AyA Liability for Denial of Drinking Water Supply to Commercial PremisesResponsabilidad del AyA por negativa de suministro de agua potable a local comercial

FILE: 12-000881-1027-CA PROCEEDING OF COGNIZANCE PLAINTIFF: ELECTRÓNICA LEYDEN. S.A.

AGAINST: INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS No 29-2013-IV CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. FOURTH SECTION. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. GOICOECHEA. Dirección01 , at sixteen hours and fifteen minutes on March twenty-second, two thousand thirteen.

Proceeding of cognizance brought by ELECTRÓNICA LEYDEN, S.A., represented by Nombre112174 , of legal age, entrepreneur, identity card number CED88739 - - , resident of Pérez Zeledón in San José, against the INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS (hereinafter AYA), represented by Attorney Adilia Campos Vargas, of legal age, identity card No. CED88740 - - , resident of Tibás. Attorneys Fausto Eduardo Gutiérrez Howell and Carlos Rodríguez Rescia, acting as lawyers for the plaintiff company, participate in this proceeding. File number 12-000881-1027-CA W H E R E A S First. That the company Electrónica Leyden, S.A. files a formal contentious-administrative lawsuit so that, in a judgment summarized by the Tribunal in the following points, it be declared: 1. The lawsuit be granted, declaring that Nombre112175 has been unwilling to provide the service and that it be compelled to grant it. 2. Nombre112175 be ordered to pay the damages and losses. 3. Nombre112175 be ordered to pay costs. 4. Nombre112175 be ordered to pay the damages and losses regarding the elapsed period during which the public aqueduct was not available (folio 134).

Second. The Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados answered the lawsuit in the negative, argued what the Tribunal understands as a lack of right, and raised the exception of prescription and expiration; it also requested that this lawsuit be declared unfounded in all its aspects and that the plaintiff party be ordered to pay both costs (folios 27-39).

Third. That in the preliminary hearing, the claim was adjusted solely to the payment of damages and losses, regarding the elapsed period during which the public aqueduct was not available. In the oral and public trial hearing, it was limited solely to the period between June 2009 and September 2012 for the indemnification purposes already indicated; given that after the latter date, the installation of the service supply had occurred.

Fourth. That the oral and public trial was held on March nineteenth, two thousand thirteen, and within the adversarial proceeding, the testimony of Messrs. Nombre112176 , Nombre112175 , was received, and as evidence for a better resolution, the testimony of Messrs. Nombre112177 and Roger Mata Arias.

Fifth. That no defects capable of generating defenselessness for the parties are observed.

Sixth. This judgment is issued UNANIMOUSLY and in accordance with the provisions of article one hundred eleven of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and forty-seven, second paragraph, of the Reglamento Autónomo de Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa de Trámite complejo, after deliberation.

Drafted by Judge Porras Mejías, and

WHEREAS

I.- Preliminary issues to consider. That the plaintiff party provided procedural satisfaction regarding the claim in which it requested a declaration that Nombre112175 had been unwilling to provide the service and that it be compelled to grant it. In the case at hand, the specific service has already been supplied, a fact stated by both parties and presumably occurring in September of two thousand twelve. The interest of the parties having been satisfied, the Chamber omits any pronouncement on the matter, it being sufficient to accept the alternative dispute resolution insofar as it meets the legal requirements for this purpose.

II.- Evidence for a better resolution: In the oral hearing, the documentation appearing on folios 149 to 173 of the case file and the testimony of Nombre112177 and Roger Mata Arias were admitted as evidence for a better resolution, in accordance with article 50.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

III.- PROVEN FACTS: Of relevance for settling this litigation, the following facts have been demonstrated: 1) That in October 2009, the plaintiff's representative requested from AYA three potable water connections in the locality of Palmares de Pérez Zeledón, one hundred meters south of Banco Nacional, for a commercial premises building (see documents on folios 40-43). 2) That on July 6, 2009, AYA placed a seal on the construction plan with a legend stating: "...ICAA, Región Brunca, Engineering Department. Certifies that an Aqueduct in use does exist in front of this property. The competent authorities are warned that this seal does not imply the availability of water and sanitary sewerage, nor that the service can be provided; legal requirements must first be met..." (see plan and response to the interim measure and lawsuit on folios 11-39). 3) That in the conflict zone, there was a water supply problem, dating from several months before the conflict at hand; even though there was hydraulic capacity (capacity of the pipes) (an uncontested fact as extracted from the statements of both parties). 4) That by official letter RB-DOM-2008-148, dated April 18, 2008, the Chief of Operations and Maintenance of the Región Brunca indicates that: "through a meeting held on April 15, the topic has been discussed between Mr. Guillermo Sánchez Solís, Mr. Fernando Bonilla O, the Head of the Commercial Area Didier Murillo, and the undersigned; furthermore, this has been analyzed with Eng. Javier Valverde, and the undersigned has been instructed to suspend the granting of availability for new non-residential services (vertical condominiums, warehouses, commercial premises, apartments, etc...)" (see official letter on folios 104-105). 5) That by official letter RB-CPZ-2009-0889 dated December 23, Mr. Nombre112174 was informed that, due to the deficit in the water supply facing the Pérez Zeledón area, and foreseeing that clients who have had the potable water service for years prior not suffer a deterioration in the same, AYA is forced to suspend the granting of water availability for commercial premises..." (see official letter GSP-DRB-CPZ-4463-2012, dated 12-6-2012, folios 98-103). 6) That on July 31, 2004, CONCESA issued the results of the "Diagnosis Report," "Alternatives Report," and two annexes. Therein, they established the current conditions of the systems in the central district of Pérez Zeledón and surrounding areas, as well as the measures required to remedy the deterioration in the current potable water infrastructure. The experts indicated a deficit in the potable water flow for 2005 of 32 liters per second at maximum hourly demand, requiring Nombre112175 to implement better integrated watershed management for water conservation. Regarding infrastructure, they recommended a topographic survey of the supply sources, repair of the dam on the Río Quebrada, a new conveyance line from another intake on the Río San Ramón to the Treatment Plants, improvements to the current treatment plants, wells, pumping stations, chlorination stations, replacement of the existing potable water distribution network in the San Isidro District with its respective boxes and valves, improvement of the potable water supply tanks, namely: Fallas and Pepe Tanks, San Luis Tank, Universidad Tank, and Los Chiles Tank..." (see the response to the lawsuit document 27-39). 7) That the defendant managed to resolve the water capacity problem in the area by mid-two thousand seven (an uncontested fact). 8) That the water service was supplied to the plaintiff company starting in September of two thousand twelve (an uncontested fact; see also the photographs provided for this purpose by the plaintiff itself). 9) That the water supply was due to the increased water capacity in the area's pipes (an uncontested fact). 10) That the plaintiff company suffered economic impact from the absence of water supply during the period from October 2009 to September 2012 (see documentary evidence contained in the case file and the testimony of Nombre112176 , Nombre112175 , Nombre112177 , and Roger Mata Arias).

IV.- Unproven Facts. Given the absence or insufficiency of evidentiary elements, the following are considered as such: 1. The date from which a water supply problem existed in the area where the plaintiff requested the services underlying the problem (there is no evidence in this regard). 2. The AYA’s representation did not demonstrate that, during the time it failed to supply water to the plaintiff, it carried out the various necessary actions in an agile, timely, and expeditious manner to guarantee the public service (there is no evidence in this regard). 3. AYA did not demonstrate any exonerating circumstance for not fulfilling the potable water supply to the plaintiff (it did not prove this with any evidence). 4. The plaintiff company did not demonstrate the existence of any moral damage or harm due to the non-supply of potable water (there is no evidence in this regard).

V.- Position and evidence of the company Electrónica Leyden, S.A. 1. Within this proceeding of cognizance, the plaintiff company seeks that the judgment orders Nombre112175 to pay it the damages and losses regarding the elapsed period during which it did not have a public aqueduct, for the period from June 2009 to September 2012. 2. To prove the foregoing, the plaintiff company presents documentary and testimonial evidence (see the administrative file subsumed within the judicial file, and the record and video of the oral and public hearing). 3. Position and evidence of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados. The AYA's representative denies the attributed liability, argues that the water service has already been supplied, and that it had not been granted previously due to the non-availability in the area for new services; in its defense, it presents documentary and testimonial evidence (see response to the lawsuit on folios 27-39).

VI.- On the necessity of potable water for human consumption. The Sala Constitucional has indicated that: "Our Constitución Política, in its article 50, enunciates the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, which is achieved, among other factors, through the protection and conservation of the quality and quantity of water for human consumption and use and to maintain the ecological balance in the habitats of flora and fauna (e.g., wetlands) and, in general, of the biosphere as the common heritage of humanity. Similarly, access to potable water ensures the rights to life – 'without water, no life is possible' states the Carta del Agua approved by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on May 6, 1968 –, to the health of individuals – indispensable for their food, drink, and hygiene – (article 21 of the Constitución Política), and, of course, is associated with the socio-economic development and growth of peoples to ensure every individual a decent level of well-being and quality of life (article 33 of the Constitución Política and 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights). Sala Constitucional Ruling 1256-2006, of February 8, 2006. This ruling describes the essential nature of water resources, which are mentioned in international instruments from 1968 and international bodies such as the Council of Strasbourg, highlighting their relevance for development and human life. This same ruling establishes, from the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972, where the importance of water resources for humanity is reaffirmed: 'In another vein, currently, the duty to preserve, for future generations, conditions of existence at least equal to those inherited (sustainable development) has been recognized, such that the needs of the present must be met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Principle 2 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972). In essence, water, from an economic and ecological standpoint, is a precious good, given that it is indispensable for any human activity (industrial, agricultural, domestic, commercial, services, etc.), as a source of energy, raw material, transportation route, support for recreational activities, and a constituent element for the maintenance of natural ecosystems – non-polluting or environmentally compatible use of water –.' Sala Constitucional Ruling 1256-2006, of February 8, 2006. The Sala has also stated that the constitutional principles forming the provisions of articles 21 and 33 of our Constitución Política not only encompass the State's duty to respect human life and protect it against the actions of third parties but also the guarantee of a dignified way of life, for which the necessary resources must be procured to make it possible, as that right cannot be confined to mere subsistence; those resources precisely include water." Sala Constitucional Ruling No. 1853-03, of March 5, 2003. The Constitución Política, in article one hundred twenty-one, subsection fourteen, states: \" (...) In addition to the other powers conferred by this Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Asamblea Legislativa: (...) 14) To decree the alienation or application to public uses of the Nation's own property (...)\". This constitutional provision has been developed in the Civil Code, in articles two hundred sixty-one to two hundred sixty-three; the first of them indicates: \"Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those that everyone can utilize because they are given over to public use. All other things are private and subject to private property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in such a case, as civil persons, are no different from any other person\". In turn, the following canon adds: \"Public things are outside commerce; and they cannot enter into it while this is not legally provided for, by separating them from the public use to which they were destined\". Thus, public domain is understood as the set of goods subject to a special and distinct legal regime from that governing private domain, which, in addition to belonging to or being under the administration of public legal entities, are affected or destined for public utility purposes, manifested in the direct or indirect use that every person may make of them. According to the cited regulations, the State possesses both public domain and private domain property; public property refers to that which a law gives a destination for public or general use; it is called \"demanial\" and is inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, and not subject to denouncement. The logic of public property is that its domain precedes the State itself, so that it belongs to the Nation as a requirement for coexistence in society. The State is limited to administering it, which as a rule of principle prevents it from leaving the public sphere. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation (See Sala Constitucional, Ruling 2306-91 of 14:45 hours on November 6, 1991). It is said that they belong to the Nation when the State is limited to safeguarding and protecting them, without in principle being able to dispose of them. These goods are outside the commerce of men and consequently have a diverse nature and legal regime from private goods – which are governed by property rights under the terms of article 45 of the Constitución Política –, insofar as, by the express will of the legislator or by their very essence, they are devoted to a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and for this reason, they cannot be the subject of private property; thus, they cannot belong individually to private parties, nor to the State, strictly speaking, as the latter is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, what defines the juridical nature of demanial goods is their purpose, insofar as they are affected and are at the service of public use, as recognized by the doctrine on the matter; thus, Nombre33033, Miguel S., in his work Tratado de Derecho Administrativo (Volume V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., page 25), considered: \"For a good or thing to be considered as a dependency of the public domain, and be subject to the pertinent regime, it is necessary that said good or thing be devoted to 'public use,' direct or indirect, dealing, in this 'latter' case, with things devoted directly -as 'final goods' or 'use goods'- to the common utility or convenience, excluding from the publicness of the goods of the State those that are of a merely instrumental nature.\" On the other hand, the private property of the State is governed by private law with elements specific to public law. These goods are within the commerce of men; they can be transferred, appropriated, and are not imprescriptible; therefore, they are susceptible to usucaption for the benefit of private parties, in accordance with article two hundred sixty-one already indicated. Note that the emphasis of the differentiation lies in relation to the intended purpose of the good, that is, the fact of being devoted to common use or serving the common good (see Sala Constitucional in judgment number 2301-91, of November 6, 1991, and 2000-06903 of 15:48 hours on August 8, 2000). As previously mentioned, due to their special juridical nature, they present the following attributes: they are imprescriptible, which implies that the right of property over them cannot be acquired through the passage of time, not even mere possession, that is, they cannot be acquired through usucaption, nor can they be lost by prescription; for which reason the use permits that the Administration grants over them always have a precarious nature, which means they can be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience at any time by the Administration – under the terms provided for in articles 154 and 155 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública –; and the concessions granted over them for their exploitation can be cancelled through the appropriate procedure; they are unseizable, meaning they cannot be subject to any lien or seizure, neither by private parties nor by the Administration; and they are inalienable, which translates into the condition that they are outside the commerce of men; hence, they cannot be alienated, sold, or acquired, neither gratuitously nor for valuable consideration, neither by private parties nor by the State, such that they are excepted from the commerce of men and subject to a special and reinforced legal regime. Moreover, their use and exploitation are subject to police power, insofar as, being goods that cannot be subject to possession, much less property, their utilization and exploitation are only possible through duly authorized acts, whether by concession or use permit, granted by the competent authority; and subject to constant control by the Public Administration. A public good can be natural or artificial, depending on whether it concerns goods declared public by the legislator considering them in the state in which nature presents or offers them (a river, for example), or goods declared public by the legislator but whose creation or existence depends on a human act (construction of a street or a public park, for example). The afectación is the act or the manifestation of will by the public authority by virtue of which the thing becomes incorporated into the use and enjoyment of the community, and it can be effected by law or by administrative act. Doctrine distinguishes between \"assignment of public character\" to a good and the \"afectación\" of that good to the public domain. The assignment of public character means establishing that said determined good would possess demanial quality; thus, for example, the general legal norm would state that all public roads are integral components or dependencies of the public domain, and this means that this applies to the current ones and those that may be built in the future. In contrast, afectación means that the good declared demanial effectively becomes incorporated into public use, and this has to do with the acceptance and receipt of public works when they are built by administration, or with the conclusion of works and their official receipt when a private party carries them out (construction of a development or subdivision (fraccionamiento), for example).- This is why it is said that afectación can be declared by law in generic form, or alternatively by an administrative act, which must necessarily conform to the legal norm serving as its reference (principle of legality). As a consequence of the previous point, it is manifest that the demanial regime is per se. Its existence and publicity occur independently of the Registry, without it being possible for the registered titleholder to allege ignorance as a means to distort and counteract the afectación. The principles of inalienability and imprescriptibility that characterize the public domain prevent the figure of the registered third party from being wielded against it to consolidate private property illicitly removed from that regime. The demanio enjoys legal publicity and, in many cases, natural publicity. The foregoing is paired with the principle of immatriculation of real estate components of the public domain, which possesses material publicity, not necessarily formal or registry publicity. Against the public domain, private holdings suffer from a weakened value, however prolonged they may be in time and even if they appear protected by entries in the Property Registry. The condition of a public domain and public use good affects third parties, even if such quality does not appear from the Property Registry. These are goods that, by their nature, do not need registry inscription (Ruling 019-2009-SVII, Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Seventh Section). Note that this principle, as an exception to the principle of registry publicity, is grounded in the fact that public domain goods enjoy material publicity, and therefore, their registry publicity is not necessary, as public domain goods, by their nature, are not subject to that institution. Additionally, there exists the figure of \"desafectación,\" which concerns \"the juridical situation by which a good ceases to belong to the public domain (...) goods that are desafectados become, in principle, patrimonial goods of the owning Administration, which, in its case, may alienate them (...)\" (Ruling 035-2009-SVII, Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). This situation, in sound logic, could only occur for those that have been declared as such by law, since for those whose condition is intrinsic, such a possibility would be precluded. Before directing the argument more concretely to the point at hand, it is manifest that when the demanial good has been created by a private party or represents a particularly intense impact that the private party is not obligated to bear, said character does not inhibit the Administration's obligation to assume liability in order to enable balance in public burdens. The contrary would entail unjust enrichment, which has no basis within the national legal system. Now, as previously mentioned, regarding water, the Sala Constitucional, in Ruling No. 5606-06, recognized its condition as a human right by stating:

\"VII.- Access to potable water as a human right. In addition to what has been stated, and perhaps the most relevant aspect in this topic, is the nature and function of water for human life. It is not necessary to detail here an explanation of the evident and notorious reality that without water there can be no life, nor quality of life, and that therefore, with or without a nationalization law, by its own essence, this topic is not and cannot be a territorial or local topic. The Sala itself, in its constitutional jurisprudence, has stated that access to potable water is a fundamental human right, insofar as it constitutes an integral part of the content of the right to health and to life. (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL, judgments numbers 534-96, 2728-91, 3891-93, 1108-96, 2002-06157, 2002-10776; 2004-1923). This same line has been maintained in judgments 2003-04654 and 2004-07779, which in relevant part state: // 'V.- // The Sala recognizes, as part of Constitutional Law, a fundamental right to potable water, derived from the fundamental rights to health, life, a healthy environment, food, and decent housing, among others, as has also been recognized in international Human Rights instruments applicable in Costa Rica: thus, it figures explicitly in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (art. 14) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (art. 24); furthermore, it is enunciated in the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (principle 2), and declared in numerous other instruments of International Humanitarian Law. In our Inter-American Human Rights System, the country is particularly obligated in this matter by the provisions of article 11.1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador” of 1988), which provides that: “Article 11. Right to a healthy environment 1.- Everyone has the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public services.’ The lack of resources does not justify the non-fulfillment of the duties of public administrations in the provision of this basic service. (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL, rulings 2003-04654 and 2004-007779). // For its part, as both the Procuraduría and the representative of Nombre112175 well recognize in their reports, internationally, the recognition of water as a human right and as a necessary precondition for all our human rights is also majority. It is maintained that without equitable access to a minimum requirement of potable water, other established rights would be unattainable – such as the right to an adequate standard of living for health and well-being, as well as other civil and political rights. In November 2002, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights affirmed that access to adequate quantities of clean water for domestic and personal use is a fundamental human right of every person. Likewise, in General Comment No. 15 on the fulfillment of articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee noted that 'the human right to water is indispensable for living a life in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights.' It also emphasizes that the States parties to the International Covenant have the duty to progressively fulfill, without any discrimination, the right to water, which entitles everyone to enjoy sufficient, physically accessible, safe, and acceptable water for domestic and personal use. // For their part, several international conferences have been held, among which the United Nations Water Conference held in Mar del Plata in 1977 stands out, which recognized that all peoples have the right to access potable water to meet their basic needs. Also, the Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986, includes a commitment by States to ensure equal opportunities for all to enjoy basic resources. // The concept of meeting basic water needs was further strengthened during the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. In Agenda 21, governments agreed that 'in developing and using water resources, priority must be given to meeting basic needs and to the conservation of ecosystems.' Similarly, in the Implementation Plan adopted at the Johannesburg Summit in 2002, governments committed to 'employ all policy instruments, including regulation, monitoring.....'\" and the recovery of costs for water services," without cost-recovery objectives becoming a barrier to poor people's access to clean water. Likewise, there are dozens of international instruments that directly and indirectly relate to water as a human right of all persons and peoples, such that it is not only a matter that by its nature tends toward nationalization, but also toward the internationalization of its use and exploitation." See how, beyond the normative support, the public-domain character of water is a necessary consequence of the imperative requirement it presents for human life, which brings with it the fact that the internal normative north is grounded in constitutional article twenty-one. At the infra-constitutional level, its public-domain status is initially regulated in the Water Law, number 276, of August twenty-sixth, nineteen forty-two:

"Article 1.- The following are waters of the public domain: // I.- Those of the territorial seas in the extent and terms established by international law; // II.- Those of the lagoons and estuaries of the beaches that communicate permanently or intermittently with the sea; // III.- Those of interior lakes of natural formation that are directly linked to constant currents; // IV.- Those of rivers and their direct or indirect tributaries, streams, or springs from the point where the first permanent waters emerge to their mouth in the sea or lakes, lagoons, or estuaries; // V.- Those of constant or intermittent currents whose channel, in all or part of its extension, serves as a boundary for the national territory, the dominion of those currents being subject to what has been established in international treaties entered into with neighboring countries and, in the absence thereof, or as to what is not provided for, to the provisions of this law; // VI.- Those of any current that directly or indirectly flows into those listed in section V; // VII.- Those extracted from mines, with the limitation indicated in article 10; // VIII.- Those of springs that emerge on beaches, maritime zones, channels, beds, or banks of national property and, in general, all those that originate on public-domain lands; // IX.- Subterranean waters whose extraction is not done by means of wells; and // X.- Rainwater that flows through ravines or watercourses whose channels are of the public domain.

Article 2.- The waters listed in the preceding article are national property and dominion over them is neither lost nor has been lost when, through the execution of prior artificial works or exploitation, the natural characteristics are altered or have been altered.

Excepted are waters exploited by virtue of contracts granted by the State, which shall be subject to the conditions authorized in the respective concession." For its part, when the granting of the concession occurred, Law 258 of August eighteenth, nineteen forty-one, the Law of the National Electricity Service, was in force, which stated:

"Article 1: All waters of the Republic, which are not private domain in accordance with the Water Law in force, ... are inalienable and of the domain, governance, and vigilance of the State" Bolstering the foregoing is the provision of article four of the Mining Code (Law 6797 of October 4, 1982), which states:

"Article 4.- …. subterranean and surface waters are reserved to the State and may only be exploited by the latter, by private parties in accordance with the law, or through a special concession granted for a limited time and in accordance with the conditions and stipulations established by the Legislative Assembly.

Natural resources existing in the soil, in the subsoil, and in the waters of the seas adjacent to the national territory, within an extension of up to two hundred miles from the low-water line, along the coasts, may only be exploited in conformity with the provisions of subsection 14) (last paragraph) of article 121 of the Political Constitution." Regarding the Administration of the resource, repealed Law number 258 of August eighteenth, nineteen forty-one, created the National Electricity Service to exercise domain, exploitation, utilization, governance, and vigilance over various resources, including all waters. Empowering it in section six to grant concessions or water rights, a norm that is coherent with the aforementioned Water Law, which in article seventeen establishes that "Authorization is necessary for the exploitation of public waters, especially dedicated to public or private interest enterprises. That authorization shall be granted by the National Electricity Service in the manner prescribed in this Law.," which is reaffirmed by article seventy of Law 16 of October thirtieth, nineteen forty-one. For its part, Law No. 2726 of April fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one and its amendments, especially those of Law No. 5915 of July 12, 1976, the "Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers" indicates:

"Article 1.- With the object of directing, setting policies, establishing and applying norms, carrying out and promoting planning, financing, and development, and resolving everything related to the supply of potable water and the collection and evacuation of wastewater and liquid industrial residues, as well as the normative aspect of stormwater drainage systems in urban areas, for the entire national territory, the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers is created, as an autonomous institution of the State." (As amended by Law No. 5915 of July 12, 1976, article 1) As can be extracted from the articles transcribed above and from a comprehensive reading of the respective laws, the S.N.E. had the purpose, in this field, of representing and exercising, on behalf of the State, dominion over the country's water resources, in order to ensure its preservation and prioritized utilization according to the importance of needs; competencies that ultimately were assumed by the Public Services Regulatory Authority but within a broader scope of action. For its part, AyA has the purpose of planning, constructing, and operating the infrastructure necessary to supply potable water and overseeing the planning, construction, and operation of the same carried out by private parties for the indicated purpose. As observed, representing the State in concession contracts was one of the mechanisms that allowed the S.N.E. to fulfill its legal purpose (as will be seen, that competency was subsequently transferred). Expressly established in its constitutive law as well as in the Water Law. For those years, it was clear that the granting of the connection was proper to it, which included the corresponding contract; while AyA has the competency to plan, design, construct, operate, and maintain works for supplying water to a population, as well as ensuring private-party works conform to its recommendations—Law No. 16 of October 30, 1941, No. 809 of November 2, 1949, and the General Law of Potable Water, among others—a function that has never entailed that of granting concessions for the exploitation of public-domain waters, even when these are destined, as in the case at hand, to provide potable water to a defined population. From the stated norms, especially the AyA Law (as well as articles 266 and 276 of the General Health Law, Law No. 5395 of October 23, 1973), it is clear that, with the exception of the latter, only municipalities, the Public Services Company of Heredia, Community Development Associations (through Rural Aqueduct Committees), or other local bodies with which AyA enters into an agreement for this purpose, there exist no other bodies empowered to administer public aqueducts. Therefore, a private party is not authorized by the legal system to provide the public service of population supply of potable water and sanitary sewerage, with the exception of the Aqueduct and Sewer Administration Associations (ASADAS) as managers of the public service. Thus, the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications (which assumed the functions of granting water concessions upon the transformation of the SNE into ARESEP), prior to granting the concession, would be under the legal obligation to verify that the private party has the prior authorization of AyA and the Ministry of Health for the private company to provide potable water service to the population, as well as the sanitary sewerage system. In the case of ASADAS that act by delegation of AyA, their legal nature arises from the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, in which the latter was empowered to delegate the administration, operation, and maintenance of the aqueduct and sewer systems—which were entrusted to it by the legislator—to groups duly formed for that purpose, as follows from article two, subsection g) of the cited law, by expressly stating: "The institution is empowered to agree with local bodies on the administration of such services or to administer them through mixed integration administrative boards between the Institute and the respective communities, whenever this is convenient for the better provision of services and in accordance with the respective regulations." Based on the norm transcribed above, the Executive Branch proceeded to issue various regulations, the Regulation of the Administrative Associations of Community Aqueduct and Sewer Systems, (Decree No. 32529 of February 2, 2005) being the current norm, which this latter regulation provides in its article 3:

'Article 3. AyA, by means of an agreement signed for this purpose, with the prior favorable agreement of its Board of Directors, may delegate the administration, operation, maintenance, and development of community aqueduct and/or sewer systems, to associations duly constituted and registered in accordance with the Law of Associations No. 218 of August 8, 1939, its amendments and respective Regulation, Executive Decree No. 29496-J, published in La Gaceta No. 95 of May 21, 2001. ..” VII.- ON ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY. Section 190 of our General Law of Public Administration refers to "legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning," from which legitimacy or its antithesis basically refers to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normal or abnormal points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented, among other things, by the service-provision activity attributed to the Public Administration as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the community. Thus, abnormality pertains to those administrative conducts that, in themselves, depart from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in article 102, subsection d., which among other things includes efficacy and efficiency) or from organization, from technical rules, or from expertise and prudent conduct in the deployment of its actions, with injurious effect on the person. This Tribunal adds, for natural or legal persons. This allows noting that abnormality can manifest itself through poor functioning; delayed functioning, or a total absence of functioning. Whenever the victim does not have that duty to bear the injury, it becomes unlawful, due to impairment to a third party against the legal system. Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances (requirements of article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration) assume the reparatory consequences of that which it could not prevent. There then occurs a breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity, and to that extent, the injury to the victim's legal sphere must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, of obligatory reparation. There is unlawfulness, insofar as the norm declares the existing obligation under the implicit premise of an injury contrary to Law, which must not be borne by the victim. Omission as a criterion of abnormality and illegality. The obligation to indemnify for damages caused by inaction. On this subject, it is pertinent to recall that in the matter of public services, it is not enough to supply the activity under whatever conditions, since users have the right to the adaptation, continuity, efficiency, and efficacy of the service (among many other rights), which entails that the service must be provided under certain minimum or basic conditions to be considered as fulfilling the purpose that justifies its existence. Accepting that a public service can be provided any which way, without further consideration, is a call to arbitrariness that cannot be shared. In the present case, the omission of Name112175 in the supply of potable water is claimed, which obliges establishing whether the Institute's conduct in not supplying the water resource to the user corresponds to an abnormal or illegitimate functioning of the Administration. Currently, it is peacefully accepted that administrative conduct encompasses not only the active behavior of the Administration (and within it, the administrative act) but also, omissive conduct, that "not doing" that has been called inactivity of the Administration, both in its formal aspect (insofar as it results in an act presumed by administrative silence) and material (referring basically to the service-provision sphere of the administrative organization). In this way, material administrative inactivity must be understood as that derived from the omission in fulfilling a pre-established legal obligation, which occurs when the Administration breaches, by omission, an obligation imposed by the Legal System or by any other self-binding mechanism, as is the case of an own act or consensual instruments, with direct injury to a legitimate interest or a subjective right, whether or not it alters a pre-existing legal-administrative relationship. More simply, there is inactivity of this type when, an obligation to give or to do imposed by the legal system or by a prior decision of the public entity or body existing, outside or within an administrative procedure, the due factual or legal activity that would bring the granted function to fruition is not deployed, to the detriment of the rights or interests of one or several passive subjects, whether private or public, individual or collective. It is that "culpa in ommittendo" in which the functional duty to act is breached by inaction. It goes without saying that administrative indolence can produce (and in fact does produce) more serious injuries than the limiting action of the public body or entity itself. Hence, it must be stated forcefully (with foundation in and in accordance with what was said in prior considerations) that the Public Administration is also liable for the damages caused by its administrative inactivity. That passivity in the face of fulfilling pre-existing obligations falls, for purposes of tort liability, as abnormal functioning of the Administration (insofar as it corresponds to a due material activity) and as illegitimate conduct, which in this case can be concurrent, insofar as the breach of what is due not only offends the rules of good administration but also infringes legality insofar as it breaches the functional administrative powers emanating from the Legal System itself. (On the parameter of liability, one may consult vote number 584-F-2005. First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.- San José at ten hours forty minutes on August eleventh, two thousand five.

VIII.- ON THE DAMAGES REQUESTED. Regarding the facts, damages claimed by the plaintiff company, their final outcome depends on the evidence provided, where the Tribunal, to resolve the merits of the claims, shall analyze the evidence in accordance with the principle of sound criticism, doctrine of section 82 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, in relation to article 318 of the Civil Procedure Code, which points out the different means of proof, which are ample so that the parties can meet the legal requirement of demonstrating the facts they assert. For the judge, the evidence will be that which demonstrates what truly happened; it is the search for the truth of the facts, in order to give them a legal qualification. In the present case, we have documentary evidence, the testimony of Name112176 and Name112175, provided by AyA, and the statements of the witnesses for the plaintiff, Name112177 and Roger Mata Arias. Among the documentary evidence, we have: The stamp on the construction plan, made by the Institute, in which it certifies that there is indeed an aqueduct in use in front of this property; official letter RB-DOM-2008-148, dated April 18, 2008, the Head of Operations and Maintenance of the Brunca Region, expressing that instructions have been given to suspend the granting of availability of new non-residential services; official letter RB-CPZ-2009-0889 dated December 23, 2009, in which Mr. Name112174 is informed that due to the deficit in the water supply facing the Pérez Zeledón zone, it is obliged to suspend the granting of water availability in commercial premises. Furthermore, on July 31, 2004, CONCESA issued the results through the formulation of several documents called "Diagnostic Report," "Alternatives Report," and two annexes. In the same, they established the current conditions of the systems in the central district of Pérez Zeledón and surrounding areas, as well as the measures required to remedy the deteriorations in the current potable water infrastructure. It indicates a deficit in the potable water flow for 2005. It is clear that the potable water service is a key, basic, and indispensable activity within any society, among which Costa Rican society is situated. Everything seems to indicate that the lack of supply of the precious liquid has its basis in the lack of capacity of the liquid in the area at the time of the facts, which was subsequently resolved. According to the rules of Rolan, public services must naturally adapt to needs; a general maxim that also applies to the potable water service. While, and as already indicated, potable water is a national asset, the public service is constituted when the liquid is distributed among all those who need it, through systems of pipes, tanks, and distribution networks; without prejudice to pumps where necessary. The public entity is constantly called upon to adopt the measures necessary to ensure the supply of the vital liquid in consideration of the needs of society, bearing in mind that the number of subscribers increases every day. It is an obligation of constant planning, in pursuit of improving conditions and ensuring the fulfillment of the public purpose. In order to establish the existence or not of the liability requested by the plaintiff, it is not enough to indicate that there was a material limitation, which is indeed an unquestionable issue and one that can eventually occur. There are many zones in the national territory where there is a limitation on water capacity and the levels of investment to bring water from one zone to another are excessive. Despite this, this jurisdictional body considers that entering to establish whether or not we are facing abnormal behavior is a matter of lesser treatment, on the bases we proceed to indicate. If we were to place the concrete situation as lawful and normal conduct of the Administration, wherein the public entity took all necessary measures so that the absence of water supply would not occur, despite which the situation was occurring, which motivated the public entity to be nimbly and diligently implementing mechanisms to resolve the problem as soon as possible; that situation would not negate the possibility of deriving liability in the case. We would be facing a case of singular, special sacrifice, with a small, intensely affected group, by virtue of which the plaintiff was forced to face a series of inconveniences; not desired by the Administration, but not for that reason grounds to exempt from liability. Under those conditions, we would be facing a case of administrative liability for lawful conduct or normal behavior. But as has been pointed out, arguing the situations is not sufficient; rather, it is necessary to prove them in accordance with canon three hundred seventeen of the Civil Procedure Code. In this case, the public entity repeatedly stated the technical impossibility of the water resource, justifying its inability to supply the service requested by the plaintiff, which this Chamber does not doubt occurred, but not a single element of conviction is provided that allows deducing since when this problem was known and, more importantly still, what were the actions undertaken by the public entity to resolve the problem. If there was a limitation on water capacity, measures should have been taken urgently to resolve the problem, especially since it involves a fundamental right, and not simply limit itself to indicating the situation. Evidently, given the inability to provide all persons with the service, the priority had to be residential activity and, residually, commercial, but that is not justification to delay the measures necessary to resolve the situation for the latter. The problem was not alien to the public entity but is inherent to its competencies, and it had to find a solution within the shortest possible time. The exercise of the right to commerce within what is regulated by articles forty-five, forty-six, and twenty-eight, second paragraph, of the Political Constitution, so that if the State finds itself obliged to deny a public service for the benefit of the community, within the system of burdens that prevail in public law, the prevailing logic is that it must proceed to indemnify the affected party. Returning to the argument, given the lack of evidence regarding actions to mitigate or resolve the problem, the jurisdictional Collegiate body is inclined to think that we are facing abnormal activity in the public service from which the liability now under consideration derives. It is not unnecessary to indicate that if, in the case of normal activity, there is no difficulty whatsoever in locating the damage presented by the plaintiff company and the causal link, in addition to a singular, special, and intense sacrifice, the fundamental basis for deriving administrative liability from articles one hundred ninety and following of the General Law of Public Administration, besides it being possible to find the titleholder's absence of having to bear the effect; in the case of abnormal activity, it is even simpler to locate the bases for liability when the actions taken to resolve the problem, as indeed corresponded, are not proven.

IX.- ON THE OBJECT OF THE CLAIM AND THE MERITS OF THIS MATTER: Basically, the plaintiff seeks an order for payment of the damages allegedly caused by not having had potable water between the period from June 2009 to September 2012. Since the primary social function of Law is conflict resolution, it must be determined which of the opposing versions given by the parties merits credibility to this Tribunal, noting that in the preceding considerations we have already advanced somewhat on this matter. The crux of the lawsuit is to determine whether the Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers indeed had the obligation to provide potable water service to the plaintiff company. The facts, the claim, the opposition presented by Name112175, and the evidence shall be examined globally, to arrive at the final result of this dispute. Returning for that purpose to part of the arguments already given in the case. Legal analysis. 1. Obligation of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers to provide potable water service to the plaintiff company. Norms must be interpreted in a reasonable manner and consistent with social reality, which today teaches us, in that sense, the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, in its section two, determines that: It corresponds to the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers: a) To direct and oversee everything concerning providing the inhabitants of the republic with a potable water service...i) To build, expand, and reform aqueduct and sewer systems in those cases where necessary and where the better satisfaction of national needs so advises. Those norms guarantee the functioning of the public service without any discrimination or differentiation whatsoever. In the case of a service already in operation, provided the person meets the requirements established for this purpose, one may speak of an authentic subjective right to its enjoyment. In the same way, as the Constitutional Chamber indicated, in the sentence previously referenced, access to potable water ensures the rights to life—"without water, no life is possible" states the Water Charter approved by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on May 6, 1968—to the health of persons—indispensable for their nourishment, drink, and hygiene—and, of course, is associated with the socio-economic development and growth of peoples to ensure each individual a dignified well-being and quality of life. In essence, water, from an economic and ecological point of view, is a precious asset, given that it is indispensable for any human activity (industrial, agricultural, domestic, commercial, services, etc.). ON THE GOVERNING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SERVICES. "All public services provided by public administrations—including welfare or social ones—are governed by a series of principles that must be observed and respected, at all times and without any exception, by the public officials responsible for their management and provision. Such principles constitute a legal obligation of an indeclinable character imposed on any administrative entity or body due to their direct and immediate normative efficacy, given that the block or parameter of legality (article 11 of the Political Constitution) to which their actions must conform is composed, among other elements, of the general principles of administrative law (article 6° of the General Law of Public Administration). It must not be lost from perspective that the General Principles of Law have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit, such that they can assume a constitutional rank if the precept with respect to which they fulfill such functions also has that hierarchy. As we will see in the subsequent consideration, our fundamental text enshrines as a fundamental right of persons that of the proper functioning of public services; consequently, the principles that inform public services, insofar as they make that right effective, have a constitutional rank. Section 4 of the General Law of Public Administration clearly provides that 'The activity of public entities must be subject in its entirety to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equality in the treatment of the recipients or beneficiaries.'...Adaptation to any change in the legal regime or to the needs imposed by the socio-economic context means that administrative entities and bodies must have the capacity for foresight and, above all, for programming or planning to meet the new demands and challenges imposed, whether by the increase in the volume of demand for the public service or by technological changes. No entity, body, or public official can adduce reasons of budgetary or financial shortage, absence of equipment, lack of technological renewal thereof, excess or saturation of demand in the public service to cease providing it continuously and regularly. Equality or universality in access demands that all inhabitants have the right to demand, receive, and use the public service under equal conditions and in conformity with the norms that govern them; consequently, all those who find themselves in the same situation can demand identical advantages.

One of the guiding principles of public service not enunciated in Article 4 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública is its mandatory nature, since it would be useless to affirm that services must be continuous, regular, uniform, and general if the service provider has no obligation to provide them. The public administration providing the public service cannot choose its clientele or users; it must provide the service to anyone who requests it…". SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA, Voto 2003-11382, San José, at fifteen hours and eleven minutes on October seventh, two thousand three. In summary, from a Constitutional and legal standpoint, it is the obligation of Nombre112175 to provide potable water service, regardless of whether the applicant is a natural or legal person, although the Sala Constitucional, in the Amparo appeals filed by the plaintiff company's representative, which were denied because the matter was one of mere legality, considering that it involved a legal person, nevertheless, according to what is indicated in the rulings of the same Sala Constitucional, it follows that potable water is a precious good, being indispensable for any human activity (industrial, agricultural, domestic, commercial, services, etc.). From this perspective, and in light of the rules of logic and human experience, Nombre112175 had the legal duty to supply potable water to the plaintiff company, unless it had proven some exemption from liability that would have prevented that duty, which was not proven in this litis. It is worth noting that for a long time, constitutional jurisprudence was oriented towards indicating that legal persons did not present fundamental rights, a position that has varied in recent years, insofar as this type of person is nothing more than a conglomerate of individuals with a collective interest. In any case, even considering the possibility of the nonexistence of a constitutional right to water (which we reject outright), the legal duty in the terms set forth is indisputable. 2. Inactivity of Nombre112175 in providing potable water service to the plaintiff company. From the above vision, public entities must provide citizens with solutions to the problems that arise in society. The problem arises when the citizen, as an active subject, does not find the due response and activity from that obligated Administration; under those circumstances, the injured person is left in absolute helplessness against administrative arbitrariness, which, due to its omissive condition, has become an unlawful dysfunction. Taking into account the circumstances and details of the process, the non-supply of potable water to the plaintiff violates constitutional principles and implies, in turn, another dysfunctionality that leaves the effective judicial protection as a prestational right in a void. The foregoing agrees with what was ordered by the judgment of the Sala Primera, in Voto 584-F-2005, indicating that abnormality can manifest through malfunctioning, tardy functioning, or a total absence of functioning. Provided that the victim does not have the duty to bear the injury, it becomes unlawful, due to detriment to a third party against the legal order. Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances, assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent. There arises, then, the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity, and in that respect, the injury to the victim's legal sphere must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, requiring obligatory reparation. In the judgment of this Tribunal, this is what happened in this case, where the defendant Institute had a duty to supply potable water within a reasonable time and did not do so. This conclusion was reached taking into account and considering that from the month of October 2009, the plaintiff requested potable water service for its commercial business, and it was not until the year 2012 that said service was granted, logically after the lawsuit had been filed before the courts (proven by the work order document visible on folio 41 and the statements contained on DVD from the preliminary hearing). From this perspective, the unlawful conduct arises as a product of an administrative dysfunction because there is no demonstrated reason attributable to nature or third parties that prevented supplying the resource, and for this Tribunal, the defendant entity did have the necessary conditions to provide potable water to the plaintiff; rather, it was due to an internal administrative decision, which has no support in our legal system, by failing to provide an essential service such as potable water supply. Hence, that administrative conduct singularly affected the plaintiff company, causing economic damage that the issuer of that conduct must indemnify. It is worth revisiting what was stated earlier: if the affectation had been a consequence of the time necessary to make modifications and adaptations to the service, we could well speak of a case of special sacrifice or liability without fault; but in this case, not a single element was provided to establish that an attempt was made to fulfill the public duties. Therefore, by basic deductive inference, we are in the presence of abnormal behavior as the basis for deriving liability. 3. Based on the ideas expressed, we will analyze the pretension, which was the object of the contradictory debate during the oral and public hearing, concerning the claim for payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) for the period between June 2009 and September 2012, resulting from the non-supply of potable water by the defendant Institute. Regarding the accreditation of the claimed damages. From the evidence in the record, such as the official communication SUB-G-GSP-DRB-CPZ-0913-2010, dated November 16, 2010, it is proven that the representative of the plaintiff company requested, on November 2, 2009, through service availability order No. 13874716, three services for commercial premises in the name of Electrónica Leyden S.A., despite the fact that by official communication RB-CPZ-2009-0869 dated December 23, 2009, it was communicated that, due to the water supply deficit facing the Pérez Zeledón zone, and foreseeing that clients who have had potable water service for years would not suffer any deterioration in it, AYA is compelled to suspend the granting of water availability for commercial premises. This Tribunal considers that the argument given by the Institute is not valid grounds to deny the requested potable water service, at least not for the time under consideration. Especially when considering relevant aspects such as the fact that the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is responsible for providing the inhabitants of the Republic with a potable water service, making it an essential service that natural or legal persons have the right to obtain; likewise, on July 6, 2009, AYA placed a seal on the construction plan, certifying that an aqueduct exists in use in front of this property. Furthermore, if we examine the arguments given by the Institute's representation to deny the water supply, in which it states that the Institutional Directive Memorandum No. RB-DOM-2008-148, dated April 18, 2008, instructed the suspension of granting availability for new non-residential services (vertical condominiums, warehouses, commercial premises, apartments, etc.), (see official communication on folios 104-105), it is deduced from the above that it is not justified why the plaintiff was not warned, when she appeared to request the service at a later date (October 2009), that potable water service for commercial premises had been suspended. Another piece of evidence invoked by the Institute in its defense is the July 31, 2004, CONCESA study, which issued results through the formulation of several documents called "Diagnostic Report," "Alternatives Report," and two annexes, pointing out a deficit in the potable water flow for the year 2005, requiring Nombre112175 to carry out better comprehensive watershed management for water conservation. Regarding infrastructure, they recommended a topographic survey of supply sources, repair of the dam on the Río Quebrada, a new transmission line from another intake on the Río San Ramón to the Water Treatment Plants, improvements to the current treatment plants, wells, pumping stations, chlorination stations, replacement of the existing potable water distribution network in the San Isidro district with its respective boxes and valves, and improvement of potable water storage tanks, namely: Fallas and Pepe Tanks, San Luis Tank, Universidad Tank, and Los Chiles Tank. Note that this report is from the year 2005; therefore, one must consider that if the officials of AYA had known for years prior that there were problems with potable water, why was the plaintiff not informed at the moment of submitting the plan for its respective processing? In addition to the above, a lack of planning by the Institute could be admitted, since they knew of the potable water shortage since 2005. Moreover, where is the accreditation of the works carried out to mitigate the situation and affect users as little as possible? Again, we find ourselves with matters that should have been proven but for which no attempt to demonstrate them exists. Yet even taking into account what was previously stated by the representatives of the public entity, this Tribunal infers that these are not sufficient and valid grounds to deny potable water service to the plaintiff company, as we would be in the presence of abnormal functioning (funcionamiento anormal) by the Administration in failing to provide an indispensable service. That is why "one speaks of inactivity in the face of the omission (total or partial) of an active conduct whose deployment, from a legal standpoint, corresponds to the Public Administration. Put differently, it involves those cases where the public entity or body does not perform the activity to which it is obligated, either by a norm or by a self-binding act. It is, then, a giving or doing on the part of the Administration, in which the administered party must be provided with the good, activity, or service that corresponds to them…". La Justicia Administrativa, González Camacho Oscar, 1st ed., San José, C.R. IJSA, January 2021, p.42. Thus, this Tribunal has no doubt about the abnormal functioning incurred by the defendant Institute due to the non-supply of the water resource to the company. From that legal perspective, it is determined that as a consequence of that omissive conduct, an unlawful injury occurred, thus operating a liability for abnormal functioning, which is compensable, of course. To reinforce the previous thesis, the Sala Constitucional has highlighted the importance of the principles of efficacy and efficiency, whose holders are the administered, and which it called the fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services. In effect, in Judgment No. 2004-05207, at fourteen hours and fifty-five minutes on May eighteenth, two thousand four, it detailed that the: "…Constitución Política encompasses an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of numerals, interpreted, a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8°, 139, subsection 4°, and 191 of the Fundamental Law insofar as they encompass, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the ‘proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies,’ ‘proper running of Government,’ and ‘efficiency of the administration.’ This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their competences and the provision of public services in an efficient and effective manner and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it becomes evident that the original constituent implicitly encompassed the principle of liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter to interpret, apply, integrate, and delimit the entire legal system…". That atypical or unnamed individual guarantee is accentuated when dealing with essential public services such as potable water supply. (See, in this regard, judgment number 2003-11222 at 17:48 hrs. on September 30, 2003). It must be emphasized that the judge's conviction to validate or not testimonial or documentary evidence is within the exclusive purview of their jurisdictional independence, the exercise of reason, and respect for the legitimacy of the evidence as a whole. In that sense, the plaintiff company managed to demonstrate with serviceable and useful evidence, such as the documentary evidence supporting the testimonial evidence, that as a result of that abnormal event issued by AYA, it suffered economic damages by having to use other means to supply potable water, as referred to by the witness Nombre112177 and Roger Mata Arias. On the contrary, the representation of Nombre112175 could not prove, with suitable evidence, any exemption from liability or disqualify the causal link between the omissive conduct—the supply of potable water—and the damaging result suffered by the plaintiff. All of this, necessarily employing logical deductions, leads us to incline toward confirming the thesis presented by the plaintiff in its lawsuit. Therefore, in light of the rules of logic and human experience, from the entire body of evidence, both testimonial and documentary, sufficient elements of conviction emerge to conclude with the required degree of certainty that, in its core aspects, the factual hypothesis presented by the plaintiff is plausible and was duly proven in this process. On the other hand, the thesis presented by the defendant lacks serviceable evidence to discredit the hypothesis presented by the plaintiff; that is, the defendant entity failed to observe that burden, as it did not provide suitable evidentiary material to prove, in an indubitable manner, that the non-provision of potable water service was due to some technical impediment or some exemption from liability stipulated in our legal system. That is why it has rightly been said that within the judicial process, it is elementary that the parties who affirm facts, as the basis of their right or their defense, provide the judge with sufficient evidentiary elements to achieve in them the necessary conviction for adopting the respective decision. Without evidence, the Judge cannot reconstruct the facts under debate, cannot verify the parties' affirmations, nor give content to the invoked right. In the case at hand, the defendant Institute has failed in that duty, as it did not provide the necessary and suitable evidence to prove its arguments set forth in the opposition to the lawsuit. Observe that the study on the deficit in potable water supply in the San Isidro district and surrounding areas dates from 2005, and the decision to suspend the supply of potable water to commercial businesses was not made until 2008. Therefore, for the reasons stated, this Chamber is led to the conviction regarding the veracity of the essential facts alleged as the factual basis of the lawsuit. Consequently, it is concluded that the balance must tip in favor of the thesis presented by the plaintiff company. Thus, in merit of the foregoing, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is ordered to pay the economic damages incurred by the plaintiff company in supplying the potable water, during the period from October 2009 to September 2012, as this was the only fact proven during this process. However, the condemnation is made in abastract (en abstracto), and its quantification is reserved for the execution of judgment stage, where the plaintiff must demonstrate with suitable evidence the quantum of those economic damages. It is made in abastract because the evidence provided by the plaintiff and other evidence is not conclusive in determining damages other than the patrimonial expense incurred by the plaintiff in supplying potable water during the period from October 2009 to September 2012. It must be noted that the condemnation for economic damages follows the provision in numeral 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which provides that the State and its entities shall be liable for all damages caused by their legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. Thus, the person causing the damage shall compensate it, unless they demonstrate some exonerating cause. Observe that the documentary evidence provided by the plaintiff, admitted in the oral and public hearing, listed as the general statement on a credit operation carried out at the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, visible on folios 149-159 of the judicial file, that document relates a bank loan obtained by the plaintiff company; therefore, in our consideration, it is not suitable evidence to demonstrate the claimed damages and losses. The same applies to the certification from the Private Accountant, Mr. Vidal Callejas Escobar, visible on folios 159-173, which details that the plaintiff generates her income from the repair and sale of white goods spare parts during the periods from October 2008 and September 2012. In the opinion of this Chamber, this is not useful evidence, as it has no direct relationship with what is discussed in this process; the same fate befalls the 20 photographs provided by the plaintiff. In reality, the testimonial evidence, such as the account of the witness Nombre112176, who affirmed that the commercial premises were using water from adjacent properties, and Roger Mata Arias, who indicated that the potable water was resolved by another means—he fetched water from a well about 20 meters behind the house of Nombre112174, and the distance between the commercial premises and the plaintiff's representative's house was 8 kilometers; he also affirmed that there was a problem with the construction of the work. The witness Lenin Fernández Badilla stated that his participation involved hauling water for the business; he went with his Pick up to the house of Nombre112174 and brought the drums of water to the plaintiff's business; this was in the year 2010. Nombre112174 paid him ¢15,000 for each water trip he hauled; he made 4 or 5 trips per month, and he finished hauling water in September 2012 (see testimonial evidence collected in the oral and public trial hearing, contained in electronic format). The documentary evidence offered by both parties is what proves the economic damages suffered by the plaintiff company because of the refusal to supply potable water by AYA.

X.- Regarding the specific damages: Evidently, in a process of this nature, the claiming party is obligated to prove not only the right but must also demonstrate, because it is incumbent upon them, the losses they claim, adjusted to the due causal relationship. It is not enough for a subject to say they have the truth, since the law itself obligates them to demonstrate, through the admitted means of proof, those affirmations of the constitutive facts of their right, even when dealing with aspects of losses caused. There is no doubt that they must equally demonstrate that these were caused to an asset of their patrimony. The doctrine has indicated that concerning the litigant's claim for damages, the party must necessarily establish the compelling factual presuppositions to demonstrate a causal relationship. In the present case, the plaintiff was unable to prove the requested damages, as it is not evident from the documentary and testimonial evidence in the record that the plaintiff company actually suffered the claimed damages due to the non-supply of potable water during the period from October 2009 to September 2012. In this case, the plaintiff, in compliance with canon three hundred seventeen of the Código Procesal Civil, applicable to the species in accordance with Article two hundred twenty of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, was obligated not only to prove the existence of the damage and its relationship to its counterpart, in addition to its illegitimacy, which it indeed did; but also the extent of its scope or quantum. Regarding this last aspect, the testimonies rendered, while allowing the derivation of the existence of possible damage, do not permit the establishment of its specific content. Technical or documentary evidence, based on concrete financial data, is evidently the ideal evidence on the matter, which was never offered. Within that framework, a specific recognition is impossible. However, despite the foregoing, Article one hundred twenty of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, in safeguarding effective judicial protection, allows for the recognition in abastract of the right so that in the execution of judgment stage, the amount of the affectation can be established specifically. Thus, the Chamber opts for this mechanism of remitting to the execution of judgment for the specific establishment of the damage suffered, always with the terms indicated as to how that damage must be proven. Regarding moral damages (daño moral), the doctrine has established that it stems from the injury to a non-patrimonial right and involves an unjust disturbance of the conditions of the person affected by it. The plaintiff indicated in the oral and public hearing that moral damage was caused to the plaintiff company by the refusal of Nombre112175 to grant the supply of potable water. This aspect is resolved as follows. It must be understood that moral damage is encompassed within damages in general. If the plaintiff claims objective moral damage, it is rejected because she did not provide suitable evidence to prove such impairment and damage. It would be damage to the general image of the company, which affected its economic capacity, aspects on which there is no element of conviction whatsoever. "Objective moral damage, contrary to the preceding (referring to subjective moral damage), requires the corresponding demonstration. As stated in the preceding section, it refers to the injury of a non-patrimonial right that generates valuable economic consequences. That is, it is that suffered by the person in their social context, and not in the individual field. Hence, it is necessary to demonstrate how the damage occurred, and essential to prove, in addition to the causal relationship, its existence, it being incumbent, under the shelter of numeral 317 of the Código Procesal Civil, on the person petitioning it, to provide sufficient proof to support it." (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, No. 226-F-S1-2008 at 15:26 on March 14, 2008; the underlined portions are ours.). Regarding subjective moral damage, several clarifications are necessary. As is known, that type of damage is the suffering, the affectation in the emotional state that people present as a result of a particular event. Historically, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia and this jurisdiction have, by a majority, maintained that only natural persons can present suffering. It cannot be forgotten that the representatives, officers, and shareholders of a company are what their name says: structures within it; but they do not constitute the person itself. Representatives cannot be confused with the legal person. Within that framework and on the stated bases, the Tribunal cannot establish the existence of a subjective moral damage to the company Electrónica Leyden S.A. Consequently, it is proper to declare the lack of right on that point.

XI.- Regarding the exceptions: The exception of expiry (caducidad) was opposed and must be rejected, as the final claim made by the plaintiff is solely for the payment of damages and losses. By an adequate interpretation, the claim for damages and losses is not subject to the exception of expiry, since, for a long time, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia has been clarifying that: "Articles 2 subsection c) and 3 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa, in truth, establish the so-called unification of procedural paths. However, it is true that the civil process of hacienda presents its own characteristics, differentiating it from the pure contentious-administrative process. In the civil process of hacienda, for instance, what relates to the nullity of acts of the Administration is not ventilated, which characterizes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In that [civil] process, what is discussed is the liability of the Administration arising from its functioning (Article 190 and following of the Ley General de Administración Pública). According to the doctrine, in the civil process of hacienda, one cannot speak of caducity related to the filing of the action. The ordinary prescription of private law operates there. Furthermore, since the nullity of administrative acts is not debated in it, the prerequisite of exhausting administrative remedies is not necessary (No. 66-1997, at fifteen hours and forty-five minutes on July twenty-third, nineteen ninety-seven). Thus, the party confuses an institute proper to the nullity process (caducity) to apply it to a civil process of hacienda, which, under the protection of Article one hundred ninety-eight, presents a prescription period. It is worth adding that in this second assumption, the legal time would not have elapsed either. Since this involves a pretension for damages and losses, numeral 198 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública must be taken as the parameter, and if we only consider the date of December 23, 2009, when the non-granting of potable water was communicated to the plaintiff's representative, to the date the complaint was notified to AYA on June 7, 2012, as visible on folio 15 bis, the prescription period of 4 years has not yet elapsed. Regarding the lack of right that was consistently invoked by the defendant, even though it was not presented in the express terms of the technical term, it is the criterion of the Tribunal that it must be declared with respect to the claimed subjective moral damage, as it lacks normative support; and rejected regarding material damage, as its existence was proven.

XII.- Regarding indexation: The same is imposed ex officio in accordance with Article one hundred twenty-three of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. It is a recognition of the loss of the purchasing value of money. If it were not granted, the plaintiff would be receiving less money (with respect to its purchasing power). Consequently, on the items established in abastract, the indexation shall begin to run from the finality of the resolution that fixes them until definitive payment.

XIII.- Regarding costs: In accordance with ordinals 119, 193, and 194 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, this process must be resolved by ordering the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados to pay both costs, applying the general principle of condemnation of the losing party and because the assumptions that would allow exemption from that payment, as per numeral 194 of the cited Code, are not configured in this case.

POR TANTO:

The extraprocedural satisfaction existing between the parties regarding the supply of water service to the plaintiff company since September of last year is accepted. The exceptions of lack of expiry and prescription are rejected. The lack of right is partially declared, and consequently, the action brought by the company Electrónica Leyden S.A. is partially granted, understood as denied in all that which is not expressly upheld. Consequently, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is ordered to pay the economic damages incurred by the plaintiff company due to the absence of potable water supply, during the period from October 2009 to September 2012, an amount to be determined in the execution of judgment stage with suitable evidence, as well as the recognition of indexation in accordance with Article 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, from the finality of the judgment that fixes them specifically and until their definitive payment. For the rest, the lawsuit is declared without merit. Both costs are to be borne by the losing party.

Rolando Porras Mejías Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR: ELECTRÓNICA LEYDEN.

FILE: 12-000881-1027-CA PROCESS: ORDINARY PROCEEDINGS PLAINTIFF: ELECTRÓNICA LEYDEN. S.A. DEFENDANT: INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS **No 29-2013-IV** **CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. FOURTH SECTION.** **SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ.** **GOICOECHEA**. Dirección01, at sixteen hours and fifteen minutes on March twenty-second, two thousand thirteen.

**Ordinary proceedings** established by **ELECTRÓNICA LEYDEN, S.A,** represented by **Nombre112174** **,** an adult, businessman, identity card number CED88739 ----, resident of Pérez Zeledón, San José against the **INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS,** *(hereinafter AYA),* represented by Attorney **Adilia Campos Vargas**, an adult, identity card number CED88740 ----, resident of Tibás. Attorneys Fausto Eduardo Gutiérrez Howell and Carlos Rodríguez Rescia appear in this process as lawyers for the plaintiff company. Case file number **12-000881-1027-CA** **R E S U L T A N D O** **First.** That the company Electrónica Leyden, S.A, files a formal contentious-administrative claim so that the judgment, which the Tribunal summarizes in the following points, declares: 1. Grant the claim, declaring that Nombre112175 has not wanted to provide the service and that it be compelled to grant it. 2. Order Nombre112175 to pay damages. 3. Order Nombre112175 to pay costs. 4. Order Nombre112175 to pay damages for the elapsed period during which the public aqueduct was not available, **(folio 134).** **Second.** The Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, answered the claim negatively, arguing what the Tribunal understands as a lack of right and raised the defense of prescription and expiration, also requested that the present claim be declared without merit in all its aspects and that the plaintiff party be ordered to pay both costs, **(folios 27-39).** **Third.** That in the preliminary hearing, the claim was adjusted solely to the payment of damages, regarding the elapsed period during which the public aqueduct was not available. In the oral and public trial hearing, it was limited solely to the period from June 2009 to September 2012 for the indemnification purposes already indicated; since after the latter date, the service supply installation had occurred.

**Fourth.** That the oral and public trial was held on the nineteenth of March, two thousand thirteen, and within the adversarial proceedings, the testimonies of Messrs. Nombre112176 , Nombre112175 , were received, and as evidence for better adjudication, the testimony of Messrs. Nombre112177 and Roger Mata Arias.

**Fifth.** That no defects capable of generating defenselessness to the parties are observed.

**Sixth.** This judgment is issued **BY UNANIMITY** and as provided in Article one hundred eleven of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and the forty-seventh, second paragraph of the Reglamento Autónomo de Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa de Trámite complejo, **after deliberation.** **Written by Judge Porras Mejías,** **and** **CONSIDERANDO** **I.- Preliminary issues to consider.** That there is a procedural satisfaction by the plaintiff regarding the claim in which it requested a declaration that Nombre112175 had not wanted to provide the service and that it be compelled to grant it. As pertinent to the case, the particular service has already been supplied, a fact manifested by both parties and allegedly occurring by September two thousand twelve. The interest of the parties having been satisfied, the Chamber omits any pronouncement on the matter, it being sufficient to accept the alternative dispute resolution as it meets the legal requirements for that purpose.

**II.- Evidence for better adjudication:** In the oral hearing, the documentation appearing on folios 149 to 173 of the case file and the testimony of Nombre112177 and Roger Mata Arias were admitted as evidence for better adjudication in accordance with Article 50.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

**III.- PROVEN FACTS:** Of relevance to settle this litigation, the following facts have been demonstrated: **1)** That in October 2009, the plaintiff's representative requested from AYA three potable water connections in the locality of Palmares de Pérez Zeledón, one hundred meters south of Banco Nacional, for a commercial premises building), **(see documents on folios 40-43)**, **2)** That on July 6, 2009, the AYA placed a stamp on the construction plan, with a legend stating: "...ICAA, Región Brunca Engineering Department. Certifies that an Aqueduct exists in use in front of this property. Competent authorities are warned that this stamp does not imply water and sanitary sewerage availability nor that the service can be provided before fulfilling legal requirements...", **(see plan and response to the interim measure and claim on folios 11-39), 3)** That in the conflict zone there existed a water supply problem, since several months prior to the conflict at hand; even though there was hydraulic capacity (pipe capacity) **(uncontroverted fact as extracted from the statements of both parties).** **4)** That by official memo RB-DOM-2008-148, dated April 18, 2008, the Head of Operations and Maintenance of the Región Brunca states that: "through a meeting held on April 15, the issue has been discussed among Lic. Guillermo Sánchez Solís, Lic. Fernando Bonilla O, the Head of the Commercial Area Didier Murillo and the undersigned; furthermore, this has been analyzed with Eng. Javier Valverde and the undersigned has been instructed to suspend granting availability for new non-residential services (vertical condominiums, warehouses, commercial premises, apartments, etc...)". **(see official memo on folios 104-105), 5)** "That by official memo RB-CPZ-2009-0889 dated December 23, Mr. Nombre112174 is notified that due to the water supply deficit facing the Pérez Zeledón area, and foreseeing that clients who have had potable water service for years prior should not suffer a deterioration thereof, the AYA is forced to suspend granting water availability for commercial premises...", **(see official memo GSP-DRB-CPZ-4463-2012, dated 6-12-2012, folios 98-103),** **6)** That on July 31, 2004, CONCESA issued the results of the "Diagnostic Report", "Alternatives Report", and two annexes. In them, they established the current conditions of the systems in the central district of Pérez Zeledón and surrounding areas, as well as the measures required to resolve the deterioration in the existing potable water infrastructure. The experts indicated a potable water flow deficit for 2005 of 32 liters per second at maximum hourly demand, with Nombre112175 needing to implement better integrated watershed management for water conservation. Regarding infrastructure, they recommended a topographic survey of supply sources, repair of the dam on the Río Quebrada, a new conduction line from another catchment on the Río San Ramón to the Water Treatment Plants, improvements to the current treatment plants, wells, pumping stations, chlorination stations, replacement of the existing potable water distribution network in the San Isidro District with its respective boxes and valves, improvement of potable water supply tanks, namely: Tanques Fallas and Tanque Pepe, Tanque de San Luis, Tanque de la Universidad, and Tanque de los Chiles...", **(see brief answering the claim 27-39).** **7)** That the defendant managed to solve the water capacity problem in the area by mid-year two thousand seven (uncontroverted fact). **8)** That the plaintiff company was supplied with water service starting in September two thousand twelve **(uncontroverted fact, see also the photographs provided for that purpose by the plaintiff itself).** **9)** That the water supply was due to an increase in the water capacity in the area's pipes (uncontroverted fact). **10)** That the plaintiff company presented economic impact arising from the absence of supplied water between the period from October 2009 to September 2012, **(see documentary evidence in the court record and the testimony of** Nombre112176 **,** Nombre112175 **,** Nombre112177 **and Roger Mata Arias).** **IV.- Unproven facts.** Given the absence or insufficiency of evidentiary elements, the following are considered as such: **1.** The date from which a water supply problem existed in the area where the plaintiff requested the services underlying the problem **(there is no evidence in this regard)**, **2.** The representation for AYA did not demonstrate that during the time it failed to supply water to the plaintiff, it carried out the different necessary steps in an agile, timely, and expeditious manner to guarantee the public service **(there is no evidence in this regard)**, **3.** AYA did not demonstrate any exemption from liability for not complying with the potable water supply to the plaintiff **(it did not prove it with any evidence). 4.** The plaintiff company did not demonstrate the existence of any non-material damage or moral harm from the failure to supply potable water, **(there is no evidence in this regard).** **V.- Position and evidence of the company** **Electrónica Leyden, S.A. 1.** Within this ordinary proceeding, the plaintiff company, *seeks a declaration in the judgment:* that Nombre112175 pay it damages for the elapsed period during which it did not have a public aqueduct, for the period from June 2009 to September 2012. **2.** To prove the above, the plaintiff company presents documentary and testimonial evidence, (see the administrative file subsumed in the judicial file, record, and video of the oral and public hearing). **3. Position and evidence of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados.** The representative of AYA denies the liability attributed to it, argues that the water service has already been supplied, and that it had not been granted before due to lack of capacity availability in the area for new services; in its defense, it presents documentary and testimonial evidence, **(see answer to the claim on folios 27-39).** **VI.- On the necessity of potable water for human consumption.** The Sala Constitucional has indicated that: "*Our Constitución Política, in its Article 50, states the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, which is achieved, among other factors, through the protection and conservation of the quality and quantity of water for human consumption and use and to maintain the ecological balance in the habitats of flora and fauna (e.g., wetlands) and, in general, of the biosphere as the common heritage of humanity. Likewise, access to potable water ensures the rights to life—'without water, no life is possible,' states the Water Charter approved by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on May 6, 1968—and to people's health—indispensable for their food, drink, and hygiene—(Article 21 of the Constitución Política) and, of course, is associated with the development and socio-economic growth of peoples to ensure each individual a dignified well-being and quality of life (Article 33 of the Constitución Política and Article 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights).* Voto de la Sala Constitucional, 1256-2006, of February 8, 2006. This opinion tells us of the essential nature of the water resource, which is mentioned in international instruments from 1968 and international bodies like the Council of Strasbourg, highlighting its relevance for development and human life. In this same opinion, the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972, is established, which reaffirms the importance of the water resource for humanity: “*In another vein, currently, the duty to preserve, for future generations, conditions of existence at least equal to those inherited (sustainable development) has been recognized, so that present needs must be satisfied without compromising the ability of future generations to do so with their own (Principle 2 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972). In essence, water, from an economic and ecological point of view, is a precious good, since it is indispensable for any human activity (industrial, agricultural, domestic, commercial, services, etc.), as a source of energy, raw material, transportation route, support for recreational activities, and a constituent element for the maintenance of natural ecosystems—use of water that is non-polluting or compatible with the environment—*.” Voto de la Sala Constitucional, 1256-2006, of February eight, 2006. The Chamber has also stated that the constitutional principles, which make up the provisions in Articles 21 and 33 of our Constitución Política, not only encompass the State's duty to respect human life and its protection against the actions of third parties, but also the guarantee of a dignified way of life, for which the necessary resources that make it possible must be procured, since that right cannot be limited to mere subsistence; those resources precisely include water.” Voto de la Sala Constitucional No. 1853-03, of March five, 2003. The Constitución Política in Article one hundred twenty-one, subsection fourteen, states: " (...) *In addition to the other powers conferred by this Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly: (...) 14) To decree the alienation or application to public uses of the Nation's own property* (...)." This constitutional provision has been developed in the Civil Code, in Articles two hundred sixty-one through two hundred sixty-three; the first of them states: "*Things are public that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those of which all can avail themselves because they are given over to public use. All other things are private and objects of particular property, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who, for such case, as legal persons, are not differentiated from any other person*." For its part, the following provision adds: "*Public things are outside commerce; and they may not enter it, while this is not legally decreed, separating them from the public use to which they were destined*." Thus, public domain is understood as the set of goods subject to a special legal regime distinct from that governing the private domain, which, in addition to belonging to or being under the administration of public legal entities, are affected or destined for purposes of public utility and are manifested in the direct or indirect use that any person can make of them. According to the cited regulations, the State possesses both public and private domain goods; public goods are those which a law gives a destiny for public or general use; they are called "demaniales" and are inalienable, imprescriptible, unattachable, and unsusceptible to adverse possession. The logic of public goods is that their domain precedes the State itself, such that they belong to The Nation as a requirement for coexistence in society; the State limits itself to administering them, which, as a general rule, prevents them from leaving the public sphere. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation (See Sala Constitucional, voto 2306-91 of 14:45 hours on November 6, 1991). It is said that they belong to The Nation when the State limits itself to their safeguard and protection, without being able, in principle, to dispose of them. These goods are outside the commerce of men and consequently have a legal nature and regime different from private goods—which are governed by property rights in the terms of Article 45 of the Constitución Política—in that, by the express will of the legislator or by their very essence, they are affected for a special destiny of serving the community, i.e., the public interest, and therefore, cannot be the object of private property, for which reason they cannot belong individually to private parties, nor to the State, strictly speaking, because the latter limits itself to their administration and guardianship. Thus, what defines the legal nature of demaniales goods is their destiny, as they are affected and are at the service of public use, as recognized by the doctrine on the matter; thus, Nombre33033, Miguel S., in his work Tratado de Derecho Administrativo (Tomo V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., pag.

25), considered: "</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic">For a good or thing to be considered a dependency of the public domain, and be subject to the relevant regime, it is necessary that said good or thing be affected to 'public use,' directly or indirectly, and in this 'latter' case, it must involve things directly affected—as 'final goods' or 'use goods'—to common utility or comfort, excluding from the public ownership of goods the State those that are of a merely instrumental nature</span><span style="font-family:Verdana">." On the other hand, the private goods of the State are governed by private law with elements specific to public law. These goods, if they are within the commerce of men, can be transferred, appropriated, and are not imprescriptible; therefore, they are susceptible to adverse possession (usucapión) for the benefit of private individuals, in accordance with article two hundred sixty-one already indicated.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana"> Note that the emphasis of the differentiation occurs in relation to the purpose of the good, that is, the fact of being affected to a common use or to the service of the common good (see Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 2301-91, of November 6, 1991 and 2000-06903 at 15:48 hours on August 8, 2000).</span><span style="font-family:Verdana">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana"> As already advanced, due to their special legal nature, they present the following attributes: they are imprescriptible, which implies that by the passage of time, the right of ownership over them cannot be acquired, not even mere possession, that is, they cannot be acquired through adverse possession (usucapión), nor can they be lost by prescription; for which reason the use permits that the Administration grants over them always have a precarious nature, which means they can be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience at any time by the Administration—under the terms provided in Articles 154 and 155 of the General Law of Public Administration—; and the same concessions granted over them for their exploitation can be cancelled, through the corresponding procedure; they are unseizable, which means they cannot be subject to any lien or seizure, neither by private individuals, nor by the Administration; and they are inalienable, which translates into the condition that they are outside the commerce of men; hence they cannot be alienated, sold, or acquired, neither gratuitously nor for consideration, neither by private individuals, nor by the State, so they are exempted from the commerce of men and subject to a special and reinforced legal regime. Furthermore, their use and exploitation is subject to police power, insofar as, since they are goods that cannot be the object of possession, much less of ownership, their utilization and exploitation is possible only through duly authorized acts, whether by concession or use permit, granted by the competent authority; and to constant control by the Public Administration.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana"> A public good can be natural or artificial, depending on whether it concerns goods declared public by the legislator considering them in the state that nature presents or offers them (a river, for example), or goods declared public by the legislator but whose creation or existence depends on a human act (construction of a street or public park, for example). The affectation is the act or manifestation of will of the public power, by virtue of which the thing becomes incorporated into the use and enjoyment of the community and can be carried out by law or by administrative act. The doctrine makes the distinction between "assignment of public character" to a good and the "affectation" of that good to the public domain. The assignment of public character means establishing that said specific good would have public domain status; thus, for example, the general legal norm would state that all public roads are integral parts or dependencies of the public domain and this means that the current ones are, as well as those that come to be built. In contrast, affectation means that the good declared public domain becomes effectively incorporated into public use and this has to do with the acceptance and receipt of public works when they are built by administration or by the conclusion of the works and their official receipt, when a private individual carries them out (construction of an urbanization or subdivision (fraccionamiento), for example).- It is for this reason that it is said that affectation can be declared by law in a generic form, or by an administrative act, which, necessarily, must conform to the legal norm that serves as its reference (principle of legality). As a consequence of what was stated in the previous point, it is manifest that the public domain regime exists per se. Its existence and publicity occur autonomously from the Registry, without the registered titleholder being able to allege unawareness as a means to distort it and counteract the affectation. The principles of inalienability and imprescriptibility that characterize the public domain prevent the figure of the registered third party from being wielded against it to consolidate private property illicitly removed from that regime. The public domain has legal publicity and in many cases natural publicity. The foregoing is coupled with the principle of first registration (inmatriculación) of the properties comprising the public domain, which has material publicity and not necessarily formal or registry publicity. Against the public domain, private detentions suffer from a weakened value, however prolonged they may be in time and even if they appear protected by entries in the Property Registry. The condition of a public domain and public use good affects third parties, even if such quality does not appear in the Property Registry. These are goods that, by their nature, do not need registry inscription (Voto 019-2009-SVII, Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Seventh Section). Note that said principle as an exception to the principle of registry publicity is based on the fact that public domain goods enjoy material publicity and therefore their registry publicity is not necessary, insofar as public domain goods, by their nature, are not subject to said institute.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana"> Additionally, there exists the figure of "de-affectation (desafectación)", which concerns "</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic">the legal situation by which a good ceases to belong to the public domain (...) goods that are de-affected become, in principle, patrimonial goods of the titular Administration, which, as applicable, may alienate them (...)</span><span style="font-family:Verdana">" (vote 035-2009-SVII, Contentious-Administrative Tribunal); a situation that logically could only occur in those that have been declared as such by law, since in those whose condition is intrinsic such possibility would be forbidden.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana"> Before orienting the argumentation more specifically on the point that concerns us, it is manifest that when the public domain good has been created by a private individual or represents an especially intense affectation that they are not obliged to bear, said character does not inhibit the obligation to assume responsibility on the part of the Administration, in order to allow balance in public burdens.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana"> The contrary would entail unjust enrichment, which lacks support within the national legal system.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana"> Now then, as already advanced, regarding water, the Constitutional Chamber, in vote No. 5606-06, recognized the condition of a human right by stating:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">“VII.- Access to potable water as a human right</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">. In addition to what has been indicated, and perhaps the most relevant aspect on this topic, is the nature and function of water for human life. It is not necessary to detail here an explanation of the evident and notorious reality that without water there can be no life, nor quality of life, and that therefore, with or without a nationalization law, by its very essence, this issue is not and cannot be a territorial or local issue. This Chamber itself, in its constitutional jurisprudence, has stated that access to potable water is a fundamental human right, insofar as it is configured as an integral part of the content of the right to health and to life. (CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER, judgments numbers 534-96, 2728-91, 3891-93, 1108-96, 2002-06157 2002-10776; 2004-1923). This same line has been maintained in judgments 2003-04654 and 2004-07779, which, as relevant, state:</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\"> // ‘V.- // This Chamber recognizes, as part of Constitutional Law, a fundamental right to potable water, derived from the fundamental rights to health, life, the environment, food and decent housing, among others, as has also been recognized in international instruments on Human Rights applicable in Costa Rica: thus, it appears explicitly in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Art. 14) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art. 24); furthermore, it is enunciated at the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (principle 2), and declared in numerous other documents of International Humanitarian Law. In our Inter-American Human Rights System, the country is particularly obligated in this matter by the provisions of Article 11.1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador” of 1988), which provides that: “Article 11. Right to a healthy environment 1.- Everyone has the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public services.’ The lack of resources does not justify non-compliance by public administrations in the provision of this basic service. (CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER, resolutions 2003-04654 and 2004-007779). // For its part, as both the Attorney General's Office and the representative of Name112175 rightly recognize in their reports, in the international field, the recognition of water as a human right and as a necessary precondition for all our human rights is also majority. It is held that without equitable access to a minimum requirement of potable water, other established rights would be unattainable – such as the right to an adequate standard of living for health and well-being, as well as other civil and political rights. In November 2002, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights affirmed that access to adequate quantities of clean water for domestic and personal use is a fundamental human right of every person. Likewise, in the General Comment</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">No. 15 on the fulfillment of Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee noted that ‘the human right to water is indispensable for leading a life of human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights.’ It is also emphasized that the State Parties to the International Covenant have the duty to progressively fulfill, without any discrimination, the right to water, which entitles everyone to enjoy sufficient, physically accessible, safe and acceptable water for domestic and personal use. // For their part, several international conferences have taken place, among which the United Nations Water Conference held in Mar del Plata in 1977 stands out, which recognized that all peoples have the right to access to potable water to satisfy their basic needs. Also, the Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986 includes a commitment by States to ensure equal opportunities for all to enjoy basic resources.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\"> // The concept of satisfying basic water needs was further strengthened during the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. In Agenda 21, governments agreed that \"in developing and using water resources, priority must be given to satisfying basic needs and to the conservation of ecosystems. Similarly, in the Plan of Implementation adopted at the Johannesburg Summit in 2002, governments committed to \"employ all policy instruments, including regulation, monitoring..... and cost recovery of water services,\" without the cost recovery objectives becoming a barrier to poor people's access to clean water. Likewise, there are dozens of international instruments that directly and indirectly relate to water as a human right of all persons and peoples, such that it is not only an issue that by its nature tends towards nationalization, but towards the internationalization of its use and exploitation.” </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">See how, beyond normative support, the public domain character of water is a necessary consequence of the imperative requirement it presents for human life, which entails that the internal normative guide is based on Article twenty-one of the Constitution. At the infra-constitutional level, its public domain status is initially regulated in the Water Law (Ley de Aguas), number 276, of August twenty-sixth, nineteen forty-two: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">"Article 1.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">The following are waters of the public domain: // I.- Those of the territorial seas in the extension and terms established by international law;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\"> // II.- Those of the lagoons and estuaries of the beaches that communicate permanently or intermittently with the sea; // III.- Those of inland lakes of natural formation that are directly linked to constant currents; // IV.- Those of the rivers and their direct or indirect tributaries, streams, or springs (manantiales) from the point where the first permanent waters emerge until their mouth into the sea or lakes, lagoons, or estuaries;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\"> // V.- Those of constant or intermittent currents whose channel, in all or part of its extension, serves as a boundary to the national territory, with the dominion of those currents subject to what has been established in international treaties concluded with bordering countries and, in the absence thereof, or regarding unforeseen matters, to the provisions of this law;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\"> // VI.- Those of any current that directly or indirectly flows into those listed in fraction V; // VII.- Those extracted from mines, with the limitation indicated in Article 10; // VIII.- Those of the springs (manantiales) that emerge on the beaches, maritime zones, channels, beds, or banks of national property and, in general, all those that rise on lands of the public domain; // IX.- Subterranean waters whose extraction is not done by means of wells; and // X.- Rainwater running through ravines or watercourses whose channels are of the public domain. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Article 2.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">- The waters listed in the preceding article are national property and the dominion over them is not lost nor has it been lost when, through the execution of artificial works or previous exploitation, the natural characteristics are altered or have been altered. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">Excepted are the waters exploited by virtue of contracts granted by the State, which shall be subject to the conditions authorized in the respective concession. ." </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">For its part, when the granting of the concession occurred, Law 258 of August eighteenth, nineteen forty-one, the National Electricity Service Law (Ley del Servicio Nacional de Electricidad), was in force, which stated:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">Article 1: All waters of the Republic, which are not private domain in accordance with the current Water Law (Ley de Aguas), … are inalienable and under the dominion, governance, and surveillance of the State</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">” </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">Supporting what has been said is the provision of Article four of the Mining Code (Código de Minería) (Law 6797 of October 4, 1982) which states:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">“Article 4.- </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">….</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> subterranean and surface waters are reserved for the State and may only be exploited by the latter, by private parties in accordance with the law, or through a special concession granted for a limited time and subject to the conditions and stipulations established by the Legislative Assembly.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">The natural resources existing in the soil, subsoil, and waters of the seas adjacent to the national territory, within an extension of up to two hundred miles from the low-water line, along the coasts, may only be exploited in accordance with the provisions of subsection 14) (last paragraph) of Article 121 of the Political Constitution.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">Regarding the Administration of the resource, the repealed Law number 258 of August eighteenth, nineteen forty-one, created the National Electricity Service (Servicio Nacional de Electricidad)</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> to exercise dominion, exploitation, utilization, governance, and surveillance over various resources, including all waters. Empowering it under numeral six to grant concessions or water rights, a norm that is consistent with the aforementioned Water Law (Ley de Aguas), which in Article seventeen establishes that “</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">Authorization is necessary for the exploitation of public waters, especially those dedicated to public or private interest enterprises. Said authorization shall be granted by the National Electricity Service in the manner prescribed in this Law</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">..”, which is reaffirmed by Article seventy of Law 16 of October thirtieth, nineteen forty-one. For its part, Law No. 2726 of April fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one and its amendments—especially those of Law No. 5915 of July 12, 1976—, the "Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados)" states: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">"Article 1.- For the purpose of directing, setting policies, establishing and applying norms, carrying out and promoting planning, financing and development, and resolving everything related to the supply of potable water and collection and evacuation of wastewater and liquid industrial waste, as well as the normative aspect of stormwater drainage systems in urban areas, for the entire national territory, the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados) is created as an autonomous institution of the State</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">.” (As amended by Law No. 5915 of July 12, 1976, Article 1)</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">As can be inferred from the articles transcribed above and from the comprehensive reading of the respective laws, the S.N.E. had the purpose in this field of representing and exercising on behalf of the State the dominion over the country's water resource, with the aim of ensuring its preservation and utilization in a hierarchical manner according to the importance of the needs; competencies that were ultimately assumed by the Regulatory Authority of Public Services (Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos) but within a broader scope of action. For its part, A y A's purpose is to plan, construct, and operate the necessary infrastructure to supply potable water and to oversee the planning, construction, and operation of the same carried out by private individuals for the indicated purpose. As observed, representing the State in concession contracts was one of the mechanisms that allowed the S.N.E. to fulfill its legal purpose (as will be seen, this competence was later transferred). It was established expressly in its constitutive law as in the Water Law (Ley de Aguas). For those years, it was clear that granting the connection was its proper role, which included the corresponding contract; while A y A has competence to plan, design, construct, operate, and maintain water supply works for a population, as well as the adaptation to its recommendations of the indicated works when carried out by private individuals—Law No. 16 of October 30, 1941, No. 809 of November 2, 1949, and the General Law of Potable Water (Ley General de Agua Potable), among others—a function that has never entailed that of granting concessions for the exploitation of public domain waters, even when these are destined, as is the case at hand, to provide potable water to a defined population. Based on said norms, especially the A y A Law (as well as Articles 266 and 276 of the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), Law No. 5395 of October 23, 1973.), it is clear that with the exception of the latter, only the municipalities, the Heredia Public Services Company (Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia), Community Development Associations (Asociaciones de Desarrollo Comunal) (through the Rural Aqueduct Committees (Comités de Acueductos Rurales)) or other local bodies with which A y A may conclude an agreement for that purpose, there are no other bodies empowered to administer public aqueducts. Thus, a private individual is not authorized by the legal system to provide the public service of population supply of potable water and sanitary sewerage, with the exception of the Associations Administering Aqueducts and Sewers (ASADAS) as managers of the public service. Therefore, the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (Ministerio del Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones) (which assumed the functions of granting water concessions upon the transformation of the SNE into ARESEP), prior to granting the concession, would be under the legal obligation to verify that the private individual has the prior authorization from A y A and the Ministry of Health</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> for the private company to provide the potable water service to the population, as well as the sanitary sewerage system. In the case of ASADAS that act by delegation from A y A, their legal nature arises from the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, in which the latter was empowered to delegate the administration, operation, and maintenance of the aqueduct and sewer systems—entrusted to it by the legislator—to groups duly formed for such purpose, as inferred from Article two, subsection g) of the cited law, by expressly stating “</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">The institution is empowered to agree with local bodies on the administration of such services or to administer them through administrative boards of mixed integration between the Institute and the respective communities, provided this is suitable for the better provision of services and in accordance with the respective regulations.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">Based on the norm transcribed above, the Executive Branch proceeded to issue various regulations, with the Regulation of Associations Administering Community Aqueduct and Sewer Systems (Reglamento de las Asociaciones Administradoras de Sistemas de Acueductos y Alcantarillados Comunales), (Decree No. 32529 of February 2, 2005) being the current norm, which provides in its Article 3: </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">‘</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Article 3. </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">A y A through an agreement signed for this purpose, with prior favorable agreement of its Board of Directors, may delegate the administration, operation, maintenance, and development of community aqueduct and/or sewer systems, in favor of associations duly constituted and registered in accordance with the Law of Associations No. 218 of August 8, 1939, its amendments and respective Regulation, Executive Decree No. 29496-J, published in La Gaceta No. 95 of May 21, 2001.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> ..”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">VII.- ON ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY. </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">Numeral 190 of our General Law of Public Administration, refers to “legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning,” whereby legitimacy or its antithesis, basically refers to the legal conduct of the Administration, while the normal or abnormal, points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented, among others, by the </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">service-provision activity </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">attributed to the Public Administration as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the collective.</span> Thus, <span style="font-family:Verdana; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">abnormality refers to those administrative conducts which, in themselves, depart from good administration (pursuant to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102 subsection d., which includes, among other things, effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, from technical rules, or from the expertise and prudent conduct in the deployment of their actions, with a harmful effect on the person.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101"> This Tribunal adds, for natural or legal persons. This allows us to note that abnormality can manifest itself through a malfunction; a delayed functioning, or a total absence of functioning. Whenever the victim does not have that duty to bear the injury, it becomes unlawful, due to impairment of a third party contrary to the legal system. Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances, (requirements of Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration)</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent. What arises then is </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity (deber de indemnidad patrimonial)</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">, and to that extent, the injury to the victim's legal sphere must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, mandatorily repairable. There is unlawfulness, insofar as the norm declares the existing obligation under the implicit presupposition of an injury contrary to Law, which must not be borne by the victim. </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">Omission as a criterion of abnormality and illegality. The mandatory indemnification obligation for damages caused by inaction.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101"> On this topic, it is pertinent to recall that in the field of public services, it is not enough to supply the activity under just any conditions, because users have the right to the adaptation, continuity, efficiency, and effectiveness of the service (among many other rights), which entails that the service must be provided under certain minimum or basic conditions to be considered as fulfilling the purpose that justifies its existence.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101"> Accepting that a public service can be provided any which way, without further considerations, amounts to a call to arbitrariness that cannot be shared. In the present case, the omission of Nombre112175 in the supply of potable water is claimed, which requires establishing whether the conduct of the Institute in not supplying the water resource to the user corresponds to an abnormal or illegitimate functioning of the Administration. Currently, it is peacefully accepted that administrative conduct encompasses not only the active behavior of the Administration (and within it, the administrative act) but also omissive conduct, that "failure to do" that has come to be called </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">inactivity of the Administration (inactividad de la Administración)</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">, in both its formal aspect (insofar as it results in a presumed act by administrative silence) and its material aspect (referring basically to the service-provision sphere of the administrative organization). In this way, material administrative inactivity must be understood as that derived from the omission in fulfilling a pre-established legal obligation, which occurs when the Administration breaches, by omission, an obligation imposed by the Legal System or by any other self-binding mechanism, such as its own act or consensual instruments, with a direct injury to a legitimate interest or a subjective right, whether or not it alters a pre-existing legal-administrative relationship. More simply, there is inactivity of this type when, an existing obligation for the public entity or body to give or do something, imposed by the legal system or by its own prior decision, within or outside an administrative procedure, the appropriate factual or legal activity that would bring the granted function to a successful conclusion is not deployed, to the detriment of the rights or interests of one or more passive subjects, whether private or public, individual or collective. It is that "culpa in ommittendo" in which the functional duty to act is breached by inaction. It goes without saying that administrative indolence can produce (and in fact does produce) more serious injuries than the restrictive action of the public body or entity itself. Hence, it must be emphatically stated (based on and in accordance with what has been said in previous recitals)</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">that the Public Administration is also liable for the damages caused by its administrative inactivity. That passivity in the face of compliance with pre-existing obligations is framed, for purposes of extracontractual civil liability, as an </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">abnormal functioning (funcionamiento anormal)</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101"> of the Administration (as long as it corresponds to a due material activity) and as an </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">illegitimate conduct (conducta ilegítima)</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">, which in this case may be concurrent, insofar as the breach of what was due not only violates the rules of good administration, but also infringes legality by breaching the functional administrative powers emanating from the Legal System itself. (On the liability parameter, see vote number 584-F-2005. First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.- San José at ten hours forty minutes on the eleventh of August of the year two thousand five. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">VIII.- ON THE DAMAGES CLAIMED. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt">Regarding the facts, damages claimed by the plaintiff company, </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; text-decoration:underline">their final outcome depends on the evidence provided</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt">, where the Tribunal, to resolve the merits of the claims, shall analyze the evidence in accordance with the principle of sound criticism, doctrine of </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">numeral</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt"> 82 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, in relation to Article 318 of the Civil Procedure Code, which indicates the different means of evidence, which are broad so that the parties can meet the legal requirement of proving the facts they assert. For the judge, the evidence shall be that which demonstrates what truly happened, it is the search for the truth of the facts, in order to give them a legal qualification; in the present case, we have documentary evidence, and the testimony of Nombre112176</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt">and Nombre112175</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt">, provided by AyA, and the statements of the witnesses for the plaintiff Nombre112177</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt">and Roger Mata Arias. Among the documentary evidence we have: S</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">eal on the construction plan, which the Institute made, in </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt">which, i</span><span> </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">t certifies that an aqueduct in use does exist in front of this property, official letter RB-DOM-2008-148, dated April 18, 2008, from the Chief of Operations and Maintenance of the Brunca Region, stating that instructions have been given to suspend granting availability of new non-residential services, official letter RB-CPZ-2009-0889 dated December 23, 2009, in which Mr. Nombre112174</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">is informed that due to the deficit in water supply facing the Pérez Zeledón area, it is forced to suspend the granting of water availability for </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt">commercial premises,</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101"> additionally on July 31, 2004, CONCESA issued the results through the formulation of several documents called "Diagnostic Report", "Alternatives Report", and two annexes. In the same, they established the current conditions of the systems in the central district of Pérez Zeledón and surrounding areas, as well as the measures required to correct the deterioration in the current potable water infrastructure. It indicates a deficit in the potable water flow for 2005. It is clear that the potable water service is a key, basic, and indispensable activity within any society, among which the Costa Rican one is situated. Everything seems to indicate that the lack of supply of the precious liquid is based on the absence of liquid capacity in the area at the time of the facts, which was later resolved. According to the rules of Rolan, public services must naturally adapt to the needs; a general maxim that is also applicable to the potable water service.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101"> While it is true, and as already indicated, that potable water is a national asset, the public service is constituted when the liquid is distributed among all those people who need it, through piping systems, tanks, and distribution networks; without prejudice to pumps in cases where it is necessary.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101"> The public entity is constantly called upon to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the supply of the vital liquid in consideration of the needs of society, taking into account that the number of subscribers increases every day. It is a constant planning obligation, seeking to improve conditions and ensure the fulfillment of the public purpose.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101"> To establish the existence or not of the liability requested by the plaintiff, it is not enough to indicate that there was a material limitation, which indeed is an unquestionable issue and may eventually occur. There are many areas in the national territory where water capacity is limited and the investment levels to bring water from one area to another are exaggerated; despite this, this jurisdictional body considers that determining whether we are facing abnormal behavior is a matter of lesser treatment, based on the grounds we proceed to indicate. If we were to classify the specific situation as a lawful and normal conduct of the Administration, where the public entity took all necessary measures so that the absence of the water supply did not occur, but despite this, the situation was occurring, which motivated the public entity to agilely and diligently implement mechanisms to solve the problem as soon as possible; that situation would not nullify the possibility of deriving liability in the species. We would be facing a case of singular, special sacrifice, with a small and intensely affected group, by virtue of which the plaintiff was forced to face a series of inconveniences; not desired by the Administration, but not for that reason grounds to exempt from liability.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101"> Under those conditions, we would be facing a case of administrative liability for lawful conduct or normal behavior. But as has been stated, the argument of the situations is not sufficient; rather, it is necessary to prove them in accordance with canon three hundred seventeen of the Civil Procedure Code. In this case, the public entity repeatedly expressed the technical impossibility of the water resource, justifying its inability to supply the service requested by the plaintiff, which this Chamber does not doubt occurred, but not a single element of conviction is provided that allows deducing since when that problem was known, and more importantly, what were the actions undertaken by the public entity to solve the problem. If there was a limitation on water capacity, urgent measures should have been taken to solve the problem, especially when dealing with a fundamental right, and not simply limit itself to indicating the situation.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101"> Evidently, given the inability to provide all persons with the service, priority should have been in residential activity and residually commercial, but that does not justify delaying the necessary measures to solve the situation for the latter. The problem was not alien to the public entity but is inherent to its powers and it had to find a solution in the shortest possible time. The exercise of the right to commerce within the provisions of articles forty-five, forty-six, and twenty-eight, second paragraph, of the Political Constitution, so that if the State is forced to deny a public service for the benefit of the community, within the system of burdens prevailing in public law, the prevailing logic is that it must proceed to indemnify the individual. Returning to the argument, given the lack of evidence on the actions to mitigate or solve the problem, the jurisdictional Panel is inclined to think that we are facing abnormal activity in the public service, from which the liability now being heard derives. It is not unnecessary to indicate that if, in the case of normal activity, there is not the slightest difficulty in locating the damage that the plaintiff company suffered and the causal link, in addition to a singular, special, and intense sacrifice, a fundamental basis for deriving administrative liability under articles one hundred ninety and following of the General Law of Public Administration, besides being possible to find the absence of the obligation of the titleholder to bear the injury; in the case of abnormal activity, it is even simpler to locate the bases for liability when the actions carried out to solve the problem, as was indeed required, are not proven. </span></p><p style="margin-top:5.05pt; margin-bottom:5.05pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">IX.- ON THE OBJECT OF THE CLAIM AND THE MERITS OF THIS MATTER</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">: Basically, the plaintiff seeks a ruling for the payment of damages caused, according to their account, by not having potable water during the period between the month of June 2009 and September 2012. The main social function of Law being conflict resolution,</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">it must be determined which of the conflicting versions given by the parties merits credibility from this Tribunal, noting that in the previous recitals we have already advanced somewhat on the matter. The crux of the lawsuit is to determine if, indeed, the Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers had the obligation to provide the potable water service to the plaintiff company; the facts, the claim, the </span><span style="font-family:Verdana">opposition </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">presented by Nombre112175, and the evidence shall be examined globally, to arrive at the final result of this litigation.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101"> Retaking for such purpose part of the arguments that have already been granted in the species. </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">Legal analysis</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101"> . </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">1. Obligation of the </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold">Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">to provide the potable water service to the plaintiff company. </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">Norms must be interpreted in a reasonable manner and consistent with social reality, which today teaches us, in that sense the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, in its second numeral determines that: It corresponds to the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers: a) To direct and supervise everything concerning providing the inhabitants of the republic with a potable water service...i) To build, expand, and reform aqueduct and sewer systems in those cases where it is necessary and the best satisfaction of national needs so advises. These norms guarantee the functioning of the public service without any discrimination or differentiation. When dealing with a service already in operation, provided the person meets the requirements established for that purpose, one can speak of an authentic subjective right for the enjoyment thereof. In the same way, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber, in the judgment previously referenced, access to potable water ensures the rights to life –"without water no life is possible" affirms the Water Charter approved by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on May 6, 1968–, to people's health –indispensable for their food, drink, and hygiene–, and is, of course, associated with the socio-economic development and growth of peoples to ensure each individual a dignified well-being and quality of life. In essence, water, from an economic and ecological point of view, is a precious asset, since it is indispensable for any human activity (industrial, agricultural, domestic, commercial, services, etc.). ON THE GOVERNING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SERVICES. "All public services provided by public administrations –including welfare or social ones– are governed by a series of principles that must be observed and respected, at all times and without any exception, by the public officials in charge of their management and provision. Such principles constitute a legal obligation of an indeclinable nature imposed on any administrative entity or body by its direct and immediate normative effectiveness, since the block or parameter of legality (Article 11 of the Political Constitution) to which they must adjust in their actions is composed, among other elements, by the general principles of administrative law (Article 6° of the General Law of Public Administration). It must not be lost sight of that the General Principles of Law have the rank of the norm which they interpret, integrate, or delimit, which means they can assume a constitutional rank if the precept regarding which they fulfill such functions also has that hierarchy. As we shall see in the subsequent recital, our fundamental text enshrines, as a fundamental right of persons, that of the proper functioning of public services; consequently, the principles that inform public services, insofar as they make such right effective, have a constitutional rank. Ordinal 4° of the General Law of Public Administration clearly provides that “</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic; color:#010101">The activity of public entities shall be subject, as a whole, to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equality in the treatment of the recipients or beneficiaries</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">”....Adaptation to any change in the legal regime or to the needs imposed by the socioeconomic context means that administrative entities and bodies must have the capacity for foresight and, above all, for programming or planning to face the new demands and challenges imposed, whether due to an increase in the volume of the public service demand or due to technological changes. No entity, body, or public official can adduce reasons of budgetary or financial shortage, absence of equipment, lack of technological renewal thereof, excess or saturation of demand in the public service, in order to stop providing it continuously and regularly. Equality or universality in access demands that all inhabitants have the right to demand, receive, and use the public service under equal conditions and in accordance with the norms that govern them; consequently, all those who are in the same situation can demand identical advantages. One of the guiding principles of public service not enunciated in Article 4° of the General Law of Public Administration is its obligatory nature, since it would be useless to affirm that they must be continuous, regular, uniform, and general if the providing subject does not have the obligation to provide it. The public administration providing the public service cannot choose its clientele or users; it must provide it to anyone who requests it..."</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101"> CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE, vote number</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101"> 2003-11382, San José, at fifteen hours with eleven minutes on the seventh of October of two thousand three. In summary, from a Constitutional and legal point of view, it is the obligation of Nombre112175 to provide the potable water service, regardless of whether it is a natural or legal person, even though the Constitutional Chamber, in the Amparo Appeals filed by the representative of the plaintiff company, which were denied because it was a matter of mere legality, as the Chamber considered it concerned a legal person, nevertheless, in accordance with what is indicated in the rulings of the same Constitutional Chamber, it follows that potable water is a precious asset, since it is indispensable for any human activity (industrial, agricultural, domestic, commercial, services, etc.). From that perspective, and in light of the rules of logic and human experience, Nombre112175 had the legal duty to supply potable water to the plaintiff company, unless it had proven any exoneration from liability that would have prevented that duty, which was not proven in this litis.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101"> It is not unnecessary to indicate that for a long time constitutional jurisprudence was oriented towards indicating that legal persons did not possess fundamental rights, a stance that has varied in recent years, insofar as this type of person is nothing more than a conglomerate of persons, with a collective interest. In any case, even considering the possibility of the non-existence of a constitutional right to water (which we reject outright), the legal duty in the expressed terms is indisputable. </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">2. Inactivity of Nombre112175 in providing the potable water service to the plaintiff company. </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">From the previous vision, public entities must give citizens solutions to the problems that arise in society. T</span><span style="font-family:Verdana">he problem arises or emerges when the citizen, as an active subject, does not find the response and due activity in that obligated Administration; under those circumstances, the injured person is left in absolute unprotectedness against administrative arbitrariness, which, due to its omissive condition, has become an unlawful dysfunction. T</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">aking into account the circumstances and the details of the process, the non-supply of potable water to the plaintiff </span><span style="font-family:Verdana">is violative of constitutional principles, and implies, in turn, another dysfunctionality that leaves effective judicial protection as a benefit right in a void. The foregoing agrees with what the ruling of the First Chamber provided, in v</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">ote number 584-F-2005, by indicating that abnormality can manifest itself through a malfunction; a delayed functioning, or a total absence of functioning. Whenever the victim does not have that duty to bear the injury, it becomes unlawful, due to impairment of a third party contrary to the legal system. Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances, assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent.</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">What arises then is </span><span style="font-family:Verdana; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity</span><span style="font-family:Verdana; color:#010101">, and to that extent, the injury to the victim's legal sphere must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, mandatorily repairable.</span> In the judgment of this Tribunal, that is what happened in this case, where the defendant Institute had a duty to supply potable water within a reasonable timeframe, and did not do so. This conclusion was reached, taking into account and considering that since October 2009, the plaintiff requested potable water service for its commercial business, and it was not until 2012 that said service was granted, after, logically, the lawsuit had been filed in judicial courts (proof: the service order document visible on folio 41 and the statements contained in the DVD of the preliminary hearing). From that perspective, the unlawful conduct arises as the product of an administrative dysfunction, because there is no demonstrated reason attributable to nature or third parties that prevented supplying the resource, and for this Tribunal, the defendant entity did have the necessary conditions to provide potable water to the plaintiff. Rather, it was due to an internal administrative decision, which has no support in our legal system, by failing to provide an essential service such as the supply of potable water. Hence, that administrative conduct singularly affected the plaintiff company, causing economic damage that the issuer of that conduct must indemnify. It is worth recalling what was previously stated: if the affectation had been a consequence of the time necessary to make modifications and adaptations to the service, we could well speak of a case of special sacrifice (sacrificio especial) or strict liability; however, in this case, not a single element was provided to establish that an effort was made to fulfill public duties. Therefore, by basic deductive inference, we are in the presence of abnormal behavior (comportamiento anormal), as a basis for deriving liability.

3. Based on the ideas expressed, we will analyze the claim that was the subject of the adversarial proceedings in the oral and public debate, which is the claim for payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) for the period between June 2009 and September 2012, as a result of the failure to supply potable water by the defendant Institute. Regarding the proof of the claimed damages. From the evidence in the record, such as official memorandum SUB-G-GSP-DRB-CPZ-0913-2010, dated November 16, 2010, it is established that the representative of the plaintiff company requested, on November 2, 2009, via pipe service availability order No. 13874716, three services for commercial premises in the name of Electrónica Leyden S.A. Despite the fact that through official memorandum RB-CPZ-2009-0869, dated December 23, 2009, it is communicated that due to the deficit in the water supply affecting the Pérez Zeledón area, and foreseeing that clients who have had potable water service for years not suffer any deterioration thereof, the AYA is forced to suspend the granting of water availability for commercial premises. This Tribunal considers that the argument given by the Institute does not constitute valid causes to deny the requested potable water service, at least not for the time under consideration. Especially when considering relevant aspects such as that the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is responsible for: providing the inhabitants of the Republic with a potable water service, thus being an essential service, which individuals or legal entities have the right to obtain. Likewise, that on July 6, 2009, the AYA placed a seal on the construction plan, in which it certifies that an aqueduct is indeed in use in front of this property. Furthermore, if we examine the arguments given by the Institute's representation to deny the water supply, in which it states that Institutional Directive Memorandum No. RB-DOM-2008-148, dated April 18, 2008, indicates that instructions were given to suspend the granting of availability for new non-residential services (vertical condominiums, warehouses, commercial premises, apartments, etc.), (see official memorandum on folios 104-105), it is deduced from the foregoing that it is not justifiable why the plaintiff was not warned when she applied for the service at a later date (October 2009) that the potable water service for commercial premises had been suspended. Another piece of evidence invoked by the Institute in its defense is the study dated July 31, 2004, by CONCESA, in which it issued results through the formulation of several documents called "Diagnostic Report", "Alternatives Report," and two annexes, indicating a deficit in the potable water flow for the year 2005, requiring the Institute to undertake better integrated management for water conservation in terms of watersheds (cuencas). Regarding infrastructure, they recommended a topographic survey of the supply sources, repair of the dam on the Río Quebrada, a new conveyance line from another intake on the Río San Ramón to the treatment plants, improvements to the current treatment plants, wells, pumping stations, chlorination stations, replacement of the existing potable water distribution network in the San Isidro district with its respective boxes and valves, and improvement of the potable water supply tanks, namely: Tanques Fallas y Pepe, Tanque de San Luis, Tanque de la Universidad, and Tanque de los Chiles. Note that this report is from 2005. This being the case, one must think that if the AYA officials knew for years beforehand that there were problems with potable water, why was the plaintiff not told at the time of submitting the plan for its respective procedure? In addition to the above, a lack of planning by the Institute could then be admitted, since they knew from 2005 that a potable water shortage existed. Moreover, where is the proof of the works carried out to mitigate the situation and affect users as little as possible? Again, we encounter issues that should have been proven, but there is no attempt whatsoever to demonstrate them. But even taking into account what was previously stated by the representatives of the public entity, this Tribunal infers that these are not sufficient and valid causes to not grant the potable water service to the plaintiff company, as we would be in the presence of an abnormal functioning (funcionamiento anormal) on the part of the Administration by failing to provide an indispensable service. For this reason, "one speaks of inactivity in the face of the omission (total or partial) of an active conduct, the performance of which, from a legal standpoint, corresponds to the Public Administration. In other words, it concerns those cases in which the public entity or body does not carry out that activity to which it is obligated, either by a regulation or by a self-binding act. It is, then, a duty to give or do on the part of the Administration, in which it must provide the administrated party with the good, activity, or service that corresponds to them..." La Justicia Administrativa, González Camacho Oscar, 1st ed., San José, C.R. IJSA, January 2022, p. 42. Thus, this Tribunal has no doubt about the abnormal functioning incurred by the defendant Institute, due to the non-supply of the water resource to the company. From this legal perspective, it is determined that as a consequence of that omission behavior, an unlawful injury was produced, thus operating a liability for abnormal functioning, subject to indemnification, of course. To reinforce the previous thesis, the Constitutional Chamber has highlighted the importance of the principles of efficacy and efficiency, whose holders are the administrated parties, and which it termed the fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services. Indeed, in ruling No. 2004-05207, at fourteen hours and fifty-five minutes on May eighteen, two thousand four, it detailed that the: "...Political Constitution includes an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administrated parties to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of the numerals, interpreted, a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the Fundamental Law insofar as they set forth, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the 'proper functioning of services and administrative departments,' 'proper conduct of the Government,' and 'efficiency of the administration.' This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act, in the exercise of their competencies and the provision of public services, in an efficient and effective manner, and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it becomes evident that the original constituent implicitly included the principle of the liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal system..." That atypical or unnamed individual guarantee is accentuated in the case of essential public services such as the supply of potable water. (See in this regard ruling number 2003-11222 at 17:48 hrs. on September 30, 2003). It must be emphasized that the judge's conviction in validating or not a testimonial or documentary evidence is the exclusive domain of their jurisdictional independence, the exercise of reason, and respect for the legitimacy of the body of evidence. In that sense, the plaintiff company managed to demonstrate, with serviceable and useful evidence, such as the documentary evidence supporting the testimonial evidence, that as a result of that abnormal event issued by the AYA, it suffered economic damages, having to use other means to supply potable water. Thus, the witness Nombre112177 and Roger Mata Arias attest to it. Conversely, the representation of the Institute could not prove, with suitable evidence, any exemption from liability, or disqualify the causal link (nexo causal) between the omission behavior—the supply of potable water—and the damaging result suffered by the plaintiff. All of this, necessarily drawing on logical deductions, leads us to confirm the thesis presented by the plaintiff in its lawsuit. Therefore, in light of the rules of logic and human experience, from the entire body of evidence, both testimonial and documentary, sufficient elements of conviction emerge to conclude, with the required degree of certainty, that in its core aspects, the factual hypothesis presented by the plaintiff is plausible and was duly proven in this proceeding. On the other hand, the thesis presented by the defendant lacks serviceable evidence to discredit the hypothesis presented by the plaintiff. That is, the defendant entity failed to observe that burden, as it did not provide suitable evidentiary material to prove, in an indubitable manner, that the non-provision of the potable water service was due to some technical impediment or some exemption from liability stipulated in our legal system. Hence, it has rightly been said that in judicial proceedings, it is fundamental that the parties who assert facts, as the foundation of their right or their defense, provide the judge with sufficient evidentiary elements to achieve the necessary conviction for adopting the respective decision. Without evidence, the Judge cannot reconstruct the facts under debate, cannot verify the parties' assertions, nor can give content to the invoked right. In the case at hand, the defendant Institute has failed in that duty, as it did not provide the necessary and suitable evidence to prove its arguments set forth in the opposition to the lawsuit. Note that the study on the deficit in the potable water supply in the district of San Isidro and surrounding areas dates from 2005, and the decision to suspend the supply of potable water to commercial businesses was not made until 2008. Therefore, for the reasons stated, this Chamber is convinced of the truthfulness of the essential facts alleged as the factual basis of the lawsuit. Consequently, it is concluded that the scales must tip in favor of the thesis presented by the plaintiff company. Thus, by virtue of the foregoing, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is ordered to pay the economic damages incurred by the plaintiff company in supplying potable water for the period between October 2009 and September 2012, as this was the only fact proven during this proceeding. However, the condemnation is made in the abstract (condena en abstracto), and its quantification is reserved for the execution of judgment stage, where the plaintiff must demonstrate with suitable evidence the quantum of those economic damages. The condemnation is made in the abstract because the evidence provided by the plaintiff and the other evidence is not conclusive in determining other damages beyond the financial expenditure incurred by the plaintiff in supplying potable water during the period from October 2009 to September 2012. It should be noted that the condemnation for economic damages is based on the provisions of Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which provides that the State and its entities shall be liable for all damages caused by their legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. In this way, the party causing the damage shall compensate it, unless it demonstrates some exonerating cause. Note that the documentary evidence provided by the plaintiff, admitted in the oral and public trial, listed as the general statement of a credit operation carried out at Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, visible on folios 149-159 of the judicial file, that document merely relates a bank loan obtained by the plaintiff company. Therefore, in our consideration, it is not suitable evidence to demonstrate the claimed damages. The same applies to the certification from the Private Accountant, Mr. Vidal Callejas Escobar, visible on folios 159-173, which details that the plaintiff generated its income from the repair and sale of white-line appliance parts during the periods of October 2008 and September 2012. In the judgment of this Chamber, this is not useful evidence, as it has no direct relationship with the matter discussed in this proceeding. The 20 photographs provided by the plaintiff meet the same fate. In reality, the testimonial evidence, such as the account of witness Nombre112176, who affirmed that the commercial premises were using water from adjacent properties, and on the other hand, Roger Mata Arias indicated that the potable water was solved by another means: he hauled water from a well that was about 20 meters behind the house of Nombre112174, and that the distance between the commercial premises and the representative of the plaintiff's house was 8 kilometers. He also affirmed that there was a problem with the construction of the work. The witness Lenin Fernández Badilla stated that his participation was to haul water for the business; he went with the pick-up to Nombre112174's house and took the drums with water to the plaintiff's business. This was in 2010. Nombre112174 paid him ¢15,000 for each water trip he hauled; he made 4 or 5 trips per month. He finished the water hauling in September 2012 (see testimonial evidence recorded in the oral and public trial hearing, contained in electronic format) and documentary evidence offered by both parties. It is this evidence that proves the economic damages suffered by the plaintiff company, as a result of the AYA's refusal to supply potable water.

X.- Regarding the specific damages: Evidently, in a proceeding of this nature, the claimant party is obligated to prove not only the right, but must also demonstrate, because it is incumbent upon it to do so, the damages it claims, adjusted to the proper causal relationship (relación de causalidad). It is not enough for a subject to say they possess the truth, since the law itself obligates them to prove, through the admitted means of evidence, those assertions of the facts constituting their right, even when dealing with aspects of damages caused. There is no doubt that it must equally be demonstrated that they were caused to an asset of their estate. The doctrine has indicated that regarding the claim for damages made by the litigant, they must necessarily establish the compelling factual grounds to evidence a causal relationship. In the present case, the plaintiff was unable to prove the requested damages, as it is not evident from the documentary and testimonial evidence in the record that the plaintiff company indeed suffered the sought damages due to the non-supply of potable water in the period from October 2009 to September 2012. In this case, the plaintiff, in compliance with canon 317 of the Civil Procedure Code applicable to the matter in accordance with Article 220 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, was obligated not only to prove the existence of the damage and its relationship with its counterpart, in addition to its illegitimacy, which it indeed did; but also the scope or quantum thereof. On this last aspect, the statements given, while allowing the existence of a possible damage to be deduced, do not allow the specific content thereof to be established. Evidently, technical or documentary evidence, based on concrete financial data, is the suitable evidence on this particular matter, which was never offered. Within this framework, specific recognition is impossible. However, to what has been stated, Article 120 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, in safeguarding effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), allows the recognition in the abstract (reconocimiento en abstracto) of the right so that in the execution of judgment stage, the amount of the affectation can be established specifically. Therefore, the Chamber opts for that mechanism of remitting to the execution of judgment for the specific establishment of the damage suffered, always with the guidelines indicated regarding the manner in which such damage must be proven. Regarding moral damages (daño moral), the doctrine has established that it arises from the injury to an extra-patrimonial right and implies an unjust disturbance of the conditions of the person affected by it. The plaintiff indicated in the oral and public trial that moral damage was caused to the plaintiff company by the Institute's refusal to grant the potable water supply. This aspect is hereby resolved. It must be understood that moral damage is encompassed within damages in general. If the plaintiff seeks objective moral damage (daño moral objetivo), it is rejected because the suitable evidence proving said impairment was not provided. It would be damage to the general image of the company, which affected its economic capacity, aspects on which there is no element of conviction whatsoever. "Objective moral damage, contrary to the former (referring to subjective moral damage), requires corresponding proof. As stated in the preceding section, it refers to the injury to an extra-patrimonial right that generates valuable economic consequences. That is, it is that suffered by the person in their social context, and not in the individual field. Hence, it is necessary to demonstrate how the damage occurred, and it is indispensable to prove, in addition to the causal relationship, its existence, with the burden, under the shelter of Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, falling on the party claiming it to provide sufficient evidence to support it." (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 226-F-S1-2008 at 15:26 hours on March 14, 2008; the underlined parts are ours). Regarding subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo), several clarifications are necessary. As is known, this type of damage is the suffering, the affectation in the mental state that individuals experience as a result of a particular event. Historically, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and this jurisdiction have, in a majority manner, held that only natural persons can experience suffering. It cannot be forgotten that the representatives, officials, and shareholders of a company are what their name states: structures within the same person; but they do not constitute the person itself. Representatives cannot be confused with the legal entity. Within this framework and on the bases set forth, the Tribunal cannot establish the existence of subjective moral damage attributed to the company Electrónica Leyden S.A. As a consequence of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare a lack of right (falta de derecho) on that point.

XI.- Regarding the exceptions: The exception of expiration (caducidad) was raised, which must be rejected, as the final claim made by the plaintiff is solely for the payment of damages. Thus, from an adequate interpretation, for the claim for damages, the exception of expiration is not viable, since for a long time, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has been clarifying that: "Articles 2, subsection c) and 3 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) indeed establish the so-called unification of channels. However, it is true that the civil treasury proceeding (proceso civil de hacienda) presents its own characteristics, differentiating it from the pure contentious-administrative proceeding. In the civil treasury proceeding, for example, what pertains to the nullity of Administration acts is not ventilated, which characterizes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In the former, what is discussed relates to the liability of the Administration, arising from its functioning (Article 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration). According to the doctrine, in the civil treasury proceeding, one cannot speak of expiration regarding the filing of the action. There, the ordinary statute of limitations (prescripción) of private law applies. Furthermore, since the nullity of administration acts is not debated therein, the prior requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not necessary. (Number 66-1997, at fifteen hours and forty-five minutes on July twenty-third, nineteen ninety-seven). Thus, the party confuses an institute typical of the annulment process (expiration) to apply it to a civil treasury proceeding, which, under the shelter of Article 198, features a statute of limitations period. It is worth adding that in this second scenario, the legal time would not have elapsed either. As this is a claim for damages, the parameter to be taken is Article 198 of the General Law of Public Administration. If we only take the date of December 23, 2009, when the refusal to grant potable water was communicated to the plaintiff's representative, to the date the lawsuit was notified to AYA on June 7, 2012, visible on folio 15 bis, the statute of limitations period of 4 years has not yet elapsed. As for the lack of right (falta de derecho) that was consistently invoked by the defendant, even though it was not presented in the explicit terms of the technical vocabulary, it is the Tribunal's criterion that it must be declared regarding the claimed subjective moral damage, as it lacks regulatory support; and rejected regarding the material damage, as its existence has been proven.

XII.- Regarding indexation: The same is imposed ex officio in accordance with Article 123 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. It is a recognition of the loss of the purchasing power of money. If it were not granted, the plaintiff would be receiving less money (with respect to its purchasing power). Therefore, on the items established in the abstract, the indexation will begin to accrue from the finality (firmeza) of the ruling that sets them and until the final payment.

XIII.- Regarding the costs (costas): In accordance with ordinals 119, 193, and 194 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, it is imposed to resolve this proceeding by ordering the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados to pay both costs. This is in application of the general principle of condemning the losing party (condena al vencido) and because the assumptions that would allow exemption from that payment, according to Article 194 of the cited Code, are not configured in this case.

THEREFORE:

The out-of-court satisfaction prevailing between the parties is accepted, with respect to the supply of water service to the plaintiff company since the month of September of last year. The defenses of lack of expiration (caducidad) and statute of limitations (prescripción) are rejected. The lack of right is partially declared, and consequently the action filed by the company Electrónica Leyden S.A. is partially granted, it being understood as denied in everything that is not expressly upheld. Consequently, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is ordered to pay the economic damages incurred by the plaintiff company due to the absence of potable water supply, for the period from October 2009 to September 2012, an amount to be determined in the sentence enforcement stage with suitable evidence, as well as the recognition of indexation in accordance with Article 123 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo from the date the judgment establishing them becomes final and until their definitive payment. In all other respects, the claim is dismissed. Both costs are to be borne by the losing party.

Rolando Porras Mejías Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR: ELECTRÓNICA LEYDEN.

S.A </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold\">AGAINST: A Y A</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span></p></div></body></html> V.- Position and evidence of the company Electrónica Leyden, S.A. 1. Within this judicial review process, the plaintiff company seeks to have it declared in judgment: that AyA pay it damages for the period during which it lacked public water supply, between the months of June 2009 and September 2012. 2. To prove the above, the plaintiff company presents documentary and testimonial evidence (see administrative file subsumed in the judicial file, record and video of the oral and public hearing). 3. Position and evidence of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados. The representative of AyA denies the responsibility attributed to it, argues that the water service has already been supplied, and that it had not been granted previously due to the unavailability in the area of capacity for new services; in its defense, it presents documentary and testimonial evidence (see answer to the complaint on pages 27-39).

VI.- On the need for potable water for human consumption. The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has indicated that: “Our Political Constitution, in its article 50, enunciates the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, which is achieved, among other factors, through the protection and conservation of the quality and quantity of water for human consumption and use and to maintain the ecological balance in the habitats of flora and fauna (e.g., wetlands) and, in general, of the biosphere as the common heritage of humanity. In the same way, access to potable water ensures the rights to life – ‘there is no life possible without water’ affirms the Water Charter approved by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on May 6, 1968 –, to the health of individuals – indispensable for their food, drink, and hygiene – (article 21 of the Political Constitution) and, of course, is associated with the socio-economic development and growth of peoples to ensure for each individual a well-being and a decent quality of life (article 33 of the Political Constitution and 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights). Vote of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), 1256-2006, of February 8, 2006. This vote relates the essentiality of the water resource, which is mentioned in international instruments of 1968 and international bodies such as the Council of Strasbourg, where the relevance of the same for human development and life is highlighted. In this same vote, it is established from the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972, where the importance of the water resource for humanity is reaffirmed: ‘In another order of ideas, currently, the duty to preserve, for future generations, conditions of existence at least equal to those inherited (sustainable development) has been recognized, so that the needs of the present must be satisfied without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own (Principle 2 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972). In essence, water, from an economic and ecological point of view, is a precious commodity, since it is indispensable for any human activity (industrial, agricultural, domestic, commercial, services, etc.), as a source of energy, raw material, transportation route, support for recreational activities, and a constituent element for the maintenance of natural ecosystems – non-polluting or environmentally compatible water use -.’” Vote of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), 1256-2006, of February eighth, 2006. The Chamber (Sala) has also said that the constitutional principles, which make up the provisions of articles 21 and 33 of our Political Constitution, not only include the State’s duty to respect human life and to protect it against the action of third parties, but also the guarantee of a dignified way of life, for which the necessary resources must be procured to make it possible, since that right cannot be limited to that of mere subsistence; among those resources being precisely water.” Vote of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) No. 1853-03, of March fifth, 2003. The Political Constitution, in article one hundred twenty-one, subsection fourteen, states: “(...) In addition to the other powers conferred upon it by this Constitution, it corresponds exclusively to the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa): (...) 14) To decree the alienation or the application to public uses of the property of the Nation (Nación) (...).” This constitutional provision has been developed in the Civil Code, in articles two hundred sixty-one to two hundred sixty-three; the first of them indicates: “Public things (cosas públicas) are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those of which everyone can avail themselves by being delivered to public use. All other things are private and objects of private property, even if they belong to the State or to the Municipalities, who for that purpose, as civil persons, do not differ from any other person.” For its part, the following canon adds: “Public things (cosas públicas) are outside commerce; and they may not enter into it, unless legally disposed so, separating them from the public use to which they were destined.” Thus, public domain (dominio público) is understood as the set of goods subject to a special legal regime distinct from that which governs private domain, which, in addition to belonging to or being under the administration of public legal entities, are affected or destined for purposes of public utility and which manifest themselves in the direct or indirect use that any person may make of them. According to the cited regulations, the State possesses both goods of public domain and private domain; public goods are those to which a law gives a destination for public or general use, they are called “demanial goods” (demaniales) and are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, and not subject to denouncement. The logic of public goods is that their domain precedes the State itself, such that they belong to The Nation (La Nación) as a requirement for coexistence in society. The State is limited to administering them, which as a general rule prevents them from leaving the public sphere. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation (See Constitutional Chamber, vote 2306-91 of 14:45 hours of November 6, 1991). When it is said they belong to The Nation (La Nación), it means that the State is limited to their safeguarding and protection, without being able, in principle, to dispose of them. These goods are outside the commerce of men and consequently have a nature and legal regime different from private goods – which are governed by the right of property under the terms of article 45 of the Political Constitution –, insofar as, by the express will of the legislator or by their very essence, they are affected to a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and because of this, they cannot be the object of private property, for which reason they cannot belong individually to private parties, nor to the State, strictly speaking, since the latter is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, what defines the legal nature of demanial goods (demaniales) is their purpose, insofar as they are affected and are at the service of public use, as recognized by the doctrine on the matter, thus, Marienhoff, Miguel S., in his work Tratado de Derecho Administrativo (Tomo V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., pag. 25), considered: “For a good or thing to be considered as belonging to the public domain, and to be subject to the pertinent regime, it is necessary that said good or thing be affected to ‘public use,’ direct or indirect, and it must be, in this ‘latter’ case, things affected directly - as ‘final goods’ or ‘goods of use’ - to the common utility or convenience, excluding from the public ownership those goods of the State that are of a merely instrumental nature.” On the other hand, the private goods of the State shall be regulated by private law with elements proper to public law. These goods are within the commerce of men; they can be transferred, appropriated, and are not imprescriptible; therefore, they are susceptible to usucapion for the benefit of private individuals, in accordance with article two hundred sixty-one already indicated. Note that the emphasis of the differentiation is given in relation to the purpose of the good, that is, to the fact of being affected to a common use or at the service of the common good (see Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 2301-91, of November 6, 1991 and 2000-06903 of 15:48 hours of August 8, 2000). As already noted, due to their special legal nature, they present the following attributes: they are imprescriptible, which implies that by the passage of time, the right of property over them cannot be acquired, not even of mere possession, that is, they cannot be acquired through usucapion, just as they cannot be lost through prescription; a reason for which the use permits that the Administration (Administración) grants over them always have a precarious character, which means they can be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience at any time by the Administration (Administración) – under the terms provided in articles 154 and 155 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) –; and the very concessions granted over them for their use may be cancelled, through a procedure to this effect; they are unseizable, which means they cannot be the object of any lien or seizure, neither by private parties, nor by the Administration (Administración); and they are inalienable, which translates into the condition that they are outside the commerce of men; whence they cannot be alienated, sold, or acquired, neither for valuable consideration nor gratuitously, nor by private parties, nor by the State, so that they are exempted from the commerce of men and subject to a special and reinforced legal regime. Furthermore, their use and exploitation is subject to police power, insofar as, because they are goods that cannot be the object of possession, much less of property, their utilization and exploitation is possible only through duly authorized acts, whether by concession or use permit, granted by the competent authority; and to the constant control on the part of the Public Administration (Administración Pública). A public good can be natural or artificial, depending on whether they are goods declared public by the legislator considering them in the state in which nature presents or offers them (a river, for example), or goods declared public by the legislator but whose creation or existence depends on a human deed (construction of a street or a public park, for example). The affectation (afectación) is the deed or the manifestation of will of the public power, by virtue of which the thing is incorporated into the use and enjoyment of the community and can be effected by law or by administrative act. Doctrine makes the distinction between “assignment of the public character” to a good and the “affectation (afectación)” of that good to the public domain. The assignment of the public character means establishing that that certain good would have demanial quality; thus, for example, the general legal norm would say that all public roads are integral parts of or dependent on the public domain and that means that they are the current ones and those that may be built in future. In contrast, affectation (afectación) means that the good declared to be of public domain is effectively incorporated into public use and this has to do with the acceptance and receipt of public works when they are built by administration or by the completion of works and their official receipt, when it is a private individual who carries them out (construction of an urbanization or subdivision (fraccionamiento), for example).- It is for this reason that it is said that affectation (afectación) may be declared by law in a generic form, or by an administrative act, which, necessarily, must conform to the legal norm that serves as its reference (principle of legality). As a consequence of what was said in the previous point, it is clear that the demanial regime is per se. Its existence and publicity occurs autonomously from the Registry, without it being admissible for the registered owner to allege ignorance as a means to distort it and counteract the affectation (afectación). The principles of inalienability and imprescriptibility that characterize the public domain prevent that against it can be wielded the figure of the registered third party to consolidate private property illicitly withdrawn from that regime. The demanio has legal publicity and in many cases natural publicity. The foregoing is coupled with the principle of first registration of the real properties composing the public domain, which has a material publicity and not necessarily a formal or registral one. Against the public domain, private holdings suffer from a weakened value, however prolonged they may be in time and even if they appear protected by entries in the Property Registry (Registro de la Propiedad). The condition of being a good of public domain and public use affects third parties, even if such quality does not appear from the Property Registry (Registro de la Propiedad).

These are assets that, by their nature, do not require registration (Voto 019-2009-SVII, Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Séptima). Note that this principle, as an exception to the principle of registry publicity, is based on the fact that public domain assets enjoy material publicity and therefore registry publicity is not necessary, insofar as public domain assets, by their nature, are not subject to that institution. Additionally, there is the concept of "declassification" (desafectación), which is "the legal situation by which an asset ceases to belong to the public domain (...) assets that are declassified become, in principle, patrimonial assets of the owning Administration, which, where appropriate, may dispose of them (...)" (Voto 035-2009-SVII, Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo); a situation that, logically, could only occur in those assets that have been declared as such by law, since for those whose condition is intrinsic, such a possibility would be barred. Before directing the argument more specifically to the point at hand, it is evident that when the public domain asset has been created by a private individual or represents a particularly intense burden that they are not obligated to bear, this character does not inhibit the Administration's obligation to assume responsibility, in order to allow for a balance in public burdens. The contrary would entail unjust enrichment, which has no basis within the national legal system. Now, as previously mentioned, regarding water, the Sala Constitucional, in Voto N°. 5606-06, recognized its condition as a human right by stating:

"VII.- Access to potable water as a human right. In addition to the foregoing, and perhaps the most relevant aspect of this issue, is the nature and function of water for human life. It is not necessary to detail here an explanation of the evident and notorious reality that without water there can be no life, nor quality of life, and that therefore, with or without a nationalization law, by its very essence, this issue is not and cannot be a territorial or local issue. The Sala itself, in its constitutional jurisprudence, has stated that access to potable water is a fundamental human right, as it constitutes an integral part of the content of the right to health and life. (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL, judgments numbers 534-96, 2728-91, 3891-93, 1108-96, 2002-06157 2002-10776; 2004-1923). This same line has been maintained in judgments 2003-04654 and 2004-07779, which, in relevant part, state: // ‘V.- // The Sala recognizes, as part of the Constitution’s Law, a fundamental right to potable water, derived from the fundamental rights to health, life, the environment, food, and adequate housing, among others, as has also been recognized in international instruments on Human Rights applicable in Costa Rica: thus, it explicitly appears in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Art. 14) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art. 24); furthermore, it is enunciated in the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (principle 2), and is declared in numerous other instruments of International Humanitarian Law. In our Inter-American System of Human Rights, the country is particularly obligated in this matter by the provisions of Article 11.1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador” of 1988), which provides that: “Article 11. Right to a healthy environment 1.- Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public services.’ The lack of resources does not justify non-compliance by public administrations in providing this basic service. (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL, resolutions 2003-04654 and 2004-007779). // For its part, as well recognized by both the Procuraduría and the representative of AyA in their reports, in the international field, the recognition of water as a human right and as a necessary pre-condition for all our human rights is also predominant. It is held that without equitable access to a minimum requirement of potable water, other established rights would be unattainable—such as the right to an adequate standard of living for health and well-being, as well as other civil and political rights. In November 2002, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights affirmed that access to adequate quantities of clean water for domestic and personal use is a fundamental human right of every person. Likewise, in General Comment No. 15 on the fulfillment of Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee noted that ‘the human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights.’ It is also emphasized that the States parties to the International Covenant have the duty to progressively fulfill, without any discrimination, the right to water, which entitles everyone to enjoy sufficient, physically accessible, safe, and acceptable water for domestic and personal use. // In addition, several international conferences have been held, among which the United Nations Water Conference held in Mar del Plata in 1977 stands out, which recognized that all peoples have the right to access potable water to meet their basic needs. Also, the Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986, includes a commitment by States to ensure equality of opportunity for all to enjoy basic resources. // The concept of meeting basic water needs was further strengthened during the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. In Agenda 21, governments agreed that "in developing and using water resources, priority has to be given to the satisfaction of basic needs and the safeguarding of ecosystems." Similarly, in the Plan of Implementation adopted at the Johannesburg Summit in 2002, governments committed to "use all policy instruments, including regulation, monitoring..... and cost recovery of water services," without cost recovery objectives becoming a barrier to poor people's access to clean water. Likewise, there are dozens of international instruments that directly and indirectly deal with water as a human right of all persons and peoples, in such a way that it is not only an issue that by its nature tends towards nationalization, but also towards the internationalization of its use and utilization." See how, beyond the normative support, the public domain character of water is a necessary consequence of the imperative requirement it presents for human life, which leads to the internal normative direction being based on Article 21 of the Constitution. At an infra-constitutional level, its public domain status is initially regulated in the Water Law, number 276, of August 26, 1942:

"Article 1.- The following are waters of the public domain: // I.- Those of the territorial seas within the extension and terms established by international law; // II.- Those of the lagoons and estuaries of the beaches that are permanently or intermittently connected with the sea; // III.- Those of the interior lakes of natural formation that are directly linked to constant currents; // IV.- Those of the rivers and their direct or indirect tributaries, streams or springs (manantiales) from the point where the first permanent waters emerge to their mouth in the sea or lakes, lagoons, or estuaries; // V.- Those of the constant or intermittent currents whose channel (cauce), in all or part of its extension, serves as a boundary to the national territory, the dominion of those currents must be subject to what has been established in international treaties entered into with neighboring countries and, in the absence thereof, or regarding what is not provided for, to the provisions of this law; // VI.- Those of every current that directly or indirectly flows into those listed in subsection V; // VII.- Those extracted from mines, with the limitation indicated in Article 10; // VIII.- Those of the springs (manantiales) that emerge on the beaches, maritime zones, channels (cauces), basins (vasos), or banks of national ownership and, in general, all those that arise on public domain lands; // IX.- Subterranean waters whose extraction (alumbramiento) is not done by means of wells; and // X.- Rainwater that flows through ravines or ramblas whose channels (cauces) are public domain.

Article 2.- The waters listed in the preceding article are national property, and dominion over them is not lost nor has it been lost when, due to the execution of prior artificial works or utilization, the natural characteristics are altered or have been altered. Waters utilized by virtue of contracts granted by the State are excepted, which will be subject to the conditions authorized in the respective concession." For its part, at the time the granting of the concession occurred, Law 258 of August 18, 1941, the Law of the National Electricity Service, was in force, which stated:

"Article 1: All waters of the Republic, which are not private domain in accordance with the current Water Law, ... are inalienable and under the dominion, government, and supervision of the State." Supporting the above is what is provided by Article 4 of the Mining Code (Law 6797 of October 4, 1982), which states:

"Article 4.- …. subterranean and surface waters are reserved for the State and may only be exploited by it, by private parties in accordance with the law, or through a special concession granted for a limited time and in accordance with the conditions and stipulations established by the Asamblea Legislativa. The natural resources existing in the soil, subsoil, and waters of the seas adjacent to the national territory, within an extension of up to two hundred miles from the low-water line, along the coasts, may only be exploited in accordance with what is established in subsection 14) (last paragraph) of Article 121 of the Constitución Política." Regarding Administration of the resource, the repealed Law number 258 of August 18, 1941, created the National Electricity Service to exercise dominion, utilization, use, governance, and supervision of various resources, including all waters. Authorizing it under numeral six to grant water concessions or rights, a norm that is consistent with the Water Law already mentioned, which in Article 17 establishes that "Authorization is necessary for the utilization of public waters, especially dedicated to undertakings of public or private interest. That authorization shall be granted by the National Electricity Service in the manner prescribed in this Law..", which is reaffirmed by Article 70 of Law 16 of October 30, 1941. For its part, Law Nº 2726 of April 14, 1961, and its amendments - especially those of Law No. 5915 of July 12, 1976 -, the "Constitutive Law of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados" indicates:

"Article 1.- With the object of directing, setting policies, establishing and applying standards, carrying out and promoting planning, financing, and development, and resolving everything related to the supply of potable water and the collection and evacuation of sewage and liquid industrial waste, as well as the normative aspect of storm sewer systems in urban areas, for the entire national territory, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is created, as an autonomous institution of the State." (As amended by Law Nº 5915 of July 12, 1976, Article 1º) As can be extracted from the articles transcribed above and from a comprehensive reading of the respective laws, the S.N.E.'s purpose in this field was to represent and exercise on behalf of the State the dominion of the country's water resources, in order to ensure their preservation and use in a hierarchical manner according to the importance of needs; competencies that were ultimately assumed by the Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos but on a broader scope of action. For its part, A y A has the purpose of planning, building, and operating the infrastructure necessary to supply potable water and supervising the planning, construction, and operation of the same carried out by private parties for the indicated purpose. As observed, representing the State in concession contracts was one of the mechanisms that allowed the S.N.E. to fulfill its legal purpose (as will be seen, that competence was subsequently transferred). Expressly established in its constitutive law as in the Water Law. For those years, it was clear that the granting of the connection was proper to it, which included the corresponding contract; while A y A has the competence to plan, design, build, operate, and maintain works for supplying water to a population, as well as the adaptation to its recommendations of the indicated works when carried out by private parties - Law No. 16 of October 30, 1941, No. 809 of November 2, 1949, and the General Potable Water Law, among others - a function that has never entailed that of granting concessions for the exploitation of public domain waters, even when these are destined, as in the case before us, to provide potable water to a defined population. From the cited norms, especially the A y A Law (as well as Articles 266 and 276 of the General Health Law, Law N°. 5395 of October 23, 1973), it is clear that, with the exception of the latter, only municipalities, the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, Community Development Associations (through Rural Aqueduct Committees), or other local bodies with which A y A may enter into a convention for the purpose, there are no other bodies authorized to manage public aqueducts. Thus, a private individual is not authorized by the legal system to provide the public service of population-wide potable water supply and sanitary sewerage, with the exception of the Asociaciones Administradoras de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (ASADAS) as managers of the public service. Consequently, the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications (which assumed the functions of granting water concessions upon the transformation of SNE into ARESEP), prior to granting the concession, would be legally obligated to verify that the private individual has the prior authorization of A y A and the Ministry of Health for the private company to provide the potable water service to the population, as well as the sanitary sewerage system. In the case of ASADAS, which act by delegation of A y A, their legal nature arises from the Constitutive Law of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, in which it was empowered to delegate the administration, operation, and maintenance of the aqueduct and sewerage systems—entrusted to it by the legislator—to duly formed groups for that purpose, as is derived from Article 2, subsection g) of the cited law, by expressly stating "The institution is empowered to agree with local bodies on the administration of such services or to administer them through administrator boards of mixed composition between the Institute and the respective communities, whenever this is suitable for the better provision of services and in accordance with the respective regulations." Based on the norm transcribed above, the Executive Branch proceeded to issue several regulations, the Regulation of the Associations for the Administration of Communal Aqueduct and Sewerage Systems (Decreto N°32529 of February 2, 2005) being the current norm, which this latter regulation provides in its Article 3:

‘Article 3. A y A, through a convention signed for this purpose, prior to a favorable agreement of its Board of Directors, may delegate the administration, operation, maintenance, and development of communal aqueduct and/or sewerage systems, to duly constituted and registered associations in accordance with the Associations Law N°218 of August 8, 1939, its modifications, and respective Regulation, Decreto Ejecutivo N°29496-J, published in La Gaceta N°95 of May 21, 2001. .." VII.- ON ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY. Numeral 190 of our General Law of Public Administration refers to "legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning," from which legitimacy or its antithesis basically refers to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normal or abnormal points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented among other things, by the service-provision activity attributed to the Public Administration as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the community. Thus, abnormality refers to those administrative conducts that, in themselves, depart from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in Article 102, subsection d., which includes, among other things, effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, technical rules, or the expertise and prudent conduct in the deployment of its actions, with harmful effect on the person. This Court adds: for natural or legal persons. This allows indicating that abnormality can manifest itself through malfunction; tardy functioning; or a total absence of functioning. Whenever the victim does not have that duty to bear the injury, it becomes unlawful, due to detriment to a third party contrary to the legal system.

Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances (requirements of Article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration), assume the reparatory consequences of that which it could not prevent. What then occurs is the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity, and to that extent, the injury to the legal sphere of the victim must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, subject to mandatory reparation. Unlawfulness exists insofar as the norm declares the existing obligation under the implicit assumption of an injury contrary to Law, which must not be borne by the victim. The omission as a criterion of abnormality and illegality. The obligation to compensate for damages and losses caused by inaction. On this topic, it is pertinent to recall that in the matter of public services, it is not enough to supply the activity under just any conditions, since users have the right to the adaptation, continuity, efficiency, and efficacy of the service (among many other rights), which entails that the service must be provided under certain minimum or basic conditions to be considered as fulfilling the purpose that justifies its existence. To accept that a public service can be provided haphazardly, without further consideration, is an invitation to arbitrariness that cannot be shared. In the present case, the omission of AYA in the supply of drinking water is claimed, which obliges us to establish whether the Institute's conduct in not supplying the water resource to the user corresponds to an abnormal or illegitimate functioning of the Administration. Today, it is peacefully accepted that administrative conduct encompasses not only the active behavior of the Administration (and within it, the administrative act) but also omissive conduct, that "not doing" which has come to be called inactivity of the Administration, both in its formal aspect (insofar as it results in a presumed act by administrative silence) and its material aspect (referring basically to the service provision sphere of the administrative organization). Thus, material administrative inactivity must be understood as that derived from the omission in the fulfillment of a pre-established legal obligation, which occurs when the Administration breaches, by omission, an obligation imposed by the Legal System or by any other self-binding mechanism, such as an act of its own making or consensual instruments, with direct injury to a legitimate interest or a subjective right, whether or not it alters a pre-existing legal-administrative relationship. More simply, there is inactivity of this type when, an obligation to give or do imposed by the legal system or by its prior decision existing for the public entity or body, outside or within an administrative procedure, the due factual or legal activity that would bring the granted function to a successful conclusion is not deployed, to the detriment of the rights or interests of one or several passive subjects, whether private or public, individual or collective. It is that "culpa in ommittendo" in which the functional duty to act is breached by inaction. It goes without saying that administrative indolence can produce (and indeed does produce) more serious injuries than the restrictive action itself of the public body or entity. Hence, it must be stated emphatically (with foundation and in accordance with what was said in previous recitals) that the Public Administration is also responsible for the damages and losses caused by its administrative inactivity. That passivity in the face of fulfilling pre-existing obligations is framed, for the purposes of extracontractual civil liability, as abnormal functioning of the Administration (insofar as it corresponds to a due material activity) and as illegitimate conduct, which in this case can be concurrent, insofar as the breach of what is due not only violates the rules of good administration but also infringes legality by breaching the functional administrative powers emanating from the Legal System itself. (On the parameter of liability, one may consult Voto 584-F-2005. Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia.- San José at ten hours and forty minutes of August eleventh of the year two thousand five.)

VIII.- ON THE DAMAGES AND LOSSES REQUESTED. Regarding the facts, damages, and losses claimed by the plaintiff company, its final result depends on the evidence provided, where the Court, to resolve the merits of the claims, will analyze the evidence in accordance with the principle of sound critique, doctrine of numeral 82 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, in relation to Article 318 of the Código Procesal Civil, which indicates the different means of evidence, which are broad so that the parties can meet the legal requirement of demonstrating the facts they affirm. For the judge, evidence will be that which demonstrates what truly happened; it is the search for the truth of the facts, in order to give them a legal classification. In the present case, we have documentary evidence, and the testimony of Mario Quesada Salazar and Irving Zelaya Palacios, provided by AYA, and the statements of the witnesses for the plaintiff, Lenin Humberto Fernández Padilla and Roger Mata Arias. Among the documentary evidence we have: Seal on the construction plan, which the Institute made, in which it records that an aqueduct is in use in front of this property, official communication RB-DOM-2008-148, dated April 18, 2008, from the Chief of Operations and Maintenance of the Región Brunca, stating that instructions have been given to suspend the granting of availability for new non-residential services, official communication RB-CPZ-2009-0889 dated December 23, 2009, in which Mr. Caballero Alvarado is informed that due to the deficit in water supply facing the Pérez Zeledón area, he is forced to suspend the granting of water availability for commercial premises, also on July 31, 2004, CONCESA issued the results through the formulation of several documents called "Diagnostic Report", "Alternatives Report", and two annexes. In the same, they established the current conditions of the systems in the central district of Pérez Zeledón and surrounding places, as well as the measures required to remedy the deterioration in the current drinking water infrastructure. It points out a deficit in the drinking water flow for 2005. It is clear that drinking water service is a key, basic, and indispensable activity within every society, among which the Costa Rican one is located. Everything seems to indicate that the lack of supply of the precious liquid had as its basis the absence of capacity of the liquid in the area at the time of the facts, which was subsequently resolved. In accordance with Rolan's rules, public services must naturally adapt to needs; a general maxim that also applies to the drinking water service. Indeed, and as already indicated, drinking water is a national asset; the public service is constituted when the liquid is distributed among all those people who need it, through systems of pipes, tanks, and distribution networks; without prejudice to pumps in cases where necessary. The public entity is constantly called upon to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the supply of the vital liquid in consideration of the needs of society, taking into account that the number of subscribers is increasing every day. It is an obligation of constant planning, in pursuit of improving conditions and ensuring the fulfillment of the public purpose. In order to establish the existence or not of the liability requested by the plaintiff, it is not enough to indicate that there was a material limitation, which is indeed an unquestionable issue and one that can eventually occur. There are many areas in the national territory where there is a limitation of water capacity and the levels of investment to bring water from one area to another are exaggerated; despite this, this jurisdictional body considers that determining whether or not we are facing abnormal behavior is a matter of lesser treatment, on the bases we proceed to indicate. If we were to place the specific situation as a lawful and normal conduct of the Administration, where the public entity took all necessary measures to prevent the absence of water supply from occurring, despite which the situation was occurring, which motivated the public entity to be agilely and diligently implementing mechanisms to solve the problem as soon as possible; that situation would not eliminate the possibility of deriving liability in the case. We would be facing a case of singular, special sacrifice, with a small and intensely affected group, by virtue of which the plaintiff was forced to face a series of undesired inconveniences—undesired by the Administration—but not for that reason grounds for exemption from liability. Under those conditions, we would be facing a case of administrative liability for lawful conduct or normal behavior. But as has been pointed out, arguing the situations is not sufficient; rather, it is necessary to prove them in accordance with canon three hundred seventeen of the Código Procesal Civil. In this case, the public entity repeatedly stated the technical impossibility of the water resource, justifying its inability to supply the service requested by the plaintiff, which this Chamber does not doubt occurred, but not a single piece of evidence was provided to deduce how long this problem had been known of, and more importantly, what actions were undertaken by the public entity to solve the problem. If there was a limitation of the water capacity, measures should have been taken urgently to solve the problem, especially since it concerns a fundamental right, and not simply limit oneself to indicating the situation. Evidently, given the impossibility of providing the service to all people, priority had to be for residential activity and residually for commercial activity, but that is not justification for delaying the necessary measures to solve the situation for the latter. The problem was not alien to the public entity but rather is inherent to its competencies, and it had to seek a solution within the shortest time possible. The exercise of the right to commerce within the norms established by Articles forty-five, forty-six, and twenty-eight, second paragraph of the Constitución Política, so that if the State is forced to deny a public service for the benefit of the community, within the system of burdens that prevail in public law, the prevailing logic is that it must proceed to indemnify the affected party. Returning to the argument, given the lack of evidence regarding the actions to mitigate or solve the problem, the jurisdictional Body is inclined to think that we are facing an abnormal activity in the public service, from which the liability now under consideration arises. It is worth noting that if, in the case of a normal activity, there is not the slightest difficulty in locating the damage suffered by the plaintiff company and the causal link, in addition to a singular, special, and intense sacrifice—the fundamental basis for deriving administrative liability under Articles one hundred ninety and following of the General Law of Public Administration—and it is also possible to find the absence of the obligation on the part of the affected party to bear the impact; in the case of an abnormal activity, it is even easier to locate the bases for liability when the actions taken to solve the problem, as was indeed required, are not proven.

IX.- ON THE OBJECT OF THE CLAIM AND THE MERITS OF THIS MATTER: Basically, the plaintiff seeks an order for the payment of damages and losses allegedly caused by not having had drinking water between the period from June 2009 to September 2012. The main social function of Law being conflict resolution, it is necessary to determine which of the opposing versions given by the parties is the one that deserves credibility from this Court, noting that in the preceding recitals we have already advanced somewhat on the matter. The crux of the lawsuit is to determine whether the Instituto de Acueductos y Alcantarillados indeed had the obligation to provide drinking water service to the plaintiff company; the facts, the claim, the opposition presented by AYA, and the evidence will be examined globally to arrive at the final result of this dispute. Taking up for this purpose part of the arguments already provided in the case. Legal Analysis. 1. Obligation of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados to provide drinking water service to the plaintiff company. Norms must be interpreted reasonably and consistently with social reality, which today teaches us, in that sense the Constitutive Law of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, in its second numeral, determines that: It corresponds to the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados: a) To direct and supervise everything concerning providing the inhabitants of the Republic with a drinking water service... i) To build, expand, and reform aqueduct and sewer systems in those cases where necessary and where the best satisfaction of national needs so advises. These norms guarantee the functioning of the public service without any discrimination or differentiation. In the case of a service already in operation, provided the person meets the requirements established for that purpose, one can speak of an authentic subjective right to enjoy it. Likewise, as indicated by the Sala Constitucional, in the previously referenced ruling, access to drinking water ensures the rights to life – "without water there is no life possible" affirms the Water Charter approved by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on May 6, 1968 –, to people's health – indispensable for their food, drink, and hygiene – and, of course, is associated with the development and socio-economic growth of peoples to ensure each individual a decent well-being and quality of life. In essence, water, from an economic and ecological point of view, is a precious asset, since it is indispensable for any human activity (industrial, agricultural, domestic, commercial, services, etc.). ON THE GOVERNING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SERVICES. "All public services provided by public administrations – including welfare or social ones – are governed by a series of principles that must be observed and respected, at all times and without any exception, by the public officials in charge of their management and provision. Such principles constitute a legal obligation of an indeclinable nature imposed on any administrative entity or body by their direct and immediate normative efficacy, since the block or parameter of legality (Article 11 of the Constitución Política) to which their actions must conform is integrated, among other elements, by the general principles of administrative law (Article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration). It must not be lost from perspective that the General Principles of Law have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit, whereby they can assume a constitutional rank if the precept for which they fulfill such functions also has that hierarchy. As we will see in the subsequent recital, our fundamental text enshrines the proper functioning of public services as a fundamental right of individuals; consequently, the principles that inform public services, insofar as they make that right effective, have a constitutional rank. Section 4 of the General Law of Public Administration clearly provides that 'The activity of public entities must be subject in its entirety to the fundamental principles of public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equality in the treatment of the recipients or beneficiaries.'... Adaptation to any change in the legal regime or to the needs imposed by the socio-economic context means that administrative entities and bodies must have the capacity for foresight and, above all, for programming or planning to meet new demands and imposed challenges, whether due to increased volume of demand for the public service or due to technological changes. No entity, body, or public official can adduce reasons of budgetary or financial lack, absence of equipment, lack of technological renewal thereof, excess or saturation of demand in the public service to cease providing it in a continuous and regular manner. Equality or universality in access demands that all inhabitants have the right to demand, receive, and use the public service under equal conditions and in accordance with the norms that govern them; consequently, all those in the same situation can demand identical advantages. One of the guiding principles of public service not stated in Article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration is its obligatoriness, since it would be useless to affirm that they must be continuous, regular, uniform, and general if the providing subject does not have the obligation to provide it. The public administration providing the public service cannot choose its clientele or users; it must provide it to anyone who requires it...". SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA, Voto number 2003-11382, San José, at fifteen hours and eleven minutes of October seventh, two thousand three. In summary, from the Constitutional and legal point of view, it is the obligation of AYA to provide the drinking water service, regardless of whether it is a natural or legal person, even though the Sala Constitucional, in the Recursos de Amparo filed by the representative of the plaintiff company, which were denied as a matter of mere legality, the Chamber considering that it concerned a legal person; however, in accordance with what is indicated in the rulings of the same Sala Constitucional, it is derived that drinking water is a precious asset, since it is indispensable for any human activity (industrial, agricultural, domestic, commercial, services, etc.). From that perspective, and in light of the rules of logic and human experience, AYA had the legal duty to supply drinking water to the plaintiff company, unless it had accredited some exemption from liability that would have prevented that duty, which was not proven in this lawsuit. It is worth noting that for a long time, constitutional jurisprudence tended to indicate that legal persons did not present fundamental rights, a position that has varied in recent years, insofar as this type of person is nothing more than a conglomerate of persons with a collective interest. In any case, even considering the possibility of the non-existence of a constitutional right to water (which we reject outright), the legal duty in the terms set forth is indisputable. 2. Inactivity of AYA in providing drinking water service to the plaintiff company. From the above vision, public entities must provide citizens with solutions to the problems that arise in society. The problem arises or emerges when the citizen, as an active subject, does not find the required response and activity from that obligated Administration; under those circumstances, the injured person is left in absolute defenselessness against administrative arbitrariness, which, by its omissive condition, has become an unlawful dysfunction. Taking into account the circumstances and details of the proceeding, the failure to supply drinking water to the plaintiff is violative of constitutional principles, and implies, in turn, another dysfunctionality that leaves the effective judicial protection as a prestational right in a void. The foregoing agrees with what the Sala Primera provided in Voto number 584-F-2005, by indicating that abnormality can manifest through malfunctioning; delayed functioning; or a total absence of functioning. Whenever the victim does not have that duty to bear the injury, it becomes unlawful, due to impairment to a third party against the spirit of the legal system.

Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, failing that and under certain circumstances, assume the reparatory consequences of that which it could not prevent. There then arises the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity (incumpliendo al deber de indemnidad patrimonial), and to that extent, the injury to the victim's legal sphere must be deemed unlawful (antijurídica), and therefore, mandatory to repair. In the judgment of this Tribunal, this is what happened in this case, where the defendant Institute had a duty to supply potable water within a reasonable time, and it did not do so. This conclusion was reached taking into account and considering that since the month of October 2009, the plaintiff requested the potable water service for its commercial business, and it was not until the year 2012 that said service was granted, after, logically, the lawsuit had been filed in court (evidence: the service order document visible on folio 41 and the statements contained on the DVD of the preliminary hearing). From that perspective, the unlawful conduct is born as a product of an administrative dysfunction (disfunción administrativa), because there is no demonstrated reason attributable to nature or third parties that prevented supplying the resource, and for this Tribunal, the defendant entity had the necessary conditions to provide potable water to the plaintiff; rather, it was due to an internal administrative decision, which has no support in our legal system, to stop providing an essential service such as the supply of potable water. Hence, that administrative conduct singularly affected the plaintiff company, causing economic damage (daño económico) that the issuer of that conduct must indemnify. It is worth revisiting what was previously stated: if the affectation had been a consequence of the time necessary to make the modifications and adaptations to the service, we could well speak of a case of special sacrifice (sacrificio especial) or no-fault liability (responsabilidad sin falta); but in this case, not a single element was provided to establish that the fulfillment of public duties was sought. Consequently, by basic deductive inference, we are in the presence of abnormal conduct (comportamiento anormal), as the basis for deriving liability.

3. Based on the ideas expressed, we will analyze the claim that was the subject of the adversarial process in the oral and public debate, which is the claim for payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) for the period between June 2009 and September 2012, stemming from the failure to supply potable water by the defendant Institute.

Regarding the accreditation of the claimed damages. From the evidence contained in the record, such as official communication SUB-G-GSP-DRB-CPZ-0913-2010, dated November 16, 2010, it is accredited that the representative of the plaintiff company, on November 2, 2009, requested, via water service availability order No. 13874716, three services for commercial premises in the name of Electrónica Leyden S.A. This is despite the fact that via official communication RB-CPZ-2009-0869 dated December 23, 2009, it was communicated to them that, due to the water supply deficit (déficit en el abastecimiento de agua) facing the Pérez Zeledón zone, and foreseeing that clients who have had potable water service for years prior would not suffer any deterioration in the same, the AYA is forced to suspend the granting of water availability (disponibilidad de agua) for commercial premises. This Tribunal considers that the argument given by the Institute is not a valid cause to deny the requested potable water service, at least not for the time under consideration. Especially when considering relevant aspects such as the fact that the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is responsible for providing the inhabitants of the Republic with a potable water service, it thus being an essential service that natural or legal persons have the right to obtain. Likewise, on July 6, 2009, the AYA placed a stamp on the construction plan, attesting that a usable aqueduct does exist in front of this property. Moreover, if we examine the arguments given by the Institute's representation to deny the water supply, in which it states that the Institutional directive Memorandum No. RB-DOM-2008-148, dated April 18, 2008, indicates that instructions have been given to suspend the granting of availability of new non-residential services (vertical condominiums, warehouses, commercial premises, apartments, etc.) (see official communication on folios 104-105), it is deduced from the foregoing that there is no justification for why the plaintiff was not warned when she appeared to request the service on a later date (October 2009) that the potable water service for commercial premises had been suspended. Another piece of evidence invoked by the Institute in its defense is the study dated July 31, 2004, by CONCESA, which issued results through the formulation of several documents called "Diagnostic Report", "Alternatives Report", and two annexes, pointing out a potable water flow deficit for the year 2005, requiring the AYA to carry out better comprehensive watershed management for water conservation. Regarding infrastructure, they recommended a topographical survey of the supply sources, repair of the dam on the Río Quebrada, a new pipeline from another intake on the San Ramón River to the Water Treatment Plants, improvements to the current treatment plants, wells, pumping stations, chlorination stations, replacement of the existing potable water distribution network in the San Isidro district with its respective boxes and valves, and improvement of the potable water storage tanks, namely: Fallas and Pepe tanks, San Luis tank, the University tank, and Los Chiles tank. Note that this report is from the year 2005; this being so, one must think that if the AYA officials had known for years prior of the potable water problems, why was the plaintiff not informed at the moment of submitting the plan for its respective processing? In addition to the foregoing, then a lack of planning on the part of the Institute could be admitted, since from the year 2005, they knew about the potable water shortage. Furthermore, where is the accreditation of the works carried out to mitigate the situation and affect users as little as possible? Again, we find ourselves on topics that should have been proven, but there is no attempt whatsoever to demonstrate them.

But even taking into account what was previously stated by the representatives of the public entity, this Tribunal infers that these are not sufficient and valid causes for not granting potable water service to the plaintiff company, as we would be in the presence of abnormal operation (funcionamiento anormal) on the part of the Administration by ceasing to provide an indispensable service. Therefore, "there is talk of inactivity in the face of the omission (total or partial) of an active conduct, whose deployment, from a legal point of view, corresponds to the Public Administration. Put another way, it concerns those cases in which the public entity or body does not perform that activity to which it is obligated, either by a norm or by a self-binding act. It concerns, then, a giving or doing on the part of the Administration, in which it must provide the administered party with the good, activity, or service that corresponds to them...". La Justicia Administrativa, González Camacho Oscar, 1st ed, San José, C.R. IJSA, January 202, p. 42. Thus, this Tribunal has no doubt about the abnormal operation incurred by the defendant Institute, due to the failure to supply the water resource to the company. From that legal perspective, it is determined that as a consequence of that omissive conduct, an unlawful injury was produced, thus operating a liability for abnormal operation (responsabilidad por funcionamiento anormal), which is, of course, indemnifiable. To reinforce the previous thesis, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has highlighted the importance of the principles of efficacy and efficiency, whose holders are the administered parties, and which it termed the fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services. Indeed, in judgment No. 2004-05207, at fourteen hours and fifty-five minutes on May eighteen, two thousand four, it detailed that the: "...Political Constitution enshrines an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered parties to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of numerals, interpreted a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8°, 139, subsection 4°, and 191 of the fundamental Law, in that they respectively set forth the deontological parameters of administrative function such as the 'proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies', 'good governance', and 'efficiency of the administration'. This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes upon public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly enshrined the principle of public administrations' liability, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal system...". This atypical or unnamed individual guarantee is accentuated when dealing with essential public services such as the supply of potable water. (See in this sense judgment number 2003-11222 at 17:48 hrs. of September 30, 2003).

It must be emphasized that the conviction of the judge in validating or not a testimonial or documentary evidence is the exclusive resort of their jurisdictional independence, the exercise of reason, and respect for the legitimacy of the body of evidence. In that sense, the plaintiff company managed to demonstrate with useful and serviceable evidence, such as the documentary evidence, which supports the testimonial evidence, that as a result of that abnormal event issued by the AYA, it suffered economic damages by having to use other means to supply potable water. This is attested to by the witnesses Lenin Humberto Fernández Padilla and Roger Mata Arias. Conversely, the AYA's representation could not accredit with suitable evidence any exemption from liability, or disqualify the causal link (nexo causal) between the omissive conduct —the supply of potable water— and the harmful result suffered by the plaintiff. All of this, necessarily resorting to logical deductions, leads us to incline towards confirming the thesis presented by the plaintiff in its claim. Therefore, in light of the rules of logic and human experience, from the entire body of evidence, both testimonial and documentary, sufficient elements of conviction emerge to conclude with the required degree of certainty that, in essence, the factual hypothesis presented by the plaintiff is plausible and was duly accredited in this process. On the other hand, the thesis presented by the defendant lacks serviceable evidence to discredit the hypothesis presented by the plaintiff; that is, the defendant entity failed to observe such a burden, as it did not provide suitable evidentiary material to prove, in an indubitable manner, that the failure to provide the potable water service was due to any technical impediment or any exemption from liability stipulated in our legal system. Therefore, it has rightly been said that within the judicial process, it is elementary that the parties who affirm facts, as the basis of their right or defense, provide the judge with sufficient evidence to achieve in them the necessary conviction for the adoption of the respective decision. Without evidence, the Judge cannot reconstruct the facts subject to debate, cannot verify the parties' allegations, nor give content to the invoked right. In the case at hand, the defendant Institute has sinned in that duty, as it did not provide the necessary and suitable evidence to accredit its arguments set forth in the opposition to the claim. Note that the study of the potable water supply deficit in the San Isidro district and surrounding areas dates from the year 2005, and the decision to suspend the supply of potable water to commercial businesses did not occur until the year 2008. Therefore, for the reasons stated, this Chamber is led to the conviction regarding the veracity of the essential facts adduced as the factual basis of the claim. Consequently, it is concluded that the balance must tip in favor of the thesis presented by the plaintiff company. Thus, by virtue of the foregoing, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is ordered to pay the economic damages incurred by the plaintiff company in supplying potable water for the period between October 2009 and September 2012, as this was the only fact proven during this process. However, the order (condena) is made in abstracto (en abstracto), and its quantification is reserved for the sentence execution stage, where the plaintiff must demonstrate with suitable evidence the quantum (quantum) of those economic damages. It is made in abstracto because the evidence provided by the plaintiff and other evidence is not conclusive in determining damages other than the financial loss incurred by the plaintiff in supplying potable water for the period from October 2009 to September 2012. It should be noted that the order for economic damages obeys the provisions of numeral 190 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, providing that the State and its entities will respond for all damages caused by their legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim, or act of a third party. In this way, the party causing the damage shall repair it, unless it proves an exonerating cause. See that the documentary evidence provided by the plaintiff, admitted in the oral and public trial, listed as the general statement of a credit transaction carried out at the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, visible on folios 149-159 of the judicial file, that document merely recounts a bank loan obtained by the plaintiff company; therefore, in our view, it is not suitable evidence to demonstrate the claimed damages. Likewise, the certification from the Private Accountant, Mr. Vidal Callejas Escobar, visible on folios 159-173, detailing that the plaintiff generates its income from the repair and sale of white goods spare parts, in the periods of October 2008 and September 2012, in the judgment of this Chamber, is not useful evidence, as it has no direct relation to what is being discussed in this process. The same fate befalls the 20 photographs provided by the plaintiff. Actually, the testimonial evidence, such as the account of the witness Mario Quesada Salazar, who affirmed that the commercial premises were using water from adjacent properties, and on the other hand, Roger Mata Arias, indicated that the potable water was resolved by another means; he hauled water from a well that was about 20 meters behind Ronald's house, and that the distance between the commercial premises and the plaintiff's representative's house was 8 kilometers; he also affirmed that there was a problem with the construction of the work. The witness Lenin Fernández Badilla states that his role was to haul water for the business; he would go with the Pick up to Ronald's house and take the barrels with water to the plaintiff's business; this was in the year 2010; Ronald paid him ¢15,000 for each water trip he made, making 4 or 5 trips per month; he finished hauling water in September 2012. (See testimonial evidence gathered in the oral and public trial hearing, contained in electronic format) and the documentary evidence offered by both parties, is what accredits the economic damages suffered by the plaintiff company as a result of the AYA's refusal to supply potable water.

X.- Regarding the damages in concrete: Evidently, in a process of this nature, the plaintiff party is obligated to prove not only the right, but must also demonstrate, as it is incumbent upon them, the damages claimed, adjusted to the proper causal link (relación de causalidad). It is not enough for a party to say they have the truth, since the law itself obliges them to demonstrate, through the admitted means of proof, those affirmations of the facts constituting their right, even when it comes to aspects of damages caused, there is no doubt that it must likewise be demonstrated that they were caused to an asset of their patrimony. Doctrine has indicated that regarding the claim for damages made by the litigant, they must necessarily establish the overwhelming factual presuppositions to evidence a causal link. In the present case, the plaintiff could not prove the requested damages, as it does not emerge from the documentary and testimonial evidence contained in the record that the plaintiff company effectively suffered the claimed damages due to the failure to supply potable water in the period between October 2009 and September 2012. In this case, the plaintiff, in compliance with canon three hundred seventeen of the Civil Procedure Code, applicable to the matter in accordance with article two hundred twenty of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, was obligated not only to prove the existence of the damage and its link to its counterparty, in addition to its unlawfulness, which it did; but also the extent or quantum thereof. Regarding this last aspect, the statements given, while allowing the existence of the possible damage to be derived, do not permit establishing the specific content thereof. Evidently, technical or documentary evidence, based on specific financial data, is the unsuitable evidence on the matter, which was never offered. In that context, recognition in concrete is impossible. However, despite the foregoing, article one hundred twenty of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, in safeguarding effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), allows the recognition in abstracto of the right so that in the sentence execution stage, the amount of the affectation can be established in concrete. Thus, the Chamber opts for that mechanism of remitting to sentence execution for the establishment in concrete of the damage suffered, always with the indicated guidelines regarding the way in which that damage must be proven. For its part, regarding moral damages (daño moral), it has been established in doctrine that it originates from the injury to an extra-patrimonial right and supposes an unjust disturbance of the conditions of the person affected by it. The plaintiff indicated in the oral and public trial that moral damage was caused to the plaintiff company due to the AYA's refusal to grant potable water supply. This aspect is resolved. It must be understood that moral damage is encompassed within damages in general. If the plaintiff seeks objective moral damage (daño moral objetivo), it is rejected because it did not provide suitable evidence accrediting such impairment or damage. It would concern damage to the general image of the company, which affected its economic capacity, aspects regarding which there is no element of conviction whatsoever. "Objective moral damage, contrary to the previous (referring to subjective moral damage), requires the corresponding demonstration. As stated in the preceding section, it refers to the injury to an extra-patrimonial right that generates valuable economic consequences. That is, it is that suffered by the person in their social context, and not in the individual field. Hence, it is necessary to demonstrate how the damage occurred, and indispensable to accredit, in addition to the causal link, its existence, it being incumbent upon the petitioner, under the shelter of numeral 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, to provide sufficient proof that supports it." (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, N° 226-F-S1-2008 at 15:26 hours on March 14, 2008; the underlined points are ours.). Regarding subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo), several clarifications are necessary. As is known, that type of damage is the suffering, the affectation in the emotional state that persons present as a result of a particular event. Historically, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and this jurisdiction have, by majority, held that only natural persons can present suffering. One cannot forget that the representatives, officers, and shareholders of a company are what their name implies: structures within the same person; but they do not constitute the person itself. The representatives cannot be confused with the legal person. In that context and on the stated bases, the Tribunal cannot establish the existence of subjective moral damage to the detriment of the company Electrónica Leyden S.A. As a consequence of the foregoing, the lack of right on that point must be declared.

XI.- Regarding the exceptions: The exception of expiry (caducidad) was raised, which must be rejected, because the final claim made by the plaintiff is solely for the payment of damages. Consequently, under a proper interpretation, the claim for damages makes the exception of expiry unviable, since from long ago, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has been clarifying that: "Articles 2 subsection c) and 3 of the Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa in truth establish the so-called unification of actions. However, it is true that the civil treasury process (proceso civil de hacienda) presents its own differentiating characteristics compared to the pure contentious-administrative process. In the civil treasury process, for example, matters concerning the nullity of acts of the Administration are not ventilated, which characterizes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In the former, matters relating to the liability of the Administration, arising from its operation, are discussed (article 190 and following of the Ley General de Administración Pública). According to doctrine, in a civil treasury process, one cannot speak of expiry referring to the filing of the action. There, the ordinary statute of limitations (prescripción ordinaria) of private law operates.

Furthermore, since the nullity of administrative acts is not debated therein, the prior requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not necessary (number 66-1997, at fifteen hours forty-five minutes on the twenty-third of July of nineteen ninety-seven). Thus, the party confuses an institution specific to the nullity process (the statute of limitations (caducidad)) by applying it to a civil public treasury matter, which, under the protection of Article one hundred ninety-eight, presents a statute of limitations (prescripción) period. It is not superfluous to add that in this second scenario, the legal timeframe would not have elapsed either. As this involves a claim for damages (daños y perjuicios), numeral 198 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) must be taken as a parameter, and if we only take the date of December 23, 2009, when the plaintiff's representative was notified of the non-granting of potable water, to the date the lawsuit was notified to AYA, June 7, 2012, visible at folio 15 bis, the statute of limitations (prescripción) period of 4 years has not yet elapsed. Regarding the lack of right that was consistently invoked by the defendant, even though it was not presented under the express terms of the technical term, it is the Tribunal's criterion that it should be upheld with respect to the claimed subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), as it lacks normative support; and rejected regarding material damages (daño material), as their existence was accredited." The Political Constitution in article one hundred twenty-one, subsection fourteen, states: " (...) *In addition to the other powers conferred by this Constitution, it is the exclusive authority of the Legislative Assembly to: (...) 14) Decree the alienation or application to public uses of property belonging to the Nation* (...)". This constitutional provision has been developed in the Civil Code, in articles two hundred sixty-one to two hundred sixty-three; the first of these indicates: "*Public things are those that, by law, are permanently destined for any service of general utility, and those that everyone can use because they are given over to public use. All other things are private and subject to particular ownership, even if they belong to the State or the Municipalities, who in such case, as civil persons, are no different from any other person*". For its part, the following canon adds: "*Public things are outside of commerce; and they may not enter into it, while it is not legally so provided, separating them from the public use for which they were destined*". Thus, public domain is understood as the set of goods subject to a special legal regime, distinct from that which governs private domain, which, in addition to belonging to or being under the administration of public legal persons, are affected or destined for purposes of public utility and which is manifested in the direct or indirect use that any person may make of them. According to the cited regulations, the State possesses both public and private domain goods; public goods are those to which a law gives a purpose for public or general use, they are called "demaniales" and are inalienable, imprescriptible, unseizable, and undeniable. The logic of public goods is that their domain precedes the State itself, so that they belong to The Nation as a requirement for coexistence in society. The State merely administers them, which as a general rule prevents them from leaving the public sphere. That is, affected by their own nature and vocation (See Constitutional Chamber, vote 2306-91 of 14:45 hours on November 6, 1991). It is said that they belong to The Nation when the State limits itself to their safeguarding and protection, without being able, in principle, to dispose of them. These goods are outside the commerce of men and consequently have a nature and legal regime different from private goods—which are governed by the right of property under the terms of article 45 of the Political Constitution—inasmuch as, by the express will of the legislator or by their very essence, they are affected to a special purpose of serving the community, that is, the public interest, and therefore, cannot be the object of private property. For this reason, they cannot belong individually to private parties, nor to the State, in the strict sense, since the latter is limited to their administration and guardianship. Thus, what defines the legal nature of domain goods (bienes demaniales) is their purpose, insofar as they are affected to and are at the service of public use, as recognized by doctrine on the matter. Thus, Nombre33033, Miguel S., in his work Tratado de Derecho Administrativo (Volume V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., pg. 25), considered: "*For a good or thing to be considered as a dependency of the public domain, and to be subject to the pertinent regime, it is necessary that said good or thing be affected to «public use», direct or indirect, and it must be, in this «latter» case, a matter of things directly affected -as «final goods» or «use goods»- to common utility or comfort, excluding from the domain of the State goods that are of a simply instrumental character*." On the other hand, the private goods of the State are regulated by private law with elements proper to public law. These goods are within the commerce of men; they may be transferred, appropriated, and are not imprescriptible; therefore, they are susceptible to usucapión for the benefit of private parties, in accordance with article two hundred sixty-one already indicated.

Note that the emphasis of the differentiation lies in relation to the purpose of the good, that is, the fact of being affected to a common use or to the service of the common good (see Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 2301-91, of November 6, 1991 one thousand nine hundred ninety-one and 2000-06903 of 15:48 hours on August 8, 2000).

As already noted, due to their special legal nature, they present the following attributes: they are imprescriptible, which implies that the right of property over them cannot be acquired by the passage of time, not even mere possession, that is, they cannot be acquired through usucapión, just as they cannot be lost by prescription; for which reason the use permits that the Administration grants over them always have a precarious character, which means they can be revoked for reasons of opportunity or convenience at any time by the Administration—under the terms provided in articles 154 and 155 of the General Law of Public Administration—; and the very concessions granted over them for their use can be canceled, through the appropriate procedure; they are unseizable, meaning they cannot be the object of any lien or seizure, neither by private parties, nor by the Administration; and they are inalienable, which translates into the condition that they are outside the commerce of men; hence they cannot be alienated, sold, or acquired, neither free of charge nor for a consideration, neither by private parties, nor by the State, so that they are exempted from the commerce of men and subject to a special and reinforced legal regime. Furthermore, their use and exploitation is subject to the police power, insofar as, being goods that cannot be the object of possession, much less of property, their utilization and exploitation is possible only through duly authorized acts, whether through a concession or use permit, granted by the competent authority; and to constant control by the Public Administration.

A public good may be natural or artificial, depending on whether they are goods declared public by the legislator considering them in the state that nature presents or offers them (a river, for example), or goods declared public by the legislator but whose creation or existence depends on a human act (construction of a street or a public park, for example). The affectation (afectación) is the act or the manifestation of will of the public authority, by virtue of which the thing is incorporated into the use and enjoyment of the community, and it can be effected by law or by administrative act. Doctrine distinguishes between the "assignment of public character" to a good and the "affectation" of that good to the public domain. The assignment of the public character means establishing that said specific good would have domain quality (calidad demanial); thus, for example, the general legal norm would say that all public roads are part of or dependent on the public domain, which means that both current ones and those that may be built are. In contrast, affectation means that the good declared as domain is effectively incorporated to public use, and this has to do with the acceptance and receipt of public works when they are constructed by administration or with the completion of the works and their official receipt, when a private party is the one carrying them out (construction of a development or subdivision (fraccionamiento), for example).- This is why it is said that affectation can be declared by law in a generic form, or by an administrative act, which must, necessarily, conform to the legal norm that serves as its reference (principle of legality). As a consequence of what was said in the previous point, it is clear that the domain regime (régimen demanial) exists per se. Its existence and publicity exist autonomously from the Registry, it not being possible for the registered titleholder to allege lack of knowledge as a means to distort it and counteract the affectation. The principles of inalienability and imprescriptibility that characterize the public domain prevent the figure of the third party registry holder from being used against it to consolidate private property illicitly removed from that regime. The domain (demanio) has legal publicity and, in many cases, natural publicity. The foregoing is linked to the principle of initial registration (inmatriculación) of properties that are components of the public domain, which has material publicity and not necessarily formal or registry publicity. Against the public domain, private holdings suffer from a weakened value, no matter how prolonged they are in time and even if they appear protected by entries in the Property Registry. The condition of being a good of public domain and public use affects third parties, even if such quality does not appear from the Property Registry. These are goods that, by their nature, do not need registry inscription (Voto 019-2009-SVII, Administrative Litigation Court, Seventh Section). Note that this principle, as an exception to the principle of registry publicity, is based on the fact that public domain goods enjoy material publicity and therefore their registry publicity is unnecessary, inasmuch as public domain goods, by their nature, are not subject to that institute.

Additionally, there is the figure of "de-affectation (desafectación)", which is about "*the legal situation by which a good ceases to belong to the public domain (...) goods that are de-affected become, in principle, patrimonial goods of the owning Administration, which, where appropriate, may alienate them (...)*"(voto 035-2009-SVII, Administrative Litigation Court); a situation which, in sound logic, could only occur in those that have been declared as such by law, since in those where this condition is intrinsic, such a possibility would be precluded.

Before directing the argument more specifically to the point at hand, it is clear that when the domain good (bien demanial) has been created by a private party or represents a particularly intense affectation that the private party is not obliged to bear, said character does not inhibit the obligation of the Administration to assume responsibility, in order to allow equilibrium in public burdens.

The contrary would entail an unjust enrichment, which has no support within the national legal system.

Now then, as was already advanced, regarding water, the Constitutional Chamber, in vote no. 5606-06, recognized its condition as a human right, stating:

“**VII.- Access to potable water as a human right** * . In addition to what has been indicated, and perhaps the most relevant aspect in this matter, is the nature and function of water for human life. It is not necessary to detail here an explanation about the evident and notorious reality that without water there can be no life, nor quality of life, and that therefore, with or without a nationalization law, by its very essence, this matter is not and cannot be a territorial or local matter. The Chamber itself in its constitutional jurisprudence has said that access to potable water is a fundamental human right, as it constitutes an integral part of the content of the right to health and to life. (CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER, judgments numbers 534-96, 2728-91, 3891-93, 1108-96, 2002-06157 2002-10776; 2004-1923). This same line has been maintained in judgments 2003-04654 and 2004-07779, which, in what is relevant, state: // ‘V.- // The Chamber recognizes, as part of the Constitution's Law, a fundamental right to potable water, derived from the fundamental rights to health, life, the environment, food, and decent housing, among others, as has also been recognized in international instruments on Human Rights applicable in Costa Rica: thus, it explicitly appears in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (art. 14) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (art. 24); in addition, it is enunciated in the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development (principle 2), and it is declared in numerous others of International Humanitarian Law. In our Inter-American System of Human Rights, the country is particularly obliged in this matter by the provisions of Article 11.1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador” of 1988), which provides that: “Article 11. Right to a healthy environment 1.- Every person has the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public services’. The lack of resources does not justify non-compliance with the duties of public administrations in the provision of this basic service. (CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER, resolutions 2003-04654 and 2004-007779). // For its part, as both the Attorney General's Office and the representative of Nombre112175 well recognize in their reports, in the international field, the recognition of water as a human right and as a necessary precondition for all our human rights is also majority. It is maintained that without equitable access to a minimum requirement of potable water, other established rights would be unattainable—such as the right to an adequate standard of living for health and for well-being, as well as other civil and political rights. In November 2002, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights affirmed that access to adequate quantities of clean water for domestic and personal use is a fundamental human right of every person. Likewise, in *General Comment No. 15 on the fulfillment of articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee noted that ‘the human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights’. It is also emphasized that the member States of the International Covenant have the duty to progressively fulfill, without any discrimination, the right to water, which entitles everyone to enjoy sufficient, physically accessible, safe, and acceptable water for domestic and personal use. // For its part, several international conferences have taken place, among which the United Nations Water Conference held in Mar del Plata in 1977 stands out, which recognized that all peoples have the right to access potable water to satisfy their basic needs. Also, the Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly, in 1986 includes a commitment by States to ensure equal opportunity for all to enjoy basic resources. // The concept of satisfying basic water needs was further strengthened during the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. In Agenda 21, governments agreed that "when developing and using water resources, priority must be given to satisfying basic needs and to the conservation of ecosystems. Similarly, in the Implementation Plan adopted at the 2002 Johannesburg Summit, governments committed to "use all policy instruments, including regulation, monitoring..... and cost recovery of water services," without cost recovery objectives becoming a barrier for poor people to access clean water. Likewise, there are dozens of international instruments that directly and indirectly concern water as a human right of all persons and peoples, in such a way that it is not only a matter that by its nature tends towards nationalization, but also towards the internationalization of its use and exploitation*”.

See how beyond the normative support, the domain character (carácter demanial) of water is a necessary consequence of the imperative requirement it presents for human life, which entails that the internal normative north is based on the constitutional article twenty-one. At the infra-constitutional level, its domain status (demaniabilidad) is initially regulated in the Water Law (Ley de Aguas), number 276, of August twenty-six, nineteen forty-two:

“**Article 1.-** *Waters of the public domain are: // I.- Those of the territorial seas in the extent and terms set by international law; // II.- Those of the lagoons and estuaries of the beaches that communicate permanently or intermittently with the sea; // III.- Those of the interior lakes of natural formation that are directly linked to constant currents; // IV.- Those of the rivers and their direct or indirect tributaries, streams or springs from the point where the first permanent waters emerge until their mouth in the sea or lakes, lagoons or estuaries; // V.- Those of the constant or intermittent currents whose channel, in all or part of its extension, serves as a limit to the national territory, the domain of those currents being subject to what has been established in international treaties concluded with neighboring countries and, in the absence of such, or regarding what is not foreseen, to the provisions of this law; // VI.- Those of any current that directly or indirectly flow into those listed in section V; // VII.- Those extracted from mines, with the limitation indicated in article 10; // VIII.- Those of the springs that emerge on beaches, maritime zones, channels, basins, or banks of national property and, in general, all those that arise on lands within the public domain; // IX.- Subterranean waters whose extraction is not done by means of wells; and // X.- Rainwater that flows through gullies or ramblas whose channels are of public domain*.

**Article 2.***- The waters listed in the preceding article are national property and the domain over them is not lost nor has been lost when natural characteristics are altered or have been altered by the execution of artificial works or prior use.* *Excepted are waters that are used by virtue of contracts granted by the State, which shall be subject to the conditions authorized in the respective concession.*” For its part, when the granting of the concession occurred, Law 258 of August eighteenth, nineteen forty-one, Law of the National Electricity Service (Ley del Servicio Nacional de Electricidad), was in force, which stated:

“*Article 1: All waters of the Republic, which are not private domain in accordance with the current Water Law, … are inalienable and under the domain, governance, and vigilance of the State*” What is ordered by the fourth article of the Mining Code (Law 6797 of October 4, 1982) supports what has been said, which states:

“**Article 4.-** *…. subterranean and surface waters are reserved for the State and may only be exploited by the latter, by private parties in accordance with the law, or through a special concession granted for a limited time and in accordance with the conditions and stipulations established by the Legislative Assembly.* *The natural resources existing in the soil, subsoil, and in the waters of the seas adjacent to the national territory, in an extension of up to two hundred miles from the low-water line, along the coasts, may only be exploited in accordance with what is established in subsection 14) (last paragraph) of article 121 of the Political Constitution.”* Regarding the Administration of the resource, the repealed Law number 258 of August eighteenth, nineteen forty-one, created the National Electricity Service (Servicio Nacional de Electricidad, SNE) to exercise domain, use, utilization, governance, and vigilance over various resources, including all waters. Empowering it in numeral six to grant water concessions or rights, a norm that is coherent with the already indicated Water Law which in article seventeen establishes that “*Authorization is necessary for the use of public waters, especially dedicated to enterprises of public or private interest. That authorization shall be granted by the National Electricity Service in the manner prescribed in this Law*..”, which is reaffirmed by article seventy of law 16 of October thirty, nineteen forty-one. For its part, law No. 2726 of April fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one, and its reforms—especially those of law No. 5915 of July 12, 1976—, "Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados)" indicates:

"*Article 1.- With the purpose of directing, setting policies, establishing and applying norms, carrying out and promoting planning, financing, and development, and resolving everything related to the supply of potable water and the collection and evacuation of wastewater and liquid industrial residues, as well as the normative aspect of stormwater drainage systems in urban areas, for the entire national territory, the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers is created, as an autonomous institution of the State*.” (As amended by Law No. 5915 of July 12, 1976, article 1) As can be extracted from the articles transcribed above and from the comprehensive reading of the respective laws, the S.N.E. had the purpose in this field to represent and exercise on behalf of the State the domain of the country's water resources, in order to ensure their preservation and hierarchical utilization according to the importance of needs; competencies that in the end were assumed by the Public Services Regulatory Authority (Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos, ARESEP) but within a broader scope of action. For its part, A y A has the purpose of planning, building, and operating the infrastructure necessary to supply potable water and supervising the planning, construction, and operation of the same carried out by private parties for the indicated purpose. As observed, representing the State in concession contracts was one of the mechanisms that allowed the S.N.E. to fulfill its legal purpose (as will be seen, that competence was later transferred). Established expressly in its constitutive law as well as in the Water Law. For those years it was clear that the granting of the connection was proper to it, which included the corresponding contract; while A y A has the competence to plan, design, build, operate, and maintain water supply works for a population, as well as the adaptation to its recommendations of said works when carried out by private parties—Law No. 16 of October 30, 1941, No. 809 of November 2, 1949, and the General Law of Potable Water, among others—a function that has never entailed that of granting concessions for the exploitation of public domain waters, even when these are destined, as is the case at hand, to provide potable water to a defined population. From the said norms, especially the Law of A y A (as well as articles 266 and 276 of the General Health Law, Law No. 5395 of October 23, 1973.), it is clear that with the exception of the latter, only municipalities, the Heredia Public Services Company (Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia), Community Development Associations (through the Rural Aqueduct Committees) or other local organizations with which A y A may enter into an agreement for that purpose; no other bodies are empowered to manage public aqueducts. So a private party is not authorized by the legal system to provide the public service of population supply of potable water and sanitary sewage, with the exception of the Administrative Associations of Aqueducts and Sewers (Asociaciones Administradoras de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, ASADAS) as managers of the public service. So the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (which assumed the functions of granting water concessions upon the transformation of the SNE into ARESEP), prior to granting the concession, would be in the legal obligation to verify that the private party has prior authorization from A y A and the Ministry of Health for the private company to provide the potable water service to the population, as well as the sanitary sewage system.

In the case of the ASADAS that act by delegation of AyA, their legal nature arises from the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados), in which the latter was empowered to delegate the administration, operation, and maintenance of the aqueduct and sewer systems—which were entrusted to it by the legislator—to groups duly formed for that purpose, as can be inferred from article two, subsection g) of the cited law, by expressly stating “</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">The institution is empowered to agree with local organizations on the administration of such services or to administer them through administrative boards of mixed integration between the Institute and the respective communities, whenever this is convenient for the better provision of the services and in accordance with the respective regulations.”</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">Based on the provision transcribed above, the Executive Branch proceeded to issue several regulations, with the Regulation of the Associations Administering Communal Aqueduct and Sewer Systems (Reglamento de las Asociaciones Administradoras de Sistemas de Acueductos y Alcantarillados Comunales), (Decree No. 32529 of February 2, 2005) being the current regulation, which provides in its article 3: </span> <span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">‘</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic\">Article 3. A</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">yA, through an agreement signed for this purpose, with the prior favorable agreement of its Board of Directors, may delegate the administration, operation, maintenance, and development of communal aqueduct and/or sewer systems, to associations duly constituted and registered in accordance with the Law of Associations No. 218 of August 8, 1939, its amendments, and respective Regulation, Executive Decree No. 29496-J, published in La Gaceta No. 95 of May 21, 2001.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> ..”</span> **VII.- ON ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY.** Section 190 of our General Law of Public Administration refers to “legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning,” where legitimacy or its antithesis refers basically to the legal conduct of the Administration, while normal or abnormal points, above all (but not exclusively), to the material conduct of the Administration, represented among other things, by the **service-providing activity (actividad prestacional)** attributed to the Public Administration as part of the social category also assigned to it in pursuit of the general welfare of the collective. Thus, abnormality refers to those administrative conducts that, in themselves, depart from good administration (according to the concept used by the General Law itself in article 102 subsection d., which among other things includes effectiveness and efficiency) or from the organization, the technical rules, or the expertise and prudent action in the deployment of their actions, with injurious effect on the person. This Court adds, for natural or legal persons. This allows us to point out that abnormality can manifest itself through poor functioning; tardy functioning; or a total absence of functioning. Whenever the victim does not have the duty to bear the injury, it becomes unlawful, due to detriment to a third party against the dictates of the legal system. Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have avoided it, or, failing that and under certain circumstances (requirements of article 194 of the General Law of Public Administration), must assume the reparative consequences of that which it could not prevent. The breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity (deber de indemnidad patrimonial) then occurs, and to that extent, the injury to the legal sphere of the victim must be considered unlawful, and therefore, of mandatory reparation. There is unlawfulness to the extent that the norm declares the existing obligation under the implicit assumption of an injury contrary to Law, which should not be borne by the victim. **Omission as a criterion of abnormality and illegality. The mandatory nature of compensation for damages caused by inaction.** On this subject, it is pertinent to remember that in the matter of public services, it is not enough to supply the activity under just any conditions, since users have the right to the adaptation, continuity, efficiency, and effectiveness of the service (among many other rights), which entails that the service must be provided under certain minimum or basic conditions to be considered as fulfilling the purpose that justifies its existence. Accepting that a public service can be provided in any manner, without further consideration, is an appeal to arbitrariness that cannot be shared. In the present case, the omission of Nombre112175 in the supply of drinking water is claimed, which obliges us to establish whether the Institute's conduct in not supplying the water resource to the user corresponds to an abnormal or illegitimate functioning of the Administration. Currently, it is peacefully accepted that administrative conduct encompasses not only the active behavior of the Administration (and within it, the administrative act) but also the omissive conduct, that “not doing” which has come to be called administrative inactivity (inactividad de la Administración), both in its formal aspect (to the extent that it reverts to a presumed act by administrative silence) and material aspect (referring basically to the service-providing scope of the administrative organization). In this way, material administrative inactivity is to be understood as that derived from the omission in the fulfillment of a pre-established legal obligation, which occurs when the Administration breaches, by omission, an obligation imposed by the Legal System or by any other self-binding mechanism, such as its own act or consensual instruments, with direct injury to a legitimate interest or a subjective right, whether or not it alters a pre-existing legal-administrative relationship. More simply, there is inactivity of this type when, an existing obligation to give or do is imposed on the public entity or body—imposed by the legal system or by a previous decision of its own, within or outside an administrative procedure—the due factual or legal activity that would bring the granted function to a successful conclusion is not deployed, to the detriment of the rights or interests of one or several passive subjects, whether private or public, individual or collective. It is that “culpa in ommittendo” in which the functional duty to act is breached by inaction. It goes without saying that administrative indolence can produce (and indeed does produce) more serious injuries than the restrictive action of the public body or entity itself. Hence, it must be stated emphatically (based on and in accordance with what was said in previous recitals) that the Public Administration is also liable for the damages caused by its administrative inactivity. Such passivity in the face of fulfilling pre-existing obligations is framed, for purposes of extra-contractual civil liability, as abnormal functioning (funcionamiento anormal) of the Administration (insofar as it corresponds to a due material activity) and as illegitimate conduct (conducta ilegítima), which in this case can be concurrent, to the extent that the breach of what is due not only violates the rules of good administration, but also infringes legality insofar as it breaches the functional administrative powers emanating from the Legal System itself. (On the liability parameter, consult vote number 584-F-2005. First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.- San José, at ten hours forty minutes on the eleventh of August of the year two thousand five.

**VIII.- ON THE DAMAGES REQUESTED.** Regarding the facts, damages, and losses claimed by the plaintiff company, their final outcome depends on the evidence provided, where the Court, to resolve the merits of the claims, will analyze the evidence in accordance with the principle of sound criticism, the doctrine of section 82 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, in relation to article 318 of the Civil Procedure Code, which points out the different means of proof, which are broad so that the parties can comply with the legal requirement of demonstrating the facts they affirm. For the judge, the evidence will be that which demonstrates what truly happened; it is the search for the truth of the facts, in order to give them a legal qualification. In the present case, we have documentary evidence, and the testimony of Nombre112176 and Nombre112175 , which AyA provided, and the statements of the plaintiff's witnesses Nombre112177 and Roger Mata Arias. Among the documentary evidence we have: a seal on the construction plan, made by the Institute, in which it records that there is indeed an aqueduct in use in front of this property; official letter RB-DOM-2008-148, dated April 18, 2008, the Head of Operations and Maintenance of the Brunca Region, stating that instructions have been given to suspend the granting of availability for new non-residential services; official letter RB-CPZ-2009-0889 dated December 23, 2009, in which Mr. Nombre112174 is notified that due to the deficit in water supply facing the Pérez Zeledón area, he is obliged to suspend the granting of water availability for commercial premises; furthermore, on July 31, 2004, CONCESA issued the results through the formulation of several documents called “Diagnostic Report,” “Alternatives Report,” and two annexes. In the same, they established the current conditions of the systems in the central district of Pérez Zeledón and surrounding areas, as well as the measures required to correct the deterioration in the current drinking water infrastructure. It points out a deficit in the drinking water flow for 2005. It is clear that the drinking water service is a key, basic, and indispensable activity within any society, among which the Costa Rican society is located. Everything seems to indicate that the lack of supply of the precious liquid is based on the lack of capacity of the liquid in the area at the time of the facts, which was later resolved. In accordance with Rolan's rules, public services must naturally adapt to needs; a general maxim that also applies to the drinking water service. Although, and as already indicated, drinking water is a national asset, the public service is constituted when the liquid is distributed among all those people who need it, through systems of pipes, tanks, and distribution networks; without prejudice to pumps in cases where necessary. The public entity is constantly called upon to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the supply of the vital liquid considering the needs of society, bearing in mind that the number of subscribers increases every day. It is an obligation of constant planning, in order to improve conditions and ensure compliance with the public purpose. To be able to establish the existence or not of the liability requested by the plaintiff, it is not enough to indicate that there was a material limitation, which is indeed an unquestionable issue and that can eventually occur. There are many areas in the national territory where there is a water capacity limitation and the levels of investment to bring water from one area to another are excessive. Despite this, this jurisdictional body considers that determining whether or not we are facing abnormal behavior turns out to be a matter of lesser treatment, on the bases we proceed to indicate. If we were to place the specific situation as lawful and normal conduct of the Administration, where the public entity took all necessary measures so that the absence of water supply would not occur, despite this the situation was occurring, which motivated the public entity to agilely and diligently implement mechanisms to solve the problem as soon as possible; that situation would not negate the possibility of deriving liability in this case. We would be facing a case of singular, special sacrifice, with a small group of intense those affected, by virtue of which the plaintiff was forced to face a series of inconveniences; not desired by the Administration, but not for that reason grounds to exempt from liability. Under these conditions, we would be facing a case of administrative liability for lawful conduct or normal behavior. But as has been pointed out, arguing the situations is not enough; rather, it is necessary to prove them in accordance with canon three hundred seventeen of the Civil Procedure Code. In this case, the public entity repeatedly manifested the technical impossibility of the water resource, justifying its inability to supply the service requested by the plaintiff, which this Chamber does not doubt occurred, but not a single element of conviction was provided that allows deducing since when this problem was known and, more importantly, what were the actions undertaken by the public entity to solve the problem. If there was a limitation in water capacity, measures should have been taken urgently to solve the problem, especially since it involves a fundamental right, and not simply limited to indicating the situation. Evidently, given the inability to provide the service to all persons, priority should have been given to residential activity and, residually, to commercial activity, but that does not justify delaying the necessary measures to solve the situation for the latter. The problem was not alien to the public entity but is inherent to its competencies, and it had to seek a solution within the shortest possible time. The exercise of the right to commerce within what is regulated by articles forty-five, forty-six, and twenty-eight, second paragraph of the Political Constitution, such that if the State is forced to deny a public service for the benefit of the community, within the system of burdens that prevail in public law, the prevailing logic is that it must proceed to indemnify them. Returning to the argument, given the lack of proof regarding the actions to mitigate or solve the problem, the jurisdictional Panel is inclined to think that we are facing an abnormal activity in the public service, from which the liability now being considered is derived. It is not superfluous to indicate that if we were dealing with normal activity, there is not the slightest difficulty in locating the damage suffered by the plaintiff company and the causal link, in addition to a singular, special, and intense sacrifice, the fundamental basis for deriving administrative liability from articles one hundred ninety and following of the General Law of Public Administration, besides being possible to find the absence of the obligation of the holder to bear the affectation; if we are dealing with abnormal activity, it is even easier to locate the bases for liability when the actions taken to solve the problem are not proven, as was indeed required.

**IX.- ON THE OBJECT OF THE CLAIM AND THE MERITS OF THIS MATTER**: Basically, the plaintiff seeks a judgment ordering payment of the damages and losses caused, according to her statement, by not having had drinking water during the period between June 2009 and September 2012. As the primary social function of Law is conflict resolution, it must be determined which of the conflicting versions given by the parties is the one deserving credibility by this Court, noting that in the previous recitals we have already made some progress on the matter. The core of the lawsuit is to determine if the Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers effectively had the obligation to provide drinking water service to the plaintiff company. The facts, the claim, the opposition presented by Nombre112175, and the evidence will be examined globally to arrive at the final result of this dispute. Returning for this purpose to part of the arguments already granted in this case. Legal analysis (Análisis jurídico). **1. Obligation of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados) to provide drinking water service to the plaintiff company.** Norms must be interpreted in a reasonable manner and congruent with social reality, which today teaches us, in that sense, the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, in its section two determines that: It is the responsibility of the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers: a) To direct and supervise everything concerning the provision of a drinking water service to the inhabitants of the republic...i) To build, expand, and reform the aqueduct and sewer systems in those cases where it is necessary and advisable for the best satisfaction of national needs. These norms guarantee the functioning of the public service without any discrimination or differentiation whatsoever. When dealing with a service already in operation, provided the person meets the requirements established for this purpose, one can speak of an authentic subjective right to its enjoyment. Similarly, as the Constitutional Chamber indicated in the previously referenced ruling, access to drinking water ensures the rights to life –“without water no life is possible” states the Water Charter approved by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on May 6, 1968-, to the health of persons –indispensable for their food, drink, and hygiene-, and of course, it is associated with the development and socio-economic growth of peoples to ensure each individual a dignified well-being and quality of life. In essence, water, from an economic and ecological point of view, is a precious good, since it is indispensable for any human activity (industrial, agricultural, domestic, commercial, services, etc.). ON THE GOVERNING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC SERVICES. "All public services provided by public administrations –including assistance or social ones- are governed by a series of principles that must be observed and respected, at all times and without any exception, by the public officials responsible for their management and provision. Such principles constitute a legal obligation of an indeclinable character imposed on any administrative entity or body due to its direct and immediate normative effectiveness, since the block or parameter of legality (article 11 of the Political Constitution) to which they must adjust their actions is composed, among other elements, of the general principles of administrative law (article 6 of the General Law of Public Administration). It should not be lost from perspective that the General Principles of Law have the rank of the norm they interpret, integrate, or delimit, with which they can assume a constitutional rank if the precept regarding which they fulfill such functions also has that hierarchy. As we will see in the subsequent recital, our fundamental text includes as a fundamental right of persons the right to the proper functioning of public services; consequently, the principles that inform public services insofar as they make such a right effective have a constitutional rank. Section 4 of the General Law of Public Administration clearly states that “The activity of public entities must be subject in its entirety to the fundamental principles of the public service, to ensure its continuity, its efficiency, its adaptation to any change in the legal regime or in the social need they satisfy, and equality in the treatment of the recipients or beneficiaries.”.... Adaptation to any change in the legal regime or to the needs imposed by the socioeconomic context means that administrative entities and bodies must have the capacity for foresight and, above all, for programming or planning to face new demands and challenges imposed, whether by the increase in the volume of demand for the public service or by technological changes. No entity, body, or public official can claim reasons of budgetary or financial lack, absence of equipment, lack of technological renewal thereof, excess or saturation of demand in the public service to stop providing it in a continuous and regular manner. Equality or universality in access demands that all inhabitants have the right to demand, receive, and use the public service under equal conditions and in accordance with the norms that govern them; consequently, all those who are in the same situation can demand identical advantages. One of the guiding principles of the public service not stated in article 4 of the General Law of Public Administration is its mandatory nature, since it would be useless to affirm that they must be continuous, regular, uniform, and general if the providing subject does not have the obligation to provide it. The public administration providing the public service cannot choose its clientele or users; it must provide it to anyone who requires it...". CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE, vote number 2003-11382, San José, at fifteen hours and eleven minutes on the seventh of October of two thousand three. In summary, from the Constitutional and legal point of view, it is the obligation of Nombre112175 to provide the drinking water service, regardless of whether it is a natural or legal person; although the Constitutional Chamber, in the Amparo Remedies filed by the representative of the plaintiff's company, which were denied for being a matter of mere legality, the Chamber considering that it involved a legal person. However, according to what is indicated in the rulings of the same Constitutional Chamber, it is derived that drinking water is a precious good, since it is indispensable for any human activity (industrial, agricultural, domestic, commercial, services, etc.). From that perspective, and in light of the rules of logic and human experience, Nombre112175 had the legal duty to supply drinking water to the plaintiff company, unless it had proven some exemption from liability that would have prevented that duty, which was not verified in this litigation. It is not superfluous to indicate that for a long time constitutional jurisprudence was oriented to point out that legal persons did not possess fundamental rights, a posture that has varied in recent years, insofar as this type of person is nothing more than a conglomerate of persons, with a collective interest. In any case, even considering the possibility of the non-existence of a constitutional right to water (which we reject outright), the legal duty is indisputable in the terms set forth. **2.** Inactivity of Nombre112175 in providing potable water service to the plaintiff company. </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">From the foregoing perspective, public entities must provide citizens with solutions to the problems that arise in society. The problem is posed or arises when the citizen, as an active subject, does not find the required response and activity from that obligated Administration; under those circumstances, the injured person is left completely unprotected against administrative arbitrariness, which, due to its omission, has become an unlawful dysfunction. Taking into account the circumstances and details of the process, the failure to supply potable water to the plaintiff </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">violates constitutional principles, and implies, in turn, another dysfunctionality that renders effective judicial protection as a prestational right void. The foregoing agrees with what was ordered by the First Chamber in vote number 584-F-2005, indicating that abnormality can manifest itself through malfunctioning; delayed functioning, or a total absence of functioning. Whenever the victim has no duty to bear the injury, it becomes unlawful, due to impairment to a third party against the legal order. Thus, if there is no duty to bear the injury (understood as the final ablative consequence of the public conduct), it is because the Administration should have prevented it, or, otherwise and under certain circumstances, assume the reparatory consequences of that which it could not prevent.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">This then produces </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101\">the breach of the duty of patrimonial indemnity</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">, and to that extent, the injury to the victim's legal sphere must be deemed unlawful, and therefore, subject to mandatory reparation. In this Court's judgment, this is what happened in this case, where the defendant Institute had a duty to supply potable water within a reasonable timeframe, and did not do so. This conclusion was reached, taking into account and considering that since October 2009, the plaintiff requested potable water service for its commercial business, and it was not until 2012 that said service was granted, logically after the lawsuit had been filed in court (proven by the service order document visible on folio 41 and the statements contained in the DVD of the preliminary hearing). From that perspective, the unlawful conduct arises as a product of an administrative dysfunction, because there is no demonstrated reason attributable to nature or third parties that prevented the supply of the resource, and for this Court, the defendant entity did indeed have the necessary conditions to provide potable water to the plaintiff, and it was rather due to an internal administrative decision, which has no support in our legal system, by failing to provide an essential service such as the supply of potable water. Hence, that administrative conduct singularly affected the plaintiff company, causing economic damage that the issuer of that conduct must indemnify. It is worth revisiting what was previously noted: if the affectation had been a consequence of the time necessary to make modifications and adaptations to the service, we could well speak of an assumption of special sacrifice or strict liability; but in this case, not a single element was provided to establish that the fulfillment of public duties was sought. Therefore, by basic deductive inference, we are in the presence of abnormal behavior, as a basis for deriving liability. </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold\">3. Based on the ideas expressed</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">, we will analyze the claim, which was the subject of the adversarial debate in the oral and public hearing, which is the claim for payment of damages and losses for the period between June 2009 and September 2012, as a result of the failure to supply potable water by the defendant Institute. </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold\">Regarding the accreditation of the claimed damages. </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">From the evidence in the case file, such as official letter SUB-G-GSP-DRB-CPZ-0913-2010, dated November 16, 2010, it is accredited that the representative of the plaintiff company requested, on November 2, 2009, through service availability order No. 13874716, three services for commercial premises in the name of Electrónica Leyden S.A. Despite the fact that through official letter RB-CPZ-2009-0869 dated December 23, 2009, it was communicated to them</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> that due to the water supply deficit facing the Pérez Zeledón area, and foreseeing that no deterioration would be caused to clients who have had potable water service for years, AYA is forced to suspend the granting of water availability for commercial premises. This Court considers that the Institute's reasoning does not constitute valid causes to deny the requested potable water service, at least not for the time under consideration. Especially when taking into account relevant aspects such as that </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">it corresponds to the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados to provide the inhabitants of the Republic with potable water service, thus being an essential service, which natural or legal persons have the right to obtain; likewise,</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> on </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">July 6, 2009, AYA stamped the construction plan, certifying that there is an aqueduct in use in front of this property. Furthermore, if we examine the arguments given by the Institute's representation to deny the water supply, in which it states that institutional directive Memorandum No. RB-DOM-2008-148, dated April 18, 2008, indicates that instructions have been given to suspend the granting of availability for new non-residential services (vertical condominiums, warehouses, commercial premises, apartments, etc...), (see official letter on folios 104-105), it can be deduced from the foregoing that there is no justification for why the plaintiff was not warned when she applied for the service at a later date (October 2009) that potable water service had been suspended for commercial premises. Another piece of evidence invoked by the Institute in its defense is the study dated July 31, 2004, by CONCESA, which issued results through the formulation of several documents called "Diagnostic Report," "Alternatives Report," and two annexes, which indicate a deficit in potable water flow for the year 2005, requiring Nombre112175 to implement better integrated watershed management for water conservation. Regarding infrastructure, they recommended a topographic survey of supply sources, repair of the dam on the Río Quebrada, a new conduction line from another intake on the San Ramón River to the Water Treatment Plants, improvements to the current water treatment plants, wells, pumping stations, chlorination stations, replacement of the existing potable water distribution network in the San Isidro district with its respective boxes and valves, improvement of potable water supply tanks, namely: Fallas and Pepe Tanks, San Luis Tank, University Tank, and Los Chiles Tank. Note that this report is from 2005. Therefore, one must think that if the AYA officials had known for years that there were problems with potable water, why was the plaintiff not informed when submitting the plan for its respective processing? In addition to the above, one could then admit a lack of planning by the Institute, since they had known since 2005 that there was a potable water shortage.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\"> Moreover, where is the accreditation of the works carried out to mitigate the situation and affect users as little as possible? Again, we find ourselves with issues that should have been proven, but there is no attempt whatsoever to demonstrate them. But even taking into account what was previously stated by the representatives of the public entity, this Court infers that these are not sufficient and valid reasons for not granting potable water service to the plaintiff company, as we would be in the presence of abnormal functioning on the part of the Administration by failing to provide an indispensable service. That is why "one speaks of inactivity in the face of the omission (total or partial) of active conduct, the deployment of which, from a legal standpoint, corresponds to the Public Administration. In other words, this concerns those cases in which the public entity or body does not carry out that activity to which it is obligated, either by a norm or by a self-binding act. It is, then, a matter of giving or doing on the part of the Administration, in which it must provide the administered party with the activity or service corresponding to them..." La Justicia Administrativa, González Camacho Oscar, 1st ed, San José, C.R. IJSA, January 2002, p.42. </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">Thus, this Court has no doubt about the abnormal functioning incurred by the defendant Institute, due to the failure to supply the water resource to the company. From that legal perspective, it is determined that as a consequence of that omission, an unlawful injury was produced</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">, thus operating a liability for abnormal functioning, which is, of course, indemnifiable. To reinforce the foregoing thesis, the Constitutional Chamber has highlighted the importance of the principles of effectiveness and efficiency, whose holders are the administered parties, and which it called the fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services. Indeed, in judgment No.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">2004-05207, at fourteen hours and fifty-five minutes on May eighteenth, two thousand four, it detailed that: "…The Political Constitution enshrines an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered parties to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of numerals, interpreted a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the Fundamental Law, insofar as they collect, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function, such as the 'proper functioning of services and administrative dependencies,' 'good governance,' and</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\"> 'efficiency of the administration.' This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act, in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services, efficiently and effectively, and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly collected the principle of liability of public administrations, which, as such, should serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter to interpret, apply, integrate, and delimit the entire legal system..." This atypical or unnamed individual guarantee is accentuated in the case of essential public services such as the supply of potable water. (See in this regard judgment number 2003-11222 at 17:48 hrs. on September 30, 2003). It must be emphasized that the judge's conviction to validate or not testimonial or documentary evidence is the exclusive purview of their jurisdictional independence, the exercise of reason, and respect for the legitimacy of the evidentiary catalog. In that sense, the plaintiff company managed to demonstrate with serviceable and useful evidence, such as documentary evidence, which supports the testimonial evidence that, as a result of that abnormal event emitted by AYA, it suffered economic losses by having to use other means to supply potable water. This is recounted by witness Nombre112177</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">and Roger Mata Arias. Conversely, the representation of Nombre112175 could not accredit with suitable evidence any exemption from liability, or disqualify the causal link between the omission </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic; color:#010101\">-the supply of potable water</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">- and the harmful result suffered by the plaintiff. All of this, necessarily resorting to logical deductions, leads us to confirm the thesis presented by the plaintiff in her claim. Therefore, in light of the rules of logic and human experience, from the entire evidentiary catalog, both testimonial and documentary, sufficient elements of conviction emerge to conclude with the required degree of certainty that, at its core, the factual hypothesis presented by the plaintiff is plausible and was duly accredited in this process. On the other hand, the thesis presented by the defendant lacks serviceable evidence to discredit the hypothesis presented by the plaintiff. That is, the defendant entity failed to observe that burden, as it did not provide suitable evidentiary material to prove, in an indubitable manner, that the failure to provide potable water service was due to some technical impediment or some exemption from liability stipulated in our legal system. Therefore, it has been rightly said that within the judicial process, it is elementary that the parties asserting facts as the basis for their right or defense provide the judge with sufficient evidence to achieve the necessary conviction for the adoption of the respective decision. Without evidence, the Judge cannot reconstruct the facts under debate, cannot verify the parties' assertions, nor can they give content to the law invoked. In the case before us, the defendant Institute has failed in that duty, as it did not provide the necessary and suitable evidence to accredit its arguments set forth in the opposition to the claim. Note that the study on the potable water supply deficit in the district of San Isidro and surrounding areas dates from 2005, and the decision to suspend the supply of potable water to commercial businesses was not made until 2008. Therefore, for the reasons stated, they lead this Chamber to the conviction regarding the veracity of the essential facts alleged as the factual basis of the claim. Thus, it is concluded that the balance must tip in favor of the thesis presented by the plaintiff company. Consequently, on the merits of the foregoing, we proceed to condemn the </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">to pay the economic damages incurred by the plaintiff company in supplying potable water during the period between October</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> 2009 and September 2012, </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">as this was the only proven fact during this process. However, the</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">condemnation is made in the abstract, and its quantification is reserved for the execution of judgment phase, where the plaintiff must demonstrate with suitable evidence the quantum of those economic damages. It is done in the abstract because the evidence provided by the plaintiff and other evidence is not conclusive in determining damages other than the patrimonial expense incurred by the plaintiff in supplying potable water during the period from October 2009 to September 2012. It should be noted that the condemnation for economic damages is in accordance with the provisions of numeral 190 of the General Public Administration Law, which provides that the State and its entities shall be liable for all damages caused by their legitimate or illegitimate, normal, or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or an act of a third party. In this way, the party causing the damage shall compensate it unless they demonstrate some exonerating cause. Note that the documentary evidence provided by the plaintiff, admitted in the oral and public trial, enumerated as the general statement regarding a credit operation carried out at the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, visible on folios 149-159 of the judicial file, is a document that merely recounts a bank loan obtained by the plaintiff company. Therefore, in our consideration, it is not suitable evidence to demonstrate the claimed damages and losses; similarly, the certification by the Private Accountant, Mr. Vidal Callejas Escobar, visible on folios 159-173, detailing that the plaintiff generates its income from the repair and sale of white goods spare parts, in the periods of October 2008 and September 2012, is not, in the opinion of this Chamber, useful evidence, as it bears no direct relationship to what is disputed in this process. The same fate befalls the 20 photographs provided by the plaintiff. In reality, the testimonial evidence, such as the account of witness Nombre112176</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; color:#010101\">, who affirmed that the commercial premises were using water from adjacent properties, and, on the other hand, Roger Mata Arias, who indicated that the potable water was solved by another means—he hauled water from a well about 20 meters behind Nombre112174's house, and the distance between the commercial premises and the plaintiff's representative's house was 8 kilometers—he also affirmed that there were problems with the construction of the work. Witness Lenin Fernández Badilla stated that his role was to haul water for the business; he would take his pickup truck to Nombre112174's house and carry the water drums to the plaintiff's business, which was in 2010. Nombre112174 paid him ¢15,000 for each water trip he made; he made 4 or 5 trips per month and stopped hauling water in September 2012 (see testimonial evidence collected in the oral and public trial hearing, contained in electronic format) and documentary evidence offered by both parties, is what accredits the economic damages suffered by the plaintiff company as a result of the denial of potable water supply by AYA.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-weight:bold; color:#010101\">X.- Regarding damages in the concrete:</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> Evidently, in a process of this nature, the claiming party is obligated to prove not only the right but must also demonstrate, as it is incumbent upon them, the damages they claim, adjusted to the proper causal relationship. It is not enough for a subject to claim they have the truth, as the law itself obligates them to demonstrate, </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; text-decoration:underline\">through the admitted means of evidence, those assertions of the facts constitutive of their right</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">, even when it comes to aspects of damages caused; there is no doubt that they must equally demonstrate that they were caused to an asset of their patrimony. Doctrine has pointed out that regarding the claim for damages made by the litigant, they must necessarily establish the conclusive factual assumptions to evidence a causal relationship. In the present case, the plaintiff could not demonstrate the claimed damages, as it is not evident from the documentary and testimonial evidence in the case file that the plaintiff company actually suffered the intended damages effectively due to the failure to supply potable water in the period from October 2009 to September 2012. In this case, the plaintiff, in compliance with canon three hundred seventeen of the Civil Procedure Code applicable to the matter in accordance with article two hundred twenty of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, was obligated not only to prove the existence of the damage and its relationship with its counterparty, in addition to its illegitimacy, which it indeed did, but also the scope or quantum thereof.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> Regarding this last aspect, the statements rendered, while allowing the derivation of the existence of the possible damage, do not allow the establishment of its concrete content. Evidently, technical or documentary evidence, based on concrete financial data, is the suitable evidence on the matter, which was never offered. In this framework, recognition in the concrete is impossible.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> However, to what has been stated, article one hundred twenty of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, in safeguarding effective judicial protection, allows the recognition in the abstract of the right so that, in the judgment execution stage, the amount of the affectation can be established in the concrete.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> Therefore, the Chamber opts for that mechanism of remitting to the execution of judgment for the concrete establishment of the damage suffered, always with the guidelines indicated as to how that damage must be proven. Meanwhile, regarding non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), it has been established in doctrine that it arises from the injury to an extra-patrimonial right and presupposes an unjust disturbance of the conditions of the person affected by it. The plaintiff indicated at the oral and public trial that non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) was caused to the plaintiff company due to Nombre112175's refusal to grant the potable water supply. This aspect is resolved. It must be understood that non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) is encompassed within damages in general. If the plaintiff claims objective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral objetivo), it is rejected as they did not provide suitable evidence to accredit said impairment.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> It would be damage to the general image of the company, which affected its economic capacity, aspects on which there is no element of conviction whatsoever. " </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">Objective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral objetivo), contrary to the former (referring to subjective non-pecuniary damage, daño moral subjetivo), requires the corresponding demonstration. As stated in the preceding section, it refers to the injury to an extra-patrimonial right that generates valuable economic consequences. That is, it is that suffered by the person in their social context, and not in the individual sphere. Hence, </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline\">it is necessary to demonstrate how the damage occurred, and it is indispensable to accredit, in addition to the causal relationship, its existence, corresponding, under the shelter of numeral 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, to the party requesting it, to provide sufficient supporting evidence.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana; font-style:italic\">” </span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">(First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 226-F-S1-2008 at 15:26 hours on March 14, 2008; the underlined points are ours.). Regarding subjective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral subjetivo), several clarifications are necessary. As is known, this type of damage is the suffering, the affectation in the emotional state that individuals present following a particular event.</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Verdana\"> Historically, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and this jurisdiction have predominantly held that only natural persons can experience suffering. It cannot be forgotten that the representatives, officials, and shareholders of a company are what their name says: structures within the same entity; but they do not constitute the entity itself. Representatives cannot be confused with the legal person. In this framework and on the stated bases, the Court cannot establish the existence of subjective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral subjetivo) chargeable to the company Electrónica Leyden S.A. As a consequence of the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare lack of right on this point.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold\">XI.- Regarding the defenses:</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt\"> The defense of expiry (caducidad) was raised, which must be rejected, as the plaintiff's final claim is solely for the payment of damages and losses. Thus, from an appropriate interpretation, the claim for damages and losses is not susceptible to the defense of expiry (caducidad), since, for a long time, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has been </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101\">clarifying that: "Articles 2 subsection c) and 3 of the Regulatory Law of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction in truth establish the so-called unification of channels. However, it is true that the civil treasury process (proceso civil de hacienda) presents its own differentiating characteristics with respect to the purely administrative dispute. In the civil treasury process, for example, what relates to the nullity of acts of the Administration is not ventilated, which characterizes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. In the former, what is discussed relates to the liability of the Administration, arising from its functioning (article 190 and following of the General Public Administration Law). According to doctrine, in the civil treasury process, one cannot speak of expiry (caducidad) regarding the filing of the action. There, the ordinary prescription of private law operates. Furthermore, since the nullity of administrative acts is not debated in it, the prior requirement of exhausting administrative channels is not necessary,</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; color:#010101\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-family:Verdana; font-size:10pt; color:#010101\">(number 66-1997, at fifteen hours forty-five minutes on July twenty-third, nineteen ninety-seven). Therefore, the party confuses an institute typical of the nullity process (expiry, caducidad) by applying it to a civil treasury case, which, under article one hundred ninety-eight, presents a statute of limitations period. It is not superfluous to add that, in this second scenario, the legal time period would not have elapsed either.</span> Since this is a claim for damages, the parameter must be numeral 198 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), and if we only take the date of December 23, 2009, when the plaintiff's representative was notified of the denial of potable water, to the date the lawsuit was served on AYA, June 7, 2012, visible at folio 15 bis, the four-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period has not yet elapsed. Regarding the lack of right (falta de derecho) that was consistently invoked by the defendant, even though it was not presented in the express terms of the technical term, it is the Court's opinion that it must be upheld with respect to the claimed subjective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral subjetivo), as it lacks regulatory support; and rejected with respect to the pecuniary damage (daño material), as its existence has been proven.

**XII.- Regarding indexation (indexación):** It is imposed ex officio in accordance with article one hundred twenty-three of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). It is a recognition of the loss of the purchasing power of money. If not granted, the plaintiff would be receiving less money (with respect to its purchasing power), so that on the items established in the abstract, the indexation (indexación) will begin to run from the finality of the ruling that sets them and until final payment.

**XIII.- On costs (costas):** In accordance with ordinals 119, 193 and 194 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), it is necessary to resolve this process, ordering the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados to pay both costs (costas), this in application of the general principle of condemning the losing party and because in this case, the circumstances that allow exempting it from this payment are not present, according to numeral 194 of the cited Code.

**POR TANTO:** The extraprocedural settlement (satisfacción extraprocesal) existing between the parties regarding the supply of water service in favor of the plaintiff company since September of last year is accepted. The exceptions of lack of expiration (falta de caducidad) and statute of limitations (prescripción) are rejected. The lack of right (falta de derecho) is partially upheld and consequently the action filed by the company Electrónica Leyden S.A is partially granted, it being understood as denied in everything that is not expressly accepted. Consequently, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados is ordered to pay for the economic damages incurred by the plaintiff company due to the absence of potable water supply, for the period from October 2009 to September 2012, a sum that will be determined in the judgment execution (ejecución de sentencia) stage with suitable evidence, as well as the recognition of indexation (indexación) in accordance with Article 123 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) from the finality of the judgment that sets them concretely and until their final payment. In all other respects, the lawsuit is dismissed. Both costs (costas) are the responsibility of the losing party.

**Rolando Porras Mejías** **Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez** **Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo** PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR: ELECTRÓNICA LEYDEN. S.A CONTRA: A Y A

PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR(A): ELECTRÓNICA LEYDEN. S.A.

CONTRA: INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS No 29-2013-IV TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN CUARTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. GOICOECHEA. Dirección01 , a las dieciséis horas con quince minutos del veintidós de marzo del dos mil trece.

Proceso de conocimiento establecido por ELECTRÓNICA LEYDEN, S.A, representada por Nombre112174 , mayor, empresario, cédula de identidad número CED88739 - - , vecino de Pérez Zeledón de San José contra el INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS, (en adelante AYA), representado por la Licenciada Adilia Campos Vargas, mayor, cédula de identidad No. CED88740 - - , vecina de Tibás. Intervienen en este proceso los Licenciados Fausto Eduardo Gutiérrez Howell y Carlos Rodríguez Rescia, como abogados de la compañía actora. Expediente número 12-000881-1027-CA R E S U L T A N D O Primero. Que la compañía Electrónica Leyden, S.A, plantea formal demanda contencioso administrativa con el fin de que en sentencia lo que el Tribunal resume en los siguientes puntos, se declare: 1. Declare con lugar la demanda, declarando que el Nombre112175 no ha querido brindar el servicio y que se le obligue a otorgarlo. 2. Se condene al Nombre112175 al pago de los daños y perjuicios. 3. Se condene al Nombre112175 al pago de las costas . 4. Se condene al Nombre112175 al pago de los daños y perjuicios con respecto al lapso transcurrido en el cual no se tuvo el acueducto público, (folio 134).

Segundo. El Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, contestó la demanda en forma negativa, argumentó lo que el Tribunal entiende como una falta de derecho e interpuso la excepción de prescripción y caducidad, solicitó además se declare sin lugar en todos sus extremos, la presente demanda y la condena en ambas costas a la parte actora, (folios 27-39).

Tercero. Que en la audiencia preliminar se ajustó la pretensión solamente al pago de los daños y perjuicios, con respecto al lapso transcurrido en el cual no se tuvo el acueducto público. En la audiencia de juicio oral y público se limitó solamente al período comprendido entre el mes de junio 2009 a septiembre del 2012 para los efectos indemnizatorios ya señalados; toda vez que después de la última fecha se había dado la instalación del suministro del servicio.

Cuarto. Que el juicio oral y público fue realizado el día diecinueve de marzo del dos mil trece y dentro del contradictorio, se recibieron los testimonios de los señores Nombre112176 , Nombre112175 , y como prueba para mejor resolver el testimonio de los señores Nombre112177 y Roger Mata Arias.

Quinto. Que no se observan vicios capaces de generar indefensión a las partes.

Sexto. Se procede a dictar esta sentencia POR UNANIMIDAD y conforme lo dispone el artículo ciento once del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y cuarenta y siete párrafo segundo del Reglamento Autónomo de Servicio de la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa de Trámite complejo, previa deliberación.

Redacta el juez Porras Mejías, y

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Cuestiones previas a considerar. Que por parte de la actora se da una satisfacción procesal en la pretensión en la que pidió que se declare que el Nombre112175 no había querido brindar el servicio y que se le obligue a otorgarlo. En lo que al caso corresponde, el servicio en particular ya fue suministrado hecho manifestado por ambas partes y presuntamente ocurrido para el mes de septiembre de dos mil doce. Al haberse satisfecho el interés de las partes, la Cámara omite cualquier pronunciamiento sobre el particular, batando con aceptar la solución alterna del conflicto en tanto satisface los requisitos legales al efecto.

II.- Prueba para mejor resolver: En la audiencia oral se admitió como prueba para mejor resolver de conformidad con el ordinal 50.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, la documentación que rola de folios 149 a 173 de los autos y el testimonio de Nombre112177 y Roger Mata Arias.

III.- HECHOS PROBADOS: De relevancia para dirimir este litigio, se han demostrado los siguientes hechos: 1) Que en el mes de octubre del 2009, el representante de la actora solicitó al AYA, tres previstas de agua potable en la localidad de Palmares de Pérez Zeledón, cien metros sur del Banco Nacional, para un edificio de locales comerciales), (ver documentos a folios 40-43), 2) Que el día 6 de julio del 2009, el AYA, le pone un sello al plano de construcción, con una leyenda que indicaba: "...ICAA, Región Brunca Departamento de Ingeniería. Hace constar que si existe Acueducto en uso al frente de esta propiedad. Se previene a las autoridades competentes que este sello no implica disponibilidad de agua y alcantarillado sanitario ni que se pueda dar el servicio antes debe cumplir con los requisitos de ley...", (ver plano y contestación de la medida cautelar y demanda a folios 11-39), 3) Que en la zona del conflicto existía un problema de suministro de agua, desde varios meses antes del conflicto que nos ocupa; aún cuando existía capacidad hidráulica (capacidad de los tubos) (hecho no controvertido según se extrae de las manifestaciones de ambas pares). 4) Que por oficio RB-DOM-2008-148, con fecha 18 de abril del 2008, el Jefe de operaciones y mantenimiento de la Región Brunca, indica que: "mediante reunión sostenida el 15 de abril, se ha discutido el tema entre el Lic. Guillermo Sánchez Solís, Lic. Fernando Bonilla O, el jefe del Área Comercial Didier Murillo y el suscrito, además, esto se ha analizado con el Ing. Javier Valverde y se ha instruido al suscrito para que se suspenda el otorgamiento de disponibilidad de nuevos servicios no domiciliares (condominios verticales, bodegas, locales comerciales, apartamentos, etc...". (ver oficio a folios 104-105), 5) "Que mediante oficio RB-CPZ-2009-0889 de fecha 23 de diciembre se le comunica al señor Nombre112174 que debido al déficit en el abastecimiento de agua que enfrenta la zona de Pérez Zeledón, y previendo que los clientes que cuentan con el servicio de agua potable, años atrás, no se les cause deterioro en el mismo, el AYA, se ve obligado a suspender el otorgamiento de disponibilidad de agua, locales comerciales...", (ver oficio GSP-DRB-CPZ-4463-2012, con fecha 12-6-2012, folios 98-103), 6) Que el día 31 de julio del 2004, CONCESA emitió los resultados del "informe de Diagnóstico", "Informe de alternativas" y dos anexos. En el mismo establecieron las condiciones actuales de los sistemas, en el distrito centro de Pérez Zeledón y lugares aledaños, así como las medidas requeridas para subsanar los deterioros en la infraestructura actual de agua potable. Señalaron los expertos un déficit en el caudal de agua potable para el 2005 de 32 litros por segundo en máxima demanda horaria, debiendo realizar Nombre112175 en materia de cuencas un mejor manejo integral para la conservación del agua. En cuanto infraestructura, recomendaron levantamiento topográfico de las fuentes de abastecimiento, reparación de la presa en el Río Quebrada, nueva línea de conducción desde otra captación en el río San Ramón a las Plantas Potalizadoras, mejoras a las actuales plantas potalizadoras, pozos, estaciones de bombeo, estaciones de cloración, sustitución de la red de distribución de agua potable existente en el Distrito San Isidro con sus respectivas cajas y válvulas, mejora de los tanques de abastecimiento de agua potable, a saber: Tanques Fallas y Pepe, tanque de San Luis, tanque de la Universidad y tanque de los Chiles...", (ver escrito de la contestación de la demanda 27-39). 7) Que la demandada logró solventar el problema de la capacidad de agua en la zona para mediados del año dos mil siete (hecho no controvertido). 8) Que a la sociedad actora se le suministró el servicio de agua a partir del mes de septiembre de dos mil doce (hecho no controvertido, ver también las fotografías que al efecto aportó el mismo actor). 9) Que el suministro de agua se debió a que se incrementó la capacidad de agua en las tuberías de la zona (hecho no controvertido). 10) Que la sociedad actora presentó afectación económica a partir de la ausencia del suministrado de agua entre el período comprendido de octubre del 2009 a septiembre del 2012, (ver prueba documental que consta en autos y el testimonio de Nombre112176 , Nombre112175 , Nombre112177 y Roger Mata Arias).

IV.- Hechos no probados.Ante la ausencia o insuficiencia de elementos probatorios se tiene como tales los siguientes: 1. La fecha a partir de la cual existía un problema de suministro de agua en la zona en la cual el actor solicitó las servicios base del problema (no existe prueba en ese sentido), 2. No demostró la representación del AYA, que durante el tiempo que no logró suministrar de agua al actor haya realizado de manera ágil, oportuna y expedita, las diferentes gestiones necesarias para garantizar el servicio público (no existe prueba en ese sentido), 3. No demostró el AYA, algún eximente de responsabilidad para no cumplir con el suministro de agua potable a la actora, (no lo acreditó con alguna prueba). 4. No demostró la empresa actora la existencia de algún perjuicio o daño moral por el no suministro de agua potable, (no hay prueba en ese sentido).

V.- Postura y pruebas de la compañía Electrónica Leyden, S.A. 1.Dentro de este proceso de conocimiento, la compañía actora, pretende se declare en sentencia: que el Nombre112175 le pague los daños y perjuicios con respecto al lapso transcurrido en el cual no tuvo acueducto público, entre el período comprendido del mes de junio del 2009 a septiembre del 2012. 2. Para comprobar lo anterior, la empresa actora, presenta prueba documental y testimonial, (ver expediente administrativo subsumido en el expediente judicial, acta y video de la audiencia oral y pública). 3. Postura y pruebas del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados. El representante del AYA, niega la responsabilidad que se le atribuye, argumenta que el servicio de agua ya fue suministrado, y que no se había otorgado antes por no disponibilidad en el área de capacidad de nuevos servicios, en su defensa, presenta prueba documental, y testimonial, (ver contestación de la demanda a folios 27-39).

VI.- Sobre la necesidad del agua potable para el consumo humano. Ha indicado la Sala Constitucional, que: “Nuestra Constitución Política, en su artículo 50, enuncia el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, el cual se logra, entre otros factores, a través de la protección y conservación de la calidad y cantidad del agua para consumo y uso humano y para mantener el equilibrio ecológico en los hábitats de la flora y la fauna (v. gr. humedales) y, en general, de la biosfera como patrimonio común de la humanidad. Del mismo modo, el acceso al agua potable asegura los derechos a la vida –“sin agua no hay vida posible” afirma la Carta del Agua aprobada por el Consejo de Europa en Estrasburgo el 6 de mayo de 1968-, a la salud de las personas –indispensable para su alimento, bebida e higiene- (artículo 21 de la Constitución Política) y, desde luego, está asociado al desarrollo y crecimiento socio-económico de los pueblos para asegurarle a cada individuo un bienestar y una calidad de vida dignos (artículo 33 de la Constitución Política y 11 del Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos). Voto de la Sala Constitucional, 1256-2006, del 8 febrero 2006. Este voto nos relata la esencialidad del recurso hídrico, el cual es mencionado en instrumentos internacionales de 1968 e instancias internacionales como el concejo de Estrasburgo, donde se destaca la relevancia del mismo para el desarrollo y la vida humana. En este mismo voto, se establece de la Declaración de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente Humano, Estocolmo, 1972, donde se vuelve a reafirmar la importancia del recurso hídrico para la humanidad: “En otro orden de ideas, actualmente, se ha reconocido el deber de preservar, para las generaciones futuras, unas condiciones de existencia al menos iguales a las heredadas (desarrollo sostenible), por lo que las necesidades del presente, deben ser satisfechas sin comprometer la capacidad de las futuras generaciones para hacerlo con las propias (Principio 2 de la Declaración de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente Humano, Estocolmo, 1972). En esencia, el agua, desde un punto de vista económico y ecológico, es un bien preciado, puesto que, es indispensable para cualquier actividad humana (industrial, agrícola, doméstica, comercial, servicios etc.), como fuente de energía, materia prima, vía de transporte, soporte de actividades recreativas y elemento constitutivo para el mantenimiento de los ecosistemas naturales –uso del agua no contaminante o compatible con el ambiente-.” Voto de la Sala Constitucional, 1256-2006, del ocho de febrero del 2006. También ha dicho la Sala que los principios constitucionales, que conforman lo dispuesto en artículos 21 y 33 de nuestra Constitución Política, no sólo comprenden el deber del Estado de respetar la vida humana y el de su protección ante la acción de terceros, sino también, la garantía a un modo digno de vida, para el que deben procurarse los recursos necesarios, que lo hagan posible pues aquel derecho no puede circunscribirse al de mera subsistencia; encontrándose dentro de esos recursos, precisamente el agua.” Voto de la Sala Constitucional No. 1853-03, del cinco de marzo del 2003. La Constitución Política en el artículo ciento veintiuno inciso catorce, señala: " (...) Además de las otras atribuciones que le confiere esta Constitución, corresponde exclusivamente a la Asamblea Legislativa: (...) 14) Decretar la enajenación o la aplicación a usos públicos de los bienes propios de la Nación (...)". Esta disposición constitucional ha sido desarrollada en el Código Civil, en los artículos doscientos sesenta y uno al doscientos sesenta y tres; el primero de ellos indica: "Son cosas públicas las que, por ley, están destinadas de un modo permanente a cualquier servicio de utilidad general, y aquellas de que todos pueden aprovecharse por estar entregadas al uso público. Todas las demás cosas son privadas y objeto de propiedad particular, aunque pertenezcan al Estado o a los Municipios, quienes para el caso, como personas civiles, no se diferencian de cualquier otra persona". Por su parte el canon siguiente agrega: "Las cosas públicas están fuera del comercio; y no podrán entrar en él, mientras legalmente no se disponga así, separándolas del uso público a que estaban destinadas". Así, como dominio público se entiende el conjunto de bienes sujeto a un régimen jurídico especial y distinto al que rige el dominio privado, que además de pertenecer o estar bajo la administración de personas jurídicas públicas, están afectados o destinados a fines de utilidad pública y que se manifiesta en el uso directo o indirecto que toda persona pueda hacer de ellos. Conforme la normativa citada, el Estado posee tanto bienes de dominio público, como privado; los bienes públicos son aquéllos a los cuales una ley les da un destino para uso público o general, se les denomina "demaniales" y son inalienables, imprescriptibles, inembargables e indenunciables. La lógica de los bienes públicos es que su dominio antecede al Estado mismo, de suerte que son de La Nación en cuanto requisito para la convivencia en sociedad, El Estado se limita a administrarlo, lo que como regla de principio impide que puedan salir de la esfera pública. Es decir, afectados por su propia naturaleza y vocación (Ver Sala Constitucional, voto 2306-91 de las 14:45 horas del 6 de noviembre de 1991). Se dice que son de La Nación es cuando que el Estado se limita a su resguardo y protección, sin que en principio pueda disponer de ellos. Estos bienes se encuentran fuera del comercio de los hombres y consecuentemente tienen una naturaleza y régimen jurídico diverso de los bienes privados –los cuales se rigen por el derecho de propiedad en los términos del artículo 45 de la Constitución Política–, en tanto, por expresa voluntad del legislador o por su misma esencia se encuentran afectos a un destino especial de servir a la comunidad, sea al interés público, y que por ello, no pueden ser objeto de propiedad privada, por lo cual, no pueden pertenecer individualmente a los particulares, ni al Estado, en sentido estricto, por cuanto éste se limita a su administración y tutela. Así, lo que define la naturaleza jurídica de los bienes demaniales es su destino, en tanto se afectan y están al servicio del uso público, según lo ha reconocido la doctrina en la materia, así, Nombre33033, Miguel S., en su obra Tratado de Derecho Administrativo (Tomo V. Abeledo-Perrot. Buenos Aires. 1992., pag. 25), consideró: "Para que un bien o cosa sea considerado como dependencia del dominio público, y sea sometido al régimen pertinente, es menester que dicho bien o cosa estén afectados al «uso público», directo o indirecto, debiendo tratarse, en este «último» supuesto, de cosas afectadas directamente -como «bienes finales» o «bienes de uso»- a la utilidad o comodidad común, quedando excluidos de la dominialidad de los bienes el Estado que revistan carácter simplemente instrumental." Por otra parte, los bienes privados del Estado, se regularan por el derecho privado con elementos propios del derecho público. Estos bienes, si están dentro del comercio de los hombres; pueden ser traspasados, apropiados, y no son imprescriptibles; por ende, son susceptibles de usucapión en beneficio de particulares, de conformidad con el artículo doscientos sesenta y uno ya indicado. Nótese que el énfasis de la diferenciación se da en relación al destino del bien, sea, al hecho de estar afectos a un uso común o al servicio del bien común (ver Sala Constitucional en sentencia número 2301-91, de 6 de noviembre de 1991 mil novecientos noventa y uno y 2000-06903 de las 15:48 horas del 8 de agosto de 2000). Como ya se adelantó, por su especial naturaleza jurídica, presentan los siguientes atributos: son imprescriptibles, lo cual implica que por el transcurso del tiempo, no puede adquirirse el derecho de propiedad sobre ellos, ni siquiera de mera posesión, es decir, no pueden adquirirse mediante la usucapión, así como tampoco pueden perderse por prescripción; motivo por el cual los permisos de uso que la Administración conceda sobre ellos, siempre tienen un carácter precario, lo cual hace que puedan ser revocadas por motivos de oportunidad o conveniencia en cualquier momento por la Administración –en los términos previstos en los artículos 154 y 155 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública–; y las mismas concesiones que se otorguen sobre ellos para su aprovechamiento, pueden ser canceladas, mediante procedimiento al efecto; son inembargables, que hace que no pueden ser objeto de ningún gravamen o embargo, ni por particulares, ni por la Administración; y son inalienables, lo que se traduce en la condición de que están fuera del comercio de los hombres; de donde no pueden ser enajenados, vendidos o adquiridos, ni a título gratuito ni oneroso, ni por particulares, ni por el Estado, de modo que están excepcionados del comercio los hombres y sujetos a un régimen jurídico especial y reforzado. Además su uso y aprovechamiento está sujeto al poder de policía, en tanto, por tratarse de bienes que no pueden ser objeto de posesión, y mucho menos de propiedad, su utilización y aprovechamiento es posible únicamente a través de actos debidamente autorizados, sea mediante concesión o permiso de uso, otorgado por la autoridad competente; y al control constante de parte de la Administración Pública. Un bien público puede ser natural o artificial, según se trate de bienes declarados públicos por el legislador considerándolos en el estado en que la naturaleza los presenta u ofrece (un río por ejemplo), o de bienes declarados públicos por el legislador pero cuya creación o existencia depende de un hecho humano (construcción de una calle o un parque público, por ejemplo). La afectación es el hecho o la manifestación de voluntad del poder público, en cuya virtud la cosa queda incorporada al uso y goce de la comunidad y puede efectuarse por ley o por acto administrativo. La doctrina hace la distinción entre “asignación del carácter público” a un bien con la “afectación” de ese bien al dominio público. La asignación del carácter público significa establecer que ese bien determinado tendría calidad demanial; así, por ejemplo, la norma jurídica general diría que todas las vías públicas son integrantes o dependientes del dominio público y ello quiere decir que lo son las actuales y las que se lleguen a construir. En cambio, la afectación significa que el bien declarado dominical queda efectivamente incorporado al uso público y esto tiene que ver con la aceptación y recibo de obras públicas cuando se construyen por administración o por la conclusión de las obras y su recibo oficial, cuando es un particular el que las realiza (construcción de una urbanización o fraccionamiento, por ejemplo).- Es por esto que se dice que la afectación puede ser declarada por ley en forma genérica, o bien por un acto administrativo, el cual, necesariamente, deberá conformarse con la norma jurídica que le sirve de referencia (principio de legalidad). Como consecuencia de lo dicho en el punto anterior, es manifiesto que el régimen demanial es per se. Su existencia y publicidad se da con autonomía del Registro, sin que sea dable al titular registral alegar desconocimiento como medio para desvirtuarlo y contrarrestar la afectación. Los principios de inalienabilidad e imprescriptibilidad que caracterizan el dominio público impiden que en su contra pueda esgrimirse la figura del tercero registral para consolidar la propiedad privada ilícitamente sustraída de ese régimen. El demanio tiene publicidad legal y en muchos casos natural. Lo anterior va aparejado al principio de inmatriculación de los inmuebles componentes del dominio público, el cual cuenta con una publicidad material y no necesariamente formal o registral. Frente al dominio público, las detentaciones privadas adolecen de valor debilitado, por prolongadas que sean en el tiempo y aunque aparezcan amparadas por asientos del Registro de la Propiedad. La condición de bien de dominio público y uso público afecta a tercero, aunque tal cualidad no resulte del Registro de la Propiedad. Se trata de bienes que, por su naturaleza, no necesitan de la inscripción registral (Voto 019-2009-SVII, Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Séptima). Nótese, que dicho principio como excepción al principio de publicidad registral tiene su fundamento, en que los bienes de dominio público gozan de publicidad material y por ende no es necesaria su publicidad registral, en el tanto los bienes de dominio público por su naturaleza, no son sujetos a dicho instituto. Adicionalmente, existe la figura de la "desafectación", que se trata de "la situación jurídica por la que un bien deja de pertenecer al dominio público (...) los bienes que son desafectados se convierten, en principio, en bienes patrimoniales de la Administración titular, que, en su caso, podrá enajenarlos (...)"(voto 035-2009-SVII, Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo); situación que en sana lógica solo podría ocurrir en aquellos que han sido declarados como tales por ley, pues en los que su condición es intrínseca tal posibilidad resultaría vedada. Antes de orientar la argumentación más en concreto sobre el punto que nos ocupa, es manifiesto que cuando el bien demanial ha sido creado por un particular o representa una afectación especialmente intensa que no esta obligado a soportar este, dicho carácter no inhibe la obligación de asumir responsabilidad por parte de la Administración, a fin de permitir el equilibrio en las cargas públicas. Lo contrario llevaría aparejado un enriquecimiento injusto, que no presenta sustento dentro del ordenamiento patrio. Ahora bien, con ya se adelantó, respecto al agua, la Sala Constitucional, en voto n.° 5606-06, se reconoció la condición de derecho humano al señalar:

“VII.- El acceso al agua potable como derecho humano . Adicionalmente a lo señalado, y tal vez el aspecto más relevante en este tema, lo constituye la naturaleza y función del agua para la vida humana. No es necesario detallar aquí una explicación sobre la realidad evidente y notoria de que sin agua no puede haber vida, ni calidad de vida, y que por lo tanto, con ley o sin ley de nacionalización, por su propia esencia, este tema, no es ni puede ser un tema territorial o local. La propia Sala en su jurisprudencia constitucional ha dicho que el acceso al agua potable es un derecho humano fundamental, en cuanto se configura como un integrante del contenido del derecho a la salud y a la vida. (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL, sentencias números 534-96, 2728-91, 3891-93, 1108-96, 2002-06157 2002-10776; 2004-1923). Esta misma línea se ha mantenido en las sentencias 2003-04654 y 2004-07779, que en lo que interesa señalan: // ‘V.- // La Sala reconoce, como parte del Derecho de la Constitución , un derecho fundamental al agua potable, derivado de los derechos fundamentales a la salud, la vida, al medio ambiente, a la alimentación y la vivienda digna, entre otros, tal como ha sido reconocido también en instrumentos internacionales sobre Derechos Humanos aplicables en Costa Rica: así, figura explícitamente en la Convención sobre la Eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer (art. 14) y la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño (art. 24); además, se enuncia en la Conferencia Internacional sobre Población y el Desarrollo de El Cairo (principio 2), y se declara en otros numerosos del Derecho Internacional Humanitario. En nuestro Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, el país se encuentra particularmente obligado en esta materia por lo dispuesto en el artículo 11.1 del Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos en Materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (“Protocolo de San Salvador” de 1988), el cual dispone que: “Artículo 11. Derecho a un medio ambiente sano 1.-Toda persona tiene derecho a vivir en un medio ambiente sano y a contar con servicios públicos básicos’. La carencia de recursos no justifica el incumplimiento de los cometidos de las administraciones públicas en la prestación de este servicio básico. (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL, resoluciones 2003-04654 y 2004-007779). // Por su parte, como bien lo reconocen tanto la Procuraduría como el representante del Nombre112175 en sus informes, en el campo internacional también es mayoritario el reconocimiento del agua como derecho humano y como una pre-condición necesaria para todos nuestros derechos humanos. Se sostiene que sin el acceso equitativo a un requerimiento mínimo de agua potable, serían inalcanzables otros derechos establecidos -como el derecho a un nivel de vida adecuado para la salud y para el bienestar, así como de otros derechos civiles y políticos. En noviembre del 2002, el Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales de las Naciones Unidas afirmó que el acceso a cantidades adecuadas de agua limpia para uso doméstico y personal es un derecho humano fundamental de toda persona. Asimismo en el Comentario General No. 15 sobre el cumplimiento de los artículos 11 y 12 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, el Comité hizo notar que ‘el derecho humano al agua es indispensable para llevar una vida en dignidad humana. Es un pre-requisito para la realización de otros derechos humanos’. Se enfatiza también que los Estados miembros del Pacto Internacional tienen el deber de cumplir de manera progresiva, sin discriminación alguna, el derecho al agua, el cual da derecho a todos a gozar de agua suficiente, físicamente accesible, segura y aceptable para uso doméstico y personal. // Por su parte se han dado varias conferencias internacionales entre las que destaca la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Agua llevada a cabo en Mar de Plata en 1977 que reconoció que todos los pueblos tienen derecho al acceso a agua potable para satisfacer sus necesidades básicas. También, la Declaración sobre el Derecho al Desarrollo, adoptada por la Asamblea General de la ONU, de 1986 incluye un compromiso por parte de los Estados de asegurar la igualdad de oportunidades para todos para disfrutar de los recursos básicos. // El concepto de satisfacer las necesidades básicas de agua se fortaleció más durante la Cumbre de la Tierra de 1992 en Río de Janeiro. En la Agenda 21, los gobiernos acordaron que "al desarrollar y usar los recursos hídricos, debe darse prioridad a la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas y a la conservación de los ecosistemas. De igual forma, en el Plan de Implementación adoptado en la Cumbre de Johannesburgo en el 2002, los gobiernos se comprometieron a "emplear todos los instrumentos de políticas, incluyendo la regulación, el monitoreo..... y la recuperación de costos de los servicios de agua," sin que los objetivos de recuperación de costos se conviertan en una barrera para el acceso de la gente pobre al agua limpia. Asimismo existen decenas de instrumentos internacionales que directa e indirectamente tienen que ver con el agua como un derecho humano de todas las personas y pueblos, de tal forma que no sólo es un tema que por su naturaleza tiende a la nacionalización, sino a la internacionalización de su uso y aprovechamiento”.

Véase como más allá del sustento normativo, el carácter demanial del agua es una consecuencia necesaria del imperioso requerimiento que presenta para la vida humana, lo que lleva apajerado que el norte normativo interno se sustente en el artículo veintiuno constitucional. A nivel infra constitucional, su demaniabilidad viene regulada inicialmente en la Ley de Aguas, número 276, de veintiséis de agosto de mil novecientos cuarenta y dos:

"Artículo 1º.- Son aguas del dominio público: // I.- Las de los mares territoriales en la extensión y términos que fija el derecho internacional; // II.- Las de las lagunas y esteros de las playas que se comuniquen permanente o intermitentemente con el mar; // III.- Las de los lagos interiores de formación natural que estén ligados directamente a corrientes constantes; // IV.- Las de los ríos y sus afluentes directos o indirectos, arroyos o manantiales desde el punto en que broten las primeras aguas permanentes hasta su desembocadura en el mar o lagos, lagunas o esteros; // V.- Las de las corrientes constantes o intermitentes cuyo cauce, en toda su extensión o parte de ella, sirva de límite al territorio nacional, debiendo sujetarse el dominio de esas corrientes a lo que se haya establecido en tratados internacionales celebrados con los países limítrofes y, a falta de ellos, o en cuanto a lo no previsto, a lo dispuesto por esta ley; // VI.- Las de toda corriente que directa o indirectamente afluyan a las enumeradas en la fracción V; // VII.- Las que se extraigan de las minas, con la limitación señalada en el artículo 10; // VIII.- Las de los manantiales que broten en las playas, zonas marítimas, cauces, vasos o riberas de propiedad nacional y, en general, todas las que nazcan en terrenos de dominio público; // IX.- Las subterráneas cuyo alumbramiento no se haga por medio de pozos; y // X.- Las aguas pluviales que discurran por barrancos o ramblas cuyos cauces sean de dominio público.

Artículo 2º.- Las aguas enumeradas en el artículo anterior son de propiedad nacional y el dominio sobre ellas no se pierde ni se ha perdido cuando por ejecución de obras artificiales o de aprovechamiento anteriores se alteren o hayan alterado las características naturales.

Exceptúanse las aguas que se aprovechan en virtud de contratos otorgados por el Estado, las cuales se sujetarán a las condiciones autorizadas en la respectiva concesión. ." Por su parte para cuando acaeció el otorgamiento de la concesión estaba vigente , la Ley 258 del dieciocho de agosto de mil novecientos cuarenta y uno, Ley del Servicio Nacional de Electricidad, que señalaba:

“Artículo 1: Todas las aguas de la República, que no sean dominio privado de acuerdo con la Ley de Aguas vigente, … son inalienable y del dominio, gobierno y vigilancia del Estado” Abona a lo dicho lo dispuesto por el artículo cuarto del Código de Minería (Ley 6797 del 4 de octubre de 1982) que señala:

“Artículo 4.- …. las aguas subterráneas y superficiales, se reservan para el Estado y sólo podrán ser explotados por éste, por particulares de acuerdo con la ley, o mediante una concesión especial otorgada por tiempo limitado y con arreglo a las condiciones y estipulaciones que establezca la Asamblea Legislativa.

Los recursos naturales existentes en el suelo, en el subsuelo y en las aguas de los mares adyacentes al territorio nacional, en una extensión de hasta doscientas millas a partir de la línea de baja mar, a lo largo de las costas, sólo podrán ser explotados de conformidad con lo que establece el inciso 14) ( último párrafo ) del artículo 121 de la Constitución Política.” En cuanto a la Administración del recurso, la derogada Ley número 258 de dieciocho de agosto de mil novecientos cuarenta y uno, creo el Servicio Nacional de Electricidad para ejercer el dominio, aprovechamiento, utilización, gobierno y vigilancia de varios recursos entre ellos todas las aguas. Facultándolo el numeral sexto para dar concesiones o derechos de aguas, norma que es coherente con la Ley de Aguas ya señalada que en artículo diecisiete establece que “Es necesaria autorización para el aprovechamiento de aguas públicas, especialmente dedicadas a empresas de interés público o privado. Esa autorización la concederá el Servicio Nacional de Electricidad en la forma en que se prescribe en la presente Ley..”, lo que es reafirmado por el artículo setenta de la ley 16 del treinta de octubre de mil novecientos cuarenta y uno. Por su parte la ley Nº 2726 de catorce de abril de mil novecientos sesenta y uno y sus reformas -en especial las de la ley No. 5915 de 12 de julio de 1976-, "Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados" indica:

"Artículo 1.- Con el objeto de dirigir, fijar políticas, establecer y aplicar normas, realizar y promover el planeamiento, financiamiento y desarrollo y de resolver todo lo relacionado con el suministro de agua potable y recolección y evacuación de aguas negras y residuos industriales líquidos, lo mismo que el aspecto normativo de los sistemas de alcantarillado pluvial en áreas urbanas, para todo el territorio nacional se crea el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, como institución autónoma del Estado.” (Así reformado por Ley Nº 5915 de 12 de julio de 1976, artículo 1º) Como se puede extraer de los artículos supra transcritos y de la lectura integral de la leyes respectivas, el S.N.E. tenía como finalidad en este campo, representar y ejercer en nombre del Estado el dominio del recurso hídrico del país, con el fin de velar por la preservación del mismo y utilización de forma jerarquizada según la importancia de las necesidades; competencias que al final de cuentas fueron asumidas por la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos pero en un margen de acción más amplio. Por su parte el A y A tiene como finalidad planificar, construir y operar la infraestructura necesaria para abastecer de agua potable y vigilar la planificación, construcción y operación de la misma realizada por los particulares con el indicado fin. Como se observa, el representar al Estado en los contratos de concesión era uno de los mecanismos que le permitía al S.N.E. realizar su fin legal (como se verá esa competencia posteriormente fue trasladada). Establecido de manera expresa en su ley constitutiva como en la Ley de Aguas. Para aquellos años quedaba claro, que el otorgamiento de la conexión le resultaba propio, lo que incluía el correspondiente contrato; mientras el A y A presenta competencia para planear, diseñar, construir, operar y mantener obras de abastecimiento de agua a una población, así como la adecuación a sus recomendaciones de las indicadas obras cuando sean realizadas por particulares -Ley No. 16 del 30 de octubre de 1941, No. 809 de 02 de noviembre de 1949 y la Ley General de Agua Potable, entre otras- función que nunca ha conllevado la de conferir concesiones para la explotación de aguas del dominio público, aún cuando éstas sean destinadas, como es el caso que nos ocupa, a proveer de agua potable a una población definida. A partir de las normas dichas, en especial la Ley del A y A (así como los artículos 266 y 276 de la Ley general de salud, Ley n.° 5395 de 23 de octubre de 1973.), queda claro que a excepción de esta última, solamente las municipalidades, Empresa de Servicios Públicos de Heredia, Asociaciones de Desarrollo Comunal (a través de los Comités de Acueductos Rurales) u otros organismos locales con los que el A y A llegue a celebrar convenio al intento no existe otros organismos facultados para administrar acueductos públicos. De manera que un particular no está autorizado por el ordenamiento jurídico para prestar el servicio público de abastecimiento poblacional de agua potable y alcantarillado sanitario, con excepción de las Asociaciones Administradoras de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (ASADAS) como gestoras del servicio público. De manera que el Ministerio del Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones (que asumió las funciones de otorgar concesiones de agua ante el transformación del SNE en la ARESEP), de previo a otorgar la concesión, estaría en la obligación legal de verificar que el particular cuenta con la autorización previa del A y A y del Ministerio de Salud para que la empresa privada preste el servicio de agua potable a la población, así como el sistema de alcantarillado sanitario. En el caso de las ASADAS que actúan por delegación del A y A, su naturaleza jurídica surgen a raíz de la Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, en la cual se facultó a este a delegar la administración, operación y mantenimiento de los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados --que le fueron encomendados por el legislador--, a agrupaciones debidamente conformadas para tal efecto, según se desprende del artículo segundo inciso g) de la citada ley, al señalar expresamente “Queda facultada la institución para convenir con organismos locales, la administración de tales servicios o administrarlos a través de juntas administradoras de integración mixta entre el Instituto y las respectivas comunidades, siempre que así conviniere para la mejor prestación de los servicios y de acuerdo con los reglamentos respectivos.” Con fundamento en la norma transcrita anteriormente, el Poder Ejecutivo procedió emitió varios reglamentos, siendo el Reglamento de las Asociaciones Administradoras de Sistemas de Acueductos y Alcantarillados Comunales, (Decreto N°32529 de 2 de febrero de 2005) la norma vigente, que dispone este último reglamento en su artículo 3:

‘Artículo 3. A y A mediante convenio suscrito al efecto, previo acuerdo favorable de su Junta Directiva, podrá delegar la administración, operación, mantenimiento y desarrollo de los sistemas de acueductos y/o alcantarillados comunales, a favor de asociaciones debidamente constituidas e inscritas de conformidad con la Ley de Asociaciones N°218 del 08 de agosto de 1939, sus modificaciones y respectivo Reglamento, Decreto Ejecutivo N°29496-J, publicado en La Gaceta N°95 del 21 de mayo del 2001. ..” VII.- SOBRE LA RESPONSABILIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA. El numeral 190 de nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública, refiere a “funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal”, de donde la legitimidad o su antítesis, hace referencia básicamente a las conductas jurídicas de la Administración, mientras que lo normal o anormal, apunta, ante todo (pero no en exclusiva), a la conducta material de la Administración, representada entre otras, por la actividad prestacional que se atribuye a la Administración Pública como parte de la categoría social que también se le asigna en procura del bienestar general del colectivo. De manera que, la anormalidad atiende a aquellas conductas administrativas, que en sí mismas, se apartan de la buena administración (conforme al concepto utilizado por la propia Ley General en el artículo 102 inciso d., que entre otras cosas incluye la eficacia y la eficiencia) o de la organización, de las reglas técnicas o de la pericia y el prudente quehacer en el despliegue de sus actuaciones, con efecto lesivo para la persona. Añade este Tribunal para las personas físicas o jurídicas. Esto permite señalar que la anormalidad puede manifestarse a través de un mal funcionamiento; un funcionamiento tardío, o una ausencia total de funcionamiento.Siempre que la víctima no tenga ese deber de soportar la lesión, se convierte en antijurídica, por menoscabo a un tercero a contrapelo del ordenamiento. Así las cosas, si no existe el deber de sobrellevar la lesión (entendida como la consecuencia final ablativa de la conducta pública), es porque la Administración debía evitarla, o, en caso contrario y bajo ciertas circunstancias, (requisitos del artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) asumir las consecuencias reparadoras de aquella que no pudo impedir. Se produce entonces, el incumplimiento al deber de indemnidad patrimonial, y en ese tanto, habrá que reputar la lesión a la esfera jurídica de la víctima como antijurídica, y por ende, de obligada reparación. Hay antijuricidad, en la medida en que la norma declara la obligación existente bajo el presupuesto implícito de una lesión contraria a Derecho, que no debe ser soportada por la víctima. La omisión como criterio de anormalidad e ilicitud. La obligatoriedad indemnizatoria frente a los daños y perjuicios causados por inacción. Sobre este tema es pertinente recordar que en materia de servicios públicos no basta con el suplir la actividad en las condiciones que sea, pues los usuarios tienen derecho a la adaptación, continuidad, eficiencia y eficacia del servicio (entre otros muchos derechos más), lo que lleva aparejado que el servicio debe prestarse en ciertas condiciones mínimas o básicas para considerarse que cumple el fin que justifica su existencia. Aceptar que un servicio público pueda ser prestado como sea, sin mayores consideraciones en un llamado a la arbitrariedad que no puede ser compartido. En el presente caso, se reclama la omisión del Nombre112175 en el suministro de agua potable, lo que obliga a establecer si la conducta del Instituto en no suministrar el recurso hídrico al usuario corresponde con un funcionamiento anormal o ilegítimo de la Administración. En la actualidad es pacíficamente aceptado que la conducta administrativa abarca no solo el comportamiento activo de la Administración (y dentro de él, el acto administrativo) sino además, la conducta omisiva, ese “no hacer” que se ha dado en llamar inactividad de la Administración, tanto en su vertiente formal (en la medida en que se revierte en un acto presunto por silencio administrativo) como material (referida básicamente al ámbito prestacional de la organización administrativa). De esta manera, ha de entenderse la inactividad material administrativa como aquella derivada de la omisión en el cumplimiento de una obligación jurídica preestablecida, que se produce cuando, la Administración incumple, por omisión, una obligación impuesta por el Ordenamiento Jurídico o por cualquier otro mecanismo de autovinculación, como es el caso de un acto propio o de los instrumentos consensuales, con lesión directa de un interés legítimo o de un derecho subjetivo, ya sea que altere o no una relación jurídico-administrativa preexistente. Más simple, hay inactividad de este tipo cuando existiendo para el ente u órgano público una obligación de dar o hacer impuesta por el ordenamiento jurídico o por una previa decisión suya, fuera o dentro de un procedimiento administrativo, no se despliega la debida actividad fáctica o jurídica que lleve a buen término la función otorgada, con detrimento de los derechos o intereses de uno o varios sujetos pasivos, ya sean privados o públicos, individuales o colectivos. Se trata de esa “culpa in ommittendo” en la que se incumple por inacción el deber funcional de actuar. De más está decir, que la indolencia administrativa puede producir (y de hecho produce) más graves lesiones que la propia actuación limitativa del órgano o ente público. De ahí que, ha de afirmarse de manera contundente (con fundamento y de acuerdo con lo dicho en considerandos anteriores) que la Administración Pública también es responsable por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados con su inactividad administrativa. Esa pasividad frente al cumplimiento de obligaciones preexistentes se enmarca, para efectos de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, como funcionamiento anormal de la Administración (en tanto se corresponda con una actividad material debida) y con una conducta ilegítima, que para este caso puede ser concurrente, en la medida en que el incumplimiento de lo debido no sólo atenta contra las reglas de buena administración, sino que infringe la juridicidad en tanto incumple las potestades administrativas funcionales que dimanan del propio Ordenamiento Jurídico. (Se puede consultar sobre el parámetro de responsabilidad el voto número 584-F-2005. Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.- San José a las diez horas cuarenta minutos del once de agosto del año dos mil cinco.

VIII.- SOBRE LOS DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS SOLICITADOS. Sobre los hechos, daños y perjuicios reclamados por la empresa actora, su resultado final depende de las pruebas que se aporten, donde el Tribunal para resolver el fondo de las pretensiones, analizará las pruebas conforme con el principio de la sana crítica, doctrina del numeral 82 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, en relación con el artículo 318 del Código Procesal Civil, que nos señala, los diferentes medios de prueba, los cuales son amplios para que las partes puedan cumplir con la exigencia legal de demostrar los hechos que afirman. Para el juez, la prueba será aquello que demuestra lo que en verdad sucedió, es la búsqueda de la verdad de los hechos, para así darles una calificación jurídica, en el presente caso tenemos la prueba documental, y el testimonio de Nombre112176 e Nombre112175 , que aportó el AYA, y las declaraciones de los testigos de la parte actora Nombre112177 y Roger Mata Arias. Entre la prueba documental tenemos: Sello al plano de construcción, que realizó el Instituto, en el que, h ace constar que si existe acueducto en uso al frente de esta propiedad, oficio RB-DOM-2008-148, con fecha 18 de abril del 2008, el Jefe de operaciones y mantenimiento de la Región Brunca, que expresa que se ha instruido para que se suspenda el otorgamiento de disponibilidad de nuevos servicios no domiciliares, oficio RB-CPZ-2009-0889 de fecha 23 de diciembre del 2009, en el que se le comunica al señor Nombre112174 que debido al déficit en el abastecimiento de agua, que enfrenta la zona de Pérez Zeledón, se ve obligado a suspender el otorgamiento de disponibilidad de agua, en locales comerciales, además el día 31 de julio del 2004, CONCESA emitió los resultados mediante la formulación de varios documentos denominados "informe de Diagnóstico", "Informe de alternativas" y dos anexos. En el mismo establecieron las condiciones actuales de los sistemas en el distrito centro de Pérez Zeledón y lugares aledaños, así como las medidas requeridas para subsanar los deterioros en la infraestructura actual de agua potable. Señala un déficit en el caudal de agua potable para el 2005. Es claro que el servicio de agua potable es una actividad clave, básica e indispensable dentro de todo sociedad; entre las cuales se ubica la costarricense. Todo parece indicar que la falta de suministro del preciado liquido presenta como sustento en la ausencia de capacidad del liquido en la zona para el momento de los hechos lo que de manera posterior fue solventado. Conforme con las reglas de Rolan, naturalmente los servicios públicos deben adaptarse a las necesidades; máxima general que también es de aplicación del servicio de agua potable. Si bien, y como ya se indicó el agua potable es un bien de la nación, el servicio público se constituye cuando el liquido es distribuido entre todas aquellas personas que lo necesitan, mediante sistemas de tunerías, tanques y redes de distribución; sin perjuicio de bombas en los casos que resulte necesario. El ente público de manera constante esta llamado a adoptar las medidas necesarias para asegurar el suministro de liquido vital en consideración a las necesidades de la sociedad, teniendo en cuenta que cada día son más la cantidad de abonados. Es una obligación de planificación constante, en procura de mejorar las condiciones y asegurar el cumplimiento del fin público. Para poder establecer la existencia o no de la responsabilidad solicitada por el actor, no basta con indicar que existía una limitación materia, lo que en efecto es un tema incuestionable y que eventualmente puede llegar a ocurrir. Existen muchas zonas en el territorio nacional donde hay limitante de la capacidad de agua y los niveles de inversión para llevar agua de una zona a la otra resultan exagerados, pese a esto considera este órgano jurisdiccional, que entrar a establecer si estamos o no frente a un comportamiento anormal resulta ser un tema de menor tratamiento, sobre las bases que pasamos a indicar. Si ubicaramos la situación en concreto como una conducta lícita y normal de la Administración, en donde el ente público tomo todas las medidas necesarias para que la ausencia de suministro de agua no se dieran, pese a esto la situación se estaba presentado, lo que motivó a que el ente público de manera ágil y diligente estuviera implementando los mecanismos para solventar el problema a la menor brevedad posible; esa situación no enervaría la posibilidad de derivar responsabilidad en al especie. Estaríamos frente a un supuesto de sacrificio singular, especial, con un grupo pequeño de afectados e intenso, en virtud del cual el actor se vió en la obligación de afrontar una serie de incomodidades; no deseadas por la Administración, pero no por ello bases para eximir de responsabilidad. En esas condiciones estaríamos frente a un supuesto de responsabilidad administrativa por conducta lícita o comportamiento normal. Pero como se ha venido señalando, no es suficiente el argumento las situaciones, sino que se hace necesario probarlas conforme con el canon trescientos diecisiete del Código Procesal Civil. En este caso, el ente público una y otra vez manifiesto la imposibilidad técnica del recurso hídrico, justificando su incapacidad para poder suplir el servicio solicitado por el actor, lo que no duda esta Cámara que ocurrió, pero no se aporta un solo elemento de convicción que permita deducir desde cuanto se tenía conocimiento de ese problema y más importante todavía es cuales fueron las acciones emprendidas por el ente público para solventar el problema. Si existía un limitante de la capacidad del agua, debieron tomarse de manera urgente las medidas para solventar el problema, máxime tratándose de un derecho fundamental, y no simplemente limitarse a indicar la situación. Evidentemente, ante la incapacidad de dotar a todas las personas del servicio, la prioridad debía estar en la actividad residencial y de manera residual lo comercial, pero eso no es justificante para dilatar las medidas necesarias para solventar la situación frente a estos últimos. El problema no era ajeno al ente público sino que le resulta propio de sus competencias y tenía que buscarle una solución dentro del menor tiempo posible. El ejercicio del derecho al comercio dentro de lo normado por los artículos cuarenta y cinco, cuarenta y seis y veintiocho párrafo segundo de la Constitución Política, de manera que si el Estado se ve en la obligación de negarle un servicio público en beneficio de la colectividad, dentro del sistema de cargas que imperan en el derecho público, la lógica imperante es que debe proceder a indemnizarlo. Retomando el argumento, ante la falta de prueba sobre las acciones para mitigar o solventar el problema, el Colegio jurisdiccional se inclina a pensar que estamos frente a una actividad anormal en el servicio público y del cual se deriva la responsabilidad que ahora se conoce. No esta demás indicar que si tratándose de una actividad normal no existe la menor dificultad en ubicar en daño que presentó la sociedad actora y el nexo causal, además de un sacrificio singular, especial e intenso, base fundamental para derivar la responsabilidad administrativa de los artículos ciento noventa y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, además se ser posible encontrar la ausencia del titular de tener que soportar la afectación; tratándose de una actividad anormal es todavía más sencillo ubicar las bases para la responsabilidad cuando no se prueban las acciones realizadas para solventar el problema como en efecto correspondía.

IX.- SOBRE EL OBJETO DE LA PRETENSIÓN Y EL FONDO DE ESTE ASUNTO: Básicamente la parte actora, pretende la condenatoria del pago de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados según su dicho por no haber tenido agua potable entre el período comprendido entre el mes de junio del 2009 a septiembre del 2012. Siendo la principal función social del Derecho la resolución del conflicto, se debe determinar cuál de las versiones contrapuestas dadas por las partes es la que amerita credibilidad a este Tribunal, advirtiendo que en los considerandos anteriores ya hemos adelantado algo sobre el particular. Lo medular de la demanda, es determinar si efectivamente el Instituto de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, tenía la obligación de dar el servicio de agua potable a la empresa actora, se examinarán los hechos, la pretensión, la oposición que presentó del Nombre112175 y las pruebas globalmente, para llegar al resultado final de esta contienda. Retomando para tal efecto parte de las argumentaciones que ya se han otorgado en la especie. Análisis jurídico . 1. Obligación del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de brindar el servicio de agua potable a la empresa actora. Las normas deben interpretarse de manera razonable y congruente con la realidad social, que hoy nos enseña, en ese sentido la Ley Constitutiva del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, en su numeral segundo determina que: Corresponde al Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados: a) Dirigir y vigilar todo lo concerniente para proveer a los habitantes de la república de un servicio de agua potable...i) Construir, ampliar y reformar los sistemas de acueductos y alcantarillados en aquellos casos en que sea necesario y así lo aconseje la mejor satisfacción de las necesidades nacionales. Esas normas garantiza el funcionamiento del servicio público sin discriminación o diferenciación ninguna. Tratándose de un servicio ya en funcionamiento, siempre que la persona cumpla con los requisitos establecidos al efecto, puede hablarse de un autentico derecho subjetivo para el disfrute del mismo. Del mismo modo, como lo indicó la Sala Constitucional, en la sentencia antes referenciada el acceso al agua potable asegura los derechos a la vida –“sin agua no hay vida posible” afirma la Carta del Agua aprobada por el Consejo de Europa en Estrasburgo el 6 de mayo de 1968-, a la salud de las personas –indispensable para su alimento, bebida e higiene-, desde luego, está asociado al desarrollo y crecimiento socio-económico de los pueblos para asegurarle a cada individuo un bienestar y una calidad de vida dignos. En esencia, el agua, desde un punto de vista económico y ecológico, es un bien preciado, puesto que, es indispensable para cualquier actividad humana (industrial, agrícola, doméstica, comercial, servicios etc.). SOBRE LOS PRINCIPIOS CONSTITUCIONALES RECTORES DE LOS SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS. "Todos los servicios públicos prestados por las administraciones públicas –incluidos los asistenciales o sociales- están regidos por una serie de principios que deben ser observados y respetados, en todo momento y sin excepción alguna, por los funcionarios públicos encargados de su gestión y prestación. Tales principios constituyen una obligación jurídica de carácter indeclinable impuesta a cualquier ente u órgano administrativo por su eficacia normativa directa e inmediata, toda vez que el bloque o parámetro de legalidad (artículo 11 de la Constitución Política) al que deben ajustarse en sus actuaciones está integrado, entre otros elementos, por los principios generales del derecho administrativo (artículo 6° de la Ley General de la Administración Pública). No debe perderse de perspectiva que los Principios Generales del Derecho, tienen el rango de la norma que interpretan, integran o delimitan, con lo que pueden asumir un rango constitucional si el precepto respecto del cual cumplen tales funciones tiene también esa jerarquía. Como veremos en el considerando subsiguiente nuestro texto fundamental recoge como derecho fundamental de las personas el del buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, consecuentemente los principios que informan los servicios públicos en cuanto hacen efectivo tal derecho tienen un rango constitucional. El ordinal 4° de la Ley General de la Administración Pública dispone claramente que “La actividad de los entes públicos deberá estar sujeta en su conjunto a los principios fundamentales del servicio público, para asegurar su continuidad, su eficiencia, su adaptación a todo cambio en el régimen legal o en la necesidad social que satisfacen y la igualdad en el trato de los destinatarios o beneficiarios”....La adaptación a todo cambio en el régimen legal o a las necesidades impuestas por el contexto socioeconómico significa que los entes y órganos administrativos deben tener capacidad de previsión y, sobre todo, de programación o planificación para hacerle frente a las nuevas exigencias y retos impuestos, ya sea por el aumento en el volumen de la demanda del servicio público o bien por los cambios tecnológicos. Ningún ente, órgano o funcionario público pueden aducir razones de carencia presupuestaria o financiera, ausencia de equipos, falta de renovación tecnológica de éstos, exceso o saturación de la demanda en el servicio público para dejar de prestarlo de forma continua y regular. La igualdad o universalidad en el acceso demanda que todos los habitantes tienen derecho a exigir, recibir y usar el servicio público en igualdad de condiciones y de conformidad con las normas que los rigen, consecuentemente, todos los que se encuentran en una misma situación pueden exigir idénticas ventajas. Uno de los principios rectores del servicio público que no se encuentra enunciado en el artículo 4° de la Ley General de la Administración Pública lo constituye el de su obligatoriedad, puesto que, de nada serviría afirmar que deben ser continuos, regulares, uniformes y generales si el sujeto prestador no tiene la obligación de prestarlo. La administración pública prestadora del servicio público no puede escoger su clientela o usuarios, debe brindárselo a cualquiera que se lo requiera...". SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA, voto numero 2003-11382, San José, a las quince horas con once minutos del siete de octubre del dos mil tres. En síntesis desde el punto de vista Constitucional y legal, es obligación del Nombre112175, brindar el servicio de agua potable, independientemente que sea una persona física o jurídica, si bien la Sala Constitucional, en los Recursos de Amparo presentados por el representante de la empresa de la actora, que fueron denegados por tratarse de un asunto de mera legalidad, al considerar la Sala, que se trataba de persona jurídica, sin embargo de acuerdo con lo indicado en las sentencias de la misma Sala Constitucional, se deriva que el agua potable es un bien preciado, puesto que, es indispensable para cualquier actividad humana (industrial, agrícola, doméstica, comercial, servicios etc.), desde esa perspectiva, y a la luz de las reglas de la lógica y la experiencia humana, Nombre112175, tenía el deber legal de suministrar el agua potable a la empresa actora, salvo que hubiere acreditado algún eximente de responsabilidad que hubiera impedido ese deber, el cual no fue comprobado en esta litis. No esta demás indicar que durante mucho tiempo la jurisprudencia constitucional se orientó a señalar que las personas jurídicas no presentaban derechos fundamentales, postura que ha variado en los últimos años, en el tanto este tipo de personas no es más que un conglomerado de personas, con un interés colectivo. En todo caso, aún considerando la posibilidad de la inexistencia de un derecho constitucional al agua (lo que de antemano rechazamos), es indiscutible el deber legal en los términos expuestos. 2. Inactividad del Nombre112175 de brindar el servicio de agua potable a la empresa actora. Desde la visión anterior, los entes públicos, tienen que dar a los ciudadanos soluciones a los problemas que surjan en sociedad. El problema se plantea o surge, cuando el ciudadano, en calidad de sujeto activo, no encuentra la respuesta y actividad debida en aquella Administración obligada, bajo esas circunstancias, la persona lesionada queda en absoluta desprotección frente a la arbitrariedad administrativa, que por su condición omisiva, se ha convertido en una disfunción antijurídica. T omando en cuenta las circunstancias y los pormenores del proceso, el no suministro del agua potable a la actora, resulta violatoria de los principios constitucionales, e implica a su vez, otra disfuncionalidad que deja en el vacío la tutela judicial efectiva como derecho prestacional. Lo anterior concuerda con lo que dispuso la sentencia de la Sala Primera, en el voto número 584-F-2005, al indicar que la anormalidad puede manifestarse a través de un mal funcionamiento; un funcionamiento tardío, o una ausencia total de funcionamiento. Siempre que la víctima no tenga ese deber de soportar la lesión, se convierte en antijurídica, por menoscabo a un tercero a contrapelo del ordenamiento. Así las cosas, si no existe el deber de sobrellevar la lesión (entendida como la consecuencia final ablativa de la conducta pública), es porque la Administración debía evitarla, o, en caso contrario y bajo ciertas circunstancias, asumir las consecuencias reparadoras de aquella que no pudo impedir. Se produce entonces, el incumpliendo al deber de indemnidad patrimonial, y en ese tanto, habrá que reputar la lesión a la esfera jurídica de la víctima como antijurídica, y por ende, de obligada reparación. A juicio de este Tribunal, esto fue lo que sucedió en este caso, donde el Instituto demandado, tenía un deber de suministrar el agua potable dentro de un plazo razonable, y no lo hizo, se llegó a esa conclusión, teniendo en cuenta y consideración, que desde el mes de octubre del 2009, la actora solicitó el servicio de agua potable para su negocio comercial y no fue sino hasta el año 2012, que le fue otorgado dicho servicio, después lógicamente que se había presentado la demanda a estrados judiciales, (prueba el documento de órdenes de servicio visible a folio 41 y las manifestaciones contenidas en DVD, de la audiencia preliminar), desde esa visión, la conducta antijurídica, nace como producto de una disfunción administrativa, porque no hay un motivo demostrado imputable a la naturaleza o terceros que haya impedido suministrar el recurso y que para este Tribunal el ente accionado, si tenia las condiciones necesarias para brindar el agua potable a la actora, y mas bien fue por una decisión administrativa interna, la cual no tiene respaldo en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, al dejar de dar un servicio esencial como lo es el suministro del agua potable, de ahí que esa conducta administrativa, afectó de manera singular a la empresa actora, provocando un daño económico que el emisor de esa conducta debe indemnizar. No esta demás retomar lo antes señalado, que si la afectación hubiera sido consecuencia del tiempo necesario para hacer las modificaciones y adaptaciones del servicio, bien podríamos hablar de un supuesto de sacrificio especial o responsabilidad sin falta; más en este caso no se aporta un solo elemento para poder establecer que se procuró el cumplimiento de los cometidos públicos. De manera que por inferencia deductiva básica estamos en presencia de un comportamiento anormal, como base para derivar la responsabilidad. 3. Con base en las ideas expresadas, analizaremos la pretensión, que fue objeto del contradictorio en el debate oral y público, que es el reclamo de pago de los daños y perjuicios entre el período comprendido entre el mes de junio del 2009 a septiembre del 2012, a raíz del no suministro del agua potable por parte del Instituto accionado. Sobre la acreditación de los daños reclamados. De las pruebas que constan en autos, como lo es el oficio SUB-G-GSP-DRB-CPZ-0913-2010, con fecha 16 de noviembre del 2010, se tiene por acreditado que el representante de la empresa actora, solicitó el día 2 de noviembre del 2009, mediante orden disponibilidad de servicio de cañería No. 13874716, tres servicios para locales comerciales a nombre de Electrónica Leyden S.A, a pesar que mediante oficio RB-CPZ-2009-0869 de fecha 23 de diciembre del 2009, se le comunica que debido al déficit en el abastecimiento de agua que enfrenta la zona de Pérez Zeledón, y previendo que los clientes que cuentan con el servicio de agua potable, años atrás, no se les cause deterioro alguno en el mismo, el AYA, se ve obligado a suspender el otorgamiento de disponibilidad de agua, en locales comerciales. Considera este Tribunal que la argumentación que da el Instituto no son causas válidas para denegar el servicio de agua potable solicitada, al menos no por el tiempo que se esta en consideración. Máxime al tener en consideración aspectos relevantes como que corresponde al Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados: proveer a los habitantes de la República de un servicio de agua potable, siendo así un servicio esencial, que tienen derecho de obtener las personas físicas o jurídicas, asimismo que el 6 de julio del 2009, el AYA, pone un sello al plano de construcción, en el que hace constar que si existe acueducto en uso al frente de esta propiedad, además si examinamos los argumentos que da la representación del Instituto, para denegar el suministro de agua, en el que manifiesta que la directriz Institucional Memorando No. RB-DOM-2008-148, con fecha 18 de abril del 2008, que indica que se ha instruido para que se suspenda el otorgamiento de disponibilidad de nuevos servicios no domiciliares (condominios verticales, bodegas, locales comerciales, apartamento, etc...), (ver oficio a folios 104-105), dedúcese de lo anterior,que no es justificante el por qué no se le advirtió a la actora cuando se presentó a solicitar el servicio que fue con fecha posterior (octubre del 2009), que se había suspendido el servicio de agua potable para locales comerciales, otra prueba que invoca el Instituto en su defensa, es el estudio con fecha del 31 de julio del 2004, CONCESA en el que emitió los resultados mediante la formulación de varios documentos denominados "informe de Diagnóstico", "Informe de alternativas" y dos anexos, en el que se señala un déficit en el caudal de agua potable para el año 2005, debiendo realizar el Nombre112175 en materia de cuencas, un mejor manejo integral para la conservación del agua. En cuanto a infraestructura, recomendaron levantamiento topográfico de las fuentes de abastecimiento, reparación de la presa en el Río Quebrada, nueva línea de conducción desde otra captación en el río San Ramón a las Plantas Potalizadoras, mejoras a las actuales plantas potalizadoras, pozos, estaciones de bombeo, estaciones de cloración, sustitución de la red de distribución de agua potable existente en el distrito San Isidro con sus respectivas cajas y válvulas, mejora de los tanques de abastecimiento de agua potable, a saber: Tanques Fallas y Pepe, tanque de San Luis, tanque de la Universidad y tanque de los Chiles. Nótese que ese informe es del año 2005, siendo así, se debe pensar que si los personeros del AYA, sabían desde años atrás que había problemas con el agua potable, porque no se le señaló a la actora en el momento de presentar el plano para su respectivo trámite, adicional a lo anterior, entonces se podría admitir una falta de planificación del Instituto, pues desde el año 2005, sabían que se daba el faltante de agua potable. Además donde esta la acreditación de las obras realizadas para mitigar la situación y afectar en la menor posibilidad a los usuarios, nuevamente nos encontramos en temas que debieron ser probados pero que no existe intento alguno de demostrarlo. Pero aun tomando en cuenta lo expuesto anteriormente por parte de las representantes del ente público, este Tribunal, infiere que no son causas suficientes y válidas, para no otorgar el servicio de agua potable a la empresa actora, pues estaríamos en presencia de un funcionamiento anormal por parte de la Administración al dejar de brindar un servicio indispensable. Por eso "se habla de inactividad ante la omisión (total o parcial) de una conducta activa, cuyo despliegue, desde un punto de vista jurídico, corresponde a la Administración Pública. Dicho de otro modo, se trata de aquellos casos en los que el ente u órgano público no realiza aquella actividad a lo que está obligada, bien por una norma, bien por un acto autovinculativo. Se trata entonces, de un dar o hacer a cargo de la Administración, en el que se debe brindar al administrado u bien, actividad o servicio que a éste corresponde...". La Justicia Administrativa, González Camacho Oscar, 1ed, San José, C.R.IJSA, enero del 202. p.42. Es así, que a este Tribunal no le queda ninguna duda del funcionamiento anormal que incurrió el Instituto accionado, por el no suministro del recurso hídrico a la sociedad, desde esa óptica jurídica se determina que como consecuencia de esa conducta omisiva, se produjo una lesión antijurídica, operando así una responsabilidad por funcionamiento anormal, indemnizable, claro está. Para reforzar la tesis anterior, la Sala Constitucional ha resaltado la importancia de los principios de eficacia y eficiencia, cuyos titulares son los administrados, y que denominó derecho fundamental al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos. En efecto, en la sentencia No. 2004-05207, a las catorce horas con cincuenta y cinco minutos del dieciocho de mayo del dos mil cuatro, detalló que la: “…Constitución Política recoge un derecho fundamental innominado o atípico que es el de los administrados al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, el que se infiere claramente de la relación de los numerales, interpretados, a contrario sensu, 140, inciso 8°, 139, inciso 4° y 191 de la Ley fundamental en cuanto recogen, respectivamente, los parámetros deontológicos de la función administrativa tales como el “buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas”, “buena marcha del Gobierno” y “eficiencia de la administración”. Este derecho fundamental al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos le impone a los entes públicos actuar en el ejercicio de sus competencias y la prestación de los servicios públicos de forma eficiente y eficaz y, desde luego, la obligación correlativa de reparar los daños y perjuicios causados cuando se vulnere esa garantía constitucional. De esta forma, queda en evidencia que el constituyente originario recogió de forma implícita el principio de la responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas, el que, como tal, debe servir a todos los poderes públicos y operadores del Derecho como parámetro para interpretar, aplicar, integrar y delimitar el entero ordenamiento jurídico...". Esa garantía individual atípica o innominada se acentúa en tratándose de servicios públicos esenciales como el abastecimiento de agua potable. (Ver en este sentido la sentencia número 2003-11222 de las 17:48 hrs. del 30 de septiembre de 2003). Se debe resaltar que la convicción del juzgador en validar o no una prueba testimonial, o documental, es de resorte exclusivo de su independencia jurisdiccional, del ejercicio de la razón y el respeto a la legitimidad del elenco probatorio, en ese sentido, la sociedad actora, logró demostrar con prueba servible y útil, como lo es la documental, que apoya la testimonial que a raíz de ese evento anormal emitido por el AYA, sufrió daños económicos, al tener que usar otros medios para suplir el agua potable, así lo refieren el testigo Nombre112177 y Roger Mata Arias, por el contrario no pudo la representación del Nombre112175 acreditar con prueba idónea algún eximente de responsabilidad, o descalificar el nexo causal entre la conducta omisiva -el suministro de agua potable- y el resultado dañoso que sufrió la actora, todo ello necesariamente echando mano a deducciones lógicas, nos hace inclinarnos por confirmar la tesis que presentó la parte actora en su demanda, por ende, a la luz de las reglas de la lógica y la experiencia humana, de todo el elenco probatorio, tanto testimonial, como documental, emergen elementos de convicción, suficientes para concluir con el grado de certeza requerido de que en lo medular, la hipótesis fáctica presentada por la parte actora, es verosímil y fue debidamente acreditada en este proceso, por otra parte la tesis que presentó la parte demandada, adolece de prueba servible para desacreditar la hipótesis que presentó la parte actora, es decir, el ente accionado, inobservó tal carga, pues no aportó material probatorio apto, para comprobar de manera indubitable, que la no prestación del servicio de agua potable, se debió a algún impedimento técnico o bien algún eximente de responsabilidad de los estipulado en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, por eso con razón se ha dicho que dentro del proceso judicial, resulta elemental, que las partes que afirman hechos, como fundamento de su derecho o de su defensa, provean al juzgador los elementos de prueba suficientes, para lograr en él, el convencimiento necesario para la adopción de la decisión respectiva. Sin las pruebas, el Juez no puede reconstruir los hechos objeto del debate, no puede verificar las afirmaciones de las partes, ni puede darle contenido al derecho invocado. En el caso que nos ocupa, el Instituto demandado ha pecado en ese deber, pues no aportó la prueba necesaria e idónea, para acreditar sus argumentos expuestos en la oposición de la demanda, véase que el estudio del déficit en el abastecimiento de agua potable en el distrito de San Isidro y lugares circunvecinos dada del año 2005, y la decisión de suspender el suministro de agua potable a los negocios comerciales, lo fue hasta el año 2008, por lo que por las razones expuestas, conducen a este Colegio al convencimiento sobre la veracidad de los hechos esenciales aducidos como fundamento fáctico de la demanda, por lo que se concluye que la balanza se debe inclinar en favor de la tesis que presentó la sociedad actora, es así, en mérito de lo anterior, se procede a condenar al Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, al pago de los daños económicos que incurrió la empresa actora, al suplir el suministro del agua potable, entre el período comprendido entre octubre del 2009 a septiembre del 2012, pues fue el único hecho probado durante este proceso, eso sí, la condena se hace en abstracto, y su cuantificación se reserva para la ejecución de sentencia, donde la parte actora deberá demostrar con prueba idónea el quantum de esos daños económicos. Se hace en abstracto, pues la prueba aportada por la parte actora y demás pruebas no son concluyentes en determinar otros daños que no sean el gasto patrimonial que incurriera la actora al suplir el suministro de agua potable entre el período que va desde el mes de octubre del 2009 a septiembre del 2012, se debe advertir que la condena a los daños económicos obedece a lo dispuesto en el numeral 190 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, disponiéndose que el Estado y sus entidades responderán por todos los daños, que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero. De esta forma, el causante del daño lo resarcirá, salvo que demuestre alguna causal exonerativa, véase que la prueba documental aportada por la actora, admitida en el juicio oral y público, enumerada como el estado general sobre una operación crediticia realizada en el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, visible a folios 149-159 del expediente judicial, ese documento lo que relata es un préstamo bancario, que obtuvo la empresa actora, por ello a nuestra consideración no es una prueba idónea para demostrar los daños y perjuicios reclamados, de igual forma lo es la certificación del Contador Privado, señor Vidal Callejas Escobar, visible a folios 159-173, en el que detalla, que la actora genera sus ingresos por concepto de reparación y venta de repuestos de línea blanca, en los períodos de octubre del 2008 y septiembre del 2012, a criterio de este Cámara, no es una prueba útil, pues no tiene relación directa con lo discutido en este proceso, igual suerte corren las 20 fotografías aportadas por la parte actora. En realidad la prueba testimonial, como lo es el relato del testigo Nombre112176 , el que afirmó que los locales comerciales, estaba utilizando el agua de propiedades abyacentes por otro lado Roger Mata Arias, indicó que el agua potable se solvento por otro medio, él jalaba el agua de un pozo que estaba como a 20 metros detrás de la casa de Nombre112174, y que la que la distancia entre los locales comerciales y la casa del representante de la actora estaba a 8 kilómetros, también afirmó que si hubo problema con la construcción del trabajo, el testigo Lenin Fernández Badilla, manifiesta que su participación era acarrear el agua para el negocio él iba con el Pick up a la casa de Nombre112174, y llevaba los estañones con el agua al negocio de la actora, eso fue en el año 2010, Nombre112174 le pagaba ¢15.000 por cada viaje de agua que el halaba, hizo por mes 4 o 5 viajes, finalizó el acarreo de agua en el mes de septiembre del 2012, (ver prueba testimonial recogida en audiencia de juicio oral y publico, contenida en formato electrónico) y documental ofrecida por ambas partes, es la que acredita los daños económicos sufridos a la sociedad actora, a raíz de la negativa del suministro de agua potable por parte del AYA.

X.- Sobre los daños en concreto: Evidentemente en un proceso de esta naturaleza la parte pretensora está en la obligación de probar no sólo el derecho, sino que debe demostrar porque así le incumbe, los perjuicios que reclama, ajustados a la debida relación de causalidad. No le basta a un sujeto decir que tiene la verdad, ya que la propia ley lo obliga a que demuestre, mediante los medios de prueba admitidos, aquellas afirmaciones de los hechos constitutivos de su derecho, incluso cuando se trata de aspectos de perjuicios ocasionados, no hay duda alguna que se debe demostrar igualmente, que fueron ocasionados a un bien de su patrimonio. La doctrina ha señalado que sobre el reclamo que haga el justiciable de perjuicios, deberá necesariamente establecer los presupuestos de hecho contundentes a evidenciar una relación de causalidad. En el caso presente, la parte actora no pudo demostrar los perjuicios solicitados, pues no se desprende de la prueba documental y testimonial que consta en autos, que efectivamente por el no suministro de agua potable en el período comprendido entre octubre del 2009 a septiembre del 2012, la empresa actora haya sufrido los perjuicios intentados. En este caso, la actora en cumplimiento del canon trescientos diecisiete del Código Procesal Civil aplicable a la especie conforme con el artículo doscientos veinte del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, la parte actora estaba obligada no solo a probar la existencia del daño y su relación con su contraparte, además de la ilegitimidad del mismo, lo que en efecto hizo; sino también el alcance o quantum del mismo. Sobre este último aspecto las declaraciones rendidas si bien permiten derivar la existencia del posible daño no permiten establecer el contenido en concreto del mismo. Evidentemente, prueba técnica o documental, asentada sobre datos financieros concretos es la prueba inidónea sobre el particular, la que nunca fue ofrecida. En dicho marco es imposible el reconocimiento en concreto. Empero a lo expuesto, el artículo ciento veinte del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo en resguardo de la tutela judicial efectiva permite el reconocimiento en abstracto del derecho para que en etapa de ejecución de sentencia se pueda establecer en concreto el importe de la afectación. De manera que la Cámara opta por ese mecanismo de remitir a la ejecución de sentencia para el establecimiento en concreto del daño sufrido, siempre con los nortes indicados en cuanto a la forma en que debe probarse ese daño. Por su parte, en cuanto al daño moral, se ha establecido en doctrina, que proviene de la lesión de un derecho extrapatrimonial y supone una perturbación injusta de las condiciones de la persona que se ve afectada por él. La actora indicó en el juicio oral y público, que se le causó daño moral a la empresa actora, por negarse el Nombre112175 de otorgar el suministro de agua potable. Sobre este aspecto se resuelve. Se debe entender que el daño moral se engloba dentro de los daños en general. Si la parte actora pretende un daño moral objetivo, se rechaza pues no aportó la prueba idónea que acredite dicho menoscabo daño. Se trataría de un daño a la imagen general de la empresa, que afectó su capacidad económica, aspectos sobre los cuales no existe elemento de convicción alguna. " El daño moral objetivo, contrario al anterior (refiriéndose al daño moral subjetivo), requiere de la demostración correspondiente. Como se dijo en el apartado precedente, se refiere a la lesión de un derecho extrapatrimonial que genera consecuencias económicas valuables. Es decir, es el sufrido por la persona en su contexto social, y no en el campo individual. De allí que, es necesario que se demuestre cómo aconteció el daño, e indispensable acreditar, además de la relación de causalidad, su existencia, correspondiendo, al abrigo del numeral 317 del Código Procesal Civil, a quien lo peticiona, aportar prueba suficiente que lo sustente.” (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, N° 226-F-S1-2008 de las 15:26 horas del 14 de marzo del 2008; los puntos subrayados, son nuestros.). En cuanto al daño moral subjetivo se hace necesario varias aclaraciones. Como es sabido ese tipo de daño es el sufrimiento, la afectación en el estado anímico que presentan las personas a partir de un suceso en particular. Historicamente, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y esta jurisdicción, de manera mayoritaria ha sostenido que solo las personas físicas puede presentar sufrimiento. No se puede olvidar que los representantes, personeros y accionistas de una empresa son lo que su nombre dice, estructuras dentro de la misma persona; pero no constituyen la persona en si misma. No se puede confundir los representantes con la persona jurídica. En dicho marco y sobre las bases expuestas, el Tribunal no logra establecer la existencia de un daño moral subjetivo a cargo de la empresa Electrónica Leyden S.A. Consecuencia de lo dicho procede declarar la falta de derecho sobre ese extremo.

XI.- Sobre las excepciones: Se opuso la excepción de c aducidad la que debe rechazarse, pues el reclamo final que hace la parte actora, es solamente para el pago de los daños y perjuicios, de manera que de una interpretación adecuada, el reclamo de daños y perjuicios, no es viable la excepción de caducidad, pues desde vieja data, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia ha venido clarificando que: "Los artículos 2 inciso c) y 3 de la Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa en verdad, establecen la denominada unificación de vías. Empero, es cierto, que el proceso civil de hacienda presenta características propias, diferenciadoras, respecto del contencioso administrativo puro. En el civil de hacienda, verbigracia, no se ventila lo referente a la nulidad de actos de la Administración, lo cual caracteriza a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. En aquél se discute lo relativo a la responsabilidad de la Administración, proveniente de su funcionamiento (artículo 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de Administración Pública). De acuerdo con la doctrina, en el civil de hacienda, no se puede hablar de caducidad referida a la interposición de la acción. Ahí opera la prescripción ordinaria del derecho privado. Además, al no debatieres en él la nulidad de actos de la administración, no es necesario el requisito previo de agotamiento de vía administrativa, (número 66-1997, de las quince horas con cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintitrés de julio de mil novecientos noventa y siete). De manera que la parte confunde un instituto propio del proceso de nulidad (la caducidad) para aplicarlo a un civil de hacienda, que al amparo del artículo ciento noventa y ocho lo que presenta es plazo de prescripción. No esta demás agregar que en este segundo supuesto, el tiempo legal tampoco habría operado. Por tratarse de una pretensión de daños y perjuicios, se debe tomar como parámetro el numeral 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, y si sólo tomamos la fecha del 23 de diciembre del 2009, donde se le comunica al representante de la actora el no otorgamiento del agua potable, a la fecha que se le notificó la demanda al AYA, el siete de junio del 2012, visible a folio 15 bis, no ha transcurrido todavía el plazo de prescripción que es de 4 años. En cuanto a la falta de derecho que fue invocada consistentemente por la parte demandada, aún cuando no fue presentada en los términos expresos del vocablo técnico, es criterio del Tribunal que la misma debe declararse con respecto al daño moral subjetivo reclamado, al carecer de respaldo normativo; y rechazada en lo tocante al daño material, al haberse acreditado su existencia.

XII.- En cuanto a al indexación: La misma viene impuesta de manera oficiosa conforme con el artículo ciento veintitrés del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Se trata de un reconocimiento a la pérdida del valor adquisitivo del dinero. De no otorgarse se estaría entregando al actor menos dinero (con respecto a su capacidad adquisitiva), de manera que sobre los rubros establecidos en abstracto la indexación comenzará a correr a partir de la firmeza de la resolución que los fija y hasta el pago definitivo.

XIII.- Sobre las costas: De conformidad con los ordinales 119, 193 y 194 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, se impone resolver este proceso, condenando al Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, al pago de ambas costas, esto así en aplicación del principio general de condena al vencido y por no configurarse en el caso, los supuestos que permiten eximirlo de ese pago, de acuerdo con el numeral 194 del Código citado.

POR TANTO:

Se acepta la satisfacción extraprocesal que impera entre las partes, con respecto al suministro del servicio de agua a favor de la sociedad actora desde el mes de septiembre del año pasado. Se rechazan las excepciones de falta de caducidad y prescripción. Se declara parcialmente la falta de derecho y en consecuencia parcialmente con lugar la acción formulada por la empresa Electrónica Leyden S.A, entendiéndose denegada en todo aquello que no se acoja expresamente. En consecuencia se condena al Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, al pago de los daños económicos que incurrió la empresa actora ante la ausencia del suministro de agua potable, entre el período comprendido de octubre del 2009 a septiembre del 2012, suma que se determinará en etapa de ejecución de sentencia con prueba idónea, así como el reconocimiento de indexación de conformidad con el artículo 123 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia que los fije en concreto y hasta su pago definitivo. En lo demás se declara sin lugar la demanda. Son ambas costas a cargo de la vencida.

Rolando Porras Mejías Ricardo A. Madrigal Jiménez Rodrigo Alberto Campos Hidalgo PROCESO DE CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR: ELECTRÓNICA LEYDEN. S.A CONTRA: A Y A