Moral damages for arbitrary dismissal of employee under pretrial detentionDaño moral por despido arbitrario de empleada con prisión preventiva

*110040861027CA* *110040861027CA* Supreme Court of Justice SECOND CHAMBER Res: 2016-000410 SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine forty-five on the twenty-ninth of April, two thousand sixteen.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (oral-electronic), by [Name 001], [...], against BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL, represented by its general judicial attorney, licensed GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS, married, resident of Heredia. Acting as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is licensed Esteban Calvo Rodríguez, single, resident of San José. All of legal age, attorneys, with the indicated exception.

WHEREAS:

1.- The plaintiff, in the complaint dated July eighteenth, two thousand eleven, brought this action so that the judgment would declare the nullity of the administrative act of dismissal executed by the bank against her, and order her reinstatement to her job with full enjoyment of her labor rights; as well as the payment of lost wages and other labor rights not received, including those related to social security, compensation for the psychological and moral damages caused, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.

2.- The defendant answered the action in the terms indicated in the brief dated February first, two thousand twelve, and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of active standing.

3.- The Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (oral-electronic), by judgment at thirteen hundred hours on May twenty-seventh, two thousand thirteen, ordered: "Pursuant to the foregoing, applicable regulations, and article 492 et seq. of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of active standing are rejected, and the present ordinary labor lawsuit filed by [Name 001] against BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL, represented by its General Judicial Attorney, Mr. GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS, is GRANTED, and therefore the following is declared: that the dismissal without employer liability executed against the plaintiff by the defendant was completely illegal and null due to violation of due process, and materially unjustified, and therefore the effects of this declaration must be retroacted to the moment or date of said illegal act, so that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. Consequently, it is appropriate to reinstate the plaintiff to her position immediately, thus confirming the precautionary measure ordered interlocutorily, unless some other legal or administrative cause prevented it. The defendant must pay the plaintiff, as damages, all lost wages and other labor rights that she would have ceased to receive, including rights related to social security, during the time she has been or was outside the banking institution, clarifying that these lost wages and other rights that the defendant must pay and recognize to the plaintiff are for the time she effectively would have been outside the institution without receiving them or without having them recognized by the banking entity. Items that must be liquidated administratively, without prejudice to the plaintiff resorting, in case of disagreement, to the respective execution of judgment in this judicial venue, with the exception of moral damages (daño moral), an item which is granted and the defendant must pay to the plaintiff the prudential sum of fifteen million colones, broken down as five million colones for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), and ten million colones for objective moral damages (daño moral objetivo); and as consequential damages (perjuicios), the legal interest on said sums from the moment each became due and until its effective payment, at the rate provided in article 1163 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which corresponds to that which the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica pays for six-month certificates of deposit; items that, as already indicated, may be liquidated administratively, without prejudice to the fact that, in case of disagreement, they may be determined in the execution of judgment stage. In addition, on the amounts to be paid, the corresponding social security contributions must be deducted as legally appropriate. The defendant is ordered to pay both costs of the trial, setting the personal costs at the prudential sum of three million colones..." (Sic).

4.- Both parties appealed and the Labor Tribunal, Third Section, of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment at eight forty-five on September twenty-eighth, two thousand fifteen, resolved: "In the absence of errors or omissions capable of producing nullity or defenselessness, the appeal filed by the defendant is partially granted, so that the plaintiff's claim for the defendant Bank to compensate her for moral damages is dismissed. The cross-appeal filed by the plaintiff is dismissed. Except as indicated, in what is the subject of challenge, the first instance judgment is confirmed…" 5.- The plaintiff filed an appeal before this Chamber, in a brief dated November twentieth, two thousand fifteen, which is based on the reasons that will be stated below in the considering part.

6.- The procedures prescribed by law have been observed.

Drafted by Judge Aguirre Gómez; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- BACKGROUND. The plaintiff stated that she worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal from January 18, 2001, to April 4, 2011, the day she was dismissed without employer liability. As she indicated, the employment relationship ended because on March 15, 2011, she was arrested at her parents' house, by order of the Criminal Court of San Ramón, for alleged money laundering (legitimación de capitales); a fact that became public knowledge. She mentioned that, as a precautionary measure, pretrial detention for one year was ordered against her. As she noted, the Director of the Legal Area of the bank declared to the press that said entity was the one that reported the alleged irregularities and coordinated her arrest with the judicial authorities. She asserted that, despite the bank knowing her situation, it asked her brother to appear at the San Ramón branch and inform the General Manager, who was her immediate boss, of what had happened. She pointed out that on April 8, 2011, a release order was issued in her favor and that on that same day two bank officials appeared at her parents' house to notify her of the dismissal letter, which her mother refused to receive because she does not live there. As she recounted, on April 12, 2011 (the first business day after her release), she appeared at her workplace and it was at that moment that she was handed the dismissal letter, which established her absences from work as the cause. She stated that in her town, San Ramón, it was said that she had been fired for being "linked with a gang of narcos", and therefore, socially, her dismissal has been seen as a sanction. She requested the absolute, evident, and manifest nullity of the administrative act of dismissal and reinstatement to her position. She also requested payment of lost wages (salarios caídos) and other labor rights not received –including those of social security–; damages, interest, and both costs (document incorporated on October 28, 2011, at 03:58:11 p.m.). The bank's general judicial attorney answered in the negative and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of active standing (document attached on February 6, 2012, at 03:10:23 p.m.). The first instance judge granted the lawsuit and ordered the immediate reinstatement of the plaintiff to her position. He ordered the defendant –as damages– to pay lost wages and other labor rights (including those of social security) not received during the entire time the worker has been or was outside the banking entity; as well as the deduction of social security contributions. He ordered payment of the sum of ₡15,000,000.00 for moral damages, interest –as consequential damages– and both costs of the proceeding, setting personal costs at the prudential sum of ₡3,000,000.00 (judgment included on May 27, 2013, at 02:47:23 p.m.). Both parties appealed the decision (documents incorporated on June 4, 2013, at 04:24:39 p.m. and on August 27, 2013, at 02:57:32 p.m.). The Tribunal revoked the judgment insofar as it ordered the defendant to pay moral damages, which it denied, and otherwise confirmed it (judgment attached on October 1, 2015, at 07:43:37 a.m.).

II.- GRIEVANCES. The plaintiff disagrees with what the Ad-quem decided regarding moral damages. She considers that the challenged judgment is not duly substantiated. She argues that the facts deemed proven by the preceding instances demonstrate that the bank dismissed her arbitrarily and unexpectedly, just when the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) was carrying out its investigative actions and the mass media maintained interest in reporting on the case; which occurred in San Ramón, where she works and lives. She alleges that the bank even sought her at relatives' houses to notify her of the termination of the employment relationship. She states that the causal link between the claimed moral damages and the bank's arbitrary act is evidenced by the connection between the dismissal without employer liability and the publicity that existed about the case at that time. She points out that the preceding instances established that the bank's conduct was irregular and reprehensible for having dismissed her illegally. She emphasizes that if the bank had processed the dismissal in accordance with the procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), it would have been ordered outside of public and media exposure, whereby the harmful effects thereof could have been lesser. She argues that what happened damaged her name and good image (document included on November 23, 2015, at 11:24:21 a.m.).

III.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE. The only point submitted to this Chamber's analysis is that related to moral damages. The position of this body, since ruling no. 481, at 10:40 on June 11, 2004, has been that in the labor jurisdiction it is feasible to compensate it when it is caused by acts that exceed the employer's sanctioning power; that is, when faced with especially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution no. 1151, at 9:45 on December 20, 2006, it was stated: "Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not appropriate in every case, but only when the sanction was surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations." In a similar orientation, judgment no. 359, at 9:40 on March 19, 2010, can be cited: "So that the moral damages that may be compensated in the labor jurisdiction (when it occurs during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) is that caused by abuses of the employer's right, who in the exercise of disciplinary authority exceeds it, causing damage distinct from the natural effects of a justified dismissal." In the specific case, the plaintiff requested payment of this item, as she estimates that the dismissal executed by the bank was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents damage to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document incorporated on October 28, 2011, at 03:58:11 p.m.). This item was granted in the first instance; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that the causal link between the alleged impairment and the defendant's conduct was not established. This Chamber differs from that reasoning. Having reviewed the case file, it is found that the banking entity incurred in an illegitimate and unexpected act of dismissal, which led to its nullity being declared in this venue, for being injurious to rights. Therefore, it is a source of moral damages. There is no doubt that the fact that the plaintiff was dismissed on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared –at the defendant's branch located in San Ramón– to return to work, after the competent judicial authority authorized her release, affected her morally. It should be noted that the termination of the employment relationship, as stated in the dismissal letter, was due to the worker's failure to report to work from March 15, 2011 (image 2 of the document incorporated on December 15, 2011, at 04:04:42 p.m.). However, according to the evidentiary material in the file, a judicial investigation was being carried out against her at that time for alleged money laundering, and on that day she was arrested and brought before the Criminal Court of San Ramón, where she was placed –as a precautionary measure– under pretrial detention for one year (images 13 and 14 of the document attached on December 15, 2011, at 04:04:42 p.m.). This last fact prevented her, for obvious reasons, from fulfilling her obligation to provide services to the bank; a circumstance that was well known to the employer. Note that, as can be seen from the testimony of both witnesses, the day after the arrest, the plaintiff's brother went personally to her boss to inform him of what had happened. Furthermore, as these investigative actions were of interest to the press, it reported on what happened (images 62-67 of the document incorporated on December 15, 2011, at 04:04:42 p.m.). In accordance with the foregoing, the absences attributed to the plaintiff, being a direct consequence of an act beyond her control, of which her employer was aware, are justified and, therefore, the decision taken by the defendant was disproportionate and arbitrary. Thus, in the opinion of this Chamber, to the suffering that the plaintiff was already experiencing by virtue of the judicial situation she was going through, was added the distress of losing her job just upon leaving prison. While that injury is remedied, as the nullity of the dismissal was declared and payment of lost wages was ordered, the bank must compensate the distress its action caused the worker, which added to the sorrow she had been enduring. This, by provision of articles 41 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and 1045 of the Civil Code. The first of them, expressly, stipulates: "Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be given prompt, complete justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws." And the second reads: "Anyone who through deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it together with the consequential damages." Additionally, articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) are a source of liability for the defendant Bank. Consequently, the judgment under review must be revoked insofar as it denied moral damages, and the first instance decision must be confirmed on that point. However, in the judgment of this body, the amount awarded must be modified. Based on a criterion of prudence and taking into consideration the described circumstances, the anguish and affliction suffered by the plaintiff, it is appropriate to set it at the sum of ₡3,000,000.00; as it is estimated that this is sufficient as recompense for the attributable damage caused by the defendant.

IV.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE ALLÓN ZÚÑIGA AND JUDGE BLANCO GONZÁLEZ:. We depart from the majority opinion for the reasons set forth below. In the labor jurisdiction, compensation is feasible for moral damages caused by acts that exceed the employer's sanctioning power, that is, when faced with especially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution no. 1151, at 9:45 on December 20, 2006, it was stated: "Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not appropriate in every case, but only when the sanction was surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations." In a similar orientation, judgment no. 359, at 9:40 on March 19, 2010, can be cited: "So that the moral damages that may be compensated in the labor jurisdiction (when it occurs during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) is that caused by abuses of the employer's right, who in the exercise of disciplinary authority exceeds it, causing damage distinct from the natural effects of a justified dismissal." In these cases, it corresponds to the victim –in accordance with article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil)– to demonstrate the existence of harmful acts carried out by the employer, beyond the dismissal itself (Vote no. 385, at 10:20 on April 12, 2013). In the specific case, the plaintiff alleges that the dismissal was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents damage to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document incorporated on October 28, 2011, at 03:58:11 p.m.). This item was granted in the first instance; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that "[…] although it is feasible to assume that the entire situation experienced by the plaintiff may have caused her moral injury both subjectively and objectively, especially due to the dissemination of what happened, it is not feasible to establish the causal link between that impairment and the defendant's conduct" (image 19 of the judgment attached on October 1, 2015, at 07:43:37 a.m.). Having reviewed the evidence brought to the case file, we share what the Tribunal decided in this regard. The plaintiff did not prove, as was her burden, the causal link between the dismissal and the claimed moral damages. As can be extracted from the file, the banking entity notified the worker of the dismissal letter on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared to return to work, a notification that was made personally and without carrying out an "excessive display," as the Ad-quem noted, so it cannot be affirmed that this behavior caused any harm to the plaintiff that must be compensated. The appellant argues that the mass media had knowledge of her dismissal; however, she did not provide any evidentiary element that the defendant motivated the publicity of that fact. It is observed that the journalistic notes offered as evidence allude to the plaintiff's arrest and her alleged participation in the crime of money laundering, but do not mention the cessation of work (images 62-67 of the document incorporated on December 15, 2011, at 04:04:42 p.m.). It was not proven that it was the defendant itself that provided said information to the press. Although it is alleged that the dismissal occurred when the plaintiff was being publicly exposed by the media and before the community of San Ramón, these circumstances cannot be attributed to the employer because they are unrelated to it. It should be considered that the bank has no influence over what the press publishes, nor what the people who live in said canton know, and therefore it cannot be affirmed that these factors are its responsibility. Having analyzed the witnesses' statements, it is concluded that the afflictions suffered by the plaintiff derived, principally, from the pretrial detention ordered against her and not strictly from the dismissal. The bank's action did not cause the plaintiff an impairment, distinct from the natural effects of dismissal, that must be compensated. The stated effects derive from the criminal investigation in which she was involved, and not from the dismissal action. Therefore, we conclude that the arguments raised by the appellant to justify payment of moral damages are not receivable, and what was decided on this point by the appellate body must be confirmed.

V.- NOTE BY JUDGE OLASO: Regardless of sharing the opinion of my esteemed colleagues, as they determine the existence of an illegitimate act by the defendant bank that generates compensation in favor of the plaintiff, I consider it important to determine that the basis for that compensation cannot derive from a norm founded on the criterion of subjective imputation such as that regulated by article 1045 of the Civil Code, for the reasons I will now set forth.

GENERALITIES ON CIVIL LIABILITY: The authors Diez Picazo and De León establish that the initial seed of civil liability is found in classical Roman law (DIEZ PICAZO, Luis and DE LEÓN, Ponce "Derecho de daños". Editorial Civitas, p. 41), which leads us to consider the possibility of requesting compensation within the scope of tortious action. Thus, for example, civil action was related to "furtum," which was an action of a penal nature exercised on the occasion of infringements of rights or a thing. On the other hand, another action was "damnum iniuria datum" which, thanks to the Tribune Aquilinus, gave rise to the so-called "Lex Aquilia." Among the most important norms of said law is the possibility of requesting compensation for the loss of slaves or a quadruped, so said action definitively derives from material damage caused (Digest 9, 2, 2). Another important element for the evolution of this type of civil action is praetorian law, given that by its nature it was less formal law and in which equity began to have significant content, in order to determine the nature and quantification of the damage. Within the framework of these normative sources, we can conclude that in "classical" Roman Law the following actions existed: 1) actions for injury or destruction of things, this provided the basis for exercising the so-called "iniuria," which was an action exercised provided there was a causal link of the damage; 2) actions for bodily injuries and damages caused to the person; 3) actions for damages caused by animals or by negligence of the person (for example, damages while riding); 4) action of deceit, that is, having acted with the intention of causing damage; 5) lastly, the "iniuria" evolved to become an action protecting personality rights, but also continued to protect infringements of the right of possession and property. Also, the influence of glossators and commentators on natural law is decisive in the evolution of civil liability, mainly for two aspects. The first lies in the fact that the spectrum of liability is broadened to situations generated not only by the agent, but also by acts carried out by slaves, which generated their master's liability –beginnings of "culpa in vigilando"– (which in this case is of utmost importance). The second aspect has to do with standing to claim compensation, because in this stage the heirs of the victim were allowed to claim compensation for death, such as could be for maintenance. Within the evolutionary framework of liability, the influence of authors such as Hugo Grotius and Domat, who formed the Naturalist School that influenced the Code, is significant. The contribution of the former consists of deriving civil action from an "illicit" fact that could be caused with deceit or by culpable or negligent action. Along these same lines, Domat classifies the three types of causes from which the right to request compensation could derive; among these are quasi-contracts, contractual breaches, and crimes or delicts. The influence of these schools determined that in 1792 a norm was enacted in the Prussian Code establishing the following: "Any damage caused by deceit or gross negligence that generates serious personal illness or death must be punishable." The Code also took this same orientation by establishing: "Article 1382. “Of delicts and quasi-delicts. Any act of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one through whose fault it occurred to repair it.” Article 1383. One is responsible not only for the damage caused by one's own act, but also by the act of persons for whom one must answer or of things one has under one's guard." Evidently, all this codification has an influence on our national legislation, which I will mention throughout this note; what I do consider important is to establish the characteristics of legislation derived from the Code, because evidently our civil legislation falls within these characteristics. The influence of that legislation within our civil legislation is evident. One need only read numeral 1045 of the Civil Code to perceive this; however, it is necessary to highlight how the perspective on the nature of civil liability cannot be exhausted solely within this norm. The norm in question starts, like the Napoleonic legislation, from an act no longer only deceitful but also negligent and imprudent on the part of the agent that generates the damage. Also, as a result of the historical and social moments that surrounded France in the 18th century, it starts from an individualistic relationship between the agent and the victim, given that not even in the mind of the legislator of that era were the effects of the theory of risk characteristic of industrial or mass commercial activity valued, much less that the State could be held liable for acting in non-conformity with the legal system. I state this because we must remember that in the year 1804, in France, what was developing was an agricultural or artisanal economy, so it was difficult to foresee the changes introduced by the Industrial Revolution; likewise, we were at a historical moment in which it was difficult to foresee the liability of the state order for an illegitimate act. Another important aspect for explaining the legislation from which ours derives is the significant influence of Canon Law. Evidently, norms like article 1045 start from a premise from which the victim's obligation derives to prove who the person was who generated the deceitful or culpable action that ultimately caused the damage. When the victim was faced with situations in which they could not prove these situations, whether due to lack of evidence or impossibility of obtaining it –due to the impossibility of obtaining it from the agent–, it was indicated that we were in the presence of "acts of God," those that were executed as punishment for the victim and therefore not compensable. In this way, compensation for damage was viewed as the "payment for a sin" and not as a compensation for the victim. Usually, and as the Chamber does in this vote, it has been indicated that civil liability finds its legal basis in article 1045 of the Civil Code, which, as I previously indicated, prescribes the obligation to repair damages together with consequential damages, that were caused by deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence.

In reality, and in accordance with the principle of hierarchy of sources, the constitutional basis for liability is found in Article 41 of the Magna Carta, which establishes: "Resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. Prompt and complete justice must be done for them, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws." Now, norms such as Article 1045 complement this general principle, given that they establish imputation criteria that are essential for determining substantive and procedural aspects, such as standing, the causal link, and the burden of proof.

As established by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), damage (daño) constitutes one of the prerequisites of civil liability (responsabilidad civil). This is because the duty to compensate is only configured if a harmful event has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system (Voto número 112 de las catorce horas quince minutos del quince de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco). For that Chamber, "damage (daño)" is any impairment, loss, or deterioration of the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (aggrieved party) that causes the deprivation of a legal right protected by the legal system. Under this reasoning, the first essential element of civil liability (responsabilidad civil) is damage (daño). Regarding the characteristics of the damage, we find: 1) it must be certain; real and effective and not hypothetical; 2) there must be an injury to a legally relevant interest deserving of protection; 3) there must be a causal relationship between the generating event and the damage (daño). Another element that configures civil liability (responsabilidad civil) is the direct or efficient causal relationship that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the damage (daño), the latter being the prerequisite for any type of liability, whether contractual or extra-contractual, so its demonstration also constitutes a sine qua non requirement for the claim for compensation to succeed.

The notion of culpability is another of the most important elements within extra-contractual civil liability, since there must be fault (culpa) on the part of the person who causes the damage (daño). Culpability constitutes a judgment of reproach, through which the liability of that person is imputed. Without the existence of fault (culpa), compensation for damages cannot be awarded in favor of the victim, as it is necessary to demonstrate that the damage (daño) was caused by an act or omission attributable to a person. It is necessary, then, that the damage (daño) be attributed to the producing agent, whether it was done with intention or because they could have avoided it and did not, by acting negligently or imprudently. This requirement of culpability is questioned by the national author Juan Marco Rivero Sánchez, who points out that such a requirement does not constitute a determining element for establishing liability. To support his argument, he relies on the provisions of articles 38 to 40 of the Civil Code, regarding the capacity of persons. The author explains that if culpability were a requirement of civil liability (responsabilidad civil), it would not be possible to demand any type of liability from persons under fifteen years of age and, therefore, any possibility of requesting compensation would be extinguished. However, this does not occur because the possibility of claiming the damage from the parents of the minor under fifteen years remains, provided they live in the parents' home (Article 1047 of the Civil Code) twelve years – according to Article 6 of the Juvenile Criminal Justice Law (Ley de Justicia Penal Juvenil) –, but the norm still maintains civil liability, shifting it to other subjects, in accordance with Article 1048 of the Civil Code.

Unlawfulness constitutes behavior contrary to the legal system, which means that the act of the person causing the damage (daño) must be classified as a violation of the legal system. This unlawfulness generates different positions in the case of damages caused by a breach of the duty of care – negligence, imprudence, and lack of skill –, given that when we find ourselves before these scenarios, evidently, there are grounds for justification that eliminate this condition, such as, for example, act of God (caso fortuito) or force majeure (fuerza mayor). This requirement, as an essential element of civil liability (responsabilidad civil), is discussed by part of the doctrine. Specifically, the author Rivero Sánchez points out that unlawfulness, within the framework of Costa Rican civil law, is not a requirement for the finding of civil liability (responsabilidad civil), by virtue of the fact that there are norms of the Civil Code that generate the obligation to compensate for the damage (daño), even though the conduct cannot be classified as unlawful, given the existence of some cause that eliminates this unlawfulness. This legislative scenario is found in Article 1043 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties." Under Rivero Sánchez's thesis, for example, in the case of the story of "Goldilocks," when the girl gets lost in the woods and breaks into the bears' house, eats their soup, and rests in their beds, we could perfectly classify this conduct as an unlawful act, typical of a violation of domicile (Article 204 of the Criminal Code). However, such unlawfulness disappears, given the existence of the state of necessity, as a ground for justification, according to Article 27 ibidem, given that the girl is lost in the woods and very hungry. Despite this, according to said author, in application of Article 1043 of the Civil Code, there would be an obligation to compensate for the damage (daño) in favor of the bears, since lawful acts also generate liability.

The dualism between contractual and extra-contractual liability has been the subject of discussion by doctrine over time. Authors such as Yzquierdo Tolsada (YZQUIERDO TOLSADA, Mariano. "Responsabilidad civil contractual y extracontractual" Madrid, Spain, Editorial Reus, Volume I, page 87), indicate that said dualism must be overcome, by virtue of the following reasons: a) of a substantive nature, because the damage (daño) is the same in either of the two fields, so there is no logical reason to give different treatment to "contractual" and "extra-contractual" damage; b) systematic, by reason that in both there is a conduct or omission that generates the damage (daño), only that in the contractual one said conduct occurs by reason of the breach; c) practical, given that it is often not easy to determine whether we are facing a case of contractual or extra-contractual liability. For example, in cases of application of Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del consumidor). In Roman law, as I explained previously, this difference was marked, since liability derived from the law of the XII Tables and was contractual in nature, while that which derived from the Lex Aquilia was extra-contractual in nature. Our Civil Code also differentiates between civil liability (responsabilidad civil) derived from a contract (articles 701 et seq.), and extra-contractual civil liability (articles 1045 et seq.). For persons who support the division between both types of liability, extra-contractual liability is constituted by active conduct or an omission, the latter referring to the absence of a prior contract, meaning it arises when damage is caused without there being a prior link or contract or obligation. Pérez Vargas, in his work "Principios de Responsabilidad Civil Extracontractual," indicates that for extra-contractual liability to arise, the presence of two elements is necessary: "…A behavior that serves as an imputation criterion, be it culpable damage or damage derived from the creation of a risk, and a harmful result of a legally relevant interest or what would be damage in a broad sense, material or moral…". Likewise, the cited author explains to us that for the person causing the damage to be obligated to repair it, a causal link between their conduct and the damage produced is necessary, which means that the damage must be the direct and immediate consequence of the conduct. Articles 1045, 1046, and 1048 of the Civil Code refer to extra-contractual civil liability. This type of liability does not arise from the breach of a specific bond, but as a result of a violation of the general duty not to harm other persons.

Regarding contractual liability, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has considered: "… contractual liability presupposes the existence of a specific juridical obligation, freely agreed upon by the parties, and also the fact that said obligation has been culpably breached by the obligor. The burden of proof corresponds to the creditor… if the creditor alleges fraud (dolo), it is not enough to demonstrate the breach, but rather the fraud (dolo) must be proven for it to generate the corresponding legal consequences (articles 701 and 702 of the Civil Code). The breach is fraudulent when the debtor voluntarily and intentionally breaches their obligation, causing damage to their creditor. Fraud (dolo), as provided in Article 701 of the Civil Code, is not presumed, and whoever commits it is always obligated to compensate the damages and losses caused thereby, even if the contrary was agreed upon." Another conceptual difference, according to the First Chamber (Sala Primera), lies in the burden of proof. In contractual cases, it is enough to demonstrate the breach for fault (culpa) to exist, whereas in subjective extra-contractual civil liability, the fault (culpa) (negligence, imprudence, lack of skill) or fraud (dolo), on which the liability of the person causing the damage is based, must necessarily be demonstrated (Voto número 320, de las trece horas del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa).

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE IMPUTATION CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE.

Objective or subjective imputation criteria constitute reference frameworks used to impute the liability of the person causing the damage (daño). In the case of the former – subjective – they are those based on aspects such as fraud (dolo) or fault (culpa), so that, upon verification of an illicit behavior – fraudulent or culpable – the obligation to repair arises. Imputation for such conduct may be for one's own behavior or for the conduct of another, that is, for an act of a third party. It is for this reason that doctrine speaks of direct and indirect subjective liability, the latter enshrined in Article 1048 of our Civil Code, "culpa in eligendo" and "culpa in vigilando." Now, fault and fraud (dolo) are not necessary to base the process of civil liability (responsabilidad civil). If that were so, in many cases there would be a denial of access to justice, especially in those scenarios where the victim finds it impossible to prove the negligence or lack of skill of the person who caused the damage (daño). It is for this reason that the courts and doctrine have raised the standards of diligence to objective criteria, as, for example, in the cases of Article 190 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and Article 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de Competencia y Defensa efectiva del consumidor).

Regarding objective imputation criteria, the parameters for imputing liability are based on the so-called "theory of risk" or on the act of a party that, due to its legal characteristics, must assume a greater degree of liability than the common denominator, for example, in the case of the State and its liability for the actions performed by its officials. In the case of the theory of risk, the starting premise is that that individual or legal entity that exercises or benefits from an activity with potentially dangerous elements must also bear its inconveniences. This theory is also known by the name of "the created damage," whose imputation paradigm lies in attributing the damage to every person who introduces into society a virtual element capable of producing it, and the subjectivity of the agent is disregarded. Consequently, the source of obligations in objective liability is not fault (culpa), negligence, or fraud (dolo), but rather the risky activity deployed by the agent, which causes that, before any injurious result to legally relevant interests – be it life, security, health, etcetera –, a need arises to repair the damage (daño) (Rivero Sánchez, Ob. Cit. Page 70).

IN THE CASE AT HAND, THE OBJECTIVE IMPUTATION CRITERION OF ARTICLE 190 OF THE GENERAL LAW OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA) APPLIES, AND NOT ARTICLE 1045 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

Once the difference between both imputation criteria is explained, it is evident that in this case, the objective imputation provided for in Article 190 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) applies. This regulation is applicable to the defendant bank, as established by Article 2 of the Organic Law of said bank, which, although it provides that it is a non-state public law entity (with its own legal personality and equity and also with full administrative and functional autonomy), emphasizes that its operation will be governed by the rules of public law. In that sense, subsection 1 of Article 2 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) provides that the provisions of that regulation will apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special norm for them. Returning to the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, its Article 47 regulates that this bank will have the same liabilities and obligations that correspond to banks, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Central Bank (Ley Orgánica del Banco Central) and the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional). The first of these laws does not have a general provision regarding banking liability for illegitimate actions of the entity. Meanwhile, Articles 27 and 28 of the second do establish scenarios of joint and several subjective liability for the members of the boards of directors of the banks, but they do not regulate what concerns the liability of the bank as an entity for the acts proper to its operation. In what interests us, Article 27 stipulates: "Each Board of Directors shall exercise its functions with absolute independence and under its exclusive liability, within the norms established by the laws, applicable regulations, and technical principles. The members of the boards of directors shall have the most complete freedom to proceed in the exercise of their functions according to their conscience and their own criteria, for which reason they shall be personally liable for their management in the general direction of the respective bank. Upon them shall fall any liability that according to the laws may be attributed to them for fraud (dolo), fault (culpa), or negligence. Those who have not recorded their dissenting vote shall be personally liable with their assets for the losses caused to the Bank, for the authorization of operations prohibited by law, or that have been authorized through fraud (dolo), fault (culpa), or negligence…". Similarly, Article 28 of that same law provides that "Any act, resolution, or omission of a Board of Directors that contravenes the legal and regulatory provisions or that signifies employment of the bank's funds in activities different from those inherent to its functions, shall cause all present at the respective session to incur personal and joint and several liability towards the bank, the State, and affected third parties, for the damages and losses that are thereby produced. From such liability, only those attendees who have recorded their dissenting vote or their objection in the minutes of the corresponding session shall be exempt. All of the foregoing without prejudice to other legal sanctions that may apply to them. " Therefore, in the absence of a general provision that holds state banking entities liable for illegitimate actions taken in the exercise of their functions, the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) applies as an objective liability regime for this type of entity.

It has been demonstrated that the plaintiff worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal until she was dismissed without employer liability. Said termination was justified because the plaintiff was arrested at her parents' home, by order of a jurisdictional authority in criminal matters, for alleged money laundering (legitimación de capitales). It was the Director of the legal area of the employer bank who made that fact public knowledge. Subsequently, a release order was issued in her favor and, despite that, on that same day, two bank officials notified her of the dismissal, which her mother did not receive, but rather it was upon presenting herself at work – on April 12, 2011 – that she was formally handed the respective letter, based on absences to report for work. She indicates as a cause for compensation that, as a result of the illegitimate action of the administration, in her town of San Ramón, it was said that she was dismissed for being linked to a narco-trafficking ring. It is for this reason that, among other claims, the plaintiff requests compensation for the moral damage (daño moral) caused by the dismissal action. Regarding the damages, the first instance judge accepts them, but resorting to the objective parameter of six months' salary established by Article 82 of the Labor Code. However, in his analysis, he never justified his decision based on negligent or imprudent act of the officials involved in the plaintiff's dismissal. In other words, a subjective imputation criterion provided for in Article 1045 of the Civil Code was not used – this despite the fact that the norm is mentioned in the judgment, but without providing a basis for why it is applicable to the case –. Despite this, the lower court granted compensation of fifteen million colones to the plaintiff for moral damage (daño moral). That ruling was overturned by the Tribunal. In her appeal, the plaintiff does not set forth any outline regarding a subjective imputation criterion on the part of the bank's public officials, but rather justifies her decision on what she calls an "arbitrary and untimely dismissal" on the part of the banking entity, so much so that the a-quo determined that said sanction had been illegal, precisely for having infringed the provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement, since if the procedure established in the agreement had been followed, the dismissal would have been processed without public and media exposure. In other words, the moral damage (daño moral) is based on an objective imputation criterion provided for in subsection 1 of Article 190 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). This norm establishes: "1. The administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim, or act of a third party…". In this case, upon accrediting the untimely and unfounded act of dismissal, the defendant party must be condemned because its act was illegitimate, since that act is based on not having respected the norms of the collective bargaining agreement which order secrecy for the dismissal actions processed. The application of the objective imputation criterion derived from that norm implies that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that damage (daño) and the causal link caused by that arbitrary and illegitimate dismissal to be entitled to compensation, regardless of whether she proves a negligent or imprudent act of the officials linked to the dismissal act. Note that both the lower court judges and the majority of this Chamber (Sala) understand it this way, since in the vote, the breach of the duty of care or fraud (dolo) of the officials is not analyzed in the slightest, but rather the reasons focus on an illegitimate and untimely act of dismissal, that is, nothing more and nothing less than an objective imputation criterion from the first paragraph of Article 190 ibidem.

THEREFORE:

In what has been the subject of appeal, the judgment on appeal is reversed only insofar as it denied the payment for moral damage (daño moral). In its place, in this regard, the first instance judgment is confirmed, modifying the amount of this claim, which is set at the sum of three million colones. Magistrates Allón and Blanco dissent and confirm the appealed judgment.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Eva María Camacho Vargas Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Flora Marcela Allón Zúñiga Héctor Luis Blanco González Res: 2016-000410 PROJASM/Iva 2 **WHEREAS:** **1.-** The plaintiff, in the complaint filed on July eighteenth, two thousand eleven, brought this action seeking a judgment declaring the nullity of the administrative act of dismissal executed against her by the bank, and ordering her reinstatement to her job position with full enjoyment of her labor rights; as well as the payment of back pay and other uncollected labor rights, including those related to social security, compensation for the psychological and moral damages caused, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.

**2.-** The defendant answered the action in the terms indicated in the brief dated February first, two thousand twelve, and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue (falta de legitimación activa).

**3.-** The Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (oral-electronic), by judgment at one o'clock in the afternoon of May twenty-seventh, two thousand thirteen, **ordered**: “ *Pursuant to the foregoing, applicable regulations, and Article 492 et seq. of the Labor Code, the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue are rejected, and the present ordinary labor claim filed by Mrs. [Name 001] against* **BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL,** *represented by its General Judicial Attorney Mr.* **GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS,** *is declared* **WITH MERIT** *. For this reason, the following is declared: that the dismissal without employer liability executed against the plaintiff by the defendant was completely illegal and null due to violation of due process, and materially unjustified; therefore, the effects of this declaration must retroact to the time or date of said illegal act, so that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. Consequently, it is appropriate to reinstate the plaintiff to her position immediately, thus confirming the precautionary measure issued interlocutorily, unless some other legal or administrative cause prevents it. The defendant must pay the plaintiff, as damages, all back pay and other labor rights she would have ceased to receive, including rights related to social security, during the time she has been or was outside the banking institution, clarifying that these back pay and other rights that the defendant must pay and recognize to the plaintiff correspond to the time she effectively was outside the institution without receiving them or without them having been recognized by the banking entity. These items must be settled administratively, without prejudice to the plaintiff, in case of disagreement, resorting to the respective execution of judgment in this judicial venue, except for moral damages, an item which is upheld, and the defendant must pay the plaintiff the prudential sum of fifteen million colones, at a rate of five million colones for subjective moral damages, and ten million colones for objective moral damages; and as damages, the legal interest on said sums from the moment each became due and until its effective payment, at the rate provided in Article 1163 of the Civil Code, which corresponds to the rate paid by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month certificates of deposit; items which, as already indicated, may be settled administratively, without prejudice to being determined in the judgment execution stage in case of disagreement. Furthermore, social security contributions must be deducted from the amounts to be paid to the extent legally applicable. The defendant is ordered to pay both costs of the trial, with personal costs set at the prudential sum of three million colones...*” (Sic).

**4.-** Both parties appealed, and the Labor Tribunal, Section Three, of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment at eight forty-five in the morning of September twenty-eighth, two thousand fifteen, **resolved**: *“No errors or omissions capable of causing nullity or defenselessness existing, the appeal filed by the defendant is partially granted, such that the plaintiff's claim for the defendant Bank to compensate her for moral damages is dismissed. The cross-appeal (apelación adhesiva) filed by the plaintiff has no merit. Except as indicated, regarding the matters objected to, the first-instance judgment is confirmed…”* **5.-** The plaintiff filed an appeal before this Chamber, in a brief dated November twentieth, two thousand fifteen, which is based on the reasons to be set forth below in the recitals section.

**6.-** The procedural actions have observed the prescriptions of law.

**Drafted by Magistrate Aguirre Gómez; and,** **RECITALS:** **I.- BACKGROUND.** The plaintiff stated that she worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal from January 18, 2001, to April 4, 2011, the day she was dismissed without employer liability. As she indicated, the employment relationship ended because on March 15, 2011, she was detained at her parents' house, by order of the Criminal Court of San Ramón, for alleged money laundering; a fact that became public knowledge. She mentioned that pre-trial detention (prisión preventiva) for one year was ordered against her as a precautionary measure. As she noted, the Director of the Legal Department of the bank declared to the press that said entity was the one that reported the alleged irregularities and coordinated her detention with the judicial authorities. She asserted that, even though the bank knew her situation, it asked her brother to appear at the San Ramón branch and inform the General Manager, who was her immediate boss, of what had happened. She indicated that on April 8, 2011, a release order was issued in her favor and that on that same day, two bank officials appeared at her parents' house to notify her of the dismissal letter; which her mother refused to receive because she does not live there. As she recounted, on April 12, 2011 (the next business day after her release), she appeared at her workplace and it was at that moment that the dismissal letter was given to her, in which her absences from work were established as the cause. She stated that in her town, San Ramón, it was said that she had been fired for being *“linked to a gang of narcos”*, therefore, socially, her dismissal has been seen as a sanction. She requested the absolute, evident, and manifest nullity of the administrative act of dismissal and reinstatement to her position. She also requested the payment of back pay and other uncollected labor rights –including those for social security–; damages, interest, and both costs (document filed on October 28, 2011 at 03:58:11 p.m.). The bank's general judicial attorney responded in negative terms and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue (document attached on February 6, 2012 at 03:10:23 p.m.). The first-instance judge declared the claim with merit and ordered the plaintiff's immediate reinstatement to her position. The judge ordered the defendant –as damages– to pay back pay and other labor rights (including those for social security) not received during the entire time the worker has been or was outside the banking entity; as well as the deduction of social security contributions. He ordered the payment of the sum of ₡15,000,000.00 for moral damages, interest –as damages– and both costs of the proceeding, setting personal costs at the prudential sum of ₡3,000,000.00 (judgment filed on May 27, 2013 at 02:47:23 p.m.). Both parties appealed the decision (documents filed on June 4, 2013 at 04:24:39 p.m. and on August 27, 2013 at 02:57:32 p.m.). The Tribunal reversed the ruling insofar as it ordered the defendant to pay moral damages, which it denied, and confirmed it in all other respects (judgment attached on October 1, 2015 at 07:43:37 a.m.).

**II.- GRIEVANCES.** The plaintiff disagrees with the decision of the Ad-quem regarding moral damages. She considers that the challenged ruling is not duly reasoned. She argues that the facts held as proven by the previous instances demonstrate that the bank dismissed her arbitrarily and untimely, precisely when the Public Prosecutor's Office was carrying out its investigative actions and the mass media maintained interest in reporting on the case; which occurred in San Ramón, the place where she works and resides. She claims that the bank even sought her out at relatives' homes to notify her of the termination of the employment relationship. She argues that the causal link between the moral damages claimed and the bank's arbitrary act is evidenced by the connection between the dismissal without employer liability and the publicity that existed about the case at that time. She points out that the previous instances established that the bank's conduct was irregular and reprehensible for having terminated her illegally. She highlights that if the bank had processed the dismissal in accordance with the procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement, it would have been ordered outside of public and media exposure, whereby its onerous effects could have been less. She alleges that what happened damaged her name and good image (document filed on November 23, 2015 at 11:24:21 a.m.).

**III.- REGARDING THE SPECIFIC CASE.** The only point submitted for this Chamber's analysis is that related to moral damages. The position of this body, since vote No. 481, of 10:40 a.m. on June 11, 2004, has been that in the labor venue it is feasible to compensate it when caused by acts that exceed the employer's disciplinary power; that is, when facing especially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution No. 1151, of 9:45 a.m. on December 20, 2006, it was stated: *“Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not applicable in every case, but only when the sanction has been surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations.”* In a similar direction, judgment No. 359, of 9:40 a.m. on March 19, 2010, should be cited: *“So that the moral damages that can be compensated in the labor venue (when these occur during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) are those inflicted by abuses of the employer's right, who, in the exercise of disciplinary power, goes too far, causing damage distinct from the natural effects of justified dismissal.”* In the specific case, the plaintiff requested payment of this item, as she believes that the dismissal executed by the bank was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents harm to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document filed on October 28, 2011 at 03:58:11 p.m.). In the first instance, this item was granted; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that the causal link between the alleged detriment and the defendant's conduct was not established. This Chamber differs from that reasoning. Having reviewed the case file, it is clear that the banking entity incurred in an illegitimate and untimely act of dismissal, which led to its nullity being declared in this venue for being harmful to rights. Therefore, it is a source of moral damages. There is no doubt that the fact that the plaintiff was terminated on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared –at the defendant's branch located in San Ramón– to return to work, after the competent judicial authority authorized her release, affected her morally. It should be noted that the termination of the employment relationship, as stated in the dismissal letter, was due to the worker's failure to report to work since March 15, 2011 (image 2 of the document filed on December 15, 2011 at 04:04:42 p.m.). Nevertheless, according to the evidentiary material in the case file, a judicial investigation was being conducted against her at that time for alleged money laundering, and that day she was detained and brought before the Criminal Court of San Ramón, where pre-trial detention for one year was imposed on her –as a precautionary measure– (images 13 and 14 of the document attached on December 15, 2011 at 04:04:42 p.m.). This last fact prevented her, for obvious reasons, from fulfilling her obligation to provide her services to the bank; a circumstance that was well known by the employer. Note that, as evidenced by the testimony of both witnesses, the day after the detention, the plaintiff's brother personally went to her boss to inform him of what had happened. Furthermore, as these investigative actions were of interest to the press, it reported on what occurred (images 62-67 of the document filed on December 15, 2011 at 04:04:42 p.m.). In accordance with the foregoing, the absences attributed to the plaintiff, being a direct consequence of an act beyond her control, of which her employer was aware, are justified and, therefore, the decision made by the defendant was disproportionate and arbitrary. Thus, in this Chamber's opinion, the suffering the plaintiff was already experiencing by virtue of the judicial situation she was going through was compounded by the anguish of becoming unemployed just upon leaving prison. While that injury is repaired, given that the nullity of the dismissal was declared and the payment of back pay was ordered, the bank must compensate the distress it caused the worker with its action, which added to the grief she was already enduring. This, as provided by Articles 41 of the Political Constitution and 1045 of the Civil Code. The first of these expressly stipulates: *“By resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be administered promptly, fully, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws.”* And the second reads: *“Anyone who, by fraud, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes damage to another, is obliged to repair it together with the consequential damages (perjuicios).”* Furthermore, Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of Public Administration are a source of liability for the defendant Bank. Consequently, it is appropriate to reverse the judgment under review insofar as it denied moral damages, and to confirm the first-instance judgment on that point. However, in this body's judgment, the amount awarded must be modified. Based on prudential criteria and taking into consideration the circumstances described, the anguish and affliction suffered by the plaintiff, it is appropriate to set it at the sum of ₡3,000,000.00, as this is deemed sufficient as compensation for the portion of the harm attributable to the defendant.

**IV.-** **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE ALLÓN ZÚÑIGA AND MAGISTRATE BLANCO GONZÁLEZ:** We respectfully disagree with the majority opinion for the reasons set forth below. In the labor venue, compensation for moral damages caused by acts that exceed the employer's disciplinary power is feasible, that is, when facing especially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution No. 1151, of 9:45 a.m. on December 20, 2006, it was stated: *“Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not applicable in every case, but only when the sanction has been surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations.”* In a similar direction, judgment No. 359, of 9:40 a.m. on March 19, 2010, should be cited: *“So that the moral damages that can be compensated in the labor venue (when these occur during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) are those inflicted by abuses of the employer's right, who, in the exercise of disciplinary power, goes too far, causing damage distinct from the natural effects of justified dismissal.”* In these cases, it is up to the victim –in accordance with Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code– to demonstrate the existence of harmful acts carried out by the employer, beyond the dismissal itself (Vote No. 385, of 10:20 a.m. on April 12, 2013). In the specific case, the plaintiff claims that the dismissal was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents harm to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document filed on October 28, 2011 at 03:58:11 p.m.). In the first instance, this item was granted; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that *“[…] while it is plausible to assume that the entire situation experienced by the plaintiff may have caused her moral injury both subjectively and objectively, especially due to the dissemination given to what happened, it is not feasible to establish the causal link between that detriment and the defendant's conduct”* (image 19 of the judgment attached on October 1, 2015 at 07:43:37 a.m.). Having reviewed the evidence provided in the case file, we share the Tribunal's decision in this regard. The plaintiff did not prove, as was her responsibility, the causal link between the dismissal and the moral damages claimed. As extracted from the case file, the banking entity notified the worker of the dismissal letter on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared to return to work, a notification made personally and without carrying out an *“excessive deployment”*, as the Ad-quem noted, so it cannot be said that this behavior caused any injury to the plaintiff that must be compensated. The appellant alleges that the mass media learned of her dismissal; however, she did not provide any evidentiary element showing that the defendant motivated the publicity on that fact. Note that the journalistic reports offered as evidence allude to the plaintiff's detention and her alleged participation in the crime of money laundering, but make no mention of the termination of employment (images 62-67 of the document filed on December 15, 2011 at 04:04:42 p.m.). It was not demonstrated that it was the defendant itself that provided such information to the press. Although it is claimed that the dismissal occurred when the plaintiff was being publicly exposed by the media and before the community of San Ramón, these circumstances cannot be attributed to the employing party as they are unrelated to it. It must be considered that the bank has no control over what the press publishes, nor what the people residing in that canton know; consequently, it cannot be affirmed that these factors are its responsibility. Having analyzed the witnesses' statements, it is concluded that the afflictions suffered by the plaintiff stemmed mainly from the pre-trial detention ordered against her and not strictly from the dismissal. The bank's action did not cause the plaintiff a detriment, distinct from the natural effects of dismissal, that must be compensated. The effects described derive from the criminal investigation in which she was involved, and not from the act of dismissal. Consequently, we conclude that the arguments made by the appellant to justify the payment of moral damages are not admissible, and the decision made on this matter by the appellate body should be confirmed.

**V.- NOTE FROM MAGISTRATE OLASO:** Regardless of agreeing with the esteemed colleagues' opinion, in determining the existence of an illegitimate act by the defendant bank that generates compensation in favor of the plaintiff, I consider it important to determine that the basis for such compensation cannot derive from a rule founded on the criterion of subjective attribution, such as the one regulated by Article 1045 of the Civil Code, for the reasons I will set forth below.

**GENERALITIES ON CIVIL LIABILITY:** The authors Diez Picazo and De León establish that the initial seed of civil liability is found in classical Roman law (DIEZ PICAZO, Luis and DE LEÓN, Ponce “Derecho de daños”. Editorial Civitas, p. 41), which leads us to pose the possibility of requesting compensation within the scope of a delictual action. Thus, for example, civil action was related to the “furtum,” which was an action of a penal nature exercised on the occasion of infringements of rights or a thing. On the other hand, another action was the “damnun *innuria datum”* which, thanks to the Tribune Aquilinus, gave rise to the so-called *“Lex Aquilia.”* Among the most important rules of said law, we have the possibility of requesting compensation for the loss of slaves or some quadrupeds, therefore, this action definitely derives from material damage caused (Digest 9, 2, 2). Another important element for the evolution of this type of civil action is praetorian law, given that by its nature it was a less formal law and in which equity began to have an important content, in order to determine the nature and quantification of the damage. Within the framework of these normative sources, we can conclude that in “classical” Roman Law, the following actions existed: 1) actions for the injury or destruction of things, which allowed the exercise of the so-called “inuiria,” an action exercised provided there was a causal nexus for the damage; 2) actions for bodily harm and damages caused to the person; 3) actions for damages caused by animals or by a person's negligence (for example, damages while riding); 4) action for fraud, meaning having acted with the intention of causing damage; 5) finally, the “inuiria” evolved to become an action that protects personality rights, but also continues to protect infringements of the right of possession and property. Also, the influence of the Glossators and the Natural Law commentators is decisive in the evolution of civil liability, mainly for two aspects. The first lies in the fact that the spectrum of liability is broadened to situations generated not only by the agent, but also by actions carried out by slaves, which generated the liability of their master –the beginnings of culpa “in vigilando”– (which in this case is of utmost importance). The second aspect relates to the standing to claim compensation, because this stage allowed the victim's heirs to collect compensation for death, such as might be maintenance payments. Within the evolutionary framework of liability, authors like Hugo Grotius and Domat have an important influence, who formed the Naturalist School that influenced the Code. The contribution of the first of them consists of deriving the civil action from an “illicit” act that could be caused by fraud or by culpable or negligent action. Along these same lines, Domat classifies the three types of causes from which the right to request compensation could be derived; among these we have quasi-contracts, contractual breaches, and crimes or delicts.

The influence of these schools determined that, in the year 1792, a provision was established in the Prussian Code stating the following: "<b><i>Any damage caused by malice (dolo) or gross negligence (negligencia grave) resulting in serious personal illness or death must be punishable</i></b>". The Code also follows this same orientation by establishing: "<i>Article 1382. “</i>Of offenses and quasi-offenses. “<b><i>Any act of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the person by whose fault it occurred to repair it</i></b>”.Article 1383. <b><i>A person is responsible not only for the damage caused by their own act, but also for that caused by the acts of persons for whom they must answer, or by things they have under their guard</i></b>”. Evidently, all of this codification has an influence on our national legislation, which I will mention throughout this note; what I do consider important is to establish the specific characteristics of legislation derived from the Code, because evidently our civil legislation falls within these characteristics. The influence of that legislation within our civil law is evident. A mere reading of numeral 1045 of the Civil Code suffices to perceive this; however, it is necessary to highlight how the perspective on the nature of civil liability cannot be exhausted solely within this provision. The provision in question originates, just like Napoleonic legislation, from an act that is not only malicious (doloso) but also negligent (negligente) and imprudent (imprudente) on the part of the agent causing the damage. Also, as a result of the historical and social moments surrounding France in the 18th century, it is based on an individualistic relationship between the agent and the victim, given that not even in the mind of the legislator of that era were the effects of the risk theory inherent to mass industrial or commercial activity valued, much less that the State could be held liable for acting in non-conformity with the legal system. I assert this because we must remember that in the year 1804, in France, what was developing was an agricultural or artisanal economy, so it was difficult to foresee the changes introduced by the Industrial Revolution; likewise, we were in a historical moment in which it was difficult to foresee the liability of the state order for an illegitimate act. Another important aspect for explaining the legislation from which ours derives is the important influence of Canon Law. Evidently, provisions like Article 1045 start from a premise from which the obligation of the victim derives to demonstrate who the person was that generated the malicious (dolosa) or fault-based (culposa) action that ultimately caused the damage. When the victim found themselves in situations where they could not prove these circumstances, either due to lack of evidence or the impossibility of obtaining it –due to the impossibility of obtaining it from the agent–, it was indicated that we were in the presence of "acts of God," those executed as punishment upon the victim and therefore not compensable. In this way, compensation for the damage was viewed as the "payment of a sin" and not as an indemnification for the victim. Usually, and as Chamber I (la Sala) does in this decision, it has been indicated that civil liability finds its legal basis in Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which, as I indicated previously, prescribes the obligation to repair damages, together with lost profits, that were caused by malice (dolo), fault (culpa), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia). In reality, and according to the principle of hierarchy of sources, the constitutional foundation of liability is found in numeral 41 of the Magna Carta, which establishes: "<b><i>By recourse to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Prompt and complete justice must be done for them, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws</i></b>". Now then, provisions such as Article 1045 complement this general principle, given that they establish attribution criteria that are essential for determining substantive and procedural aspects, such as standing, the causal link (nexo causal), and the burden of proof. As established by Chamber I (la Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (la Corte Suprema de Justicia), damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of civil liability. This is because the duty to compensate is only configured if a harmful event has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system (Decision (Voto) number 112 of fourteen hours fifteen minutes of June fifteenth, nineteen ninety-five). For that Chamber, "damage" is any diminution, loss, or deterioration of the person's (the injured party's) patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere that causes the deprivation of a legal right protected by the system. Under this framework, the first essential element of civil liability is damage. Regarding the characteristics of damage, we find: 1) it must be certain; real and effective and not hypothetical; 2) there must be an injury to a legally relevant interest deserving of protection; 3) there must be a causal relationship between the generating event and the damage. Another element configuring civil liability is the direct or efficient causal relationship that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the damage, the latter being the prerequisite for any type of liability, whether contractual or extracontractual, so its demonstration also constitutes a conditio sine qua non for the compensation claim to succeed. The notion of culpability is another of the most important elements within extracontractual civil liability, as fault must exist on the part of the person causing the damage. Culpability constitutes a judgment of reproach, through which that person's liability is attributed. Without the existence of fault, the indemnification for damages and lost profits cannot be granted in favor of the victim, since it is necessary to demonstrate that the damage was caused by an act or omission attributable to a person. It is necessary, then, that the damage be attributed to the producing agent, whether because it was done intentionally or because they could have avoided it and did not, by acting negligently or imprudently. This requirement of culpability is questioned by the national author Juan Marco Rivero Sánchez, who points out that such a requirement does not constitute a determining element for establishing liability. To support his argumentation, he bases it on the provisions of articles 38 to 40 of the Civil Code, concerning the capacity of persons. The author explains that if culpability were a requirement of civil liability, it would not be possible to demand any type of liability from persons under fifteen years of age and, therefore, any possibility of seeking compensation would be extinguished. However, this does not occur, as the possibility of recovering the damage from the parents of the minor under fifteen years remains, provided the minor lives in their home (1047 of the Civil Code) –twelve years, according to Article 6 of the Juvenile Criminal Justice Law–, but the provision nonetheless maintains civil liability, shifting it to other subjects, in accordance with numeral 1048 of the Civil Code. Unlawfulness (antijuricidad) constitutes behavior contrary to the legal system, which means the act of the person generating the damage must be classified as a violation of the legal system. This unlawfulness generates different positions in cases of damages caused by a breach of the duty of care –negligence, imprudence, and lack of skill (impericia)–, given that when we encounter these scenarios, evidently, there are causes of justification that eliminate this condition, such as, for example, fortuitous event or force majeure. This requirement, as an essential element of civil liability, is discussed by the doctrine. Specifically, the author Rivero Sánchez points out that unlawfulness, within the framework of Costa Rican civil law, is not a requirement for the applicability of civil liability, by virtue of the fact that there are provisions in the Civil Code that generate the obligation to compensate the damage, even though the conduct cannot be classified as unlawful, given the existence of a cause that eliminates this unlawfulness. We find this legislative scenario in 1043 of the Civil Code, which provides: "<b><i>Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties</i></b>". Under Rivero Sánchez's thesis, for example, in the case of the story of "Goldilocks," when the girl gets lost in the forest and breaks into the bears' house, eats their soup, and rests in their beds, we could perfectly classify this conduct as unlawful behavior, typical of violation of domicile (article 204 of the Penal Code). However, such unlawfulness disappears, given the existence of the state of necessity, as a cause of justification, according to article 27 ibidem, given that the girl is lost in the forest and very hungry. Despite this, according to said author, in application of numeral 1043 of the Civil Code, there would be an obligation to compensate the damage in favor of the bears, since lawful acts also generate liability. The dualism between contractual and extracontractual liability has been a subject of discussion by the doctrine over time. Authors like Yzquierdo Tolsada (YZQUIERDO TOLSADA, Mariano. "Responsabilidad civil contractual y extracontractual" Madrid, España, Editorial Reus, Tomo I, página 87), indicate that this dualism must be overcome, by virtue of the following reasons: a) substantive, because the damage is the same in either field, so there is no logical reason to give different treatment to "contractual" and "extracontractual" damage; b) systematic, because in both there is conduct or omission that generates the damage, except that in contractual liability, such conduct arises due to non-compliance; c) practical, given that it is often not easy to determine whether we are facing a case of contractual or extracontractual liability. For example, in cases of application of numeral 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense. In Roman law, as I explained previously, this difference was marked, since liability derived from the law of the XII Tables and was of a contractual type, while that derived from the Lex Aquilia was of an extracontractual type. Our Civil Code also differentiates between civil liability derived from a contract (articles 701 and following), and civil liability of an extracontractual type (articles 1045 and following). For those who support the division between both types of liability, extracontractual liability is constituted by an active or omissive conduct, referring to the absence of a prior contract, that is, it arises when damage is caused without there being a prior link, contract, or obligation. Pérez Vargas, in his work “Principios de Responsabilidad Civil Extracontractual,” indicates that the presence of two elements is necessary for extracontractual liability to occur: “…<i>A behavior that serves as an attribution criterion, whether culpable damage or damage derived from the creation of a risk, and a harmful result of legally relevant interest, or what would be damage in a broad sense, material or moral…</i>”. Likewise, the cited author explains to us that for the person causing the damage to be obligated to repair it, a causal nexus (nexo de causalidad) between their conduct and the damage produced is necessary, meaning that the damage must be the direct and immediate consequence of the conduct. Articles 1045, 1046, and 1048 of the Civil Code refer to extracontractual civil liability. This type of liability does not arise from the breach of a specific obligation, but rather from a violation of the general duty not to harm other persons. Regarding contractual liability, Chamber I (la Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (la Corte Suprema de Justicia) has considered: <i>“… contractual liability presupposes the existence of a specific legal obligation, freely agreed upon by the parties, and also the fact that such obligation was culpably breached by the obligor. The burden of proof corresponds to the creditor… if the creditor alleges malice (dolo), it is not enough to demonstrate the breach; rather, the malice must be proven for it to generate the corresponding legal consequences (articles 701 and 702 of the Civil Code). Breach is malicious (doloso) when the debtor voluntarily and intentionally breaches their obligation, causing damage to their creditor. Malice (dolo) as provided in Article 701 of the Civil Code is not presumed, and whoever commits it is always obligated to indemnify the damages and lost profits caused, even if the contrary has been agreed”</i>. Another conceptual difference, according to Chamber I (la Sala Primera), lies in the burden of proof. In contractual liability, it is enough to demonstrate the breach for fault to exist, whereas in subjective extracontractual civil liability, the fault (negligencia, imprudencia, impericia) or malice (dolo), upon which the liability of the person causing the damage is based, must necessarily be proven (Decision (Voto) number 320, of thirteen hours of December fifteenth, nineteen ninety).

THE OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE ATTRIBUTION CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE. Subjective or objective attribution criteria constitute reference frameworks used to impute liability to the person generating the damage. In the case of the former –subjective–, they are those based on aspects such as malice (dolo) or fault (culpa), so that, upon verification of unlawful behavior – malicious or fault-based – the obligation to repair arises. Attribution to such conduct can be for one's own behavior or for the conduct of another, that is, for the act of a third party. This is why doctrine speaks of direct and indirect subjective liability, the latter enshrined in numeral 1048 of our Civil Code, "culpa in eligendo" and "culpa in vigilando". Now then, fault and malice are not necessary to ground the civil liability process. If that were the case, in many instances, there would be a denial of access to justice, especially in those scenarios where the victim is unable to demonstrate the negligence or lack of skill (impericia) of the person who caused the damage. This is why the courts and doctrine have raised the standards of diligence to objective criteria, as for example in the cases of articles 190 of the General Law of Public Administration and numeral 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense. Regarding the criteria of objective attribution, the parameters for imputing liability are based on the so-called "risk theory" or on the act of a party which, due to its legal characteristics, must assume a greater degree of liability than the common denominator, for example, in the case of the State and its liability for the actions carried out by its public servants. In the scenario of the risk theory, the premise is that the natural or legal person who carries out or benefits from an activity with potentially dangerous elements must also bear its drawbacks. This theory is also known by the name of "<i>created damage</i>," whose paradigm of attribution lies in assigning the damage to any person who introduces into society a virtual element for producing it, disregarding the agent's subjectivity. Consequently, the source of obligations in objective liability is not fault (culpa), negligence (negligencia), or malice (dolo), but rather the risky activity carried out by the agent, which means that, in the face of any harmful result to legally relevant interests –be it life, safety, health, etc.–, a need to repair the damage arises (Rivero Sánchez, Ob. Cit. Pág. 70).

IN THE CASE BEFORE US, THE OBJECTIVE ATTRIBUTION CRITERION OF NUMERAL 190 OF THE GENERAL LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IS APPLICABLE, AND NOT ARTICLE 1045 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Once the difference between the two attribution criteria is explained, it is evident that in this case, the objective attribution provided for by numeral 190 of the General Law of Public Administration is applicable. That regulation is applicable to the sued bank, as established by Article 2 of the Organic Law of said bank, which, although it provides that it is a non-state public law entity (with legal personality and its own patrimony and, in turn, with full administrative and functional autonomy), emphasizes that its operation will be governed by the rules of public law. In that sense, subsection 1° of Article 2 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that the provisions of that regulation will apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special rule for them. Returning to the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, its Article 47 regulates that this bank will have the same responsibilities and obligations corresponding to banks, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Banco Central and the Organic Law of the National Banking System. The first of these laws does not have a general provision regarding banking liability for illegitimate actions by the entity. Meanwhile, numerals 27 and 28 of the second do establish scenarios of solidary subjective liability for the members of the banks' boards of directors, but they do not regulate matters concerning the liability of the bank as an entity for the acts proper to its operation. In what interests us, numeral 27 stipulates: “<b><u>Each Board of Directors shall exercise its functions with absolute independence and under its exclusive responsibility, within the norms established by laws, applicable regulations, and principles of technique. The members of the boards of directors shall have the most complete freedom to proceed in the exercise of their functions according to their conscience and their own judgment, for which reason they shall be personally responsible for their management in the general direction of the respective bank. Upon them shall fall any liability that, in accordance with the laws, may be attributed to them for malice (dolo), fault (culpa), or negligence (negligencia). Those who have not recorded their dissenting vote shall respond personally with their assets for the losses caused to the Bank, due to the authorization of operations prohibited by law, or that have been authorized through malice (dolo), fault (culpa), or negligence (negligencia)…”</u></b>. In the same way, Article 28 of that same law provides that “<b>Any act, resolution, or omission of a Board of Directors that contravenes legal and regulatory provisions or that signifies use of the bank's funds in activities other than those inherent to its functions, shall make all those present at the respective session incur personal and solidary liability to the bank, the State, and affected third parties, for the damages and lost profits produced thereby. Only those attendees who have recorded their dissenting vote or their objection in the minutes of the corresponding session shall be exempt from such liability. All of this without prejudice to the other legal sanctions that may correspond to them. “</b>. Therefore, since there is no general provision holding state banking entities liable for illegitimate actions taken in the exercise of their functions, the General Law of Public Administration is applicable as an objective liability regime for this type of entity. It has been demonstrated that the plaintiff worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, until she was dismissed without employer liability. Said termination was justified because the plaintiff was detained at her parents' home, by order of a jurisdictional authority in criminal matters, for alleged money laundering (legitimación de capitales). It was the Director of the legal area of the employer bank who made this fact publicly known. Subsequently, a release order was issued in her favor and, despite this, on that same day, two bank officials communicated the dismissal to her, which her mother did not receive, but rather it was upon presenting herself to work –on April 12, 2011– that the respective letter was formally delivered to her, based on absences to present herself for work. She points out as a cause for compensation that, as a result of the administration's illegitimate action, in her town of San Ramón it was said that she had been dismissed for being linked to a drug gang. It is for this reason that, among other claims, the plaintiff requests compensation for the moral damage (daño moral) generated by the dismissal action. Regarding the damages, the first instance judge accepts them, but resorting to the objective parameter of six months' salary established by numeral 82 of the Labor Code. However, in his analysis, he never justified his decision on a negligent or imprudent act by the officials who intervened in the plaintiff's dismissal. In other words, a subjective attribution criterion provided for by Article 1045 of the Civil Code was not resorted to –this despite the fact that the provision is mentioned in the ruling, but without justifying why it is applicable to the case–. Despite this, the trial court awarded the plaintiff compensation of fifteen million colones for moral damage. That ruling was overturned by the Tribunal. In her appeal, the plaintiff does not raise any outline regarding a subjective attribution criterion on the part of the bank's public officials, but rather justifies her decision in what she calls an "arbitrary and untimely dismissal" by the banking entity, so much so that the lower court (a-quo) determined that this sanction had been illegal, precisely for having violated the provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement, since, had the procedure established in the agreement been followed, the dismissal would have been processed without public and media exposure. In other words, the moral damage is based on an objective attribution criterion provided for by subsection 1° of numeral 190 of the General Law of Public Administration. This provision establishes: “<b><i>1. The administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party…”</i></b>. In this case, upon proving the untimely and unfounded dismissal act, the defendant party must be ordered to pay because its action was illegitimate, since that action is based on not having respected the norms of the collective bargaining agreement that order secrecy regarding the dismissal actions processed. The application of the objective attribution criterion derived from that provision implies that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to demonstrate that damage and the causal link (nexo causal) caused by that arbitrary and illegitimate dismissal for her to have the right to compensation, regardless of whether she demonstrates a negligent or imprudent act by the officials linked to the act of dismissal. Note that both the instance judges and the majority of Chamber I understand it this way, since the decision does not analyze, not even remotely, a breach of the duty of care or malice (dolo) on the part of the officials; rather, the reasons focus on an illegitimate and untimely act of dismissal, i.e., nothing more and nothing less than an objective attribution criterion of the first paragraph of numeral 190 ibidem.

THEREFORE:

Regarding what has been the subject of appeal, the appealed judgment is reversed solely insofar as it denied payment for moral damage (daño moral). In its place, in this respect, the first instance ruling is confirmed, modifying the amount of this claim, which is set at the sum of three million colones.

Magistrates Allón and Blanco dissent and confirm the appealed judgment.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Eva María Camacho Vargas Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Flora Marcela Allón Zúñiga Héctor Luis Blanco González Res: 2016-000410 PROJASM/Iva 2 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Emails: [email protected] and [email protected] Consequently, we conclude that the arguments raised by the appellant to justify the payment of moral damages are not receivable and, what was decided in this regard by the appellate body, must be confirmed.” **V.- NOTE BY MAGISTRATE OLASO:** Regardless of sharing the criterion of my esteemed colleagues, inasmuch as they determine the existence of illegitimate conduct by the defendant bank that generates compensation in favor of the plaintiff, I consider it important to determine that the basis of this compensation cannot derive from a rule founded on the criterion of subjective imputation, such as that regulated by Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), for the reasons I will set forth below.

**GENERALITIES ON CIVIL LIABILITY:** Authors Diez Picazo and De León establish that the initial seed of civil liability is found in classical Roman law (DIEZ PICAZO, Luis and [Name1], Ponce “Derecho de daños”. Editorial Civitas, p. 41), which leads us to consider the possibility of seeking compensation within the scope of tortious action. Thus, for example, civil action was related to *“furtum,”* which was an action of a penal nature exercised on the occasion of infringements of rights or a thing. On the other hand, another action was the *“damnum iniuria datum,”* which, thanks to the Tribune Aquilinus, gave rise to the so-called *“Lex Aquilia.”* Among the most important rules of that law, we have the possibility of seeking compensation for the loss of slaves or any quadruped; therefore, this action definitively derives from material damage caused (Digest 9, 2, 2). Another important element for the evolution of this type of civil action is praetorian law, given that, by its nature, it was less formal law and in which equity began to have important content for determining the nature and quantification of the damage. Within the framework of these normative sources, we can conclude that in “classical” Roman Law, the following actions existed: 1) actions for the injury or destruction of things, which gave rise to the exercise of the so-called *“iniuria,”* which was an action exercised provided there was a causal nexus of the damage; 2) actions for bodily injury and damage caused to the person; 3) actions for damage caused by animals or by negligence of the person (for example, damage when riding); 4) action of malice, that is, having acted with the intention to cause damage; 5) finally, the *“iniuria”* evolved to become an action that protects personality rights, but also continues to protect infringements of the right of possession and property. Also, the influence of the glossators and natural law commentators is decisive within the evolution of civil liability, mainly for two aspects. The first lies in the fact that the spectrum of liability was broadened to situations generated not only by the agent, but also by actions carried out by slaves, which generated the liability of their master – the beginnings of fault *“in vigilando”* – (which in this case is of utmost importance). The second aspect has to do with the standing to claim compensation, because at this stage, the heirs of the victim were allowed to collect compensation for death, such as maintenance. Within the evolutionary framework of liability, authors such as [Name2] and [Name3], who made up the Naturalist School that influenced the *Code*, have an important influence. The contribution of the first of them consists in deriving the civil action from an “illicit” act that could be caused by malice or by faulty or negligent conduct. Along the same lines, Domat classifies the three types of causes from which the right to seek compensation could derive; among these we have quasi-contracts, contractual breaches, and crimes or offenses. The influence of these schools determined that in 1792, a rule was established in the Prussian Code stating the following: *“**Every damage caused by malice or gross negligence that generates serious personal illness or death must be punishable**.”* The *Code* also took this same orientation when establishing: *“Article 1382.* Of offenses and quasi-offenses. ***Any act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred, to repair it**.” Article 1383. **One is liable not only for the damage caused by one's own act, but also by the act of persons for whom one is responsible, or of things which one has in one's keeping**.”* Evidently, all this codification has an influence on our national regulations, which I will mention throughout this note; what I do consider important is to establish the characteristics inherent to legislation derived from the *Code*, because our civil regulations clearly fall within these characteristics. The influence of that regulation within our civil legislation is evident. A reading of Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) is sufficient to perceive this; however, it is necessary to highlight how the perspective on the nature of civil liability cannot be exhausted solely within this norm. The rule in question is based, like the Napoleonic legislation, on conduct that is no longer only malicious but also negligent and imprudent on the part of the agent causing the damage. Also, as a result of the historical and social moments surrounding France in the 18th century, it is based on an individualistic relationship between the agent and the victim, given that, not even in the mentality of the legislator of that era were the effects of the risk theory inherent to mass industrial or commercial activity valued, much less that the State could be held liable for acting in non-conformity with the legal system. I affirm this because we must remember that in the year 1804, in France, what was developing was an agricultural or artisanal economy, so it was difficult to foresee the changes introduced by the Industrial Revolution; similarly, we were at a historical moment in which it was difficult to foresee the liability of the state order for illegitimate conduct. Another important aspect for explaining the regulations from which ours derive is the important influence of Canon Law. Evidently, rules such as Article 1045 are based on a premise from which the victim's obligation to prove who was the person who generated the malicious or faulty action that ultimately caused the damage derives. When the victim faced scenarios where they could not prove these situations, whether due to lack of evidence or the impossibility of obtaining it – due to the impossibility of obtaining it from the agent – it was indicated that we were in the presence of “acts of God,” those executed as punishment of the victim and therefore not compensable. In this way, compensation for damage was visualized as the “payment of a sin” and not as an indemnity for the victim. Usually, and as this Chamber does in this ruling, it has been indicated that civil liability finds its legal basis in Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which, as I indicated previously, prescribes the obligation to repair damages together with losses, that were caused by malice, fault, negligence, or imprudence. In reality, and according to the principle of the hierarchy of sources, the constitutional basis of liability is found in Article 41 of the Magna Carta, inasmuch as it establishes: *“**By resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. Justice must be administered to them promptly and fully, without denial and in strict conformity with the laws**.”* Now then, rules such as Article 1045 complement this general principle, given that they establish criteria for imputation that are essential for determining substantive and procedural aspects, such as standing, causal nexus, and the burden of proof. As established by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of civil liability. This is because the duty to compensate is only configured if there has been a harmful event that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system (Ruling number 112 of fourteen hours fifteen minutes of June fifteenth, nineteen ninety-five). For that Chamber, “damage” is any impairment, loss, or deterioration of the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (the injured party) that causes the deprivation of a legal asset protected by the legal system. Under this approach, the first essential element of civil liability is damage. Regarding the characteristics of damage, we find: 1) it must be certain; real and effective and not hypothetical); 2) there must be an injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection; 3) there must be a causal relationship between the generating event and the damage. Another element that configures civil liability is the direct or efficient causal relationship that must exist between the unlawful behavior or conduct and the damage, the latter being the prerequisite of any type of liability, whether contractual or extracontractual, so its demonstration also constitutes a *sine qua non* requirement for the compensatory claim to prosper. The notion of culpability is another of the most important elements within extracontractual civil liability, since there must be fault on the part of the person causing the damage. Culpability constitutes a judgment of reproach, through which the liability of that person is imputed. Without the existence of fault, the compensation of damages and losses cannot be granted in favor of the victim, since it is necessary that it be demonstrated that the damage was caused by an act or omission attributable to a person. It is therefore necessary that the damage be attributed to the producing agent, whether because it was done with intent or because it could have been avoided and was not, by acting negligently or imprudently. This requirement of culpability is questioned by the national author Juan Marco Rivero Sánchez, who points out that this requirement does not constitute a determining element for establishing liability. To support his argument, he relies on what is established by Articles 38 to 40 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), related to the capacity of persons. The author explains that if culpability were a requirement of civil liability, it would not be possible to demand any type of liability from persons under fifteen years of age and, therefore, any possibility of seeking compensation would be extinguished.

However, this does not occur because the possibility of claiming damages from the parents of a minor under fifteen years of age is maintained, provided the minor lives in their home ([Address1]) twelve years –according to Article 6 of the Juvenile Criminal Justice Law (Ley de Justicia Penal Juvenil)–, but the norm still maintains civil liability, shifting it to other subjects, in accordance with numeral 1048 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). Unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) constitutes behavior contrary to the legal system, meaning the actions of the person causing the damage must be classified as a violation of the legal system. This unlawfulness generates different positions in the case of damages caused by a breach of the duty of care –negligence, imprudence, and lack of skill–, given that when we encounter such scenarios, evidently, there are grounds for justification that eliminate this condition, such as, for example, acts of God (caso fortuito) or force majeure (fuerza mayor). This requirement, as an essential element of civil liability, is debated by legal scholars. Specifically, the author Rivero Sánchez points out that unlawfulness, within the framework of Costa Rican civil law, is not a requirement for the applicability of civil liability, by virtue of the fact that there are norms in the Civil Code that generate the obligation to compensate for the damage, even though the conduct cannot be classified as unlawful, given the existence of some circumstance that eliminates this unlawfulness. We find this legislative scenario in Article 1043 of the Civil Code, which provides: “*Lawful and voluntary acts also produce, without the need for an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or harm third parties*”. Under the thesis of [Name4], for example, in the case of the story of “Goldilocks”, when the girl gets lost in the forest and breaks into the bears’ house, eats their soup, and rests in their beds, we could perfectly classify this conduct as an unlawful act, specifically a home invasion (article 204 of the Penal Code (Código Penal)). However, said unlawfulness disappears, given the existence of the state of necessity, as a ground for justification, according to Article 27 ibidem, given that the girl is lost in the forest and very hungry. Despite this, according to said author, in application of numeral 1043 of the Civil Code, there would be an obligation to compensate for the damage in favor of the bears, since lawful acts also generate liability. The dualism between contractual and extracontractual liability has been a subject of discussion by legal scholars over time. Authors like Yzquierdo Tolsada (YZQUIERDO TOLSADA, Mariano. “Responsabilidad civil contractual y extracontractual” Madrid, Spain, Editorial Reus, Volume I, page 87), indicate that said dualism must be overcome, by virtue of the following reasons: a) of a substantive nature, because the damage is the same in either of the two fields, so there is no logical reason to give different treatment to “contractual” and “extracontractual” damage; b) systematic, because in both there is conduct or omission that generates the damage, only that in the contractual one said conduct occurs due to breach of contract; c) practical, given that it is often not easy to determine whether we are facing a case of contractual or extracontractual liability. For example, in cases of application of numeral 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense (Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del consumidor). In Roman law, as I explained previously, this difference was marked, since liability derived from the Law of the XII Tables and was contractual in nature, while that derived from the Lex Aquilia was extracontractual in nature. Our Civil Code also differentiates between civil liability derived from a contract (articles 701 and following), and extracontractual civil liability (articles 1045 and following). For those who support the division between both types of liability, extracontractual liability is constituted by an active or omissive conduct, the latter referring to the absence of a prior contract, that is, it arises when damage is caused without a prior bond, contract, or obligation existing. Pérez Vargas, in his work “Principios de Responsabilidad Civil Extracontractual”, indicates that, for extracontractual liability to arise, the presence of two elements is necessary: “…*Conduct that serves as a criterion for imputation, be it culpable damage or damage derived from the creation of a risk, and a harmful result of a legally relevant interest, or what would be damage in a broad sense, material or moral*…”. Likewise, the cited author explains to us that for the person causing the damage to be obliged to repair it, a causal nexus between his conduct and the damage produced is necessary, which means the damage must be the direct and immediate consequence of the conduct. Articles 1045, 1046, and 1048 of the Civil Code refer to extracontractual civil liability. This type of liability does not arise from the breach of a specific bond, but rather from a violation of the general duty not to harm other people. Regarding contractual liability, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has considered: *“… contractual liability presupposes the existence of a specific legal obligation, freely agreed upon by the parties, and additionally the fact that such obligation has been culpably breached by the obligor. The burden of proof corresponds to the creditor… if the creditor alleges fraud (dolo), it is not enough to demonstrate the breach, rather the fraud must be proven for it to generate the corresponding legal consequences (articles 701 and 702 of the Civil Code). The breach is fraudulent when the debtor voluntarily and intentionally breaches his obligation, causing damage to his creditor. Fraud, according to the provisions of article 701 of the Civil Code, is not presumed, and whoever commits it is always obliged to indemnify the damages and losses caused by it, even if the contrary had been agreed”*. Another of the conceptual differences, according to the First Chamber, lies in the burden of proof. In contractual liability, it is sufficient to demonstrate the breach for fault (culpa) to exist, whereas in subjective extracontractual civil liability, the fault (negligence, imprudence, lack of skill) or fraud, upon which the liability of the person causing the damage is based, must necessarily be demonstrated (Vote number 320, at one o'clock in the afternoon on December fifteenth, nineteen ninety).

**THE OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE IMPUTATION CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE.** Subjective or objective imputation criteria constitute frames of reference used to impute liability to the person generating the damage. In the case of the former –subjective–, these are those based on aspects such as fraud or fault, such that, upon verification of an illicit behavior –fraudulent or culpable– the obligation to repair arises. The imputation of such conduct may be for one's own behavior or for the conduct of another, that is, for the act of another. This is why legal scholars speak of direct and indirect subjective liability, the latter enshrined in numeral 1048 of our Civil Code, “culpa in eligendo” and “culpa in vigilando”. Now, fault and fraud are not necessary to ground the process of civil liability. If that were the case, in many cases there would be a denial of access to justice, especially in those scenarios in which the victim is unable to demonstrate the negligence or lack of skill of the person who caused the damage. This is why courts and legal scholars have raised the standards of diligence to objective criteria, such as in the cases of Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and numeral 35 of the Law for the Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Defense. Regarding objective imputation criteria, the parameters for imputing liability are based on the so-called “risk theory” or on the actions of a party that, due to its legal characteristics, must assume a higher degree of liability than the common denominator, for example, in the case of the State and its liability for the actions carried out by its officials. In the scenario of the risk theory, it starts from the premise that the natural or legal person who engages in or benefits from an activity with potentially dangerous elements must also bear its inconveniences. This theory is also known by the name of “*the created damage*”, whose imputation paradigm consists of attributing the damage to every person who introduces into society a virtual element of producing it, dispensing with the agent's subjectivity. Consequently, the source of obligations in objective liability is not fault, negligence, or fraud, but rather the risky activity carried out by the agent, which causes that, in the face of any harmful result to legally relevant interests –be it life, security, health, etc.–, a need to repair the damage arises ([Name4], Op. Cit. Pg. 70).

**IN THE CASE BEFORE US, THE OBJECTIVE IMPUTATION CRITERION OF NUMERAL 190 OF THE GENERAL LAW OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IS APPLICABLE, AND NOT ARTICLE [LicensePlate1] OF THE CIVIL CODE.** Having explained the difference between both imputation criteria, it is evident that in this case the objective imputation provided for by numeral 190 of the General Law of Public Administration is applicable. That regulation is applicable to the respondent bank, as established by Article 2 of the Organic Law (Ley Orgánica) of said bank, which, although it states that it is a non-state public law entity (with its own legal personality and assets and, in turn, with full administrative and functional autonomy), emphasizes that its operation shall be governed by the norms of public law. In that sense, subsection 1 of Article 2 of the General Law of Public Administration provides that the provisions of that regulation shall apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special rule for them. Returning to the Organic Law of the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, its Article 47 regulates that this bank shall have the same responsibilities and obligations that correspond to banks, in accordance with the Organic Law of the Central Bank and the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional). The first of these laws does not have a general provision regarding bank liability for illegitimate acts of the entity. Whereas, numerals 27 and 28 of the second do establish scenarios of joint and several subjective liability for the members of the banks' boards of directors, but do not regulate what concerns the bank's liability as an entity for the acts inherent to its operation. In what interests us, numeral 27 stipulates: “**Each Board of Directors shall exercise its functions with absolute independence and under its exclusive responsibility, within the norms established by laws, applicable regulations, and technical principles. The members of the boards of directors shall have the most complete freedom to proceed in the exercise of their functions in accordance with their conscience and their own judgment, for which reason they shall be personally responsible for their management in the general direction of the respective bank. Any liability that, in accordance with the laws, may be attributed to them for fraud, fault, or negligence shall weigh upon them. Those who have not recorded their dissenting vote shall personally respond with their assets for the losses caused to the Bank, for the authorization of operations prohibited by law, or that have been authorized through fraud, fault, or negligence…”.** Likewise, Article 28 of that same law provides that “**Any act, resolution, or omission of a Board of Directors that contravenes legal and regulatory provisions or that implies use of the bank's funds in activities different from those inherent to its functions, shall cause all those present at the respective session to incur personal and joint and several liability to the bank, the State, and affected third parties, for the damages and losses caused thereby. Only those attendees who have recorded their dissenting vote or their objection in the minutes of the corresponding session shall be exempt from such liability. All of this without prejudice to other legal sanctions that may apply to them.** " Therefore, given the absence of a general provision holding state banking entities liable for illegitimate acts taken in the exercise of their functions, the General Law of Public Administration applies as the objective liability regime for this type of entity. It has been demonstrated that the plaintiff worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal until she was dismissed without employer liability (sin responsabilidad patronal). Said termination was justified because the plaintiff was detained at her parents' house, by order of a criminal jurisdictional authority, for alleged money laundering (legitimación de capitales). It was the Director of the legal area of the employing bank who made this fact public knowledge. Subsequently, a release order was issued in her favor, and, despite this, on that same day, two bank officials communicated the dismissal to her, which her mother did not receive; rather, it was upon reporting to work –on April 12, 2011– that the respective letter was formally delivered to her, based on absences from work. She points out as grounds for compensation that, as a result of the administration's illegitimate actions, it was said in her town of San Ramón that she had been fired for being linked to a drug gang. It is for this reason that, among other claims, the plaintiff requests compensation for the moral damage (daño moral) generated by the dismissal action. Regarding the damages, the first instance judge accepts them, but by resorting to the objective parameter of six months' salary established by numeral 82 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). However, in his analysis, he never justified his decision based on negligent or imprudent conduct by the officials who intervened in the plaintiff's dismissal. In other words, the subjective imputation criterion provided for by Article 1045 of the Civil Code was not used –and this despite the fact that the norm is mentioned in the ruling, but without founding why it is applicable to the case–. Despite this, the trial court granted compensation of fifteen million colones to the plaintiff for moral damage. That order was revoked by the Tribunal. In her appeal, the plaintiff does not outline any sketch regarding a subjective imputation criterion on the part of the bank's public officials, but rather justifies her decision on what she terms an “arbitrary and untimely dismissal” on the part of the banking entity, so much so that the lower court judge determined that said sanction had been illegal, precisely for having infringed the provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), since if the procedure established in the agreement had been followed, the dismissal would have been processed without public and media exposure. In other words, the moral damage is based on an objective imputation criterion provided for by subsection 1 of numeral 190 of the General Law of Public Administration. This norm establishes: “***1. The administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party…”.*** In this case, by proving the untimely and unfounded act of dismissal, the defendant party must be condemned because its action was illegitimate, since that action is based on not having respected the norms of the collective bargaining agreement that order secrecy regarding the processed dismissal actions. The application of the objective imputation criterion derived from that norm implies that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to demonstrate that damage and the causal nexus caused by that arbitrary and illegitimate dismissal to be entitled to compensation, regardless of whether she demonstrates negligent or imprudent conduct by the officials linked to the dismissal act. Note that both the trial judges and the majority of the Chamber understand it this way, since the vote does not analyze even remotely the breach of the duty of care or the fraud of the officials, but rather the reasons focus on an illegitimate and untimely act of dismissal, that is, nothing more and nothing less than an objective imputation criterion from the first paragraph of numeral 190 ibidem.”

WHEREAS:

**1.-** The plaintiff, in a complaint dated July 18, 2011, brought this action seeking a judgment declaring the nullity of the administrative act of dismissal carried out against her by the bank, as well as reinstating her to her position with the full enjoyment of her labor rights; along with the payment of back pay and other uncollected labor rights, including those related to social security, compensation for the psychological and moral damages caused, interest, and both costs of the proceeding.

**2.-** The defendant answered the action in the terms indicated in the brief dated February 1, 2012, and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue.

**3.-** The Labor Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José (oral-electronic), by judgment at 1:00 p.m. on May 27, 2013, **ordered:** “*In accordance with the foregoing, applicable regulations, and Article 492 et seq. of the Labor Code, the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue are dismissed, and the present ordinary labor claim filed by Mrs. [Name 001] against* **BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL,** *represented by its General Judicial Attorney, Mr.* **GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS,** *is declared* **WITH MERIT,** *for which reason the following is declared: that the dismissal without employer liability carried out against the plaintiff by the defendant was completely illegal and null due to violation of due process, and materially unjustified; therefore, the effects of this declaration must be retroacted to the moment or date of said illegal act, such that things must return to the state they were in before its issuance. Consequently, the appropriate course is to immediately reinstate the plaintiff in her position, thus confirming the precautionary measure ordered interlocutorily, unless some other legal or administrative cause prevents it. The defendant must pay the plaintiff, as damages, all back pay and other labor rights that she may have ceased to receive, including rights related to social security, during the time she has been or was outside the banking institution, clarifying that these back pay and other rights that the defendant must pay and recognize to the plaintiff are for the time she was effectively outside the institution without receiving them or without them having been recognized by the banking entity. These amounts must be settled administratively, without prejudice to the plaintiff, in case of disagreement, resorting to the respective execution of judgment in this judicial venue, with the exception of moral damages, a claim which is granted and the defendant must pay to the plaintiff in the prudential sum of fifteen million colones, apportioned as five million colones for subjective moral damages, and ten million colones for objective moral damages; and as damages, legal interest on said sums from the moment each became due until its effective payment, according to the rate provided in Article 1163 of the Civil Code, which corresponds to that paid by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month certificates of deposit; amounts that, as already indicated, may be settled administratively, without prejudice to them being determined in the judgment execution stage in case of disagreement. Furthermore, social charges must be deducted from the amounts to be paid to the extent legally applicable. The defendant is ordered to pay both costs of the lawsuit, setting the personal costs at the prudential sum of three million colones...*” (Sic).

**4.-** Both parties appealed, and the Labor Tribunal, Section Three, of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, by judgment at 8:45 a.m. on September 28, 2015, **resolved:** *“There being no errors or omissions capable of causing nullity or defenselessness, the appeal filed by the defendant is partially with merit, such that the plaintiff's claim for the defendant bank to indemnify her for moral damages is denied. The cross-appeal filed by the plaintiff is without merit. Except as indicated, and in what is the subject of challenge, the first-instance judgment is confirmed...”* **5.-** The plaintiff filed an appeal before this Chamber, in a brief dated November 20, 2015, which is based on the reasons set forth in the considering part below.

**6.-** The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.

**Magistrate Aguirre Gómez writes; and,**

CONSIDERING:

**I.- BACKGROUND.** The plaintiff stated that she worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal from January 18, 2001, to April 4, 2011, the day she was dismissed without employer liability. As she indicated, the employment relationship ended because on March 15, 2011, she was detained at her parents' house, by order of the Criminal Court of San Ramón, for alleged money laundering; a fact that became public knowledge. She mentioned that pretrial detention for one year was ordered against her as a precautionary measure. As she noted, the Director of the Legal Area of the bank declared to the press that said entity was the one that reported the alleged irregularities and coordinated her detention with the judicial authorities. She asserted that, even though the bank knew her situation, it asked her brother to appear at the San Ramón branch and inform the General Manager, who was her immediate superior, of what had happened. She indicated that on April 8, 2011, a release order was issued in her favor and that on that same day, two bank officials appeared at her parents' house to notify her of the dismissal letter, which her mother refused to receive because she does not live there. As she related, on April 12, 2011 (the next business day after her release), she showed up at her workplace and it was at that moment that the dismissal letter was given to her, which established her absences from work as the cause. She recounted that in her town, San Ramón, it was said that she had been terminated for being *“linked to a drug gang”*, which is why, socially, her dismissal has been seen as a sanction. She requested the absolute, evident, and manifest nullity of the administrative dismissal act and reinstatement in her position. She also requested payment of back pay and other uncollected labor rights – including social security – damages, interest, and both costs (document filed on October 28, 2011, at 3:58:11 p.m.). The bank's general judicial attorney answered in the negative and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of current interest, and lack of standing to sue (document attached on February 6, 2012, at 3:10:23 p.m.). The first-instance judge declared the claim with merit and ordered the immediate reinstatement of the plaintiff in her position. The judge ordered the defendant – as damages – to pay back pay and other labor rights (including social security) ceased to be received during the entire time the worker has been or was outside the banking entity, as well as the deduction of social charges. He ordered payment of the sum of ₡15,000,000.00 for moral damages, interest – as damages – and both costs of the proceeding, setting the personal costs at the prudential sum of ₡3,000,000.00 (judgment filed on May 27, 2013, at 2:47:23 p.m.). Both parties appealed the decision (documents filed on June 4, 2013, at 4:24:39 p.m. and on August 27, 2013, at 2:57:32 p.m.). The Tribunal revoked the ruling insofar as it ordered the defendant to pay moral damages, which it denied, and confirmed it in all other respects (judgment attached on October 1, 2015, at 7:43:37 a.m.).

**II.- GRIEVANCES.** The plaintiff disagrees with what was ordered by the Ad-quem regarding moral damages. She considers that the contested judgment is not duly reasoned. She argues that the facts held as proven by the previous instances demonstrate that the bank dismissed her arbitrarily and suddenly, precisely when the Public Prosecutor's Office was conducting its investigative actions and the mass media maintained interest in reporting on the case, which occurred in San Ramón, where she works and lives. She alleges that the bank sought her out even at relatives' houses to notify her of the termination of the employment relationship. She states that the causal link between the claimed moral damages and the bank's arbitrary act is evident from the connection between the dismissal without employer liability and the publicity surrounding the case at that time. She points out that the previous instances established that the bank's conduct was irregular and reprehensible for having terminated her illegally. She stresses that if the bank had processed the dismissal in accordance with the procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement, it would have been issued outside of public and media exposure, whereby its harmful effects could have been lesser. She claims that what happened damaged her name and good image (document filed on November 23, 2015, at 11:24:21 a.m.).

**III.- ON THE SPECIFIC CASE.** The only point submitted for this Chamber's analysis is the one related to moral damages. This body's position, since ruling No. 481, at 10:40 a.m. on June 11, 2004, has been that in the labor venue it is feasible to indemnify it when it is caused by acts that exceed the employer's disciplinary power; that is, when facing specially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution No. 1151, at 9:45 a.m. on December 20, 2006, it was stated: *“Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not appropriate in every case, but only when the sanction was surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations.”* In a similar vein, judgment No. 359, at 9:40 a.m. on March 19, 2010, can be cited: *“So that the moral damages that can be compensated in the labor venue (when this occurs during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) is that inflicted by abuses of the employer's right, who, in the exercise of disciplinary authority, exceeds it, causing a damage distinct from the natural effects of a justified dismissal.”* In this specific case, the plaintiff requested payment of this item, as she believes that the dismissal executed by the bank was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents harm to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document filed on October 28, 2011, at 3:58:11 p.m.). In the first instance, this aspect was granted; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that the causal link between the alleged impairment and the defendant's conduct was not established. This Chamber disagrees with that reasoning. Upon reviewing the case record, it is evident that the banking entity engaged in an illegitimate and sudden act of dismissal, which led to its nullity being declared in this venue for being harmful to rights. Therefore, it is a source of moral damages. There is no doubt that the fact that the plaintiff was terminated on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared at the defendant's branch located in San Ramón to return to work, after the competent judicial authority authorized her release, affected her morally. It should be noted that the end of the employment relationship, as stated in the dismissal letter, was because the worker failed to report to work from March 15, 2011 (image 2 of the document filed on December 15, 2011, at 4:04:42 p.m.). However, according to the evidentiary material in the record, at that time a judicial investigation was being conducted against her for alleged money laundering, and on that day she was detained and brought before the Criminal Court of San Ramón, where pretrial detention for one year was imposed as a precautionary measure (images 13 and 14 of the document attached on December 15, 2011, at 4:04:42 p.m.). This last fact prevented her, for obvious reasons, from fulfilling her obligation to provide services to the bank; a circumstance that was well known to the employer. Note that, as can be seen from the testimony of both witnesses, the day after the detention, the plaintiff's brother personally went to her superior to inform him of what had happened. Furthermore, since these investigative actions were of interest to the press, it reported on what had occurred (images 62-67 of the document filed on December 15, 2011, at 4:04:42 p.m.). In accordance with the foregoing, the absences for which the plaintiff was blamed, being a direct consequence of an act beyond her control, of which her employer was aware, are justified, and therefore, the decision made by the defendant was disproportionate and arbitrary. Thus, in the judgment of this Chamber, the suffering the plaintiff had been experiencing by virtue of the judicial situation she was undergoing was compounded by the anguish of losing her job just upon leaving prison. Although that injury has been repaired, since the dismissal was declared null and the payment of back pay was ordered, the bank must compensate the distress it caused the worker by its action, which added to the grief she had been enduring. This is so, as provided by Article 41 of the Political Constitution and Article 1045 of the Civil Code. The former expressly stipulates: *“By resorting to the laws, all are to find reparation for injuries or damages received in their person, property, or moral interests. They must be afforded prompt, complete justice, without denial, and in strict conformity with the laws.”* And the latter reads: *“Anyone who, through deceit, fault, negligence, or imprudence, causes harm to another is obliged to repair it together with the damages.”* Furthermore, Articles 190 and 191 of the General Law of the Public Administration are a source of liability for the defendant Bank. Consequently, it is appropriate to revoke the known judgment insofar as it denied moral damages and to confirm on this point the first-instance judgment. However, in the judgment of this body, the amount granted must be modified. Based on a criterion of prudence and taking into consideration the described circumstances, the anguish and affliction suffered by the plaintiff, it is appropriate to set it at the sum of ₡3,000,000.00, as it is estimated that this is sufficient as retribution for the harm attributable to the defendant.

**IV.-** **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE ALLÓN ZÚÑIGA AND MAGISTRATE BLANCO GONZÁLEZ:** We depart from the majority's criterion for the reasons set forth below. In the labor venue, indemnification for moral damages caused by acts that exceed the employer's disciplinary power is feasible, that is, when facing specially qualified circumstances. Thus, in resolution No. 1151, at 9:45 a.m. on December 20, 2006, it was stated: *“Undoubtedly, any imposition of an unjust disciplinary measure causes moral suffering, but moral damages are not appropriate in every case, but only when the sanction was surrounded by truly exceptional and serious situations.”* In a similar vein, judgment No. 359, at 9:40 a.m. on March 19, 2010, can be cited: *“So that the moral damages that can be compensated in the labor venue (when this occurs during the term of the employment contract and even at the time of dismissal) is that inflicted by abuses of the employer's right, who, in the exercise of disciplinary authority, exceeds it, causing a damage distinct from the natural effects of a justified dismissal.”* In these cases, it is incumbent upon the victim – in accordance with Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure – to demonstrate the existence of harmful acts carried out by the employer, beyond the dismissal itself (Ruling No. 385, at 10:20 a.m. on April 12, 2013). In this specific case, the plaintiff alleges that the dismissal was arbitrary and damaged her social reputation, which represents harm to her honor and image (folio 15 of the document filed on October 28, 2011, at 3:58:11 p.m.). In the first instance, this aspect was granted; however, the appellate body denied it, considering that *“[…] although it is feasible to assume that the entire situation experienced by the plaintiff may have generated a moral injury both subjectively and objectively, above all due to the dissemination given to what occurred, it is not feasible to establish the causal link between that impairment and the defendant's conduct”* (image 19 of the attached judgment on October 1, 2015, at 7:43:37 a.m.). Having reviewed the proof provided in the record, we share the Tribunal's decision in this regard. The plaintiff did not prove, as was her burden, the causal link between the dismissal and the moral damages claimed. As can be extracted from the case file, the banking entity notified the worker of the dismissal letter on April 12, 2011, the day she appeared to return to work, notification that was made personally and without carrying out an *“excessive display”*, as the Ad-quem pointed out, so it cannot be affirmed that this behavior caused any injury to the plaintiff that must be compensated. The appellant argues that the mass media learned of her dismissal; however, she did not provide any evidentiary element that the defendant prompted publicity regarding that fact. Note that the newspaper articles offered as evidence allude to the plaintiff's detention and her alleged participation in the crime of money laundering, but do not mention the termination of employment (images 62-67 of the document filed on December 15, 2011, at 4:04:42 p.m.). It was not demonstrated that it was the defendant itself who provided that information to the press. Although it is alleged that the dismissal occurred when the plaintiff was being publicly exposed by the media and before the community of San Ramón, these circumstances cannot be attributed to the employer as they are alien to it. It must be considered that the bank has no influence over what the press publishes, nor what the people living in that canton know; consequently, it cannot be affirmed that these factors are its responsibility. Having analyzed the witnesses' statements, it is concluded that the afflictions suffered by the plaintiff derived mainly from the pretrial detention ordered against her and not directly from the dismissal. The bank's action did not cause the plaintiff an impairment, distinct from the natural effects of the dismissal, which should be compensated. The reported effects derive from the criminal investigation in which she was involved, and not from the dismissal action. Consequently, we conclude that the arguments raised by the appellant to justify the payment of moral damages are not admissible, and what was resolved in this regard by the appellate body must be confirmed.

**V.- NOTE FROM MAGISTRATE OLASO:** Regardless of sharing the criterion of the esteemed colleagues, in determining the existence of an illegitimate action by the defendant bank that generates compensation in favor of the plaintiff, I consider it important to determine that the basis for that compensation cannot derive from a norm founded on the criterion of subjective imputation, such as that regulated by Article 1045 of the Civil Code, due to the reasons I will set forth below.

**GENERALITIES ON CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY:** Authors Diez Picazo and De León establish that the initial seed of civil liability is found in classical Roman law (DIEZ PICAZO, Luis and DE LEÓN, Ponce “Derecho de daños”. Editorial Civitas, p. 41), which leads us to raise the possibility of seeking compensation within the scope of delictual action. For example, civil action was related to *“furtum”*, which was an action of a penal nature exercised on the occasion of infringements of rights or a thing. On the other hand, another action was the *“damnun iniuria datum”* which, thanks to the Tribune Aquilius, gave rise to the so-called *“Lex Aquilia”*. Among the most important norms of that law, we have the possibility of seeking compensation for the loss of slaves or a quadruped, so that, definitively, said action derives from material damage caused (Digest 9, 2, 2). Another important element for the evolution of this type of civil action is praetorian law, given that by its nature it was a less formal law and in which equity began to have an important content, in order to determine the nature and quantification of damage. Within the framework of these normative sources, we can conclude that in “classical” Roman Law, the following actions existed: 1) actions for injury or destruction of things, this gave grounds for exercising the so-called *“iniuria”*, which was an action exercised provided there was a causal link for the damage; 2) actions for bodily injuries and damages caused to the person; 3) actions for damages caused by animals or by a person's negligence (for example, damages while riding); 4) action of deceit, that is, having acted with the intention of causing damage; 5) lastly, the *“iniuria”* evolved to become an action that protects personality rights, but also continues to protect infringements of the right of possession and property. Also, the influence of the glossators and the natural law commentators proves decisive in the evolution of civil liability, mainly due to two aspects. The first lies in the fact that the spectrum of liability is broadened to situations generated not only by the agent but also by actions carried out by slaves, which generated the liability of their master – beginnings of *culpa “in vigilando”* (which in this case is of utmost importance). The second aspect has to do with the standing to collect compensation, because this stage allowed the heirs of the victim to collect compensation upon death, such as could be support payments. Within the evolutionary framework of liability, authors such as Hugo Grotius and Domat have an important influence, who formed the Naturalist School that influenced the Code. The contribution of the first of them consists of deriving civil action from an “illicit” act that could be caused by deceit or by culpable or negligent action. Along the same lines, Domat classifies the three types of causes from which the right to seek compensation could derive; among these we have quasi-contracts, contractual breaches, and crimes or felonies.

The influence of these schools led to the establishment, in 1792, of a provision in the Prussian Code that states the following: “<b><i>Any damage caused by malice or gross negligence resulting in serious personal injury or death must be punishable</i></b>”. The Code also adopts this same orientation, establishing: “<i>Article 1382. “</i>Of offenses and quasi-offenses. “<b><i>Any act of man that causes damage to another obliges the one through whose fault it occurred to repair it</i></b>”. Article 1383. <b><i>One is responsible not only for the damage caused by one's own act, but also for the act of persons for whom one must answer or of things one has under one's guard</i></b>”. Evidently, all this codification influences our national legislation, which I will mention throughout this note. What I do consider important is to establish the characteristics inherent to legislation derived from the Code, because evidently our civil legislation falls within these characteristics. The influence of that legislation on our civil law is evident. A simple reading of numeral 1045 of the Civil Code suffices to perceive this; however, it is necessary to highlight how the perspective on the nature of civil liability (responsabilidad civil) cannot be exhausted solely within this provision. The provision in question, like the Napoleonic legislation, starts from an act that is not only malicious but also negligent and imprudent by the agent causing the damage. Also, as a result of the historical and social moments surrounding France in the 18th century, it starts from an individualistic relationship between the agent and the victim, given that the legislator's mentality of that era did not even consider the effects of the risk theory inherent in massive industrial or commercial activity, much less that the State could be held liable for acting contrary to the legal system. I state this because one must remember that in 1804, France was developing an agricultural or artisanal economy, making it difficult to foresee the changes introduced by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Revolución Industrial" w:st="on">la Revolución Industrial</st1:PersonName>. Likewise, we were at a historical moment when it was difficult to foresee the liability of the state order for an unlawful act. Another important aspect for explaining the legislation from which ours derives is the important influence of Canon Law. Evidently, provisions like Article 1045 start from a premise from which derives the obligation of the victim to prove who the person was that generated the malicious or culpable act that ultimately caused the damage. When the victim faced situations where they could not prove these facts, either due to lack of evidence or the impossibility of obtaining it —due to the impossibility of obtaining it from the agent—, it was indicated that we were in the presence of “acts of God” of those executed as punishment upon the victim, therefore not compensable. In this way, compensation for damage was viewed as the “payment of a sin” and not as indemnification for the victim. Usually, and as <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala" w:st="on">la Sala</st1:PersonName> does in this vote, it has been indicated that civil liability finds its legal basis in Article 1045 of the Civil Code, which, as I indicated earlier, prescribes the obligation to repair damages together with losses, which were caused by malice (dolo), fault (culpa), negligence (negligencia), or imprudence (imprudencia). In reality, and according to the principle of the hierarchy of sources, the constitutional foundation of liability is found in numeral 41 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Carta Magna" w:st="on">la Carta Magna</st1:PersonName>, as it establishes: “<b><i>By recourse to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. Prompt and complete justice must be done for them, without denial and in strict accordance with the laws</i></b>”. Now, provisions like Article 1045 complement this general principle, given that they establish criteria of imputation (criterios de imputación) that are essential for determining substantive and procedural aspects, such as standing, the causal link (nexo causal), and the burden of proof. As established by <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala Primera" w:st="on">la Sala Primera</st1:PersonName> of <st1:PersonName ProductID="LA CORTE SUPREMA" w:st="on">la Corte Suprema</st1:PersonName> de Justicia, damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of civil liability. This is because the duty to compensate is only configured if there has been a harmful event that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to protection by the legal system (Voto número 112 of fourteen hours fifteen minutes of June fifteenth, nineteen ninety-five). For that Sala, “damage” is any impairment, loss, or deterioration of the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (injured party, damnificado) that causes the deprivation of a legal good protected by the legal system. Under this approach, the first essential element of civil liability is damage. Regarding the characteristics of damage, we find: 1) it must be certain; real and effective and not hypothetical; 2) there must be an injury to a legally relevant interest deserving of protection; 3) there must be a causal relationship (relación de causalidad) between the generating event and the damage. Another element that configures civil liability is the direct or efficient causal relationship that must exist between the behavior or unlawful conduct and the damage, the latter being the prerequisite for any type of liability, whether contractual or extracontractual (contractual o extracontractual), meaning its demonstration is also a *sine qua non* requirement for the compensation claim to succeed. The notion of culpability (culpabilidad) is another of the most important elements within extracontractual civil liability, since there must be fault on the part of the person causing the damage. Culpability constitutes a judgment of reproach, through which that person's liability is imputed. Without the existence of fault, the award of damages and losses (indemnización de daños y perjuicios) in favor of the victim cannot be granted, as it is necessary to demonstrate that the damage was caused by an act or omission attributable to a person. It is necessary, then, that the damage be attributed to the producing agent, either because it was done with intent or because it could have been avoided and was not, through negligent or imprudent action. This requirement of culpability is questioned by the national author Juan Marco Rivero Sánchez, who points out that such a requirement does not constitute a determining element for establishing liability. To base his argument, he relies on the provisions of Articles 38 through 40 of the Civil Code, relating to the capacity of persons. The author explains that if culpability were a requirement of civil liability, it would not be possible to demand any type of liability from persons under fifteen years of age, and, therefore, any possibility of requesting compensation would be extinguished. However, this is not the case because the possibility of collecting damages from the parents of the minor under fifteen years of age remains, provided the minor lives in their home (1047 of the Civil Code) twelve years – according to Article 6 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley" w:st="on">la Ley</st1:PersonName> de Justicia Penal Juvenil—, but the provision still maintains civil liability, shifting it to other subjects, pursuant to numeral 1048 of the Civil Code. Unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) constitutes behavior contrary to the legal system, meaning the action of the person generating the damage must be classified as a violation of the legal system. This unlawfulness generates different positions in the case of damages caused by a breach of the duty of care —negligence, imprudence, and lack of skill (impericia)—, given that when we find ourselves in these situations, evidently, there are justification causes that eliminate this condition, such as, for example, fortuitous event (caso fortuito) or force majeure (fuerza mayor). This requirement, as an essential element of civil liability, is disputed by part of the doctrine. Specifically, the author Rivero Sánchez points out that unlawfulness, within the framework of Costa Rican civil law, is not a requirement for the admissibility of civil liability, by virtue of the fact that there are provisions in the Civil Code that generate the obligation to compensate for damage, even though the conduct cannot be qualified as unlawful, given the existence of some cause that eliminates this unlawfulness. We find this legislative assumption in 1043 of the Civil Code, which provides: “<b><i>Licit and voluntary acts also produce, without the need of an agreement, civil rights and obligations, insofar as they benefit or prejudice third parties”</i></b>. Under the thesis of Rivero Sánchez, for example, in the case of the tale of “Goldilocks”, when the girl gets lost in the forest and breaks into the bears' house, eats their soup, and rests in their beds, we could perfectly classify this conduct as an unlawful act, characteristic of violation of domicile (Article 204 of the Penal Code). However, such unlawfulness disappears, given the existence of the state of necessity, as a justification cause, according to Article 27 ibidem, given that the girl is lost in the forest and very hungry. Despite this, according to said author, in application of numeral 1043 of the Civil Code, there would be an obligation to compensate the damage in favor of the bears, since licit acts also generate liability. The dualism between contractual and extracontractual liability has been the subject of discussion by doctrine over time. Authors like Yzquierdo Tolsada (YZQUIERDO TOLSADA, Mariano. “Responsabilidad civil contractual y extracontractual” Madrid, España, Editorial Reus, Tomo I, page 87) indicate that this dualism must be overcome, by virtue of the following reasons: a) of a substantive nature, because the damage is the same in either of the two fields, so there is no logical reason to give different treatment to “contractual” and “extracontractual” damage; b) systematic, by reason that in both there is conduct or omission that generates the damage, only that in contractual liability said conduct occurs by reason of non-compliance; c) practical, given that it is often not easy to determine whether we are facing a case of contractual or extracontractual liability. For example, in cases of application of numeral 35 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley" w:st="on">la Ley</st1:PersonName> de Promoción de <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Competencia" w:st="on">la Competencia</st1:PersonName> y Defensa efectiva del consumidor. In Roman law, as I explained earlier, this difference was marked, since liability deriving from the law of the XII Tables was contractual, while that deriving from <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Lex Aquilia" w:st="on">la Lex Aquilia</st1:PersonName> was extracontractual. Our Civil Code also differentiates between civil liability derived from a contract (Articles 701 et seq.), and extracontractual civil liability (Articles 1045 et seq.). For persons who support the division between both types of liability, extracontractual liability is constituted by active or omissive conduct, referring to the absence of a prior contract, that is, it arises when damage is caused without an existing prior link, contract, or obligation. Pérez Vargas, in his work “Principios de Responsabilidad Civil Extracontractual”, indicates that for extracontractual liability to occur, the presence of two elements is necessary: “…<i>A behavior that serves as a criterion of imputation, be it culpable harm or harm derived from the creation of a risk, and a harmful result impacting a legally relevant interest, or what would be damage in a broad sense, material or moral…”</i>. Likewise, the cited author explains that for the person causing the damage to be obligated to repair it, a causal link (nexo de causalidad) between their conduct and the damage produced is necessary, meaning the damage must be the direct and immediate consequence of the conduct. Articles 1045, 1046, and 1048 of the Civil Code refer to extracontractual civil liability. This type of liability does not arise from the breach of a specific bond, but rather from a violation of the general duty not to harm others. Regarding contractual liability, <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala Primera" w:st="on">la Sala Primera</st1:PersonName> of <st1:PersonName ProductID="LA CORTE SUPREMA" w:st="on">la Corte Suprema</st1:PersonName> de Justicia has considered: <i>“… contractual liability presupposes the existence of a specific legal obligation, freely agreed upon by the parties, and also the fact that such obligation has been culpably breached by the obligor. The burden of proof lies with the creditor… if the creditor alleges malice (dolo), it is not enough to demonstrate the breach, but rather the malice must be proven in order for it to generate the corresponding legal consequences (Articles 701 and 702 of the Civil Code). The breach is malicious when the debtor voluntarily and intentionally breaches their obligation, causing damage to their creditor. Malice, as provided by Article 701 of the Civil Code, is not presumed, and whoever commits it is always obligated to indemnify the damages and losses caused thereby, even if the contrary had been agreed”</i>. Another of the conceptual differences, according to <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala Primera" w:st="on">la Sala Primera</st1:PersonName>, lies in the burden of proof. In contractual liability, it is sufficient to demonstrate the breach for fault to exist, whereas in subjective extracontractual civil liability, it is necessarily required to demonstrate fault (negligence (negligencia), imprudence (imprudencia), lack of skill (impericia)) or malice (dolo), on which the liability of the person causing the damage is based (Voto número 320, of thirteen hours on December fifteenth, nineteen ninety).

**THE OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA OF IMPUTATION FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DAMAGE.** The subjective or objective criteria of imputation constitute frames of reference used to impute liability to the person generating the damage. In the case of the former – subjective – they are those based on aspects such as malice or fault, so that, upon the verification of unlawful behavior – malicious or culpable – the obligation to repair arises. The imputation for such conduct can be for one's own behavior or for the conduct of another, i.e., for an act of a third party (hecho ajeno). This is why doctrine speaks of direct and indirect subjective liability, the latter being enshrined in numeral 1048 of our Civil Code, “culpa in eligendo” and “culpa in vigilando”. Now, fault and malice are not necessary to ground the process of civil liability. If that were the case, in many instances there would be a denial of access to justice, especially in those situations where the victim is unable to demonstrate the negligence or lack of skill of the person who caused the damage. This is why the courts and doctrine have elevated the standards of diligence to objective criteria, as for example in the cases of Article 190 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración Pública" w:st="on">la Administración Pública</st1:PersonName> and numeral 35 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley" w:st="on">la Ley</st1:PersonName> de Promoción de Competencia y Defensa efectiva del consumidor. As for the criteria of objective imputation, the parameters for imputing liability are based on the so-called “risk theory” or on the action of a party that, due to its legal characteristics, must assume a higher degree of liability than the common denominator, for example, in the case of the State and its liability for the actions performed by its officials. In the case of the risk theory, the premise is that a natural or legal person who exercises or benefits from an activity with potentially dangerous elements must also bear its inconveniences. This theory is also known by the name of “<i>created damage”</i> the paradigm of imputation of which consists in attributing the damage to any person who introduces into society a virtual element capable of producing it, dispensing with the agent's subjectivity. Consequently, the source of obligations in objective liability is not fault, negligence, or malice, but rather the risky activity carried out by the agent, which causes, in the face of any harmful result to legally relevant interests —be it life, security, health, etcetera— a need to repair the damage (Rivero Sánchez, Ob. Cit. Page 70).

**IN THE CASE BEFORE US, THE CRITERION OF OBJECTIVE IMPUTATION OF NUMERAL 190 OF LA LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA IS APPLICABLE, AND NOT ARTICLE 1045 OF THE CIVIL CODE.** Having explained the difference between both criteria of imputation, it is evident that in this case, the objective imputation provided for by numeral 190 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración Pública." w:st="on">la Administración Pública.</st1:PersonName> is applicable. That regulation is applicable to the sued bank, as established by Article 2 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley Orgánica" w:st="on">la Ley Orgánica</st1:PersonName> of said bank, which, although it provides that it is a non-state public law entity (with its own legal personality and patrimony and with full administrative and functional autonomy<u>), emphasizes that its functioning will be governed by public law norms</u>. In that sense, subsection 1° of Article 2 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración Pública" w:st="on">la Administración Pública</st1:PersonName> provides that the provisions of that regulation will apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special norm for them. Returning to <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley Orgánica" w:st="on">la Ley Orgánica</st1:PersonName> del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, its Article 47 regulates that this bank will have the same responsibilities and obligations that correspond to banks, pursuant to <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley Orgánica" w:st="on">la Ley Orgánica</st1:PersonName> del Banco Central and <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley Orgánica" w:st="on">la Ley Orgánica</st1:PersonName> del Sistema Bancario Nacional. The first of these laws does not have a general provision regarding bank liability for the entity's unlawful actions. Meanwhile, numerals 27 and 28 of the second do establish scenarios of subjective joint and several liability for the members of the banks' boards of directors, but do not regulate what concerns the bank's liability as an entity for the actions inherent to its functioning. In what interests us, numeral 27 stipulates: “ <b><u>Each Board of Directors will exercise its functions with absolute independence and under its exclusive responsibility, within the norms established by applicable laws, regulations, and technical principles. The members of the boards of directors shall have the most complete freedom to proceed in the exercise of their functions according to their conscience and their own judgment, for which reason they shall be personally responsible for their management in the general direction of the respective bank. Any liability that, in accordance with the laws, may be attributed to them for malice, fault, or negligence shall fall upon them. Those who have not recorded their dissenting vote shall respond personally with their assets for the losses caused to the Bank by the authorization of operations prohibited by law, or that have been authorized through malice, fault, or negligence…”. </u></b>Similarly, Article 28 of that same law provides that “<b>Any act, resolution, or omission of a Board of Directors that contravenes legal and regulatory provisions or that signifies the use of the bank's funds in activities other than those inherent to its functions, shall cause all those present at the respective session to incur personal and joint and several liability to the bank, the State, and affected third parties, for the damages and losses produced thereby. From such liability, only those attendees who have recorded their dissenting vote or their objection in the minutes of the corresponding session shall be exempt. All of the foregoing without prejudice to other legal sanctions that may apply to them. “. </b>Therefore, in the absence of a general provision that holds state banking entities liable for unlawful actions taken in the exercise of their functions, <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración Pública" w:st="on">la Administración Pública</st1:PersonName> results applicable as the regime of objective liability for this type of entities. It has been demonstrated that the plaintiff worked for the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal until she was dismissed without employer liability. This dismissal was justified because the plaintiff was detained at her parents' house, by order of a jurisdictional authority in criminal matters, for alleged money laundering. It was the Director of the legal area of the employer bank who made that fact publicly known. Subsequently, a release order was issued in her favor, and, despite this, on the same day, two bank officials communicated her dismissal to her, which her mother did not receive, but rather it was upon presenting herself for work – on April 12, 2011 – that she was formally given the respective letter, based on absences from attending work. She points out as a cause for compensation that, as a result of the administration's unlawful action, in her town of San Ramón it was said that she had been dismissed for being linked to a gang of drug traffickers. It is for this reason that, among other claims, the plaintiff requests compensation for the moral damage (daño moral) generated by the dismissal action. Regarding damages, the trial judge grants them, but resorting to the objective parameter of six months' salary established by numeral 82 of the Labor Code. However, in his analysis, he never justified his decision based on negligent or imprudent action by the officials involved in the plaintiff's dismissal. In other words, no recourse was made to a criterion of subjective imputation provided for by Article 1045 of the Civil Code – this despite the provision being mentioned in the judgment, but without grounding why it is applicable to the case—. Despite this, the trial court granted compensation of fifteen million colones to the plaintiff for moral damage. That judgment was overturned by the Tribunal (Tribunal). In her appeal, the plaintiff does not raise any outline regarding a criterion of subjective imputation on the part of the bank's public officials, but rather justifies her decision on what she calls an “arbitrary and unannounced dismissal (despido arbitrario e intempestivo)” by the banking entity, so much so that the a-quo court determined that said sanction had been illegal, precisely for having infringed the provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement, since if the procedure established in the agreement had been followed, the dismissal would have been processed without public and media exposure. In other words, the moral damage is based on a criterion of objective imputation provided for by subsection 1° of numeral 190 of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Ley General" w:st="on">la Ley General</st1:PersonName> de <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Administración Pública." w:st="on">la Administración Pública.</st1:PersonName> This norm establishes: “<b><i>1. The administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its licit or illicit, normal or abnormal functioning, except force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party…”. </i></b>In this case, by proving the unannounced and unfounded act of dismissal, the defendant must be ordered to pay damages because its action was unlawful, since that action is based on not having respected the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement that order secrecy to be maintained regarding the dismissal actions processed. The application of the criterion of objective imputation derived from that norm implies that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to demonstrate said damage and the causal link caused by that arbitrary and unlawful dismissal in order to be entitled to compensation, regardless of whether she demonstrates negligent or imprudent action by the officials linked to the dismissal act. Note that both the instance judges and the majority of <st1:PersonName ProductID="la Sala" w:st="on">la Sala</st1:PersonName> understand it this way, since the vote does not analyze even remotely the breach of the duty of care or the malice of the officials, but rather the reasons center on an unlawful and unannounced act of dismissal, that is, nothing more and nothing less than a criterion of objective imputation from the first paragraph of numeral 190 ibidem.

**POR TANTO:** In what has been the subject of appeal, the judgment under review is overturned solely with regard to its denial of payment for moral damage. In its place, in this regard, the first instance judgment is confirmed, modifying the amount of this item, which is set at the sum of three million colones.

The Magistrates Allón and Blanco dissent and confirm the appealed judgment.

**Orlando Aguirre Gómez** **Eva María Camacho Vargas Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez** **Flora Marcela Allón Zúñiga Héctor Luis Blanco González** **Res: 2016-000410** PROJASM/Iva 2 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2257-55-94. Emails: [email protected] and mbrenesm @poder-judicial.go.cr

*110040861027CA* *110040861027CA* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2016-000410 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintinueve de abril de dos mil dieciséis.

Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José (oral-electrónico), por [Nombre 001], [...], contra el BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL, representado por su apoderado general judicial el licenciado GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS, casado, vecino de Heredia. Actúa como apoderado especial judicial de la actora el licenciado Esteban Calvo Rodríguez, soltero, vecino de San José. Todos mayores, abogados, con la excepción indicada.

RESULTANDO:

1.- La actora, en escrito de demanda de fecha dieciocho de julio de dos mil once, promovió la presente acción para que en sentencia se declarara la nulidad del acto administrativo de despido que ejecutó el banco en su contra, como a restituirla en su puesto de trabajo con el pleno goce de sus derechos laborales; así como al pago de salarios caídos y demás derechos laborales dejados de percibir, incluidos los referidos a la seguridad social, indemnización de los daños psicológico y moral ocasionados, intereses y ambas costas del proceso.

2.- El demandado contestó la acción en los términos que indica en el memorial de fecha primero de febrero de dos mil doce y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de interés actual y falta de legitimación activa.

3.- El Juzgado de Trabajo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José (oral-electrónico), por sentencia de las trece horas del veintisiete de mayo de dos mil trece, dispuso: “ Conforme lo expuesto, normativa aplicable y artículo 492 siguientes y concordantes del Código de Trabajo, se rechazan las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de interés actual y falta de legitimación activa, declarándose CON LUGAR la presente demanda ordinaria laboral establecida por la señora [Nombre 001] , contra BANCO POPULAR Y DE DESARROLLO COMUNAL, representado por su Apoderado General Judicial señor GIOVANNY MOREIRA ARIAS, razón por la cual se declara lo siguiente: que el despido sin responsabilidad patronal ejecutado en contra de la actora por parte de la demandada, fue completamente ilegal y nulo por la violación al debido proceso, y materialmente injustificado, razón por la cual, los efectos de esta declaratoria deben retrotraerse al momento o fecha de dicho acto ilegal, de manera que las cosas deben volver al estado en que se encontraban antes de su emisión. En consecuencia, lo procedente es reinstalar a la actora en su cargo de manera inmediata, confirmándose así la medida cautelar dictada interlocutoriamente, a menos de que alguna otra causa legal o administrativa lo impidiera. Debiendo pagar la demandada a la actora, a título de daños todos los salarios caídos y demás derechos laborales que hubiese dejado de percibir, incluyendo los derechos referidos a la seguridad social, durante el tiempo que ha estado o estuvo fuera de la institución bancaria, aclarando que estos salarios caídos y demás derechos que deberá cancelar y reconocer la demandada a la actora, son del tiempo que efectivamente hubiese estado fuera de la institución sin percibirlos o sin habérsele reconocido por parte de la entidad bancaria. Rubros que deberán liquidarse administrativamente, esto sin perjuicio de que en caso de inconformidad acuda la parte actora, a la respectiva ejecución de sentencia en esta vía judicial, a excepción del daño moral, extremo que se acoge y deberá cancelar la demandada a la actora en la suma prudencial de quince millones de colones, a razón de cinco millones de colones por daño moral subjetivo, y diez millones de colones por daño moral objetivo; y a título de perjuicios, los intereses legales sobres dichas sumas a partir del momento en que cada una fue haciéndose exigible y hasta su efectivo pago, según la tasa prevista en el artículo 1163 del Código Civil, que corresponde a la que paga el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica por los certificados de depósito a seis meses plazo; rubros que como ya se indicó podrán liquidarse administrativamente, sin perjuicio que en caso de inconformidad se pueden determinará en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia. Además, sobre los montos a pagar deberá hacerse el rebajo de las cargas sociales en lo que sea legalmente procedente. Se condena a la parte demandada al pago de ambas costas del juicio, fijándose las personales en la suma prudencial de tres millones de colones...” (Sic).

4.- Ambas partes apelaron y el Tribunal de Trabajo, Sección Tercera, del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, por sentencia de las ocho horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintiocho de setiembre de dos mil quince, resolvió: “No existiendo errores ni omisiones capaces de producir nulidad o indefensión, es con lugar parcialmente el recurso de apelación promovido por el demandado, de modo que se declara sin lugar la aspiración de la actora para que el Banco accionado le indemnice el daño moral. Es sin lugar la apelación adhesiva presentada por la actora. Salvo lo indicado, en lo que es objeto de impugnación, se confirma la sentencia de primera instancia…” 5.- La parte actora formuló recurso para ante esta Sala, en memorial fechado veinte de noviembre de dos mil quince, el cual se fundamenta en las razones que de seguido se dirán en la parte considerativa.

6.- En los procedimientos se han observado las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Aguirre Gómez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- ANTECEDENTES. La actora afirmó que laboró para el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal del 18 de enero de 2001 al 4 de abril de 2011, día en que fue despedida sin responsabilidad patronal. Según lo indicó, la relación laboral cesó porque el día 15 de marzo de 2011 fue detenida en casa de sus padres, por orden del Juzgado Penal de San Ramón, por supuesta legitimación de capitales; hecho que se hizo de dominio público. Mencionó que en su contra se dictó, como medida cautelar, prisión preventiva por un año. Según lo apuntó, el Director del Área Jurídica del banco declaró ante la prensa que dicha entidad fue la que denunció las supuestas irregularidades y coordinó con las autoridades judiciales su detención. Aseveró que, a pesar de que el banco conocía su situación, le pidió a su hermano que se apersonara a la sucursal de San Ramón y le informara al Gerente General, quien era su jefe inmediato, lo sucedido. Señaló que el 8 de abril de 2011 se dictó orden de libertad a su favor y que ese mismo día dos funcionarios del banco se presentaron en la casa de sus padres para notificarle la carta de despido; la cual su madre se negó a recibir porque ella no vive ahí. Según lo relató, el 12 de abril de 2011 (día hábil siguiente a su liberación) se presentó a su lugar de trabajo y fue en ese momento cuando se le entregó la carta de despido; en la cual se estableció como causal sus ausencias a laborar. Refirió que en su pueblo, San Ramón, se decía que a ella la habían cesado por estar “ligada con una banda de narcos”, por lo cual, socialmente, su despido se ha visto como una sanción. Solicitó la nulidad absoluta, evidente y manifiesta del acto administrativo de despido y la reinstalación en su puesto. Pidió, además, el pago de salarios caídos y demás derechos laborales dejados de percibir –incluidos los de seguridad social-; daños y perjuicios, intereses y ambas costas (documento incorporado el 28 de octubre de 2011 a las 03:58:11 p.m.). El apoderado general judicial del banco contestó en términos negativos y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de interés actual y falta de legitimación activa (documento adjuntado el 6 de febrero de 2012 a las 03:10:23 p.m.). El juez de primera instancia declaró con lugar la demanda y dispuso reinstalar a la demandante en su cargo de manera inmediata. Condenó al accionado –a título de daños- al pago de salarios caídos y demás derechos laborales (incluidos los de seguridad social) dejados de percibir durante todo el tiempo que la trabajadora ha estado o estuvo fuera de la entidad bancaria; así como al rebajo de las cargas sociales. Ordenó pagar la suma de ₡15.000.000,00 por concepto de daño moral, intereses –a título de perjuicios- y ambas costas del proceso, fijó las personales en la suma prudencial de ₡3.000.000,00 (sentencia incluida el 27 de mayo de 2013 a las 02:47:23 p.m.). Ambas partes apelaron lo resuelto (documentos incorporados el 4 de junio de 2013 a las 04:24:39 p.m. y el 27 de agosto de 2013 a las 02:57:32 p.m.). El Tribunal revocó el fallo en cuanto condenó al demandado al pago de daño moral, el cual denegó, y en lo demás lo confirmó (sentencia adjuntada el 1º de octubre de 2015 a las 07:43:37 a.m.).

II.- AGRAVIOS. La accionante se muestra disconforme con lo dispuesto por el Ad-quem respecto del daño moral. Considera que el fallo impugnado no está debidamente fundamentado. Argumenta que los hechos tenidos por probados por las instancias precedentes demuestran que el banco la despidió de manera arbitraria e intempestiva, justo cuando el Ministerio Público llevaba a cabo sus actuaciones investigativas y los medios de comunicación masiva mantenían interés por informar sobre el caso; el cual se dio en San Ramón, lugar donde trabaja y habita. Alega que el banco la buscó hasta en casas de familiares para notificarle el cese de la relación laboral. Refiere que el nexo causal entre el daño moral reclamado y el acto arbitrario del banco se evidencia con la conexión entre el despido sin responsabilidad patronal y la publicidad que sobre el caso existía para esa época. Señala que las instancias precedentes establecieron que la conducta del banco fue irregular y reprochable por haberla cesado de manera ilegal. Destaca que si el banco hubiera tramitado el despido de conformidad con el procedimiento establecido en la convención colectiva, este se hubiera dictado fuera de la exposición pública y mediática, con lo cual los efectos gravosos de este hubieran podido ser menores. Aduce que lo sucedido dañó su nombre y buena imagen (documento incluido el 23 de noviembre de 2015 a las 11:24:21 a.m.).

III.- SOBRE EL CASO CONCRETO. El único punto sometido al análisis de esta Sala es el relacionado con el daño moral. La posición de este órgano, a partir del voto n.º 481, de las 10:40 horas del 11 de junio de 2004, ha sido la de que en sede laboral es factible indemnizarlo cuando sea causado por actos que extralimiten el poder sancionador del patrono; es decir, cuando se esté ante circunstancias especialmente calificadas. Así, en la resolución n.º 1151, de las 9:45 horas del 20 de diciembre de 2006, se señaló: “Indudablemente, toda imposición de una medida disciplinaria injusta causa un sufrimiento moral, mas no en todo caso es procedente el daño moral, sino tan solo cuando la sanción haya estado rodeada de situaciones realmente excepcionales y graves”. En similar orientación, cabe citar la sentencia n.º 359, de las 9:40 horas del 19 de marzo de 2010: “De modo que el daño moral que puede ser indemnizado en la vía laboral (cuando este se produce durante la vigencia del contrato de trabajo e incluso al momento del despido) es aquel irrogado por abusos del derecho del empleador, quien en el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria se excede causando un daño distinto a los efectos naturales del despido justificado”. En el caso concreto, la actora requirió el pago de este rubro, pues estima que el despido ejecutado por el banco fue arbitrario y lesionó su reputación social, lo que representa un daño a su honor e imagen (folio 15 del documento incorporado el 28 de octubre de 2011 a las 03:58:11 p.m.). En primera instancia este extremo fue concedido; sin embargo, el órgano de alzada lo denegó, por considerar que no se estableció el nexo causal entre el menoscabo alegado y la conducta del accionado. Esta Sala difiere de ese razonamiento. Revisados los autos, se tiene que la entidad bancaria incurrió en un acto ilegítimo e intempestivo de despido, que dio lugar a que en esta sede se dictara su nulidad, por ser lesivo de derechos. Luego, es fuente de daño moral. No cabe duda de que el hecho de que la demandante haya sido cesada el 12 de abril de 2011, día en que esta se presentó -en la sucursal del demandado ubicada en San Ramón- para reincorporarse a su trabajo, después de que la autoridad judicial competente autorizara su liberación, la afectó moralmente. Obsérvese que el término de la relación laboral, según se consignó en la carta de despido, se debió a que la trabajadora no se presentó a laborar desde el 15 de marzo de 2011 (imagen 2 del documento incorporado el 15 de diciembre de 2011 a las 04:04:42 p.m.). No obstante, según el material probatorio que consta en el judicial en su contra, por supuesta legitimación de capitales, y ese día fue detenida y presentada ante el Juzgado Penal de San Ramón, donde se le impuso –como medida cautelar- prisión preventiva por un año (imágenes 13 y 14 del documento adjuntado el 15 de diciembre de 2011 a las 04:04:42 p.m.). Este último hecho le impidió, por razones obvias, cumplir con su obligación de prestar sus servicios al banco; circunstancia que era bien conocida por la parte empleadora. Véase que, según se advierte de la declaración de ambos testigos, al día siguiente de la detención, el hermano de la accionante fue personalmente donde el jefe de esta a ponerlo en conocimiento de lo sucedido. Además, como dichas actuaciones investigativas resultaron de interés de la prensa, esta dio noticia de lo acontecido (imágenes 62-67 del documento incorporado el 15 de diciembre de 2011 a las 04:04:42 p.m.). De conformidad con lo anterior, las ausencias reprochadas a la actora, al ser consecuencia directa de un acto ajeno a su voluntad, del cual su patrono sabía, resultan justificadas y, por ende, la decisión tomada por el accionado fue desproporcionada y arbitraria. Así las cosas, a criterio de esta Sala, al sufrimiento que venía experimentando la demandante, en virtud de la situación judicial por la que atravesaba, se le añadió la angustia de quedarse sin trabajo justo al salir de prisión. Si bien esa lesión se encuentra restañada, por cuanto se declaró la nulidad del despido y se ordenó el pago de los salarios caídos, el banco debe compensar el desconsuelo que le ocasionó a la trabajadora con su actuación, el cual vino a sumarse a la pesadumbre que venía soportando. Esto, por así disponerlo los artículos 41 de la Constitución Política y 1045 del Código Civil. El primero de ellos, a texto expreso, estipula: “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Debe hacérseles justicia pronta, cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes”. Y el segundo reza: “Todo aquel que por dolo, falta, negligencia o imprudencia, causa a otro un daño, está obligado a repararlo junto con los perjuicios”. Además, son fuente de responsabilidad para el Banco demandado los asrtículos 190 y 191 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. En consecuencia, procede revocar el fallo que se conoce en cuanto denegó el daño moral y confirmar en ese extremo el de primera instancia. No obstante, a juicio de este órgano la cuantía otorgada debe ser modificada. Con base en un criterio de prudencia y tomando en consideración las circunstancias descritas, la angustia y aflicción sufridas por la accionante, procede fijarlo en la suma de ₡3.000.000,00; por estimarse que esta resulta suficiente como retribución al aporte del daño atribuible al demandado.

IV.- VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA ALLÓN ZÚÑIGA Y DEL MAGISTRADO BLANCO GONZÁLEZ:. Nos apart amos del criterio de mayoría por las razones que a continuación exponemos. En sede laboral, es factible la indemnización del daño moral causado por actos que extralimiten el poder sancionador del patrono, es decir, cuando se esté ante circunstancias especialmente calificadas. Así, en la resolución n.º 1151, de las 9:45 horas del 20 de diciembre de 2006, se señaló: “Indudablemente, toda imposición de una medida disciplinaria injusta causa un sufrimiento moral, mas no en todo caso es procedente el daño moral, sino tan solo cuando la sanción haya estado rodeada de situaciones realmente excepcionales y graves”. En similar orientación, cabe citar la sentencia n.º 359, de las 9:40 horas del 19 de marzo de 2010: “De modo que el daño moral que puede ser indemnizado en la vía laboral (cuando este se produce durante la vigencia del contrato de trabajo e incluso al momento del despido) es aquel irrogado por abusos del derecho del empleador, quien en el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria se excede causando un daño distinto a los efectos naturales del despido justificado”. En estos casos, corresponde a la víctima -de conformidad con el artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil- demostrar la existencia de hechos dañosos llevados a cabo por el empleador, más allá del despido mismo (Voto n.º 385, de las 10:20 horas del 12 de abril de 2013). En el caso concreto, alega la actora que el despido fue arbitrario y lesionó su reputación social, lo que representa un daño a su honor e imagen (folio 15 del documento incorporado el 28 de octubre de 2011 a las 03:58:11 p.m.). En primera instancia este extremo fue concedido; sin embargo, el órgano de alzada lo denegó, por considerar que “[…] si bien es dable asumir que toda la situación vivida por la actora le haya generado una lesión moral tanto en lo subjetivo como en lo objetivo, sobre todo por la difusión que se le dio a lo acaecido, no es factible establecer el nexo causal entre ese menoscabo y la conducta de la demandada” (imagen 19 de la sentencia adjuntada el 1º de octubre de 2015 a las 07:43:37 a.m.). Revisada la prueba allegada a los autos, compartimos lo dispuesto por el Tribunal al respecto. La demandante no acreditó, tal y como le correspondía, el nexo causal entre el despido y el daño moral reclamado. Según se extrae del expediente, la entidad bancaria notificó a la trabajadora la carta de despido el 12 de abril de 2011, día en que esta se presentó para reincorporarse a su trabajo, notificación que se hizo de manera personal y sin llevar a cabo un “despliegue excesivo”, como lo apuntó el Ad-quem, por lo que no puede afirmarse que este comportamiento ocasionara algún perjuicio a la accionante que deba ser indemnizado. La parte recurrente aduce que los medios de comunicación colectiva tuvieron conocimiento de su despido; sin embargo no aportó elemento probatorio alguno de que el demandado motivara la publicidad en ese hecho. Véase que las notas periodísticas ofrecidas como prueba, aluden a la detención de la actora y su supuesta participación en el delito de legitimación de capitales, mas no hacen mención al cese de labores (imágenes 62-67 del documento incorporado el 15 de diciembre de 2011 a las 04:04:42 p.m.). No se demostró que fuera el propio accionado el que brindó dicha información a la prensa. Aunque se alega que el despido ocurrió cuando la actora estaba siendo expuesta públicamente por los medios de comunicación y ante la comunidad de San Ramón, estas circunstancias no pueden ser atribuidas a la parte empleadora pues le resultan ajenas. Tómese en cuenta que el banco no tiene injerencia sobre lo que publique la prensa, ni lo que conozcan las personas que habitan en dicho cantón, por consiguiente, no puede afirmarse que estos factores sean su responsabilidad. Analizadas las declaraciones de los testigos, se concluye que las aflicciones sufridas por la accionante derivaron, principalmente, por la prisión preventiva dictada en su contra y no propiamente por el despido. La actuación del banco no causó a la actora un menoscabo, distinto a los efectos naturales del despido, que deba ser indemnizado. Las afectaciones expuestas derivan de la investigación penal en la cual ella se vio involucrada, y no por la acción de despido. Por consiguiente, concluimos que los alegatos planteados por la recurrente para justificar el pago del daño moral no resultan de recibo y, lo resuelto al respecto por el órgano de alzada, debe confirmarse .

V.- NOTA DEL MAGISTRADO OLASO: Independientemente de compartir el criterio de los estimables compañeros y de las compañeras, en cuanto determinan la existencia de un actuar ilegítimo del banco accionado que genera un resarcimiento a favor de la actora. Considero importante determinar que el fundamento de ese resarcimiento no puede derivar de una norma fundada en el criterio de imputación subjetiva como el regulado por el artículo 1045 del Código Civil, debido a las razones que a continuación expondré.

GENERALIDADES SOBRE LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL: Los autores Diez Picazo y De León establecen que la semilla inicial de la responsabilidad civil se encuentra en el derecho romano clásico (DIEZ PICAZO, Luis y DE LEÓN, Ponce “Derecho de daños”. Editorial Civitas, pág. 41), lo cual nos lleva a plantear la posibilidad de solicitar un resarcimiento dentro del ámbito de la acción delictiva. Así por ejemplo, se relacionaba la acción civil con el “furtum”, que era una acción de naturaleza penal que se ejercitaba con ocasión de infracciones a los derechos o una cosa. Por otro lado, otra acción era la “damnun innuria datum” la cual gracias al Tribuno Aquilino, dio origen a la llamada “ Lex Aquilia”. Dentro de las normas más importantes de dicha ley tenemos la posibilidad de solicitar un resarcimiento ante la pérdida de los esclavos o de algún cuadrúpedo, por lo que, definitivamente, dicha acción deriva de un daño material causado (Digesto 9, 2, 2).Otro elemento importante para la evolución de este tipo de acción civil lo constituye el derecho pretoriano, dada que por su naturaleza era un derecho menos formal y en que la equidad comienza a tener un contenido importante, a fin de determinar la naturaleza y cuantificación del daño.En el marco de estas fuentes normativas podemos concluir que en el Derecho Romano “clásico” existían las siguientes acciones: 1) acciones ante la lesión o destrucción de las cosas, esto daba pauta para ejercer la llamada “inuiria” que era una acción ejercida siempre y cuando existiera un nexo causal del daño; 2) acciones por lesiones corporales y daños causados a la persona; 3) acciones por daños causados por animales o por negligencia de la persona (por ejemplo, daños al cabalgar); 4) acción de dolo, o sea haber actuado con intención de generar un daño; 5) por último, la “inuiria” evoluciona hasta convertirse en una acción que tutela los derechos de la personalidad, pero también sigue tutelando infracciones al derecho de posesión y de propiedad. También, la influencia de los glosadores y de los comentaristas iusnaturalistas, resulta determinante dentro de la evolución de la responsabilidad civil, principalmente por dos aspectos. El primero radica en el hecho de que se amplía el espectro de la responsabilidad ante situaciones generadas ya no solo por el agente, sino también ante actuaciones desplegadas por los esclavos, los cuales generaban la responsabilidad de su amo –inicios de la culpa “in vigilando”- (lo que en este caso es de suma importancia). El segundo aspecto tiene que ver con la legitimación para cobrar el resarcimiento, debido a que esta etapa se permitía que los herederos o herederas de la víctima cobrasen indemnizaciones ante la muerte, tal y como podrán ser los alimentos. Dentro del marco evolutivo de la responsabilidad tiene una importante influencia autores como Hugo Grocio y Domat, los cuales conformaban la Escuela Naturalista que influencio el Code. El aporte del primero de ellos consiste en derivar la acción civil de un hecho “ilícito” que podía ser ocasionado con dolo o por actuar culposo o negligente. Bajo esta misma línea, Domat, clasifica los tres tipos de causas de las que podrían derivarse el derecho a solicitar un resarcimiento, entre éstas tenemos, los cuasicontratos, los incumplimientos contractuales y los crímenes o delitos. La influencia de estas escuelas determina que el año 1792 se estatuya en el Código Prusiano una norma que establece lo siguiente: “Todo daño causado por dolo o por negligencia grave que genere una enfermedad personal grave o la muerte debe ser punible”. También el Code toma esta misma orientación al establecer: “Artículo 1382. “De los delitos y cuasidelitos. “Cualquier hecho del hombre, que causa a otro un daño, obliga a repararlo a aquél por cuya culpa ha ocurrido”.Artículo 1383. Es responsable no solo del daño causado por hecho propio, sino también por el hecho de las personas que deba responder o de las cosas que uno tiene bajo su guarda”. Evidentemente, toda esta codificación tiene una influencia en nuestra normativa nacional, de lo que haré mención a lo largo de esta nota, lo que sí considero importante es establecer cuáles son las características propias de una legislación derivada del Code, porque evidentemente nuestra normativa civil entra dentro de estas características. La influencia de esa normativa dentro de nuestra legislación civil es evidente. Basta hacer lectura del numeral 1045 del Código Civil para percibir esto, no obstante es necesario destacar cómo la perspectiva acerca de la naturaleza de la responsabilidad civil no puede agotarse tan solo dentro de esta norma. La norma en cuestión parte, al igual que la legislación Napoleónica, de un actuar ya no solo doloso sino también negligente e imprudente de parte del agente que genera el daño. También como fruto de los momentos históricos y sociales que rodeaban a Francia en el siglo XVIII, se parte de una relación individualista entre el agente y la víctima, dado que ni siquiera en la mentalidad del legislador de esa época se valoran los efectos de la teoría del riesgo propia de la actividad industrial o comercial en masa, ni mucho menos que se pudiera responsabilizar al Estado por ser actuar en disconformidad con el ordenamiento. Esto lo afirmó ya que debemos recordar que en el año 1804, en Francia, lo que se desarrolla es una economía agrícola o artesanal, por lo que era difícil prever los cambios introducidos por la Revolución Industrial, de igual forma, nos encontrábamos en un momento histórico en el que era difícil prever la responsabilidad del orden estatal por un actuar ilegítimo. Otro aspecto importante para explicar la normativa de la cual deriva la nuestra, es la importancia influencia que tiene el Derecho Canónico. Evidentemente, normas como el artículo 1045, parten de una premisa de la que deriva la obligación de la víctima de acreditar cuál fue la persona que generó la acción dolosa o culposa que a fin de cuentas causo el daño. Cuando la víctima se encontraba ante supuestos en los que no podía acreditar estas situaciones, ya sea por falta de prueba o imposibilidad de conseguirla –debido a la imposibilidad de conseguirla de parte del agente-, se indicaba que estábamos en presencia de “actos de Dios” de aquéllos que se ejecutaban como castigo ante la víctima por lo tanto no resarcibles. De esta manera el resarcimiento del daño era visualizado como el “pago de un pecado” y no como una indemnización para la víctima. Usualmente, y tal como lo hace la Sala en este voto, se ha indicado que la responsabilidad civil encuentra su asidero legal en el artículo 1045 del Código Civil, el que, como lo indiqué anteriormente, prescribe la obligación de reparar los daños junto con los perjuicios, que fueren ocasionados por dolo, culpa, negligencia o imprudencia. En realidad, y de acuerdo al principio de jerarquización de las fuentes, el fundamento constitucional de la responsabilidad se encuentra en el numeral 41 de la Carta Magna, en cuanto establece: “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. Deberá hacérseles justicia pronta y cumplida, sin denegación y en estricta conformidad con las leyes”.Ahora bien, normas como el artículo 1045 complementan este principio general, dado que establecen criterios de imputación que resultan esenciales para poder determinar aspectos sustantivos y procesales, tales como la legitimación, el nexo causal y la carga de la prueba. Tal y como lo ha establecido la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, el daño constituye uno de los presupuestos de la responsabilidad civil. Esto debido a que el deber de resarcir solamente se configura si ha mediado un hecho dañoso que lesione un interés jurídicamente relevante, susceptible de ser tutelado por el ordenamiento jurídico (Voto número 112 de las catorce horas quince minutos del quince de junio de mil novecientos noventa y cinco). Para esa Sala “daño” es todo menoscabo, pérdida o deterioro de la esfera jurídica patrimonial o extra patrimonial de la persona (damnificado) que provoca la privación de un bien jurídico tutelado por el ordenamiento. Bajo esta tesitura, el primer elemento esencial de la responsabilidad civil lo constituye el daño. En cuanto a las características del daño, encontramos: 1) debe ser cierto; real y efectivo y no hipotético); 2) debe mediar lesión a un interés jurídicamente relevante y merecedor de amparo; 3) debe mediar una relación de causalidad entre el hecho generador y el daño. Otro de los elementos que configura la responsabilidad civil, lo constituye la relación de causalidad directa o eficiente que debe existir entre el comportamiento o conducta antijurídica y el daño, siendo este último el presupuesto de cualquier tipo de responsabilidad ya sea contractual o extracontractual por lo que su demostración también constituye un requisito sine quo non para que prospere la pretensión resarcitoria. La noción de culpabilidad es otro de los elementos más importante dentro de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, ya que debe existir culpa por parte de la persona que causa el daño. La culpabilidad constituye un juicio de reproche, mediante el cual se imputa la responsabilidad de esa persona. Sin la existencia de la culpa no se puede conceder la indemnización de daños y perjuicios a favor de la víctima ya que es necesario que este demostrado que el daño se ha ocasionado por un acto u omisión imputable a una persona. Es necesario entonces que el daño sea atribuido al agente productor, sea porque se hizo con intención o sea porque pudo haberlo evitado y no lo hizo, al actuar negligente o imprudente. Este requisito de culpabilidad es cuestionado por el autor nacional Juan Marco Rivero Sánchez, quien señala que tal requisito no constituye un elemento determinante para establecer la responsabilidad. Para fundamentar su argumentación, se basa en lo establecido por los artículos que van del 38 al 40 del Código Civil, relativos a la capacidad de las personas. Explica el autor que, si la culpabilidad fuera un requisito de la responsabilidad civil no sería posible exigirle ningún tipo de responsabilidad a las personas menores de quince años y, por ende, se extinguiría toda posibilidad de solicitar un resarcimiento. Sin embargo, esto no ocurre pues se mantiene la posibilidad de cobrar el daño a los padres del menor de quince años, siempre y cuando habite en la casa de éstos (1047 del Código Civil) doce años –de acuerdo al artículo 6 de la Ley de Justicia Penal Juvenil-, pero la norma aún así mantiene la responsabilidad civil, desplazándola a otros sujetos, conforme al numeral 1048 del Código Civil. La antijuridicidad constituye un comportamiento contrario al ordenamiento jurídico, lo cual que el actuar de la persona que genera el daño debe ser calificado como una conculcación al ordenamiento jurídico. Esta antijuridicidad genera distintas posiciones en el caso de los daños provocados por una falta al deber de cuidado –negligencia, imprudencia e impericia-, dado que al encontrarnos ante estos supuestos, evidentemente, existen causas de justificación que eliminen esta condición, como por ejemplo, el caso fortuito o la fuerza mayor. Este requisito, como elemento esencial de la responsabilidad civil, es discutido por parte de la doctrina. Específicamente, el autor Rivero Sánchez, señala que la antijuridicidad, dentro del marco del derecho civil costarricense, no es un requisito para la procedencia de la responsabilidad civil, en virtud que existen normas del Código Civil que generan la obligación de resarcir el daño, a pesar de que la conducta no pueda ser calificada como antijurídica, dado la existencia de alguna causal que elimine esta antijuridicidad. Este supuesto legislativo lo encontramos en el 1043 del Código Civil, que dispone: “Los hechos lícitos y voluntarios producen también, sin necesidad de convención, derechos y obligaciones civiles, en cuanto aprovechan o perjudican a terceras personas”. Bajo la tesis de Rivero Sánchez, por ejemplo, en el caso del cuento de “Risitos de oro”, cuando la niña se pierde en el bosque e irrumpe en la casa de los osos, se come su sopa y descansa en sus camas, perfectamente podríamos ubicar esta conducta como un actuar antijurídico, propio de la violación de domicilio (artículo del 204 del Código Penal). No obstante, dicha antijuridicidad desaparece, dada la existencia del estado de necesidad, como causal de justificación, según el artículo 27 ibídem, dado que la niña se encuentra perdida en el bosque y con mucha hambre. A pesar de esto, según dicho autor, en aplicación del numeral 1043 del Código Civil, existiría una obligación de resarcir el daño a favor de los osos, ya que los hechos lícitos también generan responsabilidad. El dualismo entre la responsabilidad contractual y extracontractual ha sido objeto de discusión, por parte de la doctrina a través del tiempo. Autores como Yzquierdo Tolsada (YZQUIERDO TOLSADA, Mariano. “Responsabilidad civil contractual y extracontractual” Madrid, España, Editorial Reus, Tomo I, página 87), indican que dicho dualismo debe de ser superado, en virtud de las siguientes razones: a) de orden sustantivo, debido a que el daño es el mismo en cualquiera de los dos campos, por lo que no existe ninguna razón lógica para dar un diverso tratamiento al daño “contractual” y “extracontractual”; b) sistemático, en razón de que en ambas existe una conducta u omisión que genera el daño, únicamente que en la contractual dicha conducta se da en razón del incumplimiento; c) prácticas, dado que no resulta sencillo muchas veces ubicar si nos encontramos ante un caso de responsabilidad contractual o extracontractual. Por ejemplo, en los casos de aplicación del numeral 35 de la Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa efectiva del consumidor. En el derecho romano, tal y como lo explique anteriormente, esta diferencia se encontraba marcada, puesto que la responsabilidad derivaba de la ley de las XII Tablas y era de tipo contractual, mientras que la que se derivaba de la Lex Aquilia era de tipo extracontractual. Nuestro Código Civil también diferencia entre una responsabilidad civil derivada de un contrato (artículos 701 y siguientes), y una responsabilidad civil de tipo extracontractual (artículos 1045 y siguientes). Para las personas que apoyan la división entre ambos tipos de responsabilidad, la extracontractual, está constituida por una conducta activa u omisiva, refiriéndose ésta a la ausencia de un contrato previo, es decir surge cuando se causa un daño sin que exista un vínculo o contrato u obligación anterior. Pérez Vargas, en su obra “Principios de Responsabilidad Civil Extracontractual”, indica que, para que se dé la responsabilidad extracontractual es necesaria la presencia de dos elementos: “…Un comportamiento que sirva de criterio de imputación, sea un dañar culpable o un daño derivado de la creación de un riesgo y un resultado lesivo de interés jurídicamente relevante o lo que sería un daño en sentido amplio, material o moral…”. Igualmente, el citado autor, nos explica que para que la persona causante del daño esté obligada a su reparación, se hace necesario un nexo de causalidad entre su conducta y el daño producido, lo que significa que el daño debe ser la consecuencia directa e inmediata de la conducta. Los artículos 1045, 1046 y 1048 del Código Civil, hacen referencia a la responsabilidad civil extracontractual. Este tipo de responsabilidad no nace del incumplimiento de un vínculo determinado, sino a raíz de una violación al deber general de no dañar a las otras personas. En cuanto a la responsabilidad contractual la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha considerado: “… la responsabilidad contractual presupone la existencia de una obligación jurídica determinada, convenida libremente por las partes y además el hecho de que tal obligación haya sido incumplida culpablemente por el obligado. La carga de la prueba corresponde al acreedor… si el acreedor alega dolo, no basta con demostrar el incumplimiento, sino que el dolo debe ser probado para que genere las consecuencias jurídicas correspondientes (artículos 701 y 702 del Código Civil). El incumplimiento es doloso cuando el deudor incumple voluntaria e intencionalmente su obligación, causando un daño a su acreedor. El dolo según lo dispone el artículo 701 del Código Civil no se presume y quien lo cometa queda siempre obligado a indemnizar los daños y perjuicios que con él se ocasione aunque se hubiere pactado lo contrario”. Otra de las diferencias conceptuales, según la Sala Primera, se encuentra en la carga de la prueba. En la contractual basta con demostrar el incumplimiento para que exista la culpa, en cambio en la responsabilidad civil extracontractual subjetiva debe necesariamente demostrarse la culpa (negligencia, imprudencia, impericia) o el dolo, en los cuales se sustenta la responsabilidad de la persona que causa el daño (Voto número 320, de las trece horas del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa).

LOS CRITERIOS DE IMPUTACIÓN OBJETIVOS Y SUBJETIVOS PARA LA DETERMINACIÓN DEL DAÑO. Los criterios de imputación subjetivos u objetivos constituyen marcos de referencia que se utilizan para imputar la responsabilidad de la persona que genera el daño. En el caso de los primeros –subjetivos-, son aquellos que se basan en aspectos como el dolo o culpa, por lo que, frente a la verificación de un comportamiento ilícito – doloso o culposo – surge la obligación de reparo. La imputación a tal conducta puede ser por un comportamiento propio o bien por una conducta de otro, sea por un hecho ajeno. Es por lo anterior que en doctrina se habla de responsabilidad subjetiva directa e indirecta, consagrada la última en el numeral 1048 de nuestro Código Civil, “culpa in eligendo “ y “ culpa in vigilando”. Ahora bien, la culpa y el dolo no son necesarios para fundamentar el proceso de responsabilidad civil. Si ello fuera así, en muchos casos se daría una denegación del acceso a la justicia, sobre todo en aquellos supuestos en que la víctima se ve imposibilitada para demostrar la negligencia o impericia de la persona que causo el daño. Es por esto que, los tribunales y la doctrina, han elevado los estándares de diligencia a criterios objetivos, como por ejemplo en los casos de los artículos 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y el numeral 35 de la Ley de Promoción de Competencia y Defensa efectiva del consumidor. En cuanto a los criterios de imputación objetiva, los parámetros para imputar la responsabilidad se fundamentan en la denominada “teoría del riesgo” o en el actuar de una parte que, por sus características jurídicas, debe asumir un grado mayor de responsabilidad que el común denominador, por ejemplo, en el caso del Estado y su responsabilidad por la actuación desplegada por sus funcionarios o funcionarias. En el supuesto de la teoría del riesgo, se parte de la premisa de que aquella persona física o jurídica que ejerce o se aprovecha de una actividad con elementos potencialmente peligrosos, debe también soportar sus inconveniencias. Esta teoría también es conocida con el nombre de “el daño creado” cuyo paradigma de imputación estriba en atribuir el daño a toda persona que introduce en la sociedad un elemento virtual de producirlo, y se prescinde de la subjetividad del agente. En consecuencia la fuente de las obligaciones en la responsabilidad objetiva, no es la culpa, la negligencia ni el dolo, sino más bien la actividad riesgosa desplegada por el agente lo cual provoca que, ante cualquier resultado lesivo de intereses jurídicamente relevantes –llámese vida, seguridad, salud, etcétera-, surge una necesidad de reparar el daño (Rivero Sánchez, Ob. Cit. Pág. 70).

EN EL CASO QUE NOS OCUPA ES APLICABLE EL CRITERIO DE IMPUTACIÓN OBJETIVA DEL NUMERAL 190 DE LA LEY GENERAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA Y NO EL ARTÍCULO 1045 DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL. Una vez este caso es de aplicación la imputación objetiva prevista por el numeral 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Esa normativa es aplicable al banco accionado, tal y como lo establece el artículo 2 de la Ley Orgánica de dicho banco que, aunque dispone que es una entidad de derecho público no estatal (con personería jurídica y patrimonio propio y a su vez con plena autonomía administrativa y funcional), pero recalca que su funcionamiento se regirá por las normas del derecho público. En ese sentido, el inciso 1° del artículo 2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone que lo dispuesto por esa normativa se aplicará a los otros entes públicos, en ausencia de norma especial para éstos. Volviendo a la Ley Orgánica del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, su artículo 47, regula que ese banco tendrá las mismas responsabilidades y obligaciones que les corresponden a los bancos, conforme a la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central y a la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional. La primera de estas leyes no cuenta con una disposición general en torno a la responsabilidad bancaria por actuaciones ilegítimas de la entidad. En tanto que, los numerales 27 y 28 de la segunda si establecen supuestos de responsabilidad subjetiva solidaria para los miembros de las junta directivas de los bancos, pero no regulan lo concerniente a la responsabilidad del banco como entidad por los actos propios de su funcionamiento. En lo que nos interesa el numeral 27 estipula: “ Cada Junta Directiva ejercerá sus funciones con absoluta independencia y bajo su exclusiva responsabilidad, dentro de las normas establecidas por las leyes, reglamentos aplicables y principios de la técnica. Los miembros de las juntas directivas tendrán la más completa libertad para proceder en el ejercicio de sus funciones conforme con su conciencia y con su propio criterio, por cuya razón serán personalmente responsables de su gestión en la dirección general del respectivo banco. Sobre ellos pesará cualquier responsabilidad que conforme con las leyes pueda atribuírseles por dolo, culpa o negligencia. Quienes no hubieren hecho constar su voto disidente, responderán personalmente con sus bienes de las pérdidas que le irrogue al Banco, por la autorización de operaciones prohibidas por la ley, o que hayan sido autorizados mediante dolo, culpa o negligencia…”. De igual forma el artículo 28 de esa misma ley dispone que “Todo acto, resolución u omisión de una Junta Directiva que contravenga las disposiciones legales y reglamentarias o que signifique empleo de los fondos del banco en actividades distintas de las inherentes a sus funciones, hará incurrir a todos los presentes en la sesión respectiva en responsabilidad personal y solidaria para con el banco, el Estado y terceros afectados, por los daños y perjuicios que con ello se produjeren. De tal responsabilidad quedarán exentos únicamente los asistentes que hubieren hecho constar su voto disidente o su objeción en el acta de la sesión correspondiente. Todo ello sin perjuicio de las otras sanciones legales que pudiera corresponderles. “. Por ende, al no existir una disposición general que responsabilice a las entidades bancarias estatales por actuaciones ilegítimas tomadas en el ejercicio de sus funciones, resulta de aplicación la Ley General de la Administración Pública como régimen de responsabilidad objetiva para este tipo de entidades. Ha quedado demostrado que la demandante laboró para el Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, hasta que fue despedida sin responsabilidad patronal. Dicho cese se justificó porque la actora fue detenida en casa de sus padres, por orden de una autoridad jurisdiccional de la materia penal, por supuesta legitimación de capitales. Fue el Director del área jurídica del banco empleador quien hizo ese hecho de conocimiento público. Posteriormente, se dictó una orden de libertad a su favor y, a pesar de ello ese mismo día, dos funcionarios bancarios le comunicaron el despido, el cual su madre no recibió sino que fue al presentarse al laborar –el 12 de abril de 2011-, que formalmente se le entregó la carta respectiva, basándose en las ausencias para presentarse a laborar. Señala como causal de resarcimiento que, a raíz del actuar ilegítimo de la administración, en su pueblo San Ramón se decía que había despedida por estar ligada a una banda de narcos. Es por este motivo que, entre otras pretensiones, la accionante solicita un resarcimiento por el daño moral generado por la acción de despido. Con respecto a los daños, el juez de primera instancia los acoge, pero recurriendo al parámetro objetivo de seis meses de salarios establecido por el numeral 82 del Código de Trabajo. Sin embargo, en su análisis nunca justificó su decisión en un actuar negligente o imprudente de los funcionarios que intervinieron en el despido de la demandante. En otras palabras, no se recurrió a un criterio de imputación subjetiva previsto por el artículo 1045 del Código Civil –ello a pesar de que se hace mención de la norma en el fallo, pero sin fundar por qué es de aplicación al caso-. A pesar de esto, el juzgado de instancia le concedió un resarcimiento de quince millones de colones a la demandante, por daño moral. Esa condena fue revocada por el Tribunal. En su recurso, la accionante, no plantea ningún esbozo en torno a un criterio de imputación subjetiva de parte de los funcionarios públicos del banco, sino que justifica su decisión en lo que denomina un “despido arbitrario e intempestivo” de parte de la entidad bancaria, tanto así que el a-quo determinó que esa sanción había sido ilegal, precisamente por haber infringido las disposiciones contenidas en la convención colectiva, ya que de haber seguido el trámite establecido en la convención, se hubiera tramitado el despido sin exposición pública y mediática. En otras palabras, el daño moral se funda en un criterio de imputación objetivo previsto por el inciso 1° del numeral 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Esta norma establece: “1. La administración responderá por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal a anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero…”. En este caso, al acreditarse el acto intempestivo e infundado de despido, la parte demandada debe de ser condenada porque su actuar fue ilegítimo, ya que ese actuar se funda en no haber respetado las normas de la convención colectiva que ordenan guardar secreto de las acciones de despido tramitadas. La aplicación del criterio de imputación objetiva derivado de esa norma, implica que basta que la actora demuestre ese daño y el nexo causal provocado por ese despido arbitrario e ilegítimo para que tenga derecho al resarcimiento, independiente de que demuestre un actuar negligente o imprudente de los funcionarios vinculados con el acto de despido. Nótese que tanto los juzgadores de instancia como la mayoría de la Sala lo entendemos así, ya que en el voto no se analiza ni por asomo la falta al deber de cuidado ni el dolo de los funcionarios, sino que las razones se centran en un actuar ilegítimo e intempestivo de despido, o sea ni más ni menos que un criterio de imputación objetivo del párrafo primero del numeral 190 ibídem.

POR TANTO:

En lo que ha sido objeto de impugnación, se revoca la sentencia venida en alzada únicamente en cuanto denegó el pago por daño moral. En su lugar, a este respecto, se confirma el fallo de primera instancia, modificándose la cuantía de este extremo, la cual se fija en la suma de tres millones de colones. Los Magistrados Allón y Blanco salvan el voto y confirman la sentencia recurrida.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Eva María Camacho Vargas Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Flora Marcela Allón Zúñiga Héctor Luis Blanco González Res: 2016-000410 PROJASM/Iva 2 2295-3676, 2295-3675 y 2295-4406. Facsímile: 2257-55-94. Correos Electrónicos: [email protected]. y mbrenesm @poder-judicial.go.cr