dos mil once y número 52-2012-VI de las siete horas treinta minutos del veintidós de marzo del dos mil doce, ambas de la dictada por la Sección Sexta de este Tribunal). En este punto, cabe recordar que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 40 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, es posible impugnar los actos administrativos de alcance general con efectos normativos, mientras subsistan en el tiempo sus efectos continuados, por lo que, el plazo máximo para interponer el proceso será de un año a partir del día siguiente al cese de aquellos. Aunado a lo anterior, cabe recordar que en los supuestos de normas de aplicación automática -como en este caso-, no se requiere de un acto de aplicación individual para impugnarlas, en virtud de que resultan obligatorias inmediatamente por su sola promulgación, sin necesidad de otras normas o actos que los desarrollen o los hagan aplicables al perjudicado. Para el Tribunal la parte accionante ostenta un interés legítimo, pues se dedica a la actividad de transporte de turistas. Por lo expuesto debe ser rechazada la defensa de caducidad.

VII.-Sobre la defensa de prescripción. El Banco accionado en la presente causa, sostiene que la pretensión indemnizatoria formulada en su contra proviene del contrato de prenda, mediante el cual la empresa Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A., otorgó el vehículo placas Placa21537 en garantía real de pago de la deuda adquirida por el actor Nombre115172 , con quien sostuvo la relación crediticia. Sostiene que se trata de un contrato mercantil regido por el numeral 531 del Código de Comercio. Añade que la denegatoria del permiso se dio el día 2 de noviembre del 2009, por lo que operó el plazo de prescripción del canon 984 del Código de Comercio. Considera que transcurrió el plazo de prescripción, en virtud de que la sentencia fue notificada al Banco demandado el 8 de noviembre del 2013. Por otro lado, la parte actora sostiene que el daño que se reclama nace con la dación en pago. Considera que los 4 años del artículo 984 del Código de Comercio no han transcurrido, pues la demanda fue presentada el 18 de julio del 2013. Finalmente, sostiene que, si se parte del hecho de que lo pretendido es una indemnización de daños y perjuicios contra el Estado, por conducta lícita, aplica el plazo de prescripción de los 10 años del artículo 868 del Código Civil. Criterio del Tribunal: Ajustado a las probanzas que obran en los autos, como ya se indicó en el resultando anterior, el Decreto Ejecutivo 26883-J impugnado en esta sede, data del año 1998 y, a su vez, que el acto de aplicación individual de la norma que se impugna se produjo el día 2 de noviembre del 2009, también que la demanda fue presentada el día 18 de junio del 2013, permite visualizar que la causa no se encuentra prescrita para exigir la responsabilidad. Como se desarrollará más adelante se piden dos tipos de responsabilidad distinta, con motivo de las personas jurídicas de Derecho privado y entidades de Derecho Público. Para el primer caso, como lo indica el Banco accionado, aplica el canon 984 del Código de Comercio, que dispone un plazo de 4 años de prescripción para todo derecho y su correspondiente acción derivados del Código de Comercio, Ley n.° 3284 y sus reformas. No obstante, contrario a lo que sostiene la entidad financiera demandada, dicho plazo fue interrumpido al momento en el que fue presentada la demanda el 18 de junio del 2013. Si se tiene en cuenta que el hecho al que se le pretende ligar con los menoscabos alegados en esta sede, acaeció el 2 de noviembre del 2009, con el rechazo de la solicitud del permiso para sacar la microbús del país, a la fecha de interposición de la demanda no había transcurrido el plazo de los 4 años, siendo interrumpido con la presentación de la demanda. Por lo expuesto, debe ser rechazada la defensa de prescripción interpuesta por el Banco. Por otro lado, en lo que concierne a las entidades regidas por el Derecho Público, la responsabilidad que se solicita se rige por lo que disponen los artículos 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. En concreto, el canon 198 dispone un plazo de 4 años para reclamar a la Administración responsabilidad objetiva y no el artículo 868 del Código Civil, como lo sostiene la parte actora. Dicho numeral, en lo que interesa dispone: “Artículo 198.-El derecho de reclamar la indemnización a la Administración prescribirá en cuatro años, contados a partir del hecho que motiva la responsabilidad (…)” Planteadas así las cosas, el hecho que motiva la responsabilidad para reclamar los daños ocurrió el día 2 de noviembre del 2009, con motivo de la denegación del permiso de salida del vehículo de la parte accionante. De ese modo, dicho plazo fue interrumpido al momento en el que fue presentada la demanda el 18 de junio del 2013. Si se tiene en cuenta que el hecho al que se le pretende ligar con los menoscabos alegados en esta sede, acaeció el 2 de noviembre del 2009, con el rechazo de la solicitud del permiso para sacar la microbús del país, a la fecha de interposición de la demanda no había transcurrido el plazo de los 4 años del canon 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, siendo interrumpido con la presentación de la demanda. Por lo expuesto, debe ser rechazada la defensa de prescripción.

VIII.-Sobre la falta de legitimación pasiva del Consejo de Transporte Público: Dentro de los presupuestos de fondo a ser analizados en sentencia por el Tribunal, incluso de oficio está la legitimación ad causam tanto activa como pasiva, entendida como la aptitud para ser parte en un proceso determinado, la legitimación ad causam no es de forma sino de fondo, es la relación entre la situación jurídica expuesta por el actor y el interés legítimo debatido siendo un presupuesto para una decisión estimatoria de la pretensión. "Todo proceso jurisdiccional contencioso, comprende lo que algunos procesalistas han denominado una "relación jurídico procesal", los sujetos que en él intervienen lo hacen ejerciendo el derecho de acción y el de defensa. Actor y demandado se constituyen en partes, por el sólo hecho de ejercer aquellos derechos, sin que esto implique, necesariamente, que entre ellos exista la relación jurídico material que se ventila en el proceso. A esto último refiere precisamente la legitimación ad causam. Ésta se forma en tanto exista una vinculación de las partes con aquella situación jurídico material, de modo que requiere la identidad entre quien demanda y el titular del interés subjetivo reclamado (activa) y entre el demandado y el obligado a la prestación requerida (pasiva). Así, se dice, hay legitimación activa cuando existe la posibilidad de acoger eficazmente la pretensión con respecto a la parte actora y pasiva cuando ese pronunciamiento pueda ser eficaz en relación con el demandado". (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, n.° 775-F-03 de las 14:25 horas del 20 de noviembre de 2003). La determinación de esta idoneidad procesal está íntimamente ligada con la pretensión deducida en la acción, de modo que sólo quien se encuentre en determinada relación con ésta puede ser parte en el respectivo proceso. En el caso concreto, el Consejo de Transporte Público ha alegado la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva. Para el Tribunal no existe la relación jurídico procesal material antes dicha, entre la parte actora de este proceso y el Consejo de Transporte Público. Lo anterior en primer término, en virtud de que el CTP, no emitió una conducta activa u omisiva encaminada a denegar el permiso de salida de la microbús, pues como lo explicó en su declaración confesional, Nombre115172 , una vez que le fue rechazado el permiso de salida por el Banco demandado, no continuó con el trámite ante dicho ente público u otro de los accionados. Por otro lado, la normativa aquí impugnada es la del Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad, Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 28.883-J. Que en este caso no concierne al Consejo de Transporte Público. Por lo expuesto, no existe motivo alguno para que figure como parte demandada y debe acogerse la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva interpuesta por el CTP y en consecuencia declarar la demanda en su contra inadmisible.

IX.-Sobre el caso concreto: Como fue transcrito en los resultandos n.° 1 y n.° 7, y como se expuso en el resultando n.° 9, así como en el considerando V, todos de la presente sentencia, este proceso de plena jurisdicción, plantea varias pretensiones en contra de distintas entidades, unas de Derecho Público y otra de Derecho Privado. Consecuencia de lo anterior, dada la diversa naturaleza jurídica de las partes demandadas, nos encontramos frente a regímenes jurídicos distintos aplicables a cada una de estas. Para resolver de una forma ordenada este caso, se analizará cada una de las pretensiones por separado y será resuelto cada uno de sus argumentos. A) Pretensión anulatoria: Nulidad del los artículos 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 y 99 del Reglamento de Organización Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble n.° 26883-J, publicado en la Gaceta n.° 91 del 13 de mayo de 1998: La parte demandante acude a esta sede para reprochar, en una primera línea argumentativa muy amplia, los trámites administrativos ante el MOPT y el Registro de la Propiedad, para poder sacar del país una vehículo automotor, los cuales enumera y califica de burocráticos e innecesarios. Dentro de este conteo de trámites, destaca el que debe llevarse a cabo ante el Registro Público, de presentar la autorización del acreedor prendario, debidamente autenticada. A la vez, enumera tres decretos del MOPT, de los cuales derivan los requisitos de salida del país de vehículos automotores. Por otro lado, hace referencia a los requisitos establecidos por el Registro Público, basados en el Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble, n.° 26883-J, publicado en La Gaceta n.° 91 del 13 de mayo de 1998. Sin perjuicio de lo amplias que resultas sus disertaciones, argumentaciones y reproches, dada la forma en la que fue esbozada la pretensión, el objeto de este proceso se encamina a determinar, de acuerdo a la presente pretensión anulatoria, si los cánones 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 y 99 del Reglamento indicado, padecen de algún tipo de patología, que amerite decretar su invalidez. El motivo fundamental que reprocha la parte actora en este proceso, como generador de la patología de invalidez consiste en la inexistencia de fundamento legal, que ampare los requisitos de salida del país dispuestos para los vehículos automotores en el Reglamento que impugna. Echa de menos la existencia de una norma jurídica, emanada de la Asamblea Legislativa, que disponga como requisito de salida del país de una buseta, dedicada al turismo internacional, la autorización del acreedor prendario. También reprocha la inexistencia de un supuesto normativo legal que autorice a un Juez, en caso de que exista colisión de tránsito, requiera de su autorización. A la vez considera que la existencia de un seguro de extraterritorialidad con motivo de la salida del país de una buseta resulta abusivo. Manifiesta que la normativa reglamentaria en cuestión es contraria a lo dispuesto en la Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos, n.° 8220, así como la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor, n.° 7472. El Banco accionado sostiene que contrario a lo que manifiesta la parte actora, la facultad de otorgar permisos de salida del país a los vehículos automotores deviene directamente del artículo 140 incisos 3 y 18 de la Constitución Política, así como los artículos 2 inciso f, 3 y 4 de la Ley 3155 (Ley de Creación del Ministerio de Transportes, reformada integralmente por la Ley 4786). Es decir, lo manifestado en el hecho no deviene de un antojo de la administración, sino de un mandato legislativo de "planificar, regular, controlar y vigilar" cualquier modalidad de transporte haciendo uso de las atribuciones dadas al Poder Ejecutivo por el Constituyente de sancionar, reglamentar y ejecutar las leyes. De igual modo, los artículos 236 y 551 del Código de Comercio dan sustento al requisito de salida que otorga el Registro Nacional, que corresponde a una tutela de los intereses del acreedor prendario, que podría ver distraída o perdida la garantía que ostenta en el crédito. El Consejo de Transporte Público sostiene que al respecto la Ley 7969 artículo 7 y la Ley 3503 artículo 3, establecen las potestades que tiene el Consejo de Transporte Público para regular lo referente al servicio de Transporte Público que se brinde. La Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional sostiene que el Reglamento en cuestión tiene sustento en los numerales 11 y 12 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Finalmente, el Estado señala que el Contrato de Prenda encuentra plena regulación en los artículos 530 y siguientes del Código de Comercio y tiene por objeto garantizar obligaciones con sujeción a las reglas que disponen los referidos artículos. A la vez, sostiene, que los bienes afectados por prenda garantizarán al acreedor, con privilegio especial, el importe de la operación y los Intereses, comisiones y gastos, y ambas costas, en los términos que indique el contrato, de acuerdo con el canon Artículo 540 del mismo cuerpo normativo. Añade que en el caso particular de las prendas en las que ofrezca como garantía un vehículo automotor, debe ser constituida en escritura pública. El deudor conservará, en nombre del acreedor pignoraticio, la posesión de la cosa empeñada y asumirá las obligaciones y responsabilidades de un depositario; además, responderá por los daños que sufran las cosas y no provengan de un caso fortuito, fuerza mayor ni de la naturaleza misma de los objetos, de acuerdo con el artículo 537. A su vez, sostiene que el contrato de constitución de prenda deberá contener la información que requiere el numeral 554 del Código de Comercio e inscribirse en el Registro de Prendas. Finalmente, en las obligaciones prendarias, pagaderas por tractos sucesivos, la falta de pago de uno de ellos hará vencida y exigible toda la obligación, salvo pacto en contrario, según reza el artículo 580. De ese modo, por la naturaleza misma del contrato de prenda, que se constituye sobre bienes muebles, la única manera de garantizar el crédito lo es en el tanto y el cuanto el bien dado en garantía se mantenga en el país. De ahí que la normativa reglamentaria impugnada, en cuanto exige la autorización del acreedor prendario para que el Registro Público autorice la salida del país de un vehículo dado en garantía prendaria, encuentra pleno fundamento, en la naturaleza misma del contrato prendario. De ahí que no lleve razón la parte actora en cuanto alega que el Reglamento impugnado, regula el procedimiento para expedir un permiso de salida del país de un vehículo dado en prenda, excede la potestad reglamentaria pues, como reitera, encuentra fundamento en la propia naturaleza del contrato de prenda, debidamente regulado en los numerales 530 y siguientes del Código de Comercio, Ley n.° 3284 del 30 de abril de 1964. Criterio del Tribunal: Se hace necesario tener presente que el Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 26.883, denominado Reglamento Organización Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble, como se consigna en su encabezado, nace de conformidad con lo que disponen los artículos 140, incisos 3) y 18) de la Constitución Política, el artículo 28, párrafo segundo, inciso b) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y los artículos 236 y 551 del Código de Comercio, Ley n.° 3284 de 30 de abril de 1964. Considerando a su vez, que el Título II, Libro Primero del Código de Comercio dispuso la creación de un Registro de Bienes Muebles en la ciudad de San José, para actuar conjuntamente con el Registro de Prendas y que el artículo 2 de la Ley de Creación del Registro Nacional, n.° 5695 de 28 de mayo de 1975 y sus reformas, adscribió el Registro de Bienes Muebles a esta Institución, que incluyó además lo relativo a vehículos. A su vez, que el Decreto Ejecutivo No 23178-J-MOPT de 05 de mayo de 1994, adscribió al Registro Nacional de Buques al Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble del Registro Nacional y que el Registro Público de la Propiedad de Vehículos Automotores, el Registro General de Prendas y el Registro Nacional de Buques, han funcionado bajo Reglamentos independientes, siendo necesario estipular un único régimen jurídico para todo el Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble y; finalmente que el Registro General de Prendas había venido operado, bajo el Decreto Ejecutivo n° 34 de 10 de diciembre de 1969 y el Registro Público de la Propiedad de Vehículos Automotores ha operado bajo el Decreto Ejecutivo n.° 16821-J de 16 de diciembre de 1985, pero se hacía necesario promulgar un nuevo reglamento que codificara las normas sobre el registro de bienes muebles, a la vez que uniformara los procedimientos de todo el Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble. Con fundamento en lo anterior, el artículo 1 dispone que el Registro Público de la Propiedad Mueble está adscrito al Registro Nacional según Ley n.° 5695 de 28 de mayo de 1975 y sus Reformas y tiene bajo su competencia el registro y publicación de derechos referentes a la constitución, declaración, modificación y extinción de la propiedad mueble y los gravámenes prendarios que la afecten, así como la adjudicación y entrega de las matrículas de los bienes inscribibles y sus permisos de salida del territorio nacional, todo conforme la ley. Siguiendo el orden correspondiente en el Título Tercero de ese Decreto Ejecutivo, se regula la matriculación y los permisos relativos a bienes inmuebles. El Capítulo Primero, reglamenta los permisos de salida de los vehículos, de los numerales 94 al 98, que son los que precisamente se impugnan en esta sede jurisdiccional. El artículo 94 dispone lo siguiente: "Artículo 94.—Competencia exclusiva. El Registro otorgará los permisos de salida del país de los vehículos automotores." Por su parte, el canon 95 indica: "Artículo 95.—Requisitos del permiso Sin perjuicio de otras condiciones que en aras de la seguridad jurídica dispónga la Dirección, las peticiones de permiso de salida del país deben ser presentadas por escrito a máquina y cumplir los siguientes requisitos: a) Autorización del propietario registral para el otorgamiento de la salida, las características del vehículo, la fecha de salida y el lugar a que se dirige. Si el propietario no gestiona personalmente la salida ante el Registro, caso en que bastará la presentación de su cédula de identidad, dicha solicitud deberá venir autenticada por un Notario Público. b) Si el vehículo perteneciere a una persona jurídica, la solicitud deberá ser firmada por la persona que tuviere la representación legal la cual deberá demostrar con certificación vigente a la fecha de la solicitud. c) Haber satisfecho los derechos y demás requisitos fiscales. d) En el caso que hubiere gravámenes judiciales deberán cancelarse o en su defecto aportar autorización de la autoridad correspondiente. e) En el caso que hubiere gravámenes prendarios, deberá aportarse autorización del acreedor pignoraticio. f) En el caso de autobuses destinados al transporte colectivo de personas, deberá también aportarse constancia de estar al día con la póliza de extraterritorialidad ante el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, la nota de autorización de la Dirección General de Transporte Automotor del MOPT y una nota de la Sección de Egresos e Ingresos del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo relativa a cancelación de los impuestos. g) En el caso de vehículos destinados al servicio de turismo, deberá adicionalmente aportarse la nota de autorización del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo y la póliza de extraterritorialidad del INS. h) En el caso de taxis destinados al transporte colectivo de personas se exigirá además de los requisitos generales anteriores, la póliza de extraterritorialidad del INS y una nota de autorización de la oficina de taxis del MOPT. i) En el caso de vehículos pertenecientes a Instituciones Públicas y Poderes del Estado, se pedirá adicionalmente la autorización del jerarca del ente, debidamente membretada y sellada. j) En el caso de vehículos a nombre de Misiones u Organismos Internacionales y Cuerpo Diplomático deberá aportarse solicitud del representante de la Organización o Embajador y nota del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores certificando personería del solicitante. k) Tratándose de vehículos propiedad de pensionados rentistas se exigirá adicionalmente la nota del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo certificando que el propietario está al día en el cumplimiento de las obligaciones que el exige este status jurídico." Por otra parte, el artículo 96 dispone lo siguiente: "Artículo 96.—Autorización del permiso. Una vez admitida la solicitud, se confrontará con la información del Registro y se verificará si cumple los requisitos generales. Si no se encontrare ningún defecto se otorgará el permiso de salida, dejando microfilmados los documentos relacionados." Luego el numeral 97 dispone: "Artículo 97.—Vigencia del permiso El permiso de salida deberá ser utilizado dentro de los quince días posteriores a su expedición, en caso de vehículos particulares, y dentro de los cuatro meses posteriores a su expedición, en caso de vehículos de carga pesada." Finalmente el canon 98 señala: "Artículo 98.—Emisión de permisos por medio de la red externa del registro. El Registro por medio del Departamento de Informática del Registro Nacional, a través del Programa de Descentralización de Servicios, podrá coordinar con las Municipalidades del País u otras instituciones, a fin de que se puedan emitir en esas Dependencias los permisos de salida de los vehículos en las clases que se crea conveniente, conforme lo dispuesto en el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 26515-J de 18 de diciembre de 1997." Revisado y analizado este cuerpo normativo impugnado, para el Tribunal, no lleva razón la parte accionante al considerar que no existen normas jurídicas de rango legal, que respalden el desarrollo normativo por parte del Decreto Ejecutivo que se impugna. En una primera línea se encuentran las disposiciones de rango constitucional que le dieron sustento, de las que derivan las facultades del Poder Ejecutivo para dictar la norma reglamentaria en cuestión. Por otro lado, se encuentra la Ley de Creación del Registro Nacional, así como el Código de Comercio. La regulación de los permisos de salida de vehículos resultan ser una extensión, dentro del marco de la potestad reglamentaria del Poder Ejecutivo de los cánones 236, 530, 537, 540, 551, 554 y 580 del Código de Comercio. Nótese que el artículo 236 crea el Registro de Muebles con asiento en la ciudad de San José, que actuará conjuntamente con el Registro de Prendas. El Capítulo VIII, perteneciente al Título I, del Libro II, Código de Comercio, regula de los artículos 530 al 581 el contrato de prenda. Destaca el numeral 537 que dispone lo siguiente: "Artículo 537.- Las prendas en las que se ofrezcan como garantía vehículos automotores, buques o aeronaves, deberán ser constituidas en escritura pública. Las que se constituyan en relación con otros bienes muebles de distinta naturaleza, podrán ser otorgadas en documento público o privado o en fórmulas oficiales de contrato. En estos dos últimos casos, se necesitará la firma del deudor debidamente autenticada por un notario público. El deudor conservará, a nombre del acreedor pignoraticio, la posesión de la cosa empeñada y asumirá las obligaciones y responsabilidades de un depositario; además, responderá por los daños que sufran las cosas y no provengan de caso fortuito, fuerza mayor ni de la naturaleza misma de los objetos. Como prueba del depósito, servirá el documento o certificado que acredite la constitución de la prenda o la certificación del Registro de Prendas." A juicio del Tribunal los requisitos que se establecen en los numerales cuestionados del Decreto Ejecutivo en cuestión, como los que reprocha el actor, que consisten en el permiso del acreedor y la póliza, no resultan contrarios a las leyes antes citadas y tiene más bien como finalidad asegurar los derechos de acreedor prendario y de la garantía, para que no se vean afectados. Por otro lado, a juicio de este órgano colegiado, no existe la vulneración alegada de los cánones: 1, 8, 9 y 10 de la Ley n.° 8220, denominada Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos. Lo anterior en virtud de que como fue expuesto anteriormente, los artículos impugnados son concordantes con las disposiciones del Código de Comercio, que regula el contrato de prenda, con el fin de resguardar los derechos de los acreedores prendarios y la creación de un registro de la propiedad mueble que ordena toda esta situación. Por otro lado, los requisitos dispuestos en los numerales impugnados, a juicio del Tribunal, no resultan contrarios a la razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, lógica o buena fe, en tanto no se observa ningún trámite que resulte excesivo o innecesario, y que tenga otro finalidad más que la de brindar seguridad jurídica al acreedor prendaria; así como a los usuarios del servicio por medio de la póliza de extraterritorialidad. Motivo por el cual debe ser rechazada la petición de nulidad de las normas antes mencionadas. B) Primera pretensión ordenatoria: Que se emita orden judicial al Registro Público, para que no realice el trámite de permiso de salida del país de los vehículos, mientras no exista norma jurídica emanada de la Asamblea Legislativa que lo ampare y C) Segunda pretensión ordenatoria: Que se emita orden judicial al MOPT, para que no realice el trámite de permiso de salida del país de los vehículos, mientras no exista norma jurídica emanada de la Asamblea Legislativa que lo ampare. Para el Tribunal resulta imposible acoger estas dos pretensiones de ordenar a la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional o al MOPT lo solicitado. Lo anterior, de conformidad con lo que ha sido expuesto en el punto A) anterior, de la presente sentencia, dado que, como fue expuesto, existen normas de naturaleza constitucional y legal que respaldan las regulaciones referentes a los permisos de salida del país de los vehículos. En otro orden de cosas, tampoco se encuentra que las regulaciones cuestionadas transgredan las disposiciones de la Ley de Protección al Ciudadano del Exceso de Requisitos y Trámites Administrativos, n.° 8220. Con lo cual no se encuentra la invalidez alegada, ni motivo alguno encaminado a decretar la nulidad de los artículos 94 al 98 del Decreto Ejecutivo que se cuestiona, por ende, tampoco resulta posible acceder a las pretensiones ordenatorias dirigidas al MOPT o a la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional. D) Primera pretensión indemnizatoria por responsabilidad objetiva contra el Banco Citibank: La parte actora requiere la condenatoria al pago de daños y perjuicios causados, por responsabilidad objetiva, por establecer prácticas abusivas bancarias institucionales en calidad de acreedor prendario, para el requisito de salida del país de una buseta de turismo, que vulneraron la capacidad de pago del deudor por establecer obstáculos en la principal fuente de ingresos, en contra el artículo 46 y 140 de rango constitucional, la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor y contra la Ley 8220, por la suma $500 000 por concepto de capital (costo de la unidad de turismo, lucro cesante por cuatro años y daño moral, psicológico y patrimonial), por impedir el desarrollo del derecho constitucional de la Libertad de Empresa, por dejar cesante al deudor, por manchar su nombre ante la SUGEF e impedirle otras opciones financieras del mercado, por perjudicarlo como consumidor bancario, por dañar a la empresa moralmente; más los intereses legales existentes hasta liquidación de sentencia. del presente proceso. El Banco accionado sostiene que la denegatoria que llevó a cabo, para que el 29 de noviembre del 2009, obedeció a una política tendiente a resguardar su interés en el marco del contrato prendario. Criterio del Despacho: En relación con el deber de informar adecuada, oportuna, clara, veraz y suficientemente al consumidor, se debe tener presente que el párrafo último del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política; los incisos c) y d) del artículo 32 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor; 41 y 43 del Reglamento a esa Ley, establecen que el consumidor debe recibir información adecuada, clara, veraz, oportuna y suficiente de todos los elementos que incidan de forma directa en su decisión de consumo, por lo que es esencial que la persona que pretende suscribir un contrato como el que nos ocupa, debe conocer de manera suficiente y oportuna las condiciones, limitaciones del mismo, alcances y consecuencias, que le permitan determinar si debe o no suscribirlo. En ese sentido, la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ha considerado: “... es notorio que el consumidor se encuentra en el extremo de la cadena formada por la producción, distribución y comercialización de los bienes de consumo que requiere adquirir para su satisfacción personal, y su participación en ese proceso, no responde a razones técnicas ni profesionales, sino en la celebración constante de contratos a título personal. Por ello su relación en esa secuencia comercial es de inferioridad y requiere de una especial protección frente a los proveedores de los bienes y servicios, a los efectos de que previo a externar su consentimiento contractual cuente con todos los elementos de juicio necesarios, que le permitan expresarlo con toda libertad y ello implica el conocimiento cabal de los bienes y servicios ofrecidos. Van incluidos por lo expresado, en una mezcla armónica, varios principios constitucionales, como la preocupación estatal a favor de los más amplios sectores de la población cuando actúan como consumidores, la reafirmación de la libertad individual al facilitar a los particulares la libre disposición del patrimonio con el concurso del mayor posible conocimiento del bien o servicio a adquirir, la protección de la salud cual está involucrada, el ordenamiento y la sistematización de las relaciones recíprocas entre los interesados, la homologación de las prácticas comerciales internacionales al sistema interno y en fin, la mayor protección del funcionamiento del habitante en los medios de subsistencia...” (sentencia número 1996-04463 de las nueve horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del treinta de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y seis. Véase en sentido similar, la sentencia número 1992-01441 de las quince horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del dos de junio de mil novecientos noventa y dos). En el caso bajo examen, para este Tribunal, resulta dudosa la actuación del Banco accionado, en su conducta denegatoria del permiso de salida del país, al alegar como causal para el rechazo, la existencia de unas supuestas “políticas internas”, que la parte actora desconocía. Resulta contrario a este deber de información, que de manera sorpresiva en situaciones como lo acaecido en el caso de marras, se justifiquen denegatorias de permisos de salida del país en una política que el actor conoció hasta el momento en que solicitó el permiso. Lo procedente en el caso concreto, hubiera sido que, en resguardo del derecho a la información, en materia de consumo, que con una debida antelación, con anterioridad a la firma del contrato de prenda, el banco accionado le informara al actor sobre todas las políticas bancarias, asociadas a los permisos de salida de los vehículos. Tal información era relevante, frente a su decisión de consumo. Sin perjuicio de lo expuesto, en la línea de que para este Órgano Colegiado el Banco accionado transgredió su deber de informar de manera adecuada al actor, lo cierto es que el Tribunal no encuentra un vínculo o nexo causal entre esta conducta omisiva y los daños y perjuicios que se pretenden resarcir. No ha sido acreditado adecuadamente, que con motivo de la falta de información reprochada y la denegatoria de salida del país de la microbús, la parte actora perdiera el bien mueble, que su imagen se viera afectada, que se le presentaran dificultades para generar utilidades, a la vez, el alegado impedimento de crecer empresarialmente, así como el inconveniente de solicitar crédito con otras entidades financieras y el daño moral que alega. No se ha acreditado en el caso de marras, la existencia de un nexo causal entre estos daños alegados y la conducta del Banco de denegar el permiso de salida con fundamento en una "política Interna", cuya divulgación oportuna no ha sido creditada tampoco, faltando a su deber de información. Por lo expuesto debe ser acogida la defensa de falta de derecho y en consecuencia la demanda por responsabilidad objetiva contra el banco declarada sin lugar. E) Segunda pretensión indemnizatoria contra el Estado y la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional: A folio 527 del expediente judicial, la parte actora amplió su pretensión, ajustada y aclarada en audiencia preliminar en contra del Estado, por la suma de $138.000 por concepto de daños y perjuicios. En lo que respecta al daño moral, quien lo solicita es el señor Nombre115172 . La teoría del caso de la parte accionante para requerir responsabilidad objetiva del canon 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, tiene como sustento la emisión del Decreto Ejecutivo 28.883-J, que es el Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público, al que le atribuye invalidez en los artículos 94 al 99. Previo a resolver, se debe tener presente, como se encuentra acreditado en esta sede, que ni el Estado ni la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional, llevaron a cabo una conducta activa u omisiva encaminada a denegar el permiso de salida, pues como lo explicó en su declaración confesional Nombre115172 , una vez que el Banco accionado le rechazó el permiso, no presentó ante el resto de los demandados su gestión. La hija del actor en su declaración testimonial también confirmó este aspecto. Así planteadas las cosas, la responsabilidad objetiva que se les achaca, en la teoría del caso de la parte actora, surge de la emisión del Decreto Ejecutivo en cuestión. Para el Tribunal resulta imposible acceder a esta pretensión, en virtud de que no se cumple con el esquema de responsabilidad objetiva de la Administración, al carecer de los elementos necesarios para que se pueda exigir a la Administración alguna indemnización. En primer término, al no existir la invalidez alegada, como se explicó en el punto A) de este considerando con el número IX, no nos encontramos frente a los criterios de imputación de responsabilidad, como lo son el funcionamiento ilícito o el anormal. En lo que respecta a los criterios de imputación de funcionamiento lícito y normal, tampoco aplican en esta causa, dado que no se ha acreditado la existencia de una lesión excepcional y una pequeña proporción de afectados, como lo requiere el canon 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Se alegan una serie de daños y perjuicios que sufrió la empresa, ya mencionados en el punto D) anterior, no obstante, tampoco se encuentra un nexo causal entre estos y la emisión del Decreto Ejecutivo por parte del Estado. Por lo anterior, debe ser acogida la defensa de falta de derecho y por ende declarara sin lugar la demanda en contra del Estado y de la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional, al no poderse determinar la responsabilidad objetiva alegada.

X.-Sobre los extremos indemnizatorios. De conformidad con lo expuesto en el considerando anterior, con el número IX, de la presente sentencia, resulta imposible acceder a las pretensiones de daños y perjuicios que reclama la parte actora en contra del Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., el Estado y la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional.

XI.-Sobre las excepciones. La defensa de incompetencia fue resuelta por el Juez Tramitador, como se explica en el resultando con el número 8 de la presente sentencia. La defensa de caducidad debe ser rechazada de acuerdo con lo que se expone en el considerando VI de la presente sentencia. La defensa de prescripción debe ser rechazada con fundamento en lo expuesto en el considerando VII de esta sentencia. En lo que respecta a la defensa de falta de legitimación pasiva interpuesta por el Consejo de Transporte Público, debe ser acogida, de conformidad con lo expuesto en el considerando VIII de la presente resolución, en consecuencia, debe declararse inadmisible la demanda incoada en su contra. En cuanto a las defensas de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva interpuesta por el Banco accionado, debe ser rechazada, en virtud de que existe una relación jurídica de carácter material, en virtud de la relación contractual (contrato de prenda), así como la gestión de permiso de salida del país y la dación en pago de la microbús, situaciones jurídicas que los vinculan de modo tal que los actores pueden figurar como la parte activa y el Banco accionado como la pasiva en este proceso jurisdiccional. De igual modo, en lo que respecta a la defensa de falta de legitimación activa interpuesta por la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional, existe la relación jurídico procesal aludida con anterioridad, desde el momento en que se impugna el Decreto Ejecutivo en cuestión, siendo este un Reglamento de Organización del Registro Público, aunado a la responsabilidad que se les pretende imputar. Por este motivo, como en el caso anterior, la parte actora cuenta con legitimación suficiente para acudir en esta sede en contra del Estado y de la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional. Por lo expuesto, debe ser rechazada dicha defensa. Las defensas de falta de Interés actual y falta de causa interpuestas por el Banco, deben ser rechazadas. La primera en virtud de que el interés persiste, pues los daños que se alegan derivan supuestamente de una conducta que llevó a cabo el banco, según la teoría del caso de la parte actora, motivo por el cual su admisión o rechazo deben ser analizados en el fondo de la sentencia. La segunda debe rechazarse en virtud de que no es una defensa que se encuentre enumerada o enlistada en el Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Finalmente, la defensa de falta de derecho debe ser acogida en los términos expuestos en el considerando VIII de la presente sentencia.

XII.- Sobre las costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, este órgano colegiado no encuentra motivo alguno para aplicar las excepciones que fija la normativa aplicable y quebrar el postulado de condena al vencido, motivo por el cual Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. y Nombre115172 deben correr con las costas de los demandados.

POR TANTO.

I.-Se rechazan las siguientes defensas: a) defensa de caducidad interpuesta por el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional y el Estado. b) defensa de prescripción interpuesta por el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. y el Estado. c) defensa de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva interpuesta por el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., el Estado y la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional. d) defensa de falta de interés y falta de causa, interpuestas por el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A. e) defensa de falta de interés actual interpuesta por la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional. II.-Se acogen las siguientes defensas: a) falta de legitimación pasiva interpuesta por el Consejo de Transporte Público, en consecuencia se declara inadmisible la demanda en su contra. b) falta de derecho interpuesta por el Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., El Estado y la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional, en consecuencia, debe declararse sin lugar la demanda interpuesta por Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. y Nombre115172 . Se condena a la Transportes Turísticos Miravista MJS S.A. y Nombre115172 , al pago de costas en favor del Banco Citibank de Costa Rica S.A., El Estado, Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional y Consejo de Transporte Público.

Nombre31590 Nombre113674 Nombre114124 Nombre31590 , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A Nombre113674 , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A Nombre114124 , JUEZ/A DECISOR/A 1