Judicial Constitutional Consultation on Analogical Application of De Facto Union to Same-Sex CouplesConsulta judicial de constitucionalidad sobre aplicación analógica de la unión de hecho a parejas del mismo sexo

*090014000165FA* *090014000165FA* 09-001400-0165-FA - 6 NUMBER 377-12-(2) [Nombre75]:

REC. DE FACTO UNION PETITIONER:

[Nombre 001] and [Nombre 003] VOTE NUMBER: 592 -2012 FAMILY COURT . San José, at fifteen hours and two minutes of July sixth, two thousand twelve.- Proceeding for recognition of a de facto union (unión de hecho) established by [Nombre 001], of legal age, single, [...] and [Nombre 003], of legal age, [...]. This Court hears the present matter by virtue of the appeal filed by [Nombre 001] against the decision issued by the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at eight hours forty-seven minutes of July nineteenth, two thousand nine.- Judge Amoretti Orozco writes, and;

CONSIDERING

I.- Mr. [Nombre 001] appeared before the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, seeking recognition of the couple relationship he claims to have maintained with Mr. [Nombre 003] for more than three years, in a public, notorious, stable, and exclusive manner. He expressly claimed the extensive application of the rules contained in the Family Code (Código de Familia) intended to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of the de facto union (unión de hecho) (folios 1-2). In the appealed decision, issued at 8:47 hours on June 19, 2009, the female judge of first instance rejected the lawsuit outright (ad portas) because she deemed it unactionable (improponible) due to the fact that Costa Rican legislation, by not permitting marriage between persons of the same sex, prevents recognizing as such a bond like the one sustained between the parties, which lacks an essential element: its heterosexual character (folio 4).- II.- Although currently Costa Rican law does not recognize cohabitation between persons of the same sex as a source of rights and obligations, it is indisputable that it also does not prohibit it and that, when it occurs under conditions of stability, notoriety, and exclusivity, it cannot be substantially distinguished from that formed by heterosexual human beings, since both are instituted by virtue of consent and reflect the purpose of building a common life project, based on bonds of love and solidarity. Undoubtedly, it can be said of both bonds that their object is "(...) the life in common, cooperation, and mutual aid." (Article 11 of the Family Code (Código de Familia)). As [Nombre1] points out, "In today's society, there are same-sex couples who cohabit stably, share expenses, assets, have a common life project, and even have children, all in a public and notorious manner. Their way of life is the same as that of any marriage, except that they have not been able to access this right. If society is already prepared to face this type of cohabitation normally, the Law finds itself obligated to regulate their de facto situation." [The constitutional right to homosexual marriage in Spain. Law 13/2005, of July 1, modifying the Civil Code regarding the right to contract marriage. Ibero-American Journal of Constitutional Procedural Law (Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Procesal Constitucional), 13, January-June, 2010, p. 255]. For this reason, the members of a homosexual couple, and especially the one who occupies the weaker economic position, have analogous needs for legal protection to those of heterosexual persons who decide to live together. Hence, it is not only reasons of legal certainty and justice that require their personal and patrimonial effects to be regulated by current law. The human dignity of its members and their fundamental rights to the free development of their personality, to equality, to the protection of their family, and to the autonomy of will are compromised by the existing protection deficit. In the recent judgment of February 24 of the current year, issued in the Case of [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] vs. Chile, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights reaffirmed "(...) that the American Convention does not determine a closed concept of family, much less does it protect only a 'traditional' model thereof. In this regard, the Court reiterates that the concept of family life is not reduced solely to marriage and must encompass other de facto family ties where the parties have a life in common outside of marriage1." Therefore, denying a non-heterosexual couple the status of a family group "(...) reflects a limited and stereotyped perception of the concept of family that has no basis in the Convention as there is no specific model of family (the 'traditional family')." In support of this argument, that international jurisdictional body cited the agreement of August 16, 2010, issued by the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation which, upon resolving the unconstitutionality action A.I. 2/2010, noted that "(...) this Supreme Court considers that the sexual diversity of the contracting parties is neither constitutionally nor legally a defining element of the institution of marriage, but rather the result of the social conception that existed at a given historical moment, but not the essential core of marriage (...)." [Para. 256] and that "It is, 'therefore, the sexual orientation of a person, as part of their personal identity, a relevant element in the life project they may have and that, like any person, includes the desire to have a life in common with another person of the same or different sex or not, and that, in no way, shall limit them in the pursuit and achievement of their happiness. At this point, (...) among fundamental rights, is the right to personal and sexual identity, the former being understood as the right of every individual to be themselves, in their own conscience and in the opinion of others, according to their physical and internal characteristics and their actions, which individualize them before society and allow them to be identified, which implies, additionally, sexual identity, which projects them before themselves and socially from their sexual perspective, as well as their sexual preference or orientation and which, therefore, is inscribed within the self-determination of persons and affects the free development thereof, as it is an element that will undeniably determine their affective and/or sexual relationships with persons of a different or the same sex and, hence, their choice of whom to form a common life with and have children, if they wish to do so." [Para. 264]. It further specified that "(...) in the case of homosexual persons, in the same way as occurs with persons with a sexual orientation towards others of a different sex (heterosexuals), it is part of their full development the free and voluntary establishment of affective relationships with persons of the same sex; relationships, both, which, as different sociological data informs, share the characteristic of constituting a community of life based on affective, sexual, and reciprocal solidarity ties, with a vocation for stability and permanence in time." [Para. 266]; that "(...) if one of the aspects that guides the way an individual will project their life and relationships is their sexual orientation, it is a fact that, in full respect for human dignity, recognition by the State is demandable not only of an individual's sexual orientation towards persons of the same sex, but also of their unions, under the modalities that, at a given moment, it is decided to adopt (cohabitation societies, solidarity pacts, concubinage, and marriage)." [Para. 269]; that from the existence of same-sex parent families, a series of rights and obligations derive for those who form them, for it is a reality that they exist and, as such, must be protected by legislation: some are as respectable as others and that their recognition does not disregard principles such as the best interest of the child [para. 333].- III.- In his dissenting opinion that forms part of the judgment of September 27, 1990 (Case of [Nombre4] vs. United Kingdom), Mr. S. K. Martens, judge of the European Court of Human Rights, correctly pointed out that "Marriage is much more than a sexual union and, therefore, the capacity to have relations of this nature is not 'essential'. Persons who cannot procreate or have sexual relations can also seek to marry. This is because marriage involves more than a union that legitimizes such relations and intends procreation: it is a legal institution that creates a fixed legal relationship between the spouses and between them and third parties (including the authorities). As an author has said, the spouses, through the bonds of marriage, 'announce to the world around them that their relationship is founded on intense human feelings and on a mutual, exclusive, and permanent commitment.' It is also a kind of community in which intellectual, spiritual, and sentimental bonds are at least as essential as the physical ones. / Article 12 of the Convention [for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] protects the right of any man or woman (of marriageable age) to enter into this union and, therefore, the definition of what the words 'man and woman' mean in this context must take into account all these characteristics of marriage." In similar terms, Ms. E. [Nombre5] and Messrs. I. [Nombre6] and [Nombre7] [Nombre8], judges of that same body, pronounced themselves in their joint, dissenting separate opinion forming part of the same ruling: "The fact that a transsexual cannot procreate is not decisive. There are many men and many women who also cannot have children and, yet, have the undisputed right to marry. The capacity to procreate is not and cannot be a prerequisite for marriage." Under this same approach, the professor of the Autonomous University of Madrid, [Nombre9], suggests that, "Indeed, if marriage [and, by extension, the heterosexual de facto union (unión de hecho)] is defined as an affective and material community of life, and no longer by its social function; if its essential purpose is no longer reproductive, but defined around personal fulfillment and the free development of personality; if its constitutional content links it, primarily, to fundamental individual rights and freedoms; if ius connubium is predicated, in principle, of any person, based on requirements of equality and freedom; and if the legal regulation of marriage and of relations between spouses has experienced a turn towards the Law of Obligations; it is difficult to admit as unquestionable the prohibition on contracting marriage for same-sex couples." [Same-sex unions: regulation options and their legal implications. Private Law and Constitution (Derecho Privado y Constitución), Madrid: 20, January-December, 2006, 173-202. 188-189].- IV.- In the judgment issued on November 18, 2003, in the case of [Nombre10] and others vs. Department of Public Health, whose rapporteur was Judge Marshall, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared the prohibition on access to marriage for same-sex persons contrary to the Constitution. It argued that we are in the presence of "(...) a vital social institution (...)" and that "(...) the decision whether and whom to marry is among the most momentous acts of self-determination in life." For this reason, and because "the benefits accessible only to those with a marriage license are enormous, affecting virtually every aspect of life and death," it has long been considered a fundamental right (civil right). As it is a central element of individuals' lives and community well-being, barring same-sex persons from the right to marry deprives them "(...) of one of the most important aspects of the human experience (...)" and "(...) denies them full access to the protection of the laws (...)"; hence, such an exclusion could only be admissible if it fulfills "(...) an indispensable public objective (...)" and is "(...) a reasonable means to achieve such an end." These conditions do not exist regarding the prohibition of marriage between persons of the same sex, which exempts such a rule because of a singular trait: sexual orientation, which injures the liberty recognized in the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as the equality that prevents there from being second-class citizens. The three main justifications for this prohibition are not constitutionally reasonable: neither that heterosexual marriage provides a favorable framework for procreation (understood as non-assisted heterosexual procreation); nor that it ensures an optimal space for childcare; nor that homosexual marriage will trivialize or destroy that institution as it has been historically configured. The essence of the liberty to contract it is to unite with the person of one's own choosing. By preventing marriage between same-sex persons, "(...) the State confers an official stamp of approval on the destructive stereotypes that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to heterosexual relationships and are therefore not deserving of respect."- V.- It is true that in vote no. [Telf1], of 14:46 hours on May 23, 2006, in which it considered the legal impossibility of marriage between persons of the same sex, established in subsection 6 of Article 14 of the Family Code (Código de Familia), legitimate, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) assigned to the Legislative Assembly the responsibility of "(...) considering the need to regulate, in whatever manner it deems convenient, the bonds or rights derived from this type of union, which evidently requires a whole regulatory development in which the rights and obligations of this type of couple are established (...)." It is also true that, four years later, in no. 2010-641, at 2:56 hours on January 13, 2010, it rejected on the merits the unconstitutionality action filed by Mr. [Nombre 001] against article 242 ibid; a ruling that, according to the little information available as its drafting is still pending, cites the previously referred to no. [Telf1]. Hence, based on what is stipulated in Article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), it is not reckless to conclude that these precedents would appear to prevent us from resorting to the regulation of the de facto union (unión de hecho), contained in numbers 242, 243, 244, and 245 ibid, even if by analogy, in order to resolve this lawsuit on the merits, whereby there would be no other option but to confirm the outright rejection ordered by the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in the order issued at 8:47 hours on June 19, 2009, which, as noted, considered it unactionable (improponible).- VI.- Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore our duty to weigh the de facto situations that escape the solutions pre-conceived by the Legislative Assembly at a given historical moment, in order to adequately integrate the legal system and offer a response to the substantive claim of Mr. [Nombre 001]. Indeed, we are convinced that, in a system like the Costa Rican one, the absence of specific regulation does not authorize the outright rejection of a lawsuit. The fundamental right to effective judicial protection, recognized, among other precepts, in 8(1) and 25(1), in relation to 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights and in 41 of the Political Constitution and the principle of the hermetic fullness of the legal system, addressed by Article 6 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), prevent such a pronouncement. This was highlighted by the magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional): "In our capacity as judges, (...) we cannot ignore the social reality as an element to consider in decision-making regarding matters submitted to our knowledge (...)." (Vote no. [Telf1], of 14:46 hours on May 23, 2006).- VII.- Pursuant to the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, approved by the Legislative Assembly by Law No. 4534, of February 23, 1970, "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition." (Article 1(1)). "Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already guaranteed by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms." (Article 2). "Every person has the right to be heard, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, (...) for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature." (Article 8(1)). "Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties." (Article 25(1)). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed the content of these precepts on various occasions. In its recent judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of [Nombre11] and [Nombre12] vs. Argentina), it emphasized that "This Court has previously stated that '[i]n international law, customary law establishes that a State which has concluded an international agreement must introduce into its domestic law the necessary modifications to ensure the execution of the obligations undertaken'. In the American Convention, this principle is embodied in its Article 2, which establishes the general obligation of each State Party to adapt its domestic law to the provisions of the same, in order to guarantee the rights recognized therein2." It also reiterated that "(...) adapting domestic law to the standards established in the Convention implies the adoption of measures in two areas, namely: a) the suppression of the norms and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees provided in the Convention or that disregard the rights recognized therein or obstruct their exercise, and b) the issuance of norms and the development of practices conducive to the effective observance of those guarantees. The first area is satisfied with the reform, repeal, or annulment of the norms or practices that have those scopes, as appropriate. The second obliges the State to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations and, therefore, must adopt all legal, administrative, and other measures that are necessary to prevent similar events from occurring again in the future3." Undoubtedly, in the case of the union between persons of the same sex, its legislative recognition is essential in order to eradicate social discrimination against those who form it. Considering the particularly serious nature of this practice and because it violates several rights embodied in the Convention, such protection must be sufficient. And, following the doctrine set forth in the judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case of [Nombre13] vs. Panama), given the compelling need to offer some response to the legitimate claim made in the sub-lite, "(...) there is the duty to use those resources (...) that are related to the protection of the fundamental rights that may be affected in such cases, such as the right to liberty, personal integrity, and the right to life, as applicable, which are recognized in the American Convention." In the judgment of August 16, 2000 (case of [Nombre14] and [Nombre15]), the Inter-American Court stated that "101. (...) the right of every person to a simple and prompt recourse or to any other effective recourse before the competent judges or tribunals that protects them against acts that violate their fundamental rights constitutes one of the basic pillars, not only of the American Convention, but also of the Rule of Law itself in a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention [...]. Article 25 is intimately linked with the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by assigning protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties4. / 102. Moreover, the Court has indicated that the non-existence of an effective remedy against violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression of the same by the State Party in which such a situation occurs. In this sense, it should be underscored that, for such a remedy to exist, it is not enough that it is provided for by the Constitution or the law or that it is formally admissible, but rather it is required that it be truly suitable to establish whether a violation of human rights has been incurred and to provide what is necessary to remedy it5. / (...) / 121. This Court has established that [A]rticle 25 is intimately linked with the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by assigning protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties, from which it follows that the State has the responsibility to design and normatively enshrine an effective remedy, but also to ensure the due application of said remedy by its judicial authorities6." In that of June 21, 2002 (case of [Nombre16], [Nombre17] and [Nombre18] and others vs. Trinidad and Tobago), it expressed that "The Inter-American Court has also established that as part of the general obligations of the States, they have a positive duty of guarantee with respect to the individuals subject to their jurisdiction. This entails taking all necessary measures to remove any obstacles that may exist so that individuals may enjoy the rights that the Convention recognizes. Consequently, the State's tolerance of circumstances or conditions that prevent individuals from accessing adequate domestic remedies to protect their rights constitutes a violation of Article 1.1 of the Convention […]7." In that of September 7, 2004 (case of [Nombre19] vs. Ecuador), it reiterated that "Article 25.1 of the Convention establishes, in broad terms, the obligation on the part of the States to offer all persons subject to their jurisdiction an effective judicial remedy against acts violating their fundamental rights. / (...). Under this perspective, it has been pointed out that for the State to comply with the provisions of the cited Article 25.1 of the Convention, it is not enough that the remedies exist formally, but it is essential that they be effective, that is, the person must be given the real possibility of filing a simple and prompt recourse that allows, if applicable, the required judicial protection to be achieved." [See, in a similar sense, the judgments of November 27, 2003 (case of [Nombre20]); June 7, 2003 (case of [Nombre21]); November 28, 2002 (case of [Nombre22]); August 31, 2001 (case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Community [Nombre23]); January 31, 2001 (case of the Constitutional Court); November 25, 2000 (case of [Nombre24]); August 18, 2000 (case of [Nombre25]); November 19, 1999 (case of the "Street Children" (Case of [Nombre26] and others)); September 29, 1999 (case of [Nombre27]); May 30, 1999 (case of [Nombre28] and others); March 8, 1998 (case of the "[Nombre29] Panel" ([Nombre30] and others)); January 24, 1998 (case of [Nombre31]); November 12, 1997 (case of [Nombre32]) and November 3, 1997 (case of [Nombre33])]. In that of August 6, 2008 (Case of [Nombre34] vs. United Mexican States), it specified that "An effective judicial remedy is one capable of producing the result for which it was conceived8, that is, it must be a remedy capable of leading to an analysis by a competent tribunal in order to establish whether or not a human rights violation has occurred and, if applicable, provide reparation9." Finally, in the cited judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of [Nombre11] and [Nombre12] vs. Argentina), it specified: "107. (...) that Article 25.1 of the Convention contemplates the obligation of the States Parties to guarantee, to all persons under their jurisdiction, an effective judicial remedy against acts violating their fundamental rights. Said effectiveness presupposes that, besides the formal existence of the remedies, these yield results or responses to the violations of rights contemplated either in the Convention, the Constitution, or the laws. In this sense, those remedies that, due to the general conditions of the country or even due to the particular circumstances of a given case, prove illusory cannot be considered effective. This can occur, for example, when their uselessness has been demonstrated by practice, because the means to execute their decisions are lacking, or for any other situation that constitutes a denial of justice. Thus, the proceeding must tend towards the materialization of the protection of the right recognized in the judicial pronouncement through the suitable application of said pronouncement10. / 108. On the other hand, as the Court has previously stated, when evaluating the effectiveness of remedies, the Court must observe whether the decisions in the judicial processes have effectively contributed to putting an end to a situation that violates rights, ensuring the non-repetition of harmful acts, and guaranteeing the free and full exercise of the rights protected by the Convention11."- VIII.- According to Article 41 of the Political Constitution, "Occurring to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, in strict conformity with the laws." In its time (extraordinary session of October 11, 1982), the Full Court (Corte Plena), acting as the body in charge of constitutionality control, emphasized that a series of basic principles derive from that supreme norm to which all persons and competent bodies in the jurisdictional sphere must adjust their actions. By virtue of these, the Legislative Assembly is obliged to promulgate the legal precepts necessary to regulate individuals' rights and to establish the appropriate channels and procedures to procure their effective jurisdictional protection when they have been violated. For their part, the different Courts are responsible for interpreting and applying those provisions in such a way that they do not hinder the due verification of the grievance and guarantee, should it be proven, the full and timely reestablishment of the former. Hence, judges violate the cited constitutional provision when we make access to the stipulated procedures impossible or difficult, or when we reject or deny a petition that we should have granted in a judgment, without any reason or invoking an insufficient or spurious one. In vote no. 1739-92, of 11:45 hours on July 1, 1992, that Chamber held that "At the base of all procedural order lies the principle and, with it, the fundamental right to justice, understood as the existence and availability of a system of administration of justice, that is to say, of a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the State's jurisdictional function - to declare the disputed right or reestablish the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially in specific cases - which in turn comprises a set of independent judicial bodies specialized in that exercise, the availability of that apparatus to resolve conflicts and correct the wrongs that social life originates, in a civilized and effective manner, and guaranteed access to that justice for all persons, under conditions of equality and without discrimination.

• a)In this first sense, then, due process has, above all, programmatic dimensions, no less legally binding for that reason, which demand the existence, sufficiency, and efficacy of a judicial and procedural system suitable for guaranteeing precisely that fundamental right to justice, which is, moreover, nothing more than a consequence of the monopoly of force, assumed by the State, and the most important manifestation of the right to petition, which in Costa Rica is enshrined in Articles 27—in general—and 41—in particular—of the Constitution (…). / b) But it also has other, even more immediately demandable, implications, which may, in turn, concern the very system of the administration of justice, in itself, or the right of access to justice for all persons: / (…) / 2. And belonging to the second—the equal right of all to access justice—, in addition to the generic right to petition of Article 27 and the specific right to justice of Article 41 of the Constitution already cited, are a series of complementary—but also fundamental—attributes, including: / (i) the general right and principle of equality—and its counterpart of non-discrimination—, set forth in Article 33 of the Constitution, as well as all international instruments on Human Rights, for example Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, with the particularity that the duality of these demonstrates that equality, besides being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, so that this is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights (…); / (ii) in general, universal access to justice for every person, regardless of their sex, age, color, nationality, origin or background, or any other social condition, all of which raises, in turn, consequences that it is not necessary to examine here as they are not directly implicated in the case under consultation, such as the gratuity of justice, informality, etc.” As concluded in vote no. 1562-93, of 3:06 p.m. on March 30, 1993, the foregoing “(…) means, in the first place, that due process demands the existence, sufficiency, and efficacy of a judicial and procedural system suitable for guaranteeing the fundamental right to justice, which is the most important manifestation of the right to petition enshrined in Articles 27—in general—and 41—in particular—of the Constitution (…). In the second place, it concerns the very system of the administration of justice in itself and the right of access to justice for all persons, which implies that in every procedural system there must be 'reasonableness of effects' on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on these (…) other limitations than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, and those indispensable for them to function adequately in the life of society.”— IX.— In ordinary legislation, this fundamental right is developed, among other precepts, in Article 6 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and in Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial). By virtue of the former, “The Courts have the inexcusable duty to resolve, in every case, the matters they hear, for which they shall adhere to the established system of sources.” Pursuant to the second paragraph of the latter, “The courts may not excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from ruling on matters within their competence for lack of a norm to apply and must do so in accordance with the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources.” Even that same provision recognizes, as part of the jurisdictional power, the duty to supply the absence of legal norms: “The general principles of Law and Jurisprudence shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit. When it is a matter of supplying the absence and not the insufficiency of the provisions regulating a matter, said sources shall have the rank of law.” (Boldface added). Consequently, we jurisdictional bodies are forbidden from alleging the lack of applicable norm(s) to the specific case to excuse ourselves from ruling on the merits of a proceeding such as this. The dogma of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system (plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico) obliges us to resort, in an integrating application, to written and unwritten sources in order to identify and implement the best solution to the dispute raised. On this point, in vote no. 36-F-94, of 9:40 a.m. on May 27, 1994, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) noted that “(…) jurisprudence as an informing source of the legal system is called upon to supply, by way of extensive interpretation, the scope of the norms charged with resolving legal conflicts when no norm exists for the specific case or it was not conceived for the new legal demands (Article 9 of the Civil Code).” In nos. 112-F-92, of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; 151-F-01, of 3:20 p.m. on February 14, 2001, and 360-F-02, of 11:10 a.m. on May 3, 2002, it stated that “(…) Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 6 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code admit referral to other sources of the legal system and to the General Principles of Law when there is no applicable norm (principle of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system), on the other hand Article 12 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code admits the analogical application of norms provided there is identity of reason and no norm prohibiting it.” For its part, the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda), in no. 415, of 9:00 a.m. on December 22, 1994, framed it in the following terms: “(…) in any case, one must turn, for the sake of the best solution, to analogous situations expressly addressed, to the general principles of law, such as (…) good faith and equity, and even, as noted by Prof. [Name35] in his cited work, to common sense, that is, the sense that people normally have for reasonably judging things (Articles 10 to 12 of the Civil Code, 15 of the Labor Code, and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch).” In no. 2004-200, of 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004, that same body held that Article 6 of the Civil Code “(…) develops a right of a fundamental nature, contained in Article 41 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees all persons access to justice. However, to fulfill such a task, one must take into consideration Article 12 of that Code, according to which the analogical application of norms is appropriate when they do not contemplate a specific situation, but regulate another similar one in which identity of reason is appreciated, except when a norm prohibits that application. In a case such as the present one, denying any effect to the relationship in question, besides being unjust, means ignoring a reality, not uncommon in our environment, which is the cohabitation of two persons, (…) who were only united, or were united, by emotional ties, without protection from the legal system. The foregoing constitutes sufficient grounds for, in consideration of the value of justice that inspires the legal system, ordering the liquidation of the assets acquired and produced during the long relationship, giving the plaintiff what corresponds to her. Moreover, to resolve the question, in light of the foregoing, a response can be given to the situation raised, by resorting 'mutatis mutandi,' to the regulations given by law to similar institutions.” Finally, in no. 769-93, of 3:48 p.m. on February 16, 1993, that Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) recognized that “Here, as the consulting Court itself anticipates, one could resort to other regulations (…), or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a particular matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and even analogical application, which the following Article 12 authorizes. It must be added to the above, that pursuant to the first norm cited, a court cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of law applicable to the case raised. Judges [male and female], therefore, have at their disposal ample possibilities to resolve with express norms, with extensive application (analogical interpretation), and even through the normative re-creation based on another insufficient one. / (…) / The power of Family Law jurisprudence in our country has been such, that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Family Code (Código de Familia) originate in court decisions, some even of a markedly dissenting or minority tone, but not thereby lacking in justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law shows us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is no exception in this field, and it could even be said that it is where this behavior has been noted with the greatest speed.”— X.— Article 12 of the Civil Code stipulates that “The analogical application of norms shall proceed when they do not contemplate a specific situation, but regulate another similar one in which identity of reason is appreciated, except when some norm prohibits that application.” In relation to the analogical procedure for the integration of positive law, in vote no. 1-F-94, of 3:00 p.m. on January 5, 1994, reiterated in that of the Second Chamber no. [Telf2], of 10:26 a.m. on August 6, 2010, the First Chamber specified that “III.- (…). By analogy is understood, from a logical point of view, a procedure of singular induction from one case to another, through which one seeks to extend the validity of a proposition from one determined situation to another generically similar one. In antiquity, it was known by the name of 'procedure by similarity.' Unlike deductive procedures, in analogical induction the validity of the conclusion is not necessary, but only probable. In other words, in analogy, one compares a situation or fact with another situation or fact, and thus attempts to obtain a particular conclusion. The analogical argument is based on those similar aspects or connotations between the situations analyzed, such that the more the essential, and not merely accidental, aspects of them resemble each other, the more convincing will be the extensive conclusion reached. Another similar logical procedure is induction by generalization, in which, based on several cases, analyzing their particular connotations, a general conclusion is obtained. Generalization does not involve comparing two particular situations to extend what concerns one to the other, but rather analyzing several particular cases to obtain a general conclusion that encompasses all of them. Both types of logical procedures have an undeniable influence on legal analogy (…). / IV. After prolonged discussions in general legal doctrine, it has come to be accepted, by a majority, that the legal system can have gaps. These gaps are deficiencies of the law, which does not present a specific provision for a particular matter or case. At the same time, it has been accepted that legal systems have the latent capacity to elaborate the pertinent legal precepts, in order to resolve the conflicts of interest present in these cases. Therefore, faced with gaps in the law, the judge [male or female] cannot refuse to rule, alleging not finding any norm to apply to the specific case; that would be equivalent to a denial of justice. However, neither does he or she have the power to arbitrarily create the norm applicable to the specific case. In our normative system, the judge [male or female] is one of law, not of conscience, and any decision made must find support in the current legal system. To fill these voids, our Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, both in its prior text and in the current one, establishes that the courts cannot excuse themselves from resolving for lack of a norm, and by establishing that in such a case one shall resort to the general principles of law in the absence of a legal norm, it does not exclude that, before resorting to this interpretive criterion, one may use analogy, regulated by Articles 12 and 13 of the Civil Code, in order to apply a written norm established for a similar legal situation to the case raised. Through this procedure, one seeks to apply a legal principle that the law establishes for a certain hypothesis to another fact not expressly regulated, but which presents the same legal essence. It concerns situations in which there is no factual identity, but a substantial similarity so relevant that it justifies the application of the norm established for the case contemplated by the legislator to that lacking regulation. The application of analogy is justified by the need to regulate similar facts, according to the principle of legal equality, with similar norms. The main problem will be, in these cases, to determine whether between both situations there are legal similarities of such an entity as to permit the analogical extension of the known norm. This problem cannot be resolved mechanically or with purely logical criteria; it is rather a legal assessment made by the judge [male or female], in which it is determined whether the factual elements contemplated in the known norm, which motivated the establishment of a determined provision by the legislator (according to the ratio legis), are also present in the similar situation taken into consideration. The considered fact may have certain essential elements that characterize it and other accidental or contingent ones that accompany it. The important thing is that there is correspondence between the essential elements of the foreseen fact and those of the unregulated situation. Legal analogy is usually classified into two types: analogia legis, in which, to resolve the unforeseen case, a singular normative provision is utilized; and analogia iuris, which does not take a single norm as its starting point, but rather a series of provisions from which it derives a general principle. Both procedures obey the reasoning schemes analyzed in the preceding recital: legis corresponds to induction by analogy, and iuris to induction by generalization. Doctrine considers resorting to the general principles of law as a case of analogia iuris, which can only be obtained through generalization. To proceed to the analogical interpretation of norms, the following is necessary: 1- that a precise legal provision is lacking for the controversial case, so that analogical application would not be possible where express legal precepts exist or from which a solution to the case raised can be deduced through extensive interpretation; 2- that an essential legal similarity exists between the regulated case and the one to be regulated, which must be determined by the judge [male or female], after an assessment of both situations; 3- that it does not involve those situations in which, given the nature of the provision to be applied, analogy is inappropriate. Regarding this last requirement, legal practice has elaborated some relevant principles, which have often been expressly adopted by legislation. In this regard, it is worthwhile to cite the following: 1- It is not possible to apply prohibitive and punitive laws by analogy, as they are of a restrictive nature; 2- nor is it possible to do so in the case of norms that limit the capacity of the person or subjective rights, as this is odious matter; 3- in the case of 'ius singulare' or exceptional law, by its very nature, as it obeys a particular reason for regulation, this type of normative application does not proceed; and, 4- in the case of temporary norms, analogy also does not proceed, as they are determined for a momentary circumstance. / V. Of the situations that prevent the application of analogy, it is appropriate to refer (…) to the impossibility of extensively applying those norms of ius singulare. In doctrine, this category is contrasted with ius regulare. The latter is formed by norms characterized by the correspondence of their foundations to the general principles of the legal system; in other words, their directives, premises, and foundations do not depart from the general guidelines of Law. On the contrary, ius singulare, also called exceptional law, is inspired by rules different from those that characterize the normative system in general. On occasions, given the need to provide special protection for certain persons, or to safeguard a particular interest of legal transactions, or to solve some special cases with particular criteria of equity, or due to needs emerging from extraordinary circumstances, it becomes necessary to sacrifice general principles, establishing provisions that exclude some persons or legal relationships from the application of the normal consequences for certain acts, or establishing special sanctions or liabilities not foreseen for normal cases. Thus, singular law represents a deviation from the general norms governing the system, which is necessary for peculiar reasons of convenience that demand such treatment. Therefore, in such cases, the application by analogy of exceptional norms or ius singulare to those cases not expressly contemplated by the norms is not possible. / VI.- In our Civil Code, the analogical application of norms is regulated by Articles 12 and 13, located in its Preliminary Title. According to Article 12, the analogical interpretation of norms is possible '... when they do not contemplate a specific situation, but regulate another similar one in which identity of reason is appreciated, except when some norm prohibits that application.' In this way, the general principle of analogical application is established in those cases where there is identical 'ratio legis.' For its part, Article 13 excludes analogical application in the case of criminal, exceptional, and temporary laws. Thus, our Civil Code permits this method of integrating the Law according to the doctrinal guidelines outlined in the preceding recitals.” (See, also, vote of the First Chamber no. 167-F-S1-2010, of 8:40 a.m. on January 29, 2010).— XI.— Now then, if, as the Constitutional Chamber affirmed in the cited vote no. [Telf1], of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, “(…) the prohibition contained in the challenged regulation [subsection 6 of Article 14 of the Family Code] refers specifically to the institution called marriage (…).”; if it does not violate the Political Constitution because there is “(…) no impediment of any nature for the existence of homosexual unions. Rather, there is empirical evidence to indicate that they have increased.” and if it “(…) is not appropriate to apply the regulation developed for marriage in the terms currently conceived in our constitutional system.”; what, then, would be the regulation we should draw upon to decide this case on the merits? It must be borne in mind that, despite having been noted at that time that the problem raised “(…) does not lie in the norm challenged here but, rather, in the absence of an appropriate normative regulation to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of that type of union, especially if they meet conditions of stability and singularity, because an imperative of legal certainty, if not of justice, makes it necessary. We are, then, in the presence of a scenario of lege ferenda, but not by any stretch in that of an illegitimate omission by the State. This is noted, furthermore, because in the documentation that is attached to the record, and according to what was expressed in the oral hearing held during the substantiation of this proceeding, some countries have been enacting laws (in the formal sense) that have provided a legal framework and certain formalities to these unions, with the purpose of having them produce specific legal effects in relation to the persons who enter into them […and…], to whom (…) the legal framework that the derived constituent power organized for the treatment of heterosexual couples cannot be applied.” (Boldface added); more recently, that same body evidenced that “(…) the normative gap pointed out by […that…] Constitutional Court in the aforementioned Judgment, […remains…], with which it is […failing…] to observe, indirectly, the reasons given (ratio decidendi) by […the…] specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in matters of constitutional review, for considering that Article 14, subsection 6, of the Family Code is in accordance with Constitutional Law.” (Vote no. 2010-13313, of 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010). And it is not superfluous to mention that in that last pronouncement, it synthesized its criteria on the topic in the terms set out below: “Based on this judgment [referring to no. [Telf1], previously cited] several aspects of importance for resolving the sub-lite remain clear, which are the following: / 1°) Relationships between persons of the same sex are a social reality that cannot be ignored or evaded. / 2°) It is necessary to regulate, legislatively, the patrimonial and personal effects of such relationships between persons of the same sex. / 3°) There exists a normative vacuum on the part of the ordinary legislator that must be filled, given that the institution of marriage cannot be applied to relationships between persons of the same sex. / 4°) The ordinary legislator must issue a normative framework that regulates the legal consequences of such relationships between persons of the same sex. This Judgment, by virtue of the provisions of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), has erga omnes effects, for all constituted powers, precisely, for that reason, the ordinary legislator assumed the task of discussing the timeliness and advisability of regulating relationships between persons of the same sex.” (Boldface and underlining do not appear in the original document). Nor is it possible to fail to highlight that, as a result of the political events known by all, it does not seem foreseeable that, in the short or medium term, this state of affairs may change, especially after this past June 6, the Permanent Special Commission on Human Rights of the Legislative Assembly, chaired by Deputy ***** ******, issued a negative majority opinion on the bill for the Law of cohabitation partnerships (Ley de sociedades de convivencia) (no. 17,668), presented on April 13, 2010, by the former legislator [Name36] and the then legislators [Name37], [Name38], [Name39], and [Name40] and published in La Gaceta no. 120 of June 22 of that same year. And it does not alter what has been noted that, one day after the pronouncement of that Commission, the initiative was presented again at the Secretariat of the Legislative Directorate by Deputies [Name41] and [Name42] and Deputies [Name43] and [Name44] (no. 18,481). Note, moreover, that the topic has been in the legislative stream since September 27, 2006, the date on which [Name36], [Name37], and [Name38] presented the bill for the Law of civil union between persons of the same sex (Ley de unión civil entre personas del mismo sexo) (no. 16,390), published in La Gaceta no. 214 of November 8, 2006, which ended up archived on September 22, 2010.— XII.— Without a doubt, in this specific matter submitted for our decision, both the determination of the competent jurisdictional order to process it and the substantive regulation to which one must resort to integrate the current legal system are at stake. As, in our judgment, the condition of a family group of the homosexual couple is undeniable, it falls to the family jurisdiction to hear and pronounce definitively on its personal and patrimonial consequences. Indeed, we are convinced that, as the non-heterosexual persons who form it are also holders of the fundamental rights to equal treatment, to the protection of their family, and to effective judicial protection, they have full right to that recognition in this venue. Note, moreover, that, by virtue of those same fundamental rights, no distinction whatsoever should be made, especially if what is taken into account is sexual orientation, when guaranteeing them effective access to the judicial system so that the bodies specialized in family matters may study their claim and, through a reasoned and grounded judgment, uphold or reject it and thus resolve their conflict. It is not superfluous to evidence, furthermore, that, however much it is considered impossible to apply the regulations of marriage in these cases, no infringement of the reinforced protection contained in Article 52 of the Political Constitution is committed by recognizing such effects to the couple relationship between persons of the same sex. For that reason, and in order not to cause defenselessness and lack of protection to the parties, the accreditation of their public, stable, prolonged, and singular cohabitation would thus be sufficient to justify the recognition sought. Denying it for lack of a specific norm is not only incongruent with the family legal system but also constitutes a breach of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (see, in similar terms, vote of the Second Chamber no. 2003-143, of 9:30 a.m. on March 26, 2003).— XIII.— In support of our thesis, we consider it essential to bring up the arguments set forth by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in the judgment of December 1, 2005, issued in the context of the cases “Minister of Home Affairs v. [Name45]” (Case C.C.T. 60/04) and “Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs” (Case BAC1), through which it annulled the heterosexual clause of the matrimonial regime, extended it to any couple, regardless of their sexual or gender identity or their sexual orientation, and granted Parliament a period of twelve months to adapt its legislation so that same-sex couples could access the national Marriage Law. In accordance with the line subsequently set forth by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that foreign body, with wording by Justice Albie Sachs, specified at that time “(…) that the harm to same-sex couples exceeds the deprivations of material goods (judgment, paragraphs Nos. 71 and 72, among many others). The definition of marriage that excludes them suggests not only that their commitment, relationship, and love is inferior, but that these persons can never be part of the community that the Constitution promises to create with equality for all (judgment, paragraph No. 71). These couples are not valued with the same respect that is granted to heterosexual couples (judgment, paragraphs Nos. 71 and 81, among many others). The exclusion from the benefits and responsibilities of marriage is not a small and tangential inconvenience but represents a radical form of indirectly saying that homosexual couples are outsiders (Idem). The statements of the constitutional court reflect that discrimination operates, in the first place, from an undue exclusion of different couples from all the material benefits and protections that marriage entails and, in the second place, from the construction of a different status as members of the community, a devalued status by reason of the chosen sexual orientation.” [[Name46], [Name47] (2007). Matrimonio y diversidad sexual: La lección sudafricana. Anuario de Derechos Humanos, Santiago: 3, p. 95. Retrieved June 28, 2008, from http://www.anuariocdh.uchile.cl/index.php/ADH/article/viewFile/13460/13729]. Hence, “(…) the State cannot withdraw from certain couples the protection that the laws grant to others united in marriage, since the deprivation of these rights and the correlative stigmatization it provokes greatly limit and condition the choice and materialization of life plans. Along these lines, the Constitutional Court affirmed that given the importance and centrality that our societies attribute to marriage and its consequences in our culture, denying this right to same-sex couples represents denying their right to self-definition in a profound way (judgment, paragraph No. 72). Likewise, in one of its most prominent passages, the judgment emphasizes that the Constitution of South Africa grants rights that go beyond respect for a private sphere free from state interference, and that the litigants are not claiming a right to be 'left alone' by the State, but rather a right to be recognized as equals and treated with dignity by the law (judgment, paragraph No. 78).” [ Ibid, p.

XIV.- In summary, if, as the Second Section of the Second Civil Superior Court pointed out in its time regarding the heterosexual de facto union when it was considered by some social sectors as “(…) an illicit act contrary to good customs and marriage (…)”, the truth is that “(…) times change and case law must now fill the gap that the Legal System has in not protecting relationships of such nature.”, because “It is not possible, according to the principles of equity and justice, to set aside the joint effort made by two people who unite in that way (…).” (Voto n.º 358, of 8:35 a.m. on June 16, 1987), it is unquestionable that the same reason exists [“Principle: ‘ubi eadem ratio, idem jus’ (Like reason, like law), contemplated in Article 12 of the Civil Code (…).” (Voto de la Sala Segunda n.º 2003-502, of 3:30 p.m. on September 17, 2003)] to recognize civil and patrimonial consequences to the decision of two homosexual individuals to establish a bond with characteristics similar to conjugal ones, especially when full effect is given to the criterion according to which “(…) the legislative power is subject to the limits established ‘by treaties, in accordance with the principles of International Law.’ It is thus that the human rights established in the instruments of Public International Law – Declarations and Conventions on the matter – constitute a substantial barrier to the freedom of configuration of the legislator (sic), both ordinary and, eminently, popular through referendum. This Constitutional Court has indicated that the human rights enshrined in international instruments have, even, and by virtue of what is established in Article 48 of the Constitution, a supra-constitutional rank when they offer greater protection to individuals. Furthermore, this Constitutional Court in Voto No. [Telf3] of 11:40 a.m. on April 4, 2003, considered that even the derived reforming or constituent power – as constituted power – is limited by the essential content of fundamental and human rights, so that, through partial constitutional amendment, the essential content of those rights cannot be reduced or curtailed. It should be added that an implicit limit to the freedom of configuration of the ordinary or sovereign legislator (sic) is the Law of the Constitution itself or the constitutionality block formed by constitutional principles, values, precepts, and case law. It is necessary to add that minority rights, due to their inalienable nature, constitute an eminently technical-legal matter, which must be in the hands of the ordinary legislator (sic) and not of majorities prone to denying them.” (Voto n.º 2010-13313, of 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010).

XV.- Regarding the value of international instruments in the system of sources of the Costa Rican legal system and, in particular, of the pronouncements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in voto n.º 2313-95, of 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, that body accurately pointed out that “(…) if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural organ for interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this regulation, whether in a contentious case or a mere advisory opinion, will have – in principle – the same value as the interpreted norm. Not only ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis that we now maintain is, moreover, received in our law, when the General Law of Public Administration provides that unwritten norms – such as custom, case law, and general principles of law – shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of written law and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (article 7.l.).” XVI.- The Yogyakarta Principles on the application of International Human Rights Law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity, adopted by the International Panel of Specialists in International Human Rights Legislation and Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, at the meeting held from November 6 to 9, 2006, establish the basic standards for the United Nations Organization and the states that comprise it to advance in guaranteeing the necessary protections for non-heterosexual persons (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and transgender). In its preamble, it is recognized that “Sexual orientation and gender identity are essential to the dignity and humanity of each person and must not be grounds for discrimination or abuse.” According to its first principle, “Human beings of all sexual orientations and gender identities have the right to the full enjoyment of all human rights.” The second stipulates that “All persons have the right to the enjoyment of all human rights, without discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The law shall prohibit all discrimination and shall guarantee all persons equal and effective protection against any discrimination.” According to the third, “The sexual orientation or gender identity that each person defines for themselves is essential to their personality and constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of self-determination, dignity, and freedom. No person shall be forced to undergo medical procedures as a requirement for the legal recognition of their gender identity. No person shall be subjected to pressure to hide, suppress, or deny their sexual orientation or gender identity.” And, finally, the 24th recognizes the right of every person “(…) to form a family, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Various configurations of families exist. No family may be subjected to discrimination based on the sexual orientation or gender identity of any of its members.” To this end, States “E. Shall adopt all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that in those States that recognize marriages or registered cohabitation partnerships between persons of the same sex, any right, privilege, obligation, or benefit granted to persons of different sexes who are married or in a registered union is available under equal conditions to persons of the same sex who are married or in a registered cohabitation partnership; / F. Shall adopt all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to guarantee that any obligation, right, privilege, or benefit granted to unmarried couples of different sexes is available under equal conditions to unmarried couples of the same sex; (…).” In 2008, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States unanimously adopted resolution AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08) on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, through which the protection of human rights was extended to gender identity and sexual orientation. In that declaration, the 34 member countries reaffirmed the universality, indivisibility, and interdependence of human rights and expressed their concern over acts of violence and related human rights violations committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. In the following years, that international organization issued similar resolutions: AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10), and AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11). Finally, on December 18, 2008, the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, France, Gabon, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands presented the text of the Declaration on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity to the United Nations General Assembly, which reaffirms the principle of the universality of human rights and that of non-discrimination, which requires that they apply equally to all human beings, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Furthermore, deep concern is expressed there over human rights violations and fundamental freedoms based on sexual orientation or gender identity and over the violence, harassment, discrimination, exclusion, stigmatization, and prejudice directed against persons in all countries of the world because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and because these practices undermine the integrity and dignity of those subjected to such abuses; human rights violations based on sexual orientation or gender identity are condemned wherever they occur; a call is made to all States and relevant international human rights mechanisms to commit to the promotion and protection of the human rights of all persons, regardless of their sexual orientation and gender identity, and the former are urged to take all necessary measures, particularly legislative or administrative ones, to ensure that sexual orientation or gender identity cannot, under any circumstances, be the basis for criminal sanctions. Costa Rica is one of the 85 signatory countries of the Joint Statement to end acts of violence, and related human rights violations, directed against persons based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, presented by Colombia before the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. In January of this year, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, [Nombre48], highlighted that discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is one of the injustices that many States have ignored or even approved. “As a result, some governments treat these people as second-class citizens or even criminals. Confronting this discrimination is a challenge. But we must fulfill the ideals of the Universal Declaration.” XVII.- Recently, in the cited judgment of February 24 of this year, issued in the Case of [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] vs. Chile, in which it reiterated the obligation of the States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights to respect and guarantee “without any discrimination” the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established that sexual orientation and gender identity are categories protected by that international instrument under the term “other social condition,” included in its Article 1, paragraph 1). On the matter, it specified the following: “78. The Court has established that Article 1.1 of the Convention is a norm of a general nature whose content extends to all the provisions of the treaty, and provides for the obligation of the States Parties to respect and guarantee the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein ‘without any discrimination.’ That is, whatever the origin or form it assumes, any treatment that can be considered discriminatory regarding the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed in the Convention is per se incompatible with same12 . / 79. (…) the Court has indicated13 that the notion of equality derives directly from the oneness of the human family and is inseparable from the essential dignity of the person, against which any situation is incompatible that, by considering a specific group superior, leads to treating it with privilege; or that, conversely, by considering it inferior, treats it with hostility or in any way discriminates against it from the enjoyment of rights that are indeed recognized for those not considered included in such a situation. The Court’s case law has also indicated that in the current stage of the evolution of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination has entered the domain of jus cogens. The legal framework of national and international public order rests on it and permeates the entire legal system14 .” It further specified that, as a consequence, no internal legal norm, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or private individuals, can in any way diminish or restrict the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation. On the contrary, the proscription of discrimination based on sexual orientation entails the obligation of all authorities and officials to guarantee that they can enjoy each and every one of the rights established in the Convention. “80. Furthermore, the Court has established that States must refrain from actions that are in any way aimed, directly or indirectly, at creating situations of de jure or de facto discrimination15 . States are obliged to adopt positive measures to revert or change discriminatory situations existing in their societies, to the detriment of a specific group of persons. This implies the special duty of protection that the State must exercise regarding actions and practices of third parties that, under its tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain, or favor discriminatory situations16 .” “82. (…) Article 24 of the American Convention prohibits de jure or de facto discrimination, not only regarding the rights enshrined in said treaty, but in relation to all laws that the State passes and their application. In other words, if a State discriminates in the respect for or guarantee of a conventional right, it would breach the obligation established in Article 1.1 and the substantive right in question. If, on the contrary, the discrimination refers to unequal protection of internal law or its application, the fact must be analyzed in light of Article 24 of the American Convention17 .” “83. The Court has established, as has the European Court of Human Rights, that human rights treaties are living instruments, whose interpretation must accompany the evolution of the times and current living conditions18 . Such evolutionary interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation enshrined in Article 29 of the American Convention, as well as those established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties19 .” “84. In this sense, when interpreting the expression ‘any other social condition’ of Article 1.1. of the Convention, the most favorable alternative for the protection of the rights protected by said treaty must always be chosen, according to the principle of the norm most favorable to the human being20 .” “85. The specific criteria by virtue of which it is prohibited to discriminate, according to Article 1.1 of the American Convention, are not an exhaustive or limiting list but merely illustrative. On the contrary, the wording of said article leaves the criteria open by including the term ‘other social condition’ to thus incorporate other categories that might not have been explicitly indicated. The expression ‘any other social condition’ of Article 1.1. of the Convention must be interpreted by the Court, consequently, from the perspective of the option most favorable to the person and the evolution of fundamental rights in contemporary international law21 .” “86. In this regard, in the Inter-American System, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (hereinafter ‘OAS’) has approved since 2008, in its annual sessions, four successive resolutions regarding the protection of persons against discriminatory treatment based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, through which the adoption of concrete measures for effective protection against discriminatory acts has been demanded22 .” “87. Regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as a category of prohibited discrimination, the European Court of Human Rights has indicated that sexual orientation is ‘other condition’ mentioned in Article 1423 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ‘European Convention’), which prohibits discriminatory treatment24 . Particularly, in Case [Nombre49] Vs. Portugal, the European Court concluded that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14 of the European Convention. Furthermore, it reiterated that the list of categories contained in said article is illustrative and not exhaustive25 . Likewise, in Case [Nombre50] Vs. the United Kingdom, the European Court reiterated that sexual orientation, as one of the categories that can be included under ‘other condition,’ is another specific example of those found in said list, which are considered personal characteristics in the sense that they are innate or inherent to the person26 .” “88. Within the framework of the Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have classified sexual orientation as one of the categories of prohibited discrimination considered in Article 2.127 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 2.228 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee indicated in the case of [Nombre51] Vs. Australia that the reference to the category ‘sex’ would include the sexual orientation of persons29. Equally, the Human Rights Committee has expressed its concern regarding various discriminatory situations related to the sexual orientation of persons, which has been expressed repeatedly in its concluding observations on reports submitted by States30 .” “89. For its part, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights determined that sexual orientation can be framed under ‘other social condition’31 . Furthermore, the Committee on the Rights of the Child32 , the Committee against Torture33 have made references within the framework of their general observations and recommendations regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as one of the prohibited categories of discrimination.” “90. On December 22, 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the ‘Declaration on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,’ reaffirming the ‘principle of non-discrimination, which requires that human rights apply equally to all human beings, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity’34 . Likewise, on March 22, 2011, the ‘Joint Statement to end acts of violence, and related human rights violations directed against persons based on their sexual orientation and gender identity’ was presented before the United Nations Human Rights Council35. On June 15, 2011, this same Council approved a resolution on ‘human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity’ in which it expressed ‘grave concern at acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, [committed] against persons because of their sexual orientation and gender identity’36 . The prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation has also been highlighted in numerous reports by United Nations special rapporteurs37 .” “91. Taking into account the general obligations of respect and guarantee established in Article 1.1 of the American Convention, the interpretation criteria set forth in Article 29 of said Convention, the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Resolutions of the OAS General Assembly, the standards established by the European Court and the United Nations bodies (supra paras. 83 to 90), the Inter-American Court establishes that the sexual orientation and gender identity of persons are categories protected by the Convention. Therefore, any norm, act, or discriminatory practice based on a person’s sexual orientation is proscribed by the Convention. Consequently, no internal legal norm, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or private individuals, can in any way diminish or restrict the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation.” “92. Regarding the State’s argument that at the date of the issuance of the Supreme Court’s judgment there would not have been a consensus regarding sexual orientation as a prohibited category of discrimination, the Court highlights that the alleged lack of a consensus within some countries regarding full respect for the rights of sexual minorities cannot be considered a valid argument to deny or restrict their human rights or to perpetuate and reproduce the historical and structural discrimination these minorities have suffered38 . The fact that this could be a controversial matter in some sectors and countries, and that it is not necessarily a matter of consensus, cannot lead the Court to abstain from deciding, because when doing so it must refer solely and exclusively to the stipulations of the international obligations undertaken by the sovereign decision of the States through the American Convention.” “93. A right recognized to persons cannot be denied or restricted to anyone and under any circumstances based on their sexual orientation. This would violate Article 1.1. of the American Convention. The Inter-American instrument proscribes discrimination, in general, including therein categories such as sexual orientation, which cannot serve as a basis to deny or restrict any of the rights established in the Convention.” XVIII.- This Constitutional Chamber has also recognized that sexual orientation is a vector of social and personal discrimination and has highlighted the role of public authorities in the fight against it. In voto n.º 2007-18660, of 11:17 a.m. on December 21, 2007, it specified this in the following terms: “Through its line of case law, this Chamber has recognized as a fundamental legal principle contained in the Political Constitution of Costa Rica the respect for the dignity of every human being and, consequently, the absolute prohibition of carrying out any type of discrimination contrary to that dignity. To discriminate, in general terms, is to differentiate to the detriment of the rights and dignity of a human being or group thereof; in this case, of homosexuals. Based on the foregoing, it can be validly affirmed that discrimination based on sexual orientation is contrary to the concept of dignity duly enshrined in the Political Constitution and in the International Treaties on Human Rights signed by our country. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits in its Article 26 discrimination based on ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’; from which it also derives that acts that violate the right to equality and human dignity of persons due to their sexual orientation are not permitted, as they have the right to access any commercial establishment and to receive equal treatment, without discrimination based on their sexual preference.” In n.º 2010-13313, of 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010, it added that “The human, fundamental, and legally-configured rights of minority or disadvantaged groups, for having traditionally suffered discrimination, exclusion, and all kinds of social prejudices – as happens with that of homosexuals – arise from their (sic) movements of vindication, ordinarily, against majorities, given the insistence and natural inclination of majorities to maintain and perpetuate any discrimination and asymmetrical treatment. The public powers, for their part, are obliged, by the Constitution and the instruments of International Human Rights Law, to guarantee and promote the effective respect for the principle and right to equality – real and not formal – of such groups (articles 33 of the Constitution and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José). Situations of discrimination can be factual or legal; they will be of the first type when, faced with the existence of a disadvantaged and discriminated minority group, measures are not adopted to overcome such a state of affairs.” “Faced with groups that are the object of discrimination and social prejudice, the application of the principle of real equality and prohibition of all discrimination, which normally operates ex post to the perpetration of the discriminatory act, is not enough. Therefore, it is necessary for the public powers to implement the principle of support for such groups with effective public policies and normative measures. The principle of support for discriminated groups prevents and anticipates discriminations, such that it has an ex ante effect regarding them. The principle of support is fulfilled when legislation and regulations are enacted that recognize the rights of discriminated groups, even if these are of infra-constitutional configuration.” XIX.- As [Nombre52] points out, “Equality/prohibition of discrimination has a broader normative scope because it protects homosexuality in private spaces (preventing it from being treated by Law in an unreasonably different way from heterosexuality) but also in public ones, in that same sense. Public powers will have to provide an especially convincing or persuasive reason to legally treat homosexuals differently and worse than heterosexuals. It goes without saying that from the perspective of the prohibition of discrimination, protection becomes more effective and incisive, among other reasons because moral or historical arguments will no longer be sufficient by themselves to prevent homosexual persons from accessing certain rights that were traditionally vetoed, such as, for example, the right to maintain a stable union legally recognized with a person of their same sexual orientation.” [Homosexuality and Constitution. Spanish Journal of Constitutional Law, Madrid: 73, January/April, 2005, p.132]. Hence, it is imperative to eradicate, at least from the legal world, the deep homophobic social prejudice, which, moreover, perhaps bears a significant relationship with discrimination against women since the stigmatization of non-heterosexual persons appears closely linked to the supposed deviation from the role traditionally judged as appropriate for them (the center of social reproach seems to lie in the fact that the ‘gay’ adopts a ‘woman’s’ position and that the lesbian assumes a ‘man’s’ one). “The fundamental right not to be discriminated against based on sexual orientation would have, therefore, the typical effect of equal treatment with its two corollaries, the prohibition of direct discrimination, that is, of different and worse legal treatments based on homosexuality, and of indirect or impact discrimination, that is, of legal differentiations that could formally be established not based on sexual orientation, but that, in fact, would negatively impact the homosexual minority.” [ ibid, p. 139]. From the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation also derives a mandate for positive actions. The public powers are obliged to ensure that the social discrimination suffered by homosexual persons ‘does not prevail’ in any way, for which they are obliged to adopt equal opportunity measures. “The protection of homosexuality, despite not being explicitly mentioned by our Constitution, has become a central constitutional matter, and not only because it affects, as one might assume, a number of persons not easily determinable, but undoubtedly significant, but, above all, due to the concurrence of two qualitative arguments, one related to the value of liberty and the other to that of equality. In the question about the constitutional framework of homosexuality, liberty is certainly at stake, because the heart of the matter is the sexual orientation of persons, that is, one of the keys to human existence and, therefore, to their dignity, central to family life, collective well-being, and the development of individual personality. But equality is also implicated, because our Constitution, as Justice Harlan said of the U.S. Constitution in his dissent to the Plessy v. Ferguson Sentence (1896), ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens.’” [ Ibid, p. 117]. As Justice J. Greaney indicated in his concurring vote in the famous Sentence of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, [Nombre10] and others v.

Department of Public Health, of November 18, 2003: "As a matter of constitutional law, neither the mantra of tradition nor individual conviction can justify the perpetuation of the hierarchy according to which same-sex couples and their families are judged less deserving of social and legal recognition than opposite-sex ones."- XX.- Based on all of the foregoing and even though we have not the slightest doubt that, in order to decide whether the claim filed in this matter can be accepted or rejected, it is appropriate to apply by analogy the provisions for common-law marriage (unión de hecho) in the Family Code, with the exception, of course, of the requirement that it be a heterosexual bond, we are compelled to file this judicial consultation of constitutionality so that this Chamber may define whether its prior rulings regarding the constitutional validity of that requirement prevent us from doing so.-

THEREFORE

Even though we have no doubt that, in order to decide whether the claim filed in this matter can be accepted or rejected, it is appropriate to apply by analogy the provisions for common-law marriage (unión de hecho) in the Family Code, with the exception, of course, of the requirement that it be a bond between a man and a woman, we file this judicial consultation of constitutionality so that this Chamber may define whether its prior rulings regarding the constitutional validity of that requirement prevent us from doing so. The parties are summoned so that within a term of three days they may appear before that body to assert their rights. As long as the decision on this consultation is unknown, the processing of this matter is suspended.- Olga Marta Muñoz González Alexis Vargas Soto Luis Héctor Amoretti Orozco r.s.

------------------------- 1 Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child. Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, of August 28, 2002. Series A, No. 17, paras. 69 and 70. See also: E.Ct.H.R., Case [Name55] v. Ireland, (No. 16969/90), Judgment of May 26, 1994, para. 44, and Case [Name56] and Others v. The Netherlands, (No. 18535/91), Judgment of October 27, 1994, para. 30. 2 Cf. Case [Name57] and [Name58] v. Argentina. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 27, 1998. Series C No. 39, para. [Address1], and Case [Name13] v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 12, 2008. Series C No. 186, para. 179. 3 Cf. Case [Name59] v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objection and Merits. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 179, para. [Address2], and Case [Name60] and [Name61] v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 29, 2011. Series C No. 238, para. 85. 4 Cf. Case of [Name28] et al. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 184.; Case of [Name33]. Judgment of November 3, 1997. Series C No. 34, paras. 82 and 83; Case of [Name30] et al. Judgment of March 8, 1998. Series C No. 37, para. 164; Case of [Name31]. Judgment of January 24, 1998. Series C No. 36, para. 102; and Case of [Name32]. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 65. 5 Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9, para. 24. 6 Cf. Case of [Name26] et al. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 237; Case of [Name27]. Judgment of September 29, 1999. Series C. No. 56, para. 121; Case of [Name28] et al. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 60; Case of [Name33]. Reparations (art. 63.1 American Convention on Human Rights). Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 43, para. 184; Case of [Name33]. Judgment of November 3, 1997. Series C No. 34, para. 83; Case of [Name30] et al. Judgment of March 8, 1998. Series C No. 37, para. 164; Case of [Name31]. Judgment of January 24, 1998. Series C No. 36, para. 102; and Case of [Name32]. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 65. 7 I/A Court H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (arts. 46.1, 46.2.a and 46.2.b American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990. Series A No. 11, para. 34. 8 Cf. Case of [Name62] v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. [Address3]; Case of [Name63] v. Brazil. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2006. Series C No. 149, para. [Address4], Case of [Name64] v. Haiti. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008, para. 77. 9 Cf. Case of [Name65] v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 1, 2006. Series C No. 141, [Address5] and Case of Cantos v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of September 7, 2001. Series C No. 85, para. 52. See also: Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (arts. 27.2, 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9, para. 24. 10 Cf. Case of [Name66] et al. ("Retired and Pensioned Employees of the Comptroller's Office") v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2009. Series C No. 198, para. [Address6], and Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2011. Series C No. 227, para. 127. 11 Cf. Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005, Series C No. 134, para. [Address7], and Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra note 85, para. 128. 12 Cf. Proposed Amendment to the Political Constitution of Costa Rica related to Naturalization. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of January 19, 1984. Series A No. 4, [Address8] and Case of the Indigenous Community [Name67]. v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010 Series C No. 214, para. 268. 13 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, supra note 12, para. 55. 14 Cf. Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of September 17, 2003. Series A No. 18, para. 101 and Case of the Indigenous Community [Name67], supra note 12, para. 269. 15 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 14, para. 103 and Case of the Indigenous Community [Name67], supra note 12, para. 271. 16 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 14, para. 104, Case of the Indigenous Community [Name67], supra note 12, para. 271 and United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, Non-discrimination, November 10, 1989, CCPR/C/37, para. 6. 17 Mutatis mutandi, Case of [Name68] et al. ("First Court of Contentious Administrative Law") v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 209 and Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, supra note 12, paras. 53 and 54 and Case of [Name69] and Others v. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 13, 2011. Series C No. 234, para. 174. 18 Cf. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999. Series A No. 16, para. [Address9] and Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 106. In the European Court see E.Ct.H.R., Case of Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, (No. 5856/72), Judgment of April 25, 1978, para. 31. 19 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra note 18, para. 114 and Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 18, para. 106. 20 Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, [Address10], and Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 18, para. 106. 21 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra note 18, para. 115. 22 Cf. AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11), Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, approved at the fourth plenary session, held on June 7, 2011 ("THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY […] RESOLVES: 1. To condemn discrimination against persons on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, and to urge States, within the parameters of the legal institutions of their domestic legal systems, to adopt the necessary measures to prevent, punish, and eradicate such discrimination"); AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10), Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, approved at the fourth plenary session, held on June 8, 2010 ("THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY […] RESOLVES: 1. To condemn acts of violence and human rights violations against persons based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, and to urge States to investigate such acts and ensure that those responsible face consequences before the justice system. 2. To encourage States to take all necessary measures to ensure that no acts of violence or other human rights violations are committed against persons based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, ensuring victims' access to justice under equal conditions. 3. To encourage Member States to consider means to combat discrimination against persons based on their sexual orientation and gender identity"); AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, approved at the fourth plenary session, held on June 4, 2009 ("THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY […] RESOLVES: 1. To condemn acts of violence and related human rights violations perpetrated against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. 2. To urge States to ensure that acts of violence and human rights violations perpetrated against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity are investigated, and that those responsible face consequences before the justice system"), and AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08), Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, approved at the fourth plenary session, held on June 3, 2008 ("THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY […] RESOLVES: 1. To express concern about acts of violence and related human rights violations committed against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity"). 23 Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status". 24 Cf. E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Name49] v. Portugal, (No. 33290/96), Judgment of December 21, 1999. Final, March 21, 2000, para. 28; Case of L. and V. v. Austria (No. 39392/98 and 39829/98), Judgment of January 9, 2003. Final, April 9, 2003, para. 45; Case of S. L. v. Austria, (No. 45330/99), Judgment of January 9, 2003. Final, April 9, 2003, [Address11], and Case of E.B. v. France, (No. 43546/02), Judgment of January 22, 2008, para. 50. 25 Cf. E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Name49], supra note 24, para. 28 ("the applicant’s sexual orientation […] [is] a concept which is undoubtedly covered by Article 14 of the Convention. The Court reiterates in that connection that the list set out in that provision is illustrative and not exhaustive, as is shown by the words [']any ground such as[']). See also E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Name70] v. France, (No. 36515/97), Judgment of February 26, 2002. Final, May 26, 2002, para. 32; E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Name71] v. Poland, (No. 13102/02), Judgment of March 2, 2010. Final, June 2, 2010, para. 92; Case of [Name72]. v. The United Kingdom, (No. 37060/06), Judgment of September 28, 2010. Final, December 28, 2010, para. [Address12], and Case of [Name73] v. Russia, (No. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09), Judgment of October 21, 2010. Final, April 11, 2011, para. 108 ("The Court reiterates that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14"). 26 Cf. E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Name50] v. The United Kingdom, (No. 7205/07), Judgment of July 13, 2010. Final, November 22, 2010, para. 57 ("the Court has considered to constitute [']other status['] characteristics which, like some of the specific examples listed in the Article, can be said to be personal in the sense that they are innate or inherent). However, the European Court did not decide to limit the concept of "other status" to characteristics being inherent or innate to the person. Cf. E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Name50], supra note 26, para. 58 ("However, in finding violations of Article 14 in a number of other cases, the Court has accepted that "status" existed where the distinction relied upon did not involve a characteristic which could be said to be innate or inherent, and thus [']personal['] in the sense discussed above"). 27 Article 2.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 28 Article 2.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee the exercise of the rights enunciated in it, without discrimination of any kind on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 29 United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, April 4, 1992, para. 8.7 ("The State party has sought the Committee's guidance as to whether sexual orientation may be considered an \"other status\" for the purposes of article 26. The same issue could arise under article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. The Committee confines itself to noting, however, that in its view, the reference to \"sex\" in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as including sexual orientation"). Likewise, see X v. Colombia, Communication No. 1361/2005, CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005, May 14, 2007, para. 7.2. ("The Committee recalls its earlier jurisprudence that the prohibition against discrimination under article 26 comprises also discrimination based on sexual orientation"). In the same sense, Human Rights Committee, [Name74] v. Australia, Communication No. 941/2000, CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000, September 18, 2003, para. 10.4. See also United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, Poland, CCPR/C/79/Add.110, July 25, 1999, para. 23. 30 Cf., inter alia, Naciones Unidas, Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observaciones finales, Chile, CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5, April 17, 2007, para. 16 ("While it notes with satisfaction the repeal of provisions that criminalized homosexual relations between consenting adults, the Committee remains concerned about discrimination faced by certain persons on grounds of their sexual orientation, inter alia, before the courts and in access to health (articles 2 and 26 of the Covenant). The State party should guarantee to all persons the equal enjoyment of the rights established in the Covenant, regardless of their sexual orientation, including equality before the law and in access to health services. It should also implement awareness-raising programs to combat social prejudices"); Concluding Observations, Barbados, CCPR/C/BRB/CO/3, May 14, 2007, para. 13 ("The Committee expresses concern about the discrimination suffered by homosexuals in the State Party and, in particular, the criminalization of consensual sexual acts between same-sex adults (art. 26)"); Concluding Observations, United States of America, CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, December 18, 2006, para. 25 ("It also notes with concern the lack of prohibition of employment discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in many states (arts. 2 and 26). The State Party should accept its legal obligation under articles 2 and 26 to guarantee to all persons the rights protected by the Covenant, as well as equality before the law and equal protection of the law, without discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation"); Concluding Observations, El Salvador, CCPR/CO/78/SLV, August 22, 2003, para. 16 ("The Committee expresses its concern about cases of persons attacked, and even killed, on grounds of their sexual orientation (article 9), about the low number of investigations in relation to these unlawful acts, and about the existing provisions (such as local 'Contraventional Ordinances') used to discriminate against persons based on their sexual orientation (article 26)"). 31 Cf. United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20. Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (article 2, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/GC/20, July 2, 2009, para. 32 (“‘Other status’ as recognized in article 2, paragraph 2, of the Covenant includes sexual orientation”). Cf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18. The right to work, E/C.12/GC/18, February 6, 2006, para. 12 (“pursuant to paragraph 2 of article 2 and article 3, the Covenant proscribes any discrimination in access to and maintenance of employment on the grounds of […] sexual orientation”); General Comment No. 15. The right to water (articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2002/11, January 20, 2003, para. 13 (“the Covenant proscribes any discrimination on the grounds of […] sexual orientation”); General Comment No. 14. The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2000/4, August 11, 2000, para. 18 (“By virtue of article 2, paragraph 2, and article 3, the Covenant proscribes any discrimination in access to health care and the underlying determinants of health, as well as to the means and entitlements for achieving them, on the grounds of […] sexual orientation”). 32 Cf. United Nations, Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 3. HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child, CRC/GC/2003/3, March 17, 2003, para. 8 (“discrimination based on sexual preference is also a matter of concern”); General Comment No. 4. Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC/GC/2003/4, July 21, 2003, para. 6 (“States parties have the obligation to ensure that all human beings below 18 enjoy all the rights set forth in the Convention without discrimination (art. 2), irrespective of ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status’. These grounds also cover adolescents' sexual orientation”). 33 Cf. United Nations, Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2. Implementation of article 2 by States Parties, CAT/C/GC/2, January 24, 2008, paras. 20 and 21 (“The principle of non-discrimination is a basic and general principle in the protection of human rights and fundamental to the interpretation and application of the Convention. […] States parties must ensure that, in the framework of the obligations contracted under the Convention, their laws are applied in practice to all persons, regardless of […] sexual orientation”)] and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women [Cf. United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 27 on older women and protection of their human rights, CEDAW/C/GC/27, December 16, 2010, para. 13 (“The discrimination experienced by older women is often multidimensional, with age discrimination compounding other forms of discrimination based on […] sexual orientation”) and Draft General Recommendation No. 28 on article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, December 16, 2010, para. 18 (“Discrimination against women based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste, and sexual orientation”). 34 United Nations, Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, United Nations General Assembly, A/63/635, December 22, 2008, para. 3. 35 United Nations, Joint statement on ending acts of violence and related human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity, presented by Colombia at the 16th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, March 22, 2011. Available at: http://www.iglhrc.org/binary-data/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/494-1.pdf (last accessed February 22, 2012). 36 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Resolution on human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1, June 15, 2011. 37 Cf., among other reports, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, E/CN.4/2004/49, February 16, 2004, paras. 32 and 38 (“International human rights law proscribes any discrimination in access to health care and the underlying determinants of health, as well as to the means for their procurement, on the grounds of sexual orientation [...]. International human rights law completely excludes discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation”). See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, A/HRC/6/5, July 20, 2007, para. 28; Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Mission to Brazil, E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3, February 28, 2006, para. 40; Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Integration of the human rights of women and the gender perspective: violence against women, Interconnections between violence against women and HIV/AIDS, E/CN.4/2005/72, January 17, 2005, paras. 27 and 58; Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Civil and political rights, including the questions of disappearances and summary executions, E/CN.4/2003/3, January 13, 2003, paras. 66 and 67; Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, A/57/138, July 2, 2002, para. 37; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, E/CN.4/2001/94, January 26, 2001, para. 89. g); Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and civil unions ("uniones concubinarias") for same-sex couples. In 2009, through Law No. 18.590, (Official Gazette No. 27837, October 26, 2009), joint adoption by couples in a civil union was authorized. 38 According to various sources of international and comparative law, this discrimination against the Lesbian, Gay, Transgender, Bisexual and Intersex (hereinafter “LGTBI”) community is unacceptable because: i) sexual orientation constitutes an essential aspect of a person's identity (infra para. 139). Likewise: ii) the LGTBI community has been historically discriminated against and the use of stereotypes in the treatment of said community is common. Cf. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, E/CN.4/2004/49, February 16, 2004, para. 33 (“discrimination and stigmatization continue to pose a serious threat to the sexual and reproductive health of many groups, such as […] sexual minorities”); Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, E/CN.4/2004/56, December 23, 2003, para. 64 (“Attitudes and beliefs derived from myths and fears related to HIV/AIDS and sexuality contribute to the stigmatization and discrimination against sexual minorities. Furthermore, the perception that members of these minorities do not respect sexual boundaries or question predominant concepts of gender roles appears to contribute to their vulnerability to torture as a way of ‘punishing’ their non-accepted behavior”). Moreover: iii) they constitute a minority for whom it is much more difficult to remove discriminations in areas such as the legislative, as well as to avoid negative repercussions on the interpretation of norms by officials of the executive or legislative branches, and on access to justice. Cf. Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Civil and political rights, including the questions of: independence of the judiciary, administration of justice, impunity, Mission to Brazil, E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.3, February 22, 2005, para. 28 (“Travestis, transsexuals and homosexuals are also frequently victims of episodes of violence and discrimination. When they resort to the judicial system, they often encounter the same prejudices and stereotypes of society reproduced there”), and Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-481 of September 9, 1998. Finally: iv) sexual orientation does not constitute a rational criterion for the rational and equitable distribution or allocation of goods, rights or social burdens. Cf. Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-481 of September 9, 1998, para. 25. In this judgment, regarding the right of public school teachers not to be dismissed for their homosexual status, the Colombian Constitutional Court noted that separating a teacher from their job for that reason is based “on a prejudice without any empirical basis, which denotes the unjust stigmatization that has affected this population and that has been invoked to impose burdens on them or deprive them of rights, to the detriment of their possibilities of participation in such relevant areas of social and economic life” (para. 29). For its part, Judgment C-507 of 1999 declared unconstitutional a norm that established homosexuality as a disciplinary offense in the military forces. In Judgment C-373 of 2002, the Constitutional Court of Colombia declared unconstitutional a norm that provided as a ground for ineligibility to serve as a notary having been disciplinary sanctioned for the offense of “homosexualism”.

------------------------- VOTO NÚMERO: 592 -2012 FAMILY COURT. San José, at fifteen hours and two minutes on the sixth of July of two thousand twelve.- Proceedings for recognition of a common-law union (unión de hecho) established by [Nombre 001], of legal age, single, [...] and [Nombre 003], of legal age, [...]. This Court hears the present matter by virtue of the appeal filed by [Nombre 001] against the decision issued by the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, at eight hours and forty-seven minutes on the nineteenth of July of two thousand nine.- Drafted by Judge Amoretti Orozco, and;

CONSIDERING

I.- Mr. [Nombre 001] appeared before the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, seeking recognition of the couple relationship he claims to have maintained with Mr. [Nombre 003] for more than three years, publicly, notoriously, stably, and exclusively. He expressly requested the extensive application of the rules contained in the Family Code aimed at regulating the personal and property effects of the common-law union (folios 1-2). In the appealed decision, issued at 8:47 a.m. on June 19, 2009, the first-instance judge rejected the complaint *ad portas* because she deemed it not suitable for consideration, given that Costa Rican legislation, by not permitting marriage between persons of the same sex, prevents recognizing as such a bond like the one sustained between the parties, which lacks an essential element: its heterosexual character (folio 4).- II.- Although currently Costa Rican law does not recognize cohabitation between persons of the same sex as a source of rights and obligations, it is indisputable that it also does not prohibit it and that, when it occurs under conditions of stability, notoriety, and exclusivity, it cannot be substantially distinguished from that formed by heterosexual human beings, since both are instituted by virtue of consent and reflect the purpose of building a common life project, based on bonds of love and solidarity. Undoubtedly, it can be said of both bonds that their object is “(…) life in common, cooperation, and mutual assistance.” (Article 11 of the Family Code). As [Nombre1] points out, “In today’s society there are same-sex couples who cohabit stably, share expenses and assets, have a common life project, and even have children, all publicly and notoriously. Their way of life is the same as that of any marriage, except that they have been unable to access this right. If society is already prepared to face this type of cohabitation normally, the Law is obliged to regulate their de facto situation.” [El derecho constitucional al matrimonio homosexual en España. Ley 13/200, de 1 de julio, por la que se modifica el Código Civil en materia de derecho a contraer matrimonio. Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Procesal Constitucional, 13, enero-junio, 2010, p. 255]. For this reason, the members of a homosexual couple, and especially the one occupying the weaker economic position, have analogous requirements for legal protection as heterosexual persons who decide to live together. Hence, it is not only reasons of legal certainty and justice that demand their personal and property effects be regulated by the existing rules. The human dignity of its members and their fundamental rights to the free development of their personality, to equality, to the protection of their family, and to the autonomy of will are compromised by the existing protection deficit. In the recent judgment of February 24 of this year, issued in Case [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] vs. Chile, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights reaffirmed “(…) that the American Convention does not establish a closed concept of family, much less does it protect only a ‘traditional’ model thereof. In this regard, the Court reiterates that the concept of family life is not reduced solely to marriage and must encompass other de facto family ties where the parties live together outside marriage¹.” Therefore, denying a non-heterosexual couple the status of a family group “(…) reflects a limited and stereotyped perception of the concept of family that has no basis in the Convention, as no specific model of family (the ‘traditional family’) exists.” In support of that argument, that international jurisdictional body cited the agreement of August 16, 2010, issued by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Mexican Nation which, in resolving the action of unconstitutionality A.I. 2/2010, stated that “(…) this Supreme Court considers that the sexual diversity of the contracting parties is neither constitutionally nor legally a defining element of the marriage institution, but rather the result of the social conception that existed at a given historical moment, but not the essential core of marriage (…).” [Para. 256] and that “It is, therefore, the sexual orientation of a person, as part of their personal identity, a relevant element in the life project they may have and which, like any person, includes the desire to have a life in common with another person of the same or different sex or not, and that in no way should limit them in the search and achievement of their happiness. On this point, (…) among fundamental rights is the right to personal and sexual identity, the former being understood as the right of every individual to be themselves, in their own conscience and in the opinion of others, according to their physical and internal characteristics and their actions, which individualize them before society and allow them to be identified, which also implies sexual identity, which projects them before themselves and socially from their sexual perspective, as well as their sexual preference or orientation and that, therefore, is part of the self-determination of persons and affects their free development, being an element that undeniably will determine their affective and/or sexual relationships with persons of a different or the same sex and, hence, their choice of whom to form a common life with and have children, if they so desire.” [Para. 264]. It further specified that “(…) in the case of homosexual persons, just as occurs with persons with sexual orientation toward others of a different sex (heterosexuals), the free and voluntary establishment of affective relationships with persons of the same sex is part of their full development; relationships, both one and the other, which, as various sociological data inform, share the characteristic of constituting a community of life based on affective, sexual, and reciprocal solidarity ties, with a vocation for stability and permanence over time.” [Para. 266]; that “(…) if one of the aspects that guides the way an individual will project their life and their relationships is their sexual orientation, it is a fact that, in full respect for human dignity, recognition by the State is required not only of an individual's sexual orientation toward persons of the same sex, but also of their unions, under the modalities that, at a given moment, it is decided to adopt (cohabitation societies, solidarity pacts, concubinages, and marriage).” [Para. 269]; that from the existence of homoparental families derive a series of rights and obligations for those who make them up, for it is a reality that they exist and, as such, must be protected by legislation: some are just as respectable as others and their recognition does not disregard principles such as the best interest of the child [para. 333].- III.- In his dissenting individual opinion forming part of the judgment of September 27, 1990 (Case [Nombre4] vs. United Kingdom), Mr. S. K. Martens, judge of the European Court of Human Rights, rightly pointed out that “Marriage is far more than a sexual union, and therefore the capacity to have such relations is not ‘essential’. Persons who cannot procreate or have sexual relations can also seek to marry. This is because marriage involves more than a union legitimizing such relations and aiming at procreation: it is a legal institution that creates a fixed legal relationship between the spouses and between them and third parties (including the authorities). As one author has said, spouses, through the bonds of marriage, ‘announce to the world around them that their relationship is based on intense human feelings and a mutual, exclusive, and permanent commitment.’ It is also a kind of community in which intellectual, spiritual, and emotional ties are at least as essential as physical ones. / Article 12 of the Convention [for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] protects the right of any man or woman (of marriageable age) to enter into this union, and therefore the definition of what the words ‘man and woman’ mean in this context must take into account all these characteristics of marriage.” In similar terms, Mrs. E. [Nombre5] and Messrs. I. [Nombre6] and [Nombre7], [Nombre8], judges of that same body, expressed themselves in their joint dissenting individual opinion forming part of the same ruling: “The fact that a transsexual cannot procreate is not decisive. There are many men and women who also cannot have children and yet have the undisputed right to marry. The capacity to procreate is not, and cannot be, a prerequisite for marriage.” In the same vein, the professor from the Autonomous University of Madrid, [Nombre9], proposes that, “Indeed, if marriage [and, by extension, the heterosexual common-law union (unión de hecho)] is defined as an affective and material life community, and no longer by its social function; if its essential purpose is no longer reproductive, but defined around personal fulfillment and the free development of personality; if its constitutional content links it, primarily, to fundamental individual rights and freedoms; if the *ius connubium* is predicated, in principle, of any person, upon requirements of equality and freedom; and if the legal regulation of marriage and relations between spouses has undergone a turn towards the Law of Obligations; it is difficult to admit as unquestionable the prohibition against same-sex couples marrying.” [Las uniones de personas del mismo sexo: las opciones de regulación y sus implicaciones jurídicas. Derecho Privado y Constitución, Madrid: 20, enero-diciembre, 2006, 173-202. 188-189].- IV.- In the judgment issued on November 18, 2003, in the case [Nombre10] and others vs. Department of Public Health, for which Judge Marshall was the reporting judge, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared the prohibition on access to marriage for same-sex persons contrary to the Constitution. It argued that we are in the presence of “(…) a vital social institution (…)” and that “(…) the decision of whether and whom to marry is among life’s great moments of self-determination.” For this reason and because “the benefits accessible only to those with a marriage license are enormous, affecting virtually every aspect of life and death,” it has long been considered a fundamental right (civil right). As it is a central element of individuals' lives and the community's well-being, barring same-sex persons from the right to marry deprives them “(…) of one of the most important aspects of human experience (…)” and “(…) denies them full access to the protection of the laws (…)”; therefore, such exclusion could only be admitted if it serves “(…) a compelling public objective (…)” and is “(…) a reasonable means to achieve such an end.” These conditions do not apply to the prohibition of marriage between persons of the same sex, which makes an exception to this rule based on a singular trait: sexual orientation, which injures the liberty recognized in the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as equality, which prevents there from being second-class citizens. The three main justifications for this prohibition are not constitutionally reasonable: neither that heterosexual marriage provides a favorable framework for procreation (meaning unassisted heterosexual); nor that it ensures an optimal space for child-rearing; nor that homosexual marriage will trivialize or destroy that institution as it has been historically configured. The essence of the liberty to marry is to unite with the person of one's own choosing. By preventing marriage between persons of the same sex, “(…) the State confers an official stamp of approval on the destructive stereotypes that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to heterosexual relationships and are therefore not worthy of respect.”- V.- It is true that in Vote No. [Telf1], of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, in which it deemed legitimate the legal impossibility of marriage between persons of the same sex, established in subsection 6 of Article 14 of the Family Code, the Constitutional Chamber charged the Legislative Assembly with the responsibility of “(…) considering the need to regulate, in whatever manner it deems appropriate, the bonds or rights derived from this type of union, which evidently requires a complete normative development establishing the rights and obligations of these types of couples (…).” It is also true that, four years later, in No. 2010-641, of 2:56 a.m. on January 13, 2010, it rejected on the merits the action of unconstitutionality filed by Mr. [Nombre 001] against ordinal 242 *ibidem*; a pronouncement that, according to the scarce information available since its text is still pending, cites No. [Telf1], previously mentioned. Hence, based on the provisions of Article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, it is not bold to conclude that these precedents would seem to prevent us from resorting to the regulation of the common-law union, contained in numerals 242, 243, 244, and 245 *ibidem*, even by analogy, in order to resolve this complaint on the merits, with which there would be no other alternative but to confirm the rejection *de plano* ordered by the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in the order issued at 8:47 a.m. on June 19, 2009, which, as noted, considered it not suitable for consideration.- VI.- However, it is impossible to ignore our duty to weigh the de facto situations that escape the solutions preconceived by the Legislative Assembly at a given historical moment, in order to adequately integrate the legal system and offer a response to Mr. [Nombre 001]'s claim on the merits. Indeed, we are convinced that, in a system like Costa Rica's, the absence of specific regulation does not authorize rejecting a complaint *de plano*. The fundamental right to effective judicial protection, recognized, among other precepts, in Article 8, subsection 1) and Article 25, subsection 1), in relation to Article 1 and Article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights and in Article 41 of the Political Constitution, and the principle of the hermetic fullness of the legal system, dealt with in Article 6 of the Civil Code and Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, prevent such a pronouncement. The judges of the Constitutional Chamber highlighted this: “In our condition as judges, (…) we cannot ignore social reality as an element to consider in decision-making regarding matters submitted to our knowledge (…).” (Voto n.º [Telf1], of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006).- VII.- Pursuant to the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, approved by the Legislative Assembly through Law No. 4534, of February 23, 1970, “The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to guarantee their free and full exercise to all persons subject to their jurisdiction, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.” (Article 1, subsection 1). “Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.” (Article 2). “Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, (…) for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.” (Article 8, subsection 1).

"Every person has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, before a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties." (Article 25, paragraph 1). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed the content of these precepts on various occasions. In its recent judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of [Name11] and [Name12] v. Argentina), it emphasized that "This Tribunal has affirmed on other occasions that '[u]nder international law, a customary norm prescribes that a State which has concluded an international agreement must introduce into its domestic law the necessary modifications to ensure the execution of the obligations undertaken.' In the American Convention, this principle is embodied in its Article 2, which establishes the general obligation of each State Party to adapt its domestic law to the provisions of the same, to guarantee the rights recognized therein2." It also reiterated that "(…) the adaptation of domestic legislation to the parameters established in the Convention implies the adoption of measures in two areas, namely: a) the suppression of norms and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees provided in the Convention or that disregard the rights recognized therein or hinder their exercise, and b) the issuance of norms and the development of practices conducive to the effective observance of said guarantees. The first area is satisfied by the reform, repeal, or annulment of norms or practices that have such scope, as appropriate. The second obligates the State to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations and, therefore, must adopt all necessary legal, administrative, and other measures to prevent similar events from occurring again in the future3." Without doubt, in the case of unions between persons of the same sex, its legislative recognition is essential for the purpose of eradicating social discrimination against those who comprise them. In view of the particularly serious nature of this practice and because it violates several rights enshrined in the Convention, such protection must be sufficient. And, following the doctrine set forth in the judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case of [Name13] v. Panama), given the imperative need to offer some response to the legitimate claim made in the sub-lite, "(…) there is a duty to use those recourses (…) that are related to the protection of the fundamental rights that may be affected in such cases, such as, for example, the right to personal liberty, to personal integrity, and the right to life, as applicable, which are recognized in the American Convention." In the judgment of August 16, 2000 (case of [Name14] and [Name15]), the Inter-American Court affirmed that "101. (…) the right of every person to a simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, before a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights constitutes one of the basic pillars, not only of the American Convention, but also of the very Rule of Law in a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention […]. Article 25 is intimately linked to the general obligation under Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by attributing protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties4. / 102. Furthermore, the Court has indicated that the absence of an effective recourse against violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression of it by the State Party in which such a situation occurs. In that sense, it should be emphasized that, for such a recourse to exist, it is not sufficient that it is provided for by the Constitution or the law, or that it is formally admissible, but it is required that it be truly suitable for establishing whether a violation of human rights has been committed and to provide what is necessary to remedy it5. / (…) / 121. This Court has established that Article 25 is intimately linked to the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by attributing protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties, from which it follows that the State has the responsibility to design and normatively enshrine an effective recourse, but also to ensure the due application of said recourse by its judicial authorities6." In that of June 21, 2002 (case of [Name16], [Name17] and [Name18] et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago), it expressed that "The Inter-American Court has also established that as part of the general obligations of States, they have a positive duty to guarantee with respect to individuals subject to their jurisdiction. This entails taking all necessary measures to remove obstacles that may exist so that individuals can enjoy the rights that the Convention recognizes. Consequently, the State's tolerance of circumstances or conditions that prevent individuals from accessing adequate domestic recourses to protect their rights constitutes a violation of Article 1.1 of the Convention […]7." In that of September 7, 2004 (case of [Name19] v. Ecuador), it reiterated that "Article 25.1 of the Convention establishes, in broad terms, the obligation of States to offer all persons subject to their jurisdiction an effective judicial recourse against acts violating their fundamental rights. / (…). From this perspective, it has been noted that for the State to comply with the provisions of said Article 25.1 of the Convention, it is not enough that recourses exist formally, but rather it is essential that they be effective, that is, the person must be afforded the real possibility of filing a simple and prompt recourse that allows them to obtain, as appropriate, the required judicial protection." [See, in a similar vein, the judgments of November 27, 2003 (case of [Name20]); June 7, 2003 (case of [Name21]); November 28, 2002 (case of [Name22]); August 31, 2001 (case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Community of [Name23]); January 31, 2001 (case of the Constitutional Court); November 25, 2000 (case of [Name24]); August 18, 2000 (case of [Name25]); November 19, 1999 (case of the "Street Children" (Case of [Name26] et al.)); September 29, 1999 (case of [Name27]); May 30, 1999 (case of [Name28] et al.); March 8, 1998 (case of the "Panel [Name29]" ([Name30] et al.)); January 24, 1998 (case of [Name31]); November 12, 1997 (case of [Name32]) and November 3, 1997 (case of [Name33])]. In that of August 6, 2008 (Case of [Name34] v. United Mexican States), it specified that "An effective judicial recourse is one capable of producing the result for which it was conceived8, that is, it must be a recourse capable of leading to an analysis by a competent tribunal in order to establish whether or not there has been a violation of human rights and, if so, to provide a remedy9." Finally, in the cited judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of [Name11] and [Name12] v. Argentina), it concretely stated "107. (…) that Article 25.1 of the Convention contemplates the obligation of States Parties to guarantee, to all persons under their jurisdiction, an effective judicial recourse against acts violating their fundamental rights. Said effectiveness implies that, in addition to the formal existence of the recourses, they must yield results or responses to violations of rights contemplated either in the Convention, in the Constitution, or in the laws. In that sense, those recourses that, due to the general conditions of the country or even due to the particular circumstances of a given case, prove to be illusory cannot be considered effective. This can occur, for example, when their uselessness has been demonstrated in practice, because the means to execute their decisions are lacking, or due to any other situation that constitutes a denial of justice. Thus, the process must tend towards the materialization of the protection of the right recognized in the judicial pronouncement through the suitable application of said pronouncement10. / 108. On the other hand, as the Tribunal has previously indicated, when evaluating the effectiveness of recourses, the Court must observe whether the decisions in the judicial proceedings have effectively contributed to ending a rights-violating situation, ensuring the non-repetition of the harmful acts, and guaranteeing the free and full exercise of the rights protected by the Convention11." VIII.- According to Article 41 of the Political Constitution, "Occurring to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be afforded prompt, thorough justice in strict conformity with the laws." Previously (extraordinary session of October 11, 1982), the Full Court, acting as the body charged with constitutional control, highlighted that from this supreme norm derive a series of basic principles to which all persons and competent bodies in the jurisdictional sphere must adjust their actions. By virtue of these, the Legislative Assembly is obligated to enact the necessary legal precepts to regulate the rights of individuals and to establish the appropriate pathways and procedures to procure their effective jurisdictional protection when they have been violated. For their part, the various Tribunals are responsible for interpreting and applying these provisions in a way that does not hinder the proper verification of the grievance and guarantees, should it be proven, the full and timely restoration of those rights. Hence, judges violate the cited constitutional provision when we make access to the stipulated procedures impossible or difficult, or when we reject or deny a petition that we should have granted in a judgment, without any reason or invoking an insufficient or spurious one. In ruling no. 1739-92, of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992, this Chamber held that "At the base of all procedural order lies the principle and, with it, the fundamental right to justice, understood as the existence and availability of a justice administration system, that is to say, a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the jurisdictional function of the State - to declare the controverted right or restore the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially in concrete cases - which in turn comprises a set of independent specialized judicial bodies in that exercise, the availability of that apparatus to resolve conflicts and correct the wrongs that social life originates, in a civilized and effective manner, and guaranteed access to that justice for all persons, under conditions of equality and without discrimination. / a) In this primary sense, then, due process has, first of all, programmatic dimensions, no less legally binding for that, which demand the existence, sufficiency, and efficacy of a judicial and procedural system suitable to guarantee precisely that fundamental right to justice, which is, moreover, nothing more than a consequence of the monopoly of force, assumed by the State, and the most important manifestation of the right to petition, which in Costa Rica is enshrined in Articles 27 - in general - and 41 - in particular - of the Constitution (…). / b) But it also has other implications that are even more immediately enforceable, which may, in turn, pertain to the justice administration system itself, per se, or to the right of access to justice for all persons: / (…) / 2. And belonging to the second - the equal right of all to access justice - in addition to the generic right to petition of Article 27 and the specific right to justice of Article 41 of the Constitution already cited, a series of complementary - but also fundamental - attributes, among which: / (i) the general right and principle of equality - and its counterpart of non-discrimination - set forth in Article 33 of the Constitution, as well as all international instruments on Human Rights, for example Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, with the particularity that the duality of these demonstrates that equality, in addition to being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, so that this right is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights (…); / (ii) in general, universal access to justice for every person, regardless of their sex, age, color, nationality, origin or background, or any other social condition, all of which raises, in turn, consequences that it is not necessary to examine here as they are not directly implicated in the case under consultation, such as the gratuity of justice, informalism, etc." As it concluded in ruling no. 1562-93, of 3:06 p.m. on March 30, 1993, the foregoing "(…) means, in the first place, that due process requires the existence, sufficiency, and efficacy of a judicial and procedural system suitable to guarantee the fundamental right to justice, which is the most important manifestation of the right to petition enshrined in Articles 27 - in general - and 41 - in particular - of the Constitution (…). In the second place, it pertains to the justice administration system itself and the right of access to justice for all persons, which implies that in every procedural system there must be 'reasonableness of the effects' on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on them (…) limitations other than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, and those essential for them to function adequately in society." IX.- In ordinary legislation, this fundamental right is developed, among other precepts, in Article 6 of the Civil Code and in Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. By virtue of the first, "The Tribunals have the inexcusable duty to resolve, in every case, the matters they hear, for which purpose they shall adhere to the established system of sources." Pursuant to the second paragraph of the latter, "Tribunals may not excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from rendering a decision in matters within their competence due to a lack of applicable norm and must do so in accordance with the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources." Indeed, this same provision recognizes, as part of the jurisdictional power, the duty to supply for the absence of legal norms: "The general principles of Law and Jurisprudence shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit. When it is a matter of supplying for the absence, and not the insufficiency, of the provisions regulating a matter, said sources shall have the rank of law." (Emphasis added). Consequently, we, the jurisdictional bodies, are forbidden from alleging the lack of applicable norm(s) to the specific case to excuse ourselves from rendering a decision on the merits of a proceeding like this one. The dogma of the hermetic fullness of the legal system obliges us to resort, in an integrating application, to written and unwritten sources in order to identify and implement the best solution to the controversy raised. On this matter, in ruling no. 36-F-94, of 9:40 a.m. on May 27, 1994, the First Chamber noted that "(…) jurisprudence as a source informing the legal system is called upon to supply, through extensive interpretation, the scope of the norms responsible for resolving legal conflicts when no norm exists for the specific case or it was not conceived for the new legal demands (Article 9 of the Civil Code)." In rulings nos. 112-F-92, of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; 151-F-01, of 3:20 p.m. on February 14, 2001; and 360-F-02, of 11:10 a.m. on May 3, 2002, it stated that "(…) Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 6 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code allow referral to other sources of the legal system and to the General Principles of Law when there is no applicable norm (principle of the hermetic fullness of the legal system); on the other hand, Article 12 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code allows the analogical application of norms provided there is identity of reason and no norm prohibits it." For its part, the Second Chamber, in ruling no. 415, of 9:00 a.m. on December 22, 1994, stated it in the following terms: "(…) in any case, one must resort, in pursuit of the best solution, to analogous situations expressly dealt with, to the general principles of law, such as (…) good faith and equity, and even, as Prof. [Name35] points out in his cited work, to common sense, that is, what people normally have to judge things reasonably (Articles 10 to 12 of the Civil Code, 15 of the Labor Code, and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch)." In ruling no. 2004-200, of 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004, this same body held that Article 6 of the Civil Code "(…) develops a right of a fundamental nature, contained in numeral 41 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees all persons access to justice. Now, to fulfill such a task, Article 12 of that Code must be taken into consideration, according to which the analogical application of norms is permissible when they do not contemplate a specific situation but regulate another similar one in which identity of reason is appreciated, unless a norm prohibits that application. In a case such as the present one, denying all effect to the relationship in question, besides being unjust, means ignoring a reality, not uncommon in our environment, which is the cohabitation of two persons, (…) who were united or are united solely by affective ties, without protection from the legal system. The foregoing constitutes sufficient grounds to, in consideration of the value of justice that inspires the legal system, order the liquidation of the assets acquired and produced during the long relationship, giving the plaintiff what corresponds to her. But also, to resolve the question, in light of the foregoing, a response can be provided to the situation raised by resorting 'mutatis mutandi' to the regulations provided by law for similar institutions." Finally, in ruling no. 769-93, of 3:48 p.m. on February 16, 1993, this Constitutional Chamber acknowledged that "Here, as the consulting Tribunal itself anticipates, one could resort to other regulations (…), or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a determined matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and even analogical application, which the following Article 12 authorizes. It must be added to the above that, in accordance with the first cited norm, a tribunal cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of law applicable to the case raised." Judges [male and female], then, have at their disposal broad possibilities to resolve matters with express norms, with extensive (analogical interpretative) application, and even through the normative re-creation based on another insufficient one. / (…) / The power that Family Law jurisprudence in our country has had is such that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Family Code have their origin in court decisions, including some of a markedly dissenting or minority tone, but not for that reason devoid of justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law indicates to us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is not an exception in this field and it could even be said that it is where this behavior has been most rapidly noted." **X.-** Article 12 of the *Civil Code* stipulates that *"The analogical application of norms shall proceed when these (sic) do not contemplate a specific assumption, but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is appreciated, except when some norm prohibits that application."* In relation to the analogical procedure for integrating positive law, in decision no. 1-F-94, at 3:00 p.m. on January 5, 1994, reiterated in that of the Second Chamber no. [Telf2], at 10:26 a.m. on August 6, 2010, the First Chamber specified that *"III.- (…). From a logical point of view, analogy is understood as a procedure of singular induction from one case to another, by means of which it is sought to extend the validity of a proposition from a given situation to another generically similar one. In antiquity it was known as the "procedure by resemblance". Unlike deductive procedures, in analogical induction the validity of the conclusion is not necessary, but only probable. In other words, in analogy a situation or fact is compared with another situation or fact, and thus an attempt is made to obtain a particular conclusion. The analogical argument is based on those similar aspects or connotations between the situations analyzed, in such a way that the more the essential and not merely accidental aspects of them resemble each other, the more convincing the extensive conclusion made will be. Another similar logical procedure is induction by generalization, in which, starting from several cases, analyzing their particular connotations, a general conclusion is obtained. In generalization, it is not a matter of comparing two particular situations to extend what concerns one to the other, but of analyzing several particular cases to obtain a general conclusion that encompasses all of them. Both types of logical procedures have an undeniable influence regarding legal analogy (…). / IV. After prolonged discussions in the general doctrine of law, it has been admitted, in a majority way, that the legal system can have gaps. These gaps are deficiencies of the law, which does not present a specific provision for a given matter or case. At the same time, it has been accepted that legal systems have the latent capacity to elaborate the pertinent legal precepts, in order to resolve the conflicts of interest present in these cases. Therefore, faced with gaps in the law, the judge [male or female] cannot refuse to rule alleging not finding any norm to apply to the specific case; that would amount to a denial of justice. However, neither does he or she have the power to arbitrarily create the norm applicable to the specific case. In our normative system, the judge [male or female] is of law, not of conscience, and any decision he or she makes must find support in the current legal system. To fill these gaps, our Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, both in its previous text and in the current one, establishes that the courts cannot excuse themselves from resolving due to lack of a norm, and by establishing that in such a case one shall resort to the general principles of law in the absence of a legal norm, it does not exclude that before resorting to this interpretive criterion, analogy, regulated by articles 12 and 13 of the Civil Code, cannot be used to apply a written norm established for a similar legal situation to the case raised. By means of this procedure, it is sought to apply a legal principle that the law establishes for a certain hypothesis, to another fact not expressly regulated, but which presents its same legal essence. These are situations in which there is no identity of fact, but a substantial similarity so relevant that it justifies the application of the norm established for the case contemplated by the legislator to that lacking regulation. The application of analogy is justified by the need to regulate similar facts, according to the principle of legal equality, with similar norms. The main problem will be, in these cases, to determine whether between both situations there exist legal similarities of such an entity as to permit the analogical extension of the known norm. This problem cannot be resolved mechanically or with merely logical criteria; it is, rather, a legal assessment made by the judge [male or female], in which it is determined whether the factual elements contemplated in the known norm, which motivated the establishment of a given provision by the legislator (in accordance with the ratio legis), are also present in the similar situation taken into consideration. It may be that the fact considered has certain essential elements that characterize it and other accidental or contingent ones that accompany it. The important thing is that there is correspondence between the essential elements of the foreseen fact and those of the unregulated situation. Legal analogy is usually classified into two types: analogia legis, in which, to resolve the unforeseen case, a singular normative provision is used; and analogia iuris, which does not take a single norm as its starting point, but a series of provisions, from which it induces a general principle. Both procedures obey the reasoning schemes analyzed in the preceding recital (considerando): the legis corresponds to induction by analogy and the iuris to induction by generalization. The doctrine considers the recourse to the general principles of law, which can only be obtained through generalization, as a case of analogia iuris. To proceed to the analogical interpretation of norms, the following is necessary: 1- that a precise legal provision be lacking for the controversial case, so analogical application would not be possible where there are express legal precepts or from which a solution to the raised case can be deduced through extensive interpretation; 2- that there exists an essential legal similarity between the regulated case and the one to be regulated, which must be determined by the judge [male or female], after an assessment of both situations; 3- that it does not concern those situations in which, given the nature of the provision to be applied, analogy is improper. Regarding this last requirement, legal praxis has elaborated some relevant principles, which have often been expressly adopted by legislation. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite the following: 1- It is not possible to apply by analogy prohibitive and punitive laws, as they are of a restrictive nature; 2- it is also not possible when dealing with norms that limit the capacity of the person or subjective rights, as it is a hateful matter (materia odiosa); 3- in the case of "ius singulare" (exceptional law), by its very nature, as it obeys a particular reason for regulation, this type of normative application does not proceed; and, 4- in the case of temporary norms, analogy also does not proceed, as they are determined for a momentary circumstance. / V. Of the assumptions that prevent the application of analogy, it is appropriate to refer (…), to the impossibility of applying in an extensive manner those norms of ius singulare. In doctrine, this category is contrasted with ius regulare. The latter is formed by norms characterized by the correspondence of their foundations to the general principles of the legal system; in other words, their directives, presuppositions, and foundations do not depart from the general lines of Law. On the contrary, ius singulare, also called exceptional, is inspired by rules diverse from those that characterize the normative system in general. On occasions, given the need to provide special protection for certain persons, or to safeguard a particular interest of legal transactions, or to resolve some special cases with particular equity criteria, or due to emerging needs from extraordinary circumstances, it becomes necessary to sacrifice general principles, establishing provisions that exclude some persons or legal relationships from the application of the normal consequences for certain acts, or establishing special sanctions or responsibilities not foreseen for normal cases. Thus, singular law represents a deviation from the general norms that govern the system, which is necessary for peculiar reasons of convenience that demand such treatment. Therefore, in such cases, the application by analogy of exceptional norms or ius singulare to those cases not expressly contemplated by the norms is not possible. / VI.- In our Civil Code, the analogical application of norms is regulated by articles 12 and 13, located in its Preliminary Title. According to Article 12, the analogical interpretation of norms is possible "... when they do not contemplate a specific assumption, but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is appreciated, except when some norm prohibits that application". Thus, the general principle of analogical application is established in those cases where there is an identical "ratio legis". For its part, Article 13 excludes analogical application in the case of criminal, exceptional, and temporary laws. In this way, our Civil Code allows this method of integrating the Law according to the doctrinal guidelines outlined in the preceding recitals (considerandos)."* (See, also, the decision of the First Chamber no. 167-F-S1-2010, at 8:40 a.m. on January 29, 2010).- **XI.-** Now then, if, as the Constitutional Chamber affirmed in the cited decision no. [Telf1], at 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, *"(…) the prohibition contained in the challenged norm [subsection 6 of Article 14 of the Family Code] refers specifically to the institution called marriage (…)."*; if it does not violate the Political Constitution because there is no *"(…) impediment of any nature for the existence of homosexual unions. Rather, there is empirical verification to indicate that they have (sic) increased."* and if it *"(…) is not appropriate to apply the normative framework developed for marriage under the terms currently conceived in our constitutional order."*; what would then be the normative framework we would have to draw upon to decide the merits of this proceeding. Bear in mind that, despite it having been pointed out on that occasion that the problem raised *"(…) does not lie in the norm challenged here but, rather, in the absence of an appropriate normative regulation, to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of that type of union, especially if they meet conditions of stability and singularity, because an imperative of legal certainty, if not (sic) of justice, makes it necessary. We are, then, in the presence of a lege ferenda scenario, but not by any stretch of the imagination an illegitimate omission by the State. This is indicated, furthermore, because in the documentation attached to the file (sic), and according to what was expressed in the oral hearing held during the substantiation of this process, some countries have been enacting laws (in a formal sense) that have provided a legal framework and certain formalities to these unions, with the purpose of them having specific legal effects in relation to the persons who enter into them […and…], to which (…) the legal framework that the derivative constituent power organized for the treatment of heterosexual couples cannot be applied."* (The bold text is added); on a more recent date that same body evidenced that *"(…) the normative gap pointed out by […that…] Constitutional Court in the aforementioned Judgment, is […maintained…], with which the reasons given (ratio decidendi) by […the…] specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in matters of constitutionality control, to consider that numeral 14, subsection 6, of the Family Code is in conformity with the Law of the Constitution, are […being…] indirectly disregarded."* (Decision no. 2010-13313, at 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010). And it is not superfluous to mention that in that last pronouncement, it synthesized its criteria on the topic in the terms set forth below: *"From this judgment [it refers to no. [Telf1], previously cited] several aspects of importance for resolving the sub-lite remain clear, which are the following: / 1°) Relations between persons of the same sex are a social reality that cannot be ignored or circumvented. / 2°) It is necessary to regulate, legislatively, the patrimonial and personal effects of such relations between persons of the same sex. / 3°) There exists a normative vacuum by the ordinary legislator (sic) that must be filled, given that the institution of marriage cannot be applied to relations between persons of the same sex. / 4°) The ordinary legislator (sic) must dictate a legal framework that regulates the legal consequences of such relations between persons of the same sex. This Judgment, by virtue of what is provided in Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, has erga omnes effects, for all constituted powers, precisely, for that reason, the ordinary legislator (sic) assumed the task of discussing the opportunity and convenience of regulating relations between persons of the same sex."* (The bold text and underlining do not appear in the original document). It is also not possible to fail to highlight that, as a result of the political events known to all, it does not seem foreseeable that, in the short or medium term, this state of affairs can change, especially after last June 6, the Special Permanent Commission on Human Rights of the Legislative Assembly, chaired by Deputy ***** ******, issued a negative majority opinion on the bill for the *Law of Cohabitation Partnerships* (No. 17,668), presented since April 13, 2010, by the former legislator [Nombre36] and the then legislators [Nombre37], [Nombre38], [Nombre39], and [Nombre40] and published in La Gaceta No. 120 of June 22 of that same year. And what has been pointed out is not altered by the fact that, one day after the pronouncement of that Commission, the initiative was presented again to the Secretariat of the Legislative Directorate by Deputies [Nombre41] and [Nombre42] and Deputies [Nombre43] and [Nombre44] (No. 18,481). Consider, moreover, that the topic has been in the legislative pipeline since September 27, 2006, on which date [Nombre36], [Nombre37], and [Nombre38] presented the bill for the *Law of Civil Union between Persons of the Same Sex* (No. 16,390), published in La Gaceta No. 214 of November 8, 2006, which ended up archived on September 22, 2010.- **XII.-** Without a doubt, in this specific matter submitted for our decision, both the determination of the competent jurisdictional order to process it and that of the substantive normative framework to be resorted to in order to integrate the current legal system are at stake. As, in our opinion, the condition of the homosexual couple as a family group is undeniable, it falls to the family jurisdiction to hear and definitively rule on its personal and patrimonial consequences. Indeed, we are convinced that, as the non-heterosexual persons who comprise it are also holders of the fundamental rights to equal treatment, to the protection of their family, and to effective judicial protection, they have the full right to that recognition in this venue. Consider, moreover, that, by virtue of those same fundamental rights, no distinction whatsoever can be made, especially if what is taken into account is sexual orientation, at the moment of guaranteeing them effective access to the judicial system so that the bodies specialized in family matters can study their claim and, through a reasoned and founded judgment, accept it or reject it and thus resolve their conflict. It is not superfluous to evidence, furthermore, that, no matter how much it is considered impossible to apply the regulations of marriage in these cases, no infraction of the reinforced protection contained in Article 52 of the *Political Constitution* is committed by recognizing such effects to the relationship of a couple between subjects of the same sex. Therefore, and in order not to cause defenselessness and lack of protection to the parties, the accreditation of their public, stable, prolonged, and singular cohabitation would thus be sufficient to justify the recognition sought. Denying it for lack of a specific norm is not only incongruent with the family legal system, but also constitutes a breach of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (see, in similar terms, the decision of the Second Chamber no. 2003-143, at 9:30 a.m. on March 26, 2003).- **XIII.-** In support of our thesis, we consider it essential to bring up the arguments set forth by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in the judgment of December 1, 2005, issued within the framework of the cases *“Minister of Home Affairs v. [Nombre45]” (Case C.C.T. 60/04)* and *“Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs” (Case BAC1)*, by means of which it annulled the heterosexual clause of the marriage regime, extended it to any couple, regardless of their sexual or gender identity or their sexual orientation, and granted Parliament a period of twelve months to adapt its legislation so that same-sex couples could access the *National Law on Marriage*. In line with the line set forth subsequently by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that foreign body, with opinion written by Justice Albie Sachs, specified then *"(…) that the harm to same-sex couples exceeds the deprivations of material goods (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 72, among many others). The definition of marriage that excludes them suggests not only that their commitment, relationship, and love is inferior, but that these persons can never be part of the community that the Constitution promises to create with equality for all (judgment, paragraph No. 71). These couples are not valued with the same respect that is granted to heterosexual couples (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 81, among many others). The exclusion of the benefits and responsibilities of marriage is not a small and tangential inconvenience but represents a radical way of indirectly saying that homosexual couples are outsiders (Idem). The statements of the constitutional court reflect that discrimination operates, firstly, from an undue exclusion of different couples from all the material benefits and protections that marriage brings with it and, secondly, from the construction of a different status as members of the community, a devalued status due to the chosen sexual orientation."* [[Nombre46], [Nombre47] (2007). Marriage and Sexual Diversity: The South African Lesson. *Anuario de Derechos Humanos*, Santiago: 3, p. 95. Retrieved on June 28, 2008, from http://www.anuariocdh.uchile.cl/index.php/ADH/article/viewFile/13460/13729]. Hence *"(…) the State cannot remove certain couples from the protection that the laws grant to others united in marriage, since the deprivation of these rights and the correlative stigmatization it provokes limit and condition to a great extent the choice and materialization of life plans. In this line, the Constitutional Court affirmed that given the importance and centrality that our societies attribute to marriage and its consequences in our culture, denying this right to same-sex couples represents denying their right to self-definition in a profound way (judgment, paragraph No. 72). Likewise, in one of its most prominent passages, the judgment remarks that the Constitution of South Africa grants rights that go beyond the respect for a private sphere alien to state interference, and that the litigants are not claiming a right to be 'left alone' by the State, but rather a right to be recognized as equals and treated with dignity by the law (judgment, paragraph No. 78)."* [ *Ibid*, p. 98].- **XIV.-** In summary, if, as the Second Section of the Second Superior Civil Court pointed out at the time, regarding the de facto heterosexual union when it was considered by some social sectors as *"(…) an illicit act contrary to good customs and marriage (…)"*, the truth is *"(…) times are changing and jurisprudence must now fill the gap that the Legal System has by not protecting relations of such a nature."*, because, *"It is not possible, in accordance with the principles of equity and justice, to disregard the joint effort made by two persons who unite in that way (…)."* (Decision no. 358, at 8:35 a.m. on June 16, 1987), it is unquestionable that there exists the same reason [*"Principle: 'ubi eadem ratio, idem jus' (Where the reason is the same, the law is the same), contemplated in Article 12 of the Civil Code (…)."* (Decision of the Second Chamber no. 2003-502, at 3:30 p.m. on September 17, 2003)] to recognize civil and patrimonial consequences to the decision of two homosexual subjects to establish a bond with characteristics similar to conjugal ones, especially when full validity is given to the criterion according to which *"(…) the legislative power is subject to the limits established 'by treaties, in accordance with the principles of International Law'. It is thus that the human rights established in the instruments of Public International Law –Declarations and Conventions on the matter–, constitute a substantial barrier to the freedom of configuration of the legislator (sic), both ordinary and, eminently, popular through referendum. This Constitutional Court has indicated that the human rights enshrined in international instruments have, even, and in accordance with the provisions of Article 48 of the Constitution, a supra-constitutional rank when they offer greater protection to persons. Moreover, this Constitutional Court in Decision No. [Telf3] at 11:40 a.m. on April 4, 2003, considered that even the amending power or derivative constituent power –as a constituted power– is limited by the essential content of fundamental and human rights, so that, by means of a partial reform to the constitution, the essential content of those cannot be reduced or curtailed. It should be added that an implicit limit to the freedom of configuration of the ordinary or sovereign legislator (sic) is constituted by the very Law of the Constitution or constitutionality block formed by constitutional principles, values, precepts, and jurisprudence. It is necessary to add that the rights of minorities, due to their inalienable character, constitute an eminently technical-legal matter, which must be in the hands of the ordinary legislator (sic) and not of the majorities prone to their denial."* (Decision no. 2010-13313, at 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010).- **XV.-** Regarding the value of international instruments in the system of sources of the Costa Rican legal system and, in particular, of the pronouncements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in decision no. 2313-95, at 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, that body accurately pointed out that *"(…) if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural body for interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and reviewing national laws in light of this normative framework, whether in a contentious case or in a mere advisory opinion, will have -in principle- the same value as the interpreted norm.* Not only an ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis we now maintain, moreover, is received in our law, when the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) provides that unwritten norms—such as custom, jurisprudence, and general principles of law—shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal order and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (Article 7.l.).” **XVI.-** The *Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, adopted by the International Panel of Experts in International Human Rights Law and on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, at the meeting held from November 6 to 9, 2006, establish the basic standards for the United Nations Organization and its Member States to advance in guaranteeing the necessary protections for non-heterosexual persons (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and transgender). Its preamble recognizes that *“Sexual orientation and gender identity are integral to every person’s dignity and humanity and must not be grounds for discrimination or abuse.”* According to its first principle, *“All human beings, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity, are entitled to the full enjoyment of all human rights.”* The second stipulates that *“All persons are entitled to enjoy all human rights, without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. The law shall prohibit any such discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any such discrimination.”* In accordance with the third, *“A person’s self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity are integral to their personality and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom. No person shall be forced to undergo medical procedures as a requirement for the legal recognition of their gender identity. No person shall be subjected to pressure to conceal, suppress or deny their sexual orientation or gender identity.”* And, finally, the 24th recognizes the right of every person *“(…) to found a family, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. Families exist in diverse forms. No family may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of the sexual orientation or gender identity of any of its members.”* To that end, States: *“E. Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure that in States that recognize same-sex registered partnerships, any entitlement, privilege, obligation or benefit available to different-sex couples is available on an equal basis to same-sex couples; / F. Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure that any obligation, entitlement, privilege or benefit that is available to different-sex unmarried couples is available on an equal basis to same-sex unmarried couples; (…).”* In 2008, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States unanimously adopted resolution AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08) on *Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, by which the protection of human rights was extended to gender identity and sexual orientation. In that declaration, the 34 member countries reaffirmed the universality, indivisibility, and interdependence of human rights and expressed their concern regarding acts of violence and related human rights violations committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. In the following years, that international organization issued similar resolutions: AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10), and AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11). Finally, on December 18, 2008, the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, France, Gabon, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands presented to the United Nations General Assembly the text of the *Declaration on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, which reaffirms the principle of universality of human rights and that of non-discrimination, which requires that they apply equally to all human beings regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Furthermore, it expresses deep concern over human rights violations and fundamental freedoms based on sexual orientation or gender identity and over the violence, harassment, discrimination, exclusion, stigmatization, and prejudice directed against persons from all countries in the world because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and because these practices undermine the integrity and dignity of those subjected to such abuses; it condemns human rights violations based on sexual orientation or gender identity wherever they occur; it calls upon all States and relevant international human rights mechanisms to commit to promoting and protecting the human rights of all persons, regardless of their sexual orientation and gender identity, and urges States to take all necessary measures, particularly legislative or administrative, to ensure that sexual orientation or gender identity may under no circumstances be the basis for criminal penalties. Costa Rica is one of the 85 signatory countries of the *Joint Statement on Ending Acts of Violence and Related Human Rights Violations Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, presented by Colombia before the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. In January of this year, the United Nations Secretary-General, [Name48], highlighted that discrimination due to sexual orientation or gender identity is one of the injustices that many States have ignored or even approved. *“As a result, some governments treat these people as second-class citizens or even criminals. Confronting this discrimination is a challenge. But we must live up to the ideals of the Universal Declaration.”* **XVII.-** Recently, in the cited judgment of February 24 of the current year, issued in the Case of [Name2] and [Name3] v. Chile, in which it reiterated the obligation of the States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights (*Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos*) to respect and guarantee *“without any discrimination”* the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established that sexual orientation and gender identity are categories protected by that international instrument under the term *“other social condition”*, contained in its Article 1, paragraph 1. On this matter, it specified the following: *“78. The Court has established that Article 1.1 of the Convention is a norm of a general nature whose content extends to all provisions of the treaty, and provides for the obligation of States Parties to respect and guarantee the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein ‘without any discrimination.’ That is, whatever its origin or form, any treatment that may be considered discriminatory regarding the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed in the Convention is per se incompatible with it. / 79. (…) the Court has indicated that the notion of equality derives directly from the oneness of the human family and is inseparable from the essential dignity of the person, against which any situation is incompatible that, by considering a certain group superior, leads to treating it with privilege; or that, conversely, by considering it inferior, treats it with hostility or in any way discriminates against it in the enjoyment of rights that are recognized for those not considered to be in such a situation. The Court’s jurisprudence has also indicated that in the current stage of the evolution of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination has entered the domain of jus cogens. The legal framework of national and international public order rests upon it and it permeates the entire legal system.”* It further specified that, as a consequence, no norm, decision, or practice of domestic law, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, can diminish or restrict, in any way, the rights of a person because of their sexual orientation. On the contrary, the proscription of discrimination based on sexual orientation entails the obligation for all authorities and officials to guarantee that they may enjoy each and every one of the rights established in the Convention. *“80. Furthermore, the Tribunal has established that States must refrain from carrying out actions that are in any way aimed, directly or indirectly, at creating situations of de jure or de facto discrimination. States are obliged to adopt positive measures to reverse or change discriminatory situations existing in their societies to the detriment of a specific group of persons. This implies the special duty of protection that the State must exercise with respect to actions and practices of third parties that, under its tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain, or favor discriminatory situations.”“82. (…) Article 24 of the American Convention prohibits discrimination in law or in fact, not only regarding the rights enshrined in said treaty, but in regard to all laws approved by the State and their application. In other words, if a State discriminates in the respect for or guarantee of a conventional right, it would violate the obligation established in Article 1.1 and the substantive right in question. If, on the contrary, the discrimination refers to unequal protection of domestic law or its application, the fact must be analyzed in light of Article 24 of the American Convention.”* *“83. The Court has established, like the European Court of Human Rights, that human rights treaties are living instruments, whose interpretation must accompany the evolution of the times and current living conditions. Such evolutive interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation enshrined in Article 29 of the American Convention, as well as those established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.” “84. In this regard, when interpreting the expression ‘any other social condition’ of Article 1.1. of the Convention, the alternative most favorable to the protection of the rights protected by said treaty must always be chosen, according to the principle of the norm most favorable to the human being.” “85. The specific criteria by virtue of which discrimination is prohibited, according to Article 1.1 of the American Convention, are not an exhaustive or limiting list but merely illustrative. On the contrary, the wording of said article leaves the criteria open by including the term ‘other social condition’ to thus incorporate other categories that may not have been explicitly indicated. The expression ‘any other social condition’ of Article 1.1. of the Convention must be interpreted by the Court, consequently, from the perspective of the option most favorable to the person and the evolution of fundamental rights in contemporary international law.” “86. In this respect, within the Inter-American System, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (hereinafter ‘OAS’) has approved, since 2008 in its annual sessions, four successive resolutions regarding the protection of persons against discriminatory treatment based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, through which the adoption of concrete measures for effective protection against discriminatory acts has been demanded.” “87. Regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited category of discrimination, the European Court of Human Rights has indicated that sexual orientation is an ‘other condition’ mentioned in Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ‘European Convention’), which prohibits discriminatory treatment. In particular, in the Case of [Name49] v. Portugal, the European Court concluded that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14 of the European Convention. Furthermore, it reiterated that the list of categories set forth in said article is illustrative and not exhaustive. Likewise, in the Case of [Name50] v. the United Kingdom, the European Court reiterated that sexual orientation, as one of the categories that can be included under ‘other condition,’ is another specific example of those found in that list, which are considered personal characteristics in the sense that they are innate or inherent to the person.” “88. Within the framework of the Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have classified sexual orientation as one of the prohibited categories of discrimination considered in Article 2.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 2.2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee indicated in the case of [Name51] v. Australia that the reference to the category ‘sex’ would include the sexual orientation of persons. Equally, the Human Rights Committee has expressed its concern regarding various discriminatory situations related to the sexual orientation of persons, which has been repeatedly expressed in its concluding observations to the reports submitted by States.” “89. For its part, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights determined that sexual orientation can be framed under ‘other social condition.’ Likewise, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Committee against Torture have made references within the framework of their general observations and recommendations regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as one of the prohibited categories of discrimination.” “90. On December 22, 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the ‘Declaration on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,’ reaffirming the ‘principle of non-discrimination, which requires that human rights apply equally to every human being regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity.’ Likewise, on March 22, 2011, the ‘Joint Statement on Ending Acts of Violence and Related Human Rights Violations Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ was presented before the United Nations Human Rights Council. On June 15, 2011, this same Council approved a resolution on ‘human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity’ in which it expressed ‘grave concern at acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.’ The prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation has also been highlighted in numerous reports by United Nations special rapporteurs.” “91. Bearing in mind the general obligations of respect and guarantee established in Article 1.1 of the American Convention, the interpretation criteria set forth in Article 29 of said Convention, the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Resolutions of the OAS General Assembly, the standards established by the European Tribunal and the United Nations bodies (supra paras. 83 to 90), the Inter-American Court establishes that the sexual orientation and gender identity of persons are categories protected by the Convention. Therefore, any discriminatory norm, act, or practice based on a person’s sexual orientation is proscribed by the Convention. Consequently, no norm, decision, or practice of domestic law, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, can diminish or restrict, in any way, the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation.” “92. Regarding the State’s argument that on the date of the issuance of the Supreme Court’s judgment there would not have been a consensus regarding sexual orientation as a prohibited category of discrimination, the Court highlights that the alleged lack of consensus within some countries on full respect for the rights of sexual minorities cannot be considered a valid argument to deny or restrict their human rights or to perpetuate and reproduce the historical and structural discrimination that these minorities have suffered. The fact that this could be a controversial matter in some sectors and countries, and that it is not necessarily a matter of consensus, cannot lead the Tribunal to abstain from deciding, since in doing so it must refer solely and exclusively to the stipulations of the international obligations contracted by sovereign decision of the States through the American Convention.” “93. A right that is recognized for persons cannot be denied or restricted to anyone and under any circumstance based on their sexual orientation. This would violate Article 1.1 of the American Convention. The inter-American instrument proscribes discrimination, in general, including categories such as sexual orientation, which cannot serve as a basis to deny or restrict any of the rights established in the Convention.”* **XVIII.-** This Constitutional Chamber has also recognized that sexual orientation is a vector of social and personal discrimination and has highlighted the role of public authorities in combating it. In decision (voto) no. 2007-18660, of 11:17 a.m. on December 21, 2007, it specified this in the following terms: *“Through its jurisprudential line, this Chamber has recognized as a fundamental legal principle contained in the Political Constitution of Costa Rica, respect for the dignity of every human being and, consequently, the absolute prohibition against carrying out any type of discrimination contrary to that dignity. To discriminate, in general terms, is to differentiate to the detriment of the rights and dignity of a human being or group of them; in this case, of homosexuals.”* Based on the foregoing, it can be validly affirmed that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is contrary to the concept of dignity enshrined in the Political Constitution and in the International Treaties on Human Rights, subscribed to by our country. By way of example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits in its article 26 the discrimination on grounds of "race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinions or any other social condition" (sic). In the number 2010-13313, the following sentences were handed down: a 16: 99, paragraphs 115, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108. ↩ Based on the foregoing, it can be validly affirmed that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is contrary to the concept of dignity enshrined in the Political Constitution and in the International Treaties on Human Rights, subscribed to by our country. By way of example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits in its article 26 the discrimination on grounds of "race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinions or any other social condition" (sic). In the number 2010-13313, the following sentences were handed down: a 16: 99, paragraphs 115, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108. ↩ Even though we cannot be certain of whether the definition of "race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinions or any other social condition" is contrary to the concept of dignity enshrined in the Political Constitution and in the International Treaties on Human Rights, subscribed to by our country. By way of example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits in its article 26 the discrimination on grounds of "race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinions or any other social condition" (sic). In the number 2010-13313, the following sentences were handed down: a 16: 99, paragraphs 115, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108. ↩ [Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-16/99, párr. 115, 115, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108. ↩ Based on the foregoing, it can be validly affirmed that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is contrary to the concept of dignity enshrined in the Political Constitution and in the International Treaties on Human Rights, subscribed to by our country. By way of example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits in its article 26 the discrimination on grounds of "race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinions or any other social condition" (sic). In the number 2010-13313, the following sentences were handed down: a 16: 99, paragraphs 115, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108, 108. ↩ [Cfr. Caso [Nombre49] y otros (“Corte Primera de lo Contencioso Administrativo”) Vs. Venezuela. Excepción preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 5 de agosto de 2008. Serie C No. 182, párr. 209 y Opinión Consultiva OC-4/84, supra nota 12, párr. 271. ↩ [Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03 del 17 de septiembre de 2003. Serie A No. 18, párr. 101 y Caso Comunidad Indígena [Nombre67], supra nota 12, párr. 271. ↩ [Cfr. Caso [Nombre71] Vs. Polonia, (No. 13102/02), Sentencia de 2 de marzo de 2010. Final, 2 de junio de 2010, párr. 92; Caso [Nombre72]. Vs. Reino Unido, (No. 37060/06), Sentencia de 28 de septiembre de 2010. Final, 28 de diciembre de 2010, párr. [Dirección12], y Caso [Nombre73] Vs. Russia, (No. 4916/07, 25924/08 y 14599/09), Sentencia de 21 de octubre de 2010. Final, 11 de abril de 2011, párr. 108 ("The Court reiterates that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14")).]

[26] Cfr. E.C.H.R., Case [Name50] v. United Kingdom, (No. 7205/07), Judgment of 13 July 2010. Final, 22 November 2010, para. 57 (“the Court has considered to constitute [‘]other status[’] characteristics which, like some of the specific examples listed in the Article, can be said to be personal in the sense that they are innate or inherent). However, the European Court did not decide to thereby limit the concept of “other status” to characteristics that are inherent or innate to the person. Cfr. E.C.H.R., Case [Name50], supra note 26, para. 58 (“However, in finding violations of Article 14 in a number of other cases, the Court has accepted that “status” existed where the distinction relied upon did not involve a characteristic which could be said to be innate or inherent, and thus [‘]personal[’] in the sense discussed above”).

[27] Article 2.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

[28] Article 2.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee the exercise of the rights enunciated in it, without discrimination of any kind on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

[29] United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, 4 April 1992, para. 8.7 (“The State party has sought the Committee's guidance as to whether sexual orientation may be considered an "other status" for the purposes of article 26. The same issue could arise under article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. The Committee confines itself to noting, however, that in its view, the reference to "sex" in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as including sexual orientation”). Likewise, see X v. Colombia, Communication No. 1361/2005, CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005, 14 May 2007, para. 7.2. (“The Committee recalls its earlier jurisprudence that the prohibition against discrimination under article 26 comprises also discrimination based on sexual orientation”). In the same vein, Human Rights Committee, [Name74] v. Australia, Communication No. 941/2000, CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000, 18 September 2003, para. 10.4. See also United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations, Poland, CCPR/C/79/Add.110, 25 July 1999, para. 23.

[30] Cfr., inter alia, United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations, Chile, CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5, 17 April 2007, para. 16 (“While noting with satisfaction the repeal of provisions criminalizing homosexual relations between consenting adults, the Committee remains concerned about discrimination against certain persons on account of their sexual orientation, inter alia, before the courts and in access to health (articles 2 and 26 of the Covenant). The State party should guarantee all persons equality of the rights established in the Covenant, regardless of their sexual orientation, including equality before the law and in access to health services. It should also implement awareness-raising programs to combat social prejudice”); Concluding observations, Barbados, CCPR/C/BRB/CO/3, 14 May 2007, para. 13 (“The Committee expresses concern about discrimination suffered by homosexuals in the State Party and, in particular, the criminalization of consensual sexual acts between same-sex adults (art. 26)”); Concluding observations, United States of America, CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, 18 December 2006, para. 25 (“It also notes with concern that discrimination in employment on grounds of sexual orientation has not been prohibited in many states (arts. 2 and 26). The State party should accept its legal obligation under articles 2 and 26 to guarantee all persons the rights protected by the Covenant, as well as equality before the law and equal protection of the law, without discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation”); Concluding observations, El Salvador, CCPR/CO/78/SLV, 22 August 2003, para. 16 (“The Committee expresses concern about cases of persons attacked, and even killed, on account of their sexual orientation (article 9), the low number of investigations into these unlawful acts, and the existence of provisions (such as local “Contraventional Ordinances”) used to discriminate against persons because of their sexual orientation (article 26)”).

[31] Cfr. United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20. Non-discrimination and economic, social and cultural rights (article 2, paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009, para. 32 (“In ‘other social status,’ as stated in article 2.2 of the Covenant, sexual orientation is included”). Cfr. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18. The right to work, E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, para. 12 (“by virtue of paragraph 2 of article 2, as well as article 3, the Covenant proscribes any discrimination in access to and maintenance of employment on grounds of […] sexual orientation”); General Comment No. 15. The right to water (articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, para. 13 (“the Covenant proscribes any discrimination on grounds of […] sexual orientation”); General Comment No. 14. The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 18 (“By virtue of paragraph 2 of article 2 and article 3, the Covenant prohibits any discrimination regarding access to health care and the underlying determinants of health, as well as to the means and entitlements for achieving them, on grounds of […] sexual orientation”).

[32] Cfr. United Nations, Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 3. HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child, CRC/GC/2003/3, 17 March 2003, para. 8 (“discrimination based on sexual preferences is of concern”); General Comment No. 4. Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC/GC/2003/4, 21 July 2003, para. 6 (“States Parties have the obligation to ensure that all human beings below 18 enjoy all the rights set forth in the Convention, without discrimination (art. 2), irrespective of ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.’ Sexual orientation should also be added”).

[33] Cfr. United Nations, Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2. Implementation of article 2 by States Parties, CAT/C/GC/2, 24 January 2008, paras. 20 and 21 (“The principle of non-discrimination is a basic and general principle in the protection of human rights and fundamental to the interpretation and application of the Convention. […] States Parties must ensure that, within the framework of the obligations they have undertaken under the Convention, their laws are applied in practice to all persons, whatever their […] sexual orientation”)] and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women [Cfr. United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 27 on older women and protection of their human rights, CEDAW/C/GC/27, 16 December 2010, para. 13 (“The discrimination suffered by older women is often multidimensional, with age discrimination compounded by discrimination based on […] sexual orientation”) and Draft General Recommendation No. 28 concerning article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 December 2010, para. 18 (“Discrimination against women based on sex and gender is inextricably linked to other factors affecting women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste, sexual orientation”).

[34] United Nations, Declaration on human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, United Nations General Assembly, A/63/635, 22 December 2008, para. 3.

[35] United Nations, Joint statement on ending acts of violence, and related human rights violations, directed against persons because of their sexual orientation and gender identity, presented by Colombia at the 16th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 22 March 2011. Available at: http://www.iglhrc.org/binary-data/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/494-1.pdf (last accessed 22 February 2012).

[36] United Nations, Human Rights Council, Resolution on human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1, 15 June 2011.

[37] Cfr., among other reports, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, E/CN.4/2004/49, 16 February 2004, paras. 32 and 38 (“International human rights norms prohibit any discrimination in access to health care and its underlying determinants, as well as to the means and entitlements for achieving them, on grounds of sexual orientation [...]. International human rights law completely excludes discrimination based on sexual orientation”). See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, A/HRC/6/5, 20 July 2007, para. 28; Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Mission to Brazil, E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3, 28 February 2006, para. 40; Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Integration of the human rights of women and the gender perspective: violence against women, Interconnections between violence against women and HIV/AIDS, E/CN.4/2005/72, 17 January 2005, paras. 27 and 58; Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Civil and political rights, in particular questions related to disappearances and summary executions, E/CN.4/2003/3, 13 January 2003, paras. 66 and 67; Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, A/57/138, 2 July 2002, para. 37; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the question of human rights defenders, E/CN.4/2001/94, 26 January 2001, para. 89. g); Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and civil unions ("de facto unions (uniones concubinarias)") of same-sex couples. In 2009, through Law No. 18.590, (Official Gazette No. 27837, 26 October 2009), joint adoption by couples in a civil union was authorized.

[38] According to various sources of international and comparative law, this discrimination against the Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual and Intersexual community (hereinafter “LGTBI”) is unacceptable because: i) sexual orientation constitutes an essential aspect of a person's identity (infra para. 139). Likewise: ii) the LGTBI community has been historically discriminated against and the use of stereotypes in dealing with that community is common. Cfr. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, E/CN.4/2004/49, 16 February 2004, para. 33 (“discrimination and stigmatization continue to represent a serious threat to the sexual and reproductive health of many groups, such as […] sexual minorities”); Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, E/CN.4/2004/56, 23 December 2003, para. 64 (“Attitudes and beliefs deriving from myths and fears related to HIV/AIDS and sexuality contribute to the stigmatization and discrimination against sexual minorities. Furthermore, the perception that members of these minorities do not respect sexual boundaries or question dominant concepts of the roles attributed to each sex seems to contribute to their vulnerability to torture as a way of ‘punishing’ their unaccepted behaviour”). Moreover: iii) they constitute a minority for whom it is much more difficult to remove discrimination in spheres such as the legislative one, as well as to avoid negative repercussions in the interpretation of norms by officials of the executive or legislative branches, and in access to justice. Cfr. Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Civil and political rights, in particular questions related to: the independence of the judiciary, the administration of justice, impunity, Mission to Brazil, E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.3, 22 February 2005, para. 28 (“Transvestites, transsexuals and homosexuals are also frequently victims of episodes of violence and discrimination. When they resort to the judicial system, they often encounter the same prejudices and stereotypes of society reproduced there”), and Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-481 of 9 September 1998. Finally: iv) sexual orientation does not constitute a rational criterion for the rational and equitable distribution or allocation of goods, rights, or social burdens. Cfr. Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-481 of 9 September 1998, para. 25. In this judgment, regarding the right of public-school teachers not to be dismissed because of their homosexual condition, the Colombian Constitutional Court indicated that separating a teacher from their job for that reason is based “on a prejudice without any empirical basis, which denotes the unjust stigmatization that has affected this population and that has been invoked to impose burdens or deprive them of rights, to the detriment of their possibilities of participation in such relevant spheres of social and economic life” (para. 29). For its part, Judgment C-507 of 1999 declared unconstitutional a rule that established homosexuality as a disciplinary offense in the military forces. In Judgment C-373 of 2002, the Constitutional Court of Colombia declared unconstitutional a rule that established as a ground of ineligibility for the position of notary public, having been sanctioned disciplinarily for the offense of “homosexuality”.

------------------------- Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid: 73, January/April, 2005, p.132.", "tipoResolucion": "On the Merits", "temasEstrategicos": [ "Gender Perspective", "Human Rights", "Access to Justice", "Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights" ], "redactor": "Luis Héctor Amoretti Orozco", "expediente": "090014000165FA", "hora": "15:02", "esProtegida": "1", "esCambioCriterio": "0", "esNotaSeparada": "0", "esResolucionClave": "0", "claseAsunto": "Expedited proceeding for recognition of a de facto union (unión de hecho)", "tipoTexto": "1", "subNumeroDocumento": "1", "contenidosInteresOrden": "4", "despachoOrden": "54", "normas": [ { "norm_nom": "Constitución Política", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Constitución Política", "art_id": "4889", "norm_anno": "1949", "norm_num": "0", "norm_ver": "88326", "norm_fecha": "07 Nov 1949", "norm_id": "871", "art_num": "41" }, { "norm_nom": "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José)", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "161802", "norm_anno": "1970", "norm_num": "4534", "norm_ver": "38111", "norm_fecha": "23 Feb 1970", "norm_id": "36150", "art_num": "1" }, { "norm_nom": "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José)", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "195128", "norm_anno": "1970", "norm_num": "4534", "norm_ver": "38111", "norm_fecha": "23 Feb 1970", "norm_id": "36150", "art_num": "2" }, { "norm_nom": "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José)", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "195133", "norm_anno": "1970", "norm_num": "4534", "norm_ver": "38111", "norm_fecha": "23 Feb 1970", "norm_id": "36150", "art_num": "8" }, { "norm_nom": "Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José)", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "195150", "norm_anno": "1970", "norm_num": "4534", "norm_ver": "38111", "norm_fecha": "23 Feb 1970", "norm_id": "36150", "art_num": "25" }, { "norm_nom": "Código de Familia", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "5471", "norm_anno": "1973", "norm_num": "5476", "norm_ver": "85966", "norm_fecha": "21 Dic 1973", "norm_id": "970", "art_num": "8" }, { "norm_nom": "Código de Familia", "art_subnum": "0", "norm_inciso": "6", "norm_anno": "1973", "norm_num": "5476", "norm_ver": "85966", "norm_detalle": "Inciso 6", "norm_fecha": "21 Dic 1973", "norm_id": "970", "bdt": "1", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "5477", "art_num": "14" }, { "norm_nom": "Código de Familia", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "5487", "norm_anno": "1973", "norm_num": "5476", "norm_ver": "85966", "norm_fecha": "21 Dic 1973", "norm_id": "970", "art_num": "24" }, { "norm_nom": "Código de Familia", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "5707", "norm_anno": "1973", "norm_num": "5476", "norm_ver": "85966", "norm_fecha": "21 Dic 1973", "norm_id": "970", "art_num": "242" }, { "norm_nom": "Código de Familia", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "5708", "norm_anno": "1973", "norm_num": "5476", "norm_ver": "85966", "norm_fecha": "21 Dic 1973", "norm_id": "970", "art_num": "243" }, { "norm_nom": "Código de Familia", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "5709", "norm_anno": "1973", "norm_num": "5476", "norm_ver": "85966", "norm_fecha": "21 Dic 1973", "norm_id": "970", "art_num": "244" }, { "norm_nom": "Código de Familia", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "5710", "norm_anno": "1973", "norm_num": "5476", "norm_ver": "85966", "norm_fecha": "21 Dic 1973", "norm_id": "970", "art_num": "245" }, { "norm_nom": "Código Civil", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "88901", "norm_anno": "1887", "norm_num": "63", "norm_ver": "86586", "norm_fecha": "28 Sep 1887", "norm_id": "15437", "art_num": "6" }, { "norm_nom": "Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "171377", "norm_anno": "1989", "norm_num": "7135", "norm_ver": "87797", "norm_fecha": "11 Oct 1989", "norm_id": "38533", "art_num": "13" }, { "norm_nom": "Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (1937)", "bdt": "1", "art_subnum": "0", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_id": "152218", "norm_anno": "1937", "norm_num": "8", "norm_ver": "91197", "norm_fecha": "29 Nov 1937", "norm_id": "33635", "art_num": "5" } ], "esResolucionEstructural": "0", "padreSentenciasIgualSentido": "sen-1-0034-696925", "esCriterioUnificador": "0", "tipoContenido": "Voto de mayoría", "otrasReferencias": "Judgment of February 24, 2012, issued in the Case of Atala Riffo and daughters vs. Chile, by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Agreement of August 16, 2010, issued by the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, resolving the unconstitutionality action A.I. 2/2010. Judgment of September 27, 1990 (Case of Cossey vs. United Kingdom), European Court of Human Rights. Judgment of November 18, 2003, Hillary Goodridge and others vs. Department of Public Health, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of Forneron and daughter vs. Argentina), judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case of Heliodoro Portugal vs. Panama), judgment of August 16, 2000 (Case of Durand and Ugarte), judgment of June 21, 2002 (Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. vs. Trinidad and Tobago), judgments of November 27, 2003 (Case of Maritza Urrutia); June 7, 2003 (Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez); November 28, 2002 (Case of Cantos); August 31, 2001 (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community); January 31, 2001 (Case of the Constitutional Court); November 25, 2000 (Case of Bámaca Velásquez); August 18, 2000 (Case of Cantoral Benavides); November 19, 1999 (Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.)); September 29, 1999 (Case of Cesti Hurtado); May 30, 1999 (Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al.); March 8, 1998 (Case of the “White Panel” (Paniagua Morales et al.)); January 24, 1998 (Case of Blake); November 12, 1997 (Case of Suárez Rosero) and November 3, 1997 (Case of Castillo Páez)]. In that of August 6, 2008 (Case of Castañeda Gutman vs. United Mexican States), judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of Forneron and daughter vs. Argentina), February 24, 2012, Case of Atala Riffo and daughters vs. Chile. Bill on coexistence partnerships (No. 17.668), published in La Gaceta No. 120 of June 22, 2010. Bill on civil unions between same-sex persons (No. 16.390), published in La Gaceta No. 214 of November 8, 2006. Constitutional Court of South Africa, judgment of December 1, 2005, issued in the context of the cases “Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie” (Case C.C.T. 60/04) and “Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs” (Case C.C.T. 10/04). Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Voto 2313-95, of 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995. The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, adopted by the International Panel of Specialists in International Human Rights Law and on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, at the meeting held from November 6 to 9, 2006. General Assembly of the Organization of American States, resolutions AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08) on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10) and AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11). 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He\r\nexpressly claimed the extensive application of the rules contained in the <i>Código de\r\nFamilia</i> intended to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of the de facto union (unión\r\nde hecho) (folios 1-2). In the appealed resolution, issued at 8:47 a.m. on June 19, 2009,\r\nthe trial court judge rejected the complaint <i>ad portas</i> because she deemed it\r\ninadmissible (improponible) due to the fact that Costa Rican legislation, by not permitting\r\nmarriage between persons of the same sex, prevents recognizing as such a bond\r\nlike the one maintained between the parties, which does not meet an essential\r\nelement: its heterosexual character (folio 4).-</span><o:p></o:p></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='line-height:150%'><b><span style='font-family:\"Trebuchet MS\"'>II.-</span></b><span\r\nstyle='font-family:\"Trebuchet MS\"'> Although current Costa Rican law does not\r\nrecognize cohabitation between persons of the same sex as a source of rights and\r\nobligations, it is indisputable that it does not prohibit it either and that,\r\nwhen it occurs under conditions of stability, notoriety, and exclusivity, it cannot\r\nbe substantially distinguished from one formed by heterosexual human beings,\r\nsince both are established by virtue of consent and reflect the purpose of\r\nbuilding a common life project, based on bonds of love and solidarity. Without\r\na doubt, of both bonds it can be said that their purpose is <i>“(…) life in common,\r\ncooperation, and mutual aid.”</i> (Article 11 of the <i>Código de Familia</i>). As\r\nMaría MARTÍN SÁNCHEZ points out, <i>“In today's society there are same-sex\r\ncouples who cohabit stably, share expenses, assets, have a common life project,\r\nand even have children, all in a public and notorious manner. Their way of life\r\nis the same as that of any marriage, except that they have not been able to\r\naccess this right. If society is already prepared to confront this type of\r\ncohabitation normally, the Law is obliged to regulate their de facto\r\nsituation.”</i> [The constitutional right to homosexual marriage in Spain. Law\r\n13/200, of July 1, modifying the Civil Code regarding the right to contract\r\nmarriage. <i>Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Procesal\r\nConstitucional</i>, 13, January-June, 2010, p. 255]. For this reason, the members\r\nof a homosexual couple, especially the one who occupies the weaker economic\r\nposition, have analogous requirements for legal protection to those of\r\nheterosexual persons who decide to live together. Hence, it is not only reasons of\r\nlegal certainty and justice that demand that their personal and patrimonial\r\neffects be regulated by current legislation. The human dignity of its members\r\nand their fundamental rights to the free development of their personality, to\r\nequality, to the protection of their family, and to the autonomy of the will are\r\ncompromised by the existing protection deficit. In the recent judgment of February 24\r\nof this year, issued in the Case of Atala Riffo and daughters vs. Chile, the Inter-American\r\nCourt of Human Rights reaffirmed <i>“(…) that the American Convention does not\r\nestablish a closed concept of family, much less does it protect only (sic) a\r\n‘traditional’ model thereof (sic). In this regard, this Tribunal reiterates that\r\nthe concept of family life is not reduced solely to marriage and must encompass\r\nother de facto family ties where the parties share a life in common outside of\r\nmarriage¹<span style='font-style:normal'> </span>.”</span></i> Therefore,\r\ndenying a non-heterosexual couple the status of a family group <i>“(…) reflects a\r\nlimited and stereotyped perception of the concept of family that has no basis in\r\nthe Convention as there is no specific model of family (the ‘traditional\r\nfamily’).”</i> In support of that argument, that international judicial body\r\ncited the agreement of August 16, 2010, issued by the Mexican Supreme Court\r\nof Justice of the Nation which, in resolving the unconstitutionality action A.I. 2/2010,\r\nstated that <i>“(…) this Supreme Court considers that the sexual diversity of the\r\ncontracting parties is neither constitutionally nor legally a defining element\r\nof the institution of marriage, but rather the result of the social conception\r\nthat existed at a given historical moment, but not the essential core of\r\nmarriage (…).”</i> [Para. 256] and that <i>“It is, ‘therefore, the sexual\r\norientation of a person, as part of their personal identity, a relevant element\r\nin the life project they may have and that, like any person, includes the desire\r\nto have a life in common with another person of the same or different sex or\r\nnot, and that in no way should it limit them in the search for and achievement\r\nof their happiness. At this point, (…) among fundamental rights, one finds the\r\nright to personal and sexual identity, the former being understood as the right\r\nof every individual to be oneself, in one's own conscience and in the opinion of\r\nothers, according to their physical and internal characteristics and their\r\nactions, which individualize them before society and allow them to be\r\nidentified, which also implies sexual identity, which projects them before\r\nthemselves and socially from their sexual perspective, as well as their sexual\r\npreference or orientation and that, therefore, falls within the\r\nself-determination of persons and affects their free development, being an\r\nelement that will undeniably determine their affective and/or sexual\r\nrelationships with persons of a different or the same sex and, hence, their\r\nchoice of with whom to form a common life and have children, if they so\r\ndesire.”</i> [Para. 264]. It further specified that <i>“(…) in the case of\r\nhomosexual persons, in the same way as occurs with persons with a sexual\r\norientation towards others of a different sex (heterosexuals), the free and\r\nvoluntaryestablishment of affective relationships with persons of the\r\nsame sex is part of their full development; relationships, both of which, as\r\nreported by various sociological data, share the characteristic of constituting\r\na community of life based on affective, sexual, and reciprocal solidarity ties,\r\nwith a vocation for stability and permanence over time.”</i> [Para. 266]; that\r\n<i>“(…) if one of the aspects that guides the way in which an individual\r\nwill project their life and their relationships is their sexual orientation, it\r\nis a fact that, in full respect for human dignity, the State must recognize not\r\nonly the sexual orientation of an individual towards persons of the same sex,\r\nbut also their unions, under the modalities that, at a given moment, it is\r\ndecided to adopt (coexistence partnerships, solidarity pacts, concubinage, and\r\nmarriage).”</i> [Para. 269]; that from the existence of homoparental families\r\na series of rights and obligations derive for those who form them, since\r\nit is a reality that they exist and, as such, must be protected by legislation:\r\nsome are just as respectable as others and that their recognition does not\r\ndisregard principles such as the best interest of the child [para. 333].-</span><o:p></o:p></p>\r\n\r\n<p class=MsoNormal style='text-indent:36.85pt;line-height:150%'><span\r\nclass=SpellE><b><span style='font-family:\"Trebuchet MS\"'>III</span></b></span><b><span\r\nstyle='font-family:\"Trebuchet MS\"'>.-</span></b><span style='font-family:\"Trebuchet MS\"'>\r\nIn his dissenting separate opinion forming part of the judgment of September 27,\r\n1990 (Case of Cossey vs. United Kingdom), Mr. S. K. Martens, judge of the\r\nEuropean Court of Human Rights, rightly pointed out that <i>“Marriage is much more\r\nthan a sexual union and, therefore, the capacity to have relationships of this\r\nnature is not ‘essential.’ Persons who cannot procreate or have sexual relations\r\ncan also seek to marry. This is because marriage involves more than a union that\r\nlegitimizes such relations and that aims at procreation: it is a legal\r\ninstitution that creates a fixed legal relationship between the spouses and\r\nbetween them and third parties (including the authorities). As an author has\r\nsaid, spouses, through the bonds of marriage, ‘announce to the world around\r\nthem that their relationship is founded on intense human feelings and on a\r\nmutual, exclusive, and permanent commitment.’ It is also a kind of community in\r\nwhich intellectual, spiritual, and sentimental ties are at least as essential as\r\nthe physical ones. / Article 12 of the Convention [for the Protection of Human\r\nRights and Fundamental Freedoms] protects the right of any man or woman (of\r\nmarriageable age) to enter into this union and, therefore, the definition of\r\nwhat the words ‘man and woman’ mean in this context must take into account all\r\nthese characteristics of marriage.”</i> In similar terms ruled Mrs. E. Palm and\r\nMessrs. I. Foighel and R. Pekkanen, judges of that same body, in their joint\r\ndissenting separate opinion forming part of the same ruling: <i>“The fact that a\r\ntranssexual cannot procreate is not decisive. There are many men and many women\r\nwho also cannot have children and, nevertheless, have the indisputable right to\r\nmarry.”</i> "The capacity to procreate is not and cannot be a prerequisite for marriage."</i> Under the same principle, Professor Pilar DOMÍNGUEZ LOZANO of the Autonomous University of Madrid posits that, <i>"Indeed, if marriage [and, by extension, the heterosexual de facto union (unión de hecho heterosexual)] is defined as an affective and material community of life, and no longer by its social function; if its essential purpose is no longer reproductive, but defined around personal fulfillment and the free development of personality; if its constitutional content links it, primarily, to fundamental individual rights and freedoms; if the ius connubium is predicated, in principle, of any person, based on demands of equality and liberty; and if the legal regulation of marriage and relations between spouses has experienced a turn towards the Law of Obligations; it becomes difficult to admit as unquestionable the prohibition on same-sex couples entering into marriage."</i> [Same-sex unions: regulatory options and their legal implications. <i>Derecho Privado y Constitución</i>, Madrid: 20, January-December, 2006, 173-202. 188-189].- **IV.-** In the judgment issued on November 18, 2003, in the case Hillary Goodridge and others vs. Department of Public Health, for which Judge Marshall was the rapporteur, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared the prohibition on access to marriage for persons of the same sex unconstitutional. It argued that we are in the presence of <i>"(…) a vital social institution (…)"</i> and that <i>"(…) the decision of whether and whom to marry is among the most momentous acts of self-determination in life." For this reason and because "the benefits accessible only to those with a marriage license are enormous, affecting virtually every aspect of life and death,"</i> it has long been considered a fundamental right (*civil right*). As a central element of individuals' lives and the community's well-being, barring same-sex persons from the right to marry deprives them <i>"(…) of one of the most important aspects of the human experience (…)"</i> and <i>"(…) denies them full access to the protection of the laws (…)"</i>; hence, such exclusion could only be admitted if it meets <i>"(…) an indispensable public objective (…)"</i> and is <i>"(…) a reasonable means to achieve such an end."</i> These conditions are not met regarding the prohibition of marriage between persons of the same sex, which excepts that rule because of a singular trait: sexual orientation, which injures the freedom recognized in the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as equality, which prevents the existence of second-class citizens. The three main justifications for this prohibition are not constitutionally reasonable: neither that heterosexual marriage provides a favorable framework for procreation (meaning non-assisted heterosexual); nor that it ensures an optimal space for child-rearing; nor that same-sex marriage will trivialize or destroy that institution as it has been historically configured. The essence of the freedom to marry is to unite with the person of one's own choosing. By preventing marriage between persons of the same sex, <i>"(…) the State confers an official stamp of approval on destructive stereotypes that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to heterosexual relationships and are therefore not worthy of respect."</i>- **V.-** It is true that in vote No. 2006-7262, of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, in which the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) deemed legitimate the legal impossibility of marriage between persons of the same sex, established in subsection 6 of Article 14 of the <i>Family Code (Código de Familia)</i>, it saddled the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) with the responsibility of <i>"(…) considering the need to regulate, in whatever manner it deems appropriate, the bonds or rights that derive from this type of union, which evidently requires a complete normative development establishing the rights and obligations of this type of couple (…)."</i> It is also true that, four years later, in vote No. 2010-641, of 2:56 a.m. on January 13, 2010, it dismissed on the merits the action of unconstitutionality filed by Mr. [Name 001] against Article 242 <i>ibidem</i>; a pronouncement that, according to the scant information available as its wording is still pending, cites the aforementioned vote No. 2006-7262. Hence, based on the provisions of Article 13 of the <i>Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)</i>, it is not venturesome to conclude that those precedents would appear to prevent us from resorting to the regulation of the de facto union (unión de hecho), contained in numerals 242, 243, 244, and 245 <i>ibidem</i>, even by analogy, in order to resolve this claim on the merits, thus leaving no option but to confirm the outright rejection ordered by the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in the ruling issued at 8:47 a.m. on June 19, 2009, which, as noted, deemed it non-proposable (improponible).- **VI.-** Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore our duty to weigh the factual situations that escape the solutions preconceived by the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) at a specific historical moment, in order to properly integrate the legal system and offer a response to the substantive claim of Mr. [Name 001]. Indeed, we are convinced that, in a system like the Costa Rican one, the absence of specific regulations does not authorize the outright rejection of a claim. The fundamental right to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), recognized, among other precepts, in Article 8(1) and Article 25(1), in relation to Articles 1 and 2 of the <i>American Convention on Human Rights (Convención americana sobre derechos humanos)</i> and in Article 41 of the <i>Political Constitution (Constitución Política)</i>, and the principle of the hermetic fullness of the legal system, addressed in Article 6 of the <i>Civil Code (Código Civil)</i> and Article 5 of the <i>Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial)</i>, prevent such a pronouncement. This was highlighted by the female and male magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional): <i>"In our condition as judges, (…) we cannot ignore social reality as an element to consider in decision-making regarding the matters submitted to our knowledge (…)."</i> (Vote No. 2006-7262, of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006).- **VII.-** According to the provisions of the <i>American Convention on Human Rights (Convención americana sobre derechos humanos)</i>, approved by the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) by Law No. 4534, of February 23, 1970, <i>"The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition."</i> (Article 1(1)). <i>"Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms."</i> (Article 2). <i>"Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, (…) for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature."</i> (Article 8(1)). <i>"Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties."</i> (Article 25(1)). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos) has developed the content of these precepts on various occasions. In its recent judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of Forneron and daughter vs. Argentina), it highlighted that <i>"This Tribunal has affirmed on other occasions that '[i]n the law of nations, a customary norm prescribes that a State which has concluded an international agreement must introduce into its domestic law the necessary modifications to ensure the execution of the obligations assumed.' In the American Convention this principle is embodied in its Article 2, which establishes the general obligation of each State Party to adapt its domestic law to the provisions of the Convention, to guarantee the rights recognized therein²."</i> It also reiterated that <i>"(…) the adaptation of domestic legislation to the parameters established in the Convention implies the adoption of measures in two aspects, namely: a) the suppression of norms and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees provided in the Convention or that disregard the rights recognized therein or obstruct their exercise, and b) the issuance of norms and the development of practices conducive to the effective observance of those guarantees.</i> <i>The first aspect is satisfied with the reform, repeal, or annulment of the norms or practices that have such effects, as appropriate. The second obliges the State to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations and, therefore, must adopt all legal, administrative, and other measures that are necessary to prevent similar events from occurring again in the future³."</i> Undoubtedly, in the case of a union between persons of the same sex, its legislative recognition is essential in order to eradicate social discrimination against those who form it. Given the particularly serious nature of this practice and because it violates several rights enshrined in the <i>Convention</i>, such protection must be sufficient. And, following the doctrine set forth in the judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case of Heliodoro Portugal Vs. Panama), given the urgent need to offer some response to the legitimate claim formulated in the <i>sub-lite</i> matter, <i>"(…) there exists the duty to use those resources (…) that relate to the protection of fundamental rights that may be affected in such cases, such as, for example, the right to liberty, to personal integrity, and the right to life, as applicable, which are recognized in the American Convention."</i> In the judgment of August 16, 2000 (Case of Durand and Ugarte), the Inter-American Court (Corte Interamericana) affirmed that <i>"101. (…) the right of every person to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent judge or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights constitutes one of the basic pillars, not only of the American Convention, but of the very Rule of Law in a democratic society under the Convention […]. Article 25 is closely linked with the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by assigning protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties⁴. / 102. Moreover, the Court has indicated that the non-existence of an effective recourse against violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression of the Convention by the State Party in which such a situation occurs. In that sense, it should be emphasized that, for such a recourse to exist, it is not sufficient that it be provided for by the Constitution or by law or that it be formally admissible, but rather it is required that it be truly suitable to establish whether a human rights violation has occurred and to provide what is necessary to remedy it⁵. / (…) / 121. This Court has established that Article 25 is closely linked with the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by assigning protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties, from which it follows that the State has the responsibility to design and normatively enshrine an effective recourse, but also to ensure the due application of said recourse by its judicial authorities.</i> In that of June 21, 2002 (Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. vs. Trinidad and Tobago), it expressed that <i>"The Inter-American Court has also established that as part of the general obligations of the States, they have a positive duty of guarantee with respect to the individuals subject to their jurisdiction. This involves taking all necessary measures to remove the obstacles that may exist for individuals to enjoy the rights that the Convention recognizes. Consequently, the State’s tolerance of circumstances or conditions that prevent individuals from accessing adequate domestic remedies to protect their rights constitutes a violation of Article 1.1 of the Convention […]⁷."</i> In that of September 7, 2004 (Case of Tibi vs. Ecuador), it reiterated that <i>"Article 25.1 of the Convention establishes, in broad terms, the obligation upon the States to offer all persons subject to their jurisdiction an effective judicial recourse against acts violating their fundamental rights. / (…). Under this perspective, it has been indicated that for the State to comply with the provisions of the aforementioned Article 25.1 of the Convention, it is not enough that recourses exist formally, but rather they must be effective, that is, the person must be provided the real possibility of interposing a simple and prompt recourse that allows, where applicable, to achieve the required judicial protection."</i> [See, in a similar sense, the judgments of November 27, 2003 (Case of Maritza Urrutia); June 7, 2003 (Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez); November 28, 2002 (Case of Cantos); August 31, 2001 (Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community); January 31, 2001 (Case of the Constitutional Tribunal); November 25, 2000 (Case of Bámaca Velásquez); August 18, 2000 (Case of Cantoral Benavides); November 19, 1999 (Case of the "Street Children" (Villagrán Morales et al.)); September 29, 1999 (Case of Cesti Hurtado); May 30, 1999 (Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al.); March 8, 1998 (Case of the "White Panel" (Paniagua Morales et al.)); January 24, 1998 (Case of Blake); November 12, 1997 (Case of Suárez Rosero) and November 3, 1997 (Case of Castillo Páez)]. In that of August 6, 2008 (Case of Castañeda Gutman vs. United Mexican States), it specified that <i>"An effective judicial recourse is one capable of producing the result for which it was conceived</i>⁸<i>, that is, it must be a recourse capable of leading to an analysis by a competent tribunal for the purpose of establishing whether or not there has been a human rights violation and, where appropriate, providing a reparation.</i> Finally, in the cited judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case of Forneron and daughter vs. Argentina), it concretized <i>"107. (…) that Article 25.1 of the Convention contemplates the obligation of the States Parties to guarantee, to all persons under their jurisdiction, an effective judicial recourse against acts violating their fundamental rights. Said effectiveness supposes that, besides the formal existence of the recourses, these must yield results or responses to the violations of rights contemplated whether in the Convention, the Constitution, or the laws. In that sense, those recourses cannot be considered effective which, due to the general conditions of the country or even because of the particular circumstances of a given case, turn out to be illusory. This can occur, for example, when their uselessness has been demonstrated by practice, because there are no means to execute their decisions, or for any other situation that configures a scenario of denial of justice. Thus, the process must tend toward the materialization of the protection of the right recognized in the judicial pronouncement through the suitable application of said pronouncement. / 108. On the other hand, as the Tribunal has previously indicated, when evaluating the effectiveness of the recourses, the Court must observe whether the decisions in the judicial processes have effectively contributed to putting an end to a situation violative of rights, to ensuring the non-repetition of the harmful acts, and to guaranteeing the free and full exercise of the rights protected by the Convention.</i>- **VIII.-** In accordance with Article 41 of the <i>Political Constitution (Constitución Política)</i>, <i>"Resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice in strict conformity with the laws."</i> In its time (extraordinary session of October 11, 1982), the Full Court (Corte Plena), acting as the body in charge of constitutional review, highlighted that a series of basic principles derive from this supreme norm to which all persons and competent bodies in the jurisdictional sphere must adjust their actions. By virtue of these, the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) is obligated to enact the legal precepts necessary to regulate the rights of persons and to establish the appropriate channels and procedures to procure their effective judicial protection (tutela jurisdiccional) when they have been violated. For their part, the various Tribunals are responsible for interpreting and applying those provisions in such a way that they do not hinder the proper verification of the grievance and guarantee, in case it is accredited, the full and timely reestablishment of those rights. Hence, we judges violate the cited constitutional provision when we make impossible or hinder access to the stipulated procedures, or when we reject or deny a petition that we ought to have granted in a judgment, without any reason or invoking an insufficient or spurious one. In vote No. 1739-92, of 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992, that Chamber held that <i>"At the base of all procedural order lies the principle and, with it, the fundamental right to justice, understood as the existence and availability of a justice administration system, which is to say, a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the jurisdictional function of the State - declaring the disputed right or reestablishing the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially in concrete cases - which in turn comprises, a set of independent specialized judicial bodies in that exercise, the availability of that apparatus to resolve conflicts and correct the wrongs that originate in social life, in a civilized and efficient manner, and guaranteed access to that justice for all persons, in conditions of equality and without discrimination</i> <i>. / a) In this first sense, therefore, due process (debido proceso) has, above all, programmatic dimensions, no less legally binding for this reason, which demand the existence, sufficiency, and efficacy of a judicial and procedural system suitable to guarantee precisely that fundamental right to justice, which is not, on the other hand, more than a consequence of the monopoly of force, assumed by the State, and the most important manifestation of the right to petition</i> <i>, which in Costa Rica is enshrined in Articles 27 -in general- and 41 -in particular- of the Constitution (…). / b) But it also has other even more immediately demandable implications, which may, in turn, concern the justice administration system itself, per se, or the right of access to justice</i> <i>for all persons: / (…) / 2. And belonging to the latter - the equal right of all to access justice - besides the generic right to petition</i> <i>of Article 27 and the specific right to justice</i> <i>of the already cited Article 41 of the Constitution, a series of complementary - but also fundamental - attributes, among which: / (i) the general right and principle of equality - and its counterpart of non-discrimination - which is embodied in Article 33 of the Constitution, as well as all international instruments on Human Rights, for example Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, with the peculiarity that the duality of these demonstrates that equality, besides being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, so that the latter is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights (…); / (ii) in general, universal access to justice for every person, regardless of their sex, age, color, nationality, origin or background, or any other social condition, all of which raises, in turn, consequences that it is not necessary to examine here as they are not directly involved in the case under consultation, such as the gratuitousness of justice, informality (informalismo), etc."</i> As it concluded in vote No. 1562-93, of 3:06 p.m. on March 30, 1993, the foregoing <i>"(…) means, in the first place, that due process (debido proceso) requires the existence, sufficiency, and efficacy of a judicial and procedural system suitable to guarantee the fundamental right to justice, which is the most important manifestation of the right to petition enshrined in Articles 27 -in general- and 41 -in particular- of the Constitution (…). In the second place, it concerns the justice administration system itself per se and the right of access to justice for all persons, which implies that in every procedural system there must be "reasonableness (razonabilidad) of the effects" on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on them (…) any limitations other than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, and those indispensable for them to function adequately in the life of society."</i>- **IX.-** In ordinary legislation, that fundamental right is developed, among other precepts, in Article 6 of the <i>Civil Code (Código Civil)</i> and in Article 5 of the <i>Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial)</i>.

By virtue of the first, <i>“The Courts have the inexcusable duty to resolve, in all cases, the matters that come before them, for which purpose they shall adhere to the established system of sources.”</i> In accordance with the second paragraph of the latter, <i>“The courts may not excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from ruling on matters within their jurisdiction due to a lack of applicable norms and must do so in accordance with the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale of their sources.”</i> Even that same provision itself recognizes, as part of the jurisdictional power, the duty to fill the absence of legal norms: <i>“The general principles of Law and Jurisprudence shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal order and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit. <b>When it comes to filling the absence</b> and not the insufficiency <b>of the provisions regulating a matter</b>, said sources shall have the rank of law.”</i> (Emphasis added). Consequently, we jurisdictional bodies are forbidden from alleging the lack of applicable norm(s) to the specific case to excuse ourselves from ruling on the merits of a process such as this. The dogma of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system obliges us to resort, in an integrative application, to written and unwritten sources in order to identify and implement the best solution to the controversy raised. On this point, in ruling no. 36-F-94, at 9:40 a.m. on May 27, 1994, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) pointed out that <i>“(…) jurisprudence as a source that informs the legal system is what is called upon to fill, by way of extensive interpretation, the scope of the norms tasked with resolving legal conflicts when no norm exists for the specific case or when it was not conceived for the new legal demands (Article 9 of the Civil Code).”</i> In decisions no. 112-F-92, at 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; 151-F-01, at 3:20 p.m. on February 14, 2001 and 360-F-02, at 11:10 a.m. on May 3, 2002, it stated that <i>“(…) Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) and Article 6 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code allow referral to other sources of the legal system and to the General Principles of Law when no applicable norm exists (principle of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system); on the other hand, Article 12 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code allows the analogical application of norms provided there is identity of reason and no norm prohibits it.”</i> For its part, the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda), in decision no. 415, at 9:00 a.m. on December 22, 1994, set it out in the following terms: <i>“(…) in any case, one must turn, in the interest of the best solution, to analogous situations expressly addressed, to the general principles of law, such as (…) good faith and equity, and even, as Prof. Antequera points out in his cited work, to common sense, that is, the judgment that people normally have to reasonably judge things (Articles 10 to 12 of the Civil Code, 15 of the Labor Code and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial)).”</i> In decision no. 2004-200, at 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004, that same body held that Article 6 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) <i>“(…) develops a right of a fundamental nature, contained in Article 41 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), which guarantees all persons access to justice. Now, in order to fulfill this task, Article 12 of that Code must be taken into consideration, according to which the analogical application of norms is appropriate when these do not contemplate a specific scenario, but regulate another similar one where an identity of reason is appreciated, except when a norm prohibits such application. In a case like the present one, denying all effect to the relationship in question, besides being unjust, means ignoring a reality, not uncommon in our environment, which is the coexistence of two persons, (...) 'united solely, or once united, by emotional ties, without protection from the legal system. The foregoing constitutes sufficient grounds to, in consideration of the value of justice that inspires the legal system, order the liquidation of the assets acquired and produced during the long relationship, giving the plaintiff what belongs to her. But also, to resolve the question, in light of the foregoing, an answer can be provided to the situation raised, resorting “mutatis mutandi” to the regulations given by law to similar institutions.</i>” Finally, in decision no. 769-93, at 3:48 p.m. on February 16, 1993, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) recognized that <i>“Here, as the consulting Court itself anticipates, one could resort to other regulations (…), or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a specific matter. These criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and even analogical application, which the following Article 12 authorizes. It must be added to the above that, according to the first cited norm, a court cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of law applicable to the case raised. Judges [male and female], therefore, have at their disposal broad possibilities to resolve with express norms, with extensive application (interpretative analogy), and even through normative re-creation based on another insufficient norm. / (…) / The power of Family Law jurisprudence in our country has been such that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Family Code have their origin in court decisions, even some markedly dissenting or minority in tone, but not for that reason devoid of justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law indicates to us how the passage of time has been decisive for an evolution of its concepts and its solutions. Our country is not an exception in this field and it could even be said that this behavior has been most rapidly noted here.”</i> **X.-** Article 12 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) stipulates that <i>“The analogical application of norms shall proceed when these do not contemplate a specific scenario, but regulate another similar one where an identity of reason is appreciated, except when some norm prohibits such application.”</i> In relation to the analogical procedure for integrating positive law, in ruling no. 1-F-94, at 3:00 p.m. on January 5, 1994, reiterated in that of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) no. 2010-1094, at 10:26 a.m. on August 6, 2010, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) specified that <i>“III.- (…). By analogy, from a logical point of view, is understood a procedure of singular induction from one case to another, by means of which one seeks to extend the validity of a proposition from a specific situation to another generically similar one. In antiquity, it was known by the name of 'procedure by similarity.' Unlike deductive procedures, in analogical induction the validity of the conclusion is not necessary, but only probable. In other words, in analogy, a situation or fact is compared with another situation or fact, and thus one tries to obtain a particular conclusion. The analogical argument is based on those similar aspects or connotations between the analyzed situations, in such a way that the more the essential aspects resemble each other, and not merely accidental ones, the more convincing the extensive conclusion will be. Another similar logical procedure is induction by generalization, in which, based on several cases, analyzing their particular connotations, a general conclusion is obtained. In generalization, it is not a matter of comparing two particular situations to extend what concerns one to the other, but rather of analyzing several particular cases to obtain a general conclusion that encompasses them all. Both types of logical procedures have an undeniable influence regarding legal analogy (…). / IV. After prolonged discussions in general legal doctrine, it has come to be admitted, by a majority, that the legal system can have gaps. These gaps are deficiencies of the law, which does not present a specific provision for a determined matter or case. At the same time, it has been accepted that legal systems have the latent capacity to elaborate the pertinent legal precepts to thus resolve the conflicts of interest present in these cases. Therefore, faced with gaps in the law, the judge [male or female] cannot refuse to rule alleging that no norm can be found to apply to the specific case; this would be equivalent to a denial of justice. However, neither does the judge have the power to arbitrarily create the norm applicable to the specific case. In our normative system, the judge [male or female] is one of law, not of personal conscience, and any decision taken must find support in the current legal system. To fill these voids, our Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), both in its previous text and in the current one, establishes that courts may not excuse themselves from resolving due to a lack of norm, and by establishing that in such a case the general principles of law shall be resorted to in the absence of a legal norm, it does not exclude that before resorting to this interpretative criterion, analogy, regulated by Articles 12 and 13 of the Civil Code, may be used in order to apply a written norm established for a similar legal situation to the case raised. By means of this procedure, one seeks to apply a legal principle that the law establishes for a certain hypothesis to another fact not expressly regulated, but which presents the same legal essence. It concerns situations in which there is no identity of fact, but rather a substantial similarity so relevant that it justifies the application of the norm established for the case contemplated by the legislator to that lacking regulation. The application of analogy is justified by the need to regulate similar facts, according to the principle of legal equality, with similar norms. The main problem will be, in these cases, to determine if between both situations there exist legal similarities of such an entity as to allow the analogical extension of the known norm. This problem cannot be resolved mechanically or with merely logical criteria; it is rather a matter of legal assessment made by the judge [male or female], in which it is determined if the factual elements contemplated in the known norm, which motivated the establishment of a specific provision by the legislator (in accordance with the ratio legis), are also present in the similar situation taken into consideration. The fact considered may have certain essential elements that characterize it and other accidental or contingent ones that accompany it. The important thing is that correspondence exists between the essential elements of the foreseen fact and those of the unregulated situation. Legal analogy is usually classified into two types: analogia legis, in which, to resolve the unforeseen case, a singular normative provision is used; and analogia iuris, which does not take a single norm as its starting point, but rather a series of provisions, from which it induces a general principle. Both procedures obey the reasoning schemes analyzed in the preceding recital (considerando): legis corresponds to induction by analogy and iuris to induction by generalization. Doctrine considers recourse to the general principles of law as a case of analogia iuris, which can only be obtained through generalization. To proceed to the analogical interpretation of norms, the following is necessary: 1- that a precise legal provision is lacking for the disputed case, meaning analogical application would not be possible where express legal precepts exist or from which a solution to the case raised can be deduced through extensive interpretation; 2- that an essential legal similarity exists between the regulated case and the one to be regulated, which must be determined by the judge [male or female], after an assessment of both situations; 3- that it does not concern those situations in which, given the nature of the provision to apply, analogy is inappropriate. Regarding this last requirement, legal praxis has elaborated some relevant principles, which have often been expressly adopted by legislation. In this regard, the following should be cited: 1- It is not possible to apply prohibitive and punitive laws by analogy, as they are of a restrictive nature; 2- nor is it possible when dealing with norms that limit the capacity of the person or subjective rights, as these are odious matters; 3- in the case of 'ius singulare' or exceptional law, by its very nature, as it obeys a particular reason for regulation, this type of normative application does not proceed; and, 4- in the case of temporary norms, analogy also does not proceed, as they are determined for a momentary circumstance. / V. Of the scenarios that prevent the application of analogy, it is worth referring (…), to the impossibility of applying extensively those norms of ius singulare. In doctrine, this category is contrasted with ius regulare. The latter is formed by norms characterized by the correspondence of their foundations to the general principles of the legal system; in other words, their directives, premises, and foundations do not depart from the general guidelines of the Law. On the contrary, ius singulare, also called exceptional law, is inspired by rules diverse from those characterizing the general normative system. At times, given the need to provide special protection for certain persons, or to safeguard a particular interest of legal transactions, or to resolve some special cases with particular criteria of equity, or due to emerging needs from extraordinary circumstances, it becomes necessary to sacrifice general principles, establishing provisions that exclude certain persons or legal relationships from the application of the normal consequences for certain acts, or establishing special sanctions or responsibilities not foreseen for normal cases. Thus, singular law represents a deviation from the general norms governing the system, which is necessary for peculiar reasons of convenience that demand such treatment. Therefore, in such cases, the application by analogy of exceptional norms or ius singulare to those cases not expressly contemplated by the norms is not possible. / VI.- In our Civil Code, the analogical application of norms is regulated by Articles 12 and 13, located in its Preliminary Title. According to Article 12, the analogical interpretation of norms is possible '... when these do not contemplate a specific scenario, but regulate another similar one where an identity of reason is appreciated, except when some norm prohibits such application.' In this way, the general principle of analogical application is established in those cases where an identical 'ratio legis' exists. For its part, Article 13 excludes analogical application in the case of criminal, exceptional, and temporary laws. Thus, our Civil Code allows this method of integrating the Law according to the doctrinal guidelines outlined in the preceding recitals (considerandos).”</i> (See also, the ruling of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) no. 167-F-S1-2010, at 8:40 a.m. on January 29, 2010).- **XI.-** Now then, if, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) affirmed in the cited ruling no. 2006-7262, at 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, <i>“(…) the prohibition contained in the challenged norm [subsection 6 of Article 14 of the Family Code] refers specifically to the institution called marriage (…).”</i>; if it does not violate the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) because no <i>“(…) impediment of any nature exists for the existence of homosexual unions. Rather, there is an empirical confirmation indicating that they have increased.”</i> and if <i>“(…) it is not appropriate to apply the regulations developed for marriage in the terms currently conceived in our constitutional legal system.”</i>; what, then, would be the regulation we must draw upon to decide this process on its merits. Bear in mind that, despite having been pointed out on that occasion that the problem raised <i>“(…) <b>lies not in the norm challenged here but, rather, in the absence of an appropriate normative regulation, to regulate the personal and patrimonial effects of that type of union, above all if they meet conditions of stability and singularity, because a mandate of legal certainty, if not</b> (sic) <b>of justice, makes it necessary</b>. We are, then, in the presence of a scenario of lege ferenda, but by no stretch of the imagination of an illegitimate omission on the part of the State. This is also indicated because in the documentation added to the file (sic), and according to what was expressed in the oral hearing held during the substantiation of this process, some countries have been enacting laws (in the formal sense) that have provided a legal framework and certain formalities to these unions, with the purpose that they have specific legal effects in relation to the persons who enter into them […and…], to which (…) the legal framework that the derived constituent organized for the treatment of heterosexual couples cannot be applied.”</i> (Emphasis added); on a more recent date, that same body showed that <i>“(…) the normative gap pointed out by […that…] Constitutional Court in the previously cited Judgment, is […maintained…], with which the reasons expressed (ratio decidendi) by […the…] specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), in matters of constitutionality control, for considering that Article 14, subsection 6, of the Family Code is in conformity with the Law of the Constitution are […being…] indirectly disregarded.”</i> (Ruling no. 2010-13313, at 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010). And it is not superfluous to mention that in that last pronouncement, it synthesized its criteria on the topic in the terms set out below: <i>“From this judgment [referring to no. 2006-7262, previously cited], several aspects of importance for resolving the sub-lite become clear, which are the following: / 1°) Relations between persons of the same sex are a social reality that cannot be ignored or bypassed. / 2°) <b><u>It is necessary to regulate, legislatively, the patrimonial and personal effects of such relations between persons of the same sex</u></b>. / 3°) <b><u>There exists a normative vacuum</u></b></i> <i>on the part of the ordinary legislator (sic) <b><u>that must be filled</u></b>, taking into account that the institution of marriage cannot be applied to relations between persons of the same sex. / 4°) The ordinary legislator (sic) must enact a normative framework that regulates the legal consequences of such relations between persons of the same sex. This Judgment, by the provision of Article 13 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), has erga omnes effects, for all constituted powers, precisely for this reason, the ordinary legislator (sic) took on the task of discussing the timeliness and convenience of regulating relations between persons of the same sex.”</i> (The bolding and underlining do not appear in the original document). It is also not feasible to fail to highlight that, as a result of the political events known to all, this state of affairs does not appear to be foreseeable to change in the short or medium term, especially after last June 6, the Special Permanent Commission on Human Rights (Comisión Permanente Especial de Derechos Humanos) of the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa), chaired by Deputy Justo Orozco, issued a majority negative opinion on the draft Law on Cohabitation Partnerships (Ley de sociedades de convivencia) (no. 17.668), presented since April 13, 2010, by former legislator Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría and the then legislators José Merino del Río, Carlos Manuel Gutiérrez Gómez, Sergio Alfaro Salas, and Alberto Salom Echeverría, and published in La Gaceta no. 120 of June 22 of that same year. And what has been pointed out is not altered by the fact that, one day after that Commission's pronouncement, the initiative was presented again in the Secretariat of the Legislative Directorate by Deputies Carmen Muñoz and Carmen Granados and Deputies Carlos Góngora and José María Villalta (no. 18.481). Note, furthermore, that the topic has been in the legislative stream since September 27, 2006, the date on which Ana Helena Chacón Echeverría, José Merino del Río, and Carlos Manuel Gutiérrez Gómez presented the draft Law on Civil Union Between Persons of the Same Sex (Ley de unión civil entre personas del mismo sexo) (no. 16.390), published in La Gaceta no. 214 of November 8, 2006, which ended up archived on September 22, 2010.- **XII.-** Without a doubt, in this specific matter submitted to our decision, what is at stake is both the determination of the competent jurisdictional order to process it and the substantive regulation to which recourse must be had to integrate the current legal system. As, in our judgment, the status of the homosexual couple as a family group is undeniable, it falls to the family jurisdiction to hear and definitively rule on their personal and patrimonial consequences. Indeed, we are convinced that, as the non-heterosexual persons who form it are also holders of the fundamental rights to equal treatment, to the protection of their family, and to effective judicial protection, they have a full right to such recognition in this venue. Note, furthermore, that, by virtue of those same fundamental rights, no distinction whatsoever can be made, above all if what is taken into account is sexual orientation, at the moment of guaranteeing them effective access to the judicial system so that the bodies specialized in family matters study their claim and, by means of a reasoned and founded judgment, uphold or reject it and thus resolve their conflict. It is not superfluous to also show that, no matter how impossible it may be deemed to apply the regulations of marriage in these cases, no infraction of the reinforced protection contained in Article 52 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) is committed by recognizing such effects to the couple relationship between subjects of the same sex. For that reason, and in the interest of not leaving the parties defenseless and unprotected, the accreditation of their public, stable, prolonged, and singular cohabitation would thus be sufficient to justify the recognition sought. Denying it for lack of a specific norm is not only incongruent with the family legal system, but also constitutes a breach of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (see, in similar terms, the ruling of the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda) no. 2003-143, at 9:30 a.m. on March 26, 2003).- **XIII.-** In support of our thesis, we consider it essential to bring up the arguments set forth by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in the judgment of December 1, 2005, issued in the context of the cases <i>“Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie” (Case C.C.T. 60/04)</i> and <i>“Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v.

"Minister of Home Affairs" (Case C.C.T. 10/04), by which it annulled the heterosexual clause of the marriage regime, extended it to any couple, regardless of their sexual or gender identity or sexual orientation, and granted Parliament a period of twelve months to adapt its legislation so that same-sex couples could access the *National Law on Marriage*. Consistent with the line later exposed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that foreign body, with the opinion written by Judge Albie Sachs, then specified *"(...) that the harm to same-sex couples goes beyond the deprivation of material goods (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 72, among many others). The definition of marriage that excludes them suggests not only that their commitment, relationship, and love are inferior, but that these persons can never be part of the community that the Constitution promises to create with equality for all (judgment, paragraph No. 71). These couples are not valued with the same respect that is granted to heterosexual couples (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 81, among many others). The exclusion from the benefits and responsibilities of marriage is not a small and tangential inconvenience but represents a radical way of indirectly saying that homosexual couples are outsiders (Idem). The statements of the constitutional court reflect that discrimination operates, firstly, from an undue exclusion of different couples from all the material benefits and protections that marriage brings with it and, secondly, from the construction of a different status as members of the community, a devalued status by reason of the chosen sexual orientation."* [FERNÁNDEZ VALLE, Mariano (2007). Matrimonio y diversidad sexual: La lección sudafricana. *Anuario de Derechos Humanos*, Santiago: 3, p. 95. Retrieved on June 28, 2008, from http://www.anuariocdh.uchile.cl/index.php/ADH/article/viewFile/13460/13729]. Hence *"(...) the State cannot withdraw from certain couples the protection that the laws grant to others united in marriage, since the deprivation of these rights and the correlative stigmatization it causes, greatly limit and condition the choice and materialization of life plans. In that line, the Constitutional Court affirmed that given the importance and centrality that our societies attribute to marriage and its consequences in our culture, denying this right to same-sex couples represents denying their right to self-definition in a profound way (judgment, paragraph No. 72). Likewise, in one of its most prominent passages, the judgment emphasizes that the Constitution of South Africa grants rights that go beyond respect for a private sphere free from state interference, and that the litigants are not claiming a right to be "left alone" by the State, but rather a right to be recognized as equals and treated with dignity by the law (judgment, paragraph No. 78)."* [*Ibid*, p. 98].- **XIV.-** In short, if, as Section II of the Second Civil Superior Court pointed out in its time, regarding the de facto heterosexual union when it was considered by some social sectors as *"(...) an illicit act contrary to good customs and marriage (...)"*, the truth is *"(...) times are changing and jurisprudence must now fill the gap that the legal system has by not protecting relationships of such nature."*, because, *"It is not possible, according to the principles of equity and justice, to set aside the common effort made by two people who unite in that way (...)."* (Voto N°. 358, at 8:35 a.m. on June 16, 1987), it is unquestionable that the same reason exists [*"Principle: "ubi eadem ratio, idem jus" (Equal reason, equal right), contemplated in Article 12 of the Civil Code (...)."* (Voto of the Second Chamber N°. 2003-502, at 3:30 p.m. on September 17, 2003)] to recognize civil and patrimonial consequences for the decision of two homosexual subjects to establish a bond with characteristics similar to marital ones, especially when full effect is given to the criterion according to which *"(...) the legislative power is subject to the limits provided "by treaties, in accordance with the principles of International Law". Thus, the human rights established in the instruments of Public International Law –Declarations and Conventions on the matter–, constitute a substantial barrier to the freedom of configuration of the legislator (sic), both ordinary and, eminently, popular through referendum. This Constitutional Court has indicated that the human rights enshrined in international instruments have, even, and by virtue of the provisions of Article 48 of the Constitution, a supra-constitutional rank when they offer greater protection to persons. On the other hand, this Constitutional Court in Voto No. 2771-2003 at 11:40 a.m. on April 4, 2003, considered that even the amending or derivative constituent power –as a constituted power– is limited by the essential content of fundamental and human rights, so that, by way of partial reform to the constitution, the essential content of those rights cannot be reduced or curtailed. It should be added that an implicit limit to the freedom of configuration of the ordinary or sovereign legislator (sic) is the Law of the Constitution itself or the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional principles, values, precepts, and jurisprudence. It is necessary to add that the rights of minorities, due to their inalienable nature, constitute an eminently technical-legal matter, which must be in the hands of the ordinary legislator (sic) and not of the majorities prone to their denial."* (Voto N°. 2010-13313, at 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010).- **XV.-** Regarding the value of international instruments in the system of sources of the Costa Rican legal system and, in particular, of the pronouncements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Voto No. 2313-95, at 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, that body accurately pointed out that *"(...) if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural body to interpret the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision in interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this normativity, whether in a contentious case or in a mere advisory opinion, will have -in principle- the same value as the interpreted norm. Not only ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis that we now hold, moreover, is received in our law when the General Law of Public Administration provides that unwritten norms -such as custom, jurisprudence, and the general principles of law- will serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and will have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (Article 7.l.)."*- **XVI.-** The *Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, adopted by the International Panel of Specialists in International Human Rights Legislation and in Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, at the meeting held from November 6 to 9, 2006, establish the basic standards for the United Nations Organization and its Member States to advance in guaranteeing the necessary protections for non-heterosexual persons (lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transsexuals, and transgender persons). In its preamble, it is recognized that *"Sexual orientation and gender identity are essential to the dignity and humanity of every person and must not be grounds for discrimination or abuse."* According to its first principle, *"Human beings of all sexual orientations and gender identities have the right to the full enjoyment of all human rights."* The second stipulates that *"All persons have the right to the enjoyment of all human rights, without discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any discrimination."* By the terms of the third, *"The sexual orientation or gender identity that each person defines for themselves is essential to their personality and constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of self-determination, dignity, and freedom. No person shall be forced to undergo medical procedures as a requirement for the legal recognition of their gender identity. No person shall be subjected to pressures to hide, suppress, or deny their sexual orientation or gender identity."* And, finally, the 24th recognizes the right of every person *"(...) to form a family, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Families exist in diverse configurations. No family may be subjected to discrimination based on the sexual orientation or gender identity of any of its members."* For this purpose, States *"E. Will adopt all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that in those States that recognize marriages or registered cohabitation partnerships between persons of the same sex, any right, privilege, obligation, or benefit granted to persons of the opposite sex who are married or in a registered union is available on equal terms for persons of the same sex who are married or in a registered cohabitation partnership; / F. Will adopt all necessary legislative, administrative, and other measures to ensure that any obligation, right, privilege, or benefit granted to unmarried opposite-sex couples is available on equal terms for unmarried same-sex couples; (...)."* In 2008, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States unanimously adopted Resolution AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08) on *Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, through which the protection of human rights was extended to gender identity and sexual orientation. In that declaration, the 34 member countries reaffirmed the universality, indivisibility, and interdependence of human rights and expressed their concern for acts of violence and related human rights violations committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. In the following years, that international organization issued similar resolutions: AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10), and AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11). Finally, on December 18, 2008, the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, France, Gabon, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations the text of the *Declaration on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, which reaffirms the principle of universality of human rights and that of non-discrimination, which requires that they be applied equally to all human beings, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Furthermore, deep concern is expressed there over the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms based on sexual orientation or gender identity and over the violence, harassment, discrimination, exclusion, stigmatization, and prejudice directed against persons from all countries of the world because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and because these practices undermine the integrity and dignity of those subjected to such abuses; violations of human rights based on sexual orientation or gender identity are condemned wherever they take place; a call is made to all States and relevant international human rights mechanisms to commit to the promotion and protection of the human rights of all persons, regardless of their sexual orientation and gender identity, and the former are urged to take all necessary measures, particularly legislative or administrative, to ensure that sexual orientation or gender identity cannot, under any circumstances, be the basis for criminal sanctions. Costa Rica is one of the 85 signatory countries of the *Joint Statement on Ending Acts of Violence, and Related Human Rights Violations, Directed Against People Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, presented by Colombia before the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. In January of this year, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, highlighted that discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is one of the injustices that many States have ignored or even approved. *"As a result, some governments treat these individuals as second-class citizens or even criminals. Confronting this discrimination is a challenge. But we must live up to the ideals of the Universal Declaration."* **XVII.-** Recently, in the cited judgment of February 24 of the current year, issued in the Case of Atala Riffo and daughters vs. Chile, in which it reiterated the obligation of the States Parties to the *American Convention on Human Rights* to respect and ensure *"without any discrimination"* the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established that sexual orientation and gender identity are categories protected by that international instrument under the term *"other social condition"*, contained in its Article 1, paragraph 1). On this matter, it specified the following: *"78. The Court has established that Article 1.1 of the Convention is a norm of a general nature whose content extends to all the provisions of the treaty, and provides the obligation of the States Parties to respect and ensure the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein "without any discrimination". That is to say, whatever the origin or form it takes, any treatment that may be considered discriminatory with respect to the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed in the Convention is per se incompatible with it12. / 79. (...) the Court has indicated13 that the notion of equality derives directly from the unity of nature of the human race and is inseparable from the essential dignity of the person, against which any situation that, by considering a specific group superior, leads to treating it with privilege; or that, conversely, by considering it inferior, treats it with hostility or in any way discriminates against it in the enjoyment of rights recognized for those not considered to have incurred in such a situation, is incompatible. The Court's jurisprudence has also indicated that in the current stage of the evolution of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination has entered the domain of jus cogens. The entire legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and permeates the entire legal system14."* It also specified that as a consequence of this, no internal norm, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or private individuals, can diminish or restrict in any way the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation. On the contrary, the proscription of discrimination based on sexual orientation entails the obligation of all authorities and officials to guarantee that they can enjoy each and every one of the rights established in the *Convention*. *"80. Moreover, the Court has established that States must refrain from carrying out actions that are in any way directed, directly or indirectly, to creating situations of de jure or de facto discrimination15. States are obliged to adopt positive measures to reverse or change existing discriminatory situations in their societies, to the detriment of a specific group of persons. This implies the special duty of protection that the State must exercise with respect to actions and practices of third parties that, under its tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain, or favor discriminatory situations16." "82. (...) Article 24 of the American Convention prohibits discrimination in law or in fact, not only with regard to the rights enshrined in said treaty but with respect to all the laws that the State approves and their application. In other words, if a State discriminates in the respect for or guarantee of a conventional right, it would breach the obligation established in Article 1.1 and the substantive right in question. If, on the contrary, the discrimination refers to an unequal protection of internal law or its application, the fact must be analyzed in light of Article 24 of the American Convention17."* *"83. The Court has established, as has the European Court of Human Rights, that human rights treaties are living instruments, the interpretation of which must keep pace with the evolution of the times and current living conditions18. Such evolutionary interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation enshrined in Article 29 of the American Convention, as well as those established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties19." "84. In this sense, when interpreting the expression 'any other social condition' of Article 1.1. of the Convention, the alternative most favorable for the protection of the rights protected by said treaty must always be chosen, according to the principle of the norm most favorable to the human being20." "85. The specific criteria by virtue of which it is prohibited to discriminate, according to Article 1.1 of the American Convention, are not an exhaustive or limitative list but merely enunciative. On the contrary, the wording of that article leaves the criteria open with the inclusion of the term 'other social condition' to thus incorporate other categories that may not have been explicitly indicated. The expression 'any other social condition' of Article 1.1. of the Convention must be interpreted by the Court, consequently, from the perspective of the option most favorable to the person and the evolution of fundamental rights in contemporary international law21." "86. In this regard, in the Inter-American System, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (hereinafter 'OAS') has approved since 2008 in its annual sessions four successive resolutions regarding the protection of persons against discriminatory treatment based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, through which the adoption of specific measures has been required for effective protection against discriminatory acts22." "87. Regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as a category of prohibited discrimination, the European Court of Human Rights has indicated that sexual orientation is 'other condition' mentioned in Article 1423 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter 'European Convention'), which prohibits discriminatory treatment24. In particular, in the Case of Salgueiro da Silva Mouta Vs. Portugal, the European Court concluded that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14 of the European Convention. Furthermore, it reiterated that the list of categories set out in said article is illustrative and not exhaustive25. Likewise, in the Case of Clift Vs. the United Kingdom, the European Court reiterated that sexual orientation, as one of the categories that can be included under 'other condition', is another specific example of those found in that list, which are considered personal characteristics in the sense that they are innate or inherent to the person26." "88. In the framework of the Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have classified sexual orientation as one of the categories of prohibited discrimination considered in Article 2.127 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 2.228 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee indicated in the case of Toonen Vs. Australia that the reference to the category 'sex' would include the sexual orientation of persons29. Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has expressed its concern regarding diverse discriminatory situations related to the sexual orientation of persons, which has been expressed repeatedly in its concluding observations on the reports presented by the States30." "89. For its part, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights determined that sexual orientation can be framed under 'other social condition'31. Likewise, the Committee on the Rights of the Child32, the Committee against Torture33 have made references in the context of their general observations and recommendations regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as one of the prohibited categories of discrimination." "90. On December 22, 2008, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the 'Declaration on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity', reaffirming the 'principle of non-discrimination, which requires that human rights apply equally to all human beings, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity'34. Likewise, on March 22, 2011, the 'Joint Statement on Ending Acts of Violence, and Related Human Rights Violations Directed Against People Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity' was presented before the United Nations Human Rights Council35. On June 15, 2011, this same Council approved a resolution on 'Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity' in which 'grave concern at acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, [committed] against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity' was expressed36. The prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation has also been highlighted in numerous reports by the United Nations special rapporteurs37." "91. Taking into account the general obligations of respect and guarantee established in Article 1.1 of the American Convention, the criteria of interpretation set out in Article 29 of said Convention, the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Resolutions of the General Assembly of the OAS, the standards established by the European Court and the United Nations bodies (supra paras.

83 to 90), the Inter-American Court establishes that sexual orientation and gender identity of persons are categories protected by the Convention. Therefore, any discriminatory norm, act, or practice based on a person's sexual orientation is proscribed by the Convention. Consequently, no domestic legal norm, decision, or practice, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, may diminish or restrict, in any way, the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation." "92. With regard to the State's argument that at the time of the issuance of the judgment of the Supreme Court there would not have been a consensus regarding sexual orientation as a prohibited category of discrimination, the Court highlights that the alleged lack of consensus within some countries regarding full respect for the rights of sexual minorities cannot be considered a valid argument to deny or restrict their human rights or to perpetuate and reproduce the historical and structural discrimination that these minorities have suffered³⁸. The fact that this could be a controversial matter in some sectors and countries, and that it is not necessarily a matter of consensus, cannot lead the Court to abstain from deciding, because in doing so it must refer solely and exclusively to the stipulations of the international obligations undertaken by sovereign decision of the States through the American Convention." "93. A right that is recognized to persons cannot be denied or restricted to anyone and under any circumstance based on their sexual orientation. This would violate Article 1.1 of the American Convention. The inter-American instrument proscribes discrimination, in general, including therein categories such as sexual orientation, which cannot serve as a basis to deny or restrict any of the rights established in the Convention." XVIII.- This Constitutional Chamber has also recognized that sexual orientation is a vector of social and personal discrimination and has highlighted the role of public authorities in combating it. In Voto n.º 2007-18660, at 11:17 a.m. on December 21, 2007, it stated the following: "Through its jurisprudential line, this Chamber has recognized as a fundamental legal principle contained in the Political Constitution of Costa Rica the respect for the dignity of every human being and, consequently, the absolute prohibition of carrying out any type of discrimination contrary to that dignity. To discriminate, in general terms, is to differentiate to the detriment of the rights and dignity of a human being or group thereof; in this case, homosexuals. From the foregoing, it can be validly affirmed that discrimination based on sexual orientation is contrary to the concept of dignity duly enshrined in the Political Constitution and in the International Treaties on Human Rights signed by our country. By way of example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits in its Article 26 discrimination on the grounds of 'race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status'; from which it also follows that acts that violate the right to equality and human dignity of persons due to their sexual orientation are not permitted, as they have the right to access any commercial establishment and to receive equal treatment, without discrimination based on their sexual preference." In n.º 2010-13313, at 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010, it added that "The human, fundamental, and legally configured rights of minority or disadvantaged groups, for having traditionally suffered discrimination, exclusion, and all kinds of social prejudices—as occurs with that of homosexuals—arise from movements for their (sic) vindication, ordinarily, against majorities, given the insistence and natural inclination of majorities to maintain and perpetuate any discrimination and asymmetric treatment. Public authorities, for their part, are obliged, by the Constitution and the instruments of International Human Rights Law, to guarantee and promote the effective respect of the principle and right to equality—real and not formal—of such groups (Articles 33 of the Constitution and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José). Situations of discrimination can be factual or legal; they will be of the first type when, given the existence of a disadvantaged and discriminated minority group, measures are not adopted to overcome such a state of affairs." "In the case of groups that are the object of discrimination and social prejudices, the application of the principle of real equality and the prohibition of all discrimination, which normally operate ex post to the perpetration of the discriminatory act, is not sufficient. Therefore, it is necessary that public authorities implement the principle of support for such groups with public policies and effective normative measures. The principle of support for discriminated groups prevents and anticipates discriminations, so that it has an ex ante effect with respect to them. The principle of support is achieved when legislation and regulations are enacted that recognize the rights of discriminated groups, even if these are of infra-constitutional configuration." XIX.- As Fernando REY MARTÍNEZ points out, "The equality/prohibition of discrimination has a broader normative scope because it protects homosexuality in private spaces (preventing it from being treated by Law in an unreasonably different manner from heterosexuality) but also in public ones, in that same sense. Public authorities will have to provide an especially convincing or persuasive reason to legally treat homosexuals in a different and worse way than heterosexuals. It goes without saying that from the approach of the prohibition of discrimination, protection becomes more effective and incisive, among other things because moral or historical arguments will no longer be sufficient by themselves to prevent homosexual persons from accessing certain rights that they traditionally had been denied, such as, for example, the right to maintain a legally recognized stable union with a person of the same sexual orientation." [Homosexualidad y Constitución. Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid: 73, January/April, 2005, p.132]. Hence, it is imperative to eradicate, at least from the legal world, the profound homophobic social prejudice, which, on the other hand, perhaps bears a significant relationship with discrimination against women, since the stigmatization of non-heterosexual persons appears closely linked to the supposed deviation from the role traditionally deemed appropriate for them (the center of social reproach seems to reside in the fact that the 'gay man' adopts a 'woman's' position and the lesbian assumes that of a 'man'). "The fundamental right not to be discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation would have, then, the typical effect of equal treatment with its two corollaries, the prohibition of direct discriminations, that is, of different and worse legal treatments based on homosexuality, and of indirect or impact discriminations, that is, of legal differentiations that could be formally established not on the basis of sexual orientation, but that, in fact, negatively impact the homosexual minority." [ibid, p. 139]. From the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation also derives a mandate for affirmative action. Public authorities are obliged to ensure that the social discrimination suffered by homosexual persons 'does not prevail' in any way, for which they are obliged to adopt equal opportunity measures. "The protection of homosexuality, despite not being explicitly mentioned in our Constitution, has become a central constitutional matter, and not only because it affects, as one might suppose, a number of people not easily determinable, but undoubtedly significant, but, above all, because of the concurrence of two qualitative arguments, one relating to the value of liberty and the other to that of equality. In the question about the constitutional framework of homosexuality, at stake is, of course, liberty, because the heart of the matter is the sexual orientation of persons, that is, one of the keys to human existence and, therefore, to its dignity, central to family life, collective well-being, and the development of individual personality. But equality is also implicated, because our Constitution, as Justice Harlan of the U.S. Constitution said in his dissent to the Plessy v. Ferguson Judgment (1896), 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens'." [Ibid, p. 117]. As Justice J. Greaney indicated in his concurring vote in the famous Judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hillary Goodridge and others v. Department of Public Health, of November 18, 2003: "As a matter of constitutional law, neither the mantra of tradition, nor individual conviction can justify the perpetuation of the hierarchy according to which same-sex couples and their families are judged less deserving of social and legal recognition than opposite-sex ones." 333].-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">III.-</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> In his dissenting opinion that forms part of the judgment of September 27, 1990 (Case [Nombre4] vs. United Kingdom), Mr. S. K. Martens, judge of the European Court of Human Rights, rightly pointed out that </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“Marriage is far more than a sexual union and, therefore, the capacity to have relations of this nature is not ‘essential.’ Persons who cannot procreate or have sexual relations may also seek to marry. This is because marriage involves more than a union that legitimizes such relations and is intended for procreation: it is a legal institution that creates a fixed legal relationship between the spouses and between them and third parties (including the authorities). As one author has stated, the spouses, through the bonds of marriage, ‘announce to the world around them that their relationship is founded on intense human feelings and on a mutual, exclusive, and permanent commitment.’ It is also a kind of community in which intellectual, spiritual, and sentimental ties are at least as essential as physical ones. / Article 12 of the Convention [for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] protects the right of any man or woman (of marriageable age) to enter into this union and, therefore, the definition of what the words ‘man and woman’ mean in this context must take into account all these characteristics of marriage.”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> In similar terms, Ms. E. [Nombre5] and Messrs. I. [Nombre6] and [Nombre7] [Nombre8], judges of that same body, pronounced in their joint dissenting opinion forming part of the same judgment: </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“The fact that a transsexual cannot procreate is not decisive. There are many men and many women who also cannot have children and, yet, have the unquestionable right to marry. The capacity to procreate is not and cannot be a prerequisite for marriage.”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> Under this same approach, the professor at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, [Nombre9], proposes that, </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“Indeed, if marriage [and, by extension, the heterosexual common-law marriage (unión de hecho heterosexual)] is defined as an affective and material community of life, and no longer by its social function; if its essential purpose is no longer reproductive, but defined around personal fulfillment and the free development of personality; if its constitutional content is linked, primarily, to fundamental individual rights and freedoms; if the ius connubium is predicated, in principle, of any person, on the requirements of equality and freedom; and if the legal regulation of marriage and of relations between spouses has undergone a shift towards the Law of Obligations; it is difficult to admit the prohibition on same-sex couples from marrying as unquestionable.”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> [Same-sex unions: regulatory options and their legal implications. </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">Derecho Privado y Constitución</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'">, Madrid: 20, January-December, 2006, 173-202. 188-189].-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">IV.-</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> In the judgment issued on November 18, 2003, in the case [Nombre10] and others vs. Department of Public Health, for which Judge Marshall was the rapporteur, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared the prohibition on access to marriage for same-sex persons contrary to the Constitution. It argued that one is in the presence of </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“(…) a vital social institution (…)”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> and that </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“(…) the decision of whether and whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> For this reason and because </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“the benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death,”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> it has long been considered a fundamental right (</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">civil right</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'">). As it is a central element of individuals' lives and the community's well-being, barring same-sex persons from the right to marry deprives them </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“(…) of one of the most important aspects of the human experience (…)”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> and </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“(…) denies them full access to the protection of the laws (…)”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'">; hence, such exclusion could only be admitted if it serves </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“(…) a compelling public objective (…)”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> and is </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“(…) a reasonable means to achieve such an end.”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> These conditions are not met regarding the prohibition of marriage between persons of the same sex, which exempts such a rule because of a singular trait: sexual orientation, which harms the freedom recognized in the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as equality, which prevents there from being second-class citizens. The three main justifications for this prohibition are not constitutionally reasonable: neither that heterosexual marriage provides a favorable framework for procreation (understood as unassisted heterosexual procreation); nor that it ensures an optimal space for child-rearing; nor that same-sex marriage will trivialize or destroy that institution as historically configured. The essence of the freedom to marry is to unite with the person of one's own choosing. By preventing marriage between persons of the same sex, </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“(…) the State confers an official stamp of approval on the destructive stereotypes that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to heterosexual relationships and are not, therefore, worthy of respect.”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'">-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">V.-</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> It is true that in vote no. [Telf1], of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, in which it considered legitimate the legal impossibility of marriage between persons of the same sex, established in subsection 6) of Article 14 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">Código de Familia</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'">, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) saddled the Legislative Assembly with the responsibility of </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“(…) considering the need to regulate, in the manner it deems convenient, the bonds or rights derived from this type of union, which evidently requires a whole normative development establishing the rights and obligations of this type of couple (…).”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> It is also true that, four years later, in no. 2010-641, of 2:56 a.m. on January 13, 2010, it rejected on the merits the unconstitutionality action filed by Mr. [Nombre 001] against section 242 </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">ibid</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'">; a ruling which, according to the limited information available since its drafting is still pending, cites the aforementioned no. [Telf1]. Hence, based on the provisions of Article 13 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'">, it is not unreasonable to conclude that these precedents appear to prevent us from resorting to the regulation of common-law marriage (unión de hecho), contained in sections 242, 243, 244, and 245 </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">ibid</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'">, even by analogy, in order to resolve this claim on the merits, with which there would be no other recourse but to confirm the summary dismissal (rechazo de plano) ordered by the Family Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José in the order issued at 8:47 a.m. on June 19, 2009, which, as noted, considered it non-justiciable.-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">VI.-</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> However, it is impossible to ignore our duty to weigh the factual situations that escape the solutions preconceived by the Legislative Assembly at a given historical moment, in order to properly integrate the legal system and offer a response to the substantive claim of Mr. [Nombre 001]. Indeed, we are convinced that, in a system like Costa Rica's, the absence of specific regulations does not authorize the summary dismissal (rechazo de plano) of a claim. The fundamental right to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), recognized, among other provisions, in Article 8(1) and Article 25(1), in relation to Articles 1 and 2 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">Convención americana sobre derechos humanos</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> and in Article 41 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">Constitución Política</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'">, and the principle of the hermetic plenitude of the legal system, addressed in Article 6 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">Código Civil</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> and Article 5 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'">, prevent such a pronouncement. This was emphasized by the magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional): </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“In our capacity as judges, (…) we cannot ignore social reality as an element to be considered in decision-making regarding matters submitted to our knowledge (…).”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> (Vote no. [Telf1], of 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006).-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%; font-size:15pt"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold">VII.-</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> Pursuant to the provisions of the </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Convención americana sobre derechos humanos</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt">, approved by the Legislative Assembly by Law No. 4534 of February 23, 1970, </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> (Article 1(1)). </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> (Article 2). </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or tribunal, previously established by law, (…) for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> (Article 8(1)). </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> (Article 25(1)). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed the content of these precepts on various occasions. In its recent judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case [Nombre11] and [Nombre12] vs. Argentina) it highlighted that </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“This Court has affirmed on other occasions that ‘[i]n international law, a customary norm prescribes that a State that has concluded an international agreement must introduce the necessary modifications into its domestic law to ensure the execution of the obligations assumed.’ In the American Convention, this principle is enshrined in Article 2, which establishes the general obligation of each State Party to adapt its domestic law to the provisions of the same, to guarantee the rights recognized therein</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">2</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> It also reiterated that </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“(…) the adaptation of domestic norms to the parameters established in the Convention implies the adoption of measures in two aspects, namely: a) the suppression of norms and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees provided for in the Convention or that disregard the rights recognized therein or hinder their exercise, and b) the issuance of norms and the development of practices conducive to the effective observance of said guarantees</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; color:#0000ff">.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">The first aspect is satisfied by the reform, repeal, or annulment of the norms or practices that have such scope, as appropriate. The second, obliges the State to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations and, therefore, must adopt all legal, administrative, and other measures necessary to prevent similar events from happening again in the future</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">3</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> Without a doubt, in the case of same-sex unions (unión entre personas del mismo sexo), their legislative recognition is paramount in order to eradicate social discrimination against those who form them. In view of the particularly serious nature of this practice and because it violates several rights enshrined in the </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">Convención</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt">, such protection must be sufficient. And, following the doctrine set forth in the judgment of August 12, 2008 (Case [Nombre13] Vs. Panama), given the imperative need to offer some response to the legitimate claim raised in the </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">sub-lite</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> ,</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“(…) there is a duty to use those remedies (…) that are related to the protection of the fundamental rights that may be affected in such cases, such as the right to personal liberty, to personal integrity, and the right to life, as applicable, which are recognized in the American Convention.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> In the judgment of August 16, 2000 (case [Nombre14] and [Nombre15]), the Inter-American Court affirmed that </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“101. (…) the right of every person to a simple and prompt recourse or to any other effective recourse before the competent judges or tribunals that protects them against acts that violate their fundamental rights constitutes one of the basic pillars, not only of the American Convention, but of the very Rule of Law in a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention […]. Article 25 is intimately linked with the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by attributing protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">4</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. / 102. Furthermore, the Court has indicated that the non-existence of an effective recourse against violations of the rights recognized by the Convention constitutes a transgression of the same by the State Party in which such a situation takes place. In that sense, it must be underlined that, for such a recourse to exist, it is not enough that it is provided for by the Constitution or the law or that it is formally admissible, but it is required that it is truly suitable to establish whether a human rights violation has been incurred and to provide what is necessary to remedy it</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">5</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. / (…) / 121. This Court has established that Article 25 is intimately linked with the general obligation of Article 1.1 of the American Convention, by attributing protective functions to the domestic law of the States Parties, from which it follows that the State has the responsibility to design and normatively enshrine an effective recourse, but also to ensure the due application of said recourse by its judicial authorities</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">6</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> In that of June 21, 2002 (case [Nombre16], [Nombre17] and [Nombre18] and others vs. Trinidad and Tobago), it expressed that</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"> “The Inter-American Court has also established that as part of the general obligations of the States, they have a positive duty of guarantee with respect to the individuals under their jurisdiction. This involves taking all necessary measures to remove the obstacles that may exist so that individuals can enjoy the rights that the Convention recognizes. Consequently, the State's tolerance of circumstances or conditions that prevent individuals from accessing adequate domestic remedies to protect their rights constitutes a violation of Article 1.1 of the Convention […]</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">7</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> In that of September 7, 2004 (case [Nombre19] vs. Ecuador) it reiterated that </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“Article 25.1 of the Convention establishes, in broad terms, the obligation of the States to offer all persons under their jurisdiction an effective judicial remedy against acts violating their fundamental rights. / (…). Under this perspective, it has been pointed out that for the State to comply with the provisions of the aforementioned Article 25.1 of the Convention, it is not enough that remedies exist formally, but it is necessary that they be effective, that is, the real possibility must be provided to the person of filing a simple and prompt remedy that allows achieving, where appropriate, the required judicial protection.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> [See, in a similar vein, the judgments of November 27, 2003 (case [Nombre20]); June 7, 2003 (case [Nombre21]); November 28, 2002 (case [Nombre22]); August 31, 2001 (case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Community [Nombre23]); January 31, 2001 (case of the Constitutional Court); November 25, 2000 (case [Nombre24]); August 18, 2000 (case [Nombre25]); November 19, 1999 (case of the “Street Children” (Case [Nombre26] and others)); September 29, 1999 (case [Nombre27]); May 30, 1999 (case [Nombre28] and others); March 8, 1998 (case of the “Panel [Nombre29]” ([Nombre30] and others)); January 24, 1998 (case [Nombre31]); November 12, 1997 (case [Nombre32]) and November 3, 1997 (case [Nombre33])]. In that of August 6, 2008 (Case [Nombre34] vs. United Mexican States) it specified that </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“An effective judicial remedy is one capable of producing the result for which it was conceived</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">8</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">, that is, it must be a remedy capable of leading to an analysis by a competent tribunal for the purpose of establishing whether or not a human rights violation has occurred and, where appropriate, providing reparation</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">9</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> Finally, in the cited judgment of April 27, 2012 (Case [Nombre11] and [Nombre12] vs. Argentina) it specified </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">“107. (…) that Article 25.1 of the Convention contemplates the obligation of the States Parties to guarantee, to all persons under their jurisdiction, an effective judicial remedy against acts violating their fundamental rights. This effectiveness implies that, besides the formal existence of remedies, these give results or responses to the violations of rights contemplated either in the Convention, in the Constitution, or in the laws. In this sense, those remedies that, due to the general conditions of the country or even due to the particular circumstances of a given case, prove illusory cannot be considered effective. This can occur, for example, when their uselessness has been demonstrated by practice, because the means to execute their decisions are lacking, or for any other situation that constitutes a denial of justice. Thus, the process must tend towards the materialization of the protection of the right recognized in the judicial ruling through the suitable application of said ruling</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">10</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. / 108. On the other hand, as the Court has previously indicated, when evaluating the effectiveness of remedies, the Court must observe whether the decisions in the judicial processes have effectively contributed to ending a situation violating rights, to ensuring the non-repetition of harmful acts, and to guaranteeing the free and full exercise of the rights protected by the Convention</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">11</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">.”</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt">-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-weight:bold">VIII.-</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> According to Article 41 of the </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">Constitución Política</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'">, </span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-style:italic">“Occurring to the laws, everyone must find redress for the injuries or wrongs they may have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be provided to them promptly, fully, and in strict conformity with the laws.”</span><span style="font-family:'Trebuchet MS'"> In its time (extraordinary session of October 11, 1982), the Full Court (Corte Plena), acting as the body responsible for constitutionality review, emphasized that from this supreme norm derive a series of basic principles to which all persons and competent bodies in the jurisdictional sphere must adjust their actions. By virtue of these, the Legislative Assembly is obligated to enact the legal precepts necessary to regulate the rights of persons and to establish the appropriate channels and procedures to procure their effective jurisdictional protection (tutela jurisdiccional) when they have been infringed. For their part, the various Courts must interpret and apply those provisions in such a way that they do not hinder the proper verification of the grievance and guarantee, should it be proven, the full and timely restoration thereof. Hence, we judges violate the cited constitutional provision when we prevent or hinder access to the stipulated procedures or when we reject or deny a petition that we should have granted in a judgment, without any reason or invoking an insufficient or spurious one.

In vote no. 1739-92, at 11:45 a.m. on July 1, 1992, that Chamber held that *"At the base of all procedural order lies the principle, and with it, the fundamental right to justice, understood as the existence and availability of a justice administration system, that is to say, a set of suitable mechanisms for the exercise of the jurisdictional function (función jurisdiccional) of the State—to declare the disputed right or restore the violated one, interpreting and applying it impartially in specific cases—which in turn comprises a set of independent and specialized judicial bodies (órganos judiciales independientes especializados) specialized in that exercise, the availability of that apparatus (disponibilidad de ese aparato) to resolve conflicts and correct the wrongs that originate in social life, in a civilized and effective manner, and guaranteed access to that justice for all persons, under conditions of equality and without discrimination (condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación). / a) In this first sense, therefore, due process has, above all, programmatic dimensions, no less legally binding for that reason, which demand the existence, sufficiency, and efficacy of a judicial and procedural system suitable to guarantee precisely that fundamental right to justice, which is, moreover, nothing more than a consequence of the monopoly of force assumed by the State, and the most important manifestation of the right of petition (derecho de petición), which in Costa Rica is enshrined in Articles 27—in general—and 41—in particular—of the Constitution (…). / b) But it also has other, even more immediately enforceable implications, which may, in turn, concern the justice administration system itself, per se, or the right of access to justice (acceso a la justicia) for all persons: / (…) / 2. And belonging to the second—the equal right of all to access justice—in addition to the generic right of petition (derecho de petición) of Article 27 and the specific right to justice (derecho a la justicia) of Article 41 of the Constitution already cited, are a series of complementary—but also fundamental—attributes, among which: / (i) the general right and principle of equality—and its counterpart of non-discrimination—set forth in Article 33 of the Constitution, as well as in all international instruments on Human Rights, for example Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, with the particularity that the duality of these demonstrates that equality, in addition to being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, such that this right is also violated when there is discrimination regarding non-fundamental rights (…); / (ii) in general, universal access to justice for every person, regardless of their sex, age, color, nationality, origin or background, or any other social condition, all of which raises, in turn, consequences that it is not necessary to examine here because they are not directly implicated in the case under consultation, such as the gratuity of justice, informalism, etc."* As it concluded in vote no. 1562-93, at 3:06 p.m. on March 30, 1993, the foregoing *"(…) means, first of all, that due process requires the existence, sufficiency, and efficacy of a judicial and procedural system suitable to guarantee the fundamental right to justice, which is the most important manifestation of the right of petition enshrined in Articles 27—in general—and 41—in particular—of the Constitution (…). Secondly, it concerns the justice administration system itself and the right of access to justice for all persons, which implies that in every procedural system there must be \"reasonableness of effects\" on personal rights, in the sense of not imposing on these (…) other limitations than those reasonably derived from the nature and regime of the rights themselves, and those indispensable for them to function adequately in the life of society."* - **IX.-** In ordinary legislation, that fundamental right is developed, among other precepts, in Article 6 of the *Civil Code* and in Article 5 of the *Organic Law of the Judicial Branch*. By virtue of the first, *"The Courts have the inexcusable duty to resolve, in every case, the matters they hear, for which they shall adhere to the established system of sources."* Under the terms of the second paragraph of the latter, *"The courts may not excuse themselves from exercising their authority or from rendering a decision in matters within their competence due to a lack of applicable norm and must do so in accordance with the written and unwritten norms of the legal system, according to the hierarchical scale of its sources."* In fact, that same provision recognizes, as part of the jurisdictional power, the duty to supplement the absence of legal norms: *"The general principles of Law and Jurisprudence shall serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and shall have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit. **When it comes to supplementing the absence** and not the insufficiency **of the provisions that regulate a matter**, said sources shall have the rank of law."* (Emphasis added). Consequently, we jurisdictional bodies are forbidden from alleging the lack of applicable norm(s) to the specific case to excuse ourselves from rendering a decision on the merits of a process like this one. The dogma of the hermetic completeness of the legal system obliges us to resort, in integrated application, to written and unwritten sources in the effort to identify and implement the best solution to the dispute raised. On this matter, in vote no. 36-F-94, at 9:40 a.m. on May 27, 1994, the First Chamber noted that *"(…) jurisprudence as an informing source of the legal system is called upon to supplement, by way of extensive interpretation, the scope of the norms charged with resolving legal conflicts when no norm exists for the specific case or it was not conceived for new legal demands (Article 9 of the Civil Code)."* In nos. 112-F-92, at 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992; 151-F-01, at 3:20 p.m. on February 14, 2001, and 360-F-02, at 11:10 a.m. on May 3, 2002, it stated that *"(…) Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 6 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code allow referral to other sources of the legal system and to the General Principles of Law when there is no applicable norm (principle of the hermetic completeness of the legal system); furthermore, Article 12 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code allows the analogical application of norms provided there is an identity of reason and no norm prohibits it."* For its part, the Second Chamber, in no. 415, at 9:00 a.m. on December 22, 1994, set it forth in the following terms: *"(…) in any case, one must turn, in the interest of the best solution, to expressly addressed analogous situations, to the general principles of law, such as (…) good faith and equity and even, as noted by Prof. [Name35] in his cited work, to common sense, that is, what people normally have in judging things reasonably (Articles 10 through 12 of the Civil Code, 15 of the Labor Code, and 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch)."* In no. 2004-200, at 10:00 a.m. on March 24, 2004, that same body held that Article 6 of the *Civil Code* *"(…) develops a fundamental right, contained in numeral 41 of the Political Constitution, which guarantees all persons access to justice. Now, to fulfill such a task, one must take into consideration Article 12 of that Code, according to which the analogical application of norms is appropriate when they do not contemplate a specific scenario, but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is appreciated, except when a norm prohibits such application. In a case such as this, denying all effect to the relationship in question, besides being unjust, means ignoring a reality, not foreign to our environment, which is the cohabitation of two persons, (…) whose only bond or past bond was affective ties, without protection from the legal system. The foregoing constitutes sufficient grounds, in view of the value of justice that inspires the legal system, to arrange for the liquidation of the assets acquired and produced during the long relationship, giving the plaintiff what corresponds to her. But, also, to resolve the question, in light of the foregoing, a response to the situation raised can be provided, resorting “mutatis mutandi”, to the regulations given by law to similar institutions."* Finally, in no. 769-93, at 3:48 p.m. on February 16, 1993, that Constitutional Chamber recognized that *"Here, as the consulting Court itself anticipates, one could resort to other regulations (…), or to other parameters equally authorized by the legal system, when there is insufficiency in the regulation of a specific matter. Those criteria could be the general principles of law, which are authorized by Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 1 of the Civil Code; equity, which could be used under the terms of Article 11 of the Civil Code; and even analogical application, which Article 12 following authorizes. It must be added to the above that, according to the first cited norm, a court cannot excuse itself from hearing a matter, nor resolve it negatively, alleging a lack of applicable law to the case raised. Judges [male and female], then, have at their disposal ample possibilities to resolve with an express norm, with extensive application (analogical interpretation), and even through normative re-creation based on another insufficient one. / (…) / The power of Family Law jurisprudence in our country has been such that it has also been categorically affirmed that many of the norms of the Family Code have their origin in court decisions, some even of a markedly dissenting or minority tone, but not for that reason devoid of justice or equity. On the contrary, the historical development of Family Law shows us how the passage of time has been determining for an evolution of its concepts and solutions. Our country is no exception in this field, and one could even say that this behavior has been noticed with greater celerity here."* - **X.-** Article 12 of the *Civil Code* stipulates that *"The analogical application of norms shall be appropriate when they do not contemplate a specific scenario, but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is appreciated, except when a norm prohibits such application."* In relation to the analogical procedure for integrating positive law, in vote no. 1-F-94, at 3:00 p.m. on January 5, 1994, reiterated in that of the Second Chamber no. [Telf2], at 10:26 a.m. on August 6, 2010, the First Chamber specified that *"III.- (…). By analogy is understood, from a logical point of view, a procedure of singular induction from one case to another, by means of which one seeks to extend the validity of a proposition from a specific situation to another generically similar one. In antiquity it was known by the name of \"procedure by resemblance\". Unlike deductive procedures, in analogical induction the validity of the conclusion is not necessary, but only probable. In other words, in analogy, a situation or fact is compared with another situation or fact, and thus an attempt is made to obtain a particular conclusion. The analogical argument is based on those similar aspects or connoted elements between the analyzed situations, such that the more the essential aspects, and not merely accidental ones, resemble each other, the more convincing the extensive conclusion drawn will be. Another similar logical procedure is induction by generalization, in which from several cases, analyzing their particular connoted elements, a general conclusion is obtained. In generalization, it is not a matter of comparing two particular situations to extend what concerns one to the other, but of analyzing several particular cases to obtain a general conclusion that encompasses all of them. Both types of logical procedures have an undeniable influence regarding legal analogy (…). / IV. After prolonged discussions in the general doctrine of law, it has come to be admitted, by majority, that the legal system can have gaps. These gaps are deficiencies of the law, which does not present a specific provision for a specific matter or case. At the same time, it has been accepted that legal systems have the latent capacity to elaborate the pertinent legal precepts, in order to thus resolve the conflicts of interest present in these cases. Therefore, faced with gaps in the law, the judge [male or female] cannot refuse to render a decision alleging no norm is found to apply to the specific case; that would amount to a denial of justice. However, neither does the judge have the faculty to arbitrarily create the norm applicable to the specific case. In our normative system, the judge [male or female] is of law, not of conscience, and any decision made must find support in the current legal system. To fill these voids, our Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, in both its previous and current text, establishes that courts may not excuse themselves from resolving due to a lack of norm, and by establishing that in such a case one shall turn to the general principles of law in the absence of a legal norm, it does not exclude that before resorting to this interpretive criterion, analogy, regulated by Articles 12 and 13 of the Civil Code, may be used to apply a written norm established for a similar legal situation to the case raised. By means of this procedure, one seeks to apply a legal principle that the law establishes for a certain hypothesis to another fact not expressly regulated, but which presents the same legal essence. These are situations in which there is no identity of fact, but a substantive similarity so relevant that it justifies applying the norm established for the case contemplated by the legislator to that lacking regulation. The application of analogy is justified by the need to regulate similar facts, according to the principle of legal equality, with similar norms. The main problem will be, in these cases, to determine whether between both situations there exist legal similarities of such a nature as to permit the analogical extension of the known norm. This problem cannot be resolved in a mechanical manner or with merely logical criteria; it is rather a legal assessment made by the adjudicator [male or female], in which it is determined whether the factual elements contemplated in the known norm, which motivated the establishment of a specific provision by the legislator (in accordance with the ratio legis), are also present in the similar situation taken into consideration. The fact considered may have certain essential elements that characterize it and other accidental or contingent ones that accompany it. The important thing is that there is correspondence between the essential elements of the foreseen fact and those of the unregulated situation. Legal analogy is usually classified into two types: analogia legis, in which, to resolve the unforeseen case, a singular normative provision is used; and analogia iuris, which does not take a single norm as a starting point, but rather a series of provisions, from which it induces a general principle. Both procedures obey the reasoning schemes analyzed in the preceding consideration: the legis corresponds to induction by analogy and the iuris to induction by generalization. Doctrine considers the recourse to the general principles of law, which can only be obtained through generalization, as a case of analogia iuris. To proceed to the analogical interpretation of norms, the following is necessary: 1- that a precise legal provision is lacking for the controverted case, such that analogical application would not be possible where there are express legal precepts or from which a solution to the case raised can be deduced through extensive interpretation; 2- that there exists an essential legal similarity between the regulated case and the one to be regulated, which must be determined by the judge [male or female], after an assessment of both situations; 3- that it is not one of those situations in which, given the nature of the provision to be applied, analogy is inappropriate. Regarding this last requirement, legal praxis has elaborated some relevant principles, which have often been expressly adopted by legislation. In this respect, it is convenient to cite the following: 1- It is not possible to apply prohibitive and sanctioning laws by analogy, as they are of a restrictive nature; 2- nor is it possible to do so in the case of norms that limit the capacity of the person or subjective rights, as this is odious matter; 3- in the case of \"ius singulare\" or exceptional law, by its very nature, as it obeys a particular reason for regulation, this type of normative application is not appropriate; and, 4- in the case of temporary norms, analogy is also not appropriate, as they are determined for a momentary circumstance. / V. Of the scenarios that prevent the application of analogy, it is worth referring (…), to the impossibility of extensively applying those norms of ius singulare. In doctrine, this category is contrasted with ius regulare. The latter is formed by norms characterized by the correspondence of their foundations to the general principles of the legal system; in other words, its directives, presuppositions, and foundations do not depart from the general guidelines of Law. On the contrary, ius singulare, also called exceptional, is inspired by rules different from those that characterize the normative system in general. On occasions, given the need to provide special protection for certain persons, or to safeguard a particular interest of legal transactions, or to resolve some special cases with particular equity criteria, or due to emerging needs from extraordinary circumstances, it becomes necessary to sacrifice the general principles, establishing provisions that exclude certain persons or legal relationships from the application of the normal consequences for certain acts, or establishing special sanctions or liabilities not foreseen for normal cases. Thus, singular law represents a deviation from the general norms governing the system, which is necessary for peculiar reasons of convenience that demand such treatment. Therefore, in such cases, it is not possible to apply exceptional norms or ius singulare by analogy to those cases not expressly contemplated by the norms. / VI.- In our Civil Code, the analogical application of norms is regulated by Articles 12 and 13, located in its Preliminary Title. According to Article 12, the analogical interpretation of norms is possible \"... when they do not contemplate a specific scenario, but regulate another similar one in which an identity of reason is appreciated, except when a norm prohibits such application.\" In this way, the general principle of analogical application is established in those cases where there exists an identical \"ratio legis\". For its part, Article 13 excludes analogical application in the case of penal, exceptional, and temporary laws. Thus, our Civil Code allows this method of integrating Law according to the doctrinal guidelines outlined in the preceding considerations."* (See, also, vote of the First Chamber no. 167-F-S1-2010, at 8:40 a.m. on January 29, 2010).- **XI.-** Now then, if, as the Constitutional Chamber affirmed in the cited vote no. [Telf1], at 2:46 p.m. on May 23, 2006, *"(…) the prohibition contained in the challenged regulations [subsection 6 of Article 14 of the Family Code] refers specifically to the institution called marriage (…)."*; if it does not violate the Political Constitution because there is *"(…) no impediment of any nature for the existence of homosexual unions. Rather, there is empirical verification to indicate that they have increased."* and if it is *"(…) not appropriate to apply the regulations developed for marriage under the terms currently conceived in our constitutional legal system."*; what, then, would be the regulations we would have to draw upon to decide this process on the merits. Keep in mind that, despite having been pointed out on that occasion that the problem raised *"(…) **does not lie in the norm challenged here but, rather, in the absence of an appropriate normative regulation, to regulate the personal and property effects of that type of union, especially if they meet conditions of stability and singularity, because an imperative of legal certainty, if not of justice, makes it necessary**. We are, then, in the presence of a lege ferenda scenario, but by no means of an illegitimate omission by the State. This is also indicated because in the documentation included in the case file, and according to what was expressed in the oral hearing held during the substantiation of this process, some countries have been enacting laws (in the formal sense) that have provided a legal framework and certain formalities to these unions, for the purpose of having specific legal effects in relation to the persons who enter into them […and…], to whom (…) the legal framework that the derived constituent organized for the treatment of heterosexual couples cannot be applied."* (Emphasis added); on a more recent date that same body evidenced that *"(…) the normative gap pointed out by […that…] Constitutional Court in the Sentence cited above, is […maintained…], thereby […being…] indirectly failing to observe the reasons given (ratio decidendi) by […the…] specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in matters of constitutional control, to find that numeral 14, subsection 6, of the Family Code is in conformity with the Law of the Constitution."* (Vote no. 2010-13313, at 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010). And it is not unnecessary to mention that in this last pronouncement, it synthesized its criteria on the topic in the terms set forth below: *"Starting from this sentence [referring to no. [Telf1], cited above], several important aspects become clear for resolving the sub-lite, which are the following: / 1°) Relations between persons of the same sex are a social reality that cannot be ignored or circumvented.* 2°) It is necessary to regulate, legislatively, the patrimonial and personal effects of such relationships between persons of the same sex. / 3°) There exists a normative vacuum of the ordinary legislator (sic) that must be filled, given that the institution of marriage cannot be applied to relationships between persons of the same sex. / 4°) The ordinary legislator (sic) must issue a normative framework that regulates the legal consequences of such relationships between persons of the same sex. This Judgment, by virtue of the provisions of article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, has erga omnes effects, for all constituted powers, precisely, for that reason, the ordinary legislator (sic) assumed the task of discussing the opportunity and convenience of regulating relationships between persons of the same sex." (The bold text and underlining do not appear in the original document). Nor is it feasible to omit highlighting that, as a result of the political events known to all, it does not seem foreseeable that, in the short or medium term, this state of affairs may vary, above all after this past June 6, the Comisión Permanente Especial de Derechos Humanos of the Asamblea Legislativa, chaired by Deputy ***** ******, rendered a majority negative opinion on the draft of the Ley de sociedades de convivencia (No. 17,668), presented since April 13, 2010, by former legislator [Nombre36] and then-legislators [Nombre37], [Nombre38], [Nombre39], and [Nombre40] and published in La Gaceta No. 120 of June 22 of that same year. And what has been noted is not altered by the fact that, one day after the pronouncement of that Committee, the initiative was presented again in the Secretaría del Directorio Legislativo by Deputies [Nombre41] and [Nombre42] and Deputies [Nombre43] and [Nombre44] (No. 18,481). Consider, moreover, that the issue has been in the legislative stream since September 27, 2006, the date on which [Nombre36], [Nombre37], and [Nombre38] presented the draft of the Ley de unión civil entre personas del mismo sexo (No. 16,390), published in La Gaceta No. 214 of November 8, 2006, which ended up shelved on September 22, 2010.- XII.- Without a doubt, in this concrete matter submitted to our decision, both the determination of the competent jurisdictional order to process it and that of the substantive regulations that must be resorted to in order to integrate the current legal system are at stake. As, in our opinion, the condition of a family group for the homosexual couple is undeniable, it is incumbent upon the family jurisdiction to hear and definitively rule on its personal and patrimonial consequences. Indeed, we are convinced that, as the non-heterosexual persons who form it are also holders of the fundamental rights to equal treatment, to the protection of their family, and to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), they have the full right to that recognition in this venue. Consider, moreover, that, by virtue of those same fundamental rights, no distinction whatsoever can be made, above all if what is taken into account is sexual orientation, at the moment of guaranteeing them effective access to the judicial system so that the bodies specialized in family matters may study their claim and, through a reasoned and well-founded ruling, accept or reject it and thus resolve their conflict. It is not superfluous to further evidence that, however much it is deemed impossible to apply the regulations of marriage in these cases, no infraction of the reinforced protection contained in article 52 of the Constitución Política is committed by recognizing such effects to the couple relationship between subjects of the same sex. For this reason and in the interest of not causing defenselessness and lack of protection to the parties, the accreditation of their public, stable, prolonged, and singular cohabitation would thus be sufficient to justify the intended recognition. To deny it due to the lack of a specific rule not only is incongruent with the family legal system, but also constitutes a breach of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) (see, in similar terms, the vote of the Sala Segunda No. 2003-143, of 9:30 a.m. on March 26, 2003).- XIII.- In support of our thesis, we consider it a matter of rigor to bring up the arguments expressed by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in the judgment of December 1, 2005, issued in the context of the cases "Minister of Home Affairs v. [Nombre45]" (Case C.C.T. 60/04) and "Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs" (Case BAC1), by means of which it annulled the heterosexual clause of the matrimonial regime, extended it to any couple, regardless of their sexual or gender identity or their sexual orientation, and granted Parliament a period of twelve months to adapt its legislation so that same-sex couples could access the national Law on Marriage. In accordance with the line subsequently set forth by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that foreign body, with drafting by Judge Albie Sachs, pointed out then "(...) that the harm to same-sex couples exceeds the deprivations of material goods (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 72, among many others). The definition of marriage that excludes them suggests not only that their commitment, relationship, and love is inferior, but that these persons can never be part of the community that the Constitution promises to create with equality for all (judgment, paragraph No. 71). These couples are not valued with the same respect that is granted to heterosexual couples (judgment, paragraphs No. 71 and 81, among many others). The exclusion from the benefits and responsibilities of marriage is not a small and tangential inconvenience but rather represents a radical way of indirectly saying that homosexual couples are outsiders (Idem). The pronouncements of the constitutional court reflect that discrimination operates, first, from an undue exclusion of different couples from all the material benefits and protections that marriage brings with it and, second, from the construction of a different status as members of the community, a devalued status due to chosen sexual orientation." [[Nombre46], [Nombre47] (2007). Marriage and Sexual Diversity: The South African Lesson. Anuario de Derechos Humanos, Santiago: 3, p. 95. Retrieved June 28, 2008, from http://www.anuariocdh.uchile.cl/index.php/ADH/article/viewFile/13460/13729]. Hence, "(...) the State cannot withdraw certain couples from the protection that the laws grant to others united in marriage, since the deprivation of these rights and the correlative stigmatization it provokes, greatly limit and condition the choice and materialization of life plans. In that vein, the Constitutional Court affirmed that given the importance and centrality that our societies attribute to marriage and its consequences in our culture, denying this right to same-sex couples represents denying their right to self-definition in a profound way (judgment, paragraph No. 72). Likewise, in one of its most prominent passages, the judgment emphasizes that the Constitution of South Africa grants rights that go beyond respect for a private sphere alien to state interference, and that the litigants are not claiming a right to be 'left alone' by the State, but rather a right to be recognized as equals and treated with dignity by the law (judgment, paragraph No. 78)." [ Ibid, p. 98].- XIV.- In summary, if, as the Sección Segunda of the Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil pointed out at the time, regarding the heterosexual de facto union when it was considered by some social sectors as "(...) an illicit act contrary to good customs and marriage (...)", the truth is "(...) times are changing and jurisprudence must now fill the gap that the Legal System has by not protecting relationships of such a nature.", because, "It is not possible, in accordance with the principles of equity and justice, to disregard the common effort made by two persons who unite in that way (...)." (Vote No. 358, of 8:35 a.m. on June 16, 1987), it is unquestionable that the same reason exists ["Principle: 'ubi eadem ratio, idem jus' (Where the reason is the same, the law is the same), contemplated in article 12 of the Civil Code (...)." (Vote of the Sala Segunda No. 2003-502, of 3:30 p.m. on September 17, 2003)] to recognize civil and patrimonial consequences to the decision of two homosexual subjects to establish a bond with characteristics similar to marital ones, especially when full effect is given to the criterion according to which "(...) legislative power is subject to the limits established 'by treaties, in accordance with the principles of International Law'. Thus, the human rights established in the instruments of Public International Law – Declarations and Conventions on the matter –, constitute a substantial barrier to the freedom of configuration of the legislator (sic), both ordinary and, eminently, popular through referendum. This Constitutional Court has indicated that the human rights enshrined in international instruments have, even, and based on what is established in article 48 of the Constitution, a supra-constitutional rank when they offer greater protection to persons. Furthermore, this Constitutional Court in Vote No. [Telf3] of 11:40 a.m. on April 4, 2003, deemed that, even, the reforming or derived constituent power – as constituted power – is limited by the essential content of fundamental and human rights, so that, by way of partial reform to the constitution, the essential content of those cannot be reduced or curtailed. It is worth adding that an implicit limit to the freedom of configuration of the ordinary or sovereign legislator (sic) is constituted by the Law of the Constitution itself or the block of constitutionality formed by constitutional principles, values, precepts, and jurisprudence. It is necessary to add that the rights of minorities, due to their inalienable character, constitute an eminently technical-juridical matter, which must be in the hands of the ordinary legislator (sic) and not of the majorities prone to their denial." (Vote No. 2010-13313, of 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010).- XV.- Regarding the value of international instruments in the system of sources of the Costa Rican legal system and, in particular, of the pronouncements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in vote No. 2313-95, of 4:18 p.m. on May 9, 1995, that body accurately noted that "(...) if the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the natural body to interpret the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), the force of its decision when interpreting the convention and judging national laws in light of this regulation, whether in a contentious case or in a mere consultation, will have -in principle- the same value as the interpreted norm. Not only ethical or scientific value, as some have understood. This thesis that we now maintain, moreover, is received in our law, when the General Law of Public Administration provides that unwritten norms -such as custom, jurisprudence, and general principles of law- will serve to interpret, integrate, and delimit the field of application of the written legal system and will have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit (article 7.1.)."- XVI.- The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, adopted by the International Panel of Specialists in International Human Rights Legislation and in Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, at the meeting held from November 6 to 9, 2006, establish the basic standards so that the United Nations Organization and the States that comprise it advance to guarantee the necessary protections for non-heterosexual persons (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and transgender). In its preamble, it is recognized that "Sexual orientation and gender identity are essential to the dignity and humanity of every person and must not be the basis of discrimination or abuse." According to its first principle, "Human beings of all sexual orientations and gender identities are entitled to the full enjoyment of all human rights." The second stipulates that "Everyone is entitled to enjoy all human rights, without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. The law shall prohibit any such discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any such discrimination." According to the tenor of the third, "Each person's self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their personality and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity, and freedom. No person shall be forced to undergo medical procedures as a requirement for legal recognition of their gender identity. No person shall be subjected to pressure to conceal, suppress, or deny their sexual orientation or gender identity." And, finally, the 24th recognizes the right of every person "(...) to found a family, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. Families exist in diverse forms. No family may be subjected to discrimination based on the sexual orientation or gender identity of any of its members." With that purpose, the States "E. Shall take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure that in States that recognize same-sex marriages or registered partnerships, any entitlement, privilege, obligation or benefit available to opposite-sex married or registered partners is equally available to same-sex married or registered partners; / F. Shall take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure that any obligation, entitlement, privilege or benefit available to opposite-sex unmarried partners is equally available to same-sex unmarried partners; (...)." In 2008, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States unanimously adopted Resolution AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08) on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, by means of which the protection of human rights was extended to gender identity and sexual orientation. In that declaration, the 34 member countries reaffirmed the universality, indivisibility, and interdependence of human rights and expressed their concern about acts of violence and related human rights violations committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. In the following years, that international organization issued similar resolutions: AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10), and AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11). Finally, on December 18, 2008, the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, France, Gabon, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations the text of the Declaration on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, in which the principle of universality of human rights and that of non-discrimination is reaffirmed, which requires that they be applied equally to all human beings, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Moreover, deep concern is expressed there for violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms based on sexual orientation or gender identity and for the violence, harassment, discrimination, exclusion, stigmatization, and prejudice that are directed against persons from all countries of the world because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and because these practices undermine the integrity and dignity of those subjected to such abuses; violations of human rights based on sexual orientation or gender identity wherever they occur are condemned; a call is made to all States and relevant international human rights mechanisms to commit to the promotion and protection of the human rights of all persons, regardless of their sexual orientation and gender identity, and the former are urged to take all necessary measures, particularly legislative or administrative ones, to ensure that sexual orientation or gender identity cannot, under any circumstances, be the basis for criminal penalties. Costa Rica is one of the 85 signatory countries of the Joint Statement on Ending Acts of Violence and Related Human Rights Violations Directed Against Persons Because of Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, presented by Colombia before the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. In January of this year, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, [Nombre48], highlighted that discrimination due to sexual orientation or gender identity is one of the injustices that many States have ignored or even approved. "As a result, some governments treat these persons as second-class citizens or even criminals. Confronting this discrimination is a challenge. But we must fulfill the ideals of the Universal Declaration."- XVII.- On a recent date, in the cited judgment of February 24 of this year, issued in the Case of [Nombre2] and [Nombre3] vs. Chile, in which it reiterated the obligation of the States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights to respect and guarantee "without any discrimination" the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established that sexual orientation and gender identity are categories protected by that international instrument under the term "other social condition," contained in its article 1, paragraph 1. On this matter, it specified the following: "78. The Court has established that Article 1.1 of the Convention is a norm of a general character whose content extends to all the provisions of the treaty, and provides for the obligation of the States Parties to respect and guarantee the full and free exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized therein 'without any discrimination'. That is to say, whatever the origin or the form it may assume, any treatment that can be considered discriminatory regarding the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed in the Convention is per se incompatible with the same12 . / 79. (...) the Court has indicated13 that the notion of equality derives directly from the oneness of the human family and is inseparable from the essential dignity of the person, incompatible with any situation that, by considering a certain group superior, leads to treating it with privilege; or that, conversely, by considering it inferior, treats it with hostility or in any way discriminates against it in the enjoyment of rights that are indeed recognized to those not considered to be in such a situation. The Court’s jurisprudence has also indicated that, at the current stage of the evolution of international law, the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination has entered the domain of jus cogens. The legal scaffolding of the national and international public order rests on it and it permeates the entire legal system14." It further specified that, as a consequence of this, no norm, decision, or practice of domestic law, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, can diminish or restrict, in any way, the rights of a person because of their sexual orientation. On the contrary, the proscription of discrimination based on sexual orientation entails the obligation of all authorities and officials to guarantee that they may enjoy each and every one of the rights established in the Convention. "80. Furthermore, the Tribunal has established that the States must refrain from carrying out actions that in any way are aimed, directly or indirectly, at creating situations of de jure or de facto discrimination15 . The States are obliged to adopt positive measures to reverse or change discriminatory situations existing in their societies, to the detriment of a certain group of persons. This implies the special duty of protection that the State must exercise with respect to actions and practices of third parties that, under its tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain, or favor discriminatory situations16." "82. (...) Article 24 of the American Convention prohibits de jure or de facto discrimination, not only regarding the rights enshrined in said treaty, but with respect to all laws approved by the State and their application. In other words, if a State discriminates in the respect or guarantee of a conventional right, it would breach the obligation established in Article 1.1 and the substantive right in question. If, on the contrary, the discrimination refers to unequal protection of domestic law or its application, the fact must be analyzed in light of Article 24 of the American Convention17 ." "83.

The Court has established, as has the European Court of Human Rights, that human rights treaties are living instruments, whose interpretation must accompany the evolution of the times and current living conditions<span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">18</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. Such an evolutionary interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation enshrined in Article 29 of the American Convention, as well as those established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">19</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. " "84. In this regard, when interpreting the expression "any other social condition" of Article 1.1. of the Convention, the alternative most favorable for the protection of the rights protected by said treaty must always be chosen, according to the principle of the rule most favorable to the human being</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">20</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. " "85. The specific criteria by virtue of which discrimination is prohibited, according to Article 1.1 of the American Convention, are not a taxative or limiting list but merely illustrative. On the contrary, the wording of said article leaves the criteria open with the inclusion of the term "other social condition" to thus incorporate other categories that had not been explicitly indicated. The expression "any other social condition" of Article 1.1. of the Convention must be interpreted by the Court, consequently, in the perspective of the option most favorable to the person and the evolution of fundamental rights in contemporary international law</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">21</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. " "86. In this respect, in the Inter-American System, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (hereinafter "OAS") has approved since 2008 in its annual sessions four successive resolutions regarding the protection of persons against discriminatory treatment based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, through which the adoption of concrete measures for effective protection against discriminatory acts has been demanded</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">22 </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. " "87. Regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited category of discrimination, the European Court of Human Rights has noted that sexual orientation is "another condition" mentioned in Article 14</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">23</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic"> of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter "European Convention"), which prohibits discriminatory treatment</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">24</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. In particular, in the Case [Nombre49] Vs. Portugal, the European Court concluded that sexual orientation is a concept that is covered by Article 14 of the European Convention. Furthermore, it reiterated that the list of categories set forth in said article is illustrative and not exhaustive</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">25</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. Likewise, in the Case [Nombre50] Vs. the United Kingdom, the European Court reiterated that sexual orientation, as one of the categories that can be included under "another condition," is another specific example of those found in said list, which are considered personal characteristics in the sense that they are innate or inherent to the person</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">26</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. " "88. Within the framework of the Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have classified sexual orientation as one of the prohibited categories of discrimination considered in Article 2.1</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">27</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 2.2</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">28</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In this regard, the Human Rights Committee indicated in the case [Nombre51] Vs. Australia that the reference to the category "sex" would include the sexual orientation of persons</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">29</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has expressed its concern regarding various discriminatory situations related to the sexual orientation of persons, which has been expressed repeatedly in its concluding observations on the reports submitted by the States</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">30 </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. " "89. For its part, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights determined that sexual orientation can be framed under "other social condition"</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">31</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. Likewise, the Committee on the Rights of the Child</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">32 </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">, the Committee against Torture</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">33 </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">have made references within the framework of their general observations and recommendations regarding the inclusion of sexual orientation as one of the prohibited categories of discrimination." "90. On December 22, 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the "Declaration on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity," reaffirming the "principle of non-discrimination, which requires that human rights apply equally to every human being regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity"</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">34</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. Furthermore, on March 22, 2011, the "Joint Statement on Ending Acts of Violence and Related Human Rights Violations Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity" was presented before the United Nations Human Rights Council</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">35</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. On June 15, 2011, this same Council approved a resolution on "human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity" in which it expressed "grave concern at acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, [committed] against individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity"</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">36</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. The prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation has also been highlighted in numerous reports of the United Nations special rapporteurs</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">37 </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. " "91. Taking into account the general obligations of respect and guarantee established in Article 1.1 of the American Convention, the criteria of interpretation set forth in Article 29 of said Convention, the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Resolutions of the OAS General Assembly, the standards established by the European Court and the United Nations bodies (supra paras. 83 to 90), the Inter-American Court establishes that the sexual orientation and gender identity of persons are categories protected by the Convention. Therefore, any discriminatory norm, act, or practice based on a person's sexual orientation is proscribed by the Convention. Consequently, no norm, decision, or practice of domestic law, whether by state authorities or by private individuals, can in any way diminish or restrict the rights of a person based on their sexual orientation." "92. Regarding the State's argument that at the date of issuance of the Supreme Court judgment there would not have been a consensus regarding sexual orientation as a prohibited category of discrimination, the Court emphasizes that the alleged lack of consensus within some countries on full respect for the rights of sexual minorities cannot be considered a valid argument to deny or restrict their human rights or to perpetuate and reproduce the historical and structural discrimination that these minorities have suffered</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:super">38 </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic">. The fact that this could be a controversial matter in some sectors and countries, and that it is not necessarily a matter of consensus, cannot lead the Court to refrain from deciding, because in doing so it must refer solely and exclusively to the stipulations of the international obligations contracted by sovereign decision of the States through the American Convention." "93. A right that is recognized to persons cannot be denied or restricted to anyone and under any circumstance based on their sexual orientation. This would violate Article 1.1. of the American Convention. The Inter-American instrument proscribes discrimination, in general, including therein categories such as sexual orientation, which cannot serve as a basis to deny or restrict any of the rights established in the Convention."</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:12pt">-</span> **XVIII.-** This Constitutional Chamber has also recognized that sexual orientation is a vector of social and personal discrimination and has highlighted the role of public authorities in combating it. In Voto n.º 2007-18660, at 11:17 a.m. on December 21, 2007, it stated it in the following terms: *"Through its jurisprudential line, this Chamber has recognized as a fundamental legal principle contained in the Political Constitution of Costa Rica the respect for the dignity of every human being and, consequently, the absolute prohibition of carrying out any type of discrimination contrary to that dignity. To discriminate, in general terms, is to differentiate to the detriment of the rights and dignity of a human being or group thereof; in this case, homosexuals. Based on the foregoing, it can be validly affirmed that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is contrary to the concept of dignity duly enshrined in the Political Constitution and in the International Treaties on Human Rights signed by our country. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits in its Article 26 discrimination on the grounds of "race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status"; from which it also derives that acts that violate the right to equality and human dignity of persons because of their sexual orientation are not permitted, as they have the right to access any commercial establishment and to receive equal treatment, without discrimination based on their sexual preference."* In Voto n.º 2010-13313, at 4:31 p.m. on August 10, 2010, it added that *"The human, fundamental, and legally configured rights of minority or disadvantaged groups, for having traditionally suffered discrimination, exclusion, and all kinds of social prejudices -as occurs with that of homosexuals-, arise from movements of vindication thereof (sic), ordinarily, against majorities, given the insistence and natural inclination of majorities to maintain and perpetuate any discrimination and asymmetrical treatment. Public powers, for their part, are obliged, by the Constitution and the instruments of International Human Rights Law, to guarantee and promote the effective respect for the principle and the right to equality –real and not formal– of such groups (Articles 33 of the Constitution and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José). Situations of discrimination can be factual or legal; they will be of the first type when, in the presence of a disadvantaged and discriminated minority group, measures are not adopted to overcome such a state of affairs." "Faced with groups that are the object of discrimination and social prejudices, the application of the principle of real equality and prohibition of all discrimination, which normally operate ex post to the perpetration of the discriminatory act, is not sufficient. Therefore, it is necessary that public powers act upon the principle of support for such groups with effective public policies and normative measures. The principle of support for discriminated groups prevents and anticipates discriminations, so it has an ex ante effect regarding them. The principle of support is fulfilled when legislation and regulations are enacted that recognize the rights of discriminated groups, even if these are of infra-constitutional configuration."*- **XIX.-** As [Nombre52] points out, *"Equality/prohibition of discrimination has a broader normative scope because it protects homosexuality in private spaces (preventing it from being treated by Law in an unreasonably different way than heterosexuality) but also in public ones, in that same sense. Public powers will have to provide an especially convincing or persuasive reason to treat homosexuals legally in a different and worse way than heterosexuals. Needless to say, from the perspective of the prohibition of discrimination, protection becomes more effective and incisive, among other things because moral or historical arguments will no longer be sufficient on their own to prevent homosexual persons from accessing certain rights that were traditionally off-limits to them, such as, for example, the right to maintain a legally recognized stable union with a person of their same sexual orientation."* [Homosexualidad y Constitución. *Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional*, Madrid: 73, January/April, 2005, p.132]. Hence, it is imperative to eradicate, at least from the legal world, the deep homophobic social prejudice, which, on the other hand, perhaps maintains a significant relationship with discrimination against women, given that the stigmatization of non-heterosexual persons appears closely linked to the supposed deviation from the role traditionally judged as appropriate for them (the center of social reproach seems to reside in the fact that the "gay" man adopts a "woman's" position and that the lesbian assumes a "man's"). *"The fundamental right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of sexual orientation would, then, have the typical effect of equality of treatment with its two corollaries, the prohibition of direct discriminations, that is, of different and worse legal treatments based on homosexuality, and of indirect or impact discriminations, that is, of legal differentiations that could be formally established not on the grounds of sexual orientation but that, in fact, negatively impact the homosexual minority."* [ *ibid*, p. 139]. From the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation also derives a mandate for affirmative actions. Public powers are obliged to ensure that the social discrimination suffered by homosexual persons "does not prevail" in any way, for which they are obliged to adopt measures of equal opportunities. *"The protection of homosexuality, despite not being explicitly alluded to by our Constitution, has become a central constitutional matter, and not only because it affects, as one might suppose, a number of persons not easily determinable, but undoubtedly significant, but, above all, because of the concurrence of two qualitative arguments, one relating to the value of liberty and the other to that of equality. In the question about the constitutional framework of homosexuality, freedom is, of course, at stake, because the heart of the matter is the sexual orientation of persons, that is, one of the keys to human existence and, therefore, to their dignity, central to family life, collective well-being, and the development of individual personality. But equality is also implicated, because our Constitution, as Justice Harlan said of the U.S. Constitution in his dissent to the Judgment Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."*" [ *Ibid*, p. 117]. As Justice J. Greaney indicated in his concurring vote in the famous Judgment of the *Supreme Judicial Court* of Massachusetts, *[Nombre10] and others v. Department of Public Health*, of November 18, 2003: "As a matter of constitutional law, neither the mantra of tradition, nor individual conviction can justify the perpetuation of the hierarchy according to which same-sex couples and their families are deemed less worthy of social and legal recognition than opposite-sex ones."- **XX.-** Based on all the foregoing, and although we have not the slightest doubt that to decide whether the claim formulated in this matter can be accepted or rejected, it is appropriate to apply analogically what is provided for a common-law marriage (unión de hecho) in the *Family Code*, except, of course, for the requirement that it be a heterosexual bond, we are compelled to formulate this judicial consultation of constitutionality for the purpose of having that Chamber define whether what it previously resolved regarding the constitutional validity of that requirement prevents us from doing so.- **POR TANTO** Even though we have no doubt that to decide whether the claim formulated in this matter can be accepted or rejected, it is appropriate to apply analogically what is provided for a common-law marriage (unión de hecho) in the *Family Code*, except, of course, for the requirement that it be a bond between a man and a woman, we formulate this judicial consultation of constitutionality for the purpose of having that Chamber define whether what it previously resolved regarding the constitutional validity of that requirement prevents doing so. The parties are summoned so that within a term of three days they may appear before that body to assert their rights. While the decision on this consultation is not known, the processing of this matter is suspended.- **Olga Marta Muñoz González** **Alexis Vargas Soto Luis Héctor Amoretti Orozco** **r.s.** ------------------------- 1 *Condición jurídica y derechos humanos del niño. Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, of August 28, 2002. Series A, No. 17, paras. 69 and 70. See also: ECHR, Case [Nombre55] Vs. Ireland, (No. 16969/90), Judgment of May 26, 1994, para. 44, and Case [Nombre56] and others Vs. the Netherlands, (No. 18535/91), Judgment of October 27, 1994, para. 30.* 2 *Cfr. Case [Nombre57] and [Nombre58] Vs. Argentina. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 27, 1998. Series C No. 39, para. [Dirección1], and Case [Nombre13] Vs. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 12, 2008. Series C No. 186, para. 179.* 3 *Cfr. Case [Nombre59] Vs. Ecuador. Preliminary Objection and Merits. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 179, para. [Dirección2], and Case [Nombre60] and [Nombre61] Vs. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 29, 2011. Series C No. 238, para. 85.* 4 *Cfr. Case [Nombre28] and others. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 184.; Case [Nombre33]. Judgment of November 3, 1997. Series C No. 34, paras. 82 and 83; Case [Nombre30] and others. Judgment of March 8, 1998. Series C No. 37, para. 164; Case [Nombre31]. Judgment of January 24, 1998. Series C No. 36, para. 102; and Case [Nombre32]. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 65.* 5 *Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9, para. 24.* 6 *Cfr. Case [Nombre26] and others. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 237; Case [Nombre27]. Judgment of September 29, 1999. Series C. No. 56, para. 121; Case [Nombre28] and others. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 60; Case [Nombre33]. Reparations (art. 63.1 American Convention on Human Rights). Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 43, para. 184; Case [Nombre33]. Judgment of November 3, 1997. Series C No. 34, para. 83; Case [Nombre30] and others. Judgment of March 8, 1998. Series C No. 37, para. 164; Case [Nombre31]. Judgment of January 24, 1998. Series C No. 36, para. 102; and Case [Nombre32].* Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 65. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">7</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">I/A Court H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46.1, 46.2.a and 46.2.b American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of August 10, 1990. Series A No. 11, para. 34. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">8</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. Case of [Nombre62] v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. [Dirección3]; Case of [Nombre63] v. Brazil. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2006. Series C No. 149, para. [Dirección4], Case of [Nombre64] v. Haiti. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008, para. 77. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">9</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. Case of [Nombre65] v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 1, 2006. Series C No. 141, [Dirección5] and Case of Cantos v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of September 7, 2001. Series C No. 85, para. 52. See also: Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27.2, 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9, para. 24. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">10</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. Case of [Nombre66] et al. (“Cesantes y Jubilados de la Contraloría”) v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2009. Series C No. 198, para. [Dirección6], and Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2011. Series C No. 227, para. 127. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">11</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005, Series C No. 134, para. [Dirección7], and Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra note 85, para. 128.</span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">12</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of January 19, 1984. Series A No. 4, [Dirección8] and Case of the Indigenous Community [Nombre67]. v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010 Series C No. 214, para. 268. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">13</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, supra note 12, para. 55. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">14</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of September 17, 2003. Series A No. 18, para. 101 and Case of the Indigenous Community [Nombre67], supra note 12, para. 269. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">15</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 14, para. 103 and Case of the Indigenous Community [Nombre67], supra note 12, para. 271. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">16</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 14, para. 104, Case of the Indigenous Community [Nombre67], supra note 12, para. 271 and United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, Non-discrimination, November 10, 1989, CCPR/C/37, para. 6. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">17</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Mutatis mutandi, Case of [Nombre68] et al. (“Corte Primera de lo Contencioso Administrativo”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 209 and Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, supra note 12, paras. 53 and 54 and Case of [Nombre69] et al. v. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 13, 2011. Series C No. 234, para. 174. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">18</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999. Series A No. 16, para. [Dirección9] and Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 106. In the European Court see E.Ct.H.R., Case of Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, (No. 5856/72), Judgment of April 25, 1978, para. 31. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">19</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra note 18, para. 114 and Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 18, para. 106. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">20</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, [Dirección10], and Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 18, para. 106. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">21</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra note 18, para. 115. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">22</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11), Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, approved at the fourth plenary session, held on June 7, 2011 (“THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY […] RESOLVES: 1. To condemn discrimination against persons based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and to urge States, within the parameters of the legal institutions of their domestic legal systems, to adopt the necessary measures to prevent, punish, and eradicate such discrimination”); AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10), Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, approved at the fourth plenary session, held on June 8, 2010 (“THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY […] RESOLVES: 1. To condemn acts of violence and human rights violations against persons based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, and to urge States to investigate them and ensure that those responsible face consequences before the justice system. 2. To encourage States to take all necessary measures to ensure that no acts of violence or other human rights violations are committed against persons based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, and to ensure access to justice for victims under conditions of equality. 3. To encourage Member States to consider means to combat discrimination against persons based on their sexual orientation and gender identity”); AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, approved at the fourth plenary session, held on June 4, 2009 (“THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY […] RESOLVES: 1. To condemn acts of violence and related human rights violations perpetrated against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. 2. To urge States to ensure that acts of violence and human rights violations perpetrated against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity are investigated, and that those responsible face consequences before the justice system”), and AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08), Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, approved at the fourth plenary session, held on June 3, 2008 (“THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY […] RESOLVES: 1. To express concern regarding acts of violence and related human rights violations committed against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity”). </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">23</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">24</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Nombre49] v. Portugal, (No. 33290/96), Judgment of December 21, 1999. Final, March 21, 2000, para. 28; Case of L. and V. v. Austria (Nos. 39392/98 and 39829/98), Judgment of January 9, 2003. Final, April 9, 2003, para. 45; Case of S. L. v. Austria, (No. 45330/99), Judgment of January 9, 2003. Final, April 9, 2003, [Dirección11], and Case of E.B. v. France, (No. 43546/02), Judgment of January 22, 2008, para. 50. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">25</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Nombre49], supra note 24, para. 28 (“the applicant`s sexual orientation […] [is] a concept which is undoubtedly covered by Article 14 of the Convention. The Court reiterates in that connection that the list set out in that provision is illustrative and not exhaustive, as is shown by the words [`]any ground such as[´]). See also E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Nombre70] v. France, (No. 36515/97), Judgment of February 26, 2002. Final, May 26, 2002, para. 32; E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Nombre71] v. Poland, (No. 13102/02), Judgment of March 2, 2010. Final, June 2, 2010, para. 92; Case of [Nombre72]. v. the United Kingdom, (No. 37060/06), Judgment of September 28, 2010. Final, December 28, 2010, para. [Dirección12], and Case of [Nombre73] v. Russia, (Nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 and 14599/09), Judgment of October 21, 2010. Final, April 11, 2011, para. 108 (“The Court reiterates that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14”). </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super\">26</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Nombre50] v. the United Kingdom, (No. 7205/07), Judgment of July 13, 2010. Final, November 22, 2010, para. 57 (“the Court has considered to constitute [`]other status[´] characteristics which, like some of the specific examples listed in the Article, can be said to be personal in the sense that they are innate or inherent). However, the European Court did not decide to thereby limit the concept of “other status” to characteristics that are inherent or innate to the person. Cf. E.Ct.H.R., Case of [Nombre50], supra note 26, para. 58 (“However, in finding violations of Article 14 in a number of other cases, the Court has accepted that “status” existed where the distinction relied upon did not involve a characteristic which could be said to be innate or inherent, and thus [`]personal[´] in the sense discussed above”). </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super\">27</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Article 2.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">28</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Article 2.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee the exercise of the rights enunciated in it, without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super\">29</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, April 4, 1992, para. 8.7 (“The State party has sought the Committee's guidance as to whether sexual orientation may be considered an \"other status\" for the purposes of article 26. The same issue could arise under article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. The Committee confines itself to noting, however, that in its view, the reference to \"sex\" in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as including sexual orientation”). Likewise, see X v. Colombia, Communication No. 1361/2005, CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005, May 14, 2007, para. 7.2. (“The Committee recalls its earlier jurisprudence that the prohibition against discrimination under article 26 comprises also discrimination based on sexual orientation”). In the same vein, Human Rights Committee, [Nombre74] v. Australia, Communication No. 941/2000, CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000, September 18, 2003, para. 10.4. See also United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations, Poland, CCPR/C/79/Add.110, July 25, 1999, para. 23. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">30</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf., inter alia, United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations, Chile, CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5, April 17, 2007, para. 16 (“While it notes with satisfaction the repeal of provisions criminalizing consensual homosexual relations between consenting adults, the Committee remains concerned about discrimination against certain persons on the basis of their sexual orientation, including in courts and in access to health care (articles 2 and 26 of the Covenant). The State party should guarantee all persons the equal enjoyment of the rights set forth in the Covenant, regardless of their sexual orientation, including equality before the law and in access to health services. It should also implement awareness-raising programs to combat social prejudice”); Concluding observations, Barbados, CCPR/C/BRB/CO/3, May 14, 2007, para. 13 (“The Committee expresses concern about discrimination against homosexuals in the State party and, in particular, the criminalization of consensual sexual acts between adults of the same sex (art. 26)”); Concluding observations, United States of America, CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, December 18, 2006, para. 25 (“It also observes with concern that many States have not prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (arts. 2 and 26). The State party should accept its legal obligation under articles 2 and 26 to ensure to all individuals the rights protected by the Covenant, as well as equality before the law and equal protection of the law, without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation”); Concluding observations, El Salvador, CCPR/CO/78/SLV, August 22, 2003, para. 16 (“The Committee expresses its concern about cases of persons attacked, and even killed, because of their sexual orientation (article 9), the low number of investigations into these unlawful acts, and the existing provisions (such as local “Contravention Ordinances”) used to discriminate against persons on account of their sexual orientation (article 26)”). </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">31</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20. Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/GC/20, July 2, 2009, para. 32 (“The ‘other status’ recognized in article 2.2 of the Covenant includes sexual orientation”). Cf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18. The Right to Work, E/C.12/GC/18, February 6, 2006, para. 12 (“pursuant to article 2, paragraph 2, as well as article 3, the Covenant prohibits all discrimination in access to and retention of employment on the grounds of […] sexual orientation”); General Comment No. 15. The right to water (articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2002/11, January 20, 2003, para. 13 (“the Covenant prohibits all discrimination on the grounds of […] sexual orientation”); General Comment No. 14. The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2000/4, August 11, 2000, para. 18 (“By virtue of article 2.2 and article 3, the Covenant proscribes any discrimination in access to health care and the underlying determinants of health, as well as to the means and entitlements for their procurement, on the grounds of […] sexual orientation”). </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">32</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. United Nations, Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 3. HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child, CRC/GC/2003/3, March 17, 2003, para. 8 (“discrimination based on sexual preference is cause for concern”); General Comment No. 4. Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC/GC/2003/4, July 21, 2003, para. 6 (“States parties have the obligation to ensure that all human beings below 18 enjoy all the rights set forth in the Convention without discrimination (art. 2), irrespective of ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status’. [S]exual orientation should be added”). </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">33</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf. United Nations, Committee against Torture, General Comment No. 2. Implementation of article 2 by States parties, CAT/C/GC/2, January 24, 2008, paras. 20 and 21 (“The principle of non-discrimination is basic and general in the protection of human rights and fundamental to the interpretation and application of the Convention. […] States parties must ensure that, within the framework of the obligations they have undertaken under the Convention, their laws are applied in practice to all persons, regardless of their […] sexual orientation”).] and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women [Cf. United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 27 on older women and protection of their human rights, CEDAW/C/GC/27, December 16, 2010, para. 13 (“The discrimination suffered by older women is often multidimensional, adding discrimination on the basis of […] sexual orientation”) and Draft General Recommendation No. 28 concerning article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, December 16, 2010, para. 18 (“Discrimination against women on the grounds of sex and gender is inextricably linked to other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste, sexual orientation”). </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">34</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">United Nations, Declaration on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, United Nations General Assembly, A/63/635, December 22, 2008, para. 3. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">35</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">United Nations, Joint statement on ending acts of violence and related human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity, presented by Colombia at the 16th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, March 22, 2011. Available at: http://www.iglhrc.org/binary-data/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/494-1.pdf (last accessed February 22, 2012). </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">36</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">United Nations, Human Rights Council, Resolution on human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1, June 15, 2011. </span><br /><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super\">37</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic\">Cf., among other reports, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, E/CN.4/2004/49, February 16, 2004, paras. 32 and 38 (“International human rights standards prohibit all discrimination in access to health care and its underlying determinants, as well as to the means for their procurement, on the grounds of sexual orientation [...]. International human rights law completely excludes discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation”). See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, A/HRC/6/5, July 20, 2007, para. 28; Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Mission to Brazil, E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3, February 28, 2006, para. 40; Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Integration of the human rights of women and the gender perspective: violence against women, Interconnections between violence against women and HIV/AIDS, E/CN.4/2005/72, January 17, 2005, paras. 27 and 58; Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Civil and political rights, including the questions of disappearances and summary executions, E/CN.4/2003/3, January 13, 2003, paras. 66 and 67; Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, A/57/138, July 2, 2002, para. 37; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, E/CN.4/2001/94, January 26, 2001, para. 89. g); Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers and civil unions (\"de facto unions\") of same-sex couples.

In 2009, through Law No. 18.590 (Diario Oficial No. 27837, October 26, 2009), joint adoption by couples in a civil union was authorized. <span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:8.33pt; vertical-align:super">38</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt"> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:'Trebuchet MS'; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic">According to various sources of international and comparative law, this discrimination against the Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual, and Intersex community (hereinafter “LGTBI”) is unacceptable because: i) sexual orientation constitutes an essential aspect of a person's identity (infra para. 139). Likewise: ii) the LGTBI community has been historically discriminated against, and the use of stereotypes in the treatment of said community is common. Cf. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, E/CN.4/2004/49, February 16, 2004, para. 33 (“discrimination and stigmatization continue to pose a serious threat to the sexual and reproductive health of many groups, such as […] sexual minorities”); Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, E/CN.4/2004/56, December 23, 2003, para. 64 (“Attitudes and beliefs stemming from myths and fears related to HIV/AIDS and sexuality contribute to the stigmatization and discrimination against sexual minorities. Moreover, the perception that members of these minorities do not respect sexual boundaries or challenge predominant concepts of the role attributed to each sex appears to contribute to their vulnerability to torture as a way of “punishing” their unaccepted behavior”). Furthermore: iii) they constitute a minority for whom it is much more difficult to remove discrimination in spheres such as the legislative sphere, as well as to avoid negative repercussions in the interpretation of norms by officials of the executive or legislative branches, and in access to justice. Cf. Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Civil and political rights, in particular the questions related to: independence of the judiciary, administration of justice, impunity, Mission to Brazil, E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.3, February 22, 2005, para. 28 (“Transvestites, transsexuals, and homosexuals are also frequently victims of episodes of violence and discrimination. When they resort to the judicial system, they often encounter the same prejudices and stereotypes of society reproduced there”), and Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-481 of September 9, 1998. Finally: iv) sexual orientation does not constitute a rational criterion for the distribution or rational and equitable allocation of goods, rights, or social burdens. Cf. Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-481 of September 9, 1998, para. 25. In this judgment, regarding the right of public school teachers not to be dismissed for their homosexual status, the Colombian Constitutional Court noted that separating a teacher from their job for that reason is based “on a prejudice without any empirical basis, which denotes the unjust stigmatization that has affected this population and that has been invoked to impose burdens on them or deprive them of rights, to the detriment of their possibilities of participation in such relevant spheres of social and economic life” (para. 29). For its part, Judgment C-507 of 1999 declared unconstitutional a norm that established homosexuality as a disciplinary offense in the military forces. In Judgment C-373 of 2002, the Constitutional Court of Colombia declared unconstitutional a norm that provided for having been disciplinarily sanctioned for the offense of “homosexuality” as a ground for disqualification from holding the office of notary. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span>-------------------------</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">EXP: 09-001400-0165-FA</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:1pt; text-align:center; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">I Circuito Judicial de San José, [Dirección13] Teléfonos: [Telf4] ó [Telf5]. Fax: [Telf6]. Correo electrónico: [...]</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span> </span></p>

*090014000165FA* *090014000165FA* 09-001400-0165-FA - 6 NUMERO 377-12-(2) [Nombre75]:

REC. UNIÓN HECHO ACTOR/A:

[Nombre 001] y [Nombre 003] VOTO NÚMERO: 592 -2012 TRIBUNAL DE FAMILIA . San José, a las quince horas y dos minutos del seis de julio de dos mil doce.- Proceso de reconocimiento de unión de hecho establecido por [Nombre 001], mayor, soltero, [...] y [Nombre 003], mayor, [...]. Conoce este Tribunal del presente asunto en virtud del recurso de apelación interpuesto por [Nombre 001] contra la resolución dictada por el Juzgado de Familia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, al ser las ocho horas cuarenta y siete minutos del diecinueve de julio del dos mil nueve.- Redacta el juez Amoretti Orozco, y;

CONSIDERANDO

I.- En señor [Nombre 001] acudió al Juzgado de Familia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, con la pretensión de obtener el reconocimiento de la relación de pareja que afirma haber mantenido con el señor [Nombre 003] durante más de tres años, en forma pública, notoria, estable y singular. De modo expreso reclamó la aplicación extensiva de las normas contenidas en el Código de Familia destinadas a regular los efectos personales y patrimoniales de la unión de hecho (folios 1-2). En la resolución apelada, emitida a las 8:47 horas del 19 de junio de 2009, la señora jueza de primera instancia rechazó ad portas la demanda porque la estimó improponible debido a que la legislación costarricense, al no permitir el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, impide reconocer como tal un vínculo como el sostenido entre las partes, que no reúne un elemento esencial: su carácter heterosexual (folio 4).- II.- Aunque en la actualidad el derecho costarricense no recoge como fuente de derechos y obligaciones la convivencia entre personas del mismo sexo, es indiscutible que tampoco la prohíbe y que, cuando se verifica en condiciones de estabilidad, notoriedad y singularidad, no cabe distinguirla sustancialmente de la conformada por seres humanos heterosexuales, pues tanto una como otra se instituyen en virtud del consentimiento y traducen el propósito de construir un proyecto de vida en común, basado en vínculos de amor y solidaridad. Sin duda, de ambos vínculos cabe predicar que su objeto es “(…) la vida en común, la cooperación y el mutuo auxilio.” (Artículo 11 del Código de Familia). Como apunta [Nombre1], “En la sociedad actual existen parejas del mismo sexo que conviven de forma estable, comparten gastos, bienes, tienen un proyecto de vida común, e incluso tienen hijos, y todo ello de forma pública y notoria. Su modo de vida es igual al de cualquier matrimonio, salvo que ellos no han podido acceder a este derecho. Si la sociedad ya está preparada para afrontar con normalidad este tipo de convivencia, el Derecho se ve en la obligación de regular su situación de hecho.” [El derecho constitucional al matrimonio homosexual en España. Ley 13/200, de 1 de julio, por la que se modifica el Código Civil en materia de derecho a contraer matrimonio. Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Procesal Constitucional, 13, enero-junio, 2010, p. 255]. Por esa razón, las o los miembros de una pareja homosexual y, en especial, el o la que ocupa la posición económica más débil, tienen análogos requerimientos de protección legal a los de las personas heterosexuales que deciden vivir juntas. De ahí que no solo razones de seguridad jurídica y de justicia exijan que sus efectos personales y patrimoniales sean regulados por la normativa vigente. La dignidad humana de sus integrantes y sus derechos fundamentales al libre desarrollo de su personalidad, a la igualdad, a la protección de su familia y a la autonomía de la voluntad se ven comprometidos con el déficit de protección existente. En la reciente sentencia del 24 de febrero del año en curso, emitida en el Caso [Nombre2] y [Nombre3] vs. Chile, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos reafirmó “(…) que en la Convención Americana no se encuentra determinado un concepto cerrado de familia, ni mucho menos se protege sólo (sic) un modelo “tradicional” de la misma (sic). Al respecto, el Tribunal reitera que el concepto de vida familiar no está reducido únicamente al matrimonio y debe abarcar otros lazos familiares de hecho donde las partes tienen vida en común por fuera del matrimonio1 .” Por eso, negarle a una pareja no heterosexual la condición de grupo familiar “(…) refleja una percepción limitada y estereotipada del concepto de familia que no tiene base en la Convención al no existir un modelo específico de familia (la “familia tradicional”).” En apoyo de ese argumento, aquel órgano jurisdiccional internacional citó el acuerdo del 16 de agosto de 2010, emitido por la Suprema Corte Mexicana de Justicia de la Nación que, al resolver la acción de inconstitucionalidad A.I. 2/2010, señaló que “(…) esta Suprema Corte estima que la diversidad sexual de los contrayentes no es ni constitucional, ni legalmente, un elemento definitorio de la institución matrimonial, sino más bien el resultado de la concepción social que, en un momento histórico dado, existía, mas no el núcleo esencial del matrimonio (…).” [Párr. 256] y que “Es, `por tanto, la orientación sexual de una persona, como parte de su identidad personal, un elemento relevante en el proyecto de vida que tenga y que, como cualquier persona, incluye el deseo de tener una vida en común con otra persona de igual o distinto sexo o no y que, en modo alguno, deberá limitarlo en la búsqueda y logro de su felicidad. En este punto, (…) dentro de los derechos fundamentales, se encuentra el derecho a la identidad personal y sexual, entendiéndose por el primero, el derecho de todo individuo a ser uno mismo, en la propia conciencia y en la opinión de los demás, de acuerdo con sus caracteres físicos e internos y sus acciones, que lo individualizan ante la sociedad y permiten identificarlo, lo que implica, además, la identidad sexual, que lo proyecta frente a sí y socialmente desde su perspectiva sexual, así como su preferencia u orientación sexual y que, por tanto, se inscribe dentro de la autodeterminación de las personas e incide en el libre desarrollo de las mismas (sic), al ser un elemento que innegablemente determinará sus relaciones afectivas y/o sexuales con personas de diferente o de su mismo sexo y, de ahí, su elección de con quién formar una vida común y tener hijos, si es que desea hacerlo.” [Párr. 264]. Puntualizó, además, que “(…) tratándose de personas homosexuales, de la misma forma que ocurre en las personas con orientación sexual hacia otras de diferente sexo (heterosexuales), es parte de su pleno desarrollo el establecimiento libre y voluntario de relaciones afectivas con personas del mismo sexo; relaciones, unas y otras, que, como informan los diferentes datos sociológicos, comparten como característica que constituyen una comunidad de vida a partir de lazos afectivos, sexuales y de solidaridad recíproca, con una vocación de estabilidad y de permanencia en el tiempo.”[Párr. 266]; que “(…) si uno de los aspectos que conduce la forma en que un individuo proyectará su vida y sus relaciones, es su orientación sexual, es un hecho que, en pleno respeto a la dignidad humana, es exigible el reconocimiento por parte del Estado no sólo de la orientación sexual de un individuo hacia personas de su mismo sexo, sino también de sus uniones, bajo las modalidades que, en un momento dado, se decida adoptar (sociedades de convivencia, pactos de solidaridad, concubinatos y el matrimonio).” [Párr. 269]; que de la existencia de familias homoparentales derivan una serie de derechos y obligaciones de quienes las conforman, pues es una realidad que existen y, como tales, deben ser tuteladas por la legislación: son tan respetables unas como otras y que su reconocimiento no desatiende principios tales como el interés superior del niño o de la niña [párr. 333].- III.- En su voto particular disidente que forma parte de la sentencia del 27 de septiembre de 1990 (Caso [Nombre4] vs. Reino Unido), el señor S. K. Martens, juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, puntualizó con acierto que “El matrimonio es mucho más que una unión sexual y, por tanto, la capacidad para tener relaciones de esta naturaleza no es “esencial”. Las personas que no pueden procrear o tener relaciones sexuales pueden también pretender casarse. Se debe esto a que el matrimonio supone más que una unión que legitime dichas relaciones y que se proponga la procreación: es una institución legal que crea una relación jurídica fija entre los cónyuges y entre estos y los terceros (con inclusión de las autoridades). Como ha dicho un autor, los cónyuges, a través de los lazos del matrimonio, “anuncian al mundo que los rodea que su relación se funda en sentimientos humanos intensos y en un compromiso mutuo, exclusivo y permanente”. Es además una especie de comunidad en la que los lazos intelectuales, espirituales y sentimentales son por lo menos tan esenciales como los físicos. / El artículo 12 del Convenio [para la protección de los derechos humanos y de las libertades fundamentales] protege el derecho de cualquier hombre o mujer (de edad núbil) de entrar en esta unión y, por tanto, la definición de lo que significan las palabras “el hombre y la mujer” en este contexto debe tener en cuenta todas estas características del matrimonio.” En similares términos se pronunciaron la señora E. [Nombre5] y los señores I. [Nombre6] y [Nombre7]. [Nombre8], jueces de ese mismo órgano, en su voto particular disidente y conjunto que forma parte del mismo fallo: “El hecho de que un transexual no pueda procrear no es decisivo. Hay muchos hombres y muchas mujeres que tampoco pueden tener hijos y, sin embargo, tienen el derecho indiscutible de casarse. La capacidad de procrear no es ni puede ser un requisito previo para el matrimonio.” Bajo esa misma tesitura, la profesora de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, [Nombre9], plantea que, “En efecto, si el matrimonio [y, por extensión, la unión de hecho heterosexual] se define como comunidad afectiva y material de vida, y no ya por su función social; si su finalidad esencial ya no es reproductora, sino definida en torno a la realización personal y al libre desarrollo de la personalidad; si su contenido constitucional lo vincula, prioritariamente, a los derechos y libertades individuales fundamentales; si el ius connubium se predica, en principio, de cualquier persona, sobre exigencias de igualdad y libertad; y si la regulación jurídica del matrimonio y de las relaciones entre cónyuges ha vivido un giro hacia el Derecho de Obligaciones; resulta difícil admitir como incuestionable la prohibición de contraer matrimonio a parejas del mismo sexo.” [Las uniones de personas del mismo sexo: las opciones de regulación y sus implicaciones jurídicas. Derecho Privado y Constitución, Madrid: 20, enero-diciembre, 2006, 173-202. 188-189].- IV.- En la sentencia emitida el 18 de noviembre de 2003 en el caso [Nombre10] and others vs. Departament of Public Health, cuyo ponente fue el juez Marshall, la Supreme Judicial Court de Massachussets declaró contraria a la Constitución la prohibición de acceso al matrimonio a las personas del mismo sexo. Argumentó que se está en presencia de “(…) una institución social vital (…)” y que “(…) la decisión de si contraer matrimonio y con quién es uno de los momentos máximos de autodeterminación de la vida.” Por eso y porque “los beneficios accesibles sólo a los que tienen una licencia matrimonial son enormes, afectando prácticamente a todos los aspectos de la vida y la muerte”, desde hace tiempo se le ha considerado como un derecho fundamental (civil right). Como es un elemento central de la vida de los individuos y del bienestar de la comunidad, vedarles a las personas del mismo sexo el derecho a contraer matrimonio las priva “(…) de uno de los aspectos más importantes de la experiencia humana (…)” y les “(…) deniega el pleno acceso a la protección de las leyes (…)”; de ahí que solo podría admitirse tal exclusión si cumple “(…) un objetivo público imprescindible (…)” y es “(…) un medio razonable para conseguir tal fin.” Esas condiciones no se dan respecto de la prohibición del matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, que excepciona tal regla a causa de un rasgo singular: la orientación sexual, lo cual lesiona la libertad, reconocida en la Constitución de Massachussets, así como la igualdad, que impide que haya ciudadanos de segunda clase. Las tres principales justificaciones de esta prohibición no resultan constitucionalmente razonables: ni que el matrimonio heterosexual proporcione un marco favorable para la procreación (se entiende heterosexual no asistida); ni que asegure un espacio óptimo para el cuidado de los hijos; ni que el matrimonio homosexual trivializará o destruirá esa institución tal y como ha sido históricamente configurada. La esencia de la libertad de contraerlo es unirse con la persona de la propia elección. Al impedir el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, “(…) el Estado confiere un sello oficial de aprobación a los estereotipos destructivos de que las relaciones del mismo sexo son inherentemente inestables e inferiores a las relaciones heterosexuales y no son por ello merecedoras de respeto.”- V.- Es cierto que en el voto n.º [Telf1], de las 14:46 horas del 23 de mayo de 2006, en el cual estimó legítima la imposibilidad legal del matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, establecida en el inciso 6º del artículo 14 del Código de Familia, la Sala Constitucional le endilgó a la Asamblea Legislativa la responsabilidad de “(…) plantearse la necesidad de regular, de la manera que estime conveniente, los vínculos o derechos que se deriven de este tipo de uniones, lo cual evidentemente requiere de todo un desarrollo normativo en el que se establezcan los derechos y obligaciones de este tipo de parejas (…).”También lo es que, cuatro años después, en el n.º 2010-641, de las 2:56 horas del 13 de enero de 2010, rechazó por el fondo la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por don [Nombre 001] contra el ordinal 242 ibídem; pronunciamiento que, de acuerdo con la poca información disponible pues su redacción aun está pendiente, cita el n.º [Telf1], antes referido. De ahí que, con base en lo estipulado en el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, no es aventurado concluir que esos antecedentes parecieran impedirnos recurrir a la regulación de la unión de hecho, contenida en los numerales 242, 243, 244 y 245 ibídem, aun cuando sea por analogía, a efecto de resolver por el fondo esta demanda, con lo cual no quedaría más salida que confirmar el rechazo de plano ordenado por el Juzgado de Familia del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José en el auto emitido a las 8:47 horas del 19 de junio de 2009, que, como se anotó, la consideró improponible.- VI.- No obstante, es imposible hacer caso omiso de nuestro deber de ponderar las situaciones de hecho que escapan a las soluciones preconcebidas por la Asamblea Legislativa en un momento histórico determinado, a efecto de integrar adecuadamente el ordenamiento jurídico y ofrecerle una respuesta a la pretensión de fondo del señor [Nombre 001]. En efecto, estamos convencidos de que, en un sistema como el costarricense, la ausencia de normativa específica no autoriza para rechazar de plano una demanda. El derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva, reconocido, entre otros preceptos, en el 8, inciso 1) y en el 25, inciso 1), en relación con el 1º y el 2º de la Convención americana sobre derechos humanos y en el 41 de la Constitución Política y el principio de plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico, del que se ocupan el 6 del Código Civil y el 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, impiden un pronunciamiento semejante. Así lo destacaron las magistradas y los magistrados de la Sala Constitucional: “En nuestra condición de jueces [y juezas], (…) no podemos obviar la realidad social como un elemento a considerar en la toma de decisiones respecto de los asuntos sometidos a nuestro conocimiento (…).” (Voto n.º [Telf1], de las 14:46 horas del 23 de mayo de 2006).- VII.- Al tenor de lo dispuesto por la Convención americana sobre derechos humanos, aprobada por la Asamblea Legislativa por Ley n.º 4534, de 23 de febrero de 1970, “Los Estados Partes en esta Convención se comprometen a respetar los derechos y libertades reconocidos en ella y a garantizar su libre y pleno ejercicio a toda persona que esté sujeta a su jurisdicción, sin discriminación alguna por motivos de raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opiniones políticas o de cualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social.” (Artículo 1º, inciso 1). “Si el ejercicio de los derechos y libertades mencionados en el Artículo 1 no estuviere ya garantizado por disposiciones legislativas o de otro carácter, los Estados Partes se comprometen a adoptar, con arreglo a sus procedimientos constitucionales y a las disposiciones de esta Convención, las medidas legislativas o de otro carácter que fueren necesarias para hacer efectivos tales derechos y libertades.” (Artículo 2º). “Toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída, con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo razonable, por un juez (sic) o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley, (…) para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter.” (Artículo 8, inciso 1). “Toda persona tiene derecho a un recurso sencillo y rápido o a cualquier otro recurso efectivo ante los jueces o tribunales competentes, que la ampare contra actos que violen sus derechos fundamentales reconocidos por la Constitución, la ley o la presente Convención, aún cuando tal violación sea cometida por personas que actúen en ejercicio de sus funciones oficiales.” (Artículo 25, inciso 1). La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha desarrollado el contenido de esos preceptos en diversas oportunidades. En su reciente sentencia del 27 de abril de 2012 (Caso [Nombre11] e [Nombre12] vs. Argentina) destacó que “Este Tribunal ha afirmado en otras oportunidades que “[e]n el derecho de gentes, una norma consuetudinaria prescribe que un Estado que ha celebrado un convenio internacional, debe introducir en su derecho interno las modificaciones necesarias para asegurar la ejecución de las obligaciones asumidas”. En la Convención Americana este principio es recogido en su artículo 2, que establece la obligación general de cada Estado Parte de adecuar su derecho interno a las disposiciones de la misma, para garantizar los derechos en ella reconocidos2.”También reiteró que “(…) la adecuación de la normativa interna a los parámetros establecidos en la Convención implica la adopción de medidas en dos vertientes, a saber: a) la supresión de las normas y prácticas de cualquier naturaleza que entrañen violación a las garantías previstas en la Convención o que desconozcan los derechos allí reconocidos u obstaculicen su ejercicio, y b) la expedición de normas y el desarrollo de prácticas conducentes a la efectiva observancia de dichas garantías. La primera vertiente se satisface con la reforma, la derogación o la anulación de las normas o prácticas que tengan esos alcances, según corresponda. La segunda, obliga al Estado a prevenir la recurrencia de violaciones a los derechos humanos y, por eso, debe adoptar todas las medidas legales, administrativas y de otra índole que sean necesarias para evitar que hechos similares vuelvan a ocurrir en el futuro3.” Sin duda, en el caso de la unión entre personas del mismo sexo, su reconocimiento legislativo es primordial a efecto de erradicar la discriminación social contra quienes la integran. En atención al carácter particularmente grave de esta práctica y por violentar varios derechos recogidos en la Convención, tal protección ha de ser suficiente. Y, siguiendo la doctrina plasmada en la sentencia del 12 de agosto de 2008 (Caso [Nombre13] Vs. Panamá), ante la imperiora necesidad de ofrecerle alguna respuesta a la legítima pretensión formulada en el sub-lite ,“(…) existe el deber de utilizar aquellos recursos (…) que guarden relación con la protección de los derechos fundamentales que se pueden ver afectados en tales casos, como por ejemplo el derecho a la libertad, a la integridad personal y el derecho a la vida, en su caso, que están reconocidos en la Convención Americana.” En la sentencia del 16 de agosto de 2000 (caso [Nombre14] y [Nombre15]), la Corte Interamericana afirmó que “101. (…) el derecho de toda persona a un recurso sencillo y rápido o a cualquier otro recurso efectivo ante los jueces o tribunales competentes que la ampare contra actos que violen sus derechos fundamentales constituye uno de los pilares básicos, no sólo (sic) de la Convención Americana, sino del propio Estado de Derecho en una sociedad democrática en el sentido de la Convención […]. El artículo 25 se encuentra íntimamente ligado con la obligación general del artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana, al atribuir funciones de protección al derecho interno de los Estados Partes4. / 102. Además, la Corte ha señalado que la inexistencia de un recurso efectivo contra las violaciones a los derechos reconocidos por la Convención constituye una transgresión de la misma (sic) por el Estado Parte en el cual semejante situación tenga lugar. En ese sentido debe subrayarse que, para que tal recurso exista, no basta con que esté previsto por la Constitución o la ley o con que sea formalmente admisible, sino que se requiere que sea realmente idóneo para establecer si se ha incurrido en una violación a los derechos humanos y proveer lo necesario para remediarla5. / (…) / 121. Esta Corte ha establecido que [e]l artículo 25 se encuentra íntimamente ligado con la obligación general del artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana, al atribuir funciones de protección al derecho interno de los Estados Partes, de lo cual se desprende que el Estado tiene la responsabilidad de diseñar y consagrar normativamente un recurso eficaz, pero también la de asegurar la debida aplicación de dicho recurso por parte de sus autoridades judiciales6 .” En la del 21 de junio de 2002 (caso [Nombre16], [Nombre17] y [Nombre18] y otros vs. Trinidad y Tobago), expresó que “La Corte Interamericana ha establecido también que como parte de las obligaciones generales de los Estados, estos tienen un deber positivo de garantía con respecto a los individuos sometidos a su jurisdicción. Ello supone tomar todas las medidas necesarias para remover los obstáculos que puedan existir para que los individuos puedan disfrutar de los derechos que la Convención reconoce. Por consiguiente, la tolerancia del Estado a circunstancias o condiciones que impidan a los individuos acceder a los recursos internos adecuados para proteger sus derechos, constituye una violación del artículo 1.1 de la Convención […]7.” En la del 7 de septiembre de 2004 (caso [Nombre19] vs. Ecuador) reiteró que “El artículo 25.1 de la Convención establece, en términos amplios, la obligación a cargo de los Estados de ofrecer a todas las personas sometidas a su jurisdicción un recurso judicial efectivo contra actos violatorios de sus derechos fundamentales. / (…). Bajo esta perspectiva, se ha señalado que para que el Estado cumpla con lo dispuesto en el citado artículo 25.1 de la Convención no basta con que los recursos existan formalmente, sino (sic) es preciso que sean efectivos, es decir, se debe brindar a la persona la posibilidad real de interponer un recurso sencillo y rápido que permita alcanzar, en su caso, la protección judicial requerida.” [Ver, en similar sentido, las sentencias del 27 de noviembre de 2003 (caso [Nombre20]); 7 de junio de 2003 (caso [Nombre21]); 28 de noviembre de 2002 (caso [Nombre22]); 31 de agosto de 2001 (caso de la Comunidad Mayagna (Sumo) [Nombre23]); 31 de enero de 2001 (caso del Tribunal Constitucional); 25 de noviembre de 2000 (caso [Nombre24]); 18 de agosto de 2000 (caso [Nombre25]); 19 de noviembre de 1999 (caso de los “Niños de la Calle” (Caso [Nombre26] y otros)); 29 de septiembre de 1999 (caso [Nombre27]); 30 de mayo de 1999 (caso [Nombre28] y otros); 8 de marzo de 1998 (caso de la “Panel [Nombre29]” ([Nombre30] y otros)); 24 de enero de 1998 (caso [Nombre31]); 12 de noviembre de 1997 (caso [Nombre32]) y 3 de noviembre de 1997 (caso [Nombre33])]. En la del 6 de agosto de 2008 (Caso [Nombre34] vs. Estados Unidos Mexicanos) puntualizó que “Un recurso judicial efectivo es aquel capaz de producir el resultado para el que ha sido concebido8, es decir, debe ser un recurso capaz de conducir a un análisis por parte de un tribunal competente a efectos de establecer si ha habido o no una violación a los derechos humanos y, en su caso, proporcionar una reparación9 .” Por último, en la citada sentencia del 27 de abril de 2012 (Caso [Nombre11] e [Nombre12] vs. Argentina) concretó “107. (…) que el artículo 25.1 de la Convención contempla la obligación de los Estados Parte de garantizar, a todas las personas bajo su jurisdicción, un recurso judicial efectivo contra actos violatorios de sus derechos fundamentales. Dicha efectividad supone que, además de la existencia formal de los recursos, éstos den resultados o respuestas a las violaciones de derechos contemplados ya sea en la Convención, en la Constitución o en las leyes. En ese sentido, no pueden considerarse efectivos aquellos recursos que, por las condiciones generales del país o incluso por las circunstancias particulares de un caso dado, resulten ilusorios. Ello puede ocurrir, por ejemplo, cuando su inutilidad haya quedado demostrada por la práctica, porque falten los medios para ejecutar sus decisiones o por cualquier otra situación que configure un cuadro de denegación de justicia. Así, el proceso debe tender a la materialización de la protección del derecho reconocido en el pronunciamiento judicial mediante la aplicación idónea de dicho pronunciamiento10 . / 108. Por otra parte, como lo ha señalado anteriormente el Tribunal, al evaluar la efectividad de los recursos, la Corte debe observar si las decisiones en los procesos judiciales han contribuido efectivamente a poner fin a una situación violatoria de derechos, a asegurar la no repetición de los actos lesivos y a garantizar el libre y pleno ejercicio de los derechos protegidos por la Convención11 .”- VIII.- De acuerdo con el artículo 41 de la Constitución Política, “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida y en estricta conformidad con las leyes.” En su momento (sesión extraordinaria de 11 de octubre de 1982), la Corte Plena, actuando como órgano encargado del control de constitucionalidad, destacó que de esa norma suprema se derivan una serie de principios básicos a los cuales deben ajustar su actuación todas las personas y órganos competentes en el ámbito jurisdiccional. En virtud de ellos la Asamblea Legislativa está obligada a promulgar los preceptos legales necesarios para regular los derechos de las personas y para establecer las vías y procedimientos adecuados para procurar su efectiva tutela jurisdiccional cuando hayan sido quebrantados. Por su parte, a los distintos Tribunales les corresponde interpretar y aplicar esas disposiciones de manera tal que no entorpezcan la debida comprobación del agravio y garanticen, en caso de ser acreditado, el pleno y oportuno restablecimiento de aquellos. De ahí que los jueces y las juezas vulneramos la disposición constitucional citada cuando imposibilitamos o dificultamos el acceso a los trámites estipulados o cuando rechazamos o denegamos una petición que debimos conceder en sentencia, sin motivo alguna o invocando uno insuficiente o espurio. En el voto n.º 1739-92, de las 11:45 horas del 1º de julio de 1992, esa Sala sostuvo que “En la base de todo orden procesal está el principio y, con él, el derecho fundamental a la justicia, entendida como la existencia y disponibilidad de un sistema de administración de la justicia, valga decir, de un conjunto de mecanismos idóneos para el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional del Estado -declarar el derecho controvertido o restablecer el violado, interpretándolo y aplicando imparcialmente en los casos concretos- lo cual comprende a su vez, un conjunto de órganos judiciales independientes especializados en ese ejercicio, la disponibilidad de ese aparato para resolver los conflictos y corregir los entuertos que origina la vida social, en forma civilizada y eficaz, y el acceso garantizado a esa justicia para todas las personas, en condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación . / a) En este primer sentido, pues, el debido proceso tiene, ante todo, dimensiones programáticas, no por esta (sic) menos vinculantes jurídicamente, que exigen la existencia, suficiencia y eficacia de un sistema judicial y procesal idóneo para garantizar precisamente ese derecho fundamental a la justicia, que no es, por otra parte, más que una consecuencia del monopolio de la fuerza, asumido por el Estado, y la más importante manifestación del derecho de petición , que en Costa Rica se consagra, en los artículos 27 -en general- y 41 -en especial- de la Constitución (…). / b) Pero tiene también otras implicaciones aun más inmediatamente exigibles, las cuales pueden, a su vez, atañer al sistema mismo de administración de la justicia, en sí, o al derecho de acceso a la justicia para todas las personas: / (…) / 2. Y pertenecen a los segundo (sic) -derecho de todos por igual a acceder a la justicia-, además del genérico derecho de petición del artículo 27 y del específico derecho a la justicia del artículo 41 de la Constitución ya citados, una serie de atributos complementarios -pero también fundamentales-, entre los cuales: / (i) el derecho y principio generales de igualdad -y su contrapartida de no discriminación-, que recoge el artículo 33 de la Constitución, así como todos los instrumentos internacionales sobre Derechos Humanos, por ejemplo los artículos 1.1 y 24 de la Convención Americana, con la particularidad de que la dualidad de éstos (sic) demuestra que la igualdad, además de criterio de interpretación y aplicación de los derechos fundamentales, es ella misma un derecho fundamental, de modo que también se viola éste (sic) cuando se discrimina respecto de derechos no fundamentales (…); / (ii) en general, el acceso universal a la justicia para toda persona, indiferentemente de su sexo, edad, color, nacionalidad, origen o antecedentes, o cualquier otra condición social, todo lo cual plantea, a su vez, consecuencias que no es necesario examinar aquí por no estar implicadas directamente en el caso en consulta, como la gratuidad de la justicia, el informalismo, etc.”Conforme lo concluyó en el voto n.º 1562-93, de las 15:06 horas del 30 de marzo de 1993, lo expuesto “(…) significa, en primer lugar, que el debido proceso exige la existencia, suficiencia y eficacia de un sistema judicial y procesal idóneo para garantizar el derecho fundamental a la justicia, que es la más importante manifestación del derecho de petición consagrado en los artículos 27 -en general- y 41 -en especial- de la Constitución (…). En segundo lugar, atañe al sistema mismo de administración de la justicia en sí y al derecho de acceso a la justicia para todas las personas, lo que implica que debe haber en todo sistema procesal "razonabilidad de los efectos" sobre los derechos personales, en el sentido de no imponer a éstos (sic) (…) otras limitaciones más que las razonablemente derivadas de la naturaleza y régimen de los derechos mismos, y las indispensables para que funcionen adecuadamente en la vida de sociedad.”- IX.- En la legislación ordinaria, ese derecho fundamental es desarrollado, entre otros preceptos, en el 6 del Código Civil y en el 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. En virtud del primero, “Los Tribunales tienen el deber inexcusable de resolver, en todo caso, los asunto (sic) que conozcan, para lo que se atenderán al sistema de fuentes establecido.” Al tenor del párrafo segundo del último, “Los tribunales no podrán excusarse de ejercer su autoridad o de fallar en los asuntos de su competencia por falta de norma que aplicar y deberán hacerlo de conformidad con las normas escritas y no escritas del ordenamiento, según la escala jerárquica de sus fuentes.” Incluso, esa misma disposición reconoce, como parte de la potestad jurisdiccional, el deber de suplir la ausencia de normas legales: “Los principios generales del Derecho y la Jurisprudencia servirán para interpretar, integrar y delimitar el campo de aplicación del ordenamiento escrito y tendrán el rango de la norma que interpreten, integren o delimiten. Cuando se trate de suplir la ausencia y no la insuficiencia de las disposiciones que regulen una materia, dichas fuentes tendrán rango de ley.” (La negrita es agregada). Por consiguiente, a los órganos jurisdiccionales nos está vedado alegar la falta de norma (s) aplicable (s) al caso concreto para excusarnos de fallar por el fondo un proceso como este. El dogma de la plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico nos obliga a recurrir, en aplicación integradora, a las fuentes escritas y a las no escritas en aras de identificar y poner en práctica la mejor solución a la controversia planteada. Sobre el particular, en el voto n.º 36-F-94, de las 9:40 horas del 27 de mayo de 1994, la Sala Primera apuntó que “(…) la jurisprudencia como fuente informadora del ordenamiento jurídico es la llamada a suplir, por la vía de interpretación extensiva, los alcances de las normas encargadas de resolver los conflictos jurídicos cuando no exista norma para el caso concreto o no haya sido concebida para las nuevas exigencias jurídicas (Artículo 9 del Código Civil).” En los n.os 112-F-92, de las 14:15 horas del 15 de julio de 1992; 151-F-01, de las 15:20 horas del 14 de febrero de 2001 y 360-F-02, de las 11:10 horas del 3 de mayo de 2002, expresó que “(…) el artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y 6 del Título Preliminar del Código Civil admiten la remisión a otras fuentes del ordenamiento jurídico y a los Principios Generales del Derecho cuando no hay norma aplicable (principio de la plenitud hermética del ordenamiento jurídico), por otra parte el artículo 12 del Título Preliminar del Código Civil, admite la aplicación analógica de las normas siempre que medie identidad de razón y no haya norma que la prohíba.” Por su parte, la Sala Segunda, en el n.º 415, de las 9 horas del 22 de diciembre de 1994, lo planteó en los siguientes términos: “(…) en todo caso, debe acudirse, en aras de la mejor solución, a las situaciones análogas expresamente tratadas, a los principios generales del derecho, como (…) la buena fe y la equidad e incluso, como lo señala el Prof. [Nombre35] en su citado trabajo, al sentido común, o sea, el que las personas normalmente tienen de juzgar razonablemente las cosas (artículos 10 a 12 del Código Civil, 15 del Código de Trabajo y 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial).” En el n.º 2004-200, de las 10 horas del 24 de marzo de 2004, ese mismo órgano sostuvo que el ordinal 6 del Código Civil “(…) desarrolla un derecho de carácter fundamental, contenido en el numeral 41 de la Constitución Política, que garantiza a todas las personas el acceso a la justicia. Ahora bien, para cumplir tal cometido, se debe tomar en consideración el artículo 12 de aquel Código, según el cual es procedente la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando éstas (sic) no contemplen un supuesto específico, pero regulen otro semejante en que se aprecie identidad de razón, salvo cuando una norma prohíba esa aplicación. En un caso como el presente, el negarle todo efecto a la relación que interesa, además, de injusto, significa desconocer una realidad, no extraña en nuestro entorno, cual es la convivencia de dos personas, (…) que lo único que los une o los unió fueron lazos afectivos, sin protección por parte del ordenamiento jurídico. Lo anterior, constituye fundamento suficiente para, en atención del valor justicia que inspira el ordenamiento jurídico, disponer la liquidación de los bienes adquiridos y producidos durante la larga relación, dándole a la actora lo que le corresponde. Mas, también, para resolver la cuestión, atendiendo a lo expuesto, se puede brindar una respuesta a la situación planteada, recurriendo “mutatis mutandi”, a las regulaciones dadas por la ley a instituciones similares.” Por último, en el n.º 769-93, de las 15:48 horas del 16 de febrero de 1993, esa Sala Constitucional reconoció que “Aquí, como lo anticipa el propio Tribunal consultante, podría acudirse a otra normativa (…), o a otros parámetros igualmente autorizados por el ordenamiento, cuando haya insuficiencia en la regulación de una determinada materia. Esos criterios podrían ser los principios generales de derecho, que están autorizados por el artículo 5 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el artículo 1 del Código Civil; la equidad, que podría utilizarse a tenor de lo dispuesto por el artículo 11 del Código Civil, y hasta la aplicación analógica, que el artículo 12 siguiente autoriza. Debe agregarse a lo anterior, que conforme a la primera norma citada, un tribunal no puede excusar el conocimiento de un asunto, ni resolverlo negativamente, alegando falta de ley aplicable al caso planteado. Tienen los jueces [y las juezas], pues, a su haber, amplias posibilidades para resolver con norma expresa, con aplicación extensiva (interpretativa analógica) y hasta mediante la re-creación normativa a base de otra insuficiente. / (…) / El poder que la jurisprudencia del Derecho de Familia en nuestro país ha sido tal, que también se ha afirmado con carácter categórico, que muchas de las normas del Código de Familia tienen su origen en decisiones de los tribunales, incluso algunas de tono marcadamente disidente o minoritario, pero no por ello ayunas de justicia o equidad. Por el contrario, el desarrollo histórico del Derecho de Familia nos indica cómo el paso del tiempo ha sido determinante para una evolución de sus conceptos y sus soluciones. Nuestro país no es excepción en este campo e incluso podría decirse que es donde con más celeridad ese comportamiento se ha notado.”- X.- El artículo 12 del Código Civil estipula que “Procederá la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando éstas (sic) no contemplen un supuesto específico, pero regulen otro semejante en el que se aprecie identidad de razón, salvo cuando alguna norma prohíba esa aplicación.” En relación con el procedimiento analógico de integración del derecho positivo, en el voto n.º 1-F-94, de las 15 horas del 5 de enero de 1994, reiterado en el de la Sala Segunda n.º [Telf2], de las 10:26 horas del 6 de agosto de 2010, la Sala Primera puntualizó que “III.- (…). Por analogía se entiende, desde un punto de vista lógico, un procedimiento de inducción singular de un caso a otro, por medio del cual se busca extender la validez de una proposición de una determinada situación a otra genéricamente similar. En la antigüedad era conocido como el nombre de "procedimiento por semejanza". A diferencia de los procedimientos deductivos, en la inducción analógica la validez de la conclusión no es necesaria, sino únicamente probable. En otras palabras, en la analogía se compara una situación o hecho con otra situación o hecho, y así se trata de obtener una conclusión particular. El argumento analógico se basa en aquellos aspectos o connotados similares entre las situaciones analizadas, de modo tal que entre más se parezcan los aspectos esenciales y no meramente accidentales de ellos, más convincente será la conclusión extensiva que se haga. Otro procedimiento lógico similar es la inducción por generalización, en la cual a partir de varios casos, analizando sus connotados particulares, se obtiene una conclusión general. En la generalización no se trata de la comparación de dos situaciones particulares, para extender lo concerniente a una a la otra, sino del análisis de varios casos particulares para obtener una conclusión general que los abarque a todos. Ambos tipos de procedimientos lógicos tienen una influencia innegable en lo tocante a la analogía jurídica (…). / IV. Luego de prolongadas discusiones en la doctrina general del derecho, se ha llegado a admitir, en forma mayoritaria, que el ordenamiento jurídico puede tener lagunas. Estas lagunas son deficiencias de la ley, la cual no presenta una disposición específica para una determinada materia o caso. Al mismo tiempo, se ha aceptado que los ordenamientos jurídicos tienen la capacidad latente de elaborar los preceptos jurídicos pertinentes, para así resolver los conflictos de intereses presentes en estos casos. Por ello, frente a las lagunas de la ley, el juez [o la jueza] no puede negarse a fallar alegando no encontrar norma alguna para aplicar al caso concreto; ello equivaldría a una denegación de justicia. Empero, tampoco tiene la facultad de crear arbitrariamente la norma aplicable al caso concreto. En nuestro sistema normativo el juez [o la jueza] es de derecho, no de conciencia, y cualquier decisión que tome debe encontrar sustento en el sistema jurídico vigente. Para colmar estos vacíos, nuestra Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, tanto en su texto anterior cuando en el actual, establece que los tribunales no podrán excusarse de resolver por falta de norma, y al establecer que en tal caso se acudirá a los principios generales del derecho en ausencia de norma legal, no excluye que antes de recurrir a este criterio interpretativo no pueda utilizarse la analogía, regulada por los artículos 12 y 13 del Código Civil, para poder aplicar una norma escrita establecida para una situación jurídica semejante, al caso planteado. Por medio de este procedimiento, se busca aplicar un principio jurídico que la ley establece para cierta hipótesis, a otro hecho no regulado expresamente, pero que presente su misma esencia jurídica. Se trata de situaciones en las cuales no existe una identidad de hecho, sino una similitud sustancial tan relevante que justifique la aplicación de la norma establecida para el caso contemplado por el legislador a aquel carente de regulación. La aplicación de la analogía se justifica por la necesidad de regular hechos semejantes, según el principio de la igualdad jurídica, con normas semejantes. El problema principal será, en estos casos, determinar si entre ambas situaciones existen similitudes jurídicas de tal entidad, como para permitir la extensión analógica de la norma conocida. Este problema no puede ser resuelto en forma mecánica o con criterios meramente lógicos, se trata más bien de una valoración jurídica hecha por el juzgador [o la juzgadora], en la cual se determina si los elementos fácticos contemplados en la norma conocida, los cuales motivaron el establecimiento de una determinada disposición por parte del legislador (de acuerdo con la ratio legis), se encuentran también presentes en la situación similar tomada en consideración. Puede ser que el hecho considerado tenga ciertos elementos esenciales que lo caracterizan y otros accidentales o contingentes que lo acompañan. Lo importante es que exista correspondencia entre los elementos esenciales del hecho previsto y aquellos de la situación no regulada. La analogía jurídica suele ser clasificada en dos tipos: la analogía legis, en la cual, para resolver el caso no previsto, se utiliza una disposición normativa singular; y la analogía iuris, la cual no toma como punto de partida una sola norma, sino una serie de disposiciones, de las cuales induce un principio general. Ambos procedimientos obedecen a los esquemas de razonamiento analizados en el considerando anterior: la legis corresponde a la inducción por analogía y la iuris a la inducción por generalización. La doctrina estima como un caso de analogía iuris el recurso a los principios generales del derecho, los cuales solo pueden ser obtenidos a través de la generalización. Para proceder a la interpretación analógica de las normas, es necesario lo siguiente: 1- que falte una precisa disposición legal para el caso controvertido, por lo que no sería posible la aplicación analógica donde existan preceptos legales expresos o de los cuales se pueda deducir, a través de la interpretación extensiva, una solución al caso planteado; 2- que exista una similitud jurídica esencial entre el caso regulado y aquel a regular, lo cual debe ser determinado por el juez [o la jueza], previa una valoración de ambas situaciones; 3- que no se trate de aquellas situaciones en las cuales, dada la naturaleza de la disposición a aplicar, sea improcedente la analogía. En lo tocante a este último requisito, la praxis jurídica ha elaborado algunos principios relevantes, los cuales muchas veces han sido adoptados expresamente por la legislación. Al respecto, conviene citar los siguientes: 1- No es posible aplicar por analogía las leyes prohibitivas y sancionatorias, por ser de naturaleza restrictiva; 2- tampoco es posible hacerlo tratándose de normas que limiten la capacidad de la persona o los derechos subjetivos, por ser materia odiosa; 3- tratándose de "ius singulare" o de derecho excepcional, por su misma naturaleza, al obedecer a una razón particular de regulación, no procede este tipo de aplicación normativa; y, 4- tratándose de normas temporales, tampoco procede la analogía, por estar determinadas para una circunstancia momentánea. / V. De los supuestos que impiden la aplicación de la analogía, conviene referirse (…), a la imposibilidad de aplicar en forma extensiva aquellas normas del ius singulare. En doctrina se contrapone esta categoría al ius regulare. Este último, está formado por normas caracterizadas por la correspondencia de sus fundamentos a los principios generales del ordenamiento jurídico; en otras palabras, sus directrices, presupuestos y fundamentos no se separan de los lineamientos generales del Derecho. Por el contrario, el ius singulare, también llamado excepcional, se inspira en reglas diversas de aquellas que caracterizan el sistema normativo en general. En ocasiones, dada la necesidad de brindar una protección especial para ciertas personas, o para resguardar un interés particular del tráfico jurídico, o para solucionar algunos casos especiales con particulares criterios de equidad, o por necesidades emergentes de circunstancias extraordinarias, resulta necesario sacrificar los principios generales, estableciendo disposiciones que excluyan a algunas personas o relaciones jurídicas de la aplicación de las consecuencias normales para ciertos actos, o estableciendo sanciones o responsabilidades especiales no previstas para los casos normales. Así, el derecho singular representa una desviación de las normas generales que rigen al sistema, lo cual es necesario por razones peculiares de conveniencia que exigen tal tratamiento. Por ello, en tales casos, no es posible la aplicación por analogía de las normas excepcionales o de ius singulare a aquellos casos no contemplados expresamente por las normas. / VI.- En nuestro Código Civil, la aplicación analógica de las normas está regulada por los artículos 12 y 13, ubicados en su Título Preliminar. Según el artículo 12, es posible la interpretación analógica de las normas "... cuando éstas no contemplen un supuesto específico, pero regulen otro semejante en el que se aprecie identidad de razón, salvo cuando alguna norma prohíba esa aplicación". De tal forma, se sienta el principio general de la aplicación analógica en aquellos casos donde exista idéntica "ratio legis". Por su parte, el artículo 13 excluye la aplicación analógica tratándose de leyes penales, excepcionales y temporales. De esa forma, nuestro Código Civil permite este método de integración del Derecho según los lineamientos doctrinales esbozados en los considerandos anteriores.” (Ver, además, el voto de la Sala Primera n.º 167-F-S1-2010, de las 8:40 horas del 29 de enero de 2010).- XI.- Ahora bien, si, como la Sala Constitucional lo afirmó en el citado voto n.º [Telf1], de las 14:46 horas del 23 de mayo de 2006, “(…) la prohibición contenida en la normativa impugnada [inciso 6º del artículo 14 del Código de Familia] se refiere específicamente a la institución denominada matrimonio (…).”; si ella no vulnera la Constitución Política porque no existe “(…) impedimento de alguna naturaleza para la existencia de uniones homosexuales. Más bien, hay una constatación empírica para indicar que han (sic) incrementado.” y si no “(…) procede aplicar la normativa desarrollada para el matrimonio en los términos actualmente concebidos en nuestro ordenamiento constitucional.”; cuál sería, entonces, la normativa de la que habríamos de echar mano para decidir por el fondo este proceso. Téngase presente que, a pesar de haberse apuntado en esa oportunidad que el problema planteado “(…) no radica en la norma aquí impugnada sino, más bien, en la ausencia de una regulación normativa apropiada, para regular los efectos personales y patrimoniales de ese tipo de uniones, sobre todo si reúnen condiciones de estabilidad y singularidad, porque un imperativo de seguridad jurídica, si no (sic) de justicia, lo hace necesario. Estamos, entonces, en presencia de un escenario de lege ferenda, pero ni por asomo de una omisión ilegítima del Estado. Esto se indica, además, porque en la documentación que corre agregada en autos (sic), y según lo expresado en la audiencia oral llevada a cabo durante la sustanciación de este proceso, algunos países han ido promulgando leyes (en sentido formal) que han dotado de un marco jurídico y ciertas formalidades a estas uniones, con el propósito de que tengan efectos jurídicos específicos en relación a las personas que las llevan a cabo […y…], a las cuales (…) no se les puede aplicar el marco jurídico que el constituyente derivado organizó para el tratamiento de las parejas heterosexuales.” (La negrita es agregada); en fecha más reciente ese mismo órgano evidenció que “(…) la laguna normativa apuntada por […ese…] Tribunal Constitucional en la Sentencia supra citada, se […mantiene…], con lo cual se […está…] inobservando, de manera indirecta, las razones vertidas (ratio decidendi) por […la…] Sala especializada de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en materia de control de constitucionalidad, para estimar que el numeral 14, inciso 6º, del Código de Familia es conforme con el Derecho de la Constitución.” (Voto n.º 2010-13313, de las 16:31 horas del 10 de agosto de 2010). Y no sobra mencionar que en ese último pronunciamiento, sintetizó sus criterios sobre el tema en los términos consignados a continuación: “A partir de esta sentencia [se refiere a la n.º [Telf1], antes citada] quedan claros varios aspectos de importancia para resolver el sub-lite, que son los siguientes: / 1°) Las relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo son una realidad social que no puede ignorarse o soslayarse. / 2°) Es preciso regular, legislativamente, los efectos patrimoniales y personales de tales relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo. / 3°) Existe un vacío normativo del legislador (sic) ordinario que debe ser colmado, habida cuenta que la institución del matrimonio no puede aplicarse a las relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo. / 4°) El legislador (sic) ordinario debe dictar una marco normativo que regule las consecuencias jurídicas de tales relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo. Esta Sentencia, por lo dispuesto en el artículo 13 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, tiene efectos erga omnes, para todos los poderes constituidos, precisamente, por tal razón, el legislador (sic) ordinario asumió la tarea de discutir la oportunidad y conveniencia de regular las relaciones entre personas del mismo sexo.” (Las negritas y el subrayado no aparecen en el documento original). Tampoco es factible dejar de destacar que, a raíz de los acontecimientos políticos por todos conocidos, no parece vislumbrarse que, a corto o mediano plazo, ese estado de cosas pueda variar, sobre todo después de que el pasado 6 de junio la Comisión Permanente Especial de Derechos Humanos de la Asamblea Legislativa, presidida por el diputado ***** ******, rindiera dictamen de mayoría negativo sobre el proyecto de Ley de sociedades de convivencia (n.º 17.668), presentado desde el 13 de abril de 2010 por la otrora legisladora [Nombre36] y los entonces legisladores [Nombre37], [Nombre38], [Nombre39] y [Nombre40] y publicado en La Gaceta n.º 120 de 22 de junio de ese mismo año. Y no altera lo apuntado que, un día después del pronunciamiento de esa Comisión, la iniciativa fuese presentada de nuevo en la Secretaría del Directorio Legislativo por las diputadas [Nombre41] y [Nombre42] y los diputados [Nombre43] y [Nombre44] (n.º 18.481). Repárese, además, en que el tema ha estado en la corriente legislativa desde el 27 de septiembre de 2006, data en que [Nombre36], [Nombre37] y [Nombre38] presentaron el proyecto de Ley de unión civil entre personas del mismo sexo (n.º 16.390), publicado en La Gaceta n.º 214 de 8 de noviembre de 2006, que terminó archivado el 22 de setiembre de 2010.- XII.- Sin duda, en este asunto concreto sometido a nuestra decisión están en juego tanto la determinación del orden jurisdiccional competente para tramitarlo, como la de la normativa de fondo a la cual debe recurrirse para integrar el ordenamiento vigente. Como, a nuestro juicio, es innegable la condición de grupo familiar de la pareja homosexual, le corresponde a la jurisdicción de familia conocer y pronunciarse en definitiva sobre sus consecuencias personales y patrimoniales. En efecto, estamos convenciones de que, como las personas no heterosexuales que la conforman también son titulares de los derechos fundamentales a la igualdad de trato, a la protección de su familia y a la tutela judicial efectiva, tienen pleno derecho a ese reconocimiento en esta sede. Repárese, además, en que, en virtud de esos mismos derechos fundamentales, no cabe hacer distinción alguna, sobre todo si lo que se toma en cuenta es la orientación sexual, en el momento de garantizarles el efectivo acceso al sistema judicial para que los órganos especializados en materia de familia estudien su pretensión y, mediante un fallo motivado y fundado, la acojan o la rechacen y resuelvan así su conflicto. No sobra evidenciar, además, que, por más que se estime imposible aplicar en estos casos las regulaciones del matrimonio, ninguna infracción a la protección reforzada contenida en el artículo 52 de la Constitución Política se comete al reconocerle tales efectos a la relación de pareja entre sujetos del mismo sexo. Por eso y en aras de no causar indefensión y desprotección a las partes, la acreditación de su convivencia pública, estable, prolongada y singular sería así suficiente para justificar el reconocimiento pretendido. Negarlo por no existir una norma específica no solo resulta incongruente con el ordenamiento familiar, sino que también constituye un quebranto del derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva (ver, en similares términos, el voto de la Sala Segunda n.º 2003-143, de las 9:30 horas del 26 de marzo de 2003).- XIII.- En apoyo de nuestra tesis consideramos de rigor traer a colación los argumentos expuestos por la Corte Constitucional de Sudáfrica, en la sentencia del 1º de diciembre de 2005, emitida en el marco de los casos “Minister of Home Affairs v. [Nombre45]” (Case C.C.T. 60/04) y “Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v. Minister of Home Affairs” (Case BAC1), mediante la cual anuló la cláusula heterosexual del régimen matrimonial, lo extendió a cualquier pareja, con independencia de su identidad sexual o de género o de su orientación sexual y le otorgó al Parlamento un plazo de doce meses para adaptar su legislación de modo que las parejas del mismo sexo pudiesen acceder a la Ley nacional sobre matrimonio. Acorde con la línea expuesta con posterioridad por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, aquel órgano extranjero, con redacción del juez Albie Sachs, puntualizó entonces “(…) que el daño a las parejas de personas del mismo sexo excede las privaciones de bienes materiales (sentencia, párrafos Nº 71 y 72, entre muchos otros). La definición de matrimonio que las excluye sugiere no sólo que su compromiso, relación y amor es inferior, sino que estas personas nunca podrán ser parte de la comunidad que la Constitución promete crear con igualdad para todos (sentencia, párrafo Nº 71). Estas parejas no son valoradas con el mismo respeto que es otorgado a las parejas heterosexuales (sentencia, párrafos Nº 71 y 81, entre muchos otros). La exclusión de los beneficios y responsabilidades del matrimonio no es un inconveniente pequeño y tangencial sino que representa una forma radical de decir indirectamente que las parejas homosexuales son outsiders (Ídem). Los dichos del tribunal constitucional reflejan que la discriminación opera, en primer lugar, a partir de una indebida exclusión de diferentes parejas de todos los beneficios materiales y protecciones que el matrimonio trae consigo y, en segundo lugar, a partir de la construcción de un diferente estatus como miembros de la comunidad, un estatus devaluado en razón de la orientación sexual elegida.” [[Nombre46], [Nombre47] (2007). Matrimonio y diversidad sexual: La lección sudafricana. Anuario de Derechos Humanos, Santiago: 3, p. 95. Recuperado el 28 de junio de 2008, de http://www.anuariocdh.uchile.cl/index.php/ADH/article/viewFile/13460/13729]. De ahí que “(…) el Estado no puede sustraer a determinadas parejas de la protección que las leyes otorgan a otras unidas en matrimonio, ya que la privación de estos derechos y la correlativa estigmatización que provoca, limitan y condicionan en gran medida la elección y materialización de planes de vida. En esa línea, la Corte Constitucional afirmó que dada la importancia y centralidad que atribuyen nuestras sociedades al matrimonio y sus consecuencias en nuestra cultura, el negar este derecho a las parejas de personas del mismo sexo representa negar su derecho a la autodefinición en una forma profunda (sentencia, párrafo Nº 72). Asimismo, en uno de sus pasajes más destacados, la sentencia remarca que la Constitución de Sudáfrica otorga derechos que van más allá del respeto a un ámbito privado ajeno a la interferencia estatal, y que las litigantes no están reclamando un derecho a ser “dejadas a solas” por el Estado, sino más bien un derecho a ser reconocidas como iguales y tratadas dignamente por la ley (sentencia, párrafo Nº 78).” [ Ibid, p. 98].- XIV.- En síntesis, si, como lo apuntó en su momento la Sección Segunda del Tribunal Superior Segundo Civil, respecto de la unión de hecho heterosexual cuando era considerada por algunos sectores sociales como “(…) un acto ilícito contrario a las buenas costumbres y al matrimonio (…)”, lo cierto es “(…) las épocas son cambiantes y la jurisprudencia debe llenar ahora la laguna que el Ordenamiento tiene al no proteger relaciones de tal índole.”, por cuanto, “No es posible conforme a los principios de equidad y de justicia dejar de lado el esfuerzo en común que realizan dos personas que se unen de esa manera (…).” (Voto n.º 358, de las 8:35 horas del 16 de junio de 1987), es incuestionable que existe la misma razón [“Principio: “ubi eadem ratio, idem jus” (A igual razón, igual derecho), contemplado en el artículo 12 del Código Civil (…).” (Voto de la Sala Segunda n.º 2003-502, de las 15:30 horas del 17 de setiembre de 2003)] para reconocerle consecuencias civiles y patrimoniales a la decisión de dos sujetos homosexuales de establecer un vínculo con características similares a las conyugales, máxime cuando se le otorga plena vigencia al criterio según el cual “(…) la potestad legislativa está sujeta a los límites dispuestos “por los tratados, conforme a los principios del Derecho Internacional”. Es así como los derechos humanos establecidos en los instrumentos del Derecho Internacional Público –Declaraciones y Convenciones sobre la materia-, resultan un valladar sustancial a la libertad de configuración del legislador (sic), tanto ordinario como, eminentemente, popular a través del referéndum. Este Tribunal Constitucional ha indicado que los derechos humanos consagrados en los instrumentos internacionales tienen, incluso, y a tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 48 constitucional, un rango supra constitucional cuando ofrecen una mayor protección a las personas. De otra parte, este Tribunal Constitucional en el Voto No. [Telf3] de las 11:40 hrs. de 4 de abril de 2003, estimó que, incluso, el poder reformador o constituyente derivado –en cuanto poder constituido- está limitado por el contenido esencial de los derechos fundamentales y humanos, de modo que, por vía de reforma parcial a la constitución, no puede reducirse o cercenarse el contenido esencial de aquellos. Cabe añadir, que un límite implícito a la libertad de configuración del legislador (sic) ordinario o soberano, lo constituye el propio Derecho de la Constitución o bloque de constitucionalidad conformado por los principios, valores, preceptos y jurisprudencia constitucionales. Es menester agregar que los derechos de las minorías, por su carácter irrenunciable, constituyen un asunto eminentemente técnico-jurídico, que debe estar en manos del legislador (sic) ordinario y no de las mayorías proclives a su negación.” (Voto n.º 2010-13313, de las 16:31 horas del 10 de agosto de 2010).- XV.- Respecto del valor de los instrumentos internacionales en el sistema de fuentes del ordenamiento jurídico costarricense y, en particular, de los pronunciamientos de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en el voto n.º 2313-95, de las 16:18 horas del 9 de mayo de 1995, ese órgano certeramente apuntó que “(…) si la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos es el órgano natural para interpretar la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José de Costa Rica), la fuerza de su decisión al interpretar la convención y enjuiciar leyes nacionales a la luz de esta normativa, ya sea en caso contencioso o en una mera consulta, tendrá -de principio- el mismo valor de la norma interpretada. No solamente valor ético o científico, como algunos han entendido. Esta tesis que ahora sostenemos, por lo demás, está receptada en nuestro derecho, cuando la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone que las normas no escritas -como la costumbre, la jurisprudencia y los principios generales del derecho- servirán para interpretar, integrar y delimitar el campo de aplicación del ordenamiento escrito y tendrán el rango de la norma que interpretan, integran o delimitan (artículo 7.l.).”- XVI.- Los Principios de Yogyakarta sobre la aplicación del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos a las cuestiones de orientación sexual e identidad de género, adoptados por el Panel Internacional de Especialistas en Legislación Internacional de Derechos Humanos y en Orientación Sexual e Identidad de Género, en la reunión realizada del 6 al 9 de noviembre de 2006, establecen los estándares básicos para que la Organización de las Naciones Unidas y los Estados que la conforman avancen para garantizar las protecciones necesarias a las personas no heterosexuales (lesbianas, gay, bisexuales, transexuales y transgénero). En su preámbulo se reconoce que “La orientación sexual y la identidad de género son esenciales para la dignidad y humanidad de cada persona y no deben ser motivo de discriminación o abuso.” De acuerdo con su primer principio “Los seres humanos de todas las orientaciones sexuales e identidades de género tienen derecho al pleno disfrute de todos los derechos humanos.” El segundo estipula que “Todas las personas tienen derecho al disfrute de todos los derechos humanos, sin discriminación por motivos de orientación sexual o identidad de género. La ley prohibirá toda discriminación y garantizará a todas las personas protección igual y efectiva contra cualquier discriminación.” Al tenor del tercero, “La orientación sexual o identidad de género que cada persona defina para sí, es esencial para su personalidad y constituye uno de los aspectos fundamentales de la autodeterminación, la dignidad y la libertad. Ninguna persona será obligada a someterse a procedimientos médicos como requisito para el reconocimiento legal de su identidad de género. Ninguna persona será sometida a presiones para ocultar, suprimir o negar su orientación sexual o identidad de género.” Y, por último, el 24 reconoce el derecho de toda persona “(…) a formar una familia, con independencia de su orientación sexual o identidad de género. Existen diversas configuraciones de familias. Ninguna familia puede ser sometida a discriminación basada en la orientación sexual o identidad de género de cualquiera de sus integrantes.” Con ese propósito, los Estados “E. Adoptarán todas las medidas legislativas, administrativas y de otra índole que sean necesarias a fin de asegurar que en aquellos Estados que reconocen los matrimonios o las sociedades de convivencia registradas entre personas de un mismo sexo, cualquier derecho, privilegio, obligación o beneficio que se otorga a personas de sexo diferente que están casadas o en unión registrada esté disponible en igualdad de condiciones para personas del mismo sexo casadas o en sociedad de convivencia registrada; / F. Adoptarán todas las medidas legislativas, administrativas y de otra índole que sean necesarias a fin de garantizar que cualquier obligación, derecho, privilegio o beneficio que se otorga a parejas de sexo diferente no casadas esté disponible en igualdad de condiciones para parejas del mismo sexo no casadas; (…).” En 2008, la Asamblea General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos adoptó en forma unánime la resolución AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08) sobre Derechos Humanos, Orientación Sexual e Identidad de Género, mediante la cual se extendió la protección de los derechos humanos a la identidad de género y la orientación sexual. En esa declaración los 34 países miembros reafirmaron la universalidad, indivisibilidad e interdependencia de los derechos humanos y manifestaron su preocupación por los actos de violencia y las violaciones de derechos humanos relacionadas, cometidos contra individuos a causa de su orientación sexual e identidad de género. En los años siguientes esa organización internacional emitió resoluciones similares: AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10) y AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11). Por último, el 18 de diciembre de 2008, los Representantes Permanentes de Argentina, Brasil, Croacia, Francia, Gabón, Japón, Noruega y los Países Bajos presentaron a la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas el texto de la Declaración sobre Orientación Sexual e Identidad de Género, en la cual se reafirma el principio de universalidad de los derechos humanos y el de no discriminación, que exige que se apliquen por igual a todos los seres humanos, independientemente de su orientación sexual o identidad de género. Además, se expresa ahí la profunda preocupación por las violaciones de derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales basadas en la orientación sexual o identidad de género y por la violencia, acoso, discriminación, exclusión, estigmatización y prejuicio que se dirigen contra personas de todos los países del mundo por causa de su orientación sexual o identidad de género, y porque estas prácticas socavan la integridad y dignidad de aquéllos sometidos a tales abusos; se condenan las violaciones de derechos humanos basadas en la orientación sexual o la identidad de género dondequiera que tengan lugar; se hace un llamado a todos los Estados y mecanismos internacionales relevantes de derechos humanos a que se comprometan con la promoción y protección de los derechos humanos de todas las personas, independientemente de su orientación sexual e identidad de género y se insta a los primeros para que tomen todas las medidas necesarias, en particular las legislativas o administrativas, para asegurar que la orientación sexual o identidad de género no puedan ser, bajo ninguna circunstancia, la base de sanciones penales. Costa Rica es uno de los 85 países signatarios de la Declaración conjunta para poner alto a los actos de violencia, y a las violaciones de derechos humanos relacionadas, dirigidos contra las personas por su orientación sexual e identidad de género, presentada por Colombia ante el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas en 2011. En enero de este año, el Secretario General de las Unidas, [Nombre48], destacó que la discriminación debida a la orientación sexual o a la identidad de género es una de las injusticias que muchos Estados han ignorado o incluso aprobado. “Como resultado, algunos gobiernos tratan a estas personas como ciudadanos de segunda clase o incluso criminales. Plantar cara a esta discriminación es un desafío. Pero debemos cumplir los ideales de la Declaración Universal.”- XVII.- En fecha reciente, en la citada sentencia del 24 de febrero del año en curso, emitida en el Caso [Nombre2] y [Nombre3] vs. Chile, en la cual reiteró la obligación de los Estados parte en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos de respetar y garantizar “sin discriminación alguna” el pleno y libre ejercicio de los derechos y libertades reconocidos en ella, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos estableció que la orientación sexual y la identidad de género son categorías protegidas por ese instrumento internacional bajo el término “otra condición social”, recogido en su artículo 1º, inciso 1). Sobre el particular puntualizó lo siguiente: “78. La Corte ha establecido que el artículo 1.1 de la Convención es una norma de carácter general cuyo contenido se extiende a todas las disposiciones del tratado, y dispone la obligación de los Estados Parte de respetar y garantizar el pleno y libre ejercicio de los derechos y libertades allí reconocidos “sin discriminación alguna”. Es decir, cualquiera sea el origen o la forma que asuma, todo tratamiento que pueda ser considerado discriminatorio respecto del ejercicio de cualquiera de los derechos garantizados en la Convención es per se incompatible con la misma12 . / 79. (…) la Corte ha señalado13 que la noción de igualdad se desprende directamente de la unidad de naturaleza del género humano y es inseparable de la dignidad esencial de la persona, frente a la cual es incompatible toda situación que, por considerar superior a un determinado grupo, conduzca a tratarlo con privilegio; o que, a la inversa, por considerarlo inferior, lo trate con hostilidad o de cualquier forma lo discrimine del goce de derechos que sí se reconocen a quienes no se consideran incursos en tal situación. La jurisprudencia de la Corte también ha indicado que en la actual etapa de la evolución del derecho internacional, el principio fundamental de igualdad y no discriminación ha ingresado en el dominio del jus cogens. Sobre él descansa el andamiaje jurídico del orden público nacional e internacional y permean todo el ordenamiento jurídico14.” Puntualizó, además, que como consecuencia de ello, ninguna norma, decisión o práctica de derecho interno, sea por parte de las autoridades estatales o por los particulares, puede disminuir o restringir, de modo alguno, los derechos de una persona por causa de su orientación sexual. Por el contrario, la proscripción de la discriminación por orientación sexual conlleva la obligación de todas las autoridades y funcionarios de garantizarles que puedan gozar de todos y cada uno de los derechos establecidos en la Convención. “80. Además, el Tribunal ha establecido que los Estados deben abstenerse de realizar acciones que de cualquier manera vayan dirigidas, directa o indirectamente, a crear situaciones de discriminación de jure o de facto15 . Los Estados están obligados a adoptar medidas positivas para revertir o cambiar situaciones discriminatorias existentes en sus sociedades, en perjuicio de determinado grupo de personas. Esto implica el deber especial de protección que el Estado debe ejercer con respecto a actuaciones y prácticas de terceros que, bajo su tolerancia o aquiescencia, creen, mantengan o favorezcan las situaciones discriminatorias16.”“82. (…) el artículo 24 de la Convención Americana prohíbe la discriminación de derecho o de hecho, no sólo en cuanto a los derechos consagrados en dicho tratado, sino en lo que respecta a todas las leyes que apruebe el Estado y a su aplicación. En otras palabras, si un Estado discrimina en el respeto o garantía de un derecho convencional, incumpliría la obligación establecida en el artículo 1.1 y el derecho sustantivo en cuestión. Si, por el contrario, la discriminación se refiere a una protección desigual de la ley interna o su aplicación, el hecho debe analizarse a la luz del artículo 24 de la Convención Americana17 .” “83. La Corte ha establecido, al igual que el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, que los tratados de derechos humanos son instrumentos vivos, cuya interpretación tiene que acompañar la evolución de los tiempos y las condiciones de vida actuales18. Tal interpretación evolutiva es consecuente con las reglas generales de interpretación consagradas en el artículo 29 de la Convención Americana, así como las establecidas por la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados19.” “84. En este sentido, al interpretar la expresión "cualquier otra condición social" del artículo 1.1. de la Convención, debe siempre elegirse la alternativa más favorable para la tutela de los derechos protegidos por dicho tratado, según el principio de la norma más favorable al ser humano20.” “85. Los criterios específicos en virtud de los cuales está prohibido discriminar, según el artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana, no son un listado taxativo o limitativo sino meramente enunciativo. Por el contrario, la redacción de dicho artículo deja abiertos los criterios con la inclusión del término “otra condición social” para incorporar así a otras categorías que no hubiesen sido explícitamente indicadas. La expresión “cualquier otra condición social” del artículo 1.1. de la Convención debe ser interpretada por la Corte, en consecuencia, en la perspectiva de la opción más favorable a la persona y de la evolución de los derechos fundamentales en el derecho internacional contemporáneo21 .” “86. Al respecto, en el Sistema Interamericano, la Asamblea General de la Organización de Estados Americanos (en adelante “OEA”) ha aprobado desde 2008 en sus sesiones anuales cuatro resoluciones sucesivas respecto a la protección de las personas contra tratos discriminatorios basados en su orientación sexual e identidad de género, mediante las cuales se ha exigido la adopción de medidas concretas para una protección eficaz contra actos discriminatorios22 .” “87. Respecto a la inclusión de la orientación sexual como categoría de discriminación prohibida, el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos ha señalado que la orientación sexual es “otra condición” mencionada en el artículo 14 23 del Convenio Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades Fundamentales (en adelante “Convenio Europeo”), el cual prohíbe tratos discriminatorios24. En particular, en el Caso [Nombre49] Vs. Portugal, el Tribunal Europeo concluyó que la orientación sexual es un concepto que se encuentra cubierto por el artículo 14 del Convenio Europeo. Además, reiteró que el listado de categorías que se realiza en dicho artículo es ilustrativo y no exhaustivo25. Asimismo, en el Caso [Nombre50] Vs. Reino Unido, el Tribunal Europeo reiteró que la orientación sexual, como una de las categorías que puede ser incluida bajo “otra condición”, es otro ejemplo específico de los que se encuentran en dicho listado, que son consideradas como características personales en el sentido que son innatas o inherentes a la persona26.” “88. En el marco del Sistema Universal de Protección de Derechos Humanos, el Comité de Derechos Humanos y el Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales han calificado la orientación sexual como una de las categorías de discriminación prohibida consideradas en el artículo 2.127 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos y el artículo 2.228 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales. Al respecto, el Comité de Derechos Humanos indicó en el caso [Nombre51] Vs. Australia que la referencia a la categoría “sexo” incluiría la orientación sexual de las personas 29. Igualmente, el Comité de Derechos Humanos ha expresado su preocupación frente a diversas situaciones discriminatorias relacionadas con la orientación sexual de las personas, lo cual ha sido expresado reiteradamente en sus observaciones finales a los informes presentados por los Estados30 .” “89. Por su parte, el Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales determinó que la orientación sexual puede ser enmarcada bajo “otra condición social”31. Asimismo, el Comité de los Derechos del Niño 32 , el Comité contra la Tortura33 han realizado referencias en el marco de sus observaciones generales y recomendaciones, respecto a la inclusión de la orientación sexual como una de las categorías prohibidas de discriminación.” “90. El 22 de diciembre de 2008 la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas adoptó la “Declaración sobre derechos humanos, orientación sexual e identidad de género”, reafirmando el “principio de no discriminación, que exige que los derechos humanos se apliquen por igual a todos los seres humanos, independientemente de su orientación sexual o identidad de género”34. Asimismo, el 22 de marzo de 2011 fue presentada, ante el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas, la “Declaración conjunta para poner alto a los actos de violencia, y a las violaciones de derechos humanos dirigidas contra las personas por su orientación sexual e identidad de género” 35. El 15 de junio de 2011 este mismo Consejo aprobó una resolución sobre “derechos humanos, orientación sexual e identidad de género” en la que se expresó la “grave preocupación por los actos de violencia y discriminación, en todas las regiones del mundo, [cometidos] contra personas por su orientación sexual e identidad de género”36 . La prohibición de discriminación por orientación sexual ha sido resaltada también en numerosos informes de los relatores especiales de Naciones Unidas37 .” “91. Teniendo en cuenta las obligaciones generales de respeto y garantía establecidas en el artículo 1.1 de la Convención Americana, los criterios de interpretación fijados en el artículo 29 de dicha Convención, lo estipulado en la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, las Resoluciones de la Asamblea General de la OEA, los estándares establecidos por el Tribunal Europeo y los organismos de Naciones Unidas (supra párrs. 83 a 90), la Corte Interamericana deja establecido que la orientación sexual y la identidad de género de las personas son categorías protegidas por la Convención. Por ello está proscrita por la Convención cualquier norma, acto o práctica discriminatoria basada en la orientación sexual de la persona. En consecuencia, ninguna norma, decisión o práctica de derecho interno, sea por parte de autoridades estatales o por particulares, pueden disminuir o restringir, de modo alguno, los derechos de una persona a partir de su orientación sexual.” “92. En lo que respecta al argumento del Estado de que para la fecha de emisión de la sentencia de la Corte Suprema no habría existido un consenso respecto a la orientación sexual como categoría prohibida de discriminación, la Corte resalta que la presunta falta de un consenso al interior de algunos países sobre el respeto pleno por los derechos de las minorías sexuales no puede ser considerado como un argumento válido para negarles o restringirles sus derechos humanos o para perpetuar y reproducir la discriminación histórica y estructural que estas minorías han sufrido38 . El hecho de que ésta pudiera ser materia controversial en algunos sectores y países, y que no sea necesariamente materia de consenso no puede conducir al Tribunal a abstenerse de decidir, pues al hacerlo debe remitirse única y exclusivamente a las estipulaciones de las obligaciones internacionales contraídas por decisión soberana de los Estados a través de la Convención Americana.” “93. Un derecho que le está reconocido a las personas no puede ser negado o restringido a nadie y bajo ninguna circunstancia con base en su orientación sexual. Ello violaría el artículo 1.1. de la Convención Americana. El instrumento interamericano proscribe la discriminación, en general, incluyendo en ello categorías como las de la orientación sexual la que no puede servir de sustento para negar o restringir ninguno de los derechos establecidos en la Convención.”- XVIII.- Esa Sala Constitucional también ha reconocido que la orientación sexual es un vector de discriminación social y personal y ha destacado el papel de las autoridades públicas en la lucha contra esta. En el voto n.º 2007-18660, de las 11:17 horas del 21 de diciembre de 2007, lo puntualizó en los siguientes términos: “A través de su línea jurisprudencial esta Sala ha reconocido como principio jurídico fundamental contenido en la Constitución Política de Costa Rica el respeto a la dignidad de todo ser humano y, en consecuencia, la prohibición absoluta de realizar cualquier tipo de discriminación contraria a esa dignidad. Discriminar, en términos generales, es diferenciar en perjuicio de los derechos y la dignidad de un ser humano o grupo de ellos; en este caso de los homosexuales. A partir de lo anterior, puede válidamente afirmarse que la discriminación por motivos de orientación sexual es contrario al concepto de dignidad debidamente consagrado en la Constitución Política y en los Tratados Internacionales en materia de Derechos Humanos suscritos por nuestro país. A manera de ejemplo, el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos prohíbe en su artículo 26 la discriminación por motivos de "raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opiniones políticas o de cualquier índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social"; de lo que también deriva que no son permitidos los actos que atenten contra el derecho a la igualdad y dignidad humana de las personas por su orientación sexual, pues tienen derecho a acceder a cualquier establecimiento comercial y a recibir un trato igual, sin discriminación en razón de su preferencia sexual.” En el n.º 2010-13313, de las 16:31 horas del 10 de agosto de 2010, agregó que “Los derechos humanos, fundamentales y de configuración legal de los grupos minoritarios o en desventaja, por haber sufrido, tradicionalmente, discriminación, exclusión y toda clase de prejuicios sociales -como ocurre con el de los homosexuales-, surgen a partir movimientos de reivindicación de éstos (sic), ordinariamente, contra mayoritarios, dada la insistencia e inclinación natural de las mayorías por mantener y perpetuar cualquier discriminación y trato asimétrico. Los poderes públicos, de su parte, están obligados, por la Constitución y los instrumentos del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, a garantizar y propiciar el respeto efectivo del principio y el derecho a la igualdad –real y no formal- de tales grupos (artículos 33 constitucional y 24 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos o Pacto de San José). Las situaciones de discriminación pueden ser fácticas o jurídicas, serán del primer tipo cuando, ante la existencia de un grupo minoritario en desventaja y discriminado, no se adoptan medidas para superar tal estado de cosas.” “Frente a los grupos que son objeto de discriminación y prejuicios sociales no basta la aplicación del principio de la igualdad real y prohibición de toda discriminación que, normalmente, operan ex post a la perpetración del acto discriminatorio. Por lo anterior, es preciso que los poderes públicos actúen el principio de apoyo a tales grupos con políticas públicas y medidas normativas efectivas. El principio de apoyo a los grupos discriminados previene y se anticipa a las discriminaciones, de modo que tiene un efecto ex ante, respecto de éstas. El principio de apoyo se logra cumplir cuando se dicta legislación y reglamentación que reconoce derechos de los grupos discriminados, aunque estos sean de configuración infra constitucional.”- XIX.- Como apunta [Nombre52], “La igualdad/prohibición de discriminación tiene un ámbito normativo más amplio porque protege la homosexualidad en los espacios privados (impidiendo que sea tratada por el Derecho de un modo irrazonablemente distinto al de la heterosexualidad) pero también en los públicos, en ese mismo sentido. Los poderes públicos tendrán que aportar una razón especialmente convincente o persuasiva para tratar jurídicamente de modo distinto y peor a los homosexuales que a los heterosexuales. Huelga decir que desde el enfoque de la prohibición de discriminación la protección se hace más eficaz e incisiva, entre otras cosas porque los argumentos morales o históricos ya no serán suficientes por sí solos para impedir que las personas homosexuales accedan a ciertos derechos que tradicionalmente tenían vetados, como, por ejemplo, el derecho a mantener una unión estable reconocida jurídicamente con una persona de su misma orientación sexual.” [Homosexualidad y Constitución. Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, Madrid: 73, enero/abril, 2005, p.132]. De ahí que resulte imperativo erradicar, cuando menos del mundo jurídico, el profundo prejuicio social homofóbico, que, por otra parte, quizás guarde una significativa relación con la discriminación contra las mujeres por cuanto la estigmatización de las personas no heterosexuales aparece estrechamente vinculada a la supuesta desviación del rol juzgado tradicionalmente como apropiado para ellas (el centro del reproche social parece residir en que el «gay» adopta una posición de «mujer» y en que la lesbiana asume una de «hombre»). “El derecho fundamental a no ser discriminado por razón de orientación sexual tendría, pues, el típico efecto de la igualdad de trato con sus dos corolarios, la prohibición de discriminaciones directas, es decir, de tratamientos jurídicos diferentes y peores en atención a la homosexualidad, y de discriminaciones indirectas o de impacto, esto es, de diferenciaciones jurídicas que se pudieran establecer formalmente no en razón de la orientación sexual, pero que, de hecho, impactaran negativamente sobre la minoría homosexual.” [ ibid, p. 139]. De la prohibición de discriminación por la orientación sexual se deriva también un mandato de acciones positivas. Los poderes públicos están obligados a que la discriminación social que sufren las personas homosexuales «no prevalezca» de ningún modo, para lo cual están obligadas a adoptar medidas de igualdad de oportunidades. “La tutela de la homosexualidad, a pesar de no ser aludida explícitamente por nuestra Constitución, se ha convertido en un asunto constitucional central, y no sólo porque afecta, como cabe suponer, a un número de personas no fácilmente determinable, pero sin duda significativo, sino, sobre todo, por la concurrencia de dos argumentos cualitativos, uno relativo al valor de la libertad y otro al de la igualdad. En la pregunta sobre el marco constitucional de la homosexualidad está en juego, desde luego, la libertad, porque el corazón del asunto es la orientación sexual de las personas, es decir, una de las claves de la existencia humana y, por tanto, de su dignidad, central para la vida familiar, el bienestar colectivo y el desarrollo de la personalidad individual. Pero también la igualdad está implicada, porque nuestra Constitución, como dijera el Juez Harlan de la Constitución norteamericana en su dissent a la Sentencia Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), «ni conoce ni tolera clases entre los ciudadanos».” [ Ibid, p. 117]. Como lo indicó el magistrado J. Greaney en su voto concurrente en la famosa Sentencia de la Supreme Judicial Court de Massachussets, [Nombre10] and others v. Departament of Public Health, de 18 de noviembre de 2003: «Como asunto de Derecho constitucional, ni el mantra de la tradición, ni la convicción individual pueden justificar la perpetuación de la jerarquía según la cual las parejas del mismo sexo y sus familias son juzgadas menos merecedoras de reconocimiento social y jurídica que las de sexo opuesto».- XX.- Con base en todo lo expuesto y aunque no nos cabe la menor duda de que para decidir si la pretensión formulada en este asunto puede ser acogida o rechazada, procede aplicar analógicamente lo previsto para la unión de hecho en el Código de Familia, con excepción, claro está, del requerimiento de que se trate de un vínculo heterosexual, nos vemos compelidos a formular esta consulta judicial de constitucionalidad con el propósito de que esa Sala defina si lo resuelto por ella con anterioridad en relación con la validez constitucional de esa exigencia nos impide hacerlo.-

POR TANTO

Aun cuando no tenemos dudas de que para decidir si la pretensión formulada en este asunto puede ser acogida o rechazada, procede aplicar analógicamente lo previsto para la unión de hecho en el Código de Familia , con excepción, claro está, del requerimiento de que se trate de un vínculo entre un hombre y una mujer, formulamos la presente consulta judicial de constitucionalidad con el propósito de que esa Sala defina si lo resuelto por ella con anterioridad en relación con la validez constitucional de esa exigencia impide hacerlo. Se emplaza a las partes para que dentro del término de tres días comparezcan ante ese órgano a hacer valer sus derechos. Mientras no se conozca la decisión de la presente consulta, se suspende la tramitación de este asunto.- Olga Marta Muñoz González Alexis Vargas Soto Luis Héctor Amoretti Orozco r.s.

------------------------- 1 Condición jurídica y derechos humanos del niño. Opinión Consultiva OC-17/02, de 28 de agosto de 2002. Serie A, No. 17, párrs. 69 y 70. Ver asimismo: T.E.D.H., Caso [Nombre55] Vs. Irlanda, (No. 16969/90), Sentencia de 26 de mayo de 1994, párr. 44, y Caso [Nombre56] y otros Vs. Países Bajos, (No. 18535/91), Sentencia de 27 de octubre de 1994, párr. 30. 2 Cfr. Caso [Nombre57] y [Nombre58] Vs. Argentina. Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 27 de agosto de 1998. Serie C No. 39, párr. [Dirección1], y Caso [Nombre13] Vs. Panamá. Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 12 de agosto de 2008. Serie C No. 186, párr. 179. 3 Cfr. Caso [Nombre59] Vs. Ecuador. Excepción Preliminar y Fondo. Sentencia de 6 de mayo de 2008. Serie C No. 179, párr. [Dirección2], y Caso [Nombre60] y [Nombre61] Vs. Argentina. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 29 de noviembre de 2011. Serie C No. 238, párr. 85. 4 Cfr. Caso [Nombre28] y otros. Sentencia de 30 de mayo de 1999. Serie C No. 52, párr. 184.; Caso [Nombre33]. Sentencia de 3 de noviembre de 1997. Serie C No. 34, párrs. 82 y 83; Caso [Nombre30] y otros. Sentencia de 8 de marzo de 1998. Serie C No. 37, párr. 164; Caso [Nombre31]. Sentencia de 24 de enero de 1998. Serie C No. 36, párr. 102; y Caso [Nombre32]. Sentencia de 12 de noviembre de 1997. Serie C No. 35, párr. 65. 5 Garantías judiciales en estados de emergencia, Opinión Consultiva OC-9/87 de 6 de octubre de 1987. Serie A No. 9, párr. 24. 6 Cfr. Caso [Nombre26] y otros. Sentencia de 19 de noviembre de 1999. Serie C No. 63, párr. 237; Caso [Nombre27]. Sentencia de 29 de septiembre de 1999. Serie C. No. 56, párr. 121; Caso [Nombre28] y otros. Sentencia de 30 de mayo de 1999. Serie C No. 52, párr. 60; Caso [Nombre33]. Reparaciones (art. 63.1 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Sentencia de 27 de noviembre de 1998. Serie C No. 43, párr. 184; Caso [Nombre33]. Sentencia de 3 de noviembre de 1997. Serie C No. 34, párr. 83; Caso [Nombre30] y otros. Sentencia de 8 de marzo de 1998. Serie C No. 37, párr. 164; Caso [Nombre31]. Sentencia de 24 de enero de 1998. Serie C No. 36, párr. 102; y Caso [Nombre32]. Sentencia de 12 de noviembre de 1997. Serie C No. 35, párr. 65. 7 Corte I.D.H., Excepciones al agotamiento de los recursos internos (arts. 46.1, 46.2.a y 46.2.b Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Opinión Consultiva OC-11/90 del 10 de agosto de 1990. Serie A No. 11, párr. 34. 8 Cfr. Caso [Nombre62] Vs. Honduras. Fondo. Sentencia de 29 de julio de 1988. Serie C No. 4, párr. [Dirección3]; Caso [Nombre63] Vs. Brasil. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 4 de julio de 2006. Serie C No. 149, párr. [Dirección4], Caso [Nombre64] Vs. Haití. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia del 6 de mayo de 2008, párr. 77. 9 Cfr. Caso [Nombre65] Vs. Honduras. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 1 de febrero de 2006. Serie C No. 141, [Dirección5] y Caso Cantos Vs. Argentina. Excepciones Preliminares. Sentencia de 7 de septiembre de 2001. Serie C No. 85, párr. 52. Ver también: Garantías Judiciales en Estados de Emergencia (arts. 27.2, 25 y 8 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Opinión Consultiva OC-9/87 del 6 de octubre de 1987. Serie A No. 9, párr. 24. 10 Cfr. Caso [Nombre66] y otros (“Cesantes y Jubilados de la Contraloría”) Vs. Perú. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 1 de julio de 2009. Serie C No. 198, párr. [Dirección6], y Caso Chocrón Chocrón Vs. Venezuela. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 1 de julio de 2011. Serie C No. 227, párr. 127. 11 Cfr. Caso de la Masacre de Mapiripán Vs. Colombia. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 15 de septiembre de 2005, Serie C No. 134, párr. [Dirección7], y Caso Chocrón Chocrón Vs. Venezuela, supra nota 85, párr. 128. 12 Cfr. Propuesta de Modificación a la Constitución Política de Costa Rica relacionada con la Naturalización. Opinión Consultiva OC-4/84 del 19 de enero de 1984. Serie A No. 4, [Dirección8] y Caso Comunidad Indígena [Nombre67]. Vs. Paraguay. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 24 de agosto de 2010 Serie C No. 214, párr. 268. 13 Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-4/84, supra nota 12, párr. 55. 14 Cfr. Condición Jurídica y Derechos de los Migrantes Indocumentados. Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03 del 17 de septiembre de 2003. Serie A No. 18, párr. 101 y Caso Comunidad Indígena [Nombre67], supra nota 12, párr. 269. 15 Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03, supra nota 14, párr. 103 y Caso Comunidad Indígena [Nombre67], supra nota 12, párr. 271. 16 Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03, supra nota 14, párr. 104, Caso Comunidad Indígena [Nombre67], supra nota 12, párr. 271 y Naciones Unidas, Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observación General No. 18, No discriminación, 10 de noviembre de 1989, CCPR/C/37, párr. 6. 17 Mutatis mutandi, Caso [Nombre68] y otros (“Corte Primera de lo Contencioso Administrativo”) Vs. Venezuela. Excepción preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 5 de agosto de 2008. Serie C No. 182, párr. 209 y Opinión Consultiva OC-4/84, supra nota 12, párrs. 53 y 54 y Caso [Nombre69] y Otros Vs. Uruguay. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 13 de octubre de 2011. Serie C No. 234, párr. 174. 18 Cfr. El Derecho a la Información sobre la Asistencia Consular en el Marco de las Garantías del Debido Proceso Legal. Opinión Consultiva OC-16/99 de 1 de octubre de 1999. Serie A No. 16, párr. [Dirección9] y Caso de la Masacre de Mapiripán Vs. Colombia. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 15 de septiembre de 2005. Serie C No. 134, párr. 106. En el Tribunal Europeo ver T.E.D.H., Caso Tyrer v. Reino Unido, (No. 5856/72), Sentencia de 25 de abril de 1978, párr. 31. 19 Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-16/99, supra nota 18, párr. 114 y Caso de la Masacre de Mapiripán Vs. Colombia, supra nota 18, párr. 106. 20 Cfr. La Colegiación Obligatoria de Periodistas (Arts. 13 y 29 Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Opinión Consultiva OC-5/85 del 13 de noviembre de 1985. Serie A No. 5, [Dirección10], y Caso de la Masacre de Mapiripán Vs. Colombia, supra nota 18, párr. 106. 21 Cfr. Opinión Consultiva OC-16/99, supra nota 18, párr. 115. 22 Cfr. AG/RES. 2653 (XLI-O/11), Derechos humanos, orientación sexual e identidad de género, aprobada en la cuarta sesión plenaria, celebrada el 7 de junio de 2011 (“LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL […] RESUELVE: 1. Condenar la discriminación contra personas por motivos de orientación sexual e identidad de género, e instar a los Estados dentro de los parámetros de las instituciones jurídicas de su ordenamiento interno, a adoptar las medidas necesarias para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar dicha discriminación”); AG/RES. 2600 (XL-O/10), Derechos humanos, orientación sexual e identidad de Género, aprobada en la cuarta sesión plenaria, celebrada el 8 de junio de 2010 (“LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL […] RESUELVE: 1. Condenar los actos de violencia y las violaciones de derechos humanos contra personas a causa de su orientación sexual e identidad de género, e instar a los Estados a investigar los mismos y asegurar que los responsables enfrenten las consecuencias ante la justicia. 2. Alentar a los Estados a que tomen todas las medidas necesarias para asegurar que no se cometan actos de violencia u otras violaciones de derechos humanos contra personas a causa de su orientación sexual e identidad de género y asegurando el acceso a la justicia de las víctimas en condiciones de igualdad. 3. Alentar a los Estados Miembros a que consideren medios para combatir la discriminación contra personas a causa de su orientación sexual e identidad de género”); AG/RES. 2504 (XXXIX-O/09), Derechos humanos, orientación sexual e identidad de género, aprobada en la cuarta sesión plenaria, celebrada el 4 de junio de 2009 (“LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL […] RESUELVE: 1. Condenar los actos de violencia y las violaciones de derechos humanos relacionadas, perpetrados contra individuos a causa de su orientación sexual e identidad de género. 2. Instar a los Estados a asegurar que se investiguen los actos de violencia y las violaciones de derechos humanos perpetrados contra individuos a causa de su orientación sexual e identidad de género, y que los responsables enfrenten las consecuencias ante la justicia”), y AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08), Derechos humanos, orientación sexual e identidad de género, aprobada en la cuarta sesión plenaria, celebrada el 3 de junio de 2008 (“LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL […] RESUELVE: 1. Manifestar preocupación por los actos de violencia y las violaciones de derechos humanos relacionadas, cometidos contra individuos a causa de su orientación sexual e identidad de género”). 23 Artículo 14 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos: “El goce de los derechos y libertades reconocidos en el presente Convenio ha de ser asegurado sin distinción alguna, especialmente por razones de sexo, raza, color, lengua, religión, opiniones políticas u otras, origen nacional o social, pertenencia a una minoría nacional, fortuna, nacimiento o cualquier otra situación”. 24 Cfr. T.E.D.H., Caso [Nombre49] Vs. Portugal, (No. 33290/96), Sentencia de 21 de diciembre de 1999. Final, 21 de marzo de 2000, párr. 28; Caso L. y V. Vs. Austria (No. 39392/98 y 39829/98), Sentencia de 9 de enero de 2003. Final, 9 de abril de 2003, párr. 45; Caso S. L. Vs. Austria, (No. 45330/99), Sentencia de 9 de enero de 2003. Final, 9 de abril de 2003, [Dirección11], y Caso E.B. Vs. Francia, (No. 43546/02), Sentencia de 22 de enero de 2008, párr. 50. 25 Cfr. T.E.D.H., Caso [Nombre49], supra nota 24, párr. 28 (“the applicant`s sexual orientation […] [is] a concept which is undoubtedly covered by Article 14 of the Convention. The Court reiterates in that connection that the list set out in that provision is illustrative and not exhaustive, as is shown by the words [`]any ground such as[´]). Ver también T.E.D.H., Caso [Nombre70] Vs. Francia, (No. 36515/97), Sentencia de 26 de febrero de 2002. Final, 26 de mayo de 2002, párr. 32; T.E.D.H., Caso [Nombre71] Vs. Polonia, (No. 13102/02), Sentencia de 2 de marzo de 2010. Final, 2 de junio de 2010, párr. 92; Caso [Nombre72]. Vs. Reino Unido, (No. 37060/06), Sentencia de 28 de septiembre de 2010. Final, 28 de diciembre de 2010, párr. [Dirección12], y Caso [Nombre73] Vs. Russia, (No. 4916/07, 25924/08 y 14599/09), Sentencia de 21 de octubre de 2010. Final, 11 de abril de 2011, párr. 108 (“The Court reiterates that sexual orientation is a concept covered by Article 14”). 26 Cfr. T.E.D.H., Caso [Nombre50] Vs. Reino Unido, (No. 7205/07), Sentencia de 13 de julio de 2010. Final, 22 de noviembre de 2010, párr. 57 (“the Court has considered to constitute [`]other status[´] characteristics which, like some of the specific examples listed in the Article, can be said to be personal in the sense that they are innate or inherent). Sin embargo, el Tribunal Europeo no decidió limitar con esto el concepto de “otra condición” a que las características sean inherentes o innatas de la persona. Cfr. T.E.D.H., Caso [Nombre50], supra nota 26, párr. 58 (“However, in finding violations of Article 14 in a number of other cases, the Court has accepted that “status” existed where the distinction relied upon did not involve a characteristic which could be said to be innate or inherent, and thus [`]personal[´] in the sense discussed above”). 27 Artículo 2.1 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos: Cada uno de los Estados Partes en el presente Pacto se compromete a respetar y a garantizar a todos los individuos que se encuentren en su territorio y estén sujetos a su jurisdicción los derechos reconocidos en el presente Pacto, sin distinción alguna de raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opinión política o de otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social. 28 Artículo 2.2 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos: Los Estados Partes en el presente Pacto se comprometen a garantizar el ejercicio de los derechos que en él se enuncian, sin discriminación alguna por motivos de raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opinión política o de otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social. 29 Naciones Unidas, Comité de Derechos Humanos, Toonen Vs. Australia, Comunicación No. 488/1992, CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, 4 de abril de 1992, párr. 8.7 (“The State party has sought the Committee's guidance as to whether sexual orientation may be considered an "other status" for the purposes of article 26. The same issue could arise under article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. The Committee confines itself to noting, however, that in its view, the reference to "sex" in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as including sexual orientation”). Asimismo, ver X Vs. Colombia, Comunicación No. 1361/2005, CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005, 14 de mayo 2007, párr. 7.2. (“The Committee recalls its earlier jurisprudence that the prohibition against discrimination under article 26 comprises also discrimination based on sexual orientation”). En el mismo sentido, Comité de Derechos Humanos, [Nombre74] v. Australia, Comunicación No. 941/2000, CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000, 18 de septiembre de 2003, párr. 10.4. Véase también Naciones Unidas, Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observaciones finales, Polonia, CCPR/C/79/Add.110, 25 de julio de 1999, párr. 23. 30 Cfr., inter alia, Naciones Unidas, Comité de Derechos Humanos, Observaciones finales, Chile, CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5, 17 abril 2007, párr. 16 (“Aunque observa con satisfacción la abrogación de las disposiciones que penalizaban las relaciones homosexuales entre adultos responsables, el Comité continúa preocupado ante la discriminación de la que son objeto ciertas personas debido a su orientación sexual, entre otros ámbitos, frente a los tribunales y en el acceso a la salud (artículos 2 y 26 del Pacto). El Estado parte debería garantizar a todas las personas la igualdad de los derechos establecidos en el Pacto, independientemente de su orientación sexual, incluyendo igualdad ante la ley y en el acceso a los servicios de salud. Debería también poner en práctica programas de sensibilización con el fin de combatir los prejuicios sociales”); Observaciones finales, Barbados, CCPR/C/BRB/CO/3, 14 de mayo de 2007, párr. 13 (“El Comité expresa su preocupación por la discriminación que sufren los homosexuales en el Estado Parte y, en particular, por la penalización de los actos sexuales consensuales entre adultos del mismo sexo (art. 26)”); Observaciones finales, Estados Unidos de América, CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, 18 de diciembre de 2006, párr. 25 (“También observa con preocupación que en muchos Estados no se ha prohibido la discriminación en el empleo por motivos de orientación sexual (arts. 2 y 26). El Estado Parte debería aceptar su obligación jurídica en virtud de los artículos 2 y 26 de garantizar a todas las personas los derechos amparados por el Pacto, así como la igualdad ante la ley y la igual protección de la ley, sin discriminación por motivos de orientación sexual”); Observaciones finales, El Salvador, CCPR/CO/78/SLV, 22 de agosto de 2003, párr. 16 (“El Comité expresa su preocupación por los casos de personas atacadas, y aun muertas, con motivo de su orientación sexual (artículo 9), por el bajo número de investigaciones en relación con estos actos ilícitos, y por las disposiciones existentes (como las “Ordenanzas Contravencionales” de carácter local) utilizadas para discriminar contra las personas en razón de su orientación sexual (artículo 26)”). 31 Cfr. Naciones Unidas, Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Observación General No. 20. La no discriminación y los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales (artículo 2, párrafo 2 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales), E/C.12/GC/20, 2 de julio de 2009, párr. 32 (“En ‘cualquier otra condición social’, tal y como se recoge en el artículo 2.2 del Pacto, se incluye la orientación sexual”). Cfr. Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Observación General No. 18. El derecho al trabajo, E/C.12/GC/18, 6 de febrero de 2006, párr. 12 (“en virtud del párrafo 2 del artículo 2, así como del artículo 3, el Pacto proscribe toda discriminación en el acceso al empleo y en la conservación del mismo por motivos de […] orientación sexual”); Observación No. 15. El derecho al agua (artículos 11 y 12 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales), E/C.12/2002/11, 20 de enero de 2003, párr. 13 (“el Pacto proscribe toda discriminación por motivos de […] orientación sexual”); Observación General No. 14. El derecho al disfrute del más alto nivel posible de salud (artículo 12 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales), E/C.12/2000/4, 11 de agosto de 2000, párr. 18 (“En virtud de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 2 del artículo 2 y en el artículo 3, el Pacto prohíbe toda discriminación en lo referente al acceso a la atención de la salud y los factores determinantes básicos de la salud, así como a los medios y derechos para conseguirlo, por motivos de […] orientación sexual”). 32 Cfr. Naciones Unidas, Comité de los Derechos del Niño, Observación General No. 3. El VIH/SIDA y los derechos del niño, CRC/GC/2003/3, 17 de marzo de 2003, párr. 8 (“es preocupante la discriminación basada en las preferencias sexuales”); Observación General No. 4. La salud y el desarrollo de los adolescentes en el contexto de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, CRC/GC/2003/4, 21 de julio de 2003, párr. 6 (“Los Estados Partes tienen la obligación de garantizar a todos los seres humanos de menos de 18 años el disfrute de todos los derechos enunciados en la Convención, sin distinción alguna (art. 2), independientemente de "la raza, el color, el sexo, el idioma, la religión, la opinión pública o de otra índole, el origen nacional, étnico o social, la posición económica, los impedimentos físicos, el nacimiento o cualquier otra condición del niño". Deb[e] añadirse también la orientación sexual”). 33 Cfr. Naciones Unidas, Comité contra la Tortura, Observación General No. 2. Aplicación del artículo 2 por los Estados Partes, CAT/C/GC/2, 24 de enero de 2008, párrs. 20 y 21 (“El principio de no discriminación es básico y general en la protección de los derechos humanos y fundamental para la interpretación y aplicación de la Convención. […] Los Estados Partes deben velar porque, en el marco de las obligaciones que han contraído en virtud de la Convención, sus leyes se apliquen en la práctica a todas las personas, cualesquiera que se[a] su […] orientación sexual”).] y el Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer [Cfr. Naciones Unidas, Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación de la Mujer, Recomendación General No. 27 sobre las mujeres de edad y la protección de sus derechos humanos, CEDAW/C/GC/27, 16 de diciembre de 2010, párr. 13 (“La discriminación que sufren las mujeres de edad con frecuencia es de carácter multidimensional, al sumarse la discriminación por […] orientación sexual”) y Proyecto de Recomendación General No. 28 relativa al artículo 2 de la Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer, CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 de diciembre de 2010, párr. 18 (“La discriminación de la mujer por motivos de sexo y género está unida de manera indivisible a otros factores que afectan a la mujer, como la raza, el origen étnico, la religión o las creencias, la salud, el estatus, la edad, la clase, la casta, la orientación sexual”). 34 Naciones Unidas, Declaración sobre derechos humanos, orientación sexual e identidad de género, Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, A/63/635, 22 de diciembre de 2008, párr. 3. 35 Naciones Unidas, Declaración conjunta para poner alto a los actos de violencia, y a las violaciones de derechos humanos relacionadas, dirigidos contra las personas por su orientación sexual e identidad de género, presentada por Colombia en el 16º período de sesiones del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, 22 de marzo de 2011. Disponible en: http://www.iglhrc.org/binary-data/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/494-1.pdf (último acceso el 22 de febrero de 2012). 36 Naciones Unidas, Consejo de Derechos Humanos, Resolución respecto a derechos humanos, orientación sexual e identidad de género, A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1, 15 de junio de 2011. 37 Cfr., entre otros informes, Informe del Relator Especial sobre el derecho de toda persona al disfrute del más alto nivel posible de salud física y mental, E/CN.4/2004/49, 16 de febrero de 2004, párrs. 32 y 38 (“Las normas internacionales de los derechos humanos prohíben toda discriminación en el acceso a la atención de la salud y a sus factores determinantes básicos, así como a los medios para conseguirlos, por motivos de orientación sexual [...]. Las normas jurídicas internacionales relativas a los derechos humanos excluyen por completo la discriminación por razones de orientación sexual”). Véase también el Informe de la Relatora Especial sobre la libertad de religión o de creencias, A/HRC/6/5, 20 de julio de 2007, párr. 28; Informe del Relator Especial sobre las formas contemporáneas de racismo, discriminación racial, xenofobia y formas conexas de intolerancia, Misión en Brasil, E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3, 28 de febrero de 2006, párr. 40; Informe de la Relatora Especial sobre la violencia contra la mujer, sus causas y consecuencias, Integración de los derechos humanos de la mujer y la perspectiva de género: violencia contra la mujer, Interrelaciones entre la violencia contra la mujer y el VIH/SIDA, E/CN.4/2005/72, 17 de enero de 2005, párrs. 27 y 58; Informe de la Relatora Especial sobre ejecuciones extrajudiciales, sumarias o arbitrarias, Los derechos civiles y políticos, en particular las cuestiones relacionadas con las desapariciones y las ejecuciones sumarias, E/CN.4/2003/3, 13 de enero de 2003, párrs. 66 y 67; Informe provisional de la Relatora Especial de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos sobre ejecuciones extrajudiciales, sumarias o arbitrarias, A/57/138, 2 de julio de 2002, párr. 37; Informe de la Representante Especial del Secretario General sobre la cuestión de los defensores de los derechos humanos, E/CN.4/2001/94, 26 de enero de 2001, párr. 89. g); Relator Especial sobre la independencia de los magistrados y las uniones civiles ("uniones concubinarias") de parejas del mismo sexo. En 2009, mediante la Ley No. 18.590, (Diario Oficial No. 27837, 26 octubre 2009), se autorizó la adopción conjunta por parte de parejas en unión civil. 38 De acuerdo a diversas fuentes del derecho internacional y comparado esta discriminación contra la comunidad de Lesbianas, Gays, Transexuales, Bisexuales e Intersexuales (en adelante “LGTBI”) es inaceptable porque: i) la orientación sexual constituye un aspecto esencial en la identidad de una persona (infra párr. 139). Asimismo: ii) la comunidad LGTBI ha sido discriminada históricamente y es común el uso de estereotipos en el trato hacia dicha comunidad. Cfr. Informe del Relator Especial sobre el derecho de toda persona al disfrute del más alto nivel posible de salud física y mental, E/CN.4/2004/49, 16 de febrero de 2004, párr. 33 (“la discriminación y la estigmatización siguen representando una grave amenaza contra la salud sexual y reproductiva de muchos grupos, como […] las minorías sexuales”); Informe del Relator Especial sobre la cuestión de la tortura y otros tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes, E/CN.4/2004/56, 23 de diciembre de 2003, párr. 64 (“Las actitudes y creencias derivadas de mitos y miedos relacionados con el VIH/SIDA y la sexualidad contribuyen a la estigmatización y la discriminación contra las minorías sexuales. Además, la percepción de que los miembros de estas minorías no respetan las barreras sexuales o cuestionan los conceptos predominantes del papel atribuido a cada sexo parece contribuir a su vulnerabilidad a la tortura como manera de “castigar” su comportamiento no aceptado”). Por otra parte: iii) constituyen una minoría a la que le resulta mucho más difícil remover las discriminaciones en ámbitos como el legislativo, así como evitar repercusiones negativas en la interpretación de normas por funcionarios de las ramas ejecutiva o legislativa, y en el acceso a la justicia. Cfr. Relator Especial sobre la independencia de los magistrados y abogados, Los derechos civiles y políticos, en particular las cuestiones relacionadas con: la independencia del poder judicial, la administración de justicia, la impunidad, Misión en Brasil, E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.3, 22 de febrero de 2005, párr. 28 (“Travestis, transexuales y homosexuales son también con frecuencia víctimas de episodios de violencia y discriminación. Cuando recurren al sistema judicial, se encuentran, a menudo, con los mismos prejuicios y estereotipos de la sociedad reproducidos allí”), y Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia C-481 de 9 de septiembre de 1998. Finalmente: iv) la orientación sexual no constituye un criterio racional para la distribución o reparto racional y equitativo de bienes, derechos o cargas sociales. Cfr. Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sentencia C-481 de 9 de septiembre de 1998, párr. 25. En esta sentencia, respecto al derecho de los profesores de colegios públicos a no ser despedidos por su condición homosexual, la Corte Constitucional colombiana señaló que separar a un profesor de su trabajo por esa razón se funda “en un prejuicio sin asidero empírico alguno, que denota la injusta estigmatización que ha afectado a esta población y que se ha invocado para imponerle cargas o privarla de derechos, en detrimento de sus posibilidades de participación en ámbitos tan relevantes de la vida social y económica” (párr. 29). Por su parte, la sentencia C-507 de 1999 declaró inconstitucional una norma que establecía como falta disciplinaria el homosexualismo en las fuerzas militares. En la sentencia C-373 de 2002 la Corte Constitucional de Colombia declaró inconstitucional una norma que disponía como causal de inhabilidad para ejercer el cargo de notario el haber sido sancionado disciplinariamente por la falta de “homosexualismo”.

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